Meltem Ersoy
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Contemporary Turkey at a Glance II

Turkey Transformed?
Power, History, Culture

Springer VS

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(Eds.)

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Preface

The series *Contemporary Turkey at a Glance* seeks to promote the work of young researchers committed to the study of contemporary Turkey. This second volume of the series is based on the international conference "Contemporary Turkey at a Glance II – Turkey Transformed? Power, History, Culture", which took place at Istanbul Bilgi University in October 2014.

The conference and this volume were realized thanks to a close cooperation between the European Institute at Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul Policy Center, the Chair of Contemporary Turkey Studies at the London School of Economics, and Network Turkey. The event and this publication were funded by Stiftung Mercator within the framework of the project Network Turkey – Academic Community for Turkish Studies.

Content

Introduction

When Fuat Keyman, Ayhan Kaya, Daniel Grütjen and Esra Özyürek met in Spring 2014 to discuss how to frame the bi-annual "Contemporary Turkey at a Glance" conference, we all had a worrisome attitude towards changing dynamics of Turkish society. The economic boom was already taking a down turn, and much worse, the cruel ramifications of the downturn negatively impacted workers and the environment. The state apparatus increased its authoritarian tendencies after the Gezi Protests. It looked like the country was getting increasingly polarized and societal trust had eroded.

These developments were especially puzzling because few short years earlier Turkey was seen as a model for democracy and economic development in the Middle East. Many liberal observers celebrated the increasing rights for minorities, such as Kurds, and also an end to the army's political powers. As the government took a more authoritarian turn, liberals in and outside Turkey were heartened by the Gezi Protests, which illustrated the capacities of a pluralistic civil society and offered a snapshot of the potentialities of inclusive forms of social organizations in Turkey. Was that movement possible thanks to the AKP regime or was it a reaction to it?

All of us were seriously wondering to what extent the last decades have witnessed a real transformation of the power structures that shape Turkish society. Has the country's political culture moved beyond modes of hierarchical engagement between the state and its citizens? Were we witnessing the rise of new forms of state action or a return to early 20th century authoritarianism? Were we witnessing 19th century-style brutish capitalism that maximized benefits at any expense of workers' rights and security, or a new form capitalism? We asked young scholars to answer our questions. We named this year's conference: Turkey Transformed? Power, History, Culture.

This volume is a collection of some of the excellent presentations from that conference held at Bilgi University in October 2014. Contributions consist of a

wide range of topics from the impact of the changing dynamics in the region following the Arab Uprisings to the role of the strong one party government on the transformation of the institutions; the relations between the state and the citizens; formation of and challenges to identity in the transnational communities; the analysis of historical events to project on current politics; the intersection between the legal system and politics, and finally acts of transgressing established categories of religion and gender, in the context of state institutions.

The volume comprises of three main areas: 1) Challenging and transforming the institutional dynamics, 2) The relations between the state and the citizens, 3) Foreign policy in the face of the new dynamics in the region, and transnational identities.

Contributions in the first section focus on the changing institutional dynamics of Turkey. They analyze the role of the ruling party on reforming state institutions, the impact of political agendas on the legal system, and the role of increasing number of female religious actors on changing the Directorate of the Religious Affairs.

Through the lens of historical-institutionalism that emphasizes 'path-dependent path-shaping', **Ceren Lord** argues that the majoritarian logic of the Turkish political system has been a persistent feature, and it has been employed by the AKP to strategically shape institutions in a manner of tilting towards a form of patronal presidentialism. By looking at key legislation introduced by the AKP to analyze how actors have engaged in strategic action, and based on theoretical insights on hybrid regimes, Lord concludes that rather than conceptualizing the AKP period simply as marking change or continuity – as a transitional regime type, or a 'trajectory' toward or away from an ideal-type end point – change and continuity should be considered within the context of political cycles.

Ayşegül Kars Kaynar illustrates the important intersection of law and politics in the context of the political trials in Turkey, from 2007 onwards. Kaynar questions the phenomenon of political trials from a political vantage point, and discusses how they should be interpreted and conceptualized in terms of the relation between political power and the constitutional state. Political trials take place in the Specially Authorized Courts (ÖYMs) on the basis of Anti-Terror Law. Until their abolishment in March 2014, they divided the judicial system of Turkey and created a second criminal jurisdiction. The criminalization of political opposition within the second jurisdiction of state has become a common political instrument in Turkey, rather than an exception, as is often argued in the literature.

Chiara Maritato explores the increasing number of activities promoted by the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) toward women and families. The Diyanet employs female religious officers as female preachers (vaizeler), Qur'an teachers and vice Muftis all over the country and abroad. Maritato investigates how the the Diyanet's female personnel cast light on the evolution of women's

religious engagement in Turkey, starting from 2004. Through an ethnographic observation of the vaizeler's daily activities for women and families in Istanbul, Maritato aims to enrich the literature by mapping the professional female religious engagement – deeply rooted in the public sphere – while being in full compliance with the Diyanet, its dogma and its hierarchies.

The second section, State-Society, focuses on relations between the governing party and citizens. Contributors explore networks of clientalism, analyze the role of religious minorities in the constitution making process and also visit relations in the Ottoman Empire.

Kerem Yıldırım analyzes the shifts and continuities of the clientelistic linkages in Turkey. Yıldırım posits that the Turkish political experience is aimed towards establishing personalistic linkages between political elites and voters. By doing so, voters are not only mobilized to vote for a political party, but also they obtain information cues regarding political developments from party activists and brokers. In this respect, clientelism is a strategy for establishing party-voter convergence on different policy positions. Yıldırım examines the temporal dimensions of clientelism in the Turkish context in order to shed light on the effectiveness of clientelistic linkages in the party system.

Elif Gözler explores the long-standing effort of constitution making in Turkey, focusing on the period following the 2011 national elections, when the debate intensified and led to the formation of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission. The Commission adopted an unprecedented participatory model for the new constitution-making process. A public consultation process was initiated to collect public views, predominantly from civil society organizations. For the first time, ethnic and religious communities were officially invited by the state to contribute to an important decision-making process. Gözler explores their activities and the meanings ethnic and religious communities attributed to the process, based on the in-depth interviews.

Meltem Yılmaz Şener evaluates the World Bank's social risk management approach to poverty and explains the consequences that have emerged when this approach was implemented in the case of the Social Risk Mitigation Project (SRMP) in Turkey. The World Bank's SRMP in Turkey was formulated based on the social risk management framework conceptualized in the 2000/2001 World Development Report. Through the lens of neoliberal governmentality, Yılmaz Şener points out the gap between the ambitions of the social risk management framework and the reality experienced following its implementation in the Turkish case.

Christiane Czygan investigates Kanuni Sultan Süleyman's (Muḥibbī's) poetry, which influenced the social and political spheres of his time in several important ways. Czygan argues that it served to establish an emotional connection between

the ruler and his subjects, demonstrated cultural independence against the overwhelming Persian dominance in a time of Safawid-Ottoman warfare, and it helped build social cohesion in the struggle for Sunni-Islamic hegemony. Czygan asserts that Muḥibbī's poetry provides an excellent example of what Ute Frevert refers to as Gefühlspolitik, where not only did Muḥibbī use his poetry to influence his subjects' emotions, but also created an image of himself with a strong mystical flair.

The final section illustrates the expanding borders of the nation state by looking into the formation and transformation of identity in the transnational dimension, as well as foreign policy engagements in the region post-Arab Uprisings.

Aylin Yıldırım Tschoepe argues that a diverse group of identities such as the German-Turks can only be located through their constructions of a homescape as a common denominator. Homescapes emerge in the transnational migratory space out of migrants' tactics to counteract alienation and to (re)insert themselves upon moving from Germany to Turkey. Migrant identities and homescapes are constantly (re)negotiated in reciprocal relationship, and they are in flux over time and the transnational space between and inbetween countries. While self-stereotyping and stereotyping by the (German and Turkish) Other persists and shapes cultural imaginings, the notion of autochthonous culture is an artifact of the nation state. Yıldırım Tschoepe explains that German-Turkish diasporic cultural intimacy is what identifies the individuals as part of the group, and that they can be located through their homescape. Questions of belonging, Self and Other, global culture versus cultural intimacy in the diaspora, inbetweenness, spatial and cultural practice, flux and mobility become central elements when locating German-Turks spatially, culturally, and socially.

Jean-Baptiste Le Moulec posits that in the late 1990s in Turkey there was an upsurge in academic and research interest in Middle Eastern social sciences and humanities. This led to a flourishing field of expertise indirectly steered by the military establishment at first and then by the AKP government, using private research foundations as go-betweens. Following Ahmet Davutoğlu's foreign policy doctrine of the 2000s, this reticular constellation of Turkish scholars along with journalists and government actors has been mired in the unfolding events in the Middle East, especially after the succession of uprisings. Le Moulec argues that these event, and especially Syrian civil war, brings about a purge that turns this network of experts into an epistemic community of political followers.

Birce Altıok and Sinan Karşıyaka examine Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) chronologically using the Arab uprisings as a critical juncture and an important contra-game setter. The authors compare Turkey's foreign policy before and after the uprisings and analyze Turkey's new foreign policy adjustments in the Middle East from a comparative theoretical framework of Davutoğlu's foreign policy

vision that encompasses liberal, constructivist and realist elements. Altıok and Karşıyaka argue that

TFP has approached realist concerns in the policies concerning the Middle East, and they evaluate the recalibration of Turkish foreign policy in the post-2011 period.

Magdalena Kirchner and Şafak Baş revisit the Battle of Chaldiran, which eliminated Persian influence in Anatolia and they address the question of whether recent Turkish and Iranian foreign policy responses to shifts in their mutual security environment reflect a re-emergence of rivalry for power and influence in their neighbourhood. The Arab uprisings, alongside the US's military and political disengagement in the region, has opened new spaces for Turkish-Iranian competition, weakened incentives and the scope of bilateral cooperation, and has impeded efforts to stabilize the region. Resorting to a neoclassical realist framework of foreign policy analysis, the article traces specific policy responses to developments in North Africa, Syria, and Iraq, and concludes that although both Turkey and Iran achieved mixed results of policy success and setbacks, interstate rivalry contributed to increased instability in the region.

Erol Ülker examines the development of the Turkish national movement in Istanbul, the Ottoman capital, after the end of the Greek-Turkish military confrontation in Anatolia in September 1922. Ülker focuses on the National Defense Committee (NDC), the principal organization of the Turkish national movement in Istanbul under Allied occupation. The article discusses how the leadership of this armed committee of resistance broadened the popular base of the organization in the context of rising tensions between the Muslim and Christian elements in the city. Following a series of demonstrations in which thousands of Muslims participated between September and November 1922, the NDC initiated the founding of a group of economic confederations. One of the main goals of these confederations was to mobilize Muslim merchants, artisans, and workers around a nationalist campaign for the elimination of non-Muslims from the economy.

