Education, Professionalism and the Quest for Accountability

Hitting the Target but Missing the Point

Jane Green

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For Matthew and Rachel

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I need to make it clear, however, that in the interpretation and translation of Aristotle that I offer in this book, I lay no claim to originality. My reading derives from interpretations of several Aristotelian scholars. Those to whom I am most indebted and would like to acknowledge are (i) Elizabeth

Anscombe who emphasizes the perception/discernment—*aesthesis*—of an agent in a specific context that is recorded in the minor premise of the agent's practical syllogism; (ii) David Wiggins who effectively continues and develops that theme; (iii) Myles Burnyeat who helpfully explains the crucial role of *ethismos* (ethical formation) in the development of the intellectual virtue, *phronesis*, practical knowledge; (iv) Sabina Lovibond who draws attention to the close relationship between *ethismos* and *phronesis* and also to the element of uncodifiable knowledge which lies latent in both of these ideas; and (v) John McDowell who, in drawing on the German idea of *Bildung*, helps to explain how the 'second nature' that develops through a human being's upbringing (*Erziehung*) is not a 'mysterious gift from outside nature', but an 'actualization of some of the potentialities we are born with'.

Earlier, abridged versions of many of the central themes of this book appeared in the following articles from which I am grateful to John Wiley and Sons Ltd, and to Taylor and Francis, for granting permission to reproduce extracts:

2004	*Educational Philosophy and Theory* (Special Issue: *Work-Based Learning*), 36 (5), 549–562: 'Managerial Modes of Accountability and Practical Knowledge: Reclaiming the Practical'
2004	*Journal of Philosophy of Education* (Special Issue: *Conformism and Critique in Liberal Society*), 38 (3), 511–525: 'Critique, Contextualism and Consensus'
2009	*Ethics and Social Welfare*, 3 (2), 115–130: 'The Deformation of Professional Formation: Managerial Targets and the Undermining of Professional Judgement'. http://www.informaworld.com.

For reasons of space, I have had to omit three appendices originally included in my doctoral thesis. The thesis is available at the Institute of Education, London University, or at Senate House Library, London University, and is titled *Beyond Managerial Rhetoric: Reclaiming What Is Practical, Personal and Implicit in the Idea of Educational Accountability.*

Introduction

> Vague and insignificant Forms of Speech, and Abuse of Language, have so long passed for Mysteries of Science; And hard or misapply'd Words, with little or no meaning, have, by Prescription, such a Right to be mistaken for deep Learning . . . that it will not be easie [sic] to persuade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are Covers of Ignorance . . .
>
> John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689)

I.1 PROFESSIONALISM AND ACCOUNTABILITY: SOME TOPICAL QUESTIONS

As a result of the *marketization* of the public sector, a 'corporate' form of governance has become the predominant model for judging how professionals account for themselves at work. The rationale of this model, dictating its mode of operation, grounds the idea of what now counts as public accountability: 'to set clear targets, to develop performance indicators, to measure the achievement of those targets, and to single out, by means of merit awards, promotion or other rewards, those individuals who get "results"'.[1] Aptly described as a 'market-inspired managerialism' by Pádraig Hogan (1995: 226), this kind of accountability is also referred to in the literature as 'New Public Management' (usually abbreviated to NPM; see Section I.5 for more details).

I question the widely accepted assumption that this NPM, 'managerial' model of governance[2] provides the best *practical rationality* for achieving *public accountability*. I argue that any careful scrutiny of the underlying rationale of this model will show how and why it may be expected, paradoxically, to make professional practices *less accountable* and, when applied to education, *less educative*.

There are numerous critiques of 'managerial' modes of accountability in the literature, which highlight the deleterious effects which these modes have had on professional conduct and practice. Many who write on such matters and argue for a renewed notion of professionalism draw on the Aristotelian idea of *phronesis* (usually translated as practical knowledge, wisdom, or prudence), the ability to make practically intelligent and ethically responsive judgments in particular circumstances. So why tread the same terrain that others have trodden so ably? What more is there to be said that has not already been said?

The examination I make of present accountability policies and of their impact upon practitioners in educational and other public institutions goes

beyond current literature by referring my criticisms back to the *philosophical* foundations of NPM. Exposing the systematic defects of what I refer to as 'the managerial model' of practical rationality that rests on these foundations, and carrying Aristotelian exegesis beyond familiar debates about practical wisdom (*phronesis*) into the structure and applicability of Aristotelian practical reasoning, I make the case for an alternative model, one that complements, rather than undermines, professional judgment. There is also a bigger case to make: the need for a reassessment of the kind of practical and public rationality through which professional practitioners are expected to account for themselves.

The overarching aim of the book is to show how and why NPM, through its various 'managerial' modes of accountability, has the potential to distort, systematically, *the structure of practical reason of agents* precisely when it is needed: those moments in practice when wise decisions and judgment are called for.

So the scope of the book is intended to relate to professional practices other than those specifically concerned with education *per se*. Included will be the notions *professional education* and *professional practice*. Drawing on the idea that professional education and preparation for professional practice are 'inextricably linked' (Drummond and Standish 2007: 1), I aim to show the crucial role which *professional formation* plays in a practitioner's readiness and capacity to make wise practical judgments. When we understand better the structural, antecedent role which *formation* plays in decision-making, it will become clear why target driven practices can undermine that readiness and capability.

"But how will anyone know what to do unless they have explicit, prescribed targets to aim for?" To meet this challenge, I draw on the model of practical reasoning which Aristotle's account of practical reason and deliberation in the *Nicomachean Ethics* offers. I suggest that *professional* formation be modelled, analogously, on the account of *ethical* formation which Aristotle provides. Just as someone with ethical formation (*ethismos*) is able to find, through practical reasoning, the 'right' ethical end to act on, I show how the non-explicit ('tacit', 'implicit', 'non-articulate') practical knowledge of someone who has developed professional/occupational formation enables that person to find the local and immediately relevant end (what needs to be done there and then) and the appropriate act in the name of that end, simultaneously.

Crucially, in the neo-Aristotelian model I draw, the structure of an agent's practical reasoning is grounded on the *telos* (i.e., purpose, goal) of the chosen *métier*, (implicitly) understood by that agent as aiming at some fundamental, human good (such as health, safety, education). It is this 'good' (however inarticulately understood) which helps the agent find his or her 'end' (goal). This kind of goal, unlike a target or objective already pre-specified, is summoned implicitly from a fusion of the agent's own personal formation (*Bildung*) and occupational formation, which, together, comprise the complex notion *professional formation*.

The neo-Aristotelian model of practical rationality which provides for agent accountability that is advocated in this book points to *the structure* of practical reasoning necessary if 'ends' are (i) to be conducive to public well-being and (ii) to uphold the virtue of *responsibleness*—quite different from the idea of simply *having responsibilities*.

Although written from the perspective of the UK, the problems I uncover are not just peculiar to the UK. They need to be situated within a wider, global social-economic context. For they can be found in any country that, as a result of public service policy reform, has adopted similar economic liberal ('neo-liberal') policies and management models to those adopted in the UK.

It might seem strange, though, as Walter Kickert (1996: 168) remarks, that, in the 1970s–1980s accountability reform movement, so many different Western states (governments and administrations in the US, New Zealand, Australia, and various European countries), which differed in 'economic, socio-political, cultural, constitutional and institutional senses', adopted a seemingly similar kind of NPM to reform their public services. But those countries in which 'restructuring' of the public sector took place all shared one thing. After the oil crisis of 1973, they all experienced economic recession and saw themselves as increasingly uncompetitive in international markets.

Educational systems and teachers were in large part held to be one of the causes of economic failure: they were not producing 'a workforce with the appropriate skills for a rapidly changing world' (Kickert 1996: 2). The drive for public service reform therefore opened the way for a widespread growth of interest in 'educational management'.[3] Schools in many countries have been restructured in similar ways, in order to meet ever-increasing demands for *accountability*. The introduction of Standardised Assessment Tests (SATs) which measure pupil attainment is just one of the trends which have been shaping educational policies in OECD countries since the 1980s in the name of accountability. SATs in the UK are similar in intent, principle, and practice to assessment tests conducted in the US, mandated in the 'No Child Left Behind Act' of 2001. They are used as a way of assessing how teachers account for themselves and of how schools 'perform' in performance league tables.

But teachers are not the only ones to have been subjected to 'performance' accountability measures. Over decades of reform, implemented across the whole public sector and generated by a policy agenda of 'raising standards', all those who are employed in professional contexts have found themselves working in a competitive and, at times, punitive culture (e.g., the 'naming and shaming' of 'failing' schools, hospitals, social and welfare services, etc.). This culture is characterized by the development of target-setting systems for staff, linked through 'performance management' systems, to 'payment for results' and 'continuing professional development' schemes. A special discourse sustains these schemes which I call *managerialese*. Professionals

are now managed within an environment that draws on a management discourse originating in systems organization theory, and in business, commercial, and industrial plant enterprises. *Managerialese* is the language in which professional practitioners must now account for themselves. Whenever anyone, working in a school, hospital, police force, or social service, refers to 'quality assurance', 'continuous improvement', 'benchmarking', 'audit control', 'transparency reviews', 'performance indicators', 'driving up standards', or 'delivery' of a target, they are talking *managerialese* and owe a debt to the influence of management gurus and consultants, such as W. Edwards Deming, in the second half of the last century (see Travers 2007). New management theories, widely disseminated in business schools and later adopted by various governments seeking public service policy reform, brought 'private' business management methods—and its accompanying specialized technical language—into the public sector.

One might have thought that the vocabulary of *managerialese* more suited to the production processes of factories than 'human-service and people-intensive jobs' (Ingersoll 2003: 32) like teaching, policing, social work, nursing, or medicine. But it would be wrong to assume that such a mechanistic, production-oriented discourse marginalizes questions of ethical import. Judging from the emphasis *managerialese* places on the promotion of 'best practice' or 'excellence in practice'—by the use of *words* that evoke ideas of virtue—present models of management will claim to have virtue on their side. Here, though, as Richard Pring (2004b), quoting Wittgenstein warns, we should beware of 'the danger of the bewitchment of the intelligence by the use of language'—a language which can so easily separate 'means' and 'ends', simply through stipulating a 'statement of aims, broken down with a finite range of measurable objectives or targets' (164), as the means to the achievement of those aims. Like Pring, I have learned to adopt a wary stance towards managerial rhetoric. For although the rhetoric may speak of 'good' or 'excellent' practice, it *depersonalizes* the notion of responsibility by framing the arena of public accountability around private sector idealizations of 'good' management: goal definition, efficient resource allocation, financial performance and competition (Power 1994a: 302).

In the seventeenth century, John Locke (see the quotation which heads this chapter) puzzled over what he referred to as 'hard or misapply'd Words with little or no meaning'. Is *managerialese* a language 'with little or no meaning'? Does the vocabulary of *managerialese* 'apply' to anything of substance? It is both necessary and timely to pose such questions. There have been a sufficient number of years now—several decades—to assess the empirical consequences of the target-driven 'audit' society which present accountability mechanisms have brought into being. We have seen how managerial forms of regulation, legitimized in the name of accountability, integrate with wider audit and quality assurance accountability practices of performance management. What, then, is the verdict? Have we arrived at an ethically convincing form of accountability which the public can trust?

There is now mounting evidence of professionals being prevented from meeting the ethical demands of their *métiers*. Those now called 'professionals', although they can demonstrate (through an audit trail) that they are meeting the necessary criteria in accordance with prescribed benchmarks and indicators of professionalism, they are not always acting *professionally*! Teachers, for instance, are 'teaching to the test', to ensure the reputation of their school in 'performance' league tables and, inadvertently narrowing the curriculum against their better judgment;[4] police are 'policing to targets', in their efforts to meet political objectives and, in the process, making inconsequential arrests, in order to hit the required number of 'arrest' targets;[5] social care workers and hospital managers are manipulating or 'hiding behind the data' in order to be awarded good inspection ratings or to meet shorter waiting list targets.[6]

That professionalism and accountability can so easily become decoupled from each other in this way is taken as a starting point of enquiry. There is a puzzle to unravel. Two senses of professionalism appear to be at war with one another. For although the practitioners I have described are clearly meeting the required, formal standards on paper—the effort of which endorses their 'professionalism' within the terms of a 'performance management' model of accountability—they appear to be acting in ways which fall far short of what might ordinarily be considered to be *professional* standards. Denied, however, the necessary discretionary authority to act in ways thought appropriate for the context, practitioners will tend to rationalize their actions in terms of their institutional obligations and 'play the game'.

In all the cases described previously, hitting the target has become *an end in itself*. Given the pressures they face, however, it is not surprising that practitioners become complicit in such a dysfunctional system. In a 'high-stakes' accountability system where agents are judged favorably only by conformity to prescribed, pre-specified targets, and where an institution's reputation is judged primarily on 'performance' league table results, there is little option (often for reasons of personal economic necessity) but to work to pre-specified targets (Green 2008).

Teachers, then, for example, may find themselves 'struggling with authenticity' (Ball 2003b: 33) as a result of the '*values schizophrenia*' which they experience—a potential 'splitting' between the teachers' own judgments about their students' needs, on the one hand, and the demands for institutional 'performance', on the other. This 'schizophrenia' occurs 'when commitment and experience within a practice' are 'sacrificed for impression and performance' (33). Ball's analysis of the status quo invites us to ask exactly how such a fractured agency is able to nurture a robust sense of moral and personal responsibility.

The study I make traces these problems back to entrenched assumptions held about the kind of practical rationality now considered appropriate for organizational practices. Because schools, colleges, universities, hospitals,

local councils, probation and health services, and other public institutions appear, superficially, to be like other large, complex organizations, such as corporations or industrial plants, some managers presume they can be managed and controlled in the *same* way, as 'production-oriented organizations' (Ingersoll 2003: 218).

There are some who work in the fields of management, policy, and organization studies, however, who are now prepared to discuss the many problems which target-setting practices can cause (e.g., see Brooks 2007: 36). John Seddon (2007), a management consultant who has spent years helping local government organizations to improve their services, is adamant that the target culture is destroying the very service ethos it is meant to foster. He argues tirelessly against the managerial principle, endemic in so many public sector organizations, of judging staff by their adherence to protocols and the requirement to justify deviations from those protocols. This sort of 'accountability' is no accountability at all, he argues (216–217). It is worth quoting at length his account of when he was asked in 2003 to give evidence to a Parliamentary Select Committee (in the UK) which was carrying out a review of the impact of targets on public-sector performance improvement:

> I was the only person . . . who recommended that targets should be abolished. Nearly everyone gave evidence underlining the shortcomings of targets, but stopped short of the logical conclusion, that they should be got rid of, because they believed . . . 'there is no alternative' . . . People who work in public services want to focus on their purpose. Police want to prevent and detect crime; doctors and nurses want to treat patients . . . Managers . . . drive their workers mad. Their purpose has become . . . 'meet the targets' rather than 'improve the work'. This is why public sector workers get disheartened, demoralised and sometimes obstructive. But it is nothing to do with 'producer interests'. People are prevented from focusing on purpose by the requirement to concentrate on what the hierarchy has decided is important. (204–205)

As Seddon points out, there will always be those who remain wedded to the idea of targets to measure 'performance' and 'productivity', whatever arguments are provided to show their limitations.[7] But if this study I make does nothing more than undermine hitherto unexamined assumptions that the *only* way to deal with issues of public accountability and trust is to put faith in the kind of accountability mechanisms now promoted, then I will have accomplished one major purpose in writing this book. Until policy makers wean themselves off their faith in the idea that only the measurable is manageable, we are a long way off a new accountability paradigm becoming a reality (Green 2009a).

Seddon's persistent criticisms, however, have started to have an influence at a political level (in the UK). Some of those who were once enthusiastic apologists for the 'target culture'[8] now concede that target setting as a

routine practice proves too crude a mechanism for ensuring quality of service[9] and may lead to perverse incentives which distort professional judgment in the here-and-now of real-life work practice.[10] In the UK, a government 'select' committee report on school accountability concluded that teachers feel 'coerced and constrained' by the current system of regulation.[11]

With regard to *educational* targets, the National Audit Office (in the UK) reported that there is 'no quantified evidence' that exam targets work[12]: people may believe the use of rewards and sanctions in the public sector are effective, but evidence of 'gaming' or strategic behavior by agents undermines claims commonly made for the effectiveness of targets. The report concluded that simplistic targets distort teaching. In corroboration with the Audit Office's findings, articles with captions such as 'Targets fail our kids'[13] can appear with frequent regularity in the British media. According to a recent report by a committee of MPs, accountability practices which recommend the wide use of targets are 'deeply flawed': they cause barriers to focusing efforts on what *matters*: 'For too long, schools have struggled to cope with changing priorities, constant waves of new initiatives from central government, and the stresses and distortions caused by performance tables and targets'.[14] So it is no surprise that various politicians of all persuasions, now realizing the limitations of targets, have in fact called for 'targets to be slashed' or, alternatively, have pledged 'more trust', 'freedom', or 'autonomy' for professionals.[15]

In general terms, such pledges could be seen as a vindication of the critique I offer of the way the present accountability mechanisms have so far shown so little trust in professionals—especially teachers. At last, acknowledgment of the problems which micro-management causes! It might, therefore, be thought that the argument of this book comes too late. For not only has there been a political retreat from the *dirigisme* of early, 'New Right' forms of NPM, but also, as I have just indicated, a very public distancing by various policy makers and politicians from reliance on targets as a key managerial tool for reform and accountability.

To this, I respond by asking how far these recent pledges, concessions, and admissions which various policymakers and politicians have made take us. What guarantees are there, even if targets are 'slashed', that the same basic 'managerial' models, grounded on the same theories of human nature, motivation, agency, and practical rationality—borrowed from economic 'rational choice' and institutional 'principal-agency' theory—will not still be applied to measure the accountability of professionals? With the same model intact, just 'slashing' a few targets can only lead, as Seddon (2007) amusingly puts it, 'to doing the wrong thing righter' (8). In Chapter 9, we shall see why "trusting professionals more" is not just a simple matter of shedding a few targets.

So, in spite of recent public admissions, regarding the potentially dysfunctional aspects of target-setting practices, nothing has radically changed. Nobody is really going to the root of the problem. The reductive, impoverished language of *managerialese* that sustains these practices—a

language of 'outcomes', 'indicators', 'performance criteria', and such like—still prevails. The impression given is that all that is needed to make public sector services run better is simply lessening 'red tape', as the practice of reducing bureaucracy and target setting is often called. Many attempts have in fact been made to do just this. In the UK, The Gershon Efficiency Review, conducted by Sir Peter Gershon in 2004, was commissioned to review waste and excessive bureaucracy in the public sector;[16] in similar vein, the Regulatory Impact Unit and Better Regulation Task Force was set up to reduce excessive regulation.[17] In Australia, the Productivity Commission started initiatives to combat 'red tape'. In the US, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) provided a target of the number of hours needed to meet the Paper Reduction Act (PRA) targets (see Travers 2007:143–144). In the wake of the recent economic recession, talk of 'efficiency savings' and 'cutting bureaucracy' by politicians has re-invigorated the debate about 'red tape'.

But those who rail against 'red tape' miss the point. It is not bureaucracy *simpliciter* that is the problem. It is something else that critics of the 'Managerial State' (Clarke and Newman 1997) are up against, something so ideologically powerful that managerialism within organizational practices remains as yet, in spite of numerous criticisms directed at it, persistent and invincible (Green 2003, 2004b; see also Held 2004).

So although there have been encouraging signs that politicians are now moving on from thinking that centralized targets are the only way to make public services accountable (at one time there were 600 targets, micromanaging every aspect of service delivery in the UK)[18], there has been no sign, to date, of any renouncement of the mode of practical reasoning which has given targets the mandatory power they have so far enjoyed. And in spite of a political rhetoric about devolving more power, freedom and autonomy to schools, to allow curriculum flexibility, there remains still a barrage of centralizing and somewhat contradictory measures relating to how and what to teach and how teachers are to be 'held to account'. The increasing emphasis in educational institutions, as elsewhere in the public sector, on *management and leadership* (see Preedy et al. 2003; Ranson 2008) only provides opportunities for an extension—and certainly not a contraction—of managerial approaches.

One of the basic assumptions of this book is that every professional domain—if it is to have any identity at all—will have institutional core purposes and internal criteria of practice. It is from these purposes and criteria that an agent understands *the point* of what they are meant to do and, also, what *matters* in that profession. MacIntyre (1999) raises a question pertinent to this very point and which has haunted my thoughts throughout the writing of this book, whenever I have questioned the way in which micromanagement shapes and structures organizational activity: ' . . . might there be types of social structure that seriously threaten the possibility of understanding oneself as a moral agent and so of acting as a moral agent?'

(314). In the rush to make institutions measure up to the requirements of audit and financial accountability, have we lost sight of what it is to account for oneself in ethical, and not just efficiency and productivity terms?

Although I raise questions about *reform* here, this is the place to make clear that a nostalgic or Luddite polemic, directed against change, modernization, or management, has never been my intention. Nor is the book against the idea of accountability *per se*. The motivation for writing this book started with a philosophical project to understand how we have ended up with the accountability system we have. Before new attempts are made to evolve different systems of accountability, it is important to understand what has gone wrong in our present system.

The purpose of this introductory survey has been to lay bare the kind of issues which need further discussion:

(i) How is it possible, even when practitioners are conscientiously 'hitting' their targets, that the quest for accountability can still remain elusive? Why has the 'performance' model of accountability, with its clear, 'transparent' accountability lines and grounding principle of pre-specifying outcomes and targets as goals, produced the kind of anomalies and unintended consequences it has? For wasn't one of the problems, before the introduction of 'New Public' managerial modes of accountability, precisely the *lack* of explicitness that defined the work ethos of so many professions—the so-called 'secret garden' which the public service reformers in the second half of the last century accused professionals of wishing to perpetuate, for their own self-interest?

(ii) If, as it seems, the pursuit of explicitness (conveyed through a rhetoric of 'transparency') fails to ensure accountability (as in unintended, unwanted consequences), what, then, are the limits to what can, or should, be made explicit in an accountability system? Given that practical knowledge contains implicit components of knowledge, just how 'transparent' can one make practices without undermining trust in practical knowledge?

I.2 ARGUMENT OF THE BOOK

The story I want to tell seeks to get beneath the evidence we see around us in so many professional fields, of wasted effort, wasted resources, and wasted ideals.[19] I try to understand better the relationship between the three ideas I set out as follows: we are in search of a *practical rationality* that will translate into a *public rationality* which, in its turn, secures a form of *public accountability* that deserves our confidence.

With that end in view, we shall explore the constraints that are now placed on the practical reasoning of agents at work and the way in which

a quite different kind of practical rationality, one I associate with the work of Aristotle (to be referred to as the 'Aristotelian model', in contrast to the 'managerial model'), might be deployed by agents in their own practice. This is a practical rationality which will not demand of agents that they prove their sense of *accountableness* by demonstrating that some explicit, pre-specified 'success criteria' have been met. I shall argue that, ironically, it is precisely the emphasis now placed on *explicitness*—in the name of transparency and accountability—that is so problematic.

But in drawing on Aristotle to help elucidate issues relating to professionalism and accountability, it might still be asked, what relevance has Aristotle to the twenty-first century? First, one of the many complex things that Aristotle invites us to consider in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE) is what it is to make a responsible, practical judgment. This is surely a timeless, philosophical question that cannot be irrelevant to the kinds of questions we may want to raise *now* about the nature of decision-making in policy and political arenas.

The way of proceeding which I propose depends on a philosophical hypothesis about an *ideal of public rationality*, drawn mainly from the work of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. But his *Politics* serves as an inspiration too (once we have extracted those elements which, from a modern liberal perspective, we find offensive, e.g., slavery, the non-emancipation of women, etc.). In the *Politics* (1331b 30–32), for instance, we find the following thought: 'Sometimes the right end is set before men, but in practice they fail to attain it . . . '.

Aristotle is interested in an agent's making a right decision and keeping to it (NE 1151a 32–b4) and in why it is that some men 'act contrary to right reason' (NE 1151a 21) or 'go wrong' (NE 1104b 30–34)—that is, 'fail'—simply by not acting in the *public interest*.[20]

In Aristotle, therefore, I suggest we find a model of practical reason that is entirely appropriate for studying matters that relate to public rationality and accountability. A neo-Aristotelian approach to problems of welfare and public service should not, therefore, be automatically written off as either 'conservative' or as 'irrelevant' to our age. On the contrary, as Martha Nussbaum (1992) shows, such an approach aligns itself well with the pluralist ideals of a liberal polity and the promotion of responsible citizenship (see also Knight 2007). Bent Flyvbjerg (2001), although not focusing specifically on issues to do with public policy, has developed what he calls a '*phronetic*', Aristotelian approach to questions relating to social science. The problems which social scientists now face, he suggests, require consideration, choice and wise judgment (57). Like Flyvbjerg, I am interested in how to situate these three things in social contexts and I, too, draw on the Aristotelian idea of *phronesis*. But my focus is on the relationship between professionalism and accountability, and what factors enable—or disable—an agent's capacity to act as a responsible agent. My aim is to 'mine' those insights in Aristotle's work which relate to deliberation, practical reason,

and wisdom, and to use those insights to understand better the nature of professional responsibility. It is this concept which is going to give us the link to re-ethicize the notion of accountability and to reclaim it from the world of audit.

Aristotelian conceptions of practical rationality and agency also offer us an *ideal of a kind of living*, a way of being congruent with our ordinary lives. In Charles Taylor's phrase, we might characterize the Aristotelian approach as an 'affirmation of ordinary life' (1989: 14ff). We shall see how far the model of practical rationality that is now promoted within organizational life has diverged from the 'ordinary' way in which human beings tend to deliberate, make choices, and demonstrate that they are responsible agents in their own life.

I shall attempt to show what we may lose by this divergence—*practical intelligence* and the virtue of *responsibleness*, for instance. According to Aristotle, knowledge of how to act and the goals to pursue in particular contexts cannot be acquired by the internalization of policy 'guidelines' or rules found in a training management manual recommending approved principles for decontextualized notions of 'good practice'. For knowledge of how to act in practice and what to pursue as goals emerges out of a person's *formation* (Lovibond 2000), to be explained in Chapters 5 and 6, and cannot be separated from the complex processes through which that person develops as a human being, living and working with others. Personal formation is co-extensive with occupational and professional formation. Moreover, in the Aristotelian picture, the question will not normally arise of an agent's alienation from practices of work, the problem of 'values schizophrenia' I mentioned earlier. For someone's purposes arise from what John McDowell (1996: 24–28) would say is that person's 'second nature'—or *Bildung*—which becomes integrated in his or her own sense of self.

Nowadays, the possibility of such professional integration is highly problematic. Consider how teachers are now expected to demonstrate their professionalism. A teacher, in order to meet present demands of accountability will be obliged to bring about ends that are *already* decided upon (Pring 2004a: 123, 204). These are ends, to be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, exported into our public sector from the dominant discourses of management theory and neo-liberalism. An agent's 'accountability' now, ultimately, lies in fulfilling the audit and funding requirements which secure an institution's survival (Nixon 2005)—the conditions of which are set by politicians and policy-makers.

I.3 SOME POINTS OF CLARIFICATION

First, the philosophical doubts I raise here about the place of responsibility in managerial cultures are not to be taken as veiled criticisms, to the effect that those who work in managerial cultures are acting *irresponsibly*. The

opposite of a non-robust sense of personal responsibility is not *no* responsibility at all. The claims that I make about the constraints placed upon individual personal responsibility are *conceptual* points that turn on wider, complex philosophical problems having to do with how we understand the nature of *agency* and how we view the relation between *personal freedom* and *personal responsibility*. When a teacher has to make a decision in those 'now, just-this-minute' (Loukes 1976) moments, her practical reasoning may be compromised by decisions already made for her by others who may have no practical experience at all of teaching—and who cannot know what is going on in those 'moments'. This problem I highlight here goes much deeper than an argument about teacher 'autonomy'. The problem goes to the heart of how we might understand the nature of practical judgment.

Second, I am not saying that managers set out deliberately to diminish the responsibility of all those whom they manage. On the contrary, the rationale that grounds the idea of, say, 'performance management' is based on the idea, quite sincerely held, that this form of management will make practitioners *more* responsible and *more* professional (Clarke et al. 2000: 66).

As Alan Cribb points out, the notion of professional responsibility is now 'taken very seriously' (Cribb 1998: 19). The problem is rather that the notion has become 'ethically empty' (23). The predominant values are now the instrumental goals of demonstrating 'institutional' success, or 'getting things done effectively' (21–23). Without the benefit of other 'substantial' educational goals, the notion of responsibility 'collapses into the ability to do things'. So my point, like Cribb's, is conceptual and institutional. It is not, in the words of Zipin and Brennan (2004: 30), to be taken as an 'indictment' of the *sincerity* of individual people.

Third, I need to make clear how I see the relationship between educational accountability and public accountability. The problems of *educational accountability* that I identify may be understood as a microcosm of the problems thrown up by the more general idea of *public accountability* as that is now understood. Education is only one among many public service institutions for which some management practices are inappropriate. The micro-management of many teaching activities has helped cement the thought in public consciousness that *acquiring certification* is the same as *education*. What might this same micro-management have inflicted on other professions?

Fourth, a note about the concept *accountability*, itself. Although the questions accountable *to whom* and with respect *to what* can always be raised in particular contexts, the concept of accountability, as we shall discover, is resistant to precise definition. At a conceptual level 'accountability' is not a unified concept. It is closely related to the concept 'responsibility', itself a complex concept. At the level of policy governance, however, 'accountability' has come to have a very specialized meaning, one associated with 'satisfactory audit'. The concept as we now use it has been co-opted from financial contexts where accounts are audited. *Audit*, according

to Michael Power (1994a), is to be understood as an umbrella term for the ever-expanding practices and 'technologies' of managerial accountability. No longer the prerogative of financial audit, when applied to institutions, audit now functions as a constitutive rationalizing principle of social and economic organization and accountability. To describe an institution as *accountable* now means that the institution has produced auditable accounts of all its activities and is run efficiently.[21]

But this particular sense of 'accountability', which refers specifically to the management of auditable and efficiently run institutions, rides on the back of a second, broader meaning of 'accountability' (Charlton 1999), one allied to the ethical idea of *being answerable to*. There is often slippage between these two meanings, detectable whenever politicians remark (following some wrongdoing or malpractice brought to light in the public domain) that "lessons must be learned". What "lessons" are being appealed to when this is said? There is clearly more than 'audit' at stake here. Acknowledgment of some kind of human error or failure that has taken place, and demands for those responsible 'to be brought to account', appeal not just to legal or financial redress on behalf of the wronged parties but also to an *ethical* sense of accountability—as in, "Who should have been watching out to prevent this happening?"

Christopher Winch (1997) comes at the problem of accountability in a different way, but one which triangulates well with the two interpretations of accountability just given. His analysis provides us with a basis for assessing the accountability of a particular public institution, such as education, or the health service. Winch demarcates two distinct, but related, aspects to accountability: (i) 'constitutive accountability' is 'concerned with whether or not goods or services that should be provided actually are provided and to what level'; and (ii) 'qualitative accountability' is 'concerned with seeking ways in which what is provided can be provided in a better form' (61). The issues I raise in this book range over both these aspects. It is the form in which education is now provided that hampers teachers in finding the pedagogical space and time to teach in ways that provide rich educational experiences for all their pupils/students.[22] The pressure placed on educational institutions to link 'performance'—and pay—to examination results, as a mark of teacher accountability, comes at a cost—an 'abandoned generation' (Giroux 2003). We should not be surprised that the so-called 'problem of NEETs'—those *not in education, employment, or training*—has arisen within the present accountability culture (see Green 2008). There will of course be many complex social, economic, and political reasons why some adolescents and young adults fall by the way, educationally, through exclusions, expulsions, or truancy. But one thing is certain: this is a group which clearly has found little educational nourishment in schools obsessed with testing, certification and 'performance'.

Finally, a note about the concept 'professionalism'. The immense literature generated around the subject of professionalism bears out the idea, often

quoted, that 'a profession' is an 'essentially contested concept', especially when applied to teaching. For Winch (2004), not only is 'there is no coherent definition of professionalism that can decisively distinguish some occupations from others on the grounds of knowledge, skill or ethical commitment', but it is also his belief that teachers do not fit comfortably into conventional definitions of professionalism (186). David Carr (2000), on the other hand, argues strongly that there is a sense of professionalism which distinguishes occupations such as 'medicine, law and (arguably) education' from 'trades, manufacturing industries, mercantile enterprises', chiefly because the former 'are implicated in questions and considerations of a particular ethical or moral character which are not to the forefront of, for instance, plumbing, joinery, auto-repair, wholesale or retail and hairdressing' (39).

With such a complex and disputatious literature as background, how, then, to proceed? Perhaps the first thing is to respect the historicity of the terms *profession*, *professional*, *professionalism*, and the late-comer, *professionalization*. These terms do not appear to be static or fixed. They are constantly being re-evaluated in the light of changing social, political, and economic considerations. There have, for instance, been many re-workings of the term *profession* since the time when it referred only to the traditional 'vocations': the ministry (divinity), law, and medicine (see Bottery 1998; Burbules and Densmore 1991; Hoyle and John 1995; Perkin 2002), a time when an unambiguous set of criteria would define what counted as a profession: the acquisition of a specialized body of knowledge, the completion of formal qualifications and examinations based upon a set period of education, the existence of regulatory bodies with powers to admit and discipline members, and so on. Because medicine has no trouble in meeting all these criteria, it tends to stand as a paradigm, against which other would-be professions are measured.

Now, the boundaries of once clearly defined professions have blurred, not only as a result of shared electronic data systems of communication, but also as a result of policy initiatives to promote 'joined up governance', or 'networks of partnerships' (see Goldsmith and Eggars 2004). The *professionalization* of managers and the *managerialization* of professionals now means that the labels 'a manager' or 'a professional' do not necessarily represent two distinct (and possibly antagonistic) social groups (Exworthy and Halford 1999).

There is one more point to mention, which we shall pick up again in Chapter 9: it was assumed at one time that those who entered professions, 'professed' to serve the public. It was this implicit 'ethic' of promising—to abide by a 'public service ethos'—that (at one time) legitimized the professions' claims for 'professional autonomy'. In the 1960s, however, many challenged these claims. The professions, it was said, were self-serving, ideological monopolies.

More recently, some organizational theorists wonder if the idea of a 'profession' should even be retained: far better to focus on whether people

are effective in what they do (see Koehn 1994: 4). Running parallel to this view, though, is the idea that many occupations, once deemed only 'quasi/semi/para' professions, now have the right to seek full 'professional' status. So, although older, paternalistic conceptions of professionalism have been overturned, the notion of *professionalism* itself has clearly survived and is now very much part of the vocabulary of the modern management practices, with the emphasis placed on the idea of *service provision*.

One effect of understanding professionalism in terms of *service provision* is that it opens up the scope of what *counts* as 'a profession': any 'service provider' who 'performs' competently may now be considered a 'professional', doing a 'professional' job. Some traditionalists will balk at this new gloss on 'professionalism', whereas others will welcome the democratization of the term 'profession' which 'market' forms of accountability have inadvertently brought about. For this latter group, a return to a more exclusive concept would be considered a regressive and an elitist move.[23]

So how do I use the terms 'profession' and 'professionalism'? First, this book, focusing on the philosophical relation between professional formation and practical rationality, must leave aside many important issues relating to the historical, political and sociological notions of a 'profession': struggles over the conditions, knowledge, power, and legitimacy of professional authority; reward in relation to professional status; unequal power relations between professional and client—see, for example, Becher (1994: 165), Freidson (1994, 2001), Koehn (1994), Perkin (2002), and Young (2007) who touch on some of these issues. But, although I circumvent such issues, I use the terms 'profession' and 'professionalism' with a special emphasis (explained further in the following section, in the summary outline for Chapter 6) which aims to go some way to addressing, even if obliquely, some of the challenges which those who seek, in spite of the evident erosion of once-clear boundaries between the various professions, to defend the category of a 'profession'. Whatever erosion has taken place need not be something to lament, so long as the core, inner purposes of individual professions remain, and so long as those who work in their chosen *métier* understand the role they play in safeguarding or promoting those core purposes.

The challenge, as Geoff Whitty (2001) sees it, is to find 'a professionalism for new times', 'collectivist forms of association' which may act as 'a counterbalance not only to the prerogative of the state, but also to the prerogative of the market' (170). Whether such a concept is available or even possible is debatable. But if we think an 'ethic of public service' should still feature in a 'professional agenda' (170), then we need to focus on the kinds of things which drive an agent's practical reason to ends that will promote or preserve human well-being—towards what Aristotle calls an agent's aiming for 'the good'. From Aristotle we shall learn why ethical responsiveness and moral imagination should be considered constitutive elements of a public accountability system.

I.4 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

Chapter 1 sets the scene by looking at the nature of the dispute between *the critic* of, and *the apologist* for, managerialism, and tries to understand what justifies the feelings of concern the critic has about our present public accountability system. The main focus will be the problems that now beset education. The kind of pressures which teachers at all levels now face in a culture of hyper-accountability and 'high-stakes' testing, and the detrimental effects which these things have had on their pupils/students, is used as a microcosm of the kind of difficulties which practitioners in all sorts of professional domains now face at work.

Chapter 2 traces the rise of managerialism and the political ideological pressures which have forced older forms of administration to give way to NPM. The idea that NPM should be considered a 'neutral accountability technology' is rejected. To understand both why the notion of accountability came to be associated with explicit *target-setting practices* and why *performance management* came to have such a hold on politicians' and policy makers' strategic planning, this chapter re-visits the 1960s, when the idea of 'management-by-objectives' emerged, the declared aim of which was to make the work of institutions and those who work in them more explicit than they used to be.

Chapter 3 analyses the worth of the ideal of transparency as that ideal is now interpreted by policy-makers, and shows why micro-managing, 'rationalizing' practices which promise 'transparency', paradoxically, become opaque to the demands of public accountability. Used now mainly as an instrument of control and prescription, the chapter argues that appeals to 'transparency', as that ideal is now understood, undermine professional judgment.

Chapter 4 engages with the work of others who have written about the relation between responsibility and accountability and then shows, via the notion of *answerability*, how these two concepts may be held together in order to preserve a robust notion of individual personal responsibility in complex organizations. Drawing on the work of John Lucas (1993), in his book *Responsibility*, I introduce the virtue of *responsibleness*, a virtue of self-regulation and of vigilance, with a view to re-introducing it again as a crucial part of the argument presented in Chapters 5 and 6 where a neo-Aristotelian concept of professional education/formation will be elucidated.

Chapter 5 builds on the conclusions of the previous chapter and sketches a model of practical rationality to rival (what I call) 'the managerial model', an alternative model founded on Aristotelian tenets of deliberation, practical reasoning and judgment. The 'Aristotelian model' of practical rationality, unlike the managerial model which seeks always explicitness in practice, respects the role which implicit knowledge plays in the development of the formational virtue, *responsibleness*. The sketch is designed to challenge present assumptions that, in the absence of explicit, pre-specified targets an

agent's practical rationality is either deficient or else 'non-accountable', and therefore untrustworthy. The chapter ends by considering how an Aristotelian understanding of practical reason may become the chosen instrument of people working with a sense of collective responsibility and deflects possible objections to such an idea.

Chapter 6 draws on Aristotle's account of *phronesis* to provide a neo-Aristotelian, praxeological justification for a non-managerial model of practical rationality and public accountability. Only practical reasoning analogous to the kind of *phronetic* reasoning which Aristotle insists is essential to good deliberation and judgment—*métier-phronesis*—is able to respond to the various contingencies which crop up in everyday working life and demand judgment appropriate to the context. In the use of *métier*, the chapter extends the notion of *professionalism* beyond traditional conceptions of professionalism and familiar debates about the criteria which define 'recognized' professions. By seeking to make the notion of professionalism more inclusive, I argue that there is a general point at stake here, to do with how, in a much larger domain than that which concerns conventional understandings of professionalism, practical judgments are still expected to be made in contexts where human goods, aspirations, needs, and well-being are considerations.

Chapter 7 attends to what the apologist for the status quo might say in response to the Aristotelian understanding of practical rationality and public accountability. I show the kind of problems to be expected when attempts are made to codify practical knowledge, according to the universal principle of *making the implicit explicit*. The chapter provides a thorough examination of the well-meant—but ill-conceived—idea, crucial to all NPM accountability systems, namely, that *the more explicit professional practice is made, the better.* The fallacy in this claim, and the damage which belief in it has caused, will be explored. The book shows the limits of what can reasonably be made explicit in professional practice if we expect practitioners to use their practical reason to make intelligent practical judgments. Much of what gives a practice its sense and its integrity—its internal standards of excellence, worthwhileness and purpose in the eyes of those who practice within it—will be uncodifiable and lie beyond explicit speech or words.

Chapter 8 continues the theme of Chapter 7 by analyzing further the logic of the principle of *making the implicit explicit*. Recent attempts to *propositionalize* practical knowledge—according to the slogan 'knowing how is one species of knowing that'—are examined and the claims made are shown to be problematic. *Contra* modern, neo-Taylorist inspired moves to eliminate implicit/tacit knowledge, the chapter shows, following Aristotle, that the nature of practical knowledge is *sui generis* and irreducible, without residue, to propositional knowledge. This is the philosophical ground on which the overall argument of the book stands or falls. Examples of neo-Aristotelian practical reason at work are given: how a teacher's *Bildung*,

fused with her professional formation, shapes her idea of what is *good* and *possible* in the classroom. This, the chapter aims to show, is a teacher seriously engaged in a reflective process of *métier-phronesis* (see Chapter 6). Through her practical reasoning she brings her practical, personal, and implicit knowledge to *this* or *that* particular context in order to make a wise decision appropriate to the context.

Chapter 9 answers the managerial assertion that it is only by institutionalizing mechanisms of distrust within institutions and requiring individuals to meet precise and explicit performance criteria, indicators, or targets, that we shall achieve a public accountability that is trusted. Against that, I argue that faith in any public accountability system, however sophisticated it aspires to be, rests ultimately on the ordinary formational, personal virtues of professional responsibleness and trustworthiness. This chapter shows that strong managerial control, through holding people to targets, is in part a substitute for trusting the judgment of practitioners.

The argument about public accountability, in the end, reduces to the question of what kind of practical and public rationality has a better chance of preserving the kind of trust which each one of us needs when we look to professional practitioners to act on our behalf—whether it is education, health, or safety. The neo-Aristotelian approach, unlike the managerial approach, favors a contextualist, local, and situated practical rationality over one which makes claims to be 'objective', universal, and transcontextual. The choice rests between two very different models of public accountability, grounded on two quite different models of practical and public rationality: which of these two models has more chance of maintaining trust in the accountability of our public institutions and in promoting the kind of professionalism capable of honoring that trust?

I. 5 A NOTE ON TWO TECHNICAL TERMS

Our present public accountability system generates a plethora of acronyms and terms of art. In advance of everything else, it is necessary to review, briefly, two terms: (i) 'managerialism' and (ii) 'New Public Management' (NPM).

Eric Hoyle (2008) succinctly describes 'managerialism' as a form of 'management to excess, management as an ideology embodying the view that not only *can* everything be managed but that everything *should* be managed' (286). However illuminating this description is, it does not tell the whole story. The fact that we are able to refer to just one term, 'managerialism' must not lead to oversimplification. The same thing needs to be said about the second term, NPM. We can see why this is so, straightaway, when we learn that there are *two* interconnected strands to NPM: *managerialism* and *new institutional economics* (Rhodes 1997: 48). The former 'stresses: hands-on, professional management; explicit standards

and measures of performance; managing by results; value for money . . . the '3E's' of economy, efficiency and effectiveness; the latter 'introduce[s] incentive structures (such as market competition) into public service provision. It stresses . . . greater competition through contracting out and quasi-markets; and consumer choice' (48).

Because these two 'strands' are so inextricably interconnected (see Ferlie et al. 1996), it is, therefore, not uncommon to find that in the literature one of the terms is used to help explain the other:

> Many governments are promoting managerialist policies in the public sector and education. Managerialism is a complex concept . . . [the trend is for an] increased . . . control of managers over professionals in several professions, especially health, social services, and education. This new approach is known as *new public management* (NPM) (Coleman and Earley 2005: 189).

NPM is a complex phenomenon that has evolved over time, incorporating and encompassing various aspects of organizational and management or 'rational agency' theories, often in tension with each other. Coming on top of the methodological and theoretical tensions which exist between neo-Taylorist management practices and Human Resource Management (HRM) models (developed in reaction against rigid, management control and regulation strategies), there are at least *four* overlapping but separate models of NPM (see Willmott 2002: 67, who identifies 'Efficiency Drive', 'Downsizing and Decentralization', 'In Search of Excellence', and 'Public Service Orientation' models).

In so far as one can simply its meaning, however, NPM is often used as shorthand to refer to the application of market mechanisms, those associated with neo-liberal ideologies,[24] to key aspects of organizing the public sector—the civil service, education, transport, housing, health, prisons, social care, and so on. NPM refers to a set of broadly similar forms of public sector restructuring doctrines which dominated the bureaucratic reform agendas in many OECD group of countries[25] from the late 1970s to 1980s (Hood 1994; Aucoin 1990; Pollitt 1990).

Although it is largely agreed in the literature that there is no one single accepted reason or cause why NPM—and the managerialism it brought in its wake—caught on as a global trend and was universally disseminated throughout 'advanced liberal' societies, it is clear that the aim, wherever it was introduced, was to implement radical change in the governance and administration at all levels of public sector organization.

At this point we need to return to the term 'managerialism'. For it is only on the strength of the on-going process of 'managerialization' (Clarke et al. 2000: 8–9) that principles of NPM can continue to be implemented in public sector organizations. The 'managerial mode of coordination' (Clarke and Newman 1997: 21), typical of any public sector organization, will now

show itself in the organization's adoption of principles of NPM. I list some of the key ones here:

- explicit standards and measures of performance;
- greater emphasis on output controls;
- the break-up of monolithic into smaller, manageable units;
- shifts to greater competition in the public sector;
- the stress on private sector styles of management practice.[26]

The last two bullet points represent some of the most visible changes that have taken place within the public sector since the advent of NPM. It was the 'managerial' practices found in private industry which helped shape the model upon which a new form of public accountability was to be based. It is from *that* use of 'managerial' that we have the idea of *managerialism*.

For our purposes what more do we need to know at this introductory stage about NPM and its relation to managerialism? Perhaps we should ask, what is meant to be so *new* in NPM? The mission of those who sought in the early 1980s to introduce NPM into the public sector was to replace the 'inefficiency' of older, pre-managerial bureaucratic forms of administration (Langan 2000: 158)—often referred to as 'bureau-professionalism' (see Clarke and Newman 1997: 66; Richards 1992)—with the presumed 'efficiency' of the market and with methods of management used in private business (Lawton 1992: 145), such as 'quality assurance' schemes. This shift in institutional arrangements altered perceptions of who had the right to make and implement decisions. In this connection, many whose professional formation developed in 'older', pre-NPM days suggest that the rhetoric which now saturates management directives cannot be separated from the 'wider political strategy to reduce the autonomy possessed by professionals' (Grace 1995: 19).

Anything else 'new' worth mentioning? Perhaps the fact that 'collegial relations' have been replaced by an ethos of entrepreneurialism and by managerial structures of governance which make sure the demands of accountability are met—in the form of 'transparency reviews', 'assessment exercises', and the like. Rigorous external accountability systems are used in tandem with performance-related resource allocation funding mechanisms.

Dunleavy and Hood (1994) helpfully distinguish NPM from the 'Old Public Administration' it replaced:

> The term 'new public management' (NPM) . . . is used mainly as a handy shorthand, a summary description of a way of reorganising public sector bodies to bring their management, reporting and accounting approaches closer to . . . business methods . . . making the public sector less distinctive as a unit from the private sector . . . By contrast, traditional public administration . . . was built on the idea of a highly

> distinct public sector 'group' and . . . general . . . rules governing . . . conduct . . . (9)

The 'Old Public Administration' model was said to stifle individual and corporate initiative, encourage a culture of dependency, and interfere with the free market (Newman and Clarke 1994: 16–19).[27] So NPM's 'newness' partly consists in the fact that NPM techniques were purposely devised to dismantle and 'unlock the bastions of bureaucratic and professional power' (Common 1995), associated with Old Public Administration.

Nothing stands still, though, in the world that NPM and managerialism, together, have created.[28] Since Dunleavy and Hood wrote in 1994 there have been changes. In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, faith in markets has been dented and, according to Janet Newman and John Clark (2009), there has been a 'reinvention' of 'publicness'. In an earlier analysis made of the relationship between markets and NPM, Newman (2005: 86) sees the shift towards reliance on managerialism and marketization, the twin elements of NPM, as collapsing into different 'dynamics', and considers whether what is referred to as the 'modernization' of the public services now represents

> a new form of managerialism which takes us beyond the reform programmes of the New Public Management and its ideological roots in the New Right . . . [T]he negative consequences of organizational fragmentation are being recognized in the discourse of 'joined-up government' . . . [M]odern business practices . . . emphasize the idea of collaboration between strategic partners . . . (2000: 59)

How promising is this 'new form of managerialism' likely to be in the future for meeting expectations of public accountability? How honest are its new discourses and rhetoric? The next chapter will examine some of the concerns which the critic of this 'new form of managerialism' holds. Are the concerns justified?

Part I

Starting-Points

Ideas, Ideals, and Ideologies

1 From Concern to Doubt, From Doubt to Critique

> [I]n philosophy, the first difficulty is to see the problem is difficult . . . [W]hen our inquiry is finished . . . we shall have come to see a complicated structure where we thought everything was simple . . . we shall have become aware of the penumbra of uncertainty surrounding the situations which inspire no doubt . . . we shall find doubt more frequently justified than we supposed . . .
>
> Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (1980 [1950]: 11)

1.1 INTRODUCING *THE CRITIC* OF, AND *THE APOLOGIST* FOR, THE STATUS QUO

How might expressions of concern about the way present public accountability policies play out in practice—in particular, those which impinge on matters that relate to education—acquire the necessary 'normative grip'[1] to be recognized as well-founded, legitimate criticisms of the status quo?

I ask this question because an apologist for the status quo (henceforth: 'the apologist') may dismiss the criticisms offered by a critic of the status quo (henceforth: 'the critic') as merely personal prejudice, unwarranted expressions of dissatisfaction, or else as Luddite worries about change and modernization. In the absence of an independent, neutral, epistemological vantage point from which the perspectives of both critic and apologist may be judged, how do we distinguish a mere complaint or grumble from justified criticism of the status quo? This is the subject of this chapter—how we adjudicate between two opposing view points of the status quo.

In the Introduction to this book, I referred to the many critiques of present accountability practices available in the literature. But consider now the following critical utterances, sourced from a wide cross-section of people[2] who express real disquiet about the way present accountability practices impinge on education:

(i) "I went in to teaching for the same reason as I joined the police—community service. I enjoy working with young people, and still do, but . . . [i]n the past seven years I haven't seen anything get better. I have seen funding cut, my school struggling from one financial crisis to the next, and the Government spending millions of pounds on this or that strategy . . . " (secondary teacher)

(ii) "The demand, especially the paperwork is taking too much time . . . unnecessary amount of recording and processing . . . everything relating

to assessments distracts my focus from other things . . . " (primary teacher)

(iii) " . . . so much about teaching is about relationships . . . and what sorts of things can you measure? By and large, things that don't matter." (special needs teacher)

(iv) "[Institutional] Autonomy brings you freedom on the one hand, but you could end up losing it on the other, because the government starts throwing targets at you." (college principal)

(v) " . . . excessive bureaucracy, ridiculous deadlines and unconvincing consultation processes keep duplicating with each new initiative . . . Heads are asked to do far too much where the interest of the child is not the primary motive . . . more and more targets . . . the DfES does not need heads like me. They need a . . . compliant . . . group of heads who will . . . think within the parameters they are allowed." (head teacher)

(vi) "Something is clearly going wrong when many deputies with more than five years' experience simply don't want to apply for headship." (governor of a primary school)

(vii) "I feel the role of the head . . . is too vast, too pressurised . . . emotionally and professionally . . . Too much is about Sats, ticking boxes, finding evidence and the endless, often pointless, paperwork. That conflicts with doing what is right for the children." (deputy head teacher)

(viii) "I have a vice-principal whose main duty is to prepare for inspections, and another teacher who spends four days out of five collecting data for quality assurance, and therefore only teaches the equivalent of one day a week. That is two people away from where they should be, supporting students and teachers. Yet quality comes from teachers in classrooms . . . When I came into the job I was involved with students every day. Now I spend most of my time dealing with documents and spreadsheets." (college principal)

(ix) "We as parents want to know our children are improving but we would like less emphasis on targets. There is concern among parents that we are spending too much time [on] tests . . . and education is suffering as a result." (spokesperson for the National Confederation of Parent-Teacher Associations)

(x) " . . . to cultivate enthusiasm for literature . . . that does need time. Reading is more than a skill, it's a companion for life. If there is too much targeting and testing, you kill the purpose of exercise . . . the people who want to test subjects like English . . . don't really understand them . . . so there's an attempt to turn them into something that can be measured." (author)

These are not voices of the academy, offering well-researched, scholarly critique of the status quo. They are voices of those actively engaged in

schooling, or else in activities closely related to education. The overall impression given is that the present system of public accountability marginalizes or deforms important aims, values, and ideals of education. Such views, let us say, represent the concerns of *the critic* of the status quo. In the critical concerns listed we may detect demoralization, puzzlement, exasperation, resignation, alienation—but mostly, I suggest, frustration—frustration that nothing at all countervails against the dominant canon of what passes now for public accountability.

In confrontation with the critic stands *the apologist* for the status quo. Unlike the critic, the apologist sees the various 'managerial' modes of governance imported into the public sector from the private sector and run in accordance with principles and practices of 'New Public Management' (see Introduction, Section I.5), as having successfully reformed the way in which public accountability is understood and public service institutions, such as education, are managed.

What is the philosophically interesting story that spans these two viewpoints—*de*formation, on the one hand, and *re*formation, on the other? How do we decide between these two opposing positions?

The apologist has management theory. The critic has anxieties: how to express concerns without being seen as an opponent of change, or as against the idea of accountability *per se*. One of our tasks will be to transform the critic's anxieties and concerns into a justifiable stance of critique—concerning the worth or legitimacy of our present public accountability system.

So what does the critic have to say? It is the critic's opinion that the system of accountability now operational not only compromises teaching practice but also worsens the educational experience of students. We should take it seriously how many of those quoted previously express the thought that some of the things which 'matter' in teaching cannot be *measured* or *set as targets*. Above all, the critic is at odds with a 'performance' culture in which only measurable returns are valued.

The critic wants to appeal to something beyond this culture. But no 'professional sub-culture' (Sockett 1990: 248) is permitted to stand apart from managerial rationality, whether in the domains of administration, research, admissions, assessment, teaching, or student learning. So far as education is concerned, values drawn from business and management theory now permeate the rational planning of all educational institutions, as determiners of standards, pedagogy, and curricula (Marshall 1999: 152). For the critic, there is a further problem to consider. The dominant paradigm of *practical rationality* now operational also defines *public rationality*. So dominant has an ethos of managerialism become throughout the public sector that not just educational institutions, but hospitals, medical centers, social service offices, police stations, fire stations, prisons—all those institutions we refer to as *public institutions*—now have to comply with managerial rationalities.

Some critics (e.g., Standish 2001: 514; Elliott 2001: 207) describe the status quo as 'totalising'—precisely because it is so difficult to find any

space beyond the managerial technologies of audit and the discourses of *marketization* to generate an alternative vision to the kind of public rationality that now characterizes industrialized, 'advanced' (Rose 1996) liberal democracies.[3] So the critic who seeks to fight the presumptions of the present educational culture has a daunting task. To criticize managerial accountability is to question the legitimacy of the political, as well as the educational, status quo.

What does the apologist want to say here? Are the concerns expressed in the quotations I cited earlier to be dismissed as *mere complaints*? Will the apologist say the critic harbors unreasonable fears about modernization and change, or even a nostalgic desire to return to an imagined 'golden age' status quo *ante*?

Well, how much Luddism or nostalgia can one detect in those voices? I do not detect either of these things, myself. But suppose that I am wrong and the apologist is right. Then the apologist, *being* an apologist, ought to be able to provide positive evidence to support the status quo. What is this evidence? 'Criterial' indicators of 'performance' and 'quality assurance' will be offered as acceptable government 'benchmarks' for standards in education. But don't these beg the question?

So we arrive at an impasse. Whereas the critic sees present education accountability policies as impeding educational practices and narrowing the educational experience of pupils/students,[4] the apologist, in contrast, sees those policies as creating a 'transparent' public accountability framework in which 'good teachers'[5] are rewarded and incompetent ones identified as 'failing' teachers. Note the 'elation' reported by Woods et al. (1997: 133) of one head teacher, interviewed after a 'successful' school Ofsted inspection. Here is someone who clearly responds well to the 'performative' culture: "I'm thrilled! . . . what a sense of relief it was to know we're all going in the right direction . . . I am doing my job . . . I feel I can manage it." As Gerald Grace (1995: 23) notes, there exist many head teachers who are drawn by the image of managing director.

One thing is clear. Two different value-frameworks are now at war with one another, each working to different conceptions of public accountability and professionalism. The dialectical difference between the two positions has been summed up in the following way:

> The new public management has been seen by critics as a market-based ideology invading public sector organizations . . . But it has also been seen by others . . . as a management hybrid with a continuing emphasis on core public service values, albeit expressed in a new way. (Ferlie et al. 1996: 9)

In later chapters we shall see that the argument between the critic and apologist touches on other matters besides the role which the market plays in the organization of public service institutions. Among one of the main

concerns the critic has, is the institutionalization of a managerial practical rationality, now operational within educational practices and which *prioritizes* budget, audit, and productivity considerations in strategic decision-making. How much room will there be within this organizational framework for ethical and educational values to inform choices? Such values will become invisible—or so the critic fears.

The thing we begin to see emerging here is a conflict between two completely different outlooks which, in one way and another, will occupy us over many chapters:

(i) *It is of over-riding importance, within the present conception of public accountability, for managers to have the decisional power over all those who work in organizational practices.*
(ii) *If one is to function as a moral agent in practical contexts one does not abdicate or delegate to others one's decision-making powers.*[6]

Of course, it is somewhat artificial to reduce all the possible kinds of criticisms of the status quo to what 'the critic' believes, and equally artificial to pit 'the critic's' views against those of 'the apologist'—as if there were no points of agreement between them.[7] But my purpose here is to concentrate on broad general questions to do with professionalism and accountability as these two concepts are now understood in educational contexts. In what follows, 'the critic' will give the *anti-managerial* viewpoint, whereas 'the apologist' will give the *managerialist*'s in a version that embraces principles of NPM.

How to advance from here? First, surely we need to say some more about the very thing that lies at the heart of the dispute between the critic and the apologist—*the status quo*. Let me try to show now, with the minimum of detail, just how complex its nature is. At this point the reader may first wish to refer to the Introduction (Section I.5) of the book, and the brief discussion we had there of the terms 'managerialism' and 'New Public Management' (NPM).

1.2 THE COMPLEX NATURE OF OUR STATUS QUO

It is widely agreed by political commentators that the development of a *performative* culture is no accident. It is an integral part of the (on-going) Western, neo-liberal, reforming, and 'modernizing' project[8] which seeks to re-construct existing society along free market lines for goods and services. The 'late capitalism' of neo-liberalism that has evolved, as a result of this project, is to be sharply distinguished from the social democratic political settlement that preceded it.[9]

In spite of the many decades that have passed since the modernizing project was initiated, professionals still work in what remains a broadly

'neo-liberal' economic paradigm. The emphasis might have changed from a 1980s rhetoric of 'competitive tendering' to one of 'partnerships' and 'stakeholder' relations (Newman 2000: 46–47), but this does not mean NPM disappears. It is 'updated':

> . . . in education, as in other spheres . . . most of the premises of neo-liberalism, many of its objectives, and almost all . . . methods of delivering them [still remain]. Competition, choice and performance indicators remain the unchallenged totems of policy . . . Markets and managerialism hold sway. Structures and methods remain largely unaltered. Only the rhetoric of what schools and colleges can and should produce changes . . . (Fergusson 2000: 203)

There is thus no relaxation of the managerial regime. On the contrary, the process of managerialization has been *intensified*:

> . . . the modernization process . . . takes the pursuit of improved performance much further than the marketised version. In schools and colleges, this is manifest in the target-setting, goal-oriented approach . . . the pursuit of performance-related pay rewarding teachers whose pupils achieve targets . . . . . a range of measures . . . to provide deterrents to, or removal for, underperformance. Fast-track dismissal of 'failing' teachers . . . (211)

So where have we got to? Even if 'managerialism', defies precise definition and even if its features mutate under the influence of political and economic pressures, continuities remain. The term does unify a recognizable sequence of efforts to implant three key organizational ideals, the '3E's'—namely, *economy*, *effectiveness*, and *efficiency*.[10] An organization working towards implementing these ideals will always be judged on how well it is moving towards its objectives or targets.

