SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF EUROPE

ATSUKO ICHIJO

Foreword by
ANTHONY D. SMITH

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Foreword

In 1882, Ernest Renan, after pointing out that nations are not eternal, predicted: 'A European confederation will very probably replace them. But such is not the law of the century in which we are living' (1992: 41). Nor, in fact, of the next century. The question posed by the present study is whether the time is now ripe for Renan's prediction to be realised; or whether the nation, in his words, remains the primary guarantee of liberty. This is the fundamental issue addressed by Atsuko Ichijo's rich, in-depth study of one such European nation's changing sense of collective identity.

Many scholars have pointed to the intertwining of the global and the local, of how vast globalising trends make for an interdependent world, on which new localisms flourish and small-scale communities thrive. A similar paradox can be observed in the case of nationalism. The world is full of jostling, contentious nations, and the bitter sounds of ethnic wars; yet, in one corner of the world, in 'old Europe', there is a conscious drive to put aside past national hatreds and construct something novel, a pooled supranational sovereignty that will draw to itself the loyalties and affections of Europe's peoples, which had previously been almost wholly devoted to the national state.

Almost wholly, because there have always been multiple, overlapping identities – of class, region, gender, religion and the like – which could become salient in crises; hence, nations and nationalism never succeeded in becoming the monolith that their most fanatical devotees desired. This is one of the points that come over very clearly in the Scottish case, as Dr Ichijo's striking findings confirm. Nevertheless, in political terms, the nation still represents the largest and most potent of the various identities and communities prevalent in the modern world; and nowhere is this more so than in an 'old' nation like Scotland.

Why Scotland? The Scottish case is vital, argues Dr Ichijo, for three reasons. The first is its European stance. From being cool towards Europe in the l960s and l970s, the Scots have opened themselves up to

the idea of European integration, if always with some reservations. The same is true of the Scottish National Party. It has embraced the idea of Europe, not least because 'Europe' affords a counterbalance to the overwhelming power of England, the Scots' traditional rival and point of reference.

But there is more to it than mere power play. There is, in the second place, a profound modernisation of Scottish elites, and especially of its intelligentsia. We witness something of the same process elsewhere – in Catalonia and, above all, in Quebec. This is a secular development of polycentric nationalism: a nationalism that is open to outside influences, which feed the sense of national identity. It is in this context that the majority of Scottish elites are pro-European; that is, on cultural and historical grounds, even more than for economic and political reasons.

Herein lies the profound originality of Dr Ichijo's argument and research, and the third reason why the Scottish case is so paradigmatic today. Not only do her findings reveal the varied justifications and reasonings by which the intelligentsia balance their sense of Scottish identity with a wider European outlook and identification. They also demonstrate how those reasonings and justifications are based on deeper historical accounts of the particular nature of the Scottish past, going far back to the medieval epoch and the Wars of Independence. In other words, any reassessment of national identity is intimately tied to history, history as seen through the lens of the present, but always corrected by historical research into the past.

It is this dual vision that makes Dr Ichijo's book so fascinating. With incisive clarity and uncompromising integrity, her analysis probes the various levels of historical understanding present in the current relationship between Scotland and Europe. But, it turns out, 'Europe' is only a key by which the multiple understandings of Scotland's past can be unlocked. When present-day Scots intellectuals appeal to the Auld Alliance and Scotland's many relations with medieval and Renaissance Europe, they are simultaneously narrating a tale about Scotland's 'deep past', its antiquity as a nation apart from England. When they cite the many new interpretations of the Scottish past in the flourishing present-day Scots historical revival, they are underlining the depth of a sense of Scottish national identity. Here, at least, the answer to Walker Connor's question, 'When is the nation?', implicitly takes us back to a pre-modern age.

This in turn lends a new confidence to the present-day reconstruction of Scottish national identity. What comes through a reading of Dr Ichijo's comprehensive and penetrating survey of

Scottish elite ideas and interpretations, is a sense of assurance about the depth and stability of Scottish national identity, which in turn is related to an entrenched sense of a distinctive national past, buttressed by successive generations of Scottish historical writing, an enterprise that continues right up to our own day. It is that sense of collective history, refracted through the prism of the present, that Dr Ichijo's fine book so admirably evokes, and because history is a crucial component of all nationalisms, her findings have a relevance far beyond the Scottish case and Europe's shores. They imply a clear answer to Renan's question about the fate of nations: that, even within a wider confederation, nations remain rooted in the landscape of modernity, feeding, and being fed by, a powerful sense of the distinctive collective past.

Professor Anthony D. Smith
London School of Economics

Series Editor's Preface

The past may be another country, but it constantly impinges upon our perceptions of the countries of the present. Not only that; the past is also constantly revisited and reconsidered in the light of changing circumstances. It is a location where selective memory can be used to make (sometimes very tendentious) statements about present identity: one thinks of the collective amnesia the French left have suffered in recent years about the role the left played in the building of the French Empire in the late nineteenth century, or the similarly ludicrous claims by nationalist Scottish politicians on occasion on radio programmes in which I have participated that 'the Scots were always opposed to the British Empire'. The national past, in such constructions, is a quarry to be mined for politically convenient fictions.

The past, in other words, is not frozen, to be revealed by the patient labours of historians as the angel is revealed in the marble. It lives on, often in distinctly garbled fashion, not least in the daily traffic of contemporary life. Of course, the most famous, and funniest, reconstruction of the popular understanding of a nation's past was Sellers and Yeatman's immortal *1066 and All That*, first published in the 1930s after extensive research in London's pubs had revealed the paucity of memorable dates in English history. This present work has a much more serious intent, but it does have a certain kinship with Sellers and Yeatman in that it explores, through the national consciousness of a number of elite individuals in Scotland, their understanding of their country's history and its relationship to the European Union.

The gravitational pull of the EU has prompted a certain amount of historical re-examination across the continent. East European countries poised to join, for instance, have been concerned to uncover a European past, not least to differentiate themselves from recent Soviet domination and the still-present significant Russian 'other'. In Scotland, of course, the significant 'other' is England, and Atsuko Ichijo's book explores the understandings of the elites' hold of Scotland's history, its relationship and union with its southern

neighbour, and of Scotland's place in Europe. That her research coincided with the period in which a Scottish parliament was being re-established, a process in which most of her respondents were intimately involved, only adds to the timeliness of her investigations. The research is a contextualised presentation of the understandings of 'Scottishness' held by those most responsible for articulating that identity at a particularly signicant moment in Scottish history.

National identity is, of course, notoriously difficult to pin down with any precision. Attempts to do so often flounder on the lack of cohesion of the subject group, or the lack of clarity of the findings. Ichijo's approach effectively deals with these difficulties by the carefully targeted nature of her respondents, and an equally carefully targeted set of enquiries. The result is a series of mental histories, maps and images, whose importance goes beyond what they reveal of Scottish national identity. They also open out a general history of Scottishness, as Ichijo explores the validity of her respondents' historical assertions. In the process, she raises important questions both about how history is understood, and about how that understanding shapes elite actions.

But this book is also important for revealing how concepts of Europe have developed amongst a particular elite group. This can be juxtaposed neatly with the discussion of Scottishness, and indeed of national identities in general. The process of nation-building at the European level fundamentally presupposes that national characteristics are *not* immutable. However, the concept of Europe is itself often essentialised in contemporary political discourse, as are the British – more generally portrayed as specifically English in the comments cited here – national characteristics commonly claimed as obstacles to more enthusiastic participation in the European project. Are national identities developing or fixed? Does the idea that Scottishness is a 'civic nationalism' square this particular circle? In other words, by posing the question of what Scottishness means within the context of European integration, Ichijo very effectively exposes the tensions within the processes by which national identities are constructed and replicated. This is therefore a significant book, which will hopefully serve s a model and comparator for subsequent work exploring similar tensions in other European countries.

Peter Catterall
London

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Section 2 of Chapter 1 'When was/is Scotland' first appeared in 'The scope of theories of nationalism: Comments on the Scottish and Japanese Experiences', *Geopolitics*, 7(2), pp. 53–74.

Needless to say, all errors in the book are my own.

Abbreviations

ASEN	Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism
BNP	British National Party
COMECON	Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (of communist nations)
CSA	Campaign for a Scottish Assembly
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EBLUL	European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMU	European Monetary Union
ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
EU	European Union
GP	General Practitioner (medical)
HMSO	Her Majesty's Stationery Office
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MORI	Market Research and Opinion International
MP	Member of Parliament (British)
MSP	Member of the Scottish Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAVSR	National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights
SEA	Single European Act
SNP	Scottish National Party
SSP	Scottish Social Party
STUC	Scottish Trades Union Congress

Introduction

QUESTION AND ISSUES

This is a study about a particular aspect of contemporary Scottish nationalism, the relationship between Scotland and Europe. It started with a simple question: 'Why can Scottish nationalists be pro-Europe?' This is the question I first encountered when completing my Master's dissertation, and which has been puzzling me for more than a decade. The question reveals the assumptions I had about nationalism; that nationalism is about securing sovereignty of the nation, that is, achieving independence, and that European integration is something that fundamentally contradicts nationalism. Since then, I have come to understand that nationalism is not exclusively about independence and that European integration is not necessarily considered to be a form of supranationalism that would undermine nation-states and nationhood.[1] The question, however, remained. After all, the Scottish National Party (SNP), which now advocates 'independence in Europe', was once known for its anti-Europe stance. The Scottish electorate also seem to have changed their attitudes towards Europe. In the 1975 EEC (European Economic Community) referendum, in which the then Labour government asked whether to continue British membership of the EEC, the proportion of the 'No' vote in Scotland was higher than in the United Kingdom as a whole. However, recent surveys have shown that the Scottish voters are now less Euro-sceptic than the British voters as a whole, as we shall see in Chapter 6. What has made them change their mind? What does this change of mind signify? The number of questions sparked by the original one only multiplies.

One can argue that there is a simple answer to my simple question: 'The Scots like Europe because it helps them to get what they want, be it independence or more autonomy from England.' This may well be the case, but it still leads to further questions. Given that what Scottish nationalism and European integration appear to strive for contradict

one another, on what basis can one construct the whole idea, that being pro-Europe is good for Scotland, and, furthermore, that it will lead to Scottish self-determination? How is it reasoned and on what basis? Have the Scottish people really changed their attitudes because of these ideas? The simple answer, in my mind, does not solve the mystery and this book is my attempt to answer these questions.

This study is guided by these concerns and has three main aims. The first aim is to identify what kinds of ideas about the relationship between Scotland and Europe have been produced and are in circulation in contemporary Scottish society. There may be some ideas which promote a pro-European stance in conjunction with a stronger sense of Scottish identity; there may also be some ideas which encourage the Scots to take up Euro-sceptical attitudes in order to protect their Scottish identity. Because any view of the relationship between Scotland and Europe contains ideas about who the Scots are and what Europe is all about, this exercise should reveal how the Scots think of themselves, what kind of images of Europe they project onto these ideas, and how these two are intertwined. These ideas should, in other words, reveal where Scotland is thought to be in time and space by the people of Scotland.

The next question, then, is 'Whose ideas do I explore?' It was decided to investigate the ideas held and expressed by the members of the intellectuals and intelligentsia in Scotland, for the following reasons. First, the general framework of this study is that of sociology of knowledge. This holds that knowledge is socially constructed and that a certain group of people, the intellectuals and intelligentsia, are the agents responsible for producing, articulating and circulating ideas in society. Second, in the study of nationalism, the intellectuals and intelligentsia are held to occupy a special position in a nationalist movement. Tom Nairn, for instance, considers nationalism as a defence mounted by the intelligentsia in the periphery against the forces of uneven development.[2] According to Nairn, the periphery intelligentsia, when threatened by the prospect of being swamped by the industrially advanced areas, would resort to populism in order to improve their positions and advocate promoting the ideal of 'our own way of doing things'. Anthony Smith contends more broadly that, while not exclusively a movement of the intelligentsia, nationalism is a response of the secular intelligentsia to the processes of modernisation.[3] Focusing on the ideas propagated by the intellectuals and intelligentsia is, therefore, an appropriate way of approaching my questions about nationalism.

Second, this study will examine the basis on which these ideas are built. Sociology of knowledge tells us that ideas do not emerge from nowhere. They are conditioned by the context within which they are

formed. After all, human beings are social as well as historical beings and what we do is constrained by when and where we live, although we have agency as individuals. Ideas produced by such beings are necessarily influenced by a number of factors in the situation where they are formed. Investigating the basis of these ideas should help us understand where contemporary Scottish society is, what the Scots are thinking, and what Scottish nationalism is.

Special attention is paid to the uses of history in the examination of these ideas, since many of the pro-European views which appear in the media or in the political discourse are accompanied by some reference to history. It is also the case that many of the Euro-sceptical views circulating in contemporary Britain are accompanied by reference to history. Needless to say, nationalism, national identity and history are intricately linked. Ernest Renan's remark about the feature of a nation – getting one's history wrong – is well-known. This book aims to provide insightful material to encourage future exploration of the issue.

Findings from my interviews are, therefore, analysed in the light of Scottish history in order to investigate how 'history' is mobilised to make sense of the present. This involves distinguishing the effect of 'official' history – a historical account of a nation which is held to be 'correct' by mainstream historians – and that of 'shared memories' or, using Anthony Smith's term, 'ethno-history', a people's understanding of their own history. As will be demonstrated later in this study, 'official' Scottish history does not necessarily offer helpful clues in examining the uses of history in contemporary Scottish nationalism. In this regard, Scottish historiography is an interesting case and deserves a few words of explanation here.

There had been a strong tradition of history writing in Scotland ever since the Middle Ages. In the eighteenth century, however, the attitudes of the Scottish intellectuals and intelligentsia to their own history underwent a substantial change and the discipline of Scottish history became almost a second-class subject. This tendency appears to have been accelerated by the introduction of a competitive examination in the recruitment procedure for the Civil Service in the late nineteenth century, which did not include Scottish history as a subject. Marinell Ash noted that after the death of Walter Scott in 1832, Scottish history writing itself lost its momentum and the Scottish literati virtually stopped writing Scottish history books.[4] She described this phenomenon as a 'strange death of Scottish history' and attributed its cause to a 'historical failure of nerve'.[5] Another historian, Colin Kidd, also noted the change in the attitudes of Scottish historians to their history.[6] Both Ash and Kidd argue, in essence, that the absence of official history

writing in Scotland in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the major reason why there was no political nationalism in Scotland in that period.[7]

Recently, however, Graeme Morton challenged this view and demonstrated that far from forgetting their past, the Scots of the nineteenth century were busy commemorating their heroes such as Robert Burns, William Wallace and Robert the Bruce.[8] He argues that there *was* Scottish nationalism in nineteenth-century Scotland, as shown in these acts of commemoration, but that it was expressed in the form of what he called 'Unionist nationalism'. We now have two opposing accounts of the situation in nineteenth-century Scotland, and this contradiction derives from the fact that these historians are looking at different histories. However, here is not the place to explore this further. The foregoing, brief description of the Scottish situation should suffice to demonstrate that the interrelationships between official history, shared memories and nationalism need to be disentangled here, a point which will be discussed further in the book's Conclusion.

Third, this book aims to evaluate the positions which these ideas occupy in contemporary Scottish society. This is not to say the reception of these ideas will be investigated. While fascinating, the question of reception is beyond the scope of this study. However, an attempt will be made to assess whether these ideas are in positions where they could exercise some influence over how people think and behave. If there is some correlation between these ideas and various manifestations of the state of contemporary Scottish society, we can at least conclude that these ideas are not divorced from the reality, and obtain some clues as to whether these ideas make any difference to the people of Scotland. This exercise touches upon another issue in the study of nationalism: the elite–mass relationship. Is nationalism another form of manipulation of the masses as some still claim? By locating these ideas in contemporary Scottish society, it is hoped to provide a fresh insight into how the elite and the rest of the population interact in a contemporary setting.

This is, therefore, an exploratory study, the focus of which is on the ideas expressed by certain elites in Scottish society, with in-depth interviews chosen as the main method of data collection. The merits of in-depth interviews are numerous as are the shortcomings, but here they have been chosen because they are a way of actively collecting new and narrowly focused evidence which would otherwise be unavailable to the researcher. The method also allows the researcher to explore different levels of meaning in a way that produces rich and detailed material.[9]

In-depth interviews also appear to offer another, more personal advantage in carrying out this research. Since I am an outsider, that is, neither Scottish, nor British, nor European, the interviewees would have to explain what they think the Scoto-European relationship is, or should be, and justify it without assuming any familiarity with this issue on the part of the researcher. In other words, the respondents would have a different expectation as to how much understanding of the issues they share with me as opposed to someone, say, from England or Wales, who may be expected to be familiar with the Scottish issues. It is possible that, as a result of this, respondents would make an extra effort to clarify their thoughts when expressing them, thus potentially making the data gathered in this way less ambiguous than it would otherwise be. Another advantage of being an outsider is that no suspicion is aroused on the respondents' part. They would assume I had no axe to grind and possibly be more forthcoming in their response.

There are, of course, also disadvantages to being an outsider when carrying out interviews. The outsider might fail to recognise the importance of certain information given by the respondent through lack of familiarity with the issues. An attempt has been made to avoid this pitfall to a certain extent by familiarising myself with the background before the interviews. Also, locating the findings from the interviews in a broader context by comparing and contrasting them with available literature, survey reports and opinion polls has enabled critical examination of the content of the interviews.

There are three groups of issues to be investigated here. The first concerns Scottish nationalism and identity. The first question here is that of the demarcation of the Scottish nation, that is, 'Who are the Scots?' A further related question is, 'When was the Scottish nation?', which inevitably leads us to review the 'modernist' account of the rise of nations. The background to the emergence of the idea of 'Scotland and Europe' in Scottish nationalism also requires attention. On the basis of these discussions, we hope here to establish how the Scottish people see themselves at present: something that is inevitably reflected in their views of the relationship between Scotland and Europe.

A second set of questions needs to be asked under the heading of 'Europe'. One assumption underlying the original question is that the word 'Europe' refers to the European Union (EU). Is this the case? To a non-European such as myself, the word 'Europe' signifies a geographical and historical entity, an understanding which seems to be shared by Europeans as well. Why, then, in this context, do I, and for that matter, many Scots, assume 'Europe' means the European Union?

To clarify this point it will be necessary to investigate what kinds of idea about Europe have been formed and circulated. Without first identifying ideas of 'Europe', one cannot evaluate the ideas about the Scoto-European relationship. These ideas will therefore be compared with and contrasted to contemporary empirical developments in order to carry out such a critical assessment.

Third, theoretical implications of the findings need to be addressed. So far, the role of the elite in nationalism, uses of history in a nationalist project, history and nationhood, and the elite–mass relationship in nationalism have all been touched on. These questions will be tackled throughout the book and discussed further in the Conclusion.

Focusing on these issues means omitting some other aspects of the Scoto-European relationship. The task here is to identify, explore and evaluate ideas about the relationship between Scotland and Europe. The reception of these ideas, on the other hand, by the Scottish people as a whole, and by the peoples of Europe generally, is beyond the scope of this study. Although the uses of history in articulating ideas about the current Scoto-European relationship are relevant, the aim here is not to narrate, debunk or deconstruct Scottish history. Nor is this study an account of the ideological development of Scottish nationalism, or of the history of European integration. In addition, the possible economic effects and legal implications of the furthering of European integration are also beyond the scope of this book, although the general influence that the European project has exercised on the member states will be examined.

This is one of the first studies to investigate the interrelationship between contemporary Scottish nationalism and the processes of European integration. It is also the first of its kind to focus on the state of contemporary Scottish national identity in relation to 'Europe'. In this regard, it supplies crucial material for further research into contemporary Scottish nationalism. Furthermore, this study aims to make a contribution to the study of contemporary nationalism in Europe by establishing a framework for future comparative research. It is contended here that focusing on the uses of history is vital to the understanding of the relationship between nationalism and European integration. The proposed framework complements other approaches focusing on institutions and the mechanisms of political mobilisation that are increasingly employed by scholars of political science. This framework could also be used to investigate the nationalisms of the Catalans, Corsicans, Flemish as well as other cases in Europe. On the theoretical level, this analysis demonstrates the importance of possessing a 'rich' (that is, well-documented, eventful and varied) history and

the key contribution made by the intellectuals and intelligentsia in successfully redefining and maintaining national identity.

Before proceeding with the main argument, the key terms used in this analysis need to be defined and present outlines of Scottish history and the history of European integration presented in order to provide the necessary background to the research. The following two sections will, therefore, be devoted to these matters, followed by a final section describing the overall structure of the book.

DEFINITIONS

So far, there has been a risk of some confusion by discussing certain concerns without defining what is meant by various key terms. It is now essential to clarify these terms before moving on to further discussion.

Defining key terms in the study of nationalism is as problematic as in the social sciences in general, if not more so. As Walker Connor pointed out decades ago, the interchangeable use of the terms 'nation' and 'state' has caused serious confusion over what nationalism is all about.[10] However, the problem is not confined to this. Because most of the terms used in the study of nationalism are taken from everyday language, they require clarification before they are employed in a scholarly discussion. Since the purpose here is not to discuss the definition of nations and nationalism in detail, this clarification process is limited to defining the terms which will be employed here.

Three such terms are 'nation', 'nationalism' and 'national identity'. It would also be useful to clarify how the word 'Europe' is used here. It is proposed to define the key terms from the standpoint of an 'ethno-symbolist' perspective, which regards pre-modern ethnic ties as important in understanding the formation of modern nations and nationalism. It is hoped to demonstrate the benefit of employing the ethno-symbolist perspective in this analysis. Here, the definition of a 'nation' proposed by Anthony Smith is adopted. He defines a nation as 'a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members'.[11] The most important aspect of a nation is that it is a community, not a collectivity under a single government, and that it has a certain political agenda for the benefit of all its members.

The advantage of adopting this definition over so-called 'statist' or 'objective' ones is obvious in the Scottish case. The scholars of nationalism have come to the understanding that restricting the use of the

term 'nation' to those which have achieved their own statehood does not make much sense. The contemporary world is indeed the world of nation-states, but the reality is not as tidy as that. It is far more likely to be the case that a state contains more than one nation than that it consists entirely of one nation. In order to capture the complexity of the world we live in, it is only reasonable to reject the statist definition.

Smith defines 'nationalism' as 'an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential "nation"'.[12] However, here the beginning of this definition will be amended to 'an ideology and movement', in order to highlight the fact that nationalism is not only an ideology but also a political, social and cultural movement which pursues this ideology. Nationalism is, therefore, not loyalty to the state, which some may classify as 'patriotism',[13] nor is it only a matter of psychology, as Anthony Giddens suggests.[14] There is a further issue which concerns the Scottish case. Do we have to distinguish nationalism of the established nation-state which may be multinational from that of the nations which are not yet independent? Although this could have a significant implication in some comparative works such as comparing Scottish and British nationalism, for instance, the distinction would probably add little to this study. Therefore, the term nationalism is employed throughout the book to refer to the subject.[15] 'National identity' is defined as the self-awareness of belonging to a specific nation by its members, and as an identification with the nation and its manifestations.

Finally, the use of the word 'Europe' in this context needs clarification. As investigated in Chapter 3, the word 'Europe' has many different connotations. Since the term 'Europe' is so multifaceted, elusive and ambiguous, it is difficult to propose an a priori definition beyond geography and history. It is proposed here to draw out some general definitions from the respondents' ideals of 'Europe', and to employ the word 'Europe' to refer to the processes of European integration and everything that is associated with it. This term is further defined when required in the course of discussion.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SCOTLAND AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Besides these working definitions, it is also necessary to locate this research in its historical context. Scotland occupies the northern part of the islands of Great Britain and is located at the north-western edge of western Europe. It is surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean on its west and

north sides and by the North Sea on its east. Scotland borders with England on its south side, roughly along the line of the Cheviot Hills. The area of Scotland is 78,722 square kilometres and, as of 2001, just over 5 million people (5,062,011) live there.

Scotland has a long history.[16] The surviving physical evidence suggests that there was a settlement in the area now called Scotland which probably goes back to the beginning of the first millennium BC. The oldest written record about Scotland was compiled by the Romans when they advanced their army as far as the Firth of Tay between 79–80 AD. The Romans tried to conquer Scotland, then called Caledonia, and failed, and built two walls, the Hadrian and Antonine Walls, to contain the northern tribes in the second century.

Between the third and ninth centuries, there was movement of peoples on a large scale. The Picts, the Scots, who migrated from Ireland and gave their name to the land, the Angles, the Britons and the Scandinavians came to settle in Scotland, fought each other and eventually formed a single kingdom called Alba. During this period, Christianity was introduced into Scotland and many inhabitants of Scotland became Christian thanks to the work of such saints as Ninian and Columba. The Kingdom of Alba was finally consolidated by the end of the eleventh century.

The Scottish kingdom faced a crisis of survival in the late thirteenth century when, in 1286, Alexander III died suddenly without leaving an heir. Edward I of England immediately sought to take advantage of this opportunity to expand his rule to Scotland, and what is now called the Wars of Independence (1296–1328) began. During this period, Scotland produced many heroes and episodes which were to be long cherished by the Scottish people. William Wallace was said to have led an army of 'common folks' to defeat the tyrannical English king in 1297. He was made the Guardian of the Realm but was later captured by the English and beheaded in London. Robert the Bruce then took up the struggle and managed to maintain the independence of the kingdom. The Battle of Bannockburn in 1314, in which Robert the Bruce led the Scottish army to victory, was one of the defining moments in the history of Scotland. This period also produced a celebrated document often called the Declaration of Arbroath. This is, in fact, a letter to the Pope written by the Scottish nobles, clergymen and commoners to assert Scottish independence from the English king in 1320. As will be shown later, this document is still very much alive in the memory of the Scottish people today.

Medieval Scotland was relatively stable and enjoyed a close relationship with the continental countries, such as France and the

Netherlands. There was a military alliance with France (the Auld Alliance), trade with the continent flourished and intense intellectual and cultural exchanges took place. For instance, Mary, Queen of Scots (1542–87) was raised in the French court and was married to a French king. She returned to Scotland on the death of her husband to face the most turbulent years of Scottish history. John Knox returned from Geneva in 1559 and became the driving force of the Reformation. In 1560, the reformed Confession of Faith was approved by the Parliament and the Presbyterian Church was established. Mary, a Catholic queen, was finally deposed and fled to England in 1568. She was later beheaded by Elizabeth I of England in 1587. It was around this period that the divide between the Lowlands and Highlands of Scotland deepened.

On the death of Elizabeth I of England in 1603, James VI of Scotland succeeded to the English throne as James I. During the reign of the Stuarts, the pressure on Scotland to unite with England grew stronger. Meanwhile, the two kingdoms experienced profound conflicts with an Episcopal monarch (Charles I) and a Catholic monarch (James VII), which resulted in two revolutions. The revolutionary years were ones of confusion. After the execution of Charles I, the Scottish Parliament declared his son as Charles II, but the Scottish army was defeated by Cromwell. Charles II fled and Scotland was incorporated into the Commonwealth. Within a decade, the British monarchy was restored but later Catholic James VII (James II for England) was at odds with both England and Scotland. In 1688, the English Parliament offered the throne to the Protestant William of Orange who had married Mary, the daughter of James VII, and in the following year the Scottish throne was offered to William and Mary.

It was during the reign of Queen Anne that the Treaty of Union between Scotland and England was passed and the Scottish Parliament voted itself out of existence in 1707. Theoretically speaking, in 1707, both Scottish and English Parliaments were abolished and a new British Parliament was born; in reality, the Scottish Parliament was absorbed by the English one. The Union was unpopular in Scotland, and opposition to it reached its peak in the form of the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745, in which Charles Edward Stuart, grandson of James VII, led the army to regain the crowns of Scotland and England. The Jacobite Rebellion split Scotland, especially between the Protestant Lowlands and Catholic Highlands, a divide which profoundly affected Scottish society.[17] After the rebellion was crushed, highland society was penalised by the British government in the form of a ban on playing bagpipes and wearing the kilt. More importantly,

highland society was affected by the Highland Clearances which forced many highlanders to emigrate to make space for sheep.

By the latter half of the eighteenth century, Scotland began to see the benefit of the Union, especially in its participation in the British Empire. Scottish trade and commerce grew as did its manufacturing industry. The Scottish Enlightenment produced world-famous scholars, and Scottish scientists and engineers were at the forefront of science and technology. By the nineteenth century, Glasgow was known as the 'Workshop of the Empire' and Edinburgh became the 'Athens of the North'.

One of the main features of nineteenth-century Scotland was rapid urbanisation. The cities grew and a new set of problems such as housing and public hygiene emerged which could not adequately be covered by the existing Poor Law. This was by no means a problem unique to Scotland: in the rest of Britain similar developments had taken place. At the same time, a long-term effect of the change in the industrial structure was beginning to be noticed in Scotland as well as in the rest of Britain. One of the responses to such problems from the government was electoral reform. A succession of Reform Acts were passed to extend the franchise and increase the number of Scottish MPs. The Scottish voters were loyal supporters of the Liberal Party until the First World War, which was a threshold for two reasons. First, it killed the Scottish Home Rule Bill which the Liberal government proposed as part of its 'home-rule all round' policy. Second, it coincided with the rise of the working class, whose power was repeatedly demonstrated in the form of industrial actions, demonstrations and rent strikes. This was when the image of Glasgow as the city of the working class became widespread, as seen in the legend of 'Red Clydeside'.[18] The First World War left Scottish industry crippled and before Scotland could recover, the Second World War broke out.

The story of Scotland after the Second World War is one of decline and struggle to transform itself into a new society with modern industry. The government's National Plan could not save Scottish industry and for the first time in the history of Scottish politics, the Scottish National Party became a credible force in the 1960s. The discovery of North Sea oil fuelled the demand for a devolved Parliament. The result of the 1979 devolution referendum, however, could not meet the requirement (the so-called '40 per cent rule') set in the Scotland Bill and a Scottish assembly failed to materialise. The Labour government was brought down. While Scottish voters repeatedly voted for Labour, a Conservative government remained in power for 18 years until May 1997. The demand for home rule and for independence grew while the

Tories were in office. The newly elected Labour government held a referendum on the establishment of a Scottish Parliament on 11 September 1997 and the result was a convincing 'Yes'. The government swiftly introduced a bill to establish a Scottish Parliament. The first elections for the Scottish Parliament were held in 1999 and the first Parliament sat in the same year. It is with this recent period, from the early 1980s to the present, that this book is principally concerned.

The history of European integration is, in contrast, short. The current form of European integration started as the Schuman Plan of 1950, an initiative put forward by Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet to pool French and German coal and steel production, ostensibly as a means of avoiding a future war between the two countries. On the basis of this document, the Treaty of Paris was drafted in 1951, which led to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community with France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy in 1952. The agreement was expanded into the Treaty of Rome of 1957 which created the European Economic Community (EEC) with the purpose of establishing a single market in which the free movement of capital, goods and people would be guaranteed. The EEC continued to expand its membership, including the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986, all within 30 years. Meanwhile, the project of European integration itself went through successive reforms and its desire to establish a single European market was reaffirmed in the Single European Act of 1986. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 confirmed the move towards political union through the establishment of a monetary union by 1999. In 1992, Sweden, Austria and Finland also joined the European Union, bringing the total number of member states to 15. At the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, ten countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) concluded membership negotiations and the European Union is set to expand to 25 members in 2004. What started as a means of avoiding a further war between European countries developed into an initiative to bring about a single market and eventual political union. As if to confirm the unalterable direction to political union, coins and banknotes of the European single currency, the euro, came into circulation on 1 January 2002. The euro was in fact launched as a 'virtual' currency a few years ago but until 1 January 2002 national currencies were used in everyday life across what is now called the 'eurozone'. In order to introduce the euro, the so-called 'euro-12', 12 member states which joined the European Monetary Union, relinquished their power to alter interest rates and delegated it

to the newly established European Central Bank. This is the situation contemporary Scottish nationalism has to address in its efforts to advance its cause and, therefore, cannot be ignored in the investigation of the development of contemporary Scottish nationalism.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

This study first deals with Scotland, one of the three main issues of the book. Chapter 1 argues that Scotland is a fascinating case in the study of nationalism by way of taking up the issue of demarcation, and considers the 'when is the nation' question and the 'absence' of nationalism in nineteenth-century Scotland. Chapter 2 then traces the development of Scottish nationalism from the 1960s to the close of the twentieth century, with special attention paid to the emergence of the 'Scotland and Europe' theme. This chapter provides the socio-political background to the analysis of the interview results.

In Chapter 3, the other main variable of this study, Europe, is introduced. First, the origin of the idea of Europe is examined, followed by an investigation of different images of Europe which have come into existence over the centuries. The more specific issue of the relationship between processes of European integration and Scotland is then considered.

Chapter 4 discusses the findings from the interviews which were conducted with members of the Scottish intelligentsia between 1994 and 1995 and identifies three major visions of the Scoto-European relationship currently in circulation in Scotland.

In Chapter 5, the historical background to these three visions is examined in order to understand why and how these ideas have come into circulation in contemporary Scotland. It is hoped to demonstrate the importance of ethno-history in maintaining national identity.

Chapter 6 assesses the position of these ideas in Scottish society in the light of opinion polls and surveys. Since the interviews were conducted with members of the Scottish intelligentsia, comparing and contrasting the findings from the interviews with these data will shed light on the elite–mass relationship in nationalism.

In the Conclusion, a summary of the argument will be presented and theoretical issues raised by the research will be discussed further.

NOTES

1. For detailed discussion of the definition of nationalism, see Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* (Oxford: Polity, 2001). For an overview of various approaches in analysing European integration, see Paul Taylor, *The Limits of European Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); *The European Union in the 1990s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
2. Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism*, 2nd expanded edn (London: New Left Books, 1979), pp. 329–63.
3. Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1983), pp. 133–8.
4. Marinell Ash, *The Strange Death of Scottish History* (Edinburgh: Ramsay Head Press, 1980).
5. Ibid., p. 10.
6. Colin Kidd, *Subverting Scotland's Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, 1689–c.1830* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
7. Other historians share the view that there is no strong 'nationalist' tradition of history writing in Scotland. See Richard Finlay, 'New Britain, New Scotland, New History? The Impact of Devolution on the Development of Scottish Historiography', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 36, 2 (2001), pp. 383–93.
8. Graeme Morton, *Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland, 1830–1860* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1999).
9. See, for instance, Grant McCracken, *The Long Interview* (London: Sage, 1988); Charles Ragin, *Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1994).
10. Walker Connor, 'A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a …', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1, 4 (1978), pp. 377–400.
11. Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p. 14.
12. Ibid., p. 73.
13. Bernard Crick (ed.), *National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
14. Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Oxford: Polity, 1985), p. 116.
15. For further discussions, see John MacInnes, 'Introduction', *Scottish Affairs* (Special issue: Stateless Nations in the 21st Century), (2001), pp. 1–2; David McCrone, 'Neo-Nationalism in Stateless Nations', *Scottish Affairs* (Special issue: Stateless Nations in the 21st century) (2001), pp. 3–13.
16. For the history of Scotland, see Michael Lynch, *Scotland: A New History* (London: Pimlico, 1992), T. M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation, 1700–2000* (London: Allen Lane, 1999) and Gordon Donaldson and Robert Morpeth, *A Dictionary of Scottish History* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1977).
17. For a critical review of this type of interpretation of the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745, see Murray Pittock, *The Myth of the Jacobite Clans* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995).
18. The legend of'Red Clydeside' refers to the series of strikes by Glasgow's workers demanding a 40-hour week in 1919, which was suppressed by troops.

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The Scots and Scotland

The sociologist David McCrone declared in his *Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation* that 'Scotland stands at the forefront of sociological concern of the late twentieth century'.[1] This chapter is written in a similar spirit in order to demonstrate that the case of Scotland has much to offer the study of nationalism. One of the most frequently used adjectives when discussing Scottish nationalism is 'exceptional', which suggests that the Scottish case does not always comply with usual expectation. Why is that the case? Does it mean that Scottish nationalism is therefore not 'proper' nationalism? Or does it mean that it can help to pinpoint the lacuna in existing theories of nationalism? I believe the latter is the case, and the main aim of this chapter is to highlight what the Scottish case can offer to the future discussion of nationalism.

WHO ARE THE SCOTS? THE PROBLEM OF DEMARCATION

Who are the Scots? What is Scottishness? What it the essence of being a Scot? These are the questions which were put to the respondents in this book, and ones that many scholars and those who are interested in Scottish nationalism have been asking for some time, and they are not easy to answer. One of the respondents states '[compared with other cases] being Scottish is much more difficult to handle' but there is a shared sense that the Scots 'do have a cultural identity though in some ways this is more subtle than in the case of some other groups'. Why do the respondents use words such as 'difficult' or 'subtle' in their attempt to explain what is to be a Scot? It is mostly to do with the fact that there is not any unambiguous demarcator which distinguishes the Scots from others.

In the Japanese case, with which I am very familiar, being Japanese can be determined by various combinations of some, or all, relatively 'objective' criteria. Being born to Japanese parents (or possibly a parent) is important; it ensures a certain homogeneity in the physical appearance of the Japanese people. If one has Japanese parents, one

does not have to be born in Japan to be a Japanese although it is always preferable. The language is also essential, as being Japanese involves being a native speaker of the Japanese language. This is part of the reason why those children who are born and raised abroad with a poor command of Japanese are often faced with subtle or overt discrimination against them when they finally return to Japan. Having a Japanese passport is another criterion albeit not as important as other demarcators. In contemporary Japan, while the Japanese can be Christian or Muslim, or can subscribe to any of the thriving new religions, they have to have a good understanding of the Japanese way of life and thinking, both of which have been deeply influenced by Shintoism and Buddhism. In contemporary Japan, to sum up, blood and language are the most important characteristics in determining who the Japanese are.

By contrast, largely due to the Anglicisation which has been taking place since the Middle Ages, the Scots have little to distinguish themselves from others, especially from the English, their southern neighbours. Take the language to begin with. There are at least a couple of languages spoken in contemporary Scotland: English and Gaelic. Many, however, claim that Scots is also a separate language rather than a dialect of English.[2] In addition, some writers tried to revive and establish Lallans as the literary language for Scotland in the early twentieth century. Whether Scots or Lallans is a language or not is not a concern of this study; what should be noted here is that contemporary Scotland lacks the linguistic homogeneity that seems to be an essential element in binding other nations together. This is also the case when we look at Scottish history; there was no linguistic unity in what is now called Scotland.[3] Furthermore, the undisputedly different language, Gaelic, has been on the decline – the number of native Gaelic speakers has been steadily shrinking although the number of learners is on the increase.[4] Some would argue that the accent with which the Scots speak English can be a demarcator, and it may serve the purpose to a certain extent in everyday life. Indeed, one hears of many episodes about children with an English accent being bullied in Scottish schools and about people who feel aggravated when they hear only English accents on the radio or television. There is, however, no single Scottish accent and some prominent Scottish nationalists speak with an English accent without causing any outrage among their colleagues. The Scottish accent is not therefore a very clear criterion of being Scottish.

Another criterion, religion, is not sufficient in defining the Scots of the early twenty-first century. Membership of the established church,

the Church of Scotland, could have been enough to determine who the Scots were for a long time after the Reformation. The Church of Scotland, like any of the other established churches in the United Kingdom, is suffering from falling membership.[5] It is no longer the case that the majority of the Scottish population belong to the Kirk. In addition, contrary to the myth of a Protestant Scotland, it is now clear that Scotland was never a thoroughly Protestant country; Catholicism survived the turmoil of the Reformation in the Highlands partly because of the scarcity of the Protestant clergy who could speak Gaelic.[6] Centuries later, the successive waves of Irish immigrants brought Catholicism back to the west coast of Scotland, some of whose offspring now proudly call themselves Scots. It is fair to say that in contemporary Scotland, whether one belongs to the Kirk is not a clear criterion of being Scottish, although Presbyterianism is still perceived as an important characteristic of contemporary Scottish society by many Scots and observers.

When neither language nor religion can determine who the Scots are, the concept of 'race' is also redundant. Needless to say, much depends on the definition of race; even in its loosest sense, if one were to look out for a Scottish 'race', the search would surely be in vain,[7] for so many different peoples have left their footprints on the Scottish soil, a fact acknowledged by many Scots. There were Picts, and Scots who migrated from Ireland in ancient times. Later, the Romans tried to pacify Caledonia; Britons came to inhabit the southern part of Scotland; Saxons, Normans, Norsemen came in successive waves of migration. Even though the movement of people on a large scale slowed down during the medieval period, and even with the rise of racialist ideology in the nineteenth century, the idea of a Scottish 'race' never crystallised. The recognition of the 'racial' and ethnic diversity within Scotland, especially in the form of the highland–lowland divide, was so strongly held that the idea of 'one race' could not take root.[8] From the nineteenth century onwards, there have been further influxes of different nationalities into Scotland: Italians, Irish, Poles, Lithuanians and east European Jews. Since the Second World War, waves of Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have also come to and settled in Scotland. Although Scotland is not free from racism in terms of a sense of white supremacy, defining the Scots as a white race does not distinguish them from the English as a nation. Racism in contemporary Scotland may still have a role in defining internally who the 'real' Scots are, but it is not featured prominently in the definition of the Scottish nation in relation to the others.[9] This discussion brings us back to where we started; defining who the Scots are

is not easy, a point admitted by many of the respondents when the question was put to them.

Despite the above, it is now more appropriate than ever to talk about the Scottish nation. One of the respondents, a self-professed Unionist, stated that while he is British first and Scottish second, his children are Scottish first and British second and, according to him, this is the general trend. The recognition of a heightened sense of Scottish nationhood among the contemporary Scots is also observed by other respondents. It has been seen in many aspects of contemporary Scottish society; it is not confined to conventional politics and academic activities but has been manifested in popular culture as well. The lack of clear, 'objective' demarcators does not hinder the strengthening of a sense of Scottish identity. Not only that, this recently intensified sense of Scottish nationhood does not seem to encourage a search for any of these demarcators. There is no serious attempt to make the Gaelic language compulsory in schools or to unify the Scottish people spiritually, or 'racially'.

