Helena Carreiras
Gerhard Kümmel (Eds.)

Women in the Military and in Armed Conflict

ARBEIT GRENZEN POLITIK HANDLUNG METHODEN GEWALT SPRACHE WISSE
SCHAFT DISKURS SCHICHT MOBILITÄT SYSTEM INDIVIDUUM KONTROLL
ZEIT ELITE KOMMUNIKATION WIRTSCHAFT GERECHTIGKEIT STADT WERT
RISIKO ERZIEHUNG GESELLSCHAFT RELIGION UMWELT SOZIALISATIO
RATIONALITÄT VERANTWORTUNG MACHT PROZESS LEBENSSTIL DELI
QUENZ KUNST UNGLEICHHEIT ORGANISATION NORMEN REGULIERUN
IDENTITÄT HERRSCHAFT VERGLEICH SOZIALSTRUKTUR BIOGRAFIE KRITI
WISSEN MASSENMEDIEN EXKLUSION GENERATION THEORIE HIERARCHI
GESUNDHEIT NETZWERK LEBENSLAUF KONSUM FREIHEIT BETEILIGUN
GEMEINSCHAFT INFORMATION WANDEL DIFFERENZ WOHLFAHRTSSTAA
ETHNIE BERUF RITUAL KÖRPER MODERNISIERUNG GESCHLECHT DEMOKR
TIE EVOLUTION INTEGRATION KAPITAL REALITÄT KRIEG BILDUNG ALLTA
KULTUR VERTRAUEN LIEBE WERBUNG GLOBALISIERUNG BEOBACHTUN
RECHT EXTREMISMUS STATISTIK INTERAKTION KRIMINALITÄT ZUKUNF

SCHRIFTENREIHE DES
SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN INSTITUTS
DER BUNDESWEHR

VS VERLAG FÜR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN

Helena Carreiras · Gerhard Kümmel (Eds.)

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Foreword

This collection of articles basically originates in Durban, South Africa. In late July 2006, the International Sociological Association (ISA) held its World Congress of Sociology in the beautiful landscape of Southern Africa. As usual on these occasions, the ISA's Research Committee: Armed Forces & Conflict Resolution (RC 01) organized several sessions dealing with issues of military sociology, the sociology of war and conflict resolution. One of these sessions looked at Women in the Military: National and International Perspectives and was chaired by Helena Carreiras from Portugal and Leena Parmar from India.

As this session turned out to be very interesting and substantial, we, the editors deemed it worthwhile to make these papers available to a larger audience and thus contribute to the ongoing debate about war, the armed forces and the role of women in both war, violent conflict and the military. This anthology, then, contains the revised and updated versions of the papers that have been presented in Durban plus one or the other article that has been written specifically for the purposes of this book.

Since RC 01 is operating on principles of pluralism, it will come as no surprise to the reader that the papers in this volume are by no means coherent and uniform in terms of content and interpretation. In fact, e.g.,, the authors to this book differ quite a lot in their attitudes and opinions about the inclusion of females into the armed forces. But diversity enriches debate and furthers scientific advancement. In this sense, we hope that these articles will become voices heard in the debate.

A project like this is impossible without support and help. First of all, we would like to thank the authors for contributing their time and their expertise to this book. Next, we are especially grateful to Dr. Ernst-Christoph Meier, the Director of the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SOWI). He agreed to publish this anthology within the SOWI's book series in the VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften even though the most recent findings of the SOWI's long-term research project concerning the integration of females into the Bundeswehr were not yet available for this volume. Last, but not least, we very much appreciate the help of Cordula Röper and Edgar Naumann at the SOWI in making this book possible.

Helena Carreiras & Gerhard Kümmel
Lisbon & Neuenhagen, October 2007

Women in Combat: Reconsidering the Case Against the Deployment of Women in Combat-Support and Combat Units

Stephan Maninger

1 Introduction

The issue of women serving in the military has repeatedly been subject to much debate and controversy. There are essentially two fundamentally opposing positions on the issue. One position holds that any form of exclusion of women in the military constitutes an act of discrimination or sexism, the sole objective of which is to irrationally defend a 'man's domain'.[1] The central intellectual flaw in this line of argumentation seems to be that it turns a point of fact into a point of motive. It tends to trivialize or even ignore the overwhelming biological and sociological evidence stacked against women gaining unlimited access to all facets of military life, while simultaneously alleging a discriminatory agenda on the part of those objecting. The opposing view holds that the full inclusion of women, particularly access to combat roles, results in force degradation and a general lowering of standards to the point where modern militaries largely stand to forfeit their sustained deployability and war fighting capabilities. To substantiate this allegation, the case against women in combat-support or combat roles tends to emphasize biological and sociological limitations.

2 Biological Limitations

Despite great technological developments reducing many of the hardships endured by generations of soldiers, combat still remains a physically and psychologically extraordinarily strenuous experience. Given that military training is designed to simulate combat in order to enable soldiers to endure such conditions and outperform their opponents, women find themselves at a biological disadvantage in terms of (1) strength and endurance; (2) injuries; and (3) deployability.

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1 Although 97 per cent of US Army officer career fields and 83 per cent of enlisted occupations are open to women, women can serve in less than 70 per cent of the job slots because the remaining slots are in combat units or in units that collocate with combat units (GAO 1999: 30).

Women on average possess 55 per cent of the muscle strength and 67 per cent of the endurance of men. The average 20-to-30 year-old woman has the same aerobic capacity as a 50 year-old man. As recruits they are on average 14.3 kg lighter, 12 cm shorter and possess 16.9 kg less muscle tissue, making them experience 1/3 more physical strain than their male counterparts. The top 20 per cent of women are at a physical performance level comparable to the bottom 20 per cent of the average male population (Creveld 2001: 152f.).

After a ten-year effort in the US military to ignore these differences, it was found that of the 65,000 army women assigned to a variety of tasks requiring considerable physical strength, only 3 per cent performed adequately. Even in the medical field, a support assignment in which women have traditionally seen greater representation, it takes ten women to carry stretchers which are usually carried by six enlisted men (Freedman 1985: 22).[2] Repeated studies in several countries, many commissions of inquiry and research of every kind have confirmed the physical limitations of women in military environments. In the US military, women deployed as drivers have often been unable to change the tires of the very supply trucks they drive. This is not for lack of training but simply due to the weight of the tires. Less muscle tissue and aerobic ability means that women have less strength, less speed for shorter periods of time. During the first Gulf War, where significant numbers of women were first deployed by the US military although in non-combat units, male colleagues were shown to be inclined to take down tents and carry heavy equipment because women lacked the necessary strength or speed required for completing the tasks in the available time (Gutmann 2000: 15, 258). Given the present unchallenged technological superiority of the US military in the theaters of operations over the last two decades, the full consequences of forfeiting speed in deployment in favor of social engineering were largely avoided.

Physical limitations are also evident in combat-related training. A study at Parris Island concluded that 45 per cent of female marines were unable to throw hand grenades far enough to avoid injury under combat conditions (US

2 Since medics have been decorated in past conflicts for carrying wounded soldiers out of the line of fire, the future will show how women are going to perform such feats and survive.

News & World Report, 11 August 1997: 14).[3] Confronted with the evidence of countless studies, proponents of women in combat units often see improved training as a solution. Retired US Air Force Captain Barbara Wilson states that "[f]or some inexplicable reason the military doesn't deem it necessary to work at training women in these things and in strength and conditioning early in boot camp" (http://userpages.aug.com/captbarb/myths.html). Such efforts, however, have been made in almost all militaries trying to integrate women and have been extensively documented. The results of compensatory training have been disappointing and confirm that the physical ability gap is not easily overcome. Nature apparently provided men with what could be called a 'training advantage' insofar as the performance gap tends to increase rather than decrease through training. After eight weeks of training, men were not only still able to outperform their female counterparts in absolute terms but also in terms of training gains. Men had gained 32 per cent more strength and 48 per cent more endurance in their legs than their female comrades. Even more profound are the differences for upper body performance where the men had gained 270 per cent more strength and 473 per cent more endurance than their female comrades over the same period of time (Creveld 2000: 153). For co-ed training, where men and women conduct training together, this means that the discrepancies between high- and low-performance in any given training unit increase rather than decrease and therefore partly defeats the objective pursued with military training.

Countering such considerations is the notion that the asymmetrical military threats of the future will no longer require the kind of combat readiness of past conflicts. Perhaps applicable to 'operations-other-than-war', this is not the lesson of Afghanistan or Iraq, where basic combat skills and discipline are proving to be as relevant as ever (O'Hanlon 2002: 61). The infantry-intensive, predominantly urban counterinsurgency or peacekeeping operations of the foreseeable future are going to require more military skills, particularly discipline, rather than less. Military history also provides ample evidence that unit morale tends to crumble when there are too many soldiers unable to perform their tasks, whatever these tasks may be.

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3 One of the participants explained: "I didn't want to throw a grenade, and I didn't. I am frightened of ammunition. I was afraid it would explode in my hand." (cited in Freeman 1985: 112) While such views may be found among male conscripts, they appear strange coming from members in an all-volunteer military, particularly expressed by a member of the marine corps. It also indicates that training objectives have not been met, the soldier being unable to overcome fear in a mere training situation.

2.2 *Injuries*

Women under training have proven themselves to be comparatively injury-prone. They spend on average five times more days on limited duty due to sickness and are up to eight times more likely to be injured trying to meet the training requirements. Numerous studies and extensive research have proven this problem to be insurmountable. Gutman (2001: 256) writes: "Studies on strength continued: Another Army research division reported in 1997 that 'females in advanced training – that is, those who have completed boot camp accounted for more than half of all cases of stress fracture. The hospitalization rate among females was more that tenfold that among males. The rate among white, nonhispanic, junior enlisted female soldiers was more than 15 times higher than that of the Army overall'." More considerate and adapted co-ed training programs have demonstrated that women are still 3.3 times more likely than men to suffer from problems such as shin splints, stress fractures and fractured pelvises, brought on by physical exercise and weight-carrying. Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Barnard, the commanding officer at the British army's Winchester training center, is quoted as saying: "Girls get injured more often than the boys and take longer to recover. Pelvic fractures are common among the girls because they are often smaller but try to keep up with the boys' stride pattern." (Daily Telegraph, 2 September 2005)

In some cases the individual conditions are even more serious, depending on the type of training, with the stress fracture rate at US military's West Point being ten times higher among women, while at the US Air Force Academy the rate was five times higher than among their male counterparts (Creveld 2000: 194). Though women make up 28 per cent of the 2005 intake at the training center in Winchester, the composition of the recovery platoon, where injured personnel is expected to recuperate on light duty, is two-thirds female. This has caused the center to review its policy of mixed training and announced a return to gender-segregated training as of April 2007 for a three year trial period (Daily Telegraph, 2 September 2005).

Differences in bone and body mass, weaker skulls and jaw-bones, shorter limbs, place women at a distinct training and combat-disadvantage even under conditions where one or several of these factors are absent, for example where they are superior to men in height. It is this that has kept women at the fringes of the battlefield throughout history and seen them over-represented among the casualties, particularly among the prisoners, when homesteads, villages and towns have come under attack (Keeley 1996: 67). Even the non-combat strain of the hunter-gatherer lifestyle has historically seen women being placed at a disadvantage as a result of the physical demands made on them. Nomadic people covering great distances on foot saw their women die

at an early age due to exposure, frequent periods of hunger, physical labor and child-birth. Three of these four conditions are well-known characteristics of combat, yet the proponents of women in combat units tend to downplay or ignore the legacy of history. With a life-expectancy of about 25, women in nomadic societies were not even able to benefit from the introduction of the horse. Life on horseback held gynecological implications and reduced their ability to have children.[4] It is therefore no coincidence that the status of women in hunting societies remained unchanged while that of women in agrarian societies improved (Fehrenbach 2003: 37, 43). The hard work of agrarian societies was still less physically demanding than that of hunter-gatherers, where men exclusively held the key to survival through being physically more capable.

The relative lack of physical strength as well as the injury-prone constitution of the female body is what keeps women playing in gender-segregated sports teams. Some types of sport are avoided almost entirely and it seems unlikely that women are going to be playing American Football, Rugby or Basketball in any of the major leagues. Yet, when it comes to combat, arguably the most non-compromising, competitive and high-risk human activity, it is argued by some that women are physically up to the task or that they do not need to be. Even in modern societies, where the lessons of history are quite often disregarded in favor of ideology, women have demonstrated under simulated combat conditions (during training) that their undisputable physical limitations result in less mobility, less speed, lower combat ability and therefore invariably greater vulnerability compared to their male comrades and opponents. Barbara Wilson (http://userpages.aug.com/captbarb/myths.html) states that "[t]he Olympics has men's events and women's events – so what's the big deal about the military creating different sets of standards for age, sex, and as qualifiers for particular jobs?" Such an approach, though implicitly admitting the biological inequalities in physical performance, is unhistorical in its approach insofar as it fails to adequately consider the realities associated with combat. Future opponents are less likely to make allowance for the physical disadvantage of women *vis a vis* men in

4 This presents interesting questions about the recent interpretations made with regard to the excavations of supposed 'Amazons' in Russia. The mere presence of weapons in burial sites is considered as evidence for the existence of women as mounted warriors. While it is beyond doubt that women can skilfully ride horses and practice archery, it does not provide evidence that women were able to do so successfully over a sustained period of time against male warriors. Similar to the myth of warrior women of Dahomey, who existed but upon closer examination were more of a bodyguard rather than a combat unit, the concept of women under arms appears exaggerated and generalized to suit the feminist hypothesis.

the way the International Olympic Committee (IOC) does. They are more likely to view combat as a full-contact '*team* event' and the requirements of survival and victory will continue to ultimately dictate the rules that apply rather than any particular ideological position.

2.3 (Un)Deployability

A third major physical limitation that places women at a distinct disadvantage is their ability to have children. Figures place the so-called 'unplanned losses', due to pregnancy, of the US navy at 11.8 per cent of women deployed, with some ships even reporting 16 per cent. 2002 statistics show that the Navy reassigned to shore duty 2,159 pregnant women, or 12.3 per cent of the 17,543 enlisted women on ships (Washington Times, 16 June 2004). The army also indicated in the past that it knew of no initiatives to reduce 'unplanned losses', after 5 per cent of its women in Bosnia fell pregnant during the first year of deployment (The Washington Post, 15 September 1996).[5] Anatomical and biological realities therefore make women more prone to becoming non-combat related 'casualties' for a wide variety of reasons.

The report of the *Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces* 1992 (http://www.cmrlink.org/WomenInCombat.asp?docID=65) assessed that "[n]on-deployability briefings before the Commission showed that women were three times more non-deployable than men, primarily due to pregnancy, during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. According to Navy Captain Martha Whitehead's testimony before the Commission, 'the primary reason for the women being unable to deploy was pregnancy, that representing 47 per cent of the women who could not deploy'."[6] Personnel planning needs to make provision for convalescent leave and other matters associated with child care during deployment.

Vulnerability through debilitating medical conditions associated with standing up to the hips in water, as would be the case in jungle warfare conditions, extreme cold, as would be case in arctic or mountain warfare, is another major factor. While men have experienced the discomfort of blood-sucking leaches settling in the genital area when crossing streams or deployed in swamps, women are highly susceptible to uterus infections and other serious gynecological implications. Even under training conditions, women experience problems with some of the minor realities of a 'combat

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5 The armed forces have meanwhile adopted a more restrictive policy on releasing statistics of this nature.

6 This has been contested with reference to male absenteeism due to drug- and alcohol rehabilitation, arrests due to indiscipline and/or fighting, along with recuperation from injuries sustained in non-military activities such as sports.

day'. Research during field exercises on US recruits found: "One-third of 450 female soldiers surveyed indicated that they experienced problematic urinary incontinence during exercise and field training activities. The other crucial finding of the survey was that 13.3 per cent of the respondents restricted fluids significantly while participating in field exercises" (Military Medicine, October 1997: 690).

This raises the question of special requirements for women's health and hygiene during combat operations that more often than not include extremely primitive conditions. It will be up to the military to uphold the specific requirements of female hygiene against the dictates of battle as well as the efforts of an enemy more able to withstand the conditions of challenging environments. While climate and terrain have always been crucial factors in war, units including women will by default and the physical factors described above, face reduced operational capabilities and deployability as a result. Women themselves tend to shun military career paths involving adverse physical conditions. Field/Nagl (2001: 79) write that a survey among female cadets at the Military Academy at West Point found 30 per cent favoring a combat arms branch. Remarkable is that "only 4 per cent would select infantry, the other 26 per cent favoring armor and field artillery, branches less associated with difficult field conditions, physically arduous tasks, and hand-to-hand fighting".

At the same time the hope of avoiding conditions that jeopardize the military contributions of women has repeatedly been dashed by reality. The reduction in weight of military equipment will continue, but a wide variety of new tasks and additional technological assets place a limit on the weight reduction. Helicopter operations, for example, as well as other aspects of enhanced mobility, indicate that soldiers will spend less time in fortified bases than in previous wars. Troops will spend more time moving and operating over sustained periods of time away from direct supply lines. High-tech warriors are therefore still likely to be carrying the 30 kg combat kits that vary radically in terms of content but weigh nearly the same as that of their great-grandfathers in the fields of Flanders. At the same time they will need to dig in or speedily construct temporary bases, requiring considerable physical investment and, depending on the situation, speed. These are all characteristics of combat, partly avoidable only among support and combat-support units, though not always as the Jessica Lynch incident 2003 proved. During the first Gulf War US Army Captain Mary Roou (cited in Gutmann 2000: 258) concluded in her assessment of the conditions her supply unit faced that: "There is no way that women can dig foxholes or as many as may be required, as men!" She fails to share her conclusions about the deployability of her unit,

when unable to ensure that all its members are capable of providing basic protection against enemy fire.

Finally, the deployment of women is also subject to a biological time limit that poses an ageing challenge. While men are seen to be physically suitable for ground combat as privates or line soldiers until the age of about 32 when they slowly reach beyond their prime, women physically reach their physical 'peak' earlier. In the event that they have children, the implications can be detrimental to physical fitness and often result in permanent reclassification. Despite the above, military institutions are expected to adapt with scant regard for the implications in terms of time schedules, combat performance and survival rates. The likelihood of women being killed or wounded in combat conditions is, as a result of these factors and observations on training-deficits, estimated to be considerably higher than that of men. The more adverse the battlefield conditions are, the higher the casualty rate can be expected to be. While it is generally deemed irresponsible, if not criminal, to send 16 year-old boys or 60 year-old men into combat because most are unable to meet the physical demands of the battlefield, it is widely considered enlightened and progressive to commit women to combat conditions in spite of the obvious and persistent disadvantages they face.

3 Sociological Implications

While the proponents of opening all units to women claim that sexism constitutes the main barrier, opponents point to the negative consequences in terms of unit cohesion, lowered standards and further deployability problems, over and above those already addressed above. Looking at the research over recent years, I will deal with (1) the historical evidence; (2) the lowering of standards; and (3) unit cohesion.

3.1 Historical Evidence

The debate on the historical role of women in combat has been waged for years and this author regards the case presented by Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld (2001) as the most compelling and convincing. Consequently, there will be no further repetition of the details that prove most historical depictions of women in combat as myths. What is beyond dispute is that women have been able to participate in *specific* combat situations. The desperate though ultimately futile participation of native American women in defense of their villages, as just one example, finds mention in the diaries of US Cavalry troopers. George Armstrong Custer attests: "Before engaging in the fight orders were given to prevent the killing of any but the fighting

strength of the village; but in a struggle of this character it is impossible at all times to discriminate, particularly when (...) the squaws are as dangerous adversaries as the warriors." (cited in Goodrich 1997: 143)

Women have performed in a number of different combat situations as vengeful mothers (Hannah Dustin), patriotic slayers (Nancy Hart), as pirates (Anne Bonny and Mary Read), snipers (Maria Ivanova Morozova), resistance fighters (Nancy Wake), terrorists (Ulrike Meinhof) or as combat commander of fighter pilots (Marina Raskova) throughout the ages. Particularly Russian snipers and fighter pilots were dedicated and brave, with the former numbering about 1,500 and being accredited with killing 12,000 German soldiers during the Second World War (Pegler 2004: 178). Women in the Red Army also served as tank and mortar crews, though with less success as will be discussed below. In Britain, women had served in mixed anti-aircraft batteries, as did some of their German counterparts later in the war.

Yet, women were seldom serving in conventional combat situations or at least not over any sustained period of time. In their non-conventional roles they were generally less exposed to the rigors of campaigning, attrition and factors conducive to combat fatigue. Perhaps solely in the role of fighter pilots were they exposed to contesting directly in physical skills with their opponents. And here the comparatively heavy losses of the Soviet combat aviation regiments suggest that despite individual successes, these women were sent into an unfair contest and paid a higher price.[7] The best performance of women in active combat was in their role as snipers, where patience and cunning were more important than strength and endurance. As partisans or insurgents, too, women were and are able to play important roles. 10 per cent of Partisans operating in German occupied parts of the Soviet Union were women (Grenkevich 1999: 239). Women even joined detachments of the 6th SS Mountain Division conducting guerilla warfare in the Taunus area of Germany against advancing American forces in April 1945 (Biddiscombe 1998: 101). In Guerilla or Partisan organizations, women have been able to compensate, in part, for the above mentioned physical disadvantages by the nature of this type of warfare, changing into their feminine civilian roles at will and consequently often avoiding detection through being regarded as non-combatants unless discovered with weapons in their possession.

However, even here, depending on terrain and physical demands of the insurgency or counter-insurgency operations, women appear to have paid a disproportionately high price when participating in combat. Tito partisans lost 25 per cent of their women while only 11 per cent of their men to axis

7 In terms of tasks, some of these aviation regiments were later occupied with night raids involving slow planes, called 'sowing machines' by German troops.

counterinsurgency operations during the Second World War (Creveld 2001: 119).[8]

Where deployed alongside conventional units in combat roles, the more successful units were single-gender units. In mixed units, the results were less encouraging. The large-scale inclusion of women in the Red Army during the Second World War resulted in what could be called massive sexual abuse, but is a phenomenon whereby female soldiers were euphemistically referred to as the 'field wife'. Hastings (2004: 146) cites numerous accounts by men and women who confirm that abortions and deliberate pregnancies were rampant, with a former Red Army doctor concluding: "Whole trainloads of girls were sent home pregnant." Even four decades later, in Afghanistan during that country's civil war, officers and NCO's of the Red Army dueled with hand grenades and pistols over the few women attached to combat units as medical assistants and signals personnel (Navroz 1995: 11). The consequences for military discipline were devastating throughout and in the latter example resulted in operational paralysis, i.e., unit dysfunction.[9]

Disregarding biological realities, proponents of the gender-neutral military concept tend to refer to the apparent success of the Israeli military in integrating women. Yet, the alleged role of women as soldiers in combat and combat support units is viewed as a myth by Martin van Creveld (2003: 187), describing the weapons training given to and by women in the IDF as "symbolic". Their function was and is to fill positions which would otherwise be filled with able-bodied men who are needed in line units. The experience the Israelis made in their struggle for independence until 1948 has resulted in women not being deployed as combatants since then (Grossman 1996: 174).[10]

In the final analysis there is little evidence suggesting that women lack courage or determination, though there is evidence suggesting that they have lower aggression levels. Their attitudes to war and combat may also differ. In

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8 This means that women insurgents were more than twice as likely to become casualties as their male counterparts. Given that a significant number would have been able to avoid death or capture by timely amalgamation with the civilian population, a conventional setting could be expected to see higher casualty figures.

9 Real and alleged sexual transgressions have also become part of the military environment in Western armed forces since the mid-1990s.

10 The reasons for this are found in both the morale and disciplinary problems associated with outburst of irrational violence among male comrades of women that have been killed or wounded in combat, as well as the reluctance of their Arab opponents to surrender to women, which in turn can raise casualties as the enemy now tended to fight with greater resolve (Creveld 1991: 184).

a 2004 poll among US forces, 63 per cent of the men said they believe the US should have gone to war in Iraq, but only 42 per cent of servicewomen shared that view. 65 per cent of men approved of the way President Bush was handling the war while only 48 per cent of women did (Military Times 2005). While Bourke (1999: 311) dispels all concerns about women being more reluctant to kill, medical researchers (see Sidell/Takafuji/Franz 1997: 661) conclude, "Kessler et al found that the lifetime prevalence of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in the United States was twice as high among women", with depression too being claimed to be far more common among women.[11] Even if one were to assume the absence of disparities in terms of attitudes and combat proclivity, this may still be missing the point for two reasons, namely:

- Courage is not necessarily discipline.[12] Western armies having prevailed against non-Western adversaries in most contests over the last five centuries of warfare was not due to any lack of courage on the part of the latter. Quite the contrary is true, these warrior societies had all the attributes, physical and mental, required to excel at combat. Many, like the Zulus or the Aztecs, were even in possession of extraordinary unit discipline and collective courage. What they lacked was what Hanson (2001: 325) describes as "institutionalized bravery that derives from the harmony of discipline, training, and egalitarian values among men and officers. Europeans were careful to organize types of purported courage into a hierarchy, from the singular rashness of bold individual acts to the cohesive shared bravery along a battle line – insisting that the former was only occasionally critical to victory, the latter always". One might add that Western armies profited from a culture of utilitarian rationality that nurtured trust of the soldiers in the military structures. Social engineering and double standards in order to attain the unattainable undermine that trust as they erode unit cohesion.
- Performance as a unit is more than the sum of the individual attitudes and aptitudes.

Women undermine these qualities; pose a threat to discipline and unit cohesion, resulting in a general lowering of standards and combat effectiveness.

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11 Since women in the US have not been engaged in combat in large numbers, there is no data that provides insight into what the effects of combat exposure are. However, it is unlikely that they would show improvement through combat and consequently at the very best the national averages would be reflected among female military personnel.

12 This concept has been borrowed directly from Hanson 2001: 321.

3.2 *Lowering of Standards*

Formal gender barriers could easily be replaced by simply upholding physical standards of military training and task allocation, as Field/Nagl (2001: 83) suggest. While the proposal seems fair by generating objective criteria, it would mean accepting that even an ordinary line combat unit would have one woman for every 130 soldiers. That would be the estimated ratio if physical criteria were adhered to. Women would consequently remain entirely absent from elite units and the combat components of Special Forces. Yet, this flies in the face of Western societies' current understanding of equality and widespread concern about how 'representative' such units would be. Those opposed to restrictions seem unconvinced about the objectivity of physical criteria which they view as 'obstacles' or 'barriers' that are artificially emplaced or specifically designed to keep women out. When thousands of posts were opened to women of the US military in the mid-1990s, few were filled due to women either being non-interested or not meeting the physical requirements. This resulted in allegations of discrimination and calls for quotas or "gender-norming" (Simons 2001: 91), thereby compromising merit as a principle of Western military culture. Even the 1997 RAND Study was edited in order to accommodate the ideological stance on the subject (see http://www.cmr.org.) Again a point of fact is being made into a point of motive. Military physical standards reflect the lessons of military history and the requirements for victory. They have little to do with the preferences of a 'male environment' or 'bastion'. Only if the military were able to withstand the political pressure to follow down this ideological path, could physical criteria replace current gender restrictions.

Training standards have also been compromised. In an effort to avoid causing high rates of injury, instructors have been forced to reduce the physical demands and drill that were previously deemed necessary to ensure functional soldiers. Yet reducing performance to the level of the female physical abilities unavoidably compromises the collective training objectives, while forcing women to keep up with the men greatly increases the number of injuries. Another concern may be that any demands made on women can impact careers if they should lead to complaints or negative press reports. In some fields the changes in training doctrine have been drastic. Physical evaluation of soldiers was forced to set two performance levels, one for men and one for women. Even for relatively short-distance runs at the US Air Force Academy extra time had to be allocated for women or "risk failing 81 per cent of the its

female cadets" (Freeman 1985: 112).[13] As Field/Nagl (2001: 83) point out, this creates the impression of double-standards and causes resentment among men when it comes to promotion. Drill instructors were forced to change their role. Less shouting, more time to complete tasks were some of the immediate changes. Recruits would give their instructors a blue card to indicate that they were feeling 'blue', while women unable to cross the wall on the assault course were provided with a little chair in order to assist them. Bayonets had to be removed from the US Air Force Academy drill rifles because one cadet accidentally stabbed herself in the forehead while pulling her bayonet off during a drill (Freeman 1985: 113). Returning to the military fundamentals like digging foxholes in operational conditions, as Gulf War veteran Mary Roou mentioned above, she adds: "Unfortunately, when you're in basic training and stuff like that, those foxholes are already dug." (cited in Gutmann 2000: 258) Even in the field of logistics, maternity leave, breastfeeding breaks, physical limitations and relationships compromising the chain of command have been seen to result in a wide range of challenges to military functionality.[14] Accommodating the performance disparities between men and women ultimately means forfeiting high standards in favor of agreeing on the lowest common denominator.

The impact of the gender debate becomes more explicit when considered within the context of sexuality and its impact on military discipline. Already prior to co-ed training being re-introduced by the US military in 1996, military sociologist Charles Moskos (1990: 70) pointed out that female officers have an extraordinarily broad definition of sexual harassment, writing that it includes "sexist remarks, sex-based definitions of suitable work, the combat exclusion rule, and so on. Women officers see sexism in the military as something that requires constant vigilance." This is not conducive to unit cohesion and creates a climate conducive to the "rule of suspicion" in the chain of command. It also provides a convenient excuse when things go wrong.

Soon after the introduction of co-ed training, the US military was rocked by revelations of sexual misconduct.[15] Complicating matters further, there are

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13 The greater the distances and the heavier the combat kit, the greater the discrepancies become and the higher the failure rate of women.

14 Major General Antonio Taguba observed in his scathing report (http://rss.msnbc.msn.com/id/4894001/#storyContinued.accessed 13 September 2007) that military police soldiers at Abu Ghraib were weak in basic military occupational skills. The sexual relationships between the men and women involved in the abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq contributed significantly to the deterioration of military discipline.

15 The military had previously, in 1982, decided to discontinue the first co-ed project.

numerous cases of false sexual harassment claims. Both phenomena have been seen to end careers and consequently increase apprehension or distrust among soldiers. An independent advisory committee studied the issue in 1997, and declared unanimously that "[Co-ed basic training] is resulting in less discipline, less unit cohesion, and more distraction from training programs" (cited in http://www.cmr.org). In 2002, an Army briefing conceded that gender-integrated basic training was neither efficient nor effective, seeing positive aspects "only in sociological terms" (cited in http://www.cmr.org). This influences the military culture profoundly and holds implications for the general ability of military institutions to focus on their primary tasks – fighting and winning wars. In surveys taken during separate studies in 1998 and 1999, 78 per cent of US Army leaders expressed the view that discipline had declined in gender-integrated basic training. Deployed operationally, the impact was also evident by the particular group-dynamics of the Abu Ghraib incident, which amounted to an absolute collapse of military discipline with the well-known and far-reaching consequences involved. Major General Antonio Taguba, leading the inquest into the incident, confirmed the lack of military and occupational skills among the military police detachment at the prison, exacerbated by sexual relations among rank and file (see http://www.cmr.org).

It may be of interest to note that this occurred under non-combat conditions in a non-combat unit. The consequences were tragic, embarrassing and politically devastating. In an uncompromising and extremely hazardous combat environment they would be potentially decisive and could easily culminate in defeat. The presence of both sexes in the military, through the very nature of military operations, influences processes of group-bonding and –dynamics differently than in a civilian office environment. When operational the members of military units are in each others presence on a 24-hour basis, involving matters of life and death. Operational conditions are therefore by their very nature intimate, but among heterosexual men never sexual.

Yet, sexual harassment, real and alleged, has become a factor that continues to plague modern militaries and is resulting in dismissals in addition to substantial retention problems. The Pentagon released a report on the results of a 2002 survey suggesting the number of service-women who said they had been sexually assaulted had fallen to 3 per cent from 6 per cent in 1995. Yet, in 2004 more than 100 alleged rapes of fellow soldiers were being investigated among US forces deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq alone. In June 2005 a survey among women serving in the British military revealed that 22 per cent of Navy women claimed they had experienced sexual harassment, 9 per cent of Royal Air Force women and 12 per cent of those serving with the Army (The Guardian, 27 February 2004). Problems associated with romance

or sexual relationships, consensual and non-consensual, have necessitated harassment prevention regulations. These, however justified, might well be viewed as being as detrimental to group dynamics and unit cohesion, contributing to an atmosphere of suspicion.

The *Center for Military Readiness* (http://www.cmr.org) sums up a number of conclusions from a wide variety of studies focusing on the impact of co-ed training:

- "Less discipline, less unit cohesion, and more distraction from training programs."
- "Voluntary and involuntary misconduct, due to an emotionally volatile environment for which leaders and recruits are unprepared."
- "Higher physical injury and sick call rates that detract from primary training objectives."
- "Diversion from essential training time due to interpersonal distractions and the need for an extra week of costly 'sensitivity training'."
- "A perceived decline in the overall quality and discipline of GIBT [Gender Integrated Basic Training]; lack of confidence in the abilities of fellow soldiers; and the need to provide remedial instruction to compensate for military skills not learned in basic training."

"This often leaves basic trainees deficient in critical building block skills necessary for advanced training", the report concludes.

3.3 Unit Cohesion

Unlike civilian group dynamics and concepts of cohesion, the military context demands that unit members must become totally dependent on each other over a sustained period of time in order to complete their mission and optimize their chances of survival.[16] On the micro-level all members of the group must meet the requirements and standards of combat effectiveness. If one or more members are unable to perform, for whatever reason, individual and group survival are jeopardized. Cohesion is therefore essentially based upon the presence of *trust* among group members, both in their own ability and that of their peers. As mentioned earlier – along with those sociological aspects fostering distrust and threatening unit cohesion –, if too many group-members are unable to perform adequately, the group becomes dysfunctional. A further vital component is faith in the principle of merit and Western mili-

16 Cohesion constitutes the feelings that bind individuals to the primary group, morale deals with how individuals feel, while esprit de corps describes the feelings that bind individuals to larger units (Simons 2001: 93).

taries have adhered to it because they understand its importance in the terms of motivation. Sexual relationships, lust, love and associated factors such as favoritism, jealousies, all normal human emotions, irreparably disrupt cohesion, undermine discipline and tend to result in force degradation of which the above mentioned dueling Russian officers in Afghanistan was just one example. As Simons (2001: 95) point out: "Love rearranges loyalties. It binds one pair of individuals more closely to one another than to anyone else. The good-of-the-group shrinks to two." The emotional setting of 'comraderie' or the 'buddy-system' is altered profoundly through the introduction of women.

Fighting wars, both in the combat and combat-support functions, remains an extraordinary experience that punishes inaptitude in a way that few other occupations do. Introducing measures that jeopardize unit cohesion are therefore invariably ingredients for unnecessary losses and failure. The main challenges to morale, unit cohesion and esprit de corps on the macro-level include the following:

Deployment problems: The above-mentioned deployment problem of women due to biological predisposition is exacerbated by the sociological fall-out of the same phenomenon. After a Marine Sergeant deployed in Iraq gave birth on an operational US Warship in May 2003, *Center for Military Readiness* President Elaine Donnelly renewed her call for a full and detailed review of all Clinton-era social policies in the military, claiming they "offer overly generous education, housing, and medical benefits to pregnant sailors, regardless of marital status or number of pregnancies", adding that such measures "have created a perverse incentive for irresponsible behavior and single parenthood, especially in the enlisted ranks" (see http://www.cmr.org, 12 June 2003). Donelly's criticism is supported by a visible trend since the late 1980s that saw a disproportionate number of single-mothers among the recruits. By 1989 there were twice as many single parents in the navy than among the civilian population (Gutmann 2000: 131). In 2005, 7.8 per cent of the total armed forces personnel were single parents, 10.7 per cent of the Army and 4.7 per cent of the Marines fall into that category (see http://www.usmilitary.about.com). Yet, this is not limited to women, with the majority of single parents actually being men. A related consequence of these policies, particularly for the US military, is that in 2005 it had 168,000 members married to other members of the military, a total of 84,000 married military couples. The sociological implications of this, force the military to consider a wide variety of non-operational aspects when deciding on deployability. The prospect of a combat commander not entirely certain of exact unit-strength during an emerging crisis is no longer inconceivable. The number of 'unplanned losses' may grow exponentially depending on the operational

conditions and morale. The negative impact of this on unit cohesion, reaction time and force-level projection should require little elaboration.

Feminization: Women frequently imposed their own physical limitations on their male counterparts through the lowering of standards and by demanding changes to regulations, as has found mention above. These changes have been termed "feminization" by some (Creveld 2003: 166). And indeed some of the demands for change touch on the essentials of military organization. A former senior Army officer and current lecturer at Queens College Cambridge called for an end to the ban on sexual affairs between officers and other ranks in March 2005, describing the existing rules as outdated and unrealistic given the growing number of women in the military (The Daily Telegraph, 9 March 2005). Anita Blair, Chairman of the *Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues* shares the concern of "feminization" when in 1994 she concluded: "As a result of my work on the commission, I became convinced that the objective for many who advocate greater female influence in the armed services is not so much to conquer the military as conquer manhood: They aim to make the most quintessentially masculine of our institutions more feminine." (Gutmann 2000: 152) Concepts of 'gender-mainstreaming' and 'gender-norming' play an increasing role in Western militaries because of their prevalence in the public debate. Discussions about allocating 'gender-advisors' to operational units during training and when deployed abroad in UN peacekeeping missions are taking place in European parliaments.[17] A joint parliamentary initiative of the German coalition government in November 2006 regarding UN-Resolution 1325 provides an example for the kind of fuzzy logic that reflects the current understanding of war, stating that "the by far most frequent form of violence is not exercised by enemy soldiers or militias but by male family-members" (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/3501, 21 November 2006). Blurring the distinction between domestic and organized violence, i.e., war, and atrocities may be a privilege reserved for surplus societies and feminist theory, but hardly provides a realistic description of war as experienced by women in Darfur, Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia.[18] It is, however, indicative of the inherent irrationality on military matters that translates into unpractical and dangerous reforms. The lowering of standards, associated with the developments described here, creates a false sense of security among

17 In personal discussions with the author, soldiers have drawn analogies with the concept of 'political commissars' and similar ideological structures that have historically undermined operational freedom and efficiency.

18 The German National Archives would provide the authors of the initiative with ample opportunity to compare domestic with organized violence in, for example, Königsberg in April 1945.

women who feel they have been trained as soldiers and ultimately face the realities of combat for which they have not been adequately prepared.

4 Conclusion

The opening of Western militaries to women is largely based on questionable false assumptions about gender and the nature of future war. There is little evidence that the military challenges of the future or modern training methods make the military environment more tolerable for combat-support and combat personnel. The demands of war will remain uncompromisingly hazardous beyond the capabilities of most women and sending them into combat leaves them at a distinct disadvantage that is potentially deadly beyond normal attrition.

There are almost no visible benefits and few concrete proposals about ways of overcoming the challenges associated with women expanding into more arms of service. Given the impact that the debate and the continuing compensatory measures designed to overcome supposed 'barriers' is having on standards and combat preparedness, Western armed forces are in danger of losing their competitive advantage.

The only feasible alternative to combat exclusion regulation is that personal ability and merit are the criteria strictly upheld. Since the chances of holding that position against the pressure of a generation of politicians who have never personally experienced the unrelenting rules of combat are slim, it will require military failure on the scale of the Srebrenica incident to make the point that soldiering remains a serious and essentially exclusive trade.

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Off Limits: The Cults of the Body and Social Homogeneity as Discoursive Weapons Targeting Gender Integration in the Military

Helena Carreiras & Gerhard Kümmel

> *The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie – deliberate, contrived and dishonest – but the myth – persistent, persuasive and unrealistic.*
>
> *(John F. Kennedy 1962 as quoted in Macknick 1999: 18)*

1 Posing the Problem

The history of including women in the armed forces and also in para-military groups is a quite long one (cf., e.g., the contributions in DeGroot/Peniston-Bird 2000). Whether as camp followers, nurses, revolutionaries, spies, soldiers in disguise or as regular female soldiers and as supreme commanders, women have engaged in a multitude of classifications and trades and continue to do so (Wheelwright 1989; Jones 1997; Seidler 1998; Blythe 2001). In addition to these roles, women have been subject to military activities as non-combatants; they have been taken as hostages and trophies, they have been killed, they have been wounded and they have been tortured, raped and utilized for prostitution (cf. Enloe 1989; Albrecht-Heide/Bujewski-Crawford 1991; Pollock Sturdevant/Stoltzfus 1993; Stiglmayer 1994; Hicks 1994; Allen 1996; Skjelsbaek 2001). Thus, women are enmeshed in the military and its activities in a huge variety of ways. Yet, our focus here is the integration of females into the armed forces, an area in which, in recent decades, notable developments have occurred. Indeed, in the course of time, women have remarkably extended their military roles to even include combat thereby challenging the common view of the armed forces as a male domain and the male-warrior paradigm (Dunivin 1994). This process of 'normalization' of female participation in the military can be attributed to a mixture of different factors, among them in a first approach: women have been granted access to the military in times of a military emergency, i.e., in times of war; they have been recruited when there was a shortage of military personnel; and they themselves have forcefully demanded their inclusion in the process of women's emancipation.

As long as the history of opening the military to females, if not even longer, is the controversy around this issue. At times, the discourse had its

peaks, at others, the debate ebbed away. The protagonists in this debate are numerous and, in a first approach, they may briefly be sketched according to their basic orientation on this issue: These orientations range from the ones who are strictly opposed to any utilization of women in the armed forces to those for whom a conditional and limited access of females to the military is feasible to the ones who ardently support complete access for women. In the present article, we will not map the debate at large. Instead, we will concentrate on what we call the military traditionalists. The reason for such a focus is our sense that in recent years and, more specifically, in the wake of the terrorist suicide attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing war on terror with its most intense materialization in Afghanistan and Iraq we have been witnessing some kind of renaissance of direct ground combat in military operational thinking. And in parallel to this emergence of some new cult of direct ground combat the issue of integrating females into the military and granting them access even to combat occupations and specialties has been (re-)moving up on the agenda and reinvigorating a debate that has actually never faded away. One indication of this trend is the *Center for Military Readiness* (CMR 2003) campaign against Gender-Integrated Basic Training in the US which is to be seen in light of the fact "that military women, both enlisted and officers, are beginning to enter more nontraditional fields such as aviation, surface warfare, air traffic control, and field artillery" (GAO 1999: 1).

In what follows, then, we will examine and deconstruct two of the most pervasive and most important discoursive weapons targeting gender integration in the military, the cult of the body and the cult of homogeneity. Both reside in an essentialist conviction that nature and biology decide in the end and both adhere to what Robert W. Connell (1987: 66) once described as the "doctrine of natural difference" that creates "a limit beyond which thought cannot go" and that has re-assumed a notable relevance within a larger sociocultural environment marked by an "ascendancy of biologistic explanations in general" (Harrison 2006: 38). Yet, this doctrine may rest on a foundation much weaker than expected because although we do not deny differences between the sexes, we tend to agree with Thomas Laqueur (1990) who has advanced the idea of the making of sex and perceives sex as an intentionally invented concept and a crafted biological entity rather than an undisputable natural given (see also Fausto-Sterling 1992). In a similar vein, looking at the "nature-nurture debate", Joshua Goldstein argued that "real biology is a lot more complicated and less deterministic" and viewed the "relationship between biology and social behavior" as "a system of reciprocal causality through multiple 'feedback loops' – a complex two-way causality between biology and culture" (Goldstein (2001: 131, 129).

2 The Cult of the Body

The military traditionalists primarily stress what they see as the perennial and genuine physical and psychological qualities of men such as aggressiveness, physical strength, action orientation, boldness, stamina, willingness to endure exposure to extreme physical danger and readiness to taking lives and withstand the bloody requirements of war. These are mirrored in the adherence to the myth of the genuinely peace-loving, passive, gentle and squeamish woman which denies these attributes to women and the female body and psyche. The military traditionalists then go on to say that women are the ones to be protected by men because of their family roles of child birth and child rearing. Among the military traditionalists is the well-known Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld who maintains that the feminization of the military is equivalent to its weakening and decline leaving the armed forces in the awkward position of being successively incapable of doing for what they have been invented. He writes that "if only because research shows that going into combat is the last thing most military women want, the more of them there are around the less capable those military are of acting as effective combat units" (Creveld 2001: 442).

In the end, the 'effectiveness' argument assumes that the military is different from the rest of the society: its mission, to provide security, is singular and takes precedence over all others; therefore the role of the military is not to grant equal rights to all individuals. The basic assumption shared by those who believe that women, by their very nature, represent a danger to military readiness is that the military should not be used as a social laboratory. Because the presence of women is seen as jeopardizing the effectiveness of the forces, their access to combat functions is considered a risk for the security of the nation. Tuten has put it bluntly: "[T]he primary function of the U.S. armed services is to provide for common defense – not to redress perceived social and sexual inequalities in our society. (...) The primary function of the military services is to defend the American society, not to change it. To the extent that we use the military as a testbed for social experimentation we risk the security of the nation." (Tuten 1982: 261) In a similar vein, Marlowe (1983: 195) sustained that "if we are serious about the missions that are mandated for the combat arms, we cannot afford to make them a locus of social experimentation" (see also Moskos 1993).