The cult of 'economy, efficiency, and effectiveness', in their modern forms, hark back to Frederick W. Taylor. Taylor, working in industrial settings in the US, thought that if workers' tasks were defined and controlled and their rewards were linked to output then the 'most efficient ways of working could be structured by the manager' (Bennett et al. 2003: 64). In recent decades, neo-Taylorism[11] has taken the form of a drive to convert the public sector to cost-accounting methods associated with private industry. It is from this deliberate aping of private business methods that *management-by-objectives* emerged as a predominant feature of organizational life and from which the 'target culture', as we know it, developed. (We return to this in the next chapter when we shall be tracing the way in which managerialism gained ground.)

The idea behind management-by-objectives is that, if there are clearly defined targets to which people work, then 'value-for-money' ('economy')

and 'outcome productivity' ('effectiveness') will be achieved ('efficiency'). The effect tends to be always the same. In the original Taylor-inspired factories, and then in the schools that were forced to adopt Taylorist methods in the nineteenth century, and now in organizations and social practices that run their 'performance management' incentive and pay structures in accordance with neo-Taylorist principles, the first thing that happens is an incessant demand for production of *records*. Teachers, for instance, are constantly asked to write policy statements or reports about their activities (Callahan 1964). Pressure is put on agents to be explicit about all their activities, for this is how they demonstrate their sense of accountability. As we shall see in Chapter 3, this is how the *ideal of transparency* has now come to have a special technical meaning, one concerned not so much with the virtue of honesty but with the perceived need to provide clear record keeping for audit and data collection purposes. What managers now think of as 'good management' means that 'efficiency' not only has to be done, but also has to be seen to be done (Olssen et al. 2004: 191).

In some organizations, neo-Taylorist approaches, driven by the Total Quality Management (TQM) movement, appear to have given way to more 'humanistic' forms of management, as advocated by the introduction of Human Resource Management (HRM),[12] a reaction against the hierarchical, 'line-management' of neo-Taylorist bureaucratic practices. But this change of emphasis is not as clear-cut as one might think.

At the juncture where these two forms of management theory overlap there are tensions which managerial rhetoric masks. For the tight 'line-management' and hierarchical structures of bureaucratic authority so characteristic of Taylorism can still be found within organizations that ostensibly promote 'flexibility', 'networking', 'horizontal' lines of authority, and 'distributed' leadership (Hatcher 2005). So in spite of a rhetoric of 'empowerment', 'ownership', 'creativity', 'innovation', and 'collaboration' which HRM advocates, many school organizations still follow a style of management based on non-democratic forms of management and control.[13] There is one clear over-arching aim (of the management team) which shapes the school ethos: to secure 'value-for-money'. It will become clearer soon what is meant by 'value'.

1.3 CONCERN HARDENS INTO DOUBT: COMPLEXITY MASQUERADING AS SIMPLICITY

To say that the picture just described is complex is an understatement. Consider all the different models of management that may be at work at any point in time—among them the performance management machinery which measures agents' achievements, together with the complex structure of corporate-market forms of governance which now define the formal accountability relationships in educational institutions. Consider, next, the

pressures on institutions to pursue 'quality assurance' which create even more managerial goals to be implemented in order to inculcate practices of performance management, feedback, measurement, and comparison. Consider, lastly, the ascendancy of 'school effectiveness' as an influential discourse. The 'school effectiveness movement' tries to 'identify the levers which need to be operated in order to make a school more effective' (Barber and White 1997: 3). Together with its related discourse, 'school improvement', schools are constantly being asked to 'ascertain whether differential resources, processes and organizational arrangements affect student outcomes' (Stoll and Mortimore 1997: 9).

To all these things now add the entrepreneurial activities which educational institutions are urged to pursue as they extend their 'stakeholder' accountability relations and devolve work through 'outsourced' agencies or Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs). Such things all owe their existence to the influence of the managerial-market-inspired principles and ideals embodied in NPM. Have other valued ideals—ideals not allied to NPM practices—been marginalized in the face of the sheer weight of this system? If pressed to answer this question, a common reaction of apologists is to say,

> "Look, *what matters is what works*. We set standards. We make people accountable. Everything is transparent. We can see when standards and objectives have not been attained or reached. What more do you want?"

Well, what *does* the critic want? The critic wants an outside reference point—to understand, and then an explanation why, *in spite* of such 'reassurances' given, and in spite of the elaborate techniques and practices of auditing, accounting and performance management designed to secure public accountability—*the concerns just do not go away*. In fact, disquiet increases.

Russell, in the citation which heads this chapter, suggests that the non-philosophical stance is to rest content with what seems 'simple' to the eye. The philosophical route he recommends is to seek out a 'complicated structure where we thought everything was simple' and not to become complacent about what appears to 'inspire no doubt'.

In a similar vein, the critic could say that the mantra-maxim, 'what matters is what works' may look innocuous—or 'simple', in Russell's sense—and ideology free, but it hides precisely what the critic seeks to know:

> "We need to know more about the ends to which the work is being put and who is deciding on what counts as 'what works', and, lastly: what does it mean if we are prevented from asking questions such as these kinds of questions?"

To the critic, it is not clear that market-business strategic goals, and the aims of education are sufficiently similar or comparable with respect to the

ends which each strives for; nor is it self-evident that modes or procedures deployed for assuring accountability in a business context can be sensibly transferred to educational practices.

So speaks the critic. The doubt remains. But perhaps the critic overlooks the sincerity of the apologist—who is sure that there is *nothing* to doubt. As Gunter (1997) points out, the whole tone of the 'Management Industry' (as she calls it)

> evinces confidence . . . you are exhorted into trusting . . . systematic processes . . . proformas to fill in, checklists, key questions for action, do's and don'ts, simple diagrams showing clear relationships . . . Very rarely do you see education management writers expressing doubt . . . (3–5, 48)

1.4 THE CONFIDENCE OF THE REFORMERS: OUT WITH THE OLD, IN WITH THE NEW

The critic wants the apologist to appreciate the complexity which lies behind the bland mantras of the 'Management Industry' and then to re-assess and question the worth of the rationale upon which the 'Industry' is grounded. So we could put the apologist through some Russellian paces: can the apologist's confidence be shaken by being made to see a 'complicated structure' where 'everything was [at first] thought simple'? Let us hear the views of Sir Michael Barber, Founder of the US Education Delivery Institute and one of the chief architects of the re-structuring and reform of the British educational system when Head of the Delivery Unit in Blair's government. In his post at the Delivery Unit in the UK he had a direct line of accountability to the Prime Minister and was responsible for the oversight of the implementation of priority government targets for health, education, transport, policing, the criminal justice system, and asylum/immigration. Between 1997 and 2001 (in the UK) he was also Chief Advisor to the Secretary of State for Education on School Standards. So, with regard to education, what might he say in reply to the criticisms made so far?

Most likely he would say we are on the way to achieving a 'world-class' education system (Barber 2001). Over the many decades of educational reform, according to Barber, the teaching profession has evolved through four main teaching paradigms, which I reproduce here, and now occupies its optimal place, at the fourth or culminating stage. The early excesses of central government interference, he assures, have been curbed.[14]

In his analysis, Barber cross-tabulates two axes—(i) *knowledge-poor versus knowledge-rich strategies* and (ii) *'external' prescription versus professional judgment*. These are the four stages of 'evolution':

(1) Uninformed professional judgment (knowledge-poor/professional judgment)
(2) Uninformed prescription (knowledge-poor/external prescription)
(3) Informed prescription (knowledge-rich/external prescription)
(4) Informed professional judgment (knowledge-rich/professional judgment)[15]

Here, however, the critic will say there is a gap between rhetoric and reality. For there is no mention in Barber's vision of what Hargreaves (1994a) calls the 'elusive aspects of teachers' work . . . the personal, moral, cultural and political dimensions of teaching' (xiv). Knowledge is presented in simplistic, formulaic terms which equate to no more than 'being informed'. Barber's confidence rests on the technical definitions he gives for 'professional', 'judgment', and 'knowledge': 'knowledge-rich' is 'knowledge' that passes the tests and rigors of performance management, informed by standards set by *managerial criteria* of what *counts* as 'knowledge-rich'. By whose criteria was it decided that all the teachers in (1) were 'knowledge poor'? It is Barber's overwhelming faith in his own worldview that supports his concept of a 'world-class' education.

In *Making Sense of Education Policy*, written in 2002, Whitty, predicting the direction in which the teaching 'profession' might develop, wrote,

> One reading of the dominant tendency in England is that the government is preparing . . . leading cadres of the profession for leadership in the new marketised culture of schooling, while . . . others [will] have to be prevented from perpetuating an outmoded social service version of professionalism, even if they can not be won to the new agenda. (71)

Some years later, we are in a position to see the accuracy of his prediction: new forms of professionalism have now taken the place of older ones. More and more, the machinery of performance management accountability, along with the regimes of performance-related-pay review and appraisal, now aligns itself with initiatives for 'leadership-management'.[16] It is no wonder that those who had doubts about new ways of understanding *headship* as *leadership-management* had no option but to 'face the challenge of adjustment or flight from the field' (Grace 1995: 23).

'New' forms of professionalism have ousted 'old' ones. Where Barber sees 'new' professionalism as re-professionalization, the critic, on the other hand, wonders whether teachers are being duped into a 'false' professionalism or 'collaborating in their own de-professionalisation' (Bottery and Wright 2000: 124–128).

The debate about *re-professionalization* and *de-professionalization* is not just a matter of academic interest. These divergent views pose fundamental questions regarding the nature of teachers' work (Hargreaves 1994a: 14–15): (i) has the pursuit of *professionalization* been achieved at

the cost of making a teacher's job more routinized and deskilled? (ii) Does the intensification of work which accompanies teacher professionalization (in Barber's sense) mean that teachers have less discretion to exercise their professional judgment? How can the apologist fail to see a paradox here?

Suppose that the apologist readily concedes that there is indeed more complexity than was at first apparent. Is the apologist then getting into the spirit of the Russellian idea that a first step towards deeper understanding is to see that something that appears 'simple' may in fact be complex? At last, the critic may think, a small concession has been won! No. The apologist has not gone by the right route to seeing the complexity. Russell meant that the right kind of questioning about what presents itself for inquiry should start in *doubt*. In the same spirit, Charles Sanders Peirce (1887: 67), whose views we shall discuss soon, appeals to the idea of intellectual 'irritation' to explain how inquiry is driven forward.[17] The apologist experiences no 'irritation' in Peirce's sense. In Russellian terms the apologist is still at a stage of seeing only the 'simple'.

1.5 IS 'BEING CONCERNED' SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR GROUNDING A CRITIQUE OF THE STATUS QUO?

Does the critic overstate the case and protest too much? After all, as Grace (1995) says, many of those now in 'leader-manager' positions 'see no necessary opposition' between their own sense of professionalism and their efforts to promote educative and pedagogical values in the new market 'trading conditions for schools' (43). Just the reverse. Perhaps, then, we should side with the apologist here? Let us see.

One paradigm of teaching has displaced another. So those teachers trained in a different culture from that in which the 'new' professionals received training, if they were to survive, had to accept

> new roles, new tasks, new functions and, in the end, to absorb partial redefinitions of their professional selves . . . As re-definition takes hold . . . it is likely to be deep-seated and long-lived. The greatest sources of resistance will have departed, redefinitions will not be easily undone, and as young recruits who never knew any different move up the hierarchy, the consolidation of the new regime can bed in. (Fergusson 1994: 113)

What is implied here, fatalistically, is that, once the last critical voices are subdued, time itself will sort out the argument between the critic and the apologist. Resignation, retirement, or death will sort it out. There is evidence that this process has already started.[18] But as of now, the concerns of the critic are still felt too strongly to be ignored. So the question to press is this: how *seriously* should we take the deeply held concerns of someone?

Very seriously, Bernard Williams suggests (1995: 239). What is felt to be wrong should never be ignored. It is not the feelings as such that matter. It

is the substantive values they represent and embody. Identifying the objects of our concerns helps locate the *reasons* for the felt beliefs we hold. Such beliefs give good reason, and thereby justify (according to Williams) feelings of concern, 'in terms of our sense of what it is worthwhile in human life, to preserve, and to follow'. The role of reason is to articulate our felt concerns, our 'wholehearted commitments' (Frankfurt 1987), driving them in the direction of a critical doubt *about* the status quo. Knowing which values one 'owns' is the starting point for knowing what is worth 'taking a stand on' (Taylor 1989: 27). The notion of professional integrity is grounded on such an idea. If we feel coerced in any way to abandon our values, and that we have no option but to replace them with others which seem inauthentic, then we not only risk undermining our sense of self (Govier 1993: 110), but we also shall have little to go on, to be able to say that something *matters*. (More of this is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.)

So doubt needs to go 'to work' on something. Genuine concern nourishes it, helping to provide the 'proper material' for 'the intellectual side of judgment' to 'work upon' (Dewey 1909: 52). Doubt provides the precondition for serious inquiry and critique—but not just any old doubt, as we shall see.

1.6 THE PEDAGOGICAL ELEMENT IN DOUBT: *WANTING TO UNDERSTAND BETTER*

We have been trying to understand how it is possible to move from feelings of concern (as in "*Something is wrong here . . .*") to what might be regarded as genuine reasons for questioning the legitimacy of the status quo. Maybe the link between these two things is not obvious. Doubt, I have suggested, plays an intermediary role. One of the roles doubt plays is to understand the status quo (whatever that may be) better. In this way, doubt acts as a pedagogical tool to enhance further understanding.[19] Doubt provides the normative element needed to provoke one from a state of complacency. And there is always the risk that such provocation will erode belief in deeply held commitments (Williams 1993a: 148, 167–169). Faced with 'new data provided by reflection' (Nagel 1996: 200), the course is open to interrogate ourselves about the worth of reasons we hold. This is a necessary exercise for any serious critic. So deeply 'felt concerns' (in Frankfurt's sense) do not necessarily lead to complacency or an irrevocable commitment: self-critique may give rise to self-doubt and, potentially, to the rejection of a long-held belief.[20] The 'simple', as Russell says, may now not look so simple anymore.

The Method of Doubt served Descartes on his route back from skepticism to knowledge and certainty (Williams 1978: 62). But, as Russell suggests, doubt can also serve us in non-Cartesian ways, in much the same way as it serves a scientist whose working hypothesis is based upon doubt

about some current orthodoxy. In this methodological role, doubt helps to disrupt complacency of thought but, *pace* Descartes, may not guarantee certain knowledge. Peirce, as we mentioned earlier, anticipates Russell here by calling on the critical (contrast: skeptical) potential that lies latent in the idea of doubt—namely, the notion of *inquiry*. Dewey, like Peirce, thought that inquiry should proceed from doubt to the resolution of doubt.[21]

1.7 HOW DOUBT JUSTIFIES CRITIQUE

So now, stepping into the shoes of the critic, and departing from the largely spectatorial position I have tried to maintain, let me assert that doubt concerning the status quo is the kind that Peirce, in *The Fixation Of Belief*, called a 'living doubt', a doubt which he refused to equate with Cartesian doubt.[22]

A 'living doubt' is a doubt to take seriously, not one that initiates an idle or arbitrary skepticism of our sense-perceptions. The concerns of the critic are grounded in reasonable doubt. Perhaps, now, we have found the 'normative grip' which we were seeking at the beginning of the chapter. The normative argument of the critic grows from this 'living' doubt. But if it is not to be blocked from the start, or crowded out by doubts that are not 'living' doubts, a certain kind of courage will be needed. The critic will need to resist bureaucratic demands for 'intellectual subjugation' (Amit 2000: 232) to the instrumentality of managerial interests.

So where does the critic start? With what Barnett calls the 'performative lurch' (2000: 40–43) which all public institutions have had to make; with the cult of the explicit—of that which must now be demonstrated, whether appropriate or not; with the practices of 'performance management'.

Russell, acting at times as a stern ghost in the background to guide the argument, has helped us reach the end of the journey I undertook to describe (in Section 1.1). We have moved from a stance of *concern* or disquiet to a stance of *critique* and must now see where doubt takes us in inquiry. The task now is to assess the rationale upon which our present system of accountability is grounded. There is one thing the critic will insist on.

Anticipating Russell, Peirce refers to 'the first rule of reason'. In order to learn 'you must desire to learn and in so desiring not to be satisfied with what you already incline to think'. From this, 'there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy':

'Do not block the way of inquiry'.[23]

2 Quest for Accountability: The Managerial Response

> [L]eaders . . . often propose . . . to new-model the constitution . . . The great body of the party are commonly intoxicated with the imaginary beauty of this ideal system . . . [T]hose leaders . . . become . . . in time the dupes of their own sophistry . . . The man of system . . . is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government . . . [h]e goes on to establish it . . . without any regard either to the great interests or to the strong prejudices which may oppose it . . . But to insist . . . in spite of all opposition . . . must . . . be the highest degree of arrogance. It is to erect his own judgement into the supreme standard of right and wrong.
>
> Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759)[1]

2.1 MANAGERS, MANAGEMENT, AND MANAGERIALISM

We shall begin by tracing the origin of an idea that became prominent in the last half of twentieth century and which some apologists for the status quo still advocate, namely, the idea that 'better' accountability and management entails making professional practices as explicit as possible for audit accounting, monitoring, and training purposes: 'Not only are duties specified, but the means of evaluating the level of their performance is already prescribed, in . . . standards and targets of performance' (Hoskin 1996: 265).

Management is to be responsible for specifying the means (inputs) to achieve desirable ends (outputs)—in the form of measurable objectives, targets, or performance indicators. 'Means' and 'ends' remain, therefore, only causally or contingently related; planning and operational activities are seen as two quite distinct functions. In Chapter 6, we shall explore the idea that, for matters relating to certain kinds of professional judgment, 'means' and 'ends' may need to be constitutively, rather than only causally, related.

Pressure is now placed on professionals to make their practices explicit. The emphasis is always on having to provide 'explicit standards and measures of performance' (Rhodes 1997: 48). What is the rationale for this? The prespecification of ends ('outputs') serves to define the 'quality standards' against which the performance of practitioners will be judged (Elliott 2007: 71–72).

The fact that *explicitness* is now sought from professionals should not be seen as a mere footnote to a larger, historical story about public service and welfare reform. On the contrary, this fact needs to be highlighted, because behind the practice of conceiving professional accountability in

terms of explicitly formalized procedures and measurable outputs, targets, objectives, and so on, lies the assumption that practitioners are not to be trusted to conduct themselves professionally, without managerial modes of accountability to govern them. We shall defer discussion about trust till Chapter 9. The task now is to get on with the story of why it is that practitioners in order to *prove* they are professionally accountable must comply with managerial modes of accountability in the shape of 'New Public Management' (NPM), 'performance' models of management. (In Section 2.6 we shall explore the nature of this compliance.)

One of the most important things to say, before we go any further, is that the work of managers now cannot be equated with the kind of work done in the post-war days of public service (and for roughly four decades after) by those who, among other things, were seen as 'administrators, facilitators and wise counsels' (Bottery 2000: 62). Those we now call *managers* are expected to play a 'directive' rather than a simply administrative or negotiating role (Richards 1992; Bottery 2000). Thus what we now refer to as *management* differs generically from the *administration* once practiced by the 'archetypal professional-bureaucrat' (Pollitt 1990: 49; Gewirtz 2002: 6), a figure in the social democratic, post-war years.

This shift came about at roughly the same time as the eclipse of Keynesian economics. Throughout the 1970s, neo-liberal 'public choice' economic theory[2] (to be discussed briefly in Chapter 9) started to infiltrate most Anglophone governments' policy thinking. By the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberalism and management theory had established themselves as political and economic ideological currents that infused educational reform movements in the UK, US, Australia and New Zealand, and some European countries (Apple 2001; Ingersoll 2003; Olssen et al. 2004: 70). The idea was allowed to grow that there was just one kind of management that would be applicable to all sorts of organizations (McSweeney 1996: 209).

Although we shall be focusing in this chapter on how NPM affected public accountability policies in the UK, the issues we shall be discussing apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to any state in which neo-liberal policies were deliberately chosen in order to replace social democratic forms of governance. So although the events I am going to describe soon refer in some detail to the UK context, the argument of the chapter is intended to have much wider applicability—to those countries which have engaged in their own public service reform. As Stephen Ball (2001b) says, what needs to be understood here is a 'paradigm convergence' of policies with common underlying principles, implemented across an international context (46–48). Wherever implemented, NPM reforms were seen as an opportunity for governments to overturn the post-war social democratic settlement and the kind of bureaucratic administrations associated with that period. The aim was to change the nature of public sector services, at system, group, and individual role levels alike (Clarke and Newman 1997: 60–61; Ferlie et al. 1996: 224).

Education is just one of many public institutions now dominated by a discourse of 'managerial professionalism' (Sachs 2003: 25)—a discourse which so easily degenerates into a jargon-laded, *managerialese*. So dominant in fact has the ethos of managerialism become throughout the public sector that schools, universities, hospitals, medical centers, social service offices, police stations, fire stations, prisons, and so on, all now must comply with managerial modes of accountability. Acting as 'conduits of implementation' (Clarke and Newman 1997: 60) these 'modes' disseminate national policies universally across the whole public sector. Any hope that such public institutions might be managed, in accordance with the democratic wishes of local people, collapsed 'before the onward march of performance monitoring' (Jenkins 2006: 197).

Institutional economics explains such changes as have occurred at the 'micro' level of society in terms of *structural isomorphism*: organizations 'take on more and more of the rationalized aspects of their environment', and 'are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing concepts of what is rational'.[3]

So ubiquitous have managerial regimes now become in the public sector, it would be difficult to find any policy reform which has not drawn on managerial modes of accountability to drive through a project of state transformation (Clarke and Newman 1997: 60–61). The phenomenon we refer to as 'managerialism', then, cannot in fact be understood without an appreciation of the two-fold aim which lay behind the political desire to reform the public services (starting with the Civil Service), and which has since developed into a sustained, on-going political project of re-engineering ('modernizing') public service provision and the infrastructures of state governance. These mutually inextricable aims, I suggest, form the backdrop for any discussion about professionalism and accountability and about what now counts as rational conduct in organizational life:

i. The restructuring of the state
ii. The reform of the public sector

In this chapter we therefore come to the symbiotic relationship that holds between *neo-liberalism* and *managerialism*. We shall see how, together, these two 'isms' have been instrumental in shaping new meanings of professionalism and accountability. In particular, we shall see why it is that anyone involved with education, whether in a teaching or non-teaching capacity, has no option but to be recruited into the ideas, ideals and ideologies of managerial principles and practices.

2.2 THE EMERGENCE OF MANAGERIALISM

Let us now return to the point I raised earlier, the question of why the notion of *explicitness*, transmitted through a managerial discourse of 'transparent

accountability', has come to have such prominence in professional practices. Just why are present understandings of professional accountability so dependent on what has to be made 'visible' in practice (Hopwood 1984: 179; Hoskin 1996: 279)?

To address these questions we shall focus first on a crucial period in public policy history, the late 1960s (in the UK), in which a new idea (promoted also in other nation-states, undergoing their own public service reform movements) was championed—that a more *managerial* approach to organizing the public sector (than had hitherto existed) held the key to raising public accountability standards. (A decade later, the aim would be that a more *managerial* approach would help raise educational standards.) In the UK, the recommendations (to which Section 2.5 will return) of the 'Fulton' Committee in 1968, for reforming the Civil Service, were grounded on just such an idea: 'The development of a new managerial style is, we believe, essential for the Civil Service of the future . . . Great emphasis should be given to the development of managerial skills in staff . . .'[4]

In many countries, 'managerial effectiveness' in 'pursuit of efficiency' (Hopwood 1984)—the 'new managerial style'—was to become the recurring *motif* at the time. Almost immediately, the notion of *explicitness* became crucial to the reform program, wherever it was implemented. The demand for more and more explicitness gained momentum throughout the next two decades. With 'Rayner's Scrutinies', [5] for instance, which were initiated in order to eradicate 'waste and efficiency' (Laughlin 1996: 236–238), words such as 'transparency' and 'scrutiny', suddenly took on new import—'the key to better governance' (Hood and Heald 2006). Explicitness was seen as essential to 'clear relationships between inputs, outputs and performance measures'.[6] The assumption was that if relationships are 'precise, explicit and transparent' then this helps make them 'more amenable to competition and choice' (Mather 1991: 77).

Out of these 'Scrutinies', a policy emerged which came to be known as the Financial Management Initiative (FMI). The emphasis of the FMI was on what defines 'good management'. Launched in 1982, it was later described as being 'at the heart of a change of management style in the public sector'.[7] The two processes I mentioned earlier, (i) the restructuring of the state and (ii) the reform of the public sector, were already under way, and by then *accountability* had become synonymous with 'management accounting'. This, in turn, came to be understood in terms of the best way to achieve *economic rationalization* within the public sector.[8]

The pressure was now on to make practices measurable ("If you can't measure it, you can't manage it") which meant that organizations needed to be 'transparent' in their operation. One of the main aims of FMI was to promote a system in which managers at all levels had 'a clear view of their objectives' and could 'assess and wherever possible measure outputs or performance in relation to these objectives'.[9] The aim was to make practices explicit in terms of 'means' and 'ends'. As the 1980s progressed, a revival of the old 'Wilsonian dichotomy' (see Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman

1981; Common 1995: 136, 139) that advocated a separation of *policy* and *execution* helped towards this aim.

'Principal-agent' theories from the field of institutional economics (Arrow 1985; Levacic 2001; Pratt and Zaeckhauser 1985) provided the rationale for developing more explicit forms of bureaucracy based on this idea of separation. The 'Next Steps' initiative (in the UK), for example, was able to recommend the creation of *executive agencies* to be set up in the public sector.[10] The idea of 'contractorization' (a principle of competitive, 'tendering-out' by agencies) evolved, with special emphasis on *performance targets*: 'There are already signs of . . . a growing pattern of . . . responsibility for discrete and substantial blocks of work, devolved budgeting and explicit agreement over performance targets'.[11]

Here we come to one thing that is really clear in the story of the rise of managerialism and its relation to education: the continuing role of economics, not only in reforming the management of the state, but also in influencing priorities in policy determination and decision making (Hopwood 1984: 171):

> . . . neo-liberal discourses of accountability, efficiency and effectiveness are derived from neoclassical economics and it is this kind of economic theory which has had real effects in shaping the ways in which educational resources are ensured and allocated. (Olssen et al. 2004: 70)

Stewart Ranson (2003) traces the evolution of economic neo-liberal thought from the early 1970s to the late 1990s. In spite of all the many changes which neo-liberalism has undergone since its early triumph over social democratic welfare economics and politics, there have been continuities. It is possible to identify different 'dimensions' of neo-liberalism, ranging from early, 'New Right', 'free market' versions which arose in the US, to later, more complex and hybrid, political versions, such as the 'Third Way', promoted by Tony Blair's 'New Labour' government. But these different phases, Ranson suggests, can be seen as 'extending and intensifying' over time into a recognizable, 'coherent regime' of regulation which has since dominated education in all its many aspects.

It is clear that the 'regulation' to which Ranson alludes could not have happened unless managerialism had dovetailed so well with ideas and ideals which paid court to neo-liberal economic thought. Shattock (2006) appeals to the idea of 'ambiguity' to describe the close relation between 'governance and management structures' (124). But we can see that it is much more than that. Managerialism, as much as neo-liberalism, sits astride the status quo. Their ideals are barely distinguishable. The relationship between managerialism and neo-liberalism is not, I suggest, a marriage of convenience. It is one of ideological attraction, of 'elective affinities'.[12]

To say this is not to deny that many different political and economic forces came together to challenge social democracy and make the case for

the need for new conceptions of public accountability and of professionalism. New democratic ways of thinking, evolving ever since the emergence of the various 'Rights' movements of the 1960s, had led to a 'decline in deference towards professional people on the part of the general public'—'less preparedness to assume they always know best' (Winch 1996: 3). It is also not to deny the importance of changing perceptions of the role which democracy should play in deciding how public sector workers are to be recruited, and public services financed and distributed. We can agree, therefore, with Christopher Winch that the demand for accountability cannot be viewed as a phenomenon driven *solely* by neo-liberal ideology (146). My claim, though, is that, once this demand *was* addressed in the political arena, neo-liberalism's ability to adapt itself to different political priorities and government agendas allowed it to sustain its own powerful momentum. The demand translated readily into the regulation of the 'regimes of neo-liberal corporate accountability' which Ranson (2003) speaks of. Managers, as agents of change, were to ensure the necessary 'regulation'.

2.3 MANAGERS AS AGENTS OF CHANGE

The new management practices we have been discussing, which eclipsed older forms of administration, were understood as ways to 'reinvent' the public sector, to bring about 'transformation', and to combat resistance to change (Richards 1992). Managers were given *carte blanche* to act as agents of change (Fergusson 1994: 95).

What kind of change? In time, after the Civil Service reforms (in the UK) came the demand for the reform of education. The idea that education had to become 'more' accountable—that there was a 'crisis' and 'something needed to be done' to bring about *change* (Morley and Rassool 1999: 24)—was planted as a seed to grow in public consciousness by James Callaghan, the Labour Prime Minister at the time, when he gave his (now famous) 'Ruskin' speech, in 1976, urging a public 'Great Debate' about the way education might be better harnessed to the needs of the economy and be made 'more accountable'. That speech ushered in a new sociological, cultural, and economic climate for educational change that was not only limited to the UK. In the US, for example, the desire to increase control over what goes on in schools should not be thought of as something only associated with the 1970s school 'accountability movement'. It continues to resurface 'on a regular basis as a central tenet of educational reform' (Ingersoll 2003: 35).

By the late 1980s, the demand for 'more accountability' in education (in the UK) found its political expression in the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) and, later, in the Further and Higher Education Act (1992).[13] What effect did this have on teachers? According to one commentator, the new legislation had the intended effect of reducing the 'discretionary areas of professional practice within educational institutions . . . whilst strengthening

market and managerial controls' (Esland et al. 1999: 1). According to Gerald Grace (1995), it was the development of *large* comprehensive schools (as part of the new structural and organizational changes being brought to secondary schooling in the 1960s and 1970s) that helped encourage the idea throughout the 1980s that a new *managerial* ethos was appropriate for the running of a school. It was the sheer size and organizational complexity of such schools which 'gave impetus to the development of a management culture in schooling' (Grace 1995: 16). The head teacher of a large comprehensive of a secondary school now had to have *managerial* capacities and not just professional-administrative capacities. Gradually, it became *de rigueur* for a head teacher not to be thought of as a head *teacher* (Gunter 2001: 96) but rather, as a *leader-manager* (Gold 2004; Reeves et al. 2003: 133), one who is capable of implementing the necessary reforms.

What about higher education? The 1980s can be pinpointed as the high point also for managerialism to establish itself within higher education policy: 'from the first Thatcher cuts to the Jarrett Report on efficiency' (Bundy 2004: 166). By the 1990s, the metamorphosis of one concept of educational accountability into another was nearly complete. The Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (OFSTED), a non-ministerial government department, established under the Education (Schools) Act 1992, replaced Her Majesty's Inspectorate (HMI) and Local Education Authority (LEA) inspectorates, which were seen as symbols of an older, defunct form of educational accountability. Then, soon after, with the publication of performance ('league') tables of examination results, there finally emerged a concept of educational accountability, attuned to the new 'quasi' market culture. In line with neo-liberal thinking, parents were to select schools, based on 'informed choice'. As the 'marketization' of education gained ground, parents were conceived as proxy clients acting on behalf of their children—the new 'consumers'.

The idea of setting explicit targets for educational institutions now really took off. Numerous, new national 'attainment' targets were set for schools concerning examination and test results, exclusions, and truancy rates. The 1998 Schools Standards and Framework Act set the framework within which government was able to determine the standards by which schools and teachers were to be judged—through the processes of 'performance-related pay' and 'continuing professional development' (on this, see Pring 2001a: 280). We may take such ideas for granted but, at the time, these were *new controls* to be exercised and authorized by managers.

2.4 THE TRIUMPH OF MANAGERIALISM

From the account I have just given, a period of roughly fifty years, we see how in the UK, incrementally, through the many decades of reform, there evolved new conceptions of both public and educational accountability.

The kinds of events I have described have been replicated around the world. Wherever a neo-liberal concept of accountability was promoted, managerialism was able to enter into contexts that previously functioned without any managerial regulation. A seamless, global, consensus position, reflecting this new understanding of public accountability, established itself as the *Zeitgeist* of what Philip Bobbitt (2002) calls our new 'Market State'. This new consensus gave managers the legitimizing authority they needed, as well as the confident belief in their right to manage the process of change itself. Managerialism thus became acceptable to government as an instrument of policy. It continues to mirror, isomorphically, the functions, structures, and aims of government.

As a result, the distinction is now blurred between '*management within government*' and '*governance within management*', and with it, the distinction between *managerial* and *public accountability*. In this way, the language of managerialism (*managerialese*) mirrors the kind of structural, institutional, and cultural features that policy-makers wish to see promoted within educational institutions. This language very subtly structures practical reasoning towards managerial ends: productivity and 'efficiency gains'.[14]

Another kind of mirroring takes place. To its advantage, *managerialese*, shares the language of democracy. It pursues 'transparency', ostensibly through 'openness', 'scrutiny', and 'disclosure'. But managerialism capitalizes on the rhetoric of democracy without ever signing up to a robust form of democracy. Why do I say that?

It is true that ideas such as 'deregulation', 'devolution', 'distributed leadership', 'local management', 'partnerships', 'empowerment'—a language common to both managerialism and democracy—will suggest a 'bottom-up', consultative model of management. But even though the rhetoric tells us that autonomy of decisional power and responsibility will reside in the local, 'self-management' of organizational institutions, the reality is that contracts, targets, performance indicators, and monitoring and evaluation systems act as new forms of control. They continue to govern practitioners ('governing-at-a-distance') in order that they might 'enterprise themselves' and enact policy reform (Rose 1996: 57; Ball 1994: 78).[15]

This is how management in the public sector has been able to capitalize on the legitimacy which the rhetoric of democracy bestows on its own discourse, *managerialese*. As 'executives', 'experts', 'advisors', or 'consultants', they are, to quote Adam Smith (see the citation that heads this chapter), the 'leaders' who now 'new-model the constitution'.

2.5 'BETTER MANAGEMENT'

For reasons already manifest, we see how a new political will—a will that is still in the ascendant—was able to come into existence in the name of accountability and to bring about the 'economic rationalization' of all

public institutions. Those who are now in charge of public institutions have to orient themselves to prioritize economic, rather than social, personal or educational ideals (Hopwood 1984: 171). Managerial-market norms, rather than professional-collegial norms, now predominate. The presumption is that 'management accounting'—that is, *managerial* accountability—will secure *public* accountability. For all intents and purposes, they are now seen as one and the same. Is such an equation correct?

Public accountability should neither be reduced to managerial accountability, nor equated with it. Public accountability involves broader, more complex relationships than anything managerial. It involves relations between the trust of the electorate and government, or even between Parliament and government (see Stewart 1984: 30). But rather than pursue this point further here, it is more urgent for our purposes to revisit the time of the early public-service reforms which were initiated in the UK in the late 1960s. We need to examine the confident claims made at that time that New Public Management would bring about a better form of management than had previously existed. 'New public' managers promised to make 'the best use of public resources': 'competing values could be reduced to alternative sets of options and costs . . . assessed against their contribution to the organization's performance' (Clarke and Newman 1997: 66). The aim was 'to improve the quality and efficiency of government services through better management'.[16]

What did 'better management' mean here? *Better* management had by then become synonymous with 'management-by-objectives'. A key characteristic of management-by-objectives is to focus on 'the notion of . . . explicit, monitored, and optimized input-output relations' (McSweeney 1996: 215), designed to specify organizational objectives (Metcalfe and Richards 1984). But in order to understand more fully what was meant by 'management-by-objectives' we really need to go back to the 1968 Report of the Fulton Committee, which I mentioned earlier, in Section 2.2. It is instructive to re-visit the late 1960s. The idea of 'performance management' targets, we shall see, is heir to the earlier idea, 'management-by-objectives', which the new accountability reform movement embraced.

The Fulton Committee regarded its own recommendations for 'accountable management' both as an extension of management-by-objectives and superior to it. Wherever 'measurement of performance' was not possible, however, the committee urged the use of the principle of management-by-objectives (McSweeney 1996: 216). It was the adoption of this principle (see Recommendation No. 156, cited subsequently) that finally destroyed the traditional 'bureau-professional' model of administration (Clarke and Newman 1997) within the British Civil Service. I set out here some key points in the Report which show the framework upon which the new concept of accountability, 'management by accounting' was grounded.

Extracts from Fulton Report (1966–1968a):[17]

ACCOUNTABLE AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT

150. Accountable Management means holding individuals and units responsible for performance measured as objectively as possible . . .
151. . . . Accountable management requires the identification of . . . those parts of the organisation that form convenient groupings (or "centres"), to which costs can be precisely allocated . . . We regard this as essential to systematic management control.
152. . . . standards of achievement by which their performance can be judged . . .
153. Wherever measures of achievement can be established in quantitative or financial terms, and individuals held responsible for output and costs, accountable units should be set up . . . information . . . could be used to measure the comparative efficiency of different units . . . units [such as these] have been widely developed as an instrument of managerial control in progressive industry.
154. . . . The manager of each command . . . should be held accountable for performance against budgets, standards of achievement and other tests . . . should set up sub-systems of responsibility and delegated authority on similar lines.
156. It is still, however, important that those engaged . . . should know what their objectives are and that their performance should be judged by their results. The principle to be applied here is management-by-objectives.

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163. . . . the . . . need to devise the tight machinery for ensuring that each department . . . conducts a regular audit of its efficiency . . . The use of outside consultants could help . . .

In spite of all the fashions, fads, and styles which management theory has gone through in the subsequent decades since the Committee met, everything we experience now, decades later, bears the marks of these early recommendations. Witness, for example, the need to work to explicit objectives (No. 156); the need to measure 'performance' (No. 150); the demand for audit and efficiency assessment exercises (No. 163); the expectation that 'systematic management control' and 'quantitative measurement' (Nos. 151,153) will provide accountability; the value placed on 'outside' management consultants (No. 163).

That was in the 1960s. Let us now 'fast forward' through the decades. Even though new theories and discourses of management keep on replacing

older ones (the promise is always that *now* real 'excellence' or real 'quality' is within sight), the 'wheel', as many commentators remark, is constantly re-invented. For instance, in a book called *Performance Management: The New Realities*, we learn that

> Performance management arrived in the late 1980s partly as a reaction to the negative aspects of merit-rating and management by objectives . . . it at first incorporated many of the elements of earlier approaches; for example, rating, objective-setting and review, performance pay . . . Conceptually . . . performance management is significantly different from previous approaches, although in practice the term has often simply replaced 'performance appraisal', just as 'human resource management' has frequently been substituted for 'personnel management' without any discernible change in approach—lots of distinctions, not many differences. Performance management may often be no more than new wine in old bottles . . . (Armstrong and Baron 1999: 47)

Here we are told that the idea of 'performance management' is *meant* to have superseded that of 'management-by-objectives', but that, 'in practice', there are many overlaps between the two modes of management models—'lots of distinctions, not many differences'. Let us see if we can make sense of this.

There are a number of ways of defining 'performance management'. It can be defined (i) as a *set of practices* implemented by managers aimed at influencing the behaviors and outcomes of individuals and organizations, or (ii) as a *range of managerial techniques* to influence individuals and groups at the organizational level, or even (iii) as an *approach to improving professional practice* (Reeves et al. 2002: 3). But, alongside these three options, there are two other ways to understand performance management. The first approach concentrates on the *outcomes* and the second on the *behaviors* that a practitioner will need to display as 'performance indicators'. Thus we have

- setting goals and targets defined in quantifiable terms which the individual and or group must achieve;
- delineating specific sets of behaviors to be displayed.

The next step is to combine these two measures by specifying the behaviors that lead to 'positive outcomes'. In this way a means is created both for assessing performance and for arriving at a basis for improving it (Reeves et al. 2002: 5):

- express performance targets in terms of measurable outputs, accountabilities and training/learning targets;
- use formal appraisal procedures as ways of communicating performance requirements which are set on a regular basis.

What is remarkable about these prescriptions is that exactly the same kind of language is at work here as that which we found expressed in the 1966–1968 Fulton Committee Report, decades earlier. There is still a need for *explicitness*—in the form of clearly defined 'outputs', targets, for measuring performance, and so on. We still have evidence of a language with its own specialized meanings (see Ball 1990a: 156). 'Objectives' to be measured against 'performance' can still be found now in documents offering 'guidance' to head teachers, as we find here:

> 5.8. . . . Objectives should focus on priorities. They should be time-bound, challenging but achievable . . .
> 5.9. Some objectives may be achievable within the performance management cycle. Others may require a longer time span, in which case the record of objectives should show the milestones towards that objective to be achieved in the current cycle . . . [18]

According to some commentators, it seems to make little difference what theory of management prevails. For *whichever* particular theory of management is in fashion, 'NPM as managerialism is obsessed with objectives; it resurrects 'management-by-objectives' (Rhodes 1997: 55). This lends credence to the idea that although the terminology may change over time, its meaning remains constant: whereas the 'obsession' in the 1960s was 'objectives', 'outcomes', and 'outputs', the discourse for the last few decades has focused more on 'targets', 'indicators', 'success criteria', or 'star ratings'. Newer terms which have found their way into management discourse and policy texts, such as 'milestones', 'entitlements' or 'guarantees', adhere to the same 'command and control' logic of management-by-objectives.

The conclusion Rhodes reaches here—that managerialism is *still* 'obsessed' with 'objectives'—throws light on the observation that when one starts investigating 'education management' literature, 'it does not divide up into neat areas' (Thrupp and Willmott 2003: 120). Does it divide at all? No, there is an 'inter-relatedness', close to convergence, between 'strategic management, self-management, leadership, vision, organizational theory, effectiveness, improvement, TQM . . . strategic planning, and development planning' (57).

What conclusions can be drawn to round up our discussion here? Despite a gap of approximately fifty years, that which remains intact throughout the whole managerial revolution is the ideal of 'performativity' (Lyotard 1984) to which all must aspire, an ideal against which agents' 'performance'—their ability to demonstrate 'skills', 'competence', 'underpinning knowledge', and so on—will be measured and judged (Elliott 2001). This is how agents are now expected to show they are acting rationally and being publicly accountable. Take away the idea of explicitness, and the system of public accountability, as we know it now, would cave in.

In the chapters which follow, we shall have an opportunity to decide whether *explicitness* is really as essential to the idea of *public accountability*, as the apologist for the status quo claims it is.

2.6 MANAGERIALISM: DOES IT FUNCTION AS AN IDEOLOGY?

Ranson (2003) asks how the 'intensifying regime of performativity' is to be explained. 'Organizational' theorists provide an explanation, he says, why there is a tendency for institutions to develop a 'design type', as if a 'gravitational pull' were at work:

> Institutions . . . find it difficult to move out of a dominant design mould. They become captured by the capacity of a system to institutionalize prevailing assumptions and 'myths' and culturally entrenched rules. (469)

Similarly, institutional economics, concerned mainly with agency at the 'meso' level of institutional life, explicates the relation between authority relations (management) and goal-oriented activity (of individual agents) by showing how patterns of incentives tend to shape social action and contribute to agents constructing meanings and establishing norms.[19] This is fine as far as it goes. But the thing we want to know is how, at a certain juncture, the 'meso', the 'macro', and the 'micro' levels of social life relate (Ball 1990b).

Ranson's question, therefore, still remains: how do we explain the 'intensifying' regimes of performativity? Teachers submit to a '*force majeure*', it has been suggested (Fergusson 1994: 113), a force which holds them to the demands of, say, a 'transparency' or an 'audit' review, an 'assessment exercise', a 'strategic plan', and so on. If we recall some of the concerns listed in Section 1.1, the predominant view expressed was that such managerial tasks tend to divert attention away from the core practices of teaching. Teachers—and I use this term in its generic sense—now spend long hours on paperwork, not just for preparing lessons or lectures, but for accountability purposes. Low morale and a widespread belief that the profession may be hitting its targets but missing the point of teaching is prevalent: even 'six-figure' salaries, it has been found, does not tempt teachers into headships.[20] As we have noted before, this kind of story tends to be repeated across the whole public sector. A recent inquiry in the UK, for example, into why 400 patients died and many other patients suffered unnecessarily in an NHS Hospital Trust found that the tolerance for poor standards was fostered by a management focused more on targets rather than on patient welfare; and that those who did speak out were ignored, whereas others were deterred from doing so through fear and bullying.[21]

So it would seem that 'the force' is not so much all the extra work which managerial, bureaucratic demands bring, as the pressure to comply with

the demands made. In the act of compliance is felt 'the force'. But what is the nature of this *force*? Some critics of the status quo, in answer to this question, will claim that managerialism functions as an ideology—that it is an *ideological* force. Is there an argument, though, to back up this claim? Let us see.

Bottery (2000) urges us to 'note . . . the ideological . . . orientation' of managerialism:

> It is economistic, it is directive, it is controlling, it sees human beings as resources for its defined ends . . . it uses the language and ideas of private business organization, and in so doing facilitates their assimilation of public and educational sector concepts. (63)

Habermas, like Bottery, makes a connection between *language* and *ideology*: language always has the potential to be 'a medium of domination and social force, the medium of ideology *par excellence*'.[22] Habermas's point gains force when we consider that managerial discourse, according to Ball (1994), has the potential to function and to influence on three levels:

> [The first discourse], 'professional management' . . . relates . . . to the production of school management plans . . . it is . . . context-free . . . it concentrates upon the business of *education* rather than education as a *business* . . . It divorces management practices from values . . . It is technically oriented . . . The second discourse . . . 'financial management' . . . begins with a concern with balancing the books . . . with doing educationally what can be afforded . . . There is a close relationship . . . [with] the third discourse, which I call 'entrepreneurial management'. Here the market is to the fore; image, hype and PR, and competition, diversification and income generation are prominent in the managers' lexicon. (67–68).

For critics, like Ball, it is precisely the way in which managerial discourse monopolizes so many different levels of organizational life that is so educationally offensive. It is 'imperialistic' (1990a: 157); it has established 'new forms of authority' (1990b: 18). Its ideological influence, when linked to notions like 'accountability', school 'effectiveness' or 'improvement' should not be underestimated (1990a: 162).

So there are those who do argue that managerialism is ideological in nature, but it is still not clear what is exactly meant by this. Terry Eagleton (1991:1–3), for instance, identifies at least seventeen senses in which ideology can be understood, some of which are not even compatible![23] The various interpretations of ideology which are available may therefore complicate, rather than illuminate.[24] But one thing remains relatively uncontroversial: when 'ideology' is understood to have 'pejorative' connotations—defective claims to knowledge (Giddens 1987: 269)—it is usually contrasted with

that other, quite different meaning of ideology which is often claimed to be 'neutral': simply, a 'system of ideas'.[25]

What we are mainly interested in, then, presumably, when people criticize managerialism as an ideology, is ideology in the pejorative sense of the term, the sense usually associated with Marx's own use of the term.[26] But even that use is not without complications. For the Marxian idea of 'false consciousness' would either need to be scrapped or re-worked. One who uses managerial discourse is not necessarily being duped by the reified social relations that are constructed—as is the case, supposedly, in false consciousness. But let's not depart altogether from Marx. For his use of the term helps illuminate why the notion of ideology is so often appealed to as a tool of critique.

Commentators warn about the ambiguity, 'myths', and 'legends' which have arisen around Marx's work relating to ideology,[27] but, in so far as we can grasp a sense of what he meant, we know that for him ideology is bound up with the idea that class exploitation can remain unacknowledged by the very ones who are being exploited. So, drawing on Marxian exegesis, ideas such as 'masking', 'distortion', 'illusion', or 'deceptiveness' immediately become relevant. This is the way in which Ronald Barnett (2003) appears to use the concept 'ideology' when he describes the many ideologies which have entered the life of a university (1). A 'pernicious' ideology is one which 'distorts the conversations of the university' (73): 'what used to be the normal rhythms of academic life allowing due consideration to matters that came before it, are now dissolved . . . the market creeps surreptitiously into the collective subconscious' (72).

Barnett's reference to a 'pernicious' ideology resonates with the work of those writers who make use of the idea of *hegemony* to elucidate the ideological nature of managerialism.[28] For Raymond Williams, hegemony is

> a dominant system of meaning and values . . . not merely abstract but . . . organized and lived . . . hegemony is not to be understood at the level of mere opinion or manipulation. It is a whole body of practices and expectations . . .[29]

Now we start to understand better what is meant when managerialism is described as a *force majeure*. As conceived in terms of hegemony, the 'force' in question simply *is* the experiencing of a 'whole body of practices and expectations'. The ideology of managerialism inveigles itself into the lived experiences of agents, and their practices. It lays down a normative framework for what is to count as 'valuable knowledge, who knows it, and who is empowered' (Clarke et al. 2000: 9). Within that framework the 'force' can threaten, moreover.

Apologists for the status quo will probably reject the claim made that managerialism is ideological, and maintain that it is 'neutral', citing such things as the 'impartiality' of league tables now available to public scrutiny.

That claim is controversial, however. Setting visible targets and measuring teachers' work against standards to demonstrate 'effectiveness' may give 'the scientific aura of neutrality and impersonality' (Bottery 2000; see also Rizvi 1990: 301). But, as MacIntyre (1985: 77) points out, the value of short term 'effectiveness' depends on the value of the goals it actually pursues or promotes. 'Effective' for what end and whose purpose are the questions which should be asked. In this connection, Sharon Gewirtz (2002) notes,

> . . . discourses of post-welfarist education policy, like markets, target-setting, performance monitoring and inspection are not neutral . . . these discourses have embedded within them a set of values about what education is, and is for . . . [T]hey function as powerful disciplinary mechanisms for transforming . . . teacher subjectivities and the culture and values of schooling. (21).

Fred Inglis (2000) observes, cuttingly, 'New Public Management professes itself to be free from ideology', but '[w]hat we have . . . had better be understood in order to be rationally criticised':

> It is . . . heavily ideological . . . a doctrine promulgated by the army of . . . conviction-consultants . . . [T]he helots of these systems think in terms of silly slogans to be wastefully scrawled on flipcharts at mind-numbing conferences . . . (301)

Inglis's 'conviction-consultants' are in the same business as Adam Smith's 'man of system', enamored with his 'ideal plan' (see again the citation which heads this chapter). Smith is scathing about the 'sophistry', manifested by an 'arrogant' government, whose leaders set up their own 'supreme' standards of judgment.

2.7 SELF-JUSTIFYING POWER AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMATION

Thrupp and Willmott (2003: 124) comment on the *dirigiste* tone of the managerial texts that endorse the public sector modernizing reform agenda. Under the banner of 'continuous improvement', 'incessant change' will be urged. To try to absent oneself from the reform agenda would indicate a lack of professionalism, as if one were uninterested in *improvement*. In effect, the rhetoric of 'modernization' leaves no discursive space in which to articulate dissent: '"We" are spoken for as . . . participants in a process of change: "our" survival success or growth is aligned to that of the nation and the organization' (Clarke and Newman 1997: 53).

Reflecting on how difficult it was to find a space for honest appraisal of educational policy making, Geoff Whitty (2002) once wrote, 'Even to

suggest that current policies might not be the best way of doing [things] better, or asking whether we are clear what we mean by doing better [is] too often regarded as treachery' (137). A philosopher might suggest that the problem identified here—the unavailability of a 'normative space'[30] for genuine appraisal or criticism—is one that is bound to happen when the distinction collapses between '*it* is better' and '*we* think it is better'.[31]

In this seemingly closed, self-justifying educational world that Whitty reveals, what is at work? There are two bleak alternatives: you're either with us or you're against us! What has happened to the ideal of democracy, that different views should be heard? If value-pluralism is to have any purchase in a liberal democracy, then there is bound to be value-conflict. Different policies will represent different choices between values that become rivals for our attention. If this is so, then liberal democracy should make room to discuss them. It should strive to make room for competing accounts of *professionalism* and *accountability*.

Eagleton (1991) is interested in the process by which an ideology acquires *legitimation* in public consciousness. There are 'strategies', he says, which help mark out an ideology:

> . . . The term ideology . . . would seem to make reference not only to belief systems, but to questions of *power* . . . What kind of reference, though? . . . [T]he most common answer is to claim that ideology has to do with legitimating the power of a dominant social group or class . . . [T]he process of legitimation would seem to involve at least six strategies. A dominant power may legitimate itself by *promoting* beliefs and values congenial to it; *naturalizing* and *universalizing* such beliefs so as to render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; *denigrating* ideas which might challenge it; *excluding* rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken systematic logic; and *obscuring* social reality in ways convenient to itself. Such 'mystification' . . . frequently takes the form of masking or suppressing social conflicts . . . In any ideological formation, all six of these strategies are likely to interact in complex ways (5, original emphasis).

Within managerialism, all six of these strategies can be detected! Witness: formal criteria or performance indicators for what are to count as, say, the 'effective school', 'good practice', or the 'visionary leader', and so on, are all designed to be *universally* applicable. These managerial constructs 'downplay'—or, in Eagleton's own words, '*naturalize*' and '*obscure*'—the local, socio-economic contexts in which schools operate (see Power and Whitty 1999: 539; Thrupp and Willmott 2003: 63, 125) and the moral and intellectual initiative of those who serve them. 'Rival forms of thought' are '*excluded*'. Ideas which do not '*promote*' managerialism are '*denigrated*' or 'suppressed'.

On such evidence, we might conclude that managerialism is indeed a pernicious ideology. In truth, managerial modes of accountability which incorporate principles of NPM have to be understood by reference to the particular public rationality upon which they are based. That rationality is suffused with metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological assumptions (some of which will be discussed in later chapters) regarding human nature, motivation, and practical knowledge. These assumptions are not above question. For certain areas of human life they lack credibility. But what is clear is that anyone who is forced to conform to the prevailing public rationality is expected to believe that *nothing else* can compete with managerial expertise. For a manager is now 'the guardian of the overall purposes of the organization', which means no other 'group of staff should be able to work to a different set of priorities' (Pollitt 1990: 131). As 'guardian of the overall purposes of the organization', a manager claims to have 'the right to manage' (2–3). Adam Smith's 'man of system' will make the same claim.

Michael Power (1994a) argues that the rationality claim of managerial audit practices, deployed by governments for purposes of quality control, has attained the status of a 'cultural logic' that 'is greater than the sum of the practices it unites' (303). He points to the difficulties in trying to criticize these practices: The force of this 'logic', he suggests, is such that to be against the idea of audit 'appears to be to support non-accountability' (304). It is this 'logic', this particular rationality, now so persistently dominant in education, which has identified itself subtly—and, it would seem, ideologically—with that which is unsatisfactory in the political status quo. The place one might have wanted as a public space, in which respite from the forces of managerial accountability and the neo-liberal rationalities of government might be found, is entirely inaccessible.

In this chapter, we have seen how it has been possible for the totalizing power of managerial rationality to have gained legitimacy in a democracy. Power (1994a) puts it like this: once managerial audit and financial accountability systems were understood as a 'distinctive modality' or 'rationality' of government' (299, 302), a belief was created in the *de jure* legitimacy of managerial modes of accountability. In effect, this has meant that opportunities to base reform of public services on quite *different* models of professional or organizational practice have been ruled out. It will take a fundamental shift in political and economic policy thinking to move beyond the status quo.

In Section 2.2, I suggested that it was the 'elective affinities' between managerialism and neo-liberalism which made it so easy for managerial modes of accountability to acquire the status of legitimacy they now enjoy. And in Section 2.4, I developed the idea that, because managerialism dovetails so well with present economic neo-liberal economic ideology, this enables it to be nodded in through the democratic process.

Earnest Gellner (1974) writes in *Legitimation of Belief*, 'the issue of legitimacy is not restricted to political institutions, but arises . . . fundamentally, in other areas . . . there tends to be an interdependence between legitimations offered in one sphere and another . . . ' (29). What Gellner calls an 'interdependence between legitimations' we can observe everyday—in the close relations that exist between the 'political institutions' of government and managerialism:

> The re-making of the state towards a more dispersed form enlarged the space for management and provided new legitimation for increasing managerial discretion . . . Managerialism thus developed a tighter 'fit' with the changing organisational structures and fields of relationships that characterised the dispersed systems of the new state form. Managerialism . . . provided the . . . internal discipline and . . . performance audit that were identified as the conditions of accountability to central government. (Clarke and Newman 1997: 60)

Ball (1990a) also talks about 'fit'—how the disciplinary powers and language of management are

> reworked into versions of . . . monitoring that 'fit' into the preferred teacher discourse of professionalism . . . through schemes of self-appraisal, school improvement, and institutional development. Indeed, teachers are urged to believe *that their commitment to such processes will make them more professional*. (162; emphasis added)

Thus the 'fit' between managerialism and post-welfarist, neo-liberal ideology is as tight as it can be: state bureaucracy represents the status quo as much as the party in government does. Given that jobs for managers now outpace academics in UK universities, and that in other public service institutions there is a similar growth in 'back office', managerial staff, and outside consultancies, at the expense of 'front-line' staff,[32] we should expect no major changes to the status quo in the near future.

At first, when it was appropriated from private business management models and industrial, systems-operational theory, managerialism stood in the shadow of a neo-liberal political ideology. Now it is confident enough to stand in full sunlight, as an ideology in its own right. It throws its own shadows.[33] Between the *idea* of managerialism and the various *acts* of all those who have to conform to managerial edicts, lies a system of public accountability that can distort, by its own rigid system imperatives and it own ideological pressures, the practical knowledge and judgment of those whom we have to trust to act in the public interest. That will be the topic of the next chapter.

In this chapter we have described the long trajectory from the early public service reforms of the 1960s and through the subsequent decades, to

the status quo as of now—a trajectory that starts with demands for 'more accountability' and 'better management' and ends with a formidable, irresistible, and ideological '*force majeure*'. From the late 1970s, diverse groups, across the left and right of the political spectrum, came together to demand that education should become 'more accountable'. I do not seek to defend here everything associated with the Old Public Administration model of public accountability. The drive for 'more accountability' in education gained ground because there were some real worries around at the time, such as lack of equal opportunities, curricular incoherence, and patchy teaching quality in some schools. But was a heavily prescriptive, target-driven, managerial approach the solution? If those early reformers could have foreseen where their demands would lead, especially with respect to education—to the *industry* we refer to as 'Educational Management', and which now stands symbolically for the idea of educational accountability—would they have chosen to go down the same reform path again? Or would they have chosen an alternative route?

In Chapter 5, I sketch a neo-Aristotelian model of agent-accountability as an alternative to the 'managerial' model of accountability examined in this chapter. But before we reach that point, there are some further aspects of the 'managerial' model which need to be exposed. In the next chapter, we continue with the theme of explicitness introduced in this chapter and examine the ideal of transparency as that ideal is now interpreted in policy discourse and is used as a managerial tool of accountability and governance.

'Transparent' accountability: what could be so wrong with that idea, it might be asked. Intuitively, we might think that the ideal of *transparency* sounds exactly what an accountability system should aspire to. We shall see, however, why present attempts to embody this ideal within professional practices have led to the paradox of opacity.

3 The Lure of the Explicit
Managerial Modes of Accountability and the Ideal of Transparency

> [E]vents, processes and experiences in organizations are rarely transparent, self-evident or completely fixed, but are intrinsically ambiguous and therefore open-ended in the interpretations that can be attached to them.
>
> Haridimos Tsoukas (1994: 10)

3.1 WHY THE PURSUIT OF TRANSPARENCY?

According to Vattimo (1992), in *The Transparent Society*, 'everything' has the potential to become an object of communication, and we are guided by an ideal of 'self-transparency', both for ourselves and for society. In his essay *Exactitude*, the novelist Calvino (1996) is concerned about the 'loss of form' or 'substance' in the 'post-modern' world and hankers for a 'cult of exactitude'. Without 'exactitude', he suggests, 'a well-defined and well-calculated plan for the work in question', we risk 'diluting meanings' (56–57).

When such ideas are conjoined with further, would-be *democratic* demands for 'transparency', it seems that there is no evident limit for the need for precision, clarity, and explicitness—in a word, *transparency*. For the democratic demand for transparency is tied to the ability of agents to provide public justifications, 'given the bias that can result when decisions are taken for undisclosed reasons' (Hood 2006: 222). This demand requires at a minimum that those in positions of authority be prepared to articulate honest reasons (Blacker 2003: 1).

Through such thoughts as these the link comes to be forged between the ideal of transparency and the idea of accountability, in at least one of its meanings—that of 'being brought to account': providing information of what one has done in relation to goals that have been set, or else, to legitimate expectations that others may have of one.