Politics, history, and culture in Turkey keeps transforming and reproducing itself simultaneously. Understanding such complex and often contradictory dynamics calls for innovative approaches, fresh perspectives, and new questions. Contributors to this volume do exactly that. Both of us, Meltem Ersoy and Esra Ozyürek, left the conference at Bilgi University feeling even more worried about Turkey. But we also left feeling extremely optimistic about the flourishing field of Turkish Studies and the promise of an amazing new generation of young scholars in understanding it.

Situating Change Under the AKP

Ceren Lord

Introduction

How should we understand the post-2002 period of Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) rule? How should we assess and situate change and transformation alongside continuity? With respect to these questions, there have been two main interpretations. First, the dominant paradigm has principally been premised on transition theory, with the AKP period analysed in terms of a democratic transition process advanced by a move away from military tutelage. Second, others have stressed elements of persistence, involving the conception of the AKP period as constituting continuity with the previous 'oppressive and authoritarian state' remodelled in Islamist-conservative form (Bedirhanoğlu, 2009). Consequently, many of these analyses have argued either that the subsequent 'authoritarian bent' of the AKP has setback the 'transition' process and that this process has been hijacked by the AKP, or that a failure to consolidate reflects the persistence of authoritarian structures or a 'Kemalist mentality'. The present paper attempts to present a different view of change and continuity premised on a historical institutionalist framework that emphasises 'path-dependent path-shaping' (Hausner et al., 1995).

First, employing Lijphart's typology of majoritarian and consensus democracy, I trace the evolution of eleven variables to identify patterns of institutional persistence and change historically. In this way, I seek to draw attention to elements of path-dependency in terms of the constraining effects of institutions on political struggles and choice. Second, I employ the theoretical insights of the literature on hybrid regimes alongside key legislation introduced by the AKP to analyse how actors have engaged in strategic action, or path-shaping, thereby being shaped by and shaping institutions in a mutually constitutive manner. The paper concludes that the majoritarian logic of the Turkish political system has been a persistent

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feature and is being employed by the AKP to strategically shape institutions, tilting it towards a form of 'patronal presidentialism' (Hale, 2005). However, rather than conceptualise the AKP period as simply marking change or continuity, as a transitional regime type or a 'trajectory' toward or away from an idea-type end point (Hale, 2005: 136), I argue based on Henry Hale's insights on hybrid regimes that change and continuity should be considered within the context of political cycles (Hale, 2005: 135).

Re-assessing the AKP period, change and continuity

The ascent to power of the AKP in 2002, a political party with Islamist roots, has been generally regarded as a turning point in Turkish history. Scholarly works have widely described the AKP period as marking an era of change and transformation pointing to the pacification of the military, which had long exercised tutelary power over the political system, the launch of the Kurdish peach process, expansion of the religious field (i.e. religious education) against the ostensibly laic state and adoption of Europeanization reforms. This has indeed been mirrored in the self-representation of the AKP, in its narratives of 'New Turkey', while the party's '2023 political vision' manifesto similarly highlights the party's role as leading a 'silent revolution' of 'comprehensive change and transformation' (AK Parti 30 September 2012: 8) and 'normalising' politics by reconstructing the relationships between 'religion-politics, tradition-modernity, religion-state and state-society-individual' (AK Parti 30 September 2012: 6). The discourse of 'old regime' versus 'new regime' and 'old Kemalist Turkey' versus 'new post-Kemalist Turkey' (Öniş, 2014) remains pervasive within political analysis.

At least until the outbreak of the Gezi protests in 2013, the predominant paradigm under which the AKP period was evaluated had drawn on theories of political moderation and democratic transition. Within this literature, the AKP, presented as 'conservative democrats' (Özbudun, 2006), was argued to be leading a democratic transition owing to a combination of: i)integration with global capitalism and rise of conservative middle class/bourgeoisie (Sayari, 2007; Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; İnsel, 2003; Barkey and Çongar, 2007; Yavuz, 2009); ii)political learning and pragmatism (and learning from the '28 February' process) (Özbudun, 2006: 547, 554-555; Yavuz, 2009; Sayari, 2007; Kalaycıoğlu, 2007); iii)Europeanisation (Patton, 2007). The ascent to power of the AKP was therefore frequently described as reflecting democratisation of the polity, with the (Muslim) periphery finally winning against the authoritarian (Kemalist/secularist) centre (Çarkoğlu, 2002) or the rise of an 'independent' and

new 'Islamic bourgeoisie' acting as a liberalising class force against the authoritarian 'state-dependent 'traditional bourgeoisie'. As a result, despite being recognised as a 'culturally conservative movement', the AKP was accorded at times a leading or even revolutionary role (Barkey and Çongar, 2007) as an 'initiating force for a normalized regime of democracy' (İnsel, 2003). Underpinned by the assumption of democratisation as comprising a set sequence of stages, it was assumed that the AKP would end the '12 September' regime enshrined in the 1982 constitutional framework, whether 'it liked it or not' – in other words, democratise despite a lack of democrats (İnsel, 2003; Patton, 2007: 342; Tepe, 2005: 72).

Consequently, in line with the transition paradigm, a move away from the authoritarian military tutelary system was interpreted as necessarily constituting a transition towards a democratic regime (Öniş, 2013: 105). This basic premise of the transition paradigm however, in terms of comprising the assumption of a unilinear development and the conception of democratisation as involving a series of set stages, has been widely questioned (Carothers, 2002). Rarely has regime change across Latin America, Asia and in the former Soviet Union lauded within narratives of 'waves of democratisation', occasioned a democratic regime as assumed by the transition paradigm. Accordingly, some scholars such as Carothers have declared the 'end of the transition paradigm on the basis that reality was no longer conforming to the model (Carothers, 2002: 6). Likewise, as illustrated by the Turkish case, 'transitions' do not necessarily portend a move towards liberal democracy. Instead, they can herald the development of a variety of regimes types, or 'gray zones' resulting in some form of 'hybrid regime' which are neither dictatorial nor democratic (Carothers, 2002: 6; Schedler, 2006) and do not meet in a consistent manner (i.e. without frequent violations) basic minimum criteria of democratic regimes (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Particularly following the Gezi protests in 2013, scholarship on Turkey has started to draw attention to 'democratic reversal or backslide' after a 'major wave of democratisation' (Öniş, 2013), 'illiberal democracy' or what Özbudun has described as the "AKP's recent drift towards an excessively majoritarian conception of democracy, or even an electoral authoritarianism" (Özbudun, 2014). Yet these analyses often continue to be premised on the basic assumptions of the transition paradigm and political developments as constituting a trajectory away or towards an idealised end point.

Conversely, recent public discourse of the perseverance of 'Kemalist mentality' as exampled by depiction of the AKP as Islamist Kemalists (Bulaç, 12 April 2014; Altan, 29 April 2014) can steer towards essentialism, while reifying the state by positing a 'strong state tradition' (Heper, 1985). More importantly, these analyses tell us little, and as Kandiyoti (2012) has contended, these designations have become "empty signifiers and tropes mobilized by contending political actors in their search

for hegemony and the consolidation of their power" (Kandiyoti, 2012). On the other hand, Marxist-Gramscian analyses, such as by Bedirhanoğlu, have stressed the elements of continuity describing the AKP period as marking continuity with the 'oppressive and authoritarian state' remodelled under the AKP in an Islamist-conservative form (Bedirhanoğlu, 2009). While these approaches crucially highlight areas of institutional persistence, questions remain as to how to understand change where there is persistence and persistence where there is change.

The persistence of majoritarianism despite change

Moving on from the transition paradigm and binary approaches of change or continuity, this paper draws on the conceptual tools developed by historical institutionalism in adopting a path-dependency approach. This encompasses two key assumptions. Firstly, it involves a focus on institutions as playing a key role in shaping and constraining behaviour structuring the settings of political struggles (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Second, it emphasizes the 'mutually constitutive character of structures and agents' (Hall and Taylor, 1998). In this sense, the conception of path-dependent path-shaping as described Jessop et al, incorporates both agency and strategic action rather than a deterministic and purely structuralist definition of path-dependency. Put another way, '"[c]hoice is real but it is also constrained." Choices are strategic and the constraints are path dependent' (Hausner at al., 1995).

Turkey's constitutional tradition has reflected a preoccupation with and construction of a (Sunni) Muslim majority and ensuring its dominant position within the polity, which has been reflected in and subsequently shaped by institutional design. Since at least the inception of Ottoman modernisation, and gaining pre-eminence during the era of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), the Ottoman authorities had been concerned with the creation of a loyal majority social base for the state in order to solve the dilemmas of Empire, including the management of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious polity at an age of nation-states, alongside the question of how to 'save the state'. For the leaders of the independence struggle, the solution to these questions eventually emerged as Turkish nationalism and the establishment of the Turkish nation-state. The systematic propagation of Sunni Islam in the Hamidian era had thus evolved towards a Turkification of the Muslim masses that was facilitated by demographic and social engineering and ethnic cleansing of minorities and non-Muslims. In parallel, the non-Muslims or minorities owing to the development of the capitulations regime had come to be regarded as part of imperial penetration and domination, undermining of the sovereignty of the

Ottoman state. Nationalism and nation-building involves the 'imagination' (Anderson, 1991) and construction of a majority over a given territory. In this sense, nation-state-building inescapably privileges and constructs a majority culture (Kymlicka, 2001). Consequently, reflecting these dynamics, the nationalist leaders adopted a nationalising constitution, established as a covenant between a people (nation) and state[1] that left no room for minority rights. Lacking a liberal legacy, Turkish constitutionalism has been inherently majoritarian at its heart, positing the absolute and unconstrained sovereignty of what is understood as the Turkish-Muslim nation. In this vein, during the constitutional making processes, the minority clauses introduced by the Lausanne Treaty had continued to be regarded as concessions to imperial powers and regarded as undermining the sovereignty of the new Turkish nation-state.

This majoritarian logic has infused all aspects of Turkish politics and parties across the political divide. Accordingly, in seeking to determine institutional patterns and constraints, Lijphart's majoritarian and consensus democracy typology provides a useful framework for situating change and continuity within a historical perspective. According to Lijphart, there are two visions of democracy that underpin the diversity of democratic regimes: "one based on the majority rule principle, and one based on the idea of legitimising decisions on the basis of the widest consensus possible" (Lijphart, 1999; Bulsara and Kissane, 2009). Demarcating Republican history into four periods, chiefly in line with the adoption of new constitutions and the AKP period, I systematically trace institutional development along eleven variables that comprise Lijpharts framework as laid out in Figures 1 (Lord, 2012).