Women like Stephanie Gutmann basically agree with these ideas. She sustains that "the nineties were a decade in which the brass handed over their soldiers to social planners in love with an unworkable (and in many senses undesirable) vision of a politically correct utopia, one in which men and women toil side by side, equally good at the same tasks, interchangeable,

and, of course, utterly distracted by sexual interest" (Gutmann 2000: 12). And Brian Mitchell also argues that the integration of women into the military "threatens to leave the American military no more disciplined, no more efficient, no more fearsome, no more military than the United States Postal Service" (Mitchell 1998: XVII). In a later, somewhat lengthier passage he neatly summarizes his position which comes very close to the ideal-type, classical formulation of the military traditionalist standpoint: "No one, it seems, is courageous enough to approach the issue of women in the military as one would any other issue, analyzing it with cold rationality in the simple terms of costs versus benefits. The problem, of course, with weighing the pluses and minuses of using women in the military is that there are too many minuses. A partial list would include higher rates of attrition, greater need for medical care, higher rates of non-availability, lower rates of deployability, lesser physical ability, aggravated problems of single-parenthood, dual-service marriages, fraternization, sexual harassment, sexual promiscuity, and homosexuality, all of which adversely affect unit cohesion, morale, and the fighting spirit of the armed forces. Against these many disadvantages, women offer the military one single advantage: they are better behaved. They lose less time for disciplinary reasons and are less prone to drug and alcohol abuse. And even this is not true for the Air Force, where men are as well behaved as women. From a strict cost-benefit standpoint, the military use of women makes sense for only a handful of jobs, largely in the medical professions (...). For all other military jobs, the only reason to use women is not a military reason. It is a political reason driven by an ideology that is hostile to the military." (Mitchell 1998: 340f.)

This targeting of women's individual characteristics, their bodies and psychological characteristics that supposedly make them less effective combatants includes factors like physical strength, menstruation, pregnancy, emotionality, and ability to perform under stress and can be found in governmental reports as well. The *British Employment of Women in the Armed Forces Steering Group* serves to illustrate this well (see Textbox 1).

Textbox 1: Gender Differences in Bio-Medical Aspects of Performance and Mental Characteristics

> Anatomical and physiological factors disadvantage women in most aspects of physical performance. Male attributes of greater height, weight, fat free mass and lower body fat are associated with better performance in military tasks such as lifting and carrying weights, and marching with a load. Muscle strength, endurance and power are 30-60% lower in women, and only 1% of women math the mean level of these attributes in men. Similarly in aerobic fitness, only the fittest 1% of women reach the level of fitness of the average man. Thus women have a lower overall work capacity and must exert themselves 25–30% more than a man to achieve the same output. By operating closer to their maximum level more of the time, endurance is reduced. (...)
>
> Men and women exhibit similar gains in fitness as a result of training, but women may not have the same overall capacity. In part this is due to a lower capacity for increasing muscle bulk because of lower levels of testosterone. Differences between men and women are less among trained soldiers than among recruits, with women narrowing the gap in levels of aerobic fitness. However, size and muscle bulk remain the most important factors associated with increased performance of military tasks. (...)
>
> Because women are generally working at a higher percentage of their maximal effort to achieve the same levels of performance as men, they are at increased risk of over-use injury, and this finding was confirmed by morbidity data from the Army's Training Agency and from the Field Army. Smaller size and lower bone density also predispose to a higher incidence of stress fractures. However, men and women of equal fitness have an equal incidence of injuries. (...)
>
> While there is little evidence to suggest that the onset of a normal menstrual period affects job performance, irregular menstrual cycles pose health risks, and painful menstruation can impair performance. (...)
>
> After physical capacity, the second largest area of gender difference was apparent in the capacity for aggression. There was evidence that women required more provocation and were more likely to fear the consequences of their aggressive behaviour. (...)
>
> Source: Employment of Women in the Armed Forces Steering Group 2002: 4f.

Women's physical characteristics such as lack of physical (upper body) strength, menstruation and pregnancy have always been seen as limiting women's capabilities to perform military tasks, especially those related to combat. Tuten (1982: 248) has noted that "few would deny that these physical attributes are essential to the soldier or marine in ground combat. Therefore (...), the exclusion of women from front-line ground combat is mandated by their lesser physical capabilities." Yet, this conclusion seems overly rash and is not in line with reality which is much less clear than the military tradi-

tionalists want us to believe. Although it is true that there are physical as well as psychological differences between the sexes (see Sharp 1993; Goldstein 2001: ch. 3), it is important to note that "individual characteristics tend to be distributed, within each gender, in a 'bell-curve' distribution" which leads us to the "key issue" of "how much the male and female bell-curves overlap" (Goldstein 2001: 132, 133). The debate on women in the military thus suffers from what Goldstein (2001: 134) calls a "tyranny of averages" since the discussion judges individuals by group attributes, i.e., it is about "average gender differences without taking into account variation within each gender". Even the *British Employment of Women in the Armed Forces Steering Group* (2002: B-5) expects "a tiny minority of women estimated at 0.1% of recruits and 1% of trained soldiers who could probably achieve the required standards and perform the job effectively without sustaining higher injury rates. These elite women will be as physically capable as their average male counterparts (...)." This resonates with an even older British study which reached the conclusion that women, by way of appropriate training, could develop the same levels of physical fitness of similarly sized men (see Brower 1996: 13). Also, there are studies that reveal concern about lower stress resistance of females as unfounded. Indeed, a survey of 477 sports competitors (288 men; 189 women) on coping strategies related to stressful events found that "male and female athletes exhibited far more similarities than differences in their coping patterns. This finding supports the contention that female athletes, particularly at elite level, possess similar psychological characteristics to their male counterparts." (Anshel/Porter/Quek 1998: 375)

Next to this, physical fitness standards themselves need to be put into question since there is neither the clarity needed as to what kind of capabilities should actually be tested nor are these tests identical throughout the armed forces. So far, there is only "an insufficient basis to recommend common service-wide fitness test standards since acceptable objective criteria are lacking. The future development of appropriate criteria upon which to base general physical fitness standards, along with proper considerations of training potential, should lead to more objective and supportable standards. These standards would be based on justified requirements rather than subjective levels that are empirically derived." (Vogel 1999: 11) It may even very well be that different physical fitness standards do make sense because the "various training programs among different Services provide various ways to enhance fitness performance in order to help achieve maximum proficiency from military members both on and off the battlefield. There is no conclusive evidence that all military members, regardless of occupational specialty, unit assignment, age or gender, should acquire the same level of physical fitness. Fitness needs to promote a standard of physical readiness commensurate with the active lifestyle and deployability of the military profession. Since each

Service has a different mission, approach, and capability in meeting these general fitness goals, there needs to be some flexibility in meeting a common physical fitness standard." (Godfrey 2005: 11f.)

Moreover, there are different dimensions of fitness. It is widely accepted that all "military personnel regardless of occupational specialty, unit assignment, age or gender should acquire a base level of general physical fitness. (...) Such a DoD-wide generalized fitness standard will enhance overall health, physical well-being, military readiness and appearance. This base level of fitness can then be used as a springboard to train personnel for further physically demanding occupational specialties or unit assignments and deployable combat readiness." (Vogel 1999: 3) In this vein, one could distinguish (1) general physical fitness; (2) physical fitness "for military occupational specialties"; and (3) physical fitness concerning "mission or combat readiness requirements" (Vogel 1999: 14, 15; see also Macknick 1999; Krainz 2003). This, indeed, is often been overlooked as is the case with complaints about gendered double standards in physical fitness. The *US General Accounting Office* thus states very clearly that "the physical fitness program is actually intended only to maintain the general fitness and health of military members and fitness testing is not aimed at assessing the capability to perform specific missions or military jobs" (GAO 1998c: 6), which would have to be met by both male and female applicants to a certain occupation or specialty (see also Segal 1983: 206). Change in standards is itself a difficult issue; usually pre-existent standards are reified as if they are something outside anyone's agency or ability to challenge. Since physical tests were initially conceived to measure men's physical fitness with limited equipment, this reinforces perceptions of inequality. Not only are women being evaluated by traits on which average men score higher than average women but those physical traits in which women would outperform men are not routinely included such as measures of flexibility which is also part of fitness (see Krainz 2003).

Last, but not least, the complaint about incoming female recruits reducing military effectiveness looks very much different when seen in the light of wider recruiting practices in the military under the impact of the war in Iraq. The US, e.g., has increased the number of waivers granted to Army recruits with criminal backgrounds by no less than 65 per cent between 2003 and 2006. Overall, in this period of time, more than 125,000 service members with criminal histories have been accepted by the US military. This is to be seen in addition to other practices to meet recruiting goals such as larger enlistment cash bonuses up to 90,000 USD in cash and in benefits, easier access to American citizenship through military service, loosened weight and age restrictions, lower scores on intellectual and physical aptitude tests to join the military and a higher number of high school dropouts. Since recruiting

problems are complemented by retention problems, re-enlistment bonuses of up to 150,000 USD, depending on the length of re-enlistment and knowledge and capabilities needed, are to be named as well (Mian 2005; Associated Press, 5 July 2005; Jelinek 2006; Turse 2006; Alvarez 2007; Bender/Baron 2007)[1].

3 The Cult of Social Homogeneity

The cult of social homogeneity rests upon the presumed and feared effects of women's presence on cohesion and morale in military units, such as detrimental interpersonal processes leading to sub-optimal performance and the distortion of male-bonding. Behind the argument that the presence of women affects male bonding and thus performance is the belief that effective or successful performance is the result of cohesion, and this, in turn, is a result of social homogeneity. By interfering in the unit cohesion of male-bonded groups women would thus represent a threat to effectiveness, especially in combat situations. Gabriel has clearly expressed this point-of-view when arguing "that combat effectiveness is only partially, and probably only a small part, the result of well-applied technical skills. (...) military unit effectiveness and cohesion are far more the result of sociopsychological bonding – anthropologically, male bonding – among soldiers in combat groups. Without this crucial bonding units disintegrate under stress no matter how technically proficient or well-equipped they are." (Gabriel 1980, quoted in Tuten 1982: 251) One may just take the issue of the physical fitness test just discussed. Here, it is feared that, partially because of the perceived injustice of gender-norming the physical fitness and training standards, deeply emotional reactions may occur which possibly disrupt the cohesion of military units and thus their performance. In fact, physical performance may become one important source of perception of inequity and inequality. Referring to the physical fitness test soldiers have to go through for admission and training, Segal (1999: 576) has noted that "since a woman can pass the test with a performance for which a man would fail, many male soldiers believe that women are given unfair advantage".[2]

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1 The Canadian Forces has even dropped the physical fitness test for prospective soldiers, i.e., an elimination of physical fitness from the selection process, effective 1 October 2006, arguing that they will find means to bring soldiers into shape (CBC News 2006).

2 Interestingly, the author also notes that such concerns are rarely voiced with regard to differential standards by age (Segal 1999: 576).

Textbox 2: The Impact of Gender upon Cohesion

Several studies illustrated the influence of negative and positive attitudes to gender that exist within groups, and showed that the perception of status, and prevalent stereotypes, can affect group dynamics and ultimately group effectiveness. The findings from research into small groups highlighted common problems in constructing cohesive teams, and the importance of maintaining them through effective one-to-one interaction and teamwork skills. (...)
Organisational culture is a strong determinant of views about appropriate conduct, and has been shown to influence the achievement of goals. Studies have shown that some military groupings derive their group identity from a set of masculine values. Other organisational work shows that violation of norms that express the identity and values of a group can have a major impact on the group's performance. (...)
A further review has been undertaken since this study was commissioned to determine the extent of knowledge about the effects of introducing lone women into a male grouping. Negative consequences reported include the high profile given to token women, isolation, and pressure to demonstrate performance. (...)
There is a wide body of literature that reports on the psychological differences between men and women. This work covers many areas from mental/cognitive characteristics to leadership and performance in mixed gender groups. These areas have also been investigated in a number of different environmental settings ranging through business, academic and military. The findings and results from this work have produced ambiguous evidence concerning the psychological differences between men and women. The end result is that no clear conclusion can be drawn regarding the psychological characteristics of men and women. In the area of group dynamics, it may be easier to achieve and maintain cohesion in a single sex team, and there is resistance to inclusion of members who do not conform to group norms. (...)
It will be necessary to define more clearly the physical and mental requirements of combat before it is possible to judge whether women could perform as effectively as men. No evidence was found to suggest that mixed gender teams performed less well than single sex teams in settings that did not include combat. The importance of attitudes to changes in established views, and the importance of organisational culture was emphasised, and led to recommendations for the further studies (...).

Source: Employment of Women in the Armed Forces Steering Group 2002: 5f.

A similar effect may be expected with regard to promotions, professional military education, and key assignment where service to service data for the US military between 1993 and 1997 found that "the Army and the Navy had more significant differences in favor of men, while the Marine Corps and the Air Force had higher numbers of significant differences in favor of women" (GAO 1998a: 2). Further disruptive effects of females upon cohesion are

given by the *British Employment of Women in the Armed Forces Steering Group* (see Textbox 2).

Several arguments have been put forward to counter these apprehensions. Concerning the argument of male bonding, e.g., the evidence of women's prominent role in terrorist and guerilla groups has been cited (Binkin/Bach 1977: 91). Even stronger discoursive weight has to be attached to studies focusing on the military performance of mixed units. Two studies conducted by the US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences in the mid-1970s already examined the performance of women both in noncombatant units during training programs (MAXWAC) and while away from home installations during extended field exercises (REFWAC). In both cases results showed no significant relationship between the proportion of women and the readiness and operational capability of the units. (Binkin/Bach 1977; Holm 1993) More recently, the participation of women in peacekeeping missions has been a source of information regarding the performance of mixed groups in field situations. Various authors who have studied this issue concluded that men and women may get along much better in difficult and stressful field conditions than in the barracks because sharing tasks and goals might make integration easier and increase the possibility that people are seen as individuals more than members of a group or sexual category (Moskos 1988; Miller/Moskos 1995). Moskos' study of the US Granaderio exercise in Honduras examined the performance of male and female soldiers in a difficult field situation. According to Moskos, "the incorporation of women in the extended deployment and field conditions of Honduras can be recorded as a success story. On balance, the women were working well in demanding jobs in a difficult environment. Work relations between the sexes were better in the field setting than was often the case in garrison. Over time, the women came to be regarded and evaluated as individuals rather than as a sexual category. This individuation contributed more than anything else to the successful incorporation of women into nontraditional assignments." (Moskos 1988: 42f.). In another study, Devilbiss found evidence that "cohesion is based on commonality of experience, shared risk, and mutual experiences of hardship, not on gender distinction" (Devilbiss 1985: 543). A research conducted by Miller/Moskos (1995) among American soldiers deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina, concluded that there was a generalized acceptance of women in peacekeeping operations: 98 per cent of the soldiers, both male and female, favored the participation of women in this type of mission.

Similar findings can be retrieved with regard to the Gulf War in the early 1990s. Here, the role of servicewomen within the American troops was substantial. "Women filled a variety of jobs, ranging from medical positions to aircraft weapons assembler and loaders. Along with men, women performed

generic deployment-related tasks, including setting up and tearing down tents, filling sandbags for building bunkers, and burning human waste. Perceptions of women's performance were highly positive. Some people expressed concerns about women's physical strength capabilities; however, teamwork was frequently cited as a way physical strength limitations were overcome for both women and men." (GAO 1993: 3) The *US General Accounting Office* summarized that "[o]verall, the unit commanders and focus group participants gave primarily positive assessments of women's performance in the Persian Gulf War. (...) women and men endured similar harsh encampment facilities and conditions. Health and hygiene problems during the deployment were considered inconsequential for both men and women. Cohesion in mixed gender units was generally considered to be effective during deployment, and the unit commanders and focus group participants often described cohesion as being best while the units were deployed." (GAO 1993: 3) Next to this, although "many said that men felt a need to protect women, they gave little support for the notion that such attitudes distracted men from their responsibilities" (GAO 1993: 3f.). In addition, "there was little difference in perceptions of women's and men's ability to deal with the stress of the deployment. (...) Gender homogeneity was not reported by focus group participants as a requirement for effective unit cohesion during the deployment." (GAO 1993: 4) Thus, gender-integrated units seem to be as effective as all-male units and they seem to create some form of cohesion since "members of gender-integrated units develop brother-sister bonds rather than sexual ones. (...) Experience has shown that actual integration diminishes prejudice and fosters group cohesiveness more effectively than any other factor." (Peach 1994: 12f.)

In another study, Harrell/Miller (1997) found that gender integration in military units had "a relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion, and morale" and that leadership and training were of more importance. They conceded that gender was an issue in some units they studied, but in units where there were conflicts between sub-groups. Yet, they also noted explicitly positive effects of gender integration as professional standards improved. The ongoing war in Iraq has proven the utility of servicewomen in combat zones. Women in the US military "are now permitted to serve in more than 90 per cent of military occupations, thought they are still barred from jobs or units whose main mission is direct ground combat. But the fluid lines of conflict in Iraq have put the units in which women serve, such as military police, supply, and support, in the line of fire, challenging traditional ideas about what constitutes a 'combat' position. 'Women are fighting, they are in the streets and on the patrols', says Pat Foote, a retired Army Brigadier General. 'They are running the convoys, getting shot at and shooting back'." (Yeager 2007: 54)

Lory Manning, a retired Navy Captain, concurs: "'We now have units under fire with men and women in them', Manning says. 'We have experience of women firing weapons. They don't fall to emotional bits.' Nor has the American public fallen to bits." (Yeager 2007: 55)

In various aspects, this debate mirrors the one about homosexuals in the military. Interestingly, in both cases the debate centers less on women's or gay's attitudes than on claims about heterosexual men and their response to having women or gays with them in their units. Yet, as pointed out by Segal, "if men believe that women are not part of their group and that they cannot function with women around, this belief will disrupt functioning and may hinder actual ability to cope with the stress of combat, thereby serving as a self-fulfilling prophecy" (Segal 1982: 278). But even if we admit that the presence of women or other minority categories may have disruptive effects upon the cohesiveness of all-male groups, and that this is an important issue to be addressed by policy-makers, the question remains to assess the relationship between cohesion and performance. Contradicting intuitive ideas, research results in this field seem to be extremely elusive and inconclusive. Kier has underlined the fact that cohesion is only one of multiple factors that may affect group performance and that its contribution may be both considerably less significant and more complex than often assumed (Kier 1999: 44). For instance, there is little evidence of a casual relationship between cohesion and performance. Only a modest positive correlation has been identified and, even in this case, analysts seem to be more confident that successful performance leads to cohesion than the contrary (Kier 1999: 41).

Additionally, cohesion can be beneficial or damaging to a group's performance. Group cohesion can be dysfunctional to organizational performance whenever the group goals are contrary to those of the organization, or when the group develops a subculture that makes acts of resistance feasible. This was observed during the Vietnam War, where certain groups developed a powerful ideology of their own that was more likely to reinforce dissent from, than commitment to the service's larger goals and normative claims (Helmer 1974; Westbrook 1980 as quoted in Kier 1999: 42). A fundamental distinction to understand this issue is that between two components of cohesion: social cohesion and task cohesion. Social cohesion refers to emotional personal bonds that unite people, such as friendship, caring or closeness; task cohesion refers to a shared collective commitment to achieve goals. Research has clearly shown that while the more instrumental nature of task cohesion seems to have a positive influence on performance the same cannot be said about social cohesion (McCoun 1993; Kier 1999: 43). Where a small correlation has been identified between cohesion and performance, task cohesion was found to be the critical component. In various studies not only did social

cohesion show no contribution to the cohesion-performance link, but it has even been shown to hinder productivity, a result that has been replicated in historical and sociological research of military units. Researchers have identified multiple factors that may explain this pattern: affective bonding may provide a kind of 'shield' against external authority, it may influence commanders to be less willing to push the members of the group and in socially cohesive groups individuals may tend to devote more energy to strengthen interpersonal relationships than to achieve common tasks. These results also confirm those obtained regarding the effects of homogeneity on performance. Various studies have highlighted a similar conclusion: homogeneous groups are not necessarily more effective than more heterogeneous groups. Consistency of beliefs may produce rigidity and generate forms of what has been called 'strategic myopia', the difficulty in admitting that things could or should be different (Lorsch 1985).

In sum, although similar individuals tend to seek one another's company, and cohesive groups may often be more enjoyable, they are not always more productive. Even admitting that social cohesion may under certain conditions improve military performance, there seem to be reasons to believe that cohesion does not depend on discrimination against women, gays or lesbians. Kier has identified five reasons to sustain this claim. First, even if sexist and homophobic attitudes may help build military cohesion, that does not mean they are the best, optimal and even less the only way to achieve unit cohesion. Second, the factors that affect the formation of primary group ties are as diverse as the stability of membership, group size, frequency and duration of contact, the group's recent experience, the presence of a threat or crisis, the quality of leadership and the sense of equity within the group. Building in-group cohesion is thus something that can be achieved in many different ways, and shared values and attitudes can be created among disparate members. Third, research has indicated that social cohesion based on homogeneity (such as the one most likely to derive from 'male-bonding') is the less likely to contribute to military effectiveness. Fourth, as shown above, studies of field situations have demonstrated that when task cohesion was achieved within a group the presence of women did not damage performance. On the contrary, the distinction between the group and the outsiders was prevalent over that of the sexes within the group. Fifth, the fact that women are presently an active part of military forces and play an important role in terms of force stability, suggests that tolerating sexism and homophobic attitudes is dysfunctional. As Kier puts it, "any form of discrimination toward organizational members is pernicious in an organization that performs group tasks and depends on the integration of all individuals and units. Even if these attitudes once served important functions in the military, they are unnecessary and

they undermine military effectiveness." (Kier 1999: 47) From the policy-making point of view, this conclusion supports the vision that 'managing diversity' (see Soeters/Meulen 2007) more then assuring homogeneity is the fundamental challenge for personnel policies in modern armed forces.

4 Conclusion

Our analysis and review of literature has deconstructed the cults of the body and of social homogeneity that aim at undermining the integration of females into the armed forces. Indeed, we could prove that effectiveness is not really affected by the presence of women, neither in terms of the military's challenges of the body nor in terms of cohesion. Good leadership, technological innovation (e.g., ergonomic studies) or monitoring programs may help produce the necessary adjustments. Yet, this does not mean that attitudes towards military women have changed significantly. In fact, some believe that "there is both empirical and theoretical basis for asserting that increased contact between men and women in the military workplace will not in and of itself lead to an improvement in attitudes towards women" (Rosen et al. 1996: 539). Negative attitudes persist despite positive performance results.

While some authors have emphasized the importance of institutional policy to change such negative attitudes (Yoder/Adams/Prince 1983; Rosen et al. 1996), others have stressed the major impact of culture and the limits of formal policies in redressing culturally entrenched stereotypes. According to this later position, acceptance problems happen because of the central role that hegemonic masculinity has played in the construction of military identity and also because of its nice fit with another military core value, uniformity. "Persistent gender discrimination suggests that there are aspects of military culture that actively promote intolerance. Military culture is at odds with official policy on gender integration because masculinity has traditionally been central to military identity and culture." (Katzenstein/Reppy 1999a: 2) In this view, frequent incidents related to sexual harassment, for instance, should not be understood as a failure to have rules, but rather as a result of the clash between a sexist culture and official policies on gender integration. Accounting for the persistence of many of the problems of gender integration in the military is a dominant culture of masculinity more than the lack of rules, the deficient leadership or the absence of adequate policy. The question thus remains for research to investigate the extent to which the increasing representation of women, their access to more functions and combat functions and their participation in major deployments has contributed to alter perception's of women's roles in the military, the acceptance of women, and the readiness of gender-integrated units.

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Unsung Heroes: Women's Contributions in the Military and Why Their Song Goes Unsung

*Irene Jung Fiala**

1 Introduction

Six years after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the debate of women's roles in the military continues to be hotly contested. The debate persists in spite of the fact that one of seven soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan (Ledford 2003) is a female and that women have received the Bronze Star for bravery in combat since the war in Iraq began in 2003. Officially, the US Pentagon maintains the policy that women cannot be assigned to a combat unit. However, women are assigned to support services that may be attached to a combat unit. Unofficially, however, the policy and the practice are apparently out of step. Whatever the assignments 'officially' are, the reality is that any military assignment can potentially lead to a combat situation. The distinction between combatants and military support personnel is blurred. Those in the military are trained that 'a soldier is a soldier first and foremost' and that they belong to the same team. The soldier's sex/gender, on the other hand, is socially significant only to the degree that society makes it so.

This paper will briefly look at gender roles and gender stereotypes in an attempt to examine continuing differential treatment of men and women with an emphasis on differential treatment related to recognition by the media. While recognizing that biological differences do play a part in the on-going discrimination experienced by women, it will be asserted that current gender stratification primarily exists because of social definitions and expectations of men's and women's roles in society. This paper hopes to demonstrate that women have served, and continue to serve, valiantly in combat and support positions in spite of various exclusionary practices. This is not to devalue in any respect the roles that men play, only to acknowledge that the discourse of women's participation in today's military tends to reflect gender stereotypes rather than their actual service.

Therefore, this paper hopes to show that women's participation in the military, whether they represent acts of heroism or dutiful service, are oft-framed in a manner that reinforces gender stereotypes, reflects a masculinized military culture and rekindles the debate against 'mothers in combat boots'. By drawing from various sociological concepts this paper is hoped to

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show that women's contributions are often 'lost' in academic debate and public-oriented driven media, unless those services support current gender roles.

2 Gender Roles

In the song *Real Men* Tori Amos (2001) sings "man makes a gun, man goes to war, man can drink and man can kill and man can take a whore". Brown (2004) reminds us that not only do militaries construct masculinity, but that they 'make men'. Indeed, the idea of a 'boy becoming a man' is often times equated with a warrior-image, as represented by the young man who leaves the safety of his home and goes off to battle to protect his country or way of life from an enemy, à la Stephen Crane's *Red Badge of Courage*. The domain of men is the public domain, while women are relegated to the private domain, the home. He is the warrior, she is the mother. He ventures out to the world outside and beyond the hearth, she keeps the home fires burning, awaiting his return. But before an examination of women's contributions as soldiers can ensue, a quick look at gender roles, gender stereotypes and gender socialization must precede any such discussion because I will argue that soldier contributions are viewed through the lens of gender.

Gender roles, or socially proscribed expectations of behavior associated with one's sex, is not intrinsic or innate. By definition gender roles are socially created. And as such, they are amenable to change and vary. These roles, as any person who has taken an introductory sociology class knows, are learned in the process of socialization. However, because ideas as to what is appropriate for men and women, boys and girls, are learned early in life and then reinforced in social settings, these ideas seem 'natural' to us. Behavior, thoughts and ideas come to be viewed as stereotypical of a gender. For evidence to the 'naturalness' of these ideas in a military context, we can look to a quote found in Dunbar (1992: 55) who points out that USAF General Merrill A. McPeak stated in an article published by *Aviation Week and Space Technology* that he would select a male fighter pilot over a better-qualified female pilot while admitting that "it doesn't make very much sense, but that is the way I feel about it". It is through these socially learned beliefs and corresponding behaviors that define for many women the opportunities that are provided them and the manner in which their contributions are assessed and described. It should be noted that the same process that applies to women also applies to men. Men, who do not conform to the warrior image, just as the women who do not conform to the mother image, are open to sanction, including criticism, ridicule, denied opportunities and even hostilities.

By limiting gender roles to those embracing traditional stereotypes a label or stigma of being a 'deviant' may result. For instance, General Robert H.

Barrow (US Marine Corps) testified to Congress in 1991 that he opposed women in combat positions because he did not believe that women were capable of carrying out the "ultimate function of the military": killing (cited in Dunbar 1992: 53). In that Congressional testimony, Barrow went on to state that women were intrinsically incapable of taking the life of another. Barring empirical evidence that does not support this belief, the logical extension of such a statement regarding innateness of behavior is that women who then are capable of 'taking the life of another' must somehow be 'deviant' and not a 'real' woman. After all, if something is intrinsic or innate then it must exist in all 'normal' members of that species. The argument is one that if someone (or something) does not behave as 'nature intended', then there is something wrong with them. Therefore, if one agrees with General Barrow and others who argue that women are biologically incapable of killing another human being, then they must, by default, agree that women who do so are biologically different.

3 Mass Media Representations

Mass media representations of men and women's fitness for combat, contribution to civil service, nationalism and patriot-identity, in addition to reporting on issues that triangulate sex scandals, politics and the military, serve more to reinforce gender stereotypes then to dispel them. Whether the topic is on *Saving Private England* (Rich 2006), rescuing Jessica Lynch (e.g., Holland 2006), the court-martial of Lieutenant Kelly Flinn (Corry 1997) or the Tailhook scandal (e.g., Kasinky 1998), the media continues to be the primary, and oftentimes sole, source of information for the general public on the ongoing war. The American public relies on the news as its source of information for a war that is being fought half a world away. Ironically, as consumers of information, the representations placed before the public are often consumed whole without digesting the veracity of what is being presented.

Barker-Plummer/Boaz (2005) suggest that the mass media's coverage of the current war in Iraq serves to masculinize the discourse surrounding the war effort. Citing evidence such as the production of the news, from its writers to the sources of information to those who are being interviewed, the authors argue that the process is decidedly influenced by a male perspective. Additionally, the language that is used in the reporting of the news is highly gendered as references to the war are couched in terms associated with masculine pursuits and hobbies such as sports and hunting. The media's representation of the Jessica Lynch story was often framed from a stereotypical gendered perspective, as suggested by Holland (2006), Sanprie (2005), Takacs (2005) and Howard III (2004). Also examining the reporting of the ambush

on the convoy in which Jessica Lynch was injured, Baroffio-Bota (2005) additionally demonstrates that the interpretation of the events by the media likewise reflect gendered politics.

As the Tailhook sex scandal was settling down, Congress, the US Air Force and the media debated as to whether or not Lieutenant Kelly Flinn was being singled out on a charge of adultery because she was a woman (Corry 1997). While war and combat continued to be gendered in the mass media (Lemish 2005), those stories that challenged a masculinized military were downplayed. Women in the military were frequently portrayed as in need of rescue, as sexual objects, or as seductress. Whether they were the victims of a sexual assault or sexual harassment or the perpetrators of illicit sexual activities, the focus of this reporting reinforces the activities associated with a masculinized military – men are the warriors and women are their reward.

On the topic of women dying in combat, Defense Secretary Les Aspin told a *Newsweek* reporter in private in 1994 that "until they [the Americans, I.F.] see the coffins coming back with their daughters inside, that is when they'll make up their minds what they think" (cited in Barry/Thomas 1997: 49). Outside of the military, and with notable exceptions such as Lori Piestewa who was the first Native American female to die in the current war, or Major Rhonda Cornum, a flight surgeon who was shot down in a rescue mission over the Persian Gulf and taken as a POW, the public remains largely unaware as to the sacrifices that women make in the context of combat or support operations. As of 27 December 2006, of the 3,000 American soldiers who have been killed in Iraq or Afghanistan, 70 were women, representing about 2 per cent of the total death count (Scarborough 2006). Every soldier's death is a personal tragedy for family and friends and a loss to society. Yet, rather than recognizing that men and women have died serving their country, the *Center for Military Readiness* (a non-partisan, non-governmental organization) which opposes women in combat stated: "But deliberate exposure of women to combat violence in war is tantamount to acceptance of violence against women in general." (Scarborough 2006) I am suggesting here again that instead of recognizing the sacrifices that women (and men) have made in the war on terrorism that the discourse reverts back to women's vulnerability to violence thereby reflecting women's stratified position in general. It appears that what makes the 'news' is not the selfless service to one's country, but rather how that sacrifice can be used to reinforce stereotypical ideas of women as vulnerable while additionally serving a particular agenda.

For example, many of the media's representations of women going to war during the Persian Gulf War were that of women who were leaving behind children (Elshtain 1991). These images falsely suggested that a substantial portion of women being called upon to serve were mothers of

young children. During the Gulf War, about one-half of the 11 per cent of military women were deployed (Elshtain 1991). This would leave 94 per cent of those deployed as being men. The reader is reminded here that more fathers than mothers were called to duty (Wheelwright 1995). Because the ground war in the Gulf lasted a relatively short 100 hours, the total number of women who would have been deployed had the war lasted longer is unknown. Although Elshtain (1991: 16) calls upon women to "fight this destructive momentum" of society putting children "last" in its consideration, she notes that women's deployment is bad for children while being good for the careers of women who wish to move up in the ranks. Here, too, these statements serve to reinforce the gendered expectation that women are the most suitable care providers of children and fail to recognize that fathers, as well as mothers, were going off to war. Also reinforced is that women who wish to break the 'glass ceiling', while assumingly capable to engage in combat, for instance, are more concerned about their personal advancement than the larger societal impact on children left at home while their mothers go to war. The media's portrayal of women being deployed to the Gulf War, therefore, not only served to reinforce the idea that women should be the providers of child care and that women who wanted to pursue a military career were 'deviant'. Furthermore, men's roles as fathers were dismissed as not being worthy of the same discussion and that men are the more 'capable' warriors.

4 Discussion

Before I begin discussing some of my ideas of the role of the media in reporting on women's contributions in the military, I will state my personal biases so that the reader may weigh my arguments and suggestions appropriately. I will also state that these are my biases at the present time and I do not know if these views will change as additional arguments or evidence become available at a later time or as my own ideas change over time.

First of all, I believe in a strong and effective military providing for national security and that military readiness and effectiveness should not be compromised. I also believe that some times war becomes necessary to combat oppression, aggression and violation of human rights. While I am a firm believer in equal opportunity I also believe that 'equal opportunity' does not mean 'equal outcome'. Extending from that belief, I do not believe in 'gender norming', particularly when such practices are likely to affect the health and safety of others. Lastly, I do not believe that individual 'wants' should jeopardize the collective well-being. Having said those things, I would also remind the reader that the US has an All-Volunteer Force since 1973 and

that men and women choose to serve the military. Moreover, the military is not a 'club' that one joins but a service that one is selected to and as such, the military can disqualify those not deemed suitable for service. For those who are disqualified from service, there are ample other opportunities to serve one's country, and one can be a 'patriot' without serving with the military. That is, one does not have a 'right' to serve the US military.

Earlier in the paper I made reference to a comment by General Barrow in Congressional testimony and drew from his statement what one must logically conclude from the assertion of "intrinsically incapable". As I stated, if it were true (which it is not) that a woman is "intrinsically incapable of taking the life of another", then by definition, any woman who does so must be 'deviant' or 'abnormal'. Her act of killing would be viewed as inconsistent with her biology. How then, is the media to report her killing of an enemy? How is this inconsistency to be reconciled? Perhaps the obvious statement would be to re-examine the initial premise, which is false to begin with (see, e.g., the literature surrounding mothers who commit acts of infanticide, child abuse, partner abuse, elder abuse, female serial killers, female homicide, etc.). The simple fact is that women have 'taken the life of another'.

Women have also 'taken the life of another' in battle. Throughout American history, women had served in the nation's military in every conflict since the American Revolution. Hundreds of women had disguised themselves as men to fight in the Revolutionary War and the Civil War in the United States. Indeed, women had served unofficially as support personnel, spies as well as soldiers. It would not be until 1901 that women would gain an official role in the US military with the formation of the Army Nurse Corps. At the present time, women represent approximately 14 per cent of the US military. Recognizing that there is no conscription (and women were exempted from 'the draft' when it did exist) all of today's female soldiers have volunteered for military service. This is a point that tends to be lost in the public debate and one that I would restate: All female soldiers, throughout American history I would add, have volunteered to serve the military. The military, as a social institution, is responsible for national security and defense of the nation. To fail to recognize this point infantilizes women by implying that they are incapable of making a decision that may have life-altering outcomes. Through volunteering, women are making a choice to serve. While some women have asserted that they were misled relative to their likelihood of being deployed (Elshtain 1991), the truth is that when one agrees to serve the military, the prospect of going to war and being deployed is a reality.

Long before the US was even a country, women fought in combat across the world. One of the most famous female warriors was Joan of Arc who, at

the age of 17, had successfully led French troops into battle against the English in 1429. The contributions of women in peacekeeping operations, as well as during times of war and in combat, have been previously documented (Hampf 2006; Friedman 2005; Harries-Jenkins 2002; Iskra et al. 2002; Elshtain 2001; Rogers 1998; McElroy 1994; Dunbar 1992). Yet, with some notable exceptions such as the story of Joan of Arc, the public remains largely unaware of the likes of Captain Molly Corbin who was wounded in the Revolutionary War and was re-interred at West Point with full military honors on 14 April 1926. I suggest here that it is largely because such historical accounts do not gel well with the traditional roles of women. Historical accounts of battle reflect either the masculinized military, where the male soldiers fought bravely in combat or the eventual documentation of women who provided nurturing support and medical care for the troops or even traveled with the armies to cook for them. These accounts are arguably recorded because they reinforce traditional roles. Granted, the vast majority of the men and women in the early history of the American military conformed to gendered expectations primarily because that was the status quo. Nonetheless, those stories of contributions by women that did not conform to these stereotypes remain, in large part, untold.

Instead of examining soldier's contributions outside of the context of gender, discourse of women's service in the military has been largely sidestepped. In its place debates reverting back to her gender have been engaged. Debates such as 'should women be in combat', 'should mothers be deployed' and 'should units be integrated' are commonly heard. The debates are rather academic as women are performing duties in which they could be exposed to combat, mothers are being deployed and while a particular unit may not be integrated, the reality is that with notable exceptions (such as Special Forces), integrated units are being deployed with those that may not be integrated. Not ironically, no one (other than those who do not 'believe' in war) has suggested that men not be deployed because they may be hurt, captured or killed or that 'fathers' not be deployed because of their parenting responsibilities.

Other issues surrounding gender have also surfaced; one that is related to potential sexual behavior and another to sexual harassment. In one article, it was suggested that women in combat units would contribute to "distraction, dissension and distrust" (Simons 2001: 90). Simons (2001: 93) further argues that the presence of women jeopardizes teamwork in small combat units because "without question, lust poses the most immediate threat. But love may actually be worse. Love rearranges loyalties" and further goes to state that "it's the vulnerability of men which proves to be the real stumbling block". While I would not deny that the presence of women likely would

alter what Simons (2001: 93) called "chemistry in all-male groups", I would ask why should this become the woman's problem? But more importantly to the question at hand, and what I want to focus on here, is that once again, it is the woman's sexuality – or potential for sex – that seems to be the focus of concern in the current war. The female soldier is seen as a source of temptation, of distraction, to the male and not as a soldier trained in warfare. This line of thinking places current gender attitudes – how men and women view each other in American society – ahead of actions on the part of the soldier. Military effectiveness is measured by result. But reinforced for the public instead is that men and women can not be trusted together or that physical attraction cannot be set aside when there is a duty to serve. The idea that men are "weak when it comes to women" (Simons 2001: 95) reinforces the stereotype that heterosexual men are unable to work in close proximity or stressful environments with women without thinking, or behaving, sexually towards them. By reinforcing this stereotype, women will continue to be seen as sex objects, men as sexually obsessed and the talents and skills of both men and women overlooked due to faulty gender beliefs firmly entrenched in attitudes about sex (Rosen 2003; Serlin 2003; Shields 2000; Titunik 2000; Krueger 2000; Rosen 1996; Donegan 1996).

While much has already been written about experiences of sexual harassment encountered by women in the military, sadly attitudes condoning harassment and behaviors accepting of it are not limited to the military. Rather, the existence and continuation of sexual harassment, reflects a larger social commentary of power relations and the meanings ascribed to sex and gender (Boghosian 2005; Graff 2003; Kasinky 1998; Wallace 1998; Barry/ Evans 1997; Etlin 1997; Newman 1997).

The central point that I wanted to make in this discussion is that because academic and media discussions have focused largely on stereotypes associated with traditional gender roles that current and potential contributions of female soldiers are largely being overlooked. Individual female and group contributions should be studied to uncover the dynamics which allows for their success which, in turn, can be used to assist in military effectiveness. While 'hypermasculinity' and 'group cohesiveness' have previously been demonstrated to aid military effectiveness, additional dynamics have not been examined. Women's roles have historically been either devalued or used to support the status quo.

I suggest that the limelight debates of limitations or difficulties encountered by women in the military from a gendered perspective relegate her contributions and service in the military as a soldier to the background. Rather than recognizing what women have accomplished in the name of national defense, liberation operations and peacekeeping operations, and the

selfless service they have provided, there appears to be an endless supply of opinions, hypotheses and assumptions as to what women cannot provide or to the distractions and problems that they would represent to today's military. Instead of looking at what 'won't work' when it comes to the roles of women in the military perhaps more emphasis should be placed on the factors in the environment that allows for women to be successful, without jeopardizing military effectiveness, safety or security.

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About Intervening in Vulnerable Societies: Gender in Military Peacekeeping of the Bundeswehr

Cordula Dittmer & Maja Apelt

1 Introduction

After seven years of opening up the German Armed Forces for women, it is time to summarize the current situation, equality measures and the situation of female soldiers. This is particularly interesting because of the increasing number of deployments which the Bundeswehr faces and will face in the future. The character of the German Armed Forces has changed from defense forces to intervention forces in the last ten years: National defense no longer means defending national territories, but defending the Western liberal democratic lifestyle which is perceived to be threatened by international terrorism and civil wars all over the world. The soldiers of today fulfill multidimensional tasks such as building schools, the coordination of civil and military relief efforts, the protection of threatened minorities and so on, as well as traditional combat missions in multinational NATO, UN and EU contexts (Geser 1996; UN General Assembly 2004).

With the opening up of the forces for women and particularly with the introduction of the gender equality law in 2005, the Bundeswehr, for the first time since its founding in 1956, has had to deal with gender equality measures and quotas, work-life-balance and part-time work. This national development is reinforced through the international demands of the UN, EU and the NATO as well as non-profit organizations to integrate a gender perspective into peacekeeping and peace-building missions.

These structural organizational changes have shifted the perceptions of military masculinities and femininities: Physical strength is increasingly replaced by more information-based technologies and soft skills. As a result, Seifert (1996a: 19) ascribes to the new soldier an "amoral technical- and efficiency-oriented masculinity" based on being an expert in violence. Enloe (1993) states that soldiers in peacekeeping missions have the opportunity to develop an alternative definition of masculinity which does not necessarily rely on military and patriarchal masculinity. A third perspective is to state a traditional remasculinization because in peacekeeping missions not just soft skills but also weapon use, combat readiness and the danger of being killed or wounded play an increasingly important role (Dittmer 2007).

In the following we will analyze gender perceptions in the Bundeswehr in deployments. We will use the model of Segal (1995), Iskra et al. (2002), Kümmel (2002) and Carreiras (2006) on factors influencing the integration of

women in the armed forces. Using a neo-institutionalist perspective combined with Goffman's metaphor of organizations as a theater, we focus in particular on the international dimension. We turn our attention primarily to the ambivalent character of organizational life, the "political chameleon" and "double-edged sword" (Kümmel 2002: 615) of combat and peace-building forces. We rely on the following assumptions:

1. The international dimension will become a more important factor in the question of the integration of women in the military. Through the current multinationalization and homogenization of deployments in NATO, UN and EU contexts these international figures can pressure national organizations to implement new technologies, combat strategies and gender equality measures. However, the complexity of peace-building processes means that their demands are highly contradictory in themselves. Furthermore, they rely on the traditional male-female dichotomy.
2. These ambivalent demands result in permanent negotiation processes between the external pressure and its implementation in everyday organizational life. In these processes to argue with gender aspects becomes a means to exclude women from equal participation in peace-building and limits their operating range to traditional female roles, positions and tasks.

In the first part of the following discussion, we set out the theoretical approach underlying our two assumptions. In the second part we will refer briefly to the impact of gender in conflict and peace-building processes and international demands. Finally, in the third part, we will demonstrate how the external pressure is integrated into organizational gender politics.

2 The Integration of Women as Social Theater: Goffman and Neo-Institutionalist Approaches

The integration of women into the armed forces is relatively well researched by researchers using quantitative methods and approaches. However, the research still lacks theoretical foundation. One of the only and most developed approaches is the model initially developed by Segal (1995), extended by Kümmel (2002) and modified by Carreiras (2006). The model sets out different factors that influence the integration of women in the armed forces. These could be analyzed on an international, national and military level. The *international dimension* refers to security policies, international coalitions and conflicts and the increasingly common instances of multinational cooperation between different national armies (Kümmel 2002). The *national dimension* consists of the political, social and cultural background. The political dimen-

sion could be operationalized as the position of political parties and the legal system, lobbying and the reaction of the media (Iskra et al. 2002). The social dimension comprises demographic and economic factors as well as the segregation of the labor force and family structures. Cultural factors refer, above all, to the social construction of gender and the family (Segal 1995). *Inside the armed forces* we can analyze strategic orientations like mission definition and/or the level of threat, military culture consisting of values, ethos, gender roles, etc. and the organizational structure.

Carreiras (2006) is critical that this model now includes many variables which could potentially influence the participation of women in the armed forces, but it still remains unclear how these variables are actually related to one another. Another criticism is that the question of the operationalization of the variables has not yet been answered. In her work, Carreiras extends the model referring to theories of gendered organizations, Kanters' approach of minority and majority groups and the findings of research on segregation in the workplace (Carreiras 2006). What we would like to do in the following is not to expand the model further, but to go more into detail. We would therefore like to analyze further the qualitative aspects of the integration of women in the military focusing particularly on deployments, a goal which requires focusing more on the international dimensions.

On a theoretical level, our methodology is primarily based on neo-institutionalist approaches combined with gender-and-organization theories, such as for example, those of Joan Acker (1998). From a neo-institutionalist viewpoint, military organizations must be seen as integrated in power structures. These power structures consist of interactions, power relations in and between different actors, myths, surveillance and institutionalized rules. Organizations have to submit to these rules, norms and structures if they want to maintain their legitimacy and if they want to ensure access to external resources (DiMaggio/Powell 1983; Apelt/Dittmer/Mangold 2005). We conceptualize the armed forces not only as rational organizations, but also as social institutions. To define the armed forces as social institutions means that the perceptions and thinking of their actors and their activities are not only oriented towards organizational aims such as efficiency or profit, but towards rules, norms and values which have developed over time and in the context of the institution itself. In the military context such institutionalized rules are, for example, the image of the soldier as a combatant and the notion of comradeship or military education. In our analysis, we assume that such images always rely on gendered dimensions: The ideal soldier in a historical perspective was powerful, brave and male; military service was a rite of passage in becoming a real man; military masculinities were, according to Robert Con-

nell (2000), applied as models for civil masculinities (Frevert 2001; Barrett 1999).