Indeed, the societal pressure to present oneself in as explicit a way as possible has now acquired the status of a public virtue. Only knowledge that is *codifiable*, that is to say, 'statable in explicit propositional form', and 'open to sale in the market' as 'expertise', has the chance of counting as a 'non-rival good accessible to all' (O'Neill 1998: 150). Under conditions where the explicit is always promoted, though, that which is variously referred to as 'implicit', 'tacit', 'inarticulate', or 'non-explicit' knowledge will appear a

'less likely candidate for a public good'. Even Michael Polanyi (1958), in his efforts to explicate the idea of 'tacit' or 'personal' knowledge',[1] acknowledges that it lacks what is usually referred to as the 'objective' character of explicit knowledge. It is a 'doing of our own' (12; see also 1962; 1969b).

It was precisely the proposal that managers made in the early days of the accountability reform movement to introduce 'objectivity'—a 'neutral accountability technology' (Rizvi 1990: 301)—to monitor 'quality' and 'standards', that provided the legitimizing authority they needed to act as 'agents of change' (see again, Section 2.3, Chapter 2). Riding on the back of the generally accepted idea that transparency is the *democratic* way to be accountable, managerialism has sought to maintain its title to legitimacy by insisting upon 'transparency', which it is now claimed all government policy requires (Clarke and Newman 1997: 66).

The promise was an 'objective' public accountability system, neutral between all the competing 'vested' interests; in place of small, professional 'elites', holding the decisional power over organizational goals, there would now be, so it was claimed, an equitable, fair system of accountability. There was to be 'transparency' in the sense of clear visible targets or performance indicators to be measured against standards, in order to demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness and productivity. 'Transparency', in this context, it should be noted, thus acquired its own specialized meaning: to provide facts about numbers, statistics, and league tables for public scrutiny. To acquire information through the measurement of performance indicators was seen both as an antidote to public distrust and a way of taking back control from the 'mysterious world of the professionals' (Boyle 2000: 48–49).

This demand for 'transparent' accountability was applied in due course to *education*. Introduced on a small scale in 1992, by 1993, for the first time in British educational history, school inspections were conducted by reference to explicit and publicly available criteria and performance tables, on which the schools and teachers could be publicly judged (Furlong 2001: 130).[2]

At this point, the critic may say, "I have no difficulty with the idea that, given the large amounts of public money spent on education, there must be public accountability".[3] But is it really true that we must pursue *explicitness* as our public duty, and that not to do so is tantamount to a public failing? Is demonstrating 'transparency' in the way it is now demanded, really the distinguishing mark of a person who recognizes the proper demands of public accountability?

If the notion of 'public accountability' is conceptualized in an abstract way, in much the same way we might contemplate the abstract idea of 'justice' or of 'liberty'—if the idea of transparency is not anchored to anything *specific*—then the demand for 'total' transparency will seem intuitively correct. For we carry about with us the presumption that, *with* transparency and explicitness, truth will not be concealed and public trust will thereby be assured: 'there is a greater requirement of explicitness of reasoning in public morality than in private' (Hampshire 1991: 50).

In the same way, Nietzsche's sketch of 'the truthful man'—'simple, transparent, not in contradiction with himself . . . without wrinkle . . . concealment, form'[4]—reminds us of the links that connect *truth*, *transparency*, *trust*, and *accountability*—when these concepts are thought of in abstract terms. But accountability in the abstract is not our concern. This chapter examines the ideal of transparency as that ideal is now understood in modern management terms and is concerned with three main questions: (i) what happens in practice when an *a priori* model of accountability, one that has evolved from NPM principles, is laid as a pre-formed template over various organizational practices? (ii) What happens when that model forces a particular meaning onto 'transparent'? (iii) What happens to the practical knowledge and judgment of agents when they are subjected to the kind of practical rationality which the principles and practices of the model demand? Later on, we shall discuss the detrimental effects which such conformity may have on personal responsibility.

3.2 FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

There are critics of NPM, market-inspired accountability mechanisms who say that an abstract, *a priori* model of accountability—such as we see in the kind of 'managerial' model of accountability I described in the last chapter—cannot help but be 'coercive'. They say that with its prescriptions and procedural rules, guidelines, standards, and benchmarks as to what *counts* as 'quality', excellence, 'good practice', 'visionary leadership', and so on, agents become complicit in the ends at which the managers aim: 'caught in a disciplinary system whose negative characteristics they are actively reproducing and yet over which they feel increasingly powerless' (Shore and Wright 2000: 77).

But what sort of freedom do Shore and Wright seek, which would prevent the 'powerlessness' they describe? To an apologist for the status quo, the view Shore and Wright hold is unrealistic—an existentialist fantasy, even. It is just not possible, the apologist will say, to think that one can *feel free* in all contexts at work: complaints about 'coerciveness' should be recognized as simply a variant of the kind of tensions that may always arise between 'private' and 'public' morality (see Hampshire 1991; Montefiore and Vines 1999). Such a distinction, it will be argued, is based precisely on the old familiar dilemma between one's own ('private') view of how things should be done and what one's ('public') duty—'role' responsibility—demands. So, for the apologist, the introduction of management approaches is not necessarily divisive or threatening to professional or academic identities (Henkel 2009: 89). According to the apologist, NPM simply heralds new patterns of compromise and collaboration; corporate styles of management, now incorporated within institutional structures of governance, should be seen

as opening up exciting new career opportunities and identities for professionals (Exworthy and Halford 1999: 13).

But the apologist has not got it quite right. The so-called 'private-public' morality dilemma does not map on accurately enough to the problem Shore and Wright identify. The apologist is missing their point. For it is not as if they are recommending the abrogation of contractual 'role' responsibilities, or even suggesting that the concept of duty has no place in an accountability system. The problems they point to bear essentially on the practices of managerial-audit regimes and the power these regimes enjoy, as well as the particular construction these practices put on the idea of duty itself—when one is both 'agent and subject within the regime of performativity in the academy' (Ball 2001a: 214). Their claim is that professional responsibility is undermined because they are forced to incorporate managerial *ends* and *values* into the repertoires of their practices.

The critic and the apologist therefore paint two very different worldviews. Whereas one worldview sees professional academics as having 'to cope' with coercive managerial practices, and as being powerless to resist them, the other worldview points out the many new opportunities available for academic professionals to retain 'control'—by embracing innovative, professional-managerial roles. Which worldview is more convincing? Which worldview is better for the health and future of education? Let us go back to the ideas of 'audit' and 'performance', key terms for understanding present accountability practices.

Michael Shattock (2006) worries when audit or 'performance reviews' reduce to management 'faddism' or 'box-ticking' (138). Managerial 'reviews', he says, should be 'integral to strategy formation and . . . not be undertaken for their own sake' (14)—otherwise 'institutional integrity' may be compromised (128). Although there is something right in this criticism, the emphasis is unfortunate. In such situations, the thing that matters (and matters no doubt for the integrity of the institution) is the integrity of all the *persons* involved. What matters is the freedom of agents to act responsibly—in accordance with the virtue of *responsibleness*—to be free to reject the kind of activities that pay only 'lip-service' to accountability. Here I take the view that freedom, responsibility, and ethical activity are not separate, but overlapping aspects of human activity. Responsibleness in action might require one to question established rules, procedures, or standards (MacIntyre 1999: 313). When agents are placed in positions of responsibility or of bureaucratic power and, for fear of penalties, sanctions, demotion, or punishment, feel they cannot question the status quo, then there is every possibility that virtuous ends risk being abandoned (Bauman 1989: 18–27).

It is coercion of a psychological nature, then, that seems to be at the root of the kind of problems which professionals now experience at work: allowing oneself 'to be manipulated . . . a tool enabling others to achieve their ends' undermines both one's sense of self-respect and one's capacities for

deliberation and judgment (Govier 1993: 110–111). The fear, as one higher education lecturer puts it, is that, when corporate-style human resource management is introduced into educational practices, it can be 'used by management as a stick to beat us with'.[5]

So the freedom which critics of the status quo have in mind when they refer to managerial *coercion*, I suggest, is one of the kinds that John Lucas (1980: 198–199) discusses, namely, the freedom that gives people, if they are appointed as qualified to do a particular job, the discretion to decide what is appropriate for the context. *Freedom*, in these sorts of situations, Lucas suggests, is not an unbridled, or 'unfettered' freedom—to choose 'as one pleases'. It is, in fact, the sort of freedom with which we are quite familiar—the kind upon which the pre-conditions for a 'free' society in any democracy are based. Moreover, in a democracy, personal responsibility, or what I refer to as the virtue of responsibleness, is a basic prenuppostion for any system of legal justice to operate.

What would *personal responsibility/responsibleness* mean, then, in professional contexts? I understand the same as Hans Jonas (1984) understands by his notion of 'feeling responsible'. *Feeling responsible*, in his sense, is to be distinguished from the responsibility 'that concerns . . . the *ex post facto* account of what has been done' (93)—the responsibility of being answerable *after* the fact. Instead of facing backwards, Jonas's notion of responsibility is concerned with 'the forward determination of what is to be done': 'I feel responsible, not in the first place for my conduct and its consequences but for the *matter* that has a claim on my acting . . . [T]he welfare of others . . . obligates to actions not otherwise contemplated at all' (92; original emphasis).

'Actions not otherwise contemplated'. Jonas's phrase imports the idea of *open-endedness*. The concept of responsibility or *responsibleness* that emerges is quite different from anything we shall find in a managerial model of accountability with its need for precise, pre-specified objectives or targets to measure, or assess and evaluate, agents' competence.

Consider the requirement for teachers to be precise and explicit in their practice about 'outcomes'. This duty to be explicit results from the ideological pressures, discussed in the last chapter, which have made all public sector organization transform themselves into an auditable commodity—'one structured to conform to the need to be monitored *ex post*' (Power 1994b: 8). Nothing could be more alien to Jonas's forward-looking, open-ended notion of 'feeling responsible'. It is just as alien to what Shore and Wright (2000) seek. A major feature of managerial forms of audit, they point out 'is the extent to which it reshapes in its own image those organizations that are monitored. What is required is auditee compliance with the norms and procedures demanded by inspectors' (72). 'Auditee compliance' is *coercive*, they argue, because, even though it is claimed that the standards against which departments and individuals are to be assessed 'are those they set for themselves' (72), the processes of managerial audit, as Power (1994b) puts

it, 'do as much to *construct* definitions of quality and performance as to monitor them' (33; emphasis added).

According to Etzioni (1961), 'coercive' organizations are organizations 'in which instrumental communication . . . predominates' and there is reliance on '[b]lue-prints, technical textbooks, and experts' directives' (138–139). In such 'coercive' cultures it is difficult to see how there can be personal responsibility of the kind Lucas and Jonas bring to our attention. (In Chapter 4, we shall draw again on Lucas for further dimensions of 'responsibleness' and 'discretion'.)

The relationship between freedom and responsibility is, of course, notoriously complex. We still lack firm answers to some ancient philosophical questions that relate to these matters. My sole concern, though, here is to point to the Kantian idea, elucidated by John McDowell, that freedom is a necessary condition and source for responsible agency. Practical reason is not to be thought of as being merely compatible with freedom but, rather, as constitutive of it (McDowell 1996: 5). It is connected also with non-coercion—'negative liberty'—as understood by Isaiah Berlin (1967): 'Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act . . . The defence of liberty consists in the 'negative' goal of warding off interference' (142–146).

But it might be argued here that 'non-interference' (in Berlin's sense) just does not make sense when applied to teachers: it may not be desirable or even feasible for teachers in a democracy to be the only ones to decide what their pupils/students are to achieve; a teacher's professional autonomy, with regard to the aims of education, should legitimately be curtailed (Davis 1998: 25; White 1976: 64). I think that what Shore and Wright have in mind, however, is something like the following. The problem at present is that teachers are held to account, not simply for pre-specified *outcomes* and *results*, but also for demonstrating that they have achieved these outcomes and results according to certain *procedural principles of* practice (through evaluation checklists, 'recommendations' for 'good practice', 'guidelines' for 'quality assurance', etc.). This is how 'success' is now understood. But by demanding that teaching practices are 'transparently' prescriptive in this way, the 'managerial' model thus directs on two levels: by stipulating not only *ends* but *means*. When both means and ends are prescribed for practitioners, it is difficult for them to act on the basis of judgment in ways that 'are not determined or scripted' by others (Hansen 2001: 48). This model, stripped down to its essentials, [6] will define 'education accountability' in terms of

> responsibility for identifying and measuring educational outcomes and using information about these outcomes in decision-making . . . Teachers' methods [will be] assessed against success and costs. In the process, goals, objectives, needs assessment . . . evaluation and

> recommendations . . . [are] linked into a continuing cycle . . . 'delivery systems' [are] analysed . . . methods and techniques . . . [are] drawn up. (Kogan 1986: 75–77)

What is missing here is acknowledgment of one of the chief professional attributes a teacher may possess in the context of teaching: an awareness that the link between learning and teaching is fragile—sometimes uncertain and without a fixed end. Such a view of teaching will not fit easily into a conception of educational accountability where means and ends are pre-specified.

So what teachers appear to lack now, then, is a *pedagogical* form of 'negative' liberty. Bernard Williams (2001: 9), echoing Berlin, suggests that a crucial element of having liberty is the idea of not being in someone else's power. Williams offers us a link to the problem which Shore and Wright identify—'increasingly powerless' in the face of the demands of managerial and audit regimes.

At this point, we need to understand better the conception of practical rationality upon which the present demand for 'transparent' accountability is grounded. What kind of rationality is it that generates the kind of coerciveness and the 'routinized compliance' (Gleeson and Husbands 2003) we have been discussing?

To make a start on this, we shall now revert to one of the main tenets of the managerial model of accountability which we touched on briefly in Chapter 2, namely, the need for the inner workings of public service practices to be *rationalized* so that they become 'transparent'—transparent for the 'rituals of verification' of audit and performance management systems (Power 1997). According to the project of rationalization, education, as a public institution, must show it provides value for the money it receives (Harvey and Knight 1999: 233). Managerialism plays its part here by creating criteria of performance and rules of accountability that link funding to 'quality', ostensibly, 'to ensure the automatic improvement of efficiency and effectiveness' (234–236). Under the guise of 'economic rationalization', managerialism thus imposes, through a discourse of 'transparency', its *own* conception of accountability on education. In practice, this equates to 'a desire to treat education as a product that can be continually improved whilst lowering . . . cost' (236).

3.3 THE RATIONALIZATION PROJECT (RP): A FALLACY TO EXPOSE

The *rationalization project* (henceforth: RP) to make public services run more efficiently was the economic response to meet a political demand to make the public sector 'more accountable'. But was it the right *educational* response to such a demand? In the face of the immense sums now spent on

educational quangos, agencies, and PFI deals, plus the various legal and consultancy fees involved in setting up and managing performance contracts, plus the costs involved in inspection and monitoring the whole education system, we can even ask whether it was the right *economic* response—does the 'New Public Management' (NPM) way of running public sector services actually give 'value for money'?[7] Without the claims that managerialists and their champions have made, concerning the cost-effectiveness of their proposals and of their purported 'expertise' (see Chapters 2 and 3), they would never have prevailed or been listened to. When shall we know if their claims were true or false?

More pertinent to our concerns now, though, is whether the problem of *coerciveness*, that we are trying to identify within educational practices, originates within RP itself. Here is one description of the effects which RP had on educational practices:

> Effective rationalisation presupposed a tightening of the relationships between educational 'outputs' and the needs of society and economy . . . Roles and responsibilities were . . . clarified, authority and discretion defined, inter-organizational machinery developed and policy instruments for steering capacity designed. (Ranson 1994: 64)

So a crucial aim of RP was for 'roles and responsibilities' to be 'clarified. Once clarified, they could then be made explicit ('transparent') in new forms of knowledge—*competences*—easy to assess, measure, and evaluate. Through a further process of clarification, by the sub-division of work practices into discretely defined, specialized tasks, demands for 'transparent' accountability would then be met. Designed to cohere with public sector policies, the newly 'clarified' practices (in the form of 'agencies', for example), could easily be integrated into the economy at large (Hartley 2003).

Much hangs on the way the notion of 'clarification' is interpreted here. How much does the managerial ideal of transparency have to do with the virtue of honesty or with the authenticity of truth? In anticipation of Chapter 6, where we shall be looking at a competing (neo-Aristotelian) model of agent-accountability, I argue that, if we are interested in what it means for an agent to make professionally responsible decisions how to act then our concern with *that* should be no *less* compelling than the demand that is commonly made now for 'total transparency'.

In a report on standards and quality in education, the requirement for explicitness is clearly evident:

> In a minority of schools, the performance management of teachers did not comply fully with the requirements . . . some teachers . . . did not conform to the guidance issued by the government . . . many [objectives] were not measurable and they were not supported by clear criteria . . . (Ofsted 2003c: 66)

Notice how the language of the Fulton Committee Recommendations from the 1960s (discussed in the last chapter) lives on in what is now a recognizable language of *managerialese*: 'clear criteria' and 'measurable objectives' rank as key terms. Notice, too, how everything that has to do with a 'performative', bureaucratic culture—its measuring, regulating, legitimizing, and auditing regimes—affects the way in which public service workers are intended to see themselves and to understand their roles.[8]

Right from the start, the aim of the project of rationalizing the public services has always been to provide the systemic means for practitioners to ground—and hence, justify—their actions in explicit, measurable outcomes:

> Performative cultures presume . . . core activities within organizations can be made transparent . . . through technologies of audit . . . [These] rest upon the assumption of fixed . . . standards against which to judge performance. If quality cannot be measured against . . . fixed . . . standards or targets, it does not exist. (Elliott 2001a: 194)

But what is the rationale for RP? How rational is it? One strange effect of RP, which Elliott highlights, is that assessment of *quality*, in a 'transparent' model of accountability, is defined in *quantitative* terms. Another effect is that, driven by demands for 'total transparency', the tendency is for teachers' or academics' work to be broken down into discrete components, with clearly designated objectives assigned to each one such as 'preparation' time, 'planning' time, 'group' time, 'individual' time, and 'directed' time (Hargreaves 1994a: 113). Practical knowledge is formalized in explicit terms, with the effect that practitioners increasingly find fragmentation and displacement of core responsibilities and functions (more of this later, in Section 3.4).

Are there any further effects of RP? Consider the following:

> we can now draw up assessment criteria which can then be distributed to assessors and assessed alike. The whole process, being explicit and transparent, can now be audited and performances of both teachers and students can be evaluated. The situation has been reached in which what happens in the classroom and in the minds of the students and their teachers is wholly conducive to systematic monitoring, auditing and management. (Hussey and Smith 2002: 223)

Those who think that it is desirable that teachers' work is now 'conducive' to such systematic control clearly assume that adherence to RP provides the *best* way for all services to be run. But how compelling is the logic which grounds that assumption? Well, what is that logic?

Inspection of the literature suggests the following line of argument:

> "All sorts of activities and ventures fail because practitioners are not clear what they are doing. They need to be clearer about the aims of their activities. Or someone else needs to help them do this. This is especially true of large organizations. Among such larger organizations are public ones, which, in the past, before the public service reforms, failed conspicuously in this regard. Until better management practices forced professionals to be more accountable, knowledge was hidden in the 'secret garden' of those who claimed to have 'professional autonomy'. This was an unacceptable state of affairs, wide open to abuse and corruption. To counter these evils, knowledge must always be made more explicit. How else can we put any trust in public accountability? *Something* must secure clarity in organizations and democracy for the people. The answer to both problems is: *transparency*. We must make all public service organizations run as transparently as possible by specifying clearly practitioners' objectives and the targets they must aim for as goals."

This argument evidently overlooks the possibility that there were other deficiencies besides what are seen as the chief problems—'hidden' or 'secret' knowledge and 'professional autonomy'. The notion of trust has also been woven into the argument and that immediately raises the question of how conditions of trust within institutional contexts are cultivated and best preserved. I shall defer dealing with this question until Chapter 9. Meanwhile, let us consider the treatment of *explicitness* in this argument.

The idea that *some* explicitness might be necessary for the efficient running of an organization is one we need not deny. But in the argument it is extended into a quite different claim, namely, that *the more* explicitness there is in an organization the better. I put the fallacy in schematic form here:

(1) If some x is good, then the more x the better.

Therefore:

(2) If some explicitness is good, then the more explicitness (that can be instantiated in practices through RP) the better.

And then it seems we reach a universal proposition:

(3) What is *really best* is to extend RP to all public services.

Consider (1). If oxygen is good for a patient, then the more oxygen, the better? If a certain pesticide is good for growing carrots, then the more of this pesticide, the better? In its generality (1) is laughable. The conclusion (3) is groundless.

From our examination in Chapter 2 of the 'elective affinities' between economic neo-liberalism and managerialism, we see how easy it has been for *economic rationalization* to transmute into *managerial rationalization*. RP, we may predict, will never be abandoned until, as André Gorz (1989) writes in *Critique of Economic Reason*, 'economic reason' ceases to be given license to expand its territorial domain into every form of social practice. According to Gorz, there is an urgent need to determine which activities can be 'subordinated to economic rationalization without losing their meaning' (132–133).

3.4 'ECONOMIC REASON' AT WORK: THE CORROSION OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE UNDER MANAGERIAL MODES OF ACCOUNTABILITY

There do exist, of course, 'humanistic' approaches to systems-management theory that have their origins in the 'human relations' school of industrial psychology (Hatcher 2005: 254)—Human Resource Management (see Clarke and Newman 1997; Thrupp and Willmott 2003)—and which aim to place emphasis on persons as individuals. One might have thought this a way forward from the kind of rationalizing processes which we have been criticizing. But in practice these approaches have not completely shaken the mystique which attaches to a social scientific conception of management (Smith 2002; Fielding 1996).

Ideas such as 'self-management' and 'empowerment', it might also have been thought, would sweep away 'Fordist' or 'Taylorist' styles of line-management. But a 'contrived collegiality' is often all that is on offer: 'compulsory cooperation . . . collaborative planning, stage-managed mission statements . . . programmes . . . whose viability and practicality are not open to discussion' (Hargreaves 1994a: 80). Why is that? However consensual or 'team-building' the rhetoric, the decision-making of practitioners is still likely to be subsumed within a technical managerial specialist perspective (Ball 1990a: 157; Hatcher 2005). This is a perspective which requires activities and practices to conform to the 'imperative of monitoring'—rather than to 'their own intrinsic agendas' (Miller 1994: 26).

The epistemological implication of such conformity amounts, in brief, to this: the practical knowledge of agents (pertaining to a specific professional or occupational domain) will be re-conceptualized in two stages: (i) integrate all knowledge under a universalizing template of managerial principles; (ii) having objectified *the knowledge* (whatever happens to be the specialist source and domain of knowledge) in accordance with the lay-out of this epistemological template, divide up whatever practical aspects of the occupational 'know-how' can be codified into discrete, rule-based units or blocks of work for task and role purposes. When codified, the tasks can in theory be carried out by anyone who understands the operational rules, and various performance criteria.

Rationalization, in the sense we are concerned with, resonates with the *industrialization* process characteristic of the large Fordist, Taylorist-run factories in the early part of the last century: a process of systematizing agents' practical knowledge (or, as some will say, 'craft' knowledge); subdividing elements of that knowledge into smaller and more specialized tasks for production purposes. Modern forms of rationalization, even though more sophisticated, are grounded on the same kind of principle as were these older forms of industrial rationalization. After the re-organization of working practices in accordance with RP, it was assumed that a sufficient residue of practical knowledge, necessary for operational processes, would remain: knowledge that was once originally embodied in just one or a few persons would somehow find its own level in the new system, be made operational by many others, and then be just as serviceable as before. It was also assumed that some of the original personal and professional standards, inherent in the pre-rationalized, older service, would automatically carry over into the newly rationalized outfit.

Another assumption, which bears importantly on the issue of accountability, is that, post RP, it is no longer necessary for senior managers to possess any specialized knowledge or expertise relating to the occupation/profession they are responsible for managing. Nor is it necessary for them to observe practitioners directly at work. If managers can demonstrate to inspectors that relevant performance indicators and targets have been met then, using the technology of audit, they can prove 'systems of accountability' are in place. These are audacious assumptions. How well does the system work in practice?

Here let us turn aside from education to an area where we see managerial modes of accountability and RP fully exposed. For a description of the detrimental, practical effects which such modes of accountability and NPM principles can have on the running of a public service, consider some of the events which led up to a train crash in Hatfield, UK, in 2000, as documented by Ian Jack (2001) in *The Crash That Stopped Britain*. Our focus will be primarily on the *structure* of the model of management in use at the time of the crash and not on the fact that the model is an example of early privatization and deregulation of a public service institution. Our immediate interest here is in trying to identify the *epistemological* assumptions upon which the structure of an NPM inspired, managerial model of accountability is grounded and the culture arising from this model which conditioned decision-making on safety issues. According to the Rail Regulator, this culture was 'biased towards performance-driven decisions'.[9] The same kind of culture now permeates every public service institution: principles of NPM are 'applicable to all sorts of organizations', public or private (McSweeney 1996: 209).

Ian Jack reports that the train involved in the Hatfield crash came off the track rails at a curve that had been safely negotiated for 150 years. The 'immediate cause' was 'gauge corner cracking' (2001: 73) on a rail already

reported as defective and later found to show obvious signs of 'pre-crash metal distress'. Under these conditions speed limits ought to have been in operation on this section, pending a replacement rail. How was it possible, one might ask, when *five* different agencies of management[10] were contracted in one way or another to concern themselves with 'the same stretch of line' (64), for such an obviously faulty rail to be ignored?

One sort of answer will mention the temptation to which the whole system of industrial fines and rewards for 'efficiency savings' (2001: 53) subjected Railtrack to keep trains running at high speeds rather than slow them down or divert them from the line during repairs. Under pressure to meet targets, chief executives and managers may lose sight of the institutional goals that gave rise to the targets (Kay 2003: 354); targets will then take precedence over decisions as to what is really best to do in the actual here-and-now.

But *why* might managers lose sight? The fundamental problem was the structuring of the accountability system itself and the dispersal of responsibility between the various managerial units, each with its own commercial targets and responsibilities. Within this structure personal responsibility/responsibleness ebbed away between the many different sub-contracted sites, the 'interfaces' of management, and through 'confusing flows of money and paperwork' (Jack 2001: 65). *No one, in the end, took responsibility for the safety of the crucial bit of track at Hatfield.* The policy of outsourcing and sub-contracting different agencies of management to run a railway service led to the fragmentation of a service where individual personal responsibility was reduced to the point of non-existence.[11]

The question arises whether this apparent elusiveness of systemic accountability, due to the difficulty in locating personal responsibility/responsibleness, is an *inevitable* by-product of a system that still carries all the residual marks of 'management by objectives' (as discussed in the last chapter). According to the theoretical principles of such a system, governments impose economic 'market' disciplines on public service managers, through contracts and 'target specification'. As Kay (2003) says, micromanagement *means* 'the contractualization approach' (354).[12] For reasons of 'efficiency', and in order to satisfy the conditions under which funding is granted, people in such organizations, whether operating individually or as a group, work only on a need-to-know (and possibly 'quick-fix') basis to meet their own specific targets, thus complying with the original contracts made. The resemblance to Taylorism is striking. But here we see the application of neo-Taylorist principles of 'scientific management' outside spheres for which they were originally intended. It is this that pushes micromanagement beyond Taylorism into entirely new normative frameworks for conceptualizing public accountability.

This is no accident. With the rise of the idea of the consumer-is-sovereign, the institutional agenda of managerialism has developed its own norms, shaped by the exchange-value logic of the market. Organizations,

structured and regulated by contracts that create business units and set up internal purchaser/provider divisions (Clarke and Newman 1997: 146), are conceived as chains of 'low cost principal/agent relationships', rather than as 'fiduciary or trustee-beneficial ones' (Dunleavy and Hood 1994: 9), characteristic of an older paradigm of professionalism (Green 2004a).

When organizations are re-shaped under relations of the kind of accountability associated with NPM and performance management contracts, what then happens to the 'know-how'—the practical knowledge—of those whose jobs have been contracted out to agencies? One of the retired engineers whom Ian Jack interviewed said he had seen the virtual displacement of engineers from the business of running a railway. He spoke of *loss*—of the practical knowledge that had disappeared under managerial changes as a result of The Railways Act in 1993. He spoke, too, of the 'in-house' track maintenance gangs once answerable to the district engineer (pp.36–41):

> 'you'd never see a weed on the line. That was when you had six chaps working from the same hut, looking after their bit of track . . . The days of the line being patrolled by a man every day have gone. But it's worse than that. Not only have the maintenance structures disappeared, but the knowledge of what the structures *did* has disappeared.' (2001: 36–41)

Does such remembrance of times past point to a real problem? Or is there nothing more to be detected here than one man's wistful nostalgia?

To try to answer this question, and to focus on the kind of responsibility/responsibleness which is being invoked in the preceding quotation, let us ask how *safety* was conceived by one who worked in the railway service, prior to managerial re-organization. Judging by the engineer's reminiscences, safety was not designated as an explicit target against which 'standards' of safety could be measured.[13] Safety was so important that it was omnipresent in an engineer's 'occupational formation'. It did not need to be set as an explicit target for it conditioned everything. It was integrated with all the 'technical virtues' (Winch 2002b), particular to the practice of railway engineering. The motivation to maintain tracks safely was rooted in the engineers' experience, their practical, local knowledge, as well as their commitment to the standards which they believed their *métier* demanded of them. Like the ethical virtues, Winch suggests, technical virtues are directed towards *excellence*; they involve more than the simple accomplishment of competent performance.

Aristotle says that developing the kind of formation that aims at excellence 'takes time'. For it has to become a kind of *personal* knowledge, a part of oneself (see NE 1147a 21–22). Such knowledge is part of a person's own character 'formation'—or *Bildung* (to be discussed more fully in Chapters 5 and 6). Demands for explicitness or 'transparency' do not feature here. In a context where nothing counts as an end unless it is explicitly identified

as such, the *telos* of a service or a practice will be lost. That is the lesson of the tragedy at Hatfield. The story is familiar. Explicitness is always seen as the answer to all matters relating to accountability: unless safety is now made an explicit target, no one person or group of persons can be identified as being responsible for safety. For the engineers who were responsible for the maintenance of the tracks, before the advent of RP, however, safety was inseparable from the 'good' realized *in the practice of being an engineer.*

The fact that Railtrack's collapse finally forced track-engineering to be taken back 'in-house' suggests that managerialists themselves can be brought to realize deficiencies in the NPM model. Not that this realization has gone to the root of the problem or exposed the fallacy upon which the model is based. For the same sort of problems keep surfacing in other public services, where there can be nothing as visibly dramatic or tragic as the damage done by a train crash. I am thinking of education, health, police, fire services, and so on, where just as many layers of management operate and where each layer of management works to its own explicit objectives or targets. The principles of micro-management through the sub-contracting and 'outsourcing' of different parts of the various services still play a major role in the way those who work in the public sector are expected to account for themselves.

Policy-makers are not blind to these problems. Running parallel to the enthusiasm to outsource more and more is a new recognition of the negative consequences and problems which organizational fragmentation can bring. But what is the managerial 'solution'? As often as not, it is to create another tier of managers: 'joined-up' governance, or the 'politics of partnership' (Newman 2000: 52, 55) as attempts to bring unity and coherence to all the other managerial agencies!

It is an empirical matter, for future commentators, what success there has been in countering the fragmentation of services in this way. But so long as responsibility can trickle away when contracts become too complex for people to implement in practice; or when interstices and gaps that appear in the infrastructures of different agencies create disputed (and, in effect) 'non-liable' zones of management—so long as the foundational ideas of NPM remain—we must question the wisdom of what has become known as 'governing without governance' (Glatter 2003: 45–46). Governments, on this model, rule 'from a distance through devolved management' (Olssen et al. 2004: 138). Furthermore, 'governing without governance' leads to what has been described as 'opaque accountability': it seems the task of governing has outrun the capacity for governments to do much more than act as 'mediators', letting complex external networks of 'groupings' (the private and voluntary sectors, the professional experts, the consultants, etc.) undertake the job of 'governing' (Glatter 2003).

How can apologists for the status quo acquiesce in all this? The original aim of the public service reforms was to erect a new type of accountability system transparent to all. Can it be that the result is 'governing without

governance' and 'opaque accountability? Have we arrived at a *reductio ad absurdum* of the public service reform enterprise—the project of rationalizing public services for accountability purposes?

Perhaps these descriptions are not meant to be taken literally—they are to be taken as an ironic statement about our 'post-modern' condition, a reflection of the 'legitimation crisis' we are told all 'advanced' liberal societies now experience. In the early days of public service reform politicians in the Western world, as we discussed in the last chapter, became disenchanted with the ability of 'hierarchical' government bureaucracies to provide public services that were economically viable. They saw as a matter for reproof or censure the attachment public servants at that time had to 'outdated' liberal humanist public service ideals. But what has replaced all that? We now have the 'hollowed out' state phenomenon (Rhodes 1997: 17–18), where government has disengaged itself from managing its increasingly costly 'horizontal' networks of 'outsourced' and 'contracted-out' agencies. Why is such disengagement, expense, and lack of accountable management tolerated? Defenders of the status quo, will say that we *do* have very 'engaged', responsible people managing our public affairs—individuals appointed for their expertise and skills.

The point about 'expertise and skills' need not be disputed. The important point is to see the 'Managerial State' (Clarke and Newman 1997) for what it is. Within the state, a 'new magistracy'[14] has been formed to serve on government 'quangos' and various 'councils', 'audit offices', 'commissions', and 'trusts'. These agencies are governed by a small number of key individuals who hold 'multiple board-level positions in the new-style public sector' (Ferlie et al. 1996: 201). Just how transparent are *these* agencies?

What we have ended up with is beyond irony—beyond the playful tropes of critical theory. Managerialism has extended its empire, erected its own elite forms of power, and destroyed that which it never understood in the first place. With the advent of 'opaque accountability', it now also appears to have lost its own plot! Where is personal responsibility/responsibleness in 'opaque accountability'? What is the substitute for it? What, after all this, is the 'New Public' accountability?

3.5 TRANSPARENCY AS OPACITY

To survive in our 'performative', 'name and shame' culture, organizations will continue to meet targets which ensure funding and avoid sanctions, even if it means 'playing the system' and trying to make league tables look better than they really are.[15] This may happen even with 'laudable objectives' (Tsoukas 1994: 6). But if, as a result of the pressures which managerialism places on organizational life, such distortions *are* taking place, then what has become of the venerable ideal of transparency? Why has transparency been uncoupled from honesty? The answers to these questions go back

to the perceived political need for 'economic rationalization' (discussed earlier, Sections 3.2 to 3.4)—the project to rationalize organizations in accordance with 'management by accounting'.

However well-intentioned the thinking may have been behind the idea of trying to rationalize everything as explicitly as possible—to improve standards of public accountability and quality within educational institutions—we have clearly arrived at a paradox. In forcing institutions to adapt to 'the simplifying tendencies of the quantification of outputs' (Trow 1994: 41–44), the paradoxical result is that practitioners now have to spend 'more and more energy on the demands of managerialism', in order *to prove* their accountability. This leaves less and less time to concentrate on 'the daily business of teaching and learning'.

Michael Power (1994) points to a similar, related paradox latent in the search for transparency:

> Audit practices are publicly represented within extensive rhetorics of accountability and transparency. And yet auditing practice denies the very ideals which mobilize it. The paradox . . . arises because . . . *how* an audit is done is less important than *that* it is done. In other words, considerable symbolic and financial capital is invested in the activity of audit without a corresponding publicity of process and results. (304)

Power's analysis shows us why the pressures now placed on practitioners to meet explicit objectives may result in what Stephen Ball refers to as *fabrications of evidence* (Ball 2003a, 2006) in order to fit their actions to measurable targets demanded by managers. These 'fabrications' are the frequent response to the pressures linked to funding and pay (Ball 2001a) and lead so easily to paradox: 'Performativity produces opacity rather than transparency, as individuals and organizations take ever greater care in the construction and maintenance of fabrications' (Ball 2003a: 215).

Such 'fabrications' are not confined to educational practices. 'Fabrications' takes place, for example, in local councils, hospitals or doctors' surgeries, police stations, and so on, where clear, explicit objectives are the political target. Take, for example, the target *to bring waiting lists down*. 'Waiting lists' have been 'brought down' only because other 'lists', designated as non-urgent, have been allowed to grow: they are not under political scrutiny at the time. Such maneuvers artificially manipulate figures to obtain the desired statistics. The statistics make *visible* what it is politically or managerially expedient to make visible—'selective visibilities' (Hopwood 1984: 178).

One effect, then, of 'management by accounting', as it plays out in practice, is that it encourages managers to 'reconfigure' organizations (Miller 1994: 2), to influence what is to *count* as 'desirable and significant' (Hopwood 1984). Take the idea of 'performance indicators'. What *are* they exactly? They are highly selective objectifications of 'performances',

suggests the anthropologist, Marilyn Strathern (2000b), who helps unravel the different layers of 'visibility' subsisting in managerial cultures:

> what is concealed are the 'real' facts about how the organisation operates . . . implicit knowledge that makes interactions between people in an organisation work to make the organisation work . . . [T]he language of assessment, in purporting to be a language that makes output transparent, hides many dimensions of the output process . . . The rhetoric of transparency appears to conceal that very process of concealment . . . Realities are knowingly eclipsed. (314–315)

It is worth unravelling this. Strathern is pointing out how easy it is in our present accountability system, when only the explicit is valued, to be deceived into thinking that some things do not count as 'real' in a work situation. So as far as the demands of 'transparent accountability' are concerned, the kind of implicit knowledge which we embody in our everyday 'interactions' with others at work, the vital 'glue' which holds an organization, its people and its core purposes together, will appear less 'real' than the 'fabrications' we present to the auditors—as our 'real' work!

But if 'realities', as she suggests, are 'knowingly eclipsed' in this way—simply because they are unrecordable and do not fall under the radar of an audit review—and we see only too well the way in which our actions, situated within such a system of accountability, cannot avoid sometimes being opaque and inauthentic (because of 'fabrications'), then we should ask, what does the NPM model of public service reform *add* to the idea of public accountability? What does it add if the problems that it creates, especially in relation to personal and professional responsibility, are so clear to us, and we see how easily it can turn sour what should be an unambiguous social and democratic ideal—the ideal of transparency?

3.6 CONCLUSIONS

First, *prima facie*, the demand seems persuasive for public accountability in a democracy to be secured by explicitness and transparency. But neither democracy nor accountability ought to be assumed to issue from the teaming up of these ideas.[16] It does not follow, however, that we should launch an *all-out* assault on the idea of explicitness. Any appreciation of the regulatory functions of bureaucracy will tell us that certain sorts of explicitness need to be available on demand in an organization. Efficient bureaucratic management will entail the co-ordination of activities in a proper sequence for tasks to be done; individuals will need to know what their roles and responsibilities are. But it is also important to recognize the limits to what can be *made* explicit for standardization purposes in organizations (Ritzer 1996). Some kinds of practical activities and areas of expertise ('know-how')

may in fact be impossible to codify or articulate fully in words.[17] (More of this in Part II of the book.)

Second, at its best, the *ideal* of transparency stands as an inspirational goal for those in public positions to aspire to virtues of honesty, fairness, openness, truthfulness, and to pledge a commitment to public accountability. Holding transparency up as an ideal in practice helps enhance the democratic credentials of public institutions by giving people the right to know and trust what is being done in their name. But transparency, understood within the context of our present 'performativity' culture, runs the risk of making practices vulnerable to 'reductionism and distortion' (see Fielding 2001c: 148). There is a further risk: excessive transparency will inhibit creativity because it encourages defensiveness and risk-averseness.

Third, when *the idea* of transparency is used as 'an instrument of hierarchical control', then it may operate paradoxically, in a non-transparent way, 'through opportunistic blame deflection' (Heald 2006: 64)—the sort of activity which we discussed in Section 3.5, associated with the 'fabrications' practitioners may resort to in a 'high stakes' culture of managerial audit-accountability. Such fabrications undermine trust in professional judgment (O'Neill 2002: 63–79) by diverting the agent's attention away from his or her own objects of responsible deliberation, choice, and reasoning, in the direction only of managerial ends. It is in its potential capacity to undermine the value of practical judgment that the 'tyranny of transparency' (Strathern 2000b) lies—and from where we now see the *coercive* nature of managerialism originates.

Fourth, if this is correct, then it follows that any accountability system that elevates the ideal of transparency into a predominant organizational principle of management runs the risk of producing distorting effects on the practical judgment of agents. The intrinsic value of transparency is no greater than the intrinsic value of honesty. Once the idea of transparency comprehends something other than honesty and it is set up as *the* predominant organizational ideal, then other worthy ideals, equal contenders for consideration in an agent's decision-making and deliberation, will be marginalized. However, as Christopher Hood (2006), who has written extensively on the subject of transparency, remarks, it is easy to *say* that transparency is 'a value that has to be traded off . . . against other equally important values' (221–222). The difficult questions which remain are 'to identify exactly what those trade-offs are' and how we 'distinguish valuable transparency from more negative forms' (222).

Finally, Hood hints at the direction in which further debate on these issues may develop. But the idea of 'trade-offs' may not be the most helpful metaphor to work with. Perhaps it is best to avoid talking in terms of polarities, binaries or zero-sum terms, pitching, say, *regulation* against the *autonomy* of professionals, or vice versa. For neither the notion of professional autonomy or regulation stands alone. Both concepts need to be embedded in a wider range of ethical, social, and civic issues to do with

professionalism. Rather than *trade offs*, we need to seek ways in which professional autonomy and regulation may complement each other. We need to find the most effective point on a continuum of degrees of regulation (Lunt 2008: 86), one which leaves room for professionals to exercise their ordinary practical reason and judgment.

This chapter brings to an end Part I of the book. We have been tracing the way certain ideas, ideals, and ideologies have shaped present understandings of accountability and brought into being what I have referred to throughout as 'managerial modes of accountability', a place holder for the kind of bureaucratic, 'performative' regimes, associated with NPM, or, more derogatively, with 'managerialism'. The focus in the last three chapters has been on exploring the way a seemingly good idea—*making practices more explicit for accountability purposes*—ends up, paradoxically, creating opacity and encouraging 'fabrications' in the sense we discussed earlier.

It should be made clear that the problems I identify cannot be put down simply to *mismanagement*. The problems are fundamentally systemic. The example I gave of the train crash (described in Section 3.4) aimed to show how responsibility easily dissipates when there are too many complex interfaces between management agencies.

Some final thoughts about how 'transparent accountability' has played out in practice. As part of a public service reform program begun several decades ago, managerial modes of accountability have aimed at ever-more explicitness to monitor individual knowledge bases. Whether the field is education, health, social care, children's probation service, local government, the justice system, the police, or fire service, what we find are accountability systems engineered to be universally applicable to and for *all* contexts. But, as I shall argue in Part II of the book, such an aim is inconsistent with the operation of the practical knowledge of those who wish to direct their work at *that for the sake of which* an organization exists. Moreover, there is no basis in reason to the claim that one kind of managerial model of accountability is universally appropriate for all contexts. For even if *every* situation requires some form of accountability, it does not follow that there is *one* form of answer to every question of accountability.

Part II

Practical Judgment

4 Responsibility and Accountability

> Discussions of Accountability are peculiarly subject to technical regression; arguments about values soon become arguments about techniques.
>
> William Taylor (1978: 26)

> . . . the very close though not quite simple or uniform connection between moral experience . . . and the experience of reciprocity, mutual responsibility, and 'demands' both binding *upon* the moral agent and represented *by* him in relation with others. Society as a medium of morality means an indefinitely open field of virtual accountability, of reciprocal inspectorates . . . a tribunal extending beyond all particular group limits . . .
>
> Aurel Kolnai (1977: 147)

4.1 THE APPROPRIATION, BY MANAGERS, OF THE NOTION OF 'ACCOUNTABILITY'

Some critics of managerialism, wishing to distance themselves from how accountability is now understood, have suggested that because the word 'accountability' carries within it all that is found offensive about micro-management, we should focus instead on the notion of responsibility. 'Accountability' is 'punitive' and 'pre-dominantly contractual . . . in its discourse', Michael Fielding (2001b) argues. It is with the concept of 'responsibility' that we shall locate ethical intent on the part of an agent:

> the distinctions between accountability and responsibility point to two contrasting realities and intentions . . . Because responsibility is primarily a moral, not a technical or contractual notion, it both elicits and requires a felt and binding mutuality that does not depend upon hierarchical structures so typical of accountability. (699)

Fielding's argument is an endorsement and elaboration of Inglis's (2000) argument that the political, moral, and existential qualities of the two notions, accountability and responsibility, are different. And other critics of managerialism, who would clearly be in agreement with such views, point out that accountability is now 'equated narrowly with the use of accounting procedures' (Willmott 1996: 31), and that 'what is being assured is the quality of control systems rather than the quality of first order operations': 'In such a context, accountability is discharged by demonstrating the

existence of . . . systems of control, not by demonstrating good teaching, caring . . . ' (Power 1994b: 19).

If we do not 'declare in precise terms, the ends achieved . . . according to specific goals set', then we lay ourselves 'open to some possible disciplinary reaction' (Laughlin 1996: 228). This is precisely 'the culture and practice of blame' which Fielding describes.

The impression we take away from all these critiques is that we should abandon the use of the word 'accountability': it has been despoiled by its association with the 'performative' culture which managerialism encourages. We should, instead, 'rehabilitate' responsibility (Gaden 1999).

What are we to make of these critiques? The *responsibility* of a teacher, it might be agreed, goes much wider than any accountability targets that originate in central government and 'cascade' down through various bodies to whom the teacher is accountable, ending with the 'expected performances of individual teachers' (Pring 2001a: 281). For included in the teacher's *responsibilities* to her pupils or students will be those classroom virtues that attach to 'duty of care': reliability, fairness, tolerance, patience, and so on. One who recognizes such a duty will possess the virtue of *responsibleness*. The notion of accountability (as we shall see soon, when we examine some dictionary definitions) *should* be broad enough to absorb this virtue in its scope of meaning. For the concept of accountability is Janus-faced. Accountability can be understood as something 'external' to an agent, 'an outwardly directed accountability' (Kemp 1999: 306)—accountability as adherence to explicitly laid out regulations of an institution, set down in contract and extending to wider centers of authority which regulate and monitor the institution. But also, importantly, accountability can be understood in ethical terms, as something 'internal' to an agent, an 'inwardly directed accountability' (306).

To this extent it is very clear how ethically barren, under present managerial influences, the notion of *educational accountability* has now been rendered by the impoverishment of the broader umbrella concept it comes under, namely, *accountability*. It has been made morally barren because those who promoted the managerial practices of 'New Public Management' (NPM), in the first wave of public service reforms (discussed in Chapter 2), were able to capitalize upon the etymological roots of 'accountability' which derive from the world of accountancy and audit.[1] 'Accountability', as we saw, soon became synonymous with 'management by accounting' (McSweeney 1996). This is precisely what Fielding and Inglis find offensive and inadequate for conceptualizing educational aims, purposes, and practices.

But, strongly though I endorse the general criticisms Fielding and Inglis make of a managerial conception of accountability, I wonder whether we should be so quick to agree with them that the notions of accountability and responsibility should be *severed* in the way they suggest. There is a risk of losing something we might regret. For if we do sever them, then it makes it difficult to adopt the widely accepted principle that people should only be

accountable for those acts for which they are responsible or for those factors which it is within their power to influence (Winch 1997: 64).

MacIntyre (1999) appears to endorse this principle:

> Moral agents . . . have to understand themselves as accountable, not only in their roles, but also as rational individuals . . . [W]hen responsibility is detached from accountability, what follows about the responsibility of moral agents *qua* moral agents? (316)

So to sever links between responsibility and accountability would seem to go against a strong tradition of thought. In 1876 F. H. Bradley wrote, 'For practical purposes we need make no distinction between responsibility, or accountability, and liability' (in Haines 1955: 141). Admittedly, Bradley was talking about punishment here. But even if it is agreed that 'accountability' is 'by no means the whole . . . and not even the most significant meaning of responsibility' (141), is it wise to let the concept of accountability be appropriated for managerial and audit use only? Would this not be to acquiesce in just one more case of what Fielding (1994) himself calls 'linguistic robbery' (19)?

4.2 COMPLEXITIES INHERENT IN THE NOTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Even though the concept *accountability* is not included in Raymond Williams's (1983) book *Keywords*, it would be a good candidate:

> . . . every word which I have included has at some time, in the course of some argument, virtually forced itself on my attention because the problems of its meanings seem to me inextricably bound up with the problems it was being used to discuss. (15)

Anyone who becomes interested in the subject of *accountability*—from whatever aspect—will resonate to the problem Williams points to here. So often one finds that an author, in the process of trying to elucidate the idea of accountability, has need to appeal to concepts which are as complex as the notion of accountability itself: *autonomy*, *responsibility*, *trust*, *competence*, *professionalism*, *standards*, *transparency*, *quality*, and *excellence*—to name just a few.

There are especial problems of this nature when attempts are made to unravel the notion of *educational accountability*. Consider, for instance, the 'professional' model of educational accountability that Hugh Sockett expounds (1980, 1990, 1993). His hope is to re-instate some substantive notion of the *professional teacher*, and to explain accountability in terms of 'principles of practice' that will respect 'professional autonomy'.

Much as I agree with the spirit of Sockett's argument which seeks a different vision from the 'productivity managerialist order' (Kogan 1989: 140) now endemic in our educational practices, we still have to ask how far it can take us in the face of the present reality—a reality that accommodates standardized testing, audit monitoring, and accountability regimes. These regimes which reflect the neo-liberal global economy agenda have overturned established meanings of professionalism. Is his notion still available?

In Chapter 1 we discussed Michael Barber's reassurances that 'more informed' and 'knowledge rich' forms of teacher professionalism now offer what he regards as a 'world-class' education that older, traditional ones never could. I argued that whether these new forms of teacher professionalism really are 'better' (as he insists) must remain controversial. Those who support Barber's approach (apologists for the status quo) may think the matter closed, but if they do, they are begging the question. For it is clear that the concept of professionalism—and the very meaning of the term—is itself the site of ideological struggle (Sachs 2003: 3). That is why arguments such as those Bailey (1980) or Sockett (1980) present, proposing a model of educational accountability consistent with traditional definitions of 'professional autonomy', will stand awkwardly with now dominant conceptions of what it means to be a 'professional' teacher, as it does with received understandings of standards of public accountability (Kogan 1989: 137). Why? Because the *idea* of public accountability cannot now be separated from the political and economic ideas, ideals, and ideologies upon which the rationale of NPM was first based. In Chapter 2, I referred to the 'elective affinities' that exist between *managerial accountability* and NPM neo-liberal principles of governance. Because of these 'affinities', a *market accountability*, arising through the democratic process, has been co-opted effortlessly into current policy discourses on, say, 'effective' school management, 'school improvement', 'transformational leadership'—discourses which are intended to shape present understandings of what counts (in the relevant contexts) as *public*, *democratic*, *professional*, or *educational* accountability.

But there are further problems. Consider the following suggestion made in 1979 that there are three 'facets' of accountability:

> Answerability to one's clients (moral accountability), responsibility to oneself and one's colleagues (professional accountability); and accountability in the strict sense to one's employers or political masters (contractual accountability).[2]

All these years later, what are we to make of this? If it is meant as a complete typology of different aspects of public accountability, then it is unequal to the complexities of our present market-managerial educational status quo. Writing at a time when corporatism had not yet crept so invasively into

the operation of all public sector institutions, these authors leave no room for yet another ubiquitous type of accountability which permeates policy discourses on educational accountability: *stakeholder accountability*. Educators are now contracted to fulfill government's expectations of particular 'audiences' (Preedy et al. 2003: 53) in terms of standards, outcomes, and results that can be measured. They are also expected to be 'responsive'[3] to the interests of relevant stakeholders—parents, governors, education authorities, central government, inspectorates, local communities, and business interests (8).

Already we are close to conceptual overload! Within a moment of beginning our enquiry into the idea of *educational accountability* (via Sockett's notion of 'substantial professionalism'), we have been catapulted into an ontology of diverse 'accountabilities'—*public*, *professional*, *performance*, *managerial*, *market*, *financial*, *democratic*, *moral*, *contractual*, *stakeholder*—so far. How are we to keep track of their relations to one another? We can see, for instance, that the 'financial' accountability of a governing body in a school is not the same as the 'moral' or 'professional' accountability of a teacher (Lallo 1993: 2). But is there something that links them? The neo-Platonist question that lurks here—and which might well lead us astray in enquiry—is whether all the different varieties of accountability come under some overarching Ideal Form of Accountability, in the way Plato thought all the varieties of good came under the Form of the Good.

Let us re-direct the question and see if we can avoid the Platonist route. What we need to keep in mind is MacIntyre's idea of the 'moral agent' discussed earlier. We are trying to prevent accountability and responsibility from decoupling. John Lallo's (1993) understanding of accountability, which he claims elucidates the idea of educational accountability, offers us a way of harnessing these two concepts:

> [Accountability] involves reporting to other people about what you are doing, voluntarily or compulsorily. It means having a conscience or a moral responsibility about what you are doing. It means being answerable to other people both junior and senior . . . It is part of the essential administrative cement in a democratic society. (1)

This description shows the kind of complexities—indeed, even the political dimensions—and many layers of meaning we should be prepared to embrace in the idea of 'accountability'. It also shows the inadequacy of conceptualizing 'accountability' in purely audit-accounting terms. The refracted nature of accountability described above reflects what Kogan (1986: 26) calls 'restricted' and 'diffuse' concepts of accountability—both of which, he suggests, can be at work *at the same time* in any educational discourse. 'Restricted' relates to the 'external', formal, contractual side of accountability: 'rendering accounts to bodies in authority'. 'Diffuse' forms of

accountability relate to the 'internal' aspects of accountability, finding their realization in 'the general responsibility that any worker feels, or should feel, towards those affected by his work', if placed 'in a position of trust'.[4]

Like Kogan, Richard Laughlin (1996) also sees different layers of accountability at work at the same time. But he adds a new point. He interprets the refracted nature of accountability in terms of the moral legitimacy of those who are in a position to expect accountability from others. Even though there might be clear, explicit lines of accountability, assumptions about legitimacy, power, and meaning are implicitly contained in *any* accountability relationship: 'there is a moral relationship involved, whereby an individual or small group is exercising domination over another to ensure that something, meaningfully defined, is done by that person or persons' (229).

'Accountability', on this analysis, suggests the need for a 'moral space' to remain open in order that questions regarding the nature and legitimacy of a particular accountability relationship may be raised. When we are asked to do to do *x*, *y*, or *z*, *in the name of accountability*, we should not be prevented from asking what the purpose of doing those things might be. What ends are in view? Without the freedom to 'stop and think', as Hannah Arendt puts it[5]—without the opportunity, that is, to use our ordinary practical reason and, if necessary, distance ourselves from routine actions or from the people who are asking us to do *x*, *y*, or *z*—we run the risk of transforming ourselves from a loyal worker or citizen into a perpetrator of wrongdoing or evil (Arendt 2003; Bauman 1989; Munro 1998).

When the notion of accountability is viewed from this kind of personal and ethical standpoint, it suggests even more that, rather than *abandon* the use of the word 'accountability', we need, rather, to *reclaim* it. We need to reinstate the links that should exist between *the virtue of responsibleness* and *the idea of accountability*.

4.3 SOME DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS: RESPONSIBILITY AS ACCOUNTABILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY AS RESPONSIBILITY

To make a start on this work, consider a selection of dictionary entries for 'accountability' and 'responsibility'.[6] They reveal an intricate network of cross-referencing. According to the following dictionary definitions, [A] and [B], it is simply not true that 'accountability' and 'responsibility' point to contrasting realities. Conceptually, they are clearly inter-related. Among the various definitions offered we find that a notion of 'responsibility as accountability' (Darwall 2006: 69) as much as 'accountability as responsibility' is readily available:

[A] Accountable: **adj.**
- (i) (of a person, organization or institution) required or expected to justify actions or decisions;
- (ii) responsible (*to*, *for*);
- (iii) liable to be called to account;
- (iv) to be counted on;
- (v) explicable;

derivatives. accountability

[B] Responsible **adj.**
- (i) answerable, accountable (*to* another *for* something);
- (ii) liable to be called to account;
- (iii) answerable to a charge;
- (iv) having an obligation to do something . . . as part of one's job or role;
- (v) reliable, trustworthy;
- (vi) morally accountable for one's actions;
- (vii) capable of rational conduct;
- (viii) capable of fulfilling an obligation or trust;

Responsibility **noun.**
- (i) the state or fact of being accountable or to blame for something;
- (ii) a charge, trust for which one is responsible;
- (iii) the state or fact of being responsible;
- (iv) the opportunity or ability to act independently and take decisions without authorization;

derivatives. responsibleness **noun.** responsibly **adv.**

From these definitions we detect that 'accountability' and 'responsibility' share similar conceptual links to 'obligation', 'being answerable', 'explaining', 'justifying', or 'being called to account', depending on whether *explicability*, *liability*, *responsibility*, *or answerability* is being considered (Haines 1955) and on whether reasons demanded for the 'account' are expected to be causal or justificatory. In view of the range of meanings that may be ascribed to 'responsibility' and to avoid ambiguity I frequently prefer 'responsibleness' to 'responsibility' when I specifically want the noun to carry the idea of a virtue (such as trustworthiness or reliability). And in this connection, we can see that the entry for 'trust' extends the network of shared concepts by *including* the idea of responsibility:

[C] Trust: **noun.** The state of being responsible for someone or something—in a position of trust.

So, given the links between *responsibility–accountability* and *responsibility–trust*, we should not allow 'accountability' to be reduced to 'management by accounting' or be squeezed dry of moral import. Moreover, we can see that it is not just 'accountability' (as Fielding and Inglis suggest) that is associated with the idea of 'blame'. Blame or censure may be correctly apportioned to someone who acted *irresponsibly*:[7]

> [D] Blame: Responsibility for anything wrong.[8]

Once we acknowledge, however, that openness to blame constitutes part of the meaning of responsibility we see just how irretrievably inter-related is the relationship between accountability and responsibility. In this connection we must not forget *negligence*. But where the question is, "Who is to be held to account?", I argue that need not mean, "Who failed to follow the line-manager's instructions?"

4.4 CLEARING UP SOME PUZZLES ABOUT 'ROLE RESPONSIBILITY'

The etymology of 'to be responsible' is 'to be answerable' (from the Latin *respondeo*: 'I answer'), as in the idea of a person's being answerable for an action. *Answerability*, I suggest, provides the first step in linking accountability to responsibility.

Graham Haydon (1978) offers us the next step by suggesting that it is through the notion of accountability (48) that we can understand attributions of responsibility, as 'an approved quality either to some instance of conduct, or dispositionally, to a person' (46). Here, though, we may already be wondering what is meant by *being a responsible agent*.

H. L. A. Hart's classification of responsibility into five types—causal, legal, moral, capacity, and role—is considered by Haydon (1978), but he distrusts the idea that 'one particular sense of responsibility' can incorporate the sense of what *being responsible* means (48), even that of 'role-responsibility':

> a person is often judged to be responsible or irresponsible not just with respect to the specific obligations needing to be undertaken in the role but also with respect to his or her *fulfilment of* and *attitude to* the responsibilities of the role. (58)

Haydon's analysis shows the notion of 'role responsibility' will represent a web of inter-related responsibilities which help define 'the role'. Cribb (2006) considers three dimensions: 'institutional' (what my employer demands), 'professional' (the professional code expected of me), or 'vocational' (deeper traditions and values I hold dear). So there can then be no simple answer to the question, "What is my responsibility?"—it will

depend on the context of inquiry and an understanding of one's role played in the whole work enterprise. In this connection, Bernard Williams (1993b: 55–56) warns against thinking that there might be 'one correct conception of responsibility'.[9]

If we are to hold on to the notion of accountability, as just one of the many concepts that responsibility is related to, then Haydon's (1978) suggestion is that

> Apart from the derivative causal sense, to be responsible is to be, *in one way or another*, in a position to give an account of one's conduct . . . the person who is most likely consistently to give a satisfactory account is one whose conduct is informed by the realization that an account . . . can be appropriately called for. (This is not the thought that anyone actually will ask . . . [for] . . . an account; rather . . . it is part of the agent's awareness of his situation as an agent in the social world.) The person who realizes this is . . . the responsible person . . . (55)

This is a helpful framework for building a bridge between the two concepts, accountability and responsibility, for re-ethicizing the concept of accountability and for showing what is involved in the idea of *being answerable*. The idea of someone's being prepared to be 'called to account', as we saw from dictionary definitions, is one of the classic ways of understanding what it is to be accountable. Haydon (1978: 56) offers the *additional* idea of an agent's having 'an awareness', or a 'realization' that an account 'can be appropriately called for' (even though, as he says, no one might ask for it). An agent's sense of responsibility is to be understood, therefore, in *dispositional terms*: a 'capacity' to choose how to act, in awareness of the possibility of being called to account for whatever choices are made.