In summary, what the results of the analysis comprised in Figure 1 suggests is that despite frequent praetorian interruptions, political engineering by junta leaders and institutional change, a consistent feature of the Turkish political system, including the AKP period, has been the endurance of the majoritarian logic of politics[2]. The majoritarianism of the Turkish political system is characterised by the heavily centralized and unitary state system, the focus on the executive as a locus of power, minimal interest group penetration in policy making and aversion to power sharing as demonstrated by the preference for one-party, minimal winning and minority governments. According to the Lijphart model, the shift towards

1 This draws on Kissane and Sitter's (2010) analysis of differing patterns of the relationships forged between constitutions and nation over time and space.

2 Despite the introduction of anti-majoritarian institutions following the 1960 military intervention, the logic was less pluralism but more tutelage. See Lord (2012) for a discussion of why the Lijphart model over-represents the shift towards the consensus model during 1960-1980.

Variable	Majoritarian	Consensus	1950-1960	1961-1980	1983-2001	2002-2014	Shift to majoritarianism
Executive-party dimension							
1. Party system	Two Party system	Multi-Party system	1.4	2.8	3.5	2.1	Yes (distorted by electoral 10% threshold)
2. Cabinets	Single Party majority cabinets system	Power-sharing multi-party coalitions	100%	50%	59%	100%	Yes (since 1961)
3. Executive- Legislative	Dominant executive	Executive-legislature balance of power	3.4	1.0	1.4	5.8	Yes (since 1961)
4. Electoral system	Disproportional first-past-the-post system	Proportional representation	26.0	5.4	11.9	15.5	Yes (since 1961)
5. Interest groups	Informal pluralist interest group interaction	Co-ordination and 'corporatist' interest group interaction	Low	Low	Low	Low	Always majoritarian/no change
Federal-unitary dimension							
6. Federal-unitary	Unitary and centralised government	Federal and decentralised government	1	1	1	1	Always majoritarian/no change
7. Unicameralism- bicameralism	Concentration of power in a unicameral legislature	Division of power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses	1	2	1	1	Always majoritarian except for 1961-1980 interlude
8. Constitutional amendment	Flexible constitution	Rigid constitution	3	3	2.5	2.5	No
9. Direct democracy/ referendum	Low level of public involvement in decision making	High level of public involvement in decision making	0	1	3	2	No
10. Legislative supremacy	Legislature has the final word on the constitutionality of legislation	Legislation subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by a supreme or constitutional court	High- 1	Medium-3.5	Medium-3	Medium-3	No
11. Central Bank Independence**	Dependent on the executive	Independent central bank	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	No

*To June 2014 **Central Bank independence granted in April 2001.
Sources: (Lord 2012; Lijphart 1999; Flinders 2005; Bulsara & Kissane 2009; Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu [Turkish Statistical Institute, TUIK]. <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr>); Calculations are my own.

Fig. 1 Summary of institutional development in Turkey, 1950-2014[3]

3 Lord (2012) provides detailed discussion of each variable including problems with the Lijphart model.

greater majoritarianism, particularly after 2007, has been on the executive party dimension. This was principally the outcome of the long lasting durable cabinets underpinned by the AKP's large electoral majorities that enabled the establishment of one-party governments. Unlike other dominant party regimes such as the PRI in Mexico, the AKP's strong electoral majorities have not been simply a product of electoral system manipulation. The electoral system, despite being a PR framework, tends to produce a majoritarian outcome owing to the 10% threshold that discriminates against smaller parties or those that are geographically concentrated. The majoritarian outcome of the framework was most clearly observed in the 2002 general election when the AKP was granted 66% of the seats in parliament having won only 34.3% of the national vote. As a result, around 45% of the votes cast were not represented in parliament. The current electoral framework has a significantly disproportional effect in favouring the largest party as Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate. This is indicated by the high values for the AKP in terms of all three calculated disproportionality indicators that measure the divergence between the vote share and final allocation of seats (Gallagher, 1991)[4].

However, despite the significantly majoritarian outcome produced by the electoral system observed in the 2002 elections, as Figures 2 and 3 illustrate, the disproportionality effect has declined in subsequent elections leading to greater proportionality, at least for the smaller parties. For instance, the Loosemore-Hanby Index, which is simply a measure of the difference between votes cast and seats gained, has declined from 45.3 in 2002, indicating a high level of disproportionality, to 9.6 in the 2011 election (see Figure 2). Similarly, the Rae index (Gallagher, 1991: 38-41), which measures disproportionality per party as opposed to per election under the Loosemore-Hanby Index, has declined from 6.8 in 2002, indicating higher levels of disproportionality, to 2.6 in 2011 (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, a closer look at variations in the disproportionality with regards to individual parties (see Figure 3) shows that the current electoral system clearly favours larger parties allocating a larger boost to the incumbent party than others. For example, Loosemore-Hanby Index score is 31.7 for the AKP in 2002, 15.4 in 2007 and 9.6 in 2011 compared to 13.0 for the CHP in 2002, 0.5 in 2007 and 1.4 in 2011. Declining levels of disproportionality suggests that the AKP's electoral dominance has not been purely a product of the majoritarian electoral system. Indeed, other factors such as the weakness of the opposition should also be considered and as well as the AKP's monopolisation of rent distribution channels discussed below. On the other hand,

4 The Loosemore-Hanby Index measures the total disproportionality per election whereas Rae Index is a measure of disproportionality per party. Gallagher (1991) describes the least squares index as a 'happy medium' between the two.



Sources: 'Election of Representatives Statistics' from the Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu [Turkish Statistical Institute, TUIK], <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?alt_id=1061>. Calculations are mine.

Fig. 2 Measures of electoral disproportionality in Turkish parliamentary elections

the AKP's stated preference for the adoption of the heavily majoritarian single-member constituency plurality system suggests that majoritarianism on this dimension may be further enhanced in the future.

Conversely, despite the modest shift on the federal unitary dimension of the Lijphart framework as observed in Figure 1, it can be argued that the model under-represents the extent of the majoritarian turn on this dimension. For instance, while there has been no change in terms of the overall unitary and unicameral framework, there has been increasing encroachment on the judicial review dimension through legal reforms. In particular, the judicial reforms adopted following the 12 September 2010 referendum were defended by the AKP and supporters of the changes as measures that would bring democratisation and pluralism within the judiciary by undermining what was regarded as the 'Kemalist' orientation of the judiciary (Tezcur 20 September, 2011). Nevertheless, the reforms also resulted in expanding executive control of the judiciary by adjusting the composition and increasing the number of appointed seats at the Constitutional Court and Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (*Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu*, HSYK) (Jenkins, 2011; Özbudun, 2011). In 2014, the AKP government made renewed efforts to constrain independent judicial action following the emergence of a struggle between the AKP and its former Islamist allies, the *Gülenists*. Alleging that the judiciary

2002 General Elections					
	Votes %	Seats %	Loosemore-Hanby	Rae	Least squares
AKP	34.3	66.0	31.7	31.7	1006.1
CHP	19.4	32.4	13.0	13.0	168.3
MHP	8.4	0.0	8.4	8.4	69.9
Independents	1.0	1.6	0.6		0.4
Total			90.7	88.5	1465.1
Value of Index			**45.3**	**6.8**	**27.1**
2007 General Elections					
	Votes %	Seats %	Loosemore-Hanby	Rae	Least squares
AKP	46.6	62.0	15.4	15.4	237.7
CHP	20.9	20.4	0.5	0.5	0.3
MHP	14.3	12.9	1.4	1.4	1.9
Independents	5.2	4.7	0.2		0.3
Total			30.8	29.1	1465.1
Value of Index			**15.4**	**3.6**	**11.9**
2011 General Elections					
	Votes %	Seats %	Loosemore-Hanby	Rae	Least squares
Party 1: AKP	49.8	59.5	9.6	9.6	92.6
Party 2: CHP	26.0	24.5	1.4	1.4	2.1
Party 3: MHP	13.0	9.6	3.4	3.4	11.4
Party 5: Independents	6.6	6.4	0.2		0.0
Total			19.2	17.9	109.4
Value of Index			**9.6**	**2.6**	**7.4**

Sources: 'Election of Representatives Statistics' from the Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu [Turkish Statistical Institute, TUIK], <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?alt_id=1061>. Calculations are mine.

Fig. 3 Electoral disproportionality across parties

had been captured by 'parallel forces', the AKP sought to exert greater control over judicial appointments, thereby eroding the separation of powers. Under the original

version of the law, more direct control over the HSYK and decision-making within the body as well as control over the Turkish Justice Academy was granted to the executive branch. However, this law was partially overturned by the Constitutional Court, which retained the Justice Ministry's control over the Turkish Justice Academy. At the same time, the AKP government refused to reverse the personnel changes that were made following the adoption of the original law before the constitutional court's ruling. The subsequent announcement by the AKP that the 'national will' is more important than judicial independence when it comes to the HSYK elections (*Hürriyet Gazetesi* 26 September 2014) suggests that there may be further erosion of the separation of powers and hence increased majoritarianism on this front in the future.

Similarly, the undermining of the autonomy of regulatory agencies during the latter years of AKP rule, and questions over central bank independence, are illustrative of enhanced majoritarianism and centralisation of power. A statutory decree introduced in 2011 (Kanun Hükmünde Kararname, KHK/649. No: 2802817, *Resmi Gazete,* August 2011) granted ministries the power of supervision over regulatory bodies such as the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, Capital Markets Board of Turkey, Radio and Television Supreme Council and Competition Authority, thereby ending their autonomy which had been granted in the aftermath of the 2001-02 crisis[5]. In addition, the curbing of the powers of public professional organizations in 2013 by the AKP was driven by efforts to undermine the Chamber of Turkish Architects and Engineers (TMMOB), which, owing to its ability to grant final approval for urban planning projects, was a constraint on executive action. Both laws have therefore expanded the bounds of executive power and discretion over enforcement. Partisan engineering of the political system and executive control will be further augmented with the AKP's plans to overhaul the Public Personnel Selection Examination (KPSS), including possibly the removal of standardised exams for all civil service applications and allowing departments and state bodies to issue their own exam or conduct interviews instead of exams (*Today's Zaman* 25 April 2014).