We will use Goffman's concept of social life as a theater as the main framework in which to analyze the organization itself (Goffman 1996). It has been used in many studies, and particularly in neo-institutionalist analyses of organizations. The main theoretical aspect is the assumption that social reality consists of a front stage and a backstage. In constructing a front stage, information about the actor is transmitted through a variety of communicative sources, all of which must be controlled to effectively convince the audience of the appropriateness of behavior and consonance with the role assumed. The backstage consists of all the hidden assumptions, illusions and activities undermining the image projected onto and performed on the front stage. Using this metaphor allows us to capture the ambiguous character of organizational life. From a neo-institutionalist perspective, the image of the theater highlights the difference and dichotomy between formal organizational structures and everyday activities (Meyer/Rowan 1977; Wobbe 2003). In our context, the front stage shows the official and formal image of the German Armed Forces, as performed by their virtual self-representation, the media and military experts as well as by formal organizational structures such as military hierarchies, training, socialization, the 'citizen in uniform' or civic leadership and legal rules. To give a good performance on the front stage is to ensure political and social legitimacy and to prolong organizationnal life. Backstage we see everyday activities, informal organizational structures and high levels of trust among the participants trying to protect their 'secrets' from the audience.

3 The International Dimension and Demands of Military Peacekeeping and Gender Issues

3.1 Peacekeeping, Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution

Current peacekeeping operations are multilateral, multidimensional and multicultural. They consist of military forces as well as police forces, international organizations and non-profit organizations. All of these actors are from different nations with different cultural contexts and different understandings of conflict, conflict resolution (and gender roles) (Hansen/Rambsbotham/Woodhouse 2004). In most cases, the role of the armed forces is to create a secure environment (e.g., monitoring and verification of ceasefires, disarmament and demobilization of combatants, cantonment), in which civil actors could intervene (Hansen/Rambsbotham/Woodhouse 2004). These missions can be described as conflict management (Miall 2006).

Military engagement in building up schools or the distribution of aid on the other hand, is part of Civil-Military Cooperation Projects (CIMIC). These CIMIC efforts do not aim to build up long lasting social, economic or political structures as in development aid projects, but rather to build trust in the local population to protect the soldiers themselves (Lilly 2002; Braunstein 2001). At the same time these peacekeeping operations are protected by their mandate allowing the use of force. New peacekeeping concepts are focusing more on peace-enforcement dimensions and the acceptance of military force to end violent conflicts. Armed forces in peace-building processes must be combat ready at the same time as they do not take someone's part; they must be accepted by the civil population and they are designed to put an end to violence by using violent means. In the German context this ambivalence is fixed in the national security strategy of the German government in the definition of the 'new soldier': "Besides being combatants, the servicemen and women in the new Bundeswehr are at the same time helpers, protectors and mediators." (BMVg 2006: 60) In the following section, we analyze how peace-building processes and the discourses surrounding them are gendered and which gender concepts the international community is using and demanding from the armed forces.

3.2 Gender in Violent Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies

In the last seven years since the adoption of UN Resolution 1325 in 2000, gender awareness has increased in the analysis of conflicts and wars. Countless educational studies, commentaries and manuals have been conducted and produced, in particular in the political field of conflict resolution. In the majority of cases they aim to inform the international community about the special situation of women and girls in conflict regions. In peace and conflict studies and political sciences in general, gender awareness is also based on the idea of the importance of identity: Wars and conflicts deconstruct and reconstruct identities, imaginations of selves and relations to others on an individual and collective level. Discourses about ethnicity, nationalism and racist and gender-based rapes in former Yugoslavia have shown the importance of identity as a major cause of violence.

In summary then, the main thrust of these works is that they rely on the gender segregation of the labor market. This is associated with the separation of reproduction and production, of public and private spheres. In conflict settings this gendered division of labor may enhance the potential for an escalation of conflicts. Cockburn (2001) discovered that gender analysis could act as an early-warning system long before a conflict turns violent. One signal she argues might be the existence of structural violence: The unjust distribu-

tion of resources between and within states, high unemployment rates and low wages disrupt traditional family structures. Men are now unable to care for their families and are often dependent on criminal or illegal labor; women are affected by the cessation of social benefits. The position of the military is strengthened, freedom becomes limited and the society as a whole becomes militarized.

Another signal might be the changing public discourse which devalues the 'Other' (Cockburn 2001). As Blagojević (2004) has shown in the context of the former Yugoslavia, the political and economic collapse of the Eastern Block brought traditional male gender identities into question. Traditional patterns of identification such as the employed man, head of the family or political activist were lost, and men were deprived of their economic and social power. The only available male subject position was the traditional role of the soldier defending the motherland. Women on the other hand, could rely on the role of mother and bearer of the nation. Nationalistic discourses, constructions of 'We' and the 'Other' arose accompanied with strong normalizing and exclusionary tendencies setting the scene for armed hostilities and mass rapes (Blagojević 2004). Femininity and the female body often are described in a special symbolic way: If women are responsible for the reproduction of the nation, the enemy's destruction of the female body represents the destruction of their cultural, social and physical constitutions (Seifert 1996b).

Conflict settings are in most cases male-dominated. Most participants in violent conflicts in civilian as well as military units are male. As many studies have shown, in violent conflicts and post-conflict periods, the use of force and weapons serve as a means to negotiate masculinities (Farr/Cukier 2002). At the same time, it is recognized that women have also entered the conflict as perpetrators and that a lot of men do not identify with militarized masculinity. Gender identities are not only influential factors in wars and violent conflicts; they are also influenced by them and therefore affect the reconstruction of societies in post-conflict periods. The post-conflict period is a very important and sensitive period in which identities and power relations are negotiated by local parties as well as by the international groups sent in to keep the peace. As Lori Handrahan (2004: 433) has said: "The post-conflict environment, like conflict, is vividly about male power systems, struggles and identity formation." Although the abuse of local people in Somalia (Whitworth 2004), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mazurana 2005) or Congo (Al-Hussein 2005) by international troops has shown in a brutal manner how deeply military gender regimes affect gender regimes in host countries, the *UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations* states: "The economic and social impact of peacekeeping operations on host countries remains an under-

researched topic, worthy of further attention." (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2004: 9)[1]

Although the proportion of military units in UN and NATO peacekeeping and peace-building missions is relatively high, levels of scientific research on military out-of-area missions remain low. As Mazurana points out, "the militarization and masculinization of peace, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-building, development, and humanitarianism" (Mazurana 2005: 38) must be continuously analyzed and criticized. Peacekeeping missions and gender sensitive peacekeeping operations could both have a negative as well as positive impact on host societies and the peace-building process. As we will argue, there is a particular danger in implementing and reinforcing the traditional Western gender image of the "male-warrior, female-worrier" as Yuval-Davis (2001: 155) called it, in UN and EU contexts as well as in peacekeeping missions on site. Gender and identity discourses which have the potential to cause conflict may therefore be reinforced by male-dominated peacekeeping missions. The missions carry weapons, receive a lot of money and in many cases assume political control for a while. They are, in other words, the main institution of power. As peacekeepers are more powerful in a lot of ways, local masculinities are devalued. Western images of masculinity begin to circulate and host culture and gender orders change. These changes are not only apparent in current discourses, even "colonial conquest and settlement were carried out by gender-segregated forces" as Robert Connell (2005: 73) has noted in his description of the historical connection between globalization and masculinities. The masculinities of colonial masters can be described as the first global masculinities and are represented in a different manner by the peacekeepers of today.

1 In March 2006 the Peacekeeping Best Practice Section presented a report on the economic impact of peacekeeping in different missions (Carnahan et al. 2006). It concludes that the UN missions in economic terms do more good than harm. However, this report takes the economy out of its social, environmental and gendered context and does not integrate power structures and dependencies (Rehn/Sirleaf 2002).

3.3 *International and Political Demands of the Integration of Gender in Military Peacekeeping*

Armed forces in peacekeeping missions and in general remain, in some respects, refuges for traditional concepts of masculinity (Dittmer 2007; Apelt/ Dittmer 2007).[2] Precisely for this reason, one of the main demands of UN Resolution 1325 and of the European Parliament's resolution (Theorin 2000) is an increase in the proportion of women in all ranks in peacekeeping missions (the resolution of the European Parliament calls for at least a proportion of 40 per cent women in every mission). Both resolutions were passed in 2000 after high pressure from the international women's movement (Haartje 2003). Both Resolution 1325 and the European Parliament's resolution asked all Member States to integrate a gender perspective into all aspects of peacekeeping missions. This is a reaction to recent findings that men and women are affected differently by violent conflict and that the participation of women in peace processes strengthens the possibility of long-lasting peace agreements. It is to integrate a gender perspective in training units, during repatriation and resettlement, in refugee camps and during disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and demands the consolidation of gender-segregated data and for more research and information on the impact of violent conflicts on women and girls. Local women's organizations should be supported and women and girls should be protected from sexual violence. Appointed women should not be subject to local law and norms but to international human rights law.

3.4 *Female Soldiers in International Discourse*

Female soldiers and female personnel are ascribed a larger role in these peace-building processes. They are supposed to be models for local women and are described as being more careful with victims of sexual violence. Fur-

2 With the emergence of modern nations, modern armies were needed to protect territorial integrity and national sovereignty. This professionalization of military service was accompanied in nearly all Western armies with the formal exclusion of women. With the introduction of conscription, citizenship and masculinity were inextricably linked. For a long time the armed forces symbolized the 'school of nation' as well as the 'school of masculinity' (Frevert 2001). Since then masculinity means institutionalized power, combat readiness and courage, femininity on the contrary peacefulness, passivity and motherhood. After the Second World War this close connection formally dissolved with women's right to vote and the possibility for men to choose between conscription and community service.

thermore, in the discussions arising out of the Resolution it has been argued that female soldiers stop male soldiers from abusing the local people because women develop a feeling for the violability of host societies. The same demands can be found in the report on sexual exploitation in UN peacekeeping operations: "Finally, the presence of more women in a mission especially at senior levels will help to promote an environment that discourages sexual exploitation and abuse, particularly of the local population." (Al-Hussein 2005: 19) Current studies (e.g., Martin 2005) show that with the rising proportion of women in out-of-area missions and the proscription of getting into contact with local women sexual assaults on UN staff and female soldiers of other nations escalates.[3]

Beilstein, one of the leading UN researchers, argued in a study of female peacekeepers that "women are socially conditioned to be more peaceful and peace-loving and less violent than men. They attribute the more pacifist orientation of females to the roles that women play as mothers responsible for giving birth to and nurturing future generations and as conciliators within the family and in their local communities." (Beilstein 1995) It is interesting to note that these arguments – peacefulness and motherhood – which were used previously to exclude women from military service, are now being used to force their inclusion. Another interesting aspect in this discussion is the inversion of the traditional gender symbolism of 'men as culture' and 'women as nature': Now men are located in the context of nature, they are aggressive, powerful and not able to control their 'basic' needs and the inclusion of cultivated Western women is supposed to control this virility (Walgenbach 2005).

The problem which women in the military seem to face is that female soldiers have not yet found a satisfactory place within the social discourse (Hacker 1995). They oscillate between traditional femininity and the attempt to overcome it without being able to adopt a stable position as servicewomen. An aggravating factor is that the demands placed by the international community on international peace-building organizations rely on traditional gender roles referring to the male soldier and the female caring and emotional Other, who fulfills her biological destiny. In a recently published report on the situation of women in armed conflict and their potential for peace-

3 Already in the First World War female soldiers symbolized prostitutes, bent on sexual adventures (Hacker 1998). As Enloe (2000) has pointed out in the Second World War the US military was ordered to send black female soldiers to their military base in Great Britain because the American government wanted to stop the rising marriages between black male soldiers and white local women. This plan could be stopped by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People who pointed out that black women are not conscripted to the US army to satisfy the sexual needs of their male comrades but to be soldiers.

building which was presented at and adopted by the European Parliament (De Keyser 2006), women are seen primarily as victims of male dominance. For example, the current problem of female suicide bombers is recognized, but is linked to rape and structural inequalities these women are facing. It comments the role of "women as victims, women as instruments of peace, and women as instruments of war" (De Keyser 2006: 14). To describe women as 'instruments' is to remove self-responsibility and does not take into account that women may chose to be suicide bombers in order to be part of the community or for religious reasons. There seems to be a general tendency on the European level to reduce gender issues to women's issues with reference to a very conservative female role (Rodenberg 2003). The perception of these demands in the Bundeswehr and how they interact with the local population are analyzed in what follows.

4 Negotiation of Gender Identities in Out-of-Area Missions: The Case of German Male and Female Soldiers

It is important to take into account the fact that since the Second World War the Bundeswehr has not officially been defined as combat forces. During the Cold War the official definition was 'defense forces', after the Cold War an image of civil forces and peace-builders was constructed. As of August 2007, Germany is involved in 11 different out-of-area missions with different mandates and tasks. The proportion of women ranges between 10 per cent in Bosnia and 0 per cent in the War against Terror (Bundeswehr 2007). Thus, the gender structure in out-of-area missions could be described as segregated between dangerous and life-threatening combat missions which remain exclusively male and well-established peace-building missions with a small proportion of women, in particular in the medical service branch.

Interestingly, if we look at military conflict resolution in practice we find that there are no formal regulations in the German Armed Forces about how to deal with gender issues. Each unit must therefore negotiate how to deal with gender issues in peacekeeping contexts afresh in each different situation depending on the superior officers' good will. The international demands, resolutions and campaigns to advance the integration of a gender perspective are largely unknown. An equality law for servicewomen and servicemen became effective in 2005, but it does not mention any specific quotas or other equality measures for out-of-area missions (Dittmer/Mangold 2007).

The soldiers themselves pretend as if such gender equality measures already exist. One of the main problems expressed by soldiers who were asked[4] about their experiences in out-of-area missions is the behavior of female soldiers in public, particularly in 'Islamic' contexts. One soldier, an armored infantry man, answered a question concerning special advice for women in peacekeeping missions as follows: "Particularly for women in an Islamic country some kind of reservation is very important. I cannot act as self-sufficiently as in the – I would say – Western world. That is you have to tie or hide your hair, wear long sleeves, you should not dress provocatively, you should wear a large jacket. You know what I mean? That is, I can give you an example, in Afghanistan we had a medical servicewoman with us and we went to the drill ground. Suddenly she was surrounded by fourteen- fifteen year old boys, you could see it in their face that they could not believe why she had rolled up sleeves and a ringlet falling down, they couldn't believe it."

Female as well as male soldiers demand that female soldiers submit to special rules. They should not walk around with shorts, turned up sleeves or untied hair because as argued in the interviews, the Afghan men are not used to naked arms, legs or blond hair and therefore stare very intensively at the female soldiers. Overall, women have to be very considerate of the particular countries' culture. In most of the interviews, situations are described in which something 'bad' could be prevented without defining this 'bad'. It seems as if the stares of the local men are the only 'danger' threatening the female soldiers. The German male soldiers interpret these 'gazes' as an assault on their women which therefore have to be defended.

In the paper of the *UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations* about gender issues in peacekeeping operations (DPKO 2004) it is said that the behavior of international forces towards the host society might carry security implications. As we may observe in this discussion, female soldiers are viewed as an additional safety risk and need to be protected individually. The female soldier – and weak woman – seems to be in constant danger of being raped by Islamic men. This would be even worse if she were to be frank towards them as this might be understood as sexual sympathy. Thus, female soldiers must be protected against the cultural and religious 'Other', the Afghan and 'Islamic' male. This 'Other', as has been shown by various authors, first of all Edward Said (1978) with his ground-breaking study of Ori-

4 The interviews were carried out within a research project founded by the German Research Foundation entitled *Gender and Organization: The Example of the Bundeswehr* (2002–2005). We analyzed the process by which access to the German armed forces was opened to women in 2001 and interviewed about 50 experts from inside and outside the armed forces as well as 70 servicemen and -women in the armored infantry, medical services and the navy.

entalism, is construed as backward, uncivilized, accompanied with a "frank and open sexuality" (Hall 1992: 300). Peacekeeping could therefore be described as "part of the subject-constituting project of the colonial encounter" (Whitworth 2004: 185) implementing Westernized-rational subjectivity and Western gender symbolism in post-conflict societies producing knowledge about the backwardness of the 'Other' for legitimizing political and military decisions in the aftermath: "The new peacekeepers are warriors of the New World order." (Razack 2004: 41)

A specific German and Western masculinity is created with reference to the behavior of female soldiers. In construing the 'other' man as backward and uncivilized, Western military masculinity may be characterized by openness, tolerance, equity and thoughtful European behavior. At the same time male soldiers demand from female soldiers the same behavior they criticize of local cultures. The female soldiers themselves are subject to these male norms and feel safer. In their own accounts of peacekeeping missions they refer primarily to their status as women and not their being soldiers capable of defending themselves in dangerous situations. One high-ranking female soldier in the medical service told us about the training she received before going to Afghanistan admitting that she was very glad to be instructed on how to walk as women through the streets ("you can't look the men in the eyes") and that she feels safe now. Female soldiers are caught in a catch-22 situation. In personifying the weak and sexualized women they empower the construction of military masculinity whose discursive 'Other' they represent. As a result, they are disqualified within the armed forces as soldiers because they seem too weak to complete difficult military tasks and cannot be the protectors, but need protection themselves. In the Dutch armed forces this assumption resulted in a special division of labor whereby women were assigned administrative work although they were trained for other tasks (Sion 2001).

At the same time, female soldiers are separated from the cultural and religious 'Other' outside of the military included in the military community. They are 'our' women who have to be protected against the threatening 'Other'. In this discourse, they are part of the Western military organization and are therefore included in military discourse as women. To integrate women into peacekeeping missions seems to be highly problematic and contextual. Women are excluded from military service for being women but at the same time included as women in military masculinities in intercultural contexts. Women as soldiers appear in the discursive perception of neither men nor women.

By including female soldiers as women in the military community and excluding them as soldiers it is possible to construct a coherent male group identity which is called into question by female soldiers and by the new tasks

in peace-building contexts. A real problem here is that these constructions are legitimized by referring to the image of a real civil and democratic army, which integrates the peculiarities of local cultures in accordance with international political demands.

5 Conclusion

From the above it is possible to conclude that to gain legitimacy on the front stage means to promote gender equality and the principle of capacity and qualification as a measure of career planning. The international demands to integrate a gender perspective into peace-building missions has two effects: On the one hand these demands are adopted by reference to the cultural dimension that soldiers should be sensitive to cultural differences. On the other hand they are playing off culture against gender resulting in the reproduction of the 'male warrior – female worrier'. Peace-building in practice becomes gender segregated. Combat missions and the use of force remain male while emotional and social tasks are female. At the same time, servicemen invent the external 'Other' symbolized by Afghan men as the enemy. The image of the male soldier as combatants is reinforced and servicewomen are seen as needing protection. Thus, military peacekeeping in post-conflict periods is heavily influential in reconstructing local gendered identities and military identities are themselves influenced by perceived local gendered identities. Legitimized by international documents and gendered politics, military peacekeeping revolves around a highly militarized gender regime. The traditional dualism of gender – male warrior and peaceful women – is reproduced by presenting female soldiers in public in a very special way.

In practice, however, military peacekeeping is valued highly. Soldiers do not just symbolize a militarized masculinity; they act as a symbol of a secure environment in a physical as well as economic way. First, a lot of men and women benefit because they receive well-paid and valued employment in the military camps. The soldiers support the local economy with their own high wages. Second, they enable the host population, especially women, to live a 'normal' life by, for example, protecting and guiding them from one side of the town to another. As Cockburn/Hubic (2002) show of Bosnia, the position of local women towards the male peacekeepers could be ambivalent. On the one hand, they appreciate the male soldiers for protecting them; on the other hand they criticize male dominance and demand more female contacts. In conflict resolution processes female soldiers play an important part in body searches, making contact with local people and so on. However, they do so always in the position of the weak woman. Their positions in missions are therefore based on gender and not on their individual skills which devalues

them for other 'real' military tasks. The political demands of integration turn against themselves. The Western hegemonic gender regime is reproduced in contact with local people. There is no real confrontation with local gender regimes. The image of female soldiers is not as uncommon in many societies as the soldiers and military leadership believe with the Iranian case as the most famous example. If the international community demands an increase in the integration of female soldiers into conflict resolution – and we should demand it for a lot of reasons – it is extremely important to change gender regimes in the armed forces first. This is not a new idea but it must be done before the soldiers are trained for integrating gender regimes in local contexts during peace-building missions.

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Women in the Netherlands Armed Forces

René Moelker & Jolanda Bosch

1 Introduction: The Visibility of Women in the Netherlands Armed Forces

Changes regarding gender roles are remarkable. Some areas of social life are freed from archaic norms and behavior has become more permissive whereas working life seems subject to scrutiny, regulations and heightened civilizing norm setting. One example may illustrate the changes in gender sensitivity. The gate to the castle of *The Royal Netherlands Military Academy* is impressive. People walking underneath the walls that give entry to the courtyard will see the names of graduated cadets carved in stone. Some cadets have placed plates, and one of these plates by a group of eleven cadets graduated in 1988 reads: "Aux Femmes, Aux Chevaux, A ceux qui les montent (...) Vive la Cavalerie!" Clearly this is a prank by adolescent men with a healthy hormonal system working overtime. But when one considers the sociology of humor it is also something different. In her brilliant book on humor Giselinde Kuipers (2001: 178) analyzes jokes and explains why they sometimes are an expression of good humor, but bad taste. A good joke is an invitation to laugh, but it is also a little conspiracy at the costs of a group that is excluded. When a joke is told well, it may be difficult not to laugh even though one disagrees completely with the content. Humor is strong and it is almost impossible to object to a well-told joke. The dangerous side of these jokes is that they invite people to join the little conspiracy. The joke "aux femmes, aux chevaux" belongs to military culture and invites people to join a conspiracy that is at the expense of women. The message is hidden in humor and that is why it seems innocent. But it is not innocent because it assigns women to a subordinated role.

Gender sensitivity (see Bosch 2003) is central to the integration of women in the military because it can help to lift cultural barriers and eventually, the plate "aux femmes, aux chevaux" is not really an expression of gender sensitivity. However, despite neolithic expressions of gender insensitivity the position of women in the armed forces has changed and these changes have been subject to study for a few decades. Some of the research into the position of women in armed forces is historical in character (Dekker/Pol 1989; Kloek 2001; Kruyswijk-van Thiel 2004). Some studies go back to the start of integration policies and experiments in integration in the 1980s (Guns 1985). Some of the research relates to the present and points at the changes in the tasks of the military (i.e., the advent of peacekeeping) and its conse-

quences for the position of women (Bouta/Frerks 2002; Sion 2004; Carreiras 2004). In other publications the topic of women in the armed forces is positioned within the context of managing diversities and emancipation (Richardson/Bosch 1999; Richardson/Bosch/Moelker 2007).

With the exception of Bosch/Verweij (2002) the 'invisibility' of women in the armed forces and the theme of 'culture' are seldom addressed. Despite all policy efforts women are often invisible in the military organization. It is not only a quantitative question of there being too few women, but also a question of the dominant masculine culture that not so much denies the presence of women, but systematically neglects it. The presence of women is not a topic for popular discussion unless wrapped in military humor. The equation of women to horses mentioned above illustrates the point. The visibility of women in the military organization is clouded by the culture of the organization, but also by the aspects of the Dutch general culture (especially norms and values related to maternity that are maintained by men and women). It is not blunt discrimination that hinders the growth towards a more equal position of women – most forms of open and blunt discrimination are simply forbidden by law – nor is it lack of integration promoting policies, but it is the cultural factor that forms a barrier for emancipation. Visibility and masculinity are some aspects of the cultural factor, but so is the 'maternity culture' of women.

Discussing the visibility of women in the armed forces is the object of the study reported here. The study highlights cultural factors that are interwoven into the structural position of women in the armed forces. In order to shed light on the complexities involved, the study is divided into five sections. In the first section the changes concerning the armed forces in general are discussed. Especially the changes in the tasks of the military and the changes in the structure of the organization (defense restructuring) influence the position of women. In the second section the political position of women inside the military organization is discussed. This section points at structural inequalities but also to policies that are meant to improve women's status and position. Also discussed are pressure groups (networks) and their role in advocating the interests of women. The international context is dealt with in the third section of the study. International policies are discussed, but also the role of international peacekeeping and the way this reflects the position of women in the armed forces. Comparing the position of women inside the military to the position of women in larger society, the social structure, is the focal point of the fourth part. In part five the effects of the general Dutch culture on the position of women in society and in the armed forces are discussed.

Figure 1: Influences on Participation Levels of Women in the Armed Forces



Source: The five parts of this study are modeled on a schemas originally designed by Segal (1995) and refined by Iskra et al. (2002: 786) and Kümmel (2002; 2004: 64); see also Nuciari (2003: 281).

From Figure 1 follow the guiding questions that will be answered in the remainder of this chapter:

(1) Inside the armed forces:

- What is the status of the armed forces in the society?
- Armed forces: History, changes in mission and official goals?
- What are the consequences for the general position of women in the military?
- What is the history of women in the military?
- What are the statistics?

(2) Political aspects of female participation in the armed forces:

- What are the diversity policies in the armed forces?
- What are current policy issues?
- How can interest groups like the Defense Women's Network further the position of women in the armed forces?

(3) International context:

- What is the influence of European and international policies on the participation of women in the military?
- How does international peacekeeping change the role of women in the military?

(4) Social structure:

- What is the status of women in the society at large?
- How does socialization lead to differences in the perception of gender between cadets and civilian students?

(5) Culture:

- How are gender roles constructed?
- How do images of masculinity influence the way women can function in the military organization?

In the conclusion the theme of visibility returns as focal point of the discussion.

2 The Netherlands Armed Forces

2.1 The Status of the Armed Forces in the Society

Historically the status of the armed forces in Netherlands society has never been high. Militarism is not and never was prominent in Dutch culture. The Netherlands armed forces were at the peak of their power in the 17th century when the Netherlands Navy gained maritime supremacy and the land forces could withstand the Spaniards (Phillipe II) and the French (during Louis XIV). Several wars against the British were fought. To a large extent the actual fighting was delegated to foreign mercenaries. Partly because of the divergence between the civilian political culture and the military culture, the glory days of the Dutch Republic did not last long. The most important power elite was the merchant class and thus the armed forces served mainly to protect merchant interests. Merchant values became more dominant than military traditions. The introduction of conscription in 1814 by Napoleon did not improve the status and prestige of the armed forces. In the 19th century people, who could afford it, paid a 'replacement' to take over the soldiers' tour of duty.

Even though enthusiasm among the population in the post-Second World War era is not high, about 80 per cent of the population regards the armed forces as a necessary evil and this percentage has remained stable since public opinion researchers started measuring public support thirty years ago (Meulen 2003). Likewise, the prestige of the armed forces is not high. A colonel in the army ranks number 18 on the occupational prestige scale (Sixma/Ultee 1983: 370–372) and is positioned between a professor at grammar school and a higher civil servant. Prestige scales are assumed to be quite stable over time. In fact, Sixma/Ultee replicated almost the same ranking in 1983 as was found in an earlier study from 1953. Unfortunately there are no studies on occupational prestige that date from more recent times.

Maybe this low status position can be explained by Dutch culture that is characterized as feminine. In a large world wide survey amongst IBM personnel Hofstede (1991) concluded that the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands were not as much oriented towards careerism and hence these nations score high on the cultural trait of femininity. In contradistinction stood the United Kingdom and many of the Latin speaking countries scoring high on masculinity. International comparative research among the military replicated these findings. When compared to other nations' military cultures the Dutch military culture classifies as feminine (Soeters 2004b: 53–62). The military profession, which is regarded a profession with much emphasis on masculinity, is in higher esteem in countries that support a masculine culture

whereas prestige of the military is deemed to be lower in countries with a feminine culture.[1] Because of the relatively more feminine traits of the Dutch military, the threshold for the inclusion of women choosing a professional military career is potentially lower in the Netherlands, but on the other hand, because of the lower prestige of the military profession in the Netherlands the job will be attractive to a smaller part of the possible female applicants.

2.2 The Armed Forces: History, Changes in Mission and Official Goals

Since 1989 the armed forces have changed considerably. Peacekeeping missions have been valued high in public opinion, but prestige and status have changed little. The opening up to women did not enhance prestige and status much either. There never was a study that correlated changes in prestige to the entry of female personnel, but the new phenomenon did provoke much discussion in the media (Guns 1985).

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 the change rate accelerated. Since 1989, the Netherlands armed forces have been in a continuous state of reorganization and restructuring (Wijk 2004). The changes are related to the perception of security. No longer was it expected that the Netherlands would defend only the territory in Northern Germany against a strong enemy. Dutch soldiers could be deployed anywhere in and outside Europe and should therefore be flexible and mobile. Three consequences are interwoven: firstly, the government wished to collect the peace dividend and has been downsizing the armed forces since 1991. Secondly, the changed threat perception led to changes in tasks and missions of the military. Thirdly, the changed tasks led to changes in organizational structure. The objective is to transform the armed forces into an expeditionary organization. Suspending conscription and restructuring were necessary in order to achieve this goal. These three consequences will be discussed in more detail for they are important for the position of women in the armed forces.

The first reorganization was announced in the *Defense White Paper 1991*. In this official governmental document personnel was planned to be reduced by 16 per cent between 1991 and 1995. An additional 10 to 18 per cent reduction was planned after 1995. The *Prioriteitennota 1993* stated that strategic attack from the former Soviet-Union was not to be expected. A ten-year warning time was deemed to be appropriate. But the world had not become a safer place. Therefore, besides contributing to Europe's safety, the

1 However, it must be noted that the hypothesis of there being a correlation between prestige and the Hofstede dimension of 'femininity vs. masculinity' has never been empirically tested. Future research would have to verify or falsify this hypothesis.

Netherlands should actively engage in peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations. This dual task provided the direction for further restructuring: The Netherlands' capacity goal was to participate with battalion-size units in four peacekeeping operations at the same time for a period of three years. With respect to peace-enforcing operations, the Netherlands wished to maintain the capacity to contribute with a brigade or units of equivalent size (navy, air force) for six months only. At the same time, the Netherlands wished to maintain the strength to defend the NATO territory in a major conflict. In spite of these ambitions the armed forces faced a reduction of 30 to 40 per cent.

The most important restructuring decision in 1992–1993 was related to conscription (Bos-Bakx et al. 2004). The Netherlands did not abolish conscription; they rather suspended the so-called 'first exercise' in order to be able to participate in peacekeeping operations. This allows for the possibility to reinstate compulsory service in times of serious threat, but it is clear that once a nation has switched to an all-volunteer force, it is an organizational tour de force to return to the draft again. The Netherlands chose the all-volunteer concept and, in 1996, the last conscript left the army.

Downsizing continued. In the Novemberbrief 1994 it was announced that budget cuts should be realized through increasing efficiency. International collaboration was one of the means to achieve this. The organization had to be adapted to be able to participate in peacekeeping operations. For each deployed battalion or other unit there should be one that is recuperating, and one that is engaged in training and preparation for deployment. This meant a major reorganization. At the height of the restructuring process over 2000 larger and smaller reorganizations were carried out.

In yet another governmental set of directives, the hoofdlijnennotitie 1999, more budget cuts were announced. The cuts sum up to a total of 3 bio. Euros over a period of ten years. This is a considerable amount of money since the annual defense budget amounts to 7.5 bio. Euros (1.5 per cent of DGP). Nevertheless, after 2000 the actual budget remained stable (see Figure 2). Since then, further budget cuts have been warded off by actively participating in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. Yet, the question is how long the armed forces will be able to deliver the numbers needed for deployments.

Figure 2: Defense Expenditures, 2000–2005



Source: http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/A5FEDA20-6F7D-4A10-BF5B-CBE4ED72D2F6/0/2005uitgaveninkomstendefensieart.pdf;accessed 18 September 2007

In 2000, the Ministry of Defense published a White Paper that contains policy goals for the next ten years. According to this *Defense White Paper 2000* the core tasks of the Dutch armed forces are (1) protecting the integrity of national and allied territory, including the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba; (2) advancing the international rule of law and stability; and (3) assisting the civil authorities in the context of law enforcement, disaster relief and humanitarian aid, both nationally and internationally. To achieve this, structural changes in the armed forces were inevitable. These changes resulted in the rejection of military hardware in favor of a greater capacity for deployments. The Netherlands are now better prepared for peacekeeping operations and can sustain them for a considerable time. The downside to this structural change is that it is now even more difficult to contribute to a traditional force capable of fighting a major conflict. If it faces a major conflict, the Netherlands will experience deficiencies (Wijk 2004). These will be both qualitative and quantitative as demands for material will not be met and the personnel system will not be able to call enough reservists to duty.

Restructuring even takes on a perpetual form. A *Strategic Accord* (2002) and a *Fall Letter* (dated 8 November 2002) cumulated in policy intentions that were laid down in a *Letter to Parliament* in June 2003. The objective of the reforms mentioned in this letter is to create an expeditionary force, spend less money and at the same time create possibilities for new investments. It

notes that protecting the territorial integrity and the task of promoting international law are getting more and more intertwined because of the terrorist threat. To cope with a structural deficit of 380 mio. Euros a year, staffs and the core department will be reduced by 30 per cent (Prinsjesdagbrief, 16 November 2003). The reserves will be disbanded. The *Orion* airplanes used for patrolling the seas (formerly used for hunting down enemy submarines, now for intercepting drug trafficking) will disappear. Dutch troops stationed in Germany will be relocated to the Netherlands. 29 *F-16 jets* will be disposed of and an air force base will close. In return the main weapon arsenal will be improved and modernized. One is prepared to invest in replacements (in due time the *F-16* will be replaced by the *Joint Strike Fighter*) and technology to ameliorate the quality of the armed forces. But a personnel reduction of 12,000 will certainly be one the most difficult restructuring goals to be implemented. This reduction will be realized from 2003 to 2008 and will probably result in the involuntary dismissal of 5,000 persons. In July 2007, the MoD had to revise its policies because of the steep rise in costs of operations in Afghanistan. The number of *F-16* fighters in the air force was reduced from 90 to 72. The plan of investing in cruise missles on Her Majesty's ships was dropped. Instead of heavy equipment the emphasis is on personnel that is needed for the operations in Afghanistan. (Ministerie van Defensie 2007)

2.3 The Impact of the Transformation on the Position of Female Soldiers

The changes in the Netherlands are not so much different from the changes in other countries. Authors like Iskra et al. (2002; see also Figure 1) and Segal (1995) predict that, in general, these changes will lead to changes in the position of women in the armed forces. Three hypotheses can be derived from these studies:[2]

(1) Women's military participation tends to increase under voluntary accession systems (women are less represented in conscript armies);
(2) The importance of women's participation in the military is related to the perceived threats. The relationship takes the form of a U-curve (high threat – higher women's participation; medium threat – lower women's participation; low threat – higher women's participation);
(3) Related to the nature of missions: The more offensive or aggressive the function or purpose of the armed forces is perceived to be, the more limited women's participation.

2 Carreiras (2004: 357f.) gives an extensive set of hypotheses related to the participation of women in the armed forces.

A study by Carreiras (see Figure 3) demonstrates the importance of conscription rates for the percentage of women in the armed forces of NATO countries. The two phenomena are correlated (R=-.72; Sig. 0.01). Her conclusion is that "[t]he representation of women is higher in countries that have voluntary systems of military service or consider transition from conscript to all-volunteer forces and face actual or potential recruitment shortages. Inversely, countries based on conscript military systems and no recruitment difficulties tend to have the lowest representation of women." (Carreiras 2006: 121)

Figure 3: Force Structure and Percentage of Women Soldiers in NATO Countries



Since 1996 the Netherlands Armed Forces had reformed into an all-volunteer force. The consequences were that the armed forces had to comply to the laws of the market, change their recruitment system and try to convince more women to join the army. Legislation and emancipation were motives, too, but one of the most commonly mentioned motives to recruit more women was simply that the armed forces needed women to satisfy the need for personnel.

The Netherlands do not have the capabilities to engage in war fighting in the manner of France or the United Kingdom (compared to these war-fighting nations they can only deliver a symbolic contribution). The NATO Reaction Forces are an initiative that enable a small country to live up to the first task mentioned in the *Defense White Paper 2000*, the task to defend national and allied territory. Only by international collaboration can this task be fulfilled.

Automatically the other tasks, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcing, advancing the international rule of law and stability, and assisting civil authorities will gain importance.

In summary: The immediate threats to national security are low, conscription has been abolished, and the emphasis concerning the missions is on peacekeeping and peace enforcement. As predicted by the hypotheses the participation level of women in the military is gradually rising (see the following sections).

2.4 History of Women in the Military

"There are accounts, verified by multiple official sources, of more than 20 women who dressed as men and served in the British Royal Navy or Marines from the late 17th to the early 19th centuries. In 1690 Anne Chamberlyne joined her brother's ship and fought in the battle against the French off Beachy Head." (http://www.gendergap.com/military/Warriors-1.htm#defenders; accessed 9 June 2004) Women were often successfully hiding their sex. Somebody with a short haircut, trousers and a broad hat had to be a man. Mixed forms were not customary. When a French war-vessel entered the Tahiti harbor in 1768 the Tahitians immediately recognized a disguised woman amongst the crewmembers of the ship. This female sailor had made the complete voyage during 16 months, passing as a man. The Tahitians, who were not familiar with culturally defined sex differences in Western Europe, recognized her immediately as a woman, purely by body features, while her mates, with whom she had had close contact, had not noticed anything. It was not too difficult to be undetected because of cultural reasons – as indicated in the French example – but also because it was relatively easy for a woman to pretend to be a boy. "To catch 'em young" was a famous saying in the navy (Elias 2007: 30).

In the Netherlands the first women in arms in post-medieval times were either fighting in the rebellion against Spain or were women in disguise. An example of the first category is Kenau Simonsdaughter Hasselaers who was, according to some sources (Kloek 2001), 56 years old, financed the build of a galleon, and led 300 armed women into combat during the Spanish siege of Haarlem in 1572. She was a heroine, but ironically the name 'Kenau' nowadays denotes a woman who is overly assertive or masculine. The connotation borders on the word 'bitchy'. During the 17th and 18th century there were no women serving in the armed forces, at least not officially. However, some female soldiers and sailors actually managed to be employed by the Dutch armed forces. Dekker/van der Pol (1989) estimate that about 90 women served in the armed forces. The motives to serve differed a lot. Some of these

women were simply poor, came from foreign countries and needed the money. Others have had bad childhood experiences or needed to be away from their place of origin. Again others wanted a free journey to the colonies and marry one of the settlers. A few might have had problems with their sexual identity.

As combatants women were sometimes visible (Kenau) and sometimes in disguise. But another category of women was an integral part of the army until warfare became industrialized and conscripted, e.g., "in 1776, the Berlin Garrison of Frederick the Great consisted of 17,056 men, 5,526 women and 6,622 children. The camp follower, often seen as a parasite on the military body, was in fact an essential link in the logistical chain." (DeGroot 2001: 24) In the Netherlands, as in all Western countries, camp followers were also a common phenomenon. Yet, in the standard reference to the transformation of the Dutch logistics system to modern logistics networks, there is remarkably little information on them (Roos 2002).

In the 20th century, i.e., from 25 April 1944 until the mid-1980s, female soldiers worked in their own 'safe area' within the Dutch armed forces, first in the Women Assistance Corps and later in organizations known as the MARVA (Navy), MILVA (Army) and LUVA (Air Force). Yet, although 25 April is acknowledged to be the date of entry of the first female soldiers in the Royal Netherlands Armed forces (http://www.museumverbindingsdienst.nl/milvavhk.html; accessed 9 June 2004), the Women's Corps of the Royal Netherlands Indian Army (the colonial army of the Netherlands stationed in Indonesia) was established even earlier, on 5 March 1944 (Kruyswijk-van Thiel 2004: 12). These women were obviously not working in combat functions. Most were working as administrators, medical services, secretaries or welfare personnel (Kruyswijk-van Thiel 2004: 235). Others worked in signals units, medical units, service units, transport units, fighter control and air traffic control. How the women were perceived by the military organization, is made clear by the picture of a recruiting poster of a MARVA, coloring her lips. The text reads: "MARVA, you make the navy look nicer." It is not surprising that some of the MARVAs disapproved of this poster.

In 1978, women were given access to all military institutes and training centers. However, the Royal Netherlands Naval Academy in Den Helder remained closed for women until 1983. In 1982, the separate women's corps were disbanded and from then on female soldiers were supposed to have the same rights, opportunities and duties as their male comrades. The first women aboard ship attracted much attention from the media. Comparisons with the television series *Love Boat* were often made (Guns 1985). Nowadays the Navy itself acknowledges that it would not be able to sail without women for they form a considerable part of the sailing navy. Yet, the Marine Corps

(in the Netherlands the Marine Corps is part of the Navy) and the submarine service are still forbidden territory for women. This decision to exclude women from the Marine Corps and the submarine service is justified with reference to the accommodation situation on board, the protection of privacy and physical capacities.

2.5 Statistical Representation

As Tables 1 and 2 show, over the last 15 years the percentage of women in the armed forces has been rising slowly from 5.2 per cent in 1992 to 9 per cent in 2006.[3] However, during the last four years, the influx of women has stagnated. The number of females in operational branches even dropped significantly. Most women are employed in the Joint Support Services. The policy objective is to reach 12 per cent by 2010, to have 6 per cent in the rank of major or higher and 3 per cent in the rank of colonel and higher.

3 In the year 2006 about 20,000 civilians were employed by the armed forces. 23 per cent of these employees were female. As this research is about military personnel we will not discuss civilian personnel.

Table 1: Development of Female Military Personnel (in per cent)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
General Staff	5.1	6.7	7.6	7.1	7.5	6.9
Joint Supporting Services	11.6	12.7	12.5	13.9	16.4	15.9
Army	7.7	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.2	8.0
Air Force	8.6	9.4	9.7	9.7	9.6	9.5
Navy	10.3	10.0	10.0	10.7	10.5	10.9
Military Police	9.2	9.3	10.2	10.5	10.7	11.1
Soldiers	14.9	14.8	13.9	13.7	13.4	12.9
NCOs	4.2	4.9	5.6	6.5	6.6	6.8
Subaltern COs	9.0	9.7	10.1	10.7	11.5	11.6
Higher COs	2.8	3.3	3.8	4.1	4.4	6.2
Grand Total	8.7	9.2	9.3	9.6	9.6	9.5

Source: MoD; http://www.pvda.nl/renderer.do/menuId/37298/clearState/tr/sf/37298/returnPage/37298/itemId/200035953/realItemId/200035953/pageId/45641/instanceId/37907; accessed 16 November 2005. The numbers differ from earlier MoD publications. The most probable reason for the slightly different numbers is the restructuring of the armed forces.The absolute number of military servicemen and women serving in the Dutch armed forces is about 50,000.

Table 2: Distribution of Male and Female Personnel by Service and by Rank in 2006

	Male	Female	Total
Army	20,981 (92%)	1,783 (8%)	22,764
Air Force	9,236 (92%)	854 (8%)	10,090
Navy	9,386 (90%)	1,049 (10%)	10,435
Military Police	5,371 (89%)	685 (11%)	6,056
Privates & Corporals	16,455 (89%)	2,096 (11%)	18,551
NCOs	19,548 (93%)	1,467 (7%)	21,015
COs	8,971 (92%)	808 (8%)	9,779
Grand Total	44,974 (91%)	4,371 (9%)	49,345

Source: Heuvel 2007.

Until recently, as in other countries, women were distributed over the ranks very unevenly. In 2003, the situation appeared to have improved slightly with the Netherlands armed forces counting six female colonels. Over a period from 2000 to 2005 the number of senior female commanding officers (major or higher) has doubled. In 2006, 41 served in the army, 49 in the air force and 42 in the navy. Only five senior commanding officers (major or higher) served in the military police. Even when the size of the military police is taken into account – it is the smallest of the four services – senior female commanding officers are underrepresented. Comparing its organizational size to the navy for instance, the military police should have about 10 female commanding officers. Overall, when women would be proportionally represented in the rank of general, there should be ten female generals in the military as a whole, but in 2007 there are only two women generals in the armed forces. In 2005, the first female general was appointed in the army and in 2007, the air force appointed its first female general.

While women are underrepresented in the ranks of major and higher, they are over-represented in the short-term contracts and in the lower ranks. This phenomenon is related not only to the recruitment issue, but also to the question of retention. It appears that female service personnel quit the organization in relatively large numbers at the age of 30–35.

A very important distinction is between personnel on long-term and personnel on short-term contracts. If we look at the duration of the contracts involved – short-term versus long-term contracts – we see that women are better represented in the category of short-term contracts. It can be concluded that many of the women serve only for a short period of time. Even more remarkable is the different effect of rank within the categories 'long' and 'short-term contracts'. Within the category of long-term contracts women are better represented in the rank of corporal/soldier, whereas within the category of short-term contracts women are better represented in the rank of officer. Here we find one of the structural barriers, which explains why it takes so long before the first woman was promoted general. When only 5 per cent of officers with long contracts are female, it is much harder to get to the top than it would be if the percentage had been 22 per cent (as it is within the category of short-term contract officers). Maybe there is a glass ceiling, but also – and maybe more important – there is the problem of the numbers. It is easier to find top quality workers in a large number of candidates than it is in a small number of candidates.

Table 3: Specification of Military Personnel by Rank and by Contract (2003)

Contract	Sex	Officers		NCO (incl. Navy corporals)		Enlisted		Total	
Long-term	♂ (%)	8,269	(95%)	15,954	(96%)	2,175	(90%)	26,398	(95%)
	♀ (%)	446	(5%)	656	(4%)	250	(10%)	1,352	(5%)
	Total	8,715		16,610		2,425		27,750	
Short-term	♂ (%)	916	(78%)	3,598	(85%)	16,455	(88%)	20,969	(87%)
	♀ (%)	255	(22%)	621	(15%)	2,305	(12%)	3,181	(13%)
	Total	1,171		4,219		18,760		24,150	

Source: MoD.

