

RELIGIONS, NATIONS, AND TRANSNATIONALISM IN MULTIPLE MODERNITIES

EDITED BY
PATRICK MICHEL, ADAM POSSAMAI & BRYAN S. TURNER

Religions, Nations, and Transnationalism in Multiple Modernities

Patrick Michel • Adam Possamai • Bryan S. Turner
Editors

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Editors
Patrick Michel
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique et Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
Paris, France

Adam Possamai
School of Social Sciences and Psychology
Western Sydney University
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia

Bryan S. Turner
Australian Catholic University
Melbourne, Australia

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CHAPTER 1

Religions, Nations and Transnationalism in Multiple Modernities: An Introduction

Patrick Michel, Adam Possamai, and Bryan S. Turner

Introduction

With the permeability of borders and the greatly increased speed and volume of international communication and transportation, we are now in a new era of transnationalism, and religions are taking part in a network society that cuts across borders. World religions have dominated the cultures of the global sphere for centuries, even before the creation of nation-states. However, with globalization, these world religions have become de-territorialized "and are to be conceived no more as geopolitical territorial spaces but rather as interrelated communicative spaces within a

P. Michel (✉)
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique et Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France

A. Possamai
School of Social Sciences and Psychology, Western Sydney University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

B.S. Turner
Australian Catholic University, Melbourne, Australia

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single world" (Casanova 2012). Alongside these changes, we are also faced with a plethora of new religious re-compositions that venture across frontiers. This book explores the impact of globalization on the relationship between religion and politics, religion and nation, and religion and nationalism, and the changes that transnationalism has brought about for religious groups (and vice versa).

Spohn (2003) claims that we have witnessed a revival of both nationalism and religion since the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the demise of socialist and community movements in other parts of the world. While the revival of ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and religious nationalism can be seen as defensive reactions to globalization, these are not necessarily anti-modern, anti-Western, or anti-global. The social-scientific study of religion, nationalism, and transnationalism is thus in need of a new approach to understanding these new global phenomena.

To comprehend these changes, the next two sections explore the issue with regard to the concepts of the nation and of transnationalism. As national sovereignty is called more and more into question, while it becomes less and less a normative principle of social order (Fine and Smith 2003), new concepts such as Beck's cosmopolitanism and Habermas's post-national constellation are proposed. These theoretical approaches might be more normative in terms of the contributions of Beck and Habermas, but they do not necessarily reflect the life experience of religious and non-religious social actors and movements. We propose, then, a different and more pragmatic approach to understanding the link between religion, nations, and transnationalism by bringing the theory of multiple modernities into these debates. By using this new theory, we are also able to map out a short-term future—one in which multiple modernities are understood, paradoxically, as becoming less and less multiple as religion is standardized, and as nations lose their legitimacy as sovereign entities.

Religion as a Privileged Observatory of Globalization

For Lewellen (2002, 8), "[g]lobalization may be conceived as empirical fact, as theory, or as ideology. In reality, these dimensions blend together, but different researchers tend to emphasize one or another." If the "ideological articulator" of globalization (that is, North American

neo-liberalism—obviously inseparable from the reactions that its implementation raises) is clearly and easily identifiable, the difficulty in holding together these three dimensions (facts, theory, and ideology) results largely from the accumulation of the concrete effects of this globalization. This accumulation demonstrates, at any given moment, the scale and magnitude of globalization. It otherwise tends to prevent theoretical thinking about it, apart from in a fragmented and exploded form (see Lewellen 2002; see also Inda and Rosalo 2007; Vincent 2002). As noted by Augé (2013, 107), "actually the crisis which we speak about so much nowadays is a crisis of the universal thought, stifled by the images of the global world."

Religion is a privileged observatory of globalization. Amid a marked acceleration of major trends that impact on our life (e.g. individuation, privatization, de-institutionalization, and consumerist behaviors), religion nevertheless represents a key path to access the global world. This is due to other spheres, such as politics, being more deficient today in playing this role. Indeed, the resurgence of religion highlights the contemporary deficit of politics. As Levitt (2001, 24) observes, "[t]ransnational religious studies are not just about the organizational manifestations of faith but about the alternative places of belonging that religious ideas and symbols make possible and about the ways in which these sacred landscapes interact with the boundaries of political and civic life."

Religion now constitutes the vector, the indicator and the space where the pluralization of societies is experienced in everyday life. It highlights the fact that the description of societies as homogeneous is no longer credible. And if religion can play this role, it is because it appears to be one of the most successful dimensions (as compared, for instance, to politics) available to individuals. It allows individuals to recompose the totality of, and negotiate (or renegotiate) their relations with, the ideological requirements informing the contemporary world. And, acting in this world—amid a nondifferentiation of religion, appearing simultaneously as a means of interpreting the changes at work—they may negotiate (or renegotiate), also, the destabilizing effects of its transformations.

Religion is not univocal in meaning and orientation. It is first a source of direction. It provides religious individuals resources with to articulate (or re-articulate) their relations to themselves, to others, and to the world. The contents that this source offers appear so malleable that they can be put at the service of all strategies, simultaneous and/or contradictory though they may be. Islam, for example, the "religion of the disinherited"

in certain contexts, is thus likely to be mobilized for the purpose of contesting an order perceived as unfair; equally, it can be employed to help to justify that order (Haenni 2005, 108).

In a world characterized by significant population movements, the relationships of belonging have been deeply transformed. Indeed, a Latin American immigrant in the USA may well claim a stronger affiliation to his/her country of origin than s/he would if s/he had stayed in Latin America, as distance constitutes the basis of a reconstruction of the relationship between these two countries. If migrants return to an annual festival in their village, or contribute financially to the organization of such a festival, or regularly send money to those who stayed behind, they may come to assign to the territory of origin (which they nonetheless left) a greater significance than if they had remained physically present. Meanwhile, the massive presence of Latin Americans in the USA leads Huntington to express discomfort, a feeling of a kind of expropriation, that is, the decoupling of a territory from the cultural conditions of being its occupant. This malaise, leading to the question (with strong pathos) of "Who are we?" (Huntington 2004), is not without echo in a country like France, with the opening, through the initiative of political powers, of a debate on national identity. In both cases, religion appears central. It intervenes, for Huntington, as the essential marker of integration into North American society, via the conversion of immigrants to Protestantism. And as to France, many commentators have pointed out that, under the cover of the (re)definition of national identity, Muslims have been blamed as outsiders.

Religion, Cosmopolitanism and the Post-National Constellation

The chapters in this edited collection can be seen as reflections on a contemporary paradox, which is that, on the one hand, globalization has brought about an increasing diversity of cultures associated with the growth of cosmopolitanism, while on the other hand we have seen a growth in reactionary nationalism, for example throughout much of Europe. In sociology, the idea of a cosmopolitan world has been associated with the criticism of so-called methodological nationalism, or the idea that in classical sociology there was a tendency to equate "society" with "nation-state." The growth of world-systems theory and more

recent theories of globalization has challenged sociology to think of global networks of national and international actors operating beyond the nation-state. These theoretical developments have gone hand in hand with a call for a cosmopolitan ethic as a normative response to diversity and the creation of a cosmopolitan sociology to more effectively grapple with global developments.

Beyond academia, we can also see a growing cosmopolitanism in terms of the consumption of goods and services from across the globe, rather than simply from national producers. Another important development has obviously been that of labor movements, following the gradual deregulation of labor markets from the 1970s onward. The result has been the rise of minority communities in the developed (Western) world who have settled in large metropolitan centers. These movements have forced governments to adopt, implicitly or explicitly, various measures to cope with emerging multiculturalism and religious diversity. While in the West these developments have largely focused on the treatment of Muslim minorities, there are equally important Hindu and Buddhist groups in the multicultural mix of the globalized West.

In response to this growing social and religious pluralism, there have been major anti-immigrant, nationalist, and populist movements that reject the cosmopolitan, global cultures of the successful social groups or classes that have benefited from global economic growth. These anti-cosmopolitan and anti-globalization movements intensified in 2015 and 2016 because of the refugee crisis that has divided Europe along religious lines, threatened the Schengen agreement, and provided political ammunition to populist movements.

We can say that Habermas has a two-pronged response to the problem of social solidarity and religious differences. First, he promotes the idea of the post-secular society, in which secular and religious citizens are to give reasonable accounts of their beliefs with a view to establishing a consensus around basic democratic values and processes. Second, Habermas's (2001) project on the post-national constellation focuses on the construction of supranational institutions to meet the demands of the global economy (as the nation-state no longer has the capacity it used to have). As nation-states are no longer well equipped to develop and maintain strong welfare systems, he proposes the development of a stronger welfare system, at the European rather than the national level. For Habermas, there is a need to raise taxes and stimulate growth at the supranational level. One of his pro-

posals is for the European Union to expand its monetary policy to include a common tax policy.

Religion, Nation and Multiple Modernities

In order to deal with the increase in transnationalism in this global world, key theories, such as the post-national constellation, the clash of civilizations, and cosmopolitanism, have emerged to recommend solutions that will sustain a common social solidarity within diversity. However, these theories, according to Casanova (2011), assume that the modernization process is homogeneous (and also Western) and also that a rigid dichotomy between tradition and modernity exists. Many of these theories presuppose the death of religion and nationalism, and imply that if there has indeed been a resurgence of either of these two ideological forces, it has been mainly as a defensive reaction against the globalization process. This assumption will be questioned throughout the various chapters of this book.

The theory of multiple modernities, however, offers a provision for understanding national and transnational religions that do not go through a homogenizing process. It is a concept that attempts to undermine the hegemony of Western modernity and reflects cultural diversity and multiplicity. As Casanova (2011, 264) puts it, "[t]he multiple modernities position rejects both, the notion of a modern radical break with traditions as well as the notion of an essential modern continuity with tradition." The concept was created by Eisenstadt and grew out of the debate, in social theory, on the historical-comparative framework of the axial age (see also Thomassen 2010).

Unlike postmodernity, which is opposed to modernity as a metanarrative, the multiple modernities thesis is in disagreement only with Western domination's being at the roots of the project of modernity. It does not reject modernity; instead, it argues that the classical modern project is exhausted (Eisenstadt 2003, 953). In this sense, the theory of multiple modernities acknowledges specific expressions of culture and traditions and is reflective of a pluralist view of the world. With regard to the history of modernity, Eisenstadt (2003, 954) that

> [one has] to see it as a story of continual development and formation, constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs of modernity and of distinctively modern institutional patterns, of multiple modernities.

The theory of multiple modernities acknowledges specific expressions of culture and traditions (that can be embedded in a nationalist and religious discourse), and is a reflection of a pluralist view of the world. In our age of neo-liberalism, for example, there are varied cultures of individualism, and these generate different national patterns of belief, adherence and commitment. Further, just as the processes of secularization and de-secularization are different in various parts of the world, the same can be said with regard to the processes of nationalism and transnationalism. This new theoretical perspective, of including religion in the project of modernity, has led to two new and important paths of inquiry in sociology. The first path is a diachronic study of comparative civilizations and multiple modernities. According to this school of thought, multiple modernizations, as social change, go back to the axial civilizations—that is, to the first Axial Age, a term coined by Jaspers to describe the period from 800 BC to 200 BC (see e.g. Eisenstadt 1986; Arjomand 2011; Preyer 2012), thereby predating the French Revolution and industrialization. The Enlightenment, for Eisenstadt, came later, as a breakthrough to a new and different axial age, one that has produced multiple modernities (Arjomand 2010). However, as Arnason (2003, 173–174) has observed, the link between the two axial ages is not clear cut in the work of the Israeli sociologist:

> Is "the original modern western civilization" … a mutant offshoot of the older Western civilizational stem capable of enlarging its ancestral domain and imposing the dynamic of direct or indirect Westernization on the rest of the world? Or is the new "civilization of modernity" … a trans-traditional pattern (in the double sense of transcending historical limits and cultural borders), whose first version reflects the exceptional and many-sided innovative capacity of Western (more precisely Western European) civilization, but is also marked by tensions between the Western context and the modern dynamic? Some of Eisenstadt's formulations suggest the first view, but others are closer to the second.

Casanova (2012, 192) is faced with the same issue when analyzing the work of Bellah on the same topic:

> Is our modern global secular age the teleological unfolding of potentials implicit in the Axial breakthroughs, namely the full crystallization of Axial "theoretic" culture? Or does modernity constitute a post-Axial secular

> breakthrough of its own? … Bellah himself has offered somewhat ambiguous responses to some of these questions ….

This book, unfortunately, cannot adequately provide an outcome to this debate and acknowledges its limitation to posing certain questions.

The other path of inquiry is focused on current social and cultural changes as exemplified by the work of Berger et al. (2008), among others. This more synchronistic application has been used to differentiate various regions of the world (e.g. to differentiate the USA from Europe). Indeed, the modernity created in Europe and in the USA were different (Casanova 2006; Davie 2006). Contrast between the USA and Europe is instructive; both have gone through modernization processes, but the effects on the way religion is approached have been very different. Earlier in her work, Davie (2002) put Europe and the USA at the extremes of a continuum. She described the European experience in terms of state or elite control of religion (in which there is a culture of obligation, such as going to church because one must) and the American experience as one of religious voluntarism (in which there is a culture of consumption or choice). Davie (2002) observed that, on this continuum between religious obligation and religious voluntarism, Europe is slowly shifting toward voluntarism. Along this same continuum, Australia and Canada are hybrid cases (Possamai 2008). These observations are notable for drawing attention to the different cultures of these countries/regions and the effects of culture upon belief and non-belief. Specifically, Davie points to varied cultures of individualism, palpable in an age of neo-liberalism, and to how different cultures of individualism generate different national patterns of belief, adherence, and commitment.

In *Rethinking Secularization* (2006), Casanova traces how the development of modernity in Europe was informed by secularism. There was a move away from religion toward the emancipation of reason which would, in turn, lead to progress. In contrast, in the USA, "there was 'collusion' between religion and the secular differentiated spheres" (Casanova 2006, 11). This is explained by the fact that when the USA modernized, it did not have to go through a European process of secular differentiation which involved conflict with an established church. For example, the French Enlightenment was anti-clerical and openly anti-Christian, whereas the American Enlightenment was not. To summarize this point, Casanova (2006, 14) states:

> Traditions are forced to respond and adjust to modern conditions, but in the process of reformulating their traditions for modern contexts, they also help to shape the particular forms of modernity.

Variations of modernity were also exported and expanded around the world and were received in different ways. If some countries were eradicating religion from their public sphere to fit this mold (e.g. Kemal's Turkey), others were trying to keep religion, but within the modernist ethos (e.g. Malaysia). If, in the twentieth century, modernization equated to secularization, in the twenty-first century, as is argued below, modernization might be on a par with religious accommodation, or even revivalism.

These national and cross-national movements are not homogeneous or simply global; they follow distinctive patterns and specific "paths" within and across nations. As processes of secularization and de-secularization will be different in different parts of the world, the same goes for the types of nation-states on offer. Indeed, as Arjomand (2010) and Michel and Jaffrelot (this volume) remind us, the organization and institutional components of nation-states will be different in different regions of the world, and will change with time. The theory of multiple modernities sheds new light on the specificities of the phenomenon. It allows us to take dual paths when analyzing religion, nationalism and transnationalism; we can study these movements both diachronically (even before the advent of so-called globalization) and synchronically. As Spohn (2003, 281) states:

> … the contemporary rise of religious and ethnic nationalism is part of multiple modernization processes in different world regions, multiple constellations of nation-state formation and democratization as well as religious change and secularization in different civilizations in the present global era.

Multiple Modernities as Not so Multiple and Religion as Becoming Standardized

Casanova (2011, 263) argues that the theory of multiple modernities does not envision the global expansion of modern traits

> as a process of homogenization or convergence that would lead to a single world society or global civilisation. Rather, common modern traits or principles

> attain multiple forms and diverse institutionalizations in various historical contexts. … there is both a civilization of modernity and the continuous transformation of the pre-modern historical civilizations under modern conditions which themselves help to shape the multiple modernities. There is no single pattern of modernity.

One should not, however, ignore the fact that a specific type of modernity has collapsed and is no longer part of this multitude of modernities: communism, a modern regime of a special type, as Eisenstadt (2003, 926) has written. Left without the "second world," the "first world" has been able to develop, globally, its neo-liberal ideology which allows various regions to be "modern," but only as long as the market is free. Within the theory of multiple modernities, there is a tendency to express cultural diversity in our global world, but this illusion of equality often fails to address asymmetries of power (Thomassen 2010).

Eisenstadt (2003, 934) has already argued his point in order to balance this view. He argued that the market ideology is indeed winning over the world, but that different types of political economic strategies (e.g. how to deal with the market, state regulation and intervention, and welfare structure) will be different across regions and reflect different types of modernity.

While we agree with him that European or Western modernity is not the only *real* modernity, but is one of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2003, 977), there are nevertheless around the world today some trends toward standardization. We will detail the standardization of religion thesis to illustrate that even if modernities are plural, religions are becoming more and more singular.

Standardization, as effected by the global market, has been strongly linked to a dominant culture emerging from North American Protestantism. Brunkhorst (2011) claims that Protestant sects are still today the avant-garde of capitalism and that neo-fundamentalism and other religions follow in their tracks. This observation is elaborated by Roy (2008), who writes about the Protestantization of religion to explain this phenomenon. A French sociologist, Roy argues that while Islam and Buddhism have been "Protestantized," Christianity has been "Buddhinized" (e.g. through engagement with the practice of meditation, or Christian yoga in which "Yahwey" is used instead of Eastern mantras (Einstein 2008)). When we see expressions such as "halal McDonald's" or "Mecca Cola," we might wonder who has won over the consumer—*Shari'a* or fast food

culture (Roy 2008). As the religious market is deregulated, we see the homogenization of its products, with the individual free to choose a religious product that he or she believes is worth "purchasing."

As another example, Niculescu (2013) researched Buddhism, pop culture, and contemporary metamorphoses in American Judaism and found that, since the 1970s, the Jewish Renewal Movement has attempted to reclaim Jewish individuals who have "gone over" to Buddhism and other Eastern and alternative spiritualties. This movement has led to some blending between religions, such as infusing Chassidism and Kabbalah with elements of Buddhism, Hinduism, Sufism, and shamanism. Since the 1990s, we have seen new hybrids such as New Age Judaism, Jewish shamanism, Jewish mindfulness and Jewish yoga. In Niculescu's case study, it was not evident that religious pluralization leads to diversification; instead, *rapprochement* between religious elements suggests a standardization process. A case study by Kaplan and Werczberger (2015) noted a similar trend in Israel where, as traditional religions decline and alternative spiritualities proliferate, these authors discovered some activities among the middle class aiming to revitalize Jewish life by "New Aging" it.

Although this *rapprochement* or standardization is currently happening at a global level, it can be argued that it began within the USA. Joas (2008, 27) explains how US Protestants have influenced other religious communities over time, quoting G.K. Chesterton, who commented a century ago that "in America, even the Catholics are Protestants." In an unregulated market, monopolies emerge, and this is evident in the Protestantization process.

As religions become more and more standardized, the ways modernities deal with religions will become less "multiple." Just as there are differences in the ways in which diverse types of modernity regulate markets, so there will be differences, to a greater or lesser degree, with regard to religions.

Structure of the Book

The aim of this book is to highlight the variety in historical and contemporary relationships among religions, nationalism, and transnationalism. It must be noted that the theory of multiple modernities is used both as an introduction and conclusion to this book, as it serves to link the chapters but that not all chapters address this theory specifically.

This book is divided into two parts. The first part, "Historical Analysis," explores some historical cases of the relationship between religion and the nation in a supranational setting, long before the advent of globalization. For example, in "Contribution to a Socio-history of the Relations between 'Nation' and 'Religion': The Case of Catholicism" (Chap. 2), Patrick Michel argues that the Nation has been central to the modernization process since the nineteenth century. While strongly impacting on the social and the political spheres by attempting to remove religion, it has become, paradoxically, an object of sacralization. This created a new type of "civil religious" enchantment which greatly affected the Nation's social diversity and produced a narrative of "sameness." Today, this fiction of "sameness" cannot face the reality of globalization and pluralism. In this chapter, Michel explores various forms of resistance to this global process by focusing on the paradoxical relations between the Catholic Church and the Nation.

In Chap. 3, "'La Farina del Diavolo': Transnational Migration and the Politics of Religious Liberty in Post-war Italy," Mark Hutchinson offers a revisionist approach to the study of global Pentecostalism, using Italy as a case study. For Hutchinson, the current rise in interest in transnational Pentecostalism in Italy tends to focus upon contemporary refugees and migrant communities, and does not always take into account the longer history of Protestantism in this country. This chapter describes a particular event in 1952, when Italian Pentecostals were in conflict with the Council of State and the Democristiano government, over issues of defascistization and the legacy of the Italian liberal-democratic tradition. Hutchinson analyzes how the Pentecostal communities were suppressed under the Fascist regime, and the mechanisms of political power within the Italian nation. His chapter reminds us that religions created during modernity, such as Pentecostalism, did not wait for globalization to become transnational.

Saïd Arjomand moves to another part of the world in Chap. 4, "Persianate Islam and Its Regional Spread." He argues that the civilizational zone that expanded in the Islamic era had at its base the Persian language. It was used as the *lingua franca* in not only what is present-day Iran, but also as far as Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Arjomand sees in this Persianate world a cultural and civilizational unity which was based on the revival of the Persian language, especially through the translation of the major commentary of the Qur'an and the exegesis of Imam Maturidi in the tenth century. Later in the eleventh century,

with the growing importance of Persian Sufi texts, Arjomand claims that a distinct Persianate variant of Islam emerged in this civilizational zone. Through a civilization analysis, this chapter then discusses the spread of the Persianate world to India in the thirteenth century, to the Malay sultanate in the fifteenth century, and to other parts of Asia.

In Part II, the book moves to more contemporary cases in a global and post-communist world. For example, with Enzo Pace's Chap. 5, "Charisma as a Transnational Enterprise," we discover that African Pentecostalism is not practiced exclusively in Africa. As African migrants move into, for example, Europe, many of them import their specific religious interpretations. Through his empirical research in Nigeria, Ghana, and Italy, Pace claims that African Pentecostalism is a socio-religious innovation that has spread around the globe. This is a radical departure from the classical church model. The strong focus of this group on charismatic religious leadership is seen by the author as a type of transnational "company" or religious "enterprise." Studying the migration processes, he has discovered in his fieldwork a high mobility in individual religious choices and an observable fluidity across the boundaries of religious affiliation. Pace concludes his chapter by commenting that these new African churches that are transplanted into Europe contribute to the weakening of the traditional boundaries of Eurocentric Christianity. Another effect of this specific transnational process is a loosening of the link between national identity and belonging to a Christian denomination.

In Chap. 6, "Islam, Ethno-nationalism and Transnational 'Faith Community' in Kyrgyzstan," Aurélie Biard discovers that the opening of the Soviet borders in the 1990s has had an impact on the import of new foreign Muslim religious models, especially Sunnī Muslim, into Central Asia. The aim of Biard's chapter is to discuss the contradictory types of uses and re-uses of Islam by various actors in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. In this context of political "disenchantment" and economic slump, this religion appears to be instrumentalized as a social and cultural resource. This chapter delves first into attempts made by the Kyrgyz political authorities to promote a type of local Islam. In this process, all pan-Islamist dimensions are sidelined in order to support a specific Kyrgyz national identity. Afterwards, through the case study of the Tablighi Jama'at movement, this chapter examines the impact of global forms of Islam on the construction of post-Soviet national identities. The Tablighi Jama'at movement, as it is known in Urdu (Jama'at at-Tabligh in Arabic), aims at integrat-

ing the "born again" individual, supposedly freed of traditional affiliations (family, lineage, and so on) into a genuine "community of faith," which is not limited by a nation-state. This is an example of Kyrgys narratives of re-Islamization or of a second conversion to Islam which gives cultural support to neo-fundamentalist and transnational movements.

Chapter 7, "Multiple Modernities and Political Millenarianism: Dispensational Theology, Nationalism and American Politics," by Bryan S. Turner, contends that there is an argument developed from Alexis de Tocqueville through Jose Casanova that Christianity has not only taken an important place in the founding myths of American society, such as those that present America as the First New Nation and the Israel of the New World, but is also an important component of today's American politics. Turner discusses the discourses of the Moral Majority and the Tea Party. His chapter looks at the millenarian narratives of American political culture and covers the dispensational theology of the nineteenth century, and the "unusual relationship" between evangelical Protestantism and modern Judaism as reflected in the American foreign policy toward the Middle East. The chapter presents a reading of the gathering of the Jews as a sign of the end of times, and a nationalist reading of American exceptionalism (specifically illustrated in the foreign policy of George W. Bush, which was influenced by this eschatology). Turner concludes that American foreign interests concerning Israel and the Arab countries have been molded by a nationalist interpretation of America as a key society with a mission to engage with the crisis in the Middle East, and to follow a millenarian theology.

In Chap. 8, "From Holy Sites to Web Sites: Hindu Nationalism, from Sacred Territory to Diasporic Ethnicity," Christophe Jaffrelot highlights a paradox in Hinduism. For Jaffrelot the Hindu nationalists have a strong attachment to their national territory, so much so that they interpret it as sacred (*punya bhoomi*). This ideology is in contrast with their transnational development across the globe that sees Hindus of the diaspora as members of the national community, even if they are not citizens of India. This contradiction has been carried by the Hindutva movement since the 1920s. The chapter focuses on the specificities of this ethno-religious nationalist discourse and on how it relates to the Hindu diaspora.

In Chap. 9, "God Is Argentine and so Is the Pope! Catholicism, Popular Culture and the National Imagination," Eloísa Martín argues that in the last decade, conflicts between the Church and the State have reduced the traditional influence of Catholicism, as a quasi-state religion,

on the Argentine Government. However, since the election of Pope Francis in 2013, the relation between the Catholic Church and the State in Argentina has changed. The government praises the fact that it has now an "Argentinean Pope." This has led to a new symbolism for this Pope which has merged with the Argentine national culture. Indeed, the media and other forms of popular expression (e.g. graffiti, jokes, cartoons, and montages on Facebook) highlight a new turn in the relationship between the sacred and the national. The link between soccer, nationalism, and the Pope provides for this chapter a well-developed case study of the re-emergence of the interrelation between nationalism and religion.

The final chapter, "Branding of Spiritual Authenticity and Nationalism in Transnational Sufism," by Milad Milani, Adam Possamai and Firdaus Wajdi, explores two transnational Sufi orders, the Naqshbandi and the Nimatullahi, in Australia and Indonesia. This study, based on fieldwork in Sydney, Melbourne and Jakarta, discovers that these transnational movements have also strong local identities. This chapter contrasts these two groups in two different national contexts exploring issues dealing with religion, consumerism, nationalism by proxy, and transnationalism. It uses Mara Einstein's theories on the "branding" of faith in order to understand the "branding" of nationalism in religious groups.

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CHAPTER 2

Contribution to a Socio-History of the Relations Between "Nation" and "Religion": The Case of Catholicism

Patrick Michel

Introduction

"All individuals, all nations, cultures and civilizations have their own part to play and their own place in God's mysterious plan and in the universal history of salvation."[1] In his 1985 *Slavorum Apostoli*, Pope John Paul II evidenced the status accorded to the "nation" by the Holy See—that of a link in the chain, which ties man to civilization. The order in which these concepts were enumerated is not devoid of significance. While putting nations and cultures in a subordinate position, as intermediaries, the Pope located civilization at the end of the chain, as if civilization was to maintain a special relationship with religion or even to merge with it.

From a more down-to-earth perspective, religion and nation are intimately involved in the reshaping of legitimacy, that is to say, in the successive (and partially overlapping) attempts at reordering existing systems of beliefs, as well as in the institutionalization of religion. These multiple

P. Michel (✉)
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique et Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France

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changes have allowed beliefs to remain connected to fluid realities and to inhabit them, if not to transform them. Therefore, the reshuffled couple "religion–nation" deserves to be investigated if one wishes to explore the contemporary redeployments of these complex configurations. Over the course of history, a kind of legitimacy based on divine right has been replaced with a legitimacy associated with the nation, which was produced by and epitomized in the advance of modernity. However, from the outset, this new legitimacy was ambivalent. It was simultaneously a privileged instrument of modernization (*id est* of disenchantment) *and* an instrument thanks to which enchantment was perpetuated in a new form. This explains why the nation-based legitimacy also offered a privileged site for the refusal of modernity. The proclamation of the nation as sovereign lay at the center of the transition to modern politics and polity. Although this new source of legitimacy was sacralized nearly everywhere, its promotion made space for the perpetuation of the previous source of political authority, which was based on transcendence (and therefore on enchantment).

This endeavor to perpetuate enchantment has taken one main guise, that of an attempt to forcibly—albeit fictitiously—homogenize societies in order to produce "sameness". While the ascent of the nation reflected an increase in social and institutional differentiation in line with the logic of modernity, the national framework managed to prevail in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe through the (re)production of undifferentiation, often at the cost of multifaceted violence.

At a time when social actors are witnessing the transition to a globalized word, a new distribution of "differentiated" and "undifferentiated" has taken shape. In this configuration, the specific contents of either "religion" or "the nation" are of little interest. What matters are the successive socio-political operationalizations of these contents and, even more so, the ways in which they have acquired credibility. Between "religion" and "the nation," the focus should not be on the relationship *per se* but on what it tells us about societies' responses to today's movements. Religion needs to be considered as an intermediate object, not as an object relevant for its own sake. Once adequately contextualized, the analysis of religious matters may shed light on developments that are associated with, but not subsumed under, religion.

Religion and Nation: A Relationship Far from Being Univocal

Nation and religion both tend to resist attempts at definition. Some authors have even suggested that the definitions of religion resembled a Tower of Babel (Lambert 1991, 73–85). One might rightfully use a similar image to speak of the idea of nation. In the early twentieth century, eminent social scientists admitted that they were perplexed when faced with this notion. As Durkheim put it, "the concept of the nation is beyond doubt a mystical, an obscure idea."[2] As in the case of religion, attempts to define the nation have gravitated toward the two poles. At one pole, primordial definitions of the nation border on essentialism. At the other, scholars opt for various shades of functionalism. The nation does not easily lend itself to unified definitions, for any such definition leans toward decontextualization.[3] Since it was originally coined, the notion has evolved at the intersection between complex, and at times contradictory, logics. More precisely, the nation was intended by its very political and intellectual promoters to embody and to reconcile conflicting logics, while allowing them to retain their own dynamics.

A renewed form of legitimacy, the nation imposed itself in the nineteenth century as a new framework of collective identification and a political frame more in tune with modernity. Its promotion occurred alongside the destruction of previous constituent markers of traditional identities (both collective and individual) and the erosion of imperial logics. Thereby, the nation became a privileged site for those who wished to explore symbols, identity, and politics and, more importantly, to conceptualize their articulation.

Nationalism, meanwhile, appeared on European soil as a kind of "in-between." It embodied the gap that existed between the initial ambitions (and the original meanings) of "national movements" and the concrete realities produced by the instrumentalization of the mobilizing powers of the national idea in the service of the state. To put it otherwise (and to cut a long story short!) nationalism emerged as a social phenomenon because Cavour obviously failed to create the Italian state that Mazzini had dreamed of; because Bismarck, far from achieving German unity, used the existence of diffuse aspirations to unification among the general public to pursue the historical rise of Prussia,[4] and, perhaps most importantly, because Napoleon III never championed the rights of nationalities. Each in his own way, Cavour, Bismarck, and Napoleon placed

references to the nation at the heart of strategies designed to induce and to legitimize a reconfiguration of extant orders. The nation was a device used to promote and sanction specific kinds of political order. References to the nation also played a key role in the development of a European movement.

Gellner's argument is well known: nations do not produce nationalism. Rather, nationalism fosters the creation of nations (Gellner 1989). But, as Mahieddin (2014) notes, "nations are not as homogenizing, homogenized, and unitarian as the nationalist discourse claims they are. Ambivalent and conflicting, they are less territorial and contiguous areas of consensus than symbolic and fragmented spaces of dissent as far as their definition and their future themselves are concerned." The point observers tend to miss is that the kind of nations that nationalism produces tends to be fairly nationalistic. When scholars lament the "return of the nations," they are, in fact, depicting a revival of nationalism. However, subsumption of one phenomenon by the other might raise analytical problems. Each notion should be clearly distinguished, as the Polish historian Geremek rightly argued as early as 1989. At the time, he invited Western observers not to fear "nations" but rather "nationalisms."

The relationship between religion and nation is far from being univocal. In history, this couple has come in many guises. Let us consider the "religion vs. nation" variant. A telling example is that of Pope Pius IX and his *Syllabus* (1864). In the eyes of the Pope, both the nation and political modernity pertain to this *libertas perditionis*, this senseless endeavor to build a world emancipated from God, denounced by St. Augustine as well as by Louis Veuillot. Symmetrically, "the nation" has often been opposed to religion. From France's Third Republic to Kemal's Turkey, from Germany's *Kulturkampf* to Bourguiba's policies at the dawn of the Tunisian independence (with its lay overtones), there are many examples of the political construction of a tension aiming at predicating the progress of the nation upon an effort to contain religion. In France, the Catholic Church was turned into a symbol of what had to be overcome, and the Republic into the vector of this process. Thereby, coincidence between the Republic and the nation, which had long been pursued, was achieved.

There are also numerous examples of situations where "religion" was placed in "the service of the nation," as evidenced, for instance, by the mobilization of Catholicism for the purpose of building a "Croatian national identity" in the 1990s. We may also recall the role earlier played by Catholicism as a "central socio-cultural operator" on the Polish scene

(to borrow Krzysztof Pomian's expression). This configuration may well be reversed. In such cases, "the nation [is placed] in the service of religion." It serves a higher purpose that only few enlightened prophets are able to reveal. The Russian philosopher Soloviev wrote, for example, that "although deprived of its political independence, Poland has not perished. It perseveres in its national vocation, which has often included a theocratic component, albeit in a distorted form. Introduced mainly within the Russian Empire, the Poles do not want and cannot melt away into the Russian sea because not content to build their own national unity, they represent a spiritual idea—that of Catholicism."[5]

Moreover, the relationship between nation and religion cannot be approached independently of the environment in which it operates. For example, the Italian nation that the Catholic Church defends in the late twentieth century, establishing itself as the last bastion of the Unity, and as its guarantor, is not the nation that condemned this same Church in the middle of the nineteenth century. Gian Enrico Rusconi welcomed the "firm" position of the Church in front of or against the League, but he immediately added: "The Church has combined its pastoral concerns … with the fear of a socio-political situation that its organizational structures would be no longer able to control."[6] And indeed, if Rusconi could be satisfied with the support of the Catholic Church, his intent was not, unlike that of the latter, to defend the fiction of Italian Unity, but to plead for its passing, and to build a political identity that would be released from this fiction.

We are witnessing the end of the nation-state cycle. Stating this is not underestimating the difficulty of rebuilding political benchmarks in this part of Europe, freed (or orphaned) from the reference to communism. This is also not prophesying for tomorrow the collapse of nations—we still have kings and queens today, long after the end of the cycle of monarchy by divine right. It is simply to say that the nation-utopia, which was the privileged instrument of calling into question an "order," has been successively replaced by an institutional nation-religion[7]—an official worship—and then by a highly secularized nation, facing indifference, to which "we belong without believing," to paraphrase the sociologist Davie's formula (*believing without belonging*), which she uses to describe the attitude of the contemporary British vis-à-vis religion (Davie 1996).

This change may seem difficult to accept. Hermet, a French political scientist, was concerned after the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe to see "the Czechs, Hungarians, becoming foreign to what they

are," and "Poles resigned not to confuse faith with nationality" (Hermet 1996, 281). Eschewing the (abysmal) task of trying to identify "what" the Czechs and Hungarians[8] "are" in order to measure their new foreignness in relation to this ontological reference, we can observe that the very idea of a "Polish resignation" actually says more about the author's social representations than about Polish dynamics. It is true that Hermet stood in good company, finding Chateaubriand, Lamennais, Michelet, or, in his way, Jarry, in the construction of a purely imaginary Poland allowing all projections.[9]

The problem, of course, is that this Poland has little to do with the real one. One can remember, from this perspective, the outcome of the 1993 parliamentary elections or the 1995 presidential elections, which were widely reported, even in Poland, as sanctioning the Church's pretensions to maintaining, on a pluralist scene, a purely operative centrality acquired in the time of communism. Concerning more precisely the relationship between Catholicism and national identity, in 1997 Nowicka published a very interesting study where in she commented on the results of several surveys. Asked the question, "What do you think makes someone a Pole?" only 9.2 percent of respondents felt that the Catholic faith was very important; 17.1 percent felt that it was somewhat important, 19.1 percent not very important, and 41.1 percent not important at all. More significantly perhaps, for the question, "On what condition does a foreigner become a Pole?" the answer "being Catholic" was in the ninth (and penultimate) position, with only 1.3 percent of respondents regarding this as the most important condition, and the largest number of respondents, 30.3 percent, regarding this as the least important condition (Nowicka 1997). More recently, the anti-clerical party, launched in 2011 by Janusz Palikot, who came from PO (center-right Liberal), won 10 percent of the votes in parliamentary elections in that year. Pro-abortion, pro-same-sex marriage, pro-European, this party campaigned on progressive positions and declared itself in favor of a strict separation between Church and State.[10]

The Contemporary Uses of Religion

It is significant, in this respect, that the contemporary uses of religion in the political field are all based upon a reference to tradition. Recent mobilizations in France against "marriage for all" have amply evidenced this phenomenon. But as Certeau has noted, this political use of religion

expresses a general uneasiness and unveils something that otherwise would have stayed in the dark (de Certeau 1973). Should we then say that "it's all about religion," or should we rather say that it's about the way religion is being used to reject a development that seems to dissolve individual and collective identities? Is the contemporary demand for religion, as the alleged keeper of tradition and of the myth of origin, not a strategy to save these individual and collective identities?

What is fundamentally at stake here, and what explains the call for religion as the emblematic part of a whole, is the exhaustion of a certain identification mode linked to the nation-state, and the growing evidence of plurality replacing the fiction of a homogenous society. This plurality is induced by a permanent implantation on European soil of populations having roots in other parts of the world; as time goes by and generations succeed each other, these populations identify themselves increasingly as "French" (or "German," "Italian," and so on) *and as "European."* It was in reference to this reality that Eco evoked, as one plausible scenario for the twenty-first century, the concomitant end of a Europe of nation-states and of a "white" Europe. Speaking about this "coloured Europe," Eco added that he was "not thinking (or not only) about the colour of skin: maybe there will also be 'coloured' religions." "Why not," he went on asking, "a Sunni Christianity, an Anglican Avicenism, or a Buddhist Sufism?" (Carrière et al. 1998, 315).

The challenge therefore lies in this dialectic between homogeneity and heterogeneity, which is at work today and which underpins the European debate. It applies particularly to the problem of contemporary identities, which are fuzzy, moving, plural, and therefore potentially seen as "uncertain." But little progress will take place concerning the understanding of these identities according to what Debray obviously wants to believe: that "religion becomes an identity card" (Debray 2003).

In a period marked by the strong distortion between the time of rapid change (visible) and the time of slow change (more difficult to see and imagine), the religious actually appears to be perpetually used to serve as a vector of adjustment. This vector is basically neutral, as hard as that is to accept for all the supporters of an essentialist reading of religion as a whole, or of one specific confession. Taking a position *vis à vis* the movement can mean accompanying it (and providing religious resources to justify and even to celebrate it) or refusing it (the religious being erected in a privileged space of a call to tradition invented for this purpose—and presented as *the* tradition). It is not a matter of condemning this or that

modality of the movement, but the movement itself, in that it is seen as undermining all stabilities. Or, finally—which is perhaps the most common situation—one can take a position "taming" the movement, by slowing it down, flattening it, translating it, in order to make it assimilable in the very categories of tradition.

We can clearly see the first two configurations, in which religion is either no longer a justification of violence or, conversely, asserts itself as such. Opposing the conception advocated by the Dalai Lama ("Notions like 'my nation,' 'your nation,' 'my religion,' 'your religion' have become secondary. We have to insist, on the contrary, that the other is equal to us. This is humanity!"), we find political re-uses of religion which render it a radical reading, aimed at legitimizing absolutized identities, and thus "loopholes," in the words of Maalouf (2001).

It is less clear, however, how to figure out the meaning of the third configuration. It is worth emphasizing here how the fascination for Islamism can lead to obscuring the reality of processes that play through and across Islam. If, as Cesari said in her study of French Muslims, "investments in Islam [by the *banlieue* youth] actually reveal a quest for identity that crosses the entire French youth," then Islam can be a tool for the sociopolitical integration of young Muslims (César 2000, 63).

Renewed Relations Between "Nation" and "Religion"

As they experience acute awareness of the progress of globalization, nations become an identification register among others. Nations are questioned at three levels: as a source of legitimacy (we are moving away from the era of the "same" to that of plural identifications), as a political spring (the relevance of the national space is questioned both from below and from above), and as a community (applying "closed" membership criteria is becoming increasingly challenging). But this prospect raises many resistances. Hence, we see the emergence of political entrepreneurs who position themselves as defenders of the nation as a stable reference (this reference is characterized by its ability to be reinvented in the very process of being shielded from changes), who denounce higgledy-piggledy *metissage* and make-do, and who stigmatize the process of individualization underpinning practices of mixing. In this situation, the relationship between "nation" and "religion" now appears in new clothes. Religion may

constitute a register, a space, and a vector for the continued relevance of the nation or for its superseding.

Religion is able to confirm and to perpetuate the relevance of the nation because religion establishes the validity of the closed criteria used to define the nation. Contemporary societies are facing a multifaceted transformation process, which breaks references, redistributes relations to space and time, questions identities, and shakes any stability. It's no surprise, therefore, that all of these mutations lead to the invention of a new "Other," to be used in this situation as a reference.

There are several reasons explaining why "the Arab" (and more generally "the Muslim") has become the negative reference in which all European fears are mirrored. One is the new visibility of pluralism, due to the massive presence of Islam (this explains the French law against "ostensible signs" or the Swiss vote on minarets), defying the fictive homogeneity upon which rested the nation-state. In this respect, it doesn't make any difference to say that, in Europe, Islam intervenes basically as a resource employed to redraw the lines of a stable identity; that is, a temporarily stabilized identity, an identity serving to negotiate with a host-society which seems more inaccessible the closer you come to it. All recent research conducted in different European countries (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium and Italy) shows that for the overwhelming majority of immigrants coming from Muslim countries, Islam is a precious resource in terms of integration into the new society. If we were to draw ultimate conclusions from this observation, we could take up a phrase of Poliakov's, saying that the difference between a Catholic and a Jew is that the Catholic no longer goes to the church, while the Jew no longer goes to the synagogue, and we would say that a Muslim is someone who no longer goes to the mosque—or will cease to go to in the future. Religious practice among French Muslim immigrants, be they second- or third-generation immigrants, is much less prevalent than among the children and grandchildren of Portuguese immigrants.

Still, Islam is generally not perceived as the vehicle of a "silent revolution" of integration of the overwhelming majority, but rather as the banner of a violent revolution conducted by a small minority. Even the idea that Islam is used in an ideological and instrumental way seems sometimes hard to admit. And those who warn against the Islamic "danger" to national cohesion, national identity, and national culture are rarely contested; rarely do we hear someone responding to this by saying that these

warnings say more about those who spread them than about the reality they pretend to describe. Rarely do we hear someone saying that these ideas reveal the fears and secret intentions of those who defend them. In his letter to diocesans, from September 12, 2000, the archbishop of Bologna, Cardinal Biffi, warned of two major threats to Italian society: "the constant inflow of populations coming from distant and different countries," and "the diffusion of a non-Christian culture among the Christian population." Society is defined here using criteria of a stable identity, and the reference to Catholicism plays a central role. The victory, in the Polish parliamentary elections on October 25, 2015, of Jarosław Kaczynski's Law and Justice Party (PiS) shares the same logic, articulating anti-European rhetoric, anti-migrant (and anti-Muslim) discourse, and the promise to "bring back the values of Catholicism in Poland" (Kowalski 2015, 8). It is true that shortly after September 11, the Primate Glemp warned, from the same perspective, against the dangers Muslim immigration would pose to Polish identity. And Radio Maryja's objective is still a re-Catholicization of the Poles, which inevitably means a disqualification of the Jews, ex-communists, and other Freemasons—Father Jankowski, of Gdansk, was able to assert that "the Jews have no right to represent the nation," without being condemned by the Church or by politicians. The religious appears central in the management of political disenchantment. The Church intervenes—religion is invoked—to slow pluralization, that is to say, to perpetuate a reading of reality where in the public space is conceived as a total space, undifferentiated, and where the Other's "citizenship" is questioned. This tends to vindicate those who claim that, in the final analysis, "the only 'unity' that is noticeable in Europe is that of fear, of everything that Europe is not—without exception: the Islamist 'integrism,' immigration, 'totalitarianism,' the collapse of the socialist states, China, the United States … Europe is a constant and absurd management of fear" (Badiou 1993).

Although religion may be used to reiterate the relevance of the nation, the purpose of those who resort to it may well be to move beyond the nation. This configuration needs to be seen in connection with the progress of globalization and in a context where the market of symbolic goods has become increasingly competitive. The system put in place by John Paul II was based on the coupling of the unending assertion of a unique central truth, that of *Splendor veritatis*, and its adjustment to the diversity of local realities through the Pope's travels. This resulted in a constant movement back and forth between the center and the periphery, feeding

continual transactions. The massive use of canonization and beatification, initiated by Pope John Paul II and continued by his successors, participates in this movement when local authorities/religious entrepreneurs and believers are likely to benefit from getting a "blessed" or a "saint" of their own. In the process, the Vatican is able to reaffirm its centrality. One example is provided by the opening, in 2005, of the cause of beatification of the "Father of Independence" and first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere Kambarage (1922–1999). Fouéré has analyzed this case, in which the state "tends to lose its legitimacy to produce an imaginary of the nation" because of "the inability of elites to realize the hopes raised by democratization and economic liberalization." As for the Catholic Church, its ability to monopolize the enunciation of a religious truth was being challenged by new churches, and its status as the preferred partner of the Tanzanian state was being questioned. Against this background, State and Church had a shared interest in using the "promotion of the revisited figure of Nyerere" as a symbolic resource (Fouéré 2008, 47–97).

Since Pius IX listed "the main errors of our time" in his 1864 *Syllabus* and concluded his inventory by denouncing the idea that "[t]he Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself, and come to terms with, progress, liberalism and modern civilization,"[11] and ought moreover to "make compromise with these ideas," the Church has been in a position of having to constantly renegotiate its relationship with space, time, and authority.[12] True, the arrangements put in place at the end of the nineteenth century by a Church which conceived of itself as an anti-modern alternative to modernity have been revised by John Paul II: the bracket of modernity is now supposed to be closed; hence, the Church does not need to situate itself in relation to it. However, this thesis has reached its limits. Furthermore, the acceleration of a multifaceted movement that works at and upsets all societies raises anew the question of the relationship with space and time. While Islam and Evangelical movements are still able to build a relationship to territory which suits the requirements of societies more or less suddenly drawn into globalization, the Catholic Church remains, because of its institutional logic, locked in a conception of the religious sphere of legitimacy in the world that current developments are questioning more and more. (This holds even if Francis considers that "it is not advisable for the Pope to take the place of local Bishops in the discernment of every issue which arises in their territory. In this sense [the Pope says] I am conscious of the need to promote a sound 'decentralization'").[13]

The configuration is the same when it comes to the relationship to time. In Latin America, several Indian movements have been asking the Pope to acknowledge their entitlement to a belief system of their own. Some North American observers argue that Latin America was never truly evangelized. Faced with these challenges, Benedict merely stated that "the proclamation of Jesus and of his Gospel has not, at any time, entailed the alienation of the pre-Hispanic cultures; nor could it be equated with the imposition of a foreign culture."[14] In the same vein, when considering the Evangelization of the country, the Vatican's text on the "martyrs of China" emphasizes "the desire to bring people to the light of the Gospel in order to develop further the treasures of their rich and deep cultural and religious traditions." Christianity is "seen as a reality that was not opposed to the highest values of the traditions of the Chinese people; nor was it superimposed on them. [Christianity] endowed them with a new light and a new dimension."[15] In any case, for Evangelicals as for Catholics, the reference to the nation appears purely instrumental. If the progression of neo-Pentecostalism bears testimony to the pluralization of societies, to the renewal of axiological systems in connection with the accelerated transformation thereof, and to the advances of neo-liberal globalization, the invocation of the nation among Latin American Evangelicals ("the *nación para Cristo*," the proclamation of *Jesus' para transformar the nación*) is primarily designed to disseminate a model ideologically informed. Similarly, the exaltation of specific nations through religion observed in Latin American Catholicism aims primarily to promote a "*Patria grande*" which is part and parcel of the "*Pueblo universal.*"

Highlighting the relative neutrality of contents (regardless of the register we consider—religious or national) does not entail that we deem these contents interchangeable. Each discourse is intended to provide a coherent narrative. Each of them is born of a particular context and has developed in specific situations on which it sheds light. These localized contexts help to elucidate the various elaborations and re-elaborations of existing narratives. Therefore, what is at stake is not the existence of specificities, but of a fictitious insularity which endows these specificities with unique qualities, and thus certifies their existence. In a world that is characterized by generalized movement, insularity tends no longer to exist. Correspondingly, the very notion of centrality is becoming eroded. As a result, although contents can still supply, reproduce, justify, and legitimize

the existence of specificities, they do so with an ever decreasing plausibility. They are constantly confronted with and subjected to an undeniable fact: contents are merely relative.