Conversely, what is not captured by the Lijphart framework (and partly underlies the over-representation of the 1960-1980 period within the consensus dimension) is the evolving role of the military within the Turkish political system. The military, as the self-designated guardians of the state order, played a central role in Turkish political life as a type of 'veto player' or tutelary power. The military has undertaken direct interventions including in 1960, 1971 and 1980 along with a 'post-modern'

5 For example, the AKP's deputy chairman has stated that the regulatory bodies have to be in line with the AKP's '2023 Vision' and the 'political will' which is 'responsible to the people' (*Radikal Gazetesi* 14 May 2014).

coup, which involved the issuance of a memorandum in 1997 forcing the Islamist-led coalition government to resign. In addition, in April 2007 an e-memorandum was issued against the AKP government's efforts to appoint its presidential candidate. However, the military under the AKP has been largely pacified (though the irreversibility and permanence remains to be seen) owing to the Europeanization reforms undertaken since 2001 and the 2007 *Ergenekon* trials (Cizre and Walker, 2010; Gürsoy, 2011) that resulted in the imprisonment of senior members of the general staff. The pacification of the military therefore removed an important veto player within the system that could constrain the realm of political action as was experienced by the AKP's predecessor, the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP) in 1997. In parallel, over this period, the executive branch has accumulated greater control over the security apparatus. For instance, under new laws introduced in 2010 and 2014 the Prime Minister has been granted final authority over the conduct of investigations into military and national intelligence service (MIT) personnel, effectively tying the security apparatus of the state to the executive.

'Path-dependent path-shaping'

A key element of path-dependency within the Turkish political system is therefore the majoritarian institutional framework outlined above. This majoritarian framework owing to its unitary and centralised character, weak separation of powers and the disproportional effect of the electoral system that favours large parties has facilitated concentration of power in the executive branch. This structure in turn has accentuated the executive's monopolisation, alongside the formal, of both informal institutions, including clientalistic[6] networks and mechanisms of rent distribution. Figure 4 contains a summary – albeit not an exhaustive one – of key legislative changes adopted during the AKP period that have enhanced centralisation of power in the executive body and monopolisation of rent distribution mechanisms. The new laws relate especially to the expansion of patronage powers of the executive, which have been linked to the emergence of new rent-seeking coalitions comprising chiefly of construction companies, amongst others, compared to the big business-bureaucracy-military coalition (Demir, 2005) of former periods (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010). Frequent adjustments in public procurement laws, the

6 Patronage politics has been a persistent feature of the Turkish political system with political parties seeking to enhance their voter base through rent distribution. See Sayari (2011).

Fig. 4 Key legal changes

YEAR	LAW	SUMMARY OF LAW & CHANGES INTRODUCED	IMPACT
2002-14	Public Procurement Law (No. 4734) (changed 30 times and amended 168 times).	The law established rules with regards participation and awarding of public tenders. Some of the key amendments have included the extension of exemptions. For example, changes include domestic price advantage clause to privilege domestic tenders over foreign ones; the exemption of purchases of the state-owned Turkish Coal and Mine Management Company; exemptions of purchases of goods and services for research and development projects; exemption of certain contract award procedures by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation; exemption of acquisition of goods and services of the agencies under the Law Establishing the Regional Development Agencies and Investment Support and Promotion Agency.	Patronage politics; influence over private sector and rent distribution. Centralisation of rent seeking mechanisms.
2004	Law No:5273, bringing TOKI, which had previously been under the public works ministry, under the prime ministry.	TOKI was established in 1984 for the purpose of constructing social housing but its powers and role were expanded under the AKP to not just provide housing for middle and low income but also luxury housing and services. The new expanded remit of the company includes engaging in profit-oriented projects with the private sector; transformation of squatter areas and to undertake urban planning, while the responsibilities and power as well as land bank of 64.5mn square metres of Urban Land Office was transferred to it.	Patronage politics; TOKI is an important mechanism of rent distribution under the AKP. Centralisation of rent seeking mechanisms.
2010, 2014	Laws related to the Court and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK).	The HSYK Constitutional changes in 12 September 2010 include those related to the composition of Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). The 2014 amendments to the law granted more direct control over the HSYK and decision-making within the body to the ministry of justice. This law was partially overturned by a ruling over the Constitutional Court although the ministry of justice retains control over the Turkish Justice Academy which is tasked with the training of judges.	Centralisation and undermining of separation of powers, executive intervention in judicial processes.
2011	Decree with the force of Law (Statutory Decree) no: 28028 on reorganisation of public bodies.	The decree grants ministries the power of supervision over regulatory bodies such as the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, Capital Markets Board of Turkey, Radio and Television Supreme Council, and Competition Authority, thereby ending their autonomy which had been supported in the aftermath of the 2001-02 crisis by international organisations such as the IMF.	Centralisation or power owing to the undermining of autonomy of regulatory agencies; points to increased majoritarianism and centralisation of power in government authority.
2012	Metropolitan City Law (No: 6360)	The new law involves redistricting whereby provincial cities with a population of more than 750,000 people will be turned into metropolitan cities with the borders extended to the province border thereby absorbing formerly separate villages.	Centralisation: This law leads to further centralisation by reducing local government in villages and involves redistricting to bolster the party's electoral strength, for example by adding conservative municipalities to opposition run districts to dilute and weaken its voter strength.
2012	Circular 2012/15, No:28325 stipulating that the prime ministry has to give permission regarding usage and allocation of immovables of public sector organisations.	This circular grants the prime ministry authority to grant Mining Licences.	Patronage and centralisation of power: The power to decide on granting of licences and revoke them is another means of intervening in the private sector and supporting or punishing businesses.
2012	'2B' Forest Law (No. 6292).	'2B' Law allows land formerly classified as forests belonging to the state treasury to be made available for sale and development. The ban on construction is lifted on the basis that these areas that have 'lost their forestry nature'.	Patronage: The sale of Treasury land is a key avenue of rent distribution for government.
2012, 2014	National Intelligence Services and National Intelligence Organisation Law (No: 6532 and No:6278).	Following the amendment introduced in 2012, the investigation and questioning of MIT employees requires the prime minister's written permission. This means the PM can block investigation of MIT and summons by prosecutors.	Centralisation: The significant expansion of MIT powers which is responsible to the prime ministry is indicative of the accumulation of power within the executive body.
2013	'Sack Law' ('torba yasa') which includes amendments to reduce the powers of professional organisations.	The 'sack law' passed after midnight involved the curbing of the powers of the Chamber of Turkish Architects and Engineers (TMMOB), representing around 400,000 professionals, leading to the loss of its ability to grant final approval for urban planning projects. TMMOB was established in 1954 by Law 7303 as a corporate body and a professional organization defined in the form of a public institution.	Centralisation: Turkey is typified by majoritarianism in terms of its interest group system.
2013	Law on environmental impact assessments (EIA).	Law on EIA, originally adopted in 1983, 'refers to the studies to be carried out for the determination of the likely positive or negative impact that the projects will have on the environment'. The changes adopted in 2013 allow exemption of major infrastructure projects from environmental impact assessment.	Patronage and centralisation: The change removes another check on executive decision making on allocation of land and infrastructure projects.

expansion of the role of the Mass Housing Association (TOKI) in 2004, particularistic and partisan nature of distribution of social welfare services, amongst other examples, have provided important mechanisms for the AKP to engage in partisan social engineering (Dunleavy, 1992), thereby bolstering its electoral support and hence executive power. Both the enhanced monopolisation of formal and informal institutions therefore have augmented the ability of the AKP to engage in strategic action or path-shaping.

Beyond change and continuity: political cycles and hybrid regimes

Going beyond a binary focus on change and continuity or democratic trajectories, it can be argued that political developments in hybrid regimes like Turkey can be understood in terms of political cyclicality (Hale, 2005). Characterised by a wide gap between codified law and rule enforcement (Levitsky and Murillo, 2013) hybrid regimes in particular facilitate cycles of enhanced authoritarianism and contestation while supporting path-dependent path-shaping to effect transformation. In this sense, for instance, the very institutional structures that facilitated enhanced authoritarianism under the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP) government in the 1980s and under the AKP since 2002, also produced weak coalition governments throughout the 1990s.

Conversely, in enhancing the AKP's ability to engage in 'path-dependent path-shaping', it can be argued that the regime is evolving towards patronal presidentialism (Hale, 2005). Based on his analyses of Russia and post-Soviet states defined as hybrid regimes, Henry Hale defines patronal presidentialism as comprising two key components including a directly elected president with significant powers relative to the other arms of the state and extensive informal power based on patron-client relationships (Hale, 2005). It is the control and ability to selectively distribute state resources (i.e. wealth, jobs, etc.) that makes this form of regime type self-reproducing given the mutual dependence between the president and elites: "the president depends on elites for implementing decisions and delivering votes while elites depend on the president for resources and/ or continuation in their posts -patronal president has a decided advantage in that the elites must act collectively if they are to use the president's dependence on them to challenge that president" (Hale, 2005).

Turkey currently does not have a presidential system, but the endowment of the presidency with significant political powers under the 1982 constitution and

the 2007 constitutional changes to allow for a popularly elected president have resulted in a hybrid system between parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism (Özbudun, 2012). The AKP, and particularly president Erdoğan, have sought to establish a presidential system[7] but have so far been constrained since the party lacks the two-thirds majority in parliament to change the constitution. Future changes may consolidate these trends however, with Erdoğan's increasingly personalised presidential style of politics already evidenced by his significant intervention in various aspects of political and social life including the media[8], the judiciary and the civil service appointments.

At the same time, ideologically driven struggles can play a role in reducing political cyclicality enhancing a regime's ability to endure periods of contestation and economic crisis which may impact patronage channels (Hale, 2005). The AKP has thrived on a type of populism, a 'politics of *ressentiment* that encourages the projection of hatred onto groups or classes seen as privileged and exclusionary and as oppressors of the national "underdog"' (Kandiyoti, 2014) while at the same time utilising its vast powers of patronage to engage in preference shaping strategies (Dunleavy, 1992). This involves the politics of polarisation to bolster the party's electoral support, exacerbating social fault-lines, alongside using internal crises, institutional manipulation, context management and manipulation of perceptions has been facilitated by greater government control over the media and encroachments on freedom of information.

Conclusion

Both the liberal (largely based on the transition paradigm) and Marxist approaches towards the AKP period have offered important insights in terms highlighting change and elements of continuity, respectively. However, it has been suggested here that a path-dependency approach premised on the insights of historical institutionalism provides a more holistic approach in identifying change and continuity, while incorporating strategic action and agency. In this sense, majoritarianism is identified not just as a feature of the AKP period but as a general persisting dynamic of the Turkish political system. At the same time, the concentration of power this

7 As has been noted by Özbudun (2012), these debates are not new with former presidents Özal and Demirel advocating such a change.

8 An example is pro-government papers publishing the same headline on the same day; (*Radikal Gazetesi* 6 March 2014).

has facilitated along with the prevalence of informal institutions, a characteristic of hybrid regimes, is argued to have enabled strategic action, or path shaping, by the AKP to further bolster its hold on the structures of power. Based on Hale's insights on the inherent flexibility of hybrid regimes therefore in heralding periods of contestation and concentration, it is suggested that change and continuity during the AKP period can be analysed within the context of regime cycles rather than as constituting a trajectory towards an ideal end point (Hale, 2005).