In 2004, only 13 per cent of the all women in the army occupied positions in combat units, 15 per cent in technical functions and 72 per cent served in auxiliary areas. In the navy and the air force there was another kind of occupational segregation. In these branches women were seldom working in technical classifications and trades. As expected they were represented quite well in support functions. Nevertheless, in the navy and the air force, women were better represented in combat units. 33 per cent of women in the navy were working in combat related positions (i.e., *Zeedienst*). In the air force 19 per cent of women served in combat functions. When they were pilots, they were mostly in helicopters, not in fighter jets (*F-16*). The low representation of women in combat units in the army was partly caused by the physical demands in infantry, cavalry and artillery because for women these demands were difficult to meet.

Table 4: Per cent of Women by Function in 2004

Functions	Army		Navy		Air Force		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Combat	231	13	375	33	180	19	786	21
Technical	254	15	43	4	91	8	388	10
Support	1,228	72	703	63	666	71	2,597	69
Total	1,713		1,121		937		3,771	

Source: MoD; see also Richardson et al. 2007: 209.
Note: Only female service personnel, civilians are excluded.

In August 2004, the Minister of State van der Knaap announced to increase recruitment levels to 30 per cent to get more women into the armed forces. This new policy objective realistically acknowledged that for several reasons the turn over in female service personnel was high. In order to retain a reasonable percentage of women, whilst accepting a high turn over rate, one has to put more effort into recruitment. But these targets for recruitment were only attainable in the military police. According to (Heuvel 2007: 4) "the percentage of females entering the armed forces was 11 per cent in 2005 and 13 per cent in 2006. Although the Marechaussee [military police] has an intake percentage of 35 per cent in 2005 and 2006".

3 Political Aspects and Policies

3.1 Diversity Policies in the Armed Forces

Although it is clear from the beginning that military culture is not really open to women, the policymakers have never seriously made plans to change the masculine culture. For example, the first emancipation memorandum *Women in the Armed Forces*, written some 25 years ago, stressed the importance of cultural change, which was needed to train men and women equally in a male-dominated environment. But the assumption always was that culture would change automatically if more women entered the armed forces. For 25 years the leading issue in the policy on women in the armed forces has been the enhancement of the entry, the mobility and the retention of women.

In 1989, the leading thought was that affirmative action would stimulate the integration of women. All services implemented the *Positive Plan of Action for the Integration of Women.* The intention was to reach 8 per cent military women by 1993. But progress reports in the early 1990s showed that women were not interested in military jobs. Reasons why women did not enlist were the image of the military as an organization of men only, the lack of technical education among women and physical overload during basic training. In 1994, to reach a percentage of 8 per cent servicewomen was postponed until the end of 1996.

The next policy document (1997) on emancipation was written with the shortage of personnel in mind. This time the idea was that the female workforce was essential for meeting the general recruitment targets of the armed forces. In 1997, it was envisaged to have 12 per cent military women and 30 per cent female civil servants in the armed forces by 2010. Again the measures meant to increase the numbers and not to change the culture. For instance, only one small paragraph of this policy document paid attention to mutual acceptance. It was only due to the *Working Conditions Acts* of 1994,

in which employers were obliged to protect their employees against sexual harassment and violence, that the armed forces developed regulations regarding misconduct in general and sexual harassment in particular.

This policy document dating from 2007 is still valid nowadays and forms the starting point for the recently presented *Gender Action Plan* (2004) which was the result of five internal and external factors. Firstly, there was the call for change from the shop floor. The *Defense Women's Network (Defensie Vrouwen Network, DVN)*, a change agent that tries to influence policy-makers and to promote the interests of women in the armed forces, had developed political pressure. With the help of members of parliament the DVN emphasized the need of assigning role models on all hierarchical levels including special key commissioners in the management who were to address gender issues.

Secondly, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment had developed a national policy on gender mainstreaming[4] in 2001 and established a watchdog committee that would have to evaluate all ministries if and how they had implemented the gender perspective in their work and policy and about their further intentions in this area. To illustrate this for the armed forces with a small example from ergonomics: After some research, the straps that enable both men and women to carry heavy backpacks were improved to fit both sexes.

Thirdly, the Inspector General of the Armed Forces had extensively evaluated the effects of the emancipation policy between 1997 and 2003 and came up with the following recommendations:

- Evaluate the emancipation policies and fit them to developments in society and the armed forces.
- Contrary to single-shot policies for female service personnel and specific policies for the armed forces, integrate emancipation policies into the regular policies of the armed forces.
- Work as much as possible on retention.
- Do not make female service personnel the disproportional victim of reduction and reorganization.
- Appoint gender ambassadors to regularly and personally meddle with the implementation of emancipation policies.

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4 Gender mainstreaming is defined as "the (re)organizing, improving, developing and evaluation of processes of policy in such a manner that the gender perspective makes part of all policies formulated, by the actors that normally are responsible for those policies" (Council of Europe 1998. Online: http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/equality/02._gender_mainstreaming/eg-s-ms(1998)2rev+1.asp#P107_22962; accessed 18 September 2007.)

- Establish clear achievement indicators.
- Establish a strict monitoring system in order to track and evaluate developments.
- Given the need for the armed forces to use the potential of women on the labor market, the need for recruitment and improved measures for retention, it is important to objectively keep track of the progress made. Evaluate again by 2008. (Jaarverslag 2003)

Fourthly, in 2000, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. In 2002, the Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael (Frerks/Bouta 2002) analyzed how the Netherlands (including the armed forces) would be able to contribute to increasing the role of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. The UN Resolution 1325 and the research by Clingendael brought the Ministry of Defense into contact with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Social Affairs and several NGOs on the subject of women in armed conflict. This resulted, in November 2003, in the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment to establish the taskforce *Women in Conflict Situations and Peacekeeping* in order to also open the discussion on women in armed conflict within the armed forces.

Finally, the armed forces faced a huge manpower reduction in the years 2003 to 2008. During this reorganization special attention was to be paid to the reintegration of female servicewomen.

In summary, the consequences of these five factors for the *Gender Action Plan* were:

- The concept of 'gender' has become more accentuated. In the armed forces gender has been defined as "the cultural and social meaning that is related to one's sex" (Laak 2003: 13). Gender is expressed in the stereotyping of males and females, the gendered division of labor, legislation, rituals, culture and identity.
- All the services had to formulate specific goals on recruitment, retention, training, career development, balancing work and child care and appoint so-called 'gender-ambassadors'.
- In general more attention has been paid to role models.
- According to the UN Resolution 1325, the gender perspective during deployments abroad has become much more relevant.

3.2 *Issues in Current Policies on Women in the Armed Forces*

3.2.1 Recruitment

As mentioned above, in 2004 the Minister of State van der Knaap announced an increase in recruitment levels to 30 per cent to get more women into the armed forces. The armed forces have implemented an acquaintance program for young men and women at secondary educational levels to give them an opportunity to witness what military life is about and to provide some insight in physical fitness requirements and basic military knowledge. This program seems to have a positive impact on the recruitment of women in particular. The armed forces have also been trying to change their image of a 'males only club' through information and recruitment campaigns. The aim is to make clear that women are also welcome to join the armed forces. Furthermore, qualified females are being assigned as recruiting officers and are viewed as role models for potential female recruits.

3.2.2 Retention

The 12 per cent policy objective is not feasible when the turnover rates are as high as they are at present. To keep women in the armed forces and promote more women to higher positions in the organization, the policy objectives have to be more specified. Thus, additional objectives have been set for the officer ranks. For the ranks from major and higher it is planned to reach 6 per cent, and for the ranks of full colonel and higher the aim is to arrive at 3 per cent. To retain women in the armed forces, barriers in career development (such as career schooling and compulsory sea duty for the navy, both around the age of 30–35) must by identified and settled. Also, measures to enhance the work-life balance will have to be improved by providing better child care facilities and arrangements.

3.2.3 Training

Although servicewomen undergo the same training as their male counterparts, the military has implemented additional physical training programs for men and women with difficulties in this area. Contacts have been made with local sports facilities at which young people are given the opportunity to upgrade their physical fitness in the pre-recruitment phase. These courses seem to have a positive effect on the recruitment of women. Training is also related to realistic functional requirements; therefore, women and men must meet the same physical standards. Currently, several studies are being conducted to find a better solution to optimize training efforts in relation to functional requirements. One major step taken in this area is the introduction of new ergo-

nomic designs of tasks and equipment to reduce physical requirements without diminishing operational readiness.

3.2.4 Mobility

The armed forces have chosen to pursue an integral career policy for both men and women. However, the individual needs of servicewomen, especially with regard to their careers in both a short-term and a long-term perspective, are given greater attention in order to limit the outflow of women. The promotion of women through the ranks remains limited, however, because many women leave military service at a relatively young age.

3.2.5 Work-Life Balance

In 2002, an armed forces brochure was published describing all of the current rules and regulations regarding work and child care. Child care is essential for making work and life compatible. Normally, child care is bought from agencies on the free market. There are special 'Kindergarten' organizations that offer places for children. The 'difficulty' is, however, that there is not always sufficient room for everyone, which means there are waiting lists. The military also has some facilities. All elements of the organization (the Services, the Defense Inter-Service Support Service and the Central Organization) have contracts with agencies in this field. The use of child care is subject to conditions that are mainly intended to support the employees who are most in need of childcare. Parents are entitled to a financial contribution to child care costs, but the respective budget so far is quite modest which means that putting people on a waiting list will be inevitable. The armed forces are also looking into the possibilities for in-house child care, i.e., at or near the workplace, and has started a number of pilot projects whose application terms and administrative procedures differ quite a lot. Furthermore, there are special arrangements for women, e.g., the right to maternity leave, the right to re-entry up to six years after leaving the military and the right to be exempt from deployment in Peace Support Operations or compulsory marine exercises in the case of children up to the age of four. In practice, however, the servicewomen do not like to be an exception and therefore find it hard to make use of these arrangements.

3.2.6 Gender Ambassadors

In 2002, the military appointed so-called 'gender-ambassadors'. These gender ambassadors are high-ranking generals who have to place gender political aspects on the political agenda and who are encouraged to develop specific initiatives in this regard. To give some examples: The air force has imple-

mented regular discussions with groups of female officers about their objectives and ideas and the opportunities the air force can offer them. In addition, the gender ambassador for the navy has announced an initiative to increase the number of female NCOs. And a study has just been started to better understand why competent female NCOs do not progress up the ranks. Next, the army's aim is to critically analyze its recruitment campaign and make sure that future campaigns will appeal to both men and women. Lastly, the military police intends to put the gender issue on the agenda at every commander's meeting.

3.2.7 Sexual Harassment

Another focus is on the general attitude towards women and the prevention of all forms of misconduct such as (sexual) harassment, pestering, bullying, teasing and discrimination against women. The regulations regarding conduct unbecoming in general and harassment in particular are based on the *Working Conditions Act*. Since 1994 employers are obliged to protect employees against sexual intimidation and violence. The MoD publication *With All Respect* (Ministerie van Defensie 2001) states clearly that conduct unbecoming is unacceptable. Since 17 September 2001 people can call upon the *Regulation Complaints Conduct Unbecoming*. Conduct unbecoming is defined as intimidating, humiliating or threatening behavior, directed at one person or a group of persons. Examples are sexual harassment, aggression and violence, discrimination, extremism (both from the right and the left), stalking, teasing, bullying. Sexual harassment is subdivided in sexual rapprochement, requests for sexual favors, verbal and non-verbal sexual behavior, jokes, remarks, 'accidental' contact and assault (Broek 2003). People can turn to a central or a local 'confidential counsellor', a person that treats all information in confidence. In the army alone there are 170 confidential counsellors. They register complaints anonymously for statistical purposes. The confidential counsellor can help with reporting penal behavior to the military police or with reporting an official complaint to the Committee in charge of *Complaints Conduct Unbecoming*. People who file a complaint are guaranteed legal protection in order to assure that the complaint can never be disadvantageous to the complainant.

Sexual intimidation has never been thoroughly studied in the armed forces. In early 2002, a preliminary research into conduct unbecoming was published (KPMG 2002). 8,000 civilian and military workers were asked to fill in a questionnaire in which sexual intimidation was one of the items. 41 per cent responded. Only 1 per cent of the respondents reported to be a victim of sexual intimidation. 11 per cent reported to be bothered by gossip. Compared to other studies these percentages seem rather optimistic. Accord-

ing to some research by the Ministry of Social Affairs (2002) 17 per cent of female employees are confronted with sexual intimidation at one time (among males the figure is 4 per cent). Within the Netherlands Police, 69 per cent of the females and 44 per cent of the male employees were confronted with sexual intimidation (Sandfoort/Vanwesenbeeck 2000).

The study by Staal et al. (2006) was based on a large-scale survey (N=3,800). The main results were that there is relatively much of conduct unbecoming in the armed forces ranging from rude language to physical violence and use of sexual force. Young men and women are the most likely victims of pestering, but women are more often sexually harassed than men. Men are sexually victimized by men and women; women are only victimized by men, not by other women. Conduct unbecoming occurs more frequently in the armed forces than in other Dutch organizations, but the incidence is equal to the Dutch police corps and the US and UK army. Half of the female respondents is reproached sexually, but is not bothered by it (a little bit bothered is counted as not bothered). One out of six women is bothered by sexual misbehavior, one out of ten males is bothered by pestering. (see Table 5)

Causes for conduct unbecoming are (1) the conditions and nature of work and working conditions (boredom, physical work); (2) a lack of social leadership; (3) the composition of personnel (males being the largest group) and personnel policies; and (4) structures and systems (hierarchical structure and power distance). The analysis leads to recommendations regarding clear rules of conduct which should be formulated explicitly and improving social leadership and integrity (commanders are responsible). Furthermore, the organization of integrity care is to be transformed into a safety net of independent professionals, and management and organization should change in order to further a safe and protective work environment, career policies, possibilities for development and training, and job enrichment.

Table 5: Conduct Unbecoming and Pestering (in per cent)

		Male		Female	
		bothersome	Not bother-some	bothersome	Not bother-some
Conduct Unbe-coming	Sexual attention & rapprochement	3	37	14	50
	Unwanted physi-cal touching	1	7	8	32
	Sexual strain/force	0	1	4	5
Pestering	Being excluded	3	3	7	4
	Pestering at work and with regard to personnal live	7	4	9	5
	Direct violence	1	7	1	5

Source: Staal et al. 2006: 48. A 'little bit bothersome' was coded as 'not bothersome'.

3.3 Interest Groups: The Defense Women's Network

Keeping women in and improving the position of women in the armed forces is not only related to policies that are developed from above, but is also very dependent on political pressures from below, i.e., from the pressure that comes from organizations of female service personnel themselves. But the females are not the only ones to organize themselves. There are three types of networks who exert considerable influence on the policies of the armed forces: (1) The *Defense Women's Network (DVN)*; (2) the *Foundation Homosexuality and Armed Forces*; and (3) the *Defense Multicultural Network.*

The philosophy behind the pressure groups is best formulated in the 'managing diversities' approach. According to Richardson (2003) the 'managing diversities' approach is very different from 'emancipation' approaches. Emancipation is directed at combating inequalities and backward positions of minorities. Emancipation is important for it should lead to equal treatment and equal opportunities, but does the emancipation approach really change the behavior on the shopfloor? The managing diversities approach believes it does not. Cultural barriers and behavior on the shopfloor largely remain the same. According to Richardson, the managing diversities approach stresses differentiation in cultures and hopes to solve conflicts between groups by spreading knowledge of cultural backgrounds and increasing cultural empathy. Individuals, who are capable of decoding the norms and values of the other, will probably perform better in collaborating. The emancipation approach will not be efficient when it lacks the appeal to cultural empathy that

is embodied in the managing diversities approach. That is why Richardson concludes that we will have to move beyond emancipation and strive for integration.

This, in fact, is also the conclusion of the former DVN Chairperson Henny Snellen and her predecessor Jolanda Bosch (2003). Emancipation is good, but actual behavior on the shopfloor level should also change. Therefore the three networks should work together, but also remain separate organizations. According to Snellen and Bosch it is good to have joint meetings with the Minister of State in addition to the separate meetings that are organized regularly. Snellen and Bosch advocate *Working Apart Together!* In other words, 'managing diversity' is a useful approach, but there is also a need for a separate women's network. The women's network should not be subsumed under a kind of overarching 'diversities network'. The most important reasons for a separate network are the specificity of the network and the gender issues related to it.

Since twelve years the DVN (see www.defensievrouwennetwerk.nl) is the change agent that tries to influence policy-makers and to promote the interests of women in the armed forces. It consists of active female service personnel and operates as an equivalent of the 'old boys network'. It is difficult for a female NCO to ask for direct help or advice from other females that may or may not be higher in rank. Thanks to DVN meetings, discussions and newsletters, it becomes easy for a servicewoman to get into informal contact with other female members of the network. They can help each other because they form an informal 'old girls' network. The network is advantageous to both the women themselves and to the organization at large. The network is a source of knowledge and expertise that is often consulted by policy-makers. The Personnel Department of the Ministry often invites the network to participate in consultative meetings. Objectives of the network are given in Text Box 1.

The DVN should also be a separate network because of the type of issues the network addresses. Most prominent is the gender perspective that is advocated. Laak (2003: 13) defines gender as "the cultural and social meaning that is related to one's sex". Gender is expressed in the stereotyping of males and females, the division of labor between the sexes, legislation, rituals, culture and identity. Policies related to gender are conforming to the concept of *Gender Mainstreaming* that was adopted by the Council of Europe (1998) and defined as "the (re)organizing, improving, developing and evaluation of policy processes in such a manner that the gender perspective becomes part of all policies formulated". Gender mainstreaming results in the management of diversity in every aspect of policy-making, i.e., the gender perspective is to be interwoven into all workplace aspects.

Textbox 1: Why DVN (Defense Women's Network)

As a woman working for the Ministry of Defense (military or civilian), you have few female colleagues in the workplace. Because you are in the minority, you stand out as a female. The Defense Women's Network (hereafter referred to as DVN) offers the opportunity of meeting others and to share unique experiences. During your career, you have had to face challenging obstacles. Defense women have the opportunity within the DVN to stimulate each other in taking the next bold step and assisting and motivating each other as new challenges need to be faced.

DVN pays special attention to situations which you, as a defense woman, may be confronted with and offers ways to handle these challenges. During theme days, information is offered and skills practiced (often through the use of workshops).

Our association has the following main objectives:

- To inspire, stimulate, inform and motivate women who are employed in the Dutch Ministry of Defense.
- To strengthen the position of Defense women and stimulate their advancement to higher positions within the Defense Department.

3.4 The International Context

International treaties influence the position of women in the Netherlands Armed forces considerably. This is true for the past regarding the entry of women in the organization and it is true for the present as the participation of women in peacekeeping is reinforced by UN resolutions. In 1952, the Netherlands signed an international treaty on the rights of women in New York (Roozenbeek 2003: 15). This UN treaty stated that women are entitled to the same rights on the labor market as men. Article 3 of this convention reads: "Women shall be entitled to hold public office and to exercise all public functions, established by national law, on equal terms with men, without any discrimination." No longer was it allowed to exclude women from occupations or to employ women under different conditions than men. Prior to this treaty women were often paid less while performing the same tasks as men. When working women married they had to resign from their jobs and devote themselves to housekeeping and child raising. After signing the treaty, it took the Dutch parliament almost 20 years to ratify the treaty (1971). In the 1974 Defense White Paper the intention was formulated that women would be admitted to training facilities for professional soldiers like the NCO school and the Royal Netherlands Military Academy/Naval Academy. The general staff, in 1976, ordered a study regarding the admission of women into the armed forces. The Army and the Air Force opened up for women in 1978. In 1982, the women's corps, that sustained segregation, was disbanded and from this

moment on female military service personnel was supposed to have equal rights, opportunities and duties. In 1983, the Naval Academy was the last training facility to welcome servicewomen (Roozenbeek 2003: 16). In total, it took 31 years to implement the guidelines from the New York treaty regarding the position of women in the armed forces.

Nowadays the Netherlands do not comply to European legislation/ guidelines in all respects. As was pointed out before, the submarine service and the Marine Corps are not accessible to women. On 30 June 2000, the *European Committee on Equal Treatment*[5] declared the exclusion of women from the submarine fleet and the Marine Corps to be in conflict with the *European Equal Treatment Act*, but was unable to bring about changes in national policies.

Yet, Dutch policy-makers are very receptive concerning UN Resolution 1325[6] (see Textbox 2) regarding the demand to incorporate the gender perspective into peacekeeping missions. The UN clearly distinguishes between decision-making concerning conflict resolution, the role of women during peacekeeping missions, and the post-conflict roles of rebuilding war-torn societies, and wants to consider the gender perspective as it is evident that conflict resolution and rebuilding societies will benefit from this. First, the roles of women will be discussed in more detail. Then a few examples that demonstrate why conflict resolution benefits from a larger participation of women in peace support missions are given. Next the Dutch policies and experiences of Dutch female peacekeepers will be dealt with.

5 http://www.clara-wichmann.nl/activiteiten/nemesis/nemesis32001.html; accessed 9 June 2004.

6 http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf; accessed 2 December 2004.

Text Box 2: Exerpts from UN Resolution 1325, Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting on 31 October 2000

The Security Council

4. *Further urges* the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5. *Expresses* its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and *urges* the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

9. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

10. *Calls on* all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict

Bouta/Frerks (2002) distinguish seven roles of women: (1) Women as Victims of (sexual) violence; (2) women as combatants; (3) women for peace in the non-governmental sector; (4) woman in 'Formal Peace Politics'; (5) woman as coping and surviving actors; (6) women as heads of household; and (7) women and (in)formal employment. Depending on the phase the conflict is in – pre-conflict, during the conflict, post-conflict – the possible interventions from women in these seven roles are different. Women may be guerrilla fighters, victims, survivors, nurses, NGO-relief workers, military peacekeepers, UN observers, business women starting up new enterprises, etc. In war-torn countries these roles are related to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and rebuilding society. But many of the roles are founded on opposing interests and therefore the roles often are in conflict with each other.

Karamé (2001) explains why it has been beneficial to conflict resolution to include women in a UNIFIL peacekeeping mission. During their 20 year-long presence in South Lebanon, the Norwegian battalion always included a certain number of women. One of the problems the Lebanon had was that many young and adult men had left the area because of unemployment and the prospect of being forced to join one of the militias. Women were over-represented in the region. Many of these women had actively participated in the conflict. The had smuggled arms and ammunitions and actually fought

their enemies. Some had booby-trapped cars in the Israeli-occupied zone. As UNIFIL comprised more and more civilian components (rebuilding society), it required many interactions with the female population. The goals of the Norwegian peacekeepers could only be reached by fostering good relations with the local population, i.e., mainly to women, and the best way to improve such understanding was to use female peacekeepers.

A second example is derived from Miller/Moskos (1995) who researched the blurring of moral standards in Somalia. Most important in their analysis is the role of diversity: "The United States contingent differed markedly in social composition from the other 20 national contingents. The other troops were entirely male (except for some medical personnel); the U.S. contingent was 12 per cent female, twice the percentage of women soldiers who served in the Gulf War. The other contingents were basically of one race – either black (e.g., Nigeria, Botswana), white (e.g., Italy, Belgium, Canada, Australia) or brown (e.g., Pakistan, Morocco), whereas the Americans were the only multi-racial force: approximately one-third of the U.S. soldiers in Somalia were black." *Operation Restore Hope* was a confusing mission for the US soldiers. They were trained as warriors and were given the job of performing a humanitarian mission. They expected to be distributing food among grateful Somalis, but they were scorned and attacked. The attitude of the soldiers moved through three phases: (1) high expectancies when they first came to Somalia; (2) disillusionment after disappointing experiences; and (3) reconsideration. In the last phase, reconsideration, the soldiers adopted one of two value systems that enabled them to cope with the ambiguity of the mission. They chose between the value system 'warrior' or 'humanitarian'. White males in combat battalions mostly chose the former and thus to answered violence with violence. Hence, they were often on the brink of committing abusive behavior. Afro-Americans, women and soldiers from support units did not blame the Somalis. They chose the value system of the 'humanitarian' and tried to make sense of the Somali behavior and clearly distinguished between Somali clan warriors and needy refugees.

This research by Miller/Moskos has often been misinterpreted. Authors like DeGroot (2001) derive from the Somalia study that a larger percentage of women prevents the blurring moral standards. "[M]ale soldiers are less inclined to assert their dominance if female soldiers are present. Women seem to calm stressful situations (...) stated simply, men behave better when in the presence of women from their own culture" (DeGroot 2001: 36f.). The events in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, featuring Lynndie England, prove that this is not necessarily so. Whilst trying to combat gender stereotypes, DeGroot is using a gender stereotype himself, namely the stereotype that women have a civilizing effect on men.

There is another interpretation that relates diversity to cohesion. Diversity might temper extreme cohesion for a certain period of time. Strong cohesion leads to 'we' versus 'them' thinking (Soeters 2004a) and this logic can easily lead to the blurring of moral standards. There was high cohesion in the Abu Ghraib prison and there was authorization from superiors that explains the events in that prison. Diversity could not prevent this from happening. In Somalia, diversity in the support units could temper extreme cohesion for a while and this saved the US soldiers in support units from typecasting the Somalis as a nuisance and a pest. Diversity may break undesirable forms of male bonding, macho behavior and what comes of it. A higher percentage of women in units is therefore desirable. But higher participation of women in the armed forces does not guarantee that moral standards will not blur when in due time cohesion rises to such levels that strong in and out-group feelings take the overhand.

Dutch female service personnel has been deployed in many countries from the beginning of their enlistment. For example, in 1946 the Dutch government sent female service personnel to Egypt. Women were also deployed in police actions in the Netherlands Indies (1947–1948). Later women participated in Korea (1953), in Lebanon (1979), in the Sinai desert (1982) and in the Gulf war in 1991. Despite these historical facts, the Dutch government resisted the deployment of female UNMOs in Former Yugoslavia, by arguing that Muslims in Bosnia would not accept a female negotiator. However, when Scandinavia and the United Kingdom started deploying female UNMOs, the Dutch government gave in. A female UNMO stated that she had never experienced any disadvantages in being a woman: "During negotiations I observed that I was easier to approach for the Muslims than my male colleagues. Obviously a woman was more accessible for them." (Richardson/Bosch 1999: 145)

At present the defense organization seems to show no preference for men or woman. It is an image of equality. The question whether this is a genuine point of view remains unanswered. Is this image meant to keep up appearances? One could think so given the ambivalence that is recurrent in peacekeeping operations such as the Kosovo mission. During this mission female soldiers were not allowed to be on guard because they would not impress the locals. So putting them on guard would mean taking too big a risk. Altogether, in 2003, 7 per cent of the deployed personnel was female. In absolute numbers this means that 574 female soldiers and 8,093 men were deployed.

Table 6: Deployed Women in 2003

		Navy	Army	Air Force	MP	Total
Officers	♂	308	708	283	9	1,308
	♀	21	74	26		121
NCOs (incl. navy corporals)	♂	1,023	1,215	508	145	2,891
	♀	37	49	36	7	129
Enlisted	♂	1,140	2,480	212	8	3,840
	♀	85	220	16	3	324
Total	♂	2,471	4,403	1,003	162	8,039
	♀	143	343	78	10	574

Source: Rapportage krijgsmachtdelen.

Dutch experiences with deploying women, in general, are positive, but they also point at certain barriers and the persistence of masculine prejudices regarding the integration of women. When interviewing 16 female soldiers who had been on deployment (Bosch/Verweij 2002: 129–133), these women were generally very enthusiastic about their experiences. They experienced a high level of autonomy and responsibility, and said they learned a lot about themselves and their work during deployment. Examples they gave of learning experiences included helping to reconstruct a country, giving advice, solving a range of logistic problems, negotiating, cooperating with people from different nationalities, being far away from home for a long time and coping with loneliness. They also mentioned examples of learning new skills, such as using cold steel. Many women stated that there were a number of factors that were important for their well-being during employment. Among them, good health and the possession of good social and communication skills seemed to be the most important. They mentioned skills such as being able to accept other persons, not being egoistic, having a positive attitude, flexibility, empathy, and mental strength.

Most of those interviewed had felt fully accepted by the team members with whom they were directly cooperating. Every interviewee said that she had a 'buddy' on whom to lean, within her immediate environment. Buddies keep an eye on each other and provide help during stressful events. Most of the women had male buddies whom they trusted greatly, and whom they considered good listeners. But almost every one had a 'dip' at some time during the deployment. Their stories illustrate that 'feeling bad' was accepted as part of the challenge. The women interviewed were positive about the deployment, but this does not mean that gender relations were unproblematic. These relations involved markedly stereotyped representations of masculinity and femininity. This does not come as a surprise. Rosabeth Moss Kanter's (1977)

research on gender led her to conclude that in groups where women are few in relation to men they tend to be treated as a token, i.e., as 'something special'. Sometimes reactions of male military personnel towards women even were antagonistic. A particular medic, the only woman who regularly joined social patrols during a peacekeeping operation, gave a striking example of hostility that she had experienced: "[T]here was a rather fanatic platoon. They were clearly anti-woman. The platoon commander showed that openly and encouraged the members of the platoon to do the same. That bothered us [the women] a lot. A lot of provocative and sick remarks were made, but when we passed by, we were ignored completely." (cited in Bosch/Verweij 2002: 132) When asked whether she went on patrol with these men, she replied: "Yes, you are walking all day, silently, without saying a word." (cited in Bosch/Verweij 2002: 133)

A second type of reactions is singling the women out for notice, and being derogatory about women. A female military surgeon described what happened when she wished to visit an Egyptian battalion: "I wanted to visit a little Dutch signal unit under Egyptian command. I was in front of the gate but I wasn't allowed access, because I was a woman. 'But I'm the doctor', I argued. His answer remained no. I was a woman and nothing else mattered. In the end the sergeant major had to make a deal with the Egyptian commander, so that I was allowed to enter." (cited in Bosch/Verweij 2002: 133) A third type of reactions is that military men see women as people who require protection. So women often get benevolent, but uninvited and unwanted help as was the case with a female sergeant: "My commander stressed my womanhood. I didn't want that at all. For example, in meetings he urged the men to remove the porno-pictures in the private rooms because of my presence. But I didn't mind at all: the boys pay for their rooms, so they pay for their privacy. The commander put me on a pedestal that wasn't funny. It gave me the feeling I had to walk on tiptoe. I only wanted to do my job in the normal way." (cited in Bosch/Verweij 2002: 133)

These findings correspond with findings from Carreiras (2004) and Sion (2004) who also interviewed deployed female soldiers from the Netherlands Armed forces. A random selection from their interviews confirms the problems women are confronted with. "A 39-years-old Dutch air-force Lt Colonel: 'Once I was a commander and was commanding about 50 people. We had there a poster from Playboy (...) They had cut out my head and put it on that poster, in the office (...) I really thought, what do I have to do? Is this a kind of insubordination or is it just an attack from men on women or something like that'." (cited in Carreiras 2004: 285) Sometimes women are accepted during deployments when they are perceived not to be a women like Carina. "With Carina it doesn't feel like she is a woman. She does her work

and there is no difference. Carina is special, she (...) never complains and always does her work. But I met many women who do not do their work well (...) Artillery is too difficult for them. In the barracks it works well but in exercises artillery work is too hard for some women, not every woman can do it. They must be physically strong and also, how can I say it? Not too soft, they must stand for themselves and then it can work. (...) She is nice and integrates well but this is not a place for women (...) they can serve in administrative units but not in combat units. (...) I have no problem with Carina. She never had problems, she is relaxed." (cited in Sion 2004: 271)

In some rare cases, there are expressions of open non-acceptance: "The NCO said: 'I think that we infantry soldiers shouldn't have women. You can say that we have one woman [Ingrid] but she is part of the staff (...) Place one woman among men and you'll get a completely different atmosphere! I think that we must pay attention to it. Girls who don't know what they want to do with their life and they are young and they are thrown into a men's world. There are only few who manage well and Ingrid is a perfect example of one. This is a girl who stands still! And does her job perfectly (...) [but] one woman among ten men?' 'What are you doing here?' I ask myself." (cited in Sion 2004: 276)

International and national policies aimed at ameliorating the integration of women in the armed forces serve their purposes well, but they are only half the story. Open non-acceptance may be suppressed, but hidden non-acceptance or subtle ways of letting women know that they are not wanted persist. Bosch/Verweij (2002) have pointed to the phenomenon of 'enduring ambivalence'. Regarding gender policies in general Carreiras (2004: 318–325) concludes: "If military men feel overly pressured by institutional policies or these are interpreted by both men and women as sources of inequity, blatant resistance to women's integration 'may fade only to be replaced by more subtle, covert forms of discrimination and hostility' (Yoder/Adam/Prince 1983: 334). (...) policies may be a necessary but not sufficient condition to ensure the sustainability of the process of gender integration in the military (...) greater inclusiveness in Women's Military Participation will probably depend on change regarding women's 'controlling' presence in society, its impact on cultural conceptions of gender relations and on a more balanced distribution of domestic and paid work between the sexes."

4 Women in Dutch Society

4.1 The Status of Women in Society at large

According to the *Emancipation Monitor 2002*, a bi-annual publication that monitors progress regarding the position of women in society, the status and position of women is improving. The report concludes that "the emancipation process is heading in the right direction (...) no major breaks in the trend have been observed and developments are slowly but surely going down the desired path" (Portegijs et al. 2002: 251). But the *Emancipation Monitor 2004* also concluded that the change process stagnates (Portegijs et al. 2004). Where does this stagnation come from?

Much has been achieved. Women can study whatever they like and compete for jobs on an equal basis to men. Formally many laws guarantee equality. The most important of them is Article 1 of the Dutch constitution which bans whatever form of discrimination. The article reads: "All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race, or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted." But there are more laws that concern equality such as the *General Equal Treatment Act*[7] dating from 1994 and the *Working Conditions Act*, which forbids sexual intimidation and aggression at work.[8] There is an *Equal Treatment Committee* to place complaints and many companies as well as the armed forces have adopted codes of conduct in order to prevent harassment and to improve working conditions (Verweij et al. 2000). Havinga (2004) states that the *General Equal Treatment Act* is of undiminished necessity. When companies want to optimize their services towards their clients, they might favor recruiting a certain sex. For example, female patients mostly prefer to be helped by female doctors. But when a certain sex is favored during the recruitment process the *Equal Treatment Act* is violated.

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7 This Act provides for equal treatment of persons irrespective of their, *inter alia*, sex and civil (marital) status. More information in English on the General Equal Treatment Act can be found on the site of the international labor organization: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/gems/eeo/law/nether/l_geta.htm.

8 See the site http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/gems/eeo/law/nether/l_wca.htm. It reads "Under Article 4 (2), employers are obliged to protect employees as much as possible from sexual harassment and aggression and violence in the workplace. Under Article 5, the employer is compelled to pursue a policy on sexual harassment. Sexual harassment must be included in the risk analysis and evaluation which employers are bound to carry out under the Act."

Regulations concerning maternity and paternity leave stimulate equal opportunity and labor participation. Maternity leave is 16 weeks without any reduction of one's salary and can be used 4–6 weeks prior and 10–12 weeks after the expected date of birth. Comparing with other European countries is difficult as the conditions concerning remuneration differ.[9] In the UK, e.g., maternity leave is 26 weeks, but pay is lower (90 per cent for the first 6 weeks, for the remaining period 142 Euros a week). Paternity leave for the father of the newborn child is 2 days after the moment of birth. Other European countries are more generous in this respect (Finland: 18 workdays; France and the UK: 14 days; Belgium 10 days in the private sector and 4 ays in the public sector). But some other European countries, including Austria, Germany and Italy, do not provide paternity leave. Instead they have other regulations.

In the Dutch case, parental leave can be enjoyed before the child reaches the age of 8. Both parents are entitled to this form of leave. It can amount to 13 times of the weekly working hours and should be used for a maximum of half the working week over an uninterrupted period of up to 6 months. Compared to other European countries these 13 weeks are modest. Yet another form of policy that is meant to enhance the labor participation of women is career interruption. Three times during their career they can take such a career interruption ranging from 2–6 months and including a payment of 490 uro a month.

On 1 January 2005 a new law regarding child care went into force. According to this law, employers are expected, but not obligated to contribute one third of child care costs. The Netherlands government also contributes to these costs. For lower annual incomes below 22,000 Euros this contribution amounts up to 60 per cent per child. The higher the annual income, the lower the contribution. When employers contribute less than one third of the costs, government may contribute more, even up to 90 per cent for lower income groups.[10] This new law is meant to promote the use of child care facilities because, in 1998, only 18.5 per cent of the children aged 0–4 years were enrolled in formal child care facilities (Duyvendak/Stavenruiter 2004: 46–49).

9 For an overview of leave schemes in the EU see Duyvendak/Stavenruiter 2004: 141–148.

10 More information and exact percentages can be found at http://www.wetkinderopvang.nl.

Figure 4: Female Labor Participation in Europe in 2003 (in per cent)



Source: Eurostat – New Cronos, cited in Portegijs et al. 2004: 143.

In the US, the labor participation of women is 15 per cent higher than it is in Europe. In Europe 56 per cent of the female work population had a paid job for at least one hour a week. Following this definition of paid work, this percentage is highest in Sweden (72 per cent) and lowest in Italy (42 per cent). In the Netherlands, this applies to 66 per cent of the women in the age group 15–64 years.[11] This means that the Dutch are catching up because The Neth-

11 See http://www.nrc.nl/economie/artikel/1078380884103.html; accessed 2 November 2004.

erlands have, for a long time, been at the bottom of the ranking and now they are third (see Figure 4).

The Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics departs from a different definition in measuring labor participation. Its definition is based on a minimum of 12 hours of paid work a week. Using this definition labor participation in the Netherlands was 55 per cent in 2003. The good news is the steady increase over time. Another positive development is that the generation in the age group of 25–34 years is participating very actively. In wider Dutch society, in 2005, roughly 59 per cent of the women work for at least 12 hours a week, compared to 46 per cent in 1996. So there is an upward trend and compared to other European countries the most recent percentage is reasonably high. (See Tables 7 and 8)

Table 7: Net Labor Participation in the Society at large (in per cent)

Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
%	44.6	46.9	48.7	50.6	52.0	53.5	54.3	54.7

Source: http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/table.asp?PA=60035ned&D1=4-10&D2=0,2&D3=0&D4=0&D5=(l-11)-l&DM=SLNL&LA=nl&TT=2; accessed 2 November 2004.
Note: Percentages relate to the working occupational population in per cent of the population.

Table 8: Net Labor Participation in Society at large by Age Group (in per cent)

Year	Women				Men			
	1990	1995	2000	2003	1990	1995	2000	2003
15–24	41	37	41	40	43	40	47	45
25–34	53	61	71	73	88	86	92	89
35–44	43	50	62	66	90	90	92	91
45–54	33	42	52	61	82	85	88	88
55–64	11	13	20	24	42	39	47	53
Total	**39**	**44**	**52**	**55**	**71**	**72**	**77**	**75**

Source: CBS (Enquete occupational population), cited in Portegijs et al. 2004: 66.

However, these seemingly positive developments regarding female labor participation do not tell the whole story. This is because the Netherlands rank first in part-time work: 70 per cent of the female work force is employed in part time jobs (see Table 9). Apparently, in one of the most liberal and emancipated European countries, mechanisms are at work that greatly influence the position of women in society and deforms liberal progressive politics into conservative cultural gender patterns. Women still conform very much to ascribed and traditional gender roles and choose to remain at home. The glass

ceiling is not easily broken when women are too much involved in part-time work. Making a career is difficult when working on a part-time basis.

Table 9: Part-Time Work[a] according to Sex (age bracket 15-64 years, in per cent)

	Women			Men		
	1994	2001	2005	1994	2001	2005
Netherlands	56	59	61	11	15	15
Denmark	26	23	25	10	10	12
Finland	12	15	15	7	8	8
Sweden	25	21	21[b]	7	8	9[b]
Norway	38	33	33	8	10	10
Belgium	30	32	33	4	6	6
Germany	28	35	39	3	6	7
France	25	24	23	5	5	5
Luxemburg	26	28	31	2	2	2
Austria	.	26[c]	30	.	3c	5
Ireland	26	33	35	6	7	7
Great Britain	41	40	39	7	9	10
USA	20	19	18	9	8	8
Greece	13	10	11	5	3	3
Italy	21	24	29	4	5	5
Portugal	15	15	14	5	6	6
Spain	14	16	22	2	3	4
Hungary	.	4	5	.	1	2
Poland	.	17	17	.	8	7
Slovakia	4	2	4	1	1	1
Czech Rep.	6	5	6	2	1	2

a part time work = less than 30 hours a week in main occupation.
b number from 2004.
c number from 2002.
d data are about persons in salaried employment.
Source: OECD (2006a), cited in Portegijs/Hermans/Lalta 2006: 145.

Duyvendak/Stavenuiter (2004: 34f.) report that 30 per cent of all work is done by part-timers. 59 per cent of the women work less than 30 hours a week. In the Netherlands of all part-time workers 22 per cent are male and 78 per cent are female. On average Dutch women work 25 hours a week compared to 33 hours for the average European woman.[12] The combination of a full-time job and a part-time job is most popular with couples. It occurs

12 See http://www.nrc.nl/dossiers/werk/1014097922460.html; accessed 2 November 2004.

in 37 per cent of the cases. Mostly, the man has the full-time job whilst the woman is working part-time. If only one of the partners has a full time job while the other does not work it is almost always the man who is working. This happens with 28 per cent of all couples. Only in 14 per cent of all couples both partners are working full-time. The choice to work full-time or part-time is dependent on the presence of children in the family. In 6 per cent of the families with children under 18 years, both parents are working full-time. 46 per cent of families with children conform to the one-and-a-half job standard.[13]

Although many developments will eventually result in the glass ceiling to be more permeable in future, the ceiling is still in existence. Females are performing better in university and more often choose and finish pre-university education. Within higher professional education and university education women graduate more quickly and have higher success rates. In many disciplines women form the majority of students. Yet, it remains difficult for women to reach the top. Only 5 per cent of the board of directors of the top 25 enterprises was female in 2003 (Portegijs/Boelens/Olsthoorn 2004: 185f.). Only 8.5 per cent of all full professors at universities are female.[14]

In 2001, the pay of women was 81 per cent of that of men. In 1995, hourly pay was 76 per cent of that of men. When statistically controlled for differences in age, level of education and economic sector, there still remains a difference in pay of 7 per cent in the private sector and 3 per cent in the public sector. According the *Emancipation Monitor* this difference has not narrowed since 1996 (Portegijs/Boelens/Olsthoorn 2004: 267). In 2001, only 41 per cent of women aged 15–65 earned more than 70 per cent of the minimum wage and were thus defined as economically independent compared to 69 per cent of men (in 2000). Seen from 1990, economic independence is on the rise. In that year the percentage of economically independent women was 25 only.

Judging from some newspaper clippings a proportion of young Dutch women does not worry much about being economically dependent or falling into a traditional role pattern. A 31 year-old lawyer states that she liked it that her mother was at home during her childhood years and that she would not mind doing the same if she had kids.15 Others stopped working because

13 Translated from a newspaper clipping on numbers published by the Central Bureau of Statistics in 2004; see http://www.nrc.nl/dossiers/werk/artikel/1087190394435.html; accessed 2 November 2004.

14 See http://archief.nrc.nl/?modus=l&text=emancipatie&hit=27&set=1; accessed 2 November 2004.

15 NRC, 10 September 2001. Online: http://www.nrc.nl/dossiers/werk/artikel/1015199734764.html; accessed 2 November 2004.

combining work and caring for children was too difficult.[16] Portegijs et al. (2002: 247) state that "if the amount earned by a woman is just enough to cover the cost of child care, 27 per cent of women and 46 per cent of men consider that the woman might as well stay at home and look after the children herself". And they conclude somewhat ambivalently that "the proportion of women continuing to work after the birth of the first child had increased. In the 1990s over 70 per cent of working women continued to work after the birth of the first child, although in many cases working fewer hours than before", but also that the "willingness to work more hours under the present conditions is not particularly great. Working women with children aged under 12 want on average to work two hours more than they do at present." (Portegijs et al. 2002: 244f.)

4.3 Socialization and the Different Perception of Gender in the Armed Forces and in Society

The positive trend towards equality and emancipation in wider society is replicated in the armed forces, but change in the armed forces is at a rather slow pace. One of the problems is the difference between civilians and the military in the perception of gender. This difference might originate from differences that already existed before individuals decided to join the armed forces. But from a research by Caforio et al. (2007) a different explanation seems probable: The hypothesis in this research is that the different perception of gender in civil society and in the armed forces stems from socialization effects. In their adolescent years individuals are socialized in a way that determine their perception of gender. In the armed forces socialization has its strongest impact during basic training or during the education at the military academies.

In order to test this hypothesis students from civilian universities were compared to cadets from the Royal Netherlands Military Academy. They were asked to express their view on the question whether or not women should be fully integrated in the armed forces, even in combat roles. The comparison shows that male cadets and male civilian students almost equally favor (or disfavor) integration. Females are much more in favor than the males, but there is a difference between the female cadets and the female students. The female cadets are much more in favor of full integration than the female students. This difference may stem from the fact that female cadets are better informed about the content of the job and maybe are more support-

16 NRC, 4 March 2004. Online: http://www.nrc.nl/dossiers/werk/artikel/1078380884093.html; accessed 2 November 2004.

ing the idea that women can perform well at it, too, whereas female students are not so sure about this (see Table 10).

Table 10: Attitudes toward the Integration of Women into the Armed Forces (in per cent)

		Are you male/female	Male	Female	Total
What are you studying (university course)?	military academy (sig chisq < .05)	1 – yes in all (also combat) roles	49.7	78.1	54.5
		2 – yes, but not in combat roles	43.9	21.9	40.1
		3 – no	4.5		3.7
		4 – no opinion	1.9		1.6
		Total	155	32	187
			100.0	100.0	100.0
	civilian university (not significant)	1 – yes in all (also combat) roles	48.9	64.6	56.8
		2 – yest, but not in combat roles	42.6	25.0	33.7
		3 – no	6.4	2.1	4.2
		4 – no opinion	2.1	8.3	5.3
		Total	47	48	95
			100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Based on the data reported in Moelker 2007.
Note: Slight deviations occur in the total since it does not always amount to an exact 100 per cent because of occasional missing values.