Notes

1. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Slavorum Apostoli*, written on the occasion of the eleventh centenary of work of Evangelization of the brother saints, Cyril and Methodius. Rome, June 2, 1985 (19), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/fr/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_19850602_slavorum-apostoli.html.
2. Emile Durkheim, *Textes III* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1975), 49. The same passage can be found at the beginning of Dominique Schnapper's *La communauté des citoyens. Sur l'idée moderne de nation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994).
3. Distinguishing a "political nation" from a "cultural nation," a nation according to Renan from a nation in the German sense, a contract-based nation, and therefore a nation based on autonomy, a nation organized by the idea of belonging, and, consequently, by heteronomy, may at some point have been relevant. In 2000, however, the German nationality code introduced a territorial principle in the definition of citizenship. Children of foreigners born on German territory, from foreign parents who were also born in Germany, and who have been living there for a long time, are now German since birth. One may wonder what has remained of the old political/cultural national binary. See https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Droit_du_sol - cite_note-21.
4. The entity born out of the process of German unification, under the aegis of Prussia, is a good example of this. The German Reich legitimized its position through the nation, by its pretension to realize and to embody it. This led to the creation of institutions apparently in phase with political modernity (the Reichstag being elected by universal suffrage). But, in reality, this entity was much more the result of the instrumentalization of a national movement in the service of the Prussian State's interests, and the product of a violence exerted on that part of German territory which did not recognize this construction. The German Chancellor—who was necessarily Prussia's Chancellor—was not responsible before the Reichstag, but before Prussia's Landtag. The latter was elected not

by universal suffrage, but according to the law of "the three classes," which gave exorbitant privileges to the Junkers. The aim was to perpetuate the legitimacy of a divine-right monarchy, along with the system that was associated with it, behind the facade of a construction relying on national rights.

5. Vladimir Soloviev, *Conscience de la Russie* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1950), 71. (The quoted text was written in 1884 and published in St. Petersburg in 1904.) In the contemporary period, the same argument can be found in Lewandowski's *Theology of the Nation*: "The Polish Nation is aware God has assigned it a double task: first, a task at home, which is relevant to it, to the members of the Nation; the second task is external, concerning the other Nations, all the divine Economy. In either case, it has general and specific roles to play. … Thanks to its identity and its individuality, it is at the service of the other Nations, complete what they do lack, and what lacks to the entire Family of Nations" (Jerzy Lewandowski, *L'Eglise et la Nation polonaise selon le cardinal Stefan Wyszynski* (Berne-Francfort/M.: Peter Lang, 1982), 158).
6. Gian Enrico Rusconi, *Patria e repubblica* (Bologne: Il Mulino, 1997), 7–8. The support the Church granted to the nation has a particular meaning. At the time of the exhaustion of the central reference to the legitimacy of divine-right monarchy and, therefore, the shift from a political landscape which tends to organize itself according to the logics linked to the nation-state and no longer according to an imperialistic logics, the Church has reorganized itself: it has extracted itself both from time (positioning itself as an instance of anticipation of the failure—purportedly unavoidable—of modernity) and space, holding its ground on a sort of extra-territoriality which would allow it to resurface everywhere and to pursue the logical conclusion of constituting the Pope into a monarch, thus breaking with the fiction of "*primus inter pares.*" See my paper, "Le dernier pape. Réflexions sur l'usage du politique sous le pontificat de Jean-Paul II," in *Tous les chemins ne mènent plus à Rome*, ed. René Luneau and Patrick Michel (Paris: Albin Michel, 1995), 390–415. The double approach, which is to reaffirm today its universality (the adoption of a universal Catechism, for the very first time since

the Council of Trent) and to defend the nation-state, would tend to indicate that the Church is aware that the world has reached a turning point in its history, and is reorganizing itself in order to face it.

7. As Gentile puts it, nationalism becomes a form of "religion" as it constitutes "a sacralization of politics which manifests itself in the modern age and asserts itself when the political dimension, *after gaining its institutional independence*, vis-à-vis traditional religion, acquires its *own religious dimension*, in the sense that it acquires an autonomous sacred dimension that allows it to claim the prerogative of defining the meaning and the ultimate goal of human life, at least on the earth, for the individual and the collective" (*Les religions de la politique. Entre démocratie et totalitarisme* (Paris: Seuil, 2005), 14).
8. The ontological task as implied would assume, moreover, that they are all *the same*, which seems far from being demonstrated.
9. Hermet is, admittedly, sometimes disconcerting in his analysis of nations and nationalism (*Histoire des nations et du nationalisme en Europe* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1996)). He finds fault with Gellner (55–56) for being more "concerned to develop a theory than shedding light on complex realities." He then produces facts which are rather in line with Gellner's theory, but this is to better put them aside by using the argument that they are associated with the Austro-Hungarian or Russian empires ("conglomerations of the most diverse populations") and proposes, therefore, to stick to Western Europe (57). Without going as far as considering Italy, Germany, or Belgium (which consideration must doubtless refer to complex realities of the Russio-Austro-Hungarian type which will consequently be discarded), he uses—without regard to the scaffolding of a theory—two examples: that of Coventry's craftsmen in 1713 (in order to reflect the frame of mind of the English masses) and that of the declaration by King Henri IV to the important figures of Lyon (the facts in line with Gellner's approach pertained, for their part, to average conscripts, poor emigrants, or peasants). Zeldin, in his *History des passions françaises*, seems to be infinitely closer than Hermet to "complex realities" when he points out, at the beginning of the first chapter (dedicated to national identity) of the second tome of his book: "In 1864, a Schools Inspector, on

a tour on the mountains of Lozère, interviewed children in a school in a village: 'In which country is situated Lozère?' Not a single pupil could answer. 'Are you English or Russian?' They could not tell" (Paris: Seuil, 1980, 5).

10. The party, which has been the victim of the excesses of its founder (attempting to remove the crosses from the compound of the Diet and other provocations), changed its name in 2013 and became "Twoj Ruch." It has been brushed off during the 2014 European elections.
11. For the text of the *Syllabus* ("Syllabus of the principal errors of our time, which are censured in the Consistorial Allocutions, Encyclical and other Apostolic Letters of our most Holy Lord, Pope Pius IX," December 8, 1864), see http://www.salve-regina.com/Magistere/PIE_IX_syllabus.htm.
12. Pope Pius IX, eager to respond to an evolution which, with the end of the *Ancien Régime*, the establishment of the nation-state, and the acceleration in the transition to industrial society, challenged in time (the Church is not "modern") and space (the Pope has no State any more) the very existence of the Church, implemented a system where in the Church, excluding itself from modernity, denounced the "senseless endeavour of the building of a world emancipated from God," according to Louis Veuillot's expression. Deprived of its own space, the Church pretends, notably though missions, to occupy all space. At least, by pontifical infallibility, the Pope granted for himself a spiritual authority of a sort none of his predecessors had enjoyed.
13. Apostolic Exhortation *Evangelii gaudium* of Pope Francis, Rome, November 24, 2013. http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/fr/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html.
14. Benedict XVI, Inaugural address of the V^{e} Conférence of the episcopate of Latin-America and the Caribbean, May 13, 2007, CELAM, *V Conferencia General del Episcopado Latinoamericano y del Caribe. Documento conclusivo*, CELAM, Bogotá, 2008, p. 8.
15. http://www.vatican.va/news_services/liturgy/saints/ns_lit_doc_20001001_zhao-rong-compagni_fr.html.

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CHAPTER 3

"La Farina del Diavolo": Transnational Migration and the Politics of Religious Liberty in Post-War Italy

Mark Hutchinson

Myths—Professional and Popular

It is not an exaggeration to say that much of the social science literature on religious transnationalism is not well rooted in historical context. In part, this is because of (a somewhat mutual) boundary-keeping between historians and social scientists, in part because of divergent disciplinary and publishing approaches (Knudsen and Gram-Skjoldager 2014), and in part because the self-narratives of transnational actors are often held in forms which are oral in nature, and so are opaque to students of the past. As Greer notes, the procrustean national ethos of much historiography

The original version of this chapter was read at the "Religion, Nation(alism) and Transnationalism Symposium," July 9, 2014, University of Western Sydney. The title comes from a reference by Giorgio Spini in an article in the *azionista* journal, *Non Mollare*, on December 7, 1945. It is a traditional saying, which, in full, reads, "La farina del diavolo va tutta in crusca" (The flour of the devil ends only in chaff [bran]), indicating that mixed motivations produce unpredictable ends.

M. Hutchinson (✉)
Western Sydney University, NSW, Australia

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continues to exert a powerful influence on a wide range of subjects (Greer 2010, 696). In this setting, it is possible for myths to be received as fact, by both the members and the students of transnational movements. This chapter begins with a matched pair of such myths: one held by many Italian Pentecostals themselves, of the unique, autochthonous origins of Pentecostalism in Italy; and one assumed by many social scientists, of a *recent* breaking of transnational Pentecostalism on the shores of Italy through mass migration from the global south.

Myth is sustained because its narratival form flows easily across, and gives form to, the various globalizations in which people are caught up (see Adedibu 2013). What is often overlooked in the literature on the *new* Pentecostalism in Italy (Pace and Butticci 2010) is the fact that there was a *previous* Pentecostalism—one that predated the current interaction between "religious" Africa and "secularizing" Europe, or the concept of "reverse mission", became topics of conversation. Before the current interest in the waves of refugees breaking on the shores of Lampedusa and other parts of the often forgotten Italian south (Stillman 2013), these same places were the originating points for their own global diasporas. The study of these previous Pentecostalism(s), it is suggested here, demonstrates much about the Italian society which is dealing with the current issues, and which acts in many instances as the framework onto which new African, Asian, and Latino Pentecostalisms have more recently "bolted" themselves. Closer attention to the history of Protestantism in Italy indicates, indeed, that the concept of reverse mission is probably a poor one, suggesting a mobile world speaking back to essentialist nation-states, when, in fact, those nation-states have themselves long been at the core of reticulating diasporas, out of which voices have spoken back to Europe.[1] There are many such cases: the particular case studied here is one which has had significant impacts on the nature of Pentecostalism in Italy and demonstrates much about how the Italian state was formed.

Italia Diasporica e Protestante

Contingent on the turbulent emergence of the transnational order through the nineteenth century, Italy was "the departure point of the largest emigration from any country in recorded world history" (Fiore 2002).[2] Indeed, Fiore suggests that "Italian outbound and inbound flows of migration [are] foundational phenomena in the understanding of Italy's complex formation as a nation" (Fiore 2002, x). Formed amid wars (class,

civil, European, and global), depressions (local, continental, and global), and other "alarums," *italianità* has always been a mobile category and Italy itself an entity centered on extended webs of human mobility. What is overlooked in many studies (which preference for reasons of neatness *italianità* as authentically Catholic, and so Protestantism as an "erosive" foreign virus) (Fiore 2002, 139) is the fact that each movement back and forth across the Atlantic (and these, of course, were only part of the greater world story) was attended by a Protestantization. The first great wave of the nineteenth century was that of radicals, artists, and exiles. Many found homes in the traditional Protestant denominations and, like Agide Pirazzini, formalized the already extant connections between mobile American revivalists, English Bible Society missioners, and the "Israel of the Alps," the Waldensians. This was the first Protestantization (1880–1920): the fusion of Waldensian revivalism with elite liberal (then often masonic) Protestantism in a liberal nationalist alliance which had a powerful impact (as Giorgio Spini has noted in *Risorgimento e Protestanti*, 1998) on the early aspirations of the first Italian Republic. Just as the breaching by nationalist forces of the Porta Pia on September 20, 1870, was a culmination not just of a long political process but of "the long dream of a religious Reformation in which the liberal-national revolution found its spiritual foundations" (Spini 1998, 341), so British agencies seeking to mobilize anti-Fascist sentiment after the invasion of Sicily in 1943 discovered it mainly (as Special Operations Executive officer Malcolm Munthe recorded after the fall of Siracusa) among internationalist communists, intellectual liberals, old Protestant noble families (such as Massimo Salvadori-Paleotti), and "an ardent Waldensian Christian by the name of Marchesi 'who looked upon us as soldiers of the protestant faith militant'" (Bailey 2014, 11: 260).

This Liberal Protestant (and mainly northern) Protestantization found fertile ground in the second great exodus of the (mainly southern) Italian poor. The indigenous spiritual potentialities which this latter carried with them were captured and translated by first-wave ministers, teachers, and community leaders for mainstream (particularly Presbyterian and Methodist) American Protestant churches, resulting in significant conversions among working-class migrant peoples from New York to Chicago. There were, of course, inevitable tensions between the first and this second diasporic Protestantization: tensions of class, education, and mobility. The liberal nationalist Protestantization gave the burgeoning "little Italies" Sunday Schools, sewing classes, and mothers' groups. The spiritual poten-

tial in revivalist Waldensianism promised, but ultimately could not deliver, what the poor really wanted: independence, respect, an indigenized language of revival, a mode of direct action, and Congregationalist polity (Simpson 1916, 66). The poor would take this back to the mountains and islands of the south, gathering and directing the anti-clericalism and lay spiritualities that they found there into small gatherings of Methodist, Waldensian, and Baptist congregations.

By the time of the third Protestantization—the energization associated with Azusa Street and William Durham—there were already communities of Italian Protestants—the Chiesa dei Toscani in Chicago, attended by the Lombardi, Ottolini, and Francescon families, and the Baptist church in Naples, attended by Giuseppe Petrelli; the Baptist, and Waldensian communities in Sicily and Abbruzzo from which emerged characters such as Giuseppe Beretta and Susanna Colantonio—among which Pentecostalism could spread not as an import, but as a form of indigenous revitalization. All of these religious globalizations moved easily back and forth across the Atlantic, each wrapping itself in a story of God's present action, *il Risveglio*. Successful leaders, such as Frank Gigliotti (second wave) and Nello Gorietti (third wave), captured the energies of these various stories by acting as translators between communities, using their energies to establish new institutional forms.

The Genesis Myth of Italian Pentecostalism

Perhaps the most powerful of these self-constructive stories was the *internal* myth around which would come to cohere the *Assemblee di Dio in Italia* (or ADI), long the largest Pentecostal denomination in Italy. The basic "origin story" starts with a group of northern Italian migrants of the Chicago area becoming converted in Presbyterian, Baptist, and Christian and Missionary Alliance churches (the Chiesa dei Toscani), before being touched by the Azusa Street Revival via the "finished work" ministry of William Durham at the North Avenue Mission in Chicago.[3] This rugged group of tradesmen (mosaicists, builders, and painters), working mainly in the expanding retail architecture of *fin-de-siècle* America, took the gift of the Holy Spirit and, following divine guidance, spread the "full gospel" through Italian migrant communities west and east, almost immediately sending Giacomo Lombardi to Italy, followed by Pietro Ottolini and Luigi Francescon (Toppi 1998). They sparked a revival which spread throughout the nation, but which was crushed by the rise of Fascism and

its partner, the Vatican—an oppression which continued after the Allied invasion established a Republic in which religious freedom was honored in the breach, due to the failure of defascistization to uproot the agents and laws of the Buffarini-Guidi era. Bold apostolic leaders, such as Roman pastor Umberto Gorietti, emerged from Fascist prisons to appeal to the Assemblies of God in the USA (AGUSA), who took up their cause with the US Government, which, in turn, placed pressure on the Italian government to enact the requirement in the new Italian Constitution for religious freedom. The result was the drawing together of all the churches of the Revival into formal recognition by the Italian State in 1955 (Toppi 2004). It is a profoundly biblicized mindset, echoing the Johannine concepts such as: "The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it" (John 1: 5 NLV).

It is a story which is dualistic at its base, which is correct in its details, but fundamentally politicized in its assertions. It permits of a type of rule by particular lineages of men, exercising tight control over experiential innovation, and a catacombs Christianity fixed on the counter-Catholic religious culture of the 1950s. This control is reinforced by the fact that state recognition bestows the right to own property, pay salaries centrally, and receive funding under the State's "otto per mille" program.[4] Like many of Italy's national stories, it is a story which is Rome-centered and hierarchical. Its selectivity, however, becomes apparent when one looks at the broader archival sources.[5] In fact, the third wave (transnational Italian Pentecostalism) was much more interconnected with the previous internationalizations of Italian Protestantism than has previously been recognized. If there was, as Gilroy has pointed out, a "Black Atlantic" (Gilroy 1993), and even an indigenous "Red Atlantic" (Weaver 2014), then it would not be just mere parody to suggest that there was also a "brown Atlantic" based on circular Southern Italian migration-and-return. It was certainly a distinction made by American immigration agents who, on the immigration proformas at Ellis Island, were provided with a separate race category for "Italian (South)" (Moe 2010). This was a more mute transnational reticulation than the northern Italy of the Renaissance, culture, and the arts: it was an Atlantic of Little Italies, festas, and transported local saints which, as Reeder notes, more than doubled the annual rate of migration from Italy to the USA, peaking "around 1905-06 when over 1.5 million men and women left," more than half of them from the six provinces in the South (Reeder 2010, 23). Amid the more public and stereotyped corporate expressions of Little Italies, however, there was the

mobile self-making of Protestantization and Pentecostalism. The *Risveglio* was indeed, as the ADI myth proclaims, a specifically *Italian* thing (Toppi in Esposito 2013, 137), but perhaps not in the way that it has been intended.

Excavating Italian Pentecostalism

Reconstructing that story shares all the problems of popular cultures: the sources are mobile, oral, few and scattered. It is possible, however, to negate the "genesis myth" at key points. The foundation submovement of the myth, involving the Abbruzzese Giacomo Lombardi coming to Rome in 1908 and breaking through the opposition of the traditional Protestant churches, is undermined somewhat by the fact that he was preceded by the cyclical migration of a young woman, Susanna Colantonio.[6] Susanna was born in Chicago c. 1891, one of five children of Michele Colantonio and Fiorangela Balzano, who re-emigrated to Provincia Isernia for some years, returning again when Susanna was 15 (c. 1906). Michele brought back with him more than experience of the New World: while in America, he had been converted to the Presbyterian Church of the USA,[7] which was (like many of their coreligionists who sought more effective missions among Africans and Australian Aboriginal people) in the habit of importing Waldensian pastors to evangelize Italians.[8] A number of training centers were set up to increase the number of locally trained Italian language ministers—one at the Bible Teachers Training Institute in New York (under Agide Pirazzini, professor of Hebrew, and later father-in-law of Frank Gigliotto)[9] and another at Colgate University (under Antonio Mangano) (Mangano 1917). Dennis Barone (2010, 136) writes of the two northern diasporas, the political radicals and the mainline Protestants but, as Spini notes, in many cases the two were one. The Pirazzini family was just such an example of *garibaldini* who also featured Waldensian ministers, a fusion made possible by the combination of British Protestant liberalism and American revivalism circulating in nationalist Italian circles at the same time.[10] The church in Chicago which formed the core of their community had been founded by former *garibaldino* Michele Nardi, and pastored by revivalist Geymonat disciple, Filippo Grilli, both Waldensians. Family networks were also essential. Susanna's aunt (Sunday school director under Grilli) was Rosina Balzano, the wife of Luigi Francescon, the future leader of the first Italian Pentecostal

Church in Chicago, and the Pentecostal pioneer of Brazil.[11] So, when Michele Colantonio returned to his home town near Castellone al Volturno, he brought with him an "apostolic," proselytizing faith which split his family, but ultimately saw (Susanna later claimed) "two whole towns" converted. This was probably an exaggeration, but the fact that *something* had happened was certain. In A. B. Simpson's biography of Michele Nardi, it is noted:

> While in Naples, they received a letter from some Christians in the mountains who, while in America, had found Christ. They invited Mr. Nardi to come and see them, but as Rev. [Teofilo Gay] was going that way on some business in the interest of the Waldensians, Mr. Nardi asked him to visit them, which he did. He found a number of people there who wore the name Christian on their hats and also on their houses so that the priests would not bother them. They had evangelized the whole village, and now there is a nice church and school in that village under the Waldensian Society. (Simpson 1916, 66)

On their return to the USA, Susanna was attending Sunday school at the North Avenue Mission in Chicago, when Durham returned from Azusa Street with the Pentecostal experience. Even in her Presbyterian family, this created marginalization and conflict, and resulted in "persecution": "I was forbidden to go to church. I was told I was being hypnotized. The people were poor and had brought kitchen chairs that were broken to the mission. These were repaired by wires, etc., and I was told that there was power in those wires and that was why people fell over and went into ecstasy" (Colantonio 1945, 2). At this point, her father told her that they were going to be returning to Italy once again. When they were met by their relatives and friends, she began to preach to them from Acts 2 about "the great Later Day Outpouring of the Holy Spirit." A regular Pentecostal service was thus built over a Waldensian slab based on anti-clerical provincial foundations. She would later claim (while in itinerant ministry through the USA) that she was the "first person in Italy at this close in age of Grace to receive this wonderful endowment of power" (Colantonio 1945, 3).

Excavating the trans-Atlantic flows in this way produces a very different story to the ADI "genesis myth," in a number of ways. First, its shape is circular, and reticulative, rather than unilinear and neat. It centers not on apostolic men, but on a 15-year-old girl and the spontaneous spread

of conversion through global family networks. It builds on the impact of nineteenth-century British and American revivalism which had, since the 1860s, made considerable inroads into Italian Methodist and Waldensian circles. It is a story of a poverty-ridden south made porous through migration, rather than of a bureaucratic order centered on Rome. Most importantly, its popular nature suggests to us that if this story of New World Metropole and marginal *meridionale* village survived, then there were probably many others. We know, for example, that there were spontaneous eruptions of Pentecostal-like phenomena in Italy's south in the 1880s and 1890s.[12] It is important, therefore, to qualify the usual descriptions of even good scholars, such as Michael Di Giacomo, who introduce the subject with statements such as, "Pentecostalism among Italians began not in Italy, but in Chicago" (Di Giacomo 2011). Italian Pentecostal *church formation* commenced in Chicago, but not Italian Pentecostalism as such. As David Martin notes with regard to the Indian and South American cases, Pentecostalism starts everywhere before it starts somewhere, emerging out of the global ferment of missional Methodism, holiness, and revivalist movements (Martin 2002, 197). Largely individual and pietistic, however, the carriers were swept away on the great wave of migration which took vast numbers of Italians (by some estimates, over 9 million) to North and South America between 1860 and 1914. That, however, was not the end of the story. When they went to the USA, they met people like Nardi and Grilli, and for at least 600,000 and perhaps as many as a million of them, American experience went along with Protestantization. As early as 1895, there were "striking" strides being made by the Salvation Army and the Christian and Missionary Alliance in the lower East Side of New York, and in Chicago (Magnuson and Magnuson 2004, 129), and, around 1913, an alarmed Aurelio Palmieri claimed that there were more dedicated Italian language Protestant churches in the USA than there were dedicated *Catholic* Italian language churches (Palmieri 1918, 89). Long before these institutionalized into formal networks such as the Italian District of the AGUSA, however, the repeated and spontaneous return to, and evangelization of, local villages in the south of Italy was commonplace.[13]

Here too, the unidirectional denominational myth frays at the edges. When, in 1948, the newly born ADI was looking for a place to hold its first national convention, there were few choices: even before the 1929 Concordat and the subsequent suppression of most Pentecostal meeting places throughout Italy, there were few churches large enough to con-

tain a significant audience. The denomination's orthodox historical voice, Francesco Toppi, focuses on Rome and Naples, and brushes over the choice of Raffadali, which he describes as "the largest Pentecostal community of the period, in Raffadali (Agrigento), a marginal and uncomfortable location, though highly indicative of the rural and proletarian origins of the movement" (Toppi 2004). Raffadali, even now a relatively small *commune* split between its traditional role as a rural service center and its rather more recent development as a dormitory suburb for Agrigento, may have been (culturally, politically, socially, and geographically) marginal to Rome, but it *was* in Sicily, and Sicily was (due to its significant contribution to the Italian diaspora) the growth hub for Italian Pentecostalism. Its marginality was, of course, primarily conceptual, driven by the mental map of the world as conceived from via dei Bruzi, Rome. Raffadali, after all, was a community founded in 1925 by an illiterate laborer who, converted in the USA, returned to evangelize friends and family. But then, the entire movement was peripheral to national life, and Gorietti didn't have a lot of choices (Toppi 2006).

The fact of that marginality can be seen in the ADI's struggle for state recognition. Francesco Toppi has handed down the "orthodox" view of events in his short biography of Gorietti. Rooting his account in the Fascist oppression of the five communities of Pentecostals in Rome at the time, Toppi uses Gorietti's multiple convictions "for having facilitated banned Pentecostal meeting activities" as a *de facto* way of inferring his natural leadership of what was a very flat, fissiparous network of experiential hubs.[14] This is, of course, a form of Whig history read back from succeeding events into the period. While Toppi's account repeatedly emphasizes the superiority of Gorietti's character, the critical moment seems to have been Gorietti's involvement in the Fourth National Convention of the "Chiese Cristiane Evangeliche Pentecostali," and his subsequent appointment from this putative national body to the "Comitato per la distribuzione dei Soccorsi in Italia" (Italian Aid Committee). The impact of this sort of body was significant on a post-war Italy in which a highly fragmented political left and center were scrambling to organize and counteract both the remnants of Fascist control in the arms of the state, and American concerns over the rise of the Communist and Socialist Parties. Anti-communist Socialist Labor organizer, Vanni Montana, for example, points to the fact that Catholic dominance of the ENDSI ("L'Ente nazionale per la distribuzione dei soccorsi in Italia") was "a godsend for the establishment of a Catholic political machinery that was enabled to

match its Socialist and Communist counterpart, but excluded lay forces" (Montana 1975, 276). Luconi has pointed to the concerns of American Protestants over this dominance, and their countermobilization through the New York City-based National Evangelical Committee for Relief in Italy, to help Italian Protestants (Luconi 2004, 110). Gorietti's character and charism may have had less to do with his success, then, than his access to English translators and his position at the heart of material largesse.

A similar story may be projected for Gorietti and the ADI. The sudden connection of this small, if growing, network of experiential religionists to the great forces of the age made the movement. Gorietti became the mediator between Italian churches and expansive American and British Evangelicalism (Hutchinson 2014) and connected what was (from 1947) renamed the Assemblee di Dio in Italia to the eponymous, rapidly globalizing "brand" of Pentecostalism based at Springfield, Missouri. In May 1947, Gorietti was at the first Pentecostal conference in Zürich, making "an impassioned plea, requesting the realization of the principles of religious liberty for Pentecostal Italian churches" (Toppi 2004).

Placing Charisma in Transnational Context

It is to the convergence of these "great forces," rather than the distinctive holiness of an individual apostle, that one must look for the rise of Pentecostalism in Italy. From a scattered handful of secret churches at the end of the War, by 1950 most sources are talking about a movement of perhaps 100,000 members, three times the size of the next largest Protestant movement in the country. If, as Martin notes, Pentecostalism emerges from a global spark which meets local socio-cultural tinder, what were the precursor elements which contributed to the growth of the movement? The contributors are apparent from the key sources illustrating the events. The 1952 Petition to the Council of State accusing the Minister for the Interior (Mario Scelba) of reimposing a Fascist regime of religious oppression, for example, was signed by two leading lawyers close to the *Partito d'Azione* and the non-communist political left, one of whom was on the Council itself. The third name on the petition was a local solicitor—Giacomo Rosapepe—whose name appears regularly in Italian cases brought to oppose unilateral bureaucratic action (particularly through the use of *foglio di via obbligatorio*) and the continuance of Fascist legislation (especially the religious legislation contingent on the Concordat of 1929, including those of 1931 and the infamous Circolare Buffarini-Guidi of

1935). The jurists Arturo Carlo Jemolo and Leopoldo Piccardi saw in the Pentecostal case both an opportunity to continue the defascistization which had stalled with the American anti-communist crusade in Italy, and a mechanism to forestall rightist, Catholic Democristiano resurgence. Their opponent in the case, after all, was the "Iron Sicilian", Mario Scelba, a core element of the DC manipulation of southern conservatism, whose Interior Ministry was cracking heads and breaking up Socialist street marches. All three carried the disappointments of the failed Italian liberalism of the Risorgimento, and its radicalized successors, which, as Giorgio Spini has indicated, had significant connections to international Protestantism. (Piccardi's own involvement in the Fascist regime would later lead to the dissolution of his own vehicle for redemption, the Partito Radicale, while Rosapepe [a Catholic] was kept busy defending Protestants and Socialists.) All three were close to either the *Azionisti* or attempts to revive Cavourian liberalism or Mazzinian nationalism (Croce 1950), in which literary and press figures such as Benedetto Croce, Carlo Sforza, Alberto Tarchiani, and Alberto Cianca were involved. They were connected through "La Consulta," a network of Italian activists for religious liberty, "outstanding citizens … many of them Catholics," such as the economist Ernesto Rossi, who saw the vastly inflated security machinery of the DC government as a form of resurgent Fascism. It is only through such a lens on broader post-war liberal Italian politics that one can understand why, in the first Constituent Assembly of the new Republic, it was PSDI ("Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano") Socialists, such as Luigi Preti, rather than *democristiani,* such as Aldo Moro, who took up the cause of religious liberty against continuing oppressive Fascist legislation (Esposito 2013, 98–99).

From the Italian side, then, the Pentecostal case was caught up in the convergence of national and transnational interests. Ferrari (2010) notes that 1946–1948 was Italy's "Constituent Moment," and along with Benedetto Croce and the other resurgent liberals who wished to reclaim the tolerant glories of the Albertine Constitution, Jemolo was a key protagonist in attempting to push ahead a moral consensus. By 1952, however, it was clear that the "moment" had dissipated—with the departure of the occupying forces, and also with the alternative pathways through and protection from the domestic authorities—Italy reverted to what became the paradigmatic nepotism and cronyism of a DC traditionalism. American foreign policy missed its liberalizing moment, wrapped up in supporting a rightwing government as a counterbalance to the street-marching ranks of the Italian Communist Party and the larger threat of Russian

expansionism. It was no surprise, in this context, that Italian Pentecostals failed to achieve action from an American Embassy dominated by conservative diplomats James Clement Dunn and Outerbridge Horsey. They then turned to more direct political action in the USA itself.[15] In one of the odder moments of historical convergence, then, the conservative politics of American Protestants became a means of carrying forward center-left agendas in the struggle between the DC-dominated Ministry of the Interior and the "radical" and Liberal-dominated Council of State. Here too, the rapidly globalizing Pentecostal movement found itself acting as the ground across which broader purposes moved.

The main indicative sources here are attached to the petition from the AGUSA to the US Secretary of State, and associated with direct lobbying both of the State Department and the Italian Ambassador, Alberto Tarchiani.[16] This sort of direct pressure had commenced in the immediate post-war period, while American occupation forces were still widely present in local Italian towns and villages. While, among religious organizations, the Catholic agencies received the bulk of governmental emergency aid, the resurgence of grass-roots Pentecostalism quickly encountered support from American Pentecostal servicemen and chaplains.[17] Rather than leave support to government or the Catholic Church, Italian American Protestants organized around a number of key figures in New York to make aid available to Italian communities of like faith. In order to gain access to support, however, movements needed organization and representatives. It was local *miseria* in the south, verging on mass starvation, which pushed the constitutionally congregationalist Pentecostal churches there into cooperation. Before 1929, they had categorically refused closer organization: after 1947, when Gorietti was elected as president at the 1947 Naples convention, he became the focal point for material aid, political protection, and the campaign for legal recognition. His international connections secured his position as the means by which vital support flowed back to Italian churches—and his control over American Protestant foreign aid drew churches into the movement. His representation at Pentecostal conferences in London, Switzerland, and Springfield, Missouri, made him the natural choice as the legal representative both of the disparate Italian Pentecostal communities and to the Italian Republic for formal recognition of property rights and, over the longer term, for the juridical recognition of the movement as a legal entity and recognized religious movement. In the shorter term, the lack of protection under domestic law for Italian Protestants meant that the campaign for religious

liberty needed to operate through other means. Repeatedly, therefore, their American supporters appealed to the State Department to take up breaches of the US–Italy treaty framework under the rubrics of restraint of trade, legal abuse of American citizens, or taxation of foreign enterprises. The incorporation of ADI Churches under the Rome-based Angelus Trust, for instance, provided cause to take up the cudgels, because the churches had been built with American money, and were held in trust for the AGUSA.[18]

Nor was Gorietti afraid to shame the Americans into action. Speaking through the Sicilian-born, New York-raised elder and future Field Secretary for the AGUSA in Rome, Antonio Piraino, at the Central Assembly in Springfield, he derided those who could "shout Hallelujah in Church, but shut their mouths when they left for fear of persecution." Europe was in a mess, in part because of the moral waste "British and American soldiers" left behind them when they left. Quoting Cardinal Ascalesi, Gorietti estimated that 14,000 young girls in the Naples region were infected by venereal disease, many between the ages of 10 and 14. Gang violence, suicides, abandonment—this was a society coming to pieces. In the meantime, Pentecostal believers were being arrested, beaten, and killed. Despite this, he noted, thousands were being saved: Revival had come to Italy.[19] It was a claim to authority, to the right to help from the wealthy, lax American Church from the Church of the persecuted, sealed by the presence of "the Holy Spirit himself."

Converting Personal Charism into Political Power

A non-aligned populist religious movement with this sort of energy quickly gained the attention of those with more strategic and political interests. As Pang (2008) notes with regard to the *other* great site for Italo-American Pentecostal expansion, the nineteenth-century transatlantic world was ruled by elites organized around liberalism, Freemasonry, and Protestantism (Pang 2008). While dominantly Anglo-Saxon, the fracturing of established elites through the dramatic events of the 1930s and 1940s also provided pathways to influence for migrants. Some of these appear odd to us now, and in the debates about American influence after the War, would appear to be shadowy figures of evil import. Figures such as Freemason, Methodist minister, and OSS/CIA operative, Frank Gigliotti, make more sense in nineteenth-century garb. Born in Calabria, Gigliotti first migrated to the USA with his mother at the age of

eight, before being orphaned and living a range of lifestyles "on the edge" which, whether or not his accounts are true, go a long way to explaining his conservatism, individualism, and desperate desire for social recognition and influence. He seems to have studied at the Facoltà Valdese from 1925 to 1928, which may well have colored his views of the place of Catholicism in a free, democratic society. While there, he organized, among returned Italian American veterans, a branch of the American Legion, which he used to agitate for migration reform in the Whitehouse.[20] Re-emigrating to America in 1928, Gigliotti was ordained and ministered in Lemon Grove, California, before being caught up in the War as advisor for the OSS's support of popular and resistance forces in Fascist Italy. The evidence is not conclusive, but it does appear that he was quite prepared to work with any non-communist resistance force, both during the War and afterwards, including transnational organized crime.

Whether or not Gigliotti was personally involved in the debatable events surrounding Lucky Luciano and the American invasion of Sicily, he was certainly involved in a variety of non- and anti-communist and anti-Fascist Italian interest groups through and after the War. In 1942, with OSS support, he helped form the American Committee for Italian Democracy and was behind the formation of the American Committee for Religious Liberty in Italy, into which he drew many of his fellow anti-Fascists (such as Charles Fama).[21] So it is perhaps not surprising that we find him (along with a number of other mainline, masonic Protestants) writing to and pressing the case for religious liberty on the Italian government from soon after the War. Indeed, he brokered visits to Tarchiani's office (in 1946, 1948, and 1952), and in 1950 can be found claiming to the Assistant Secretary of State (John D. Hickerson) that in 1947, he, Charles Fama, and a delegation of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) "and other interested people" went "on a mission to Italy where we helped guide the writing into the Italian Constitution of the three Articles 17, 18, and 19, which deal with freedom of assemblage, freedom of association, and freedom of religious worship."[22] Among the "interested people" touring southern Italy with this delegation were a number of journalists—the resulting press coverage added to the circulation of Gigliotti's own pamphlets on religious persecution in Italy (such as his *Religious Liberty in Italy*, which was printed in the millions) to create a climate for "doing something" in Italy, just as the US government was already doing in Germany.[23] Gigliotti's contributions and the power plays around the nature of the Constitution, however, have been quite erased from the

founding myth of Italian denominational Pentecostalism. As Nasini notes with regard to the historiography of the Italian Resistance, there was a tendency among post-war political and neo-Mazzinian organizations to exaggerate the indigeneity of Italian efforts to oust the forces of Fascism (Nasini 2012), eclipsing the work of "countless fully-fledged American spies of Italian nationality [who] participated in the Liberation of Italy" (Nasini 2012, 46). Gigliotti, in fact, made the first attempt to work with the Italian government directly on the treatment of Protestants. This led to positive reports by Tarchiani, and denials by both the Vatican and the Italian government, and passive resistance on the part of the state machinery.[24] It was, ironically, this denial of the obvious which would make the later marshaling of evidence by the ADI, AGUSA, and Rosapepe all the more effective. By then, however, Gigliotti disappears from the narratives of institutions on both sides of the Atlantic, for (it is easy to imagine) similar reasons: the importance to both Church and Nation of retaining the coherence of the mythologies of founding. His account to Tarchiani in 1946, of the origins of Italian Pentecostalism—of a distributed, grassroots movement which began in Italy and the USA at about the same time, in which "[p]eople in small congregations in the mountains of the Abbruzzi's were having the same experiences as people in small congregations in Sicily. They did not know of each other's existence. They had no correspondence or physical contact"[25]—did not suit the Whig histories of denominations. It might be argued, however, that it *did* suit the Whig history of formalizing global Evangelical interdenominational organizations, such as the NAE. Gigliotti's account applies Jonathan Edwards's definition of *revival* to the story of Pentecostal origins: it was a "surprising" and sovereign work of God, a genuine manifestation of the Holy Spirit, rather than a sectarian tongues heresy. It is very clear, however, that Gigliotti was still involved in a process in which the AGUSA and the ADI became the respective public faces on either side of the Atlantic. Each diasporic wave told the story in ways which suited their self-concept and underlying theology.

Mobilizing Three Globalizations

It is, however, essential to remember that the stage upon which Gorietti and Gigliotti strode was the vast, transnational community of Italian migrants, moving restlessly across the Atlantic, and with the expansion of American settlement from Ellis Island out to the mid-west and to the

burgeoning West Coast. Such places allowed Italian Americans more space to break into positions of public influence—moving to California, for example, put Gigliotti in direct contact with the rising Republican party, and inserted him much higher in State hierarchies than he could have had reason to expect in the settled East. What gave Gigliotti and Gorietti their influence, however, was their ability to combine and guide the energies of the not one, but three, globalizations which were occurring at the time. At the organizational level, the NAE was globalizing in self-conscious counterposition to the emergence of the World Council of Churches, the religious counterpart (to the point of sharing founding contributors) of the fledgling United Nations, the founding San Francisco conference of which Gigliotti had attended as a veterans representative. As James D. Murch said of the movement only a few years after its founding,

> [i]n this area of endeavour, evangelicals live in a shrinking world where the affairs of their brethren in Christ become their concern when their liberties are restricted. Evangelicals must not only appeal the case to Heaven, they must act when able to do so. The greatest weapons in this combat are diplomacy and the press. During the past ten years great strides have been made by evangelicals in maintaining such relations with the Department of State that every violation of religious freedom may effectively be called to the government's attention. Where it involves US citizens, they request action and generally they get it. (Murch 1956, 139)

Gigliotti made his way onto the NAE Committee on Religious Liberty (1948), which soon became a full Commission on Evangelical Action, the official voice of the NAE to Washington in global issues. After the stoning of Church of Christ missionaries in Frascati, Gigliotti was present when (in January 1950) the NAE protested the stoning to the State Department and (by letter) to De Gasperi as Italian Prime Minister. The language of the letter strongly indicates Gigliotti's authorship. In the cover letter to Dean Acheson, it is important to note, the parties to the protest are the NAE (including the AGUSA as a member), Gigliotti's American Committee on Religious Liberty in Italy, and the Italian churches outside the AGUSA, the Christian Churches of North America (Murch 1956, 145–146). This latter was a congregationalist federation of the *Risveglio* churches in both the USA and Italy, which proudly held onto the "unorganized" ethos of the pre-war Pentecostal upsurge on both sides of the Atlantic. War, however, exposed its lack of organization and ability to

project a presence with regard to the state. The more centralized AGUSA, by way of comparison, could protect its ministers from the draft and build ministry opportunities through military chaplaincies, while the Christian Church of North America (CCNA) could not. The earlier popular globalization of the CCNA's missions was thus coopted by the bureaucratic globalization of the AGUSA's missions arm under Noel Perkin. When Gorietti contrasted AGUSA self-satisfaction with apostolic sacrifice in his Springfield sermon, it may well have been to this tension that he was referring. It enabled him to play the two Pentecostalisms against one another, so maintaining the moral high ground and emphasizing the indigeneity (and hence local control) of the Pentecostal movement in Italy. He did so not just because of a fear of being swamped by American religious culture, but because of the indigenizing potential of Pentecostalism which had been basic to its spread in the first place. In Italy, the culture to which the CCNA had bonded was village-level exceptionalism, accepting, transforming, and then counterposing itself as a fourth force to those impulses which had given rise to Fascist racialism, Socialist localism, and Catholic statist ritualism. Americans would continue to send missionaries in large numbers to Italy, seduced (as new worlders often are) by the communal values of a "thick" culture which managed somehow to remain authentically itself. (This is still the case today—as evidenced by the preponderance of foreign missionaries in the north, while most Italian Protestants live in the south.) Those churches either absorbed them or spat them back out. Ironically, therefore, the post-war acceptance of American help was conditioned by a sort of love–hate relationship which required the constant mediation, and therefore indispensability, of a Rome-based, bureaucratic elite, supported not by the AGUSA in general but by the largely former-CCNA Italian District of the AGUSA.

The churches coopted into the AGUSA were almost all originally founded by those who had come out of the Chicago revival of 1908, or by their successors. There was a theological connection to the AGUSA (which was born in 1912) through William Durham's influence on both. The Italian churches, however, were also strongly influenced by the mystical former Baptist pastor and then Pentecostal missionary/writer, Giuseppe Petrelli. Petrelli's concept of the "spiritual church" resulted in extreme congregationalism and (apart from the general division in Italian Protestant churches which he sparked in the 1920s over the eating of blood products) ensured that neither the AGUSA nor the ADI in Italy would ever have a monopoly on Italian Pentecostalism.[26] Shortly after the

formation of the ADI, for example, a number of churches in Piedmont, Calabria, the province of Foggia, Sicily, and the valley of the River Sele in Campania joined forces around Petrelli's magazine *Il Regno di Dio* (The Kingdom of God, later *Il Granel di Senape*) to form a separate movement. Likewise, there would remain Petrellian house groups and churches, and the resistant congregationalism of individual churches even within the AGUSA, scattered throughout the USA for decades. Petrelli was important to Italian Pentecostalism: he provided a semblance of scholarship and biblical authority, and his works were often the only thing (apart from the Bible) which many Italian Pentecostals read. It provided a bracing message of resistance to the world which struck a chord with small Pentecostal groups isolated in an ocean of Catholicism in Italy, or surrounded by the overwhelming materialism and forces for culture drift within families in America. It was, in short, a technology of self-maintenance for pilgrims, either spiritual (in Italy) or glocal (in the USA and among Italian Pentecostals around the world).

Counter to this "disorganizing" force (which led to conflict within Italy itself, first with the disaffiliation in 1943 of the *Zaccardiani*, and then continued contention with the CCNA network) the churches which affiliated with the AGUSA Italian District (formed at the Syracuse Convention, January 15–17, 1948, in Joseph R. Flower's Grace Tabernacle) were enthusiastic organizers. At the heart of this effort was Anthony Piraino, the first AGUSA Field Secretary to Rome, and later a full-time missionary, until his death in Pescara, Italy, in 1992. Piraino was born in Palermo in 1915 and was six when his mother, Vincenza *née* Armetta (1889–1976), followed her sister (Rose Lisciandrello, arrived 1913) and husband (Mariano Piraino, arrived 1920) to the USA. It would be the Lisciandrellos who would connect—through a healing experience—the family network into broader Italian Pentecostalism, and who would plant the first Italian church in Brooklyn, "Calvary Pentecostal Church." Piraino grew up there and became involved in Italian youth work including (with his uncle) a radio ministry entitled "La Voce nel Deserto." As a Sicilian, he had to learn Italian formally in order to continue ministry in anything other than his local dialect. Through the Depression, he worked in a shoe factory, preferring piecework, which enabled him to finish early and use the rest of the day in ministry.[27] Piraino was ordained in the Evangelical Christian Pentecostal Church in 1943, and added to the AGUSA Ministers list just before the founding Syracuse Convention.[28] He attended the NAE representa-

tion to Tarchiani to appeal for full religious liberty in Italy and called upon Samuel Reber (Acting Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs in the State Department) to press for observance of Article 15 of the Italian Peace Treaty with the USA. Piraino was Gorietti's translator on his tour through the USA, covering some 20,000 miles and dozens of churches, and so actually spoke the words of Gorietti's challenge to the AGUSA in Central Assembly, Springfield. In that great church, accosted by Gorietti's powerful rhetoric and accounts of the sufferings of Italy, Piraino felt sure that he would follow the calling of a missionary in Italy. The AGUSA had committed $25,000 to the support of the Bible School there—money that, in fact, needed to come from its member churches. At the end of his 1948–1949 tours, Andrew Piraino would remember, Gorietti and his father sat around the dining table and counted out the donations made on the speaking tour.[29] They counted $26,000, a huge sum for a fledgling movement—indeed too large for a movement which would not be formally recognized by the Italian state until 1959. Knowing that one of the female members of the church was making the trip to Italy with Gorietti, they went to the airport and watched her board a Trans-World Airlines Constellation, with the money tucked into her knitting bag.

