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# The Enlightenment and Its Effects on Modern Society

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ISBN 978-1-4419-7386-3 e-ISBN 978-1-4419-7387-0  
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-7387-0  
Springer New York Dordrecht Heidelberg London

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Printed on acid-free paper

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# Chapter 1

## Liberty, Life, and Happiness for All: The Ideals and Legacies of the Enlightenment in Modern Societies Revisited

### Introduction

#### *Modern Democratic Society and the Enlightenment*

Most people in modern Western and other democratic societies take the latter's constitutive values and institutions as parametric, namely given or granted. This applies to such values and institutions as liberty, equality, justice, democracy, inclusion, human rights, dignity, well-being and happiness, humane life, civil liberties, scientific rationalism, technological and social progress and optimism, economic prosperity, free markets, secularism, pluralism and diversity, individualism, universalism, humanism, and the like. For instance, in modern democratic societies most people, with certain exceptions, consider social, including political, ideological, and increasingly cultural, pluralism or diversity as "a given" (Dombrowski 2001) and the necessary condition of individual and other freedom (Habermas 2001; Hirschman 1982; Van Dyke 1995). This also holds true for the concept and pursuit of individual happiness, well-being, and humane life in society (Artz 1998; Lane 2000) considered almost universally a given value or incontestable, inalienable human right of individuals solely for being humans (Cole 2005) within modern democratic societies. Overall, most people regard these and related foundational values and institutions of modern democratic society as if they were somehow preexisting, present, and unproblematic, simply always being "out there."

Like other Western societies, most Americans take as parameters or givens such things as liberty, equality, justice, democracy, human rights, civil liberties, inclusion, universalism, individualism, science and technology, the pursuit of happiness and well-being, humane life, social progress, economic prosperity and freedom, including free markets, and related constitutive values and institutions of their society. Yet, by contrast to other democratic societies, most Americans, as well as many US sociologists and economists, tend to redefine and appropriate these values and institutions as uniquely or native "American" rather than as common Western ideals. Alternatively, these supposedly unique American values and institutions are

typically distinguished from, and occasionally opposed to, their “non-American” or “foreign,” including Western and other European, variants. For most Americans and many US social scientists, these values and institutions, notably universal liberty, equality and justice, democracy, science and technology, progress, individualism, optimism, happiness, human life, economic prosperity, market freedom, and the like are as “American” as the “apple pie,” while their opposites being dismissed and disdained as “non-American” and “foreign,” including “European” a la the “old” and “decadent” Europe.

The current work argues and demonstrates that virtually all of these essential values and institutions of modern Western and other democratic societies, including America, can be considered primarily the ideals and legacies of the Enlightenment as their main foundation and point of origin. They are, first and foremost, the creation and heritage of the Enlightenment as a specific intellectual movement and victorious cultural revolution in Western Europe, with subsequent partial ramifications and resonances in America and beyond, especially during the eighteenth century. This book revolves around, develops, and substantiates the proposition that the Enlightenment is the primary foundation and point of origin of modern democratic societies and their fundamental values and institutions. In particular, it makes and confirms the “political incorrectness” or “indecent proposal” that the main American democratic values, ideals, and institutions substantially originate in and precisely derive from the European Enlightenment rather than being uniquely or exceptionally “American” to be invidiously distinguished from and opposed to those “non-American” or “foreign,” including Western “European.”

The aforesaid of the Enlightenment casts doubt on both taking modern democratic societies’, including America’s, constitutive values and institutions as granted, preexisting, or “pre-Enlightenment” (Cascardi 1999) *and* redefining them as uniquely “American” vs. “non-American,” including “European.” It thus reveals these views and beliefs as myths and collective deceptions or misrepresentations. The first is the general myth of “given” – for example, “Christian,” “pre-Enlightenment” – Western democratic values and institutions preceding the Enlightenment. The second is the special “American myth<sup>1</sup> of origins” (Dessí 2008) or religious-like creed of America’s exceptional, mostly pre-Enlightenment Puritan-rooted values and institutions independent of, different from, and even opposed to the “foreign,” European Enlightenment defining ethnocentric (Beck 2000) Americanism espoused by US hyperpatriotic conservative sociologists (Lipset 1996) and “libertarian” economists (Friedman 1982). At least this is what the current study intends to contend and demonstrate.

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<sup>1</sup> Dessí (2008:539) comments that “American myths of origins, for example, were built around the arrival of the [Puritan] Pilgrim Fathers,” as well as the American Revolution, the exploration of the West, and the Civil War.

## ***Modern Democratic Values and Institutions and the Enlightenment***

In a sociological sense, modern Western and other democratic societies are primarily the children of the Enlightenment as their true, though often unrecognized, parent, and only secondarily and in part, jointly of other “parents” such as the pre- and anti-Enlightenment. This holds true not solely, as usually assumed, of Western Europe, but also, though often overlooked, of America, specifically its Jeffersonian liberal, secular, egalitarian, inclusive, and democratic, as differentiated from its Puritan-rooted conservative, theocratic, nonegalitarian, exclusionary, and undemocratic, design and reality. The above contradicts US conservative economists’ and sociologists’ (Friedman 1982; Lipset 1996) claims to American exceptionalism *cum* superiority or triumphalism (Baudrillard 1999; Bell 2002) in relation to modern democratic Western European societies, thus to the Enlightenment as their historical point of origin and intellectual foundation.

In general, modern Western and other, including American, civilization, is, above all, the offspring and realization of the eighteenth century European Enlightenment and its liberal, democratic, secular, rationalistic, egalitarian, equitable, inclusive, pluralistic, universalistic, optimistic, progressive, and humanistic ideas and values, while just minimally or residually of pre-, anti- and non-Enlightenment forces. It is essentially an Enlightenment-based civilization (Berman 2000; Habermas 2001; Mokyr 2009; Smart 2000) as the social system and historic period of a market economy, democratic polity, free civil society, and rationalistic-humanistic culture, and only in the nonessential sense a pre-, anti- and non-Enlightenment “civilization.”

This is the main argument to be developed and substantiated in this work. Admittedly, it may sound self-evident and tautological or redundant in modern liberalism and its projection and system of liberal-secular democracy and society continuing and appreciating the Enlightenment’s ideals and legacies. Still, in contemporary societies, especially “exceptional” *cum* superior America, not “every schoolboy knows” (Bateson 1979) that modern Western democratic civilization is fundamentally an Enlightenment-based one in that its foundational values and institutions of universal liberty, equality, justice, happiness, human life, progress, and the like primarily derive from and are inspired by this cultural revolution in eighteenth century Europe.

Furthermore, most “schoolboys” and scholars, including sociologists and economists a la Talcott Parsons and Milton Friedman, in America “know” or are taught and teach the opposite absolute “truth” in accordance with American triumphant and narcissistic exceptionalism (Bell 2002; Holton 1987; King 1999; Turner 2002) relative to other Western and all societies; that America’s constitutive values and institutions are uniquely, exceptionally, and exclusively “American,” with other Western and all societies needing a sort of permission to apply them from the US “inventor” holding their sole “property right” and, as bellicose conservatism contends since Puritanism (Gould 1996; Munch 2001; Tiryakian 2002), divinely

ordained with “manifest destiny” to save *cum* destroy the “evil” world not sharing these “all-American” ideals and institutional arrangements. Alternatively, these values and institutions are considered implicitly or explicitly independent, different, and even opposed vis-à-vis the liberal-secular Enlightenment as “European” and “foreign” (Bloom 1988; Bremer 1995; Dunn and Woodard 1996; Friedman 1982; Lipset and Marks 2000), thus “un-American,” in spite or perhaps because of Jefferson et al. being exposed first-hand to and inspired by its ideals (Archer 2001; Byrne 1997; Patell 2001; Phelps 2007).

The above self-evident argument is therefore justified or necessitated by this seemingly “blissful ignorance” (Wacquant 2002) and in that sense “darkness,” compounded with denial or forgetting, regarding the relationship of American and generally Western constitutive values and institutions to the Enlightenment, in America and to a lesser extent other modern societies. After all, the original definition and activity of the Enlightenment was, as Descartes, Voltaire, Diderot, Kant, Hume, Condorcet, and others emphasized, overcoming ignorance and intellectual immaturity, including religious and other superstition and prejudice, and thus spiritual darkness, through the light of reason, methodical doubt, and knowledge (Kant’s “dare to think” and know). Generally, as Keynes (1972) suggests, a “study of the history of opinion is a necessary preliminary to the emancipation of the mind” and in extension of human life and society.

In sum, the “double jeopardy” of ignorance-darkness and denial-forgetting in this respect provides the rationale and even necessity for the argument and portrayal of modern Western as primarily Enlightenment civilization. The latter also includes America in its Jeffersonian liberal-democratic ideal and proxy-reality. No doubt, this is an axiom or paradigm in one context, such as modern liberalism in the Enlightenment tradition or Western liberal democracies. Yet, it is an exact opposite in other settings, a contested “rediscovery,” as in America extolled as an “exceptional [superior] nation” by Parsons et al., and a rejected proposition or proxy heresy in conservatism, fascism, religious fundamentalism, theocracy, and other forms of the anti- and pre-Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment and its sociological child, liberal, secular, democratic, rationalistic, optimistic, and progressive, including capitalist, modernity (Bauman 2001; Beck 2000; Habermas 2001), forms a revolutionary break and thus essential discontinuity from, rather than an evolutionary outcome of and so, continuity with previous Western and other civilizations and history (Giddens 1984; also, Angel 1994; Mokyr 2009). The Enlightenment’s revolutionary discontinuity relative to previous societies and times holds true as a general pattern, with a few secondary variations. Among these, the main variation is what Simmel and Parsons call the artistic and humanistic Renaissance as a prelude to or precursor of the liberal, secular, democratic, and rationalistic Enlightenment, through its revival of classical “pagan” vs. medieval “Christian” civilization, notably art and culture.

Yet, the proto- or proxy-Enlightenment Renaissance was, as Pareto registers, halted “too soon” in Northern Europe, as well as probably prevented from ever “coming to America.” The Renaissance was countered, in his account, precisely by the explicitly antiartistic and implicitly antihumanistic Protestant Reformation,

particularly Calvinism's theocratic "disciplinary" revolutions (Gorski 2003; Loveman 2005) and, in Weber's words, its "extreme inhumanity" or harshness (Fourcade and Healy 2007), including its Anglo-Saxon derivative, Puritanism in the case of America (Parsons<sup>2</sup> 1967a). In this respect, the Reformation, especially the Calvinist Revolution, functioned as a type of pre-Enlightenment initially and of counter- and non-Enlightenment subsequently, just as did religious conservatism or orthodoxy overall (Habermas 2001; Nisbet 1966). Thus, within Protestantism, the tendency toward countering the liberal-secular Enlightenment was particularly evidenced by Calvinism (Bremer 1995; Sorkin 2005) and its Puritan (Munch 1981) or evangelical sects, including, as Mill and Weber suggest, Methodism (Byrne 1997) and especially American Baptism (Hinson 1997), both, alongside Presbyterianism, dominating and converting the old US South into the anti-Enlightenment "Bible Belt" following the Calvinist Great Awakenings (Boles 1999; German 1995).

Specifically, the Enlightenment exhibits a revolution and thus a profound discontinuity in relation to the medieval social system such as the feudal *ancien regime* and "Christian" civilization in Western Europe and beyond. It is no wonder that its exponents designed and designated this period as the Age of Enlightenment or Reason in deliberate opposition to and projected supersession of the Dark Middle Ages of unreason, ignorance, and what Kant called perpetual spiritual "immaturity," including religious superstition, fanaticism, prejudice and wars, and theocratic control and oppression. They defined the Dark Middle Ages to incorporate both the feudal *ancien regime* as societal despotism and "Christian" civilization as religiously grounded and dominated (pre-) civil society and culture reduced into the "servant" of, thus subordinating and sacrificing humans to, theology, religion, and church, simply as theocracy *cum* "godly society."

Consequently, liberty, equality, justice, universal inclusion, democracy, rational science and technology, societal progress and optimism, economic prosperity and freedom, individual dignity, well being, happiness, humane life, and related foundational elements of modern democratic societies, including America, express the Enlightenment's revolutionary discontinuity or radical break with the pre-Enlightenment, notably medievalism with its feudalism and "Christian" civilization. These Enlightenment values and institutions are hence revolutionary, novel, discontinuous, and even deviant or aberrant within Western "Christian" and other religiously based society and civilization during its *long durée* (Braudel 1979) in terms of centuries and millennia, from the fourth through eighteenth century AD.

Specifically, such values and institutions are new and anomalous, if abstracting from some short-term, mostly secondary deviations from and previous opposites to a medieval "Christian" social order and *Civitas Dei* (godly society) in general within this timeframe. Of course, the most salient contemporaneous deviation in this respect was the fifteenth century artistic and humanistic Renaissance. In this context, the latter was a sort of embryo-Enlightenment reviving classical "pagan"

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<sup>2</sup>Parsons (1967a:57) implies this in stating that "their negative valuation of ritual is one of the few points on which the Puritans and the men of the humanistic Renaissance could agree."

culture and civilization, rather than its medieval “Christian” phase “deconstructed” as a regression into antiartistic primitivism and antihumanism, instead attempted to revitalize or “purify” by the Protestant Reformation (Eisenstadt 1965), notably Calvinist disciplinary counter-revolutions (Gorski 2003) in Europe and their Puritan theocratic revolts in England (and Scotland) and America (Juergensmeyer 1994; Stivers 1994). Yet, the Renaissance was reversed, if Pareto is correct, and to that extent represented a short-lived and relatively secondary deviation from the medieval *Civitas Dei* in most of Protestant Europe, especially England and America, where it essentially never “came,” as Weber implies detecting a sort of artistic emptiness, devastation, and regression owing to Calvinist Puritanism, as the paradigmatic instance of, as Hume classically documented, antiartistic and anti-humanistic antagonism as well as antiseccular radicalism (Juergensmeyer 1994) in these two countries. Prior antipodes and thus defined enemies of the medieval “godly” social order hence involved classical Greek democracy, art, science, and culture, as well as the Roman republic and law, etc., as extant Enlightenment and liberal analogs or proxies and precursors (Garrard 2003; Manent 1998), yet condemned and almost destroyed as “pagan” by their “Christian” successor.

Alternatively, most Enlightenment values and institutions were *not* and are *not* normal, natural, and continuous in the genesis, historical evolution, and present reality of Western and other modern democratic societies, while keeping in mind such pre-Enlightenment deviations as the Renaissance and classical civilization. Hence, they could not and cannot be taken as granted and givens as though preexisting and always “out there,” as pre-Enlightenment medieval, as distinct from antique, values and institutions, notably within “Christian” civilization officially commenced with establishing what Pareto calls the Roman theocracy and the legalization of Christianity in the fourth century AD (Sorokin 1970). Given their revolutionary and recent origin within the *long durée* of thirteenth to eighteenth centuries, these values and institutions are not, as taking them as givens implies, invariably irreversible or “to stay forever” and unchallenged in Western and other democratic societies, including America, let alone in undemocratic and non-Western settings, especially Islamic and other theocratic countries.

The possibility of a reversal of and challenge to Enlightenment values and institutions is indicated by antiliberal, antiseccular, antiegalitarian, antidemocratic, anti-rationalistic, and related adverse reactions or counter-revolutions in Western and other modern societies, including America. These antagonisms span from medieval-rooted conservatism to its “monster-child” or subtype fascism to communism and to neoconservatism and its own offspring or ally neofascism and its religious subtype revived fundamentalism such as Islamic radicalism throughout the world and “Christian” evangelicalism in America and to a lesser extent Europe. All antiliberal and antidemocratic counter-revolutions, with the partial and debatable exception of communism mostly on the account of its secularism, especially conservative medieval-inspired revolts, fundamentalist theocratic revivals, and fascist totalitarian subversions, have basically functioned and still function as a sort of counter-Enlightenment. They do either in their specific opposition to and attack on the Enlightenment as the identifiable target *or* by opposing and attacking modern liberal-democratic, secular,

egalitarian, rationalistic, and pluralist society (Munch 2001) as its enduring ideal, creation, and legacy within Western civilization and even beyond, as indicated by the global trends to liberalization and democratization, secularization, rationalization, and diversity during the early 2000s (Inglehart 2004).

In summary, the constitutive values and institutions of modern democratic societies, including America in its Jeffersonian project and reality, in virtue of being primarily rooted in the eighteenth century Enlightenment, are genuinely – even if not totally – innovative and thus “new under the sun” of Western, specifically “Christian” and related religiously based civilization during its long-term evolution since the fourth century and the institutionalizing of Christianity and the establishing of the Roman theocracy. This essential innovation contradicts various counter-Enlightenment, including medievalist, conservative, fascist, neoconservative, neo-fascist, fundamentalist, neo-Marxist, postmodernist, feminist, and other adversaries and critics and their “nothing under the sun” hostile or skeptical allegations and implications about Enlightenment ideals, achievements, and legacies.

## The Process and Outcome of the Enlightenment

### *Destruction of Old, Creation of New, Social Values, and Institutions*

In sociological terms, the Enlightenment is what Durkheim would call a total social fact of revolutionary change. It is through intellectual or cultural tools – for example, ideas and books such as the *Encyclopedia* in France – as distinct from political means against the old domestic or colonial order subsequently used by, in Pareto’s<sup>3</sup> word, the Enlightenment’s “daughters,” the French and in part American Revolution. In a way, the Enlightenment operates as the composite process of intellectual destruction and delegitimization (“deconstruction”) of the values and institutions of the *ancien regime* as a total social system and of creation or projection of those of a new society. The inner logic, essential process, and ultimate outcome of the Enlightenment are the destruction of old oppressive, theocratic, irrational, and inhumane social values and institutions, and the creation of new democratic, secular, rational, and humane ones through human reason or, as Kant put it, “dare to think.” In this sense, the Enlightenment constitutes what Schumpeter may call complete “creative destruction” or generalized “Copernican revolution” in society. It does so in at least four domains and respects such as culture, civil society, polity, and economy, as specified below.

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<sup>3</sup>Pareto remarks that “it has been said that the Revolution was the daughter of Voltaire and of the Encyclopedists. This is true only to a small extent insofar as humanitarian skepticism had weakened the upper classes.”



First, the Enlightenment originates and operates as the intellectual, cultural challenge to and eventually the act of destruction of medievalist theocratic culture in which all cultural forms and subjects were literally reduced to the servants of theology, religion, and church, thus subordinated and eventually sacrificed (heretics, libertines, etc.) to theocracy. Alternatively, it arises and functions as the creation or reinvention of a new secular or nonreligious, rationalistic, and what Weber calls sensuous, emotional type of human culture and civilization, including art. In artistic terms, the Enlightenment continues and expands the Renaissance that was, if Pareto is correct, “halted too soon” by the Protestant Reformation, notably antiartistic strict Calvinism in Europe and its evermore extreme offspring in antagonism toward art and humanism, Puritanism in England and America.

In cultural terms, the Enlightenment is the process of creative destruction with respect to medieval “godly” theocratic culture, including art, philosophy, “Christian science” exemplified by geocentric astronomy and biological creationism, and education, and alternatively, in relation to its modern secular, though not necessarily antireligious, alternatives. In short, it transcends and substitutes the first, and projects and creates the second type of culture, including art and science. Symbolically, the Enlightenment conjoins the destruction of the Inquisition as the exemplar and symbol of medieval pre-Enlightenment culture and society with the creation of noninquisitorial, nonviolent resolution of scientific and other intellectual, political conflict and dissent, including religious heresy, blasphemy, or heterodoxy.

Counterfactually, if the Enlightenment, including its precursors like the Renaissance, had not happened, or had failed, the Inquisition would have likely still operated either in its original Catholic original or its derivative, as Weber and Tawney suggest, Protestant, especially Calvinist-Puritan, substitutes. Consequently, without the Enlightenment, geocentric “the sun revolves around the [flat] earth” astronomy and biological creationism would likely have been still coercively imposed, dissent from them punished with death as heresy, and believed by most people, as is in part the first and notably the second and its “intelligent design” variations, plus the belief in supernatural miracles and “Satan” (Glaeser 2004), including “witches,” in contemporary America. At least in this respect, the Enlightenment forms the true revolutionary and innovating, thus novel, process of enlightening and liberation from the Dark Middle Ages, the genuine light and liberty cast on and superseding the literal darkness, misery, and death of antiscience irrationalism, including superstition, ignorance, or prejudice, and of theocratic oppression in medieval culture.

Second, the Enlightenment develops as the process of creative destruction with respect to what its representatives (Kant, Hume, Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu, Condorcet) as well as critics (Hegel, etc.) and predecessors (Hobbes) designated or implied as civil society in the sense of the sphere of individual freedom and agency, including privacy, thus the free private life-world (Habermas 2001). Specifically, the Enlightenment arises and acts as a sort of intellectual destroyer or challenger of medieval “uncivil” (McCann 2000) or precivil society in the sense of a nonexistent civil society in medievalism and the pre- and counter-Enlightenment generally such as traditionalism and conservatism, respectively. Alternatively, it does as the intellectual creator or projector of modern

civil society through its advocacy and promotion of individual dignity and liberty, privacy, and human and civic rights. These were categories virtually nonexistent, unknown, or, after their embryos in ancient Greek democracy and the Roman republic, “burned and buried” in medieval society and pre-Enlightenment traditionalism, and are attacked and eliminated or subverted by the counter-Enlightenment such as conservatism, fascism, neoconservatism, and neofascism.

In this sense, the Enlightenment operates as the Schumpeterian destruction of medieval non- or precivil “godly” society of theocratic oppression, humiliation, and death for “higher” divine powers, and the creation of modern secular, but not invariably or openly antireligious, civil society of individual liberty, privacy, human well-being, happiness, dignity, rights, and life. Symbolically, the Enlightenment performs the act of destruction of the medieval, especially, as Weber implies, the Protestant, vision and reformation of society as a super-monastery of sadistic-masochistic saints (Adorno 2001; Fromm 1941; McLaughlin 1996) vs. sinners (also, Gorski 1993), in which humans are forced, as by Calvinism, especially Puritanism, to become life-long monks or ascetics and priests (Munch 1981), thus a sort of overarching and permanent open prison populated with humans as prisoners for life. In turn, it engages in the process of (re)creation of a nonmonastic or nonascetic, nontheocratic, and generally noncoercive private sphere, thus the modern autonomous, secular, or normal life-world defining true civil society. Furthermore, the Enlightenment movement formed a (micro) civil society on its own right created and functioning through free exchange of ideas in Paris’ salons frequented by most of its representatives as admittedly “freethinkers”<sup>4</sup> (Byrne 1997), including Voltaire, Hume visiting from Scotland, and Jefferson and Franklin residing in the city, but avoided or despised by its enemies or skeptics like Calvinist Rousseau (Garrard 2003).

Counterfactually, in the absence or failure of the Enlightenment, non- or precivil theocratic society after the model or image of an ascetic and coercive monastery and permanent open prison would have probably persisted in Western and other societies. It would especially, in Calvinist Europe like Geneva, Holland, Scotland, and in part Prussia (Gorski 2003), and Puritan-dominated England transiently (and Scotland continuously) and America enduringly (Munch 2001). In Mises’ (1950) words, this theocratic order would have petrified in the form or image of the “peace of the cemetery” without the Enlightenment. In turn, modern civil society would have hardly ever been established or retrieved from Hobbes’ secular or Aristotle’s previous similar vision in the absence or failure of the Enlightenment. At least in this respect, the Enlightenment is the true revolutionary process or project of innovation,

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<sup>4</sup>Byrne (1997:31) adds that “what the militant freethinkers of the Enlightenment provided was the intellectual weaponry which opened up the possibility of widespread disbelief,” though one wonders what is “militant” about such and other free thinking distinguished, as Jefferson suggested, from action, unless one assumes the stance of the religious pre- and counter-Enlightenment for which any different thought or dissent is a “militant” heresy or blasphemy subjected to punishment with death, as by the Catholic Inquisition and New England’s Puritan theocracy, thus a standpoint from the Dark Middle Ages.

liberation, humanizing, openness, and escape from the oppressive, dehumanizing, including cruel and sadistic-masochistic, closed, and exclusionary Dark Middle Ages, in their early Catholic and late Protestant “Christian” renditions alike.

The Enlightenment is the probably first – after ancient democracy and civilization (Manent 1998) and its attempted rebirth by the Renaissance – genuine liberal-democratic endeavor and optimistic hope for escaping and transcending the darkness, superstition, misery, despair, oppression, and death of pre- and anti-Enlightenment societies and times, such as the feudal *ancien regime* and conservative-fascist social systems, respectively. In particular, within Great Britain and especially America the Enlightenment promises an escape from and overcoming what Tawney (1962) calls, referring to late-medieval Puritanism, the theocratic “hell in this world” construed, through Weber’s and (before Hume’s) detected Puritan “pure hypocrisy” (also, Bremer 1995), as “paradise lost and found” and “God’s Kingdom on Earth” (Munch 2001) a la Winthrop’s (and Reagan’s) “shining city upon a hill.” The Enlightenment is the prime force that exposes and transcends Puritan and any theocratic “paradise” as a tyrannical dystopia extolled and coercively enacted, as via the death penalty and mass imprisonment for sins-crimes, by US religious conservatives as the high, only road to “heaven” (Lemert 1999), specifically the Calvinist salvation of a few “elect” saints through the “delirium of total annihilation” (Adorno 2001) of most humans and the corrupt world as “evil,” “ungodly” forces a la Armageddon (Juergensmeyer 2003).

A third related dimension of the Enlightenment’s process of intellectual destruction of the *ancien regime* as a total social system and of creation of a new society involves its political subsystem. The Enlightenment acts as the prime agent of intellectual and, through its “daughters” or “heirs” the French and American Revolutions, political overcoming of medieval and generally pre- and counter-Enlightenment, namely traditional and conservative illiberal and repressive “godly” (Zaret 1989) politics. Alternatively, it does as the force of intellectual and, through these revolutions, political creation, involving the projection, construction, and promotion, of modern liberal-secular democracy and society. In sum, the Enlightenment intellectually and eventually politically exposes and transcends medieval and any theocracy as “holy” tyranny, and creates or projects modern liberal-secular democracy as the system of political liberties and rights.

Hence, the Enlightenment originates and functions as the Schumpeterian movement of intellectual destruction of the old theocratic sociopolitical order and of creation of a new secular, but not necessarily or explicitly antireligious, democratic social-political system. Symbolically, it is the act of safe demolition of the medieval and other pre-Enlightenment tyrannical and self-collapsing, as through religious conflicts and wars (Angel 1994; Dombrowski 2001), political construction as the church-state enforcing “godly” politics and ruled by “divinely ordained” agents, including, as Puritan masters claimed, “God’s [anti] vice regent [s]” (Zaret 1989), with “divine rights” to rule, punish, and kill other humans for their vices, sins, and pleasures as grave crimes. The Enlightenment and its product liberalism intellectually demolishes or delegitimizes and transcends the Vatican Church (Burns 1990) or Catholic theocracies and what Weber calls Calvinist “state churches” in Europe and America, including the Puritan “theocracy of New England” spanning from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century (Munch 2001).

Alternatively, the Enlightenment is the process of symbolic construction of a new type of political building in which sacred and secular powers are no longer merged, a merger reportedly never doing much “good” to virtually any society in history and existence (Dahrendorf 1979), from Pareto’s “Roman Theocracy” to Weber’s “Calvinistic state churches” in Europe and their Puritan version in the “theocracy of New England” (and briefly England) to its presumed evangelical heir the Southern “Bible Belt” and to Iran’s “Islamic Republic” and Taliban-ruled regions. Instead, the Enlightenment formally separates sacred and secular powers and realms through what Jefferson called the “wall of eternal separation of church and state” (Dayton 1999), and substantively differentiates religion and politics in general. The latter process is an aspect of social differentiation and rationalization, notably continuing and even reinforcing secularization in modern democratic societies (Gorski and Altinordu 2008; Inglehart 2004), including in part “godly” America (Crabtree and Pelham 2009; Hout and Fischer 2002), contrary to conservative or rational choice antiseularization detractors.

Counterfactually, if the Enlightenment did not develop or succeed in its operation and legacy, medieval theocracy *cum* “godly” politics and society would have likely, with expedient Vatican- and Puritan-style adjustments, remained a prevalent type of political system in modern Western and other societies, including America under colonial and postrevolutionary Puritanism and its recurrent revival via “reborn” fundamentalism through the twenty-first century. Conversely, in this scenario a free, open, inclusive, or liberal-democratic secular sociopolitical system would have hardly ever been established and even conceived in these societies in the absence or failure of the Enlightenment as the foremost project of political liberty and democracy. Simply, there was *no* such thing as democracy, especially its liberal-secular, inclusive, and pluralist version, in the medieval order and the pre-Enlightenment overall, excepting in part ancient Greece and Rome. In turn, this democratic form is eliminated or perverted in the counter-Enlightenment like medieval-rooted authoritarian conservatism and its own metastasis totalitarian fascism, including Nazism, just as its religious subtype, theocratic fundamentalism such as revived Islamic radicalism and American “Christian” (mostly Protestant) “born again” evangelicalism.

Hence, it is a set of irrational expectations, entertained by the obverse of “rational fools” (Sen 1977), to expect that pre-Enlightenment traditionalism would miraculously establish, and counter- and post-Enlightenment conservatism does and will sustain and promote, liberal-secular and pluralist democracy, thus a truly democratic polity as the admittedly political creation and project of the Enlightenment (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). In this respect, the latter functions as the true revolutionary and novel<sup>5</sup> (Artz 1998) process and project of democratization via political

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<sup>5</sup>Artz (1998:35) comments that the Enlightenment’s ideals “at first glance” look like an “uncoordinated collection of high-minded Liberal sentiments, almost platitudes today. Yet the common ideas of one age were once the novel discoveries of an earlier generation.” In his view, the Enlightenment’s ideas were far from being “platitudinous in their time [but] have come to seem so, paradoxically because of their key power to make converts” (Artz 1998:35).

liberalization, thus genuine liberation from what Popper (1973) calls medieval despotic authoritarianism, notably from theocracy as “godly” tyranny. In sum, the Enlightenment is the process of creative destruction by intellectually destroying or superseding the old despotic and closed order, including medieval theocracy, and creating or designing a new political structure as liberal-secular and inclusive democracy.

Fourth, the Enlightenment functions as the process of creative destruction with respect to the economy itself, including capitalism – to which Schumpeter originally applied the concept vs. precapitalism like feudalism. It does as the prime agent of intellectual and, through the French and American Revolutions, political destruction or overcoming of what Weber calls economic traditionalism, and of creation or vision of a modern economy, including the theory and system of free markets and competition (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Mokyr 2009; Phelps 2007; Hirschman 1977).

Specifically, the Enlightenment intellectually destroys or discredits feudalism as the economic structure of the *ancien regime* as a total social system. In turn, it creates or envisions modern capitalism as a coherent theoretical concept. It does directly by its philosophers such as Hume and Ferguson, and its protosociologists like Condorcet, Montesquieu, and Saint Simon, or indirectly through classical political economy as the product or part, including Adam Smith who was the actual member of the Enlightenment<sup>6</sup> (Berry 1997; Tribe 1999), as had been his predecessors, French *Physiocratic* economists (Quesnay, Turgot). For instance, Keynes (1972) explicitly traces the first theoretical formulation of the *laissez-faire* doctrine of early modern capitalism to the “political philosophers of the day” of the Enlightenment, specifically those in France, rather than to British classical political economists proper like Smith, though the latter himself was a self-described member of Hume’s led Scottish Enlightenment. Also, some contemporary economists attribute the associated invisible-hand doctrine to the Enlightenment, especially Montesquieu’s and other noneconomic, political “arguments for capitalism before its triumph” (Hirschman 1977, 1982).

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<sup>6</sup>This does not necessarily contradict, or is just neutral to, Weber’s thesis of an “elective affinity” or “intimate connection” between Calvinism and the “spirit and structure” of modern capitalism. The Enlightenment was the first or most developed articulation, via classical political economy, of the theory of a free-market, capitalist economy in contrast to ascetic Protestantism as, assuming that Weber is right, its putative religious source and sanctification in practice. Simply, the Enlightenment philosophically and sociologically conceptualized or envisioned, while, if Weber is correct, Calvinism practiced via its “inner-worldly asceticism” or sanctified by its “harsh” dogma of predestination, but did not theorize about, in the scientific sense of economics and sociology, a free market economy or capitalism. Thus, a remarkably sociologically-minded leading economist, Akerlof (2007:15) comments that “Weber describes Calvinists as aspiring to be ‘worldly ascetics’” through saving favored to consumption, simply protocapitalist entrepreneurs, but not capitalist “theorists.” Similarly, Fourcade and Healy (2007:296) comment that Weber “was careful to show that the rational search for profit he observed among the protocapitalist Calvinists did not follow logically from their religious worldview” and thus their ideological or theoretical conception but “rather, their actions made psychological sense as a way to relieve the salvational anxiety their harsh religious doctrines tended to produce.”

Generally, the Enlightenment directly as through Hume, Condorcet, Montesquieu, and Saint Simon, or indirectly via Smith's classical political economy is admittedly the primary intellectual source and theoretical formulation of the conception of economic freedom, including free markets, thus modern capitalism replacing feudal servitude, just as of political liberty and democracy (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Mokyr 2009) superseding despotism and theocracy. Therefore, it operates as Schumpeter's process of true creative destruction by destroying or discrediting the old oppressive and closed feudal and other traditional economic structures, while creating or conceptualizing new free and open values and institutions in Western and other economies, including, via Jefferson's Paris transmission, America.

At the minimum, it is the Enlightenment that philosophically and sociologically discredits and delegitimizes and in that sense "softly" destroys feudalism or serfdom and other forms of economic traditionalism and oppression, including slavery. Alternatively, as Keynes suggests, it posits, legitimizes, and thus conceptually – not necessarily practically, if Weber is correct in his Calvinist-capitalist connection thesis (Akerlof 2007; Fourcade and Healy 2007) – creates modern capitalism or the free-market economy (Hirschman 1982). This holds true both of Enlightenment philosophers and sociologists such as Hume, Condorcet, Montesquieu, Saint Simon, and others *and* classical economists<sup>7</sup> like Smith – thus his liberal disciples Ricardo and Say, minus antiliberal Malthus – as well as Quesnay, Turgot, and other French *physiocrats*.

Symbolically, the Enlightenment safely demolishes the old, self-collapsing house of master-servant or slave relations, and constructs or projects the building of a new nonfeudal type of relations between economic agents based on what Spencer calls "voluntary cooperation" and the "system of contract" as opposed to the feudal regime of compulsion and status or hierarchy. Also, labor liberties and rights, including collective organization and action, thus industrial democracy as a system of countervailing capital-labor freedom and power, are the logical and eventual outcome of the Enlightenment's new liberal economic design and system, exemplified by the New Deal in America expressive of American liberalism, yet delayed and countered by the counter-Enlightenment such as conservative-authoritarian capitalism or capitalist dictatorship (Pryor 2002) as a sort of neofeudalism (Binmore 2001), of new master-servant economy and polity.

Counterfactually, the above implies that if the Enlightenment did not develop or fully succeed through the French and American antifeudal and procapitalist Revolutions in economic terms, feudalism would have likely persisted as an economic system, and thus perpetuated the *ancien regime*. Alternatively, capitalism would have hardly ever established itself as a systematic theoretical concept and

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<sup>7</sup>Most classical economists, either belonged to – like Smith, not to mention Hume, Quesnay, and Turgot – the Enlightenment or were theoretically associated with, as shown by Ricardo, Say, Senior (in part), and Bastiat, Mill, Cairnes, and Marx (partly). An unsurprising exception was Malthus, a Protestant minister-turned-economist espousing clerical anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal ideas (Somers and Block 2005).

problematic of economics and sociology, and even as an institutional order, despite Weber's Calvinist-capitalist "intimate connection," in Western and other societies, including America, without the advent, triumph, and heritage, of the Enlightenment. At most, in this scenario feudalism would have likely coexisted, as it did, if Weber is correct in his thesis, during the pre-Enlightenment, with Calvinist *theocratic* capitalism or capitalist theocracy, thus with an also illiberal, oppressive economic system, in the absence or failure of the Enlightenment, including its later political realization via the French and American Revolutions. In summary, the Enlightenment acts as the Schumpeterian genuine process of creative destruction in economic values, principles, and structures. First, it does so by being directly or indirectly, via Smith's classical political economy, the intellectual destroyer of feudalism and traditionalism as the old economic blueprint and system. Second, it does so as the theoretical creator or the chief designer and promoter of modern liberal-democratic, as distinguished from Calvinist and other (e.g., Islamic) theocratic, capitalism, as in Smith's words, the market "system of natural liberty," including the original, albeit subsequently relaxed or qualified, doctrines of government *laissez-faire* and the "invisible hand" of markets (Hirschman 1977; Mokyr 2009).

In these four accounts, the Enlightenment arises and functions as the process of creative destruction with respect to prior Western and other society and time. Specifically, it does so as the destroyer of through a revolutionary break and thus substantive discontinuity with the old medieval closed, despotic, and theocratic society, including feudalism, during early and late medieval times, from the fourth to eighteenth century AD. Alternatively, it does as the creator or projector of a new open, liberal-democratic, and secular, though not necessarily antireligious, social system in Western and other societies, including America even if to a lesser extent than modern Europe. In summary, the Enlightenment intellectually deposes the medieval feudal, despotic, and theocratic order to what Mannheim calls the "dead past," and conceptually inaugurates or ushers in modern liberal-democratic society as a novel ideal, a total social system, and historical period. This book is organized accordingly, revolving around these four themes and arguments. This is a comparative-historical, as well as theoretical empirical analysis, rather than a history of the Enlightenment's substantive relevance for and legacy in modern Western societies, including America.

## **Appendix: *The General Concept of Enlightenment***

The Enlightenment with a capital E as the specific cultural movement and historical event in seventeenth to eighteenth century Europe and in part America is to be distinguished from the general and perhaps older (and subsequent) idea of enlightenment with a noncapital "e". This is useful to emphasize in view of various confluences between "the Enlightenment" in particular and "enlightenment" in general in the sociological and other literature, including critical (Horkheimer-Adorno's) theory and its Hegelian "dialectic of enlightenment," not "the Enlightenment" (Cascardi 1999). This work deals specifically with *the* Enlightenment and its ideals,

achievements, and legacies in modern Western societies so that just a few remarks about “enlightenment” will suffice for the sake of distinction and comparison.

For instance, early *laissez-faire* French economist Frederic Bastiat categorically stating “no wealth, no enlightenment” uses the latter concept in a general, abstract sense, and suggests, following Adam Smith, the economic and thus societal, conditions of “enlightenment” as understood. This is also manifest in his statements that “there are but two things that can save society: justice and enlightenment [i.e.] the equality of well-being, of enlightenment, of moral dignity” and that the “social order [is] so constituted as to diffuse more and more enlightenment, morality, and happiness among more and more people.”

In retrospect, like Smith and most orthodox and neoclassical economists, Bastiat did not register or envision exceptions to his axiomatic rule “no [material] wealth, no [spiritual] enlightenment” and alternatively to the wealth-enlightenment equivalence. A paradigmatic exception to this rule or equivalence is modern America. This is the wealthiest and yet reportedly the least “enlightened” or progressive society in the sense of rationalistic, secular, and liberal (Inglehart 2004), including artistic (Scitovsky 1972; Throsby 1994) and intellectual (Munch 2001), conversely, the most and even the “only remaining primitive” (Baudrillard 1999) case in cultural terms among contemporary Western societies. For illustration, the wealthiest country in the world has by far the lowest public expenditure on the arts or esthetic culture among modern Western societies (Throsby 1994), just as the highest percentage of people (71) maintaining the primitive medieval belief in “Satan” (Glaeser 2004) and implicitly “witches” within the West. Furthermore, some US conservatives both admit and celebrate that most, especially young, Americans, while self-described as the “richest” in the world, are “natural savages [*sic*]” (Bloom 1988). In particular, they celebrate the fact that the Bible has been the “only common culture” in American history and society, implicitly acting as the chief contributor to this extolled “savagery” *cum* innocence à la Rousseau’s “noble savage” only corrupted by “ungodly” and “un-American” liberal-secular, notably university, public education to be substituted with *no* education, not to mention private and home religious schooling on a scale unknown in modern Western societies, as “better” according to religious conservatives such as “born again” Protestant fundamentalists (Darnell and Sherkat 1997).

At this juncture, this and related observed, including political-democratic and welfare-state, “backwardness” (Amenta et al. 2001) is what, first and foremost, defines, identifies, and typifies the new or rather perennial “American Exceptionalism” (Inglehart 2004; Quadagno 1999) and in that sense a kind of aberration in relation to other Western societies. Hence, “American Exceptionalism,” as perpetuated and glorified by conservatism, does *not* consist in, as US conservative sociologists (Lipset 1996) and economists (Friedman 1982) triumphantly claim, superior “liberty,” “individualism,” “pluralism,” “democracy,” “rationality,” “prosperity,” “progress,” and the like compared with all other, including Western European societies as “inferior” in these terms. For instance, the “wealthy” conservative “Christian” America is an exceptional society among these societies by persistently and systematically depreciating, through the lowest public spending on, art and



other secular culture as the actual or potential means of Bastiat's enlightenment. Conversely, it is by promoting, on a scale unknown or unrivaled among modern Western societies, private and home religious schooling, as typically a tool of secular nonenlightenment in the sense of religious superstition, prejudice, unreason, ignorance, and fanaticism, including the widespread belief in "Satan" and "witches" (and in part the "flat earth" medieval dogma), thus irrationalism and darkness favored to science (e.g., evolutionary biology, climate science, etc.). Of course, this holds true unless one claims a sort of "godly enlightenment" through such beliefs or what Hobbes<sup>8</sup> called "strong fancies," including "fairies, ghosts, and goblins," and the "power of witches," as implicitly does American religious conservatism, and explicitly as did early Calvinism with its claim to "enlightened" faith opposing the Enlightenment as "false" and rationalizing its post-Calvin tyrannical theocracy in Europe (Sorkin 2005). Both tendencies in America perpetuate Puritanism's strident antagonism, as Hume, Mill, and Weber register, to art and all secular culture, and its rejection or devaluation of nonreligious education and science unless harnessed in the "higher" cause of the Puritan total mastery of the world: theocratic domination and repression within society and permanent "holy" war against and subjugation of other "evil" societies (Becker 1984; Juergensmeyer 1994; Merton 1968; Munch 2001).

At any rate, at least America under religious conservatism, specifically predominant Protestant sectarianism and evangelicalism (Jenness 2004; Lindsay 2008; Lipset 1996), deviates from and "falsifies" Bastiat's equation between wealth and enlightenment as dubious economic determinism or reductionism. Alternatively, it suggests that wealth as the economic factor, while perhaps the necessary, is not the sufficient condition of "enlightenment" in the general sense and to that extent of human happiness and emancipation or liberty, as demonstrated by opulent pre- or early capitalist despotic societies, such as Italian city-states, identified by Simmel and also by modern wealthy "capitalist dictatorships" such as Singapore's and in part American "unfettered" capitalism with its persistently "inhuman face" during neoconservatism (Pryor 2002). Evidently, "enlightenment," like happiness as the invention of the Enlightenment (Artz 1998), presupposes not only wealth as what Marshall calls the material prerequisite of human welfare and capitalism as an economic system, but also other, noneconomic conditions, specifically political democracy, civil society, and secular, as different from theocratic, culture, just as all of these are conditioned, sustained, and promoted by the process of "enlightening," including knowledge, science, and education, as Voltaire, Condorcet, Kant, Diderot, Hume, Jefferson, and others suggest.

Also, critical social theory (the Frankfurt School) uses "enlightenment" in the "widest sense as the advance of thought," which "has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:1). Arguably, the "essence" of enlightenment thus understood is the "choice between alternatives" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:25). Hence, when these

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<sup>8</sup>Hobbes' full statement is that "from this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense, did arise the greatest part of the religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fauns, nymphs, and the like; and nowadays the opinion that rude people have of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches."

critical theorists adopt from Hegel and elaborate on the “dialectic of enlightenment,” they operate with the general concept, and yet usually address the “dark side” or destructive effects of *the* Enlightenment as the specific historical phenomenon in eighteenth century Europe, creating a conflation or lack of differentiation between the two concepts and processes. As some sympathetic commentators admit, “the potentially vague and troubling term ‘Enlightenment’ [is in Horkheimer and Adorno] both the designation of a historical epoch [the modern European Enlightenment] and as the description of a conceptual paradigm. [Their] critique of the instrumentalization of reason says nothing about whether what lies at stake in the question of Enlightenment is itself historical or theoretical (Cascardi 1999:21). Admittedly, in their work, “Enlightenment” betrays a struggle both to describe a fundamental structure of reason and to characterize the historical practices that, in modernity, have led to rationalization and reification (Cascardi 1999:22). In this view, their analysis “shuttles back and forth between the historical and the theoretical meanings of the term “Enlightenment” [i.e.] the nature of enlightened reason [and] the specificity of the modern Enlightenment as an historical phenomenon [namely] an embodiment of the self-canceling ideals of bourgeois, democratic culture” (Cascardi 1999:23–24). Some contemporary analysts follow or evoke this dual treatment of “enlightenment” as both a “philosophical concept” and an “historical process” (Trey 1998:11). Also, following early critical theory, this entails a preference for the first concept on the ground that a new “politics of emancipation is by necessity a politics of enlightenment,” yet a “form of enlightenment that moves beyond the parameters of modernity” as the product or project of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, and thus beyond the latter itself (Trey 1998:7–8).

Of course, this reopens the question and dilemma whether, how, and to what extent “enlightenment” in general is possible in present and future democratic societies by overcoming or neglecting and depreciating the values, achievements, and legacies of *the* eighteenth century Enlightenment laying at the heart of modern democracy and civilization (Berman 2000; Habermas 2001). From the stance of the latter, the answer is categorically and unambiguously negative; to paraphrase Bastiat, “no Enlightenment from the eighteenth century, no enlightenment in the twenty-first century and beyond.” While certainly not all enlightenment has been *the* Enlightenment during human history, the eighteenth century Enlightenment and its legacy today is the very essence and condition of “enlightenment” in modern Western and other liberal-democratic and secular society. In short, in this society human “enlightenment” as a general concept and process assumes and maintains the specific form of *the*—not just any—European Enlightenment and its legacy from the eighteenth to the twenty-first century (Angel 1994; Hinchman 1984). If “enlightenment” is simply “something people do”<sup>9</sup> (Bittner 1996:346), then the

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<sup>9</sup>Bittner (1996:346) rejects Rousseau’s underlying Calvinist and in part Kant’s secular view that “original maturity, lost through our own fault and regained by the endeavors of enlightenment,” as a “mere repetition of paradise,” supposedly “lost by our sin and regained through redemption.” No wonder, most of its key figures, notably Voltaire, Diderot, and Hume, rejected Rousseau’s Calvinist and generally theocratic or “Spartan” views as incompatible with, and even hostile to, the Enlightenment and its project of modern liberal-secular and democratic society (Garrard 2003).

specific Western modern Enlightenment involves their actions in Europe and beyond during the eighteenth to the twenty-first century.

The above yields two corresponding distinctions. One is the distinction between the old and new, premodern and modern Enlightenments, as Hegel and other analysts suggest. Thus, “while Hegel usually writes of *the* (the eighteenth century) Enlightenment, he sometimes mentions an ancient Enlightenment as well [suggesting that] the modern Enlightenment epitomizes and completes a process of enlightenment which began several millennia ago” (Hinchman 1984:2), notably with ancient Greek philosophy as well as art and science. In short, this distinguishes premodern and modern “enlightenment,” including persuasion and education, as the noncoercive “means of moral regulation” in contrast to coercive “forms of social control” (Ruonavaara 1997).

Another distinction is between what Weber would call the Occidental and the Oriental Enlightenment, though he associates the “Enlightenment” and even “enlightenment” as such, through associating rationalism, including capitalism, and liberalism, with the West rather than the Orient. In short, this is a distinction between what some analysts describe as “Enlightenment West” and “Enlightenment East,” the first defined primarily by rationalism and liberalism, and the second by irrationalism or mysticism and conservatism or traditionalism, respectively (Angel 1994). Furthermore, one could object that even the Western Enlightenment is “too diffuse and amorphous a concept to admit of neat definition and delineation [so] argue with reasonable plausibility that “enlightened” thinking began with Renaissance humanism, with the Reformation, or even with the Greeks” (Byrne 1997:3). Some analysts argue that such historical redefinitions or speculations “would be spurious” (Byrne 1997:3) and instead suggest limiting the Western Enlightenment to a specific social space and historical time, Europe, notably France, and in part beyond like America, during the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries. The current work centers on the Western Enlightenment and situates the latter in this specific social space and time, primarily eighteenth century Europe.

## Chapter 2

# Modern Democratic Society and the Enlightenment

### The Children of the Enlightenment

Modern Western and other democratic societies', including Europe's and America's, fundamental values and institutions are, first and foremost, the creations and legacies of the Enlightenment. Their ideals and social structures of liberty, equality, justice, democracy, inclusion, individualism, social progress, secularism, pluralism, scientific and technological rationalism, economic prosperity and freedom, free markets, the pursuit of happiness and well being, dignified humane life, optimism and hope, universalism, and humanism are primarily rooted in, advocated, and advanced by the Enlightenment. The latter is understood as a sort of cultural revolution, starting as an intellectual or philosophical and sociological movement in Western Europe, especially, though not solely, in France, with subsequent partial ramifications and derivations in America and other non-European or non-Western settings during the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century.

In this sense, modern liberal-democratic, egalitarian, rationalistic, secular, pluralist, advanced, humanistic, and progressive society, or simply modernity, is the child of the Enlightenment (Habermas 2001). Conversely, the latter is the prime intellectual creator of modernity (Beck 2000; Habermas 2001), specifically its liberal-Western version in light of actual or possible "multiple modernities," including illiberal and non-Western ones (Eisenstadt 2003; Jepperson 2002; Eisenstadt and Sachsenmaier 2002), just as the existence of Eastern forms of "enlightenment" (Angel 1994). In short, the "modern project" of society admittedly originates in and derives from, above all, the Western Enlightenment (Smart 2000).

Alternatively, the Enlightenment, in virtue of its inner ideal or dream of, to paraphrase Jefferson, "liberty, equality, justice, life, and happiness for all," is the genuine originator, more specifically the spiritual parent, of the project and reality of modern liberal-democratic society (Artz 1998; Delanty 2000; Munch 2001). Essentially, it is the true foundation and vision of modern free, open society (Popper 1973) through various explicit and "links" between the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and modern social, including political, philosophical and scientific, conditions during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Hinchman 1984; also, Habermas 2001). On this account, to paraphrase a postwar statement about generalized Keynesianism

(Akerlof 2007), “we are all the Enlightenment’s children” (Artz 1998; also, Byrne 1997). This holds true as a general pattern or prevalent tendency, with some deviations and oppositions in the form of the pre- and counter-Enlightenment such as medievalism and conservatism, including fascism, revived fundamentalism, neo-conservatism, and neofascism, respectively. In this respect, the Enlightenment constitutes what Durkheim would call a total sociological, as distinguished from limited intellectual or philosophical, phenomenon, including social revolution or, as Sidgwick puts it, innovation, involving multiple and complex societal ramifications and consequences as well as socio-historical conditions and settings (Linton 2001; Simon 1995).

In sociological terms, the expression “the child and children of the Enlightenment” substantively signifies that modern liberal-democratic Western and other societies and the people living in them, including America and Americans, are primarily the societal outcomes, legacies, and descendants of the Enlightenment (McLaren and Coward 1999), as distinguished from the pre-Enlightenment and opposed by the counter-Enlightenment. As observed, it is Enlightenment rather than pre- and counter-Enlightenment values and institutions that are at the “heart of Western civilization” (Berman 2000) hence being, first of all, the expression and heir of the Enlightenment. These values and institutions include “Enlightenment traditions” of liberal-secular democracy and an esthetic and rationalistic culture centered around the arts and sciences, in particular involving the “disinterested pursuit of the truth, cultivation of art, and commitment to critical thinking” through “an expanding intellectual inquiry” (Berman 2000). The “influence of Enlightenment” is also observed and salient in modern society in that “so many” of its problems appear and are framed and solved within the “parameters of Enlightenment norms” (Fitzpatrick 1999). A cited paradigmatic instance is the “enshrinement of Enlightenment ideas in public law” as displaying the “tension” between its “universal norms” and their “appropriate application” to individuals, groups, and societies (Fitzpatrick 1999).

Conversely, Western, and even more non-Western, illiberal-undemocratic societies have almost invariably been the children of – that is, reproduced and justified by – the pre- and counter-Enlightenment predating and countering the Enlightenment and its ideals, respectively. Paradigmatic negative instances include the transient conservative and counter-revolutionary restoration of the *ancien regime* in early nineteenth century France (Delanty 2000), Bismarck’s German authoritarian and militarist-imperial state (Habermas 1989a), and Nazism and other totalitarian and warlike fascism (Blinkhorn 2003) in interwar, as well as neoconservatism and neofascism in postwar, Europe (Giddens 2000; Hodgson 1999). Such instances or functional equivalents are also found in America at some historical points, as during Puritanism until its “disestablishment” in the early nineteenth century, Federalism, paleoconservatism, including McCarthyism, then neoconservatism and within it revived religious fundamentalism and neo-fascism, and geographic regions like Puritan-ruled New England and the fundamentalist Southern and other “Bible Belt,” including the (also) Calvinist “Wild West” (Clemens 2007; Dunn and Woodard 1996; Lipset 1996; Munch 2001) and the “nightmarish world” (McCann 2000) of Mormon-ruled Utah.

All these cases exemplify outcomes of the counter-Enlightenment countering, as well as of the pre-Enlightenment predating, the French and American Revolutions. For example, religious-political conservatism in Europe and America during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century arose from medievalism and functioned as the anti-Enlightenment (Eisenstadt 1999; Nisbet 1966) and antiliberalism resulting in illiberal, and thus undemocratic, societies and historical periods. And it has continued to do so since, through paleoconservatism and interwar fascism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and via neoconservatism, including “born again” religious fundamentalism and neofascism, up to the late twentieth and early twenty-first century (Dombrowski 2001; Habermas 2001; Munch 2001). By analogy, medievalist traditionalism and religion such as orthodox Catholicism and Protestantism in Europe persisted and petrified as the pre-Enlightenment (Habermas 2001) and consequently, as Mannheim (1967) suggests, pre-liberalism and predemocracy.

These opposite lineages of modern liberal-democratic open vs. illiberal-undemocratic closed societies reveal the stark contrast and profound contradiction between Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment ideals, values, and institutions, and their respective societal outcomes of liberty and democracy *and* of illiberty and authoritarianism, respectively. Evidently, the sociological child of the Enlightenment and its ideals and values is the polar opposite to that of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment: liberal-democratic and open vs. illiberal-undemocratic and closed society.

In a sense, one cannot emphasize enough that modern Western democratic and other societies, including in both Europe and America, prove primarily to be the creations and legatees, thus most people living in them the spiritual children<sup>1</sup> (Artz 1998) or heirs, of the eighteenth century Enlightenment and its ideals of liberty, equality, justice, democracy, universalism, reason and rationalism, optimism and social progress, well being, happiness, human life, and the like. This emphasis is needed because in these societies, particularly “exceptional” America, not “every schoolboy knows” and acknowledges – and this includes many, especially conservative, sociologists and economists – the primary historical genesis or cultural foundation of their constitutive values and institutions in the Enlightenment, itself unknown or “forgotten” by ordinary people, especially most Americans. Instead, most “schoolboys” view these values as preexisting, including pre-Enlightenment, notably as “Christian,” in particular “Protestant” (Berger 1991; Lipset 1996; Mayway 1984; Parsons 1967a), and parametric or given, simply always “out there.”

Thus, recall that most people in today’s Western and other societies (Inglehart 2004) regard political and increasingly cultural pluralism or diversity as a parameter or given (Dahrendorf 1959; Dombrowski 2001; Hirschman 1982) in an open, democratic society. Yet, not everyone seems to know or recognize that this social value and condition is primarily the ideal, product, and legacy of the Enlightenment and its holistic or “comprehensive” liberalism (Dombrowski 2001; Reiman 1997).

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<sup>1</sup> Artz (1998:35) observes that “so successful were [the Enlightenment’s ideals] they that at bottom we are still the spiritual children of the eighteenth century.”

Counterfactually, without the Enlightenment and its holistic, consistent liberalism political pluralism and cultural diversity probably would not attain the near-axiomatic status of a necessary condition and an integral element of modern democracy, civil society, culture, and liberty (Habermas 2001; Hirschman 1982). Alternatively, pluralism, including scientific relativism and culture diversity, would hardly ever supersede “totalitarian monism” (Dahrendorf 1959) and absolutism pervading the pre- and counter-Enlightenment like theocratic medievalism and authoritarian conservatism, including totalitarian fascism and religious fundamentalism, respectively, without Enlightenment pluralistic liberalism.

The emphasis on modern Western civilization as the sociological child primarily of the Enlightenment is also needed with respect to supposedly unique and exceptional “American” ideals, values, and institutions. In particular, US super-patriotic sociologists (Lipset 1996), “libertarian” economists (Friedman 1982), and conservative politicians (and perhaps most Americans) construe and appropriate such venerable values and institutions as liberty, equality, justice, democracy, the idea of happiness, life, and well being, economic freedom and prosperity, free markets, capitalism, rational science and technology, optimism and social progress, and the like as exclusively or quintessential “American” as the “apple pie.” Furthermore, they, especially conservative politicians, invidiously distinguish and oppose these “all-American” ideals and arrangements vis-à-vis “non-American,” including Western and all “European”<sup>2</sup> (Bloom 1988), thus implicitly or explicitly the Enlightenment as “foreign,” “ungodly,” and “un-American” (Dunn and Woodard 1996). The emphasis on the initial and ever-continuing lineage of modern Western civilization, including also liberal-democratic Jeffersonian America (Kloppenbergh 1998), in the European Enlightenment provides a necessary antidote to such anti-scientific ethnocentrism and spurious triumphalism (Baudrillard 1999; Beck 2000; Bell 2002) self-rationalized as hyperpatriotic Americanism, a religious-like creed (Lipset 1955; Munch 2001) or infantile “hubris” (Berman 2000).

Hence, the origin or foundation of constitutive and most cherished Western values and institutions, notably liberty and democracy, in the Enlightenment contradicts

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<sup>2</sup>For example, some US neoconservatives accused liberal opponents and measures, such as the 2009 Congress economic stimulus bill, for the “Europeanization of America” in the apparent belief that American values and institutions are different from and even opposite to those of Western and all Europe. Ironically, this is the virtually same expression that Max Weber used when visiting America in 1904, “Europeanization of the American national character.” Hence, at least from Weber’s standpoint, there are hardly any values and institutions in America that are not of direct or indirect European origins, as epitomized by the twin religious-economic complex of Calvinism *cum* Puritanism and modern capitalism both, as even patriotic Parsons would admit, transplanted from the “old world” to the “new nation.” On this account, the conservative accusation of “Europeanization of America” is what Weber calls, in the related reference to the “appeal to national [American or other] character,” a “mere confession of ignorance” and thus “entirely untenable.” Such ethnocentric accusations also confirm Cooley’s classic definition of ethnocentrism as the “matter of lack of knowledge” or simply the product of ignorance and (so) arrogance, and eventually aggressive nationalism and militarism, in mutual relation and reinforcement.

these two stated or unstated conventional views in the current sociological and economic literature and modern democratic societies, including America. First, this casts doubt on the explicit or implied view considering these values and institutions as somehow pre-given or preexisting and unproblematic in Western and other democratic countries, including America, almost as if they were normal, natural, or continuous in the genesis, historical evolution, and present reality of these societies. It specifically contradicts treating them as being prior to or after the Enlightenment, as pre- and counter-Enlightenment – for example, as “Christian,” including Protestant or Calvinist, and “conservative” – values and institutions. In this sense, it contradicts what appears to be a sort of collective amnesia or “momentary lapse of memory” in modern democratic societies, at least among conservative or nationalist groups and sociologists and economists, with respect to the primary historical origins of their defining and foundational values and institutions, notably universal liberty and political democracy in particular.

Second, the above casts doubt on the tendency of US conservative sociologists and economists – and perhaps most Americans – to redefine and appropriate cardinal Western values and institutions, notably liberty and democracy, plus free markets and capitalism, individualism, universalism, social progress, the pursuit of happiness and life (and property), etc., as uniquely and exceptionally “American” in an invidious distinction à la Veblen from and thus opposition to those “non-American,” particularly “European.” Simply, it casts doubt on the view that these beloved values and institutions are as “American” as the “apple pie,” thus somehow pre- and counter-Enlightenment elements, as the “American myth of origins” (Dessi 2008). In this sense, it doubts, alongside the common “collective amnesia” about the sources of these values and institutions, presumed libertarian-democratic, yet anti- or non-Enlightenment, American exceptionalism (Lipset 1996) and ethnocentrism (Beck 2000) *cum* triumphant Americanism (Bell 2002) as a civil and even, conjoined with self-perpetuating or revived Puritanism, true religion (Munch 2001). At least this is what this chapter and study overall aims to contend and demonstrate.

In summary, this chapter argues and shows that fundamental Western values and institutions, notably liberty and democracy are, first, the specific products and legacies of the Enlightenment vs. the pre- and counter-Enlightenment rather than, as often assumed, pre-given, natural, and “out there” in modern societies. Second, and as a corollary, it contends that beloved “American” values and institutions, including liberty and democracy, are essentially rooted in and stem from the Enlightenment by Jefferson and his followers (Byrne 1997; Patell 2001), thus not being exclusively or uniquely American to be exported to and imposed on all other societies, as US conservative hyper-patriotic sociologists claim (Lipset and Marks 2000), as a “universal model.”

The first argument redresses the partial “collective amnesia” in modern Western and other democratic societies, including America, about being the children of the Enlightenment as the prime creator or source of their foundational, enduring values and institutions. The second dispels the ethnocentric myth, redefinition, and appropriation of these values and institutions as, to extend Parsons’ (1967b) expression,



“conceptions and arrangements of the desirable” as exclusively and exceptionally “American” invidiously distinguished from “non-American,” including “European” and thus the Enlightenment dismissed as “foreign,” “ungodly,” and (so) “un-American.”

At least, these arguments intend to “remind” both the reader and author that virtually all of what most people in modern Western and other societies, including America, value, desire, or take for granted, notably freedom, equality, justice, democracy, social progress, the pursuit of individual happiness, material well being, human life, rational science, technology and medicine, etc., rests originally or ultimately in and directly or indirectly derive from, the Enlightenment. These societies are observed to “still believe” in Enlightenment ideals such that societal institutions are changeable, and social misfortunes solvable, rather than immutable and beyond human control *cum* “divinely ordained,” the aim of individual life is happiness in society or “maximum self-realization here below,” and the future entails hopes or opportunities, just as challenges<sup>3</sup> (Artz 1998). In particular, these arguments aim to “remind” that cherished “American” libertarian, democratic, egalitarian, inclusive, and individualistic values and institutions such as liberty, equality, life, and justice “for all,” the pursuit of happiness, and the like are not really exceptional, exclusive, and native, simply “made in America” only. Rather, they are universal within the context of modern Western civilization and “foreign” or exogenous in the sense of originating in and championed by the European Enlightenment and its holistic liberalism, and transmitted from the “old world,” literally Paris, to the “new nation” via Jefferson, Franklin, Paine, in part Madison, etc. First and foremost this is indicated by the modern conception and institution of human liberty in society, considered next.

## The Modern Concept of Liberty and the Enlightenment

### *The Ideal and Legacy of the Enlightenment*

Liberty in modern society, including political and individual or civil liberties and human rights can be considered primarily, though not solely, the child of the Enlightenment (Bauman 2000; Beck 2000; Habermas 2001). The latter is the paradigmatic ideal of universal human liberties and thus the paradigm and basis of classical and modern liberalism defined by the “principle of liberty” (Mannheim 1986). The modern concept and practice of liberty, especially individual liberties and choices, as probably the most cherished value and institution in modern Western and other democratic societies, including Europe and America, is first and

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<sup>3</sup> Artz (1998:35) suggests that “we still believe [in the Enlightenment ideals] that man and his institutions can be changed, that social and political problems can be improved rather than endured, that the goal of human life is maximum self-realization here below, and that the future is a challenge and an opportunity.”

foremost, grounded in and invented or most fully developed by the Enlightenment. As observed, the Enlightenment's liberal, thus truly libertarian, and humanitarian values provide "indispensable weapons" for establishing and sustaining "human dignity and freedom" (Fitzpatrick 1999) in modern society.

Human liberty and dignity, especially individual liberties and private choices, constituted the supreme ideal and value of the Enlightenment, in conjunction and reciprocal reinforcement with human reason and knowledge defining rationalism and with social-economic progress. At the minimum, the Enlightenment provides the strongest, fullest, and most consistent, elaborate, and articulate expression and advocacy of the ideal and search of human liberty and dignity, liberation, life and happiness against "all odds" and opposing forces. It rediscovers, rehabilitates, and most strongly advocates the perennial human quest and dream of societal liberty, including free, equal, and expanded life chances (Dahrendorf 1979), simply of a free, open society (Popper 1973). This holds true, even though this cultural revolution does not in a strict sense invent the concept of liberty or freedom (used here interchangeably), as found in various anticipations and precursors of the Enlightenment, especially, as Hume and others recognized, classical Athens democracy and in part the Roman law and republic (Garrard 2003; Manent 1998), as well as the Renaissance as their attempted artistic-humanistic revival. Thus, Bentham implies that the Enlightenment's members were "the most enlightened advocates for liberty" during those and other times in Western society and beyond. In particular, Mises (1957) acknowledges that the crucial concept of the Enlightenment is "freedom of thought, speech, and communication" and other conceptions and "policies of freedom" (also used interchangeably with "liberty").

Furthermore, the Enlightenment represents the ideal of what can be considered integral or comprehensive, thus, to use Mises' (1957) word, indivisible liberty in society, namely economic and noneconomic, individual and group, positive and negative, political and civil liberties, etc. Its conception of integral indivisible liberty reveals its comprehensive and consistent liberalism (Dombrowski 2001), as epitomized in what Mannheim (1936) calls the Enlightenment's inner "liberal idea," and is revealed in advocating and promoting the sum total of actual and possible liberties in society, including cultural, political, religious, civil, and economic ones (Artz 1998). The Enlightenment becomes the ideal and process of human liberation or emancipation through liberalization and related social processes such as rationalization, modernization, democratization, structural-institutional differentiation, including secularization (Evans and Evans 2008), cosmopolitanism, nascent cultural globalization (Beck 2000; Habermas 2001) perhaps anticipated by the Renaissance and classical civilization<sup>4</sup> (Caplan and Cowen 2004), humanization of social relations, etc. In particular, this involves the Enlightenment's envisioned "possibility" of individual emancipation through individuals' realized or expanded

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<sup>4</sup>Caplan and Cowen (2004:404) that the "rise of [post] medieval society and the Renaissance was, in large part, a process of re-globalization [reviving antiquity], as the West established significant contact with the Chinese and Islamic worlds."

control or “mastery” over their lives and destinies (Eisenstadt 1998), especially by the individual and public use of human reason and knowledge, as epitomized by Kant’s “dare to think,” defining scientific rationalism.

As critics and skeptics admit, its ideal of liberation is epitomized by the emancipating content (Trey 1998) and goals of the Enlightenment (Garrard 2003) as the project of “individual emancipation” (Nisbet 1966). Admittedly, the aggregate societal outcome or promise is a modern “emancipated society” by means of the “procedures of Enlightenment” such as human reason’s “democratic hope” (Cascardi 1999). This hope characterizes its complete, consistent liberalism hence underscored by optimism vs. antiliberalism such as authoritarian conservatism, including theocratic fundamentalism and totalitarian fascism. In stark contrast, conservatism, notably religious fundamentalism and fascism, is typically characterized with lack of hope or pessimistic gloom such as Weber’s “gloomy” Calvinism and “pessimistically inclined” Puritans, and the theological bliss of “heaven” (Lemert 1999), yet through “hell in this world” theocratic Puritan-style (Tawney 1962) or fascist, or else both merged. The latter outcome is shown in “born again” American evangelicalism and neo-Nazism via their shared design for “Christian America” as evangelical theocracy (Juergensmeyer 2003; also, Lindsay 2008; Smith 2000) to be ultimately realized by “Christian” neo-Nazi militia through “holy” war or “tea party” counter-revolution against liberal-secular democracy and other Enlightenment values, reenacting the *respublica Christiana* of medieval Europe (Nischan 1994), as did theocratic Puritanism in New England (Stivers 1994).

This means that the Enlightenment and liberalism overall harbors what Mannheim would call the *not* necessarily unrealizable utopia of universal liberty, equality, justice, reason, progress, well being, human life, and, conceivably, happiness in society in Jefferson’s sense “for all” expressing its liberal-democratic hope for and focus on the future. In stark contrast and vehement opposition, the counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism, in particular conservatism, notably fundamentalism and fascism, have “no utopia” (Mannheim 1936) and thus hope for the future, but a counter-utopia induced by the obsession with and living in the “dead past” as “paradise lost” to be “found” by any means, including violence, war, and destruction, especially for religious conservatives like Islamic and US fundamentalists (Juergensmeyer 2003).

In short, the Enlightenment utopia is the project and hope of future human freedom, justice, progress, well-being, happiness, and dignified life in society. By contrast, the pre- and anti-Enlightenment counter-utopia is invariably a theocratic and other totalitarian “Orwellian universe” (Collins 2000) either petrified, after the image of Mises’ (1950) “peace of the cemetery,” or revived via religious revivalism, as by the Great Awakenings and their perpetual reenactments in America. This is the universe, or rather the dark underworld, of illiberty, suffering, and cruel death for “higher” divine and militarist designs.

Within the Anglo-Saxon world it is simply what Tawney (1962) identifies as Puritan-style “hell in this world,” a sort of “deserved” punishment within *society*

enforcing the Providential “damnation” of most humans and “salvation” of a few in accordance with what Weber describes as the anti-universalistic and in that sense “non-Christian” Calvinist theological dogma of predestination through a “double decree” for the “reprobate” and the “elect” by the “God of Calvinism.” For instance, the Enlightenment utopia is substituted with a dystopia such as the “fantasy” (Giddens 1984) of salvation in a millennial “Biblical Garden” (Gould 1996) through Puritan-style “hell in this world” in early and modern America as the “Bible Community” and the 1,000-year Nazi-state in Germany. Despite their quasistatistic differences in “degrees of unfreedom” with the second being the more total and “sincere” destruction of freedom, both the Puritan-evangelical and Nazi-fascist species of millennialism resurrect the “dead past” and seek the detested “liberal hope” (Lemert 1999) literally to “die first,” though the latter, like any other, “dies last.” Generally, observations suggest that Puritanism and in extension Calvinism fulfilled in Anglo-Saxon societies, notably America, the same “sociological function” as did in Nazism in Germany and other fascism in Europe (McLaughlin 1996), essentially of illiberty and oppression, including sadistic-masochistic torment and violence (Adorno 2001; Fromm 1941), and to that extent of counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism.

In Western civilization, the modern sociological conception and institutional practice of liberty in society truly begins with the Enlightenment and its complete and consistent liberalism or its inner “liberal idea.” This at least applies to the context of medieval and post-medieval Western civilization since the establishment of what Pareto calls the Christian “Roman theocracy” in the fourth century through the mid eighteenth century. This is to be distinguished from classical “pagan” Greek and Roman civilization, notably “liberal” Athens inspiring Hume and other Enlightenment figures (Garrard 2003), admittedly involving a relevant degree of freedom, democracy, and equality (Manent 1998), and attempted to revive by the Renaissance from its near-theocratic destruction during the Dark Middle Ages. The nihilism about “non-Christian” as well as nonreligious ideas, values, and institutions precisely defined these times as “dark” and as Hume and Veblen call them, even “barbarian,” yet persisting as the “model” for the counter-Enlightenment, notably conservatism’s “image of the good society” (Nisbet 1966), including religious fundamentalism seeking to retrieve “paradise lost” from medieval darkness and of fascism like Nazism obsessed with and trying to reaffirm the “glory” of medieval Germanic civilization.

At least the Enlightenment is the critical or turning point in the human perennial dream and quest for liberty, including equal life chances (Dahrendorf 1979) and a free, open society (Popper 1973) in relation to the pre- and counter-Enlightenment-like medievalism or feudalism and conservatism, including fundamentalism and fascism, respectively. At the minimum, the Enlightenment creates, formulates, and champions a complete and consistent “philosophy and system of liberty” (Van Dyke 1995) defining both early and modern liberalism, while not inventing the idea of freedom in the strict sense present in its precursors and anticipations such as

classical civilization, especially Athens democracy, and the Renaissance.<sup>5</sup> Notably, perhaps for the first or most salient time in Western civilization, especially medieval “Christian,” the Enlightenment reportedly considered and transformed society into an “object of conscious human endeavor,” including substantial change and reconstruction<sup>6</sup> (Eisenstadt 1998).

### *Enlightenment Liberalism – The Principle of Liberty*

As noted, the Enlightenment is, first and foremost, the principle of integral and indivisible liberty in society, conjoined and mutually reinforced with those of human reason and knowledge and societal progress. Hence, the Enlightenment constitutes or generates complete and consistent liberalism axiomatically defined by the principle and social system of liberty, in conjunction and mutual reinforcement with rationalism premised on the postulate of human reason (Angel 1994) and knowledge and progressivism through societal, notably scientific, technological, medical and economic, progress. In this sense, liberalism originates primarily as the creation and extension, and remains, above all, the evolving legacy and tradition of the Enlightenment alongside classical democracy like liberal Athens as the prototype for Hume, Voltaire, and other early liberals vs. Sparta, as instead the model of such anti-Enlightenment figures as Calvinist Rousseau (Garrard 2003) and Calvinism overall, from Calvin’s Geneva to Winthrop and colleagues’ design of America as “Christian Sparta” (Kloppenber 1998).

The Enlightenment is the prime foundation or source of modern liberalism as the philosophical ideal and the social system of liberty (Van Dyke 1995). The latter includes both liberal democracy *and* a free-market economy (Buchanan and

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<sup>5</sup> Some may add the Protestant Reformation to these pre-Enlightenment conceptions of freedom. However, the Reformation at best advocated only or mainly theological or religious freedom of conscience rather or more than secular freedoms, and even then it, especially its Calvinist “Second” phase, did not always practice what it had preached, as Weber and other sociologists suggest. At worst, it proved as antagonistic and destructive via, especially Calvinist-Puritan theocracies, to human liberty, including civil and political liberties as medievalist Catholicism and the Vatican Church. After all, the Reformation was, at least in part, an adverse religious *cum* evangelical reaction to the manifest or latent artistic and other secular freedoms and humanism of what Parsons calls the “humanistic Renaissance,” just as to hegemonic Catholicism as the prime and explicit theological target. For example, Parsons implies that the “men of the humanistic Renaissance” and early Puritans diverged on the matter of artistic and other secular freedom and humanism by agreeing on only on “few points” such as the “negative valuation of ritual.” Furthermore, Pareto observes that in northern Europe the Renaissance was, and thus its secular artistic and other liberties and humanistic values, “halted too soon” by the Reformation as a religious revival seeking and succeeding to supplant what he calls the “Roman [Catholic] theocracy” by a new Protestant version.

<sup>6</sup> Eisenstadt (1998:213) adds that for the Enlightenment the “possibility of extending an individual’s mastery over his own destiny, or of gaining his emancipation, implied not just the task of understanding society, but of reconstructing it.”

Tullock 1962; Mokyr 2009), and relatedly rationalism as the axiom and systematic use of human reason (Habermas 2001), knowledge and science, and progressivism as the “rational expectation” and realization of continuing progress primarily and even exclusively through liberal-rational mechanisms in society. At the minimum, alongside its close correlate (Alexander 1998) rationalism as well as progressivism, liberalism, including “liberal political philosophy” emphasizing and defending the “autonomy of the individual against oppressive, irrational traditions” (Hinchman 1984), is the child of the Enlightenment. By contrast, antiliberalism, specifically authoritarian conservatism and its totalitarian mutant fascism; just as revived theocratic fundamentalism is the offspring of the pre- and counter-Enlightenment such as despotic medievalism, feudalism, romanticism, and traditionalism overall (Nisbet 1966; also, Eisenstadt 1999).

For instance, in Mannheim’s (1986) sociological account, the Enlightenment is described as the exemplary “liberal idea” and constitutes the model or basis of liberalism. While liberal theory is epitomized by and founded on the Enlightenment, conservatism is above all based on medieval traditionalism and romanticism, thus being “essentially the expression of a feudal tradition,” in adverse reaction to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. In summary, liberalism is the aggregate outcome of the Enlightenment, while conservatism being “nothing more than traditionalism become self-reflective” in opposition to liberal philosophy as its “immediate antagonist” (Mannheim 1986). In Mises’ (1950) words, liberalism was and remains the “flower” of the rationalistic Enlightenment that inflicted a “death blow to the regime of the old Church,” Catholic and Protestant churches alike, in Europe through its “policies of freedom.” This applies to early European (including French and German) and British liberalism, both being the flowers of the Enlightenment ideal of integral liberty in society, notably “individual emancipation”<sup>7</sup> (Eisenstadt 1998; Nisbet 1966).

The above identifies and emphasizes “the Enlightenment and its liberal heirs” (Habermas 1989a) and “the liberalizing ideas of the Enlightenment” (Anderson 1991). For instance, the “liberal legal model” is linked to “Enlightenment conceptions of the social contract” (Uggen and Manza 2002). Overall, with its concept of integral liberty in society the Enlightenment comprises overarching liberalism, including “reasonable pluralism,” although this liberal version is not adopted by all liberals, let alone antiliberals such as authoritarian conservatives, in particular theocratic fundamentalists and totalitarian fascists (Dombrowski 2001).

Hence, liberty in society is at least indirectly the child or legacy of the Enlightenment through liberalism and rationalism as its twin children or intertwined and mutually reinforcing legacies. At the minimum, if not freedom itself, then liberalism as the ideal and system of liberty, hence liberal democracy, society,

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<sup>7</sup>US conservative sociologist Nisbet (1966:9) registers that British “utilitarian liberalism – from Bentham to Spencer – held to a view of church, state, family, moral tradition that did not differ from earlier views of the Enlightenment [i.e.] individual emancipation” in France as well as Great Britain (Hume, Ferguson, etc.).

and modernity, is the true child or heir of the Enlightenment. If not freedom or democracy as such in light of classical democratic civilization, including liberal Athens, then modern liberalism, including its economic and political and other noneconomic versions, essentially originates in the Enlightenment. Furthermore, liberty has invariably been the program of liberalism among modern Western societies (Dahrendorf 1979) in spite of antiliberal, (especially conservative) including fundamentalist and fascist, “libertarian” or “democratic” claims and rhetoric. To that extent liberty in society proves to be primarily the ideal, creation, and legacy of the Enlightenment both directly and indirectly through liberalism, as the crucial historical point in the perennial human dream and search of freedom, specifically within medieval Western civilization, Pareto’s Christian theocracy and the institutionalization of Christianity by Constantine after 313–321 AD (Sorokin 1970). For instance, Enlightenment-based liberalism rejects and supersedes, thus representing the obverse of, medievalist Roman Christian absolutism and its “state-centered view of the constitution of political community” (Ku 2000).

### *Universal Liberalism – “Liberty for All”*

Jefferson’s “liberty for all” is probably the most cherished single ideal, value, or credo, and thus a parameter or given in America and in its corresponding formulations, in other Western societies. Yet, what is parametric or given in modern free societies forms a relatively novel (Artz 1998) and recent creation and legacy, first and foremost, of the Enlightenment and its universal liberalism. It is specifically the product and heritage of the Enlightenment principle of universal liberty originally formulated and articulated by Kant, Voltaire, Condorcet, Montesquieu, Diderot, Hume, and other authors, as distinguished from the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, such as preliberal “Christian” Catholic and Protestant medieval civilization and antiliberal conservatism, respectively. As Hegel and other critics or skeptics admit, it is the Enlightenment, not the pre- and counter-Enlightenment, that for the first time within the medieval “Christian” world provides or envisions human society with “universal freedom” (Schmidt 1996) in the sense of “liberty for all” individuals and groups à la Voltaire, Kant, Hume, and Jefferson.

In particular, Jefferson brought the principle of universal liberty – as well as its complementary principles of equality and justice (Mannheim 1986) – from his second home in Europe, Paris metaphorically; and from Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, Condorcet, and other leading French and European Enlightenment figures substantively, to the “new nation.” Alternatively, he could *not* take (Archer 2001) the principle from the American pre- and counter-Enlightenment, epitomized by late-medievalist and postrevolutionary Calvinist Puritanism (Bremer 1995) with its New England theocracy that was geographically closer but sociologically more distant to his Virginia, and America overall in his liberal-secular vision than was evidently France or the “old world.” Recall that Jefferson, like Madison and

even once-Calvinist Franklin (Byrne 1997), rejected the old Puritan vision of America as the theocratic and austere “godly community” (German 1995) or Winthrop’s “Christian Sparta” (Kloppenber 1998). He did so in favor of liberal-secular democracy and society (Kloppenber 1998), including the “wall of eternal separation” (Dayton 1999) between church and state, founded on the Enlightenment principles of universal liberty, equality, justice, life, and happiness, as well as reason, knowledge, science, education, and social progress (Patell 2001; Phelps 2007). If anything, liberty “for all” individuals and groups provides a paradigmatic instance of constitutive and parametrically “given” Western, including “all-American,” values and institutions primarily rooted in and derived from the Enlightenment in contrast to and opposition of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, namely the medieval “Christian” world and the postmedieval conservative order, respectively.

Notably, if, as US super-patriotic sociologists and economists allege, and most Americans believe, “liberty for all” is as “American” as the “apple pie,” then the latter is made via Jefferson and colleagues’ importation of imported foreign French Enlightenment rather than of purely native pre- and anti-Enlightenment, Puritan or sectarian-Protestant and conservative, ingredients. No doubt, in America “every schoolboy” is taught and knows, as do sociologists and economists, of “liberty for all” as the foremost and cherished American value and institution. Yet not all American “schoolboys,” including sociologists and economists, seem, to be taught, know, realize, or acknowledge that Jefferson or Franklin literally or figuratively imported this “all-American” ideal and value – and, on a lighter note, wine and conceivably “French fries” – from Paris, France during the Enlightenment, thus from the despised “old world” to the “first new nation” (Calhoun 1993).

Counterfactually, if the Enlightenment did not exist, Jefferson’s “liberty for all” would have likely never existed or prevailed as a common ideal and value in post-revolutionary and contemporary America. After all, this was indicated by pre- and anti-Enlightenment Puritanism as the “most totalitarian” subtype of Calvinism (Stivers 1994) with its exclusionary, sectarian theocracy (Munch 2001) exemplified and symbolized by “Salem with witches” (Putnam 2000), as reflected in “European Enlightenment theories about degeneracy in the New World” (Gould 1996). Instead, such sectarian theocracy would have been perpetuated indefinitely in the guise of “Christian” liberty (Clark 1999; Davis 2005) and America (Smith 2000) or “godly community” (German 1995) by compulsion, persecution, and extermination *cum* “holy terror” (Merrill 1945) of “non-Christians,” including Catholics, Quakers, Anglicans, let alone nonbelievers, if any, and Native Americans subjected to a prototypical instance of genocide (Mann 2005) “in the name of God, Amen” (as cited by Tocqueville). Hence, for all of them the Puritan “body of liberties” (Gould 1996) or “Christian liberty” was not worth the paper on which it was written or printed (Dayton 1999). That was what Puritanism effectively tried, and in part succeeded, from the early seventeenth to the mid nineteenth century only to be formally, not necessarily or immediately substantively, “disestablished” primarily because of Jefferson’s Enlightenment ideas and institutions rejecting its theocratic-disciplinary



design of America as “Christian Sparta” or, in its revived evangelical design, as a “Christian” variant of Iran<sup>8</sup> or Taliban-style society (Juergensmeyer 2003).

Generally, most Americans and other Westerners seem to treat the ideal of universal liberty as a given, preexisting, and old, such as “Christian,” especially “Protestant,” explicitly or implicitly overlooking or downplaying its relatively novel and revolutionary creation and articulation by or its primary roots in the eighteenth century non- or post-Christian Enlightenment. Alternatively, they overlook or downplay the moment that there was/is *no* such thing as “liberty for all” in the pre- and counter-Enlightenment among Western societies, including both Europe and America, namely in preliberal medievalism and antiliberal conservatism, including fundamentalism and fascism, respectively. However, in virtue of its primary origin or most consistent expression in the Enlightenment, the ideal of universal liberty on closer inspection proves less a given and old or conventional than a variable and new or revolutionary, notably less uniquely and exceptionally “American,” than is frequently supposed in modern Western societies (especially America). As the Enlightenment’s flower, the lifespan of the ideal of integral liberty and thus liberalism is only a fraction, about two centuries, within the *long durée* of Western “Christian” civilization, of two millennia since the first to fourth century AD, as is in particular economic freedom or modern capitalism (Giddens 1984; Hirschman 1977).

Alternatively, the life cycle of the ideas, practices, institutions, and symbols of illiberty (Dahrendorf 1979), as mostly the pre- and counter-Enlightenment’s “weeds,” is ever-recurring and almost infinite within the *long durée* of Western “Christian” and all religiously determined civilization (Lenski 1994), except for its classical phase like ancient Greek democracy or liberal Athens (Garrard 2003). It formed a sort of Mises’ “peace of the cemetery” only to be disturbed or interrupted by the Enlightenment and its ideal of liberty. In summary, the ideal and exercise of universal liberty was a nonentity or heresy and taboo or “forbidden apple” in pre-Enlightenment “Christian” and other religiously dominated major (including “axial” and Islamic) civilizations (Eisenstadt 1986; Hamilton 1994). Yet, primarily due to the Enlightenment, it became a given (Cole 2005), almost a platitude (Artz 1998) in its child, liberal Western society and modernity, though not necessarily or immediately in other “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt 2003), especially modern “Enlightenment East” (Angel 1994) reportedly pervaded by a “natural” mix of religious irrationalism or mysticism (Inglehart 2004) with what Weber calls “Oriental despotism,” as shown by most contemporary Islamic societies (excluding Turkey as the sole major exception precisely due to the spread of Enlightenment liberal-secular ideas or legacies from Europe).

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<sup>8</sup> Juergensmeyer (2003:212) remarks that the “idea of a nation based on [‘Christian law and order,’ a ‘Christian Republic’] is on the minds of Christian religious activists [with] the Protestant governments of the early American colonies [grounding] their constitutions in biblical law [as a model] or precedent for a ‘new kind of Christian government.’” He also observes that US fundamentalism “admires the attempts of Muslims in Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan to create regimes grounded in Islamic law” (Juergensmeyer 2003:212).

For instance, the proposition, as formulated, or restated in view of the Renaissance and classical democracy, by the Enlightenment, that all humans are endowed with liberties and rights “simply by virtue of being human” (Cole 2005) was embraced only during the late eighteenth century in and impacted society and politics, “most notably” (Hinchman 1984) the American and French Revolutions as the realizations of this and related ideals such as equality and justice. By contrast, the proposition had been nonexistent or proscribed as an “indecent ungodly proposal” equated with heresy or blasphemy as a deadly sin, within the *long durée* of pre-Enlightenment “Christian” and other theocratic societies enduring “for several thousand years” with *no* notion and institution of “abstract” human liberties and rights being incorporated into their “laws and customs” (Hinchman 1984). Alternatively, modern Enlightenment-based Western liberal-democratic society alone has established and firmly entrenched the principle that, in virtue of being humans, all individuals have “universal, inherent, and inalienable” liberties and rights (Cole 2005).

In summary, the Enlightenment is (the model of) universal liberalism or liberal universalism through the principle of comprehensive liberty for all individuals and groups in society ideally or ultimately, though not always in history and reality. In particular, it is the “project of a universal moral liberalism” understood as the “right of all human beings” to freedom of control of their life on the basis of their “possession” and application of reason (Reiman 1997). Even critics suggest that one should not “altogether” abandon the Enlightenment’s liberal universalism and rationalism in favor of “cultural relativism and absolute pluralism” (Patell 2001), especially as found in postmodernism and militant feminism, as a new type of counter-Enlightenment<sup>9</sup> (Habermas 2001).

Modern liberal-pluralist society (Munch 2001), especially including the “pluralization of forms of life and the individualization of lifestyles” (Habermas 1996), is the child or legatee of the Enlightenment, namely its prototypical idea and appreciation of social pluralism or diversity (Hirschman 1982), as well as individual liberty and happiness. Recall that an integral dimension of Enlightenment consistent and comprehensive liberalism involves “reasonable” social pluralism taken as a given (Dombrowski 2001) in modern democratic societies since the late 18th century. Consequently, the Enlightenment’s pluralism is “comprehensive pluralism” comprising its economic and noneconomic types, including political, civil, religious, and other cultural pluralisms or diversities. Conversely, its comprehensive liberalism rejects and transcends social monism or absolutism and uniformity, including their political and religious forms, as illiberal-undemocratic reproducing totalitarianism (Dahrendorf 1959; Habermas 2001; Mises 1966), which spans from theocracy or “godly” tyranny (Juergensmeyer 2003) to fascism and communism as pseudo- and antireligious dictatorships.

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<sup>9</sup>In passing, in the Enlightenment, liberal universalism in the sense of universal liberty on one hand and cultural relativism and pluralism, just as and individualism, on the other are complementary rather than mutually exclusive principles, simply complements or correlates, and not substitutes or opposites, as epitomized by Kant (Habermas 2001).

Notably, the Enlightenment is observed to emancipate and separate religious liberty or the freedom of conscience from its specifically “Christian dress” and any generally religious and theocratic form (McLaren and Coward 1999). It is thus effectively neutral and indifferent to, or not preferring, “any religion,” thus inaugurating or ushering in “cultural and religious pluralism” characterizing modern democratic societies (McLaren and Coward 1999). Consequently, in Enlightenment-based modern liberal-secular society, the Christian and any religion becomes “one among many” rather than the “one, single true religion given by the one and only God”<sup>10</sup> (Byrne 1997). Hence, this modernity transcends the pre-Enlightenment *respublica Christiana* or *Civitas Dei* and its anti-Enlightenment revivals such as “Christian [evangelical] America” (Smith 2000) with its “faith-based” government and the “Bible Belt” as the Protestant-fundamentalist functional equivalent of Iranian or Taliban-style Islamic theocracy (Bauman 1997; Juergensmeyer 2003; Mansbach 2006).

## Individualism and the Enlightenment

Individualism, as another constitutive value of modern Western and other democratic societies, including, but not only, as US celebratory sociologists and economists claim, America, is also primarily the ideal, creation, and legacy of the Enlightenment. Understood in the sociological sense of the ideal and pursuit of individual liberty, choice, dignity, well-being, happiness, humane life, privacy, and hope in society, individualism, first and foremost, originates or fully develops in the Enlightenment as an individualistic intellectual movement and cultural revolution par excellence. Individualism thus understood is largely taken as a given or preexisting value in modern Western democratic and other societies, particularly America; and yet its relatively recent primary, most articulated, and consistent origin, epitome, and promoter lies precisely in the Enlightenment. In Durkheim’s words, it is the Enlightenment that, above all, “consecrated” the human person and thus implicitly humane life become “sacred,” and established what he seemingly regrets as a “cult of the individual” defining moral and other social individualism. The Enlightenment posits and defends the sanctity and inviolability (Cole 2005) of individuals and their liberty, rights, dignity, well-being, privacy, humane life, and happiness in society, as the essence of social, as distinct from methodological, individualism.

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<sup>10</sup>Byrne (1997:16) comments that “this awareness of the customs and beliefs of other cultures raised crucial issues for Christian theology and the dominant role of the Christian church. If civilizations had existed for thousands of years without hearing of Christ then was revelation insufficient? Christian religion and culture [became] one among many and not as the one, single true religion given by the one and only God.”

## *Enlightenment vs. Other Individualism*

Enlightenment and generally liberal sociological individualism (Boudon 1981) is distinguished from pre- and anti-Enlightenment theological or religious individualism associated (as Simmel suggests) with Christianity, in particular Protestantism as Weber and Parsons emphasize. Enlightenment-liberal individualism is secular, within human society, “here below” (Artz 1998), rather than what Weber calls the “world beyond,” sacred or “heavenly,” as in Protestantism, notably Calvinism and its (as Weber and Mises put it) Anglo-Saxon derivative, Puritanism (Zaret 1989). To paraphrase Durkheim, in Enlightenment liberal individualism, human individuals and their life are sacred, while in its theological Protestant, especially Calvinist, alternative, only suprahuman beings or gods and their immortality as well as their self-assigned agents like Puritan theocrats or regents (Zaret 1989) are. In other words, Enlightenment, liberal-secular individualism is defined (as in Simmel’s definition) by “individual happiness as the [main] meaning and purpose” of society. This is in sharp contrast to theological, specifically Calvinist, ersatz or spurious individualism. The latter denies or devaluates happiness and hope by condemning humans as “evil” or “depraved” and depreciating or suspecting human relations and friendships as “ungodly,” in favor of bliss in “heaven” (Lemert 1999) and supra- and antihuman entities and causes like Weber’s omnipotent, merciless, and unjust (as by the “unjust” predestination of a few “elect” and the “remainder of humanity” as “damned”) “God of Calvinism” and “holy” war within societies and across societies against “infidels.”

Furthermore, the Enlightenment demonstrates positively – and Christianity, particularly Protestantism, negatively – that Christian, particularly Protestant, theological or transcendental individualism is *not* the necessary and sufficient condition of sociological or secular individualism thus understood, particularly political and civil. It shows that these two types of individualism are not necessarily and intimately connected and convergent, just as sacred and secular powers, but often disconnected and divergent, and even mutually exclusive and opposite. For instance, this is what Durkheim implies in *Suicide* registering the “state of moral individualism” ensuing from the “weakening” of traditional religion, including implicitly Protestant theological “individualism.”

The Enlightenment paradigmatically postulates political, civic, and cultural individualism by positing individual liberty, choice, dignity, well-being, humane life, happiness, and hope in polity, civil society, and culture, simply “in this world.” Alternatively, it rejects or is indifferent, just as to religion overall, to theological transcendental individualism considering individuals only in relation to God, sacred books, and “heaven,” specifically submission and eventually sacrifice (Parsons 1967a; Lemert 1999; Wuthnow 1998). Enlightenment and generally liberal sociological individualism effectively supplant and supersede theological or religious (including Protestant, notably Calvinist) individualism as a redundant, yet “imperfect” substitute or nuisance rather than, as Parsons et al. suggest, complementing and reaffirming it. In Durkheim’s terms, the “state of moral individualism” in the

Enlightenment and liberalism both result from and substitute for or transcend the “weakening” of traditional religion, including glorified Protestant theological individualism.

For instance, Parsons (1967a) extols the “immediacy of the individual soul to God”<sup>11</sup> and sacred books such as the Bible, seen as “inherent” to Protestantism, in an invidious distinction from “collectivist” and repressive Catholicism, and even to original Christianity overall, as Simmel implies. To the Enlightenment, however, this transcendental “immediacy” is not enough or even needed (Bittner 1996) for individual liberty, dignity, happiness, and humane life in society, “here and now” (Artz 1998). In particular, theological individualism is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of political liberty and thus democracy, especially its liberal-secular and only genuine and viable type, as Mises (1950) acknowledges stating that the latter is a “hollow form” if devoid of liberalism. This was witnessed by what Weber calls “Calvinistic state churches” in Europe (Geneva, Holland, and in part Prussia) (Gorski 2003), including Puritan theocracies in Great Britain (England transiently and Scotland near-permanently) and America (Munch 2001), not to mention Pareto’s medieval Christian “Roman theocracy.” If Parsons’ glorified “immediacy” of individuals to God epitomizing Protestant theological individualism formed the necessary or sufficient condition of individual liberty in society and democracy, “Calvinistic state churches” as the paradigmatic antithesis of the latter were nonsequiturs and would not have been established and lasted for centuries, as did New England’s Puritan theocracy from the 1630s to the 1830s. Specifically, if it did, what Weber identifies as the “unexampled tyranny of Puritanism,” notably its “theocracy of New England” or Winthrop’s “Christian Sparta,” as the most repressive and even “totalitarian” subtype of Calvinist theocracies (Munch 2001; Stivers 1994), would have never existed on the face of the earth, such as early and contemporary America as the “Bible Garden”.

To argue or imply the opposite, as Parsons et al. seem to do (Mayway 1984), amounts to a Parsonian variation on the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” by conflating theological and sociological individualism, with the latter misconstrued as the mere effect or auxiliary of the former<sup>12</sup> (Ruggles 2007). Specifically, it conflates the Protestant personal “immediacy” to God, the Bible, and “heaven” with the

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<sup>11</sup> Parsons states that “probably the primary source of this individualistic cast of European thought lies in Christianity [viz.] the immediacy of the individual soul to God, inherent in [Protestantism],” thus curiously overlooking the Enlightenment and its sociological or secular individualism. To imply, as he does, that Christianity, specifically Protestant theological individualism, was the “primary source of this individualistic cast” of the Enlightenment overlooks that the latter was originally and essentially a non- or post-Christian, though not fully anti-Christian or atheistic, cultural revolution (Artz 1998), notably in France (Voltaire, Diderot) and in part Britain (Hume).

<sup>12</sup> Evoking Parsons, Ruggles (2007:969) suggests that “increasing individualism and a growing taste for privacy [is regarded] as a logical outcome of cultural changes set in motion by the Reformation and the Enlightenment,” implicitly conflating the theological individualism and transcendental “privacy,” namely what Weber calls “unprecedented inner loneliness,” in the former with the sociological individualism and societal privacy in the latter.

Enlightenment liberal-secular principle of individual liberty, choice, dignity, well-being, happiness, privacy, humane life, and hope in *society* or this world. It confuses the sacredness of supra- and antihuman deities, notably the omnipotent, unjust, and merciless “God of Calvinism” and his self-assigned Puritan agents claiming “divine rights,” with the sanctity of human individuals in Durkheim’s sense and the inviolability of their liberties, choices, rights, and lives (Cole 2005). In particular, such arguments commit a conflation of individualist evangelicalism – individuals as their own private theologians and priests in evangelical, sectarian Protestantism – with liberal-secular democracy, civil society, and culture.

The latter is defined and typified by the principle of individual liberty, choice, dignity, humane life, happiness, privacy, and hope, simply the sanctity or respect of humans, and not supra- and antihumans like deities and their self-designated agents with claimed “divine rights” to rule, including torment and kill, other, “depraved” humans. In terms of *dramatis personae*, these Parsonian and related views conflate Calvin and his Puritan “children” Winthrop (Kloppenbergh 1998) and Cromwell (Gorski 2000) as supposed theological “individualists” *cum* actually theocratic autocrats with Voltaire, Kant, Hume, and Jefferson as social-political individualists and liberals (Beck 2000; Habermas 2001; Patell 2001). And Calvin and colleagues embodying the pre-Enlightenment, and Voltaire, Kant, Hume and Jefferson representing the Enlightenment are as different, opposed, or distant as almost literally “heaven and earth.”

Furthermore, such Enlightenment writers as Hume, Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu, and others would admonish that theological individualism can strategically a la Machiavelli be used as what Simmel calls a “compensatory substitute” for sociological or secular individualism in Durkheim’s sense of the sacredness of human individuals and their liberty, life, and happiness in society. For instance, Parsons’ glorified Protestant, especially Puritan, personal “immediacy” to God, the Bible, and “heaven” can be exploited to compensate for the absence or destruction and restriction of individual liberty, choices, rights, privacy, happiness, and humane life in society or “here and now,” operating as spurious political individualism. In essence, this was what sectarian Protestantism, once established in power, notably, as Weber and other sociologists (Tawney 1962) suggest, Calvinist-Puritan theocracy, has historically done and, via its fundamentalist survivals or revivals (Juergensmeyer 2003), presently does. This Calvinist pattern ranges from Calvin’s France via Huguenots and Geneva (Byrne 1997) to Holland under official Calvinism (Gorski 2003) to Puritan theocracies in England, Scotland (Gorski 2000) and America. As regards the latter, the pattern specifically includes early New England (Munch 2001; Stivers 1994) and, as a theocratic “intelligent” design and even growingly realized or approached social system, the contemporary “Bible Belt” (Bauman 1997; Boles 1999; Friedland 2002), not to mention Utah’s effective Mormon, contrary to Southern evangelical detractors denouncing Mormonism as non-Biblical and even “non-Christian,” Biblical-modeled theocracy (McCann 2000; Weisbrod 1999).

From the prism of the Enlightenment and liberalism, Protestant or Christian and other theological and religious “individualism” operates as the poison or “Trojan

horse” of sociological, secular individualism, thus what Mises might call bogus or ersatz “individualism,” making it hardly worth the paper on which it is written or printed. This is what Edward Ross intimates by considering Puritanism, including implicitly its theological “individualism,” as the “antidote” or rather poison of secular democracy and its underlying political individualism in America, thus literally worthless for the Enlightenment’s liberal-democratic vision. For example, for “witches,” “heretics” like Quakers, and “heathen” Native Americans (Munch 2001), Parsons’ Protestant “immediacy of the individual soul to God,” just as “Christian liberty” (Dayton 1999) or the “Body of Liberties” (Gould 1996) in his Puritan-ruled New England, was not worth the paper on which they were solemnly printed.

The above holds true, with prudent qualifications, for their subsequent and contemporary functional equivalents or proxies. The latter include liberal secularists and notably unbelievers and agnostics in America due to their observed systematic (“need not apply”) exclusion from politics and culture and other mistreatments by “godly” powers like a “faith-based” government at all levels (Edgell et al. 2006), especially by “Bible Belt” and other “red” states, proclaiming and demanding the belief in the “existence of Divinity”<sup>13</sup> as the key condition for political and social inclusion, and apparently sanctioning the denials of or indifference to such a proclamation. For them, the Jeffersonian elimination of the “religious test for political office” (Dayton 1999) and the related constitutional prohibition of “government promotion of religion” via the “wall of eternal separation of church and state” and by implication Puritan theological individualism is hardly worth the paper used.

At any rate, it is important to distinguish the Enlightenment’s sociological or secular individualism focused on human individuals and their liberty, happiness, well-being, dignity, privacy, and humane life in society from pre-Enlightenment medieval “Christian,” including Protestant, and any theological individualisms with their exclusively “heavenly” focus (“beyond the stars,” as a self-proclaimed “born again” evangelical US President said). Such “heavenly” individualism is thus outside of the scope of the Enlightenment principles of empirical reality or empiricism, human reason, knowledge, and rationalism, knowledge and science, and is instead ersatz political and social individualism from the angle of liberal-secular democracy and modernity.

In addition, Enlightenment, and any sociological individualism, is to be distinguished from methodological individualism (Boudon 1981). This is a distinction

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<sup>13</sup> Denying what the US Federal government officially in some obscure documents proclaims as the “existence of divinity” remains a crime of blasphemy. While not punished with death as by New England Puritanism, such a “crime” remains a certain open or tacit disqualification or at least disadvantage and not so “great expectation” for political office in much of America, especially the “Bible Belt” ruled, as Mencken (1982) noted a century ago, by “godly” fundamentalist powers that enforce with what Hume called Puritan-style “wild fanaticism” related proclamations and consequently make “unbelievers need not apply” in politics up to the early twenty-first century, despite such discriminatory practices on the basis of religion being judged unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the 1960s.

between the first as ontological or empirical and the second as epistemological or analytical individualism (Hayek 1948), between human individuals endowed with liberties, rights, dignity, happiness, and hope in society, *and* particular scientific and other analysts taking these individual humans as the point of departure and main unit of analysis. As in the previous case, methodological or epistemological individualism is neither the necessary nor sufficient condition of sociological or ontological, including political and civil, individualism, thus individual liberties, choices, rights, well-being, humane life, and happiness, and conversely the second type does not necessarily lead to the first.

In summary, the Enlightenment was an essentially (though not extremely) individualistic intellectual movement and a cultural revolution in the form of social or secular, thus genuine, individualism, as distinguished from and superseding theological or “heavenly” individualism as its “compensatory substitute” amenable to and degenerating into Machiavellian manipulation.

### ***Liberal Individualism***

On the basis of its liberal core, the Enlightenment is a paradigmatic exemplar or primary source of liberal individualism or what Mannheim (1986) calls “individualistic liberalism” in modern Western societies. In this sense, the Enlightenment constituted *liberal*, as profoundly different from and opposed by antiliberal (if any) individualism, such as conservative and fascist, both being usually religious or theological and partly economic, individualisms. Yet typically it does not become what Parsons (1967a) calls atomism regarded as characteristic of utilitarianism and orthodox economics. Atomism is its extreme and exaggerated form after the image of humans as Leibnitz’s isolated monads or existing in the Hobbesian antisocial state of nature involving “war of everyone against everyone.” For instance, in early and contemporary America a functional equivalent or proxy of this Hobbesian state is the anti-Enlightenment “Wild West” (Clemens 2007; Hill 2002) pervaded by glorified “rugged individualism” and inhabited by self-reliant individuals relying on their private weapons for defense (Munch 1994), perpetuating the self-destructive gun culture as literally the deadly weapon destroying or perverting all Enlightenment values and institutions, especially comprehensive pacifism or peaceful conflict resolution within and across society. Also, Enlightenment liberal individualism is not, as Durkheim admits, necessarily egoism, as its related extreme and degenerate form, contrary to anti-Enlightenment conservative, notably fundamentalist and fascist enemies, glorifying “greater than humans and life” collective religious and national causes, and postmodern detractors alleging “nothing new under the sun” (Trey 1998) in this respect.

Additionally, Mises (1950) suggests that the “individualist social philosophy of the epoch of [the] Enlightenment disposed of the conflict between Individualism and Collectivism,” thus between modern liberalism and medieval-rooted anti-Enlightenment conservatism, including its own offspring fascism, as well as



socialism or communism.<sup>14</sup> By assumption, the “individualistic forces of the Enlightenment” (McLaren and Coward 1999) resolved this conflict in favor of individualism and liberalism, thus yielding liberal individualism or individualistic liberalism. Evidently, Enlightenment core values and legacies inherited in modern Western and other democratic societies include individualism, in intimate connection and mutual reinforcement with the complex of liberalism, secularism, scientific rationalism, and social progress (Angel 1994).

As implied, Enlightenment liberal individualism is specifically and consistently defined and expressed by the principle and institutional system of individual liberties, rights (including privacy), respect, dignity, well-being, happiness, and humane life within society, as distinct from Weber’s “world beyond” postulated by Parsons’ theological, “heavenly” alternative. In short, the Enlightenment literally cultivated the “threads of individual liberty” and fused them with related values, including “equality under the law” (Hodgson 1999). No doubt, individual liberties and choices, civil rights, a private sphere or privacy, personal autonomy, fulfillment, well-being, humane life, and happiness are firmly established and taken for granted values and institutions in modern Western democratic and other societies, particularly, but not only America, as ethnocentric writers and politicians allege and perhaps most Americans believe. If so, then they are first and foremost the product and legacy of the Enlightenment and its liberal-secular individualism, rather than or just secondarily of Parsons’ pre- and anti-Enlightenment Protestant theological “individualism” as its “compensatory substitute” used as a Machiavellian “heavenly” substitution – by implication, “all you need for liberty, life, and happiness is your personal immediacy to God and the Bible, forget liberal Enlightenment-based individual liberties and human rights, including those globally recognized and codified by the United Nations, as ungodly, foreign, and (so) evil.”

If the essence of enlightenment in general is admittedly, freedom of the “choice between alternatives” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) in social life, it was then specifically the eighteenth century Enlightenment that primarily provided such choices and hence individual and all liberties among Western and other societies. In short, the Enlightenment is consistently and completely “prochoice” in all social fields and thus profreedom for individuals, epitomizing its consistent and comprehensive liberalism. Conversely, both the pre-Enlightenment, specifically medieval Western “Christian” and other religiously dominated (Islamic, Hindu, etc.) civilization, and the counter-Enlightenment like postmedieval conservatism, including its own “child” fascism and its religious subtype fundamentalism, substantively proscribe, eliminate, or restrict “choice between alternatives” in social life, thus individual liberty in society.

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<sup>14</sup>Mises explicitly and systematically links “Collectivism” with “Socialism” and only implicitly or sporadically with “reactionary Conservatism,” just as “Individualism” with “Liberalism.” A minimalist interpretation is that if “Individualism” is paradigmatically linked with “Liberalism,” then “Collectivism” is with “Conservatism” as its original and perennial antagonist, and not, as he often seems to contend, only or mainly with “Socialism” as the identified major antiliberal, more precisely, anticapitalist, force.

At most, both the pre- and anti-Enlightenment permit a spurious “choice between alternatives” beyond human society through “heaven and hell” or “salvation-damnation” choices as a “compensatory substitute” over which humans have no control or “input” relative to suprahuman divine forces and determinations. This holds true in particular of Calvinism with its predestination doctrine of individuals being saved or damned regardless of their deeds or moral merits as once-Calvinist Franklin objected (Byrne 1997), as well as Islam with its equivalents like the dogma of determination in this world, distinguished by Weber from Calvin’s transcendental doctrine. In passing, Calvinism, including Puritanism, therefore admittedly committed an “almost exact” reversal (Tawney 1962) of original or idealized Christianity as Weber’s universal religion of salvation reckoning “good works” as the path or promise, via the pre-Calvinist Christian church as the organization for dispensation of religious grace to all on the ground that the “house of God is open to everyone,” to heaven. Alternatively, Calvinism-Puritanism functioned as and through revived Protestant fundamentalism (e.g., Southern Baptism with its Calvinist doctrine of “unconditional election,” cf., Hinson 1997) remains the functional equivalent of Islam, as in Weber’s account not “genuine” religion of universal salvation, in respect of such antiuniversalism in “heaven” or what he calls “particularism of religious grace.”

Yet from the prism of the Enlightenment and its liberal individualism, such Calvinist, Islamic, and other transcendental “choices” seek to compensate for and ultimately eliminate or pervert the freedom of the “choice between alternatives” in society. For instance, contemporary Protestant and Islamic fundamentalism in America and Muslim societies are observed to promise to solve the “agony of choice” by ultimately eliminating choices themselves (Bauman 2001). This is in particular observed and expected for the “evangelist churches of the Bible Belt” in America and the “Islamic integrisme of ayatollahs” in Iran, as well as Taliban “holy warriors” in Afghanistan (Juergensmeyer 2003; Mansbach 2006), as shared theocratic and thus protototalitarian “solutions” to the “burden” of individual liberty through actually abolishing human liberties (Bauman 1997) and eventually lives, as via the common death penalty system and “holy” war.

Hence, this “choice” between “heaven and hell” expresses a sort of ersatz individual freedom in social life a la “Christian liberty” (Dayton 1999) as the “freedom of choice” among various branches of Christianity or religion, thus metaphorically just different forms of “opium” in a value-neutral sense (Merton 1968) or “religious goods” within the “economics of religion” *cum* rational choice theory. Within sectarian Protestantism this especially involved the individual “freedom of choice” among multiple almost invariably theocratic, evangelical, and apocalyptic or nihilistic sects, cults, and agents, thus types of theocracy or “holy” tyranny, including kinds of “godly” punishment, death, and mass suicide, and in that sense humiliation and suffering of both oneself and others or composite sadism-masochism (Adorno 2001; McLaughlin 1996) and their “high roads” to the “fantasy of salvation” (Giddens 1984). As implied, the latter or “heaven” degenerates from a universal, free “good” by “good works” in original or idealized universalistic Christianity to a monopolized or scarce “commodity” via “heavenly” oligarchic election

(Zaret 1989) of a few and damnation for most humans, as in antiuniversalistic Calvinism and its theological parasite Puritanism (e.g., its adoption of the predestination dogma). Recall the ersatz “freedom of choice” between multiple theocratic and nihilistic sects and cults, thus types of “godly” tyranny, punishment, cruel torment and suffering, and ultimate death or sacrifice for “higher” causes, was what precisely typified Calvin’s pre-Enlightenment Geneva, Holland under Calvinism, Puritan-ruled England and Scotland and New England as well as the latter’s vestige or revival in the anti-Enlightenment, antiliberal Southern “Bible Belt” and its extensions in other “red” regions such as Utah’s Mormon theocracy, etc.

Such pre- and anti-Enlightenment “freedom” and society was a sort of nightmare world, expressing the Dark Middle Ages and their attempted return via conservatism (Bauman 2001; Berman 2000), for the Enlightenment, thus the very reason for the latter’s advent and renewal, via the neo-Enlightenment, and its individualistic liberalism. For instance, observations suggest that Mormon-ruled Utah is the “nightmarish world” (McCann 2000) or the most distant point from the frame of the Enlightenment and individualistic liberalism, as are in extension the “Bible Belt” and Iran, Taliban, and other Islamic theocracies (Bauman 1997; Juergensmeyer 2003), all being as antithetical to Enlightenment-based values and societies as “heaven and hell.”

If anything, freedom of individual choice, dignified life, and happiness in society, a paramount ideal and value in modern democratic societies, is what crucially distinguishes the Enlightenment from the pre- and counter-Enlightenment denying and eliminating such choices, or at most permitting their transcendental beyond-society and ersatz, Christian and Islamic only “liberty” substitutes. Modern liberal-democratic and individualistic societies, including Europe and America hence become the true children or heirs of the Enlightenment and its liberal individualism. They have developed beyond the medieval Christian world, including the Protestant Reformation with its glorified theological yet socially spurious or compensatory, eventually theocratic “individualism,” as well as the counter-Enlightenment (such as conservatism and its ultimate product or regular ally fascism).

Consequently, what analysts identify as “the ‘sunlit’ side” of the Enlightenment entails its emphasis on, alongside human reason, hope, and social progress, and defense of individual autonomy and its “opposition to religious and political tyranny” (Hinchman 1984). In that sense, this side of the Enlightenment at least counterbalances, if not fully neutralizes, what its various adversaries, detractors, critics, and skeptics, from Burke and Hegel to Marxist and other critical theorists to post-modernists and feminists, emphasize as its “dark side,” forming its inner “dialectic” and self-contradiction (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). Admittedly, in virtue of its underlying intertwined political liberalism, individualism, and rationalism, the Enlightenment was a “celebration of the autonomy of the individual against oppressive, irrational traditions” (Hinchman 1984), including its “human rights” tradition (also, Habermas 2001). Furthermore, even its first and perhaps most “enlightened” critic Hegel, unlike Burke mourning the end of the “darkness” of aristocratic-despotic feudalism and attacking its liberal-democratic successor, considered the “freedom of the individual” and hence the formation of the “uniquely modern domain” of

civil society as the sphere of personal liberties and privacy, to be the “irrevocable achievement of the modern age” of Enlightenment during the eighteenth century (Schmidt 1996). The term “irrevocable” is another way to acknowledge what has already been stated. Modern liberal-democratic society, precisely defined by individual freedom and the independent civil sphere, is, as Hegel described modernity, the genuine child of the Enlightenment (Berman 2000; Delanty 2000; Habermas 2001; Smart 2000). At least it is more so than the product of the pre- and counter-Enlightenment, namely the medieval Christian world, including traditional Catholicism and the Protestant Reformation, and illiberal conservatism, respectively.

## Social Equality and Justice and the Enlightenment

In conjunction and mutual reinforcement with liberty and the sanctity of human individuals and their life- and happiness-defining individualism, equality, inclusion, and justice are constitutive values and institutions, or givens, in modern Western democratic and other societies, including America. These values and institutions, including Jeffersonian universal equality and justice – as expressed in “all men are created equal” and “justice for all” – in America, are essentially and primarily the ideals and legacies of the Enlightenment. In this respect, modern egalitarian and inclusive societies are, first and foremost, the true children of Enlightenment’s original values of social equality, inclusion, justice, and progress (Dillon 1999; Steensland 2006). Specifically, they are the offspring of the Enlightenment on the account of its “threads of equality under the law,” joined and reinforced with individual liberty (Hodgson 1999). Relatedly, modern equitable or fair societies are the descendants of the Enlightenment in virtue of its “more just vision for the future” (Simon 1995), of its “ideals of justice and progress” (Steensland 2006).

Hence, those people and groups, yet not necessarily all, entitled with and enjoying equality, inclusion, and justice in their societies are primarily indebted and “grateful” to the Enlightenment (Byrne 1997) as the strongest and the most consistent advocate of such human rights and entitlements, in conjunction and mutual reinforcement with individual and political liberty. In short, they are so, even if perhaps unknowingly, because of original “Enlightenment values” of equality, justice, and inclusion, including “communal participation,” in society (Dillon 1999). In this sense, “we are all the debtors” to the Enlightenment by admittedly owing to it the modern “Western political principle” and institutions of equality, including equal life chances or opportunities, universal inclusion, justice, and liberty<sup>15</sup> in society (Byrne 1997).

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<sup>15</sup>Byrne (1997:24) comments that “whether it was Rousseau’s rather vague idea that somehow power should emanate from the ‘general will’ of the people or the new American ideal of everybody’s right to the pursuit of happiness, it is to the Enlightenment that we owe the Western political principle that everyone in society should have a share in society’s benefits and opportunities.”

The Enlightenment is historically the first or strongest program of genuinely universal equality, inclusion, and justice (like liberty) in society within the framework of Western and other civilization during its postclassical or medieval phase since the fourth century AD, except for the artistic Renaissance also harboring or anticipating egalitarian and humanistic as well as liberal and modernist ideas (Eisenstadt 1998). At least in view of classical democracy and the Renaissance the Enlightenment creates if not the first, then, as Gustav Schmoller suggests, the most open, powerful, and consistent project and formulation of the “democratic idea of equality” or sociopolitical egalitarianism within Western and other society during its history, since ancient Greek civilization through the eighteenth century. Furthermore, in some historical accounts, the Enlightenment is effectively the first or novel project with respect to egalitarianism as well as rationalism, democracy, human liberties and rights, and social progress within Western history and society<sup>16</sup> (Artz 1998).

In turn, social equality, universal inclusion, and justice (like liberty) form the enduring, self-reproducing, and expanding heritage of the Enlightenment in modern Western and other democratic, egalitarian, and inclusive societies. Hence, these ideals and values, conjoined and mutually reinforced with liberty and the sanctity of human individuals and their rights, well-being, life, and happiness, form a sort of post- or rather neo-Enlightenment in modern democratic societies, including Europe and America alike. Admittedly, the modern notion of equality, thus egalitarianism, is primarily grounded in and derived from the Enlightenment liberal-democratic, egalitarian, and rationalistic vision of *all* humans – not just the few “elect,” as in Calvinism and its evangelical revivals (Southern Baptism’s “unconditional election,” etc.) – as endowed with the “fundamental right” to be “free and reasonable persons”<sup>17</sup> (Brink 2000). In particular, American democratic-egalitarian and Enlightenment traditions are linked, as epitomized by Jefferson and colleagues, with the first resting on the second<sup>18</sup> (Cross 2000).

### ***Enlightenment vs. Non-Enlightenment Egalitarianism and Inclusion***

The Enlightenment’s principle of universal equality, inclusion, and justice in society is to be distinguished from Christianity’s original theological equality. This distinction is needed in light of what some sociologists describe as the sociologically

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<sup>16</sup> According to Artz (1998:33), the Enlightenment was the first to posit that “the ability to use their reason makes men equal, laws should accord with popular wishes and should preserve men’s rights, and with the use of reason, progress is sure to come.”

<sup>17</sup> Brink (2000:13) adds that this egalitarian and liberal “assumption is based on a post-Enlightenment belief in the reasonableness of human beings [resting] on their capacity to act autonomously,” the term “post-Enlightenment” apparently signifying neo- rather than counter-Enlightenment.

<sup>18</sup> Cross (2000:245) comments that “both the cultural Right and Left shared the Enlightenment idea that adults must protect children from the adult world of limitless choice in order to prepare them to enter it with self-restraint.”

“deceptive egalitarianism of Christian faith” (Dahrendorf 1979) in contrast to that of secular liberalism, including the Enlightenment.

First, to the Enlightenment, Christianity’s original egalitarianism or universalism in respect of “heaven” is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of true equality, universal inclusion, and justice as well as liberty, humane life, and happiness, within human society or “this world.” “Heavenly” or theological “egalitarianism” and “universalism” are not enough for, albeit occasionally helpful and supportive to genuine sociological egalitarianism and universalism, let alone libertarianism in the proper form and sense of liberalism rather than conservative spurious “libertarianism.” Furthermore, the Enlightenment implicitly admonishes or envisions that such theological egalitarianism and universalism could be strategically used, in the way of Machiavellianism or extolled utilitarianism (Mayway 1984), as Simmel’s “compensatory substitute” or ersatz alternative for its sociological variant. Namely, equality, universal inclusion, and justice in “heaven” or before God can be substituted for those in human society or before its institutions, hence made, as Tawney (1962) observes for Puritanism, a sort of “hell in this world” or purgatory for most humans to be redeemed for their suffering and tormenting by the ultimate reward of the “fantasy of salvation” (Giddens 1984) in the world beyond. On this account, from the stance of the Enlightenment, Christian and other religious “heavenly” egalitarianism reappears as spurious, insufficient, thus “deceptive” in sociological or secular terms. In consequence, the Enlightenment both initially appropriates and eventually transcends Christian theological egalitarianism and universalism. It does by transforming and “landing” the latter from “heaven” into human society, unlike, in the view of such Enlightenment writers as Voltaire, Kant, and Hume, Christianity and other world religions (including Islam and Hinduism) regarded as unable or unwilling to perform this transformation and extension during most of their history (also, Juergensmeyer 2003).

If, as Schmoller (and Simmel) suggests, the egalitarian-democratic idea of equality in primarily theological-religious terms was “produced by Christianity,” its explicit reformulation by the eighteenth century Enlightenment reportedly “caused most states to give up the privileges of classes and strata, and to substitute equality of rights.”<sup>19</sup> The Enlightenment does not merely appropriate or continue but rather transforms and extends such theological egalitarianism and universalism into the sociological principle of “equality and justice for all” within society, or of humans “equally valued” (Lucas 2000) by societal institutions and secular powers, not just by transcendental sacred power not only by God, simply by government. At the minimum, it adds and joins sociological, secular to Christian putative theological, sacred egalitarianism and universalism, universal equality, inclusion, and justice within society to those in “heaven,” though this is hardly ever a concern for the Enlightenment focusing on life and hope in the social world.

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<sup>19</sup> Byrne (1997:24) proposes that the Enlightenment’s “Western political principle that everyone in society should have a share in society’s benefits and opportunities” probably had its extant and implicit roots in the early “Christian belief in the equality of all in the sight of God,” or as Lucas (2000) puts it, “equally valued by God.”