When the group of cadets is analyzed more thoroughly, remarkable differences between the 1st and 4th year cadets are found. Regarding the former, 61 per cent of the male and 83 per cent of the female cadets support full integration. Compared with the 4th year cadets, a tremendous decrease in support occurs for the male cadets. The percentage favouring women in combat roles drops to 26 per cent whereas 69 per cent of the female cadets still support the principle of women in combat roles. Obviously, the male cadets have changed considerably over the four years that they have enjoyed academic training. The female cadets have changed only a little bit. Unless there are other explanations, this has to be attributed to socialization effects during their stay at the Military Academy. At the start of their training, they barely differ from civilian male students; the cadets are even more supportive than the civilians. But at the end of their education many cadets oppose the integration of women in combat roles. (see Table 11)

Table 11: Attitudes of 1st and 4th Year Cadets toward the Integration of Women into the Armed Forces (in per cent)

In which year of course are you?	Are you male/female?	Male	Female	Total
1st year (not significant)	1 – yes in all (also combat) roles	60.7	83.3	64.0
	2 – yes, but not in combat roles	34.6	16.7	32.0
	3 – no	1.9		1.6
	4 – no opinion	2.8		2.4
	Total	107	18	125
		100.0	100,0	100.0
4th year (sig chisq < .01)1	1 – yes in all (also combat) roles	25.5	69.2	35.0
	2 – yes, but not in combat roles	63.8	30.8	56.7
	3 – no	10.6		8.3
		47	13	60
		100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Based on the data reported in Moelker 2007.

One can also look at these statistics in a different way. Only a very small group is resolutely against women in the armed forces. In the first year, 3 per cent oppose the integration of women compared to 10 per cent in the fourth year. The overall difference between male cadets and male civilian students opposing integration is negligible (4.5 vs. 6.4 per cent).

5 Discussion: Visibility and Culture

The position of women in the armed forces is improving, yet, the change rate is slow. The change process is difficult. Resistance towards change is overt, but also covert. The overt resistance is comparatively easy to deal with. Blatant sexism, discrimination, inequality of opportunities etc. is dealt with in legislation and in the policies of the armed forces. A lot has been achieved already, but more has to be done in the future. Regulations were and are being implemented. Working conditions have been improved and will even improve more in future. Much effort is put into recruiting and keeping women.

However, the covert resistance is much more difficult to deal with. The covert resistance is in the culture and starts with socialization. During training and military education newcomers in the organization acquire the norms and values of the armed forces. These norms and values help the young re-

cruit to adapt to the traditional hierarchical organization. Some of the norms and values, like discipline and courage, are functional on the battlefield and help to survive in extreme conditions. Alongside the many valuable norms, the value of masculinity is acquired. Military language is permeated with masculine expressions and vocabularies (Higate 2003). The cadets' view towards women in the military changes in a negative direction in the course of their 4 year-stay at the military academy. The male cadets start with a moderate positive attitude towards women in the military, but over time they become less positive. Only a very small percentage becomes 'antagonistic' regarding the integration of women. The acquired norm of masculinity leads to a lack of gender sensitivity. The plate at the entry to the castle of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy – as described at the start of this chapter – is an example of this lack of gender sensitivity. The fact that it is also funny, makes it compelling to the reader. By the humor the reader becomes an accomplice in the male 'conspiracy' that is at the expense of women. It is a subtle and covert resistance towards the integration of women; the occasional visitor will not even notice that there is such plate. These are forms of resistance that are not very visible. And if he or she does notice the plate, he or she will probably smile!

Enlarging the number of women in the armed forces and improving working conditions is also difficult because of a strong 'maternity' culture (Carreiras 2004) in the Netherlands (this is not only a problem of the military organization, but a problem in the wider civil society, as well). Both women and men support the idea that parenting is more important than career. If the choice has to be made it is often in favor of the family with small children. Better child care facilities and the possibility to work part time makes it easier to combine care tasks and career, but still many young women interrupt their career. This is one of the reasons why there is a larger percentage of women in the lower ranks and why the percentage higher up the hierarchy is low. There are other reasons as well; it simply takes 20 years to climb the ladder. That is why the Minister of State is in favor of recruiting highly qualified female specialists directly from civil society and give them a rank according to their experience, capacities and credentials. But this policy intention is not implemented yet.

The numerical presence of women in the armed forces is low. That is why women stand out. They feel that they are expected to perform well all the time (also trying to live up to male physical standards), and are treated as 'something special'. In this respect women are very visible, even conspicuous. At the same time women are culturally made invisible. To a large extent they make themselves invisible so that they stand out less. They do not want to be treated as something special so they adopt a low profile, or try to be-

have like men in order to be accepted. This is nothing new, in the 17th century, navy women were dressed in men's clothes in order to remain unnoticed. But in order to remain culturally invisible and to survive in the present day defense organization women have to adapt psychologically as well.

The only way to really put an end to numerical under-representation and cultural invisibility is demographic management. Kanter (1977) already pointed at the logic of numerical representation. When very few women are represented in an organization, there are hardly any problems. Women are even treated overly gallantly. When more than 30 per cent of the personnel is female, they are treated irrespective of their sex. It is normal to have female colleagues. However, right now all the militaries in the world are in the undesirable middle position. The percentage of women is rising, but nowhere is it surpassing Kanter's threshold. In the end all resistance and opposition stems from this demographic logic. Women will rise to equal status only when they are represented in larger numbers. Likewise they need to be represented better in higher ranks.

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Defying the Prohibited Arena: Women in the UAE Military

Suaad Zayed AL-Oraimi

1 Introduction

According to feminist activist Nancy Hartsock (1996), many of us have constructed some knowledge and awareness to the extent to which society is constructed by relations of domination and subordination. However, most of us are still unaware of how the system of domination and submission operates theoretically and practically. By definition, women throughout the world have experienced different kinds of relations of domination, based on their actual settings, but they lack theoretical clarity about how these relations are socially constructed and maintained.

Throughout history and across cultures, the military has been a major force in society and the public sphere. It is a male dominated arena, but, in the last five decades, the role of women in the military has grown and has gained much attention. Increasing women's awareness of their role in the military has taken place not only in the West, where the growing body of feminist thoughts are very active, but throughout the developing countries, as well. This is the starting point for the present study which documents and analyzes the involvement of females in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) military.

In this country, women were excluded from public life for a long time. Currently, there is an overall concern shown by the policymakers in the UAE to include women in certain public arenas, including the military. Due to different social and cultural barriers, women, so far, are not fully integrated in the military. Yet, they are allowed to attend a military school for women. Hence, the major purpose of this research is to explore the status of women in this school and highlight the nature and practice of their role therein. In this regard, the study will present the individual and collective experiences of women and their perception of everyday life. In addition, the study will demonstrate the ways in which the cultural, tribal and political constructions of gender differences influence the status of women in the UAE military.

Through my observation and my interaction with women from different cultures and social affiliation, I have come to a conceptual and empirical assumption. My argument is that women throughout the world and across cultures have been confronted with similar forms of discrimination. No matter what their social and personal positions are, women have been subjected to different levels of social, economic and political inequalities; and the military is no exception. This unfair situation has been created because of stereotypes

of femininity and masculinity. This dichotomy is clearly constructed in the military, also. Indeed, it seems to be of a universal character. According to these stereotypes men are rational and women are emotional; men must be in the public sphere and women have to commit themselves to the household.

Despite the structural differences between most public institutions and the military, the stereotypes of gender roles are the same which means that women's roles in the public arena and their role in the military are somehow related. Thus, since women live in analogous social conditions and perceive social reality in a perspective of gender differences, their experiences of everyday life are valid. Based on this argument, it is legitimate for this research to establish a link between women's everyday experiences in social institutions and the military.

By studying the status of women in the UAE military in depth, I will be able to achieve the following goals: I will explore how women evaluate their involvement in the military, identify social barriers that prevent women from participating in public life, study how women's social status is constructed in UAE society, highlight how women in the UAE military incorporate gender perspectives in their everyday life, and observe how women in the military school manipulate policies and utilize resources.

Since the establishment of the UAE in 1971, progress and development processes have taken place in all social and economic aspects in the country. Consequently, women have become an increasingly important part of these processes. They have been pursuing job opportunities in different work places and approaching various social and economic institutions. The military is one of these working places that have attracted women in the UAE, despite the fact that women's engagement in the military is socially prohibited.

Although there are various social barriers to gender interaction in the military, two critical changes have happened in UAE society: One is related to women's social status and the other regarding their role in the military. However, due to different social and cultural features, the roles women can play in the military are still limited. Also, due to political and demographic issues, the military has started to accept women and recruit them in certain services, such as nursing and administrative jobs; meanwhile the crucial units are closed for women.

1.1 Goals and Objectives

The aims and objectives of this study are to explore women's position in the UAE military and to analyze how the sexual and biological differences determine women's role in the military. Moreover, this study intends to show that the perception of women's occupational career in the military is based

not on performance, but on a gendered view of their role in society. In addition, the study aims at detailing the relationship between the subordinated position of women in the military and their present status in society. In this context, the study will demonstrate that the exercise of power in the military is connected to social values and norms that appreciate and favor males and masculinity. Furthermore, the study aims to empower women, whether they occupy civilian or military jobs, serve in lower or higher positions. Finally, the study provides military women an opportunity to document their experiences, allows their voices to be perceived on the local and regional basis and introduces them to other women throughout the world.

1.2 The Significance of the Study

The importance of this study is obvious in its scarcity. This study is significant because it is the first to explore gender relations in the military and provide a comprehensive overview about women soldiers in the UAE. By exploring the dynamics of involvement in the military process, the study has taken the initiative to document the interaction of everyday life in a most structured institution such as the military. Next to this, the present study will contribute to increase gender knowledge in the military and raise awareness concerning the gendered policy system in the military. Last, but not least, it will reveal strategies that are used by women to fight the stereotypes of women in the military. Therefore, the study will create linkages between gender awareness and social behavior.

2 Basic Information about the UAE

The UAE is a tiny, oil-producing country located in the Arab-Persian Gulf and is considered an Arab and Muslim land. As a semi-institutional monarchy, the UAE was established on 2 December 1971 as a federation of seven Emirate 'states'.[1] The federation was established nine years after oil was discovered in the Emirate of Abu-Dhabi, the current capital of the UAE. In 1970, these emirates having been British colonies for more than 70 years, achieved independence from Britain. Since its establishment, the country has gone through rapid and massive economic and social change, and, currently, the federal structure is experiencing the first political reform since its establishment. To illustrate the status of women in the military, it is important to

1 These were: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Al-Sharja, Ajman, Um-Al-Quiwain, Ras Al-khaima, and Al-Fujaira.

understand the economic situation, social change, the construction of national identity and political reform of the UAE (Ibrahim/Al-Suwidy/Ahmad 2004).

2.1 The Economic Situation

With the discovery of oil in Abu-Dhabi in the 1960s, the economic situation of the country changed significantly. Because of oil, new economic structures emerged along with new activities; the oil industry became the basis for the country's development. In essence, the UAE moved from basic economic activities (such as small-scale trade, fishing, pearl-diving, farming, and handcrafting) toward much more complex ones (such as oil export, large-scale trade, capital investment and re-exports). As a result, most citizens abandoned their traditional careers to acquire new jobs. Yet, because they lacked the necessary technological skills, most people were unable to cope with the new economic activities. Therefore, many of them joined the basic social services (such as drivers, schools and hospital guards and small business owners). Meanwhile, to encourage the young generation to replace the foreigners, the government has established a high-tech learning system and several training programs (Ibrahim/Al-Suwidy/Ahmad 2004).

Today, the UAE is a vital center for international economic activities and the oil industry. The country successfully re-invests the oil revenues on local, regional and international levels (such as high-rank banking investment and stock-market trade). In addition, the government encourages investments in more elaborated oil-based manufacturing industries. To attract more international investment, much of the oil revenues were heavily utilized to facilitate the development process on different levels. Massive infrastructural projects were realized concerning, e.g., roads, electricity installations and telephone lines, but also high-tech projects including telecommunication, modern airports and fancy hotels. This kind of development has brought investors from different parts of the world and created a significant credibility for the UAE financial and services systems.

With the onset of globalization, the economic system has changed again. The role of the state has started to shrink and the role of international investors has risen. More recently, specifically in the late 1990s, the UAE was introduced to the international market not only as an oil-producing country, but as a safe haven for transnational investments as well. Different social, economic and social factors have encouraged transnational networks to invest in the UAE, among them the oil-based wealth, the political stability and the geographical location of the country. In fact, global market forces shifted from Southeast Asia to the Gulf States, especially Dubai, which became a center for multinational markets in the region.

With the emergence of the global market, the boundaries between countries are not as clear as before. People are free to move and follow job opportunities. Due to the oil boom, the UAE has become a country that attracts immigrants, either from neighboring countries such as Iran, India, Pakistan or Bangladesh, or from elsewhere. Moreover, with the inflow of transnational capital to Dubai, immigration continually increases. More people in more parts of the world dream of better life in the UAE. Today, the immigrants are a powerful force since they account for 80 per cent of the 5 mio. people living in the UAE. According to the Labor Ministry, the labor market in the UAE includes people from 202 countries, thus exceeding the number of UN members. 2.6 mio. male immigrants work for both the public and the private sector. Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis account for 75 per cent of the working population of the UAE. Indian laborers account for 50 per cent of the labor force in the private sector, Pakistanis 18 per cent and Bangladeshis 7.6 per cent. With 52 per cent, Dubai attracts most of the foreign laborers in the country, most of them in construction (Year Book 2007).

Due to the increasing number of immigrants, the country is facing the threat of losing its Arabic identity. Thus, the government has been trying to raise the Arab population in the UAE, which accounts for 15 per cent of the population only. Despite the government's efforts, the challenge still exists since the local citizens and the Arab nationals account for only 35 per cent of the whole population. Moreover, 2.6 mio. immigrants are skilled and non-skilled male laborers who have come to the UAE without their families. This situation creates a gender gap because the male population is twice that of the female population. For the most part, this poses a serious problem that challenges the social stability of the UAE. For example, in recent years, violent crimes have increased with each individual immigrant who steps on UAE soil. Also, with the increasing presence of international business, many networks of organized crime have entered Dubai, implying a shift of the country from a simple, crime-free community to a complex crime based-society.

In addition, since they are not permanent residents, the immigrants send the majority of their income back to their families; literally billions of US-dollars leave the country every year. This affects the money rotation in the UAE and decreases its capital accumulations. Moreover, the social services that the UAE provides for immigrants (such as health care, training programs, water supply, electricity and the increasingly necessary support for unemployed immigrants) cost millions. As a consequence, the UAE is reconsidering its immigration policies.

2.3 *Patterns of Social Change*

There are two types of social change: material and non-material. Material social change traditionally refers to a sudden transformation and a massive change of the living conditions and the standard of living. Material social change usually occurs due to invention (technology) or discovery (electricity, oil). Such change provides people with options and affects their everyday lives. On the other hand, non-material social change affects values, beliefs, legal systems and social institutions. For the most part, non-material social change manipulates society's thoughts and actions. Such change is slow and difficult and often follows material social change.

Since material and non-material social change do not occur at the same time, there usually is a 'gap' between these two types of social change. At times, if material social change is gradual and smooth, there might be a balance with non-material change. But, if material change is rapid, it will not be in line with non-material change. Due to the discovery of oil, a sudden and massive social change has occurred in the UAE. In the 1980s and early 1990s, change was characterized by rapid and quick transformation. Modernization processes could be seen all over the country: in the economic order, in the infrastructure, in the demographic structure, in the social structure, in the family, in the life-style, in housing, and even in medication and food. People moved from traditional, poor life to a modern, wealthy system. Everyday life has also changed and living conditions have improved in different parts of the UAE. Free educational institutions have been established on all levels, a free healthcare system has been created, and free or modestly priced housing has increasingly been provided to the country's citizens.

However, since the 1990s, the influence of globalization has increased. People have become more modern in terms of clothes, music, movies, literature and the media. The local lifestyle is dominated by Western and international cultures. Within this context, a system of modern education based on new principles has been established, with curriculums that have been designed to meet Western values and global standards. The study of foreign languages, organized by private schools, has meanwhile even come to the detriment of both the study of Arabic and public schools.

As we have seen, change in the economic sector has impacted upon the demographic structure of the country; new cities for new inhabitants have emerged, thus establishing new social relations. Many people no longer live in the same villages and towns, in the same house, or in the same community as their parents did. The immigrants have also created their own social and economic reality. The old demographic structure has been overtaken by the

new inhabitants. To protect their own identity, locals have segregated themselves in certain areas.

Structural change also affected social relations and solidarity in both the household and community: the extended family has given way to the small families with relatives living in far away places. This modern life has created a certain level of individuality because people have increasingly become uninvolved in their community. Because their previously simple life has been affected by the immigrants, people have become more conservative. The old communities and neighborhoods are gone, and people feel unsafe within the new communities. Indeed, oil-based wealth, globalization, social change and cultural interaction have fostered a new lifestyle structure in the UAE.

However, social and economic changes have not taken the same direction in all emirates. The material social change is different from one emirate to another. This difference is determined by the social conditions and the economic growth in each emirate. For example, infrastructural change is quick and rapid in the emirates of Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Al-Sharjah and slow in the other four emirates.

By contrast, non-material social change has not been rapid; in fact, it has been very slow. Because of economic prosperity, modernization has been implemented on a very large scale and very quickly, while people have not been given enough time to rearrange their lives and adapt it to the new social reality. As a result, traditional norms and values still dominate mainstream thinking in the UAE. Even if they are trying to cope with social change and adjust their lives, people are trying to sustain and uphold their own culture and traditions such as Islamic norms, Arabic values, and tribal communities. (see Ibrahim/Al-Suwidy/Ahmad 2004).

2.4 Constructing National Identity

National identity has always been of highest concern in the UAE. By promoting nationalism, the federal government has been able to save the unity of the country. Citizens are encouraged to participate in the feeling of national identity. Even those who traditionally identify themselves as basically belonging to independent tribal groups, still feel attached to the national identity. Today, nationalism works together with social change, economic development and political formation.

Socially, the UAE is unique in its economic growth and in its decrease of its citizen population. Foreigners have been invited to carry out the social and economic development. With the inflow of immigrants, the internal social structure of UAE citizens has become more homogeneous. The fear of foreigner causes the native citizens to balance their affiliations and their

national identity. No tribal or ethnic conflict exists; people are unified as never before. The tribal structures have even started to wane and state institutions are gradually replacing them. The younger generation feels more attached to a national identity as Emiratis than to a tribal one. In some emirates, the tribal affiliation is no more than a last name.

Economically, the UAE is a wealthy nation; the state owns the oil fields and controls the public sector. Despite the differences in the natural resources between the emirates, a balanced system of wealth distribution has been established by the federal government. Most UAE citizens are financially secure; even those with a low income find their way to employment, free education, healthcare and housing. Thus, economic prosperity has contributed to building a stable government and a relaxed social structure of the federal state.

Politically, politics is a governmental business in the UAE. All citizens mandated the national government to handle every political issue. As a collective identity, the tribal structure backs the unity of the country. The tribal alliances, which existed before the discovery of oil and the establishment of the federal state, serve as a backbone for the government's legitimacy. The leaders of the former tribal structures nowadays preside the modern federal state. Even though people have been replaced by others, the tribalized presidential structure remains. Currently, this political kinship formation is going through a process of opening space for a more national participation, but, so far, the Emirati national unity cannot be viewed as replacing tribal identities. Tribalism and nationalism exist in the UAE without little contradiction. Being identified as a UAE citizen does not mean that one must deny his or her tribal identity. In fact, people combine their national integrity with tribal idealism. From the UAE citizen's point of view, these two components are compatible to each other.

2.5 Political Reform

On 2 February 2007, a paradigm shift occurred and a new political foundation was established in the UAE. The President issued a decree for a reconstruction of the Federal National Assembly Council (FNAC)[2], after the parliamentary local and federal elections of December 2006. Due to this decree, the government allows for and expects more political participation by the people of the country. Thus, the UAE is experiencing a democratic govern-

2 The FNAC was established in 1971. Its members (males) were appointed by the sheikhs of the local emirates following each emirate's share of the country's population.

ment for the first time since its establishment in 1971. In the long term, the state, perhaps, aims to reach a certain level of democracy and accomplish certain goals of legitimacy. Now that the state has allowed for public participation, people are experiencing and enjoying a new type of political responsibility.

Theoretically, the Emiratis have been provided with new political opportunities. Empirically, however, the situation is different. It was not a nationwide election process, but a restricted one. In other words, the elections were not based on general public participation, but on a partial, regulated input. The government has decided to gradually introduce the citizens to their new political rights. Only some citizens obtained the opportunity to participate in the first elections and had the right to vote and run for office. Voters and candidates, both men and women, were randomly selected by the governors of individual emirates and some appointees were exclusively chosen.

The new FNAC thus operates on two political patterns: election and appointment, a combination of a world-standard democracy and a tribal democracy. Tentatively, the elected members should account for only half of the 40 FNAC members; the other half is to be appointed by the governors of each emirate. Yet, due to unsatisfying election outcomes, the government appointed more than half of the FNAC members.

Upward mobility has indeed taken place in the UAE, but in a steady hierarchal fashion. Even if the federal government has integrated certain citizens into the political process, the relationship between citizens and policymakers basically remains the same as before. The power structure does not allow for argument and choice. There is, e.g., no indication of establishing political parties or political groups. This reveals some contradiction and ambiguity as there has not been a change in the agenda or ideology in the UAE's political system while there has been a change in the political and social structure. Although the foundation of democratic rules was established, a democratic legal system and legislation has not yet been set up.

Until recently, the FNAC operated upon its former strategy, which was not based on congressional power, but on a traditional legitimate authority. Its source of legitimacy comes directly from the president of the UAE and the governors of each emirate. For 35 years, the FNAC has played only a counseling role. However, the Minister of National Affairs has stated that the government is going through a gradual change in its legislative structures and constitutional laws.

Astonishingly enough, most of the appointed members of the FNAC, men and women, are average people. They were not selected based on their last names, their attachment to certain tribes, or their economic background, but rather on citizenship. Some are highly educated with plenty of work ex-

perience, and others only have average education. Thereby the UAE is attempting to diversify its political system. By moving away from class, race, religion and ethnicity, the country is establishing a certain level of equality. Gender inequality, however, is still a critical issue that raises the question of equal opportunity in UAE society.

In conclusion, it might be said that the UAE is going through massive social and economic change. Yet, political reform is still moving slowly. Examining the policy-makers' agenda, one might get the impression that before allowing a nation-wide electoral participation, the UAE wishes to center its attention on building the state's political infrastructure. The next step, perhaps, will focus on building civil society and on human resources.

3 Theoretical Approach and Literature Review

This study is addressing power relations as a critical social issue that has been legitimized and justified by the community, whether in social institutions or in society as a whole. The military is one of these social institutions that legitimize authoritative power relations. Accordingly, within the military, authority is the legitimate right and resource to use power and it affects both sexes. Yet, due to their subordinated position in society, women in the military have experienced the practices of power differently. Throughout the theoretical analysis, the study defines power, examines how it has been addressed in the feminist analysis, investigates how power relations in the military have been authorized and gendered, and presents the historical involvement of women in the military.

3.1 Defining Power

According to Max Weber, power is "the probability of persons or groups carrying out their will even when opposed by others" (cited in Marshall 1994: 412). For Nancy Hartsock (1996: 8), power is "the ability to compel obedience". Within this context, obedience is based on control and domination. The dominant group initiates this relationship to subordinate other people in society and forces them to act against their will. Hartsock believes that this domination is embedded in the social structure and legitimized by the community.

3.2 Feminists' Perspectives on Power Domination

According to Nancy Hartsock, power domination has neither been recognized nor discussed by feminists. Although feminists analyzed the status of women in society, they did not pay adequate attention to power relations. Even if some feminists addressed the concept of male domination, they did not analyze the way in which power was socially constructed and maintained Yet, Hartsock believes that through its political practice, the contemporary feminist movement creates an empirical link between the exercise of power in the public domain and male domination in the household. Within this context, both feminists and anti-feminists agree that the exercise of power is a masculine activity and preoccupation. Hartsock suggests that in order for women to oppose domination in both the public and private spheres, they must develop a form of unity. Women have to initiate grassroots organizations in which the differences in positions within the group would not lead to differences in power. (Hartsock 1996)

Theories of power are theories of the creation of communities. To examine these theories one should inspect the construction of communities throughout history and raise questions of how communities have been maintained. Hartsock believes that communities are created and maintained by the dominant group (men). Thus, since we live in a community structured by one gender, power domination has been authorized and legitimized by the aspect of virility. Such awareness will help us to understand how the theories of power have been legitimized. (Hartsock 1996)

Lisa Boyce and Ann Herd believe that the tendency to attribute certain characteristics to gender can also be extended to occupations that are more likely to be held by men or women. Thus, whereas in society power domination takes the form of a structured human interaction, in the military the exercise of power takes the form of a structured and systematic domination. Within the military, women soldiers are evaluated through gender role stereotypes. (Boyce/Herd 2003)

3.3 The Gendered Power Relations in the Military

Although the use of power in the military is authorized, the concept of domination, especially male dominance, has received little or no attention. Throughout history, women have been subjected to a certain level of power domination whether in the community or in the military. However, this phenomenon has been disregarded even by women themselves. For example, feminists have avoided addressing the exercise of power in their analysis, whether the practice of power occurs in the community or in social institu-

tions (such as the military). Feminists are also accused of pressuring women towards combat arms. They encourage women to be involved in the military, but they do not investigate gender relations in this institution. In doing so, feminists accepted men's policy as the standard and sought to apply it to women. Some scholars believe that feminists, who act as advocates for women's integration into the military, are unaware of stereotype and gender discriminations. Thus, feminists are unable to define power, to identify women's role in the military or to close the gap between their argument and the beliefs of women in the military (Harrell 2002).

3.4 Women in Military History

It is not an easy task to historicize women's engagement in the military because women's role in the public sphere in general and in the military in particular is usually neglected. Historically, women were not presented as contributors to, but as beneficiaries of the armed forces. Thus, historians did not write about women and disregarded their participation. According to Nancy Hartsock, women were excluded from the historical process and thus have no history. Men have been dominating the scene and have been building a reputation of honor. Social respect and admiration are usually based on the good positions that men occupy in the public sphere, especially in politics. Therefore, the political community is associated to power as is the military and the battlefield where the collective good can constructed as the primary concern of the hero. Hartsock believes that, ever since the writings of Homer, the battlefield has been inhabited by men only and that heroism has continually been associated with the masculine role in society as a whole. (Hartsock 1996)

As she points out, the community both sustains and provides for the warrior-hero and sends him to a possible death. If the warrior-hero wishes to gain a reputation for honor, he must risk his life to death. Meanwhile, the ideals of the warrior-hero have been attached directly and explicitly to the construction of gender roles because the warrior-hero was also the head of the household. Within this context, the division of labor between the sexes is based on power hierarchy and heroism as well as on gender differences. Indeed, our understanding of power relations is rooted in the ideals of heroism. Thus, those who are sent to face a potential death are characterized as warrior-heroes and as defenders of freedom. Since women's status in the household did not enable them to reach such an honored position, history has systematically been disregarding women. (Hartsock 1996)

Despite the fact that women have been continually engaged in the military, their role has always been limited. During World War Two, women were recruited in large numbers. They were called whenever they were

needed to fill manpower gaps or with regard to specific capacities and certain tasks. For example, due to manpower shortages, the US felt compelled to recruit no less than 350,000 women for its military effort. At the end of the war, however, the military demobilized these women because their efforts were not deemed necessary any more. Thus, women's contribution is needed temporarily and in cases of emergency. Meanwhile, the military has started to recruit women in large numbers in peacetime also, but in most cases gender specific restrictions were imposed on women's service and women's roles have been constrained to non-combat work, such as nursing and administration (Harrell 2002). Overall, then, since women's involvement in the military was not clearly presented for most of the time, their historical participation is still devalued (Simon 2001).

However, there are some feminists who have worked to detail and evaluate the contributions and achievements of females in public life, including the military, although this has aroused considerable uneasiness within the polity. These feminists investigate the ideological dimension of gender roles and their impact upon the position of women in the military. Thus, feminists believe that, throughout history the military has been a male institution. Even if, for some reasons, the decision-makers include women in the military, they still depend on men as the basis for large recruitment.

In addition, the representation of women in the press was limited to the policies of the military. Female soldiers were presented in the media as citizens who have the duty to defend their country, not as a subordinated group. This was reason for some concern about women's citizenship rights. The policymakers in the military tried to eliminate the concept of citizenship and more or less treated women as second-class citizens. Thus, based on this perspective, feminists believe that changes in social and gender relations must take place in both social and military structures. However, as it is evaluated by Kita Simon (2001), the research of feminists often is a trivial discourse. According to her, feminists are theorizing about the status of women in the military based on abstract ideals rather than on empirical investigation. If they aim to present women's issues, feminists must open a global discussion about the principles of women's citizenship rights and address their subordinated position in the military.

Indeed, citizenship rights have triggered the most heated debates raised by feminists across cultures and nations. This critical topic has moved the discussion about women's rights from legislation texts to the actual practice of everyday life. According to Kita Simon this consideration must center on the meaning of citizenship, the rights and the responsibilities, especially in relation to the military obligation. Thus, based on rights and responsibilities, there is the critical question about the requirements for citizenship: Who is

chosen for the privileged position of serving in the armed forces; who is obliged to serve in the military to protect the national sovereignty? The answers are linked to a belief that considers gender differences as basic to the construction of rights and duties. Following this, the privilege of citizenship has been given to the defenders, to those responsible for the protection of the nation's borders. Moreover, historically, the question of citizenship was very much associated with free will, independence and freedom to make choices, so "if women's free will is so constrained, can they, in fact, be full citizens?" (Simon 2001: 24). Simon believes that when we are able to define the basic criteria of citizenship, the question of citizens' responsibility and obligation is crucial.

Therefore, gender inequality in the military is one critical issue that has perplexed servicewomen. Some feminists argue that throughout history, there was no gender equality in most societies. Women have been treated as second-class citizens not only in the military, but in society as well. Thus, gender roles, citizenship rights and military obligations are not in balance. Since women's participation in the military is easily forgotten, not everyone in the community is convinced that women should have citizenship rights like men (Simon 2001; Boyce/Herd 2003).

4 The Islamic Doctrine on Women's Involvement in the Military

Since this paper sketches the status of women in an Arabic and Muslim society (the UAE), it is important to briefly explain the Islamic perspective on women in the military. This presentation includes the definition of the Jihad, the Islamic thinking about gender relations and examples of women in the historic Islamic militaries.

4.1 The Jihad

Based on Islamic principles, the Jihad can be defined as "religious and holy war by Muslims against their enemies to defend their land, properties, their honors and their families" (The Qura'n). Regarding this definition, Muslims view Jihad as a sacred duty just for men; there is no military obligation for women. Conversely, in Islam, women are always classified in terms of honors and must be treated with great respect. Thus, they must be protected because they are vulnerable to be attacked.

4.2 Islam, Gender Relations, and the Jihad

Throughout its instructions, Islam constructs on a fundamental relationship between the sexes. The Qur'an (the Islamic Book) shows a great deal of texts that emphasize a cultural ideology around gender. Moreover, it restricts the agenda of equal rights to different roles and duties. In the Islamic doctrine, there is no obligation for women to serve in the military. Islam obliges Jihad for capable men only and women have only been accepted in the military as volunteers. However, despite this fact, women have contributed to the Jihad and assisted the Islamic military system.

During the Prophet Mohammad's time, Arab women were considered as an equal part of Islamic society and enjoyed full citizenship rights. Based on their new social status, which has been provided to them by Islam, women were engaged in different social, economic and political roles. The Islamic military was one of many institutions that appreciated women's involvement in their activities. Thus, women were free to serve in different positions in the military (such as warriors, defenders and nurses), but their inclusion on the battlefields followed very specific guidelines.

Moreover, women preferred not to be comprehensively involved in serious military responsibilities to avoid risk, capture, and death. However, despite all these facts, women were ready to fight side by side with men whenever they were needed to defend their society. Even if Muslim women were fully involved in masculine duties, they were protected by Islamic laws from being devalued. Therefore, women were able to occupy and maintain leadership positions in male dominated areas.

Now, more than 1,400 years after the Prophet's death, women are still fully recognized by Islam, but even though men and women have equal rights, their missions in life are different. Each sex has unique abilities in certain areas and shortcomings in others. Yet, the Islamic division of labor, in both private and public spheres, is based on a complementary perspective not on competition and conflict.

4.3 Women as Heroes in Arab-Islamic History

Despite the fact that Jihad is not required for women, there is no room for gender discrimination in the Islamic doctrines in terms of rights and duties. Even if Islam emphasizes differences and similarities between genders, it never focuses on masculinity. Indeed, there is a historical reminiscent record for Arab-Muslim women's participation on the battlefield. Muslim women, such as Aisha, the last wife of Prophet Mohammed, participated in the Battle of Camel to protect Islam after the prophet's death. She took full responsibi-

lity to guide the battle and protect her followers. Kholah Bint Al-Azoar participated in most of the Islamic battles with her brother and she was captured with other Muslim fighter women by the Romans, but she never gave in. More recently, in Algeria many Arab-Muslim women have participated in the battlefield against France for their country's freedom. Currently, in Palestine and Iraq, Arab and Muslim women have been fighting against Israel and the US to protect their families and to free their land; many of them have been killed, some have been captured, and others have continually resisted. All these women have become symbols of respect and appreciation. They obtain a status of honor, especially those who were killed in battle.

5 Women in the UAE Military

Officially, there is no history of women in the UAE military. The UAE is a newly established country and its military has also been founded just recently. Therefore, women's involvement in the armed forces has come with the country's formation processes. Yet, the foundation of women's military service and women's official enrolment in the military emerged with the most critical events in the Gulf region's recent history; the Second Gulf War, when the UAE government established a military school just for women.

5.1 The Establishment of Kholah Bint Al-Azoar's School

In 1990, in the middle of the Second Gulf War, the former President of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed, issued a decree to institute the first military school for women in the UAE history as well as in the Gulf States. The reason behind this decision was to fill the gap in the UAE military during the emergency to meet the immediate need for military services during the war, and to prepare women to be able to protect themselves and their country against any unexpected invasion. Therefore, Kholah Bint Al-Azoar, a military school for women, was established in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE.

As stated earlier, the UAE is a small country with a small population, and its military is based on its national people. Since its establishment, the military has attracted male students from their high schools, yet it is not enough for a country that depends on immigrants in all its development. Women are also needed to take part in national security since immigrants are not allowed to serve in the military.

Therefore, women are the best solution to fill the employee gap in the military, and the school has stared to accept their applications based on their nationality as UAE citizens. The involvement in the UAE military is based on an employment policy not on a voluntary strategy.

5.2 Who is Kholah Bint Al-Azoar?

The military school for women in the UAE is named after the hero and the most famous female warrior in the Arab and Islamic history. Kholah Bint Al-Azoar was a knight soldier and one of the nation's defenders during the earlier Islamic conquests and the establishment of the Islamic state. She was fighting side by side with men to protect people within the nation of Islam and attack their enemies during and after the Prophet Mohammed's time. Kholah also served in the Islamic military as a nurse whenever she was needed to join the military in battle.

5.3 What are Women Doing at Kholah School?

Kholah School is fully prepared to absorb young women from different emirates as residents for the weekdays; in the weekends, they are free to go home. Yet, students who live in Abu Dhabi attend their work during daytime which starts at 7:00am until 3:00pm. The school also provides nursery and daycare that host the military women's children, from newly born to school age kids. Before joining the military, the young women must pass an extensive military assessment program, including computer skills as well as fitness exercises. Usually these processes take six months; then, the young ladies are fully prepared for military jobs.

Kholah School has two training sessions a year; each of them includes not more than 150 students. Thus, the annual enrolment of female students to the school is about 300 students. However, the dropout rate from the school during the military training program reaches more than 30 per cent. Some young women cannot stand the heavy duty during the training courses and prefer to leave the school. Those who complete their training become official employees in the military as soldiers and serve as office workers either at Kholah School itself or in different military camps. Yet, most of the graduate students work at Kholah. The military rank is arranged based on educational level and service experience. For example, new students who hold less than a high school diploma become ordinary soldiers; others who have a high school diploma serve as sergeant after passing special training and skills; with a college degree and enough experience, military women serve as sergeant majors, captains, lieutenants, generals etc.

However, with all these military ranks, status and titles, military women in the UAE are not serving as real military armed forces. They only do the office work and serve as special guards for the first lady of the UAE and female members of the royal family. The military women, therefore, are especially armed and trained for such missions. Thus, females in the UAE military un-

dergo different training programs than their male colleagues. Their duty and mission are different; while men get higher military training to serve as real armed forces on the battlefield, women are trained to perform office work and guard jobs.

Military women also have an opportunity to be promoted; however, their promotion is again different from those of their male comrades. Men's promotion is usually based on actual maneuvers under battlefield-like circumstances; on the other hand, women's promotion is solely built upon their achievements in logistics and training in the camp.

Homogeneity is also one feature at Kholah School. Women account for almost 90 per cent of the camp. Faculties, trainers, and administrators are women; men work as constitutional operators. This situation enables women to be more comfortable and cooperate with each other. During my visit to the school, I felt that Kholah School is more of a feminine institution than a military base you world normally expect. Even if they are unfamiliar with military hierarchy and authority, young women practice the activities of military everyday life. According to the military guidelines, they must adjust to non-traditional roles. Meanwhile, these young women view their participation in the armed forces as a career; nevertheless, there is a variety of individual motivations. From the military point of view, it is not necessary for these women to take an actual part in the armed forces since they will not participate in battle. According to a military woman, the logistics job is not less than combat, both of them are needed, and they complement each other. It appears that women themselves are happy with this agenda, and they are not seeking more than the existing situation. They understand and appreciate their position in both, the society and the military. For them, the military is not more than any ordinary job with prestige and higher salary.

6 Methodological Approach

This study relies on a qualitative approach and field work to effectively obtain information about the situation of women in the military. The interviewees were selected in two ways: (1) The first group of interviewees consists of a non-random sampling of women in the military. The choice of the sample was based on a quota selection of servicewomen according to their status in the military (officers, soldiers, students); (2) The second group of interviewees are people outside the military and follows a judgmental sampling. It includes both men and women. The women were selected with regard to their educational background and their position in society. Within this context, the methodological approach includes different instruments such as face-to-face interviews, non-participant observation and group discussions.

6.1 Face-to-Face Interviews

Face-to-face interviews and open-end questions are the base of data collection in this study and were designed to give more freedom and space for women to freely express their opinion. I used this technique for two reasons: (1) to collect data directly from the people under study; and (2) to be able to visit the interviewees in their actual settings and observe the environment in which they live. Therefore, I visited the military school for women, workplaces and households.

6.2 Non-Participant Observation

Non-participant observation is a field work method that can be used to collect data directly by observing people without participating in their activities. In this research paper, I implemented this approach in order to obtain information about the status of women in the UAE military. For example, I was able to visit the military camp (female's military school) twice and observe the everyday activities directly. Moreover, in my report, I use this technique to observe and document the interactions among women themselves and their relationship with male commanders. This direct observation enabled me to understand the roles that women can play in the military and in the society as well.

6.3 Group Discussions

In order to give enough room to present their opinions and attitudes about women's involvement in the military, I conducted informal group discussions. The sample was selected based on my knowledge and judgment; some of them are friends. The women who participated in these discussions come from different backgrounds and are affiliated to distinctive social groups; some of them are not employed by the military. Hence, the technique of the group discussion and the selection of the sample enabled me to obtain more information without restriction and provided the interviewees with more time to express themselves freely. For example, during the discussion, women demonstrated different family and social barriers that regulate women's role in society and the social perception of women in the military.

7 Analysis of the Findings

7.1 Why Are Women Entering the Military and Kholah School

Not all women in the UAE are excited to join the military school; certain women took the military as a choice and each woman has her own reason and motivation. Nevertheless, some young women feel that they took important steps toward self-determination, freedom and autonomy once they joined the military. Also, the findings suggest that there are different social and economic factors that encourage or prevent young women in the UAE from joining the military. These factors are associated with the social construction and the economic situation of UAE society. As I mentioned previously, UAE society is based on tribal structures and traditional norms and values; women's participation in the public sphere is based on this tribal and customary perspective, but on different levels. Meanwhile, not all national citizens have tribal origins because some citizens belong to non-Arab minorities. Therefore, we may expect that different social groups have different social norms and values. Thus, each individual woman has her own position in society, which is based not only on her social class, but also on her tribal status. Also, the anticipated social behavior varies from one social stratum to another.

Within this context, each group, based on its social class, is subjected to certain social regulations. The paper will reveal how the economic background, social status, location, marital status, and educational level can effect or determine women's position in UAE society. These features are diverse in their effect from one social group to another. While the mobility of women from the upper and middle classes is subject to different kinds of social regulation, lower class women have more freedom to move. Thus, the investigation will clarify the means by which women are divided into different social stratums.

7.1.1 Economic Background

The findings of this study suggest that the enrolment in the military is not always a free choice for some young women in the UAE, but may also simply be a necessity of life. The data show that there is a positive linkage between social classes and the enrolment in the military; the lower the family's income the higher the likelihood to join the military. More than 60 per cent of the young women in the sample come from lower-middle and lower class families. Some of them have to work to support their families and children (also as single mothers), and others share the responsibility to generate income with their husbands. Within this context, women in the military are not working to fulfill their ambitions, but meet economic needs.

As I mentioned before, the UAE is a rich country with a small population. In comparison to some developing countries, people in the UAE live in economic prosperity. Hence, the economic stratification in this country is different from those of other societies as, e.g., a lower class income in the UAE might be considered as an upper class income in other Third World countries. In this case, what attracts some young women to the military is not some state of poverty, but a desire for more economic prosperity. The military in the UAE pays higher salaries than any other government institutions. Relatively poor young women with little education literally do not have many job opportunities and the military is the best solution for them. To illustrate this, this is what I have been told by Interviewee # 1 who is a 20 year-old female: "I am # three of seven brothers and sisters. My father is a girl school guard and my mother is a housewife. I could not complete my high school and stayed home for a year doing nothing, and then my father encouraged me to go to Kholah School because my father's salary is not enough. Now, I am an employee and have a salary, I am thinking of buying a car. I feel safe at this school. They treat me with respect, but you know, there are a lot of regulations in the military, but I like it."

7.1.2 Social Status

In the UAE, the social status determines a woman's life. Her status in society is not only based on her education, job and achievements, but to the power of her tribe, too. To be affiliated to a big and strong tribe, a woman must not be involved in what is considered socially taboo. For most tribes, it is a great honor for men to serve in the military. Yet, it is a taboo for the women of these tribes. Based on tribal norms and values, women who have a higher tribal status must not participate in public jobs; if it is necessary, they have to be veiled. In addition, in some families, women are allowed to work as girl school teachers only. Therefore, most young women who are enrolled in the military come from either non-tribal backgrounds, small tribes, or from minorities that are not originally from the UAE. Here is a young woman expressing her view of joining the military.

Interviewee # 5 is a military woman, 25 years, non-tribal status, lower-middle-class: "I graduated from high school with a low per centage, therefore, I could not go to college, and I could not find a job. I tried to work for the police, but my brother refused because he works there, then I decided to go to the military. Yes my family allowed me and my father encouraged me to join Kholah School. Even though it is far away from my family, I am happy there. There is no difference between the military and other jobs; what is different is only the commands and orders, but I am used to it." Therefore, for some non-tribal social groups mentioned earlier women's appearance in

public or their engagement in the military is not a problem. Based on the discussion above, minorities and non-tribal-based affiliation are not restricted. These women are not subjected to social punishment if they break traditional norms.

7.1.3 Geographical Location

The findings suggest that there is a notable correlation between the location and the level of tolerance in terms of social values and norms. This situation is fully associated with one emirate's natural resources and the family's economic status. Most of the young women who are enrolled in the military school are from relatively poor emirates, regardless of their tribal and social status. People from the same tribal affiliation, but belonging to different emirates evaluate social norms and values differently. For example, tribal groups from oil-rich Emirates, such as, Abu Dhabi, are very conservative and try hard to maintain the tribe's patriarchal norms and values, while those from less economically advanced emirates are more flexible. Moreover, it is not only about the economic situation, rather it is about the environment. Nomads who settle in Abu Dhabi are more traditional, while those who live in other emirates are more modernized. Therefore, location, economic status, and other social factors influence people's beliefs, norms and values. If a military job is considered as male dominated force for one social group, it is feminized by others. Women themselves doubt this view, but their opinions vary from one emirate to the other.

National security is one debate that some people emphasize in their discourse. Those who are from low income emirates justify their women's involvement in the military as a national duty; both men and women should defend their country. On the other hand, those who are from rich emirates see military service as a national and moral duty only for men.

Women from different groups are competing over their engagement in the military. They view their situation from different perspectives. For lower class women the military is a place to find a job not because of national honor or duty, but because the military pays a significant amount of money and accepts people with different levels of education. Women from upper class and tribal status reject women's involvement in the military. A young woman provides her opinion.

Interviewee # 8 is a 24 year-old middle-class female with a tribal background and from a low income emirate: "I am from a small village, when I graduated from the university I applied for a job at Kholah School (...) because I know what I want. There was no job for me in my village, and my mother would not allow me to go to another place, but Kholah School. She believes it is safe. When I was at college, I learned from some friends about

the military and the high salaries they provide. I support my mother, my brothers, and sisters. I do not care about what other people say, this is my life and I am not doing anything wrong. For me, the military is just like any other job."