Whatever decisions agents make, they are responsible because they will be aware that actions 'do not take place in a causal vacuum' (Haydon 1978: 56). John Lucas, too, conceives the responsible person as someone who is 'aware of the causal nexus' surrounding decisions made and activities undertaken—aware, that is, not just of 'the actually foreseen, but for the reasonably foreseeable' consequences of their actions (Lucas 1993: 52). There are important moral distinctions to keep clear here: the difference between *what we do* and *what we allow to happen*; and between *what we aim at* and *what we foresee as the result of what we do* (Foot 1985: 23).

4.5 AN AMBIGUITY IN THE IDEA OF 'BEING CALLED TO ACCOUNT'

In this section, I extend Haydon's argument to show that, although it is right to draw our attention to the idea that the responsible person will always be potentially 'aware' that she might be 'called to account', there is an

important ambiguity in this idea that needs to be brought out, an ambiguity which, if not exposed, only feeds managerialism exactly what it wants. We must avoid falling into the trap of assuming that all goal-oriented activity has to be articulated in a language of objectives and targets and that 'awareness' can automatically be reduced to propositional thought. This would be to encourage the kind of managerialism we discussed in Chapter 2, namely, 'management to excess . . . the view that not only *can* everything be managed but that everything *should* be managed' (Hoyle 2008: 286).

As we saw in Chapter 3, in its quest for 'transparency', managerial modes of accountability are characterized by precise rules, codified regulations, and procedures without which it will be assumed that nothing will demarcate the accountable from the unaccountable. But the truth is that being accountable is not always a matter of exactitude (Bennett 1980: 15). As Lucas (1993) points out,

> however much we specify reasons, we find occasions when it is reasonable to do something which outruns the reasons we have specified . . . [I]f we require people only to act on reasons they can subsequently give, we are preventing them acting on a hunch or other intuitive reasons they believe are cogent but could not defend to a hostile questioner. Instead of asking myself whether I am really doing my job properly, I concentrate on making sure that I can answer the questions other people may put to me . . . (186)

In this light we see that *answerability*, however helpful as a 'bridging' concept between responsibility and accountability, masks what seems, *prima facie*, to be a conceptual incoherence: that in the idea of expecting someone to be answerable—'to be able to give an account'—there may be much that lies in the 'account' that will be resistant to full explication. In pressing for 'an account' we may be asking too much (perhaps the person in question finds it difficult to articulate precise reasons) or too little (we do not want to hear clever exculpation).

In answer to the problem that has now emerged let us start with Lucas's (1993) idea of *negative responsibility* (53). For Lucas, negative responsibility is a 'duty of care' responsibility. Where something goes wrong and there is some special reason why I should have tried to do something about it, I shall be asked, "Why didn't you do something about it?" But 'duty of care' responsibility also applies in the here-and-now of real-life practice. If I am a responsible person at work I need to be prepared for contingencies to occur which might slow me down or throw me off course. If things go *really* wrong I shall need to ask, "What can I do to prevent things getting worse?"; or, "How can I make the best of the situation?".

What I choose to do in circumstances when things 'go wrong' cannot be prescribed in advance through a set of precautionary instructions ("Do this if X occurs . . .") simply because of the impossibility of predicting everything that could potentially go wrong. It will take a certain kind of

practical knowledge to be able to respond intelligently and flexibly to contingency and changed circumstances, a form of practical judgment associated with the 'know how' of one's *métier*—which I refer to in the next two chapters as *métier-phronesis* (modelled on the Aristotelian notion of *phronesis*). Ensuring that certain bad outcomes do not occur may even 'require us to undertake actions we would not normally do' (Lucas 1993: 53). So even where I am appointed to a specific task to achieve a certain goal, it is *also* my responsibility to try to avert bad (or evil) side-effects and to waste no effort in counter-productive acts in the process. But nobody can write all this up in the form of objectives or targets. Having 'negative responsibility' is an inherently, implicit (non-explicit, inarticulate) form of knowledge which the responsible person will show they have by embodying it *in action*. Here is a chance for the virtue of *responsibleness* to come alive.

'Negative responsibility' thus *extends* the concept of responsibility by allowing the agent just the kind of indefiniteness which we met in the last chapter (Section 3.2), in connection with the 'open-endedness' which was characteristic of Hans Jonas's concept of 'feeling responsible'. The concept of negative responsibility shows up starkly the difficulties in thinking it is always possible to specify precisely the terms on which accountability will be judged by another. Lucas (1993) considers what might be 'the criteria for successful discharge' of someone's responsibilities:

> There is no one goal of endeavour but a heterogeneous collection of awkwardnesses to be avoided and problems to be diffused, with little . . . to show . . . except that things are no worse than they were at the outset. (55)

But, if so, then one's general accountability is not only open-ended. It is also, as Lucas says, 'inherently limited': 'nobody can be required to answer for everything' (186). And this 'limitation' bears importantly on how one is to assess someone's discharge of responsibilities. Sometimes duties are specified minutely, and it may be appropriate to do so, suggests Lucas. But there is always a cost: the more someone is tied down by specific instructions, or the more someone has to provide explicit reasons why they are going to do something, the less they can be held responsible to see to it that things go well generally within their sphere of responsibility.[10] Unless we really want the agent under certain stated conditions to report a specified task as impossible to do then we should implicitly agree to accept their judgment in the absence of weighty reasons not to act (185–186).

4.6 ANOTHER AMBIGUITY: 'HAVING A REASON'

Managerial 'transparency', as we saw in the last chapter, can demand of agents that they account for their actions through an 'audit' trail, one which articulates the rationale and justification of 'outcomes' planned, or

performance indicators, standards, or targets demonstrated. From this perspective, purposive action requires from an agent a high degree of articulacy—a preparedness to specify in advance of acting thus and so, what he or she is going to do and why: this is the way 'success' criteria are now checked. In the absence of such articulacy, the assumption would be that the agent is not acting professionally or accountably. But is it always necessary to provide an explicit reason for acting thus and so? More specifically, must we see practical rationality only in terms of the giving and demanding of reasons for conduct? Williams (1993a) suggests not:

> When we say that someone ought to have acted in some required or desirable way in which he has not acted, we sometimes say that *there was a reason* for him to act that way . . . Although we can say this, it does not seem to be connected in any secure way with the idea that *he had a reason* to act in that way. Perhaps he had no reason at all. In breaking an obligation he was not necessarily behaving irrationally or unreasonably, but badly. (192)

To have a reason (*logon echein*) does not necessarily mean one can give it (*logon didonai*)—this is the way Lucas (1993: 186), drawing on Aristotle, puts the matter. We can be good but inarticulate deciders (57), able to size up a situation rapidly, to act in a certain way, but unable to subject every reason we might have, to explicit examination. This may be because 'we can never completely specify the vast amount of collateral knowledge which we bring to bear in responding to an ordinarily complex situation' (Hampshire 1978: 89).

Does this convince? We need to understand more about the dialectic at play, between reasons that need to be explicitly articulated and ones that do not, when an agent is engaged in goal-oriented, intentional action. The *activity of reasoning*, Aristotle, Lucas, and Williams are saying, need require no more than that an agent be in a certain mental-cognitive state; and being in such a state is perfectly intelligible and rational without that agent's having *to make explicit* their reasoning. (More of this in Chapters 7 and 8.)

G. F. Schueler (2003) argues for a position sympathetic to this view. He suggests that someone who acts for a reason 'must at a minimum take some consideration, at least one, as *providing* some reason' for acting as they do (159). But although it is 'essential' that the agent gives the consideration 'some weight' in her deliberations, she can do this 'without ever formulating to herself the explicit thought that this consideration provides her with a reason to act':

> She need not 'say to herself' that this consideration provides her with a reason . . . Of course . . . she might formulate the explicit thought that this consideration gives her a reason to act in this way. But formulating

> the explicit thought, and even perhaps sincerely agreeing to it, say, verbally, is neither necessary nor sufficient for it to be true of her that she regards this consideration as a reason to do what she does. (159)

The idea, then, of having an 'awareness' (in Haydon's sense; see again Section 4.4) suggests that one's ability to form beliefs in a way that is 'responsive to evidence is not at all the same as the ability to present reasons for one's beliefs, either to others or to oneself'.[11] The problem we face here, once more, is one of ambiguity. The notion of 'having a reason for action' is ambiguous. For reasons can *justify* as well as *motivate* and, however logically separate they might be (Straughan 1988: 11), in practice, these functions may be inextricably entwined.

So even if it sounds counter-intuitive—counter-intuitive because it might be thought that an essential defining part of what our rationality consists in is that we are always able to give reasons for what we do—it is becoming evident that practical rationality does not necessarily demand an agent's *explicit* cognizance of why she acts thus and so. Someone can act when there may have been no call for explanation or justification before, during, or after a certain action. The fact that one is able to Φ without being able to explain or justify Φ-ing by articulating one's reasons does not compromise the rationality of the action Φ. MacIntyre (1988) helps explain why this might be so:

> The structure of normality provides the . . . basic framework for understanding action. Acting in accordance with those structures does not require the giving or the having of reasons for so acting, except in exceptional types of circumstances in which those structures have been put in question . . . It is departing from what those structures prescribe which requires the having and the giving of reasons. (24–25)

The theoretical model of practical rationality suggested in all the quotations I have given so far in this section expands the notion of practical rationality presupposed by Lucas's idea of *negative responsibility*. His idea is compatible with an Aristotelian model of practical rationality. An agent's 'negative responsibility', we recall, provides a sense of 'watchfulness' to guard against all the innumerable things that have the potential to go wrong. (Think of the well-planned lesson that 'goes wrong' because the teaching assistant on whom the teacher is dependent for that day's teaching is absent.) The agent's *responsibleness* resides in this kind of *implicit* (i.e., non-explicit) watchfulness and responsiveness to contingency. According to this view, the rational person need not be governed by explicit 'formulae or rules': the failure to be able to 'specify, and to make explicit, does not impair the rationality' of the agent or the agent's actions (Hampshire 1978: 90).

The upshot of the discussion in this section is that the kind of rationality that is entirely appropriate for responsible agency has much less to do

with assuming reasons must always be specifiable in advance of any goal-oriented action planned and much more to do with the kind of rationality Michael Oakeshott portrays. 'Rationality' for Oakeshott is 'the certificate we give to any conduct which can maintain a place in the . . . coherence of activity which composes a way of living (1991: 130):

> No action is by itself 'rational' . . . [T]here is no ground . . . upon which we may exclude *a priori* any type of action. An impulsive action, a 'spontaneous outburst', activity of obedience to a custom or to rule, and an action which is preceded by a long reflective process, may, alike, be 'rational'. But it is neither 'rational' nor 'irrational' on account of these or in default of these . . . (129–130)

4.7 QUESTIONS OF JUSTIFICATION

Let us just pause here for a moment and reflect how far we have come from the NPM (managerial) perspective we concentrated on in Part I of the book. The model of practical rationality which we are now considering will always depend on the skilful and intelligent use of discretion on a case-by-case basis (Hood and Heald 2006: 60). The managerial conception of practical rationality, however, is grounded on the idea that the choices, decisions, judgments, and actions of the agent should always be capable of justification against pre-specified criteria or objectives (the 'ends' managers seek). For this is how it is established whether 'people are doing what they are meant to be doing', and thereby meeting expectations of public accountability. But contrast this 'managerial' way of understanding accountability with Lucas's interpretation of how a responsible person might be thought to be acting accountably. In the discharge of responsibilities, Lucas (1993) suggests it is a mistake to construe purposeful action in terms of specific, explicitly articulated ends ('objectives', 'outcomes' 'targets'). For then it becomes 'natural to construe success by reference to those ends, and the extent to which they have been realised'. This would exclude a domain of purposeful action where responsible and accountable agency is clearly being enacted:

> The doctor whose timely advice saved his patients from contracting heart disease or cancer . . . [the school teacher] whose swift intervention saved a child from being bullied . . . all have nothing to show for their pains, because their main concern . . . [was the avoidance of] the bad things which but for them would have happened . . . (206).

What has just been suggested will go against every instinct of the managerial mindset:

> "What *justifies* these ascriptions of responsibility or 'answerability' (as you call it) and how can *we* believe in those judgments if we cannot check that objectives are being met?"

This reaction is understandable, for what is now being suggested, according to the view Lucas offers, is that the demands for more and more rationalization of activities, or for means and ends to be pre-specified explicitly as outcomes, outputs, products, delivery targets, and so on, is as impractical and irrational as it is ungrounded.

Nevertheless, let us attend to the challenge. To the dismay of the managerialists, all that remains, if someone does press the case for *justification*, is to make reference to a kind of fundamental, implicitly understood knowledge that shows itself in what Aristotle refers to as the 'moment of action' (NE 1110a 14). From an Aristotelian perspective it is this knowledge of the agent that serves to justify certain practical activities or ways of acting. But for the majority of those trained in theories of 'performance' management, it will be very difficult to accept Williams's (1993a) suggestion that a practice can 'hold itself up':

> if [a] linear search for reasons is pursued, there will have to be at least one practice of reason-giving for which no reason is given and which holds itself up . . . We may not be able in any real sense, to justify [a practice] even to ourselves. A practice may be so directly related to our experience that the reason it provides will simply count as stronger than any reason that might be advanced for it. (113–114)

Williams goes further: the idea that our practices must 'stand up' to a 'reflection' that demands 'total explicitness' is based on a misunderstanding of rationality, both personal and political (Williams 1993a: 200). Williams points to the futility of what he calls the 'foundationalist' quest to 'rationalize everything':

> . . . Once we see that it is impossible to rationalize everything, the project of rationalizing as much as possible need not be understood as doing the next best thing. We may conclude instead that we were looking in the wrong direction. (113)

"Looking in the wrong direction"—Williams's concerns in the quotation above are epistemological, but his comments bear equally upon the lengths to which present regulatory and accountability systems will insist agents provide explicit, quantifiable 'evidence'—in order to prove their accountability. Wittgenstein (1974) might agree with Williams here that the 'managerial response' to the quest of accountability is indeed 'looking in the wrong direction':

> As if grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting . . . Not only rules, but examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leaves loop-holes open . . . the practice has to speak for itself. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules; we are taught[12] judgments and their connexion with other judgments . . . (sections 110, 139–140)

4.8 SKEPTICISM AND ACCUSATIONS OF PRAGMATIC DOGMATISM

This is what the apologist for the status quo has to say to Williams and Wittgenstein:

> "How can you seriously suggest that we run a public accountability system on the basis of a practice 'speaking' for itself? Why should we trust a practice to speak for itself? The voices of the practitioners will be merely 'subjective' or 'personal'. What you suggest is just *pragmatic dogmatism*."

Anyone who thinks like this are like those who, in Williams's (1993a) words, 'stand outside' a particular practice (114) and are skeptical how that practice can justify itself if it is not subject to the kind of 'transparent' forms of audit accountability now deployed to scrutinize organizational practices.

John Dewey's thoughts on *the practical* and *the personal* help us to see just how deeply mired the managerial position is in a Western philosophical tradition which insists that (i) the 'practical' be contrasted with its alleged opposite, the 'theoretical'; and (ii) the 'personal' be associated with the 'subjective', with the implication that 'subjective' is inferior to 'objective' theoretical knowledge. To insist on making these dichotomies, Dewey argues, leads straight to the idea that practical and personal knowledge are in some way suspect: *private* and *secret*. But knowledge, he insists, can be both personal and practical without ceasing to be either 'public'—or open to criticism. He castigates those who think that everything of a practical nature should be 'regarded as "merely" personal', where 'the "merely" has the force of denying legitimate standing in the court of cosmic jurisdiction' (1977: 126). It is 'sheer prejudice', he writes, 'a culture-survival' of past philosophies (in the Platonic-Cartesian tradition) to think like this and to continue to employ disparaging terms such as 'merely subjective' when applied to the practical and the personal.

According to Dewey, the error in thinking in this 'prejudiced' way is due to mistakenly thinking of practical knowledge as something fixed and static. It should be thought, rather, as an *activity of knowing* by means of which we are able to transform our experiences (see Johnson 2003: 339).

Dewey, faced with the managerialists' skepticism we saw previously, might well have said that they just do not understand the nature of practical knowledge; that, in their quest to make as much practical activity as they can explicit (through 'rationalization'), they go against that nature and, ultimately, risk destroying it.

Interesting comparisons may be drawn here, between the thoughts of Dewey and the part of Michael Polanyi's work which is concerned with implicit, or as he preferred to call it, 'tacit' or 'personal' knowledge. Polanyi always insisted that his use of 'personal'—as exemplified in his idea of *personal knowledge*—must not be seen as a synonym for 'subjective' and as somehow an 'inferior' kind of knowledge. On the contrary, *the personal* is linked to what it is to make *responsible judgments*:

> [an] act of personal knowing makes us both necessarily participate in its shaping and acknowledge its results with universal intent. This is the prototype of intellectual commitment. It is the act of commitment . . . that saves personal knowledge from being merely subjective. Intellectual commitment is a responsible decision, in submission to the compelling claims of what in good conscience I conceive to be true. (1962: 65)

So what are we to conclude from our inquiries? In Dewey's claim that the *practical* and the *personal* can be shared and made public, and in the congruence we find between his views, and those of Polanyi concerning the epistemological status of practical knowledge (which, for Polanyi, is always rooted in the 'tacit', the implicit), and in Lucas's notion of 'negative responsibility', I suggest that we have put up a modest defense against the managerialists' skepticism. Indirectly, we have defended an Aristotelian model of practical rationality. We might not have won over the total skeptic who is dissatisfied with the kind of practical rationality which Lucas, Williams, Wittgenstein, and Oakeshott propose. But we have offered apologists for the status quo a different perspective from which they might re-assess their allegiance to *the explicit*.

To win the apologists over we should have to persuade them to abandon not only their Platonic-Cartesian faith in the attainability of certainty, but also their positivist fixation with measurement and verifiability. They would need to give up the idea that we can only judge the worth or viability of a practice if we continually bombard it with tests to evaluate and measure its successes. Apologists will find disturbing the kind of freedom that is needed for 'negative responsibility' to be given its head. They will think it no better than an 'anomic' or 'ungoverned' form of accountability (Bailey 1980). How different is the non-managerial view, described by Lucas (1993):

> Many people are severer judges of themselves than anyone else would dare to be, and have more intimate knowledge of failures and

> inadequacies, and can hold themselves to account more exactly than anybody else. (187)

We are faced then, again, with two completely different worldviews: one which is prepared to trust people and their practical knowledge, recognizing, realistically, that a few, as Aristotle says, might 'go wrong' (NE 1104b 30–34), and one that is not prepared to do that. Which worldview is more appropriate for grounding a public accountability system? Having shown the cost of continuing with the second alternative and the near certainty of alienation and bad outcomes for which no one can be identified as being strictly responsible (see Chapter 3), I adjourn the question till Chapter 6.

Before I conclude, here is an example which might help to show the enormous leap of faith which apologists for the status quo will have to make if they are to open their mind to the kind of practical rationality that has been suggested in this chapter.

Consider, with Andrew Davis (2000), the case of a teacher who is recorded as doing the right kinds of things in a classroom, by an inspector assessing her, but, when asked to assess herself ('self-assessment'), she cannot give a satisfactory answer. She is unable to provide an explicit account of her actions or make assertions about how well her learning objectives have been achieved. So the inspector is unable to assess the teacher's own self-assessment. A formal statement will need to be made that the teacher 'failed' the required criterion of assessment. On this view a gap appears between her expertise and her 'accountability'. But is there really a gap?

There is only a gap between the teacher's 'expertise' and her 'accountability' if what is to *count* as knowledge is based on a Platonically inspired paradigm of rationalism. That paradigm dictates that we shall count as having a rational grasp of *x* if we can articulate *approved* reasons.[13] In Sections 4.5 and 4.6 I argued against such a requirement. Neither rationality nor rational agency is subject to such a requirement.

Davis's example of the teacher highlights the kind of problem that can occur when, in order to judge whether a teacher is worthy of 'qualified teacher status' (QTS), a list of 'standard based assessments'[14] is brought to bear on her teaching practice. The rationale for this approach is ostensibly to maintain the educational accountability of the teaching profession. But the result, as we see, may be a clash of epistemologies and rationalities, where the agent *within* the practice comes off badly in the eyes of one who, as Williams (1993a: 114) puts it, 'stands outside' the practice itself. The teacher's knowledge served her well enough to teach the lesson that was observed. But she was unable to articulate *in the approved format* what she knew. Does this mean that she was not professionally responsible or that she was educationally 'unaccountable'?

That the teacher's response might not do justice to the actual quality and standard of her teaching only tells us that it might not be possible always to break down one's knowledge neatly into particular elements or say how or

why one knows how to do certain things (on this, see Luntley 2000: 30).[15] This is not to be understood as a significant weakness, Aristotle suggests (NE Book V.10). As we shall see in Chapter 6, it is in the nature of practical knowledge. *That* is the leap of faith demanded of the apologists who defend the status quo.

4.9 JUDGMENT AND 'ENDS'

Public accountability can be thought of as a 'partnership' that has to balance (i) the legitimate responsibilities of elected governments to be accountable and, in that role, to act as guardians to protect the rights of the public—this will include the administration and regulation of public institutions and sanctions, if necessary, for those found to have acted non-accountably; (ii) the right of those who serve the public—the teachers, doctors, nurses, civil servants, care workers, and so on—to exercise professional discretion when and where appropriate; (iii) the right the public has to trust that an accountability system will not impede those who work in public institutions from fulfilling their professional responsibilities.

But the way in which (i), (ii), and (iii) are now configured has led to an imbalance in the 'partnership'. Conditions (ii) and (iii) have been disregarded. Those who work in public institutions have ended up with little professional discretion—they make their decisions from among various managerially specified 'ends', already prioritized and chosen for them. Pre-specified objectives or targets will be the 'ends' to which an agent must work. This is the way, it will be claimed, of achieving accountability through an 'objective' method of evaluating, assessing, and comparing standards—without the 'bias' which the professionals, if left to themselves, would import in to the system. This claim we have already met in previous chapters. The rationale of it is that the role of *management* within an organization functions as a 'neutral accountability technology' (Rizvi 1990: 301). But, as MacIntyre (1985) points out—*à propos* of the spurious managerial quest for 'neutrality'—any 'ends' which have substance, and thereby raise questions of value will lie 'outside the scope' (30) of an organization run on managerial lines. Are apologists for the kind of accountability system we have now, who are ready to contemplate the demise of 'negative responsibility' (in the sense discussed in this chapter), equally prepared to sacrifice what it will take to make a judgment? As Mark Lutz (1999) cries out, 'Isn't choosing between *ends* what *real* judgment is about?' (154; original emphasis).

Here is a rallying cry to make us look in the direction of a completely different model, one drawn on Aristotelian lines—of how an agent makes responsible decisions and judgments. These will be decisions and judgments that will arise from an agent's own ethical education (Burnyeat 1980), her 'ethical formation' (Lovibond 2002) or *Bildung* (McDowell 1994: 84).[16]

Such attributes, together with the agent's capacity for *phronetic reasoning*, will enable an agent to make choices that do not have to align themselves with the 'ends', the objectives and targets, that managerialists articulate.

What may surprise the apologist for the status quo is the way in which this alternative model characterizes practical reason while dispensing altogether with the cult of the explicit. For it is in the idea of *the implicit* (the non-explicit) that we shall locate the notion of accountability.

5 Accountability, Answerability, and the Virtue of Responsibleness

Sketch of a Neo-Aristotelian Model of Practical Rationality

> [O]f all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity . . . the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them . . .
>
> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book II.1, 1103a 26–35)

> Our nature is largely second nature, and our second nature is the way it is not just because of the potentialities we were born with, but also because of our *Bildung* . . . . . Our *Bildung* actualizes some of the potentialities we were born with . . .
>
> McDowell, *Mind and World* (1996: 87–88)

5.1 IS THERE A MODEL OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY TO RIVAL THE MANAGERIAL ONE?

In previous chapters we have spent time examining certain aspects of management theory and practice. But now we need a competing, compelling alternative theory of practical rationality that can be put into contrast with the kind of rationality which issues from the instrumental, 'managerial model' now implemented throughout public sector institutions—even if only a sketch of a theory. There is no other way to throw into relief the corrosive aspects of the practical rationality which now orchestrates all the different elements associated with 'New Public Management' (NPM)—and the managerialism it has spawned.

The rival theory I shall present is drawn from Aristotle. Just as a shaft of bright sunlight is able to pick out dust particles in the air, the Aristotelian model will pinpoint that which seems alien to reason in this 'New Public' model of practical rationality. Aristotle offers us a model of practical rationality that shows what the *structure* of an agent's practical reasoning needs to look like if purposive, goal-oriented action is to aim at 'practically wise' ends: someone who is merely 'clever' at following *the means* to an end might be in pursuit of a silly, bad or evil end (NE 1144a 18–28; cp. 1152a 11–15; *Politics* 1331b 32–33). Can the managerial model of practical rationality distinguish between these two kinds of purposive action? This is the kind of question I seek to make relevant to ask in this chapter.

Why is it important to ask this? As so many corporate, financial, or even public service scandals have revealed over the last few decades, professionals can become complicit, often unwittingly, in cases of malpractice and misconduct, or, as we find in education, they can become caught up in a 'performance' league table system which provides incentives for teachers to teach chiefly 'to the test', rather than in ways they know would be best for their students. The main thing always is to prove that one has met whatever pre-specified objectives, targets, outcomes, standards, benchmarks, or indicators have been set. This is how those who work in professional contexts are now expected to account for themselves. In all such cases, professionals in various fields have demonstrated that they are indeed very 'clever', in Aristotle's sense, at achieving pre-specified 'ends' and in enabling their institutions to acquire 'star' ratings in inspections. But sometimes, being 'clever' in this way can produce unintended, unwanted, and, sometimes, tragic consequences.[1] If we are serious about finding a model of public accountability that leaves room for practitioners to make practically wise judgments in the contexts in which they work, we need to make sure that, within the framework of that model, *practical reason* in pursuit of goals is not hampered by a generic model of managerial, 'means-end' reasoning.

'Practical reasoning', as Elijah Millgram (2008) puts it, is 'philosopher-speak for figuring out what to do', and needs to be contrasted 'with theoretical reasoning' which is 'figuring out what to believe or what the facts are' (732). So when we talk about the *structure of reason* of an agent in practical contexts, we are not demanding strict logical principles of deductive inference.[2] An Aristotelian model of practical rationality, as we shall see soon, understands goal-oriented, purposive action very differently from a performance management model—which, for short, I shall abbreviate to the 'managerial model' (to be distinguished from the 'Aristotelian model'). Stephen Toulmin's description of what it is to explain human conduct in 'the Aristotelian manner' illustrates well just the kind of contrast that I think our inquiry demands. Aristotelians, he says,

> do not *impose* patterns or ideal forms on human behaviour . . . rather, [they] recognize such general patterns as operative factors *in* human behaviour . . . then explain particular actions by relating them to . . . recognized modes of behaviour. (1969: 100)

Aristotelian practical rationality is remarkable in that it is congruent with the ordinary way in which we make decisions every day. Unlike the managerial model of practical rationality, it does not carry presuppositions about rational action from business, economic, or systems-organization theories. In so far as any of those theories are needed and Aristotle leaves out something vital we shall have to consider bringing some or all of them back. But let us see if we are forced to do so. I aim to show how Aristotelian practical reasoning (contrast: 'managerial' strategic planning) enables agents in

their own work context to find an appropriate fit between the relevant end and the appropriate act in the name of that end. The task we have ahead of us could be seen as an attempt to restore ordinary practical reason to its proper place in institutional and organizational life.

We begin with a sketch of Aristotle's theory based on some distinctive points central to his model of practical rationality. In the next chapter I shall set out his theory more fully. At the outset, rather than plunge the reader immediately into Aristotelian exegesis, I shall draw on just a few Aristotelian insights to highlight what is deficient in the kind of practical rationality now underwriting present understandings of professionalism and accountability.

5.2 INDIVIDUAL PRACTICAL RATIONALITY

When a person acts or chooses how to act, he or she acts or chooses for the sake of an 'end', or, what Aristotle calls a '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*' (NE 1140b 16–19).[3] Put more plainly, an 'end' can be thought of as an aim of action or goal: it is something for the sake of which an action is to be done, even though, ordinarily, we tend to replace such a stilted phrase with the simple infinitive construction as in, "Why did the chicken cross the road? To get to the other side!" (Richardson 1997: 50).

For Aristotle, an end—a '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*'—is the object of a want or desire (*orexis*) that is adopted along with the means towards achieving that object. But such a motivating kind of desire cannot be just any kind of desire—a vague, ungrounded, unfocused wish or longing. Where desire for a good end is the starting point of action and where reflection or deliberation are in point—when *phronesis* is at work—the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*' appears to an agent either as *worth* pursuing in itself (under the aspect of the good) or as forced upon the agent by some existing commitment which can itself satisfy the agent (again, under some aspect of the good) (NE 1094a 16–23; 1138b 22). That takes us back to the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*' that grounds the purposive action of an agent. Either (when possible)[4] the person chooses that end itself or else chooses some means to the end or some constituent of the end. But *where* does the end itself come from? What determines an agent's starting points (*archai*)[5] for action (NE 1110a 16–17; 1112b 33–34; 1113b 17–21, 32–34)? The answer to this question for Aristotle lies in the role which *formation* plays in decision-making, deliberation, and judgment.

Sometimes the agent will need to take time to formulate the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*', either by 'calculation and reasoning' (NE 1117a 21)[6] or after consultation with others when it is difficult to decide what to do (NE 1112b 3–9). Sometimes, though, the matter has to be decided immediately. But even in this second sort of case we can *reconstruct* the agent's practical reasoning as if there had been deliberation. Of course, there are clear

differences between 'hot', spontaneous, intuitive forms of decision making and 'cooler', deliberative ones.[7] But the resemblance between these two modes of decision-making, I suggest, is more striking than the differences between them. As Aristotle says, 'sudden actions are in accordance with one's character' (NE 1117a 21). In such 'sudden' moments one does not suddenly lose all one's dispositions, values, or beliefs. So if an agent is asked to 'give an account' of what happened in those 'sudden actions', the reasons offered under questioning (by a supervisor, assessor, inspector, barrister, etc.) will always need to bear on what, in the circumstances, *mattered*, *prevailed*, or *counted* for that agent. And that will reveal the agent's character.

In so far as the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*' is a rational basis on which to deliberate, make judgments, or act, the agent will quite typically have had a range of questions to consider, such as, what is important here? Will pursuit of this end stand in the way of achieving something else that matters equally or even more? How much does this end itself matter? How much am I prepared to re-think what to do and so re-specify the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*': have I really assessed the situation correctly?

Spelled out in such terms, these may well appear heavy, ponderous questions. But adult people often run through such a gamut of questions as a matter of course when there is a need to balance the needs, aims, and hopes of all the individual members of a family, including their own. When it comes to spending the weekend at home, how does a mother decide, even from what might be quite a mundane list of things, such as needing to finish a report for work next week, keeping a promise to her children to go to the park, remembering to phone a friend who is ill, and so on, *what is for the best*? "If I keep my promise then the children will be happy, but I might not have time to write the report (so: trouble at work). If I break the promise then I disappoint the children (so: I betray their trust)." And so on. "*What really matters here*?" is the basic question she is tussling with. If practical reason or rationality is to be at issue, such questions, as those I listed earlier, cannot be avoided if the activity of *judgment* is to mean anything.

Once we imagine someone's taking questions about 'what matters' seriously, it appears that a reasonable person must not only have a dispositional sensitivity to the opportunities, challenges, and pitfalls that present themselves at the moment when he or she is to act. That person must have something else as well—namely, some *antecedent sense* of what matters to a human life and what doesn't matter, and, along with that, some way of applying that sense to their case. The rational agent, I am suggesting, has to consider his or her end of action and bring to bear upon it some antecedent formation, a process of development which has been gone through, and a mentality, a certain state of mind or being, which such a formation will bring into being.

The logic of the term *formation*, as it will be used in this chapter and the next, is similar to the logic of the German idea of *Bildung*. Both of these terms stand for complex sets of ideas and—rather like the term

'education'—can be deployed either to describe a process of development, an initiation into a certain way of being, or the actual state of being of a person who has experienced such a process of formation and initiation.[8] *Bildung*, as I intend to use this complex concept, is to be thought of as a dynamic, on-going developmental process without an ascertainable limit, or pre-determined end-point.[9] Following Gadamer (2001), I see it as a process of formation, a process of 'self-education' (as he puts it) that lasts for a person as long as life itself lasts for that person.

There can be many varieties of formation—a *managerial* formation, even a *mafia* formation, for example. But our concern is with *ethical* formation (*ethismos*), as expounded by Aristotle (when he describes the kind of deliberation that someone with *phronesis* will embark on), and with *professional* formation as that overlaps ethical formation. Professional formation, Terence McLaughlin helped me to see (through his idea of '*pedagogic phronesis*' as that relates to teaching practice),[10] is a structural counterpart of ethical formation. (More of this in Chapter 6.) It is this antecedent element which pre-exists a particular action or decision, this *formation* of a person—or, following McDowell (1996), a person's *Bildung*—and its application to 'the moment of action' (NE 1110a 14), that we are attending to in this chapter. We need to understand better how those elements encompassed in a person's *Bildung*, the 'animating values . . . inner resources and character' which a person possesses (Winch 2006b: 108) contribute to particular *acts* of judgment. The process of character formation is dialectical, based as is has to be on experiential learning and development. It is not merely 'inculcation' into the various moral virtues, but will involve 'the development of interests, abilities, attitudes and values' (76).

For an Aristotelian, rational personhood is something more than an instrumental, acquisitive, agential capacity for maximizing 'desire-satisfaction'. It has to do with the kind of person someone has become, a person who has an (ever-developing) conception of *what matters* that prepares them to see the possibilities and impossibilities that present themselves in this or that situation in which they have to decide or are to act.

Apologists for the status quo—the 'managerialists' as I sometimes refer to them—want all goals to be made explicit for organizational reasons. But Aristotelian agents who have undergone a process of formation in the sense we are sketching now understand effortlessly and implicitly an indefinite mass of considerations which, if they had to be made explicit every time any decision was taken, would be *impossible to itemize or enumerate*. Many of the decisions we make *now* have their formative starting points in infancy or childhood when the first rudimentary building blocks of moral and social understanding were being laid—in the early stages of *formation*.[11]

It is this kind of developmental formation that enables agents who make goals to be in a position to qualify or further specify the goals they choose to act upon, and, if necessary, to re-assess the terms on which the goals

are worth pursuing. That which originates 'from within' as starting points (*archai*)[12] depends, wherever one happens to be, on the needs and necessities upon which one has to act. The ethically or (as I shall argue in Chapter 6), the professionally formed person's knowledge about the end to be pursued in a particular context, in so far as this knowledge is general and represents a whole way of being or acting, cannot, from the nature of the case, be given a complete verbal articulation. (How could it? This is a slice of life.)

Sabina Lovibond (2002: 28), illuminating this aspect of Aristotle's doctrine, stresses the *uncodifiability* of what someone with formation knows. So action which reveals the presence of such knowledge cannot be reduced to the mastery of something given in a form of words. Rather it is itself a capacity to determine, *articulately enough for the purpose*, what end is to be pursued *here* in a particular context, if the overall end is to be made real *here*. As we saw in Chapter 4, the demand that *everything* that one does can be justified through the giving of explicit reasons is epistemologically dubious, a hangover of foundationalism, and not necessarily a mark of rationality (see again Chapter 4).

Consider how someone with the kind of formation we are talking about is always at the ready, to guard against the innumerable things that may spoil or undermine the achievement of the goal. This preparedness is carried as practical, personal, and implicit knowledge. No code of 'good practice', realistically, could enumerate everything that might have to be guarded against. Nor could the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*', towards which a rational agent deliberates and on the basis of which she acts, be re-described in words that encompass everything it represents. This is because a desire (*orexis*) that serves in its context as an appropriate starting point for practical reasoning is not a mere form of words. It is a state of being (Lovibond 2002). It issues from a general conception and developed trust of what is worthy and worthwhile (Strike 1999)—a conception of the good as *telos* (a goal, or end) (NE 1142b 33). That conception enables agents to conceive ends, and in Aristotelian terms, *to test them under the aspect of the good*, to see which human goods and needs need safeguarding, and either to renew their confidence in whatever they are proposing, or to deliberate on what may be judged to be problematic, bad, hurtful, and so on, in the proposed action. In other words, they understand the meaning of their own '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*'—the purpose and point of what they are doing—and how it relates to a larger set of concerns that may involve others' well-being. They understand how it relates to *eudaimonia*, to happiness, or to flourishing as a human being.[13]

5.3 PRACTICAL RATIONALITY WITHIN INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: FROM INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY TO SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

Now let us consider an organization and the rationality of its operations. This shift of focus obviously makes a difference, but it does not simplify

the question of the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*', the end to which the agent aims. Just as an individual will fall into irrationality unless she understands what is good about her '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*', the terms on which it is worth pursuing and the terms on which it may have to be abandoned, so will an enterprise, a firm, a school, or health service, or even a ministry or agency of government, fall into irrationality if it does not make clear to itself and those who work for it what is worthwhile about the course or policy it is pursuing. It must not forget the reason why it embarked on this or that policy.

An organization conducts itself rationally to the extent that it validates its policy in the larger framework in which it has its being, whether this is the long-term interests of its stakeholders, the education of pupils or students, or the health needs of the public, for which it has been made guardian. A policy pursued will be rational to the extent that it appears as answering to some good within that larger framework and to the extent that it can be interpreted in these or those circumstances in a way as answering to that good.

What, then, in the institutional case corresponds to the formation or *Bildung* of an individual agent? I suggest a shared and communicable sense of the human good that is served by the institution itself—and especially so if it is intended as a *public* institution. Such a sense cannot be wholly encapsulated by words alone—as we find in 'mission statements'. At best, a mission statement expresses some part of that shared sense or *ethos*. But in itself a mission statement is just words, not a state of being. Whatever high ideals and objectives a mission statement expresses, if the organization is carrying out time-wasting, dubious, or corrupt practices (as was the case with the disgraced energy company, Enron, which, in its heady days of 'success' signed up to corporate ideals of good practice and social responsibility), then the words on the statement will be just idling, like a broken wheel that engages with nothing.

An individual who works within an organization that has a non-explicit, yet communicable ethos that serves some indispensable human good (the health of patients, the safe conveyance of passengers, the education of pupils, etc.) needs to understand the policies she is charged with implementing in the light of her participation in that sense of a *shared purpose or role*. (Recall the railway engineer from Chapter 3, interviewed after the Hatfield crash, whose understanding of his *telos* was that he was part of a large shared concern to make railways carry passengers *safely*.) It is by virtue of that participation that one who works in an organization will have a sense of what-is-to-be-guarded-against—even to the point of questioning the policies one is meant to implement. It is in this way that someone who works in an organization may still retain a 'critical element', and avoid becoming merely a 'servant of policy' (Young 1999: 3), someone who thinks it acceptable to say the shaming words, if ever asked to 'give an account', "*I was just following orders*".

This is the place to note that one with some shared, *non-explicit* sense of the good that the organization is concerned with, not only has that which John Lucas calls 'negative responsibility' (discussed in Chapter 4), the kind of 'preparedness' I spoke about above (in Section 5.2), where an agent is attuned to the possibilities of things not turning out as planned. Such a person can also have a sense of flourishing (*eudaimonia*)—even a sense of pride—through their own endeavors, as well as a sense of helping to contribute to the well-being of the collective, co-operative practical rationality of an organization (Mackie 1985). Here, if anywhere, is what protects an organization from the dissipation of its efforts, irresponsibleness, indifference, neglect, stress, low morale, and alienation of those who work within it.

The picture of rational administration that emerges here is based on the idea that each agent within an organization will have his or her own particular area of responsibility; but each will have also some idea of how his or her area connects with others' areas of responsibility. Furthermore, all will share in some inarticulate idea of a good outcome and of what is to be avoided. Each or all can still be held responsible or answerable where they fall short of the standards of diligence, awareness or attention that come to be established within this enterprise as the received (not necessarily formalized or written) professional norms for those who work within it. In such an organization there will be social co-operation, sustained by sufficient inter-personal and shared communication among people who are able, as Bourdieu's idea of *habitus* suggests, to work within practices with 'regularity, unity and systematicity even in the absence of any imposed . . . organization' (Bourdieu 1997: 59; see also 1977: 72).

In such a framework, the aim is for a healthy mix of individual responsibility and shared organizational responsibility which 'makes it possible for large numbers of people to combine in complicated . . . operations' (Vickers 1983: 229). In such a framework, the role of each person will have both 'a prescribed and a discretionary content'. There may be certain organizational principles or national standards with which the agent has to comply, but when it comes to deciding *how* those principles and standards apply or are to be implemented, then those who were appointed to act in positions of responsibly will consult their own skills and experience, the very things which won them their posts in the first place.

We see resemblances here to some aspects of the model of administration that characterized public institutions before the reforms of the last few decades altered the way institutional arrangements and decisions were made, that is, before 'New Public Management' eclipsed 'Old Public Administration' (Dunleavy and Hood 1994). But is the scenario we have just described perhaps the limit for trying to implement the Aristotelian model in organizational life?

It is clear enough that modern organizations have been engineered to go beyond this point. Here, at last, the inadequacies of the Aristotelian model can be shown, or so the managerialist will say: it is obsolete and has no place

in the kind of modern complex organizational institutions that now characterize our public sector services. But not so fast. The limitations of one model do not prove the adequacy of another! Nor should the Aristotelian model be dismissed outright because it suggests a size of organization irrelevant to the needs and operation of modern organizations. Research from the field of evolutionary anthropology reports that there are limits to the number of people we are capable of learning from and bonding with.[14] From an educational perspective, the benefits have long been recognized in the US of the 'small school' scheme, whereby large schools are broken into smaller schools.[15] The success of the US scheme and the fact that a similar idea is now being taken up in the UK lends credence to the findings of this research.

Furthermore, what is to be made of the problems reported over the last few decades of the management of public sector services (in the UK) which have ranged over a whole range of diverse sets of public services? Some of these problems I documented in the Introduction to this book. They have not gone away. Neither have the concerns of the critic (of the status quo), documented in Chapter 1. So there remain some pressing questions for those who reject the alternative, Aristotelian approach I argue for: how has it been possible for such a rigorous, target-driven system, designed to monitor exactly what is going on in every public service institution, to be so dysfunctional? Within the terms of its own criteria for successful 'performance delivery', we have evidence of 'underperformance' of the system itself.

After nearly half a century of public service reforms and a program of 'continuous improvement', the original promise to create a system that offered 'better accountability' (see again Chapter 2) seems not to have been kept. Problems of demoralization among professional practitioners and of unintended, distorting consequences[16] occurring within institutions remain. Such paradoxical failures that have occurred do little to advertise the virtues of the managerial way of doing things which has a proclivity to understand human action in quantifiable terms. Some of our public institutions have been described, even by those who have been proponents of managerial models of public accountability or in positions of management themselves, as 'not-fit-for purpose', unsustainable and inconsistent, or as inefficient, ineffective and too costly (see discussion of this in Introduction to the book). So much for the famous managerial three 'E's' of *efficiency*, *effectiveness*, and *economy*. If these kinds of problems are not exaggerations are they not an indictment of managerial rationality? Where, within the managerial model, is there room for the virtue of professional responsibility to flourish?

Here we return to the irreducibly ethical dimension of an agent's engagement with her own (authentically initiated) practical reason, and to the role of the formation, nature, and bearing of a person's character. On an Aristotelian view, good practical judgment must be rooted in an affirmation of the idea of a robust sense of *personal* agency, not in the idea of a well-run *system* with clear targets, objectives, prescriptions, and regulations as a way of holding people 'to account'. For Aristotle, as for Dewey, thousands

of years later, practical judgments are not about systematizing practical knowledge under some overarching theory. Practical judgments are about persons *acting* in the world. They have '*direct* existential import'.[17]

5.4 A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: ARISTOTLE CONFRONTS AN APOLOGIST FOR MANAGERIALISM WHO SETS A CHALLENGE

Suppose Aristotle came back to life, acquainted himself with recent political and economic history, and studied the way in which, over the last century, the notion of *professional knowledge*—its status and what should substantiate its content—has become such a contentious and topical issue.[18] Suppose also, that in order to situate himself more fully in the modern world, he reviews the present work of a doctor, a navigator, and financier/business man (cp. NE 1104a 10; 1112b 4–5). Then, having brought himself up to date with how the formal structures of our present democratic arrangements differ from the Athenian conception of participative democracy and how these formal structures of governance now impact upon the institutions of the *polis*—that is, the state and its various institutions—he confronts an apologist for the status quo. I imagine that this is what Aristotle might say:

> "I notice that teachers now have to defer to the precepts issued by "line-managers". I notice that the members of many professions are judged not on their own terms—according to their own *telos*, what they are aiming for—but on the criteria and rules of another: that of *management*. So the thing I want to ask is this. Why do you believe that managerial 'ends' *should* claim priority in *praxis*? This seems all wrong. Surely to think in this way is to 'take refuge in theory' (NE 1105b13) and to misunderstand the nature of what it is to have to *make* a practical judgment? The 'end aimed for is not knowledge'—*knowing*, say, what *counts* as the theory of 'best practice'—'but action', *doing* the thing that it is right to do (NE 1095a 5–6).
>
> 'The fact that men use the language [of 'excellence' and 'quality'] that flows from [managerial] knowledge proves nothing; for even . . . those who have just begun to learn a science can string together . . . phrases.' (NE 1147a 18–22). What does that kind of theoretical knowledge show about their capacity to do the right thing?
>
> The kind of practical knowledge—'*know how*', I believe you all now call it—needed for a well-run practice, starts not from 'universals' (those general managerial principles, prescriptions and rules for 'best practice' which your managers speak about) but from the 'particulars'—in specific contexts (NE 1143b 5). Your managers are mistaken to 'look for precision' (NE 1098a 26–27) all the time. For the subject matter of the practical, things to do with 'conduct and . . . of what is

> good for us, these have no fixity'. No one statement will be correct for all contexts (NE 1104a 3–5). Someone with practical wisdom will grasp implicitly in practice—through *noûs*—how to apply 'principles' (NE 1104a 5–9; 1137b30–1138a 5; 1143b 4–6). For they will know what *good* is at issue in the context.
>
> 'Know how', if it is to serve good ends, I say, can *only* be understood relative to human purposes and to what is conducive to *eudaimonia* (human flourishing). For, 'the end of an action is relative to the occasion' (NE 1110a 13). And everything that I have said bears, too, on that which concerns the good of the *polis*. For the flourishing of an individual and the well-being of the *polis* are interdependent (NE 1103b 3–7; *Politics* 1252a 2–6)."

Straightaway, though, we can equally imagine that Aristotle would have to contend with the incredulity of the managerialist:

> "Surely clear 'ends' have to be set to ensure that the *polis* is served well, as *you* yourself, Aristotle, would wish. It may be hard for you to accept, but such clarity—we now call it 'transparency'—is a prerequisite of a modern democracy. How could your ideas about practical matters—that they 'lack fixity'—be put to use in a public accountability system? And just how would agents know how to apply principles in practice, as you suggest is possible, if we don't make clear at the outset for all to see *which* principles are to be put to use in practice?
>
> I challenge you to answer: where else *can* 'ends' in practice come from if not through clearly specified targets, objectives or outcomes as means to those ends? How will anyone *know* what they are meant to be doing without making it absolutely *explicit* what it is that does need doing?"

I intend to take up the challenge that has just been made, in a way that I hope Aristotle would not have condemned outright. In the next chapter we shall explore in some detail what is involved for a particular man (at work) to make a certain decision how to act and the way his choice of what to do could take him in either one of two directions: *in* the public interest or *against* it. From an Aristotelian perspective we shall examine the structure of this man's thought and see how what he decides springs from the kind of formation he has acquired, the sort of person he is (his *Bildung*), and his *engagement* in the good (this point to be explained in Chapter 6). But before we get to the next chapter, there is just a final bit of the sketch that needs to be filled in.

5.5 REPLY TO THE CHALLENGE: PRELIMINARIES

For brevity, *ethismos* (ethical formation), *Bildung*, upbringing, habituation, and so on, will often be shortened under the single word, *formation*.

But in this choice of word, I wish to avoid any suggestion that someone's acquiring formation is little more than a process of being moulded—a 'being-for-others' (Hollis 1985: 222). 'Formation' may, of course, be used in this sense.[19] But that is a sense which would 'lose the actor completely' (227). Someone who acquires formation, in the Aristotelian sense, is an active participant in the whole process.

But how does one go about building a rival model of practical rationality from the place where we are in now? In answering the managerial challenge I shall not confine myself to Aristotle. I shall marry his theory with what we can learn from what was best in the less formalized, pre-managerial modes of administration that the pioneers of management-by-objectives and NPM were determined to replace (as explained in Chapter 2). Without commitment to be in agreement with everything which managerialism displaced, or to idealize or romanticize that earlier administrative work culture, I propose that we try to see those older modes of administration in the way their administrators might have seen them. How would *they* have answered the managerialist's challenge? I want to understand the *praxeological justification*[20] which those pre-managerial administrators might have given for their way of 'doing things'. Can we set that kind of justification against the justification which apologists for managerialism now claim for their way of 'doing things'?

If the 'Old Public Administration' paradigm (so described by Dunleavy and Hood 1994), is to contribute to our response to the challenge, there are three things we need to understand:

(1) the pre-managerial idea of practical rationality on which all older modes of administration relied;
(2) the largely unsystematized or intuitive knowledge on which these modes depended: knowledge made more articulate only on demand and at need, and knowledge that was never *fully* articulate because it was almost coextensive with the whole lifeworld that the practitioners themselves inhabited;
(3) the non-fractured, open-ended kind of *responsibleness* (as described in Chapters 3 and 4) which, at their best, these modes demanded of those who worked in the service of the public—what we referred to in the last chapter as someone's *answerability* to expectations of public accountability.

It is part of the 'reconstruction' task we are now undertaking to see how (1), (2), and (3) would have hung together in any careful defense of the administrative culture that they supported. Apart from the faults managerialists have pointed out about 'outmoded', 'inefficient', 'inflexible', and 'monopolistic' forms of traditional bureaucracies[21] and despite the fact that in 'such critiques, the more positive traits of professional practice are usually ignored' (Cribb and Ball 2005: 118) what may be said of the merits of

the 'Old Public Administration', as against the 'New Public Management' culture?

One thing worth pointing out, straightaway, is that we can see the rationality of older modes of administration as developing out of the *everyday* rationality of the individual agent and not from some *theory* about how humans should act in organizations. That is to say, we can see the practical rationality, characteristic of older modes of administration, as developing out of the practical wisdom (*phronesis*) of the individual agent in the company of his/her colleagues or associates. The starting point of our enquiry, then, is *phronesis*.[22]

In textbooks on management theory, *decision-making* is represented as one, among many, desirable organizational skills to be acquired for strategic planning and for demonstrating creativity (e.g., 'blue-skies' or 'out-of-the-box' thinking).[23] Instituting 'a disciplined process of decision-making' helps 'to set goals and monitor performance' (Pfeffer and Sutton 2006: 136). Management consultants, therefore, will recommend *systematizing* the activity of decision-making, in order to 'enhance organizational performance': 'explicit strategies' will enable managers to answer the question, 'What should I do in this situation?" (136, 150).

In their search for the ideal decision-making model—to be applicable to any well-run organization—managers may well latch on to the idea of Aristotelian *phronesis*, practical wisdom, and see something attractive in it, namely, the bare idea of 'know how'. But to think 'know how' can be extracted like this, distilled to make it neutral with respect to value (i.e., value-less) would be to misunderstand *phronesis* completely.

'Know how', it is true, is often used by some as a gloss for the term *phronesis*. But the risk, then, is that 'know how' will be reduced simply to *knowing what to do in practice*.[24] Without further qualification, the original meaning of *phronesis* will then be lost. For in certain contexts, '*knowing what to do in practice*' may mean no more than that an agent knows how to comply with pre-specified ends set by others[25]—the antithesis of what Aristotle intended in the idea of an agent's capacity to make a *phronetic* choice.

But once we put to one side managerial theories of 'strategic' decision-making and restore the discussion of choice, decision-making, and judgment to the domain of philosophy where *phronesis* began its philosophical life—namely, within the Aristotelian theory of the ethical that contains it—a missing component will come onto the scene, over and above the elements I refer to in (1), (2), and (3).

This is the idea (4), of ethical formation (or, *formation*, for short) which I introduced earlier and of its relation, *professional formation*. This is the stance or dispositional outlook which a public servant (or as we would say now, 'service provider') is able to identify in a particular context of practical choice: the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*' someone is to act (NE 1140b 16–19).

In that framework, it ceases to be a mystery how *phronesis* might play a part in a work situation—how, that is, through *Erziehung* (upbringing) and participation in life a person gains a way of understanding and seeing

the world. In employment, that person will then be formed further by the expectations of, and communication with, associates and colleagues in a workplace (Arendt 1957: 208). On these terms *occupational or professional formation* is revealed as another element of the developmental process, *Bildung*.

In the process of coming to share in a certain culture or outlook, those who are initiated into, and later 'participate' within, a 'community of practice' (Wenger 1991; Lave and Wenger 1998) will have acquired a whole range of concerns, some of which will be prohibitive in nature, whereas others will be understood to promote certain good ends. These concerns are waiting for the moment they might find fulfillment in a particular context. Such concerns will not be in any order (as we might find in list of bullet points of performance criteria or indicators specifying 'good practice'). But, in a *given* context, a person who has developed the kind of formation we are discussing will be sensitive to the kinds of concerns there are at issue in that context and how important each one is there and then.

5.6 The Relationship Between *Principles* and *Phronesis*

In our thought experiment (in Section 5.4), the managerialist challenged Aristotle to say how agents would know how to apply principles in practice, if it were not made clear at the outset, and in explicit terms, *which* principles are to be used in practice. This is set as a challenge because in a managerial concept of accountability an agent's decision-making and practical reason is directed to *start* from a procedural principle, carefully worded in the name of, say, promoting 'effective schools', a 'learning environment', 'quality assurance', or 'excellence in practice'. On an Aristotelian view, the managers have got things the wrong way round:

> . . . about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the rule is indefinite, like the leaden rule used . . . [to make] . . . moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so the decree is adapted to the facts. (NE 1137b 32)

What Aristotle means by this is that principles, whether in the guise of 'guidelines' or 'rules of procedure', need to be flexibly applied in practice. Principles cannot displace a practitioner's grasp of the good that is at issue *right now*. It is simply a mistake Aristotle suggests (NE 1098a 26–27) 'to look for precision in all things alike', for, 'about some things it is not possible to make a universal [i.e., a general] statement' (NE 1137b 13). This is because the subject matter of the practical is *unlimited* (NE 1137b 18–19, 29–32).

Principles, then, may serve to remind the agent of what, among many other considerations, need to be borne in mind, but they are potentially always 'modifiable' in the light of particular cases (Dunne 1993: 361). They

are modifiable in principle because they are understood as fallible generalizations (laws sometimes have to be amended or re-interpreted in the light of new cases). Practical judgment/wisdom (*phronesis*) is always needed for deciding how a principle is to be applied in context, how to refine and possibly re-state the would-be universal statement, adjusting it, if necessary, to make a correct statement for this or that context:

> Nor is practical wisdom (*phronesis*) concerned with universals [i.e., generalities] only—it must also recognize the particulars [the specifics instantiated by particulars]; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars. (Aristotle, NE 1141b 15–17)

It is not, then, that Aristotle disagrees with the managerialist about the usefulness of principles in the sense of precepts, prescriptions, rules, codes, mandates, instructions, or guidelines. The Aristotelian will have a 'deep interest in the universal' (Nussbaum 1990: 38). But when principles are not understood as providing only general guidance concerning the good, and instead are applied rigidly, whatever the circumstances, they may in fact frustrate or destroy that good—one of the quickest routes one can take to hit the target but miss the point.

This is why the Aristotelian insists on the logical and practical priority of 'the particular' rather than putting unquestioned faith in universally applicable prescriptions intended to apply across the board (as we find in decontextualized principles for 'good practice' or 'effective' schools). General principles have a role in practice only in so far as they help give 'form and specificity to the reasons supporting judgement': 'they *need not be made explicit in advance*' (Hostetler 1997: 14; original emphasis). With this proviso regarding the role which principles play in practical judgment, we are now ready to turn to Chapter 6.

6 Quest for Accountability: The Neo-Aristotelian Response

> The origin of action—its efficient, not its final cause—is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist without reason and intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character
>
> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book VI. 2, 1139a 32–37)

6.1 IN SEARCH OF A MODEL OF AGENT-ACCOUNTABILITY THAT RECOGNIZES THE VIRTUE OF *RESPONSIBLENESS*

The question I start with is this: what kind of practical reasoning—what wisdom concerning *ends*, the constituents of those ends, and the *means* to those ends—should we expect of one who has to act responsibly in work contexts? Trying to answer this question will help give us a handle on the subject of this chapter, *professional formation*, as well as in assessing whether the kind of practical rationality which practitioners are now expected to deploy in practice is adequate for making wise, professional judgments appropriate for the context.

The aim now is to offer a 'professional' service as a 'service provider', and, in that role, one's responsibility will be to see that certain targets are met: that waiting lists are reducing, pass rates are increasing, productivity is improving, and so on. But can it be that all there is to being 'professional' is demonstrating that one can meet someone else's targets or else demonstrate that one has implemented one's own pre-specified objectives? There are those—critics of the status quo—who have been nurturing doubts for many years that this way of harnessing practitioners' professionalism is not the best way to ensure public accountability. In large part, many of these doubts turn on questions of responsibility, choice, and judgment—of *human agency*, in short.

The question which drives this chapter, therefore, is whether there is available a notion of professional responsibility—a sense of *responsibleness*, I shall call it—capable of combining individual or personal responsibility with organizational or institutional accountability, one that does not risk replicating the kind of problems which our present accountability system appears unable to avoid (see Clark 2007). If there were, then what kind of practical rationality would need to underpin it and what would the professional formation for achieving such responsibleness look like?

6.2 VIRTUES OF PROFESSIONAL FORMATION

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE), Aristotle explored the analogies between craft knowledge (*techne*) and virtue (*arete*) (see NE Book II, Ch. 1, 1103a 34–1103b 10). He also insisted on distinguishing them (see NE Book II, Ch. 5, 1105a 28–33–1105b 4; and Book VI, Ch. 4). But I am interested in the analogies one might draw between them: in what professional wisdom, moral wisdom, technical know-how, and practical knowledge have in common, in where all these things overlap,[1] and in the kind of *practical reasons* which these things make possible for agents.

In this connection, this is the place to make some assertions about what I shall call *virtues of professional formation*. Let us say that one who is to make a wise judgment within a given *métier* (i) has an abiding interest in, and care for, the *telos*[2]—main goal or purpose or good—of her *métier*; (ii) pursues the characteristic good of that *métier* with creativity and moral imagination; (iii) and has the virtue of *responsibleness*, and a *particular responsibleness* with respect to the goals of that *métier*—and she will think of these goals as belonging within a larger context that makes such ends *worth* pursuing, *worth* her pursuing and *worth* society's having her pursue.

Notice the use I make of the single word *métier*[3] to represent in broad terms the idea of a 'profession'—which, as it will be made clear later on, I am not restricting to those occupations which traditionally have been granted the status of a 'profession'. As I gave notice in the Introduction to this book, the focus throughout this book is not on questions of *status* or of *legitimacy* with respect to claims of professionalism. My concern all along is with the *structure of reasoning in relation to ends sought and the spirit in which the agent is to act*. Of course, we might want to draw limits to what does or does not count as a *métier*, just as we might want to draw limits on what does or does not count as a profession. But such issues belong to a discussion which must be deferred for now. For what I am especially interested in exploring is the mentality or attitude of an agent as formed by that agent's *métier* and the kind of practical reasoning appropriate for that *métier* which will aid decision-making and judgment. Every *métier*, I shall say, is directed at some specific human need or good (the health of patients, the safe conveyance of passengers, the education of children, the care, security, or relief of suffering of others, etc.). 'Needs' or 'goods' such as these not only enter into the definition and purpose of the *métier*. They also help structure the thoughts and practical reason of practitioners by whose efforts the needs or goods are to be realized as 'ends'—that is, as something for the sake of which actions are done.

6.3 THE CONCERNS PROPER TO DELIBERATION AND DECISION-MAKING

What will it take for a particular person of practical wisdom (*phronesis*), the so-called *phronimos*, to deliberate in a practical context and to arrive

at a decision how to act there and then (Burnyeat 1980: 81–82)—or, if not to deliberate (when instant decisions are required), then to choose *as if* she or he had deliberated (Anscombe 1992: 80)? These are the sorts of questions which Aristotle raises in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He is interested in how human reasoning plays its part in the service of judgment and action.