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Political Trials and the Second Jurisdiction of the State: Normalcy of the Exception

Ayşegül Kars Kaynar

Political Character of Trials

Political trials are one of the most controversial issues in Turkish politics. From 2007 onwards, a series of political trials have started to be prosecuted. All of them are heard in the Specially Authorized Courts on the basis of Anti-Terror Law. In all, the scope of investigation is broad – trials spread countrywide and hundreds of individuals are charged. Their investigation and prosecution processes are marked with violations of rule of law, from long pre-trial detention periods, to police's unlawful role in the preparation of indictments and production of fictitious evidence. To be sure, while each case is unique, there are important similarities. Each case is significant for the sake of the questions they raise for the relation between politics and law on the one hand, and the constitutional state and political power on the other.

Political trials are commonly held to belong to the domain of law. They take part in the courts that are supposedly independent from politics and the political power. Therefore, they seem to concern only the judicial power of the state. However, this view may be misleading. There are many reasons why political trials are also political issues. To illustrate this point, the best known and most debated political trials, Ergenekon case and KCK Case are chosen as examples. When we look at closely, it will be seen that in both of these cases, it is the political opposition to the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) who is being charged in the courts. This opposition is principally from the Turkish military in Ergenekon case, and Kurdish politicians and activists in the KCK Case. Secondly, it is principally political issues which are handled in the courtrooms by jurists. This issue is civil-military relations, Kurdish minority problem, and constitutional right to protest and demonstration respectively.

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At the heart of Ergenekon case lies the allegation about planning a military coup against the AKP government. This allegation maintains that the Ergenekon investigation centers on the Turkish military. Therefore, in the initial stages of the investigation, it is not ordinary citizens, but mostly the members of the military which feared judgement. It is commonly known that the military reacted against the AKP government. The confrontation between the AKP and the military was indeed contentious up until 2008. For instance, in 2007 at Turkish Embassy in Washington, General Yaşar Büyükanıt warned that "the Republic has not faced greater dangers since 1919. Military could not allow the country to disintegrate" (Baran, 2010:60). The danger that he pointed to was the AKP power. Nevertheless, the tension between the military and the AKP accelerated during presidential elections. In April 2007, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül was nominated by the AKP as the presidential candidate. It was not only that candidate Gül was an ardent Islamist, but also his wife dons a headscarf. In the first round of presidential elections on April 27 Gül took 357 of the votes, while 367 were needed. This situation left the election of the president to the second round. On the very same day the Turkish General Staff published a memorandum on its website, which was called as "e-memorandum". The e-memorandum stated that the presidency of Gül would disturb secularism. The military implicitly warned that it would intervene if secularism was put at risk by the election of Gül (Höjelid, 2010:467). On the first of May, the Constitutional Court annulled parliament's vote for Gül. On May 6, Gül withdrew his candidacy.[1]

The military's power in the National Security Council (MGK) and the fact that from time to time the military used this power to the detriment of civilian governments (as in the example of February 28), make the military the AKP's most troublesome and strongest adversary. In this regard, the Ergenekon case is a part of the AKP's struggle with its adversary – the AKP tries to gain political leverage over the military though Ergenekon case. Therefore, what is at stake in the Ergenekon case is actually a political issue.

In the KCK (Koma Civaken Kurdistan) case, however, it is the executives and members of the (dissolved) Democratic Society Party (DTP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) who are principally and mostly interrogated, taken into custody, arrested, and charged. As of the beginning of the KCK's investigation in April 2010, 1,483 BDP members in total had been arrested.[8] Therefore, the target

1 Seeing that the parliament is not able to elect Gül as President, Erdoğan called for early general elections. In July 2007, the AKP won a landslide victory with 46.7 percent of the votes and obtained 441 of the 550 seats in the parliament. Finally, in August 2007, Abdullah Gül was elected as the President in the first round after gaining the support of Nationalist Action Party and some Kurdish members.

of the KCK case is explicitly Kurdish politicians. Some of the defendants are even elected representatives of the people (mayors and an MP of the BDP). However, they are now being incriminated by membership to an illegal organization.

The indictment of the KCK main trial at Diyarbakır incriminated the BDP members and the other defendants by "violating the unity and indivisible integrity of the state with its territory", "being a member of armed terrorist organization", "heading an armed terrorist organization", and "aiding and abetting a terrorist organization". According to the indictment, Kurdish armed movement Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) reorganized and renamed itself as the KCK. Therefore, the KCK is allegedly the same organization as the PKK. The only difference is that the KCK is the main umbrella structure, mostly organized in the cities. Hence, it is generally referred as the "urban establishment of the PKK". Consequently, the indictment names the terror organization as the "PKK/KCK".

The BDP has not managed to pass the 10% threshold in the general elections and enter the parliament. As a result, it opts backing independent candidates to whom the election threshold rule do not apply. Hence, in general elections the BDP is far from competing and beating the AKP. However, the AKP and the BDP have competed against one another in the southeastern cities, where significant numbers of Kurds live. In the last local elections held in 2009, the BDP increased the number of municipalities under its control to 99 (Satana, 2012: 176). This made the BDP a significant political rival of the AKP in southeast Turkey. Within this competitive political environment, the AKP has used a discourse of Islamic brotherhood and religious commonality as a way of increasing its influence over the Kurdish population in southeastern cities. However, repressive measures have also been used. The KCK investigations and pre-trial arrests is one of these repressive measures used against Kurdish politicians in order to get them out of AKP's way or bring them in line with AKP's policy preferences, one of which is Kurdish Opening.

All in all, in these two political trials it is the AKP's political opponents who are being charged. The AKP intimidates and represses political opposition by charging them in the courts. Hence, it is not wrong to say that judiciary and courts are used as political instruments that the AKP utilizes to criminalize opponents and control society. This is in line with what Tom Ginsburg says about the social role of the courts. According to Ginsburg (2010:177), courts in general function as an effective instrument of social control. As a part of this social control, they may specifically be used to intimidate, harass or even eliminate opponents, which make them an apparatus of repression. They can demobilize popular oppositional movements efficiently, reduce the need to exercise force, and garner legitimacy for the regime, showing that it "plays fair" in dealing with opponents, and can create positive image for its regime and negative ones for the opposition.

The latest example that illustrates this role of judiciary and the courts is the Gülen Cemaat case. Cemaat has been the closest ally of AKP governments within state establishment for years. In fact, Ergenekon and KCK cases were carried out by Cemaat members situated in police force and judiciary. However, since 2012 this alliance has started to break apart. The enmity which ended up in the courts took place with the corruption probe against the AKP. On December 17, 2013 a criminal investigation uncovered the bribery and corruption scandal in which four active AKP ministers and their sons were involved. Recordings of phone-tapped conversations that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan instructed his son to dispose of large amounts of hidden funds from their private home were leaked to internet as well. The government tried to cover up the scandal. The prosecutors Celal Kara and Muammar Akkaş were removed from the case and four prosecutors, including Kara and Akkaş and one judge involved in the investigation, were dismissed from their professions later on. Tens of thousands of policemen have also been dismissed.

The AKP accused the Cemaat of conducting the investigation. Prime Minister Erdoğan charged that Gülen Cemaat formed an illegal "parallel state structure" and had established a terror organization with the objective of ousting AKP from power. In the following days, the courts acted in line with Erdoğan's words. On the anniversary of the investigation, on December 14, 2014, two flag-bearers of Gülen Cemaat were taken into custody by the police. Chief Editor of *Zaman* Newspaper Ekrem Dumanlı, and *Samanyolu* Media Group Head Hidayet Karaca were accused of being members of the terror organization. While Dumanlı was released, Karaca was arrested.

The Cemaat case is another example to the political function of trials. In this case, an old ally was repressed by being charged in the courts. Cemaat was criminalized and demonized for being a "terrorist organization" responsible for the wrongdoings of the state, although it is known to have cooperated with the AKP for many years. This is yet another example of how the AKP opts to punish its opponents through judicial means.

Ozansü (2012) suggests that in political trials, political power and political opposition come face to face. These two poles continue to struggle in court houses. Therefore in political trials, court rooms are actually political arenas. This view especially holds true for these three cases. The dialogue and negotiations between the AKP and the military, and the Kurdish movement and the Gülen Cemaat did not conclude with the start of the trial processes. On the contrary, the courts are used by the AKP to increase bargaining power in these negotiations. Therefore, the battle between political power and opposition in the parliament, administrative offices, and in the civil society is simultaneously joined by the battle in the courts. In this regard, the Ergenekon case should be considered as a part of the broad

relation between the AKP, the MGK and the Turkish armed forces. While the military is perceived as a threat to the AKP's political power and was charged in the Ergenekon case, the Ergenekon case itself intervenes into the relation between the AKP and the military and transforms the perception of threat. Similarly, the KCK case is a part of the AKP's Kurdish policy. It is a determinant taken into consideration in the dialogue between the AKP, the PKK, and the BDP, and it is a factor in the current Kurdish peace process. The Cemaat case on the other hand is a part of a reformulation and transformation of a sustained alliance; it is a power struggle between two partners.

These points make political trials no longer solely a legal matter. Indeed, the political character of these trials is as ostensible as their legal nature. Therefore, it is better to resituate them within the intersection set of law and politics. Yet in this case, they shall be re-interpreted and re-conceptualized in terms of the relationship between political power and rule of law or constitutional dimension of the state.

Justice of Specially Authorized Courts

In political trials, criminalization of political opposition takes place in the Specially Authorized Courts (ÖYMs) on the basis of Anti-Terror Law. Up until their abolishment in March 2014, the ÖYMs functioned as high criminal courts. They were introduced with the new Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) No 5271, prepared and proposed by the AKP government in June 2004. Articles 250-252 of the new CMK established high criminal courts, which have special authorities. According to Article 250 of the CMK, trials launched against crimes defined in Articles 302-339 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) No 5237 will not be conducted in regular courts, but will be assigned to assize courts whose judicial district is to be determined by the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) at the proposal of the Ministry of Justice. The majority of the crimes, defined in Article 302-339 of the TCK and assigned to the ÖYMs, fall into the scope of Anti-Terror Law No 3713. Accordingly, Articles 302, 307, 309, 311-315, 320 and the first paragraph of Article 310 of the TCK are defined as terror crimes in Article 3 of Anti-Terror Law. All of the terrorist crimes are regulated by Article 250 of the CMK, and are overseen by the ÖYMs.

The criminal procedure for regular judgments is defined by the CMK. However, the ÖYMs stay out of it in many respects. The ÖYMs have exceptional judgment rules. Prosecutors and defendants of the ÖYMs were given many exceptional rights. Only some of them will be mentioned here for the sake of illustration and explication.