7.1.4 Marital Status

Marital status also plays a central role in driving young women into the military or preventing them from joining it. Data show that married women are not really attracted to the military; their feelings are largely impacted by their husbands who do not encourage them to join the military. On the other hand, unmarried and divorced ones are more likely to join the military. Yet, whenever a single woman gets married, she might leave the military because of her husband and family. Some single young women indicated that they will sacrifice their military jobs if they get married and if their husbands ask them to do so, regardless of their position in the military.

It is a noted situation that divorced young women prefer to join Kholah School even if they have children. Some participants neither hold a college degree to help them find a job, nor do they succeed to maintain their marriage. As it is noted earlier that marriage is the desired goal for most of female participants; when these young women fail to protect their marriage, they loose hope. A young woman provides her experience.

Interviewee # 4 is a 30 year-old educated middle class female from a wealthy emirate with high tribal status: "I hold a college degree in management and worked for two years, then I got married; my husband wanted me to stay home and I did when I had my first daughter, I have two girls. I stayed married about eight years, but I could not save my marriage. Now I am working for the military. I want to take care of my girls. I joined the military because I feel more comfortable, in the military we are treated with respect and we do not experience any harassment."

Evidently, some of the divorced women want to stay far away from their community. They consider the military camp as an exile to be segregated from society and their parents' home. These women indicated that military school is better than their homes because nobody reminds them of their unsuccessful marriage.

7.1.5 Educational Level

Failure in achieving a certain level of education is one reason that drives young women to get enrolled in the military. When they are not given a choice, they decide to become soldiers. Some of them believe that it is better for them to be soldiers than anything else, especially for those who could not complete their high school diploma. Moreover, serving in the military does not require a college degree; it is enough for one to obtain a high school diploma or less to be employed by the military. Thus, girls who could not complete their education are able to find decent positions in the military. A young woman shows her interest in military service. Interviewee # 7 is a 19 year-old, lower class female, no tribal status and from a low income emirate: "I could not finish my school because I did not like it. My family encouraged me to join Kholah School. Although the military is hard for girls I still like it, I like the people working there because they want to help girls like me. In the military, I feel myself, and feel strong; nobody can hurt me. When I get married, I will stay in the military; if my husband asks me to drop out from the military, I will refuse. This is my job, I have nowhere else to go."

The data show that highly educated women are ready to leave their job in the military whenever they find better alternatives. Either the offer is a marriage, a higher position, or a higher salary. Their educational background makes them more confident to move from one position to another. In addition, some of them indicate that they might leave the military if they get a chance to complete their higher education. Those with no education, money, or husband, find the military as a salvation. A military woman explains her situation. Interviewee # 10 is a 25 year-old female, middle class with tribal status and from a low income emirate: "Education makes a difference; enables women to have alternatives and choices. I have chosen the military myself. I got a degree in psychology, but I preferred to join the military. However, it will not be my final destination; I will leave the military if I get a better offer, or maybe I will complete my higher education since I am not married. Maybe I will leave the military if I get married (...). I am not sure, but I know that I will not stay in the military forever. The military is no more than any regular institution, but people see it as a mysterious place especially for women. I do not feel that I am different because I have joined the military. People have stereotyped military women as being free and can do whatever they want. It is not true, military women are very committed to social norms and vales."

8 Social Acceptance of Women's Involvement in the Military

50 men and women outside the military participated in this study. They were allowed to document their view about the engagement of women in the UAE military. Some of these people are highly educated, others with high school diplomas, and the rest are illiterate. Also, acceptance and objection differ from one emirate to the other and from one social status to the other. The sample is based on different variables such as economic background, social status, location, age, gender and level of education. Before approaching all these variables, however I would like to present the most critical obstacle in the UAE society to women's achievement in general and to military women in particular. This observable fact is gender stereotyping.

8.1 Gender Stereotyping in the UAE Society

Gender stereotyping has been defined as "the belief that a set of traits and abilities is more likely to be found among one sex than other" (Boyce/Herd 2003: 1). Based on this definition, the propensity to feature gender can be expanded to occupations that are more likely to be held by men or women. Traditionally, in UAE society, the military has been regarded as a masculine profession. Most participants, men and women, adhered to this view. Based on this definition, gender stereotyping can be found against women by men but also amongst women. This presents a big dilemma. They are more prejudiced against themselves than men, especially in terms of their inability in making changes in society, in their personality and in their contribution to the armed forces. Regarding these facts, it appears that in UAE society people's views are shaped and reshaped by gender stereotyping.

8.2 Economic Background

Just like people in other societies, people in the UAE have been affected by economic factors. A luxurious life strongly affects people's attitudes and opinions. Today in the middle of rapid changes and development processes, people are still conflicting over social norms and values. What is seen by wealthy people as faulty and shameful might be considered as normal behavior by others. Women's involvement in the military is the topic that people discussed in the focus groups of this research. For example, upper class participants do not accept the idea, while those with low income see the military as a source for good wages. The wealthy believe that women must not join the military under any circumstance. From their point of view, women's par-

ticipation on the battlefield will put them in harm, capture, or death. They indicated that Islam never placed women's life at risk.

Alternatively, those with middle class income do not completely reject the idea, but they refer the matter to women themselves. Some participants consider such a matter as personal behavior. Also, people with low income, especially men, justify their participation in the military. They regard military service as a national duty; while women consider it a personal choice. In men's opinion, there is no difference between men and women; thus, they encourage women in their families to join the military. The following is a male participant's opinion about women's participation in the military. Interviewee # 6 is a 30 year-old policeman (low income): "I have two sisters; one of them is in the military. I am a policeman and I feel that everybody must serve his/her country. Women can do some jobs in the police and the military. Society is changing and women are becoming educated, why should they only work at schools? I am a married man and my wife does not work because she could not finish her education. If she does not have children, I will allow her to join Kholah School; not only for money, but also to be ready to defend her country."

8.3 Social Status

There is a considerable similarity between economic factors and social status. People with higher social and tribal status, especially those from rich emirates, view the situation from the basis of economic status; women from high social and economic strata, as they indicated, are not in need to work for the military. Therefore, women should stay home to take care of their children. In fact, they adjusted standards and restrictions to women in their community. Yet, the minorities with low social and economic status are not included in their cultural ideology.

However, the educated ones with economic and social status, who are from Dubai, accept the idea, but if necessary, women should work only at girl schools. In their opinion, the military is not a suitable place for women. On the other hand, the educated young males who are from rich emirates, with high social, economic and tribal status do not dump the idea, but they are uncertain about women's ability in making changes, in both social life and in the military. They believe that women are behaving and acting based on emotions; thus, they are not qualified for the armed forces.

Moreover, participants, who are also from tribal backgrounds, but belong to emirates with no oil resources, are more flexible. Their opinions are based on realities and facts; they distinguish between what is morally accepted and what is traditionally rejected. Yet, some young men formed their attitude

against women upon traditional stereotypes without adequate knowledge or experience. Some of them went far away from truth in their judgment on women's ability; they doubted that women could be successful military leaders, or even senior government officials. Interviewee # 2 is a 19 year-old, upper-class male college student with tribal status from a rich emirate: "I think women in the UAE should stay home and take care of their children. There is no need for women to work; the men in their families must support them. If some women must work, because of economic need, they must work for girl schools, not for the military or the police (...) I have three sisters, one is at the university; my father will not allow her to work because she is provided with whatever she needs. It is important for girls to go to school (...) to be able to teach their children and to be good wives."

8.4 Geographical Locations

Since this study is a nation-wide project, its sample covers all seven emirates. This strategy enables the study to make a comparison between people from different emirates. This comparison shows those who are from different locations within the same culture formulating different understandings. Yet, location here is also associated with other variables such as the economy, education, social status, gender and age. However, in general, the strong correlation is between location and economic factor. While participants from low income emirates support women's participation in the military, people from the rich ones, especially those with higher tribal and economic positions, reject the idea completely. Also, people from rich emirates and tribal status with middle income reject women's appearance in public; they indicate that women do not have to work; if necessary they are only allowed to be teachers at girl schools.

However, some middle class educated participants from rich emirates look at the situation from the perspective of ability, necessity, and needs. In their view, the military is not a harmful place for women, but a difficult one. If a woman feels that she is capable for the military and it is the only way to support herself and her family then it should be done. Yet, rich educated participants (men and women) from wealthier emirates are not fully supportive of women's involvement in the military. While some men reject the idea, women support the matter, especially if military women will not reside in the camp. These women believe that women soldiers should work during the daytime because women are responsible for families and children. When these women were asked if they would accept the military job for themselves or for women in their families, they replied: "No, it is not for us." The following is a young woman presenting her idea. Interviewee # 19 is a 25 year-

old woman, upper-class, belonging to a wealthy emirate, with tribal and social status: "I graduated from university with a law degree two years ago; I am not working because I do not want to work. I supervise my father's business from my home. I am engaged, my fiancé is overseas doing his Master's degree. He also does not want me to work. I would support women to work in the military if they do not stay in the camp and if there is segregation between the sexes. I heard that these women are facing a lot of challenges on the family and social levels. Yes, I said: I will approve this kind of work, but not for me."

8.5 Age

The findings suggest that there is a positive correlation between older age and the degree of tolerance toward women's participation in the military. While older participants support women's involvement in the military, young participants of both sexes reject the idea. People at the age of 50 and above are more likely to be lenient. They appreciate women's participation in the military and not only encourage them to join the military, but also to be actual partners in the armed forces if it is necessary for the country. For them, the country is the priority. If women are needed to defend their country, they should enroll in the armed forces. Older participants pay great respect to the government's decisions and appreciate what the government has done for them. The changes which the older generations have seen during the early development periods have resulted in great faith for the leaders of the country. A senior man explains why it is necessary for women to be involved in the military. Interviewee # 30 is a 60 year-old senior man from a wealthier emirate, with high economic and tribal status: "Women must be ready for their country if the military needs their support. The population of the country is small and men are not enough to work everywhere, women must help. It is not shameful to work for the military; it was established and operated by the leader of this country. If my daughters wanted to go to the military, I would encourage them. I have three daughters, one works as a teacher; the other two are housewives."

Young people, especially college students, regardless of their geographical location, economic and social status, and (sometimes) sex reject the idea entirely. Young men feel that women compete with them for job opportunities even in the police and the military; they commented "those are not women's jobs". Some of them indicated that they will not allow their sisters to work for the military, and they themselves would never marry women enlisted in the military.

With caution, female college students accept the idea to some extent, precisely those who come from low income emirates, this acceptance came as a last resort for women seeking employment. Some of them indicated that they may join the military if they get married and their husbands allow them to do so. Marriage is the priority for these young women and the family also plays a significant role in women's lives, while men are free to orchestrate their own future. A female college student expresses her attitude about the military. Interviewee # 20 is a 21 year-old college student from a middle class family and low income emirate: "I have no problem with the military as an institution, but the problem is the people who have negative views about young women who are enlisted in the military. Sadly, women enrolled in the military face an obstacle in getting married; many men refuse the idea of getting married to a female soldier. So if I decide to join the military, my brothers will oppose the idea strongly. However, both my parents will support the idea."

8.6 Gender

Gender makes no considerable difference and does not show big variation; other variables influenced its performance. Both men and women have similar beliefs and attitudes toward women in the military. Both men and women showed no middle rank interception, either acceptance or rejection, and women revealed more strength in their opinion as opposed to men. These women tried to justify their attitudes by placing the blame on the society. For example, some young women who hold college degrees and could not find jobs for more than two years did not accept military jobs. In their view, society puts loads on their shoulders and they cannot challenge the situation by themselves. However, highly educated women realize the facts and try to find a solution. A female medical doctor discusses the social rejection of military women. Interviewee # 53 is a 28 year-old upper class female; medical doctor from a wealthy emirate with high social and tribal status: "For me, since I am a doctor, I have no problem working. I am a public person and it is not shameful if I go to a military hospital. I encourage young ladies to join the military, but the problem is with other people. They look at these girls in a negative way since the military is a male dominated force. Sometimes these young women are victims because in some communities, they are disrespected. Some people never see their achievement as country defenders."

Meanwhile, young women who are seeking jobs at government institutions view the military as a masculine arena: even if they work in an office environment, the idea is not accepted. They indicated that the military uniform will obliterate their womanhood. A young woman, who holds a degree

in Sociology, stated that her family encourages her to join the military, but she refused in favor of marriage and children. Interviewee # 44 is a 24 year-old female from a low income family as well as a lower income emirate: "The military is for those who could not finish their education and have dropped out from high school. For me, there are many opportunities, with my degree, I will find a job. However, I graduated two years ago, and I cannot find a job until now. I want to get married and then maybe join either the police or the military if I cannot find a job and my husband allows me. I am not engaged yet."

8.7 Level of Education

Education made a great variation in participants' thoughts and beliefs. Education is the most important variable to determine people's opinions, formulate their attitudes, and rebuild their values and beliefs. All participants, both women in the military and others who provided their view about women's participation in the military are very much influenced by their level of education. Most highly educated people from different emirates, regardless of their social status, their income, their tribal status or their gender, (except their age) evaluate the situation very reasonably. They view the case from the point of view of those who are in the situation. Women who are involved or those who are ready to join the military should decide what is suitable for them. A young man provides his view. Interviewee # 25 is a 35 year-old, upper class educated male, from a low income emirate with tribal status: "I cannot talk on behalf of women and decide what is good and what is bad for them. They are capable to decide for themselves. The military is a great governmental institution with a highly organized system. If women feel that they can make a change in the military, then they should join it; otherwise, they should look for other jobs. I know that some young ladies go to the military just for the high salary. I urge women to join the military, but to be serious. If my daughter wishes to join the military, I will allow her, but she has to be educated; for example, a medical doctor in the military hospital."

Age is the only variable that did not correlate with education. For instance, some young men did not appreciate military women. They believe that these women cannot make any significant achievement in the military; they only do the office work. In addition, the young men believe that military leaders do not consider women as real military personal; they believe that they are employed for the public eye. The following is a young man presenting his ideas. Interviewee # 90 is a 23 year-old educated lower class male, from a low income emirate: "I do not discriminate against women, but I am a reasonable person. Women are doing nothing in the military except for wast-

ing the military's time. I do not understand why women choose to join the military instead of working at schools or hospitals. The society needs teachers and medical doctors. I ask women to leave the military for men if they really want to do something good for themselves and their country."

Educated women welcome the idea and accept military jobs only if women are given higher military ranks. Some of the college degree holders wish to work for the military, if they become sergeant majors with higher salary. Otherwise, they will find other jobs. In that, these women are not rejecting the idea, but they are looking for a better position in the military relevant to their education. A young lady expresses her thinking. Interviewee # 70 is 26 year-old educated middle class female from a rich emirate with tribal status: "I know that my family will oppose the idea of the military, but I would like to work for the military. I hold a business degree; if I find a good job in the military, I will try to convince my brothers. My parents might accept the idea, but my brothers will not. I do not care what other people think, this is my life. The military is good if a woman does the office work and is given a high rank; otherwise, why should I leave my house for a regular job?"

Yet, highly educated women, especially those from emirates with low income, believe that women themselves should decide if they prefer to work for the military or not. In their view, the military is a perfect choice, especially for young women with no education. The following is a lady discussing the idea. Interviewee # 11 is a 40 year-old highly educated upper class female with tribal status and from a rich emirate: "I believe that women are not able to work in the armed forces; they should only do the office work. The military is good for those with no education. If women perform such jobs, they will help men in doing the serious work. They will help each other and this is what the country needs; both men and women work hand by hand in cooperation. I am not qualified for a military job because this is not my field. If my daughter wants to join the military, I will encourage her, but she needs to complete her education."

9 Conclusion

From the discussion above, one can conclude that UAE society is not yet ready to fully accept women in the military, or even as senior government officials. The conflict in people's attitudes and opinions reveals the situation within which these people live. Values, norms and morality are the things people must focus on. However, social status and the economic background also dictate the views people have regarding women's participation in the military.

Women who are the subjects of this study can be described as passive. They are very much influenced by traditional social norms and values to the point that there is no individual agency. The study reveals that women who enter the military do not do so out of their own volition, but because of other forces such as choosing to join the military rather than finish high school, an opportunity to increase the economic standing, and other social and economic forces. The study also reveals that these women will immediately drop out of the military if they have a chance of getting married, getting a better job and so on.

Another important fact is that educated women, who we see as leaders of women's causes are not in, touch with women's realities. The study shows that educated women do not attempt to understand the traditional and patriarchal doctrines which have a huge influence on women's roles in the society. Educated women are very careful in presenting their attitudes and opinions about women's role in society because they do not want to alienate themselves from social acceptance. In fact, educated women state that women themselves are to blame for their lack of success in the public sphere. Educated women separate themselves from women who choose to join the military because they see the military as a last resort rather than a sign of success. They see the military as a place for women with no education, social status, or financial strength.

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From Loyalty to Dissent: How Military Women Respond to Integration Dilemmas

Helena Carreiras

1 Introduction

By the beginning of the 21st century, despite a considerable heterogeneity regarding integration policies, all NATO countries had admitted and increased the number of women in their armed forces. During the past three decades various restrictions have been lifted; women have been progressively allowed to enter military academies and given access to a wider variety of positions and functions. In 2000, around 280,000 women were serving in NATO forces.

The factors that induced these convergence effects derive from some global sociological trends affecting most Western countries, albeit with diverse rhythms and degrees: increasing pressure for gender equity and changes in the military towards force reduction and professionalization. The growing number and diversification of women's military roles can be seen as both a symptom of and one of the most visible consequences of change in the armed forces.

There is, however, the reverse side of the medal. Despite the tendency to eliminate discrimination and equalize status between service members, occupational restrictions still exist and women are largely excluded from many combat-related areas and functions. They have limited representation in higher hierarchical posts and power positions within the military system. They are not always readily accepted, but often have to face hostile reactions. Empirical data show that even when formal/legal integration has been accomplished, effective social integration has not necessarily followed (Winslow/ Dunn 2002). In addition, progress made in the past has not always followed a linear pattern. Women's military participation has been subject to cycles of expansion and contraction (Segal 1999), and tendencies to reinstate exclusionary policies have been observed.

In this paper I address the question of gender integration in the armed forces, focusing on the problems faced by military women and on the integration strategies they develop. After discussing the issue from a theoretical point of view, making resort to contributions in the area of gender and organizations, among them those of Kanter (1977) and Yoder (1983, 1991), the paper carries out an empirical analysis of the way how military women rationalize their experience, namely in terms of the obstacles and hardships they face, and proposes a typology of integration strategies. This analysis is

supported by nearly three dozen interviews with female officers in the Portuguese and Dutch armed forces, conducted in 2000 within a broader comparative research project on policies of gender integration in the armed forces.[1]

2 Gender Relations in Organizations

In a case study of an American corporation in the mid-1970s, Rosabeth Moss Kanter stressed the importance of organizational dynamics and structural features to account for people's responses. She identified three major factors that condition work behavior: structure of opportunity, power and relative numbers. The third element in the model, *relative numbers*, is probably the most tested and discussed component of the whole theory. It refers to the proportions and social composition of people in similar situations, that is, the relevant social types in various parts of the organization (e.g., women, blacks, and other ethnic minorities). The basic assumption here is that numerical distribution has a major influence on the social experiences of the group.

In Kanter's case study, women were found in extremely low numbers among male peers, a situation that created strikingly different interaction contexts for men and women. Due to their limited proportion – the very few among the very many – these women became *tokens*, that is, representatives of their category rather than independent individuals, "symbols of how-women-can-do, stand-ins for all women" (Kanter 1993: 207). Kanter argued that the *token* situation – members of a subgroup that make 15 per cent or less of the whole – explains particularly negative consequences: *performance pressures* due to high visibility, social isolation resulting from the exaggeration of differences by the dominant group (contrast), and finally role-encapsulation, as an effect of gender stereotyping (assimilation). Visibility, contrast and assimilation, in turn, generate typical token responses.

First, the high *visibility* of the token – a novel perceptual element whose every move is noticed and easily recalled – leads to various forms of performance pressures. While "the token does not have to work hard to have her presence noticed (...), she does have to work hard to have her achievements noticed" (Kanter 1993: 216). However, tokenism seems to set up contradictory dynamics, for people in that minority status may also be afraid of being too outstanding in performance for fear of retaliation. They would thus try to become socially invisible.

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1 This research is the basis of the author's PhD thesis, defended at the European University Institute in Florence in 2004, later reviewed and published by Routledge (Carreiras 2006). This paper draws on parts of the thesis.

A second consequence of the token situation is *contrast,* the exaggeration of differences. Because perceived differences generate uncertainties among dominants about how to behave toward tokens, this effect leads dominants to amplify both their commonality and the tokens' differences. By doing so, they create and heighten boundaries of which previously they might not even have been aware. Shared elements of the dominant culture (for instance, in the case of masculinity, displays of aggression or potency) are thus emphasized in contrast to the token, as a way of reaffirming in-group understandings or asserting group solidarity. "Ironically" – Kanter notes – "tokens (...) are thus instruments for underlining rather than undermining majority culture." (Kanter 1993: 223) Tokens' answers to the reinforcement of cultural boundaries could take two forms: either accepting isolation with the risk of exclusion from important informal socialization, or trying to become insiders by defining themselves as exceptions and turning against their own social category.

Finally, a third type of effect is set in motion that aims at reducing dominants' uncertainty about tokens through the use of stereotypes: assimilation. This refers to situations when "[t]he characteristics of tokens as individuals are (...) distorted to fit pre-existing generalizations about their category as a group" (Kanter 1993: 230). Tokens become encapsulated in specific roles that keep them in a bounded place and out of the mainstream interaction. Kanter found that, in general, the tokens' responses to role encapsulation tend to be conservative. Low-risk strategies for minimizing change and attempts to adjust to previously defined stereotypical roles were found to be the most common.

Kanter's work has been extensively tested and her findings have been replicated across a variety of settings. Although with slightly different expressions, the negative consequences and dilemmas of numerical scarcity were identified among the first women to join certain occupations such as correction officers in male prisons (Jurik 1985; Zimmer 1986), police women on patrol (Martin 1980), coal miners (Hammond/Mahoney 1983), physicians (Floge/Merill 1985), and academics (Young/Mackenzie/Sherif 1980). In the field of military organizations, Yoder/Adams/Prince (1983) found that the first women to join the military academy at West Point reported social isolation, excessive visibility, and role encapsulation. Rustad (1982) also identified similar patterns in a study of American enlisted women.

However, Kanter's proposal has also been subject to serious criticism. In particular, inconsistencies have been found regarding Kanter's assumption that the situation of women improves as their numbers increase in an organization (Bird 1996). Over time, Kanter's hypothesis has been challenged by various alternative explanations. One of the most tested has been Blalock's

minority size-inequality hypothesis (Blalock 1970; South et al. 1982). While in the former proposal token minorities are considered to be subject to greater hardships than non-tokens, and it is predicted that an increase in minority numbers would help to eliminate problems, Blalock's perspective has led to the opposite prediction, that is, the increase in numbers would generate additional pressure. Originating in the race relations literature, it suggests that "minority individuals are less likely to be accepted by the dominant category when there are enough of them to present threats to the political and economic security of the majority" (South et al. 1982: 588). Instead of diminishing the negative consequences of tokenism, numeric surges may be experienced as threatening by the dominant majority, who then react by increasing discrimination. This may result in harassment, wage inequities and blocked mobility. Support for this hypothesis from research findings has been considered moderate to strong (South et al. 1982). How can we thus make sense of these opposing views? Under which conditions and circumstances does tokenism produce such disparate effects?

A critical perspective, which tries to identify the pitfalls in Kanter's theory of tokenism but still aims at reconciling her analysis of numbers with other types of intervening variables, comes from Janice Yoder. She argues that Kanter's model, as well as subsequent replications, confounded four different factors: numeric imbalance, gender status, occupational appropriateness and intrusiveness. Yoder considers that despite the attention given to gender as a master status that permeates social relations in organizations, Kanter minimized the gender of her subjects when discussing the negative consequences of tokenism. Against the assumption that tokenism produces identical results independently of the social category of the token, Yoder sustains that the gender of the token affects its status. In fact, she argues, there is overwhelming evidence that token men avoid the negative consequences of numeric imbalance (Fairhurst/Snavely 1983). Some studies have shown that the visibility afforded to token men may even enhance their opportunities for promotion. "In short", Yoder concludes, "the negative consequences of tokenism seem to occur only for members of social categories that are of lower status relative to the majority" (Yoder 1991: 181). Kanter, according to Yoder, thus failed to acknowledge the extent of organizational and societal sexism as one of the basic causes for the negative consequences of tokenism. How are we to explain both the popularity of Kanter's analysis and the replication of her findings? According to Yoder, this happens because all these studies focused on women working in occupations stereotypically defined as masculine and considered at the time as inappropriate for women. 'Gender

inappropriateness'[2] is thus proposed as another relevant variable that should be added to the analysis.

A third variable that has been demonstrated to influence outcomes is 'intrusiveness', the degree to which the presence of minorities is seen as threatening by the dominants. Intrusiveness – the central dimension in Blalock's hypothesis – is also related to the social value of occupations in terms of compensation and prestige. Male-dominated occupations usually score higher on both aspects. Research has extensively shown the pervasive effect of this process of gender typing, highlighting patterns such as the devaluation of women's work (England 1992; Steinberg 1990) or an occupation's decrease in prestige as it becomes female-dominated (Reskin 1991; Maruani/Chantal 1989). Yoder hypothesizes that women in Kanter's case study may have felt the negative effects of tokenism, not necessarily or only because they were few but because of their increasing numbers, a growth that was perceived as particularly intrusive in a previously all-male occupation.

The main point of Yoder's argument is not that numbers are not important, but that their impact should be evaluated in combination with other variables. The combined effects of token numbers, gender status, norms of occupational inappropriateness and intrusiveness may generate different outcomes. It is thus possible to reconcile apparently opposite approaches by teasing out the individual and combined influence of these four independent variables. The analysis of structural determinants – such as those identified by Kanter – may and should be combined with the socio-historical characteristics of the subjects (Beccalli 1997).

In any case, all negative consequences of tokenism have been found in military contexts: the military universe provides the conditions for performance pressures, social isolation and encapsulation. These negative consequences of tokenism are the product of a convergence between asymmetric gender status, numeric imbalance, intrusiveness and occupational inappropriateness.

2 The process of gender typing of occupations entails both a normative definition of what is considered appropriate work for men and women, evoking negative consequences for deviant behavior, as well as a numerical dimension, operationally defined by the ratio of women to men workers (in the occupation as a whole or in the immediate work groups) (Yoder 1991: 182).

3 Women in the Armed Forces: Obstacles and Integration Strategies

Taking into account the theoretical propositions and empirical generalizations described above, it is now important to look at the integration of women in the military in order to evaluate the applicability of that framework. Which problems do military women face in building their institutional identity? How do they rationalize their experiences, and how do interactional patterns reproduce or subvert organizational principles and policies? What kind of integration strategies do women develop? The analysis of women officers' interviews conducted in the Netherlands and Portugal[3] confirms, to a large extent, the conclusions of previous studies concerning the impact of the military's gender regime – namely the institutionalization of hegemonic masculinity and its correspondent archetypes of femininity – on gender integration. Despite the growing acceptance and routinization of women's military participation, cultural resistances are still prevalent. Although a large majority of interviewees does not recognize the existence of explicit discrimination – at least they have not felt it personally – a diversity of problems has been identified that not only coincide but clearly amplify patterns observed in situations of *tokenism* and women's access to other 'atypical' or 'inappropriate' occupations.

3.1 The Paradox of Discrimination

A first (surprising) result of the interviews might be referred to as the 'paradox of discrimination'. When directly confronted with the question of male soldiers' resistance to women in the military and the existence of discrimination, a large majority of women officers, irrespective of their national background, state they have never experienced it, although they know about cases of effective and explicit discrimination. There is a tendency to underline the exceptional character of discriminatory practices, (1) through 'particularization' – that is, explaining discrimination in terms of the idiosyncratic characteristics of specific individuals; (2) by situating it at a different institutional location, as is the case of transferring that burden to enlisted women; or (3) also by referring it to a specific time-frame (initial periods of women's presence in the armed forces or in a certain unit).

3 29 semi-directive interviews were conducted among military women officers with different organizational backgrounds in Portugal and the Netherlands in 2000.

However, in the course of almost every interview, these same women recognize the existence of a variety of obstacles and difficulties regarding both the acceptance of women in general and their own personal experience. This is the case of a Portuguese parachutist on a short-term contract: having started by saying that "I personally don't have any reason to complain. I never had any problems", moves on to reporting a situation that could actually be described as perceived discrimination on the basis of gender: "I am the deputy of a company commander, and they won't give me the position of company commander because I am a woman. There is even a company where a commander is missing (...) [Did you complain about that?] Yes, I have shown that I am as capable as a man but (...) I think it is the only negative aspect here: at the leadership level a woman is not welcomed (...). Being a woman is always a disadvantage." (31 year-old Portuguese army lieutenant, parachutist)

Accounts of male resistance to women's presence range from various forms of symbolic ostracism – as in the refusal to adapt language used in basic training – to rather brutal intimidating practices. This latter situation is reported by one of the first women to join the Portuguese armed forces who felt enormous resistance to her presence at the academy: "It all started with small things, such as anonymous letters under the room door, pornographic images (...) sometimes they went inside and made a mess." (30 year-old Portuguese air force lieutenant, pilot)

Stories of women having to cope with sexual jokes and pornographic posters are also common. A 39 year-old Dutch air force lieutenant colonel gives one of the most extreme accounts of such a situation: "Once I was a commander and was commanding about 50 people. We had there a poster from Playboy, a kind of girl (...) and everybody saw pictures of me in advertisements [air force recruitment campaign]. They had my head cut out and put it on that poster, in the office. (...) I really thought 'what do I have to do? Is this a kind of insubordination or is it just an attack from men on women or something like that?'" (39 year-old Dutch air force lieutenant colonel, electronics)

Most of these accounts come from women who work in operational or technical areas, or refer to specific situations such as academy life. Both contexts are known to be a reserve of traditional military norms and values; as such, they are less exposed to change than other more occupational or civilian-like institutional settings. Yet, even interviewees who report intimidating practices show an ambivalent position regarding their global evaluation of inequity. Why then, do women officers prefer not to talk about discrimination? This apparent contradiction is probably the result of two interrelated processes: on the one hand, the need these women may feel, as officers, to avoid a

negative image of the integration process, trying to stick to a more 'official version' of reality; on the other hand, the reinterpretation of problems as difficulties, hardships, and obstacles – in any case, something different from discrimination – may serve as an important goal in the process of self-identification and building of a positive institutional image. The discrimination diagnosis would probably sound like dissent, jeopardizing women's chances of being accepted, while at the same time tying them to the undesirable role of the victim. The analysis of specific problems and dilemmas confronted by women provides additional occasions to confirm this interpretation.

3.2 The Negative Effects of Tokenism: Visibility, Contrast and Role Encapsulation

Almost all of the negative consequences of tokenism, intrusiveness and asymmetric social status were identified by women in the two countries. Problems associated with gender numerical imbalance, concerning both the hardships of the 'one token' situation and the 'intrusiveness' of greater numbers of women, were frequently described. Performance pressures, resulting from excessive visibility are a generalized complaint: "We were being tested, evaluated. That's what I felt, a pressure, the need to do everything perfect and comply with the orders we had, not break the rules to reach the goals. That's what I tried to do." (27 year-old Portuguese army lieutenant, administration)

Performance pressures also lead to the proverbial 'double bind' regarding the evaluation of women's performance: when a woman is positively evaluated her success is considered an individual accomplishment, not generalized to other women. It may even be interpreted at the expense of her femininity. When she fails, her womanliness is affirmed and her failure is likely to be generalized to all women: "You are always in the picture and they are not even aware of it, but as soon as you make a mistake everybody notices. If a man makes a mistake nobody cares, we do not even remember his name anymore." (39 year-old Dutch air force captain, helicopter pilot)

Likewise, if a woman is praised, it is said to happen because she is a woman and not because she performed well: "I became captain now, there are some colleagues from my class who have the same rank now, and some are still lieutenant and they will stay for another year, so they are looking, 'oh why did she become captain? Ah (...) because she is a woman.' They argue as a joke, but there is second meaning. When you get something before they do, they always suspect." (27 year-old Dutch army captain, logistics) This cognitive process may be less unconscious and more strategic than is usually

supposed. Used as an argument in competition for promotion, it becomes an instrument in the power structure of gender relations.

A second set of problems relates to the mechanism Kanter named *contrast*, the exaggeration of differences between tokens and the majority group (Kanter 1977, 1993). One of the consequences of *contrast* is social isolation and exclusion from informal networks. Many women, especially when they were the only one, felt lonely and excluded from socialization in the men's group, either because they were not invited or because they were not really interested in sharing 'boys' talk' or activities such as 'drinking and smoking in the bar', or 'watching porn movies'. To be sure, women react differently to social isolation, as shall be seen further on. Nevertheless, the idea that 'there was something going on and information being passed that I missed' is very often transmitted. The above quoted Dutch air force captain notes that "(...) as a women, no matter how close you think you are with your male colleagues and go on exercises, you sleep in the same tents, you go on UN operations, you share a lot of experiences together; no matter how much you feel part of the group, in the end you will never be. They will always be, at some point, not unfriendly but whatever (...) they bond together and you realize there is something going on and you are not part of it (...). And it does not matter if you are gay or women or ethnical minority. It does not make any difference. It is the same; it is just the basic fact: you are a minority. And it is not personal; you just have to live with that." (39 year-old Dutch air force captain, helicopter pilot)

In her theoretical assessment of this dimension of tokenism, Kanter has underlined the process through which men tend to amplify commonalities, emphasizing shared elements of the dominant culture, such as, in the case of masculinity, displays of aggression or potency, in contrast to the token's stereotypical features. However, empirical data points to a more complex situation. While this type of boundary heightening seems to depict accurately the situation in special and operational units (e.g., marines, pilots), in less 'extreme' environments the presence of women is often considered to relax the atmosphere. It induces language moderation and less exaggerated macho behavior. In the eyes of some women, men who do not identify with hegemonic masculinity apparently appreciate this situation of lowering boundaries: "You know, there is also a lot of pressure between men. A lot of them are doing things they do not really like to do (...). As soon as women join the squadron, the atmosphere changes; mentality changes. That is also funny then, because a lot of guys say 'we like it'. There is not as much peer pressure anymore for them. Attention gets focused on the women (...) and not on the few men that are weak or not so good in their job." (39 year-old Dutch air force captain, helicopter pilot)

The third most common consequence of tokenism *role encapsulation* (the distortion of women's characteristics to fit existing stereotypes) is again a salient process reported by Portuguese and Dutch interviewees. The ambiguity of women's role as both soldiers and women is a permanent reference: "You have to prove yourself as an officer and as a woman." (27 year-old Dutch army captain, logistics); "When women join the forces they are immediately labeled: looking for men. Since I came it's been a hard fight to escape that label." (24 year-old Portuguese air force lieutenant, navigator).

Besides focusing on general obstacles to the integration process, the interview aimed at exploring the question of more insidious forms of discrimination, such as sexual harassment. Here again, positions reveal caution. Despite the fact that some women reported personal experiences that could fit a general description of harassment, most declared that they knew about specific cases but had never been the object personally. However, in this case there are remarkable differences between the discourses of Dutch and Portuguese women. This can be related to the very different policy approaches regarding sexual harassment at the organizational level. While Dutch women are aware of the existence of formal complaint mechanisms, the Portuguese talk about a 'grey area' and the very negative consequences, for the supposed victim, of using formal complaint procedures: "These are very tricky situations. Now, if one asks me: 'why didn't you complain?' No, these things happen and we cannot prove them; these are very grey situations and besides they don't just happen, it is a slow process (...) the tendency is to say 'she provoked it, she is the bad one'. So I think it is natural that people don't want to talk about it." (30 year-old Portuguese air force lieutenant, pilot)

With regard to sexual behavior, various interviewees also reveal the existence of a phenomenon that seems to be particularly amplified in the military environment: the control of women's sexuality. Women's sexual behavior is a matter of organizational anxiety, especially among Portuguese officers. One of the most striking examples of this is an account of the interruption of male sailors' socialization with women invited aboard the ships (usually during scales at foreign ports) after the moment women joined the navy: "One night there was a conversation among officers. We talked about different behaviors regarding women aboard ships. Then he told me: 'Women are not equal. Women are women, men are men, and they cannot behave the same way.' Then, he gave various examples. When ships are at shore it is rather common to have female visits aboard. From the moment the crew included women the commander prohibited those visits. Why? Not to upset women sailors, he said! But it was really because if they would bring female friends the girls would also be allowed to bring men and that was totally out of the question;

he could not even imagine that." (35 year-old Portuguese navy lieutenant, physician)

This same circumstance is confirmed by male soldiers who react in an extremely negative way to the possibility that women sailors would be allowed to invite civilian men aboard ships. There are also various other situations where women are required to conform to gender-appropriate behavioral norms. This is often done through specific requests concerning women's body and physical appearance: a Portuguese male naval engineer reports a situation where he 'had to' tell a girl to shave her legs; a Portuguese male soldier in the Marines reveals his uneasiness for 'having to' tell two girls that they should not shave their hair completely; many others express their worries about possible pregnancies. One of the most interesting examples comes from a Portuguese air force female cadet who, because of her 'manly' behavior felt pressures to conform to the 'correct' female identity. She reports a brigadier's admonition: "Once he told me: 'you know X, women have their place here but there are two mistakes: The men who cannot deal with them, and women themselves. To emulate men we don't need you. Maybe we opened up to women because they have something that the organization needs. In general you have to be equal but then there are particularities where you have to be women and they have to be men'. He told me that I should behave like a woman; otherwise I would not be of any value to the organization because I would be simulating something I was not. From then on I started to pay more attention, trying to be myself, lowering my defenses." (27 year-old Portuguese air force cadet, pilot)

3.3 Positive Discrimination, Differential Evaluation and Inequity

Notwithstanding the previous findings regarding integration difficulties, and the intensity of reports on the negative effects of male soldiers' resistance to accept women as equal co-workers, women officers seem to resent more the existence of 'positive' than 'negative' discrimination. At first glance, this is a surprising result and one more paradox revealed at the interpersonal analytical level. In fact, the majority of the interviewees are upset with the dynamics of 'positive' discrimination, both in its organizational form (specific policies, rules or standards for women) and in its attitudinal expression in protectionist and paternalist behavior on the part of some men. Both are seen as negatively affecting women's acceptance, since men's perception of unfair and unequal treatment would provoke rejection and sexist attitudes. Even a measure such as part-time work – technically available to both men and women but clearly more used by the latter – may produce the same negative effects. Referring to a woman colleague, promoted at the same time, a Dutch army captain says:

"But I said to her: 'it is not fair that we become major at the same time, because I have worked five years full-time and you worked half-time. So why is it not that you have to stay longer captain and then become major?' O.k. if we make that kind of rules, those women walk away. It's always a contradiction (...) But inside of me I don't feel that is fair. (...) It is not possible that she has the same experience as me when you are just there half-time. She must do that work some years longer, maybe not for 50 per cent longer, but for example 40 per cent." (33 year-old Dutch army captain, logistics)

From the point of view of paternalistic and protectionist attitudes, women officers are conscious of how deference can be a reminder of difference: accepting protection means accepting to be different, which, in turn, leads to rejection by male peers. To be sure, sometimes paternalism is considered 'understandable'. But this does not mean it is accepted. On the contrary, most women find themselves facing a dilemma since it is difficult to reject paternalism without confronting male authority and sending a message of presumption and excessive rigidity.

More than in any other area, tension in this respect rises whenever the question of physical skills and tests is at stake. This is one of the areas where more difficulties are signalled in the course of the interviews and where women's positions reveal greater ambivalence. While the Dutch are divided over the question of similar or different physical tests, the Portuguese tend to understand why men (namely at the academy) feel discriminated against because of women's lower physical requirements.

An interesting feature of discourses about positive discrimination is that women tend to be more critical of other women who accept favors than of the organization, which develops policies that are seen as favoring women (especially in the Dutch case where those policies actually exist) or of men who have paternalist attitudes: "Of course men do not like that [positive discrimination of women] and I can not blame them for that. If we want to do the same things we have to have the same rights but also the same obligations." (28 year-old Dutch air force captain, intelligence analyst)

In addition, the interviewees' speech reveals a process of rationalization that somehow naturalizes male peers' resistance. There is an interpretation of men's behavior as normal or at least 'understandable': it is understandable (not necessarily acceptable) that they refer to women saying 'man'; that they resent the existence of different physical standards; that they prefer to bond with other men; that they use deference towards women. The share of cognitive models that regulates gender roles and identities has this curious consequence: the normalization (or at least under-evaluation), on the part of the supposed victim, of the discriminatory discourse/behavior of the supposed offender.

3.4 *Women's Responses to Organizational Constraints*

Women officers react differently to the problems described above. But before exploring these different profiles, it is important to look at commonalities and specifically at two responses, which are shared by all interviewees: *over-achievement* and *rejection of one's kind.* Overachievement is a frequent token's response to visibility and the performance pressure it generates. Women feel they have to do more and better than their male peers, and that this effort is not always rewarded: "It is hard because you have to give 200 per cent and you see that your men colleagues do not have to do the same things and that is why it is hard in the beginning. I also think that women do not want to stay long in the army because it costs you a lot of energy, always [trying] not to come in the picture or in the spot lights; but if you want to be accepted you have to give much more than a man. You get results, but it costs a lot of time and a lot of energy." (41 year-old Dutch army captain, communications)

However, if overachievement is a strong pattern, the amplitude of the second response is overwhelming. The lack of cohesiveness among tokens has also been identified as one of the most common responses of members of a minority group to social isolation and role encapsulation. The *rejection of one's kind* constitutes an attempt at detaching oneself from the stereotypical characteristics associated with one's social category. This is extremely amplified in the present research. Both Portuguese and Dutch women officers adopt a particular critical stance regarding other women. In general, they prefer to work with men, who are seen as more 'direct', 'honest' 'sincere' 'friendly', 'straightforward' and 'loyal'. Women, instead, are considered to be more 'conflictive' and driven by 'jealousy': "There's a lot of trouble between women and jealousy, and I think it's easier to deal with men [Why do you think it happens?] Maybe men talk about it when they don't agree and women just let it go." (37 year-old Dutch navy major, administration); "Women are like cats. They lie and they don't look at means to reach their goals. Frequently, when they want something they are even hypocritical, deceiving (...) I think that among men there is more loyal competition. When they have something to say, they say it." (27 year-old Portuguese air force cadet, pilot)

Positions are ambiguous regarding women as role models: on the one hand, the presence of older women who could act as mentors is considered positive since lower rank women can see that it is possible to progress; on the other hand, women as superiors may be seen as a threat: "I think it is not easy for lower ranking females if there is a higher ranking female. You think you know more than, or better than anyone what is going on. If they complain to

a male officer they might get lucky." (41 year-old Dutch army captain, communications)

If we turn now to the different integration strategies, it is possible to identify a variety of women's responses to organizational constraints. In order to make sense of this diversity, I have built a typology where cases are classified along two different dimensions: on the one hand, women's normative conception of gender 'distance' in terms of their focus on difference or equality; on the other hand, their dominant attitude concerning the organization. Figure 1 displays the various types.

Figure 1: A Typology of Military Women's Integration Strategies



Each strategy is characterized by a specific standpoint regarding two variables: on the one hand, the dominant perception of gender in terms of equality and difference – which defines various archetypes of masculinity and femininity: 'masculinization', 'diluted femininity', 'emphasized femininity', and 'militant femininity'; on the other hand, women's attitude towards the organization, defining a set of responses which I have named after Hirschman's famous typology: 'conservative loyalty'; 'disruptive loyalty'; 'silence', 'voice' and 'exit' (Hirschman 1970).

The two types in the right column – *disaffection* and *antagonism* – do not have empirical correspondence in any of the interviews. They remain theoretical possibilities to be explored and tested in future research. Being members of the active force, none of the interviewees could be classified as hav-

ing adopted the 'exit' solution described by those types. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine situations where women with egalitarian gender values would feel so disappointed and impotent in the face of organizational constraints, as to opt for leaving the armed forces passively and without conflict. *Disaffection* would thus correspond to an attitude of great skepticism regarding the possibility of women being truly accepted and given equal treatment in the military, together with the belief that nothing can be done about it. *Antagonism,* instead, would refer to those cases of profound discontent due to the organizational failure in accommodating women's difference. In this case, 'exit' with conflict could be a possible outcome.

Conformists believe that gender differences should be minimized. Women should avoid exposure and excessive visibility and should adapt to existing rules. This is the prototypical defensive position coincident with Kanter's remarks regarding tokens attempt at becoming socially invisible (somehow 'diluting' their femininity), carefully building an image that minimizes organizational and peer concerns. Conformists use various mechanisms to play down difference, but two of them are especially visible: self-contention and search for gender neutrality. "The main thing is not complaining. When you complain about different things you are not accepted. I had in my mind 'I am not going to complain', so if I have a tough time I walk or something, they cannot see me crying or complaining." (24 year-old Dutch army lieutenant, medical service); "I always wanted to be the more neutral possible, not being an excessively feminine stereotype nor the opposite. Try to find a balance, to be able to have good relationships and manage things." (31 year-old Portuguese navy lieutenant, psychologist)

Those who confront integration dilemmas through *assimilation* believe that gender differences should not only be minimized but eliminated. Women should adapt and do it 'the military way': develop aggressive and directive leadership styles, share male social practices and use the same language. The idea is to deal with men on their own ground. By unconditionally incorporating dominant aspects of military culture, assimilation entails women's 'masculinization', that is, the display of stereotypical masculine traits both in physical appearance and behavior. Since this type of subversion of gender norms is seen as dangerous, the *assimilation* strategy involves a disruptive kind of loyalty. Such cases range from discursive practices such as those of a 27 year-old Portuguese air force police officer who always refers to the 'men' under her command, even if those 'men' include women, to those of a 27 year-old Portuguese air force pilot, who provides the most remarkable example of someone who assimilated male culture to a point of having identity problems and even being warned about it by a male officer: "Once they told me: 'Stop, you are a woman; you are not a man'. I reached the extreme of

only dressing in men's clothes, I didn't feel well with a skirt. Male jackets, boots (...) Before I was not like this, I liked typical female clothes and make-up. Since I came I cut my hair like the boys. I stopped being feminine. (...). And there is something I am not very proud of, the language, but it ended up by saving me; when they started testing me I would answer with some bad words." (27 year-old Portuguese air force cadet, pilot)

Complicity is the most conservative of the four integration strategies. It reproduces traditional gender roles by emphasizing the stereotypical characteristics of femininity. As noted by Connell, there is a kind of fit between this pattern of 'emphasized femininity' and traditional conceptions of masculinity (Connell 1995). The 'accomplice' believes that gender differences should be preserved. Women should keep and openly express their femininity and behave according to traditional gender roles: "I do everything not to be confounded with them, not to be confounded. I love to dress my skirt and do everything to wear it because I am a woman, I am in the military but I am a woman (...) My skirt, my shoes, my earrings. (...) I am a woman, I like it and care about it. They see me and they say 'she is a woman and an officer, but she is careful to show that she is a woman, she is feminine'. Maybe the girls don't care, but I do." (27 year-old Portuguese army lieutenant, administration) They further believe that, in the military, there are functions that are more appropriate for women, and therefore, their exclusion from combat functions is legitimated.