Meanwhile, the demand for greater autonomy or independence has been steadily growing, as will be seen in greater detail in the following chapters. Most discussion of a Scottish Parliament adopted the principle of residence when faced with the question of 'Who are the Scots?'; people are Scottish if they live in Scotland. This is the position adopted by the SNP as well as the Scottish Constitutional Convention, a consultative body which, in 1995, produced *Scotland's Right, Scotland's Parliament*, a proposal for a Scottish Parliament. Those who were eligible to vote at the referendum on the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1997 were indeed those who were entitled to vote at the local election and lived in Scotland. The Scottish Parliamentary Election Survey of 1999 also found that although birth was the most important criterion for being a Scottish citizen according to the respondents, just over 50 per cent of them were also prepared to accept residence over birth, and descent was the least important criterion.[10] The Scottish preference for the principle of residence is frequently presented in contrast to some of the states that gained their independence recently, such as Latvia and Estonia, where the language requirement was incorporated as a condition of citizenship being granted.[11] To understand this contrast, it may be useful to introduce a certain set of ideal types of nationalism: ethnic vs. civic nationalism. As it is not the purpose of this chapter to examine the different types of nationalism, it should suffice merely to mention in passing that the type of nationalism which the majority of contemporary Scottish nationalists pursue is very close to civic nationalism, which deals with the question of demarcation in non-cultural, non-ethnic ways.

The Scottish case demonstrates powerfully the importance of the subjective element, that is, the will of the people in forming and maintaining a nation. The 'Who are the Scots?' question is often met by answers such as 'it is an affair of the mind'. This strongly subjective and also voluntaristic characteristic of the contemporary Scottish nation is captured well by theorists such as Ernest Renan and Max Weber. Neither of them tries to define a nation using 'objective' criteria. Instead, they stress the ambiguity of the definition of a nation: for Renan, the only criterion is the will of people to hold together; for Weber, a nation is about cultural values.[12] The Scottish case, however, defies other attempts that are made in order to reduce the ambiguity of the definition of the nation conceded by Renan and Weber. Stalin's once influential, 'scientific' definition of a nation fails to encompass the Scottish nation as such because he demands that all four of his criteria be satisfied.[13] Anthony Giddens, whose main concern is the nation-state, which he holds to be one of the main characteristics of modern society, entwines nation and state. According to Giddens, the nation is a collectivity which is subject to a unitary rule.[14] The Scots do not satisfy his definition since they do not have their own government. But a nation is a community. As David McCrone carefully depicts, the Scots form their own community which has similar qualities to other 'proper' nations.[15] Giddens' agenda prevents himself from recognising the importance of the community aspect of the nation.

As stated, the Scottish nation lacks clear demarcators. What, then, does bind them together? Where does the shared sense of being Scottish come from? There are three main elements. The first is territory. As a few of the respondents point out, the borders of the area now called Scotland have been relatively stable; although it is an exaggeration to assert, as some of the respondents did, that the Scottish borders have been unchanged since Roman times, it is plausible to claim that they have been largely unchanged, especially in relation to England, since the late ninth century, when the Kingdom of Alba came into being.[16] By the thirteenth century, when the phrase 'the Kingdom of Scotland' was already in common use, the Anglo-Scottish border was fixed on the Tweed–Solway line as conceded by Alexander II of Scotland in 1237.[17] The later disputes concerning the Anglo-Scottish border, however, have not had any significant impact on the overall territorial integrity of Scotland.[18] One of the consequences of the stability of the borders is that it has made a territorial definition of Scots possible; Scots are the people who live in Scotland.

Can we go further and argue that Scots are the people of the land, that is, the glen, the moor and the loch? This, although tempting, is too far-fetched. The landscape of the Highlands, that is the glen, the moor and the loch, is now inseparably associated with the idea of Scotland, mainly due to the works of Walter Scott and the Scottish Tourist Board. There are, however, many kinds of landscape in Scotland and each has contributed in shaping the sense of being Scots. The winding hills in the Borders have produced their own sense of place, which has been expressed in many ballads. This sense of place was certainly different from that of the Highlands or Islands. Walter Scott was brought up with these ballads of theBorders and went on writing about the Scottish past. Although his vision of an authentic Scottish past was very much that of the Highlands, his vision was also shaped by the images from these ballads which he internalised. Much caution, therefore, is required in tying a particular landscape to the sense of being Scottish.

This is not to deny the landscape can carry a lot of weight in people's identity. The British Election Survey of 1992 found that 'the scenery' came second after 'the people' as the reason why the Scottish respondents were proud of Scotland, attracting support from 30 per cent of the sample, with 35 per cent choosing 'the people'. Analysing the responses to this question on the British scale, the researchers found that 'the people' and 'the democracy' came to the top of the list, and 'the scenery' third.[19] This result indicates that attachment to the scenery is more important in a positive sense of being a Scot than in that of being a Briton. For a positive sense of being British, democracy is more important than the scenery. However, there is no knowing whether the Scottish respondents had the same landscape in mind or different images from their home towns in replying to this question. What we can say is that the appreciation of the landscape is probably more important in Scottish identity than in British identity, but it is fair to conclude that it is geography that unites Scots, not the landscape.

The second element is having a common history. As seen earlier, the people of Scotland formed their own kingdom from the medieval period till 1707; this has provided the Scots with a different history from those of the English, the Irish and the Welsh. History is reflected in institutions, some of which still remain in today's Scottish society. For example, people in Scotland were, and still are, subject to a code of Scots law. They developed a different economic framework, evidence of which is manifest in different banknotes that, until now, have been circulating north of the border. Scotland also established different trade patterns from those of England, which will be examined in detail later. Christianity in Scotland, too, was introduced and organised

differently from England. Roman Catholicism reached Scotland via Ireland and the island of Iona enjoyed a special status as the basis of Christian missionary activities in the Middle Ages. By the twelfth century, the notion of a Scottish Church was established and many of the Scottish dioceses were given the status of 'special daughter' of Rome, thus acquiring a certain authority which neither the Archbishops of York or Canterbury could challenge.[20] Scotland's Reformation brought Calvinism to its people and its egalitarian structure of the Church, and Scotland still maintains a different education system from the rest of the United Kingdom.

The Scots have their own foundation myths and their own heroes and heroines. The legends which accompany the Stone of Scone, on which successive ancient Scottish kings were crowned, tell us that the Scots are the descendant of Scota, a daughter of a Pharaoh and that she led the Scots from Egypt to Scotland through Spain and Ireland. Scots also have their own saints: St Ninian, who is said to have introduced Christianity to the southern Picts, St Columba, who established a missionary church in Iona, and St Andrew, the patron saint of Scotland. There are also many heroes and heroines. For instance, William Wallace is the embodiment of ordinary folks' determination to defend Scotland, and Robert the Bruce is the good king. Mary, Queen of Scots, both loved and hated by her subjects, was beheaded by the English Queen, Elizabeth I. These are distinctively Scottish heroes and heroines; not English, not Irish nor Welsh. The common history that Scots share did not come to an end when Scotland entered into the Union with England in 1707. Scotland was left, by and large, to manage its own business and continued to be a different society following a different history. Two examples of the latter are the Highland Clearances and the Disruption of the Kirk in 1843.[21] These incidents probably mean little to the English or the Welsh; for the Scots, however, they have caused pain, anger and confusion, which still remains in their collective memory.

The common history which is the basis of the sense of togetherness for Scots has cultivated certain Scottish characteristics, or, to employ a more controversial term, values. These may not be so radically different from those of the English or any other European, Christian nations and have changed over the course of history but they are what make the Scots feel that Scottish society is distinctive. With the majority of the population believing that they share certain values which are different from others', these values shape the way in which Scots see themselves and the way they behave. In the nineteenth century, Scots believed in self-reliance and diligence – those were what made the

Scots great. Those were the values that the Kirk preached, and their success in the British Empire and in industry was the product of their efforts based on these values.[22] In contemporary Scotland, the emphasis is more on egalitarianism than on self-reliance.[23] The idea that Scottish society is democratic and egalitarian has been expressed in various forms such as the ideas of the 'democratic intellect' and 'Lad o'Pairts', both of which are held to crystallise the democratic nature of the Scottish education system.[24] This supposed egalitarian nature of Scottish society, according to many contemporary Scots, has made the Scots more compassionate than their southern neighbours. The political culture of contemporary Scotland is perceived as different from that of England and there is some statistical evidence that the Scots are more sensitive to economic equality and more sympathetic to the socially disadvantaged than the English.[25] The symbol of contemporary Scotland is the 'Bearsden man', a middle-class professional living in a wealthy suburb supporting Labour rather than the Tories.[26]

Finally, the Scots are bound together because they have a clear 'other', namely, the English. Despite the Union, the English never ceased to be 'the other' for Scots and a glance at the Scottish newspapers can tell us that being confused with the English is one of the greatest insults contemporary Scots can encounter.

In short, the contemporary Scottish nation is a historical and territorial community without any clear cultural or physical demarcator. The Scots are those who are attached to the area called Scotland and share historic memories and values which Scottish history has shaped, and the Scots are people who want to be Scottish. It is, as one respondent put it, 'a state of mind'. These points all reveal that the Scottish case poses a challenge which no student of nationalism can ignore since it directly addresses the question of demarcation. The Scottish case shows that the statist definition is flawed. At the same time, it urges more efforts from students of nationalism to devise a better way of defining a nation, a challenge which provokes heated discussions.

WHEN WAS/IS SCOTLAND? [27]

Another contentious issue in the study of nationalism is the problem of dating a nation. One of the claims the Scottish National Party (SNP) sets forth in their literature is that the Scottish nation is one of the oldest in Europe, that the Scots were one of the earliest to acquire a 'clearly defined' national identity guarded by stable borders.[28] What the pamphlet implicitly refers to is, no doubt, the experience of the Wars of Independence (1296–1328), and especially the Declaration of

Arbroath (1320), which, according to many Scots, unequivocally demonstrates that a Scottish national identity existed by the late thirteenth century. The SNP is, therefore, advocating that the Scottish nation came into being in the Middle Ages, which, from their viewpoint, provides greater legitimation for the cause of independence.

According to Walker Connor, however, one should be suspicious of the claim which asserts that a nation existed prior to the nineteenth century because, for him, nationalism is a mass phenomenon.[29] He argues that until the majority of people become aware of their membership of a nation, which did not happen even in 'old' nations such as France until the late nineteenth century by way of the introduction of conscription and universal education, a nation cannot exist. From this perspective, the Scottish example represents the efforts on the part of nationalists to persuade fellow members, and other nations, of the authenticity of their project. He contends that therefore it makes no sense to investigate nationalism before the nineteenth century. This is a view which is close to the one put forward by modernists, who hold that nations are essentially a modern form of social organisation. However, there are other strands of theories of nationalism which argue for the case of pre-modern nations such as the primordialists and perennialists; the former argue that nations are 'natural' expressions of human nature while the latter think of nations as a form of social grouping whose origins go back to time immemorial. Simply put, while modernists maintain that nations are a modern construct, the primordialists and perennialists hold that nations are old.[30] The discussion which follows demonstrates that the Scottish case provides a wealth of interesting material for the examination of different theoretical strands.

The modernists' view

Some theorists, often referred to as 'modernists', maintain that the nation is a distinctively modern institution. Although modernists such as Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson are by no means in complete agreement as to what caused the rise of nationalism, they share at least two basic assumptions: that nationalism is a modern phenomenon and that, in Ernest Gellner's celebrated sentence, 'It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round.'[31] The modernists' thesis is that if nationalism creates nations and if nationalism is a modern phenomenon, then it follows that there can be, by definition, no pre-modern nations.[32]

What are the modernists' views on the Scottish case? Because Scotland is, presumably, often considered to be a relatively 'minor'

case – it is a small nation without its own state – there is not much about Scotland in these scholars' works. It is, nonetheless, still possible to put together observations and comments on Scotland which they have made in passing. Ernest Gellner regards a nation as a 'homogeneous, internally mobile culture/polity' which emerged as a response to the processes of industrialisation that had profoundly transformed the structure of society. In this sense, according to Gellner, the nation is a distinctively modern institution. He acknowledges that some nations have 'navels', that is, a tie with a pre-modern cultural and ethnic entity, but asserts that these 'navels' are not essential in understanding the nation phenomenon.[33] How does the Scottish case fare in his analysis? He concedes that, in the Scottish case, language did not play the major part as allocated in his model and that a shared historical memory – a navel – was important. In spite of this, he did not feel the Scottish case contradicted his model.[34] It is fair to assume that Gellner would argue that the Scottish nation is best understood as an institution formed, like any other nation, in response to the need of industrial society for a culturally homogeneous labour force. Hence, from Gellner's point of view, it is nonsensical to argue that there was a Scottish nation in existence around the time of the Wars of Independence.

Eric Hobsbawm, another modernist, also declares that the nation is a product of modernity.[35] It is, therefore, pointless to ponder over whether a Scottish nation existed in the Middle Ages. At the same time, he proposes a concept of 'proto-national' bonds to explain why nationalist mobilisation has been so successful across the globe.[36] Proto-national bonds are the sense of collective belonging that already existed before the age of nationalism, which can later be mobilised on a national scale. He agrees that proto-nationalism could have an important role in forming modern nationalism in terms of supplying symbols which, in some cases, evoke powerful emotions, but asserts that proto-nationalism is not nationalism because it has no '*necessary* relation [original emphasis] … [to a] … territorial political organisation' which he holds to be a key component of modern nationalism.[37] He also denies that there is any continuity between proto-nationalism and modern nationalism, citing the example of Jewish proto-nationalism and modern Zionism. Reviewing his argument in relation to the Scottish experience, it is reasonable to assume that Hobsbawm would agree that there was a proto-nation in medieval Scotland, which, however, should not be equated with the modern Scottish nation. One could, therefore, contend that Hobsbawm agrees with Gellner on the point that there was no Scottish nation in late thirteenth-century Scotland.

These arguments do not mean that modernists in general deny that there is a Scottish nation because it lacks statehood; most of them are far more sensible than that. Gellner, for instance, casually admits that Scottish nationalism exists.[38] However, the Scottish case does pose an awkward problem for many modernist schemes such as Gellner's with regard to the absence of full-blown nationalism in Scotland in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Tom Nairn, who also considers nationalism to be an essentially modern phenomenon, explains this anomaly by pointing out the massive immigration of the Scottish intelligentsia to the south which accelerated after the death of Walter Scott.[39] Because Scotland lost the middle-class intelligentsia, whose mission is, according to his scheme, to invite the masses into history, he concludes there was a curious absence of Scottish nationalism in the age of nationalism. Benedict Anderson, questioning Nairn's tendency to treat his native Scotland as 'an unproblematic, primordial given', goes on to imply that what was happening then was the making of a British nation of which Scotland was becoming a part.[40] He points out that by the early seventeenth century, the use of English was widespread in Scotland and that there were no barriers for intellectuals, politicians and businessmen to perform their pilgrimage to the centre, in this case London, under the Union. That is why, according to Anderson, there was neither a typically vernacular-based nationalism nor the American-style civic nationalism in nineteenth-century Scotland. The modernists' stance on the question of 'When was the Scottish nation?' is summed up: 'not in the pre-modern period, but in the modern era'.

Some historians' view

The modernists' view is therefore unequivocal. There are, however, dissenting voices raised against that view, especially from historians. They suggest that some nations, including the Scottish nation, did exist in the pre-modern era. It is perhaps understandable for Scottish historians to take the view that the Scottish nation existed in the medieval period because of the need to challenge an English-centred view of the history of the British Isles; it is part of the process of re-evaluating the formation of Britain. William Ferguson, an eminent historian, declares that 'a Scottish nation undoubtedly existed by 1286' as he believes that the episodes of the Wars of Independence demonstrate the existence of 'a well-defined Scottish identity'.[41] Other historians who are concerned with the problem of nations and nationalism agree with Ferguson. Hugh Seton-Watson classifies the Scots as one of the old nations, that is, nations which came into existence before the

emergence of the doctrine of nationalism, along with the English, French, Dutch and so on.[42] He argues that a significant number of people of Scotland came to share the belief that they constituted a nation before the French Revolution when the doctrine of nationalism emerged. He states specifically that the Scottish nation was emerging in the late thirteenth century – around the time of the Wars of Independence – but admits that due to 'the diversity of peoples and languages', the formation of the Scottish nation was not completed before the sixteenth century.[43] In a similar vein, Adrian Hastings argues that the Scottish nation, like many western European nations, was formed well before the eighteenth century, contrary to what most of the modernists suggest.[44]

These historians' arguments are based on the understanding that a nation is a self-aware community which possesses a national identity that is linked to a demand for political autonomy for the people.[45] They examine the Scottish experience against this criterion and are satisfied that a Scottish nation, a self-aware community with a distinctive identity and desire for political autonomy, did come into existence in the Middle Ages.

Another interesting point made by the historians in regard to the Scottish case is that those who lived in medieval Scotland did not constitute an ethnicity, a culturally homogeneous community, due to their multi-racial and multi-lingual nature in the Middle Ages.[46] It is a well-known fact that what is now called Scotland was at that time populated by the Picts in the north-east, the Scots from Ireland in the north-west, the Angles in Lothian, the Britons in Strathclyde, the Normans and the Norse. Many languages were spoken including Gaelic, English, Norman French and Latin. The army which David I, King of Scots, led at the Battle of the Standard in 1138 against the English army was recorded by a contemporary English historian to have been composed of 'Normans, Germans, English, of Northumbrians and Cumbrians, of men of Teviotdale and Lothian, of Picts (who are commonly called Galwegians) and of Scots'.[47] These diverse people, however, so the historians argue, shared a national consciousness. They were held together as a nation by geography and kingship. The people of medieval Scotland, according to these historians' view, formed, first and foremost, a political community, united in their desire to defend the autonomy of the kingdom.

These observations about medieval Scotland presented by the historians seem to share certain characteristics that some of the modernists hold as essential to a modern nation. On the criterion that a nation is a political community, it could be argued that the people of

medieval Scotland constituted such a one. A Hobsbawmian explanation could perhaps be entertained in this case since the people of medieval Scotland arguably existed as a function of a territorial state called the Kingdom of Scotland. However, Anderson's criteria of a nation seem to be more easily met by the Scottish experience. For example, the Declaration of Arbroath, which arguably demonstrates an early understanding of the idea of popular sovereignty, could satisfy one of them, that is, an understanding of and a belief in the sovereignty of the people. Is it, then, legitimate to deny even the possibility of the existence of a nation in the pre-modern era, as the modernists do? In order to answer this question, we shall now explore further some of the characteristics of a nation in the case of medieval Scotland. These characteristics include self-awareness as being one people, a certain level of mass participation, the idea of comradeship and a belief in the sovereignty of the people.

Medieval Scotland

It is, of course, extremely difficult to reveal what people really felt in the past. Thanks to recent research, however, one can obtain at least a rough picture of the life of people in medieval Scotland. In this regard, the most important episode in Scottish history is the Wars of Independence (1296–1328).[48] This was a series of wars between the kingdoms of Scotland and England over the kingship of Scotland. When Alexander III (1241–86) died, leaving as his only heir his granddaughter, Margaret, the Maid of Norway (c. 1283–90), England had finished its campaigns against Wales and Ireland and was ready to expand its activity to the north. When Queen Margaret died on her way to Scotland in 1290, the question of succession to the Scottish throne became paramount. Edward I of England (1272–1307) intervened at the invitation of some Scottish nobles during the period of interregnum (1290–92) and chose John Balliol (c.1250–1313) as the King of the Scots. King John was enthroned and crowned at Scone on the Stone of Destiny on St Andrew's Day in 1292. John's allegiance to England did not last long, probably because of Edward I's intention to requisition all the Scottish wool, the most important export product and a crucial part of livelihood in medieval Scotland, in order to finance his war against France, and to mobilise Scotsmen to fight for England in France.[49] King Edward of England regarded King John as his vassal and made many demands which ignored the authority of the community of the realm of Scotland, an authority considered by the Scots to be above the authority of a king.[50] Scotland, having formed an alliance with France in 1295, then started a war with England in 1296.

At the Battle of Dunbar in 1296, Edward I defeated the Scots and the years of warfare between Scotland and England ensued.[51] The Wars of Independence, as these became known, provide interesting episodes in discussing the issue of mass participation in 'national' affairs. Alexander Grant presents two sets of evidence which suggest a considerable degree of participation by 'ordinary people' in the Wars of Independence.[52] First, 'Ragman Roll', which is the list of more than 1,000 names of Scots who paid homage to Edward I after the Battle of Dunbar, contains a considerable number of lesser clergy and townsmen. Grant, comparing these figures to the estimated number of the English gentry in the late thirteenth century (around 3,000), concludes that the list contains many more people of a lower status than the English gentry. This, according to him, indicates the wide involvement of 'ordinary people' not only in warfare with England but also in political processes. Second, the famous revolt of 1297 which elevated William Wallace (c.1270–1305), a son of a minor landowner, to Guardian of the Realm, was depicted by a contemporary Yorkshire chronicler, Walter of Guisborough, as a nationalist revolt. His interpretation of the event that the common folk, led by Wallace, made their stand against the English because they were Scots is still repeated by some historians.[53] Modern historians express reservations in interpreting the revolt of 1297 as a purely nationalist one, since there were other more compelling reasons to rebel against Edward I, such as a fear of being conscripted for his war in France.

There are, however, further episodes from this period which, to some historians' minds, point more to the nationalist interpretation of the event.[54] When Thomas of Edinburgh, an obscure priest, heard that victorious King Edward's army was approaching the town in 1296, he solemnly excommunicated King Edward in an act of defiance. Another Scotsman named William of Bolhope, who had been resident in England, hurried home to enlist with the Scottish army when the war broke out in 1296. Undeterred by Edward's army's victory over his countrymen, he armed himself with two swords and set off for England, where he met his death following his refusal to acknowledge allegiance to King Edward. In another instance, the surviving records of a small estate called Coldingham in south-east Berwickshire, consisting of only two parishes, show that it provided at least 40 men, possibly as many as 80, from its tenants to join the Scottish army of 1297–98. Needless to say, it is impossible to establish an accurate level of the non-elite's involvement in these affairs and admittedly these examples only provide a collection of fragmented episodes which do not necessarily convey a fair picture of what actually happened.

Nonetheless, the fact that these episodes were not only recorded in those days but have survived deserves serious consideration.

There is ample data for the discussion of Scottish self-awareness in the Middle Ages. There is, to begin with, some evidence which suggests the existence of a Scottish self-awareness of their being a united people in medieval Scotland. As we have seen, medieval Scotland was composed of many different peoples, a fact which was reflected in the way the Scottish kings referred to their subjects. For example, David I called his subjects 'Francis et Anglis' in 1124; some 40 years later, William the Lion, King of Scots, described his people as 'tocius terre sue Francis et Anglis Scottis et Galwahensibus'. By the beginning of the thirteenth century, however, this racial address had died out and it became customary for the king to refer to his people as subjects of the realm of Scotland. The consequence of this was that they all became, at least in the official addresses, Scots.[55] Although this evidence does not reveal anything about the ordinary folk, it suggests that at least among the ruling class there was a desire to present the inhabitants of Scotland as one united people.

Another interesting discovery is the place-name 'Ingliston' and its variants. It literally means a settlement of the English and would appear to refer to places where English-speaking Scots lived. However, when all the places called 'Ingliston' are mapped, most of them actually turn out to be Norman settlements from England rather than the settlements of English-speaking Scots.[56] This demonstrates that the label 'the English' did not simply signify the people who spoke some form of English, as did many of the Scots in the Middle Ages, but rather that it referred to the people from south of the border, from England. This differentiation implies that in medieval Scotland there was a kind of self-awareness among the Scots which was based on geography rather than a language. In other words, the Scots were the people who were not from the south and language was a less important issue in defining them.

Another indication of the existence of Scottish self-awareness is the rise in the writing of medieval history. From the late fourteenth to the mid-fifteenth centuries, Scottish historians produced successive chronicles of Scotland. The major works included: John Fordun's *Chronica Gentis Scotorum* (*Chronicle of the Scottish Race*) (c. 1365–85), written in Latin, which put forward the Gaelic, therefore ancient, origin of the Scottish 'race'. Also Andrew Wyntoun's *Orygynale Cronykil of Scotland* (c.1410–20) written in Scots shows a strong sense of Scottishness, vindicated by the Wars of Independence and which advocates, following Fordun, the ancient origin of the Scottish kingdom. Another, Walter

Bower's *Scotichronicon* (*Scots' Chronicle*) (c.1440), written in Latin, traces Scottish history up to the end of the reign of James I in 1436.[57] These were, of course, written by an elite for the elite. But they were, as many historians of medieval Scotland argue, an attempt to consolidate an already existing Scottish self-consciousness with the Scottish claim for independence after the Wars of Independence.[58] It was not only historical narratives that began to be compiled as an expression of a separate Scottish identity. Around the same time as Fordun's chronicle, a heroic romance of King Robert, *The Brus*, was written by John Barbour, containing a medieval ballad about Alexander III.[59] It was later incorporated in Wyntoun's work. In the late fifteenth century, an epic poem, *The Wallace*, was compiled by Blind Harry, which was effectively a populist version of this 'official history'.[60] It is certain that these two poems were read by people outside the ruling circle, and following the introduction of the printing press in 1507, these two works were repeatedly reprinted.

On the point of horizontal comradeship, there is also some evidence which implies that there was some form of understanding on common rights and duties for the Scots in medieval Scotland. The very idea of the community of the realm is one such example. The Barons' letter to the Pope in 1320 (better known as the Declaration of Arbroath) was written on behalf of the whole community of the realm of Scotland which included not only barons, the ruling circle, but all the freeholders.[61] Also, all the adult males in Scotland were required to possess arms appropriate to their wealth so that they could be called upon for policing or military purposes. When they were summoned, they went to defend the realm, not the landlord. It was called 'common army service' or 'Scottish service'.[62] This is similar to the modern idea of conscription in that it was regarded as a shared duty undertaken by all the adult males in Scotland. In return, the dutiful Scots could expect a fair legal hearing by the king or his representative.

As for the belief in the sovereignty of the people, the medieval Scots produced a remarkable document, the Declaration of Arbroath, which was written to plead with the Pope for his acknowledgement and confirmation of Scottish independence from England. Most of the letter is, therefore, dedicated to the description of the history of the Scottish kingdom which, the letter claims, goes back to ancient Egypt, and forcefully argues for the legitimacy of the rule of Robert I. At the end of this account of Scottish history, there is a phrase stating that Robert the Bruce became the king of Scots 'by rightful succession and the consent of "every one of us"'.[63] What is suggested here is a recognition that popular consent is essential for legitimate rule. There then follows a

passage declaring that if Robert the Bruce were to surrender Scotland to the English, he would be deposed and another man who could defend the kingdom would be made king. Two important issues arise from this. The first is a recognition that sovereignty does not lie with the monarch but with the community of the realm. The second is an understanding that the relationship between the king and his people is contractual, and that the king does not have a divine right to rule. The Declaration of Arbroath has, as a consequence, gained a reputation as being the first ever document clearly to demonstrate an understanding of popular sovereignty, which is, incidentally, an important component of the modern ideology of nationalism.

'When is the nation?' in the Scottish case

The above evidence appears to support the historians' claim that there was a Scottish nation in the Middle Ages. This would not, however, convince the modernists, for they consider a nation to be a mass phenomenon, that is, something in which the majority of the population participates with regards to its formation and maintenance. The evidence cited earlier does not satisfactorily demonstrate the level of mass participation that modernists hold so dear in the case of medieval Scotland. On the other hand, the historians would find no difficulty in claiming that their case is vindicated since popular participation is not the essential issue for them. The modernists' and historians' arguments fail to engage with each other, and as a result, it cannot be claimed that the question 'When was/is the Scottish nation?' has been thoroughly examined. The main reason why the two positions cannot engage with one another in a constructive manner lies in the familiar old problem: the problem of definition, or in other words, the 'What is a nation?' question. Connor suggests that the scholars of nationalism should move on to discuss the 'When is a nation?' question because he believes this has not received sufficient attention. The problem, as has been shown by examination of the Scottish case, is that contemporary scholars of nationalism are not quite ready to tackle the 'When' question in a meaningful manner, since there is no unequivocal answer to the 'What' question. However, it should be noted that the exploration of the 'When' question in each case will highlight what issues theories of nations and nationalism should strive to explain, and in this indirect way, the question could help the investigation of the phenomena of nations and nationalism.

What then has the 'When is the nation?' question illuminated in the Scottish case? In the above examination, the level of mass participation has been clearly marked out as a critical aspect in understanding what

a nation is and has brought our attention back to the question of definition. Indeed, this is a theoretical debate which has been going on for a while, and promises to continue for the foreseeable future. Another point raised by the above examination is the question of what it is that theories of nations and nationalism can actually achieve in light of the fact that many people believe, in one way or another, that a particular nation is in effect old with its origin based in or before the Middle Ages. From the phenomenological point of view, this belief would then constitute a reality for these people, providing a frame of reference for their thinking and behaviour. The task for analysts then is not just to debunk the myth but to ask why people choose to believe, or wish to believe, in that particular view and what role it plays in a certain setting.

The fact that the Scottish National Party subscribes to the medieval origin of Scottish nationhood is not surprising since it strengthens their claim of the authenticity of the Scottish nationhood. The more authentic a nation is, the more legitimate the cause of independence becomes. However, the SNP also promotes the idea of a modern, civic, inclusive and heterogeneous Scotland, which could clash with their belief in the old Scottish nationhood. If a nation is old and authentic, it is very likely that the nation is also pure and homogeneous. Advocating the purity of the nationhood in contemporary liberal democracy, however, could be a suicidal act for any political party which aims to become a mainstream force. In the case of Scotland, this potential problem has been solved by portraying Scottish history as one of continuous intermingling of different peoples.[64] Therefore, the SNP can advocate the old and authentic nationhood while championing the idea of a civic and multicultural Scotland. Asking the 'When is the nation?' question in the contemporary Scottish context does not reveal when the Scottish nation was irrefutably formed or whether the Scottish nation exists; it demonstrates, rather, some of the ways in which the idea of nationhood are mobilised in contemporary society. This would lead us to look closely at what role nations and nationalism play in the modern world. In the absence of any agreement as to what essentially constitutes nations and nationalism, what one can expect from theories of nations and nationalism is probably some guidance on how to understand the 'Why is the nation?' question better. Investigating why nations and nationalism are mobilised under some circumstances but not under others seems not only to offer more insight into what nations and nationalism mean in a particular setting but also offers another way of approaching what they are.

It has also transpired that discussions of the 'When' question in each case cannot be divorced from the political agendas of the participants. The Scottish context is interesting in this respect since the perennialist position – that of the SNP for instance – has accommodated the civic vision of the Scottish nation. This has become necessary both because of the prevailing idea that civic nationalism is good while ethnic nationalism is bad, and because of the acceptance of the civic idea of nationhood by the main actors in Scotland. As a result, a claim for the 'oldness' of the Scottish nation is now sitting with a claim of inclusiveness and plurality, not with a claim of purity of the nation.

WHY DID THEY NOT BARK IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY?

What is often described as a paradox of Scottish nationalism is the apparent absence of a movement demanding Scottish independence during the late eighteenth century and for most of the nineteenth century.[65] While many of the nations on the continent were actively seeking independence, Scotland, which lost its independence as recently as 1707 through its union with England, did not experience any significant movement in a similar vein except for the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745. The desire for some sort of autonomy did not crystallise as a political movement until the very end of the nineteenth century when the Scottish Home Rule Association was founded in 1886.[66] Curiously, however, the Scots of the time were not complacent about their nationhood; Scotland produced Walter Scott and James Macpherson whose works were quests for an authentic Scottish past and were translated into foreign languages and stimulated nationalist movements elsewhere, but not in Scotland. This section will, therefore, examine the 'absence' of political nationalism in Scotland under the Union.

Despite the disagreement about the origin of the nation, most of the theorists of nationalism agree that national*ism* is a modern phenomenon. Nationalism occurs when, according to Gellner, an agrarian society transforms itself into an industrial society in order to secure cultural homogeneity which is an essential condition of a modern society, or, according to Hobsbawm, when the political elite needs legitimation from the masses for democratisation or revolutionary processes. Nairn argues that nationalism is an invitation issued by the threatened intelligentsia to the masses to save and maintain their societies. Others take the growth of bureaucratic states as a key factor in the rise of nationalism; nationalism provides legitimacy for the new type of states which started emerging around the late seventeenth century.

All the conditions mentioned above existed in the Scotland of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Industrialisation in Scotland took off around the mid-eighteenth century, which led to unprecedented economic and population growth.[67] There were continual waves of improvement in the agricultural sector while the Scottish economy was becoming less and less dependent on agriculture. The distribution of the population also changed. The notorious Highland Clearances were carried out most intensively in the early nineteenth century to implement a new form of sheep farming. It left the Highlands deserted and many crofters looked for their livelihoods by emigrating to Glasgow, Australia and Canada. Scotland was transforming itself into an urban society. The proportion of the population living in towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants rose from 17 per cent in 1800 to 32 per cent in 1850, and to 50 per cent in 1890.[68] Scotland had a sizable bourgeoisie during this period. The Anglicisation of Scottish society accelerated as the political centre became firmly fixed in London.[69] The British state, which survived the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745, the last civil war fought on the British soil, endured the shock of American independence, and fought off Napoleonic campaigns. Meanwhile, India was added to its Empire. As the British state expanded, dissatisfaction about the nature of political representation especially among the working class was growing in lowland Scotland from the late eighteenth century. The office of the Secretary of State for Scotland, which was originally established by David II (1329–71) was abolished in 1747. Despite all these conditions, political nationalism, that is, a movement for regaining lost independence, never took off in Scotland. The desire for autonomy created a handful of associations towards the end of the nineteenth century, but none of these sought for independence.

From the Union of 1707 until the end of the nineteenth century, the level of intellectual and cultural activities in Scotland was one of the highest in the world. There was the Scottish Enlightenment in the late eighteenth century, which produced such eminent scholars as David Hume (1711–77), Adam Smith (1723–90), Adam Fergusson (1723–1816), Thomas Reid (1710–96), and William Robertson (1721–93). There were successive waves of inventions from the 'hotbeds of genius': James Watt (1736–1819) revolutionalised the steam engine by separating the condenser; the world's first steamboat, the *Charlotte Dundas*, was equipped with the engine which William Symington (1763–1831) built; and many more followed.[70] Scotland also commanded respect from the world for its literary achievement. Robert Burns (1759–96), son of a small farmer, enjoyed an international reputation as the national poet

of Scotland. He composed in Scots, and his works were translated into many languages. As many Scots emigrated to Canada, Australia and elsewhere, Burns' Clubs also spread over the globe. *Ossian*, which was heralded as the long-lost epic of ancient Gaelic heroes of Scotland, was published in 1760. This was, as it turned out, in part a forgery by James Macpherson (1738–96). Nevertheless, it was eagerly read by both Scottish and European readers. *Ossian* triggered a 'long line of nationalist epic literary fakes' and inspired many nationalist movements on the continent.[71] In Scotland, it certainly stimulated the mushrooming of antiquarian and historical societies but did not produce a nationalist movement for independence. Walter Scott (1771–1832) published a series of novels which fixed the Highlands as the essence of the Scottish past not only in Scottish minds, but, more broadly, also in British minds. He was a Scot who cared for Scotland and who shed tears over what he perceived as the erosion of Scottish culture but he did not seek to regain independence for Scotland. He was, at the same time, British and an imperialist. In a way, Scott is a personification of Scotland of this period: Scottish but, at the same time, British. A strong Scottish identity was not matched by a strong political movement in Scotland under the Union.

Why did political nationalism not take hold in the Scotland of this period? Trying to answer this question is an attempt to seek the conditions under which nationalism as a movement for independence takes off, which is why the Scottish case is important in the study of nationalism. There are several explanations offered so far. Tom Nairn concedes that the Scotland of this period had two of the most important components in the rise of nationalism: a rising middle class and an intelligentsia. Since Scotland, or more precisely the Lowlands, which were the power centre of Scotland, was overdeveloped instead of underdeveloped, it did not follow the usual path to nationalism. According to his scheme, the uneven development would produce the dissatisfied intelligentsia who would then initiate nationalism. This sense of dissatisfaction would be gradually diffused among the rising middle class who faced the disadvantages of underdevelopment. Together, they would form their own organic community to defend their culture which was seen as under threat from the centre and would seek an independent statehood as a means of safeguarding it. This process would eventually involve the masses, which is the main characteristic of nationalism. Because Scotland was overdeveloped, Nairn continues, the Scottish intelligentsia did not hold grievances against the British state nor did the middle class, hence the absence of political nationalism. Nairn also argues that Romanticism in Scotland

did not develop in the way it did in other parts of Europe, which left the Scottish intelligentsia 'rootless'. The Scottish intelligentsia deprived of nationalist missions, began to emigrate from Scotland in search of a greater mission in the world. All this meant that when the working class emerged in Scotland, they did not undergo cultural nationalisation, a further reason for the absence of political nationalism in Scotland.[72]

Graeme Morton and Lindsay Paterson question Nairn's equation of nationalism with the quest for independence. Morton, concentrating on the conflict of civil society and the centralisation of the state in the nineteenth century, argues that what Scotland experienced during this period was not the absence of nationalism but what he calls 'unionist nationalism'.[73] Nationalism in the Scotland of the period took the form of unionist nationalism rather than the movement for independence because the British state did not intervene in Scottish civil society. Since civil society in Scotland was fairly autonomous and benefited from the Union, particularly from its participation in the running of the Empire, the Scottish middle class had no reason to break out of the Union with England. What they did want to achieve, however, was Scotland's equality with England under the Union.[74] When the centralisation of the British state reached the point of undermining the autonomy of Scottish civil society, there arose a desire for home rule. Paterson's argument also focuses on the nature of the pre-twentieth-century British state and the autonomy of Scotland.[75] Scotland as a small nation living next to a big, powerful neighbour made a rational choice based on 'realpolitik' to go for union with England, but the eighteenth-century British state allowed the Scots to govern themselves.[76] This arrangement was developed into a Scottish system of government in the nineteenth century, which ensured the unhindered development of Scottish civil society and culture. As a result, there was no need, according to Paterson, for the Scottish middle class to break out of the Union in order to express itself.

What all the three scholars consider as significant is that the middle class in Scotland during that period was content and had few grievances against the British state. This was the result of the nature of the British state of the time; it was, for Nairn, a post-absolutist state as well as, for Morton and Paterson, a non-interventionist one. Nairn goes on to argue that the contented middle class made the potential nationalist intelligentsia, a crucial element in his model of nationalism, functionless. A consequence of this was that Scotland failed to conform to the general scheme of nationalism. Morton and Paterson reject the idea that Scotland was an exception in the wider current of nation-

alism of the time and instead, propose a more flexible definition of nationalism. For them, nationalism does not have to seek outright independence; the nationalisms of small nations, because of geopolitical constraints, often pursue the aim of achieving a considerable degree of autonomy. In short, the issue is wrongly posed; it is the equating of nationalism with the movement to achieve independence that failed in comprehending the Scottish case.

There is considerable evidence to demonstrate that even after the death of Walter Scott, in the period in which Nairn maintains the drain of intellectuals from Scotland occurred, Scottish identity remained strong and expressed itself in various ways. According to Morton, in the period 1830–60, the Scottish middle class was busy erecting Scott and Wallace monuments, commemorating the centenary of the birth of Robert Burns and making an attempt to build the National Monument on Carlton Hill in Edinburgh with the participation of the working class.[77] As the significance of monuments and public ceremonies in nationalism and in the maintenance of national identity has been extensively discussed, there is no need to repeat it. It should suffice to point out, as the above evidence shows, that Scottish society was, despite the absence of a desire for independence, very concerned with itself and was making continuous efforts to maintain its identity.

This leads one to conclude that Scotland was not an exception in the age of nationalism. The expression of Scottish nationalism of the time was different from other cases for good reason – Scotland was already a nation which enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy under the Union. It also enjoyed the fruits of participation in the British Empire. Equating nationalism with the movement for independence is inadequate since nationalism is about securing the unity, autonomy and identity of the nation. For the Scots of this period, the way to advance Scottish interests was to participate in the project of the British Empire. The British Empire for the Scots was a means of leaving the footprints of this small nation in the wider world.[78] One of the aspirations behind any nationalist movement is to secure a respectable place for the nation amongst its fellow nations of the world. Scotland was achieving this by staying in the Union with England.[79] When the two conditions, that is, the non-interventionist state and the British Empire, were gone, Scottish nationalism came to be expressed in a different way, which will be discussed in Chapter 2.

NOTES

1. David McCrone, *Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of the Stateless Nation*, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 1.
2. For example, the Scottish National Party prints its Convener's message in three languages (English, Scots and Gaelic) in the annual conference agenda. It is not, however, required to advertise jobs, for instance, in three languages in Scotland.
3. Michael Lynch, *Scotland: A New History* (London: Pimlico, 1992), pp. xiii–xv; Bruce Webster, *Medieval Scotland: the Making of an Identity* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 12–16.
4. The *Census 2001* gives 58,650 (1.2 per cent of the Scottish population) as the number of Gaelic speakers. This represents a decline of 11 per cent compared to the 1991 figure. The decline of the number of Gaelic speakers is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: The Number of Gaelic Speakers, 1891–2001

Year	*No. of Speakers*	*Percentage (%)*
1891	254,415	6.3
1901	230,806	5.2
1911	202,398	4.3
1921	158,779	3.5
1931	136,135	2.8
1951	95,447	1.9
1961	80,978	1.6
1971	84,580	1.6
1981	79,297	1.6
1991	65,978	1.3
2001	58,650	1.2

Source: Census 1991 and 2001.