In 1950–1951, Piraino was the Italian Branch's New York-based secretary, from which position he helped organize the third and fourth annual conventions. These decided to place a field secretary in Rome in order to manage the (by now) slightly chaotic situation of American Italian missionaries returning to evangelize, and to ensure that the District's funds were well spent. They campaigned under the title "Millions of Italians for Christ." In 1951, the District Convention appointed Piraino as field secretary and made a special offering of $1500 to send him and his small family on their way. They arrived in Rome in September that year, initially for a period of two years only, and the next year attended the World Pentecostal Conference in London. Here, the appeal of the ADI to the AGUSA was read out to delegates by Noel Perkin, resulting in the world body forming a permanent standing committee on religious liberty. The District later decided to make a significant push into the development of local Sunday schools, and shortly after sponsored Josephine Furnari to establish these in Italy. Through the "Italian Christian Educational Foundation," under Vincenzo Burchieri (1893–1962) of San Cataldo (Caltanissetta), the Branch also raised money for the support of the ADI's Bible school in Rome (opened 1954). Piraino oversaw the other AGUSA

groups moving through Italy, including the CA "Gospel Teams." His work with Furnari, and later with the year-long "Sunday School Teams" led by people such as Richard Scotti, saw them involved in teacher training, direct ministry, the production of "Sunday school quarterlies," and other literature (provided by organizations such as the Boys and Girls Missionary Crusade) which they found were snapped up by churches wherever they went. The (American) emphasis on "system" and method is marked, themes of Sunday school conventions including "Sunday School Organization," "Teaching Methods," "Workers' Conferences," "Opening Service," "Importance of Records," "Literature," and so on. For a country much divided over the "organized church," it is remarkable they did not have more opposition than they did. Instead, Piraino reported, Sunday school teachers "ate it up." Classes were divided into functional parts, training provided to teachers, doubtful pastors (for whom the approach smacked too much of "organization") won over, and resources provided. With the push out of America by the Sunday School Training Squad, by 1954, Piraino was reporting that "most of our activities are centred around Sunday School work," with the aim of putting "a Sunday school in every church, and a church in every city" in Italy.[30] Over time, Piraino's Rome-based printing presses became a net exporter, rather than an importer, of such materials, as translation of quarterlies such as *The Adult Student*, and *Adult Home Study* courses were mailed to the Italian diaspora in America, Canada, North Africa, Switzerland, France, and Belgium. By 1959, they were running five high-speed presses with attendant folding, and other machinery. Their operations published four Sunday school quarterlies (*Adult Student, Junior Pupil, Primary Pupil*, and *Primary Teacher*), the *Sunday School Counsellor*, Sunday school materials (such as record books), as well as hymnals and doctrinal books. In essence, Piraino had replicated the Bible Society, with a missional Pentecostal edge.[31] In 1956, visitors from California (the Shelleys) were shown a print room out of which six tons of gospel literature had been mailed around Italy in the previous month. He was planning, he noted, to distribute a million tracts throughout Sicily. Squeezed between Catholicism and the largest Communist party outside Russia, the Shelleys' tour connected with all the major fears of Americans in the 1950s. When they met the ex-priests, Pietro Selvieggio and Lorenzo Ramacini, who between them handled translation and printing, their sense of Piraino's effectiveness on the "front line" of the free West was confirmed. Piraino himself had to handle the diplomatic tension between enthusing American

Pentecostal interest (which was in no doubt that the Vatican was behind the oppression of Pentecostal churches) and the increasing interest by the secular press. To the *Detroit News* in 1959, he made the nice distinction that "interferences were never the known policy of the Catholic church but … the zealous police were bolstered by 'ecclesiastical influences.'"[32] Numbers of times, he traveled into the Italian south in order to intervene in the case of Italian pastors who had been arrested and charged, or to help churches which were being harassed, often not by the authorities as such but by "special" local groups or families who carried out the tacit will of the Church or the Questura.

Located in a city which contained so much Christian history, Piraino also became something of a clerical tourist agent. He used occasions such as a visit to the Mamertine Prison to encourage American visitors to consider the persecuted nature of the Italian church. While driving up the Appian Way in a tiny Fiat ("these little European cars are not made for six-footers"), Ken Schmidt, CA President from California, described it this way:

> Brother Gorietti is driving and to the other side of me is Brother Bracco. Each of these brethren has been imprisoned and persecuted many times for the gospel's sake. Their arrests and imprisonments have not abated their love for Christ. Behind me are Brother and Sister Zizzo who are laboring for Christ in Torino, Italy. They are now talking about Paul's journey up this very road and the conversation drifts to present-day persecutions and the recent closing of thirty-five of the Pentecostal churches in Italy. This picture fades and again I am walking down the winding stairs into Paul's prison in Rome. Brother Piraino, Secretary of the Italian assemblies, is explaining about the post where Paul was chained. Here the apostle wrote many of his inspired words. It is so damp and cold.[33]

Piraino is the hidden hand in almost all the operations which led to the recognition of the ADI, the essential link between Rome, New York, Washington, and Springfield, Missouri. As his Italian Branch brethren were meeting in Schenectady, NY, Piraino was with Gorietti and Bracco at a meeting of "La Consulta." Rosapepe's brief outlining of the hundreds of cases of persecution convinced these democratic activists that here was a problem around which their case against Scelba could proceed. They heard Jemolo outline the steps which needed to be taken to ensure that all laws prior and in contradiction to the Constitution were ruled invalid. Cases of persecution in other traditions had occurred, but Pentecostals

were the largest and most active, and therefore the major target for the laws. Through to 1955, Piraino translated documents, kept the case before both Springfield and Washington, and made sure that American consular and religious observers were present during public considerations of the religious liberty clauses of the Constitution. As well as working with the ADI, Piraino cooperated with visiting Evangelists who began to tour through the country, including those at the Allied Forces Southern Europe Command and NATO offices in Naples and Germany. In 1956, he hosted Paul Boyer, who was present with him on May 1 when the right to religious freedom was affirmed by the Council of State. "How well do I remember the rejoicing in the church that day …" remembered Boyer later, who became a test case for the new legal standing: "plans were immediately put into action" by Gorietti and Piraino "for short meetings to be conducted in ten of the most needy cities south of Rome to Sicily …."[34] Meetings were held in Foggia, Bari, and other places, as a way of daring the local *mareschialli* to intervene. The rest, as they say, is history.

Conclusions

This paper began with the observation that there is an odd silence among contemporary scholars as to the pre-"migrant crisis" existence of Pentecostalism in Italy. Further excavation led to the observation that there were in fact a series of mutually enclosing myths, held by both scholars and by Pentecostals themselves, about their origins. These in turn may be held in tension with the self-understandings of American and British actors, giving rise to the question: Why do these persist if even those now writing from inside the tradition (such as Esposito) refer to its central planks as "conventions"? The past and present functionality of unilinear myths is one obvious reason. For the ADI, for example, the internal myth of pre-War foundations ("Chicago-to-Rome") has justified three generations of leadership by a relatively small group of men, who have maintained influence through the impact of the myth upon the culture, and thus the ADI's relationship with broader Italian culture. It is not the most conservative Pentecostal culture in Italy, nor is it entirely closed to the outside world. The careful balancing between past charisma and present bureaucratization, however, and between the past catacombs of Christianity and the current triumphalism in the movement's unusual (for Western Europe) size, are largely articulated through the myth. So, it remains because it is useful. It also remains, however, because contemporary scholars have

(with the exception of a handful of independent writers such as Traettino, Introvigne, and Esposito) forgotten the post-war Pentecostal challenge to Italian Catholic "normality" (itself a sort of "foreign influences" myth) when, for reasons connected to other globalizations, this marginal transnational movement became, for a short period, the field upon which broader forces contested for greater religious liberty in Italy. As Giorgio Spini (himself an *azionista* of the period) noted in his work on the link between Protestantism and Liberalism in the Risorgimento, the formation of a national myth required not just a remembering of the national self, but a forgetfulness about third forces, such as the Reformation. Italy learned not too much from America, he was later to write, but too little.[35]

In the same way, the rewriting of transnational Italy in the present is largely operating in the disremembrance of previous globalizations and previous transnational Italies such as these indigenous streams of Pentecostalism. Another myth arises, of Pentecostalism's foreign birth, now gloried in as a reflection of an Italy emancipated from its Papal past, evidence of its multicultural future. But that myth, too, validates (for its holders) their own legendary past. Just as the formation of the first national myth of Italy excluded the Protestants, so its reformulation with the establishment of the Republic excluded the Pentecostals. Why does the orthodox myth of Italian Pentecostalism remain? Because it is sustained by the continuing forgetfulness of contemporary Italian scholarship. If historians can provide anything in the contestations of great theories, it is a mirror in which to see such myths for what they are. It is an outcome with which the post-Enlightenment Italian founders of our craft (Giambattista Vico and Benedetto Croce) would have been well pleased.

Notes

1. There has been some work on problematizing the concept—usually with the objective of nuancing the concept rather than rejecting it: for example, Faye Y. Abram and Ashley Cruce, "A Re-conceptualization of 'Reverse Mission' for International Social Work Education and Practice," *Social Work Education* 26(1) (February 2007): 3–19.
2. See Fiore's work on georeferencing Italian migration.
3. The standard ADI "orthodox" works are: Eugenio Stretti, *Il movimento pentecostale. Le Assemblee di Dio in Italia* (Torino: Claudiana, 1998); David A. Womack and Francesco Toppi, *Le radici del*

Movimento pentecostale in Italia (Roma: ADI-Media, 1989); and F. Toppi, *E Mi Sarete Testimoni. Il Movimento Pentecostale e le Assemblee di Dio in Italia* (Roma: ADI-Media, 1999).

4. "L'Otto per Mille: Origini storiche, evoluzione giuridica, come funziona", http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/confessioni/doc/Otto_per_mille.pdf (accessed July 8, 2014).
5. Particularly those in the American Assemblies of God Archives in Springfield, Missouri, and those of the Società di Studi Valdesi, Torre Pellice.
6. US Census; Ellis Island Shipping Records, online.
7. Susana Colantonio, Pamphlet, Flower Pentecostal Heritage Centre, Springfield, MO, 1945.
8. See Bill Edwards, *Moravian Aboriginal missions in Australia 1850–1919* (Adelaide: Uniting Church Historical Society (SA), 1999).
9. On whom, see below.
10. See the discussion of this in A. E. Baldini and M. Firpo (eds), *Tradizione protestante e ricerca storica. L'impegno intellettuale di Giorgio Spini*. Atti della Giornata di studio (Torino, November 8, 1996) (Firenze: Olschki Editore, 1998).
11. Francesco S. Toppi, *Luigi Francescon* (Roma: ADI-Media, 1997); A. B. Simpson, *Michele Nardi: His Life and Work* (New York: Blanche P. Nardi, 1916), 35, 42ff.
12. Giuseppe Beretta reported speaking in tongues as early as 1898 ("La prima ondata," CESNUR); and other oral history projects point to the importance of voices, dreams, and so on, among local religious actors.
13. See M. Hutchinson, *Pellegrini: An Italian Protestant Community in Sydney 1958–1998* (Sydney: APSS, 1998).
14. He underplays, for example, the tensions with Roberto Bracco, and Ettore Strappaveccia, and the issues surrounding the division led by Zaccardi.
15. G. Rosapepe to M. O. Horsey, April 4, 1952, Italian Persecution Folder, Flower Pentecostal Heritage Center (FPHC) Archives. For the politics of people such as Dunn, see Kaeten Mistry, *The United States, Italy and the Origins of Cold War: Waging Political Warfare 1945–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
16. F. B. Gigliotti to A. Tarchiani, August 27, 1946, "Religious Liberty in Italy," FPHC Archives. Also: University of Wisconsin Foreign

Relations Collection, Foreign Relations of the United States, http://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/FRUS.

17. See the correspondence to Evangelical Fellowship of Mission Agencies (EFMA), 1945+, BGC Collection 165, Series VIII, Countries Files: Italy.
18. "Appeal by Foreign Missions Department to US Department of State, 9.9.1953," September 9, 1953, Italian Persecution Folder, FPHC Archives.
19. *Pentecostal Evangel*, September 11, 1948, 4.
20. "Presbyterian Ministers Urge Measure to Unite Declarants Families," *Jewish Daily Bulletin*, February 11, 1927, http://www.jta.org/1927/02/11/archive/presbyterian-ministers-urge-measure-to-unite-declarants-families#ixzz34aK4jPaV.
21. F. B. Gigliotti, "Religious Liberty in Italy," FPHC Archives. Gigliotti claimed that not only was he (and the NAE) instrumental in writing the religious liberty clauses into the new Constitution of the Italian Republic, but in inserting the same liberties into the 1945 United Nations Charter, guaranteeing religious liberty to the citizens of all its members. Item 3 notes that the UN existed in order "[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." With regard to Fama, see his role in disconnecting John Grier Hibben from a nominal involvement in Fascist organizations (J. G. Hibben to C. Fama, *The Princeton Alumni Weekly*, 30:9 (November 22, 1929), 232). This was shortly after the announcement of the Concordat: Fama's Protestantism was key to his anti-Fascism. Fama was described by a contemporary as "medical examiner of the Board of Estimates of the City of New York, honorary Police Surgeon, U.S. Medical Corps in the World War, with foreign service, President of the Italian National Union of Protestant Clubs, and authority on Protestant Italians in America" (William Seabrook, *Americans All: A Human Study of America's Citizens from Europe* (London: G. G. Harrap, 1938)).
22. F. B. Gigliotti to J. D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State, May 8, 1950, in "Italian Persecution" Folder, Flower Pentecostal Heritage Centre, Springfield, MO.

23. The liberal English Catholic paper, *The Tablet*, noted the responsiveness of the de Gasperi government to pressure by Fama and Gigliotti who "threatened to lobby against any further relief for Italy in the Senate at Washington unless their demands are met," and saw the granting of religious liberty as the price for "endorsing the Lateran Concordat in Article 7." "News, Notes and Texts: Italy: Freedom of Belief," *The Tablet*, May 10, 1947, http://archive.thetablet.co.uk/article/10th-may-1947/10/news-notes-and-texts (accessed June 18, 2014).
24. Esposito (*Un Secolo di Pentecostalismo Italiano* (Milano: The Writer, 2013), 98–9) tells the other side of this story—Preti clearly had knowledge of Tarchiani's responses to inquiries through the Foreign Office as to the extent (and so political capacity) of American Pentecostalism.
25. F. B. Gigliotti, "Religious Liberty in Italy," August 27, 1946, Folio, Flower Pentecostal Heritage Centre.
26. Antonio Bernabei Chauvie, et al., 2012, "Biografia del servitore di Dio Giuseppe Petrelli," http://giuseppepetrelli.weebly.com/uploads/2/6/8/9/2689036/biografia__pdf.pdf (accessed July 19, 2014).
27. Interview, Andrew Piraino, July 16, 2012, PHC, Alphacrucis College.
28. *Assemblies of God Ministers Letter*, March 24, 1948, FPHC Archives.
29. Interview, Andrew Piraino, July 16, 2012, PHC, Alphacrucis College.
30. *Pentecostal Evangel*, May 16, 1954, 6; May 20, 1956, 12.
31. *Pentecostal Evangel*, September 27, 1959, 16.
32. *Pentecostal Evangel*, February 1, 1959, 23.
33. *Pentecostal Evangel*, June 22, 1952.
34. *Pentecostal Evangel*, January 31, 1960, 27.
35. Quoted in Tiziano Bonazzi, "Gli Studi di Storia Americana," in Baldini and Firpo (eds), *Tradizione protestante e ricerca storica* (Florence: Olschki, 1998), 86ff.

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US Census data, various.

CHAPTER 4

Persianate Islam and Its Regional Spread

Saïd Amir Arjomand

Introduction

If we ponder on the title of this edited book, the term "transnationalism" accompanying "religion" requires a quick comment. It is a modern term, with the "nation-state" as its implicit referent, which gives it something of an exceptional character. "Nation(alism)" is the implicit norm and "transnationalism" is the implicit exception. If we may be permitted to apply the term somewhat anachronistically to the long history of the world religions, the norm and the exception are reversed: world religions are inherently universalistic and therefore transnational, and their nationalization occurs in particular cases. World regions are historically formed and, as a rule, include a variety of shifting polities and, in modern times, nation-states. I therefore chose my title advisedly, to refer to an important variant of Islam that emerged in the Persian-speaking region of the Muslim empire in the tenth century, and spread into other regions, thereby creating a Persianate world region down to the nineteenth century. Persianate Islam remained the defining feature of this world region or civilizational zone, until the strong centrifugal forces of British and Russian imperialism in

S.A. Arjomand (✉)
State University of New York in Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794, USA

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the nineteenth century greatly weakened its cohesion and those of Indian, Iranian, and Turkish nationalism in the twentieth century destroyed it.

World Religions and World Regions or Civilizational Zones

For a useful conception of a world region as a civilizational zone, we can turn to Max Weber, who uses the term *Kulturkreise* (literary cultural circles, meaning regions, as in Ptolemy's *Geography*), which later civilizational analysts like Eisenstadt and Arnason have equated with civilizations. Given our subject, we may note that already in the late tenth century, the Persianate civilizational zone was called Irānshahr (the land of Iran) and, according to Abu Mansur Tusi, the composer of the earliest known *Epic of Kings* in New Persian, "extends from the Oxus river to the Nile" (cited in Mottahedeh 2012, 156). The incomparable Abu Rayhān al-Biruni (d. 1050), furthermore, bridging the gap of nearly two millennia between Ptolemy and Weber, freed the notion from Ptolemaic geographical determinism with regard to Irānshahr as the central circular region of the world:

> For political reasons … the inhabited world was divided into seven circular parts, like the six circles which encircle (tangentially) a seventh circle … The reason for this division is that the great kings were natives of Irānshahr … This partition has nothing to do with natural climatic conditions, nor with astronomical phenomena. It is made according to kingdoms [i.e., polities] which differ [because of] different features of their peoples and different codes of morality and customs. (cited in Mottahedeh 2012, 156–157)

Weber can be said to highlight one of Biruni's two foci—culture. He accordingly wedded this conception of *Kulturkreise* to his seminal idea of the world religions of salvation as the core around which civilizations grow, and Marshall Hodgson (1974) followed Weber's paradigm with reference to Islam, but without adopting his term. Now in this conception, Hodgson's Islamicate civilization constitutes a world *region*—what Hodgson would call Islamdom, in analogy to Christendom. And, without using the term, he indeed followed Abu Mansur in defining the Islamicate civilization as extending from the Nile to the Oxus.

Jeremy Smith (2010, 122) rightly argues that the Weberian mode of deriving civilizational forms from world religions is unnecessarily restrictive. There was, however, a competing and older conception of

civilization as constitutive of a world region that is equally relevant to our concern. By the end of the eighteenth century, the growth of Orientalism led to a shift from the unitary to the pluralist conception of civilization. The Sanskrit-based civilization of the "Hindus" and the Persian-based civilization, which was extended to pre-Islamic Iran with the nineteenth-century archaeological discoveries, challenged the idea that Europe was *the* world "civilization." *Language* rather than religion was the basis and decisive marker of civilization for Orientalism (Rudolph 2010, 144). However, it took the rise of Japan and an entirely new geo-politics of the post-WWI era to institutionalize the shift from the singular to the plural conception of civilizations. In this conception, a world region is a civilizational zone, and we can think of the Persianate world as a civilizational zone based on the Persian written language and the dialects it generated or influenced.

Far from being mutually exclusive, the two conceptions are complementary. As collective identity is indeterminate- and context-dependent, so these two (and other) conceptions of world regions are not mutually exclusive, but intersecting and overlapping—one can be Muslim and Persian at the same time and so simultaneously belong to the Persianate world and Islamicate civilization. The Persianate world and Islamicate civilization entwine and interpenetrate, thus producing "Persianate Islam," which has acted as one of the engines of expansion of the frontiers of the Persianate world for centuries.

The Emergence and Development of Persianate Islam

The obvious correlates of the Islamicate civilization are the Umayyad and 'Abbasid Empires (660–1258 CE), and that of Persianate Islam, the rise of the local dynasties in Iran around 900, and much more surprising, also of the Turko-Mongolian nomadic empires in the Eastern Islamic lands after the Mongol invasion, especially in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. The disintegration of empires, too, can produce similar political coherence resulting from the formation of successor states/polities. In this connection, the Indologist Sheldon Pollock (1998) had the seminal idea of the vernacular millennium as the period when the ecumenical languages—Sanskrit, Latin, and Arabic—receded, to make possible the growth of vernacular languages and cultures as a result of polity formation

with the rise of local monarchies. Pollock (1996) also formulated the idea of the Sanskrit Cosmopolis (300–1300 CE), to which Richard Eaton has juxtaposed that of the Persianate Cosmopolis (900–1900) to propose a heuristic dichotomy of two historically overlapping and interpenetrating models of cosmopolitan culture. This interpretation is backed by rigorous analysis and superbly detailed illustrations that show how the introduction of a Persianate vision of society, polity, and cosmic order impacted the legacy of the eleventh to twelfth-century Chalukya Empire that was preserved in its Kakatiya successor state that survived to the first quarter of the fourteenth century and was revived by Vijayanagara in the sixteenth century (Eaton and Wagoner 2014).

Arnold Toynbee (1935, 1: 68, 83) recognized the specificity of the society and civilization of the zone from the Sea of Marmara to the Gulf of Bengal, whose ecumenical unity as the three early modern Muslim empires lasted into the mid-sixteenth century, and called it "Iranic":

> In the Iranian world, …. the New Persian language … gained a currency as a lingua franca; and at its widest, about the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries …, its range extended … from the Ottoman *pash-alyq* of Buda, which had been erected out of the wreckage of the Western Christian Kingdom of Hungary after the Ottoman victory at Mohacz in A.D. 1526, to the Muslim "successor-states" which had been carved, after the victory of the Deccanese Muslim princes at Talikota in A.D. 1565, out of the carcass of the slaughtered Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar. For this vast cultural empire the New Persian language was indebted to the arms of Turkish-speaking empire-builders, reared in the Iranian tradition and therefore captivated by the spell of the New Persian literature, whose military and political destiny it had been to provide one universal state for Orthodox Christendom in the shape of the Ottoman Empire and another for the Hindu World in the shape of the Timurid Mughal Raj. These two universal states of Iranian construction on Orthodox Christian and on Hindu ground were duly annexed, in accordance with their builders' own cultural affinities, to the original domain of the New Persian language in the homelands of the Iranian Civilization on the Iranian plateau and in the Basin of the Oxus and the Jaxartes; and in the heyday of the Mughal, Safawi, and Ottoman regimes New Persian was being patronized as the language of literate humanizers by the ruling element over the whole of this huge realm, while it was also being employed as the official language of administration in those two-thirds of its realm that lay within the Safawi and the Mughal frontiers. (Toynbee, 5: 514–515)

Hodgson, who developed Toynbee's idea, coined the term "Persianate" and applied it to the cultural traditions that grew on the basis of the Persian language, and further contrasted the continued vitality of the "Persionate zone" with the early flourishing of the "Arabic zone" of the Islamicate civilization, going so far as to divide the latter historically "into an earlier 'caliphal' and later 'Persianate' phase" (Hodgson 1974, 2: 293–294). Let me propose we take a step further back and talk about the emergence of a proto-Persianate culture within the caliphal phase of the Islamicate civilization—that is, with Persian wisdom and Indo-Persian political ethic and statecraft in Arabic garb.

Arabic was the language of the Qur'an, and was elaborated into the *lingua franca* of the Islamic empire—incidentally, by grammar scholars who were mostly of Iranian origin. The people of the conquered Persian Empire, like other conquered populations, were called the '*ajam* (stutterers) by the Arab overlords. Unlike other populations, however, the Iranians not only kept their own language, which was now written in the Arabic script as the so-called New Persian, but also saw it develop into the carrier of a major Islamicate tradition across a vast and expanding region. The social revolution of Islam, the 'Abbasid revolution (750 CE), began in Khorasan and Transoxania (northeastern Iran and Central Asia) and integrated the subject populations into an Islamic society. Canfield (1991, 4) plausibly argues that, by the time of Caliph al-Ma'mun (r. 813–833), whose mother was Persian and who moved the Caliphate to Khorasan, "conquerors and subjects were melded into a single Persianate society." The Persian stutterers began a vigorous socio-cultural movement throughout the Islamic imperial ecumene, which is known as the *Sho'ubiyya*, in order to extol their cultural superiority over Arabs. The *Sho'ubiyya* movement was sustained and strengthened by the rise of independent local dynasties under the Caliphate in the ninth and tenth centuries which had a keen interest in the revival of the Persian monarchy. The *Sho'ubi* writers wove Iranian mytho-history into the narrative of Islamic history, equating ancient kings of Iran with the early prophets mentioned in the Qur'an, and claimed that Persian was the language of the ancient prophets from Adam to Ishmael, Abraham's son and the progenitor of the Arabs (Dabiri 2013). Furthermore, they produced a pluralistic conception of wisdom, combining the Greek *sophia* and Judaeo-Christian *hokhma* with the maxims of Persian and Indian sages, already translated into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. 757) (Kristó-Nagy 2013), which can properly be called Persianate. The greatest writer of Persian in Arabic

grab was arguably Mohammad b. Jarir al-Tabari (d. 923), who wrote the monumental *Tārikh al-Rusul wa'l-Muluk* (History of Prophets and Kings), as well as a major Qur'an Commentary (*tafsir*). The pluralistic Persianate conception of wisdom culminated in the *Javidān Kherad* (*Sophia Perennis*), where 'Ali Ibn Moskuya (Miskawayh) (d. 1030), still writing in classical Arabic, compiled maxims from the wisdom (*hikma*) of the Persians, the Indians, and the Arabs (including Islam), as well as that of the Greeks (Zakeri 2007).

New Persian was forged, from the beginning, as the complementary *lingua franca* of Islam, and with the boost from the Samanid "vernacular" polity formation in the tenth century, became the main vehicle for the spread of Islam as a world religion and of the Islamicate civilization. The main subsequent impetus to the spread of Persian came from state formation and military conquest by Turkish slave dynasties, beginning with the Ghaznavid (989–1149), who ruled eastern Iran and northern India from their capital Ghanza in Afghanistan, and by Turko-Mongolian nomadic empires, beginning with the Great Seljuq Empire (1040–1157). The royal patrons of Persophonia, who assured its continuous reproduction and growth, were the Persianized Turks converted to Islam, the ruling elite of medieval and early modern monarchies and empires, for whom Persian was not the mother tongue but the second language (Fragner 1999, 78).

The Persianate Cosmopolis rested on the development and consolidation of the Persian *koine* and its effectiveness in maintaining a monopoly of the medium of writing for over a millennium, over a growing world region. To explain this, Spooner and Hanaway (2012, 18–26) shift their focus away from Fragner's focus on the royal patrons of Persophonia and their court poets onto what Max Weber would call the bearers or carriers (*Träger*) of the Persian epistolary literature, history, and the Persianate culture—namely the *dabirs* and the *monshi*s, synonymous terms used for the bureaucratic estate in the earlier and later periods, respectively. They attribute the remarkable stability of written Persian and its high immunity from continuous vernacular change to the small size of this estate and its restrictive control over the culture of literacy. The cultural domination of this estate of literati in the Persianate world was perpetuated through generations by scribal families who manned government administrations (and who, incidentally, had their own secular training outside of the *madrasa*s, where education focused on the Qur'an, Islamic law, and, at times, theology).

The polymorphous and multifaceted character of Persophonia thus made written, literary Persian influential on the evolution of Turkic, Indic, and other languages of the "Persianate" ecumene (Canfield 1991; Doerfer 1998, 241–246). Ehsan Yarshater (1998, 77) confirms that Persian literature "provided inspiring models for generations of Indian, Turkish and Central Asian poets writing in Persian or in their own tongues." Muzaffar Alam (2004) analyzes the fascinating politics of the official appropriation of Persian and the reaction of the regional elites of the Mughal Empire, who countered it by advocating the Hindi-based Hindawi, and gradually Persianized it. In the eighteenth century, Hindawi was being written in the Persian (instead of Hindi) script, and thus became the language of the *ordu-ye shāhi* (royal camp; also *ordu-ye ma'allā*). This language of the Mughal elite at the royal court, called the urdu/camp in recognition of their long-continued Turko-Mongolian nomadic custom, percolated down to the lower rungs of administration, and eventually further down to the people.

The revival of the Persian language by the Samanids in Khorasan and Transoxania in the early tenth century laid the foundation for the emergence of a Persianate world whose ecumenical cultural unity had two components: Persianate Islam and Persian kingship. The most significant works in the nascent Persian prose were the Persian creed of the leading Hanafi theologian, Abu Mansur Māturidi (d. 944),[1] especially the *Great Commentary* (*Tafsir-e bozorg*) on the Qur'an (which was wrongly attributed to Mohammad b. Jarir al-Tabari (d. 923) in the later medieval period) and the Persian translation of Tabari's monumental *History of Prophets and Kings* by the Samanid Vizier, Abu 'Ali Bal'ami (d. 974 or after 992), which, alongside a slightly earlier prose translation,[2] paved the way for the later versifications of the *Epic of Kings* (*Shāhnāma*). These were both completed in the third quarter of the tenth century, under Mansur b. Nuh (961–976). Thus, from the very beginning, the Persianate variant of the Islamicate civilization combined the Persianization of Islam with the revival of Persian kingship.

The Persian bureaucrats serving the Il-Khanids, or descendants of Chingiss Khan, who overthrew the Caliphate in 1258 and ruled Iran for another century, not only promoted the Persianate idea of imperial monarchy but did so in close association with the promotion of the very idea of Iran, thus restoring the ecumenical unity of the Persianate world within their expanding empire (Lane 2003). In their bid for independence from the Great Qā'ān, the Il-Khans no doubt found it convenient

to convert the subordinate, nomadic Ulus Hűlegű to the territorial, God-protected realm of *Irān-zamin*. The transformation of the Il-Khans to the *Shāhanshāh* was, however, the work of Persian bureaucrats. Already by 1249, the highest Persian official in the Mongol imperial administration in Iran, Bahā' al-Din Jovayni, known as the *sāheb-divān* (master of the fiscal bureau), had dispatched his son, 'Atā-Malek Jovayni (d. 1283) to the imperial capital, Qaraqorum, to take part in the enthronement of Mőngke as the imperial Qā'ān in 1250, telling him to write a history of the rise of the Mongols for the edification of the young *Pādshāh* (imperial king). The idea was evidently to do so within the Persian statecraft and historiographic framework of kingship. The result, completed by 1260, was no less than the *Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā* (History of the World Conqueror), in which Jovayni offered a constitutional reading of the rise of Chinggis Khan as the foundation of a Persianate imperial monarchy (Arjomand 2016a). Persianate kingship had lost a serious conceptual rival with the destruction of the Caliphate by the Mongols. The first Il-Khans, Hülegü (d. 1265) and Abāqā (d. 1282), decorated the palaces at the Sasanian coronation site of Takht-e Soleymān with verses of the *Shāhnāma* on tiles (Melville 2013).

Jovayni's constitutional reading of Mongol imperial monarchy was reinforced by its teleological interpretation of Rashid al-Din Fazlallāh as the preparatory stage for the advent of his royal patron, Ghāzān Khan, as the "King (*pādshāh*) of Islam." The later Il-Khans, as is well known, promoted it by producing lavishly illustrated manuscripts of *Shāhnāma*, and commissioned Hamdallāh Mostawfi (d. 1740/740) to write their own supplementary epic of kings, *Zafarnāma* (Book of Victories), which devoted a larger number of verses to the kingship of Chinggis Khan and his descendants than to either the Arabs or the Persians. Hamdallāh was the last architect of the Il-Khanid political theology and offered a somewhat different constitutionalist interpretation of Mongol history that stemmed from a teleology centered on Iran rather than on Islam. This teleology, faithful to the Persian tradition in Ferdawsi's *Shāhnāma*, made the king's divine charisma transitive and spread to the realm of Iran, making it prosperous and luminous. Thus the good news [of Ghāzān's ascension] came from the heavens to earth: "That to the land of Iran (*irān-zamin*) a king/shall be sent by God" (cited in Arjomand 2015: 322).

Sufism did not take long to blend with Persianate Islam and shape its further development. With the exposition of mystical concepts in the elegant Persian prose of Khʷaja ʻAbdollāh Ansāri (d. 1088) in the mid-eleventh century, to which time our earliest extant Persian dictionary of Asadi Tusi (d. 1073) also dates, Persian replaces Arabic as the primary medium for the expression of Sufism. Ansāri's followers, Rashid al-Din Maybodi (d. after 1126), Ahmad Ghazāli (d. 1126), and ʻAbd al-Karim Samʻāni (d. 1167) (Chittick 2014), as well as ʻAyn al-Qozāt Hamadāni (d. 1131) and Hakim Sanā'i (d. 1131), continued to write in Persian in the twelfth century, and thus Sufism, too, was incorporated into Persianate Islam and, in fact, became its new distinctive feature.

Sufism deepened its penetration of grass-roots urban civic associations and guilds in the twelfth century, as it was finding consummate expression in Persian literature. Even the late ʻAbbasid Caliph al-Nāser le-Din Allāh (r. 1190–1225) sought to exploit it by unifying all these associations as "the purified Fotovva" within the Sufi order of his Persian advisor, Shaykh ʻOmar Sohrawardi (Arjomand 2016b: 5). This was followed by the devotional cult of ʻAli and the Shiʻitization of Sufism from below among antinomian dervish groups in the thirteenth century. By the early fourteenth century, the famous traveler Ibn Battuta (2, 139–142) was entertained by an Akhi/Fotovva organization (*al-akhiyyāt al-fityān*) in Anatolia and he reported the Akhis activities in Central Iran. The Sufi-penetrated Akhi guilds cum youth organizations had, in effect, enjoyed self-government in Ankara in alliance with local patricians and *amir*s since the 1290s because of the weak control from the Il-Khanid capital in Sivas. As the Il-Khanid Empire disintegrated after 1336, the guilds established a de facto "Akhi republic" (Arjomand 2016b). Better documented than the Ankara "Akhi republic" is the history of the so-called Sarbedār republic, which emerged in Sabzavar in eastern Khorasan in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Il-Khanid Empire. The Akhi-Fotovvat artisans of Sabzavar participated in government with patricians and local *amirs*, briefly becoming actual rulers between 1346 and 1362, and the local *amir*s twice coopted, as partners in government, the Shaykhs of a local Shiʻite dervish order, which had been recruiting a militia in Khorasan for the advent of the Mahdi—but only to murder them and revert to autocracy, first after three years, in 1343, and the second time after a year, in 1363 (Arjomand 2004, 240–243).

Popular Sufism as a mass movement among the subject population, which gathered great momentum under Turko-Mongolia domination and partly as a reaction to it, was bound to have an impact on the normative ideal of Persianate kingship. World renunciation was a pronounced feature of Persianate Sufism, and, in fact, had a paradoxical long-term impact on the idea of imperial monarchy. Najm al-Din Rāzi, known as the Dāya (tutor) (d. 1256/654), followed the call of the great Shaykh of his eponymous Kobraviyya order, Shaykh Najm al-Din Kobrā (d. 1221/618), to preserve and propagate Islam in the face of the Mongol invasion. He fled the Mongols from city to city from Khorasan to Anatolia, where he was introduced to Seljuq Sultan of Rum, 'Alā' al-Din Kay-Qobād, by the great Shaykh 'Omar Sohrawardi, and offered him his magisterial treatise, *Mirsād al-'ibād min al-mabda' ila'l-ma'ād* (The Path of God's Bondsmen from Origin to Return). The novelty of Najm al-Din's approach, the first to reflect the substantial impact of world renunciation on the conception of kingship, consists in treating kings as real Sufi disciples. He accordingly entitles his chapter on the tradition or manner of kings, "wayfaring" (*soluk*), as he does for the other classes in society. Najm al-Din's mirror for the wayfaring of kings thus produces a distinctively Sufi conception of kingship and society. Different classes of society perform their specialized functions to assure the cultivation of the seed of spirituality and knowledge, and each class needs the others to perform its functions. "Finally, a just and politic king (*pādshāh*) is needed to maintain equilibrium among the people and to repel evil and prevent the oppression of the weak from the strong, and to preserve and protect the subjects …" (Rāzi, 112). Rāzi enjoins his ideal wayfaring king "to strive to attain true and abiding kingship by means of this *borrowed and transient kingship*," and not to deprive himself of fair reputation among men and reward in the hereafter (Algar tr., 397, emphasis mine).

In 1258/656, the fateful year of the overthrow of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad by the Mongols, Sa'di wrote the *Golestān*, the most influential mirror for the prince in Persian literature. Sa'di's first chapter is on the tradition/[normative] manner of kings (*sirat-e pādshāhān*), as the wielders of earthly power, and is followed by a second chapter on the ethics (*akhlāq*) of the religious elite or the wielders of spiritual power, who are, significantly, called the "dervishes" (*darvishān*). This ordering is quite remarkable because it shows that the Sufi virtuosi as dervishes have replaced the jurists as the religious elite in Persianate societies after the Mongol invasion.[3]

The nemesis of the upward mobility of the Sufi masters into the ranks of the spiritual elite of the post-Mongol Turko-Mongolian world was the tremendous growth of the Shi'itized Sufism of antinomian dervish groups, or God's unruly friends, as Karamustafa (1994) calls them. The Qalandars, Haydaris, Malamatis, and Abdāl of Rum turned Sufi world renunciation into rejection of society, or "renunciation of society through outrageous social deviance" (Karamustafa 1994, 76). They also made a significant contribution to the simultaneous Persianization and Islamicization of Anatolia. The famous fifteenth-century antinomian dervish, Kaygusuz Abdal, for example, pointed to the formative impact of Persian Sufi poetry on his poems in the Turkish vernacular as a major contributor to the consolidation of what he calls "vernacular Islam" in Anatolia (Karamustafa 2014, 330).

Transnational Growth of Persianate Islam

The greatest poet of the Delhi Sultanate, Amir Khosraw of Delhi (d. 1325), transmitted both the Persianate idea of kingship and Persianate Sufi Islam to India. Sunil Sharma (2005) rightly calls him the poet of Sufis and Sultans. There is, however, an asymmetry in this implied patronage of Amir Khosraw. In contrast to his rapidly changing royal patron, he remained, throughout his career, the constant disciple of the great Sufi saint, Nizam al-Din Awliya. Amir Khosraw's lyrics, which continue to be sung by Qawali singers to this day, were permeated by the spirit of Persianate Sufism and spread it into the popular culture of the Delhi Sultanate.

With the continuous immigration of Persian scribes/bureaucrats and Sufi masters from Central Asia and Iran into the Delhi Sultanate and, from the fourteenth century onward, to the Deccan, the core region of the overlap of the Sanskrit and Persianate Cosmopolises, Persianate Islam, and Persianate political ethic was imported and naturalized hand in hand (Siddiqui 2006; Arjomand 2008; 2009). The close association of rulers and Sufi saints, typical both of the Delhi Sultanate and the fifteenth-century Persianate world, is found in the close association of the Bahmani rulers of the Deccan and their Sufi spiritual advisers. The juxtaposition of the tomb of Firuz Shah Bahmani (1397–1422) and the tomb (*dargāh*) of Shaykh [Sayyed] Mohammad Hosayni Gisu-Daraz (d. 1422) in Gulbarga, which, like the juxtaposition of the *ivān* imitating the Tāq-e Kesrā and the Hazar Sotun hall in the same fort, expresses the "dual [royal and spiritual]

Persianate architectural power symbols adopted by the early Bahmanis" (Philon 2010, 16).

Meanwhile, the Mongol rulers of Iran were paradoxically instrumental in the expansion of *dār al-Islām* to Anatolia, and its intensive Islamicization. Persianate Sufism came to Anatolia as Tranoxania and Khorasan were overrun by the Mongols, and the Seljuqs of Rum gave refuge to Sufi masters, such as Najm al-Din Rāzi, as well as to antinomian Qalandar and Haydari dervishes in great numbers. Around 1239–1242/637–639, while Mawlana Jalāl al-Din was settling in Konya, the antinomian dervish, Bābā Eshāq—called Bābā Rasul Allāh by his followers who wore red caps—led a massive rebellion of Turkman tribesmen who had been displaced from Kh^{w}arazm (Arjomand 2016b).

The tremendous growth of the Persianate culture under Turko-Mongolian domination also meant the growth and transformation of Persianate Islam. Persianate Islam, still firmly rooted in the Qur'an and the *hadith*, manifested itself in a novel form as a result of the overthrow of the caliphate and the disestablishment of the *ulamā*—this novel form of adaptation to the collapse of Islamic political and religious authority manifested itself in a new pattern of religious authority born from the synergy between Sufism and Shi'ism. This new pattern of authority greatly intensified the millenarian and mystical elements latent or dormant in Orthodox (Sunni) Islam. The rise of popular Sufism, and with it, the religious and political prominence of the Sufi Shaykhs, was concomitant with the disestablishment of the *ulamā*, and the greatly enhanced opportunity structure of the highly changeable and decentralized Turko-Mongolian nomadic empires in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries induced some of the leading Sufi Shaykhs to give Persianate Sufi Islam a distinctly millennial inflection. A number of them claimed to be the Mahdi and launched massive millennial movements (Arjomand 1984; Mir-Kasimov 2014).

This new mystic-millennial Islam completed the paradoxical impact of Sufi world renunciation on Persianate kingship. Millennial Sufism inspired a Timurid prince, Mirza Eskandar b. 'b. 'Omar-Shaykh, who was an initiate into the Horufi millennial movement and ruled Fars for a few years in the early fifteenth century, and claimed to be the Mahdi of the End of Time, who unifies the apparent and real monarchy (*saltanat-e suri o ma'nawi*) (Binbaş 2014). This foreshadowed the absolutist pattern of fused religio-political authority established by the youthful founder of the Safavid Empire in 1501, Shah Esmā'il. Esmā'il's father (and grandfa-

ther), as the *shaykh*s of the Safavid Sufi order, had sought, in the historian Khʷānd-Amir's (*Habib al-Siyar*, 4: 426) words, the "unification of dervishhood and kingship" (*jamʿ-e darvishi o shāhi* (—that is, of the material and the spiritual monarchy. A quarter of century after Esmaʿil, a Timurid prince, who had lost his domain in Central Asia, moved south and conquered India by chance. Both in his intellectual formation and his political career in Central Asia, Kabul, and India, Babur was the embodiment of multilingual Persianate culture of the Timurid ecumene. When the aged Timurid historian left the Safavid domains for India in the last years of his life, it was this latest symbiosis of Sufism and kingship that he brought with him to Babur, who died shortly after his arrival. So he re-dedicated his treatise to Babur's son, Homayun. The early Safavid "millennial sovereignty" was thus imported into the Mughal Empire of the Timurids in India (Moin 2012). Thus, the hitherto temporal autocracy of imperial monarchy was enhanced, in the early modern Muslim empires, by the addition of a sacral element: spiritual sovereignty.

The great Mughal emperor Akbar (1566–1609) fully exercised his spiritual sovereignty in creating a unified cultural framework for his ethno-religiously plural empire as he integrated the Hindu Rajputs systematically into its political and military organization. According to his historian and counselor, Abu'l-Fazl, who added a constitutional interpretation of his reforms, *Ā'in-e Akbari* (Akbar's Institutes), to the epic account of his master's rise in *Akbarnāna* (Book of Akbar), Akbar took great interest in the social conditions, culture, law, and philosophy of the Hindus "who form the bulk of the population and in whose political advancement the emperor saw the guarantee of the stability of his realm" (cited in Alam 2004, 138–139). Akbar accordingly commissioned the translation of Hindu scriptures and Sanskrit texts on religion, law, mathematics, astronomy, ethics, and myths into Persian, and was called by the poet Keshav Das "the master of both religions," possessing attributes of Vishnu (Alam 2004, 139). Akbar's religious synthesis, *din-e elāhi*, bore a particularly strong Persianate imprint through emigrants belonging to the mystical-millennial Noqtawi heresy, and formulated its key concept of *solh-e koll* (universal conciliation) (Amanat 2014, 375). The Persian Noqtawi's also imparted the Persianized pantheism of Ibn ʿArabi's religious pluralistic doctrine of the "unity of existence" into Akbar's millennial declaration of his infallibility and his changing of the Islamic calendar (Amanat 2014).

The End of Persianate Islam

The expansion and consolidation of the Persianate world in Central Asia and India continued down to the nineteenth century. The coherence of the Persianate world region was greatly weakened in the nineteenth century with the expansion of the Russian Empire into the Caucasus and Central Asia, and with Macauley's infamous 1837 memorandum on education under the Mughal Empire, which in effect disestablished Persian in India two decades before the establishment of the British Raj.

The destruction of the Persianate ecumene was completed in the twentieth century with the creation of the Soviet republics in Central Asia and, in 1947, the new state of Pakistan. Although its cultural founding figure, Mohammad Iqbal, wrote eloquent poetry in Persian, the state created for the Muslims of India declared itself the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, discarding the Persianate heritage of seven centuries of Muslim rule in India for the Islamic ideology taught in its schools. With the overthrow of the monarchy in 1979, Iran itself discarded Persianate Sufism, as much as Persianate kingship, in favor of political Islam and Islamic government. The declared goal of the revolutionary Islam Republic of Iran was certainly transnational. It had nothing Persianate about it, however.

Its declared goal, as elaborated in the Preamble to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was to export the Islamic revolution to the entire Muslim world. The Preamble to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran affirms its commitment to the continuation of revolution at home and abroad in order to create a "unified and universal community of believers (*umma*)." Before long, however, it became clear that the enthusiasm of Sunni Muslims for Iran's Islamic revolution was ephemeral, and Shi'ite clericalist political Islam was only exportable to Shi'ite Muslims, among whom the Iranian revolutionary government had succeeded in setting up its "fifth columns."

The initial success in exporting the Islamic revolution across the boundaries of the Iranian nation-state into Pakistan and Afghanistan soon backfired. In Pakistan, attempts by Iranian agents and diplomats in the 1980s soon provoked a sharp Sunni reaction and plunged Pakistan into an exacerbating Shi'ite–Sunni sectarian conflict that continues unabated to this day. 'Allāma 'Arif Husyan al-Husayni, who had been studying in Najaf during Khomeini's exile there, spent some four years

in Qom before returning to Pakistan in 1978. In 1980, he helped Mufti Ja'far Husayn, a prominent figure in the Shi'ite community, found the Tahrik-i Nifaz-i Fiqh-i Ja'fariyya (Movement for the Implementation of the Shi'ite Law) and organize its protest demonstrations, until he was assassinated in August 1988. This set up a chain reaction over which Iran had no control. Sunni Mullahs responded by setting up some dozen militant sectarian organizations. The most notable of these is the Sipah-i Sahabah Pakistan, founded by a Deobandi cleric, Mawlana Haqnawaz Jhangvi (assassinated in 1989), to demand that the Shi'a (over 15 percent of the population) be declared non-Muslim. Over 200 people were killed in sectarian violence in the Punjab Province of Pakistan between 1989 and 1994, another 200 died in a "five-day war" in the Northwest Frontier Province in 1996, with some 70 more deaths in the first 10 days of August 1997 in anticipation of the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the country (Arjomand 1991).

Sectarian violence in Pakistan mounted sharply after 2000 and has continued unabated. Iran cannot be said to have gained anything by this continuous exacerbated violence, which has stimulated anti-Shi'ite sectarian mobilization in Southeast Asia, notably in Malaysia and Indonesia. Unlike Persianate Islam with its absorptive capacity and adaptability, the pan-Islamic façade of contemporary political Islam has proved highly deceptive. Though equally transnational, it greatly sharpened the sectarian divide between Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims, unleashing religious wars that are fiercely sectarian, as is evident after the emergence of the Islamic State of the Caliphate in occupied Iraq and Syria.

Notes

1. We also have the translation of another Hanafi creed in the last quarter of the tenth century (Julie S. Meisami, *Persian Historiography to the End of the Twelfth Century* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999)).
2. The so-called *Shāhnāma-ye Abu Mansuri* was completed in 957/346, and only its preface survives (Meisami, *Persian Historiography*, 20).
3. A jurist (*faqih*) and, even more rarely, a proponent of perennial wisdom (*hakim*) are nevertheless occasionally mentioned in the parables of *Golestān*.

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CHAPTER 5

Charisma as a Transnational Enterprise

Enzo Pace

Global Pentecostalism

According to the estimates of the *World Christian Trends* (2001) and the Pew Forum Research Center (2015), at least one in four of the two billion Christians around the world belongs to a Pentecostal church or a charismatic movement. More prudent estimates set the figure at around 350 million. We can speak only in terms of estimates because nobody has counted accurately as yet. It would be far from easy to do so, because the various aggregations are numerous and new movements are continually appearing on the scene, and also because it is sometimes difficult to classify the great variety of phenomena going by the name of Pentecostalism in simple, unifying categories.