Women who choose *assertiveness* think that gender differences should be respected but in an emancipatory sense. Women should impose their specificity, not adapt to gender-unfair rules and macho behaviors. This strategy corresponds to a pro-active behavior, where women use 'voice' to make their claims or channel their complaints. If 'emphasized femininity' involves the risk of increased role encapsulation, *assertiveness* is also a risky strategy. It erodes various loyalties, not only towards the organization and male peers, but also towards other women since support for feminist militant positions is extremely reduced. It may result in effective segregation either imposed from the outside or self-induced. Assertive women are ready to report cases of supposed sexual harassment, to use the official complaint channels, to ensure respect for existing policies regarding maternity and family, to denounce failure in promotions or assignments due to women's family responsibilities, etc. They are also ready to confront male culture, as in the frequently mentioned issue of watching porn movies or having posters of naked women on the walls. Referring to the latter situation, a Dutch army captain reports her assertive behavior: "I said to those mechanics: I want you to take them [posters] down, 'why? they have been there for years', and I said 'I do not care, I accepted this but I do not any longer, I want you to take them down'. 'Oh, we

are going to talk to the commander', and I said 'I don't care to whom you are going to talk to, but I win this, you take them down'." (33 year-old Dutch army captain, logistics)

All these strategies are ideal-types. Interviewees have been classified according to a dominant tendency in their discourses, but some have been included in more than one type. Change through time also occurs, and various women report having changed their opinions and behavior in the course of the years. These cases refer usually to moves from the more cautious *conformist* position to *assertiveness* or from *assimilation* to *conformity*. In other cases, reported ambivalence of gender status makes it difficult to classify certain interviewees: "You should not behave like 'ok I am a woman and I can not do this and I can not do that'. On the other hand you should not behave like a man because you are not a man, you are a woman." (28 year-old Dutch air force captain, intelligence analyst)

As expected, there is also a lot of criticism between the various types. *Conformist* women tend to criticize both *emphasized femininity* and *masculinization*. In turn, those who adopt *assimilation* criticize *emphasized femininity*, and finally those in the *accomplice* category tend to criticize *assimilation*. If we look at the distribution of interviewees by the various types (see Table 1) we see that the most conservative strategies are clearly preferred: 23 out of 29 women prefer not to challenge military culture, by choosing to act in a *conformist* or *accomplice* manner. *Conformity* is by far the most frequent strategy: Almost 60 per cent of the interviewees (17) are classified in this category.

Table 1: Women's Integration Strategies by Country

Strategies	Portugal	The Netherlands	Total
Assimilation	3	1	4
Complicity	2	4	6
Conformity	11	6	17
Assertiveness	0	2	2
Total	16	13	29

Although this is true for both Portuguese and Dutch women officers, almost two-thirds of the former adopt a *conformist* position (11 in 16) for less than half of the latter (6 in 13). Compared to their Portuguese counterparts, Dutch female officers diversify integration strategies, using to a greater extent the more risky responses of *complicity* and *assertiveness*. Such eclecticism may relate to the more diversified organizational orientations found among Dutch

women (namely the more self-centered, hedonistic motivations associated with postmodern values), while the institutional orientations of the Portuguese might explain the greater per centage of those who prefer to keep a low profile and a non-challenging attitude.

4 Conclusion

After reviewing, in the light of relevant contributions in the field of gender in organizations, the hardships faced by military women, and proposing a typology of women officers' responses to integration difficulties, at least one question deserves to be addressed: what changes do female officers think that have taken place since women began to join the military? Do they identify changes or do they believe that everything remains the same? If women's presence in the military 'shakes' the existing gender regime, albeit in a piecemeal manner, and unintentionally, as some believe, we should expect the main protagonists of change to acknowledge this to some degree. Surprisingly, however, when asked this question directly, women mention very few changes, stressing instead superficial aspects related to the global social atmosphere rather than effective structural transformations: less ruthless behavior on the part of men, more polite language, more relaxed (less macho) atmosphere, etc.

A majority of interviewees in the two countries thinks that the dominantly male culture is not affected by gender integration. Notwithstanding the different *rationales* used to justify problems caused by gender integration, or even the various response patterns, there is a certain level of cross-cultural stability of cognitive models of gender, visible in a set of issues:

- Women officers in the two countries report symbolic and material obstacles to integration that reproduce well-known patterns of segregation of women in atypical occupations: performance pressures resulting from excessive visibility, social isolation and role encapsulation. Very few, however, identify these problems as discrimination in a negative sense. On the contrary, they feel far greater resentment about the existence of positive discrimination, both in the form of special policy measures and in the paternalistic attitudes of higher-ranking men.
- Female integration strategies tend to be conservative: a majority responds to organizational and cultural constraints in a conformist manner, trying to play down their difference and creating distance from the women's group. They tend to criticize other women who adopt supposedly inadequate integration strategies or those who accept favoritism, rather than criticize the organization, which issues the policies associated

with positive discrimination. This is particularly clear with regard to the question of different physical standards. The objectivity of measures is rarely questioned, whereas men's perception of relative deprivation is interpreted as understandable.

To be sure, results also show that there are inconsistencies, ambiguity and paradoxes which point not only to the complexity of individuals' adjustment to structural arrangements, but also reveal the way whereby the 'gendering' process at the individual and interaction levels is often more flexible and contradictory than what might be predicted. In any case, these observations suggest a disturbing possibility as far as the evaluation of organizational policies and programs aimed at promoting gender integration is concerned: that the efficacy of policies will be limited by the way in which individuals interpret them; or more, that policies aiming at formal integration may turn out to work against social integration. Cultural values regarding masculinity and femininity as well as those concerning women's social roles can work as countervailing forces in the process of women's integration in the military, even when all other conditions are favorable.

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Chivalry in the Military

Gerhard Kümmel[*]

1 Introduction

Chivalry is a word that is often been used in the context of the military. Yet, the meaning attached to chivalry differs. Here are some examples:

- In his Memorial Address of 20 July 1966 in memory of the military resistance against Adolf Hitler the Bundeswehr's former Lieutenant General Hans Speidel quotes a section of a speech Colonel General Ludwig Beck once gave on *The Lesson of Total War* saying: "Chivalrous warfare, a sense of law and justice, decency and honesty in his relations towards the enemy are an intrinsic desire of the soldier of honor (...)." (Speidel 1966)
- In the mid-1990s Major General Jürgen Reichardt was rather enthusiastic about the performance of German parachuters in the Second World War and hereby attributed a lot of importance to chivalry: „The German parachuters were neither better equipped than their counterparts nor did they have excessive command of strength, weapons and food. What made the difference was the spirit. The warrior spirit, the esprit de corps, the spirit of chivalry." (Reichardt 1996)
- In a mid-1990s commentary in the German weekly paper *Die ZEIT* Hans Arnold deplored the absence of chivalry and wrote: "The marginalization of ethical and moral reflection is especially pronounced in those parts of the army which are usually referred to as elite troops, special forces, command troops or rangers. The soldiers of these units are characterized by a particularly strong and uncritical concentration on an ethically neutral mechanism of command and obedience." (Arnold 1995: 46)
- In a 2004 interview in the supposedly far right-wing weekly paper *Junge Freiheit*, former Brigadier General Reinhard Günzel of the German Special Forces Command (Kommando Spezialkräfte, KSK), raised the question, whether "there is an officer or a soldierly ethos at all in the Bundeswehr" and gave the answer by himself by charging the „1968 cultural revolution": "No, there is no such ethos (...) any more. How should there be given the fact that the military is seen as a job only." Neverthe-

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* The views expressed here are those of the author only. German quotations have been translated by the author.

less, he ends hopefully because there "obviously still is some soldierly essence in the country" (Schwarz 2004: 4f.).

- Even in ex-negativo references to the armed forces the term chivalry is being used thus marking its importance for the military. Author Karl Kraus, in his famous novel The Last Days of Mankind has his Doctor Abendrot saying: "As a knight in spirit we turn to the sword, even though the flame-thrower has already proven its utility, and we are determined to fight with steam, gases and mines to the end. (...) With all the trimmings of chemistry the Germans fight in the spirit of chivalry." (Kraus 1988: 744)
- One last facet of chivalry is represented by the well-known 1982 movie An Officer and Gentleman, written by Douglas Day Stewart, directed by Taylor Hackford and starring Debra Winger, Richard Gere and Louis Gosset, Jr., which is about decent behavior, courage, politeness, courteousness and love. One of the last sequences of the movie in which the newly graduated officer candidate Zack Mayo alias Richard Gere wearing a shining white uniform rides (!) into the factory where Paula Pokrifki (Debra Winger) works in order to take her with him is a proper and graphic illustration for this.

As can be inferred from this, the sub-texts to the term chivalry, its contents, show a good deal of variance. Speidel's concern is honorable behavior in war and Arnold moans the deficit or even the absence of conscience and ethical-moral reflection among soldiers, while Reichardt's objective is combat readiness and the will to victory of a coherent collective, a group of soldiers. Güntzel, in turn, deplores – in a somewhat Huntingtonian manner – the deficit and the loss of military and soldierly virtues in Germany. And Kraus formulates a critique of German militarism by also using the term chivalry while *An Officer and Gentleman* praises the soldier as the protector of the weak, the rescuer from misery and the epitome of politeness, decency and courteousness.

What, then, does chivalry mean, especially in a military setting? What does it entail and in which connotations is it used? To approach these questions and issues is the objective of our paper. It starts with a historical view on the terms knight, knighthood and chivalry and moves on to sketch two pertinent forms of the present occurrence of chivalry in the sphere of the military, namely (1) chivalry in combat and in theaters of war and, of special interest here, (2) chivalry in male soldiers' behavior vis-à-vis females and its implications for the gender order in the armed forces. The article ends with some reflections on the future of chivalry in the military.

2 Knight, Knighthood and Chivalry

The knight is a rather clear-cut historical figure. Although the *equites* of Ancient Rome are often considered to be precursors of the knight, knighthood is usually associated with the period of the Middle Ages (500 – 1500 AD). As such, the knight is defined as the "armored warrior riding into combat" (Ritter 1992; see also Keen 1986; Borst 1998; Fleckenstein 2002; Hechberger 2004). With this several essential criteria and characteristics of the knight are already given. The German word *Ritter* as well as the Dutch expression *Ridder* stem from the Germanic word for riding (*ridare*) and is first being used as a written term in writings of the 12th century.[1] The knight as a figure emerges from the armored cavalry which has developed in the Late Ancient Frank Empire of the Merovingians and Carolingians and which has successively become the means deciding the outcomes of combat and war. He disseminated the whole of Europe until far into the Eastern parts of the continent.

Since his equipment consisting of well-trained horses, armor, weapons, squires and servants requires substantial financial resources, which, in general, only members of well-suited and rich families dispose of, the knight is recruited from the nobility and ministeriality of the time and becomes the warrior caste of the Middle Ages. At the times of the crusades from the late 11th century until the middle of the 15th century, different orders of knights develop such as the Teutonic Order, the Order of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, the Order of the Knights of Malta, and, of course, the famous Order of the Knights Templar. In the 12th and 13th century, knighthood experiences its high time and even becomes hereditary.

Soon thereafter, however, and, in fact, already beginning with the 13th century, the societal demise of the knight sets in and reaches its low with the figure of the robber baron, who threatens the public order and is thus attached outlaw status. In this process, several factors come into play. One is economic plight, another the transition from the economy of bartering with natural produce to the money-based economy, and a third the increasing relevance and popularity of mercenary armies. Overestimated in its relevance, but often named is a fourth one, the development of firearms following

1 In other languages such as in Italian (cavaliere), in Spanish (caballero) and in French (chevalier) the term is derived from the Late Latin word for horse (caballum) which is obviously also the source of the word cavalry.

the invention of gunpowder in the 14th century.[2] Yet, the decisive factor may be the decreasing military relevance and effectiveness of the knight due to the creation of well-organized ground troops with longer halberds, spears and pikes. As, among others, the Battle of Kortrijk/Courtrai (1302), the victory of the Swiss peasants at Sempach (1386) and the Burgundy defeats at Grandson, Murten and Nancy (1476–1477) indicate, the infantry advances to gain the upper hand in combat.

But the culture of the knights, knighthood and images of chivalry possess a fascination that transcends their later idealizations and romanticizations and reaches far beyond the Middle Ages. This resonates with their socio-cultural leverage upon the societies of the time because the 'just' and 'holy' wars of Christianity, the crusades, in which, at the beginning, the religious-ideological moment is more important than power politics, lead to a relatively far-reaching cultural homogenization of the (Christian) territories in Europe. The knights' way of life, their world views, ethical-moral standards and code of honor are a transnational, "an Occident-wide phenomenon" (Rittertum 1992) and shape public opinion and behavior in medieval society. They represent a role model for the nobility throughout Europe, shape life at court and reach out to the well-suited patrician families of the medieval city.

This cultural homogenization is advanced by the wandering minesingers who praise the actual as well as the supposed glorious deeds of the knights, most prominent among them Walther von der Vogelweide and Wolfram von Eschenbach. They and their fellow-minnesingers create very important cultural artefacts of the Middle Ages such as the *Songs of the Nibelungs*, *Parsifal* and the *Song of Roland.* In the courtly epics, like Thomas Malory's *Le Morte d'Arthur*, in the stories of the Knights of the Table Round and the Holy Grail, the cultural imprint of knighthood and chivalry is reflected.

This means that the knight's caste is "not only characterized by the similarity of the military function of its members, but also and even more so by the sharing of a life style" (Ritter 1992) whose elements are "pagan warriorship, Christian soldiery, and the dim memory of classical heroism" (Braudy 2003: 81). It is further advanced by the Clunian Reform which aims at "the revival of monastery life" and at "the humanization and Christianization of the nobility" (Rittertum 1992). Knighthood, then, comprises several essential elements:

2 For quite some time the knights can compensate for this by way of improving the armor of knight and horse. But there were limits to this because this requires the horse to have more strength and it makes the knight increasingly inflexible and immobile.

- A military cult of the warrior-hero which involves courage, braveness, resolution and a willingness to sacrifice and die;
- a not-codified warrior ethos that, e.g., declares an ambush as a non-knightly way of fighting and prefers the open frontal attack and matching of strength and skills as a fair and honest way of fighting in which the other – the noble knight – is respected as being of the same kind;[3]
- and, derived from this, chivalry, i.e., ethical and moral convictions, virtues and norms that are not codified either, but consist of elements of Germanic law, ancient and Christian ethics comprising fairness, justice, honesty, modesty, magnanimity, helpfulness and standing up for the weak, the defenseless, the widows, the orphans and the noblewomen and for the truth, the law, the church and Christianity (see, inter alia, Winter 1979).

Summarizing then, knightly behavior is, at first, constrained to combat and the theater of war. Yet, later on, with the increasing importance of the courts, it is transposed to life at court and widened to include elements such as good manners and courteousness. The manners' literature of the time targeting the future knight reflects these ideals of good behavior. "Knightly discipline and courtly behavior combine to form what is considered civilized behavior and relates to self control, self-assurance and generousness, as well as to humanity and grace." (Rohls 2004: 65)[4] These are the two sources, combat and court, which also determine the usage of chivalry in the present.

3 Chivalry in Combat Behavior: The Civilization of War through the Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict

Chivalrous behavior in the theater of war and the ensuing differentiation between allowed and not-allowed action in war are the result of a process of socio-cultural norming which made war and warfare subject to certain rules (see also Kaeuper 2002). "This does not necessarily happen (...) because of one's own judicial and moral convictions, but by way of reciprocity. The decisive line of thought is that each combat action that contradicts the accepted forms of warfare triggers a similar reaction from the other warring party. (...)

3 The knightly code of honor is restrained to fighting between knights. Often the fighting does not aim at killing the other, but to capture him in order to make his family, relatives and friends pay for his release.

4 A recurring reference in this regard is the book Libre qui es de l'ordre de cavalleria by the Spanish knight Ramon Lull written between 1279 and 1283. For an English version see Lull 2001.

This fear of reciprocal countermeasures serves the establishment of rules of war and their compliance." (Hankel 2002) This can be conceived as the direct precursor of the idea of constraining war through some Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict by people such as, among others, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and Emériс de Vattel which has led to codifications like the Hague Convention, the Briand-Kellogg-Pact, the United Nations Charter and the Geneva Conventions as well as to institutions such as the International Court of Justice. As a consequence, chivalry, "the Code of Honor of medieval knighthood has to be counted among the intellectual roots of present day humanitarian law", in particular with regard to the Hague Convention (Mader 2002: 122).

The acceptance throughout the world for such laws of war has much been helped by the fact that similar codices have existed well beyond Europe. For example, basic elements of humanitarian law can be found in the pre-Christian law book *Manus* from India, but also in Arabia. Here, one may think of figures like Caliph Omar, Sultan Saladin, who re-conquered Jerusalem in 1187 and let the Christians leave the city untouched, and Abu Bekr, the first successor of Mohammed. The Japanese Bushido culture has also be named in this regard. These few examples illustrate "that 'warriors' of different cultures may arrive at surprisingly similar (military-)ethical demands" (Mader 2002: 123; see also Trim 2002).

Following a development which may be interpreted along the lines of Norbert Elias' (2001) *Civilization Process* one may find in various documents regulations constraining and civilizing war which are acceptable across cultures. Among them are, e.g., the obligation to refrain from combat action against the civilian population, to take care of non-combatants and to treat prisoners of war well; the outlawing of certain ways and means (weapons) to fight; and the respect for religious holidays. These regulations are then transferred to particular field manuals of the armed forces (for one example see Department of the US Army 1976).

Such codification of norms and rules, however, does not necessarily imply that there is compliance towards them. Rather, theory and practice differ in this domain as well. The history of constraining war by way of humanitarian law and rules of war is also a history of non-compliance to these rules. Just to name an example of the more recent past, the conflict in Iraq and the unacceptable behavior of US soldiers in the Abu Ghraib prison in which prisoners have mentally and physically been tortured shows that the skin of civilization may be thin. The public outcry, not only in the US was immense because this "type of behavior is repulsive to Americans, who want to see their soldiers as knights in shining armor, not cruel barbarians. Reports of these atrocious incidents forced people throughout the world to wonder how the

military representatives of an honorable nation could have gone so far down the road to such dishonorable conduct." (Farrell 2004)

Yet, the critique and condemnation of the American conduct was be no means unanimous since the sub-textual question whether the good objectives legitimize even dubious means found and still finds affirmative answers. Thus, it seems to be all the more necessary to revive the idea of military knighthood and chivalry: "In a battle against terrorists and murderers, chivalry prevents warriors from becoming the very things they are fighting against." (Farrell 2004) What is required, then, is "a new, modern, encompassing form of 'chivalry', not only as an 'ideal' or 'vision'" (Mader 2002: 126). The notion of chivalry has thus survived the knight as a historical figure and is still relevant in today's and the future's theaters of war, combat and conflict as it puts limitations on the conduct of war and regulates and civilizes warfare.

4 Chivalry in Male Soldiers' Gender Behavior

4.1 Etiquette in Today's Military

Chivalry cannot only be observed with regard to combat and war, but also with regard to male behavior in gender relations which can obviously be traced back to life at court (see also Barber 1996). The essence here is that both the European medieval knight and the Japanese Bushido or Samurai are figures with a thoroughly masculine connotation. As such they represent influential models of masculinity and, though implicitly, feminity (see, inter alia, Braudy 2003). The way in which the two sexes have treated each other in courtly society and, in particular, the behavior of the knight towards the noblewoman reveals a construction of a gender order in which the male is the strong one, the protector, the active one and also the courting one while the role of the weak and passive one, those in need of protection and the courteously treated and courted one is attributed towards the female.

In the training in "style and forms" (Gosoge 1989), i.e., in the manners' literature for today's soldiers and especially for today's officers one cannot only easily see a direct line of tradition to the manners' books for the medieval knights, but one can also easily discern a gender model, here with regard to the German Armed Forces, that reflects the one just mentioned. To illustrate this some sections from the instruction literature on manners shall be cited: "True courteousness and chivalry are heartfelt. The way of dealing with the ladies shows very clearly who has a sense of tact. (...) In a group of people not knowing each other as well as in select groups of people at a reception the expression 'Dear Madam' as a form of address is useful to deal

with ladies whose names are not familiar yet. Even more important is that this form of address adequately expresses the special admiration one has for ladies. (...) The kiss on the hand also is not yet antiquated (...). It is left to one's own judgment whether to express one's chivalrous feeling towards a lady by such a gesture." (German Department of Defense 1965: 48f.)

Furthermore, there is a more detailed passage dealing with appropriate behavior at ballroom occasions and official receptions: "You may significantly contribute to making such an event successful and thereby create pleasant memories of it, if you pay attention to the following: (...) You introduce yourself to the other guests at your table. The first dance is reserved for your female dinner partner; the following dances – usually called compulsory dances – are reserved for the other ladies at your table. In addition, you should try hard to have a dance with your host's wife. Be careful that this does not take the form of a men's crowd rushing to her after each dance. On the other hand you should avoid having a lady remaining alone at a table. When asking her to dance bow to her. (...) It is no longer necessary to formally ask the husband or the companion of a lady for his permission to dance with her. Yet, elderly people sometimes consider such asking as very appropriate. You escort the lady to the dance floor. Following the dance you escort your lady back to her seat and formally thank her for dancing. Should a lady approach your table or should a lady leave your table, stand up (...). Do not form 'men's corners' to which ladies have no access. Be natural towards a lady. If a single lady wants to leave, escort her to the exit, take care of her transportation, if necessary, escort her home." (Offizierschule der Luftwaffe 1989: 22f.)

In this genre, women are presented as those that are in need of paternalistic treatment; furthermore, they are often pictured in their traditional role as the housekeeper, the housewife: "It is good tradition at personal invitations (...) to bring a present with you to give to the housewife. Almost always appropriate are bouquets of flowers, especially at your first visit. (...) Flowers are presented to the housewife (...) when you are welcomed by your hosts. (...) Please be careful not to present red roses (symbol of love) or so called funeral flowers such as white asters." (Offizierschule der Luftwaffe 1989: 33)

These constructs of the female as someone to be courted and to be protected symbolically makes war a men's business. Women here are applauding and caring spectators only (Seifert 1996: 180f.). Such attitudes can also be found in interviews with male soldiers. Seifert, e.g., cites the following section taken from an interview with a younger officer: "(...) I love women too much to see them suffering. It is bad enough to see young men suffering. (...) I think I had more problems seeing a female buddy dying (...) than a male one." In another interview the officer's statement reads like this: "I

think that women are especially vulnerable in times of war to fall victim to the most atrocious crimes (...) Feminity is not a shelter. I also think that women exerting military violence is something strange." (Seifert 1996: 181, 184) Seifert (1996: 184) interprets these statements by arguing "that women (...) need to be protected from stepping to the side of inhumanity by exerting violence themselves. (...) The woman as a victim of war is not as troublesome as the woman as an executor of violence."

These aspects of chivalry are by no means an exclusively German phenomenon, but can be observed in the militaries of the world. A study on incoming Dutch officers, e.g., states that "[g]eneral manners and rules of conduct for cadets, as laid down in 'The Blue Book' or the booklet 'White on Black' in particular indicate that courtesy and chivalry are still values that apply to the population of cadets" (Moelker 2005: 93) and concludes "that values of chivalry still have their place in the life of a cadet and consequently also in officer socialisation" (Moelker 2005: 104).

4.2 Benevolent Sexism

For the Social Sciences chivalry is a domain of social psychology dealing with convictions and stereotypes vis-à-vis the females. In particular, for gender research and research on sexism the notion of chivalry is important (see, e.g., Eckes 1997). The changes and improvements in women's status in society due to changing life-, education- and career-courses and processes of emancipation in recent decades cannot be denied (Spence/Hahn 1997). Nevertheless, gender discrimination at the work place persists. Although women have a comparable or even better education than men, their work biography is still more discouraging than men's (Halford et al. 1997; Heintz et al. 1997; Bauer 2000). In other spheres of social life female discrimination also persists. In studies on the division of work in families the traditional role models come to the fore in broad segments of society – even if the women have jobs (see, e.g., Menzel 2000; Wouters 2004; Cornelissen 2005).

Sexism research in recent years has noted both change and persistence in the phenomenology of sexist attitudes and has found that "prejudices against women are decreasingly uttered openly, but increasingly in subtle and covert ways" (Eckes/Six-Materna 1998: 225). In concepts of 'modern', 'subtle' or 'neo-sexism' (Benokraitis/Feagin 1995; Tougas et al. 1995) which resonate with socio-psychological research on anti-semitic, xenophobic and racist attitudes (Swim 1995; Zick 1997), three forms of sexist attitudes are identified (see also Figure 1 for illustration):

(1) In 'traditional sexism' the biological differences between men and women are stressed, the inferiority of females is taken for granted and classical gender role models are given preference.
(2) 'Modern sexists' "see the political claims of feminist groups regarding equality and equal opportunity for man and women in society as well as measures to advance the status of women as a threat to values of egalitarianism. They fear that females might get a more advantageous position than men and think that women are granted privileges they are not entitled to." (Eckes/Six-Materna 1998: 226; see also Glick/Fiske 1996; Swim/Cohen 1997). In such a perspective, affirmative action programs and claims towards equality become means of discriminating against men.
(3) The third variant of prejudices against women are attitudes which look prosocial at first and result in a prosocial behavior which is perceived, in the eyes of sexists, as good and positive (Eckes/Six-Materna 1998: 235) It is a benign, benevolent variant of sexist attitudes which resonate and resort to a concept of paternalistic chivalry (see Nadler/Morrow 1959; Schmerl/Steinbach 1973; Glick et al. 2000), which leaves women a constrained set of roles to live. To illustrate this: Research has found that women are more likely to get help from a male stranger than men (Eagly/Crowley 1986). A closer look reveals that traditional mechanisms and perceptions are at work here, namely that "women are the 'weaker' sex" and that they "are dependent on men for their survival" (Viki 2003).

Figure 1: Sexism and Its Components



5 Empirical Research

In recent years, social psychologist Ulrich Wagner and his team have taken up these ideas and developed a sexism scale that differentiates between these three variants of sexism (see Wagner/Schmermund 2000). This scale has been used in a study of the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SOWI) on the integration of women into the Bundeswehr. The study was based on a survey put to both male and female soldiers and conducted in 2005. The interesting finding is that the responses to the items of traditional and modern sexism revealed little variance with regard to most variables such as service, rank, classification and trade, political and religious affiliation, but, quite naturally, significant ones with regard to gender. However, with regard to the items of benevolent sexism, the differences were much less pronounced. The various items for benevolent sexism and the significance of difference in responses according to gender can be inferred from Table 1; the response data are given in Figure 2. The basic findings are that the three variants of sexism can be found among a good deal of male German soldiers. German female soldiers, however, are rather seldom traditional or modern sexist, but quite a few of them are benevolent sexists.

Table 1: The Items for Benevolent Sexism and Gender Differences

Item	Significance	Item	Significance
Each man should have a women to adore.	n.s.	A man should cherish his woman.	< 0,01
If both parents are working and if their child falls ill at school, the authorities should rather call the mother than the father.	n.s.	It is important that men are gallant, e.g., by opening the doors for women and help them to get out of the car.	< 0,001
Not success, but the love of a woman makes a man a real man.	n.s.	Men should financially take care of women.	< 0,001
Men without women are worth 50 per cent only.	n.s.	Women should be protected by men.	< 0,001
In comparison to men women have more sense for culture and good taste.	< 0.01	Women should see to create a cosy home for their men.	< 0,001

Figure 2: Benevolent Sexism and Gender (approval in per cent)



Source: SOWI Survey *The Integration of Women into the Bundeswehr*, 2005.

6 What to Make of This

The military obviously is a sphere in which chivalry and benevolent sexism can be found. The military's manners' books cited above with regard to the German Bundeswehr and the Dutch Armed Forces as well as the findings of the survey of German soldiers are proof of this. Yet, chivalry and benevolent sexism are problematic in that "chivalry comes with the restrictive norms of a conservative world view. Wherever chivalry is celebrated, lived or revived, it requires and upholds the (self-)confining of women to their traditional, 'innate' behavioral role set." (Schmerl/Steinbach 1973: 62)

Women also have a role in this because they, too, may display traditional, modern and benevolent sexist attitudes. Such attitudinal overlap between men and women is arguably easiest with regard to benevolent sexism as the data above suggest. As the minority and token group in the military, female soldiers adapt – consciously or unconsciously – to "the system-justifying ideologies of dominant groups in a manner that perpetuates their own oppression", in particular because they perceive benevolent sexism to be prosocial and advantageous for themselves (Viki 2003; Jost/Banaji 1994), although that need not be the case in practice in the long run (Kilianski 1998). Benevolent sexism and chivalry come with a friendly face which helps them finding acceptance and approval even among women, but they simultaneously cement the status difference between men and women (Schmerl/Steinbach 1973: 65) – all the more so since benevolent sexism correlates positively with both traditional and modern sexism and serves as a supporting pillar for them. The three variants of sexism can thus be seen "as complementary ideologies that serve to maintain men's dominance over women" (Viki 2003). As such, then, chivalry "may be a barrier to gender equality" (Viki 2003; see also Jost/Banaji 1994; Kilianski 1998).

On the other hand it should not be denied that chivalry has unequivocal positive effects as well. The taming and civilization of war, however limited and deficient they may be, is by no means something to be overlooked or belittled, because, as we have seen, the creation of regulations and rules regarding the proper and legitimate and legal behavior in violent conflict and war, to a considerable extent, stem from and relate to the socio-cultural, normative value system of the medieval knights and knighthood (see also Robinson 2006). Even the benevolent sexism of today's military's manners' books is functional to a certain extent because such rules of conduct "bring people of diverse backgrounds together and allow them to interact without threat of the situation collapsing" (Finkelstein 1989: 139; see also Elias 2001; Sennett 2003). Or in the words of Renè Moelker (2005: 97): "Etiquette allows people to interact, irrespective of their social status (...). Etiquette makes the interac-

tion between people of unequal rank safe and predictable." Thus, "etiquette and values of chivalry are functional for the work of the officer" in particular and the military in general (Moelker 2005: 104).

The flip side of the coin, however, is that chivalry – or, to be more precise: some facets of chivalrous behavior – works to maintain existing traditional images of gender roles. As a consequence, it contributes to and nourishes sexist attitudes and behavior in the military and may complicate the process of integrating women into the armed forces. Although chivalrous behavior basically means to treat one another with human dignity, the point here is that the constellation is not reversible. Chivalry in this, narrow, sense has the male as its sole sender and the female as its sole address; it is gendered. Men and women cannot change sides or slip into the role of the other. What seems to be necessary, then, is something like a gender-neutral conception of chivalry. As long as such a form of chivalry does not exist, chivalry remains an ambivalent phenomenon with both positive and negative aspects.

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The Militarization of Gender and Sexuality in the Iraq War

Lindsey Feitz & Joane Nagel

1 Introduction

There is an intimate connection linking gender, sexuality, and war: calls to arms by men to defend women and children, intense camaraderie of men in arms, men's sustained and vigorous resistance to military service by women and homosexuals, mass rape and sexual servitude in warfare, survival sex by refugees and non-combatants in war zones, sexual commerce surrounding military bases and in 'rest and recreation' destinations (Mosse 1996; Johnson 2000; Moon 1997; Sturdevant/Stoltzfus 1992; Enloe 1990, 2007). There also are the sexualized depictions of both sides in armed conflicts: from 'our' men who are honorable and virile, to 'their' men who are perverted and/or impotent; from 'our' women who are virtuous and vulnerable, to 'their' women who are promiscuous and treacherous (Ducat 2004; Goldstein 2001); and there is the phallic discourse of 'war talk': from weaponry – guns, bullets, missiles, and bombs, to military campaigns – assaults, penetration, conquest, and surrender (Cohn 1993; Cooke/Wollacott 1993). Just as there is a military-industrial complex that depends on war for profits and growth, war-making depends on a military-sexual complex to recruit, motivate, and retain military personnel (Hartung 2001; Nagel 1998, 2003).

Masculinity always has served as the cultural bedrock from which to launch military recruitment efforts and military operations. The content and meaning of most masculinities resonate with calls to military service and support for military undertakings (Courdileone 2005; Connell 2005; Baker 2006).[1] This not to say that all men love war, make war, or advocate war. It is to say that the intimate connection between war and manhood is longstanding and ubiquitous. Attributes of hegemonic masculinities across time and space reference warrior traditions that emphasize bravery, toughness, daring, honor, strength, and courage (Mosse 1996; Tosh 2004). A number of feminist scholars argue that the US 'War on Terror', including the war in Iraq, reflects not only the patriarchal assumptions of warfare in general, but also serves as a violent, performative stage on which to reassert US national virility following the attacks of 9/11 (Jeffries 2007; Enloe 2007; Tetrault 2006; Puar 2004).[2]

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1 For discussions of militaries and masculinities in national settings other than the US, see Higate 2003; Sasson-Levy/Katz 2007; Milicevic 2007.

2 For a series of discussions of the implications of the September 11th attack on the US World Trade Center, see Caforio/Kümmel 2005.

According to Mann (2007: 155): "[American] sovereignty becomes a certain style of national masculinity and war becomes an occasion for its performative constitution, self-making rather than self-defending. Indeed, the superpower identity can only be maintained and expressed through repetition, through a staging and restaging of its own omnipotence."

It is not only patriarchy and masculinity that provide the cultural infrastructure for militarism; femininities can give aid and succor to militarized masculinities. In their role as mothers, many women play a critical role in gender projects' intent on turning boys into men. As lovers and wives, heterosexual women are consumers of manliness and as such, succumb to the seduction of military power and prowess. Lesbian femininities that simulate qualities of militarized manliness and embody 'female masculinities' also can mirror and lend a degree of legitimacy to hegemonic masculinity (Gershick 2005; Halberstam 1998). Whatever their sexual orientation, when women move from civilian life into the armed forces, they participate in the legitimation of militarism, lend cover as 'gender decoys' deflecting the hypermasculine nature of the military and war, and can become gendered weapons of war in ways they did not sign up for when they enlisted (Eisenstein 2004).

We argue here that the gendered, sexual nature of war is not simply a historical artifact of warfare or the military, but is an ongoing, evolving feature of military organization and operations. We will focus on the war in Iraq to show how the US military has adapted to and exploited the increased numbers of women in its armed forces. We find that despite the US military's longstanding and vigorous resistance to including women in its ranks (Mitchell 1989), women's increased numbers and expanded roles have become a new resource for military leaders. Women soldiers, sailors, and National Guard personnel have found themselves playing parts they never anticipated when joining the service.

2 Women's Changing Presence and Place in the US Military

In the 1970s, the US armed forces adopted policies that opened the door to the increased recruitment and service of women in the US military: the elimination of a 2 per cent cap on women's enlistment and the adoption of gender-neutral recruiting policies. In 1970, 27,948 women comprised only 1 per cent of active military personnel in the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines; by 2005, there were 201,759 women or nearly 15 per cent of active service

personnel in these four branches of the armed forces.[3] In 1973, women constituted only 4.2 per cent of the officers in the four branches of the military: in 2002, 15.6 per cent of officers were women (US Defense Department 2002, 2004a, 2005a). This feminization of military manpower is reflected in the composition of the armed forces serving in the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Corbett (2007) reports that by 2007 more than 160,000 female soldiers had been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, four times the number who served in the 1991 Gulf war; approximately 11 per cent of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are women (Ginty 2007).

This unprecedented number of women are deployed in an equally unprecedented array of roles, and these numbers and roles combine to make the Iraq war an important site for understanding the current and future deployment of militarized femininities. This is especially true in light of the blurring of traditional gender roles and front lines in Iraq. Women are not only a growing presence in the US military because of their sheer numbers and responsibilities associated with rank and despite prohibitions against combat duty for women. Most military observers and women veterans themselves report that women are involved in military violence and combat situations on a daily basis in Iraq (Skiba 2005; Williams/Staub 2005; Solaro 2006). This is partly because there is no clear 'front line' in the Iraq occupation since urban warfare and guerrilla tactics defy conventional notions of battle zones. It is also the case that women's expanded police and guard duties bring them into close contact with combatants and prisoners further blurring the line between women's combat and non-combat duty. Despite its continued insistence on women's official exclusion from combat, the US military has deployed women soldiers in a variety of combat-related roles in Iraq – as security workers, pilots, and armored vehicle drivers.[4]

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3 Ginty (2007) reports that this per centage is expected to double by 2020. Although women are still officially restricted to non-combat roles, they serve in virtually all areas of the military, including as pilots of combat aircraft (Harrell et al. 2002). The US Air Force began training women as fighter pilots in 1993; in 2005 4.1 per cent of USAF pilots were women (Wilson 2005). For an overview of women in the US military, see Manning 2005, for the experiences of women during the early period of gender integration, see Stiehm 1982, 1989; Segal 1995 and for information about the ways the military has addressed and is adapting to increasing numbers of female service women in terms of healthcare, childcare, etc., see Bell/Stevens/Segal 1996; Ginty 2007; Rhem 2005.

4 For a discussion of the ambiguities of women's role in combat zones, see Nantais/Lee 1999; Miller/Moskos 1995; Scarborough 2005. For a discussion of women in peacekeeping see DeGroot 2001; Segal/Segal 1993. For a discussion of the problems of locating battlefronts and, some argue, impossibility of keeping women out of combat situations, see Jervis 2005; Agostini 2005; CNN 2005b.

The mission creep toward combat for women in the US armed forces is consistent with Enloe's (2007) argument that escalating global conflict has militarized the daily lives of both men and women and that the definitions of masculinity and femininity in national public discourses have reshaped the meaning of patriotism, national security, and state-sanctioned power. Enloe describes an international state system characterized by proliferating patriarchal political institutions. It is within this masculinist political and military global environment that we see a widening array of military roles for women in military operations and institutions around the world. What is ironic, but predictable from Enloe's analysis, is that as US servicewomen enter deeper and higher into the military's ranks, the entrenched patriarchal institutional character of the military remains intact. Sasson-Levy (2007) describes a similar resilience in the Israeli Defense Force as sequential 'degendering' and 'regendering', first as women are integrated into officer training, and then as the masculinist gender order recovers its footing. Like many longstanding organizations, military social structural arrangements can survive despite deep changes in their personnel and frequent efforts at reform.

Our argument here is that the presence of women does not seem to have undermined the US military's masculinist culture and mission. We find that, instead, the US military has capitalized on its new feminine resource and has developed new strategies for incorporating femininity and women's symbolic and material presence into its mission. In the Iraq war, women soldiers have been asked to serve not only as supply clerks, cooks, mechanics, nurses, doctors, and pilots, they also have been enlisted in a variety of gender and sexual roles above and beyond the call of duty – as wives and lovers of service personnel, as targets of sexual harassment and assault, and as symbols for enactments of both masculine bravery and contempt. To illustrate our argument, we examine three specific sites in which women's gender and sexuality have been deployed in the Iraq war. We begin with the staged rescue of Jessica Lynch whose sexual purity and female innocence was used by the military to garner domestic support for the war in its early days; we then turn our attention to the twisted sexual landscape of Abu Ghraib prison where white American female soldiers were used to dominate and eroticize the torture of prisoners and where a woman officer was singled out for disciplinary action; we conclude with a review of the gender politics and sexual dynamics between male and female personnel in the US military.

3 Damsels in Distress: Military Missions and Publicity Campaigns

On 23 March 2003, in the opening days of the US invasion of Iraq, a caravan of 18 vehicles and 33 soldiers from the US Army's 507th Maintenance Company, a support unit of clerks, repairmen, and cooks, was attacked by Iraqi troops in southern Iraq near Nasiriyah. Eleven US soldiers were killed, seven were captured, and the rest escaped. One of three women with the 507th taken prisoner by the Iraqis was Private First Class Jessica Lynch of Palestine, West Virginia.[5] When the Humvee she was riding in crashed, this 19 year-old supply clerk suffered lacerations, a broken arm, broken leg, and head and back injuries. She was taken by Iraqis to a hospital and treated for her injuries. One week later, the US military stormed the hospital where Lynch was being held, whisked her away to safety, and flew her to Germany for medical treatment.

Lynch's rescue was filmed by the US military and the dramatic footage of the assault on the hospital and Lynch's liberation was widely circulated by the US news media. On 23 August 2003, Jessica Lynch received a medical honorable discharge from the Army and an 80 per cent disability benefit. Seven months after her rescue 500,000 copies of her biography, *I Am a Soldier, Too: The Jessica Lynch Story*, were released; during the next week she was interviewed by Diane Sawyer on ABC's *20-20*, by Katie Couric on NBC's *Today* show, by David Letterman on CBS's *Late Night Show*, and by Larry King on CNN's *Larry King Live*; and in November 2003, a movie-of-the-week docudrama, *Saving Jessica Lynch*, starring Canadian actress, Laura Regan, was televised on NBC.

The dramatic rescue of Jessica Lynch and its wide dissemination in print and broadcast media demonstrated how well the US military had learned the media lessons of Vietnam, in particular how to control and channel the visual images coming out of a war. Although the Iraq war is now well into its fourth year with thousands of military and civilian deaths and casualties,[6] and despite the hours of television viewed every day by Americans, we see almost nothing of the war: no body bags, no helicopters med-evacing dying and wounded GIs, no Americans gunning down Iraqis or being gunned down by them, no blood, no suffering. It is in striking contrast to the Vietnam war

5 For the official US Army report on the 507th's encounter with Iraqi troops, see US Army 2003 (http://www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy/AttackOnThe507MaintCmpy.pdf).

6 In April 2007, Iraq Body Count (2007) estimated the number of civilian deaths in the Iraq war at between 61,391–67,364.

coverage how very few images of death and mayhem haunt the US evening news. The few pictures Americans saw of the torture and violence in Abu Ghraib prison were all the more shocking not just because of their content, but because of their rarity. American reporters embedded with the troops in Iraq seem to have forgotten their cameras and misplaced their keyboards. News releases from the military and government controlled the message and camouflaged the violence. We *heard* about the daily deaths, but we have seen almost nothing.

The Pentagon's practice of embedding reporters is one of the means by which military and political control of the message has been accomplished. Embedding journalists with soldiers has been a double-edged sword in Iraq war reporting. By allowing the media access to the conflict by placing them inside the combat situation, rather than positioned as outside observers, embedding has created opportunities for a close up and personal view of the war, but this intimate relationship between reporters and troops also has rendered the press dependent for their own safety on the troops about whom they are expected to tell an objective story. Michael Weisskopf (2006), a reporter with *Time* magazine, was imbedded with the First Armored Division in Iraq in 2003, when he lost his hand tossing a bomb out of his armored vehicle; he identifies that as the moment when the line between reporter and soldier began to blur for him. Critics of the embedding process argue that even when such drastic injuries do not occur, it is inevitable that reporters will come to identify with the troops who protect them. This dependency has led Hess/Kalb (2003: 12) to ask whether there is a Stockholm syndrome in which the journalists start to "identify with the soldiers and lose their professional detachment?"

The rescue of Jessica Lynch raises related questions about the military and the media and the extent of their mutual embeddedness. Lynch's rescue played in the US news as the heroic rescue of damsels in distress – American men saving a pretty, young, white American woman from possible sexual and personal assault by dark and dangerous Iraqis. The role of race in the Lynch rescue scenario has been widely noted (Tucker/Walton 2006; Howard/Prividera 2004; Douglas 2003; Grundy 2003). As they have reported, two other women were injured during the attack on 23 March 2003: Lori Piestewa, a member of the Hopi Nation, was driving the Humvee carrying Lynch, and Shoshana Johnson, who became the first African American woman prisoner of war, was injured during the attack and also held captive. Piestewa died from her wounds in the hours following the attack, and Johnson was rescued a week later when she and several fellow prisoners were found by US troops during a house-to-house search. Saving Jessica Lynch,

however, was the US military's, US government's, and US news media's main story, and they stuck to it, (...) at least, for a while.