Negatively, while appropriating or consonant with the original Christian, Catholic-Orthodox belief in the “equality of all in the sight of God” and thus universal salvation, the Enlightenment repudiates with “disgust” (Artz 1998) Protestantism’s (specifically Calvinism’s) underlying radically opposite idea of inequality before an omnipotent, unjust, and merciless or nonunderstanding Deity, as described by Weber, and thus in “grace,” indicating theological antiegalitarianism and antiuniversalism. As Weber and other sociologists suggest, the latter is epitomized by Calvin’s doctrine of predestination as antiegalitarian and antiuniversalistic or exclusionary proto-oligarchic, thus immoral even for Calvinist dissidents like Franklin (Byrne 1997) in virtue of the divine “double decree” (“from eternity”) of “election” of the “aristocracy of salvation” or “heavenly” oligarchy (Zaret 1989) and of “damnation” of the majority of humans regardless of their respective merits or deeds in society. Calvinism, including Puritanism that embraced the doctrine of predestination (the 1647 Westminster Confession), commits a striking reversal of Christianity’s original or idealized egalitarianism and universalism in “heaven” or salvation, conditional on “good works” and of related values such as compassion (Tawney 1962) and *caritas* (Tiryakian 2002). Recall that Weber depicts the doctrine of predestination as “unjust,” “harsh,” and “extreme inhumanity” and to that extent ultimate immorality, becoming a nonsequitur for the humanistic Enlightenment and some dissident Calvinists (Arminians), from Servetus executed for blasphemy by Calvin and colleagues in Geneva (Dombrowski 2001) to Franklin.

In sum, the Enlightenment regards the initial Christian belief in the “equality of all in the sight of God” as partial, insufficient, or compensatory and in that sense “deceptive” for *societal* equality, universal, inclusion, justice, and liberty. Consequently, it transforms and transmits this egalitarianism and universalism from transcendental “heaven” to life “here and now” in contrast to, as the Enlightenment perceives, the Christian and other world religions during most of their history and societies. And, it rejects or neglects the subsequent Protestant (specifically Calvinist) alternative and thus non- or pseudo-Christian idea of effective *inequality* of humans in the “sight of God,” in divine grace, salvation, or “heaven,” especially because of its adverse consequences for social equality, inclusion, and justice and its sanctification or sociodicy (Bourdieu 1998) of their exact opposites. Remember also that Weber identifies the “analogy between the unjust (according to human standards) predestination of only a few” in Calvinism for heaven as a “harsh” dogma (also, Fourcade and Healy 2007) with “extreme inhumanity” and the “equally unjust, but equally divinely ordained, distribution of wealth” and in extension power and status, thus life chances or opportunities in society.

Consequently, Enlightenment’s inner egalitarianism, inclusion, and universalism supersede Calvinist-Puritan “heavenly” antiegalitarianism and antiuniversalism as the “aristocracy of salvation” postulated by the antiuniversal and inhumane dogma of predestination and its empirical ramifications in society in the composite of societal aristocracy, oligarchy, and theocracy serving as their dogmatic sacred rationalization. The Enlightenment transcends Calvinist inequality and exclusionism in religious salvation as directly hostile and adversely consequential to sociological egalitarianism and universalism, thus equality, inclusion, and justice in society, just

as Franklin does in his post-Calvinist phase, “inimical” to morality and humanity overall (Byrne 1997). At this point, the Enlightenment and Calvinism, including its Anglo-Saxon extreme Puritanism, and perhaps Protestantism overall function as polar opposites, as mutually exclusive, hostile, disdainful, or distant as “heaven and earth.” It is no wonder that most Enlightenment, French (and in part British) philosophers and sociologists (except for Calvinist Rousseau), notably Voltaire, Diderot, Helvetius, and Comte, like Hume, viewed Calvin’s antiegalitarian exclusionary theology (and even that of the later Luther), in particular his aristocratic doctrine of predestination, let alone his and other tyrannical Calvinist theocracies, with “nothing but raillery and disgust” (Artz 1998). In essence, to the Enlightenment, Calvinism and other Protestantism is even more retrogressive, antagonistic, and destructive in terms of equality, inclusion, and justice in society than original or idealized Christianity, including medieval Catholicism. The underlying reason is its introducing into Christianity of theological “un-Christian” inequality, injustice, and antiuniversalism in the form of sectarianism in the “sight of God.” This sectarianism provides the dogmatic sanctification, as via the predestination dogma, or theology of social inequalities, exclusion, and injustice, as well as of theocratic oppression, persecution, and extermination or “holy” war, not just of what Parsons (1967a) calls the “goodness of [the] God” of Calvinism in an atypical mood almost a la Veblen.

What Weber calls Protestant, for most Enlightenment writers, specifically Calvinist (Munch 1981), sectarianism, notably, in Hume’s words, Puritan “sectaries” in England and America, is and are axiomatically – by definition as “sect” – or actually even more antiegalitarian, antiuniversalistic, or exclusionary than petrified theocratic Catholicism. In this account, the latter as “church” at least maintains the original Christian belief in the equality of humans (“souls”) before God, claiming universalism in salvation or “heaven” (ecumenicalism), an idea overtly or covertly rejected by Protestantism, particularly, explicitly, and vehemently by Calvinism and its sectarian derivative Puritanism (Munch 1981). Comte observes that because of the Protestant connection with the “conservative [social] system,” essentially the antiegalitarian, exclusive, unjust, and despotic feudal *ancien regime* as the “theocratic order” and “theological age,” “all emancipation of the human mind became more repugnant to official Protestantism [and its unorthodox dissenting sects] than to the most degenerate Catholicism.” Using his ideal-type dichotomy Weber may add that this repugnance to human emancipation and implicitly equality, universal inclusion, and justice in society persists precisely because Protestantism arose and functioned at least initially as “sect” as an axiomatically closed, exclusive, and often militant or violent group. This is exemplified by what he identifies as Calvinism’s “sectarian” tendencies and, notably, their extension and intensification through Puritan sects in England and America (also, Munch 1981), in contrast to Catholicism as “church,”<sup>20</sup> namely a universal “hierocratic” organization for

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<sup>20</sup>Generally, Weber distinguishes Catholicism or original Christianity as “church” from Protestantism as a “sect” or the polar opposite; also, he somewhat imprecisely describes early Calvinism, including Puritanism, as the “Church militant” in the apparent or logical meaning of sectarian militancy.



“administration of salvation” to all, though in a sort of fine print on grounds of “good works” as judged God’s representatives.<sup>21</sup>

Hence, for most Enlightenment philosophers and sociologists, notably Voltaire, Kant, Hume, and Comte, Protestantism( especially Calvinism) is a paradigmatic case of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment alike. It is at least on the account of its theological antiegalitarianism and antiuniversalism, simply “heavenly” sectarianism implied in the dogma of predestination, and its consequent dogmatic sanctification of economic, political, and cultural inequality, exclusion, and injustice as “divinely ordained,” and thus immutable, as is “salvation” or “damnation” of humans, “from and for eternity.” Alternatively, for Voltaire, Diderot, Hume, and others, with its illiberal and inhumane traits the “Reformed Church” is not and cannot, contrary to Parsons et al., be the religious equivalent, let alone the source, of the Enlightenment and its liberalism, individualism, universalism, and rationalism, just the original pre-Protestant Christian idea of universal equality before God and in “heaven,” while more tolerant and humane, had been neither necessary nor sufficient to attaining such a condition in human society.

## Social Universalism and the Enlightenment

Social universalism in the form of universal liberty, equality, inclusion, justice, including life chances, human well-being, dignified life, and, if possible as an intangible or a subjective state, happiness in society is also the fundamental value and institution becoming sort of a given in modern Western democratic and other societies. A paradigmatic exemplar is the foremost cherished value, ideal, or dream of universal equality, liberty, justice, including life chances or opportunities, and happiness in Jeffersonian or liberal America, as distinguished from Puritan or conservative (Kloppenber 1998; Munch 2001). It is exemplified by ideas such as “liberty and justice for all,” “all men are created equal,” every human, or at least each American in a conservative narrow or ethnocentric version, is entitled to the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness, etc.

Social universalism as a constitutive value of modern Western and other democratic societies is also primarily the ideal, creation, and legacy of the egalitarian and universalistic Enlightenment, thus being of a relatively radical and even revolutionary

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<sup>21</sup> Protestantism, including Calvinism and even Puritanism, describes itself as a “reformed” and even claims to be the only “true” and “pure church” within Christianity, but strictly speaking is “sect” in Weber’s ideal-typical framework. This is what, after all, his expression “Protestant sectarianism,” adopted by Weberian (Munch 2001) as well as US conservative sociologists (Lipset 1996), indicates. In passing, Weber makes a distinction between Calvinism as “church” or “hierarchical institution” and Puritanism as “sect” to distinguish the former from the latter as its derivative. Still, for Weber Calvinism and even Protestantism as a whole substantively remains a “sect” vs. Catholicism as “church” within the framework of Christianity, as indicated by his detection and emphasis of Calvinist underlying “sectarian” tendencies, generating or culminating into Puritan sects (also, Munch 1981).

character and recent origin. In particular, the supreme ideal of equality, liberty, justice, life, and happiness “for all” in America is basically Jefferson’s formulation, codification, or substantive transfer from the old to the new world, of Enlightenment social, including political, cultural, and moral, universalism, notably the universalistic, liberal, egalitarian, optimistic, and humanitarian ideas of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, Condorcet, Kant, and Hume. Substantively implied in Jefferson’s egalitarian statements and formally enacted recently, following the civil rights movement of the 1960s, particularly the American idea of equality of economic and other opportunities, as distinct from that of condition or wealth, is first and foremost, the expression of the Enlightenment ideal of what Weber and other sociologists call universal, equal, and expanding life chances (Dahrendorf 1979).

The Enlightenment was and remains the paradigm or model of social universalism comprising universal liberty, equality, inclusion, and justice, including life chances or opportunities, as well as the pursuit of human well-being, dignified life, and happiness in society via its enduring legacy. In particular, it was and remains the paradigm of individual moral liberty or universalistic morality (Habermas 1989a), as epitomized by Voltaire-Hume-Kant’s appreciation and attribution of free agency in this and other spheres of society to all humans. In this sense, the Enlightenment’s is true liberal universalism or universal social, including moral, cultural, and political, liberalism (Reiman 1997). Its universalism is true to the very name, as distinct from spurious and partial economic, free-market, libertarianism. It is what Hayek (1948), holding anti-Enlightenment and antirationalistic views (in contrast to his strongly pro-Enlightenment colleague Mises), claims to be “true individualism” spuriously attributed to such archenemies of the Enlightenment and liberalism as Burke, the supreme apologist of feudal aristocracy (Schmidt 1996), and Tocqueville similarly described by Parsons (1967a), alongside Enlightenment and liberal precursors or representatives like Locke, Hume, Ferguson, and Smith.<sup>22</sup>

In Mannheim’s (1986) words, the Enlightenment harbors universalism in the specific sense of “individualistic liberalism” as the principle of universal individual liberty in society, and not only, as in economic “libertarianism,” the economy and markets, but also in morality and private life or the civic sphere, religion, art, science, education, and all culture, and politics. Hence, as the principle of universal individual liberty, equality, inclusion, justice, and happiness in society, Enlightenment’s liberal universalism is the prime condition and even substantive equivalent, rather than – as anti-Enlightenment conservatism or specious libertarianism a la Hayek et al. claim – the opposite of individualism. If genuine universalism is not the “enemy” of, but rather sustains and complements, individualism (Habermas 1996) as a general rule, then this holds true first and foremost of their

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<sup>22</sup>In a typical misconception of the Enlightenment and liberalism (Berry 1997), in so doing Hayek overlooks or denies that Burke’s and any feudal-rooted or protoconservative antiliberalism is either by assumption or in reality anti-individualism, as precisely witnessed in pre-liberal traditionalism or antiliberal conservatism, from medieval despotism to fascism to “born” again fundamentalism and neo-fascism. Thus, it is anything but liberal “individualism” or Mannheim’s “individualistic liberalism.”

Enlightenment liberal, as distinct from pre- and counter-Enlightenment antiliberal, including conservative (if any) versions.

In general, the Enlightenment established the “right of all human beings to freedom” on the basis of emphasizing reason and thus rationality defined by the use of reasoning, notably its scientific form (Evans and Evans 2008; Parsons 1967a) – and not narrowly by utility seeking as in utilitarianism and its modern variant, rational choice theory – as humans’ “distinctive capacity.” In that sense, it comprised and attempted to realize the consistent “aspiration to moral universality” (Reiman 1997). The latter is therefore understood and advocated in the sense of universal individual liberty in the sphere of morality and private life or privacy, thus within civil society, and societal inclusion of all humans, regardless of their ascribed, notably religious, status as the basis in the both pre- and counter-Enlightenment, including the medieval Christian Catholic and Protestant order and postmedieval conservatism, respectively. For instance, the Scottish Enlightenment as epitomized by Hume as well as Ferguson and Smith was universalistic by incorporating “all of humanity and all facets of humanity in its scope,” thus what is called “twin-track universalism” expressed by the concept of “civilization” (Berry 1997).

### *Cosmopolitanism*

A special dimension of Enlightenment and all liberal universalism is cosmopolitanism as its ultimate extension or logical realization beyond a specific society to all other societies or ideally, the world as a whole. Cosmopolitanism, like its corollary pacifism, has not yet become a defining value or a given. Instead, it is typically overwhelmed or subverted by its polar opposites such as nationalism and ethnocentrism *cum* patriotism and their ultimate outcomes (militarism and imperialism) in most Western and other democratic societies, except for (in part) Scandinavia and Canada, especially in America during superpatriotic, militaristic, and imperialistic neoconservatism (Abbott 2005; Steinmetz 2005).

Alternatively, due to its principle of reason and knowledge, the Enlightenment provides the most effective antidote, within the *long durée* of human civilization, to the widely admitted poison or irrationality of nationalism and ethnocentrism, including narcissistic “Americanism,” as what Cooley classically portrays as the “matter of a lack of knowledge” or the product of “blissful ignorance” of other societies. Consequently, it is a most promising long-run remedy to nationalism-ethnocentrism’s pathological effects of militarism, permanent war, and destruction to the no-return point of a MAD outcome via “high-tech” weapons of mass destruction (Habermas 2001; Schelling 2006). The latter is primarily approached or threatened by anti-Enlightenment forces such as Puritan-rooted US neoconservatism or “born again” evangelicalism in its Armageddon-like war on the “evil” world resulting in the “delirium of total annihilation” as the “best” path to Calvinist “salvation” (Adorno 2001), as done or anticipated by apocalyptic, self-destructive fundamentalist sects and cults and their “divinely ordained” (“God told me”) leaders in America.

Despite “die hard” antic cosmopolitan and antiuniversalistic atavistic or premodern medieval<sup>23</sup> (Friedland 2002; Gorski 2000) religious nationalism as a sort of extended tribalism in modern societies, especially America under conservatism enamored with “Americanism” (King 1999; Turner 2002), cosmopolitanism, like pacifism and universalism overall, is primarily the product and legacy of the Enlightenment and liberalism in general (Beck 2000; Habermas 2001). As observed, contemporary cosmopolitanism, although still weak in relation to or subdued by nationalism and militarism, even in many Western democratic societies, particularly post- or anti-Jeffersonian America, is primarily traced to the eighteenth century Enlightenment and its “impulse toward worldly breadth” (Dicker 2003), unlike both the pre- and anti-Enlightenment with their opposite tendencies to closure and exclusion.

The Enlightenment is the paradigmatic and probably the first genuine or most elaborate and explicit vision of cosmopolitanism within Western society and perhaps beyond, while being adumbrated by the implicitly cosmopolitan Renaissance and its own ideal, classical civilization. In short, the Enlightenment’s is admittedly a “new cosmopolitan culture” (Byrne 1997) defined by the concept of the “citizen of the world,” or openness and tolerance to other cultures and societies. It is in stark contrast and profound discontinuity with the largely antic cosmopolitan, parochial or local, closed, and closed-minded or intolerant medieval world (Gorski 2000), and alternatively, like the Renaissance, in affinity and continuity with relatively cosmopolitan, open, and open-minded or more tolerant classical civilization (Manent 1998; Popper 1973). In this sense, the Enlightenment forms the first genuine or most consistent and powerful project of a cosmopolitan open vs. provincial closed society within Western and other civilization (Angel 1994).

While most Enlightenment philosophers and sociologists, being cosmopolitan in one way or another, except for their main “deviant” Rousseau, also predictably given his lingering antic cosmopolitan Calvinism, cosmopolitanism is especially evident and strong in Kant, Voltaire, Condorcet, Montesquieu, Diderot, Hume, Smith, Saint Simon, Comte, and others. As observed in Europe during the eighteenth century, the cosmopolitan “idea of the citizen of the world” represented an instance of the “programmatically” and “fashionable” ideas of the Enlightenment (Beck 2000). Predictably, the idea is based on the European Enlightenment’s sharp and coherent “distinction between cosmopolitanism and nationalism” (Beck 2002). In turn, the “new cosmopolitan culture of the Enlightenment” reportedly came in conflict with “the traditional political and religious world” (Byrne 1997), primarily “Christian” and in extension Islamic medievalism. In particular, Kant is often invoked as the quintessential cosmopolitan figure of the Enlightenment, at least in its German version, as are Voltaire and Hume in its French and Scottish versions,

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<sup>23</sup>Friedland (2002:125) observes that “we today confront the apparently premodern specter of religious nationalism.” Also, casting doubt on the prevalent view that nationalism is a “modern phenomenon,” Gorski (2000) identifies, in such Western societies as the Calvinist Netherlands and Puritan England, “medieval roots” in their “nationalist discourses” as “no less nationalistic” than those of the French Revolution.

respectively. For instance, in Kant's vision of cosmopolitanism, through their "public use of reason," humans act not only as members of a concrete society or "the entire commonwealth," but "indeed even of a cosmopolitan society" (Schmidt 1996; also, Habermas 2001).

## **Social Progress, Optimism, and Pacifism and the Enlightenment**

### ***Social Progress***

Social progress, or the belief in it, notably its scientific-technological, medical, and economic version, is also an established value or given, even a sort of entitlement and great expectation, for most people in modern Western and other societies, in particular America. Like the prior values, this shared value is primarily the product and legacy of the Enlightenment as a paradigmatic progressivism as well as, relatedly, rationalistic optimism and pacifism owing to its axiomatic "conception of progress and rationality" (King 1999) and its "progressive social goals" (Cascardi 1999). It is primarily to the progressive Enlightenment that modern Western and other advanced societies, including America, are indebted for the idea, expectation, or entitlement, and fact of continuing societal, notably scientific-technological, economic, and medical, progress.

If modern societies exist in the "age of great expectations" of continuous rapid scientific-technological, educational, economic, medical, as well as political, cultural, and overall societal advancement or improvement, then the Enlightenment inaugurates, ushers in, or heralds such times, aspirations, and hopes more than do any pre- and anti-Enlightenment forces. If anything, with respect to the conception and "rational expectation" of social progress, minimally scientific-technological and medical advance and economic improvement, modern Western and other developed societies, including America, represent the true descendants of the Enlightenment. In this sense, "we are all the children" of the progressive and optimistic Enlightenment figures, from Condorcet, Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu, Saint Simon to Hume, Smith, Kant, and Comte. In summary, the near-universal idea and expectation or hope in modern advanced societies, in particular America, that humans can make progress in society by improving or changing their social, including economic, political, and cultural, "destiny" or condition rather than having no control over it predetermined by suprahuman forces like Providential Design (Bendix 1984) is first and foremost the product and legacy of the progressive and optimistic Enlightenment.

Conversely, the common idea and expectation of human progress or social improvement was absent and even unimaginable in the pre-Enlightenment era, like medievalism as, in Comte's view, the exemplary regressive or "retrograde," static, and petrified social system after the image of Mises' "peace of the cemetery." And subsequently, the idea has been condemned, proscribed, or subverted beyond

recognition, as well as strategically abused by the counter-Enlightenment such as conservatism, including religious fundamentalism and fascism. In this sense, modern Western and other democratic advanced societies are indebted to the Enlightenment for disturbing this medieval and generally pre-Enlightenment “peace of the cemetery.” It does so through the then “heretic” idea that humans can improve and generally change their social destiny or condition (“lot”) and pursue and attain happiness, rather than, as in medievalism, permanently remain in the inherited “station of life” and state of misery, indignity, humiliation, torment, and suffering as “divinely ordained” (Bendix 1984). In Weber-Dahrendorf’s words, most people living in modern Western societies, including Americans, figuratively owe, above all, to the Enlightenment the idea of universal life chances or equal social opportunities, a sort of heresy in pre-Enlightenment medievalism and an object of attack, subversion, and suspicion in counter-Enlightenment conservatism, notably theocratic fundamentalism and totalitarian fascism.

The Enlightenment is the paradigmatic and perhaps first genuine ideal and celebration of social progress<sup>24</sup> (Angel 1994), in the sense of improvement and advancement of the human condition (Mumford 1944), life, and happiness in society, within Western civilization, notably in the midst of the medieval Christian world, excluding in part its classical phase and the Renaissance. If anything, it is this social progressivism and optimism, joined and mutually reinforced with rationalism and liberalism, that crucially causes the Enlightenment to delegitimize and supersede the pre-Enlightenment, in particular the medieval Christian world, including both its Catholic and Protestant versions. This world lacked and even opposed the idea of social progress and hope in favor of societal petrification and “heaven” after the image of the “peace of the cemetery.” Thus, Weber cautions that contrary to common views, the “old Protestantism of Luther, Calvin [etc.] had precious little to do with what is today called progress [and even] to whole aspects of modern life which the most extreme religionist would not wish to suppress today, it was directly hostile.” Notably, he suggests that Protestantism should *not* in this and “any other” sense, such as lack of “joy of living,” regarded as “connected with the Enlightenment.”<sup>25</sup> For instance, Calvin’s conception of the “good life” was a polar opposite to that of the Enlightenment as well as the Renaissance and classical civilization, namely to the individual’s search for the “joy of living”

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<sup>24</sup> Angel (1994:347) observes that the Enlightenment is the “epoch in which the third line of progress in history, the dismantling of indiscriminate chiefdom [and theocratic] consciousness (i.e.) the damage that chiefdom consciousness has perpetrated in rippling through our social institutions and entrenching ego-consciousness.”

<sup>25</sup> In contrast to Weber, Mises states that the Enlightenment “doctrine of human progress was an adaptation of the Christian philosophy of salvation,” by implication to society, by modifying the latter “in order to make it agree with its scientific outlook.” This is a somewhat surprising statement, because Mises, like Weber, typically contrasts and even opposes the Enlightenment to the Christian and other religion, as did and do most representatives of both.

through “joys of creativity” and thus self-expression, realization, or happiness in society<sup>26</sup> (Phelps 2007).

In Comte’s terms, the Enlightenment is the first genuine paradigm and appreciation of social dynamics focusing on progress and change in society, in contrast to the pre- and counter-Enlightenment as mostly conceptions and glorifications of “social statics” centering on order and maintenance of petrified institutions and societies. In particular, it provides (also indirectly via classical political economy) the first or most consistent conception of what J.S. Mill, influenced by Comte, calls economic dynamics positing advancement and continuous change in science-based technology and economy in contrast to the pre- and counter-Enlightenment as largely conceptions and glorifications of the “stationary [economic] state” devoid of development and capital growth, as exemplified by ancient China as well as European feudalism.

On this account, recall that Enlightenment constitutes the first true or strongest ideal of improved and expanded life chances, including, as via the French Revolution, the “progressive extension of citizenship rights” promoting equality (Dahrendorf 1979) and, as in the US civil-rights terminology, equal economic and other opportunities indicating progress or amelioration in economy and society. In summary, the above indicates that the Enlightenment is an axiomatic type of social progressivism as well as optimism, humanitarianism, and rationalism, superseding the pre-Enlightenment as the exact opposite, and provoking the anti-Enlightenment as the attempted restoration of the latter.

Thus, Mises (1957) remarks that most postmedieval philosophies of history (e.g., Hegel, Comte, Marx, etc.) were just “adaptations of the Enlightenment idea of progress” in society, including technology and economy as well as politics, culture, and civil society. In this regard, Condorcet is the Enlightenment and subsequently, through his active participation in the French Revolution, “most prominent champion of the notion of progress” (Byrne 1997), as indicated by the title of his best known work (*progrès de l’esprit humain*). Generally, the Enlightenment’s intrinsic idea and rational expectation is that progress in society, ranging from science, knowledge, education, medicine, technology, and economy to governance and politics and to morality and esthetic culture, tends to generate an “enlightened and liberated humanity” freeing itself from the long-standing “degradations of poverty, ignorance, and despotism” (Smart 2000) seen as pervasive in the pre-Enlightenment, specifically the medieval “Christian,” just as Islamic and other religiously dominated, world (Lenski 1994).

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<sup>26</sup> Somewhat atypical for most economists, Phelps (2007:555) adopts the “classical theory of what the good life is, a theory that originated in Europe: Aristotle declared that people everywhere wanted to expand their horizons and ‘discover their talents.’ The Renaissance figure Benvenuto Cellini described the joys of creativity and making it in his autobiography. In Baroque times Miguel de Cervantes and William Shakespeare dramatize the individual’s quest – a moral view call[ed] *vitalism* [also] reflected to a degree by Thomas Jefferson and Voltaire among other Enlightenment figures.” Phelps (2007:555) registers that, in contrast to classical civilization, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment, “for John Calvin (1536), the good life consisted of hard work and wealth accumulation,” though he and his Calvinist disciples would add (and Weber implied) that the latter was only the means of (attaining knowledge of) salvation (“election”) or religious grace as the ultimate, transcendental definition of the “good life” and human “happiness.”

In this sense, the Enlightenment forms the first or paradigmatic collective intellectual and indirectly political (as via the French and American Revolutions) endeavor of striving to what economists (Hirschman 1993) call “voice and exit” in the medieval Western world and beyond, while anticipated by the Renaissance and classical civilization. Admittedly, the Enlightenment is a *voice* for the “expansion of human freedom, reason, life, and happiness and for the unleashing of human powers through the overcoming of various natural and metaphysical obstacles” by means of “expanding scientific discovery and application” (Garrard 2003). Alternatively, it is opposed to and eventually seeks an *exit* from repressive “organized religion, prejudice, and superstition,” specifically, though not solely, their “Christian” form during the “Dark Ages” (Garrard 2003).

### *Optimism and Hope*

Modern Western and other democratic societies (especially America) are generally optimistic or hopeful about the future of human society, as are most individuals living in them (particularly Americans) about their own futures in social, including economic, political, and cultural, terms. Like the idea and expectation of social progress, collective and individual optimism or hope as a given or prevalent in these societies is, above all, the product and legacy of the Enlightenment as an exemplary optimistic, hopeful movement and period in which human hope really “dies last.”

The Enlightenment is the model of optimism or hope about the future of society and of humans in virtue of its original “optimistic spirit” (Fitzpatrick 1999), with certain unsurprising exceptions like Rousseau with his Calvinist pessimism (Garrard 2003) inherited from what Weber calls “gloomy” Calvinism. In particular, it is the prototype and source of liberal optimism and human hope or dream for a better future life within society, as distinguished from the world beyond. This optimism or hope includes utopia in Mannheim’s sense of an idea and attempt of social change or reform, by conceptually and notably in practice transcending the pessimistic and hopeless past and present through a future society, for example the feudal, theocratic, and closed *ancien regime* superseded by liberal-secular and inclusive democracy and civil society.

This very outcome indicates that what pre- and counter-Enlightenment, or feudal and conservative, forces dismissed as “utopia” in the sense of “unrealistic” and “unrealizable,” and still do as mere liberal hope in favor of “heaven” (Lemert 1999), the Enlightenment considers a realistic or possible option, invariably in the form of a liberal-secular, democratic, egalitarian, rational, progressive, and humanitarian future society. What was a “utopia” or “childish dream” for pre- and counter-Enlightenment forces like feudal aristocrats and their arch-conservative apologists a la Maistre and Burke (Parsons 1967a; Schmidt 1996) during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has become an established social reality, something “very real,” in Western and other democratic societies by the 2000s. At this juncture, the evolution of these societies during this period can paradoxically but plausibly be



described as the triumph of the Enlightenment *utopia* and thus liberal hope or dream of a free, rational, progressive, inclusive, and humanitarian society by becoming reality and thus its own fulfillment, a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton 1968). In virtue of this Enlightenment self-reproducing legacy, modern democratic societies during the 2000s (except for the salient “deviant case” of America under neoconservatism) experience the process and age of a sort of new Enlightenment and liberalization in general (Inglehart 2004), including further secularization (Norris and Inglehart 2004), rather than of the post- and counter-Enlightenment, antiliberalization, and antiseularization, contrary to the wishes of US neoconservatives, including fundamentalists and neofascists, as well as rational choice theorists’ assertions.

The Enlightenment is probably the first genuine and comprehensive type of collective and individual optimism, notably liberal hope, within Western civilization. If anything, in virtue of its optimism and liberal hope, the Enlightenment deeply differs from and transcends the pre-Enlightenment as a basically pessimistic and hopeless social system and time, as evidenced by medievalism with its pessimism and hopelessness, while excluding classical civilization and its revival through the Renaissance as more optimistic and hopeful or less pessimistic than medieval times. In this sense, optimism and liberal hope, along with human reason, knowledge, progress, and liberty, are the true light or sunshine in the Enlightenment, and pessimism and hopelessness, alongside superstition, ignorance, and oppression, were what made the Middle Ages truly dark. Mises (1957) remarks that “as against the pessimism of ancient and modern authors who had described the course of human history as the progressive deterioration of the perfect conditions of the fabulous golden age of the past, the Enlightenment displayed an optimistic view.”

In particular, Enlightenment optimism and liberal hope differ from and transcend the essentially pessimistic medieval Christian world, including both its Catholic and Protestant, especially Calvinist-Puritan, versions, devoid of and even condemning optimistic views about humans and society in favor<sup>27</sup> of pessimism a

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<sup>27</sup> According to Garrard (2003:9), Rousseau’s Calvinist pessimism was “among the most uncompromising in the history of modern thought [vs.] atheism and materialism in France after 1750.” This is indicated by Rousseau’s “pessimistic view of history” “savage,” “barbaric,” “civilized” stages as degeneration and that the “main culprit in the tendency of societies to degenerate into a Hobbesian war of all against all is *amour-propre*,” asking, for instance, “if Sparta and Rome perished, what State can hope to endure forever?” (Garrard 2003:110–2). As a predictable Calvinist solution, Rousseau suggested that his fellow Genevans (and all societies) should, as they did, “follow the example of the authoritarian Spartans rather than the democratic Athenians [and their] “dangerous innovations” (Garrard 2003:113). In a bizarre or frivolous twist Rousseau’s “pessimistic conservatism” was manifested in arguing “against the introduction of modern theater in Geneva,” apparently a place where Shakespeare “needed not apply” like in Puritan-ruled England. For illustration, “while there, he watched and was impressed by the French plays that Voltaire had been staging.” Rousseau was outraged; he feared that the theater would debase the morals of his innocent compatriots and that Voltaire “would cause a revolution there, and I would find again in my fatherland the tone, the appearance, the morals that were driving me from Paris” (Garrard 2003:113–4). Then, “in a letter to Voltaire in 1760, Rousseau accused him of ‘ruining’ his beloved Geneva – the ‘anti-Paris’ – incontrovertible proof of which came shortly afterward when his native

la original sin (Byrne 1997) and in that sense cynicism, fatalism, or (Calvinist) predestination via “God’s Providential Design” (Bendix 1984). Weber implies this by observing that the “optimism of the Enlightenment,” as manifested in the belief in the harmony of private and public interests, rejected and eventually transcended “Protestant asceticism in the field of economic ideas” by its “rosy blush” and in that sense was the “laughing heir,” thus the polar opposite, of ascetic Protestantism. Specifically, it is the antipode of what he calls “gloomy” Calvinism and its “terrible seriousness,” with Calvin and colleagues sometimes classified among the “greatest haters” of humanity and their doctrines, notably Calvin’s antiuniversalistic dogma of predestination, being “colored by this hostility”<sup>28</sup> (Fromm 1941; McLaughlin 1996). As is typical, such initial Calvinist doom and gloom and intense hatred were inherited and further reinforced by Puritanism through “pessimistically inclined” Anglo-Saxon Puritans and their “peculiar misanthropy,” including Winthrop and colleagues as “stodgy” (Gould 1996) and “austere” (Kloppenbergh 1998) American Calvinists, plus Calvinist Rousseau, nominally the member but actually a fierce critic of the Enlightenment<sup>29</sup> (Garrard 2003). This is indicated by the observation that Enlightenment optimism is reflected in the idea that society tends to progress under the “guidance of reason” in contrast to and rejection of the “moral pessimism” of Calvinism (Byrne 1997) starting with Calvin himself (Heller 1986), as hyperascetic Protestantism, including Puritanism and its survivals like Presbyterianism, Baptism, and Methodism and its revivals in the aggregate form of contemporary “born again” evangelicalism.

Generally, the Enlightenment is reportedly “optimistic” about humans attaining a “better future” in and improving society, while rejecting and overcoming the pessimistic “traditional Christian” original-sin view of humans, the “authority of Church and state,” and the “sanctity of revelation” by the “rule of experiment and reason”<sup>30</sup> (Artz 1998). Particularly, Enlightenment optimism is grounded on and

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city banned and burned both *The Social Contract* and *Emile*. As a consequence of these events, Rousseau renounced his Genevan citizenship ‘forever’ [second time]” (Garrard 2003:114). If anything, the bizarre, if not insane, case of Rousseau was a paradigmatic proof that the Enlightenment and liberalism overall and Calvinism and all ascetic Protestantism were as mutually exclusive and opposites as literally “heaven and earth,” despite some attempts at reconciliation (Sorkin 2005), specifically that his “die hard” Calvinist views literally poisoned or disfigured his actual or potential Enlightenment and liberal-democratic ideas.

<sup>28</sup>Fromm (1941) adds that the “most striking expression of this hostility is found” especially in “Calvin’s doctrine [of predestination]” and “concept of God” as a sort of “Oriental despot” (Artz 1998).

<sup>29</sup>In this connection, Calvinist Rousseau was an exception that really proved the rule, namely the pattern the Enlightenment as paradigmatic optimism or hope and of Calvinism as exemplary pessimism or “gloom and doom.”

<sup>30</sup>Artz (1998:35–6) adds that “the traditional Christian view of man as tainted by original sin, enduring this vale of tears, and hoping for salvation was no longer acceptable (but) the reasonable course for man (was) to forget about sin in the old sense, and to concentrate on his self-development here and now.”

justified by the “belief in human perfectibility” that rejects the opposite claim contained in the “Christian belief in original sin,” as epitomized in Condorcet’s view of humans as perfectible or “improvable”<sup>31</sup> rather than eternally depraved (Garrard 2003). Alternatively, Enlightenment optimism, notably liberal hope, has been condemned and attacked or suspected as “ungodly” by the counter-Enlightenment such as religious and political conservatism, including fascism. Conservatism has substituted Enlightenment optimism with a theological alternative of “heaven” (Lemert 1999) and its theocratic equivalent of totalitarian “paradise” in the form of a medieval-like “godly” society or “God’s Kingdom on Earth” (Munch 2001) such as “Christian America” (Juergensmeyer 2003), including the “Bible Belt” (Bauman 1997) and a “faith-based” government.

Enlightenment optimism, including liberal hope, overcomes, in Western democratic societies, pre-Enlightenment, specifically medieval “Christian,” pessimism and helplessness or fatalism, including its Calvinist disguise *cum* Divine predestination.<sup>32</sup> Yet evidently the antioptimistic medieval “empire strikes back” through counter-Enlightenment religious conservatism counterattacking the optimistic enemy and refusing to admit the defeat (or take “no” for an answer). Apparently, this conservative attack on liberal optimism and hope forms a particular front and facet in medieval religious orthodoxy’s continuous “mindless battle” (Habermas 2001) against the Enlightenment and liberalism overall.

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<sup>31</sup>Garrard (2003:104) comments that “not only were human beings not tainted with an indelible corruption that always limits progress but, given the empiricism of the French Enlightenment, they were also seen as malleable, and therefore improvable (e.g., Condorcet).”

<sup>32</sup>In passing, Weber and Parsons et al. do not consider the Calvinist dogma of divine predestination, unlike the Islamic one of predetermination, fatalism on the grounds of its “elective affinity” with capitalist activity or wealth accumulation as the “proof,” though not the means, of God’s grace, but this is a dubious view, a sort of “deprived mental gymnastics” (Samuelson 1983). Simply, if humans are predestined by the God of Calvinism either to salvation (a few) or damnation (most) absolutely beyond their control, then this is absolute fatalism from their stance, though with respect to what Weber calls the “world beyond,” as distinguished from “this world.” He limits “fatalism” to the latter by relating the Islamic and other doctrines of predetermination to “this world” in contrast to the Calvinist doctrine of predestination related to the “world beyond,” but this distinction is also dubious or fluid. Conceivably, if humans are predestined beyond their control to “heaven” or “hell,” they will likely experience this as fatalistic as being predetermined in “this world,” simply, as “nothing to do about it” as their fate. For most humans the Islamic doctrine of societal predetermination and the Calvinist dogma of “heavenly” predestination, while formally or theologically distinct, eventually have substantively identical social effects of fatalistic resignation or helplessness in relation to suprahuman entities and their self-designed agents as theocrats with “divine rights,” contrary to Weber and Parsons et al. As Fourcade and Healy (2007:296) imply, the “protocapitalist Calvinists” were resigned to or inflicted by the “salvational anxiety their harsh religious doctrines tended to produce,” notably Calvin’s inhumane and antiuniversalistic doctrine of predestination.

## *Pacifism*

Most modern Western and other democratic societies, with the predictable anti-pacifistic exceptionalism of America as well as Great Britain, under counter-Enlightenment conservatism, have generally become more peaceful and in that sense pacifistic in intersocietal relations, especially following WW II. At the minimum, this holds true if not of the former and would-be-again “great powers” within NATO, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany especially under conservative governments, not to mention Nazism, and, above all, America in the neoconservative project of “empire” (Steinmetz 2005) or imperial state (Abbott 2005), then it does for other exemplary democratic societies such as Scandinavian and similar Western European countries and Canada.

To be sure, unlike social progress, rationalism, and optimism, pacifism has not, like its basis cosmopolitanism, yet become a universal value or a given. Instead, it is overwhelmed and/or subverted by lingering or reasserting militarism and imperialism driven and rationalized by nationalism and militant religion in these societies, especially America during neoconservatism (Abbott 2005; Steinmetz 2005), contrary to Spencer’s and Madison’s expectations of a pacifist, peaceful modern industrial society. For instance, American “born again” fundamentalism reconstructs the “Christian church” and consequently, according to its logic of theocratic merger, “Christian America” as “not pacifist” (Juergensmeyer 2003). Rather, the latter is placed in a perpetual “holy” and “just” war against “evil” societies, just as within society through culture wars and violence, including terrorism, on the grounds that “the Lord God is a man of War” and the Bible “a book of war [and] hate,” with the result of America, including the US military, reconstructed as the “Christian Army of God” (Juergensmeyer 2003) composed of “Christian soldiers” and driven by the “holy scriptures.”<sup>33</sup> In this regard, like cosmopolitanism in general, pacifism appears and is dismissed by “holy” culture and military warriors as “utopian” in America.

Yet, whenever and wherever it has become a given, as in early postwar Germany, Japan, Italy, and most notably Scandinavia and Canada, thus for whatever it is worth or salient in modern Western societies, pacifism is primarily the result and legacy of the Enlightenment and liberalism generally, just as is its parent cosmopolitanism. In global terms, this applies to the “increasing international tendency to prohibit war as an instrument of policy” (Heymann 2003), epitomized in the United Nations’ prohibition or criminalization of wars of aggression (Habermas 2001), namely “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Such a prohibition reflects or realizes the Enlightenment’s hope or expectation of ending total and offensive war in human society (Angel 1994).

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<sup>33</sup> For instance, during the “war on terror” in the 2000s the Pentagon reportedly included a “Bible quote on the cover page of daily intelligence briefings” for the neoconservative administration, such as “quotes from the books of Psalms and Ephesians and the epistles of Peter:” (“Behold, the eye of the Lord is on those who fear Him. To deliver their soul from death. Therefore put on the full armor of God, so that when the day of evil comes, you may be able to stand your ground, and after you have done everything, to stand”).

In turn, predictably the United Nations' prohibition is violated or subverted by anti-Enlightenment conservative forces in the Western "great powers," especially America and Great Britain, on both nationalist and militarist grounds, namely for its representing international<sup>34</sup> or global, so "anti-American," law *and* for being pacifist alike. In recent times, such violations or subversions are exemplified by NATO's illegal 1999 attack on the former Yugoslavia on behalf of an admittedly "ethnic terrorist army" – thus a double act of interstate terrorism – and the joint American-British invasion and occupation of Iraq during the 2000s, just as before by the Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and other postwar "all-American" offensive wars. Therefore, anti-Enlightenment conservative nationalistic-militaristic forces in America, Great Britain, and other "great powers," including reunified Germany, seek to render the United Nations' prohibition and in extension the Enlightenment's principled repudiation of wars of aggression not worth the paper on which it is printed. This is how the prohibition was precisely experienced by those countries, from Vietnam to Yugoslavia to Iraq, subjected to the American-British Puritan-style self-righteous, moralistic war (Tiryakian 2002; Turner 2002) on the "evil" world through the indiscriminate use of "high-tech" weapons of mass destruction.

The Enlightenment is the most consistent and articulated conception of pacifism through rejecting what Spencer calls offensive permanent wars in favor of defensive temporary war only and overcoming militarist and repressive by peaceful and liberal-democratic industrial society. Enlightenment pacifism promotes and intellectually legitimizes what Weber also identifies and predicts as the "universal pacification and the elimination of all struggles for power in the great world empires," though this prediction has not proved as valid as he, and Spencer and Madison, perhaps expected, in light of the experience of World War I and World War II. In general, in Webster's words the Enlightenment provides the vision of "general pacification of social relations," economic and social, sacred and secular, intra- and intersocietal. Notably, the Enlightenment admittedly entails "optimism" about and endeavors for the "elimination of large scale wars"<sup>35</sup> (Angel 1994).

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<sup>34</sup> Referring to the neoconservative war cum "crusade" on terrorism (Heymann 2003:164) comments that the US president "is free, as far as our own courts are concerned, to ignore customary international law, but that has its price; so, too, does an unwillingness to take part in a regime of treaties, or to subject ourselves to new institutions designed to enforce international law."

<sup>35</sup> Angel (1994:346) elaborates that such Enlightenment optimism or pacifism suggests compelling evidence that "people can live out their lives without manifesting the potential for the irrational collective aggressions of large scale wars [i.e.] both in small scale societies and in large scale technologically advanced collectivities there is no overwhelming need for wars [vs.] any neat sociobiological or psychological argument for pessimism." This leads to the following hypothetical question and answer: "Isn't it perhaps enough to point to the holocaust [plus ethnic cleansing] to prove the bankruptcy of [the Enlightenment] hopes that collective irrationalist barbarities can be overcome? But it is shortsightedness to think that genocidal irrationalism is an invention of the twentieth century, as though designed by an antirationalist puppeteer to prove the hopelessness of rationalistic human prospects. From the earliest days (there are) records of genocidal intentions and campaigns" (Angel 1994:341). For example, arguably "if the Hebrew Bible can take for granted the acceptability of genocidal campaigns *and* the pursuit of justice, then our collective horror at the Holocaust shows the degree of moral progress (during) the last several thousand years" (Angel 1994:342).

## Human Happiness in Society and the Enlightenment

The idea and pursuit of human happiness and humane life in society or this world is a universal value, expectation, entitlement, or given (Artz 1998) in modern Western and other democratic societies, in particular America. Like social progress and optimism, the concept of and right to the pursuit and attainment of human happiness and humane life is, first and foremost, the creation and legacy of the Enlightenment, and thus of relatively novel nature and recent historical origins.

The Enlightenment is the vision and celebration of human happiness and humane life in society or “here below” as distinct from the world beyond and what US conservatives prefer as “heaven” (Lemert 1999; Wuthnow 1998). Its project or dream is, as Diderot put it, “the happiness of humankind” by, in Condorcet’s words, “seeking progress from misery to happiness.” Diderot and Condorcet are particularly relevant in virtue of their shared emphasis on reason and scientific rationalism, notably the “acquisition of knowledge,” as a “necessary condition of human happiness” (Garrard 2003). They thus reject and overcome the condemnation of secular “ungodly” knowledge as a “forbidden apple” and the explicit or implicit equation of ignorance with “bliss” in the pre-Enlightenment Christian world and contemporary anti-Enlightenment religious conservatism like Protestant fundamentalism in America (Darnell and Sherkat 1997). For instance, Diderot’s edited *Encyclopédie* as the foremost expression and document of the French and all European Enlightenment, posits and promotes, alongside secular morality and public virtue (also, Linton 2001), “human happiness in this life as its object,” with emphasis on “toleration and humanitarianism” (Artz 1998). Admittedly, this crucial book is characterized with “an almost boundless confidence” in science and reason in general as the primary instrument of “advancing human understanding and thereby happiness” (Garrard 2003).

In modern economic terms, the Enlightenment aims at “maximizing human happiness” (Angel 1994; McLaren and Coward 1999) through its “theories of universal happiness” (Linton 2001). In passing, the term quantitative “maximization” (Clark et al. 2008) does not seem appropriate with respect to happiness (Lane 2000), as an instance of admittedly “invaluable goods” (Arrow 1997), and thus essentially impervious to quantification or cardinal measurement, as is Bentham’s utility-pleasure as one of its elements or correlates. Yet, in a far cry from Diderot-Condorcet’s notion of happiness, it is misconstrued and distorted as “psychic income” or an “empirical measure” of the “economic notion” of “experienced utility” (Clark et al. 2008) by economists and rational choice theorists denying or neglecting its essential difference from monetary incomes, consumption, and other precisely quantifiable or measurable variables.

Notably, the Enlightenment constitutes the project of universal happiness, just as life, liberty, equality, and justice. It does so by endowing “all” individuals and groups, including economic classes, in society, with the right or “entitlement” to pursue and attain happiness as they – not outside supra- and antihuman forces like Deities and theocratic church-states – understand and experience it. This in particular holds true of the French Enlightenment in virtue of projecting and promoting

“happiness and well-being among all classes” and positing, for the first time or most strongly and coherently, that the “only justification,” thus the main function, of the modern state consists in the “promotion of the good life for its citizens”<sup>36</sup> (Artz 1998). Admittedly, for the French and other Enlightenment the prime function or goal of the modern state or government is attaining the universal “happiness of the people,” thus inducing ruling powers to “act with virtue” in the sense of promoting the public interest or common good (Linton 2001).

In general, the Enlightenment project and political legacy of a liberal-democratic state and civil society did and does aim to promote (“maximize”) “happiness among a diverse number of groups” (McLaren and Coward 1999), and not only a few preordained as in the pre-Enlightenment Christian world like the “elect” in Calvinism and Puritanism, and other theocratic, notably Islamic, world. Hence, the Enlightenment expresses universalism in what Sorokin (1970) describes and deplores as *eudaemonism*, thus representing the paradigmatic universal “ethics of happiness” in society, even if not the first, if he is right in positing pre-Enlightenment, notably pre-Christian *eudaemonic* forms.

In Weber’s words, the Enlightenment defends and celebrates the “joy of living” and the “value of human life” (Einolf 2007). It does so in sharp contrast to and rejection of Protestant and other Christian and religious asceticism and its depreciation, including humiliation, suffering, and torture, and eventually destruction and sacrifice of humans and their lives for supra- and antihuman forces and causes a la “God, Nation, State.” A particular variation and conceptual articulation of “joy of living” is what is called *Vitalism* (from French *vivre* or “to live”). Thus, *vitalism* as the individual’s “quest” for the “good life,” including creativity and happiness, while prefigured or originated in the Renaissance and Baroque and classical times, was expressed by Voltaire and then Jefferson among “other Enlightenment figures” (Phelps 2007) and developed and articulated by pragmatist philosophers like Henri Bergson with his conceptions of vital *élan* and “creative evolution” (and William James). The US Constitution legalizes and declares “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” as “self-evident truths” (Byrne 1997) primarily under the direct or indirect impetus of the Enlightenment through Jefferson’s appropriation of its ideals and values, notably those of Voltaire and Montesquieu (Artz 1998).

For illustration, a particular aim, effect, and legacy of the Enlightenment conception and promotion of universal happiness or “joy of living” and humane, dignified life is the gradual abolition of the government torture (Einolf 2007) and other cruel, degrading, and inhumane punishment of humans as the severe forms of inflicting unhappiness, humiliation, vengeance, and suffering. Such an outcome has been achieved in most Western societies, with exceptions like

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<sup>36</sup> Artz (1998:33) states that the French Enlightenment philosophers “were eminently practical and utilitarian, and aimed to promote happiness and well-being among all classes. [For them] the only justification for the State is for the promotion of the good life for its citizens, men [are] rational, they can conceive the good, can discover means of obtaining it, and should be allowed, if they used reason, to direct their own lives by their knowledge, reason, and experience.”

Germany under Nazism and America during neoconservatism. This also holds true of the eventual abolition of the death penalty, as the ultimate form of inflicting unhappiness and suffering by the state on individuals or groups for crimes and even moral sins, as in Puritan and Islamic theocracies and fascism. Again, such an outcome has happened in all Western societies, with the predictable exception of America under pre-Enlightenment Puritanism and anti-Enlightenment conservatism. Reportedly, it was “Enlightenment ideas about rationality and the value of human life,” including happiness, that primarily persuaded, through legal reformist “persuasive arguments,” European states and rulers to gradually “abolish torture” (Einolf 2007) of humans for sacred and secular “higher” powers *cum* in the “name of God, State, Nation,” including, as in Tocqueville’s account, in the “name of God, Amen” in New England’s Puritan theocracy, at least formally.

In retrospect, skeptics may add that while the old disdained European “sovereigns” were so persuaded, the new American “republican” powers are apparently not yet “convinced to abolish torture,” an example is the death penalty, in their “empire of liberty” (Steinmetz 2005) or imperial state (Abbott 2005). This is indicated by the US neoconservative government’s reported methodical tortures and other abuses of non-American “enemies” *cum* “non-combatants” in its Puritan-style “holy” war against the “evil” world (Heymann 2003; Turner 2002). In this war virtually no rules and conventions of treating humans properly have applied for long, including habeas corpus, legal assistance, and fair trials as a sort of luxuries that the US neoconservative government cannot afford until its (temporary) replacement in the 2008 elections, except for the “rule of the jungle” *cum* the “Wild West” expanded beyond the “land of freedom.”

The preceding is also indirectly indicated by the documented (as by DNA evidence) and admitted (even by a former Illinois conservative governor George Ryan) executions or long imprisonment of innocent people falsely accused for various sins-crimes, especially sexual offenses like rapes, and apparently sacrificed to the “greater than life” Puritan-style “tough” on sin-crime neoconservative crusade and paranoia. Reportedly, this war on crime, including drugs and even consensual sexuality, generating an explosion in mass imprisonment unknown or unparalleled among Western societies (Becky and Western 2004; Sutton 2004; Uggen and Manza 2002) and an increase in executions (Jacobs et al. 2005) until recently, is unparalleled in its “Draconian severity” (Patell 2001) or inhumanity (Reuter 2005), thus a striking perversity or “unique anomaly” (Pager 2003), among modern Western democratic societies.

On one hand, the eventual abolition of torture, just as the death penalty in virtually all Europe is first and foremost the aim, result, and legacy of the Enlightenment appreciation of the “value of human life.” On the other hand, the apparent persistence and even revival of such a practice with vengeance in America under neoconservatism is, above all, due to the stronger pre- and anti-Enlightenment, specifically, cruel, inhumane Puritanism or Protestant sectarianism overall and harsh, antihumanistic conservatism, respectively. In essence, torture, like the death penalty, in Western societies has been at least formally abolished primarily



through the spread of “Enlightenment ideas of rationality and the value of the individual”<sup>37</sup> (Einolf 2007). Conversely, the apparent failure of its abolition, despite the US conservative government’s typical Puritan “we do not torture” hypocritical rhetoric in America expresses the absence or weakness of such ideas in relation to pre-Enlightenment Puritan irrationalism a la witch trials and inhumanity and to anti-Enlightenment conservative antirationalism and antihumanism. Therefore, if by some wonder “how on the earth or in the hell” a supposedly Western government leader can still practice torture in the twenty-first century, the likely major reason is anticipated. Enlightenment rationalism and especially humanism via the value of individuals, like liberalism, have typically been, in spite or because of (by attacking) Jefferson and colleagues, and remain weaker than their pre- and anti-Enlightenment opposites such as irrational-theocratic Puritanism and antirational-repressive conservatism.

In historical terms, human happiness in society was “a new idea in [Christian] Europe,” as Saint-Just remarked. This holds true, though with certain anticipations, including Bentham’s narrow utilitarian or pseudoeconomic definition and conception of “happiness” by the “principle of utility,” including implicitly its material form of wealth in orthodox economics, as well as what Sorokin (1970) calls the “ethics of happiness” or *eudaemonism* in its pre-Christian “pagan” and post-Christian, specifically Renaissance, versions. The Enlightenment concept of happiness, while adopting the term, transcends or extends the narrow and simplistic utilitarian or pseudoeconomic conception of it as utility, including wealth or money. It redefines happiness in broad also secular, yet mostly nonutilitarian or noneconomic, terms, essentially as what Weber calls the “joy of life” above and beyond Bentham’s narrow and simple “principle of utility” and its material form, while partly retaining or evoking the hedonistic component of worldly pleasure, though hedonism or *eudaemonism* precedes Benthamite utilitarianism as its variant (Sorokin 1970). Alternatively, Bentham’s “principle of utility” is just the partial utilitarian or pseudo-economic dimension, precursor, or proxy of the Enlightenment concept of happiness as a holistic category.

Hence, the Enlightenment conception of happiness comprises but is not contrary to orthodox economic and rational choice misconceptions, limited to and exhausted by the “principle of utility,” including wealth or money, as its utilitarian, pseudo-economic element, just as “pleasure” as its biological-psychological component. Simply, the Enlightenment does not propose, as utilitarian economics did and rational choice theorists do, that “all you need for happiness is utility *cum* wealth or money,” just as pleasure in itself, but usually much more to be determined or expressed by each human agent through self-determination or self-expression (Habermas 2001), in addition and conjunction to, just as often independent of these variables. Consequently, it conceives and promotes human happiness as a more complex, elusive, and holistic state than utility-maximizing or economic contentment,

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<sup>37</sup> Einolf (2007:109) comments that the critics of the “traditional account of the abolition of torture” claim that the latter “was not abolished due to the spread of Enlightenment ideas, but due to a change in the standards of proof required for a conviction.”

and even sensual pleasure, a conception largely vindicated by the contemporary research on happiness and its determinants (Frey and Stutzer 2002; Lane 2000; Yang 2008) despite some economic denials (Clark et al. 2008; Deaton 2008). Simply, contrary to economic determinism, it is “not just money” (also, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997) or even that “more money is preferred to less” (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) that is “all you need” to be happy, which is both implied in and consistent with the Enlightenment complex, noneconomic and even transutilitarian concept of happiness.

The Enlightenment concept of happiness is specifically novel within the medieval “Christian” world since the fourth century AD, as distinguished from the pre-Christian classical antecedent with its “ethics of happiness” (Sorokin 1970) and its implied elements of liberty and equality in society (Manent 1998), as well as post- or non-Christian (notably Renaissance) *eudaemonism*. In particular, this is what Weber implies suggesting that Protestantism, especially Calvinism and its derivative Puritanism, “must not be understood as joy of living [or happiness] nor in any other sense as connected with the Enlightenment” and by implication the Renaissance. Protestantism and the Christian world overall lacked the Enlightenment “joy of living,” just as rejected and destroyed the pre-Christian “ethics of happiness,” as indicated by what Sorokin (1970) observes as the disappearance of the latter and the dominance of its opposite, the “ethics of principles” from the fifth century to the end of the fifteenth century,<sup>38</sup> thus from the establishment of Pareto’s Roman theocracy to the Renaissance. To that extent, the idea of happiness was virtually unknown or proscribed, at least in the form of “joy of living” or sensual pleasure, as a “forbidden apple” in the post-classical or medieval pre-Enlightenment Christian, Islamic, and other world. This was a world in which humans were forced or expected to be anything but happy within society – while promised heavenly “bliss” as the reward for their societal suffering and misery as “divinely ordained” – in turn anticipated in the classical pre-Christian “ethics of happiness,” as from the fifth century BC to the first century AD, and its Renaissance variant (Sorokin 1970).

Against this background, the Enlightenment conception and promotion of universal happiness in society is truly novel and even revolutionary within the medieval Western world. In particular, the Enlightenment’s new function and justification of the state as the collective agency for promoting universal human happiness is a far cry and revolutionary deviation from, as Weber implies, the Calvinist and generally Christian, as well as Islamic and virtually all world religions (except perhaps for Buddhism, yet see Juergensmeyer 2003) shared antihumanist injunction. Recall that this is the command that “humans exist for the sake of God” and his glory and “happiness” and consequently for the church-state as “divinely

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<sup>38</sup> Sorokin (1970:426) observes that “at the end of fifth century (420–380 BC) there is a great flaring of the ethics of happiness. It becomes dominant [but] with the beginning of [the Christian] era, it begins to decline, and after fourth century AD it goes underground.” And, in his account the Christian “period from fifth century AD to the end of fifteenth century [is] monolithic again, entirely dominated by the ethics of principles.”

**Table 2.1** Enlightenment-based values and institutions in modern democratic societies

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Integral, holistic liberty
Political pluralism and culture diversity
Individual liberty, choice, dignity, privacy, well-being, and hope (individualism)
Equality, equal life chances or opportunities, and inclusion (egalitarianism)
Justice (equity, fairness)
Social universalism
Cosmopolitanism
Social progress
Optimism and hope
Pacifism
Happiness
Others (see next chapters)

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ordained” and “godly” theocrats with “divine rights,” not conversely (Bendix 1977). Generally, the Enlightenment “common assumption” of social institutions conceives them as existing “for man rather than the reverse” and justifying their existence in virtue of (their “utility” in) promoting human happiness rather than of “antiquity” (Artz 1998). It rejects and overcomes the opposite Calvinist and other Christian and near-universal religious injunction of humans existing as the means to what Parsons (1967a) calls the “purposes [happiness] of God” and thus theocratic “divinely ordained” social institutions like church and state, rejection on the Kantian grounds that, as Simmel put it, “the moral maxim never to use a man as a mere means is actually the formula of every sociation.”

In this sense, the true history of the idea and promotion of human happiness in modern society begins with the Enlightenment, in radical discontinuity and disjuncture from the pre-Enlightenment Christian world, while in continuity and conjunction with Sorokin’s “ethics of happiness” of classical pre-Christian civilization, as well as of the Renaissance. For instance, in America it starts with Jefferson’s Enlightenment-inspired idea of the “pursuit of happiness” in this life, in tension and even contradiction with pre-Enlightenment Calvinist Puritanism in which humans existed and were effectively sacrificed, for example as “witches,” “for the glory of God” and his self-proclaimed agents with “divine rights” a la Winthrop and colleagues (Bremer 1995), but in implicit continuity or affinity with the classical and the Renaissance pre-Puritan “ethics of happiness.” To that extent, Americans symbolically owe the venerable ideal of the “pursuit of happiness,” like virtually all other cherished American ideals and values, precisely to the Enlightenment via Jefferson’s rather than to the pre-Enlightenment such as Puritanism and the anti-Enlightenment like conservatism. (The above Enlightenment-based values and institutions in modern democratic societies are summarized in Table 2.1.)

# Chapter 3

## The Enlightenment and Western Civilization

### The Enlightenment and Contemporary Civilization

On the account of its impact and legacy in modern democratic societies and their constitutive values and institutions, the Enlightenment can be considered the critical historical point and the landmark intellectual event in contemporary, specifically postmedieval Western and world civilization since the eighteenth century. At least it can be thus considered in conjunction with the Industrial Revolution and the French and American Revolutions, as its direct or indirect economic and political outcomes, realizations, or expressions, respectively.

The Enlightenment is the crucial, decisive cultural factor in contemporary Western society because in association with these economic and political revolutions implementing or expressing its ideals, it intellectually ushered in liberal-democratic modernity as its child (Delanty 2000; Habermas 2001; Juergensmeyer 2003; Smart 2000) and rendered the moderns its children (Artz 1998). Negatively, it is such a factor in virtue of intellectually ending by delegitimizing despotic traditionalism, notably feudalism and theocratic medievalism, as the “dead past” and making traditionalists or the ancients, specifically feudalists and medievalists and their defenders a la Maistre and Burke, ultimately an extinct or “endangered species” among Western democratic and other societies. In summary, the Enlightenment, including its revolutionary economic and political corollaries, is what Weber may call the “most fateful,” or fatal for its conservative-fascist adversaries and its postmodernist (neo-Marxist, militant-feminist, etc.) detractors, cultural force in modern democratic Western and other societies.

### *The Enlightenment and Stages in Western Civilization*

In this respect, postclassical Western and other society, following the collapse of the Roman empire and the institutionalizing of Christianity, may be tentatively divided into certain social types and historical stages implied previously. The first type and stage is the medieval, including feudal, and other pre-Enlightenment society

and history. It is epitomized by the Christian Catholic and Protestant world in Europe and symbolized by the Dark Middle Ages and the Inquisition in Catholicism and its functional equivalents or proxies in the “new” Protestantism, especially, as Weber suggests, Calvinism and its Anglo-Saxon derivative Puritanism. The second type or stage of postclassical Western society is the antimedieval, including antifeudal, and in part non- or post-Christian liberal, secular, democratic, universalistic, and rationalistic Enlightenment. It is epitomized by the ideals of liberty, equality, justice, universal inclusion, democracy, reason, science, knowledge, joy and happiness, well being and humane life, hope and optimism, social progress, and the like, while symbolized or implemented by the French and in part American political Revolutions, as well as expressed or eventuated in the Industrial Revolution.

The third type or stage of postclassical Western society is the postmedieval anti-Enlightenment. It is exemplified by conservatism, including religious fundamentalism and fascism, seeking a return to medievalism as the “golden past” or “paradise lost” and thus a model of the “good society” (Nisbet 1966). The fourth type or stage is the new Enlightenment. It is manifested in the global processes of renewed liberalization, secularization, democratization, rationalization, and cultural modernization in general since the end of World War II, especially during the late twentieth and early twenty first century, in Western and other democratic societies (Inglehart 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004; also, Dobbin et al. 2007). This holds true as a rule, with the salient “deviant case” of America during neoconservatism (Inglehart and Baker 2000), particularly “born again” religious fundamentalism and neofascism, in adverse reaction as the neo anti-Enlightenment (Habermas 1989a) and antiliberalism in the “new nation” in contrast to the “old” Europe. (The four stages are summarized in Table 3.1.)

These four societal types or historical stages reflect the typical and hence predictable pattern in Western and world civilization and history from, say, the first or the fourth century AD to the twenty first century. The pattern is as follows in admittedly generalized and simplified but essentially plausible contours and terms. First, following on and nearly destroying ancient civilization and democracy, “in the beginning [medievalism] there was societal darkness” in the form of feudalism, despotism, and theocracy *cum* “godly society.” It was symbolized by the Inquisition and its functional equivalents in what Weber<sup>1</sup> calls “Calvinistic State Churches,”

**Table 3.1** Stages in postclassical Western society

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The medieval pre-Enlightenment: the fourth – early eighteenth century AD (the dark middle ages)
The Enlightenment: the mid to late eighteenth century (the peak: early liberalism, secularism, rationalism, modernism)
The anti-Enlightenment: the nineteenth and twentieth century (conservatism, fascism, neo-conservatism, religious fundamentalism, neo-fascism)
The new Enlightenment: the late twenty and early twenty first century (new liberalism, secularism, rationalism, modernism)

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<sup>1</sup>Weber observes that the “ecclesiastical supervision” by the “Calvinistic State Churches” of individual life “almost amounted to an inquisition” and Tawney (1962) identifies an “inquisitorial discipline” in early Calvinism, including Puritanism.

including Puritanism with its persecutions and witch trials in New England, etc., as well as “holy” wars or crusades, as “less legitimate examples of religious violence from Christianity’s heritage” (Juergensmeyer 2003). The Enlightenment, conjoined with democratic-political and industrial revolutions reflecting and implementing its ideals, illuminates and overcomes the medieval darkness and oppression through the light and liberty of liberal, secular, egalitarian, rationalistic, universalistic, and humanitarian democracy and society. Then, the anti-Enlightenment in the form of medieval-grounded conservatism, including fascism, seeks and often succeeds to restore the pre-Enlightenment darkness of feudal servitude, despotism, and theocracy through counterrevolution or violent revolt, including religious violence or “holy” war, against liberal-secular, democratic, egalitarian, universalistic, and rationalistic modernity. Yet again, the new Enlightenment exposes and transcends the conservative-fascist restoration of the medieval pre-Enlightenment through a composite process of renewed and reinforced global liberalization, secularization, democratization, rationalization, and modernization in general. Then, the new anti-Enlightenment in the face of neoconservatism, notably religious fundamentalism and neofascism, darkens the new light through renewed and reinforced inequality, oppression, and theocratic practices or designs like “godly” or “faith-based” society “déjà vu all over again,” and so on full circle.

This past and present pattern yields corresponding predictions or expectations about the future. The new future Enlightenment, however designated, will invariably strive to illuminate, overcome, or alleviate the pre- and anti-Enlightenment societal darkness of un-freedom, inequality, injustice, exclusion, superstition, fanaticism or irrationalism, misery, suffering, humiliation, death, and regression or stagnation in society. It will through liberalization as liberation, secularization, democratization, inclusion, rationalization, and related global processes of modernization that are solidifying and further expanding liberal-democratic modernity. However, in doing so the new Enlightenment will also invariably be counterattacked and occasionally reversed or subverted by the anti-Enlightenment in the form of neoconservatism, including “reborn” religious fundamentalism and neofascism, aiming to restore and perpetuate societal darkness after the model or image of the Dark Middle Ages, including feudalism and medieval despotism and theocracy, through antiliberalization, antidemocratization, and related counter-processes. The Enlightenment is thus likely to continue operating as the primary foundation and justification of modern liberal-secular, egalitarian, and rationalistic democracy and civil society. On the other hand, it will probably operate as the agent provocateur of neoconservative authoritarianism, including neofascist totalitarianism evoking the ghost of fascism in Europe and fundamentalist theocracy (Phillips 2006) in America after the model of Puritan “godly” society (German 1995) and the image of the “Bible Garden” (Gould 1996).

In turn, neofascist totalitarianism and the new fundamentalist theocracy, of which the Enlightenment and liberalism is the major agent provocateur, can be conjoined and mutually reinforcing to form a double anti-Enlightenment antiliberal explosive and eventually destructive mix. This is exemplified by fundamentalist cum evangelical neo-Nazi terrorist and racist groups a la Christian terrorist militia, etc. in contemporary America, especially, but not solely, the “Bible Belt” (Friedland 2001; Juergensmeyer 2003; Munch 2001; Turk 2004). To that extent, this poses the

“double jeopardy” of both the neofascist *and* theocratic anti-Enlightenment in contemporary America in contrast to other Western societies in which the design of theocracy *cum* “godly” or “faith-based” society is instead *caput mortuum* (clinically dead). And, this double anti-Enlightenment jeopardy truly redefines and predicts the “phenomenon of American exceptionalism” (Inglehart 2004). Alternatively, the latter does not consist in exceptional-as-superior democracy<sup>2</sup> (Smelser and Mitchell 2002) and its “resilience” to antidemocratic fascist as well as theocratic outcomes, contrary to what US conservative economists and sociologists “patriotically” claim (Friedman 1982; Lipset and Marks 2000). These claims misrecognize or deny that a “faith-based” society as “all-American” is essentially or ultimately fundamentalist theocracy reconstructed by the new evangelical power elite (Lindsay 2008), reviving the pre- and anti-Enlightenment Puritan “godly community” (German 1995) as its model, as well as the Protestant or Christian equivalent of Islamic theocracies in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Taliban-ruled regions, and elsewhere. No wonder, Puritanism was reportedly the prototype or precursor of “modern antiseccular” Protestant, Islamic, and other fundamentalism (Juergensmeyer 2003).

On this account, American exceptionalism is likely to reappear as not only an admittedly “double edged sword” (Lipset 1996), but rather a single-edged, self-destructive sword. The latter consists of the anti-Enlightenment mixture of theocratic or theocentric (Wall 1998) “faith-based” society like “Christian *cum* evangelical America” (Lindsay 2008; Smith 2000) or the “Bible Garden” with neofascist totalitarian nihilism, as embodied by neo-Nazi “Christian identity” militia movements or “Dragons of God” a la McVeigh et al. (Juergensmeyer 2003; Turk 2004). This exceptional single-edged sword is that the pre- and anti-Enlightenment in America has been in the past, persists in the present, and is likely to continue to be more resilient, comprehensive, theocratic-fascist, and stronger in the future, just as the Enlightenment narrower and weaker, than in Western Europe. At least from the prism of the old and new Enlightenment and its liberal-democratic and secular ideals, this is true American conservative *cum* theocratic, Islamic-like exceptionalism and to that extent perversion or aberration compared to Western societies, rather than exceptional *cum* superior democracy, resilience to undemocratic outcomes, democratic stability, individual liberties and rights, etc.<sup>3</sup> (Lipset and Marks 2000).

In summary, illuminating and overcoming societal darkness in the sense of illiberty, injustice, exclusion, misery, suffering, unreason, and stagnation in society

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<sup>2</sup>Smelser and Mitchell (2002:21) observe that “American hegemony also has a less tangible political-ideological ingredient, namely, a conviction of the moral superiority of a particular [American] version of democracy.”

<sup>3</sup>Like other super-patriotic conservative sociologists and economists, Lipset and Marks (2000) extol the supposed “resilience” and “stability” of American democracy in an invidious distinction from the “old” and unstable European societies. However, in view of a myriad of admittedly non-democratic, including theocratic, practices and legacies, notably the continuing predominance of Protestant sectarianism (Lipset 1996), ranging from New England’s Puritan theocracy through McCarthyism to the “politics of unreason” of neo-conservatism, this extolled “stability” reappears as what Mises calls the “peace of the cemetery” after the model or image of “Salem with witches” (Putnam 2000).

has always been and is likely to be the *raison d'être* of the Enlightenment as the paradigmatic liberal-democratic, universalistic, humanistic, progressive, and rationalistic ideal within modern Western civilization and beyond (Angel 1994; Mokyr 2009). Conversely, the Enlightenment has always been and is likely to be such a reason or rationale for the anti-Enlightenment, especially in the form of conservative, including fascist and theocratic, illiberal, antidemocratic, and irrational ideas and practices.

The above forms a full circle. Societal darkness after the model or image of the Dark Middle Ages is illuminated and superseded by the Enlightenment. Then the latter is attacked by the conservative, including fascist and theocratic, anti-Enlightenment restoring this medieval pre-Enlightenment condition. Yet, it is illuminated and overcome again by the new Enlightenment, countered *déjà vu* by the neoconservative, neofascist, and neotheocratic anti-Enlightenment, and so on. In this context, the Enlightenment has always admittedly (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) operated as a revolutionary agent with respect to – simply the “terminator” of – pre-Enlightenment oppression and irrationalism epitomized in medievalism, and the agent provocateur of anti-Enlightenment counterrevolution represented by conservatism, including fascism (Habermas 2001) and “reborn” religious fundamentalism (Juergensmeyer 2003). In this sense, without the oppressive and irrational Dark Middle Ages, including feudalism and Christian Catholic and Protestant theocracy, there would probably have been no Enlightenment (and perhaps the Renaissance) illuminating or superseding them. In turn, in the absence of the latter and its supposedly “flawed [ungodly] ideals” no conservatism, including fascism and “born again” fundamentalism, would admittedly have ever (re)emerged in Western societies, including America (Dunn and Woodard 1996). Just as the Enlightenment arose as the ray of enlightenment or illumination primarily of the Dark Middle Ages, so conservatism developed as the “anti-Enlightenment” (Nisbet 1966) and has remained, through fascism, neoconservatism, neofascism, and the new fundamentalism, since through the early twenty first century.

In essence, the Enlightenment is the genuine creator or definitive beginning of modernity, specifically its liberal-democratic, secular, rationalistic, and universalistic, form or interpretation. In this sense, democratic modernity is the true “child” (Habermas 2001) and “we the moderns are [almost] all children” (Artz 1998) of the Enlightenment as axiomatic modernism (Angel 1994; Juergensmeyer 2003) or modern vision, as both its advocates and critics emphasize for different reasons and in opposite evaluations. What Weber, Durkheim, Parsons, and other analysts identify as modernization, including rationalization, liberalization, democratization, secularization, and related social processes, truly begins or develops with the Enlightenment and its direct outcomes or indirect ramifications in industrial English and political French and in part American Revolutions ushering in modern capitalism and liberal-secular democracy, respectively.

At this juncture, the trilogy of premodernity or traditionalism, liberal modernity or societal modernism, and conservative counter- or post-modernity as social types-states and historical stages essentially corresponds to that of the pre-Enlightenment, the Enlightenment, and the anti- or post-Enlightenment, respectively. In addition, insofar as what sociologists observe as the second, mature (Beck 2000; Habermas 2001)



**Table 3.2** Correspondence of social types and historical stages in postclassical Western society

Premodernity, traditionalism	The medieval pre-Enlightenment
Liberal modernity, societal modernism	The Enlightenment
Antiliberal, conservative counter- or postmodernity	The anti- or post-Enlightenment
New liberal modernity	The neo-Enlightenment

or reemerging liberal modernity (Inglehart 2004), surviving and succeeding conservative counter- or postmodernity as a social system and time, is added to the trilogy, the extended scheme corresponds to that of the pre-Enlightenment, the Enlightenment, the anti-Enlightenment, and the new Enlightenment, respectively (Table 3.2).

First, in a sequence this holds true of premodernity in the form of economic, political, and cultural traditionalism such as medievalism, including feudalism, despotism, and theocracy, in relation to the pre-Enlightenment, thus what Mannheim (1967) calls “pre-democratic” ideas and times as premodern attributes or outcomes. Second, it applies to liberal-democratic modernism in the general sense of a social system and historical time of modernity – by analogy to capitalism or feudalism as an economic order – relative to the Enlightenment as its parent or point of origin, alongside perhaps the Renaissance (Eisenstadt 1998). Third, it holds for antiliberal, specifically conservative, including fascist, neoconservative, neofascist, and neofundamentalist, counter- and postmodernity in the sense of a social system and time antithetical to modernity (not of a critical artistic and social theory as usually understood), in relation to the anti- or post-Enlightenment as its underlying source or framework. Fourth, it does for the second, renewed liberal modernity or new modernism in that the latter expresses or corresponds to the neo- or reaffirmed Enlightenment.

Alternatively, it is the fourfold sequence of the pre-Enlightenment, the Enlightenment, and the anti- or post-Enlightenment, and the neo-Enlightenment that primarily conditions, predicts, and epitomizes the scheme of premodernity, modernity, counter- or postmodernity, and the new modernity. Predictably, the pre-Enlightenment does so with respect to medievalism and other traditionalism, except for classical civilization and the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment in relation to liberal-democratic, secular, and rationalistic modern society. The anti-Enlightenment does in respect of antiliberal conservative, including theocratic, fascist, and neoconservative, adverse reactions (and selections) to the Enlightenment, and the neo-Enlightenment in relation to a new liberal modernity.

### **The Highest Point in the Quest for Human Liberty, Equality, Justice, Life, and Happiness?**

The Enlightenment constitutes probably the highest point or climax and completion of European civilization and history in general since classical Greek and Roman democracy, culture, and society (Hinchman 1984). It does by renewing or reaffirming, as did

the Renaissance in mainly artistic terms, and developing and completing, through the French and partly American Revolutions as its sequels, classical pre-Christian civilization, while transcending its medieval Christian succession as theocratic and thus undemocratic, irrational, destructive, and regressive (Garrard 2003).

The Enlightenment forms the highest stage and completion of, thus being continuous with, European civilization and history primarily in the sense of their beginning with classical democracy, culture, and society, as distinguished from their medieval Christian “new beginning,” a distinction needed to keep in mind. In Schumpeter’s terms, the Enlightenment constitutes the process of creative *adaptation* or reinvention and extension of premedieval classical civilization, and of creative *destruction* or overcoming of its medieval Christian phase. This is a difference in substance of liberty and illiberty respectively, and not just in statistical-like “degrees of freedom.” Hence, no logical and historical contradiction results from considering the Enlightenment, like its vision of liberal democracy and in part capitalism, both the pinnacle of and in a basic continuity with European civilization and history since its classical democratic stage (Manent 1998) *and* the revolutionary break and in a profound discontinuity from its particular medieval Christian and overall preliberal, predemocratic (Mannheim 1967), notably theocratic, as well as precapitalist phase (Giddens 1984).

After all, most major Enlightenment, just as the Renaissance, figures regarded medieval Christian society, in virtue of its theocratic and irrational nature symbolized by the Dark Middle Ages, as a major aberration or retrogression within the evolution of Western civilization since classical democracy and culture<sup>4</sup> (Garrard 2003). Conversely, they did not extol it as Western civilization’s genuine form and highest stage, as claimed in religious orthodoxy’s Papal and Protestant “mindless battles” against liberalism (Habermas 2001; Burns 1990). It is no wonder that they attempted to retrieve, further develop, and complete classical democracy and culture as the lost treasure condemned, destroyed, and buried as “pagan” by the Christian theocratic world instead rejected as causing or perpetuating the misery, destitution, oppression, superstition, death and war, and irrationalism, thus darkness of medievalism, including feudalism and despotism. If not openly rejecting it, virtually *no* major Enlightenment representative, from Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Condorcet to Kant and to Hume, preferred and selected medieval Christian civilization over classical “pagan” civilization, including science, philosophy, and art, as the model for modern democracy, culture, and civil society, but rather the opposite, especially protoliberal, democratic Athens (Garrard 2003). This holds true with the expected, ambivalent exception of

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<sup>4</sup>In a critical analysis, Garrard (2003:105) acknowledges that the Enlightenment’s “broad consensus [was] that history had seen the essentially progressive, if often slow and uneven, expansion of human freedom, reason, and happiness and the unleashing of human powers through the overcoming of various natural and metaphysical obstacles, largely through expanding scientific discovery and application and the slowly diminishing influence and power of organized religion, prejudice, and superstition.” Garrard (2003:105) remarks that the Enlightenment view of social development and progress is compatible with the belief that during any specific period civilization may advance slowly, stop or even temporarily regress [to] account for periods such as the “Dark Ages”.

Rousseau as the first theocratic, Calvinist counter-Enlightenment enemy or critic (Collins 2000; Garrard 2003). Another exception was Locke with his spurious Puritan notion of ersatz-toleration – denied to non-Puritans as “non-Christians” and atheists – as the precursor rather than the representative of the Enlightenment<sup>5</sup> and liberalism (Champion 1999; Fitzpatrick 1999; yet see Zaret 1989; Bloemraad et al. 2008)<sup>6</sup> instead truly epitomized by Hume and his followers (Berry 1997).

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<sup>5</sup> Champion (1999:9–10) registers that “Locke was the son of a Puritan” and “advocated the toleration of all religious sects except Roman Catholics and atheists,” thus effectively only of Protestants. In this account, the “former were excluded because they maintained a foreign allegiance to the Pope, and the latter because they lacked moral responsibility, and were not bound by oaths” (Champion 1999:10–1). Admittedly, “for Locke there were limits to tolerable opinion. Atheism and popery were beyond the pale [and seen] as threats to social order. [He] specifically thought atheists were a danger to society because they could not be bound by promises or oaths (sanctioned by the threat of divine retribution). So even for Locke, still studied as a founder of modern liberalism, the defense of conscience was ultimately rooted in a conception of the duty to pious conviction, rather than the logical rights of free expression [i.e.] what Locke enfranchised was the free expression of a Christian conscience, rather than the rights of free expression” (Champion 1999:24). In turn, Bayle rejected Locke’s argument by positing that “atheists are less dangerous than idolators, and that lack of religious faith does not necessarily lead to bad conduct” and even that a “society of atheists could be more moral than a society founded on religious superstition [as] nothing is more common than to see orthodox Christians living evil lives, and free thinkers living good ones” (Champion 1999:25–6). Fitzpatrick (1999:49) also registers that “Locke was opposed to toleration for Roman Catholics and atheists [i.e.] those who owed allegiance to a foreign authority, those who could be absolved by their religion of moral and political crimes, and those who did not believe in the moral order.” By contrast, “as a Deist, [Locke’s pupil] Shaftesbury was able to set aside traditional Christian concerns such as original sin, grace, and salvation [and adopted Pufendorf’s] separation of theology and morality (reason)” (Fitzpatrick 1999:51). In this alternative to Locke’s Puritanism “the religious conscience [as] derived from the moral conscience is fearful of God’s disapproval of our actions and hopes for his approval of good behavior (yet) not the main motivating or regulating force.” Our prime concern is to do good for its own sake for, although fear of divine retribution is an element of the religious conscience, that fear itself is derived from an evaluation of conduct by the moral or natural conscience. Deistic thinking placed secular morality at the heart of conscientious concern; it set aside fears of future rewards or punishments as the basis for conscientious action, for to act on such a basis would imply a loss of moral freedom, involving doing the right thing for the wrong reasons. Whereas Locke had placed checks on liberty of conscience (Shaftesbury) implied the “relaxation of restraints” (Fitzpatrick 1999:52). In turn, Zaret (1989:175–6; also Walzer 1963) considers Locke a key representative of political liberalism and thus the Enlightenment by proposing that he offered an “essentially secular conception of politics with a religious rationale [i.e.] a Protestant identity” as against Puritanism’s ideal of “godly politics” citing his statement that “there is absolutely no such thing [as] a Christian commonwealth” in apparent reference to Cromwell’s Puritan “Holy Commonwealth” in seventeenth century England. However, in light of the above rather than Locke, as at most its precursor, with Hobbes even more so, Hume was the true epitome of the British, namely Scottish, Enlightenment and liberalism in general (Berry 1997).

<sup>6</sup> Bloemraad et al. (2008:155) comment that “during the Enlightenment, justification of subjecthood led to Lockean notions of consent and contract, opening the way to liberalism’s language of individual rights, a central part of contemporary citizenship.” Zaret (1989:163–76) considers Locke an archetype of “liberal-democratic ideology,” including an “essentially secular conception of politics with a religious rationale [i.e.] a Protestant identity” (also, Walzer 1963).

While not openly “anti-Christian” (with certain exceptions), these Enlightenment figures treated Christian civilization not even as the “second best,” let alone, as Pareto himself implies in referring to early Christianity’s Roman theocracy, the Pareto-like optimum. Rather they viewed it as the antithesis, obstacle, or just nuisance to creating and sustaining modern free society and instead invoked, following the Renaissance, “pagan” classical democracy and culture as the extant societal model or precursor (Artz 1998; Garrard 2003). For illustration, Hume and most other Enlightenment representatives identified such a democratic model in “pagan” and “liberal Athens,” as opposed to illiberal and “austere Sparta” preferred by Calvinist Rousseau<sup>7</sup> (Garrard 2003) as well as by US Puritans like Winthrop and colleagues with their theocratic design of America as “Christian Sparta” only to be rejected and disestablished by Jefferson and Madison in the early and mid nineteenth century (Dayton 1999; Gould 1996; Kloppenberg 1998). Conversely, they did not take as the model the medieval *respublica Christiana* (Nischau 1994) and its Protestant functional equivalents such as Calvinistic state churches in Europe (Geneva, Holland) and Puritan “Biblical Commonwealths” and “Republics” in England and America. These social systems were regarded by Hume et al. as the antithesis and destruction of classical and modern democracy alike, yet embraced as an ideal by anti-Enlightenment conservatives, in particular Winthrop’s totalitarian theocracy (Stivers 1994) as the “shining city upon a hill” for Reaganite and other US neoconservatives, especially theocratic “born again” evangelicals (Reagan’s “I am one of you”).

In general, the Enlightenment is probably the supreme expression and culmination of the human perennial quest for liberty, reason (“light”), equality, inclusion, justice, including free, equal, and just life chances (Dahrendorf 1979) human dignity, well-being, life, and happiness against all enemies, obstacles, and odds in virtually all societies and times (Popper 1973). In a way, the human quest or dream of liberty, equality, justice, reason, humane life, and happiness holds true of Western and Eastern societies and civilizations (Angel 1994; Eisenstadt 1986; Sorokin 1970), though perhaps more in the first than the second historically, if Weber is correct in his controversial Occidental-only liberalization and rationalization thesis, or presently (Bendix 1984; Habermas 2001). This has been a search underpinned, shaped, and guided by what analysts denote “Enlightenment West and East” (Angel 1994) defined by liberalism and rationalism, including secularism, and mysticism respectively, as respective ways and paths to attaining the perennial human aims of liberation, equality, justice, reason or enlightenment, well-being, and happiness.

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<sup>7</sup>According to Garrard (2003:79), Sparta “provides Rousseau with his political ideal [for] civil religion. [For him] dissensus is fatal to political unity (so) strongly disapproves of religious non-conformity, which fosters division rather than unity. It was in deference to this principle that he justified his return to Protestantism during his visit to Geneva in 1754, even though he had ceased to be a Calvinist” In this account, “his prohibition on religious intolerance is primarily based on a desire to limit civil strife and disunity in already heterogeneous societies rather than on the intrinsic value of either toleration or diversity, which is hardly surprising in a man who admired Sparta” (Garrard 2003:80). Conversely, Rousseau “came to detest the salon culture of Paris in [favor of] the rough Spartan manliness of Geneva” (Garrard 2003:25), thus essentially detesting the Enlightenment versus theocratic Calvinism.

To restate what Heine said of Voltaire, “in the great war for the liberation of humanity the Enlightenment will always stand first” (Artz 1998). It will by admittedly including “some of the greatest names of human history” (Horkheimer 1996) and due to its liberal-democratic, egalitarian, rationalistic, and humanistic ideals and values and their extensions or reflexes in non-Western settings.” In this sense, human liberty, reason, dignity, happiness, and life always have had and will have its “best friend” in the Enlightenment, and conversely their worst enemy in the anti-Enlightenment, including conservatism, fascism, fundamentalism, theocracy, and other enemies of modern free, open society as its original ideal and/or eventual outcome (Popper 1966).

As a corollary, the Enlightenment is both continuous and discontinuous, convergent and divergent, in relation to previous societies and historical periods, or the pre-Enlightenment. As implied, the Enlightenment is essentially continuous and convergent with European civilization and history in general since classical democracy, culture, and society (Artz 1998; Manent 1998). The latter is epitomized by protoliberal and democratic Athens (Garrard 2003) as the extant model vs. illiberal and austere Sparta forming instead the pre- and anti-Enlightenment ideal, as for Calvin, Calvinist Rousseau, English-American Puritans, and US conservatives. On this account, the Enlightenment is the highest point or the logical, ultimate stage of the evolution of Western, notably classical, civilization, specifically the further development and extension of democratic Athens as a local prototype in the form of modern liberal-secular, inclusive, and rationalistic democracy and society. In Schumpeter’s terms, it is the greatest, strongest, and most consistent creative adaptation of classical civilization and democracy by its further evolution and universal expansion, thus overcoming the slavery and other forms of exclusion in Athens, etc.

Generally, as implied, the Enlightenment is fundamentally continuous and convergent with the human perennial quest for liberty, reason, equality, justice, dignity, life, and happiness, including free, equal, and just life chances, in all societies and times. It is analogously the highest point of such a general search or dream of humanity from its very beginning to the early third millennium. Admittedly, the period of the Enlightenment and its outcome, modern science and knowledge represents the ultimate stage or essential part of “an often interrupted movement” involving human aims and attempts at liberating from the “cage of the closed society” and at creating an “open society” (Popper 1973) founded on a fusion of liberalism and rationalism. On this account, such a movement spans in a historical sequence from Great ancient civilization, especially Athens and Socrates, to the (or its) Renaissance through the intermediate phase of pretheocratic “early Christianity (down to Constantine).” By implication, the latter was, as Pareto also implies, still “uncorrupted” and not yet rendered the social world “mad” (Bourdieu 2000) by its absolute power in the form of the Roman theocracy and what Popper calls the “authoritarian Church of the Middle Ages”<sup>8</sup> or “medieval authoritarianism.”

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<sup>8</sup>Popper (1973:26) comments “it is necessary to ask which attitude is more Christian, one that longs to return to the ‘unbroken harmony and unity’ of the Middle Ages, or one that wishes to use reason in order to free mankind from pestilence and oppression?”

In turn, the Enlightenment is essentially discontinuous, divergent, and incompatible with a specific form and stage of European civilization and history, such as early and high medieval Christian societies and times. In this sense, it performs a radical break from and revolutionary overcoming of pre-Enlightenment European civilization and history in its medieval Christian type and phase. Recall the latter spans from, as Pareto suggests, the establishment of its Roman theocracy in the fourth century AD (Sorokin 1970) to the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries and later, as witnessed by the Vatican Church and New England's Puritan theocracy until the 1830s. In Schumpeter's terms, the Enlightenment constitutes the most comprehensive, strongest, and most consistent creative destruction with respect the medieval Christian world and its theocracy, and not only creative adaptation as in relation to the classical "pagan" and democratic predecessor. It operates as the process of intellectual destruction ("deconstruction") and substitution of the medieval Christian society as the old social-economic, including feudal, despotic and theocratic, structures and the creation or projection of liberal-democratic modernity as the new institutional structure in Western societies and later beyond. The following focuses and elaborates on the Enlightenment treated as the process of creative destruction<sup>9</sup> (Bauman 2001) in society, or a social, especially cultural, revolution, thus its basic discontinuity and divergence with pre-Enlightenment medieval, as distinguished from classical, Western and other society and times.

## Cultural Revolution in Modern Society

The Enlightenment is probably a crucial cultural revolution or innovation within the Western world, in particular on the account of its revolutionary project or invention of modern liberal-secular and rationalistic democracy and civil society. To use Popper's (1966) terms, the "greatest of all moral and spiritual revolutions of history" beginning several centuries ago in Europe was the "Enlightenment period" of the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century (Scott 2004). Despite its point of origin and epicenter in Europe, notably France and Paris, the Enlightenment did not remain long limited to this region and period but subsequently extended and ramified into other, non-European societies, including partly America via Paris-residing Jefferson and colleagues (Byrne 1997), especially Philadelphia as its American center (Patell 2001). As Sidgwick put it, at the minimum it formed the "innovating and reforming period of the eighteenth century" in Europe. It blends social, notably cultural, revolution precisely defined by radical or substantive innovation in society, including culture, just as economy and politics, with reform or gradual, incremental societal change. At this juncture, revolution or innovation is at least (to paraphrase Robbins 1952) half of the Enlightenment equation in relation to the pre-Enlightenment such as medieval societies and times and

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<sup>9</sup>Bauman (2001:65) extends Schumpeter's expression to modernity as a whole describing the latter as "the era of creative destruction, of perpetual dismantling and demolition; the 'absolute beginning' was another face of the instant obsolescence of all successive states."

generally what Weber and Mannheim denote economic and cultural traditionalism distinguished from modernism, notably liberalism, including modern capitalism.

In virtue of its cultural revolution and social innovation, the Enlightenment originates and operates as the paradigmatic Schumpeterian project and process of creative destruction vis-à-vis pre-Enlightenment medievalism and other traditionalism, excluding classical democracy and civilization that it attempts to revive, adapt, and expand via a sort of creative adaptation. It does so by spiritually destroying or terminating traditionalism, specifically medievalism or feudalism, as the old social order or the *ancien régime* and intellectually creating or innovating modernity as the new cultural and political structure among Western societies. In this sense, it acts as the first true social, especially cultural, revolution or innovation during the *long durée* of the Western world, from the institutionalization of Christianity and the establishment of its Roman theocracy in the fourth century to the eighteenth century, alongside the Renaissance as an artistic revolutionary movement. The Enlightenment, alongside partly the artistic Renaissance, becomes the first or the strongest and most consistent and articulate effort to disturb what Mises (1950) would call the “peace of the cemetery” of the petrified, repressive Dark Middle Ages epitomizing Christian civilization and time, notably the Roman theocracy and sixteenth to eighteenth century Protestant Calvinist-Puritan theocracies.

To the Enlightenment, just as to the Renaissance, the Dark Middle Ages were the manifest and salient regression and reversal of European civilization (Garrard 2003), specifically classical democracy and culture, and the human perpetual search of liberty, equality, justice, reason, well-being, humane life, and happiness. It defined medieval times and societies in these terms due to their literal or figurative darkness in the form of religious superstition and the perversion of science and reason, theocratic oppression, persecution and extermination, and wars of religion unrestrained by rules. Like the Renaissance as its precursor, the Enlightenment aims to revive, adapt, and expand, in a modern liberal-secular and inclusive or universalistic form, classical Athens democracy and civilization, notably culture, including philosophy and science. Alternatively, like its precursor, it considers classical civilization to be buried in the image of the “peace of the cemetery” or perverted into the ritual sacrifice or docile servant of theology, religion, and theocratic church during the Christian Catholic and Protestant Dark Middle Ages. In summary, the Enlightenment develops as the complete cultural as well as political “Renaissance” in the sense of liberal-secular rebirth or reinvention of classical civilization and democracy, including science, just as the Renaissance proper did as its artistic revival mostly.

Hence, either in a substantive connection to or formal independence from and going beyond (Bauman 2001)<sup>10</sup> pre-Christian classical civilization, the Enlightenment proves to be a true and even paradigmatic modern social, especially cultural, peaceful,

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<sup>10</sup>Bauman (2001:63) suggests that “unlike classical antiquity,” the Enlightenment and modernity in general “had a job to do: creating an order which otherwise would not come about, shaping the future which otherwise would assume an unacceptable form.”

as distinct from political or violent, revolution. It does so through the process of creative destruction in society, particularly culture, including science, knowledge, and technology. The process blends the overcoming or delegitimizing of the darkness, irrationalism, theocratic oppression and persecution, suffering and death for “higher” Divine causes in Christian medievalism with the invention or hope of the “light” a la Descartes<sup>11</sup> (Reiman 1997), reason, science, knowledge, progress, liberty, and human well-being and happiness in post-, though not necessarily anti-, Christian liberal-secular modernity. In summary, the Enlightenment overcomes or delegitimizes medieval traditionalism intellectually and morally, notably the feudal, despotic, theocratic, exclusionary, and irrational *ancien regime* of society. Second, it conceptually creates, legitimizes, and ushers in modernism (Angel 1994; Juergensmeyer 2003) as the new or reinvented, after the model or precedent of classical democracy, liberal-democratic, inclusive, and rationalistic social system and historical period, notably liberalism, including modern capitalism.

### *The Creative Destruction of Traditionalism*

As noted, a negative dimension or outcome of the Enlightenment as an exemplary cultural revolution is its intellectual destruction (“deconstruction”) or delegitimization of traditionalism in the specific form of medievalism with its feudalism, despotism, irrationalism, and theocracy. The Enlightenment performs a revolutionary disjuncture and break from, and thus substantive discontinuity, disaffinity, and divergence with, traditional, specifically medieval, society. Alternatively, the Enlightenment and consequently its aggregate outcome liberalism, including liberal democracy and civil society, entails *no* significant evolutionary association, continuity, affinity, and convergence with traditionalism in the specific form of medievalism (Mannheim 1986), notably at least medieval Christian Catholic and Protestant theocracy. This also holds true of capitalism or the market economy, as the theoretical construct of the Enlightenment (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Hirschman 1977; Keynes 1972; Mokyr 2009) and an element of liberalism, in relation to what Weber calls “economic traditionalism.” Specifically, it applies to modern liberal capitalism relative to the medieval economy such as master-servant feudalism, the closed anticompetitive guild system, and patriarchal patrimonialism (Kiser 1999). And yet, these latter left vestiges in American and British conservative antilabor, procapital (Myles 1994) laissez-faire capitalism as “belated feudalism” (Orren 1994; also, Steinberg 2003) or neofeudalism (Binmore 2001), and the “new patrimonial capitalism,” defined in America by the “revenge” of capital or plutocracy over labor (Cohen 2003).

In sociological terms, liberalism or modernism as a total social system (and time) in Durkheim-Parsons’ sense, specifically capitalism as its economic structure or

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<sup>11</sup>Reiman (1997:9) registers that Descartes proof of the “natural right of the rational subject to authority over [their] beliefs is the light in the Enlightenment.”



subsystem, does *not* constitute a mere evolutionary succession “out of” traditional societies and economies such as medievalism and feudalism (Giddens 1984). Arguably, as the “first genuinely global type” of economy and society in human history, capitalism and liberalism overall, notably liberal-secular democracy, developed out of a “double discontinuity” in the evolutionary development of Western civilization, the “intertwining of political and industrial revolutions” from the eighteenth century on (Giddens 1984). The latter, notably the French and in part American political revolutions were either direct and manifest (the first) or indirect and latent (the second) outcome, realization, or expression of the Enlightenment’s democratic ideals of political liberty and equality (Artz 1998). Also, the English Industrial Revolution was the logical expression, extension, and application, at least a correlate, of the Enlightenment, specifically its scientific rationalism and “open science” as the “important precursors” (Temin 2006) of such technological and economic changes, and thus of capitalism. This implies that, like societal liberalism, (the idea of) industrial capitalism in the sense of the scientific or philosophical concept of a market economy, including *laissez-faire* (Keynes 1972) and invisible-hand (Hirschman 1977) conceptions, originated or fully developed in the eighteenth century Enlightenment and its politically democratic and free-market economic outcomes and ramifications (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Hodgson 1999; Mokyr 2009).

Negatively, like liberalism overall, notably liberal democracy, capitalism does not emanate, or just secondarily, from the pre-Enlightenment, including, as in Weber-Parsons’ framework, its high medieval or late feudal Protestant forms such as Calvinism (Heller 1986) and its English-American transplant Puritanism (Walzer 1963; Zaret 1989). For instance, this is indicated by the “lack of ‘capitalists’” in eighteenth century France (Simon 1995) before and during the early stages of the Enlightenment, just as original sixteenth century French Calvinism was in its economic vision rooted in feudalism and “immature” (Heller 1986), and even religious “irrationalism” (Grossman 2006), in terms of modern industrial capitalism (*despite* Weber et al.), let alone liberal democracy.

Notably, modern capitalism and a fortiori secular democracy in England and America does (and could) not result from Puritanism as long as the latter was a “theocratic revolt against the increasing secularism” (Juergensmeyer 1994) of seventeenth century English politics and society, just as Jeffersonian secularism and liberalism in the postrevolutionary American society (Gould 1996). *Prima facie*, Puritanism’s “theocratic revolt” and eventually its established theocracy in England transiently (and longer in Scotland) and America near-permanently is the polar opposite or what Ross calls “antidote” (rather “poison”) of not only, as self-evidently, liberal-secular democracy but also, as less manifestly, of capitalism in the sense of economic liberalism (Walzer 1963; Cohen 1980; Delacroix and Nielsen 2001; Grossman 2006). This is contrary to the usual sociological, curiously both Marxian and Weberian, accounts of the seventeenth century English Puritan Revolution as a case of liberal-bourgeois revolutions (Goldstone 1986; Moore 1993) by which, as none other than Marx put it, “free competition was conquered.”

For instance, while adopting and elaborating on Weber’s thesis of an “elective affinity” between Calvinism and the modern capitalist economy, Tawney (1962) acknowledges that New England’s Puritan theocracy was “merciless” not only to

moral-religious and political liberty (Munch 2001), but to unrestricted economic freedom (“license”) and in that sense to glorified “all-American” unfettered capitalism (German 1995). And it is a sort of “depraved mental gymnastics” (Samuelson 1983) or nonsequitur contradicted by both logic and evidence to claim, as do Parsons et al. (Mayway 1984), that such Puritan and any “theocratic revolt” against secularism eventuating in theocracy in England and America does or could lead to modern *secular* democracy and capitalism in the sense of economic *liberalism*. Counterfactually, it could have hardly been otherwise. For like its parent European Calvinism, English-American Puritanism has first been an exemplary case of the pre-Enlightenment and preliberalism, then, in opposition to the Enlightenment and liberalism as “totally antithetical” (Bremer 1995) to its Calvinist worldview, the counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism. And it remains the counter-Enlightenment through revived Puritan-inspired fundamentalism in America, especially the “Bible Belt,” like Southern Baptism and related evangelical sects and cults with theocratic ambitions and apocalyptic scenarios of total (self) destruction, by the late twentieth and early twenty first century (Juergensmeyer 1994; Munch 2001).

In particular, the Enlightenment in France is profoundly discontinuous, divergent, innovating, and thus revolutionary with respect to traditional society, specifically the feudal or medieval *ancien regime*. It is so in virtue of, as even critics admit, its commitment to the “emancipatory project” of complete, including cultural and political, liberation of humans from the “fetters of prejudice, intolerance, and tradition,” including what one of its “heroes,” Francis Bacon, like Hobbes before, rejects as the religious and other “idols of the human mind”<sup>12</sup> (Garrard 2003). Admittedly, the Enlightenment represents a revolutionary project of liberation by seeking and attempting to recreate or reorganize society in which humans are endowed with the capacity and opportunity for “free and independent action,” while subjecting the preexisting determining, oppressive, and irrational social institutions (and the natural environment) to “human control” (Garrard 2003). The Enlightenment redefines “enlightenment” as a process of increased “truth and knowledge,” based on reason and science, replacing “ignorance and superstition” rooted in religious and other irrationalism and fanaticism, thus promising to yield the aggregate outcome of the “promotion of human well-being” (Garrard 2003). It thus envisions human happiness, life, and hope *within* society promoted by liberalism, as distinguished from, as even Calvinist Rousseau<sup>13</sup> suggests, “bliss” in theological “heaven” (Lemert 1999) or the medieval “fantasy of salvation” (Giddens 1984).

In turn, the pre-Enlightenment and prerationalism and preliberalism overall, including medievalism in particular, but excluding classical civilization, is essentially

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<sup>12</sup>Garrard (2003:13) registers that Bacon was “one of the heroes” of the Enlightenment philosophers in France.

<sup>13</sup>Garrard (2003:78) comments that for Rousseau “Christianity has caused a debilitating and destructive separation of the City of God from the City of Man, with the latter subordinate to the former [theocracy]. Christianity’s *refus du monde* turns our attention away from earthly concerns, thereby allowing tyranny to flourish. That is why true Christians are ‘made to be slaves.’ (Christians’) first allegiance is to the otherworldly City of God (which) is why Christianity is incompatible with good citizenship.”

a sort of (pre-) history of oppression, closure and exclusion, inequality and injustice, humiliation, misery, destitution, and suffering, unreason and irrationalism, and religious superstition, fanaticism, coercion, and wars. Notably, the pre-Enlightenment is such a society and period in relation to the Enlightenment and rationalism and liberalism in general as the program and hope of freedom, equality, justice, reason, progress, well-being, life, happiness, and peace, thus of a free, open society (Popper 1966). Admittedly, prior to the Enlightenment and liberalism, including capitalism, the “typical state of mankind” has been “tyranny, servitude, and misery” (Friedman 1982), as well as religious superstition, fanaticism, wars, barbarism, and savagery. For instance, the Enlightenment regards savagery or barbarism as manifesting not only in “infanticide or cannibalism” but also in the worship of and human and nonhuman sacrifices, including suffering and self-mutilation, for “suitably fearsome gods” (Berry 1997), including what Weber describes and Puritan Milton laments as the merciless and nonunderstanding “God of Calvinism” after the image of an “Oriental despot” (Artz 1998) with his “double decree” of predestination cum damnation of most, election of a few, humans. Generally, the Enlightenment considers “orthodox religious dogmas” and “abstruse metaphysical systems” to be “impediments” to human reason, liberation, dignity, well-being, and happiness, including the “exercise and development” of humans’ “mental faculties and powers” and their “direct experience” of social and physical worlds (Garrard 2003).

In particular, the French Enlightenment, especially Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach, and (with qualifications) Voltaire and Montesquieu, like their Scottish counterpart Hume, espouses the explicit or implied “denunciation of religion as an ideological illusion” (Deutschmann 2001). For instance, the French Enlightenment’s most famous and influential figure<sup>14</sup> (Artz 1998), Montesquieu is probably exasperated or perplexed by revealed religion<sup>15</sup> (Kenshur 1993) and rejected theology as “doubly intelligible by the matter which is treated and by manner of treating it,” as cited approvingly by Pareto, just as are even more Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach, and Voltaire, as well as Hume in Scotland. Alternatively, Montesquieu exhibits liberalism and humanism by rejecting “despotism, slavery, intolerance, arbitrary taxation, and inhuman penal codes” (Artz 1998), as well as rationalism and egalitarianism, just as do the other philosophers adopting the “language of the Enlightenment”<sup>16</sup> (Kenshur 1993). Furthermore, Montesquieu’s influence on

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<sup>14</sup>In Artz’s (1998:50) view, Montesquieu “was the first [Enlightenment] Philosophe to win a widespread reputation.”

<sup>15</sup>Kenshur (1993:5) comments that Montesquieu was “baffled by the specific and mutually inconsistent commandments of revealed religions, commandments according to which objects and practices are arbitrarily designated as pure or impure and hence as pleasing or repugnant to God.”

<sup>16</sup>Kenshur (1993:5) comments that Montesquieu “believes that people are capable of obtaining moral knowledge through rational means, by dint of their capacity to grasp transcendent principles of equity and justice, and of behaving virtuously in accordance with that knowledge.” Kenshur (1993:5) adds that, according to Montesquieu, “not only are people capable of being virtuous without being constrained to do so; only unconstrained acts can count as virtuous: actions performed out of fear of punishment or hope of reward are not meritorious,” expressing what modern liberals call “moral liberalism” (Reiman 1997).

the American revolutionaries such as Jefferson and others is well known, admitted, and documented. Thus, his protosociological work *The Spirit of the Laws* not only contributes to the “birth of sociology” (Byrne 1997) in France but reaches the status of a “veritable classic” in colonial and revolutionary America, being “well known” to Jefferson and others (Franklin, Adams, Madison, Hamilton, etc.) (Artz 1998). Additionally, Montesquieu’s principle of the separation of political power becomes reportedly “embodied” in the US Constitution, just as being “very influential” in the formulation of its French counterpart (Artz 1998).

If the above is correct, then the pre-Enlightenment condition of “tyranny, servitude, and misery” justifies and necessitates, rather than – as its conservative enemies and postmodernist, Marxist, and feminist detractors allege – invalidates, the sociological or intellectual “stalwart defense of the Enlightenment” (Trey 1998), yet through statements of fact or evidence (“what is”), not value judgments (“should”). The Enlightenment hence develops as the true promise of “light” at the end of the long “tunnel” of unreason, un-freedom, inequality, exclusion, injustice, misery, destitution, pestilence, suffering, persecution, war, and the like in social history, in particular its medieval stage. Alternatively, the postmodernist, including neo-Marxist and feminist, critiques and especially conservative, notably fundamentalist and fascist, attacks of the Enlightenment and its legacy are an illogical and ahistorical nonsequitur. They are so in view of its liberal-democratic, egalitarian, and humanitarian ideals and values, however imperfectly realized through the French and in part American revolutions and liberalism overall, vs. the pre-Enlightenment illiberal, undemocratic, and inhumane logic and history. These critiques are logically spurious and empirically unfounded by failing to compare and contrast the Enlightenment’s “costs and benefits” (dialectic) for human liberty, equality, justice, dignity, well-being, happiness, and life with those of the pre- and post-Enlightenment such as medievalism and conservatism.

For the current purpose, this comparison is a valid sociological procedure, rather than as postmodern, Marxist, and feminist, critics particularly do, comparing Enlightenment “costs and benefits” with some abstract ideal and unrealizable utopia, as distinguished by Mannheim from realizable or realistic. If one makes such a cost-benefit comparative calculation or estimate, this would likely yield a sort of serendipitous rediscovery, or rather expected realization, that in what Merton (1968) may call the Enlightenment’s “net balance of an aggregate of consequences” for modern society, its societal benefits vastly outweigh its costs in quantity and quality. Namely, a proxy calculus or inventory of what economists call “psychic” noneconomic income and cost would likely yield this balance. It would reveal that the Enlightenment, despite its many failed promises, unfulfilled dreams, imperfections, and abuses and perversions by antiliberal, notably conservative-fascist, forces, is unambiguously an evolutionary or rather revolutionary step forward in the perennial human quest or dream of liberty, equality, justice, life, and happiness.

Notably, it is so by comparison with both the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, specifically medievalism and conservatism, including fascism, respectively. The general and potentially fatal flaw of the postmodernist, Marxist, and feminist critiques, let alone the conservative and fascist vehement attacks and destruction, of the Enlightenment is that they fail to realize, recognize, and appreciate the

benefits or “bright side,” while identifying and overstating the “dark side” (rather abuses) of its complex dialectic, especially by comparison with the pre- and anti-Enlightenment. Simply they mostly find the “bad” Enlightenment and liberalism, and are oblivious of or dismiss the “good” Enlightenment and liberalism (Habermas 2001), thus self-contradicting the premise of its intrinsic “good-bad” dialectics (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). In Hegelian terms, they overstate the Enlightenment’s “negative dialectic” and aesthetic (Adorno 1973) and miss or downplay its “positive dialectic” and aesthetic as its integral and typically prevalent element on the account of its vastly greater “net balance” of material and nonmaterial benefits than costs for modern society.

### *The Creation of Liberal-Democratic Modernity*

The positive, constructive dimension or outcome of the Enlightenment as cultural revolution is its intellectual creation or legitimization of modernity as the new liberal-democratic, secular, and rationalistic social system and historical period supplanting traditionalism such as medievalism and its feudalism, despotism, and theocracy. Recall, liberal-secular, democratic, universalistic, and rationalistic modernity is primarily the child of the Enlightenment (Habermas 2001), as both its adherents and its critics emphasize.

In this connection, as the respective political and economic facets of modernity, modern liberal democracy and industrial capitalism in the sense of a concept of a market economy – *pace* Weber-Parsons’ pre-Enlightenment Protestant thesis – are both, first and foremost the “children” of the Enlightenment. Conversely, they are not, or just secondarily, ones of the pre- and post-Enlightenment such as medievalism, including medieval Catholicism and Protestantism, and conservatism, respectively. In particular, what Mannheim (1986) calls modern “individualistic liberalism,” as the defining element and foundation of democratic and capitalist modernity (also, Hodgson 1999), was primarily the offspring or extension of the Enlightenment. This is indicated by Enlightenment “formulations”<sup>17</sup> (Reiman 1997) and “traditions” (DeLue 1999) of liberalism. The latter includes the “classical liberalism of the Scottish Enlightenment” (Razeen 2002; Delanty 2000; Kumar 2001) founded by

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<sup>17</sup> Reiman (1997:6) suggests that “two great Enlightenment formulations of liberalism” are those of Locke and Kant. However, John Locke is more accurately and commonly considered, not the least because of his latent Calvinism, notably his Puritan-rooted denial of religious tolerance and freedom to non-believers, non-Christians, and some Christians (“Papists”) in contrast to Voltaire (Fitzpatrick 1999), at best a precursor of the Enlightenment and thus liberalism, in this case its British version, in contrast to David Hume as its true exponent. Also, DeLue (1999:xii) identifies “two different enlightenment traditions [in] Kant and Smith,” as representing the German and Scottish Enlightenments respectively, but Hume is a better example for the latter (after all, he greatly influenced Smith).

Hume and continued by Ferguson and Smith, a link that “libertarian” economists like Hayek et al. misconstrue or neglect, by denying or “forgetting” that their liberal-economic hero was a member of the rationalistic Enlightenment (Berry 1997).

In essence, by formal analogy to and substantive divergence from traditionalism, modernism as a social system and period, typified by the rationalistic “individualist belief in human perfectibility, social progress and scientific [knowledge],” is primarily founded in the Western, as distinct from the Eastern, Enlightenment (Angel 1994). Admittedly, “modernizing social conditions” are initiated with the Enlightenment (Lemert 1999), in particular ideology being an “invention of the modern age” of enlightenment (Lemert 1999). In general, a sort of sociological consensus exists that modern society is the product of the Enlightenment (Smart 2000), that the problems of “modernity” were most fully articulated during the latter<sup>18</sup> (Simon 1995), though sometimes the Renaissance<sup>19</sup> is placed at the initial stage of this process of modernization (Eisenstadt 1998). In particular, the liberal or social democratic conception of modern society, adopting individual liberty as its “prime value,” reportedly follows the “tradition of the Enlightenment” (Giddens 2000).

Negatively, Enlightenment-based modernity is antitraditionalism in general in the sense of an antithesis to economic, cultural, political, and other social traditionalism, or to, sacred religious and secular “profane” traditions, powers, and institutions alike as in Weber-Durkheim’s dichotomy. The Enlightenment, modernist “opposition to tradition” entails attempts at or, as in skeptical sociological accounts, claims to the “liberation” of humans from “unreasoning acceptance of mere tradition”<sup>20</sup> and “illegitimate domination,” through the idea of or claim to a “voluntary historical foundation,” as in US and French revolutionary “nationalist narratives” (Calhoun 1993). Historically, the Enlightenment exhibited a mix of opposition and skepticism to the “venerable institutions and traditions of the past,” with traditional Catholic and Protestant religions and church being among the main, though not sole, targets (Byrne 1997). For instance, such targets in early nineteenth century America were primarily the “twin inhumane institutions Calvinism and slavery”

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<sup>18</sup>Simon (1995:3) adds that “the writers of the Enlightenment are part of the beginning of the phenomenon of mass culture [i.e.] *mass enlightenment*.”

<sup>19</sup>Eisenstadt (1998:215) points to Weber’s identified “contradictions” in modern society: between “the creative dimension inherent in the visions that led to the crystallization of modernity – the visions of the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment and the Great Revolutions – and the flattening of these visions, the ‘disenchantment’ that resulted from the growing routinization and, above all, bureaucratization of the modern world.”

<sup>20</sup>However, Calhoun (1993) comments that positioning their nation within history allowed nationalists who claimed ancient roots still to evoke the heroism of creation and the prestige that since the Enlightenment adhered in many quarters to the production of something new – as in the US’s claim to be “the first new nation.” If so, this illustrates the abuse and perversion of Enlightenment values by anti-liberal, especially conservative, forces in Europe and America. In short, it exemplifies the nationalistic and conceivably militarist and imperialist abuse and perversion of the Enlightenment.

(Clark 1999), namely New England's Puritan theocracy and the slave economy in the South at least eventually, though even Jefferson and colleagues did not initially oppose the latter.

In particular, Enlightenment modernism is antimodievalism, including antifeudal, by delegitimizing ("deconstructing") and positing disintegration of the medieval or feudal *ancien regime* as an aberration and even regression in human civilization and evolution (Garrard 2003). This is an outcome subsequently achieved or approximated through the French, American, and other Western antifeudal liberal-democratic revolutions (Moore 1993) and ramifications, as the Enlightenment's attempted substantive realizations or outcomes ("daughters"), as well as by the Industrial Revolution as the expression and application of its scientific rationalism (Temin 2006). For instance, the French Enlightenment and the earlier Renaissance conception of modernity is reportedly formulated in respect of the "dissolution" of medieval social structures and the construction of a completely new society "independent of the past"<sup>21</sup> (Trey 1998). Admittedly, the outcome of the Enlightenment destruction of medievalism and its creation of modernism as respective social systems is a "spirit of progress and self determination" induced by scientific-technological "advancements" and religious, political, and economic "liberalization" alike (Trey 1998), as elaborated next.

## The Creative Destruction of Feudalism and the Medieval World

In particular, the Enlightenment is a genuine, paradigmatic sociocultural revolution with respect to oppressive feudalism and theocratic medieval society through a revolutionary discontinuity and break from these particular forms of economic and social traditionalism. In this sense, it operates as the process of creative destruction of feudalism as an economic order of master-servant relations and of Christian theocracy and society as a political and social system of religious coercion, repression, persecution, extermination, and wars. In general, it rejects any economic servitude or bondage and all theocracy or "holy" tyrannical rule, as epitomized by what Weber calls the "unexampled tyranny" of Puritanism and Calvinism overall.

As a negative dimension of its sociocultural revolution, the Enlightenment performs the act of intellectual destruction or delegitimization of the feudal economic system and theocratic political-social institutions, representing, in conjunction and mutual reinforcement, the oppressive and irrational medieval *ancien regime*. It and subsequently the French Revolution defines, rejects, and eventually supersedes, intellectually and politically respectively, the *ancien regime* as a mix of feudalism and medieval theocracy, of master-servant economic relations and of "godly" political tyranny and cultural irrationalism.

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<sup>21</sup>Trey (1998:3) observes that "initially the newness of the modern period meant a return to the 'grand old days,' referring to the golden age of antiquity [as] exemplified in the art and literature of the Italian Renaissance [but later], as a consequence of the French Enlightenment, modernity came to refer to a newness that was independent of the past."

In Comte's words, the Enlightenment aims at and results in transcending the feudal theocratic-military regime and the theological age in the specific form of Christian Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant theocracy and society. It does because in the latter all human culture, including art, philosophy, science, and technology, and humans are reduced to the "servant" of theology, religion, and church, thus literally sacrificed or subordinated to these "holy" causes. It transcends what Comte's precursor Vico had called the supra- and antihuman "age of Gods" and Rousseau the "City of God," and "age of heroes," as the divine-centered world (Byrne 1997) and the hero-centered world, defining the theological-theocratic and military stages of social history, respectively. For instance, its probably first constructive critic Hegel – in contrast to its nihilistic adversaries like Calvinist Rousseau and aristocratic Burke – and other philosophers considers the Enlightenment and its social philosophy the highest point and product of a "long process of civilization and spiritual development" (Hinchman 1984), thus human enlightenment in the Western world and beyond. Admittedly, this long process commences with and reaches its first peak in classical Greek civilization, including philosophy, science, art and culture, and Athens democracy, yet declining and relapsing into the preclassical primitive or barbarian and superstitious stage in the medieval Christian world to the point of cultural darkness or spiritual regression after the image of the Dark Middle Ages and perpetuated via theocratic oppression. This suggests that the Enlightenment is the "result of a long process of civilization and spiritual development" primarily in the sense of resulting from, continuity with, and reviving of classical culture and democracy, as had been the Renaissance, while representing a break or discontinuity from the medieval Christian succession and destruction of "pagan" cultural-political elements.

Negatively, the Enlightenment is not (and could not be) the "result of a long process of civilization and spiritual development" with respect to its medieval Christian stage. For in the latter, as both Hegel and Comte imply, social philosophy and all human culture, just as classical democracy, reaches the state of *caput mortuum* (clinical death) by being perverted into the maiden of and even effectively dissolved into theology, religion, and theocratic church. On this account, for most Enlightenment figures, the medieval Christian world is an aberration, regression, and reversal of this long "civilization and spiritual development," and hence a sort of "process of decivilization and spiritual un-development" relapsing into barbarism or primitivism and cultural backwardness or darkness. Thus, Hume identifies in the Christian and all religion, especially Puritanism and its theocratic "sectaries," a "barbarous zeal," describing Cromwell as a "barbarian," and himself as (consequently?) "not a Christian" (Berry 1997). Voltaire rejects the "childish absurdities," "contradictions," and "miracles,"<sup>22</sup> including what Pareto denotes the "scientific

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<sup>22</sup>Artz (1998:79) adds that "Voltaire believed in a natural religion (as) engraved on the hearts of men everywhere (Confucius, Socrates, Cicero) opposed to organized Christianity (miracles, supernatural doctrines, positive religious duties)." "He attacked the contradictions in the Bible and the improbabilities of miracles (and) the childish absurdities in the Bible." In this view, Voltaire also made "criticism and a satirizing of the idea of Leibniz and Pope that this is 'the best of all possible worlds' (Artz 1998:82)."



errors,” of the Bible (Artz 1998). Ferguson, Hume’s successor suggests that Greek democratic city-states and the Roman republic were “civilized,” yet followed and virtually destroyed as “pagan” or “heathen” by “barbaric pastoral peoples” (Berry 1997) inhabiting the medieval Christian world and petrifying it for centuries as Mises’ “peace of the cemetery.”

By definition, the Western Enlightenment, or perhaps any form of enlightenment (Angel 1994), could not result from, but only rejects and overcomes, this return to barbarism through “barbaric” peoples and “barbarous zeal,” including theological “childish absurdities” and “scientific errors,” in medieval Christian “civilization.” The latter consequently reappears to most Enlightenment philosophers and scientists such as Diderot, Montesquieu, Condorcet, Voltaire, Hume, Saint Simon, etc. as anticivilization and anticulture, including antiphilosophy and antiscience, directly inspiring anti-theoretical conservatism and indirectly prefiguring antiscientific fascism (Mannheim 1986) and religious fundamentalism. To argue the opposite (as “Christian scientists” may do) tracing or linking the Enlightenment and modernity, notably Western, particularly American, democracy, to Christian “civilization,” is a flagrant illogical nonsequitur and a major empirical error alike. This error is indicated by the fact that Christian, Catholic, and Protestant religious orthodoxy reacts by “mindless” battles (Habermas 2001) against the Enlightenment, and both the Vatican and Calvinism/Puritanism engage in “struggles” with liberalism (Burns 1990; Dombrowski 2001) in general. Reportedly, the Western Enlightenment and liberalism overall, including liberal democracy and civil society, does (and could) not incorporate “any of the prophetic authoritarian versions” of Christianity, including official Catholicism and theocratic Protestantism, as well as of Judaism, Islam, and other world religions (Angel 1994) as systems of authoritarian restraint, repression, and control (Bell 1977).

As a constructive dimension of its sociocultural revolution, the Enlightenment is the process of intellectual creation or innovation of antifeudal and antitheocratic and post-, though not invariably anti-, Christian social values and institutions. In Comte’s words, it intellectually creates or projects a rational, liberal-democratic, egalitarian, secular, and humane social system and the “positive age” based on liberty, equality, justice, life and happiness, reason, science, knowledge, and progress in society. As observed, the “central” values and projected institutions of the seventeenth to eighteenth century Western Enlightenment were individual liberty, the pursuit and accumulation of “scientific, objectively verifiable knowledge,” “social progress,” “increasing social justice” and “maximizing human happiness” (Angel 1994). In short, whatever its historical conjunctures and cultural expressions starting with Western Europe and expanding beyond, the Enlightenment’s essence remains the “humanistic pursuit” of social and individual well-being, justice, and scientific rationalism (Angel 1994). In Vico’s terms, it delegitimizes and transcends the “age of gods” and the “age of heroes” as the attributes of the medieval pre- and conservative counter-Enlightenment by means of the new humanistic “age of men” or human-centered social world (Byrne 1997) characterizing modern liberal-democratic and secular society. It thus generates a major shift from what Rousseau calls the transcendent “City of God” to the worldly “City of Man” (Garrard 2003), essentially from theocracy to democracy, from “bliss” and “reward” in heaven to happiness

and well-being within society, from Calvin to Voltaire in France, from Winthrop and colleagues to Jefferson in America, just as Vico prophetically predicts.