5. In 1984, Kirk membership was 907,920. As of 2001 the Church of Scotland estimates the size of its membership as 600,000. According to Peter Brierley and Fergus Macdonald, *Prospect for Scotland: Report of the 1984 Census of the Churches* (London: MARC Europe, 1985), only 17 per cent of the adult population in Scotland attended church of any denomination every week. According to the Scottish Social Attitudes survey of 2000, while 40.9 per cent of the respondents described themselves as having no religion, those describing themselves as Presbyterian was 35.3 per cent and as Roman Catholic was 13.4 per cent.
6. T. C. Smout, *A History of the Scottish People 1560–1830* (London: Fontana, 1972), p. 312; Lynch, *Scotland*, p. 363.
7. In medieval history writing, there are a few references to Scottish 'racial' solidarity. This should be understood as an expression of a desire for a sense of homogeneity of Scottish society, rather than an accurate description of it. With at least three languages, Gaelic, English and French, spoken, the desire to unite people of all kinds in the name of Scotland seems to have been strong. See Alexander Grant, 'Aspects of National Consciousness in Medieval Scotland', in Claus Bjørn *et al*. (eds), *Nations, Nationalism and Patriotism in the European Past* (Copenhagen: Academic Press, 1994), pp. 68–95.
8. Colin Kidd, 'Teutonist Ethnology and Scottish Nationalist Inhibition, 1780–1880', *Scottish Historical Review*, 74, 197 (1995), pp. 45–68.
9. Racism in Scotland often expresses itself as an anti-English feeling which materialises in the form of organisations like 'Settlers Watch' and 'Scottish Watch'. On the other hand, support for the British National Party (BNP), which is the main anti-immigrant party in the United Kingdom, remains lower than that of England.

10. Lindsay Paterson *et al*., *New Scotland? New Politics?* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), pp. 118–9.
11. This is a crude comparison which tends to ignore the different contexts in which Scotland, Latvia and Estonia are found. Nonetheless, it is employed as a way of demonstrating the 'civic' nature of contemporary Scottish nationalism by nationalists and devolutionists alike.
12. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds), *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 17–18; H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 171–9.
13. Stalin's four criteria are a common language, a common territory, a common economic life and a common psychological make-up. It should be noted that Stalin drew up his definition of the nation in order to deny any autonomous status to the Jews (Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (London: Methuen, 1977)), pp. 3–4. This episode eloquently illustrates the centrality of the concept of the nation in the modern world. It also explains why there is so much confusion over the term 'nation'. In the world of 'nation-states' where we live, the definition of the nation has a high political stake.
14. Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, p. 116.
15. McCrone, *Understanding Scotland*, pp. 26–33.
16. Lynch, *Scotland*, p. 39.
17. Ibid., p. 88.
18. Because of the geography, the dispute over the northern border with Scandinavian countries has not had a strong impact on the sense of Scottishness. It has, of course, influenced how people of Orkney and the Shetland Islands, which were part of the Norwegian territory up to 1472, see themselves. On the Anglo-Scottish border, Berwick-upon-Tweed is an interesting case. Berwick was taken by the English in 1296, then changed hands many times till 1482 when it finally fell into English hands.
19. Lynn Bennie, Jack Brand and James Mitchell, *How Scotland Votes: Scottish Parties and Elections* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 134–5.
20. Lynch, *Scotland*, p. 93; Webster, *Medieval Scotland*, p. 70.
21. On 18 May 1843, 474 ministers of the Church of Scotland broke away from the Kirk to form the Free Church of Scotland. This was caused by a bitter dispute over the relationship between the Kirk and state.
22. Richard Finlay, 'Controlling the Past: Scottish Historiography and Scottish Identity in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', *Scottish Affairs*, 9 (1994), pp. 127–43.
23. Isobel Lindsay, 'The Uses and Abuses of National Stereotypes', *Scottish Affairs*, 19, (1997) pp. 133–48.
24. The 'democratic intellect' and 'Lad o'Pairts' will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
25. William Miller, Annis May Timpson and Michael Lessnoff, *Political Culture in Contemporary Britain: People and Politicians, Principles and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 39–40 and p. 370.
26. The phrase 'Bearsden man' is coined by James Mitchell of the University of Strathclyde to characterise Scottish political culture. Bearsden is a wealthy suburb of Glasgow with a matching social profile to that of south-east England. Unlike their counterparts in England, Bearsden men and women are not necessarily Tory supporters because of their strong 'sense of community'. See N. Cohen, 'Can Essex Man be Tempted North of the Border?', *Independent on Sunday*, 22 January 1995.
27. This section has appeared in A. Ichijo, 'The Scope of Theories of Nationalism: Comments on the Scottish and Japanese Experiences', *Geopolitics*, 7, 2 (2002), pp. 53–74.
28. Scottish National Party, *Scotland: A European Nation* (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 1992), p. 4.
29. Walker Connor, 'When is a Nation?', *Ethnic Racial Studies*, 13, 1 (1990), pp. 92–103. A similar point was again made in Walker Connor, 'From Tribe to Nation?', *History of European Ideas*, 13, 1–2 (1991), pp. 5–18 which is now reproduced in Walker Conner, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 210–26.

30. For theoretical discussion of these positions, see John Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism* (London: Fontana, 1994) and Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London: Routledge, 1998).
31. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 55.
32. It also follows that there is no post-modern nation since the nation is intrinsic to modernity.
33. Ernest Gellner, 'Reply: Do Nations have Navels?', *Nations and Nationalism*, 2, 3 (1996), pp. 66–70.
34. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 44.
35. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality,* 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 14.
36. Ibid., pp. 46–79.
37. Ibid., p. 47.
38. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 44.
39. Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain,* pp. 123–4.
40. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. edn (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 80–90.
41. William Ferguson, *The Identity of the Scottish Nation: An Historic Quest* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p. 19.
42. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, pp. 5–7.
43. Ibid., pp. 21-42.
44. Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 70-1.
45. Ibid., p.3; Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p. 5.
46. Hastings, *Construction of Nationhood*, pp. 70–1; Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p. 26; Ferguson, *Identity of the Scottish Nation*, p. 13.
47. Ferguson, *Identity of the Scottish Nation*, p. 25; Lynch, *Scotland*, p. 53.
48. For an excellent account of the Wars of Independence, see G. W. S. Barrow, *Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland*, 3rd edn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988).
49. Grant, 'Aspects of National Consciousness in Medieval Scotland', pp. 68–95.
50. The community of the realm was also found in medieval England and France. See Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900–1300* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 262.
51. The 'Stone of Scone' or 'Stone of Destiny' on which successive Scottish kings were crowned was taken to England by Edward I in the course of this raid. The Stone was, after 700 years, returned to Scotland in November 1996.
52. Grant, 'Aspects of National Consciousness', pp. 83–5.
53. For instance, G. M. Trevelyan described the revolt led by William Wallace as follows:

> This unknown knight, with little but his great name to identify him in history, had lit a fire which nothing since has ever put out. Here, in Scotland, contemporaneously with the very similar doings in Switzerland, a new ideal and tradition of wonderful potency was brought into the world; it had no name then, but now we should call it democratic patriotism. It was not the outcome of theory. The unconscious qualities of a people had given it reality in a sudden fire of rage. Theories of nation-hood and theories of democracy would follow afterwards to justify or explain it. Meanwhile, it stood up, a fact. (G. M. Trevelyan, *History of England* (London: Longman, 1937), p. 218.)

54. Grant, 'Aspects of National Consciousness', pp. 86-8.
55. Ferguson, *Identity of the Scottish Nation*, p. 27.
56. Grant, 'Aspects of National Consciousness', p. 78.
57. Ferguson, *Identity of the Scottish Nation*, pp. 43–53.
58. Grant, 'Aspects of National Consciousness'; Lynch, *Scotland*, pp. 133–4.
59. Ferguson, *Identity of the Scottish Nation*, p. 46; Grant, 'Aspects of National

Consciousness', pp. 79–80.
60. Lynch, *Scotland*, p. 113.
61. Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities*, p. 274; Barrow, *Robert Bruce*, pp. 306–11.
62. Grant, 'Aspects of National Consciousness', *Identity of the Scottish Nation*, and Alexander Grant, 'The Middle Ages: The Defence of Independence', in Rosalin Mitchison (ed.), *Why Scottish History Matters* (Edinburgh: Saltire Society, 1991), pp. 15–25.
63. Ferguson, *ibid.*, p. 42.
64. The idea of a heterogeneous Scotland is widely held in contemporary Scotland. For instance, the exhibits in the Museum of Scotland which opened in 1999 are organised along this idea. Some would even argue that because of this historical awareness, Scottish society has been relatively more open to the so-called 'new immigrants', absorbing them as 'new Scots' (Bashir Maan, *The New Scots: The Story of Asians in Scotland* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992)).
65. This puzzlement is shared by many scholars of nationalism. For instance, Tom Nairn devotes a chapter ('Scotland and Europe') in his *The Break-Up of Britain*.
66. The National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR), a pressure group to express Scottish grievances against the British government formed in 1853, is arguably the first organisation which signals the rise of political nationalism in Scotland. However, NAVSR did not demand devolution, let alone independence. NAVSR was, as Morton argues, an expression of a certain kind of nationalism which does not take the form of demand for autonomy. See Graeme Morton, *Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland, 1830–1860* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1999).
67. Lynch, *Scotland*, p. 406.
68. Ibid., p. 411.
69. Walter Scott, around 1806 when some changes in the administration of justice in Scotland were discussed, lamented: 'little by little, whatever your wishes may be, you will destroy and undermine, until nothing of what makes Scotland Scotland shall remain'. (Paul H. Scott, *Walter Scott and Scotland* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1981), pp. 69–70).
70. The pamphlet published by the Scottish Office, *Scotland in Profile*, lists 17 names as Scottish genius who contributed to industry and science by inventing and discovering something.
71. Raymond Pearson, *European Nationalism 1789–1920* (London: Longman, 1994), p. 209.
72. Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain*, pp. 105–25.
73. Graeme Morton, 'Scottish Rights and "Centralisation" in the Mid-Nineteenth Century', *Nations and Nationalism*, 2, 2 (1996), pp. 257–80; Morton, *Unionist Nationalism, passim*.
74. Morton, *Unionist Nationalism*, p. 138.
75. Lindsay Paterson, *The Autonomy of Modern Scotland* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), pp. 44–5 and pp. 70–2.
76. This is a most striking feature of Scottish society of this period, which has caught many scholars' attention. For instance, Christopher Harvie describes it as 'semi-independence', which 'non-national nationalism' of Scotland secured (Christopher Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics 1707–1994*, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 34–43).
77. Morton, *Unionist Nationalism*, pp. 155–88.
78. For the details of Scottish participation in the Empire, see Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism*, ch. 2 and Michael Fry, *The Scottish Empire* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2001).
79. The participation in the British Empire was the policy adopted by both home-rule movements and the SNP before the Second World War. John McCormick, one of the founders of the SNP and the Scottish Convention, wrote in 1932 that Scots had certain obligations to the British Empire and therefore had to compromise would-be Scottish sovereignty in foreign policy (Richard Finlay, *Independent and Free: Scottish*

Politics and the Origins of the Scottish National Party 1918–1945 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1994), p. 103). This demonstrates the extent to which the British Empire had penetrated into Scottish life by the interwar period. It is possibly these years when the Scottish commitment to imperialist ideals reached its peak (Michael Fry, *Patronage and Principle: A Political History of Modern Scotland* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), p. 209).

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The Emergence of the 'Scotland and Europe' Theme

Scottish nationalism, the dog that failed to bark in the nineteenth century, featured prominently in newspaper headlines in the second half of the twentieth century. What is more, it was instrumental in the realisation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. Whether the Scottish Parliament is the most effective means of taking the steam out of Scottish nationalism or the first step on the slippery slope to independence remains to be seen. Although the initial excitement about the Parliament has subsided amongst the Scottish voters, it is also clear that according to them the Scottish Parliament is here to stay.[1] In short, the setting has changed, and the change – the Parliament – is not going to disappear in the foreseeable future.

This chapter provides the immediate background to what this book is concerned with: the emergence of the 'Scotland and Europe' theme in Scottish nationalism. It charts the recent development of Scottish nationalism from the surge of political nationalism in Scotland in the 1960s to the present.

THE SURGE OF POLITICAL NATIONALISM IN SCOTLAND[2]

Scottish nationalism clearly entered a different stage during the 1960s when the Scottish National Party (SNP), founded in 1934, started to gain more and more electoral support. The rise of the SNP in the 1960s and 1970s attracted much attention from scholars since it came as something of a 'surprise'.[3] By the latter half of the twentieth century, the negative image of nationalism had been firmly established with its connotations of irrationality and violence. Moreover, nationalism had come to be regarded as a characteristic of the developing world of Asia and Africa, not the developed and 'advanced' world of the West. The growth of nationalism within an industrial society was, therefore, unexpected. A number of attempts have been made to explain the surge of political nationalism in Scotland in the late twentieth century, which are not repeated here.[4] What needs to be pointed out here is that scholars agree that the surge of Scottish nationalism was not an

irrational phenomenon of a society reverting back to its atavistic tendencies, but rather a response to social change which mainly took place in the postwar era and can be explained by a variety of factors. Tracing the development of Scottish nationalism which culminated with the 1979 referendum will be focused on, in order to demonstrate how nationalism had become a significant force in Scottish society in the late twentieth century. This is a necessary step in order to establish the context wherein the ideas about the Scoto-European relationship have evolved since the SNP was instrumental in placing the issue of 'Europe' at the centre-stage of debates about Scotland's future.

In examining Scottish nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, the ideal types of political and cultural nationalism offer the starting point. Political and cultural nationalisms, although they may complement each other, are two different phenomena. Political nationalism is a kind of nationalism which primarily seeks autonomous state institutions. Cultural nationalism is, on the other hand, more concerned with the moral regeneration of a community.[5] Since the principal objective of political nationalism is to gain autonomy/independence, support for a nationalist party provides a good indication of its presence. From this perspective, it was political nationalism that was on the rise in the Scotland of the 1960s.

The Scottish National Party was established as the only nationalist party in Scotland in 1934 as a result of merger of the National Party for Scotland (founded in 1928) and the Scottish Party (founded in 1931). Both parties were set up as pressure groups to put forward the case for Scottish self-government. While the National Party for Scotland inclined towards left-wing politics, the Scottish Party was more right-wing, and the merger of these two parties with different political inclinations created a tension within the SNP which is still evident today.[6] The SNP remained politically insignificant for a long time. It secured the seat for Motherwell at the by-election in 1945 thanks to the wartime pact between the Conservatives and Labour, and held it for six weeks until the subsequent general election. Thereafter, the SNP's presence in Scottish politics dramatically weakened. Meanwhile, Scottish voters first gave firm support to the Conservatives, then helped the revival of the Liberals, but from the 1955 general election, steadily decreased their support for the Conservatives (see Appendix 2).[7] From the early 1960s, however, there were signs that the SNP was gradually establishing itself as a credible political power in Scotland. Ian MacDonald, standing for the SNP, gained 18 per cent of the vote cast at the Glasgow Bridgeton by-election in 1961. William Wolfe, the future SNP Chairman, came second with 23.3 per cent of the vote at

the West Lothian by-election in the following year. The local election of 1967 was a success for the SNP, gaining 69 seats across Scotland. Later in the year, a Glasgow solicitor, Winifred Ewing, won the Hamilton by-election and made history for the SNP. She arrived in London in a special train with pipers, stirring Scottish sentiment. In the following municipal elections in 1968, the SNP's performance was the best ever.

The SNP's victory at Hamilton sent a huge shock wave through the Scottish political system. The Conservatives, having set up a working group to consider the Scottish question, issued 'the Declaration of Perth' at the 1968 Party Conference promising a Scottish assembly. The Labour government, while denouncing nationalism, in 1969 appointed a Royal Commission on devolution under Lord Crowther who was later succeeded by Lord Kilbrandon. The Home Committee, appointed by the Conservatives, recommended an elected 'Scottish Convention' in 1970. At the 1970 general election, the SNP secured 11.4 per cent of the vote cast in Scotland, which translated into a seat for Western Isles. Then 1973 became a memorable year for Scottish nationalism. First, Gordon Wilson, another future Chairman of the SNP, came second to Labour securing 30.2 per cent of the vote at the Dundee East by-election. Later in the year, the Royal Commission on the Constitution (the Kilbrandon Report) was published, recommending legislative devolution to Scotland. Within a week of the publication of the report, Margo MacDonald won a seat for the SNP at the Govan by-election. Between 1974 and 1979, the frenzy for devolution, or for some, Scottish nationalism, peaked. At the February 1974 general election, the SNP won 21.9 per cent of the vote and secured seven seats and a White Paper on devolution was published. At the October 1974 general election, the SNP won 30.4 per cent of the vote and sent a 'football team' of 11 MPs to Westminster. More White Papers and government reports recommending a variety of forms of devolution for Scotland were published, and the Scotland and Wales Bill was introduced to the House of Commons in 1976.[8] The Bill was killed at the third reading in 1977 and the Labour minority government was forced to submit a separate Scotland Bill later in the same year, which went through successive turbulent readings and committees. In October 1978, the Scotland Bill was given Royal Assent and the date of the referendum was set for 1 March 1979.

The SNP decided to campaign for a 'Yes' vote but the Labour Party was divided. There were no financial subsidies from the government for the 'Yes' campaign. In addition, the 'Yes' side was divided. The Labour campaigners did not co-operate with the SNP supporters and there were two cross-party movements for a 'Yes' vote: 'Yes For

Scotland' and the 'Alliance For An Assembly'. Above all, the messages which these various pro-devolution campaigns were sending were contradictory. Labour and Liberals argued that devolution would strengthen the Union; the SNP's view was that a 'Yes' vote was a step towards independence. On the other hand, the 'Scotland Says No' campaign launched by the Tories was well-funded and Labour's 'No' campaign had the support of a few prominent Labour MPs. Their message was clear: a 'Yes' vote would destroy the Union.

There were other factors which affected the referendum, one of which was the 'Winter of Discontent'. The British public had to bear a succession of public sector strikes during the winter of 1978–79. The referendum then became an opportunity for the voters to express their anger at what was perceived as the government's incompetence rather than an opportunity to contemplate the possibility of a Scottish assembly. In addition, the former Tory Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, went on television just before the referendum to urge voters not to vote 'Yes', since the future Conservative government could deliver a better deal.

The result of the referendum was that 51.6 per cent voted 'Yes' and 48.4 per cent voted 'No'. Under the '40 per cent rule', which was inserted in the Bill at the last moment, in order to implement the Scotland Bill more than 40 per cent of the total electorate had to vote 'Yes'. The bill was defeated since those who voted 'Yes' turned out to constitute 32.9 per cent of the total electorate, thus failing to meet the requirement (see Appendix 2). The SNP parliamentary group put down a motion of no-confidence and effectively brought down the Labour government within a month. At the 1979 general election, the SNP lost nine of its seats and its share of votes was reduced to 17.2 per cent. Scottish nationalism seemed to be on the decline.

'INDEPENDENCE IN EUROPE'

At the general election that followed the defeat of the 1979 referendum, the right-wing Thatcher government came into power and electoral support for the SNP was almost halved. The momentum for more Scottish autonomy seemed to have gone. Scottish nationalism, however, had not disappeared: by the late 1980s, the SNP recovered its electoral support and, for a variety of reasons, pressure within Scottish society to establish a Scottish Parliament was mounting.[9] Many observers have noticed that the divergence between Scottish and English political culture has become more pronounced since the arrival of the Thatcher government. This appears to be due to differ-

ent socio-economic constraints that Scotland and England have been experiencing. For instance, the decline of the manufacturing industry was more severe in Scotland than in England,[10] while Scottish unemployment has been, on the whole, higher than the British average. Higher unemployment would mean more reliance on welfare provided by the state, which may in turn have translated into a more socialist political culture in Scotland while England was moving in a more liberal direction. The poll tax was another issue which seems to have contributed in antagonising the relationship between the Tory government and the Scottish voters.[11] However, exploring and evaluating these factors are not the task of this book. Instead, we focus here on a particular new element in the development of Scottish nationalism from 1979: the European dimension.[12] The SNP's adoption of the 'Independence in Europe' policy was the most striking sign of this new development. During the course of the 1980s, the SNP, which was known for its deep scepticism of the project of European integration, gradually transformed itself into the most pro-European party in Scotland and perhaps in the United Kingdom as a whole. The prominence of the European dimension was not confined to the SNP: the devolutionists who were campaigning for a Scottish Parliament, but not for independence, also began paying serious attention to it.

The 1979 general election was a disaster for the SNP; its share of the vote was reduced from 30.4 per cent to 17.3 per cent and the number of MPs dropped from eleven to two. The Thatcher government repealed the Scotland Act and devolution was no longer an issue under the Conservative government. Some politicians who supported devolution were also disillusioned. Malcom Rifkind, a then pro-devolution Tory, concluded that the Scottish public was not interested in devolution. The late John Smith, a then Labour backbencher who was to be put in charge of devolution in the shadow cabinet, was also disappointed. The SNP was experiencing the most painful split between the fundamentalists and gradualists over its strategy to achieve Scottish independence; its share of votes in the 1983 general election dropped to 11.7 per cent, although it managed to keep two seats. Given the drop in electoral support for the SNP, the decline of Scottish nationalism became a fashionable topic amongst academics.[13]

Quietly, however, things began to change. Support for constitutional change, be it a devolved parliament or independence, grew steadily through the 1980s. At the 1987 general election, the number of Conservative MPs was reduced to 10 from 21, although securing 24 per cent of the total vote cast in Scotland. The SNP's share of the vote increased to 14 per cent which translated to three seats. At the 1992

general election, contrary to pre-election speculation, the Tories in Scotland did not collapse, but slightly increased their standing by gaining 25.7 per cent of the vote and 11 seats. However, in terms of the percentage of vote, it was the SNP which increased its share the most with a 21.5 per cent share of the vote, thus securing three seats. With this result it was clear that the level of support for the SNP had recovered to its pre-referendum level. Nationalism in Scotland was reviving and one of its new features was the European dimension.

It is fair to say that 'Europe', in its all-encompassing sense, would never have gained such prominence in the development of Scottish nationalism had the SNP not launched its policy of 'Independence in Europe' in 1988. It is also fair to add that if there had not been something in Scottish society that was receptive to this idea, 'Europe' would have had little impact, as will be seen later. Here we will examine the launch and the effect of the SNP policy.

The 'Independence in Europe' policy was the brainchild of Jim Sillars, a one-time Labour member, who joined the SNP in 1980 after the collapse of the Scottish Labour Party, a splinter group of the Labour Party. He was a Euro-sceptic and campaigned fiercely against the continuation of Britain's EEC membership at the 1975 referendum. To him, the European Economic Community was, first of all, a capitalist project with an ever-increasing centralist tendency, to which a socialist Scotland should be opposed. However, in the 1980s he began campaigning for the 'Independence in Europe' policy. He articulated the case for independence in Europe in a pamphlet published in 1985 and then in a book in 1986.[14] In his argument, he first conceded that in the modern world absolute sovereignty of a state was impossible for geopolitical reasons and because of the globalisation of economy. According to him, the sovereignty of a modern state had to be relative, for example, restricted by mutual international agreements. Nonetheless it was important for Scotland to regain its sovereignty so that it could negotiate the terms of these binding agreements. He subsequently identified the most formidable obstacle in achieving Scottish independence as the fear of isolation/separation, especially the fear of severing the customs union with England. He then proposed independence in Europe as a means to safeguard the economy and industry of an independent Scotland, and to counter a more general fear of isolation. He clearly favoured an intergovernmental structure of the European Community to that of a federal one, since the former would allow a small state to exercise more influence in real terms than it could outside such a structure.[15] In short, his pro-European stance is that of a pragmatist and the 'Independence in Europe' policy, adopted at the

1988 SNP annual conference, was a realist and pragmatist strategy, not a wholehearted commitment to the 'ever-closer union' of European states.

Sillars seemed to have succeeded in tapping into the changing mood in the SNP. In the 1960s and 1970s, the SNP was known for its deep scepticism towards the EEC because it was perceived to be a capitalist, centralist and elitist project. To someone like Billy Wolf, who served as the Party Chairman from 1969 to 1979, it was an undemocratic institution with a strong centralist tendency and this was the view of the party.[16] The SNP campaigned for a 'No' vote at the 1975 referendum, but British membership of the EEC was endorsed. The SNP began to re-examine its policy towards the EEC and became keener to seek Scottish representation in the European institutions. After the defeat of the 1979 referendum and in the general election the same year, the first direct election to the European Parliament was held. A veteran nationalist, Winifred Ewing, who had a considerable influence within the party, was elected for the Highlands and Islands seat. She played a significant role in drawing the SNP's attention to the potential economic gain from the European Community (EC) and became a strong supporter of EC membership. At the 1983 Annual Conference, the SNP modified its position in regard to the EC and recommended Scottish membership, pending a post-independence referendum.[17] Sillars entered the debate on Europe when the overall direction of the SNP was shifting.

There was another element which prompted the policy change. The European Community itself underwent a huge change in the 1980s. The appointment of Jacques Delors as the President of the European Commission in 1985 is widely regarded as having been a catalyst for the change. His name is firmly associated with the revival of the EC which moved to establish a single market. The result was the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. Although the SEA was not presented as a move towards federalisation of the EC, the establishment of a single market inevitably touched almost all aspects of the Community's functions. The SEA, therefore, set the Community in motion and Europe became a big issue again. In Britain, too, interest in the European project was heightened, to which the SNP as an opposition party had to react. In other words, without the revival of the dynamics for further integration in Europe, the EC would not have occupied such a central place in SNP policies.

The SNP's adoption of the 'Independence in Europe' policy was described by many of the respondents in this book as being 'a master stroke' or 'a mature move'. It did not, however, bring about an

immediate increase in support for the SNP. The level of support for the policy remained higher than the level of support for the SNP itself: in other words, the 'Independence in Europe' policy was more popular than the SNP.[18] Although it did not prove to be a decisive vote-winner for the SNP, the policy set the context wherein the debate on the constitutional arrangement for Scotland was taking place. Labour and Liberal Democrats incorporated the European dimension in their respective Scottish policies, and the Tories emphasised the role of the Scottish Office in negotiations with the EC. Civic organisations working for a Scottish Parliament also started paying more attention to the EC membership question. By adopting the 'Independence in Europe' policy, the SNP fundamentally altered the framework from which Scottish nationalism evolved after the 1979 referendum.

The most notable feature of the development of Scottish nationalism since the 1979 referendum has been the prominence of the European dimension, which was highlighted by the SNP's newly adopted policy. The SNP's view of Europe is pragmatic and Europe is merely a means of achieving independence. As the European dimension received more and more attention, many different views of 'Europe' emerged and were articulated. The following section looks at in what way 'Europe' was represented by players other than the SNP during the course of devolution debates.

CIVIC POLITICS IN DEVOLUTION DEBATES

The term 'civic politics' refers to political initiatives and movements which operate beyond the domain of party politics. One of the distinctive features of the Scottish political scene between 1979 to 1997 was the so-called democratic deficit, whereby despite the fact that the majority of the MPs the Scottish electorate returned to the House of Commons came from the opposition parties, the government in London was formed by the Conservatives.[19] As a consequence, the weight carried by the conventional political parties in Scotland was effectively reduced since the influence they could exercise in the UK political arena did not match the level of support they enjoyed in Scotland. When established political parties are not in a position to bring about a change, and when the need for a change is keenly felt, people may opt to take the initiative by forming cross-party pressure groups and movements, which is what happened in Scotland. Following the defeat of the 1979 referendum and even after the 1992 general election, the Scottish people expressed their views through various civic groups, many of which worked for the realisation of a

Scottish Parliament. Civic politics has been a distinctive aspect of Scottish life since 1979 and reflects the process of reformulating Scottish identity which has taken place during the same period.

The Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA, later renamed as the Campaign for a Scottish Parliament) was formed in 1980 by those who supported the 'Yes For Scotland' camp at the 1979 referendum. The aim of the campaign was to establish 'a Scottish Assembly or Parliament with such powers as were desired by the Scottish people'. During the 1980s, when discussion of constitutional change was on the retreat, the CSA kept the devolution flag flying, and after the 1987 general election, the CSA formed a steering committee to discuss the establishment of a National Convention that would seek to build a consensus for a new home rule scheme. The committee produced a document entitled *A Claim of Right for Scotland* which set out the mechanics for the Convention in 1988.[20] The document was signed by many Scottish Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs, the representatives of local authorities, churches and voluntary organisations at the inauguration meeting of the Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1989 which was established on the basis of the document. The Scottish Constitutional Convention discussed the plan for a Scottish Parliament and published its report, *Scotland's Parliament, Scotland's Right*, at a grand ceremony held in the General Assembly Hall in Edinburgh in 1995. The document was to serve as the blueprint for a Scottish Parliament, the establishment of which was now a formal commitment of the British Labour Party. It is important to recognise that Labour's commitment has been won by these civic bodies.

The CSA was not the only body advocating the need for a Scottish Parliament under the Conservative government. There is an association called Common Cause, established by lawyers, civil servants and academics in 1992, which aims to provide a forum for discussion about a Scottish Parliament and democracy.[21] It has organised a number of meetings across Scotland to discuss the issues that it feels a Scottish Parliament should be discussing in order to help the Scottish people envisage what a possible Scottish Parliament would be like. Another association is Scotland United, a non-party political group of politicians, novelists and local councillors, which organised a spectacular march demanding a Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh just after the 1992 general election. It has been successful in staging more rallies across Scotland which have attracted many people.

There was a group called Democracy for Scotland which kept a vigil in front of the Parliament Building in Edinburgh, the then expected site of the Scottish Parliament, from the day after the 1992 general

election, in order to express their desire for the establishment of a Scottish Parliament. Reflecting the mushrooming of cross- and non-party organisations working for a Scottish Parliament, an umbrella body called the Coalition for Scottish Democracy was formed in 1993 to 'advance the broad movement for democratic renewal within our country'. In 1994, the Coalition established a Scottish Senate (later renamed the Scottish Civic Assembly), a forum where the representatives of local authorities, various civic organisations and churches in Scotland have debates on government policy, which is seen as a step towards empowering Scottish citizens.

Civic politics in Scotland was born out of the Scottish people's frustration with the existing political situation and has been articulating and expressing the Scottish people's desire for a constitutional change in the form of literature, declarations, meetings and marches. Just as it became part of contemporary Scottish society, it also contributed to the redefinition of Scottish identity. As one of the respondents in this book put it, to be a contemporary Scot was to be angry with the existing constitutional arrangements. In other words, being part of civic politics was to be a Scot, thus civic politics has added another dimension to Scottish identity.

What implication does the rise of civic politics have for ideas about the relationship between Scotland and Europe? Civic politics in Scotland seemed to have encouraged instrumental pro-European attitudes among the Scottish people. Although relations with the EU was not *the* issue for these organisations, many of them were aware of the role which the EU could play in advancing their cause. Most of their literature on relations with the EU point out the need for Scottish interests to be adequately represented in the EU institutions, where the existing system of representation was regarded as unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons. They were especially concerned with participation in the Committee of the Regions. Under the pre-devolution arrangement, the Scottish delegation to the Committee of the Regions was appointed by the Secretary of State and not directly accountable to the Scottish electorate. The Campaign for a Scottish Parliament wished to see more accountability in this regard, which was, they argued, only possible through the establishment of a Scottish Parliament.[22] The Scottish Constitutional Convention took a similar view. Scotland needed proper and accountable representation in the EU institutions and therefore, a democratically elected Scottish Parliament was even more important in order to promote Scottish interests in the EU.[23] It is worth noting that these bodies emphasised the importance of continuing participation in the EU for the future of Scotland

despite falling support for the EU which was evident in opinion polls. Their argument was based on the sober recognition of the significance of the EU in contemporary Scottish life which had built up over 20 years, combined with the desire for greater democracy. Europe, or more precisely, the European Union was perceived as a benefactor rather than a threat by these bodies because they saw it primarily as a means to advance Scottish interests and, to a certain extent, as an embodiment of social democracy for which they strived and with which they thought Scottish people had an affinity.

Civic bodies in Scotland calling for a redressing of what they saw as a democratic deficit in Scotland have added a new dimension to the meaning of being a contemporary Scot. At the same time, because they tended to present the EU as a potential good for Scotland rather than a burden, they strengthened the positive image of Europe. By achieving these two things, they established a link between a positive image of Europe and strong identification as a Scot. This is, of course, just one of many ideas about the relationship between Scotland and Europe that have been put into circulation, and is not the most influential one. What is significant is that another idea which links pro-Europeanness to Scottishness has been disseminated from a source other than the SNP. In this way, a range of ingredients for the construction of ideas about the Scoto-European relationship were made available in Scottish society during the devolution debates.

THE 1997 GENERAL ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

After the disappointment of the 1992 general election with which the Conservative government returned to power, the pressure for devolution in Scotland grew stronger. By then the Labour Party, the biggest party in Scotland, was formally committed to devolution and the Scottish voters had been further alienated from the Conservatives who were hostile to the idea of devolution in principle.[24] Following the publication of *Scotland's Parliament, Scotland's Right* by the Constitutional Convention in 1995, there emerged a consensus among the major political parties in Scotland that any future referendum on the establishment of a Scottish Parliament should include a question about its tax-varying power. Devolution was, however, not *the* issue of the 1997 general election, even in Scotland, and it was fought on familiar issues such as economy, employment, welfare and so on.

Nonetheless, the result of the 1997 general election was significant from the viewpoint of the development of Scottish nationalism. First, because the Labour Party won the majority, not only in Scotland, but

throughout Britain, devolution became an achievable goal. Second, the fact that no Tory MPs were returned from Scotland demonstrated the distinctiveness of Scottish politics, which appeared to be heightened. Concern over the possible 'break-up of Britain' surfaced yet again and the newly elected Labour government argued the case for devolution as a way of keeping the United Kingdom together.[25] Devolution was, according to Labour and the Liberal Democrats, good for Scotland and Wales, but it was also good for Britain as a whole because it would enhance the quality of democracy throughout the UK.[26]

As promised, the Labour government introduced the Referendum (Scotland and Wales) Bill in May 1997. It set out who was eligible to vote and stipulated that the referenda would be pre-legislative ones. It was confirmed that eligible voters for the 1997 referenda were those who were normally entitled to vote in local government elections. This meant EU citizens who resided in Scotland and Wales were eligible to vote but those Scots and Welsh who resided outside their respective areas were not. This was seized on, especially in Scotland, by civic bodies as well as political parties as another sign of the victory of the civic definition of Scottishness over the ethnic one. Two questions were put to the Scottish voters at the referendum: one on whether a Scottish Parliament should be established, and the other on whether the Parliament should have a tax-varying power. Pro-parliament parties, the Labour, the Liberal Democrats and SNP, joined forces with civic bodies to form 'Scotland Forward' to campaign for the 'Yes–Yes' vote, while the Conservatives led the 'Think Twice' campaign urging the voters to reject the devolution plan. Interest in the planned Parliament shown by the Scots was strong. In July a White Paper on Scottish Parliament, *Scotland's Parliament*, was published and it was a number one bestseller for weeks in Scotland. The referendum took place on 11 September, and the 'Yes' vote for the first question constituted 74.3 per cent of the total vote cast, and for the second, 63.5 per cent. Following this unambiguous endorsement for the establishment of a Scottish Parliament and for the granting of a tax-varying power, the Scotland Bill was introduced in December to work out the nuts and bolts. One of the most distinct features of the plan for the Scottish Parliament was the electoral procedure. A combination of the conventional first-past-the-post system (constituencies) and additional-member system (regional list) was to be used to elect 129 members to the Scottish Parliament.[27] It has long been argued that proportional representation returns a result which reflects voters' preference more faithfully than the conventional UK method. Incorporation of proportional represen-

tation means no single party can dominate the Parliament, which makes building and managing coalitions essential: a rather un-British way of practising politics. Some optimistically predicted a revolution in British politics, 'A new dawn of British politics', starting from the new Parliament.

The first election of the Scottish Parliament was held on 6 May 1999. Labour won the largest number of seats – 56 – with 53 constituency seats and 3 regional list seats. The SNP became the second largest with 35 seats (7 constituency and 28 regional list), followed by the Conservatives (18 seats – 0 for constituencies and 18 from the regional list) and the Liberal Democrats (17 seats – 12 constituency seats and 5 regional list seats). The Scottish Socialist Party and the Green Party each won a list seat, while Dennis Canavan, standing as an Independent following a row with the Labour Party, won Falkirk West. Failing to secure the absolute majority, the Labour Party struck a deal with the Liberal Democrats to form a coalition and it was expected some divergence in policies would emerge between the Westminster and Scottish Parliaments. The new Parliament met on 12 May 1999, and Winifred Ewing, by virtue of being the oldest member, announced: 'The Scottish parliament, adjourned on the 25th day of March, 1707, is hereby reconvened.' The Parliament was officially opened by Queen Elizabeth II on 1 July the same year. In reply to the Queen's speech, the then First Minister, the late Donald Dewar, gave a speech which was full of references to Scottish history and expressions of nationalist sentiments as well as the aspirations of devolutionists.

'Scotland and Europe' was not the major issue during the referendum or the Scottish Parliament election campaigns. However, as many commentators agree, the European dimension remains important.[28] The SNP still advocates 'Independence in Europe' and therefore the debates about the constitutional arrangement are about the choice between maintaining the status quo with a degree of devolution or independence in the European Union. According to the Scottish Social Attitude survey of 2000, 47.3 per cent of the respondents chose maintaining the status quo as their preferred option while 19.3 per cent wanted to see independence in the EU, suggesting that independence in Europe is not a forgotten issue in post-devolution Scotland.[29] The relationship between the Scottish Executive and Parliament on the one hand and the EU on the other is still being debated, since the former has not been granted the competence to represent Scotland at the Committee of the Regions. In addition, as mentioned earlier, recent surveys have found that Scottish

national identity is now linked to a less hostile attitude towards the EU.[30] Given that the sense of being Scottish shows little sign of weakening in contemporary Scotland, its association with the EU will linger on for a while, if not be further accentuated. The European dimension has therefore become an integrated feature of contemporary Scottish society and of contemporary Scottish nationalism. It will not be easily discarded and will continue to colour the path Scottish nationalism takes.

NOTES

1. John Curtice and Ben Seyd, 'Is Devolution Strengthening or Weakening the UK?', in Alison Park *et al*. (eds), *British Social Attitudes, the 18th Report: Public Policy, Social Ties* (London: Sage and National Centre for Social Research, 2001), pp. 227–44.
2. Alan Clements, Kenny Farquharson and Kirsty Wark, *Restless Nation* (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1996), James Mitchell, *Strategies for Self-Government: The Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1996) and William Wolfe, *Scotland Lives: The Quest for Independence* (Edinburgh: Reprographia, 1973) are particularly relevant to this section.
3. For the details of academe's reaction to the surge of nationalism in the West, see Walker Connor, 'Ethnonationalism in the First World: The Present in Historical Perspective', in Milton Esman (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 19–45.
4. There is a large amount of literature trying to explain the surge of Scottish nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s. Michael Hechter put forward the internal colonialism theory (Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975); 'Internal Colonialism Revisited', in Edward Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski (eds), *New Nationalisms of the Developed West* (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 17–26) which has been disputed by many sociologists including David McCrone (McCrone, *Understanding Scotland*). Milton Esman stressed the importance of the discovery of North Sea oil (Milton Esman, 'Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict in Industrial Societies', in Milton Esman (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*, pp. 371–90), on the importance of which many commentators agree. Jack Brand explains it as an expression of Scottish voters' alienation from the central government (Jack Brand, 'National Consciousness and Voting in Scotland', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 10, 3 (1987), pp. 334–48; 'Scotland', in Michael Watson (ed.), *Contemporary Minority Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 24–37). Christopher Harvie provides a comprehensive historical account of the recent surge of nationalism in Scotland (Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism*). More recently, Bennie *et al.* (*How Scotland Votes*, ch. 1) have provided a concise survey of possible factors that might have contributed to the rise of political Scottish nationalism in the period.
5. Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism*, pp. 39–46; Kosaku Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 1–2.
6. Mitchell, *Strategies for Self-Government*, pp. 172–90; Finlay, *Independent and Free*, pp. 71–125.
7. In the late 1940s, the Scottish Covenant led by John MacCormick drew up the petition to demand home rule, which was allegedly signed by nearly 2 million Scots. The Covenant, however, proved to be insignificant in electoral terms and was ignored by the main political parties as well as the government. See Jonathan Hearn, *Claiming Scotland: National Identity and Liberal Culture* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 2000), p. 165.