Suppose that the matter in hand is the kind of thing that is proper to be deliberated by the given person ('no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise nor about things that it is impossible . . . to do').[4] Then, according to Aristotle, practical deliberation itself is a process by which the person with a general, practical conception (but not necessarily a conception that can be articulated explicitly) discovers the 'means' towards achieving the end (*telos*) for the context (NE 1112b 12–13, 36–37; 1113b 3–4).[5]

As we discussed in Chapter 5, such an end will be the agent's starting-point (*arche*) for action. But, as I argued in Part I of the book, nowadays, the considerations proper to a given *métier* are constantly supplanted by other considerations that stand in no clear relation to the proper ends of a given *métier*. *Management* itself has now become an end in itself and constantly obliterates what Aristotle refers to as the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*' (*to hou heneka*), where this is seen as the *arche*, the starting point of action.[6] Whatever their *métier*, those who now work in public sector organizations are expected to reorganize their thoughts and practices in accordance with managerial rationalities.

Take the role of a 'health care manager'. Given that she has been trained *to be a manager* and will see *managing* as a generic skill, what does she see as her priority, her goal, or, as Aristotle would say, her *telos*? Is her commitment primarily to *good health care* or to *good management*?[7] The presumption is that these two aspects of her job will fuse, non-problematically. But do they? In practice, a legitimate concern for 'good management'—the idea, say, of 'managing resources efficiently'—once it gets muddled up with 'indicators' of 'performance' by which efficiency is measured, and comes loose from the very reasons *why* we have public institutions to care for seriously ill or dying people—can all too easily distract attention from the ends or core purposes of the hospital, care home or clinic itself, the ends which it is for the efforts of professionals themselves to give practical interpretation in the here-and-now context of their work. Unintentionally, managerial demands placed upon staff can militate, often with tragic results, against what is truly in patients' interests (as we saw in the examples discussed in the Introduction to this book). In trying to navigate her way between, on the one hand, managerial duties and responsibilities and, on the other, the sensible deployment of ordinary practical judgment, the health care manager may well find that her everyday practical reasoning and decision-making are undermined. What do her professional formational virtues (as described in Section 6.2) tell her? What exactly is she to prioritize in the here-and-now?

The example I have just described relates to health care. I leave the reader to determine the extent to which the kind of 'professional' dilemma I have just described applies to other public service practices.

6.4 ANALOGY BETWEEN ETHICAL FORMATION AND PROFESSIONAL FORMATION

So much for the kind of everyday dilemma that now makes the issue of 'professional formation' topical and urgent. Let us now consider a very different kind of practical rationality from the one at present promoted and ask how, according to Aristotle, the agent obtains the 'starting point' for action. Here is a first response:

> . . . the starting points of practical projects are constituted by what those projects are for . . . to see the starting point . . . to . . . act . . . for the sake of *this*, and because of *this* . . . [but] badness is corruptive of the starting point. (NE Book VI. 5, 1140b 16–20)[8]

From this passage and others that I shall give soon we get confirmation of the claim made in Chapter 5, Section 5.2 that practical wisdom (*phronesis*) presupposes ethical formation (*ethismos*) to specify the 'end' or goal of action as well as the resolve to act. Merely knowing what is right does not give an agent *phronesis*; the agent must be *disposed* to do what is right, too (NE 1152a 8–9).[9]

But now, *abstracting from the specifically ethical interest of Aristotle's doctrine*, and aiming for an inclusive formulation which will go some way to addressing the managerialist's challenge posed in Chapter 5, I propose that we consider a 'broader' sense of ethical than that which Aristotle intended.[10] The 'broad' sense will embrace that which we regard as professional conduct, worthy of, say, the compassion and diligence of a nurse on a busy ward, the patience and tolerance of a teacher in a large, mixed-ability class, the determination and bravery of a fireman going into a smoke-filled house, the consideration and respect shown by a housing benefit officer to someone seeking assistance . . . and so on.

All such people, apart from the technical expertise or competences they possess, or even the various virtues of character they clearly display, carry an implicit ideal of a *duty of care*—to the task in hand, to other people, to fulfill the challenge before them. What is to be included in this broad sense of the ethical, then, is the mentality or attitude of an agent as formed by that agent's *métier*. We can see that a condition of this broad sense of ethical is that the agent *should care for some sort of good*. Crucially, the structure of the agent's practical reasoning is grounded on this end or aim (*telos*).

There is a general point which is at stake here, having to do with how, in a much larger domain than that which is specifically 'moral', wise

judgments still need to be made in contexts where human goods, aspirations, and needs are considerations. As well as being technically adept at what they do, we want those whose responsibilities extend to the welfare and needs of the public to direct their technical skills and their expertise towards good ends. Without this expectation, why should we trust that they have our well-being in mind and will not harm us (Baier 1985)? This expectation extends just as much to the experienced principal/head-teacher/leader as to the inexperienced teaching/class assistant. For even relatively 'mundane' jobs can still be 'challenging' (Wringe 1991: 38), in that they demand certain standards of logic, practical reasoning, integrity, and judgment.

So in any job where human needs and goods are paramount—where there is a demand for a public service which the public can trust—what constitutes knowledge of the relevant 'end' essentially depends on the agent's whole, overall personal growth and formation, her own *Bildung*, and her own specific form of 'professional' development and *phronesis*, appropriate to her chosen occupation. '*Métier-phronesis*', I shall call this.

Métier-phronesis, then, is to be thought of as *structurally analogous* to the practical reasoning and judgment associated with *ethical phronesis*. By this I mean that wise practical action in work situations will emerge from the agent's perception and practically intelligent responses to the *particularities* of the context—and not solely from a prescribed set of, procedures, or rules. In both cases the capacity for *phronetic reasoning* is developed through a temporally extended, multifaceted process of *formation*—hence the reference I make to a person's *Bildung* (McDowell 1996: 84). The neo-Aristotelian need not deny that general rules or principles, or even 'guidelines' for 'good practice' have their place in practical reasoning, but will insist that they need to be considered on their merits in context, and not be applied in a *dirigiste* manner.

6.5 THE STRUCTURAL ROLE OF *FORMATION*: AN ANTECEDENT TO DELIBERATION AND ACTION

The structural role of formation then is that it *connects* the contingencies that an agent has to cope with—in a particular context—and the agent's appropriate responses there and then. Aristotle talks about the importance of the 'moment of action' (NE 1110a 14; 1116a 9), and how, in such 'moments', as he puts it, 'the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion' (NE 1104a 8–9).

At this point, someone might ask, "But how will someone know what to do at work without explicit objectives or targets to work to?" The person who asks this kind of question assumes that, in the absence of explicit, pre-specified objectives or targets, an agent's practical rationality is either deficient or else unaccountable. The sub-text to the question just posed

is this: "Where on earth could the 'objective' the agent is to pursue itself come from—if it is *not* explicitly pre-specified in the form of a target?" The Aristotelian form of this question is, "What determines an agent's starting point (*arche*) for action?" (NE 1110a 16–17; 1112b 33–34). There is an Aristotelian answer to this question. So let us turn now to Aristotle.

First, look at quotation [A], taken from Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

> [A] . . . virtue [ethical formation, *Bildung*] makes us aim at the right mark [end] and practical wisdom makes us take the right means [the right thing towards that end]. (1144a 7–10)[11]

Following the Aristotelian scholar David Wiggins,[12] I take this last line to cover two possible senses: 'the right means to the end' and 'the right constituent of the end'. So 'means', in this line, does not have to be understood solely in a sense that *limits* it to a 'technical-rational', sense of 'means to end', as in 'the right method of achieving the end'. A linear, causally efficacious, and instrumental reasoning (as used in a target-driven managerialism), where 'means' and 'ends' are identifiable apart from each other, is not the only model of reasoning available to agents:

> Neither the identification of ends with goals nor the visual metaphor of aiming should be taken to imply that all ends are physically, temporally, or even conceptually separate from the actions done for their sake. (Richardson 1997: 50)

The point I want to derive from quotation [A] is not, in the 'narrow' sense, an 'ethical' one, but a *structural* one: knowledge of how to act and of what to pursue in practice emerges out of a *process of formation*. So even though the quotation speaks of 'virtue'—an idea essential to the notion of *phronesis* as Aristotle originally intended—I am now inviting the reader to consider the *neo-Aristotelian* position I am proposing, inspired by McLaughlin's notion of 'pedagogic' *phronesis* (introduced in Chapter 5), by (i) reading the Aristotelian texts I provide in this chapter in the inclusive way I have just suggested and by (ii) focusing on the idea of the crucial role that formation plays in *structuring* wise and responsible decision-making in particular contexts. Professional formation can be seen as a structural counterpart of ethical formation. I want to go further than McLaughlin by extending *his* extension of Aristotle's idea and applying it equally to the practical reasoning of a wide range of agents in their chosen *métiers*.

Let us now return to Aristotle:

> . . . it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral virtue [ethical formation] . . . choice will not be right without practical wisdom any more than

> without virtue [ethical formation]; for the one determines the end and the other makes us do the things that lead to the end. (NE 1144b 30–1145a 6)[13]

Such passages from Aristotle, stressing the intimate interdependence of *phronesis* and formation, lead us to the next step, namely, to see an agent's practical wisdom and formation not as *separate* attributes of an agent, but as *different* aspects of *one and the same state*. Stressing the interdependence between formation and *phronesis* in this way helps us see the special role of formation in the fixing *in context* of the 'end' for *that* context (the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*'), as first explained in Chapter 5. I shall ask later, in Section 6.9 (as a challenge to the apologist for the status quo), how else it might be fixed and try to show that there is no other way to fix it.

If we look at quotation [A] in the *structural* way I have suggested, we see that it is formation which makes an agent aim at the right 'mark'—the right 'objective', as we would say now. Formation provides for the agent a standing *readiness* to be able to notice what needs to be done, what the end is to pursue in the here-and-now. Without such 'readiness', why should the agent be motivated to act in such and such a way? Following Sabina Lovibond (2002) in her book *Ethical Formation*, I therefore understand 'formation' as providing for an agent that necessary *antecedent sense* of what is of value to a human life—what matters and doesn't matter—and the capacity to apply that sense to deciding in the here-and-now. Formation is a logical pre-condition of practical wisdom. Formation, acting in this antecedent role, as we shall see soon, imparts a practical understanding—a not completely articulate, but nevertheless still communicable, ethos that defines an agent's *métier*—of the end to be pursued in the here-and-now.

So in a work context, 'professional formation', as I am envisaging it, is the product of a complex mix of personal, social, ethical, and occupational (*métier*) formations (in the plural). All this is well conveyed in the German word *Bildung*[14] which, in one of its many meanings, carries the idea of a person's character, sense of self and life-lived-so-far. (Some call this an agent's 'narrative'.)

6.6 PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION AND THE VIRTUES OF PROFESSIONAL FORMATION

Just as in the original account Aristotle gives of how ethical formation (*ethismos*) develops, where a person is initiated into an ethical life by *doing* (see NE, Book II, 1103a 32–1103b 1) and by *listening* to those who already display and embody practical wisdom in their actions (NE 1143b 13), so will a professional formation, in the neo-Aristotelian analogy I am drawing, depend in part on a supervised 'workplace-based occupational formation' (Winch 2000: 18). Whatever other models of professional education

are considered necessary for the training process, *apprenticeship* remains an indispensable, generic model of education for acquiring a professional formation. The idea of *being an apprentice* is usually associated with the formal, certificate-based apprenticeship route for young people in the sixteen to nineteen age groups entering a trade. But an 'apprenticeship', understood in the informal sense Aristotle invites us to consider, where an aspiring *phronimos* is advised to 'attend to the . . . sayings and opinions of experienced . . . people of practical wisdom' (NE 1143b 12–14), will also be an important route for those at the start of their professional careers, a crucial element of their professional education. The student doctor, nurse, or trainee teacher, just as much as the trainee bricklayer or plumber, if they are going to succeed in their chosen *métier*, will need to acquire practical knowledge about how 'things are done'. They need to learn from others the art of judgment-making. They have to learn how *judgments* are made (Wittgenstein 1969: 227e; 1974: 139–140).

On such a basis, the 'novice'[15] professional learns to notice what is relevant to this or that context, the kind of standards that are to be aimed at—as well as those which are unacceptable. Like the 'novice' *phronimos*, the novice teacher, doctor, dentist, probation worker, civil servant, barrister, and so on, learns from those more experienced and who 'see aright' (NE 1143b 13), in the light of professional standards. They learn what it is to reason *phronetically*—why *métier-phronesis* is needed when judgment is called for. From them, too, the novice-professional will learn just how demanding and exacting it can be to do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason (Aristotle, NE, 1106b 20–23; 1115b 19–20). And this, as we shall see shortly, is what ultimately helps give the agent the minor premise of a practical syllogism which prompts the question, "What really matters here?"

So whether it is a 'professional', 'technical', or 'artisanal' education (see Winch 2000: 17), someone in this formative, 'apprentice' stage of a career will need to participate in an 'on-the-job element of training' (16). In this trainee period, the 'apprentice' will be laying down a framework of implicit meanings as embodied practical knowledge—'knowing-how-to'. We can think of this formative stage as an initiation into a particular *métier* community. To become a 'participant' of such a community (see Wenger 1991), there will of course be formal, theoretical instruction, and specific practical and technical skills to acquire. It is only by seeing how those in the community conduct themselves that the core purposes of the *métier* in question come to be understood. The trainee teacher, for example, on route to gaining qualified teacher status, needs to develop the necessary formational virtues of teaching under the guidance, support, and correction of an appointed school mentor and other teaching staff. Assessment, evaluation, and feedback will all play their part here as the trainee teacher learns to apply theory, guidelines, codes of conduct, and so on, in practice. But no amount of theory about *how to teach* can compete with the kind of

knowing-how-to-teach which is learned experientially, within the community of a school. This knowing-how-to becomes embodied, implicit knowledge, and is acquired in part also through watching colleagues' teaching methods and listening to their opinions and advice. This process of watching, listening, and absorbing the norms inherent in a community is a vital part of what Aristotle meant by 'learning by doing' and explains why a practice might be said to have 'cognitive powers' (Burnyeat 1980: 73).

Here it is worth mentioning the work of Robert Solomon (1999), a philosopher who studied ethical conduct in US workplaces. Arguing from a standpoint that 'business ethics' need not be oxymoronic, he shows why many of the common problems which arise in organizational life—alienation of employees, resentment and petty rivalries among staff, and so on—is a result of the leaders of those organizational practices doing little to encourage an ethical work culture of openness, trust, and mutual co-operation, one in which mistakes can be admitted. For those who believe that a 'greed is good' work ethos is the only way to motivate people or to achieve corporate success, he recommends a change of direction which he refers to as the 'Aristotelian approach'. This begins with Aristotle's idea that we are primarily 'social animals' (*zoon politikon*), members of communities. From this viewpoint, even the so-called 'self-made' man or woman of business only 'makes' it by being part of a society: self-interest is always parasitic on, and defined in terms of, the interests we hold in common with others (43–44). The seventeenth-century 'social contract' tradition of thought, still pervasive in much management thinking—and which insists that we are fundamentally 'atomistic' individuals, only contractually related to others—does not, Solomon suggests, provide the right model for ethical governance or even efficient, organizational management (see also Morris 1997). In fact, the 'Machiavellian' approach, which assumes that power, control, or fear will get the 'best' out of employees, invariably turns out to be counter-productive. In 'command and control' work environments that deliberately incite 'competition, antagonism and continuous jostling for status and recognition' (Solomon 1999: 39), virtues of professional formation (in the sense I outlined at the beginning of this chapter), such as integrity, trustworthiness, and responsibleness—the very things which *all* well run organizations need—will have little or no chance of being nourished.

Where instrumental values or a 'Machiavellian' culture have not completely colonized the work ethos, however, there should in theory be opportunities for 'apprentices' (novices, trainees, etc.) undergoing a process of occupational formation to be inducted into the moral environment of a workplace (Winch 2000: 17, 26). And then there is a chance for virtues of professional formation to develop. For ethical understanding is the outcome of a successful process of *formation* (Lovibond 2002: 9).

So much of what counts as workplace ('on-site') learning, then, will be of a non-formal nature—learning what kind of norms of conduct and attitudes are valued in a work context. Hence the agent's need for a practical,

and not solely a theoretical, understanding of her job. The aim is to *become* a good practitioner, not simply reflect *about* being a good practitioner.[16] 'Reflective practice' is in fact inadequate without some substantial habituation already acquired in *métier* formation and the development of *métier-phronesis*. But saying this does not mean that we should regard the role which *techne* plays in practical situations as being in some way less important than *phronesis*—as if acquiring technical skills plays a lesser part than *phronesis* does in demonstrating or acquiring expertise and know-how (see Kristjánsson 2005). Anyone who aims to become a 'good' teacher will soon find that there is much more to teaching than just displaying practical wisdom in dealing with students (Winch 2004: 189).

If the structural analogy I have drawn is correct—that is, that between (i) craft/*techne* and virtue and (ii) *métier-phronesis* and *ethical phronesis*—then, in neo-Aristotelian-MacIntyrean terms, we see how a novice-apprentice comes to understand the 'goods' internal to the *métier* of, say, engineering, nursing, policing, teaching, and so on. Of course, you cannot become any of these things without also acquiring a mass of theoretical knowledge on which you will be assessed—if you want to attain accreditation in certain publicly recognized standards. But what the neo-Aristotelian model of practical rationality will insist on, in addition to having to train within a prescribed and regulated, learning framework, is that within a particular community of practitioners, you become party, as I have already suggested, to an implicit ideal of a *duty of care*. You need to develop a sense of what is to be guarded against, what is to be promoted, and, where applicable, what it is to make 'the best of things'. In this way, the virtue of *responsibleness*, alongside all other virtues of professional formation, becomes for agents, as Aristotle says, 'a part of themselves' (NE 1147a 23). Henceforth, the agent will not have to be constantly demonstrating to others that practice guidelines for 'good practice' are being followed, as our present accountability system now demands, but will be looking instead, to the work itself in the circumstances in which it is being done—as (Aristotle himself says) doctors and helmsmen do (see NE 1104a 7–10).

6.7 THE STRUCTURAL ROLE WHICH FORMATION PLAYS IN FINDING THE RIGHT END

Practical reasoning in the Aristotelian tradition is concerned with the rational execution of intentions in *action* (Carr 1981b: 646) and enables the agent to be alert and ethically sensitive to whatever 'particulars' strike that agent as relevant for decision-making. This is precisely what it means for an agent to use *discernment* in judgment (Pendlebury 1993: 150) and—if we pick up the argument from Chapter 4—to be prepared to be *answerable* for decisions taken.

What we need to focus on now is the crucial role that a human formation (or *Bildung*) plays in *structuring* wise and responsible decision-making. How does reason *connect* the contingencies that an agent has to cope with—in particular situations—and that agent's appropriate responses there and then? Before I set out a quotation which illustrates how formation or *Bildung* identifies an 'end' specific enough for practical deliberation, however, I must again remind my managerial opponent that the point we are concerned with is not in the narrow sense a 'moral' one—even if the text suggests this—but *structural*. The thing we are concerned with is the way in which the relevant considerations have to be *summoned* and the *shape in which they present themselves to the rational agent*.

I have chosen a quotation from Book VI, 1143b 1–6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Ross 1980: 153), split the text up (as [B] and [C]), and inserted commentary in order to make it easier to understand:

> [B] . . . [T]he [special kind of] intuitive reason [that is] involved in practical reasonings [contrast that which is involved in theoretical reasoning] grasps the last and variable fact, i.e. the minor premiss. (1143b 1–3)

In this passage [B], Aristotle mentions 'the minor' (or, as it sometimes called, 'the second') premise of a practical syllogism.[17] The practical syllogism can be understood as a recapitulation of what moves an agent to act, but not a deductively valid form of inference; it is an explanatory mode of words used to understand the structure of practical reasoning and the way in which decisions are reached: it 'fits the way we actually reason' (Richardson 1997: 37–38). And although the practical syllogism is not to be taken as an accurate description of the order of 'actual mental processes', the interest of Aristotle's schematic account of practical inference is that it nevertheless describes 'an order which is there whenever actions are done with intentions' (Anscombe 1972: 80).

Now we can carry on with quotation [C]:

> [C] For these variable facts [which enter into the minor premiss] are the starting points for the apprehension of the end [i.e., the 'objective', the thing to be done here and now] . . . [For things which the person who has formation/*Bildung* cares about] are reached from [their grasp of] the particulars [the specifics of particular situations calling for this or that response] . . . [So it is of these specifics that] we must have perception (*aesthesis*) . . . [The capacity for] this perception is intuitive reason (*noûs*). (1143b 3–7)

The structural point we are concerned with in quotation [C] is the way in which the relevant considerations both *summon the good that is relevant here*, and *shape the aspect* (*description*) *under which they present*

themselves to the rational agent. The agent's target—the 'objective' or goal to be achieved—is the good to be attempted *here* or the potential bad (e.g., harm, hurt lack of safety, or any evil) to be avoided *here*.

Now let us go back to the managerialist's challenge: how will a person know how to do the right thing without explicit objectives being set? Here, at last, is the Aristotelian answer. Formation gives the agent an outlook and a general readiness to pick out that which matters for purposes of the good. Then the kind of perception Aristotle calls *aesthesis*—which we may understand as 'situational awareness' (Wiggins 1998: 237) or 'attentiveness' to the context (Smith 1999: 330)—is the exercise of 'the readiness'. It assembles material for the minor premise. *Phronesis* then narrows general concern for the good to the context and to the end (*telos*) to be enacted in practice. *Knowing what to do* issues from a *practical understanding*—an understanding which can only become operative by reference to a particular context—whether a routine occasion or an emergency. Knowing what to do is *summoned* implicitly from *formation* only at the time of need—at the time an agent needs to act on a decision.

Let an example help illustrate all these points and bring to life the quotations introduced previously. I have chosen one that illustrates simultaneously the structural point just made in [B] and [C] and also the falsity of the idea that there is a radical 'disconnect' between the ethic proper to a *métier* and the ethic proper to one who tries to live a life honestly and responsibly with due care for others' well-being or welfare. To conceive professional, personal, and civic aspects of life as independent or unrelated is alien to Aristotelian thought and would stand in the way of a meaningful and flourishing life (*eudaimonia*).

Imagine a local building contractor who has recently won a bid to participate in a Public Finance Initiative (PFI), *Building Schools for the Future*,[18] and whose *métier* is structural engineering. One day, on examining his contract, he notices a loophole in the way costs for materials have been estimated. He realizes, without anyone's ever having to discover it, that he could now use cheaper materials. To do so would definitely help his profit margins. Yet his professional experience—his 'know-how'—also tells him that to do this means he could not personally guarantee the project for thirty years (the terms of the contract): the cheaper materials would have a shorter life (that is why he estimated for the superior ones). Moreover, it would be dishonest on many levels. In particular, it would betray the trust placed in him by many parties: his co-contractors, the various 'stakeholders' involved in the consultation process, his own employees who respect his professional expertise, and the high standards of work he expects from them. Lastly, it would betray the trust of taxpayers who, through the democratic process, have tacitly consented to the PFI school building initiative. All these diverse parties expect a *good* job. But now let's ask, what *prompts* all these thoughts he has? What prompts his ideas about betraying trust placed in him by others, or his thoughts about the importance of maintaining good

professional standards? Ideas such as these, which manifest a strong sense of professional integrity, do not just appear *ab initio*.

In the case of this particular man, what enables him to be in a position to deliberate and decide how to act is complex. There is the specific body of expert knowledge he has, the technical, theoretical, and practical knowledge particular to his *métier* and to the professional ethic he upholds, to maintain safe building standards. At the same time, his disposition to act honestly and with a sense of public spirit—civic virtue—are summoned and mediated by the responsibleness that is imparted to him by his overall formation.

Take the *man at the very moment he is deciding what to do*. Where exactly has he got to in his reasoning? Using the schema of reasoning suggested in quotation [B], we can say that he has arrived at something specific about the situation—something which, through what Aristotle calls *aesthesis*, 'perception' (NE 1109 b 21–23), he perceives as 'particular' or 'ultimate': 'the last and variable fact' (NE 1143b 3)—the minor premise.[19] He surveys the facts before him and fastens on what strikes him as especially worth considering. Exercising *aesthesis*, his *métier-phronesis* then supplies the necessary component of practical judgment. In other words, he has got to the 'minor' premise in a practical syllogism, the premise pertaining to *the possible*—what is feasible, given the circumstances (Wiggins 1998: 227).[20] He has the following kind of thought: "However 'do-able' this might seem to be, it would be both unprofessional and underhand. It would go against what I believe in".

And *that* thought is ready to summon and engage with *a good* which will enter into some major premise. What good? What major premise? A major premise which spells out his committed concern with the ends of his *métier* and other concerns he has—not to act against the 'good' inherent in that *métier*.[21] In brief, his deliberation is something like this: "Even though I can see a way of alleviating my present cash-flow problems (an ever-present concern), I just can't deviate from the terms of the original contract. Not only would I have to oversee an inferior job, it goes against *what matters*. Conclusion: I just can't do this." In a subsequent syllogism the two premises can combine to show what he must now do positively to get the contract corrected.

The two premises in combination—the minor and the major, drawn from the reservoir of values and concerns that are a part of his own formation or *Bildung*—decisively prescribe that he should not use cheaper materials. How do ethical formation and *métier*-professional formation compare here? So far as *phronetic* reasoning is concerned, I see no interesting difference or clear line.

So how was the right end arrived at? The agent, given the occupational/professional formation he has developed through his *métier* training, and *being the person he is*, sees (from the 'particulars'—i.e., what strikes him as the 'facts' of the situation) what he must *not* do. This is how his formational

virtue of *responsibleness* leads him to wise judgment, in the here-and-now. (This point relates to the third virtue of professional formation, listed in Section 6.2). This is a man concerned not only with the technicalities of good building practice, but one whom the public can trust to act *in* its interest and *for* its good. His decision represents ideals of what it is to live ethically and also by the 'ethic' of his profession, embodied in his formation. That is the good he contributes to society. No wonder Aristotle says (at NE 1147b 9–10) of the minor premise that it 'determines action'. Get that wrong and nothing much else will go right (see Anscombe 1981: 72).

Such a man, we see, at the moment of decision-making, does not need to draw on the findings of a 'quality review' which defines criteria of 'good' practice. His 'professional formation'—a fusion of his own *character*, his *occupational* (*métier*) *formation* which furnishes for him his *professional ethic*, and the *practical* and *technical knowledge* he has acquired over the years—helped give him his 'objective', what he knows he must do in that context.

The managerialist always wants a specific objective, a consciously, envisaged objective. But if we learn anything at all from the example I have just given, it is that it is possible to determine an objective (what needs to be/should be done) by reference to a specific context, and in the light of a person's formation working dialectically with practical reason. To a managerialist, all this might sound inadequate as a way to account for oneself. But it is how we would account for ourselves in a law court, if ever asked to do so. We would have to account for ourselves without recourse to the language of *managerialese* and perhaps explain ourselves in terms which, although at first sounding vague—for instance, "Something didn't feel right", or "It seemed the right moment to try this"—can be made more specific if justification is required. Even though they may sound 'vague' in comparison with a precisely worded managerial 'outcome' or 'objective', these initial thoughts, feelings, or concerns lead us to our minor premise and starting point for action. They are a mark of our character.

No doubt the man in the example falls short of Aristotle's ideal of the fully fledged *phronimos* who possesses a 'unity' of the virtues (NE 1145a 1–3). He may, for instance, have a terrible temper or be unfaithful to his wife but he is a 'good enough' citizen. He may not be a 'paragon' of virtue, but he clearly has sufficient moral knowledge and imagination not to fail to follow through what the minor premise records. He is able to identify what *matters* in the context.

It is the ability of the structural engineer to use practical wisdom, his own *métier-phronesis*, as a deliberative excellence (*euboulia*), together with *aesthesis*, which helps mediate between his habitual, generic knowledge and the 'particulars' of the action-situation he finds himself in. But this is not all. As we saw from the texts cited earlier (in [A], [B], [C]), his *metier-phronesis* cannot be understood without reference to its *antecedents* carried in his own person, his own *Bildung*. It is his *formation* that equips him to find the 'end' which enables him to know what to do.

There is just one more piece in the story of how the structural engineer arrives at his decision and acts on the basis of this decision. In [C] we see how he does this through the faculty of *noûs*, the faculty of (so to speak) 'catching on', at the point where explanations run out. *Noûs*, as Aristotle understands this, is a general capacity rational beings have to bring understanding to a situation, an 'intuitive reason' or intelligence that will be presupposed not just in cases relating to proof or logical analysis but also for practical reasoning. Jerome Bruner describes the phenomenological experience of 'catching on' as an 'intrinsically unanalysable process from an experimental point of view', 'unverbalisable'—an 'enigmatic process' akin to the 'psychologist's "aha" experience' (Bruner 1993: 131–132). In the ethical or practical version of this faculty, *noûs* develops by the process of ethical formation and is brought to bear more and more discriminatingly upon the 'particulars' that need to be grasped, after a certain point is reached, *without further explanation or explicit instruction*. Because the thing which this process involves can be expressed only in its particular application, there is no full or completely articulate statement to be had of that which it involves. This is practical, personal, and implicit knowledge, I shall say.[22]

6.8 MEANS AND ENDS

Is implicit knowledge a problem philosophically or even psychologically speaking?[23] Is *Bildung*?[24] Of course, there are all sorts of philosophical questions to be asked about them—about the psychology of learning by doing and about the further ramifications of *Bildung* that resonate in the idea of a *Bildungsroman*, of *paideia*, of *ethos*, and, not least, questions to do with the notion of *culture* itself as well as the *cultivation* or initiation into a tradition or way of being (Holland 1997). But my purposes are fully satisfied if I can persuade the reader that (i) there is such a thing as implicit knowledge in the sense we see embodied in the Aristotelian notions of *ethismos* and *phronesis* (and *phronetic* reasoning) and that (ii) there *has* to be such a form of knowledge if all sorts of things which we comprehend and know about already in the worlds of action and administration are even to be possible. These points once made, I suggest, do not need to wait for confirmation by a theory of, say, the cognitive psychology of formation. They are *explananda*, not hypotheses. They find their own praxeological justification in the lived rationale of our various modes of being.

In this chapter, I have presented an alternative to the dominant paradigm of practical rationality now promoted. I have illustrated the beauty of Aristotelian practical reason, its congruence with the kind of ordinary reasoning we do in our everyday lives. Agency, professional integrity, or personal ideals are not compromised or hijacked at the crucial moment of decision-making. There is no risk of 'values-schizophrenia' (Ball 2003: 33), forcing

professional and managerial identities to war against each other. In the example I gave, we see how close the fit can be between the means and the ends of an agent who knows what he is doing and why he is doing it. There is a constant interplay between 'means' and ends': in the presence of professional formation and the virtue of responsibleness, 'means' and 'ends'—the 'what', 'how', and 'why'—simply come into being together. The value of the Aristotelian model is that practical reasoning can be both 'normative' and 'effective' at the same time (Orton 1997: 570). What apologists for our present accountability system will find so hard to understand here is that in an Aristotelian form of practical reasoning, as we saw in the example I gave earlier, we may have a *telos*—an aim, a goal—which is not articulated as a 'clearly envisaged objective' (Emmet 1972: 51).

John Dewey would have been as perplexed as Aristotle to learn that what counts now as *good practice* is represented in such a way that ends and means come adrift from each other. It is an 'absurdity', he writes, to think 'of any "end" which is set apart from the means by which it is attained and apart from its own further function as means' (1964: 97). Ends and means for Dewey lie on a 'continuum' and in the course of an inquiry or the attainment of a goal (what he calls 'ends-in-view') we may revise our means or our ends or both. Although he had his differences with Aristotle (see Richardson 1997), Dewey, like Aristotle, recoils philosophically from the idea that ends be conceived as 'frozen and isolated' (73).[25]

The points Dewey makes about *means* becoming logically separated from *ends* bear importantly on issues that relate to the practice of teaching when education is conceived essentially as the efficient means to the attainment of clearly defined ends (the *sine qua non* of managerial rationality):

> . . . a language of 'ends' and targets established outside the process of being educated—the endless lists of competences . . . which might be objectively measured, the professional skills on which teachers are to be assessed if they are to progress . . . 'Education' . . . becomes the means to achieve those ends, and it is judged essentially by its effectiveness. If it is not effective, then it should adopt other 'means' . . . the quality of the 'imput' is measured simply by the reference to the success or otherwise of the 'output'. (Pring 2001a: 286)

Any organization—not just one of an educational nature—which regards the relation of ends and means as being purely *external* to each other, as Weber observed, has the potential for instrumental or consequentialist thinking, and utilitarian forms of bureaucracy to shape the ethos of the organization (see Etzioni 1961: 141). The risk, then, is of the potential for a 'dangerous space' (Carr 2000: 221)—a 'moral gap'—to open up between means and ends. The dictum, 'the end justifies the means' can mean '*any* means', which then leaves room for 'means' to be free from moral constraints (Bauman 1989; Honderich 1995: 230).

In the Aristotelian model of practical reason the problem of such a 'moral gap' does not arise. When an agent exercises practical judgment the 'good' to be realized is something to be sought *through* the action undertaken by the agent and is not to be understood as 'an independently specifiable aim' (Smith 1999: 331). The 'means' are 'constituents-to-end' (Wiggins 1998: 220):

> Deliberation is . . . a search, but it is not primarily a search for means. It is a search for the *best specification*. Till the specification is available there is no room for means. When this specification is reached means-end deliberation can start, but difficulties that turn up . . . may send me back a finite number of times to . . . a better or more practicable specification of the end . . . [T]he whole . . . difficulty of the matter is in the search for adequate specifications, not in the technical means-end sequel . . . the main business of practical reason is ends and their constituents, not instrumental means. (Wiggins 1998: 225, 374)

"Send me back a finite number of times . . . to . . . a better or more practicable specification of the end". This point is crucial (see Millgram 2008). The person who has developed the capacity for *phronesis*—or its counterpart *métier-phronesis*—will be someone who has developed the disposition to re-appraise situations in ethically imaginative ways, and, if necessary, to be prepared to make corrections to the original 'specification' of the 'end' (see again Wiggins 1998: 225, 374). Through a process of self-interrogation (e.g., "Have I really got this right?", "Could she have meant something else?"), the deliberator calibrates his or her own beliefs and commitments in relation to what is judged good and possible in a particular context. And sometimes, there is no *one* clear answer. Sometimes, the only 'right' thing is compromise. How does *compromise* fit into the framework of a performance management model of agent-accountability?

6.9 ARGUMENTS THE DETERMINED MANAGERIALIST MIGHT OFFER TO DISPENSE WITH FORMATION

My argument so far has been to show the distinctive role which *formation* and *métier-phronesis* play in the fixing, in a particular context the 'end' (the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*'). The aim, as I announced in Section 6.5, was to show that there is no other way to fix it. But perhaps there is still doubt, so let us ask, is there any *other* way in which rational agents could be supplied with a starting point and a *that-for-the-sake-of-which* for rational deliberation? MacIntyre, if we were to enlist him here, might suggest that we propose the following experiment: let someone start from a desire that chances to turn up where they are. Why shouldn't they just go on from there? After all, as MacIntyre (1988) says,

> in the liberal public realm individuals understand each other and themselves as possessing . . . [an] ordered schedule of preferences . . . Each individual . . . in contemplating prospective action has first to ask him or herself the question: What are my wants? . . . The answers to this question provide the initial premise for the practical reasoning of such individuals, a premise expressed by an utterance of the form: 'I want it to be the case that such and such' . . . (338)

In such a 'liberal' scenario, the desire expressed is transformed 'without further qualification into statements of a reason for action, into premises for practical reasoning' (338). What is wrong with that, someone may ask. Why do we need the story about *formation* and *phronesis*? Wouldn't it suffice *to begin* from a desire that is empirically supplied at the time?

What if, though, *that* desire appeared mad, arbitrary, or totally trivial? How then would the result be rational? Well, if formation *were* present then we might try to see what could be reasonable in the desire. After all, the 'ends' which the person with *phronesis* aims at (as 'objectives') are not *arbitrary*. The deliberator is not operating in a 'private' world, disconnected from publicly agreed, exogenous, enduring values (Woods 2003: 156). But then, at this point, at least, we surely need the thought from the *Nicomachean Ethics* (at 1143b 3) about the importance of the minor premise (already quoted in Section 6.7) and its relation to the good, or else we need a similar thought that is suggested by MacIntyre's (1988) critique of the kind of practical reasoning that simply takes off from a particular 'preference' (341). Either way, we shall need formation if there is to be practical reason in action.

Suppose that the Aristotelian conception of formation *were* dispensed with, then why shouldn't something else take its place? The managerialist's suggestion must be that the training and 'continuing professional development' of a fully accountable agent can perfectly well be accommodated through performance management with its regulatory systems of 'performance indicators' and 'attainment targets', and through the agent's internalization of various complex sets of instructions in the form of 'guidelines' for delivering 'best practice'. 'All this, we shall be told, 'drives up standards'.[26]

The example that I chose of the structural engineer, poised at the moment of deliberation, in illustration of the operation of the practical syllogism, was precisely intended to invite such objection from the managerialist theorist who places faith in this sort of professional education and training. The managerialist theorist, I say, faces a dilemma.

Either the instructions ('guidelines') will be general, in which case something Aristotelian will have to come back in order for them to be *made determinate for action in a particular context*, or else they will be specific. But if they are specific enough for action then there must be a limitless number of them. Given the endless variability of circumstances, no finite

number of them will *ever* be sufficient even for the most ordinary life—unless somehow the professional novice (trainee, student, apprentice) can 'catch on' to the rationale from instructions given for certain *specific contexts* and then *extrapolate* (inductively?) to the others. But that rationale itself cannot consist of a specific instruction. We are carried back to the first alternative, and so, inevitably, we return to something like Aristotelian *noûs* (intuitive reason, comprehension) as we previously explained it (in Section 6.7). So why not appeal, right from the start, to the Aristotelian account of practical *noûs* and the faculty which one with formation is able to identify in a given context as the right end (the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*') to aim for?

In so far as educational practice is concerned, we have already agreed (in Section 6.6) that the activity of teaching cannot rely solely on *phronesis* (or 'pedagogic *phronesis*', to use McLaughlin's term). If the goal of teaching is student learning, then two other Aristotelian kinds of reasoning, *theoria* and *techne*, will be needed too.[27] Nevertheless, the idea that it is operationally possible to train up teachers in theoretical canons and techniques of 'best practice', constructed by policy-makers who, in each iteration of reform, are 'convinced' that the new ideas they impose on teachers are better than the old ideas they once imposed (Kennedy 2002: 356), is not, I suggest, *progress*.

Perhaps it is time to re-assess the kind of practical rationality that now structures 'patterns of action and interaction' (Ogawa and Scribner 2002: 577) within organizations. MacIntyre, as we discussed earlier, points out that the structure of practical reasoning which prevails in our present political and economic climate *starts* with 'bare preferences' or 'wants' (as in, "We want X to happen", where X could be filled in by any general policy a policy maker or manager might wish to initiate) *without necessarily also thinking about the good and the possible*—without, that is, re-situating the policy in the context of what good is possible *here* or what harm can be fended off *here*. A bare, explicit managerial target, for example, a bare "We want . . . to bring down the waiting time to see a doctor/raise the number of students achieving pass rates . . ." *needs no further qualification*. Such desiderata, although it might be argued that they represent admirable administrative or political goals, exist in their own right as *wants*; they have been set 'loose' (1988: 338, 340) from all consideration of what is good or possible *in the particular circumstances* in which the 'wants' are expressed. With MacIntyre, we might say that this is how desirable *public ends* and managerial *means*, aimed at those ends, can easily become uncoupled from one another.

At this point, Aristotelians and advocates of non-managerial modes of administration will press the claims of a practical, public rationality that harmonizes ends to means, and means to ends in the way that the 'Aristotelian' model which I have described in this chapter does. They will press the following questions: when newer and still newer generations of

managers dispense altogether with formation and the *phronetic* mode of reasoning that formation makes possible, or when the managerial way of 'doing things' becomes the only way of 'doing things', what then will *co-ordinate* the 'objectives' that are fixed upon with *the good that is in the context possible*? The answers to these questions will need to be considered carefully—when they are revealed.

Part III

End-Points

Ideas, Ideals, and Ideologies

7 Return of the Lure of the Explicit
'Making the Implicit Explicit'

> The criterion of understanding is clearly not in the order's actual words, nor in the mind of the person giving the order, but solely in the understanding of the situation and in the responsibleness of the person who obeys. Even when an order is given in writing, so that the correctness of the understanding and carrying out of it can be verified, no one assumes that it makes everything explicit. The comic situation in which orders are carried out literally but not according to their meaning is well-known. Thus there is no doubt that the recipient of an order must perform a definite creative act of understanding its meaning.
>
> Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (1970: 298)

7.1 WHAT IS REASONABLE AND UNREASONABLE IN THE IDEA OF *MAKING THE IMPLICIT EXPLICIT*?

It is easy to imagine that apologists for the status quo—who I have been calling the 'managerialists'—might have been reading Chapter 6 with mounting indignation. For in the neo-Aristotelian picture I have described, I have drawn attention to the ways in which implicit knowledge is embodied in action and is integral to practical judgment. The man in the example we discussed in the last chapter (Section 6.7) did not try to conform his reasoning to a generic model of decision-making; he did not rely on explicit targets to know what to do. And yet could identify his 'objective'—his 'end' (*telos,* the '*that for the sake of which*') and act on it. The kind of practical 'know-how' it took to do this he owed to his formation and to the virtues of professional formation associated with his *métier.* In the process of deliberating and reasoning, he exemplified what I called *métier-phronesis*, the structural counterpart of the Aristotelian notion of *phronesis*. The point of the example was to show that those judgments we commonly refer to as *professional* judgments—judgments made in specific contexts in response to particular problems, incidents, or events—require a *phronetic* kind of practical reasoning. A linear, cause-and-effect, 'hit-the-target-here's-how-to-do-it' kind of reasoning is not always the appropriate professional response to complex situations.

In its own inscrutable way, the practical, personal, and implicit knowledge carried in formation, I argued, prepares an agent to discern and identify what is the best thing to do in the circumstances (in Aristotelian terms, *the good*), as well as what needs to be safeguarded or promoted in the name of the same general cause (in Aristotelian terms, *the possible*).[1]

By analogy with the account Aristotle gives in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of the way the person with practical wisdom, the *phronimos*, deliberates and comes to make a practical judgment, the neo-Aristotelian will hold that the capability of making practical judgments, even in modern organizational practices, cannot be mimicked by subjecting the agent to specific objectives, targets, benchmarks, performance indicators, or criteria.

One who is inclined to a managerial way of doing things, however, will challenge the faith and weighting the Aristotelian places on the notion of implicit knowledge and argue as follows:

> "We can accept your contention that implicit knowledge has an important role to play in how the person who has practical knowledge makes decisions. But we now have a duty—in order to *spread good practice*—to try to turn this special kind of knowledge into something more accessible for strategic planning and dissemination purposes. To leave implicit knowledge where Aristotle leaves it is just far too mysterious! It does not explain anything. What we need to do is make more explicit the ways in which the professional—*whatever* his or her *métier—knows how* to do certain things."

By the end of the chapter it will be clear what is problematic with this argument. But, *prima facie*, it might be thought the managerialist speaks some sense. After all, as Charles Taylor has argued, we are all 'self-interpreting animals' (1985) who are constantly trying to make articulate a largely inarticulate sense of what we value. Making explicit that which lies implicitly in our understanding allows us to establish the kinds of values on which we would be 'capable of taking a stand' (1989: 27). In this way each of us may explicate what we believe in. And now, why stop with the question, 'What do *I* believe in?' After all, it was Socrates' intention (by means of the dialectical method of cross-examination, the *elenchus*) to 'draw out' his conversants by making explicit that which they assumed implicitly and then by challenging them. There was no other remedy, Socrates thought, for the state of 'illusion' or false belief.

Similarly, the hermeneutic tradition is based on the idea of attempting to make explicit that which is held at the level of the implicit, namely, our 'prejudices' (i.e., our 'presuppositions', 'pre-judgements', or 'pre-understandings'). If every viewpoint we hold is colored by presuppositions, argues Gadamer, what could be better than making those presuppositions explicit in order to gain better insight into our beliefs and attitudes?

> [R]eflection on a given pre-understanding brings before me something that otherwise happens behind my back . . . Thus only through hermeneutical reflection . . . can [I] deem freely what in my pre-understanding may be justifiable and unjustifiable . . . [2]

From very different traditions we arrive at what appears to support the managerialists' position: we must *transcend* the implicit if we are to fulfil our potential as human beings and live lives which aim at truth, progress, and authenticity. In neo-Cartesian fashion it seems that we must be in a perpetual state of readiness to interrogate ourselves; the alternative is to wallow in complacent habits of reasoning, fail to fulfil our human potential, and condemn ourselves to the 'ghettoes' of our own practices (Gilroy 1989: 106).

So are the managerialists not simply following where Socrates once led the way? For the notions of 'self-evaluation' and 'self-assessment', common ideas in managerial rhetoric and performance management programs, rely heavily on the idea of the *self-examining self*. What is the alternative, it may be asked—an *unreflective* practitioner? No one would seriously want to promote *that* idea (McLaughlin 1999: 9) so the idea of the 'reflective practitioner' (see Schön 1987) remains a potent educational and pedagogical 'ideal type'.

But now let us ask how close the theses of Socrates, Taylor, and Gadamer really are to the managerial project. There is at least one difference. Such theses will self-interrogate and explicate not endlessly (in the name of 'continuous improvement') but *at need* and *for a definite purpose*. One stops with something adequate for the context.

Similarly, Aristotle, as we saw in the last chapter, thought that precision is required only in so far as the nature of the case demands explicitness (NE 1094b 12–25): *some* implicit knowledge can be made *more* explicit or articulate at need. In pedagogical contexts, we see this idea at work in the teaching model that Vygotsky drew. His well-known saying, 'What the child is able to do in collaboration today, he will be able to do independently tomorrow' (Vygotsky 1989: 220) is a good pedagogical example of a reasonable application of the principle, *making the implicit explicit*. Teachers 'scaffold' a child from the 'everyday', 'spontaneous' concepts a child already knows and which are 'situationally meaningful' (being rooted in 'concrete', 'personal experience') to more complex (what Vygotsky termed) 'scientific' concepts. In this way a child will 'restructure and raise spontaneous concepts to a higher level . . . '.

We could identify many other examples of a pedagogical nature which draw, quite reasonably, on the principle *making the implicit explicit*. For the teaching model based on Socrates' own 'method', where there is an on-going commitment to reason and truth, is still inspirational for many teachers (Hogan 1995). Socrates' influence will be present in any teacher who, as Hogan says, believes in the critical function of education, where the search for knowledge will give 'a better insight into . . . beliefs, attitudes and actions' (39).

Reasonable applications of the principle may also be found in situations that do not bear directly on matters of a pedagogical nature. Consider, for example, adults working on a joint task as a team. In such cases the

knowledge of each 'needs to be articulable' (Clarke and Winch 2004: 512) in order to ensure sufficient mutual understanding for tasks to be shared and subtasks to be co-ordinated. For knowledge involved in joint action is a collective asset, something more than a set of discrete items of individual knowledge (see also Alanen et al. 1997; Bratman 1999).

So there are times when we might endorse the principle *making the implicit explicit*—when there are specific tasks, purposes, or goals to accomplish. But anything more *general* to do with making the implicit explicit would be problematic, an Aristotelian would say, if the generality were to be embodied as a directive, in the form of a policy initiative, to be implemented across the whole of the public sector, in every organizational practice. As we discussed in Chapter 3, where we examined the ideal of transparency (as interpreted now by managerialists), if explicitness is pursued as an end in itself—as a principle of policy—then practice risks being distorted. The pursuit of explicitness must always be the servant of practice, not its master.

7.2 MAKING *IMPLICIT KNOWLEDGE* EXPLICIT: SOME COMPLICATIONS

But what is it that lies behind the managerial desire to make implicit knowledge explicit? The managerialists' thought appears to be that any implicit knowledge that is embodied in know-how must (somehow) be transformable into a set of 'objective' practice training 'Guidelines' or 'Recommendations'. (If it *must* be, then it *can* be, seems to be the thought here.) Whatever know-how is embodied in the practical wisdom and expertise of a professional, this is what managers seek to make 'explicitable'. This demand should not surprise us, though. As we saw in Chapter 3, accountability, under the banner of 'transparency', precisely depends now upon 'making the invisible visible' (Munro 1996: 5).

But is there anything concrete or specific enough here *to manage* and make explicit? The assumption that there must be comes from thinking of implicit knowledge by analogy with explicit, codified knowledge. Practical knowledge, in this view, belongs to the same generic kind of knowledge as codifiable, explicit knowledge. It is just a shadowy, hidden, paler version. The opposing view that I shall defend and develop in the second half of the chapter, and expand on further in the next one, is that the implicit knowledge of someone with practical knowledge is not like that. It is *sui generis*.

Like Michael Polanyi's notion of 'tacit knowing', the notion of implicit knowledge that I shall expound is not something that can be *made* to appear on request. There is no substantial, discretely individuated *body* of knowledge which can be brought to the surface of consciousness/awareness—as if it were a nut, lying within its shell, waiting until the moment it is cracked open.[3]

A first step in understanding why the analogy breaks down is to acknowledge the potential ambiguity inherent in the concept *knowledge* itself. *Knowledge* is systematically ambiguous (Allen 1978: 168) between 'knowing' (*noēsis*, which designates an act of a *knower*) and 'things known' (*noēta*, which can exist *apart* from a knower). Things known stand as 'objects' in the world. But when we refer to 'implicit knowledge', in the sense we have been talking about, as something embodied, as a personal kind of knowledge activated in the process of *phronetic* deliberation, we are *not* naming an object.

I have already urged on several occasions that we think of implicit knowledge as that which is *non-explicit* or *not articulate*. But this formulation may invite an objection of circularity: implicitness is to be understood by contrast with explicitness and explicitness by contrast with implicitness. There is a further problem. One often needs to make use of different, but related terms, such as 'inaccessible' or 'inarticulate' to help explain the character of implicit knowledge, but then, when it comes to explaining explicit knowledge, the same list may be enrolled, only this time, replaced by 'accessible' or 'articulate' (Tirosh 1994: xix).[4]

Perhaps, though, what we are faced with here is a case of benign and not vicious circularity and the way out is to illustrate, by examples, what one means by the implicit or the explicit—examples which in their context are self-sufficient. Here I follow Wittgenstein's advice—that we should quell what seems to be an irrepressible, philosophical urge 'to understand the basis or essence of everything', by providing *definitions* (Wittgenstein 1969: 27). It is a futile exercise—a quest for something unobtainable—Wittgenstein suggests, if we think we can always provide clear definitions to questions of the form, 'What is X?'

But even with this 'dispensation' from Wittgenstein, there is still another complication to be noted before we move on. Although Polanyi's position regarding 'tacit knowing' is full of technical terms,[5] one aspect of his work at least is accessible and relevant to our concerns. According to Polanyi, 'tacit knowing' may contain 'actual knowledge'; but that knowledge is 'indeterminate, in the sense that its contents *cannot be explicitly stated*' (1969a: 141).

The examples Polanyi gives will be familiar: the bicyclist, the pianist, the surgeon, the radiologist, the blind man. All these people will use skilful *personal* knowledge to achieve their goals. But even though they might 'possess intellectual control over a range of things' (1962:103), they will 'grope for words to tell what [they] know' (102). For 'personal' knowledge is an 'inarticulate intelligence' that 'cannot be put into words' (1966: 4).[6] Can we say any more about what is meant by suggesting that the 'content' of what is known '*cannot be explicitly stated*'?

In order to confront this question we need to be aware of yet one more ambiguity, depending on how '*cannot be explicitly stated*' is interpreted. At the risk of over-simplification[7] there are, I suggest, three *main* ways we may understand this idea, corresponding to three types of implicit knowledge.

Type I is knowledge that in principle cannot be put into *sufficient* words to say *how one knows what one knows*. Examples would be the recognition of a face, the skill in acquiring a first language, or in operating a machine, implement, or instrument. Here one may be unaware of the biological-evolutionary, linguistic, mechanical, ergonomic, gravitational, mathematical, or musical principles upon which a large element of those skills depend (Polanyi 1969a: 49–57).

Type II is knowledge which is not yet articulated, but which could *in theory* be articulated, perhaps in the form of a set of instructions for someone to follow. Consider, for example, the skill of tying a bowline sailing knot or of icing a cake. It is important to note though, that even with Type II knowledge, the articulation of instructions, however detailed, will not *guarantee* success in the transference of implicit knowledge from one person to another. Depending on the task in hand, it might still take a much more complex form of *practical knowledge*—one more akin to Type III knowledge (discussed next)—for successful completion of the task. For even detailed instructions may be misunderstood or misapplied by the use of inadequate or faulty materials; or else fail in their objective, because the learner lacks the background knowledge which the explainer assumed that the learner had.

Now let's return to the kind of knowledge with which we were concerned in the last chapter, namely, the implicit knowledge of the *phronimos*. This might appear to be a very special case of Type I, but is really quite different in nature. This is Type III. Recall that the *phronimos* need not be able to reconstruct the workings of *ethismos* (ethical formation), or give rules for finding the right thing to do, or to articulate the reason why she notices the particular things she notices. Much of the time she is just asking others to 'see' (comprehend, intuit) what has to be done. When asked to 'account' for herself, she may be able to reconstruct the practical reasoning which led to her decision, but *only in retrospect*. She can't state anything general because her know-how only emerges in specific contexts as she applies *phronetic* (or *métier-phronetic*) thinking to whatever happens to be the problem, issue, or query in hand.

From the examination we made in the last chapter of the crucial role that the minor premise plays in the practical syllogism, we learned that this kind of implicit knowledge (Type III) arises only when the agent is 'immersed in contingency' (Nagel 2006), in the actuality of lived experience, making a response to something which demands—at the appropriate 'moment of action' (Aristotle, NE 1110a 14) and in a specific context—a decision how to act. This type of knowledge, I argued, emerges in practice. It emerges from the dialectical relationship between an agent's dispositional make-up and the *ethismos* or *Bildung* that supports her *phronesis*. Such knowledge emerges only relative to the moment, as a response to all the intangible and eclectic things to which humans tend to attach significance, meaning, and value—the tone of someone's voice, the expression of vulnerability

in another, a feeling that something is not right. Such responsiveness, as I argued in the last chapter, helps inform choices and is at one with the attributes, dispositions or qualities which a teacher who possesses 'pedagogic *phronesis*'[8] will have when deciding what to do in the 'pedagogical moment' (Van Manen 1991).

How can one start to pin down the 'content' of this kind of knowledge when it is so ephemeral, dependent on the character of a *particular* person acting in a *specific* context? Here we are truly 'groping' for words (Polanyi 1962: 102) to describe what, by its very nature, exhausts words. In the *Philosophical Investigations* (1969), Wittgenstein expresses the kind of complexity that attaches to the 'content' of certain kinds of human knowledge which are not susceptible to indisputable 'proof': 'What is most difficult here is to put this indefiniteness, correctly and unfalsified, into words' (227e).

In complete harmony with the account which Aristotle gives in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of how ethical formation is acquired (the focus of the last chapter), Wittgenstein (1969) raises the following question, regarding the way we learn to make confident judgments about our feelings or perceptions:

> Can one learn this knowledge? Yes some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through '*experience*'.—Can someone else be a man's teacher in this? Certainly . . . he gives him the right *tip*.—This is what 'learning' and 'teaching' are like here.—What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgments. There are rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating rules. (227e)[9]

So is the managerialists' project, to make the implicit explicit, doomed from the start? Is the desire to turn the knowledge of the *phronimos*—or, analogously, the knowledge of one who has developed *métier-phronesis*—into something explicit an attempt to turn what really belongs to the realm of *judgment* into a *system* of general rules? First Aristotle, and now Wittgenstein, tells us that there is a kind of knowledge that cannot be systematized, even though, out of such a knowledge it is possible for theoretical, propositional attitudes to be formed, and for rules—that is, 'tips', as Wittgenstein says, or precepts, as Aristotle says—to be of some use. They are both saying, as does Polanyi (1969), that there can be no 'short cuts' in acquiring these attitudes:

> . . . experience shows that no skill can be acquired by learning its constituent motions separately . . . imitation offers guidance . . . but in the last resort we must rely on discovering for ourselves the right feel of a skilful feat. We alone catch the knack of it; no teacher can do this for us. (126)

7.3 FURTHER COMPLICATIONS: UNCLEAR DISTINCTIONS, A MISLEADING DICHOTOMY AND A LOGICAL FALLACY

In their own individual ways, Aristotle, Wittgenstein, and Polanyi argue that 'one learns from experience' and it is only through experiential learning that practical knowledge can develop. But what does it really mean in terms of acquiring knowledge, to say that *one learns from experience*? What is the nature of the kind of knowledge which is 'saturated' with experience (Vygotsky 1989: 218–222)? Is this a form of knowledge which lies on a continuum and will be *implicit* at one end, when applied in the realm of the practical, and then becomes *explicit* as soon as propositions are brought in to describe the practice? This just does not make sense—how would one individuate or identify the point where and when the metamorphosis occurred? No, much more credible is the idea that when one learns from experience, one's state of perceptiveness, one's state of being, awareness, and sensibility is what changes. *That* is the basis on which one can say, "I won't do that again . . . I should have . . . ". Such propositional thought works dialectically with our practical experience. Here we see why it is that no practice 'stands outside a theoretical framework' (Pring 2004b: 129). In the case we are discussing ('learning from experience'), 'practical' and 'propositional' understanding will be inter-dependent, each growing *into* and *out of* the other.

So now, looking beyond the kind of case we have just discussed, and seeking to broaden the discussion to a consideration of the developmental processes associated with the genesis and growth of human understanding (see Hamlyn 1978), we are in a position to state the following hypothesis: however clear, explicit, and articulable are the 'theories' we form on the basis of our 'reflections-on-experience' (specifying exactly how not to make *that* mistake again), the conclusion we come to will still contain *irreducible* inarticulable or 'tacit' elements, the *residue* of their origin. Polanyi (1969) helps elucidate:

> . . . we see *tacit knowledge* opposed to *explicit knowledge*; but these two are not sharply divided. While tacit knowledge can be possessed by itself, explicit knowledge must rely on being tacitly understood and applied. Hence all knowledge is *either tacit* or *rooted in tacit knowledge*. A wholly explicit knowledge is unthinkable. (144; original emphasis)

Some provisional conclusions for this section can now be offered. On the basis of the exploration undertaken to understand what is meant by the suggestion that the 'content' of what is known '*cannot be explicitly stated*', we are now in a position to say that Type III knowledge—the 'knowing-how-to' of the *phronimos*—is an 'emergent' kind of knowing where the use here, of the gerund, *knowing*, connotes an active, personal *state-of-being*.

If this is right, then we might agree that the implicit knowledge of the *phronimos*—and, by implication, the implicit knowledge of the

professional's *métier-phronesis*—is a knowledge that is like no other kind of knowledge. It is *sui generis* in nature—possible only through a process of human development, growth, and formation (one's *Bildung*, as I have been using that word in previous chapters). This is a kind of knowledge that gradually comes to be embodied in ways we might describe as 'visceral, felt, not easily communicated' (Toren 2001: 167), ways which constantly involve a 'process of *negotiation* within a situation'; it is certainly not a knowledge that is dependent on goals 'mapped out' or 'determined' by 'experts' (Bonnett 1991: 280). Nor can it be reduced, *without residue*, to explicitly articulable, propositional knowledge—if only because its existence will always be dependent on the 'attentional field' (Luntley 2002: 168) of individual agents in specific situations. *Prima facie*, Type III knowledge looks to be a highly unsuitable candidate for systematic forms of management.

We can now return to the managerialists' project, announced at the beginning of the chapter, and try to make sense of their plan to make the implicit knowledge of the *phronimos* explicit. The managerialists must think that this is possible. Here is a reconstruction of something that they may have in mind.

(i) In every given case there is some *explicitable* information in principle that might be made available about how the *phronimos* proceeds.

But now, the thought is as follows: if that is so, then we ought to be able to turn the phronimos's explanation to advantage and spell out his or her knowledge, explicitly. From this, it is tempting to conclude,

(ii) There is a body of *explicitable* information about how, in every given case, the *phronimos* proceeds.

But the trouble is that proposition (ii) is a much stronger claim than (i). More importantly, (ii) does not follow from (i). It is an example of the notorious 'quantifier-shift' fallacy which often creeps unnoticed into logical reasoning.

One cannot argue from:	'For every child born there is a father' (*For all x, there is a y such that . . .*)
to	'There is someone who is every child's father' (*There is a y, such that for all x . . .*)

7.4 ATTEMPTS TO CODIFY IMPLICIT KNOWLEDGE

There is a clear demand for the *codification* of knowledge in fields where 'reflective' practice and 'continuous professional development' are

encouraged. This demand tends to be made for good pedagogical reasons. But, as we shall see soon, *in the context of our present accountability system* this demand is problematic.