For instance, considered its representative (Byrne 1997; Simon 1995), just as its major critic and enemy (Collins 2000; Garrard 2003), Calvinist Rousseau, recognizes that the French Enlightenment, embodied by his friend-turned-opponent Voltaire, is truly revolutionary in sociological terms by creating a new vision of human society, elements of which he adopts or shares. Admittedly, Rousseau realizes that the French Enlightenment marks a “decisive shift,” in human society and thinking from a “divine-centered” to a “human-centered” social world and “vision of reality,” as initiated by the Renaissance, sharing elements of this movement like deism<sup>23</sup> substituting or moderating his original and seemingly lingering Calvinism (Byrne 1997). In particular, the French Enlightenment, notably Voltaire and Rousseau, while diverging on various points, converge on formulating a “new concept” of humans and human society beyond the “Christian vision of salvation history” from the original “Garden of Eden” as “paradise lost” due to “original sin,” rejected by both as inhumane, to the “final judgment” day<sup>24</sup> (Byrne 1997).

### *The Enlightenment as the Dual Destroyer-Creator*

In consequence, the Enlightenment implicitly, and the French Revolution explicitly, becomes not only what “libertarian” economists like Hayek (1955) lament and condemn as the “destroyer of [‘Christian’] civilization” based on traditional, medieval “institutions and customs” which they, like most conservatives, prefer to those of liberal-secular modernity as the child of the former.<sup>25</sup> More precisely, the Enlightenment operates as what Hayek’s more moderate or less conservative colleague within the Austrian school Schumpeter may call the “creative destroyer” of Christian *theocratic* civilization. For the Enlightenment, the latter is by definition the civilization of “holy” tyranny, persecution, extermination, and war, epitomized by both Catholic despotism and Calvinist-Puritan tyrannies, as are virtually all religiously dominated, notably “axial period”<sup>26</sup> (Habermas 1996) and proximate (e.g. Islamic) civilizations during most of history (Angel 1994; Eisenstadt 1986;

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<sup>23</sup>Byrne (1997:201) adds that, deviating from Calvinism and Christianity overall, “in his rejection of any innate human depravity through original sin (emphasis on the positive effect of environment on the development of the human being), Rousseau has had an immense influence on the modern Western understanding of the human subject.”

<sup>24</sup>Byrne (1997:201) suggests that Rousseau’s “vision of human innocence was instrumental in the emergence of a de-theologized anthropology on which the rationale of the human sciences depend.”

<sup>25</sup>This is in sharp contrast to Hayek’s own teacher and colleague within the Austrian school of economics, Mises who was positive and even enthusiastic about the Enlightenment and rationalistic liberalism seen as its “flower” in relation to traditionalism.

<sup>26</sup>Weber’s follower Jaspers coined the term the “Axial Period” (Habermas 1996) or “Axial Age” (Gorski and Altinordu 2008), a concept especially elaborated by Eisenstadt (1986).

Hamilton 1994; Juergensmeyer 2003; Sorokin 1970). In Weber's terms, the Enlightenment functions as the "creative destroyer" of charismatic and traditional authority, as the "authoritarian principle" of legitimization of power, typifying the medieval Christian and "all of the older religiously based social formations" (Lenski 1994). Alternatively, in this respect, it does as the creator or supporter of rational-legal authority as typical or prevalent "only in modern secular societies" (Lenski 1994) as the children of the Enlightenment.

In this sense, the Enlightenment becomes a generalized "Copernican revolution" (the term used for marginal economic theory in Schumpeter 1954) in sociological terms with respect to medieval Christian and other traditional religiously dominated societies. It thus literally or substantively translates and extends Copernicus' and other heretic "un-Christian" scientific revolutions in astronomy, and later biology, medicine, etc. into revolutionary social changes or innovations and progress. In summary, the Enlightenment functions as the "creative destroyer" or generalized "Copernican revolution" by intellectually transcending Hayek's old "institutions and customs" of feudalism and theocracy *and* by creating or projecting new social structures.

Ironically, these newly created or projected social structures comprise, alongside liberal-secular democracy and civil society, what Hayek and other "libertarian" economists celebrate as the "spontaneous" market order of capitalism as the novel economic system. The Enlightenment conceptually creates the latter in virtue of its theory of a free-market economy<sup>27</sup> (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Garrard 2003; Mokyr 2009), including original *laissez-faire* (Keynes 1972) and invisible-hand (Hirschman 1977) doctrines, as adopted and refined by its member Smith (Berry 1997), the father of economic science (Buchanan 1991), in conjunction with its conception of liberal-secular political democracy. Its creation via conceptualization of new capitalist economic and democratic political structures a la Schumpeter is a supreme irony in the Hayekian "libertarian" context. Hayek (1955) and his disciples vehemently attack Enlightenment "constructivist rationalism" or "constructivism"

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<sup>27</sup>It is remarkable blunder or omission that Hayek overlooks that it was the Enlightenment that provided the first or most articulated and consistent theoretical foundation and justification for his celebrated "spontaneous market order," including, as Keynes remarks, the *laissez-faire* doctrine. Hayek's blunder or omission is also striking because his teacher and colleague Mises, like Keynes, essentially attributed or linked the conception of a free market economic system, notably the *laissez-faire* doctrine, to the Enlightenment or its ramifications in classical political economy represented by Smith, who was himself officially a member of Hume's Scottish Enlightenment (Berry 1997; Tribe 1999). And, if Hayek, as he does, credits Smith with the design of a "spontaneous market order" he overlooks or forgets that this classical economist was also an Enlightenment philosopher, who wrote the "Theory of Moral Sentiments," just as the "Wealth of Nations." For instance, Garrard (2003:26) comments that for the (French) Enlightenment "positive laws, institutions, and beliefs are (since society is natural) unnecessary to produce the general harmony of nature in society, although steps are sometimes required to eradicate or regulate forces that disrupt this natural harmony, such as religious conflict. This French Enlightenment conception of the spontaneous order of nature and society is consistent with its rejection of contract theory (e.g. its pessimistic Hobbesian form), according to which order is the intentional product of human will."

as the “abuse of reason” and expressing “anthropocentric limitations” (Smith 2003), notably scientism as the “counter-revolution of science,” in favor of pre-Enlightenment traditionalism and irrationalism, such as ignorance, prejudice, rigid tradition, and aristocracy, extolled by their arch-conservative model Burke (Giddens 2000; Schmidt 1996).

Yet, this Enlightenment rationalism, as admittedly “one of the crowning achievements of the human intellect”<sup>28</sup> (Smith 2003), logically entails as its integral element and historically yields as its aggregate outcome the very glorified market-capitalist “spontaneous order” as an epitome of rationality in the form of rational economic calculation denied to non- or pseudocapitalism, like socialism, social democracy, the welfare state, the New Deal, and communism all lumped together in a total cacophony by Hayek and his teacher Mises. Such “libertarian” capitalist anti-Enlightenment antagonism seems unable or unwilling to recognize the evident contradiction self-rationalized as the false antinomy of the “bad” and “good” rationalisms of the French and British (Scottish) Enlightenment, respectively (Hayek 1955; Infantino 2003; Smith 2003).

After all, the Enlightenment is, as Mannheim (1936) notes, “one of the weapons of the rising bourgeoisie” and to that extent of Weberian modern “bourgeois capitalism” as Smith’s “system of natural liberty” or Hayek’s “spontaneous” market order and its political extension in liberal democracy, including the “bourgeois public sphere” (Linton 2001; Simon 1995), and civil society as its private realm. And, recall Hayek et al.’s hero, Smith is a “key member” of the Scottish Enlightenment (Berry 1997; also, DeLue 1999; Razeen 2002; Tribe 1999), along with Hume as the founder and leader.<sup>29</sup> However, Smith’s “membership of the Enlightenment family” (Berry 1997) seems overlooked by Hayek and other “libertarian” economists through a market-economic misappropriation or reduction of this Enlightenment basis, thus a sort of amnesia. In essence, in an exemplary case of the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” Hayek et al. overlook or “forget” that Smith is a “liberal” classical economist primarily because of being a member of the Enlightenment and crucially influenced by its

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<sup>28</sup>Smith (2003:468) registers that Enlightenment Cartesian rationalism or constructivism ‘uses reason to deliberately create rules of action, and create human socioeconomic institutions that yield outcomes deemed preferable, given particular circumstances, to those produced by alternative arrangements. “Notably, following Hayek’s attack, Smith (2003:468) proposes that even though Enlightenment rationalistic constructivism is “one of the crowning achievements of the human intellect, it is important to remain sensitive to the fact that human institutions and most decision making is not guided primarily, if at all, by constructivism.”

<sup>29</sup>Berry (1997:vii) remarks that “Scottish Enlightenment” refer[s] to Scotland between 1740 (Hume’s *Treatise of Human Nature*) and 1790 (Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments*). He also includes Hume’s followers or successors Ferguson and Smith in the “membership of the Enlightenment family” (Berry 1997:23). In this view, notably Hume’s “experience was European rather than narrowly Scottish and British” citing his lucid statement “Some hate me because I am not a Tory, some because I am not a Whig, some because I am not a Christian [*sic*] and all because I am Scotsman” (Berry 1997:18).

leading representatives like Hume (Berry 1997) and partly by Montesquieu (Hirschman 1977) and other French members, including the *physiocrats* or “economists” (Quesnay, Turgot, etc.). As pertains to the Hayekian libertarian economic appropriation or reduction of Smithian “sociological economics” (Reisman 1998), admittedly Hayek’s historical renditions of liberalism “rarely” mention that Smith is a “member” of the Scottish Enlightenment,<sup>30</sup> while extolling his “liberal” economic theories (Berry 1997). This is a kind of fallacy of omission or “amnesia,” and alternatively a failure of historical association, if Hayek’s teacher Mises (1950) is correct in describing Smith’s and other celebrated classical economic-political liberalism as the very “flower” of the rationalistic Enlightenment. It is no wonder that admittedly “a number” of economists and historians emphasize Smith’s “place in the Scottish and European Enlightenment” and generally situate his “liberal” economic and other works in a “wider cultural and political context” (Tribe 1999).

Generally, with some exceptions (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Young 1997), “libertarian” economists overlook or deny that classical economic and political liberalism, as the ideal of liberty to be preserved by “libertarianism,” is primarily the creation and legacy of the Enlightenment (Mannheim 1986; Dombrowski 2001; Razeen 2002; Reiman 1997), in contrast to conservatism rooted in pre-Enlightenment traditionalism, specifically medievalism. In an ironic twist, Hayekians overlook that none other than their teacher Mises (1950), praised as the “classical liberal” (Hayek 1941), describes classical liberalism and thus “libertarianism” as the “flower” of the “rationalist” Enlightenment and so its “constructivist rationalism” that they attack as the “abuse of reason.” This holds in virtue of the Enlightenment’s conception of *both* a liberal, free-market economy and liberal representative democracy (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Mokyr 2009; Young 1997).

Considered a key “moment in the formation of modern humanity,” yet “a period without a fixed date,” the Enlightenment is defined by “multiple entries,” notably the “formation of capitalism,” hence Hayek’s “spontaneous market order,” and the “constitution of the bourgeois world” (Foucault 1996). In turn, the capitalist-bourgeois formation proceeds in conjunction with the “establishment of the state system” and the “foundation of modern science” and its correlate technology<sup>31</sup> (Foucault 1996). In particular, the eighteenth century Enlightenment was reportedly “one of the weapons” of the bourgeoisie in being the “crucial” movement and time in the “formation of a bourgeois public sphere” as a “conceptual space” interposed between civil society and the state and crystallizing in the notion of “public

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<sup>30</sup>Berry (1997:197) comments that “just as there is more to Smith’s liberalism than a defense of ‘natural liberty’ so there is more to the social theory of the Scottish Enlightenment than Smith; it does not all fall under his shade. The Scottish Enlightenment in general is held to be significant for ‘liberal’ thinking.”

<sup>31</sup>Foucault (1996:392) also includes what he calls the “organization of an opposition between the art of being governed and that of not being governed in such a manner.”

opinion,” especially in France, notably Paris<sup>32</sup> (Linton 2001). The effect of the French Enlightenment is thus identified as “liberal political discourse,” despite the absence of capitalists in the modern sense, as the counter-ideology of the “nascent bourgeoisie” vs. the old dominant ideology of “aristocratic privilege” in eighteenth century France<sup>33</sup> (Simon 1995). As critical theorists admit, the Enlightenment as an intellectual movement in France created a “broad base in the French middle class” rather than limited to a “small elite” (Horkheimer 1996). For instance, in eighteenth century France the Enlightenment’s philosophers “primarily” directed their writings to the “discontented middle classes”<sup>34</sup> (Artz 1998; Linton 2001), thus providing “one of the weapens” of the bourgeoisie.

## Generalized “Copernican Revolution” in Society

The Enlightenment especially originates as the project, and functions as the process, of “creative destruction” of medieval theocracy designated, enforced, and rationalized as “godly” society (*Civitas Dei*), millennial “God’s Kingdom on Earth,” and the like. In particular, it first intellectually transcends (“deconstructs”) and then, via the French and in part American Revolutions, socially overcomes Pareto’s Catholic Roman theocracy, as well as its Protestant, especially Calvinist and Puritan, substitutes within Christianity.<sup>35</sup> Specifically, it operates as a generalized, cultural “Copernican” revolution in relation to medieval theocracy and society as established through institutionalizing Christianity (Constantine) as an official religion during early medieval times (Popper 1973). Admittedly, the Enlightenment constitutes the essential part and peak of an “often interrupted movement” toward human liberation and escape from “the cage of the closed society” and the formation of an “open society” (Popper 1973). In this context, it generates a profound discontinuity,

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<sup>32</sup>Linton (2001:3) comments that the “social and cultural history of the Enlightenment is now as vital as the ideas themselves to any account of the nature of the Enlightenment. No longer are historians content to consider the Enlightenment as a set of ideas viewed in isolation from their readership: they are also engaged in assessing the effect of the growth in an audience for intellectual works, particularly amongst the bourgeoisie.”

<sup>33</sup>Simon (1995:7–14) observes that the French “nascent bourgeoisie,” although politically disenfranchised, [still] exerted their influence precisely in the creation of a public sphere separate from both the state and civil society [i.e.] the bourgeois public sphere [with] a counter-ideology to the dominant one of aristocratic privilege [viz.] liberal political discourse in spite of the lack of “capitalists” in eighteenth century France.

<sup>34</sup>Artz (1998:31) adds that “one of the causes of these changes in the thought [the Enlightenment] was the great growth of the middle classes.”

<sup>35</sup>Pareto remarks that the “religion of Christ, which seemed especially made for the poor and humble, has generated the Roman theocracy” and implies that Protestantism, making initially identical claims and promises like liberation and equality, has subsequently done the same through its own, especially Calvinist and Puritan, theocracies.

even direct or indirect revolutionary break, from Christian theocracy and civilization spanning from the institutionalization of Christianity through the medieval Catholic Church to Calvinist-Puritan theocracies (Geneva, Holland, Great Britain, and America) during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. In this sense, the Enlightenment is not the creative destruction of Pareto's "religion of Christ" in its original form or in itself. It is only of its subsequent, yet predictable as typical for virtually all prior and subsequent world religions (Eisenstadt 1986; Juergensmeyer 2003; Lenski 1994), theocratic and thus violent mutation in Roman and Protestant theocracy *cum* "godly" politics, "holy" war, and "Christian civilization," including "Christian science" (astronomy, biology, medicine, economics, etc.) and education.

Particularly indicative and relevant in this respect is the *Encyclopedia*, edited mostly by Diderot, as the main statement and document of the French and all Enlightenment and a publishing enterprise forming a "center of network creativity"<sup>36</sup> (Collins 2000). This work redefines and delegitimizes traditional religion (Artz 1998), notably theocracy, including theocratic and petrified Christianity, as intrinsically antihuman by sacrificing or subjecting human well-being, happiness, and life to suprahuman causes and inhumane or violent via "holy" war of extermination against "infidels" (Juergensmeyer 2003), fanatical, ignorant, superstitious, or irrational contradicted by reason, knowledge, and science. The document reveals and documents what Weber calls the "religions of salvation" in the world beyond or "heaven" as effectively the theocratic, in Hobbes' words, "fancies" and superstitions of self-inflicted and sadistic restraint (Bell 1977), suffering, punishment, violence and war, and death within *society*, simply, as referred to Puritanism by Tawney (1962) "hell in this world." It rediscovers them as incompatible with and contrary to humanity and civilization, *human* liberty, well-being and happiness, and dignified, humane life (Bittner 1996).

Alternatively, the *Encyclopedia* advocates and promotes religious liberty, tolerance, and humanitarianism<sup>37</sup> seen as destroyed or perverted in medieval Christian, Catholic, and Protestant alike, theocracy and other theocratic "religions of salvation," while proposing a morality based on "human experience and independent of religion" (Artz 1998). For instance, Voltaire and other Enlightenment figures like Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach, Condorcet, Montesquieu, and Hume are disgusted with (Artz 1998) or suspected traditional Christianity, especially its medieval theocracy, for its "bloody history" and perceived "superstitious practices" (Byrne 1997).

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<sup>36</sup>Overall Collins (2000) suggests that in France the "Enlightenment intellectuals [were] supported by combination of state bureaucracy as patronage base, plus divided political authority promoting cultural competition." In turn, the Scottish Enlightenment was "based on civil servants imposing peace on political-religious strife [while] the German idealist movement [was] a surprising turn from the Enlightenment repudiation of metaphysics" (Collins 2000).

<sup>37</sup>Artz (1998:109–10) adds that the French "government, urged on by the Church, intervened to forbid circulation of the work. Along with science and technology, the *Encyclopedia* emphasized nature, reason, and tolerance. In this it appealed to all but the most Conservative readers." Further, the *Encyclopedia* "contained many articles on the arts and letters, and [also] laid the foundations of modern sociology, anthropology, and ethnology" (Artz 1998:110).

In particular, they are repelled by Christianity’s “bloody record of crusades and religious wars,”<sup>38</sup> especially Protestantism’s practices and images of perpetual “warfare” (Juergensmeyer 2003). In comparative terms, for the Enlightenment and its legacy of secularism and pacifism, the “bloody history” of Christianity, particularly Protestantism, notably Calvinism and, above all, its subtype Puritanism, is as “disturbing” as Islam’s, with “holy” cosmic war and other violence glorified and “vividly” depicted in “both the Old and New Testaments of the Bible” (Juergensmeyer 2003; also, Angel 1994). A predictable exception is Rousseau because of his Calvinism, joined with deism later, and consequently his “protototalitarian impulses”<sup>39</sup> (Simon 1995) and his “critiquing Enlightenment progress and rationality” in favor of a “sentimentalist defense” of theocratic “nondogmatic” religion to yield “anti-modernist modernism” (Collins 2000; Garrard 2003).

Still, despite its disgust with the “bloody history” and “superstitious practices” of the medieval Christian world and Weber’s “religions of salvation” generally, the Enlightenment is primarily antitheocratic and just secondarily anti-Christian or antireligious and atheistic overall. While critical of the official religion and the theocratic church, most Enlightenment figures are deists, including “ungodly” Voltaire and once-Calvinist Franklin, forming what Weber<sup>40</sup> calls “deistic communities,” and agnostics or skeptics. Only a few are true atheists or nonbelievers such

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<sup>38</sup>Juergensmeyer (2003:157) comments that “whole books of the Hebrew Bible are devoted to the military exploits of great kings, their contests related in gory detail. Though the New Testament did not take up the battle cry, the later history of the Church did, supplying Christianity with a bloody record of crusades and religious wars.” In short, “despite its central tenets of love and peace, Christianity—like most traditions—has always had a violent side” (Juergensmeyer 2003:19). He invokes Protestantism, with its persistent “model of warfare” and tenet that “Christian living *is* war,” as an “example” within Christianity (Juergensmeyer 2003:157).

<sup>39</sup>Simon (1995:19) remarks that, as “in some sense representative of the French Enlightenment,” Rousseau’s “vision of utopia leads to social conformism [and thus] a form of totalitarian social control,” as indicated by the “totalitarian implications of his efforts to instill a sense of community among the citizenry.” In this view, in a “classic definition of totalitarianism as a collapse of the distinction between the state and civil society, [Rousseau’s] emphasis on civic virtue (etc.), combined with his call to nationalism, bear a striking resemblance to fascism. His political programs eradicate the distinction between the state and civil society (as) all relations are both social and political relations (Poland, Corsica) because the state mediates all aspects of its citizens’ lives. “Rousseau’s nostalgia for classical republics [etc.] culminates in political programs that resemble the mass engineered domination of totalitarian regimes” (Simon 1995:20). While identifying the “protototalitarian impulses in Rousseau’s social theory [as in] the mob psychology of the fascist state” and the dissolution of individual to “national identity,” Simon (1995:170–4) still classifies Rousseau (and Diderot) into the “first critical theorists.” One symptom of his “protototalitarian impulses” was Rousseau’s support (in *Discourse*) of burning the Library of Alexandria by Muslim rulers and conceivably by Christian popes (Garrard 2003:17). Another one was his claim that Geneva’s Calvinist Spartans “had wisely banned [the modern theater]” (Garrard 2003:25).

<sup>40</sup>Weber registers that “in Western Europe, since seventeenth century, the strata of Enlightenment religions produced (in Anglo-Saxon and French culture areas) unitarian and deistic communities and (those) of a syncretistic, atheistic, or free-church variety. In Germany, Enlightenment religious views found a hearing among the same groups that were interested in Freemasonry (i.e.) those who have little direct economic interests (e.g. university professors, declassed ideologists and educated strata who partly or wholly belonged to the propertyless people).”



as Holbach and Helvetius, perhaps Diderot and Hume as the “notorious infidel” (Berry 1997) or agnostic<sup>41</sup> (Byrne 1997), alongside Hobbes and Spinoza as the Enlightenment’s relevant precursors.<sup>42</sup>

In this sense, it is inaccurate or imprecise to argue, as Hayek (1955) imputes, that by despising those social “institutions and customs” devised without a conscious plan or design, the Enlightenment turns into the “destroyer of the [Christian] civilization” founded on such “spontaneous” arrangements and values. Rather, it proves to be primarily the “destroyer” of the medieval Christian Catholic and Protestant theocracy *cum* “godly society.” Recall that *Civitas Dei* was established as what Pareto calls the Roman theocracy perverting, in his view, the “religion of Christ” during early medieval times, then reinvented, expanded, and reinforced as, as Weber puts it, “too lax and imperceptible” through the Protestant Reformation<sup>43</sup> (Foucault 1996) and its own, especially Calvinist-Puritan, theocracies in high medievalism. Hence, this theocracy endured for more than one millennium, the fourth through the eighteenth century, thus, as Enlightenment figures like Voltaire, Diderot, and Hume (or cynics) might say, exceeding its original millennial “date of expiration” of the 1,000 year “Kingdom of God” or “fantasy of salvation” (Giddens 1984). In summary, the Enlightenment operates as the “creative destroyer” of theocratic, as distinct from nontheocratic, if ever, Christian civilization or the irrational Dark Middle Ages defined as “dark” precisely by the official status of Christianity as the established religion and effective theocracy or “godly” tyranny since early medievalism.

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<sup>41</sup>Byrne (1997:10) comments that Hume’s skepticism “about ordinary knowledge and about religious truth (involved) a nascent agnosticism which in the (nineteenth) century would develop into a systematic articulation of atheistic philosophy.” In turn, according to Garrard (2003:19–20), the “influence of Hume on the trend away from concepts such as the state of nature, the social contract, and natural law was considerable at this time.” In this interpretation, Hume’s *Of the Original Contract* “presents a powerful skeptical case against what he elsewhere refers to as the ‘fallacious and sophistical’ theory of the social contract.” Related to this eighteenth century decline in contract theory was the growing appeal of the idea of human beings as naturally sociable, a view that enjoyed almost unanimous support among the *philosophes*. [e.g.] Diderot never wavered from his conviction that men “were never isolated.” [For d’Holbach also] “what is called the state of nature would be a state contrary to nature” (Garrard 2003:20).

<sup>42</sup>Hobbes’ open or implied atheism or agnosticism is well-known and paradigmatic. Spinoza is also often classified among atheists, agnostics, or deists due to his “rational reading of the Bible.” If interpreted literally, the Bible is full of errors and contradictions and impossibilities. “[Spinoza] pleaded strongly for toleration and religious freedom as practiced in Holland” (Artz 1998:7; also, Kaplan 2002). He proposed that “the nature of things is not to be understood through the Bible, but the Bible is to be understood by the nature of things” and became a “martyr for the freedom of thought [and] one of the early prophets of democracy” (cited in Artz 1998:8). In this account, Leibniz is also a precursor of the Enlightenment because “Leibniz’s God is not like an Oriental despot,” “seeking to reconcile Christianity with rationalism” (Artz 1998:9).

<sup>43</sup>Foucault (1996:383–4) suggests from the Protestant Reformation especially there was a “veritable explosion of the art of governing men [viz.] a displacement in relation to its religious source (laicization), an expansion into civil society of [it] and the methods for doing it.”

Furthermore, the Enlightenment constitutes the project and process of creative destruction vs. both Catholic *and* Protestant Christian theocracies or established state churches, not only the first, as usually assumed given its origin, prime relevance, and climax in France under the “holy alliance” of theocratic Catholicism with despotic secular power (“God and the King”). It intellectually delegitimizes not only theocratic Catholicism allied with royal despotism in feudal France, through its dissent or critique<sup>44</sup> (Foucault 1996), notably “critical reason” in the form of philosophy and science overcoming “tradition, established religion, or conventional political and social thinking”<sup>45</sup> (Byrne 1997). It also does what Weber calls “Calvinistic states churches” in Europe, such as Calvin’s and Rousseau’s Geneva<sup>46</sup> (Byrne 1997; Garrard 2003) and Holland under official Calvinism (Kaplan 2002), including their English-American derivatives like Puritan theocracies in England transiently (plus Scotland longer) and America enduringly.

A paradigmatic exemplar involves the appearance of “European Enlightenment theories about degeneracy in the New World” (Gould 1996), specifically what Weber calls the “theocracy of New England” (Munch 2001) under American Puritanism as the “most totalitarian” (Stivers 1994) subtype of Calvinism and by

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<sup>44</sup> Foucault (1996:385) implies that Renaissance and implicitly Enlightenment or modern Critique was to promote “universal and indefeasible rights to which every government (the monarch, the magistrate, the educator, or the father) will have to submit [as] the problem of natural law.” He adds that “natural law is certainly not an invention of the Renaissance, but from the sixteenth century on it took on a critical function, one it would always retain” (Foucault 1996:385).

<sup>45</sup> Byrne (1997:1) states that “in a narrow sense ‘Enlightenment’ refers to [the mid eighteenth century] when, particularly in France, there emerged groups of freethinkers intent on grounding knowledge on the exercise of critical reason, as opposed to tradition, established religion, or conventional political and social thinking.”

<sup>46</sup> Byrne (1997:184) remarks that “Rousseau’s ideal state owes a great deal to the political structure of his home town of Geneva (a citizen) raising the issue of the impact of Calvinist theology on European political theory.” [Yet] it is worth noting Rousseau’s bitter disappointment when the Small Council of Geneva (the highest ruling body) condemned *Emile* and *The Social Contract*. The city-state which Rousseau had admired as a model of good government had shown itself somewhat less tolerant than he had anticipated. Rousseau was prepared to trace this intolerance back to Calvin himself: “Calvin was undoubtedly a great man, but he was, in the end, (only) a man, and what is worse, a theologian. He had, besides, all the pride of a genius who feels his superiority and who is outraged that anyone disputes it with him.” In this account, his theory “reflects a tension inherent in Rousseau’s home and model state, Geneva, where the Calvinist form of theocratic government existed in an at times uneasy relationship with the liberating Protestant emphasis on the purity of the gospel and the inviolability of the individual conscience” (Byrne (1997:185). Similarly, Garrard (2003:1) suggests that “even after his ‘reform,’ which took Rousseau back to his native city in 1754 to be readmitted to the Calvinist Church and to have his Genevan citizenship restored, he returned to the salons of Paris.” In this view, Rousseau “favored an ‘enlightenment’ of the spirit achieved through the cultivation of virtue with the aid of conscience, rather than an ‘enlightenment’ of knowledge and reason” (Garrard (2003:3). Yet, he reportedly “participated in, influenced and was influenced by a social, cultural, political, and philosophical environment that was predominantly French in an age when France was the dominant cultural force in Europe” (Garrard 2003:11). En passant, his book *Emile* “was banned for its religious heterodoxy in both Catholic Paris and Calvinist Geneva” (Garrard 2003:70).

implication Protestantism. Reportedly, as an antitheocratic or secular “philosophical movement,” the Enlightenment in America, like in Europe, eventually becomes “totally antithetical” to theocratic Calvinism at the “core of New England Puritanism”<sup>47</sup> (Bremer 1995). On this account, this initially intellectual movement proves a true “Copernican revolution” in societal terms in Jeffersonian America by eventually “disestablishing” Calvinist Puritanism via Jefferson’s “wall of eternal separation” of church and state and removal of the “religious test” for political office (Dayton 1999), as it does a fortiori in France and Europe.

Even more explicitly and strongly than in Jeffersonian America in which “die-hard” Puritanism resisted its “disestablishment” for no less than half a century after the Revolution (Dayton 1999; Gould 1996; Kloppenberg 1998), the Enlightenment in France identified the largest and most persistent obstacle to human liberty, happiness, life, reason, and social progress in the traditional theocratic Church as its “principal target” (Garrard 2003). This applies, though to a relatively lesser extent, to most other European societies during the “Age of Reason,” with local and relatively secondary exceptions like Calvin’s Geneva and Scotland during Calvinism with its independent Calvinist cum Presbyterian church serving as the ersatz-parliament and ensuring its national identity within an officially Anglican and England-dominated Great Britain<sup>48</sup> (Berry 1997). As observed, the Enlightenment in France identifies “organized religion,” notably the theocratic church, as the “chief culprit” in the perennial conflict between “lightness and darkness, freedom and slavery, truth and ignorance” (Garrard 2003).

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<sup>47</sup> Bremer (1995:225) adds that “but in the early eighteenth century, in England and in the colonies, many were attracted to the philosophers claim to have discovered natural laws, their optimistic view of man, and their skepticism toward all orthodoxies.” Also, Bremer (1995:225) suggests that “the English Enlightenment (from Newton’s *Principia Mathematica* in 1686 and Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* 1689) represented in its essence a challenge to the traditional reliance upon authority in religious and secular life, and carried an assertion of man’s ability to discover the secrets of the universe and exert some control over his destiny.” In turn, according to Kumar (2001:42), “behind all English social thought of this time was the fertilizing influence of the eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment,” as exemplified by “John S. Mill,” admirer of Comte and Tocqueville, might also make a passable candidate as a “founding father of English sociology.”

<sup>48</sup> Berry (1997:12–3) observes that Presbyterianism was the “officially sanctioned form of Church government [in Scotland] and subscription to the tenets of the Westminster Confession was made the test of orthodoxy. Six years later this was put into fateful effect with the execution of a 19-year-old student Thomas Aikenhead for blasphemy (even after he had recanted of his alleged view that theology was ‘a rapsodie of feigned and ill invented Nonsense’). Here, on the face of it, is an event that represents all that the Enlightenment was fighting against.” In this account the British Union “itself should have confirmed the Church’s position since the retention of Presbyterianism was one of the articles of the Treaty. Arguably, however, this enhanced position made it the focus of political attention and this helped eventually the Scottish Church (or elements of it) and the Scottish Enlightenment to come to some sort of rapprochement” (Berry 1997:13). Further, Berry (1997:14) suggests that the Church Moderates “were the ‘Enlightenment’ party. This, together with their institutional centrality, makes the Enlightenment in Scotland very different from that typically associated with the French situation. This difference is reinforced by the close relationships between the Moderate clergy and other members of the Enlightenment, even including the notorious infidel—David Hume.”

For illustration, Voltaire's famous statement "crush the infamous thing" in the "name of humanity" especially opposes organized and theocratic religion and generally any "arbitrary, entrenched, and senseless power by an absolute Church or State" (Artz 1998). In his France, like other European societies, including Great Britain and Germany<sup>49</sup> (Foucault 1996), the "infamous thing" was royal absolutism, the Crown reportedly persisting in its official legitimation by the medieval "Divine right" sanctification of monarchy (Garrard 2003), thus the theocratic fusion of church and state, "God and the King." Predictably, this sociological theodicy or sociodicy of absolute political power (Bourdieu 1998) was provided and propagated by official Catholicism in France and other Catholic societies as in Spain, Italy, etc. It was also by established Protestantism in Great Britain ("God save the King/Queen"), Germany, and colonial America under Puritanism with its "republican" variation of the "divine right" by Winthrop and colleagues to rule (Bremer 1995).

## How the Modern West Was Won?

In retrospect, the Enlightenment achieves a victory over pure or diluted theocracies, from France, Holland, and England and Jeffersonian America, and the irrational Dark Middle Ages representing the pre-Enlightenment, as well as over their post-medieval conservative-fascist survivals or revivals representative of the anti-Enlightenment. In short, it is at least "seemingly victorious" (Horkheimer 1996) against theocracy and religious orthodoxy's "mindless defensive battle" against the Enlightenment (Habermas 2001). In consequence, liberal-democratic, secular, and rationalistic modernity as the child of the Enlightenment has triumphed over, as sociologists since Weber suggest, economic and cultural traditionalism, including medievalism or feudalism, as exemplified by liberalism's eventual triumph over "Papal struggles" (Burns 1990).

Predictably, the victory of the Enlightenment and liberalism over Christian theocracy and traditionalism is the most complete, irreversible, or enduring in Catholic France, to a lesser extent in mostly Anglican England (and in Calvinist Scotland despite Hume et al.). Conversely, it is the most incomplete, reversible, or transient in Puritan-Protestant America owing to the dominant force and legacy of theocratic Puritanism and Protestant sectarianism and evangelicalism overall (Jenness 2004; Lindsay 2008; Lipset 1996). Most other Western societies seem more or less intermediate cases, including Lutheran-Catholic Germany. The latter is characterized with "the somewhat pedantic tradition of the German Enlightenment" (Habermas 1989b) founded or represented by Kant and epitomized in his suggestion "dare to think" and the idea of the "public use of reason" (Habermas 2001; also,

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<sup>49</sup>Foucault (1996:387) cites a German's king's (Frederick II) infamous anti-Enlightenment statement, "Let them reason as much as they want as long as they obey."

Cascardi 1999)<sup>50</sup>, yet, like liberalism (Habermas 1989a), counterattacked<sup>51</sup> (Schmidt 1996) and often subdued by romanticism or idealism and its outcome conservatism, including eventually fascism, in adverse reaction (Collins 2000). In general, the Enlightenment-liberalism's victory is greater or its impact deeper in its point of origin and epicenter, France or Western Europe and its adjacent areas like Great Britain than in non-European societies, including America, let alone Islamic and other Eastern contexts dominated by what Weber calls "Oriental" irrationalism and illiberalism or despotism (Angel 1994).

Counterfactually, one can argue that it is hardly possible to conceive of the rationalistic and liberal-secular Enlightenment as arising and becoming victorious in non-European settings like "Asia or Africa" (Artz 1998), but only or primarily in Europe, though this hypothetical assertion, like Weber's Occident-Orient dichotomy, is criticized by non-Europeans as "Euro-centric" (Habermas 2001). Arguably, only Europe could actually produce and conceivably can reproduce, for better or worse (so, no value judgment is made, preempting accusations of "Euro-centrism") what analysts (Angel 1994) term the "Western Enlightenment" defined by liberalism, secularism, and rationalism, as distinct from and opposed to and by "Enlightenment East" with its opposite defining attributes like faith, mysticism, religious irrationalism, etc. And, the original fact that "Enlightenment West" was a "general intellectual and cultural climate" (Byrne 1997) permeating European societies, particularly France, Germany, the Netherlands, England, and Scotland, from the mid seventeenth to the early nineteenth century probably prefigured and predicted its victory over the pre- and anti-Enlightenment in most Europe rather than or less in non-European societies, including America, let alone Weber's "Oriental" regions and despotisms.

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<sup>50</sup>Cascardi (1999:13–5) comments that Kant "wishes to preserve a realm of moral freedom that would not be constrained by the contingencies of fact (an action as moral only when it is done out of a sense of obligation to the moral law [duty], not by merely fortuitous means)" and the Enlightenment "division of fact (nature) and value (freedom) [is] articulated in [Kant's] first two *Critiques* (of Reason)." In this view, for Kant our "conceptual cognitive and moral structures fail to accommodate" the so-called "primary" aesthetic experiences of pleasure and pain and the "failure" of aesthetics to bridge fact and value has social and political implications beyond what [he] may have recognized (Cascardi 1999:17–9). Arguably, great art "alone among the socially differentiated spheres of Enlightened modernity—the cognitive, the practical, and the aesthetic—suffers the effects of that differentiation and invites us to reflect upon it as an objective and irrefutable fact" (Cascardi 1999:20). Cascardi (1999:38) infers that Kant's "theory of aesthetic reflection marks affect (pleasure, pain) as evidence that the process of Enlightenment as a mode of systematic critical reflection is necessarily *incomplete*." In passing, Kant "lived in Königsberg in Prussia (under Frederick the Great as the first of exemplars of enlightened kingship) where the dominant Lutherans coexisted with (Quakers, Mennonites, German Swiss Calvinists, Huguenots, etc.)" (Fitzpatrick 1999:49).

<sup>51</sup>Schmidt (1996:10) registers that "after the publication of *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*," Frederick threatened Kant with future "unpleasant measures" should he continue to "misuse" his philosophy to "distort and disparage many of the cardinal and basic teachings of the Holy Scriptures and Christianity." "In this and other works, Kant make energetic defense of the right to freedom of expression" (Schmidt 1996:29).

In virtue of the comparatively incomplete victory or weak legacy of the Enlightenment and liberalism, relative to pre- and anti-Enlightenment Puritanism and conservatism, in America compared with Europe, the “first new nation” (Calhoun 1993; Lipset 1969) reappears in a new, exceptional light or darkness, as the case may be. It situates the “new nation” less within the setting of Enlightenment-based Western liberal-secular modernity and civilization (Berman 2000) than in non-Western preliberal and theocratic traditionalism up to the twenty first century, as comparative sociological research indicates (Inglehart 2004). Hence, what reveals the true attribute, operation, and outcome of the “phenomenon of American exceptionalism” (Inglehart 2004) is the comparative incompleteness or weakness of the Western Enlightenment and liberalism in America rather than, as US sociologists a la Parsons et al. claim (Mayway 1984; Lipset and Marks 2000), being the pinnacle and “model” of the West.<sup>52</sup> At this point, Parsons et al.’s ethnocentric or naïve claim that Western civilization and even “half a million years of human history” have reached their culmination in the American, largely Puritan-conservative (Lipset 1996), sociopolitical and economic system, is described as “more than faintly ridiculous” (Giddens 1984).

In a sense, the triumph and enduring legacy of the Enlightenment and its liberalism, democracy, secularism, universalism, rationalism, and progressivism primarily or more than anything else, including the rise and institutionalization of Christianity, define, typify, and constitute Western civilization as “Western” in the sense of liberal-democratic, rational, secular, universalistic, and progressive modernity. On this account, only Jefferson-Madison’s, and not Winthrop-Reagan’s Christian Puritan-evangelical, America belongs to the social space and time of Western civilization as understood. Conversely, the failure and the non-existent or weak legacy of the Enlightenment and liberalism essentially marks non-Western, Oriental, especially Islamic, civilization as illiberal, despotic, irrational, and theocratic, thus distinguishes it from and opposes it to its condemned Western alternative. To that degree, the “other,” Puritan-evangelical “exceptional” America has historically been and remains by the twenty first century closer to Weber’s Oriental, including Islamic, illiberal, theocratic, and irrational world than to Western liberal, secular, and rationalistic modernity (Friedland 2002; Inglehart 2004; Juergensmeyer 2003). In this respect, conservative reproduced and celebrated “American exceptionalism” effectively reveals or “shockingly” exposes itself as Oriental, specifically Islamic-like theocratic rather than “libertarian-democratic” exceptionalism and in consequence a sort of “striking” perversion or deviation (Inglehart and Baker 2000) in relation to Enlightenment-based Western civilization. For the two major and most persisting and unapologetic deviations from and putative alternatives to Enlightenment-based Western civilization and liberal modernity are today precisely

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<sup>52</sup>This also reveals US conservatives’ calls for more “Western education” in the school system as a self-contradictory non sequitur, unless “Western” is, as they do, reductively misconstrued as “American.”

Islamic theocracies *and* American theocratic conservatism (Juergensmeyer 2003), especially Iranian and Taliban-style theocracy and the US “Bible Belt” as “protototalitarian” equivalents (Bauman 1997).

At any rate, the Enlightenment and its legacy of liberalism, secularism, and rationalism are the most victorious and enduring at its birthplace, Europe, notably France, and the least in non-European societies, including America, as well as Islamic and other Oriental settings. In a comparison, this trajectory is in sharp contrast to that of another French creation like Calvinism. The latter largely fails in its home, France and Western Europe overall, with exceptions like Geneva and early Holland, while triumphing through its Anglo-Saxon derivative Puritanism, in England transiently by the Puritan Revolution (and Scotland more fully) and America enduringly to the point of becoming what Tocqueville prophetically calls the “destiny” of the “new nation,” up to the twenty first century (Munch 2001). The Enlightenment and Calvinism, while originally both primarily French creations, are as opposite and distant as “heaven and earth” in value-neutral terms, as were the first through its Jeffersonian translation and Calvinist Puritanism in America later (Bremer 1995). They are as opposite and mutually exclusive as “heaven and hell” in this world respectively, on account of the Enlightenment’s foundational and positive, and Calvinism’s antithetical and destructive, effects for liberal-secular democracy and society and ultimately life.<sup>53</sup>

Apparently, France has been more successful in exporting its Calvinism via derivative Anglo-Saxon Puritanism (and, say, “French fries”) than its Enlightenment, as well as its art and “high” culture, to America. Conversely, the “new nation” has typically revealed more preferences for the first and thus medieval-style “godly” society than for the second and so liberal-secular modernity, in spite or because of Jefferson’s French-Enlightenment “foreign” and “ungodly” experience and project of America (Archer 2001; Patell 2001; Phelps 2007) as the opposite to Winthrop’s Puritan design of “Christian Sparta” (Kloppenber 1998). This French “foreign” theocratic and fundamentalist Calvinism through Puritanism, rather than the liberal-secular and democratic Enlightenment and its child modernity, regenerates and sanctifies celebrated “American exceptionalism” by acting as Tocqueville “destiny” of America. This holds true especially when compared with France and Western Europe generally characterized with opposite outcomes, namely, eventual Calvinist theocratic failures, except for early Holland and Geneva and Scotland, and Enlightenment liberal victories (Dombrowski 2001).

Thus, in France the Enlightenment philosophers reportedly achieve a “great victory” in civil society, especially among the middle classes and even partly the aristocracy, against “obscurantist despotism in both Church and state” representing

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<sup>53</sup>And conversely, they were “hell and heaven” in what Weber calls the “world beyond” given conservative preferences for theological “heaven” or Calvinist-style salvation *cum* election of only few over liberal hope “for all” (Lemert 1999; Wuthnow 1998).

the *ancien regime*, though their enemies held in their hands “all the weapons”<sup>54</sup> (Artz 1998). Admittedly, they eventually succeed to dominate in “the realm of civil society, and have continued through their ideas and legacies since, up to the twenty first century, though the state and church in France, as in all Europe during the pre-Enlightenment, remain the “exclusive domain of the king and the aristocratic grandees and senior clerics” (Garrard 2003). Critics admit that eighteenth century France was the main stage, era, and thus victory of the Enlightenment, involving “some of the greatest names of human history” such as Voltaire (Horkheimer 1996). As regards the latter, Heine Voltaire has been widely regarded as contributing more to eradicating or deconstructing religious and other “superstition and hocus-pocus” than anyone else (Artz 1998). Particularly, Voltaire is credited with crucially contributing to the idea of tolerance and freedom in religion and politics, including the free press (Artz 1998), becoming the Enlightenment’s “greatest champion of religious toleration” (Fitzpatrick 1999). In summary, France was the “land of the Enlightenment” (Alexander 2001b) in the sense of a society in which the latter attains its almost total victory or its “most forceful expression” (Byrne 1997). Predictably, within France, Paris with its salons, frequented both by French and non-French figures, including Hume, Jefferson, and Franklin represents the greatest triumph and the highest point of the French and all Enlightenment during the late eighteenth century (Byrne 1997).

In contrast, the Enlightenment reportedly reaches less than a “great victory in the minds” of America’s middle and other classes, and its key representatives like Jefferson and colleagues have hardly ever “dominated” in American politics and civil society (Archer 2001), with a few exceptions like revolutionary Philadelphia as the “heart of the American Enlightenment” (Patell 2001), in the way their French counterparts do in their own. Furthermore, initially this is a sort of Pyrrhic victory in America, and has remained since through the early twenty first century, with some variations – for example, the “liberal” 1960s, briefly the period after the 2008 elections – reflecting the “peculiarities” as weaknesses of the “American version of Enlightenment”<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Artz (1998:111) remarks that “a great blow had been struck at obscurantist despotism in both Church and state. The Philosophes had won! A Trojan Horse had been planted square in the middle of the Old Regime!”

<sup>55</sup> Kloppenberg 1998:26) emphasizes the “pervasiveness of Scottish common sense philosophy in the American Enlightenment. The Scottish Enlightenment was dedicated to discovering methods by which a provincial culture could create forms of social virtue without having to rely on republican political institutions unavailable to a province that was, like America, uncomfortable with its status.” However, this emphasis seems to overlook or downplay the pervasiveness or influence of (also) the French Enlightenment, including Montesquieu (Artz 1998) in the American Enlightenment; after all, all the major representatives of the latter like Franklin, Paine, and Jefferson “spent considerable time in France” (Byrne 1997:48). For instance, “Franklin was for 11 years before the French Revolution the American ambassador to Paris. In religion he quickly moved away from the Calvinism in which he was raised, thinking (like many of his contemporaries) that its rejection of good works was inimical to morality. Franklin was for a while a deist, but eventually he settled for a sort of benign and skeptical indifference in religious matters” (Byrne 1997:48).



(Kloppenbergs 1998). This holds true in light of the pre-Enlightenment's resurrection with vengeance from the "dead past" through endemic religious counter-revolutions. Specifically, it involves resurrecting the totalitarian Puritan theocracy (Munch 2001) in the *déjà vu* form of "godly" politics and society à la the "Bible Garden" by the Great Awakenings and other fundamentalist revivals<sup>56</sup> (Byrne 1997) up to the 1980s–2000s and the self-perpetuating "predominance of Protestant sectarianism" (Lipset 1996) in American history and life. Another related process has been the rise and dominance of the counter-Enlightenment like initially paleoconservatism and recently neoconservatism, including neofascism and "reborn" evangelicalism, seeking to resurrect from the "dead" the pre-Enlightenment by perpetuating the theocratic, fundamentalist tradition of Puritanism (Dunn and Woodard 1996).

Hence, the battle between the Enlightenment and the pre- and counter-Enlightenment, in particular in the form of theocracy *cum* "godly" society, while largely ending with the victory of the first in most of Western Europe, has continued in America from the eighteenth to the twenty first century. This has formed a sort of enfolding drama in America, with varying and reversible outcomes. These outcomes range from the initial and incomplete victory of the Jeffersonian Enlightenment over the Puritan pre-Enlightenment to the paleoconservative and neoconservative, including "born again" fundamentalist, anti-Enlightenment's subsequent victories or reversals. Both outcomes therefore redefine and typify conservative anti-Enlightenment American *cum* Islamic-style or Oriental-like "exceptionalism" *cum* antiliberal and theocratic or antiseccular perversion or deviation compared with and often opposed to Enlightenment-rooted Western liberal-secular modernity.

In turn, one could argue that in fact America is a society in which those forces with Enlightenment ideas or "sympathies" realize "greatest political success with the least violence," as witnessed by such "major figures" of the American Revolution as Jefferson, Franklin, and Paine, spending "considerable time in France" and thus "deeply" immersing themselves in the "spirit and thinking of the age" (Byrne 1997). Arguably, this peaceful success is due to that, in stark contrast to France, America's leading Enlightenment figures actually belong to the "establishment" and thus their "achievements" are not the outcome of conflicts with political and/or religious powers<sup>57</sup> (Byrne 1997), with the salient exception of Jefferson's conflict and tensions with the latter, specifically orthodox Puritanism denouncing him as "wicked" (Archer 2001; Kloppenberg 1998; Baldwin 2006;

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<sup>56</sup>Byrne (1997:51–2) remarks that the "revivalism of Jonathan Edwards beginning in the mid 1730s, led to the Great Awakening, an eruption of Protestant enthusiasm which flourished mainly among the rural poor." In this account, "their emphasis on personal commitment and inward faith demonstrated through vibrant outward expression was one of the aspects of religion which the cool detachment of the Enlightenment ideal found most repugnant; here, if more evidence was needed, was another clear example of Hume's contention that human beings are governed by their passions much more than by their reason" (Byrne 1997:52).

<sup>57</sup>Byrne (1997:49) adds that "Jefferson became both President of the American Philosophical Society and President of the Union."

German 1995). Reportedly, filtered through Jefferson and Madison, the Enlightenment provides the prime impetus to the US Constitution's proclamation of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" as "self-evident truths," and its avoidance of their anchoring in a "detailed biblical or theological argument" (Byrne 1997). Yet, it is admitted that this "political success" does not become a great victory for Enlightenment values and institutions over these pre-Enlightenment arguments and forces in America, including the period of the Revolution and the Constitution, in the way it does in France. For instance, Enlightenment ideals provide the American quest for independence from the British Empire with only a "supporting rationale," making the Revolution as well as the ensuing Constitution both owe "comparatively little" to these ideas<sup>58</sup> (Byrne 1997). Furthermore, reportedly the "basic enduring features" of the political system and culture in America have been formed well before the Enlightenment ideas of Jefferson and Madison. Namely, they were due to the impact of "pre-Enlightenment doctrines" such as "a particular brand of Protestantism" (Archer 2001), specifically Calvinist Puritanism<sup>59</sup> with its inner tendency to what Hume detected as "wretched fanaticism" and its invariant outcome of, as both Weber and Ross observed, "holy" tyranny in the form of "coercive theocracy" (Zaret 1989).

Additionally, instead of their total victory as in France, the observed battle or "drama" between "fundamental American Enlightenment ideals" and Puritan-

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<sup>58</sup>Byrne's (1997:49) full statement is that "for those Europeans who too quickly assume that the French Revolution was the fulfillment of Enlightenment ideals, it is sobering to recall that the American Revolution took place 13 years earlier and owed comparatively little to those ideals." Also, in his view, the arguably "crowning achievement of the Moderate Enlightenment was the American Constitution which enshrined the principle (of) complete separation between church and state. Many of the framers of the constitution (e.g. Jefferson and Madison) saw the separation of church and state not as a tactic to negate the influence of religion on American life but as essential to the true possibility of religious freedom. [Yet] the Constitution did not push the Enlightenment ideal as far as it could and it reflects one of the failures of this phase of the Enlightenment in America [i.e.] the belief that all issues could be settled by compromise between reasonable people" (Byrne 1997:51).

<sup>59</sup>Archer (2001:275–6) observes that in the Federal Constitution "Enlightenment ideas [influenced] American political thought. But, while key individuals (Jefferson and Madison) were personally influenced by these ideas, it was not their personal preferences that were principally responsible for establishing (Jefferson's) wall of separation between Church and State." Arguably, "those, like Jefferson and Madison, who were influenced by Enlightenment ideas, supported the separation of religion and politics for fear that religion would corrupt politics. Enlightenment ideology [favored] secularism, but key elements of American political culture emerged before its influence was felt [which] was largely restricted to a section of the revolutionary elite" (Archer 2001:277). A paradigmatic exemplar was the "Enlightenment-influenced Jefferson," yet an "atypical" case in early as well as later and modern America (Archer 2001:228). In turn, some non-academics like amateur historians also argue that the "Declaration of Independence treats religion in a cool, Enlightenment sort of way [but] was an ex post facto justification of American beliefs. The Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, often called the 'first written constitution of modern democracy,' were inspired not by democratic Athens or republican Rome or Enlightenment philosophy but by a Puritan preacher's interpretation of a verse in the Hebrew Bible" (Gelernter 2005).

rooted Protestant sectarianism and fundamentalism as “revivalist Christianity” continues in America to “this day,” as exemplified by conflicts over separation of church and state, including “prayer in schools,” and “priority of science over revealed truth” exemplified by biological evolution vs. creationism and its “intelligent design” variations (Byrne 1997). The drama between the Enlightenment and the pre- or anti-Enlightenment in America has typically assumed the form of liberal-conservative culture and violent, including moral-religious, temperance, and ideological, wars during most of its history, from the eighteenth to the twenty first century (Bell 2002; Wagner 1997). By contrast, the drama or culture war between the Enlightenment and the pre- or anti-Enlightenment, and in extension liberalism and traditionalism or conservatism, is mostly nonexistent or nonconspicuous in most Western societies, with certain predictable minor exceptions such as hyper-Catholic theocentric, postcommunist Poland, and to a lesser and diminishing extent Ireland (Byrne 1997; Inglehart 2004).

# Chapter 4

## The Enlightenment and Modern Culture

### The Enlightenment as Cultural Revolution

#### *“Creative Destruction” in Culture*

The Enlightenment represents the paradigmatic exemplar of cultural or spiritual revolution within Western civilization. It is especially an axiomatic (by definition) intellectual and rationalistic, including scientific, revolution, a revolutionary vision and process of enlightening, rationalizing, and liberating via human reason, science, knowledge, and societal progress overcoming unreason, superstition, ignorance, stagnation, and oppression. In this sense, it constitutes what has been referred to as a universalized or generalized “Copernican revolution” in Western culture (Schumpeter 1954).<sup>1</sup> In short, the Enlightenment is the epitome and primary source of what Weber calls modern Western cultural rationalism or the process of rationalization in culture and society overall.

The autonomy or independence of human secular, including what Weber calls sensuous, emotional, as well as intellectual and rationalist culture in relation to religion and theology, notably theocratic church, is a given value or parameter in modern Western democratic societies, including America. In particular, this holds true of independent, autonomous secular science and education, as well as art and philosophy, vis-à-vis religion, theology, and theocratic church as a well-established value, institution, and practice in these societies. If anything defines modern Western advanced democratic societies culturally compared with their traditional and non-Western counterparts, this is the autonomous, independent, or separate existence and operation of secular culture, including science, education, art, and philosophy, from theology, religion, and theocracy, just as the separation of state and church does the first politically relative to the second.

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<sup>1</sup>Schumpeter (1954:919) describes marginal-utility theory, expounded by Jevons, Menger, and Walras during the early 1870s, as a “Copernican revolution” within economics, especially the theory of economic value and prices.

Yet, autonomous secular culture, notably science and education, as the constitutive value and institution of modern Western democratic societies, including America, derives, first and foremost, from the Enlightenment, in conjunction with and continuation of the Renaissance, especially with respect to the autonomy of the arts, as well as classical Greek-Roman civilization. Conversely, there had been *no* such thing as independent, autonomous or free secular science, education, art, philosophy, and culture in general in relation to theology, religion, and church in the pre-Enlightenment. The pre-Enlightenment specifically incorporated the medieval Christian and other religiously overdetermined, especially Islamic, world in contrast and nihilistic opposition to its classical “pagan,” especially ancient Greek, civilization. The latter was characterized with relative scientific, educational, artistic, philosophical, and other cultural and other autonomy and creativity in relation to religion and politics (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993; Manent 1998), yet literally burned and buried or perished<sup>2</sup> (Caplan and Cowen 2004) during the “godly” Dark Middle Ages, which precisely self-defined the latter as “darkness” from the prism of the Enlightenment and classical civilization alike. And, still there is *no* autonomous secular science, education, art, philosophy, and culture as a whole in relation to religion and church in the anti-Enlightenment, specifically cultural conservatism, including religious fundamentalism and “godly” fascism. Analogously, there is no such thing as a “free lunch” in both feudalism or patrimonialism (Kiser 1999) and neoconservatism or the “new patrimonial capitalism” (Cohen 2003), including false “libertarianism” à la Hayek and Friedman, as antiegalitarian, repressive economic systems and ideologies, with “libertarian” conservatism as the functional equivalent of feudal despotism, as Simmel implies in observing the latter’s “promotion” of the market economy combined with political repression.

While taken as a given in modern democratic and advanced societies, the autonomy of culture in general and of science in particular from religion, including both transcendental theology and theocratic church, is a relatively novel and radical idea and development. It is primarily rooted in, derived from, and promoted by the Enlightenment, with the latter continuing and reinforcing the artistic Renaissance and classical civilization in this respect. If anything, this makes the Enlightenment a paradigmatic cultural or generalized Copernican, notably scientific, revolution and indicates the novelty and magnitude of its achievement and legacy in Western civilization and beyond (Angel 1994). This at least applies to the context of medieval Christian civilization, as distinct from and opposing classical “pagan,” civilization, such as the *ancien régime* in France. The Enlightenment aimed and eventually succeeded to delegitimize and transcend the medieval world as anticultural, notably antiscientific, in secular and rationalistic terms, just as the Renaissance did so as antiartistic and antihumanistic.

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<sup>2</sup>Caplan and Cowen (2004:404) remark that “Rarely are these so-called ‘Dark Ages’ cited as an especially fertile period for architecture, writing, reading, or the visual arts. The buildings of antiquity fell into disrepair or were pillaged for their contents. Bronze statues were melted down for their metal, and most of the notable writings of antiquity perished.”

Particularly, an integral value and practice of modern democratic societies, including Jeffersonian America, is that science, knowledge, and secular education, simply school, like state, is formally or substantively autonomous and separate from theology, religion, and church in contrast to their illiberal and undemocratic counterparts, such as medieval antecedents and conservative successors. For instance, this is indicated by scientific biology's, notably, evolutionism's, independence and separation from, just as triumph over – with predictable exceptions like the fundamentalist “Bible Belt” and Islamic theocracies (Juergensmeyer 2003) – what Merton (1968) calls the theological “argument from design” like Biblical and Koran creationism or “intelligent design” (Darnell and Sherkat 1997; Martin 2002). This a fortiori applies (as the recent Popes admitted) to heliocentric Copernicus-Galileo's astronomy<sup>3</sup> (Evans and Evans 2008) vs. its medieval “godly” geocentric the “sun-revolves-around-the-earth” opposite, as well as scientific sociology, economics, and other social sciences in relation to theology and religion as “Christian science.” Specifically, in scientific-educational terms, what defines modern Western advanced, democratic societies, including Jeffersonian America and excluding the “new nation” during “born again” fundamentalism and neoconservatism overall, is the existence of essentially independent secular physical and social science and education from Christian and any theology, religion (including the Bible), and theocratic church disguised as “Christian science and education.”

In essence, from the prism of secular science, knowledge, technology, and education in liberal-democratic societies, Christian, like Islamic, “science and education,” from astronomy, biology, and medicine to sociology and economics, is an illogical nonsequitur, oxymoron, inner contradiction, simply, “there is no such thing.” Curiously, this is what Puritan Locke implies by admonishing that there is or could be *no* such thing as the “Christian Commonwealth” (Zaret 1989) in England and beyond, thus implicitly “Christian [Evangelical] America” (Smith 2000). By implication, in spite of perennial and methodical attempts at establishing it, if the “Christian Commonwealth” is a nonsequitur and nonentity or nonviable, as indicated by the collapse of virtually all “godly” communities in Western societies, including the Puritan “godly community” (German 1995) in America, so is Christian “science and education” as its particular element. As Locke reluctantly implies and Hume and Comte explicitly state this is essentially because theology or religion, be it Christian or Islamic, as the nonempirical realm of faith and human submission or sacrifice to transcendental entities and causes, normally is not and cannot become science, knowledge, education, and technology as an empirical and secular domain in the Enlightenment sense, just as is no art or esthetic culture in the meaning of the Renaissance. Simply, as Simmel also implies, religion has “nothing to do with” science, just as politics and morality, actuated by a different logic, just as, in Parsons' (1967a) atypical quasi-Weberian mode, scientific theory does not demonstrate the “goodness of God,” thus does not engage in theodicy.

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<sup>3</sup>Evans and Evans (Evans and Evans 2008:88), while rejecting what they call the “warfare narrative” of science and religion, register the “first skirmish” between Galileo and the Catholic Church.

In Comte's terms, religious "science" is logically impossible or factually unviable because theology and religion, as a spurious "source of sociological knowledge" (Evans and Evans 2008) and generally a form of irrationalism, including what Hume called (referring to Puritanism) "wretched fanaticism," defined and dominated the theological age and the theocratic-military social system as the primitive stage and type of human evolution and society. In contrast, secular science, knowledge, education, technology, and rationalism or positivism overall define and determine the positive age and modern rationalist, progressive, and secular society. In Spencer's similar words, the first factors determined "militant society" defined by the "system of status" involving "involuntary cooperation" and religious and other "offensive war," while the second did "industrial society" redefined by the "system of contract" comprising "voluntary cooperation" and "defensive war." For Comte, Spencer, and other Enlightenment figures and disciples, these evolutionary stages and societal types are as historically or geographically distant and sociologically different or opposed as "heaven and hell," with the positive-scientific age optimistically regarded as the first and the theological-theocratic as the second.

In this sense, within the Enlightenment's ideal and legacy, Christian, like Islamic (Evans and Evans 2008) and other religiously based, "science, technology, and education" is what Weber calls an "impossible contradiction" – religious, faith-based "science" – and contemporary economists an "impossibility theorem" (Arrow 1950), as was even to Locke its societal basis, the "Christian Commonwealth." This holds true in spite of or precisely because of the perpetual, yet ultimately futile, efforts by pre- and anti-Enlightenment forces to establish and impose both of them, especially in historical and contemporary America designed and reconstructed as the "Christian nation" (Juergensmeyer 2003; Lindsay 2008)<sup>4</sup>, effectively a Puritan-inspired fundamentalist theocracy (Munch 2001) after the image of the "Bible Garden" (Gould 1996) as "paradise lost and found" in the "Bible Belt." For instance, Christian and

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<sup>4</sup>Even an empathetic sociological study admits theocratic aims in American evangelicalism in observing that "cultural influence has certainly been evangelicalism's goal [with] the bureaucratic challenges [its elites] face when they attempt to infuse more religion into public institutions that serve a pluralistic constituency [i.e.] the difficulties they face when trying to steer large bureaucracies or powerful institutions toward their evangelical aims" (Lindsay 2008:74–6). Prima facie, infusing "more religion into public institutions" is an exemplary theocratic tendency, notably steering "powerful institutions toward their evangelical aims" expresses a fundamentalist action, so long as these institutions are supposed to be independent from religious influences, including "evangelical aims," as per Jefferson's constitutional "wall of separation of church and state" and "prohibition of promotion of religion." Yet, most US evangelicals construe such constitutional provisions as not really separating state and church or prohibiting the promotion of religion in politics, with many condemning them as "ungodly" and so "un-American" to be eliminated by religious (or "tea party") antigovernment revolution or "holy" culture war and under the "right" circumstances such as the evangelical control of all branches of government, domestic crises or national emergencies, foreign wars, etc.

other religious (e.g., Islamic), eventually theocratic, “astronomy,” “mathematics,”<sup>5</sup> “physics,” “chemistry,” “biology,” “climate science,” “medicine,” “technology,” “economics,”<sup>6</sup> “sociology,” or “social sciences” are instances of anti- or prescientific irrationalism, including Hume’s “fanaticism,” thus inner contradictions and utter impossibilities from the stance of Enlightenment scientific rationalism. Just as merging or allying state and church eventuates in eliminating liberal-secular democracy and instituting theocracy (Dahrendorf 1979; Dombrowski 2001), blending science and education with theology and religion ultimately results in destroying or perverting the first into the servant of the second, thus of theocratic control, as happened during and defined the Christian Catholic and Protestant Dark Middle Ages. This is what the Enlightenment precisely posits and predicts. Just as its political liberalism via the project of liberal-secular democracy suggests the first outcome, its scientific rationalism through autonomous secular science, knowledge, and education premised on academic freedom does the second.

At most, within the Enlightenment’s legacy Christian and other religious (Islamic, etc.) “science, technology, and education,” from “astronomy,” “biology” and “medicine” to “economics” and “sociology,” represent what Adorno and Mises may call ersatz (Fourcade and Healy 2007) or bogus substitutes (as Americans would say, “jokes”) for their genuine and near-universal forms. The latter tend to become autonomous or emancipated from theology and religion, as Comte suggests, their initial and persistent constraints or their primitive embryonic forms at most, and thus from theocratic church. It is because religion and theology are, despite some misgivings (Evans and 2008), typically considered non- and even, as during the Dark Middle Ages and revived Islamic and American fundamentalism, antiscientific forces, simply that church is not school or a scientific laboratory (and state) in the proper sense, as incidentally indicated by the lack of mandatory school prayer in Western, including US, secular, or public schools.

At least this is what Parsons (1951) would describe as a sort of consensus on the “basic value” of autonomous secular science, theorizing, research, knowledge, and education, including his sociological theory, relative to theology, religion, and church, in his case, fundamentalist, sectarian, and theocratic Puritanism as his ambivalent religious “heritage” (Alexander 1983). Thus, none other than Puritan Parsons (1967a) declares that the function of scientific research and data, including sociological theory, is *not* to “demonstrate the goodness of God,” thus theodicy.

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<sup>5</sup>That Christian mathematics may not be a sheer fantasy in America, recall the “godly” Indiana legislature in 1897 tried to change the “pagan,” ancient Greek mathematical concept of  $\pi$  from 3.14 to 3.2.

<sup>6</sup>For example, US “born again” fundamentalist theologians (the “Reconstructionists”) “established the Institute for Christian Economics in Tyler, Texas” (Juergensmeyer 2003:28), as well as the “Institute for Intelligent Design” and its sociological cousin the “Institute for Studies of Religion” at a Baptist University in Waco, also Texas. This state thus seemingly becomes a sort of epicenter of religious fundamentalism or extreme conservatism in America, though with a myriad of worthy contestants, effectively all US “red” states, from the “deep South” to Colorado (until recently), Arizona and Utah, to Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, the Dakotas, and even some “blue” regions. For instance, another “scientific” fundamentalist “Institute for Intelligent Design” is located nowhere else than in Seattle, the mostly liberal or “blue” state of Washington.



Yet this was precisely what his Puritanism (Becker 1984) dictated, notably the “glorification of God” (Evans and Evans 2008; Merton 1968) as the “theocratic revolt” against secular culture and politics, and thus the prototype or precursor of contemporary Protestant and Islamic antiseccular fundamentalism (Juergensmeyer 1994). In extension, the Christian, Islamic, and all other world religions did and still do dictate such a “godly” function of science, education, technology, medicine, and culture overall (Eisenstadt 1986; Lenski 1994) through both theological dogma and theocratic coercion or religious violence and “cosmic” war and terror (Juergensmeyer 2003).

Yet primarily due to the Enlightenment legacy the opposite, Parsonian consensus on the value of autonomous science, education, technology, and medicine in relation to theology, religion, and church, just as politics and state, holds true of most modern Western democratic societies. As typical, this rule or pattern has a salient and persistent exception in the form of Christian America increasingly permeated by antisecular theocratic evangelicalism (Lindsay 2008), as the striking “deviant case” (Inglehart 2004), especially the fundamentalist “Bible Belt” and its “red” extensions or equivalents (Utah under near-total Mormon rule, etc.). The latter is pervaded on a scale unrivaled among modern Western societies by private and home religious schooling and “science” preferred, as is “no schooling” at all, as “better” than secular education and science (Darnell and Sherkat 1997) just as its functional equivalents (“madrasahs”) in Islamic countries oppose or neglect “secular rational science” (Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Turk 2004). And as also typical, such American and Islamic fundamentalist exceptionalism is the kind of exception that confirms rather than refutes the sociological rule or historical pattern, a sort of theocratic perversion or aberration that proves, and not disapproves, the normalcy of Enlightenment-based secular science, culture, and civilization. For the Enlightenment scientific and other cultural legacy has always been and remains weaker in America than Western Europe and virtually nonexistent or expunged in the Islamic world (except for, indirectly and partly, Turkey).

If a single value, in a Parsonian-Weberian context of scientific rationalism and cultural rationalization overall, is defining and constitutive of Western societies by comparison with their non-Western, especially Islamic, counterparts, it is exactly the autonomy or emancipation of science, and even, as Weber registers, mature capitalism (also, Habermas 2001), from theology, religion, and church, notably their theocratic forms, in his capitalist case from Calvinism. Conversely, what defines or typifies in scientific and educational terms, most non-Western, especially Muslim, societies, with the partial yet threatened exception of secularized Turkey, is precisely the loss of the autonomy of secular science, knowledge, and education, as well as art and all culture, relative to religion, theology, and theocratic church *cum* “Islamic science.” This lack of scientific autonomy makes the US “Bible Garden” closer to Islamic theocracies such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Taliban-ruled regions than to modern Western societies (Bauman 1997; Friedland 2002) and reveals celebrated conservative American *cum* Islamic-type exceptionalism as a sort of theocratic perversion in relation to the West.

In summary, the autonomous status of secular science, knowledge, and education relative to theology, religion, and church is a given, parametric value in Western democratic, as opposed to Islamic and other theocratic, societies, including Jeffersonian, excluding evangelical, America. In turn, this autonomy is primarily the achievement and enduring legacy of the Enlightenment continuing and completing the Renaissance and classical civilization in this respect. In essence, if what Hayek et al. dogmatically attack as scientism and “constructivist rationalism” culturally defines democratic modernity, including the glorified “spontaneous order” of modern capitalism, vs. despotic traditionalism, then it is first and foremost the heritage of the Enlightenment. In this sense, the latter constitutes the paradigmatic, most comprehensive and strongest scientific, educational, and overall rationalistic revolution in Western and other civilization (Angel 1994).

The Enlightenment does so by reviving, expanding, and reinforcing classical science, philosophy, and rationalism from their near-death, including burned “pagan” works, within antiscientific and generally irrational medieval Christian Catholic and Protestant “civilization.” The latter condemned and vanquished or persecuted “ungodly,” “un-Christian” scientific and other rationalistic ideas and persons (Copernicus, Galileo, Bruno, Spinoza, etc.) as heresies and heretics or “witches” by antiheresy or witch trials, a belief and practice of extreme irrationalism shared by Catholicism and anti-Catholic Calvinism, including Puritanism in colonial America (Byrne 1997; Harley 1996). Simply, the Enlightenment is the vision and process of “enlightenment” and thus liberation through secular science, knowledge, and education as emanations of human reason and intelligence, not of suprahuman “intelligent design,” just as the pre-Enlightenment Dark Middle Ages were the times of literal or figurative darkness owing to the virtual death (*caput mortuum*) of these and all cultural patterns by sacrificing them to religion and ultimately theocracy.

In summary, if anything is the true “light” in the Enlightenment, it is precisely secular science, knowledge, education, including technology, and reason overall in the service of human liberty, equality, justice, dignity, peace, welfare, happiness, and life. In short, they are in the function of liberation or in the name of “emancipation” (Vandenbergh 1999). Conversely, contrary to what critics allege as its “good-bad” dialectic à la Hegel, the Enlightenment’s scientific, technological, and other rationalistic ideals and achievements are not in the function of repression, subjection, inequality, injustice, suffering, humiliation, misery, war, destruction, and death for “higher” ends. Instead, they are harnessed in the service of these anti- and suprahuman causes by the counter-Enlightenment, specifically conservatism, especially German fascism and American neoconservatism sharing authoritarianism or tyrannical oppression within society and militarism or the use of technologically advanced weapons of mass destruction against other societies.

Consequently, the Enlightenment represents the axiomatic movement and process of a generalized “Copernican revolution” or Schumpeter-like “creative destruction” in all culture, notably secular science, knowledge, and in extension technology, education, and philosophy, and in part art. As the designation “the Age of Reason” indicates, it especially involved “creative destruction” in rationalistic or

intellectual culture exemplified in secular science, knowledge, technology, and philosophy, just as the Renaissance did primarily in esthetic or emotional culture represented through art. This is another way to state that the Enlightenment is a paradigmatic intellectual or rationalistic, and the Renaissance an esthetic or artistic, revolution, in ideal-typical terms, as Weberian ideal-pure types. In this sense, the Enlightenment functioned as Hayek's condemned "destroyer" of antiintellectual and pre- and antirationalistic culture, as found in medieval Christian, Islamic, and other religiously overdetermined civilizations, and the creator of its intellectual and rationalistic form essentially emancipated from sacred and secular powers alike.

If what culturally distinguishes modern Western and other democratic societies from their non-Western, notably Islamic, and undemocratic counterparts is an intellectual, rationalistic culture, notably science and philosophy, autonomous from both theocratic religion and politics, including academic freedom, then this is, first and foremost, the achievement and legacy of the Enlightenment. Conversely, an autonomous rationalistic culture, including academic freedom, in relation to sacred as well as political powers is virtually non-existent or weak in the second class of contemporary societies primarily because of the complete absence or weakness and failure of the Western Enlightenment (Angel 1994). Alternatively, this is due to the persistence and even prevalence of the pre-Enlightenment, including medieval Islam in Muslim societies (except for Turkey) and traditional Catholicism in South America (Inglehart 2004). It is also due to the rise and dominance of the anti-Enlightenment like religious-political conservatism counterattacking or preventing the Western Enlightenment, including both its conception of liberal democracy and a market economy, from coming to non-Western, especially Islamic (Kuran 2004) societies.

Similarly, if a distinct hallmark of modern Western and other democratic, as compared with non-Western, especially Islamic, and undemocratic, societies is an esthetic culture or art autonomous from theology and religion, just as politics and state, including artistic freedom, then this is also, above all, the accomplishment and heritage of the Enlightenment, in conjunction with the protoartistic Renaissance. Conversely, such an autonomous esthetic culture, including artistic freedom, is absent or weak in the second class of societies as, first of all, the effect of the absence or weakness of the Enlightenment as well as the Renaissance. Conversely, it is the result of the perpetuation of the pre-Enlightenment and the pre-Renaissance, including medieval Islam in Muslim societies and traditional Catholicism in South America, and the rise and dominance of the anti-Enlightenment and the anti-Renaissance such as cultural conservatism. On this account, in Western and other democratic societies "we are all the children" of the Enlightenment, namely of Hume, Kant, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Condorcet, etc., in the sense of intellectuals, specifically theorists, scientists, and educators, just as of the Renaissance, of de Vinci et al., as artists or art-connoisseurs.

Negatively, the Enlightenment is the process of destruction and overcoming of the old cultural – or rather anticultural in its own secular and rationalistic terms – including irrational or antirationalistic and non- or antiscientific, structures. Specifically, it functions as Hayek's "destroyer" of medieval cultural institutions,

including “Christian” science, education, art, and philosophy, resulting from the degeneration of secular culture into its theological and theocratic spurious substitute, thus antiscience from the Enlightenment’s angle and antiart from the Renaissance’s angle. The Enlightenment is the act of overcoming the medieval Christian antithesis and substitute of classical “pagan” and all secular culture (and democracy), including science, philosophy, and art dissolved into the instrument of religion and theocratic church, thus effectively, like most humans, sacrificed to “higher” causes and “sacred” powers. In short, it aims to overcome the “godly” nihilistic destruction of classical science, art, and culture (and democracy), including the burning of its works, as “ungodly” by its medieval “Christian successor.

At this point, the element of “destruction” in the Enlightenment is in fact an attempt to stop and reverse a previous act of nihilistic, “uncreative” destruction by the pre-Enlightenment Dark Middle Ages” destroying, literally burning and burying, classical culture and democracy, notably science and art, for the higher cause of establishing “God’s Kingdom on Earth.” On the account of pre-Enlightenment cultural nihilism, it redefines medieval culture and civilization as regressing into a primitive or barbarian antihuman stage (Berry 1997; Garrard 2003), thus as anticulture and anticivilization, especially “Christian science and art” seen as, in Comte’s words, retrograde and inferior to their classical, notably Greek, “pagan” forms and in that sense antiscience and antiart, as did the Renaissance before. In summary, the Enlightenment intellectually destroys (“deconstructs”) medieval cultural structures as nihilistic, regressive, and thus anticultural in relation to classical and other secular culture, including art and science.

### *The “Rationalistic Renaissance”*

The Enlightenment is positively the process of liberation and recreation or revival of secular rationalistic culture from the irrational chains or constraints of dogmatic theology and oppressive and violent (Juergensmeyer 2003) religion, notably theocratic church or “sacred” power, within the medieval Christian world. In cultural terms, the Enlightenment forms the comprehensive “renaissance” as well as development of classical culture, including its science and philosophy, just as the Renaissance proper had been of its art and in part sciences (Evans and Evans 2008). In particular, it constitutes the renaissance of classical intellectual, rationalist culture (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993), thus of cultural, notably scientific, rationalism, by analogy to the Renaissance as the rebirth of classical esthetic culture or art. In this sense, the Enlightenment marks the rebirth and then the expansion and evolution of classical intellectual or rationalistic culture, notably its science and philosophy, from its *caput mortuum* (“clinical death”), terminal condition in the medieval Christian world. The above specifically characterizes the Enlightenment as the liberation and recreation of intellectual or rationalistic culture, as linked to, yet distinguished from, its esthetic form as the main (though not sole) focus of the Renaissance. In this sense, the Enlightenment both continues and expands the

Renaissance from esthetic and emotional to intellectual and rationalistic culture, from art to science and philosophy, from artistic creativity and imagination to reason and scientific rationalism.

First, the Enlightenment embraces and continues the Renaissance's manifest and primary artistic revolution, the liberation and recreation of classical esthetic culture or art from the medieval Christian attempted destruction or perversion of it as "pagan." As observed, both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment considered esthetic or artistic concerns "a truly universal aspect of human nature"<sup>7</sup> (Berry 1997). Second, the Enlightenment expands and reinforces, actually consummates, the Renaissance's latent and secondary intellectual, rationalistic revolution, its embryonic (e.g., de Vinci's) attempt at liberating and recreating classical science, knowledge, education, and philosophy from the medieval Christian destruction or perversion of them into the instrument of theology and theocratic religion. This confirms that the Enlightenment is the true heir of the Renaissance, and not, as often assumed, of the Protestant Reformation and Christian "civilization" overall, with respect to both esthetic and intellectual culture, art, and science. Alternatively, the Renaissance, rather or more than the Protestant Reformation, is the genuine precursor or herald of the Enlightenment and liberal modernity overall (Eisenstadt 1998) in these respects. Therefore, the Enlightenment exhibits an essential continuity or convergence with the Renaissance and classical culture with respect to art and reason, thus esthetics and rationalism alike, just as freedom and democracy.

Furthermore, on this account the Enlightenment generates or ushers in the true rebirth of Western and other human civilization (Angel 1994). This is because from the Enlightenment's prism, classical culture (and democracy), notably art, philosophy, and science, is the prototypical and, as Hegel also implied, the highest stage of Western and all human civilization until that point (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993), while its medieval Christian antithesis represents an aberration and regression (Garrard 2003) into a primitive barbarian phase (Berry 1997), such as Comte's "theological age" and "theocratic-military regime" or Spencer's "militant society." This is how most Enlightenment members construe or misconstrue for their enemies, like Burke et al., the medieval Christian world, especially its "godly" science and philosophy, as well as art, as did more specifically the artistic Renaissance. For instance, they mostly identify ancient "liberal Athens" (Garrard 2003) as the highest point or, as Tönnies puts it, apogee<sup>8</sup> and thus the model of cultural, including artistic, philosophical, and scientific, progress, just as political democracy and freedom (Manent 1998). Conversely, they reject the medieval *Civitas Dei* or the *respublica Christiana* (Nischan 1994) in its Catholic and

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<sup>7</sup>Berry (1997:181) adds that "cultivation in its metaphorical sense is linked to its more literal meaning. As humans win the time to contemplate, so they leave the kingdom of necessity and enter the realm of freedom. Life in a free and civilized society is a better life than all that has gone before. The enlightened social theorist is not only justified in making that judgment, it is inescapable; it is human nature."

<sup>8</sup>Tönnies remarks that the classic "southern European culture of the ancient world [reached] its apogee in Athens and came to an end in Rome."

Protestant renditions, as an aberration and regression in cultural and political terms, with the unsurprising exception of Calvinist Rousseau preferring the second, as instituted in his Geneva by Calvin et al., and “austere Sparta instead” (Garrard 2003).

Symbolically, the Enlightenment retrieves, repairs, and stores classical cultural and democratic works from the nihilistic “fire” of the medieval *respublica Christiana*, including the Catholic Inquisition and its Protestant functionalist equivalents, with its infamous burning of “pagan” books, as “godly” Rousseau, as the initial anti-Enlightenment insider enemy or critic (Collins 2000), fervently advocated<sup>9</sup> (Garrard 2003). To continue the above example, it tries to save Athens’ cultural, notably artistic, philosophical and scientific, works and legacies from their burning, though apparently not totally “burned” and “buried,” in the “sword and fire” of the medieval Christian social order and its “holy” Inquisition in the broad sense. And continuing this original act, the new Enlightenment did and does this with respect to the Nazi and the US conservative burnings of “anti-German” and “un-American” liberal books and other intellectual works in Europe and America<sup>10</sup> (Hull 1999).

If anything, this retrieval, recreation, storage, and appreciation of classical cultural and democratic works from their literal or figurative burning and destruction by pre- and anti-Enlightenment medieval and conservative forces demonstrates the creative, constructive element in the Enlightenment’s dual process of generalized “Copernican revolution” or “creative destruction” in relation to medieval Christian

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<sup>9</sup>Recall that Rousseau stated that “had the library contained works opposed to the Gospels and had Pope Gregory been in the position of the Caliph Omar, the Library [of Alexandria] would still have been burned, and it would be perhaps the finest deed in the life of that Illustrious Pontiff” (cited in Garrard 2003:17).

<sup>10</sup>Hull (1999:49–50) observes that Nazism organized “mass book burnings in an attempt to destroy the work of Jewish and liberal thinkers and writers” in Germany and “books suspected of containing communist propaganda are burned in US information libraries abroad, and many of these libraries are closed” during postwar conservatism (McCarthyism), as well as various other, especially “immoral,” books are banned in America’s domestic schools and libraries, notably under neoconservatism and in the “Bible Belt.” In a similar practice, “born again” religious US conservatives often disfigure or disguise classical, Renaissance, and other artistic works, such as covering or draping “ungodly” and “indecent” Greek and Roman paintings and statues (e.g., nude statues of “pagan” gods and goddesses, etc.) with Puritan-style black-white and/or patriotic red-white-blue materials. This grotesquely illustrates American conservatism’s morbid obsession with and nihilistic antagonism to secular art, inherited from its parent antiartistic Puritanism. In retrospect, this neoconservative practice, alongside the prohibition of “ungodly” and “immoral” books, is a sort of “progress” compared with the burning and otherwise destroying “pagan” paintings, sculptures, and other artistic works, just as libraries, during the Christian Dark Middle Ages. In comparative terms such anti-artistic practices in the name of “godliness” and “morality” do and can happen “only in America” as a “faith-based” society under neoconservatism among modern Western societies and in Islamic theocracies like Iran and Taliban regions beyond. Apparently, antiartistic and anti-intellectual, thus anti-Enlightenment, neoconservatism reproduces and reveals “American exceptionalism” in this respect and relocates America closer to Islamic theocracies than to modern Western liberal-secular societies.

culture. Alternatively, if anything renders pre-Enlightenment Christian and other religiously overdetermined (including Islamic), as well as anti-Enlightenment conservative-fascist, culture and civilization nihilistic or totally destructive, thus substantively anticulture and anticivilization or primitive and barbarian, then it is the burning or depreciation of classical and other “ungodly,” notably liberal-secular, books and related works for “higher” causes and “sacred” powers.

It is primarily due to the legacy of the Enlightenment that Western and other democratic societies invariably identify and treat this bizarre activity of burning books and other intellectual and artistic works as a certain pathological syndrome and nihilistic practice. They consider such a practice the act of or prelude to the destruction and regression of human culture and civilization, and of descending into primitivism and barbarism, simply of collective madness or “mad” society after the image of Nazism and its absolute power (Bourdieu 2000) and “perversions” (Barnes 2000). Conversely, during the pre-Enlightenment burning and otherwise destroying intellectual and artistic works was usually conducted as, to paraphrase Veblen, a “meritorious” and healthy *cum* “godly” Christian or “antipagan” and “Islamic” activity, a sort of proxy physical exercise or medicine in medieval theocracies. Recall this was exemplified by the burning of Alexandria’s library by Muslim theocratic invaders and conceivably, as Calvinist Rousseau counterfactually advocated, by “holy” Christian rulers, Catholic Popes and their Protestant would-be-proxies like his compatriot Calvin, the Protestant “Pope of Geneva” (Garrard 2003).

Such pre-Enlightenment nihilism is self-perpetuated in various forms and degrees, mostly in the form of burning or “just” banning liberal “immoral” books and other artistic works, in the anti-Enlightenment, from paleoconservatism and fascism to neoconservatism, including religious fundamentalism and neo-fascism, in Europe and America. For instance, Nazism fanatically burned and otherwise destroyed what it construed as “degenerate” or “corrupt” liberal artistic works (Bourdieu and Hans 1995), just as postwar conservatism in America did books on the ground of “communist propaganda,” and American neoconservatism, especially religious fundamentalism, continues this venerable practice by banning “indecent” or “immoral” literature in schools, including, no less, some of Shakespeare’s plays (Hull 1999). Apparently, the destroying or banning of books and other intellectual creations of human culture and civilization is not a “big deal” but a “right thing to do” for “godly,” “moral,” and “patriotic” reasons to European fascists and US neo-conservatives, particularly a sort of “all-American” activity and “favorite pastime” for “reborn” fundamentalists in the “Bible Belt” and beyond (e.g., Alaska’s hyper-conservative ex-governor’s “exploration” to ban “ungodly” or “indecent” literature in libraries).

Yet, as the legacy of the Enlightenment, modern Western and other democratic societies have reached the genuine Parsonian consensus on the “basic value” of appreciating and preserving artistic and intellectual creations as defining and constitutive of human culture and civilization, while considering their destruction or prohibition on “godly,” “moral,” “patriotic,” or any grounds the “new barbarism” that restores and promotes ignorance and superstition against secular

knowledge (Dahrendorf 1979). In particular, it seems as if revived American religious conservatism continues to extol “blissful ignorance” and to condemn secular knowledge as the proxy “forbidden apple,” thus presenting itself as the exemplary anti-Enlightenment. This is as indicated by US “born again” fundamentalists’ belief that *no* schooling, let alone private and home religious, schooling is “better” than public-secular education and science condemned as sacrilege and threat to divine power, though one wonder if mere human ideas can really threaten it, as well as self-proclaimed “godly” political powers (Darnell and Sherkat 1997). “Conservative Protestants” in America admittedly tend to voice “moral criticisms of science,” including both the natural and social science, more than “other Americans” (Evans and Evans 2008).

In summary, if there is a single concrete, commonly agreed indicator of the “light” or “reason” in the Enlightenment, then it is saving, reconstructing, and preserving cultural works like books and artistic creations from their literal or figurative burning and burial in the fire of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, such as medievalism and conservatism, including religious fundamentalism and fascism, respectively. Conversely, if there is such an indicator of “darkness” or “unreason” in the Dark Middle Ages and their conservative-fascist survivals or revivals, it is precisely burning and otherwise destroying, as well as banning, such works on various, usually “godly,” “moral,” and “patriotic” (“Christian,” “Islamic,” “decency,” “pan-German,” “all-American,” etc.) grounds. At this juncture, perhaps no single element more concretely and vividly demonstrates or symbolizes that the pre- or anti-Enlightenment and the Enlightenment are as different, distant, or opposed as “heaven and earth” than the burning and generally destroying, plus banning, of books and other cultural works in the first and their preserving and reconstructing in the second. The first activity is the indicator and symbol of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment’s irrational cultural nihilism and barbarism, and the second of the Enlightenment’s rational “creative destruction” and civilizing in culture.

### ***Light, Reason, and Liberation vs. Darkness, Superstition, and Subjugation***

In cultural terms, the Enlightenment originates and operates as an axiomatic rationalistic or generalized “Copernican revolution,” the process of “creative destruction” in intellectual culture epitomized by science and philosophy, in continuity and connection with the Renaissance as a revolutionary episode largely in its esthetic, emotional form. This renders the Enlightenment the epitome and main source of modern, as distinguished from classical Greek-Roman (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993; Popper 1973), Western cultural rationalism or the process of rationalization in the sense of Weber, notably its scientific form called scientism by its followers (Habermas 1971) and its opponents (Hayek 1955) alike.



Cultural rationalism, notably scientism in the sense of systematic scientific theorizing, research, objectivity, and freedom (Habermas 1971) autonomous from both religion and politics, church and state, culturally differentiates modern Western and other democratic societies from their non-Western, particularly Islamic, and undemocratic counterparts, as Weber and his followers argue in what “Oriental” critics perceive as a display of “Eurocentrism” (Habermas 2001). If so, this persistent differentiation between the two types of societies is primarily due to the original rationalistic ideal and enduring legacy of the Enlightenment in Western societies. Conversely, as long as cultural, notably scientific, rationalism independent of sacred and secular powers is nonexistent or weak in the second, especially Islamic, societies, this is first and foremost, because of the absence or weakness of the Enlightenment. Alternatively, it is due to the persistence of “die hard” medieval pre-Enlightenment values and traditions establishing “path-dependence” (Inglehart and Baker 2000), as well as the adverse reaction and prevalence of conservative anti-Enlightenment cultural forces, in these societies. Hence, the fact that cultural rationalism, notably rational, autonomous scientific research, is a given or parametric value, institution, and practice, what Parsons would call an evolutionary “cultural universal,” in the context of modern democratic civilization, and not in other settings such as Islamic societies, is to be primarily traced to the Enlightenment and its triumph and heritage in the first compared to the second. If anything, scientific rationalism or scientism, including its application in technological and medical progress, renders modern Western and other democratic societies the genuine, legitimate “children” of the Enlightenment.

To be sure, Western scientific rationalism or science is not entirely the creation of the rationalistic Enlightenment, just as art was not of the artistic Renaissance, but rather, like the arts, particularly Greek classical culture, specifically philosophy with its prototypical concept of reason (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). Still, after its promising beginning and application in classical civilization, and its medieval submersion and retrogression into theology, religion, and theocracy, scientific rationalism or scientism reached its highest, most articulate, and consistent expression precisely in the Enlightenment. This is what its representatives and its precursors and followers celebrate, from Bacon, Newton and Descartes to Condorcet, Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu, Hume, Kant to Saint Simon and Comte to its modern supporters, just as its enemies and critics lament in a sequence from arch-conservative Burke and Rousseau to “new conservative” Hitler, and to “libertarian” Hayek et al. and US antiscience evangelicals. The Enlightenment revived, from the darkness, irrationalism, and literal “sword and fire” of the medieval Christian world, including the Catholic Inquisition and Puritan witch trials, and then developed and extended to the greatest degree, at the time, classical scientific rationalism.

On this account, the Enlightenment is the epitome and the true or primary source of modern scientific and related rationalism and freedom as a given value and culture universal in Western democratic and other societies. It is so in continuity and conjunction with, and through extension, development, and reinforcement of, the scientific and cognate rationalism of classical science, philosophy, and culture and

in discontinuity and disjuncture with the medieval Christian world<sup>11</sup> and its “godly” destruction or perversion of these “pagan” creations. As Pareto implies, counterfactually without the Enlightenment, classical science and philosophy, thus scientific and cultural rationalism, like art and democracy, would have likely have remained (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) burned and buried in the darkness, sword, and fire of the medieval Christian world in these terms as a sort of Mises’ “peace of the cemetery” or desert. Consequently, it would have hardly ever become and remained a given value and institution, a culture universal in these societies, as probably neither would artistic creation and freedom without the Renaissance.

The above implies that the Enlightenment is the axiomatic movement and process of cultural destruction (“deconstruction”) of unreason and irrationalism, in particular religious and other superstition, prejudice, ignorance, and rigid oppressive tradition, as symbolizing literal or figurative darkness in society and human life. On this account, “*the Enlightenment*” became a perfectly appropriate designation for this rationalistic and intellectual revolution, and not, as its enemies alleged, a pretentious or empty word. The eighteenth century Enlightenment developed as the exemplary and most developed, articulate, and consistent form of rational *enlightenment* and in that sense human emancipation within Western and all civilization (Angel 1994). It did through illuminating and eventually overcoming the “darkness” of religious and other superstition, fanaticism, ignorance, and regression or stagnation by the “light” of reason, science, knowledge, and progress.

In short, the Enlightenment reveals and overcomes irrationalism by comprehensive cultural, notably scientific, rationalism (Evans and Evans 2008), though not in the narrow and spurious sense of utility-maximizing or cost-benefit calculation in economics and rational choice theory. What is enlightening or the “light” in the

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<sup>11</sup> Saisselin (1992:3) intimates that medieval pre-Enlightenment Christian culture and society in the seventeenth century incorporated or led to Baroque as a “civilization [and] period of absolute monarchy [and] an alliance of church and state to maintain the hierarchical structure of society [plus] economic mercantilism.” On this account, the eighteenth century Enlightenment was a “mentality opposed to the Baroque” characterized by “unruly and fantastic imagination, religious fanaticism, undisciplined passions, and a dispersal of personality” (Saisselin 1992:4–5). In particular, Saisselin (1992:28) suggests that “the most devastating and thorough critic of baroque society in its advanced state of luxury and hence corruption, was the citizen of Geneva, the capital of Protestantism, Jean-Jacques Rousseau” alternatively seen as the member and “enemy” of the postbaroque Enlightenment. Generally, Saisselin (1992:26) proposes that in the Enlightenment the arts were judged by “sentiment (sensationalism), while the hierarchy of genres was justified by the social hierarchy. [So] the history of the arts (was) in terms of the development of society (Montesquieu); one might also think of the arts in terms of a therapeutic for ennui (Pascal, Helvétius)” (Saisselin 1992, 26). In this view, “given the esthetic realm (as) beyond the rational and the practical, the man of taste could also be lifted, thanks to the new formulation of esthetic judgment, onto the realm of the ideal. Before him lay a great future in the role of dandy, artist, and esthete (Oscar Wilde). As the man of taste had been opposed to economic man by the eighteenth century, so would the nineteenth oppose the dandy to the philistine. Kant came at the right time. Art, which before 1789 and the new society had been inseparable from rank, fortune, passion, desire, pleasure, and luxury, could now assume an identity of its own that could be justified on the theoretical level” (Saisselin 1992, 141).

Enlightenment is hence human reason, science, knowledge, social progress, or rationalism. It retrieves, recreates, and reaffirms the latter, notably their classical forms, from the darkness, fanaticism, and irrationalism of the pre-Enlightenment, specifically the “sword and fire,” “torture and death”<sup>12</sup> (Juergensmeyer 2003) of the Christian Dark Middle Ages epitomized or symbolized by the Catholic Inquisition and its Protestant analogs like Puritan witch and monkey trials, “Bible Belt” style (Boles 1999) in the generic sense of antirationalism.

Furthermore, negatively characterized, the Enlightenment is the first or the strongest and most comprehensive modern (Angel 1994) project and process of delegitimation and “demolition” (Bauman 2001) of unreason and irrationalism, including ignorance, myth, rigid tradition, religious superstition, prejudice, and fanaticism, as oppressive, regressive, and inhumane, simply darkness and suffering in human life thus, as by Puritanism, made “hell in this world.” To paraphrase the statement about its key member Voltaire, in humanity’s perennial struggle and dream for liberation from these and related forces of darkness, oppression, suffering, humiliation, and death the Enlightenment will likely always stand as the first liberator, as has in the past and does in the present. Of course, this statement holds true of the Enlightenment along and in continuity with classical science, philosophy, and culture that the Age of Reason retrieved and regenerated from their “death” in the Christian Dark Middle Ages, as well as with the Renaissance as the artistic and humanistic precursor of this rationalistic revolution and modernity (Eisenstadt 1998).

In particular, the Enlightenment provides the first or, by reinforcing the Renaissance’s embryonic efforts, the strongest delegitimation and overcoming of the nihilistic destruction or depreciation of human reason, dignity, well-being, happiness, liberty, and ultimately life in favor of suprahuman intelligence or divine design (Bendix 1984; Merton 1968) and revelation in the medieval Christian world, including both Catholicism and Protestantism<sup>13</sup> (Zaret 1989). Hence, for the first time or most strongly in history it delegitimized and overcame the literal or figurative sacrifice and submission of humans to “higher” entities and their self-proclaimed “godly” agents in this and other world religions, especially Islam, as systems of strict repression, control, and constraint (Bell 1977), authoritarian power (Lenski 1994), and cosmic war and violence, including “holy” terrorism (Juergensmeyer 2003).

In this sense, in humanity’s long quest and liberation of human reason and knowledge, including the autonomy of science and philosophy, from supra- and antihuman forces like sacred religious and secular political powers, the Enlightenment

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<sup>12</sup>Juergensmeyer (2003:26) observes that the thirteenth century “Inquisitions were the medieval Church’s attempt to root out heresy, involving torture of the accused and sentences that included burning at the stake.”

<sup>13</sup>Zaret (1989:163) observes that Protestantism, in particular Puritanism “emphasized the corruption of reason and its limited role in religion.” He comments that “intolerance and radicalism were inevitable when religion [Puritanism] rejected reason in favor of unbridled revelation” (Zaret 1989:163).

will always stand the first or most manifestly and saliently through its ideals and legacies, along and in continuity with the Renaissance and classical culture. Recall that Diderot proposed that “everything must be examined, everything must be investigated, without hesitation or exception. Puerile restrictions must be stamped out; any barriers not set up by reason must be overthrown.” In a similar vein, Holbach wondered “how could the human mind, haunted by frightening phantoms and guided by men interested in perpetuating its ignorance, make any progress?” His answer to the question is evidently negative, adding that man “has been told only about invisible powers on which his fate was supposed to depend. He believed himself forced to groan under the yoke of his gods, whom he knew only through the fabulous accounts of their ministers.”

The French Enlightenment in particular admittedly delegitimizes “mythology in all its forms,” including its incorporation in the “most powerful institutions of the day” (Horkheimer 1996), as an evidently rational and democratic action, not in the economic-utilitarian sense of rational choice theory, aiming at liberation from irrational and oppressive forces and showing remarkable courage. As also observed, most French Enlightenment philosophers reject and overcome irrationalism, in particular its forms as identified in “religion and popular superstitions” (Artz 1998). For instance, Holbach is reputed as “the personal enemy of the Almighty” (Artz 1998), probably the “most overtly antireligious” among them (Byrne 1997). Generally, the European Enlightenment, from Diderot and Kant to Hume, aims at eliminating religious and other “superstition and obscurity” in society via its “substantive principles” of human reason and knowledge serving as “incentives to progress” and alternatively as “checks on barbarism” (Schmidt 1996) identified, as also does Veblen, within the pre-Enlightenment Dark Middle Ages or envisioned to return in the conservative anti-Enlightenment (Berry 1997). Admittedly, the Enlightenment involves a consistent endeavor to eliminate “prejudice” and “superstition,” thus eliminating or controlling the “sources of fear” and yielding Hegel-Weber’s “disenchantment” of the world (Cascardi 1999; also, Aron 1998).

Positively characterized, the Enlightenment is the paradigmatic modern project and process of legitimation, (re)creation or reconstruction, and celebration, of human reason and intelligence vs. Providential (“intelligent”) Design as a suprahuman and even, as in the case of what Weber calls the “God of Calvinism” with his inhumane predestination, explicitly antihuman blueprint. In short, the Age of Reason is the model of scientific and other cultural rationalism against religious and political superstition, fanaticism and irrationalism, and societal progress and change opposing the regression and petrification of society within Western and other civilization (Angel 1994).

On this account, the Enlightenment produces a genuinely revolutionary change or innovation in intellectual or rationalistic culture, a true revolution of human reason, scientific rationalism, and social progress, in Western civilization and beyond. If “generalized Copernican revolution” or Schumpeter’s “creative destruction,” specifically “invention” or “innovation,” applies to the Enlightenment, it does so with respect to its new, original principle and promotion of human reason, scientific rationalism, and social progress overcoming superstition and other forms

of irrationalism and stagnation in society. In particular, within the framework of Western and other Christian civilization from the fourth to the eighteenth century AD, the Enlightenment was the strongest, most comprehensive, and consistent movement and project of reason, scientific rationalism, and societal progress and to that extent intellectual and rationalistic revolution, while building and expanding on their earlier forms or embryos in classical science, philosophy, and culture overall.

In a way, within the context of the medieval Christian world during this time span, the Enlightenment was the most revolutionary or innovative cultural movement and time period in valuing and promoting human reason, scientific rationalism, and social progress, and in that sense enlightening and liberation. This holds true, with proper qualifications, of those cultural stages and periods both before this context, except for classical philosophy and science, and after, especially anti-Enlightenment conservatism, including European fascism and “born again” religious fundamentalism in America. Condorcet, Montesquieu, Diderot, Voltaire, Hume, Kant, Turgot, Smith, as well as Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and Saint Simon, Comte, etc. did more in this respect than virtually all pre-Enlightenment, including “Christian,” philosophers, economists, and “sociologists,” and their anti-Enlightenment conservative, including fundamentalist and fascist, heirs attacking, reversing, or perverting Enlightenment rationalistic innovations. At this juncture, as a paradigmatic rationalistic revolution or intellectual innovation the Enlightenment reveals and transcends the medieval pre-Enlightenment as what Mill calls a “stationary” social state and Mises a petrified society after the image of the “peace of the cemetery,” as a sort of sociological equivalent of the proverbial “emperor with no clothes.”

Alternatively, acting as what its French members would call an agent provocateur, the Enlightenment provokes the birth of the conservative anti-Enlightenment as an open or covert counterrevolution via restoration (Bourdieu 1998) of the idealized pre-Enlightenment in the specific form of the Christian world or “godly society” as the “golden past” or “paradise lost” that, as both history shows and the proverb says, has never existed in human society. Hence, as a rationalistic revolution the Enlightenment focuses on the present and projects and hopes, via its liberal hope and optimism, for the better future, while the retrograde medieval pre-Enlightenment “living in the past” and the conservative-fascist anti-Enlightenment fleeing into the illusionary “security of a dead past” (Mannheim 1936) or resurrecting the “dead hand of the past” (Harrod 1956). In summary, in cultural and other terms the Enlightenment is a revolutionary or innovative exemplar in Schumpeter’s sense (he prefers “invention”). It transcends the pre-Enlightenment, exemplified by the medieval Christian world, as nonrevolutionary or stationary and petrified in Mill-Mises’ meaning, while provoking the anti-Enlightenment, epitomized by conservatism, including fundamentalism and fascism, as counterrevolutionary or reactionary (Mannheim 1986).

The Enlightenment consequently represents the true epitome, model, and image of “light” or “enlightening” and to that extent progress and liberation in culture and human social life. It does so by overcoming darkness, ignorance, superstition,

fanaticism, rigid tradition, thus subjection and oppression, epitomized by the irrational, including antiscience and superstitious, and oppressive, notably theocratic, Christian and other Dark Middle Ages. Simply, it is truly a ray of “light” or, as Condorcet implied, “sun” and the act of enlightening not just because of the term, but its substance, what Weber calls substantive elements consisting in its “ultimate values,” just as its formal designation.

The Enlightenment’s essence is the specific way and form of enlightening, including educating, through human reason, knowledge, science, social progress, and cultural rationalism overall. Conceivably, enlightenment can also proceed via their exact opposites, thus antirationalism or irrationalism like mysticism, especially in Eastern religions and cultures (Angel 1994), and “enlightened” faith in religion overall, as claimed by Calvinism’s “Enlightened Orthodoxy” construing the secular Enlightenment as “false” (Sorkin 2005). To the Western Enlightenment, however, as Kant (“dare to think”), Hume, Voltaire, Diderot, and others suggest, enlightening through the opposite of reason such as irrationalism, including mysticism and “enlightened” faith, is axiomatically anti- or pre-Enlightenment, just as conversely, the latter, including the Christian religion like orthodox Calvinism, regards the former as “spurious” enlightenment (Angel 1994).

For instance, for the Western Enlightenment, as Weber observes, emancipation from rigid, especially “sacred,” tradition, is a supreme “form of enlightenment,” yet the exact opposite, namely unreflective “blind” observance of religious and other traditions, is so to “Enlightenment East” (Angel 1994) based on mysticism, and to “enlightened” faith, including Christian Catholic and Protestant “enlightened orthodoxy.” In a Weberian framework, the Enlightenment considered human reason and scientific rationalism capable of replacing and transcending rigid tradition, especially its religious forms, “only in the name” of enlightening and liberation (Habermas 2001). Admittedly, the image of “light” forms the “best guide” for representing the “essence” of the Enlightenment in virtue of ushering in and preserving *un siècle des lumières* against pre-Enlightenment societies and times pervaded with pervasive and enduring darkness (Berry 1997). And, for the Enlightenment the antinomy or sharp contrast between “light” and “dark” is effectively that of “knowledge, reason or science” vs. “ignorance, prejudice, and superstition” (Berry 1997).

In addition and relation to the “light” or “sun,” a single word that describes and reflects the essence of the Enlightenment is evidently human “reason” with its ramifications in science and knowledge, and its articulation and systematization in scientific and other rationalism. In short, human reason, alongside individual liberty, well-being, life, and happiness, is the “sunlight” or bright side of the Enlightenment (Hinchman 1984). In this sense, the latter is essentially the model of human reason, as its “pivotal concept” (Martin 1998), thus universal rationalism or rationalistic universalism. The Enlightenment’s appreciation of and confidence in reason (Kloppenbergh 1998), in virtue of being human, secular, and rationalistic, forms the polar opposite of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment “enlightened” trust or faith in suprahuman Divine intelligence and design, as antihuman, religious, and antirational or irrational, specifically what analysts refer to as Calvinist (and other

Christian) “enlightened orthodoxy” (Sorkin 2005) characterized with, as Weber describes its cardinal dogma of predestination, its “extreme inhumanity.”

In particular, the Enlightenment rejects and transcends through its appreciation of and confidence in human reason what Weber calls Calvinism’s commandment that humans shall invariably show “absolute and exclusive trust” in an absolutely transcendental, omnipotent, and non-understanding, virtually merciless (because of the “unjust” predestination “decree”), God after the image of an “Oriental despot,” rather than in their fellows. For instance, Condorcet paradigmatically epitomizes and reflects the Enlightenment’s appreciation and celebration of human reason or rationality (Somers and Block 2005) and its “ideal of rationalism” (Ku 2000) or rationalistic liberalism (Mannheim 1986) and universalism (Patell 2001). Recall that Condorcet envisioned that “the time will therefore come when the sun will shine only on free men who know no other master but their reason [against] the “stigmas of ignorance and the “superstitious connivance of priests” (Berry 1997). If anyone, Condorcet is the epitome of what Merton (1968) calls the “sometimes naïve” or excessive rationalism of the Age of Enlightenment, perhaps along with Kant (2001; Beck 2000; Habermas 2001) and Diderot (Artz 1998).

In a way, the credo or “tenor” of the Enlightenment, specifically its German version, is subsumed, as Kant put it in his programmatic statement, “dare to know!” and “have the courage to use your own reason,” including the “public use” of reason as the collective endowment or potential of human society, in order for humans to take control of their own “destiny” and “must always be free” (Berry 1997; Byrne 1997; Habermas 2001; Bauman 2001). Hence, its spirit is epitomized by an “emphasis on the power of reason” defining rationalism for the aim of human liberation and dignified life, social progress, and discovering the “truth about humanity and the world” (Byrne 1997). Admittedly, its principle of reason entails the “use of human thinking in a critical way” becoming emancipated and autonomous from or unhindered by “undue deference to authority, custom or religious revelation,” yielding “antireligious sentiment and action”<sup>14</sup> (Byrne 1997), especially antitheocratic ideas and actions. Enlightenment reason is thus profoundly and consistently liberal or truly libertarian, rather than, as Hayekian spurious “libertarianism” imputes in a misconstrued attack on “constructivist rationalism,” intrinsically committing “abuses of reason.” These are instead committed, what Hayek et al. overlook or deny, primarily by anti-Enlightenment, antiliberal forces, notably conservatism and its religious subtype fundamentalism and its monster-child fascism, plus quasi-Enlightenment, illiberal communism in turn conflated with “socialism” and even “social democracy,” including Scandinavian liberal-democratic welfare states and the US New Deal, all denounced as departures from *laissez-faire* capitalism.

In short, the Enlightenment identifies reason as the essence of humans (Brink 2000) and the chief instrument of their liberation from darkness and tyranny,

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<sup>14</sup>Byrne (1997:6) invokes the “enthronement during the French Revolution of the Goddess of Reason in the cathedral of *Nôtre Dame de Paris*” as a case of the Enlightenment “model of reason” leading to “vehement antireligious sentiment and action.”

superstition, and oppression, thus valuing and promoting cultural rationalism, including scientific knowledge (Callero 2003). As observed, its commitment to reason is “noble and immensely beneficent,” because examining “all ideas and institutions” in society through the “light of the best science and thought of the time” is more effective than “blindly” accepting “ancient abuses and absurdities,” specifically those transmitted from the medieval Christian world (Artz 1998). Thus, one of its first critics, Hegel recognizes that the “sunlit” side of the Enlightenment, as expressed in its “emphasis on reason and autonomy” and “opposition to religious and political tyranny,” seen as “inseparable from its dark side,” expressing the “dialectic of enlightenment” *generally* (Hinchman 1984). Also, some critics in the Hegelian-Marxian tradition admit, citing Voltaire’s views, the Enlightenment principle of reason is expressed in the “sentiments of justice and pity” as the foundation of human society (Horkheimer 1996). This is demonstrated by the Enlightenment twin ideal of “universal reason [and] compassion” (Baxter and Margavio 2000) in society.

In a way, as contemporary Hegelian-Marxian critics emphasize, the Enlightenment (and enlightenment generally) is the “progressive technical domination of nature” (Adorno 1991) via reason or rationalism, specifically science, secular knowledge, education, and technology. However, these sympathetic critics, like the libertarian-conservative nihilistic adversaries of the Enlightenment, overlook what has been mentioned earlier. This is that this domination of nature is envisioned to be in the service of *human* liberation or emancipation (Vandenberghe 1999), well-being, happiness, and life rather than subjugation, misery, suffering, war, and death as in what both deplore as “abuses of reason” by the anti-Enlightenment, notably by conservatism, repressive capitalism, fundamentalism, and fascism, as well as communism. The “sunlit side” is thus inherent and primary to the Enlightenment and its dialectic, its intended outcome (manifest function) and normal use, while the dark side being incidental and secondary, its unintended outcome (latent function) via “abuses of reason” mostly by the anti-Enlightenment, especially conservatism and its theocratic and totalitarian subtypes fundamentalism and fascism, as reinvented feudalism and medievalism (Bourdieu 1998). This is a crucial moment that critical theory and postmodernism *and* Hayekian spurious “libertarianism” overlook or downplay. Simply, the “good” Enlightenment is the rule, at least in conception and intention, and the “bad” Enlightenment the exception actually confirming the rule via anti-Enlightenment conservative-fascist and capitalist abuses of its ideals and legacies, within its assumed “good-bad” dialectic.

The above is a proper way of understanding what critical theorists emphasize as the “dialectic” of reason by identifying and contrasting the bright and dark side of Enlightenment rationalism, specifically Hegel-Weber’s “instrumental rationality,” in the economic form of capitalism. Admittedly, its bright side consists in that the Enlightenment idea of universal reason or rationalism, while presumably “in the service of capitalism,” overcame or weakened, first, “religious-metaphysical” irrationalism dominating Christian Europe until the late seventeenth century, and second, “aristocratic privilege and the abuses of the church” (Simon 1995). To that extent, it functioned as what Schumpeter calls the prime mover in the “destruction



of the *ancien régime*” (Simon 1995) of superstition, theocracy or “holy” tyranny, misery, destitution, pestilence, injustice, suffering, death, and war.

This positive dialectic is intrinsic and primary, a rule to the Enlightenment in relation to its contingent, secondary “negative dialectics” (Adorno 1973) or dark side as an exception expressed in reason and rationalism misconstrued or abused as “domination” that undermined the “foundations for ethical life” (Simon 1995). Such an exception effectively confirms the rule, because the anti-Enlightenment primarily, and in particular conservatism, including fundamentalism and fascism, perpetrates such misconstructions and abuses of reason and rationalism for the sake of domination, repression, war, and thus human suffering and death.

This is a salient moment that both neo-Marxian critical and postmodern theorists *and* especially “libertarian” Hayek et al. fail to note or acknowledge. In particular, Hayekian “libertarian” economists condemn “abuses of reason” or Enlightenment “constructivist rationalism,” in the French version as supposedly inferior to the British, as “antiindividualistic” or “collectivist.” Yet, they fail to realize or acknowledge that anti-Enlightenment conservatism, including “libertarianism” in the form of unfettered repressive capitalism, not to mention theocratic fundamentalism and totalitarian fascism, is the main abuser of rationalism, notably science and advanced technology, in the service of human subjugation, destruction, war, suffering, and death, instead singling out quasi-Enlightenment socialism (confused with communism). On this account, “libertarian” capitalist or individualistic attack by Hayek et al. on the Enlightenment’s liberal rationalism or rationalistic liberalism forms the most contradictory, misguided, and nihilistic anti-Enlightenment position in modern social thought and ideology, more than the partly constructive and emancipator criticism of its “good-bad” dialectics by Hegel-inspired critical and sociological theory, and even skeptical and cynical postmodernism (Bauman 2001). After all, none other than Hayek’s own mentor Mises (1950) considers classical liberalism, thus “true” libertarianism and individualism, the “flower” of the “rationalist” French and British Enlightenment and hence of its “constructivist rationalism.”

## **The Enlightenment Legacy of Human Reason and Social Progress**

If anything, modern democratic societies are the “children” or legates of the Enlightenment on the account of its principle and legacy of human reason and its expected outcome, social progress and thus dignified and perhaps happy human life devoid of extreme pre-Enlightenment, typically religiously grounded or rationalized, misery, humiliation, suffering, and early (natural or violent) death for divine and other “higher” causes. The legacy of the Enlightenment’s principle of reason defining cultural rationalism is, conjoined and mutually reinforced with that of liberty that defines liberalism, is foundational and essential for modern Western and other democratic societies as well as enduring, extensive, and varied with a myriad of variations and forms. Hence, the Enlightenment proves to be a sort of “destiny”

of modern democratic and advanced societies in this respect. These societies are “destined” to function with, or be path-dependent (Inglehart and Baker 2000) on its legacy of reason as the individual capacity of humans *and* the collective endowment of human society and its “public use” (Bauman 2001; Habermas 2001), and consequently with rationalism and social, notably scientific, technological, medical<sup>15</sup> (Steckel 2008), and economic, progress. Admittedly, they are “destined” to continue living with the “legacy of Enlightenment reason” in its multiple forms (Byrne 1997) such as individual and collective, scientific, technological, economic, political and cultural, rationalistic, and liberal ones, blended in Mannheim’s “rationalistic liberalism” as the composite principle of human rationality *and* liberty (*pace* Hayek et al.).

In that sense, “we the moderns are [almost] all the children” of Condorcet, Saint Simon, Hume, Kant, and Comte with their, if sometimes naïve and excessive (Merton 1968; Smelser 1992), Enlightenment rationalism, just as “we are all Keynesians” (Akerlof 2007; De Long 2000) again in facing another severe economic crisis (the 2007 “Great Recession”) through rational aggregate-demand management by enlightened fiscal policies, thus “public use” of reason, since the 2000s. A form of its legacy of reason and rationalism involves the rising tension between the “new cosmopolitan culture of the Enlightenment” and the “traditional political and religious world” (Byrne 1997), specifically tyrannical Christian medievalism. As it stands, this expresses the tension between the global rationalism, openness, freedom, and universal inclusion of the Enlightenment and its “child” liberal modernity and the parochial irrationalism, closure, oppression, and exclusion of pre-Enlightenment traditionalism, especially medievalism. It reflects Parsons’ (1951) dichotomy between cultural-ethical universalism and particularism, as well as achievement and ascription, as antithetical or alternative value-orientations and norms (“pattern variables”), respectively.

In general, these variations of the legacy of the Enlightenment’s principle of reason, conjoined with that of liberty, in modern societies are divided into rationalistic-progressive and liberal-democratic legacies and outcomes. In this respect, cultural, notably scientific, rationalism and social, including technological, progress *and* liberalism and democracy, in conjunction and mutual reinforcement, become the proxy “destiny” of advanced Western and related societies. They do so in the sense that these societies are “destined” to continue to live with, or be path-dependent on, the joint rationalistic-progressive and liberal-democratic legacies and outcomes of the Enlightenment ideal of reason in association and mutual reinforcement with that of liberty. A predictable salient deviation among modern Western societies is observed to be conservative, “faith-based” or evangelical (Smith 2000) America, as comparative sociological studies suggest (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart 2004; Munch 2001). The “new nation” seems “destined,” as Tocqueville predicted by his diagnosis of its “destiny” as “embodied” in the first Puritans, to

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<sup>15</sup>For instance, (Steckel 2008:134) observes that “scientific interest in heights began during the Enlightenment.”

live primarily with the heritage of pre-Enlightenment Puritanism (Dunn and Woodard 1996; Munch 2001), as well as its heir, anti-Enlightenment conservatism, including “born again” predominant Protestant sectarianism (Lipset 1996) and evangelicalism (Lindsay 2008). By contrast, it does secondarily with respect to the rationalistic-liberal legacy of the Enlightenment in spite of and counteraction to Jefferson’s “ungodly” and “foreign,” so “un-American” ideas and legacies as “atypical” in American history and society (Archer 2001).

The preceding yields two propositions or inferences. First, modern Western and cognate societies are, as usually described, rationalistic, specifically scientifically based, and progressive, at least technologically, medically, and economically, as well as liberal-democratic, except for conservative America<sup>16</sup> like the “Bible Belt” and other “red” regions, as a salient deviation. In short, they are both advanced *and* free, respectively. Second, they are such primarily because of their strong and enduring Enlightenment twin legacy of reason and liberty, rationalism and liberalism, and their aggregate outcome social progress, functioning as the determinant or tracing path-dependence in this respect (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Alternatively, the observation that “faith-based” America is a striking “deviant case” among Western societies primarily is to be attributed to the weaker and transient Enlightenment rationalistic and liberal legacy in the “new nation,” or alternatively the stronger heritage and dominance of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment such Puritanism or Protestant sectarianism (Lipset 1996) and conservatism respectively, than in the “old world.” Skeptics may comment “so much” for the “new” in the self-glorified “first new nation” (Lipset and Marks 2000) and for the “old” in the disdained “old Europe” at the start of the third millennium. In the context of modern Western rationalistic and liberal societies, what is “new” in the “new nation” is a sort of degenerate newness or involution, as anticipated by “European Enlightenment theories about degeneracy in the New World” (Gould 1996), notably the “most totalitarian” Calvinist theocracy in Puritan New England (Munch 2001; Stivers 1994).

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<sup>16</sup> A recent syndrome of “conservative America” or the continuing dominance of religious-political conservatism, notably evangelicalism and implicitly neofascism, in the “new nation” is that by far Americans’ most watched television and radio programs (“talk shows”) are those of extreme neo-conservative, basically fundamentalist and neofascist, personalities and views compared to their liberal counterparts. From the stance of the Enlightenment and liberalism, this tendency is frightening or alarming given its “present and clear danger” to and its ultimate elimination or perversion of liberal-secular democracy as well as reason, science, and education, including its incitement or inspiration of anti-secular and antiliberal terrorism after the model or image of the 1995 Oklahoma bombing by “Christian soldiers” incited or motivated by such conservative evangelical and/or neofascist “antigovernment” rhetoric. In retrospect, the striking and, among modern Western societies, unparalleled popularity and thus short or long-term impact of neoconservative, notably evangelical and neofascist, radio and television programs in America during the 2000s parallels or evokes the rise and power of fascism in interwar Europe, including Nazism in Germany. And, Nazism (Habermas 2001) and American neo-conservatism (Habermas 1989a), including neofascism, are prototypical instances of the counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism.

Conversely, if non-Western, particularly Islamic, societies are commonly depicted as anti- or nonrationalistic and anti- or nonliberal, this is above all due to the absence and failure or relative weakness of the Enlightenment and its legacy of rationalism and liberalism in relation to pre-Enlightenment cultural or religious traditionalism like Islam and its heritage of irrationalism, including mysticism (Angel 1994), and “Oriental despotism.” At this juncture, conservative “Bible Belt” America, owing to its also enduring and dominant heritage of the pre-Enlightenment in the specific form of theocratic Puritanism (Munch 2001) and its successor sectarian and evangelical Protestantism (Jeness 2004; Lindsay 2008; Lipset 1955), strikingly converges with non-Western, including Islamic and related, societies. And, for the same reason it manifestly diverges and latently disassociates itself from Western civilization as its presumptive model and leader (Lipset and Marks 2000), in respect of the comparative Enlightenment legacy of rationalism and liberalism, the ideals of reason and liberty, including secularism, defining Weber’s “West” vs. the “Orient.” This rediscovers conservative-perpetuated and glorified “American exceptionalism” as actually non-Western, notably Islamic-like illiberal and nonrationalistic, rather than “libertarian-democratic,” exceptionalism from modern Western society, a moment that US hyperpatriotic sociologists (Lipset 1996) fail to recognize and likely “shocking” to most Americans. To that extent, conservative “American exceptionalism” reappears and persists as a sort of Islamic-style antirationalistic and theocratic or antiseccular societal perversion or aberration in relation to rationalistic and liberal-secular Western modernity (Inglehart 2004; Munch 2001). In consequence, such exceptionalism promises to make, if not has already made, America, at least the “Bible Belt” (and Utah, etc.), a sort of anti- or non- and post-Western society (Beck 2000), rather than a model and leader of the West and all societies, as shown by neoconservatives’ disdain and hostility for the “old” Enlightenment-based Western Europe.

Comparative sociological studies (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart 2004) identify America during neoconservatism as a “striking” deviation from Enlightenment-based Western and global rationalism and liberalism, including secularism (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Conversely, they identify it as closer to or comparable with non-Western, including Islamic and traditional Catholic, societies in terms of pre- and anti-Enlightenment religious irrationalism or traditionalism and antiliberalism, as well as nationalism. In particular, analysts (Bauman 1997) identify and compare the US Southern “Bible Belt” and Iran under Islamic theocracy as two major and functionally equivalent anti-rationalistic and anti-liberal, and in that sense anti-Enlightenment, “protototalitarian” attacks on and destructions of individual liberty and personal choice. In this view, both American and Islamic fundamentalism solemnly promise to eliminate the “evil” or “burden” of individual liberty and the “agony of choice,” especially in personal morality and private life, by eliminating human liberties and choices themselves and ultimately lives (Bauman 2001) via their shared systems of executions for sins-crimes, as well as their common (though antagonistic) perpetual wars on “evil” forces for the sake of world military domination.