8. A White Paper, 'Our Changing Democracy', which advocates a 142-member legislative assembly with considerable powers retained by the Secretary of State for Scotland, was published in November 1975. 'Devolution to Scotland and Wales: Supplementary Statement' was published in August 1976, 'Devolution – the English Dimension' was published in November 1976. See Mitchell, *Strategies for Self-Government*, pp. 318–19.
9. See, for example, David Denver *et al.*, *Scotland Decides: The Devolution Issue and the Scottish Referendum* (London: Frank Cass, 2000) and Hearn, *Claiming Scotland*.
10. Devine, *The Scottish Nation,* p. 592.
11. Ibid., pp. 603–4.
12. The SNP's pro-European stance was not, in fact, new. From the early 1940s to 1950s, the SNP had adopted a positive attitude towards the pan-European movement and the idea of setting up a European community. It did not, however, help to enhance the electoral appeal of the SNP at that time. Moreover, the European dimension had little impact on the development of Scottish nationalism in the late 1960s or 1970s. For details, see Peter Lynch, *Minority Nationalism and European Integration* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996), pp. 27–9, and Murray Pittock, *Scottish Nationality* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 126.
13. For instance, see Mark Kauppi, 'The Decline of the Scottish National Party 1977–81: Political and Organisational Factors', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 5, 3 (1982), pp. 326–48.
14. J. Sillars, *Scotland: Moving On and Up in Europe* (Edinburgh: privately publ., 1985); *Scotland: The Case for Optimism* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1986).
15. Sillars, *Scotland: The Case for Optimism*, pp. 181–91.
16. Lynch, *Minority Nationalism*, pp. 29–36.
17. Mitchell, *Strategies for Self-Government*, p. 233; Lynch, *Minority Nationalism*, pp. 37–8.
18. For instance, in 1994, when the level of support for the SNP was around 30 per cent, a poll reported that 48 per cent of the respondents thought that an independent Scotland within Europe would be better off. See Lynch, *Minority Nationalism*, pp. 43–4.
19. Jonathan Hearn argues that the situation should be seen as a North–South divide in which a division emerged between the Conservative-supporting south of England and the Labour-supporting north of England, Wales and Scotland. However, he agrees that although the fault line did not coincides with a national one, that is, it did not divide Britain into England and Scotland, because of the characteristics of Scottish society, the situation was seized upon as a national one (Hearn, *Claiming Scotland*, p. 51).
20. For the significance of *A Claim of Right for Scotland*, see Lindsay Paterson, *A Diverse Assembly: The Debate on a Scottish Parliament* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1194), p. 144 and Hearn, *Claiming Scotland*, *passim*.
21. According to a founder of Common Cause, Professor William Storrar, Common Cause does not have any connection with a body of the same name in the United States (personal communication, 4 April 2004). Common Cause is one of the bodies which has helped to set up the Scottish Civic Forum, of which it is now a member.
22. Campaign for a Scottish Parliament, *Campaigners' Briefing Pack* (Edinburgh: Campaign for a Scottish Parliament, 1994).
23. Scottish Constitutional Convention, *Scotland's Parliament, Scotland's Right* (Edinburgh: Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995).
24. Denver *et al.*, *Scotland Decides*, ch. 2.
25. Interestingly, the Labour government, while pushing for devolution, sought to reassure English voters by equating the power of a future Scottish Parliament with that of a parish council. In particular, Tony Blair's assertion 'sovereignty rests with me as an English MP and that's the way it will stay' infuriated the Scottish opinion. See 'Real Power Will Stay With MPs in England, Blair tells Scotland', *The Scotsman*, 4 April 1997 and the leading article 'The Meaning of Home Rule', *The Scotsman*, 5 April 1997.

26. Critique of this approach can be found, for instance, in Tom Nairn, *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited* (London: Verso, 1997).
27. The additional-member system is sometimes described as a form of proportional representation (Vernon Bogdanor, *Devolution in the United Kingdom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 219) but Peter Catterall argues that it is not (Peter Catterall, 'The Politics of Electoral Reform Since 1885', in Peter Catterall *et al.* (eds), *Reforming the Constitution: Debates in Twentieth-Century Britain* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 129–57).
28. Paterson, *A Diverse Assembly*, p. 227.
29. The results of the 2000 survey are available at http://www.natcen.ac.uk/research/surveys/ssas/ssa_2000_contents.htm.
30. Curtice and Seyd, 'Is Devolution Strengthening or Weakening the UK?', p. 240.

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The Evolution of the Idea of Europe

In the late 1980s, 'Europe' emerged as a major theme in the Scottish political scene. What, then, is 'Europe'? So much has been written on whether there is such a thing as Europe and so many participants in this debate have conceded that there is no single definition of it. For example, the historian Max Beloff concludes, after a series of discussions with historians and other scholars from various countries of Europe, that it is 'a myth to imagine that Europe has had all the time some real existence'.[1] More recently, Gerard Delanty also argued that Europe 'cannot be regarded as a self-evident entity'.[2] Some anthropologists who have taken interest in the phenomenon of Europeanisation declared 'Europe as an entity is not a stable, sovereign, autonomous object but exits only in historical relations and fields of power',[3] but the discussion continues.[4] One of the reasons is, of course, the drive for an ever-closer union among the European countries. The question 'What is Europe?' would never lose its political importance in the age of European integration. Whether Europe is a real entity is beyond the scope of this book; what we are concerned with here is the idea of Europe, which exerts influence on a wide range of human activities. The idea of Europe has evolved over the years, resulting in a great variety of images and visions of Europe. This has not only made it difficult to establish a unified European identity but has also enabled some nationalists in Europe to pick and choose whichever one fits their particular nationalist vision. The Scottish case is no exception; many people who advocate some kind of closer relationship between Scotland and Europe as the best strategy for Scotland's future, consciously or unconsciously pick and mix images of Europe to suit their ideals of Scotland. This chapter explores the evolution of various ideas of Europe which are available to the contemporary Scots.

FROM MYTHS TO GEOGRAPHY

The word 'Europe' derives from Greek mythology. Europa, a Phoenician princess, was one day seduced by Zeus disguised as a

snow-white bull. Enchanted, she sat on the bull's back. The bull rose to its feet and took her from the shores of Phoenicia, present Lebanon, across the sea to the island of Crete. There she bore several sons by Zeus, then married the King of Crete and became the mother of Minos. It is not clear why the ancient Greeks adopted her name to refer to the land stretching westward beyond their territory; there is no philological explanation.[5] However, it is clear that the Greeks applied the name 'Europe' to the mainland of present Greece, as opposed to the Aegean islands which they thought constituted the centre of their world. The story of the abduction of Europa has been popularised by the Romans and the moderns alike. Finding the mythological explanation irrelevant, some have continued to wonder why Europe is called Europe. There has been, however, no definitive answer to the question.

It is interesting to note that the origin of the name Europe lies with what we now call the Orient: Europa was an import from what we today refer to as the Near East. This is ironic when contrasted to the history of European colonialism, and could be a subject for deep reflections on what Europe is. However, this is not a place to develop a critique of 'Europe', but rather to investigate what 'Europe' meant in the antiquity.[6]

Although the ancient Greeks came up with the name Europe, it remained a rather vague concept.[7] According to their early world view, ancient Greece did not belong to Europe – Europe was just like Asia where barbarians roamed. Aristotle and Hippocrates seem to have shared the view that Greece was a separate entity lying between Europe and Asia.[8] Europe was a geographical category, but its precise location and shape remained obscure. It was clear that the Mediterranean separated Europe from Africa, and the Sea of Azov and the River Don were often thought to separate Europe from Asia, but it was not known whether there was sea to the north and to the east of Europe.[9]

Although Europe did not mean much to the ancient Greeks, the geographical concept of Europe sometimes took on a political connotation because of the confrontation between the Greeks and Persians.[10] By the fifth century BC, the adjective 'Asiatic' was firmly associated with vulgarity, lavishness and anything Persian that was antithetical to the Greek way of life. The geographical terms of Europe and Asia were then connected to cultural–political terms of Greece and Persia by Isocrates (d. 338 BC) who identified Europe with Greece, that is, freedom, and Asia with Persia, that is, despotism.

For the ancient Greeks, therefore, Europe was a landmass stretching westward from the Aegean. They sometimes belonged to Europe as opposed to Asiatic Persia, but sometimes did not because they were

the civilised as opposed to the barbarians. The rise of Macedonia then added another twist to the idea of Europe. As Alexander's Empire expanded at the expense of the Persians and other barbarians the centre of Europe shifted to Asia Minor and came to include Greece.[11] During the Roman period, Europe was principally a geographical region which referred to the area that covered most of what we now call Europe except Scandinavia, and often excluded the British Isles and the Iberian Peninsula. Europe did not mean much to the Romans, either, since for the Romans Rome was the heart of civilisation.[12] It is, therefore, fair to conclude that Europe in antiquity was primarily a geographical concept, albeit quite a vague one from our point of view, without strong emotions or meanings attached to it.

It was Christian thinking that gave some moral and emotional values to the idea of Europe. During the early years of Christianity, the idea that the peoples of the world were descendants of Noah emerged. According to this, Europe was the land of the Greeks, Gentiles and Christians who originated from Japheth; Asia was populated by the Jews and Arabs who descended from Shem; Africa was for the Negroes whose father was Ham.[13] Since the Bible accorded Japheth superiority over Shem and Ham, Europe, by virtue of being the land of the descendants of Japheth, was deemed to be superior to Asia and Africa. Possibly the earliest source of the European superiority complex?

The idea of Europe travelled a long way before it met the idea of Christendom in the Middle Ages. The ancient ideas of Europe do not resonate strongly in contemporary discussions of Scotland and Europe, perhaps because Scotland was not 'on the map' when these ideas were formulated. This section has, however, demonstrated that the concept of Europe is like a living thing: it has changed continuously since its birth. At times, it has been a vague, rather neutral geographical idea, at times synonymous with freedom and civilisation, as well as being identified with the inherent 'superiority' of Europe over other continents. The ancient idea of Europe thus transformed itself in the Middle Ages, and yet again in the modern period.

VARIOUS IMAGES OF EUROPE

We now know the word 'Europe' derived from Greek mythology but precisely when the term 'Europe' entered into popular vocabulary is not clear. As is often the case in the social sciences, scholars cannot agree when people started to use this term. Some say it was in the sixteenth century[14] and others say it was in the fifteenth century.[15] They

agree, however, that the term came to be used frequently when the supposedly stable border of medieval Europe was radically shaken. Constantinople fell in 1453 and the Byzantine Empire was incorporated into the Islamic world. The Eastern Roman Empire was the manifestation of one of the roots of today's Europe, that is, the Greek and Roman inheritance, and the Christian world was seriously threatened by the fall of Constantinople. However, those who were later to become known as 'Europeans' were beginning to discover the 'New World' across the Atlantic Ocean, effectively shifting the western border of Europe further west. The explorers from European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Holland, and so on, were not only expanding the European frontiers further but also encountering many different peoples of the new world. It can be argued, therefore, that the idea of Europe came into being as something opposed to Islam on the one hand and to different cultures and civilisations of the new world on the other. It is a logical development, therefore, for the term 'Europe' to acquire a strong association with Christendom (as opposed to the Islamic world) and the notion of civilisation (as opposed to the 'non-civilisation' of the New World).[16]

Europe as Christendom

The idea of Europe as Christendom is a product of the Middle Ages. At the beginning of the Middle Ages, when Charlemagne was crowned Holy Roman Emperor in 800, although the Pope referred to him as *rex*, *pater Europae* (king, father of Europe), the word Europe was basically a term indicating territory without any emotional connotations.[17] The foundation for identifying Europe with Christendom was cultivated through confrontations with the Muslim forces. Despite the differences between the Roman Catholic Church of the West and the Greek Orthodox Church of the East, Christians could unite in the face of the threat from Islam. As Latin Christendom grew stronger through the military power which it mobilised in defence of the Faith, the importance of Europe as the geographical centre of Christendom began, by the twelfth century, to be expressed by the Pope. One should note that the concept of Christendom used to cover a wider geographical area than that designated as 'Europe' in the Middle Ages. Christendom theoretically included Anatolia which was inhabited by Greek Orthodox Christians and North Africa where Coptic Christians were found.[18] By the time of the Crusades, however, Africa had ceased to be part of Christendom for more than a couple of centuries and Anatolia was under continuous threat from Islamic forces. It was the fall of Constantinople that made the identification of Christendom with

Europe possible. Immediately after the fall of Constantinople, Pope Pius II (1458–64) used the terms 'Europ', and 'Respublica christiana' interchangeably.[19]

So the idea of Europe as Christendom was established. It was, however, full of schisms and divisions contrary to the united front occasionally shown to the Muslim world. There was a division between the Eastern Christianity led by Constantinople, and the Western Christianity ruled by Rome, and this was 'the very first major rupture in the fabric of Europe'.[20] Both sides were constantly in trouble with heresies. A century after the fall of the Byzantine Empire, a new but deep cleavage between Catholics and Protestants emerged when the Reformation took place and Protestantism was, in addition, to be fragmented as it developed. As well as religious conflicts, there were a number of secular wars amongst European lords. Erasmus regarded the situation as alarming in the face of continuous threat from the Islamic world and called for the unity of Christendom in 1517.[21] Moreover, Calvin, one of the Reformers, summed up the consequences of the Reformation in the 1560s as 'the shattering of Europe'.[22] In short, there was no unity in Europe just as there had been none in Christendom.

Europe as Christendom, however, retains some appeal in contemporary Scotland. Although not many of the respondents in this book were willing to define Europe, there were a few who linked Europe closely with Christendom. One of the respondents, while acknowledging the deep cleavage resulting from the Reformation, stated that Europe was historically Christendom and justified it by pointing out that the boundary of Europe more or less coincided with the geographical limits of the spread of Christianity,[23] a statement which clearly demonstrates the attraction that the vision of Europe as Christendom still possesses. In this secular and politically correct age, equating Europe with Christendom would provoke some controversy since this scheme presupposes Islam as a common enemy. Europe as Christendom retains a powerful attraction, however, because it can offer a clear 'other'; Europe is what is not Muslim. It is a clear-cut definition and, therefore, can evoke a sense of unity, however vague it may be.

The enduring power of the identification of Europe with Christendom was recently demonstrated in debates over the bombings of Kosovo and Afghanistan.[24] The intervention in the Kosovo crisis was primarily justified on the basis that it was a European crisis which needed to be dealt with by Europeans. Moreover, it was even more urgent for the Europeans to intervene because the majority of

victims were Muslims. If the Europeans left Kosovars in misery, the relationship between 'Christian' Europe and the 'Muslim' part of the world would deteriorate, it was argued. One can see an underlying, still widely shared recognition that Europe is Christendom in the pleas for intervention which were made in order to avoid a revival of a strong identification of Europe with Christendom, since it was deemed to deepen the cleavage that was supposed to exist between Europe (the West) and the Muslim world. Similarly, in the debates over the bombing of Afghanistan, the latent identification of Europe with Christendom frequently surfaced, despite the West's identity often being described as civilisation. Both cases attest to the continuing influence of the idea of Europe as Christendom in the contemporary world in which Scotland finds itself.

Other respondents are drawn to the idea of Europe as Christendom from a different angle. One of the features of medieval Europe was the existence of a pan-European elite culture. Latin, the language of the Faith, functioned as the lingua franca amongst the clergy, scholars and elite from different countries. They moved from country to country with ease and there was no major obstacle in the exchange of ideas. This is, for example, how the Scottish Enlightenment made a contribution to Europe; David Hume, Adam Smith and others wrote in Latin and consequently were not disadvantaged by their native tongue. For some, this is the ideal Europe: a space with a common language and free movement of people which encourages the exchange of ideas that, in turn, gives rise to flourishing cultures and the advancement of society therein. In this image of Europe, Christianity does not feature prominently, it is the lingua franca which Christianity provided for the elite of medieval Europe that matters.

However, the idea of Europe as Christendom does not seem to enjoy explicit public support in contemporary Scotland. Concerns with this vision of Europe are often expressed in normative terms, which can be roughly summarised under two headings. First, there is a widely shared perception of the decline of Christianity in contemporary Europe, which leaves some people feeling uncomfortable with the definition of Europe as Christendom and possibly arguing that it is not an accurate reflection of contemporary Europe and is therefore backward-looking. Some doubt if this definition could promote a stronger identification with Europe amongst Europeans given the diminished influence of Christianity, others feel uneasy with explicitly suggesting Islam as a common enemy. This is certainly a sensitive subject for contemporary European countries which have a considerable immigrant population within their borders, assuming these countries

are working towards inclusion of the newly arrived population. There are also the concerns already mentioned about the possible implications of the identification of Europe with Christendom to world politics. It is a politically charged definition whose potential to influence the way people think and behave has been recently highlighted in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. The recent electoral surprises in Europe, such as the successes of Jean-Marie Le Penn of France or the Pim Fortuyn's List in the Netherlands, also suggest that the idea of Europe as Christendom is not a spent force. For these reasons, the image of Europe as Christendom is rarely endorsed officially, but remains as an undercurrent which shapes the way people see the world.

Europe as civilisation

Viewing Europe as 'civilisation' may be less controversial once the idea is re-examined and reformulated to discard the unquestioned notion of the superiority of Europeans which often comes with it. As already mentioned, the view of Europe as civilisation was born when the Europeans began to encounter the New World, although it is arguably drawn from the ancient idea of Europe as a land of the civilized as opposed to the barbaric Persians. This was also the time when the identification of Europe with Christendom came into being. The idea of Europe as Christendom, however, did not then go on to develop as a basis for establishing a firm unity of European peoples. This was due to continuous internal divisions and, most importantly, the Reformation and the religious wars which arose as a consequence.[25] The secular idea of Europe as civilisation, on the other hand, continued to evolve as more and more explorers set out to sea and as the Renaissance and Enlightenment opened a new arena for secular ideas. By the end of the eighteenth century, Europe was no longer synonymous with Christendom; it was about European, that is, civilised values. A blind belief in the superiority of Europe over other parts of the world was also firmly incorporated into the idea of Europe.[26]

Before investigating the various images of Europe which the identification of Europe with civilisation offers to contemporary Scots in particular, and Europeans in general, let us briefly examine the concepts of culture and civilisation since they provide an important clue in understanding the underlying assumption of European superiority in this view. Before the eighteenth century, the word culture referred to individuals' intellectual development and had no collective aspect. For the social dimension, there was a separate notion of civility (civilité) which, by the sixteenth century, had secured its place in the

European vocabulary. The concept of civility meant, in essence, good manners including proper behaviour, literacy and self-discipline. For both Montaigne and Montesquieu, civility was something strongly associated with the court such as that of the Byzantine Empire, not necessarily with Europe. However, toward the end of the eighteenth century, a curious development took place. Culture, which meant the development of individuals' mental capacity, became associated with civility, good manners. Culture was now used to refer to the social attitude of a collection of people and their intellectual faculty as a people.[27] In the eighteenth century, the word 'civilisation' was coined to refer to the social dimension of culture and despite the reluctance of contemporary intellectuals such as Voltaire and Dr Johnson, the word gained immediate popularity. The secret of the success of the term 'civilisation' is probably its close association with the idea of progress that was heralded by the Enlightenment. The idea of levels or phases of civilisation was the manifestation of the spirit of the time. It also offered a way of making sense of the world the Europeans were discovering. As people in Europe became increasingly aware of the non-European world and the various cultures contained therein, it is no wonder a scheme of the world which classified each society according to its progress or level of civilisation acquired such popularity. This scheme allowed people to put some kind of order in a chaotic world and, moreover, to put Europe at the top of the hierarchy. The sense of European superiority was now secured. Accordingly, the image of Europe was increasingly depicted as that of a crowned queen.[28] By the nineteenth century, the identification of Europe with civilisation and superiority was complete.

What is 'European civilisation' and what kind of images of Europe does it provide for contemporary Scots and Europeans in general? Although the sense of superiority and its imperial connotations have been played down in the postwar era, the idea of Europe as civilisation still offers many 'politically correct' visions. Europe can still be a civilisation which is different from Asian and African cultures without implying European superiority.[29] The foundation of European civilisation is the Greco-Roman heritage, most of which was preserved by Muslim scholars, and the Christian tradition. Since then it has evolved through humanism, the Enlightenment, revolutions and technological advancement to an image of Europe as civilisation which is supported by many European political leaders.[30] From this all-encompassing notion of European civilisation, many images of Europe can be derived: it can be a society which respects individuals and their human rights; an entity which accords priority to the freedom of indi-

viduals and is associated with democracy;[31] a land where people believe in rationality, science and technology; and a society with advanced technology. Europe can be equated with material well-being – a rich society – and it probably still means progress. Most of all, Europe is modernity.[32]

The variety of images of Europe one can develop from the idea of Europe as civilisation has allowed the respondents in this book to have different perceptions of Europe. Some of them see Europe as a place where they share cultural heritages such as Greek philosophy, Roman administration, the Renaissance and so on. Some see Europe as the place where the rule of law is established, where democracy works and human rights are respected. There is little difficulty for them in relating Scotland to these views of Europe. Scotland has indeed played an important role in the cultural field, most notably during the Enlightenment, and it has also contributed to theology through the Reformation. In addition, Walter Scott, as well as Robert Burns, made a tremendous impact on European literature. The Scots are, above all, proud of their egalitarianism, and although many respondents were careful not to give any unconditional endorsement to this popular belief, they could nevertheless select this aspect of Scottish society and tie it to the image of a democratic Europe.

Curiously, not so many of the respondents here pay attention to Europe as a continent of technological advancement. This is curious since one of the images of Scotland is that of the land of technological and industrial advances. In the nineteenth century, Scotland produced many of the scientists and engineers whose discoveries and achievements contributed to the prosperity of the British Empire. The image of Europe as the land of scientific achievement should, therefore, be the one with which contemporary Scots can identify themselves comfortably. But this is not the case, for two possible reasons. First, the image of Scotland as a country with scientific genius is no longer dominant. On the contrary, due to the decline of its main industries, steel and ship-building, the association of Scotland with industrial advances has considerably weakened. Although Scotland has recently attracted much foreign investment which has brought jobs, the common complaint is that what Scotland is given by these investors is the assembly line, but not the research and development function which would bring Scottish industry to the forefront of modern technology.[33] Second, Europe no longer occupies the number one place for scientific advances in popular perception. The fact that the EU leaders have felt compelled to adopt the Lisbon Agenda which aims to establish the EU as a world-leading IT economy by the year 2010 reveals that the

decline of Europe in the technological field is acknowledged by politicians and industries alike. Under these circumstances, advocating the image of Europe as the land of advanced science and technology does not resonate either among Scots, or, as would seem likely, among Europeans. This image of Europe, therefore, does not feature prominently in contemporary Scotland.

Evolution of the idea of Europe as civilisation

The image of Europe as civilisation has continued to evolve through the twentieth century. In the interwar period, the idea of Europe as civilisation was developed further by various pan-European movements.[34] Between the First and Second World Wars several blueprints for a future Europe were presented. Friedrich Nauman (1860–1919) advocated the creation of 'Mitteleuropa' in 1915, which was a free-trade area with a federal supranational political structure built around Germany. T. G. Masaryk (1850–1937) also presented a plan of 'New Europe' which he articulated in his book, *The New Europe*, published in 1918. It was envisaged as a special zone of international co-operation among the small nations located between Russia and Germany. During the interwar period, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1972) initiated the pan-European movement to establish a Europe with a single political identity. 'Paneuropa', as he called the united Europe, was described as a common market with a supranational structure which would guarantee to reduce the risk of border conflicts. Aristide Briand (1862–1932), a former French Prime Minister who was deeply impressed with Coudenhove-Kalergi's plan, proposed to set up the United States of Europe at the League of Nations in 1930. The United States of Europe as he envisaged was to be a European-wide political entity with a federal link amongst European countries. These proposals for a united Europe emphasised the image of Europe as civilisation and it was considered Europe's mission to continue to civilise the world.

In addition to strengthening the image of Europe as civilisation, these initiatives added a few more dimensions to the idea of Europe, which are of particular importance to Britain as a whole and, of course, to Scotland. Most notably, these plans proposed new borders for Europe. Contrary to the idea of Europe as Christendom, which in principle included the Eastern part of Europe and even parts of North Africa and Anatolia, as we noted earlier, and to the idea of Europe as civilisation which, in effect, included North America, these plans drew borders of Europe in relation to Russia and North America. While most of the initiatives were put forward as a mechanism to avoid further

wars caused by border disputes amongst European countries, Europe was also conceived as a defence bloc and the supposed enemy was often Russia. It is evident that North America was no longer seen as a part of Europe but as a competitor for economic hegemony in the world. What was considered to be 'Europe' in these proposals lay between the Atlantic and Russia and the centre of gravity was often thought to be in Germany or in France. Interestingly, Britain was not assigned a main role in these plans, except in Briand's idea of the United States of Europe. Britain held a curious position because of its geography, its ties to North America and its Empire, and its lack of interest in, or even its antagonism to, the idea of establishing a federal system in Europe. The latter is attributed to the fact that in Britain the concept of the indivisible sovereignty of Parliament was firmly established by the mid-eighteenth century.[35] Anything that challenges the absolute sovereignty of the Parliament was, therefore, alien to the British and it certainly explains, at least in part, the lack of interest in pan-European movements in Britain. The sense of distance from Europe, which many of the respondents here say that many contemporary Britons and, for that matter, Scots share, seems to have been sharpened around the 1920s and 1930s.

New images of Europe in the postwar era

These pan-European initiatives could not achieve their goals and the Second World War broke out in 1939. This war turned out to be more devastating in terms of loss of human life and damage caused to the countries involved in the war than the First World War. Moreover, the Second World War was full of incidents which shook the belief in a civilised Europe. Nazi persecution of the Jews is one example which has led to a fundamental questioning of the nature of Western civilisation. However, in the postwar period, the idea of Europe as civilisation, especially as a land of human rights, or Europe as democracy, has been strengthened in reaction to many atrocities committed during the two World Wars.[36] In particular, the resistance movement in Italy and France during the Second World War contributed significantly to the strengthening of the commitment to the idea of Europe as a land of democracy and human rights. In addition, this vision of Europe was increasingly associated with what is often termed western Europe as a result of the Cold War. The tension between the US-led western bloc and the Soviet-dominated eastern bloc was institutionalised in the form of military alliances (NATO and Warsaw Pact, respectively) and trade agreements (EEC and COMECON). At the same time, this rift began to be interpreted not only as a division

between capitalist and socialist societies, but also between free, democratic societies and oppressive regimes.

The identification of the idea of Europe with western Europe and the land of democracy and human rights reached its pinnacle in 1975 when the Helsinki Final Act was adopted and signed by many European countries. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 was one of the core documents which underpin the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). CSCE was one of the initiatives proposed in order to defuse the tension between western and eastern Europe at the height of the Cold War. The Helsinki Final Act was not only an agreement about how the security and disarmament issues should be dealt with but an expression of a strong commitment to the promotion of human rights. Many human rights monitoring organisations in the eastern bloc were set up as a response to the Act.[37] The Helsinki Final Act represents one of the images of Europe, that is, the land of democracy and human rights, which is precisely why the Bosnian war was so shocking to contemporary western Europeans – had this image of Europe not been cultivated over 50 years, the Bosnian war would not have had such an impact on western European societies.

Another important postwar development which influenced the idea of Europe was, of course, the initiative which led to the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, often referred to as the process of European integration. The most significant force that compelled politicians such as Jean Monnet (1888–1979), Robert Schuman (1886–1963) and Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967) to pursue the project of European integration was the realisation that if European countries were to have any future, further wars between them had to be prevented. What has now become the European Union was essentially a device conceived by these three to secure peace in Europe. As the Cold War intensified, however, the focus of security policies shifted from the centuries-old antagonism between Germany and France to the tension between the western and eastern blocs. The security aspect of the European project was gradually subsumed in NATO and a drive to set up a Single Market gathered force. It is evident that in Britain by the time of the 1975 EEC referendum, the project of European integration was understood primarily as a capitalist project to establish a Single Market. This was why, as we saw earlier, some Labour MPs, along with some key figures in the SNP, opposed the continuation of British membership at the 1975 referendum. At the same time, the term 'Europe' became increasingly used to refer to the EEC. A decade later, the Single European Act of 1986 further reinforced the image of Europe as a market and a world economic power.

The idea of Europe as the EEC then gradually merged with the identification of western Europe as the land of democracy and human rights. The European Community was expanding its membership to countries in south Europe, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece, which had become known for their dictatorship and military rule for some time after the Second World War. It was only after some measures of democratisation were put in place that they were admitted to the EC. Human rights and democracy became part of the criteria of accession to the EC and the same principle now applies for accession to the European Union. In this way, membership of the EC has become associated with these notions, and as a result has established the EC as a club of democratic states.[38] 'Europe' now represents democracy.

Compared to Europe as democracy, the image of Europe as 'social' democracy is a more recent phenomenon. Although the Treaty of Rome had already made a call for equality for women in the workplace and the standardisation of social security in member states, as well as setting up the European Social Fund to tackle unemployment, the social democratic face of Europe became more prominent only at the appointment of Jacques Delors as the President of the European Commission in 1985. Delors revived the drive towards further integration among the member states and pursued the realisation of monetary union. In this sense, he strengthened the image of Europe as a market. He also paid a lot of attention to social policy. During his presidency, there were several moves which could be interpreted as attempts to reform this capitalist organisation into a social democratic institution. One such indication was the adoption of the Community Charter for the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers in 1989, which is a comprehensive statement of workers' rights. The European Commission, under Delors' leadership, began working on the implementation of the Charter which was often described as 'Marxist' by the Thatcher government. It sought to address issues such as the minimum wage, protection of young workers, employment contracts and collective redundancies, all of which were to be added as a chapter to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. As a result of British objections, this part was taken out from the draft treaty and made into a separate Social Protocol (Social Chapter). The aim of the Social Chapter is to promote workers' rights and to ensure a basic standard of living for EU citizens. As a result, the EU came to symbolise a type of social democracy to which all respectable governments should aspire. As we shall see, in Scotland in particular, the EU was beginning to be viewed as social democracy which opposed the Thatcherite British government. The EU was, in other words, beginning to be seen to pursue social justice

based on compassion, and it was no longer merely a cold capitalist system. The British Labour Party supported the Social Chapter as did the SNP. The SNP, which defined itself as 'left-of-centre', sought to promote this aspect of the EU as well as its social democratic stance. Europe had now become a symbol of social democracy which stood against the global wave of privatisation.

Europe as diversity

The idea of Europe as civilisation can be interpreted in many different ways and leads us to another view of Europe: Europe as 'diversity'. Many commentators writing on the idea of Europe end up with this: Europe is about diversity with no single unified identity.[39] This does not mean that the peoples of Europe have little in common; on the contrary, they share a lot of experiences, and it is argued that if they were to strip away their national differences, a continental unity of some kind would be unveiled.[40] Various cultures in Europe have developed their characteristics through the constant interchange of influences and Europe, in this sense, constitutes 'an interconnected whole' or 'an existence in variety'.[41] This, for some scholars, is not enough and they would like to see a more solid European unity.[42] Most of the respondents here who attempt to define Europe, however, seem to be content with the idea of Europe as diversity. According to them, the charm of Europe is to be found in its diversified culture with a hint of underlying unity. One of them quoted Edmund Burke to illustrate his point that in Europe nobody would feel as if he were in a foreign country. This perspective obviously allows many possibilities within the framework of Europe; what Europe means can be tailored according to your own needs although there are certain limitations. One should recall here that the concept of Europe started as a term referring to a specific territory. It was then identified with Christendom, and then with many aspects of what is called civilisation. Whatever they wish to regard as European should fall into at least one of these categories. The idea of Europe as diversity is so flexible that it can accommodate different, even competing, views of Europe under its heading. This is a key to understanding the effect of the SNP slogan 'Independence in Europe'. On this intellectual level, it is not a contradiction in terms and therefore many of the elite in Scotland can embrace the idea in their own way.

As has been illustrated, there are many images of Europe available in the contemporary world. 'Europe' entered into the written text as a rough description of a geographical entity in ancient Greece and its meaning has been constantly redefined by people in Europe. It has

meant Christendom and it has meant civilisation. Its borders have shifted, sometimes including Asia Minor and North Africa, sometimes including North America. In the twentieth century, the meaning of Europe underwent considerable change. Geographically, Europe has shrunk; it no longer includes North America, North Africa, or Anatolia. It has become almost synonymous with western Europe and is now identified with the European Union. Europe now stands for a whole range of things: Christianity, civilisation, democracy, human rights, the market and social democracy. The repository of images of Europe is large and this is one of the reasons why the SNP's slogan 'Independence in Europe' has caught the Scottish people's imagination – it helps them project their own visions of Scotland against the background of their favoured images of Europe.

PROCESSES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND SCOTLAND

So far, a number of images of Europe have been reviewed and it has been pointed out that their abundance allows nationalists and devolutionists in Scotland to adopt and tailor them to their advantage. The question we shall turn to now is what images of Europe and Scotland the processes of European integration specifically have provided for the Scottish people. This is a valid question since, over the past five decades, the EU has provided a wide range of institutions which influence actions taken by various actors in Scotland and elsewhere in the EU. Three areas of interaction between Scotland and the EU will be examined: regional development policy and cultural policy; the European Parliament; and the Committee of the Regions.

Regional development

Since the prime motive of European integration is the establishment of a single internal market, regional policy used to occupy a less prominent position in the European project. The initial assumption was that the market forces unleashed by the creation of a single market would eventually eliminate regional disparity by achieving better economic growth.[43] Consequently, there was little provision for a Community-wide regional policy when the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, apart from the establishment of the European Investment Bank whose aim was to create loans for projects in many depressed areas. It was not until the 1970s that any attempt to draw up and implement a coherent, European-wide regional policy was made.[44] Interestingly, this was the EC's response to the threat to depressed regions posed by the market forces brought about by economic integration, the same force that was, in the

early days of the EC, supposed to stimulate growth in these areas.[45]

The present EU's regional policy has its origin in the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975.[46] It is worth noting that although the operation of the ERDF is the core of the EU's regional policy, there are also other measures taken by the EU for the purpose of eliminating regional disparities. They are the European Social Fund, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance, and together with the ERDF, they constitute the Structural Funds of the EU.

The EU's regional policy has gone through many reforms (in 1979, 1984, 1989, 1993 and 1999). The EU's control over the policy has been expanded and the representation of regional interests has also been improved. For instance, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 allowed regional ministers, for the first time, to represent their respective states in the Council of Ministers.[47] In order to facilitate smoother communication between the decision-making body of the EU and the regions, the Maastricht Treaty also set up the Committee of the Regions with an advisory status. It is clear that regional policy now constitutes an important part of the EU's policy consideration as Structural Funds expenditure has grown to be the second largest item in the EU budget after the Common Agricultural Policy. The increasing importance of regional policy in the process of European integration can also be observed in the European Commission's *Agenda 2000*. The document was discussed at the Berlin Council in 1999 to agree on the overall programme to reform the EU in view of planned enlargement. The reform of Structural Funds was one of the foci of the debate mainly due to its financial weight in the EU budget, confirming that regional policy had come to occupy a significant place in EU policy making.

Scotland, with its outdated industrial structure and its heavier reliance on agriculture and fishing, has been a beneficiary of various help from the Structural Funds. Up until 1999, the Structural Funds used to have seven objectives:

1 Development of structurally backward regions
2 Conversion of regions in industrial decline
3 Combating long-term unemployment
4 Increasing youth employment
5a Adjustment of agricultural structures
5b Promoting the development of rural areas
6 Helping the remote Arctic areas

Between 1994 and 1999, the Highlands and Islands received £241.3 million for its Objective 1 status; western Scotland £259.9 million and eastern Scotland £107.9 million to meet Objective 2. Between 1995 and 1999 Scotland as a whole received £241.3 million under Objective 3. In 1999, Scotland received £11.4 million to meet Objective 4. Between 1994 and 1999, Dumfries and Galloway received £36.5 million, and northern and western parts of Grampian £30.3 million, the Borders £23.3 million, rural Stirling and Upper Tayside £19.4 million under Objective 5b.[48] Compared to the devolved Scottish Executive's annual budget, which is around £20 billion, the share of contribution to Scotland from Structural Funds is probably small. However, what is important is perception. Provided the people in Scotland perceive the flow of money from Structural Funds as significant, it is reasonable to speculate that for many Scots the EU has become primarily a source of funding for development in any guise.

At the latest reform, however, the number of objectives has been reduced to three[49] as a result of which, Highlands and Islands has lost Objective 1 status but has been granted a phasing-out assistance of £194 million for 2000–06. The south of Scotland, around the north-east coast and west of Scotland have been granted Objective 2 status and will receive around £521 million, and to meet Objective 3, Scotland is to receive £310 million for 2000–06.[50] Scotland's share of structural funds allocated to the United Kingdom is 10.8 per cent, and it is not particularly high in proportion to its population. Although now probably at a reduced volume, European money is still seen coming through to Scotland.

The development of EU regional policy has arguably changed the Scottish perception of the EU. Initially, the Scottish reception of EEC membership appeared to be less enthusiastic than that in Britain as a whole, as shown in the results of the 1975 EEC referendum. This referendum confirmed the continuation of UK membership of the EEC with a 67.2 per cent 'Yes' vote in the UK; in Scotland the percentage for the 'Yes' vote was 58.4 per cent.[51] The experience of the Thatcher government in the 1980s, however, seems to have been instrumental in changing the perception of the European Union in Scotland. During this period, the Scots became known as pro-Europeans as a number of commentators and opinion polls have suggested.[52] The EU's increased attention to regional development may well have played a significant role in bringing about this change. The most prominent feature of the Conservative government under Mrs Thatcher was centralisation, which, coupled with deregulation, another flag-ship policy of the Thatcher government, was seen as harmful to Scotland which was

dependent on heavy industry. In the meanwhile, the EU, through the Structural Funds, was allocating more and more funds to pull Scotland up economically, which has probably given some credibility to the idea of a social Europe – a Europe whose main concern was with the welfare of people, not the market. This was a variation of the idea of Europe as social democracy identified earlier, which seemed to resonate with the idea of an egalitarian, communitarian Scotland. This aspect will be examined in Chapters 4 and 5.

At the same time, the EU's regional policy appears to have influenced the Scottish perception of the British government. Since EU regional policy leaves a lot of room for member states to manoeuvre, its pattern of influence is largely determined by the internal structure of each member state. In some cases such as Belgium, Spain and Germany where some kind of federal structure has been functioning, EU regional policy is said to have been working in the direction of strengthening the regions against the national state.[53] The Belgian regions and German *länder* are able to deal with the European Commission direct or represent themselves at the Council of Ministers and therefore influence the positions of Belgium and Germany within the EU. On the other hand, some of the centralised states, such as Denmark and Portugal, still remain centralised despite the operation of the Structural Funds for the past few decades.

The case of the United Kingdom is interesting in this respect. The ERDF was created at the UK's insistence as a measure of refunding its contribution to the agricultural policy and at the same time to accommodate its emphasis on regional policy within the United Kingdom.[54] Curiously, however, the impact of the ERDF is least visible in Britain for many reasons, most of which stem from the amount of power the central government retained until devolution took place in 1999 – there was no regional government in the United Kingdom until devolution. The absence of regional bodies was chiefly compensated for by the presence of territorial ministers in the cabinet and some degree of administrative devolution to Scotland and Wales in the form of the Scottish Office and Welsh Office.[55] Since there was no regional government which could administer the funding from the ERDF and other European institutions, the central government naturally assumed responsibility.

The British government also has a peculiar rule in administering the ERDF fund, called 'non-additionality'.[56] This means that the money allocated to a particular project by the ERDF will not be added to the existing budget for the project in question but will replace the expenditure. This practice clearly reflects the understanding of the UK

government that the ERDF is a means to refund the British contributions to the EU budget. Although the 'non-additionality' policy is not recognised by the European Commission, the British government refuses to give it up. It certainly works in favour of the central government trying to retain as much power as possible over the regions and is without doubt a point of contention between the central government and local authorities which could become a source of grievances against the central government.[57] The UK central government is arguably creating an atmosphere in which resentment towards the central government could swell instead of increasing its authority to extract more compliance from the local governments.

There were also other issues. When Structural Funds went through a reform in 1988, Britain as a whole decreased its share of the fund allocation due to its failure in qualifying regions for Objective 1 status and its non-co-operation with the Commission which resulted in a lower allocation of funds for objective 2 areas. In addition, since the reforms, EU regional policy has increasingly been formed through greater consultation with the regions. These reforms, therefore, inadvertently put the British government's legitimacy in governing Scotland in question in the eyes of Scottish people since the existing arrangement, because of the principle of non-additionality and the lack of regional government, did not bring about the best possible opportunities from the EU for Scotland. The development of the EU's regional policy has arguably contributed in fostering resentment amongst the Scottish people towards the British government.

Cultural policy

The EU's role in the field of culture is not as clear as it is in the field of regional development.[58] This is mainly because of the existence of a separate organisation, the Council of Europe, which comprises 38 countries of Europe and deals with issues of human rights, education, culture and environment. The EU would be concerned with cultural policy, therefore, only when it has some impact on the free movement of capital, goods and labour within the Community. Like education policy, the need for a Community-wide cultural policy was felt around the 1970s, a call for action on which was made by the European Parliament in 1974. According to the document produced by the Commission, the scope of Community action is restricted to freedom of culture-related trade and movement of cultural workers and the problem of copyright.[59] These are not, however, urgent issues which stateless nationalisms within the EU would face. For them, more important is the protection of minority languages. After all, many of

the stateless nationalisms in Europe such as the Welsh and the Basques have evolved around language issues. Such issues as the protection and promotion of minority languages are taken up by the Council of Europe since these are often presented as human rights issues. Therefore, the EU's role in minority languages is not prominent.

However, concerns with the status of minority languages were raised and discussed in the European Parliament. In 1981, the Parliament passed a resolution to revive and promote the use of minority languages in the Community. Consequently, in 1982, the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL) was established to represent the voices of the users of minority languages and to conduct research into the situation of minority languages. It is funded mainly by the EU and some member states and local governments contribute to make up the rest. The EBLUL is an example that the EU can be a venue where the voice of minorities can be heard and negotiated. Like many other EU institutions, however, the EBLUL cannot enforce its decisions on member states, which obviously limits the amount of influence it can exercise over national states. Viewed from this angle, the EU remains essentially an intergovernmental organisation which in principle respects the sovereignty of the member states. Nonetheless, the EU officially supports preservation and promotion of these languages partly because it is linked to its ideal of unity in diversity.