Even where it is acknowledged that 'teaching . . . cannot be reduced to simple technical descriptions', we are told that there is 'scope for making practical knowledge more explicit, and thus more capable of being . . . codified' (Eraut 1994: 47, 65). The idea seems to be that a teacher's 'vernacular' pedagogical knowledge should be turned into codified knowledge, with 'the potential to develop a corpus of systematic pedagogical knowledge' (McNamara 1991: 307).

Similarly, Oakley (2003) writes that for proponents in the field of 'evidence-based education' it is a matter of regret that the educational sector appears to be dominated by a reliance on procedural 'craft' knowledge. There is a responsibility, she urges, to see non-codified knowledge as having the 'potential' to be made codifiable and synthesized in ways that are 'explicit, transparent, replicable . . . '.

In these arguments, there is an important assumption at work—that non-codified knowledge can (must?) be made codifiable and that, as Oakley (2003) puts it, doing this is a 'pre-requisite' for the development of 'systematic methods for applying knowledge to the *production* of knowledge'. These arguments make covert appeal to an organizing and governing principle: *to make the implicit explicit*. This principle is openly endorsed in the work of David Beckett (2004), who seeks to establish 'a new epistemology of practice' for learners in the workplace—to understand better their own 'inferential understanding' (503ff). Rather than accept 'experience' as an 'epistemological bedrock', there needs to be 'a conversion of what is done (acted) into what is said (articulated)' (500).

Robert Brandom, author of *Making the Implicit Explicit* (1994) and *Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism* (2000), on whose work Beckett draws, sees the 'process of expression' as

> making *explicit* what is *implicit*. This can be understood in a pragmatist sense of turning something we can initially only *do* into something we can *say*: codifying some sort of knowing *how* in the form of a knowing *that*. (2000: 8; original emphasis)[10]

As we shall soon see, Eraut, McNamara, Oakley, Beckett, and Brandom are not alone in being what we might call *explicitists*, those who endorse the general idea of making knowledge which is implicitly known, explicit, by *codifying* it in propositional form. Although each argues from very different agendas and disciplines, there is something all *explicitists* tend to share—an epistemological impatience with the notion of implicitness: that it does not explain anything, that it does not add anything to our understanding, and that it is obfuscating.[11] In Habermas, such an

impatience can be detected when we see just where his notion of 'critical self-reflection' (Grundy 1989: 92) leads. He, too, appears as an *explicitist*:

> When we use the expression "rational" we suppose that there is a close relation between rationality and knowledge. Our knowledge has a propositional structure: beliefs can be represented in the form of statements . . . In linguistic utterances knowledge is expressed explicitly; in goal-directed actions, an ability, an implicit knowledge is expressed; this know-how can in principle also be transformed into a know-that. (1981: 8)

So now the stakes are raised! We are no longer talking, as we were at the beginning of the chapter, about the risk, should we not engage in the activity of making the implicit explicit, of stifling progress, or of not fulfilling our human potential, or of remaining in a state of false belief, or even of becoming ossified in our practices. Our *rationality* is at risk.

Can this be right? Does our practical rationality—and all that hangs on it—mimic, as Habermas seems to suggest, the explicitness of 'linguistic utterances'? How, then, is the notion of *agency* to be understood? What are the metaphysical implications of such a linguistic thesis? Can practical knowledge really be represented by a propositional form of words? Is that what Habermas has in mind? The thesis of the *explicitists*—that 'knowing how' can simply be converted into 'knowing that'—is not intuitively persuasive. In the next chapter we shall see just how implausible it is when we study one particular argument that claims such a conversion is possible.

7.5 WHY THOSE WHO ATTEMPT TO CODIFY PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE MAY UNWITTINGLY COLLUDE WITH THE UNREASONABLE DEMANDS OF MANAGERIALISM

'All is explicit, all made present', writes Paul Standish (2000), as he reviews the way in which the demand for 'what we need to know' is presented to us in the form of 'performativity league-tables', 'numbered paragraphs . . . bullet-pointed lists, spreadsheets, flow-charts' (162). *This*—that is to say, the things he describes here—is where the principle of *making the implicit explicit* logically leads. For the problem is *not* simply that managerial accountability practices attempt 'to make the implicit explicit'. In the process of trying to do this, non-instrumental values which it is impossible to quantify will be marginalized as irrelevant (see Bottery 2000: 280; Strathern 1999), so much so that teachers themselves may begin to be uncomfortable with anything that does not explicitly demonstrate the learning experience of their students in terms of 'valid', measurable outcomes:

> How many teachers . . . are now able to listen openly, attentively and in a non-instrumental, exploratory way to their . . . students without feeling guilty, stressed or vaguely uncomfortable about the absence of criteria or . . . a target tugging at their sleeve? (Fielding 2001c: 146)

Strathern (1998) provides an anthropological explanation of why (what I call) the 'lure of the explicit', has so effortlessly taken over our practices:

> . . . new virtues silently glide into existence . . . It has thus become 'good practice' simply to describe one's mission through stating aims and objectives and procedures to achieve them. Even to aim to do so smacks of virtue . . . 'Good practice' carries the double resonance of ethical behaviour and effective action. Simultaneously a standard of measurement and a target to which to work, is thought to bring its own reward. Organizations will be more effective in their performance, if they are . . . explicit about their goals. (2)

Glossed in terms like this, the ubiquitous rhetoric of 'good practice', although it promises so much, in reality is 'invested' with a dubious 'morality', one that is 'hard to contest' (Morley 2003: 49). Why should educationalists fear this? One thing to fear is a version of Gresham's Law: work that produces measurable outcomes will tend to drive out work that produces unmeasurable outcomes (Wilson 1989: 61).[12] The 'problem' is not just that audit attempts to make the implicit explicit, but that 'it is a false presentation of visibility': 'with audit in place, no-one need *look for* . . . implicit values' (Strathern 2006: 197; original emphasis) or the 'give-and-take' understandings we share with others (Aucoin 1990: 198, 200). It is these kinds of 'invisible' values and understandings (see Section 3.5) which actually enable organizations to *work* (Strathern 2000: 314–315)!

The kinds of cognition which are being discussed here and which are based on unarticulated forms of trust and embodied knowledge are not entirely 'transparent' to reflection (O'Neill 1998: 140). They subsist at the level of the implicit in our everyday lives. As I showed in Chapter 6, such understandings are an essential component of practical knowledge, 'knowing-how-to', and of *métier-phronetic* practical reasoning, both of which are required when professional judgment is called for. Do these forms of cognition have any future at all in a system of accountability whose proponents appear to be running a similar campaign as the *explicitists*?

It is time to assess the supposed worth of the principle *making the implicit explicit*. To make a start on our enquiry let us note an important assumption that runs covertly in this principle:

> K′ The practitioner's practical knowledge ('knowing how') can be re-configured into propositional knowledge suitable for universal dissemination.

The managerial version of this carries a stronger modal emphasis:

> K″ Managing 'know-how' and enhancing it by means of making it more explicit must be an objective of policy.

We need look no further than the work of Donald Schön (1983, 1987) to find acknowledgement of the role of assumption K′. (We shall deal with K″ in the next chapter.) Schön's position regarding the relationship between implicit and explicit knowledge is problematic. For although he sees clearly the essential role that implicit knowledge plays in practical judgment, almost everything he actually writes *about* implicit knowledge has the potential to be misinterpreted by those who do not respect the *sui generis* nature of practical knowledge. Let me explain.

Schön starts off by drawing our attention to the impoverishment of the 'technical rational' model as a basis for conceiving the notion of professional knowledge. He says that when professional practice is seen as no more than the skilful application of theoretical knowledge to the instrumental problems of practice, then *artistry* has no place.[13] Schön's 'knowing-*in*-action' draws upon Polanyi's notion of 'tacit' knowing. (Discussed briefly in Sections 7.2 and 7.3.) Influenced by Polanyi, Schön insists that the characteristic mode of ordinary practical knowledge is that we are usually 'unable to describe the knowing which our action reveals' (Schön 1983: 54). So far, all this is helpful. However difficult the notions of implicit or tacit knowledge have been found, and in whatever ways Schön's work has been criticized or refined,[14] one basic point always seems to survive, namely, his endorsement of the claim that such non-explicit forms of knowledge are indispensable to practical knowledge. (Compare the managerialists' concession on this point, in Section 7.1).

But no sooner has Schön begun to illuminate the nature of the practical, than a version of the principle, *making the implicit explicit*, springs into action. Tacit knowledge is to be brought to the surface by students 'reflecting on the tacit knowledge implicit in their own performance' (1987: 88). As Wilfred Carr (1989) explains:

> For Schon, 'reflection in action' involves reflecting on 'knowing in action'. It is the process through which the hitherto taken for granted knowledge implicit in action is made explicit, critically examined, reformulated . . . (10)

Schön's suggestion may seem to have a reassuring, familiar ring about it, resonating, as it does, with the kind of Socratic-Taylorian-Gadamerian ideas we touched on earlier, in Section 7.1, where it was agreed that, *in*

specific contexts and *for specific purposes*, there are good reasons why we should endorse the idea of making the implicit explicit. But there are hidden dangers in the *general* idea Schön advocates. The word 'reformulated' which is used in Carr's interpretation of Schön's thesis (in the citation I gave previously) is where the problem begins.

At this point, let us turn to the work of Beckett and Hager which illustrates, more easily than Schön's work, the problem inherent in the idea that implicit knowledge can be *reformulated* into explicit forms of knowledge. Beckett and Hager (2002) argue that much of the 'tacit' can be, and should be, 'made explicit for learners' (120). They suggest that 'know-how' is a type of 'knowing what to do in practice' that is 'evident from people's various intentional actions' (172). In its turn, this suggests a possible reading of 'know-how': Jones knows how to X just if Jones propositionally knows *what the way is or what the ways are of doing X*. (This form of words recurs in the Stanley-Williamson ['S-W'] thesis, to be discussed in the next chapter.) Given this interpretation which Beckett and Hager provide—where there is a shift from *knowing how to*, to *knowing how to articulate*—the route to the explicit seems clear. One who 'knows how' has the potential to make his or her *knowing how to x . . . y . . . z* codifiable in terms of "I now *know that*———".

Even if such a thing is not intended, the chief beneficiary of such a thesis is managerialism. For *knowing how*, being deemed a suitable candidate for codification, becomes ready for 'capture'—wide open, that is, to Oakley's demand that it be subjected to the discipline of 'systematic methods' to create 'explicit, transparent, replicable' knowledge (see again Section 7.4). And to suggest that 'the knowledge base in education programmes lends itself to codification and generalisability' (Beckett and Hager 2002: 104) gives managerialists all they need to justify the regulation of the knowledge base of any practice they seek to organize.

But perhaps the important question to ask here is whether practical knowledge can really be *organized*. Friedrich Hayek (1949) famously believed not: it existed only in 'particular circumstances and time', and could not 'enter into statistics' (83). Now, however, there are numerous attempts to 'organize' practical knowledge. It has been suggested that learning processes, if they become more explicit to a learner, will be more 'easily integrable' with 'managerial disciplines' such as strategy, economics, accounting, and information systems.[15] But here one might ask, is this ease of integration something for educationalists to *celebrate*? The demand for educators to 'integrate' their work in accordance with the principles of a managerial system of accountability arises directly from the very system in which those educators operate—in ways that are designed to 'facilitate, coordinate and order its inner workings'.[16]

Is it not strange that those who are most likely to be concerned about the low status and trust that is accorded to tacit, intuitive, embodied, practical, and ethical forms of knowledge are some who *unwittingly* stoke the fires of

technicism and instrumentalism? Consider Habermas (1987), for instance, who coined the phrase 'colonization of the lifeworld' in order to show how areas of social life can be subject to new forms of domination through instrumental, rather than 'communicative' forms of rationality. Habermas alerts us to new 'legitimations' and 'counter-cultures' which have encroached on practical and ethical lifeworlds. Yet he does not appear to have seen how easy he has made it for those who still see virtue in micromanagement to propose that practical knowledge be *systematized* and *instrumentalized* on the basis of 'transforming' 'knowing-how' 'utterances' into 'knowing that' 'utterances' (1981: 8). The 'transformation' which he endorses (see again Section 7.4), may actually help set in motion the very kind of 'colonization' he laments. Let me explain.

To give endorsement to any *general* project to codify and systematize practical knowledge always carries risks—the kind of risks we associate with Taylorism and Fordism. Take McNamara's (1991) urging that teachers' own 'vernacular' pedagogical knowledge be made 'accessible to colleagues' (307). *Prima facie*, this sounds reasonable, resonating as it does with a well-established literature on 'action research' which sees a link between the collegial sharing of ideas among teachers and the enhancement of their own status, research and professional development.[17] Problems emerge, though, with McNamara's stipulation that vernacular knowledge be 'codified . . . written down or recorded . . . as a permanent artefact' to create 'a corpus of systematic pedagogical knowledge'. How does he think this is to be accomplished? Answer: through 'deliberate intervention by a sensitive observer to ensure that teachers' subjective skill and experience become codified as permanent records of practice'. McNamara outlines a substantial sense of teacher professionalism which I welcome. But in our present climate of accountability what assurances do we have that the kind of 'intervention' and 'sensitive' observation he has in mind can be guaranteed? Given the context in which teachers now work, and the pressure placed on researchers to find the 'quick-fix' answers which politicians seek, McNamara runs the risk of undermining his own thesis. Instead of *re-establishing* the professional authority of teachers (1993), his proposals could *re-enforce* managerial authority.

Again, to exhort educationalists to be 'reflective practitioners' may in fact lead to activity which is profoundly anti-educational (McLaughlin 1999). It offers policy power to managers eager to tabulate and systematize practical knowledge. Once demands are met to bring practical knowledge and experiential learning 'under more critical control' (Eraut 1992: 8) through codification, teachers, subject to managerial disciplines may all too easily be forced to exhibit in their own person 'the law-like generalizations wanted by government' (Pring 2004b: 139).[18]

Consider how the concept of *evaluation* now functions in our educational vocabulary. Evaluation is no longer used primarily as a means for developing and sharing an understanding of the process of teaching and

learning.[19] A school may no longer 'speak for itself', through showing how it measures up to the trust invested in it to promote worthwhile educational activities (McBeath 1999: 6). Evaluation, as it now is understood, is yoked to the process of external audit inspections of institutions, 'to evaluate returns on public investment'. The activity of *evaluating*, in many educational institutions has been reduced to a ranking exercise—to determine how a teacher or her institution 'performs'.

Connected with this is the further worry about the way research is now commissioned. Because policy makers want short-term answers to justify the pledges they make and political targets they set, policy language, even when it gives the appearance of being 'data-driven', is in fact 'data-driving' (Apthorpe 1997: 54).[20] Research undertaken in universities should aim to *inform* rather than *displace* the judgment of educationalists (Elliott and Doherty 2000: 217). The discourse chosen in policy documents now does more than inform. Its job is also to persuade (Apthorpe 1997: 54). And the kind of 'persuasion' which is at work, *because* it is ideological, may be difficult to resist (see Chapter 2). Information provided by organizational institutions must comply with performance-related resource allocation grants, and with standardized audit and appraisals systems, the rationale of which tends not to be open to question:

> The combination of an externally imposed . . . accountability regime and a highly circumscribed strategic environment has meant that governance at all levels has tended to become less about initiative . . . and more about process and compliance. (Shattock 2006: 39)

So when, in the name of 'continuous improvement' (see Morley and Rassool 1999: 49–50; Oakland 1993), educators comply with managerial requests to measure and report on their 'performance' in order to demonstrate the 'effectiveness' and 'quality' of their work, they should not really be surprised to find that such requests take them to a place where they really do not want to be (see Smith 2001). Where is that? A managerial 'lifeworld' committed to monitoring 'short term-targets' or to recording data for 'assessment exercises', 'transparency reviews', 'standardized assessments', 'enterprise audits', 'strategic/development plans', 'marketing strategies', and so on. In that world there is no appeal to further standards that stand above or beside managerial ones. There is little room in such a 'lifeworld' to ask how the efforts of an educational institution relate to *educational* ideals. Here we have a form of Habermasian 'colonization', *par excellence*.

Is it surprising if educators who think they are acting diligently by meeting externally imposed targets may, on some occasions, feel their own agency and professional judgment compromised; or that when managerial targets are in fact met, the so-called 'achievement' actually provides relatively little satisfaction? For, as we are told, the managerial

doctrine of 'continuous improvement' carries the message that 'your best is never good enough' and 'satisfaction is the same as complacency' (Bottery 2004: 92).

7.6 SUMMARY

It is only if we recognize the limits to what can and should be made explicit for accountability purposes that we have any hope of management practices not undermining, systematically, the professional judgment of agents and the ends of their chosen *métiers*. Here we should remember the distinction MacIntyre (1985: 194) draws between institutions and practices. We need institutions which nurture and do not deform the practices of given *métiers*. We need institutions with management structures that do not inadvertently deform the professional formations of those who seek to preserve the integrity of their own practices and the ends of their *métiers* (Green 2009: 128).

This chapter has been the first part of a study into the logic of the principle of *making the implicit explicit*. The task for the next chapter will be to show that this principle, which grounds the epistemology and methodology of present managerial modes of accountability (that have evolved from the ideas, ideals and ideology of 'New Public Management') is problematic both in its practical effects and in its grounding.

The main aim in this chapter has been to show how the 'lure of the explicit' constantly beckons us like a siren, urging us to make our implicit knowledge explicit. At the beginning of the chapter I spelled out instances when the principle of making the implicit explicit may enhance understanding and self-knowledge. But we also explored where the principle takes us, if we follow it unquestioningly. When we try to make the implicit explicit we may in fact distort the thing we least wish to distort. The process of distortion may happen insidiously. First, implicitly understood 'regularities' of organizational practices are 'codified' and turned into propositional statements and then they are 'translated into rules of action' (Strathern 2000: 317)—rules of questionable practical value.

Is it not an irony that the very kind of 'technical rationalization' of knowledge that Schön so fiercely denigrated has now been granted new licence to return in a neo-Taylorist figuration? Moves towards a 'scientific management' of the workplace by Taylorism in the early twentieth century were precisely attempts to *eliminate* uncodified knowledge, to replace the practical knowledge and judgment of individual workers by codification—through 'rules, laws and formulae' (O'Neill 1998: 141).

8 'Knowing How To'
Further Attempts to Make Practical Knowledge Explicit

> . . . The "model lesson" . . . is a monument . . . of the eagerness of those in authority to secure immediate practical results at any cost . . .
>
> John Dewey (1964: 321)

> Educational standards . . . The problem is not one of correct policy formation. Policies are relatively easy to formulate and often easier to mandate. *The problem is one of practice*. Good teaching and substantive curricula cannot be mandated; they have to be grown.
>
> Elliot Eisner (2003: 248)

8.1 MANAGERIAL 'EXPERTISE'

Now it is time to consider assumption K″, the second of two assumptions that we highlighted in Section 7.5, in the last chapter. It is K″ which I suggested grounds the managerial principle of *making the implicit explicit*:

> K″ Managing 'know-how' and enhancing it by means of making it more explicit must be an objective of policy.

I suggest we start by examining more closely the epistemology of the managerial modes of accountability used to 'rationalize' railway services in the UK, as first outlined in Chapter 3. The analysis we made of the Hatfield rail crash showed how, in accordance with 'New Public Management' (NPM) principles, attempts were made to systematize the practical knowledge of the original engineers and to distribute this knowledge across discrete, competing agencies of management. The general idea was to uncouple the basic 'know-how' of the original railway engineers from their so-called 'inefficient' routines and put it to use more efficiently. Once the knowledge was 'depersonalized' in this way, managers could then fulfill the functions severally assigned to them as per their training (as to what constitutes an efficient, well co-ordinated and productive organization) across the various agencies of management (to set targets, implement 'strategic planning', etc). The guiding principle, we noted, appeared to be to try to abstract activities such as 'monitoring, control and planning' from the actual execution of these functions (Hopwood 1984: 178) and to charge designated managers

to apply their own special expertise and set targets accordingly. Managerial modes of accountability were then free to work their way systemically through an organization's practice and be implemented 'on the ground, in every service outlet' (Fergusson 1994: 95).

What does such an account tell us about the nature of managerial 'expertise'? Among the most common of the proposals made about this expertise will be (i) that practices appropriate for private sector industry and commercial businesses can be applied to the public sector—that there is no generic difference between these two spheres; and (ii) that 'efficient management' will make 'effective' organizations—whatever the nature of the organization. These two proposals embody the universal claim that, whatever the core purposes of the practice, the process of managing of them will be the same. As we discussed in Chapter 2, on the basis of this kind of claim, managers assume they have the *right* to manage (Pollitt 1990; Sachs 2003).

The thought seems to be that if a management theory is good, then it should be good for *any* organizational practice, whatever the character and nature of the work that people are recruited to do, be it in a railway, health, prison, or emergency service, an educational institution, a post office, and so on. Moreover, those who are in charge of strategic thinking within an organization, and who will be making sure that performance indicators are being met, are not necessarily required to have any detailed knowledge of the kind of work they will be managing. The rationale of this is that managers will be able to deal with issues in an impartial, impersonal way. Can we say any more about this kind of 'impersonal' knowledge?

If dispositional capacities and competencies are seen as detachable from the normative contexts which once served to give them significance (Carr 2000: 105), then specialized *know-how* will be seen as needing no particular 'knower'. Following Karl Popper (1972), we could say managerial expertise is driven by an 'epistemology without a knowing subject'. For if managers are to analyze, dissect, delegate, devolve, or subcontract tasks then the actual work of an organization has to be uncoupled from the personal experiences of those in whom practical knowledge and skills reside. Otherwise it cannot be redeployed, as managers think fit. But notice the assumption here: after redeployment, that which remains will still retain all the values that once attached to the practitioners' practical knowledge—an assumption which, as we saw in Chapter 3, is highly contentious. Some practical knowledge, indispensable to the *telos* of the organizational practice did not survive the 'rationalization' process and (in the words of the engineer who was interviewed) were 'lost'.

So what comes next? Once 'uncoupled' in the way described here, know-how can then be encapsulated in an explicit, generalizable form (Dunne and Pendlebury 2003: 197), and then it is ready to be devolved. 'Steering at a distance' is the metaphor often used to describe this kind of managerial 'governance'—a form of managing that creates 'arm's length agencies' (Glatter 2003: 46).

Perhaps, even more clearly than before, we can see why the idea of *personal knowledge* will be problematic to the theorist of management. For what is now being suggested is that someone's skill, expertise, or competence is not to be understood as an integral part of a complex norm-governed process and practice (Clarke and Winch 2006). Such capacities must be seen as 'transferable' attributes that will produce a particular output. A set of skills which work well in one context, it is assumed, will transfer easily to another.

The economic model suggested here is one which 'idealizes' rational action by abstracting 'schematically from what people do and from the context' (Hollis 1987: 169). This process of abstraction enables a person's practical knowledge to be boned as cleanly as it can be of any 'personal' elements it may have. A person's know-how is then pared down even further to their productive *units* of labor, their measurable 'inputs' which (ideally) will produce the desired level of 'output'—in terms of cost-effectiveness. This is how economically 'rational' and 'efficient' organizations are meant to run (Katz and Rosen 1991: 281).

At this point, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that agents, when viewed through the lens of such an economic model, are seen as little more than *fungibles*. There is fungibility between things (commodities) when one 'commodity is freely exchangeable into another commodity' (Katz and Rosen 1991: 74). By analogy with this model of commodity value, the logic of 'economic rationality' leads us to conclude that, in so far as organizations are to use resources cost-effectively (and where knowledge is understood in terms of *human resources*), one person is inter-changeable with another. It is not the person that matters, but what that person produces—hence the managerial mantra, "It's *results* that matter." What a contrast with an Aristotelian view of rational agency! For an Aristotelian, *the personal* is inseparable from the agential—it is what meaningful agency consists in.

What should be the philosophical response to the idea that know-how can be uncoupled from a practitioner, and then 're-attached' (Carr 2000: 105) in a newly generalized form, at the discretion of some manager? That such a process is clearly endorsed as 'good' management illustrates that managerial 'expertise' is itself an example, *par excellence*, of what is prized in management theory: a depersonalized, so-called 'objective' knowledge. It is one of the many 'abstract' or 'expert' systems (Giddens 1990, 1991) of modernity, locatable only within the values and principles of effective management. It claims to maintain a validity that is independent of all those who are part of the 'system'. An important managerial skill, then, for strategic planning, will be to 'delocalize', depersonalize', and 'disembed' practical knowledge from everyday practice, re-contextualizing it, wherever needed, within new organizational sites (agencies, call centers, trusts, etc.). It is therefore not surprising that newly appointed managers need not know anything very specific about the nature of the service they will control. This is the case even for educational institutions.

It is now possible for someone without qualified teacher status to become eligible as a school's head teacher, leader, or principal, the role now being characterized as that of 'chief executive'. Such people are chosen for their management ability rather than any formal knowledge of either teaching or of things taught. The expertise of newly appointed managers lies essentially in the fact that they are *qualified to manage* in a *generic* sense. This generic skill is transferable to *all* domains and has its own standards of competence, quality, and excellence. How is the claim that managerial expertise is said to be 'universally valid' (McSweeney 1996: 217) justified? A possible answer is *positivism*, which purports to describe the world in 'objective' and non-personal terms. The 'new public', 'managerial' way of running public sector institutions offered forms of 'expert' knowledge that positioned managers as 'neutral' and 'impersonal', indifferent 'between different . . . occupational interests' (Clarke and Newman 1997: 66).

It is at this point that we see why the principle *making the implicit explicit* is so important to managerialism. If *subjectivity* is to be avoided—this is a chief requirement of positivism—then the first order practices of an organization must be made as explicit as possible—for 'objective', verification purposes. How else to measure performance and standards and see whether targets are being 'delivered'?

Once practices are 'depersonalized' in accordance with the strictures of positivism, managerial expertise will seek to submit the teacher, the nurse, the railway engineer, and so on, to a regulatory discipline that purports to be 'objective' through such things as 'transparency reviews', 'assessment exercises'. In this way, it is argued, the 'arbitrary' judgments of professional 'elites' or of the 'manadarins', characteristic of older modes of administration (McSweeney 1996: 214) will be avoided. Such are the claims which apologists for managerialism have been making now for over a half a century. But if *these* are the claims, then managerial expertise must submit itself to the same stern tests that were applied to the previous, now deposed, modes of administration (as discussed in Chapter 6).

Let us start by asking *why*—despite philosophy's unfavorable assessment of positivism—the belief in managerial expertise is still so persistent. How *can* it persist when the managerialists' unwavering belief that their own kind of management is the only means by which public accountability can be sustained stands in such tension with empirical evidence which shows that managerial systems are just as prone as other forms of bureaucracy to burgeon, to create powerful and controlling forms of life, to invent their own abuses (and their own 'elites'), and to generate immense costs (through consultancy or legal fees for the various 'private-public partnership' contracts, or for the introduction of information data systems designed to serve the bureaucracy, etc.) at the public's expense?

Managerial procedures are still defended and justified—just as they were, decades ago, when they were introduced in the first wave of public service reforms—by reference to politico-economic fiscal restraints and the

supposed need for better forms of bureau-regulation. But has the promise to bring about economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, the so-called three 'E's' of good management, been fulfilled? Have the new structural forms of 'governance', characteristic of NPM, *decreased* bureaucracy and cost? No. These kinds of structures increase fragmentation and complexity, which leads to the need for enhanced supervision, regulation, and co-ordination ('joined up governance', as described in Chapter 3), but this in turn generates new 'transaction' costs.[1] Within the terms of its own criteria of what counts as 'good' management, the managerial response to the question of accountability cannot be described as a success.

How has it been possible for the belief in the worth of managerial modes of accountability to persist in the face of such damning empirical evidence? It looks as if there must exist *other* arguments for managerial 'expertise'—arguments, I suggest, so strong that they might be thought to spring from the very nature of practical reasoning, especially instrumental reasoning, *Zweckrationalität*. So the question becomes, does managerial 'expertise' *really* represent the essence of practical rationality and practical know-how?

8.2 THE *SUI GENERIS* NATURE OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE

In the twentieth century the most famous attempt to discuss know-how at a general, philosophical level was that of Gilbert Ryle in the *Concept of Mind*. Ryle saw himself as pursuing a campaign against the 'intellectualist legend' that all knowledge is propositional: 'that the agent must go through the internal process of avowing . . . certain propositions about what is to be done' (Ryle 1966: 29–30). 'Knowing how', or 'knowing-how-to' (as one might prefer to say), he maintained, is *sui generis*, and irreducible to propositional knowledge (32).[2] When he says that 'a soldier does not become a shrewd general merely by endorsing the strategic principles of Clausewitz; he must also be competent to apply them',[3] Ryle is making a general point about what it is to acquire the practical reasoning needed for *know-how*. Such reasoning is not learned, he suggests, by internalizing rules or instructions:

> Even where efficient practice is the deliberate application of . . . prescriptions . . . putting the prescriptions into practice is not identical with . . . grasping the prescriptions. (49)

But the managerialists are not likely to be persuaded by what has been said so far to give up the idea of 'managing know-how' (Boyle 2000: 134), and will say,

> "You still haven't explained what is wrong with trying to systematize 'know-how'. Doesn't the assembly line show that there is no difficulty *in principle*? Granted that the work of a professional is more complex

> than that of an assembly line worker, we should still be able to make professional knowledge—and what it is composed of—explicit for organizational purposes. Managerial expertise lies precisely in being able to do this kind of thing."

Clearly the Rylean claims are extremely problematic for managerialists. If a managerial accountability is to function, all forms of '*knowing how*' that are extant in an organization will need to be re-conceptualized, made explicit, and turned into propositional knowledge—through concepts such as 'units' 'elements' 'competences', 'outcomes'—for strategic planning, data collection, and audit and assessment purposes.

Equally, though, the managerialists' claims are problematic for Ryle. For. in effect, Ryle is extrapolating from Aristotle's notion of *practical knowledge*. An Aristotelian, as much as a Rylean, stands in contrast with any managerial outlook whose ideal would be to see the activity of teaching based on probabilistic theoretical generalizations about what is 'effective' in classrooms.[4]

So how am I to reply to the managerialists' proposal which aims to make practical knowledge explicit—purportedly, for 'spreading good practice'? *Prima facie*, such an idea sounds incontestable. But, arguing from an Aristotelian-Rylean perspective, let us now consider a teacher who knows how to explain Darwin's theory of evolution to a class of sixteen-year-olds. Ryle would not have denied that her 'knowing-how-to' depends crucially for its *exercise* on propositional knowledge. Nor would he have denied that a teacher who *is* able to teach Darwin's theory to a class of sixteen-year-olds could, in ordinary propositional manner, say, to a teaching assistant whom she was mentoring: "Because the pupils may not have been exposed to the Genesis account of creation, it is important to begin by interesting them in the sorts of things Darwin encountered on the voyage of the Beagle." On another level she might then add, still in propositional mode, "Watch out for those two boys at the back who usually try to wreck the lesson. The best way to manage them is to . . . ". Ryle would have allowed indefinitely more propositional claims of this sort which demonstrate the many skills of the teacher and her application of theoretical knowledge in practice.

Do these 'admissions' undermine Ryle's case? The managerialists may be expected to see them as a victory, as establishing *knowing that* as the basic form of rational understanding and of demonstrating the reducibility of knowing-how-to. For the teacher's ability to articulate all this advice in this way has the appearance of propositional thought. Her *knowing how to* x, y, z . . . seems now to have been reduced to *knowing that* x, y, z is the case.

But the managerialists have not understood. For the thing Ryle insists upon is that what the teacher articulates propositionally is *not* replacing, or 'standing in' for, her practical knowledge. The availability of the propositional version—the teacher's practical hints on the lesson itself, as well

as her tips about how to create a conducive environment for learning—*is parasitic for its relevance and its content on prior practical knowledge that is made available by her own occupational (métier) training, formation, and experience*. It is only because of such a background that the teacher is in a position to produce countless claims about how to teach to the best of her ability.

In Chapter 6 we saw that a person who has acquired sufficient ethical formation 'can be credited with certain "uncodifiable" reserves of knowledge' (Lovibond 2002: 31). We saw, too, how the kind of implicit ('non-explicit') knowledge which ethical formation gives to the *phronimos* 'outruns what can be expressed in any finite list of beliefs or principles' (62). An agent's formation enables her constantly to specify and re-specify her end for this or that particular context. *Formation*, we concluded—and now we see just how Rylean this conclusion was—is no more equivalent to the acquisition of discretely and explicitly described 'competences', items of 'knowing-how-to', than it is to the internalization of a list of propositions or prescriptions.

To bring the last claim to life from an educational perspective, consider a check-list of testable competences for teacher 'know-how', comprising such things as able to '*cope with mixed ability groups*', '*keep to the objective of the lesson*', '*include time for feedback/plenary*', and so on. How can one suppose that the sum of such particular competences can add up to the chief 'competence' that a teacher needs? How can they amount to the ability to enable pupils, in the context of learning, to 'catch on' to whatever is being taught? Something has gone wrong already if the teacher, at the crucial pedagogical moment, is distracted from *that* purpose and activity, by a separate demand to meet a specific performance target—to demonstrate some aspect of her own 'professional development', perhaps, or to prove that she is adhering to a prescribed way of teaching. Where these demands break in upon the teacher's concentration, coherence is lost between a practitioner's 'knowing-how-to', the activity of the practitioner in a particular context at time *t*, and her implicit knowledge of the ends of that activity at time *t*—the good that is possible *there* and *then* in *that* classroom with *those* children. I hope it is clear now that I am not denying that some propositional, codified knowledge will have its usefulness to practice. But as we saw in Chapter 6, that information cannot contain or lay bare the *whole end* of an activity, the *telos* of an activity—or, what we referred to in that chapter as the agent's *that-for-the sake-of-which* she pursues her 'objective'.

As if it is their duty, *explicitists* will always try to re-describe in general terms the ends or the know-how of a practitioner explicitly. But, in *general terms*, ends—and notoriously, educational ends—are 'neither clear, fixed, unitary nor evaluatively straightforward' (McLaughlin 1999: 13). That does not mean they are obscure. To a teacher who cares for a student's 'greater good' and who is 'adept at . . . making particular judgments about when . . . to push hard for mastery and when it is better to defer or deflect' (Dunne 2004: 172), they will become clear in context.

Before we proceed any further, here is an interim summary of the place we have reached, concerning Ryle. The Rylean thesis is sometimes expounded as if it were only a grammatical thesis about 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. Ian Rumfitt, whose work we shall be looking at soon, has raised the question whether it does justice to the contribution Ryle has made to philosophy to focus only on the grammar of these terms. Ryle's argument, he claims, should be seen as a metaphysical thesis regarding the nature of practical understanding.

On this interpretation Ryle would have wanted to say that, even where the skilled practitioner is able to offer an endless list of maxims in the grammatical form, "It's useful to remember that", and so on, *no* conjunction of such tips, however long and however detailed, will be sufficient for acquiring a particular kind of practical know-how—as if all one needed in order to play the piano was, *this is the way* to strike the piano keys . . . *this is the way* to keep time . . . *this is the way* to play the opening of 'Moonlight Sonata' . . . *this is the way* to . . . and so on. (How long would such a list have to become to mark the difference between: *knowing how a piano is played* and *knowing how to play the piano*?) Propositional knowing *about* how to do X will presuppose practically knowing how to X.

8.3 IS A SENTENCE THAT EXPRESSES A 'KNOWING HOW' VERB BEST CONSTRUED AS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A *KNOWER* AND A *PROPOSITION* OR A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN *AGENT* AND AN *ACTIVITY*?

Here we return to assumption K′ (from Section 7.5. of the last chapter):

> K′ The practitioner's practical knowledge ('knowing how') can be re-configured into propositional knowledge suitable for universal dissemination.

As if in response to the *Zeitgeist* of transparency which we discussed in Chapter 3, but without reference to Schön or others who seek to make the implicit explicit (the '*explicitists*', as I called them) whom we first discussed in the last chapter, Stanley and Williamson (2001) have made the move to *propositionalize* practical knowledge by seeing practical knowledge in reductionist, and not *sui generis* terms. Snowdon (2003) and Rosefeldt (2004) also argue for this position but I shall concentrate only on the argument Stanley and Williamson present. For not only is it expressed in very clear terms, it has also incurred a critical response from Ian Rumfitt (2003).[5] We must weigh these two arguments against each other. Much hangs on whose argument is more plausible. Stanley and Williamson's claim appears to be inimical to the trend of my own argument.

This is how the Stanley-Williamson thesis (henceforth, S-W) goes. Knowing how (once it is distinguished from simply 'being able', 'being not prevented', 'having the strength to', etc.) is a special sort of propositional knowledge: 'Knowledge-how is simply a species of knowledge-that' (2001: 411). S-W seeks to show that *all* forms of 'knowing-how-to' can be *reduced* to 'knowing that'. Knowing how to play the piano, the S-W thesis would say, is knowing 'under a practical mode of presentation' (429) that this or that *way* is how to play the piano. Even though knowledge under a 'practical mode of presentation . . . entails the possession of certain dispositions', it is still, S-W claims, 'genuine' 'knowledge that'.

The boldness of S-W should be noted. For even though S-W concerns the *grammar* of 'knows-how-to' constructions, it soon becomes clear that with the S-W thesis, we are presented with a *metaphysical* hypothesis about the nature of practical knowledge—one based on a *linguistic* theory: on the 'semantics of knows how' (Rumfitt 2003:158). The evidence in support of this metaphysical claim

> consists in the existence of sentences each of which is used to attribute knowledge-how and . . . which . . . will construe its knowledge-verb as expressing a relation between a person and a proposition.

Rumfitt is not the only one who is critical of S-W. Winch (2005) questions whether their claim that 'knowing how' be construed in terms of 'knowing that' captures accurately enough the way in which our epistemic concepts—such as *skill*, *expertise*, *competence*, and so on—play a central role in our practical activities (2). These are concepts which belong to our *assessment of an agent's activities*. In order to appreciate the connections between epistemic concepts and human activity, it is much more helpful, as David Carr suggests (1979, 1981a), to see 'knowing how to' verbs as expressing a relationship between an *agent* and an *activity* rather than between a *knower* and a *proposition* (see also Winch 2005: 2). With this brief introduction to the background issues, relating to the Rylean 'anti-intellectualist' project, let us now see how S-W bears up to analysis.

S-W takes off from the by now familiar case of riding a bicycle. But this example, we are to understand, is expository: *the thesis is general and not just limited to activities of a physical nature*. According to S-W the sentence,

> 'Hannah knows *how* to ride a bicycle'

can be unpacked as

> 'Hannah knows that *w* is a way of riding a bicycle.'

S-W construes the 'how' in 'knows how to' as following in the pattern of the 'indirect question' construction. The 'how' is like the 'who' in

'Hannah knows *who* her uncle is'

or the 'whom' in

'Hannah knows *whom* to call for help in a fire.'

So the claim is that the expression 'knows how to ride a bicycle' is 'a linguistic construction involving a question word ('how') and an infinitive which combine to form . . . an embedded question' (2001: 133). Just as Hannah knows the answers to the 'embedded' questions, 'Who is my uncle?' or 'Whom do you call for help in a fire', she knows the answer to the question, 'What is the way to ride a bicycle?'.

But can it be that all there is to practical knowledge is having the answer to some 'embedded how to' question? Let us focus here on how *w* is specified. S-W proposes (2001: 428) that there may be no alternative to practical demonstration where you might show the person: "*Like this!*"

Is this convincing? Suppose you show the person in question how to ride a bicycle by mounting the bicycle, pedalling around her, adding a running commentary perhaps on *what the way is to ride*. Does that person know what you mean by "*Like this*"? If the answer is "Yes", then what shall we say if, despite not being disabled, or ill, or fearful, she still cannot do it herself?

S-W cannot be defended by saying that there is irreducible knowing-how-to concealed in what it takes to understand the *ostension* of the '*this*'. That would be self-defeating. But S-W can exploit the distinction between knowledge and ability. It can say that she knows how to ride a bicycle but she can't do it for some reason. How plausible though is that? Surely the subject's 'failure' is not physical. Is it not a failure of know-how, the know-how of competence? At this point S-W appears to resort to assertion:

> . . . undoubtedly . . . there are intricate connections between knowing how and dispositional states. But acknowledging such connections in no way undermines the thesis that knowing-how is a species of knowing-that. (2001: 429–430)

Stanley and Williamson do express a worry (433), though, that their notion of 'practical modes of presentation' might conceal 'appeal to an unreduced notion of knowing-how'. But this worry is soon dismissed: they are 'not engaged in the reductive project of reducing talk of knowledge-how to talk that does not involve knowledge-how' (433–434). In reply to this, Ryleans might ask what the reductive project of S-W amounts to. Does the project meet Ryle on the same metaphysical ground? Ryle, after all, held that knowing-how was *logically prior* to knowing-that. What we are missing from S-W is an account of *the source* of the 'practical mode of presentation'. To assert, 'It is simply a feature of certain kinds of propositional knowledge that possession of it is related in complex ways to dispositional states' (Stanley and Williamson 2001: 430), might be said to be question-begging. Exactly how

do these 'dispositional states' originate? Might they not involve something Ryle would claim was distinctively practical—'knowing-how-to'?

8.4 CAN PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE BE *REDUCED* TO PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE?

These difficulties I pose might not be conclusive against the S-W thesis. If the point at issue has now become obscure, Ian Rumfitt (2003) provides an escape from the immediate impasse. His insight extends far beyond the case of riding a bicycle—to complex activities we may find in a work situation—and bears equally on pedagogical issues relevant to educational practices.

Rumfitt challenges the S-W treatment of the 'how' in the 'knowing how to' construction. He concedes to S-W that knowing how need not *entail* 'here-and-now' ability (consider: broken legs, incapacity at time *t*, etc.). But he shows how doubtful it is to assume that 'knowing that' can engage fully with competence. I summarize next the main steps of his argument.

In seeking to arbitrate between Ryles's thesis and the thesis of S-W, Rumfitt inquires in what way claims of 'knowing how' are treated in languages other than English. If the S-W thesis were right, Rumfitt suggests, the propositional thesis ought to work for *any* language and not just the peculiarities of the syntax and semantics of ascriptions of practical knowledge in English. But he notes that in French the S-W sentence about Hannah is

> 'Hannah *sait monter* à vélo.'

not

> 'Hannah *sait comment monter* à vélo'.

Moreover, in Romance, Slavonic, Greek, and Latin languages, 'knowledge how' constructions show hardly a trace of the indirect question. In such languages a speaker attributes practical knowledge by harnessing a 'knowledge' verb directly to a bare infinitive. Rumfitt's charge is that if the S-W thesis works less well for other languages apart from English, this helps vindicate Ryle's thesis. The point here is that Ryle's thesis, although it never said that agent-activity *excludes* the relevance of 'knowing that' constructions from any explanation of what it is to know how to do something, insists, nevertheless, that elucidating 'knowing-how-to' in terms of 'knowing that' fails to mark an important feature of practical knowledge (see also Winch 2005: 3).

The picture this suggests for educational issues (and here I go beyond Rumfitt) is that knowledge which is characterized by *savoir + infinitive* construction amounts to more than any *occurrent* capacity. Whether we are talking about a student teacher's or an experienced teacher's practice

in the here-and-now of busy classroom activity, we can see that the knowing-how-to which the inexperienced teacher seeks and the knowing-how-to which the experienced teacher embodies in her work, is a dispositional sort of knowledge, acquired experientially and contextually—by doing and by 'catching on' and by practising persistently. The practicing in question develops and enhances an aspect of the mind, a non-propositional aspect, one that cannot be explicitly laid out beforehand for the person who is learning. And it is *this* practical grasp that generates maxims in propositional form.

8.5 CHOICE AND DECISION-MAKING IN 'THE MOMENT OF ACTION'

Yes, the *explicitists* will say, but aren't the managers' recommendations, say, on how 'to measure outcome performance', or how to use a model of 'teaching expertise', simply intended to help the practitioner to enhance practice? My reply is this. Holding on to a commitment that practical knowledge is *sui generis* does not entail a denial of the role that theory, research, guidelines, techniques, introspection, feedback, or evaluation—even 'feedforwardness' (Beckett and Hager 2002: 35)—can play in the pedagogical requirement that there be *development* and *assessment*. Their usefulness, however, is to be judged case by case, by considering how helpful they are to doing what is required in a particular context. Propositional and theoretical knowledge, we can agree, play an important role in informing practical ability. What we have seen, though, is that propositional or theoretical forms of knowledge, in the form of skills, objectives, or outcomes that define 'good practice', can only supplement that which they presuppose, the process of *formation*. They will never *add up* to it.

Dunne (1995), whose focus in the following quotation is on the nature of the pedagogical relationship, suggests that one of the difficulties with a model of teaching which stresses 'behavioural objectives'

> is its exclusiveness of concern with instructional outcomes and its . . . neglect of teaching as an engagement or a process . . . its inattention to the experiential dimension of learning. Framed within this model . . . one gets no sense of the pedagogic relationship as setting up a field of psychic tension with its own forces of attraction and repulsion that . . . intrinsically affect whatever 'content' may loom up within it. (5)

Consider the implicit knowledge of a head teacher of a large, urban school. This is made evident in the way s/he responds in a context-sensitive way to immediate problems that (as Dunne puts it) 'loom up' in a day's work, and by her attempts to balance the social and educational needs of the

pupils. In the 'heat' of any immediate decision-making, where these needs converge and threaten conflict, a new 'leadership-management' initiative urged upon head teachers by government[6] must stay in the 'cold'. A wise, responsible decision is needed by that head teacher *at that moment* and *for that moment*. As we saw in Chapter 6, there is a point at stake here about how *practical reason* and *judgment*, in the moment when a decision needs to be made, must link up with the priority of the particular circumstances in activating the relevant concern with the right end, rendered explicit only *after* the event.

Let us see now how well the Aristotelian model—with its stress on the important role which the minor premise, 'the last and variable fact' (NE 1143b 4), plays in practical reasoning—might apply in a teaching context. In contexts where a teacher's practical reasoning is not inhibited by managerial 'objectives', how would the model work? Does the Aristotelian model leave room for what Dunne, in the preceding quotation, refers to as 'psychic tension'?

To attend to these questions I am going to adapt a particular case study written up by Greta Morine-Dermisher.[7] While trying to preserve the original sense of the original statements made by one teacher (someone called Miss Baker) recorded in Morine-Dermisher's transcripts, I have taken the liberty of changing some of the actual words used and re-constructing them in order to demonstrate how the premises of this teacher's practical reasoning make oblique reference to *the good* and *the possible* (see discussion of this in Section 6.7).

This is the scenario, condensed from the original description to be found in Morine-Dermisher's account:

> Miss Baker notices that Robert is clearly trying to avoid being asked a question in her lesson (The silent message she reads from his downcast face is: "Don't ask me, teacher!"). The boy has recently started to struggle and his grades are slipping. She has not got to the bottom of why this has been happening. She now earnestly wants to do the best for Robert. But what is 'the best' for this boy right now?

If we reconstruct Miss Baker's thoughts, we see the role which the minor premise plays in a teacher's practical reasoning. Miss Baker has to choose the *right* thing to do for the boy—ethically, practically, pedagogically. In an Aristotelian model, unlike a managerial model of 'teaching practice', there will be no hard line between these three considerations.

Here are some of Miss Baker's premises, taken from the transcripts (and amended in the way I have described), which supplied the content of her practical reasoning:

1. It is important not to embarrass pupils.
   (value premise, stating 'the good')

If I call on Robert and he is unclear about this, I will embarrass him.
(empirical premise, stating 'the possible')

2. It is important to keep the lesson moving for the sake of the whole class and for what I want to teach.
(value premise, stating 'the good')

   If I call on Robert and he is unclear about this, the class may "fall apart".
(empirical premise, stemming from consideration of 'the possible')

From later transcripts, Morine-Dermisher was able to identify another motivating premise in Miss Baker's reasoning, based on beliefs about *volunteering*:

3. Mostly I like to call on those who raise their hand—for it makes them feel good if they get the answer right.
(value premise, relating to 'the good')

4. I shall call on Mark who wants to answer; doing this will avoid embarrassing Robert, unnecessarily.
(empirical premise, bearing on 'the possible')

It was her own formation and *Bildung*, fused with her occupational formation, that shaped Miss Baker's idea of what was *good* and what was *possible* in that classroom. This is a teacher seriously engaged in a reflective process of *pedagogic phronesis* (see Chapters 5 and 6) to understand what mattered in that context. Through her own practical reasoning, her individual *métier-phronesis*, she brings her practical, personal, and implicit knowledge to this particular context in order to make a decision relevant to *this* context. Her decisive minor premise, whatever it actually was (this is not clear from the transcripts) leads her, in the end, to ask Mark—*not* Robert—for the answer.

Further analysis of the transcripts might just as easily have shown the many strong influences at work that could have helped form the content of her minor premise. Gingell and Winch (2006), for instance, have argued that in terms of the practical syllogism, the minor premise of a teacher's reasoning might make reference to a theory informed by research. Perhaps Miss Baker was drawing on a theory of 'self-esteem' she had recently read about. That does not count against anything I have argued for. As Aristotle shows, the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge is not so much a distinction between mind and body or thought and action but a distinction between two different sets of concerns (see Carr 1993: 262). Nor is a concern for truth and understanding, the province of theoretical knowledge, irrelevant to *praxis*. Practical 'know-how' must draw on any

facts or empirical theories embodied implicitly in *formation* which may appropriately be used for making a wise practical judgment.

So alongside all the technical competences Miss Baker finds necessary for teaching, there will also need to be those irreducibly implicit and ethical elements in her bearing and manner (Hansen 1993;Van Manen 1991) which will direct her (in Aristotelian terms) to her '*that-for-the-sake of which*' (her guiding *telos*) and which, in general terms, will be 'caring' for her 'student's 'greater good'—'for *this* student at *this* stage of readiness' (Dunne 2004: 172).

Certainly, a teacher's judgment will sometimes be concerned with technical means and ends. But if a particular student's 'greater good' is to be respected, then a teacher's practical reasoning must be normative in nature as well as concerned with that which is technically effective (e.g., a particular reading scheme thought 'effective' for helping children learn to read). Wilfred Carr (1987) expresses the thought I have in mind here:

> The educational character of any practice can only be made intelligible by reference to an ethical disposition to proceed according to some more or less tacit understanding of what it is to act educationally. (166)

Through an Aristotelian lens we catch sight here of an alternative to the model of teaching now promoted and to what is involved in being considered *educationally accountable*. We have a view of teaching where

> The application of practical reasoning to teaching involves more than a calculation of the most efficient means to achieve a desired end. Work in these areas impinges on the lives of others, who may be influenced, guided or manipulated by the means chosen to undertake particular tasks. For this reason the ethical as well as the technical desirability of the means becomes an issue.[8]

So what more can we say about Miss Baker? This teacher was acting in what she considered to be a responsible way. The crucial question here, in view of the argument presented in Chapter 4, where I argued that the links between responsibility and accountability should not be severed, is whether the kind of responsibility which Miss Baker shows in her whole way of being—how she teaches, what she is concerned about, and so on-represents *educational accountability*. Well, it has a great deal going for it, I suggest. Here is a sense of *being accountable* which translates into the open-ended nature of *answerability* (thereby encompassing the idea of 'negative responsibility', as discussed in Chapter 4). Her accountability (in this sense), therefore, transcends any legal-contractual responsibilities for which she is formally accountable. It would not be correct to see her professional, formational virtue of *responsibleness* as an 'add-on' to her contractual responsibilities. It is in fact her responsibleness which allows

her to explore what her contractual responsibilities and accountability ought to be.[9]

Miss Baker, rather like the man who featured in the example I gave in Chapter 6, may not count as a *phronimos* in strict Aristotelian terms. Who knows what human frailties and weaknesses she might have. But, nevertheless, in the neo-Aristotelian interpretation I have given of her conduct and of the kind of reasoning in which she engaged, it is clear that she is trying to embody and promote human good in her thought and actions. Her sense of answerability resides in what she feels is her responsibility for the pupils' well-being—not just pedagogically but in a broader sense too, one which takes into account, and is sensitive to, their personal well-being. In her whole approach and how she reasons, Miss Baker manifests an ethical accountability—*answerability*—pursuing what she thinks the 'goods' of education should be for her students, even though those goods she helps promote may only manifest themselves years later—and possibly, in a way 'quite removed from [what] helped form them' (Bryk and Schneider 2002: 18). In some inarticulate, implicit sense she knows she may never see or evaluate the *long-term* effects of what she says and does *but yet she acts as if she will*. Her professionalism lies in recognizing there is an 'ethical demand' (Løgstrup 1997) placed on her, unconstrained by time. An educational accountability which focuses on *short-term* policy initiatives is not sufficient for Miss Baker's sort of *personal* responsibleness.

I stress 'personal' here because it is in virtue of being the person she is that she acts in the way she does. Michael Fielding (2000), drawing on John Macmurry, has brought alive just how important it is—for educational reasons—to respect the integrity of *the personal* in educational life.[10] Present accountability practices only make things harder for teachers like Miss Baker to cultivate the 'personal' in the sense Macmurry means.

According to Macmurray, placing emphasis on the notion of the personal does not *ipso facto* devalue the functional, technical, or instrumental in life. On the contrary, he urges, the relationship between the personal and functional is inter-dependent. But whatever the trend, we must not forsake the personal for the functional. A balance needs always to be aimed for. This means that there is always a point in asking whether our schools are *educational* institutions and not just functional places, certification providers (Fielding 2000: 402).

So we are left with the question why it should now be thought a better form of educational accountability for management to replace a teacher's practical knowledge—her 'knowing-how-to'—by some supposedly universal, *zweckrational*, managerial 'knowing that'. The rationale for this kind of thought, as we have already discussed in previous chapters, rests on the principle, 'the more explicitness in an organization, the better' from which follows the idea that practitioners should always be working to clear, explicit objectives and targets. I have already discussed the fallacy

underlying this principle (see Section 3.3). Rather than rehearse that argument again, I quote Dunne's (1993) response to this idea:

> A precise statement of objectives, it [is said], can keep the teacher "on target". But how can a teacher know that the target set is a desirable or appropriate one? For all its exactness of formulation, how can one avoid its being arbitrary? . . . [O]ne can do so only through a kind of judgment and good sense that neither depends on nor derives from a commitment to objectives formulation *per se* . . . Both the pre-specification of objectives . . . and subsequent evidence supplied by the approved form of evaluation . . . leave answers to the teacher's questions of the form "what shall I do?" massively underdetermined. (4)

In contrast, the kind of teaching which an Aristotelian model offers does not start with explicit objectives and finish by proving they have been met. It will need a particular context even to make a start. *Then* it will know where to conclude. Contextualization of a problem is not to be thought of as something *extra* to an act of deliberation about how to achieve things in practical terms. It is the *sine qua non* which enables us not only to make sense of what we are trying to do (Carr 1993: 267; Wiggins 2006: 346, n. 20), but also to account for ourselves in ethical terms:

> the goal of practical enquiry or deliberation, is marked by its concern to determine and bring about the *good* . . . [T]he context in which practical enquiry . . . operates is essentially an ethical-evaluative one . . . a teacher's failure to respect children is not a failure of skill or technique, but a failure of moral attitude or value. (Carr 1993: 263, 267)

So whatever skills are needed for teachers to apply their technical and theoretical knowledge successfully in practice, a teacher's *pedagogic phronesis* (as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6) must be free to go to work in those moments that occur spontaneously in the classroom and which offer opportunities for 'significant', as opposed to 'teaching-to-the-test' learning (Entwistle et al. 2000: 19). It is *pedagogic phronesis* that makes constant reference to the 'end' in view. Those who do seek to circumscribe a teacher's role would do well to remember just how multifaceted one moment in the classroom can be:

> The teacher uses the moment in a situation that is better described as kaleidoscopic than stable. In the very process of teaching and discussing, unexpected opportunities emerge . . . [this] dynamic and complex process . . . yields outcomes far too numerous to be specified in behavioural and content terms in advance. (Eisner 2005: 19)

Explicitists may feel uneasy with the idea, expressed here, of 'outcomes far too numerous to be specified . . . in advance'. But need they? Consider the

problem which arose in Miss Baker's class, of *a boy who does not want to answer a question*. Why should we think that something as complex as this can be sorted out by one simple 'effective' answer, universally applicable for all contexts—as if there were one rule for every teacher in every possible situation to implement? There may be many reasons why the boy shows reluctance to put up his hand, apart from not knowing the correct answer—to do with background family circumstances, or the mental or physical state he is in that day. We should not even be surprised if there are alternative ways of tackling this kind of problem. A different teacher, one with a very different personality from Miss Baker, with a different demeanor, manner, or physical presence in the classroom, may well have handled the situation quite differently and succeeded in getting the boy to answer the question. There will be many different routes to what counts as 'good practice' (Carr 1993: 265–266). Nothing can be determined beforehand here. Matters that pertain to the practical, as Aristotle says, 'have no fixity' (NE 1104a 4).

The point here is that the *pedagogical relationship* between *teacher* (in its generic sense) and *learner* can neither be managed nor reduced to any other human interaction.[11] The individual, personal, practical knowledge which each teacher brings to a class of students is a reflection of that teacher's own practical knowledge developed through *formation*. Practical knowledge, as Dunne puts it eloquently, is like 'a fruit which can grow only in the soil of a person's experience and character' (Dunne 1993: 358).

It is true, of course, that education as a public institution should try 'to justify its conduct to those who provide the resources for it' (Winch 1997: 4), for that is an important part of what public accountability will involve. But if we have learned anything at all from Aristotle, about the kind of conditions needed for making responsible, practical judgments appropriate for the context, and how doing that will depend on using practical reason for good ends (in the sense we see Miss Baker use her reason to promote good ends), then we know that when teachers are prepared to give two of their 'most precious assets, their time and their energy' (Winch 1997: 4), the principle of accountability must call on moral *as well* as financial considerations: 'Accountability is not just about the stewardship of money' (Winch 1997: 4).

8.6 CONCLUSION

In our culture of 'transparency' and in an age which is transfixed with quantification and measurement, the thing that struggles for recognition is something that lies partly beyond words. On pain of regress or rendering it inexplicable how anyone ever acts, we must recognize that for any agent in any field there will be a repertoire of teleologically[12] 'basic' acts (Hornsby 1980: 84–88), where teleologically basic acts are acts one does and *knows how to do* otherwise than on the basis of knowing in what way they are

done. How well do theorists of management understand this? Where we are concerned with *practice*, it is the teleologically basic (and not the causally or neuro-physiologically basic) which must concern us (104). For human action invites teleological appraisal. In so far as it invites quantitative or statistical understanding that presupposes the rational appraisal of the end or the goal. It is 'an elementary mistake of the philosophy of psychology', Carr (1993) suggests,

> to suppose that actions may be identified as neutral causal processes without reference to human purposes, values and goals inherent in the realms of normative discourse . . . For we can only rationally establish what . . . count[s] as coherent instances of good practice in the light of some evaluative perspective on the proper goals of such practice. (266)

How, then, are we to understand managerialist demands to make explicit what is implicit in a person's practical know-how? Do these demands really flow from the requirements of our public rationality and shared *Zweckrationalität*?[13]

It is true that by inventing ends, and the means to achieve them, *any* conduct, organized under this principle, can become *zweckrational*.[14] But the question that remains is whether it is right or sensible, or consistent with education itself to impose management models on educational practices and those who practice within them. It is not even clear whether the management models now instantiated in public institutions, ostensibly, to make those institutions 'more accountable', provide a public accountability system able to meet expectations of public trust—the subject of the final chapter.

9 Public Trust and Accountability
What Public? Whose Trust? Which Accountability?

> I wonder men dare trust themselves with men . . .
>
> Shakespeare, *Timon of Athens*, Act 1, Scene II, 45

> There are many answers to the question: What is the public? Unfortunately many of them are only restatements of the question
>
> John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (1991 [1927]: 38)

9.1 INTRODUCTION

There is nothing in the position I have advocated in previous chapters which prevents either

(i) 'internal' forms of accountability and self-regulation, tied by law to public, 'external', regulatory bodies, accountable in the last resort to the government of the day. Such bodies will have the authority to advise, monitor, inspect, and, if necessary, see that miscreants are 'brought to account'. Disputes can be settled by arbitration. Although I have argued against micro-managing practices, that they leave insufficient discretion (usually referred to as 'freedom') for professional judgment, this does not mean I am arguing for a rampant form of 'professional autonomy', one cut loose from the requirements of democratic accountability. In a democracy those who work in professions cannot be assumed to be the sole arbiters of how their professions are run or regulated;

or

(ii) a form of 'professional development' which encourages new theoretical frameworks of thought to re-vitalize practitioners' thinking and prevent complacency of thought (see again Chapter 8, Section 8.5). A *métier*, although part of a tradition or culture, and possessing its own occupational/professional norms and core purposes, will be subject to a continuous process of modification from external social and politico-economic factors and prevailing ideologies. From the fact that a neo-Aristotelian conception of 'professional' formation stresses

> the importance of practical, personal, and implicit knowledge, this does not mean that 'closed', 'a-theoretical', or 'idiosyncratic' forms of knowledge are thereby endorsed (see Kennedy 2002: 356, on this).