By 2025, the number of Christians worldwide is expected to be 2.6 billion. The majority of them will live in Africa (633 million), Latin America (640 million), and Asia (460 million). The Christianity that is taking shape in what was once the Third World can be seen as a Third Church (Buhlmann 1977), distinct from the main historical Christian churches (in particular, the Catholic and the Protestant). It might be better described as a postcolonial Christianity, proud of its indigenous traits

E. Pace (✉)
University of Padova, Padova, Italy

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and posessing its own cultural categories (no longer modeled on those of European philosophical tradition), and organized much more flexibly than the complex ecclesiastical formats that have dominated the history of Western Christianity—formats that the hierarchies and authorities of the older churches tried to export, transplanting them elsewhere with results that were sometimes ambivalent or dubious, and sometimes dramatic as in the case of Rwanda (Pace 2003).

Philip Jenkins (2002), a historian of religion, has written of the advent of a new type of global Christianity that tends to present itself as well tempered in the certainty of its beliefs and more slender in its organizational forms. It is a faith that believes in the gifts of the Spirit, not in merely abstract terms, but as a socially observable fact: if you pray hard enough, the Spirit will heal you, loosen your tongue, make people speak in tongues, infuse a capacity for prophecy, reveal where the devil is hidden, and confer power enough to battle with the devil and exorcize him here and now; all this can happen with no barriers between lay people and priests or pastors, because the faithful are convinced that the Spirit blows where it will and on whoever believes in it.

Organizational Models, Types of Leadership, and Styles of Communication

Given the complexity of the phenomenon, taking a look at the various organizational models and styles of communication adopted by the various Pentecostal churches can help us to delineate the object of our analysis and shed light on the process of differentiation underway in the forms of religious leadership within modern-day Christianity, from the classical figure of the pastor to that of the charismatic entrepreneur. We need to consider at least three dimensions:

1. The relationship between the various leading characters and the *word* (laid down in the holy text, i.e. the Bible)
2. The variety of styles used to communicate this *word*, from traditional learned communication to market-oriented communication
3. The different ways of behaving in the ritual space, from the traditional model of Bible study (the Bible Schools) to rites converted into performances by expert actors, who stand alone on a stage in a large space, capable of containing huge audiences (mega-church auditoriums, mega-screens, mega-miracles)

All these serve the purposes of a strategy for marketing *salvation goods* (Fig. 5.1).



Fig. 5.1 The three analytical dimensions

By letting the three above-mentioned dimensions interact (the economy of the biblical text, the leader's style of communication, and how the space and ritual action are managed), I aim to sketch a type of leadership that functionally helps us to get our bearings in the vast world of modern-day Pentecostalism. First of all, from the Pew Forum research (2006), we can distinguish not only between the Pentecostal and the charismatic pastors, but also between these two figures and what I will call the *charismatic entrepreneur*. The flow chart below summarizes the salient features that I intend to analyze here, grouping the three figures under the very broad umbrella term (also borrowed from the research conducted by the Pew Forum) of *revivalists* (Fig. 5.2).

The first type of (Pentecostal) leadership is consistent with all those churches and denominations that belong to the *classical* Pentecostalism developing historically in a Protestant environment in the early twentieth century. It met with remarkable success in the Church of God in Christ, for instance, and later in the Assemblies of God (AG), established in 1914 at Hot Springs (Arkansas) and now boasting nearly 13,000 communities in the United States alone (three million followers).

Essentially, the origins of this phenomenon can be seen in the spiritual reawakening that occurred between 1850 and the beginning of the twentieth century in the English-speaking Protestant world, from Wales in Great Britain to several states in North America. This was certainly not the first reawakening. There had been others, in more or less lengthy and intense cycles, such as the development of new sects that later became Methodism or the Church of the Brethren, producing what historians call the Second Awakening (late eighteenth



Fig. 5.2 Pentecostals, charismatic leaders, and charismatic entrepreneurs

to mid-nineteenth century). We can trace the ideas of reawakening people's consciences, returning to a more primitive model of the church, cleansing the ecclesiastical structures excessively concerned with the temporal world and political power, and rediscovering the *social* power of the Sermon on the Mount (when Jesus spoke about beatitude). The Second Awakening harked back to the Puritan movement that had set an earthquake in motion under the British monarchy and the Church of England in the seventeenth century, then expanded to the New World.

If we conventionally consider Puritanism as the First Reawakening, there have since been at least another three great waves of movements cyclically returning to the ideas of the community of *the saints and all those who stand equal in the eyes of God*, and of a more slender and democratic type of church, that is anti-clerical and anti-hierarchical in its organizational format. The outcomes of these waves may well differ, but the motives behind them seem to be much the same. After the rising of Puritanism, the second, nineteenth-century wave saw the consolidation of new denominations such as Methodism. The third concerned what has been termed, to good effect, the "holiness movement," that in many ways anticipated the motives that led preachers later on to insist on the topics of the Baptism of the Spirit and the healing charisma, typical of early Pentecostalism.

The event generally described as the starting point of the fourth Pentecostal wave took place at the Bethel Bible College in Topeka, the capital of Kansas, where the first Pentecostal group was established on

January 1, 1901, under the guidance of Charles Parham. This group expanded into Missouri and Texas, and eventually, with greater success, into California, where the first Pentecostal mission opened in Azusa Street in Los Angeles, under the guidance of William Seymour, in 1906. This original spiritual humus generated one of the greatest networks of the kind mentioned earlier, the AG. To give an idea of the extent of its success, as at 2013, this denomination had 283,413 churches dotted around 110 countries worldwide, with more than 65 million followers. What animates this Pentecostal movement and its leadership (now considered classical or historical) is the firm conviction that the second coming of Jesus will be preceded by a period of redemption and spiritual reform for all people on Earth. Consistent with the teachings of the Gospel, the wait for this second coming is marked by faith in the gifts of the Holy Spirit. It is therefore a church of the Pentecost, convinced that the last times are upon us.

The second type of leadership is *charismatic*, and refers to all those new religious movements born between 1960 and 1980, both within the main Christian churches (Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic) and outside them, and sometimes even in open conflict with them. These movements consist of groups of believers who practice rites and have spiritual experiences similar to those of the historical Pentecostal churches, but who do not identify with any of them. The point of rupture with the established churches stems specifically from the fact that these new groups acknowledge a particular charismatic person as having extraordinary gifts, the power to heal, and the power to enable the faithful to communicate with the Spirit. In some cases, followers may remain in contact with, and consider themselves still part of, a Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox church, but will tend to organize their activities independently because they feel they are living a *sincerely Christian* experience in their rituals. They gain experience of speaking in tongues (*glossolalia*), and they go wherever there is someone believed to have extraordinary gifts of healing and exorcism. They meet without the need for any hierarchy or established organizational format.

In the Catholic Church, for instance, there has been a Pentecostal movement ever since 1967. It arrived in Europe from the United States during the years immediately after the end of the Second Vatican Council. The movement has had legitimization issues with the Church but, now that some misunderstandings and tensions have been overcome, it forms a movement within the Church that is known as Renewal in the Holy Spirit.

Its followers speak in tongues, and they believe in the gifts of healing and of prophecy. They have not established a new church, but some of them have broken away to form movements that the ecclesiastical authorities consider to fall outside the Church, and that therefore shine entirely in their own light.

Also in the Catholic sphere, imposing examples come from Brazil, with the figure of the singer and songwriter, Father Marcelo, or from the Philippines, where the El Shaddai movement has attracted nearly ten million followers and become a church within the greater Catholic Church.

The third type of leader—that I have called a *charismatic entrepreneur*—is part of a movement that has formed more recently, starting in the early 1980s and continuing throughout the present days. The dominant feature of this figure lies in the transformation of the idea of the gifts of the Spirit into a moral resource that can lead to *worldly success*. The term "success" is used here in a broad sense: it can denote anything from economic success to material well-being as a consequence of having regained a spiritual and psychological harmony; from the capacity to influence political decisions (Garcia-Ruiz and Michel 2012; Mariano and Oro 2011) to engagement directly in the political debate. The word "movement" is meant in a sociological sense, as a tendency of vast social proportions, involving millions of people dotted all over the main continents of the globe. This tendency takes shape in a type of socio-religious aggregation that may resemble a church, but is initially presented as a group of people drawn toward and fascinated by the power of a charismatic leader.

The charisma begins with an individual person, and then develops into different types of charisma, or gifts of the Spirit. It gradually expands as the community of followers increases in number. In many cases, this community subsequently develops into a fully fledged organization that is sometimes pyramidal, sometimes slender and multicentric, sometimes supported by a sizable bureaucratic and administrative apparatus, and sometimes only virtual, entirely reliant on the often ephemeral virtues of the web (Internet) and the mass communication media it exploits. Tele-preachers first create a virtual, electronic church, and it is only in a second phase, when their audience has become substantial in number, that they consider building a physical meeting place, that may be a mega-church of imposing architectural design where Sunday services are on offer—rather like a megastore, a *mall* of the spirit. Examples of this kind are just as easy

to find in the United States as in Asia. At Garden Grove in California, Pastor John Osteen opened a prayer hall called the Crystal Cathedral: it consists of 10,000 panes of glass held together by a tubular framework. It has the capacity for 2,900 people and has been built to withstand an earthquake reaching the highest level of the Richter scale. In South Korea's capital, David Yonggi Cho, founder of the Yoido Full Gospel Church (which boasts approximately 850,000 members), has built a huge auditorium on the island of Yeouido. Up to 26,000 people can pray together in this massive assembly hall. The City Harvest Church founded by Kong Hee On in Singapore has a hall of similar capacity. Such phenomena can be found in Latin America too, especially if we look at the organizational style of a church born in 1977, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, that has a predilection for converting huge cinemas or large public spaces into places of prayer with capacity for thousands and thousands of people.

The mass of people becomes, in itself, a reassuring sign of the success of the people managing these new churches. Healing body and soul, while succeeding in life, seem to be the two objectives that are swelling the ranks and arousing the fervor of the new, more worldly wise charismatic churches. The slogan *nothing is too hard for God* perfectly sums up a way of thinking that seems to characterize the theology of these churches.

The Charismatic Enterprise

We are therefore looking at a new ideal type (to borrow from Weber's language) of socio-religious organization. Following the church and the sect that Christianity has acknowledged throughout its history and right up until the present day, we are now seeing a third type of aggregation that we can understand as a *charismatic enterprise*, that exalts personal talents rather than ecclesiastical systems, while it allows individuals to personally experience the gifts of the Spirit in order to succeed in life. This sociological construct can be compared, in practical terms, with the socio-religious formations of charismatic inspiration. In other words, we can see how strongly the idea of success is preached in each case: it may be only in neo-Puritan terms (change your way of life and cleanse yourself of your bad habits, and everything in and around you will be better); or it may be a call for economic prosperity that nurtures an individual's enterprising

spirit; or it may become an ideological platform for launching into the political arena.

What characterizes the profile of the leaders of this type of organization, the charismatic entrepreneurs, can be summarized as follows. A church is born as a *personal business*, centered on a given individual who succeeds in being acknowledged as having extraordinary gifts. This individual must be capable of offering a rituality that in many ways reiterates the classic format adopted by the historical Pentecostal churches, but competes with the latter specifically when it comes to the enacting of the *extraordinary*, which is placed directly within the grasp of the faithful. These rituals become a series of miracles, healings, and exorcisms. The leader's ritual performance must serve a strategy designed to ensure the church members' loyalty, rather than to establish stable communities. In other words, the goal is to establish a network of spiritual consumers, faithful beneficiaries of a set of spiritual and material salvation goods, who appreciate, and pay the right price for them every time they seek to draw immediate benefits in their affective and professional lives, and physical health.

The first investment of symbolic capital is, therefore, in the specific figure of the leader who *starts up* the enterprise, and who must necessarily communicate with the *mass*. Mass production relies on an executive class capable of organizing the charisma as a collective enterprise, exploiting every modern means of communication: transmitting images, establishing transnational bonds between the mother organization and its subsidiaries around the world, getting serial productions underway, differentiating the products for sale, training promoters, and so on. Converting a religious message into a business, presenting and representing the figure of the leader as a successful entrepreneur, adhering unreservedly to the idea of market competition ("my liturgical performance is more effective than yours"), and convincing a new generation of well-educated and urbanized followers that they must believe in order to be successful, modern, and competitive: all this appears to be a winning strategy. It appeals to a far from negligible proportion of Christians of the Third Millennium, who are leaving the churches of their birth to become *majority shareholders* in the new charismatic enterprises.

What we should study in these charismatic entrepreneurs is, therefore, the relationship between the power of communication and the mass. This topic is hardly new; many scholars have considered it in the past, including Le Bon (1895), Ortega y Gasset (1929), Riesman (1950), and Mosse (1975). Their fundamental contributions focused more on the political

aspects, however, and aimed to show how democracy and liberalism can degenerate into authoritarianism. The religious dimension was consequently not very apparent in their analyses. At most, it emerged when an author considered the sacralization of political power, as occurred under Nazism in Germany (see in Mosse), or the deification of Communist collectivism (discussed by Ortega y Gasset).

One scholar who did explore the socio-religious dynamics of the relationship between the mass and power was Elias Canetti (1960). Recalling a passage in his book *Crowds and Power*:

> All ceremonies and rules pertaining to such institutions are basically intent on capturing the crowd; they prefer a church-full secure to the whole world insecure. The regularity of church-going and the precise and familiar repetition of certain rites safeguard for the crowd something like a domesticated experience of itself. These performances and their recurrence at fixed times supplant needs for something harsher and more violent. (Canetti 1960, 21)

All the rebellions against traditional ceremonials recounted in the history of religions have been directed against the confinement of the crowd, which wants to feel the sensation of its own growth again. The Sermon on the Mount in the New Testament comes to mind. It is enacted in the open, thousands are able to listen, and there is no doubt that it is directed against the limiting ceremoniousness of the official temple. One remembers the tendency of Pauline Christianity to break out of the national and tribal boundaries of Judaism and to become a universal faith for all. One remembers the contempt of Buddhism for the caste system of contemporary India.

The inner history, too, of the several world religions is rich in occurrences of a similar kind. The Crusades developed into crowd formations of a magnitude no church building of the contemporary world could have held.

Attending a rite lasting three or four hours in the prayer city of a large charismatic church in Lagos or Accra enables us to really *see* the emergence of a postcolonial Christianity that is no longer indebted to the historical European or American churches. This is Christianity converted into a *mass consumer good*, made available to a multitude of individuals who finally feel free. It is an explosion of religious effervescence and vitality, to borrow again from Canetti, and bringing to mind Durkeim's well-known idea of the sacred. Now the strategic aspect of

this type of mass consumption of Christianity lies precisely in what the charismatic entrepreneurs have to offer. First of all, they may promise that they can bring people physically into touch with the *afterlife* here and now, in the physical and psychological battle that *every believer* can fight against *Satan and his toxic influence*, thanks to the protection offered by the mass. So the Spirit (of good) can triumph—obviously always "in the name of Jesus"—here and now. Second, they can demonstrate, as a result, that the ceremonial or rite is no mere repetition of an established order, but a series of improvisations; the leader is always able to arouse new emotions, passions, and beliefs that feel new even though the scene being enacted has been carefully prepared and is hetero-directed. Where the charisma is an enterprise, the leaders' power of communication lies in their ability to make each and every individual imagine another world of signs and potential meanings. That is why so much attention is paid to the aesthetic dimension of the ritual (Butticci 2013, 2016; Meyer 2011, 2012; Ojo 2005). Third, the charismatic entrepreneur can convert this spiritual energy into a driver of social actions to achieve success in life: if I am able (here, for all the world to see) to defeat an enemy who has tried to prevent me from being myself, then I can put my powers to the test, stand up to the adversities of life, and cope with obstacles that have so far prevented me from succeeding economically and socially.

The Field of Investigation: Nigeria and Ghana

The ideal type of the charismatic entrepreneur described above is the outcome of research conducted by the author together with Annalisa Butticci, between 2008 and 2012 (Pace and Butticci 2010), on the most recently formed neo-Pentecostal and charismatic churches in Nigeria and Ghana (and in these countries' Italian diaspora).

Studying these two cases, I focused on the new type of postcolonial Christianity, and the various models of religious leadership emerging in these settings. The question, of how the charismatic entrepreneurs wield their powers of communication and induce people to imagine that another world is possible (in both symbolic and material terms) seems to me particularly important in the case of these two countries where, even more than elsewhere, the proliferation of neo-Pentecostal and charismatic aggregations seems to know no bounds. It is virtually impossible to count them because there are so many, and because many of them are

so fleeting. Some have become large, well-established denominations that are quite well organized and relatively well funded. Others are of middling size and rely largely on the figure of their charismatic leader, whose demise can be expected to trigger conflicts over who is to manage the charisma (and any accumulated economic fortunes). Others are smaller and have few resources.

There is another important aspect to consider when we study these formations, and that is the relationship between the new symbolic systems gradually developed by the charismatic entrepreneurs and the socio-religious and socio-cultural environment in which they operate. These entrepreneurs sometimes succeed in establishing themselves as leaders of a transnational enterprise, either because their fame spreads beyond their country's boundaries, or because the organization that develops around them succeeds in expanding (like the historical churches) with networks of missions abroad. Either way, the organizational model is market-oriented (Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001; Freston 2004; Währisch-Oblau 2009). In socio-religious terms, this market orientation means that the leader is less interested in explaining the Bible, and more concerned with exhibiting his credentials as a successful charismatic entrepreneur. At the same time, this leader needs to create a *language* that is *authorized* (in religious terms), an economy of signs of salvation that seems consistent with the demand for a religion that is neither inherited, nor wholly uprooted from the system of indigenous beliefs and practices, or from that religion of the Spirit that still plays such a large part in the collective mentality, like a sort of barely-concealed vitality that has never been erased, not even by the forms of Christianity most closely resembling the indigenous cultures (and certainly not by European Christianity) (Bediako 1992; Kalu 2008; Mbiti 1986). Traces of this vitality emerge in the rites of deliverance, though this is hotly denied by the charismatic leaders and neo-Pentecostal pastors, who often see the traditional religions of the spirits as an expression of the devil.

In sketching the figure of the charismatic entrepreneur, I was inspired by an enlightening text written by Ogbu Kalu (2008), professor of World Christianity and Mission of the McCormick Theological Seminary. Though his approach is mainly theological, Kalu takes a broader look at the phenomenon of African Pentecostalism, more from the stance of *religious studies*, so to speak. His writing consequently also contains some useful sociological and anthropological considerations, some of which are

worth mentioning here as part of our analysis of our two case studies of neo-Pentecostal charismatic entrepreneurship, Nigeria and Ghana.

The first observation has to do with the process of de-colonization of the religious cognitive map of many African populations. Up until the end of the 1970s, preachers and missionaries from the United States tried to spread their message in the African continent, but (as Kalu demonstrates) the years from 1980 to 1990 saw the birth of churches that wished to be independent from those imported from America. More importantly, the decade saw the creation of transnational networks involving different African states (Adogame et al. 2012; Hackett 1990; Ojo 2005). Some churches first established in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, and Malawi have proved capable not only of spreading beyond their national boundaries and opening branches in almost all the principal states of sub-Saharan Africa (including Ethiopia), but also—from a certain point onward after the 1990s—of setting up branches of their churches in Europe or the United States. They have done so partly by following migrants' footsteps, and partly thanks to favorable contingencies, such as in the case of Pastor Sunday Adelaja, who successfully founded his own Pentecostal Church in Kiev. At the request of its present leader (Enoch Adeboye, professor of mathematics at the University of Lagos), one of the largest Nigerian churches—the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), founded in Nigeria in 1952 by Josiah Akindayoni (1909–1980)—recently purchased a piece of land in Texas, in the town of Floyd (sadly famous as one of the centers of the Ku Klux Klan) for around $1 million. Another church—the Deeper Life Bible Church, also founded in Nigeria in 1982 by Willian Kumuyi—had communities dotted around sixteen African states within ten years of its foundation.

It is worth underscoring that many other leading characters have initially tried to remain faithful (even linguistically) to the mentality of the urban populations to which they were preaching. The founder of the RCCG, for instance, was illiterate, and his sermons were always delivered in Yoruba (the language of the populations inhabiting the south-west of Nigeria); but his successor, Adeboye, translated them into English, the national language of Nigeria. Similarly, the young pastors emerging, at the beginning of the charismatic reawakening of the 1980s, everywhere from Benin to Burkina Faso, from the Ivory Coast to Congo, and from Nigeria to Ghana, preferred to qualify themselves not as pastors, but as *aliliki*, or freelance preachers: figures somewhere between the prophets who had already appeared in Africa between 1910 and 1950 (often

in combination with the first anti-colonial movements)—like William Wade Harris in Liberia or Simon Kimbangu in Congo—and the holders of an oracular power that is reminiscent of the ancient figure of the shaman. This gave rise to a new generation of preachers who rapidly became emancipated from the traditional ecclesiastical models and turned into charismatic entrepreneurs. They have formed a whole array of new churches or church-like organizations, inventing not only new (and sometimes highly imaginative) names for them, but also a distinctly unconventional repertoire for managing all things sacred (from rites to preaching styles). Kalu coined a very fitting term for defining this new type of religious leader—"Big Man of the Big God"—and the first question he asks is:

> Since Pentecostals imagine themselves as being engaged in the re-evangelization of modern Africa, how has the intensive use of media enhanced, reshaped, and even endangered Pentecostal missionary strategy? (2008, 104)

The link that Kalu sees between the emergence of a new type of Pentecostal leader and these churches' use of communication media (both traditional and modern) is to the point, because the founders of the charismatic churches of the 1980s are excellent communicators. They use the language of the media for a precise purpose, and that is to make the transition from the figure of the traditional shepherd of souls, spiritual curator of a community of believers, to that of the successful stage performer. They must know how to conduct their rites like a show, occupying the stage with the ease of an experienced actor, modulating their voices, and switching from strong emotions to peaceful reflections. Some of these new leaders are enlightening examples: they generally have a good university education and some even have PhDs in the pure sciences, like Daniel Olukoya, the founder of the Mountain of Fire and Miracles Ministries, with his PhD in microbiology, awarded at the University of Reading in the UK.

A leader like Olukoya belongs to a generation that knows how to appreciate modern mass communication media, and he was convinced that the traditional preaching methods needed changing. The capacity to communicate must become an added value, another strength of the charismatic leader's personal curriculum. The mediatic organization of religious rites serves this purpose: it helps to lend power, especially to those conducting

the ritual action. Singing, preaching, shouting against the forces of Satan, obsessively invoking the name of Jesus against them, these preachers stand on huge stages (that increasingly resemble the apse of a church), holding religious services with the aid of mega-screens that echo their image all over their prayer cities. The preacher thus shows, time and again, that he is a superhero, bestowed with a divine power, who can let single believers come into physical contact with this power, and gain possession of it in small but sufficient doses.

Rijk van Dijk (2001a, b) studied these figures in Malawi and has emphasized that the aura of power that every leader strives to demonstrate in public is not only the product of an ultra-modern mediatic and spectacularized Pentecostalism. It also reflects a longstanding concept identifiable in the culture of several African populations. He says there is a word, *kukhwima*, that traditionally means someone who has reached an exceptional state of grace that gives him or her an immense power. This condition was mainly a feature of the shaman or village witch doctor, who could manipulate what were believed to be good spirits and set them against the spirits of evil. Continuing the work of the European missionaries, the Pentecostalism of the 1970s has always tried to eradicate the ancient cults that were (and still are) widespread among African populations, insisting instead on Bible studies and community prayer, and spreading the gifts of the Holy Spirit instead of the traditional exorcist and magical practices.

In some ways, the new charismatic tendency developing since the 1980s is paradoxical. The religious leaders' uninhibited use of the media (old and new) has had the effect of emphasizing the image of the powerful representative of God, whose words and gestures can work amazing miracles in the very moment when a rite is being performed. Oddly enough, this return of the magical enchantment is facilitated by what we see as the very symbol of modernity, the new media. That is why the *big man* makes no mystery of becoming rich; the image of a life of ease and material well-being is presented as an example to imitate—especially for the younger generations, who see this new form of Pentecostalism as a successful undertaking (the charismatic enterprise), a trademark capable of competing with other brands on the market, a way of life that makes them *modern*. Like van Dijk, other scholars (Asamoha-Gyadu 2004, 2005, 2013; Ojo 2013; Ukah 2003) have pointed out this historical shift in the process of differentiation experienced by Pentecostal Christianity in the last 30 years or so in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Religion joins

the market of mass consumer goods and is treated as such by those striving to occupy a place in a market already very crowded with salvation goods, and making every effort to reach as many people as possible, whatever their cultural levels and social classes: a *pop-religion* fascinated by the new charismatic entrepreneurs.

Transnational Charismatic Enterprise and Global Christianity

Canetti's reflections have often come to mind when I have entered a neo-Pentecostal church or a charismatic enterprise in Brazil, Nigeria, or Ghana. I have felt a sense of being confused, with a great body of people who seemed to expand as a mass and, with passionate enthusiasm, allow themselves to be swayed by the charismatic leader of the moment, and whether he more closely resembled a pastor or an entrepreneur was of little importance at the time.

What was noticeable, in other words, was the trench that now separated these masses convinced by somebody with the extraordinary power to communicate with the Spirit to abandon "the limiting ceremonies of the official temple" (Canetti 1960, 21). In this particular case, we are talking about the official Christianity of the historical churches born in Europe and then transplanted elsewhere. These churches exported their evangelical message all over the world, following in the footsteps of the colonial powers. Their message was filtered through Euro-centric philosophical and theological cultures, supported by authoritarian models of conversion, and designed to reproduce the organizational formats of the Christian Church in social contexts that had no familiarity with them.

Postcolonial studies (see e.g. Asad 1993; Chakrabarty 2000; Levitt 2012) have provided a critique on how European and American theories on religion are taken as universal. According to Asad, in particular, the issue concerns why we tend to view some kinds of religion to be normal or natural. To try to correct for this implicit bias, when studying African Pentecostals in Nigeria, Ghana, and Europe, I am obliged to adjust my lens.

Firstly, I tend to reconsider the relationship between sacred, magic, and religion in modern Christianity. The charismatic enterprise in many cases in Africa mobilizes some cultural resources long ago repressed, removed, and disqualified by the Christian missionaries during the European settlement era. As Davidson (1972, 156)—a prominent scholar of the cosmogony of the Dogon's people (Niger)—reminds us,

a member of a tribe, when asked by a Christian missionary to abandon his gods, answered: "Does your god really want us to climb to the top of another palm tree and then let go and allow ourselves to fall?" The new charismatic leader invites people to embrance Christianity without giving up their pre-Christian religious roots (Pace 2011). In African Pentecostalism, we find not only God's revenge (Kepel 1991), but also the return game of the magic-sacral excluded and negatively stigmatized by the missionaries and then by the established mainstream churches (Catholic, Reformed and, more recently, Independent). It occurs not against the hypermodern means of communication. The oral power of the charismatic leader works well amongst the multi-media enterprise of the word. Religion doesn't stay primarily within contained spaces (local, national, or regional communities), but moves, circulating in the world, and cyberspace advances the aim of the charismatic enterprise to cross any cultural and religious borders. The above-mentioned Nigerian pastor, Sunday Adelaja, who 20 years ago inaugurated in Kiev a Pentecostal church (The Embassy of the Blessed Kingdom of God for All Nations) boasts a TV ministry, plans for a $15 million church stadium, and aims to reach five million people in Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and China.

Secondly, we have to consider the charismatic enterprise not as a source of a stable set of beliefs and practices, institutionalized, doctrine-oriented, and codified in a time and space. It is, rather, an investment of symbolic resources which circulates between spaces, crossing cultural borders and challenging the traditional monopolistic and oligopolistic religious market historically ruled by dominant churches and institutionalized tradition. This kind of enterprise shares the process of globalization, creating a new brand that we can call global Christianity. We can use also the formula of transnational Christianity (see Levitt 2001, 2012). Using a transnational methodology means looking at how the process of incorporation, enduring homeland, or other involvements occur at the same time and mutually inform each other.

Migration patterns flow all over the world and people continue to take part actively in the religious field in their homeland, while being in connection simultaneously with other spaces where their church or charismatic pastors are settling, opening congregations for migrants and, in some cases, for the autochthons. Instead think in binary terms—the countries of origin of Afro-Pentecostal churches versus their destination or their so-called reverse

mission to Europe and the West—the transnational approach helps us to understand to what extent the charismatic enterprise challenges nation states and the historical Christian churches' interests and power. Despite their aim to be a world religion, actually they seconded, in many cases, the process of national identity building. Therefore, I agree with the Rudolph and Piscatori (1996): if globalization means the dilution of state sovereignty, the charismatic enterprise represents a heuristic case study, because of its structural capability of crossing not only state boundaries, but also broadly symbolic boundaries tracked historically by the Christian churches in the territories of national states. Thus, the Afro-Pentecostal enterprise leads to formation of a transnational civil society, religion-oriented. Therefore, the conflicts arise within rather than across state boundaries. In contrast to centralized forms of organization and patterns of diffusion from above (such as state-certified religion in China or in Russia), the charismatic pastors coming from Africa are likely to be global religious actors as well as challengers of national and religious established boundaries. The output of this process is the formation of a global Christianity without a church, that is, without the historical organizational model we used to call church. The former seems to me more coherent and flexible, with the masses of migrants all over the world: they are able to build from below (Smith and Guranizo 1998) a network of individuals, charismatic leaders which move in mission, and religious institutions in their homelands and in their host countries. The charismatic leaders bridge between the host and home countries' respective practices, beliefs, sacred performances, and particular cultural backgrounds.

Conclusion

In the light of studies conducted on neo-Pentecostalism as a new form of globalized Christianity, the idea that I have briefly discussed here can be summarized as follows: within the neo-Pentecostal galaxy, it is worth analyzing the phenomenon of what I have called the charismatic enterprise. This is a form of market-oriented religious action. The charisma works like a brand, a cult product invented and developed by a leader capable of competing in a crowded and aggressive market of salvation goods. To be successful, this product must incorporate collective benefits and individual incentives. In other words, it must be presented as a universal religious message, but at the same time, it must be offered as an

effective way to improve an individual's personal life. In one formulation, it must succeed in appearing and being seen by the faithful as a powerful sign of salvation and well-being.

All this is not new; it is a typical trait of religions. In the case analyzed here, however, the product is *always consumable*, reproducible in time and space, and it never leaves the consumer dissatisfied. The production means exploited by charismatic entrepreneurs include a style of communication that tends to expand and gain strength through modern media. Their communication becomes a performance in which the faithful, guided by their leader, play a direct part, personally engaging in the *spiritual warfare*, mimicking a physical struggle against the forces of evil, and grasping beneficial powers through the mediation of their leader. The ritual drama has a dual function: it brings those participating in the leader's performance "out of themselves," enabling them to experience, with all their senses, the release granted by a superior power, as happens in the long sessions of deliverance. But it releases the people from what? The explicit wording follows the canonical format of the struggle against Satan and his evil doings, but the release really has to do with all the micro dramas of people's daily lives (in their affections, diseases, careers, poverty, pain, and so on). What is important to note here is that the communication lies not in the leader's more or less fervent and effective sermon, but in a collective action (what Durkheim might call a form of collective effervescence) designed to enable the experience of something at once sacred and useful that immediately adds *value* for the individual (Anderson and Tang 2004; Drønen 2013; Lauterbach 2006).

The fluidity of this kind of religious movement across national boundaries is not exclusive to charismatic Pentecostalism. New media (including digital religion) and relatively cheaper means of transportations facilitate people to keep in touch. It concerns the old churches, sects, and new manifestations within Christianity, as well as other world religions like Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism. Anglican, Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, and Adventist churches as well as Jehovah's Witnesses and so on tend to extend their respective model of religious organization using contemporary media. But the charismatic enterprise is a less bureaucratized and hierarchical pattern designed to perform a more creative and emotional experience of sacredness and magic: it seems better suited to serve transnationally oriented members. The impact both on the type of religiosity and on the locales where the enterprise arose and where it tries to expand itself is the emergence of a global Christianity that is independent of the

ideal types of churches/sects that characterize the history of the spread of the Christian Gospel. Global Christianity is drawing a new map of believing and belonging. And it is again making plausible the ties between magic, religion, and the sacred, because the power of the magical and sacred belongs to the long cultural memory of people who have become Christian through the work of missionaries during the historical cycles of Western colonialism. In that sense, the success of the new charismatic and Pentecostal enterprise depends on its devout individuals (in Africa as well as in Latin America and Asia) to take ownership of their ancestral faith while remaining Christians.

The transnational dimension of the charismatic enterprise therefore lies not only in its leader's ability to set up new branches in other parts of the world, going beyond the frontiers of language, culture, and religion, but also—and more importantly—in the organizational principle of the enterprise. If the leaders' action is market-oriented, we can understand why they interpret their mission not, as traditionally intended in Christian theological terms, as spreading a message of presumably universal salvation, but as establishing a *successful brand* in different, articulated religious markets characterized by a remarkable diversity.

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CHAPTER 6

Islam, Ethno-Nationalism, and Transnational "Faith Community" in Kyrgyzstan

Aurélie Biard

Introduction

Since its independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan, a Turkic-speaking republic with a nomadic tradition, has had to combine the fundamental experience of nearly one and a half centuries of Russo-Soviet domination with the supposed "rediscovery" of a Muslim past (*Sunnī* Islam from the *Ḥanafī* school of Islamic law). The opening of the Soviet borders, at the beginning of the 1990s, contributed to the penetration of new inflows and the import of new foreign Muslim religious models into Central Asia. These influences are dominated, as far as religion is concerned, by the neo-*Hanbalī* movements, which have spread throughout Central Asia (in particular in the Uzbek Fergana) from as early as the mid-1970s, and have benefited locally from the weakening of the dominant *Hanafiyya* stream in *Sunnī* Islam and the decline of mystical orders (Dudoignon 2001, 24–25).

Since Kyrgyzstan gained independence in 1991, religion (including Islam) has benefited from visibility in the Central Asian public space and from participation in the correspondence between the private and public

A. Biard (✉)
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales and Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France

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realms. This is especially the case in Kyrgyzstan, where religious practice is subject to less state control, if only in regard to dress codes, that is, wearing the veil, for women, and the garment called "the Pakistani" for male affiliates of the revivalist, proselyte movement called *Tablighi Jama'at* (in Urdu) or *Jama'at at-Tabligh* (in Arabic)—a "preaching group" from the Indian subcontinent which is banned throughout Central Asia, with the notable exception of Kyrgyzstan. This high visibility gives credence to the idea of "what some will rush to call the *return*" (Derrida 1996, 61), or even the revenge of religion after 70 years of scientific atheism and, therefore, a religious "re-enchantment." Yet the post-Soviet period cannot be seen as a revival of belief; indeed there has been little disruption in the religious sense but, rather, change in its political expression. This resurgence of religion, of Islam in particular, should not be viewed as a return and does not serve as proof of a religious re-enchantment in the region; it does not call into question the continuation of a long process of secularization in post-Soviet societies. It outlines the contours of a reconstructed space where, adapting to changing conditions, the process of the "disenchantment of the world" continues to use the words of Max Weber.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the contradictory types of (re-) use of Islam, as a private and a public religion, being undertaken by various actors in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. The sudden (re)appearance of religion, namely Islam, in Kyrgyzstan has taken place on a fragmented scene, where the socio-political context is "on the brink." Kyrgyzstan is the most democratic state in Central Asia, and as such it is the only one to have experienced ousters of incumbent regimes. With two "revolutions," or "coups," changing the makeup of the elites,[1] there is a sense that it is a weak and fragile state that is incapable of ensuring the distribution of public goods.[2] Significant migratory outflows make the country's economy and state budget highly dependent on remittances sent home. More than half a million citizens leave the country each year, mainly for Russia and Kazakhstan. This phenomenon is related to strong demand for labor in those countries, as well as extreme poverty in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the southern regions, which are overcrowded and suffering from a severe shortage of land. The country's social fabric has also been fundamentally changed, as it was in Kyrgyzstan that political and economic "shock therapy" was most severely applied, which locals mainly experienced as trauma. New social structuring appeared, with a strong division between those who won and those who lost from the

changes. While part of the population decided to flee these problems by emigrating, new elites within the new globalized culture have also emerged. Kyrgyz politics functions according to system of patronage, which is regional or lineage based. Undergoing regular transformations, these networks show their profound malleability and adaptability to current economic conditions.[3] Power struggles are scenes of confrontation between different elite networks for control of economic and political space. These power struggles tend to be ethnicized or racialized—notably since the June 2010 interethnic violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks[4] in the Fergana Valley in Kyrgyzstan, which occurred against a background of political-mafia maneuvers. They thus pave the way for a virulent Kyrgyz ethno-nationalism.

In such a context of economic slump, social cleavage, and broad disenchantment with politics (Michel 1994), Islam appears as a paradoxical but unavoidable resource, albeit one subject to contrary instrumentalizations. Islam is perceived by the state authorities both as a key driver of national identity and as bearing the risk of dilution of the Kyrgyz nation into a larger Islamic community. The political authorities present Islam as a national and "traditional" faith and, as such, glorify it as the "religion of the nation." But Islam is directed to stay within this strictly folkloric, historical, and moral framework. Kyrgyzstan is, at the same time, the only state in the region to have accepted the arrival of foreign Islamic and proselytizing Christian movements without repressive measures, even as they bring money, religious publications, and new ways of thinking. This has increased the globalization of religion in the country, which is considered a unique place for debate in the post-Soviet space.

This chapter first addresses the issue of the Kyrgyzstani state's instrumentalization of religion. The government mobilized Islam most of all as an identity marker, which facilitated the liquidation of the Soviet regime, construction of the nation in progress, and redefinition of a notionally stable identity in a context characterized by severe transformations. For the Kyrgyz authorities, Islam also has another function, which is to allow for the disqualification of the political enemy—an abstract figure constructed for the purposes of legitimizing regimes. In the Kyrgyz case, this enemy is the supposed "Uzbekness" of all Islamic movements not recognized as a part of a "state-sanctioned" Islam. The example of the proselyte Tabligh (*Tablighi Jama'at*) in Urdu, whose active predication is successful in re-Islamizing young Kyrgyz in particular (Tablighis normally go out for 3-day, 40-day, and 4-month "daavats" (ara. *da'wa*, an

"invitation" to follow the injunctions of the Divine Law) to rural areas of the country, inviting the local population to visit the mosque where they conduct sermons) but which presents itself ostensibly as a purely religious organization that has distanced itself from politics,[5] sheds some light on the ambivalence of the state's instrumentalization of Islam: how to fit such a transnational movement, from the Indian subcontinent, in the framework of the state-advocated "good" moderate Islam, that is, an "ethnic-national" Islam which promotes "Muslimness" as a natural extension of ethnic and national belonging? By not banning this pietistic movement like its Central Asian neighbors, and attempting on the contrary to institutionalize it, the Kyrgyzstani authorities hope to co-opt it, conscious that they have to "ride the wave" of Islamization and, if possible, give it some direction. This means for the political authorities encouraging an apolitical conservative re-Islamization which would on the one hand help heal certain social ills (unemployment, crime, drugs, etc.) and on the other, contain the threat posed by Islamic groups holding a discourse of political opposition to "impious" regimes in the name of "original" Islam while appearing as a regime supporting Islam and its blossoming and not as a *kafir* (infidel), therefore illegitimate, one to the eyes of the believers.

Second, this chapter examines the question of how global and revivalist forms of Islam, emanating from Pakistan (with the example of Tabligh) especially, are impacting the construction of post-Soviet national identities and attitudes vis-à-vis society and politics. The promoters of the revival of Islam seek to disconnect religion from culture, thinking of it as standing alone, and to rebuild it in a space that is no longer territorial and therefore no longer subject to the national political order.[6] This chapter argues that what is seen as the "revival" of Islam in Kyrgyzstan can be placed in parallel with similar movements all over the world, especially with the marketization of Christianity in Latin America and the "born-again" phenomenon in North America. The mutations of Islam in Kyrgyzstan are studied here through a study case of the "born-again" phenomenon, which is taking place through a narrative of re-Islamization or a second conversion to Islam, and which favors the Tabligh pietistic movement. This case study involves Imam Askar, a rural migrant who became a Tablighi (Kyr. *daavači*) member in Bishkek, the capital city, in the early 2000s. The material presented here was collected in the village of Geologia,[7] in the district (*rajon*) of Sokuluk near Bishkek, where Imam Askar lives, in early 2010 before President Bakiev was removed from power and fled the country.

Sacralizing the Nation, Islam, and "Kyrgyzness" or the Ethnicization of Religion

Disenchantment with Politics and Ethno-Nationalism

The post-independence political order, whether in Kyrgyzstan or in the other Central Asian republics, could no longer rely on a foundation that claimed to be socialist, and which was considered the main element of social cohesion, and had to search for new sources of legitimacy. When the communist system collapsed, the authorities were left to find a new source of social cohesion, in order to connect the different segments of Kyrgyzstani society (composed of Kyrgyz as well as national "minorities" such as Russians and Uzbeks) while retaining an enchanted political rapport. National identity and its reification were used to "restore the order" of the nation-state and as a panacea to the crisis of confidence that afflicted post-independence politics, which struggled to identify a credible horizon for the young Kyrgyz state.

For the authorities seeking to legitimize the new political order born of independence, there was a political and intellectual crystallization around the theme of the nation, as well as the production of fictional sameness in respect of the "imagined community." An interactive process and intrinsic product of modernity (Delannoi 1999; Birnbaum 1997) or, as Zeev Sternhell defined it, a party of "another modernity" (Sternhell 2006), nationalism acts to integrate citizens and legitimize elite choices, while guaranteeing social cohesion in a period of significant upheaval. The normalization of Kyrgyzstan, as sought by citizens and political authorities alike, especially after the political upheavals of 2005 and 2010 and then the violence in Osh in June 2010, required the creation of a consensus that can be achieved only through rehabilitation of patriotism. No other symbol in Kyrgyzstan offers such a wide membership platform, beyond all possible divisions, and such a range of available cultural material, as that of the nation.

Consensus seems to be emerging around the nationalist or xenophobic theme because this has proved to be fertile ground, largely dominating the entire society since the violence in Osh and Jalalabad, in the Fergana Valley, which occurred in June 2010, shortly after the second Kyrgyz "revolution" and resulted in an estimated death of 393–2000 people (of which the vast majority were Uzbeks) and 400,000 displaced persons. Fear of national minorities (including Uzbeks), which are depicted as fifth columns that undermine the very foundations of the Kyrgyz nation,

demonstrates one of the major routes of some "reconciliation" within Kyrgyz society, because it defines "otherness." Far from dividing citizens according to ideological influences and cultural backgrounds, or whether they see themselves as "winners" or "losers" of "shock therapy," the xenophobic theme fosters unity. It offers a wide consensual platform, such that the nationalist referent allows those in power to determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of political offerings.

State promotion of the fatherland/nation as a template for a new social contract has oscillated in Kyrgyzstan between the official celebration of a political nation and of an ethnic nation.[8] From the administration of the first Kyrgyz president, Askar Akayev, to that of the second president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, political authorities cultivated vague doctrines regarding their vision of Kyrgyz identity. Although the Akayev government engaged in consensus-based patriotic centrism,[9] the Bakiyev government opted for a more assertive ethno-nationalism, which continued under the current president, Almazbek Atambayev.[10] Ethnically based nationalism tends nowadays to be positioned as a politically correct ideological framework in contemporary Kyrgyzstan.

In these deliberate productions of the Kyrgyzstani state, religion is summoned as a part of a republican historiography, dominated by so-called ethnic references, that is supposed to best sanctify the nation (that of the people: *ethnos*). Through the exaltation and sanctification of the titular nation, religion is used to provide support to "the restoration of order," to consolidation of the nation-state after the violent and chaotic fragmentation of the 1990s. It is not a question of any particular religion, but of religious thought as essential to a supposed "Kyrgyz way" or Kyrgyzness. Yet the place attributed to Islam—the majority religion in Kyrgyzstan as in the rest of Central Asia—in the promotion of patriotism is more problematic. What terrifies post-Soviet elites in search of a strictly national faith is an Islam with social efficacy and influence over civic identity—specifically, they are concerned about its possible politicization in such a way that it would undermine State structures.[11]

The sacredness of the nation, as compensation for the loss of a sense of politics since the Soviet collapse in 1991, is therefore accompanied in Kyrgyzstan—as it is more broadly in Central Asia—by attempted guardianship of Islam. The region has inherited many characteristics of its Soviet past, linked both to the place that religion occupies in public life and to the anguished relationship of the state with Islam (Khalid 2013, 117).[12] In terms of everyday practice, all the Central Asian states recognize and

value Islam as a national tradition and a key element of collective identity. This mixing of official recognition of the religion and general mistrust vis-à-vis Islam led Kyrgyzstan, like other Central Asian countries, to distinguish so-called good, moderate, or strictly national Islam, from Islam that is considered to be bad, extremist, or foreign (Khalid 2013, 120). This "good" (which is to say "moderate") Islam is supposed to support the secular state, even if the latter is discredited and authoritarian, while the actors behind "bad" or "extremist" Islam would be disloyal to any type of secular regime.[13]

In the case of Kyrgyzstan, "good" Islam corresponds to a supposed Kyrgyzness and serves as a vehicle for the adoration of the nation and its supposed uniqueness, while the enemy form of Islam is mainly incarnated in an intrinsically Wahhabi/"extremist"/"terrorist" Uzbekness.[14] This latter view of Islam primarily applies to "non-ethnics" and would permit the exclusion of the political enemy—an abstract figure reconstructed for the purposes of legitimizing power. The first, celebrated form of Islam is seen as participating in the state's promotion of the country/nation as a template for a new social contract, while the second must be eradicated. Religious authorities are responsible for defining the line that separates the tolerated from the unacceptable, even if the secular administration ultimately renders the decision.

Within independent Kyrgyzstan, the official vision that the National Spiritual Directorate (or *muftiyyat*) conveys is that of a tolerant, indigenous *Ḥanafī* tradition that is also open to Kyrgyz "custom" (*salt*) and is compatible with secularism. These customs partake of the "Kirghiz way" or kïrgïzčïlïk, that is, the "Kirghiz ways of doing"—whose norms are linked to the respect due to arbak, that is, "ancestral spirits," to clan hierarchies, and so on. The Kyrgyz authorities are not severely repressive in targeting "non-traditional" religious practices, but like elsewhere in Central Asia, are marked by a return to Soviet models that are now reinforced by the dominant norms of the Shanghai Organization.

The Reconstruction of the Political "Enemy" via the Religious

The governments of the new republics of Central Asia, after some sort of liberalism in 1991 and 1992, continued with a twofold policy of repression of so-called radical Islam and implementation of a national and traditionalist, quietist Islam. The *bête noire* of the political regimes stemming from the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was, from that point

on, "Wahhabism" in all its forms, whether it came from Saudi Arabia or from Pakistan. This term, "Wahhabi," was revived in the USSR in the wake of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and was used extensively in the late 1990s and 2000s by Kyrgyz and other Central Asian authorities to denote Islamic practices that were not sanctioned by the state; presently Kyrgyz authorities tend to use terms such as "Islamic terrorists" (religious extremists). The creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (OCS), which, under the guidance of Russia and China, produced alternative norms to those of Europe and North America, with a marked return to Soviet models, accentuated the blind character of the police repression, which cracked down on all forms of opposition, especially in the Fergana Valley, forcing religious competition into clandestinity.

Islamist destabilizations in the region were very broadly instrumentalized to reconstruct the notion of enemy, necessary to every state's attempt to arrogate the monopoly of public expression. Indeed, the established powers in Central Asia, whether in Kyrgyzstan or in the other republics, by presenting themselves as the only guarantors able to safeguard democratic and secular values, have elaborated an outrageous schematization of every form of religiosity which is non-controlled or which aspires to autonomy, by incorporating it into a political opposition force systematically qualified as "Wahhabi," "extremist," or even "Islamic terrorist."