Scotland has been interacting with the EU in cultural fields mainly in relation to one of its indigenous minority languages, Gaelic. Both Scots and Gaelic are represented in the EBLUL but it is in conjunction with Gaelic that people in Scotland have been interacting with the EU. For instance, the University of the Highlands and Islands, a soon-to-be-established 'virtual' university to create more opportunities in higher education in the sparsely populated Highlands and Islands and, closer to our concern here, to provide some course entirely taught through the medium of Gaelic, is partly funded by the European Structural Funds. The EU has also assisted the Skye area under the heading of the rural diversification programme, to investigate the possibilities of staging a festival of Gaelic arts which has led to the inauguration of *Feis Alba*. The language issue is an important one in the EU's promotion of the idea of 'unity in diversity' as well as 'Europe of regions' which stresses its plural nature. Given that there has been a Gaelic Renaissance since 1970s,[60] an increasing number of people must have come into contact with the EU through Gaelic, thus being exposed to the ideas about Europe discussed earlier and at the same time cultivating the notion that Scotland is different from the rest of the United Kingdom.

The European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions

The European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions are two prominent institutions through which the Scottish people can interact with the EU. The European Parliament has been in operation since 1952 and is supposed to be one venue through which ordinary people in Europe can participate in European decision making. When the first direct election to the European Parliament took place in 1979, the United Kingdom was allocated 81 seats in the Parliament, which was increased to 87 in 1994 in view of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden. There are eight directly elected Scottish Members of the European Parliament (MEP).

Although the European Parliament remains largely a consultative body with limited competence in terms of decision making, the SNP has been quick to exploit the opportunities provided by it. At the first European election, the SNP's Winifred Ewing won the Highlands and Islands seat and discovered that the Parliament could be an effective means to promote Scottish interests. The European Parliament is arguably given more media attention because of the SNP's emphasis on it, which could in time influence Scottish people's opinion of the EU. The SNP has been depicting the EU along the lines of 'unity in diversity' and highlighting its co-operation with other nationalist parties at the Parliament in order to secure an even greater say for Scotland in the EU. As will be shown later, the SNP's activity has also strengthened an instrumental view of Europe, that is, Europe is something to be utilised in order to promote Scottish interests. Because the main channel of interaction between Scotland and the EU has been the European Parliament, it has come to embody some of the ideals of democratic processes which, especially under the Thatcher government, were seen as weakening in Britain. As a result, the instrumental view of Europe has incorporated a concern for participation in democracy, which has been picked up by activists in civic politics as well as by SNP supporters.

However, we should refrain from jumping to the conclusion that the SNP's emphasis on the European Parliament has made the Scots Europhiles. The results of the recent European elections tell us that the Scottish electorate is not particularly excited about the European Parliament. The Scottish turnout at the 1994 European election was 38.2 per cent compared to the UK figure of 36 per cent; at the 1999 election, it dropped to 24.7 per cent compared to the UK average of 23.3 per cent. Images forged and broadcasted about Europe have not necessarily made the Scots want to behave like model Europeans. Nonetheless, it remains important that the European Parliament has

received more public attention in Scotland than in the rest of Britain, because it has influenced the way the Scots see Europe.

The Committee of the Regions was set up in 1994 to represent local and regional government from across the EU. It is a consultative body but has statutory rights of consultation and is, therefore, one of the venues like the European Parliament through which Scottish interests can be advanced. Scotland has four members, each of whom is a local councillor in Scotland, whose activities are co-ordinated by the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities. An interesting point to note here is that in its present form, Scotland is represented by local authorities, but not as a regional body. Since devolution, it has been questioned whether Scotland should be represented by the Scottish Executive rather than local authorities in the Committee. In other words, with devolution, the institutional identity of Scotland in the European context has also become an issue which could lead to heightened sensitivity about Scotland's position in the EU and, by extension, in the world.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the relationship between Scotland and the current processes of European integration is the description of Scotland as a region. Since Scotland is not a sovereign state, it is not a member of the EU; it is merely a region of the United Kingdom in its relation to the EU. The ways in which actors in Scotland interact with the EU are therefore organised according to the idea of Scotland as a region. This has clear implications on how processes of European integration feature in different ideas of Scotland and its relationship with Europe. Nationalists, who believe in the Scottish nationhood, could refuse the idea of Scotland being a region of the EU and promote a vision of an independent and sovereign Scotland in the EU and the world. On the other hand, those who are content with the idea of Scotland as a region may entertain a vision for Scotland which is securely locked within the frameworks of the United Kingdom and the European Union. The relationship with the EU, analysed from this angle, has brought about different ideas about what Scotland is and what it should be, and how it should relate to the outside world.

As Scotland has been interacting with the EU, more attention has been drawn to Scotland's state-like nature.[61] Even before devolution conscious efforts had been made to lobby the European Commission directly, not through the Scottish Office or the Secretary of State for Scotland. The establishment, in Brussels in 1992, of Scotland Europa, a subsidiary of Scottish Enterprise which is dedicated to promoting Scottish interests in the European context, is an example of such efforts.

The reasoning behind it was that under the pre-devolution system, the UK government could not represent the interests of Scotland in the best way because Scottish interests could not be represented separately, they had to be an incorporated aspect of the British case. This meant that the Scottish Office had to negotiate Scottish demands with other departments and might occasionally be overridden by a UK-wide concern. Moreover, until the general election of 1997, the Scottish Secretary had come from the political party which did not represent the majority of Scottish voters who had voted for the opposition for more than ten years. The influence Scotland could exercise over EU policy was, however, limited with or without Scottish representatives in Brussels, since EU decisions are essentially an intergovernmental affair. Without full membership and without a place in the Council of Ministers, Scottish influence was only felt indirectly in the EU decision-making process. Nationalists and devolutionists argued, therefore, that Scotland would need a properly mandated regional government to represent Scottish interests on the European level.

Indeed, this was one of the reasons why formal devolution was argued to be necessary in Scotland. With the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, a new body, Scotland House, was set up in Brussels to be the basis for the Scottish Executive for lobbying the EU institutions in the areas which have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Scotland House has also incorporated Scotland Europa to act as host to a number of Scottish organisations. In this sense, Scotland has defined its separate institutional identity in the European context. The establishment of Scotland House, however, poses an interesting question in relation to the UK government's own representation in Brussels, UKRep. The UKRep is supposed to promote the UK-wide interests while Scotland House is responsible for representing specifically Scottish interests. However, the two are in practice inextricably intertwined and in order to maximise the effect of lobbying, a close co-ordination of activities between Scotland House and UKRep would be required. It is reasonable to expect that, in due course, someone will question why Scotland requires separate representation. The lobbying infrastructure through which Scotland is supposed to interact with the EU can also ignite further self-reflection on the part of Scotland as well as Britain as a whole.

The current processes of European integration have conditioned, although not exclusively, the framework within which Scotland's identity and future is thought about, discussed and acted upon. They have also connected some of the perceptions of Europe to the people in Scotland by providing media through which people can relate to the

EU. The EU, therefore, has produced another context in which the Scoto-European relationship is articulated. What is more it is a continuing process which has a lot of potential to produce new ideas of Scotland, of the United Kingdom, of Europe and the relationship between them.

NOTES

1. Max Beloff, *Europe and the Europeans: An International Discussion* (A report prepared at the request of the Council of Europe) (London: Chatto & Windus, 1957), p. 275.
2. Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p. 1.
3. John Borneman and Nick Fowler, 'Europeanization', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 26 (1997), p. 489.
4. One example of what is going on in the discipline of history regarding the European issue is Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (London: Pimlico, 1997).
5. Denys Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of An Idea* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1957), p. 1.
6. For a comprehensive critique of the idea of Europe, see Delanty, *Inventing Europe*.
7. Delanty, *Inventing Europe*, p. 17.
8. Hay, *Europe*, p. 5.
9. Pim den Boer, 'Europe to 1914: The Making of an Idea', in Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (eds), *The History of the Idea of Europe* (rev. edn) (Milton Keynes: Open University and London: Routledge, 1995), p. 15.
10. den Boer, 'Europe to 1914', p. 16; Delanty, *Inventing Europe*, p. 18; Hay, *Europe*, p. 3.
11. Delanty, *Inventing Europe*, p. 19.
12. Ibid., p. 20; Hay, *Europe*, p. 5.
13. Delanty, *Inventing Europe*, p. 27; Hay, *Europe*, p. 14–15.
14. Jon Hale, 'The Renaissance of the Idea of Europe', in Soledad García (ed.), *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy* (London: Pinter, 1993), pp. 46–63.
15. den Boer, 'Europe to 1914'; Delanty, *Inventing Europe*.
16. Norman Davies provides a concise account of the evolution of the idea of Europe in relation to the developments in the discipline of history. See Davies, *Europe*, 'Introduction'.
17. den Boer, 'Europe to 1914', p. 270.
18. Hale, 'The Renaissance of the Idea of Europe', p. 46.
19. den Boer, 'Europe to 1914', p. 35.
20. Hélene Ahrweiler, 'Roots and Trends in European Culture', in García, *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy*, pp. 30–45.
21. den Boer, 'Europe to 1914', p. 37.
22. Hale, 'The Renaissance of the Idea of Europe', p. 47.
23. One of my respondents commented on this issue.

    > Historically, Europe is Christendom. The word 'Europe' was not invented and used until the Renaissance. Until then, they talked about Christendom. Despite the schism of the Reformation, I feel a great sympathy with the saying 'Europe is the Faith and the Faith is Europe'. Now we are in the twentieth century and Christendom or Christianity is so much in decline, it is difficult to maintain unless we look at history. The definition of, or the boundaries of Europe was formed after the fall of the Roman Empire; the limits of Christianity. Whatever was Christian was Europe. I think to some extent this is still the case. (Respondent 1, writer)

24. The author has extensively investigated this for the EURONAT (Representations of Europe and the Nation in Current and Prospective Member States: Media, Elites and Civil Society) project. See Atsuko Ichijo, *Nation and Europe in the British Public Discourse: The Cases of Media and Political Elite Debates*, Project report (D3 and D4) prepared for the EURONAT project funded by the European Commission Research DG, Key Action

Improving the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base (contract No. HPSE-CT2001-00044) published online at http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/EURONAT/Projects.shtml, 2002.

25. den Boer, 'Europe to 1914', p. 58; Delanty, *Inventing Europe*, p. 30.
26. den Boer, 'Europe to 1914', p. 48.
27. den Boer, 'Europe to 1914', pp. 62–5; Hale, 'The Renaissance of the Idea of Europe', p. 54.
28. den Boer, 'Europe to 1914', pp. 48–58; Hale, 'The Renaissance of the Idea of Europe', p. 49.
29. Beloff, *Europe and the Europeans*, p. 9.
30. For instance, Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, referred to the Christian and humanistic ideology as a foundation of the European way of life in his memoir. See David de Giustino (ed.), *A Reader in European Integration* (Harlow: Longman, 1996), p. 57. A few decades later, Mikhail Gorbachev presented the image of Europe as a common civilisation in his *Perestroika, New Thinking for Our Country and the World* which was published in 1988. See de Giustino, *A Reader in European Integration*, p. 280.
31. This is one of the images of Europe which Vaclav Havel, the then President of the Czech Republic, emphasised in his address to the European Parliament on 8 March 1994. See de Giustino, *A Reader in European Integration*, pp. 285–90. This reflected a concern which was shared by many east European leaders after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. By tying their countries to a Europe of democracy, they hoped to build politically stable and economically prosperous countries.
32. For instance, Agnes Heller argues that the concept of Europe is modernity itself which is entangled with the ideas of accumulation of knowledge and progress. These features were refined in seventeenth-century western Europe where the accumulation of knowledge, the experiments with political craftsmanship and the accumulation of wealth took place. See Agnes Heller, 'Europe: An Epilogue', in Brian Nelson *et al*. (eds), *The Idea of Europe: Problems of National and Transnational Identity* (Oxford: Berg, 1992), pp. 12–25.
33. There are some signs which suggest that the idea of Scotland as a country of scientific genius is reviving. For example, an article entitled 'Is This a New Age of Enlightenment?' (*Scotland on Sunday*, 11 May 1997) listed three major recent scientific breakthroughs by scientists based in Scotland: a former GP developed a treatment which might turn out to be a cure for AIDS, a team at Dundee University pioneered the 'biological bullet' which could lead to a cure for some cancers, and the Roslin Institute in Edinburgh succeeded in cloning a sheep. The article quoted a scientist who declared 'there is an incredible pace of discovery and Scotland is a great place to be working in. Things are happening in Dundee, Edinburgh and Glasgow.' Whether this enthusiastic view of scientists will touch the hearts and the minds of Scottish people remains to be seen.
34. For details of pan-European initiatives, see Peter Bugge, 'The Nation Supreme: The Idea of Europe 1914–1945', in Wilson and van der Dussen (eds), *The History of the Idea of Europe*, pp. 83–149.
35. John Kendle, *Federal Britain: A History* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 5.
36. For the details of the postwar events, see Timothy Bainbridge and Anthony Teasdale, *The Penguin Companion to European Union* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995), de Giustino, *A Reader in European Integration*, and Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945* (London: Longman, 1991).
37. Gorbachev considers the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act as the turning point of modern history.
38. The *Independent on Sunday* stated in its leader on 12 May 1996 that Europe was good for democracy and cited these countries.
39. Beloff, *Europe and the Europeans*, p. 275; Ahrweiler, 'Roots and Trends in European Culture'; Heller, 'Europe: An Epilogue'; Sven Papcke, 'Who Needs European Identity and What Could It Be?' in Nelson *et al*. (eds), *The Idea of Europe*, pp. 61–74.
40. Beloff, *Europe and the Europeans*, p. 275; Jan-Baptiste Duroselle, *Europe: A History of its Peoples* (trans. Richard Mayne) (London: Viking, 1992), p. 415.
41. Papcke, 'Who Needs European Identity?', p. 63.
42. Duroselle, *Europe*, p. 415.
43. Michael Keating, 'Introduction', in Michael Keating and Barry Jones (eds), *Regions in the European Community* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 1–19; Michael Keating,

'Europeanism and Regionalism', in Michael Keating and Barry Jones (eds), *The European Union and the Regions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 1–22; Harvey Armstrong, 'The Role and Evolution of European Community Regional Policy', in Keating and Jones (eds), *The European Union and the Regions*, pp. 23–64.

44. John Mawson, Mario Ruis Martins and John T. Gibney, 'The Development of the European Community Regional Policy', in Keating and Jones (eds), *Regions in the European Community*, pp. 20–59.
45. Armstrong, 'Role and Evolution'.
46. The ERDF was conceived at the 1972 Paris Summit and some literature puts the ERDF's establishment in 1972. The operation of the ERDF started in 1975.
47. Keating, 'Europeanisation and Regionalism'.
48. European Commission Representation in the United Kingdom, *Scotland in Europe* (London: European Commission Representation in the United Kingdom, 1999).
49. Objective 1: To assist in development and structural adjustment of EU regions; Objective 2: To support the economic and social conversion of areas facing structural difficulties (particularly in areas of industrial decline, rural areas, urban areas and fishery-dependent areas); Objective 3: To support the adaptation and modernisation of education and training systems and employment policies. (Scottish Parliament, *European Structural Funds* (01/03), Edinburgh: The Information Centre, Scottish Parliament, 2001).
50. Scottish Parliament, *European Structural Funds* (01/03) (Edinburgh: The Information Centre, Scottish Parliament, 2001).
51. For the result of EEC referendum, see Appendix 2.
52. For example, see Neal Ascherson, 'Introduction', in Geraldine Prince (ed.), *A Window on Europe: The Lothian European Lectures 1992* (Edinburgh: Cannongate, 1993), pp. xix–xxvii, and James Mitchell and Graham Leicester, *Scotland, Britain and Europe: Diplomacy and Devolution* (Edinburgh: Scottish Council Foundation, 1999), pp. 25–6.
53. For an overview of the influence of EC/U regional policy on the regions and member states, see Michael Keating, 'Europeanism and Regionalism', in Keating and Jones (eds), *The European Union and the Regions*, pp. 1–22.
54. Mawson *et al*., 'Development of the European Community Regional Policy'; Armstrong, 'Role and Evolution'; Keating, 'Europeanism and Regionalism'.
55. Michael Keating and Barry Jones, 'Nations, Regions, and Europe: The UK Experience', in Keating and Jones (eds), *The European Union and the Regions*, pp. 89–144; Michael Keating and Nigel Waters, 'Scotland in the European Community', in Keating and Jones (eds), *Regions in the European Community*, pp. 60–88.
56. Keating and Waters, 'Scotland in the European Community'; Arthur Midwinter *et al*., *Politics and Public Policy in Scotland* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 85–91.
57. John Sutcliffe, 'The Implementation of the EU Structural Funds in the Highlands and Islands: From Objective 1 to Phasing Out', *Scottish Affairs*, 36 (2001), pp. 105–23.
58. Joseh A. McMahon, *Education and Culture in European Community Law* (London: Athlone Press, 1995), pp. 173–5.
59. Ibid., p. 122.
60. Sharon MacDonald, *Reimagining Culture: Histories, Identities and the Gaelic Renaissance* (Oxford: Berg, 1997).
61. David McCrone, *Understanding Scotland*; Mitchell and Leicester, *Scotland, Britain and Europe*; Mark Lazarowicz (ed.), *New Scotland, New Europe: Scotland and the Expanding European Union* (Edinburgh: Centre for Scottish Public Policy, 1999).

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‘Europe is Good for Scotland’: In the Eyes of the Respondents

Having reviewed the historical development of Scottish nationalism and the evolution of the idea of Europe, we shall now examine ideas concerning the relationship between Scotland and Europe which are in circulation in contemporary Scotland. The material analysed in this chapter is taken mainly from the interviews conducted with the members of the Scottish intelligentsia, but published materials such as newspaper columns and letters to newspapers by interviewees and others are consulted when necessary.

The interviewees hold positions of influence, articulating and implementing ideas about Scotland, the Scottish people and their future. They are of different political persuasions, and have different degrees of involvement with politics, either conventional or civic, but are in the business of expressing their opinions on where Scottish society should be heading. They represent most aspects of Scottish society which make Scotland distinctive, such as politics, culture, education, media, the Kirk, law and civil service as well as business. Out of 36 interviewees, eight explicitly support the Scottish National Party, five support the Labour Party and two the Conservative Party. The rest do not clarify their political persuasion. In terms of religious background, three of them make it clear that they are from a Catholic background. Their ages range from the thirties to the seventies, and in terms of gender, six of them are female. (Interviewees’ details can be found in Appendix 1.)

The identification of ideas about the relationship between Scotland and Europe currently in circulation based on this material involves two tasks, first, to clarify what kind of idea about the Scottish nation is presented and second, what kind of Europe is envisaged. As mentioned earlier, this study is not primarily concerned with how these ideas are received by the Scottish people, but the ideas identified in this chapter will be placed into a wider context for assessment in Chapter 6.

That there are many concepts of ‘Europe’ held currently, as explored in Chapter 3, is reflected in the fact that most of the respondents, regardless of political persuasion, are in one way or another

pro-Europe. Some are pro-EU as well as pro-Europeans while others are sceptical of the EU but pro-European. On a very superficial level, some of them say that they are pro-Europe because the English are anti-Europe. More often, the respondents paint better-thought-out pictures of what the relationship between Scotland and Europe should be. Sometimes, Europe is a means to achieve Scottish independence or to secure Scottish autonomy. Europe, at the same time, is an environment in which they can promote social democratic values and a vision of a nation which is civic and plural, of which Scotland is an example. Europe is also seen as a substitute for the British Empire.[1] It should be made clear that these views are not expressed separately but complexly intertwined to form detailed opinions on the relationship between Scotland and Europe. Almost all the respondents touch upon all these aspects but with varied emphasis on each. The fact that all the respondents put forward these three views suggests that these are the main views of the Scoto-European relationship presently in circulation, which reflect and influence public opinion in contemporary Scotland. The rest of this chapter will analyse each of these three views.

EUROPE AS A MEANS OF DISTINGUISHING THE SCOTS FROM THE ENGLISH

The most immediate reaction, as opposed to a view, given by many respondents to the question of the relationship between Scotland and Europe is that the Scots like Europe because the English do not. Although, strictly speaking, this is not a view on the Scoto-European relationship, it is worth looking at it in detail because it clarifies the wider framework within which all the other ideas are being formed and circulated.

> The whole people in Scotland is happy with the idea of European involvement. They are not like the English, so-called 'Euro-sceptics'. There may be some Euro-sceptics in Scotland but I think there is more enthusiasm. (Respondent 2, historian.)

> Hostility to Europe is an English experience. It is really hardly found here. We want to be European. (Respondent 3, literary critic.)

The above are some examples of this reaction. What these statements imply is that, first, in their eyes, the English are synonymous with Euro-sceptics and second, that the Scots want to be European because the English are not. In other words, Europe is one of the reference points where the Scots can distinguish themselves from their

southern neighbour. It is a statement on the Anglo-Scottish relationship, not on the Scoto-European relationship. Others put their observation in a slightly different way:

> I think there is very little Euro-sceptic vote in Scotland. A great deal of indifference and some enthusiasm. Some have a quite general feeling that they like them [Europeans] better than the English, I am afraid. (Respondent 4, academic.)

> People are fed up with Britain and London rule and cannot think Europe would be any worse. Some way, they think it would be better. (Respondent 5, solicitor.)

These statements suggest that Europe serves Scottish people's interests not only as a means of distinguishing the Scots from the English but also as an opportunity to express their anti-English feeling in a less contentious way. By siding with Europe, which is seen as progressive, the Scots acquire an indirect way of expressing their desire not to be like English. Consequently, in this framework, what Europe is does not really matter; as long as it provides the Scottish people with material which makes them distinct, in particular from the English, the Scots can be pro-Europe. But is that all that these statements suggest? The following remark offers more insight:

> There is Bill Walker [former Conservative MP, Tayside North] and other individuals who are very Euro-sceptic. But all the parties in Scotland are pro-Europe. Even most of the Tories. So in political institutions in Scotland, there is nothing parallel to English nationalists' hostility to Europe which is causing so much trouble for the Tories. (Respondent 6, journalist.)[2]

Whether all the parties in Scotland are pro-Europe as claimed here is a matter of dispute. However, the more important point here is that the interviewees understand Euro-scepticism as something strongly associated with the Conservative Party, and hold the view that the Conservative Party is understood to be the party of England and not of Scotland, not only by themselves, but also by the majority of people in Scotland. Why is this the case?

It is a relatively recent phenomenon that the Tories are perceived as anti-Scottish; at the 1955 general election, the Unionist Party won more than 50 per cent of the vote cast in Scotland, an incident which is still unique in Scottish history. However, by the late 1980s, the Tories themselves acknowledged that they were seen as anti-Scottish.[3] Since the investigation into the decline of the Conservative Party in Scotland lies

beyond the scope of this book, it should suffice to point out that the rise of New Right thinking within the Conservative Party and its attack on welfare provisions, some of which were widely held to be distinctively Scottish, is often held to be responsible for creating hostility to the Conservative Party in Scotland by the respondents here and many other experts on Scottish current affairs.[4] Against this background, it is worth examining what is called the democratic deficit here. It refers to the political situation in the United Kingdom, especially between 1979 and 1997, where while the majority of MPs returned by the Scottish electorate to the House of Commons came from opposition parties, the Conservative government remained in power (see Appendix 2). In other words, the Scottish people were ruled by the party which the majority had not voted for.[5] It was often argued that the Conservative government was in power thanks to the English voters, leading to an even stronger association between the English and the Tory Party being formed in the Scottish political debate.[6] Moreover, those who spectacularly displayed their doubts about European integration were often Tory Cabinet members, Tory back benchers and prime ministers themselves.[7] Although not all the Conservatives were Euro-sceptics and not all the opposition MPs were pro-Europe, under the circumstances of the 'democratic deficit' and increasing alienation of the Scottish electorate from the Tories, it was helpful for people in contemporary Scotland to adopt the 'English are Tories and therefore Euro-sceptics' theory in order to define the situation, and therefore, to reflect who they were and what to do in this chaotic world.

There is another issue related to this reaction, which has been picked up by many of the respondents: the notion of sovereignty. For some of the respondents, the Scottish understanding of sovereignty is different from the English one, and that is why Scots are more pro-Europe because European integration does not pose the same level of threat to Scotland as to England. Here is one of the most forceful comments on this issue:

> In Scotland, it [Europe] is something practical. And there is something more political in a way, which is the doctrine of sovereignty. The English state system, which is a very old one, which is based on the principles of absolutism, which is the authority must be absolute or it doesn't exist. The authority is retained by the British Parliament. Therefore, they cannot understand a system of shared authority which is a typical Enlightenment, post-French Revolution, republican system, which is the system of the member states of the EU. It is also a constitutional principle of the [European] Union itself. This is alien and the English can only perceive this as a threat. The whole English, they call it British,

> political tradition is under threat. But the Scots really do not have that hang up; they are much more normal in their attitudes to the constitutional issue. (Respondent 7, journalist.)

Note the word 'normal'. What is said here is that 'they', the English, are not normal when it comes to the constitutional issue, but the Scots are, and being normal in this instance means being like other countries in Europe. In other words, according to this speaker and other respondents, Europe is a criterion against which the degree of divergence in the constitutional arrangements of each country should be measured. This respondent's view of the British constitution that it is, in fact, an English one which is essentially alien to the Scots contrasts with the thesis put forward by Joseph Jacob that the British constitution is 'more of Scotland than of England'.[8] This may suggest a generally undeveloped awareness on the part of the Scottish public of the evolution of the British constitution over a few centuries. Alternatively, it may indicate that a desire to distinguish Scotland from England has grown stronger in contemporary Scotland to the extent that even the constitution is mobilised as an identity marker.

Another respondent develops this view into one of national identity:

> Here we talk about Wallace and Bruce. But in England, it is much more to do with sovereignty. The Crown, the Queen, and parliamentary sovereignty. In Scotland, it is much more to do with heroes. It [sovereignty] is much more at the heart of their national identity. So if you hit them there, it will hurt them more than the Scots or the Welsh. That is why it has always been much easier for the Scottish and Welsh to cope with Europe. (Respondent 8, academic.)

The notion of sovereignty is now firmly linked to national identity. He argues that the idea of parliamentary sovereignty is so deeply rooted in English national identity that it dictates English attitudes to European development, while the Scots and Welsh, who do not possess such a theory, can be more flexible in their approach towards Europe. According to both respondents, the important factor that differentiates the Scottish attitude to Europe from the English one is the issue of sovereignty. Why these respondents assert that the Scottish understanding of sovereignty is a popular one will be investigated in Chapter 5. How far, then, does this view penetrate the hearts and minds of Scottish people? Another respondent bluntly dismisses the whole idea:

> I do not accept that. The bulk of the public in England and Scotland has never heard of absolute sovereignty or parliamentary

> sovereignty. I do not think it means anything to them. Even amongst political activists, it is a fairly new phenomenon. (Respondent 9, academic.)

Although he admits the word 'sovereignty' has recently become fashionable in political debates, his point leads us to the following conclusion: for the Scottish intelligentsia, Europe serves as a reference point where they can distinguish the Scots from the English by developing an elaborate argument about sovereignty. In doing so, they can assert that the Scots are 'normal' and similar to fellow Europeans. Moreover, they are suggesting, intentionally or unintentionally, that the Scots are more democratic. For the majority of the population, however, the argument of sovereignty is still alien, but Europe, at least, offers an opportunity to assert the perceived difference between the people of Scotland and those of England by identifying the English with the Conservative Party and Euro-sceptics. Probably, for most Scots, it is more about being pragmatic than the elaborate discourse on sovereignty, as the following statement indicates:

> England has the Parliament, has a power in the world, but some of the power has been lost to the European level. But from a Scottish point of view, we do not have power to lose, we do not have any effective sovereignty within Scotland, we are not exercising power, we are not influencing events, so we cannot lose power to the European level. And we are quite enthusiastic because the less power at Westminster, the better. (Respondent 10, party employee.)

What is being expressed here is exactly the same sentiment as that observed when the Scottish people support any team playing against England in sport. In other words, it could be anything as long as England loses face.

As stated earlier, we have not been dealing here with the relationship between Scotland and European integration, but rather the Anglo-Scottish relationship. What should be noted is that ideas about the Scoto-European relationship are formed and debated within the framework established by the relationship between Scotland and England, and, to some extent, Scotland and the idea of Britain. Another point suggested here is that supranationalism, in this case the process of European integration, can be an ally of nationalism, in this instance Scottish nationalism, not necessarily threatening the latter's aspiration. Why should this be so?

EUROPE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE

One of the most popular views on the relationship between Scotland and Europe is that the European Union serves Scotland either as a means to achieve independence, or to obtain greater autonomy for Scotland. Independence and devolution are, technically speaking, two different things and each of them attracts different groups of followers. A closer look at both positions reveals that both agree that what is at stake is securing more say for the Scottish people in running Scottish affairs and that the essential difference between them is what would be a desirable and realistic means for achieving this goal. For nationalists it is 'Independence in Europe' which aims to get rid of the framework of the United Kingdom, while for devolutionists, the most desirable and realistic method is to set up a domestic Parliament while recognising the necessity and benefits of keeping the Union with England. In the context of contemporary Scotland and for the purpose of the thesis, therefore, both nationalists and devolutionists are equally nationalist because they are concerned with establishing and maintaining the autonomy, unity and identity of the Scottish nation.

A few words of clarification about the devolutionists are required here. Although they are closely associated with the Scottish Constitutional Convention which was, in effect, a pact between the Scottish Labour Party and the Scottish Liberal Democrats to work together for a Scottish Parliament, there are also devolutionists amongst the Tories. The devolutionists would go out of their way to argue that they are not nationalists, that they are not looking for the break-up of the United Kingdom. Their argument is that devolution is good for Scotland, so it should be good for the United Kingdom as a whole. This is why many analysts in Scotland include devolutionists in the category of nationalists, as is done here, since, like most nationalists in the world, they are primarily concerned with revitalising the Scottish nation. The advantage of putting the nationalists and devolutionists in the same category is that this avoids equating nationalism with a movement for independence. Nationalism, as has been argued earlier, is not a mere movement for independence; it is a wider, historical and cultural phenomenon. By recognising the nationalist component of the devolutionists in Scotland, this narrow view of nationalism can be avoided.

So why do the Nationalists like Europe? One of the respondents has a clear answer:

> We see it [the European Union] as a strategic method of winning independence. That is you can have the maximum political change with the minimum economic disruption. (Respondent 11, accountant.)

What is implied here is that the European Union makes it plausible for Scotland to achieve independence by providing a single market to which, nationalists believe, an independent Scotland has automatic access, thus eliminating the fear of separation with which the SNP has always been associated. If independence does not mean the loss of trade with England or with the continental countries, where most of the Scottish trade takes place, it should be more acceptable for the Scottish people to opt for independence. In order to persuade the voters that there is nothing to be feared from the prospect of an independent Scotland, the SNP has agreed to surrender the idea of absolute sovereignty of an independent state in return for economic assurances. The effect of this move made by the SNP is praised by other respondents.

> What they have done is quite a remarkable shift; a party which is a nationalist party accepting the membership of such an institution as the European Community. It is most difficult to come to terms with the fact that there is no true independence but the SNP can use that language. It is far more realistic. (Respondent 9, academic.)

This point is also supported by an opinion poll, in which 52 per cent of the respondents said that they would feel less resistance to independence with this policy, while those who said it would be more difficult to support independence constituted 8 per cent.[9] One of the reasons is that it appeals to common sense.

> Clearly, if Scotland is to be a nation-state, Europe is the only way Scotland can achieve it. You cannot have a nation of 5 million people, stuck on the outskirts of the European continent that did not have that special relationship. (Respondent 12, academic.)

On the SNP's side, therefore, there appears to be a trade-off of part of sovereignty with potential economic benefits, which has more advantages than disadvantages. In other words, 'you get a lot of benefit but not many of the penalties' (Respondent 7, journalist) with this policy. This logic has a striking similarity to the way in which the Union of Scotland and England is often explained; Scotland has gained a lot of benefit from the Union in return for giving up sovereignty, a line of reasoning which echoes some aspects of Scottish history.

Those who are involved with the SNP are curiously quiet about the sovereignty issue. Although they indicate time and again that the SNP prefers the confederal or intergovernmental model of the European Union to the federal one, the sovereignty question is rarely addressed

in a straightforward way. Given the inherent ambiguity of the 'Independence in Europe' policy, it may be natural for the SNP to try to avoid facing it for the fear of damaging its standing. It is also not too far-fetched to theorise that since the SNP has a long tradition of seeking independence within some frameworks, such as the British Empire, unlike other nationalists in the world, Scottish nationalists are not fanatical about achieving absolute sovereignty.[10] More recently, the SNP's support for the British–Irish Council, also known as the Council of Isles, may reflect this flexible approach to the sovereignty issue.

What about devolutionists? Those who are not actively seeking independence but increased autonomy also view European integration favourably. Those who are engaged in civil politics in Scotland often refer to the decision-making process within the EU as more suitable for Scotland, since, to their mind, it is designed to reflect minorities' views better than the Westminster system. They also talk about being a 'region' of Europe which enables Scotland to enter into direct negotiations with institutions of the European Union or other regions and member states. However, for the devolutionists this only becomes possible when Scotland has its own Parliament. Otherwise, negotiations have to be done through the London government, which, to the devolutionists and Nationalists alike, does not secure the best deal for Scotland. For the devolutionists, European integration, thus, ensures and even necessitates Scottish autonomy.

What we have discussed so far suggests that European integration is used to win support and votes for independence and/or a greater degree of autonomy for Scotland. In this respect, 'Europe is good for Scotland'. But why is gaining independence or a greater degree of autonomy so important? It is because in the respondents' eyes, and according to opinion polls, Scotland urgently needs some constitutional change to be revitalised as a nation. The Scottish nation, according to many Scots, is not realising its full potential because it is trapped in the Union with England which no longer works in favour of Scotland. Even the Conservative respondents, who are enthusiastic supporters of the Union, agree that the Union of Scotland and England cannot continue without reform.[11] They differ from nationalist respondents in that they believe the Union, once reformed, will continue to serve Scotland best. Others are not so sure about the future of the Union and in order to secure the renaissance of the Scottish nation, they look to the European Union. One respondent put his view as follows:

> I do not have any illusion that there is this panacea about Europe. At the same time … it does give Scottish people a degree of self-confidence that could exist without dependency upon London. (Respondent 5, solicitor.)

A view also supported by a nationalist:

> I do not know enough to compare hypothetical Scotland in the European Union and Scotland independent out of the EU. The main advantages which I am interested in would be the growth of feeling of identity and feeling of responsibility with the identity. We have a small part to play in the affairs of the world instead of the affairs of Westminster, I think it would be good for everyone. (Respondent 13, accountant.)

Carrying on the status quo, especially under the legacy of Thatchersim, means, to these respondents, being labelled as a 'subsidy junkie' who cannot stand on his own feet, being told that you have to lose your Scottish accent in order to be taken seriously. For them, the Scottish people at present lack self-confidence which, they believe, any nation with as long a history as Scotland must have. They also believe that the Scottish people are not confident because Scotland is trapped in the Union which the English are perceived to dominate. Therefore, they work for independence or a greater degree of autonomy. What independence or devolution will eventually bring about is a 'normal' relationship with England. In the eyes of the respondents here, European integration will help the Scots with forming a better relationship with England. A further reason why Europe is good for Scotland, at least for the moment, is as the following statements suggest:

> And it has always seemed to me that Europe provides a framework for answering the question: 'How could you maintain the kinds of sensible, civilised, intimate links between Scotland and the rest of Europe, particularly between Scotland and England, at the same time creating an adequate degree of Scottish independence?' (Respondent 14, academic.)

> Anything which enables Scotland to be less obsessed with the English is good … You could imagine a day when Europe became very centralised and Scotland would want to be free again, but that will be far in the future. (Respondent 15, literary critic.)

So far, we have examined the view of Europe as a means of achieving a greater degree of Scottish independence from England by providing an economic and institutional framework in which all the western European countries are now operating. By doing so, Europe offers an opportunity for the Scottish people to regain the confidence that any proper nation should possess and to form a better relationship with England. Conveniently, there is a history of Scottish links with

continental Europe, to which almost all the respondents refer in justifying their point. The Auld Alliance with France which goes back to the thirteenth century, the trade link with Scandinavian countries, Baltic countries, France and Low countries and the intellectual and religious link with Holland are the three connections cited to back up their argument for a special Scottish affinity to continental Europe. Because of the historical experience of a closer relationship with continental countries until the Union of 1707, they argue that the Scottish people have less resistance to the process of European integration than the English, which makes it easier to pursue these tactics. The historical justification given by the respondents will be investigated in Chapter 5.

EUROPE AS A SPACE WHERE A MORE JUST SCOTLAND IS POSSIBLE

The previous section considered the instrumental view of Europe, which projects Scotland as a nation suffering from an unfair deal with England. In this view, Europe is a static existence awaiting to be used by the Scots. Does Europe, then, not represent any substance or value to inspire the nationalist movement in Scotland? To many respondents, the answer is 'yes'. For them, Europe represents progress, social democracy, fairer principles of decision making, respect for diversity and so on, which are good for Scotland because the Scots are committed to these values.

When respondents talk about Europe being progressive, they are referring to the relatively recent developments in the process of European integration, such as the operation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the drafting and consolidation of the Social Chapter or the establishment of the Committee of the Regions. The work of the ERDF, which is visible in many areas in Scotland, seems to suggest, for people in Scotland and for some of the respondents, that the European Union cares for the periphery, unlike the London government whose fundamental philosophy is based on the effect of market forces. They argue that Europe does not neglect underdeveloped or de-industrialised areas just because they are not self-supporting in contrast to the Thatcherite policy of self-reliance. In addition, the birth of the Committee of the Regions can be interpreted as a sign of the EU's commitment to diversity within the EU, because it is set up as an arena where regional interests, which are not necessarily well-represented by the member states, can be aired and taken seriously. The Social Chapter, from which Britain was exempted until Labour came to power in 1997, is seen as evidence that European integration is not only about the market, that is, capitalism, but about the welfare of human beings. Thus, arguments such as 'Europe representing communal values rather than

free marketeering' (Respondent 16, academic) become convincing, although this is only one aspect of European integration.

This picture of Europe is, as suggested above, a recent one and it is all the more appealing to the Scottish people because of the experience of Thatcherism. The exact meaning of Thatcherism exceeds the scope of this book,[12] but as Margaret Thatcher admits in her memoirs, her policy was not popular in Scotland.[13] Most of the respondents, even a Conservative supporter, point out the importance of her government in sharpening the sense of being Scottish, which in this context, means to be egalitarian, committed to the welfare state, community-oriented as opposed to being market-oriented, and ready to accept state intervention. This change in Scottish society during the 1980s and 1990s is recognised by almost all the respondents.

> And many of these who vote SNP without being committed to nationalism are not just voting tactically. Their thinking is based on the idea that you might be able to have a more just society in Scotland. I think what Thatcher did was to make injustice into a principle … so, people looked for some positive identity within which to expand their anti-Thatcherism. In Scotland, it could be 'Scottishness', it could be the idea that Scotland is a small country whose history has taught people that their getting on with each other is vital for social well-being. (Respondent 17, academic.)

'Injustice' is the key word here. The electoral situation of the United Kingdom was such that it allowed the Scottish people to see themselves as different from Mrs Thatcher and her government. If Mrs Thatcher was unjust, the Scots who had voted for the opposition parties repeatedly were, consequently, bound to be just. In due course, the Scots could also label their southern neighbour as greedy, selfish, uncaring and so on, since Mrs Thatcher and her government had been in power thanks to the seats they had won in England. This set of circumstances made it easier for the Scottish intelligentsia in the 1990s to emphasise an idea of the Scottish nation being caring, socially just, and morally committed.[14] Here again, history helped them to support the idea of the Scots being democratic and egalitarian with examples such as the parish school system introduced in the sixteenth century which was allegedly the forerunner of twentieth-century universal education. Moreover, many respondents maintain that the harsh climate and the poverty of Scotland has taught Scottish people to work together, and co-operate with one another for the betterment of the commun-ity. The following is an example of such a self-definition of Scots:

> I suppose I feel more comfortable being grouped around with economic prosperity, being able to, in an egalitarian way, help other less prosperous nations to improve the quality of living and reduce poverty and malnourishment. (Respondent 18, academic.)

In this view, the Scots are the people who are egalitarian and committed to social justice. This view of the Scottish nation, in addition, conforms to the definition preferred by the Scottish intelligentsia, that is, of the Scottish nation as a civic and territorial nation:

> I believe that Scottish collective or communal identity is primarily institutional, rather than ethnic or cultural … The central structure or architecture derives from the civic institutions of 'civil society' which were left intact by political assimilation after the Union of 1707. (Respondent 19, academic.)

> The founding people of Scotland were many and therefore that is something to be celebrated. And anybody can be a Scot; if you live here, if you contribute to the country, you are a Scot, regardless of your background, where you are born or your lineage. The only way to define Scottishness is in civic or territorial terms. That can conform to the modern world today. (Respondent 12, academic.)

The European Union, which is symbolised by the Social Chapter, is, therefore, an ideal framework for the Scots to realise what they believe in. Thus, the Europe envisaged here is a space with social democratic values and respect for diversity which does not resemble any existing system of governance, especially the nation-state model.

> It [Europe] is clearly not going to operate as a kind of monolingual entity. Europeanness will always be weak, flexible, multi-stranded … Europe is far more likely to develop as demos than ethnos, which is more political rather than cultural/ethnic … It [the definition of Europe] can only ever be, and only ever should be, a civic, loose territorial definition.[15] (Respondent 12, academic.)

Within this framework, the Scots will be able to realise their ideals, working with others in Europe with the same values; the difficulty of which under Westminster rule is revealed by the following respondent:

> What role Scotland will play in Europe, what role Europe plays in the world is very difficult to predict. But I hope that Scotland,

> through its own Parliament, would be a factor in Europe for the empowerment of people for social progress and be able to link up with other nations and regions and peoples in Europe with the same aspirations. (Respondent 5, solicitor.)