And yet the position I reach is commonly held to be wide open to the charge of leaving public servants ("service providers") *unaccountable*: it is irrational (we are told) to entrust important responsibilities to people whose efforts cannot be regulated or measured by reference to fully explicit, pre-specified performance criteria, indicators, or targets, for without such things we shall not know if people are doing what they are meant to be doing. For the sake of an accountability system which the public can trust, the professions must be regulated by clearly defined, performance management controls. So speaks the apologist for the status quo.

In this last chapter, I need to answer these charges and defend the reliance that I build upon the *formational virtue of trustworthiness*—the formational disposition of one whom it is safe to trust and/or deserves our trust. The main strategy in this chapter is to highlight the disastrous effects on the ideal of public service (i) of *institutionalizing distrust*, as the main organizing principle for managing public sector services through performance-management based policies, and (ii) of covering up any gaps and deficiencies that have been created by the *managerialization* of our public services by substituting for personal trust an impersonal, institutional surrogate that bears no relation to the formational virtue of trustworthiness. For the trustworthiness of people is that upon which public accountability ultimately depends. The security that regulatory, monitoring, and checking devices promise is illusory. No system can be better than the people who work it. That is the one irreducibly ethical dimension to organizational life. Here I echo John Dewey (1927):

> Ultimately all deliberate choices proceed from somebody in particular . . . all arrangements and plans are made by somebody in the most concrete sense of "somebody" . . . When the . . . state is involved in making social arrangements like passing laws, enforcing a contract, conferring a franchise, it still acts through concrete persons. The persons are . . . officers, representatives of a public and shared interest. (18) [1]

The plan of the chapter is as follows: to explore, briefly, what counts now as the 'public face' of accountability, in view of the fact that so many different forms of managerial accountability now exist; to review the criticisms which, several decades ago, were urged against the *public service ethos*, seen by reformers of the 1960s and 1970s as a symbol of a flawed and inadequate system of public accountability; to direct some criticism of my own against that which has replaced the public service ethos as an ethical basis for public accountability policies; to examine attempts that have been made to restore better relations of trust between teachers and government;

and lastly, to defend the idea that a public accountability system must find room, for those whose professional responsibilities involve *serving* the public, to be able to develop and deploy the kind of formational virtue of trustworthiness worthy of a 'professional' formation.

Even if it seems counter-intuitive to suggest, in a culture in which public trust is said to have eroded (O'Neill 2002), that we make *trust* rather than *distrust* of others a starting point for understanding how organizations and practices should be managed, I argue that we need to trust *trust*[2] rather than put our trust in *distrust*, if there is to be any hope of there *being* public trust in a public accountability system.

9.2 PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE 'RUSSIAN DOLL' EFFECT

In previous chapters we have picked our way carefully through the minefields of managerial rhetoric and the language of 'New Public Management' (NPM). Two noteworthy things stand out from our efforts to circumnavigate those hazards.

First, the relationship between *public accountability*, *educational accountability*, and *liberal democracy* is volatile—vulnerable to any political, cultural, economic ideology that happens to define the *Zeitgeist* or grip the democratic will (see Kogan 1986: 26). A pro-market ('neo-liberal') form of liberal democracy now influences our understanding of what *counts* as public accountability. The injection of neo-liberalism has involved radical change for the public sector: collegial forms of organization that once prevailed have been replaced by institutional arrangements guided by market models of performance-related pay contracts and resource allocation.

Second, as a consequence of the first, *educational accountability* is always susceptible to politicization and the short-term targets which politicians promote. What counts as educational accountability tends therefore to be 'the engine of policy'[3] and will turn on the answers to the following questions: 'By what right, on what conditions and with whose consent are decisions made and actions taken within the schools and colleges'? (Kogan 1998: 88). 'Market' or 'managerial' forms of accountability are much more political than their proponents might be prepared to acknowledge. Proposals to 'marketize' and 'managerialize' education are not a neutral answer to Kogan's question.

A few more anomalies to note, before we move on. In Chapter 4 (Section 4.2), we noted the complexity inherent in the notion of *accountability*. As a result of the influence of NPM on public sector policy-making and public management practices, many diverse forms of accountability now appear to collapse into each other. Just as with a set of wooden Russian dolls, designed to fit into each other, until only one remains visible—the largest, standing as the 'public' face for all the others—so we now have differing

'sizes' of public accountability: *market*, *professional*, *managerial*, *democratic*, *stakeholder*, and so on. The 'public' face that represents them all and which manifests itself through policy documents is what we now call *public accountability*. From this originates all current orthodoxies held about standards of quality in education and from which we are meant to draw our understanding of *educational* accountability. How rational, though, are these standards—do they define a *sine qua non* for public rationality? Do they really help promote the idea of public service and public spirit?

One way in which we might confront some of these questions is to ask why the *public service ethos* was rejected by the early public service reformers and, in particular, by the 'public choice' economic theorists. (More about the latter group, soon.) For as we shall see, when we examine it in more detail, the public accountability model based on the public service ethos allowed for a particular notion of public rationality to be valued—one which, in Aristotelian terms, helped direct professional ideals and practical reason (in specific contexts) towards *the good* and *the possible* (in the sense we discussed in Chapter 6). Before its demise, that ethos helped to define the duties, responsibilities, and obligations of those who worked in the public sector, as well as the manner in such people conducted themselves. From this flowed a specific way of interpreting the ideal of public accountability. In the UK, however, from the time of the Fulton Committee enquiry onwards (as discussed in Chapter 2), the system which that ideal represented was said to be inflexible, over-bureaucratized, and over-subsidized.

We need not deny that some of these criticisms were justified. But was it a good idea to let *everything* to do with this model of accountability disappear? Although we might have welcomed the opportunity to discard the old world of deference, could nothing of value have been safeguarded while we learned to adapt to the new ideas, ideals, and ideologies that gave us the world of market consumerism?

In trying to identify such merits as were present in the old style of public service administration, however, I do not take myself to be defending everything that was politically associated with it at the time. Here I echo Whitty's approach (2002: 21): one might accept that there were 'equity failings' in education prior to the accountability reform movement of the 1970s, but instead of *abandoning* systems of education that were based on democratic forms of governance as Chubb and Moe (1990), in their defence of the marketization of education recommended, perhaps the alternative, Whitty suggests, should have been to *reform* these failings.

9.3 THE RISE, FALL, AND DEATH OF THE OLD PUBLIC SERVICE ETHOS

Raymond Plant (2001) writes that the idea of a *public service ethos* was first applied to the civil service and the administration of the British Empire.

But as the role of the state expanded in the late nineteenth century and the public sector grew, ideas that had been applied to the civil service came to shape the character of administration in the spheres of health, education and social services.[4]

Plant uses the word 'ethic' interchangeably with 'ethos', perhaps to emphasize the substantial moral grounding and idea of virtuous citizenship embodied in the ideal of professional service. In the following quotation, where he is describing the entry of new recruits into the civil service, we see the appeal made to civic ideals, saturated with quasi legal-ethical principles:

> They would enter the service of the state believing the state to be a body with moral purposes, articulating a sense of the . . . public good which they would then pursue in a disinterested way . . . Public service was an exercise of civic virtue . . . Allied to this was the idea of professionalism . . . members of professions saw themselves as being bound together by common professional ties, common experiences . . . and by common norms . . . by the ideas of profession and service . . . such people have to be trusted as professionals bound by an ethical code or ethos . . . seeking to do the public good and not recommending schemes which will mean their own enrichment. (2001: 2)

This description Plant provides complements other historical accounts of the rise of 'professionalism', how those who entered professions implicitly *professed* to act as disinterested ('neutral') public servants for the greater good (Perkin 2002). The description also tallies very well with the account Martin Lawn (1987: 61–67) gives in his book, *Servants of the State: The Contested Control of Teaching 1900–1930*, of how teachers (in the UK) came to embrace the public service ethos. Lawn charts the growth of the National Union of Teachers (NUT) and the government's attitudes at the time to the teachers' concerns to gain status and better pay. H. A. L. Fisher's 1919 Education Bill offered a new, ideal vision of responsibility, situated within a concept of professionalism, with attendant recognition and status (160).

The *Times Educational Supplement* (of 1918) reports that the state expected teachers to perform a civic service

> analogous . . . to the functions performed by members of the Civil Service . . . the State will expect, and will receive from the teaching profession a measure of unstinted and zealous service on behalf of the childhood of the country.[5]

The important point to emerge from this excursion into history is to note, first, that even though motives of self-interest might have underpinned the teachers' fight to establish professional status and 'autonomy',[6] nevertheless, this strand of self-interest was not at odds with the 'service ethic' that

was embraced by the teachers. As Lawn says, a strong union that protected professionalism was *not* in contradiction with a defence of altruism, service, and quality in an educational service. Nor was the idea of sacrificing 'immediate personal interests and convenience' necessarily in contradiction with the belief that 'in the long run dedicated commitment and loyal service will be recognized and rewarded' (Fox 1974: 79).

The account Lawn gives reminds one of Hume's insistence that self-interest—Hume called it 'self love'—does *not* necessarily marginalize or swamp altogether motives of 'benevolence' towards others.[7] Such a view, of course, stands in stark contrast to the 'public choice' theorists' hypothesis,[8] that it is *only* self-interest that motivates human agency. According to this view policy-makers should treat all people, whether they are politicians, bureaucrats, or ordinary citizens, as rational 'maximizers' of their utility (Codd 1999: 46) and to expect them to be 'knaves' and not 'knights' (Le Grand 2003).[9]

As heirs of Hobbes, the 'public choice' theorists saw self-interest as the prime motivating force for human agency. A professionalism grounded on the values of a public service ethos was merely a mask for 'vested interests'. A direct consequence of their influence was that the old public service ethos came to be discredited: even if a few civically virtuous existed, there was always the risk of exploitation by 'unvirtuous free riders' (Marquand 2004: 97). The notion of collective self-discipline, the basis of the public service ethos which once served to bolster the professions' credibility had now 'lost its purchase'; public trust was bound to be betrayed.

One other key assumption that helped bolster the 'public choice' theorists' reform agenda was the belief in *methodological individualism*, the theory that all social phenomena are reducible to facts about individual behaviour (Lukes 1996: 452). In perfect accord with this belief, there arose (from the field of 'institutional economics') 'principal-agent' theory, concerned with the nature of contractual relationships which govern social co-ordination: 'In any contractual relationship . . . there is a principal, who contracts an agent to provide goods or services' (Levacic 2001). And once complex social phenomena and human relations were explained in contractual terms or 'elementary units of action' (Scott 2000), it was then only a short step to saying that such things as the *public good* or *public duty* made no sense—because such normative considerations were deemed irrelevant (Codd 1999: 46).

In order to set the tone for the rest of the chapter, this is the right place to note Amartya Sen's rebuke to those economic theorists who claimed to have defined, once and for all, the nature of human psychology. 'This self-interest view of rationality', says Sen (1987), 'involves *inter alia* a rejection of the 'ethics-related' view of motivation' (15):

> It would be extraordinary if self-interest were not to play quite a major part in a great many decisions . . . The real issue is whether there is a

plurality of motivations, or whether self-interest alone drives human beings. (19)

9.4 'NEW LAMPS FOR OLD': THE OLD PUBLIC SERVICE ETHOS IS TRADED IN FOR A NEW ONE

In Chapter 2 we discussed the way in which the early public service reformers' rejection of Keynesian, 'welfarist' economic policies cleared the ground for NPM and neo-liberal principles to be deployed in the organization and provision of public services. One of the fall-outs of these changes was the assault made on *the professions* which were said to be guilty of paternalism and elitism. Their claims to 'professional autonomy' were seen as an impediment to the neo-liberal project. No body or institution could be allowed to be powerful enough to stand between the consumer and market forces.

A view closely related to these charges, which emerged in the late 1970s, was that teachers had abused their 'licensed' autonomy. No longer was the teaching profession to be granted a professional mandate to act on behalf of the state in the best interests of its citizens (Whitty 2001: 160–161). The message that went out to the public, helped by a media 'discourse of derision' (Ball 1990b: 18) was that teachers could not now be trusted.

By the 1980s, distrust of all those who worked in the public sector—and not just the teachers—became a culturally accepted norm. The *professions*, viewed as a distinct social group, were all tarred with the same brush of distrust, which according to the outgoing Head of the Quality Assurance Agency in the UK, when describing the kind of ethos now endemic in universities, has never gone away: the principle of 'guilty until proven innocent' is how he has described the kind of ethos now endemic in universities.[10] Even in the mid 1990s, when the first wave of neo-liberalism was shedding its 'New Right' legacy and was evolving into a 'Third Way' form of governance (see Giddens 2001), there was no reprieve for the old public service ethos—now just a 'broken reed' (Marquand 2004: 95).

From the account given thus far, one might have thought that we had seen the last of the public service ethos. After all, haven't we just buried it in the shroud of its own bad reputation? We hardly need to rehearse the criticisms made against it in the second half of the last century: poor management, a culture of welfare dependency, the intransigence of big state monopolistic bureaucracies, professionals who seemed a law unto themselves, and so on. But, emerging like a phoenix out of the ashes of the old public service ethos, a brand new 'public service ethos' has now arisen! Witness the existence of a booklet titled *The Public Service Ethos*, the cover of which I reproduce here:

Public Administration Select Committee

THE PUBLIC SERVICE ETHOS

GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE

to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2001–02

First Special Report of Session 2002–03

The Stationery Office Limited

Is this the old public service resurrected—or something else? From this booklet we can extract the rationale of what we shall now need to call the *new* public service ethos:

> . . . The Government sets national standards that really matter to the public, within a clear framework of accountability . . . This means . . . hospitals, schools, police forces and local government . . . agree [to] tough targets . . . Conduct is regulated throughout the public services, whoever the provider is. Behaviour therefore is controlled by the conditions set in the regulatory and accountability frameworks and through contracts. (4, 5, 9)

Let us match this extract with two other sources, the first of which is a pamphlet titled *Advancing a New Public Service Ethos* (2002) by New Local Government Network (NLGN). Here we find

(i) a direct appeal to a brand new public service ethos:

> . . . driving through a performance and service culture that places the customer at its heart . . . The challenge for public service reform is . . . to fundamentally transform the nature of the product so that a new relationship is established between citizens, their services and public bodies . . . and deliver a transformational service experience with a new public service ethos at its heart. (11–12)

(ii) the commercial-contractual nature that underpins the new public service ethos:

> . . . Effective accountability is more likely to be secured . . . when partnership between the public, private and voluntary sectors is able to encompass:
>
> - A realistic set of commercial relationships and contractual terms. (19)

(iii) managerial-audit accountability systems able to 'test' if a public service 'ethos' is present:

> Audit and inspection processes should also test for a public service ethos in all public services irrespective of who manages them. (19, 24)

My last source for the new public service ethos is the foreword for *Public Private Partnerships: The Government's Approach* (2000):

(iv) to create this new partnership approach we needed a fundamental shift of thinking, putting behind us the ideology and dogma of the past. In the modern world, governments are judged not on what they own, or on how much they spend, but on whether they deliver. In Government, therefore, our focus in all that we do is on outcomes rather than inputs. (5)

9.5 COMMENTARY ON THE NEW PUBLIC SERVICE ETHOS: CITIZEN-CONSUMERS' AND THE 'HOLLOWING OUT' OF *THE PUBLIC*

The first thing to note is that a citizen, in what John Clarke (2004b) has dubbed our 'consuming society', is now to be equated with a consumer or customer. The hybrid term 'citizen-consumer' (Clarke 2004a; Needham 2003) challenges a distinction once taken for granted: because the concept of the consumer is tied to the concept of the market, and state provision excludes market provision, citizens, therefore, should not be equated with consumers (see White 1994: 122). *Citizenship* now emerges as co-extensive with *consumership*. Does there remain a legitimate use of the term 'public' when there has been such a 'hollowing out' (Rhodes 1997: 17–18) of the state and when the old metaphorical boundaries between public and private 'spheres' are deliberately blurred? The new public–private settlement aims for a status quo where a government, its state accountability policies, and its corporate-market life are virtually indistinguishable. We all live in the same 'discursive space' as the 'state and government agencies' (Giddens 1994: 15; see also Fraser 1992). Can we make sense of this?

From the various extracts quoted at the end of Section 9.4, which describe the (new) public service ethos, we learn that conduct is 'controlled' through 'accountability frameworks' and that the 'dogma of the past is behind us'. But what exactly is *before* us?

This is how the public sector has been described: a series of processes to deliver 'customer-centric sets of services'.[11] Should this way of describing the public sector surprise us? Not really, once we note that NPM was always intended to be a way of 'reinventing government'.[12] It was always the intention of the public service reformers that the managerial revolution would reorient professional attitudes around what it means to be a 'public servant'.

The contrast with the old public service ethos is stark. According to the precepts upon which the older ethos was founded, 'the public domain' was not simply to be equated with what was *provided* in the public sector (Marquand 2004: 26). The public domain was understood in transcendent, ethical terms to allow the civic virtue of public spiritedness to flourish (91). Compare the way in which the new public service ethos now interprets the idea of 'public spirit'. In a section from the publication produced by NLGN (from which we cited earlier in Section 9.4) the following 'practical step' is recommended—to take us 'from vision into reality': 'The provision of a set of best practice materials to enable organisations engaged in public service to ensure they can draw the right lessons about the operation of a public service ethos' (24–26).

There is nothing reminiscent of the old public service ethos here. In place of an *internal* personal 'ethic' to motivate, there will be an *external* motivator: the provision and operation of 'the best practice materials': 'Top-down performance management is a key element of the 'self-improving' model of public services . . . '.[13]

Does this new version of a public service ethos inspire more public trust in our public institutions than the one that was discarded? We do have an answer of sorts to this question. A recent poll conducted in the UK reveals that 'families feel let down by public services': public services do not 'meet their needs' and 'politicians do not understand the reality of their lives'.[14] On the basis of this research, perhaps it is worth enquiring whether, after all the promises that were made back in the 1960s and 1970s, to bring about 'better management' and 'better accountability' (see Chapter 2), public trust has been betrayed.

9.6 TRUST AND BETRAYAL

Dante, who considered the public interest more sacred than the private, counted the kind of deceit manifested by betrayal of public trust as a 'treachery', 'the sin of cold blood'.[15] What is it about the betrayal of public trust that made Dante use the word 'sin' here? In calling it 'treachery' does he exaggerate? Or does he identify something important about those in whom

we have no option but to place our trust? The trust Dante is concerned with is cognate with *trustworthiness*. Betrayal is morally offensive because it is tied up with the value of what has been entrusted—our own well-being.

What is it for a trust to be betrayed? The serious consequences which can attend the violation of trust in private and personal circumstances—depression, grief, suicide—manifest the profound importance of our being able to trust those people to whom we are closest. Human flourishing and well-being depend on non-betrayal of trust. In the face of evidence of betrayed trust, a once-existing trust turns easily to distrust.

Annette Baier (1992: 124) suggests it is unlikely that any clear criterion or principle could be used as a 'magic formula' for regulating the right mix of trust or suspicion we should hold towards others or how many times betrayal can be sufficiently forgiven for us to start trusting again. Indeed, if forgiveness is impossible and the most that is possible is a 're-acceptance', an important element of forgiveness, but not the same as forgiveness (Kolnai 1978: 222), can trust and goodwill ever be renewed—or will there always be a residual mistrust that lingers? Is there an analogue of the 'trust-betrayal-mistrust' patterning which typifies cases of betrayed *personal* trust, for cases of betrayed *public* trust?

Let us transfer these questions to the world of education. Here I want to begin by examining two attempts that have been made (in the UK) to address the problem of 'public trust' in relation to education. They arise from two perspectives—that of the public's so-called 'failing confidence in education' (Hargreaves and Fullan 1998: 24), and that of the teachers' perception that their goodwill and sense of professionalism had been betrayed.

In 2005, an important olive branch was offered to teachers: a 'New Relationship' between inspection teams and schools.[16] This was meant to rebuild the professional confidence of teachers and restore trust. 'Shorter', 'sharper', and 'smaller' were seen as 'key downsizing elements' of the new inspection' (McBeath 2006: 4). The rationale of the 'New Relationship' was understood in the following way: 'It is time to trust schools more and to draw on the professionalism of teachers'.[17] This statement of goodwill, though, needs to be weighed against the choice of metaphor used by the then Chief Schools' Inspector, 'We're exchanging a searchlight for a laser',[18] and also against the fact that drastic cuts in the inspection budget had been demanded (McBeath et al. 2005: 41).

'Trust' was seen as one of the main themes of the New Relationship. But has anything of substance changed a few years on? Empirical evidence tends to show that the managerialization of education has in fact intensified. Inspectors now make greater use of written records and test scores to reach their verdict, rather than rely on classroom observation. The so-called 'new' trust granted to schools is only realized through head teachers producing quantities of data of test scores and evaluation records—data that will have to be 'attainment related, comparative and benchmarked' (McBeath 2006: 15). Here we have all the hallmarks of a managerial form

of accountability, with all the attendant disadvantages of stress to teachers which a 'high-stakes' accountability system brings.[19]

Any optimism conveyed in the UK by the recent political rhetoric of 'trusting teachers more'—by granting them more 'autonomy' and 'empowerment'—needs to be balanced against the recognition that, as yet, there is no drawing back from the systemic framework on which *the conditions* for trust now depend. 'Earned autonomy' is not a synonym for 'professional autonomy'. 'Autonomy' is in fact only granted when all the top-down targets, dependent on government's view of good, 'performing' schools, are met: 'Earned autonomy is located within a context that accepts and works within current state strictures on education—the acceptance of the competitiveness settlement and all that goes with that' (Avis 2005: 218).

Despite, therefore, the autonomy and choice that a discourse of 'self-management' promises, those who work in educational institutions—whether primary schools or universities—still find that their professional identity depends on seeing themselves not primarily as educators, but as subjects 'to-be-managed' or 'to-be appraised' (Ball 1990a: 123).

So we shall have to wait and see whether the 'New Relationship' for school inspection, introduced a few years ago, will eventually iron out the problems which a previous attempt at winning back the teachers' trust had left unresolved. In 2001, the then Education Secretary, Estelle Morris, gave what was billed as a 'vanguard' speech, titled *Professionalism and Trust*, in which it was announced that there was now 'a new era of trust in our professionals on the part of Government' (1). The new trust was to come from 'a framework of national priorities, underpinned by a system of national accountability, inspection and intervention to maintain standards' (5).

The speech was intended as a way of healing the damaged relationship of trust between government and teacher. Distrust and feelings of betrayal had been fermenting (on both sides) over many decades of educational reform.[20] Any hope that the teachers might once have had, to work in high-trust, collegial places of work, or to be part of policy reform consultation process, never materialized.[21]

Although the speech was given some years ago, it is still instructive to analyze it. The *Realpolitik* may have changed, but the mechanisms of accountability described in this speech remain in large part unchanged. Performance management, with its clear, pre-specified outcomes, objectives indicators, and such like, is still regarded as the chief way in which practitioners account for themselves. If we were to raise the question of public trust today, how it is to be ensured, in all likelihood, the answer would be the same as the one given in 2001: public trust comes from *confidence in the regulatory and monitoring structures in place*:

> We do now have an accountable teaching profession. Performance tables, the inspection system, performance management, examination and assessment arrangements, procedures for tackling school

> weakness, all contribute to the effective accountability of teachers and head teachers . . . and generate public and Governmental trust in our schools. (Morris 2001: 26)

In the last resort, the validity of claims such as these will rest on the public's judgment of the 'performativity' ideal itself, as to how well it provides the trust that it promises. The main problem, I have argued throughout, is how the ideal tends to play out in practice. The principle which grounds all performance, target-driven practices is a 'command and control' management that sustains 'a state of continuous doubt about the trustworthiness of those engaged in core activities' (Elliott 2001: 201). To put it another way, the default position for performance models of professional accountability is one of distrust: 'guilty' in the court of accountability until proved 'innocent'.

If we analyze the speech, we can see this problem—one of systemic distrust—lurking beneath the actual words said. First, the idea of trust between the government and teachers raised in the speech is ambiguous (Bottery 2003b: 246). Morris's speech concerns itself mainly with understanding the relationship *in one direction only*—trust by government of teachers—rather than trust teachers have in the government and how their previously betrayed trust might now be repaired. The speech talks of trust but says nothing of the government itself *being trusted*. Why does this matter?

Trusting someone may 'be little more than a pragmatic calculation' (Bottery 2003b: 246). *Being trusted*, however, is more complex and brings in quite different considerations. If someone has *been trusted* to do something, this presupposes an implicitly understood judgment about character and integrity.

9.7 CALCULATING TRUST AND INSTITUTIONALIZED DISTRUST: HOW A SPIRAL OF DISTRUST MAY BE GENERATED

Certain economic models referred to as 'rational choice' (or 'game') theory circumvent discussions about 'character' or 'integrity' by transforming inter-personal trust relations into a 'game' of calculation or 'trade-offs' between what one is prepared to risk losing in order to gain advantage over another and what one calculates will at least keep one 'even' with one's competitor. 'Rational choice' theory posits an abstract, 'ideal' of rationality: it denies the existence of any kind of action other than the purely calculative, instrumentally motivated (Hollis 1987: 169; Scott 2000) as in, 'How can I best advance my material advantage given present conditions?' (Bryk and Schneider 2004: 14).

If we have to resort to (theoretically) idealized models to explain human relations, why not face up to their limitations? These models construct a theory of human psychology and motivation but they ignore the psychodynamics that accompany *inter-personal* relations of trust—what John

Sydow (2002) calls the 'facework' aspect of trust relationships (46).[22] For one of the things we know is that to be treated *as if* one is not trustworthy—through certain kinds of monitoring and checking actions—can affect a person's conduct detrimentally:

> theories can become self-fulfilling . . . we can produce the very behavior we [fear] in . . . those around us. So, if we expect people to be untrustworthy, we will closely monitor their behavior, which makes it impossible to develop trust . . . [H]ow can I know if you can be trusted unless I provide you an opportunity to show you can be trusted? (Pfeffer and Sutton 2006: 50)

The relevance of this to modern performance-based policies should be recognized: 'formal controls instituted to increase performance reliability can undermine trust and interfere with the achievement of the very goals they were put in place to serve . . . [T]hey communicate distrust' (Taschannen-Moran and Hoy 2000: 583).

When a low-trust ethos pervades an organization then the scene is set to create a spiral of mistrust, as Patricia White (1993) suggests, between trustor(s) and trustee(s). Sensing that one is distrusted may evoke feelings of frustration, alienation, anger, resentment, indifference, or lack of commitment (Le Grand 2003:167). But the picture is just as bad from the perspective of one who distrusts: for the tendency then is to persist in seeing the one who is the object of distrust as a threat; this then fuels more reasons why to distrust. Distrust feeds on distrust. The result is a spiral of mistrust:

> eventually [she] reacts with distrust on her own part, feeling herself feeling relieved of moral obligation and free to act in her own interest. This reaction further confirms the initial distrust and leads to a downward spiral or a self-fulfilling prophecy which can totally paralyse an organization . . . (Lane 2002: 24)

Contrast this kind of scenario with the one which Cary Cooper, now professor of organizational psychology and health, and President of the British Academy of Management, describes. The temptation to resort to micromanagement and to keep a tight watch on employees' every move, in the face of pressure to produce results, he says, should always be resisted: 'If there is trust employees feel valued and have autonomy and control, which are the most important motivating factors. So they feel engaged and will perform at their optimum . . . '.[23]

The aim, then, for any system of accountability must surely be to stop 'distrust [from] gaining the upper hand [and] being perceived as a fundamental distrust of the good will of a particular person (White 1993: 76).[24] This implies that any accountability checks that are made within an

organizational practice must not seem over 'intrusive' to those of whom an account is expected (Winch 1997: 67).

In the light of this discussion, where we see how easily certain kinds of monitoring and checking procedures 'are not consistent with trust, but are indicative of mistrust' (Manson 2004: 5), we should ask what is the nature of the kind of trust which the performativity ideal helps sustain within organizations. Here is one account, from a book titled *Trust in Organizations*:

> . . . managers may decide trust is important because it improves the motivation, morale and compliance of subordinates—all of which are in the service of enhanced organizational performance and help advance the manager's own agenda. Thus, as managers, they may be willing to expend a fair share of their discretionary attention resources on "building" relational trust with subordinates. However, this expenditure is justified not on grounds that such trust is intrinsically worthwhile or right but rather on purely calculative grounds: by investing in trust now, they hope to garner enhanced payoffs down the road in terms of lower turnover, absenteeism, shirking, and so on. (Kramer 1996: 227)

From this extract we see how the virtue of trustworthiness is seen as an economic commodity. From the perspective of 'principal-agent' institutional economic theory, the economic value for an organization increases in terms of efficiency because it lessens the need for costly monitoring (Levacic 2001).[25] We also see how easily the notion of 'trust' may be appropriated for political/managerial/economic use. Trust is a means for achieving organizational ends and for overcoming 'moral hazard'.[26]

When trust is understood in such calculative terms, Bottery (2000) suggests, trust is certainly seen as a 'good thing'—but 'good' only from a 'second-order', economic, rather than a 'first-order', ethical point of view (73). Sometimes, however, only the 'first-order' kind will do. For when we are concerned about the trustworthiness of a person it is not only a function of calculable risk (see Johnson 1993: 167). In this regard, consider the following definition of trust, where trust is understood in terms of *confidence in the face of risk*:

> Trust may be defined as confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles. (Giddens 1990: 34)

Here is a helpful definition of trust as a noun, but it leaves out what is so important about *interpersonal trusting*. Once we have the verb, *to trust*, we arrive at the question of what it is *to trust someone* and to take that person as *trustworthy*. In the literature on trust, however, we find a constant slippage between *trust* and *trustworthiness* (see Hardin 2001: 16 on this),

one which occurs especially in discussions when trust is understood in economic, calculative, or functional terms, something to be contracted for, as in principal-agent institutional economic theory, where transaction costs are seen as the main organizational problem (Lane 2002). But it is essential to distinguish between these two concepts. *Betrayal* of trust is not a failure of trust *simpliciter*, but rather a failure of *trustworthiness* (Hardin 2001: 32) which is a matter of a person's *formational virtues*—honesty, fidelity, sincerity, integrity. The *value* of trustworthiness cannot be measured by any economic or utilitarian value it might have.

9.8 TRUST, NAIVETY, GULLIBILITY, AND CYNICISM

A neo-Aristotelian model of decision-making, built on norms of personal responsibleness and trustworthiness, does not imply that we should always be trusting. It is common ground between those who promote an Aristotelian approach to questions of agent-accountability (along the lines described in Chapter 6) and those who, in contrast, favor the managerial approach and advocate performance management, that organizations need *vigilance*. But what each means by vigilance is quite different. New forms of 'vigilance, surveillance and performance appraisal' (Olssen 2003: 200) have been deliberately introduced to replace ordinary vigilance, care, and personal responsibleness. Perhaps, though, in spite of our discussion in the last section, about how low-trust environments may provoke a spiral of mistrust, one residual thought remains—that it would be politically naïve to adopt the Aristotelian model of accountability: "Far better to hold people to account through systems of performance contracts,[27] rather than put faith in individual people who, after all, can be fallible." Let us deal straightaway with the point about placing trust in contracts, rather than in persons.

Prima facie, the idea of contract is appealing. In its ideal form a contract is a paradigm of an obligation freely undertaken: 'contract is an act of autonomous will . . . an instrument of mutual benefit'.[28] But as Baier (1995) remarks, even though the 'beauty of . . . contract is its explicitness . . . we can only make explicit provision for such contingencies as we imagine arising' (117). And, therein lies the problem. As Aristotle says, the nature of *practical* matters is 'indefinite' (NE 1137b 18–19, 29–32).

Gambetta (1988a) also sounds a warning note: 'Contract shifts the focus of trust on to the efficacy of sanctions, and either our or a third party's ability to enforce them if a contract is broken' (221). This raises, once more, the question whether 'contract' trust really does supersede distrust completely. Or does it steal back surreptitiously? Even where the law catches up with those who do not keep their contracts (such as the disgraced firm, Enron) there may never be a satisfactory way of recompensing (in terms other than financial) those people whose trust has been betrayed by a broken contract. Let us here recall Dewey's point which I cited at the beginning of this chapter:

'Ultimately all deliberate choices proceed from somebody in particular'. Contracts cannot infallibly circumnavigate possible betrayals of trust.

It was Durkheim's insight to see that there is always an element of the *pre-contractual*[29] in any contract. Here he was echoing a point made by Hume (1748) when he argued against the seventeenth-century Social Contract theory of political obligation. Contracts themselves are only possible against a background of non-contractual relations which build and depend on trust (O'Neill 1998: 172). Contract as a paradigm of interpersonal trust relations may *limit* distrust but will never *eradicate* the need for trustworthiness in a person.

Now let us deal with the charge of naivety. There is a difference between trust existing in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and *gullibility* which is trust in the presence of evidence to the contrary.[30] When charges of naivety are made, perhaps we need to establish whether the charge is really one of gullibility. If it is, then there is confusion. We can be trusting without being credulous. If, *for fear of being naïve*, we gave up altogether on trusting others, we could never learn anything new.[31]

Suppose, though, that someone persists in the naivety charge. Then we must ask the same kind of question we might ask an epistemological skeptic—"What would ever satisfy you?" Imagine we ignore costs and try to set up every monitoring check the human mind could devise, would that ever satisfy the objector? No. How could it? We could never guarantee for certain that someone would not find a way to cheat that particular system. But is cynicism the only response to make here (Warnock 1996: 52)? The cynic will hold that 'the dark side of us is the whole truth about us' (Delattre 1988: 36) which implies that the only thing that will satisfy the objector is if the problem of human imperfection and evil could be solved! But why then suppose that a foolproof system be constructed?

A much stronger argument to make against the position that I hold would be to take Hobbes's line and just say outright that what I suggest is based on a faulty hypothesis of human nature: humans cannot be trusted *sufficiently*. We have already discussed Hobbes's views regarding trust in Section 9.3, where we noted the legacy he bequeathed to the 'public choice' economic theorists. What is there to be said to those who are still in thrall to Hobbes?

Here is one answer. The question of *whether to trust* should not be seen as an all or nothing issue (Thomas 1979: 100). It is not a question of deciding *in general*, suggests Thomas, whether we ought, as a priority, to prefer *trusting* people in preferance to relying on institutional rules, procedures, or sanctions of a system. It is a question, rather, of whether we can distinguish *certain situations in which trust is appropriate*. To take an all-or-nothing view, he suggests, is the same mistake Hobbes made:

> if my trusting someone would threaten my personal security, then I have a reason for not trusting him; but Hobbes's error is to exalt this reason into an over-riding one . . . Hobbes's main aim was to deliver the individual

> from . . . insecurities . . . But . . . to constantly maximize [one's] own chances of survival could have the effect of depriving the community . . . of that which could make the greatest contribution to [its] security, namely the willingness of some . . . to face . . . perils. (98)

All that is left for the objector at this stage is to hanker for something that is as 'system proof' as it can be:

> "*If only* we could get an accountability system set up, with the right kind of rules, regulations, procedural norms, benchmarks and codes of practice, *democratically* approved, and with sanctions and disciplinary measures for those who fail to adhere to them, we would then have the perfect system. We just need experts and consultants who can advise how best to put policies into operation with managers in charge, to monitor and check. Then we would not have to rely on finding trustworthy people. All we would need are people competent enough to know what is expected of them. If we set clear targets we can verify who is not measuring up to the required performance criteria."

But what is described here is the public accountability system we now have—*managerialism*! Managerialism is predicated on an organizational logic of *institutionalized distrust*: trust is conditional on proving one is not untrustworthy. If we follow this route—if we think that trusting *distrust* rather than trusting *trust* is the best form of public rationality—then, in consistency, we should take everything else that goes with this rationality. We accept managerialism. But note that we should still be left with the 'problem of trust'. Indeed, we are ready for the 'spiral of distrust'. Our best course may be to appraise the prospects of 'trust management' (Sydow 2002: 54).

When a management system chooses to embrace a Hobbesian version of trust, one that is based on calculation, prudence, and self-interest, then it will be no surprise that the only form of motivation which such a system cultivates is one that is dependent on extrinsic rewards, such as *performance-related-pay*. But in such a system is there any space for people to be encouraged to exercise 'negative responsibility'—the kind of responsibility we discussed in Chapter 4—and which has the potential to nurture the virtue of trustworthiness? This is the kind of responsibility that does not depend on extrinsic motivators. It starts from an attachment to the good at which an activity is aimed (MacIntyre 1985: 187).

9.9 THE ROLE OF *FIDUCIARY* RESPONSIBILITY AND TRUST: CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN TRUSTING SOMEONE AND WONDERING WHETHER THAT TRUST WILL BE KEPT

It is the 'gap' across time and space which gives rise to 'the problem' of trust. For trust needs to start precisely when hard, immediately verifiable

evidence is lacking, when there is a time-lag, a 'suspension of account-keeping' (Ensminger 2001: 199), before there can be any monitoring of an action (Gambetta 1988a: 217).

Here is one way in which the 'gap' may be closed which does not take the managerial route. We start with the thought that public trust, like private trust cannot be understood reductively in terms simply of just relying on someone's *knowledge* or *competent performance* (Baier 1992: 117). Being accountable is not a simple matter of using knowledge correctly, in accordance with a checklist of *what to do*. Nor is it even sufficient to say that the person must use knowledge wisely. The knowledge must be used not only wisely *but on our behalf*. This introduces the idea of 'fiduciary responsibility'. The fiduciary element involved in trusting others to bear our goodwill in mind is to give '*discretionary powers to the trusted, to let the trusted decide how, on a given matter, one's welfare is best advanced, to delay the accounting for a while, to be willing to wait to see how the trusted has advanced one's welfare*' (117; original italics).

We arrive now at the counter-intuitive thought that for someone to be publicly accountable we need to be willing, as Baier suggests, '*to delay the accounting for a while*'. The idea of 'fiduciary trust' closes the 'delay' gap. For the entry point for trust is where, in spite of lacking epistemic evidence that someone's knowledge will be used to safeguard or preserve our needs, interests, or well-being, and where the possibility of checking up is difficult or precluded, we nevertheless adopt an (unarticulated) 'attitude of optimism' (Jones 1996). This is an optimism that is carried implicitly through society in unarticulated beliefs and taken-for-granted understandings, the kind of optimism that in fact sustains human practices—as we learn both from David Hume and, more recently, from 'social capital' theory.[32] We now see that this sort of optimism underpinned the rationale of the old public service ethos. A major part of what it meant to be a public servant at the time of the old public service ethos was an expectation that those trusted would carry out their *fiduciary* obligations and responsibilities (Barber 1983: 9)

> The values of the Public Service include the trust that comes from serving others, the sense of obligation that overrides personal interest, the professional commitment to do one's best, the pride associated with working in an esteemed organization, and the stake one acquires from making a career in the Public Service.[33]

Compare what we have now:

> Teachers are inscribed in . . . exercises in performativity [as] they attempt to fulfil the . . . imperatives of competition and target-achievement . . . The humanistic commitments of the substantive professional—the service ethic—are replaced by the teleological promiscuity of the technical professional—the manager.[34]

Our present, *new* 'public service ethos' places high value on 'the competitive institutional professional' (Bottery 2003a: 204), someone who sees professionalism mainly as 'the construction of personal portfolios and advancement', rather than in terms of 'the good of their institution'. And yet it advertises the values of the public service ethos! Here we have yet another case of 'linguistic' or 'rhetorical' robbery (Fielding 1994; Halliday 2004). Those who resurrected the old public service ethos, emptied it of its old values, only to fill it up with values of managerialism, have helped themselves to everything attractive in the vocabulary of their critics. They have appropriated the words *public service ethos* but what those words now stand for lacks the 'ethic' on which the original public service ethos was grounded (see again Section 9.3). 'Linguistic robbery', Fielding (1994) says, undermines 'the credibility of the conceptual story which the stolen language strove to give voice' (19). Philosophy's task here is to make sense of the idea of the survival of a concept outside the frame of thought that made it intelligible in the first place.

9.10 TRUST AND DISTRUST: MAINTAINING AN EQUILIBRIUM

I have been arguing that no *system* is better than the people who run it, and have been highlighting the importance of *inter-personal* forms of trust manifested through the virtue of trustworthiness. I have also highlighted the various problems that can result from *institutionalizing distrust* when used as a managerial tool for accountability purposes. Let me now acknowledge the kinds of contexts when 'system trust' and 'institutionalized distrust' will play an important role.

We rely on impersonal, abstract systems of finance and technology to reduce complexity in our lives (Luhmann 1979). Every time we give our credit details over the phone, we place our trust in 'abstract systems' (see Giddens 1990, 1991). But herein lies the problem with 'system trust': for the very reason such systems are 'abstract', they are 'out of our control', and no particular person can be held accountable (Misztal 1996: 93). 'System trust', therefore, cannot really take us very far in an enquiry into the notion of public accountability.

As for the notion of 'institutionalized distrust', this clearly has a role to play in democratic systems—to keep in check the claims to legitimacy which an authority in power makes (White 1993: 75). But, even within a democratic framework of norms, any safeguards and controls that are instituted in order to counter 'opportunistic behavior' will always need to be balanced against over-regulation. Regulation should control *the exceptions* without burdening *the whole* (Boyfield 2006: 5–6).

But what exactly counts as a 'burden'? Recall how easy it is for a 'spiral of mistrust' (see again Section 9.7) to be created. Let us seek advice here from a psychologist who has given some thought to relationships of

trust. An *equilibrium* always needs to be kept between trust and distrust if personal virtues such as self-reliance, self-trust, and independence are to flourish, recommends John Bowlby (1994: 107). So as well as institutionalizing forms of democratic distrust, it seems we must, for *equally* good democratic and organizational reasons, discourage work environments which systematically foster mistrust. Only if such a balance is held is there a chance for public accountability to meet democratic accountability on the same footing.

9.11 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

So how might we summarize the nature of the relation between public trust and accountability? Let us start with some general thoughts on trust and distrust.

First, we have to accept that trust is a mysterious, ephemeral phenomenon and not something that can be engineered or managed. For absence of trust is not even the same as distrust: trust and distrust are contraries and not contradictories.

Second, neo-Aristotelians can be realists as well as idealists. The kind of trust we are concerned with is not the trust that members of a family or life-long friends assume or expect of each other. 'Professional' trustworthiness—although it is open-ended and structurally similar and will call on moral virtues, such as responsibility, reliability, consistency, honesty, and so on—does not need to have the pretensions to full ethical virtue (see again Chapter 6, Section 6.7).

Third, the relation between trust and distrust is fragile. It is a well-known phenomenon that lack of trust can fulfill a prediction that something will not work. The stock market, for instance, can crash as cumulative distrust brings about the very possibility that provoked the distrust. This might be why *trusting* is often described as a 'rational' form of irrationality designed to absorb uncertainty (Luhmann 1979: 8, 69). It might be the case that the best that can be had 'is a weakly structured probability' (Dunn 1984). But the fact that it is needed for any inter-personal co-operative human endeavor shows that trusting is in a sense more fundamental and primitive (Williams 2002: 49, 85) than the moral conventions or positive laws of any society. John Locke, in his study of the nature of political obedience, allowed for the recognition of trustworthiness as a causal pre-condition for the existence of any societal arrangement.[35]

Fourth, trustworthiness will tend to flourish as a virtue where there is an initial de-feasible presumption of trust. This is why it is important to be aware of the risks when deliberate distrust mechanisms are built administratively into institutional practices, ostensibly for purposes of democratic accountability. Peter Johnson, in his book *Frames of Deceit* (1993), a study of political and public trust, warns,

> It would be ironic if a preoccupation with the rational basis of system trust resulted only in an encouragement of a more calculating disposition and an inability to act in the public domain unless securely supported by sanctions, insurance policies, or safety procedures. (171)

As a reminder of just how 'ironic' our present managerial reality is—in the sense of 'ironic' Johnson intends—let us end with an ancient philosophical question, at least 2,000 years old. In his *Satires*, Juvenal asked, 'Who guards the guardians?'[36]

The question goes to the heart of all matters to do with accountability, trust, and distrust that we have touched on in this chapter and also to the heart of questions such as, "Why should we trust professionals?" or "Why should we trust the teachers?" The logical problem is obvious. We are led into a regress of distrust once we pose such questions. To put in a 'second-order' layer of guardians to guard the 'first-order' ones only raises the same fear—how can *they* be trusted? So how is the regress of distrust to be terminated?

Luhmann (1979) suggests that it is only if a question of trust or distrust becomes 'acute' or 'problematic' that we fasten on what we take to be the prominent features in the context. In such circumstances, when selecting the critical variables which signify trust there is an element of *indeterminacy*: 'in the simplifying, in the reduction of complexity, there always lies an unstable, incalculable moment' (69); there is no way this sort of situation can be predicted; it takes on the character of a 'threshold experience', often as the result of 'a chance first impression' (74). If trust between people emerges at all, it emerges implicitly and dynamically in those 'interstitial spaces' (Seligman 1997: 25) where roles, responsibilities, and expectations meet. So now, knowing that what counts as trustworthiness may in fact only show itself in particular contexts—'in the moment of action'—(Aristotle, NE 1110a 14)—let us ask the question again, but in a slightly different form: *what* guards the guardians?

There is really only one answer: it is 'professional' formation (the close relative of ethical formation), but not without careful, judicious recruitment and a certain 'watchfulness' (Dewey 1927: 69)—ordinary vigilance, that is—which guards the guardians. This is what protects the public interest. Once we reject micro-management, what else could there be?

Conclusion

HAMM: . . . Enough, it's time it ended . . .
Have you not had enough?
CLOV: . . . Yes! . . . All life long the same questions . . .
HAMM: . . . But . . . . . we change! We lose our hair,
our teeth!
Our bloom! Our ideals!
CLOV: . . . We do what we can . . .

Samuel Beckett, *Endgame*

1.

The Aristotelian model of practical rationality, introduced in Chapter 6 by way of contrast to the managerial one, encouraged us to look beyond the achievement of meeting pre-specified organizational goals as a *sine qua non* of public rationality. The two rival models of practical rationality we have been considering are well characterized by Kemmis (2003):

> instrumental (technical) reasoning manifests itself in attitudes of *systematisation, regulation, and control*—focussing on the 'system' aspects of the social settings involved (. . . regarded in a rather abstract, generalised and disembedded way). By contrast, practical reason manifests itself in attitudes which value *wise and prudent judgment about what to do in shared social contexts*—focusing on the 'lifeworld' aspects of particular settings (understood in a more localised, concrete and historically specific way). (312)

We see now how the argument between the critic of the status quo ('the critic') and the apologist for the status quo ('the apologist'), the two antagonists we met in Chapter 1, is clearly a struggle between systemic, means-end reasoning and contextually-based, practical reasoning. These two forms of rationality draw on different sets of ideals and, importantly, different and incompatible conceptions of human values—to do with what matters, or what is to be prioritized.

Each will therefore have difficulty engaging with the other, but the apologist (whom we have also been calling 'the managerialist') will have the greater difficulty, I think. For the critic can at least propose that managerialism be subjected to the same tests by which, when the 'rationalization' of the public services was first promoted, other rival conceptions of management were found wanting and displaced. How well does the managerialist's

agenda live up to the promises made in the early days of the public service 'accountability' reform movement—the promises to get rid of waste and inefficiency and to install a 'better managed' form of public accountability that might be trusted?

The critic may also want to say that in practice the implementation of the managerial model (i) poisons the source of the ethical in human relations, by putting artificial limits on what might be considered appropriate objects of thought and action; (ii) marginalizes any kind of knowledge which is either not verifiable or translatable into some explicit, propositional form; (iii) excludes alternative (i.e., non-managerial) ways of conceiving organizational life; (iv) marketizes that for which no real market is properly imaginable,[1] with the consequence that 'standards are often violated . . . goods usurped [and] . . . spheres invaded, by powerful men and women' (Walzer 1983: 10) who, acting on behalf of the 'customer' have succeeded in replacing the notion of *public spirit* by the ersatz notion of *service provision*.

What is wrong with thinking of oneself as a 'service provider'? Sen and Williams (1982) suggest that we cannot regard ourselves simply as instruments, conduits to a greater general utility. For what we *do* is always more than we *produce*. The utilitarian or instrumental outlook, wherever it breaks out in social practices, destroys the very networks of responsibility and trust that are required for life to have meaning. It also robs us of 'notions which utilitarianism can neither accommodate nor explain' (21).

2.

Winch (1996) says that the 'principle of accountability', as it applies to education, is a political as well as moral issue (4). But I have had to sideline many important questions of a political nature that bear on the notion of educational accountability. I have dwelt mostly on normative, ethical questions relating to how those who work in professional contexts account for themselves, or, more specifically, where one's professional responsibility as a teacher lies in meeting expectations of public accountability. On my view these questions relate to the role of how *formation* (and its analogues, *occupational* or *professional formation*) figures in a teacher's practice.

To stress the importance of the ethical in accountability and the importance of virtues of professional formation, as I have done, is not to adopt an over-idealistic or outmoded stance, one totally out of touch with modern business needs. On the contrary, there are many who write from the perspective of organizational and management theory whose views complement the conclusions of this book. To focus only on efficiency, productivity, the 'profit-margin' or 'bottom-line', in fact, is counter-productive, argues Tom Morris (1997), author of *If Aristotle Ran General Motors*. Morris is guided by Aristotelian insights to argue that there need not be any conflict between institutional organizations that are run efficiently or ethically. In

fact, the former, he argues, presupposes the latter. Just as Aristotelian in its conclusion (although no overt acknowledgment is made to Aristotle) is some recent research from the field of management and leadership studies. I refer to a report by *The Work Foundation* in the UK, the result of an in-depth, two-year study (including six high-profile UK organizations) into what constitutes 'good leadership'. The report concludes that controlling, target-driven approaches to leadership are counter-productive:

> There needs to be a paradigm shift for all leaders who remain fixated on numbers and targets. Outstanding leaders focus on people, attitudes and engagement . . . Our findings strongly suggest that an approach which connects leaders to people and people to purposes defines outstanding leadership.[2]

3.

In an Aristotelian worldview, just as an 'individual' cannot be conceived in 'atomistic' terms as a utility-maximizing agent—the construct favored by adherents of 'rational choice' ('game') theory—so a teacher ought not to be construed chiefly as an embodiment of that idealized, abstract, decontextualized, managerial construct, *the effective teacher.* Any individual, in whatever aspect of life, will see herself as rooted in society, rooted not simply as a consumer, but also as a citizen. The idea of a state existing solely to 'maximize the opportunities' of its citizens, united only through shared consumption patterns would be alien to an Aristotelian worldview. An individual *qua* citizen is a 'member of an association' (Aristotle, *Politics* 1276b 20). 'We must not think of a citizen as belonging [solely] to himself' (1337a 27–30) but as one who acts also for the sake of the good of the *polis* (1252b 29–30).

Here we have the idea of a *collective* being suggested rather than just a *collection* of private individual interests. The potential for collectives to turn totalitarian, fascistic, and tyrannical under the influence of non-benign or fundamentalist ideologies is one of the main tragic narratives of the twentieth century. But if our 'advanced' liberal societies are not to implode under the pressures of competitive individualism, or through lack of social cohesion, it is more important than ever, as Chantal Mouffe (1993) suggests, to 'pose once again the question of the common good and that of civic virtue' (33). The challenge is to do this 'without postulating a single moral good' and without 'forego[ing] the gains of liberalism'.

4.

So how might Aristotle's idea of civic virtue be made real in the educational world of today? Echoing the kind of 'association'[3] which Aristotle

describes, Dewey (1899) saw schools as 'embryonic' of community life and 'active with types of occupations that reflect the larger society':

> When the school introduces . . . each child . . . into membership within . . . a little community, saturating him with the spirit of service, and . . . with . . . self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guaranty of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious. (1967 [1899]: 29)

Without commitment to a complete Deweyean educational vision or, indeed, to every philosophical assumption upon which that vision is grounded, we can still acknowledge that which is indispensable to us here—namely, schools where there is a concern not only with the cultivation of the competitive ('entrepreneurial' or 'self-directed') self, but also a concern with the 'larger society', and with schools whose ethos actively encourages pupils to develop *civic dispositions*. A management virtue such as entrepreneurialism should not be elevated above *other* 'basic spheres of experience', necessary for fulfilling human potential and capabilities (Nussbaum 1992). The recent banking crisis and economic recession have given us all time to think about how overblown notions of individualism, materialism, and consumerism can end up undermining feelings of security and well-being, at personal, political, and societal levels. Perhaps, then, Aristotelian ideas of civic responsibility (echoed here in the Deweyan quotation) might not appear quite as quaint as they once might have done at the height of the 'greed is good' culture of the 1980s and 1990s. If a 'citizenship education' is to mean anything at all, then it will need to promote the idea that individual actions impinge on others. Simon Jenkins captures the thought I have in mind here: 'Good schools are underpinned and not damaged by civic commitment and civic pride'.[4]

What chance is there now in our educationally managed classrooms and in a culture that encourages educational institutions to think of students as customers, for such civic dispositions and a sense of public spirit to develop? It is not good enough for apologists for the status quo to say that such neo-Aristotelian–Deweyan ideas "have no place in this century". Here I challenge those who favor the *marketization* and *managerialization* of schools to answer the question why we have so many disaffected students who *should* be in classrooms—as 'members' of a 'little community', as Dewey puts it—but who choose instead to truant (or if not to truant, then to end up suspended or expelled). Why are so many young adults, brought up in our present, so-called 'better managed', 'more accountable' educational system on a road to nowhere except a life spent loitering in shopping malls, dealing in drugs, and the like?[5] We need to understand why non-success is now interpreted by so many as failure.[6] This kind of *disengagement*[7] that we witness cannot really be what Chubb and Moe (1990) had in mind when they first launched their attack on the old 'democratically' run state bureaucracies and sought to introduce a competitive market ethos and new

forms of management into schools.[8] What does it say about the kind of education system we have when (in the UK) a 'commissioner for children' is appointed to find out why so many children, faced with the pressures of 'endless testing', are so unhappy?[9]

5.

As a way of addressing the problem of disengagement, truancy, suspensions, and disaffection, some policy-makers now recommend that schools offer new freedoms and flexibility to teachers; the curriculum is to be less 'prescriptive' so that pupils will be 'actively and imaginatively engaged in their learning';[10] more 'personalized' learning and assessment schemes are recommended. We can only hope that the new rhetoric which recommends teachers to use their professional judgment to teach in creative ways will really change educational cultures for the better and not turn out to be gesture politics. If there remain 'powers' which not only predetermine 'strategic decisions' (Shattock 2006: 39) but also determine people's standing and livelihood, then, despite the rhetoric of 'empowerment', 'self-direction', or 'creative leadership', present managerial appraisal schemes will continue to structure agents' motivation and practice very subtly towards economic rationalism (discussed in Chapter 3) and towards a model of pay incentives which those schemes promote. Preedy et al. (2003) enlarge on the concern I have just raised:

> Meeting government control accountability requirements to demonstrate ongoing improvement in students' attainments may lead schools and colleges to focus on boosting the performance of borderline pass/fail students at the expense of higher and lower attainers . . . This is likely to challenge . . . ethical norms . . . [T]here are . . . tensions between external accountability demands focused on student's academic attainment, and internal . . . accountabilities . . . norms and values . . . (9)

Such is the power of the 'external' demands of market and managerial accountability. They have the power to trump 'internal moral conversations':[11]

> The pressures of performance act back on pedagogy and the curriculum, both narrowing the classroom experience of all students and encouraging teachers to attend specifically to those students likely to 'make a difference' to the aggregate performance figures of the class and the school. (Ball 2001a: 52)

In the face of an 'Effectiveness and Performance Review' (Shattock 2006: 138ff) and the amount of documentation required to prepare for it (see

again Chapter 1, Section 1.2, for an explanation of why there are now incessant demands for the production of *records*), it may be difficult for teachers to remember the core ideals that first motivated them to want to become teachers.

6.

The assumption that performance-related pay incentives are effective motivators is in fact a matter of controversy in management literature. Pfeffer and Sutton (2000) argue that they are only effective when performance outcomes are under the direct control of the people who receive the incentives (111–112). If this is not feasible to organize, then financial incentives can actually undermine motivation. Frustration sets in when people are working in a system that makes it impossible for them to have direct influence to affect outcomes.

A seminal article by the economists Holstrom and Milgrom (1991),[12] addressing the relationship between *incentives* and *pay structures*, confirms the conclusion arrived at here. Holstrom and Milgrom distinguish between 'single-task' and 'multi-task' activities. An example of a 'single-task' activity would be a shopkeeper who gives incentives to staff to sell more of product X, to increase profits. Teachers' work is characterized as 'multi-task', when understood as doing more than 'maximizing' the examination grades of their students: to concentrate only on this goal 'would sacrifice such activities as promoting curiosity and creative thinking' (25).

When people are required to fulfill multiple tasks to complete a job successfully, Holstrom and Milgrom argue, it is better to pay a fixed wage rather than apply performance incentive schemes tied to explicit target outcomes. In other words, it is necessary to broaden incentives beyond those generated only through performance-related pay targets.[13] If their conclusion is right, we have one explanation of why schools are sometimes called 'results' factories and why some pupils feel alienated from their own educational experience.

Work being done in the field of organization and systems theory also sees problems related to target-setting practices used to drive performance management systems. Again, a key problem relates to explicit targets when used for strategic planning of institutional goals. Even if targets are being meticulously met, work and production may suffer. Why? Because there is little or no motivation for 'service providers' to work above and beyond specified targets: innovative ways will be found to ensure the targets are met, however damaging this might be to the core purposes of a service (Seddon 2005). We can understand this in rather the same way 'work-to-rule' practices cause productivity to slow down or else grind to a halt when workers observe only the duties stated in their job descriptions. The point here is that strict adherence to targets has the effect of limiting output and,

perversely, of not providing customer/client satisfaction in the long term. The 'work-to-rule' principle demonstrates that practices, if they are to work well, depend more on informal understandings and on spontaneous improvisations, than upon formal work rules or compliance with demands to meet targets (see also Scott 1998: 310).

It is worth remembering, in this connection, the problems which governments in Eastern Europe experienced in the last century when attempts were made to control centrally the production of goods and the provisions of services, through specifying industrial production targets and measuring performance. The result was not just inefficiency, but frequently a failure to serve basic needs.[14] The parallels between this form of economic organization and attempts in the West to manage public sector in terms of performance indicators and targets need to be underlined (Hammersley 2000: 106).

7.

The conclusions reached by the various theorists I have just quoted are in line with the overall argument of this book. All along I have argued that the emphasis now placed on explicitness and transparency (through the managerial demand for pre-specified, explicit targets/objectives/outcomes, etc.) tends to distort motivation and judgment.

Of course, it would be to overstate the argument to say that we should never appeal to the idea of a 'target' to set goals. The teacher of foreign languages, for example, may decide to 'target' certain irregular verbs for her students to learn. Here, a 'target' is aimed at *by the teacher herself*, not as an end in itself, but *for the sake of* a bigger educational end or goal: so that her students become proficient in speaking and writing a foreign language. Problems tend to arise when attempts are made to extend the scope of this pedagogical approach rigidly, to *all* aspects of an educational process (see Stenhouse 1975).[15]

Nevertheless, the idea of a real-life archer or hunter, aiming at, and then hitting a visible target—and from which we draw the metaphorical idea of setting 'targets' at work—remains a potent image. And the idea of 'SMART' targets—targets defined as 'specific', 'measurable', 'achievable', 'realistic', and 'time-bound'—admittedly, is compelling, for it simplifies reality for us. This is why the practice of setting goals for people in terms of clear and precise targets is seductive for managers and workers alike: everyone feels they know what to do and how to go about doing it. But in Part II of the book I showed why the kind of 'knowing', which is referred to here, if locked into the dictates of a managerial rationality, cannot measure up to the complexity and contingency characteristic of the kinds of situations in which many professionals practise.

The main problem with drawing on the metaphor 'hitting a target' as an inspiration for goal-oriented activity is that the image which it suggests—an

agent acting decisively, not hesitating, and so on—is inappropriate when hard decisions are called for. The kind of *specificity* that a real-life archer needs in order to be successful is precisely what is lacking in contexts where unpredictable systems of interpersonal relationships and complex human needs have to be addressed.[16] For this very reason, jobs in teaching or in medicine or in any of the caring professions where 'welfare professionals' serve the public (Harrison 1999: 62) would appear to be unpromising occupations for implementing target setting practices. Aristotle reminds us that it is a mistake to seek always 'precision' (NE 1094b 13) in certain spheres of life: 'Matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health' (1104a 3–8).