Due to the violence of police repression, the first generation of political parties participating in the general elections within the nationally defined boundaries of the state ceded its place to a second one that turned away from the political authorities. This second generation is more Salafi-inspired.[15] Thus, in the 2000s, there appeared in Central Asia international missionary networks such as the Pakistani *Tablighi Jama'at*, the Turkish Nourdjou movement, and an internationalist Islamist party of Palestinian origin, long based in London, called the *Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islamiyya*. These networks acted as vectors of Islamization "from below"; they are not seeking to impose an Islamic state from the top down, but rather to implement "original" Islam and to transform post-Soviet Muslims into "good," "authentic" Muslims through purifying social values. This is even the case for the *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, which simultaneously held a discourse of political opposition to the established regimes, in particular to that of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan.

September 11 and its afterlives have enabled the established powers to repress the Tahrir along with other Islamic currents—and any Muslim believer whose observance of Islam is manifest can be considered as a

hidden political activist—in the name of the fight against "Islamic terrorism." This repression has taken place against the background of increasing inequalities that are perceived in community and ethnic terms. Hence, the Uzbeks of south Kyrgyzstan, which is administrated by Kyrgyz functionaries even in districts with an Uzbek majority, constituted the first demographic kernel of the *Hizb ut-Tahrir*. Thus the Tahrir recruits first within the Uzbek minorities of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, and particularly in the prisons of these republics. Currently, the Tahrir tends to be present among the Kyrgyz, the Kazakhs, and certain Tajik groups.[16]

A favorite theme of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* is the immediate establishment of the caliphate, or *khilafat* (a theme already present among Mawdûdî), in place of the Islamists' Islamic State. *Hizb ut-Tahrir* considers the Islamists to be circumscribed by the limits of the nation-state. According to *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, the caliphate is central to the reconstruction of the *Ummah*. Beyond this statement of principle, *Hizb ut-Tahrir* also acts as a driver of re-Islamization from below, through its system of Islamic mutual aid (charitable actions, help to the most destitute, loans of money at zero interest rates, free schooling in its clandestine Koranic schools) (Karagiannis 2010). Thanks to its condemnation of national borders that have reduced cross-border commercial flows, and its promotion of free trade, the party is relatively popular in the towns in the northern and eastern portions of the Fergana Valley (Andijon, Namangan, and Kokand in Uzbekistan; Osh, Kara-Suu, and others in Kyrgyzstan), which are marked by high unemployment and offering few economic opportunities. This rhetoric seems to appeal primarily to those whose economic survival is linked to the bazaars.[17]

The Salafists are not the only ones to denounce the compromise of so-called traditional Islam with political regimes and their social orders, and instead advocate a return to authentic Islam. This is also the case of the main Islamic proselytizing movement of the twentieth century, the *Tablighi Jama'at* in Urdu (*Tabligh at-Jama'at*, in Arabic), a "preaching group" that embodies the revivalist movement.[18] Revivalism calls for the importance of individual conversion as the appropriation of personal salvation. Born from Protestant movements, revivalism touched the Muslim world from the eighteenth century with the puritanical, Saudi Wahhabi movement. Since then, many revivalist movements have emerged, calling for the conversion of individual nominal Muslims.

The transnational dimension and neo-fundamentalist discourse of these movements have not prevented them from having a community

dimension: *Hizb ut-Tahrir* among Uzbek minorities of Central Asia; Tabligh within the eponymous Kyrgyz population.

While *Hizb ut-Tahrir* is banned throughout Central Asia and is seen in Kyrgyzstan mainly as the party of the Uzbek minority, Tabligh is very active in Kyrgyzstan. The pious Tabligh which is a missionary organization founded in India in 1926 by Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandhlawi gradually expanded from a local to a national organization, and finally to a transnational movement, and it has branched out to more than 90 countries worldwide.[19] The practice of Islam as preached by Tabligh finds a receptive audience among the Kyrgyz population, particularly young people, who find in this transnational religious expression a new form of dignity in what is a difficult social and economic context. It is prohibited for the Tablighis, or *daavači* in Kyrgyz—who, as a group, are supposed to carry the good word from village to village and town to town (this obligation to preach [in foreign countries] recalls the work of American Mormons)—to get involved in religious controversies or to discuss politics, and notably the links between religion and the state (*dîn wa dawla*). The Tablighis thus engage in verbal disagreements (which most often take place in the mosques during heated discussions between believers after Friday prayers) against the members of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, whom they accuse of sowing discord (*fitna*) among the Muslim communities of Kyrgyzstan by their wanting to establish a regional Islamic caliphate in Central Asia.

Due to its "proverbial apoliticism," Tabligh has been attempting to become institutional in Kyrgyzstan: there is a department dedicated to the *da'wa-daavat* in Kyrgyz—in the local *muftiyyat*. This is exceptional for the Central Asian space, as Tabligh has been banned elsewhere. This Office of *Daavat*, operating within the *muftiyyat*, oversees missionary practices. In order to go on a 40-day mission, men must bring three signatures to the *muftiyyat*—one from their families, one from their local imam, and one from their local police precinct. They also must prove they have sufficient funds to support their families while away. Moreover, during the month of March 2009, Kyrgyzstan's former supreme mufti or *čong* mufti, Murataly Žumanov, issued a *fatwâ* urging the Tablighis to stop differentiating themselves from other Muslims through the way they dress. As a matter of fact the Tablighis often wear short trousers and grow a beard while shaving their mustache. They say they do so to respect the Prophet's *sunna,* but in doing so, they go against the country's "traditionalist" ulema' opinion. This very same *fatwâ* asks

the Tablighis and/or *daavači* to choose from the people who want to attempt the *daʿwa* the ones with enough theological knowledge since the *daavači* have often been denounced for their lack of theological training. Admittedly, the issue of *Tablighi Jamaʿat* has divided political and religious leaders as well as ordinary citizens into two groups—those who support the movement and view it as a solution to social problems (Tablighis advocate for the total cessation of smoking, drinking, and drugs), and those who identify the pietistic movement as an "extremist organization." But Kyrgyz authorities first and foremost seized on the idea that they could exert social control over and containment of the Islamist opposition within the pietistic movement. By allowing Tablighi preaching, the Kyrgyz governments thought they would be able to monitor re-Islamization and meet the religious needs of the local population, and ensure that the return to Islam was not accompanied by opposition political claims. They therefore tended to favor the development of this transnational pietistic movement, constituted mainly of ethnic Kyrgyz and which does not reject the schools of jurisprudence, including the *Ḥanafī* school that dominates throughout Central Asia, on the contrary, some Tablighi activists forcefully impose their idea of Islamic orthodoxy within *Ḥanafī*, particularly regarding rituals (e.g. methods of prayer).

Tabligh may have been labeled an "extremist organization" by the State Commission on Religious Affairs in 2009 during a session of the National Security Council on so-called religious extremism. The Security Council Secretary was the Kyrgyz southerner nationalist Adahan Madumarov who supported the clampdown toward *Tablighi Jamaʿat*, castigating the so-called growth, among youngsters especially, of "religious fanaticism."[20] But the "Wahhabi," "extremist," "Islamic terrorist" labels that the Kyrgyzstani authorities affix to all suspect practices serve above all as a denunciation of everything that does not correspond to "Kyrgyzness." The accusation of "Wahhabism" or "extremism" has become one of the best ways for the authorities to stigmatize national "minorities," which, because they are considered an ethnic other, can be said to be naturally prone to religious extremism and secessionism. Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan are regularly accused in public discourse of wanting the establishment of a caliphate in the Fergana Valley; this accusation has become one of the official explanations of the ethnic violence that broke out in the Fergana provinces of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, 20 years to the day after the June 1990 conflict,[21] and which largely determined the structure of Uzbek civil

society in Kyrgyzstan. The theme of endangering national unity is even one of the leitmotifs of power. The theme of sovereignty offers a modernized version of the discourse on the nation through its focus on contemporary issues of globalization. This concept of the nation relies on the sort of conspiracy discourse that is fashionable throughout the post-Soviet space.[22] This official accusation, that the alleged "Wahhabism" of the Uzbek "minority" was responsible for the violence in Osh and Jalalabad in 2010, allows the authorities to ignore the political and financial processes that were at play in this violence.

This example allows one to explore the need of the Kyrgyz state and its religious institutions to create a religious enemy ("Wahhabism," "extremism," "Islamic terrorism," and so on) and this enemy's materialization as an identifiable fifth column in the form of the Uzbek minority, which is accused of being intrinsically Wahhabi. This accusation automatically registers in the perception of a close overlap between ethnic and religious identity. According to this logic, because they are not ethnically Kyrgyz, Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan *must* be practicing an Islam that is not the officially promoted "good Islam" but an enemy form of Islam, that is, Wahhabism. The resilience of interethnic violence in Osh comes mainly from differences between rural and urban areas in their access to material and symbolic resources (no international observers' analyses can support the official Kyrgyz discourse, as the religious element was missing from the conflict).

The social contract of nationalism/patriotism that the state has presented to society revolves mainly around policy referents such as risks to national and territorial unity and the security threat linked, according to the authorities, to the expansion of an Islam that does not correspond to "Kyrgyzness." However, with the collapse of the Soviet welfare state and in a context of economic stagnation, the contract does not operate at the local level. In no way can it provide an improved standard of living or the support the population expects. The contract seems to indicate the contrary, the ineffectiveness of the state, which is now unable to meet the basic needs of its population.

In such a context of State disengagement, what can the uses and reuses of religion, which proceed from movement and uncertainty (to use Balandier's (1985) categories), as generated by modernity, do at the local level? In what way can religion be used for the purposes of redistribution of resources in a society dislocated by sudden changes linked to the collapse of the Soviet welfare state and the forces of globalization? The idea

that Islam is a response to the crisis—social, personal, metaphysical, or a crisis of identity—provoked by the discrediting of the post-independence Kyrgyz state as a provider of social goods is regularly mentioned by many actors of the Islamic world in Kyrgyzstan.

Tablighi Revivalism: Beyond the Sovereignty of the Nation-State and Across Borders

The "Born-Again" Phenomenon

Soviet modernization deeply eroded community affiliations and introduced new concepts of the individual, culture, and religion. The social turmoil of the 1990s caused by the post-independence political and economic slump intensified the phenomenon of conversion, boosted by the collapse of an authoritarian modernization megaproject. However, the phenomenon of conversion is still often related both to national identities and to economic and social profiles.

One is able to convert to neo-fundamentalist Christian movements (Pentecostal, Evangelical, and so on)[23] or to "inner convert," in which case one remains within the same religion, but is *born again*, following the example of the charismatic Christian movements (including Catholic), all of which have adopted this schema of thinking. The believer thus becomes a "confessor": he or she must express his or her faith in all domains of life.

Kyrgyz narratives of re-Islamicization or of a second conversion to Islam are strangely similar: most often they contain a very personal itinerary that begins with a feeling of dissatisfaction and of failure (linked to the crisis of post-independence), followed by a search for meaning. This search sometimes passes through diverse systems of thought, before a sudden lightning-strike-type encounter with God. (Re)conversion is a personal experience, an illumination, and, more rarely, an intellectual approach. Theological debate doesn't play the slightest role here: what prevails is the "narrative of life." Those who undergo an individual reconversion generally seek to reform the faith of close friends, parents, and allies.

Let's take the case of Askar, a Solto originally from the village of Belek and *imam khatib* of the only mosque—not officially registered with the authorities in 2010—from the village of Geologia, near Bishkek. Askar, who is from a family of shepherds and 1 of 11 children, reconverted to

Islam in the 2000s under the influence of his young nephew, Almaz, who resided in Bishkek and became a *davači*. Askar worked as a bus driver and then as a taxi driver and settled in a shanty town in the capital. The political and economic transition of post-independence set off a process of "internal migration" and raised afresh the problem of constructing the identities of new rural migrants such as Askar, newly settled in Bishkek and without a high level of education. Islam, notably in its neofundamentalist form or, more exactly, in the structures established in its name, thus appears as a resource, a particularly well-adapted or pertinent one, for helping people to manage the brutal changes they endure. Askar's second conversion to Islam, as well as his joining the Tabligh (which immediately ensued from the conversion), can be likened to an enterprise of making his future again seem worth believing in, whereas before it had appeared to him as uncertain and, frequently, hostile. Reconversion to Islam constitutes, from this viewpoint, the promise of a way out of social isolation, a promise born of the certitude of personal salvation. Such "spiritual rebirth" constitutes, moreover, the guarantee of a reorganization of life in all its aspects.

Askar decided to join the Tabligh and take his message to local populations by going on the road and devoting himself to his calling with great zeal, in the hope that Islamic orthodoxy might triumph in a Kyrgyz society wrecked by errors and anomie. Askar was seduced by the principles that ensure the appeal of the Tabligh everywhere: the intensity of personal commitment, the simplicity of the message, and group cohesion. Askar's membership in the Tabligh thus progressed from his being individually changed by the group that calls itself the "*jama'at*"—thereby demonstrating that it reconstructs, at the microcosmic level, a community of believers and a "faith community"—to his insertion, along with its other followers, into a very restrictive religious and social framework.

Individuation and "Faith Community"

Askar's second conversion attests to the way in which the individual is produced through reference to the religious. Inner conversion is presented as an initiating rupture that gives rise to a new individual. It constitutes the very kernel of a radical transformation through the acceptance of God as personal savior and becomes the origin of a "spiritual identity," that is to say, of an enhancing self-image, of a prospect of victory. Askar in fact lays claim, through the religious, to a remodeled identity: he attributes

to himself an enhanced, proud identity, the identity of a zealous Muslim preacher, which thus replaces that of the poor and uprooted migrant. The posture that Askar opts for is therefore that of over-investment, of an overestimation of the religious resources, which he takes as an instrument with which to position himself with respect to the social changes affecting Kyrgyz society.

In the course of this identity mutation, Askar reconstructs a meaning of life and a system of ethics by internalizing the code of conduct preached by the Tabligh. Let's briefly recall that the Deobandi code of conduct was adopted by the Tabligh organization (Metcalf 1982): it didn't go much further than a "revitalization of the *sunna*" (*ihya al-sunna*), which constitutes the unsurpassable norm, "the (good) custom" established by the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, as it is related in its "Traditions" (Ar. *hadith*). The Tablighi *hadith* texts serve as models for everyday life (Metcalf 1993). The Tabligh also adheres to a form of purified Sufism. The textbooks used by Tablighis, especially those written by their main ideologist, Muhammad Zakariyya, are informed by the attention to spiritual values that dominated the Sufi milieu of the thirteenth century. The emphasis is on personal virtues: steadfastness, fear of Allah, abstinence and self-denial, piety and scrupulousness, self-sacrifice, devotion to the Prophet, and so on (Metcalf 1994, 587). In inculcating these personal characteristics, these texts offer detailed guidance for every aspect of daily life. From this viewpoint, Askar's social failure is seen as a simple test that must be overcome, poverty is endured as a shield from the temptations of (over) consumption, and so on.

Contemporary Islamic revivalism, in all its forms, puts the individual in the forefront, as an actor but also as an end. Hence, with the Tabligh, inner conversion is a process aiming to give birth, via an encounter with God and the concomitant imitation of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, to an autonomous individual that is freed of traditional affiliations (to family, of lineage, and so on) and of the community constraints that are supposed to have bridled him or her. Now, inner conversion actually gives itself the goal of integrating the individual into a "community of faith." This community of faith—which can be likened at once to a small local *jama'at* recruited on a territorial basis, most often at the level of a suburban mosque (like that to which Askar belongs), and to a supranational community[24]—does not advance kinship ties rooted in territoriality. This faith community is militant, and proposes, by means of intense proselytizing activity, to convert or to reform the practices of nominal Muslims.

Aiming to present itself as an approach to entry into modernity, via a rupture with old community links, in reality, the community of faith thus participates in the integration of the inner "converted" into a new community, under the cover of subjugation to God and respect for the *sunna* of the Prophet of Islam. Inner conversion is, of course, presented as an initiating rupture that gives rise to a new individual, but what is at issue here is a conception in which emancipation occurs via one's wrenching oneself away from a community logic. There is in this, of course, a way out of the community of origin; however, it does not open up onto autonomization, but, instead, onto a re-communitarization. As Patrick Michel and Jesús García-Ruiz put it, "contemporary individuation certainly is prevalent, in the mode of legitimization, of modern individualization. But more than an autonomous individual, contemporary individuation aims to produce an individual who adheres to renewed forms of community" (Michel and García-Ruiz 2012, 29).

The demands of those who are reconverted bear on recognition, rooting, and acquiring the status of actor. The point of inner conversion is to acquire dignity, to be part of a community, and to become an actor of one's own destiny. The Tabligh in particular, following the example of other movements belonging to different religious traditions, such as the Evangelic Churches, has displayed a real ability to latch onto this kind of demand and satisfy it. The answer the Tabligh supplies nonetheless corresponds to the institutional nature proper to such movements; fuzzy, mobile, they thus "open onto the margins, and in any case set up camp within heteronomy" (Michel and García-Ruiz 2012, 98). They prove able to provide the recognition, roots, and the actor status that is sought after without giving individuals the autonomy that one might have thought should accompany such provisions. The second conversion to Islam opens naturally onto a neo-community, which works at stabilizing the effects of the said conversion.

This "community of faith" surrounds individuals in a very constraining social and religious framework (Gaborieau 1997). The Tablighi neo-community that integrated Askar insists on the notion of sacrifice to please God. Askar therefore complies strictly with the Tabligh program. As advocated by this pietist movement, progressive detachment from ties with this world by means of prayer, *dhikr* (remembrance, which corresponds in the Tabligh with the recitation of fervent prayers), *'ilm* (knowledge of God), and *khuruj* ("exit") is supposed to allow the true believer to finally find the serenity to which the soul aspires. Family, work, social position, and material well-being are only pale diversions. As success is always taken to

be proportional to the individual effort invested, Askar scrupulously carries out all obligatory and supererogatory religious rites and devotes all his time to it. Askar lives only for the *namaz* and the *daavat*, says his cadet brother (who inherited the family's livestock), and does not work—he is the imam of an unregistered mosque and receives no salary—which has plunged his family, his wife, and his two children into extreme poverty. The Tabligh, by regulating behavior and by the effects that it produces on individuals, functions as a genuine total institution, as described by Goffman. However, it differs from a total institution in that, for example, it is possible to quit it without sanction. In addition, as Felice Dassetto underscores, "the fact of belonging to the Tabligh does not constitute a physical separation from the social world but is a symbolic and real means by which to penetrate it" (Dassetto 1988, 168).

The *Tablighi Jama'at* has been innovative in its way of reaching people wherever they are, across borders, and supervising them (Ismailbekova and Nasridinov 2012). The organization of the Tabligh has a concentric and hierarchical structure, built around their founder and his successors, who are still based in their "center" (*markaz*) in Nizammuddin; each of these has been the pivot and the "head" (Ar. *amir*). The *amir* delegates authority gradually, to the national, provincial, and district "leaders," and down to the smallest preaching group of about a dozen people, which has its own hierarchy. The Tabligh has successfully constituted a supranational community that can be manipulated and mobilized. The community is composed mostly of members who were born as Muslims, with a small proportion of converts. This "faith community" generally adopts a posture that rejects the surrounding society and culture, which is perceived as being "deviant" from the Islamic orthodoxy they advocate. The Tabligh movement tries to define a Muslim identity that is both deterritorialized and de-culturalized. The Tablighis seek, in fact, to define Islam as no longer linked to any given society, and still less to a Muslim society. This "missionary action" (which is the official translation of the word "*tabligh*") differs from Christian proselytizing, even if it borrows some of its vocabulary and inspiration. But for the Muslim community, it certainly represents a revival in the methods of the apostolate. The *Tablighi Jama'at* has recreated, in Kyrgyzstan as elsewhere, strong communitarian logics that can be extra-territorial, and it is thus linked to globalization.

From its emergence in the early 1990s, Tablighi proselytization gradually drew a new universe of meaning, in line with the religious centers

of the Indian subcontinent (where the movement was born), which are projected, thanks to the resources of globalization, on to the representations, norms, and ideological influences that reject the values of contemporary Kyrgyz society. The concept of "total" faith preached by the Tabligh involves living a way of life outside typical society, which is supposedly hostile to "authentic" Islam. Tabligh therefore arises primarily as a movement for the bottom-up re-Islamization of society, with the spiritual progress of individuals being its only major concern. Tabligh has focused on ways to achieve the formation of a core of the truly faithful and the consolidation, through a constituted body of doctrine, of a kind of supranational cultural code. The Tablighi strategy to establish "authentic" Islam in local communities, and in the process forming spaces of Islamization that incidentally fit snugly against ethnic contours, flirts with a political posture that radically questions the established social or political order. Although Tablighis remain unconnected to external society as it appears to them (they live as a minority surrounded by what they perceive to be a secular, atheist, and materialistic culture), they strive to form within it landlocked Islamized spaces that they hope will serve as pockets of resistance.

Post-Soviet political elites, including Kyrgyzstani presidents (A. Akayev, K. Bakiyev, A. Atambayev), exist in a part of the world that has been stripped of (or, in a way, orphaned by) communist references. They are the eulogists of an enchanted national design articulated around references to the absolute. For specific historical reasons, the Central Asian presidents needed to draw on a utopian nation, while ensuring a highly secularized nation devoid of any reference to politicized Islam. Kyrgyz identity is certainly presented as inseparable from its place in the *Sunnī* Muslim world, but there is a desire to fit religious practice into a moderate, nonpoliticized, and regional form. From the outset, the nation in Central Asia has been built on ambivalence. It is simultaneously "a privileged instrument for modernization (that is to say disenchantment) of politics *and* a potential instrument of perpetuation, under a new form, of enchantment, that is to say a place, also privileged, for refusal of modernity" (Michel 1999, 82). In other words, to proclaim the sovereign nation is clearly an essential step in a transition to modern politics. But as long as this new source of legitimacy is sacred, as is the case in Central Asia—to differing degrees in each republic—it is "an old policy, based on transcendence (and therefore enchantment) that was in fact maintained" (Michel 1999, 84).

In the Kyrgyz case, disenchanted post-Soviet politics flowed from the celebration of a so-called Kyrgyzness, or "Kyrgyz way," that would

legitimize the state's sovereignty (borders) and new national identity by promoting its one titular group. Yet the place of Islam in the celebration of the nation and its "re-enchantment" is ambivalent. Admittedly, Kyrgyz political authorities praised the presumed "revival" of Islam during the 1989–1991 split, but while trying to inscribe it on the territory of the new nation-state and making it one of the elements of the social contract of nationalism/patriotism that the Kyrgyz state proposed to society in order to remobilize society in favor of the state. The post-independence Kyrgyzstani political order thus linked itself to religion, hoping to capture the greater operability of what is essentially an ultimate legitimacy, and to (re)bless itself through the worship of the titular nation. This nation-centric concept of religion claims that the transcendent has no other mission than to confirm the justness of the national mission and come to its support. It therefore induces a folkloric and secularized interpretation of religion.

However, whether in Kyrgyzstan, other CIS countries, or the broader Islamic world, since the turn of the twenty-first century, the practice of religion has been marked by slippage from traditional systems toward fundamentalism. Neo-fundamentalism is involved in globalization, in the sense that it allows identities to ignore territories and cultures. The identities are based on individual choice and a set of markers with low content but high differential values. Islam, thus purified, becomes compatible with any social context, on the condition of living in an imagined community. Neo-fundamentalism is clearly a product and an agent of deculturation of Muslim societies, which explains its success and transnationalism.

The current mutations of Islam in Kyrgyzstan go against the official promotion of a strictly "national" and traditionalist Islam, which would be playing out in the fiction of a coincidence between territoriality and a "religious identity" thought of as stable. Islam is, for some, an opportunity for identity recomposition, which can be achieved in two ways that are mutually compatible: the construction of a local Islamized space (e.g. around a mosque), and accession to the *Ummah*, or at least to the "faith community" or local and/or transnational neo-community by participation in an internationalist network (as is the case for the Tablighi, Askar). Although nationalized and put under trusteeship by the post-Soviet Kyrgyzstani state, Islam is largely reclaimed by the local population as an element that participates in a post-Soviet context perceived as chaotic and twice "rearranged" in terms of the social fabric and politics. Emerging through the re-use of Islam at the local level are the contours of a new

rapport to culture, society, and politics. One especially sees with the example of Tabligh, which focuses on the formation of a loyal and "authentic" core that has been *born again*, and thus appears as a supranational movement to reactivate the political solidarity of Muslims regardless of where they are, across all borders, and to supervise them, an unprecedented challenge for the Kyrgyz state and its regional and sacred vision of the nation.

Islam (especially neo-fundamentalist Islam) wants to respond to post-independence disillusionment, at the end of the dream of the "sacred" nation as a collective salvation. The sacredness of national "traditions" and the territory of the nation-state are seen as being made obsolete by the emergence of new entities related to the *Ummah*, the community of believers. "Post-Sovietism" and the hopes vested in the sovereignty of the nation-state as a collective salvation have had their day. Kyrgyzstan has entered the time of post "post-Sovietism," in which the core matrix of current recomposition is based on the religious. It is Islam that is now seen as providing direction, expressing political and social frustrations, and outlining new collective and individual identities. It is in relation to Islam—rejection, competition, cooptation, assimilation, and the sacred—that Kyrgyz society is being built.

Notes

1. In 2005, the country followed Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine in the series of "color revolutions" where political opposition and NGO actors engaged in relatively peaceful overthrowings of regimes. However, the often naive and political interpretation in some circles, particularly Anglo-Saxon ones, that the country was "on the road to democracy" was quickly undermined by the growing authoritarianism of the second president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, limitations on previously acquired freedoms, and levels of corruption so high that they transformed the regime into a well-organized kleptocracy. The second, bloodier revolution (or coup, according to interpretation) that overthrew the regime in April 2010 illustrated the contradictions in the country. State failure and its seizure by political-mafia networks partly explain the ethnic violence in Osh in June 2010, after the second revolution, but the Kyrgyz political elites managed to maintain the democratic process by installing an interim leader, Roza Otunbayeva (the first female president in the former Soviet bloc), and a parliamentary system.

Since 2011, and the election of Almazbek Atambaev, the Kyrgyz political regime has oscillated between highs and lows, with multiple parties cultivated by parliamentary institutions and Western influence, and economic failure and weakness as the state seeks to reestablish itself as the distributor of public goods.

2. For the population, the abrupt transition to a market economy was, above all, a sign of the total bankruptcy of the state and its mission, with key sectors such as public health and education having been permanently damaged; the tumultuous democratic life of the country often was interpreted as a sign of weakness and chaos, not success.
3. When Kyrgyzstan achieved independence, lineal affiliations were revived via networks of economic and political clientelism, especially during election time.
4. The count from the country's 2002 census: 5.12 million inhabitants, of whom 64.9% were Kyrgyz and 14.3% Uzbek. The vast majority of the Uzbeks live in the south of the country (600,000 dominate populations of the regions of Jalalabad, Osh, and Batken). The Uzbeks of southern Kyrgyzstan have been targeted during the political troubles that have followed the ouster of Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in Spring 2010. They have become second-class citizens, even though they have been settled on the land in question since before the drawing of its modern national borders.
5. Because of their lack of interest in building an Islamist State and their insistence on the idea that a society is Islamic insofar as its members have joined Islam, these preachers are working at setting up Islamized spaces rather than at taking power, hence their insistence on the work of *daʿwa* and on the implementation of standards from a specific space (by proceeding village after village, for instance).
6. These trends go hand in hand with an acceptance of greater visibility in the public space—even the ostensible break with dominant practices and culture. Religiousness is exhibited as such: it will no longer be a part of culture, and will not be reduced to one symbolic system among others. Faith is decoupled from culture and knowledge because, in order to "circulate," this religious object must appear as universal and not as linked to a specific culture, Kyrgyz or otherwise. Fundamentalism is thus the form of

religiousness best adapted to globalization because its de-culturalization is assumed and is the instrument of its claim to universality. See Olivier Roy, *La Sainte Ignorance. Le temps de la religion sans culture* (Paris: Seuil, 2008).

7. Askar's native village is Belek, near Geologia. Belek is a village rebuilt on the ashes of the old Kalinin kolkhoz, composed almost exclusively of Kyrgyz associated with the *uruu* (line) of Solto. The village has been strained due to the dismantlement and disappearance of the kolkhoz, the drastic reduction of herds, and record-breaking unemployment. The disenfranchised, above all the former shepherds of once mighty herd, became the favorite targets of Tabligh (fieldwork observations, 2010, in Belek and Geologia).
8. See for Russia, Marlène Laruelle, *Politiques et idéologies des nationalismes dans l'espace russe et postsoviétique*, Habilitation à diriger des recherches (Paris: IEP), sous la direction de Monsieur le Professeur Dominique Colas, 19 juin 2008 and Marlène Laruelle, *In the Name of the Nation. Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia* (New York: Palgrave/MacMillan, 2009).
9. Akayev followed the model then established by Boris Yeltsin in Russia, which insisted on Russian citizenship (*rossiiskii*) rather than on Russian ethno-cultural identity (*russkii*). Akayev quickly moved to marginalize the few small parties that were trying to promote Kyrgyz ethnic nationalism, often with pan-Turkist or Islamicizing references. He developed the slogan "Kyrgyzstan, our common home" (*Kyrgyzstan—nash obshchii dom*) as the flagship for the country's new identity.
10. These ideological postures had direct translations in the economic arena: Akayev let Uzbek leaders and residents invest in the burgeoning private economy, which rallied many of them to Akayev's side, whereas his successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, based his legitimacy on a more pronounced Kyrgyz nationalism, challenging the de facto autonomy acquired by the Uzbek minority in the local management of economic affairs. Competition for control of economic resources heightened during Bakiyev's regime: the Uzbeks traditionally dominate the bazaars and the urban economy, and the Kyrgyz the rural economy and the administration, whereas the shadow sectors are divided between both communities, with a growing preponderance of Kyrgyz circles, which were directly

supported by the Bakiev family, in particular the brother of the president, Zhanysh, and Kurmanbek's son Maksim.

11. At one time (after the first "revolution" in 2005 that drove Akayev from power and put Bakiyev in charge), the preference was to celebrate the nation with a pre-Islamic religion such as Tengrism or *tengrianstvo* ("practices linked to the Sky"), which was an ancient religion of the Turkic peoples. The reactivation of Tengrism, which corresponded to a diffuse millenarian and utopian movement, was both politically motivated and presented as a form of re-consecration or re-enchantment of the nation. This faith, promoted by elites in search of spirituality without transcendence, consists of worshipping Mother Earth and moving past one's current situation in pursuit of a better after-life. See Aurélie Biard and Marlène Laruelle, "'Tengrism' in Kyrgyzstan: In Search of New Religious and Political Legitimacy," in *Representing Power in Modern Inner Asia: Conventions, Alternatives and Oppositions*, ed. Isabelle Charleux, Grégory Delaplace, Roberte Hamayon and Scott Pearce (Bellingham: Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University, 2010), 55–96.
12. The Central Asian authorities have also kept in place the structures of supervision set up during the previous period. Kyrgyzstan has decided to keep its State Agency for Religious Affairs, allowing it a very tight control over all the various religious movements, as well as its Spiritual Board of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, or *Muftiyyat*. During World War II, Stalin, in exchange for support in the war effort, normalized his relations with Islam and instigated an official structure. Several spiritual directorates were created, in particular that of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, founded in October 1943 and based in Tashkent. The Soviet regime hoped that by allowing limited religious activity under bureaucratic oversight, it could prevent such activities from going completely underground and be able to monitor and control them. The practice of Islam and Islamic ritual within the purview of the officially recognized religious directorates appeared as "official Islam." But multiple divisions existed within SADUM itself, between reformist Ḥanafī, and conformist and radical Ḥanafī. It is well established that during the Soviet era, the reformist current dominated the Soviet religious institutions (with, for instance, Mufti Ziyavutdin Babakhanov, who served as mufti in Tashkent from 1957 to 1982,

and who was closely connected to both the *ahl-i hadith* and the *ahl-i Qur'an* groups in Tashkent). During the Soviet period, there were four main religious actors: Sufi networks; spiritual directorates which played the card of Soviet power; conservative theologians from the *hujra* (illegal religious school) milieu; and, from the 1960s, young militant mullahs, who were students of the conservative theologians but opposed to the spiritual directorates, especially concerning pietism. A great schism occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, linked to the rupture between traditionalists and "renovators" (*mujaddidi*).

13. See Russell Zanca, "'Explaining' Islam in Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach for Uzbekistan," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 24(1) (2004): 99–107; and from the same author, "Believing in God at Your Own Risk: Religion and Terrorism in Uzbekistan," *Religion, State & Society* 33(1) (2005): 71–82.
14. See Rebekah Tromble, "Securitising Islam, Securitising Ethnicity: The Discourse of Uzbek Radicalism in Kyrgyzstan," *East European Politics* 30(4) (2014): 526–47.
15. For actors and movements in the Salafi spirit, it is about establishing "authentic" Islam at the local level (by preaching, among other means). A complex and evolving movement, Salafism covers a wide range of ideological positions, from "Quietist" Salafism (socially conservative and "politically soft," according to Samir Amghar, and for which action is based on religious education) to revolutionary Salafism (which advocates direct actions, with implicit support for the Third World). See Samir Amghar, *Le salafisme d'aujourd'hui. Mouvements sectaires en Occident* (Paris: Michalon Editions, 2011).
16. While the broad majority of citizens of Kyrgyzstan or the other Central Asian republics are favorable to a secular regime, in which religious practice is autonomous with respect to the state and in which the right to non-belief or to minority faiths is recognized, the errors committed by the established authorities, in particular, their obsessive fear of any non-conformist approach of religion, as well as their treatment of socio-economic stakes, have played directly into the hands of those who see Islam as an alternative political solution. In the whole region, the flagrant corruption of the elites and of the administration, the disappearance of social services, the desire for a more equitable social distribution, and

glaring injustices (imprisonment and rackets used as daily weapons by the security services) are all pushing sections of the citizenry to see Islam not only as a moral refuge, but also as an alternative ideology. Increasingly, the ills of the regimes are therefore explained as being due to their secular nature. September 11, as well as the Western military presence in Central Asia (there was a US base of Manas at Bishkek airport until 2014) which enabled the established powers to ramp up pressure on their opponents, have engendered growing hostility toward the West, even in reputedly secular Kyrgyzstan.

17. The example of the town of Kara-Suu and its bazaar in the Kyrgyzstani Fergana Valley, which is regarded as the Central Asian "capital" of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, perfectly illustrates this phenomenon. Growing international markets on Kyrgyzstani territory, oriented around Chinese products, alarmed Uzbekistan, which tried to strengthen its border. The rhetoric of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which condemns the new border restrictions and promotes free trade and an "authentic" Islamic tax, is more favorable to professional circles linked to the bazaars. See Aurélie Biard, "Power, 'Original Islam', and the Reactivation of a Religious Utopia in Kara-Suu, Kyrgyzstan," *Central Asian Affairs* 2 (2015): 347–66.
18. These preachers systematically condemn the *'urf u 'ada* ("customs"), even when the latter does not concern questions of dogma, on the grounds of their innovative nature (*bid'a*) in comparison with the "original" Islam. They condemn any form of cult of the saints and visit to the graves of saints (*mazar*). They also attack the specific rites around funerals (*ash*), which have a particular importance for the Kyrgyz. These preachers then try to persuade the local population not to pursue such practices which are grasped, if one relies on their *emic* representations, as the "ways of saying" and "ways of doing" of the ancestors, and try to ban them, thus provoking distress among the local population.
19. See Marc Gaborieau, "The Transformation of Tablîghî Jamâ'at into a Transnational Movement," in *Travellers in Faith. Studies of the Tablîghî Jamâ'at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal*, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000), 121–38.
20. In October 2011, Kurbanali Uzakov of the State Commission on Religious Affairs also alleged that *Tablighi Jama'at* encourages

"extremism" and should be outlawed. Meanwhile, the head of the State Committee on National Security (GKNB), Keneshbek Dushebayev, has compared the movement to *Hizb ut-Tahrir*.

21. The election of Askar Akayev to the presidency in October 1990 was inscribed in the context of the violent riots of June in Uzgen, in the country's south. Allegations that Kyrgyz were trying to build houses on an Uzbek collective farm served as the spark, and the riots for the control of arable land continued until the Soviet army intervened. The legacy of the Uzgen conflict gave voice to rising Uzbek and Kyrgyz nationalisms.
22. See Marlène Laruelle, "The Paradigm of Nationalism in Kyrgyzstan. Evolving Narrative, the Sovereignty Issue, and Political Agenda," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45(12) (2012): 39–49.
23. See, among others, Mathijs Pelkmans, "Religious Frontiers after Socialism: Missionary Encounters and the Dynamics of Conversion in Kyrgyzstan," in *Religion, Identity, Postsocialism*: The Halle Focus Group 2003–2010, ed. Chris Hann (Halle: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2010), 41–4; from the same author, *Conversion after Socialism*: *Disruptions, Modernisms and Technologies of Faith in the Former Soviet Union* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009).
24. See Aksana Ismailbekova and Emil Nasridinov, "Transnational Social Networks and Trajectories of Religious Practices and Discourses of Kyrgyz Dawatchis," *Transnational Social Review: A Social Work Journal (TSR)* 3 (2012): 177–95.

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CHAPTER 7

Multiple Modernities and Political Millenarianism: Dispensational Theology, Nationalism, and American Politics

Bryan S. Turner

Introduction

The idea of multiple modernities is tied inevitably to the work of the late Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. It has been used primarily as a critique of unidimensional Western theories of the rise of capitalism and the basic processes of urbanization and industrialization. Early theories of modernization saw the end product of capitalist industrialization as the dominance of a uniform "modern society" that was liberal, literate, democratic, urban, and secular. Thus, Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958) can be said to have provided the definitive account of a uniform modernity. While sociologists focused on the effects of industrialization, it was also assumed that the basic rational model of modernity had been defined

Aspects of the argument relating to American religious history first appeared in Bryan S. Turner (Introduction: American Exceptionalism. In *Secularization*, ed. Bryan S. Turner, vii–xii. London: Sage, 2010).

B.S. Turner (✉)
Australian Catholic University, Melbourne, Australia

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and inspired by the Enlightenment. Eisenstadt's analysis of multiple modernities was expressed in a variety of publications that gave rise to numerous iterations of the basic idea (Eisenstadt 2002, 2003). Of course, modernization theory had received ample criticism before the adoption of the multiple modernities thesis. For example, Latin American sociologists had argued that developmental modernity had resulted in dependence and underdevelopment (Cardoso and Faletto 1979).

It is not my intention to explore comprehensively the many facets of the debate. I shall in this chapter concentrate primarily on the place of religion in modernity. In that regard, Eisenstadt's theory of multiple modernities should not be isolated from his equally influential and relevant analysis of the axial-age religions (Eisenstadt 1982, 1986). The elements of a theory of multiple modernities within an emphasis on culture and religion can be identified with his influential volume on Japan (Eisenstadt 1996). While he was careful not to overstate either the uniqueness or the continuity of Japanese civilization, he was aware that its cultural and religious distinctiveness should not be overlooked. In his interpretation of Japanese culture, he discussed the processes whereby Japan had absorbed external influences such as Buddhism and Confucianism. Thus Eisenstadt (1996, 283), considering the unique features of Japan, observed that the notion of a divine nation with its peculiar sacredness did not entail any idea of a chosen nation or a nation subject to a contract with an all-powerful God. However, this "conception of sacred peculiarity held its own when confronted with universalistic ideologies—Buddhism, Confucianism, or, in modern times, liberal, constitutional, progressive, or Marxist—all of which seemed to call for a redefinition of the symbols of collective identity in universalist directions" (Eisenstadt 1996, 283). In this regard, Japan is not unlike America, which from its early colonial period saw itself in terms of a religious calling to protect and export liberty and freedom, not simply for the Americas, but for the world.

This interpretation of Japanese civilization is connected with Eisenstadt's contributions to the debate about axial-age religions (Turner and Susen 2011). These religious and philosophical developments in the period 800–200 BCE shared a number of basic elements, but perhaps the most salient is the recognition of a realm of values and ideas beyond and often in conflict with the mundane world. While criticism may have been a shared characteristic, Eisenstadt once more recognized the variations within this common framework. With the development of these common axial-age themes, "the resulting institutions differed considerably, not only between

the different axial civilizations, but also within the framework of the same civilization—be it Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist or Christian. The variety is clearly visible in different institutional choices prevalent in different civilizations" (Eisenstadt 2012, 285). The various ways in which these variations on a common theme were crystallized had long-term implications for the divergent forms of modernity.

The radical interpretation of religious axiality is that many aspects of modernity had their origins in the axial age. The idea of an axial age is, consequently, a challenge to the modernity of the modern, but at the same time, it raises fundamental questions about secularity. I am unable here to enter into the complex debates about the axial-age religions (Bellah and Joas 2012). My principal focus is on the role of religion in the formation and character of American modernity, on how America is exceptional in terms of the prevalence of religion in public life, and, more specifically, about the role of millennial beliefs in its political culture and its form of nationalism. Scholars have, from Alexis de Tocqueville onwards, recognized the exceptional character of religion in American life and the paradox that America, in many respects the carrier of secular modernity, has been profoundly shaped by religion. America is simultaneously religious, secular, and modern. My aim here is to focus on something more limited in scope, namely, the political impact of evangelical fundamentalism on American domestic life and, more precisely, to examine the impact of millenarianism on foreign policy. American modernity is exceptional in many respects, but not enough attention has been paid to the shaping of America as a revolutionary society by the religious theme of redemption. One significant exception is Ernest Lee Tuveson's *Redeemer Nation* (1968). Its revolutionary character is not secular, but religious, and its foreign policy engagement with Islamic societies in the Middle East and Asia has an influential foundation in an evangelical understanding of the apocalypse. This commentary on Eisenstadt's interest in the sacred and the political provides me with the necessary theoretical "excuse" to examine some of the distinctive features of the religious traditions of American that underpin its exceptional characteristics as a nation. Hence, I take its exceptional characteristics as supporting Eisenstadt's theory of multiple modernities. Furthermore, this discussion of religious factors in the development of America after independence underlines the fact that American nationalism has a distinctively religious coloring in its self-interpretation as a nation with a destiny.

The notion that the development of America can be understood within Eisenstadt's framework has been addressed explicitly by Juergen Heideking, who argues that the specificity of American modernity was forged out of the revolutionary experience whereby American nationalism is "the product of a continuous political discourse and a confrontation with what was perceived as the European, especially British, model of state- and nation-building" (Heideking 2002, 220). Thus, the American Revolution was the response of a peripheral colony to "forced modernization attempted by the metropolitan center in London" (Heideking 2002, 222). This revolutionary period was seen by the founding fathers as a self-conscious experiment in the creation of a republic that was brought into being by an act of political will. Heideking interprets the uniqueness of this experiment in terms of legal and political institutions, and especially in terms of a written constitution, the determining role of the Supreme Court, and, finally, in terms of a civil religion which, in its references to the New Jerusalem and a chosen people, created a sense of national identity that was deeply colored by a religious vision. While there was no uniform separation of church and state in the American colonies, Thomas Jefferson's Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom laid the basis for individual freedom of religion from state interference. Jefferson followed John Locke in proclaiming freedom of religion for Muslims (often referred to as "Turks"), Jews, and dissenters. Jefferson's views of Islam were somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand, Islam was associated with piracy on the high seas, which was a threat to American shipping. On the other hand, he had in his library Georg Sale's translation of the Qur'an. He regarded Islam as less developed as a religion than Christianity. Despite this unstable perspective in Jefferson's political ideas, Muslims were to enjoy the same legal protection as other religions (Spellberg 2013). In the absence of an established church, freedom of speech and conscience became a constitutional corner-stone of American democracy.

Religion and Politics in American Society: The Original Debate

There is a well-established scholarly tradition in political theory to the effect that Christianity, or more precisely Protestantism, is deeply embedded in the narrative of American society and its self-understanding as a nation with a special calling. This religious dimension has been widely

recognized by American historians. From Alexis de Tocqueville and his famous journey to America in 1831, American and European observers have been equally fascinated by the influence of organized religion in American public life (Offe 2005). Tocqueville and his companion, Gustave de Beaumont, arrived in New York on the pretext of an official visit to study the penitentiary system of the United States. The resulting publication—*Democracy in America*, in 1835 and 1840—is generally regarded as the most influential study of the special conditions that secured the success of the colonial experiment in democracy and the role played by religion in supporting a dynamic civil society (Tocqueville 2003). However, he took a pragmatic rather than elevated view of the role of religion, noting that "[w]e have to recognize that if religion does not save men in the other world, it is very useful for their happiness and importance in this" (Tocqueville 2003, 512). He claimed that the political success of the democratic republic rested on three factors: the federal system; municipal institutions; and the constitution of judicial power. He speculated that, given the constitutional checks on the state and its administrative bureaucracy, religion played a major part in America's emerging civil society and that the religious individualism of the Protestant sects was highly compatible with secular individualism and the spirit of equality that was prevalent on the frontier. For Tocqueville, the Protestant sects in American society offered a stark contrast to the role of the Roman Catholic Church, which had, for obvious reasons, opposed the French Revolution. In 1856, Tocqueville published *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (1964). He sought to understand the problems of the French Revolution, such as the Terror, by a comparison with the successful revolution of the American War of Independence.

American society has been periodically revitalized by various "Great Awakenings" that in various ways also achieved a "revitalization" of American culture and society. The first Awakening (1730–1755) promoted the idea that American society was ruled by divine law, and at the same time, it recognized the principle that membership of the community was nonetheless voluntary, and this recognition provided a religious underpinning for America's emerging democracy. While Puritanism was the basis of religious fundamentalism, the eighteenth-century Awakening was an Evangelical movement in seeking to promote personal piety rather than a reform of society and government. Although the emphasis was on faith rather than belief and practice, this Evangelical revival may have contributed to the Revolution in providing a basic national consciousness.

After independence, the Protestant denominations had to establish their place within the new republic, and the Second Great Awakening (1790–1840) was consequently more fundamentalist in seeking to shape the public values of the new society through the Christian conversion of the national community. The First New Nation was to be a "Righteous Empire" (Marty 1970) and a "Redeemer Nation" (Tuveson 1968) with a definite millennial role with a global reference. Further revitalization took place with the Third Awakening (1850–1900) and the Fourth Awakening (1960–1981), which continued to shape both culture and politics in American society. While these were Christian conversion movements, America's religious culture has been understood within the broader framework of its "civil religion." Thus Robert Bellah's analysis of the American civil religion identified a number of key events that have defined its contents. The colonial experience itself, the Declaration of Independence, and George Washington's leadership established the idea of America as a new Israel that had called people out of subservience to monarchy and a land-owning aristocracy. However, this civil religion has a tragic dimension in slavery and warfare. In the tragedy of the Civil War, the ideas of sacrifice and rebirth were forged out of the slaughter of young men on the battlefield. The theme of tragic loss and heroic sacrifice was further reinforced in the two world wars, in Korea and in Vietnam. More recently, Afghanistan and Iraq have been added to the list. The Gettysburg National Cemetery, the Arlington National Cemetery, and Ground Zero have become sacred sites in the national mythology of suffering and sacrifice (Bellah and Tipton 2006). In the modern period, given American involvement in a "War on Terror," it is also the case that Islam does not sit easily in the American religious landscape.

This civil religion is part of a patriotic self-definition rather than a national Christian framework. However, while recognizing the force of Bellah's argument, one should not ignore the continuing influence of Christian fundamentalism in the United States. In the twentieth century, the conservative churches grew rapidly in response and opposition to the secular liberalism of American society which has, for example, been illustrated by various decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to the teaching of evolutionary thought in schools, women's rights to abortion, acceptance of homosexuality in public life, and, most controversially, same-sex marriage. Against these manifestations of a secular legal culture, fundamentalists held to the notion of Biblical inerrancy and the doctrine of creationism, and worried about the decline of the family and the growth

of sexual promiscuity. They feared that these cultural and social developments would contribute to the decline of America as the leading nation (Marsden 1980). Political lobbying by Christians within the Republican Party has mobilized party politics around these issues in various attempts to counter the impact of secular liberalism on family life.