As regards this ultimate punishment, sociological studies (Jacobs et al. 2005) suggest that the neoconservative death penalty and penal system in America is functionally equivalent to that of Islamic Iran (and China). Specifically, it is in terms of frequency of executions for crimes and moral sins like drug and sex related nonviolent offenses, and by implication of religious, specifically fundamentalist and thus primitive, grounding and sanctification, as in the Bible a la “eye for eye,” etc. and the Koran, respectively. For instance, both theocratic Iran effectively and “faith-based” America potentially, as via the federal government, apply the death penalty to drug trade, violent sexual offenses (as proposed in Texas, etc.), and even consensual sexuality such as adultery being capital offense in this and some other Islamic countries, just as was in Puritan New England, and criminalized in the US military and most of the “Bible Belt.” To that extent, both legal systems are perversions or deviations from and antitheses to an Enlightenment-based minimal, civilized, and humane or “mild” penal system (Rutherford 1994), including its abolition of death penalty, torture (Einolf 2007), and related cruel practices like witch trials (Byrne 1997). Conversely, both are survivals or revivals of pre-Enlightenment maximalist, primitive, and inhumane Draconian penal systems defined by what Durkheim registers as infliction of “suffering” for sins-crimes (equated) and assumed, also by other classical sociologists like Comte and Spencer, to be the “dead past,” yet “not so fast” according to US and Islamic “tough on sin-crime” conservatives or fundamentalists.

In general, the functional equivalence or affinity between American “born again” and Islamic fundamentalism reveals the resurrection and vengeance of the pre-Enlightenment such as medieval Puritanism and Islamism, respectively, and the triumph and dominance of the anti-Enlightenment like cultural conservatism based on them in both societies. Alternatively, it indicates the absence and failure, as in Islamic countries, or relative weakness, as in conservative America, of the Enlightenment legacy of rationalism and liberalism, including secularism, in relation to the pre- and anti-Enlightenment heritage of irrationalism and anti-liberalism in these societies dominated by otherwise different and hostile religions and “holy” warriors. No doubt, “Islamic Iran” or Taliban Afghanistan and “Christian [read Protestant-evangelical] America” (Smith 2000) may be as opposite and hostile as “hell and heaven,” respectively, for .S “born again” religious conservatives, and vice versa for their Muslim enemies; and, they are usually seen as such. Yet, from the prism of the Enlightenment legacy of rationalism and liberalism, including secularism, they are functional equivalents or substitutes. From this prism, they are just different versions of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, thus irrationalism and anti-liberalism, notably of totalitarian theocracy and “holy” war (Juergensmeyer 2003). As such, they exhibit a manifest or latent Weberian “elective affinity” (Turner 2002), Parsonian convergence, and even enter into “holy” alliances against their shared enemies of rationalism, liberalism, and secularism such as “ungodly” science and education (e.g., evolution theory, etc.) and liberal-secular democracy, at certain occasions such as international conferences about human rights and liberties, notably birth control (joined by the Vatican Church). A peculiar syndrome of their shared antiscientific antagonism and irrationalism is that in contemporary

society only or mostly American and Islamic fundamentalisms reject biological evolutionism,<sup>17</sup> instead resigned to by official Catholicism, in favor of their versions of Divine creationism or “intelligent design,” and primarily maintain the belief in “satan” and implicitly “his associates” from the Dark Middle Ages witches (Glaeser 2004; Smith 2003).

### *Rationalist and Progressive Legacies*

The Enlightenment, with its twin principle of reason and liberty, bequeathed an extensive and enduring rationalistic and progressive and liberal-democratic legacy in modern societies. This is the legacy of Enlightenment-rooted cultural, notably scientific and educational, rationalism and social, including technological and medical, progress in modern Western and other democratic societies. If these societies are “destined” to live with the legacy of the Enlightenment’s ideal of human reason in various forms, then this is primarily in the form of rationalistic and progressive, in conjunction and mutual reinforcement with liberal-democratic, legacies.

In particular, the Enlightenment’s rationalistic-progressive legacies include the legacy of scientific rationalism and science as a legitimate human endeavor, what Weber calls vocation, among modern Western and other advanced societies. As indicated, these societies are invariably self-defined as premised on scientific rationalism and driven by advances in science and hence technology, medicine, and economy. They are so in sharp contrast to and (invidious) distinction from their non-Western, especially Islamic theocratic, counterparts with their opposite premise of religious and other irrationalism, including mysticism, and the suppression, regression, or devaluation of the physical and social sciences, and consequently technologies and even medicine, in favor of tradition, religion, theocracy, or authoritarianism (Inglehart 2004). In this, like most respects, modern advanced societies embed and continue, first and foremost, the Enlightenment’s rationalistic heritage, just as others, notably Islamic countries, reflect and perpetuate its absence or weakness in favor of the irrational or antirationalistic vestiges of the medieval pre-Enlightenment and the conservative anti-Enlightenment. America during most of its history, especially under conservatism, has been as a sort of intermediate case between these two ideal types of society because of its dual, Enlightenment (secondary) and pre- and counter-Enlightenment (primary), heritage or influence, that of Jefferson and of Winthrop, for instance.

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<sup>17</sup>For example, according to Gallup (February 2009), “on the eve of the 200th anniversary of Charles Darwin’s birth, a new Gallup Poll shows that only 39% of Americans say they ‘believe in the theory of evolution,’ while a quarter say they do not believe in the theory, and another 36% don’t have an opinion either way. These attitudes are strongly related to education and, to an even greater degree, religiosity.” Specifically, the belief in the theory of evolution is positively related to education, and negatively to religiosity.

If anything, in terms of scientific and educational rationalism and science as Weber's vocation, modern advanced societies are the genuine "children" of the Enlightenment ideal and promotion of human reason and secular knowledge. Conversely, underdeveloped, especially (but not solely) Islamic theocratic and other third-world societies appear as the offspring of pre- and counter-Enlightenment irrationalism and antirationalism, including traditionalism, mysticism, myth, religious fanaticism, superstition, prejudice, and ignorance. Predictably, America has been and remains an intermediate case between these two classes of modern society. Namely, it is the "child" secondarily of the Enlightenment ideal of human reason and social progress in its Jeffersonian transmission *and* primarily of the pre- and counter-Enlightenment tradition of superstitious and culturally irrational Puritanism, exemplified by "Salem with witches" and embodied by Winthrop et al., and its own product antirationalistic conservatism incarnated by "born again" fundamentalists and symbolized by "monkey trials." This reveals "two Americas" or America's two "parents" and "faces." And, its Puritan and generally Protestant-sectarian parentage or face is typically dominant and more glorified (the "Pilgrims" and "Thanksgiving" vs. Jefferson) up to the twenty-first century, as established since Tocqueville and Weber (Dunn and Woodard 1996; Lipset 1996; Munch 2001).

For instance, even some conservative US economists imply that peoples in Western societies, including America, are the "children" of the Enlightenment and its rationalism in stating that with the latter "we share the faith that man can rationally organize his own society, that existing organization can always be perfected, and that nothing in the social order should remain exempt from rational, critical, and intelligent discussion" (Buchanan and Gordon 1962). As also observed in modern advanced Western and other societies, it was the Enlightenment that "bequeathed" the ideas of "rationality and reason," and the tradition of scientific rationalism and the institution of science as a vocation in particular (King 1999). In short, this tradition and in consequence scientific and technological progress represents the "Enlightenment inheritance" (King 1999). Alternatively, the absence or weakness of the tradition of rationalism and science, thus scientific and technological progress, reflects the pre- and anti-Enlightenment vestige of irrationalism and antirationalism like mysticism and antiscientific antagonism. This negative outcome or adverse selection is witnessed in most underdeveloped, especially Islamic, societies. The latter at this juncture appear and remain "backward" primarily because of their persistent pre- and anti-Enlightenment cultural vestiges (Inglehart 2004), and alternatively, the lack or failure of Enlightenment rationalism and liberalism translated in corresponding social institutions fostering both economic development and political democracy (Bendix 1984; Olson 1996).

In turn, America presents a generally intermediate case between what Weber describes as "Occidental" rationalism, liberalism, modernism and democracy (and capitalism) *and* "Oriental" irrationalism, conservatism or traditionalism, and despotism (and pre-capitalism). This signifies an intermediate space between two cultural and societal poles. One is the Enlightenment legacy of rationalism, autonomous science, and scientific and technological progress in the Jeffersonian transmission. The second is the pre- and anti-Enlightenment vestige of irrationalism and

antirationalism in the respective forms of irrational, “witch hunting” Puritanism (Harley 1996) and antirationalistic conservatism, including antiscientific antagonism toward “ungodly” science, medicine, and technology, including scientific biology, stem cell and other medical research, vaccinations, climate science, critical sociology, economics, and other social science.

For instance, America’s celebrated rationalistic and progressive values and institutions of scientific, technological, and economic progress are primarily inherited from the Enlightenment and its principle of reason, knowledge, science, and education. In turn, in the “promised land” of liberty “genuine academic freedom” has reportedly been an exception and “never” the rule, with both physical and social scientists, including economists and sociologists, being the “principal victims of public attacks” (Coats 1967) and mistreatments, since “ungodly” evolution teachers and “heretic” and “sinful” of the early twentieth century Veblen to dissenting scientists during the 2000s. These practices are exemplified or symbolized by antirationalistic “embarrassing” (Boles 1999) “monkey trials” as a generic term for religious attacks or culture wars against “ungodly” science like secular biology during the 1890s and early 1900s just as before and after, up to the early twenty-first century (Martin 2002), in contrast to most of Europe, including the Vatican with its resignation to biological evolutionism. Such a persistent “holy” antiscience war was and is, above all, the vestige of pre- and anti-Enlightenment Puritan theocratic irrationalism and conservative antirationalism. It was/is notably of their “die-hard” antagonism to critical and any secular science and education, including, but not confined to, evolutionary biology<sup>18</sup> (Evans and Evans 2008; Martin 2002), as a perceived threat to sacred and secular authority (Darnell and Sherkat 1997).

At this juncture, the Enlightenment inheritance of reason, rationalism, and scientific and technological progress makes America an integral part of Western civilization. Yet the pre- and counter-Enlightenment vestiges of Puritan irrationalism and of conservative antirationalism, notably antiscientism, makes it closer to Weber’s Oriental irrational mysticism (Angel 1994) and despotism, a sort of sociologically intermediate point or “bridge” between Western Europe and Islamic Iran (Friedland 2002), Taliban Afghanistan (Mansbach 2006), or Hindu India (Archer 2001). In this sense, modern America places itself both at the heart and far outside of Western civilization and culture. Such a seeming paradox is resolved or explained by the historical existence and persistence of “two Americas” at least since revolutionary times.

The first embeds and continues the Enlightenment Jeffersonian inheritance of reason, rationalism, and social progress, and the second does the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, namely Puritan, Winthrop’s and conservative, vestiges of irrationalism and antirationalism, notably antiscientism, of which antievolutionism is just one salient facet, or antagonism to secular science. Furthermore, the Southern “Bible Belt” is usually identified, and even self-defined with a high dose of pride and joy, as

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<sup>18</sup>Evans and Evans (2008:98) note that “the religion and science social conflict that is most readily available in the public mind is probably the debate over Darwinian evolution owing to legal cases and political debates over public schooling,” primarily in America.



being far distant from and opposed to the despised rationalistic and scientific, as well as liberal-secular, Western Europe, and, alternatively, closer to Islamic and other “godly” non-Western societies, like theocratic Iran and Latin America (Inglehart 2004). Recall “Bible Belt” evangelicalism and Iranian Islamic fundamentalism, sharing antirationalism, notably antisecularism, and antiliberalism, are identified as the two major protototalitarian “solutions” to the “burden” of individual liberty and the “agony” of personal choice in modern society (Bauman 1997; 2001) by eliminating liberties and choices themselves. Overall, they are found to share various “commonalities”<sup>19</sup> (Friedland 2002) or affinities (Turner 2002) in repression and war.

In summary, the rationalistic-progressive, notably scientific, legacies of the Enlightenment are the strongest and most enduring in modern advanced Western societies, and the weakest and least persistent, if not nonexistent, in their non-Western, especially Islamic, underdeveloped or undemocratic counterparts. In turn, they are of an intermediate strength, influence, and duration in America, particularly counteracted and diminished under the dominance of neoconservatism, including “born again” theocratic fundamentalism and “godly” neofascism, hence the two being usually merged or allied, as during the 1980s–2000s.

In general, an indicator of the power of Enlightenment legacies is what is commonly observed as the triumph and dominance of human reason, notably science and knowledge, over ignorance, myth, superstition, prejudice, unreasonable belief, and religious fanaticism, and of social progress over rigid traditionalism, stagnation, and regression to primitivism such as religious fundamentalism. As indicated, this triumph holds true of modern Western advanced societies, with the partial exception of America under neoconservatism, but not (yet) for most of their non-Western underdeveloped, particularly Islamic, counterparts. The Enlightenment effectively predicts or prefigures this triumph, establishing modern Western rationalism’s path-dependence on its ideal of reason (Inglehart and Baker 2000) as human societies’ (and individuals’) inherent endowment with “public use” in the sense of Kant and Condorcet. It not merely posits an abstract, as anti-Enlightenment conservative and other adversaries allege (Dunn and Woodard 1996), utopian or unrealizable ideal of human reason and social progress as well as liberty in society. It also attains the victory, or what Mises (1957) calls “supremacy” of reason, progress, and liberty, thus rationalism, progressivism, and liberalism, over their opposites, notably religious superstition and other irrationalism, rigid tradition, and theocratic and all oppression. This especially holds true of the French Enlightenment as the “celebration” *and* the triumph of reason, rationalism, and social progress over superstition, irrationalism, and tradition, notably the “victory of science over religion and ordinary knowledge” (Delanty 2000).

Thus, Mises (1966) observes that “people called themselves happy [as] citizens of an age of enlightenment which through the discovery of the laws of rational conduct paved the way toward a steady amelioration of human affairs. In unmasking

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<sup>19</sup>Friedland (2002, 400–1) registers the “commonalities between Iranian and American fundamentalism,” such as their shared obsession with the “public display of the female body” such that in this respect in “both the US and Iran its themes [are common].”

age-old superstitions the Enlightenment has once and for all established the supremacy of reason.” In particular, Hegel and other critics both diagnose and lament as the “apparent triumph” of the Enlightenment principle of reason and its public use and thus rational enlightenment over mythology and religious faith in early modern society<sup>20</sup> (Schmidt 1996). Admittedly, the new rationalistic ideas of Enlightenment, considering the physical and social world rational and thus amenable to scientific “naturalistic” explanation, have become the “foundational assumption of modern European culture,” substituting or undermining “Christian theology and its anthropology and cosmology” (Byrne 1997). In consequence, the Enlightenment reportedly results in reconstituting human ideals in the direction of “dominance of reason over faith,” the “authority of the scientist over that of the bishop,” and the “methodology of investigation over the explication of doctrine” (Byrne 1997; Smith 2000).<sup>21</sup> In particular, this applied to the French Enlightenment as “a celebration of reason and progress” and generally of rationalistic modernity “triumphant” over traditionalism, notably the “victory of science over religion,” thus rationalism, liberalism and secularism (plus materialism and republicanism) being its “driving forces” (Delanty 2000).

As implied, the Enlightenment’s rationalist legacies in particular involve the legacy and triumph of secular rationalization in relation to sacred tradition, superstition, fanatical faith, and mysticism. This is indicated by the victory of scientific rationalism over religious irrationalism, science over religion in modern advanced societies, except for America during “born again” fundamentalism, neofascism, and neoconservatism in general. It is exemplified by the triumph of biological evolutionism over Christian and Islamic creationism, not to mention that of heliocentric over geocentric astronomical theory and of medical research and scientific medicine over its religious ersatz-substitutes (prayer as the “best” medical therapy, etc.).

The Enlightenment represents the axiomatic project and the exemplary triumph of secular rationalism over petrified religion and rigid tradition. It attains the victory over religion’s perceived, as by Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach, Hume, and in part Voltaire, intrinsic irrationalism, including superstition, prejudice, fanaticism, ignorance, and childishness (Weber’s word), or its antirationalism in counterreaction, as in religious conservatism *cum* the counter-Enlightenment (Nisbet 1966). In short, the Enlightenment is the model and primary source of Western secular, notably scientific and technological, rationalism or societal rationalization overcoming various forms of irrationalism, especially religious superstition and fanaticism and rigid traditionalism.

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<sup>20</sup>Schmidt (1996:31) adds that “perhaps the most important thing the Enlightenment taught was that we are neither gods nor guardians who survey the world from outside but rather men and women who speak from within it and must summon the courage to argue about what is true and what is false and what is right and what is wrong.”

<sup>21</sup>Smith (2000:193) objects that “despite lingering Enlightenment ideologies about strong objectivity and universal rationality, our lives remain fundamentally governed by the imaginative narratives of the historical traditions that encompass them” in primary reference to “Christian [evangelical] America” as an essentially pre- and counter-Enlightenment (Puritan and neo-conservative) theocratic design.

At this juncture, Enlightenment secular rationalism or societal rationalization is to be distinguished from what Weber calls “rationalization” in religion (also, Habermas 2001), notably Calvinist economic and political “rationalism” expressed in rational capitalism and the “rule of law.” Furthermore, from the stance of Enlightenment secular rationalism, Calvinist “rationalism” turns out to be theocratic, supreme irrationalism (Artz, Frederick 1998), as well as non- and antiliberalism, and “heavenly” rationalization overall societal antirationalism, a crucial difference that Weber (Grossman 2006) as well as Parsons (1967a) do not fully recognize or sufficiently illuminate. In Calvinism, this is witnessed, as Hume detects for its English transplant Puritanism, by “wretched fanaticism,” superstition, including the belief in “witches” that “had to be destroyed” (Smith 2003) and their “master” satan (Glaeser 2004) and the (patho)logical practice of their destruction by witch trials and exorcism (Byrne 1997; Harley 1996), prejudice, ignorance, and antiscientism. This “godly” irrationalism or fanaticism reaches the point of Calvinism’s original (Goldstone 2000) and American fundamentalism’s persisting antagonism to aspects of modern medicine (vaccinations, stem cell research, radiation, etc.). Calvinism, including Calvinist Rousseau, condemned and attacked the rationalistic French Enlightenment as not “true” enlightenment (Sorkin 2005), just as Hayekian “libertarianism” assails it as “false” or “constructivist” rationalism.

In consequence, with its secular rationalism or rationalistic liberalism, the Enlightenment rejects and supersedes, rather than, as often assumed, embraces and develops, religious “rationalization” within the Christian world as societal antirationalization, including Calvinist protocapitalist “rationalism” as theocratic irrationalism (Grossman 2006). In reaction, “religious orthodoxy” declared a joint Catholic-Protestant “holy” war or “mindless” battle against the Enlightenment (Habermas 2001), as “false” or “ungodly” enlightenment, reason, and liberty, as especially construed by Calvinism during its Geneva theocracy (Sorkin 2005), and liberalism as “spurious” liberation, as both Calvinist and papal antiliberal “struggles” (Burns 1990) alleged.

It is thus important to emphasize and keep in mind the profound difference and probably irreconcilable opposition or contradiction between Enlightenment liberal-secular rationalism or rationalistic liberalism and its pre- and anti-Enlightenment theological-religious and theocratic ersatz-substitutes. The latter especially involve “rationalization” in Christian and other world religions as systems of “rational” constraint (Bell 1977; Eisenstadt 1986) and repressive power (Lenski 1994), including “holy” war and violence (Juergensmeyer 2003). For instance, this is suggested in proposing as “fruitful” for social theory the Enlightenment concept of public use of reason that focuses on the “phenomenon of the lifeworld [of] the communicative actors”<sup>22</sup> (Habermas 2001) instead of the “rationality” of a “transcendent

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<sup>22</sup>Habermas (1996:403) comments that “the world-historical process [in Weber’s] sociology of religion [was] rationalization [and] the cognitive advance of the ‘axial period’ [Jaspers’ word] (extending from Buddha via Socrates and Jesus up to Muhammad).” In his view, the “basic concepts of rational psychology had never gotten a hold on the fundamental experience of the Judeo-Christian tradition, despite the kinship of metaphysics with theology [viz.] a transcendent God, simultaneously judging and merciful, before whom every individual, alone and irreplaceable, must answer for his life as a whole” (Habermas 1996:408–9).

God” in Christianity, especially Calvinism, and the Weberian “rationalization” of the “Christian consciousness” of sin and punishment or expiation, suffering, and self-humiliation. The rationale for this “indecent,” “ungodly” proposal is that if the “totality of the life world” of everyday life and thus civil society is conceptualized as the absolute “speculative idea of the [divine] One and All,” then this reproduces an irrational or transcendental “illusion,” as against nonabsolute “truth and morality” as the Enlightenment’s tenet and legacy.

As implied, the above difference includes the substantive distinction and disjuncture between Enlightenment secular rationalism and Calvinist theocratic “rationalism” as ultimate tyrannical irrationalism (Grossman 2006), just as any tyranny is in essence irrational, as Nazism also demonstrates. Weber himself intimates this by opposing Calvinism to the Enlightenment’s idea of “progress” and “joy of life,” though does not elaborate. After all, Enlightenment rationalism was primarily responsible for discrediting and eventually ending “witches” and “witch trials,” as extreme forms of religious irrationalism and fanaticism, characteristic of supposedly “rational” Calvinism (Byrne 1997), American Puritanism (Harley 1996) in particular, as well as for weakening the belief in satan (Glaeser 2004) in modern Western societies, with the expected exception of Puritan-rooted America. Counterfactually but plausibly, without Enlightenment rationalism as the countervailing and eventually victorious cultural force in these societies, Weberian Puritan “rationalism” would have hardly ever desist in its reproduction and exorcism of “witches” and satan via “witch trials” and “monkey trials,” and actually perpetuated them wherever it survives or revives, as only in “godly” America in contrast to Europe (Glaeser 2004).

Hence, a paradigmatic case of the Enlightenment model and enduring legacy of secular rationalism overcoming religious irrationalism or “rationalization” in religion a la Weber, is what can be described figuratively as the death of “witches” and related emanations or associates of “satan” or the “devil” in modern advanced societies, with the predictable exception of America during resurgent conservatism, especially “born again” evangelicalism. Just a small fraction of Western European populations (11% and 18% in Denmark and France, respectively) continue to hold beliefs in the existence of “satan” and by implication “witches,” and yet most Americans do (71%) (Glaeser 2004), as virtually everyone seems to do in Islamic societies. If anything exemplifies the rationalistic or scientific heritage of the Enlightenment in modern advanced societies, as well as the profound difference of its secular rationalism from Christian “rationalization,” including Calvinist “rationalism,” then it is its primary role in the death of “witches” and in part “satan” or the “devil”<sup>23</sup> (Popper 1973) during the seventeenth to eighteenth century, just as in the gradual formal

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<sup>23</sup>Popper (1973:26) approvingly cites the following historical observation about medievalism, dominated by the Christian “authoritarian Church of the Middle Ages”: “Mankind stood helpless as though trapped in a world of terror and peril against which there was no defense. God and the devil were living conceptions to the men of those days covered under the afflictions which they believed imposed by supernatural forces. For those who broke down under the strain there was no road to escape except to the inward refuge of mental derangement which, under the circumstances of the times, took the direction of religious fanaticism.”

abolition of torture in Western societies (Einolf 2007), though not, as in a way expected, in America under neoconservatism. And conversely, (the beliefs in) “witches” would have likely continued to exist “live and well” up to the present without the victory and legacy of Enlightenment secular rationalism over Christian “rationalization,” including Calvinist “rationalism,” expressed also in “rational” or methodical “witch trials,” as in Catholic Europe and Puritan-ruled America, and, alternatively, with the persistence of such “godly” activities (Byrne 1997).

By analogy to torture, if some wonder “how on the earth” most people in an exemplary “Western” society like America continue to believe, as indicated by many surveys, in “witches” or their derivatives like “satan,” not to mention creationism preferred over evolutionism, by the twenty-first century, the “probable cause” has been anticipated. This is that Enlightenment rationalism, like humanism and liberalism, despite Jefferson et al., remains weaker in the “new” supposedly rational nation than does pre-Enlightenment irrationalism like fanatical Puritanism and its heir, sectarian evangelical Protestantism as well as counter-Enlightenment antirationalism such as conservatism and neoconservatism, including neofascism (“Christian” terrorist neo-Nazi groups, etc.).

In general, modern societies are the “children” or “debtors” of the Enlightenment and its secular rationalism at least on the account of its acting as the prime “terminator” of “witches” and consequently witch trials à la Puritan Salem and in extension “satan” as their “master.” Perhaps nothing more vividly reflects the rationalistic victory and legacy of the Enlightenment in modern advanced societies than its crucial role in the disappearing act of “witches” and kindred “evil” creatures as superstitions simultaneously reproduced and exorcized for centuries by religious irrationalism within the Christian world, including Catholicism and Protestantism (Byrne 1997), notably Calvinism and its Anglo-Saxon transplant Puritanism (Harley 1996). Admittedly, it was only the rationalistic or scientific framework of “seminal Enlightenment thinkers” since Bacon, Descartes, and Newton through Voltaire, with its “convincing alternative,” that made possible and enduring the “disappearance” of the beliefs in witches or witchcraft and thus “cruel” witch trials in both Catholic-Protestant Europe and Puritan America (Byrne 1997). In short, the “leading lights” of the Enlightenment exposed the “witchcraft craze,” contaminating via, just as Holbach would expect defining religion a “sacred contagion,” social contagion medieval Europe and early America, as the “darker side” of religion (Byrne 1997). While not being the “only cause” of eradicating the belief in “witches,” as a sort of “mother” of all irrational beliefs, and the cruel practice of witch trials, the Enlightenment reportedly dealt the “crucial blow” in their “eventual downfall”<sup>24</sup> (Byrne 1997), just as did in the gradual abolition of torture, and later, one add, the death penalty, in Western democratic societies (Einolf 2007).

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<sup>24</sup>Byrne (1997:19) elaborates that “when the sophisticated eighteenth century critics thought of religion, what came to mind (oftentimes) was the barbarity of the persecutions and the official theological rationale which had guided them. The kindly local pastor or the art-loving bishop were to many Enlightenment intellectuals merely the pleasant mask which covered something far deeper and more sinister [i.e.] an almost physical revulsion (e.g., Voltaire) at the thought of the

This holds true with the apparent dual exception of “faith-based” America. This then puts glorified conservative “American exceptionalism,” an admittedly “double-edged sword” anyway (Lipset 1996), in the new light or rather the old medieval-like darkness of surreal “witches” and “all too real” torture and death for sins-crimes. Yet, this is an exception or deviation that actually confirms the sociological rule or historical pattern. The rule is that whenever and wherever the Enlightenment with its twin rationalism and liberalism enters or is victorious, “witches” or “satan,” torture, and the death penalty disappear or alter, as in modern advanced societies. Conversely, when and where it is absent or weak, they arise or self-perpetuate, as in Islamic countries and evangelical America, as peculiar aspects of conservative American and Islamic shared exceptionalism from and consequently a sort of perversion of Western society.

### *Liberal-Democratic Legacies*

The Enlightenment ideal of human reason, joined and mutually reinforced with that of liberty, also bequeathed an extensive and enduring liberal-democratic, interconnected with its rationalist-progressive, legacy in modern free and open societies. This is the legacy of Enlightenment-grounded cultural and political liberalism as the ideal and social system of liberty, including secularism, and hence liberal-secular

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horror of people dying for beliefs which the more enlightened considered products of a distorted imagination.” However, reportedly, “there were occasional outbreaks of the persecution of witches in Europe in the eighteenth century [in isolated areas] and the last judicial execution of a witch occurred as late as 1782, in Switzerland” (Byrne 1997:19). Byrne (1997:17) adds that the “decline and virtual disappearance of the belief in “witches” marked the century from about 1650 onwards (though) belief in “witches” and in the use of dark powers is as old as the human race.” On this account, the late Middle Ages “developed the notion that the power of the witch was due to her having made a pact with the devil (with) the effect of making the witch akin to a heretic and thus instigating the persecution of those who (before) would have been treated with a mixture of respect and fear. The persecution of witches in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (reflecting the fear of an unknown, hostile world) had its roots deep in medieval Europe’s abhorrence of heresy and the propaganda of the heresy-hunters, and it was fed by the disruption of the religious wars which followed the Reformation (e.g., “witches” found more among minority communities like Huguenots in France and Catholics in England than those orthodox believers)” (Byrne 1997:17). For instance, in Germany the 1580s–1620s the “attack on witchcraft was (but) institutional and social hysteria (resulting) in the persecution of anyone suspected of dissidence (or odd behavior). Catholics, Calvinists, and Lutherans alike persecuted witches, thinking that they were thereby preventing the devil’s work; that they were hardly at the same time doing the work of the Christian God seems only to have occurred to a few. Their enthusiasm for the truth resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of innocent people (between 1623 and 1633, 600 “witches” were killed in the German city of Bamberg). The ending of the religious wars and (their) social disruption, horror at the sheer scale and barbarity of the executions, the emergence of more benign expressions of religious belief (e.g., German Pietism) and, no doubt, the prudent observation that today’s accuser might be tomorrow’s victim all played a role (in) the decline in the belief in witches and the accompanying cessation of persecution” (Byrne 1997:18).

democracy in modern Western and other democratic societies. Hence, so long as Western and other free societies are “destined” to live with the legacy of the Enlightenment’s ideal of reason (and liberty) in varying forms, it signifies living with its liberal-democratic, in conjunction and mutual reinforcement with its rationalistic-progressive, legacies.

This implies that the Enlightenment’s ideal of human reason is not only, as axiomatic or self-evident, rationalistic, humanistic, and consequently progressive by leading to social progress. It is also liberal and in consequence democratic, as witnessed in Kant’s concept of universal reason and its public use as the rationalistic, thus epistemological or conceptual, grounding and justification of modern political democracy (Habermas 2001; Martin 1998). This liberal-to-democratic path of reason and thus social rationalism proceeds in accordance with, as classical and modern liberals suggest, the axiomatic equivalence or equation between political liberalism and democracy. Specifically, democracy, as Mises (1950) puts it, is essentially impossible, unviable, or spurious (“hollow”) without liberalism as the ideal and system of liberty. It is a sort of “illiberal democracy” as an inner contradiction or absurd, exemplified by Christian, Islamic, conservative, communist, and other antiliberal “democracies” as effectively theocratic and secular tyrannies or dictatorships. In essence, Enlightenment liberalism posits and predicts that political democracy is either liberal – and rationalistic in the sense of public use of reason as a collective endowment of human society – or not “democracy” at all, but rather its opposite or perversion. And, this is a proposition and prediction that has been overwhelmingly corroborated in Western and other societies, both Europe and America, from the eighteenth to the twenty-first century. In summary, the Enlightenment’s ideal of reason is not only self-evidently rationalistic but truly and profoundly libertarian in the sense of original comprehensive economic and social liberalism, not of spurious “libertarianism” defined by economism (Tilman 2001), notably market absolutism or fundamentalism (Somers and Block 2005; Hodgson 1999).

Alternatively, the Enlightenment’s entwined ideal and promotion of universal liberty is not only axiomatically liberal-democratic or “libertarian.” It is also essentially rationalistic, as well as humanistic and progressive, as US “rational-choice” economists (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Young 1997) emphasize, though in a reductive manner reducing all human rationality to utility maximizing or cost-benefit calculus as its special utilitarian or economic case. Ideals of human reason and liberty in society are intertwined and mutually reinforcing, simply “twins,” within the Enlightenment and in extension Mannheim’s “rationalistic liberalism.” In factor-analytic terms, reason and liberty, rationality and liberation, rationalism and liberalism, “load on” – i.e., express or indicate – human “enlightenment” as its indicators, and conversely the latter is their “unobserved variable” or synthesis, within the specifically Western Enlightenment (Angel 1994).

In essence, “modern liberty” (Dahrendorf 1975) in society, including political democracy, is primarily the project, achievement, and legacy of the Enlightenment’s twin ideals of human reason and freedom, just as is axiomatically contemporary scientific and generally cultural rationalism. This involves both a manifest and

latent, direct and indirect inheritance or “path-dependence” (Inglehart and Baker 2000) of liberty in modern society, in particular political democracy, vis-à-vis the Enlightenment and its liberalism. Notably, the modern notion and institution of political freedom and democracy is admittedly the direct creation and heritage of the Enlightenment (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Young 1997), especially the ideas of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, Kant, and Condorcet (Artz 1998; Byrne 1997; Dahrendorf 1979; Habermas 2001).

The indirect inheritance or “path-dependence” of modern liberty and democracy in relation to the Enlightenment manifests itself via the agency of rationalistic liberalism as its own supreme creation or extension. Liberty, including its political expression in democracy, continues reportedly to be primarily the liberal “partisan” program in modern free society (Dahrendorf 1979) and to that extent the project and heritage of the Enlightenment with its “comprehensive liberalism” (Dombrowski 2001). In this context, it is almost universally agreed in modern democracies that the “basics of liberty,” including its capacity for providing “new life chances” while preserving the existent, remains “indispensable under all conditions” (Dahrendorf 1979). These conditions also include, as in America during neoconservatism, the national state of “emergency” (Habermas et al. 1998; Turner 2002) or a police state *cum* “homeland security” (Cable et al. 2008) within society and “holy” wars against “evil” societies. Recall Madison warned and implicitly predicted that those societies that sacrifice liberty to national security or “defense” via a “war against a foreign enemy” deserve neither, and will eventually lose both. This was witnessed in Nazi Germany and America during the Cold War and the “war on terror” and the “axis of evil,” in which, as commonly observed, the “first casualty” was human freedom, life, and truth. To that extent, the Enlightenment operates as the prime mover of this quest and realization of liberty or the process of liberation, including the creation and extension of life chances, directly and specifically, or indirectly and generally via rationalistic liberalism.

In particular, individual liberties and choices and human rights in modern society are primarily inherited from or grounded in and justified by the Enlightenment’s principle of human reason or social rationalism, as its entwined ideal of liberty or liberalism. Such inheritance is due to the fact that the Enlightenment’s model of human reason is (also) individualistic in the sense of individual humans’ and humanity’s, as distinct from a suprahuman divine, universal capacity for thinking (“dare to think”) and intelligence, in conjunction and mutual reinforcement with its being liberal-democratic, just as rationalistic and humanistic. It is indicated by individualistic liberalism or liberal individualism as primarily the creation and legacy of the Enlightenment (Hodgson 1999). Like liberty overall, this involves the manifest and direct inheritance or path-dependence of individual liberties and human rights in relation to and their justification and protection by the Enlightenment. It also involves a latent and indirect form of such heritage of the Enlightenment via the agency of its product, individualistic and rationalistic liberalism.

Thus, Weber suggests the manifest and direct inheritance in the above sense observing that individual liberties and rights, such as “Universal Rights of Man” during the French Revolution, “find their ultimate justification in the belief of the



Enlightenment in the workings of individual reason which, if unimpeded, would result in the at least relatively best of all worlds, by virtue of divine providence and because the individual is best qualified to know his own interests.”<sup>25</sup> Also, with typical sarcasm, Veblen observes that “essentially romantic notions of untrammelled [individual] initiative and rationality governed the intellectual life of the era of Enlightenment.”<sup>26</sup> As contemporary critics admit in Kant’s programmatic statement “What Is Enlightenment?” the basic prerequisite of the Enlightenment is “not just” reason, but also the “freedom of rational self-assertion” or “rational will” against obstacles like “cowardice, laziness, or the public limitation” of such freedoms, as epitomized in Descartes’ ideas of rational doubt and freedom of choice (Cascardi 1999). Also, admittedly the Kantian Enlightenment provides a “fundamentally ‘democratic’ answer” to the old and new issues of ethics and epistemology, an ethical and epistemological “justification” of democracy<sup>27</sup> in virtue of its idea of “universal Reason” (Martin 1998).

Alternatively, the Enlightenment’s principle of human reason constitutes a countervailing force against oppression, subjugation, and the subversion of democracy and free civil society, namely the abuse of political and other social power. Hence, it functions as the antidote to the old “poison” of the pre-Enlightenment like medievalism and feudalism precisely defined by extreme oppression, subjugation, and the destruction or perversion of human liberty, dignity, and life in the form of tyranny, especially its theocratic variant in “godly society” a la the *respublica Christiana*. For example, US conservative sociologist Edward Ross implicitly admits that democracy worked as an “antidote” to Puritanism, notably theocratic “Puritan tyranny” as a “godly community” (German 1995) or a “Biblical Commonwealth”

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<sup>25</sup>Weber adds that this “charismatic glorification of ‘Reason’,” as tragically exemplified by Robespierre, was the “last form that charisma has adopted in its fateful historical course.”

<sup>26</sup>However, Veblen’s observation overlooks that romanticism or idealism, particularly in Germany, and its ramification conservatism, arose, as Mannheim suggests, as an anti-Enlightenment and anti-rationalistic reaction, and that the Enlightenment tried to supersede medievalist romanticist, idealist, proto-conservative, and irrational forms or antecedents.

<sup>27</sup>Martin (1998:101) comments that the “Enlightenment philosophers agreed that society *was* dependence, but did not agree as to whether this dependence implied rule-from-another. Was there any greater participation in the undeniable fact of *rule* than a calculus of the puny before Leviathan? In this view, Kant’s “solution was [a] to link individual reason with universal rationality, allowing the individual will to *fulfill* itself in willing what was universal (even against one’s own particular interests), and [b] to establish the *boundaries* of reason, and to demonstrate that it was impossible to disprove the existence of moral agency” (Martin 1998:101). Martin (1998:122–3) adds that “when ‘Reason’ is replaced by the sociological lens [as by Mannheim], an ethical problem naturally arises. This is because it was universal Reason that allowed Kant to establish a fundamentally “democratic” answer to the problems of ethics and epistemology. But the sociological perspective – with its dethronement of Reason – undermines the epistemological justification of such democracy.” He infers that while Mannheim “is more explicitly self-contradictory than Weber, the essential resolution is similar” [a] emphasizes that knowledge of the social world will allow us *greater*, not lesser freedom (confusing freedom with efficacy), and [b] deliberately minimizes the role of social authority in the production of knowledge” (Martin 1998:123).

(Gould 1996) of which America is considered to be a “lineal descendent.”<sup>28</sup> Conversely, he implies that pre-Enlightenment (Bremer 1995) Calvinist Puritanism and its moralistic theocratic “tyranny,” while coexisting and coworking with, acted as the “poison” of Enlightenment-based Jeffersonian political democracy and individual liberty in America (Munch 2001). In general, the Enlightenment operates as Hayek’s “terminator” of the medieval pre-Enlightenment’s “unbearable lightness of existence,” given what Weber would call the “adverse fate” of tyrannical, notably theocratic, medievalism or the *ancien regime* in Europe, including Puritanism (Bremer 1995) via the official “disestablishment” of Puritan theocracy in post-revolutionary America by Jefferson’s constitutional “wall of separation of church and state” (Dayton 1999).

Yet despite the evident collapse of the despotic and theocratic *ancien regime* in Europe, the term “terminator” hardly means definitive termination, or the “end of the story” of the pre-Enlightenment. In particular, this applied to medieval religious orthodoxy and theocracy. Instead of reconciling with its termination or disestablishment, recall it reacted by a “holy” war against the Enlightenment and its liberal-democratic legacy (Habermas 2001). This was indicated by the “papal struggles” (Burns 1990) against liberalism in Europe and Protestant, especially Puritan, fundamentalist anti-liberal “crusades” or culture wars (Bell 2002; Lipset 1996; Munch 2001) in America during its history, from the times of Jefferson attacked as “ungodly” to the present. On this account, the Enlightenment and its liberal-democratic and rationalistic antidote can never underestimate with impunity the resurrecting ability or potential of the “poison” of the pre-Enlightenment, particularly medieval despotism and Catholic-Protestant theocracy, from its presumed death, though this may be the “last stand” of a dying civilization – simply, “never say never” by Enlightenment forces or heirs. For instance, this was witnessed in interwar Europe, including Germany, where fascism as the attempted return to medieval despotism and barbarism, and in extension its creator authoritarian conservatism (Blinkhorn 2003) was underestimated and dismissed as weak and irrelevant by Enlightenment-based liberal-democratic forces (Beck 2000; Habermas 2001). The well-known outcome was the fascist “death penalty” for or liquidation of liberalism and liberal democracy, a deed for which conservatism reportedly rewarded its creation, fascism, as in Germany, with eternal “gratitude” (Blinkhorn 2003). If authoritarian conservatism had been the initial anti-Enlightenment, its extremist version, fascism, notably Nazism, became consequently the extreme form of the latter and antiliberalism (Dahrendorf 1979) overall. And, both sought to resurrect pre-Enlightenment medieval tyranny and barbarism from the “dead past.”

Also, Enlightenment, Jeffersonian liberal-democratic forces, relatively weaker and further weakening, in America usually tend to underestimate the pre-Enlightenment, specifically the self-perpetuating power of theocratic Puritanism (Munch 2001) and

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<sup>28</sup>More precisely, Ross states that democracy in America provides its “own antidote” in the form of Puritanism by working “together” with the latter, but still implies that the two are contradictory rather than complementary.

sectarian, fundamentalist Protestantism (Lipset 1996) generally, and virtually never with impunity. It is indicated by the survival or revival of theocracy as a “faith-based” society after the image of a “Bible Garden” (Gould 1996) eliminating or perverting liberal-secular democracy, culture, and civil society as the “unmitigated evil” and eventually human life, as via the death penalty for sins-crimes and “holy” wars against the “evil” world. In comparative terms, “never with impunity” signifies that what is an established reality of liberal-secular democracy and culture in modern Western societies (Munch 2001) has mostly been and remains a sort of disdained literal utopia or hope (Lemert 1999) in “faith-based” America by the early twenty-first century precisely because of underestimating the theocratic Puritan pre-Enlightenment by the secular Enlightenment. In this sense, it is a sort of self-inflicted punishment to experience or embrace conservative-reproduced and celebrated American Islamic-like theocratic “godly” exceptionalism, thus a perversion or aberration, from secular Western civilization as a “double edged” (Lipset 1996) and perhaps eventually self-destructive tragic sword (Turner 2002).

Of course, what is “impunity” in the sense of avoiding the deadly “sword” of medieval-style tyrannical theocracy and totalitarian fascism from the prism of the Enlightenment and its liberal-democratic legacy is the exact opposite from that of pre-Enlightenment medievalism and its attempted resurrection from death by anti-Enlightenment conservatism, including religious fundamentalism and fascism. For both the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, “impunity” becomes an ultimate punishment and supreme “evil” in the form of Enlightenment-rooted liberal-secular democracy, culture, and civil society condemned, especially by US religious conservatives, as “ungodly” (and foreign) and so supremely “un-American” (Deutsch and Soffer 1987; Dunn and Woodard 1996). Conversely, what is punishment in the form of tyrannical theocracy and totalitarian fascism for the Enlightenment and liberal-democracy is ultimate, God-given reward or heaven<sup>29</sup> (Lemert 1999) to pre-Enlightenment theocratic Puritanism and its revivals through “reborn” Protestant fundamentalism in America (Munch 2001), as well as to anti-Enlightenment authoritarian conservatism as the creator or foundation of fascism.

The preceding reaffirms that the Enlightenment and the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, specifically theocratic medievalism, including Puritanism, are as disparate,

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<sup>29</sup> It is striking that some US sociologists of religion (Lemert 1999; Wuthnow 1998) use, especially in reference to anti-Enlightenment “reborn” fundamentalism, the term “heaven” as if it were an empirically “researched and proven” domain rather than a transcendental, thus neither (possible to be) confirmed nor disconfirmed, idea, reflecting a sort of “fantasy of salvation” (Giddens 1984). Comics may comments that US anti-Enlightenment *born again* fundamentalists have proven the sociological “existence” of heaven, just as, for that matter, of “Satan” and “witches,” for this kind of “sociology of religion.” Furthermore, this reveals a clear preference for evangelical “heaven” over liberal-secular “hope” dismissed as unrealistic or utopian (Dunn and Woodard 1996), implying that the pre-Enlightenment “fantasy of salvation” is more sociologically realistic or pertinent than Enlightenment optimism about the future of human society. Hence, such “sociology of religion” adopts an unscientific or theological, as well as an ideological conservative or anti-liberal, standpoint and thus retrogresses or degenerates effectively into theology, just as it also does into triumphant ethnocentrism *cum* super-patriotic Americanism (Lipset 1996; Lipset and Marks 2000).

distant, contradictory as different planets or social worlds in value-neutral terms or, in US conservatives' valuation, "ungodly" liberal hope in human society and transcendental "heaven," respectively. This is what Ross intimated stating that Enlightenment-based Jeffersonian democracy and Puritanism "have worked together" as mutually countervailing rather than (or just secondarily) complementary forces. They have as adversaries, competitors, or "strangers," as shown by Jefferson and colleagues in relation to Puritans as orthodox Calvinists (Baldwin 2006; Dunn and Woodard 1996; German 1995; Gould 1996), hardly ever "friends" or collaborators, except transiently as during the Revolution against a common enemy, despite received contrary views (Byrne 1997; Hartz 1963; Kloppenberg 1998).

In general, Enlightenment liberal-secular democracy and pre-Enlightenment theocratic Puritan and any "tyranny" could not have logically and have not historically worked, do not in the present, and *otherwise* likely will not in the future. This holds true in virtue of the two being axiomatically polar opposites and in that sense objective adversaries, despite various transient mutual compromises and accommodations. To argue the opposite, as does conventional wisdom in America, is substantively equivalent to arguing that Enlightenment liberal democracy and anti-Enlightenment fascist tyranny "worked together" in interwar Europe, including Nazi Germany. Both claims are not only logical nonsequiturs amounting to Orwellian antilogic connecting antidemocracy and democracy ("double-thinking"). More importantly, these claims are contradicted by the historical and present experience. Essentially, *no* tyranny, "godly" Puritan in America's early history and its "Bible Belt" design, or "ungodly" fascist in interwar Europe, is logically compatible and can actually work "together" with the Enlightenment liberal-democratic ideal. And, to claim that only *Puritan* "all-American," but not fascist and other "foreign," tyranny could, do, and will, via theocratic "born again" evangelicalism (Lindsay 2008), work "together" with democracy in America is, in addition to being illogical and empirically ungrounded, a standard expression of "American ethnocentrism" (Beck 2000) or exceptionalism as triumphalism (Bell 2002). Simply, it is admittedly the "American kind of hubris" (Berman 2000) and what Weber calls, concerning the claims to the exceptional "national character," a "mere confession of ignorance." It is no wonder that US sociologist Cooley classically defines ethnocentrism as the matter of lack of knowledge and in that sense ignorance producing ethnocentric arrogance that reinforces it in a "virtuous circle" of religiously justified "blissful ignorance" or religious nationalism (Friedland 2001). Generally, the Enlightenment's central principle of human reason advances (as stated by its German member Wellmer) the "demand for the abrogation of all repressive conditions" that claim legitimacy on no other grounds than their "sheer existence" (Schmidt 1996).

In summary, the "true spirit" of the Enlightenment admittedly consists in advancing human reason and secular knowledge, including science, in the "name of emancipation," and conversely, the latter in the "name" of or through the former (Vandenberghe 1999). Arguably, defending the Enlightenment principle of reason and knowledge is consistent with opposing those social groups and societies masking their "abuses of power under the appearances of reason" or using its "weapons,"

including advanced civilian, medical, and military technology, for the aim of reproducing and rationalizing an “arbitrary empire” (Bourdieu 1998), as observed for American and British neo-conservatism, including spurious “libertarianism” or “neoliberalism.”

Furthermore, in conjunction with and continuation of its operation vis-à-vis the pre-Enlightenment, the Enlightenment operates initially as the antidote and eventually or conceivably as Hayek’s “terminator” of the counter-Enlightenment and its new antiliberal, antidemocratic “poison.” This “poison” primarily and initially assumed the form of conservatism as the attempt at resurrection of medievalism from death, and thus, like its medieval model (Nisbet 1966), defined by oppression and the destruction or perversion of human liberty, dignity, well-being, happiness, and life through conservative authoritarianism. The latter in particular did and does include the eternal theological design of theocracy and “right totalitarianism” (Giddens 1979) like fascism.

While acting as a direct and immediate antidote and “terminator” of the tyrannical, notably theocratic, “poison,” of pre-Enlightenment medievalism, the Enlightenment did indirectly and subsequently so in relation to anti-Enlightenment conservatism, including fascism. It did so through its creation of rationalistic, secular, and individualistic liberalism as the ideal of liberty implemented and continued in the social system of liberal democracy, culture, and civil society as the “nightmare” or “unmitigated evil” for postmedieval conservatives of all stripes, colors, and times, especially US conservatives or religious fundamentalists, not to mention fascists in Europe and America alike. Thus, US conservatives (Deutsch and Soffer 1987; Dunn and Woodard 1996) complain that the Enlightenment-grounded “liberal democratic ideal of moral neutrality” acts as the antithesis of post-Enlightenment conservatism and by implication pre-Enlightenment medievalism, in that it sanctions the “dedication to individual freedom over any other individual or social good,” notably deity, religious belief, and “godly” morality.

Apparently, for American religious-political conservatism, just as for Islamic fundamentalism reaffirming their substantive antiliberal affinities (Turner 2002) or commonalities (Friedland 2002), the supreme, unmitigated “evil” in modern society is the precisely Enlightenment-based “dedication to individual freedom” as the prime value and institution of contemporary Western democracies in relation to other values and institutions. At this juncture, one wonders how and why the liberal-democratic “dedication to individual freedom” has become the “evil” or “problem” in the very “land of freedom” of which US conservatives are the self-proclaimed guardians (“super-patriots”), hence what will remain of liberty and democracy in America if this Enlightenment-rooted value were substituted or weakened by opposite pre- and anti-Enlightenment anti-individualistic and antiseccular values. And, presumably, the “dedication to individual freedom” at the expense of “godly” and associated antiseccular values reflects the imputed “crisis of liberal democracy” in America and beyond as the “crisis of moral foundations” for which antiliberal conservatism, particularly religious fundamentalism and implicitly its penchant and “trained capacity” for “holy” antigovernment and state terror (Juergensmeyer 2003), is the supposed cure-all or solution.

Of course, for Enlightenment-inspired liberal-democratic forces, this is the type of cure that, to paraphrase Mannheim and Keynes, “cures the disease by killing the patient,” specifically promising to solve the “burden” of individual liberty and the “agony of choice” by eliminating liberties and choices themselves (Bauman 2001). It is the solution shared by American “Bible Belt” evangelicalism and Islamic fundamentalism (Friedland 2002; Juergensmeyer 2003), which again reveals conservative “American exceptionalism” as an Islamic-like theocratic “godly” perversion or deviation from liberal-secular Western civilization (Inglehart 2004). They are thus revealed as similar and often allied protototalitarian destructions of *cum* alternatives to individual liberty and personal choice redefined as “evil,” “ungodly,” or a “problem” and “burden” best to be avoided in both (Bauman 1997), as was in interwar German fascism prompting “escape from freedom” (Fromm 1941; McLaughlin 1996).

In retrospect, US “godly” conservative allegations leave a taste of *déjà vu*, of history repeating itself truly or grotesquely. They continue fascism’s, notably Nazism’s, complaint about the “liberal democratic ideal” for promoting individual liberty at the expense of “deeper” sacred and national values, and its diagnosis or imputation of the “crisis of liberal democracy” as the “crisis” of morality because of liberalism’s “corrupt” values and culture, including, as the Nazis accused, “degenerate” artistic (Bourdieu and Haacke 1995) and related works to be burned or destroyed. As Mannheim (1986) notes, Nazism arose as a *putschist*, subversive, or terrorist conservative movement through alleging and then exploiting “crises” in modern liberal-democratic society, offering its own “solution” by destroying the latter (e.g., Germany’s Weimar Republic).

The above reveals a striking fascist-to-conservative continuity or affinity in denouncing *and* pronouncing dead the Enlightenment liberal-democratic antidote to the antiliberal and undemocratic “poison” of the anti-Enlightenment, including the shared practice of burning and banning “degenerate” or “indecent” books by Nazism and American conservatism (Hull 1999). Yet, such continuities are not random and transient but intrinsic or built in and enduring. They are, given that fascism, notably Nazism, was primarily the creation of reactionary conservatism (Moore 1993), thus the most extreme form of the conservative anti-Enlightenment (Habermas 2001) and antiliberalism (Dahrendorf 1979), as is neofascism in relation to neoconservatism and its own counter-Enlightenment *déjà vu*. In prospect, these conservative allegations anticipate or diagnose the shared neoconservative and neo-fascist *déjà vu* complaints about and attacks on liberal-secular democracy, culture, and civil society in Europe and especially America as “evil,” “foreign,” and “ungodly,” so “un-American,” just as the Nazis attacked it as “anti-German.”

By analogy to the pre-Enlightenment, the Enlightenment functions as both the initial antidote and the eventual “terminator” of the equally “unbearable lightness of existence” of anti-Enlightenment conservatism, including fascism. This holds true to the extent that the “reality of a liberal and pluralist society” (Munch 2001), including culture and democracy alike, is firmly established or at least a prevalent trend, in modern Western societies (Inglehart and Baker 2000), with the striking “deviant case” of America during neoconservatism, especially revived religious fundamentalism (Inglehart 2004), by the early twenty-first century. Yet, like in the

case of the pre-Enlightenment, “terminator” means more a process than a definitive outcome of termination, again “never say never” about the anti-Enlightenment and its antiliberal and antidemocratic force and potential. This is indicated by conservatism’s and recently neoconservatism’s, including religious fundamentalism’s and neofascism’s “die-hard” opposition and attack against the established or emerging reality of liberal-secular and pluralist democracy, culture, and civil society in Europe and especially America since the 1980s through the 2000s.

In particular, neoconservatism, notably “reborn” Puritan-rooted fundamentalism, in America is observed to exhibit and engage in such antagonism toward modern liberal society, including both democracy and culture (Munch 2001). On this account, from the angle of the Enlightenment’s liberal-democratic ideal and legacy, one can never underestimate religious and other neoconservatism in America, let alone its extreme subtype neofascism, with impunity, but instead always with severe punishment, including literally the death penalty, for liberalism, rationalism, democracy, and all human liberty and life. This simply means “never say never” about the end of the conservative, notably fundamentalist and fascist, anti-Enlightenment.

Yet like the pre-Enlightenment’s revival, observations suggest or predict that such rebirth of Puritan, just as Islamic, fundamentalism and conservatism overall from the “dead” (Dunn and Woodard 1996) is likely the last stand or battle cry of a slowly dying or dissolving anti-Enlightenment conservative world in modern advanced societies, except for evangelical America, which reveals celebrated conservative American exceptionalism as a true perversion or aberration from Western culture and civilization. This is indicated by the diagnosed “terminal condition” (Eccleshall 2002) of anti-Enlightenment conservatism (and fascism), despite its periodic returns from death, in most modern Western societies, with the “deviant case” of America during neoconservatism, including theocratic fundamentalism (Inglehart 2004; Munch 2001), though even the latter showing such “symptoms,” as in the last Presidential and other elections.

## **The Enlightenment as Revolution in Science, Knowledge, and Education**

In particular, the Enlightenment constitutes a paradigmatic generalized “Copernican revolution” in science, knowledge, and education within Western and other culture. It does so because it is the paradigmatic exemplar of scientific rationalism, as indicated by Enlightenment “scientism and objectivity” (Angel 1994; Habermas 1971) as the foundation of modern science and education and in extension technology and medicine, and thus of technological, economic, medical, and other societal progress. In the Enlightenment, scientism is understood in the sense of rational, methodical pursuit and positive valuation of science, including scientific theory, method, research, and knowledge, and its technological, economic, medical, and other applications.

Notably in the Enlightenment, and liberal modernity in general, scientism and technological applications intend to enhance human liberty, dignity, well-being, happiness, and life in society, rather than destroying or perverting them, as in anti-Enlightenment conservatism-fascism's abuse of most sciences, technologies, and medicine for repressive or totalitarian, militarist, and other antihuman aims. Enlightenment scientism and technological, economic, and medical progress are hence cultivated in the service of human emancipation (Vandenberghe 1999), well-being and life, not of subjugation, suffering, and death, as in the conservative, including fundamentalist and fascist, anti-Enlightenment. Original Enlightenment scientific rationalism or scientism is condensed in Comte's statement, implicit in and likely inspired by Condorcet and Saint Simon (and perhaps Descartes and Bacon), "from science [and knowledge] comes prediction; from prediction comes action" in the aim of attaining and promoting liberty, democracy, justice, and human well-being, happiness, and dignified life in society. Admittedly, Western Enlightenment scientism and objectivity stand at the root of "scientific ideals, democratic ideals, and the ideals of social justice" (Angel 1994) in modern societies.

In this sense, Enlightenment scientism is not only rationalistic and intellectualistic as self-evident, but liberal and thus truly libertarian, just as humanistic. This contradicts Hayek et al.'s "libertarian" cum conservative vehement misconstrued attacks on "constructivist rationalism" owing to its alleged "abuses of reason."<sup>30</sup> These abuses are actually perpetrated or endorsed, above all, by the anti-Enlightenment, especially and persistently conservatism, including religious fundamentalism and fascism, in the service of authoritarian, in particular theocratic or totalitarian, rule within society, and of militarism and wars against other societies, rather or more than by Enlightenment-based liberal democracy and culture. This is an evident and salient fact yet typically overlooked by conservative assaults on, as well as neo-Marxist, postmodernist, and feminist critiques of, the Enlightenment and its scientific ideals.

Hence, Enlightenment scientism is the form both of rationalism and liberalism, as well as humanism, an expression of human reason and liberty, an instrument of enlightenment and the pursuit of knowledge *and* of liberation and emancipation in society (Angel 1994; Vandenberghe 1999). In turn, such scientism contradicts "libertarian" and conservative opposite imputations. These glorify irrationalism, anti-scientism, and, following their model Burke (Schmidt 1996), human prejudice and ignorance as the path to "freedom" a la Hayek's "spontaneous order" of laissez-faire capitalism as an absurd mix of anarchy, literally or figuratively "license to kill" for capital *and* of Leviathan, tyranny against labor, while condemning "constructivist rationalism" (reduced or equated to socialism) as the "road to serfdom." Enlightenment scientism also reveals as nihilistic or self-destructive the shared conservative and fascist glorification of religious irrationalism as the path to "heaven" (Lemert 1999). For instance, scientism exposes and transcends the

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<sup>30</sup>As noted, Mises is an exception in economic "libertarianism" due to his valuing and celebrating the Enlightenment for its rationalism and liberalism alike.



Puritan-style nihilistic “delirium of total annihilation” cum Calvinist “salvation” in American “reborn” fundamentalism and/or neofascism (Adorno 2001) after the image of Armageddon and the form of total destruction and mass sectarian suicide<sup>31</sup> (Juergensmeyer 2003).

Furthermore, Enlightenment scientism proves *both* more rational and liberal, reasonable and proliberty, enlightening and liberating, knowledgeable and emancipating than anything else, except for classical culture and the Renaissance as its embryos or precursors in Western and all civilization prior to and after the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries (Angel 1994). Conversely, virtually no other phenomenon, excepting classical culture and the Renaissance, has been more or equally so. Both the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, specifically medievalism and conservatism, have been its polar opposites, the exemplars of irrationalism and illiberalism, antirationalism and antiliberalism, unreasonableness and antiliberty, ignorance and subjugation, antiknowledge, and oppression.

### ***Liberation and Well-Being Through Science, Knowledge, and Education***

At this juncture, with its scientific rationalism the Enlightenment develops as the project and process of liberation, well-being, dignified life, and happiness through science, knowledge, and education as, along with philosophy and art or “high” esthetic culture, the supreme manifestation of human reason, thus rationality and intelligence. While this is certainly not the only actual and possible means and path of human liberation or emancipation, well-being, dignified life, and happiness, it reaches its highest form and fullest expression, after its early precedents in classical science and culture and the Renaissance, in Enlightenment scientific rationalism (Angel 1994; Delanty 2000).

From the prism of Enlightenment scientific rationalism, liberation through science, knowledge, education, and their constructive technological applications promoting human liberty, happiness (Garrard 2003), well-being, and life in society, is the genuine and primary form of liberating humans from irrational, including superstitious, fanatical, and ignorant, and oppressive sacred and secular powers, church and state (Artz 1998). In short, such liberation represents the most effective means of realizing and satisfying the perennial human dream, thirst, and quest for liberty (Popper 1973), justice, and expanded life chances (Dahrendorf 1979). Conversely, for Enlightenment scientific rationalism, liberation via the opposite of science, knowledge, and education, such as superstition, religious and other nonscientific belief,

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<sup>31</sup>Juergensmeyer (2003:138) comments that US “Concerned Christians” came to Jerusalem in 1999 with the “expectation that the end of the millennium would be the occasion for the apocalyptic confrontation after which Christ would return to earth [and] charged with planning to instigate a series of terrorist acts in order to precipitate Armageddon, and perhaps to kill themselves in an act of mass suicide in the process.”

and ignorance, is what its open admirer Mises, in contrast to his student Hayek as its overt enemy, and its critics Adorno et al. would call bogus, ersatz “liberation” a la Christian or Islamic “liberty” (Smith 2000), as in America under neoconservatism and theocratic Iran and Taliban-ruled regions. In effect, it is self-perpetuating oppression, subjugation, suffering, death, and war, as evidenced in pre-Enlightenment medievalism and anti-Enlightenment conservatism, including fascism.

Conservative and non-Western critics may object that Enlightenment scientism and rationalistic liberalism overstates or exaggerates liberation through science, knowledge, and education as the sole or main form, overlooking or dismissing its non-rational, nonscientific, including mystical, forms (Angel 1994). Presumably, it thereby commits what Hayek et al. call the fallacy of “constructivist rationalism” and its “abuse of reason.” Enlightenment precursors, figures and disciples like Descartes, Bacon, Condorcet, Voltaire, Kant, Jefferson, Saint Simon, Comte, etc. would respond that liberation through science, knowledge, education, and thus reason is more genuine, complete, and enduring than that via their opposites, including superstition, prejudice, and ignorance, thus lies in the broad sense of Bacon’s *idolas*, at the minimum the “lesser evil” than the latter, the “worst except for its alternatives.” Jefferson essentially implies this in his strong advocacy of public education, hence science (and philosophy), knowledge, and reason, as the means of promoting and sustaining democracy, thus political liberty and emancipation in postrevolutionary America. Perhaps Jefferson and especially his Paris sociological *amis* Condorcet, Diderot, and Voltaire (and Hume), as well as Descartes, Bacon, Saint Simon and Comte too rationalistically, optimistically, or naively (Merton 1968; Smelser 1992) propose and predict liberation through science, knowledge, education, and reason as a sort of panacea, as evident since their times. Alternatively, they fail to envision various abuses and perversions of scientific rationalism and its product advanced industrial, military, medical, and other technology, especially and (seemingly) paradoxically by the anti-rationalistic or antiscientific counter-Enlightenment such as religious conservatism, notably its American version, including fascism, for joint repressive and militaristic, antiliberty and anti-human, aims. This is what critics emphasize by rediscovering the Hegelian dialectic of the “good-bad” Enlightenment and of “enlightenment” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993; Cascardi 1999).

No doubt in view of such past experiences, modern Western democratic and other societies have realized that human liberation or emancipation through science, knowledge, education, technology, and reason is *not* a panacea or an invariable outcome, thus moderating Enlightenment scientific rationalism in its originally excessive optimism or its “liberal hope” of rational liberty. While not a panacea, an essential value and practice of these societies, including Jeffersonian America, is precisely liberation as well as justice, extended life chances or social mobility, well-being, and happiness<sup>32</sup> (Putnam 2000) through, just as a high valuation of, these

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<sup>32</sup>Putnam (2000:333) observes that “four additional years of education – attending college, for example – is the “happiness equivalent” of roughly doubling your annual income.”

elements of scientific rationalism, including education, rather than via their opposites like superstition, fanatical faith, prejudice, ignorance, and other forms of irrationalism. If so, then this value is the self-evident and enduring legacy of the Enlightenment and its scientific rationalism. Conversely, liberation via anti-scientific irrationalism, including superstition, fanatical belief, prejudice, ignorance, and mysticism, simply Bacon's *idolas*, has become an illogical non sequitur in these societies, including rationalistic Jeffersonian-liberal, as distinguished from and opposed by irrational Puritan-conservative, America, primarily as the legacy of Enlightenment scientific rationalism.

If any single element crucially distinguishes in cultural terms modern Western and other advanced democratic from non-Western underdeveloped and undemocratic societies, then it is probably liberation through, just as the high valuation of, science, secular knowledge, education, and technology rather than superstition, myth, fanatical faith, prejudice, and ignorance, even by the late twentieth and early twenty-first century (Inglehart 2004). In short, it is liberation through scientific rationalism vs. that via antiscientific irrationalism, including religious mysticism, the latter distinguishing the second type of societies from the first (Angel 1994). On this account, minimally education, modern advanced and democratic societies are the true "children" or heirs of Enlightenment scientific rationalism, and conversely "deviants" (in Merton's sense) from or "rebels" against pre-Enlightenment medieval irrationalism and counter-Enlightenment conservative antirationalism. At the minimum, "liberal education" (and arts) in modern societies, including Jeffersonian America, is, first and foremost, the product and legacy of Enlightenment scientific and educational rationalism (and the artistic Renaissance).

Owing to its original scientific and educational rationalism, the Enlightenment initially acted as the generalized "Copernican revolution" and eventually became the very foundation of modern science, knowledge, and education, and in extension technology in Western and other societies. Alternatively, like liberal-democratic modernity as a whole of which it is an integral element, modern rational science and "liberal" education is, first and foremost, the "child" of the Enlightenment as a paradigmatic scientific and educational revolution and rationalism. As usual, Enlightenment scientific and other cultural rationalism develops in an essential continuity, affinity, or convergence with classical science, philosophy, and culture, as well as the artistic and humanistic Renaissance. Conversely, it stands in a profound discontinuity, disaffinity, or divergence from medieval Christian, Islamic, and other religiously subverted "science," "education," "philosophy," "technology," and "medicine." In summary, the Enlightenment's "offspring" is modern science, knowledge, and education (Hinchman 1984), notably the global "expansion" of higher education (Schofer and Meyer 2005), including cognitive skills (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008), and hence civilian or constructive, as opposed to military or destructive, technology (and medicine) and its continuing progress.

If anything, what is "light" or "sunlit" and hence, other things equal, liberation in the Enlightenment is science, knowledge, education (Angel 1994), and in extension technology in the name and prime service of liberty, democracy, equality, justice, expanded life chances, and human well-being, happiness and life, rather

than their elimination or perversion, as in the anti-Enlightenment, especially conservatism and fascism. This is what its major figures, precursors, and disciples precisely propose and emphasize, notably Condorcet, Voltaire, Diderot, Kant, Hume, Jefferson, Bacon, Descartes, Saint Simon, Comte, etc. Conversely, what is “darkness” and hence, other things equal, human oppression and subjugation in the medieval pre-Enlightenment and the conservative-fascist anti-Enlightenment is the destruction or perversion and sacrifice of science, knowledge, education, and technology, including medicine, for “higher” supra- and antihuman causes such as sacred and secular powers (“God and Nation”), essentially theocracy and totalitarianism, war and death.

On this account, via its generalized Copernican scientific and educational revolution the Enlightenment illuminates and overcomes the “darkness” of the pre-Enlightenment, notably the European Dark Middle Ages and their American functional equivalents, as in Puritan-ruled New England symbolized by witch trials. The Enlightenment marks the beginning of the end of the Dark Middle Ages in Europe and America, of the irrational and tyrannical *ancien regime* in Western civilization. This is a process of termination to be politically completed by the French and in part American liberal revolutions as the proxy “daughters” of its twin ideals of rationalism and liberalism.

With its scientific and educational legacy, by providing the foundation for modern science, knowledge, education, and hence technology the Enlightenment delegitimizes and supersedes the anti-Enlightenment conservative-fascist antagonism to scientific rationalism or antisocialism. Recall that the latter is exemplified by anti-evolutionism and other religiously based antisocial nihilism in American and Islamic fundamentalism, spanning from hostility to stem cell and other medical research and treatment, climate science or global warming theory (Stern 2008) to critical economic, sociology, and other social sciences. In short, the Enlightenment reveals such antisocial nihilism as a sort of medieval darkness *déjà vu*, the proxy new Dark Middle Ages (Bauman 2001; Berman 2000).

For instance, Helvetius’ statement that “education makes us what we are” condenses French and other Enlightenment scientific and educational rationalism. Specifically, it does the Enlightenment’s valuation and promotion of science and education as the primary or indispensable means of human liberation and enlightening, as well as of expanding life chances or social mobility and thus well-being and happiness, as universally agreed in a sort of Parsonian consensus among modern societies (Dahrendorf 1979). Also, Hume proposes that when the religious and other “tempers of men are softened as well as their knowledge improved [by science], this humanity appears still more conspicuous, and is the chief characteristic which distinguishes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance.” He adds that religious and political factions “are then less inveterate, revolutions less tragic, authority less severe, and seditions less frequent.” In general, for the Scottish and French Enlightenment the “power” of science and education – broadly understood as the “malleability of man” – represented a “crucial premise” of the belief in social progress, just as the prime means of the latter (Berry 1997). As skeptical and sarcastic Veblen observes, the “order-of-nature [was] characteristic preconception of

the era of enlightenment. Beginnings of the modern scientific movement were made in Italy in the days of the Renaissance, and Central Europe had its share in the enlightenment; but these early modern risings of the scientific spirit presently ran into the sand, when war, politics, and religion reasserted their sway in the south of Europe.” Other critics also register the “rationalistic philosophy” of the Enlightenment understood as scientism or “objective” science (Husserl 1954). They recognize that the “movement” of the Enlightenment and enlightenment overall manifested the rationalistic belief that scientific progress would “finally” dispense with religious and other “idolatry”<sup>33</sup> and tyranny (Horkheimer 1996).

Admittedly, the Enlightenment is primarily instrumental in the “emergence of a scientific way of thinking,” as epitomized or prefigured by Descartes’ and Newton’s use and Bacon’s advocacy of “scientific method”<sup>34</sup> (Byrne 1997). In a sense, the Enlightenment completely reopens a sort of Pandora box of “ungodly” or skeptical science and art, initially opened by the Renaissance, specifically Copernicus and other heretics like Galileo and Bruno (and de Vinci), as well as “pre-discovered” (in Merton’s sense of pre-discovery) by the classical sciences, philosophy, and arts. For instance, reportedly the Enlightenment “exacerbated” the “gap” between religion and science created by the religious, papal condemnation and punishment of Galileo and before Copernicus, for proposing the scientific astronomic theory that the earth was not “flat” (Smith 2003) and “revolved around the sun,” not conversely as the medieval Christian “science” of astronomy had argued (Byrne 1997).

At this juncture, the term “generalized Copernican Revolution” reappears as perfectly appropriate to connote the Enlightenment and its scientific rationalism, encompassing both natural and social science, for example biology and sociology. Thus, the “steady rise” of new physical sciences like biology (and geology) reportedly

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<sup>33</sup>Specifically, Horkheimer (1946:361) states that the “movement of Enlightenment, so typical of Western civilization, expresses the belief that the progress of science will finally do away with idolatry.” However, this statement seems to conflate or does not sufficiently distinguishes between the eighteenth century Western Enlightenment and “enlightenment” in general, including both Western and non-Western societies (Angel 1994), a problem found in the Frankfurt critical theory of the “dialectic of Enlightenment” overall, as sympathetic Cascardi (1999) admits. As argued and shown in this work, the eighteenth century Enlightenment was instead *atypical* of Western civilization (except for its classical phase and the Renaissance), notably its Christian stage instead, like Oriental cultures, typified by “enlightenment” in the inverted form of faith, mysticism, and irrationalism overall, as Angel (1994) also shows.

In turn, Horkheimer (1946:363) objects that Enlightenment pluralism is the “streamlined revival of the doctrine of “‘double truth’ which [in the transition from the religious to the bourgeois idea of the individual], has played such a great role and now, at the decline of bourgeois individualism, is tried out again. [Double truth] was invoked in order to permit science to emancipate the individual from dogmatic ideologies.”

<sup>34</sup>Byrne (1997:10) comments that Bacon’s “scientific method marked a distinctive break from [medievalism] and laid the basis for the independence of science from pre-determined philosophical or religious interpretations of nature.” In general, “each scientific advance was [usually] viewed as a negative moment for religious belief. The medieval view [i.e.] that religious truth and scientific truth were merely two aspects of the same reality, came under severe pressure as the new methods of science came into conflict with established beliefs” (Byrne 1997:11).

invalidated the “historical veracity of the biblical account of creation” adopted by Catholicism and Protestantism (and Islam<sup>35</sup> with proper adaptations) (Byrne 1997). Scientific rationalism substituted creationism as what Voltaire called one of the “childish absurdities” or, in Pareto’s words, the “scientific errors” of the Bible and thus medieval “Christian science” revealed as Mises’ bogus science, including the admitted “incompatibility of at least core Christian truth claims with science” in America<sup>36</sup> (Evans and Evans 2008). However, it did so at the price of sanctions by sacred and secular powers, as the antiscientific “empire strikes back,” in Europe and even more persistently America, from spiritual condemnation and excommunication to suppression, imprisonment and, as in Puritan times, death for blasphemy. This is symbolized by “monkey trials” or their proxies against evolutionary biology (Martin 2002) and other sciences, including climate science, certain medical research and treatments, critical sociology and economics, etc., by pre- and anti-Enlightenment forces of Puritanism and its heir conservatism persisting in varying forms and shades in “Bible Belt” America up to the present.

In general, the Enlightenment’s original rationalistic principles and enduring legacies in modern advanced societies are reportedly a “dynamic concept of reason, skepticism, and the emergence of scientific methodology” (Byrne 1997). In particular, this includes its principle that the pursuit of knowledge, just as happiness in Jefferson’s sense joined with education, is “worth” virtually invariably, while replacing or undermining “many of the assumptions of the Christian worldview” (Byrne 1997). According to this principle, such pursuit of knowledge is worth both in itself as enlightening, in continuity or analogy with the Renaissance’s implied idea of “art for the sake of the art,” and in the function of human liberation, justice, well-being, life, and happiness. Admittedly, the “tragedy for Christianity” consists in resorting “too often” to condemnation and other sacred sanctions of Enlightenment rationalistic as well as liberal ideas, representatives, and legacies (Byrne 1997). Orthodox religious forces reportedly construed and condemned, as an “attack on the foundations of religion,” the Enlightenment’s principle of freedom of thought and inquiry of “all subjects” in relation to authority, notably “secular thinkers’ independence from religious interference” (Byrne 1997).

In particular, the Enlightenment constitutes and in its course bequeaths the ideal of scientific knowledge vs. ignorance, superstition, prejudice, myth, fanaticism, and other forms of irrationalism in the pre-Enlightenment or medievalism, and their perpetuation or resurrection from death by the antirationalism, including antiscentism,

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<sup>35</sup>Byrne (1997:11) gives the following example: “In 1655 Isaac de la Peyrère argued on scientific grounds that Adam could not be literally considered the first man; its author suffered much the same fate as Galileo.”

<sup>36</sup>Evans and Evans (2008:100) state that the “incompatibility of at least core Christian truth claims with science has not had a negative effect on religious practice in the United States in the past few 100years. Knowing that science cannot prove that Jesus was resurrected does not seem to have had an impact on belief in the resurrection of Jesus [so generally] publicized scientific claims about the world are so inconsequential to belief and practice in American religion that they do not matter,” including the “truth of global warming.”

of the counter-Enlightenment, especially conservatism and fascism. Within medieval Christian culture, the Enlightenment exploded or corroded the explicit or implicit Biblical “forbidden apple” or fear of secular knowledge and, for that matter, original sin, and alternatively “blissful ignorance” as expressing religious superstition, fanaticism, myth, primitivism, barbarism, and irrationalism in general. For the Enlightenment, knowledge and the rule of reason overall is the chief instrument of overcoming primitivism and barbarism, including religious fanaticism and fundamentalism, plagued by superstition, ignorance, myth, and other cultural irrationalism. It is, alternatively, the main means of creating or ushering in a modern civilized, reasonable, and free society, termed liberal modernity and culture (Delanty 2000; Habermas 2001).

In this sense, the Enlightenment truly functions as the process of “creative destruction” in culture and society in general, simply as a true generalized Copernican, scientific/knowledge and cultural revolution. As observed, the Enlightenment, particularly its French version, engages in the “reevaluation of all values” in society and posited a “new world view” or a “new order of thought,” while transforming the “standards of humanity” (Artz 1998). While questioning and gradually invalidating the “validity of old religious, ethical, and political systems,” it moves from “otherworldly and pessimistic ideas” to a “secular view of life” and “optimistic attitude toward the future,” in which science, knowledge, education, and the rule of reason are given the “place of grace” (Artz 1998). *Prima facie*, the latter outcome signals a genuine cultural, thus generalized Copernican, revolution within Christian civilization hence experiencing creative destruction.

The Enlightenment values knowledge and the rule of reason both for its intrinsic and extrinsic value or merit. For the Enlightenment knowledge is intrinsically valuable, a value in itself, thus implying “knowledge and enlightenment for the sake of knowledge and enlightenment,” as art was for the Renaissance and its ramifications (“art for the sake of the art”). In this respect, the Enlightenment supersedes the denial of an intrinsic value to human knowledge as valuable or meritorious in itself in favor of “higher” suprahuman divine causes in the pre-Enlightenment, specifically medieval Christian and any religiously-grounded, especially Islamic, civilization, just as the Renaissance did such a negative treatment of art within the latter. In addition, the Enlightenment considers knowledge and the rule of reason to have an extrinsic value or merit beyond “knowledge for the sake of knowledge.” This is its value as the chief, though not the only, means and form of human liberation, including, as Jefferson implies, democracy, in which knowledge or education is individual and collective “power,” equality, and justice (Angel 1994; Brink 2000), in particular expanded life chances or social mobility (Dahrendorf 1979).

In doing so, the Enlightenment, besides exploding the myth of the “forbidden apple” or the irrational fear of human knowledge, rejects and exposes liberation via “blissful ignorance,” religious superstition or fanatical faith, and other forms of irrationalism as spurious “liberation” and effective subjugation, within the pre-Enlightenment, including the medieval Christian world. It also preempts or anticipates “liberation” through the destruction, perversion, or Machiavellian manipulation and abuse of existing human knowledge, science, technology, and

medicine for “higher” supra- and antihuman oppressive and militaristic causes by the anti-Enlightenment, specifically authoritarian and militarist conservatism, including theocratic fundamentalism and totalitarian fascism. It exposes such “liberation,” as another, as with neoconservatism and its revived fundamentalism and neofascism, form of the elimination or perversion of human liberty, well-being, and life, thus the resurrection of pre-Enlightenment subjugation, suffering, and death from the “dead past.”

In summary, the Enlightenment and generally rationalistic liberalism’s answer to the recurring question, to cite the title of a sociological book, “knowledge for what?” is new and revolutionary within medieval Christian culture. The answer is knowledge both for, by analogy to art, its own sake as the supremely rational form of enlightenment, including education – a value or merit in its own right too – *and* in the aim of liberty, democracy, and enhanced life chances, thus as the means of human, well-being, dignified life, and happiness. This rationalistic-liberal solution to the perennial problem and dilemma of the purpose of human knowledge allows the Enlightenment to initially delegitimize and transcend the medieval pre-Enlightenment and, through its legacy, preempt and eventually defeat the conservative-fascist anti-Enlightenment. This holds true of modern advanced societies, except for America during conservatism, which hence puts American conservative exceptionalism in the proper light or rather the darkness of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment and the perversion or deviation from the Enlightenment and its rationalistic-liberal ideals. Conversely, it does not hold for most underdeveloped societies, particularly the Islamic world (minus Turkey) in which pre- and anti-Enlightenment forces of traditional religion and cultural conservatism persist and reign supreme preventing the spread or reversing (as attempted by fundamentalism even in Turkey during recent times) Enlightenment ideas (Inglehart 2004).

In stark contrast and vehement opposition to the Enlightenment, medievalism and its heir, conservatism, including fascism, all deny that human knowledge and thus rational enlightenment has an intrinsic value to be pursued for its own sake independent of “higher” supra- and antihuman values like God, faith, nation, state, empire, and war. They also deny that knowledge is a rational instrument of human liberation, well-being, life, happiness, and even of enlightenment, as in the Eastern Enlightenment via religious and other mysticism (Angel 1994) and in Calvinism rejecting the Western Enlightenment as “false” and reinventing “enlightened faith” (Sorkin 2005). Instead, they claim to reach liberation, well-being, and happiness, as well as enlightenment, through the opposites of knowledge like ignorance, superstition, prejudice, fanatical belief, or myth, thus effectively perverting these ideals into subjugation, misery, suffering, darkness, fanaticism, and overarching irrationalism epitomized or symbolized by Bacon’s *idolas* and the belief in “witches” in medieval Europe and Puritan America. Alternatively, this opposite solution by the devaluation, destruction, or perversion and abuse of knowledge makes the Christian medieval world a stage of the pre-Enlightenment, thus irrational and predemocratic in Mannheim’s sense, in relation to the Enlightenment and its rationalistic liberalism. Also, it renders its heir, conservative (also) “godly” society a la “faith-based” (Lipset and Marks 2000) or “Christian” (Smith 2000) America, including the “Bible Belt”



(Boles 1999), a phase of the anti-Enlightenment, hence antirationalism and anti-liberalism. As critics admit, the Enlightenment endows “all reasonable beings” with the capacity to pursue and attain “genuine knowledge” of, just as happiness in, the world and consequently with “equal say” in society and its institutions, a view motivating early political liberals, including Locke or rather Hume and Kant (Brink 2000). In particular, the French Enlightenment provides the foundation of an “enduring conception” of modernity as a system or discourse of “knowledge and power” (Delanty 2000) in the prime or manifest function of human liberation, happiness, and life.

At this juncture, it is instructive to mention the *Encyclopédie* as the “central document” of the Enlightenment *and* its ideal of scientific knowledge valued both as an end in itself and the means of liberation and happiness in France and in extension Europe. Admittedly, its “particular conception” of enlightenment places an “almost boundless confidence” in knowledge and science as a “means for advancing human understanding and thereby happiness” (Garrard 2003). Namely, the *Encyclopédie* regards the “acquisition of knowledge,” only via “a clear, rational mind” and the “unimpeded” sensual experience of the world, as a “necessary condition of human happiness,” while replacing “traditional authority and mystical religious beliefs as the ultimate source of knowledge”<sup>37</sup> (Garrard 2003). As critics admit, the *Encyclopedie* represents an unprecedented “ambitious” attempt by Enlightenment philosophers at redrawing the “boundaries of the world of knowledge”<sup>38</sup> (Lamont and Molnar 2002). In summary, if a single element epitomizes (Delanty 2000) the French and other, with prudent qualifications, European Enlightenment it is the 17-volume *Encyclopedia* edited mostly by Diderot and released in 1751–1772.

### ***The Program of Intellectual Freedom***

The preceding implies that the Enlightenment is the first genuine and coherent program, movement, and practice of intellectual or academic, specifically scientific and philosophical, freedom of thought, as had been the Renaissance with respect to artistic liberty and creativity, within Western civilization, in continuity with its classical, and discontinuity with its Christian, phase. With respect to the freedom of thought, the Enlightenment continues, develops, and expands classical, especially Greek, science, philosophy, and culture, with its early forms or embryos of scientific, philosophical, and cultural freedoms, as well as the Renaissance and its artistic

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<sup>37</sup>Garrard (2003:18) adds that “the application of [Bacon’s] methodology beyond the natural sciences became a central element of the Enlightenment project of maximizing human control of the world, the structure of which was held to be inherently rational and understandable.”

<sup>38</sup>Lamont and Molnar (2002:180) add that Diderot and d’Alembert, as its editors, “chose selectively among elements of earlier topographies of knowledge in charting a new line between the known and the unknowable.”

liberty and creativity. Conversely, it discontinues and supersedes the medieval Christian world. In the latter, from the stance of the Enlightenment, the freedom of thought, including scientific and philosophical (and artistic) liberty, was basically *caput mortuum* or nonentity and nonsequitur due to the dissolution and sacrifice of science, philosophy, and all culture to theology, religion, and theocracy, as most dramatically (but not solely) epitomized and symbolized by the Catholic Inquisition and its functional equivalents in Protestantism.

If anything demonstrates the Enlightenment's deep discontinuity and incompatibility in cultural terms with medieval as well as postmedieval Christian and any religiously-dominated, especially Islamic, civilization, it is what Durkheim<sup>39</sup> calls the "freedom and independence of thought," especially its academic version in scientific and philosophical freedoms, in relation to "higher" sacred as well as secular causes and powers. For instance, Diderot suggests that the "arts and sciences must be granted the freedom which is so vital to them," thus implicitly being incompatible with religion in general, official Christianity in particular<sup>40</sup> (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Evans and Evans 2008). In general, the French and other representatives of the Enlightenment posit freedom of thought and inquiry for the scientific purpose of discovering the "secrets of nature and of man's behavior" (Artz 1998). A logically integral element of the Enlightenment's idea and exercise of academic and other intellectual freedom is a skeptical or critical stance on traditional, established social, especially political and religious, ideas and institutions, for its "original freshness and strength" consist in its "critical element" (Berman 2000).

In particular, the Enlightenment constitutes the first genuine or most consistent project and exercise of academic or scientific-philosophical freedom in analyzing Christian and other religious ideas and texts as well as practices and institutions. In this sense, it represents the first truly scientific or objective and critical treatment of religious works, specifically their Christian forms like the "Holy Bible." To that extent, it devised or prefigured what Durkheim proposes as the quintessential scientific sociological method of considering all social phenomena, including religious ideas, texts, and institutions, as "things" or "data" to be analyzed objectively rather than sacred objects forbidding such analyses, as witnessed in the pre-Enlightenment,

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<sup>39</sup>Durkheim states that "liberal philosophy has had as its precursors heretics of all kinds whom the secular arm rightly punished [for their freedom and independence of thought] throughout the Middle Ages [by the Inquisition] and has continued to do so up to the present day."

<sup>40</sup>Norris and Inglehart (2004:7) remark that "the era of the Enlightenment generated a rational view of the world based on empirical standards of proof, scientific knowledge of natural phenomena, and technological mastery of the universe. Rationalism was thought to have rendered the central claims of the Church implausible in modern societies, blowing away the vestiges of superstitious dogma in Western Europe." Also, Evans and Evans (2008:85) recognize that the "vision of incompatibility [of science and religion] was the result of the new [sociological] field's Enlightenment assumptions," while rejecting this vision in favor of an alternative view (reminiscent of the Vatican post-war doctrine that the two are not incompatible or opposed, such as evolution theory and faith). In turn, they suggest that "religion can decline owing to factors unrelated to science and Enlightenment rationality" (Evans and Evans 2008:100), thus rejecting the view of the latter as the opposite or substitute of the former.

specifically the medieval Christian world, and in part remains in the anti-Enlightenment, especially “born again” American and Islamic fundamentalism. (Recall that the latter are the only two major religious groups sharing creationism and condemning biological evolutionism in modern societies.) In short, such a scientific method is the logical outcome and legacy of the Enlightenment’s idea and practice of academic freedom, including a critical analysis of traditional ideas, values, and institutions. Durkheim’s sociological method elaborates and implements, with some modifications mostly in his late career (Parsons 1967a), the original “rationalistic model of the Enlightenment” (Tiryakian 2002), particularly Bacon, Descartes, Montesquieu, Condorcet, Saint Simon, and Comte.

In other words, by positing and exercising academic freedom in analyzing religious ideas and texts, the Enlightenment becomes a first truly consistent attempt at scientific deconstruction of Christian and other “sacred” books, including the “Holy Scripture,” in Western culture, thus a true generalized Copernican, cultural revolution, specifically in hermeneutics or the method of interpretation of texts. In general, the Enlightenment reveals and overcomes Voltaire’s “childish absurdities” and Pareto’s “scientific errors” in the Bible and Christian “science” overall. In doing so, the Enlightenment admittedly rejects and supersedes religious “superstition, fanaticism, and prejudice,” in particular divine revelation as contributing “nothing” to the existing knowledge through “natural human reason” (Schmidt 1996). For instance, it demonstrates, by “historical and philological criticism,” that various parts of the Scriptures, especially the dogmas of original sin, eternal punishment and its variations, as in US anti-Enlightenment neoconservatism,<sup>41</sup> or transcendent predestination, are problematic and also of “dubious authenticity” (Schmidt 1996). Consequently, especially the French Enlightenment deconstructs the official, theocratic Christian church, including both Catholic and Protestant theocracies, as a “colossal fraud,” Jesus a “well meaning, but deluded fanatic,” and his apostles “clever and self-seeking deceivers” (Schmidt 1996), with some of its key representatives being imprisoned for their “irreverent opinions” (Garrard 2003; Simon 1995) such as Voltaire and Diderot in France (just as Kant was threatened with imprisonment for his ideas by the king of Prussia). In particular, Spinoza provides a model of an “enlightened reading” of the Holy Scripture subjecting the latter to the “same method of interpretation” as applied to the “ordinary phenomena of nature” (Bittner 1996), anticipating Durkheim’s sociological method for investigating social facts. And, by applying scientific philological methods to the Biblical texts, the Enlightenment, desanctifies or dethrones the latter from the transscientific absolute rank of “Holy Scriptures” to being scientifically treated as “any other text”

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<sup>41</sup>For instance, during neoconservatism, Congress passed a federal law allowing “the continued detention of ‘sexually dangerous’ convicted federal inmates [with mental illness] who have served their prison terms” – yet invalidated by an appeals court for “exceeding the limits of congressional authority” – just as did ultraconservative (“red”) states. In retrospect, this is a neoconservative variation on Puritan-style and Nazi-like perpetual punishment for sexual and other offenses – though for a limited category that American conservatism, following Puritanism, can be expected extend to encompass all sinners – as well as on humanity’s eternal expiation for “original sin.”

(Bittner 1996). In doing so, it contributes to an understanding of religious and other ideas and institutions that tend to eliminate superstitions of “all kinds” on the basis, as Kant states, that true enlightenment is “liberation from superstition” in religion and all culture (Bittner 1996).

In retrospect, in modern advanced and democratic societies, including universities, academic freedom, in its various scientific, philosophical as well as artistic, forms is first and foremost, the outcome and legacy of the Enlightenment and its rationalistic liberalism (Bendix 1970). Counterfactually, without the Enlightenment and liberalism, genuine, extended academic and cognate freedom would be likely non-existent or weak in these societies. Actually, it is in those societies lacking or reversing this legacy, as in Islamic and other theocratic countries, in which academic and other intellectual freedom is a religious-like taboo and virtually unknown, and America under Puritanism and conservatism. In the latter case, reportedly genuine academic and related freedom “never has been the rule” (Coats 1967), with scientists and other academics subjected to constant attacks for their “ungodly” and/or “un-American” ideas and writings by “godly” and “patriotic” antiliberal and anti-intellectual forces.

Predictably, these attacks on academic freedom were most extensive and intense under the Puritan pre-Enlightenment in which such liberty was, due to its “most totalitarian” Calvinist theocracy (Stivers 1994), an illogical nonsequitur or an effective nonentity (Dayton 1999), and then in its heir, the conservative anti-Enlightenment reversing the Jeffersonian Enlightenment<sup>42</sup> (Hull 1999). Some instances of victims or targets of such attacks are, besides “witches” exorcized by witch trials in Puritan New England, adherents of evolution theory (Martin 2002) subjected to “monkey trials” in the “Bible Belt,” Veblen et al. (Theodore Dreiser, etc.) attacked as the “saboteurs of the Status Quo” in early twentieth century America (Eby 1998) and their proxies during the “red scare” and McCarthyism with “ugly scars” on politics and academia (Smelser and Mitchell 2002), and dissenting sociologists and other scientists during the “war on terror” (Colorado, etc.).

For instance, Veblen’s contemporary Richard Ely registered in late nineteenth century Germany’s university system “a new and exhilarating atmosphere of freedom” lacking in American universities (King 2004), a missing link self-perpetuating or recurring since, from “monkey trials” as attacks on science and the “red scare” through McCarthyism and the Cold War to neoconservatism and the “war on terror.” As observed, despite the rhetoric of “academic freedom,” the latter has “never” been the rule but an exception during most of American history, especially in private religious (“Christian”) universities where it has been virtually, up until the early twenty-first century, nonexistent or perverted into “Christian liberty” which for free-thinking academics a la Veblen or Pareto is hardly worth the paper on which it is printed, as was admittedly the hypocritical Puritan “Body of Liberties” in New England’s theocracy (Dayton 1999; Gould 1996).

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<sup>42</sup> At this juncture, with respect to academic and other, including political, freedom, the Jeffersonian Enlightenment may have superseded or challenged the Calvinist-Puritan pre-Enlightenment (Bremer 1995), yet has been subsequently reversed or subverted by the conservative, including neoconservative, anti-Enlightenment in adverse reaction.

In short, where the Enlightenment twin ideal and legacy of reason and liberty is absent or “embattled” by the anti-Enlightenment (Bendix 1970), so is in consequence academic and related intellectual freedom. Consequently, without Enlightenment rationalism and liberalism, scientific and similar dissenters or Durkheim’s “heretics of all kinds” would still be severely “punished” to the no-return point of execution by sacred and secular powers for the freedom and independence of thought,” as were in the Dark Middle Ages by the “holy” Inquisition and its Protestant proxies like Puritan witch trials. They actually are in those societies where the Enlightenment-liberal legacy of academic and other intellectual freedom is nonexistent or weak like the Islamic and most other non-Western world (again with rare exceptions like Turkey). This also applies to America during conservatism, in which various dissenting or heretical scientists and other academics, including but not limited to evolutionary biologists, have been the “principal victims of public attacks” (Coats 1967; also, Bendix 1970; Martin 2002), as symbolized by “monkey trials” against scientific biology and science generally, spanning from pre-Enlightenment Puritanism to its declared heir anti-Enlightenment neoconservatism, from the seventeenth to the twenty-first century.

As observed, modern society, notably its university, finds its primary foundation and necessary condition in the “liberal idea of independent inquiry, free discussion, and academic self-government” (Bendix 1970), as originated in or championed by the Enlightenment. In turn, like most ideas of liberalism and the Enlightenment, this idea has reportedly been and continues to be subjected to “attack,” especially “outside attacks of religious and political fundamentalists” on the “inherent radicalism of free inquiry” (Bendix 1970), thus implicating or predicting revived fundamentalism in America and Islamic countries as the major antagonistic and attacking force. In particular, virtually all sociologists would agree that the Enlightenment-liberal ideal of academic freedom, even if culturally or politically attacked and “precarious” and the concept of reason is “embattled,” forms a “vantage point of considerable promise” for sociological theory and research, and (most of them) generally that scholarly work is “consonant” with liberalism (Bendix 1970).

Notably, the modern university in Western societies, including Jeffersonian America, at least most public and private nonreligious universities starting with the university that Jefferson founded in his Virginia, adopts and implements “Enlightenment goals” as its driving forces (Berman 2000). On this account, the Enlightenment is, if not the founder then the prime mover and inspiration of the modern Western university, notably its public and secular forms. Thus, most universities in Western societies, including Jeffersonian America, were founded or revitalized and thrived in the aftermath, and by the direct or indirect inspiration, of the Enlightenment. In summary, the modern university as we know it, the autonomous liberal, secular, and pluralist realm of academic freedom, namely theory, critique, research, and knowledge independent of sacred and secular power, would hardly exist or at least develop and expand in the present forms without the Enlightenment and its twin ideal and legacy of rationalism and liberalism. For the autonomy of the modern university, thus science and education, from “higher” powers is primarily rooted in the fact that the Enlightenment admittedly creates and pursues the “real universalizing strand” of modern discourse

making possible knowledge to be “separated” from power (Alexander 2001b), sacred and secular, church and state, alike.

### *The Foundation of Modern Social Science*

Notably, the Enlightenment is the creator, at least the primary foundation, of modern social science, criticism, and objectivity. The origin of modern social science, including sociology and economics, is first and foremost, rooted in the Enlightenment as a social-scientific, especially sociological and economic epistemological, prototype and generalized Copernican revolution par excellence. In scientific terms, the Enlightenment forms especially a sort of proto- or proxy- sociology, as epitomized by Montesquieu, Condorcet, Voltaire, Hume, Saint Simon, and perhaps Rousseau (if deemed its member), not to mention Comte as the titular founder of the discipline. No wonder, Durkheim considers Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Saint Simon to be “forerunners of sociology” and himself adopts in his sociological method of treating social phenomena as “data” or “things” the “rationalistic model of the Enlightenment” (Tiryakian 2002). Similarly, the latter is a kind of proto- or proxy-economic science initially called political economy, as demonstrated by Montesquieu (Hirschman 1977) and Condorcet (Mueller 1997), plus Quesnay, Turgot, and other members of the physiocratic economic school in France, as well as Hume and Smith in Great Britain. After all, Smith, widely, though not universally, considered the nominal “father” of modern economic science (Buchanan 1991), was a member of the Scottish Enlightenment of which Hume was the leading representative (Berry 1997).

In general, the Enlightenment represents a proto- or proxy-social science, ranging from sociology as the most general discipline in the classical definition to its particular disciplines, economics, history, political science, and anthropology. And, its members are model- or arch-scientists, and not only philosophers, as exemplified by Condorcet, Montesquieu, Hume, Saint Simon, Comte, and others. In this sense, modern science, including sociology and economics, represented by Comte and Smith respectively, is primarily the creation and lasting legacy of the Enlightenment and in extension rationalistic liberalism. As observed, the Enlightenment in France created the foundation for or exerted profound influences on the rise and advancement of “all the social sciences: government, history, economics, sociology, and psychology” (Artz 1998). Notably, the expression “social science” was a creation of the French Enlightenment, expressing an “entirely different conception of modernity and of knowledge” (Delanty 2000). Overall, the French and other European Enlightenment centers on studying human society in connection with the “natural world in all its aspects”<sup>43</sup> (Byrne 1997).

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<sup>43</sup>Byrne (1997:157–8) cited the following episode: “When asked by Napoleon about the place of God in his theory, Laplace famously replied: “Sir, I had no need of that hypothesis” and comments that “ it was not so much his theories which had no need of the hypothesis of God but rather the world he described therein.

In particular, sociology is, above all, a creation of the Enlightenment. Specifically, it is so either directly and immediately, as with Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, Condorcet, and in part Rousseau, or indirectly and subsequently through the Enlightenment lasting impact and legacy, as in the case of Saint Simon and Comte<sup>44</sup> (Evans and Evans 2008). In short, the Enlightenment, especially its French version, is the prime mover and historical time of the birth or “inception” of sociology and social theory, especially its critical variant (Antonio 1989). Notably, it is the first genuine attempt at objectivity in sociology and other social (and physical) science through explicitly distinguishing unscientific value judgments from scientific statements of fact. In doing so, the Enlightenment directly, as in case of Durkheim, or indirectly, as in Weber’s, inspired the classical sociological Durkheimian-Weberian distinction between values and facts, “should” and “is,” the concept of reasonably value-free or objective sociology and all social science. For instance, Hume states that it “seems altogether inconceivable” that “should” or “ought” be derived from “is” because they are “entirely different,” a statement sometimes described as “Hume’s Law” (Berry 1997). Identical or similar statements and implications concerning objective, value-free sociology and science overall are found in such Enlightenment figures and disciples as Montesquieu, Diderot, Voltaire, Kant, Condorcet, Saint Simon, and Comte.

As acknowledged, sociology was born in the “course of a critical encounter,” first and foremost, with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution of the eighteenth century” (Zeitlin 1981). In particular, admittedly critical sociology, notably classical sociological theory, experienced its “inception during the Enlightenment”<sup>45</sup> (Antonio 1989, 1991). In general, modern Western society has been reportedly permeated with social theory primarily because of and since the Enlightenment (Beiner 1992). Notably, recall the Enlightenment created and pursued the “real universalizing strand” of modern social theory and discourse, “at once democratic, Western, and Axial in origin” (Alexander 2001b). For illustration, the sociological-anthropological theoretical “tradition of taxonomies” are “derived from Enlightenment writers’, including Turgot’s trilogy of “savage,” “barbarian,” and “civilized” societies, adopted by various authors, from anthropologists Morgan and Bachofen to Comte and Spencer to Marx, as “alternative labels for hunting, pastoral, and agricultural societies”

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<sup>44</sup>Evans and Evans (2008:89) identify, though do not embrace, the “new field’s [sociology’s] Enlightenment assumptions” and add that “we should not forget that it was Comte, the supposed father of sociology, who thought he was going to replace the religion of the time with a new religion of science called sociology.”

<sup>45</sup>However, Antonio (1991) suggests that “a prudent critique of sociological theory would build on this epistemological critical side of the classical tradition [i.e., the critique of the Enlightenment] rather than abandoning modern theory.” This suggestion is somewhat surprising, if not contradictory, in light of the admitted “inception” of critical sociology or classical sociological theory in the Enlightenment which it is suggested to subject to critique!

(Lenski 1994). In particular, by being “committed to the scientific spirit and method” Durkheim adopted and applied to sociology the “rationalistic model of the Enlightenment,” even if later in his work (as in *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*) showing appreciation of the “departure of ordinary actors” from this model (Tiryakian 2002).

As indicated, the Enlightenment is the first or the most articulate and consistent critique of society within Western medieval Christian civilization and history. In particular, it is the most consummate critique of traditional societal institutions, both what Weber and Mannheim call respectively economic and cultural traditionalism, in this case medievalism exposed as the Dark Middle Ages. For instance, Kant characterizes modern society as an “age of criticism” with respect to traditional institutions and authorities and an “age of enlightenment,” though not yet “an enlightened age” (Schmidt 1996). Hence, the Enlightenment treats sacred and secular power, church and state, as no longer being able to legitimize themselves through relying solely on “deference” that traditionally they enjoyed (Schmidt 1996), or what Weber calls traditional and charismatic authority as the undemocratic or “authoritarian” principle of legitimation. As even postmodern critics admit, the Enlightenment and its product liberal modernity are “the heroic ages of critical thought” against all forms of “illusion – superstitious, religious, or ideological” (Baudrillard 1994c). Particularly, recall Voltaire and other members of the French Enlightenment (Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach) reconsider the Bible “simply another product of human history and culture,” and consequently its errors or limitations as the “source of historical accuracy and scientific knowledge” became “increasingly evident” (Byrne 1997). The aggregate, admittedly “inevitable,” outcome of Enlightenment scientific rationalism, including the growing knowledge of the natural as well as social world, is the disintegration of what the religious authorities of those and all societies and times tried to preserve, and try to restore, the “particular synthesis” of religion with science, culture, and politics typifying the medieval Christian world (Byrne 1997).

Finally, the Enlightenment bequeaths the enduring legacy and heralds the triumph of modern social science and scientific rationalism overall over traditional religion, theology and theocracy, as well as nonscientific metaphysics, and irrationalism in general. On this account, Comte’s (in)famous diagnosis and prediction of the advent of modern “positive” as rationalistic, scientific society and age replacing previous irrational theological and metaphysical societies and ages has been or is likely to be ultimately vindicated. This holds true, if the present global trends to scientific and cultural rationalism and liberalism, including secularism, in Western and other democratic societies (Inglehart 2004), continue in the future. Reportedly, the Enlightenment’s “objectifying” scientific rationalism has succeeded to outlast in modern advanced societies its antagonist, antiscientific irrationalism like theology or “transcendental philosophy” (Hinchman 1984). In particular, the “mainstream social sciences of the twentieth century” admittedly reflect this rationalistic legacy “most decisively” in virtue of adopting its methodological assumptions,” as



**Table 4.1** The cultural legacies of the enlightenment ideal of reason

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Rationalist and progressive legacies
Liberal-democratic legacies
Science, knowledge, and education
Liberation and well-being through science, knowledge, and education
The Program of Intellectual Freedom
The Foundation of Modern Social Science

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well as its “aspirations toward political efficacy and [democratic] social control,” expressing the “triumph of Enlightenment modes of thought”<sup>46</sup> (Hinchman 1984). The cultural legacies of the Enlightenment and its ideal of reason are summarized in Table 4.1.

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<sup>46</sup>Hinchman (1984:251) adds that “modern social science, [just as] its Enlightenment predecessor, has tended to reduce the endless variety of cultural and social life to a range of fairly simple determinations [behavioral psychology and sociology] which lend themselves to the working out of lawlike generalizations.”

## Chapter 5

# The Enlightenment and Politics

### The Enlightenment as Proxy Political Revolution

The Enlightenment is a sort of political revolution in the broader sense of generalized Copernican cultural revolution or an intellectual movement *with* revolutionary and other relevant political, notably liberal-democratic, effects and legacies. In particular, these political outcomes comprise the French and American democratic revolutions usually considered, to a greater (the first) or lesser (the second) extent, what Pareto would call the “daughters” of the Enlightenment as their cultural foundation and prelude, specifically their intellectual rationale and herald. On account of its revolutionary influences and legacies, the Enlightenment turns out to be an indirect or “soft” (“velvet”) revolution in politics, notably democracy, as distinguished from direct or true (violent) political, including its own “daughters” the French and American, revolutions. At the minimum, the Enlightenment functions as the cultural functional equivalent or analog and proxy of modern political revolution, even if not as such in the strict sense. In Schumpeterian terms, it does so by virtue of originating as the project and functioning as the process of, like liberal modernity (Bauman 2001), “creative destruction” in politics through the cultural demolition of the old and the creation of new political structures.

### *The Enlightenment vs. the Ancien Regime*

By assumption and in reality, its “creative destruction” involves the Enlightenment’s spiritual demolition or delegitimation of what Mannheim calls “authoritarian, predemocratic” political ideas and institutions, and its intellectual creation or projection of democracy. In this sense, the Enlightenment is, as Burke and his followers a la Hayek et al. lament, the intellectual “destroyer” of the medieval despotic *ancien regime* by theoretically discrediting it, before the French (and American) Revolution politically completing this process of destruction of feudalism. Alternatively, it is admittedly the theoretical “creator” of modern democracy through its liberal-democratic theory influencing as well as implemented by these revolutions,

just as, in conjunction, of the market economy by the conception of free markets (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Hirschman 1977; Mokyr 2009).

Notably, the Enlightenment constitutes a proxy political revolution or secular “creative destruction” in relation to theocracy as the religious subtype of totalitarianism or despotism, simply “holy” tyranny and thus the “sacred” antithesis and elimination of democracy and human liberty and life for what Parsons (1967a) calls the “purposes of God” in demonstration of the “goodness of God.” It does so through the intellectual destruction of theocratic politics in the form of a merger of sacred and secular power as the pre- and anti-Enlightenment in political terms, and the creation or projection of a liberal-secular polity. The Enlightenment acts as the theoretical “destroyer” of the old government as a church-state epitomized by the medieval *ancien regime*, and the creator of the new form of political governance in which these two powers are formally separated or substantively differentiated by the formation of the liberal-democratic system. In this respect, it signals or heralds the end of “godly,” and the beginning of secular, attacked by its enemies as “ungodly,” politics via its destruction or delegitimation of theocracy as a “sacred” type of tyranny and its creation or legitimation of political democracy in modern Western society. In short, the Enlightenment and its sequels the French and American Revolutions destroyed the “legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm”<sup>1</sup> (Anderson 1991) and created legitimation for a new political system of secular, egalitarian democracy. This is implicit in Kant’s proposition that an “attempt to require conformity to a fixed set of [religious or other] doctrines is void because it fails the test [of consent] that any proposed legislation must pass if it is to be legitimate.”

Simply, the Enlightenment reveals and states that the theocratic “divinely ordained,” like any tyrannical, “emperor has no cloths,” if not for the first time, given medieval heretics, the Renaissance, etc., then in probably the most open, powerful, unapologetic, unequivocal, articulate, and consistent manner within post-classical Western civilization, the fourth to eighteenth century AD. Probably more than anything else within the latter, it exposes what Weber would call the “naked” despotic power and in that sense tyrannical “nakedness” of theocracy as “godly” politics and any other form of pre- and antidemocracy. To that extent, modern Western and other societies are indebted to the Enlightenment more than to anything else for the open and unequivocal (in the pre-Enlightenment covert, equivocal, or “shy”) exposing of theocracy as “holy” tyranny, war, and death, and the consequent separation of sacred and secular powers and laws, church, and state. This Enlightenment-based differentiation, like that between legislative, executive, and judicial powers, is a constitutive element of their democracy and political and civil liberties, yet constantly threatened and undermined by pre- and anti-Enlightenment

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<sup>1</sup>Anderson (1991:6–7) states that the nation is “imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.” This traces the rise of the nation and thus the nation-state as an “imaginary community” to the Enlightenment and its sequels political revolutions, as also do other sociologists (e.g., Friedland 2001).

conservative forces, especially in America by survived or revived Puritanism (Munch 2001) and its heir neoconservatism<sup>2</sup> (Dunn and Woodard 1996). In this, like in other respects, modern democracies are the true “children” or legitimate heirs of the Enlightenment.

Conversely, non-Western theocratic countries, especially Islamic, just as theocratic (Wall 1998) forces among Western societies, particularly (but not only) America and its “Bible Belt,” almost invariably identify and target the Enlightenment and liberalism as the chief culprit for revealing the “divine” emperor, including, as Hume recounts, self-proclaimed (one-hundred odd) Puritan “divines” in seventeenth century England, as well as New England until the mid nineteenth century (Fehler 2005), as without democratic and humane “cloths,” and for the consequent separation of church and state, thus for the end of theocracy’s “heaven” (Lemert 1999) or “paradise lost.” In this respect, Islamic theocracies and what analysts call “American theocracy” (Phillips 2006) or theocratic fundamentalism form the most persistent and fanatical enemies of the Enlightenment and its ideal of liberal-secular democracy, and to that extent of modern free and open society. Conversely, both define the latter as their main “public enemy,” which again exposes conservative-reproduced and celebrated American exceptionalism as an Islamic-like theocratic, rather than “libertarian” (Lipset and Marks 2000) deviation (Inglehart 2004) and thus perversion from Western liberal-secular democracy. Thus, Iranian (and Taliban-style) Islamic theocracy and American “Bible Belt” theocratic evangelicalism attack the Enlightenment-based project and reality of modern liberal, secular, and pluralist polity and society (Munch 2001) as their major adversary (“evil”) to be destroyed by their common protototalitarian “solution” to the “burden” of individual liberty and the “agony” of choice by destroying liberties and choices (Bauman 1997; Friedland 2002).

In particular, the Enlightenment operates as a proxy political revolution vis-à-vis Christian medieval and postmedieval theocratic “godly” politics and society termed *Civitas Dei*. First, the Enlightenment inherited the condition of Christian theocracy *cum* “godly” politics in postmedieval Europe, as the religious and political background against which the Age of Reason emerged and liberal-secular democracy developed. It aims and eventually succeeds, as via the French and American

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<sup>2</sup>Heymann (2003:16) comments that in the wake of 11 September 2001 the US neoconservative government’s “political posture was always aggressive, for the administration trusted that the American people would not demand greater deference to allies or to domestic civil [and] democratic liberties [subjected to] “temporary” losses [which] could last for generations.” Heymann (2003:18) predicts that if “overriding particular democratic liberties” was to become a practice of “decades of a war on terrorism, the country’s democracy would change fundamentally.” Specifically, “creating either a state of perpetual war or an ‘intelligence state’ will not greatly reduce the danger from [terrorism and weapons of mass destruction], although it will gravely increase the danger to democracy” (Heymann 2003:166). In particular, Heymann (2003:160) observes that the neoconservative government has pursued “a strategy of preventing, after the fact, the operation of the separation of powers (denying the need for legislative oversight and the right of judicial review). The costs of not trusting the Congress and the courts are grave and unjustified.”

Revolutions, to overcome this theocratic and thus predemocratic condition. In pre-Enlightenment and early modern Europe “no proper boundaries” reportedly existed between religion and politics instead being “virtually inseparable” (Kenshur 1993), which is the definition and condition of Christian and any theocracy.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, during the pre-Enlightenment even the “more enlightened thinkers” advocating religious toleration and nominally rejecting “attempts to compel beliefs” showed more enthusiasm and interest in the establishment and promotion of a “certain kind of universal religion” to be imposed on and accepted by all than in the respect for different “private convictions” (Kenshur 1993).

Among these “more enlightened thinkers,” Puritan John Locke was an exemplary instance of the spurious nature and inherent limits of pre-Enlightenment and preliberal religious toleration, just as of theocratic compulsion and persecution, as were most other Calvinists as repressive disciplinarians (Gorski 2003) in Europe, from Geneva (Sorkin 2005) to Holland (Kaplan 2002) and Prussia (Nischau 1994). Locke’s was ersatz religious tolerance in virtue of being afforded only to Puritans and other Protestants, and denied to non-Protestant Christians such as Catholics on nationalistic grounds a la foreign “Papists” and to nonbelievers on the ground of their imputed incapacity for moral judgment and conduct (Fitzpatrick 1999). Of course, Locke’s Puritan and generally religious argument is that non-Christians (read non-Puritans) and nonbelievers overall lack moral capacity because of their lacking fear of God’s ultimate sanction for their immoral actions. The argument overlooks that Locke’s “Christians,” reduced to Puritans, and other religious believers did and do commit, as Diderot emphasized and prophetically predicted, the most egregious acts of atrocity, cruelty, inhumanity, and murder, including “holy” terror and war (Juergensmeyer 2003) to the no-return point of genocide, as that committed by Puritanism against Irish Catholics as well as Native Americans (Mann 2005), thus ultimate immorality in, as New England’s Puritan rulers proclaimed and cited by Tocqueville, the “name of God, Amen.” On this account, while widely seen as a “liberal,” Puritan Locke and colleagues were far from being liberal-democratic in the sense of the Enlightenment and modern liberal-secular democracy, not really equivalents nor even precursors of Hume, Kant, and Voltaire as instead true liberals-democrats, but rather the heirs of preliberal Calvin et al. At least from the prism of the Enlightenment, Locke was not a true modern liberal-democrat after the model of his Scottish successor Hume, because he was unable or unwilling to overcome his Puritan pre-Enlightenment heritage, the latter being a sort of chain or impediment on developing genuine liberalism, thus the conception of liberal-secular democracy.

The Enlightenment becomes the movement of “creative destruction” vis-à-vis inherited theocratic “godly” politics through a dual process or outcome. This first involves the spiritual destruction or delegitimation of the medieval *respublica*

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<sup>3</sup>Kenshur (1993:4) adds that because “it was widely believed that religious diversity had bad political consequences, heterodox beliefs were widely deemed ipso facto politically dangerous. To neutralize the threat posed by fanatics or heretics it was necessary to correct their beliefs – by persuasion or by compulsion – or to eliminate the obstinate dissenters from the body politic.”

*Christiana* (Nischan 1994) as the old political structure of theocracy and, second, the creation or projection of the modern post-, though not necessarily anti-Christian liberal-secular polity, as the new system of democracy. Notably, the French Enlightenment is typically considered a paradigmatic exemplar in this respect compared with its German, British, and American versions. Arguably, the Enlightenment contains a “markedly anticlerical cast” in France because of the “continuing ecclesiastical wealth, power, and persecution,” but “generally” not or less so in Germany and Great Britain (Garrard 2003), as well as America (Byrne 1997). In this argument, France appears as an exception in relation to the rest of Europe as well as America in respect of the antithesis of the Enlightenment and religion. Alternatively, the Enlightenment is “greatly” assisted by the established Calvinist “Reformed” church solely or mostly in Scotland because of its peculiar position within Great Britain (Berry 1997; Champion 1999), like in America during the Revolution (Byrne 1997; Kloppenberg 1998; yet cf., Artz 1998; Bremer 1995), and unlike in Catholic France and the rest of Europe, where the Age of Reason arose in “opposition to religion” (Delanty 2000). In this alternative argument, France and most of Europe including in part England, was the rule, and Scotland as well as America the exception in respect of the opposition between the Enlightenment and the established church, a view that seems more historically correct or appropriate for the purpose of this work.

In essence, the above particular national versions of the Enlightenment shared the commitment to superseding medieval Christian and any theocracy and establishing modern secular democracy. This is exemplified by Hume’s and Jefferson’s attempts at supplanting Calvinist-Puritan theocracies *cum* “godly” societies in Great Britain (Scotland) and America, respectively, with liberal-secular democracies, just as Kant’s efforts to transcend the *respublica Christiana* with its post-Christian version in Lutheran-Catholic Germany. On this account, the Enlightenment develops as a truly transnational or cosmopolitan antitheocratic, though not necessarily antireligious, and prodemocratic liberal-secular (again not invariably atheistic) movement and ideal, with evidently revolutionary aims or outcomes in polity and all society.

Hence, for the Enlightenment, primarily Christian and any theocracy *cum* “godly” politics and society, only secondarily Christianity and religion as such, is tyrannical or nondemocratic and nonhuman, thus problematic and unsustainable within the *long durée* of Western civilization. Thus, when Voltaire proclaims “crush the infamous thing;” he suggests precisely overcoming Christian theocracies or organized churches-states in Europe and beyond, and generally any “use of arbitrary, entrenched, and senseless power by an absolute Church or state”<sup>4</sup> (Artz 1998), not Christianity and

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<sup>4</sup>Artz (1998:77) registers that Voltaire “was particularly attached to the idea of [religious] toleration and a free press.” In this account, Voltaire “believed in a natural religion [as] engraved on the hearts of men everywhere (Confucius, Socrates, Cicero) opposed to organized Christianity (miracles, supernatural doctrines, positive religious duties). He attacked the contradictions in the Bible and the improbabilities of miracles [and] the childish absurdities in the Bible” (Artz 1998:79). For instance, he makes “criticism and a satirizing of the idea of Leibniz and Pope that this is ‘the best of all possible worlds’” (Artz 1998:82). Artz (1998:82) concludes that “no man ever did more to kill superstition and hocus-pocus.”

religion in itself. In this sense, most French and other Enlightenment figures and disciples, with some exceptions (Diderot, Holbach, Helvetius, Hume, and Comte), are primarily antitheocratic and antidespotic, secular and prodemocratic, and not, as the established Christian religion (Byrne 1997; Habermas 2001) accuses or construes them, anti-Christian and antireligious or atheistic. Reportedly, even in the French Enlightenment, despite its “humanistic objectives” demanding the “retreat of religion” from politics and society, most of its members do not embrace “atheism” (Garrard 2003), adopting instead agnosticism, deism, or naturalism, and nontheocratic, nonfundamentalist, or nonfanatical beliefs. If so, contrary to religious orthodoxy’s accusations or misconstructions as “anti-Christian,” these and even more German, British, and American Enlightenment thinkers remain Christians of sorts, but moved beyond medieval and postmedieval, including contemporary, “Christian” theocrats or fanatical fundamentalists, as exemplified by Franklin’s renouncing of Calvinism and thus Puritanism on moral grounds.

Specifically, the Enlightenment constitutes a proxy political revolution vs. Catholic, Protestant, and other forms of Christian theocratic “godly” politics and society in Europe and beyond. It does through the intellectual destruction of Catholic, Protestant, and other Christian theocracies and the conceptual creation of post-Catholic and post-Protestant, though not necessarily anti-Catholic and anti-Protestant, liberal-secular democracies in European and other societies. Voltaire’s proclamation “crush the infamous thing” signifies intellectually destroying through delegitimizing not only, as anti- or non-Catholic analysts à la Parsons et al. imply, medieval Catholic theocracies in France and elsewhere, but also their high-medieval Protestant Lutheran and Calvinist substitutes (Artz 1998) in Europe and implicitly pre- and post-Jeffersonian, Puritan-conservative, America (Dombrowski 2001) as a “godly” polity and society.

For instance, Voltaire and other members of the French Enlightenment, excluding Calvinist Rousseau, view Luther’s narrow “new faith” and especially Calvin’s predestination theology with “nothing but raillery and disgust” (Artz 1998). Generally, they identify the “laws of nature and the use of reason” as the “basis for truth” and in extension human liberation, in profound discontinuity or divergence from the Protestant Reformation referring “all judgments to the Bible” (Artz 1998). In particular, they, including even Rousseau, argue that humans are “essentially good” as long as they are directed by the rule of reason, and rejected the “Christian ideas of the weakness” of their intelligence and their “inherent sinfulness” (Artz 1998). These ideas are especially “reformed,” amplified, and enforced by antihumanistic Calvinism (Heller 1986) and its Anglo-Saxon extreme derivative Puritanism as the paradigmatic exemplar of un-brotherliness, the polar opposite of what Weber calls the “ethic of brotherhood” or “brotherly love” (Symonds and Pudsey 2006), including lack of *caritas* and compassion (Tiryakian 2002) including its enmity to charity or welfare assistance as its “dark side” (Hudson and Coukos 2005). The outcome is the Enlightenment’s diffusion of a “new” worldview “radically at variance” with those of both the Catholic Dark Middle Ages and the Protestant Reformation among a “great number of the literate population,” especially the middle classes of the eighteenth century (Artz 1998). In counterreaction,

Catholic and Protestant theocracies or established churches mounted a “mindless battle” (Habermas 2001) against the Enlightenment, including Voltaire. This is witnessed by the long “papal struggles” against liberalism (Burns 1990), and Lutheran and especially Calvinist-Puritan anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal attacks and even reversals, as witnessed in post-Jeffersonian America during revived religious fundamentalism and conservatism since the 1980s through the 2000s (Dombrowski 2001; Munch 2001).

Notably, Voltaire’s proclamation and the French Enlightenment overall is directed not only against official Catholicism in France and the Vatican church-state and popes-theocrats, as commonly known or assumed. It is also explicitly or by implication against Weber’s identified “Calvinistic state churches” and theocratic Calvinists in pre-Enlightenment Europe and, through their Puritan derivatives and Puritans, in Great Britain (England transiently, Scotland lastingly) and pre-Jeffersonian America. This is indicated by Voltaire’s implied rejection of theocratic Calvinism, specifically its Geneva theocracy installed by Calvin, the “Pope of Protestantism,” and celebrated as the model of political governance by its “proud” citizen, Calvinist-Catholic-and-again-Calvinist Rousseau (Garrard 2003).

On this account, the French and other Enlightenment really operates as Hayek’s “destroyer” not just as commonly agreed, of official Catholicism in France. It also does as such a force, yet widely overlooked, with respect to theocratic Protestantism, notably Calvinism in Europe (e.g., Holland) and its Anglo-American equivalent Puritanism in Great Britain and America. It hence exhibits a revolutionary break or profound discontinuity with both otherwise mutually hostile and warring subtypes of Christian theocracy or “godly politics.” Negatively, like liberalism, it does not and cannot continue, contrary to what Parsons et al. imply, the “Reformed Church,” because the latter is effectively Calvinist-Puritan tyrannical theocracy, just as its Catholic theocratic predecessor, and the Protestant Reformation overall due to its aim to create a “purer” medieval despotic order, not liberal democracy (Eisenstadt 1965). In Weber’s words, in virtue of its antitheocratic project, like its “joy of life,” the Enlightenment is the destructive or delegitimizing and adverse “heir” of theocratic Calvinism and Protestantism in the analogous sense of the latter being one of traditional Catholicism, as “heir” in both cases means destruction or opposition, at least mere temporal succession, not substantive continuation and inheritance. In adverse reaction, as does official Catholicism through its “papal struggles” with liberalism (Burns 1990), theocratic Calvinism in Europe (Geneva, Holland, etc.) and, via Puritanism, in America (Bremer 1995) counter-attacks the Enlightenment as “false,” replacing it with its own “true enlightenment” like “enlightened faith” (Sorkin 2005), and in extension liberal-secular democracy as “ungodly.”