While the Scots like Europe for the reasons explored above, it is also recognised that Europe will like Scotland because of its 'healthy' nationalism.

> Scottish institutionalism – moderate, quiet, with an image of civic rather than ethnic nationalism – is favourably seen in Europe among the Eurocrats of Brussels and Strasbourg. (Respondent 19, academic.)

> I think not only Scotland is good for Europe but Scotland is, I would argue and I do not think I am arrogant here, I would argue that Scotland is essential for Europe. I think it is a very important element which goes back into the Scottish traditions to some extent, and to the Scottish history and Scottish politics. And that is Scotland is not an ethnic state. (Respondent 20, academic.)

But what if Europe abandons its social democratic inclination that is much cherished by the Scottish intelligentsia as the process of integration progresses? Some of the respondents have an answer for this question.

> But Scots always go against those institutions or people who are obstacles to further social progress. So you will find Scots within Europe will be at the forefront of trying to constantly bring about a greater control, greater rights for the people of Scotland and of Europe … But also within Europe, I want Scotland to play a much more practical democratic role that it is unable to do through the framework of Britain. So that Scots can re-assert themselves in the international arena and be a positive player. (Respondent 5. solicitor.)

To summarise, in this vision, Europe, in the first instance, helps the Scots to define themselves as a people who possess social democratic values. At the same time, Europe provides an environment in which talk of social democratic values is received with empathy, not dismissed as too idealistic, and helps the Scots to consolidate these values as part of their self-definition. The Scots, then, try to institutionalise and strengthen these values in the space called Europe, thus creating a two-way process in which Europe is good for Scotland because

Europe is where Scots can pursue their ideals without being ridiculed as being too visionary, and Scotland is good for Europe because the Scots contribute to promote these social democratic values throughout Europe.

This vision of the relationship between Scotland and Europe suggests two things. First, that Europe helps the Scots to assert their moral superiority over, above all, the English and other nations in the world. They see themselves as a people with high moral standards – they care for community more than money.[16] They are prepared to contribute to Europe and the world in their pursuit of social progress. Unlike in many Euro-sceptic views, here the EU is not seen as an obstruct for democracy but as a defender of decent societal values. Whether or not the EU is a superstate in the making is not the main issue here. What is emphasised are the values which, according to the respondents, the Scots share with other Europeans. Although some concerns over centralisation, bureaucratisation and the dominance of the larger countries in the European Union are expressed, there is little fear of losing sovereignty. If the respondents are worried, they are worried about the possible decrease of democracy within the EU. Even if that happens, the Scots are, according to the respondents, prepared to fight against it to retain maximum democracy both for Scotland and other small countries in the European Union. This idea has a very strong moral dimension, which in principle could be in conflict with the process of European integration as its focus is on the creation of the Common Market. However, thanks to its recent move towards the left, the EU has successfully catered for the nationalists' morality. Europe is, therefore, good for Scotland according to most of the respondents. Whether this idea is a product of the idealistic elites who are detached from the views of the majority of Scots will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Another dimension of the understanding of the Scottish nation which is expressed in conjunction with this view is the idea of a civic Scotland. The reason why the Scots seem to like social democracy is often explained by referring to the alleged civic nature of the Scottish nation. For example, one of the respondents made reference to the speech given by William MacIlvanny, a writer, at the demonstration in Edinburgh on 10 December 1992, on the occasion of the EU Summit held in Edinburgh. According to this respondent, MacIlvanny declared that the Scots were mongrel and mixture of many peoples and 'everyone cheered' (Respondent 12, academic). This episode was brought up by other respondents, too, in their attempt to account for what appears to be the social democratic orientations of the contemporary Scots. Furthermore, there is a widely held popular myth of a less racist Scotland, whose existence is recognised by many of the respondents, including church activists. This is partly supported by

the representatives of ethnic communities in Scotland, though this is not to say, and no respondent claims, that there is no racism in Scotland.[17] These episodes and beliefs are important in society where it has become a common sense that ethnic nationalism is bad but civic nationalism is good. The view of Europe as a space where a more just Scotland incorporates these elements, and therefore provides an even more coherent worldview that tells the Scots and the world who the Scots are and where they are in the contemporary world.

EUROPE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Another view of the relationship between Scotland and Europe is that from Scotland's point of view Europe is replacing the British Empire, and for this reason Europe is good for Scotland. This raises the question: What did the Empire represent for Scotland? On a rather abstract level, it used to offer the Scots a focus for their understanding of the world.

> It [Europe] surely has the same function as the Empire did in the past. We looked at Victoria not so much as the Queen of Britain, she was the Empress of the Empire, the figure head in the suffering world. The Empire is gone, the Commonwealth is in fraction, so, what Europe does is to provide a kind of surrogate identity. It is not real identity. (Respondent 21, academic.)

On a more practical level, the British Empire was the solution for the Scottish problem of being a poor nation with an educated, talented and motivated population. For the Scots it represented 'places to go, to explore, to exploit, proselytise or settle'.[18] At the same time, taking part in the British Empire offered Scots a role in the international arena which a small nation like Scotland might not otherwise have had. In this sense, Europe provides the Scots with a new stage for Scottish talent; a new frontier and a bigger role to play in the world. This is the view shared by many of the respondents.

> I do think people feel the entity that they have to come to terms with is Europe, not the United Kingdom. I do think people want to find a more satisfactory relationship with Europe. Scotland, being a small country, is always looking for opportunities to act on a bigger stage than her own size makes possible. And Europe is that bigger stage. (Respondent 22, historian.)

> I think in some ways the EU replaces what the Empire was for the Scots. The Scots were very good at running the Empire, we will

> be equally good in European affairs at all levels … At the level of personnel, we will bring more people to the European level as administrators and operators. We will bring some ideas, like the ideal of social justice and egalitarianism to the European level, to add another voice arguing for these kinds of things. (Respondent 10, party employee.)

This Scottish tradition of supplying talented persons to other parts of the world where they are needed is now legally supported in the framework of the European Union, and the historical experiences of the Scots tell the respondents that the EU will be the new empire for the Scots.

> In terms of job opportunities, Europe is providing a lot for Scotland. The Single European Act has produced four freedoms and one of them is freedom of movement. Scots have historically had no problem in freedom of movement. We tended to go all over the world but we now have rights to work in Europe … Because of that historical willingness Scots get on very well. (Respondent 12, academic.)

Evidence is now emerging that the Scots used to emigrate to the European continent even during the period of the British Empire, and, more importantly, successfully integrated with the host societies. This ensures, in the respondents' minds, the success of the Scottish people in the European Union. Incidentally, this is the reason why the Scottish people should dissociate themselves from the English who have gained a rather unfavourable reputation in Europe.

> But you see, the Scots are poor and well-educated, but a poor nation always sends lots of people abroad. So if you go round Scandinavia or Germany, you keep coming up against Scottish names. People who emigrated as late as the nineteenth century, immigrated to Europe and set up the businesses or became politicians and so on in these countries. With all these networks and connections existing, I found myself that in the 1980s, not a good decade for Anglo-European relationships, being a Scot was not a disadvantage at all in Europe. (Respondent 20, academic.)

Scotland's relationship with Europe in this regard, therefore, can be summarised as follows. Europe is a socio-economic space which is a product of European integration, which allows the Scots to develop their skills and to realise their potential. The legal framework of the EU ensures the right of the Scottish people to participate in the Common

Market and beyond, thus making it easier for the Scots to revive their tradition of going out and making the most of their talents. The Scottish nation is envisaged to be a small but well-educated, talented and energetic nation, which has lost its vitality with the loss of the British Empire. The European Union is and will be an alternative to the British Empire and an opportunity for the Scots to revitalise their energy. In order to play a bigger role in Europe and beyond, many respondents argue, Scotland at least has to have its own Parliament. Nationalists argue that this aim is best achieved through independence; devolutionists think that a Scottish Parliament should be enough, for the structure of the European Union is such that it gives enough say to a devolved Scottish Parliament to act independently of the London government. This vision of the Scoto-European relationship is powerfully backed by historical memory centred on the glorious days of Scotland in the age of the British Empire, something that is explored in more detail in Chapter 5.

An interesting point shared by the views which have been examined is that none of them suggests a fear of losing sovereignty to Europe. In other words, European integration is not understood here as a process of removing sovereignty from the member state to form a European 'super-sovereignty'. This prompts the question of how the respondents can afford not to be concerned with sovereignty while discussing securing and maintaining identity and autonomy of Scotland. One possible answer can be found in the historical experience of the Scots, namely the Union with England.

As mentioned above, the absence of a nationalist movement in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Scotland is thought to be one of the major issues to be tackled in the study of Scottish nationalism. One way of explaining why this was so, and a point which was not discussed earlier, is to focus on the nature of British identity. The main point, according to those who subscribe to this school of thought, is that British identity was a quasi-national identity which was constructed in order to survive the expansion of the British Empire and the wars which accompanied this expansion, and therefore, has little ethnic content which might have suppressed Scottish identity.[19] For the Scots, then, it is possible to comprehend the process of European integration as something similar to the formation of Britain. As many respondents point out, the Scots are used to being part of something bigger, and the Scottish experience reveals that this does not entail denying or suppressing their Scottishness. In the British Empire, the Scots left their own mark rather than an English, or even a British one. The assumption shared in certain circles that the European Union will not and cannot evolve into a superstate also helps the Scots to come to terms with Europe. Europe is too diversified to work in the same way

as a unitary state, therefore, many of the respondents say, Europe can only resemble the British state, with which Scotland used to live quite happily. In this sense, the EU is seen as an institutional framework for understanding the world.

Despite these views of the Scoto-European relationship, which stipulate that Europe is good for Scotland, Scotland is not free from Euroscepticism and there are views that suggest Europe is not good for Scotland. These counter-arguments need to be considered in order to provide a fairer picture.

'EUROPE IS NOT GOOD FOR SCOTLAND'

There are some voices which argue that Europe is not good for Scotland in contemporary Scottish society. This view is held not only by Conservative supporters, as the discussion may seem to suggest, but also by some of the Labour activists and SNP supporters. The debate on European Union issues in Scotland has undergone a big change in direction since 1975 when a higher proportion of the Scottish electorate voted against the continuation of EEC membership than elsewhere in the United Kingdom. The reason for rejecting membership is presented by some of the respondents as a reflection of the left-wing tendency of the postwar Scottish population, which was shared both by Labour supporters and nationalists alike.

> At the time Britain entered the Common Market and a referendum was held in 1975, there was a very strong vote against membership in Scotland, it was stronger in Scotland than anywhere else. And the Labour party in Scotland and the STUC [Scottish Trade Union Congress] took a position of opposition to membership, not, unlike some of the Conservatives on the basis that we did not want to be part of any foreign organisations, but because we saw it as a capitalist institution. (Respondent 23, trade unionist.)

> I did not like the EEC because it seemed to be too centralist. This is one aspect of it. And I thought it was too capitalist. (Respondent 13, accountant.)

The then European Economic Community was 'too capitalist' for those Scots who were developing socialist, or collectivist, tendencies. This is, for many of the respondents, a relatively recent development. In the nineteenth century, or more precisely in the Victorian era, 'the Scots were famous for their individualism and their opposition to the state, or hostility to the state' (Respondent 22, historian). This

emphasis on individualism is usually attributed to the teaching of the Calvinist Kirk. This was the tendency represented in the Kirk by the so-called evangelicals who had dominated the General Assembly from the 1830s. Before that, between the 1750s and 1830s, the General Assembly had been under the influence of the moderates who had sought to align themselves with their English counterpart and to emphasise moderation in religious enthusiasm.[20] What is interesting is that just as with the nineteenth-century Scots principle of self-reliance, which was most visibly represented by the Kirk's administration of Poor Law, the twentieth-century Scottish commitment to egalitarianism and the community is also understood to be supported by the philosophy of the Kirk.[21] It is widely accepted that the Church of Scotland forms one of the backbones of Scottish identity; these changing stances of the Kirk towards social issues over time indicate that it probably continues to be so in this allegedly secular age.

Those who opposed EEC membership on the basis that it was too capitalist and too centralist were concerned with one aspect of the sovereignty of Scotland: namely the control of North Sea oil. In the 1970s, the SNP's vision of Scotland was already that of building a socially democratic, just society with the revenue from North Sea oil.[22] Joining the European Economic Community meant, for some, losing the final say over the disposal of oil revenue, which was regarded as the essential element for realising a democratic welfare state in Scotland.

> The idea of Scotland some of us had in the 1970s, not everyone, was that Scotland was an independent country, outside the EC, which would have a sort of radical, democratic constitution and it would use its oil wealth to repatriate control of its own economy, neglected by the assets which had been sold-off without providing the economic basis of welfare democracy. And we felt the Common Market, as it then was, was incompatible with this edition of an independent Scotland, because it involved an integrated economy, so depriving your democratically elected institutions of any real measure of control of your economy. You are bound to surrender the control as the process of integration advances. I still feel that. (Respondent 24, civil servant.)

This type of argument is, however, no longer fashionable as there is a growing realisation that the world economy is so much more interdependent and dominated by the multinationals today that to assume the national state could retain absolute control over its economy is simply untenable. The following is from a nationalist who campaigned against EEC membership:

> I just accept the fact that we are in, and I have more understanding of the interdependence of economies of small countries. I have got to accept the situation. (Respondent 13, accountant.)

This is an issue which all nationalists have to face in the world today. The reality of the world economy is such that it is almost impossible to argue the case for economic independence. Since sovereignty of the state has been undermined so much by developments in the world economy, opposition to European integration based on this argument is very difficult to sustain. If the nationalist movements want to be credible, they have to accept this type of economic framework in their argument. Moreover, this is probably easier for nationalists to digest because it is about strategy, recognition and ideology, and does not affect their identity.

A different type of objection to European integration which is based on the identity question also exists and is best summarised as the fear of an imposed cultural uniformity. It is, incidentally, aired by Conservative Party supporters.

> I am a bit sceptical about the European Union because it is a very ambitious enterprise. And history tells us that an ambitious enterprise often falls apart. I think there is less chance of falling apart if the unification proceeds very slowly. If it is rushed and if you are powerless amongst the centralised European institutions, then it provokes some reactions, which you can see in most countries already … It depends on how strong the push to the uniformity is. (Respondent 1, writer.)

> This is what I like about Europe, diversity in unity. It is much more important to preserve this than to become like each other. That is why I dislike people in Brussels trying to make us like each other. We should be happy with our differences. (Respondent 22, historian.)

What they are looking at is the aspect of European integration which others do not attend to; European integration as a force seeking to establish its own identity by eliminating internal differences within the Union. Neither of the two respondents is against a Europe of cultural diversity to which both express their attachment, nor to a Europe of the free market. The danger they see in the project of European integration is that because it is a political project as well, it inevitably leads to an attempt to force uniformity in the same way as nation-states have been doing. They believe that the Europe of the European Union is bound to be unified. The single currency requires all kinds of harmonisation

which leads to the setting up of universal rules for everything, leaving no room for local diversity. They do not care about the notions of subsidiarity and devolution in the European Union and by taking this stance they oppose those who believe the Europe of the European Union would be the one of diversity and subsidiarity. What they see is that the distinctiveness of Scotland or Scottish identity will be exposed to the powerful force of uniformity as integration proceeds. On this basis, Europe is not thought to be good for Scotland.

This is an argument which is in tune with what we understand as Euro-scepticism in general. The EU is seen as a faceless, overwhelming desire to swamp small nations like Scotland. The Scottish nation is perceived to be distinct but also powerless in front of the huge machine called the European Union. The EU is therefore demonised. Europe, in the form of the EU, therefore, is not good for Scotland.

To summarise what has been discussed so far. Europe is, on the whole, seen as good for Scotland because the perceived benefits from the EU outweigh its potential threat to Scottish identity. The Scottish intelligentsia can utilise this version of Europe to promote their visions of Scotland. On the other hand, although opposition to European integration from the viewpoint of economic independence has died out, there is a fear of uniformity, in other words, cultural assimilation. European integration in the latter view is seen as supranationalism which seeks to establish itself in the same way as the nation-states have been doing. There are two competing interpretations of European integration and also competing understandings of who and what the Scots are. This plurality is nothing special; in any nation, there are competing ideas about the nation. There are competing ideas about Europe as well. Even in Britain, which is widely seen as deeply Euro-sceptic, there are different ideas mobilised about Europe, some of which are favourable. In Scotland, because of the SNP's strategy, the pro-European views are more visible than in Britain as a whole. Chapter 5 will take a closer look at the use of history in these arguments to help gain a clearer picture of what is happening in contemporary Scotland.

NOTES

1. Some respondents, however, expressed a sense of detachment from the British Empire by describing it as a 'British' thing but not a 'Scottish' thing.
2. It is interesting to note in connection with this statement that one of the most vocal Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party, Teddy Taylor, is a Scot. However, he lost his Glasgow Cathcart seat at the 1979 General Election, and since 1980 has been representing an English seat (Southend East). In this sense, he is probably not included in the group of individuals to which the respondent refers.
3. James Mitchell, *Conservatives and the Union: A Study of Conservative Party Attitudes to*

Scotland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), p. vii; David Seawright and John Curtice, 'The Decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 1950–92: Religion, Ideology or Economics?', *Contemporary Record*, 9, 2 (1995), pp. 319–42.

4. Seawright and Curtice suggest that the decline of support for the Tories in Scotland may have been more to do with some contingencies such as the state of the economy at the time of general elections than its dissociation with Scottishness. See Seawright and Curtice, 'The Decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 1950–92'. However what is important for the argument here is that the decline of the Tories in Scotland is largely understood as a result of their 'Anglicisation' by a large number of people in Scotland as other commentators suggest. See Mitchell, *Conservatives and the Union*; McCrone, *Understanding Scotland*.
5. This often led to the argument that the Conservative government, therefore, had no mandate to rule Scotland. This was usually rejected by the argument that since general elections are fought on a UK basis, this kind of discrepancy did not raise any constitutional question. The problem with this argument was that an increasing number of people in Scotland were not satisfied with it. For the most eloquent account on democratic deficit, see Sillars, *Scotland: The Case for Optimism*. At the same time, this is an interesting issue which can clarify whether the United Kingdom is a unitary state or a union state. See Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin (eds), *Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of West European Peripheries* (London: Sage, 1983).
6. When looking at the percentage of votes cast for the Conservative Party in England, it is clear that the majority of people do not vote for the Tories. Because of the 'first past the post' system, however, the majority of English seats are taken by the Conservatives. This is well recognised by the respondents here; at the popular level, it is not.
7. The examples are Mrs Thatcher herself and eight so-called 'Euro-rebels', MPs from the Conservative Party who were deprived of the whip because of their public opposition to government policy concerning the European Union in late 1994.
8. Joseph M. Jacob, *The Republican Crown: Lawyers and the Making of the State in Twentieth Century Britain* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996), p. 306.
9. See SNP Research Bulletin, 1988.
10. Lynch, *Minority Nationalism*, p. 25.
11. Michael Fry, a historian, published a report which recommended devolution in order to strengthen the Union. Allan Massie described the Union as a beautiful old house which needs repair but should not be destroyed: Allan Massie, 'Beautiful Old Union House is not Beyond Repair', *Scotsman*, 31 October 1995.
12. James Mitchell and Lynn Bennie identify four aspects of Thatcherism in the Scottish context, namely, Thatcherism as personality, as British nationalism, as a 'two-nation' electoral strategy, and as free market ideology, and conclude it is the latter three aspects which have influenced Scottish politics and Scottish public opinion. See James Mitchell and Lynn Bennie, 'Thatcherism and the Scottish Question', in *British Election and Parties Yearbook 1995* (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 90–104.
13. Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 618–27.
14. It may be necessary to insert here that the Conservative Party which secured unprecedented support from the Scottish electorate in the 1950s was largely seen as 'one nation' Conservatives, which strove to appease the Scottish voters by initiating a series of measures of administrative devolution. For the recent history of the Conservative Party in Scotland, see Mitchell, *Conservatives and the Union*.
15. A word of caution. This statement is not suggesting that being 'political' is being 'weak' and that 'cultural/ethnic' is 'strong'. This statement sets out a scenario whereby the European Union becomes an institutional framework in which many nations of Europe are free to develop their distinctiveness without a unified definition of 'Europeaness' being imposed on them. This is certainly one of the visions of the relationship between Scotland and Europe which are in circulation in contemporary Scotland.
16. One respondent puts her view on this issue as follows, which sums up the mood of the respondents in simple language:

> Because up here, what matters is the community, society. Margaret Thatcher said there is no such thing as society, we disagree. We have society here which is not per-

> fect, but good society and we want to keep it, want to strengthen it. What the English Tory government is doing is totally contradicting what you can call natural Scottish values … The reason why the railways are anathema to the Tories is that they are the function of the community, social service. And that is precisely why we want them and they do not. (Respondent 3, literary critic.)

17. For minority views on Scottish society, see, for instance, Maan, *The New Scots*.
18. William Ferguson, *Scotland: 1689 to the Present* (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1968), p. 33.
19. Tom Nairn, *The Enchanted Glass: Britain and Its Monarchy* (2nd edn) (London: Vintage, 1994), pp. i–xxxxvi; Morton, *Unionist Nationalism*; David McCrone, 'Unmasking Britannia: The Rise and Fall of British National Identity', *Nations and Nationalism*, 3, 4 (1997), pp. 579–96.
20. Callum G. Brown, *The Social History of Religion in Scotland since 1730* (London: Methuen, 1987), pp. 15–17.
21. Alice Brown, David McCrone and Lindsay Paterson, *Politics and Society in Scotland* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p. 149.
22. For the vision of a social democratic Scotland held by the core members of the SNP, see Wolfe, *Scotland Lives*, which is an autobiographical record of Wolfe's involvement in the SNP and Scottish politics.

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The Uses of History: Why Europe is Good for Scotland

The views on the relationship between Scotland and Europe analysed in Chapter 4 are often justified by referring to the historical experiences of the Scottish people. For example, in order to assert the existence of a traditional Scottish affinity to continental Europe, many respondents mentioned the Auld Alliance with France or the old habit of the 'better-offs' to send their sons to the continent for further education as supporting evidence. This chapter will focus on this 'rationalising exercise' by the respondents. It aims to examine how Scotland's past is rediscovered, reinterpreted and used by the respondents to back up their visions of the Scoto-European relationship.

There are various reasons why this task is important in this study of contemporary Scottish nationalism. As some social anthropologists have argued, in order to reach a deeper level of understanding of a society, one has to ask the question 'How did the present create the past?' because the past, the present and the future are intertwined in the human mind.[1] In a study of nation and its identity, therefore, it is crucial to investigate how the past is represented by people who live in the present. Moreover, as has been argued before, nationalism is not only a political movement, but a wider phenomenon, which can be described as 'a historicist culture and civic education'.[2] In the study of nationalism, therefore, asking how the present shapes the past is even more pertinent precisely because that will lead to a better grasp of the issues which a particular nationalism confronts in a particular period. By examining the issues each case of nationalism tries to address, we can obtain a broader spectrum of what is involved thereby enabling us to obtain a firmer understanding of nationalism in general. The aim of this chapter is not, however, to debunk or demythologise the nationalist discourse, nor does it aim to propose a truer, more correct interpretation of Scottish history. What it tries to do is to achieve an understanding of how and why these views on the Scoto-European relationship have come about by an examination of Scottish views of their own history.

There are three themes to be explored here. The first is the Scottish tie with the continent before the Union of Scotland and England. As

we have seen, this historical experience is frequently cited by the respondents to legitimise their claims that there is a special affinity between Scotland and the continent which does not exist between England and Europe. Also, the respondents often state that the Scottish nation is perceived to be egalitarian and civic by many people in Scotland including the respondents themselves, and attempt to explain this fact by selecting relevant episodes from Scottish history. This is echoed in the view of the Scoto-Europe relationship which sees Europe as an environment in which a more just Scottish society is possible. The second theme is, therefore, the myth of an egalitarian Scotland. The third is the relationship between Scotland and the British Empire. The vision of the energetic and talented Scottish nation is usually put forward in the context of the British Empire. What the British Empire was for the Scottish people and how the experience and memory of it influences the current debate about where Scotland should be heading, needs to be explored in depth.

SCOTLAND AND EUROPE BEFORE THE UNION

One of the visions of the Scoto-European relationship discussed in Chapter 4 is that the European Union serves Scotland as an instrument for achieving independence. Many respondents add that the idea of the EU helping the Scottish people to get rid of London rule is not difficult for the Scots to accept for historical reasons. They argue that Scotland was always a European nation, that the Union with England and the entry to the British Empire unfortunately cut off the much-cherished ties with the continent, and that, therefore, it is nothing new for the Scots to think and act in the context of Europe. For example:

> We may take it [that Scotland is part of Europe] as an accepted fact, perhaps a bit of history. Until the Union of Scotland and England in 1707, Scotland was a normal, accepted, interactive part of Europe, what used to be called Christendom. (Respondent 25, businessman.)

Some respondents go even further and stress that Scotland is very European, or more European than England. In evidence they point out European influence on its key institutions such as Scots law and the Church of Scotland.

> It is important to add that there have also been particular ways of thinking between Scotland and Europe that differentiate

> Scotland from the rest of the UK. They are also historically important in the Church and the law, and in the education system and in military alliances in the Middle Ages. Scotland was connected to Europe in a different way from England. That has important cultural traces. So, although Scotland and England are both European countries … they are European in different ways … Negatively, the Scots are related to Europe differently than the English people, generally by feeling less threatened by it. (Respondent 14, academic.)

> We are part of Europe. Historically, Scotland has always been a more European country than England has. For example, our legal system is based on the Roman civil codes that is from the time of the Roman Empire, like the laws in most European countries … So we always felt more at home inside the European Community. (Respondent 11, accountant.)

> And we still feel this [closeness to Europe] because our institutions are still very much affected by this European connection. Our legal system, our universities and so on are very European. Our architecture is very European oriented. (Respondent 2, historian.)

According to these respondents, because Scotland used to have a closer relationship with continental countries than England and because this relationship influenced the way in which many of the Scottish institutions were formed, the Scots would naturally feel a certain affinity towards Europe. This is what is claimed by the respondents based on their interpretation of Scottish history. Historical details need to be considered in order to be able to put these claims into perspective.

There are two main issues. The first is the actual interaction between the Scottish people and the peoples of continental Europe that took place before the Union of 1707 or, probably more appropriately, before Scottish participation in the British Empire; and the second is the continuing influence of such an interaction on Scottish society that is still visible today.[3]

It is now accepted that pre-Union Scotland had been actively engaged in trade with the continental countries since the twelfth century when Norman rulers first introduced the burgh system in Scotland.[4] While Scotland was not renowned for exporting luxurious goods, Scottish merchants were busy importing wine from France, timber from Norway, consumer goods from the Netherlands, and rye

and flax from Poland. Unlike trade between the continent and England, which was in the hands of the German Hansa, the Scottish merchants were in charge of trade between themselves and the continent. As a result, before the Reformation, Scottish settlements were established in various parts of the continent, such as Danzig, Copenhagen, Elsinore, Bruges, Middleburg and Veere.

Closely intertwined with the active trade with the continent was the steady flow of migration from Scotland to European countries. Recent scholarship has shown that Poland was a more popular destination than Ulster or Scandinavia in the seventeenth century. The wave of emigration of pedlars, merchants and craftsmen to Poland has been recorded since the late fifteenth century and it reached its peak in the first half of the seventeenth century. In 1621, it was estimated that about 30,000 Scots were in Poland, and their prosperity was noted by an English MP who, back in England, issued a warning against the naturalisation of Scots in 1606, for fear of being overwhelmed by Scots immigrants. At the same time, recent works have demonstrated that Scots in Poland rapidly assimilated into Polish society and many Scottish names survive to this day in a polonised manner.[5]

Scandinavian countries were the second most important destination for migrants from Scotland in the seventeenth century. At the end of the fifteenth century, the King of Denmark already considered it necessary to limit the activities of Scottish pedlars in his kingdom. Most of those who made it to Scandinavia, however, were soldiers, a reflection of the international reputation of the time for Scottish fighting men. Many of them, if they survived the wars, settled in these countries, and did not return to their native country. It is estimated that about 10 per cent of the population in early seventeenth-century Bergen were born in Scotland.

One particular aspect of Scottish migration to continental Europe was mercenary and this was another point where pre-Union Scotland was deeply involved with Europe. For example, in 1568, 2,000 Scottish mercenaries fought for the king of Denmark, and 3,000 for the king of Sweden in 1573. It is also recorded that between 1620 and 1642, 10,320 Scottish soldiers were recruited for France, 2,800 for The Netherlands, 800 for Russia and 15,000 for Bohemia. Some of them managed to succeed socially in countries where they settled. Patrik Gordon (1653–99) became one of Peter the Great's foremost commanders. James Keith (1696–1758) served in the armies of Russia, Spain and Prussia and became Field Marshal for Frederick the Great. Some historians maintain that many of the Swedish nobility today take pride in a Scottish ancestry.

Yet another facet of the interaction between pre-Union Scotland and the continent involved intellectual communities. The fact that Scotland did not have its own university until 1412 when St Andrews University was founded, obliged students of all disciplines to travel elsewhere for further training, especially to France and The Netherlands, because of the military tension between Scotland and England. Even after the foundation of Scottish universities, many of the most talented graduates of domestic universities continued to travel to the continent for further education until the mid-eighteenth century. There is ample evidence demonstrating the magnitude of this exchange. For example, there were about 1,460 Scottish students who matriculated at Leyden between 1575 and 1800. These Scottish students did more than receive an education; they stayed to teach, to write and to contribute to the administration of universities. For example, 'between its foundation and the Reformation the University of Paris enjoyed the benefits of seventeen or eighteen Scottish rectors'.[6] One of the best-known figures of this kind is John Mair (1467–1550).[7] Born in East Lothian, he was educated at Cambridge and Paris. As soon as he received his Master's degree in 1494, he started lecturing at the University of Paris and by the time he was awarded a doctorate, he was a well-established humanist scholar whose circle included Erasmus and Ignatius Loyola. He came back to Scotland to take up the post of the Principal of the University of Glasgow in 1518. In 1523, he moved to St Andrews. While he was in Glasgow, he wrote one of the monumental works in Scottish historiography, *History of Great Britain* (1521), published in Paris and written in Latin, in which he called for a unification of Scotland with England.

The European influence on Scottish intellectuals was not confined to philosophy. John Knox (c.1514–72) was also trained in Geneva, and after the Reformation, there was a flow of continental students to St Andrews University to study Calvinist theology. Before the University of Edinburgh became established for its excellence in medicine, many Scottish medical students were trained in Dutch universities. In the Court of the Stuarts, the influence of French culture was obvious. The Palaces of Stirling and Linlithgow are but two examples of the royal taste for French culture. Medieval Scotland was actively engaged in intellectual exchange with the continent.

One of the fundamental reasons for the lively interaction between Scotland and continental Europe was military alliances. The resistance to the domination of the English crown over Scotland led Scotland to form an alliance with France known as the Auld Alliance. It was first signed in 1295 promising aid from Scotland to the French king in the

event of war between France and England and was renewed many times until the Reformation. The Auld Alliance brought another arrangement between Scotland and France. French subjects could enjoy the same rights as native Scots and Scots were granted the same privileges by the French king. This particular episode appears to support the argument that Scotland was so heavily involved with European countries, as opposed to England, for a reciprocal citizenship arrangement to exist.[8] Only two of the respondents, however, mentioned this arrangement. This suggests that this nationality arrangement between the two countries is a lesser-known fact in modern Scotland and one that could be picked up by Euro-enthusiasts to promote more pro-European attitudes amongst the Scots.

One of the clearest pieces of evidence of such lively interaction with the continent concerns Scots law. In discussing the interrelationship between Scots law and Scottish identity, there are two separate points to be considered. One is the fact that the Scots have always had, and still have, a separate legal system from the English that has survived the Union, which is why Scots law is widely perceived as one of the pillars of Scottish identity. In this case, the content of Scots law is not brought into question; Scots law is important as an institution.[9] The other is that because Scots law is closer to the civil law of continental countries than the common law of England in terms of legal type, Scots law serves as evidence that Scottish people are traditionally more European. The first argument is well-established in the study of Scottish nationalism and of Scottish society in general, and a view widely held by people in contemporary Scotland. However, since this aspect is not directly relevant to the present discussion, attention will be turned to the second view, which was echoed in many interviews undertaken with members of the Scottish intelligentsia and which deserves further exploration.[10]

The evolution of Scots law is a complicated subject which expands over many centuries. For the purpose of this section, however, it should suffice to state that Scots law is a product of the development of Scottish society itself. It has been formed under Celtic, Nordic and Norman influences together with some elements borrowed from English common law. As a result, its origins are not entirely rooted in Roman or civil law.[11] Throughout the Middle Ages, a great deal of effort was made by Scots lawyers to assert the Scottishness of Scots laws which in turn lay the foundations for the case being made for a Scottish kingdom as an entity separate from England. Interestingly, at the same time, English lawyers were concerned by the possible contamination of their law by a Scottish counterpart that was perceived to

be Roman, in other words, foreign.[12] Though the Scottish lawyers' case for the distinctiveness of Scots law was not solely based on its Roman character, it is worth noting here that the origins of the association of Scots law with the Roman law lay in the Medieval period. How, then, has Scots law obtained its Roman law character? As mentioned earlier, because of the geopolitical environment of the Middle Ages, Scottish law students used to go to Paris before the Reformation, and to Utrecht and Leiden after the Reformation, to study law, rather than to Oxford or Cambridge. These students were naturally trained in the civil law tradition which they then brought back to Scotland, thus adding a particularly strong continental flavour to Scots law.[13]

That Scots law has a strong mark of the Roman law tradition is, then, an undisputable fact. Does it imply, as some of the respondents here insist, that Scots law makes Scottish people more European than the English? This is difficult to substantiate. For one thing, after the Napoleonic war, the flow of Scottish students to the continent was radically reduced and the direct influence of European laws on Scots law waned. Moreover, during the nineteenth century, many continental countries began to codify their laws while Scots law remained largely uncodified just as the English laws. Even though Scottish universities continued to educate students in the Scottish tradition, Scots law was cut off from new developments on the continent. Secondly, as the function of the state has expanded, the number of UK-wide laws enacted by the British Parliament has been enormously increased. This has brought about two consequences to the Scottishness of Scots law. The UK-wide laws are, by definition, designed to apply to the whole of the United Kingdom and the distinctiveness of Scots law is not necessarily reflected within them. Furthermore, since these UK-wide laws are applied to the whole of the UK, it is more likely that the Scottish courts find themselves bound by precedents set by their English counterpart. Thus, the distinctiveness of Scots law has to a certain extent recently been eroded – Scots law is steadily becoming more British.[14] If Scots law is less Scottish now than before, it is difficult to insist that Scots law is evidence of a special Europeanness of contemporary Scottish society.[15] Nevertheless, the fact that Scots law has a European character remains. This can be picked up by certain people to argue 'Let's leave the UK and go back to our roots.' In other words, Scots law can provide powerful material in order to advance a separatist cause.

Another institution which is often cited as testimony of intense Scoto-European interaction is the Church of Scotland. This is a reformed church of the Calvinist tradition, and the fact that it is organised in a Presbyterian manner brought back from the continent at the

time of Reformation, which, to a great extent, differs from that of the Church of England, often prompts the respondents and the Scottish people in general to think it is a European church; the Kirk is European while the Anglican church is not. On the other hand, the Reformation broke Scotland's most important link with a continental country, that is, the Auld Alliance with France, and Protestantism was one of the strongest bases for the Union of Scotland and England.[16] The continental influence on the structure and theology of the Church of Scotland, if any, is not so clear-cut as for Scots law. The Kirk, as a social structure, therefore, does not provide such powerful evidence of a special Scottish tie to the continent. The Kirk as a pillar of Scottish society helped more to cultivate what is perceived as the egalitarian tradition of Scottish society than Scots law. The distinct aspect of Scottish society that the Kirk nurtured centred around egalitarianism, not the continental influence. The egalitarian aspect of the Kirk shall be examined below.

So far, we have examined the basis of the argument put forward by the respondents for the special and traditional Europeanness of the Scottish people. The fact that Scotland, especially before the Union of 1707, was heavily involved in the interaction with the continental European countries is beyond any doubt. It is, therefore, difficult to dismiss the first half of the claim put forward by a nationalist historian who is keen to rediscover the European past of Scotland: 'We were actively and consciously European centuries before the EEC.'[17] Whether the Scots were *consciously* European is more problematic. Certainly, until quite recently, the Scots were consciously Christian and Europe was, after all, Christendom. However, the English were also Christian and, therefore, European by the same token. In order to confirm the claim quoted above, more than evidence of active interaction between Scotland and the continent is required. This is, however, another question which lies beyond the scope of this study.

One of the interesting recent developments in the study of Scottish history is an intensified interest in the Scottish tie with the continent, the memory of which faded under the influence of the British Empire. The question, then, is 'what is the driving force behind the new trend in the study of Scottish history?' The standard answer would be the rise of revisionism within the discipline of history which rigorously questions anything that was taken for granted under the pervasive influence of the Whig interpretation of history. In this regard, looking at Scotland as a European nation but not as a junior partner of the British Empire is part of the vigorous efforts being made by the new generation of historians to re-evaluate Scottish history. Curiously, the

most authoritative figure in the study of Scottish history has also been engaged in rediscovering the old Scottish ties to Europe and recently concluded his paper on the history of Scottish migration as follows:

> Scots were not a remote, insular people sitting on the fringe of civilization, but a cosmopolitan people exceptionally prone to emigrate in order to seek their fortunes in other countries, and with a reputation for competence whether their trade was learning, killing or buying and selling. More than England, Scotland was a European country, more at ease in, and less suspicious of, other cultures. It may be mere sentimentality, but I like to think this legacy left the Scots much less afraid of modern Europe than the English appear to be at the present.[18]

One is tempted to speculate that academia's recent surge of interest in the European past of Scotland has arisen in response to the changing environment in which Scotland currently finds itself, that is, the deepening sense of alienation from the London government and the furthering of European integration. It appears that academia tries to help, intentionally or unintentionally, to redefine the Scots as Europeans, not British. Another possibility is that they are trying to draw a sharper line between the Scots and their southern neighbour by referring to Europe. One of the non-academic respondents has a clear view on this matter:

> We are very pragmatic people in that sense. People have discovered some of the old trade links, historical links. It is only in the past ten years that some of the historical links between Scotland and continental Europe have been revived and come to light again. When I was a child, when I had to read Scottish history, all Scottish history had to do with heroes of the Empire, many of them Scots, conquering India and Hong Kong. (Respondent 25, businessman.)

He seems to argue that history is something that serves the present purpose of the nation. This theme of 'Scotland and Europe' fits very well the mood of the age of European integration. Scottish historians may argue otherwise, but many perceive the recent development as such.

AN EGALITARIAN NATION? A MONGREL NATION?

The widely held belief that Scottish society is egalitarian, democratic, compassionate and thus less racist was mentioned repeatedly in the

course of interviews. Even when it is not explicitly mentioned, one can be sure the respondents' recognition that the Scottish people share this strong belief in the existence of the egalitarian spirit in Scottish society underpins the second vision of the Scoto-European relationship, that is, Europe as a space where a more just Scotland is possible. Let us consider first how this idea is expressed by the respondents.

The Church of Scotland: its structure and social programmes

The idea that Scottish people are egalitarian, democratic and compassionate is voiced either as the respondents' own view or as what most Scottish people believe. For example:

> We have got a very egalitarian spirit. Basically everyone is equal. (Respondent 2, historian.)

> In Scotland there is a long history of feeling that people are aware of having duties to those worse off. It may not be the precise format or scheme, but it is the principle. (Respondent 5, solicitor.)

> We have produced an almost socialist society which probably came from the Reformation. The idea was basically that every child should go to school from the age of five or thereabouts and that the child should be taught basics and taught at public expense. That is something that happened in Scotland from about the 1560s, a long time ago. In England it did not happen until four hundred years later. (Respondent 25, businessman.)

So Scots believe that everyone is equal, expressed in the form of compassion for the worse-off and a commitment to universal education.[19] Where, then, does this come from? Why are the Scots egalitarian and compassionate? Many respondents point to the Church of Scotland.[20] For example:

> The English tried to pretend that they had more democratic institutions throughout history, right back to the Middle Ages, which is not true. The Church of Scotland was more democratic than anything in England. (Respondent 2, historian.)

> But we would like to think that in Scotland, the Church is a democratic system. Every church is the headquarters of the Church of Scotland, the moderator who sometimes is a sort of highest person, is the first among equals. All parish ministers are equal, no

> bishops, no hierarchy … And then, people can relate to it more directly because everyone has an equal say … Traditionally, the Church of Scotland has been strong in the community. (Respondent 26, church worker.)

These statements suggest that the Scottish nation has been and is egalitarian because of the structure of the Church of Scotland. It is different from that of the Church of England in that the former is organised in a less hierarchical way, which has had, it is implied, a special effect on Scottish society. In addition, the Kirk has been credited for its enthusiasm for education and, to some extent, poor relief, which leads us to consider the role of the Church of Scotland in forming and defining Scottish society.

The Church of Scotland, the reformed church, came into existence as a result of the Reformation in Scotland. Some clarification is necessary here. There were, arguably, two Reformations in Scotland; one started in 1560 with the return of John Knox to Scotland and another was related to the deposition of Mary, Queen of Scots in 1567.[21] It is also argued that the process of Reformation was not completed until 1690.[22] For the purpose of this section the Reformation refers to a series of events through which the reformed church emerged and was established between 1560 and 1690.