In this regard, Jose Casanova's *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994) has been especially influential in directing sociology away from a simple secularization thesis to recognize the ongoing influence of religion in public life. He recognized that, in the decades between the Civil War and the First World War, there was "the secularization of American higher education and the loss of Protestant cultural hegemony over the public sphere of American society" (Casanova 1994, 137). However, in contemporary America, the Christian Right gained in importance in response to the apparent political success of secular liberalism, especially in terms of sexuality, reproduction, and family life.

Television offered a great opportunity for the Protestant denominations to develop televangelism and expert marketing techniques to reach large audiences. By the late 1990s, there were three significant groups on the New Christian Right—the Moral Majority, Christian Voice, and Religious Roundtable. Under the leadership of Jerry Falwell, the Moral Majority raised huge funds. Falwell abandoned his old position, in which Christianity had nothing to do with politics, and began to articulate a conservative political agenda. Falwell claimed that Christians should do something about the crisis surrounding the family, gender, and homosexuality. The result was the eventual transformation of the privatized religion of Evangelical Protestantism into the Moral Majority as a public religion. While the secular character of consumer society has not been reversed, certain branches of the Protestant Church (re)entered the public domain over moral issues—especially over homosexuality, alcoholism, and general social anomie. The agenda of the Christian Right received considerable electoral support, and when they combined with the neoconservatives in the Republican Party, they were a considerable political force.

These religious movements provoke a more general question as to why religion has come to be influential not just in American society, but in American politics from the Reagan election onward. In more recent sociological approaches, the so-called market or economic explanation of religious activity argues that, precisely because America did not have an established church, competition between denominations created more

robust and "efficient" conditions in the American religious market (Finke and Stark 1992; Stark and Finke 2000; Warner 2004). The implication is that, paradoxically, the more a religion demands from its adherents, the more they will give to religious organizations. In terms of the costs of commitment, the specific contents of a religious message are thought to be less important for success than the demands for commitment that it places on its members (Kelley 1977). Ultimately, the costliness of commitment is measured by the degree of control exercised over members' lifestyles by the church. Although this thesis has been widely influential, research data provide only limited support for the strong church thesis. Joe Tamney (2002) offered a different explanation, suggesting that conservative congregations provide ideological support for conventional gender identities, and in a society which is deeply divided over gender issues, such psychological reassurance can be attractive. Furthermore, given the general uncertainties of everyday life, the certainties of religious teaching on morality can also be psychologically supportive and comforting. For some critical theorists, religious fundamentalism, following the military failures of the Vietnam War, ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and America's difficulty in managing the crisis in Syria, provides a vehicle for the expression of resentment against a range of social targets—gay men, black Americans, central government, intellectuals, and strident feminists. These resentments were crystallized around right-wing populist politicians such as George Wallace, Patrick Buchanan, and Oliver North, and the frustrations were concentrated in male workers in the blue-collar sector of the labor force that suffered most from the decline of manufacturing industries (Connolly 1995, 123). More recently, the rise of the Tea Party may be associated with resentment against the decline of their particular vision of and assumptions about America (Turner 2014). The Tea Party agenda of small government and low taxation is supported by Republican members of the House Freedom Caucus in the House of Representatives, which also supports various fundamentalist causes against same-sex marriage, recognition of homosexuality in public life, and the funding of Planned Parenthood. Although there is evidence that fundamentalism is more common in low-income strata that have been marginalized by the growth of the service sector, there is also agreement that fundamentalism cannot be seen only as a working-class protest movement. There are, I want to suggest, more enduring issues about the connections between American identity and theological understandings of its unique historic role.

Dispensational Theology

This account of the exceptional presence of religion in American society is well known and well rehearsed (Bruce 1990). It establishes the basis for claiming both that religion contributes to American exceptionalism and that the unique characteristics of American modernization support the multiple modernities thesis. However, what is missing or understated in these conventional accounts of the exceptional character of America is the millenarian underpinning of political life and, especially, American foreign policy. More specifically, it ignores the role of millenarian assumptions in American foreign policy, especially toward the Middle East. Starting with the dispensational theology of the nineteenth century and proceeding to the "unusual relationship" between Evangelical Protestantism and modern Judaism, I consider how American foreign policy toward the Middle East has been influenced by the legacy of dispensational theology, the idea that the end of times has been foretold by the gathering in of the Jews, and the crises in the Middle East herald this catastrophic event leading to the salvation of the faithful. The foreign policy of George W. Bush after 9/11 can, in particular, be constructed around this version of the theology of catastrophe. It was a view that finds an echo in Condoleezza Rice's understanding of the exceptional character of America's universal responsibility to defend liberty and freedom. The more intense the Middle East crisis, the more Evangelicals believe that their catastrophic view of history is coming to fruition. Those who reject this millenarian view of the end of history will be left behind and, in the idea of the Rapture, the elect will ultimately join together in paradise. Hence, American foreign interests toward Israel and the Arabs are shaped by the intersection of a nationalist sense of America as a society with a unique commission in the world, a religious theory of apocalypse, and the conjunction of a Middle East crisis.

Let us look more carefully at this religious legacy in the politics of American nationalism. There is a strong element of millenarianism in the eschatological doctrines of early Christianity around the notion of a Second Coming in which Jesus will ultimately triumph over the world and gather in a faithful remnant. This doctrine had diverse origins, but one important development came out of the Catholic Apostolic Church that was inspired by two charismatic sisters from Clydeside in Scotland, who were famous for their exceptional holiness and ability to speak in tongues. Under their influence, Edward Irving, a minister of the Church

of Scotland, was persuaded that the "gifts of the spirit" and prophecy were fundamental evidence of holiness. Diarmaid MacCulloch (2009, 829) comments that these events were "the first glimmers of the modern Pentecostal movement." It was through a series of conferences at Albury in Surrey, England, that the idea of a series of dispensations evolved, in which these dispensations would culminate in the Second Coming before the millennium. John Nelson Darby, a former Irish Anglican Priest, left his church to join the Plymouth Brethren, where he eventually became their principal leader. He saw history in terms of an apocalyptic struggle, and he developed the idea of a "Rapture" from Matthew 24: 36–44, in which the righteous man would be taken up in to Heaven by Jesus while another man will be left behind. The biblical passage warns us to watch and be alert, since the coming of Jesus cannot be known in advance. Thus the Rapture was a secret and unpredictable event that was to have cosmic consequences.

Darby's notion of the dispensational character of history is described as "premillennial," in which there is no human agency but only the action of Christ in changing the world. The premillennial evangelical vision of society stressed its internal divisions and conflicts, and premillennialists departed radically from the optimistic liberalism of nineteenth-century Protestantism. Premillennial theology embraced a dark and cataclysmic view of history and society, in which there is a Great Tribulation lasting for seven years and standing between the end of the existing dispensation and the beginning of the Kingdom of God. Because no human agency can bring a dispensation to an end, it is a deterministic view of history in which there is no progress or development.

In the United States, this stream of critical theology influenced the evolution of fundamentalism, which views modern society as profoundly sinful and in want of redemption. MacCulloch (2009, 863) distills fundamentalist theology into five main points: the inerrancy of the Bible; the divinity of Jesus; the Virgin Birth; "penal substitution" (Jesus died on the cross in the place of sinners); and the physical resurrection of Jesus in the flesh. Fundamentalism was grounded in the Reformation, which rejected allegorical or symbolic modes of reading the Bible and asserted a literal reading of the biblical text. As a result, it came inevitably into a profound conflict with the social trend toward secularization in the West.

This was the theology of Charles H. Spurgeon, the pastor of the Metropolitan Tabernacle in London, whose sermons had an important influence over the development of American Evangelical Protestantism

and its understanding of the role of Jews in the final dispensation. In the history of Christianity, the Jews have been held responsible for the crucifixion of Christ and hence held responsible for the anti-Semitism that has tarnished the development of the West. Although Islamophobia is widely recognized as a blight on Western cosmopolitanism, there is also evidence of rising "Judeophobia" (Taguieff 2004). In general, Evangelical Protestantism has been associated with anti-Semitism as a consequence of the belief in biblical inerrancy. However, partly as a consequence of dispensationalism, Evangelical Christians have built a special relationship with Israel and the Jews.

The Politics of the Evil Empire

Fundamentalist visions of the world, which have been prominent in much of modern American politics, are often visions of resentment, driven by individuals or groups that have found themselves marginalized in the modern economy by lack of skills and education. The resentment, which is typically driven against feminists, east-coast intellectuals, and gay men, has surfaced in the Christian Right, the Tea Party, and the right wing of the Republican Party (Turner 2014). However, the resentment and the disappointment go back to the election of President Jimmy Carter in 1977, who, while a professing Christian, was too closely associated with liberal Protestantism and with an ecumenical sentiment. It transpired that Carter was not firmly opposed to abortion, and under his presidency, the US Internal Revenue Service withdrew the tax-exemption arrangements for faith schools. Carter's apparently tolerant stance on homosexuality was, in part, the driving force behind the evangelical creation of the "Moral Majority" as the basis for mobilizing the political force of the Christian Right in politics. While Evangelicals might have been disappointed with Carter, the distance between President Dwight Eisenhower and Carter is striking. Eisenhower made the unforgettable observation in 1954: "Our government makes no sense unless it is founded on a deeply felt religious faith—and I don't care what it is" (Johnson 1997, 859). As the Evangelicals became disillusioned with Carter, they played a role in ejecting him in 1980 and they transferred their support to Ronald Reagan, despite the fact that he was in many respects the epitome of Hollywood values and lifestyle. Nevertheless, Reagan expressed their worldview in adopting the famous phrase "The evil Empire" to describe the Soviet Union. He thus affirmed the view that history is only the struggle between good and evil.

This division of the world was part of the driving force behind the Cold War which was, apart from anything else, a clash between the secular and the religious.

The alliance of Republicans and Evangelicals had significant consequences for American foreign policy commitments to Israel. At the time of the foundation of Israel in 1948, relations with the new state were less than supportive. However, with the rise of an aggressive nationalism in Egypt under Nasser, American foreign policy became committed to the security of Israel. Behind the secular foreign policy objects of Washington was the evangelical notion of the key role that Israel would play in the final dispensation, when Jesus would return and the Jews would be invited into the Christian world through conversion. As a result, "an unusual relationship" emerged between Evangelicals and Jews, albeit from very different perspectives and with distinctively different interests (Ariel 2013). Evangelical Christians have joined with the Jewish political lobby in the United States to sustain a pro-Israeli foreign policy even where that policy has been under strain from the continuous building of Jewish settlements, conflicts with Palestinians, and the marginalization of Arab citizens within Israel (Ben Porat and Turner 2011).

The connection between Evangelical Christianity and the Republican Party was further expanded with the election of George W. Bush to the presidency. Support for Bush came from two directions: the neo-conservatives and the Christian Right. Consequently, there was an extensive overlap of interests between Bush and Evangelicals over both domestic and foreign policies. The alliance was reinforced by the events of 9/11. The Evangelicals became the basis of the "counter–counterculture" which forged considerable support in Congress. In the fight against HIV/AIDS, the Bush administration diverted funding from prevention to abstinence programs. On a range of other issues—global warming and evolution—Bush was in agreement with dispensational theology. Why seek to address global warming when the Last Days are here? In foreign policy, neo-conservatives and Evangelicals combined support for Israel, distrust of the UN, dislike of the Pope, support for efforts to contain China, the demand that, globally, nations should implement legislation to secure and protect freedom of religion, and fear of Islamic radicalism. The global world, for Evangelicals, is a new world order in which the antichrist is rising to power (Boyer 1992). The alliance between neo-conservatives and Evangelicals was manifest in the creation of the Project for the New American Century, which supported an increase

in defense spending, confrontation of American enemies, promotion of freedom, and the creation of the basis for international prosperity. Another important development during the Clinton administration was the creation of the Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad in 1996 and, later, the signing of the Religious Freedom Act (1998). The rise of Islam has provided a powerful cause for these two very different wings of conservatism to discover common ground. It is not necessary to claim a direct link between the Christian dispensationalists and American policy. Rather, neo-conservative and Evangelical lobby groups combined around a common agenda in domestic and foreign policy. While exercising some caution about the direct impact of dispensationalism, "[a]pocalyptic belief by itself does not influence foreign policy, but rather co-mingles with other factors influencing the Middle East policy of the United States, including control of oil and geo-strategic dynamics" (Saiya 2012, 190). The war on terror was fought within a framework that saw the struggle between good and evil as a permanent feature of the modern world. The invasion of Iraq was necessary because Evangelicals believed that Saddam Hussein was attempting to rebuild the city of Babylon.

American politics continues to be polarized around a set of issues that have been largely defined by Evangelical Christians in Congress (D'Antonio et al. 2013, 101), namely, around abortion, defense spending, welfare, and taxation. Polarization has taken place as the presence of conservative Protestants has increased among Republican members and correspondingly decreased among Democrats. Although the Moral Majority is less visible in American politics, Evangelicals, especially in the Republican Party, continue to oppose any settlement with the Palestinians that might compromise the status of Israel, and steadfastly oppose any nuclear treaty with Iran.

Conclusion: Multiple Modernities and Millenarian Politics

The idea of "American exceptionalism" is no longer exceptional. In the history of the United States, there has been little evidence of any serious socialist politics of opposition. America is also exceptional in religious terms. Recent surveys of religious activity in the United States suggest that there is a decline in membership, attendance, and belief, and the

fault line between liberal and conservative Christians remains an important feature of the American religious landscape. Among younger age groups, there is a significant increase in the number of people declaring that they have no religion. One difference between conservative and liberal Christians is that conservatives lose fewer young people to the unaffiliated section of the population (Chaves 2011, 89). We could therefore reasonably conclude that religious affiliation to churches is declining and there is a growth of "spirituality" or post-institutional and post-orthodox religious experimentation. This raises the question: is the United States beginning a process of secularization that European societies witnessed in the last century?

While this picture of decline is reasonably accurate in broad terms, the most interesting feature of religion in the United States is that, while there is institutional decline, religion has been central to the most controversial political debates in recent decades, where conservative churches, both Protestant and Catholic, have found themselves in deep opposition to modernization: to combatting environmental damage from global warming, same-sex marriage, acceptance of homosexuality in public life, abortion, contraception, the teaching of evolution in schools, and so forth. Despite the trend toward private spirituality, religion has been very much in the public domain. In the United States, despite the separation of church and state, religious issues figure large in American politics, especially in elections and the race for the White House. American presidents, as a matter of duty, swear their allegiance to God and to America's religious mission to spread liberty and freedom. America, like Japan, provides incontrovertible support to Eisenstadt's observations about the multiplicities of modernity. What has been missing in these historical and sociological accounts is the exceptional influence of dispensational theology on American politics, both domestic and international. A millenarian stream has been present in American foreign policy, especially during the presidency of George W. Bush, but that influence came about because of a conjunction of interests and ideas between the neo-conservatives and Christian Evangelicals. Millenarian ideas were and remain influential in American popular culture around the idea of a Rapture. In short, dispensationalism has found its way into the civil sphere, where it is clearly contrasted with Robert Bellah's notion of a civil religion. Dispensational ideas are influential in the civil sphere in opposition to secular modernity, but there has been little recognition of this influence in the sociology of religion.

Jeffery Alexander, in his attempt to promote cultural sociology and in drawing on the sociology of religion of Emile Durkheim, has argued in *The Performance of Politics* (2010) that much public culture is organized around a series of binary divisions, most notably the division between the sacred and the profane. For Alexander, the solidarity of the civil sphere is articulated by shared codes that profoundly structure our view of social reality (Alexander 2006). These codes are typically binary oppositions between liberty and repression, the good and the evil. Alexander is optimistic about the outcome of struggles within the civil sphere insofar as they result in a more universalistic message of social inclusion. This optimism is not entirely well founded (Turner 2015). In this chapter, I have described the impact of Evangelical Christianity on American politics and, more specifically, the consequences of dispensational, premillennial, apocalyptic thought on American political life in negative terms. In foreign policy, it has made the construction of a rational and feasible political strategy toward the Middle East largely unachievable. In domestic politics, it has contributed to the paralysis of Congress over matters of considerable urgency. American society presents a case study of modernity that is deeply embedded in its religious history but a form of religion in which Evangelicals have resolutely opposed modernity.

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CHAPTER 8

From Holy Sites to Web Sites: Hindu Nationalism, from Sacred Territory to Diasporic Ethnicity

Christophe Jaffrelot

We don't see the colour of the passports, but the relations written by blood which matter the most (Speech of Narendra Modi during the Pravasi Bhartiya Divas, Bangalore, 8 January 2017)

Introduction

Students of nationalism in India have traditionally focused their attention on the opposition between the universalistic definition of the nation promoted by Jawaharlal Nehru after 1947 and the ethno-religious model propagated by Hindu nationalists. This opposition echoed a classic division, at work in almost all political societies: on the one hand, progressive ideologues tend to equate the national body politic with citizens paying allegiance to a given nation-state, and on the other, revivalists identify the national identity with cultural features such as the religious.[1]

C. Jaffrelot (✉)
Ceri-Sciences Po/Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris, France

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Over the last 25 years, Hindu nationalism has gained momentum at the expense of the Nehruvian legacy, as is evident from the electoral success of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014. While the rise to power of Hindu nationalism does not seal the fate of Indian nationalism *à la* Nehru, it suggests a new research agenda regarding the (a priori, contradictory, and in practice, harmonious) dynamic between a brand of nationalism rooted in a specific territory and globalization.

Hindu Nationalism: A Paradoxically Territorial Ideology

Hindutva to Sangh Parivar: An Idea into a Movement

Hindu nationalism, as an ideology, has been codified by V.D. Savarkar in *Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu?* in 1923 (Savarkar 1989). For him, the first criterion of the Hindu nation was the sacred territory of the Aryavarta—a geographical notion we'll return to below. Then comes race: for Savarkar, Hindus were the descendants of the "Vedic fathers" who occupied this land in Indian antiquity—which takes us back to territory. In addition to religion, land, and race, Savarkar mentions language as a pillar of Hindu identity. In doing so, he refers not only to Sanskrit but also to Hindi: hence the equation he finally established between Hindutva and the triptych, "Hindu, Hindi, Hindusthan," typical of an ethnic nationalism. This ideology was at odds with the brand of multiculturalism promoted by Gandhi and Nehru within the Congress party, from which the Hindu Mahasabha members, including their leader, Savarkar, were expelled in 1937.

For Savarkar, the majority community was supposed to embody the nation, not only because it was the largest community, but also because it was the oldest. For his followers (until today), Hindus are the autochthonous people of India, whereas the religious minorities are outsiders whose members must adhere to Hindutva, presented as the national culture. In the private sphere, they may worship their gods and follow their rituals, but in the public domain, they must pay allegiance to Hindu symbols. This applies especially to Muslims and Christians, the proponents of the really un-Indian religions in India.[2]

While Savarkar shaped the ideology of Hindu nationalism, he did not explain how Hindus could concretely react to the Muslim threat, or reform and organize themselves. This task was taken up by one of his fol-

lowers, K.B. Hedgewar, who founded the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS (National Volunteer Corps)) in his home town, Nagpur, in 1925 (Deshpande and Ramaswamy 1981). This movement—which quickly became the largest Hindu nationalist organization—was intended not only to propagate Hindutva ideology but also to infuse new physical and martial strength into the majority community.

To achieve this twofold objective, Hedgewar decided to work at the grassroots level, in order to reform Hindu society from below. He created local branches (*shakhas*) of the movement in towns and villages, according to a standardized pattern: young Hindu men gathered every morning and every evening on a playground for games with martial connotations and for ideological training sessions. The men in charge of the *shakhas*, the *pracharaks* (preachers), dedicated their lives to the organization; as RSS cadres, they could be sent anywhere in India to develop the organization's network. At the time of independence, there were about 600,000 *swayamsevaks* (volunteers) (Curran 1951). The RSS had become the most powerful Hindu nationalist movement, but it had little impact on public life in India, simply because it remained out of politics. M.S. Golwalkar, who succeeded Hedgewar as *Sarsanghchalak* (head) of the organization in 1940, had made apoliticism a mandatory rule (Andersen and Damle 1987; Kanungo 2000).

However, soon after independence, the RSS's leaders realized that they could no longer remain apart from politics. In January 1948, Mahatma Gandhi was killed by a former *swayamsevak*, Nathuram Godse, and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru immediately banned the organization, the leaders of which then realized that they could expect no help from any political party. A number of the movement's leaders who favored the RSS's involvement in politics argued that this state of things justified its launching a party of its own. Though reluctant, Golwalkar allowed the opening of talks with Shyam Prasad Mookerjee, the then Hindu Mahasabha president—negotiations that resulted in the establishment of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh in 1951, on the eve of the first general elections (Baxter 1971; Graham 1990). This party is the ancestor of the BJP, which was created in 1980.

The Jana Sangh was to be only one of the front organizations set up by the RSS, its aim no longer being merely to penetrate society directly through *shakhas*, but also to establish organizations working within specific social categories. Hence, in 1948, RSS cadres based in Delhi founded the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP (Indian Student Association)),

a student union whose primary aim was to combat communist influence on university campuses. In 1964, in association with Hindu clerics, the RSS set up the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP (World Council of Hindus)), a movement responsible for grouping together the heads of various Hindu sects in order to lend coherence to this very unorganized religion and endow it with a form of centralized structure (Bhatt 2001; Jaffrelot 2001). Taken together, these initiatives—among many others—were presented by the mother organization as forming the "Sangh Parivar," "the family of the Sangh," that is, of the RSS (Jaffrelot 2005).

Hinduland: Matribhoomi and Punyabhoomi, Mainstays of Hindutva

Political scientists usually differentiate territorial nationalism, based on the citizenship rights of those who were born in the fold of a nation-state, from ethnic nationalism. This distinction does not apply in the case of Hindu nationalism because of the sacred quality of the Indian territory (Jaffrelot 2004, 197–215).

For Savarkar, a Hindu is first of all one who lives in the zone between the Indus river, the seas, and the Himalayas, an area "so well-knit, so well demarcated from others and yet so strongly entrenched that no country in the world is more closely marked out by the fingers of nature as a geographical unit …" (Savarkar 1989, 82). It is because of this territorial entrenchment that, according to Savarkar, in this land, the first Aryans, as early as the Vedic period, have developed a sense of nationality. But this land is not only a geographical unit. It is also the sacred territory of the Hindus. Hence Savarkar's distinction between the Hindus and the others (the Muslims and the Christians, mostly): for although Hindusthan is to them fatherland, as it is to any other Hindu, it is not to them also a Holy land. Their holy land is far off in Arabia and Palestine (Savarkar 1989, 113).

The RSS inherited this view of the Hindu land from Savarkar, as is evident from the "prayer" that its members recite daily on the *shakha* ground:

> Oh Mother (Bharatmata or Mother India) ever affectionate to your children—salutation to thee. Oh Hindu land, I have been happily brought up by you. Oh the supreme benefactor holy land, this body be laid down for you.

Since Savarkar, for the Hindu nationalists, India is not only their motherland (*matribhoomi*) but also their holyland (*punyabhoomi*).

This mystic of the national land was further exacerbated after the partition of India in 1947.[3] Since then, all the local branches of the RSS hold a function every year on August 14 in the name of "Akhand Bharat," the "United India" that the movement is longing for.[4] This objective acquired a deeply emotional quality, with India described as a mother goddess (Bharat Mata) and Partition as "the cursed vivisection of India" (Godse 1989, 58), a phrase used during his trial by Nathuram Godse, an RSS fellow traveler and a Savarkarite who assassinated Gandhi in 1948 in reaction to this devastating catastrophe that the Mahatma had allegedly provoked.

More than 70 years after the publication of Savarkar's *Hindutva*, the Secretary General of the RSS, H.V. Seshadri, echoed his territory-based definition of the Hindu Rashtra (Hindu Nation):

> Every single mountain and river, big or small, named or unnamed covering the body of Bharat Mata, has the imprint of divinity and history. Boundless myths and historical events woven around every one of them have become the woofs and warps of our one unifying National Consciousness. While on the one hand they have been the traditional abodes of gods and goddesses, they (mountains?) have also stood as shields of protection and security for our people against the foreign aggressors.[5]
>
> The rivers flowing out of them have been verily the lok-matas—the motherly streams nurturing and nourishing our people for countless generations. They have even become household names playing on the lips of our people all over the country—they having become the cherished names of our sisters, daughters and mothers. Littered on the banks of these rivers are endless hallowed spots of pilgrimages and Melas [Hindu religious festivals] which draw men and women, young and old, from far and near, cutting across all the superficial barriers of caste, creed, sect, language, customs and habits. Even during the last thousand years of our life and death struggle against the foreign invaders, these centres have acted as bulwarks for preserving the nation's psyche rich with the spirit of cultural and spiritual oneness. The source and support for the founding and flourishing of mighty empires, kingdoms and civilizations have also been the same lok-matas. Intertwined with all ancient myths and heroes and Avataras, they, in short, symbolise the unending flow of our national life since those hoary times.
>
> No less has been the role of our holy pilgrimage-centres and capitals of mighty and world-renowned empires and seats of learning, scattered

> throughout the country and commanding the universal homage of the entire people. The Kumbha Mala at Prayag,[6] for example, that draws countless millions from every nook and corner of the country for a holy dip at the Triveni Sangam [the place where the Ganges, the Yamuna and the Saraswati, allegedly, used to meet] indeed presents the radiant picture of a miniature Bharat. Ayodhya and Mathura, the birth places of Shri Rama and Shri Krishna who strengthened the emotional bonds between the north and south and the east and west respectively, recalls the essential oneness of our Motherland. (Seshadri 1997, 4)

This paradigmatic text offers an exhaustive illustration of the allegedly organic relation between the sacred land that is Bharat and the Hindu Rashtra. This nation is presented simultaneously as the body of a *persona*, Bharat Mata, and as a sacred land defined by nature, mostly rivers and mountains. This *persona* is a collective individual made of all kinds of groups which merge in this holistic whole because of their symbiotic relation with this sacred space. This symbiosis is fostered by the ritual worshipping of, on the one hand, sacred sites built next to the holy rivers and mountains and, on the other hand, mythologico-historical figures like Rama and Krishna, avatars of Vishnu, whose birthplace is known, as if they were human beings. For Seshadri, the gathering together of Hindu pilgrims, at the times of religious festivals, on the banks of sacred rivers, forms a nation in miniature. Pilgrims, indeed, are the material of *communitas*, social constructs in which hierarchies are abolished.[7] But this transmutation is only possible because of the holy location where it occurs.

This definition of the nation, rooted in a culturally loaded territory, reflects an old depreciation of the state. An RSS publication, titled *Punya-Bhoomi Bharat*, explains:

> In most of the nations of the world state has the place of primacy … In this respect, Bharati's in a peculiar situation because the basis of this ancient nation has ever been culture and not politics. In our land many a state have come and gone … The elements of the national unity of Bharat are present in ample measure in its history, geography, religion, philosophy and culture. The sight and touch of the rivers on the banks of which our forefathers created literature that became the standard of human civilisation, the mountain caves which were honoured by the penance of the sages and the lakes that bear testimony to their accomplishment cleanses the mind and body of all sin and suffering … To make everyone in our nation realise this, it is necessary that every citizen of Bharat is familiarised with its rivers and mountains

> which are nature's boon, with its places of pilgrimage and with the great memorials of its ancestors. (Sharma 1993, 3–4)

Indeed, in the last decades of the twentieth century, the RSS has made an effort to spread a nationalist Hindu consciousness by taking its supporters and sympathizers to the banks of sacred rivers. In 1983, the Ekatmata yatra (pilgrimage of unity) was launched by one of the RSS offshoots, the VHP. Three caravans rallied from Kathmandu to Rameshwaram (Tamil Nadu), Ganagasagar (Bengal) to Somnath (Gujarat), and Hardwar (Uttar Pradesh) to Kanyakumari (Tamil Nadu), on which converged 69 other caravans starting from the interior, distributing the waters of the Ganga (50 centiliters for 10 rupees) and provisioning the holy waters of the local temples or the other sacred rivers that they met on their way. This show of mixing of the waters was aimed at symbolizing the Hindu unity; all the caravans converged, moreover, on Nagpur, the headquarters of the RSS and the geographical center of India, before separating once again (Assayag 1998).

The same phenomenon was observed in 1989, in the course of the movement for the construction of the Ram Temple. This divinity—an avatar of Vishnu—was born, according to the legend (in which a large majority of Hindus believe), at Ayodhya (Uttar Pradesh). This site was said to have been occupied by a temple, until it was replaced by a mosque, in the sixteenth century, on the orders of the first Mughal emperor, Babur. From 1984, the VHP demanded the restitution of this site to the Hindus. During the summer of 1989, with logistical support from the RSS, the VHP organized the Ram Shila Pujan, that consisted of honoring, in a devotional manner, the bricks (*shila*) inscribed with the name of Ram. These consecrated bricks were to be used for the construction of the new temple dedicated to Ram. This demonstration took place in the four corners of India. Subsequently, all these bricks were dispatched to Ayodhya, where they were exhibited with the markings of their place of origin. The operation, once again, was aimed at mobilizing the Hindu population spread out across the Indian territory.

In 1990, the VHP launched a Ram Jyoti Yatra (pilgrimage of the light of Ram). At Ayodhya, the fire of a Vedic sacrifice gave birth to a torch that served to light up two others in Benaras and Mathura (the places of the birth of Krishna), the two cities where mosques have allegedly been constructed in the place of temples. These flames were spread all over the country to light up the small lamps that every Hindu family has in their

home for the feast of Diwali (the festival of lights), with which this operation very opportunely coincided.[8]

At first sight, the Hindu Rashtra is a utopia, a non-accessible dream. But, as Michel Foucault has shown in one of his lectures, a utopia has "no real space."[9] Instead, the Hindu Rashtra looks like what Foucault calls a "heterotopia," "a sort of place that lies outside all places and yet is actually localizable." Indeed, like the Hindu Rashtra, heterotopias "are linked for the most part to bits and pieces of time, i.e. they open up through what we might define as a pure symmetry of heterochronisms." Hence the bringing together of gods, myths, avatars, and heroes, to use Seshadri's words.

To sum up: Hindu nationalism defines the national space of India not as an administrative territory, like the Nehruvian state, but as a *punyabhoomi*, whose holiness harks back to the Vedic Golden Age. This Hindu Rashtra is concretely anchored in sacred sites which are mostly natural (even seen as inherent in mother Earth, like rivers and mountains) and anthropomorphic, as is evident from the figure of Bharat Mata and many other metaphors of the body. As a result, the Hindu Rashtra fulfills the criteria of a "heterotopia."

In 1995, Satish Deshpande hinted at a contradiction between this ideology of the Hindu nation and globalization which "tends to undermine the particularity of places and to subordinate them to a universal logic" (Deshpande 1995, 3225). More than 20 years later, it seems that the Sangh Parivar has not been affected by globalization but has benefited from one of its features, the growth of the Hindu diaspora.

Globalizing Hindu Nationalism: The Diasporic Connection

The Making of a Global and (Partly) Virtual Parivar

Transnationalizing a Nationalist Network

The Hindu nationalist movement had developed its network outside of India even before 1947. In 1946, as the RSS legend goes, two *swayamsevaks* heading for Kenya started a *shakha* on the ship they had taken in Bombay.[10] The RSS first established new branches in East Africa, with the creation of the Bharatiya Swayamsevak Sangh in Nairobi, and then expanded in Myanmar (which the RSS calls Bramhadesh) under another name, Sanatan Dharma Swayamsevak Sangh, and in Nepal, as the

Matrubhumi Swayamsevak Sangh. In the West, the RSS developed in the UK when, in the wake of decolonization in Africa and the new anti-Indian policies which followed in some countries, large numbers of Hindus migrated to UK. It operated there under the name "Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh" (Hindu Volunteers Corps). In Great Britain, *shakhas* were first created in Birmingham, Bradford, and Leicester, where the RSS overseas operations headquarters was transferred to from Nairobi. The whole network of the RSS in the West was then rechristened Hindu Sevak Sangh (HSS). The HSS has some presence in 135 countries, including the USA, where it runs 150 *shakhas* (Tatwadi 2014).

The HSS became more important for the Sangh Parivar during the Emergency from 1975 to 1977, when the RSS was banned. It then turned to the HSS to activate advocates for its cause and to find an alternative source of funding. In 1976, *swayamsevaks* settled in Great Britain founded the Friends of India Society, whose primary aim was to organize and defend Hindutva principles abroad. Gradually, the RSS came to be in a position to replicate, in the West, the "family" (*parivar*) it had already created in India (Therwath 2005, 411–428).

The VHP UK was founded some eight years after the VHP in India; in 1972, the Overseas Friends of the Bharatiya Janata Party became the correspondent for the BJP in the country; the Rashtra Sevika Samiti (Committee of the Female Servants of the Nation)—the women's wing of the RSS founded in 1936 in India—also has an alter ego in Great Britain in an organization of the same name; the National Hindu Students Forum, is, likewise, the official correspondent for the ABVP; and Bharat Sewa (Service of India) is the functional equivalent of Sewa Bharti, the department of the RSS committed to social work.

In the USA, Hindutva adherents reproduced the same system, except that the VHP of America came first (as early as 1971). In May 1990, the Hindu Students Council was formed. As for the alter ego of Sewa Bharti, in the USA, it is called the India Development and Relief Fund.

Cyber Hindutva

By definition, the members of the Hindu diaspora that the RSS attracts cannot relate to their *punyabhoomi* in the same way that those who reside in India do. Even daily meetings on the *shakhas* are out of the question, especially in the West, where urban life does not provide the necessary space nor allow the required time. The HSS adjusted to these new constraints. First, it initiated Sunday schools, in imitation of those of the Christian

church.[11] Second, it went digital and invented the cyber Hindutva. The first cybershakha was conducted in India in 1999, in the presence of the RSS chief.[12] Since then, the overseas branches of the Sangh have been relying heavily on YouTube and Skype to conduct their activities and re-create the semblance of a gathering, in spite of the scattered nature of the diaspora. As a result, *swayamsevaks* from all over the world share the feeling of taking part in a community that is not as imagined as the one theorized by Benedict Anderson (1985), since they are able to see each other. A YouTube tutorial teaches how to behave on the *shakha* (how to salute the RSS flag, what has to be sung, etc.).[13]

In the 1990s, the Hindu nationalist movement increased the number of its Internet websites, enabling its overseas members to remain in contact, to stay immersed in the Hindutva mindset, and to keep informed of Sangh Parivar actions. However, the diaspora is not turning to India, nor to the HSS, only to the mother organization. Gradually, a two-way (cyber) traffic has developed. Ingrid Therwath has shown that only 23 percent of the websites of the Sangh Parivar are located in India, whereas 51 percent of them are located in the USA, UK, the Netherlands, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Mauritius, and New Zealand. With 30 percent of the websites, the real hub is the American HSS (Therwath 2012, 13–14).

The dematerialization of communication has not only run parallel to a form of deterritorialization, it has also resulted in a shift away from the erstwhile India-centric set of activities of the RSS. In the 1980s, *yatra* politics was India-centric (in geographical terms), and when members of the diaspora wanted to support it, they could contribute from outside (some of the Ram *shilas* destined to build the Ayodhya temple had been sent from the UK, for instance). In the twenty-first century, Hindutva politics is decentered, and the Hindu diaspora plays a major role in its production from outside India. This trend has found a more explicitly political dimension with the rise to power of Narendra Modi.

Narendra Modi, Diaspora Nationalism, and Deterritorialized Citizenship

Narendra Modi is the first Hindu nationalist leader to relate to a great extent to the diaspora. This special relationship results partly from his Gujarati background. Gujaratis were the first Indian community to travel and settle down across the globe because of their trading activities. As

fervent Hindus, many of them developed networks of temples. In Great Britain, the Sangh Parivar found a valuable ally in the Gujarat-based Swaminarayan sectarian movement. In 1995, the building of the huge Swaminarayan temple in Neasden, in the London suburbs, reflected the growing influence of the movement in England. The "Gujarati connexion" of the Hindutva forces among the Gujarati diaspora was equally strong in the USA, partly thanks to the Swaminarayan network, but also because of other sectarian movements, such as the Swadhyaya movement (Poros 2010). The Gujaratis form a major component of the Indian diaspora in America too.[14] In this group, the Patels may be in a majority. According to an estimate, they would be about 1.7 million, working primarily in American hotels and motels (sometimes nicknamed "potels") (Bhatka 2003; Dhingra 2012), where they can easily maintain their long-distance ethnic identity. To paraphrase Benedict Anderson[15]: "Behind the counter, they can recreate India with khadhi-bhaat cooking in the kitchen, and Ramayan episodes and Bollywood playing on the television" (Patel 2014).

Gujarati politicians have cultivated their relationship with the US-based non-resident Gujaratis (NRGs, as they are popularly known), who benefit from a systematic coverage in the local media.[16] During the 1990s, Keshubhai Patel, a BJP leader who was twice Chief Minister of Gujarat (1995 and 1998–2001) before Modi, went to the USA for fund raising on a regular basis.[17]

But Narendra Modi was an even more regular visitor. He had been in touch with Gujarati expatriates in the USA during the Emergency when, as one of the underground RSS leaders, he was a link-person between Indians abroad and at home. His professor of political science at the university, Pravin Sheth, remembers: "When Dr Mukund Mody, a US-based NRI, who had formed a vibrant forum in America to help re-establish democratic values in India, came to Gujarat in 1976, Narendrabhai had organized a meeting with him at my residence."[18] This American connection would have continued after the Emergency, had Narendra Modi been allowed to pursue his studies in the USA. Indeed, after completing his MA, in "the beginning of the 1980s he had obtained an admission for advanced studies in Athens University of Ohio State in America. But maybe, as he was a bachelor, RSS volunteer, not having direct family and financial links to come back after his study, he was rejected a student visa by US Consulate in Mumbai."[19] However, Modi continued to pay a lot of attention to the USA. In fact, no BJP leader has been as familiar with the

USA (including the countryside) as Narendra Modi, who traveled there repeatedly in the 1980s and 1990s.

> Modi traveled far and wide in the US using NYC as a pitstop, remembers Prakash Swamy, one of several Indian scribes who Modi kept in touch with in the Big Apple where he stayed weeks at a time. He also traveled, often by road, to and around cities such as Chicago and Boston, and flew to Texas and California. Everywhere he went, he was interested in governance and infrastructure—roads and rivers and urban regeneration; how Americans were approaching problems and what India can learn from it. (Rajghatta 2014)

After the 2002 Gujarat anti-Muslim pogrom, Narendra Modi was refused his visa by the US administration, which considered that, as Chief Minister of the state, he was at least partly responsible for this tragedy.[20] Yet he remained connected to the Gujarati diaspora through video-conferences.[21] He also tried to circumvent this visa problem by organizing the Vishwa Gujarati Parivar Mahotsav in January 2004, an event targeting the NRGs likely to invest in Gujarat.[22]

Modi's diaspora policy consisted in reinvigorating the Non-Resident Gujarati Foundation, that was part of the NRI Division of the state government, one of whose aims was "[t]o channelise the savings and surplus financial resources of the NRGs into the Gujarat's developmental efforts for mutual gain."[23] During the 2007 election campaign, when Modi was running for re-election in Gujarat, he mobilized the support of Hindus from the USA too (Chopra 2007).

US-based NRGs then became important interlocutors for Modi. He addressed them at a distance in 2008 during the World Gujarat conference when, according to the website nritoday.net, "30,000 Gujaratis converged at the Raritan Expo Center in Edison, New Jersey [one of the epicenters of the Gujaratis in the US] to celebrate Gujarati language, culture, heritage, art, history, enterprise and people in all its grandeur."[24] In 2010, an NGO (Friends of Gujarat) based in New Jersey organized a similar event called "Swarnim Gujarat," to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the state and to promote business relations between Gujarat and the NRGs.[25] A senior bureaucrat had traveled to the East coast with a large delegation including representatives of major regional companies (Ajay 2013). Narendra Modi addressed NRGs at a distance again in May 2012—mostly to attract investors—and then in March and May 2013,

when he addressed the participants of 18 city gatherings simultaneously in 3D (Ajay 2013).[26]

Parallel to this effort to relate to the Gujarati diaspora, in 2003, the government of Gujarat initiated a new function, "Vibrant Gujarat"—whose motto was "Sow a rupee and harvest a dollar"[27]—which was also intended to attract investors from the diaspora, including Gujaratis.

After he became Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi was able to travel everywhere in the West again. He then made a point of relating to the diaspora. In fact, the culminating points of his official trips were often his visits to Hindu temples (as in Canada) or his (mass) meetings with members of the diaspora, like those at Madison Square Garden, the Allphones Arena of Sydney in 2014, or the Wembley Stadium in 2015. Each time, Modi addressed the audience as if it was made up of ambassadors of India and model citizens of India before whom he was responsible—even though, often, its members had not cast their vote at the time of election.

In San Jose (California), during his interaction with Indian IT engineers of Silicon Valley, he declared: "The world has changed its impression about India because of your talent in computers. With your talent, commitment, innovations you are forcing the world to change. If they do not change their view about India, they would become irrelevant in the 21st century."[28] These views are well in tune with RSS appreciation. The mouthpiece of the Sangh, *The Organiser*, made a similar point, emphasizing without inhibition that Hindus stood apart within the Indian diaspora:

> Global Indians have also played an important role in elevating India's image in the world. They are making enormous contributions to the various communities where they live. They are the cultural ambassadors of India and have promoted the right perspective of our cultural heritage, inter-cultural understanding and youth development. Indeed in many cases their impact has transcended national boundaries and has been truly global. Hindus in general are a highly educated, qualified, accomplished community, deeply rooted in their traditional values. They contribute in economy, education, health, science and technology, and culture. Hindus are a peace loving, law abiding, co-existing and contributing community throughout the world and they don't depend on welfare from the government.[29]

Modi also looked at the members of the diaspora as model citizens before whom he was accountable. In San Jose, in the SAP Centre, he told 18,000 people: "Today, after 16 months (as Prime Minister of India), I want a

certificate from you saying if I've fulfilled my duties or not."[30] This statement echoed the promise he made in Sydney before an ecstatic crowd: "We want to create the India you are dreaming of."[31] This commitment was consistent with the urban policy of his government in Gujarat and with the building of 100 smart cities that he announced as Prime Minister of India. As Chief Minister of Gujarat, he initiated RURBAN General Development Control Regulations. Presenting this scheme in 2009, the Principal Secretary (Panchayat and Rural Development) declared: "The project will create urban-like facilities and high quality urban infrastructure in rural areas and encourage urbanites to enjoy rural life. It's a concept of countryside living found in the US and UK and other European countries where land is costlier outside the city areas" (Pathan 2009, 4).

This reference to the Western model of urbanization reflects a fascination for the Western pattern, but also the influence of the US- and UK-based Gujarati diaspora on Modi's mindset.

Lately, Modi's attempt to be the Prime Minister of the diaspora has found expression in the easing of visa rules which applied to non-resident Indians. According to the executive order passed in January 2015, Persons of Indian Origins and Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs) did not need to renew their cards, which thus gained lifelong validity. Interestingly, the two groups were merged, which means that the Government of India now issues only cards of OCIs, suggesting that the diaspora is made up of citizens of India. This is precisely what was implied by the easing of the act of voting, that was also decided in 2015, when the Supreme Court ordered the central government to give NRIs e-voting rights. This allows them to cast their ballots without traveling physically to their constituencies—something they had had to do since they were granted the right to vote in 2010.

While Narendra Modi is more nationalistic than all his predecessors, he is also more likely to emulate the West, as is evident from his deep interest in the way the USA has developed economically. And this inclination may be reinforced by the role those of the Indian diaspora living in the West may play under his regime. After all, his 2007 and 2014 election campaigns have been conceived, respectively, by an American PR firm (APCO Worldwide) and by Indians who had been trained in the USA.[32]

Conclusion

The manner in which Hindu nationalists relate to their "imagined community" has changed dramatically in the course of time. In the twentieth century, it was as a "heterotopia," implying that, as H.V. Seshadri wrote, "citizens" should be physically in touch with their land, a sacred territory, the *punyabhoomi* of Savarkar. In the twenty-first century, it is largely deterritorialized because of the growing role of the diaspora within the Sangh Parivar. This is largely due to migrations and Internet-based connectivity, two facets of globalization.

More than 20 years ago, Satish Deshpande looked at globalization as one of the challenges the Sangh Parivar was facing because of the questioning of any "heterotopia" that this process implied. Clearly, the Parivar has adjusted to this challenge by embedding its "imagined community" in cyberspace, endowing itself with another aspect of Benedict Anderson's work, "long distance nationalism."[33] In fact, the Hindu diaspora has become a major component of the RSS nebula, Narendra Modi recognizing the OCIs as part of his core constituency.

The "diasporization" of Hindu nationalism has developed parallel to a shift in emphasis from a land-oriented ethno-religious identity to a deterritorialized, global ideology. But this transformation is more natural than it seems. In fact, it reflects a key dimension of the "traditional xenology" of India (Halbfass 1990). In ancient times, the Indian territory was designated simply as "*prithvi*" or "*Jambu-dvipa*," that is, "the earth" or "the whole earth" (Sircar 1967, 20). And the proponents of Hindu revivalism, like Swami Vivekananda, always considered that their creed had a universalist mission. Vivekananda made that point very clear in 1893 when he took part in the Parliament of the World's Religions, in Chicago. RSS chiefs, when they started to travel abroad—a practice Rajendra Singh initiated only in 1994—said the same thing. When the successor of Rajendra Singh, K.S. Sudarshan, went to Kenya, he claimed that Hinduism was the panacea for all the problems of the world: "… it is only the Hindu thought that can guarantee a solution to all the present problems ranging from terrorism to consumerism because the Hindu thought has a scientific base and is also time tested."[34] Unsurprisingly, therefore, the slogan of the HSS is "Hindu Jage, Vishwa Jage."[35] Clearly, a nationalist ideology of that kind can be more easily deterritorialized and made compatible with the diasporization process.

Notes

1. See Christophe Jaffrelot, "Nation-building and Nationalism: South Asia, 1947–90," in *The Oxford Handbook of The History of Nationalism*, ed. John Breuilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 495–514.
2. See Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism. Hindus and Muslims in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); and Christophe Jaffrelot, *Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics* (London: Hurst, 1996).
3. See the book of the then-secretary General of the RSS, H.V. Seshadri, *The Tragic Story of Partition* (Bangalore: Sahitya Sindhu Prakashana, 1982).
4. I attended this function in Ajmer on August 14, 2015. Soon after, a senior RSS leader, Ram Madhav, reasserted that "Akhand Bharat" remained on the agenda of the organization; see "India, Pakistan and Bangladesh will reunite to form 'Akhand Bharat': Ram Madhav," *The Times of India*, December 26, 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Pakistan-and-Bangladesh-will-reunite-to-form-Akhand-Bharat-Ram-Madhav/articleshow/50333856.cms. See also the last response of Ram Madhav in his interviewonAljazeera,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m1W-oXZ_31U.
5. This interpretation of history is highly disputable since, in spite of the mountains and the sea surrounding India, the country has been constantly invaded.
6. This festival is organized every six years at the confluence of two of the most sacred rivers of Hinduism, the Ganges and the Yamuna. A third river, the Saraswati, that has disappeared, also allegedly used to meet these two.
7. On the description of pilgrims as forming a *communitas*, see V. Turner, *Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Actions in Human Society* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974).
8. For a detailed study of other *yatras*, including the Rath Yatra, see Christophe Jaffrelot, "The Hindu Nationalist Reinterpretation of Pilgrimage in India: The Limits of *Yatra* Politics," *Nations and Nationalism* (2008): 1–19.