For instance, Enlightenment-based liberal-democratic ideology in Europe, specifically Great Britain, reportedly emerges “explicitly against” applying Protestant beliefs to politics and rejected their claim that politics and religion were “inseparable” (Zaret 1989). Developing as a response to Protestant “radicalism,” liberalism goes beyond Protestantism (substituted with natural religion or deism), specifically rejecting the Puritan, old theocratic vision of “godly politics,” and greatly “secularized” political life by removing religion from politics (Zaret 1989). In particular,



the Enlightenment is profoundly “antithetical” to the Puritan and other Protestant, especially Calvinist, ideal of “godly politics,” while providing the “ideological basis” for the institutional differentiation between religion and politics in modern liberal-secular democracies (Zaret 1989; also, Bremer 1995; Evans and Evans 2008).

### *The Enlightenment and the New Politics*

Positively, the Enlightenment is the process of creation or projection of the new politics in the form of a liberal-secular polity or state through establishing the formal and substantive distance or differentiation between religion and politics, and sacred and secular domains overall. This includes but is not limited to the legal distance between sacred and secular powers and laws in the form of constitutional separation of church and state. In consequence, the Enlightenment creates or ushers in liberal-secular democracy precisely defined by such separation of church and state and generally the institutional differentiation between religion and politics (Evans and Evans 2008), while destroying or delegitimizing their merger or alliance defining and sustaining theocracy.

On this account, the Enlightenment proves simultaneously Hayek’s destroyer of the traditional theocratic fusion, and, as Mises (1950) incidentally suggests, the creator of the modern democratic “fission” (Smelser 1997), between religion and politics, sacred and secular life overall in modern Western societies. In particular, it does so with respect to the theocratic merger and the separation of sacred and secular powers and laws, church and state, respectively in these societies. For instance, Diderot suggests that the “distance between throne and altar can never be too great. In all times and places experience has shown the danger of the altar being next to the throne.” Generally, he argues that religion is “buttress which always ends up bringing the house down,” a view shared by Voltaire, Montesquieu, Condorcet, Hume, Kant, and most other Enlightenment figures (minus Rousseau), adumbrated by their precursors Hobbes, Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza (except for Locke), and adopted or developed by their successors, classical sociologists ranging from Saint Simon, Comte, and Spencer (in part) to Marx, Tönnies, and Pareto.<sup>5</sup>

No doubt, a foundational value and institution of modern Western democracies is the constitutional separation of sacred and secular powers and rules, church and state, and generally the formal and substantive differentiation between religion and politics. Comparatively, what distinguishes these societies from their nondemocratic counterparts, in particular Islamic, “Christian,” and other theocratic or theocratic (Wall 1998) settings, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Taliban regions, as well

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<sup>5</sup>More than a century later, Tönnies echoes Diderot commenting that that “once the world and all its destinies are put into the hands of one single God, who created them from nothing, sustains them according to his good pleasure and gives them laws and ordinances which make their entire development seem regular and necessary, all subordinate wills and freedoms in nature are lost, even the free will of mankind.”

as postcommunist Poland, and the US “Bible Belt” is precisely the existence and salience of such separation in the first place and its absence or weakness in the second place. Evidently, this constitutive value and institution of modern secular democracies is first and foremost the ideal, creation, and legacy of the Enlightenment and liberalism. Conversely, its absence or weakness in nondemocratic or illiberal societies, in particular Islamic and other theocratic political systems like those mentioned is, above all, due to the nonexistence or failure of the Enlightenment and liberalism. Alternatively, it is due to the survival and persistence of the pre-Enlightenment and preliberalism, notably the “path dependence” on religious traditionalism (Inglehart and Baker 2000), including medieval Islam in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Taliban regions, medievalist Catholicism in Poland, and late-medieval Puritanism or Protestant sectarianism (Lipset 1996) in evangelical America. Relatedly, it is due to the resurgence and dominance of the counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism such as political conservatism based on revived fundamentalist Islam and evangelical Protestantism (Lindsay 2008), with their various commonalities (Friedland 2002), especially in Islamic countries and “Christian” America<sup>6</sup> (Juergensmeyer 2003; Smith 2000), notably Iran/Taliban regions and the “Bible Belt” (Bauman 1997; Mansbach 2006).

If anything, in respect of the formal separation of church and state and/or the substantive differentiation of religion and politics, modern secular democracies are the genuine “children” of the Enlightenment and liberalism, and conversely their nondemocratic counterparts are the true heirs of the pre- and counter-Enlightenment, pre- and antiliberalism. Hence, like modernity as a whole, modern liberal-secular democracy, constituted by such separation of sacred and secular power, is the “child” of the Enlightenment, and conversely contemporary Islamic, Christian, and other theocracies defined and reproduced by their merger are the offspring of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment. On this account, “we are all,” namely those in modern societies adopting secular democracy and its legal separation of church and state as a given value and institution, Enlightenment “children.” To extend what is said of Voltaire, in the “great war for the liberation of humanity” from theocratic and any tyranny, darkness, suffering, humiliation, terror, war, and death for, as Pareto puts it, the “Divine master,” via the separation of sacred and secular power, the

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<sup>6</sup>Juergensmeyer (2003:212) observes that the US fundamentalist (“Christian Reconstruction”) movement often “admires the attempts of Muslims in Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan to create regimes grounded in Islamic law. To [US fundamentalists] freedom of religion means freedom to live under religious law. Since America’s secular government has denied [them] this freedom, [they regard it as hypocritical.” Also, he remarks that the US Christian militia’s “attitude toward modern liberal government is similar to those of neoconservative Hindu nationalists [viz.] that liberal government expects an obedience that is “feminine” and “infantile” (Juergensmeyer 2003:205). Overall, the “radical religious movements that emerged from these cultures of violence throughout the world are remarkably similar, be they Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, or Sikh [and] have in common [many] things,” notably the rejection of Enlightenment-based “liberal values” (or compromises with them) and secular society’s “boundaries” conserving religion” (Juergensmeyer 2003:221).

Enlightenment stands and likely “will always stand first” (Artz 1998). The latter, and Voltaire in particular, for the first time or most explicitly and consistently in Western Christian history and beyond, postulates the separation of politics from religion, notably secular from sacred powers and laws, state from church, as an “essential condition” of human freedom, for what Kant also called “mankind’s exit from its self-imposed immaturity”<sup>7</sup> (Friedland 2001).

In view of its emergence and operation in the midst of none than a Christian theocratic polity or church-state, the Enlightenment particularly results in the creation or legitimization of post-Christian nontheocratic politics or government. Predictably, the latter assumes the form of a project and institutional system of modern liberal-secular, including constitutional, democracy designed to be separated from, coexisting with, and neutral<sup>8</sup> (Bellamy 1999), but not necessarily antagonistic, toward Christian and other sacred powers and religions. When Diderot proposes that the “distance between throne and altar can never be too great” he primarily has the vision of a post-Christian and generally postreligious or nontheocratic state and polity. His observations that “in all times and places experience has shown the danger of the altar being next to the throne” and religion is “buttress which always ends up bringing the house down” also particularly (though not only) refer to medieval Christian theocracy and established Christianity.

Still, the Enlightenment project of a post-Christian polity in the form of liberal-secular democracy is not necessarily, as the established Catholic and Protestant religion accuse, anti-Christian and atheistic. Its aim or outcome is overcoming or delegitimizing Christian and any “godly” politics as “sacred” tyranny or theocracy through designing and creating a post-Christian polity as secular democracy, but not of Christianity and religion itself *as long as* it is distant or separate from the “throne,” thus nontheocratic, by the newly established distance and separation of church and state. Recall, with some exceptions including Diderot himself, most Enlightenment figures are not atheists or antireligious but remain Christian broadly defined or religious, in a range from moderate tolerant Christianity to deism or natural religion à la Voltaire, with some retaining theocratic beliefs like Calvinism, as shown by Rousseau holding Geneva’s theocracy, as its “proud citizen,” instituted by Calvin and perpetuated by his heirs, as a political ideal.

In essence, for the Enlightenment post-Christian secular democracy is neither anti- nor pro-Christian, anti- nor proreligious overall. Rather, it is distant and separate from and neutral to Christian and any religion and church as sacred power and a private realm (to be) substantively differentiated from politics as the public sphere,

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<sup>7</sup>Evoking Durkheim, Friedland (2001:127) suggests that “in place of religion, the person and the polity would now assume sacred status in the modern western world, nationalism donning the trappings of a religion.”

<sup>8</sup>According to Bellamy (1999:95), Enlightenment rationalism “treats political questions as a matter for experts in the public good [so] overrides or re-educates people’s ideas of their interests in the name of a vision of progress. But, as heirs of the Enlightenment, [modern liberals] believe in holding the ring for these conflicts by means of a neutral constitution, rationally defined in the name of justice.”

or legally separated from the state in modern Western and other democracies in contrast to most non-Western (especially Islamic) societies in which such differentiation or separation has not been attained or completed yet. From the prism of the Enlightenment project of liberal-secular democracy, the substantive differentiation or the formal separation of sacred and secular power and life defines, conditions, and sustains modern democratic societies and their political and other liberties. Alternatively, its absence or weakness does define eventually loses its “dignity” and consequently respect other societies as nondemocratic or illiberal, specifically theocratic, as epitomized by most Islamic countries, excluding Turkey as a rare exception, or quasidemocratic, as witnessed by Catholic-dominated regions such as South America and Poland and in part Ireland in Europe, as well as the Southern “Bible Belt” (and Utah) in post-Jeffersonian America.

As expected, the French Enlightenment particularly (though not solely) creates the project of a “secular, rational state” (Garrard 2003) superseding theocratic church and official religion as the expression of political irrationalism. This project included the “restraint of the monarch’s [divine] power by law” as in France and America<sup>9</sup> (Halliday and Osinsky 2006). As observed, the Enlightenment in France aims at and, via its “daughter” the French Revolution, succeeds in undermining “clerical power” via, as Diderot insists, the “complete separation” of state and church and the resulting “subordination” of the latter to a secular polity, just as the “wholesale liberalization” of laws regulating religious beliefs and practices (Garrard 2003). Admittedly, the French Enlightenment constructs and prefers a state in which humans are “not slaves” to masters with self-proclaimed divine rights to theocratic and any tyranny. It also reconsiders true Christianity or a “good Christian” not necessarily compatible with “persecuting anybody,” and patriotism and citizenship a la a “good” Frenchman and citizen not incompatible with political dissent, “without courting those in power” and with lack of nationalism or “flattering national prejudices” and ethnocentrism or xenophobia viewing foreigners as “inferior” in all respects (Garrard 2003).

The second part of the observation can be extended to the other national versions of the Enlightenment, such as America’s Jeffersonian and Germany’s Kantian forms. This is being both a “good” American or German *and* Christian without becoming an intolerant conformist defining the authoritarian, sadistic-masochistic personality (Adorno 2001; Fromm 1941) and nationalist *and* a persecutor, theocrat, fundamentalist, and “holy” culture and military warrior or a Nazi, as Jefferson and Kant implied, respectively. Regarding wars of extermination, Kant rejects them and Jefferson says that “during the period of my administration not a drop of the blood of a single citizen was shed by the sword of war.” Yet, like in most respects, Jefferson is an exception to the rule, an atypical (Archer 2001) Enlightenment-inspired and hence enlightened President-philosopher (Phelps 2007), because most US, especially pre- and counter-Enlightenment, Puritan and conservative presidents,

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<sup>9</sup>Halliday and Osinsky (2006:464) observe that “with the eras of the Enlightenment and revolution in Europe and the United States in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, governmental forms emerged that had, as a defining characteristic, the restraint of the monarch’s [Divine] power by law.”

have precisely done the opposite, especially since the mid and late nineteenth century (Mexican, Indian, and Spanish wars, etc.) through the early twenty-first century and the war on the “axis of evil.” In Jefferson’s words, this is precisely shedding the “sea of blood” of thousands of American citizens and millions of non-Americans by the “sword of war” explicitly or implicitly in the “name of God and Nation,” as anticipated by Puritanism’s injunction of theocratic and warlike practices “in the name of God, Amen.” Yet, Jefferson’s pacifism is an exception confirming rather than refuting the rule or pattern of the Enlightenment as pacifistic or peaceful vs. the pre- and counter-Enlightenment such as Puritanism and its heir American conservatism as intrinsically, in virtue of being theocratic or repressive, warlike or militaristic and violent overall through “holy” war and terror (Juergensmeyer 2003). Hence, Jefferson’s pacifism is due to his Enlightenment influences transmitted from foreign Paris salons to America, an “ungodly” and “un-American” act in itself for his theocratic and political opponents or detractors (Gould 1996), and alternatively, to *not* being a Puritan-style or evangelical president, unlike most of his predecessors and successors. Conversely, these denounce pacifism as “ungodly” and “un-American,” and embrace and practice militarism, notably aggressive wars against “evil” to “protect” American “values” and interests, because of being most unaffected by or opposed and indifferent to the Enlightenment and, alternatively, pre-Enlightenment Puritan or anti-Enlightenment evangelical presidents (as Reagan and another bellicose neoconservative politicians have declared).

Reportedly in historical terms, the Enlightenment as a period ushers in and therefore paradoxically differs from modern Western democracies and times (Byrne 1997). Namely, in the latter the “arguments and debates” about church and state are manifest and intense to a “less significant degree” than during the Age of Reason and its sequels, “centuries or even decades ago,” primarily because religion has been “downsized” to a “much reduced role in public life” (Byrne 1997) compared with previous times. To that extent, by accomplishing its original vision of a liberal-secular state and religion as a private realm and choice, modern democratic societies are really the “children” or heirs of the Enlightenment, yet surpassing their “parent.”

Conversely, on the account of this accomplishment, such Enlightenment representatives as Diderot, Voltaire, Condorcet, Hume, Kant, and others might proclaim “mission accomplished” or “total unconditional victory,” with a few exceptions and qualifications. While the above holds true of most modern Western and other democracies, predictable “exceptions” are reportedly “Christian” America (Smith 2000) as well as hyper-Catholic Poland and in part Ireland (Byrne 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000). In particular, in evangelical America such “arguments and debates” about church and state, politics, and religion have instead escalated and intensified to the point of admittedly “futile” (Bell 2002) and violent (Juergensmeyer 2003) religious and culture wars. Alternatively, they have always been “crusades” in American history and society since theocratic Puritanism and sectarian Protestantism overall (Lipset 1996; Munch 2001). This sheds another light, or rather darkness from the prism of the Enlightenment, including its “theories about degeneracy in the New World” (Gould 1996), on the conservative “phenomenon of American exceptionalism” (Inglehart 2004) vis-à-vis Western liberal-secular

democracy, as an Islamic-like theocratic deviation that is admittedly a “double-edged sword” (Lipset 1996) and ultimately single-edged, on account of its destructive effect on human liberty and life.

An expression of the Enlightenment post-Christian polity and state is the concept of moral politics. The concept signifies secular and universal political morality or civic virtue, as exemplified by the pursuit of the “public good” and distinguished from and often opposed to and by, Christian and other moral-religious virtues. As registered, an Enlightenment “universalist morality” intrinsically has “no limits” in its scope of application by considering not only “personal relationships” but also political activities, thus power seeking and constellations, as amenable to “moral scrutiny,” leading to “moralization” of politics, notably government (Habermas 1989a). In turn, this morality deeply differs from the (neo)conservative minimizing of the “burdens of moral justification on the political system” by the “higher” end of power justifying any available means and tactics à la Machiavelli in direct or indirect opposition to the Enlightenment. This makes (neo)conservatism the anti-Enlightenment, just as Machiavellianism, in this and other respects.

In particular, the French Enlightenment provides an exemplary case of moral politics in the idea of virtue as “necessary” in political or public, just as non-political or private, life through the motivation by and promotion of “the general or public good,” as opposed to “self-interest and personal gain,” traced back to Greek-Roman civilization and its “classical republican tradition”<sup>10</sup> (Linton 2001). In general, humanity, not transcendental God, forms the Enlightenment “locus of virtue” (Linton 2001). In particular, the Enlightenment considers Christian ideas about virtue to have a negative “political dimension” in that they dubiously claim the “futility of virtue without God,” and instead it adopts the secular “civic virtue of classical republicanism” (Linton 2001; also, Foucault 1996).<sup>11</sup> Admittedly, the Enlightenment concept of political virtue is egalitarian or universalistic by theoretically affording “anyone,” not only self-declared “Christian” Catholic and notably Puritan moral virtuosi or saints, as in the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, the aspiration to virtuous life in politics and society “regardless of their birth,” thus not being limited to “any one social class,” in contrast to the “autocratic government” of the *ancien régime* (Linton 2001).

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<sup>10</sup>Linton (2001:2) comments that “today we are acutely aware of how manipulative politicians may seek to justify violence and oppression in the name of an imposing but empty rhetoric of ‘the public good,’ ‘the general will,’ or ‘liberty and equality’ [i.e.] the idea of moral politics, the politics of virtue.” Still, admittedly “virtue in its classical sense of ‘love of the *patrie*’ or ‘love of equality’ was an essential ingredient of this political ideal [i.e.] a selfless devotion to the public good [that is] incompatible with the amassing of private wealth and the pursuit of luxury”. Linton (2001:15) also contrasts the “civic virtue of classical republicanism [as] the most explicitly political [and] egalitarian with ‘kingly and noble virtue’ as the opposite”.

<sup>11</sup>Foucault (1996:383) remarks that Christianity adopted an idea that was “completely foreign” to classical or ancient culture, namely that “every individual, whatever his age or his status, from the beginning to the end of his life and down to the very details of his actions, ought to be governed and ought to let himself be governed [i.e.,] be directed toward his salvation, by someone to whom he is bound in a total, and at the same time meticulous and detailed, relation of obedience.”

## Modern Democracy vs. Traditional Theocracy

The Enlightenment consists not only of the intellectual destruction of traditional theocracy like the medieval Christian church-state but also the creation or projection of modern democracy as (to use Ross' term) the liberal-secular "antidote" to the theocratic and other tyrannical "poison" from medievalism and traditionalism, minus classical civilization. If anything, its conceptual creation, minimally projection, of modern democracy affirms that the Enlightenment is truly what Sidgwick describes as an "innovating" movement and period of the eighteenth century, revealing the element of "creative" in its process of "creative destruction." In this sense, the Enlightenment originates as a proxy and soft democratic revolution or eventually proves so, through the French and American political Revolutions and its enduring legacy in modern democracies. In short, it is a democratic revolution of modern democracy both directly by its new radical ideal, and indirectly via its revolutionary heritage. At the minimum, it is the theoretical foundation and herald, through its theory and vision of modern democracy, of democratic political revolutions as its implementation in France, America, and elsewhere. On this account, modern democratic political revolutions in these and other societies were, if not the "daughters," then the younger "sisters" of the Enlightenment and its ideal of modern democracy and liberty generally.

Overall, modern democracies are indebted for their establishment and persistence to the Enlightenment (Byrne 1997), both directly to its ideal of democracy and indirectly to its "sister" democratic French-American political revolutions. They are more to it than to any other social factor within Western civilization and beyond, notably the medieval Christian pre-Enlightenment, including official Catholicism and the Protestant Reformation, and the conservative-fascist counter-Enlightenment, including neoconservatism and neofascism. In essence, modern democracies were established in the late eighteenth century and are sustained by the early twenty-first century primarily (not only of course) because of the Enlightenment's revolutionary vision of democracy, its realization through these democratic political revolutions, and its lasting legacy. Conversely, they were and are so in spite and vehement opposition of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, specifically theocratic medievalism and its revival from the "dead past" in authoritarian conservatism, including totalitarian fascism in interwar Europe and repressive "faith-based" neoconservatism and theocratic fundamentalism or "godly" neofascism in postwar and today's America.

For instance, modern democracy in France was established and sustained primarily because of the Enlightenment, its democratic ideal directly, its "sister" the French Revolution indirectly, and its heritage continuously. Conversely, it was in spite and opposition of the pre-Enlightenment such as the "Christian" *ancien regime*, and the anti-Enlightenment like religious-political conservatism a la de Maistre et al. This holds true with prudent *ceteris paribus* qualifications of most modern Western democracies, including those in Great Britain, Germany, and even America where the Enlightenment and its heritage has been relatively

weaker or more diluted and the pre- and anti-Enlightenment stronger and more tenacious. Thus, democracy or its proxy in modern Germany was established during the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries and maintained by the twenty-first century largely because of the Enlightenment's democratic ideals and legacies, specifically Kant's ideal of freedom (Schmidt 1996). Alternatively, it was in spite of and in opposition to the pre-Enlightenment *respublica Christiana* and counter-Enlightenment conservatism (Mann 1993) or romanticism, including fascism (Blinkhorn 2003) and neofascism. The Enlightenment or liberalism notably Hume's version, was a prime factor, conjoined with Anglicanism as less repressive and ascetic and more Enlightenment-friendly than Puritanism (Bremer 1995), in establishing or sustaining modern democracy in Great Britain (Munch 2001). Conversely, it was in spite of and in opposition to the Christian pre-Enlightenment such as English theocratic Puritanism (Zaret 1989), though subsequently somewhat "tempered" by moderate Anglicanism (Munch 2001), and Scottish official Calvinist Presbyterianism (Fitzpatrick 1999), and the conservative anti-Enlightenment, including repressive and moralistic neoconservatism like Thatcherism (Giddens 2000; Hodgson 1999).

Even revolutionary and modern democratic America is far from being a sole exception to the above rule or historical pattern, contrary to pre- and anti-Enlightenment, namely Puritan and conservative, glorified "American exceptionalism" (Dunn and Woodard 1996; Lipset and Marks 2000). Democracy, specifically its proper, Jeffersonian liberal-secular form was established in America in the late eighteenth century and has been sustained by the early twenty-first century primarily because of the Enlightenment's ideals translated by Jefferson and colleagues, though to a lesser extent than in France. Conversely, it was and has been in spite and vehement opposition of pre-Enlightenment Puritanism and its theocratic "Biblical Commonwealth" and of anti-Enlightenment conservatism, including "born again" neoconservatism and its "Bible Belt" design.

Simply, democracy in America was established and has endured primarily because of Jefferson's Enlightenment, however atypical (Archer 2001) and weak or diluted (Byrne 1997), in spite of and in opposition to Winthrop's Puritan pre-Enlightenment and his disciples, "rigid extremists" (Blomberg and Harrington 2000) or "born again" evangelicals a la Reagan and his colleagues representing the neoconservative anti-Enlightenment. Conversely, if Winthrop's Puritan pre-Enlightenment was perpetuated and prevailed over Jefferson's Enlightenment, as during the revolutionary and postrevolutionary phases, then America would have likely remained "Christian Sparta," thus tyrannical theocracy in the form of what Weber calls Calvinist Bibliocracy rather than a formally secular democracy defined by the legal "wall of eternal separation of church and state." Jefferson-Madison's Enlightenment ideas rejected and transcended Winthrop's vision of America as theocratic, austere "Christian Sparta" (Kloppenber 1998), yet a "shining city upon the hill" for US conservatives like Reagan and his colleagues. They were also primarily instrumental in disestablishing the Puritan "Biblical Commonwealth" or the Calvinist Congregational Church in New England during the mid nineteenth century (Gould 1996).



To the extent that the “born again” neoconservative anti-Enlightenment prevails over or perverts and stigmatizes Jefferson’s Enlightenment and liberal heritage, modern America moves away from Western secular democracy to a theocratic, including Islamic-style, “godly” or “faith-based” polity and society, defining American *cum* Islamic non-Western exceptionalism, and thus perversion or deviation. This is witnessed by reinventing the ultraconservative South as another Bibliocracy after the image of Winthrop’s “Biblical Garden” déjà vu as “paradise lost and found.” Recall “Bible Belt” evangelicalism and Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, Taliban regions, etc. are identified as shared theocratic “solutions” to the “evil” of secular democracy, and the “burden” and “agony” of individual liberty and personal choice, by destroying political and all liberties and choices (Bauman 1997; Friedland 2002; Mansbach 2006).

For instance, recall that comparative sociological analyses suggest that the neoconservative death penalty and generally the penal system in America is functionally equivalent (Jacobs et al. 2005) to those in Islamic theocracies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia (and Taliban-ruled regions) in terms of its frequency of execution as well as its “Draconian severity” (Patell 2001). Notably, these penal systems appear as functional equivalents in virtue of their shared religious bases and sanctifications in the Bible and the Koran, respectively. At least this shared religious grounding and justification (à la the Biblical “eye for eye,” “blood shed”) attaches to the neoconservative “tough on sin-crime” death penalty and penal system, as especially pervasive in the “Bible Belt” (Texas, the “deep South”), a theocratic or fundamentalist attribute. Consequently, this “holy” foundation subverts secular democracy and politics, notably the legal separation of church and state, in America into actual or potential theocracy after the model or image of the “Biblical Garden” as the perennial ideal since Puritanism. What analysts identify as democracy in America “moving south” and politics being placed under the “shadow of Dixie” (Cochran 2001) involves or is likely to comprise this theocratic and other authoritarian subversion of a democratic secular polity as, above all, the Jeffersonian Enlightenment ideal, product, and heritage.

### ***The Enlightenment and Liberal-Secular Democracy***

The Enlightenment is specifically the original project of liberal-secular democracy, defined by liberty, inclusion, equality, and justice in politics, including “universal rights of men” simply in virtue of being “human” (Cole 2005; Hinchman 1984) and related values and ideals. It is thus the exemplar and foundation of modern political liberalism because of a “natural affinity between the Enlightenment and liberal politics” (Schmidt 1996). To the Enlightenment, liberal-secular democracy as defined forms the only genuine and viable type of democratic politics and government in modern society of the system of political liberty. This means that the Enlightenment identifies political liberalism, including secularism, universalism, and pluralism, as the true, sole form of democratic philosophy or ideology, despite

some actual or potential discrepancies between “enlightenment” and “liberal,” as in their German versions<sup>12</sup> (Schmidt 1996). Hence, within the Enlightenment, the theory and reality of a liberal, secular, and pluralist polity and society (Munch 2001) is the ideal and genuine experience of political and other human liberty, rights, dignity, well-being, happiness, and (“joy” of) life.

In this sense, the Enlightenment considers liberal-secular democracy to be the only or most effective instrument of attaining political and other liberty and well-being, just as, via the public use of human reason a la Kant (Habermas 2001), including education in Jefferson’s sense, true enlightenment by “standards for enlightened” and free action and the “creation of properly enlightened polities and communities” (Fitzpatrick 1999). Simply due to its intrinsic liberalism, secularism, pluralism, and universalism, the Enlightenment posits and in a way predicts that modern democracy is either liberal, secular, pluralistic, and universal—or not “democracy” at all. This has proved to be a sort of prophetic prediction for modern Western and other democratic societies, as has been evident since the Enlightenment, up to the early twenty-first century. Hence, as a rule or in principle, the Enlightenment establishes the formal and substantive equivalence, minimally close connection, congruence, elective affinity in Weber’s sense, or convergence in Parsons’, between liberalism and democracy, liberal and democratic ideas and politics, though with a few certain variations and exceptions<sup>13</sup> (Artz 1998). The aggregate outcome or legacy in modern democratic societies is what Mannheim (1986) and other sociologists (Zaret 1989) call composite or fused liberal-democratic ideology and government vs. also compounded or merged illiberal-authoritarian ideas and states (Fung 2003).

For the Enlightenment, liberalism and modern democracy form a sort of logical and empirical synthesis simply go “hand in hand” as a rule or a primary liberal-democratic tendency, with secondary exceptions. In turn, anti-Enlightenment conservatism, particularly antiliberal fascism, denies, discredits, and destroys this synthesis, as American neoconservatism, including religious fundamentalism and neofascism, does by stigmatizing and assaulting, and disassociating liberalism from democracy

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<sup>12</sup>Schmidt (1996:12) proposes that despite a “natural affinity between the Enlightenment and liberal politics, many *Aufklärers* [German Enlightenment figures] were not liberals [and some] ardent liberals were by no means well disposed toward the Enlightenment [plus] was (not) assumed that political revolution was a means for advancing the cause of enlightened political reforms.” In this view, “if liberalism (was) a conception of politics that gives priority to ‘rights’ over the ‘good’ and holds that the chief end of the state is to secure individual liberty rather than to attain public happiness, then few of the leading figures in the [German] Enlightenment could be classified as liberals. Just as it was possible in eighteenth century Prussia to embrace enlightenment but eschew liberalism, so too it was possible to advocate liberalism while attacking enlightenment” (Schmidt 1996:12).

<sup>13</sup>Artz (1998:76) suggests that, for example, “there were in France three main currents of Liberal political thought. [1] The idea of a thoroughly enlightened despotism [e.g. the Prussia of Frederick the Great]. To this ideal most of the Philosophes, including Voltaire, adhered. [2] The idea of a limited monarchy as it existed in England, the type of monarchy praised by Locke and Montesquieu. [3] Democracy as expounded by Rousseau.” He adds that currents (b) and (c), “in somewhat perverted forms, were tried in the French Revolution” (Artz 1998:76).

and “American.” By analogy, to use Mannheim’s word, pre-Enlightenment medievalism as preliberal and predemocratic was a sort of “collective unconscious” about or pre-dating this fusion, thus a “stone age” in this sense. In general, this antagonism and nihilism toward the logical synthesis or historical link of liberalism with modern democracy and liberty is the essence, definition, and mission or function of antiliberalism, both its conservative “godly” and fascist and its nonconservative radical (or communist) versions. For instance, Mises (1957) remarks that the “philosophers of the Enlightenment were almost unanimous in rejecting the claims of hereditary royalty and in recommending the republican [democratic] form of government” in the specific form of liberal-secular democracy<sup>14</sup> (Biggart and Castanias 2001). Generally, he argues that modern democracy can exist and function “only within the framework of Liberalism” as the aggregate and supreme “flower” of the rationalistic Enlightenment. Arguably, modern democracy “necessarily follows from Liberalism” and hence the Enlightenment as its prime source, becoming the necessary and sufficient or sole condition of contemporary democratic politics.

Furthermore, both the theory of modern democracy *and* that of the market economy are admittedly “products of the Enlightenment” and its “flower” liberalism, with its philosophers considering the polity and the economy *not* “separately” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962), but holistically or protosociologically, as Durkheim acknowledges by calling Montesquieu and Rousseau “forerunners” of sociology. At this point, Condorcet, in addition to Hume, Kant, and Montesquieu, is invoked as the epitome for the theory of modern democracy, namely voting rules as collective procedures for reaching optimal political outcomes or rational social choices, as is Smith as the one for the conception of the free-market economy as the “system of natural liberty,” becoming political-economic proxy-heroes of public choice theory or the economics of politics (Buchanan 1991; Mueller 1997). Admittedly, such tinkers of the French Enlightenment as Condorcet treat voting as a “collective quest for truth” and devise proper rules generating optimal or “good” outcomes (Young 1997), including the “Condorcet paradox”<sup>15</sup> (Borgers 2004).

As sociological critics admit, liberalism’s “deep suspicion of any form of arbitrary government” is crucially influenced by the Enlightenment, specifically its principle of reason (Brink 2000). In consequence of such Enlightenment principles, modern democracy admittedly rejects tradition, convention, and other forms of irrational coercive (“heteronomous”) political authority as “legitimate bases of social and political order” and adopts the new liberal idea of legitimacy through government persuasion of its citizens<sup>16</sup> (Brink 2000). In Weber’s words, the

<sup>14</sup>Biggart and Castanias (2001:475) observe that “later liberal thought particularly eighteenth century works of Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as David Hume and Adam Smith moved the locus of authority away from kingly powers to the individual and the public as representative of the collective of individuals.”

<sup>15</sup>Borgers (2004:58) comments that the Condorcet paradox arises “if there are three or more” collective choices (e.g., electoral alternatives or candidates).

<sup>16</sup>Brink (2000:42) comments that the liberal idea “is that a social order is legitimate [only if] reasonable citizens of this order can be expected to acknowledge the reasonableness of the principles and norms on which it is built.”

Enlightenment principle of reason operates as the prime mover in relinquishing or undermining charismatic and traditional authority as the non- or predemocratic “authoritarian” and irrational principle of legitimacy typifying theocratic traditional societies *and* in establishing or projecting its legal-rational authority as a democratic type in modern liberal democracies (Lenski 1994). In sum, the Enlightenment’s “best” accomplishments are reportedly, first, creating a “set of minimal standards of human rights” as “morally binding” on governments and individuals; second, establishing “exacting standards” for “enlightened” individual action and the “creation of properly enlightened polities and communities;” third, integrating “religious and moral concerns” in modern society (Fitzpatrick 1999).

If these and related accomplishments and their legacies define and typify modern democracies, the Enlightenment has proven liberal-democratic “mission accomplished,” with secondary exceptions. And its critics admittedly overlook “one crucial point” in their complaints about the “loss of diversity and particularity” as imputed to the Enlightenment’s “universalizing and democratizing tendency,” because of the former already being threatened by a “far more dangerous” generalizing trend than that of the latter, such as the “burgeoning Leviathan” or absolutist state as the “haunting specter” of the late medieval pre- and especially conservative-fascist anti-Enlightenment (Fitzpatrick 1999). Furthermore, political liberty, the defining and foundational element of modern liberal, as different from illiberal,<sup>17</sup> democracies (Einolf 2007), is found to be “inseparable” from the Enlightenment’s “traditions of democracy” (Berman 2000). For instance, Kant’s explicit and Voltaire and colleagues’ implied “dare to think!,” just as Descartes’ “I doubt,” rather than appealing to sacred and political authority, form the “touchstone” of the Enlightenment and in extension of modernity, namely are at the “heart of parliamentary democracy, the Western judicial system, and of our understanding of biological evolution and the physical world” (Berman 2000). Moreover, conceivably “we” would be practically “finished” if this Enlightenment credo is relinquished (Berman 2000), of course “we” signifying modern liberal-secular democracies, and not any (particularly illiberal) antiseccular “godly” Islamic or Christian “democracies” as effectively tyrannical theocracies (“republics”).

Alternatively, from the prism and legacy of the Enlightenment, nonliberal and nonsecular democracy has been and remains a nonsequitur, inner contradiction, absurdity, or oxymoron. Thus, within this framework, “Christian” and other “godly” (Islamic), conservative, fascist, as well as communist or popular, neoconservative, and neofascist “democracies” are what Mises would call ersatz, bogus, or hollow forms of democracy. Substantively, for the Enlightenment and liberalism-secularism, illiberal, nonsecular democracy is the political system of illiberty and a “faith-based” government or church-state one of authoritarianism or totalitarianism, in particular theocracy or theocratic politics. This is shown by virtually all conservative, including fascist, illiberal, and antiseccular “democracies” as the mixture

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<sup>17</sup>In Einolf’s view (2007:107) in “illiberal democracies” political elections “occur but the other features of liberal democracy, such as minority rights, the rule of law, and an independent judiciary, are not present.”

of un-freedom with “faith,” tyranny with “godliness,” as indicated by traditional conservatism in Europe and America, then interwar Italian, Spanish, and other Catholic-based fascism, Nazism (in part). It is also indicated by American “born again” religious neoconservatism and neofascism like “Christian militia” terrorism<sup>18</sup> literally overdriven by the idea of the American state based on “Christian law and order” and thus as a “Christian Republic” and “civilization” (Juergensmeyer 2003). Predictably, the Puritan prototheocratic “governments of the early American colonies,” notably New England, grounding their constitutions in “biblical law” serve as a model and precedent for a “new kind of Christian government” in the “new nation” (Juergensmeyer 2003) hence made as old or even older than the disdained “old world” of Europe.

Yet, as Mises (1950) suggests, “democracy without Liberalism is a hollow form.” He implies antiliberal democracies are bogus, nongenuine forms, though in his negative obsession with socialism or communism (not distinguished or conflated) he vehemently opposes liberal democracy to its socialist or communist variants, overlooking or downplaying its opposition to its conservative “godly” forms as “authoritarian, illiberal” states (Fung 2003). This is a fallacy recommitted by his disciples such as Hayek and other “libertarian” economists (Buchanan 1991). Popular communist “democracy,” from the defunct Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to China, North Korea, and Cuba, converges with Christian, Islamic, and other “godly” conservative and fascist “democracies” in that it is also antiliberal. However, it diverges from them in its being secular, more precisely antireligious, though with salient exceptions like Yugoslavia and Poland during communism, in which religion was stigmatized and discouraged but not formally banned and permitted as a private matter, for example, yielding a Pope John Part II from a communist country.

In consequence, from the prism of the Enlightenment, political antiliberalism, arising out of medievalism in adverse reaction to its “child” liberal modernity, invariably operates as an antidemocratic ideology, as witnessed by authoritarian conservatism, including its monster-offspring totalitarian fascism. And it remains so, as evidenced by neoconservatism and its own product or ally neofascism. In turn, like conservatism and fascism, communism is antiliberalism, minus antisecularism, and anti- or quasidemocratic, as in the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, in part Poland and Hungary, respectively. Thus, interwar European fascism, notably Nazism, as the extreme variant of conservatism and antiliberalism (Dahrendorf 1979), in particular of the anti-Enlightenment (Habermas 2001), prefigures “all-American” neoconservatism, including neofascism a la “born again” fundamentalism (“Christian” militia, etc.), as also antiliberal and anti-Enlightenment extremism. Both German fascism and American neoconservatism have succeeded to discredit or attach a stigma to liberalism and liberal democracy as “anti-German”

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<sup>18</sup>Juergensmeyer (2003:202) remarks that “the proliferation of noninstitutional male paramilitary orders, such as the Christian militia, is a relatively recent phenomenon.”

and “un-American”<sup>19</sup> respectively, and even as “undemocratic,” just as “ungodly” or “anti-Christian.”

Conversely, American neoconservatism follows or converges with European fascism, including Nazism, in that it adopts (even without giving “credit”) and further expands original fascist and generally conservative extreme antiliberalism and anti-secularism. In this sense, there is nothing “new under the sun” of antiliberal, anti-Enlightenment conservatism, despite the prefix “neo” and its claim to novelty. To paraphrase Weber and Parsons, despite its claims to “newness” and “all-American,” American neoconservatism, including neofascism, exhibits an elective affinity or convergence with the “good old” European conservatism and fascism, notably Nazism. It specifically does in terms of extreme antiliberalism, including antisecularism, antipluralism or antidiversity, and antiuniversalism or exclusion, an antiliberal, antivoluntaristic, and anti-Enlightenment, and consequently anti- or pseudodemocratic ideology and politics.

Hence, contrary to its claims to democratic “exceptionalism” (Lipset and Marks 2000), American neoconservatism confirms what Michels would describe and in part implies as an “iron” sociological law or historical-empirical pattern. This is that antiliberalism, including the anti-Enlightenment, in virtually all societies and times has been and remains antidemocratic<sup>20</sup> (Cable et al. 2008), overtly or covertly, directly or indirectly, sooner or later (Dahrendorf 1979; Mannheim 1986). And, extremely antiliberal American neoconservatism, far from being an exception to, is the exemplary “proof” of, the law or pattern of “who says antiliberalism and anti-Enlightenment, says antidemocracy.” It is a sort of “depraved mental gymnastics” (Samuelson 1983) to claim that American neoconservative, including “reborn” fundamentalist neofascist, antiliberalism or its anti-Enlightenment is exceptional,

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<sup>19</sup>For example, in 2008 a US neoconservative presidential candidate accused his opponent for having the “most liberal voting record in [Congress] history,” while invidiously distinguishing his own “true conservative” record. The underlying ground for such neoconservative accusations is apparently that being “liberal” in politics and social life overall is “evil” or “bad,” a kind of stigma, and “conservative” is “good” (“godly”) in America, just as was in Nazi Germany, in contrast to the rest of the world, especially both Western and Eastern Europe, where liberalism and conservatism are defined in exactly opposite terms, specifically as democratic and antidemocratic, respectively (Inglehart 2004). This bizarre, yet typical, case illustrates the extent to which neoconservatism, in alliance with neofascism, in America has succeeded in discrediting and subverting liberalism, thus liberal-secular democracy, including its Jeffersonian version, as “un-American,” a success evoking, if not modeling after, that of Nazism that also discredited and destroyed this democratic ideal of the Enlightenment (e.g., the Weimar Republic) as “anti-German.” So, for the Enlightenment and its liberal-secular legacy, US and other neoconservatives and neofascists are just (Sen’s inverted) “irrational fools” proud of what most others in modern democracies are ashamed of (antiliberalism and the anti-Enlightenment) and to that extent threatened with eventual extinction or vegetative existence, as has largely happened in democratic societies, just as their medieval theocratic role models or ancestors (in this case, Puritans primarily) embodying the pre-Enlightenment *ancien regime* have become an “extinct species.”

<sup>20</sup>Cable et al. (2008:398) remark that “events since the 9/11 terrorist acts, however, suggest increased discursive containment and a corresponding antidemocratic trajectory. The establishment of a Department of Homeland Security conjures eerie images of police states.”

like America itself, *cum* democratic or “libertarian,” while, in an invidious ethnocentric distinction, that of the “old” European conservatism and fascism (and communism) is not, thus for the first time ever in Western and all human history. It is an Orwellian antilogic, absurdity, or “double talk,” typical of US “reborn” neo-conservatives and neofascists as would be “future dictators of an Orwellian universe” (Collins 2000), to “reinvent” political democracy and human liberty – and even humans as “natural born” conservative Americans – as if the latter commenced with them, from a sort of “theater of absurd.” This is what has near-universally, minimally in Europe, been considered an extreme, paradigmatic anti-democratic and antiliberty ideology and politics, namely conservative-fascist extreme antiliberalism, including the anti-Enlightenment.

From the prism of the Enlightenment vision and legacy of liberal-secular democracy, antiliberal neoconservative or evangelical “faith-based” democracy in America is as genuine, so “all-American,” and viable in the long run among Western democracies as are “Islamic” and were European conservative and fascist “Christian” and communist “democracies.” It is in a way asymptotically close to the zero degree. It is a sort of “impossibility theorem” (Arrow 1950) or contradiction of the reality of liberal democracy and society (Munch 2001), despite fanatical conservative efforts to perpetuate “godly” politics after the model or image of fundamentalist, medieval-rooted millennialism (Giddens 1984), specifically its Puritan version (Kloppenber 1998), and Nazism a la the “one thousand year Biblical Garden,” etc. Jefferson and other Enlightenment-inspired US founders and their disciples would predict that such a conservative “all-American” perversion of Enlightenment-based liberal-secular democracy as “un-American” ultimately “cannot stand,” including the constitutional separation of church and state perverted by the design, if not reality, of yet another “Biblical Garden” in the South and beyond. This is witnessed by the observed “terminal condition” (Eccleshall 2002) of neoconservatism in Europe, including Great Britain (original Thatcherism), and its crisis, discredit (“neo-cons”), or setback even in America during the early twenty-first century, as incidentally indicated or heralded by the 2008 elections, though they and their “liberal” aftermath may provoke another resurrection of conservatism from “death” or conservative counter-revolution and future political victories in the manner that the 1960s did, just as the advent of Enlightenment-based liberalism acted as the agent provocateur of the rebirth of arch-conservatism from the ashes of medievalism (Mannheim 1986).

### ***The Enlightenment and Modern Democratic Revolutions***

As indicated, the Enlightenment is not only a generalized Copernican cultural revolution, but also the underlying, direct or indirect, source and inspiration of modern liberal-democratic and egalitarian revolutions or radical political changes in Western societies. Notably, it provides the direct or indirect impetus for the French Revolution as what Pareto calls its “daughter,” including the liberty, equality, and

“universal rights” of humans, though he and some other analysts do not fully accept, or even reject such a revolutionary connection. At the minimum, this impetus is possible or potential, even if, as sometimes supposed, not fully and openly realized, by virtue of the fact that the Enlightenment represents an axiomatic cultural and intellectual or “soft,” and the French a paradigmatic political and violent, revolution. The first revolution preceded the second, or both occurred in the proximate time period, the mid-late eighteenth century, from the perspective of the *long durée* of centuries or shorter Kondratieff waves of 50–60 years.

Conversely, even in the absence of compelling, manifest historical evidence for such a link between the two revolutions – which is not the case – it would be sociologically unrealistic or “antisociological” to claim that the prior type of revolution do not have a significant impact on the subsequent. It would be so in light of, besides the time-framework, the interdependence of social phenomena and changes, in this case initial cultural and successive political radical change (Byrne 1997), as an established sociological proposition since the time of Comte and Durkheim. Hence, the Enlightenment’s direct or indirect impetus or inspiration to the French Revolution, as respective cultural and political revolutions or radical changes can plausibly be assumed or cannot be ruled out on theoretical sociological grounds. More importantly, it has been largely confirmed, or not fully negated by historical evidence (Artz 1998; Byrne 1997; Hinchman 1984; Linton 2001) despite some dissenting views (Garrard 2003; Schmidt 1996). In summary, it would be a sociological equivalent of miracle if the French and even American democratic Revolution was not to some degree influenced by the Enlightenment and its vision of democracy, and occurred in a social-cultural vacuum, a sociological nonsequitur for these and similar “liberal” revolutions (Moore 1993). At least, as Mises (1957) disapprovingly observes, the ideas and writings of the Enlightenment philosophers in France as well as Great Britain crucially “actuated” the French Revolution.<sup>21</sup>

As observed, during the late eighteenth century, the Enlightenment’s heretic idea (“indecent proposal”) that humans are endowed with liberties and rights “simply by virtue of being human” succeeded in strongly influencing political ideas and practices, “most notably in the American and French Revolutions” (Hinchman 1984). Reportedly, the “burden of proof” remained on those Enlightenment philosophers, including Kant, Voltaire, Montesquieu and Hume, defending the “idea of universal human rights” and liberties because of European and other societies persisting for 1,000 years, as during the fourth to eighteenth century AD, without any “system of abstract” liberty and right being incorporated into their “laws and customs” (Hinchman 1984). As also recognized, the Enlightenment’s ideas and their dissemination in society tend to have relevant “political and social, as well as religious, repercussions” (Byrne 1997), including those for the French and in part American

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<sup>21</sup>Mises’(1957:378) full statement is: “The British and French philosophers whose writings actuated the French Revolution, and the thinkers and poets of all Western nations who enthusiastically hailed the first steps in this great transformation, foresaw neither the reign of terror nor the way Babeuf and his followers would very soon interpret the principle of equality.”



Revolutions. By implication, to exclude the French and even American Revolutions from these sociopolitical “repercussions” of the Enlightenment is not only a sociological nonsequitur but a historical error, because this period is “not a time of intellectual detachment” but “inevitably” involves “practical concerns,” both political and nonpolitical<sup>22</sup> (Byrne 1997). To that extent, the Enlightenment is a movement and period with revolutionary or radical political consequences in general, even if assuming its particular impact on the French and especially American Revolutions being inconsequential or “invisible,” which is incorrect as shown below.

Furthermore, pertinent historical evidence indicates that the Enlightenment (as a cultural innovation) operates as the direct, manifest, and even what Schumpeter would call the prime mover of the French and to a lesser extent American political Revolutions, just as technological and other invention does in modern capitalism. At least in terms of the sociological “Thomas theorem” (Merton 1995), that is the social definition or construction of the situation or reality of the French Revolution. Simply, it is the prevalent experience or perception of the latter, both by its liberal revolutionary agents and by its medieval-conservative enemies, and their respective descendants (Artz 1998; Byrne 1997; Garrard 2003). In short, the near-consensus on both sides, for opposite reasons of course, is that the Enlightenment forms the driving force of the French and to a lesser extent American Revolutions.

For instance, reportedly conservatives à la de Maistre and Burke condemned the French Revolution for the “spread of the Liberal and Radical ideas of the [Enlightenment] *Philosophes*,” while their liberal or radical counterparts regarded the Revolution as the “result of abuses in the Old Regime” (Artz 1998). Consequently, the French Revolution is deemed a sort of inevitable outcome of both factors, the Enlightenment “programs of reform” and old-regime “abuses.” In particular, the “influence” of the Enlightenment philosophers is manifest and salient on the Revolution’s “political, educational, and religious policies” from its beginning to its completion, for example of Montesquieu, notably his conception of separation of political powers (La Porta et al. 2008), on the Constitution of 1791 and Rousseau on that of 1793 (Artz 1998). In summary, Enlightenment ideas manifestly and strongly influenced the “political, religious, social, and educational acts” of the French Revolution, with even their influences being “very marked in the course of events of the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries” (Artz 1998).

As also observed, medieval-rooted conservatives like de Maistre and Burke found and condemned an “unquestionable connection” between such Enlightenment principles as “universal reason, individual rights, liberty of thought, and political innovation” and the French Revolution as their attempted realization (Byrne 1997). For example, while vehemently attacking the French Revolution and Enlightenment

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<sup>22</sup>Byrne (1997:xi) suggests that the Enlightenment “was not a time of intellectual detachment [but] inevitably tied to practical concerns, such as how to live a good life, how to reconcile traditional religious belief with new scientific discoveries, what to make of the strange new cultures which were being discovered around the world, how to organize society so that people of different religious persuasions could live together in peace.”

ideas, becoming a role model to conservatives and “libertarians” a la Hayek et al., Burke reserved “excessive praise” for the “aristocracy and clergy” (Schmidt 1996) as the emanation and vestiges of the feudal *ancien regime* the disappearance of which he almost tearfully deplored, as did in a more sensible way another aristocrat, Tocqueville (Parsons 1967a). As critics recognize, in France and Europe overall, its “supporters and opponents” alike share a “widespread agreement – if not actual unanimity” that the French Revolution represents the continuation and completion of liberal-democratic tendencies initiated by the Enlightenment (Garrard 2003). In short, the observed or assumed “connection” between the Enlightenment and the French Revolution has ever since reportedly become “so familiar” (Schmidt 1996).

At the minimum, the Enlightenment constitutes the indirect or latent ideological source and inspiration of the French Revolution, as well as other liberal or “bourgeois” revolutions (Moore 1993), including in part the American in its Jeffersonian rendition or interpretation. In other words, it operates as the main determinant or prime mover, if not as the initial cause, at least the precipitating intellectual factor and precedent of this political revolution. Alternatively, the French Revolution represents an indirect or latent attempt at institutional realization of the Enlightenment, notably its ideals of “universal reason, individual rights, liberty of thought and political innovation” (Byrne 1997), as Burke, de Maistre, and other reactionary conservatives in Europe lamented. This in a way holds for the American Revolution in its Jeffersonian rendition, though probably to a lesser extent if the Enlightenment forms supposedly an even more indirect and secondary influence on it (Byrne 1997; Kloppenberg 1998) than on its French counterpart, in spite of Jefferson and colleagues directly exposed to and inspired by Paris’ Enlightenment and its salons (Artz 1998; Garrard 2003). For instance, the French Revolution attempts to realize indirectly or “unconsciously” (in the sense of Mannheim’s “collective unconscious”) through its actions and institutions the ideas of Voltaire, Condorcet, Rousseau (if deemed their colleague rather than a Calvinist adversary), and Montesquieu. Also, the American-Jeffersonian version does so, especially with respect to the ideas of Montesquieu (Artz 1998), joined with Hume and other British figures or precursors (e.g., Locke) of the Enlightenment, against the opposition by official Calvinism or theocratic Puritanism (Baldwin 2006; Bremer 1995; German 1995). An example is the French Revolution’s declaration and institution of “Universal Rights of Men” also cited by Weber, notably “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” as well as the American-Jeffersonian revolutionary formulation of “liberty and justice for all,” as the quintessential ideal and legacy of the Enlightenment.

Minimally, the French Revolution is what Dahrendorf (1979) calls a “delayed and distorted effect” of the Enlightenment and its liberal-democratic and egalitarian ideals, though he implies more immediate and clearer or stronger links between the two. Specifically, he suggests that such a minimal impact applies to the American Revolution using a “delayed and distorted effect” to describe the “application” of Montesquieu ideas (*the Spirit of the Laws*), particularly separation of power, to the US revolutionary Constitution. Beyond this minimalist supposition, the French, if

not American, Revolution is an almost instantaneous and nearly pure or undistorted political outcome of these ideals as its logical intellectual foundation and inspiration within the *long durée* of the eighteenth century. It is so given what Weber would call an “elective affinity” or “intimate connection,” a sort of “natural” synthesis, of the Enlightenment as axiomatic political liberalism and liberal revolution or democracy.

The preceding reportedly indicates a “natural affinity” of the Enlightenment with liberal politics and revolutions in general, making the “connection” between the first and the French Revolution in particular “by now so familiar,” though their relationship is described as “troubling” during the 1790s (Schmidt 1996). An invoked instance is Kant’s “paradoxical stance” toward the French Revolution by opposing revolutions “on principle,” yet considering this special case as “evidence of the moral improvement” of human society, as evidenced in the “achievement of a republican form of constitution” (Schmidt 1996). Generally, for reactionary conservatism à la aristocratic Burke and de Maistre (“the Right”), the Enlightenment becomes a “synonym for a political naïveté with murderous consequences” through the French Revolution and other liberal revolutions, while rationalistic and egalitarian liberalism (“the Left”) views this Age of Reason as expressing the “unfulfilled dream of a just and rational society” (Schmidt 1996).

As critics also register, Enlightenment philosophers and their ideas are “often associated” with the French Revolution, including the “bitter hatred of the clergy,”<sup>23</sup> though this association is seen as debatable (Byrne 1997). Admittedly its agents and followers embraced and believed in the “Enlightenment ideals of reason, toleration and education” during and following the French Revolution in the aim and hope of creating a future political and social system in the form of liberal-secular democracy “better than the rule of the old regime” (Byrne 1997). Yet it is argued that the French Revolution, specifically the “outbreak of the postrevolutionary ‘terror,’” marked a “decisive end” of the Enlightenment, a “definitive close” of its hopes for a “more reasonable and just society” in France and Europe overall (Byrne 1997).

Such arguments construing the French Revolution as a violent deviation from rather than the realization of Enlightenment liberal-democratic ideals are typical of ethnocentric American and other “Anglo-Saxon” conservatives (Dunn and Woodard 1996; Lipset and Marks 2000) since Burke’s British-aristocratic and “godly” condemnation. Such arguments ignore or downplay the French Revolution’s attempted realization or lasting legacy of “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” “universal” human rights, including citizenship rights and expanded life chances (Dahrendorf 1979), and democracy (Habermas 2001), thus a “more reasonable and just society.” They neglect or “forget” the “bright side” of the Revolution, as a paradigmatic example of liberal-democratic and egalitarian revolutions (Moore 1993) and a “springboard for modern conceptions” (Linton 2001) of democracy

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<sup>23</sup>However, (Byrne 1997:2) objects that the influence of the Enlightenment philosophers on the French Revolution is disputable and even that since most of them “were reasonably conservative politically, they would most likely have been horrified by events in the 1790s [dead by then].”

and politics, overstating its excesses or “dark side.” While extolling the American Revolution as pure from any excesses or “dark side,” they overlook what critics from Hegel to neo-Marxist critical theory admit as the “good-bad” dialectics of the Enlightenment and by implication the French Revolution as its “daughter” or its “delayed and distorted effect.” In doing so, US critics overlook that the American Revolution can also be and has been subjected to critical scrutiny detecting a “dark side” or excess too, from slavery to repressive “sedition laws” (Hull 1999; Lipset 1996), as can and have any Western liberal-democratic revolutions revealing a “Janus-face” in this sense admittedly typifying the West as a whole (Duverger 1972).

At this juncture the main question or dilemma is evidently whether or not a “direct relationship” existed between Enlightenment ideas and the French Revolution (Linton 2001). Admittedly, while the French Revolution proves the “springboard” for modern democratic and political ideas, its “revolutionary” conceptions derive from the Enlightenment “context” of the eighteenth century, with, for example, Robespierre’s “basic understanding” of (virtue in) politics traced to “Enlightenment thought” (Linton 2001). Particularly influential in the French Revolution are reportedly Holbach-Helvetius’s “theoretical models” of human society as governed “not by God but by virtue” in the sense of “doing good to others” (Linton 2001). Notably, in the generation of the French Revolution Enlightenment effective or implicit “radicalism and egalitarianism,” as implied in its idea of civic virtue, reportedly culminates into an “explicit language of political rights” (Linton 2001) and liberties defining modern democracy. Admittedly, at the minimum the French Revolution is more influenced, even if indirectly, by the Enlightenment “egalitarian rhetoric of civic virtue” than by the “Christian doctrine of equality of souls”<sup>24</sup> (Linton 2001) as, from the liberal-secular viewpoint, what Dahrendorf (Dahrendorf 1979) calls “deceptive egalitarianism.” The outcome is the seemingly “paradoxical relationship” between Enlightenment ideas of “universal happiness, selfless citizenship” and the “often violent realities of revolutionary politics”<sup>25</sup> (Linton 2001).

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<sup>24</sup>Linton (2001:18) comments that “it did not, however, follow that a speaker who enlisted the rhetoric of virtue must have radical and egalitarian sympathies – just as the Christian doctrine of equality of souls did not make all Christians political democrats.” Linton (2001:209) points to “the terrible power of a language of moral politics, its capacity to bring power to those who defined themselves as “moral” and to destroy those deemed the enemies of virtue (i.e.,) the power of rhetoric in revolutionary politics (“there were words that saved and words that killed”).” In this account, “one consequence of the [Jacobin revolutionary] Terror was the subsequent discrediting of the rhetoric of political virtue. (In England), Burke led the thunderous attack on the principles of “universal benevolence” and his chief target was Rousseau, although these principles had originally stemmed from his countrymen [e.g., Bolingbroke, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson]” (Linton 2001:212).

<sup>25</sup>Linton (2001:203–4) adds that “one of the ironies of the Revolution is that it was initiated by members of the highest-ranking nobility even though the rhetoric at its heart, the rhetoric of virtue, was antiaristocratic,” which derived from the Enlightenment and thus affirmed the influence of the latter on the former. In turn, Linton (2001:208) argues that “only a small minority of active participants in the early stages of the Revolution were directly influenced” by philosophers like Montesquieu, Rousseau, etc., and generally the “men of the late 1780s owed an intellectual debt to a much wider body of ideas than the Enlightenment narrowly defined.”

Yet arguably, this paradox has commonly been observed in modern liberal-democratic revolutions as US ethnocentric conservatives allege, including not only the French Revolution but also the American variant and its sequels like the Civil War as a revolution on its own right (Moore 1993) and in part antisegregation and other civil rights movements of the twentieth century. As an instance of such a relationship, the Enlightenment idea of civic, as opposed to Christian, virtue became “enshrined in the Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen” (“virtues and talents”) as the “self-conscious and defiant statement” of the French Revolution (Linton 2001). Other instances included the Revolution’s adoption and incorporation of such Enlightenment ideas and conceptions as the new idea that the ultimate aim of politics or the state is promoting the “happiness” of humans for which purpose political powers are expected to act with “virtue,” as well as the concepts of “popular sovereignty” and the “general will,” though causing some “confusion and uneasiness” during early revolutionary years (Linton 2001). Such Enlightenment ideas, minimally the radical notion that the state should promote human happiness, rather than inhumane suffering, oppression, humiliation, and punishment as before, objectively renders the French and, in part, American, Revolution Pareto’s political “daughter” of its cultural equivalent or precedent, though in a “serendipitous discovery” or unintended inference (Linton 2001).

## The Political Legacies of the Enlightenment

### *The Legacy of Political Liberties and Human Rights*

As noted, the Enlightenment bequeathed crucial and enduring political legacies in modern democracies. Alternatively, the constitutive values and institutions of modern democracies essentially reflect and continue its political legacies, and thus realize or embody its original ideals of the “good,” as distinguished from “godly,” state and society as a whole. By assumption and in reality, the Enlightenment’s lasting political legacies in modern democracies are liberal, secular, pluralistic, and thus democratic, just as egalitarian, universalistic, humanistic, and cosmopolitan or transnational in interaction and mutual reinforcement. They hence reflect its integral liberalism, (project) of democracy, secularism, pluralism, egalitarianism, universalism, humanism, cosmopolitanism or globalism, and interrelated ideals, including religious freedom and tolerance. (Table 5.1 summarizes the political and related legacies of the Enlightenment.)

These ideals and legacies render the Enlightenment a substitute or proxy political revolution and thus creative destruction in politics. Notably, the project of liberal-secular democracy is a truly revolutionary idea or radical proposition (ungodly “indecent proposal”) within medieval Christian and other “godly” politics, from the fourth to the eighteenth century. And it remains such as the Enlightenment ideal and legacy, in an anti-Enlightenment, conservative “faith-based” polity and society, as

**Table 5.1** Political and related legacies of the enlightenment

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Political liberalism
Liberal-democratic polity
Secularism
Pluralism
Egalitarianism
Universalism
Humanism
Cosmopolitanism
Others, including religious freedom and tolerance

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in America under neoconservatism and most Islamic states. In this sense, the Enlightenment forms a prototypical “velvet” political revolution both with its original ideal of liberal democracy in the midst of the *ancien regime* of theocracy. It does so via its subsequent liberal-democratic legacy vis-à-vis theocratic anti-Enlightenment conservative states like “Christian [evangelical] America” and Islamic Iran and Taliban regions, from the eighteenth to the twenty-first century.

This continuing revolutionary nature of the liberal-democratic legacy, like the ideal of the Enlightenment sheds a new light, or rather darkness, from its prism on neoconservative revolutions or fundamentalist “born again” revivals in America and their Islamic counterparts such as the Islamic “Revolution” in Iran, Taliban Afghanistan, etc. Namely, it reveals them as effective counter-revolutions in the sense of restorations (Bourdieu 1998) of the “dead past” of medieval theocracy or “godly” politics as “golden,” or “paradise lost” in typically conservative adverse reaction and selection essentially against the Enlightenment’s liberal-democratic legacy. The latter is manifested in modern liberal-secular revolutions or processes like those occurring in the 1960s and continuing and expanding globally through the 2000s (Inglehart 2004). At this point, contemporary evangelical and Islamic “revolutions” or revivals arise as anti-Enlightenment counter-revolutions via restorations of the pre-Enlightenment, including the neoconservative “Revolution” (1980s–2000s) in America and Great Britain as the counter-Enlightenment (Habermas 1989a). This also holds true of the “Great Awakenings” in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century America as the theocratic or fundamentalist “counter-offensive” (Foerster 1962) against Enlightenment secularism, liberalism, and rationalism, as well as of the Nazi “Revolution” as the extreme counter-Enlightenment (Habermas 2001). Generally, virtually all conservative, including religious Christian, Islamic, and other fascist, neoconservative and neofascist “revolutions” have been and are likely to be, in one way or another, anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal counter-revolutions. They have been so from the eighteenth to nineteenth century Great Awakenings to the twentieth to twenty-first century evangelical revivals in America, the Nazi-fascist “revolution” in interwar Europe to neoconservative and neofascist, as well as Islamic, “revolutions” in contemporary societies. This suggests that conservatism, including both religious fundamentalism and fascism, and the anti-Enlightenment overall has typically tended to define and

condemn the Enlightenment as a genuine political revolution in its liberal-democratic ideals and legacies alike, and consequently to act as a permanent counter-revolution against them.

In summary, with its ideal of liberal-secular democracy, the Enlightenment initially is and remains a proxy, “soft” political revolution through its equivalent legacy defining and constituting modern democracies. Alternatively, it represents a sort of permanent agent provocateur, unwitting producer of antiliberal, antidemocratic conservative, notably theocratic and fascist, “hard core,” including violent, counter-revolutions as revolts against the Enlightenment and its liberal-democratic ideals and legacies, and as restorations of the medievalist pre-Enlightenment. In particular, its legacies in modern democracies involve the Enlightenment’s lasting legacy of universal or comprehensive, as opposed to particularistic or selective, political liberty and human rights as well as well-being, inclusion, equality, and justice. This legacy reflects, continues, and realizes Enlightenment liberal, universalistic, egalitarian, and humanistic ideals. This Enlightenment legacy of liberty, rights, justice, life, and happiness “for all” à la Voltaire, Kant, Hume, and Jefferson represents the definitional and foundational value and institution of modern democracies thus defined by and premised on its liberal, universalistic, and egalitarian ideals. At least on the account of this heritage, modern democracies are primarily the “children” or heirs of the Enlightenment. They are in the sense of being reproduced by or descending more from the latter than any pre- and anti-Enlightenment social force, including medieval Christian, Catholic and Protestant alike, “godly” politics and the conservative also “faith-based” polity à la the US neoconservative government, as respectively theocratic and theocentric, thus essentially illiberal, antidemocratic forces.

The Enlightenment legacy thus consists of a liberal-democratic, secular, and humane state or government as the very institution promoting and protecting universal political and civil liberties, rights, inclusion, equality, justice, well-being, life, and happiness. Hence, its legacy is a type of political organization that is the institutional basis and defender of modern democracy, as well as human liberty, well-being, happiness, and life, simply most “natural” to or compatible with a democratic, free, and humane society. In this sense, the modern liberal-democratic, secular, and pluralistic state, including limited government, is the “child” of the Enlightenment more than of anything else, including the medievalist pre- and conservative anti-Enlightenment characterized with pre- and antiliberal, pre- and non-democratic, theocratic and antiseccular, and absolutist and antipluralistic political institutions with virtually unlimited power, respectively.

As observed, the Enlightenment’s initial project and enduring political legacy is a “liberal, democratic state” aiming to promote human happiness “among a diverse number of groups” (McLaren and Coward 1999), expressing its intertwined blend of liberalism, humanism, pluralism, and universalism or egalitarianism. Furthermore, as the heritage or outcome of the Enlightenment, admittedly the modern liberal state evolves “in many respects” in a major “protector, rather than a potential opponent” of human liberties and rights in virtue of serving as a “court of last resort” for individuals and groups whose rights are eliminated or menaced by, as in America

under conservatism, “biased laws and institutions” and “large private organizations” (Hinchman 1984). In particular, its continuing legacy in modern democratic states has been that the Enlightenment minimally delineated limits as “red zones” beyond which modern states would violate “universally accepted norms” (Fitzpatrick 1999) of democracy. One of these universal norms is that that of popular sovereignty, involving self-governance and active participation in “democratic, representative governance,” as primarily the product and subsequently legacy of the Enlightenment liberal or bourgeois “critiques” of traditional society and politics (Langman 2005).

The preceding expresses the Enlightenment’s general element and heritage of integral political liberalism as the principle and system of universal liberty, equality, inclusion, justice, well-being, life, and happiness in polity and society, and thus the intellectual foundation and rationale of modern liberal democracies and societies. Following Mannheim’s link between the two, most contemporary, both liberal and conservative, analyses emphasize liberalism’s “Enlightenment inheritance” (Patell 2001) and see liberals as “heirs of the Enlightenment” (Bellamy 1999) in contrast to conservatism’s, including fascism’s, pre-Enlightenment heritage in medievalism. To the extent that modern democracy (as Mises suggests) is only genuine and sustainable with, and “hollow” and unsustainable, as is dictatorship for opposite reasons, in the *long durée* without, political liberalism, or simply liberal, it is first and foremost the heritage of the Enlightenment as the paradigmatic liberal-democratic project. Hence, modern democrats are above all the heirs of the latter, as shown in America by Jefferson and colleagues whose democratic ideals and practices were inherited from Paris and then articulated and implemented in Philadelphia’s Enlightenment, though stigmatized or derided by Puritan paleoconservatives (Byrne 1997; Gould 1996; Patell 2001) in the way contemporary liberalism has been attached a stigma (the “L-word”) by neoconservatism starting with Reaganism and via successful indoctrination of most Americans since the 1980s.

The link of Enlightenment-based liberalism and democracy, and conversely of antiliberalism and nondemocracy, holds true as a proxy “iron” sociological law or historical pattern in virtually all Western democracies and periods, spanning from revolutionary France and America to contemporary European and other Western societies, from the late eighteenth to the early twenty-first century. In turn, US “democratic” neoconservatives claim an exception to the rule by disassociating democracy and democrats from the Enlightenment and liberalism overall condemned and stigmatized as “un-American,” and instead associating them with the anti-Enlightenment and antiliberalism as “all American,” as do Islamic fundamentalists in Iran, Taliban regions, etc. Therefore, both groups seek to create their own counter-Enlightenment and antiliberal “democracies” and/or “republics.” Both antiliberal groups may have succeeded in “disconnecting” most Americans and Muslims from, or dissuading them in, this association between democracy and liberalism, and conversely nondemocracy and antiliberalism, a sociological equivalent to restoring the “flat earth” dogma or the belief in “witches” and related superstitions from the Dark Middle Ages. Yet, they are the two strongest and most persistent perversions or deviations in this respect among modern societies (Inglehart 2004), specifically US neoconservatives within Western democracy



(Lipset 1996; Munch 2001), and their Islamic functional equivalents in the world. Thus, their shared illiberal, theocratic American and Islamic exceptionalism confirms rather than contradicts the rule or pattern of a liberal-democratic Enlightenment-rooted synthesis and its obverse.

Unlike US neoconservatism and Islamic fundamentalism, even interwar fascism, including Nazism (as well as communism), did not succeed or even try to discredit, but instead acknowledged, this liberal-democratic synthesis to eventually destroy it and establish totalitarian rule. And it did so by acting as the extreme counter-Enlightenment (Habermas 2001) and antiliberalism (Dahrendorf 1979), just as do US neoconservatism and Islamic fundamentalism. In consequence, fascism did not discredit, as instead neoconservatism, especially Reaganism, has done by its strikingly successful indoctrination of most Americans, the original and continuing synthesis of modern democracy with the Enlightenment and liberalism overall. It also confirmed the opposite link implied in the “law” of liberalism and democracy, the fusion of totalitarian and other undemocratic politics with the anti-Enlightenment and antiliberalism. At least interwar fascists, notably the Nazis, were brutally honest in destroying both Enlightenment liberalism *and* democracy. By contrast US neoconservatives and neofascists and Islamic fundamentalists claim to reinventing “democracy” or “republic” *without* Enlightenment liberalism, as anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal “democracies.” This is a degree of honesty, or conversely hypocrisy, that appears as the only or main difference between European fascism and American neoconservatism, including fundamentalism and neofascism. Fascists (and to a degree communists) were sincere in that by destroying Enlightenment liberalism they effectively destroyed political democracy as its ideal and legacy (Blinkhorn 2003). In contrast, both US neoconservatives and Islamic fundamentalists claim that their destruction of the first through their anti-Enlightenment and antiliberalism results in reinventing true “democracy” or “republic.” In the process they make most Americans and Muslims, as in Iran and even in part Turkey, believe this “depraved mental gymnastics” via their respective apparatuses of indoctrination and propaganda.

German and other interwar fascism, Russian and Chinese communism, US neoconservatism, and Islamic fundamentalism specifically all have “proved” that the Enlightenment and liberalism overall is “hostile” or “foreign”: “anti-German,” “anti-Russian” and “anti-Chinese,” “un-American,” “anti-Muslim,” respectively. Still, fascists and communists have failed and even not tried, and only US neoconservatives and Islamic fundamentalists succeeded to “prove” that Enlightenment liberalism yields “false” democracy and nondemocratic outcomes a la “big” or “tax-and-spend” liberal government in America, as in neoconservatism’s accusations. However, this celebrated anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal, yet “democratic” conservative American *cum* Islamic exceptionalism does not contradict but confirms the “rule” that modern democracy has been and remains primarily the Enlightenment liberal project and legacy, by making America the “striking” major “deviant case” (Inglehart 2004) in this sense among Western democracies.

The preceding also indicates that the Enlightenment entails the original ingredient and bequeathed the enduring legacy of democratic political rationalism in

interconnection and mutual reinforcement with those of liberalism, secularism, and individualism. A salient expression of Enlightenment political rationalism is what Weber calls legal-rational authority, as a democratic method of legitimizing power and domination, typifying modern liberal-secular Western and other democracies (Lenski 1994). The Enlightenment's, notably Condorcet's, voting rules and procedures for attaining majority decisions or rational social choices (Mueller 1997), eventually free and fair elections in politics and beyond, exemplify its democratic political rationalism, in particular legal-rational authority or the "rule of law" and other "rules of social games" regulating modern democracies (Dahrendorf 1979). Then, what Hayek et al. (but not Mises as more moderate in this respect) vehemently reject on "democratic" and "libertarian" grounds as the French Enlightenment's "constructivist rationalism" turns out to be truly democratic and liberal. It does so by forming the theoretical (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) and legal, as via legal-rational authority, foundation of modern democracy and free society overall. Hence, Enlightenment liberalism's symbiosis (Popper 1973) of political rationalism with democracy and liberty exposes this rejection as the "libertarian" monumental "fallacy of misplaced concreteness," as a symbiotic legacy in modern democracies specifically of market absolutism (Hodgson 1999) reducing a democratic polity and free society overall to the "spontaneous order" of capitalism or "free markets" (Tilman 2001).

Furthermore, Weber's ideal type of legal-rational authority as the formal principle of legitimacy in modern democracies is, first and foremost, the innovation and heritage of the Enlightenment. First, it is so directly because of the Enlightenment's ideal of democracy and liberal-democratic, as distinct from authoritarian or repressive, including conservative-fascist and communist, rule of law. Second, it is as Weber suggests, indirectly through its "child," liberal polity and modernity, or modern political liberalism and rationalism (Habermas 2001). In virtue of its direct and indirect innovation of legal-rational authority in the form of the liberal-democratic rule of law and other rules for "social games," the Enlightenment is truly Sidgwick's "innovating" movement and time, and in this sense an example of Schumpeter-style invention in politics.

In turn, Enlightenment political rationalism profoundly differs from and transcends pre-Enlightenment, including medieval, political irrationalism or traditionalism. Such irrationalism was expressed in charismatic and traditional authority, including their merger via the Weberian "routinization of charisma," as the "authoritarian principle" of legitimation typifying premodern and predemocratic, largely despotic, societies (Lenski 1994), notably medieval Christian, both Catholic and Protestant, and other (Islamic, etc.) theocracies. Alternatively, legal-rational authority as a democratic principle of legitimacy is an illogical non sequitur and empirical nonentity or unknown in these societies, especially theocracies, as Weber observes for economic and political traditionalism like feudalism and patrimonialism. In aggregate, in virtue of destroying or discrediting charismatic and traditional authority as the old political structure and inventing or designing its legal-rational variant as the new, the Enlightenment operates as Schumpeter-style creative destruction in politics.

At this juncture, what in legal-formal terms defines the Enlightenment and its “child” liberal-secular democracy and modernity is precisely legal-rational authority by contrast to and transcending the pre-Enlightenment and traditionalism generally defined by its irrational and authoritarian antithesis, charismatic and traditional types. This is also in contrast with and opposition by the counter-Enlightenment, in particular conservatism (including fascism). Thus, conservatism aims at restoring charismatic and traditional authority separately or jointly, just as the pre-Enlightenment overall, and at destroying or subverting and abusing their legal-rational version. This nihilism is driven by conservatism’s original and persistent imperative, embraced and intensified by its monster-child fascism, that, as Michels (1968) registers and predicts, democracy “must be eliminated” by all available means, ideally by the “democratic way of the popular will” like free elections, etc., as conservative-fascist allied forces succeeded in interwar Europe and in part America during McCarthyism and neoconservatism. In this sense, conservatism, including fascism, whenever in power seeks and succeeds to eliminate or subvert democracy by using Weber’s legal-rational authority like free elections, or the democratic rule of law to eventually destroy or pervert it. This was witnessed in Germany following Nazism’s formally legitimate electoral victory in 1932 and in part America, especially Florida, in the 2000 Presidential “Un-election” (Hill 2002) to be redressed only 8 years later.<sup>26</sup>

The above contrast and opposition epitomizes the Enlightenment’s political rationalism as essentially liberal-democratic, and thus truly libertarian (*pace* Hayek et al.) vs. the pre-Enlightenment’s irrationalism and the counter-Enlightenment’s antirationalism as basically pre- and anti- or quasidemocratic, respectively. The aim is not to establish and “prove” that political rationalism generally is typically democratic with variations involving abuses, and conversely irrationalism or antirationalism, in particular charisma and tradition, authoritarian, as Weber implies (also, Popper 1973) and Jefferson suggests linking rational education with democracy, thus more or less established. Rather, it is that the Enlightenment’s original element and enduring legacy is political rationalism and consequently democracy and individual liberty.

Hence, one can acknowledge, although not totally embrace as do skeptical sociologists, the “political rationality, individualistic and democratic traditions” of the Enlightenment (Smelser 1992), even if invoking some unrepresentative cases (e.g., Locke as a largely pre-, and Rousseau as an almost, anti-Enlightenment case). Notably, this implicitly recognizes the Enlightenment’s and liberalism’s connection of political rationalism with individualism and democracy, at least what Weber and Parsons may call their elective affinity and convergence. This contradicts Hayek et al.’s forceful but deeply misguided antirationalistic attack on Enlightenment “constructivist rationalism” as antiindividualistic and nondemocratic.

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<sup>26</sup>One could imagine the future outcomes, simply the neoconservative incumbent wining indefinitely, if residency was not limited to two terms, as partly indicated by similar problems or controversies in the 2004 election.

In particular it acknowledged Kant's Enlightenment principle and legacy of religious liberty, tolerance, and pluralism in modern secular and democratic Germany and Europe overall. This is expressed in his view that preventing or suppressing the "criticism" of "holy" ideas "in books and articles" by the state's "coercive power" is "absolutely impermissible," even though particular confessions demand from their members strict conformance to a "fixed set of doctrines" (Schmidt 1996). In short, the Kantian Enlightenment's legacy is reportedly multiconfessionalism in Germany and Europe substituting for its monistic theocratic antecedent, the medieval Catholic and Protestant *respublica Christiana* (Nischan 1994). Kant's ideal of religious liberty, tolerance, and pluralism is shared by most Enlightenment thinkers, precursors, and disciples, notably Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu, Condorcet, Hume, Hobbes, and Saint Simon, with a few "logical" exceptions, like Calvinist-theocratic Rousseau and Puritan-intolerant Locke, acting as anti- and pre-Enlightenment cases, respectively. Furthermore, this ideal is inherited in modern liberal-secular democracies to become their constitutive value, except in part for America under religious conservatism due to, for instance, its medieval-style burning and/or banning<sup>27</sup> critical "ungodly" and "immoral" books, up to the late twentieth and early twenty-first century (Hull 1999).

### ***The Legacy of Religious Freedom, Tolerance, and Pluralism***

In particular, Enlightenment-based religious, moral, and related "spiritual" liberty, tolerance, and pluralism joined and mutually reinforced with their political forms, are established and sustained as given values and institutions or parameters within which modern Western democratic societies operate since the late eighteenth century through the twenty-first century (Dombrowski 2001). If anything, what distinguishes these societies from nondemocratic, non-Western, especially Islamic, countries is the presence and salience of religious-moral freedom, tolerance, and pluralism in the former and their absence or weakness in the latter. Needless to say,

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<sup>27</sup>For instance, an ultraconservative, evangelical US governor and then vice-presidential candidate was reported urging identifying and banning "ungodly" and "immoral" books from public libraries in, of all places, Alaska on the seeming assumption that the latter may with such "ungodliness," contaminate "Christian America" as a whole. This is not an isolated case, but just a symptom of a sort of "method in the madness" (Smith 2000) of neoconservatism which, as Hull (1999) shows, has banned and seeks to ban thousands of "blasphemous" and "indecent" books from US libraries, especially those in the "Bible Belt" (Texas, etc.), thus continuing, like in other respects, the tradition of Puritanism and in extension the Dark Middle Ages, as well as interwar Nazism, all sharing such practices. If anything makes American neoconservatism, in particular "born again" evangelicalism, like Nazism, an exemplar of the anti-Enlightenment, it is banning and even, as Hull (1999) shows, burning such books, as during McCarthyism, just as this practice made medieval Catholicism and Puritanism alike cases of the pre-Enlightenment.

except for fundamentalists or theocrats in Islamic countries and America, especially the “Bible Belt,” without genuine religious-moral freedom, choice, tolerance, and pluralism, the concept of political democracy and human liberty and life is hardly worth, as in American and Iranian “republican” constitutions, the constitutional paper on which it is printed. Without these Enlightenment ideals, democracy effectively degenerates into theocracy *cum* “godly politics” and “faith-based” state. This is witnessed in Islamic theocratic “democracies” or “republics” like Iran, Taliban-ruled regions, and even legally secular Turkey’s state growingly attacked and subverted by Muslim fundamentalists in recent times. In America it is also shown during “reborn” religious neoconservatism, minimally the theocratic “Bible Belt” as the political design and system of Weber’s Calvinist, specifically Baptist, Bibliocracy.

Alternatively, genuine and full, as distinguished from spurious and partial, religious-moral freedom, choice, tolerance, and pluralism define and constitute liberal-secular democracies as the only valid or most coherent and sustainable form of modern political democracy. In turn, they contrast with and transcend illiberal, antiseular “Christian” and “Islamic,” just as nonreligious communist, ersatz “democracies” or “republics” as anything but democratic and even republican in the classical sense, which enforce un-freedom, intolerance, and absolutism, at most permitting spurious and partial “liberties,” “toleration,” and “pluralism,” in religion and morality. Hence, in *democratic* terms, liberal-secular democracy is as Mises implies, the only genuine, viable reality or Weberian ideal type. Conversely, there is *no* such thing as illiberal, antiseular “Christian” and “Islamic” (plus nonreligious communist) “democracy,” in spite or rather because of various historical and persistent attempts to (re)invent the latter as a “godly” ersatz-substitute for such an “ungodly” polity. For example, this is what even Puritan Locke realizes by stating that “there is no such thing as a Christian Commonwealth” (Zaret 1989) in spite or rather because of Puritanism’s creation of “Biblical Commonwealths” in England and New England, following Calvinism’s Bibliocracy in Europe and emulating Catholicism’s medieval *respublica Christiana*.

Like their other differences, this salient difference between modern democratic and undemocratic societies is to be primarily attributed to and explained by the victory and heritage of the Enlightenment in the first, and its defeat by or weakness in relation to the pre- and anti-Enlightenment like medievalism and conservatism in the second, particularly Islamic countries, with the rare yet growingly threatened exception of Turkey. In factor-analytic terms, religious and moral, just as political and all, liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism in modern Western democracies “load” on (express) the Enlightenment, and their opposites in nondemocratic states on the medieval pre- and conservative anti-Enlightenment. Alternatively, the Enlightenment is the “unobservable” and often seemingly forgotten variable underscoring or accounting for these observable religious and moral values and institutions or indicators in modern democracies, just as the pre- and counter-Enlightenment are so with respect to the opposite observables in their undemocratic counterparts.

The above expresses the historical and present evidence that religious, moral, and related tolerance, freedom, choice, and pluralism or “competition” in contemporary

Western and other democracies are primarily the ideal and legacy of the Enlightenment (Dombrowski 2001; Kaplan 2002). In turn, they are only secondarily or not at all the heritage of the pre-Enlightenment such as medieval Christian politics, including official Catholicism and the Protestant Reformation, and the anti-Enlightenment, as in conservative “faith-based” states, including the US government under neoconservatism. Like its other ideals, this Enlightenment ideal is embraced and implemented, and its legacy expanded, by secular and democratic political revolutions such as the French and American in a Jeffersonian construction. In this sense, these revolutions objectively, latently, or indirectly develop as Pareto’s “daughters” of the Enlightenment ideal of religious, moral, and other tolerance, freedom, choice, and pluralism. A major difference between the two is that the French Revolution develops, as he puts it, “anti-Christian” and antitheocratic, thus as total creative destruction, as its adversaries and critics, from Maistre and Burke to Tocqueville lamented. In turn, the American Revolution develops as the “Christian” revolution specifically, as Comte describes it tracing it to the Calvinist “disciplinary revolutions” in Holland and Great Britain (Gorski 2003), “Protestant” (Byrne 1997; Dunn and Woodard 1996; Kloppenberg 1998), yet nontheocratic, a major deviation from Winthrop’s Puritan theocracy as the “Bible Commonwealth” primarily due to Jefferson’s Enlightenment-inspired “ungodliness” (Gould 1996). Thus, Jefferson as well as Madison admittedly repudiate Winthrop’s Puritan vision of America as theocratic “Christian Sparta” in favor of secular democracy (Kloppenber 1998) legally defined by the constitutional “wall” of separation of church and state, crucially contributing to the “disestablishment” of the “Bible Commonwealth” in America during the early nineteenth century. Hence, the initial difference between the French Revolution as “anti-Christian” and the American Revolution as “Christian” pales by comparison with the shared antitheocratic project and eventual outcome that both revolutions objectively realize and expand this Enlightenment ideal and legacy of secular democracy superseding theocracy or “godly” politics.

Counterfactually, without the Enlightenment and the realization and extension of its ideals and legacies by secular political revolutions and institutions, modern Western and other democratic societies would remain in or return to the Hobbesian state of nature in the sense of intergroup and intersocietal, not merely interindividual, as in Hobbes’ original conception, conflict, war, and anarchy. What is “counterfactually” or hypothesis for the present and the future has almost invariably been “factually” or reality in the past of these societies during the pre- and anti-Enlightenment. In particular, without the Enlightenment, modern democratic societies would remain in or revert to universal wars of religion of “everyone against everyone” in the sense of every religious group and society against all others. They would persist or descend in a state of permanent religious persecutions, conflicts, wars, and tensions, notably what Kant and Simmel call the “holy” war of extermination, thus genocide, unrestrained by any rules, just as they were during the pre-Enlightenment, including the Dark Middle Ages and the Reformation and the counter-Reformation (Dombrowski 2001; Kaplan 2002). For instance, the Enlightenment and liberalism generally primarily contributed

to ending or mitigating fraternal Catholic-Protestant “holy” wars within Christianity in the aftermath of the Reformation and counter-Reformation in Western Europe, including modern Holland (Kaplan 2002) and Northern Ireland (Dombrowski 2001). This also applies to violent conflicts within Protestantism itself, like those between theocratic Calvinists and moderate Lutherans in Holland (Kaplan 2002), Prussia (Nischau 1994), and of extremist, ultra-ascetic Puritans against nonascetic Anglicans in Great Britain (Fitzpatrick 1999) and America.

Overall, the Western and entire world would likely remain in Comte’s theological age and theocratic-military regime of domestic and global crusades and jihads in the absence, failure, or weakness of Enlightenment ideals and legacies rather than overcoming or mitigating such “holy” wars through liberalization, secularization, rationalization, and democratization. These processes are observed in most Western and other democratic societies, with the “striking” yet unsurprising deviation of America during neoconservatism (Inglehart 2004), notably “born again” religious fundamentalism, as essentially the anti-Enlightenment *déjà vu* (Habermas 1989a; Juergensmeyer 2003). Conversely, the Western and whole world would remain in the age of crusades in the sense of “holy” cosmic wars and related religious violence (Juergensmeyer 2003) as long as the pre-Enlightenment perpetuated itself indefinitely and/or the counter-Enlightenment prevailed in opposition to the Enlightenment. This is what happened in America in part during its post-Jeffersonian period and especially neoconservatism, a “deviant case” among modern Western democracies, and in most non-Western, particularly Islamic, states. Hence, the counterfactual hypothesis has or is likely to become a plausible prediction predicting a factual outcome.

The scenario of permanent “holy” war within- and across-society has precisely materialized in those societies stamped with prevalent pre- and anti-Enlightenment, especially Islamic and militant Christian, notably Protestant<sup>28</sup> (Juergensmeyer 2003), values, legacies, and influences. This holds true in part of America due to the political “predominance” (Lipset 1996) and superior social “prestige” (Jeness 2004) of Protestant fundamentalism cum evangelicalism, as reestablished and even expanded in recent times (Lindsay 2008), and sectarianism as in essence the strident theocratic, thus antidemocratic, form of the anti-Enlightenment in relation to the Enlightenment. The fundamentalist anti-Enlightenment seeks and succeeds, as in the “Bible Belt,” to revive from the dead the Puritan pre-Enlightenment that

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<sup>28</sup>Juergensmeyer (2003:157) registers that in Christianity “warfare has not just been relegated to religion’s legendary histories [but] intricately related to its contemporary symbols” and Protestantism is an “example.” Namely, “Protestant preachers everywhere [encourage] their flocks to wage war against the forces of evil, and their homilies are followed with hymns about ‘Christian soldiers,’ fighting ‘the good fight,’ and struggling ‘manfully onward.’ [In] modern Protestant Christianity the ‘model of warfare’ [is] one of the most enduring. [For Protestantism] ‘Christian living *is* war’ [as] a ‘literal fact.’ The images of warfare in Protestant Christianity situated the faithful in a religious cosmos that inevitably had a moral valence”.

“stamped” America with a “set of conservative values”<sup>29</sup> (Dunn and Woodard 1996). It does via antiliberal, antisectional, and antipluralist culture and military wars and revivals, tendencies virtually unknown in Western democracies with stronger and more enduring Enlightenment legacies (Munch 2001; Singh 2002).

The above scenario completely applies to Islamic theocracies like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Taliban-ruled regions, and others in which the Enlightenment has been virtually unknown or rejected as “Western” and the pre- and anti-Enlightenment almost always reigned supreme and undisputed. Turkey is a salient nontheocratic exception among Islamic states, but precisely because it was “Westernized” by adopting and implementing Enlightenment secular-democratic ideals, yet opposed by revived fundamentalist Muslim forces, thus confirming rather than contradicting the rule. It is no wonder that one can observe the persistence of domestic and global religious wars or crusades and jihads respectively (“jihadic politics”) in those societies in which Enlightenment ideals and legacies are weak or missing compared with the pre- and anti-Enlightenment. Above all, these societies are predictably America under neoconservatism among Western democracies and Islamic theocracies (Turner 2002), in particular the evangelical “Bible Belt” and theocratic Iran (Bauman 1997).

In summary, counterfactually paraphrasing Comte and Spencer, without the Enlightenment’s ideals and legacies of religious-moral freedom, choice, tolerance, and pluralism or “competition,” modern Western and other societies would remain in or revert to the “theological age,” notably the “theocratic-military” system or “militant society” rather than evolving into rationalist, secular, and economically advanced industrial democracies. And factually, they almost invariably have done and do whenever and wherever such Enlightenment ideals and legacies have been and are weak or absent vs. the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, as partly witnessed in America during its post-Jeffersonian and neoconservative phases, and completely in Islamic theocracies like Iran.

### ***The Enlightenment vs. Intolerance and “Holy” War***

In retrospect, the Enlightenment provides a paradigmatic diagnosis and prediction alike of the inherent or ultimate warlike, militaristic nature of most religion, thus “holy” war as its initial tendency or eventual outcome, exemplified by crusades in Christianity, jihads in Islam, and their functional equivalents in virtually all world

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<sup>29</sup>In a celebratory mode, Dunn and Woodard (1996:84) state that “Puritanism was the dominant political and intellectual force in the new nation through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John Winthrop [et al.] stamped the nation with a set of conservative values which emphasized respect for the established order, leadership by the favored few, the importance of community, and a preference for gradual change.” They infer that America’s “national institutions and values were influenced by Calvinism more than Deism, by the Reformation more than the Enlightenment, and by the revolution in England more than the revolution in France” (Dunn and Woodard 1996:84).



and local religions. In this sense, it rediscovers, after the Renaissance's implicit and related heretic diagnoses, and reveals to society that the theocratic "holy" emperor "had no cloths" with respect to wars of religion, and thus mutual annihilation, just as tyranny. This is the discovery and revelation of an equivalent or precursor of MAD (mutually assured destruction) as the result of a nuclear war of extermination (Habermas 2001; Schelling 2006), via a "preemptive strike," by "godly" and so "good" America (Holton 1987) against the "ungodly" and "evil" world (Russia, China, etc.). For the Enlightenment, self-destructive and thus fanatical, irrational wars are inherent to most religion because of its observed intrinsic sectarian or, in Madison's words, factional closure, exclusion, discrimination, intolerance, aggressiveness, destructiveness, and militancy against out-groups condemned as "ungodly" or "infidels," thus eliminated with a sacred rationale or perfectly "good conscience," as in Puritanism and Islam.

Alternatively, the Enlightenment posits and predicts that these defining elements of most religion (will) eventuate, sooner or later, in a "holy" war of extermination between opposing religions or sects within them, with each claiming to be the only "true" and "godly," condemning and seeking to exterminate on sacred grounds all the others as "false" and "ungodly." Simply, this is the long story of most religion cut short by the Enlightenment, the perpetual reciprocal war of extermination or MAD as the rule, not an exception, in the historical origin and development of world and local religions. Hence it rediscovers and reveals most religion, particularly theocratic and militant world religions like evangelical crusading Christianity, including early Catholicism and the "new" Protestantism, and fundamentalist jihadic Islam, as the formula and path of Kant's total war of extermination between "true believers" and "infidels," insiders and outsiders, simply as US evangelicals put it, "people like us" and "people not like us" (Lichterman 2008), aiming at and resulting in a genocide of the latter (Angel 1994). It reveals the supposed religious "cure-all" as turning into the poison of human life and liberty, including, as Ross implies for American Puritanism, democracy, theological "heaven" into "hell in this world," as in Tawney's expression used for Puritan theocracy, a sort of "recipe for social disaster."

At least that is, for better (its liberal heirs) or worse (its conservative enemies), the Enlightenment's notably its French version's new definition and construction of the social effects of religion, performing or anticipating a sort of (post) modern "deconstruction" of traditional faith and "godly" politics typifying the *ancien regime*. In general, the Enlightenment identifies, reveals, and emphasizes (correctly or incorrectly) the "dark side" of religion or sacred (and political) power (Artz 1998) and minimizes, deconstructs, and deemphasized its "bright side" more than did any intellectual movement in the Christian world through the eighteenth century. As usual, the Renaissance is the major historical precursor, and Hobbes, Spinoza, Bacon, etc. the individual precursors, of the Enlightenment in this respect.

Thus Voltaire, while not an atheist but a deist, observes that religion "is not a brake, it is on the contrary an encouragement to crime [for] all religion is founded

on expiation.” In his view, “natural religion can suffice against solitary and secret crimes; but positive religion has no brake for crimes committed together with others. Religion even encourages them; it blesses a hundred thousand men who are going to slaughter each other.” Further, Diderot contends that “everywhere a God is admitted, there is a cult; wherever there is a cult, the natural order of duties is reversed and morals corrupted. Sooner or later, there comes a moment when the notion that has prevented the stealing of an ecu causes the slaughter of a hundred thousand men.” Also, Holbach alongside Helvetius, probably the only major declared atheist or the “personal enemy of God” within the French Enlightenment, categorically argues that religion “was and always will be incompatible with moderation, sweetness, justice, and humanity.”

Even Calvinist (and briefly Catholic) Rousseau occasionally expresses his misgivings about what he sees as the inherent theological intolerance and theocratic tendency of religion, specifically of traditional Christianity, including both official Catholicism and Calvinism ruling his native Geneva. He concedes that theological-religious and civil-political intolerance are “inseparable” because “it is impossible to live in peace with people who one believes are damned [and] to love them would be to hate God who punishes them [and hence] they must absolutely be either brought into the faith or tormented.,” as the Calvinist dogma of predestination cum salvation vs. damnation commands. Admittedly, as he put it, “wherever theological intolerance exists, it is impossible for it not to have some civil effect; and as soon as it does, the Sovereign is no longer Sovereign, even over temporal matters. From then on, Priests are the true masters; Kings are merely their officers [which defines] a Theocratic Government.” Rousseau implies that official Catholicism and Calvinism alike practice “theological intolerance” and establish a “Theocratic Government.” This is demonstrated by Catholic and Calvinist theocracies, including the Vatican and Poland, as his pristine ideal (alongside Corsica!) *and* his native Geneva, respectively, although Rousseau occasionally embraces theocracy or disapproves it less than “intolerance,” thus overtly opposing most Enlightenment figures, particularly Voltaire, as well as Diderot and Hume.

The Enlightenment positively creates an open, tolerant, liberal-secular, peaceful or pacifist “antidote” to the self-destructive “poison” of closed, intolerant, aggressive, or militant religion in general, notably tyrannical theocracy and religious total wars of mutual extermination and genocide. In particular, given its social context, this Enlightenment antidote is designed to cure such “poisonous” tendencies and outcomes in official Christianity, including Catholicism and Protestantism, especially theocratic Calvinism in Europe and its derivative Puritanism in Great Britain and America. In Mises’ (1950) words, the Enlightenment provides the cure for Christian institutions or churches that have petrified since their official establishment during the last days of the Roman Empire, in the image of the “peace of the cemetery” as instituted and enforced by Catholic and Protestant or Calvinist-Puritan theocracies. As early US conservative sociologist Ross intimates, the Jeffersonian Enlightenment (Patell 2001), through secular democracy as its political outcome or project, provides an “antidote” to what he admits as “Puritan tyranny”

and in that sense undemocratic “poison” in America described as the “lineal descendant” of Puritanism.<sup>30</sup>

Generally, the Enlightenment creates its “antidote” to the self-destructive “poison” and “sword” of intolerant, theocratic, and warlike religion, through its foundational liberal concept and practice of true religious liberty or freedom of conscience, hence toleration, and pluralism or “competition.” For instance, in 1682 Bayle stated that a “society of atheists would perform civil and moral actions as much as other societies do,” because man “almost never acts in accordance with his principles,” religious or other, though most Enlightenment figures, including Voltaire, did not advocate atheism but instead “natural religion” or deism and were not atheists rather deists. Overall, the Enlightenment postulates “no significant difference” in moral terms between the “godly” conduct of “Christians” and the “ungodly” behavior of nonbelievers, thus reconsidering individuals’ religious beliefs as “simply irrelevant” to their actual actions seen as a “function of their passions and temperament, not their professed convictions” (Garrard 2003).

The Enlightenment admittedly ushers in the “democratization of conscience” and the “concomitant development of natural rights demands for toleration and liberty of conscience” (Fitzpatrick 1999). Specifically, it reportedly displaces the “religious dimensions of conscience” regarded as dubiously equated with or derived from “godliness” by an emphasis on the “moral conscience,” and created a “liberal public sphere” as the social space for freely discussing ideas and cultivating truth,<sup>31</sup> notably viewing toleration in religion in a “positive light”<sup>32</sup> (Fitzpatrick 1999). Hence, the Enlightenment acts as a “moralizing force” stressing the individual’s “moral conscience” largely autonomous from religion and maintained religious tolerance “close to the top” of its program by recognizing that (as Paine put it) such and other spiritual freedoms are at the “root of political liberty” (Fitzpatrick 1999).

In virtue of democratizing conscience as the “natural law” found in all humans, like other universal “laws,” the Enlightenment reportedly entails the “beginnings of the movement toward toleration based on religious conscience” in Europe, along with the Protestant Reformation (McLaren and Coward 1999). Yet, compared with or from the prism of the Enlightenment, the Reformation is found to be as “dogmatic

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<sup>30</sup>Ross claims that democracy in America has “worked together” with Puritanism, thus providing “its own antidote.” Alas, this claim becomes a sort of non sequitur by his admitting of “Puritan tyranny” as long as “democracy” and “tyranny” are as mutually exclusive or opposite as “heaven” and “hell” even in the “exceptional nation,” and only can work “together” in an Orwellian dystopia or fantastic polity driven by the medieval Christian “fantasy of salvation” (Giddens 1984) often (as observed for modern US Calvinists) through judgment day annihilation of the “evil” world and oneself in the manner of apocalyptic, mostly Puritan-inspired, sects and cults in America (Adorno 2001).

<sup>31</sup>Fitzpatrick (1999:54) adds “from the midcentury [eighteenth century] there was a powerful trend within the Enlightenment to trust the ‘inner voice’,” invoking Rousseau and Kant.

<sup>32</sup>Fitzpatrick (1999:56) comments that the Enlightenment also accepted the “claims of the religious conscience” in accordance with its attempt and the ensuing trend to “emphasize the enlightening of conscience as a means of combating enthusiasm.”

and intolerant” as official Catholicism (Dombrowski 2001). As observed, especially Calvinism when and where, as Calvin in Geneva, Calvinists in Holland, etc., attained power “soon” established its political rule “just as repressive of individual differences as the old Roman orthodoxy,” with this intolerance targeting a large variety of “infidels,” from Roman Catholics to dissenting “reformers” (e.g., Servetus in Geneva) and non-Christians and nonbelievers as “entirely outside the bounds of tolerance” (McLaren and Coward 1999).

Even “liberal” Locke, in expressing his inherited Calvinism, placed Catholics, non-Christians, and atheists as “entirely outside the bounds of tolerance” on sacred and moralistic grounds, thus essentially limiting it to Protestants and more narrowly Puritans like himself, simply to “people like us,” thus perverting it into intolerance for all of “them.” Locke’s solution was ersatz-tolerance, “anything but” (as Americans would say a “joke”), and on this sociological basis, apart from the chronological criterion of living in the late seventeenth century, he was a pre- rather than a true Enlightenment philosopher, contrary to received views. Apparently he was unable or unwilling to fully free himself, unlike, coincidentally, Franklin from his father’s Calvinism, specifically Puritanism pervaded by, in Mill’s words, “fanatical” moral-religious and political intolerance. In turn, Mill observes that Puritanism, whenever and wherever becoming powerful or dominant, as in England and New England, manifested its “fanatical” intolerance by suppressing “all” human liberties as well as “amusements.” Hence, contrary to the claim to be an exception to the rule, Protestantism, notably Calvinism and its sect Puritanism, admittedly continued and confirmed the “all too common” historical “pattern” of religious groups “victims of repression by the state and orthodox religion” becoming incapable or unwilling of freeing from “intolerance themselves” (McLaren and Coward 1999).

The underlying reason for the difference in tolerance between the Enlightenment and the Protestant Reformation, like Catholicism, is their different treatment of the relationship between religious and political power, church and state. The Enlightenment reportedly regards church as “separate from but subordinate” to state, though “useful” in preserving “social and moral order” (McLaren and Coward 1999). By contrast, the Reformation, especially Calvinist theocratic “disciplinary” revolutions (Gorski 2003), subordinate state to church as dominant in the form of medieval *Civitas Dei* exemplified in Calvin’s Geneva (Frijhoff 2002), just as official Catholicism had done. In short, the Enlightenment’s solution to the long-standing problem of church-state relations is secular democracy establishing tolerance, and that of the Reformation, just as of Catholicism, theocracy practicing intolerance. From the stance of the Enlightenment, no pertinent political and sociological differences exist between Catholicism and Protestantism, in spite of their theological and religious differences, as especially emphasized by the latter. An exemplary instance of the Protestant pre-Enlightenment or medieval-like solution to state-church relations is Calvinist-Puritan “godly politics” with its intrinsic political and religious intolerance (Zaret 1989).

In virtue of its “comprehensive” liberalism, including pluralism, it is the Enlightenment that envisions and allows religious liberty, tolerance, and pluralism,

“rather than anything” that the “Catholic Church or Luther or Calvin” have done (Dombrowski 2001; Kaplan 2002). In particular, the French Enlightenment admittedly advocates “greater religious tolerance,” with Voltaire as a notable example advocating that “atheists should be tolerated” and that atheism is “less disastrous than fanaticism”<sup>33</sup> (Garrard 2003), contrary to both his friend-turned-opponent Calvinist Rousseau and Puritan Locke. The preceding demonstrates that the Enlightenment’s and generally liberalism’s ideal and legacy is genuine, complete, and undivided religious freedom, tolerance, and pluralism. Conversely, it exposes their spurious, partial, and mutilated forms in Calvinism/Puritanism, just as Catholicism, thus Calvinist-Puritan inherent negations or “built-in” limitations with respect to true religious liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism, contradicting the opposite claims of European Calvinists and English-American Puritans, and their descendent and admirers.

In a comparative-historical setting, the Enlightenment delegitimizes and supersedes the pre-Enlightenment in terms of religious liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism or “competition.” It does the latter’s typical intolerance, un-freedom, and absolutism, at most spurious and limited toleration, freedom, and pluralism, as in the Protestant Reformation and Locke’s Puritan “solution,” in religion, as what Weber and Schumpeter call the traditional or old religious-political, essentially theocratic, structure. Alternatively, it creates or designs and legitimizes genuine and full liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism in religion and politics, as the modern, new religious-political, essentially democratic, structure. This joint process evidently epitomizes Schumpeter’s definition of creative destruction through substantial invention and thus revolution or radical change. In this sense, the Enlightenment constitutes the process of creative destruction or a truly innovating movement particularly in the realm of religion and, given its pre-Enlightenment “godly” merger with politics. It is a genuine yet peaceful revolution in religious liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism, in contrast to the Protestant Reformation as a limited and violent or intolerant “reform” in this sense (Means 1966), as Luther, Calvin, and even Puritan “liberal” Locke show. Hence, it functions as Hayek’s deplored “terminator” of traditional religious-political institutions, notably the Dark Middle Ages of un-freedom, intolerance, and absolutism in religion and politics, and as the creator of their modern alternatives defined by opposite principles and practices.

Although in doing so, the Enlightenment acts, or rather is construed by its enemies as the *agent provocateur* of the anti-Enlightenment. The latter specifically

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<sup>33</sup>In passing, unlike once-Catholic Rousseau, Puritan Locke denied tolerance not only to atheists or non-Christians seen as “incapable” of moral judgment and conduct but also to Christian Catholics in England as “foreign” papists. Locke hence effectively reduced his celebrated religious “toleration” and “liberalism” to Calvinist Puritans, at most all Protestants, thus to “believers,” “insiders,” simply “us,” vs. “infidels,” “outsiders,” or “them.” This is a clear illiberal syndrome because of denying to others what one demands for oneself, religious liberty, typical of Calvinism (Kaplan 2002), which admittedly makes Locke’s ideas a far cry from the Enlightenment and liberalism overall (Fitzpatrick 1999), contrary to received opinion in the sociological and other literature (Smelser 1992; Zaret 1989).

comprises religious-political conservatism, overtly or covertly attempting to restore the ex ante condition of pre-Enlightenment intolerance, un-freedom, and absolutism, or at most limited toleration, freedom, and pluralism, particularly their medieval Catholic and Protestant forms, in religion and politics. In this respect, overall, the Enlightenment and liberalism by its revolution or innovation provoke anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal, notably conservative, including fascist, counter-revolutions against religious and political, liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism. They are the restorations of the pre-Enlightenment, specifically medieval Christian opposites or substitutes of political, liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism, reflecting medievalism as the “model” for conservatism and its “good” *cum* “godly” society (Dunn and Woodard 1996; Nisbet 1966).

In aggregate terms, the Enlightenment becomes not only the willing “terminator” of the medieval pre-Enlightenment, but also the unwilling agent provocateur of the conservative anti-Enlightenment in terms of religious freedom, choice, tolerance, and pluralism. Both outcomes reveal its nature as a genuine “velvet” revolution in religion as well as politics and all society. In summary, the Enlightenment (re)creates or ushers in genuine religious tolerance, liberty, choice, and pluralism as its intended innovation (manifest function) and in the process provokes the anti-Enlightenment’s conservative counteraction and “mindless battle” (Habermas 2001) against its creation, as the unintended effect (latent function). Thus, Mises (1957) suggests that for the Enlightenment and generally classical liberalism as its “flower,” “nothing could be less compatible with true religion than the ruthless persecution of dissenters and the horrors of religious crusades and wars.” He explicitly refers to the medieval “Christian Church,” Catholicism and Protestantism alike, including the “holy” Inquisition and its proxies as well as Catholic vs. Protestant “fraternal” wars of extermination in the wake of the Reformation, as in France, Germany, Holland, England, etc., and in part spanning into the twenty-first century as in with a diminishing intensity, Northern Ireland (Dombrowski 2001). He notably implies that without the moderating impact and legacy of the Enlightenment’s liberal ideal of religious freedom, tolerance, and pluralism, the “ruthless persecution of dissenters and the horrors of religious crusades and wars,” such as those between “believers” and secular “infidels,” Christian and non-Christian religions, Catholicism and Protestantism, would have continued in modern societies. This outcome is also what modern analysts (Dombrowski 2001) explicitly suggest.

Conversely, the implication is that whenever and whenever this Enlightenment impact has been absent or weak in relation to the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, these practices have continued or resumed, with certain variations and adaptations. This is witnessed by what sociologists primarily identify in America during neoconservatism, as perennial and “futile” moral-religious culture wars (Bell 2002; Lipset 1996) or domestic and foreign proxy crusades, and their Islamic hostile analogs (Juergensmeyer 2003) through “jihadic” politics and jihads (Turner 2002). Hence, one may infer that the absence or weakness of the Enlightenment and its “flower” liberalism, and the presence or power of the medieval pre- and conservative anti-Enlightenment, help to understand or shed light on what are seemingly incomprehensible and puzzling culture wars or proxy crusades unique to America among

Western democracies (Singh 2002), just as “jihadic” politics and jihads in Islamic states. In particular, this duality helps to comprehend the US “Bible Belt”<sup>34</sup> and fundamentalist Iran, as, from the prism of Western liberal-secular democracies, incomprehensible protototalitarian realities or designs of theocracy vs. democracy and human freedom overall (Bauman 1997).

To indicate that the Enlightenment is a revolution or genuine innovation in religious liberty, choice, tolerance and pluralism recall that “at the beginning” of the Age of Reason the idea of toleration in religion was not common and institutionalized but “profoundly contested” and “rarely implemented” (Fitzpatrick 1999). In turn, the Enlightenment’s innovation in religious liberty and tolerance consisted in its “universalization” of the freedom of conscience by “de-Christianizing” and freeing it from its “cultural constraints” (and emphasizing “natural” religion or deism), while provoking resentment among its opponents and critics<sup>35</sup> (Fitzpatrick 1999). As also observed, pre-Enlightenment *ancien régimes* were effectively theocracies as “confessional” states defined by the doctrine that church and state were “intertwined,” such that rulers had a divine right to rule and mission to accomplish in society through strict religious and political control alike over their subjects and “thou shall” belong to “one confession” (Fitzpatrick 1999). In turn, the Enlightenment primarily contributes to weakening these doctrines in the eighteenth century with its “contractarian notions” of the state to which church became “subordinated,” in the view that religion, while “useful” in maintaining the moral-social order, should be governed by “state needs and demands,” and its “enlightened jurisprudential” ideas of religious issues as an “inappropriate area of concern for the criminal law” (Fitzpatrick 1999). As an alternative to the pre-Enlightenment coercive and punitive treatment of such spiritual issues, the Enlightenment grounds religious liberty or freedom of conscience in an “interior conviction” resistant to any “amount of coercion” (Fitzpatrick 1999) and punishment on sacred or political grounds *à la* in the name of “God and Kingdom.” Particularly, the Protestant Reformation reportedly generated or contributed to, first, an “immense amount of confessional and civil strife;” and second, the “dominant view” in post-Reformation and generally pre-Enlightenment European societies and America that religious and social peace could be maintained only by “uniformity of religion within a given territory” rather than by toleration rejected as bringing “conflict” (Fitzpatrick 1999). And it is the

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<sup>34</sup>In a striking irony, self-declared (classical) liberal Mises, originally Weber’s student and Austrian economist, has been immortalized, of all places in America and the world, in the Southern “Bible Belt” (Alabama) as a fervently and proudly ultraconservative antiliberal and antiseccular region through a “libertarian” economic institute, i.e., in a region that is anything but “libertarian” in noneconomic, including political, religious, or cultural, terms, and closer to theocratic Iran than to democratic Europe (Bauman 1997). This is analogous to canonizing, say, skeptical (deist) Voltaire in the Vatican or Calvinist Geneva, and “infidel” Hume in Scotland’s official Calvinism (Presbyterianism).

<sup>35</sup>Fitzpatrick (1999:54) adds that for the Enlightenment the “assertion of the infallibility of conscience chimed in with the growing feeling that the old world of *ancien régime* Europe was corrupt and that it could be reformed by the assertion of the natural rights of conscience.”

Enlightenment that primarily overcomes the condition of imposed uniformity and lack of toleration in religion through its principle of full and genuine religious liberty, choice, pluralism, and tolerance<sup>36</sup> during post-Reformation times, and not, as usually claimed and assumed, the Protestant Reformation, instead perpetuating this state of affairs. Admittedly, in stark contrast to rather than anticipation of, the Enlightenment, the Protestant Reformation did not “immediately” establish a “state of toleration and liberty” but instead committed “many cases of intolerance and bigotry,” exemplified the “burning of Servetus by Calvin” in Geneva as the “classic case” (Means 1966).

The preceding suggests that genuine religious liberty, choice, pluralism, and tolerance are established, or alternatively un-freedom, uniformity, and lack of toleration overcome among modern Western societies because first and foremost of the Enlightenment and its original ideals and enduring liberal, pluralist, and tolerant legacies. Conversely, they are established and overcome respectively not because of, but rather in spite of, and in vehement opposition by the pre-Enlightenment, specifically Christian and other medieval “godly” politics, including not only official Catholicism but also the Protestant Reformation, as well as of the conservative anti-Enlightenment like “born again” religious neoconservatism, notably fundamentalism.

On this account, the ideal of religious liberty, choice, pluralism, and tolerance represents a true innovation and in that sense “Copernican revolution” in relation to the pre-Enlightenment, thus making the Enlightenment an innovating movement or the process of creative destruction. For instance, in Europe before the Enlightenment, “tolerate” reportedly did *not* signify religious liberty as defined by its members Voltaire, Kant, Hume, and others, but something “merely” to “suffer” (“souffrir” in French), by “grudgingly” conceding its “existence” (Kaplan 2002). As long as “until the Enlightenment” (Kaplan 2002) comprised not only medieval Catholicism and the Catholic counter-Reformation, but also the Protestant Reformation and post-Reformation, it contradicts the conventional wisdom tracing religious liberty,

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<sup>36</sup>For instance, Fitzpatrick (1999:47–8) comments that the royal “revocation in 1685 of the Edict of Nantes (1598), which had afforded some measure of toleration to French Protestants, created a situation far worse than the existing one of limited toleration.” Prior its revocation, the Edict of Nantes was perhaps the only the pre-Enlightenment and preliberal official instance of religious freedom, tolerance, and pluralism, specifically of majority Catholic and minority Protestant (Calvinist) groups. In contrast, the opposite condition, toleration of minority Catholics and other Christians, as well as nonbelievers, by majority Protestants, was still nonexistent, as in Geneva and Holland under official Calvinism as well as Great Britain during both Anglicanism and Puritanism, and colonial Puritan-Anglican America. And, it was only or primarily the Enlightenment that changed this condition by permitting such liberty and tolerance both to Catholics and Protestants (Kaplan 2002), as happened in Western Europe, including France, Holland, Germany, Great Britain (in part), and revolutionary America, long after the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic counter-Revolution alike. In turn, the Edict of Nantes dispels or exposes as a cherished myth (or “sweet lie”) the conventional wisdom a la Parsons et al. of the Reformation’s and thus Protestantism’s (in particular Puritanism’s) greater religious liberty, tolerance, and pluralism or individualism compared with Catholicism’s supposed un-freedom, intolerance, and absolutism or collectivism (Mayway 1984).



choice, tolerance, and pluralism mostly to Protestantism (Mayway 1984; Parsons 1967a), and especially Calvinism in Europe and Puritanism in England (and Scotland) and America (Dunn and Woodard 1996).

Religious liberty, choice, pluralism, and tolerance are established particularly while un-freedom, uniformity, and lack of toleration overcome, among historically Calvinist, just as Catholic, societies *not* (as usually supposed) because of but in spite of and methodical opposition of pre-Enlightenment Calvinism, like Catholicism. Instead, they are primarily so because of the Enlightenment and liberalism generally. For instance, in Holland, England (and Scotland), and even America, they are respectively established and overcome in spite of and in opposition to ruling Calvinism and its Anglo-Saxon equivalent Puritanism, and because first and foremost of the Enlightenment and liberalism, as are in France owing to the latter and despite and in adverse reaction by official Catholicism. For both Catholic and Calvinist “godly” politics and *Civitas Dei* imposed religious un-freedom, absolutism, uniformity, and intolerance only to be overcome or delegitimized by, for example the ideas and actions of Voltaire and Jefferson in their respective societies, just as of Hume and Kant in Great Britain and Germany. Hence, to deny the link of “godly” politics with religious illiberty and intolerance about Calvinist and other Protestant societies, and allege the same link for their disdained Catholic types as do anti-Catholic Calvinists and US Puritan sociologists a la Parsons et al., is an illogical nonsequitur, a sort of “depraved mental gymnastics” or Orwellian double thinking. Furthermore, it is a manifest historical-empirical fallacy contradicted by history and evidence, from Calvin’s Geneva (Dombrowski 2001) and Holland under official Calvinism (Kaplan 2002) to Great Britain (England and Scotland) and America during Calvinist Puritanism and its heir “born again” Protestant fundamentalism (Munch 2001).

Evidently, the Enlightenment ideal and legacy of religious liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism supersedes or delegitimizes not only, as usually assumed, their opposites in official Catholicism, as it does in France most fully and dramatically. It also does their limited, spurious, or perverted forms in ruling Calvinism (and Protestantism), including Puritanism, a la Calvin’s and Winthrop’s and even Locke’s ersatz-religious “freedom” and “toleration” for themselves mostly, while denied to *others* (Kaplan 2002), thus perverted into their opposites, as in Geneva (Sorkin 2005) and New England (Davis 2005). This is what the Enlightenment does in Calvinist Holland, (once) Puritan England, and, via Jefferson and colleagues postrevolutionary America.

Hence, a paradigmatic instance of the Enlightenment innovative ideal of religious liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism overcoming medieval “godly” politics and *Civitas Dei* is its transcending the lack of or partial and spurious toleration in what Weber calls Calvinist “state churches,” including Puritan theocracies, just as their Catholic “Papist” precedents. For instance, the Enlightenment faced Calvinist theocracies in Geneva under Calvin and colleagues’ arch-theocratic rule, Holland ruled by Calvinism, as well as England and New England during its derivative Puritanism. And it revealed and ultimately transcended their “freedom” and “toleration” as nonexistent or spurious through its ideal of full, genuine religious liberty, tolerance, and pluralism.

### *Universal vs. Partial Political-Religious Liberties*

In essence, the Enlightenment posits universal, thus genuine and full liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism, notably for others or out-groups, unbelievers or “infidels” in religion as well as politics. This contrasts with and supersedes their partial or exclusionary, thus spurious forms in pre-Enlightenment Calvinist-Puritan and other Christian theocracies generously permitting “freedom” and “toleration” only to Calvinists-Puritans and at most Protestants, as the “only true Christians.” In turn, they denied them to the religious and nonreligious Other (Habermas et al. 1998) by what Mill diagnoses as English-American Puritanism’s “fanatical intolerance” of other religions, let alone nonbelievers such as heretics, atheists, agnostics, and secularists originally subjected to extermination as “witches” and “libertines” and persistently to exclusion as observed for Puritan-based religious conservatism in America (Edgell et al. 2006; Lichterman 2008). This fanaticism metastasizes into what is observed as the “sadistic intolerance to cultural otherness widespread in American society” (Bauman 2000), especially its evangelical anti-Enlightenment “Bible Belt.” Remember, even Locke, supposedly the pioneer of liberalism, failed to go beyond Calvinism’s ersatz religious “liberty” and “toleration” by denying them to non-Puritans or non-Protestants (Catholics), as well as to nonbelievers on typical Calvinist grounds of anti-Catholicism or anti-Popery and the atheist inability of moral judgment. From the prism of the Enlightenment and modern secular democracy, such grounds are patently prejudiced and false, even frivolous and bizarre, being apparently constrained, if not blinded, by his “Christian [Puritan pseudo-Christian] identity” (Champion 1999).

Notably, Locke’s and other Puritan-Calvinist, if not Christian, antiseccular and anti-liberal claim that nonbelievers like atheists and agnostics or non-Christians and secularists or liberals (initially “libertines”) are “incapable” or “unwilling” of moral judgment and conduct is patently false, self-serving, or bizarre for the Enlightenment and liberalism. It is so given that, as Simmel points out, morality, like politics, “has nothing to do with religion at all” in modern secular society with multiple and conflicting religions and nonreligious worldviews and values (Dombrowski 2001; Habermas 2001; Merton 1968). On the contrary, by its ethical universalism or universal inclusion a la Kant opposed to particularism, Enlightenment secularism or liberalism is capable and willing of rendering universalist or inclusive, and thus genuine, moral judgment and action. The latter is distinguished from particularistic and thus spurious or “deceptive” (Dahrendorf 1979) Christian, especially Locke’s hypocritical Puritan, and other religious (e.g., Islamic) exclusive, sectarian, or dual morality with its double standards. Such religious morality invidiously divides humans into “true believers” and “infidels” or out-groups as “enemies” a la “Christians” vs. “non-Christians,” “us” and “them” to be eliminated as the Pareto-like optimum or excluded, as the second best, from politics and society, as observed in America under early Puritanism and “reborn” neoconservatism (Edgell et al. 2006). Thus, modern critics recognize that the Enlightenment blend of universalism and rationalism affords the ability and willingness for making “moral judgment” and is consequently preferable to “cultural relativism and absolute pluralism” (Patell 2001). In turn, in the Enlightenment and modern liberalism

“universalism” or inclusion and “diversity” or “pluralism” are considered to be *not* necessarily mutually exclusive but rather complementary or synergetic ideas and tendencies (Habermas et al. 1998).

For instance, Weber acknowledges that “if they are strong enough, neither the Catholic nor the [old] Lutheran Church and, all the more so, the Calvinist and Baptist old church recognize freedom of conscience for *others* [the latter on the grounds of protecting] the glory of God.” He notably implies that the Enlightenment primarily overcomes this state of un-freedom and intolerance for others mixed with a sort of “self-freedom” and “self-toleration” of Calvinists, including Baptists, as well as Catholics and other Christians. Weber observes that freedom of conscience, as the “oldest” and even “most basic Right of Human” ensuring “freedom from compulsion, especially from the power of the state,” and related rights and liberties “find their ultimate justification in the belief of the Enlightenment in the workings of individual reason.” This is what the above observation explicitly suggests showing that in Europe the Enlightenment first redefines tolerance as religious liberty rather than, as in the pre-Enlightenment, signifying the “suffering” of something “ungodly” or reluctantly conceding its existence (Kaplan 2002).

Needless to say, for the Enlightenment and in extension its offspring modern liberal-secular democracy and perhaps any reasonable believer, Calvinist and other “Christian” religious “freedom” and “toleration” only for oneself vs. others condemned as “infidels” and subjected to “holy” wars of extermination (Gorski 2000), is an illogical nonsequitur (“self-toleration”), a cynical denial and perversion of true into ersatz religious liberty and tolerance. For the latter can only be, as Kant, Voltaire, and Hume proposed, universal, simply “for all” in Jefferson’s sense, or is not liberty and tolerance at all. In short, the Enlightenment ideal of universal religious liberty and tolerance reveals the Calvinist and other “Christian” (including Vatican) theocratic emperor as having “no clothes” in this respect. Hence, the Enlightenment universalizes religious liberty, choice, and tolerance to potentially all individuals, groups and societies. By contrast, Calvinist-Puritan and other “Christian” rulers deny to others what they demand for and once in absolute power, generously grant to themselves and their followers, while being outside of government, as witnessed in Holland and virtually any society, from Geneva to England (and Scotland) and America under ruling Calvinism (Kaplan 2002). They actually universalize intolerance, repression, and the reign of “holy” terror and war, as in Puritan-ruled England and New England (Gorski 2000; Merrill 1945; Munch 2001; Walzer 1963; Zaret 1989).