First, Article 91 of the CMK states that the timeframe to keep a person in custody cannot exceed 24 hours starting from the moment of apprehension. However, it is 48 hours for the ÖYMs (Article 251 of the CMK). Secondly, the CMK Article 102 limits the term of arrest to two years in tasks covered by high criminal courts. If extended, such extension cannot exceed three years in total. However, the period of arrest can be twice as long concerning the crimes overseen by the ÖYMs (Article 252 of the CMK). Third, Article 154 of the CMK allows suspects or the defendant to meet with the defense counsel any time without any requirement in surroundings where the conversation cannot be overheard by others. The exchange of letters between them is not subject to inspection. These rights are also eliminated in the ÖYMs. Article 10 of Anti-Terror Law states that if a lawyer's mediation is suspected to facilitate communication between a defendant and a proscribed organization, the judge may decide for the presence of an official in the meetings. Also, the exchange of letters between them can be inspected, and the judge may restrict this exchange partially or totally.

As seen, the ÖYMs stay out of the CMK. Articles 250-252 of the CMK bring exceptions to regular criminal judgment procedure. In this way, the existence of specially authorized courts, discriminatory rights and judgment procedures divide the judicial system of Turkey into two. It creates a second criminal jurisdiction, to which political trials belonged. On the one hand, there is legal justice, courts of general jurisdiction that enforce general judgment procedures, and constitutional rights. On the other hand, there are the ÖYMs that operate with exceptional judgment procedures. Also, the ÖYMs constitute exceptions to the CMK to the detriment of defendants. It strengthens prosecutors and it deprives suspects and defendants of some of their regular rights, or rights that they would have in other courts. Therefore, the most obtrusive and troublesome feature of the judgment of the ÖYMs is the restriction of defense – the judgment of the ÖYMs is unjust as powers of prosecution and the defense are unequal (Ertekin, 2011).

Similarly, society is divided into two on the basis of its relationship with the constitutional state. A part of it enjoys basic constitutional rights and freedoms, subject to regular jurisdiction of the state and therefore is called "citizens". The other part, however, are called as "terrorists", subject to restriction of rights, and charged in special courts on the basis of exceptional judgment procedures (Ertekin, 2011a). These two systems of rights and judgment systems (and statuses of individuals) continue to live side by side within the constitutional state in Turkey.

The Character of Specially Authorized Courts: Exception and Extraordinary?

In the literature the Anti-Terror Law and the ÖYMs that together constitute a second criminal jurisdiction are qualified as "exceptions" and called "extraordinary". Most of the time they are associated with the theory of *Enemy Criminal Law* developed by Günter Jakobs. According to Jakobs, the state gives different rights to those defined as a "citizen" and those defined as an "enemy". Correspondingly, they are subject to the *Citizen Criminal Law* and the *Enemy Criminal Law*. The Citizen Criminal Law is preventive; its objective is to prevent crimes before they happen (Rosenau, 2008:393). The requirement for one's assessment as "citizen" is his/her obedience of the legal system and acceptance of validity of the normative order. Under these conditions, interaction and dialogue between the individual and the state can be possible via penal sanction. Within the confines of this interaction and dialogue, a criminal is perceived as a person. However, an "enemy" is not covered by a preventive law because the state sees that an enemy could not meet the minimum basic cognitive requirement to be assessed as citizen. An enemy is regarded to turn his/her back to legal order. Hence, an enemy actively opposes the legal order and is a rival of it (Jakobs, 2008:497). With this reasoning, an enemy's interaction and dialogue with the state has ceased and therefore the enemy cannot be an object of usual, general criminal law.

The enemy loses his/her civil rights. In other words, those individuals who are denied of the legal order of the state are also denied their basic rights. In this context, the enemy is not treated as a person (Jakobs, 2008a:66). The people who are removed from personality are thereby "unpersons". For this reason, the state does not give them the usual rights of accused and does not respect their private lives. Presumption of innocence does not apply to the enemy; instead, they are subject to "presumption of criminality". The state will benefit from any doubt about the innocence of the accused. The enemy is a source of threat in the eyes of the state and the state fights against the enemy (Kanar, 2011:72). Therefore, the objective of the Enemy Criminal Law is the elimination of this threat with the least damage and with the most appropriate method (Ökçesiz, 2008: 554). Hence, punishment of the enemy is not necessarily directed to his/her concrete or manifest action; rather, it is oriented to prevent future actions.

As Sinn (2008:613) underlines, there are four components of the Enemy Criminal Law. Prevention of future crimes is paramount and accounts for the first component. For instance, within the Enemy Criminal Law, intention to commit a crime or planning a crime is itself punished even if the crime does not take place. Second, the punishment is disproportionate to the crime, and is not reduced. The

relation between intention to commit murder and committing murder may actually be weak; however, intention is punished equivalently to committing murder. Third, the right to a defense counsel is restricted or denied to the enemy defendant. Lastly, the Enemy Criminal Law is no longer a code for criminal actions; rather, it is a code for warfare. As mentioned above, the state declares those who have not showed their respect to legal order as an enemy. Afterwards, it mounts attacks against them to protect itself. Meanwhile, as Hayrettin Ökçesiz (2008a:561) states, the incident that led to the creation of such a code of warfare is organized crime and especially terrorist crimes. That's why Enemy Criminal Law is used against "terrorists" in particular.

Taken together, we can draw parallels between Jakobs' theory of Enemy Criminal Law and special judgment rights and the procedures of the ÖYMs in Turkey. Perhaps the first striking similarity is the name of the law for the prevention of terrorist crimes. The literal name of Anti-Terror Law No 3713 in Turkish is "Warfare against Terror", which reveals the state's perspective of *fighting against* an enemy. Secondly, the acts of inciting, provocation, and attempting to commit terror crimes covered by the Anti-Terror Law are considered as independent crimes (Article 311 and 312 of the TCK). Similarly, those who are not members of a terrorist organization, but participate in a meeting with organization members or commit a crime in the name of the organization are disproportionately subjected to the same punishment as members of organization (Article 2 and 7 of the Anti-Terror Law). Moreover, as stated above, the rights of the defendants charged in the scope of the Anti- Terror Law in the ÖYMs are restrained; the meeting of defendants with defense counsel is restricted. In this context, Ercan Kanar (2011: 67) claims that the Anti-Terror Law and the ÖYMs fall into the category of Enemy Criminal Law. According to him, the ÖYMs reflect the Enemy Criminal Law that Jakobs developed.

Importantly, the Enemy Criminal Law has an extraordinary character. Jakobs (2008: 490) says that the Enemy Criminal Law is used in exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, the Enemy Criminal Law should not be regarded as an arbitrary attitude or a bunch of rules oriented to unlimited annihilation of the enemy. On the contrary, the Enemy Criminal Law is used in a constitutional state ruled by the rule of law intentionally and with utmost care. It is an *ultima ratio* resorted to only exceptionally. Therefore, it is an exceptional law; its exercise does not constitute continuity. Ökçesiz (2008a:565) associates the Enemy Criminal Law with a state of emergency, one of those exceptional situations. He analyzes the Enemy Criminal Law within the context of a state of emergency and in this way, frequently refers to Article 15 and Article 120 of the 1982 Constitution that regulate state of emergency. Finally, Aponte (2008:577) also reminds us that in practice the Enemy Criminal Law is enforced as state of emergency criminal law.

Hence, the ÖYMs are not only exceptional but also extraordinary courts. Such exceptional and extraordinary courts do not routinely arise in "normal" or "usual" periods of parliamentary democracy and constitutional state. Indeed, exceptional courts generally emerge in times of social unrest, when the coercion of political power is felt in society more deeply. In addition, they are used only temporarily. *Independence Courts*, *Courts Martial*, and *Yassıada Courts* are examples of extraordinary courts that appeared in extraordinary times in the history of Turkey (Aydın, 2012: 345). However, the same cannot be said for the ÖYMs. Firstly, the AKP did not declare a state of emergency or consult emergency regulations in any way. Hence, it exercises political justice and uses extraordinary means without declaring a state of emergency. Secondly, the ÖYMs are embedded in the CMK or Anti-Terror Law. In other words, extraordinary criminal judgment regime is integrated into general criminal judgment procedures. As such, the operation of general or "usual" criminal law automatically operates extraordinary, exceptional criminal law. In such a circumstance, extraordinary law is no longer an occasional occurrence. On the contrary, it is made regular. Society is regularly under extraordinary judgment regime.

How shall one interpret the continuous presence of extraordinary law and courts in ordinary times in Turkey? Does it create an extraordinary state? Put another way: is the constitutional state in Turkey exceptional, either partially or implicitly? Aponte (2008:575) gives an affirmative response to the last question. According to him, the presence of a state of exception does not necessarily require the legal promulgation of state of emergency regulations or martial law. He claims that the presence of exceptional rules like the ones concerning terrorism also creates a state of exception.

However, adopting Aponte's views for Turkey is problematic. If the presence of extraordinary law and courts is deemed sufficient to create a state of exception without promulgation of state of exception legally, it means that a constitutional state in Turkey has been under state of exception for 30 years. This is because extraordinary courts and laws have existed for 30 years. Article 143 of the 1982 Constitution established the State Security Courts (DGM). These courts were progenitors of the ÖYMs, as they were also exceptional courts. The DGMs were abolished in 2004; however, the ÖYMs were established in place of them on the same day with almost the same duties and rights. Hence, if Aponte is right, Turkey has never regained normalcy after 1980; it has existed *as a state of exception*. Hence, the claim of exceptionality sounds sententious in the theory; however, it turns out to be barren in practice.

Actually, the presence of extraordinary laws, courts and judgment procedures does not make the period we live in an extraordinary state as a whole. In order

to determine what a "state" is we have to look at the situation and functioning of powers of a constitutional state. What we see today is that the constitutional state in Turkey continues its normal functioning as a parliamentary democracy from the point of legislative and executive powers. Constitutional rights remain unchanged; executive organs work seamlessly in a complete and regular manner; the legislative organ works seamlessly in a complete and regular manner, as does the judiciary despite operating the ÖYMs. Ergo, Turkey enjoys a normal, ordinary state in spite of the presence of extraordinary courts, laws, rights. Haluk İnanıcı (2011: 52) evaluates this duality and says that the ÖYMs exist as a "normal exception" or "an exception that is not an exception". İnanıcı's comment reveals a contradiction. The ÖYMs are called "an exception" and as "not an exception". However, they cannot be both simultaneously. In this respect, although İnanıcı underlines that exceptional courts operate in a normal-usual period, his comment is insufficient in shedding light to the situation of the ÖYMs.