9. Foucault, Michel, "Of Other Spaces," *Diacritics* 16(Spring) (1986): 24. This text has been republished as Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias," in *Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory*, ed. Neil Leach (New York: Routledge, 1997), 330–36.
10. On this global networking, see Christophe Jaffrelot and Ingrid Therwath, "Western Hindutva. Hindu Nationalism in the United Kingdom and North America," in *Communalism and Globalization in South Asia and its Diaspora*, ed. Deana Heath and Chandana Mathur (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 45–56; and, by the same authors, "The Global Sangh Parivar: A Study of Contemporary International Hinduism," in *Religious Internationals in the Modern World: Globalization and Faith Communities since 1750*, eds. A. Green and V. Viaene (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 343–64.
11. As Vijay Pallod, Houston-based *pracharak*, told the author in 2009 (Interview with Vijay Pallod, November 21, 2009, in Houston). According to Pallod, who joined the RSS after coming to the USA in 1980, eight *shakhas* were still run along the traditional pattern in Houston in 2009, and attracted about 40 highly educated Hindus (medical practitioners, engineers, etc.).
12. It was not a great success because of technical problems, but it improved with time. See the following account by some of the participants whose excitement is noticeable: "The cyber *shakha* was attended by over 250 people physically present in Delhi. We could not communicate with you, unfortunately, because our multiply tested VSNL connection kept timing out every 5 minutes, and the times we did connect we could not enter the chat room because the no. of people exceeded the limit.

    And yet, all the adhikaris present and all the press people had nothing but praise for the effort, and that praise goes to the efforts that you all made. While we know that there is no tradition of complimenting our own swayamsevaks, we would still like to take this moment to thank all those who worked through the nights and those who participated in the cybershakha.

    Now with the concept tested, all we need to do is perfect it. There will be a next time, that much we know!!!" (http://hindunet.org/cybershakha/).

13. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TWq5ijRgCF8.
14. See Sharmina Mawani and Anjoom A. Mukadam (eds), *Gujaratis in the West: Evolving Identities in Contemporary Society* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2007).
15. On the notion of "long distance nationalism," see Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalisms, Southeast Asia, and the World* (London: Verso, 1998).
16. See the columns called "Global Gujarati" and "Gujarati Pride" in the Ahmedabad edition of *The Times of India*, or the one called "Gujaratis Outside Gujarat" in the Ahmedabad edition of *DNA*.
17. Biographers of Modi, M.V. Kamath and Kalindi Randeri, mention that in the 1990s his predecessor, Keshubhai Patel, used to go to the USA "to mobilise funds from NRIs for the development of Gujarat" (M.V. Kamath and K. Randeri, *Narendra Modi: The Architect of a Modern State* (New Delhi: Rupa, 2009), 64).
18. Pravin Sheth, *Images of Transformation: Gujarat and Narendra Modi* (Ahmedabad: Team Spirit, 2007), 54. Mukund Mody died in New York in 2013, after decades of association with the Sangh Parivar in the USA. See http://www.haindavakeralam.com/HKPage.aspx?PageID=17426 (accessed November 8, 2013). Indeed, Mukund Mody had established the Overseas Friends of BJP in the USA in 1991. See http://www.newsindia-times.com/NewsIndiaTimes/20130607/5223698173563886880.htm (accessed November 8, 2013).
19. Sheth, *Images of Transformation*, 57–8.
20. On the US refusal to issue a visa to Narendra Modi, see Kingshuk Nag, *The NAMO Story. A Political Life* (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2013), 114.
21. In fact, he was refused a visa in 2005, when he intended to attend the Annual Convention and Trade Show of the Asian American Hotel Owners Association in Florida and eventually addressed them by video. A section of Narendra Modi's website is devoted to this activity. See "Shri Narendra Modi Addressing the Global Indian Diaspora Through Video Conferencing," http://www.narendramodi.in/category/speeches/page/7/.
22. Ajaya Kumar Sahoo, "Issues of Identity in the Indian Diaspora: A Transnational Perspective," in *Transnationalism: Diasporas and the Advent of a New (Dis)order*, eds. Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 535. See also "Govt Pulls out all

Stops to Ensure NRG Participation," *Times of India,* January 14, 2004. See http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2004-01-14/ahmedabad/28330588_1_Gujaratis-nrgs-kites-vishwa-Gujarati-parivar-mahotsav (accessed November 28, 2013).

23. See http://www.nri.gujarat.gov.in/objective-nrg-found.htm (accessed December 13, 2013).
24. "World Gujarati Conference in New Jersey." See http://www.nri-today.net/community-news/554-world-Gujarati-conference-in--new-jersey (accessed November 28, 2013).
25. Watch http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KMRb-ybu9Gk and http://mastitours.net/binkoo/gujarat/BoothApplication.pdf (accessed November 28, 2013).
26. Ibid. See also Sudhir Vyas, "Friends of Gujarat to Organize 3-day Gujarati Meet in NJ—Friends of Gujarat announce a 3-day Conference to Unite and Showcase the Gujarati Community," http://www.desiclub.com/community/culture/culture_article.cfm?id=1183 (accessed November 28, 2013).
27. Narendra Modi used this formula in one of the Vibrant Gujarat meetings. See George Hype, "In Gujarat, Sow a Rupee & Reap a Dollar: Modi," *Rediff.com*, January 8, 2008, http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/jan/08pbd1.htm (accessed November 18, 2013).
28. "Brain Drain Can Become Brain Gain: Modi," *The Hindu*, September 28, 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-at-sap-centre/article7697735.ece.
29. Guna Magesan, "Exploring Brand NRI," *The Organiser*, January 11, 2015, http://organiser.org//Encyc/2015/1/3/Cover-Story--Exploring-Brand-NRI.aspx. The writer is the CEO of World Hindu Economic Forum, which, according to its web site, "seeks to bring together financially successful elements within the Hindu Society such as traders, bankers, technocrats, investors, industrialists, businessmen, professionals, along with economists and thinkers, so that each group can share their business knowledge, experience, expertise and resources with their fellow brethren" (http://www.wheforum.org). Usually, the RSS distinguishes between the Hindus of the diaspora and the others in a more subtle manner, by calling the former "Pravasi Bharatyas," which means "Overseas Indians," but with sanskritized conotations (see Prerna Lau Sian, "The Dynamic Diaspora," *The Organiser*, January 6,

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34. "K.S. Sudarshan in Kenya. Hindus for peace, noble ideals," *The Organiser*, February 4, 2007, p. 9.
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CHAPTER 9

God Is Argentine and so Is the Pope! Catholicism, Popular Culture and the National Imagination

Eloísa Martín

Introduction

Pope Francis has held a high profile in mass and social media since the very beginning of his mandate. He was named Person of the Year by *Time* magazine and appeared on the cover of *Rolling Stone* and *The Advocate*. According to Pew Research Center (2014), public interest in him increased after the Youth Conference in Rio (2013) and his online presence, considering the number of mentions on social media, ranked him just behind US President Barack Obama, Nelson Mandela (who died in 2013) and Bashar al-Assad. Compared with his predecessor, the Pew Research Center reports that Benedict XVI had less coverage during the last part of his tenure (2005–2013) than Francis had in his first year—even though Vatican Facebook, Twitter and Instagram accounts were created during Benedict XVI's mandate. However, the smiling face of the "cool" Pope from the far end of the world has little to do with the image most Argentineans had of the man who became Francis in April 2013. In this chapter, I will show how Jorge Mario Bergoglio, the archbishop of

E. Martín (✉)
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

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Buenos Aires and spokesman of a conservative Catholic Church linked to the elites and closely related to the last military dictatorship, became, in a snap, globally charismatic, an *extraordinary being* (Martín 2008), opening up at the same time the possibility for the Church to keep its power and political influence.

The arrival of Jorge Bergoglio in the Holy See has introduced a number of changes in the relations between the Catholic Church and the Argentine state. While traditionally these relations have been characterized by the preferential status of Catholicism as the quasi-official state religion, the past decade witnessed a series of conflicts between Church and State. The Catholic Church and the Kirchner administrations were involved in a series of conflicts leading to a radical change in their relationships. However, a few weeks after the coronation of Pope Francis, the discourse of the Argentinean government underwent a radical change, with a sudden emphasis on the importance of having "an Argentine Pope." At the same time, Francis himself maintained his Argentinean attributes, at least through the media, by being photographed countless times drinking with mates, by renewing his Argentine passport and by holding a jersey or a flag of the popular soccer team, San Lorenzo.

Facing the "Francis phenomenon," Argentinean scholars such as Frigerio (2014) and Viotti (2015) focus on the polysemy of the Pope and analyze the multiple modes of reception and the different social uses of his image. While this is a legitimate exercise, because there will always be conflicting interpretations and nuances in the appropriations of any public figure, in this chapter I suggest that, even with these multiple modes of reception and appropriation, there has been a rapid process of crystallization of the figure of this Argentine pope which allows us to recognize Francis as a unique and coherent character.

With the media playing a key role, Pope Francis's features have become standardized in a way that allows his face and body to be easily recognized. Through a process of codification, he has become part of a popular culture which is carrying a clearly recognizable image of Francis in different products and performances, thus reinforcing and consolidating this unique and coherent image of the Pope. As part of this complex construction, the sacred and the nation are, as I will argue below, combined and strengthened. I will use the case study of soccer to demonstrate the claims of this argument.

Church and State in Argentina

To understand Francis, we need to understand Bergoglio. To understand Bergoglio, we need to understand Catholicism in Argentina. To understand Catholicism in Argentina, we need to understand the relationship between Church and State in this country. As Levine (2014) has noted, it is necessary to consider Bergoglio's time at the head of the Argentinean Episcopal Conference in order to understand Pope Francis's insistence that Catholics actively participate in the public sphere and that the Church take a leading role in core public debates.

There is no official data on the number of Catholics in Argentina: according to the Church, 89 percent of the population is Catholic,[1] though a recent survey placed the figure at about 76 percent (Mallimaci 2011). Traditionally, relations between the Catholic Church and the State in Argentina have been characterized by Catholicism's preferential status as a quasi-official state religion and by the clergy speaking out openly and frequently on governmental issues. Besides, under its Constitution, the Argentine State supports Catholicism in both symbolic and material terms, covering the cost of salaries for bishops, grants for international travel, scholarships for seminarists and so on.

Authors such as Zanatta (1996), Mallimaci (1992) and Lida (2015) identify the origin of the close ties between the Church and the Argentine State in the 1930s through a pivotal link with the Armed Forces, which ultimately created a direct association between being Catholic and being Argentine. This relationship had its ups and downs during the last century, depending on who was president.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Argentina has experienced regular cycles of political and economic crisis that prevent social mediators from playing a significant role in the public arena and thus give the Church an opportunity to do so. From 1945 on, Argentina has experienced a series of Peronist governments and democratic interruptions, which have included coups d'etat and resignations. The relationship between the Catholic Church and Peronism is highly complex and has several nuances that could not be addressed here. As Caimari (1994) argues, Peronism and Catholicism presented themselves as totalizing identities whose jurisdictions overlap. This relationship has oscillated between "honeymoons"—when a Peronist administration agrees with ecclesial demands, especially those related to parenting control, health, divorce and education—and

"relationship problems" when the two forces struggle for control over public issues and Peronism ignores (or outright refuses) Church requests. The relationships between Bergoglio, president of the Argentinean Episcopal Conference (2005–2011), and Presidents Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007–2015) have undoubtedly been difficult. Former President Néstor Kirchner's commitment to human rights challenged the central role of the Church and its active support of the last dictatorship (1976–1983). In addition, the legislation on gay marriage (2010), sexual health (2003) and gender identity (2015) was also severely criticized and condemned by the Church and by Bergoglio himself.

Néstor Kirchner started his administration in the midst of a major crisis in the nation's history. After less than two years as president, Fernando De la Rua resigned in December 2001, immersing Argentina in socioeconomic chaos during which its institutions severely deteriorated. During the transitional period that followed, the Mesa del Diálogo Argentino (Board for Argentine Dialogue) was created. It was a forum for re-establishing the legitimacy of the country's institutions while presenting the Church as the moral guardian of State policies and the referee of social conflict (Esquivel 2004, 205 and 208). The Board was expected to formulate a schedule of activities, proposals and recommendations and present them to the government.

The Church agreed to participate in the Mesa del Diálogo on the basis of its self-perceived moral authority and its role as the nation's mainstay. Its participation not only allowed the Church to distance itself from the last dictatorship and the Menem administration (1989–1999), which had damaged its social legitimacy, but also allowed a privileged group of institutions, led by Bergoglio, to (re)found the nation. As I have demonstrated elsewhere (Semán and Martín 2006), it was easy for the Church to regain its legitimacy in this scenario because the winner of the 2003 elections was a politician whose positions were at odds with the Church's deeply conservative ones. As president of the Argentinean Episcopal Conference, Bergoglio fiercely opposed both same-sex marriage and sex education in public schools; he encouraged demonstrations by pro-life groups; he was against the gender identity laws and the expansion of women's rights; and he rejected the laws that abolish economic privileges that the Church obtained during the dictatorship (Mallimaci 2013, 227).

On the State side, President Kirchner's position was clearly anticlerical: he avoided ecclesiastic events and canceled Argentina's automatic alignment with the Vatican at international forums. Unlike many other

presidents, he did not pay homage to Pope John Paul II or attended his funeral, though he ultimately went to the ordination of Benedict XVI in Rome. In addition, since its beginning, the Kirchner administration had an active human rights policy that fostered a reinterpretation of the country's recent past. As part of this policy, the laws that pardoned state crimes during the last dictatorship were repealed; trials of those who had committed crimes against humanity began again and the Day of Memory[2] was declared a national holiday.

The dispute over the memory day and human rights policies of the recent past represents the cornerstone of many clashes between the Church and the Kirchner administration. In this sense, Archbishop Bergoglio criticized the government for promoting "open wounds and internal struggles" which caused social exclusion "through attitudes: indifference, intolerance, exacerbated individualism, sectarianism" (Bergoglio 2004, 50–51). The reopening of trials of those who committed crimes under the dictatorship not only contradicted Bergoglio's call for national unity in the archbishop's speeches, but also struck a nerve in the scaffolding of public life in Argentina: the complicity and collaboration between the military and the Church (and/or sins of omission). In addition, it highlighted that fact that no punitive actions were ever taken by the Argentinean Episcopal Conference, an organization over which Bergoglio presided, against the priests found guilty of complicity and of direct involvement in crimes under the dictatorship (Mallimaci 2013, 229).

The tension between the government and the Catholic Church continued during Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner's administration. The election of Bergoglio as pope invigorated the debate regarding his actions during the last dictatorship and posed the question of the relationship between Church and State in Argentina.

Bergoglio Becomes Pope

Jorge Mario Bergoglio's election as pope in March 13, 2013, came as a great surprise to many Argentines. Although his name was shortlisted in 2005 during the conclave which elected Benedict XVI (Scheper-Hughes and Scheper-Hughes 2015), his recent retirement and the negative context back home[3] made it unlikely that he would become the first Latin American pope in the Church's history.

Various authors argue that Bergoglio was always linked to political power and recognize that his brilliant career is, at the very least, uncommon

(Lida and Fabris 2013; Scheper-Hughes and Scheper-Hughes 2015). In 1973, Bergoglio received the highest ranking at Compañia de Jesus in Argentina (Jesuit Order), a ranking he held throughout Argentina's last dictatorship. He went on to become bishop, archbishop and finally cardinal of Buenos Aires (in 2001), and he was the unofficial spokesman for the Catholic Church as president of the Argentinean Episcopal Conference (2005–2011).

Even if Bergoglio's rapid ascent from regular priest to the head of the Church could be eventually interpreted as a divine sign of his extraordinary character, it is difficult to explain his actions during the last Argentinean dictatorship. Unlike Francis, Archbishop Bergoglio did not present the Church as welcoming, accepting or flexible. More than a man "from the end of the earth," Bergoglio was "a traditionalist archbishop totally opposed to the rights of women and gays, questioned by many members of the clergy, and accused of handing over two fellow Jesuits to their torturers" (Blancarte 2013, 295).

Emilio Mignone, a major human rights advocate in Argentina, and journalist Horacio Verbitsky have both accused Bergoglio of collaborating with regard to the detention of two Jesuit priests, Francisco Jalics and Orlando Yorio, in 1976, and of doing nothing to prevent them from being kidnapped and tortured by the de facto government. According to Chossudovsky (2013), these priests were kidnapped thanks to the information that Bergoglio provided to the military authorities. The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo have also accused Bergoglio of complicity with the dictatorship, and witnesses claim that Bergoglio was aware of the illegal appropriation of babies born in concentration camps. This debate hit the papers almost immediately after Bergoglio became Francis, highlighting that sin is defined not only by direct action but also by thought and omission. Scheper-Hughes and Scheper-Hughes (2015) included on the list of Bergoglio's sins of omission the disappearance of three women: two French nuns and his former mentor, all of them linked to Liberation Theology, whose disappearances Bergoglio was aware of but did nothing about.

When he was announced as Pope Benedict's successor, many Argentines were upset. Although most local newspaper headlines bragged that the Pope was now Argentine (Frigerio 2014), the cover of left-wing daily *Pagina 12* simply proclaimed "¡*Dios mío*! ("OMG"), while the by-line read: "The prelate has been accused of complicity with the military dictatorship, had a troubled relationship with the Kirchner government and was a tenacious opponent of gay marriage, sex education and reproductive

health policies." Also in April 2013, Brazilian cartoonist Latuff, very well known for his political drawings, published two cartoons portraying Pope Francis: in one he is performing a military salute while using a medallion with the face of the dictator Videla; in the other, he is uncovering his military uniform beneath the white robe.[4]

Gimenez Beliveau (2014a, 2014b) illuminates the lukewarm reaction to Bergoglio's election among groups associated with Liberation Theology with Oscar Campana's phrase: "I'd rather be a New Zealander"[5] he quipped, in order to be genuinely pleased with the election and willing to believe in this new, libertarian pope, ignoring Bergoglio's conservative past and his close ties to the economic and politic powers.

The Three Bodies of Pope Francis

After his election as pope, through a ritualized change of status that includes various symbolic elements, Jorge Bergoglio disappeared, as expected, to become Francis. But Francis chose—carefully or by chance, we may never know—to forego certain symbols (from the red shoes to the official residence and the limo), while repeatedly hinting at his "human" fragility in his dealings with laymen. It is not that Francis wants to show the Bergoglio behind the white robe—Bergoglio must be permanently detached from the image of the Pope—but that he puts a more accessible face on the religious monarchy. His simplicity and approachability are not, I maintain, indicators of the natural body of the head of the Catholic Kingdom, as Kantorowicz (1998) considered in his analysis of the medieval kings. His "Pray for me!" motto and regular jokes about soccer with his visitors—be they presidents or regular attendants to the Wednesday assemblies—should be understood as part of a construction of Francis as a character: a third body of the Pope.

If medieval kings, as analyzed by Kantorowicz, had two bodies, the natural and the political, the mass mediatization of Pope Francis creates a third one. This virtual body is an avatar that blurs the natural body (Bergoglio)—while assuming some of its functions as performances—and strengthens the political body that provides the papacy with continuity.

His gestures of simplicity range from foregoing Vatican paraphernalia to reducing his distance or differences from common people at religious rituals. In addition, Francis has been caught in countless pictures and videos behaving as a layperson: we have seen him carrying his own bag and wearing his own worn shoes, sipping a *mate* handed to him by someone

in the crowd, wearing a very simple cross over his chest, paying his hotel bill at the reception desk, taking public transport and cheering for a soccer team. These actions are considered by the media and the recent scholarship as "gestures." Francis's gestures are specific actions that condense a message—usually political. While he does not necessarily encourage proposals for doctrinal or political change within the institution he heads, Francis has opted to perform specific actions, short-range but with high impact on the media. These actions, defined in hundreds of headlines in Argentine newspapers as "Francis gestures," create the image of a more flexible, more open, more "modern" Church. The constant breaking of Vatican protocol (even more evident in contrast to the hyper-valuation of the ritual and the pomp of his predecessor), the flexibility in discourse regarding issues of sexual and family morality, and his joviality in dealing with the laity, among others, are recognized as gestures of Francis. Most important, the gestures constitute a break with the existing hierarchy of the Pope and the laypeople, placing Francis in the ideal and horizontal position of *communitas*, creating an egalitarian and unmediated association between individuals who are temporarily released from their hierarchical positions in the social structure (Turner and Turner 2011). And like certain rock stars and famous actors, like the "people's princess," Diana—and in a very different fashion, also Princess Kate (Middleton), when she shops at middle-class stores—this is the secret of Francis's enormous popularity. The everyday becomes extraordinary for someone who, due his position, is legitimized through relationships of distance and superiority. The routine activities he shares with the common people, as he has with Hollywood stars (Dyer 2002, 22), have made him even more special, and have become gestures. This is a useful approach when considering the ubiquity of everyday images of Pope Francis: the combination of his extraordinary position as pope and his ordinary behaviors in public lead to the construction of a third and mediatized body, distinguishing him from his predecessors in a unique way.

In this process of constructing a third body, the media plays a key role, because all these everyday gestures are witnessed simultaneously by millions of people around the world. Mass media and social media, be they secular or religious, disseminate and multiply a unique, coherent and standardized image of Pope Francis that represents what Carozzi (2006) has referred to as a restricted display code. This restricted display code—which includes gesticulations, phrases, clothes and intonation—ensures easy recognition, turning him into a character. It allows his attributes to

be identified as his own but also appropriated by others for impersonation, because of their "performability" (Carozzi 2003). Indeed, this process of legitimizing and crystalizing a certain image depends on the agency of both media and audience. On the one hand, certain images, movements, gesticulations and voices are chosen and repeated to create a character, while others are discarded because they do not fit within the code. The media that produces and disseminates the Pope's character—through repetition, quotes, clippings and replays—is composed of both the secular mainstream broadcasts, the Vatican's own news (via the Catholic News Agency), Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. All consistently present the "same" Pope Francis.

Further, certain images are reinforced through public appropriation, involving Catholics, fans, devotees and admirers in the construction of this restricted display code in a role that even includes disregarding some of the features chosen by the media, as I will show below. In a third phase of this process, the media gathers popular productions that reinforce the restricted code—from memes to graffiti, including people dressed like Pope Francis at games played during the 2014 Soccer World Cup—and disseminates them, multiplying their impact and, ultimately, consolidating a unique image of Pope Francis.

This is the case of Mauro Palotta's "SuperPope" (Fig. 9.1), depicting Francis as one of the Marvel super heroes,[6] which was shared by the Vatican social media (Fig. 9.2) and was highlighted in a Catholic News Agency interview, granting Palotta global fame overnight. The Italian artist explained that he tried to portray Francis wearing "the clothing that he always wears … simple shoes, a black bag and an iron cross." All popes have dressed similarly, with garments that identify them and highlight the institution, eliminating any personality elements—blurring the natural body. But in the case of Francis, there are the accessories—the shoes, the bag, the simple cross—that have become his trademark and a key element for the restricted display code, as can be observed in Fig. 9.1.

A third element of SuperPope is the blue and red scarf emerging from his bag, identifying Francis's favorite Argentine soccer team, San Lorenzo. For Palotta, the scarf evokes the Pope's humanity: "So he is a superhero but with that little scarf, he reminds everyone that he is human above all else." For the artist, Francis's love for San Lorenzo makes him human because, like other San Lorenzo fans, he cheers for his team when they win and suffers when they lose. Yet what may elude the artist—though it clearly appears in his work—is the fact that, for most superheroes, human-

Fig. 9.1 SuperPope, by Maupal, in the streets of Rome [Image used with the authorization of Mauro Pallota. Mauro Pallotta Copyright]

ity is a facade, a carefully structured performance to hide one's "real" abilities, and one's "real" power. The Vatican itself has expressed its approval for Palotta's SuperPope: "Since Michelangelo and the Sistine Chapel, it has never expressed its approval for any artist, not to mention a street artist!"[7] This, I argue, is because the portrait reinforces the restricted display code for Francis's third body.

The co-construction of the third body of Pope Francis includes soccer as one of the main elements of the restricted display code: "Of all the labels that Argentines have given Francis, the only one he has full embraced is 'San Lorenzo de Almagro fan'" (La Vega 2014). He has been portrayed carrying his team colors (as in Fig. 9.1) and has received dozens of blue- and red-striped jerseys from the Catholic crowds. He has made jokes about praying for San Lorenzo to defeat its historic rival.[8] Even the new San Lorenzo stadium will be named after him, with a bronze monument of the Pope standing on the sidewalk outside the San Lorenzo headquarters.

In this regard, and thanks to his third mediatized body, Francis gains advantages over medieval kings, over his predecessors, and also over other

Fig. 9.2 Tweet posted by Vatican Communication portraying Maupal's SuperPope

extraordinary beings. The body duplicity guarantees the continuity of the (Catholic) monarchy, and the performance element created by the restricted display code allows him to surpass and eliminate the natural body, creating an extraordinary being through a humanized character, a character to whom people can easily relate.

Thus, Francis is the agent but also the result of an encoding process in which the media plays a central role. There are some elements that are highlighted and repeated in the secular media and also by the Vatican (via the Catholic News Agency) that then become Francis "gestures." However, there are other discourses, gesticulations and actions that are either dismissed or reinterpreted through this restricted code. The Pope's definitive refusal to acknowledge the women's agenda in the Church (Murphy 2014; Scheper-Hughes and Scheper-Hughes 2015), for example, could contradict Francis's image as comprehensive, flexible and attentive to the

demands of modernity; however, this has received no mention by the secular media. Similarly, the Pope's grimace upon receiving a wooden crucifix with an image of a sickle and a hammer alongside Christ, a gift from Bolivian President Evo Morales in July 2015, could never be considered a Francis gesture.

Francis's grimace in response to Morales's gift was so evident—and mediatized—that the Vatican spokesman was forced to deny what everyone could see: "The Pope has had no particular reaction to this." Federico Lombardi's explanation at a press conference was immediately disseminated through news media. "That isn't right," the Pope had mumbled with visible unease. And for a second, Francis revealed the old Bergoglio, who had referred to a León Ferrari exhibit in a public museum in Buenos Aires in 2004 as "blasphemous" before demanding it be canceled, because the museum was funded by taxpaying Catholics and "people of good will."[9] In spite of the denial, Francis made the association with the León Ferrari affair himself, in a press conference on the flight back to Rome:

> When I saw it [the sculpture], it took me by surprise. … it could be referred to as protest art. For example, in Buenos Aires, a few years ago, there was an exhibit by an excellent, creative, Argentine sculptor who has since passed away. It was protest art, and I remember one [sculpture] of a crucified Jesus Christ going down on a bomber.[10] It was a critique of Christianity allied with imperialism, bombing. So, first, I didn't know what to make of it; then, I called it protest art, which in some cases may be offensive.

Francis fails to acknowledge the name of Ferrari—who was not just a creative Argentine sculptor, but one of the most important artists of the twentieth century—and reinterprets his reaction of disgust as one of mere surprise. Indeed, he was caught off guard by the gift from the Bolivian president, and the natural body, Bergoglio's face, appeared for a second. But this face must be either disregarded or reinterpreted to keep the authenticity of Francis's face.

Francis, co-constructed as a character—as a third virtual body—through media and public reception was no longer able to simply call Morales's gift blasphemous, as Bergoglio doubtlessly would have done. The arrangement, which includes the exercise of quoting certain phrases and clipping certain images to turn them into gestures of Francis being flexible, tolerant, smiling and "cool," could not include a negative response to a "protest" art object. After all, who is he to judge?

G10D, THE MESSI(AH) AND THE POPE

A week after Bergoglio's election, a survey was conducted to gauge Argentine public opinion on the new pope. According to more than 90 percent of those who took the survey, the election of Pope Francis was "important" or "very important," and the main reason argued was because "he is Argentine" (see Table 9.1).

This survey shows that, regardless of their religious affiliation, Argentines are proud to see one of their countrymen in such an important post, because it brings visibility to the country and links Argentina with positive values (D'Alessio 2013). Concurrently, Pope Francis's actions are the main topic in the media and in academia: both seek to determine if the Pope's public speeches—or more specifically, the most effective phrases short enough to tweet—are signals of change in the Church (for good or evil, depending on the perspective) and whether such change could (or will) affect society at large, but particularly Argentine society (Blancarte 2013; Mallimaci 2013). Viotti (2015) argues that the "Francis effect" revealed Catholic-centric mind-sets deeply rooted in the Argentinean culture. Along the same lines, Semán (2014) considers also Catholic-centric the importance given to Francis among Argentinean scholars, noting that the changes faced by the Catholic Church are not intended to change society, but to update it (the Church) in relation to the societies where it is inserted.

D'Alessio's survey shows that, at the moment of his election, Argentines expected Francis to improve the country's image abroad. In this sense, the election of Francis has more to do with local culture—and how Argentines imagine themselves—than with Catholicism or with religion. As with Maradona and other national icons, such as Gardel, Che Guevara and Evita, it is Francis's position at the top of the world—the success abroad, as Carozzi (2003) has shown for Gardel—that makes him important locally: 87 percent of interviewees agreed that the global impact of Archbishop Bergoglio changing into Francis could help solve the country's problems.

Pope Francis embodies the main features of the ideal Argentine in popular culture: affability, transgression, simplicity, "street smarts" (Frigerio 2014), but most important, "being the best, being the first" to become a Latin American pope, making his way up from the middle class to the world's summit and, at the same time, being slightly iconoclastic (even among his peers). In this sense, for Argentines, the Pope has more in common with Maradona and other extraordinary beings (popular saints, music stars, healers) than with his predecessor Benedict XVI.

Table 9.1 Why the election of Pope Francis is important

Because:	*%*
He is Argentine	61
He has close ties to the people	58
He is Latin American	55
Of his personality	55
Of his ideas	48
He has close ties to the clergy	41
Of his charity	35
Of another reason	14

Source: D'Alessio IROL, March 2013

Note: Multiple choice question answered only by respondents who stated that his election was important; the number of people who gave each answer is shown as a percentage of the total

Pope Francis has been using soccer as an icebreaker in his meetings with both regular people and world leaders, emphasizing his Argentinean origin. Any time he meets a Brazilian—whether it is a high school student, a soccer player or President Dilma Rousseff—he jokes about their historical rivalry with Argentina, generally asking, "Who was better, Maradona or Pelé?" He thus toys with the (im)possibility of the Brazilian guests irritating the Holy Father if they speak their minds; at the same time, they are not capable of betraying their convictions or (God forbid) even lying to the Pope!

If Francis includes his passion for soccer as part of his own restricted display code, when the Argentine team is playing, the idea of nation appears, and renews the direct ties of Catholicism–Argentinity discussed earlier. Through Francis's hand, the traditional and conservative connection between Argentine national identity and Catholicism acquires new features, especially at the level of popular culture.

As I showed elsewhere (Martín 2017), soccer is one of the matrixes that model the relationship with the sacred in Argentina: not as metalanguage or a religious metaphor, but as an anchor to the specific everyday experiences involving sacred forces: God, saints, the deceased and other extraordinary beings, including the Pope making them a "natural" part of the world. The figure of Maradona, who is an object of public devotion and has his own "church," opens up the possibility of including the idea of nation in this very specific way of framing people's relationship with the sacred. And, most important, since in Argentina soccer and the nation provide a specific repertoire for the sacred, Francis could appeal

to these elements to shape his restricted display code, by one side. By the other, the restricted display code make Francis available to be interpreted, performed and appropriated through his repertoire. This double process became especially clear during the Soccer World Cup in Brazil, in 2014.

During World Youth Day 2013, Francis used soccer metaphors to encourage youth to share the word of God: "Play up-field" and "Kick forward," he told the crowd. A local sports channel in Argentina transformed his speech into a pep talk for the national team during the World Cup. The ad[11] shows how the Pope "took Rio," and concludes: "If one Argentine did this, imagine what twenty-three can do" (in reference to the entire national soccer team).

The ad was released before the World Cup, and by that time Francis was generally considered only as someone who did things right: as one of the world's most successful Argentines, together with the Nobel Prize winners and the queen of the Netherlands, among others—a representative of Argentina's national character who proves that Argentines are better than the rest and able to reach the top of the world, in spite of all the country's socioeconomic difficulties. But Francis is not considered one of a kind, as might be expected. The ad represented the capacity he embodies, to seduce and captivate the world, as that of any Argentine, which is why 23 would do it even better. Francis is not equivalent to Maradona, who could not be replaced by 23 good players, or even to Messi plus 22. Yet this situation would change by the end of the World Cup.

As the Argentine team qualified for each successive round in the World Cup, the figure of Francis acquired other connotations, becoming an extraordinary being, a person capable of making miracles. The Pope performed his very first "miracle" during the Argentina–Switzerland match: the Swiss team had plenty of chances to score, but "miraculously" all shots ricocheted off the goalpost. Argentina finally scored and won, and dozens of memes on Twitter and Facebook, later reproduced in newspapers, showed pictures of the goals that the Swiss missed thanks to Pope Francis's "spirit."[12]

At that very moment, Francis was considered the Argentine who has the most potential to influence the game's outcome, because of his having direct access to the sacred, because he is himself a soccer fan, and because he is Argentinean. The popular idea of the sacred has nothing to do with merit (who played better and deserved to win the game), but with having access to the sacred. The hierarchy of values at stake at this point has nothing to do with Catholicism, but with the expectations of Argentine national popular culture: first comes the nation, understood in soccer

terms as the colors of passion (Martín 2017), the value of the blue and white jersey. Technical quality, merit and soccer as a spectacle, if even considered, are supplementary. Therefore, it does not matter that the Swiss team could play better and so deserve to win: Francis appeals to soccer (and to being, himself, an Argentinean soccer fan) as part of his restricted display code, and this allows the Argentines to call the Pope into action when the Argentine team is playing. Catholicism, then, takes second place, to reveal an access to the sacred world that is not associated with religious affiliation but directly with the idea of nation.

Through this alleged action, in the "miraculous" victory of the Argentinean team over the Swiss team, Pope Francis definitely buried Bergoglio and entered the category of the extraordinary. He thus proved he is capable of performing miracles, and many have been attributed to him since.[13] It is possible to observe, then, a process of sacralization of Pope Francis, which turns him into an extraordinary being, himself taking part in a texture of the sacred. This "sacredness" is not derived from (although it could be reinforced by) the institution of the papacy, but requires human agency as a central part of its constitution.[14]

Pope Francis has become an extraordinary being in the national imagination, and is considered as good as the Messiah, a name that has been used to refer to Lionel Messi. However, he has yet to surpass the greatest Argentine in history, Maradona, who is still D10s (God). The story would have been different if Argentina had won the Battle of the Popes in the final match of the World Cup, as it was portrayed in dozens of memes and cartoons through social media and newspapers. In this "battle," the power to summon sacred powers during everyday life was at stake in Argentine popular culture, though the final result was what mattered most. It did not matter which team had the best technical capacity, nor the better players, but which one of the two popes was more powerful. In the end, with Germany's victory, Francis didn't fail as pope, but as an Argentine. The "hand of God" (Maradona's hand) scored a goal against England in 1986 and Argentina went on to win the World Cup that year: this remains the greatest miracle of Argentinean soccer. Francis's hand only led the team to the finals. This failure does not exclude him from the category of the extraordinary, just as a saint who does not perform a miracle requested by a devotee is no less of a saint. Nor does the devotion end if a request is not fulfilled. However, it does position Francis within a divine hierarchy where some extraordinary beings can *achieve* more than others. In this case, and so far, it is clear that Maradona is higher in the hierarchy than Pope Francis.

Final Thoughts

Pope Francis is not Bergoglio (first body) anymore, or simply a pope (second body) performing what is usually expected of a person in this position. Through the media and public reception, Francis has been co-constructed as a character, which includes being flexible, tolerant and smiling—as a third virtual body. This virtual body strengthens the political body that provides the papacy with continuity, in a manner that the institution of papacy alone is no longer capable of doing.

And, at the same time, Francis has become an extraordinary being, and, as such, capable of performing miracles, of achieving more, of interfering in the everyday world. While some of the miracles attributed to him could be easily reinterpreted into the Catholic acquis (a pregnancy, some health relief), others are a privileged heritage of popular culture. This is the case of the presence and agency of Francis in soccer. And when we talk about soccer, and the national team is playing, the idea of nation appears and has little to do with the more straightforward idea of Catholicism–Argentinity that I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.

As a matrix, soccer frames people's relationships with the sacred: not as metalanguage or a religious metaphor, but as an anchor to specific experiences and particular semantics and their influence on the way nation and religion are imagined. In this regard, soccer helps us to challenge hegemonic definitions of religion and national identity. And it poses an interesting challenge in developing the restricted display code for Pope Francis, because while he is the main actor for this character, the script and the features are decided elsewhere: at the meeting point of Catholicism, popular culture and the national imagination.

Notes

1. Rates for 2004. http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/sc4.html (accessed November 2, 2015).
2. March 24 is the Day of Memory for Truth and Justice, for the civilian deaths caused by the last dictatorship in Argentina. It has become a symbol of resistance against the policies of oblivion and reconciliation; against the denial of crimes committed under the dictatorship. It is in support of bringing to justice those found guilty of crimes during those dark years. See Eliana Lacombe, "La Marcha, la Misa y las Aguas Danzantes: Memorias heterogéneas en tiempos y espacios concentrados," *Runa* 36(1) (2015): 98.

3. Scheper-Hughes and Scheper-Hughes suggest that this was also the reason why his name was not further considered for Peter's throne in 2005. See Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Jennifer Scheper-Hughes, "The Final Conversion of Pope Francis," *Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies*, Spring (2015).
4. Images found at https://latuffcartoons.wordpress.com/tag/jorge-rafael-videla (accessed May 2014).
5. http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-215876-2013-03-15.html.
6. This is not the only time Pope Francis has been depicted as a super hero. At the time the picture was released, the encyclical *Laudato Si*, a short video, was released on YouTube showing him fighting "the bad guys" to defend planet Earth, in the same way that all super heroes do: "Pope Francis: The Encyclical," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=76BtP1GInlc (Creative Commons) (accessed September 2015).
7. Personal communication via email on January 25, 2016.
8. In a video that went viral, during a Wednesday audience in November 2015, someone handed him a bag with a jersey of San Lorenzo's historic rival team, Huracán. Joking, Pope Francis replied, "I pray for the Balloon to pop" ("*Rezo pa'que se le pinche el Globo*"), a reference to Huracán's nickname *globo*.
9. At that time, one of the most important newspapers in Argentina, *La Nación*, gave a lot of space to this event, as can be seen at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/659247-la-iglesia-advirtio-que-la-muestra-de-ferrari-es-una-blasfemia.
10. He refers to the installation "Western Civilization and Christianity" that depicted a life-size Christ being crucified on an American fighter jet.
11. The video, released by TyC Sports in June 2014, was titled "Jogo Bendito" (Blessed Game) and written deliberately in Portuñol, a mix of Portuguese and Spanish that Argentines and Brazilians commonly use to communicate with one another. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVzMK8WbA7Q.
12. An example of these memes could be found at http://mundod.lavoz.com.ar/futbol/la-foto-del-papa-evitando-el-gol-de-suiza-es-furor-en-las-redes-sociales (accessed May 2014).
13. The tabloids have run stories on people who claim to have been healed after praying to him, and the wife of the mayor of Buenos

Aires says that she owes her third child to the Pope, because he put his hand on her belly and prayed with her when he found out she wanted to become pregnant.

14. Similarly to Latour's "*factish*" (Bruno Latour, *The Modern Cult of the Factish Gods* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010)), the concept of extraordinary beings (Eloísa Martín, "Seres extraordinarios. Más allá de la devoción y de los fans," *Revista Todavia* 20, December 2008) acknowledges the human origin of sacred people, places and times, pointing out the direct, active and constitutive human agency and the possible transitory nature of the status of "sacred," while not losing sight of the autonomous nature of the sacred.

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CHAPTER 10

Branding of Spiritual Authenticity and Nationalism in Transnational Sufism

Milad Milani, Adam Possamai, and Firdaus Wajdi

Introduction

Sufism has been a "transnational" religious experience centuries prior to the advent of the modern-day nation-state. The transnational characteristics of notable Sufi groups have already been analyzed in the recent literature by, for example, Dickson (2014) on Sufism as a public religion, Rytter (2014) on charismatic counseling, and Piraino (2016) on Sufism online. Drawing on the central argument of this edited book, the present chapter explores if and how a transnational religious group can counter the global standardization of religion. Drawing on the work of Einstein (2008), it will be argued that, depending on its national context, a transnational religious group can brand itself, not only through what it offers religiously, but also through its national base.

M. Milani (✉)
School of Humanities and Communication Arts, Western Sydney University, Sydney, Australia

A. Possamai
School of Social Sciences and Psychology, Western Sydney University, Sydney, Australia

F. Wajdi
Universitas Negeri Jakarta, Jakarta, Indonesia

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Using the results from fieldwork conducted in Australia (Milani and Possamai 2013, 2015), a multi-faith Western country, and Indonesia (Wajdi 2015), a Muslim majority country, this chapter explores the well-known transnational Sufi orders, Haqqani and Süleymancı (Naqshbandi), as well as the Khaniqahi (Nimatullahi). In light of the work of Eisenstadt (2003) on the multiple modernity thesis, and the focus of this edited book, Indonesia and Australia each has a different type of modernity when dealing with religion. Australia has had a strong Christian history since European settlement, and religion is not a significant part of the public sphere. Indonesia has had a strong Muslim history, and religion is a highly significant part of its public sphere. Indonesia and Australia therefore provide good points of comparison to aid understanding of how religious transnationalism can be different in two different modern regions of the world.

This chapter first details the common and then divergent historical background of the Sufi organizations under study. An account of the Australian and Indonesian contexts is then provided. The analysis then focuses on how these groups brand themselves commercially in their respective countries and, more importantly, their nationalistic heritage. We found, for instance, that the Naqshbandi brands itself openly as a more religious consumerist group in Indonesia and Australia, whereas the Nimatullahi brands itself as non-commercial. Whereas the Naqshbandi does not brand its Turkish link in Australia, the case is different in Indonesia, as the link to the Ottoman Empire is part of its "brand." The Nimatullahi, on the other hand, has a strong link to a Persian nationalist heritage in Australia.

A Common Historical Background

The origins of Islamic mystical thought are broadly located in the universality of the Muslim faith and in the creed of unity (*tawhid*). Yet "Sufism" makes significant headway in the Persianate context, infused with socio-cultural developments in ninth-century Iran and Iraq. The hallmark of the Sufi mystic was the claim to having a direct vision of God. This was distinct from the earlier pious Muslim ascetic, who underwent rigorous spiritual exercises for the sake of purity, but made no such claim. The rise of Sufism is due to the popular interest in the alternative it offered, but it is historically linked to increasing conversion (to Islam) and urbanization in developing cities in Iran and Iraq—specifically, Khurasan and Baghdad

from the ninth century onward. In the medieval Muslim world, Sufism was simply one more variation in the interoperation of religion as offered by a variety of groups, some with quite extraordinary claims (Bulliet 1994, 106). The institutionalization of Sufism was indicative of its success as an alternative experience, facilitated by geographically extensive brotherhoods dedicated to the spiritual method of a particular local master. The Sufis were, in effect, non-sectarian in their core beliefs, but they were often enthralled in local politics and ideological arguments over religion.

The culmination of this experience is made manifest on the national level with Safavid rule. This takes the form of Shi'a dominance in sixteenth-century Iran. In 1501, Shah Ismail I, a self-professed messiah (Matthee 2008), was successful in establishing himself as king and ruler over Persia, declaring Shi'ism as the official state religion. Within ten years, he had gained complete autonomy over Persian lands, and his empire spanned from Tabriz, its capital, to Khurasan, uniting Iran under his newly founded dynasty. Shah Ismail was also heir to a fourteenth-century Sufi order by the name of Safaviya, which was founded by its namesake, Safi al-Din Ardabili (1252–1334). It was originally a Sunni order that later radicalized and subscribed to a Twelver Shi'a position (Matthee 2008). It was under Ismail's leadership that the order transformed into the dynastic rule, thus becoming the Safavid Empire and adopting Shi'ism as the official religion of its domains. The success of the Safavids in Iran created a further religio-political gulf in the Sunni–Shi'a divide, which explains both the strong Shi'ite tendency of Iranian religious identity and the politics of the sectarian struggle which spills over into the "intra-tariqa rivalry" of Sufi orders (Lewisohn 2006, 50).

At a glance, the Naqshbandi and Nimatullahi Sufi orders originate in the Persianate world. Both trace their *silsila*, or spiritual lineage, back to the Prophet of Islam, their respective masters being validated through differing *isnad* (lists of authorities). Today, the Naqshbandi and Nimatullahi orders are recognized as tracing their authority to the Prophet via Abu Bakr, the first of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs, and Ali ibn abi Talib, the fourth of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, respectively. In fourteenth-century Iran, the Nimatullahi group was a contemporary rival of the Naqshbandi. The Nimatullahi, as a rule, remained bipartisan in their politics, but adopted Shi'ism from the time of Safavid sovereignty (1501–1722) (Graham 1999a; 1999b, 165). The Safavids represented an axial point in Iran's history, since they were pivotal in instigating an

Iranian cultural renaissance, and especially in grounding Iranian identity in Shi'ite Islam. The Safavid move was crucial for Iranian independence and national integrity, directly opposing the advancement of Ottoman (Sunnite) Turkey into its territories. The Nimatullahi played into this nationalistic agenda, and would later use it to promote their own brand of Sufism and periodically win the patronage of the post-Safavid Shahs of Iran (see Lewisohn 1998, 448; Van Den Bos 2002).

Originating in Iran, the Naqshbandi and Nimatullahi orders hail from Persian Muslim grandmasters, Baha al-Din Naqshband (1318–1389) (Naqshbandi) and Shah Nimatullah Wali (1331–1431) (Nimatullahi). From the early modern period, both orders have continued to evolve outside of the Iranian socio-political setting. Today, both have a recognizable global presence and millions of followers. The following section will, however, explore two specific manifestations of the two orders, the Naqshbandi Süleymancı and the Khaniqahi Nimatullahi, as they have developed in their respective national contexts, Indonesia and Iran.

Readers will notice that there is neither a Naqshbandi Süleymancı presence in Iran nor a Nimatullahi Khaniqahi presence in Indonesia. This is mainly due to the predominant national religious affiliation, as defined by the firm adherence to sectarian (Sunni–Shi'a) division. Iran is a Shi'a country, whereas Indonesia is Sunni. The type of Sufi order and its development in each of the two countries is influenced by adherence to nationalist religious ideologies and their respective religio-political dynamics (Zulkifli 2013).

The Naqshbandi Süleymanci

The Naqshbandi Sufi order is one of the oldest and most prominent of the Sufi orders, estimated to be 1300 years old. Strictly speaking, its history does not officially begin before the lifetime of Baha al-Din Naqshband Bukhari (1318–1389), after whom the order is named. A meta-history of the order can be surmised in the following three stages: the initiation of Abu Bakr by Muhammad; the era of the Khwajan or "Grandmasters" (preceding Baha al-Din Naqshband); and the establishment of the Naqshbandi line (from the time of Naqshband). There are within the order itself many sub-branches, which make it difficult for the academic to address the entirety of the order in any specific fashion.

Stylistically, and in terms of praxis, the order is unique in its preference for "silent *dhikr*," albeit with the exception of periodically reverting to

vocal *dhikr* under particular masters. The practice of *dhikr*, or "remembrance," is a principal Sufi exercise, promoting the consistent mindfulness of God. This is usually, but not necessarily, performed vocally during meditation or *sama'* (group meditation) sessions along with sacred music or chanting of the sacred names of God (Milani 2012). In principle, Sufis practice *dhikr* with every conscious breath.

The Naqshbandiya no longer have any direct ties with their Iranian heritage, which was deliberately realigned by steady migrations abroad. There is also a strong association with Sunni identity, which was forged out of exchanges with traditionalists such as the Salafi in the nineteenth century. The Naqshbandi, therefore, differed very little from traditionalists in the eyes of the Sheikh, since they followed the Qur'an, Sunnah, and Shari'a to the letter—the exception being that Sufis required a further commitment from the Muslim: to be guided in the esoteric sciences (*'ilm al-batin*) in order to be further purified (Al-Wai'ili 1895–1896: 4). Naqshbandi praxis was indelibly bound to the imitation of the Prophet (Sahib 1915–1916: 96).