Hence, what precisely distinguishes the Enlightenment and liberalism from the Calvinist and other Christian pre-Enlightenment, as well as from the conservative-fascist anti-Enlightenment if anything, is universal liberty, choice, and tolerance for others in the first vs. “self-freedom” and “self-toleration” in the second, as Weber recognizes. Recall that the Enlightenment produces “universalization” of religious conscience and its freedom and tolerance through “de-Christianizing” it (Fitzpatrick 1999), thus demonopolizing it from delusory, self-proclaimed “true Christians,” Catholics and Protestants alike, and extending it to “all.”

As implied, under official Calvinism, Holland provides a paradigmatic, though not the only instance of the Enlightenment’s diverging from and transcending of

Calvinist or “Christian” theocracy in respect of religious liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism. Reportedly, ruling Calvinism’s “decisive “rejection of toleration” by the Dutch regent class” in Holland was manifested in the “outlawing of Catholicism” and the “elevation” of the Reformed Church into the “official faith of the Republic” during the 1570s–1580s (Kaplan 2002). Notably, “genuine,” Enlightenment-inspired religious tolerance and liberty prevailed in Calvinist-ruled Holland “only” during the eighteenth century” (Kaplan 2002). Hence, it did so not because of but in spite of and opposition to ruling Calvinism *itself* claiming to be the sole “true” (“Reformed”) church and hence (patho)logically condemning and attacking any Christian churches, with “papist” Catholicism as the main and Lutheranism as the secondary target, not to mention nonbelievers (e.g., Spinoza) as outside of any notion and practice of tolerance. In summary, in Calvinism and even the Protestant Reformation overall its declared “love” of religious freedom typically falls short of “liberality” in the sense of the readiness for granting *others* or all the liberty one demands for oneself (Kaplan 2002). It thus exhibits a sort of immaturity or what Weber calls “childishness” in relation to the Enlightenment and liberalism precisely characterized by such “liberality” or universality in religious liberty.

Historically, following Calvinist Holland, another paradigmatic instance in the above respect is England (and Scotland) during Calvinism or rather its derivative English Puritanism (and Scottish Presbyterianism). In England, as in Holland under Calvinism before, (and, with some variations, Scotland) true religious liberty, tolerance, and pluralism were established primarily because of the Enlightenment and liberalism, and non-Puritanism like Anglicanism. Conversely, they were in spite of and in opposition to Puritanism (and in part Presbyterianism), as Hume and Mill classically showed documenting Puritan “wretched fanaticism” and “fanatical intolerance.” In short, religious liberty, tolerance, and pluralism were established in Great Britain because of Hume’s and related ideas and legacies, and in spite of and in opposition to Cromwell and his colleagues, including Puritan Locke usually but evidently inaccurately described as a “liberal.” Furthermore, recall that Weber’s remark that the Puritan House of Commons rejected “any intention to relax the golden reins of discipline or to grant any toleration,” with the Puritans rejecting freedom of conscience as a “toleration for soul-murder [*sic*].” For instance, complete religious liberty and tolerance for “all,” namely “full rights of citizenship” for Catholic and other Christian (e.g., Unitarian) “consciences,” were not recognized and institutionalized “until the early decades of the nineteenth century”<sup>37</sup> in Great Britain

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<sup>37</sup>Champion (1999:18) adds that Puritanism ““dissolved, dismantled, and destroyed” the Anglican (condemned as Papist) “religious infrastructure of Bishops, Churches, and ecclesiastical courts,” as well as “defeated, imprisoned, and finally executed” the King.” Also, following the military defeat of Puritanism and the restoration of the Monarchy in England, the “compromise of the 1689 toleration was a successful attempt to stave off the threat of [Catholic] James II’s alternative of a much more radical liberty of conscience” (Champion 1999:24). For instance, (Catholic) King James’ “sincere commitment to religious pluralism was perceived by Protestant contemporaries as advancing the dual standards of the Papal antichrist and political tyranny: the fact that religious radicals such as Quakers supported the indulgence merely reinforced the dangers to social order” (Champion 1999:24).

(Champion 1999), which happened primarily under the direct or indirect impetus of the Enlightenment and liberalism overall, as represented by Hume's ideas and legacies. This confirms the limited scope and spurious character of religious liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism in England and beyond during the pre-Enlightenment and their universal and genuine nature in the Enlightenment. It is no wonder that even the most "liberal" or radical" pre-Enlightenment theorists like Locke were constrained, if not blinded, in their ideas of religious toleration and liberty by their "Christian identity" (Champion 1999), especially Puritanism as a "theocratic revolt" against secularism and its implied idea of tolerance (Juergensmeyer 1994).

What has been said of Holland during Calvinism and England under its Puritan derivative holds true, with prudent qualifications of colonial and even postrevolutionary New England under Puritanism. Genuine and universal religious liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism in postrevolutionary New England and America overall were primarily established because of the Enlightenment and liberalism as imported and translated by Jefferson and colleagues. Conversely, they were in spite of and even in opposition to Puritanism as "American Calvinism" (German 1995), or at most secondarily due to the latter (Davis 2005). Genuine, universal religious liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism were either nonexistent or limited and spurious in the perverse, destructive form of "freedom" and "toleration" for oneself or "people like us," namely American Calvinists as theocratic Puritans in the face of Winthrop et al., as in Holland, England, or Europe, in pre-Enlightenment America. In America, as in these societies, the Enlightenment and liberalism through Jeffersonian secular-democratic forces redefine toleration in religion as religious liberty and pluralism, thus being "totally antithetical" (Bremer 1995) to the Calvinist pre-Enlightenment mostly typified with theocratic oppression, intolerance, and absolutism, "freedom of conscience" and toleration" afforded only or mostly for Puritans (Dayton 1999; Davis 2005). Recall Weber's striking observation that religious toleration, thus liberty, choice, and pluralism, "was least strong" in none other than those states "dominated by Puritanism," specifically "Puritan old or New England." He attributes this in part to Puritans' "ethical mistrust" of religious and economic out-groups (also, Merton 1939), contradicting their and their heirs' claims to some "exceptional" strongest tolerance as "pure hypocrisy."

For example, in 1644 Roger Williams, the famous dissenter, described the fact that in the Puritan colonies (Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Haven) "God's children should persecute God's children" as a "monstrous paradox" (Dayton 1999). They were functioning theocracies by reportedly imposing the "true religion" or "consensus" on "matters of doctrine and worship" and punishing those challenging the "reigning" Calvinist congregational orthodoxy through their "statutes and practices" (Dayton 1999; also, Davis 2005). Also, in prototypical display of what Weber diagnosed as Puritan "pure hypocrisy" – he may add that the only "purity" in "Puritanism" – their rulers claimed or saw "no established religion in their jurisdictions" (Dayton 1999). For instance, punishments for "crimes of religious belief" – note that Puritanism still defined dissent in religion

as a crime—ranged from fines, reprimands, whipping, and banishment to death, as Tocqueville also registers, “in the name of God,” inflicted by “secular magistrates” authorized by the legal codes of the colonies. In particular, the admittedly “blinkered view of the founders on the concept of liberty” in religion “according to the rules of scripture,” with the “right to worship” granted “only” to those following the strict official “conception of godly, scriptural rules,” was “perfectly” reflected in Massachusetts’ *Body of Liberties* of 1641 as a model or precedent for “all Puritan colonies” (Dayton 1999). In a sense, this Puritan *Body of Liberties* was hardly worth the paper on which it had been written due to its intolerance and thus illiberty in reality, as were and are virtually all pre- and anti-Enlightenment legal codes, including conservative, fascist, communist, and Islamic “constitutions.” Reportedly, the Puritans not only pursued the “policy of intolerance” as their final solution to the “problem of dissenters” but even were “righteous” (thus “feeling-good”) in doing so<sup>38</sup> (Dayton 1999). As an indicative instance, New Haven’s legal system was closer to the “continental inquisitorial approach” than to the “incipient adversarial mode of English common law,” in the function of the “overriding” aim of eradicating and punishing “all sin,” exacting repentance from the malefactors via the “broad powers of the magistrates” against sins and ungodliness<sup>39</sup> (Dayton 1999).

Theocratic Puritanism was formally “disestablished” in Massachusetts in the 1830s, only several decades following the Revolution, a sort of “sad story of the death of kings” (Cohen 2003) in the form of Puritan masters with self-assigned

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<sup>38</sup>Dayton (Dayton 1999:30) observes that in seventeenth century America, “few voices joined Roger Williams in defining religious liberty as a vision of many faiths coexisting in peaceful harmony. Instead, each group saw itself as the only true vanguard of the revolution begun by Luther and Calvin. Pleas for liberty to worship on the basis of religious conscience were made out of concern for the group’s *own* salvation (so) their members would not be corrupted by papist or unscriptural practices. Claims for religious liberty in the pre-1680 Anglo-American world neither were made in the interest of pluralism nor did they often resort to the language of rights. Puritans, once they took the reins of government in seventeenth century New England, confronted the problem of dissenters who claimed to belong to the Puritan fold.”

<sup>39</sup>For instance, an illustrious dissenter (Anne Eaton) in Massachusetts argued that a “heterogeneity of believers could exist within the Puritan fold, as long as all church members accepted Calvinist tenets” (Dayton 1999:33). Hence, staying “within the Puritan fold,” this, like most New England Baptists, argued for “a very limited notion of religious liberty [not for] a multiplicity of denominations (or abolishing) the laws requiring all residents to attend church (and) a tax system by which everyone paid to support the orthodox churches. The Puritans’ inflated notion of their own, exclusive righteousness” (Dayton 1999:39). This admittedly revealed New England’s Puritan leaders’ “policy of intolerance,” since these Baptists “presented themselves as Calvinists who did not deny the validity of the orthodox Puritan churches [e.g., Anne Eaton’s prior Calvinist credentials]. The crucial shift of the 1680s (was) when the laity embraced a slightly expanded notion of tribe whereas nearly all clergy remained bitterly opposed to the language of individual rights and the formal policy of toleration that was imposed on them by the king and parliament in the wake of the Glorious Revolution. Yet Puritan ministers after the settlement of the 1680s treated Baptists, Quakers, and Anglicans with as much contempt as they could muster” (Dayton 1999:40).

divine rights to rule (Bremer 1995) for their conservative disciples and admirers (Gould 1996). Despite its official “disestablishment” Puritanism’s “religious tests for office-holding” have admittedly persisted, as its self-perpetuating heritage, in America “long after the passage” of Jefferson’s “landmark” 1786 Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (Dayton 1999), evidently inspired by the Enlightenment. In summary, the latter’s “epistemological skepticism,” inspiring in part and joined with the American revolutionaries’ “constitution of aspirations,” was primarily responsible for creating “new legal and ideological terrains” of religious liberty, in spite and opposition of the “dueling passions” of Puritan-rooted Protestantism continuing to permeate American politics and culture long after (Dayton 1999), as via culture and military wars.

Also, postrevolutionary Calvinist Puritanism resisted religious liberty and tolerance advocated by the Jeffersonian Enlightenment and liberalism, as well as by “liberal” Protestantism in America<sup>40</sup> (Clark 1999). Notably, “liberal” Protestantism and implicitly the Enlightenment reportedly rejected the “twin inhumane institutions of Calvinism and slavery,” with the “struggle against Calvinist orthodoxy” assuming the form of a “revision or rejection of traditional sources of religious authority” (Clark 1999). In summary, both Enlightenment and Protestant liberal-egalitarian ideas or discourse were a “critique of authoritarian religious power” (Clark 1999), specifically Calvinist-Puritan theocracy, in early postrevolutionary America. Local and contemporary instances of this seemingly perennial struggle or “culture war” between the Enlightenment and Calvinist or other “Christian” theocracy abound in America, notably the anti-Enlightenment “Bible Belt” and its analogs

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<sup>40</sup>Clark (1999:62) suggests that “a model of free speech (emerged) with roots deep in the dissenting tradition of liberal Protestantism (the divine mandates of individual conscience) (with) antebellum religious liberals’ fierce assertion of the right of private judgment against orthodox authority, in the course of the struggles that signaled an end to the reign of Calvinism (i.e.) the assertion of individual moral agency in spiritual matters as against older, disabling forms of orthodox practice.” In this account, however, the “robust “Christian liberty” of dissenting groups [the Levelers] had been tamed by liberal political thought [Lockean liberalism]. The Founders’ ideals of toleration and separation, while they created a private space for religious belief, also sought to limit the role of belief as an active force in the secular sphere [the Lockean demotion of private judgment] (Clark 1999:63). Also, reportedly while Calvinist evangelicalism was “epitomized in revivalism,” for liberal Protestantism, the “primary bonds of the new religious community were formed through more formally rational pursuits of debate and discourse” (Clark 1999:67). For instance, with Luther as their hero, “liberals proclaimed that the freedom to challenge received wisdom was ‘essential to liberty in Church and State’ [by] an experimental form of spontaneous inquiry [as] the only way to gain true knowledge, in light of the demotion of revelation and other authoritarian forms of ordering,” thus the liberal “public conscience” conflicting with the “wily proslavery ‘priesthood,’ a ‘religious aristocracy’” (Clark 1999:68–70). Also, reportedly, in the “antebellum period, as the force of universalist enlightenment thought waned, Christian egalitarianism became for a time the vehicle for notions of equality [the ‘authority of conscience’]” (Clark 1999:69).

such as Mormon-controlled Utah (Weisbrod 1999).<sup>41</sup> For instance, despite the tolerant Enlightenment or “enlightenment” overall and modern trends to “religious tolerance” of mainstream Christian dominations, “non-Christian” groups are still subject to “pressure for conformism or assimilation” (McLaren and Coward 1999), primarily and predictably in the “Bible Belt” and other anti-Enlightenment regions in America and beyond.

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<sup>41</sup>Weisbrod (1999) implies that ruling Mormonism in Utah is an antithesis of the Enlightenment and liberalism overall, as well as liberal Protestantism. Overall, Weisbrod (1999:139) registers that Mormonism’s “general approach to the American Constitution as divinely inspired.” In particular, reportedly the “family values with which the Mormon Church is associated in 1996 are for the most part the same family values articulated by the Christian nation in 1896: heterosexual monogamy, family stability, large families, and traditional family structures” (Weisbrod 1999:142). The study suggests that “even in Utah [as] a ‘sovereign state,’ a religious group cannot control its environment in the way that was possible in the nineteenth century. Mormon Church (is not) simply representing *the church* standing against *the state*, but also [one] overlapping and penetrating the state in the form of religious ideas in the consciousness of individual voters or religious affiliations of state officials” (Weisbrod 1999:146). Yet, it admits that Mormon has done so via the “reconstitution of a theocracy” (Weisbrod 1999:147), and thus of the anti-Enlightenment, for nothing is more antagonistic and nihilistic or destructive to the Enlightenment and liberal-secular democracy than a theocratic as well as fascist state.



## Chapter 6

# The Enlightenment, Civil Society, and Economy

### The Enlightenment as a Civic Revolution

#### *Civil Society vs. Civitas Dei*

The Enlightenment constitutes a generalized “Copernican revolution” or creative destruction in civil society, as well as the economy, in interaction and mutual reinforcement with its revolutionary operation and change in culture and polity discussed earlier. In particular, the Enlightenment represents the process of destruction, in the form of intellectual delegitimation (“deconstruction”), of theocratic “sacred” civil society found in the pre-Enlightenment, especially *Civitas Dei* in medievalism. It does so because this theocratic, “godly” version amounted to a sort of “McCann because of lacking such a sphere of private liberties or a life-world (Habermas 2001) autonomous from theocratic religion and tyrannical state merged and mutually reinforced and perpetuated.

For instance, Mises (1957) observed that “only in the Age of Enlightenment did some eminent philosophers [cease] brooding about the hidden purpose of Providence directing the course of events. They looked upon human events from the point of view of the ends aimed at by acting men, instead of from the point of view of the plans ascribed to God or nature” (citing Mandeville and Smith as instances). As critical theorists (Horkheimer 1996) also acknowledge, the pre-Enlightenment, especially medieval theocratic, religion found itself in the “deadly struggle” with the Enlightenment and its principle of “secular Reason.” By implication, this struggle implicated the medieval Christian religion or theocracy, above all official Catholicism in France and ruling Protestantism, especially theocratic Calvinism in Holland and its derivative Puritanism in Great Britain and America, and to a lesser degree Lutheranism in Germany, with a few exceptions effectively confirming the rule, such as moderate (Munch 2001) Anglicanism in England and America (Bremer 1995) and nonorthodox elements of Presbyterianism in Scotland (Berry 1997). In summary, Catholic-Calvinist orthodoxy embarked on a “holy” war or “mindless” battle (Habermas 2001) against the Enlightenment demonized and attacked as “ungodly” and “anti-Christian.”

Like feudalism in what Marx called its “deadly struggle” with capitalism, medieval religion, in particular theocracy, as the integral ingredient of the *ancien regime*, was eventually defeated or discredited by the Enlightenment directly or indirectly via the French Revolution. This was epitomized in official Catholicism’s defeat by the Enlightenment and/or via the French Revolution in France. It was also in Calvinism’s replacement or tempering by the Enlightenment in Holland (Kaplan 2002) and Puritanism’s in England, also “tempered” by Anglicanism (Munch 2001), and to a degree, remaining as official Presbyterianism, in Scotland (Berry 1997). This applied to antitheocratic disestablishment in Puritanism, due primarily to Enlightenment-inspired Jeffersonian forces (Dayton 1999; Gould 1996; Kloppenberg 1998) in revolutionary America. As Weber notes, in virtue of being less ascetic, intolerant, oppressive, or theocratic than Calvinism and Puritanism (including Presbyterianism), Lutheranism and Anglicanism were less hostile to and waged a less “deadly” war with—the second even embracing elements of—the Enlightenment (Bremer 1995), and hence were criticized (“deconstructed”) to a lesser extent by the latter.

At this juncture, one can infer that the “heartland” of the Enlightenment is the “critique of religion” (Bittner 1996) inspired by or reminiscent of Hobbes’ “heretic” view that “making the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods [thus] from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of Gods.” To the Enlightenment, the worship for the “holy” falls to the “ground” as long as “no such powers” empirically have been proved or can be proved to exist and hence religious beliefs and practices become “mere products of fantasy and fear” (Bittner 1996). Arguably, in light of the Enlightenment’s (Kant’s) “indecent proposal” for overcoming humankind’s long self-imposed “immaturity” and servitude to fanciful suprahuman causes and entities such as Hobbes’ “innumerable sorts of Gods,” the “holy” or religion by revealing itself as humanly created or “all too human,” by analogy to the proverbial emperor with no clothes, is eventually stripped of its “dignity” and consequently respect (Bittner 1996).

Like Hobbes, the Enlightenment, especially its European (French, German, and Hume’s) version, redefines religion or God as a human or social creation, rather than the supreme creator of humans or society, in virtue of the ultimate basis of religious beliefs and practices being “only our fear, nothing in the nature of things” (Bittner 1996) in the sense of Montesquieu definition of the “spirit” of social laws. The Enlightenment hence anticipates or prediscovers (in Merton’s sense) the prevailing classical sociological conception of religion as a human social creation, as epitomized in Durkheim’s explicit or implicit concept of “society as God” and conversely, the “idea of society is the soul of religion” and “religious forces are human, moral forces.” Furthermore, it redefines religion as “all too human,” rather than suprahuman by being beyond any human traits, in the view that fear producing or grounding religious beliefs and practices forms an “immature reaction” in Kant’s sense to eventually disappear upon a “clear understanding of things” (Bittner 1996). In summary, the Enlightenment, notably its original European “ungodly,” as distinct from the American derivative more “godly,” version, redefines and reconstructs (or “deconstructs”) religion, including God, as the main cause and effect

alike of what Kant identifies and regrets as humanity “long self-imposed immaturity” and thus darkness, un-freedom, indignity, suffering, and death.

The “battle” between secular thinkers and clerics, though not necessarily that of nonbelievers against believers, forms a “basic core element” of the Enlightenment, including its Scottish version (Berry 1997). Reportedly, the Enlightenment defines its mission primarily as the intellectual struggle against “unreasonable religion or superstition”<sup>1</sup> (Berry 1997). As is typical, this is essentially “mission accomplished” in light of the Enlightenment’s initial victory over or discredit of “unreasonable religion or superstition” and its strong enduring legacy of reason and scientific rationalism among modern Western and cognate societies. In turn, the Enlightenment rejects fanaticism and superstition in religion in spite of or because of that, with a few exceptions such as “notorious infidel” or self-declared non-Christian Hume, the common religious view of its European representatives and some of their American counterparts is Deism (Berry 1997), and not, as its adversaries accuse, atheism. For instance, Voltaire as well as Franklin and Jefferson were either declared or implied deists; thus, Weber describes Franklin as, despite or because of his “Calvinistic father,” a “colorless deist.” Even the French Enlightenment philosophers are sometimes described as “Christians in secular dress” (Artz 1998) mostly in the sense of deism or some variations thereof and less in that of atheism and what Pareto calls “anti-Christian religion” seen as characterizing the French Revolution.

While for the Enlightenment there is no such thing as civil society or the autonomous life-world in medievalism, in this respect it considers classical civilization as an exception, like others. From the viewpoint of the Enlightenment, classical civilization initially reached, or anticipated and approached most closely, free civil society (Manent 1998), but was burned and buried, notably its artistic and its intellectual works perished (Caplan and Cowen 2004) as “pagan” in medieval Christian *Civitas Dei* since the fourth century AD. In this sense, like the Renaissance two centuries earlier in artistic terms, the Enlightenment is a sort of “renaissance” of secular classical “pagan” civil society as a model, or embryo because of its slavery (yet see Patell 2001<sup>2</sup>), against its theocratic Christian medieval opposite. As registered, the French Enlightenment philosophers appreciate and embrace the Greek and Roman classics, with their “generally worldly attitudes,” as expressing “more reasonable ways of thinking” than those found in medieval petrified Christianity (Artz 1998).

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<sup>1</sup>Seemingly evoking the Enlightenment’s stance, especially of Diderot, Holbach, Helvetius, Hume, and in part Voltaire, on religion, Einstein is reported to have written that all religions are an “incarnation of the most childish superstitions. God is nothing more than the expression and product of human weaknesses, the Bible a collection of honorable, but still primitive legends which are nevertheless pretty childish.”

<sup>2</sup>Patell (2001:xix) objects that “liberalism’s Enlightenment inheritance [is] its overreliance on rationalism and its blindness to its relation with forms of domination such as slavery, racism, and misogyny.” In this view, the “failures of Enlightenment rationalism” (distinguished from Enlightenment liberalism) are epitomized in what is called the “passage from Enlightenment to slavery” (Patell 2001:195–196) in seeming reference to America as the only Western society with such an economic system during the nineteenth century post-Enlightenment.

The preceding suggests that the Enlightenment specifically constitutes the process of creative destruction with respect to the Christian version of “godly” civil society or *Civitas Dei* characterizing the medieval pre-Enlightenment. The Enlightenment redefines and transcends this, like any theocratic version as the primitive antithesis or perversion of its ideal of modern liberal-secular civil society (and democracy), thus spurious or “uncivil.” In short, it reconsiders *Civitas Dei* an exemplary source and syndrome of humanity’s “long self-imposed immaturity,” darkness, oppression, suffering, and death, thus what made the Middle Ages sociologically dark.

The Enlightenment delegitimizes and supersedes not only, as usually assumed, the early Catholic variant of medieval *Civitas Dei* and the *respublica Christiana* as spurious or precivil society and predemocratic republic respectively, as paradigmatically occurred in France. It also does, often overlooked by sociologists like Parsons et al., its later Protestant variants, especially exemplified by what Weber calls Calvinist Bibliocracies in Europe (Geneva, Holland, etc.) and their Puritan derivatives, “Holy” or “Biblical Commonwealths” in England and colonial America. The Jeffersonian Enlightenment is observed to be “totally antithetical”, (Bremer 1995) i.e., opposed to the Puritan “godly community” (German 1995) and its Calvinist worldview, rejecting Winthrop’s vision of America as the theocratic “Biblical Commonwealth” or “Christian Sparta” (Kloppenbergh 1998), as is its original French version toward Catholic *Civitas Dei* in France. For the Enlightenment there is simply *no* such thing as civil society in the Christian pre-Enlightenment, both in the Catholic and Protestant supposedly opposite types of *Civitas Dei* and *respublica Christiana*, and solely preexisting or anticipated and approached in classical Greek democracy as its model.

The French Enlightenment is “especially critical” of traditional and theocratic religion and its “godly” (per)version of secular civil society (Artz 1998). Particularly, its representatives are critical of traditional Christianity, notably its persistent theocratic design and system of precivil medieval *Civitas Dei*, becoming “ever present in their minds” (Artz 1998). They reportedly identify the official Christian Church as “intolerant” and retrogressing in “superstition” (Artz 1998), thus, as in Comte’s words, “retrograde.” In particular, the French Enlightenment is “disgusted” by the claims of virtually every Christian church or sect to be the “exclusive means of salvation” (Artz 1998). This disgust is attached not only to universalistic Catholicism as the universalistic religion or church for administration of salvation. It is also to nonuniversal or sectarian Protestantism like Calvinism owing to its particularistic or exclusionary and harsh (Fourcade and Healy 2007) dogma of predestination in the form of what Weber<sup>3</sup> calls the “double decree” of election of only a few “elect” and damnation of most humans as “reprobate,” evincing its “extreme inhumanity” and effectively reversing or perverting original Christianity (Tawney 1962).

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<sup>3</sup>Weber observes that for Calvin “only a small proportion of men are chosen for eternal grace,” and characterizes his doctrine of predestination as “unjust,” “harsh,” and “extreme inhumanity,” as well as an influence in the “elementary forms of conduct and attitude toward life.”

In comparative terms, the Western Enlightenment, in contrast to its Eastern alternative, originates and operates mostly in contradiction to “Divine Voluntarism, of Jewish, Christian, or Islamic type,” and their shared dogma that the “will of God, the Supreme Personal Being” forms the “fundamental value” (Angel 1994). Still, as also observed, the Enlightenment’s opposition to “Divine Voluntarism,” particularly its Christian theocratic type, is not “necessarily” generalized into the “rejection of all” forms and things of religion (Byrne 1997), but embraces its “natural” form present, as Voltaire and others suggested, in every human being or deism, contrary to the antireligion or atheist accusations by its adversaries and detractors like Burke et al. Reportedly, the Enlightenment primarily joined with related tendencies,<sup>4</sup> puts “under sustained pressure” and eventually overcomes, as via the French and in part American Revolution, the “dominant role” of religion in European societies and colonial America (Byrne 1997). This dominance consisted in the religious regulation of “everything,” from the “rhythm of life” to express the “liturgical year” to the “appointment of kings and emperors” or political authorities by self-proclaimed (agents of) sacred powers (Byrne 1997), from Catholic Popes to their Protestant functional equivalents like Calvin, the “Pope of Protestantism,” then Cromwell in England, and Winthrop in New England.

In consequence, the Enlightenment proves to be a sort of prototypical civil revolution in relation to, via intellectual delegitimation of, the medieval Catholic *and* Protestant *Civitas Dei* as an “uncivil” or “precivil” society from its standpoint. In this sense, it is the model or precursor of contemporary civil rights movements and liberalization trends in Western societies, including America, since the 1960s through the 2000s (Inglehart 2004). Recall the Age of Reason directly or indirectly, via the French (and American) Revolution, declares universal civil or human rights (“Universal Rights of Men”), as Weber recognizes in observing that “all of these rights find their ultimate justification in the belief of the Enlightenment in the workings of individual reason.”

The Enlightenment rejects and supersedes Catholic and Protestant “godly” societies alike as theocracies, thus the tyrannical antitheses of secular civil society. It hence transcends both the “old” Catholicism and the “new” Protestantism or the Reformation as the elements and vestiges of despotic medievalism. And while acting as Hayek’s “terminator”<sup>5</sup> of both societies and times as the Dark Middle Ages, through its “constructivist rationalism,” the Enlightenment becomes a sort of agent

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<sup>4</sup>According to Byrne (1997:17), these tendencies included the “decline in the power of the papacy, the loss of a united religious front after the Reformation and the further fragmentation within Protestantism, the growth of a merchant class independent of the clergy, the emergence of alternative forms of knowledge (e.g., advances in biology and medicine), the inherent inability of an inflexible theology to cope with changed circumstances [etc.]”

<sup>5</sup>Hayek (1955:92) objects that the “rationalist whose reason is not sufficient to teach him those limitations of the powers of conscious reason, and who despises all the institutions and customs which have not been consciously designed, would thus become the destroyer of the civilization built upon them,” through the Enlightenment-driven “counter-revolution of science.” Also, Hayek (1991:367) in his attack on the Enlightenment asserts that the “only kind of rational action that [its] constructivist rationalism recognizes is action guided by such considerations as If I want X then I must do Y.” Similarly, some of his followers reject what is seen as the “one-sided rationalism and pragmatism of the Anglo-French Age of Enlightenment” (Infantino 2003:100).

provocateur of the counter-Enlightenment in the process. It provokes the rebirth from the darkness, fire, and ashes of medievalism of the anti-Enlightenment in the form of religious Catholic and Protestant conservatism, eventually including fascism, in antagonistic reaction seeking to restore the *ex ante* condition of medieval *Civitas Dei* a la “faith-based” civil society and politics, as in America during neo-conservatism, notably “born again” fundamentalism. As Mannheim (1986) shows, religious-political conservatism was born as medievalist traditionalism turned “self-reflective” in facing and adversely reacting to the birth of liberalism, grounded in the Enlightenment, and condemned as its “immediate antagonist.”

Thus, Mises (1957) suggests that “no historian ever denied that very little of the spirit of Christ was to be found in the churches of the sixteenth century which were criticized by the theologians of the Reformation and in those of the eighteenth century which the philosophers of the Enlightenment attacked.” By implication, the latter churches that the Enlightenment philosophers criticized included both those of the Catholic pre- and counter-Reformation and the Protestant Reformation, especially Calvinism and its Anglo-Saxon sectarian duplicate Puritanism, claiming to be the only true “Reformed” and so “Christian” faith and church. Even Parsons (1967a), with his “Puritan heritage” (Alexander 1983) intimates this by stating that the “immediacy of the individual soul to God, inherent in [Protestantism] gave a peculiar turn to the problems of social thought in the last age [seventeenth century] before social thought became predominantly secular in spirit,” under the prime impetus of the Enlightenment and liberalism. He thus implicitly admits that the latter effectively transcends, rather than, as usually supposed, continues, the Protestant Reformation. He also does so stating that science does *not* demonstrate the “goodness of God” (Parsons 1967a), a sort of blasphemy for his inherited Puritanism that dictates that all culture and society shall precisely become the demonstration and realization of the divine good and will, thus theodicy, as Weber registers and Merton (1968) acknowledges (Becker 1984).

As noted, the Enlightenment invents and substitutes the optimistic conception of humans as “essentially good,” if directed by “reason” (Artz 1998), for pessimistic and basically antihumanistic Christian and other religious doctrines, especially Protestant or Calvinist-Puritan. Its optimism supersedes the Christian pessimism of the doctrine of the “weakness of man’s intellect” and “man’s inherent sinfulness” (Artz 1998) as particularly emphasized by Protestantism, traced to “original sin” for which humans, as Puritanism or Protestant sectarianism (Lipset 1996) in America especially stipulates through its “obsession with vice and sin” and temperance wars (Wagner 1997), shall be perpetually punished, yet seen by the Enlightenment as an inhumane dogma or Voltaire called a “childish absurdity” that even Calvinist Rousseau rejected (Garrard 2003). Notably, the Enlightenment philosophers and sociologists disseminated their new and revolutionary ideas “radically at variance with the accepted views of the Middle Ages and of the Reformation Era” *alike* among a “great number” of social classes, in particular the middle class, of the eighteenth century (Artz 1998).

At this point, the main statement of the French and all Enlightenment, the *Encyclopédie* regarded rising “atheistic beliefs” as (also) caused by the “open hostility” of Catholicism and Protestantism (Byrne 1997), thus rejecting the

Protestant Reformation and the Catholic counter-Reformation. In consequence, in France in 1759 the *ancien regime* banned the *Encyclopédie* as the “source of Helvetius” and other “atheistic ideas,” and imprisoned Voltaire, Diderot, and others for their “irreverent opinions,” with the pope placing it on the “Index of Forbidden Books” and making Catholics face excommunication for its possession<sup>6</sup> (Garrard 2003). Overall, in France and Germany the absolute state placed many Enlightenment authors under “police surveillance” and threatened them (as the Prussian emperor did Kant) with imprisonment for their writings (Simon 1995). This initial anti-Enlightenment pattern has survived and continued in America during paleo- and neoconservatism. During paleoconservatism this was indicated by the US Puritanical government’s use of “illegal wiretaps” (Juergensmeyer 2003) of alcohol and drug sinners-*cum*-criminals during Prohibition and the war on drugs (Friedman 1997), not to mention the “red scare” and McCarthyism featuring similar practices and admittedly leaving “ugly scars” (Smelser and Mitchell 2002) on American politics and society. Following and technologically perfecting this arch-conservative prototype or precedent, neoconservatism admittedly perpetrates unlawful “intrusive and secret” surveillance of citizens, “arbitrary” indefinite detention and “suspension of habeas corpus,” and torture or “hurtful interrogation methods”<sup>7</sup> (Turk 2004) of non-Americans in the “war on terror.”

In turn, despite the theocratic “Christian” “empire striking back,” in eighteenth century France, as well as in twentieth and twenty-first century America, the “growing secularization” in civil society during the period preceding the 1789 Revolution reportedly produced the spread of “anti-Christian and anticlerical ideas in intellectual circles” (Garrard 2003). As a sign of the *esprit de temps*, Holbach declared religion a “sacred contagion” (*la contagion sacrée*), even a “form of pathological disorder” (Garrard 2003) in the shape of mental epidemic or hysteria, as witnessed in religious sects, cults, and revivals such as the evangelical Great Awakenings in eighteenth century America (Archer 2001) and their replays, including yet another fundamentalist revival since the 1980s.

### ***The Enlightenment vs. the Protestant Reformation***

The Enlightenment operates as the process of civic revolution or creative destruction versus the Protestant Reformation, just as traditional Catholicism and its counter-Reformation and its “reformed” design and reality of theocratic *Civitas Dei* as

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<sup>6</sup>Garrard (2003:15) adds that “Helvetius and La Mettrie narrowly escaped the same fate [of imprisonment] by fleeing into exile [as did abbé Raynal ending up in far-off St. Petersburg].”

<sup>7</sup>Turk (2004:282) comments that in its “war on terror” the US neoconservative government pursued two “fateful” policies, first, the “decision to dilute or abrogate established legal restraints on governmental power” such as “indefinite detention along with the suspension of habeas corpus” for non-Americans, second, the “decision to invade Iraq without United Nations legitimation [thus] eroding the freedoms being defended in the war against terrorism,” decisions that future historians will likely characterize as “fatal” or egregious and irresponsible.

non- or precivil society. It not only considers Catholicism but also Protestantism, especially, in Weber's words, "strict and gloomy" Calvinism and its sectarian variant Puritanism, to epitomize and symbolize the theocratic and thus tyrannical pre-Enlightenment, by representing the part and vestige rather than the end and overcoming of the Dark Middle Ages with secondary differences, such as Protestant high, shorter versus Catholic early, longer medievalism.

Furthermore, the Enlightenment regards Protestantism, notably Calvinism, as tending to become even "darker" and more primitive or fundamentalist, notably intolerant, oppressive, theocratic, inhumane, militant, and warlike, than the "darkest" official Catholicism, or at least equally so. In this view, this tendency of the "Reformed Church" accorded with and intensified rather than (as the term "reformed" claimed) deviated from what sociological analyses find as the universal theocratic, violent or warlike, and genocidal logic and practice of virtually all previous world religions, from Judaism and Hinduism to Christianity, especially Protestantism and Islam (Angel 1994; Juergensmeyer 2003). Reportedly, Protestantism did so by aiming to "purify" and perpetuate into infinity the Dark Middle Ages recreating, and not, as Parsons et al. claim, overcoming a "purer" medieval social order (Eisenstadt 1965) in the form of "reformed" theocratic *Civitas Dei*. As registered, the French Enlightenment reserves "nothing but raillery and disgust" both for Lutheranism and Calvinism, as the First and Second Reformation respectively, namely Luther's narrow definition of his "new faith" and especially "Calvin's theology" (Artz 1998). The underlying reason is that for the Enlightenment the "laws of nature and the use of reason" form the "basis" for truth, liberty and progress rather than, as the Reformation did, evaluating "all" statements and judgments by the "holy" authority of the Bible with Voltaire's identified "childish absurdities" (Artz 1998), not to mention what Pareto also identified as its nonscientific "errors." On this account, the Protestant Reformation represented a sort of implicit anti-Enlightenment and hence antiliberalism and antirationalism before, rather than a stepping stone, as Parsons et al. imply, for the Enlightenment itself and modern liberalism and rationalism, just as the explicit anti-Renaissance in adverse reaction to the artistic and humanistic Renaissance. In a way, by returning to what the Age of Reason are the Bible's "childish absurdities," were for, including nonscientific "errors," elevated to the sole basis of truth, law, and society, thus regressing even further into the Dark Middle Ages than Comte's "most degenerate Catholicism," the Reformation substantively, as Weber implies, diverged from the Enlightenment, just as in Pareto's view, wherever and whenever successful, reversed the Renaissance or prevented it from spreading, as in Puritan America. In this sense, Luther, notably Calvin and his Puritan theological "children" Cromwell and Winthrop and colleagues. on one hand, and Voltaire, Kant, Condorcet, Hume, Jefferson, as well as Hobbes, de Vinci, Copernicus, etc. on the other, were as different or opposite as (often literally) "heaven and earth," with the rare exception of Rousseau extolling as its "proud citizen," Geneva's Calvinist theocracy as a model.

From the stance of the Enlightenment, by what Weber calls "Calvinistic state churches" in Europe (Geneva, Holland) and via Puritanism in England and America (and Presbyterianism in Scotland), Calvinism degenerated into the "darkest," notably



the most oppressive, theocratic, inhumane, and irrational or superstitious species of not only Protestantism but also the Christian religion, thus of the pre-Enlightenment in the Western world. In consequence, the Enlightenment admittedly develops as a movement “totally antithetical” (Bremer 1995) to Calvinism and its Anglo-Saxon sectarian derivative, Puritanism (and Presbyterianism). This observation admits that even in America the Enlightenment in its Jeffersonian transfer becomes in part, antithetical to and eventually supersedes Puritanism as just “American Calvinism” (German 1995) and the “most totalitarian” (Stivers 1994; Munch 2001) Calvinist subtype, even if working together against a common adversary during the Revolution (Byrne 1997). Minimally, this holds true on the account of the Enlightenment, as embodied by Jefferson and Madison, being primarily instrumental in rejecting Puritanism’s theocratic and hyperascetic vision of America as “Christian Sparta” (Gould 1996; Kloppenberg 1998) and disestablishing its Calvinist theocracy via the Congregational Church in postrevolutionary times, as in New England during the 1830s.

Predictably, the Enlightenment especially rejects and overcomes the “Calvinist mistrust of the powers of human reason” (Byrne 1997). By implication, it does so because from the stance of the Enlightenment such mistrust axiomatically displays – in factor-analytical terms, “loaded” on – Calvinist irrationalism or antirationalism, *pace* Weber-Parsons’ rationalistic thesis. In that sense, it exhibits “darkness,” as exemplified by the primitive belief in witches and the practice of witch trials, especially pervasive in American Puritanism (Harley 1996) and through the even more persistent and widespread beliefs in the devil and antirationalistic “monkey trials” of science, its heir “born again” fundamentalism. Precisely, human reason is expected and gradually has succeeded, as in modern advanced societies, to overcome or illuminate the Calvinist “reformed” or purified medieval-style darkness or irrationalism, including “witches” and witch trials and the “satan.” Simply, in modern Enlightenment-based civil society like Western Europe (France, Scandinavia, etc.) there is virtually *no* such thing as “satan” (Glaeser 2004), let alone his/her associates “witches.” Instead, these creatures continue to “exist” as superstitions or irrational beliefs in those societies with comparatively weak or nonexistent Enlightenment traditions like conservative America and Islamic countries, respectively. For instance, such emotional ramifications of unemotional Calvinism as Pietism in Germany and revivalist Puritan Methodism in England and America developed “parallel” to and usually against, thus being “largely untouched,” by the Enlightenment (Byrne 1997). This applies even more so to original Calvinism in Europe by counterattacking the Enlightenment as “ungodly” and “false” and instead seeking to reinvent its own “godly” enlightenment in the form of “enlightened faith,” as in Geneva by Calvin’s heirs (Sorkin 2005). Predictably, such antagonism implicates official Calvinist Puritanism in America by condemning Jefferson and colleagues as “evil” and “wicked” (Baldwin 2006; German 1995).

As also suggested, the Enlightenment makes the utilitarian “union of morality and utility” devoid of “religious veneer,” thus contrasting with and transcending Locke’s Puritan-rooted “godly” utilitarianism (Zaret 1989). In addition, except for its Scottish version, it dissolves or relaxes the utilitarian “union of morality and utility” itself by disassociating the former from the latter, as exemplified by Kant’s rejection of

Benthamite utilitarianism in favor of an ethics considering humans within the “kingdom of ends” (Habermas 2001) rather than the useful means à la Machiavelli to other sacred and secular goals. This confirms that regarding the relation of “morality and utility” as an element of civil society, just as religious liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism as another ingredient, the Enlightenment substantively differs from and goes beyond Lockean supposed Puritan “liberalism” (Kloppenbergh 1998), including “freedom” and “toleration” in religion, as spurious à la “Christian liberty” for Puritans or at most Protestants only, thus partial and insufficient.

Conversely, it affirms that Puritanism, like Calvinism overall, is not a stepping stone to the Enlightenment but an exemplary case of the pre- and implicitly anti-Enlightenment, and that “liberal” Puritan Locke was not really an equivalent of Voltaire, Kant, and Hume but instead a sort of Protestant version of medieval Catholic theologians, like Calvin and his Geneva theocracy (the “pope” and “Rome of Protestantism”). Puritan Locke’s, like Calvin’s, case prefigured Calvinist Rousseau, who in terms of a liberal-secular civil society, including religious liberty, tolerance, and pluralism, was not akin, but vehemently opposed to Voltaire, and implicitly Kant and Hume. The cases of Locke and Calvin confirm that theocratic Puritanism and Calvinism generally was originally part and parcel of the medieval pre- and by implication anti-Enlightenment. Then, Rousseau and Calvin’s other heirs in Geneva and beyond affirm that Calvinism subsequently became, directly or indirectly via its Puritan sectarian ramifications, like Presbyterianism, Baptism, and Methodism in America, a type of anti-Enlightenment in adverse reaction to Enlightenment liberalism, secularism,<sup>8</sup> and scientific rationalism (Juergensmeyer 1994), as exemplified by the Calvinist antiliberal, antiseccular, and antirationalistic Great Awakenings (Archer 2001; German 1995; Means 1966).

Calvinism remains so via Puritan survivals or revivals in America by the early twenty-first century. For instance, “born again” US Puritan-inspired fundamentalists are observed to be particularly antagonistic to or “unhappy” with the “Enlightenment formulation of church-state separation” to be reversed by “reconstructing” America as a “Christian society” and using the Bible as the “basis” for the “nation’s law and social order”<sup>9</sup> (Juergensmeyer 2003). Notably, they are vehemently opposed to, to the point of “holy” war against, “wicked” (German 1995) Jefferson’s Enlightenment-inspired formulation: “Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should

<sup>8</sup>Juergensmeyer (1994:45) observes that “the Puritans, with their theocratic revolt against the increasing secularism of seventeenth-century English politics, may be regarded as precursors of modern antiseccular radicals” or Christian and other (Islamic, etc.) fundamentalists.

<sup>9</sup>Juergensmeyer (2003:28) notes that US contemporary fundamentalists like “Reconstruction” theologians regard the history of Protestant politics since the early years of the Reformation as having taken a bad turn, and they are especially unhappy with the Enlightenment formulation of church-state separation. They feel it necessary to “reconstruct” Christian society by turning to the Bible as the basis for a nation’s law and social order.

“make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building “a wall of eternal separation between Church and State.”

In general, Locke’s (and Calvin’s) and Rousseau’s cases confirm that for the life-world of the Enlightenment and liberalism, medieval Calvinist-Puritan, like Catholic, *Civitas Dei* proves to be pre-democracy, via its revival from the “dead past,” anticivil society, just as, analogously, pre- and antidemocracy. This includes the spurious nature, inherent limits or insufficiency, and the ultimate elimination of religious liberty, choice, tolerance, and pluralism in Calvinism and its sectarian amplification Puritanism. Evidently, even in its supposedly “best” or “most” moderate versions like Locke-Rousseau’s, Calvinist-Puritan “civil society” and “democracy,” including its supposed ingredient of religious “freedom” and “toleration” only for “true believers,” is deceptive, deficient, and primitive, and eventually antagonistic and nihilistic, relative to its Enlightenment-liberal version.

### ***The Agent Provocateur of the Conservative Anti-Enlightenment***

In turn, by superseding both the Protestant and Catholic pre-Enlightenment *Civitas Dei* as precivil and predemocratic society, the Enlightenment acts as the agent provocateur of the anti-Enlightenment in adverse reaction (and selection) seeking to restore this social order, such as the *ancien regime* in France, glorified as the “golden past” or “paradise lost.” Originally, the anti-Enlightenment assumes the form of Protestant, Catholic, and other Christian (and non-Christian) medieval orthodoxy revived or reinvented as religious-political conservatism in opposition to the Enlightenment and liberalism condemned and attacked as “ungodly” and thus “false,” as Calvin’s heirs did in Geneva (Sorkin 2005), enlightenment and liberation.

Subsequently, it has assumed the form of Protestant, Catholic, and other “godly” fascism, including Nazism, as an extreme subtype of conservatism and antiliberalism overall, as happened in interwar Europe. Its more recent functionally equivalent form is also “godly” neoconservatism, including revived religious fundamentalism and/or neofascism these being typically merged or allied, so virtually indistinguishable from each other, especially in contemporary America. Neoconservatism has been especially pervasive and prominent, even until recently dominant, in America (to be) reconstructed by neoconservatives (so-called “neo-cons”), including “born again” fundamentalists and/or “Christian” neofascist movements (Munch 2001) as “faith-based” society (Juergensmeyer 2003) after the model of the Puritan “Biblical Commonwealth” as “paradise lost,” and to a lesser extent Europe, particularly Great Britain during Thatcherism (and in a Catholic proxy theocratic Poland).

Conversely, as Mannheim (1986) shows, anti-Enlightenment religious and social conservatism was born out of pre-Enlightenment traditionalism in the form of Protestant and Catholic medieval *Civitas Dei*, becoming “self-reflective” and antagonistic vis-à-vis the Enlightenment and its “child,” emerging liberal civil society and modernity. On this account, the conservative anti-Enlightenment, as embodied by Maistre and Burke, is an instance of the medieval “empire strikes back,” as the latter actually did through the Roman Christian “holy empire” and

its hostile Protestant functional equivalents like Calvinist-Puritan “Biblical commonwealths” striking against the Enlightenment and its project of liberal-secular civil society and democracy. For instance, the “empire strikes back” in America by the early twenty-first century through the “Bible Belt” continuing and even intensifying fundamentalist antagonism to or “unhappiness” with the “Enlightenment formulation of church-state separation” in favor of recreating the “new nation” as a medieval or primitive (e.g., from year 1 AD) “Christian society” based on the Bible (Juergensmeyer 2003). On a lighter note, in the case of Maistre and Burke, as its conservative examples and emblems, the anti-Enlightenment is what Americans would call the “revenge of the nerds” in the face of medieval “godly” Catholic and Protestant aristocrats seeking to resurrect from the dead the past feudal aristocracy and *ancien regime* (Parsons 1967a). This description could be extended to US anti-Enlightenment neoconservatives, including “born again” fundamentalists and/or “Christian” neo-Nazi groups, if not for the detail that they, unlike Maistre, Burke, Tocqueville, etc., are typically and even proudly anti-intellectual a la Reagan and colleagues’ “plain talk.” They rely less on “word” than on the Biblical “sword” through “holy” war against the secular government or counter-state religious terrorism when not in power (Juergensmeyer 2003), just as violent repression and crusade-like culture/military wars once in dominance, thus state terror (Turk 2004).

As observed, the Enlightenment undermines the “foundations of religious life” in Europe with the effect of medieval “religious orthodoxy,” Catholic and Protestant in unison, reacting in a “mindless defensive battle” (Habermas 2001). In the process, this reaction expands and results in religious and generally social as well as political anti-Enlightenment reactionary conservatism exemplified by Maistre and Burke, in defense and attempted revival of medieval Catholic and Protestant “Christian” orthodoxy and its *Civitas Dei*. Admittedly, Roman Catholic and Protestant (Lutheran and Calvinist) religious orthodoxies, while otherwise disunited and mutually hostile, become “thoroughly united” in their adverse reaction to the Enlightenment’s “emerging scientific and rational world view” (Byrne 1997). The observation affirms that the Enlightenment operates as the agent provocateur, thus true, though a sort of serendipitous, unifier of Protestant and Catholic religious and social conservatism. Through its legacy, it still does by the early twenty-first century, also unifying the two, including their subtype or ally neofascism, with none than their mortal enemy (Islamic fundamentalism) at various occasions (international conferences on civic liberties and human rights, etc.) on a common front against the Enlightenment-based reality of modern liberal-secular civil society and democracy, including the separation of church and state (Juergensmeyer 2003). At this juncture, to invert Marx’s (in)famous proclamation, Protestant and Catholic, Christian and Muslim, and all fascist and other enemies of the Enlightenment “unite,” as they apparently have done and do.

The Enlightenment serendipitously uniting medieval religious orthodoxies expresses, first, a Protestant-Catholic, and second, Christian-Islamic variation on the old theme and practice of, as Simmel observes, “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” The Enlightenment, with its “child” liberal civil society, is defined, condemned, and attacked as the common enemy of both Protestantism and Catholicism, and generally theocratic Christianity and fundamentalist Islam, otherwise mutual enemies,

as well as by fascism and neofascism. These (and other) religious groups thus become anti-Enlightenment “friends” or “brothers in arms,” often literally as in their shared “holy” antiseccular wars, from their alliances against private liberties and rights (birth control, medical research, etc.) at global conferences to religious terrorism (Juergensmeyer 2003). That not only official Catholicism but also orthodox Protestantism, including Lutheranism and Calvinism, formed the conservative anti-Enlightenment is indicated by that in the late eighteenth century reportedly “some Protestant countries” experienced counter-Enlightenment Calvinist and Puritan “religious revivals,” such as Pietism in Germany and the “Methodist revival” in England and America, countering “any naive misunderstanding” of the period as “godless” (Byrne 1997).

Notably, Catholic and Protestant “united” religious orthodoxies condemn and attack the secular Enlightenment as “un-Christian,” “ungodly,” thus “false” to be reversed and replaced by “Christian,” “godly,” and so “true” enlightenment, as effectively the counter-Enlightenment<sup>10</sup> (Schmidt 1996). As noted, particularly Calvinism attacks the “false” secular Enlightenment and produced its own alternative of “true” religious enlightenment, thus substantively the counter-Enlightenment, antiliberalism, and, as Weber admits, antimodernism. Recall Weber finds that Protestantism, especially strict, ascetic Calvinism, is in *no* way and sense “connected with the Enlightenment” and “had precious little to do with” social progress such that to “the whole aspect of modern life, it was directly hostile.” For instance, Calvin’s theocratic heirs in Geneva (Vernet) condemned the French Enlightenment, including Voltaire’s secular ideas, as “false” because of its perceived “indifference, deism and the subversion of Christianity” (Sorkin 2005), and claimed to create their “Christian” alternative of “enlightenment,” as did (with contradictions typical of) its “proud citizen,” Calvinist Rousseau as the first insider anti-Enlightenment figure (Garrard 2003).

## The Enlightenment and the Creation of Modern Civil Society

### *Civic Innovation*

Positively, the Enlightenment constitutes the process of intellectual innovation or projection of modern civil society, like democracy, thus as a truly “innovating movement.” Specifically, it is not only Hayek’s deplored “terminator” of medieval

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<sup>10</sup>Schmidt (1996:8) cites the statement of Moser, an adversary of the Enlightenment in Germany, that “all enlightenment that is not grounded in and supported by [Christian] religion is not only the way to destruction, immorality, and depravity, but also to the dissolution and ruin of all civil society, and to a war of the human race within itself, that begins with philosophy and ends with scalping and cannibalism.”

Christian Catholic and Protestant *Civitas Dei* as a precivil and predemocratic social order. It is also Mises', a curious contradiction between the two "libertarians," creator of post-Christian, secular civil society and democracy. It hence represents the exemplary force of creative destruction with respect to modern civil society. Admittedly, the Enlightenment's overcoming of Christian and any *Civitas Dei* is at the root of modern "predominantly secular" civil society, as manifest in the "de-Christianizing of Europe" (Byrne 1997) and to a lesser extent America, specifically its Jeffersonian liberal ("blue") side (Kloppenber 1998), since. Thus, during the early twenty-first century the Enlightenment-rooted "de-Christianizing of Europe" is manifest in what are observed as "post-Christian" Scandinavian and other Western European societies, with some minor exceptions (e.g., postcommunist hyper-Catholic Poland), in contrast to and opposition by "Christian" evangelical, "faith-based" America as a salient "deviant case" (Inglehart 2004). It is this deviation from Enlightenment-based post-Christian secular civil society and democracy, rather than superior individual and democratic liberties (Lipset and Marks 2000), that redefines and reveals the true nature of the "phenomenon of American exceptionalism" (Inglehart 2004) that conservatism reproduces and glorifies. In this respect, the latter proves a "striking" (Inglehart and Baker 2000) non-Western, notably Islamic-like, exception cum perversion from rather than a "model" (Lipset and Marks 2000) or "leader" of Western civilization. For a secular civil society, like the rationalistic Enlightenment, originally is, as Weber implies, a distinctly "Western" phenomenon, and remains by the twenty-first century, with "Westernized" exceptions such as Japan and Turkey, thus confirming rather than refuting the "rule."

Modern liberal-secular civil society, like modernity as whole, is in a way the supreme sociological achievement, victory, and legacy, simply what Hegel calls the "child" and Mises, referring to modern liberalism, the "flower" of the Enlightenment (Byrne 1997), first and foremost, while in continuity and conjunction with the Renaissance and classical civilization. Alternatively, it is not, or just secondarily, the outcome of pre- and anti-Enlightenment social factors, such as medieval Catholic-Protestant religious orthodoxy's creation of *Civitas Dei* and conservatism's recreation or design of "godly" society like "faith-based," "Christian" America. And, this "child" is demonized, attacked, and transiently exorcized as "illegitimate" and "evil" or "witch" via literal or figurative witch trials by the anti-Enlightenment seeking to restore the ex ante state of Christian *Civitas Dei*, with the resulting conflicts between the Enlightenment's "new cosmopolitan" civil society and culture and political and religious traditionalism (Byrne 1997).

For instance, its earliest and perhaps most "enlightened" critic Hegel considered the "development of that uniquely modern domain" of secular civil society to be the "irrevocable achievement" of the age of the Western Enlightenment (Schmidt 1996) as the admitted epitome or climax of "enlightenment" beginning with classical civilization and philosophy (Angel 1994). As observed, the Enlightenment primarily contributes to establishing the modern "dialectical connection" between social pluralism or "pluralization of forms of life" and individual liberties and choices or "individualization of lifestyles" in that a "functionally differentiated" civil society becomes "decentered," while state, like church, losing its status of the "political

apex” integrating the functions of total society<sup>11</sup> (Habermas 1996). The “liberal Enlightenment thinkers” admittedly envision the “emerging civil society” as a force counteracting the “proclaimed public authority of the absolute monarchy”<sup>12</sup> (Ku 2000). In its original and continuing vision, civil society would entail discussion and debate and reach a sort of “negotiated” consensus about “Enlightenment ideas of the rights of man, popular sovereignty, republicanism, and democratization” (Langman 2005). As skeptical sociologists acknowledge, the Enlightenment itself and also via its legacy does provide “democratic” solutions to certain “fundamental and fateful” problems of civil society<sup>13</sup> (Alexander 2001a).

As even postmodern critics recognize, the “modern project” of secular civil society and democracy “derives” from the Enlightenment<sup>14</sup> (Smart 2000) and early liberalism is the “heroic ages of critical thought” operating against all form of

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<sup>11</sup> Habermas (1996:418–419) comments that the economy and state administration tend to expand into and beyond the “horizons of the lifeworld,” thus to “colonize” it and threaten the autonomy of civil society from both (and church) in modern capitalist societies. Also, echoing Habermas, Langman (2005:4953) suggests that “with the growth of capital, the rational interests of the system increasingly colonized the life world.”

<sup>12</sup> However, Ku (2000:227) proposes that since “the public signifies a domain of citizenship attached to both state and civil society (one should abandon) the Enlightenment dichotomy between public/state and private/market/civil society.”

<sup>13</sup> Alexander (2001a:243) asks are outsiders “rational or irrational, honest or deceitful, open or secretive, autonomous or dependent?” and suggests that the “democratic, Enlightenment answers to this pair of fundamental and fateful questions are straightforward, but objects that ‘in real civil societies, however, such morally correct answers have not been fully forthcoming.’” In this view, the “difficulty” for liberalism and the “participants in these actually existing civil societies is that these contradictory dimensions of formally democratic social systems did not, and do not, express themselves in a transparent way [but] hidden by constitutional principles and Enlightenment culture alike. For the public world was not nearly so shielded from the vagaries of the private worlds as Enlightenment and constitutional thinking proclaimed” (Alexander 2001a:241). In particular, Alexander (2001a:244) proposes that “civic education is not an opening up to the abstract qualities of Enlightenment rationality per se (but) learning how to embody and express those qualities that allow *core group* members persuasively and legitimately to exhibit civil competence.”

<sup>14</sup> Smart (2000:448) claims that the Enlightenment “modern project” of society is “increasingly being called into question and rendered problematic.” Smart (2000:448–450) adds that the “implied skepticism about the Enlightenment equation of increasing rationality with progress in respect of ‘justice, virtue, equality, freedom, and happiness’ is by no means confined to [‘postmodern’] analyses,” positing the “inappropriateness of the Enlightenment assumption of the rational autonomous subject.” In his view, a “critical preoccupation with the dark side of the Enlightenment has been a persistent feature of European thought since at least the end of the nineteenth century, a feature that has become more prominent of late” (Smart 2000:456). This yields the inference that “while the *rhetoric* of emancipation may persist, the modern Enlightenment *ideal* has been tarnished. [The Enlightenment’s intrinsic] idea that progress in science, technology, art, and politics would produce an enlightened and liberated humanity, a humanity freed from the degradations of poverty, ignorance, and despotism remains not only unrealized, but increasingly in question” (Smart 2000:459). For example, Smart (2000: 461) approvingly cites Baudrillard’s postmodern view that “since the Enlightenment, the West has constituted itself as ‘a culture *in the universal*’ and all other cultures have been ‘entered in its museum as vestiges of its own image.’”

“illusion–superstitious, religious, or ideological”<sup>15</sup> (Baudrillard 1994c). Still, except for such admissions, postmodernism as a social theory generally deconstructs or distrusts “Enlightenment values of rationalism, individualism and historical progress”<sup>16</sup> (Angel 1994) foundational of modern civil society, culture, politics and economy, and is thus antimodernism<sup>17</sup> (Shapin 1995). Postmodern critics are observed to aim “directly and unreservedly against the Enlightenment” (Habermas 2001) and its vision and legacy (“dialectic”) of modern civil society as well as democracy.

As noted, the Enlightenment movement itself constitute or functions as a sort of microscopic secular civil society and liberal culture on its own right. This is epitomized by the “salon culture of Paris” (Garrard 2003; Langman 2005) as the epicenter or meeting point of most French and other European representatives of the Enlightenment, including Voltaire, Diderot, Holbach, Hume, Jefferson, and Franklin,

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<sup>15</sup>Baudrillard’s (1994c) states that “one may dream of a happy conjunction of idea and reality, in the shadow of the Enlightenment and of modernity, in the heroic ages of critical thought. But that thought, which operated against a form of illusion – superstitious, religious, or ideological – is substantially over.” Also, he objects that “in the Euclidean space of history, the shortest path between two points is the straight line (like that) of Progress and Democracy. But this is only true of the linear space of the Enlightenment” (Baudrillard 1994a:10). In this view, in particular “logically, racism should have diminished thanks to Enlightenments progress. But, the more we know that a genetic theory of race is unfounded, the more racism is reinforced” (Baudrillard 1994b). A variation on these postmodernist critiques is the anthropological critique of “the Enlightenment faith in pure reason and in the social progress that rationality is supposed to engender” (Marcus and Fischer 1986:117).

<sup>16</sup>Angel (1994:34) adds that the “postmodernist insistence on incommensurability and/or tradition-relativism is at odds with what is actually managing to take place, and has managed to take place [i.e.] the transformation of the world into an interlocking network if not a global village.” In his view, postmodernists “are out of touch with both the historical and contemporary realities of human interaction and dialogue within single cultures and across disparate cultures” and infers that radical postmodernism “does not succeed in its critique of modernism” (Angel 1994:35). Notably, Angel (1994:346) suggests that abandoning (Western) “Enlightenment scientism and objectivity in order to rediscover” mysticism would only “compound” the problem, for “without objective thinking we are led into parochial nationalisms, and subtle chauvinisms.” He concludes that the “correct target of current postmodernist [e.g. feminist, pessimist] critiques of control-minded approaches to nature, is the ego-driven, patriarchal chiefdom structure manifested in all its forms, and not the objective thinking which underlies scientific ideals, democratic ideals, and the ideals of social justice” (Angel 1994:346).

<sup>17</sup>Shapin (1995) remarks that anti- or postmodernism “tackles the great Enlightenment dualisms” such as nature/culture, human/nonhuman, and the like “in order to display their historical specificity and thereby to reject them.” In particular, he suggests that feminism, as part of anti- or postmodernism, “often has its own intellectual and frankly political agenda” (Shapin 1995). In turn, Berman (2000:51) states that, as a vital element of liberal civil society and culture, the “old university, prior to postmodernism and political correctness, entertained Enlightenment goals that energized it” and that “all this is gone now [as] postmodernism brought to the table not merely the denial of truth but also the denial of the *ideal* of truth.” For illustration, he comments that when antimodernist or militant feminists “can say that Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony is filled with “the throttling, murderous rage of a rapist incapable of attaining release,” we see how nakedly sick the deconstructive enterprise finally is. This is not merely intellectual failure; it is moral failure as well” (Berman 2000:51). Berman (2000:56) concludes that “it is one thing to see the limits of the Enlightenment tradition after you have studied it for a few decades. It’s another to reject it before you have ever been exposed to it,” as done by postmodernism, including feminism.



with only Rousseau feeling “uncomfortable” in, attacking, and eventually leaving the Parisian setting for its Spartan opposite, Calvinist Geneva. As registered, in eighteenth century France (in particular Paris), coffeehouses and salons form the “public sphere,” in which they and others would discuss and debate “Enlightenment ideas” diffused through books, notably the *Encyclopedia*, thus becoming the “central moment” of civil society (Langman 2005). For instance, even Calvinist Rousseau occasionally attended “the salons of Paris,” although he eventually deplored and resented its “salon culture” in favor of the “rough Spartan manliness of Geneva”<sup>18</sup> (Garrard 2003), the theocratic paradise of Calvinism, or the “Rome of Protestantism.”

The Enlightenment’s vision and its own microrealization of secular civil society is attacked by its opponents, especially the conservative anti-Enlightenment seeking to resurrect medieval *Civitas Dei* as its “holy” (per)version, from the “Holy” Roman-Catholic Empire to the “Holy” Puritan Commonwealths in England and America, etc. Reportedly, the Enlightenment vision or practice of civil society as the realm of enlightened and free human life or the life-world and “enlightenment” has generally been and remains “always right” against its religious adversaries<sup>19</sup> (Bittner 1996). Arguably, the “sacred” counter-arguments against the Enlightenment are not tenable as long as the life-world or a “good human life” does not necessarily presuppose and need “something holy” and even would be “better” without the latter<sup>20</sup> (Bittner 1996), especially its intrinsic depreciation and destruction, as via “cosmic war” and religious violence (Juergensmeyer 2003) of humans and their lives for “greater than life” divine causes and entities. In summary, they are irrational arguments for “superstition” practiced “long” in human, including Western, society and history and against the “short” practice of the Enlightenment with which many are not “at home” yet (Bittner 1996). Still, the “appetite” for the Enlightenment and its legacy, like other “good things,” reportedly arises and increases rather than decreases with the “eating” (Bittner 1996).

### *The Human Life-World and the “Holy”*

To develop and clarify the above argument, by implication for the Enlightenment and its legacy of secular humanism, a “good” life-world or human life would not need and indeed be “better” without the “holy” or “sacred,” including, though not always, God, defining religion for a set of plausible intertwined and mutually reinforcing reasons.

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<sup>18</sup>Garrard (2003:1) remarks that “even after his “reform,” which took Rousseau back to his native city in 1754 to be readmitted to the Calvinist Church and to have his Genevan citizenship restored, he returned to the salons of Paris.”

<sup>19</sup>Bittner (1996:352–3) adds that “no particular kind of argument is specific for enlightenment, but its end is – which is desecration” and that the “reasons against enlightenment follow one pattern: reducing the high to the low, enlightenment deprives us of something vital.” For instance, “it is an inconvenience “to take blessed water and to have masses read,” [as is] to declare one’s allegiance to a national flag” (Bittner 1996:356).

<sup>20</sup>Bittner (1996:355–6) adds that “it is not true that respect and love require the mysterious and inaccessible [for] we do not know of human nature in these matters, we only know of human history.”

First and foremost, the “holy” or religion operates directly or indirectly against “good human life” in virtue (or if) being antihumanistic for the Enlightenment. The “holy” is especially antihumanistic by depreciating, subordinating, and ultimately sacrificing, literally or figuratively, humans and their lives, as in Durkheim’s antinomy, as “profane” to “sacred” supra- and antihuman entities and “greater than life” causes, like divinity and providential design (Bendix 1984) as a “higher authority” (Juergensmeyer 2003). Such depreciation is premised on the idea and practice of human sacrifice as “central to religion” and the “most fundamental form of religiosity” in the form of a “rite of destruction” (Juergensmeyer 2003), including killing other humans and oneself, as what Weber registers (for Puritan Methodism) as the “methodical” doctrine and action of “sanctification” or attaining “holiness.” A common element of world and virtually all religions<sup>21</sup> (Juergensmeyer 2003), as Weber observes this is epitomized by Protestantism’s opposition to “joy of living” characteristic of the Enlightenment, particularly the “extreme inhumanity” of Calvinism, including its antihumanistic, exclusionary, and harsh dogma of predestination (Fourcade and Healy 2007) and its commandment that “humans exist for the sake of God, and not God for the sake of humans” (Bendix 1977).

Second, the Enlightenment argues that the “holy” or religion is antithetical and destructive to “good human life” in a direct and explicit way. Arguably, the “holy” tends to be violent or militant and militarist through its inner “cosmic” wars consummating Durkheim’s “profane” versus “sacred” antinomy or “incommensurable divide”<sup>22</sup> (Friedland 2001) to the point of religious terrorism (Juergensmeyer 2003), against outsiders and “infidels,” including other believers and nonbelievers or secularists, as representing the “unholy” or “evil” thus demonized and destroyed or persecuted as “enemies.” The “holy” first invidiously divides humans into “godly” and “good” insiders or believers *and* “ungodly” and “evil” outside or unbelievers, according to US “reborn” fundamentalists, “people like us” and “people not like us” (Lichterman 2008). Then, it (patho)logically commands a “holy” war of extermination or genocide by the first against the second to be, as US fundamentalists advocate, persecuted and perished<sup>23</sup> or “exterminated” in a “religious Armageddon”

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<sup>21</sup>Juergensmeyer (2003:167–8) observe that sacrifice is a “rite of destruction that is found, remarkably, in virtually every religious tradition in the world. What makes sacrifice so riveting is not just that it involves killing, but also that it is, in an ironic way, ennobling. The “destruction is performed within a religious context that transforms the killing into something positive” He adds that “there is some evidence that ancient religious rites of sacrifice, like the destruction involved in modern-day terrorism, were performances involving the murder of living beings” (Juergensmeyer 2003:167).

<sup>22</sup>Friedland (2001:130) comments that “religion gravitates naturally to the language and the postures of war. For warfare is an occasion for the display and adjudication of absolute, non-negotiable differences [viz.] the incommensurable divide [by Durkheim] between the sacred and the profane [i.e.] an absolute partitioning into good and evil mapped onto us and them.” In his view, the “capacity for violence ultimately marks the sacred. To violently broach the public sphere is to declare the absence of state guarantee, a state without God being a profane state, a profanity demonstrated by violence against the state” (Friedland 2001:130).

<sup>23</sup>For instance, a US Bible-Belt Southern Baptist pastor was reported to proclaim (to his “flock”) in 2008: “Persecute [nonevangelicals and the ungodly]. Let them perish and let [their] children be fatherless, and [their wives] widow[s].”

(Juergensmeyer 2003), at best excluded from civil society and politics (Edgell et al. 2006) as the maximum that “infidels” can hope for and get.

The preceding is also found to be a universal element of world religions, as indicated by the “virtual universality of violence in religious images and ideas,” with “holy” war providing the setting and rationale for actual or symbolic sacrifice of other humans and oneself (“martyrs”) to suprahuman forces and causes<sup>24</sup> (Juergensmeyer 2003). Recall intrinsic religious “holy” war is exemplified by Christian crusades both in the sense of medieval religious wars and modern culture wars, especially in America, resorting to physical and symbolic violence or power (Bourdieu 1988) respectively, and by the Islamic jihad as a general spiritual struggle and militarist expedition alike (Turner 2002), and even their variants in supposedly pacifist Buddhism<sup>25</sup> (Juergensmeyer 2003). In particular, a paradigmatic example is American Puritanism’s prospect of “total annihilation” or collective suicide through a “holy” war against “evil” in the form of modern liberal-secular civil society and democracy and “infidels” *cum* liberals and secularists as the most certain path to Calvinist “salvation” (Adorno 2001), thus a truly MAD (mutually assured destruction) outcome (Habermas 2001). In summary, most world religions reportedly provide a sort of “moral license to kill”<sup>26</sup> by, for example, “soldiers for Christ and country” in America and “soldiers and servants in the cause of Allah” (Juergensmeyer 2003) in Islamic countries, thus for “greater-than-humans-and-life” causes.

Third, for the Enlightenment the “holy” or religion is antithetical and destructive to “good human life” in an indirect and implicit way. This is that the “holy” tends to be antiliberal by opposing and destroying individual, especially private moral, liberties and choices as “ungodly” for the sake of “higher” forces and causes like “deity,” “faith,” “church,” and “morality.” This is also found to be a common element of world religions. It is epitomized in the Protestant Reformation’s, notably Calvinism-Puritanism’s, commandment, “you think you have escaped from the

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<sup>24</sup>Juergensmeyer (2003:169) comments that religious warfare can be seen as a “blend of sacrifice and martyrdom: sacrificing members of the enemy’s side and offering up martyrs on one’s own.” For instance, the “Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist cultures of violence” today “rely on [their] precedents and [theological] justifications for their own acts of religious violence” (Juergensmeyer 2003:218). Overall, Juergensmeyer (2003:242) concludes that modern religious violence or terrorism “has much to do with the nature of the religious imagination, which always has had the propensity to absolutize and to project images of cosmic war.”

<sup>25</sup>Juergensmeyer (2003:156–7) observes that the “idea of warfare has long had an eerie and intimate relationship with religion. History is studded with overtly religious conflicts such as the Crusades, the Muslim conquests, and the Wars of Religion that dominated the politics of France in the sixteenth century.

The Muslim notion of *jihad* is the most notable example, but even in Buddhist legends great wars are to be found.”

<sup>26</sup>Juergensmeyer (2003:215) remarks that the “very act of killing on behalf of a moral [religious] code is a political statement.” Generally, religious fundamentalists or terrorists “would do virtually anything if they thought it had been sanctioned by divine mandate or conceived in the mind of God” (Juergensmeyer 2003:216).

monastery, but everyone must now be a monk throughout his life,” cited by Weber. This is a paradigmatic statement of antiliberal antagonism and nihilism toward individual moral and related liberty and thus private or “good” human life.

Fourth, to the Enlightenment, the “holy” or religion directly or indirectly functions against “good human life” in that it is antiprogressive, including antiscientific, retrogressive, and antimodern. The “holy” does so by obstructing or retarding social progress, the improvement of the “human condition” (Mumford 1944) in society, while reproducing or sanctifying regression, eternal misery in “this world,” stagnation, or the petrification of the old regime in the image, if not the form, of Mises’ “peace of the cemetery.” This is also observed to be a common element of world religions, and is manifest and salient even in supposedly progressive and rationalist or “pro-capitalist” Calvinism and Protestantism. Recall this is what Weber acknowledges by observing that the latter “had precious little to do” with social progress and to “the whole aspect of modern life, it was directly hostile.”

Fifth, for the Enlightenment the “holy” or religion directly or indirectly functions against “good human life” in that it is basically anti- or deceptively egalitarian, exclusionary, and unjust. The “holy” is so by establishing an invidious distinction, and thus inequality and unfairness between “true believers” and “infidels,” insiders and outsiders, simply “us” versus “them” to be exterminated as the Pareto-style optimum, excluded as the “second best,” despite the rhetoric of “equality,” “justice,” and “inclusion.” Also, found to be a common, though somewhat incipient or hidden, element of world and all religions, it is epitomized *inter alia* in the “deceptive egalitarianism of the Christian faith” (Dahrendorf 1979) and its proxies like “Islamic justice” in Islam (Davis and Robinson 2006). A particular example is the overt anti-egalitarianism and exclusionism of Calvinism, including its theological dogma of predestination *and* its theocratic practices, and its transplant Puritanism and its own heir or revival, “born again” American fundamentalism excluding “infidels” like atheists, agnostics, etc. as supremely “un-American” from civil society and culture (Edgell et al. 2006), not to mention politics such that the “law of the land” or expectations is that “ungodly need not apply for political office” in the “Bible Belt” and beyond.

Last, but really not the least, for the Enlightenment and its secular humanism, a “good human life” would not need and indeed be “better” without the “holy” or religion on the grounds of its ideals and legacies of human reason and scientific rationalism and evidence. This holds true insofar as the “holy” turns out to be Hobbes’ fancy or delusion, illusion, fantasy, and superstition contradicted by empirical reality, notably knowledge and science, for example, “Christian” by scientific astronomy, Christian-Islamic “creationism” by evolutionism, Christian-Islamic “climate science,” “medicine,” “economics,” and “sociology” by their scientific forms, etc. Also observed in world and all religions, such fancies, fantasies, and superstitions are exemplified in the shared Christian-Islamic and other religious beliefs in “satan” and “witches” only to be refuted and superseded by the Enlightenment (Byrne 1997) and modern science and knowledge (Glaeser 2004), medieval and contemporary millennialism a la “one-thousand year Kingdom of God,” including the Catholic and Protestant “fantasy of salvation” (Giddens

1984), and the like. Simply, to the Enlightenment a “good human life” would not need and indeed be “better” without the “holy” or religion *if* the latter is fanciful in Hobbes’ sense as well as anti- and suprahuman or inhumane in Weber’s. The conditional “if” means that the Enlightenment, especially in its scientific or sociological aspect as represented by Montesquieu, Condorcet, Saint Simon, Comte, etc., is explicitly or implicitly agnostic, as is, in Weber’s and Mises’ view, true science, including economics and sociology. To paraphrase Weber, science “does not and cannot know the existence, nature, operation, and outcome of the holy,” neither affirming nor denying the latter as beyond empirical proof and denial alike.

To preempt accusations of “blasphemy” or “antireligion,” this is how the Enlightenment and its secular humanism reconstructed (“deconstructed”) most religion, rightly or wrongly as an empirical matter, for better or worse, so no value judgments are made. In summary, civil society, and democracy, the problem is *not* religion in itself (if) understood as the system of private faith or personal beliefs and practices which, like any other ideas, hence, as Voltaire and others emphasize, humans are completely free to choose and pursue as they wish, to the Enlightenment and its secular humanism. What is problematic for the Enlightenment and liberal-secular civil society and democracy is enforcing, imposing, and spreading religious beliefs and practices by virtually all world religions, including Christianity and Islam, through “holy” wars such as crusades and jihads, simply by the Biblical and Islamic “sword,” thus (Churchill’s) “blood and tears.”

To paraphrase Clausewitz’s classic definition of war, for the Enlightenment the problem is not religion as private, freely chosen faith or “policy” (and activity), but the “continuation” of this “policy” by “other means” like coercion and force, including violence and terrorism, enacting “cosmic” wars (Juergensmeyer 2003). In other words, the Enlightenment finds problematic not religion *per se* but theocracy within society and religious wars against other “ungodly” societies, both continuing “godly politics” by coercive and violent means to the point of no return Puritan- or Islamic-style “total annihilation” as the path of “salvation” or martyrdom (Adorno 2001). In short, it considers religion a grave danger to human liberty and life *only* insofar as it entertains theocratic ambitions and warlike tendencies, elements of “holy” tyranny and wars “in the name of God.” Yet the Enlightenment (to cite the book of master novelist-sociologist Balzac) “lost illusions” by rediscovering, after Hobbes, Spinoza, etc., and predicting that most world and local religions are precisely theocratic and warlike, as sociological analyses also confirm since the time of Comte through Weber and Pareto and to contemporary sociologists (Juergensmeyer 2003).

### ***The Enlightenment and Sacred-Secular Differentiation***

Notably, the Enlightenment represents the first genuine, systematic, and consistent attempt at differentiation between sacred and secular realms and powers, namely theology, religion, and church from politics, state (and law), and civil society (Dahrendorf 1979; Evans and Evans 2008; Munch 2001) within postclassical, Christian European civilization and beyond. By differentiating and thus freeing civil

society and politics from coercive and all-encompassing religion, in particular the theocratic church-state such as the medieval *respublica Christiana*, it produces a true innovation and in this sense a radical, revolutionary change in modern Western societies. Hence, the Enlightenment conceptually creates, or recreates if considering classical democracy and the Renaissance, civil society as the secular realm of individual liberties and privacy. It constructs the free and private life-world in which for the first time or most visibly and consistently in social history all humans are in principle, even if not immediately in reality – for example, Great Britain’s master-servant economic relations, Russia’s serfdom, America’s slavery and antilabor history (Piven and Cloward 1977; Piven 2008), etc. endowed or “entitled” with the freedom and capacity for the “pursuit of happiness” and “good life” overall.

Particularly, the Enlightenment (re)creates civil society as differentiated and autonomous from political and sacred powers, or their typical fusion or alliance defining theocracy, as in the European medieval *Civitas Dei* and the American Puritan “godly” and neoconservative “faith-based” community. This reveals modern *secular* civil society, as a private sphere differentiated and independent from the public domain of the state and the religious realm of church alike, the “child” of first and foremost the Enlightenment. It is Mises’ “flower” of the latter’s prototypical differentiation between these social realms, a process perhaps initiated or pre-figured in classical “pagan” civilization, yet stopped and even reversed in its medieval Christian phase, while partly resumed with the Renaissance. As is typical, the Enlightenment’s vision of civil society revealed its continuity or convergence and affinity with classical democracy and the Renaissance, and its discontinuity or divergence and disaffinity with the Christian and any *Civitas Dei* or theocracy.

Reportedly, civil society is rooted in the Enlightenment’s “modernist assumption” that private and public spheres or lives are “separate,” with individuals being “solely responsible” for their “integrity and morality” (Juergensmeyer 2003). In short, its values create or shape civil society by endowing it with the “temper of rationality and fair play” in contrast to and opposed by orthodox religion (Juergensmeyer 2003). As observed, its “attack” on Christianity or rather Christian theocracy a la *Civitas Dei* plants the “seeds” of modern “predominantly secular society” and represents the “intellectual ancestor of the de-Christianizing of Europe” (Byrne 1997), as especially witnessed since postwar times through the early twenty-first century. In this sense, contemporary “post-Christian” (Inglehart 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004) European, especially Scandinavian, societies are the sociological successors or realizations of the Enlightenment vision of a “new” secular and cosmopolitan civil society opposing, and being opposed by and overcoming the “traditional political and religious world” (Byrne 1997). In general, the modern “secular vision” of the relations between state/church and civil society in Western Europe and Jeffersonian America derives from the “Western Enlightenment” (Edgell et al. 2006). Admittedly, “Enlightenment-based critical reason” and its “emancipatory interests” arose and operated in “fundamental conflicts” with the “clerically sustained dynastic rule” (Langman 2005). They still do against the latter’s variations or embellishments such as “faith-based” government in “evangelical America,” especially (but not only) the “Bible Belt” or “Dixie-land” (Cochran 2001) with its “dynasty” of “good old boys” networks (Mailath et al. 2000)

of feudal-like aristocrats-oligarchs and would be theocrats, i.e., political-economic and religious-culture “warriors.”

In turn, the Enlightenment’s institutional differentiation between sacred and secular realms and powers (Evans and Evans 2008), notably its differentiating and emancipating civil society from both church and state, overcomes their dedifferentiation or merger (Dahrendorf 1979; Dombrowski 2001) through theocracy in the medieval pre-Enlightenment, including Christian *Civitas Dei*. And, its legacy exposes as theocratic and is likely to overcome the attempted dedifferentiation (Alexander 1998) or merger déjà vu of these realms and powers, thus the dissolution of civil society into state or church, in the conservative anti-Enlightenment. The latter comprises interwar “godly” fascism, including Italian, Spanish, and other Catholic (Vatican-supported) fascisms, and in part Nazism, in Europe *and* religiously “born again” fundamentalist neoconservatism and its product or ally neofascism like neo-Nazi “Christian” terrorism (Smith 1994) in America.

Reportedly, the Enlightenment rejects the “theocratic state” and advocates the “religious right of conscience,” thus being “anticlerical,” but “less clearly antireligious,” as part of the “natural rights of man” to be redefined and implemented as “secular human rights,” and in that sense its aims being “fundamentally ethical” (Fitzpatrick 1999). Hence, admittedly the fact that it does not represent an “exclusively” antireligious movement but a “secularizing tendency” in civil society, such as politics makes certain fears “exaggerated,” like the conservative and postmodern claims that the legacy of enlightened and rationalistic conscience is “liberal complacency”<sup>27</sup> (Fitzpatrick 1999). Arguably, creating a just civil society of “free and equal citizens” is first and foremost the “result of the Enlightenment” rather than the “outmoded faith of the Christian ages”<sup>28</sup> (Dombrowski 2001). In comparative terms, in contrast to its Eastern alternative, the Western Enlightenment admittedly posits and predicts that the realm of ethics and other social values does and will vanish as long as a “possibility of free choice” does not exist, as witnessed in most world and other religions (Angel 1994; Kenshur 1993<sup>29</sup>).

The above implies that the stronger and more enduring the legacy of the Enlightenment is, the more secular and differentiated or autonomous civil society is in relation to both state and church, and their theocratic merger or alliance. This

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<sup>27</sup>Fitzpatrick (1999:56) refers to the “belief that all right-thinking people will have the same notion of the good and the true, irrespective of circumstance [leading to] conformism [plus] secular anarchistic individualism.”

<sup>28</sup>According to Dombrowski (2001:3), “as a result of the Enlightenment, one way of [creating] a just society composed of free and equal citizens divided by incompatible comprehensive religious or philosophical, still reasonable, doctrines is to find a new *comprehensive* philosophical and secular doctrine that would provide a synoptic worldview to deal with all of life’s problems, would be suitable to the modern world, and would replace the supposedly outmoded faith of the Christian ages.”

<sup>29</sup>Kenshur (1993:3) comments that “when we encounter a zeal for consistency and a refusal to compartmentalize beliefs as when people with the conviction that they are obeying the revealed commands of God undertake to invade and occupy neighboring countries, or to establish theocracies, or to disrupt the lives of physicians who perform abortions – we may feel that the violation of compartmental boundaries poses a threat to civility and to the moral and social order.”

relationship is in particular witnessed in modern Western Europe and its extensions. In Western Europe as well as other democratic societies in the “West” in sociological terms (Canada, Australia, Japan, etc.), the strongest and more enduring Enlightenment legacy is linked with the dominant process of secularization, liberalization, and thus further liberation and democratization (Inglehart and Baker 2000) in civil society and politics. In turn, among Western societies neoconservative “faith-based” America with its comparatively weaker and less enduring Enlightenment legacy is identified as a salient “deviant case” (Inglehart 2004) from the global trend toward secular and liberal civil society, alongside secondary exceptions such as Catholic postcommunist Poland and Ireland (also, Byrne 1997), not to mention Latin America outside this setting. Such a salient deviation expresses the “phenomenon of American exceptionalism” (Inglehart 2004) as reproduced and celebrated primarily by conservatism,<sup>30</sup> as an admittedly “double-edged sword” (Lipset 1996). The deviation thus implies a negative form of the link of the Enlightenment’s legacy with a secular autonomous civil society. This holds true in general, though other observations<sup>31</sup> indicate that even contemporary America experiences secularization (Crabtree and Pelham 2009; Gorski and Altinordu 2008; Hout and Fischer 2002), and thus is no longer “exceptional,” despite “reborn” theocratic fundamentalism, and contrary<sup>32</sup> to conservative rational-choice self-serving denials of secularizing trends in the “new nation” and other modern societies. If such trends are genuine and continuing, they precisely renew the Enlightenment legacy of secularism, weak and limited though compared with Western Europe, in Jeffersonian America, thus reflecting or corresponding to a sort of neo-Enlightenment in modern democratic societies, including the “new nation” hence “exceptional no more” in terms of secularization, consequently rationalization, and liberalization.

Conversely, the weaker and more limited the Enlightenment’s legacy remains in modern societies, the less secular, liberal, thus liberated or autonomous civil society

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<sup>30</sup>TIME magazine comments (April 2009) that the “old conservative idea of ‘American exceptionalism,’ which placed the US on a plane above the rest of the world as a unique beacon of democracy and financial might, has been rejected. At almost every stop, [the new US President] Obama has made clear that the US is but one actor in a global community.”

<sup>31</sup>According to the 2008 American Religious Identification Survey, “secularity continues to grow in strength in all regions of the country.” For instance, the “percentage of Americans claiming no religion has now increased to 15%,” reflecting an “additional 4.7 million ‘Nones’ (with the growth of the adult population since from 207 million to 228 million). In regional terms, “Northern New England has now taken over from the Pacific Northwest as the least religious section of the country, with Vermont, at 34% “Nones,” leading all other states by a full 9 points.” Specifically, it is found that “only 1.6% of Americans call themselves atheist or agnostic. But based on stated beliefs, 12% are atheist (no God) or agnostic (unsure), while 12% more are deistic (believe in a higher power but not a personal God).”

<sup>32</sup>Gorski and Altinordu (2008:55–7) comment that rational choice theorists of religion (Stark et al.) “misunderstood or oversimplified the core claims of secularization theory” in that their “attacking secularization theory” is “hardly fair” because there exist “many different versions of the theory, most of which do not predict extinction [of] religion,” but the decline of its “social significance” that Enlightenment “humanists, rationalists, and social scientists had been repeating since the days of Hume, Voltaire, and Comte.”



tends to be. This is precisely witnessed in post- or anti-Jeffersonian conservative America, let alone Islamic and other hyperreligious non-Western societies. As observed, theocratic fundamentalism purports and even, as in the “Bible Belt,” succeeds to redesign and reconstruct America as a putatively “Christian,” factually evangelical-sectarian, thus non- or quasi-Christian in the universalistic original meaning of Christianity, civil society and nation (Juergensmeyer 2003; Smith 2000). In such a “new” society that Jefferson repudiated as theocracy a la Puritan “Christian Sparta” and would likely make him turn in his grave, predictably, secularists, liberals, and nonbelievers (atheists, agnostics, etc.) continue to be excluded as maximal “un-American” (Edgell et al. 2006) from civil society and culture, thus mistreated or discriminated against on “godly” grounds by the early twenty-first century. They are excluded even more from national and regional politics to the point of “infidels need not apply” for political office in the federal government and especially the “Bible Belt” (although such laws have been declared unconstitutional they are still perversely enforced or at least yield corresponding expectations and outcomes of self-exclusion and exclusion, as in the “godly” South).

The Jeffersonian Enlightenment attempted and initially succeeded to remove the Puritan-rooted “religious test” (Dayton 1999) for political office typifying and sustaining theocracy, as in New England ruled by Puritanism, and implicitly for free participation and inclusion in civil society and culture. Yet by the early twenty-first century the Jeffersonian legacy appears to be weaker than or is reversed by the conservative anti-Enlightenment restoring (Dayton 1999) and admittedly expanding (Bell 2002) this testing of “faith” and “godliness” in politics and civil society as the seemingly main “qualification” for political office on virtually all levels, federal (Presidency, Congress, Supreme Court, etc.), state, and local, especially but not solely, in the “Bible Belt.” If such testing of “in God we trust” or else, namely exclusion from political life and civil society (or more), is the exact diagnostic test or syndrome of Puritan and any theocracy, then the neoconservative anti-Enlightenment, as typical, aims and succeeds to restore the theocratic pre-Enlightenment in America and reverse the secular Enlightenment. The outcome or prospect of these anti-Enlightenment reversals is the composite (un)civil and political exclusion of and discrimination against “ungodly” liberals-secularists as more “un-American” than anyone else. In consequence, the “drama” (Byrne 1997) continues and intensifies between Jeffersonian Enlightenment secularism and revived anti-Enlightenment religious fundamentalism,<sup>33</sup> as the prime basis and essence of culture wars in America forced by the evangelical revival to enter the twenty-first century almost

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<sup>33</sup>The 2008 American Religious Identification Survey finds that “mainline denominations [Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, etc.] experienced sharp numerical declines [12.9%] vs. the growth among ‘Christian,’ ‘Evangelical/Born Again,’ or ‘nondenominational Christian.’” In particular, it finds that “significantly, 38.6% of mainline Protestants now also identify themselves as evangelical or born again,” inferring that “it looks like the two-party system of American Protestantism – mainline versus evangelical – is collapsing. A generic form of evangelicalism is emerging as the normative form of non-Catholic Christianity in the US,” as represented by Baptists as “the largest non-Catholic Christian tradition” (increasing by two million since 2001).

in the same way it did the nineteenth century, due to the Puritan counter-Enlightenment “Great Awakenings.”

On account of such reversals, it often seems to observers that there is *no* such thing as true civil society differentiated and autonomous from state and church in their alliance or “flirt,” just as “free lunch” (Feldstein 2005) in America during anti-Enlightenment, antiseccular (and antiegalitarian and antiwelfare) neoconservatism (Bauman 2001; Munch 2001; Singh 2002), just as in its parent pre-Enlightenment Puritanism (Dunn and Woodard 1996). At the minimum, this applies to the extremely anti-Enlightenment fundamentalist “Bible Belt” (Bauman 1997) and its functional equivalents, all characterized by what observers depict as “uncivil” society and even (e.g., Utah as effectively a strict Mormon theocracy) a “nightmarish” world (McCann ) of “godly” control, oppression, and systematic murder by the death penalty and “holy” wars, both practices being sanctified on “sacred” Biblical grounds. Hence, these “red” regions represent the theocentric antithesis and destruction, often literally via religiously grounded executions and offensive wars, thus “blood and tears,” or, perpetuating Puritan “vigorous” hypocrisy” (Bremer 1995), hypocritical perversion of civil society as a secular and autonomous life-world (Habermas 2001) in relation to church and state. On this account, they effectively exist in a different sociological world or planet and time than modern Western civil societies and even some “blue” regions within America, that of pre-Enlightenment medieval *Civitas Dei* in its proto-Puritan version of the “godly community” (German 1995).

The preceding yields corresponding tentative predictions or “rational expectations.” On one hand, as long as the Enlightenment’s legacy remains stronger in relation to the pre- and anti-Enlightenment in Western Europe, civil society will continue to be and even grow more secular-liberal, differentiated, and autonomous from state and church, as comparative studies indicate (Inglehart 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Munch 2001). On the other hand, as long as this legacy remains weaker than, or is reversed by the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, respectively by Puritanism and conservatism in America, civil society will continue to be and even grow less secular-liberal, differentiated, and autonomous from state and church, thus practically nonexistent or in a vegetative state, as these studies also suggest. This can be predicted even more or expected for most non-Western, especially Islamic theocratic, societies in which the Enlightenment’s legacy has been nonexistent or weak compared with the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, and consequently a genuine civil society as defined is virtually a nonentity and will remain if this missing link perpetuates itself.

At this juncture if this dual condition persists, the prospect, like the past and present condition, of civil society, like politics, in America under anti-Enlightenment neoconservatism such as Puritan-rooted “reborn” evangelicalism seems closer to that of Islamic societies under pre-Enlightenment Islamism than Western Europe with its prevalent (though not exclusive) Enlightenment legacy.

Some global surveys indicate that in religious terms, contemporary America, especially its Southern “red” part, is closer to or more comparable with “some predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East and tribal societies in Southern

Africa” than, except for its “blue” regions like New England, to “secular nations in Europe.”<sup>34</sup> Minimally, this applies to civil society in the “Bible Belt” as the most anti-Enlightenment or conservative and fundamentalist region of contemporary America since and owing to the antiseccular and antirationalistic evangelical Great Awakenings (Archer 2001; Boles 1999; Means 1966).

Observations indicate that this region, just as its putative deviation, Mormon-ruled Utah, moves closer, seemingly paradoxically but in fact consistently, to its enemy fundamentalist Iran (Bauman 1997; Friedland 2002) and other “godly” third-world countries than to liberal-secular Western European, notably “post-Christian” Scandinavian, societies detested as “ungodly” due to their Enlightenment, thus “un-American” values (Dunn and Woodard 1996).

For example, the cited survey finds that “what Alabamians and Iranians have in common” by the early twenty-first century is a sort of anti- or pre-Enlightenment expressed in the shared extremely high religiosity, mostly fundamentalism, for Alabamians “are about as likely as Iranians to say religion is an important part of their lives”<sup>35</sup> (Table 6.1). In this respect, “sweet home Alabama” is not an exception or aberration but only exemplifies and amplifies the typical commonality (Friedland 2002) or affinity (Turner 2002), notably the protototalitarian equivalence or convergence (Bauman 1997) of the “Bible Belt” and evangelical (cum “Christian”) America as a whole with Islamic theocracies. In summary, the Enlightenment is likely the main future predictor, as was the prime original creator, of civil society as a secular, differentiated, and autonomous sphere in relation to other social realms and powers, notably coercive church and repressive state and their theocratic osmosis.

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<sup>34</sup>In a commentary entitled “What Alabamians And Iranians Have In Common” from 9 February 2009, Crabtree and Pelham comment on the results of Gallup’s 2006, 2007, and 2008 World Poll of religiosity. They suggest that while religion has always had the “considerable effect” on American society and politics, globally a “population’s religiosity level is strongly related to its average standard of living.” Specifically, “Gallup’s World Poll indicates that 8 of the 11 countries in which almost all residents (at least 98%) say religion is important in their daily lives are poorer nations in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the 10 *least* religious countries studied include several with the world’s highest living standards, including Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Japan. Among 27 countries commonly seen as part of the developed world, the median proportion of those who say religion is important in their daily lives is just 38%.” They infer that “from this perspective, the fact that two-thirds of Americans respond this way makes us look extremely devout,” though with a “wide regional variation in religiosity across the 50 American states,” with Mississippi (85%) as the “leader,” and Vermont (42%) as the main “outlier.”

<sup>35</sup>Crabtree and Pelham add that “Georgians in the United States are about as religious [76%] as Georgians in the Caucasus region” [75%]. They conclude that “it’s fascinating to note that in terms of religiosity, Americans span a range that invites comparisons to some predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East and tribal societies in Southern Africa, as well as to some relatively secular nations in Europe and developed East Asia,” the first applying to the “Bible Belt” and the “Wild West” (Oklahoma, Texas), the second primarily to New England (Vermont, New Hampshire, Main, Massachusetts, etc.). Finally, Crabtree and Pelham advise that “recognition of that fact should give Americans pause when we’re tempted to apply blanket generalizations to other cultures; for example, to say residents in those nations are less devout or more prone to zealotry than people in America.”

**Table 6.1** Levels of religiosity in US states and Muslim (and other) societies

Top 10 most religious US states		Countries with comparable religiosity	
Is religion an important part of your daily life?		Is religion an important part of your daily life?	
State	Yes (%)	Country	Yes (%)
Mississippi	85	Lebanon	86
Alabama	82	Iran	83
South Carolina	80	Zimbabwe	81
Tennessee	79	India	79
Louisiana	78	Iraq	79
Arkansas	78	Romania	78
Georgia	76	Botswana	77
North Carolina	76	Haiti	76
Oklahoma	75	Tajikistan	76
Kentucky	74	Georgia	75
Texas	74	Cyprus	75

Gallup poll Daily tracking 2007–2008

### *The Enlightenment and Modern Secular Humanism*

In consequence, the Enlightenment is the prime source of modern secular humanism as a set of humanitarian values, practices, and institutions in Western and other democratic societies. Like most of their constitutive values, in modern Western and other democratic societies secular humanism is first and foremost the “child” of the Enlightenment and liberalism in general, only secondarily or not all of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment like Christian Catholic and Protestant *Civitas Dei*, conservative “faith-based” society, etc., and antiliberalism such as conservatism and fascism. The Enlightenment bequeaths, in a secular form, a strong and enduring humanistic and to that extent egalitarian, universalistic, and democratic legacy in modern civil society. For in factor-analytic terms, egalitarianism, universalism or inclusion, and democracy typically “load on” or indicate humanism as the underlying variable, and conversely, the latter entails the former.

Reportedly, the “modern meaning of humanism” precisely originates or is reflected in the Enlightenment ideals and values of a “self-conscious life, of authentic self-realization, and of autonomy” (Habermas 1996). As usual, this holds true of Enlightenment humanism in essential continuity with and continuation and extension of what both Simmel and Parsons recognize as the humanistic Renaissance and the object of its revival, classical civilization. Conversely, it has been and remains in basic discontinuity and revolutionary break from medieval Christian and other *Civitas Dei* as intrinsically antihumanistic through the submission of humans to suprahuman forces, and ultimately inhumane by sacrificing or tormenting human lives to “greater than life” causes via theocratic tyranny, including torture and death for heresy and other sins, and “holy” war. In short, the Enlightenment recreates or ushers in a civil society or human civilization with “strong humanistic values” (Berman 2000). In particular, the “rational Enlightenment home” admittedly is “more brotherly” and “less aristocratic” than Weber’s pre-Enlightenment charisma or religious and other “genius” and sacred tradition, because its product, secular and egalitarian democracy

entails “suspicion” of Pareto’s elites and geniuses redefining them by “creativity and reputation” (Fuchs 2001) via what Simmel also calls social leveling typifying modern civil society. This is a variation on the theme that Enlightenment-based legal-rational authority is, as Weber suggests, a democratic principle of power legitimization typical of modern secular democracies and civil societies, and charisma, like tradition, the undemocratic or authoritarian characteristic of traditional, especially religious or theocratic, formations (Hamilton 1994; Lenski 1994).

Originally, the Enlightenment is the epitome of secular, universalistic humanism. It is by being what Voltaire called the “party of humanity” defining, constituting, or condensing true *human* morality or ethics as the love and “goodness” for humans rather or more than suprahuman entities and causes like deity, “holy” war, nation, etc., as in the pre- and anti-Enlightenment. For illustration, he implied and some of his colleagues (Brissot) stated that “to be a man, to love one’s fellow men, that is to bring together all the virtues. Only the love of humanity can inspire great actions and create true heroes,” thus found and sustain true, universal morality in society (Byrne 1997). The paradigmatic example of Enlightenment secular universalistic humanism is Kant’s categorical imperative to “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” by treating *all* human beings “never merely as a means and always as an end,” thus placed within the “kingdom of ends” (Habermas 2001).

Voltaire’s and Kant’s Enlightenment principle expresses universalistic morality or moral universalism (Habermas 2001) primarily defined by and founded on the love for humans as intrinsic ends rather than extrinsic means of suprahuman forces and causes. This is a sort of humanistic “Copernican revolution” or innovation (Byrne 1997) within Christian *Civitas Dei* in which, as the very designation commands and Weber observes for its Calvinist-Puritan rendition, humans existed and were literally sacrificed, as the tools of the Divine Will, for the “sake of God,” and not conversely (Bendix 1977), for Calvinism’s interest “is solely in God, not in man.” Alternatively, according to Voltaire-Kant’s Enlightenment moral imperatives, inhumanity and thus immorality is the (patho) logical outcome of treating humans not as intrinsic ends but as the means literally or figuratively sacrificed, including ceremoniously and not-so-ceremoniously killed, for supra- and antihuman and “greater than life” causes like sacred and secular power.

Hence, the Enlightenment replaces Christian and other “godly” morality or ethics as effectively non- or pseudohuman, thus “deceptive” (Dahrendorf 1979) moral egalitarianism, just as, for analogous reasons, it, especially Kant, rejects Machiavellianism and other utilitarianism as inhumane and thus immoral or amoral. For instance, the Enlightenment, specifically Kant’s categorical imperative, even reportedly goes beyond Christian ethics by universalizing what it regarded as the “egocentric character” of the Christian and other seemingly humanistic Golden Rule (Habermas et al. 1998). Namely, the Enlightenment’s moral imperative postulating that “all” human subjects are endowed with the ability to desire and follow a “just maxim as a general rule” universalizes and thus transcends this rule’s “universalization test from the viewpoint of a given individual” as “egocentric” and thus spurious, insufficient universalism (Habermas et al. 1998).

In general, from the Enlightenment’s prism, both “Christian” and other “godly” morality *and* Machiavellianism and utilitarianism consider humans no more than the mere means to other ends, sacred or ideal and secular or material, respectively.

Curiously, this is what none other than Puritan Parsons (1967a) admits for Protestantism by registering its “devaluation” of human actors as such, and their “reduction” to the means of the “purposes of God,” just as “one’s own ends.” He thus serendipitously reveals the composite of “godly” antihumanism and Machiavellianism, respectively, in what he extols as “individualistic” and “democratic” Protestantism in an invidious distinction from “collectivist” and “authoritarian” Catholicism and all pre-Protestant Christianity. Yet, perhaps constrained by his “Puritan heritage” (Alexander 1983), Parsons fails or refuses to draw such inferences as if the “devaluation” and “reduction” of humans for “godly” and personal purposes were not really antihumanistic and Machiavellian, respectively. Instead, they were presumably and remain perfectly consistent with a humane, secular civil society and democracy in America (Mayway 1984) glorified as the pinnacle of social evolution (Giddens 1979), yet *not* in other societies, in a sort of Orwellian double-think typical of anti-Enlightenment Protestant conservatism and its reproduced American “godly” exceptionalism (Inglehart 2004; Lipset 1996; Munch 2001). Evoking Simmel and Weber, Parsons recognizes the “humanistic” quality of the Renaissance and in extension of the Enlightenment as its continuation and reinforcement in terms of humanism, in contrast to and opposition by what he also serendipitously admits as anti- or quasihumanistic Puritanism.<sup>36</sup>

For his part Weber acknowledges the “humanistic indifference” and thus heritage of the Enlightenment in contrast to, for example, Calvinist passionate “extreme inhumanity,” including Puritan “misanthropy” as “godly” hatred of humans and human fellowship seen as inimical to or diverting from God, yet claiming to be true and only “Christian” morality or ethics and “love.” Admittedly, the Enlightenment identifies “our common humanity” as the “unifying vision” of humanity by uniting human potentials and subjects, and as instrumental in its “daring task” of liberating humans from the “parameters and limitations” of religious, cultural, and geographical locality, just as Kant stated, “dare to think in terms of a science of humanity” (Byrne 1997). Reportedly, Enlightenment secular humanism is distinct from and transcends the medieval period of Christian and other religious “humanism” through a “fundamental shift in consciousness” (Byrne 1997). For instance, redefining humanity as dignity premised on reason, the Enlightenment rejects the doctrine of original sin and its “pessimistic anthropology” as an “affront” to human dignity and in extension the life-world of civil society, thus as the “common opponent” for “all the different trends” of the former (Byrne 1997), including even Calvinist and transiently Catholic Rousseau (Garrard 2003).

The preceding applied especially to the French Enlightenment. As observed, the latter derives the “legitimacy of public opinion” from humanity’s “natural moral integrity” and its “universal conscience,” thus expressing a “confidence in the integrity of man at the expense of God,” rather than from the “sanction of God” rejected as sanctifying the despotic “authority of absolute monarch and Church” (Linton 2001). The French Enlightenment particularly argues for and emphasizes the

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<sup>36</sup>Parsons (1967a:57) states that “their negative valuation of ritual is one of the few points on which the Puritans and the men of the humanistic Renaissance could agree.”

“humanitarian impulses” of moral virtues like charity (*bienfaisance*) in the conviction that “uncorrupted” humanity harbors “natural” inclinations for “virtue” (Linton 2001). Also, the Scottish Enlightenment as represented by Hume and Smith, reportedly distinguishes, even within modern capitalist or “commercial” society, material self-interest from “sympathetic relations” or “moral sentiments,” a distinction seen as an indispensable condition for sustaining and extending personal or civil relations resting on “sympathy and sentiment”<sup>37</sup> (Silver 1992).

In historical terms, the Enlightenment exhibits a strong continuity and affinity primarily with, and even continues and extends to the Renaissance with respect to secular humanism. Thus, Weber implies that the “humanistic indifference” of the Enlightenment adopts and continues what Simmel calls the “humanism of the Renaissance.” Conversely, what Parsons (1967a) names the “men of the humanistic Renaissance,” contrasted with his celebrated early Puritans, inspired those of the Enlightenment, in particular the French philosophers. Thus, the latter reportedly show admiration for the general “worldliness” of the Italian humanists of the Renaissance, including Montaigne, Rabelais, and Machiavelli (but perhaps not what came to be known as Machiavellianism in his *Prince*) (Artz 1998). For instance, the French philosophers especially admire the humanists’ “use of the classics,” their “detachment from myth,” their praising of “a life of action,” their preferring of “ethics to metaphysics,” and their “hard-headed eclecticism” (Artz 1998). In particular, these philosophers admire and adopt the tendency of the Renaissance humanists to read Christian and any “holy” books with “skeptical detachment” (Artz 1998). In turn, just as the Enlightenment admires the “humanism of the Renaissance,” the latter, as well-known, admired the “political, scientific, cultural and artistic achievements of ancient Greece and Rome” (Byrne 1997). The Enlightenment largely follows the Renaissance’s admiration for ancient civilization (Garrard 2003), though with certain variations, such as placing more emphasis on modernization, innovation, and originality, just as did its “child” modernity (Bauman 2001), relative to a mere revival of classical or other tradition, simply on the “moderns” vs. the “ancients” (Habermas 2001).

### ***Enlightenment Humanism and the Penal System for Sinners-Criminals***

As implied, a salient expression and enduring legacy of Enlightenment-based secular humanism and civil society is appreciation and respect of human liberty, integrity, well-being, happiness, dignity, and life through an enlightened and humane legal, notably penal, system. In Durkheim’s terms, its humanism is expressed in the

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<sup>37</sup>Silver (1992) objects that Smith and Hume, representing the Scottish Enlightenment, “are not immune to constructing historical understandings suiting their ideological purposes. They analyze commercial, not capitalist, society. Their moral theory addresses a society dominated by merchant gentlemen, sincerely but temperately Christian. [This] vision may be challenged as an ideological moment the assumptions of which the later development of liberal society has put in question.”

Enlightenment's project of modern civilized "civil law" with mild "restitutive sanctions" for violations, thus replacing traditional primitive "penal law" involving "repressive sanctions," including suffering, death, and other cruel, inhumane, and degrading punishment for transgressions. Hence, the Enlightenment-based humane, minimalist, or mild legal, including criminal-justice, system legally defines or typifies modern Western and other civilized and democratic societies.

The above holds in principle and as a generalized tendency, with America's salient yet predictable celebrated exceptionalism during anti-Enlightenment neoconservatism in the form of a "tough on crime [and sin]" criminal justice system with "Draconian severity" (Patell 2001) as a "unique anomaly" (Pager 2003) among these societies, thus a salient exception effectively confirming rather than refuting the sociological rule or historical pattern. In stark contrast, a pre- and anti-Enlightenment inhumane, maximalist, and Draconian legal-penal system legally defines or typifies antecedent and successive primitive or barbarian societies, exemplified by Comte-Spencer's theocratic-military society, as well as most Islamic countries. Alternatively, what analysts call the modern enlightened, minimal, and humane or mild criminal justice system (Rutherford 1994) is axiomatically and empirically the original project and lasting legacy of the Enlightenment. This is witnessed in modern Western Europe in contrast to America during anti-Enlightenment neoconservatism as well as Islamic theocracies.

By contrast to Enlightenment-based Western legal systems, the latter two share an inhumane, maximal, and Draconian "tough" criminal justice system to the point of religiously sanctioned primitivism or barbarism, including "eye for eye" retribution, extremely long sentences and executions for both sins and crimes, sinners and criminals, with the first equated to the second, as well as of guilty and innocent people alike, physical and mental torture etc. As pertains to the punishment, including the execution of innocent people, an Enlightenment-based and earlier Roman-law legal principle is that in a civilized society punishing or executing an innocent person is "a worse error" than freeing the guilty whose guilt is unproved (Prendergast 2007). Yet by imprisoning and executing with Puritan-style good conscience, especially for fabricated sexual offenses, many (as proved by DNA evidence) innocent people, with Texas (including the Dallas county) as the most notorious but not isolated case, the neoconservative US, like Islamic, criminal justice system overtly or covertly repudiates or disdains this Enlightenment penal rule.

On this account, both penal codes effectively operate as *criminal injustice* systems in Popper's sense of illegal official murder and other severe punishment and to that extent state terrorism expressing theocratic repression or "political absolutism"<sup>38</sup> (Cooney and Burt 2008) and in terms of Durkheim's principle of legal justice as the "fit" of Dostoevsky's "crime and punishment" composite. Furthermore, in regards to the latter, the US neoconservative anti-Enlightenment criminal justice system

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<sup>38</sup>According to Cooney and Burt (2008:492), Durkheim's thesis that the "severity of punishment increases with political absolutism – is almost certainly true."



reportedly exhibits virtually *no* relationship between “crime and punishment,” contrary to rational-choice apologists (Becker 1976) of “tough on crime” policies, with imprisonment (Sutton 2004) actually expanding “despite stable or declining crime rates” to the point of reaching a paradoxical condition of “less crime, more punishment” (Cooney and Burt 2008), as does its Islamic counterpart.

Comparatively, “less crime, more punishment” can occur “only in America,” more precisely its anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal or neoconservative “red” sections like the Southern “Bible Belt” (Texas, etc.), but not in the rest of Western civilization, which reveals a sinister facet of the conservative reproduced celebrated “phenomenon of American exceptionalism” (Inglehart 2004) and beyond the West also in Islamic theocracies like Iran and Taliban-ruled regions. Historically, in virtue of crime rates not really explaining imprisonment rates in America during recent times<sup>39</sup> (Cooney and Burt 2008), the neoconservative, like Islamic, criminal justice system reverts to pre-Enlightenment despotism such as the Dark Middle Ages and their Inquisition and to fascist totalitarianism (Bähr 2002), or alternatively ushers in an anti-Enlightenment Orwellian dystopia. All of these societies and periods are characterized with the lack of a pertinent link between crime and punishment, including “less crime, more punishment.”

If anything, the pre- and anti-Enlightenment disconnection of crime and punishment makes this “criminal justice system” truly criminal, including murderous, in the sense of illegitimate or excessive state punishment, execution, and to that extent official religiously grounded terror, and the system of egregious injustice. It thus makes a mockery of penal justice and becomes a cruel joke for its victims. It especially does for those imprisoned, often for life due to Draconian “three strikes” laws, for moral sins like nonviolent drug offenses comprising almost two thirds of the US prison population during the 2000s, let alone innocent people executed, during the neoconservative Puritan-rooted “obsession with sin and vice” (Wagner 1997) reclassified (Friedman 1997) and punished as crimes and couched, following Puritanism’s “pure hypocrisy,” in the “tough on crime” counter-Enlightenment and antiliberal rhetoric. A paradigmatic instance is the neoconservative “recriminalization of drugs and alcohol”<sup>40</sup> (Cooney and Burt 2008) through “drug-war crimes” (Reuter 2005) and the increased age limit for alcohol consumption (from 18 to 21 years, by far the highest in the West and even the world, minus the Islamic world), not to mention the persistent “dry” states in the “Bible Belt” and beyond (Utah, etc.) and national prohibition.

In retrospect, executing and imprisoning innocent people is a long tradition, a sort of favorite pastime (before and along with baseball) in the American pre- and anti-Enlightenment, spanning from Draconian Puritanism and its executions of

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<sup>39</sup>Cooney and Burt (2008:521–2) observe that crime rates do not explain imprisonment rates during “the surge in American imprisonment since the late 1970s,” for “imprisonment has expanded despite stable or declining crime rates.”

<sup>40</sup>Cooney and Burt (2008:, 519) comment that “the status of users has long been known to affect the decriminalization and recriminalization of drugs and alcohol” in America during past and present times.

“witches” to its heir fundamentalism and its own “Monkey Trials” to McCarthyism with its proxy witch hunts. Yet, this practice has perhaps culminated or intensified and escalated in neoconservatism, including “reborn” evangelicalism, with its “tough” on sin-crime laws and practices. Neoconservatism’s “war” on crime (Schram et al. 2009), especially drugs and sexual sins, in virtue of executing and imprisoning many innocent people for overt or covert religious and moralistic reasons, becomes, like all culture, civil, and military offensive wars, a kind of mass paranoia and mixed sadism-masochism, thus collective madness or insanity, making the entire society “mad” (Bourdieu 2000). This is epitomized by the antisin paranoia, including the “sadistic intolerance to cultural otherness,” notably sexual sins (Bauman 2000), in the “Bible Belt” and other ultraconservative “red” US regions. This neo-conservative warlike hysteria is not random and likely not transient. Rather, it is a (patho)logical sequel of a long pre- and anti-Enlightenment pattern, notably the Puritan-style “holy” war and “method in the madness.” It is part of a process predating and perverting the Enlightenment-based legal system based on the rule that it is a graver error to execute or imprison an innocent person on whatever “godly” and related grounds, such as “in the name of God” by Puritanism and Islam, than not punishing the guilty with the unproved culpability.

Hence, the Enlightenment-based criminal justice system is truly the system of (legal) justice defined by Durkheim’s “fit” between crime and punishment and generally humane treatment. Conversely, the pre- and anti-Enlightenment antithesis or perversion is the system of injustice due to its invariant misfit between crime and punishment through Draconian punishments, typifying, for example, slavery in ancient Rome (Allen 2008) and the US South (Budros 2004), and inhumane treatments, including torture, for in a sense nothing is more unjust and criminal than inhumanity in virtue of its denying “common humanity” (Byrne 1997). On this account, a more accurate description of pre- and anti-Enlightenment criminal justice systems, like those in Islamic theocracies and neoconservative America or “American theocracy” (Phillips 2006), in particular Iran and the “Bible Belt,” is *criminal and injustice* systems.

First, they are *criminal*, including, as Popper (1966) implies, murderous, on the account of punishing and even executing often guilty and innocent persons alike for moral sins or crimes—not differentiated, with the first reclassified as the second—on “sacred” fundamentalist grounds. Second, they are *injustice* systems because of Draconian “tough” punishments like extremely or ridiculously long and thus unreasonable or irrational prison sentences a la 99 and more years in America without any reasonable fit with the crimes-sins committed. It is no wonder that analyses identify the neoconservative, notably “Bible Belt” (Texas, etc.) death penalty system in America as “functionally equivalent” to that of Iranian theocracy (and China) with respect to their shared Draconian severity and frequency of executions (Jacobs et al. 2005), as well as their common fundamentalist grounds in the Bible and the Koran, respectively.

In a way, the neoconservative, especially fundamentalist “Bible Belt” (Texas, etc.), criminal justice system remains, judging by various observations and

reports, a pre-Enlightenment world, a vestige or revival of primitive and barbarian times, through the observed “persistence of increasingly harsh punitive crime policies”<sup>41</sup> (Matsueda et al. 2006), in Spencer’s words, simply “full of horrors.” It would require a separate chapter or another book to list and discuss these “horrors.” One horror is the “profitable” starving of and denying basic health care to prisoners,<sup>42</sup> not to mention those almost 50 million Americans uninsured (Gruber 2008), thus excluded from an otherwise comparatively inefficient health-care system<sup>43</sup> (Garber and Skinner 2008), as composite Puritan-capitalist punishments, consequently many of them dying of “natural causes.” Other horrors span from reported unlawful imprisonment for money in collusion with the prison

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<sup>41</sup>Matsueda et al. (2006:118) comment that “policies of getting tough on crime always resonate well in the US political arena. However, such resonance is often based more on ideology than empirical research on punitive practices, such as evaluations of California’s Three Strikes laws that show at best small general deterrent effects, and our findings of modest deterrent effects of perceived certainty of arrest. The finding of *some* deterrent effect, however modest, is not surprising, given the need for the appearance of legitimacy in the legal system to maintain the consent of the governed. What is surprising, however, is the persistence of increasingly harsh punitive crime policies in the US in the face of this growing body of research.”

<sup>42</sup>In 2009 media reported that a “federal judge ordered an Alabama sheriff locked up in his own jail after holding him in contempt for failing to adequately feed inmates while profiting [\$212,000 over 3 years with surplus meal money] from the skimpy meals [based on] dramatic testimony from skinny prisoners about paper-thin bologna and cold grits.” The judge accused the sheriff of making money by “failing to spend the allocated funds for food for inmates.” Further, the judge said the “Alabama law allowing sheriffs to take home surplus meal money is ‘probably unconstitutional.’ In turn, prisoners reportedly said ‘meals are so small that they’re forced to buy snacks from a for-profit store the jailers operate.’ Most of the inmates appeared thin, with baggy jail coveralls hanging off their frames. Prisoners testified they ate corn dogs twice a day for weeks.”

<sup>43</sup>Garber and Skinner (2008:27–33) find that the US healthcare system “experiences a unique degree of allocative inefficiency, even when compared to other high-income countries,” in particular that “avoidable deaths and medical errors are much more common in the US than in European countries” and that “health burdens generally seem to be greater in the US.” For instance, “the percentage of chronically ill patients who reported they eschewed doctor or nurse visits, failed to adhere to recommended treatments, or did not take full medication doses because of costs ranged from 42% in the US to just 5 percent in the Netherlands” (Garber and Skinner 2008:33–4). Also, Cebul et al. (2008:96) find that “inadequate preventive care, especially for those with chronic disease, is one of the most important quality failures in the U.S. healthcare system.” Deaton (2008:67) admits that “almost all the inhabitants of high-income countries are well satisfied with their health care and medical systems [with] the US as an exception” (due to its lagging in equity, access, and safety), thus revealing another, hardly glorious facet of American exceptionalism. Furthermore, “in terms of confidence in the health care and medical systems, the ranking of the US in the World Poll (88 out of 120 nations) is even worse than reported in World Health Organization, which ranked it 37th out of 191. (WHO ranked Sierra Leone 191st which is only three places behind the US in the World Poll)” (Deaton 2008:68).

industry<sup>44</sup> to a sort of unlawful eternal punishment making society an open prison<sup>45</sup> to admitted executions or incarcerations of both innocent and guilty people overtly or covertly on “godly” grounds a la the Biblical “eye for eye,” or “blood shed” sanctifying the Puritanical neoconservative, fundamentalist obsession with and “holy” war on sin and vice cum crime.

These and a myriad of other practices, epitomizing a pre- and anti-Enlightenment Orwellian world, while abolished among modern Western societies, are part and parcel of the neoconservative Puritan-inspired “method of madness.” The latter involves “massive incarceration” for moral sins-as-crimes, as a legacy of Puritanism,<sup>46</sup> especially (but not only) drug possession and related nonviolent moral, notably sexual, offenses. It also includes “spine-chilling stories of the lengthening death-row queues,” often with the innocent presumed-guilty, as proved for alleged violent sexual and other offenders by DNA evidence in Texas (the Dallas county as the national “leader” in sentencing, imprisoning, and likely executing such people). A general syndrome is the “systematic, deliberate deterioration of prison conditions,” thus “godly” dehumanization of the penal system<sup>47</sup> (Bauman 1997). In this sense, the neoconservative Puritan-rooted criminal justice system looks like what Americans would call a horror movie, to be watched like others, but not witnessed first hand, in virtually all respects, with its “tough on crime” laws and policies generating rates of incarceration rates are “unprecedented in US history and unrivaled

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<sup>44</sup>For instance, in 2009 media reported that “in one of the most shocking cases of courtroom graft on record, two Pennsylvania judges have been charged with taking millions of dollars in kickbacks to send teenagers to two privately run youth detention centers. Among the offenders were teenagers who were locked up for months for stealing loose change from cars, writing a prank note and possessing drug paraphernalia.” Further, in 2002 a judge reportedly “shut down the county-run juvenile prison in 2002 and helped the two companies secure rich contracts worth tens of millions of dollars” and was described by a victim as “playing God. And not only was he doing that, he was getting money for it.” The *Economist* summarized the “all-American” free-enterprise story in this way: “First the [Pennsylvania] judges received monetary rewards for sanctioning the building of a new private-sector prison in their area. Second, they were paid for closing a county-funded prison nearby. And, then, of course, they offered up the “juvenile delinquents” for the benefit of the owners of the new jail. Both judges were elected, not appointed. The judges are going to jail, but the prison companies have so far avoided prosecution. If the prisons get off, though, that will be another disgrace.”

<sup>45</sup>For instance, the 4th US Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in the 2000s that “Congress overstepped its authority when it allowed civil commitment of ‘sexually dangerous’ federal inmates [i.e.] that the federal government has the power to hold sex offenders in custody indefinitely beyond the end of their prison terms.”

<sup>46</sup>In his *Communitarian Letter* entitled “Danger: Creeping Puritanism” (from 02/2009), Amitai Etzioni captures the essence of the latter, by writing that in America “Puritanism long suffered – and inflicted tons of suffering on others – by demanding human perfection and by making a mountain of sin out of every minor transgression.”