Ordinariness of Political Justice

The ÖYMs are exceptional courts. Yet, they do not constitute an exceptional or an extraordinary state for constitutional state and liberal parliamentary democracy. Extraordinary regulations of the TCK 250-252 and the Anti-Terror Law Article 10 are ordinary parts of the regular law and constitutional state in Turkey. Therefore, something that is defined as "usual or normal exception" just like in the case of İnanıcı's comments, loses its exceptional character. Exception melts in the usual. In such a situation, longevity of exceptional courts and judgment procedures cannot be named "exceptional". Özkan Agtaş (2012:16) also remarks that the ÖYMs and extraordinary rights are step by step becoming commonplace and that general/usual laws and courts are becoming secondary. Therefore, gradually, general law or the rule of law is subrogated to exceptional, extraordinary rights and procedures. Within this context, the second jurisdiction of the state loses its exceptional and extraordinary character – it becomes usual and normal.

Consequently, when the AKP charged its opponents in the ÖYMs from 2007 to 2014, it used a usual and normal political means that the rule of law and constitutional state in Turkey provided for political power. Hence, any criticism of AKP's political means and attitudes is likely directed to liberal parliamentary democracy and the constitutional state in the first place. Suggesting otherwise, and calling the ÖYMs and extraordinary rights exceptions, takes constitutional state and parliamentary democracy out of the gazw of criticism and idealizes them.

Seeing the picture of normalcy of special courts (including both ÖYMs and the DGMs), there appears the need to reconceptualise the second jurisdiction of the state and and rethink political trials. In this regard, the concept of "political justice" that is used by Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) may be helpful. Schmitt is best known for his political theory and his thoughts on "politics", "sovereignty" and "friend and enemy distinction". Moreover, he is known as the theorist of borderline cases, like the state of exception and extraordinary situations. However, he is an ardent critic of parliamentary democratic and constitutional regime as well. He thinks that parliamentary democracy and constitutionality claim to have a liberal content and substance. However, they are merely organizational forms and they lack and fail to protect any specific content, he contends. In his words, democracy within a constitutional state can be liberal, socialist, conservative; militarist or pacifist, absolutist or liberal, centralized or decentralized, progressive or reactionary without ceasing to be a democracy (Schmitt 1985:25). Hence, for him, democratic politics in the parliament is an empty form, it is only procedural. In such a context, the continuous presence of exceptional courts and extraordinary rights of political opposition does not surprise him. On the contrary, *political justice* is such a concept which shows that these institutions are regular apparatuses of constitutional states and parliamentary democracies used to supress political opposition.

In the discussions of courts and trials, Schmitt rejects the independence of judiciary from political power. On the contrary, through controlling or influencing the appointment and promotion of prosecutors and judges by the ruling party, political power can control judiciary, and also the enforcement of law in the court rooms by jurists. Therefore Schmitt claims that we can identify a *political component* in the enforcement of laws to any and every concrete case in the courts. However this view, which binds judiciary to ruling party, has the defect of complete subjugation of law and legality to political power. When the political component of judicial decisions dissolves within legal order, all judges, all courts, and all cases are affected by that. Under such a circumstance, all trials become *political* – from traffic accidents to tax fraud and theft, and all trials must be reckoned as political trials. However, still to call a traffic accident a political trial sounds bizarre and actually, would rob that phrase of its meaning. Hence, to an extent, all trials are political; yet, some are *more* political than the others.

Schmitt states that among all legal disputes that must be settled within the general jurisdiction of the state, political character of some of the disputed questions or the political interest in the object of dispute emerges strongly. Due to political distinctiveness of such cases, they are handled differently. Accordingly, because of their political character, a special procedure or order is provided for these genuine legal disputes. Schmitt calls this process the actual problem of *political*

justice (2008:176-177). Here in political justice, the issue is basically a legal dispute. However, it is deemed politically important by the political power. Because of its political importance, a special procedure or order is provided for these legal disputes. Actually, these disputes must be decided by the courts of general jurisdiction in accordance with the generality principle of law. However, they are discriminated, taken out of the general jurisdiction, and judged within a specialized jurisdiction. Therefore, for some cases, a special type of justice – *political justice* – is provided *vis-à vis* legal justice.

In political justice, political interests directly intervene into legal disputes. Yet, they intervene by changing the jurisdiction of these politically important cases. Direct intervention of political interests comes simultaneously with the provision of special or exceptional rules and procedures of judgment. Therefore, a special justice system is activated only with this intervention and decision of political power.

There are couple of important issues to bear in mind. First, the concept of political justice is another concept that refers to the second jurisdiction of the state. However, in contrast to the *Enemy Criminal Law* conceptualization, it makes no reference or claim to the exceptional or extraordinary character of special courts or of this second jurisdiction. Rather, these apparatuses operate when the political power needs them to. This means that the constitutional state and parliamentary democracy inherits *exceptional* courts and *extraordinary* justice system. This makes the second jurisdiction of the state potentially at the heart of constitutional system. This potential blossoms or it is activated when the need emerges. Therefore, the second jurisdiction of state may even be called a rule, rather than exception. In addition, this concept uncloaks the political function of this second criminal jurisdiction, and its relation with the political power. Therefore, the paper defends that Schmitt's formulation of political justice better explains political trials and the ÖYMs than the discussion of their exceptional and extraordinary legal status.

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"To Make Mosques a Place for Women"

Female Religious Engagement within the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs

Chiara Maritato

Introduction

In 2012, a Report[1] by the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs noted the lack of facilities for women in Turkish mosques. To potentiate female access to religious knowledge and services, a program of "beautification" was launched that consisted primarily of making mosques (also) a place for women. In Istanbul, the project was held dear by the then-vice Mufti Kadriye Avcı Erdemli, who encouraged activities aimed at reaching as many women as possible. Regarding the issue, she stated: "many mosques have no place for women, not even toilets for ritual ablutions". Moreover, female sections often consisted of spaces without proper ventilation and were not even outfitted to host preaching or seminars: "most of the places were used for storage, were usually filthy and freezing cold in winter. However, it is necessary to give the right to access sacred places and take advantage of their spiritual feelings to women too."[2]

In this sense, I argue that the institutionalization of Diyanet's female religious experts, along with fostering religious activities directed toward women, is a crucial point from which to assess the redefinition of women's spiritual engagement in Turkey.

Since 2004, an increasing number of female personnel have been employed by the Presidency of Religious Affairs—in Turkish, *Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı,* known

1 The report "*Camilerde Kadınlara Ayrılan Mekanların Güzelleştirilmesi Çalışmaları 2012 Genel Raporu*" considered all the about 91.000 mosques in Turkey and found that only 7750 mosques provided places and services for women, too. Report cited by Fatma Çamur (2013: 95).

2 Conversation with Kadriye Erdemli, Istanbul Il Müftülüğü, 02.05. 2013. For more information about the Project, please consider Avcı Erdemli 2013: 69-71.

M. Ersoy und E. Ozyurek (Hrsg.), *Contemporary Turkey at a Glance II*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-16021-0_3

as the Diyanet. The Diyanet is a state institution charged with the management of religion in Turkey and is often considered one of the emblems of the Turkish secularism, *laiklik*[3]. Established in 1924, the Diyanet is an administrative office under the control of the Prime Minister. It embodies the Turkish state's then-ruling Kemalist-positivist-nationalist elite's will to bureaucratize and control the expression of religion in public sphere (Gözaydın, 2006). Concretely, this control materializes in hiring religious personnel, supervising the activities carried out in mosques through the network of provincial and local Mufti offices and in elaborating a Turkish "true" understanding of Islamic knowledge (*doğru din*). However, in assessing this campaign for women's religious engagement, it should be noted that this is part of a broader strategy aimed at increasing religious presence in the public realm. For the purpose of enlightening readers on the everyday consequences of this political decision, I decided to start with the following question: concretely, how does a redefinition of the number and competencies of the Diyanet' s female personnel cast light on the evolution of female religious engagement in Turkey?

The relationship between women and religion has been explored by a number of scholars who approach religion, particularly Islam, as an instrument of either resistance or empowerment (Aune, Sharma, and Vincett ,2008; White, 2002). In both cases, women experience a religion that instrumentally either relegates them as subjects or provides them with liberation. Criticizing these approaches, Saba Mahmood provocatively asks "why [do] a large number of women in the Muslim world actively support a movement that seems inimical to their own interests". It is as if "something intrinsic to women should predispose them to oppose [these] practices" (Mahmood, 2012: 2).

Moreover, when confronted with a veritable "*question de la femme*" in Islam, the approaches are divided into two levels: the first one, in line with an idealistic "secular" public sphere (Habermas, 1991), considers the presence of female Islamic engagement to be nothing but the umpteenth evidence of a conspiratorial attempt to Islamize mores. The second one promotes "wishful thinking" aimed at seeking out religiously motivated forms of women's empowerment. The latter encompasses the huge and controversial debate on Islamic feminism (for an overview: Ahmed, 1992), which is widely accepted within the secular academia, particularly in the West. Claiming the necessity of a female interpretation of sacred texts, these

3 Added among the principles of Turkish Republic Constitutionally in 1937, the *laiklik*, considers religion and state not as separate-but-equal entities; rather, it institutionalizes instruments of state control over religion (Berkes 1998; Gözaydın 2006; Yavuz 2009; Kuru 2007).

scholars see religious engagement as a tool for women's liberation from the male tradition of misogyny.

This article distances itself from both these approaches. The main argument is that approaching women's daily engagement in religion necessitates a direct and inductive perspective. Moreover, the peculiarity of Turkish secularism requires a distinction between the activities carried out on a voluntaristic basis by women participating in Islamic movements and congregations (Turam, 2007; Raudvere, 1998) and those occurring within the frame of a state institution, the Diyanet. I opted to concentrate on the latter to deliberately avoid mixing the two.

In this sense, the literature on women's access to religious institutions provides a better conceptualization of the phenomenon. This perspective differs considerably from the previous ones: authors studying women enrolled in churches, congregations, mosques and synagogues are questioning, above all, the consequences of including and legitimating female roles and expertise within male-dominated institutions.

Focusing on Islam, Masooda Bano and Hilary Kalmbach (2012) explored in a recent work the evolution of female engagement in madrassah and mosques. In particular, they analyze whether the religious female authority is *octroyée* from above by the state and/or other male-dominated religious institutions or it is the result of a woman's previous engagement in religious movements. Approaching the transformation of female religious engagement in Turkey, I profited greatly from the articles of two scholars, Mona Hassan (2011) and Fatma Tütüncü (2010), who studied Turkish female preachers (*kadin vaize;* pl. *vaizeler*[4]) appointed by the Diyanet. Tütüncü describes the state-appointed female preachers as a tool "to understand the sovereign power of the Turkish state, which exceptionally defines legitimate religious subjectivities, politicizes religiousness and mobilizes on women campuses" (2010:596-597). Hassan even more explicitly refers to the state: the hiring of women among the official preaching workforce, she affirms, "signifies a transformation of the hitherto predominantly private forms of women's religiosity into a public affair subject to state regulation" (Hassan, 2011:452).