In assessing the impact of the Reformation on Scottish society, it is helpful to concentrate on two figures: John Knox and Andrew Melville (1545–1622). It was Melville who was, like Knox, trained in Geneva, who advocated a presbyterian system of church structure. In 1578, shortly after the death of John Knox, the General Assembly adopted Melville's proposal, which ran counter to Knox's preference, of setting up a system of church courts consisting of Kirk session, presbytery, synod and General Assembly.[23] It was not easy for the Melvillian programme to be implemented and consolidated in Scotland for there were conflicts between the Church and the state and between presbyterian and episcopalian tendencies within the early Church of Scotland. This matter was finally settled by a new constitution for the Church of Scotland, ratified by William III in 1690, which confirmed its presbyterian system. The Church of Scotland at present, as a consequence of the 1690 settlement, is organised on the basis of parish church or congregation, which is administered by the Kirk session consisting of ministers and elders. Parish churches form a presbytery, which sends a delegation to the General Assembly. It is, therefore, fair to say that, in terms of structure, the Church of Scotland is egalitarian.

This egalitarian aspect of the Kirk is believed by many people to be reflected in its social programme, most importantly in education and poor relief.[24] In this respect, we have to turn to John Knox and his *First Book of Discipline* (1560) in which he revealed his visionary theology.[25] Knox's aim was to establish the Kirk as the moral authority in a Godly Commonwealth. Even the state had to listen to the church on moral issues. A Godly Commonwealth was only possible when the Kirk took up the responsibility of educating the mass in addition to the power of discipline. Since children were born 'ignorant of all godliness', their souls had to be touched by the Kirk, therefore, there had to be a school in every parish. Education, at the elementary level, could be given free of charge for poor children so that not a single soul would escape the teacher's net. The programme envisaged in the *First Book* was 'a comprehensive scheme and far more inclusive than those of reformers elsewhere in Europe'.[26] After the parish school, those who were bright could advance to grammar schools in the town, where they learnt Latin and other subjects for four years. After grammar schools, selected pupils could go on to colleges or high schools in important burghs to read classical languages, logic and rhetoric for another four years. There was a provision at every level for bursaries for those worse-off. Knox also noted that society had a duty to care for the so-called 'impotent poor', namely the elderly, widows, fatherless children, the disabled and the sick. He argued there should be a reasonable provision for them in every parish so that they would not have to go begging around Scotland. Knox envisaged that these programmes should be funded by the incomes of old churches. Although the *First Book of Discipline* remained a blueprint for a Godly Commonwealth, the plans that were declared in it were modified and implemented, and these had a significant influence on Scottish society.[27]

These were Knox's intentions. How were they implemented? As far as the education programme was concerned, the Protestant reformers started with what had already been established by the Catholic Church before the Reformation. There were song schools which were attached to cathedral and collegiate churches, 'English' schools for boys and sewing schools for girls in Medieval Scotland. Though hampered by financial difficulties, reformers turned song schools into grammar schools and parish schools and consolidated the old tradition of primary education. For example, by around 1700 more than 90 per cent of all parishes in Lothians, Fife and Angus had parish schools.[28] Whilst the sixteenth century did not necessarily see a great advance in literacy among the Scottish population, there was some improvement by 1660. By the eighteenth century, the literacy level of males in Scotland was 89 per cent (for females 77 per cent), whereas in England it was 70 and 59 per cent respectively.[29]

This marvellous Scottish achievement should be put into perspective in order to appreciate its real impact.[30] To begin with, it needs to be recognised that the passion for education and literacy was not peculiar to the Scots. Many Protestant countries, such as Sweden and The Netherlands, shared the zest for improved literacy since it would allow ordinary people to have access to the Bible. Even some Catholic countries and regions of the period made great efforts to improve literacy, and in this sense, the Scottish case is not as distinct as most Scottish people would like to believe. Although the Scottish scheme was the first of its kind among the European countries to be devised as a national one, concern for the education of the masses was universally shared among European countries around the time of the Reformation. On the other hand, Daniel Defoe found the Scots of his time more godly and better educated than the English. Even if the Scots cannot claim an exclusive copyright for the idea of universal education, they can be assured that their efforts bore better fruit than the English for a long time.

The other aspect of the issue, that is, the funding of the educational system in Scotland, also needs some qualification. It is not disputed that Scottish education was subsidised by the well-off, such as landowners, whose contribution provided the school building and salary for the teacher, thereby reducing the net cost of education. It is also an established fact that the Kirk gave bursaries to gifted boys, though the number was strictly limited. However, although the Scottish system was designed to be a national one, primary education did not become compulsory until 1872, and parents had to bear the cost of schooling. The result was most of the children attended school for only a few years, long enough to learn the very basic skills. It is, therefore, difficult to agree with some of the respondents here that the parish school system in Scotland was socialist. The idea behind the system was egalitarian and probably slightly socialist but the practice, judging from today's standards, did not live up to the ideals.

As regards poor relief, it was not unlike the English system: the Scottish Act of 1574 ('Anent the Punishment of Strong and Idle Beggars and Provision for Sustentation of the Poor and Impotent'), which was to be the basis for the poor relief operation in Scotland till the late eighteenth century, was almost a copy of the English Act of 1572 ('An Act for the Punishment of Vagrants, and for Relief of the Poor and Impotent'). The poor relief systems in Scotland and England shared the concept of 'legal poor' and the belief that the amount received by paupers should be less than the earnings of the lowest paid workers.[31] The administration and funding was different in the two countries. In

Scotland, the Kirk sessions were responsible for the operation in rural areas and magistrates and town councils in burghs. The fund for poor relief in Scotland was primarily drawn from voluntary contributions while in England it was mainly from a form of taxation. The reason for the Scottish reliance on voluntary donation was it would make the poor more grateful, and it was widely believed that the cause of pauperism was a lack of moral fibre.[32]

The fact that the Kirk ran a social programme which recognised the needs of the poor and sick is beyond any doubt. The Scottish poor relief system, however, makes neither the Kirk nor the Scottish people particularly egalitarian and compassionate since other countries, notably England, had similar systems around the same time. Moreover, the Kirk's poor relief scheme appears today to be too judgemental to serve as evidence of the egalitarian spirit of the Scottish people. However, these social programmes, when singled out of the context, enable them to be interpreted as evidence that the Scots are egalitarian, socialist and compassionate, a type of the argument contemporary Scots would like to hear.

The Declaration of Arbroath and popular sovereignty

Closely interwoven with the Kirk's influence on Scottish society, there are distinctive traditions of Scottish thinking which should be considered in relation to the myth of a democratic and egalitarian Scotland. As mentioned in Chapter 4, in emphasising what is seen as the inherently democratic nature of the Scottish nation, many respondents cited the Declaration of Arbroath and a supposedly distinctively Scottish scholarly tradition which is often called the 'democratic intellect'. The Declaration of Arbroath, together with the experiences of the Wars of Independence, is frequently mentioned as evidence of a long history of popular sovereignty in Scotland while the democratic intellect, which is more difficult to pin down, is a synthesis of the Scottish passion for education and the egalitarian spirit of Scottish society. Since the respondents based their arguments on these traditions, they also deserve examination here.

The most convincing basis of the argument for the long tradition of popular sovereignty in Scotland is the idea of the community of the realm in medieval Scotland. The community of the realm of Scotland in the age of Wallace and Bruce was composed not only of the king, bishops, earls, barons, lesser clergy and earldoms but of the representatives from the burghs as well.[33] The celebrated letter to the Pope of 1320, which is now called the Declaration of Arbroath, was written by and on behalf of this community which included the representation of

commoners; it was not a letter written by Robert I to claim his own right to rule Scotland without English interference.[34] Moreover, the document is renowned for its clear understanding of the contractual nature of the relationship between the ruler (Robert I) and the ruled:

> … Him [Robert I], too, divine providence, his right of succession according to our laws and customs which we shall maintain to the death, and the due consent and assent of us all have made our Prince and King. To him, as to the man by whom salvation has been wrought unto our people, we are bound both by law and by his merits that our freedom may be still maintained, and by him, come what way, we mean to stand.
>
> Yet if he should give up what he has begun, and agree to make us or our kingdom subject to the King of England or the English, we should exert ourselves at once to drive him out as our enemy and a subverter of his own rights and ours, and make some other man who was well able to defend us our King …[35]

The letter clearly stated that Robert I was king because it was the will of the community of the realm of Scotland, not because it was his will. Robert I was, it also made clear, bound by his duty to the community of the realm of Scotland, from which his right to rule originated. For some of the interviewees, both the Declaration of Arbroath and the idea of the community of the realm of Scotland provide the evidence that supports their argument that popular sovereignty is an established tradition in Scotland, hence, Scottish society is traditionally democratic.

While it is undeniable that there was something similar to the idea of democracy in a modern sense in Medieval Scotland, it is difficult to conclude from this that Scotland has been, and is, more democratic than other countries, especially England. For the expression 'community of the realm' was not exclusively Scottish but it was also found in England and France.[36] England has produced the Magna Carta, another celebrated document in the history of democracy, which asserted the rights of the people against the tyrannous king. Why, then, do some respondents regard England as less democratic than Scotland, despite the most renowned constitutional history of England? The clue is found in their distaste for what they call 'the English idea of absolute sovereignty of Parliaments'. According to these respondents, democracy in England lacks the fundamental principle, namely, popular sovereignty, which was firmly installed at the heart of democracy by the French Revolution. Instead, the Parliaments of England

inherited absolutism from former days and, partly because of this, they deny modern political freedom to their people in spite of England's world-wide fame as the mother country of democracy. After all the British are subjects, not citizens, so they argue.[37] When one looks at the historical background to this, it was ironically the Scottish dynasty, the Stuarts, that brought absolutism in, which caused the two English revolutions. The crown had, however, gone south in 1603, therefore, it was no longer exclusively Scottish. In 1707, the Scots lost their sovereignty as well. The idea of parliamentary sovereignty is, thus, an English one in the minds of the Scottish people, and in Scotland the memory of popular sovereignty eloquently expressed in the Declaration of Arbroath has survived as a distinctively Scottish notion.

It is curious that many of the respondents refer to the Declaration of Arbroath as a democratic document, not as a nationalist one. It is curious because the Declaration is very nationalistic in the sense that it unequivocally states that the English cannot rule Scotland; Scotland must be governed by the Scots. It was possible for the respondents here to argue forcibly that the Declaration of Arbroath is one proof that Scotland is a very old nation and therefore deserves independence. Most of them, however, did not try to affirm the authenticity of the Scottish nation by referring to this document. Most of them were keen to stress that the Scots were democratic people even in the medieval period. This is probably to do with their preference for a civic definition of the Scottish nation. Many of them are weary of ethnic nationalism because of the bad press it has. In Scotland, Labour often brands 'Nationalism' (with an 'N') as a dark force. In these circumstances, emphasising the civic aspect in relation to the Declaration is a morally acceptable way of arguing the case for independence or for a greater degree of autonomy.

The democratic intellect

The democratic intellect is an umbrella term which is used to refer to the whole range of ideas about Scottish egalitarianism manifested in the traditional Scottish education system. What it means varies quite dramatically according to different individuals since they use this term for whatever they think valuable and admirable about Scottish society. Originally used as the title of a book on Scottish university education in the nineteenth century by George Davie, published in 1961, the democratic intellect can, in principle, mean two different things. First and most frequently, it means that Scottish universities had traditionally been more democratic than their English counterparts because of

their 'open-door' policies which allowed the poor to receive university education and, therefore, to climb up the social ladder by merit rather than by birth.[38] This claim is substantiated by the records which show that Scottish universities used to have a higher proportion of lower-class students than English ones.[39] That is why respect for education, according to many of the respondents, is one of the proofs that Scotland was and is more democratic because it means that what is important in Scotland is not birth but merit. The democratic intellect has, however, another meaning. When one examines the celebrated work by Davie, *The Democratic Intellect*, one finds that his concern was not so much with the decline of the traditional open-door policy of Scottish universities but with the fate of their traditional teaching style, that is, general, humanist education, which was under increasing pressure from London to conform to the English type of higher education in the nineteenth century. The democratic intellect, therefore, sometimes means the tradition of disliking specialisation and emphasising general education at Scottish universities, which, as a result, has arguably produced socially concerned citizens and morally responsible leaders. In other words, the democratic intellect is the philosophy which used to underpin higher education in Scotland, and this philosophy was about educating students in such a way that they would be able to reflect on the basis of knowledge, not be intellectual machines.[40]

When one examines the history of this belief, one comes to realise that all the ideas clustered around the phrase 'the democratic intellect' have been nurtured through Scotland's humanist and Calvinist traditions. The humanist thought of sixteenth-century Scotland encouraged a radical and civic definition of liberty by placing the origins of human societies in their historical context; the political order could not be divine since it had been formed by a succession of human decisions; thus, sovereignty lay with the people.[41] History, according to the humanists, was essential in understanding this principle and also in creating a good society. History was, those thinkers believed, an educational medium to cultivate the rational and moral faculty of people.[42] Calvinists, who saw history as a special expression of the Divine Wind not as a proof that the political order was not divine, also considered history to be a prophetic medium.[43] History, therefore, acquired a special position as a moralistic medium in the post-Reformation Scottish intellectual climate. Historians, as a consequence, gained a respectable position in Scottish society, and during the social turmoil of early modern Scotland, successfully combined the humanist notion of public spirit and the Calvinist emphasis on self-control to argue forcibly for learning, especially rational learning, as a virtue.[44]

The Scottish monarch went to London to rule both Scotland and England in 1603, as did many members of the Scottish ruling class, leaving a leadership vacuum in Scotland. As a consequence, the development in Scottish thought described above elevated scholars to the position of leaders of Scottish society on the basis that they were men of learning. What is important here is that in early modern Scotland, learning itself had acquired an esteemed position as a virtue and, without doubt, this has been reflected in the tradition of Scottish education.

There is another related Scottish tradition that is often seen as a proof of the egalitarian nature of Scottish society: the myth of the 'Lad o'Pairts'.[45] The 'Lad o'Pairts' is typically an extremely gifted son of a poor peasant, whose family cannot bear the entire cost of their son's further education. Someone in the community, be it the landlord or the parish minister, would recognise his talent and would give him financial support to finish university education. The boy, upon the completion of his study, would then come back to the community as a minister or a medical doctor. This is one of the favourite themes repeated in Scottish popular novels in the nineteenth century. The myth of the 'Lad o'Pairts' reveals certain beliefs the Scottish people have about themselves and their society. First, the Scots are people who have a deep respect for education; or who believe in the enhanced prospects in life which education may bring. Second, the 'Lad o'Pairts' personifies a widely held belief that what is important in Scotland is merit, not birth: if you are academically gifted, you can get on in society no matter how poor your family is.

The 'democratic intellect' and 'Lad o'Pairts' are both symbols of the egalitarian nature of the Scottish people. Whether these are the correct representation of Scottish society, past and present, is not important in this analysis. What should be noted is that there is a tradition amongst the Scots to perceive themselves to be egalitarian. This was evident in the late Donald Dewar's speech given at the state opening of the Scottish Parliament on 1 July 1999. The Scots often refer to this tradition in their attempt to assert their distinctiveness – they are Scots, not English. The same attempt is now being made in a novel situation, that is, that of European integration, and it seems to be succeeding in winning the hearts and minds of the Scottish people. In the wake of the recent socialist tendency in the European Union, socialist Scotland goes very well with socialist Europe in Scottish thinking.

Scotland as a 'less racist' society

Having examined various aspects of the notion of an egalitaarian Scotland, we now turn to other, related beliefs, namely, the notion of

Scotland as a mongrel nation and the popular myth that Scotland is less racist than England. Of course, the recognition that the Scottish nation has been formed by many different peoples does not automatically promise more tolerance towards different racial and ethnic groups in contemporary Scottish society. The two aspects are, nonetheless, interwoven in the Scottish mind according to the respondents here and some other evidence.

Let me examine the former, that is, the idea of Scotland being a mongrel nation first. One of the respondents, a prominent Scottish Nationalist, puts his belief in a moralistic vein:

> One of the interesting aspects of the establishment of the Scottish nation is that it has always been a mixture of different peoples, peoples of different ethnic origin … Scots have always been a mixed people. (Respondent 13, accountant.)

Elsewhere, he has repeatedly expressed his belief that the fact that the Scottish nation is a mixture of many different peoples is the strength of modern Scottish nationalism.[46] In contemporary Scotland, the idea of Scotland being a mongrel nation is often interpreted as a proof that Scottish nationalism is not ethnic, which is to be condemned, but civic, which is progressive and to be promoted. In addition, if the Scots have mixed origins, so the argument goes, anyone can become a Scot regardless of his/her ethnic or racial origin as long as he/she wants to live in Scotland and to contribute to Scottish society.

It is interesting to note that the recognition of the Scottish nation being a mixture of many different peoples, not being racially or ethnically pure, has been around since the Middle Ages as discussed in Chapter 1. Moreover, Susan Reynolds argues that it is why the medieval Scots sought to present themselves as one people because it was the only way to claim rightful regal independence.[47]

The recognition of the racial and ethnic plurality of the Scottish nation was, according to another historian, one of the reasons why Scotland failed to develop a classical nationalist ideology in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[48] At the moment of the emergence of ethnology and racialism, Scottish intellectuals had to confront a situation where Scotland was inhabited by 'Teutonic' lowlanders and 'Celtic' highlanders. According to the Teutonic ideology which seemed to become influential at one point but which eventually failed to establish itself as the dominant ideology of nineteenth-century Scotland, while the lowlanders belonged to the Teutonic people, together with the English, who were fit for industrialisation with their Germanic

virtues, the Highlanders were the descendents of the inferior Celtic race, whose minds were not attuned to commerce and industry and who were primitive in their political and legal institutions.[49]

Opinion was divided as to what should be done. Some sought to marginalise the Gaelic inheritance to re-establish the Scottish nation as a modern, Gothic mainstream European nation, others appreciated the hybrid nature of Scottish identity.[50] What is important here is not whether the Gaelic component of Scottish society was valued, but that the Scottish intelligentsia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were aware of the ethnic and racial plurality of the Scottish nation. Moreover, they did not try to impose an idea of the Scottish nation as one race. The idea of Scotland being a mongrel nation is, therefore, deep-rooted in Scottish history. The appreciation of this fact has varied according to each period of history. The medieval chronicler felt an acute need to claim common descent for the peoples of Scotland in order to assert the legitimacy of Scottish independence. The nineteenth-century scientists could not accommodate the Celtic element of the Scottish nation when they sought to constitute a pure Scottish race which deserves its success in the world. The idea of the mongrel nation seems to have been deeply imbedded in contemporary Scottish minds.

> It is difficult to be a Euro-Scotsman if you do not accept that you are also European. I do not know where my ancestors come from, but some of them must be Picts, some of them Roman soldiers and some of them Vikings. All European. (Respondent 25, businessman.)

It is significant that even this idea can be used to legitimise the need of establishing an even closer tie with the continent. The Scots as a mongrel nation fits with the idea of a Europe of diversity. The idea of a mongrel nation is now an asset rather than a hindrance in the age of European integration.

Even though the recognition of the Scots being a mongrel nation goes back to the Middle Ages and has become deeply rooted in the Scottish psyche, it does not support the powerful myth that Scotland is less racist than England without qualification. Historically, the Scots have not been known for their remarkable racial and ethnic tolerance. An example of an intolerant Scotland was its anti-Catholicism intertwined with an anti-Irish feeling observed in the nineteenth century, which has certainly survived to the present. Roman Catholic emancipation in 1829 was profoundly unpopular in Scotland. The middle

class of Victorian Scotland, which was known to be religious, was against the emancipation since the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland were opposed to the idea. The lower classes were also against Catholic emancipation, not so much for religious reasons, but because of their fear of the influx of cheap labour from Ireland which might arise as a consequence. Some historians have summed up the mood of the time: 'A full Scottish referendum would have rejected the Catholic claims.'[51] The emancipation which was passed by Westminster despite widespread Scottish resistance fuelled sectarianism in Scotland. On the other hand, other immigrant communities, such as Italians, Jews and Poles, seem to have fewer problems in integrating with Scottish society. Also, Scottish society seems to have succeeded in harnessing racial and ethnic discrimination against so-called new immigrants from the Indian subcontinent. However, this does not imply that Scotland is free from racism; on the contrary, the Racial Equality Commission in Scotland has recently witnessed an upsurge in the number of complaints. One of the respondents here, in her attempt to explain the situation, emphasises the fact that Scotland has received a smaller number of immigrants than England. To her mind, because the number was relatively smaller, the integration of immigrants, both old and new, except Irish, has not been made into such a big issue as in England. Still, it is enough to strengthen the popular myth in Scotland that Scotland is less racist than England.

The idea of an egalitarian Scotland and its related myths and beliefs are, as demonstrated so far, based on Scottish history – official history and shared memories – and it has survived because it provides yet another context in which the Scots can differentiate themselves from others, especially the English. These ideas, in themselves, do not necessarily make the Scots more European. It is the recent development within the European Union that has mobilised these ideas in projecting the vision of Scotland as a democratic, egalitarian and socialist country in the continental manner.

SCOTS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE

The third theme, Scotland and the British Empire, is more straightforward. There is ample evidence that the Scots enthusiastically participated in the project of the British Empire, made a significant contribution to and profited enormously from it. Some of the descriptions of Scotland such as the 'workshop of the Empire', of Glasgow as the 'second city of the Empire' convey the flavour of the self-perception of the Scots in the nineteenth century. At the same time, these were an

expression of the self-confidence of Victorian Scotland. The positive evaluation of the experience of the British Empire for the Scottish people is shared by many respondents. For example:

> To Scots, the British Empire was more important than to the English people. Because it gave ourselves a defined role in the world, and also gave us an idea or ideal that we are equal to England in this much grander project. So in a sense, the British Empire, the Scots' experience of it, was embedded in Scottish nationalism because the Scots could feel quite important in the world and they felt they had a worthwhile contribution to make. (Respondent 10, party employee.)

> And the Empire, while it was British, also left a lot of room for Scottish expression. The Scots are very proud of being soldiers and all our regiments wore kilts and were often victorious. So this made Scots very proud of Scotland and the Empire which the Scots were helping to run. (Respondent 22, historian.)

There are many episodes that support these views. One of them is Scottish participation in the running of British India. The huge expansion of British India roughly coincided with the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 and its suppression. The '45 was the last armed attempt to express profound opposition to the Union of Scotland and England and after the '45, the Scots 'settled down to make money and to try to make the Union work'.[52] Thanks to the patronage of Henry Dundas (1742–1811), the President of the Board of Control for India of the time, many young Scotsmen found civil and military opportunities in British India. These were much sought after opportunities since they could lead to a fortune that was only possible in British India at that time. In 1767, the normal profit in internal trade in Bengal ranged between 20 and 30 per cent while Adam Smith confirmed in the same year that a profit rate of 8 to 10 per cent was good.[53] Scottish participation in colonial India was disproportionate and Dundas was aware of the fact. He warned the new Governor of Madras, Sir Archibald Campbell, in 1787:

> It is said with a Scotchman at the head of the Board of Control and a Scotchman at the Government of Madras, all India will soon be in their hands, and that the country of Argyle will be depopulated by the emigration of Campbells to be provided by you at Madras.[54]

Not only in India but elsewhere in the British Empire, the Scottish presence was prominent. Since the late eighteenth century, emigration from Scotland had taken place to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, and the proportion of Scots emigrants among all the emigrants from Britain exceeded that of the Scottish population in Britain. For instance, it is estimated that in Canada for every ten Scots immigrants or descendants there were 13 English ones in spite of the rough numerical ratio of Scots to English being 1:7.[55] On the military side, Scots were enjoying a great reputation. Scots soldiers were often reported to be victorious in successive imperial wars. The establishment of the Highland regiments with easily recognisable uniforms after '45 surely helped to spread the image of Scottish bravery, though in half the Scottish regiments officers and men were predominantly English and Irish.[56] Scots also went out on missionary activities. The most prominent Scots missionary, David Livingstone (1813–73), who dedicated his life to Africa, managed to combine an economic development programme for undeveloped Africa with Christianity to form a notion that Britain had a mission to civilise Africa.[57] Scots missionary activities reached as far as the Far East, including Japan.

While for some Scots the British Empire was 'places to go, to explore, to exploit, proselytise or settle',[58] those who stayed at home were busy 'enterprising'. Scotland experienced an unprecedented economic growth between the 1780s and 1914. The population grew which led to emigration at an annual rate of 4 per cent and rapid urbanisation. 'The workshop of the Empire' started with the cotton industry in the late eighteenth century and moved on to heavy industry for which Scotland was to be renowned all over the world. The iron industry was supported by relatively cheap domestic labour, local minerals and the lower cost of production together with an expanding overseas market. Between 1830 and 1844, Scottish output of iron grew from 40,000 tons a year to 412,000 tons, and its share in the British output rose from 5 per cent to 25 per cent.[59] By 1850, the iron industry's output made up 90 per cent of all British exports. Shipbuilding which dominated Scottish industry from the late nineteenth century till the First World War was 35 per cent of British output. The British Empire was essential in releasing Scottish energy as an ever-expanding market for Scottish industry.[60]

The Scots were surely the people of the British Empire: they ran it, they fought for it, they explored it, they preached the gospel in it, they accumulated wealth from it and they benefited disproportionately from it. The British Empire served the Scots not only as a source of profit but as a way of participating in the wider world and was

probably more significant for the Scots than the English. If one recalls that the basic proposition for European integration is to create the biggest single market in the world so that Europe can compete with the United States and the Far East, it is reasonable to assume that this side of the European project should provoke the memory of Scottish participation in the British Empire amongst the Scottish people.

In this chapter, the historical background to the three visions of the Scoto-European relationship has been examined. On the whole, all three visions are supported by the Scottish past, although there is an element of exaggerated appropriation of historical facts by the respondents here and the contemporary Scots. Two issues emerge from the above discussion. The first is that the fundamental problem these visions are addressing is not Europe in its vague sense but the English. The idea of Europe is insufficiently articulated in these visions in which Europe can take many forms. Europe is a tool with which the Scots can assert what they perceive to be their difference from the English. It is an identity building and maintenance activity. Second, one cannot help being amazed at the wealth of historical memory that the Scots possess. So many episodes and so many ideas are mobilised to elaborate these three visions. This leads us to ponder the importance of having a rich history – both official history and shared memories – in establishing national identity, a theme which is discussed by scholars like Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson. Scottish identity, like any other contemporary national identities, is now facing a world which has been changing with dramatic speed. Scottish people, however, can look back to their history in order to make sense of these changes and to work out what should be done. The wealth of their history has, so far, provided enough grounds on which a new Scottish identity can be built in a new Europe. European integration is still moving ahead and in a short space of time, the Scots will face a different reality. Even then, if they scrutinise their history, they will surely come up with a new formula for a renewed Scottish identity. National identity is never static. It is constantly being reconstructed and reformulated while assuring a significant sense of continuity. These visions of the Scoto-European relationship are examples of this on-going process.

NOTES

1. Malcom Chapman, Marion McDonald and Elizabeth Tonkin, 'Introduction – History and Social Anthropology', in Elizabeth Tonkin, Marion McDonald and Malcom Chapman (eds), *History and Ethnicity* (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 5–7.

2. Smith, *National Identity*, p. 91.
3. For historical facts presented in this chapter, see Devine, *The Scottish Nation*; Michael Lynch, *Scotland: A New History* (London: Pimlico, 1992); Paul H. Scott, *Scotland in Europe: Dialogue with a Sceptical Friend* (Edinburgh: Cannongate, 1992); T. C. Smout (ed.), *Scotland and Europe 1200–1850* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1986); T. C. Smout, 'The Culture of Migration: Scots as Europeans 1500–1800', a paper presented at the 'Scottish Dimensions Conference' at Ruskin College, Oxford, 24–26 March 1995.
4. Communication between Scotland and Scandinavian countries had been well-developed by the thirteenth century. When the daughter of Alexander III, the mother of the Maid of Norway, set out for Norway on 11 August 1281, she arrived at Bergen on the 15th, when it was said:

> They hoysed their sails on Moneday morn
> Wi'a' the speed they may;
> They hae landed in Noroway
> Upon a Wodensday.

   See G. W. S. Barrow, *Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland* (3rd edn) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988), ch. 1 for more details.
5. When Professor Smout introduced this episode in his talk at the Scottish Dimensions Conference in 1995, there was an interesting response from the audience. One of the memories of the Second World War that the Scottish people still cherish is the stationing of the Polish regiment in Scotland. It is still remembered partly because many of the Polish soldiers who could not return home were buried in Scotland. One of the audience suggested that some of these Polish soldiers might have been the descendants of the Scottish immigrants in the Middle Ages. By this he was suggesting that there was, indeed, a strong tie between Scotland and Europe. Later, nearer VE Day, there were a few letters published in the *Scotsman* which explored the same theme.
6. Alexander Broadie, *The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1990), p. 3.
7. For biographical details of John Mair and the evaluation of his works in the tradition of Scottish philosophy, see Broadie, *The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy*, ch. 3.
8. This arrangement formally came to an end in 1904. I owe this point to Professor Murray Pittock of Strathclyde University.
9. For the discussion of whether Scots law reflects the value of Scottish society, see J. M. Thompson, 'Scots Law, National Identity and the European Union', *Scottish Affairs*, 10 (1995), pp. 25–34.
10. When asked what Scottishness is, many of the respondents list Scots law as one of the institutions which shape and sustain the distinctiveness of Scottish society. The fact that Scotland has a separate legal system was brought to the wider attention of the United Kingdom when the Scottish Labour Party and the Scottish Liberal Democratic Party successfully gained an order from the Court of Session to postpone the broadcasting of the 'Panorama' interview with the then Prime Minister John Major on 3 April 1995, on the basis that it might affect the local authority election in Scotland which was to take place three days later. As a result, the broadcast of the programme was withdrawn in Scotland a few minutes before the scheduled time. This incident provoked a heated exchange over the alleged neutrality of the BBC, prompting a move from BBC Scotland to demand more autonomy from London headquarters and a flood of letters to the Scottish papers complaining of English insensitivity to the diversity of the United Kingdom.
11. Neil McCormick, 'Law', in Paul H. Scott (ed.), *Scotland: A Concise Cultural History* (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1993), pp. 343–56; Hector MacQueen, '*Regiam Majestatem*, Scots Law, and National Identity', *Scottish Historical Review*, 74, 197 (1995), pp. 1–25.
12. MacQueen, '*Regiam Majestatem*', p. 14.
13. McCormick, 'Law', p. 350.

14. Because of this situation, some Scottish lawyers support the establishment of a Scottish Parliament. These lawyers argue that Scotland as a society with its own legal system but lacking its own legislature is an abnormality which should be solved by setting up an adequate legislative function.
15. The increasing influence of European legislation on British law manifests itself on the UK level. Put differently, it is not only Scots law that is becoming more European by the legal implication of European integration. Nonetheless, there may be a case for the argument that Scots law is better-placed to absorb the impact of European development.
16. Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (London: Pimlico, 1992).
17. Paul H. Scott, *In Bed with an Elephant: The Scottish Experience* (Edinburgh: Saltire Society, 1985), p. 9.
18. Smout, 'The Culture of Migration'.
19. In stressing the compassionate character of Scottish people, one of the respondents made reference to a poem by Robert Burns in which the poet apologised for unintentionally destroying the nest of a mouse (*The Mouse*, 1785). In addition, when I was carrying out the interviews at the SNP Conference in 1994, a poll was published in the Scottish papers revealing that the Scots gave more to charities than others in the United Kingdom. Needless to say, it was hailed as evidence of the caring nature of Scottish society.
20. There are other factors mentioned by the respondents. One of them is the smallness of the Scottish nation.

    > And a smaller nation in relation to a larger nation tends to produce sentiments of a certain kind of social solidarity and also feelings of being an underdog. I think that is an element in Scottish identity, which perhaps has made the Scots particularly sensitive on issues of equality. (Respondent 27, academic.)

21. Lynch, *Scotland*, p. 34.
22. Smout, *History of the Scottish People*, p. 66.
23. Andrew Melville returned to Scotland in 1574 to be the first principal of Glasgow University and played an important role in reforming Glasgow and St Andrews universities. When he advocated the presbyterian system, however, one of his intentions was to exclude lay authority, namely the state, and to promote theocracy, which may be at odds with the present view of a democratic Kirk. See Smout, *History of the Scottish People*, ch. 2 for details.
24. For social programmes of the Church of Scotland, see Smout, *History of the Scottish People,* ch.3.
25. What is now called the *First Book of Discipline* was not a separate publication. It was published as an appendix to Knox's *History of the Reformation in Scotland* (1560) and the title by which we are now familiar with this document was given later by an editor. It is called 'First' in order to distinguish it from Melville's work of 1579. See James Scotland, *The History of Scottish Education, Vol. 1: From the Beginning to 1872* (London: University of London Press, 1969), p. 44.
26. Scotland, *The History of Scottish Education, Vol. 1*, p. 45.
27. The Church of Scotland secured its established position by the Treaties of Union of 1707, was not troubled by Catholicism till the nineteenth century when the influx of immigrants from Ireland changed the demography to a large extent. Until the Disruption of 1834 when 474 ministers left the Kirk to form the Free Church, the Kirk had been relatively free from breakaway movements. It is, therefore, fair to concentrate on the influence of the Church of Scotland on Scottish society up to the nineteenth century.
28. R. A. Houston, 'Scottish Education and Literacy, 1600–1800: An International Perspective', in T. M. Devine (ed.), *Improvement and Enlightenment* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1989), p. 44.

29. McCrone, *Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation*, p. 94.
30. For the details discussed here, see Houston, 'Scottish Education and Literacy'.
31. R. A. Cage, *The Scottish Poor Law* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1981), pp. 17–18.
32. Ibid., pp. 84–5.
33. Barrow, *Robert Bruce*, p. 300.
34. Ibid., p. 303; Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900–1300*, p. 274. At the end of the first paragraph of the letter, it reads:

    > … and the other barons and freeholders and the whole community of the realm of Scotland send all manner of filial reverence, with devout kisses of his blessed feet.

    See James Ferguson, *The Declaration of Arbroath* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970).
35. Ferguson, *The Declaration of Arbroath*, p. 9.
36. See, Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities*, p. 262.
37. One of the main points the SNP puts forward is that the Scottish people should be citizens, not subjects. This is in tune with other UK-wide constitutional reform movements such as Charter 88.
38. George Davie, *The Democratic Intellect* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1961), p. xvii; Andrew L. Walker, *The Revival of the Democratic Intellect* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1994), p. 24.
39. For instance, Walker quotes the following figures.

    > Between 1740 and 1839 13% of the students at Glasgow University came from the families of the nobility and landed gentry, by comparison with 35% at Cambridge between 1752 and 1849; 11% at Glasgow came from industry and commerce, as compared with 8% at Cambridge, at Glasgow one-third, i.e. 33.3%, came from labouring families…
    > (Walker, *The Revival of the Democratic Intellect*, p. 33).

40. Ibid., p. 162.
41. David Allan, *Virtue, Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993), pp. 33–4.
42. Ibid., p. 58.
43. Ibid., p. 51.
44. Ibid., p. 80.
45. McCrone, *Understanding Scotland*, pp. 95–103; Andrew Nash, 'Re-reading the "Lad o'Pairts"', *Scotlands*, 3, 2 (1996), pp. 86–102.
46. It was expressed in the personal correspondence of 6 July 1995 and Wolfe, *Scotland Lives*.
47. Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities*, pp. 273–6.
48. Kidd, 'Teutonist Ethnology and Scottish Nationalist Inhibition, 1780–1880'.
49. The idea of 'Germanic Lowlands' has contributed to trivialising the nature of the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745. Instead of appreciating its nationalist character which could have posed a serious threat to the newly united Britain, historians have been interpreting this event as a minor uprising of a primitive and inferior Celtic sentiment. See Pittock, *The Myth of the Jacobite Clans*, ch. 1.
50. One of them was Walter Scott. He fully appreciated the importance of the Celtic heritage in Scottish society and did a great deal to bring the Highlands back into Scottish minds. See Kidd, 'Teutonist Ethnology and ScottishNationalist Inhibition, 1780–1880'.
51. Sydney Checkland and Olive Checkland, *Industry and Ethos: Scotland 1832–1914* (London: Edward Arnold, 1984), p. 125.
52. Ian Hamilton, 'Time to Stop Dreaming about the Great Pretender', *Scotsman*, 18 June 1995.

53. Bruce Lenman, *Integration, Enlightenment, and Industrialization: Scotland 1746–1832* (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), pp. 81–2.
54. Lenman, *Integration, Enlightenment, and Industrialization*, p. 82.
55. Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism*, p. 59.
56. Ibid., p. 61.
57. Checkland and Checkland, *Industry and Ethos*, p. 162; Fry, *The Scottish Empire*, pp. 148–60.
58. Ferguson, *Scotland: 1689 to the Present*, p. 333.
59. Lynch, *Scotland*, p. 406.
60. Chekland and Chekland, *Industry and Ethos*, p. 12.

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Scotland and Europe: An Assessment

So far, it has been argued that the European dimension has been a distinctive one in the recent development of Scottish nationalism (Chapter 2), the kinds of ideas about the Scoto-European relationship which are in circulation in contemporary Scotland have been identified (Chapter 4) and the historical basis on which these ideas are built has been analysed (Chapter 5). How these different ideas about the Scoto-European relationship identified in this study have been received by the Scottish public is very difficult to measure and certainly beyond the scope of this book. Any investigation of the reception of these ideas requires a completely different methodology, which then becomes a separate study. What can be done here is to complete the picture as much as possible by tracing the changes of Scottish people's perception about the relationship between Scotland and Europe. By doing so, it should be possible to evaluate whether the ideas produced by the Scottish intellectuals and intelligentsia have been operating in an environment which is shared with the majority of Scottish people. If the shift in Scottish opinion about the Scoto-European relationship has no correspondence to the ideas identified in this book, one can begin to suspect that Scottish intellectuals and intelligentsia are living in a remote, different universe. If Scottish opinion has been changing in a direction which does not directly contradict the ones suggested in the book, it would imply that Scottish intellectuals and intelligentsia are more or less in touch with the reality and therefore the ideas they produce influence as well as reflect the general mood of the people of Scotland. This is not an exercise to establish a cause and effect relationship; it is an attempt to put the producers and disseminators of ideas in a wider framework. Ideas, like everything else in social sciences, are socially constructed. The aim of this chapter is to gauge whether these ideas reflect what 'real' people feel and think.

It is not being claimed, however, that opinion polls and surveys can reveal what people feel and think, something that is always difficult to ascertain people. The most obvious way of finding out how these ideas have been received by 'ordinary' people in Scotland would be to inter-

view every individual in Scotland, which, with a population of 5 million, is impossible. Even were it possible, we could never be sure that we had been able to capture accurately how people really felt and thought. Likewise, opinion polls and surveys are at best the least evil alternative to guessing. They are readily available and numerous, and have some advantages in ensuring the representativeness of the respondents by applying mathematical procedures in selecting the sample. They are not, however, free from problems in respect of their reliability, a good example of which was the spectacular failure of opinion polls in predicting the 1992 UK general election result. Most of the polls predicted the return of a Labour government after the election, while in Scotland, in January 1992, *The Scotsman* reported that more than 50 per cent of the respondents of its survey supported independence as their favoured constitutional option. The outcome of the election was another Conservative government with 21.5 per cent of Scottish votes cast for the SNP. Despite their weaknesses, opinion polls provide useful material for exploring the environment in which these ideas have been circulated. They may not reveal the 'true' picture of what people really feel but they can provide a rough idea, on which qualitative research can be based.

The first half of this chapter will look at opinion polls and surveys to map out the shift in the Scottish public opinion about the Scoto-European relationship. The second half deals with the other element in the Scoto-European relationship – Scotland and Britain/England.

SCOTLAND AND EUROPE: CHANGING PERCEPTION

In stark contrast to the recent re-imagining of Scotland as a pro-European country examined in the previous chapters, in the 1970s Scotland was hostile to the European Economic Community, as has been mentioned earlier. An opinion poll conducted in September 1971, when the United Kingdom formally joined the EEC, recorded 27 per cent of the Scottish sample in favour of membership while 62 per cent was against. The same poll showed that 47 per cent of the British public as a whole supported membership while 45 per cent disapproved. The Scots were more hostile to the EEC than the British as a whole by about 20 percentage points.[1] The Scottish public were opposed to membership of the EEC for fear of further marginalisation. The SNP was firmly against the EEC and the then Chairman, William Wolfe, sent a letter to the European Commission declaring that an independent Scotland would hold a referendum on Scottish membership and that the SNP would not hesitate to advocate withdrawal from the EEC

depending on the result. Many Labour MPs saw the EEC as a capitalist monster and were, therefore, against it, though officially the Labour Party endorsed membership.

The discrepancy between British and Scottish opinion on the EEC reappeared in the 1975 EEC referendum. UK membership of the EEC was reaffirmed by 67.2 per cent of the vote cast across the United Kingdom while the Scottish electorate supported membership by 58.4 per cent.[2] The only two areas that voted against the EEC were Shetland and the Western Isles, both in Scotland.[3]

During the 1980s, however, Scottish opinion began to move in the opposite direction for the reasons discussed in Chapter 2. One indication of the shift in Scottish opinion is shown in a survey conducted by the *Glasgow Herald* and BBC Scotland in 1988, in the same year as the SNP adopted the 'Independence in Europe' policy. Of the sample chosen, 55 per cent thought that Scotland would be better off if it was independent in Europe while 23 per cent thought it would be worse off and 11 per cent though it would make no difference, and a further 11 per cent did not know (see Table 2).[4]

Table 2: Scotland and Europe (1998) 'Will an independent Scotland in Europe be better/worse off?'

View	*Percentage*
Better off	55
Worse off	23
Neither / No difference	11
Don't Know	11

Source: Keating and Jones, 'Scotland and Wales: Peripheral Assertion and European Integration', p. 321.

This poll indicates that there had emerged among the Scots some expectation towards the European Community as a benefactor when the SNP dramatically introduced the European dimension to Scottish nationalism in 1988.