It took the press some time to start checking their 'facts', but six weeks after Lynch's rescue, a BBC documentary, *War Spin*, challenged the veracity of the US military's account. Reporter John Kampfner referred to the story of saving Jessica Lynch as "one of the most stunning pieces of news management ever conceived", and he questioned the entire "rescue" – from the storming of the Iraqi hospital by US special forces to the filming of the operation on a night vision camera (Kampfner 2003). Instead, Kampfner reported that "witnesses told us that the special forces knew the Iraqi military had fled a day before they swooped on the hospital (...) Dr. Anmar Uday [reported]: 'There were no [Iraqi] soldiers in the hospital (...) It was like a Hollywood film. They cried, 'go, go, go', with guns and blanks without bullets (...) and the sound of explosions. They made a show for the American attack on the hospital-action movies like Sylvester Stallone or Jackie Chan'." In fact, according to Kampfner, "[t]wo days before the snatch squad arrived, [Dr.] Harith [a-Houssona] had arranged to deliver Jessica to the Americans in an ambulance. But as the ambulance, with Private Lynch inside, approached a checkpoint American troops opened fire, forcing it to flee back to the hospital (...) When footage of the rescue was released, General Vincent Brooks, US spokesman in Doha, said, 'Some brave souls put their lives on the line to make this happen, loyal to a creed that they know that they'll never leave a fallen comrade'."[7]

The highly publicized rescue of Jessica Lynch at the beginning of the Iraq war placed her gender, race, and sexuality at the forefront of a media campaign designed to garner domestic support for the war effort. The spinning and counter-spinning of Lynch's rescue has prompted a number of questions about her symbolic value as a sexualized tool of wartime propaganda (Tucker/Walton 2006; Pin-Fat/Stern 2005; Howard/Prividera 2004). McAlister (2003) views Lynch's rescue as an updated version of 17th, 18th and 19th century captivity narratives which featured white women captured and imperiled by American Indians. The more modern Jessica Lynch version of this historical narrative was updated by the use of video cameras, special forces, and the aid of a vastly more developed mass media. Lynch stood in for past generations of white women used to justify wars against 'primitive' non-whites whose conquest it is declared will set them free from their dark, uncivilized state. McAlister argues that foregrounding Lynch's physical and sexual vulnerability provided a moral justification for invasion of Iraq. She

7 The BBC story was broadcast on 18 May 2003; it took a little longer for the American domestic[ated] press to uncover the truth; see corroborating interviews with several US journalists on 10 June 2003 (Smith 2003).

stresses the centrality of a sexually virtuous white woman (Lynch was not only young, pretty, and white, she was unmarried and had no children) to a successful narrative, noting that women of color like Johnson or Piestewa are never cast in leading roles in American captivity narratives.

Howard/Prividera (2004) reviewed hundreds of media reports following Lynch's rescue and found that as time progressed from the moment of her capture, reports focused increasingly on her femininity rather than her activities or identity as a soldier. Relatively little was reported about the duties Lynch performed in the military, instead the authors found that she was repeatedly described in news stories as "cute", "young", "attractive", "blonde", and a "Miss Congeniality" winner who loved her hairbrush (Howard/Prividera 2004: 92). The media were not only captivated by her physical appearance, Howard/Prividera found that Lynch's sexuality was widely discussed, especially speculations about whether she was sexually assaulted while she was held captive. The military and the media represented Jessica Lynch as a brave heroine because of her circumstances rather than a war hero honored for her military skill. Howard/Prividera argue that the rhetorical framing of Lynch's rescue and her public transformation from a brave soldier to a vulnerable captive requiring rescue by [real] soldiers perpetuates dichotomous gender stereotypes within the military and the media "as the identities of and relationships between 'Jessica' and her rescuers were constructed for the media public" (Howard/Prividera 2004: 96).

Several months later another sexualized image of a female soldier captured the attention of the public and the media. This is not a damsel in distress, rather it was the specter of Private Lynndie England sexually taunting and demeaning naked, male Iraq prisoners. Mason (2005: 40) compares Jessica Lynch's and Lynndie England's relative symbolic value and media depictions; she argues that both were small town Appalachian women who played an important role in shaping public opinion and distracting public attention from US military operations at critical junctures of the war: "Like a photographic negative of the good Jessica Lynch, the evil Lynndie England appeared as another hillbilly gal to deflect criticism of the systemic U.S. extremism, in this case the extremism of torture and terrorist humiliation in prisons." Lynndie England's highly publicized role as the villainess of Abu Ghraib is our next site for examining the militarization of female sexuality in the Iraq war.

4 Chicks with Guns: Disciplining Dominatrixes and the Eroticization of Torture[8]

Private First Class Lynndie England of Fort Ashby, West Virginia, was a 20 year-old US Army reservist serving in the 372nd Military Police Company at Abu Ghraib prison in 2003 when pictures were made public of her and other guards abusing Iraqi prisoners.[9] In these pictures, England and her fellow reservists were seen in a variety of poses with prisoners as props. Prisoners were photographed nude, bound, forced into human piles, covered in feces, and threatened by dogs.[10] Some of the most lurid photographs involved sexual positioning and posing of prisoners and guards, including England, Specialist Sabrina Harman, and Specialist Charles Graner. Like Jessica Lynch, Lynndie England and Sabrina Harman also were pretty young white women, but their race, gender, and sexuality were deployed in a very different way in this arena of Iraq war – not as damsels in distress, but as dominatrixes in a bizarre chronicle of torture and abuse.

The goings on in Abu Ghraib prison easily could have been anticipated by anyone who has taken an introductory-level social science course. We have known for over 40 years, based on the work of Stanley Milgrim, Philip Zimbardo, Robert Jay Lifton, and Albert Bandura, among others, that without proper supervision and constraints, many people in hierarchical authority systems placed in charge of others defined as inferior or enemies are quite likely to follow orders, suspend moral judgment, and abuse those under their control.[11] This is exactly what happened at Abu Ghraib. After reviewing official reports commissioned by the Defense Department, most scholars and human rights organizations concluded that the torture and abuse of prisoners by US military and contract personnel at Abu Ghraib was caused by the military's failure of leadership and lack of supervision (Hooks/Mosher 2005; ACLU 2007). Findings in reports commissioned by the US Defense Department in

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8 For an expanded discussion of the deployment of female sexuality at Abu Ghraib, see Feitz 2005.

9 Abu Ghraib photographs are widely posted on the Internet; see, e.g., White/ Davenport/Higham 2004.

10 Charles Graner was found guilty on ten charges including aggravated assault, maltreatment, and conspiracy and is serving a 10 year sentence; Sabrina Harman was convicted of mistreating detainees and was sentenced to six months in prison; Megan Ambuhl pleaded guilty to dereliction of duty and received a sentence with no jail time; Lynndie England pleaded guilty to conspiracy to mistreat prisoners and received a 3 year prison sentence. For a complete summary of additional prosecutions and convictions for the Abu Ghraib scandal, see Follman/Clark-Flory 2006.

11 For a brief summary of this social psychology literature, see Schlesinger 2004.

the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib photographs (Fay-Jones 2004; Taguba 2004; Schlesinger 2004) documented how top-ranking military officials and members of the Justice and Defense Departments, most notably Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld through their relaxed definitions of torture and acceptable interrogation techniques, helped create a dangerous and chaotic prison environment rife with opportunities for individuals and groups to commit "acts of brutality and purposeless sadism" (Schlesinger 2004: 5). Zimbardo (2007) compares the results of his well-known Stanford Prison Experiment of 1971 to the events at Abu Ghraib, arguing that blaming and prosecuting a few 'bad apples' for their misdeeds at Abu Ghraib deflects much needed scrutiny and accountability of the authorities responsible for creating and mismanaging the 'bad barrel' that Abu Ghraib became.

The prisoner abuses by England, Harmon, Graner, and their fellow guards at Abu Ghraib were not simply a case of human nature in action. US military intelligence personnel and contract workers advising prison staff actually encouraged and orchestrated the misconduct (Fay-Jones 2004; Schlesinger 2004). Abu Ghraib was not the first instance in which US military personnel had sexually abused detainees. Similar programs of torture had been underway for some time at the US prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (also known as 'Gitmo') where prisoners were smeared with fake menstrual blood, made to put women's underwear on their heads, threatened with dogs, forced to appear nude in front of women, and sexually humiliated (Shaulis 2006; Saar 2005). In fact, the so-called 'Gitmoization' of operations at Abu Ghraib was facilitated by Guantanamo prison commander, Major General Geoffrey Miller, who helped set up operations at Abu Ghraib (Fay-Jones 2004; Schlesinger 2004; Hersh 2004). The three major official US government reports all include descriptions and testimonies of American female and male soldiers physically, sexually, and emotionally abusing prisoners.[12]

12 The Taguba Report (2004) was commissioned to investigate the 800th Military Police Brigade, of which England, Graner, Harmon, and Ambuhl were members. The report also cited Brigadier General Janis Karpsinski for a failure in leadership and demoted her to Colonel, charges which she publicly refuted in her book, *One Woman's Army* (2006). The Fay-Jones Report (2004) examined the role of military intelligence personnel, as well as the involvement of officials at the Justice and Defense Departments, in creating the conditions for misconduct at Abu Ghraib. The Schlesinger Report (2004) was commissioned by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to provide an independent review of the scandal. Together the reports provide a comprehensive investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal, including a discussion on how 'interrogation' techniques from Guantanamo were implemented at Abu Ghraib by General Geoffrey Miller. For a survey of official documents associated with the Abu Ghraib scandal, see Greenberg/Dratel 2005; Danner 2004; Strasser 2004.

The initial public outrage over Abu Ghraib was sparked by a disturbing visual montage of prisoners twisted into degrading poses at the hands – and cameras – of US military personnel. As the story unfolded, however, the media focused on the personal lives of the military personnel involved, and the story shifted from a purely military scandal to an unfolding soap opera starring Lynndie England as the sexually promiscuous lead, Charles Graner, as the man whose child she carried, Sabrina Harmon, as the woman who, alternately with England, posed with Graner in front of naked detainees, and Megan Ambuhl, as the woman Charles Graner married while he was in prison and England was pregnant with his child. The torture and abuse of prisoners became an incidental backdrop to the more important media story – the sexual soap opera and the demonization of its bad girl star, Lynndie England.

In August 2004, after several months of US popular media coverage of the women of Abu Ghraib, the Defense Department's Fay-Jones Report was published to very little notice. The report revealed that the photos were the tip of an iceberg: sexually torturing prisoners in US custody in Iraq and other fronts on the War on Terror was commonplace, and so was the presence and direct involvement of both male and female military personnel. According to the report, incidents of sexual abuse were among the most frequent type of abuse committed in US detention facilities, ranging from sodomy, forced sexual stimulation, and fondling of prisoners genitals. For instance, the report stated that "[m]any of the [male and female] Soldiers who witnessed the [prisoners'] nakedness were told that this was an accepted practice. Under the circumstances, however, the nakedness was clearly degrading and humiliating." (Fay-Jones 2004: 68) The *New York Times* (2005) editorialized that the use of women as tools in prisoner abuse was an "exploitation and debasement of women serving in the United States military". Fay-Jones (2004) also reported that at least two female Iraqi detainees were sexually assaulted or raped by American servicemen at Abu Ghraib. We do not wish to dismiss these crimes from our analysis, but instead note that the lack of media attention to these incidents may be attributed to public and media fascination with female perpetrators (like England), rather than female victims.

What accounts for the military's deployment of women as sexual torturers? Part of the answer to this question lies in American military's obsession with Arab men's sexuality. Hersh (2004) argues that US military intelligence and conservative intellectuals have long subscribed to a theory of Arab masculinity based on two Orientalist texts written in the mid-1970s: Raphael Patai's *The Arab Mind* (1973) and Bernard Lewis' *From the Prophet Mu-*

hammad to the Capture of Constantinople (1974).[13] *The Arab Mind* includes a chapter on sex that discusses the taboos associated with female sexuality and homosexuality. Hersh (2004: 40f.) reports that the book became "the bible of the neocons on Arab behavior" in the months before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq; "[i]n their discussions (...) two themes emerged – 'one, that Arabs only understand force and, two, that the biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation'." Massad (2004) concurs with this analysis, arguing that US government officials' view of Islamic culture stresses Arab sexuality and that the sexualized Othering of Arabs reflects a broad disdain for the people and the region that is part of an ongoing US imperial agenda of military, economic, and political domination. Massad also argues that the photographs taken at Abu Ghraib served two purposes: they were intended to blackmail prisoners who were told their families would see them and they were trophies for US soldiers, "mementos for American and British soldiers to take home with them to show to their families and friends" – an intent Massad interprets as deeply racist.

Massad notes the involvement of women soldiers in the Abu Ghraib torture, but he seems to see them as simply extensions of American masculinism – another way to feminize Arab men. When we look at the pictures of Abu Ghraib, however, we see considerably more going on. The women are not simply beating or manhandling the prisoners; they are positioned in very sexual ways – dagging a detainee on a leash, pointing at a hooded prisoner's genitals, posed with American men above and Iraqi men below them. These images are as revealing about Americans' sexuality and masculinity as about the presumed sexual cosmologies of the prisoners in Abu Ghraib. The apparent fun the Americans were having and the creative gusto with which they undertook their sport suggest that the scripts they were enacting were not only deeply racist, but also deeply familiar. A number of feminist scholars echo this sentiment and argue that deploying the physical bodies (and symbolic presence) of American servicewomen to sexually humiliate Arab men reflects the broader sexist, homophobic, and misogynist agenda that informs American military discourse (Jeffries 2007; Enloe 2004; Tetrault 2006) and a narrative of racial and national superiority that justifies American interventionism and imperialism (Puar 2004; Mann 2006).

13 See Hersh 2004 and De Atkine 2004 for a discussion of these books and their influence on the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison.

The torture at Abu Ghraib produced images of dark, Arab men suffering at the hands of white American women.[14] The gendered and sexed and raced nature of the torture reflects a specific brand of white, militarized, American female sexuality.[15] Historically the torture and sexual humiliation of prisoners of war and prisoners by mainly male guards is well-documented. What was surprising to many who viewed the Abu Ghraib prison photos was the enlistment of women in these undertakings. This development probably has as much to do with opportunity as with any new low in US military standards of conduct. Our point here is that the photographs from Abu Ghraib document an important consequence of the increased presence of women in the US military. Women's sexuality has become a tool in an expanded military arsenal, a new form of war materièl. The new weapon is women's assumed unique sexual power to demean and humiliate enemy men.

Women's gender and sexuality are not only useful in the prisons in Iraq, their increased presence in the ranks and on the battlefield is proving to be valuable for maintaining men's morale. The expanding presence of women has become a kind of portable R&R resource to the extent that servicewomen choose to have sex with their comrades or find themselves coerced into sexually servicing the servicemen. Sex between the troops is another important and complex site where servicewomen have become part of the US military-sexual complex in Iraq.

5 Comrades in Arms: Sex and the Servicewoman

Sexual abuse, exploitation, and rape are perennial problems in the US military. Not only civilians have been targets of US soldiers here and abroad, so have their women comrades (Cohen 2000; Brant 2005; Tessier 2003; Giles/Hyndman 2004; Francke 1997). In 2006, 21 year-old Army Specialist Suzanne Swift decided to go AWOL rather than return to Iraq and "report for duty (...) on my bed", as she quoted one of her male superior officers. Swift's charges were in a long series of reported incidents of sexual harass-

14 We are aware that not all detainees at Abu Ghraib are Iraqi, or Arab, or Muslim, but we are unable to document the national or other identities of any of the detainees, and we believe that these were their presumed identities by US soldiers implicated in their abuse, so we will use these terms sparingly, but when necessary to clarify our argument.

15 For a discussion on artists and activists using the Abu Ghraib photos in an attempt to redirect public discourse on torture see Hesford 2006. As a pedagogical tool to critically educate Americans about the discourse of gender, race, empire, and their relationship to military culture see Giroux 2004.

ment, assault, and coercion (sometimes called 'command rape' of female soldiers in and out of combat zones. Her refusal to return to duty raised new questions about the legality, feasibility, and credibility of citing fear of sexual harassment or assault as a justification for obtaining an official leave of absence from active duty (Corbett 2007; Benedict 2007).

Whatever the outcome of Swift's case, she is not alone in reporting sexual harassment by her comrades in arms. According to the US Defense Department's own studies, increasing numbers of female soldiers report they are fighting a war on two fronts: battling for both their sexual safety and their lives (US Defense Department 2004b, 2005b, 2005c, 2006). Jeffries (2007) argues that servicewomen's vulnerability to sexual assault in the patriarchal, masculinist military institutional setting has been overlooked by feminist calls for equal opportunity for servicewomen. The vulnerability of women in the military's unequal gender power structure has been reaffirmed by a range of military women. For instance, Iraq war veteran, Colonel (and former Brigadier General) Janis Karpinski recently reported that in 2003 three female soldiers died of dehydration because they refused to drink liquids late in the afternoon for fear of being raped by male soldiers on their way to the latrines at night, a fate resisted by Specialist Mickiela Montoya who instead decided to carry a knife with her at all times: "The knife wasn't for the Iraqis (...) it was for the guys on my own side." (cited in Benedict 2007)

The sexual mistreatment of servicewomen has resulted in recurrent scandals and inquiries from the earliest days of gender integration of US armed services and military academies. The 'modern era' of military sex scandals began in 1991 when more than 80 women reported being molested by Navy and Marine pilots at a Las Vegas Tailhook convention. This scandal was followed by a 1996 revelation that dozens of women recruits had been sexually assaulted at the Army Ordinance Center in Maryland, which was followed in 2003 by 142 women cadets' allegations of sexual assault during the previous 9 months at the Air Force Academy. The Pentagon dutifully, but ineffectually launched studies and task forces after each of these, leading US Congressman John McHugh to comment in 2004: "Over the past 15 years (...) we have had 18 major studies on sexual assault (...) That's more than one a year. And yet (...) to put it kindly, we've got a long way to go, in terms of both [sic] prosecution and prevention and response, that are necessary." (cited in Martineau/ Wiegand 2005; for a catalog of reports, see US Defense Department 2005c; see also Vogt et al. 2007)

The apparent inability or unwillingness of the Pentagon to deal with the problem of sexual assaults against US servicewomen has been well-documented by researchers and by the Defense Department itself. In May 2004, the Secretary of the Army released a study of sexual assault in the

Army only for the 5 year-period from 1999–2003 (US Defense Department 2004a). The study revealed that the number of sexual assaults in the Army increased during the 5-year period from 658 in 1999 to 822 in 2003, though the proportion of women reporting assault appears to be fairly constant at around 4.5 per cent. Rates of rape and sexual assault are notoriously difficult to ascertain due to variations across time and place in defining, reporting, and classifying data. In light of the US military's poor record of responding to its mainly women members' sexual abuse, it is not surprising that the "Department of Veterans Affairs found nearly 75 per cent of military women who said they had been assaulted did not tell their commanding officer" (Martineau/Wiegand 2005). The low figures in the Army study fly in face of other studies finding rates of reported rape closer to one-quarter of women surveyed (Herdy/Moffeit 2004) with rates of sexual harassment much higher (Murdoch/Nichol 2005). In 2005 alone, the Defense Department reported 2,374 allegations of sexual assaults among armed forces personnel (US Defense Department 2006). Rates of domestic violence associated with military service are higher still (US Defense Department 2003) and have been cited by some researchers as indicative of a broad culture of violence against women in the US military (Rosenthal/McDonald 2003).

The war in Iraq has not improved the situation for US women serving in the armed forces despite the Defense Department's revised definition of sexual assault "as a crime" rather than an "inappropriate behavior" (Hansen 2005). The Miles Foundation, a not-for-profit organization that supports and advocates for victims of violent behavior associated with the military challenged the Defense Department's most recent DTMs (directive-type memoranda) narrow definition of sexual assault which excludes acquaintance, date, or offender-known rape (Hansen 2005) and also fails to acknowledge the personal responsibility of persons who commit sexual crimes, consequently reinforcing a climate that Kristine Houser (2007) sees as the primary obstacle in implementing effective sexual prevention and intervention programs. Bowen (2007) argues that the failure to include these kinds of sexual assault minimizes the problem since 70–80 per cent of sexual assaults in the armed forces are acquaintance or known-offender rapes (Bowen 2007). Although they see the Defense Department's 2004 Joint-Task-Force on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response as a step in the right direction, advocates at the Miles Foundation and the National Alliance to End Sexual Violence continue to criticize the Pentagon's unwillingness to issue legislative mandates to address sexual assault in the military. Corbett (2007) argues that this limited accountability has sent mixed messages to female soldiers, leading many servicewomen to adopt a 'why bother' attitude when it comes to reporting sex crimes perpetrated by their male comrades, especially in light of the fact that

only 2–3 per cent of cases go to court marshal and the most common response is administrative disciplinary action (Bowen 2007), and those women who do report sexual crimes to their commanding officers run the risk of being labeled a traitor (Benedict 2007).

In many ways, women soldiers being raped, molested, or harassed is not a surprise given the hypermasculine, patriarchal structure and tradition of the armed services and women's relatively low and controversial status within them. But rape, molestation, or harassment are not the only ways that sexuality enters into women's military service experience. As the photographs of Abu Ghraib prison illustrate, women's sexuality is deployed as an instrument of torture in military prison settings. And as those photographs and the biographies of Abu Ghraib guards Charles Graner, Lynndie England, Sabrina Harman, and Megan Ambuhl indicate, sex among the troops is part of contemporary military service experience.

Many servicemen and women enter into sexual relations willingly, even enthusiastically, and situations of danger and conflict can be powerful aphrodisiacs (see Williams/Staub 2005; Herbert 1998). In her study of pregnancy in the US armed services and its impact on military readiness, Monsen (1997) reported that during the 1991 Gulf war, "more than 1,200 pregnant women (out of 40,579) were evacuated from the gulf region" (see also Griffin 1992). Since most sex does not result in pregnancy (even accounting for the fact that some women might have been pregnant prior to shipping out), a pregnancy rate of 3 per cent suggests that rates of sexual relations must have been considerably higher. We could find no figures on pregnancy rates among women serving in Iraq, but there is no reason to believe there has been a diminution of sexual contact among the troops.

In situations where sexual harassment is potentially high, it is sometimes in the interest of women to form sexual alliances, to 'hook up' with men in order to gain support and/or to place themselves off-limits to other men. This is not to say that women are having sex with men (or women) in Iraq only out of intimidation or self-protection. Any consideration of sexuality in the US military, however, should reference the broader context within which soldiers enter into sexual liaisons. Is it fair to refer to women's sexual involvement with men in the military as 'servicing the servicemen'? Part of the answer to that question has to do with rank – whether women are partnering with men of equal rank – and part has to do with the pressures to get along in an intense atmosphere in a male-dominated organization. We do not wish to underestimate women's sexual agency, but as women, we are quite aware of the limits of personal power when confronting a potent, exploitative, and dangerous reality like the one the US has created in Iraq (see Corbett 2007; Williams/

Staub 2005; Stiehm 1996 for women's points of view on their military service).

6 Conclusion

We have argued here that there is a military-sexual complex that provides a critical libidinal infrastructure for war. We have noted the literature on gender and war which identifies wars as sites of homosocial masculine solidarity, arenas of male sexual aggression, theaters of hypermasculine, heteronormative performance, stages where gender and sexual scripts are enacted and reinforced. In the face of growing numbers of American women in the military we asked the questions: What happens when women enter the masculinist spaces of the military and war zones? Are the women masculinized, are the spaces feminized, or does something else occur? We have concluded that despite an unprecedented number of American women enlisted as military, paramilitary, and support personnel; the US war in Iraq is no exception to the historical masculinist rules of war.

We find that the US military-sexual complex has incorporated and exploited women and femininity to achieve combat goals, and we conclude that, despite much official rhetoric about the limitations of women in combat, the deployment of women as weapons of war has been integrated into the US military's structure and operations. In her analysis of the Abu Ghraib photos, Eisenstein (2004) observed that the appearance of women dressed as men "participating in the very sexual humiliation that their gender is usually victim to" was at first confusing until she realized that the US women of Abu Ghraib were actually "gender decoys", serving as cover for sexual and racialized abuses, camouflaging gender and racial power relations. Eisenstein notes that such "gender swapping and switching leaves masculinist/racialized gender in place [so that] just the sex has changed; the uniform remains the same."

We have argued that women have been deployed in the war in Iraq in the propaganda campaign to win the hearts and minds of the American people, as weapons of war in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, and as willing and unwilling intimate partners within the US armed forces. We find that although women are incorporated into military operations, they continue to occupy gendered places within the armed forces. Not only are female sexuality and gender deployed and consumed by the military organization and its personnel, women are quite likely to be vilified, blamed, and prosecuted when their exploitation becomes public or when things go wrong. We compare the lack of disciplinary action against Major General Geoffrey Miller, who commanded the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, later helped 'Gitmo-

ize' US operations at Abu Ghraib, and received a Distinguished Service Medal from the Army when he retired (White 2005) to the treatment of former Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, who was put in charge of 15 military prisons in Iraq with no prior experience in the field of corrections, and was blamed for the Abu Ghraib scandal. Karpinski resisted being cast as a "fall gal" for Abu Ghraib, and argued that the abuses there and elsewhere are part of a policy directed and implemented mainly by US military intelligence and its hired contract workers (Karpinski/Strasser 2006). Nevertheless Karpinski was demoted to Colonel before she retired, leading us to conclude that when women enter longstanding, entrenched masculinist spaces like military organizations, even when their numbers grow and they are promoted to positions of power and authority, they remain vulnerable to sexual exploitation and scapegoating and their ability to control the definition of the situation and their role in it is limited. The case of servicewomen in the Iraq war illustrates the capacity of organizational social structure to sustain inequalities and established patterns of power relations even in the face of significant demographic shifts in personnel.

Recent policy changes in the US military more broadly defining sexual abuse, instituting expanded confidentiality rules, and establishing new guidelines for reporting and responding to service personnel reports of sexual assault is a step toward dismantling the military's longstanding 'don't tell, don't respond' strategy for *not* dealing with sexual harassment and assault (see US Army 2005; US Defense Department 2005b). However, it remains to be seen whether these new policies are up to the tasks of transforming military gender and sexual culture and deescalating the militarization of femininity.

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Violence Against Women in Conflict Zones

Ceyda Kuloglu

1 Introduction

The nature and the battle ground of wars have changed in time. According to the common statistics to show how the nature of war has changed 80–90 per cent of the victims of the First World War were from the military, whereas around 90 per cent of the victims of today's conflicts are civilian. The victims of today's conflicts are mostly women and children and this is due to the blurred borders between "war front" and "home front" (UNRISD 2005: 210f.). To give just one example: The 2006 attacks of the Israeli Air Force on Lebanon did not distinguish civilian from military areas when bombing the country and it was mostly the civilian population that died or was injured during the conflict (atv, 16 July 2006).

Conflict research usually differentiates between four stages of a conflict. These stages are "pre-conflict", "the conflict itself", "peace process", and "reconstruction or reintegration" (El Jack 2002: 9). It is assumed that the gender specific differs according to conflict stage. Women experience the conflict differently than men, so their needs differ both during and after the conflict. The conflict effects women according to their age, context (rural or urban women), support network (whether they are together with their family and community or not), and position in the conflict (displaced person, politician, head of household or combatant). Furthermore, the type of the conflict – whether it is an international or national conflict or an occupation and whether it is an ethnic or religious conflict – is also important for its effects on women (Lindsey 2004: 23).

In this descriptive paper, I want to explore some facts and statistics on the impacts of conflicts on women by using examples from specific conflict zones. The paper contains mainly three parts. In the fist part, the direct and indirect impacts of war on women are evaluated. In the second part of the paper, the situation of women in post-conflict conditions is demonstrated; and in the final part women's position in the peace-building process is explored.

2 The Impact of Conflicts on Women

2.1 The Direct Impact

2.1.1 Sexual Assault and Rape

Using sexual assault and rape in conflict zones has been the case since the ancient times, but it has recently gained very much attention. The media's and women's organizations' attention was first drawn to this issue by news about mass rape Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. As Amnesty International (AI) mentions, in 1992, Bosnian Muslim and Croat women were detained by Bosnian Serb Forces in the town of Foca, in the former Yugoslavia, and these women were raped every night. Besides, these women were denied medical care for the injuries from sexual abuse and beatings. In 2001, at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, three Bosnian Serb men were convicted of 33 war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the rape of Bosnian Muslim women in Foca (Amnesty International 2007).

Using rape as a weapon of war has also been used in Afghanistan, Algeria, East Timor, Liberia, Uganda, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and elsewhere. The forms of sexual violence differ and can be extreme. It includes rape and torture of women in front of the husbands and other family members, the use of rifles, and other things for insertion, rapes of pregnant women which lead to miscarriages, the mutilation of breasts and other genital organs, mass rapes and other atrocities against women (UNRISD 2005: 215).

Research contends that there are three meanings of rape in war. The first meaning is the 'booty principle' of war. According to this principle, the victor continues to use violence against women one or two more months after the war has ended. The second meaning of rape in war is to humiliate the men of that nation as they can not protect their women. Finally, the last explanation is 'male bonding'. Here, women and also men fall victim to systematic rapes and gang rapes in order to protect the cohesion, the bonding among males (see Cockburn 2004: 36).

Rape is not only used for torture and to degrade the enemy. It is also used as a strategy aiming at 'ethnic cleansing', like in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia (UNRISD 2005: 215). Rape as a strategy for 'ethnic cleansing' has two dimensions. The first one has the aim of impregnating women to have children who belong to the same nationality as the perpetrators. The second aim is to force the community to flee and thus to "cleanse" the area from a specific ethnic group (Lindsey 2004: 24).

The statistics of rape in war are not easy to obtain because of it is associated with feelings of deep shame. The victims fear to be stigmatized within their community and also to be found by the perpetrator. For example, Iraqi rape victims experienced divorce or were even killed (UNRISD 2005: 215). There are no accurate data on rape in war, but it is estimated that in the 1992–95 conflict 20,000 to 50,000 Bosnian Muslim women were raped by Serb soldiers (Watts/Zimmerman 2002: 1236).

Women are not only subjected to sexual assault and rape by enemy soldiers, but also by UN peacekeepers and by people working for non-governmental organizations (NGOs). According to a UNHCR and Save the Children report, in West Africa refugee girl children from Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, between 13 and 18 years of age, were sexually exploited by male aid workers who were employed by international and national NGOs and by the UN (Hynes 2004). As the former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women stated, women were subjected to sexual abuse and rape by UN peacekeepers in Kosovo, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, Cambodia and Bosnia (Coomaraswamy 2001).

2.1.2 Forced Marriage, Sexual Slavery and Forced Domestic Labor

Sexual slavery, i.e., keeping women in camps and forcing them to provide sexual services to soldiers, are other forms of violence against women during conflicts. Sometimes the women and girls are forced to marry a soldier, be his domestic servant, sexual slave and also move with him from one region to another until the conflict ends. These forced marriages are defined as "enslavement" by the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Coomaraswamy 2001).

The most striking example of 'forced marriages' are the 'comfort women' who were recruited from Korea, China, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia by the Japanese Army. It is estimated that 200,000 to 350,000 girls and young women were used as 'comfort women' during the 1930s and the Second World War. These women experienced very extreme forms of sexual abuse. At the end of the war, most of them were executed or forced to commit suicide; only less than 10 per cent survived (Hynes 2004). In Sudan, women and girls were also forced to be sexual slaves and domestic servants in the civil war between the North and the South of the country. The estimates show a huge variance and range from 5,000 to 100,000 (Lamb et al. 2004: 48).

2.1.3 Mortality, Loss and Widowhood

Because men are usually the direct targets in war, the death toll of men in violent conflict is said to be higher than women's, but it is also argued that the number of deaths and injuries of women in conflicts may be higher than it is generally assumed. The loss of family members mean the loss of loved ones, the loss of protection, the loss of the breadwinner and the loss of the household. For example, in Bosnia 92 per cent of the missing people are male, in Kosovo it is 90 per cent (Lindsey 2004: 30f.).

It is estimated that in war-torn societies, up to 30 per cent of the population are widows. These women have to overcome emotional and psychological pain due to the loss of husbands, fathers, sons and brothers. In addition, they also have to take care of the economic, nutrition and health care needs of the dependent family members such as children and the elderly people (UNRISD 2005: 214). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Mozambique, Angola, and Somalia, the majority of the women in the population are widows. 70 per cent of the Rwandan children are supported by their mothers, grandmothers or older sisters. It is estimated that 58,500 households are headed by girls. These widows either remarry or not, face discrimination in law and custom, extreme poverty and violence (Hynes 2004).

2.1.4 Disability of Women and the Difficulty to Access Health Care

It is estimated that there are more than 100 mio. anti-personnel landmines and unexploded ordnance that lie unmarked in 90 countries. It is assumed that between 15,000 to 20,000 people have been maimed or killed by these weapons. The majority of these people, approximately 70 per cent of them, are civilians. Women and girls are particularly affected as they are the ones who mostly do the work in the fields. In the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region women and girls constitute about 35 per cent of the mine victims. When fetching fodder for the animals, crossing agricultural fields or just carrying out daily activities the fall victim to these weapons (Hynes 2004).

In some cases, women are even used as mine detectors by the soldiers. As a victim of a mine accident, a woman has little chance to get married; and if she is married, she cannot perform the tasks of a mother or a wife, she has difficulties obtaining health care because the doctors are mostly male in those areas and most of the victims are divorced by their husbands after the accident. For example, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, because of the denied and delayed access to hospitals, 52 women gave birth and 19 women and 29 newborn infants died in military checkpoints in Occupied Palestinian Territory between 2000 and 2002 (Ertürk 2005a: 9). In addition, the surviving women have to deal with the

trauma of disability and the responsibility for their family (Lindsey 2004: 29).

2.1.5 Child Soldiers

According to the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers study of 2001, in 178 countries child soldiers, i.e., soldiers under 18 years of age, were found in the military, armed groups, militia or paramilitary groups (see Amnesty International 2004a: 32). 40 per cent of the child soldiers around the world are girls and the majority of them are also providing sexual services for their superiors and male combatants (OCHA/IRIN 2005).

2.1.6 Women's Active Participation in Conflict

Women are not only the victims of the war, but also the supporters of the fighting groups in their own country. For example in Canada and the United States, women can serve in every branch including combat branches in the military. Women are also actively joining fighting forces in liberation struggles as in El Salvador, Guatemala, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Palestine (Mazurana et al. 2005: 2f.). In El Salvador, women participated in the civil war as active members and 30 per cent of the combatants and 40 per cent of the revolutionary leaderships in the early years of the conflict were women. On the other hand, in Guatemala although the exact number is uncertain, it is estimated that 15 per cent of the combatants of the officially demobilized forces were women (Ertürk 2004).

Women usually tend to join the military or armed groups in order to be treated as equals and to be given the same rights as men. But these women and girls often find themselves as sexual slaves who are forced to take contraceptives or forced into abortion (Amnesty International 2004b: 59f.). As data collected in 2004 from Liberia show, 73 per cent of the women and girls experienced some forms of sexual violence in the fighting forces (OCHA/IRIN 2005: 185). Not only in irregular fighting forces, but also in regular armies women face sexual assaults. Between 2001 and 2003, at least 92 rapes were reported among the 43,000 US Air Force troops stationed in the Pacific (Amnesty International 2004a: 31).

The experience of female combatants in post-conflict situations differs. They cannot go back to their traditional roles in their families and communities because of their specific experiences and also they face suspicion and rejection from their families and communities because of their active involvement in warfare (Salem-Pickartz 2004: 42).

2.2 *Indirect Impacts*

Although there are direct deaths because of the flight and population disruption among women, there are also indirect deaths due to hunger, exposure, exhaustion, infection or epidemic disease, injury and trauma (UNRISD 2005: 213f.). The other indirect impacts of war on women can be 'honor killings', 'female genital mutilation' (FGM), HIV/AIDS and other sex associated vulnerabilities, and suicide.

2.2.1 HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STD)

During war, as a consequence of rape, HIV/AIDS and other types of STD are spreading. Sexually transmitted infection risks are two to five times higher for soldiers than for civilians. In conflict times this ratio even comes close to fifty times because combatants are involved in the sexual exploitation of women and they rather regularly meet prostitutes (Rehn/Sirleaf 2002: 52). With mass rape, the risk of infection increases dramatically.

The genocide in Rwanda that looks like a thing from the very distant past still continues to take lives because of the spread of HIV/AIDS. "A woman who was raped and infected with the virus became a potential source for transmission for any future sexual partner; her subsequent children would almost certainly die; and the chance or likelihood of the same women surviving is slim (...) so the HIV/AIDS is a 'three-pronged weapon'." (Amnesty International 2005a: 5) In Rwanda, it is estimated that no less than half a million women were raped and 67 per cent of them were infected with HIV/AIDS (Ertürk 2005b: 14).

2.2.2 Honor Killings

The 2003 US-led war in Iraq has had many consequences for women. Prostitution, rape, abduction and trafficking in women have increased since April 2003. Because of the rape of the Iraqi women by American soldiers or just the suspicion of such an act Iraqi women become victims of 'honor killings' (Hynes 2004).

2.2.3 Health Problems due to Chemical Weapons

Biological, nuclear and chemical weapons also affect women's health seriously; women especially experience miscarriages and birth defects in children (Lindsey 2004: 29). In Vietnam, the victims of chemical weapons have suffered disabilities related to their reproductive organs and have given birth to disabled children. So, not only the direct victims, but also the generation

yet unborn at the time of the armed conflict suffer from chemical weapons (Coomaraswamy 2001: 15).

3 The Situation of Women in Post-Conflict Conditions

Not only during the conflict but also in post-conflict environments women are more vulnerable than men. Usually, women are more affected by unemployment and more often than not become prostitutes to make a living. The 'internally displaced women' and the 'refugee women' also suffer more than men and they have special needs in the camps for example in their menstruation periods or they need special health services for their gynecological problems. The increased domestic violence after the war is another problem for women. Early marriages, trafficking in women and the situation of rape children are additional problems that women face after the conflict. In other words, although the conflict ends, the problems that women face do not vanish parallel to this.

3.1 Economic Responsibilities

The loss of the male head of the household and the income he has generated implies that women and also children have to assume new economic roles. Women's workloads as providers and caregivers increase with these new economic roles. As the majority in the marginalized workforce, in times of conflict, women are the first ones that become unemployed or underemployed. This situation puts women and girls in a risky position and makes them easy targets for prostitution, trafficking and begging (Mazurana et al. 2005: 5–7).

3.2 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees

As a consequence of intimidation, terror, murder, sexual violence and displacement the number of households headed by women and children increases. Indeed, most of these women are war widows because the adolescent and adult males in the family have died in the course the conflict (Mazurana et al. 2005: 6). UNHCR estimated that the total number of displaced people due to armed conflict was 34 mio. in the year 2004. 9.3 mio. of them were refugees and 25 mio. IDPs (OCHA/IRIN 2005: 185). The overwhelming majority of these 34 mio. people were women. According to data for the year 2001, 80 per cent of the world's refugee and IDPs were women and children (Mazurana et al. 2005: 8).

There is a difference between being a refugee and an IDP. While the refugee's assistance and protection are guaranteed by international law, the IDPs have no institutional or legal mechanisms for assistance. Yet, the situation of women in both IDPs and refugee camps is not safe. In the camps, women do not have adequate security and support. In addition, there is not enough female staff and officers and, even worse, there is some sexual exploitation by the peacekeepers (Rehn/Sirleaf 2002: 23–25). In fact, women have to sell their bodies to these peacekeepers just to survive and protect their family members (Willenz 2005: 316).

3.3 Increased Domestic Violence

It is well-known that domestic violence is a world-wide problem in peace times. But its presence in or after conflicts is usually overlooked. There are many factors that support domestic violence during the conflict, such as the presence of weapons, the experienced violence by the male family members and the reflection of it to women and children, the lack of jobs, shelters and basic services and economic difficulties. Because men both exerted, witnessed and experienced violence during the conflict they often continue to use violence in their relations to their family members after the conflict in their homes. For Israel, e.g., it is argued that combatants have difficulties to show non-violent behavior after the conflict and the domestic violence increased with the militarization in society. On the other hand, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, men who were detained by Israeli soldiers, have used the same interrogation tactics they experienced in detainment in their relations to the members of their family. As a consequence of this and because of the unemployment, the overcrowded living-conditions in the camps and the experience of bulldozed houses, domestic violence including incest, rape and suicide has increased (Rehn/Sirleaf 2002: 16f.).

It is estimated that in the US domestic violence in military families is three times of that in civilian families (Amnesty International 2004b: 52). In 1996, a Pentagon study found that from 1991 to 1995 more than 50,000 active-duty service members hit or physically abused their spouses and in 2002, in a six-week period, several women were killed by their husbands who were members of the US Special Forces in North Carolina. Three of them had just returned from special operations in Afghanistan (Amnesty International 2004a: 18).

3.4 Trafficking in Women and Children

The combination of prewar inequality, war economies and criminal acts and organizations, destruction and destabilization factors puts women and girls at high risk of falling victim to trafficking. Trafficking also involves deception, coercion, forced sex, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation and forced prostitution. As a consequence of these extreme situations, women face physical and mental health problems and also unwanted pregnancies (Mazurana et al. 2005: 7). It is estimated that in 2000 700,000 to 2 mio. women and children were trafficked across international borders. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 750 to 1,000 women are trafficked each year (Vlachova 2005: 300). The age of these women is usually between 19 and 24. 75 per cent of them left their home under false pretensions, i.e., with the false promise of good job offers, and the rest of them was kidnapped or voluntarily agreed to become prostitutes (Rehn/Sirleaf 2002: 15).

3.5 Early Marriages of Girl Children and Rape Children

Because of the decrease in household resources girl children marry at an even younger age, sometimes even with the intention to protect them against attacks by military and rebel forces. In some regions, e.g., in Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia, these young females get married even well before their menstruation sets in (Mazurana et al. 2005: 6). As discussed above, rape is used as a weapon of war and forced pregnancy as a form of 'ethnic cleansing' was used as a military strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda and also occurred in Bangladesh, Liberia and Uganda. In these cases, women who had been raped and became pregnant were imprisoned until the children were born. Up to 20,000 women were raped in Kosovo and many of them had babies from these rapes. Besides these rapes in the conflict, many children are also the offspring of secret relationships with peacekeepers and other international personnel. After the conflicts ended, those rape children and their mothers are in desperate need of social services, medical and psychological care and economic support, but for many societies the rape children symbolize the trauma of the nation and society prefers to neglect their needs (Rehn/Sirleaf 2002: 17f.).

4 Women in the Peace-Building Process

Although armed conflict and post-conflict situations affect women deeply, women are notably absent from peace talks and relevant decision-making processes (Mazurana et al. 2005: 3). This situation was recently deplored by

women's groups. The UN Security Council reaffirmed the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts as well as in the peace-building processes afterwards and stressed the importance of women's equal participation in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. Thereby, this was framed as a responsibility of the international community (Coomaraswamy 2001: 20).

There are important instruments which conceive violence against women in conflict as a war crime. First of all, the International Criminal Court (ICC) defined rape, sexual slavery and trafficking, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization and other forms of sexual violence and persecution as crimes against humanity and as a war crimes in international and non-international armed conflict (OCHA/IRIN 2005: 197; Amnesty International 2005b: 62). Secondly, the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights defined violence against women as a violation of human rights (Ertürk 2004). In the same year, the UN's Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women was adopted in which all forms of violence against women in armed conflicts were included into the general scope of the declaration (Amnesty International 2005b: 33). Thirdly, the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action (1995) included armed conflict as one of its critical areas of concern.

With the instruments above, women's victimization in conflict was well acknowledged, but the participation of women in the peace-building processes was still deficient. Finally, in 2000, the Security Council Resolution 1,325 Women, Peace and Security was adopted. Article 1 "urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution and peace process" (Ertürk 2004). The participation of women in the peace-building processes is crucial because on the one hand it helps to advance the case of gender equality and non-discrimination of women and on the other hand it is important to eradicate violence against women in conflict and post-conflict situations (Amnesty International 2004b: 64).

5 Conclusion

As a conclusion, it can be argued that violence against women in zones of conflict continues if the actors do not change their behavior. These actors are the protected ones – the women and the children –, the protectors – men –, and the peace negotiators – again men. If more women join the armed forces, reach positions at relevant international decision-making levels and participate in peace negotiations, the violence against women may decrease both during and post-conflict situations. The importance of more women in armed

forces is to deconstruct the masculinist and violent character of the military and I believe if the number of women in the armed forces reaches a 'critical mass', i.e., a per centage high enough to result in influential positions in the decision-making process[1], the structure of the military can be changed. Also, the sexual harassment that happens in most of the armed forces around the world may decrease with the increased number of women in the military. But the main point is not merely increasing the number of women in the military; the important point is increased gender sensitivity of these women. If the women within the armed forces are gender-blind and merely reproduce the patriarchal norms of the society, nothing will be different for women in and after conflict. Women in the military should be gender sensitive in order to protect women's human rights in conflicts and peace negotiations. If more gender sensitive women participate in peace negotiations, the experiences of the women during and after the conflict cannot be overlooked and the specific needs of these women can better be served.

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1 More information about 'the critical mass' can be found in Kanter 1977.

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About the Authors

Apelt, Maja (born in 1963), PD Dr. rer. pol., Assistant Professor at the Helmut Schmidt-University, University of the Bundeswehr Hamburg (Germany).

Bosch, Jolanda (born in 1967), Dr., Assistant Professor at the Netherlands Defense Academy, Breda (Netherlands).

Carreiras, Helena (born in 1965), Ph.D., Assistant Professor at the Sociology Department of ISCTE – Lisbon University Institute (Portugal).

Dittmer, Cordula (born in 1977), M.A., Ph.D. Candidate at the Center for Conflict Studies, Philipps-University Marburg (Germany).

Feitz, Lindsey (born in 1978), Master of Arts, American Studies, Ph.D. Candidate in the American Studies Program at the University of Kansas, Lawrence (USA).

Fiala, Irene Jung (born in 1965), Ph.D. Sociology, Assistant Professor of Sociology at Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, Edinboro, Pennsylvania (USA).

Kümmel, Gerhard (born in 1964), Dr. phil., Senior Researcher at the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences, Strausberg (Germany).

Kuloglu, Ceyda (born in 1979), Ph.D. Candidate in Sociology, Research Assistant in the Faculty of Communication at Baskent University, Ankara (Turkey).

Maninger, Stephan (born in 1967), Dr. phil., Lecturer at the Historical Institute, Jena (Germany).

Moelker, René (born in 1960), Dr., Associate Professor at the Netherlands Defense Academy, Breda (Netherlands).

Nagel, Joane (born in 1977), Ph.D., Sociology, University Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas, Lawrence (USA).

Zayed AL-Oraimi, Suaad (born in 1961), Assistant Professor at the United Arab Emirates University, Al-Ain (United Arab Emirates).