The ethnography of Sufism, generally speaking, is complicated, and the Naqshbandiya are no exception. Naqshbandi identity, for instance, is colored by its host nation, Turkey (Algar 1970), while in India and Pakistan, the order might represent its own unique cultural peculiarities (Buehler 1998). The Naqshbandiya have periodically adopted various sobriquets referencing key figureheads; that is, from the initial founder, Baha al-Din Naqshband (1318–1389), to Ahmad Sirhindi "Mujadded" (1561–1624) (Naqshbandi-Mujaddedi) of India, Mevlana Khalid-i Baghdadi (1777–1826) (Naqshbandi-Khalidi), and Nazim al-Haqqani (b. 1922) (Naqshbandi-Haqqani) (Jonker 2006, 80–81). No matter how fragmented the order appears to be, coherence is always found in adherence to Islamic ideology (Henkel 2009).

The Naqshbandi *tariqa* (order) is one of the largest within the Sufi traditions. They have attracted an ample following from among Turkic-speaking peoples in Central Asia and Kurdish regions, Syria and the Caucasus, the Indian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia, where they have become the dominant *tariqa* in some areas (Abu-Manneh and Zarcone 2008, 9; Nielson et al. 2006, 104).

The Süleymancıs (or Süleymaniyyah: a follower of Süleyman) began with their founder, Syeikh Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan. He was born in 1888, in Silistre, on the northeastern border of Bulgaria, and carries the title of *Seyyid and Sharif*, since his lineage is believed to have descended from the Prophet.

The leader of the Süleymancıs was the 33rd *mursyid kamil* (an initiating master of the highest level) of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. And practices like *rabita* (oath taking), *dhikr* (litany recitation), and *khatim* (*dhikr* in a group run three times a week) are specific elements of Süleymancı Sufism. All Süleymancıs have to take the initiation pledge (T. *rabita*, A. *bai'at*) to Syeikh Süleyman. They believe this creates a spiritual connection between the disciples (*telebe*) and the Syeikh, linking the global Süleymancı community. The Süleymancı also encourage members to live according to the way of *hizmet* (religious service).

The Süleymancıs believe that Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan is the last of these 33 Sufi masters and that since his death there has been no other *murshid kamil* (perfect master) and no comparable spiritual authority in the world today. The Süleymancıs hold the view that a true master can continue to assist the living. This view is expressed in the book of *Altun Silsile*: that any *murshid kamil* is capable of giving advice (*irsyad*) directly to his initiates through what is called "*uwasi irsyad*" (Ar. guided without meeting) from beyond the grave. Thus the Süleymancıs maintain that Syeikh Süleyman serves as the sole spiritual director on the esoteric plane for all initiates in the movement. He is also regarded as the final heir of the Prophet Muhammad, having been born to refresh the religion (*mujadid*) after a period of a hundred years from the death of the next-to-last *mursyid kamil*. Süleymancı practice is chiefly defined by emphasis placed on *rabita* or "spiritual bonding"—making a connection to the Sufi master, originally through initiation—and *khatim* or "group *zikir*," which can include non-initiates. *Khatim* is also an occasion for Süleymancıs to welcome outsiders to participate in their rituals and learn more about the Sufi interpretation of Islam.

Very little is known about the early form of the Süleymancı movement in Turkey. Recording of information about Islamic movements was difficult to maintain in the politically turbulent circumstances of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Information and stories were passed on in narrative form from Süleyman's early students to later ones. One source interviewed in Istanbul, an *abi* (elder) who understands the history of the movement, is Abi Zaitin Burnu, who teaches History of the Süleymancıs in one of the Süleymancı schools in Turkey and works for the Ottoman archive. According to his narrative, the development of the Süleymancıs started (and this is reflected also by the story told by Süleymancı teachers in Jakarta) with the idea of preserving the Islamic religion, which seemed to be fading in Turkey.

Syeikh Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan died in 1959, leaving behind an established *jamaah* and 14 *Kuran kursu* schools in Turkey. The directorship of the Süleymancı schools was then taken over by Süleyman's son-in-law, Kemal Kacar, as Syeikh Tunahan had no sons. Kemal Kacar was the *abimist* (the highest of the senior brothers) of the Süleymancıs from 1954 until his death in 2000. The leadership was then taken over by the Syeikh's grandson, Arif Ahmet Denisolgun, the current *abimist*.

During the period under the leadership of *abimist* Kemal Kacar, the Süleymancıs established their first overseas branch, in Germany in 1959. Soon more centers in Germany and in other European countries were established. Under the leadership of the second *abimist*, Arif Ahmet Denizolgun (2000–present), the Süleymancıs have established 6000 branches in Turkey and overseas, making the Süleymancı movement the second biggest Islamic movement in its home country, Turkey, and among the most significant of the Turkish transnational movements. It now operates in 130 countries on five continents.

The Süleymancı transition from a national to a transnational movement was triggered by the first outreach program to set up branches in Germany in order to service a large Turkish migrant community there. This was replicated to assist Turkish migrant communities in Holland, and then again in the 1970s with an expansion to the Balkan countries and, at about the same time, to the USA and Australia, where there were also growing Turkish migrant communities. Later, in the 1990s, Süleymancıs began a new kind of outreach: not to Turks living outside Turkey but to Muslims of any ethnic or national background in foreign countries. Thus they began to establish schools in substantially Muslim areas of the former Soviet Union countries (Russia and Kazakhstan), and then in Africa and Asia after the turn of the century. The Süleymancıs trace this impetus to carry their religious service abroad to their Syeikh, who early on predicted that the *jamaah* he formed would become an international movement. Tunahan is said to have been aware of this possibility when he predicted: "You will be flown to other countries to give lectures" (UICCI-Rawamangun 2012).

The robust Süleymancı outreach program has therefore forced the group to go further than many other Sufi groups in developing hierarchical bureaucratic structures to coordinate its domestic and international activities. It would seem that the Süleymancı move toward extended transnational outreach reflects their intention to preserve the Islamic religion in Turkey in the face of what they saw as the threat of secularism, and to

contribute to global Islamic revivalism. This stage in the life cycle of a social movement, defined by Blumer as "formalization" (Blumer 1951, 150), is characterized by multiple levels of organizational management and formally defined areas of authority.

In Indonesia, as in Turkey, the success of the Süleymancı movement can be attributed to its focus on the public agenda. The order is a Turkish transnational Sufi organization which carefully utilizes "educational opportunity spaces" in the form of private Islamic education (T. *Kuran kursu*, I. *pesantren*), and an especially Turkish style of Qur'an memorization program. While private Islamic education has been offered by many providers in Indonesia, the Süleymancı movement has been able to compete on two fronts. First, they offer free Islamic tuition and high-quality dormitory accommodation with provision for students to attend general curriculum schools. They also offer a distinctive Turkish Ottoman Qur'an memorization method, which claims to yield much faster results than other methods currently used in Indonesia. Second, they meet the educational needs and piety aspirations of a significant number of young Indonesian Muslims from less affluent homes.

The Khaniqahi Nimatullahi

In terms of structure and organization, the Nimatullahi order has four major branches (Lewisohn 2006, 65), which are further broken down into a number of sub-branches in a system too complex to detail here in full.

The Khaniqahi Nimatullahi are characterized by their liberal attitude toward religion, and to some extent, this has been the general pull in its gaining followers and hence success in the West, and acquiring thousands of non-Islamic (Western) followers (Lewisohn 2006, 64). Their appeal has been an emphasis on spiritual, internal, or moral aspects of Islam as opposed to strict adherence to the external, literal religion, or law-based Islam (Lewisohn 2006, 53). The exception to this rule within the wider frame of the Nimatullahi order is the Gunabadi schism. This group, which transitioned into the Islamic Republic era, did so based on its endorsement of the fundamentalist ideology of the regime and the outward observance of religious law and customs (see Lewisohn 1998, 453; Trimingham 1971, 164).

One of the distinctive features of the Khaniqahi Nimatullahi Sufi order is their attempt to retain a connection with pre-Islamic Persia, despite

being a prominent Sufi order with roots in fourteenth-century (Islamic) Iran. This order maintains the un-deviated "Nimatullahi" sobriquet, after the name of the order's founder, Shah Nimatullah Wali (1330–1431). To date, there have been numerous shifts in leadership and splinterings of the order. One of the more recent adaptations of Nimatullahi came to pass under Javad Nurbakhsh (1926–2008), hailed as a "reformer" of Sufism by his own group. Nurbakhsh, who allegedly descended from the famed Nurbakhshi line of Sufis, decided to retain the Nimatullahi sobriquet despite the fact that the order had literally entered into a new era under his leadership. Nurbakhsh placed distinct emphasis on the masters of the northeastern Iranian province of Khurasan, its association with pre-Islamic Iranian culture, and the particular type of Sufism that emerged there as a result (Nurbakhsh 2000).

The unique Khaniqahi myth-history demonstrates a desire to connect with the ancient Iranian heritage, while legitimating this by designating a line of masters stretching back to times before the Prophet (sometimes imagined as going as far back as Zarathushtra or the mythic king Kay Khusraw of Firdausi's *Shahnameh*) (Lewisohn 2006). The Khaniqahi claim their teaching to be a "neglected" modification of Persian mysticism (*tasawwuf-e Irani*), frequently referred to in Javad Nurbakhsh's Sufi discourses (Lewisohn 2006, 56–57, 64). This is not to say that the Khaniqahi do not consciously acknowledge or promote their traditional Islamic roots or their obedience to the fundamental principles of Islamic religion. It has been, however, alleged by Nurbakhsh that Sufism was a result of Islam's coming into contact with the culture of Iranian chivalry (*javanmardi*) (Lewisohn 2006, 59; Nurbakhsh 1996, 13).

The Khaniqahi order maintains a large underground following in present-day Iran, but the order has had significant success in gaining non-Iranian patrons abroad. Its wider global demand is largely due to the universal appeal of an "intoxicated" style of Sufism which the order promotes. This entails placing greater emphasis on random acts of loving kindness and friendship as opposed to rigidity of ritual and religious dogma. While the core of the order is steeped in Iranian tradition, the universality of Persian cultural icons—such as the poetry of Rumi and Hafiz and the order's penchant for spiritual liberality—assists in the spread and rebranding of the Nimatullahi Sufi way. Being of Shi'ite origin, the rebranding is, however, limited to non-Sunni countries and either those geographic locations directly affected by Persianate culture (literature,

music, poetry, art) or secular countries such as Australia, the USA, and the UK that have had exposure to such features of Persianate culture.

Rather than utilizing educational institutions or Islamic programs, the Khaniqahi have continued to expand the building of "*khaniqahs*," through property acquisition in major cities across the world. The Khaniqahi focus is not religious education, as it is for the Suleymancis, but rather the spread of its own brand of moral spirituality. The establishment of a network of *khaniqahs* around the globe is central to the Khaniqahi Nimatullahi method of success. It is also central to their rebranding, as it reinforces the image of a traditional Sufi order with connections to the medieval Sufi heartland in greater (or pre-modern) Iran.

Khaniqahi practice follows the *qawali* style—musical recitation of mystical poetry. Nurbakhsh's writings and discourses have outlined the importance of individual community service and the successful livelihood of followers as key markers of a "true" Sufi. This being so, a charitable body or political party may not represent the Khaniqahi, but the Khaniqahi influence has continued to have indiscriminate reach and anonymous impact.

The Australian Context

Hammer (2006) notes that pre-modern Sufi ideas, practices, and structures have changed both as part of the modernization process and as a result of the migration of Muslims and Sufi groups to the West. Speaking about the US case, she explains that there are Sufi groups that are not bounded by the Islamic tradition, and, instead, make reference to a universal expression of mysticism in their discourse. This section aims to contextualize the study of Sufi groups in Australia, with reference to previous scholarship about such groups and the modernization/adaptation processes.

Australia possesses a richly diverse population of Muslims. The latest census data reveal the Muslim community to comprise more than 70 different ethnic groups (ABS 2011). Although Muslims represent 1.9 percent of the Australian population, there are no reliable data to indicate how Muslim affiliations break down into sub-groups (Akbarzadeh and Roose 2011). Because the Sufi heritage is an "inner" or "hidden" dimension of Islam, its members and their specific practices are often indistinguishable from the general Muslim community, at least to the non-Muslim observer. For this reason, Sufis have generally experienced

a degree of anonymity in Australia, a tendency that makes a traditional narrative history of Sufism in Australia a somewhat challenging task. The history of the arrival of Islam in Australia begins with the arrival of Indonesian and Afghan visitors and migrants, Macassar fisherman in the sixteenth century, followed by Malay and Filipino pearl drivers recruited by the Dutch (Macknight 1976). The first mosques were built between 1889 and 1907 in outback New South Wales, Adelaide, Perth, and Brisbane (Akbarzadeh 2001). While the cultures of these early arrivals possess a strong Sufi heritage, Sufism was formally introduced to Australia in 1927 through non-Muslim representation. Sufism had already been introduced to the USA (1910) and Europe (1912) in connection with Hazrat Inayat Khan's Sufi Movement. It was initially promulgated in Australia by two associated figures, namely, Baron von Frankenberg (1889–1950) and Francis Brabazon (1907–1984) (Genn 2007, 2013; Keating 2002a, b). The existing literature on the Sufi Movement has marked the beginning point of a history of Sufism in Australia, underlining the capacity of Sufism to adapt itself to a Western audience and non-Muslim culture. There is little literature about the history of other orders in Australia after this time, or about their contemporary forms and activities.

Hermansen has sketched the activity of Sufi orders in the USA, as well as the study of Sufism in American academic institutions (2000, 2007). Werbner has charted the variety of experiences and activities of Sufi groups in Britain (2006). In Australia however, apart from Genn's work on the Inayat Khan Sufi order of Australia, there is an absence of in-depth analysis of divergent Sufi groups in the domestic context. Research that explores how Sufism operates at the grassroots level therefore has the potential to yield new knowledge about the role of Sufism within Australian Muslim communities.

Recent publications on two Sufi orders in Australia, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani Sufi order and the Khaniqahi Nimatullahi Sufi order (Milani and Possamai 2013, 2015), have, however, provided a further advancement toward contextualizing Sufism in Australia. Based on a pilot study, the publications have provided an initial survey of the belief system, organizational structure, online activity, and identity narrative of these two orders through in-depth interviews with members. One important finding in this study has been that the member base of both groups is overwhelmingly from non-Muslim backgrounds. Many interviewed had converted to Islam by way of Sufism. Though this might mean different things for different

converts, Sufism is certainly an important factor within the Muslim dynamic to be considered in closer detail in the Australian context.

Of the two orders studied, the Khaniqahi are focused on in this chapter because they demonstrated a greater local engagement with the community through fundraising events, steady contribution to regional charity, and hosting Sufi evenings open to the public in a visible public space, as identified by the "Sufi House" in Sydney's inner west. Given the disproportionately high non-Muslim interest in "mystical Islam," the Khaniqahi are worth noting since they have been successful in their appeal to "Westerners" in their embodiment of a "love Sufism" that draws on well-known Persian literature such as Khayyam, Hafiz, and Rumi in portraying a culturally refined Islam.

The Indonesian Context

Indonesia is a majority Muslim country, and it is widely argued that Sufism and the Sufi orders played a crucial role in the Islamization process in the Archipelago (Bruinessen 1994, 1; Laffan 2011, 24). According to Bruinessen (1994, 1), the first Islamization of Southeast Asia took place in the same period as the rapid development of medieval Sufism and the growth of the Sufi orders (*tarikat*). Therefore, the version of Islam that was taught to the first Southeast Asian converts was strongly colored by Sufi teachings and values. It is also suggested that it was the Sufi coloration of Islam in that period that made it attractive to converts. As Bruinessen observed, "the development of Sufism was one of the factors making the Islamization of Southeast Asia possible" (Bruinessen 1994, 2). Laffan (2011) has shown that Sufi praxis has been part of Islamization since the fourteenth century.

In the following centuries, Sufi figures played important roles in the Islamization of the Archipelago. In the fifteenth century of Indonesian Islam, the legendary Nine Saints (*Wali Songo*) dominated stories of the spread of Islam. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Sufi mystics, such as Hamzah Fansuri and Abdurrauf Singkil, were leading Muslim figures in Aceh, the famed gateway of Islam into the Archipelago. In the eighteenth century, the time of neo-Sufi reformism, the prominent Sufi, al-Falimbani, worked to mediate between the *Shari'a* (Islamic law) and *tasawwuf* (Sufi metaphysics) (Azra 2004, 109–112; Laffan 2011, 4–24).

The important role played by Sufi *syeikhs* and brotherhoods in former times in Indonesia was resumed in the later twentieth century, in the midst

of Indonesia's Islamic revival. Howell (2001) argues that the picture of Islamic revival in Indonesia, which started in the 1970s as it did also in other parts of the Muslim world, and appeared to be scripturalist, did, in fact, include a revival of Sufism. Howell showed the "inner" side of Islamic revival, which was represented by "Sufi-inspired forms of piety" to which Muslims turned to supplement the otherwise dry, rule-oriented Wahhabi, Modernist, and Salafist piety regimes. The late twentieth-century Sufi revival engaged sectors of society previously thought to find Sufism's devotional and mystical traditions unappealing: urbanites, women, and young people. As Howell has observed,

> … devotional and mystical intensifications of core Islamic practice—in short "Sufism"—have survived. Indeed, they are being enthusiastically pursued, and not only by the elderly village men once thought to be Sufism's sole refuge in the twilight of its existence. (2001, 702)

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, new forms of Sufi piety promotion have proliferated and reached wide audiences (Hoesterey 2009; Howell 2012). These include *tasawwuf* courses taught in commercial, adult Islamic educational institutes, Sufi-inspired televangelism, and mass rallies featuring revivalist preaching along with sung prayers.

In addition to the significant development of the study of Sufism in Indonesia and strong indications of its continued success and influence there, Indonesia has also experienced a transnational Sufi wave that contributes to Islamic revival in the country. Recent interactions between the global movement of Islamic revival and Indonesian Islam suggest an influence of Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, and Iranian Islam in this regard (Fox 2004; Laffan 2011, 10–12), yet scholars seem to have neglected the role played by the Sufi-oriented Turkish movement operating in Indonesia as a part of the global piety movement. Although Laffan (2011, 10–12) mentioned the connection between the Ottoman Empire and Aceh in sixteenth-century Indonesian Islam, the emergence of a new wave of Turkish influence shows no necessary connection with the old history, and therefore can be seen as a new stimulus to Islamization introduced by the modern Turkish transnational movement.

The Turkish organization's role in Indonesian Islam is relatively new, as it only began its outreach in Indonesia in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, its progress is significant. To date (as indicated previously), three Turkish movements have established branches in Indonesia

and run many kinds of religious *hizmet*, mostly in the education sector. Among the three, only one organization encompasses a traditional Sufi order with a fully authenticated Naqshbandi affiliation: the Süleymancıs. The Süleymancıs have been able to establish themselves in this market by setting up boarding schools and constituting a national branch, called the United Cultural Centre of Indonesia (UICCI). The Süleymancıs formally established the UICCI in 2005.

Branding of Religion

Einstein (2008) argues that, in today's market logic, religions can no longer rely on "brand loyalty." This idea is echoed in the work of Roy (2008), who states that, with globalization, there is a simultaneous process of standardization and customization, in which the language of marketing is the new vernacular. Religions must compete to attract new customers and keep existing ones. People might today seek authenticity in religion in this mass production society, and the branding of religion offers a type of narrative which establishes an identity and marks "difference" in the religious market (Sanders 2012).

According to Einstein's (2008) research, in an increasingly competitive market, religious groups have taken on names, logos, and slogans to make their voices heard, and she equates this branding of faiths with the branding of secular products. She defines branding as

> … about communicating an idea through a product. It is about creating meaning—taking a physical object and turning it into more than the sum of its parts. It is about creating a personal connection between consumers and products (or services) through communications that lead to thoughts and feelings that have nothing to do with the product's physical attributes. Branding is about fulfilling a need, providing what marketers call the benefit. (Einstein 2012, 11)

In the USA, Einstein estimates, 36 percent of Americans attend a religious service once a month, and close to 80 percent believe in God. More than the 40 percent of Americans who believe but do not attend a religious service are likely to read books on religion, watch religious films at the movies, check religious sites on the Internet, and so on. As "religion is increasingly moving from pew to pixel" (Einstein 2008, 8), these people, who see themselves as religious, are mainly consumers of popular culture

and do not necessarily follow the guidance or advice of a religious leader. For the majority of these people, their religious identity tends to be formed outside of a religious institution. These are the most likely to be attracted to, and remain within, religions as a type of brand.

Further, the competition is not only between religious groups themselves but with popular culture as well. Over the last 20 years, there has been an explosive growth in the media industry (more TV channels, new social media, etc.), and with this, also, an increase in the religious content in popular culture. As Einstein (2008, 35–36) states:

> The ability to choose on the part of the seeker has made the religious marketplace more competitive. Monopoly practices no longer apply because churches cannot take their parishioners for granted. Marketing becomes the means to attract new parishioners as well as retain current ones. … in order to compete with these consumer-oriented choices, churches have to cater to consumers more aggressively, since minimally they are asking religious practitioners to leave their homes to be part of their community. Religious institutions have to make the trip worthwhile. … How else to compete against television, video games, time with the family, sports, and everything else that occupies the lives and minds of America today?

Branding is not just about achieving a great commercial success; it can be simply about giving an identity to a group, a type of informal branding. For example, Palmisano (2013) found that new monasteries (those created after Vatican II), even if they provide an alternative to the demands of consumer capitalism, nevertheless have to internalize parts of neoliberalism. They provide merchandise to customers and are sites of religious tourism. There are also some religious groups that are, of course, less involved in consumerism. Paradoxically, these groups can sometimes unintentionally brand themselves as non-commercial and be perceived as more authentic.

Branding of Sufism in Australia

In previous research, Milani and Possamai (2013) discovered that in the West, of the two orders, the Naqshbandi order is more focused on attracting Muslims practitioners and also more involved in consumer culture. The Nimatullahi order, on the other hand, is more open to accepting non-Muslims members and, even though it is more Western in appearance, is less inscribed in consumer culture. For example, on the

Internet, the Naqshibandiya has a stronger focus on Islam than does the Nimatullahiya. The former makes more visible references to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Its site also invites people to donate to charities—for example, it asks people to support orphans, showing pictures of children wearing Muslim accoutrements—or to the group itself, through PayPal. Images of people shown on the Naqshibandiya website are less mundane than those on the Nimatullahiya site. They may include mystical elements, such as light radiating from the sky or from a passageway. The Naqshibandiya leaders tend to be portrayed as having long beards and wearing non-Western clothing. There is a link to a Muslim online shopping network where people can buy, not just books, but also clothes, perfumes, rings, and various accessories. A link to the *SufiLive* Radio station is also accessible.

Taking into account that the informants from the Nimatullahi order had a very positive approach to the influence of Western values, it could perhaps be expected that the group would be influenced by consumerism, but this was not reflected in the statements of the participants.

> I think that spirituality and consumerism are at odds. But I also feel that with consumerism there's coercion, which is at odds with spirituality. ... I don't think that it [this order] markets in a way that promotes consumption of it.

Another respondent from this group hinted that Sufism is not perceived as an easy path that can be facilitated by consumerism:

> … the order does not engage in consumer culture to promote itself. There's not much propaganda in Sufism and in this order. It's really the way of the elect, really. Not everybody can become a Sufi, it is not for everybody.

In the following comment, we can see a link between the weak approach to consumerism and a feeling of authenticity among the group:

> I don't think that this order puts itself out there [in consumer culture] very much. I don't think they're trying to market themselves to anyone. … I went to the Nimatullahis I liked it, coz it was more traditional.

For the Naqshbandi, the situation is slightly different, as one respondent explained:

> [Consumerism] has come up a lot of times, and I'm not really for that. But American counterparts are all for it. For me personally, it's a spiritual group and it's as simple as that and it comes out of my pocket. But they merchandize everything, books by the masters, but I'm not against it.

Another mentioned how useful it is to have access to certain commodities:

> There's one of the main websites based in America that does sell things like prayer beads and the like. … Traditionally the order wore the Ottoman dress, turbans and baggy trousers and you can buy that online. Also books, prayers mats and all that sort of thing.

Both groups appear to provide an alternative to Western values. *Nimatullahi.org* espouses Western appearance, is more open to the Westerner, but reacts against consumerism, as a way, perhaps, to provide a source of authenticity for the group's spirituality and as an alternative to other Western spiritualties that are fully engaged in consumer culture. *Naqshbandi.org* shows itself to be more Muslim in its appearance, less open to non-Muslims, and more open to commodified culture, most likely because its "authenticity" does not reside in its resistance to consumerism of spirituality but in its more "traditional" Muslim appearance.

Branding of Sufism in Indonesia

The Süleymancıs receive funding from Muslims around the globe. This enables operation of their boarding schools (T. *Kuran kursu*; I. *pesantren*). Involvement in commercial business becomes a sensitive issue, since the traditional Muslim attitude perceives engagement in business as usury.

The popular success and expansion of the boarding schools has, however, meant an increased involvement in business activities on the part of the Süleymancıs. One example of business activity is "Hizmet Tourism" which provides travel services to Turkey. The present consumer attitude of the Süleymancıs can also be seen in their graduates. One interviewee stated: "Many Süleymancı teachers [in Jakarta] have decided to become involved in more business activities with some even giving up their teaching job, yet they retain their Süleymancı membership." This growing trend is not viewed negatively by the board of the Indonesian Süleymancıs. One Süleymancı senior student in Jakarta said: "There are some alumni of the Süleymancı boarding schools who decided on leaving, not to be teachers (T: *hoca*; I: *ustadz*), but rather to run a business or some other job outside

the Süleymancı circle. However they are still members of the Süleymancıs and contribute (financially) to the cause."

The Süleymancıs also request donations for the fasting break or animal sacrifice festival, to fund Muslim students to allow them to complete their religious education at the Süleymancı boarding school. An online form and bank details are made available. According to one respondent, the number of donors has increased. Whereas, previously, Süleymancı fund raisers had to go "knocking on doors," now people are coming to them offering money.

Branding is not just about achieving great commercial success; it can be simply about giving an identity to a group—a type of informal branding. In Indonesia, the Süleymancıs are seen as having been able to preserve their image as supporters of the piety movement. This is clearly important for the Süleymancıs, as their main target market is Muslims, especially those who wish to become more pious. The Süleymancıs are careful to ensure their image remains in favor with their main supporters in Indonesia, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, whose role is crucial to the development of the transnational Süleymancıs in Indonesia. The Süleymancıs display a photograph of the Religious Affairs Minister and his staff on their website and invite them to visit their well-established boarding school in Turkey. The success of the Süleymancı consumer engagement lies in their ability to align business strategies with Islamic education.

The Süleymancıs are not anti-consumerist, but they restrict consumer activity to accommodation and religious services, and the sale of Islamically approved items. A large portion of their consumer market consists of their own members, with non-members making up part of the tourism activities. Tourism also helps to promote Süleymancı Sufism and attract new members.

Branding Persian Nationalism in Australia

Of the seven people interviewed in the Khaniqahi group in Australia, none explicitly identified with "Islam" or as being "Muslim." The six who were Australian born discussed their relationship with a group that is Persian-based, expressing a variety of perceptions concerning this. For example, one member who is a long-time devotee and heavily involved in the organization said:

> As an Australian, not as an Iranian, [it's] difficult in some sense. Belonging to an order here … it's Persian-based, and I don't speak much Farsi—very

> little. I'm learning a lot more as I go, but not fast enough. There seems to be a feeling that … if you're not Iranian, then you're not necessarily knowing how things should be in the Sufi order and you're always—you're not really asked to serve as such ….

However, another member of the group, a long-time devotee, seemed to feel differently:

> The order has a cultural feel and there are many Iranians, but there are enough non-Iranians for me not to feel uncomfortable.

Another member, who is involved in the leadership, pointed to the challenge of both spreading the order and maintaining its heritage:

> There is a strong Irani culture behind it. In terms of adapting, the master once said that this is an Irani order. At the same time, it is spreading across the world and sheikhs like myself are not Iranian. Still, I hope that it doesn't lose its Iranian heritage. This culture contains many treasures of music and poetry like Hafiz and Rumi, and why would you want to discard that?

According to Lewisohn's (2006) observations, Western converts to the Khaniqahi are encouraged to learn Persian but not Arabic, because the group stresses the "Iranianness of the Sufi tradition" (Lewisohn 2006, 56). Lewisohn finds the global reach of this group to be limited by this ethnocentric approach, which affirms the Iranian nature and native Persian origin of the Khaniqahi brand of Sufism. He points out that the group fosters a strong perception that a Westerner cannot (really) become a *darvish* (Lewisohn 2006, 56), a perception echoed by the first interviewee cited above. These limitations may be mitigated, in Lewisohn's opinion, because many Westerners do not have a strong affinity with nationalistic values, and tend to embrace this religion for non-nationalistic reasons. The present authors' own sense of the situation, from interaction as researchers with the Khaniqahi order studied here, is that many members are simply attracted to the "Sufi culture" without necessarily knowing it is Iranian. Lewisohn observes that in Iran—a predominantly Shi'a nation—the Khaniqahi group tends to attract mainly Shi'ite Muslims, whereas in the West, where the group must inhabit a "cultic milieu" (Campbell 1972) in competition with numerous Eastern and New Age groups, it attracts particular types of Westerners seeking a different kind of cultural and spiritual experience.

Of the Haqqani group in Australia, none of the participants made reference to an Iranian, Turkish, or any other nationalist culture. Whereas

the Khaniqahi order valued a cultural capital based on Persian culture and values, Haqqani members focused more on the symbolic capital of being Muslim. The focus of the Haqqani seems to be exclusively on the practice of the group in Australia rather than on maintaining Persian (or any other) cultural links. As one informant suggested, the group is intentionally inclusive of Westerners:

> Fifteen percent [are] born Muslims, the remainder are non-Muslims and have since become Muslims over time … There's tremendous appeal and we are making it accessible to the Westerner. We don't separate men and women. We share a meal at the end of *dhikr* [Sufi meditation ceremony] together. We are not prescriptive and we allow people to adopt the principles that are meaningful in Islam through their own desire to do so.

Branding of Nationalism in Indonesia

The Indonesian Süleymancı Sufi group was established by Turkish Muslims from the German and Australian Süleymancı branches in 2005, and there are now 13 branches across Indonesia. Historically, the Süleymancıs have not attempted to convert non-Muslims to Islam, but have focused on engaging fellow Muslims to join their order.

Most senior members of the Süleymancıs in Indonesia are Turkish and have gone to Indonesia to help establish Islamic boarding schools there. The founders, the Turkish *abi* (T: brother), initially provided free boarding schools for poor students, but then, later, for anyone willing to study Islam and become a devotee to Süleymancı Naqshbandi Sufism. Turkish *abi* remain at top of the Süleymancı Naqshbandi hierarchy, though with the development of the Süleymancıs in Indonesia, some Indonesian *abi* have moved into leadership positions, such as branch directorships.

The influence of the Turkish culture is very strong in Indonesian Süleymancı boarding schools, with Turkish being the main foreign language taught. One teacher explained that "[i]t is important to teach Turkish language because students need to prepare themselves for the higher education level which will be in Turkey with lessons in Turkish." Although Arabic and English are taught in the boarding schools, Turkish is the dominant language for daily conversation between teachers and students.

An Indonesian student in his final year at an Indonesian Süleymancı boarding school said, "Indeed I can see that the Turkish *abi* are more

knowledgeable, maybe because they are Turkish, so they received a better education [in Turkey]. I can see a difference between Indonesian students, compared to Turkish ones …."

Although the Turkish language is dominant in the Süleymancı Naqshbandi, the Turkish *abis* (or any other overseas *abis*) attend an Indonesian language course before becoming teachers in Indonesian Süleymancı boarding schools. The Indonesian Süleymancıs' identification with Turkey is based on their belief that the Turks have the longest tradition and heritage of Islamic civilization, especially from the Ottoman era, and that Sufism, just like the Naqshbandi, originated in Turkey before spreading globally.

Conclusions

Although they have a common history, each of the two groups discussed has experienced a different historical trajectory. One remained in Persia and the other migrated to Turkey. Today, both are transnational and have migrated to Indonesia and Australia.

This chapter has explored how, in a world in which religions are becoming more standardized, transnational groups brand themselves in a different setting. It has discovered that the Naqshbandi group is more attuned to consumerism and brands itself as such in Indonesia and Australia. The Nimatullahi group does not engage as much in consumerist behavior and, paradoxically, brands itself as non-commercial. But the branding of a religious transnational group is not just about religion; it is also, and even more paradoxically, about nationalism. While the Naqshbandi do not brand their Turkish link in Australia, the opposite is the case in Indonesia: their connection to the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish language is part of their "brand." The Nimatullahi, on the other hand, have a strong link to a Persian nationalist heritage and to a growing community of Iranians in Australia. The Nimatullahi brand is a composite of liberal moral spirituality, legitimated by the Nimatullahis' historical Persian roots.

This chapter has demonstrated, using fieldwork research, that in a globalized world where there is increasing standardization of religion, transnational religious groups brand not only their religious product but their "re-invented" nationalist heritage as well.

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Religions, Nations and Transnationalism: Conclusion

In the mid-twentieth century, following the defeat of Nazi Germany and the economic reconstruction of post-war Europe, a triumphant North America became the general model of modernization. In some measure, this was implicit in the sociology of Talcott Parsons, in his vision of the social system as an adaptive mechanism. The underlying mood of functionalism was thus an optimistic view of social development. Indeed, in development studies, this North American model of growth achieved some level of consensus. To take one example, Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958) provided an analysis of how Turkey as "a traditional society" could be transformed into a successful "Participant Society" based on secular values, liberal democracy, urbanization, literacy, and mass communication. While Turkey was a "society in a hurry," its secularization policy would create a unified and functional civil society. Modernization theory proposed a more or less uniform and evolutionary picture of social change that, despite local resistance, would become successful.

Modernization theory did not, however, develop an international relations theory, and was less concerned about international conflicts. Instead, research focused on nation-states as more or less self-contained entities within which there were nevertheless a common pattern of modernity. Religion would not play a prominent role in shaping modernity; on the contrary, religious values and institutions, insofar as they survived at all, would become privatized and a matter of individual lifestyle. We can date

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these intellectual developments in terms of some key publications in sociology. In American sociology, we have already noted the publication of *The Social System* (1951). In British sociology of religion, this view of secularization was well illustrated by Bryan Wilson's influential *Religion in Secular Society* (1966), in which he charted the slow erosion of the influence of mainstream churches on society as a whole. In modernization theory specifically, Walt Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1961) argued that development would be driven by modernizing elites and that all societies would eventually arrive at prosperity through mass consumption.

There was unsurprisingly much opposition to both American political and economic dominance and, correspondingly, much criticism of the functional version of modernization theory. The post-war period was characterized by anti-colonial independence movements throughout Asia and Africa. In Latin America, Marxist-inspired revolutionary movements came to the fore, producing influential objections to the dominant development model such as *Dependencia y desarrollo en America Latina* (1971) by Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto. Marxist theories of social change emphasized how development in core economies often produced underdevelopment in peripheral regions. The idea of underdevelopment became an important counter-argument to the overly optimistic picture of inevitable prosperity for all. Perhaps the most significant intellectual development coming out of this critique was Immanuel Wallerstein's *The Modern World System* (1974), which put forward the major alternative to the development models of more conservative economists.

While these new theories in the 1970s provided a more complex and comparative view of social change, they shared one thing in common as Marxist-inspired theories of the dysfunctional nature of global capitalism—they systematically ignored religion and religious institutions in their global picture of modernity. In the period spanning 1950 to the 1990s, the intellectual struggle between Parsonian sociology and neo-Marxist sociology represented the main options in accounts of modernization theory. Of course, another option was the legacy of Max Weber's sociology, but Weber was primarily known for his theory of rationalization, which was also grounded in a view of the inevitability of secularization. In these debates, there was little room for religion except to say that it was in decline. The ultimate disappearance of religion was famously described by the American sociologist Kingsley Davis in *Human Society* (1948): religion was likened to leaves before a fire.

How did the academic world wake up to the presence of religion not just in the private world, but in the public sphere as well? Firstly, the creation of a general theory of globalization in opposition to Wallerstein emerged in the work of Roland Robertson in his *Globalization* (1992). Robertson had already established the importance of religion in any sociological interpretation of society in *The Sociological Interpretation of Religion* (1970), and perhaps unsurprisingly his vision of the global world gave much greater weight to religion and culture in general than earlier Marxist visions of the economic character of globalization. Another important development in the recognition of religion in relation to major political and social movements came with the publication of Jose Casanova's *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994). Casanova described the public consequences of Liberation Theology on Latin America, the Moral Majority in the United States, Solidarity in Poland, and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. After 9/11 and the war on terror, jihadism presents a major threat to European security. Conflicts between different religious traditions—Copts and Muslims in Egypt, Muslims and Buddhists in Myanmar, Muslims and Buddhists in southern Thailand, Christians and Muslims in Indonesia—now shape politics around the world.

The revival of the sociology of religion has been one effect—of the radicalization of Islam and the general role of world religions in the public sphere. The growth of public religions has offered a major challenge to the traditional secularization thesis. Juergen Habermas, who had ignored religion through out most of his career, had to enter the debate about the role of religion in post-secular society with 'Religion in the Public Sphere' (2006).

While this recognition of religion in modern politics and society is a welcome alternative to the simple secularization thesis of the 1960s, in terms of a critique of development theory, the most influential intervention came from S.N. Eisenstadt, who did much to popularize the idea of multiple modernities, which is clearly a dominant theme in this edited collection. While Eisenstadt was in many ways profoundly influenced by Parsons, he clearly recognized that there were many pathways to modernity and many different forms of modernity. His notion about divergent histories of modernization was illustrated by his *Japanese Civilization* (1996). Eisenstadt pointed out that, while Japanese modernization after the Meiji Revolution shared much in common with the West, as Japan developed it also had many unique features that distinguished it from Western modernization.

After Eisenstadt's intervention about multiple modernities, his way of understanding social change has become widely accepted. While societies may exhibit distinctive characteristics, which means that there is not one model of development, it is also the case that within societies, different regions may have very different developmental characteristics.

The chapters in this book, while covering various parts of the world and religious groups, have demonstrated how important religions are today in the public sphere and how they impact on nations. The theory of multiple modernities has helped to understand that, if religions can now be part of a modern society, their integration can be different from one region to the next. This book has indeed highlighted the problem with the idea of finding a universal status and role of religion in our contemporary world. Even if the theory of multiple modernities allows for a diversity of understanding to be presented, we have also noticed that one main option on how to be modern (i.e. communism) is less and less available, whereas another (i.e. neo-liberalism) is more and more dominant. The theory of multiplicity exists within a neo-liberal paradigm.

The texts presented here show that it now appears impossible, as a sociologist, to provide a definition of religion achieved by consensus. Nevertheless, as illustrated by the chapters in this book, religion is an essential tool of analysis through which to describe and understand the transformations of contemporary societies. This is why, as explained above, it has acquired in recent years a new visibility in public and scientific debates. Further, the study of religion in sociology is not limited to the sub-discipline of the sociology of religion anymore. It now includes other sub-disciplines that research religion in relation to, for example, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, management of immigration in urban settings, and social developments in various parts of the world.

The new goal should therefore be to displace religion from the heart of a general sociology, and to free ourselves from self-referential categories within specialized sub-disciplines. We should understand religion not purely with regard to its own pertinence and relevance, but as an indicator which, once contextualized, could be established as a primary tool for social analysis. The need for such renewal is evidenced by the confusion existing around the topic. Religion is indeed often constituted as an object outside of its social and cultural environment. There would be, for example, a "religious dimension of globalization," which would lead to religion adapting itself through these various transformations. Such an academic approach perpetuates the idea that there is a religious field that

is more or less autonomous. This presupposition is often at stake in the way media, politicians, and scientists from other disciplines ask questions such as "Does religion favor a particular form of economy?" or "Is religion [or a particular creed, and principally Islam in today's Western context] compatible with democracy?"

To paraphrase the words of Michel de Certeau, when politics bends, religion returns. But if it comes back, it certainly does not do so for an exclusive religious purpose. The visibility of this return in the public space has a primary effect of emphasizing a deficit in politics that is so strong that it defies even political articulation. Hence, in a context in which we find an abundance of social and cultural markers floating around, the recourse to religion is used as a register to forge a renewed relationship with the totality. This happens in a context of exhaustion of faith, hope, and trust. In this reading, it is not the credibility of religion that is at stake today, but rather the credibility of politics.

The chapters in this edited collection address a range of issues from different societies and vantage points. However, they share the conviction that religion has not in global terms become a matter of private belief and practice, but rather that it is deeply embedded in the public domain. It is difficult to speak of nationalism or nation-states or national politics without including religion. The chapters convey that any analysis of modern politics and religion has to be undertaken from a global perspective. They reinforce the view that there is not and never has been a single model of modernization.

Contributor Biographies

Saïd Amir Arjomand (PhD, University of Chicago, 1980) is a Distinguished Service Professor of Sociology and Director of the Stony Brook Institute for Global Studies. He is the founder of the Association for the Study of Persianate Societies, is the editor of the *Journal of Persianate Studies* and was the editor of *International Sociology* (1999–2005). His most recent books include *After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors* (2009), *The Rule of Law, Islam and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran* (eds. with Nathan J. Brown, 2013) and *Social Theory and Area Studies in the Global Age* (2014).

Aurélie Biard is a Post-doctoral Fellow at the Labex TEPSIS at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS) and an associated researcher at the Centre for Turkish, Ottoman, Balkan, and Central Asian Studies (CETOBaC, CNRS). Her PhD dissertation (completed in 2015 at the Paris Institute for Political Studies) examines the impacts of present-day reconversion to Islam, among post-Soviet youths, on community re-building and social integration. She has been a lecturer for graduate students at the George Washington University, on 'Islam and Ethnicity in Central Asia,' at the Elliot School of International Affairs, Washington, DC, in 2016, and is in charge, in 2017–2018, as part of the CERIA (Central Eurasia-Religion in International Affairs Initiative at George Washington, funded by the Henry Luce Foundation) of the research axis 'Bourgeois' Islam, Prosperity Theology and Ethics (ara. ādāb) in Muslim Eurasia.' This research axis studies the deployment of a 'bourgeois Islam' among urban middle classes of countries with a rent economy in Central Eurasia (esp. Kazakhstan, Tatarstan, Russia and Azerbaijan, in the Caucasus region). It focuses especially on the virtues of practical ethics the new Muslim capitalists convey in order to legitimate their accumulation of capital. Her main publications include 'The Religious Factor in

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the Reifications of "Neo-ethnic" Identities in Kyrgyzstan,' in *Nationalities Papers* and 'Power, "Original Islam," and the Reactivation of a Religious Utopia in Kara-Suu, Kyrgyzstan,' in *Central Asian Affairs*.

Christophe Jaffrelot is a senior research fellow at CERI (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales) at Sciences Po (Paris), the research director at the CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique), a visiting professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at the King's India Institute (London), and Global Scholar at Princeton University. Among his publications all originally by Hurst in London and Columbia University Press in New York are *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to 1990s* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1999), *India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003) and *Dr. Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting Caste* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2005). He has also co-edited, with Laurent Gayer, *Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalization* (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2012).

Mark Hutchinson took a PhD in Australian intellectual history at the University of New South Wales (1989) and from 1990 to 1991 was a senior researcher (with Professor Bruce Mansfield) on the Macquarie University 25 Year History Project (*Liberality of Opportunity: A History of Macquarie University 1964–1989*, Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1992). At the completion of that project, he took up the position as the founding director of a humanities research center at Macquarie University. From 1998 to 2002, in addition, Mark was an assistant director of the Currents in World Christianity Project at Cambridge University. From 2000 to 2010, he was the Dean, Graduate Studies (later Dean of Academic Advancement), and a reader in history and society, at Alphacrucis College, Sydney, and from 2011 to 2012 he was the university historian at the University of Western Sydney in preparation for the celebration of the university's 25th anniversary in 2014. The author and/or editor of ten books and over 80 research papers, Mark has been a prolific contributor to conferences, research projects, and media. He lives in Sydney with his wife, Alfonsa, who has been a long-suffering witness to a life spent in front of a keyboard. Her observation of the work of historians is to say that her husband is "good with dead people."

Eloísa Martín is a tenured assistant professor at the Department of Sociology, University of Rio de Janeiro, in Brazil and the editor of Current Sociology. She is the Secretary-Treasurer for RC22 on Sociology of Religion in the International Sociological Association (2014–2018). She has been elected executive secretary for two terms (2003–2007) and vice-president (2007–2009) of the Asociación de Cientistas Sociales de la Religión en el Mercosur (MERCOSUR Association of Social Scientists of Religion). She was the co-founder and the editor of Ciencias Sociales y Religión/Ciências Sociais e Religião (Social Sciences and Religion) from 1999 to 2010 and an associate editor of Sociedade & Estado (State & Society)

from 2008 to 2011. She was a tenured researcher at CONICET (Argentinean Sciences and Technology Council) and an assistant professor at the University of Brasilia. Eloísa collaborates with the International Bibliographic Review organized by Social Compass and the International Society for the Sociology of Religion, since 2000. She has published widely on Catholicism and popular religion in Spanish, English, and Portuguese.

Patrick Michel is a senior research fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and a full professor (*directeur d'études*) at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris). In addition to his primary interest in Central Europe, his research focuses on the theoretical aspects of the relation between politics and religion.

Milad Milani is a historian of religions interested in historical sociology, political history, intellectual history, and comparative studies. He is a lecturer with the School of Humanities and Communication Arts and is a member of the Religion and Society Research Centre, Western Sydney University. He is the current Communications Officer of the Australian Association for the Study of Religion. Milad's first book is titled *Sufism in the Secret History of Persia* (Gnostica, 2013) and he has a forthcoming manuscript with Routledge: *Sufi Political Thought*. He is currently working on projects examining Sufi political interventions, Sufi orders in Australia and classifications of Muslim identity and indigeneity in Sufism. His broader research focus examines Sufi literary polemics, early Islamic historiography, Iranian religion, cultural production, religion, and secularity.

Enzo Pace is a full professor of Sociology of Religion at the University of Padova (Italy) and a visiting professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. He is the past-president of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion and the co-editor of the *Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion* (Brill). His recent publications include *Religião em movimento* (Estrategias Creativas, 2010, eds. with Helena Vilaça), *Le religioni pentecostali* (Carocci, 2010, eds. with Annalisa Butticci), *Religion and Politics* (Brill, 2011, eds. with Patrick Michel), *Religion as Communication* (Ashgate, 2011), *Mapping Religion and Spirituality in the Age of Pluralism* (Brill, 2013, eds. with G. Giordan), *Le religioni nell'Italia che cambia* (Carocci, 2013, ed.) and *La comunicazione invisibile: Le religioni e internet* (San Paolo Editore, 2013).

Adam Possamai is a professor in sociology at Western Sydney University. He is the (co)author and (co)editor of close to 20 books and special issues, and more than 70 articles and book chapters. He is the past-president of the International Sociological Association's Committee 22 on the Sociology of Religion. He is the book series editor of *Popular Culture, Religion and Contemporary Society: A Social-Scientific Approach* with Springer.

Bryan S. Turner is the presidential professor of Sociology and the director of the Committee on Religion at the Graduate Center at the City University of New York, and a professor of the Sociology of Religion at the Australian Catholic University (Melbourne). He was the Alona Evans Distinguished Visiting Professor of Sociology at Wellesley College. His publications in the sociology of religion include *Weber and Islam* (1974), *Religion and Social Theory* (1983), *Religion and Modern Society* (2011) and *The Religious and the Political* (2013).

Firdaus Wajdi is a lecturer at the Islamic Studies Program, Universitas Negeri Jakarta [State University of Jakarta]. His PhD from the Religion and Society Research Cluster, Western Sydney University, sponsored by the Australian Leadership Award Scholarship, examines Turkish Muslim transnational movements with a case study of the Süleymancis in Indonesia. His research interests include Sociology of Religion, Globalization and Religion and Transnational Religious Movement. Some of his works appeared in *KOMUNITAS: International Journal of Indonesian Society and Culture*; *NARASI: Journal of Religion, Science and Culture*; and *Jurnal Studi Al Qur'an*.

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