By the early 1990s the reputation that the Scots were pro-European became widely spread. The enthusiastic reception of the European Summit of 1992 which was held in Edinburgh is often held up as evidence of the Scots' pro-European attitude.[5] A pro-European former Tory MP, Edwina Currie, expressed her admiration for the Scots for being pro-European and claimed that because of their pro-European stance, the Scots had managed to extract more benefits from UK membership of the EU.[6] This is difficult to ascertain and certainly beyond the scope of this study. However, this claim is another example of the

pro-European camp's attempt to push their agenda forward by highlighting the possible economic benefit of a deeper integration with other European countries.

This does not mean, however, that all the Scots had wholeheartedly embraced a pro-European stance. A close look at the opinion polls suggests that among them there remained a certain amount of scepticism towards the European Union. A MORI poll conducted in October 1993 shows that while 49 per cent of the Scottish sample was in favour of EC membership, English support for it was 45 per cent, and 46 per cent of the British sample (excluding Northern Ireland) was in favour.[7]

Table 3: Support for the European Community (October 1993)
'If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the European community, how would you vote?'

	Scotland	*England*	*Britain*
Stay in	49%	45%	46%
Get out	31%	40%	39%
Don't know/no opinion	20%	15%	15%

Source: MORI, October 1993.

Table 4: Views on the Long -Term Future of Britain's Relationship with the European Union, 1997 and 2000

1997 (Scottish Election Study, 1997)

Preferred option	*England (%)*	*Scotland (%)*
Leave EU	17.3	12.3
Reduce EU powers	43.5	40.3
Leave as it is	14.6	15.3
Increase EU powers	6.9	13.6
Single European government	6.9	6.9
Don't know	7.8	11.5

Source: James Mitchell and Graham Leicester, *Scotland, Britain and Europe: Diplomacy and Devolution* (Edinburgh: Scottish Council Foundation, 1999), p. 26.

2000 (British Social Attitudes, 2000 and Scottish Social Attitudes, 2000)

Preferred option	*Britain (%)*	*Scotland (%)*
Leave EU	17.3	11.4
Reduce EU powers	38.3	36.6
Reduce EU powers	19.5	21.3
Increase EU powers	9.9	13.4
Single European government	6.9	8.9
Don't know	7.8	8.5
Sample size	2293	1663

Source: British Social Attitudes, 2000 and Scottish Social Attitudes, 2000.

In other words, Scottish support for EC membership was only 4 per cent stronger than English. On the other hand, when one looks at the opposition to membership, 31 per cent of the Scottish sample was opposed to it while the figures for the English and British opposition as a whole were 40 per cent and 39 per cent respectively (see Table 3).

What the poll reveals is that Scots were more reluctant in opposing membership than the rest of Britain. In other words, the Scots of the 1990s were not wholeheartedly pro-European but were less sceptical of the EC/U than people in the rest of Britain.

The pattern, which seems to have emerged in the late 1980s, of the Scots being less Euro-sceptical than the British as a whole or the English is still observed as shown in the results of two surveys summarised in Table 4.

In both surveys, Scottish respondents were less prepared to leave the EU and slightly more willing to increase EU competence than the English respondents in the 1997 survey or respondents from Britain as a whole in the 2000 study.

These results suggest that the pattern – the Scots being less Euro-sceptical than the remainder of Britons – seems to have become entrenched over the past 15 years. In this respect, too, Scotland is different from other parts of the United Kingdom. This can only be explained by a combination of factors as explored in this book: alienation of the Scots from the central government, the SNP's pro-European stance, the civic bodies' instrumental views of Europe and politicisation of Scottish identity under the Tory government which does not seem to have calmed down under the Labour government.

The distinctiveness of Scottish public opinion from the British opinion as a whole can be seen in one of the most contentious issues of European integration: the euro (see Table 5).

Just as support for the EU, the Scottish respondents are less antagonistic to the euro than the British as a whole. In addition, there is a hint of more indecisiveness in Scottish public opinion. In Scotland the opinion on the European single currency is more evenly distributed

Table 5: Support for the Euro (2000) 'If there were a referendum on whether Britain should join the single European currency, the euro, how do you think you would vote?'

	Scotland (%)	*Britain (%)*
To join the euro	33.5	27.3
Not to join the euro	53.9	63.6
Don't know	12.5	8.8
Refused to answer/No answer	0.1	0.4

Source: Scottish Social Attitudes 2000, British Social Attitudes 2000.

than in Britain as a whole. These figures therefore should not be seen as an indication that the Scots are more markedly 'supportive' of the single currency; it is probably more accurate to say that they are more 'indifferent' to this issue. This Scottish indifference could be explained by the widely held view that the constitutional issues do not threaten Scottish identity; on the contrary, it thrives on them. The British attitudes described in Table 5, on the other hand, suggest that they are more influenced by English experiences than Scottish ones, largely due to the size of England. It could be argued that because the constitutional arrangement is so deeply imbedded in English national identity, issues like the euro can provoke more intense feelings.

Scottish opinion on Europe has shifted considerably since the 1970s, and the Scots are less Euro-sceptical than the British as a whole. How does this relate to the ideas about the Scoto-European relationship that have been identified earlier in this study?

Table 6: Support for the European Union: the UK and the EU Average, 1996–2000 (%)
'Is the EU good for Britain?' (figures in brackets show the EU average)

	1996	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*
Yes	36 (48)	36(48)	37 (54)	29 (51)	28 (50)

Source: Eurobarometer, Reports Nos 46, 48, 50, 52, 54.

Table 7: Scottish Support for the European Union (2000)
'On the whole do you think the European Union has been …'

View	*Percentage opinion*
Good for Scotland	35.5
Bad for Scotland	21.7
Neither	29.7
Don't know	13.0
Sample size = 1,663	

Source: Scottish Social Attitudes, 2000.

Since the early 1990s, British support for the EU has been declining while the EU average figures are slightly on the rise as Table 6 shows. However, according to the recently launched Scottish Social Attitudes survey, Scottish support for the EU is a little higher than the British figure reported in the *Eurobarometer 54* (Table 7).

Results from different surveys cannot easily be compared and the fact that we cannot trace a chronological development of Scottish support for the EU since the Scottish Social Attitudes survey has only a few years of history makes the comparison even more difficult.

However, these tables at least indicate that while the British opinion as a whole has become more Euro-sceptical, the gap between the Scottish and British opinions has remained. Why should this be the case? One speculation is that, as has been argued earlier, Europe is probably used by the contemporary Scots as a tool to distinguish themselves from the rest of the Britons, especially the English. If being Scottish means not being English, and being English means being Euro-sceptical, being less Euro-sceptical is one way of asserting one's Scottishness. Scottish opinion on Europe is not formed entirely upon Scotland's relationship with Europe; it is conditioned by Scotland's relationship to England and Britain as a whole.

A further interesting aspect of these polls is that Scottish opinion of the European Union reflects some distinctive features of Scottish political culture. The ICM poll conducted in June 1994 asked questions about specific aspects of the process of European integration. The response to the questions about the principle of subsidiarity and the EU's role in employment rights clearly illustrates some aspects of the contemporary Scottish political climate. While 50 per cent of the respondents were in favour of the principle of subsidiarity, 26 per cent were against. Given the fact that in Britain, the term 'subsidiarity' is most commonly employed to mean the national sovereignty of the member states, these figures imply that the Scots are, on the whole, supportive of retaining national sovereignty. The majority of the respondents (75 per cent), however, also supported the EU's intervention in guaranteeing the same employment rights and salaries in all EU states while 16 per cent were opposed to EU intervention. The response to questions of subsidiarity and the EU's role in regulating employment practice offers us a portrait of a contemporary Scot. While not quite prepared to give up the sovereignty of the British state, he/she warms to the idea of an interventionist authority (in this case, the European Union) which will work to achieve a perceived common good (in this case, equal rights for all workers of the EU member state) showing the strong influence of the egalitarian or quasi-socialist political culture of contemporary Scotland.

This is consistent with other findings. Many studies have found that especially since 1970s the Scottish political culture has moved to the left. The Scots have been found to be more strongly oriented towards socialist values.[8] More recently, Alice Brown *et al.*, based on the 1997 British Election Survey, argue that the Scots are more socialist and more liberal than the English and that there is little regional variation within Scotland in this respect.[9] There is another aspect to these findings. Other studies have also noted that the Scots tend to show a

more socialist orientation in their political values and, moreover, Scottish identity has been linked to left-wing values.[10] In contemporary Scotland therefore being Scottish is linked to holding left-wing values and attitudes. Curtice and Seyd also note that the Scottish identifiers, that is, those who identify themselves as exclusively Scottish or more Scottish than British, tend to show more favourable attitudes to Europe than the English identifiers.[11] Taken together one can speculate that the view of Europe as a space where a more just Scotland is possible seems to have a good chance of resonating with Scottish people. In this vision of the Scoto-European relationship, a strong identification as Scottish, holding left-wing values and being pro-Europe are combined neatly to present a consistent worldview. Utopian, perhaps, but it appears to suit the general trend in the Scottish opinion.

Opinion polls and surveys available show that some of the ideas about the Scoto-European relationship have not been produced and circulated in a vacuum. It appears that the ideas of Europe as a means of distinguishing Scots from the rest of the British and as a space where a more just Scotland is possible correspond to what polls and surveys have found. These figures do not necessarily confirm that the intellectuals and intelligentsia are manipulating the masses. They merely affirm that these ideas do have an influence in contemporary Scottish society. Since many opinion polls and surveys now include an option of independence within the EU in the question on constitutional preference, it is fair to say that the idea of Europe as a means of achieving independence has now become part of the Scottish opinion, or institutionalised. Other ideas are not as clearly institutionalised, and it remains to be seen if and how they are incorporated in contemporary Scottish society.

SCOTLAND AND BRITAIN

We have seen that the Scoto-European relationship in contemporary Scotland is articulated in reference to Britain or England, and therefore the Scottish relationship to Britain/England needs investigating in order to come to a reasonable assessment of the ideas of the Scoto-European relationship identified in this study.

One of the issues that has attracted much scholarly attention is that of the fate of British identity amongst the Scots. Opinion polls and surveys suggest that Scottish identity has become stronger in relation to British identity among the Scots over last three decades (see Table 8).

The figures in Table 8 show clearly that the proportion of respondents who claim exclusively Scottish identity nearly doubled between

Table 8: Moreno National Identity in Scotland, 1992–2000

	1992 (%)	*1997 (%)*	*1999 (%)*	*2000 (%)*
Scottish, not British	19	23	32	37
More Scottish than British	40	38	35	31
Equally Scottish and British	33	27	22	21
More British than Scottish	3	4	3	2
British, not Scottish	3	4	4	4
Other	1	2	3	4
Base	957	882	1,482	1,663

Source: Curtice and Seyd, 'Is Devolution Strengthening or Weakening the UK?', p. 236.

Table 9: Forced-choice National Identity in Scotland, 1979-2000

	1979 (%)	*1992 (%)*	*1997 (%)*	*1999 (%)*	*2000 (%)*
Scottish	57	72	72	77	80
British	39	25	20	17	13
Base	661	957	882	1,482	1,663

Source: Curtice and Seyd, 'Is Devolutio Strengthening or Weakening the UK?', p. 237.

1992 and 2000, with the proportion of those who acknowledge the British component of their identity slowly declining.

The question that asked the respondents to choose which one identity best described the way they felt about themselves has been included in the survey since 1979 when the first referendum failed to establish a Scottish Parliament. What can be seen from Table 9 is that by the early 1990s, Scottish identity had become much more salient for the respondents than British identity. This apparent strengthening of Scottish identity had started in the 1980s and continued through the 1990s.

Many questions arise from the figures shown in Table 9. Why did Scottish identity, despite the result of the 1979 referendum, become stronger? What triggered it in the 1980s and what sustained the trend throughout the 1990s? Probably the issue of the north–south divide, as discussed earlier in the book, has been instrumental. The majority of Scottish people felt uneasy about the Thatcher government and the values it was promoting, and increasingly identified with more corporatist or socialist orientations found in many Scottish institutions.

What is most relevant to this study is that these figures seem to suggest that there has been a shift in the frame of reference of the Scots. If they increasingly think of themselves as Scottish, the way they see the world should also have changed. Since the ideas about the Scoto-European relationship that have been identified in this book offer a new framework for the people of Scotland, they have a fair

chance of being taken up by some people who are looking for a new way of articulating their place in the world.

Furthermore, if these figures are signalling the death of Britishness in Scotland, as some scholars have begun to speculate, this also offers another insight into the position of these ideas in contemporary Scottish society. Although there is ample disagreement about the finer points, most scholars agree that the British Empire was an important factor in the emergence of the British identity.[12] The strong link between the British Empire and the sense of being British suggests that the idea of Europe as a substitute for the British Empire may not be a popular one among the Scots who are increasingly putting Scottishness first and Britishness second at best. Although the view is built on a particular episode of Scottish history, the geopolitical situation could undermine its appeal.

The three views of the Scoto-European relationship identified in this study are not the products of some intellectuals who lead insulated lives. These ideas do appear to reflect what is going on in contemporary Scottish society. No idea, of course, can be generated free from the context. However, this chapter offers some clues in investigating one of the issues in nationalism: the relationship between the elite and masses. There is a group of scholars who argue, to put it simply, that nationalism is one of the means that the elite mobilises in order to manipulate the masses.[13] The discussion in this chapter suggests a more nuanced relationship between the elite and the masses in a mature democracy. Ideas are still predominantly produced by the elite but the masses do not swallow them blindly. If the manipulation theory is right, given the strengthening of Scottish identity, the SNP should be enjoying overwhelming support from the electorate and the ideas identified in this book which are in line with the SNP's policy should be taken up by many, and Scotland should be achieving independence. However, the prospect of independence is not certain and the SNP is only the second party in Scotland. The Scots are less Euro-sceptic but not overwhelmingly Europhile. There seems to be a division of labour that the elite produces ideas and the masses consume them, but the consumers exercise their autonomy in choosing which idea to take up or which ideas to combine to make sense of the world. Nationalism in this context is more a project of equals than a top-down affair. Is this the intrinsic nature of nationalism or is this a feature of democratic societies? This is another question requiring further investigation.

NOTES

1. Ambrose Martos, 'Scotland and European Union: Changing Political Attitudes 1972–1995' (unpublished MSc. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1995), p. 4.
2. The 'Yes' vote in England was 69 per cent and 65 per cent in Wales. See Appendix 2 for details.
3. In Shetland, the 'No' vote was 56.3 per cent and in Western Isles, 70.5 per cent.
4. Michael Keating and Barry Jones, 'Scotland and Wales: Peripheral Assertion and European Integration', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 44, 3 (1991), pp. 311–24.
5. Neal Ascherson, 'Introduction', in Geraldine Prince (ed.), *A Window on Europe: The Lothian European Lectures 1992* (Edinburgh: Cannongate, 1993), pp. xix–xx.
6. *The Scotsman*, 9 November 1996.
7. The poll was conducted between 21 and 25 October, 1993, with 1,795 adults at 143 sampling points across the United Kingdom. It should be noted that the Scottish sample involved 169 adults, who only constituted 9 per cent of the sample, and there is, therefore, a greater risk of sampling error in the Scottish result. Nonetheless, we can obtain a rough comparison between Scottish and English public opinion.
8. Miller *et al*., *Political Culture in Contemporary Britain*.
9. Brown *et al*., *Politics and Society in Scotland*, pp. 6–8.
10. Alice Brown, David McCrone, Lindsay Paterson and Paula Surridge, *The Scottish Electorate: The 1997 General Election and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), ch. 4; Bennie *et al*., *How Scotland Votes,* ch. 10; Curtice and Seyd, 'Is Devolution Strengthening or Weakening the UK?'.
11. Curtice and Seyd, 'Is Devolution Strengthening or Weakening the UK?'.
12. Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation*; Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism*; McCrone, *Understanding Scotland*; Pittock, *Scottish Nationality*.
13. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (2nd edn) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (New Delhi/Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991).

Conclusion

I conclude this study by briefly recapitulating the main argument and returning to some of the issues which this analysis has raised. The aim was to identify, explore and evaluate the ideas about the Scoto-European relationship in circulation in contemporary Scotland. Through a series of in-depth interviews with members of the Scottish intelligentsia, three different views concerning the relationship between Scotland and Europe have been identified (Chapter 4). First, Europe is seen as a means of achieving more autonomy or independence for Scotland, and for this, Europe is good for Scotland. The best-known embodiment of this vision of the Scoto-European relationship is the SNP's celebrated policy of 'Independence in Europe'. In this vision, 'Europe' refers mainly to the institutions and arrangements of the European Union which, according to the respondents here, would provide economic and security assurances for a more autonomous Scotland or an independent Scotland. The image of the Scottish nation is that of a nation of under-achievers, which, because of the current political arrangements in the United Kingdom, is prevented from maximising Scottish talents and skills. There is a recognition that the processes of European integration could lead to the undermining of the sovereignty of the nationstate, but it is a remote possibility, and there is no acute anxiety linked to this view.

Second, Europe is a space where a more just Scotland is possible. In this vision, 'Europe' refers not only to the institutions and political arrangements of the EU but also to its relatively recent tendency to move away from outright capitalism towards social democracy. The symbol of this 'Europe' is the Social Chapter. 'Europe' in this vision is where priority is given to workers' interests and the welfare of the citizens over the interests of employers and large capitalists. This image of Europe is particularly attractive to the respondents here when set against a Thatcherite Britain or an 'aggressively individualistic' England. The image of the Scottish nation presented here is that the Scots are traditionally egalitarian and they care for community, not for money. Because of this political culture in Scotland, according to the

respondents here, the Scots would feel more comfortable within the framework of the European Union with its social democratic inclinations than within the United Kingdom which was governed by a party that had been repeatedly rejected by the Scottish electorate. The Scots would also be good for Europe because they would work hard to bring about more justice in Europe. Whether or not the process of European integration is in fact an expression of supranationalism which might take away the sovereignty of an independent Scotland or the power of a more autonomous Scotland is not a major concern in this vision. The emphasis is on the realisation of a more just society in Scotland, and in Europe in general, where the sovereignty issue does not feature prominently.

Third, Europe is seen as a substitute for the British Empire. In this vision, Europe is essentially a single and free market which is open to any Europeans and regulated by an international agreement. Every player in this market is equal. The Scots, whose talents and skills are now not utilised to the fullest extent, would enter this new market and be successful. Since everyone is equal in the Common Market, even a small nation like Scotland would have a chance of success, judging by their successful record in the running of the British Empire. Some of the respondents here were confident that the Scots would prosper in the European Union. The Scots should, according to these respondents, wholeheartedly embrace the project of establishing a single market in Europe and work towards it. It will be interesting to see if this logic will be extended to the planned enlargement of the EU. Already, an SNP MEP has begun expressing a positive view of eastern enlargement as offering more opportunities for Scottish business, but it is not yet connected to any aspect of Scottish nationality.[1]

What has also emerged from the analysis is that the Scoto-European relationship is always articulated with reference to Britain or England. This confirms that the most significant other for the contemporary Scots are the English or the Anglo-British. Scottish national identity continues to be defined in relation to the perceived English or Anglo-British one. Europe may be playing a more visible role in Scottish society than the English one but it has not become the main reference point for the Scots in making sense of the world they live in.

It has also been demonstrated that each of the three views is built on the basis of certain historical experiences (see Chapter 5). For instance, the Auld Alliance with France is, according to these respondents, one proof that the Scots were pro-European in the past and, therefore, can easily be pro-European both now and in the future. The Scots, the respondents argue, only need to awaken to this fact. The

idea of an egalitarian Scotland draws on, among other things, post-Reformation history which brought about the supposedly democratic system of the Church, and the parish school system which was, in its conception, close to the idea of universal education. In addition, the Declaration of Arbroath is often cited by these respondents as evidence of the supposedly democratic nature of the Scottish people. Moreover, the legacy of the British Empire is still apparent in the everyday life of contemporary Scots. Many people still have relations living in ex-colonies and the spectacular ceremony of the hand-over of Hong Kong in 1997, in which Scottish regiments took the leading role, reminded us of the extent of the Scottish involvement in the running of the British Empire. The glory of the British Empire is not a fashionable or politically correct topic now as it has imperialist and even racist implications, but the fact that the Scots were successful, disproportionately so according to some, in the British Empire is not forgotten. These historical experiences are now mobilised by the Scottish intelligentsia to propose new ideas about the Scoto-European relationship.

This study also showed that what has enabled the Scottish intelligentsia to form new ideas about the relationship between Scotland and Europe is the fact that large repositories of images of both Scotland and Europe exist. The Scots have a long history and their historical memory is rich. Many peoples, the Picts, Scots, Angles, Norse and many more, came to Scotland and they brought with them their myths and memories which are now blended into the Scottish ones. Christianity played a part in establishing the distinctiveness of Scotland since it came through Ireland, not from south of the border. The Scots have their heroes and heroines –William Wallace, Robert the Bruce, Mary, Queen of Scots, Bonnie Prince Charlie, and their golden ages – the reigns of Alexander and Robert I, the Enlightenment, the age of improvement – as well as the myths of 'Red Clyde' and militant socialism (see Chapter 1). Likewise, the idea of Europe has been evolving for more than a millennium; it is a geographical entity with ambiguous boundaries, Christendom, civilisation which leads the rest of the world, the continent of scientific progress, the land of human rights, and a free market (see Chapter 3). Because there are a large variety of images of Scotland and Europe, the Scottish intelligentsia can select from these to match appropriate images of Scotland and Europe to present coherent views of the Scoto-European relationship.

These ideas which were articulated by the intelligentsia, when contrasted with other evidence, were on the whole in tune with what the majority of the Scottish people appeared to think as demonstrated in Chapter 6. According to the opinion polls, the Scots are less sceptical of

the European Union than the British as a whole. Moreover, the Scots are likely to give stronger support to the EU's intervention to promote welfare of the workers and citizens of the member states than the British as a whole. However, their pro-European attitudes are instrumental and the emergence of a European identity even among the supposedly pro-European Scots seems to be remote.

Before addressing theoretical considerations that this book has raised in regard to the study of nationalism, it is necessary to confront one issue. The interviews on which the argument is based were carried out between 1994 and 1995. Given that some time has lapsed, it is necessary to consider whether the argument still stands in the Scotland of the twenty-first century. Much has changed: there is now a Scottish Parliament; the Tories are no longer in power; the coins and notes of the European single currency, the euro, are now in circulation. However, the views of the Scoto-European relationship which are identified in this study have not changed much. The surveys and opinion polls indicate that the Scots are still less Euro-sceptic than the British as a whole as illustrated in Chapter 6, which suggests that Europe is one of the means by which the Scots can assert their difference from the English. The Scottish Executive also propagates an instrumental view of the European Union in that it is the main export market for Scotland.[2] Moreover, the idea that the Scots are more community-minded and socialist-oriented than the English now has a concrete expression in the form of a few policies that the Scottish Parliament has approved. The Scottish Executive abolished university tuition fees for Scottish students primarily because of the need of the Labour party to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats in the Scottish Parliament, but the fees was also widely seen as unfair. It now pays for the personal care of the elderly citizens, a policy which is operating only within Scotland. Even with the arrival of the Labour government at Westminster, the urge to emphasise the caring nature of the Scottish people as a whole is alive and kicking. Above all, Europe is not yet a primary issue. Therefore, no new ideas have yet emerged about the Scoto-European relationship. If it comes, the euro referendum will have a significant effect on the setting in which discussions take place. It is possible that the social democratic idea of Europe might give away to an anxiety over the EU as a supranational entity with one interest rate; it is also possible that the euro could be used as yet another tool to distinguish the Scots from the English. We can only speculate about the impact of the referendum but for the time being, the views identified in this study continued to be reproduced and circulated in contemporary Scottish society.

We now need to turn to the two issues which require further consideration in the light of all these findings. The first is the role of intellectuals and intelligentsia in nationalism. The second is the uses of history in nationalism.

The role of intellectuals and intelligentsia

This is a methodological issue: how valid is it to conduct a series of interviews with members of the intelligentsia? A broad framework of the sociology of knowledge was employed and it was proposed that the intellectuals and intelligentsia have a special role in society, namely producing, articulating and circulating ideas which would otherwise not be available for the majority of people. It was also recognised that many scholars attributed an important role to the intellectuals and intelligentsia in nationalist movements, hence the decision to conduct in-depth interviews with members of the Scottish intelligentsia in order to explore the relationship between Scotland and Europe. At the same time, there remained the problem of representativeness – how representative of contemporary Scottish society are the views of the Scottish intelligentsia? The aim here was to tackle this question by comparing the findings from the interviews with the results of opinion polls, social trend surveys and the general political and social background. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the three views of the Scoto-European relationship are, by and large, the reflections of the views of the majority of Scottish people about themselves and Europe; in other words, these views are not pure inventions by the intelligentsia. It is fair to conclude that the Scottish intelligentsia have a particular role of articulating what the majority of the people feel and think in contemporary Scottish society, and, therefore, in the development of contemporary Scottish nationalism. This also establishes the validity of carrying out research on their views as a means of investigating contemporary Scottish nationalism.

The role of the intellectuals and intelligentsia is, however, less clear-cut in contemporary society than a few centuries ago, which is one of the issues raised by Edward Said.[3] The proliferation of intellectuals and intelligentsia has been brought about by general democratisation processes in many aspects of society, such as the expansion of higher education, the shift in the industrial structure of Western societies towards knowledge-based industry and the enlargement of the bureaucratic state. The fact that there are more people in contemporary society who are in the position of producing, articulating and circulating ideas – a traditional role of the intellectuals and intelligentsia – suggests, first, that it is now more difficult to identify these

groups within the given population. For instance, amongst the interviewees for this study, there are some business elites and civil servants who do not fit the conventional category of intellectuals and intelligentsia. As was argued earlier, the business elite and civil servants in Scotland play an important role in forming and circulating ideas about Scottish society and its future, although they do not necessarily make a living by dealing with ideas. In any study of contemporary nationalism, therefore, the definition of intellectuals and intelligentsia needs to be carefully examined. In this study, it was proposed to define the intelligentsia as those who received university-level education and are in the business of forming and articulating ideas for the purpose of public consumption. This allowed examination of the views held by some business elite and civil servants which provided crucial data for the analysis. The definition of the intelligentsia applied here, however, may not be appropriate in other studies. What is important is to recognise the changing composition of the intellectuals and intelligentsia in contemporary society and to redefine the concept of the intellectuals and intelligentsia in order to create a meaningful framework for research.

Second, the fact that there are more intellectuals around than a century ago implies that it is now more difficult to form a unified idea of a nation in a nationalist movement. It has always been the case that there are several competing ideas about a nation in any nationalism. Different answers to the 'Who are we?' question are constantly proposed and negotiated. National identity, as with our personal identity, provides a sense of continuity and 'sameness' but this does not mean that identities are static; they can be redefined in response to changing circumstances. However, when the discussion can be confined to a relatively small circle of intellectuals and intelligentsia, it should be easier to make efforts to reach some consensus about the nation in question. In today's world, this task, significant in any nationalist project, is becoming increasingly difficult as a result of the larger number of participants. More ideas of a nation are now presented by an ever-increasing number of intellectuals and intelligentsia. In addition, different kinds of ideas are also put forward by immigrants, women and other people whose voices were previously not publicly heard, but who now have acquired a means of expression thanks to the overall democratisation of contemporary society.[4] More ideas and more participants in the debate seem to make negotiations to form a consensus difficult, if not impossible. Does this mean that we are witnessing the fragmentation of ideas of a nation? Can we no longer suppose that it is possible to form some kind of consensus concerning the question of

'Who are we?'? Or is it just a matter of a longer and more difficult process of coming to a general agreement?

The Scottish case provides some evidence which supports the latter view – a consensus is still possible but the process is possibly longer and subject to more rigorous examination by the participants of the debate. Some of the so-called 'new' immigrants in Scotland – mainly people from the Indian subcontinent – propose and actively promote a democratic and civic vision of the Scottish nation while acknowledging the existence of racism in contemporary Scottish society which alienates some of their fellow immigrants. A group called the 'Scots Asians for Independence', for instance, backs this kind of view of the Scottish nation. They give qualified support for the popular myth that the Scots are 'less' racist than the English, and argue that gaining independence is an opportunity to create a truly inclusive civic Scottish nation in which ethnic nationalism and racism have no place. This vision ties in with the long-held view of the democratic and egalitarian Scots and is well-received by the white intelligentsia. Judging by the low level of support for such organisations as the British National Party, it is probably also supported by the majority of the Scottish people. This is one example in which the entry of new participants has not led to the fragmentation of the idea but to its redefinition. Historically speaking, this is not surprising. Many nations have absorbed different peoples in the course of history and this did not always result in the break-up of the idea of the nation. There is no reason to presume that the expression of new types of ideas and the entry of different types of participants will lead to the break-up of the process of forming ideas of a nation. Certainly, the speed and the degree of the proliferation of intellectuals and intelligentsia have been recently accelerated, yet it is not clear if this represents a substantial change in the way nationalist ideas are formed and negotiated. It is, therefore, premature to predict the fragmentation of the ideas of a nation at this stage.

The uses of history

The second issue concerns the way history is used by nationalists. As has been demonstrated, Europe is, indeed, seen as a means of achieving independence or greater autonomy, but this does not exclusively constitute the 'pro-European' attitudes of Scottish nationalists. The Scottish nationalists also favour Europe because it can be a space where a more just society is possible and because it can act as a replacement for the British Empire. What is most remarkable about these views of the Scoto-European relationship is that they are built upon the basis of certain episodes from Scottish history. Given the fact that

Scotland has a long history, there is always some historical evidence which can be used to back up different images of Scotland. In addition, the same can be said about Europe; over the centuries, the peoples of Europe have built a large repository of images of Europe and they can now pick an image which matches the way in which they see themselves. Thus, when the Scots want to see themselves as egalitarian and caring, they remember the legacy of the Reformation, the socialist tendency of the early twentieth century and so on, and project these memories against the image of Europe as the home of social democracy. When they want to see themselves as adventurers who dare to go out and explore, enter into new business and be successful in the outside world, they remember the glorious years of the British Empire and tie this image of Scotland to an idea of Europe as a free market. In this way, that is, by using history, the Scottish nationalists have succeeded in embracing even the process of European integration in their ideology.

But which history? The Scottish case presents an interesting picture in this regard. Scotland used to be allegedly the only European country in which its own history was not taught as a separate subject in schools. Moreover, the discipline of Scottish history was for a long while seen as a second-class subject pursued by men of leisure, not by serious academics. This was ironic since from the Middle Ages until the Enlightenment, the Scottish literati had been preoccupied with Scottish history and had produced a large number of works.[5] However, around the time of the death of Walter Scott history writing in Scotland lost its rigour and energy, and attitudes towards Scottish history changed. This is what was described by Marinell Ash as the 'strange death of Scottish history'.[6] Colin Kidd even argued that after the Union of 1707, Scottish historians discarded their past as being anachronistically feudal and defined the Union with England as the moment of liberation of the Scottish nation.[7] Scottish history was rewritten from the dominant Whig point of view and the glorious past of Scotland as a sovereign and free country was written off as primitive, and unsuitable for a Scottish nation which was determined to embrace modernity, the personification of which was England. Official Scottish history was, then, a denial of the Scottish past, the Scotland of the Picts and Scots, of St Columba, of the Wars of Independence, of the Declaration of Arbroath, and of the Stuarts. Despite the official denunciation of the Scottish past, the Scots continued to cherish their memories of Wallace and Bruce, Robert Burns, the Jacobite myth, and their tradition of the 'Lad o'Pairts' even after the Union of 1707. This is evident in the facts that such medieval literature as *The Wallace* and *The*

Brus were reissued and reprinted time and again in post-Union Scotland and that the Victorian Scots built several monuments dedicated to Scottish heroes with public subscription.[8]

Today, the respondents here no longer resort to the type of history which has dominated the scene, often called 'Whig history' of Scotland. They appreciate what they perceive as the exceptionally modern aspect of the Declaration of Arbroath which suggests that the medieval Scottish understanding of sovereignty is close to the modern version of popular sovereignty. They do not necessarily agree with the Scottish historians of the eighteenth century in their assessment of the meaning of the Union with England. Many of these respondents admit that Scotland benefited from the Union in terms of its participation in the running of the British Empire. Fewer now regard the Union as a liberation from primitive feudalism than in the eighteenth century. Moreover, there is a renewed interest in Scottish history and, as elsewhere in the world, revisionist historians are scrutinising the 'official' history of Scotland.

What enables these respondents to produce a new vision of Scotland to suit today's reality is the abundance of historical material in Scotland. The bulk of the historical material employed by the respondents here is not made up of 'official' documents. In this sense, the Scottish case provides a powerful piece of evidence for the centrality of 'ethno-history' or shared memories in maintaining national identity. Historians will, as always, revise and rewrite history to fit the needs of the day. However, 'official' history, revised or not, may not be at the core of national identity as the Scottish case suggests. What a researcher should look for is historical memories which the past generations have handed down to the present one and which are still cherished by people. Those nationalist intelligentsia who manage to tap into these collective memories will succeed in promoting their view. This means that the nationalist intelligentsia would face a problem of winning the hearts and minds of people at a time of change if they did not have a 'rich' history. If their repository of historical experiences is very limited, it is difficult to propose a new idea which will have resonance among people, with the likely outcome being a discrepancy between what the intelligentsia put forward and what people believe in. This will certainly result in an unsuccessful mobilisation of the masses, and therefore, a case of unsuccessful nationalism.

How the relationship with 'Europe' is portrayed offers another insight into the complexity of UK society. As repeatedly noted in this study, the Scots are, on the whole, less Euro-sceptic than the British as a whole and the English. The ideas about the Scoto-European

relationship which are in circulation draw on what is perceived as a pro-European past of the Scots. Turning to what kinds of ideas are circulated by the elite within the Anglo-British framework, it is striking that the historical frame of reference employed there is focused on the Second World War. In the political discourse, in particular, Britain's identity is defined based on its experience of the Second World War, and therefore the Anglo-British elites often employ the 'we the British, they the Europeans' framework. Europe in this case is, more often than not, presented negatively with its connection to Nazi Germany emphasised. Also the so-called special relationship with the United States is stressed in this view. These tendencies have produced a number of views of the relationship between Britain and Europe which suggest that Britain is distant and different from Europe. Nonetheless, England also has a long history and its own pro-European past. It is not tapped into, however, in contemporary British society. Comparing and contrasting the uses of history in the views of the relationship with Europe between Scotland and Britain in general is another task that needs to be undertaken on a future occasion. The uses of history does, after all, provide a good comparative framework in the study of nationalism and national identity.

NOTES

1. Neil MacCormick, 'Scotland without aShout at the Summit', *The Scotsman*, 6th December 2000.
2. Emma Cowing, 'McLeish is Looking to Broaden Scots' European Horizon', *The Scotsman*, 10th October 2001.
3. Edward Said, *Representations of the Intellectual* (London: Verso, 1994).
4. The proportion of non-white residents in Scotland is around 2 per cent of the entire Scottish population according to the 2001 census.
5. David Daiches, 'The Scottish Enlightenment', in David Daiches, Peter Jones and Jean Jones (eds), *The Scottish Enlightenment 1730–1790: A Hotbed of Genius* (Edinburgh: Saltire Society, 1986), pp. 1–42.
6. Ash, *The Strange Death of Scottish History*, *passim*.
7. Kidd, *Subverting Scotland's Past, passim*.
8. Michael Lynch, 'The Age of Renaissance and Reformation', in Rosalind Mitchison (ed.), *Why Scottish History Matters* (Edinburgh: Saltire Society, 1991), pp. 26–36; Morton, *Unionist Nationalism*, pp. 97–132.

Appendix 1:

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES*

William Anderson, Scottish Office (Scottish constitutional issues spokesman)
Neal Ascherson, Senior Assistant Editor, *Independent on Sunday*; Trustee, Common Cause
Grant Baird, Executive Director, Scottish Financial Enterprise
Terry Brotherstone, Lecturer in History, University of Aberdeen
Alice Brown, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Edinburgh; Vice-Convener, Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland
Ewen Cameron, Lecturer in Scottish History, University of Edinburgh
Richard Finlay, Lecturer in History, University of Strathclyde
Michael Fry, journalist; historian
Peter Grainger, Scottish Consultative Council on Curriculum
Marjorie Grant, Church of Scotland, Church and Nation Committee
Christopher Harvie, Professor of British Studies, University of Tubingen
Joy Hendry, Editor, *Chapman*; writer; critic
Colin Kidd, Lecturer in Scottish History, University of Glasgow
Isobel Linsay, Lecturer in Sociology, University of Strathclyde; Campaign for a Scottish Parliament; Scottish Constitutional Convention; Trustee, Common Cause
Michael Lynch, Professer of Scottish History, University of Edinburgh
Allan Massie, writer; journalist
Stephen Maxwell, Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations; Trustee, Common Cause; former SNP parliamentary candidate
Alan Macartney, Member of the European Parliament, SNP; Senior Vice-Convener, SNP
Neil MacCormick, Reginus Professor of Public Law, University of Edinburgh, former SNP parliamentary candidate
David McCrone, Reader in Sociology, University of Edinburgh, Convener, Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland
Christopher MacLachlan, Lecturer in English Literature, University of St Andrews; Editor, *Scotlands*

Dan MacLeod, Lecturer in Media Studies, University of Stirling
Joyce MacMillan, journalist; theatre critic; Scottish Constitutional Convention; Trustee, Common Cause
Iain MacWhirter, journalist
Doreen Melon, European Central Support Unit, Scottish Office
Alan Millar, solicitor; Secretary, Common Cause
James Mitchell, Lecturer in Politics, University of Strathclyde
Tom Nairn, journalist; Trustee, Common Cause
Lindsay Paterson, Research Fellow, Centre for Educational Sociology, University of Edinburgh; Vice-Convener, Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland; Editor, *Scottish Affairs*
Murray Pittock, Lecturer in English Literature, University of Edinburgh
Kelvin Pringle, Research Officer, SNP
Paul Scott, historian; Vice-President, SNP; Vice-Chairman, Saltire Society; Convener, Advisory Council for Arts in Scotland; President, Scottish PEN
Bill Spiers, Deputy General Secretary, Scottish Trades Union Congress
Gordon Willson, accountant; Former SNP Chairman 1979–90
William Wolfe, accountant; Former SNP Chairman 1969–79; Former SNP President 1980-82

* Affiliations are listed as of the time of the interviews.

Appendix 2:

REFERENDA AND ELECTION RESULTS

Table A-1: The 1975 EEC Referendum Result

	Turnout (%)	*YES vote (%)*
UK	64.5	67.2
England	64.5	68.7
Scotland	61.7	58.4
Wales	66.7	66.5
Northern Ireland	47.7	52.1

Source: Michael Keating and Nigel Waters, 'Scotland in the European Community', in Michael Keating and Barry Jones (eds), *Regions in the European Community* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 61.

Table A-2: The 1979 and 1997 Referenda Results

1979 Referendum. Turnout: 62.9%

	YES vote	*NO vote*
% of the vote cast	51.9	48.4
% of electorate	32.9	30.8

Source: James Mitchell, *Strategies for Self-Government: The Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1996), p. 323.

1997 Referendum. Turnout: 60.4%

	Scottish Parliament	*Tax-raising powers*
% of voting YES	74.3	63.5
% of electorate	44.8	38.4

Source: *The Economist*, 20 September 1997.

Table A-3: General Elections in Scotland, 1945–97
(percentage of vote with the number of seats in brackets)

	1945	*1950*	*1951*	*1955*	*1959*	*1964*	*1966*	*1970*
Conservative	41.1 (27)	44.8 (32)	48.6 (35)	50.1 (36)	47.2 (31)	40.6 (24)	37.7 (20)	38.0 (23)
Labour	47.6 (37)	46.2 (37)	47.9 (35)	46.7 (34)	46.7 (38)	48.7 (43)	49.9 (46)	44.5 (44)
Liberal*	6.6 (2)	6.6 (1)	2.7 (1)	1.9 (1)	4.1 (1)	7.6 (4)	6.8 (5)	5.5 (3)
SNP	1.2	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5	2.4	5.0	11.4 (1)
Others**	3.3	1.6	0.5	0.8	1.2	0.7	0.6	0.6

	1974 Feb.	*1974 Oct.*	*1979*	*1983*	*1987*	*1992*	*1997*	*2001*
Conservative	32.9 (21)	24.7 (16)	31.4 (22)	28.4 (21)	24.0 (10)	25.6 (11)	17.5 (0)	15.6 (1)
Labour	36.6 (41)	36.3 (41)	41.5 (44)	35.1 (41)	42.4 (50)	39.0 (49)	45.6 (56)	43.2 (55)
Liberal*	8.0 (3)	8.3 (3)	9.0 (3)	24.5 (8)	19.2 (9)	13.1 (9)	13.0 (10)	16.4 (10)
SNP	21.9 (7)	30.4 (11)	17.3 (2)	11.7 (2)	14.0 (3)	21.5 (3)	22.1 (6)	20.1 (5)
Others**	0.6	0.3	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.8	1.8	4.5 (1)

* 'Liberal' includes Liberal, Liberal/SDP Alliance and Liberal Democrats.
** 'Others' includes Communists, Greens and so on.

Source: Alice Brown, David McCrone, Lindsay Paterson and Paula Surridge, *The Scottish Electorate: The 1997 General Election and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 7 and Bryn Morgan, *General Election Results, 7 June 2001*, London: House of Commons Library (2001).

Table A-4: The Scottish Parliament Election Results, 1999
Seats won by Party

	Constituency MSPs	*Regional List MSPs*	*Total*
Labour	53	3	56
SNP	7	28	35
LibDem	12	5	17
Conservative	0	18	18
Green	0	1	1
Independent	1	0	1
SSP*	0	1	1
Total	73	56	129

*Scottish Social Party.

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