Keith Hoskin (1996) writes that the problem with targets is not that goals set as targets are bad, or even—as Goodhart's Law would predict[17]—that, because of the unintended consequences of their *becoming* targets, the measures used to achieve the targets undermine the reason there was for setting the target. The problem, Hoskin suggests, is that it 'confirms people in ways of seeing which presume that 'the target' is the problem' (266). If organizational activities concentrate on goals that are concrete, uncontroversial, and easy to operationalize, it will be at the cost of other desirable goals that are more abstract and for which success criteria are less clear (Etzioni 1964; Abrahamsson 1977).

8.

It was once estimated that schools (in the UK) had to satisfy more than 30,000 edicts, rules, and regulations.[18] We shall see whether the recent political rhetoric emanating from the newly elected coalition government in the UK (as of May 2010), of 'giving teachers more freedom' and of 'getting rid of targets and bureaucracy', through its project to turn schools into Academies, 'free' from local authority control, makes any difference.[19] Maybe *some* targets will be dropped. But the number, in a sense, is irrelevant. Even if reduced in number, if targets are still linked to the kind of management systems now in place, they will remain a symptom, and not be seen as a cause, of the kind of problems we have discussed throughout this book.

The high point of centralization, though, it is said, has been succeeded by new models of public service (see Coffield et al. 2007 on this). But again, nothing much seems to have changed. In spite of the persuasive political rhetoric about 'localism' and 'decentralization', this new way of talking has not yet translated into a changed conduct of politicians who cannot resist turning their political ideals into quantifiable targets. There is little sign yet that the kind of accountability system which Paul Hoggett (1996: 10) once characterized, paradoxically, as 'centralized decentralization', is being wound down. As Seddon (2005) puts it, instead of trying to shape a service

to 'do the best by the service user', the standard model of management still preferred in many public institutions is for an arbitrary *number* to be made the focus of people's efforts and for that number to be imposed from top to bottom of the hierarchy within an organization.

In the final stages of writing this book, one piece of research has just emerged from the world of medicine which echoes both Hoggett's and Seddon's concerns. It is reported that 'surgery targets endanger patient safety'.[20] When asked about what gets in the way of patient safety, the surgeons polled said they did not feel in full clinical control because of pressure put on them to get through operating list targets. Patient safety, they reported, was put at risk by having to operate on patients they had never seen before and also because of the 'lack of time for complex operations'. We do not seem to have travelled very far from the kind of concerns I listed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.1), voices from the world of education concerned about the excessive proportion of their working lives spent on working to targets and in 'safeguarding their information trails', rather than doing the job they are trained to do.[21]

9.

The Aristotelian model of practical rationality I described in Chapter 6 shows us how personal ideals help to give life—and work—'significance' (James 1908: 265ff), by offering a vision of a *way of being and living*. There is room in an Aristotelian practical rationality to recognize the worth of civic virtue and to embrace as public goods—'common human goods', we might say—the kinds of things without which our lives would be impoverished or deficient, such as education, health, and mental well-being.

The professions represent the only mechanism we have for collectively providing ourselves with such 'goods', suggests Daryl Koehn (1994), who then goes on to ask: 'If the professions are not trustworthy, whom shall we trust?' (5). Koehn's question resonates with the conclusion I reached in Chapter 9. In that chapter I showed why accountability mechanisms which specify precise objectives against which the 'performance' of agents is checked, monitored and evaluated (referred to as 'institutionalizing distrust') may become counter-productive, causing a 'spiral of mistrust'. This is because such institutional mechanisms can undermine the pre-conditions for trustworthiness and honesty in practice—the very things needed for agents to act ethically and with professional responsibility (see Postema 1980 and 1995 for more on this).

Notwithstanding criticisms and controversies surrounding his own definition of a *practice*,[22] MacIntyre (1985) highlights just how fragile the relationship between practices and institutions may be—how the 'goods' of each may conflict and how 'a practice to retain its integrity will depend on the way in which the virtues can be . . . exercised in sustaining the

institutional forms which are the bearers of the practice' (195). Managerial mantras, recommendations, or guidelines, even when promoted in the name of accountability, once *institutionalized*, may lead to rigid structures of regulation, ill-equipped to deal with the *particularities* that arise in specific contexts.

Onora O'Neill (2002) argues that the present culture of accountability fosters less, rather than more, trust between the professions and the public, even though present accountability mechanisms are intended to make professionals more accountable to the public. This disjunction occurs because 'the real requirements' of accountability are now to regulators, to departments of government, to funders (O'Neill 2002: 5).

With O'Neill's words, we have come, in T. S. Eliot's words, full circle: after 'all our exploring' we seem to have arrived 'where we started'.[23] For in Chapter 1, we were trying to understand the rationale of the concerns of those critics of the status quo who feel that the imposition of managerial forms of accountability undermines their own educational practice.

In our journey to this end-point, however, we have in fact reviewed many things, not least the fragility of the relationship that holds between *accountability*, *trust*, and *responsibility*. We have seen how structures of managerial regulation, once embodied in practices, have the potential not only to undermine an agent's inner sense of professionalism, but to destabilize networks of trust, to undermine personal responsibility, and to pervert the ends of accountability. The formational virtues of *responsibleness* and *trustworthiness*, irreducible to requirements laid out in advance, are easily subverted by managers who insist that educators work to ends which are explicitly demonstrable, 'systemic and unavailable to question' (Inglis 1989: 45). What are the chances that under such conditions educators will communicate democratic values to their charges by example (Guttman 1987)?

10.

But the last thing we need now are 'blue-prints' for a new accountability system. Much better would be to take inspiration from the kind of thought that Richard Elmore (2003) expresses: 'We didn't simply "discover" accountability with the advent of performance–based accountability policies in the latest era of education reform' (15): 'Performance-based accountability polices embody a particular normative view that is just one of many possible versions of accountability vying for the attention of schools and their communities' (14–15).

"Just one of many possible versions of accountability." Let us keep this thought alive when we try, through public debate and local forums,[24] to discuss matters relating to the way the professions should account for themselves. Bernard Williams once said that morality is not 'one determinate set of ethical thoughts': 'It embraces a range of ethical outlooks' (1993: 174). Perhaps

it would be a step in the right direction to adopt a similar approach to questions of professionalism and accountability. Only then might ways be found to resist the pressure to be 'co-opted into the language and therefore the ideology of management' (Gunter 1997: 86). Do we know why we use words like 'efficiency' and 'cost-effectiveness' so much in relation to education and do we challenge the use of them as we try to get back to discussions about the aims and values of education? These are precisely the kinds of questions which should surface in forums where teachers meet. Philosophy of education may then play a positive role in helping towards a better theoretical understanding of the practical. As Winch says, philosophy does not always have to be 'destructive'; it can also act as 'advocate and critic' (Winch 1996: 5, 147).

I have tried in the criticisms I have made of present managerial practices to take those practices back to the ideas, ideals, and ideologies out of which they sprang and from which they drew nourishment. What all management models have in common—whether they tend to the scientific management school of thought or to the human relations school of thought—is a shared assumption about practical rationality: if people are not made to work to pre-specified targets or objectives, then there will be chaos in an organization. I have offered apologists for the status quo an alternative way of conceiving how people in professional contexts may engage in practically rational, goal-oriented activity.

11.

So before I end I offer two utterances which convey the spirit of each of the two practical rationalities we have considered, the instrumental and the contextual. We know what different worlds each leads into. The world of education knows by recent experience the troubles of the first.

First, a description given by Anne Storey (2000) from a 'Technical Consultation' document, the aim of which is to improve the *performance management* process for teachers. There were

> no fewer than 16 criteria laid out as necessary to cross the performance threshold . . . these were reformulated into five areas of competence, covering subject knowledge, teaching and assessment, pupil progress . . . wider professional effectiveness (in effect, continuing professional development) and 'professional characteristics' . . . Each of the five threshold standard elements are subdivided . . . (518)

Second, comes a different vision of teaching practice, one which complements an Aristotelian model of practical rationality:

> There is another view . . . This view would state that our objectives are only known to us in any complete sense after the completion of

> our act of instruction . . . Objectives by this rationale are heuristic devices which provide initiating consequences which become altered in the flow of instruction . . . [T]he teacher . . . asks a fundamentally different question from "What am I trying to accomplish?" The teacher asks "What am I trying to do?" and out of the doing comes the accomplishment.[25]

Even if it seems counter-intuitive, policy-makers should consider why the second might just represent a better form of *educational accountability* than the first.

12.

In so far as a managerial form of rationality requires that practices and ends be made explicit (in the ways I have described in previous chapters) we have a choice. We can conceive the notion of *public rationality* afresh in order to leave room for the *formation* of persons who will have the capacity to use their practical reason and their personal and implicit knowledge to help shape ends of action that will contribute to a goal, articulated not in *managerialese*, but in a way that makes sense to the agent in context. Or we can abandon everything that we might have once expected from an ideal of public rationality.

If we do the second then we will need to search for something philosophically wrong with the following claim that appears as a true insight: 'the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion . . . ' (Aristotle, NE 1104a 8–9).

13.

So now, who is to have the last word—the critic of, or the apologist for, the status quo? Do we follow what I have called the 'lure of the explicit' (even though it may lead to micro-management and a full-blooded managerialism)? Or, as I have argued throughout, do we resist the thought that the more explicit we make our practices the more accountable we shall be? For those who still have their doubts—prefer even now to follow the 'lure of the explicit' and risk all that that pursuit might bring—I end with my leitmotif (expressed through Polanyi 1962), in the hope that such doubters will reconsider their stance:

> . . . it is the inarticulate [implicit, non-explicit] which has the last word, unspoken and yet decisive . . . (71)

Notes

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. Pollitt, cited in Bottery (2004: 87).
2. The term *governance* is used to capture 'various aspects of new public management (NPM), such as deregulation, contracting-out, agentification and privatisation' (Bache 2003: 301); and Rhodes (1997: 15, 49–51). It must not be taken as a synonym for *government*.
3. Educational management, as theory and practice, was derived from management principles first applied to industrial and commercial enterprises. But the idea that schools needed a separate tier of management first originated in the US where programs of educational management developed strongly in the 1950s and 1960s (see Bush et al. 1999). By the 1970s and 1980s there was also widespread international interest, chiefly in Anglophone countries, in how all public sector services might be better managed and restructured, in order to run more efficiently and effectively. Education, as a public service, was seen as just one strand of a general problem.
4. Teachers make pupils practice SATs tests *ad nauseam* till they are skilled at taking them: see Mansell (2007); see also 'Teaching to the Test', in *Testing and Assessment, Third Report of Session 2007–08, Vol. 1*, House of Commons: Children, Schools and Families Committee (London: The Stationery Office Ltd), 42–46.
5. See Seddon (2005: 205) and BBC News: Targets 'Distort Crime Recording': HTTP: <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news/bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7089837.stm> (accessed 20 August 2008).
6. Christine Gilbert, Ofsted's Chief Inspector of Children's Services in the UK, reported in *The Guardian*, 6 December 2008: 41; see also: 'Hospital Condemned Over Cleanliness Gave Itself Top Marks': *The Guardian*, 28 November 2009: 7.
7. See 'Season of Good Cheer for Target Advocates', *Society Guardian*, 6 January 2010: 4.
8. Matthew Taylor, once advisor to Tony Blair (when Prime Minster), has said, "Too many schools are drab, joyless assessment factories", Editorial, *The Guardian*, 18 October 2008: 34; and that 'key aspects of the existing assessment and accountability regime have now become counterproductive', *The Times Educational Supplement*, 13 November 2009: 35; Estelle Morris, once Education Minister in the UK, and an advocate of performance targets, now admits 'weaknesses' in the educational system, *Education Guardian*, 23 September 2008: 4.

9. Andy Burnham, Chief Secretary to the Treasury in the UK government, *The Guardian*, 18 July 2007: 1
10. For a comprehensive list of the perverse side effects of target setting, see Table 3.1: 36, in Brooks (2007).
11. Children, Schools and Families Select Committee report, cited in *Teaching Today*, February 2010, Issue 71: 21.
12. BBC News: 'No Evidence' Exam Targets Work: HTTP: <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news/bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/763> (accessed 27 September 2008).
13. *London Evening Standard*, Editorial, 4 December 2009: 14.
14. Select Committee Report, the Department of Children, Schools and Families, 'Schools Entangled in Red Tape, Say MPs', *The Guardian*, 7 January 2010: 14.
15. See 'Blears Slashes Local Govt Targets to Give More Freedom': HTTP: <http://www.politics.co.uk/news/economy-and-finance/blears-slashes-local-govt-targets-to-give-more-freedom--$479857.htm> (accessed 23 November 2009); see also 'Central Targets No Longer Fit for Purpose—LGA' (Local Government Association): HTTP: <http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/core/page.do?pageId=2146193> (accessed, 24 November 2009).
16. *Releasing Resources to the Front Line: Independent Review of Public Sector Efficiency, 2004*: HTTP: <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/efficiency_review120704.pdf> (accessed 6 December 2009).
17. HTTP: <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file22967.pdf> (accessed 6 December 2009).
18. *Society Guardian*, 18 July 2007: 2.
19. 'Welcome to the Office, the New Stasi State', *The Observer*, 21 February 2010: 39: ' . . . a social worker must complete five forms to justify every action she takes . . . the forms come from a head office that has seen the number of bureaucrats double in four years and its budget increase threefold. You can find the same story across the public sector'.
20. 'Public interest' is not being used here in a narrow economic sense—as the 'utility' sum of individual preference-interests—but in a broader sense, in the way Brian Barry (1965) proposes: 'those interests which people have in common *qua* members of the public' (190).
21. 'Efficiency to Deliver', Her Majesty's Government Departmental Report (2006: 95).
22. The *Nuffield Review* (2009) found the present culture of testing in the UK has created a narrow focus on written exams. This has consigned a generation of pupils to an 'impoverished' education which has let them down. Available: HTTP: < http://www.nuffield14-19review.org.uk> (accessed 7 January 2010).

    In the UK, several other important review bodies, commissioned to report on the state of education, endorse this view: see conclusions of the 'Alexander Report', *Cambridge Primary Review*: HTTP: <http://www.primaryreview.org.uk> (accessed, 7 January 2010); and also 'Rose Report': *The Independent Review of the Primary Curriculum: Final Report* (2009), London, Department for Children, Schools and Families.
23. See Carr (2000: 39–42) for a robust rebuttal of this idea.
24. The 'key' elements of neo-liberalism are usually given as minimal government ('deregulation' or 'government at a distance', as it is sometimes called), market fundamentalism, and a belief in the values and priorities of NPM techniques which 'go hand in hand with quasi-markets' (Power, Halpin, and Whitty 1997); for broader issues that relate to neo-liberal

thought, see O'Neill (1998). In so far as one can summarize other core beliefs of neo-liberalism, they are as follows: market-based mechanisms used for accountability in the public sector; regulatory and control procedures grounded on 'performance', and 'principal-agency' contract management models; an enlargement of the managerial workforce within organizations; institutional governance through detailed, pre-specified, external monitoring, audit and evaluation practices. See Jonathan (1997), Lawton (1992), Olssen (2003), Olssen et al. (2004: 7, 137, 172), Ranson and Stewart (1994), Woods et al. (1997), for information, analysis, and critique.

25. Lawton (1992) provides some detail: ' . . . at the national level in the UK . . . and New Zealand . . . at the state level in the USA (e.g., Kentucky) . . . and Australia (e.g., Victoria . . .), and at the district level in Canada (e.g. Edmonton . . .) and the USA (e.g., Florida . . .)' (140).
26. Hood, cited in Bottery (1998: 6), where a more complete list is given.
27. For seminal accounts of how new public *management* differs from previous public *administration* models, see also Ferlie et al. (1996), Hood (1992), and Pollitt (1990); see also Rhodes (1997) for the relation NPM has to managerialism. Hoyle and Wallace (2005: 69) provide a useful table showing three ideal types of managerialism.
28. See Charlton and Andras (2003) who discuss the 'modernization imperative' which demands 'continual change'.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. I owe the idea of 'normative grip' to Anderson (2003).
2. Sources for all the quotations given in the list of 'concerns' in Section 1.1 are as follows:
   i. 'School's "Pillar" Brought Down by "Bunch of Bureaucrats"', *Times Educational Supplement*, 28 February 2003.
   ii. MacBeath et al. (2005: 31).
   iii. MacBeath, op. cit.
   iv. Original quotation given by P. Sikes: 'Teachers' Lives and Teaching Performance', in Gleeson and Husbands (2001) and further discussed in Cribb and Ball (2005: 122).
   v. 'They Could Learn a Thing or Two from Colleges', *Education Guardian*, 7 March 2006, 9.
   vi. 'Look Back in Anger', *Education Guardian*, 8 August 2006, 1.
   vii. 'Too Happy Being Number Two', *Education Guardian*, 21 March 2006, 3
   viii. *Education Guardian*, op. cit., 3; see also 'Where Are All the Head Teachers?', *The Guardian G2*, 13 March, 2006, 3.
   ix. 'Another Go at Duplication', *Education Guardian*, 21 February 2006, 9.
   x. Letter to the Editor, *The Guardian*, 22 February 2006, 31.
   xi. 'Primary Results Fall Well Short of Official Targets', *The Independent*, 8 August 2005, 9.
   xii. 'True Crime: Sats Are Killing Our Stories', *Education Guardian*, 8 November 2005, 5: children's authors express views on the present practice of 'cutting up' the text of stories for test purposes.
3. For more information on 'advanced liberalism', see collection of essays in Barry, Osborne, and Rose (1996).

4. On the 'narrowing' effects of present educational management practices, see Gleeson and Husbands (2003: 509); Thrupp and Willmott (2003: 123); Reay and Williams, cited in Fielding (2001c: 147).
5. For discussions about how the concept, *the good teacher*, is used in educational management policy, see Fitzclarence et al. (1995); Gewirtz (2002); Gleeson and Husbands (2001); Mahoney and Hextall (2000); Moore (2004); Shain and Gleeson (1999); Smyth and Shacklock (1998); Woods et al. (1997).
6. In my use of words here, I am drawing on the work of Govier (1993).
7. Thrupp and Willmott (2003), for example, identify at least two kinds of *apologism*—'subtle' and 'overt'.
8. The key features of neo-liberalism are given in the Introduction to the book, n. 24.
9. The period that existed between the post-war years, dating approximately from 1945 to the 1970s; see Grace (1995); Gewirtz (2002); Clarke, Gewirtz, and McLaughlin (2000); Clarke and Newman (2001).
10. See *The Local Government Finance Act* (1982); also Rhodes (1997: 48).
11. 'Taylorism' originates from the mid-nineteenth century and refers to the principles and practices of 'scientific management' propounded by Frederick W. Taylor (1856–1915), an American engineer. For a full account of the impact of Taylorism on education in the US, see Callahan (1964: 81–82).
12. Sometimes referred to as 'Strategic Human Resource Management'; see Thrupp and Willmott (2003), Ch. 7, who situate this aspect of managerial theory and practice in the context of 'school development planning' (SDP).
13. See Fielding (1996; 1999); Gunter (1997); Hatcher (2005); Smith (2002).
14. Barber, reported in Bottery and Wright (2000: 129).
15. Barber, cited in Fullan (2003: 6).
16. See National College for School Leadership (NCSL) (2002) Professional Qualification for Headship, development materials pack. *Development Stage Unit 1.1* (Nottingham: NCSL); see also Ofsted (2003) *Inspecting Schools: Framework for Inspecting Schools*.
17. Within the terms of his own pragmatism ('pragmaticism'), Peirce emphasizes the connection between ideas and practice and between belief and habits; see Scheffler (1974: 20). There needs to be an 'irritation', a breakdown in prior habits, before the process of critical inquiry can begin.
18. See 'Young Guns Ditch Old Values', *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 15 December 2006, 1, 12.
19. Burbules (2003: 170) explores this idea when he discusses Socrates' efforts (in Plato's *Meno*) to help the slave come to understand a geometrical truth.
20. So self-critique may give rise to self-doubt about the worth of one's concerns. But we are also trying to understand the special status which certain deeply held values have in defining the core of a person's individuality— namely, those values which provide for the possibility of acting in ways that generate a certain degree of *integration* within our volitional make-up; see Anderson (2003).
21. Deweyan inquiry stresses the 'transactional' and 'open-ended' nature of inquiry: inquiry 'institutes new environing conditions that occasion new problems'; see Schön, in Scott (2003).
22. For Peirce (1887: 68), Cartesian 'doubt' is a deliberate form of self-deception, not a real doubt. Taking a fallibilist-pragmatist epistemological stance, the aim is to replace real doubt by settled beliefs which may then eventually need to be revised; see Hookway (1985).

23. Peirce's own emphasis, in bold; see Ketner (1992: 178).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. See 'Of the Character of Virtue', vi.ii.2.15–2.18, in Raphael and MacFie (1976).
2. The key features of neo-liberalism are given in the Introduction to the book, n. 24.
3. Meyer and Rowan, cited in Hopwood and Miller (1994: 10); a 'rationally' managed organization is one which uses explicit goals against which performance may be measured, the measurement of which can be used in a future planning process which involves a cyclical system of audit, planning, prioritising, implementing and evaluating (Bush et al. 1999).
4. Fulton Report (1966–1968b: 98). The ethos of the Civil Service, it was widely thought at the time, was one of 'arrogance' and 'amateurism', something strongly denied by Lord Robbins (1971) in *Autobiography of an Economist* (London: St Martin's Press), 184.
5. Sir Derek Rayner's 'Scrutiny' programs; see Common (1995: 142); Metcalfe and Richards (1984).
6. Hood, cited in Laughlin (1996: 238).
7. Ibbs Report (1984: 108), cited in McSweeney (1996: 201).
8. 'Economic rationalization', as applied to managerially run public institutions replaces 'professional values and needs led policies' with 'rationalistic management, designed to achieve economy and efficiency' (Rhodes 1997: 92). Bottery (2004: 79–84) traces how both Weberian (bureaucratic means-end efficiency) and Taylorist ('scientific management') conceptions of 'rationalization', together with the demands of neo-liberal market economic rationalization (standardization to allow for comparisons between nation states to be made for international league tables) have combined to bring into being a universally applicable 'predominant mode of organization'.
9. White Paper, 'Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Civil Service', *Cmnd. 8616*, reported in Laughlin (op. cit).
10. Source: Mather (1991: 77).
11. See Lord Hunt of Tanworth, in Haseler et al. (1991: 96–97).
12. The term, 'elective affinities' derives from chemistry and describes the attraction between particular substances.
13. See Phillips and Furlong (2001) for further details relating to this period.
14. 'Efficiency to Deliver', DfES *Departmental Report* (HM *Government Departmental Report*) (2006: 95).
15. See Wallace (1992: 167): accountability can devolve 'onto a small management group or team, who may operate a technocratic, hierarchical system of control in the name of local management'. Ball (1994: 78) argues that 'self-management' should be seen as 'a mechanism for delivering reform rather than a vehicle for institutional initiative and innovation'.
16. *Next Steps*, 'Efficiency Unit', cited and discussed in Common (1995).
17. HMSO *Cmnd 3638*. Chairman, Lord Fulton.
18. *Performance Management for Teachers and Head Teachers: Guidance* (2006: 15), report by the Rewards and Incentives Group (Nottingham, UK: Department of Education and Skills [DfES] Publications).
19. See Clarke and Newman (1997: 86); Powell and DiMaggio (1991); Tsoukas (1994).
20. 'Six-Figure Salaries Fail to Tempt Teachers into Headships', *The Guardian*, 29 February 2010, 9.

21. 'Hospital Caused "Unimaginable Suffering"', *The Times*, 25 February 2010, 11; 'How Hundreds Died After Basic Care Was Ignored', *The Independent*, 25 February 2010, 4.
22. Habermas, cited in Thompson and Held (1982: 287); see also Fairclough (1991).
23. See also Williams (1988) for an overview.
24. See Goodwin (1987: 22).
25. This is the sense of ideology introduced by Destutt de Tracy in 1796.
26. Marx and Engels (1965 [1846]: 37).
27. See, for example, Morrison (1995); McCarney (2005).
28. Grace, discussed in Thrupp and Willmott (2003: 170ff).
29. Williams, cited in Bailey (1984: 211).
30. Scheffler, cited in McLaughlin (2000).
31. Putnam, criticizing 'cultural relativism', cited in Heyting (2004: 498).
32. 'Jobs for Managers Outpace Academics', *Financial Times*, 23 February 2010, 4; 'Number of NHS Managers Rises by 84 per cent', *The Independent* 26 March 2010, 27.
33. T. S. Eliot, *The Hollow Men*: "Between the idea/And the reality/Between the motion/And the act/Falls the shadow".

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. Polanyi claimed that a rationalist, impersonal, objective conception of knowledge cannot do justice to how we understand the concepts of discovery and inquiry, learning, and human knowledge. See Grene (1996) for Polanyi's views on 'objective' knowledge. Far from our knowledge being conceived as impersonal, his claim is that when we learn, or make a discovery there will be an implicit level of understanding involved. Acquiring knowledge is therefore in this sense highly personal—a *personal* knowledge (as described in his seminal book, *Personal Knowledge*). An important part of Polanyi's aim, Prosch (1986: 98), suggests, was to show the inadequacy of positivism as a universal epistemology.
2. An inspection regime, OFSTED, replaced the old HMI school inspection system. Quantitative forms of measurement as a means of assessing quality were introduced.
3. See Brighouse (2000: 31): 'Inefficiency is wasteful . . . waste is bad . . . it constitutes an opportunity cost.'
4. Nietzsche, cited in Desjarlais (1996: 893).
5. Report on the detrimental effects of managerial practices on university academic life, 'Public Agenda', *The Times*, 27 March 2007, 6.
6. This interpretation of educational accountability is completely at home with a 'cause and effect' view of teaching (Watkins 2005: 10–11: *if* the right (i.e., 'effective') strategies are put in place *then* improvement will take place. David Hargreaves, cited in Hammersley (2002: 17), urges educational researchers to adopt such an approach.
7. The work of Allyson Pollock, a leading critic of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) schemes is important here. She has shown how and why the costs of PFI projects tend to escalate dramatically from the initial 'outline business case' to the final figure and how the tax payer is tied into thirty year contracts: on this see David Craig (2006), *Plundering the Private Sector* (London: Constable), 141, who discusses PFIs and also provides a full account of the extent to which the management of the public sector in the UK has been 'handed over'

to private consultants, at an estimated cost of £70bn (£20bn for management consultants and £50bn for IT systems consultants).

8. For Bourdieu, as William Gay (1998: 138), explains, *the* predominant language in a society is inseparable from the distribution of power in society.
9. Report on the Hatfield crash, *Financial Times*, 25 July 2007, 3.
10. Two companies were responsible for passenger trains; Railtrack, answerable to the Regulator, ran the signaling and owned the line; the line was maintained and repaired by a firm of civil engineers, who had a contract with Railtrack; another engineering firm had a contract for track replacement.
11. The judge, summing up at the Hatfield rail crash trial, said the disaster was 'the worst case of sustained industrial negligence' he had seen in his thirty years' experience, *Evening Standard*, 7 October 2005, 1.
12. For the impact of a 'contractualist environment' on teaching practice, see Brown et al. (1996).
13. It was the setting of safety as an explicit and separate target that precipitated the insolvency of Railtrack; safety became an expensive 'bolt-on' to an already 'managerialized' practice, generating a regress of more targets to amend previously aimed for targets.
14. Stewart, cited in Ferlie et al. (1996: 200).
15. An important area of research of an empirical nature relates to *the validity of the principle of 'value-added' in public league tables* for assessing and rating pupils' and schools' achievement; see Goldstein (2001).
16. 'Democratic deficits' can arise in spite of greater levels of transparency of decision-making and enhanced patterns of direct accountability when the power of 'quasi-public' bodies, such as 'trusts', supplant what were once understood as traditional functions of local government. See Clarke and Newman (1997: 144–145).
17. An extensive literature has grown up in the field of cognitive psychology relating to the subject of implicit knowledge. See, for example, N. Ellis (Ed.) (1994) *Implicit and Explicit Learning of Languages* (London and New York: Academic Press); A. Reber (1993) *Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 16–23; See also Claxton (2000: 35–37); Eraut (1994: 15); Tomlinson (1999a, 1999b).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. The notion of 'accountability' or of 'being accountable' graduated in the 1600s, from the world of pure financial accountancy, where it would have the sense of: 'reckon, count, calculate', and 'to render an account of, to explain and to answer for' (Wagner 1989: 7); Boland and Schultze (1996) trace the etymology of the word, 'account': the idea of 'giving an account' encompasses two quite different elements—'narration' and 'computational'—derived from (i) 'story-telling' (Old French, *a conter*, meaning, *to tell a story*) and (ii) 'calculation' (late Latin, *accomputare*, meaning to *compute*); according to Hoskins (1996: 275), at some point in the development of the etymology of 'accountability', the notion of 'reckoning'—rendering an account—was extended from its use in the world of accountancy to include the idea of 'stewardship': 'an accounting for how you have . . . used the things with which you have been charged . . . goods, money or powers': In this way, *responsibilities* helps broker a link between responsibility and accountability: 'Accountability is the capacity and willingness to give explanations for conduct . . . how one has discharged one's responsibilities' (Boland and Schultze 1996: 62).

2. Becher and Eraut, cited in Kogan (1986: 27).
3. Halstead, cited in Preedy et al. (2003: 53).
4. Becher and Eraut, op. cit. (26–27).
5. Arendt discussed in Nixon (2004: 116).
6. *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* and *The New Oxford Dictionary of English*.
7. The term 'irresponsibility', not 'non-responsibility', is commonly taken as an antonym for 'responsibility', the latter being reserved for those who, for some reason, are incapacitated or are prevented from having the capacity for conduct which can be assessed for praise or blame, such as children or those who are confirmed as insane; see Gaden (1999).
8. *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*.
9. Williams (1993b: 53) suggests that although one can identify four 'basic elements of any conception of responsibility' which are 'cause, intention, state and response', 'there is not and never could be just one appropriate way of adjusting these elements to one another'.
10. Cp. Griffiths and Lucas (1996: 197): The 'more we limit discretion, the less we can look for in the way of actual achievement or new initiatives.'
11. Kornblith, cited in Foley (2001: 21).
12. The word 'taught' has been offered as translation for *beigebracht* (in the original German text), from the verb *beibringen*: to furnish, produce, impart, teach.
13. *The Republic* stipulates that to have 'real' knowledge of something (*episteme*) is to be able to 'give an account' of it: we only have a rational grasp on something when we can *articulate* it. The ancient Greek word for 'reason' (*logos*) has in its range of meanings, 'speech' and 'account'.
14. Such as DfES (2002) which specifies eighty-four standards.
15. Cp. Polanyi (1962: 56) who discusses how someone's 'skilful performance' may be 'paralysed' when a 'sense of context' is destroyed.
16. For more on *Bildung*, see Endnote (No. 9) for Chapter 5.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. In the UK, an inquiry held into why so many patients died at the Mid Staffordshire Hospital Trust and were routinely neglected, or left 'sobbing and humiliated', found that managers 'were preoccupied with government targets and cutting costs'. *The Times*, 25 February 2010, 11.
2. See Richardson (1997) who highlights the controversies surrounding the notion of practical inference.
3. This is just one of many references throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics* to 'the-that-for-the-sake-of-which'. David Wiggins (2006: 237–238) helps explain, *inter alia*, the relation that an agent's understanding of the 'that for the sake of which' has to that agent's implicit grasp of what is good or possible in a particular context: ' . . . within the sphere of the ethical and the practical, it is the capacity for appreciation of what matters in this or that situation *as given* which is the starting point for understanding the 'that for the sake of which' the practically wise person acts . . . It is an understanding of the *spirit* into which the agent is to act'.
4. Aristotle's notion of 'possible' needs to be situated in the context of his wider discussion about *the voluntary* and its relation to *responsibility* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book III, Chs. 1 and 5: see 'Introduction' in Schoeman (1987); and Lucas (1993: 274); see also *Eudemian Ethics* (EE) where there is discussion of what it is not to act 'under compulsion' (EE 1224b 8–14).

5. The notion of *arche/archai*—starting-point(s)—is used in more than one context and with more than one meaning:
    (i) In theoretical reasoning, *arche*, as it appears in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE), will be translated as rational principle (NE 1140b 32–35; 1141a 8; 1150a 5). In the case with which we are concerned, to do with practical reason, the *arche* is the origin ('originating cause') for action. It lies in the agent's grasp of *the-that-for-the-sake-of-which*, the end for which the agent is to act *here* (NE 1140b 16–20). It is difficult for the person who is 'ruined by pleasure or pain' (NE 1140b 17–19) to get the right sort of starting points (cp. NE 1095b 5–10). The passage at NE 1140b 16–20 prompts the thought that *arche* in Aristotle sometimes means the '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*' action is to be attempted *here*, that is, in a *specific* context, and sometimes it means the *general* source for the determinations in context of this, that or other '*that-for-the-sake-of-which*'.
    (ii) To get the right starting points 'there must be a gradual development of good habits of feelings' (Burnyeat 1980: 70), an education of the emotions (NE 1104b 12–13; 1105b 20–21; 1106b 20–22); see White (1984) who discusses how 'educating the emotions' is relevant to moral education.
    (iii) Some references for *arche/archai*—'starting-point(s)' to be found in the text of the *Nicomachean Ethics* are given below (although set out separately, close examination of the text will reveal how closely inter-related the various senses can be):
        (i) as imparted by habituation: NE 1095b 6–8;
        (ii) as seen by one in the role of philosopher: NE 1098 b 2–5;
        (iii) as an originating cause of action ('choice'): NE 1139a 33–34; 1140b 15–19;
        (iv) man himself as an agent of action: NE 1110a 15–17; NE 1113b 17–21; 1139 b 4–5; 1140b 19–20 (cp. EE 1224b 8–14; see also n. 4 above on *the voluntary*);
        (v) where originating cause and *telos* converge: NE 1140b 16.
6. Translation from Broadie and Rowe (2002). Ross (1931) has 'calculation and rule'.
7. On this distinction, see Eraut (1994: 53; and 1995); Schön (1983); Beckett (1996); Beckett and Hager (2002: 10).
8. The following definition, cited in Nordenbo (2002: 347), illustrates the relation between *formation* and *Bildung* and the way in which both these terms can stand for either a *process* or the *outcome* of that process: 'Like the Latin *forma* (*Gestalt*) and *formatio* (*Gestaltung*)—the English *form/formation,* the French *forme/formation—Bildung* refers to the actual *process of development* as well as its . . . *form*'. See also Lovibond (2002) whose account of the development of ethical formation involves a process towards a *state of being.*
9. The notion of *Bildung* I am drawing on here comes from the tradition where *Bildung* is an *on-going* process of formation of character and dispositions, and carries a far wider and more complex sense of 'educational process' than might have once been understood, at various times in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to refer to a person's cultural initiation into an education based around certain canonical texts—in the way we might think of someone's acquiring a *liberal education* and becoming *gebildet* through various forms of education and experience, both formal and informal (see Winch 2006a: 392).

See also Hardcastle (2007) on the complexity of the term, how it came to stand for powerful educational, pedagogical and ethical humanist ideals and carried with it the idea of something radically creative—a 'self-activated humanizing process'. For a general introduction to the notion of *Bildung*, see *Journal of Philosophy of Education* (2003), 36 (3); and *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (2003), 25 (2), two special issues devoted to the subject of *Bildung*.

10. *Pedagogic phronesis* 'harmonises' with, and arises out of, *phronesis* (McLaughlin 1999: 15), and becomes relevant whenever a teacher is faced with 'complex pedagogical challenges' or 'where abstract principles and guidelines require interpretation and implementation in practical contexts' (McLaughlin 2005: 56). See also McLaughlin (2000: 454; 2005: 322).
11. My MA dissertation, *Understanding Moral Understanding* (2000), London University, sought to understand both the starting points for social and ethical awareness in human understanding and the acquisition of moral concepts in early childhood.
12. Cp. EE 1223a 14–16; 1224b 13–14.
13. There is no exact translation of the Greek, *eudaimonia*. Sometimes *eudaimonia* is translated either as 'happiness/pleasure' or 'flourishing'. To avoid any confusion with utilitarian conceptions of happiness or pleasure, I prefer to use 'flourishing'. Key passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* can be found at 1095a 18–20; 1097a 39–1098a 20. I am using the *Nicomachean Ethics* as the main text for interpreting '*eudaimonia*'. But scholars' debates turn on (i) two possible conflicting conceptions of *eudaimonia* in the Aristotelian corpus: *theoria* (contemplation) in the *Eudemian Ethics* or *phronesis* (acting in accordance with virtue, practical wisdom) in the *Nicomachean Ethics*; (ii) the relation *eudaimonia* has to 'the good life' (1140a 25–30) and the 'ergon' (function) of man (1097b 22–1098a 20); (iii) what 'the good life' itself means: either 'the life of the good man' or 'the life good for man'. See essays by Thomas Nagel, John McDowell, David Wiggins and Kathleen Wilkes in Rorty (1980).
14. See R. Dunbar (1996) *Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language* (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press).
15. Report on the 'schools within a school' scheme for inner-city schools: *Education Guardian* 12 December 2006, 1.
16. Brooks (2007: 36): see Table 3.1.
17. Dewey, cited in Hager (2000: 292).
18. The literature which considers such questions is vast. For the kinds of *general* issues at stake and useful references, see Freidson (1994; 2001); Koehn (1994); Perkin (2002). For professional knowledge and action as the exercise of discretionary judgment and the question of teachers' professional knowledge, see Carr (1995; 2000), Dunne (1993); Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986); Eraut (1994); Hargreaves (2000), Kogan (1989); Luntley (2000); Pring (2004a); Schön (1983); Shain and Gleeson (1999); and Winch (2004). For a sociological perspective, see Young (2007).
19. See Holland (1997: 170–179), who discusses some 'extreme essentialist' positions which pay no attention to 'competing sites of the self'.
20. Skirbekk (1983: 118) explains how the notion of *praxeology* relates to *practice*: 'those features of day-to-day activities without which those activities could not retain their identity . . . [a] search . . . quite different from an empirical review . . . Our concern is with the basic structure of these activities . . . features seen as constitutive—as a *sine qua non*—of the activities in question'.
21. For some faults about the old administrative culture that were admitted at the time by one who thought that the culture could update its management without dismantling everything it had stood for, see *Note of Reservation* to

Chapter 1 of 'The Fulton Report' (discussed in Chapter 2); Sir Lionel Robbins, who once worked in the UK Civil Service before it was reformed in accordance with NPM practices, registers a 'strong protest' at the depiction of 'the most able and dedicated' administrators as 'amateurs', a description which succeeds only in achieving a 'slick headline and . . . cheap appeal': *Autobiography of an Economist* (Macmillan: St Martin's Press), 184.

22. For a rich discussion on the complexity and the 'varieties' of *phronesis* in the literature, see Noel (1999).
23. 'Strategic management is about how firms can create and sustain competitive advantage', Sako (2002: 91). See also Pfeffer and Sutton (2006: 137, 150).
24. See Beckett and Hager (2000: 173), who appear to gloss *phronesis* in this form of words.
25. See Pring (2001a: 281) who cashes out the scope of what 'others' will mean in educational contexts.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Attempts to draw clean lines between the so-called *phronesis–praxis* and *techne–poiesis* distinctions are controversial. Dunne (1997: 261) claims that in Aristotle's work we can find a notion of technical deliberation which bears some 'resemblances' to *phronesis*. See also Kristjánsson (2005) and Winch (2002).
2. In Aristotelian terms, human actions are intelligible in so far as they are capable of being directed by the agent at achieving some 'end' or goal, a *telos*. So understood, the role of a *telos* provides a motivational guide towards purposeful behavior. For MacIntyre (1990), the core values and standards of a craft/profession serve as 'the shared *telos*' of that profession/craft: what are 'produced as the best judgments or actions or objects . . . are judged so because they stand in some determinate relationship to that *telos* . . . ' (64).
3. In the etymology of '*métier*' there is a fusion of: *magisterium* (mastery) and *mysterium* (something into which one is initiated).
4. NE 1140a 32–34; see NE 1112b 27–28 for elucidation of 'possible': 'By 'possible' things I mean things that might be brought about by our own efforts . . . '
5. The phrase 'means to an end', as it occurs in Book III of *The Nicomachean Ethics*, has been the subject of much controversy among Aristotelian scholars. Commentary and translations of the passages I have cited are usually given in terms of 'means' and 'ends'. But some Aristotelian scholars think this invites misinterpretation of the Greek phrase, *ta pros to telos*, as a means-end 'technical' rationality. The misinterpretation rests on mistranslation, suggests David Wiggins (1980): the Greek preposition, *pros* ('towards'), covers both causal and constitutive or specificatory relations between the end in question and the steps taken towards it. The phrase 'means to an end', therefore, does not necessarily indicate only causality.
6. For references and commentary on 'starting points' (*archai*), see), Chapter 5, n. 5.
7. For this example, I acknowledge Knight (2007: 161), who refers to the role of a 'health care manager'.
8. Translation: Broadie and Rowe (2002: 180).
9. Translation: Dunne (1999: 54).
10. For a rich discussion of 'narrow' and 'broad' conceptions of morality, see Haydon (1999).
11. Translation: Ross (1931).

12. See Wiggins (1998: 220); and n. 5 of this chapter.
13. Translation: Ross (1931).
14. For further commentary on *Bildung*, see Chapter 5, n. 9.
15. On the term 'novice', see Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986).
16. Cp. NE 1103b 27–29: 'we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good . . . '.
17. The practical syllogism consists of a piece of reasoning with one premise, the first, called the 'major', relating to one of the agent's *general* concerns (i.e., the 'good' that is coming into question), and the second premise, the 'minor', concerning what looks feasible to the agent, i.e., what is possible). Then there is a practical conclusion, the act to be done. On the practical syllogism: see NE 1141b 16–22 for Aristotle's own example of how practical reasoning (about what sorts of meats are digestible) and *phronesis* are related. The classic place where examples of the practical syllogism are given is in *De Motu Animalium*, Chapter 7, 701a 12–14; see also Raz (1978) for a selection of essays on the nature of practical reasoning; and Carr (1981b: 646) who endorses the Aristotelian thesis that practical reasoning is concerned with inferences that lead to action rather than merely to 'the formation of intentions'.
18. A £45bn government, PFI project, initiated in the UK in 2005–2006, to rebuild and upgrade the entire secondary stock of school buildings.
19. The minor premise of a practical syllogism 'arises out of . . . one's perceptions, concerns, and appreciations', from what strikes one as being 'in the situation [the] most salient feature of the context in which [one] has to act' (Wiggins 1980: 234).
20. See Wiggins (1998: 226–228), for a rich discussion of the relation between *the good* and *the possible* with respect to *ends* chosen by the agent.
21. In the choice of words I have used here, I am drawing on Wiggins (1998: 233).
22. How close does Aristotle come to recognizing the implicit?

    There are many references which can be found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (e.g., 1104a 3–5; 1109 b 21–25; 1112b 3–10; 1137b 18–20, 29–32; 1143b 4–5, 11–14) which show the emphasis Aristotle places on that which cannot be made more explicit than the subject matter demands or where, in certain practical connections or contexts, there is no need for explicit articulation. We have clear evidence, too, of the emphasis which he places on the minor premise as the starting point for the practical syllogism (1143b 1–4), a premise which issues from the process of ethical formation, itself irreducible to explicit articulation. But it may be said he was not completely consistent.

    Consider this passage:

    > For the syllogisms which deal with acts to be done . . . involve a starting point (*arche*), viz. 'since the end, (i.e. what is best, is of such and such nature), whatever it may be (let it for the sake of the argument be what we please [whatever])'. But this is not evident except to the good man; for wickedness perverts us and causes us to be deceived about the starting points of action. Therefore it is evident that it is impossible to be practically wise without being good (1144a 18–1144a 36).

    Almost everything here is compatible and harmonizes with the account I have given of Aristotle's doctrine except one thing—namely the seeming attempt to imagine a practical syllogism with a *major premise* instead of a minor premise as its starting point, a major premise which appears to be expressive of the inclusive *that-for-the-sake-of-which*, that I argue is fixed by formation. Did Aristotle really think such a thing could be put

into words? He does not try to state a major premise of this sort or give an example here. If it seems in this particular text that he contemplates this, then, drawing on the work of Anscombe (1981) and of Wiggins (1980, 1998), already discussed in this chapter (Chapter 6), my case for the interpretation of the other passages from the *Nicomachean Ethics* which I have cited in this chapter rests on the fact that he is departing here from the model of practical wisdom he expounds at NE 1143b 1–3 and on the superior workability of the model that has the agent begin with the premise of the possible, the *minor premise*.

23. See Chapter 3, n. 19, for more on implicit knowledge.
24. See Chapter 5, n. 9, for more on *Bildung*.
25. Garrison (1999: 305): 'for Dewey, the valued end . . . *emerges* in the creative effort'.
26. *Making Good Progress: How Can We Help Every Pupil to Make Good Progress at School*? Department for Education and Skills (2006), 2, which refers to 'the framework of tests, targets and performance tables which have helped drive up standards . . . '.
27. See Kristjánsson (2005) for more on this.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. For more on the relation between *the good* and *the possible* in Aristotle, see Chapter 6, n. 20.
2. Gadamer, cited in Grundy (1989: 92).
3. There have been experiments which attempt 'knowledge elicitation' of implicit knowledge: see Chapter 3, n. 19.
4. The distinction we intuitively draw between (i) implicit and explicit knowledge does not come to terms fully with the complexity of either the distinction between (ii) articulate and inarticulate knowledge, or between (iii) non-propositional and propositional knowledge. Neat correspondences cannot to be found mainly because (ii) and (iii) are themselves subject to the same problem which (i) raises.
5. Tacit knowledge is to be understood in *relational* and not *substantial* terms, as being part of a triadic and dynamic relationship (A 'attends' from B to C) between two poles of knowledge, *focal and subsidiary*: we can be '*focally aware* of a stereo–image, by being *subsidiarily aware* of the two separate pictures' (Polanyi 1969b: 316). Our explicit awareness (our *focal* awareness) is always founded in and carried by the tacit acceptance of something not explicit (a *subsidiary* awareness). An inarticulate aspect to learning is grasping 'clues' which relies on 'the unspecifiable subsidiary elements' present in perception (Polanyi 1962: 88). Tacit knowledge is a *presupposition* for learning, a heuristic process, an activity of discovery, part of a 'tacit integration' (see Polanyi 1969a: 126, 128, 144), not a form of knowledge *per se*.
6. The often quoted Polanyian aphorism, 'we know more than we can tell', precedes the quotation just given. For more on Polanyi, see Chapter 3, n. 1.
7. For some finely drawn distinctions, see Eraut (1994: 15). See also Molander (1992: 15), who suggests, 'Instead of talking about the impossibility of description or articulation', it is generally better to talk about the 'inexhaustibility of reality'.
8. For references to McLaughlin's notion of 'pedagogic *phronesis*' see Chapter 5, n. 10.
9. See Luntley (2003: 171) for commentary on this passage.

10. The 'knower', according to Brandom, will have 'practical know-how' and on the strength of that know-how is able to situate 'responses' in a 'network of inferential relations', able to tell, for example, what follows from something being cold, 'what would be evidence for it, what would be incompatible with it, and so on' (2000: 162).
11. See, for example, J. Perraton and I. Tarrant (2007) 'What Does Tacit Knowledge Actually Explain?', *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 14 (3), 353–370; and Hager (2000: 286).
12. Cp. Oakeshott (1962) on the adverse effects of modern forms of 'rationalism'.
13. Carr (1989: 7–11) provides a comprehensive summary of Schön's work.
14. See Gilroy (1993); Eraut (1994); McLaughlin (1999).
15. Argyris cited in Beckett and Hager (2002: 184).
16. My argument here draws on Tauber (2005: 159, 162–163), whose object of critique is 'this era of managed [health] care'.
17. Two of the key ideas behind the 'action research' movement is that teachers can improve their own teaching practice and take an active role in contributing to educational research through reflection on their tacitly held 'theories' and values. See Stenhouse (1975, 2003); Carr and Kemmis (1986); Carr (1989); Elliott (1991); Winch and Foreman-Peck 2000).
18. The 'action research' movement (see previous note) has had to come to terms with a managerial and neo-liberal agenda (Papastephanou 2006: 192). Ironically, what is now referred to as 'action research' may in fact be 'indistinguishable from the positivistic, single-item cause-effect research' which the action research movement sought to replace (Adelman 1989: 177). The movement has become susceptible to 'domestication'—'a tool offered to teachers for the purpose of realising government policy intentions': Bridges, cited in Papastephanou (2006: 197).
19. 'Assessment Use in Learning and Teaching' (2000), *The National School Improvement Network Research Matters*, 12 (Autumn), 1 (Institute of Education, London University).
20. Is some research discredited because it does not suit the government's agenda? See *Times Higher Education Supplement*, 1 December 2006, 1, 6–7.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1. Hirst, cited in Glatter (2003: 46).
2. Cp. Ryle's earlier, seminal piece, 'Knowing How and Knowing That' (1971) in *Collected Papers, Vol. 2* (New York: Barnes and Nobles), 212–225.
3. In our present educational climate, it is hard to look at the word 'competence' in a fresh way— or in the way in which Ryle intended it here, which was that practical 'knowing-how-to' will always be more than the satisfaction of a *sum* of descriptions of demonstrably measurable, behavioral criteria (discrete, individuated 'competent' pieces of behavior). For the claim that 'competence' models are either located firmly within technically rational, managerial approaches or else grounded in behaviorist learning theories, see, for example, Hyland (1994, 1997, 2006); see Hodkinson and Issitt (1995) for a selection of essays on the subject; and Carr (1993) who distinguishes normative from technical senses of competence.
4. See Reynolds and Cuttance (1992). For discussion and critiques of the 'School Effectiveness' and 'School Improvement' movements, see Elliott and Doherty (2001: 213–219); Gewirtz (2000: 19–20); Pring (2000: 23); Standish (2000: 162–163); see Thrupp and Willmott (2003);White and Barber (1997).

5. Rosefeldt (2004) and Carr (1979, 1981), like Rumfitt (2003), do not see 'knowing how' in reductionist terms and are in large agreement with the main conclusion of Ryle's argument.
6. The National College for School Leadership (NCSL), where head teachers receive training to become 'leaders' issues a sixteen-page instruction manual which articulates a vision of leadership.
7. I am drawing here on one of several case studies relating to the subject of teachers' beliefs about classroom management and discipline: see Morine-Dermisher (1987: 398–399).
8. Adelman, cited in Grundy (1992).
9. There is much more to be said here about the social and political dimensions of what John White (1976) calls 'teacher accountability'. My focus here is primarily on the structure of thought and practical reasoning of a teacher who is responding to her pupils' educational needs and is taking into account what is best for their 'educational process' (see Bruner 1996).
10. The use of 'personal' here is not to be confused with the notion of *personalized learning*, an educational policy initiative for schools comprising five key teaching components, see HTTP://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/personalisedlearning/five/ (accessed 17 July 2007).
11. Nohl, cited in van Manen (2003: 427); see also Spiecker (1984) who discusses Nohl.
12. 'Teleological', as I use the word here, coheres with Dorothy Emmet's meaning of 'purposive behaviour'. Emmet (1972: 50) draws attention to the ambiguity of the word, 'teleology' owing to the fact that 'end' 'as a translation of *telos* and *teleios* covers both senses ambiguously.' One sense derives from the original Greek roots of the notion *teleios* ('completion'), as in 'the completion or end of a process, for instance where a plant or an animal is fully grown'. Another sense is where 'end' connotes the notion of a 'purpose', 'as something about which there can be deliberation (*boulesis*), or which is effected by conscious choice.' (*prohairesis*).
13. See Weber (1964: 115) for his own account of *zweckrational*.
14. Gellner, cited in MacKenzie (1991: 157).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

1. Cp. Aristotle, *Politics* (1332a 30–34): 'A city can be virtuous only when its citizens who . . . share in government are virtuous . . . '.
2. See Gambetta (1988a).
3. Cotter, cited in Preedy et al. (2003: 53).
4. Plant (2001) draws attention to the influence of thinkers who were concerned about the moral basis for government, such as Jowett, T. H. Green, Toynbee, and Tawney.
5. Reported in Lawn (1987: 67).
6. See also John White's account, discussed in Grace (1978: 98–99), of how teachers gained autonomy over the curriculum.
7. Hume, *Treatise*, III ii. 2 (1978 [1739]: 487); Hume [1751] (1962) *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, IX.1 (1962 [1751]: 271), Appendix II.
8. See O'Neill (1998); Orchard and Stretton (1994); Codd (1999); and Olsen et al. (2004), for the central assumptions of 'public choice' theory.
9. Le Grand (2003) refers to Hume's declaration that '. . . every man ought to be considered to be a *knave* . . .'. But see John O'Neill (1998: 172), who

claims most commentators ignore the context in which Hume made this comment and hence misinterpret him.

10. Peter Williams (2009: 15): *The Result of Intelligent Effort: Two Decades in the Quality Assurance of Higher Education* (Institute of Education publications, University of London).
11. Reported in 'Words of Wisdom', *The Guardian*, 15 April 2004, 15.
12. Osborne and Gaebler, cited in Samier (2003: 73).
13. A discussion paper from the prime minister's 'Strategy Unit', *Education Guardian*, 6 February 2007, 4.
14. Interim report of research undertaken by The Family Commission: *The Guardian*, 22 February 2010, 6.
15. See J. Sinclair (1978) *The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: Inferno* (New York: Oxford University Press), 414–418: 'those guilty . . . will be doomed for eternity to have their souls disabled and numbed by ice . . . a . . . more paralysing sin than all the forms of violence or of simple fraud, and it is its own penalty, in the numbing, hardening and disabling of the soul with cold . . . clamped in the ice'.
16. *A New Relationship with Schools: School Improvement Partners' Brief* (2005) (London, DfES/Ofsted).
17. Extract of Treasury 'consultation' paper, reported in *Times Educational Supplement*, February 13 2004, 8.
18. See the *Times Educational Supplement,* February 13 2004, 22: 'Will Ofsted shock us or trust us?
19. On '*high-stakes*' see Davis (2006) and Mansell (2007). Woods (2005: 37) asks whether 'having to succeed in terms of performance measures' causes stress among teachers. On *stress*, see J. Dunham & V. Varma (1998) (Eds) *Stress in Teachers—Past, Present and Future* (London: Whurr); for surveys and reports see: 'Suicidal Teachers Turn to Helpline', *Times Educational Supplement*, 2 February 2001; 'Stress Among Teachers is Everyone's Concern', *Guardian Education*, 20 June 2006, 6: report on 302,300 teachers in England in 2005 who took time off for stress-related 'occupational' ill health reasons (56% of the workforce). According to the National Association of Headteachers, large numbers of headteachers are volunteering to take early retirement (despite losing pension benefits) rather than continuing in stressful jobs.
20. From the teachers' perspective there was a legacy of *mistrust of government*—of the 'dismissive and dishonest . . . portrayal of schools and of the profession' and also of the 'sense of threat' to which the public accountability policies subjected them (McBeath et al. 2005: 40–41). But on the other side, there was the legacy of *mistrust of teachers*—the idea that teachers themselves had somehow betrayed public trust and needed to be made accountable.
21. See Hargreaves (1991, 1999); Fielding (1996, 1999); Hatcher (2005).
22. See also Luhmann (1979: 74) on the 'subjective processes' of trust.
23. 'Trust: The Smallest Word That Makes the Difference': report by Liz Hollis, in *UK's Best Workplaces*, produced by Great Place to Work Institute UK, Special Report, May 2010, 22.
24. There can be confusion between two sorts of distrust, whether directed at a person or a system: 'fundamental' and 'procedural', suggests White (1993: 76). The former will question the goodwill of the person, or the fundamental aim or end of a system. The latter, 'procedural distrust', is not directed at the person's good will, or the values which ground the system, but at the competence of the person, institution or system—not its broad aims, but its means or procedures.
25. See also Dasgupta, 'Trust as a Commodity', in Gambetta (1988b).

26. A 'principal' cannot, without cost, monitor the 'agent's' action and information (Arrow 1985; Pratt and Zaeckhauser 1985).
27. One question which arises in the literature on 'system' trust and bears on the argument of this chapter is how easily trust in *systems* translates into the trustworthiness of *persons*. From the literature we do not get an unequivocal answer. The complication is that impersonal or 'system' trust cannot be understood as a form of trust co-ordinate with what I have called a norm of trustworthiness. System trust is not to be thought of as trust at a 'higher' level than 'personal' trust (Luhmannn 1979; Giddens 1990; Shapiro 1987). System trust is usually taken to be a totally different kind of trust, its main feature being that it has a 'complexity-reducing' function (Lane 2002: 7, 15; Luhmann 1979).
28. Herbert Spencer, cited in Misztal (1996: 36).
29. Durkheim (1933); see Seligman (1997) for a discussion of this point.
30. Putnam (2000: 136, and 466, n. 6).
31. Cp. Polanyi's (1946) view of how scientific progress is made: when I say that I trust someone's evidence, a leap of epistemological faith is made; a fiduciary, tacit element is always involved when we accept the epistemic authority of others. See also Foley (2001) and Lehrer (1997) on the notion of 'self-trust'.
32. See Putnam (1990, 1992); Coleman (1990); Fukuyama (1995).
33. Schick, cited in Codd (1999: 49).
34. Ball, cited in Moore (2004: 77).
35. John Locke [1690] *Second Treatise of Government*, C.B. Macphearson (Ed.) (1980) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company), IX, 136; XIII, 149.
36. '*quis custodiet ipsos custodies*?'

NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION

1. With a 'real' market customers makes choices on the basis of whatever criteria occur to them. With a notional (or 'quasi') market someone else selects the criteria from which customers then choose.
2. The full report, *Exceeding Expectation: The Principles of Outstanding Leadership*, is available at: HTTP: <http://www.the workfoundation.com> (accessed 8 January 2010).
3. Cp. Dewey's characterization of democracy as 'a mode of associated living' (1916: 61).
4. 'Comment and Debate', *The Guardian*, 28 May 2010, 37.
5. Special Report, *The Observer*, 6 May 2007, 10–11: an 'estimated 100,000 'invisible' teenage dropouts'.
6. See Broadfoot (1996: 5) who discusses pupils' expectations of themselves.
7. *The Nuffield Review on The Education and Training of 14–19 year olds* seeks to address this problem; it can be accessed at: HTTP:<http://www.nuffield14-19review.org.uk>
8. See Olssen et al. (2004) for the changed relationship between democracy and education in a neo-liberal, global economy.
9. Professor Sir Al Aynsley-Green, *Education Guardian*, 20 March 2007, 8.
10. Ken Boston, QCA Chief Executive, *Education Guardian* (special report), 3 April 2007, 1.
11. Cohen, cited in Montefiore and Vines (1999: 7).
12. See also Prendergast (1999). I am grateful to Dr David Myatt, Dept. of Economics, Nuffield College, Oxford University, for discussions on the subject of *incentives*.

13. Cp. Luntley (2000) for an in-depth study of the idea of relating pay to measurable 'outputs'.
14. Nove, cited in Hammersely (2002: 106).
15. Although Stenhouse (1975) was highly critical of the 'behavioural objectives model of curriculum design' when applied across the whole curriculum, he did not discount the appropriateness of targeting certain learning objectives in 'training' contexts, where the *retention of information* is required for achieving certain educational ends.
16. I am drawing on Millgram (2008), Chapter 9, 'Specificationism'.
17. Goodhart's Law originates with C. Goodhart (1989) *Money, Information and Uncertainty* (Macmillan, London). 'Goodhart's Law, as originally defined by Goodhart, says Keith Hoskin (1999: 279–280), referred only to 'the money beloved of monetarists' and stated that, 'as soon as a particular instrument or asset is publicly defined as money in order to enable monetary control, it will cease to be used as money and be replaced by substitutes which will enable evasion of that control'.
18. 'Schools suffering under weight of 300,000 government edicts', *The Daily Telegraph*, 16 December 2009, 14.
19. If the Academy project for 'free schools' entails (as it has done in Sweden from which the idea of 'free schools' is modelled) that teachers have to concentrate on narrowly measurable outcomes to count as 'not failing' in national performance tables then it is unlikely that there will be any substantial changes made to present accountability, monitoring and inspection management structures.
20. Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons, BBC News, 16 June 2010: HTTP: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/health/10335408.stm> (accessed 17 June 2010)
21. Simon Jenkins, *The Guardian*, 10 March 2010, 31.
22. See MacIntyre and Dunne (2002); and Special Issue of the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* (2003), 37 (2).
23. T. S. Eliot, 'Little Giddens', *Four Quartets*.
24. One of the recommendations in the *Nuffield Review* on 'fourteen-to nineteen-year-olds' education and training is that national and local forums take place with teachers: reference given in note 7.
25. Macdonald, cited in Eisner (2005: 21–22).

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