<sup>47</sup>Bauman (1997:60) observes that in America during neo-conservatism “massive incarceration, spine-chilling stories of the lengthening death-row queues and the systematic, deliberate deterioration of prison conditions [dehumanization] are deployed as the principal means of “terrorization” of the underclass, now presented to public opinion as enemy number one of public safety.”

by other nations” (Schram et al. 2009). On the account of such penal “horrors,” the neoconservative “rule of law” in America is not worth the paper on which it is printed for those subjected to it, especially almost 2.5 million prisoners and about seven million ex-inmates denied basic political and other rights and excluded from politics and civil society (Uggen and Manza 2002), and even elemental economic subsistence through denying them or discriminating against them in employment, education, and housing, no less (so forced back to sin-crime via homelessness, etc.).

The latter reaffirms that the Puritan-rooted, in Weber’s words, pre-Enlightenment “extreme inhumanity” and devaluation of human life and dignity of American conservatism (Reuter 2005), notably evangelicalism, just as fascism, can never be overlooked or underestimated with impunity. This is what those millions of victims (e.g., nonviolent drug users) of its “tough” on sin-crime laws and policies have actually experienced by being subjected to long incarceration, not to mention those executed, for factual or fabricated sins-crimes. Most Americans, minus evangelical saints-rulers (Lindsay 2008), could potentially experience it first hand within a society perverted into an open prison or a Calvinist super-monastery, as indicated by the dramatic increase of the probability for an average American to be imprisoned (Uggen and Manza 2002) during neoconservatism.

In particular, the US neoconservative and the Islamic criminal *injustice* systems are pre- or anti-Enlightenment by criminalizing moral sins and harshly punishing, even executing sinners, especially nonviolent sexual and drug offenders, equated with and punished as true or violent criminals. Yet, these sinners-as-criminals are a sort of prisoners and victims of ethical as well as political conscience<sup>48</sup> (Béland 2005), thus substantively innocent from the prism of the Enlightenment and modern liberal-secular democracy and civil society. For the latter typically does not treat and punish moral sinners as real criminals, and does not as a rule equate personal sins or vices with crimes. This is premised on the Enlightenment-based principle of freedom of choice between “virtue” and “vice” (Van Dyke 1995) or what Hayek (1960) calls, though failing to identify the Enlightenment source, between morally “right” and “wrong” action, in opposition to and by the fundamentalist “Bible Belt,”

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<sup>48</sup>Béland (2005:34) observes that “the tension between civil rights and policing is especially striking in the US where “zero tolerance” “policies enacted to fight delinquency and illegal drugs have implicitly targeted [social] minorities while increasing the prison population,” overwhelmingly of nonviolent drug-offenders or moral sinners and in that sense of innocent prisoners of ethical (and sometimes political) conscience. Béland (2005:34) adds that the “maintenance of such a large prison population and the increase in military spending associated with the “war on terrorism” “could divert resources from other areas of state protection like social policy and environmental protection;” thus being economically and/or socially irrational (Akerlof 2002). Heymann (2003:16) comments that “war on terrorism is the wrong theme. Reliance on the military is the wrong set of priority activities.” He also suggests that the US neoconservative “war on drugs” lacks the characteristics of real wars (Heymann 2003:20). Pillar (2001:2) also comments that counterterrorism differs from “the “war” on illegal drugs – in which thoughtful and serious critics (albeit ones still in the minority) have challenged the goal of interdicting the supply of drugs and have even suggested legalizing much of what is now illegal.”

Islamic, and other religiously grounded or theocratic pre- and anti-Enlightenment penal systems doing the exact opposite.

Furthermore, the Draconian “tough on crime” criminal justice system in the “Bible Belt” (notably, Texas) and its extensions by doing so actually operates as anti-Biblical and anti-Christian, and thus fails on its own terms, instead converging with its Islamic hostile counterpart. It does so on the account of the Bible’s apparent lack of equation of sins with crimes, so sinners with criminals, and even exoneration or forgiveness for the first, as indicated by “who has not sinned” and related Biblical passages, which even some conservatives (presidential candidates, governors, mayors, etc.) cite in defense of their *own* sexual and other sins, while condemning and harshly punishing those of others such as “ungodly” liberals. This indicates that if something “dies last” or “lives forever” in American anti-Enlightenment religious conservatism standing in the glorified tradition of Puritanism (Dunn and Woodard 1996), this is, alongside detested liberal hope for happiness in this world substituted by bliss in heaven (Lemert 1999), what Weber calls pre-Enlightenment Puritan “pure hypocrisy” that Hume classically diagnosed and predicted.

The above opposition is particularly epitomized by that, expressing the humanistic legacy of the Enlightenment, modern Western European societies reportedly adopt a more “humane treatment” (Reuter 2005) of certain and all moral offenders, like nonviolent drug users than the US Draconian “tough” criminal justice system and its even harsher Islamic counterpart. They do so by treating such offenders as medical cases or addicts to be cured, and not true criminals to be severely punished, as in neoconservative US and Islamic criminal justice systems operating as functional equivalents. An ultimate instance of their functional equivalence is that the Iranian and other Islamic *and* the neoconservative (e.g., federal government) criminal justice system actually (the first) or prospectively (the second) punish what “libertarian” economists (Friedman 1997) would call “free-market enterprise” in certain “chemical substances” or drug trade (just as rape often seen in both systems as a more serious crime than murder) with the death penalty as a pre-Enlightenment relic or anti-Enlightenment reaction. However, *no* modern Western European society does so, primarily due to the Enlightenment legacy of humanism and freedom of choice between “virtue” and “vice.” In turn, this seemingly perverse or shocking functional equivalence between “Christian” America’s and Muslim Iran’s (and Taliban’s) criminal justice systems is predictable with almost mathematical precision or expected with near-certain “irrational expectations,” as both are forms of pre-Enlightenment irrationalism. It is given the observed commonalities and affinities between Christian, including Protestant, Islamic, and other pre- and anti-Enlightenment religious conservatism in “holy” executions, violence, and war for the “glory of God,” as Weber observed, especially for Calvinism/Puritanism relative to Islam, and contemporary sociologists also show (Friedland 2001; Juergensmeyer 2003).

Generally, for the Enlightenment, if not even the Bible due to “who has not sinned,” and within its offspring modern liberal secular democracy, equating moral sins or vices with crimes and punishing sinners as criminals is a flagrant illogical nonsequitur and practical elimination of individual liberty, dignity, and eventually life. Conversely, moral sins are equated with crimes and sinners punished as criminals only in the pre-Enlightenment, such as the medieval Christian *Civitas Dei*,

especially its Calvinist, above all Puritan, forms, and its Islamic counterpart, as well as in anti-Enlightenment conservatism, including interwar “godly” fascism in Europe and “born again” fundamentalism in America. In short, this only or mostly did, does, and will likely happen in theocracy or “holy” tyranny and fascist totalitarianism, both acting as Ross’ “antidote” or rather poison of liberal-secular democracy.

Evidently, Enlightenment secular humanism joined with liberalism reproduces and predicts an enlightened, minimalist, humane, and just legal, notably truly criminal *justice* system as found in modern Western societies. Such a legal system is only consistent with and proper to modern liberal-secular civil society and political democracy. This is a general rule or common pattern, with the expected exception of America during anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal neoconservatism revealing its glorified American exceptionalism in a new light or rather darkness in the form of the penal menu “full of horrors” all within the “law and order” (Dahrendorf 1979). Conversely, the exact opposite of a just criminal justice system is the outcome of pre- and anti-Enlightenment antihumanism and extreme inhumanity epitomized in Calvinism’s theological dogmas and theocratic practices, including Christian, Islamic, and other religious “humanism” as spurious, narrow, and “deceptive (Dahrendorf 1979), thus nonhumanistic in the Enlightenment secular and universalistic sense. This is witnessed by conservative inhumane, maximalist, and Draconian criminal justice *cum* effectively *criminal* (including murderous) and *injustice* systems in America and most Muslim countries both during anti-Enlightenment religious conservatism or fundamentalism. Such a legal system is totally inconsistent with antithetical, and ultimately destructive to modern liberal-secular civil society and political democracy, as to human liberty, dignity, well-being, and life overall.

In particular, the French Enlightenment philosophers reportedly oppose the despotic *ancien regime*’s penal system as inhumane in the “name of humanity,” even cruel (Bastille), and unjust overall (Artz 1998). Notably, expressing the “great growth of humanitarianism” during the Enlightenment, its principle of reason posits the “futility and cruelty of vindictive penalties” and other forms of repression (Artz 1998). Recall that this humanizing of the penal system includes the eventual abolition or delegitimation of physical torture as a paradigmatic and poignant instance of the Enlightenment ideal and legacy of humanism, in modern democratic societies, except for America during anti-Enlightenment neoconservatism, an exception thus confirming the sociological “rule.” Admittedly, the deep impact of “Enlightenment ideas about rationality and the value of human life,” and concomitantly legal reformers’ “increasingly persuasive arguments,” is primarily responsible for “gradually” persuading European rulers about the new, radical wisdom of abolishing torture (Einolf 2007), although not yet apparently their American, specifically paleo- and neoconservative, counterparts remaining proudly “exceptional” in this and related respects. At least the prevalent view in the historical and legal literature is that torture in modern liberal-democratic societies has been delegitimized and ultimately abolished, with some exceptions, as during the American neoconservative “war on terror” by “hurtful” or “enhanced” interrogation methods (Turk 2004), because of generalized “Enlightenment ideas of rationality and the value of the individual” (Einolf 2007).

## The Enlightenment as a Proxy Economic Revolution

### *Civil Society and Economy*

A procedural remark is in order. Considering the Enlightenment's relationship to the economic system in connection with, rather than separately from, civil society has its compelling rationale despite most economists' possible misgivings and tendency to separate and isolate the economy, including markets, from the larger society, or to reduce the latter to the "marketplace" a la rational choice theory. This is that the Enlightenment originally considers the capitalist economy, including the market, to be a constitutive component of civil society as the private realm in relation to the state or the public sphere. This is epitomized by Hegel's original conception of civil *cum* bourgeois commercial society, the sphere of private market or economic transactions separate and autonomous from the public realm of the state and politics, as well as Marx's and Tönnies' mostly Hegellian definitions. Also, Hobbes' pre-Hegellian concept of "civil state,"<sup>49</sup> distinguished from and superseding the "state of nature," is an extant proxy of Hegel's civil bourgeois society. Generally, during the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries the liberal Enlightenment attributed to the capitalist economy, and markets in particular, an "essential part in the formation" of civil society defined as what Parsons (1967b; Alexander 1998) calls a societal community organized and functioning "independent of the specific direction of state power" (Ku 2000).

To that extent nascent capitalism and what Smith calls its "system of natural liberty" and Hayek its "spontaneous order" of markets and all "rule-governed institutions" (Smith 2003) forms an integral element of secular civil society and liberal modernity as the Enlightenment's creation, simply of its holistic liberalism, contrary to Hayekian dubious "libertarian" reductions of "liberal" to "capitalist" or "market." Consequently, if modern liberalism, as an ideal of liberty, social system, and historical period, is what Mises denotes the "flower" of the rationalistic Enlightenment, then this also logically and historically holds true of modern capitalism as the *particular*, economic component or subsystem of liberal society and modernity as what Sorokin (1970) calls a sociocultural, specifically, "sensate" or rationalistic supersystem. Simply, if liberal civil society and modernity is, as Hegel recognized, the child of the rationalistic Enlightenment, so is its economic constituent, the modern capitalist economy or the market, contrary to Hayek and colleagues' disjuncture of the latter from "constructivist rationalism."

Liberal society and modernity, simply liberalism, as what Pareto calls a "sociological system" is more comprehensive and complex or "complicated" than capitalism as the economic system and its "particular" case,<sup>50</sup> rather than, as in Hayekian "libertarian"

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<sup>49</sup>Recall Hobbes remarks that "out of civil state, there is always war of every one against every one" defining the "state of nature," which implies that lack of such a universal or permanent war defines civil society.

<sup>50</sup>Pareto acknowledges that the equilibrium "states of the economic system may be regarded as particular cases of the general states of the sociological system."



economics, the other way round. In Durkheim-Parsons' terms, liberal and any society constitutes a total social system (Arrow 1994) incorporating the capitalist and other economy, including the market, as its subsystem, alongside politics, culture, and other societal subsystems. Hence, as long as liberal society and modernity is the sociological "child" of the Enlightenment, the capitalist or market economy at least as a conception (Hirschman 1977), is the special economic offspring of the latter. In Mises' words, modern capitalism is the market-economic "rose" of the rationalist Enlightenment precisely because liberalism is its societal "flower." This is instructive to emphasize given that most economists, especially Hayek-style "libertarians," with some exceptions (Buchanan and Tullock 1962), tend to overlook and even deny the original link of (the conception of) modern capitalism and markets with the Enlightenment (Mokyr 2009) and its project and outcome of liberal civil society and modernity.<sup>51</sup> Hence, the title "Enlightenment, civil society, and economy" simply makes sense in this context.

### *The Enlightenment as Economic Innovation*

The Enlightenment also constitutes a proxy economic revolution in conceptual terms through its revolutionary or innovative conceptions of the modern economy, specifically the conception of capitalism and free markets, in conjunction and mutual reinforcement with its cultural, political, and civic revolutions. Such conceptual economic revolution or innovation is to be distinguished from contemporaneous and subsequent industrial and technological revolutions or inventions during the eighteenth century and later. However, it is the Enlightenment that primarily provides the intellectual foundation and justification for industrial and technological revolutions and advancements, thus for modern capitalism through its scientific rationalism, objectivism, and progressivism and their applications (Angel 1994; Artz 1998; Foucault 1996; Hinchman 1984). Notably, Enlightenment scientific rationalism is reportedly a major source or precursor of the late eighteenth century Industrial Revolution ushering in modern capitalism in Western Europe (Temin 2006; Allen 2008; Mokyr 2009). In this sense, the Enlightenment directly and initially by its ideas an intellectual economic, and indirectly and eventually via its effects and legacies, represents a technological-industrial revolution through a "new and rational approach to the study of technology"<sup>52</sup> or the "Industrial Enlightenment" (Allen 2008). In short, it is not only a conceptual innovation in Sidgwick's sense, but also a proxy practical invention a la Schumpeter within the economy (Hobijn and Jovanovic 2001; Howitt 2000), like civil society, politics, and culture.

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<sup>51</sup>Hayek and other libertarian economists, in curious contrast to his predecessor Mises, deny or overlook the link through disassociating modern capitalism or the "spontaneous order" from and even opposing it to liberal society and modernity by attacking Enlightenment "constructivist rationalism" on the account of its "abuse of reason" in favor of some sort of irrationalism such as traditions and ignorance, as well as "true" liberalism or individualism reduced to narrow market freedom.

<sup>52</sup>Allen (2008:959) comments that "a new and rational approach to the study of technology of the eighteenth century [is] trace[d] to the Enlightenment."

Above all, the Enlightenment is a revolution or true innovation in conceptualizing, describing, explaining, and predicting the nature and operation, simply thinking about the economy, including markets, as an integral element of society, or the subsystem of the total social system. In this sense, just as in philosophy and, as Durkheim suggests, sociology, the Enlightenment represents a revolution or innovation in economic ideas, particularly the main intellectual background or philosophical framework of modern political economy or economics as science, as Keynes and Mises both suggest, though from opposite theoretical positions (Hirschman 1977; Hodgson 1999). The Enlightenment truly revolutionizes economics or political economy by what Keynes identifies as its original *laissez-faire* doctrine and Mises does as economic liberalism or individualism (Hodgson 1999) first embraced and developed by the French Physiocratic School and following it Smith and his successors (Ricardo, Say, etc.).

Thus, Keynes and John (1972) attributes the origin and spread of the *laissez-faire* doctrine to the “door of political philosophers” belonging to or associated with the French Enlightenment rather than to the British “political economists.” For instance, he invokes Marquis d’Argenson, a friend of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists like Diderot, as the “first writer” using the phrase *laissez-faire* in “clear association with the doctrine”<sup>53</sup> in 1751, thus before Smith (both the 1759 *Theory of Moral Sentiments* and the 1776 *Wealth and Nations*). Also, probably the best known (Artz 1998) Enlightenment philosopher and sociologist Montesquieu admittedly formulates the idea of an “Invisible Hand” in the sense of a force causing individuals who pursue their “private passions” like honor<sup>54</sup> or glory to intentionally and even “unknowingly,” while considering only their “own interests,” contribute to the “public good” or “general welfare” (Hirschman 1977; Fourcade and Healy 2007), thus inspiring or anticipating Smith’s economic formulation of the pursuit of material gain via the market.

Generally, the two major schools of economic thought during the late eighteenth century are rooted or embedded in the French and Scottish Enlightenment, respectively, the Physiocratic School in France and its successor, Smith’s political economy in Great Britain. On this account, modern political economy as science is what Mises may call the “flower” of the Enlightenment, specifically of “Enlightenment economic thought”<sup>55</sup> (Mokyr 2009), just as are sociology and all other social sciences of its

<sup>53</sup>Keynes (1972:278) cites Marquis d’Argenson’s statement in French: *Laissez-faire, telle devrait être la devise de toute puissance publique, depuis que le monde est civilisé* (*laissez-faire* should be the principle of all public power since the world is civilized).

<sup>54</sup>Baxter and Margavio (2000:401) also comment that the “writings of the Scottish Enlightenment provide a foundation for the conception of honor contained in a self defined by reason and applied to the conduct of business. [Hume and Smith] insist that concern for honor both stimulates and tempers selfish excess in the conduct of business.”

<sup>55</sup>Mokyr (2009:350) remarks that “Enlightenment thinkers reasonably argued that it would be better if market forces and free enterprise (as opposed to government officials or academic committees) determined payoffs. Moreover, they felt that patents encouraged innovation and that innovation was the key element in economic growth [and] Eighteenth century thought developed a growing belief that monopolies of all types, even temporary ones, were bad. There was an intuitive sense that access to knowledge should be free because anything that limited access to useful knowledge was bad for the Baconian program, the cornerstone of Enlightenment economic thought.”

general protosociological ideas (Delanty 2000). When he proposes that modern liberalism is the “flower” of the Enlightenment, Mises primarily (though not solely) signifies *economic* liberalism and individualism (Hodgson 1999). He thus implies modern economic science as, in his definition, the theoretical conception and rationalization of the latter in the form of laissez-faire capitalism and its variations, a view prevalent in the Austrian (and Chicago) school of economics (Kirzner 1992).

While this is not another history of the birth of economics, it is useful to emphasize that the French Enlightenment’s (Artz 1998; Delanty 2000) invention of the concept of modern social science logically and actually incorporates, alongside sociology, that of economics as its integral part. Conversely, it is both an illogical nonsequitur and, as Keynes and Mises both imply, a historical fallacy to somehow “exempt” the birth of modern political economy from the Enlightenment’s integral concept of social science and scientific rationalism overall and attribute to the “queen” of the social sciences—this expression reveals such a contradiction—origins and ideas totally independent of this “constructivist rationalism,” as economists à la Hayek and colleagues (Smith 2003) are prone to. If admittedly the Enlightenment primarily generates the modern “institutions of open science” (Temin 2006), then the latter comprise economic science as its component, alongside other social and natural sciences. For instance, the two major economic thinkers of the time, Turgot (or Quesnay) in France and Smith in Great Britain belonged to or were closely associated with the French and Scottish Enlightenment, respectively.

Specifically, the Enlightenment represents the process of intellectual destruction or delegitimation of what Weber and Mannheim call economic and social traditionalism and of theoretical creation or conception and projection of what can analogously be described as economic and social modernity. In this sense, the Enlightenment proves the intellectual “terminator” of the traditional economic order and the creator or designer of a modern alternative through the conception of a market economy as its theoretical innovation (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Mokyr 2009), just as its concepts of liberal democracy and civil society (Habermas 1996). Hence, it operates as proxy creative destruction in the economy by theoretical innovations in economic science, as distinct from technological, industrial, organizational, and other practical inventions as Schumpeter’s “prime mover” of modern capitalism. Yet, Enlightenment scientific rationalism and progressivism forms the prime intellectual foundation for such technological and economic advancement or progress.

In other words, the Enlightenment’s innovation of the theory of a market economy and liberal civil society and democracy “revolutionizes” the nature and scope of economic and social reasoning leading to modern economics and sociology as the new social sciences, respectively. It does just as technological, industrial, organizational, and other practical inventions, founded on or stimulated and justified by Enlightenment scientific rationalism, revolutionize the character and operation of the economic system resulting in modern capitalism as the new economic structure. In this sense, the Enlightenment turns out to be not only what Schumpeter may call the first “Copernican revolution” (the second being, in his view, marginal-utility theory) in economics, as Durkheim suggests, in sociology, as a social science. It also

proves through its scientific rationalism and progressivism to be an extant generator, predictor, or precursor of practical revolution and advancement in the economy, notably progress in technology. On this account, the importance of the Enlightenment both for economics as a social science or theory and the economy as a social system or praxis, just as for sociology and civil society and democracy, is impossible to overstate. In summary, both the science of economics and the modern (capitalist) economy, just as sociology and civil society and democracy, are Mises' "flowers" of the Enlightenment and its scientific rationalism. This contradicts Hayek and colleagues' peculiar, even admittedly "obscure and mystical" (Smith 2003) grounding of economic thinking and action alike in pre- and anti-Enlightenment irrationalism, including tradition and ignorance, following their role model Burke extolling irrational prejudice as well as feudal aristocracy (Schmidt 1996).

### *The Enlightenment vs. the Feudal Master-Servant Economy*

The Enlightenment in particular develops as the movement of intellectual destruction or delegitimation of feudalism or the *ancien regime* of economy and society. The Enlightenment becomes the intellectual "terminator" of feudalism as the severe and petrified form, in the image of the "peace of cemetery," of economic traditionalism or precapitalism<sup>56</sup> (Simon 1995) and what Schumpeter calls the old, precapitalist economic structures. Specifically, it delegitimizes and supersedes feudalism as the special, economic facet of the Dark Middle Ages, and thus as exemplary darkness in the form of servitude, oppression, and misery in the economy and beyond. Notably, the Enlightenment aims and eventually succeeds to become the intellectual "terminator" of feudalism as a subtype of master-servant economy (Orren 1991; Steinberg 2003; Allen 2008). This is perhaps the Enlightenment's sole termination of traditionalism which presumably Hayek and colleagues would not deplore given their rejection of the "road to serfdom" narrowly construed as socialism or communism conflated with each other, as an unmitigated evil versus capitalism, including its authoritarian forms, as paradise-nirvana. For the Enlightenment, including the Christian Dark Middle Ages, medievalism as a whole was a type of master-servant society and historical period, feudalism formed an economic ingredient or subsystem of the latter, though it can also be described and analyzed as a sociopolitical system, as does Weber.

Initially and minimally, the Enlightenment reveals and delegitimizes ("deconstructs") feudalism as a master-servant economy and society by analogy to exposing the proverbial emperor with "no clothes." Subsequently and eventually through its legacy of economic and political liberalism, freedom and egalitarianism, it contributes to overcoming the feudal master-servant economy in favor of liberal-democratic, including welfare, capitalism (Hodgson 1999; Pryor 2002), though some vestiges or embellishments of feudalism in "new" capitalist or free-enterprise

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<sup>56</sup>For instance, Simon (1995:14) registers the "lack of capitalists" in eighteenth century France.

forms have persisted or reappeared in Western economies. This especially applies to Great Britain until the late nineteenth century<sup>57</sup> (Steinberg 2003) and America through the 1930s (Orren 1991) and, via persistent antilabor ideas, institutions and policies<sup>58</sup> (Piven 2008), beyond. In legal terms, both economies adopted English master-servant common law, yet extolled<sup>59</sup> on efficiency grounds by some economists (La Porta et al. 2008) that defines capital-labor relations as effectively or figuratively those between masters and servants, respectively (Bourdieu 1998; Baland and Robinson 2008<sup>60</sup>; Nickell 2008<sup>61</sup>).

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<sup>57</sup>Steinberg (2003:456–8) observes that in Great Britain the “solidification of master and servant law,” through the Master and Servant Act of 1823, “represented a new form of subjugated labor” and that “free labor, in fact, did not come into being until the Workmen’s and Employers Act of 1875.” Also, Piven (2008:12) notes that “English Methodist preachers invoked for their parishioners the awesome threat of everlasting punishment in hell that would be visited on Luddite insurgents in the nineteenth century.”

<sup>58</sup>For example, Piven (2008:9) suggests that in virtue of its “laws prohibiting public sector strikes,” as epitomized by the Homeland Security department denying elemental labor liberties and rights to its employees, America under neoconservatism is a salient anomaly among modern Western (and other) economies in which such prohibitions are virtually nonexistent or rare. Alternatively, organized labor’s “inability” to protect labor liberties and rights in the US is anomalous or exceptional among Western economies, for instance France where unions “continue to exert considerable power in French politics” (Piven 2008:12).

<sup>59</sup>While overlooking its master-servant element and legacy and glorifying English common law’s “superior performance” in the economic realm compared to Continental, especially French, civil law, La Porta et al. (2008:286) admit “the high costs of litigation, and well-known judicial arbitrariness, in common law countries” like Great Britain and America. Still, they intimate such master-servant ingredients by registering that “common law saw the enterprise as an unencumbered property of the employer, with the workers relegated to contractual claims on the surplus from production,” while French civil law “saw property and responsibility as two sides of the same coin” and involved the “exercise of public power for the protection of workers” (La Porta et al. 2008:309). In short, admittedly “countries that have strong [capital] protection indeed have weak protection of labor” (La Porta et al. 2008:311) and these are primarily those with common law. Crucially, it is unwittingly admitted that English common law was effectively a legal instrument or “lethal weapon” of the rising capitalist class against labor reduced to near-servant status – thus the perversion of justice – by observing that (alongside lawyers) property owners were on the “same winning side” in the late seventeenth century Glorious Revolution (La Porta et al. 2008:303). In general, La Porta et al. (2008:305) register that the “differences between common and civil law manifest[ed] themselves for the first time during the Enlightenment.” Yet, with respect to the above revolution, Besley and Persson (2009:1233) consider

England following the 1688 Glorious Revolution “a nondemocratic political system.”

<sup>60</sup>Baland and Robinson (2008:1738) observe that landlords’ control of the “political activities” of their laborers “was critical in determining the outcome of rural elections” in Great Britain “before the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872” and that during the nineteenth century “radicals and reformers complained about the lack of a secret ballot” in this putative model democracy (relative to continental Europe).

<sup>61</sup>Nickell (2008:384–5) implies a proxy master-servant vestiges in observing that “employees in the United States work more hours per year than in most other rich countries and have fewer weeks of holiday than in any other. The dispersion of earnings is higher in the United States, and more adults and children live in relative poverty, than in any other rich country. Median real hourly earnings in the United States have barely risen over the last 35 years despite a substantial rise in productivity.”

This master-servant law and definition of labor-capital represents a pre-Enlightenment despotic relic or “ghost” of the dead past self-perpetuated or resurrected by anti-Enlightenment authoritarian conservatism, especially its American version, including totalitarian fascism (labor camps, etc.). Thus, American neoconservatism perpetuates or restores this pre-Enlightenment master-servant vestige in embellished “all-American” forms. These include labor repression via antilabor and antiunion ideas, laws, and practices, including capital arbitrary suppression or at best “constrained employer discretion”<sup>62</sup> (Hirsch 2008), virtually unpaid proxy-slave prison labor in most US states, and other master-servant or “slave-like” (Wacquant 2002) work settings, joined and mutually reinforced with the systematic promotion of the “economic interests of narrow” groups (Béland 2005), namely plutocracy. Predictably, a paradigmatic instance is the observed “persistence of labor repression” in the US postbellum South through the early twenty-first century, in conjunction and mutual reinforcement with persistent “political disenfranchisement, intimidation, violence and lynching”<sup>63</sup> (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008) at least until the 1960s.

In comparative terms, no modern Western and other democratic society is probably more pervaded by labor repression via antilabor ideas, institutions and practices than is America under neoconservatism (and pre-New Deal paleoconservatism) during the 1980s–2000s and to that extent by a pre- and anti-Enlightenment proxy master-servant economy. In particular, in no region in modern advanced democratic societies is labor more persistently, systematically, and intensively subjected to demonization and repression, thus a proxy master-servant economic system, just as various groups to political disenfranchisement and coercion, than in the US South as the persistent “outlier” and thus a pre-Enlightenment supreme exemplar in the Western world in this sense.

Conversely, this hyperconservative region seems closer to underdeveloped, “third-world” economies in terms of labor repression and thus a pre-Enlightenment master-servant economy, just as to Islamic theocracies like Iran with respect to the protototalitarian theocratic “Bible-Belt,” so anti-Enlightenment, “solution” to the

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<sup>62</sup>Hirsch (2008:153) registers “the shift away from union governance [as the norm] in the US private sector toward the current norm of constrained employer discretion.” He predicts that in the US economy “collective bargaining is likely to remain a minority model, as nonunion norms of employee governance evolve in response to market forces and public policies,” while admitting that “union decline results in what is arguably an underproduction of worker voice and participation in the workplace” (Hirsch 2008:154). In turn, “as private union membership fell by nearly half, nonunion private wage and salary employment more than doubled” in the US during 1973–2006, with the 90% plus of the private sector being “not unionized” (Hirsch 2008:156–73).

<sup>63</sup>Acemoglu and Robinson (2008:268–9) observe that “even though former slaves were enfranchised and slavery was abolished at the end of the Civil War, the South largely maintained its pre-Civil War agricultural system based on large plantations, low-wage uneducated labor, and labor repression, and it remained relatively poor until the middle of the twentieth century.” And, in their view, the “persistence of labor repression in the US South is consistent with changes in political institutions because they were offset by the exercise of de facto power; slavery was replaced by monopsonistic arrangements, policies designed to impede labor mobility, political disenfranchisement, intimidation, violence and lynching” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008:268–9).

“burden” of liberty and the “agony” of choice by eliminating liberties and choices (Bauman 2001). For in the South, like Islamic and other third-world countries, labor repression and thus a pre-Enlightenment master-servant economy invariably operates in reciprocal association and reinforcement with such a theocratic design as the “godly” justification of antilabor ideas<sup>64</sup> (Hirsch 2008), laws and practices condemning unions as “ungodly” and “un-American, just as with “political disenfranchisement,” including intimidation, violence, and lynching in the past and present, also justified on “holy” grounds (Jacobs et al. 2005; Messner et al. 2005). In turn, a master-servant economy through labor repression, political exclusion, and the “Bible Belt” design of theocracy in the South all indicate or “load on” the pre- and anti-Enlightenment as their underlying factor, as they do in Iran and other Islamic theocracies. Thus, when observers notice with alarm that democracy in America is “going south” or American politics being placed in the “shadow of Dixie” (Cochran 2001), this expansion of the “Dixieland” implies the composite of a master-servant economy via persistent labor repression with political exclusion and theocratic coercion, and hence the pre- and anti-Enlightenment and pre- and antiliberalism overall, expanded to the “land of freedom.”

In addition to, and conjunction and mutual reinforcement with labor repression, American neoconservatism restores or approximates and evokes the pre-Enlightenment, feudal master-servant economy through its systematic promotion and defense of narrow economic interests, including but not limited to, tax reductions for the latter resulting in the state reduced “capacity” for raising public revenues<sup>65</sup> (Béland 2005). Notably, this promotion paradigmatically qualifies or appears as master-servant restoration or approximation because it almost invariably involves promoting and defending the economic interests of feudal-style, Burke’s aristocracy in the “all-American” form of what Weber identified as “naked” plutocracy or business oligarchy (Fligstein 2001; Pryor 2002) as “top heavy” (Wolff 2002; also, Keister and Moller 2000; Keister 2008) in wealth.

For instance, in the feudal master-servant economy one percent or less of the population owned half or more of the wealth (Lenski 1984). This then provides a sort of statistical proxy definition of feudalism and other oppressive precapitalism in terms of extremely unequal economic distribution, and in spite or because of such inequality lack of or low redistribution of wealth by the state “from richer to poorer agents” (Benabou 2000). Comparative, this is a sort of “steady state” also typifying American capitalism (Benabou 2000) as well as Latin America and other

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<sup>64</sup>For instance, Hirsch (2008:169) remarks that “employment share gains [in the car industry] were evident among mostly nonunion facilities in southern states [and] US companies fell behind their Japanese and European competitors.”

<sup>65</sup>Béland (2005:35–6) elaborates that the US “poses a paradox. In the world’s most powerful state, elected officials promoting the economic interests of narrow – and affluent – constituencies have significantly reduced the capacity of the state to raise revenues while increasing military spending and breeding popular fears about terrorism [so] a deepening contradiction between declining extraction powers and rising protection needs.”

nondemocratic third-world societies<sup>66</sup> (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). Also, primarily as the result of neoconservative economic ideology and policies a la Reaganomics, including, inter alia, tax cuts for plutocracy, one percent in America reportedly owns almost half of the total and more of financial wealth during the early twenty-first century (Wolff 2002) déjà vu, just as did prior to the Great Depression and the New Deal (Piketty and Saez 2006). In terms of this feudal 1–50% ratio, as of labor repression, neoconservative “all-American” unregulated capitalism (Fishback 1998) objectively defines or exposes itself (in the sense of the proverbial emperor with no cloths) as pre-Enlightenment master-servant “belated” feudalism (Orren 1991) as it did before the New Deal period, or neofeudalism (Binmore 2001) as it does in recent times (Piketty and Saez 2006; Neckerman and Torche 2007) and extreme wealth and income inequalities do overall (Anand and Segal 2008; Keister and Moller 2000<sup>67</sup>). Conversely, it does not present itself as a “new” liberal-capitalist economic system (Pryor 2002) defined by universal equality, liberty, and justice in the sense of Jefferson’s Enlightenment ideal and the Constitution. Generally, a “highly unequal” capitalist and other society tends to oscillate “in and out of democracy”<sup>68</sup> (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001), alternatively dictatorship or repression, as exemplified by Latin America and in part America during neoconservatism.

If the feudal master-servant and related economy like slavery is *caput mortuum* in contemporary Western economies, with the partial or disguised exception of America under antilabor paleo- and neoconservatism, this is primarily because of the Enlightenment legacy of integral, both labor and capital, economic and political freedom, egalitarianism, universalism, and humanitarianism. Conversely, if it is not yet “presumed dead,” as in most underdeveloped economies, as well as America under conservatism (Orren 1991), especially the antilabor South, this is mostly because of the absence or weakness of such Enlightenment legacy compared with the pre- and anti-Enlightenment in these societies and regions. At this juncture, neoconservatism’s perpetuated and celebrated antilabor and antiunion American exceptionalism, admittedly a “double-edged sword” anyway (Lipset 1996), let alone third-world exceptional “sharper swords,” effectively reveals as a feudal-like master-servant deviation, despite America’s glorified lack of feudalism (Lipset and

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<sup>66</sup>Like Benabou (2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001:957) observe that economic inequality “does not necessarily lead to more redistribution. Unequal societies switch between regimes and in nondemocratic regimes, there is no redistribution.”

<sup>67</sup>Keister and Moller (2000:63–76) find that wealth ownership in the US “has long been concentrated in the hands of a small minority of the population” to the point that during neoconservatism “levels of wealth inequality are so extreme that most people register hardly any wealth at all.”

<sup>68</sup>Acemoglu and Robinson (2001:957) add that “inequality emerges as a crucial determinant of political instability because it encourages the rich to contest power in democracies, and also often encourages social unrest in nondemocratic societies. Therefore, democracy is more likely to be consolidated if the level of inequality is limited, whereas high inequality is likely to lead to political instability, either in the form of frequent regime changes or repression of social unrest,” with both outcomes characterizing Latin America, and the second at least in part America under neoconservatism (Pryor 2002).



Marks 2000), from the Enlightenment's "destruction" of feudalism as the old, and its projection and legacy of liberal-democratic capitalism as the new, economic system. To that extent, such exceptionalism confirms the rule or pattern of liberal-democratic capitalism or economic liberalism being Mises' "flower" of the rationalistic Enlightenment rather than, as US and UK master-servant or antilabor "free-market" conservatives claim, disconfirming it.

### ***The Enlightenment and Economic Modernity and Freedom***

The Enlightenment positively represents the process of theoretical, as different from practical, creation or projection of economic modernity or a modern economy transcending Weber's and Mannheim's economic and social traditionalism. In particular, it involves the theoretical creation, minimally anticipation, of a modern market economy or industrial capitalism as an example of Weberian economic modernity as well as Schumpeter's new economic structure. It does so through its "theory of the market economy" (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Mokyr 2009) in conjunction with its conceptions of liberal-secular democracy, civil society, and culture. Hence, it provides the intellectual or philosophical foundation and rationale for the modern market economy or industrial capitalism as the practical realization of its principles of reason and rationality, knowledge and science, and individual liberty, with some capitalist modifications and distortions of these ideals (Berman 2000), just as it does for civil society and political democracy.

As registered, modern industrial capitalism adopts the Enlightenment "ideal of the pursuit of knowledge" and the "new" harnessed in the service of technological advancement and economic growth, while reductively redefining and thus distorting newness as signifying "more commodities" (Berman 2000). While the mid eighteenth century Age of Reason is usually described as "preindustrial" (Garrard 2003) and/or precapitalist (Simon 1995), the Enlightenment and the associated "institutions of open science" admittedly represented "important precursors of the Industrial Revolution" (Temin 2006; Mokyr 2009) and thus modern capitalism or the free market economy. As critics suggest, the "triumph of capitalism" in Western societies owed more to Enlightenment and related "political arguments for capitalism before its triumph"<sup>69</sup> (Hirschman 1977) than to purely economic considerations. Montesquieu was especially relevant with his argument for free market trade or

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<sup>69</sup>Hirschman (1977:59) contends that the "triumph of capitalism, like that of many modern tyrants, owes much to the widespread refusal to take it seriously," just as to the Enlightenment and related "political arguments for capitalism before its triumph." Further, postmodern theorists like Derrida (1994) propose that capitalism contains "credulity, occultism, obscurantism, lack of maturity before Enlightenment, childish or primitive humanity. But what would Enlightenment be without the market? And who will ever make progress without exchange-value?"

commerce on the grounds of its being peaceful or gentle (*doux*), his “general psychological premise” justifying the pursuit of material interests as insuring against irrational “passions” and his concept of an “Invisible Hand” before Smith’s formulation, though stated in relation to the “search for glory” rather than the “desire for money”<sup>70</sup> (Hirschman 1977). Notably, it is acknowledged that *both* the theory of the market economy, thus modern capitalism, and the theory of democracy or political freedom are “products of the Enlightenment;” and this joint creation is explained by that its philosophers, sociologists, and economists considered the economy and politics jointly, not “separately” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). Admittedly, the modern economic or public-choice conception of the “good” political society is inspired by and akin to that of the “philosophers of the Enlightenment” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).

Notably, the Enlightenment constitutes the blueprint of economic freedom, just as of civil and cultural liberties and political freedoms, in reciprocal relationship and reinforcement. First, it does so directly through Montesquieu, Hume, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, and other economically-minded Enlightenment philosophers and sociologists, including the early Smith (the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*). It also does so indirectly through classical political economy, notably, the later Smith (the *Wealth of Nations*), and its own precursor and partial influence the French Physiocratic economic School (founded by Quesnay and also represented by Turgot and other *économistes*) based on the maxim of *laissez faire et laissez passer*. In particular, the Enlightenment formulates the conception of market freedom and individualism through free trade or commerce, markets, and competition. Alternatively, this conception, like the theory of a market economy overall, defining modern capitalist economies is primarily rooted in and derives from the Enlightenment, either directly or indirectly through classical political economy, from Montesquieu and Hume to Smith et al. Recall that Montesquieu’s argument for commerce and thus trade and free markets as gentle and peaceful, as well as for pursuing individual material interests as insuring against irrational “passions,” was one of the crucial Enlightenment and other precapitalist “political arguments for capitalism before its triumph.”

In turn, while Mises and other “free-market” economists (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) extol market-economic liberalism or individualism as the “flower” of the Enlightenment, critics or skeptics regard it as expressing Enlightenment individualistic

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<sup>70</sup>According to Hirschman (1977:10), “in fact, the idea of an “Invisible Hand” – of a force that makes men pursuing their private passions conspire unknowingly toward the public good – was formulated in connection with the search for glory rather than with the desire for money by Montesquieu.” He cites Montesquieu statement that the “pursuit of honor” (in a monarchy) “brings life to all the parts of the body politic;” as a result, “it turns out that everyone contributes to the general welfare while thinking that he works for his own interests.” Hirschman (1977:62) comments that Montesquieu “persistent use of le *doux* commerce strikes us as a strange aberration for an age when the slave trade was at its peak.”

“preconceptions”<sup>71</sup> in connection to the market and economy (Hodgson 1999), as especially, but not only, prevalent in the British or Scottish strand. However, aside from such positive and negative evaluations, they agree that the Enlightenment is the primary seed or root of the new “tree” of market-economic liberalism and individualism as the idea of individual freedom and choice in the market and the economy, like in civil society, politics, and culture, as the equivalent principle defining noneconomic liberalism. Reportedly, free-market individualism, thus modern capitalism defined by it (and socialism), shows its “roots” in the Enlightenment’s principles of “individual liberty, absolute property rights and equality under the law” integrated into the “visionary fabric of a market system” (Hodgson 1999). Relatedly, the “intellectual roots” of what is called the “state/public versus market/private” or civil-society duality are traced to the Enlightenment, particularly its British version in Locke, Smith, and Bentham (Ku 2000). In particular, the idea of a market-based, individualistic, and spontaneous economic system is “often” traced or related to the “philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment” such as Hume, Ferguson, and Smith, although this individualism is viewed as “institutional” rather than atomistic, and Smith an “institutional individualist” (Udehn 2002) and its work “sociological economics” (Reisman 1998).

A fortiori, the French Enlightenment blends its underlying, often denied or overlooked by its “Anglo-Saxon” enemies or critics since Burke, “individualistic liberalism” (Mannheim 1986) with elements of sociological institutionalism à la Durkheim (Merton 1998) as well as of institutional economics in Veblen’s formulation rather than in the “new” version *cum* orthodox economic principles applied to institutions. The blend is epitomized by Montesquieu (Hirschman 1977, 1982; Fourcade and Healy 2007) as well as Voltaire and Condorcet (Easterly 2008<sup>72</sup>) and later, Saint-Simon. It is no wonder that Durkheim considers Montesquieu and Saint-Simon (alongside Rousseau) the “forerunners” of sociology defined as the “study of institutions.”

Next, the Enlightenment proposes a new, positive evaluation and treatment of economic activity and prosperity, namely the pursuit of wealth and material and technological progress, as an autonomous, secular, and legitimate end in social life, just as it advocates equality and justice in the economy. Such novel appreciation

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<sup>71</sup>Hodgson (1999:11) proposes that the “transformative phenomenon of learning is ultimately corrosive of the contractarian and utilitarian manifestations of Enlightenment thought” and infers that the “common, Enlightenment preconceptions of both market individualism and collectivist socialism are thus undermined.” Similarly, Willer (2009:23) comments that in explaining collective action “Enlightenment philosophers invoked an implicit social contract that citizens agree to.”

<sup>72</sup>Easterly (2008:95) comments that “two contrasting worldviews coexist in institutional economics, which go all the way back to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The top down view of institutions sees them as determined by laws written by political leaders (the view of most Enlightenment intellectuals like Rousseau and Condorcet).” In his view seemingly preferring the alternative solution, “the bottom up view sees institutions instead as emerging spontaneously from the social norms, customs, traditions, beliefs, and values of individuals within a society, with the written law only formalizing what is already mainly shaped by the attitudes of individuals (the view of the leading critic of the top-down French Revolution, Burke)” (Easterly 2008:95).

rejects and supersedes the pre-Enlightenment typical religiously-grounded, including Christian and Islamic, depreciation and negative treatment of economic action and material interest. Conversely, the Enlightenment does so with respect to the pre-Enlightenment's favoring of spiritual activity like contemplation, meditation, blind belief, myth, fanaticism, mysticism, asceticism, then economic stagnation, material deprivation and suffering, or poverty and misery as the God-decreed path to salvation. It also overcomes pre-Enlightenment's condemnation of wealth or money, especially its enjoyment,<sup>73</sup> like all sensual pleasures, as, in Puritan terms, the ungodly "temptation of the flesh," "evil," or "Mammon," at most the means and expression of divine glory and grace, as in Weber's controversial connection of Calvinism and capitalism. In particular, the Enlightenment involves the positive valuation of market trade or commerce as an autonomous and legitimate activity, as epitomized by Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, and others, let alone their "representative" Smith within classical political economy. This is in sharp contrast to the pre-Enlightenment's Christian and other religious stigma or suspicion of trade, as wealth in itself being more pleasing to "Mammon" than to God, thus proscribed or stigmatized, at most the subordinate means of divine glory and the path to (the knowledge and proof of) salvation, in Weber's Calvinism.<sup>74</sup>

Recall a paradigmatic case of the Enlightenment's positive valuation of economic activity and interests is Montesquieu "persistent use" of the notion of gentle and peaceful commerce (*le doux commerce*) and in extension trade and markets on the stated rationale that actors overcome their "passions" as irrational forces by seeking material gain (Hirschman 1977). Admittedly, the "positive" evaluation of trading and related economic action has become prevalent only "since the eighteenth century Enlightenment," for prior to the latter, including the Christian pre-Enlightenment, market trade as a legitimate activity was "suspect" and traders almost stigmatized as engaging in "less moral pursuits than

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<sup>73</sup>Weber remarks that Calvinism's "real moral objection is to relaxation in the security of possession, the enjoyment of wealth with consequent idleness and the temptations of the flesh." In his account, for Calvinism "wealth is bad ethically only in so far as it is a temptation to idleness and sinful enjoyment. But as a performance of a duty in a calling it is not only morally permissible, but actually enjoined." Thus, Calvinist asceticism "looked upon the pursuit of wealth as an end in itself as highly reprehensible; but the attainment of it as a fruit of labor in a calling was a sign of God's blessing." Weber traces the view "the greater the possessions, the heavier the feeling of responsibility for them, for holding them undiminished for the glory of God and increasing them by restless effort" back into the Middle Ages but proposes that "it was in the ethic of ascetic Protestantism that it first found a consistent ethical foundation."

<sup>74</sup>Weber comments that in Calvinism "the world exists to serve the glorification of God and for that purpose alone [and] the elected Christian [read Calvinist] is in the world only to increase this glory of God by fulfilling His commandments." In short, for Calvinism "all creation, including the fact that only a small proportion of men are chosen for eternal grace, can have any meaning only as means to the glory and majesty of God."

other members of society” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). For instance, the French Enlightenment “proponents” of *doux commerce* reportedly value market trade for civilizing (softening and refining) “manners” and luxury for promoting “gentleness” (*douceur*) and “civility” in contrast to Christian moralists stigmatizing and proscribing such activities and pursuits<sup>75</sup> (Garrard 2003), just as the developing market evidently influenced “Enlightenment cultural productions”<sup>76</sup> (Simon 1995).

In particular, Voltaire characterizes and envisions the “new civilization of modernity” (England as the prototype) as a “sumptuous commercial civilization” resting on and driven by “trade and luxury, not self-sufficiency and asceticism,” of which an ancient model or precedent was “liberal Athens rather than austere Sparta,” in the belief that individual happiness (hedonism) instead of heroism is the “motor of history” (Garrard 2003). Predictably, Hume is a sort of British equivalent of Voltaire and, to add, Montesquieu (Hirschman 1977) in this respect, or conversely, the second is the French substitute for the first. Hume predicts that those societies pervaded by the spirit of industry, saving, art and luxury, and producing “delicacies and luxuries” to be more likely “rich, powerful, and happy” than their “austere or unproductive” alternatives like ancient Sparta as, in his and Voltaire’s view, a “completely inappropriate model for modern civilization” (Garrard 2003).

Needless to say, this applies *a fortiori* to Hume’s admirer and successor Smith, who in a sense just transforms or translates and codifies what Keynes would call Enlightenment economic and moral philosophy into political economy as science, as shown by the transition from the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* to the *Wealth of Nations*. As is well known, Smith admired Hume, especially his work *History of England*, for his treating commerce and market trade as “modern substitutes for more antiquated notions of virtue” (Garrard 2003), as he did Montesquieu for the same reason (Hirschman 1977), just as Keynes recognized the Enlightenment philosophers as innovators in economic doctrine. The fact that Keynes rejects and declares the “end of laissez-faire” does not change the fact that the Enlightenment, including both Montesquieu and Smith, pioneered this and associated doctrines, like the “invisible hand” (Hirschman 1977), and to that extent (as Sidgwick also implies) modern economic science, just as, via Saint Simon and Comte, created sociology’s foundational “assumptions” (Evans and Evans 2008). As regards Keynes in terms of the public use of reason via rational collective action such as the

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<sup>75</sup>Garrard (2003:22) comments that “commerce was understood very broadly in Enlightenment France, referring not merely to economic activity but to a wide range of voluntary forms of mutual exchange and reciprocity.”

<sup>76</sup>Simon (1995:8) adds that the “culture of the French Enlightenment stands midway between the patronage of the seventeenth century and the marketplace of twentieth century culture,” presenting Rousseau and Diderot as instances.

sensible state or “new fiscal activism” (Auerbach 2009) in the economy during severe economic crises such as the Great Depression and the 2008–2009 financial crisis, “we are all Keynesians now,” from postwar (Akerlof 2007; De Long 2000; Eggertsson 2008) to recent times,<sup>77</sup> “we are all the Enlightenment’s children” (Artz 1998) in general.

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<sup>77</sup>Akerlof (2007:5) comments that during the 1960s “even Milton Friedman was famously – although perhaps misleadingly – quoted: ‘We are all Keynesians now.’” Also, in 2008 even the perennially laissez-faire *Economist* recognized Keynesianism’s renewed relevance as an economic policy and the sole or main sensible solution to the global financial-economic crisis in an editorial “Dr. Keynes’ Chinese Patient,” and by implication American and European “patients,” as witnessed by Keynesian-style stimulus measures in America, Europe, and elsewhere. In turn, some US neoconservative politicians reportedly threw the 2009 Keynesian-style economic stimulus bill to the floor “with disgust” on the ground of its turning the creation of employment into “wasteful” government spending, apparently denying or overlooking that the latter is instrumental in the former, under some conditions and within certain parameters or boundaries. Needless to say, this was paradigmatically witnessed during the Great Depression “widely viewed as a failure of capitalism and the product of destructive competition” (Hirsch 2008:155) and the New Deal involving a “policy regime change” in the sense of the “elimination of certain “policy dogmas” that constrain the actions of the government” (the Hoover Administration), first of all the dogma against “government consumption and investment” via “expanded real and deficit spending” or the “principle of balanced budget” (Eggertsson 2008:1476; De Long 1996). In short, the policy regime change through the “elimination of these policy dogmas” accounted for “about 70–80% of the recovery” in production during 1933–1937 (Eggertsson 2008:1479). In turn, if the arch-conservative Hoover regime, constrained by the policy dogmas such as balanced budget, “had remained in place in 1933–1937 then, output would have continued to decline and been about 30% lower in 1937 than in 1933 and 49% below the 1929 peak” [i.e.] output would have continued to contract in the absence of the regime change (Eggertsson 2008:1479–80). In sum, “in the absence of the regime change, however, the economy would have continued its free fall in 1933, and output would have been 30% lower in 1937 than in 1933, instead of increasing 39% in this period (Eggertsson 2008:1506), affirming the inherently self-destructive or ultimately pathological character of American “unfettered” capitalism. Further, such neoconservative near-violent acts may perhaps prefigure or incite and inspire, as they have done in the past, real-life violence, including counter-state terrorism, by “reborn” religious conservatives or fundamentalist like “Christian” militia against the liberal “big” government in America. And, to show that this is not a fantasy, an extreme conservative NY newspaper published, after the passage of the economic stimulus in February 2009, a cartoon that, in some interpretations, suggested assassinating the “liberal” President, as the promoter of the stimulus, alluded to by a dead monkey killed by police. In another conservative incitement of or exercise in terrorism (or murdering political opponents), some conservatives were reported to “shoot at a target with the initials of the democratic congresswoman [they were] trying to unseat” at a gun range in Florida, with the following explanation (by the President of the “Republican Club”): “If we want to shoot at targets that look like that, we’re going to go ahead and do that.”

## Chapter 7

# Counter-Enlightenment, Post-Enlightenment, and Neo-Enlightenment

### The Enlightenment vs. the Dark Middle Ages Déjà Vu

#### *The Medieval “Empire Strikes Back”*

As indicated, the Enlightenment proceeds as the “agent provocateur” or unwitting factor of the perpetuation or revival of the pre-Enlightenment, notably the Dark Middle Ages, from what Weber may call the terminal condition of *caput mortuum* (“presumed dead”) or total darkness. This perpetuation or revival of the medieval pre-Enlightenment assumed the form of an adverse reaction (and selection) and counterrevolution, namely radical, including violent or militant, revolt against the Enlightenment, simply the counter- or anti-Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment provokes the counter-Enlightenment as its unintended or perverse outcome (“latent function”) aiming to perpetuate or restore the pre-Enlightenment. This outcome parallels liberalism or liberal democracy unintentionally provoking antiliberalism that aims to perpetuate or restore preliberalism or predemocracy and premodernism as a social system and time. The counter-Enlightenment originates and subsequently persists, first and foremost, in the form of conservatism (Nisbet 1966), especially its religious version (Juergensmeyer 2003), and eventually becomes fascism, and remains neoconservatism and neofascism currently. Relatedly, antiliberalism, above all, arises and successively endures as conservatism, and ultimately develops into fascism (plus communism), and continues as neoconservatism and neofascism through the early twenty-first century.

In aggregate terms, while the Enlightenment is defined by liberalism, liberal democracy, secularism, and rationalism, the pre-Enlightenment is epitomized by medievalist traditionalism, predemocratic despotism, theocracy, and irrationalism in the form or image of the Dark Middle Ages. And, the counter-Enlightenment is exemplified by conservatism, including fascism, revived religious fundamentalism and neo-fascism, hence antidemocratic conservative authoritarianism and theocratic-fascist totalitarianism, and antirationalism. In virtue of being liberal, democratic, secular, and rationalistic, the Enlightenment supersedes the medieval, despotic, theocratic, and irrational pre-Enlightenment, simply the Dark Middle Ages. The counter-Enlightenment, as a result of being conservative-fascist, thus

authoritarian or totalitarian, and antirationalistic attempts to resurrect the Dark Middle Ages from the “fire and ashes.” The Dark Middle Ages thus provide the negative impetus and rationale for the advent of the Enlightenment, yet the positive inspiration and enduring model for the counter-Enlightenment’s adverse reaction and revolt. Hence, the Dark Middle Ages form the reference point in exploring the opposition between the two, thus liberalism vs. conservatism and fascism, liberal democracy against its conservative-fascist opposites.

The opposition between the Enlightenment and the counter-Enlightenment, liberalism and conservatism, including fascism, revolves around their opposite definitions of medievalism as the axis and the entire Christian world as one of “axial age” civilizations (Eisenstadt 1986; Habermas 1996) or religiously dominated social formations (Lenski 1994). Simply, medievalism is “hell in this world,” as late-medieval Puritan societies are described (Tawney 1962), inhumane darkness, the “dead past” (Mannheim 1936) or the “dead hand of the past” (Harrod 1956) and the “peace of the cemetery” for the Enlightenment. Yet, it represents a “golden past,” “heaven,” “paradise lost,” “God’s Kingdom on Earth,” and the persisting ideal (Dunn and Woodard 1996; Nisbet 1966) for the conservative, including fascist, counter-Enlightenment, and remains so for the latter’s neoconservative, notably fundamentalist and neofascist sequels. To better understand the Enlightenment and the counter-Enlightenment, hence liberalism and conservatism, including fascism, their initial and continuing opposition notably requires taking account of medievalism as the liberal-democratic “nightmare” and the conservative, including fundamentalist-fascist, “sweet dream.” Alternatively, it is difficult to grasp them without considering the Dark Middle Ages as the extant factor or immediate precipitator, by their axiomatic darkness, irrationalism, despotism, and theocracy, of the Enlightenment and liberalism as their creative “destroyer” and of the counter-Enlightenment, conservatism, including revived fundamentalism and fascism, as their perpetuation or resurrection from the “peace of the cemetery” (“second life”).

Thus, the Enlightenment acts as the negative cause or “provocation” of medievalism’s perpetuation or resurrection from the “dead past” or extinction, in the form of conservatism, especially its religious version (Juergensmeyer 2003), as the exemplary “anti-Enlightenment” (Nisbet 1966) during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and since. In this sense, conservatism as an ideology, social system, and historical period resurrects or returns to what has been for all intents and purposes nearly extinct medievalism as, though denying that the latter was the Dark Middle Ages, the model for the conservative vision of the “good” *cum* “godly” society (Nisbet 1966). This is witnessed by Maistre-Burke’s and other archconservatives’ medieval, including aristocratic (Parsons 1967a; Schmidt 1996) and theocratic (Juergensmeyer 2003), ideals and “long-summer dreams” in the aftermath of the antimedieval, antiaristocratic, and antitheocratic French Revolution as the (perceived) “daughter” of the Enlightenment. In particular, conservatism reportedly represents “essentially” the reflection and an attempt at perpetuation or resurrection of the “feudal tradition” (Mannheim 1986), thus a master-servant economy or economic serfdom, conjoined and mutually reinforced with political despotism and aristocracy and tyrannical theocracy.



Overall, the reaction against the Enlightenment and the resurrection of the “dead hand of the past,” such as Weber-Mannheim’s pre-democratic, authoritarian traditionalism, specifically medievalism (and premedievalism), assumes the form of the counter-Enlightenment, especially conservatism, including fascism subsequently and neoconservatism, revived fundamentalism, and recently neofascism. In this respect, initially conservatism constitutes a type of, just as effectively resurrects, traditionalism turned “self-reflective” (Mannheim 1986) and antagonistic toward the emerging Enlightenment and modern liberalism or liberal modernity defined and attacked as its “immediate antagonist.” Thus, archconservatism was born vengeful as traditionalism’s revenge against early liberalism, through medievalism’s revival with vengeance against the Enlightenment as the “mortal enemy,” as is “reborn” neoconservatism, including revived fundamentalism and neofascism, by reportedly resurrecting from the “dead” (Dunn and Woodard 1996) and acting as the main force of the anti- or post-Enlightenment (Habermas 1989a). Hence, the Enlightenment and its political expression the French Revolution, alongside the prior Renaissance, acts as the prime “agent provocateur” of the birth of conservatism (Dunn and Woodard 1996) out of nearly *caput mortuum* (extinct) medievalist traditionalism, as well as its rebirth in the form of interwar fascism and of postwar neoconservatism, including revived fundamentalism and neofascism.

## The Birth and Maturation of the Anti-Enlightenment – Enemies of the Enlightenment

The main, although not sole, forces of the counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism generally, thus enemies of the Enlightenment and liberalism, have historically been conservatism, including romanticism, and its extreme subtype fascism (Table 7.1). They essentially remain such through their “new” forms like neoconservatism, including revived fundamentalism and neofascism, by the early twenty-first century.

### *The Main Current of the Counter-Enlightenment – Conservatism*

Conservatism initially represents the major force and expression of the counter-Enlightenment, thus the original main enemy or opponent of the Enlightenment.

**Table 7.1** Forces of the counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism

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Conservatism
Arch or paleo (old) conservatism
Romanticism
Neoconservatism, revived religious fundamentalism
Fascism
Nazism
Neofascism, neo-Nazism

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First, it remains so through first, paleoconservatism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; second, fascism in interwar Europe; and third, neoconservatism, including revived religious fundamentalism and neofascism, in European and especially American society by the twenty-first century. Especially in conjunction and mutual reinforcement with political-economic, religious conservatism originally forms the major, has since continued as, and remains the most persistent and implacable enemy of the Enlightenment, hence the supreme anti-Enlightenment.

Thus, in eighteenth century France the “religious opponents of the Enlightenment” reportedly attacked its “values of secular morality,” including individualism, skepticism, and modernism (Juergensmeyer 2003). In general, in Europe during these and later times the “religious enemies” of the Enlightenment opposed “religion’s public demise” and attempted to reverse this trend by attempting to restore the *ex ante* pre-Enlightenment condition<sup>1</sup> (Juergensmeyer 2003). Since the late eighteenth century, religious conservatism has persistently continued to operate as the main form or driving force of the anti-Enlightenment, antiseccularism, antiliberalism, and antirationalism, and remains such, especially through its revived fundamentalist versions in America and beyond Western society, notably the Islamic world, by the early twenty-first century. Thus, contemporary fundamentalist Protestant and Islamic groups reportedly proclaim the “death of secularism” and literally act on this proclamation by committing acts of religious violence, including terrorism sanctified as expressing “holy” cosmic war against “evil” forces (Juergensmeyer 2003). Notably, they both condemn and seek to destroy or undermine modern liberal-secular democratic states as “morally corrupt and spiritually vacuous” overlooking or denying that it is the Enlightenment that constructs the modern nation-state with a “fair amount of moralistic fervor” (Juergensmeyer 2003), as exemplified by the notion of political virtue as the promotion of public interest (Linton 2001). Overall, both religious groups are observed as rising in adverse reaction, including violent and warlike revolt, against modernism, including individualism and skepticism, derived from the “European Enlightenment” and extended to the world in the last three centuries<sup>2</sup> (Juergensmeyer 2003).

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<sup>1</sup> Juergensmeyer (2003:224–5) observes that “from the time that modern secular nationalism emerged in the eighteenth century as a product of the European Enlightenment’s political values, it has assumed a distinctly antireligious, or at least anticlerical, posture [and] religious ‘enemies of the Enlightenment’ protested religion’s public demise.” He adds that these religious views “were submerged in a wave of approval for a new view of social order in which secular nationalism was thought to be virtually a natural law, universally applicable and morally right. Enlightenment modernity proclaimed the death of religion. Modernity signaled not only the demise of the Church’s institutional authority and clerical control, but also the loosening of religion’s ideological and intellectual grip on society. Scientific reasoning and the moral claims of the secular social contract replaced theology and the Church as the bases for truth and social identity” (Juergensmeyer 2003:225).

<sup>2</sup> Juergensmeyer (2003:239) comments that “it is poignant that the governments of modern nations have so often been perceived as being morally corrupt and spiritually vacuous since the Enlightenment concepts that launched the modern nation-state were characterized by a fair amount of moralistic fervor [Rousseau’s civil religion]. Despite the noble rhetoric of [the] Enlightenment [its] opponents at the time belittled the secularists’ morality just as their modern critics have done.”

On this account, religious, political-economic, and cultural conservatism defines itself and operates as the perpetual, sworn, and foremost enemy of the Enlightenment and liberalism, and to that extent of what Popper calls an open, free society in the specific yet only genuine or viable, form of liberal modernity and democracy. In particular, contemporary American conservatism, notably Puritan-rooted “born again” religious fundamentalism, is observed to methodically and yet fanatically oppose and attack the emerging and expanding “reality of liberal and pluralist society” (Munch 2001) as the original ideal and enduring legacy of the Enlightenment (Habermas 2001). In doing so, it reveals a sort of “method in the madness” (Smith 2000) of antiliberalism, anti-secularism, antipluralism, antidiversity or absolutism, antirationalism, antiuniversalism, closure, and exclusion<sup>3</sup> of out groups, especially (but not only) of liberal-secular “infidels” as maximally “un-American” (Edgell et al. 2006). In comparative terms, American religious conservatism cum evangelicalism does so in “affinity” with (Turner 2002) and admiration (Juergensmeyer 2003) for its putative enemy, Islamic fundamentalism,<sup>4</sup> as two major counter-Enlightenment, antiliberal and antirationalistic “protototalitarian” forces in contemporary society (Bauman 1997).

Hence, the birth of conservatism out of medieval traditionalism turned self-conscious and hostile toward the Enlightenment and liberal modernity is simultaneously the genesis of the counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism. Its birth involved the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century rebirth or reverse “renaissance” of the Dark Middle Ages as the preliberal, predemocratic, theocratic, and irrational Christian world, unlike the fifteenth century Renaissance preferring its classical “pagan” predecessor over the latter. Alternatively, it entailed a sort of “Providential Design” (Bendix 1984) and creation of the counter-Enlightenment, thus antiliberalism, antiseccularism, antidemocracy, antirationalism (Nisbet 1966), and antimodernism (Juergensmeyer 2003). On this account, conservatism was born, thus “genetically programmed” to operate ever since both as a reactionary *and* radical, thus extreme in aggregate, ideology and social system. This signifies both conservatism’s perpetuation or restoration of the pre-Enlightenment “dead past” *and* its antithesis or counterrevolution against Enlightenment-based modernity. Simply, “born, raised,

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<sup>3</sup> Cynics or skeptics may add that American religious neoconservatism’s “method in the madness” of antiliberalism has perpetuated what Weber and Parsons extol as the rational “methodical” practice and doctrine of “sanctification” defining early Methodism and other Calvinist Puritanism, thus being the only or main form of “methodism” in “reborn” fundamentalism in which “methodically” and “fanatically” complement or reinforce, and not contradict or mitigate, each other. After all, recall Weber characterized early Methodism, like Baptism, as a paradoxical mix of Calvinist ascetic “methodicalness” and non-Calvinist hyperemotionalism reaching mass hysteria, and Hume described Puritanism as mixing the methodical “sourness and austerity of manners” with “wretched fanaticism” and “unreasonable obstinacy,” thus a sort of exemplary “method in the madness.”

<sup>4</sup> Juergensmeyer (2003:212) observes that US fundamentalism (e.g., “the Christian Identity” militia movement) “admires the attempts of Muslims in Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan to create regimes grounded in Islamic law.”

and living” in the medieval past as its “golden” era or “paradise lost” conservatism attacks and tries to eliminate the liberal present and future or “hope” in favor of theological “heaven” (Lemert 1999) via theocratic “hell in this world” (Tawney 1962) in the way of theocratic Puritanism and its survivals or revivals in American fundamentalism (Munch 2001).

Evidently, adverse reaction, and, to add, selection, as conservatism’s defining element (Dunn and Woodard 1996), comprises both a reactionary return to the “golden past” or “paradise lost” – which, as usually said, has never existed – *and* a negative response to the new or changed societal reality as a deviation from this “heaven.” Briefly, it does both “back to the future” of the pre-Enlightenment and a counterattack on the Enlightenment. Paradigmatic instances are various recurring conservative religious movements and revivals in America, spanning from the Great Awakenings in the mid and late eighteenth century to the fundamentalist awakening *cum* evangelical revival of the 1980s–2000s (Juergensmeyer 2003; Lindsay 2008; Lipset 1996; Munch 2001). For instance, the Great Awakenings expressing “Calvinist revivalism” (German 1995) represented such a double composite of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment. These religious revivals arose not only as a revival or expansion of New England’s late-medieval Puritan theocracy. They, especially the second Great Awakening, also proceeded as a “counteroffensive” (Means 1966) against the liberal, secular, democratic, and rationalistic Enlightenment, embodied by Jefferson and colleagues condemned as “wicked” (Baldwin 2006; German 1995) because of rejecting Winthrop’s archtheocratic vision of America as Bibliocracy a la the “Biblical Garden” (Gould 1996) and “Christian Sparta” (Kloppenber 1998).

In view of such counter-Enlightenment reactions, “European Enlightenment theories” posited the theocratic, fundamentalist, and fanatical-irrational “degeneracy in the New World” during these times (Gould 1996), just as they still do, in light of another evangelical “Great Awakening” in recent decades. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries “degeneracy in the New World” primarily referred to Puritan-ruled theocratic New England as a paradigmatic “holy” tyranny until a half century after the Revolution (Dayton 1999; Gould 1996) and those regions afflicted with and eventually subdued by the anti-Enlightenment, antisecular, and antiration-alistic Great Awakenings. These regions include especially the “old” South turned into Mencken’s (1982) theocratic “Bible Belt” (Boles 1999) ruled for long by what he calls evangelical (Presbyterian-Methodist-Baptist in a chronological sequence; Boles 1999) “barbarism” and the protobarbarian “Wild West” eventually “Calvinized” as well (Clemens 2007). The outcome of this process is the new Southwest as the “only in conservative America” seemingly paradoxical compound of Hobbes’ proxy state of nature self-perpetuated by the pervasive gun culture (Munch 1994) *and* of theocratic Leviathan through the growing policing state (Bourdieu 1998; Wacquant 2002), notably Puritan-style vice-religious police (Merrill 1945) and temperance and culture wars (Bell 2002; Wagner 1997). For only in the new Southwest can Hobbes’ polar opposites, the primitive state of nature defined by anarchy and universal war and political governance in the image of Leviathan as its

overcoming, be merged through merging the anarchic, violent “Wild West” (Hill 2002) *and* the coercive-repressive “Bible Belt.” (Texas is a paradigmatic or “biggest” instance of this merger of warlike anarchy and oppressive Leviathan, alongside, say, Oklahoma and other southwestern “red” states.) This implies that during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries European Enlightenment theories’ thesis of “degeneracy in the New World” mostly, though not only, refers to the “Bible Belt” and the “Wild West” (or their merger a la Texas, Oklahoma, etc.). Like Puritan New England and the “old” South during the late eighteenth century, these regions are pervaded by another anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal religious revival during the 1980s–2000s and still ruled by evangelical crusaders (Boles 1999; Lindsay 2008), thus causing the “promised land,” from the stance of the Enlightenment, to be the stage of Dreiser’s “American Tragedy” in the sociological format of “American theocracy” (Phillips 2006) as the poison of democracy and liberty, or the world’s “laughing stock” (Hill 2002) – or else both.

Overall, Mises (1957) suggests that conservatism as a set of beliefs (e.g., conservative historicism) “developed from the end of the eighteenth century on as a reaction against rationalism” as epitomized by the Enlightenment. In his account, “to the reforms and [changes] advocated” by the Enlightenment, conservatism “opposed a program of preservation of existing institutions [and] even of a return to extinct institutions. Against the postulates of reason it appealed to the authority of tradition and the wisdom of ages gone by.” Thus, conservatism’s “main target” was the Enlightenment “ideas that had inspired the American and the French Revolutions,” while these conservative “champions proudly called themselves anti-revolutionary and emphasized their rigid conservatism.” Notably, Mises (1950) remarks that for the Christian Church, Catholic and Protestant alike, “Enlightenment and liberal thought have created all the evil which afflicts the world today,” with the Enlightenment being seen as “undermining the religious feeling of the masses.” However, he implies that the Enlightenment underestimated the force of the conservative and other or “socialist” counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism. Yet, typically equating in a cacophonous conflation “socialism,” including European social democracy or the welfare state and the US New Deal, not distinguished from communism, with “totalitarianism,” Mises<sup>5</sup> overlooks that market liberalism or individualism epitomized by laissez-faire and invisible-hand doctrines, thus capitalism

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<sup>5</sup>Mises (1950) proposes that the “social philosophy of the Enlightenment failed to see the dangers that the prevalence of unsound ideas could engender;” for rationalism and liberalism “assumed that what is reasonable will carry on merely on account of its reasonableness” but never envisioned the “possibility that public opinion could favor spurious ideologies whose realization would harm welfare and well-being and disintegrate social cooperation,” particularly conservatism (and, even more important for him, “socialism”). In his view, early, Enlightenment-based liberals “did not anticipate the popularity of reactionary [conservative], superstitious, and unreasonable [ideas] in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.” Mises concludes that the “history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has discredited the hopes and prognostications of the Enlightenment [for] the peoples did not proceed on the road toward freedom, constitutional government, civil rights, free trade, peace, and good will among nations. Instead the trend is toward totalitarianism, toward socialism.”

as the coherent theoretical concept was reportedly, just as its opposite socialism, rooted in the Enlightenment (Hodgson 1999).

As implied, the beginning of the counter-Enlightenment in France and Europe can be probably traced to, alongside Maistre, Bonald, Burke, and other medievalist archconservatives as the external and implacable enemies of the Enlightenment, Calvinist Rousseau as a sort of insider within the latter, at least initially or conventionally regarded. This is primarily because Rousseau's political ideal represents an extreme and irreconcilable antithesis to that of the Enlightenment, in particular his friend-turned-opponent Voltaire, essentially the vision or dream of "totalitarian social control" (Simon 1995) in the form of theocracy constituted by the strict, obligatory "civil religion" vs. a secular polity and society. Recall specifically that his ideal is Calvin's theocratic government in Geneva of which Rousseau called himself a "proud citizen" – along with, no less, rural Corsica and Poland<sup>6</sup> (Allen 2008) – eventually becoming from a nominal member (by visiting Paris' salons) to an "enemy rather than merely a critic of the Enlightenment" (Garrard 2003), though not the only one, in view of archconservatives à la Maistre and colleagues and Burke.

On this account, Calvinist Rousseau is an initial case of counter-Enlightenment in the Enlightenment itself, a sort of "enemy within," for he is also viewed as a member of the latter, unlike Maistre, Burke, and other archconservatives commonly regarded as outside enemies. Notably, Voltaire viewed Rousseau as the "Judas" of the "party of humanity" by his "betrayal" of the Enlightenment, while the second blaming the first for "ruining" Geneva by "corrupting" its morals through spreading "enlightened" Parisian ideas and values by the theater (Garrard 2003). At this juncture, Rousseau is described as the "Enlightenment's first really serious opponent" in virtue of his "critique" of its modern secular and rationalist civilization<sup>7</sup> (Garrard 2003), along, not necessarily in association, with Maistre, Burke, and other archconservatives. Arguably, what particularly "separated" Rousseau from the Enlightenment was his idea and defense of theocracy or civil religion by "divinizing" the political system and law or "state, coercion, and punishment" to the no-return point

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<sup>6</sup>An implied reason why Rousseau revealed a bizarre preference for rural Poland might have been that "in Venice and Florence, for instance, about one third of the men were literate during the Renaissance, while only two percent of the peasants in Poland could read" (Allen 2008:958), thus perhaps approaching his ideal of the "noble savage" uncorrupted by education and civilization.

<sup>7</sup>Garrard (2003:6) adds that the "presumed link between the Enlightenment and the [French] Revolution implies that the 'revolutionary' Rousseau was a supporter of the Enlightenment too," which, in his view, is incorrect. Rather, it is suggested that Rousseau was a "counter-Enlightenment" in that he "unequivocally committed to the view that the 'republic of virtue' that he favored requires the very opposite of what the *philosophes* understood by enlightenment [via] austere republican politics [and] devaluing reason and the intellect in favor of direct, instinctive sources of moral perception such as conscience, which is man's link with the divine, the very source of morality itself" (Garrard 2003:6–7). In short, Rousseau argued for a "strong and exclusive sense of patriotic identity, the intervention of a quasi-divine legislator, the integration of religion, society, morality, and the state [against] the enlightened 'republic of letters' of the *philosophes*" (Garrard 2003:7).

of the death penalty for “public lack of belief,” predictably after the “model of his hometown, Geneva’s Calvinist theocratic government”<sup>8</sup> (Garrard 2003). Alternatively, his “rejection” of the Enlightenment project of a “secular, rational state” was the most shocking and offensive to its representatives, alienating Rousseau from both “atheists and deists” (Garrard 2003), including Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach, and Voltaire. Given Rousseau’s “Calvinist background in Geneva” with its “strong tradition” of theocracy cum civil religion, his pre- and anti-Enlightenment beliefs that politics and society shall *not* be differentiated, notably the state not being separated from religion and “godly” morality is “hardly surprising”<sup>9</sup> (Garrard 2003). In summary, alongside archconservatives like Maistre and Burke, Calvinist Rousseau initiated the “beginning of [a] full-scale rebellion” against the Enlightenment’s admittedly “emancipatory goals,” reaching, to both movements, the “self-evident” status of its “first enemy” (Garrard 2003).

The peculiar, if not, as regarded by his contemporaries, disturbed and bizarre case of Rousseau and virtually all Calvinists, including Puritans, since Calvin confirms that Calvinist and any theocracy and the Enlightenment have been and remain, as via theocratic revivals like the “Bible Belt” in America, as different, distant, and opposite as “heaven and hell.” The latter is understood in a value-free sense of distance, and even allowing, as US religious conservatives claim, that theocracy may be a path to “heaven,” and the Enlightenment the “road to hell,” at best mere liberal-utopian “hope” (Lemert 1999; Wuthnow 1998). With or without such evaluations, they have been and are polar opposites in terms of modern liberal-secular democracy and society. The above also affirms that Calvinism, including its Anglo-Saxon sectarian variant Puritanism, has been and remains, as via Puritan-rooted evangelicalism in America, at best insufficient and “fortuitous” (Zaret 1989), at worst antithetical and destructive in relation to modern Western liberal-secular democracy and society. Alternatively,

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<sup>8</sup>Garrard (2003:71) notes that “Voltaire wrote in the margin of his copy of [Rousseau’s] *Social Contract* that ‘all dogma is ridiculous, deadly. All coercion on dogma is abominable. To compel belief is absurd. Confine yourself to compelling good living.’” In this view, “Rousseau claims that those who publicly behave as though they do not believe in the civil religion [‘the existence of an omnipotent, intelligent, benevolent divinity that foresees and provides’] can legitimately be put to death. [His] civil religion [goes] beyond what the Enlightenment philosophes were prepared to accept, such as the existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, foresighted, and providential Divinity, the afterlife, the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, and the sanctity of the social contract and the laws” (Garrard 2003:71).

<sup>9</sup>Garrard (2003:115–6) adds that for Rousseau the reign of moral-religious virtue (as he understood it) “remained possible” only in those “far-flung pockets that had not yet been completely overwhelmed by ‘civilized’ values ‘like Poland and Corsica’” (*sic*) in which “a prudent policy of republican, Counter-Enlightenment austerity and atarkic isolation was still worthwhile [i.e.] a severe ‘republic of virtue’ stressing collective discipline, the subordination of the individual to the group.” In this view, Rousseau is “distinctive” within classical republicanism by the “intensity of his opposition to the Enlightenment,” while today republicanism is “contrasted with liberalism, not ‘enlightenment,’” and admittedly his “active cultivation of patriotic sentiments, normative consensus, and social and religious homogeneity” situate him within the “anti-pluralism of classical republicanism” (Garrard 2003:118).

it confirms that modern liberal-secular democracy has been established and sustained in spite and opposition, *not* because of Calvinism, just as Catholicism in Europe, including Puritanism in Great Britain and America, and primarily as the achievement and legacy of the Enlightenment.

In general, beginning with Rousseau “a full-scale rebellion” against the Enlightenment reportedly developed in France and beyond only after the “violent revolutionary overthrow of traditional institutions” in 1789 and the process of modernization, including industrialization, secularization, and urbanization, in the nineteenth century in contrast to the Age of Reason as “pre-revolutionary” in political sense and “preindustrial,” including precapitalist (Garrard 2003; Simon 1995). The observed rationale for the counter-Enlightenment was that the “revolutionary excesses” in the wake of the French Revolution in the 1790s were by its conservative enemies imputed to the Enlightenment, yielding an “eruption of hostility” to the latter in the revolutionary aftermath (Garrard 2003). Recall this hostility to the Enlightenment after the French Revolution was initiated or incited by Maistre and Bonald in France and even more virulently by Burke in England (Garrard 2003). Furthermore, the latter, with his longing for and seeking to restore the dead “golden” past of the (French and English<sup>10</sup>) feudal aristocracy, theocracy, and clergy (Schmidt 1996), has become a model for anti-Enlightenment conservatives of virtually all shades, places, and times (Giddens 2000), including market “libertarians” a la Hayek et al. (1948) (Easterly 2008; Infantino 2003).

Generally, conservatism develops out of medieval traditionalism turned, as Mannheim (1986) observed, self-conscious and antagonistic to nascent “rationalistic liberalism” as its “immediate antagonist” originating in and resting on the Enlightenment. Conservatism is born from the darkness of irrational medievalism, or antirational romanticism as in Germany, in opposition to “all constructions of human relations” subjected to “rationalistic universal” norms and rights like “Enlightenment doctrines of natural law”<sup>11</sup> (Kettler et al. 1984). In particular, recall medieval religious orthodoxy acts in adverse reaction by mounting a “mindless defensive battle” against the Enlightenment on the account of its “crimes” of, first, shaking the “foundations of religious life,” and second, showing that the “unifying force of religion” is impossible to regenerate “within the medium of reason” (Habermas 2001).

Also, most of today’s religious traditionalists like “orthodox Christians” (Brink 2000) in Europe and especially in the face of fundamentalist Protestants, in America are observed to remain hostile to and deny that the Enlightenment, including its Kantian formulation, was a “good thing” (Dombrowski 2001). Instead, they claim the opposite by condemning and attacking its ideals, notably the separation of church and state, as “ungodly” (Juergensmeyer 2003). As some US conservative sociologists emphasize, conservatism arises “in reaction to the individualistic Enlightenment” and

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<sup>10</sup> Allen (2008:960) remarks that Burke’s glorified English aristocrats (knights) were the “most rapacious warriors in Europe” rather than “good business managers.”

<sup>11</sup> Referring to Mannheim, Kettler et al. (1984:73) cites Muller’s romantic conservatism in which the “political perspectives of estates [were] hostile to the modern bureaucratic or liberal state” and thus by implication to the rational and democratic ideal of the Enlightenment.



as its polar opposite emphasizes supra-individual collective entities (“small groups”) in society such as church, family, estate, and the like (Nisbet 1952). Admittedly, in contrast and opposition to the Enlightenment, early conservatism adopts the institutional medieval system as the inherited “absolute reality” and “model” for its vision of the “good society,” thus a sort of sacred order as the supreme gift or bequest of history (Nisbet 1966). Notably, in early nineteenth century Europe and America religious-political conservatism reportedly formed or solidified itself as the “anti-Enlightenment” (Nisbet 1966), following Maistre-Burke’s initiation into the “hall of fame” and hostility against the Enlightenment. Generally, US and other conservatives both emphasize and celebrate the moment that conservatism in Europe and America historically developed and acted as the anti-Enlightenment from Maistre-Burke’s times and has largely remained such since through fascism and neoconservatism, including revived religious fundamentalism and neofascism.

As approvingly registered, conservatism emerges as an adverse reaction to, alongside the “idealism of the Renaissance,” the Enlightenment’s supposedly “flawed vision” implemented and culminating in the French Revolution, and the “mistaken promises of modern utopian ideologies” (Dunn and Woodard 1996). Of course, an example of the latter is found in the “special utopian significance of rationalism in the French Enlightenment” (Smelser 1992; Giesen 2005<sup>12</sup>). Particularly, the French Enlightenment regrettably puts an emphasis on “freedom of form and spirit” as well as, like the Renaissance, “feeling and originality” (Dunn and Woodard 1996). For in doing so it renders “traditional religious doctrines” really “gone with the wind,” thus a cause (like the movie’s end) for shedding tears,<sup>13</sup> notably the original-sin doctrine of first humans born in “sin” and subjected, including by association their descendants commanded to expiate their ancestral (and direct) parents’ sins (sic), to ultimate punishment and final reckoning by “judgment before an omnipotent God” (Dunn and Woodard 1996), specifically within Puritanism and revived evangelicalism Weber’s merciless, nonunderstanding “God of Calvinism” resembling an “Oriental despot” (Artz 1998). It is no wonder that even Calvinist Rousseau rejected the doctrine of “original sin,” thus by implication “depraved” and “evil” humans as Puritanism especially insists, as a paradigmatic case of what his once-friend Voltaire called the “childish absurdities of the Bible.”

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<sup>12</sup>In the view of Giesen (2005:284), “postmodern politics and historical action in Western societies are reluctant to pursue a utopian vision of a perfect society. Instead, they are increasingly moved by the urge to prevent catastrophes and to save victims. The positive transcendence of an ideal society as envisioned by enlightenment’s public discourse is replaced by the negative transcendence of victims.”

<sup>13</sup>Dunn and Woodard (1996:74) invoke Rousseau as an exemplar of the French Enlightenment and lament that his concept of freedom “was a release from God, culture, authority, and any kind of restraint [i.e.,] Deity, history and community – the nametags of conservatism. This seems, first, a questionable, if not patently false, interpretation of Rousseau whose political ideal was Calvinist theocracy a la Geneva (and Sparta), not liberal-secular democracy, second (and as a corollary) he was not a typical representative of, but (as seen by Voltaire, etc.) rather a deviant from or enemy to the French Enlightenment, and third, it reaffirms that most anti-Enlightenment adversaries or critics misconstrue, misunderstand, and are often ignorant about the Enlightenment” (Schmidt 1996).

Yet to indicate that the theocratic medievalist “empire strikes back” or “never quits, gives up, or jokes,” the “gone with the wind” condition is to be eventually restored and enforced as “paradise lost” by “godly” conservatism in America (re) constructed as the “Christian nation,” (Smith 2000) as the euphemism for evangelical theocracy (Juergensmeyer 2003; Lindsay 2008). Fittingly, this “paradise lost” is especially, though not solely, to be, if not already, “found” in the old “gone with the wind” South recreated as a fundamentalist “Bible Belt” as another “Biblical Garden” of flowers, bliss, and nirvana after its Puritan precedent and model (Gould 1996), yet for the Enlightenment, Mises’ paradigmatic “peace of the cemetery.”

In this “paradise lost and found” or “gone and come with the wind” bliss, humans are or will permanently be punished for their “original sin” committed by their ancestors (or parents) by “judgment before an omnipotent God” or rather by his self-assigned agents with divine rights to rule, punish, and kill, like the Puritan vice-police state, policemen (Merrill 1945), and crusaders (Juergensmeyer 2003; Turner 2002) as anti-vice regents (Zaret 1989). Actual sinners-criminals are punished with “Draconian severity” (Patell 2001) in America such as nonviolent, let alone violent, drug and sexual offenders both when imprisoned, not to mention executed, and afterwards through exclusion and discrimination, as in employment, education, political life (Uggen and Manza 2002), and even housing, which literally forces them back into streets, thus eventually crime, prison, and death row. Presumably, in a counterfactual prediction, without the challenge of the Enlightenment, in conjunction with the Renaissance and the French Revolution (and “utopian ideologies”), “no articulate modern conservatism” would exist, which attacks all of them, notably the former, as “challenges to sacred traditional society” (Dunn and Woodard 1996). In particular, contemporary American conservatism (like Reaganism) is extolled for proudly standing in and perpetuating the sacred “tradition” (Dunn and Woodard 1996) of Puritanism as the theocratic pre- and counter-Enlightenment as during colonial and postrevolutionary times respectively, and thus its role model, for example Winthrop for Reagan and colleagues.

In turn, during New England’s colonial and postrevolutionary theocracy, Puritanism, while forming both the pre- and counter-Enlightenment, exemplified by its irrational witch trials and its antiliberal attacks on Jefferson as “ungodly” respectively, strategically adopted and exploited a la Machiavelli Enlightenment ideas and visions for its repressive and expansionist purposes (Bremer 1995; Gould 1996). In colonial New England, nationalist conservatives reportedly “conveniently” used the “Enlightenment vision” of social progress to serve “historical euphemism” by dissolving and thus justifying the “whole issue of Puritan intolerance,” including witch trials, the persecution of Quakers, and the extermination or dispossession of Native Americans, within pre-Enlightenment “times of ignorance” (Gould 1996). Yet the conservative, typical Machiavellian abuse of this vision of social progress, while self-serving and self-convincing, could not convince its point of origin Europe, as indicated by its “Enlightenment theories” about pre and anti-Enlightenment irrational and theocratic “degeneracy in the New World” (Gould 1996), particularly Puritan-ruled New England and the Great Awakenings’ “counteroffensives” against the Age of Reason. This “degeneracy” likely made European Enlightenment thinkers wonder as to what was really new in the “first new nation” (Calhoun 1993; Lipset 1969) compared with the “old world” of Europe. It probably yielded the inference

or impression that the first was actually older in the sense of pre and anti-Enlightenment, notably Puritan-rooted, irrationalism and theocracy than the second, and still is, as comparative sociological analyses show (Inglehart 2004), contradicting opposite ethnocentric claims expressing triumphant Americanism (Bell 2002). As is also known, Puritanism's claimed process of "civilization" of Indian "savages" via a "holy" war of extermination and expansionism exploited and fused the "legacies of Enlightenment theory" with "providential history" to form the "antebellum rhetoric of Manifest Destiny" commanding and realizing the "disappearance" of Native Americans as "heathen" or "godless" and morally "impure" (Gould 1996; Munch 2001), as a prototypical case of genocide or ethnic cleansing (Mann 2005).

As some of its admirers admit, American (and English) Puritanism initially adopted some ideas of the Enlightenment in that during the early eighteenth century in New (and old) England many Puritans became "attracted" to the latter's discovery of "natural laws," its "optimistic view of man," and its "skepticism toward all orthodoxies" (Bremer 1995). Puritanism did so for its theocratic and expansionist and to that extent pre and anti-Enlightenment aims primarily perpetuating and expanding its "godly community" (German 1995) in the form of the "Bible Commonwealth" as, or ruled by, what Winthrop designated and instituted as *mixt aristocracie* (Bremer 1995). Predictably, the latter was sanctified by the pre-Enlightenment Calvinist dogma of predestination. Recall this dogma was characterized with, in Weber's words, "extreme inhumanity" and harshness (Fourcade and Healy 2007) and established the narrow "aristocracy of predestined salvation," a sort of "heavenly" oligarchy (Zaret 1989) vs. the rest of humanity as, say, the population of preordained "damnation" and, following this antiegalitarian, exclusionary, and antihumanitarian theocratic logic, what Winthrop advocated as "subjection" as a supposedly "universal condition" of society. Yet, as an intellectual and implicitly political movement, the Enlightenment in its "logical" course reportedly became "totally antithetical" to Calvinism as a pre-Enlightenment theological vision at "the core of New England Puritanism" (Bremer 1995) and its theocracy.

First, the above confirms that American Puritanism, like its theological parent European Calvinism, originally is the pre- and eventually becomes counter-Enlightenment. It becomes the latter in adverse reaction (and selection) to the Enlightenment via American conservatism, including neoconservatism, notably revived religious fundamentalism and neofascism, standing in the Puritan "tradition" (Dunn and Woodard 1996), exemplified by Reaganism's public admiration for Winthrop's theocracy (Munch 2001) as, in accordance with Puritanism's "vigorous hypocrisy" (Bremer 1995), a "shining city upon the hill." Second, it affirms that Puritanism in America and Great Britain, Calvinism overall in Europe (Sorkin 2005), selectively adopts and uses elements of the Enlightenment in order to eventually destroy or subvert the later for what Parsons (1967a) calls the "purposes of God," essentially for tyrannical theocracy and "holy" war (Juergensmeyer 2003). Also, fascism and conservatism adopt and use selective procedures of modern liberal democracy such as free elections to ultimately eliminate or pervert it, as in interwar Europe and, via neoconservatism, notably revived religious fundamentalism, and neofascism in alliance, America during the 1980s–2000s. The above expresses the pre- and anti-Enlightenment's tendency for adopting and using certain

elements the Enlightenment in order to ultimately destroy or pervert the latter, just as of antiliberalism to adopt and use some ideas and methods of liberalism for the sake of eliminating or subverting it.

Just as it was born, conservatism has matured, persisted, and thus perpetuated itself as the counter-Enlightenment and anti-liberalism overall. In this process of maturation or growth from its “birth” and “childhood,” conservatism has developed into the prototypical, consummate, and perpetual (“eternal”) exemplar of the counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism. And, through fascism, neoconservatism, and neofascism, it has developed into the ultimate or extreme form of the counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism. Fascism has been and remains the most extreme counter-Enlightenment (Habermas 2001) and antiliberalism (Dahrendorf 1979), and was born, with some variations as the “monster-child” or ally of conservatism in interwar Europe and is, via neofascism, “reborn” as that of neoconservatism in contemporary European and American society. Hence, conservatism, including neoconservatism, can plausibly make a double claim to be the “crown-jewel” of the highest and strongest counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism both in its own right and from its birth *and* through its offspring of and its growth in fascism and neofascism, a sort of “win-win” situation. Conservatism, including fascism, functions as the foremost counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism by condemning and attacking the Enlightenment and liberalism because of what Mannheim (1986) calls the “principle of liberty” as supreme “evil,” conjoined and mutually reinforced with equality, justice, reason, secular knowledge and science, social progress, individual well-being and happiness, humane life, universal human and civil rights, etc.

Early conservatism reportedly construes and attacks the Enlightenment’s liberal “passion for rights and liberties” as unleashing “destructive individualism” in relation to “any sense of community” (Schmidt 1996). Admittedly, these conservative and, for that matter, postmodernist and feminist, anti-Enlightenment accusations are “caricatures” by overlooking that precisely the liberal “passion” for human rights and individual liberties is of “greatest importance” in considering the remarkably “continuing viability” of the Enlightenment’s ideals and “hopes” in modern democratic societies (Schmidt 1996). Particularly “striking” is the observed tendency of the conservative critics of “enlightenment” to hardly “ever” bother about addressing the ideas of those writers actually belonging to *the* Enlightenment (Schmidt 1996), with predictably Burke as an exemplary, though not isolated, old case<sup>14</sup> and his admirers Hayek et al. as neoconservative or “libertarian” cases (Easterly 2008). Not surprisingly then, the conservative and other, postmodernist and feminist critiques of “enlightenment” reportedly fail to meet the “current standards for historical accounts” of the Enlightenment (Schmidt 1996).

Furthermore, a sort of conservative, including fascist, “counter-enlightenment” persists and perpetuates itself in contemporary Western societies (Habermas 1975). In particular, an “old anti-Enlightenment” conservative and, to add, pre-Enlightenment

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<sup>14</sup>Schmidt (1996:28) comments that “Burke goes after [the Enlightenment] but never troubles himself with asking whether French thinkers might not actually have given some thought to the question of whether ‘prejudices’ could ever be completely eradicated.”

medieval Machiavellian theme reportedly condemns and attacks an Enlightenment-based universalistic morality for recognizing “no limits” in subjecting all political actors and activities, like “personal relationships,” to “moral scrutiny,” thus for being anti- or post-Machiavellian (Habermas 1989a). Conversely, this implies that what defines the conservative anti-Enlightenment, just as the medieval, Machiavellian pre-Enlightenment and generally utilitarianism, is refusing to subject political actors and activities, though not personal relationships, at least those of others, to “moral scrutiny,” instead justifying the immoral or amoral means by “noble” ends like “divinely ordained” rule and “holy” power. As Mannheim (1986) shows, conservatism tends to act in the classical fashion of Machiavellianism in virtue of its pattern of considering the “technique of domination” in a “rather cold-blooded way,” consequently using virtually any effective means for attaining absolute power that realizes its “ideology of absolutism.” As also observed, an “explosion of Counter-Enlightenment thought” was witnessed only during the “second half of the twentieth century” that is substantively continuous or comparable with the “eruption of hostility” toward the Enlightenment in the late eighteenth century initiated by Rousseau as its “first enemy” from within (Garrard 2003), besides Maistre and Burke as its external arch-conservative enemies. On this account, instances of such counter-Enlightenment span from neo-Marxian critical theory and hermeneutics to pragmatism, communitarianism, and neoconservatism and to feminism and post-modernism, all sharing the “art” of imputing the “origins” of social “pathologies” in modern civilization to the Enlightenment<sup>15</sup> (Garrard 2003).

### *Neo-Conservatism Cum the New Counter-Enlightenment*

Just as paleoconservatism did as the old, neoconservatism arises and functions as the new counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism overall by condemning and attacking the ideals and legacy of the Enlightenment and liberalism. On this account, neoconservatism is anything but “neo,” as there was “nothing new under the sun” of conservatism with respect to the antagonism toward the Enlightenment and liberalism. Specifically, a formal or secondary difference can be that neoconservatism condemns and attacks both the original ideals and the continuing legacies the Enlightenment and liberalism by the early twenty-first century, just as did interwar fascism and does today’s neofascism, while paleoconservatism did and objectively could only the first elements during the late and early nineteenth centuries. Hence, this two-front attack renders neoconservatism, just as fascism and neofascism, even the more comprehensive, “holistic” counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism, thus

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<sup>15</sup> Garrard (2003:119–20) comments that “even though there are clear echoes of Rousseau’s earlier denunciation of the Enlightenment in (critical theory, hermeneutics, pragmatism, feminism, post-modernism, and communitarianism) – all of which contain some version of the charge that the pathologies of our civilization have their origins in the eighteenth century Enlightenment – his name is rarely invoked in this context.”

“new” compared with, paleoconservatism, perhaps the only valid neoconservative claim to “novelty” in this respect.

Thus, US and other neoconservatism, including revived religious fundamentalism, reportedly attacks Enlightenment ideas, values, and institutions as the legacy defining and residing at the “heart” of modern Western civilization, including the “disinterested pursuit of the truth, cultivation of art, and commitment to critical thinking” (Berman 2000). Reviving and reinforcing and expanding the archconservative “eruption of hostility” to the Enlightenment, neo-conservatism is observed to be “hostile” to the latter’s legacies and traditions, notably those of “democracy” and “expanding intellectual inquiry” and secular culture of which “central” elements are science, art, and literature (Berman 2000). As also registered (referring to Habermas’ appropriation of the Enlightenment), neoconservatism is hardly new but involves a “return to religious and traditional values” as the glorified reservoirs of the meaning of life supposedly lost in the “evolution of modernity,” and the “immediate” effect of the supposed post-war “crisis” (Trey 1998), just as fascism being the outcome of what it construes and exploits as “crises of modern society” (Mannheim 1986). Yet, from the prism of “ideals of enlightened” and liberal modernity, its “conservative critics” like neoconservatives “reborn” and dominating notably America and to a lesser extent other Western societies<sup>16</sup> since the 1980s fail to recognize and account for social and economic “advancements”<sup>17</sup> (Trey 1998). In summary, if “only the second half of the twentieth century” witnessed an “explosion” of the counter-Enlightenment (Garrard 2003) equivalent or comparable

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<sup>16</sup>Trey (1998:128) observes that during neoconservatism the public sphere in America “was occluded by systematic imperatives that convened against critical perspectives” on, for example, the Gulf War in 1991. In his view, during this period “when conventional ‘Enlightenment’ type oppositions were undertaken [appealing to rights or attempting to open up dialogue] these were thwarted by powerful political and economic structures that denied them access to potentially critical spheres of discourse, [which] represents a further structural shift from the already transformed, but nonetheless latent, [Habermas’] bourgeois public sphere that still might have been somewhat intact during the Vietnam era” (Trey 1998:129). Trey (1998:129) concludes that under neo-conservatism the US political system “seemed to learn a great deal more from Vietnam than did the opposition.” In the “1990s, the system is both more diffuse and more consolidated: diffuse in the sense that it has branched out, into the world, in ways that are difficult to track quickly; consolidated in the sense that internal pressure has been all but annulled.”

<sup>17</sup>Trey (1998:5) comments that “contrary to the neoconservatives, Habermas refuses to see this phenomenon as an inherent repercussion of modernity [but] a function of communicative distortions that are associated with [capitalism].” In turn, Trey (1998:3–4), noting that postmodernism’s common theme is simply that “there is nothing new under the sun,” comments that the “post” “indicates that we are beyond the modern-enlightenment myth that something can be created out of nothing.” This view (elaborating on Habermas defense of the Enlightenment) identifies the postmodernist “threat to the tradition of enlightenment thought” or “nostalgic modernism” in the form of “cynical postmodernism” and suggests that while late modern or advanced-capitalist postindustrial societies “are in concrete terms not postmodern, a theory of enlightenment that is sensitive to the conditions of late modernity must take into consideration countermodern critiques” (Trey 1998:12–3). However (departing from Habermas), Trey (1998:31–67) contends that enlightenment generally “was not by necessity a product of modernity” and even that the “project of enlightenment cannot be fulfilled in modern terms,” and yet objects that post-modernity,

with its “eruption” in the late eighteenth century starting with its archenemies Rousseau, Maistre and Burke, then its main form is neoconservatism, including “born again” religious fundamentalism and/or neo-fascism, especially its American version (Juergensmeyer 2003).

### *Counter-Enlightenment Conservative “Romance” – Romanticism*

Another related early form of the counter-Enlightenment, especially in Germany and other parts of central Europe, was romanticism. While early conservatism represents a sort of universal or common form of the counter-Enlightenment in Europe, including France and Great Britain, as well as America, romanticism and idealism forms the specifically German anti-Enlightenment (Delanty 2000). Romanticism forms a prototypical instance or precursor of the conservative counter-Enlightenment in Germany and adjacent societies, given that, as Mannheim (1986) suggests, German and other conservatism is founded “primarily on romanticism” (Delanty 2000; Trey 1998), just as liberalism is on the Enlightenment. As the foundation as well as a particular form of conservatism in Germany and beyond, anti-Enlightenment romanticism is essentially an emotional and nostalgic return to medievalism, thus the pre-Enlightenment, preliberalism, irrationalism, and premodernism.

Thus, during the eighteenth century the “first wave” of enemies and critics of Enlightenment-based modernity in “full swing” arose in the form of romanticism

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as defined by identity crises, “culminates in a cynical resignation to what is worst about modernity [i.e.] the aftermath of modernity: a phase in the evolution of modernity that is qualitatively distinguishable from early phases, but does not represent a radical departure.” In this view, for instance, in culture postmodern features like radical differences are “subjectively contrived”; in the economy they “cloak and preserve the very worst of modern capitalism” like alienation and exploitation, while “expunging that which is desirable,” including efficiency and productivity, in civil society they “provide the framework for a political myth that deflates contestation and reifies existing hegemonies” (Trey 1998:68). This leads to the inference that the “conditions of advanced capitalist societies are not postmodern at all. Rather they represent the aftermath of modernity, or modernity in struggle with itself: still modern but at a point where modernity runs up against its own contradictions. Hence the need for a politics of enlightenment in the aftermath of modernity” (Trey 1998:68). Arguably, in the “aftermath of modernity, the classical politics of enlightenment becomes less effective and more compromised,” which requires formulating a new “politics of enlightenment” extending “outward into the margins of society” (Trey 1998:129–30). The analysis infers that if the “emancipatory content of the Enlightenment has been thoroughly depleted,” this results in “a vacuum of sorts, insofar as the great thinkers of emancipation [Kant, Hegel, Marx] were all products of this tradition” as against cynical postmodernism’s conclusion that the “best we can hope for politically is an estheticized liberalism that celebrates” postindustrial capitalism, suggesting that the “break with postmodernism is first and foremost a break with cynicism” (Trey 1998:163). Admittedly, the “ideal espoused by Enlightenment thinkers was that these discourses [of knowledge, justice, and taste] could be institutionalized in such a way that they would provide the foundation for a rational society [though] the three spheres have come under the control of experts who administer knowledge-based power independent of the general public” (Trey 1998:5).

and its conservative “offshoots” holding an “idealized view” of the Dark Middle Ages and rejecting the “reverence for antiquity” characteristic for the latter and the Renaissance before (Trey 1998). In short, “the romantic counter-Enlightenment” revolted against the Enlightenment and liberal modernity, primarily in Germany and secondarily in the rest of Europe, including England (Delanty 2000). At this point, Hegel’s philosophy of history is often cited as the exemplary case of the romantic and idealistic counter-Enlightenment in Germany. Hegelian philosophy is frequently considered a “variation on a recurrent romantic theme,” though Hegel can also be admittedly interpreted as a philosopher criticizing with “almost as much vigor” romanticism as the Enlightenment<sup>18</sup> (Hinchman 1984). As more unequivocal instances, Herder’s and Goethe’s “attack on reason” in late eighteenth century Germany formed part of this romantic “revolt” against liberal modernity or “modern society, as did Byron’s and Malthus”<sup>19</sup> (Somers and Block 2005) in England, just as early twentieth century German and other social thought (Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Freud) was a “repudiation of the Enlightenment” (Delanty 2000), continuing or evoking romanticism. Overall, much of early twentieth century social thought in Europe is interpreted as being in “romance” with romanticism, while anticipating and perhaps inspiring fascism, notably Nazism, by being “definitively anti-Enlightenment” and announcing the “end” of liberal modernity, with Nietzsche and Heidegger in Germany as indicative, but not isolated, instances (Delanty 2000), as well as appropriated Nazi heroes or models (the first) and perceived sympathizers (the second).

Furthermore, the romanticist counter-Enlightenment not only revolts against but also occasionally reverses or hinders the Enlightenment. It does either directly, immediately, and transiently by romanticism or indirectly, subsequently, and more enduringly via its “offshoots” like conservatism and its own offspring fascism. This predictably happened especially (but not only) in Germany during the romanticist

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<sup>18</sup>Hinchman (1984:253) adds that for Hegel the “Enlightenment and various forms of romantic protest, including intense religious faith, have conditioned each other for centuries. The Enlightenment seems to those who are romantically inclined to disparage and distort a very significant part of their experience, especially that which concerns symbolic truth, custom and tradition, and religious belief.” The study concludes that “since the Enlightenment has a monopoly on the definition of rational thought, those who protest feel they must go beyond the limits of rationality altogether, toward a cult of sentiment, an immediate intuition, in the heart, of right and wrong, or even an invocation of the ‘law of the stronger’ in organic nature” (Hinchman 1984:253).

<sup>19</sup>According to Somers and Block (2005:271), from the “axiom of social naturalism, Malthus calls into question the entire Enlightenment distinction between mind and body, reason and instinct.” In this view, Malthus “turned to the Enlightenment project of piercing the ‘deceit’ of ‘first appearances’ and using the light of reason to find the truth of an underlying rational order. This is ‘theoretical realism’ [or Cartesian rationalism] – a militantly anti-positivist theory of causality for which unobservable or ‘theoretical entities’ [laws of human nature] are the *real* [hidden] causal forces behind the appearances of experience” (Somers and Block 2005:272). Somers and Block (2005:273) conclude that the “broken clock is the classic metaphor of this Enlightenment project. Shattering the illusion that the clock’s causal mechanisms are empirically observable is a precondition for making the clocks inner workings accessible to science.”



late eighteenth century, as indicated by Prussian antiliberal rulers (Michels 1968), and the conservative nineteenth century, with Bismarckian conservatives after the 1871 unification breaking the “back” of Enlightenment liberalism (Habermas 1989a) and in the process making German society more authoritarian than other societies (Mann 1993). This counter-Enlightenment and antiliberal revolt and reversal both caused and culminated in the Nazi nihilistic counterrevolution (Blinkhorn 2003; Manent 1998; Moore 1993). The latter found extant inspiration in romanticism, specifically pre-Enlightenment medieval Germanic civilization as the “golden past.” Overall, it was incited and/or supported by anti-Enlightenment conservatism through the latter’s shared opposition to liberal democracy and the Weimar Republic (Beck 2000; Blinkhorn 2003) that, as per the conservative common rule, “must be eliminated” (Michels 1968) by any effective means à la Machiavelli (Mannheim 1986), including fascism. A similar scenario materialized partly in France through the conservative restoration of the *ancien regime* during the 1830s, and America via the counter-Enlightenment evangelical Great Awakenings and their various sequels, including the fundamentalist revival of the 1980s–2000s (Juergensmeyer 2003).

As noted, romanticism is a specifically (though not exclusively) German variant of the counter-Enlightenment during the eighteenth century, with subsequent conservative “offshoots” and eventually fascist ramifications and outcomes. Notably, romanticism represents an attempt at restoration of the “glory” of medieval Germanic civilization and the “true” German *Folkgeist* (the “spirit of the people”<sup>20</sup>), in adverse reaction to what it attacks as the “anti-German” and “foreign” Enlightenment and liberalism. Romanticism initiates a long-standing counter-Enlightenment and antiliberal tradition in Germany. The tradition spans from illiberal and militarist Prussian rulers (Michels 1968; Nischan 1994) to Bismarckian authoritarian and militant conservatives subduing liberalism (Habermas 1989a; Mann 1993) to their totalitarian and warlike heirs, Hitler and the Nazis as the extreme species of the anti-Enlightenment (Habermas 2001) and antiliberalism destroying liberal democracy and coming close to destroy Enlightenment-based civilization (Beck 2000). Romanticism’s attempted restoration of “glorious” medieval Germanic civilization and attack on the “foreign” Enlightenment and liberalism thus represent a classical German romanticist-to-conservative anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal theme that Nazism seized, exploited, and carried to its extreme totalitarian, militarist, and destructive consequences.

In turn, this theme is not exclusively characteristic of the romantic-conservative-fascist German counter-Enlightenment, but also has some functional equivalents or proxies and echoes in American conservatism, including neoconservatism, particularly revived religious fundamentalism and neofascism. In spite of its claims to superior exceptionalism and novelty, paleo- and neoconservatism in America seeks

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<sup>20</sup>For instance, Mannheim (1936:234) suggests that the idea that “there is no substitute for the spirit of a people” (as stated by Adam Muller), “derived from romanticism, becomes the leading theme” of German conservatism.

and often succeeds to restore the medieval “golden past.” Predictably, the latter assumes the glorified form of the seventeenth century Puritan “godly community” (German 1995) as what Weber calls the “theocracy of New England” (Munch 2001) restored as a “faith-based” society or “one nation indivisible under God” (Giddens 2000), as in the conservative enacted new pledge of allegiance since the 1950s,<sup>21</sup> in which “we trust in God” or else, minimally social exclusion (Edgell et al. 2006), notably the “Biblical Garden” (Gould 1996) as “paradise lost” to be “found” in the “Bible Belt” (Boles 1999). Like its German variant, American conservatism extols this restoration or resurrection of the theocratic pre-Enlightenment from its admitted “death” (Dunn and Woodard 1996) as no less than, as Reaganite and other neoconservative “rigid extremists” (Blomberg and Harrington 2000) claim, the “renaissance of American civilization.” Conversely, conservatism condemns and attacks, as especially do Reaganism and its derivatives, the Enlightenment and liberalism as “un-American,” “foreign,” and “ungodly,” of course, the supreme reason for defining them and everything “under the sun” as “un- and anti-American.”

Conservatism arises and operates as an antirationalistic and antiliberal movement, displaying, as Mannheim suggests, nostalgia or melancholy for and resurrecting medievalism from what he calls the “dead past” in Europe and America. In turn, romanticism is just an extremely irrational, sentimental (“tearful”), nostalgic, or melancholic expression or basis of this conservative return to the pre-Enlightenment, specifically in Germany and adjacent countries. This renders the difference between these two subtypes of the counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism the matter of quantitative degrees of antirationalism or irrationalism, including sentimentality, nostalgia, or melancholy for the medieval pre-Enlightenment as the shared ideal, and to that extent darkness and un-freedom, rather than of quality and substance. On this account, like the conservative counter-Enlightenment generally, the specifically German and contiguous romanticist anti-Enlightenment is a reactionary movement seeking to restore the “golden past.” In this case, the latter is the medieval Germanic empire to be restored through literally “blood and tears,” namely offensive wars by conservatism and Nazism, conservative-Nazi sadism-masochism (Fromm 1941; McLaughlin 1996) and other perversions (Barnes 2000), and extreme emotions reaching mass hysteria (Adorno 2001) and societal madness (Bourdieu 2000).

Hence, while anti-Enlightenment German and other romanticism is or founded the conservative counter-Enlightenment, the reverse is not necessarily true. Namely, not all the conservative counter-Enlightenment is romanticist in the sense of emotional or sentimental. It is indicated by what Weber and Parsons identify as antiemotional

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<sup>21</sup> Also, some “godly” US states have recently enacted and enforced their own versions of the conservative reinvented pledge of allegiance of the 1950s. For instance, its Texan version made a law in 2007 is “Honor the Texas flag; I pledge allegiance to thee, Texas, one state under God, one and indivisible.” Following the judicial upholding of the pledge in 2009, Texas Attorney General proclaimed that “patriotic acknowledgments of the Almighty are constitutional. Texans can rest assured that we will continue defending their children’s ability to recite the state Pledge of Allegiance each morning.”

and unsentimental Calvinism and Puritanism acting as anti-Enlightenment religious orthodoxy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, as against Jeffersonian ideas in postrevolutionary America, and ever since through its revival in American conservatism continuing the Puritan theocratic tradition. Simply, the Enlightenment's "romantic enemies"<sup>22</sup> (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) are almost invariably conservative, though not all anti-Enlightenment conservatives are "romantic," but also "unsentimental" after the image of antiemotional Calvin and "stodgy Calvinists" (Gould 1996) à la Puritan Winthrop and his "born again" evangelical heirs and admirers like Reagan and colleagues.

### *The Ultimate Conservative Anti-Enlightenment – Fascism*

In virtue of being primarily, with secondary variations, the monstrous offspring or subtype, at least the regular ally and close "friend," of conservatism, fascism is the ultimate conservative form of the anti-Enlightenment and generally the extreme version of antiliberalism (Dahrendorf 1979). Hence, fascism, notably Nazism, as primarily extreme conservative, "right-wing" totalitarianism (Giddens 1979), has always been the extreme or lethal conservative enemy of the Enlightenment and liberalism, and remains such through neofascism, including neo-Nazism by the early twenty-first century. Thus, virtually all the fascist, including Nazi, forms of the anti-Enlightenment and antiliberalism tend to be conservative, and in extension medieval or romanticist, in origin or effect. This holds true as a general rule, with the qualification that not all counter-Enlightenment and antiliberal conservatism is or becomes fascism. However, while no simple equation between anti-Enlightenment conservatism and fascism exists, recall that the first often tends to climax in the second (Manent 1998; Moore 1993), and many conservatives eventually become "fascists" under certain social conditions or historical conjunctures (Blinkhorn 2003; Lipset 1955) such as political crises in inter- and postwar Europe and (also) culture and military wars in America.

Like conservatism, including romanticism, fascism, Nazism particularly, can be deemed both a type of the pre-Enlightenment and of the anti-Enlightenment. First and foremost, fascism constitutes or produces a return to the pre-Enlightenment, specifically medievalism, revealing its extant source in and inspiration from or affinity with romanticism and hence the latter's offshoot early conservatism, as especially (but not only) demonstrated by romanticist Nazism. Fascism, especially Nazism, and conservatism in interwar Germany and Europe overall reportedly attempted to revitalize "antiquated dogmas" by enforcing or inducing their

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<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, Horkheimer and Adorno (1993:33) assert that (the) Enlightenment "is as destructive as its Romantic enemies claim" in virtue of it "subjecting everything particular to its discipline, it left the uncomprehended whole free to rebound as mastery over things against the life and consciousness of human beings."

acceptance by “mass hypnosis” and their adherence with “fanaticism and not with reason,” for the “purpose of modern mass manipulation”<sup>23</sup> (Horkheimer 1996). In short, fascist and reactionary conservative “political factions” used medievalist and other “mythologies” for the sake of turning back the “course of history” (Horkheimer 1996), and still do via neofascist and neoconservative groups. As also observed, even modern Western societies witness a “return” of the pre-Enlightenment, namely of “avowedly irrationalist and mythological” ideas in politics and popular culture alike, joined with a revolt against the Enlightenment’s “progress” in separating metaphysical elements from “rational thought” (Hinchman 1984). By assumption and in reality, interwar Nazism and all fascism, precisely defined by extreme irrationalism and mythology, represents a paradigmatic or “obvious” instance, as does also the observed “proliferation of religious cults,” Christian and other “pseudosciences,” romanticist or reactionary social movements in contemporary Western societies, in particular America during conservatism (Hinchman 1984).

Second, fascism, particularly Nazism, represents the most extreme conservative and totalitarian anti-Enlightenment and generally antiliberalism, thus the foremost nihilistic enemy of the Enlightenment and liberalism. For instance, Nazi totalitarianism, rooted in and allied with German authoritarian conservatism, revolts totally against and eliminated the “civilizing forces” generated and heralded by the Enlightenment, eliminating the “hopes for a domestication of state power” and a “humanization of social relations” (Habermas 2001). The anti-Enlightenment, antiliberal, and antidemocratic “threat of Nazism” (Hinchman 1984) hence eventually materialized in the destruction of Enlightenment values, liberalism, and democracy (the Weimar Republic) in interwar Germany,<sup>24</sup> just as continued in the “antidemocratic trajectory” (Cable et al. 2008) of American neoconservatism and neofascism.

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<sup>23</sup>Horkheimer (1996:365), in a critical sociological analysis of the positive-negative “dialectic” of (the) Enlightenment, proposes that “through being used for the purpose of modern mass manipulation the antiquated dogmas lose the last spark of genuine life [so] no intellectual way back. The more strongly the masses feel that the concepts [to be] revitalized have no real basis in today’s social reality, the more can they [accept] these concepts only by mass hypnosis and, once accepted, the more will they adhere to them with fanaticism and not with reason.” He concludes that if these conservative-fascist factions “are victorious the masses must embrace their respective ideologies despite their incongruence with man’s experience” in industrial and democratic society, as happened in Germany and other “Fascist states” (Horkheimer 1996:366).

<sup>24</sup>Hinchman (1984:262) comments that “astonishingly few citizens in Weimar Germany, when the threat of Nazism became plain, were actually willing to defend their state [vs. their Volk].” In this view, the “Weimar Republic in Germany offers an instructive example of the dangers at the heart of Hegel’s vision of a rational state [as] highly vulnerable to totalitarian movements partly because of the elements Hegel identified precisely as crucial to a rational state [i.e.] a citizenry suspicious of and unaccustomed to political involvement, a highly trained, professional corps of civil servants who often made policy when elected governments could not” (Hinchman 1984:262).

## The Post-Enlightenment

### *Post-Enlightenment as the Anti-Enlightenment*

One variation or interpretation of the post-Enlightenment is the anti-Enlightenment. In particular, the post-Enlightenment can be considered or interpreted as the conservative anti-Enlightenment through religious and other conservatism's (re)birth in adverse reaction to the Enlightenment during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and by its operation as an antithesis to the latter since (Juergensmeyer 2003). Hence, the conservative type comprises, in aggregate and a historical sequence, the paleoconservative, fascist, neoconservative, and neofascist anti-Enlightenments. During the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, this type assumes the form of the neoconservative, including the neofascist, anti- and in that sense post-Enlightenment. In other words, the "birth" of the post-Enlightenment reportedly requires the "midwifery" of neoconservatism or neofascism in virtue of being the anti-Enlightenment and antiliberalism (Habermas 1989a). In this sense, neoconservatism, in particular neofascism and revived religious fundamentalism, is the necessary and sufficient condition of the post-Enlightenment. Generally, the post- as anti-Enlightenment marks a sort of death, as in Nazi Germany and interwar fascist Europe (Habermas 2001), or a crisis and reversal, as in America under neoconservatism (Berman 2000), of the Enlightenment and its ideals and legacy.

However, the post-Enlightenment is not necessarily or cannot always be interpreted as the conservative and other anti-Enlightenment, but also its alternative, just as postmodernity or postindustrialism overall is not invariably anti-modernism or antiindustrialism, if "post" means a formal timeframe, and "anti" a negative substantive change. This is implicit in the observation that the "thesis of a post-Enlightenment" is not "convincing" (Habermas 1989a) in the negative substantive sense of a *dominant* anti-Enlightenment reversing the Enlightenment in the Western world, not so much in that of a time period just succeeding the latter. This holds true except for the predictable exception of America, given the celebrated, ever-renewed "predominance" of pre- and counter-Enlightenment religious fundamentalism such as Weber's "Protestant sectarianism" (Lipset 1996) over the Jeffersonian Enlightenment (Archer 2001; Byrne 1997; Patell 2001).

Yet, the above is a "striking" and comparatively isolated exception or "deviant case" (Inglehart and Baker 2000) among modern Western societies in which the Enlightenment's legacy remains dominant (Byrne 1997). This reveals the true nature of the "phenomenon of American exceptionalism" (Inglehart 2004) as exceptionality in the anti-Enlightenment and in extension antiliberalism within Western society, rather than, as super-patriotic US writers claim (Lipset and Marks 2000), in liberty, individualism, and democracy. Such exceptionalism moves the "new nation" away from Weber's Western rationalistic, liberal, and secular modernity and instead closer to irrational, conservative, and theocratic Eastern traditionalism, including Oriental despotism and religious mysticism (Angel 1994). This reverse non- or quasi-Western exceptionalism perplexes and makes objective, scientific analysts wonder as to what

is really “new” and “Western” in anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal, as distinct from Enlightenment Jeffersonian, America as the “first new nation” and the claimed model or leader of the Western and entire world (Lipset and Marks 2000).

In a way, virtually nothing is more substantively “Western” in the modern sense than, as Comte, Weber, and other analysts suggest (Angel 1994), rationalism, liberalism, and secularism, notably their prime foundation, the rationalistic, liberal, and secular Enlightenment. Conversely, hardly anything is more “non-Western” or “Oriental” in the substantive sense than irrationalism, conservatism or traditionalism, and Comte’s “theological age” or “military-theocratic regime.” To that extent, conservative anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal “American exceptionalism” reveals itself as single- rather than admittedly “double-edged sword” (Lipset 1996) in the sense of being self-contradictory and self-destructive or self-defeating with respect to the claim to America being the “first new nation” in the West and the model or leader of the Western “free” world.

Skeptics able to preserve their basic objectivity or sheer sanity from the social contagion of neoconservative triumphant Americanism (Bell 2002; King 1999; Turner 2002) as collective hysteria or narcissism may comment that such exceptionalism instead makes America the “first new nation” in the Orient in the sociological (not geographical) sense, and the model or leader of the Eastern “not-so-free” world, perhaps alongside Iran and China. Recall that these countries all *inter alia* are observed to share a functionally equivalent death-penalty and penal system (Jacobs et al. 2005) executing and otherwise punishing with Draconian harshness humans for both sins and crimes. The latter are not differentiated by such criminal justice – and hence by equating moral sins with true crimes – effectively criminal-as-murderous (Popper 1973) and injustice systems, a lack of differentiation that, like that between religion and politics or civil society (Evans and Evans 2008), is a distinctly non-Western, especially Islamic “specialty.” In this sense, conservative American *cum* Islamic-style “exceptionalism” makes the “new nation” a sort of geographical Western model or leader of the *Eastern* “Enlightenment” precisely defined by irrationalism, nonliberalism, nonsecularism (Angel 1994) or religious mysticism, traditionalism, and theocracy in contrast to “Enlightenment West” with its opposite defining properties. At first sight, this appears a salient or, for most Americans taught and used to view America as the model, leader, and even creator of Western civilization and democracy,<sup>25</sup> shocking paradox. Yet, conservative

<sup>25</sup>For example, even a putative liberal and cosmopolitan US secretary of state claimed in Europe during 2009 that America created “democracy” in the Western and entire world, by stating that American democracy is “older” than the European, as well as confessing the lack of understanding of the supposed excessive complexities of the multiparty system characterizing the latter vs. the simple and clear two-party system of the former. While “no comment” is perhaps the best comment in the substantive sense of the origins of Western democracy and the role of the multiparty system in the latter, as “every schoolboy and schoolgirl” does or should know even in the West, including America, such ethnocentric claims, expressing triumphant Americanism (Bell 2002), confirm Cooley’s classical definition of ethnocentrism as the “matter of lack of knowledge” or simply ignorance producing and being reproduced by arrogance, thus becoming “blissful ignorance.” Cynics or comics may comment that it could have been worse or “better,” depending on the perspective; at least, the above US official did not claim that the “new exceptional nation” invented the word “democracy” or perhaps did implicitly by claiming the invention of the concept and practice.

“American exceptionalism” by being a “striking” perversion or deviation from “Enlightenment West” and liberalism, and functionally equivalent to Islamic theocratic exceptionalism is on its own right a sort of “mother of all paradoxes,” self-contradictions, perversions or deviations in the modern Western world.

In sum, the post-Enlightenment in the substantive, as different from chronological, sense can be not only the anti-Enlightenment, as in the case of neoconservatism, revived religious fundamentalism, and neofascism. It can also involve the persistence or renewal of the Enlightenment and its legacy, as witnessed in contemporary Western and other democratic societies, while registering America’s conservative deviation in the form of Islamic-style theocratic “godly” “exceptionalism,” thus perversion or aberration, from the latter.

### ***Post-Enlightenment as the Neo-Enlightenment***

The above implies that an alternative variation or interpretation of the post-Enlightenment is what can be, seemingly counter-intuitively or illogically, considered the neo-Enlightenment in the sense and form of persistence or renewal and reaffirmation of the Enlightenment and its legacy in modern democratic societies. And, the neo-Enlightenment appears to be the prevalent variation or the most plausible interpretation of the post-Enlightenment in modern Western and other democratic societies, with the salient deviation of America under neoconservatism. This is in sharp contrast to, alongside the latter, non-Western, undemocratic societies, especially Islamic and other theocracies, where the opposite equation seems valid, the post- as anti-Enlightenment. Simply, with the Enlightenment “post” can be not only and obviously “anti,” opposition and substitution, but also and less manifestly “neo,” persistence, renewal, and reaffirmation, in substantive terms. In short, what comes “after” the Enlightenment can be both the anti- and neo-Enlightenment. And, what comes *after* – whether the anti- or neo-Enlightenment – depends on the specific societal context such as American, Islamic, and other Eastern vs. Western European, the historical conjuncture, including interwar fascist vs. postwar democratic Europe, and power constellations like conservative-theocratic and fascist vs. liberal-secular political dominance or influence, respectively.

In essence, the “post-Enlightenment world” (Juergensmeyer 2003) of liberal and secular society, including politics, culture, and the civil sphere, is that of the neo-Enlightenment. When observed that contemporary religious conservatism’s challenge to modern secular democracies is “profound” and often violent or terrorist because of its “fundamental critique of the world’s post-Enlightenment secular culture and politics” (Juergensmeyer 2003), the latter evidently signifies the neo-Enlightenment or the legacy of the Enlightenment, including “post-Enlightenment science” (Evans and Evans 2008) as neo- rather than anti-Enlightenment. The same applies to the prediction that it is “unlikely” that religion will, following religious revolt, violence, and terrorism in recent times, return, especially in theocentric or hyperreligious societies like “godly” America, let alone Islamic countries, to its “privatization” in the “post-Enlightenment world” (Juergensmeyer 2003) *cum* neo-

Enlightenment liberal-secular society. In turn, it would be a non sequitur and empirical fallacy to interpret this world as the anti-Enlightenment; to say that religious conservatism is a “fundamental critique of the world’s *anti*-Enlightenment secular culture and politics” is self-contradictory and empirically incorrect. Religious and political conservatism, as especially (but not only) “born again” in America and Islamic countries (Juergensmeyer 2003), forms *the* anti-Enlightenment, the axiomatic, supreme enemy of Enlightenment values, achievements, and legacies.

Alternatively, the “birth” of the post-Enlightenment as the neo-Enlightenment requires the “midwifery” of contemporary liberalism as the new or pro-Enlightenment (Habermas 1989a). In this sense, the post- as neo-Enlightenment reflects the Enlightenment’s persistent, or renewed and reaffirmed legacy in modern Western societies functioning in a “path-dependence” (Inglehart and Baker 2000) primarily on the latter (Byrne 1997), with the “deviant case” of America under neo-conservatism, just as the post- as anti-Enlightenment does the destruction or perversion of this heritage. Hence, if the post- as anti-Enlightenment marks the death or crisis, the post- as neo-Enlightenment does the rebirth or renaissance, of the Enlightenment and its ideals and legacies. This is witnessed in postwar and modern Western societies, except for neoconservative America as a deviation, not to mention Islamic and other theocratic or traditionalist countries, from the latter.

Consequently, the post- as neo-Enlightenment constitutes or epitomizes the new liberalism and rationalism as the composite modernized principle of liberty (Mannheim 1986), reason, and progress, conjoined with equality or equal life chances, inclusion, and justice, in society, just as the original Enlightenment did their classical forms. Alternatively, it represents or ushers in the “new liberty” (Dahrendorf 1975), in a “secular dialectics” (Dahrendorf 1979) or interaction with equality and justice as complementary, synergic principles, and public use of reason (Habermas 2001) and social progress defining modern liberalism and rationalism reintegrated and reinforced in Mannheim’s “rationalistic liberalism.” Apparently, the new liberalism and thus liberty is *not* to be understood in the sense of “neoliberalism” as effectively “neoconservatism” (Bourdieu 1998). The latter is, especially its American version a la Reaganism and “libertarianism,” a paradoxical or absurd, self-contradictory, and self-defeating (Beck 2000) mix of economic *laissez-faire* and social oppression, Hobbesian anarchy or unfettered “license to kill,” literally or figuratively, in economy *and* Leviathan-image tyranny in society (Giddens 2000; Hodgson 1999; Pryor 2002).

For instance, the idea of the post- as neo-Enlightenment is implied in registering “post-Enlightenment faith in progressive history and national prosperity” (Gould 1996), as the evident legacy of the Enlightenment in Jeffersonian liberal-secular and democratic, as distinguished from Puritan conservative and theocratic or “godly,” America. Reportedly, the contrast and opposition developed and continues between “post-Enlightenment concerns over the progress of reason” in America and Puritan “gloom and doom” expressing what Weber calls “gloomy” early Calvinism defining Winthrop and his heirs as “stodgy Calvinists” (Gould 1996; Kloppenber 1998). Hence, this is the contradiction between Jefferson’s Enlight



enment-based project of America as liberal-secular democracy *and* Winthrop's pre-Enlightenment divine design of Puritan theocracy or *mixt aristocracie*. It is between a social system characterized with the "wall" of separation of church and state and liberty, life, equality, and justice "for all" *and* one in which most humans are in "subjection" as a "universal condition of mankind" after the atavistic ideal of "Christian Sparta" as an old Calvinist favorite, and sectarian-oppressive "Salem with witches" (Putnam 2000).

The idea of the post- as neo-Enlightenment is also implicit in observing that like the eighteenth century modern Western societies, including America, inhabit an "in-between world" involving "religious tradition" and "authoritarianism" in contradiction to the "critical demands of post-Enlightenment modernity"<sup>26</sup> (Byrne 1997; Dillon 1999<sup>27</sup>; Ku 2000<sup>28</sup>). Notably, it is implied in that the notion of endowing all humans with "universal, inherent, and inalienable" liberties and rights in virtue of being "human" is "firmly" established in "post-Enlightenment Western culture" (Cole 2005) in the evident sense of the neo-Enlightenment and new liberalism. Given this notion, to interpret "post-Enlightenment Western culture" as "anti-Enlightenment" and antiliberalism or conservatism and fascism is both an illogical nonsequitur and an empirical fallacy.

In comparative terms, it is observed that the operation of the post- as neo-Enlightenment assumes the form of "survival" of Enlightenment rationalism (Szokolczai and Fustos 1998) and liberalism, in contradiction with other "axial moments" like Protestantism and Catholicism, in modern Western European societies.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Byrne (1997:235) comments that "one could avoid this tension by no longer taking seriously the claims of the religious tradition or by retreating to the opposite pole and immersing oneself safely in religious authoritarianism. But both alternatives involve the sleep of reason, for neither religion nor modernity is going to disappear."

<sup>27</sup> Dillon (1999:291), rejecting Habermas' dichotomy of the Enlightenment and traditional religion, contends that "the multiplicity of strands and discourses" is found in "both premodern and post-Enlightenment religions." Further, he argues that religious values "are used for the offensive, emancipatory purposes [favored by Habermas]: the realization of Enlightenment values of equality, justice, and communal participation," invoking Catholicism (Dillon 1999:295). Dillon (1999:302) concludes (contra Habermas and other Enlightenment defenders) that "faith is open to a self-critical rationality and is not associated solely with a pre-Enlightenment interpretive monopoly."

<sup>28</sup> Ku (2000:221) proposes that the Habermas' "interpretation underlies an overly rationalistic conception of public culture within a republican model that builds upon the Enlightenment ideal of rationalism." Moreover, Ku (2000:234) contends that the "notion of rational-critical discourse, as it is rooted in the Frankfurt School tradition and Enlightenment rationalism, is a cultural – or insufficiently cultural – apolitical, and carries undemocratic meanings."

<sup>29</sup> Szokolczai and Fustos (1998:226) find that "differences in the way social background factors influence value preferences at the individual level among East and West European countries are due not so much to modernizational or economic variables at the country level, or to the relative degree of liberalization under communism, but to the stamps of like Protestantism, the Enlightenment and the different versions of socialism." Namely, the "major differences were due to the marks left by Protestantism and Communism (as well as) the persistence of the Catholic-Protestant dividing-line [and] survival of Enlightenment rationalism and the impact of social democracy" (Szokolczai and Fustos 1998:226).

In particular, such contradictions are exemplified by “evident generational conflicts” in the “value system” of modern Great Britain (Szakolczai and Fustos 1998) between Enlightenment rationalism and liberalism and moralistic and oppressive Puritanism. In these conflicts in Great Britain, like most Western Europe (Holland, Germany, etc.), Enlightenment values typically prevail, experiencing a rebirth and thus ushering in the neo-Enlightenment, over Puritanism facing a second death after its defeat in the seventeenth century Puritan Revolution, as witnessed after the demise or eclipse (even within the “Conservative Party”) of puritanical Thatcherism (Giddens 2000; Hodgson 1999) during the late 1990s and early 2000s.

### *The Post-Enlightenment as Post-Modernity*

Still another variation or interpretation of the post-Enlightenment is postmodernity, a notion especially (but not solely) characteristic of postmodernism strongly critical and skeptical toward the Enlightenment and its applications and legacies (Habermas 2001). Hence, such a notion implies that the post-Enlightenment is a sort of post-liberal, postdemocratic, postsecular, postpluralist, postrationalistic, and generally postmodern society and time. Still, the notion of the post-Enlightenment as postmodernity seems different from the idea of the neoconservative and neofascist anti-Enlightenment. This is because a postliberal, postrational, and postmodern society and time is not necessarily or mostly antiliberal, antirational, and antimodern, notably conservative, including fundamentalist and fascist. It can also be the exact opposite by retaining or reaffirming at least certain basic elements of liberalism, rationalism, and modernity, including liberal-democratic, as different from authoritarian or dictatorial, capitalism<sup>30</sup> (Saisselin 1992).

In this sense, the above notion can also be understood in terms of the post-Enlightenment as a neo- rather than anti- or nonmodernity, namely second, mature modernity. Apparently, the post-Enlightenment as postmodernity thesis hinges on the conception or picture of the latter as anti-, non-, or premodernity déjà vu, as in postmodernism (Baudrillard 1994a; Bauman 2001), or neo- or second modernity, as in modernist sociological theory appreciative of the Enlightenment’s ideals and legacies (Beck 2000; Giddens 2000; Habermas 2001). At this juncture, each post-Enlightenment as postmodernity thesis stands or falls on the merit of the conception of the latter as either non- or neomodernity. Post-modernism’s portrayal of postmodernity as non- or even “nothing new under the sun” premodernity in the sense of non- or preliberal, democratic, secular, pluralist, and rational is a problematic diagnosis in view of the observed prevalent global trends to liberalization, democratization, secularism, pluralism, and rationalism (Inglehart 2004) in contemporary Western and other societies. It is in light of the growing “reality” of a liberal-democratic, secular, and pluralist society (Munch 2001) defined by the “new liberty”

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<sup>30</sup> Saisselin (1992:8) suggests that “not only are we post-Enlightenment and postbourgeois but we also live in what is characterized as a consumer society.”

(Dahrendorf 1975), and hence a reemerging or reconstituted, rather than extinct or superseded, modernity.

On this account, the modernist sociological conception of postmodernity as a sort of neo- or second modernity does more justice to these processes than postmodernism’s vision of it as non- or premodernity. Hence, the thesis of post-Enlightenment as postmodernity in the sense of the new modernity as a renewed liberal-democratic, secular, and pluralist society and time seems more plausible than the non- or premodernity alternative. This makes one wonder if postmodernism’s “deconstruction” of the Enlightenment and modernity is not misguided by misconstruing the latter *cum* “postmodernity” as non- and premodernity rather than, as these prevalent social processes indicate, neomodernity or new modernism defined by renewed liberalism, secularism, pluralism, rationalism, and the like.

Hence, the post-Enlightenment as postmodernity as understood in postmodernism differs from the post- as neo-Enlightenment. It does because (or if) “post” presumably entails going beyond liberal-democratic, secular, and rationalistic modern society and time, not just in the formal sense of temporal succession but also in the substantive way of replacement. This is what critical postmodernism proposes or predicts<sup>31</sup> (Cascardi 1999; Trey 1998) and anti-Enlightenment neoconservatism, especially religious (American, Islamic, and other) fundamentalism, and neofascism desire or dream and actually attempt. (Table 7.2 summarizes these variations or interpretations of the post-Enlightenment.) Conversely, the post-Enlightenment as postmodernity in the sense of neo- or second liberal modernity is substantively identical to the post- as neo Enlightenment, discussed next.

**Table 7.2** Variations or interpretations of the post-Enlightenment

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The post-Enlightenment as the anti-Enlightenment
The post-Enlightenment as the neo-Enlightenment
The post-Enlightenment as postmodernity
Post-modernity as non- or premodernity
Post-modernity as neo- or second modernity

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<sup>31</sup> Alerting to but not fully embracing post-modernism, Trey (1998:7) recognizes that “a politics of emancipation is by necessity a politics of enlightenment” but objects to the sociological (Habermas) “conception of the relationship between the ideals of the Enlightenment and the development of modern societies” on the grounds that it “unnecessarily links the concept of enlightenment to modern social, political, and economic developments.” He contends that “some of the basic structures of modernity have fallen into dissolution” and proposes a “form of enlightenment that moves beyond the parameters of modernity,” as an alternative to the politics of enlightenment tending toward “fortifying a quasi-liberal status quo [of] neo-conservatism [*sic*]” (Trey 1998:7–9). Trey (1998:11) concludes that the question is “whether the atrocities of the current century are a sign of immaturity or a function of the very maturation process that Kant so enthusiastically lauds. Critical theorists feel that the project of enlightenment must be continued by reconceptualizing it in a manner that is compatible with existing social and political conditions.” Among these critical theorists Cascardi (1999:5) posits the “nonclosure of the Enlightenment” in the sense that the “pursuit of constructive social and ethical goals” does not necessitate either an “anti-Enlightenment stance” or returning to “Enlightenment rationality.”

## The Neo-Enlightenment

The neo- or new Enlightenment is the prevailing variation or most adequate interpretation of the post-Enlightenment among modern Western democratic societies, except for neoconservative American exceptionalism. This is in contrast to, besides the latter, their undemocratic, especially theocratic, counterparts in which the post-as anti-Enlightenment instead prevails. As the term suggests, the neo-Enlightenment entails the renewal and reaffirmation, or resumption and completion, and to that extent reproduction of or continuity with (Berman 2000) the Enlightenment. In a sense, it is the late twentieth and early twenty-first century renaissance of the original Enlightenment by analogy to the fifteenth century Renaissance as the artistic and humanistic revival of classical “pagan” civilization and democracy almost perished and buried in the Christian and theocratic Dark Middle Ages. In this analogy, the neo-Enlightenment is the rebirth or rescue of the Enlightenment from attempted destruction (literally burning) and burial by the conservative-fascist, including neoconservative and neofascist, anti-Enlightenment since its rise in adverse reaction striving to restore the “golden past” or “paradise lost” of the Dark Middle Ages during the late eighteenth century through Europe under fascism and to America during neoconservatism. At the minimum, the “rumors of the death” of the Enlightenment and its “child” liberal modernity are admittedly “greatly exaggerated” (Bauman 2001). And, this postmodernist admission provides a sort of minimalistic definition and formulation of the post- as neo-Enlightenment.

By assumption, the neo-Enlightenment not only continues but renews and expands the Enlightenment’s original project of liberal-secular, pluralist, democratic, egalitarian, inclusive, rationalist, progressive, and humanitarian society. Furthermore, sociological observations suggest that the neo-Enlightenment in modern societies has become or resulted in the new “reality of a liberal and pluralist society” (Munch 2001) vs., as during the original Enlightenment, the opposition of surviving or reviving anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal forces. In this account, these forces persist among modern democratic Western societies, particularly (though not only) America in the form of survived or revived theocratic Puritanism through “born again” Protestant fundamentalism and sectarianism (Juergensmeyer 2003; Lipset 1996; Munch 2001), as well as undemocratic countries like Islamic theocracies (Iran, Taliban-regions, etc.) ruled by fundamentalist Islam as the foremost anti-Enlightenment and antiliberalism. Modern democratic societies are observed to usher in the new Enlightenment “simply as a way of life” rather than a “political movement” (Berman 2000). The new Enlightenment consists in a “strong continuity with Enlightenment traditions of democracy and expanding intellectual inquiry,” notably scientific research, and continuing or renewing a “civilization with strong humanistic values”<sup>32</sup> (Berman 2000).

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<sup>32</sup>Berman (2000:176) predicts that “if the twenty-second century brings with it a return to Enlightenment values, it will not be in the sense of coming full circle (but incorporating) the positive contribution of the postmodern assault. The Enlightenment vision of unlimited improvement,

## *The Neo-Enlightenment and the New Liberalism*

Hence, the neo-Enlightenment constitutes the new liberalism, including secularism and pluralism, though not in the sense of “neoliberalism” *cum* laissez-faire capitalism resurrected from the dead past by none other than politically and culturally antiliberal neoconservatism a la Reaganomics and Thatcherism (Giddens 2000). Consequently, the neo-Enlightenment epitomizes and ushers in the “new liberty” in modern society (Dahrendorf 1975). It also represents a consistent composite of liberalism’s complementary principles in renewed forms, such as universalism, egalitarianism, rationalism, progressivism, pacifism, cosmopolitanism, and humanitarianism, just as the original Enlightenment did their early versions. On this account, the neo-Enlightenment entails the rebirth of the new liberalism/liberty and its complementary principles, just as the Enlightenment did the birth of their early versions, and the Renaissance the artistic and humanistic rebirth of classical civilization and in part democracy. In factor-analytic terms, the new liberalism and its complementary principles, including rationalism and progressivism, thus renewed liberty institutionalized in liberal democracy and society, “load” on or express the neo-Enlightenment as their foundation or common denominator. Conversely, neo-Enlightenment variables “load” on or epitomize the new liberalism, i.e., the renewed liberty of liberal democracy and society, as their synthesis or aggregate outcome.

In particular, modern critical moral liberalism rescues and reaffirms from conservative-fascist nihilism (literally burning), as well as postmodern cynicism, the “Enlightenment project of a universal moral liberalism” expressed in the “Enlightenment argument for the right of all human beings” to freedom of self-direction in their life predicated on the “possession of reason” (Reiman 1997). Arguably, such an argument of “liberty of all” in private and all societal life is able to refute the criticism of “feminists and [non-Western] multiculturalists” that misconstrue Enlightenment universalism as “biased” toward a “male” and “Western” worldview, and of postmodernists overall cynically negating any “possibility of a universal moral ideal” (Reiman 1997). In summary, modern moral liberalism continues and reinvigorates both the Enlightenment’s principle of reason as humans’ “distinctive capacity” and its ideal of “moral universality” in the form of universal freedom of self-direction in morality and private life as well as of conscience in religion (Reiman 1997), as sociology and other social science does with respect to Enlightenment “themes of freedom, equality, rationality, and progress”<sup>33</sup> (Mirchandani 2005). Admittedly, the ideal of equality and

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and total knowledge of the world, is no longer credible.” Also, he recommends that a “certain détente is possible between the Enlightenment and postmodernism. Postmodernism rapidly degenerated into a terrible, narcissistic hubris; but stirred in with Enlightenment values, it might enable those of the New Enlightenment to cultivate humility with regard to fixed positions on the nature of truth” (Berman 2000:177).

<sup>33</sup> Mirchandani (2005:88) proposes that the “increased self-awareness fostered by epistemological postmodernism combines with the grounded surefootedness of empirical postmodernism to inspire sociologists to selectively reappropriate modern concepts and to reinvigorate enlightenment [*sic*] themes of freedom, equality, rationality, and progress.”

inclusion in society undergirds the “liberal idea” of universal liberty endowing “all citizens” with the “fundamental right” of being treated as “free and reasonable” individuals, premised on the post- as neo-Enlightenment conviction in the “reasonableness of human beings” (Brink 2000).

### *Trends Toward the Neo-Enlightenment*

In comparative and global terms, the prevailing trend toward the neo-Enlightenment and new liberalism and thus liberty in contemporary society is indicated by a number of social processes, including secularization and rationalization, liberalization and democratization, and modernization overall. One indicator of the emerging neo-Enlightenment and new liberalism is the process of global secularization and axiomatically rationalization, as especially (but not solely) witnessed in advanced democratic societies, with the predictable, salient exception of America during neoconservatism, notably “reborn” fundamentalism as strident antisecularism and antirationalism. At the minimum, if not global or total, this process involves Western, in the sociological, not geographic sense, *renewed* and reinforced secularization and rationalization primarily (but not only) in European societies. This is in sharp contrast to and opposition by neoconservative or “faith-based” America as the “classic deviant case”<sup>34</sup> (Evans and Evans 2008; Inglehart and Baker 2000) from the modern West in secularization and in extension rationalization and liberalization, as well as most (though not all) non-Western, especially Islamic, countries. To that extent, the process of secularization and rationalization represents the renewal and reinforcement of the secular and rationalistic Enlightenment, thus really the neo-Enlightenment in Western societies and their proxies (e.g., Japan), notably Europe as its original home, while excluding in particular American neoconservative antisecular and antirationalistic or antiscientific exceptionalism.

Comparative sociological research identifies renewed, reinvigorated, and prevailing trends to secularization and rationalization and hence the neo-Enlightenment in most modern developed and democratic societies, except for neoconservative America, as well as weaker or opposite tendencies in underdeveloped and non- or pseudodemocratic, particularly Islamic and Catholic, countries. Predictably, these secularizing and rationalizing modern trends are especially manifested in the decline of the social function and impact of religion (Evans and Evans 2008; Gorski and Altinordu 2008; Hout and Fisher 2002), and of coercive religious-political institutions in particular, in relation to liberal-secular, rationalistic, including scientific, and humanistic ideas, norms, and institutional structures as the vehicles of the New Enlightenment and liberation (Inglehart 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Reportedly, “basic findings” indicate growing secularization in modern democratic

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<sup>34</sup>Evans and Evans (2008:101) add that America is the “classic deviant case in the secularization debate [primarily because it is the one Westernized democracy where vulnerability [to individual and societal risks] is high owing to the lack of a welfare state and other features.”

societies, especially Western Europe and even in part America, thus confirming secularization theory and resulting in “scholarly consensus” or provoking “little disagreement” in the scientific literature (Gorski and Altinordu 2008). First, these findings are the drastic decline of “levels of Christian observance and belief in Western Europe,” through the levels and patterns of decline show considerable variations “by country and region,” and second, the dramatic diminution of the “social functions” of church organizations and ruling groups in the West (Gorski and Altinordu 2008). Both processes are partly witnessed recently even in modern America, notably New England (Crabtree and Pelham 2009). Reportedly, modern America is pervaded by another evangelical revival as an adverse reaction to secularization and, through its theocratic antidemocratic political agenda (Lindsay 2008), a reason for “why more Americans have no religious preference” (Hout and Fisher 2002) yet still a small minority relative to evangelicalism and in that sense fundamentalism as the perpetual dominant force<sup>35</sup> (Edelman 2009).

Thus, comparative sociological analyses find that during the late twentieth and early twenty-first century comparatively the “emphasis on religion” reportedly diminished in “most of the advanced industrial societies” (Austria, Canada, France, Germany, South Korea, Poland, Spain, and the UK), while increasing in “most of the developing countries” (Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa), as well as America by a “slight increase” (Inglehart 2004; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004). In a bizarre or ironic twist, this increase makes neoconservative “faith-based” America closer to, for example, Bangladesh, Mexico, and other Islamic and non-Western societies or the “Third World” in this respect than to Europe, Great Britain, and Canada, and in that sense outside, rather than, as US neo-conservatives claim, at the “heart and head,” of Western civilization. This is implicit in the observation that the “public opinions of the poorest societies” and countries with an “Islamic cultural heritage” are most prone to put the “greatest emphasis on religion” (Inglehart 2004), as is “Christian” America formally belonging to neither.

In particular, salient generational variations reportedly persist in secularization and rationalization among developed and democratic societies, including America, in the form of “differences between younger and older generations in the importance attached to religion,” with those 50 or more years of age being 2–4 times more likely to see religion as “very important” in their life than those under 30 years of age (Inglehart 2004). Because this “pattern” is primarily observed in “advanced industrial societies,” from Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain to the UK, Canada, and even the US, it indicates an “intergenerational shift toward a more secular outlook” in the developed world (Inglehart 2004). To that extent, this indicates a generational shift to the neo-Enlightenment characterized by renewed or reaffirmed “more” secular and rationalistic views at least among younger generations in virtually all modern Western societies, including America,

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<sup>35</sup>Edelman (2009:210) observes that “measured levels of religiosity in American are high – for example, 68% of Americans state that the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, according to the National Election Survey” and in that sense are fundamentalists *cum* evangelicals (despite some formal or artificial differences between the two groups).

a finding also consistent with casual observations. In particular, it implies the American younger generation's partial rebellion against or "second thinking," evoking, if not completing, the similar trends of the "liberal" 1960s, about neoconservatism's theocratic antisecularism and its Machiavellian manipulation of organized religion, "faith and God" (Hout and Fisher 2002) for the aim of "permanent" (as its adherents declared in the early 2000s) political, cultural, and global military domination. Thus, younger generations prevail among more and more Americans with "no religious preference" (Hout and Fisher 2002) and primarily because of the theocratic, "godly" political agenda of resurgent evangelicalism (Lindsay 2008). In turn, wealth and education are found to have positive effects on secularization and rationalization in that the "higher" the income and education, the "less emphasis on religion," and conversely, though, predictably this pattern primarily holding for "advanced industrial societies" (Inglehart 2004).

Among these societies the main instances of and exceptions to the global process of secularization and rationalization, thus the neo-Enlightenment, are also predictable or expected. For instance, the "most secular" modern societies are found to be Germany, Sweden, and Norway in Europe and Japan and China beyond, reflecting a "combination" of certain social and historic conditions, notably the "secularizing impact of affluent postindustrial societies" combined with an "advanced welfare state," as well as the "relatively secular-bureaucratic Confucian tradition" in the last two (Inglehart 2004). In particular, the fall of church attendance is reportedly most drastic in Scandinavian countries reaching the point of "post-Christian societies" and other "historically Protestant" regions, and also "drastically" in "most of the historically Catholic countries of both Western and Eastern Europe" (Inglehart 2004). Also, the predictable main exception or the most "striking deviant case" from this pattern in advanced societies is identified in Protestant America during "godly" neoconservatism, alongside hyper-Catholic Poland and Ireland, featuring "relatively high" church attendance and religiosity comparable with Islamic and other undeveloped societies (Inglehart 2004). These findings reportedly provide strong evidence for the "secularization thesis," contrary to its rational choice detractors and fundamentalist (Christian, Islamic, etc.) enemies, with "striking deviant cases," most notably and predictably America during antisecular neoconservatism exhibiting a "much more religious outlook" than predicted by its "economic levels" (Inglehart 2004; Evans and Evans 2008<sup>36</sup>; Gorski and Altinordu 2008<sup>37</sup>).

Evidently, none other than "faith-based" America as the technologically "most advanced" and economically "richest" country in the world and the poorest,

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<sup>36</sup> Evans and Evans (2008:92) comment that the "consensus among scholars is that this process has occurred over time," specifically secularization in the macro-form of "institutional differentiation, in which religion becomes separated from other institutional spheres" such that "whereas at one time the state, the family, education, and other institutions were legitimated by religious symbols, secularization occurs when this is no longer the case." They add that "whereas there is consensus that macro secularization [i.e., decline in individual belief and practice] has occurred, there remains a debate as to whether micro secularization has occurred" (Evans and Evans 2008:92) in America and even Western Europe.

<sup>37</sup> Gorski and Altinordu (2008:60) object that classical "secularization theory simply stands Christian eschatology on its head by postulating that religious darkness will give way to secular



particularly Islamic, countries display what Weber implied in his comparative analysis of Puritanism and Islam and Parsons ruled out as an elective or “inner” (Mises’ word) affinity and convergence in terms of “emphasis on religion” and alternatively de-emphasis on secular-rationalistic values. Conversely, both cases contrast to and even oppose modern Western societies typified by the opposite tendency. Such are apparently what Merton (1968) may call the “perversities of social logic” of American “born again” religious-political neoconservatism. This consists in that, as the methodical and unapologetic anti-Enlightenment via anti-secularism, antiliberalism, and antirationalism, neoconservatism condemns and destroys, as “ungodly,” so “un-American,” and “evil,” secularism, liberalism, and rationalism expressing the neo-Enlightenment in modern Western societies. Yet in so doing, it effectively “dislocates” America away from the Western world and into its non-Western, especially Islamic, polar opposite, in sociological terms.

At least from the viewpoint of Jeffersonian Enlightenment secularism, rationalism, and liberalism, this “dislocation,” namely making America sociologically more distant from, for example, Jefferson’s Paris than Islamic Iran, is the true “perversity” or “curse,” yet “blessing” for his enemies. To that extent, it turns out to be a sort of generalized Dreiser’s “American tragedy” and genuine, as distinct from what conservatives celebrate as spurious democratic, libertarian, Islamic-style theocratic or “godly” exceptionalism as a truly “single-edged sword” ultimately destructive to democracy and human liberty and, as via “holy” culture and military wars (Juergensmeyer 2003), life. In so doing, “godly” American neoconservatism becomes an objective “brother in arm” or ally of its mutually declared mortal enemy, fundamentalist Islam.

This is witnessed by their common “Bible Belt” and Iranian, protototalitarian “solution” to the alleged “burden” of individual liberty and the “agony” of personal choice (Bauman 1997) by a design and system of theocracy as well as “holy” war through religious violence or terrorism (Juergensmeyer 2003). It is also by their joint stand (with the Vatican) against certain human choices and rights (e.g., family planning or birth control) at international conferences, just as their shared belief in creationism and its variations against biological evolutionism. As regards the latter, fundamentalist Protestants in America and Islamic fundamentalists are the probably only two major contemporary religious groups retaining and imposing or favoring creationism and its “intelligent design” variation over evolutionism, with even the Vatican Church officially adopting the latter as “more than a hypothesis,” while many “Bible Belt” states characterizing it as “just a theory.” At least this reveals American Protestant and Islamic fundamentalism as the major and most tenacious enemies of or threats to modern science, thus scientific rationalism, knowledge, and technological, including medical, progress, even more so than what Comte calls the “most degenerate Catholicism” apparently rethinking its long “papal

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enlightenment.” In turn, they state that in spite or perhaps because of continuing secularization in Western societies “the ranks of the pro-Enlightenment party of reason, meanwhile, have dramatically thinned, and not only in the West, with many one-time partisans adopting a more appreciative and open stance toward religion, even if they do not go native” (Gorski and Altinordu 2008:76).

struggles” against “rationalistic liberalism” (Burns 1990). In fact, Comte predicts this Protestant anti-rationalism in observing that following its “political triumph,” from Europe to America, “all emancipation of the human mind became more repugnant to official Protestantism [and its oppositional Puritan sects] than to the most degenerate Catholicism.” He implies that the Reformation, notably the Calvinist “Reformed” Church, yielded a sort of “reformed” *cum* retrieved, intensified, and universalized medieval irrationalism (Grossman 2006) – *pace* Weber and Parsons – and tyrannical preliberalism (Eisenstadt 1965; Walzer 1963) rather than “reformed” Christianity, let alone, as often supposed, “reformed” religious freedom, tolerance, and pluralism.

At this juncture, celebrated conservative American exceptionalism in “godliness” and “faith-based” society (Dunn and Woodard 1996; Lipset and Marks 2000) in relation to modern Western societies reveals itself as a true reversal or pathological deviation, at least admittedly a “double edge sword” (Lipset 1996). It does so from the stance of these societies’ prevailing neo-Enlightenment secularism, rationalism, and liberalism, and as the reason for patriotic “pride and joy” only from the angle of non-Western, especially Islamic, pre- and counter-Enlightenment anti-secularism, antirationalism, and antiliberalism. One wonders what to expect other than a deviation from the West and a convergence with the non-Western, Islamic world, if neoconservatism’s design of America remains the anti-Enlightenment. This is the design of anti-secular, antirationalistic, or antiscientific, and antiliberal “faith-based” society after the image of a “Bible Garden” (Gould 1996) as “paradise lost” for “reborn” fundamentalists, yet the “peace of the cemetery” from the prism of the Enlightenment, in a revival of Puritanism’s pre-Enlightenment vision and creation of a “godly community” (German 1995) a la the “Biblical Commonwealth” and “Christian Sparta.”

The above yields a logical inference and probable prediction or “rational expectation.” This is that America stands as a Western democratic society primarily on the ground and legacy of the Jeffersonian Enlightenment renewed or continued through neo-Enlightenment secularism, rationalism, and liberalism. Conversely, it falls, or sociologically dislocates to a non-Western Islamic world, on the Puritan pre-Enlightenment of theocracy *cum* “godly” society resurrected by the neoconservative anti-Enlightenment as anti-secularism, antirationalism, and antiliberalism. Simply, if America is (to be) a genuine and “leading” Western society, the neoconservative anti-Enlightenment, like its parent and model the Puritan pre-Enlightenment, ultimately “cannot stand,” as Jefferson and Madison implied by rejecting its theocratic vision of “Christian Sparta” in favor of an Enlightenment-based secular, rationalistic, and liberal project (Kloppenbergh 1998).

As stated, another related indicator of the emerging neo-Enlightenment and thus new liberalism is axiomatically the process of renewed global liberalization of which secularization is a facet and part and rationalization a close complement and link. Like the first, this process is especially (but not only) witnessed in Western and other advanced democratic societies, with striking yet predictable American exceptionalism *cum* antiliberalism during antiliberal neoconservatism. As during its classical phase in the eighteenth century Enlightenment, this renewed liberalization, including political and economic liberal innovations or reforms dating since the end

of World War II (Dobbin et al. 2007), indicating the neo-Enlightenment is crucially the process, endeavor, or at least promise and hope of human liberation and emancipation, including individual freedom, dignity, well-being, and happiness in society defining liberal-secular individualism.

Hence, this process continues and perhaps culminates the human perennial quest for freedom, happiness, and dignified life, including equal life chances (Dahrendorf 1979). It thus reveals the new liberalism, like the old, as the true, supreme principle and practice of “new liberty” (Dahrendorf 1975), including political democracy, conjoined and mutually reinforced with equality and justice in a synthesis or synergy (Putterman et al. 1998), contrary to neoconservative “libertarian” accusations in America (“big liberal” government, the “tax and spend” welfare state, etc.). In particular, the new liberalization in modern societies comprises further democratization as its political dimension, just as the old liberalism involved the principle and system of democracy, of liberty in polity, as in all society.

In comparative terms, most Western societies reportedly experience a recent modern (or “postmodern”) trend toward ideas, values, and institutions promoting and emphasizing “human choice and emancipation” (Inglehart 2004) and in that sense liberalization or liberalism precisely defined by such emphasis vs. anti-liberal conservative religious and political forces denying or limiting choices, especially in morality and private life.<sup>38</sup> In particular, this trend involves the connection between cultural liberalization and political democratization, generally culture and democracy or its authoritarian obverse, in modern societies. Specifically, the “empirical linkages” between culture and democracy consist in that modern liberal democracies are characterized with “strikingly different political cultures” from conservative “authoritarian” societies, with the first, for example, ranking high and the second low on “self-expression” values (Inglehart 2004). These and related cultural values like self-direction, self-determination, or individual autonomy are, as seen, the very ideals and legacies of the Enlightenment (Habermas 2001), in conjunction with its prelude the Renaissance as the ideal of artistic self-expression and creativity, rather or less than of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment like medievalism and conservatism, respectively.

As implied, the most comprehensive indicator of the neo-Enlightenment and new liberalism is the process of renewed or continuing and expanding modernization of which the new liberalization, democratization, secularization, and rationalization are particular dimensions that in factor-analytic terms “load” on or express it. Just as the first or early modernity was the “child” of the original Enlightenment (Habermas 2001), what is often called the second or late modernity is (likely to be) an effect or expression of the neo-Enlightenment (Bauman 2000; Beck 2000; Berman 2000; Dombrowski 2001; Reiman 1997). In a sense, the neo-Enlightenment

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<sup>38</sup>Inglehart (2004:11) adds that a “new Postmodern political cleavage pits culturally conservative, often xenophobic parties, disproportionately supported by Materialists; against change-oriented [liberal] parties, often emphasizing environmental protection, and disproportionately supported by Postmaterialists.”

works out through renewed or continuing modernization and its particular processes and outcomes such as liberalization, secularization, rationalization, and the like. It thereby tends to usher in a new or mature liberal modernity, rather than, as post-modernists claim, “post-modernity,” just as the original Enlightenment did via its liberalizing, secularizing, rationalizing, and other modernizing tendencies and ushered in the first modernity.

In historical terms, early modernization reportedly involves a “change” in political and other authority from “religious to secular institutions and ideologies” (yet remaining “external” to individuals), with rational science reaching “almost the same absolute authority” at its “peak” of the first modernity as religion in pre-modernity (Inglehart 2004). In turn, later modernization or the second, late modernity (“postmodernity”) tends toward eroding the “absoluteness of all kinds of external authority,” religious and secular alike, hence become “internalized” (Inglehart 2004), erosion that is already present or implicit in the Enlightenment’s opposition to *any* authoritarian power of church and state, and continued and reinforced in the neo-Enlightenment.<sup>39</sup> And, both the exemplary instances of and the salient deviations from the global trend to renewed cultural modernization or the second modernity are predictable from those pertaining to secularization and rationalization. For instance, contemporary America is found to be “not a prototype of cultural modernization” for other societies contrary to “some postwar modernization writers” (Inglehart 2004) like Parsons and colleagues claiming that the “Puritan nation” is the climax of social evolution and a “model” (Lipset and Marks 2000) for Western and all countries. Rather, it is identified as “a deviant case” in virtue of a “much more traditional value system than any other advanced industrial society” by ranking “far below other rich societies” on the dimension “traditional/secular” and “levels of religiosity,” plus “national pride,” “comparable” to those of Islamic and other underdeveloped societies (Inglehart 2004). This deviation casts a new light or rather pre- and anti-Enlightenment darkness of traditionalism – a statement of fact, not a value judgment in Weber’s sense – on the “phenomenon of American Exceptionalism” (Inglehart 2004). Alternatively, liberal-secular Sweden, Holland, and Australia, for example, are found to be at the “cutting edge of cultural change” rather than conservative “godly” America<sup>40</sup> (Inglehart 2004).

Other intertwined global indicators of or trends toward the neo-Enlightenment and new liberalism include individualism or individual liberty and private choice, political pluralism and culture diversity, egalitarianism or equality and justice in society, universalism in the sense of universal inclusion, humanitarianism through respect for human dignity, happiness, well-being and life, pacifism via peaceful intra- and intersocietal interactions and conflict resolution, then globalism

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<sup>39</sup>On this account, “postmodernity” defined by the double erosion of sacred and secular power turns out be the late or renewed Enlightenment-based modernity rather than replacing it.

<sup>40</sup>Inglehart (2004:17) also finds that “after 45 years under diametrically opposite political and economic institutions, East Germany and West Germany remained more similar to each other than the US and Canada.”

**Table 7.3** Main trends toward the neo-Enlightenment and new liberalism

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Secularization and rationalization
Liberalization and democratization
Modernization
Others
Individualism
Pluralism and diversity
Egalitarianism
Universalism
Humanitarianism
Pacifism
Globalism, cosmopolitanism

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and cosmopolitanism, and the like (Table 7.3). In general, all these processes, though in varying degrees, express (“load on”) or at least complement the neo-Enlightenment and new liberalism/liberty, just as their early forms did the original Enlightenment and early liberalism.

### “American” Values and the Enlightenment Revisited

If, as shown, the Enlightenment is the primary historical creator or the point of origin of the foundational and enduring elements of modern Western and other democratic societies, including America, it consequently represents also, directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly, the foundation of “American” ideals, values, and institutions. If “American” cherished values and institutions, such as liberty, equality, justice, democracy, science and technology, social progress, the pursuit of happiness, material prosperity, free markets, etc., are substantively “Western,” then they are primarily the creation, expression, and legacy of the Enlightenment as their common point of origin and cultural basis. This contradicts the penchant of hyperpatriotic US sociologists and economists, not to mention politicians and most ordinary Americans, to reductively conceive “Western” civilization, culture, democracy, history, art, science and technology, progress, economy, capitalism, markets, etc. as “American” as its supposed creator, epitome, and leader (Lipset and Marks 2000). For instance, it contradicts Parsons and colleagues’ claim that social evolution or “half a million years of human history” culminated in the US social system as “ridiculous” (Giddens 1984). In this sense, “American” are essentially Enlightenment-inspired ideals, values, and institutions transplanted and filtered in America, as classically demonstrated by Jefferson and his followers, just as in Western European and other democratic societies.

Conversely, there is probably *no* such thing as purely and exclusively “American” ideals, values, and institutions, notably universal liberty, equality, justice, (pursuit of) happiness, and liberal-secular democracy, independent of and separate from, let alone opposed to, those derived from and inspired primarily by the Enlightenment.

This is paradigmatically epitomized by Jefferson and to a lesser degree Franklin, Madison, and other US founders either directly or indirectly influenced by this intellectual revolution and pursuing its ideals and values through political action like the American Revolution and materializing them in social institutions and rules, including the Constitution (Archer 2001; Byrne 1997; Patell 2001). These values and institutions are simply far from being as uniquely or native “American” as apple pie but instead originally Enlightenment and in that sense “old” European or “foreign,” creations and legacies.

### *Enlightenment vs. Pre- and Anti-Enlightenment American Values*

The preceding evidently holds true solely or mainly of liberal-democratic values and institutions as represented and embodied by Jefferson and colleagues in America. These values are to be distinguished from and opposed to and by their antiliberal or conservative and undemocratic, notably theocratic, forms rooted in Puritanism (Munch 2001) and in extension Calvinism and other sectarian and fundamentalist Protestantism (Jenness 2004; Lindsay 2008; Lipset 1996). The latter, like religious conservatism overall, including Catholic and Islamic, has typically been and remains essentially a sort of pre- and counter-Enlightenment (Habermas 1989a; Juergensmeyer 2003; Nisbet 1966) and consequently pre- and antiliberalism in general (Burns 1990; Mannheim 1986). Simply, if America is as an ideal or reality the “land of freedom” as the highest and most cherished “American” value, it is primarily because of the Jeffersonian Enlightenment-inspired liberal ideals, values, and institutions of universal liberty, justice, and equality. Enlightenment influences have almost invariably been and remain, with some exceptions, as during the American Revolution against a common adversary, in tension with and attacked, including through culture wars, by the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, spanning from theocratic Puritanism to repressive neoconservatism, including theocratic “reborn” fundamentalism and/or “godly” neofascism (Archer 2001; Byrne 1997; Juergensmeyer 2003; Munch 2001).

Conversely, America as the “land of freedom” is a kind of “impossibility theorem” (Arrow 1950), an impossible ideal, just a dream or social reality without these Enlightenment-inspired liberal-democratic values and institutions. This seems a plausible proposition and probable expectation unless one claims that America’s pre-Enlightenment and preliberal phase like New England’s Puritan “Biblical Commonwealth” was really such an oasis of liberty a la a “shining city upon a hill” rather than the “most totalitarian” (Stivers 1994) Calvinist theocracy (Munch 2001) within the Protestant “Christian” world, thus “anything but,” as Puritanism claimed, the “Body of Liberties.” Recall that the Puritan code of the “Body of Liberties” was officially a system of “Christian liberty” (Dayton 1999). It was thus from the prism of the Enlightenment and its project of liberal-secular democracy effectively ersatz-liberty, simply what Americans would call a theocratic or hypocritical “joke of liberties,” hardly worth the paper on which it was printed for “infidels,” including

non-Christians such as Native Americans and nonbelievers and other or dissenting Christians like Catholics and Quakers. In this sense, by contrast to its colonial phase pervaded by pre- and counter-Enlightenment Calvinist Puritanism (Bremer 1995), revolutionary and postrevolutionary America, at least in its Jeffersonian ideal of liberty, equality, justice, life, and happiness “for all,” is the true creation or reflection of the Enlightenment’s liberal-secular, egalitarian, equitable, and universalistic values and ideals.

At this juncture, the American Revolution, at the minimum its Jeffersonian project, appears, as does even more its French counterpart (e.g., on the account of Condorcet’s direct prominent role), as Pareto’s “daughter” of the Enlightenment, at least its “distant cousin.” This sociologically identifies the Enlightenment as the underlying inspiration or the extant rationale (Byrne 1997) minimally for Jefferson and in part Franklin, Madison, and Paine, even if not for the other less Enlightenment-influenced and more religious or theocratic, notably New England’s Puritan, revolutionaries. Recall the Enlightenment represents originally and primarily a Western European phenomenon subsequently and partially transplanted in America by, first of all, Jefferson (Archer 2001; Patell 2001), as well as Franklin and Paine, experiencing first-hand its epicenter Paris salons (Byrne 1997), and indirectly by Madison. In turn, like in Europe, construed as “ungodly,” as well as “foreign” or “un-American,” the Enlightenment in America initially faced the deep hostility and vehement opposition of, and yet it transiently superseded or “disestablished,” at least during post-revolutionary times, the pre- and counter-Enlightenment, notably Calvinist Puritanism with its theocratic design and system of a “Biblical Commonwealth” ruled by *mixt aristocracie* (Bremer 1995) or predestined “heavenly” oligarchy (Zaret 1989; Gould 1996). In turn, the Enlightenment’s transient overcoming of the counter-Enlightenment was signaled by the Jeffersonian disestablishing of Puritan theocracy as the Calvinist Congregational Church in New England (and its Anglican version in Virginia) during postrevolutionary times, including its “final eradication in Massachusetts in 1833” (Gould 1996), thus a full half century after the largely secular or nontheocratic American Revolution.

As is known, the anti-Enlightenment hostility and opposition was exemplified by established Puritanism’s or Calvinist orthodoxy’s vociferous attack on Jefferson as “wicked” (Baldwin 2006; German 1995), “atheist,” and “un-American” (Gould 1996) and attempted reversal of his Enlightenment-inspired political reforms, notably the “wall of eternal separation between church and state.” For example, as the result of anti-Enlightenment attacks and reversals, New England’s archaic Puritan-religious tests for political office reportedly persists in America “long after the passage of Thomas Jefferson’s landmark 1786 Act for Establishing Religious Freedom” (Dayton 1999) through the Constitutional prohibition of “government promotion of religion,” thus despite such practices, especially persisting in the “Bible Belt,” being evidently unconstitutional (as the Supreme Court declared in the 1960s).

In a way, such tests have persisted until the early twenty-first century in various open or covert forms. These span from (paraphrasing) “nonbelievers need not apply for office” or “thou shall recognize the existence of divinity” atavistic and irrational (“dumb”) laws in the “Bible Belt” and other “red” states excluding and discriminating

against atheists, agnostics, secularists, and liberals in politics and society (Edgell et al. 2006) to federal presidential inaugurations<sup>41</sup> using the Bible and prayer, a ubiquitous ritual at virtually all public occasions, from Congress to sports and cultural events, and similar practices. All these are essentially theocratic vestiges of the pre-Enlightenment Puritan era as the “golden past” or “paradise lost” to be retrieved or found by the conservative anti-Enlightenment, yet the “dead hand of the past” (Harrod 1956) for Jefferson and Madison that would like turn, though perhaps not surprise, them in their graves, just as a ghost or “spectre” (Seed 2005) for Hume revealing Puritanism’s “wretched fanaticism.” Furthermore, such Puritan-era theocratic tests have been “rejuvenated” through “faith-based” innovations like the 1954 “one nation, indivisible under God” addition as the reflex of McCarthyism and the Cold War “godly” hysteria, the “in God We Trust” novelty; so, presumably, every American “thou shall trust” or else, including if not execution as during Puritanism, exclusion from and discrimination in politics and civil society. These and similar “innovations” are anti-Enlightenment paleo- and neoconservative, notably fundamentalist, reversals of Jefferson-Madison’s Enlightenment-inspired ideas and legacies, such as ending the religious test for politics and generally prohibiting the “government promotion of religion” and erecting the “wall of separation between church and state,” that would even more likely turn and shock them in their graves.

To that extent, both pre-Enlightenment Puritan archaic vestiges and anti-Enlightenment conservative “innovations” deliberately undermine and ridicule Jefferson’s “wall” of separation between church and state and consequently render the Constitutional prohibition of “government promotion of religion” hardly worth the paper on which it is substantively written by Jefferson and Madison inspired by the Enlightenment. Generally, from the stance of the Enlightenment’s ideal of liberal-secular democracy and society, virtually all pre- and anti-Enlightenment or pre-liberal and anti-liberal, including Catholic, Protestant, Islamic, conservative, fascist, and communist, constitutions are *not* worth the paper on which are written

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<sup>41</sup>It is striking that during Presidential inaugurations, apart from the ubiquitous prayer, US presidents take “oath of office” by holding the Bible and *not* the Constitution as if they solemnly promised or were expected to uphold the first but not the second (or both?) in what it is supposed to be secular democracy with *no* “government promotion of religion” by a “wall of separation” between church and state. One wonders if such religious rituals, including the ever-present prayer, are not “government promotion of religion,” then what is among modern Western democracies, but apparently what Weber calls Puritanism’s “pure hypocrisy” lives on in “American democracy” *cum* pre- and anti-Enlightenment “faith-based” politics. At this point, such “godly” rituals make the constitutional proclamation prohibiting “government promotion of religion” in America hardly worth the paper on which it is written from the prism of the Enlightenment’s project and system of modern liberal-secular democracy, as are worthless most proclamations of most pre- and anti-Enlightenment (e.g., Puritan, Islamic, and other religious, and conservative-fascist) constitutions a la establishing Christian and Islamic “liberty.” They also deliberately undermine and make a ridicule of Jefferson’s “eternal wall of separation” between church and state. Like most “godly” or “faith-based” elements in US politics, this long-standing and venerable tradition is a vestige or reflex of pre-Enlightenment Puritan theocracy and times, which apparently even Jefferson’s Enlightenment-inspired ideas and reforms could not eradicate and relegate to Mannheim’s “dead past” or Hume’s “ghost” of Puritanism.



in virtue of establishing Christian, Islamic, conservative, fascist, and communist “liberties” as what Mises calls bogus, or anything but, liberty. The only genuine, namely comprehensive, universal, and enduring form of liberty is, as he implies, that established in Enlightenment-based liberal-secular democracy and society.

At any rate, on both pre- and anti-Enlightenment accounts, by rejecting the “government promotion of religion” and erecting a “wall” of separation between church and state, Jefferson’s implied diagnosis of the Puritan religious test for politics, like Weber’s of Calvinist conditions for modern capitalism, as *caput mortuum* is premature or overly optimistic in accordance with Enlightenment optimism or liberal hope. Simply, the “rumors of the death” of both pre- and anti-Enlightenment, Puritan-conservative “godly politics” in America seem “greatly exaggerated” by the early twenty-first century in spite or because of, i.e., in adverse reaction to, Jefferson’s removal of such tests and erecting a “wall of separation between church and state.”

Therefore, “American,” specifically liberal-democratic, ideals, values, and institutions, notably universal liberty, equality and justice, and secular democracy, are essentially derived from and inspired by the Enlightenment through its Jeffersonian appropriation and realization. In this sense, these values and institutions are “Western” rather than exclusively, uniquely, and newly “American” to be invidiously distinguished and ethnocentrically opposed as “superior” to those “non-American,” including even “West European,” as “old” (e.g., “feudal”) and “inferior” (Lipset and Marks 2000). Conversely, in a way there is perhaps *no* such thing as truly “American” pre- and counter- or non-Enlightenment values and institutions, as exemplified by Puritan theocracy and its various Great and small fundamentalist “awakenings,” in virtue of being opposite to a liberal-democratic and pluralist society (Munch 2001) as the Jeffersonian ideal of America as the land of universal liberty, equality, justice, well-being, life, and happiness. As Jefferson and colleagues put it, Enlightenment ideals and institutions in virtue of being axiomatically liberal-democratic, egalitarian, rationalistic, and humanistic, are quintessentially “American.” Alternatively, they might add that truly “American” values and institutions, in the sense of America as the “land of freedom, equality, and justice for all,” are primarily those of the liberal-democratic, egalitarian, and humanistic Enlightenment. At least this is what this work has tried to argue and show.

The preceding casts doubt on the penchant of superpatriotic US sociologists and economists, as well as politicians and most ordinary Americans, to define and appropriate (“borrow”) these and virtually all other cherished values and institutions as uniquely or only “American” in an invidious distinction from and ethnocentric dismissal of “non-American,” including “European” and by implication those of its Enlightenment. It thus puts a question mark on their implicitly grounding America’s beloved ideals in a sort of pre- and counter-Enlightenment, specifically in theocratic medievalism and religious conservatism, preceding and succeeding the Enlightenment, respectively (Dunn and Woodard 1996; Nisbet 1966).

Instead, the present work traces America’s, specifically Jeffersonian, values and institutions of a liberal-democratic, secular, pluralist, egalitarian, and rationalistic society, primarily to the European Enlightenment as appropriated and “imported” literally or figuratively from Paris by Jefferson and in part Franklin and Paine, just

as it does modern Western and other democracies and free societies. Hence, an Enlightenment-based society reveals itself as the “true” or “genuine” (“bright”) nature of America from the stance of modern liberal-democratic societies, in particular the Jeffersonian ideal of universal liberty and secular democracy. Conversely, this work identifies or suspects the “other” (“ugly” or “dark”) side of America in the pre- and counter-Enlightenment, specifically theocratic Puritanism and its heir revived sectarian and fundamentalist Protestantism, simply religious conservatism (Lipset 1996). From the stance of the Enlightenment, the “other America” is the design and social system opposite and destructive to liberal-democratic, secular, and pluralist society (Munch 2001), in essence pre- or anti-Enlightenment “American theocracy” (Phillips 2006) in the form of a “godly community” (German 1995) of Puritan-like saints and sinners-as-criminals in total Winthrop’s style “subjection” and after the image of a “Biblical Garden” (Gould 1996). Adopting the concept of and rediscovering the “two Americas” in sociological terms,<sup>42</sup> this work primarily deals with “Enlightenment, liberal, democratic America” as epitomized and symbolized by Jefferson and colleagues, and secondarily with “pre- and anti-Enlightenment, illiberal, undemocratic America” represented and exemplified by the Puritan master Winthrop and his theocratic and conservative heirs and admirers, including Reagan and colleagues, for the sake of comparison and contrast.

Alternatively, since this analysis treats modern Western and other democracies and their constitutive values and institutions as primarily founded on the Enlightenment,

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<sup>42</sup>The concept of “two Americas” is to be credited to a US atypically liberal-secular and enlightened or intellectual, as different from anti-intellectual “plain talk,” politician from, of all places, the “Southern Bible Belt,” who proposed and used it mostly in the sense of a sharp economic divide, the “rich America” vs. the “other America.” While such politicians (despite, as typical for Puritan America, their political careers being ruined because of their “immoral” private lives) come most closely to be the modern variants or proxies of Jefferson and his Enlightenment ideals in America, this concept of “two Americas” is explicitly economic, so too narrow for broader, sociological purposes. The present work redefines and broadens the concept from the stance of the Enlightenment to yield the antinomy of “Enlightenment and liberal-democratic-secular America” and “anti-Enlightenment and illiberal-undemocratic-theocratic America,” simply American “liberal democracy” and “American theocracy” (Phillips 2006). It thus understands the concept in broader sociological terms by extending it to encompass a comprehensive societal, including political, civic, cultural, as well as economic, divide and conflict between the “two Americas.” In Durkheim-Parsons’ terms, the “two Americas” is applied to (divisions in) America as a “total social system,” including economy, polity, civil society, and culture as its subsystems, not only to its economic subsystem. In other words, the “two Americas” reflect America’s “Janus face” in both economic and non-economic terms, as a variation on the “two faces” of modern Western society in general (Duverger 1972). And, perhaps no modern Western society is or looks more “Janus faced,” i.e., both liberal and illiberal or free and repressive, democratic and undemocratic or theocratic, open and closed, inclusive and exclusive, egalitarian and anti-egalitarian, just and unjust, than America. For instance, a French official said (following the arrest of a film director in Switzerland in 2009 on the US international warrant for having illicit sex in 1978) “in the same way that there is a generous America that we like, there is also a scary America that has just shown its face” (adding that thereby the artist was “thrown to the lions”). In our terms, the “generous” reflects Enlightenment and liberal-democratic-secular Jeffersonian America, and the “scary” anti-Enlightenment and conservative-repressive-theocratic Puritan (Winthrop’s) America.

it would be an illogical non sequitur and, more importantly, the substantive sociological fallacy of “misplaced concreteness” to treat America’s in a different way. This is the fallacy of treating America and its defining elements of universal liberty, equality, justice, life, happiness, and democracy as instead based in other social factors like the pre- and counter-Enlightenment, particularly theocratic Puritanism and its offspring authoritarian conservatism, respectively. This holds true until and unless one claims, as do US ethnocentric analysts and most politicians, some American democratic, libertarian, and individualistic “exceptionalism” as triumphalism (Lipset and Marks 2000) as a religious-like creed (Lipset 1996), civil religion (Beck 2000; Munch 2001), basically an “hackneyed” belief (Wacquant 2002) in institutional and cultural “superiority”<sup>43</sup> (Allen 2008) or unenlightened, ignorant-arrogant “kind of hubris” (Berman 2000).

From the prism of the transnational, cosmopolitan Enlightenment (Beck 2000; Habermas 2001) and its liberal-democratic, individualistic, egalitarian, rationalistic, universalistic, and humanistic principles, it is logically contradictory and historically incorrect to claim American and any other national exceptionalism or exclusivity in liberty, equality, justice, the pursuit of life and happiness, democracy, universalism, individualism, rationalism, and humanism. Alternatively, from this stance, it is logically consistent and empirically plausible to posit, to paraphrase Parsons, the American, more precisely Jeffersonian, and other national convergence on, or rather adoption of, the Enlightenment-rooted and championed ideals and values of universal liberty, equality, justice, reason, life, happiness, social progress, and democracy. This involves a convergence on the complete or partial realization of these ideals in corresponding social institutions and practices in the form of a liberal-democratic, egalitarian, just, secular, pluralist, rationalistic, and humane society.

### ***The Enlightenment and American Liberal-Democratic Values***

As a corollary of the above, the Enlightenment provides the direct or indirect foundation and inspiration in particular for “American” liberal-democratic *cum* “Western” cherished ideals, values, and institutions, notably universal liberty, equality, justice, well-being, life, and happiness. It does by the agency of Jefferson, Franklin, Madison and Paine, and their first- and second-hand experience and transmission of and inspiration by the Enlightenment as a cultural revolution and its ideals from Europe, mostly France or Paris, to prerevolutionary and revolutionary America. In this sense, these and other “American” liberal-democratic values and institutions are not uniquely or native “American” in the sense of being independent of, let alone different from and opposite to, “Western European” ones. Rather, they are essentially the ideals and legacies of the Enlightenment as their primary and

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<sup>43</sup> Allen (2008:969) objects that various sociological as well as biological “arguments for the superiority of Anglo-American culture make the differences between the West and the East unbridgeable and a source of perpetual conflict.”

strongest source and their point of origin, alongside, in part, the Renaissance as its anticipation. Simply, there *is* such thing as American-Enlightenment values and institutions in their liberal-democratic, egalitarian, pluralistic, secular non-theocratic, rationalistic, universalistic, peaceful, and humanistic forms. Conversely, there is *no* such thing as purely “American” ideals and values independent, separate, and different (as often alleged) from or opposite to the Enlightenment and its Western modernity. This holds true except for illiberal, undemocratic, and theocratic designs and values originating in pre- and counter-Enlightenment Puritanism and other religious conservatism, as the creator or extant source of the illiberal “other” America. This is the “dark side of the moon” of oppression, coercion, Draconian punishment (including the death penalty and life imprisonment for sins-crimes), inequality, injustice, exclusion, discrimination, theocracy, militarism, offensive wars, destruction, and individual and mass death. Hence it is the medieval-like darkness of the (patho)logical ultimate “delirium of total annihilation” *cum* Calvinist “salvation”<sup>44</sup> (Adorno 2001; also, Smelser and Mitchell 2002) in the judgment-day image of fundamentalist Armageddon (Juergensmeyer 2003) through a MAD (mutually assured destruction) outcome (Habermas 2001; Schelling 2006) of a “preemptive” nuclear or other war of extermination against the “evil” world.

If America is the social system or project of liberty, equality, justice, and happiness “for all,” then “Enlightenment” and “American” values and institutions are substantively identical and interchangeable, as Jefferson et al. argue or imply, given their very origin and fullest articulation, promotion, and development in the Enlightenment. Conversely, on this supposition, pre- and counter-Enlightenment, including Puritan and other sectarian, theocratic, and conservative, and “American” liberal-democratic values and institutions are as polar opposites or distant as “heaven and earth.” In sociological terms, it is an opposition of social un-freedom, ignorance, superstition, prejudice, darkness, unreason, war, destruction, and death after the image of “Salem with witches” (Putnam 2000) and “Monkey trials” (Boles 1999) against liberty, reason, knowledge, science, happiness, wellbeing, progress, peace, and humane life in society, respectively. After all, this is suggested by the eighteenth century “European Enlightenment theories about degeneracy in the New World” (Gould 1996), especially New England under tyrannical theocratic mastery (Munch 2001; Stivers 1994) by pre- and anti-Enlightenment Puritanism (Bremer 1995).

In general, within the context of modern liberal-democratic, pluralistic, and secular society (Munch 2001) as the “child” of the Enlightenment, sociologically, as distinguished from geographically, only or mostly Enlightenment-based values and institutions originate, exist, or matter rather than specific national or geographic, including “American,” “French,” “British,” or “German” ones as its particular expressions. After all, while taking place within a definite space and time setting like Western Europe, notably France, and radiating beyond, including America, the

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<sup>44</sup>Smelser and Mitchell (2002:32) remark that “glorification of and personal salvation through violence is not limited to Islamic terrorists. Salvation as a voluntary martyr to violence or suffering has a religious history with roots in the theology of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, as well as analogs in Buddhism.”

Enlightenment is essentially a paradigmatic global and cosmopolitan vision (Beck 2000; Habermas 2001) and transnational cultural revolution, as are its ideals, achievements, and legacies. For instance, Voltaire, Condorcet and Saint Simon, Hume and Smith, and Kant and Hegel, as well as Jefferson, regarded and defined the Enlightenment as a pan-European and even global process and movement, rather than narrowly “French,” “British” (English and Scottish), “German” or “American,” respectively, although it reached the fullest development and expression in these countries, especially France and Great Britain (Scotland). In particular, Hume regarded himself as part of Europe’s rather than of Great Britain’s or Scotland’s Enlightenment and intellectual scene, with his perspective and experience being “European rather than narrowly Scottish and British”<sup>45</sup> (Berry 1997). In this sense, as Hume and Kant imply, claiming exclusively “French,” “British,” “German,” or “American” values and institutions is an ethnocentric non sequitur within modern liberal-democratic society as its “child,” for they are more accurately considered those of the Western Enlightenment or their own respective versions of it. To claim so by invoking some exceptional or superior American, French, British, and other “national character” or genius (the German *Folkgeist*) as the source of such values and institutions reveals what Weber calls a “mere confession of ignorance.” Furthermore, as Western and other history shows, such claims are the symptom of nationalism and ultimately the rationale for militarism and imperialism, including what Spencer calls offensive and imperial<sup>46</sup> (Abbott 2005) wars as Clausewitz’s “continuation” of nationalistic politics against other societies by “other means” in the function of British, German, French, or American “empire” (Steinmetz 2005). For instance, such wars are the “continuation” of the “typical US imperial strategy” of imperialism (“indirect empire”) involving “the creation of dependent but autonomous regimes” (Steinmetz 2008) by “high-tech” means. The latter range from new generations of “nukes” to pilotless drones and to future robots-soldiers, exploiting and perverting science and technology for the sake of global military dominance and ultimately destruction or subjugation of humans, both non-Americans and Americans as the path to realizing America’s “manifest destiny” or Calvinist “salvation” through the Puritan-style “delirium of total annihilation” (Adorno 2001) in the form of a MAD nuclear or other catastrophe (Habermas 2001; Schelling 2006).

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<sup>45</sup>In Hume’s words, in Great Britain “some hate me because I am not a Tory, some because I am not a Whig, some because I am not a Christian and all because I am Scotsman” (cited in Berry 1997:18). This perhaps helps to explain his “European experience” (including his living in Paris) and perspective.

<sup>46</sup>Abbott (2005:270) observes that “in the current imperial situation, the US military must maintain a complex set of strategic outputs ranging from nuclear deterrence to preparedness for major conventional war to the long list of quasi-warfare activities characteristic of imperial militaries [to keep] the United States hegemonic.” Steinmetz (2005:350–1) remarks that “American empire, especially since 1945, has been oriented toward a total ‘domination of sea and air’ in the interest of the free movement of capital, commodities, and people and the stabilization of conditions within the [global division of spheres of influence], and not toward claims to new territory,” notably the “existence of a dense web of US military installations in more than 140 countries around the globe.”

Hence, to preempt impressions of “anti-Americanism,” what is proposed about uniquely “American” liberal-democratic values and institutions independent of the Enlightenment as a primarily European phenomenon, and conditioned by pre- and counter-Enlightenment, such as Puritan Protestantism and conservatism, holds for those claimed to be exclusively “French,” “British,” or “German.” These notions of national democratic values and institutions are non sequiturs, at best incomplete “truths,” as Hume, Kant, Condorcet, Voltaire, Saint Simon, etc. testify, in the original framework of the transnational global or cosmopolitan, namely pan-European Enlightenment, thus its child modern liberal-democratic society. The Enlightenment is truly “a pan-European” intellectual movement ushering in or linked with the “modern state, republics and parliamentary regimes” because of its promotion of “religious tolerance, economic liberalism, modernization of the state, judicial and fiscal reform,” and its reevaluating of humans by a “more optimistic and secular view of the destiny of man” (Saisselin 1992).

In summary, the Enlightenment’s values and institutions express and realize themselves in these particular national forms and contexts, including the American. Conversely, these latter converge (“load” in factor-analysis terms) on the former as the general type, global vision, and transnational phenomenon. This puts in a proper framework and helps to understand the seemingly surprising (for most Americans), dubious, or “shocking” proposition that America’s most cherished values and institutions like universal liberty, equality, justice, life, happiness, and democracy are not uniquely “American” in a sociological sense, but rather those of the transnational Enlightenment, including its Jeffersonian transmission from the “old world” to the “new nation,” literally from Paris to Philadelphia (Patell 2001), thus truly American only in the derivative sense of “Western.”

## **Appendix: Critics and Skeptics of the Enlightenment**

While its conservative-fascist enemies attack and destroy the Enlightenment and its liberalism by “fire and sword,” including anti-Enlightenment and antiliberal religious-like crusades or culture wars, as in America under conservatism, its critics or skeptics deconstruct its nature and effects by “water and word,” just as its members “deconstructed” the medieval pre-Enlightenment in their way. An early and perhaps best known form of this deconstruction or critique of the Enlightenment is what Hegel conceived as the “dialectic” of the Enlightenment or enlightenment generally, a conception adopted and expanded by later critical sociological theory (the Frankfurt School). Recall this conception posits an inner contradiction or opposition between the positive and negative, “good” and “bad” elements, tendencies, and outcomes, thus the “dialectic” of the eighteenth century Enlightenment and any rational enlightenment (Hinchman 1984; Schmidt 1996). This indicates Hegel’s dual reconstruction and deconstruction, appreciation and critique of the Enlightenment and rational enlightenment overall, and its consequences like its beneficial or intended results and harmful or unintended side-effects, achievements and failures, promises and frustrations, hopes and disappointments. On this account, Hegel’s critique was part of a “process of

self-criticism” within the Enlightenment itself (Cascardi 1999), thus closer to, just as critical of, Kant than to Burke, de Maistre, and other sworn conservative-romanticist enemies of the Enlightenment and its political expression, the French Revolution.

Thus, a historical study suggests that Hegel regarded the Enlightenment (and rational enlightenment defined in terms of “self-conscious individuality”) as setting the “foundations for political freedom” as “freedom within the state” through the “the conception of man as a universal being” with an “inherently infinite worth” grounding “his claim to rights and human dignity on ‘natural’ grounds rather than on the traditional order of a given society” (Hinchman 1984:2). In this view, for Hegel “the ‘sunlit’ side of the Enlightenment,” manifested in its “emphasis on reason and autonomy and opposition to religious and political tyranny,” was “inseparable from its dark side, gloomy acquiescence in [humans as] mere machine[s] propelled onward by inscrutable drives toward an ever-receding *fata morgana* of satisfaction,” thus reflecting the “dialectic of enlightenment” overall (Hinchman 1984:8). Admittedly, Hegel’s intent is the “quest to preserve and enhance the ‘human rights’ tradition of the Enlightenment while detaching it from what he saw as its crudely inadequate image of man”<sup>47</sup> (Hinchman 1984:8–9). This analysis concludes that for Hegel “appreciating the limitations of rational thought as defined by the Enlightenment does not mean jettisoning rationality altogether [or] reason [as] a part of the universalizing and formative activity [of] spirit”<sup>48</sup> (Hinchman 1984:254).

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<sup>47</sup>Hinchman (1984:9) adds that Hegel shows that “the atomized, desiring self depicted by the Enlightenment is a necessary and yet incomplete representation of man in the modern world. The ‘natural’ man depicted by liberal theorists is actually the creature of the historical collectivity [i.e., all] that is really human arises out of [the] interaction with society and the state.” In this view, Hegel portrays the “starting point of the Enlightenment’s social philosophy as the result of a long process of civilization and spiritual development,” while the “opposition between a critical, rigorous, but somewhat narrowly defined and reductionistic rationality and the self-expressive cults of faith and feeling introduces the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’” (Hinchman 1984:253) generally.

<sup>48</sup>Hinchman (1984:259) comments that the political right is “suspicious of an effective and omniscient [Hegelian] state because it fears that such a state might become ‘socialistic’ and try to redistribute wealth. Indeed, the principle Hegel defended [an effective state run by a professional, well-educated elite with wide powers to control civil society] was far more prescient and accurate than [the Jeffersonian] faith in popular virtue and *laissez-faire*.” This view identifies the “underlying agreement between Hegel and certain neo-Hamiltonians [in modern] America on the fundamental ‘rationality’ and appropriateness of the state’s enhanced role in our lives. The Hamiltonians [like Hegel] tend to see local and private-sector tyranny, the dominance of the strong over the weak, as at least as much of a threat to basic human rights and liberties as the power of a rationally organized and intelligently run state” (Hinchman 1984:260). Hence Hinchman (1984:261) infers that “since in many cases real injustices and failings of civil society were the efficient causes of the bureaucracies creation, to abolish them may frequently mean reinstating those same old injustices or at a minimum closing one’s eyes to serious problems, thus allowing them to get worse and worse.” In turn, he suggests that by regarding the “egoism and self-absorption characteristic of a modern democracy [as] the most fertile soil” for despotism, Tocqueville makes the “proper Jeffersonian response to Hegel’s Hamiltonianism” (Hinchman 1984:262). Hinchman (1984:263) concludes that Hegel (like Hamiltonians), “turned to the state because he saw the defects in other institutions designed to achieve the good (contracts, morality, family, civil society). In a crisis, these citizens are the only hope and support for a ‘rational’ state. Without them, it will degenerate into a mere machine of coercion or collapse like a house of cards.”

Another study also identifies Hegel's "dialectic of enlightenment" as expressed in his view that the "universal freedom that the Enlightenment brought into the world culminates in a 'fury of destruction'"<sup>49</sup> (Schmidt 1996:21). Admittedly, the Enlightenment "task was to create political institutions that could be reconciled with the principle that, for him, represented the irrevocable achievement of the modern age: the freedom of the individual [and] the development of that uniquely modern domain [of] 'civil society'" (Schmidt 1996:22). Yet, what indicates its dialectic is that this "apparent triumph of enlightenment over mythology, like the triumph of enlightenment over faith [in Hegel] turns out to be only a struggle of enlightenment with itself" (Schmidt 1996:23). In sum, its dialectic consists in that the Enlightenment "routs superstition and obscurity, [yet] corrodes the substantive principles that had once served as incentives to progress [or] checks on barbarism. Once reason has become a mere instrument, it serves whatever power deploys it" (Schmidt 1996:24), just as by analogy the "dialectic of the counter-enlightenment" is also detected in such other critics as Nietzsche<sup>50</sup> (also, Trey 1998).

Also, a sociological analysis restates Hegel's critique that by placing "instrumental rationality in the place of reason, the Enlightenment pursued an idolatry of reason," revealing the "dialectic" of enlightenment (Habermas 2001:135). In short, Hegel's "dialectic" of enlightenment is "truncated" in that "instrumental rationality is inflated into an unreasonable whole" (Habermas 2001:141). Apparently, this view situates Hegel's critical "dialectic" within the Enlightenment rather (or more) than in the romanticist and other anti-Enlightenment à la Burke et al. Similarly, another study regards Hegel's critique as belonging to "a process of self-criticism originate[d] within the Enlightenment [or] the critical Enlightenment project" (Cascardi 1999:5–12). In this view, Hegel's "peculiar restlessness and dispersion of modern consciousness," contrasted to the ethical life of the Greek polis, "constitute

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<sup>49</sup>Schmidt (1996:21) cites Hegel's statement that "one might say of the [anti-Enlightenment] Estates [in Germany] what has been said of the returned [anti-revolutionary] French émigrés: they have forgotten nothing and learnt nothing."

<sup>50</sup>Schmidt (1996:25) identifies Nietzsche's "dialectic of the counterenlightenment" in the sense that his goal was that of "disentangling the eighteenth century Enlightenment from its complicity with democratic revolutions," stating "it is not Voltaire's moderate nature, but Rousseau's passionate follies and half-lies that called forth the optimistic spirit of Revolution against which I cry: 'Ecrasez l'infame!.' In this view, For Nietzsche the Enlightenment 'addressed itself only to the individual' (vs.) the shallowness and the commonness of the egalitarian dreams of the French Revolution" (Schmidt 1996:25). Arguably, Nietzsche's "dialectic of the counterenlightenment": all attempts to resist enlightenment paradoxically turn out only to serve the cause of further enlightenment [i.e., the] secret complicity between enlightenment and counterenlightenment (viz.) counterenlightenment may serve the cause of enlightenment (while) enlightenment will lead to a new obscurantism. "Every victory of enlightenment was also a triumph of a new and insidious form of domination [Foucault]" (Schmidt 1996:26). The study infers a "complicity between enlightenment and domination" in that the Enlightenment "meant above all else having the courage to reinvent oneself," with the "most unsettling of all enlightenment schemes" being Bentham's *Panopticon* (Schmidt 1996:27–8). Also, Trey (1998:3) poses the question (referring to Habermas) of how modernity's "counter-discourses" such as Romanticism and Marxism "evolved into post-discourses that rely heavily upon Nietzsche's analysis of modernity."



a failed attempt to reverse the process of Enlightenment if only because they attempt to ignore the process of self-reflection by which their own critical consciousness was produced”<sup>51</sup> (Cascardi 1999:40).

Echoing Hegel and other prior critics of the Enlightenment (e.g., Nietzsche), some critical theorists wonder how its “great movement of rationalization led us to so much noise, so much rage, so much silence and dismal mechanism? [i.e.] to the rage of power?,” asserting that by its story that “our social or economic organization lacked rationality,” modern society finds itself before “surely too much power” (Foucault 1996:390). In this account, the Enlightenment, both in its French and German variants (*Lumières* and *Aufklärung*), was “necessarily linked” to power through “objectivism, positivism, technology,” thus to the link of “some element of knowledge, some mechanism of power”<sup>52</sup> (Foucault 1996:393–4; yet cf., Alexander 2001b).

Most Marxian critics or skeptics of the Enlightenment and generally liberalism adopt or evoke and elaborate on and reinforce the Hegelian “dialectic of enlightenment,” starting from Marx to neo-Marxists. Thus, Marx’s skeptical or critical position on the Enlightenment and liberalism is implied in considering them the products and instruments of the bourgeoisie or the capitalist class, as “bourgeois enlightenment” and “bourgeois liberalism” imposed as “socialistic” on labor. In view of this skepticism, some contemporary sociologists suggest that Marx shows that “there *is* a way to explain the origins, nature, and function of abstraction in economic exchange without succumbing to Enlightenment metaphysics” or “a hyperrationalist Enlightenment” (also invoking Simmel) (Kamolnick 2001).

Elaborating on both Marx and Hegel (and Freud and in part Weber), the Frankfurt School’s critical theory of the “dialectic of enlightenment” is probably the best known neo-Marxist critique of the Enlightenment and liberalism overall. While like Hegel, this critique uses the expression the “dialectic of enlightenment” in general, its prime reference and target, just as his and Marx’s, is the eighteenth century Enlightenment in particular, thus modern liberalism. This often admittedly creates a confusion between the “dialectic of enlightenment” and the “dialectic of

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<sup>51</sup> Cascardi (1999:47) proposes that the “resistance to a deep-structure mapping of the dialectic of Enlightenment can more profitably be replaced by an esthetic critique.”

<sup>52</sup> Foucault (1996:384) proposes that “from the fifteenth century and right before the Reformation [there was] a veritable explosion of the art of governing men (383–4), (viz.) a displacement in relation to its religious source (laicization), an expansion into civil society of [it] and the methods for doing it.” Notably he claims that the “bloc” of the French Enlightenment (*Lumières*) and Revolution “no doubt hindered in a general way this relation of rationalization and power from being really and profoundly called into question” (Foucault 1996:389). In particular, Foucault (1996:389) asserts that “perhaps, too, the fact that the Reformation [as the first critical movement in the way of the art of not being governed] did not have in France the fullness and success it knew in Germany [signified] that in France this notion of *Aufklärung* [had no] great a significance, and [also] never took hold of a historical reference with as long a range as in Germany [*sic*].” However, Alexander (2001b:371), registering Foucault’s “postmodern inversion of Enlightenment rationality,” comments that “there is, in fact, a real universalizing strand of ‘modern’ discourse [i.e.] at once democratic, Western, and Axial in origin – allows knowledge to be separated from power, contra Foucault. Only such a separation can leave open the possibility for the critical thinking and action that create justice.”

the Enlightenment” (Cascardi 1999), to be solved by using the context of its statements to identify the precise meaning of the subject, general or particular.

First and foremost, echoing Hegel as well as Weber, this critical theory posits that (the) “Enlightenment’s program” was the “disenchantment of the world” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:1) and a “frozen dialectic” in the form of a “destructive developmental cycle”<sup>53</sup> (Habermas 2001). Moreover, in this view, (the) Enlightenment “stands in the same relationship to things as the dictator to human beings,” more specifically it “dissolves away the injustice of the old inequality of unmediated mastery, but at the same time perpetuates it” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:6–8). Particularly, the critique agrees (with Hegel) that “the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century [was] inexorable,” expressing the same character of the “movement of thought itself.” Focusing on the eighteenth century Enlightenment, it contends that due to the (capitalist) use (and abuse) of the latter “the paradox of faith degenerates finally into fraud, the myth of the twentieth century and faith’s irrationality into rational organization in the hands of the utterly enlightened as they steer society toward barbarism” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:15). Furthermore, this view claims that (the) Enlightenment “is totalitarian as only a system can be” through its (mythical) quest for “domination of the world” to the point of “mythic terror” stemming from a “horror of myth”<sup>54</sup> (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:18–22). While it admits that the “essence” of (the) Enlightenment is the inescapable “choice between alternatives” (leading to the “inescapability” of power), the critique charges that with the spread of capitalism “the dark horizon of myth is illuminated by the sun of calculating reason, beneath whose icy rays the seeds of the new barbarism are germinating” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:25). Evoking Marx, it objects that (the) Enlightenment in its “bourgeois form” was over-determined by its “positivism” and consequently “never immune to confusing freedom with the business of self-preservation” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:32).

Further, the critique charges that (the) Enlightenment is “destructive” through the “self-destructive tendency of Reason” consisting in the “positivistic dissolution of metaphysical concepts up to the concept of Reason itself” (Horkheimer 1996:366). For instance, describing (the) Enlightenment as “the progressive technical domination” of nature and society, the critique objects that the “total effect of the culture industry is one of anti-enlightenment” in that enlightenment “becomes mass deception and is turned into a means for fettering consciousness” (Adorno 1991). In turn, the critique suggests that the Enlightenment “will only fulfill itself if it forswears its last complicity with them and dares to abolish the false absolute, the principle of blind power” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:33). In particular, it implies that the Enlightenment can act as the antidote of religion’s and other culture’s “functions of social control” and repression, as “with the deliverance of

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<sup>53</sup>Habermas (2001:139) presents Weber’s “affinity between Protestantism and capitalism” as an instance of the “destructive developmental cycle.”

<sup>54</sup>Horkheimer and Adorno (1993:24) add that generally the “enlightened spirit replaced fire and the wheel by the stigma it attached to all irrationality” and that its hedonism “was moderate, extremes being no less repugnant to enlightenment than to Aristotle.”

Faith from the deadly struggle with secular Reason, much of its original substance seems to have dwindled away” (Horkheimer 1996:360). Finally, admittedly “far from engaging in romanticism, as have so many eminent critics of [the] Enlightenment, we should encourage [the] Enlightenment to move forward even in the face of its most paradoxical consequences” (Horkheimer 1996:366–7). If so, then this suggestion implicitly admits that the “dialectic” or rather its “dark,” negative side is not intrinsic to, but rather results from various, capitalist as well as non-capitalist (“socialist” in Mises-Hayek’s account) abuses, subversions, and distortions or refractions of, the Enlightenment and its ideals. This is also implied in the cogent critical observation that at its center, the “colonizing states” modern law’s “universality rests on a claim to modernity and rationality as it presses forward the agenda of the Enlightenment, now refracted through theories that champion private property rights, the subordination of law to markets, and contraction of the political sphere” (Halliday and Osinsky 2006:456). Overall, an overview infers that the Frankfurt School’s critical theory turns out to “share” with the eighteenth century philosophers and sociologists a “belief in the values of the Enlightenment to shape a more just vision for the future” (Simon 1995:22).

Other Neo-Marxist critical theories of the “dialectic” of the Enlightenment proceed along identical or similar lines. They adopt and emphasize the (Horkheimer-Adorno) “negative side” of (the) Enlightenment as a “result of the conception of reason as domination, which developed from the seventeenth century on” (Simon 1995:4). For instance, a critique in this tradition states that (for Horkheimer and Adorno) the “emancipated society promised by the procedures of Enlightenment – reason’s democratic hope – failed to defend the possibility of reciprocal recognition among subject-selves against the ongoing threats of rationalization, reification, and domination” (Cascardi 1999:4). In this view, the “characterization of that which precedes the Enlightenment as a period of darkness or ignorance marked by superstitions and uncritical beliefs (dogmatism, intolerance, for Kant) fails to acknowledge the historical validity of the beliefs and practices of the ‘pre-Enlightenment’ world. But insofar as the Enlightenment recognizes that it cannot overcome history, it has recourse to the notion of progress. But the Enlightenment notion of progress cannot defend itself against the charge that it may be the product of a distorted reading of the past”<sup>55</sup> (Cascardi 1999:26). The study infers and emphasizes a “self-canceling ‘dialectic of Enlightenment’” (Cascardi 1999:39).

Another critique, though more appreciative, of the Enlightenment, starts with critical theory’s (Adorners) thesis that the latter “slowly got transmuted into

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<sup>55</sup> Cascardi (1999:27) adds that the “interpretation of the Enlightenment’s progressive stance as an ideological ‘distortion’ is reinforced by the fact that it produces only self-serving explanations of what motivates its rejection of the past. Autonomous reason [i.e. constituting itself independently] presents itself as both the product and the cause of progress in history. [Critical theory] question[s] the Enlightenment narrative of progress by representing the process of Enlightenment as incomplete (not in Habermas’ sense of calling for its completion) as a structure that was never fully formed in the separation of reason from myth.” In this view, “everything relegated by the process of Enlightenment to ‘mythical thinking,’ which reason attempts to suppress (superstition, madness, religion, genius, art) was at best repressed” (Cascardi 1999:31).

scientism and positivism” (Berman 2000:107). In this view, the “original freshness and strength of Enlightenment thought was its critical element; but as it became a tool of the existing social and political order, it started to convert the positive values it was elected to defend into ‘something negative and destructive.’ So if political freedom is inseparable from Enlightenment thought, that thought nevertheless contained the seeds of a reversal. For modernity eventually issued out into the commercial society, which became a metaphysics in its own right” (Berman 2000:107). Hence, this critique proposes a “distinction between a ‘good’ Enlightenment and a ‘bad’ one. The former is the Age of Reason, the world of Hume and Voltaire, which gave us our notions of critical analysis. The latter is the modern obsession with quantification, control, and the domination of the natural world,” as identified by critical theory (Adorno, etc.) (Berman 2000:114). It concludes that the “good” and “bad” Enlightenment “are not all that separable; historically, they came as a package deal”<sup>56</sup> (Berman 2000:119). Also, some post-modern social theorists contend that the “sinister potential of the Enlightenment [was] unraveled” by critical theory (Adorno et al.), but admit that the “news of modernity’s death is grossly exaggerated” (Bauman 2001:103; yet cf., Burawoy 2000<sup>57</sup>). Most elements of these critiques have been directly or addressed throughout this work, so it is not necessary to address them at this juncture.

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<sup>56</sup> Expanding on Adorno, Berman (2000:129) object that the Enlightenment “turned into its opposite,” such as “control revolution,” “land of desire,” “McWorld,” which in turn “evoked a series of disturbed responses” like the “New Age, deconstruction, sentimental ecology, religious fundamentalism.” In this view, the “scientism and materialism of Enlightenment civilization [has], under the relentless progress of capitalism, turned that program into the corporate/commercial culture of the twentieth century [e.g.] the phase of McWorld, an era of economic technobrilliance, in which shadow has replaced substance and where the system’s success is actually its failure” (Berman 2000:160).

<sup>57</sup> Burawoy (2000:695) apparently disagrees with the view of postmodernists like Bauman that the “collapse of the Soviet Union signals the collapse of the enlightenment project, of the possibility of a rationally planned society” instead suggesting its viability and defense. Generally, Kloppenberg (1998:105) registers and implicitly defends the “Enlightenment faith in reason of the sort some late twentieth century postmodernists find objectionable.” In another, explicit defense, Callero (2003:117) emphasizes that, for instance, symbolic interactionism’s “commitment to Enlightenment values that privilege reason and rationality are in stark contrast to the postmodern break with the discourse of science.” This view thus contrasts with the claim of post-modern theorists (Derrida, Baudrillard) that “the idea that individuals are in possession of a core, rational, unitary self, endowed with an essential nature and an independent consciousness, is simply a political artifact of the European Enlightenment” (Callero 2003:118). Callero (2003:119) infers that if the Enlightenment values of rationality, reason, and scientific knowledge “are understood to be the discursive foundation of control and domination,” not emancipation, in modern society (as in Foucault), then this is “problematic in that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to theorize the possibility of emancipation through organized resistance and political intervention if actors are conceived to be mere subjects of discourse.” In short, he concludes that the “radical break with Enlightenment ideals has dissolved the foundation of a universal self and eliminated the assumption of an agentic and knowledgeable actor” (Callero 2003:119).

## Chapter 8

# Conclusion

### **A World without Enlightenment Ideals, Achievements, and Legacies**

#### ***The Dark Middle Ages Universalized in Society and Perpetuated into Infinity***

Imagine a society devoid of Enlightenment-based ideals, values, and institutions, a world in which the eighteenth century European Enlightenment never happened or was extinguished by, for example, burning and banning its books, arts, and other intellectual works, as precisely was done by the anti-Enlightenment like Nazism and American conservatism (Hull 1999). In essence, this is the world of the Dark Middle Ages universalized in Western society and self-perpetuated into the relative infinity of millennia in the form of millennial theocracy a la “God’s Kingdom on Earth” or at least the *long durée* of centuries (Braudel 1979). It is either symbolized in the original form by the “holy” Catholic Inquisition and Puritan “Salem with witches” or in a modified shape after the image of an Orwellian dystopia of darkness, dissent and sin as crime, tyranny, persecution, human misery, permanent war *cum* peace, mass death, and ultimately total self-destruction as the path to “heaven” and “salvation,” as committed or prefigured by pre- and anti-Enlightenment religious sects and cults in America and elsewhere.

First, imagine an economy without the Enlightenment and its economic ideas and legacies. Without the latter the economy would still remain a genuine or proxy master-servant economic system in the form of feudal servitude, and humans would continue to be divided into and opposed as masters and servants or slaves, aristocrats and serfs. That this is not a counter-factual hypothesis or speculation but a realistic possibility and even reality is indicated by a master-servant economy in some forms still remains, and humans continue to be divided and opposed as masters and servants, in those societies with a nonexistent or relatively weak Enlightenment experience and legacy relative to the pre- and anti-Enlightenment.

Thus, these contemporary societies with a genuine or proxy feudal-style master-servant economy include most Islamic (except perhaps for Turkey) and other

theocratic non-Western countries based on the pre- and anti-Enlightenment religious ideas and institutions of economic “liberty” and “justice.” They also comprise counter-Jeffersonian America during conservatism up to the early twenty first century and Great Britain until the mid nineteenth century (Steinberg 2003). In pre- and anti-Enlightenment, namely Puritan and conservative America, a feudal-style master-servant economy assumes the form of, alongside slavery, European-style “belated feudalism” (Orren 1991) or “neofeudalism” (Binmore 2001) designated and extolled as “all-American” unfettered capitalism (Fishback 1998), as during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and, with certain modifications, through the early twenty first century. “Neofeudalism” and hence the “new” master-servant economy in America is defined or typified by continuous and, especially in the South, expanding and intensifying conservative procapital, plutocratic and anti-labor, antiunion institutions and policies (Hirsch 2008), including slave-like prison labor in most Southern and other states, from pre- and anti-New Deal times to the early twenty first century, thus making capital and labor the new respective master-servant classes *déjà vu* (Bourdieu 1998). It is also defined or typified by the fact that one percent of the population owns about 50% of national, especially financial, wealth, as in America during the 1920s and the 2000s (Wolff 2002), as they did in the old European feudalism (Lenski 1984), a ratio that becomes a statistical definition or approximation of a feudal master-servant economy, thus objectively transforming conservative “unfettered capitalism” into the latter. Similarly, in neoconservative America and in part Great Britain, a feudal-style master-servant economy resumes the shape of the “new patrimonial capitalism” or capitalist patrimonialism defined by the “revenge” and renewed dominance of capitalist aristocracy over labor (Cohen 2003).

In summary, imagine an economy without the Enlightenment’s legacy and one will likely see the economic “dead hand of the past” or what is “gone with the wind” in modern advanced and democratic societies founded on its legacies. This is the economy of “masters and puppets” self-perpetuated either in the original form of feudalism, patrimonialism, and Burke’s adored old aristocracy *or* capitalist neofeudalism and new patrimonialism through proxy-aristocracy *cum* plutocracy and oppressed labor as novel master-servant classes. This is also precisely witnessed in those societies with no or weak Enlightenment legacy, specifically slightly modified precapitalist feudalism and patrimonialism in the Islamic world (excluding perhaps Turkey), and capitalist neofeudalism and new patrimonialism in Puritan-conservative, as distinct from and opposed to Jeffersonian-liberal, America.

Second, imagine politics without the Enlightenment and its political ideals and legacies. Without the latter and their realization through the French, American, and other Enlightenment-inspired liberal “bourgeois” revolutions, politics would remain a despotic *ancien régime* of medievalism. Humans would continue to be divided and opposed as rulers with “divine rights” and the ruled with virtually no rights and liberties other than the “right” and “Christian liberty” to total submission, or what Winthrop commanded and imposed as “subjection” as a “universal condition of mankind,” to their “divinely ordained” masters like himself and his

Calvinist precursors and fundamentalist heirs. Without the Enlightenment politics in particular would self-perpetuate in eternity or infinity as “godly politics” merging the latter with religion, a merger virtually never doing societies “any good” (Dahrendorf 1979; Dombrowski 2001) and defining theocracies or “holy” tyrannies and wars at all times and places. Specifically, “godly politics” would continue in the form of medieval Catholic and Protestant *Respublica Christiana*, including the Puritan “Biblical Commonwealth” exercising Weber’s “unexampled tyranny of Puritanism” and becoming the “most totalitarian” (Stivers 1994) Calvinist theocracy in colonial and early revolutionary America, if the Enlightenment did not exist. Like before, this is not a speculation or counter-factual hypothesis but a reality or realistic possibility, as indicated by the fact that theocratic “godly” politics continues to dominate in those contemporary societies with a nonexistent or weaker Enlightenment experience and legacy than of the pre- and anti-Enlightenment.

As expected, those societies with theocratic “godly politics” or theocentric (Wall 1998) political systems involve most Islamic, with the rare and increasingly endangered exception of Turkey, and other underdeveloped countries, from Hindu and Buddhist Asia to Catholic South America. In all these societies, the Enlightenment always was and remains a nonentity or minor nuisance relative to pre-Enlightenment forces like Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Catholicism, etc. and anti-Enlightenment conservatism grounded on and perpetuating them. Another predictable instance is anti-Enlightenment conservative America in which theocratic “godly politics,” including the Puritan religious “godliness” test for political office, not only perpetuates itself or survives. It reinvents or “rejuvenates” itself and further expands via various neo-Puritan “innovations” and extensions like “one nation indivisible under God,” “in God we trust,” and the like during post-Jeffersonian, postwar, and Cold War times. These reinventions and extensions of Puritan theocratic vestiges that Jeffersonian Enlightenment-inspired ideas and constitutional rules have been supposed to put to rest in the “dead past” seek to reconstruct “godly” politics or “faith based” government and a “Christian nation” after the medieval model or image of the seventeenth century “Biblical Garden.” Alternatively, they systematically undermine and ridicule Jefferson’s “wall of eternal separation” between church and state, and render the Constitutional prohibition of “government promotion of religion” hardly worth the paper on which it is written and printed.

In summary, imagine modern politics without the Enlightenment and one will likely see the political “dead hand of the past” as “gone with the wind” in modern democratic societies based on its legacies. This is the tyrannical *ancien regime* of “godly politics” self-perpetuated either in the original medieval form of Christian, both Catholic and Protestant, theocratic political systems, including New England’s Puritan theocracy *cum* “republic,” and Muslim and other theocracies or in the derivative shape of “Islamic Republic” of Iran and “faith-based” America, for instance.

Third, imagine civil society without Enlightenment ideals and legacies of civic liberties. Without the latter, civil society defined by such liberties would remain a nonentity, a sort of un- or precivil society or, if somehow established or prefigured, as in part by classical civilization and the Renaissance, degenerate into and be

perverted by its opposite. Figuratively, civil society as the free private life-world would remain a taboo or “forbidden apple” in the form of, as Pareto and Weber suggest especially for Calvinist Protestantism, of an overarching monastic order or supermonastery. Humans would continue to be divided and opposed as “saints” and “sinners” punished with primitive Draconian severity to the point of no-return cruel death, as witnessed especially in Islam and Puritanism as functional equivalents in this respect, in accordance with the pre- and anti-Enlightenment equation of sensual pleasures with moral sins and the latter with serious crimes. Recall Calvinism’s hyperascetic injunction that all humans “must be” monks for life instead of hoping to escape from the medieval Catholic monastery. In this sense, without the Enlightenment, civil society would likely remain buried in and prevented from emerging by the medieval darkness of Mises’ “peace of the cemetery” and degenerate into a proxy open prison for humans (minus saints-rulers) defined as sinners-criminals, especially by Puritanism and Islam. In short, without it, civil society as the sphere of moral and other individual liberties, choices, and privacy would remain what Weber calls an “impossible contradiction” or “impossibility theorem.”

This is not a mere speculation or counter-factual hypothesis, but a real possibility and reality, as indicated by the observation that civil society is a nonentity or undeveloped and subverted in those societies with no or weak Enlightenment experience and legacy. As before, exemplary instances of such societies are Islamic, except for Turkey, yet under constant fundamentalist subversions, and other non-Western countries in which civil society as defined is virtually nonexistent or merely embryonic. Another instance is America where civil society is continuously perverted by anti-Enlightenment conservatism into the Puritan-style “godly community” (German 1995) or a “faith-based” nation. Hence, the conservative anti-Enlightenment subverts genuine individual freedom and privacy into ersatz “Christian liberty” (Dayton 1999) for “true Christians” (“people like us”) and repression and persecution, exclusion and discrimination (Edgell et al. 2006) against “infidels” (“them”), spanning from “untrue” nonevangelical Catholic and even Protestant Christians to liberal secularists and nonbelievers, just as in seventeenth century New England ruled by Puritanism. Further, this perversion of civil society and liberties tends to eventuate in a sort of permanent supermonastery of saints and sinners or an open prison for humans defined as sinners-criminals due to “original sin” committed by their “depraved” ancestors, and the effective prison for those millions of Americans committing sins-as-crimes like drug, sexual, and other nonviolent moral, let alone violent, offenses (Schram et al. 2009).

In summary, imagine a civil society without the Enlightenment and one will again likely see another facet of the “dead hand of the past” as also “gone with the wind” in modern democratic societies constituted by its ideals and legacies. This is a pre-civil society in the form of a societal monastic, Puritan-style order “recreating” and forcing humans to behave as permanent proxy-monks, saints, and angels, or else, basically “hell” in this and other worlds alike. It is thus an open prison for most humans treated as depraved sinners-criminals on the account of “original sin” and punishing them with Draconian harshness, including death and long imprisonment, for their sins-crimes, thus eventually converted into an effective prison and



**Table 8.1** A society without the Enlightenment

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Master-servant economic system
Feudal servitude
Despotic political system
Medieval theocracy (“godly politics”)
Un- or precivil society
Monastic order, open prison
Culture as the servant of religion
Inquisition and Salem

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death-penalty system as in Islamic theocracies and America during conservatism. In short, this is a precivil society after Mises’ image of the “peace of the cemetery.”

Finally, imagine a culture without the Enlightenment and its cultural values and legacies. Without the latter, human culture would remain the servant of theology, religion, church, and theocracy as during the Christian Dark Middle Ages and their Islamic and other equivalents, and all cultural creations, including humans themselves, would continue to be subordinated and eventually sacrificed to “higher” religious causes and forces. Symbolically, culture, including science, art, and philosophy, would remain burned, buried, or petrified in the medieval Catholic Inquisition in Europe and its Protestant functional equivalents like Puritan “Salem with witches” and fundamentalist “Monkey Trials” against scientific rationalism in America, in the absence of the Enlightenment. In summary, without the latter, culture would indefinitely remain, to use Weber’s words, *caput mortuum* or in terminal condition through the “adverse fate” or the near-death of secular art, philosophy, science, education, technology, and medicine sacrificed to “holy” causes (Elements of a society without the Enlightenment are summarized in Table 8.1).

Again, this is not a mere speculation or counter-factual hypothesis but a real possibility and reality. This is indicated by that secular culture, including art, science, and education, and sometimes technology and medicine (e.g., vaccinations, stem-cell and other medical research) remains the subordinate instrument to “sacred” purposes and forces in those societies with no or weak Enlightenment experience and legacy. As before, type cases among these societies are pre-Enlightenment Islamic and other religiously dominated underdeveloped countries, as well as in part America during anti-Enlightenment religious conservatism, as specified below.

***“Back to the Future” of Witches, Witch Trials, and other Wondrous Creatures and Practices***

In particular, without the Enlightenment’s ideal and legacy of cultural rationalism and humanitarianism, pre-Enlightenment “godly” irrationalism and antihumanism, including the “good old” religious ignorance, superstition, fanaticism, cruelty, and inhumanity would continue to prevail over and subdue or pervert and exploit human

reason, notably secular knowledge, science, education, technology, and medicine. And, irrationalism and antihumanism actually do so in those societies with no or weak Enlightenment rationalistic and humanitarian legacy, as in pre-Enlightenment Islamic societies and anti-Enlightenment America, respectively.

For instance, the medieval “godly” geocentric “flat earth” theory would still be widely held (Smith 2003) and its scientific heliocentric alternative condemned and its adherents punished, if not executed, without the Enlightenment and its precursor the Renaissance (Copernicus, etc.). And, in a way this actually seems the case or possibility in “Christian” evangelical America, with some, not only illiterate but also partly educated, fundamentalists seemingly believing in the medieval doctrine of the “flat” earth as the “center” of the universe, probably the only ones within the modern Western world. The above applies to various other expressions of pre- and anti-Enlightenment religious ignorance, superstition, fanaticism, and irrationalism overall, such as “witches” and witch trails, creationism and “monkey trials,” “godly” medicine, and the like, all intellectually demolished or discredited by the Enlightenment (Bauman 2001).

In another instance, without the Enlightenment people in modern Western and other societies would still believe in “witches” and related, from the stance of its scientific rationalism, superstitions like satan or the devil, etc. and consequently, based on the idea that “witches ha[ve] to be destroyed” (Smith 2003), indulge in witch trials and other rituals of exorcism and act as witch exorcists, not just watching movies or reading books with such themes and titles. They still do so in those societies where the Enlightenment has been nonexistent or weak and submerged by pre- and anti-Enlightenment forces, such as America as well as Islamic and other non-Western societies. Recall that surveys indicate that no less than more than two thirds (71%) of Americans and virtually all religious conservatives still believe in (the existence of) “witches” or the “devil” and implicitly (the need for) witch trials and similar rituals of exorcism of “satan,” as do apparently most in Islamic societies, but drastically smaller numbers of Western Europeans do (11% in Denmark and 18% in France) (Glaeser 2004). Perhaps nothing better exemplifies and symbolizes the pre-Enlightenment Dark Middle Ages and their irrational vestiges than the lingering belief in “witches” and the “devil” (Popper 1973), as the “mother” of all ignorance, superstition, irrationalism, and in that sense cultural madness—remember the “witchcraft craze” in Puritan New England’s Salem—in America under conservatism and Islamic and other societies with no or weak Enlightenment tradition and legacy.

Also, for example, without the Enlightenment and its legacy of scientific rationalism people in modern Western and other societies would still believe in religious “creationism” as against Darwinian biological evolutionism (Evans and Evans 2008). And they still do in those societies where the Enlightenment and its scientific rationalism was nonexistent or weak in relation to pre- and anti-Enlightenment forces, like America as well as Islamic and other non-Western societies. Various surveys show that more Americans believe in “creationism” and its variations like “intelligent design” and by implication the need for irrational or grotesque (“funny?”) “monkey trials” against biology and other science, than in

biological evolutionism, as do most people in Islamic and similar hyperreligious non-Western societies.

Alternatively, the exact opposite pattern is being observed in Western and all Europe, with partial exceptions like ultra-Catholic, semitheocratic Poland, as even the Vatican effectively abandoned or “forgot” creationism in favor of evolutionism as “more than a hypothesis” in the view that religion and science are not necessarily in conflict, seemingly drawing the lesson from its counterproductive persecution of medieval scientists-heretics like Copernicus and Galileo (recently rehabilitated). By contrast, pre-Enlightenment fundamentalist Islam even in Turkey and anti-Enlightenment Protestant fundamentalism in America did and do the exact opposite. They thus apparently fail or refuse to learn from their own histories of persecution of “infidel” or “ungodly” scientists, including Puritan “witch trials” in New England and fundamentalist “monkey trials” against evolutionism and secular science overall in the “Bible Belt” and beyond. This include Protestant fundamentalism’s downgrading of evolution into “just a theory” and its “reinvention” of creationism as “intelligent design” rejected as nonscience even by the Vatican and yet taught as “science” at US private religious universities (as in Texas, Virginia, the state of Washington, etc.). At least on the account of being virtually the only major religions existing within or impinging on, respectively, Western society, holding the belief in “creationism,” like “satan,” these forms of fundamentalism become the most antagonistic, dangerous, persistent, and destructive anti-science forces compared to which the Vatican with its history of persecution of “ungodly” scientists now seems “rational” and “liberal.” Furthermore, their shared “creationism,” like the belief in “satan,” is not random or accidental but built in as part of the common pattern of irrationalism and antirationalism, notably religiously grounded and perpetuated superstition. The latter hence amplifies and magnifies their antagonism and threat to virtually all secular science, education, art, philosophy, even technology, and medicine, not just evolutionary biology, from climate science or global warming theory (Nordhaus 2007; Stern 2008) and medical stem-cell and other research to critical economics and sociology. As a US physical scientist observes with respect to global warming, “the solution to the problem is greatly retarded by the lack of scientific and technological awareness in certain societies, notably the US, where superstitions and political passions often trump sound reasoning.” And even a moderately conservative US governor complained that most religious and political conservatives in America “don’t believe there is such a thing as global warming [notably, being due to human actions], they’re still living in the Stone Age,” thus in the pre-Enlightenment, as revealed on a mass scale at neoconservative antigovernment “tea parties.” (For instance, an extremely conservative senator from Oklahoma declared in the Senate that global warming was “the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people.”)

In a related example, without the Enlightenment and its scientific rationalism people in modern Western and other societies would still believe in “godly” vs. scientific medicine (Gruber 2008). And they still do in those societies with the weak or nonexistent Enlightenment and scientific rationalism relative to pre- and anti-Enlightenment forces, such as America as well as Islamic and other

non-Western societies. Thus, observations show that more Americans believe in a sort of “godly” or “Christian” vs. scientific medicine, like the presumed health and other “efficacy of prayer” (Evans and Evans 2008), reading the Bible as a sort of medical textbook (e.g., US “Christian scientists” have written books prescribing Bible reading as the most effective cure for some intimate feminine problems), etc., than those in Western and all Europe, just as do most people in Islamic and other hyperreligious non-Western societies. This is indicated by most US religious conservatives’ observed vehement opposition to “legitimate” (Evans and Evans 2008) stem-cell research, with many even opposing vaccinations and other medical treatments (e.g., chemotherapy or radiation) for reasons of “faith,” with often courts forcing parents usually from fundamentalist sects or cults to allow medical care to their seriously ill children (cancer, etc.).

In general, without Enlightenment scientific rationalism religious (“Christian”) “science” and “education” would remain exclusive or primary and true, secular science and education nonexistent or secondary, simply “church” would replace or dominate “school,” in modern Western and other societies. Far from being just a counterfactual hypothesis, this is precisely witnessed in those contemporary societies with a limited or missing heritage of Enlightenment scientific rationalism in relation to medieval pre- and conservative anti-Enlightenment factors, namely America within Western culture and Islamic countries in the non-Western world, respectively. Recall sociological research finds that contemporary US religious conservatives like Protestant fundamentalists, especially, but not solely, in the “Bible Belt,” reveal a preference for private and home religious “science” and “education” to secular science and education as a perceived threat to sacred and political powers (Darnell and Sherkat 1997; also, Juergensmeyer 2003). Islamic fundamentalists in Muslim countries reportedly have the identical “revealed preference” for religious schools (*madrasahs*) and for rejecting or neglecting secular science and education necessary for “functioning in modern society” (Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Turk 2004).

In the absence or weakness of Enlightenment scientific rationalism, *no* science and education whatsoever would continue to be favored to secular science and education, hence ignorance to knowledge remaining a sort of “forbidden apple.” As before, the conditional or possibility (“would”) becomes the present or reality (“does”) in those contemporary societies or regions lacking or weakening the Enlightenment legacy of scientific rationalism, such as Islamic countries and conservative America, notably the “Bible Belt,” respectively. Recall sociological research finds that religious conservatives in the “Bible Belt” and elsewhere escalate their anti-scientism to the point of preferring “no” education as “better” to secular schooling and science on sacred and political grounds (Darnell and Sherkat 1997), just as do Islamic fundamentalists.

Next, without the Enlightenment and its scientific and general cultural rationalism various “ungodly,” immoral” or “indecent,” and “unpatriotic” and similar books and other artistic and intellectual creations would have been burned or otherwise destroyed or banned in modern Western and other societies, and their authors subjected to Inquisition-style punishments for their heresy and other

“crimes” of freedom of thought. And, such works continue to be destroyed or banned in those societies lacking a strong Enlightenment legacy of cultural rationalism, notably of the appreciation of artistic and intellectual creations as constitutive of human civilization, in relation to pre- and anti-Enlightenment factors, like America (Hull 1999), especially, but not solely, the “Bible Belt,” as well as Islamic and other non-Western societies. Their authors are consequently subjected to Inquisition-like punishments for their heretical “crimes” in these societies or regions. The latter include in particular “Christian America” where denying the government proclamation of the “existence of divinity” is sanctioned as blasphemy or “un-American,” with punishments from the death penalty in the Puritan era to “just” exclusion from politics and society in modern times (Edgell et al. 2006), not to mention Islamic societies where such denials, including apostasy, are punished even more harshly, often simply execution.

In addition, without the Enlightenment legacy of rationalism and humanitarianism, nonviolent moral sins and vices (alcohol use, “fornication,” pornography, prostitution, adultery, etc.) would continue to be criminalized and sanctioned, and their perpetrators, like those committing small property crimes (petty theft, etc.), harshly punished, often with life or long mass imprisonment (Sutton 2004), if not death, as sinners-criminals in modern democratic societies. And they actually are still in those societies lacking or deprecating such an Enlightenment legacy. As expected, these societies are first and foremost, Islamic and other moralistic-religious non-Western countries, in which, except for Turkey, moral sins continue to be criminalized and sinners harshly punished to the point of death (drug trade, pornography, prostitution, and adultery by public stoning in Iran, Taliban-ruled regions, etc.). Also predictably, among these societies is neoconservative America, in which various moral sins, including consensual sexual offenses (e.g., adultery in the military and the “Bible Belt”), continue to be criminalized, and sinners harshly punished to the point of life imprisonment and even prospectively death (as for drug trade and rapes). For instance, such punishments are mandated by “three strikes” laws passed by neoconservative forces in most US states punishing repeated drug and related moral offenses, plus petty crimes (theft of pizzas, vitamins, and chocolates, “bounced” checks, etc.), with life in prison, and other “tough on crime” policies (Akerlof 2002; Matsueda et al. 2006) expressing the “Draconian severity” (Patell 2001) of the conservative penal system and making it “unique anomaly” (Pager 2003) among modern democracies in the twenty first century. This is in a striking yet “proud” deviation from the Western world. In the latter, such moral sins are either decriminalized (adultery and prostitution, also not criminalized even in Turkey still) or punished less harshly such as drug possession and trade, definitely not with life in prison and death, through a more “humane” (Reuter 2005) Enlightenment-based minimalist (Rutherford 1994) penal system than America’s Puritan-style maximalist code of sin-as-crime and Draconian punishment.

Simply put, human sinners, and, as even the Bible implies, they potentially include virtually all humans, would still be criminals and punished accordingly, including executed, in modern societies if not for the Enlightenment’s legacy. And they actually are in those societies missing or devaluating its legacy, like

Islamic countries and “Christian” America, notably the Puritanical “Bible Belt” in spite of the biblical seeming exoneration or understanding of sinners (“who has not sinned,” etc.). At this juncture, just as the seventeenth century “Biblical Commonwealth” did, this region appears as “anything but Biblical” or “Christian love” (Sorokin 1970) a humanistic deficit traced to Puritanism’s admittedly “almost exact reversal” (Tawney 1962) of original Christian values by its “lack of caritas and compassion” (Tiryakian 2002).

Further, without the Enlightenment legacy of rationalism and humanitarianism, torture and other cruel, degrading, and inhumane punishment of domestic and foreign “enemies” would likely persist in modern Western and other democratic societies rather than officially abolished or prohibited at least. Torture actually persists in those contemporary societies lacking or diluting such an Enlightenment legacy, as in Islamic and other non-Western theocratic or hyperreligious countries, as well as America (Einolf 2007; Heymann 2003) during paleo- and neoconservatism, from the Cold War and the Vietnam War to the “war on terror” and the “axis of evil.” Like most Islamic countries, except perhaps for Turkey, the anti-Enlightenment US conservative government admittedly uses “enhanced” or “hurtful interrogation methods” (Turk 2004) for “greater than humans and life” causes, “crusade” – a term often used by religious conservatives, including an evangelical President, in the “war on terror” – and “security,” reviving or evoking pre-Enlightenment Puritan repression and “holy” wars (Munch 2001) in the “name of God.” At this point, the importance of the Enlightenment for basic human dignity or common humanity freed of humiliating, inhumane treatment is impossible to overstate and overemphasize in modern liberal-democratic societies.

To take the ultimate or paradigmatic example, without the Enlightenment’s legacy of rationalism and humanitarianism, the death penalty for sins-crimes, not distinguished in the pre- and anti-Enlightenment, would remain, rather than be abolished, in modern democratic societies. And, as an ultimate cruel, degrading, and inhumane punishment, especially when applied to nonviolent moral sinners like drug users and sexual offenders without using violence and innocent persons, the death penalty remains in those societies lacking or dissolving such an Enlightenment legacy. They are predictably Islamic and other authoritarian non-Western nations (China, North Korea), as well as America (the federal government and most states) as the lone and “proudly” persistent deviation from the Western world, with Texas, with its true spirit of a merger of the anarchic, violent “Wild West” and the theocratic-repressive “Bible Belt,” as the “leader” within the latter. For example, all the members of the European Union have abolished the death penalty as well as torture, as have Canada and Australia. At this juncture, this missing Enlightenment, and conversely, the strong pre- and anti-Enlightenment, link is the primary historical factor helping to understand, explain, and predict the seemingly incomprehensible, unexplainable absurd or paradox, “shock” for most Americans. It helps comprehend and explain “how on the earth” the presumed polar opposites, contemporary Iranian, Taliban, and other Islamic *and* American, notably “Bible Belt” and “Wild West” a la Texas death-penalty systems, have come to function as functionally equivalent (Jacobs et al. 2005) in terms of frequency and religious

**Table 8.2** A world without Enlightenment rationalism and humanitarianism

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Geocentric “flat earth” theory favored to heliocentric astronomy
“Witches,” satan (the devil), witch trials, exorcism, and exorcists perpetuated
“Creationism” and “intelligent design” preferred over “ungodly” biological evolutionism
“Godly” medicine (the Bible, the Koran, prayer, etc.) more “effective” than scientific medicine
Religious “science” and “education” (and home “schooling”) primary over secular science and education
“No” science and education favored to secular science and education, ignorance to knowledge
“Ungodly” books and other intellectual creations burned or banned, dissenters executed or punished as “heretics”
Nonviolent moral sins and vices criminalized and harshly punished, sinners-criminals or “evil enemies” reproduced and multiplied
Torture and other cruel, degrading, and inhumane punishment and abuses continued
The death penalty for moral nonviolent sins-crimes still applied, sinners-criminals punished with death

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Koran-Biblical grounds of executions. Hence, the Enlightenment’s importance for the most elemental, ultimate matter of human life and existence freed of government-inflicted death and other suffering like torture cannot be overstated and overemphasized in modern democratic societies. (The preceding is summarized in Table 8.2.)

## A World with Enlightenment Values and Legacies

### *Welcome to Liberal-Democratic Modernity*

The fundamental values and institutions of modern democratic Western and other societies, including America, are essentially grounded in, derived from, and inspired by the Enlightenment as the cultural or intellectual revolution of seventeenth to eighteenth century Europe. Arguably, the Enlightenment is the primary source of such cherished ideals and institutional arrangements among modern Western and other democratic societies as universal liberty, equality and justice, inclusive representative democracy, rational science and technology, social progress, material well-being and prosperity, individual dignity, life, and happiness, and the like. In short, Enlightenment-based ideals, values, and institutions stand at the “mind and heart” of Western civilization (Berman 2000).

To paraphrase Parsons’ (1967b) definition of values, the Enlightenment is at the root of the projects, “dreams,” conceptions, and institutional practices of the “desirable” in sociological terms, specifically a free, open, inclusive, egalitarian, just, pluralist, secular or nontheocratic, rationalist, progressive, prosperous, and humane society. Simply, most, though perhaps not all, of those things that people in modern Western and other democratic societies, including America, consider “desirable” and “valuable” (“good”) originate in one way or another in the Enlightenment, notably

universal liberty, equality, justice, reason, social progress, inclusive democracy, individual choice, dignity, humane life, and happiness, economic well-being, and the like. And, conversely, most, again not all, of those things that they consider in opposite terms, such as un-freedom, inequality, including extreme feudal-like economic inequalities (e.g., the top one percent owning half or so of societal wealth as in European feudalism and American neofeudalism cum “unfettered capitalism”; Lenski 1984; Wolff 2002), injustice, unreason through religious superstition, ignorance, prejudice, or fanaticism, exclusion and discrimination, despotism, theocracy, anti-individual coercion and suffering, material deprivation and destitution, premature death and extremely low life expectancy and the like are in various ways rooted in and bequeathed from the pre-Enlightenment and extended and perpetuated by the counter-Enlightenment. Recall the pre-Enlightenment specifically involves medievalism with its master-servant feudalism, political despotism, and societal theocracy after the image of the Dark Middle Ages, and the counter-Enlightenment medieval-rooted archconservatism, including religious orthodoxy, then fascism, and neo-conservatism, in particular revived theocratic fundamentalism and neofascism, the first predating and the second succeeding or counteracting the Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment originates and functions as a true cultural, intellectual revolution within Western and other, specifically “Christian” civilization and history. It does in the sense of a substantively revolutionary break and profound discontinuity from the latter and its main values and institutions. In Schumpeter’s terms, the Enlightenment is a paradigmatic project and process of “creative destruction” in cultural and other social, including political, civic, and economic, terms. This means the intellectual destruction (“deconstruction”) of the old structures and the creation or projection of the new in culture as well as politics, civil society, and economy. In essence, the Enlightenment intellectually challenges and eventually supersedes medievalism and its cultural and other social institutions and values, and creates or envisions modern liberal-democratic society. This is a process inspiring and politically continued and completed by the French and in part American Revolutions in the Jeffersonian blueprint as what Pareto would call the Enlightenment’s objective, though not always recognized, “daughters” or at least close “cousins.”

In particular, the Enlightenment is an axiomatic process of creative destruction by destroying or superseding the irrational, oppressive, and theocratic Dark Middle Ages inflicting humans with suffering and sacrificing them to “higher” divine and theocratic causes (*Civitas Dei, respublica Christiana*), and creating or ushering in the Age of Reason, liberty, dignified life, (concept and right of) happiness, and liberal-secular democracy in Western and other societies, including Jefferson-Madison’s America. In this respect, it constitutes the act of true enlightenment and liberation from the ignorance, superstition, prejudice, overall irrationalism, suffering, misery, and oppression of the Dark Middle Ages as the axiomatic pre-Enlightenment, thus really “light” in the midst of and illuminating their pervasive and self-perpetuating repressive, notably theocratic tyrannical, darkness.

If anything, the Enlightenment can be credited, or blamed as the case might be, for the creative destruction of the Dark Middle Ages as a social system and



historical period, by casting the light on the end of the medieval “tunnel” of despotism and theocracy *cum* “godly” society through the project of universal liberty and secular democracy. In this sense, the Enlightenment originates and operates as the true nemesis or Hayek’s deplored “terminator” of the Dark Middle Ages. Yet, the latter never “graciously” conceded the defeat but perpetually tried to resurrect from death or oblivion in the image of what Milton Friedman (Friedman 1982) calls Frankenstein (or perhaps medievalist Count Dracula) through religious, Catholic and Protestant, orthodoxy’s “mindless battle” (Habermas 2001) against the Enlightenment, and then postmedieval anti-Enlightenment conservatism, including ultimately fascism like Nazism. In this respect, the battle has continued or been reenacted between the liberal-secular-rationalistic Enlightenment and the Dark Middle Ages in the “new” form of counter-Enlightenment religious and political conservatism, including fascism, in post-medieval Western societies, in particular America (Byrne 1997).

The battle continues through the culture war between the Enlightenment legacy and the “new” Dark Middle Ages (Bauman 2000; Berman 2000) in the form of neoconservatism (Bourdieu 1998), including revived religious fundamentalism and neofascism, especially in America and to a lesser extent other Western societies by the early twenty first century. A manifest and salient facet of this culture war in America is the protracted or renewed conflict and “drama” (Byrne 1997) between Enlightenment-based liberal-democratic secularism and pre- and anti-Enlightenment theocratic, revivalist fundamentalism, as indicated by the contradiction between the observed process of secularization even in the “one nation indivisible under God” (e.g., the increase of Americans with “no religion” to around 15%) – *pace* “rational choice” nonsecularization theories of religion – and the revival and expansion of evangelicalism as the dominant non-Catholic (and the “only true”) “Christian” denomination during the 2000s. While the aggregate eventual outcome of the battle between the Enlightenment and the Dark Middle Ages, like capitalism and feudalism, has been evident and hardly ever in doubt in Western democratic societies, including Jeffersonian vs. Puritan America, the medieval feudal, despotic, and theocratic “loser” has persistently refused to take “no” (defeat) as an answer through its conservative, including fundamentalist and fascist, revivals from death (Dunn and Woodard 1996) and violent revolt, including (alongside Islamic religious conservatism) “holy” terror and war, against Enlightenment-based liberal-secular democracy and society.

At any rate, it seems impossible to overstate and overemphasize the Enlightenment’s importance for modern democratic, free societies and their fundamental values and institutions of liberty, equality and justice, rationalism and social progress, well-being, happiness, and humane life “for all.” It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the Enlightenment is at the cradle, growth, and future of virtually everything that most people, excluding neofascists, “born again” religious fundamentalists or conservatives, extreme neoconservatives, and other pre- and anti-Enlightenment extremists, in modern democratic societies value and cherish. These modern societies and the moderns are the legitimate sociological children of the liberal-democratic, secular, rationalistic and progressive Enlightenment

more than of anything else preceding and opposing it, namely the medieval pre-Enlightenment and the conservative-fascist anti-Enlightenment respectively, instead being “enemies” of free, open society in Popper’s sense. Conversely, the Enlightenment represents the true intellectual parent of modern free societies and the moderns more than does any other factor predating and countering it. The victory of the Enlightenment over initially the medieval pre-Enlightenment and eventually or prospectively the conservative-fascist Enlightenment yields and heralds the present or impending triumph of free, open society, in the only genuine and viable form of liberal-democratic modernity, over its “enemies.” In this sense, in the setting of modern free society “we are all [minus its enemies] really the children,” even if unknowingly, of the Enlightenment and its ideals.

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