The article thus aims to examine the extent and the consequences of female scholars' penetration into the Diyanet's hierarchies. For this purpose, in the first section, I present the way women perform new roles and offices. In particular,

4 Deriving from the Arabic term *wāʿiẓ* (pl. wuʿʿāẓ), indicating the preacher who gives sermons and conveys admonishment (*waʿẓ mawʿiẓa*), the Turkish *vaiz* (pl. *vaizler*) currently indicates male or female (*kadin vaiz* or *vaize*; pl. *vaizeler*) preachers. v. "Wāʿiẓ." *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heimlich's. Brill Online, 2014. Reference. University of Torino. 10 July 2014; cfr. "Vaaz." TDV *Islam Ansiklopedisi*, yıl: 2012, cilt: 42, sayfa: 404-407 Hasan Cirit.

the 2003-2010 Bardakoğlu Presidency is presented as an example that led to the changing role of women within the institution and religion's broad access to the public realm. In the second section, I examine how concretely these policies entail the flourishing of projects for women and families; opening religious hierarchies to women goes thus hand in hand with the strengthening of female participation in the religious public realm.

Approaching female religious engagement: a matter of method

To assess how concretely a redefinition of Diyanet's female religious officers could cast light on the evolution of female religious engagement in Turkey, I opted for political ethnography (Ybema et al., 2009) as the main methodology. Political ethnography combines "field research tools of observing (with whatever degree of participation), conversing (including formal interviewing), and the close reading of documentary sources" through "first-hand, field-based observation and experiences [...] participating in organizational members' lifeworlds, establishing working relationships with them" (Ybema et al., 2009:13).

For the purpose of describing and, as much as possible, understanding the activities of the Diyanet's female personnel, I thus conducted ten months of ethnographic research in different Istanbul neighborhoods[5]. My research consisted of attending female preachers' seminars and sermons, Qur'an readings and *tefsir* (exegesis of the Qur'an) sessions weekly in mosques and municipal cultural centers. In addition to these observations, I conducted repeated and in-depth interviews with the preachers (*vaizeler*) and female personnel working at Istanbul's Provincial Mufti Office and at the Ankara Diyanet's Head Office, Department of Family and Religious Guidance (*Aile ve Dini Rehberlik Daire Baskanliği*).

5 In particular, I did my longest ethnographic observations in Beşiktas, Üsküdar and Bahçelievler. The choice of these neighborhoods, with different social-historical backgrounds, was due to the necessity to frame the phenomenon by letting emerge the similarities and differences of state-sponsored female religious engagement. Moreover, I attended for shorter periods female sessions in the Kadıköy's Suadiye district. During the fieldwork, I repeated visits at *Fetva Odasi* located at the Çemberlitaş Nuruosmaniye Mosque, where Istanbul's vaizeler turn at the Fatwa Online Service.

From engagement to offices: the institutionalization of female personnel within the Diyanet

At the end of the Bardakoğlu Presidency in 2010 a report of the main projects and services carried out was published. In a paragraph concerning the services provided to women, the data on female personnel show a veritable transition between 2004 and 2005: the number of women employed was 2,696 in 2004 and 5,496 in 2005. In 2007, 10,892 women were working in the Diyanet; in 2010, their number reached 11,041. However, examining these numbers more in detail, attention should be paid to the female preachers (*vaizeler*), female Qur'an teachers and female vice Mufti employed in the Mufti Provincial Offices (*Il Müftü Yardımcısı*). In 2003 the number of vaizeler was 76. The following year, 182 were employed, and in 2010, their number reached 403 (Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı, 2011:14-15). In 2014, 727 female preachers were employed by the Diyanet[6]. Concerning the female Qur'an teachers, they were 2,374 in 2003 and 10,655 in 2010. Moreover, since 2005, women, have been able to hold office as Provincial *Müftü Yardımcısı*; their number was 11 in 2010. How can this transition be assessed? In particular, how can this transition help conceptualize the evolution of female religious engagement in Turkey?

In the history of Islam, figures such as shaikhs, müftis, teachers (*muallim*), imams, preachers and pilgrimage guides have been charged with the dissemination of religious knowledge (Melchert, 2006). However, the case of Turkey is in this sense emblematic: with the establishment of the Republic in 1923, religion became the prerogative of specialized people trained to teach religious knowledge, propagating faith and piety.

In this sense, the state controls the doctrine of Islam through bureaucratized religious officials (*din gorevlisi*) employed by the Diyanet as "a profession, not a vocation" (Görmez, 2008:248). It is thus worth considering how concretely the religious public realm opened its doors to women. Far before the official hierarchies, the presence of women in Sufi Orders (*tarikat*) was documented in Turkish modern history: women traditionally have participated in religious communities (*cemaat*), organizing preaching sessions and weekly collective meetings (*zikr*) in houses or students' dormitories[7]. The experience of Samiha Ayverdi, a famous writer and Sufi mystic operating between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic has been followed

6 Email conversation with Fatma Bayraktar, *Din Hizmetleri Genel Mudurlugu*, 15.09.2014.

7 Among the religious communities and Sufi orders rooted in Turkey, some, as part of the *Hizmet* Movement, are providing religious education to women and organizing regular meetings in students' dormitories and private houses. See Berna Turam (2007), in particular Chap.5.

by her disciple, Cemalnur Sargut, a famous teacher of the Sufi 'Rifaí Order who has a great number of followers in Turkey and abroad today[8]. As Catharina Raudvere (1998) notes, in Islamist rhetoric, the meeting of women outside the control of imams or religious hierarchies is associated with uncontrolled Sufi activities (Raudvere, 1998: 140). Thus, the introduction of female religious officers has been explained as the state's paternalistic (White, 2003) will to control female religiosity.

However, considering that from 1944 to 1952, there were only four women among the Diyanet's workforce, this operation developed differently over the years. In 1962, Beyza Bilgin graduated in theology and became the first female preacher, *vaize*, in Turkey. From the 1960s to the 1980s, there were no more than two or three female religious personnel in Ankara. In 1997, a woman became an expert in religious services at the Ankara Mufti Office, and in 1998, another woman was appointed an expert in religious education (Sucu, 2005: 94-95). According to Ayse Sucu, the female sections (*kadın kolları*) established during the 1990s acted as a model to encourage female religious engagement: they promoted social cultural services for women that were gaining increasingly more visibility and legitimacy. In particular, women working in these sections engaged in "unifying society [...] their activities going beyond the classic profession of employees, they were more sensitive" (Sucu, 2005: 96). Moreover, reporting on the creation of a female section within the Diyanet Foundation (*Vakfı*) in 1996, Sucu states: "working for the Diyanet, it was necessary to talk with people from every walk of life. The issues were always the same: the Turkish woman is a person per se, or she only belongs to the family; if she is a person who works, this does not necessarily mean that she has a position in society. In the community, women's status is disadvantaged" (Sucu, 2005: 102-103).

Within the Diyanet's female sections, religious education was provided with the aim to make women correctly understand religion and to provide lessons on writing-reading and vocational courses. In the 2000s, the Diyanet Foundation's *kadın kolları* gained increasingly more visibility and legitimacy; these women gained new competencies, and their participation within the institution was reaffirmed. The Bardakoğlu Presidency is largely considered the one that promoted change for women's issues within the Diyanet. As Hicret Toprak[9], the President of the KAGEM

8 Regarding Cemalnur Sargut, please see the official website: http://www.cemalnur.org and the page of the WISE Muslim Women: http://www.wisemuslimwomen.org/muslimwomen/bio/cemalnur_sargut/. She is also the president of the *Türk Kadınları Kültür Derneği* (TURKKAD) Turkish Women Cultural Association fhttp://www.turkkad.org/default.asp?PG=YTR_01&NWS00_CODE=&NWS01_ID=&tPARAM=.

9 Conversation with Hicret Toprak, Diyanet Vakfı KAGEM, Ankara, 21.01.2014.

Diyanet Vakfı clearly states, "Beyond the circumstances, people's choices are relevant in articulating changes. Prof. Ali Bardakoğlu and Hatice Guler [today retired, Hatice Guler worked for the Diyanet, elaborating projects for women through the Offices for Families] started to set women's issues in the Diayanet's agenda". "Modernity in Turkey", affirms Bardakoğlu, "went through women. For a long time, men decided for them: how to dress, what to study, but there is no trace of this in the Islamic sources. There is no obligation concerning child brides or polygamy."[10]

In 2010, under the Presidency of Prof. Mehmet Görmez, a reorganization of the Diyanet's structure occurred: a Department of Family and Religious Guidance (*Aile ve Dini Rehberlik Daire Baskanliği*) was established and was headed by Professor Huriye Martı until 2014. Regarding the introduction of female personnel among the Diyanet *kadro*, she explains: "the 1997 military coup disabled female students graduating from religious vocational high schools (*Imam Hatip*) from attending any faculties but theology". This decision produced an unexpected effect: "in the faculties of theology, there were almost no more men! That's how these women were employed by the Diyanet; over time, they naturally entered the institution. It was necessary to employ women to diffuse true belief and to put religion in the service of family life."[11]

In this sense, apart from the daily activities carried out by preachers and Qur'an teachers in local communities, female personnel participate in the Commission, preparing the Friday noon prayer (*Hutbe*), working as religious experts (*Din Hizmetleri Uzmanı*)[12], at the Head of Diyanet's Departments as well as anchor-women at the Diyanet TV channel. Another aspect to mention is female religious officers' authority, which derives from both their religious knowledge and their belongingness to an official institution (Bano and Kalmbach, 2012), which represents itself as an "umbrella" able to include different religious interpretations.

In the case of the female preachers, for instance, many of them graduated from faculties of theology, obtaining Masters and PhDs[13]. Moreover, being a Diyanet's *vaize* or a Qur'an teacher allows them to overcome the sectarianism of religious congregations and communities (*cemaat* and *tarikat*). On this issue, Huriye Martı affirms: "first of all, a *vaize* is bounded to the Diyanet. In this sense, she represents

10 Conversation with Prof. Bardakoğlu, *Kuran'i Kerime Araştirmalari Merkes*i (Research Center on the Qur'an), Istanbul, 4.2.2014.

11 Conversation with Prof. Huriye Martı, Department of Family and Religious Guidance, Diyanet, Ankara, 13.11. 2013.

12 In 2010, 62 women worked as religious experts (*Din Hizmetleri Uzmanı*); see (Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı 2011:15).

13 Concerning the competition for becoming a vaize, please see Hassan (2011b).

the institution before any other affiliation. If a preacher follows only a particular *cemaat* [religious community], she is under the control of the Mufti and the other Diyanet's personnel working in the mosque. In cases of complains, they report to the Diyanet."[14]

Inside the Diyanet's "New Gender Policy"

The state's intervention in female religiosity goes hand in hand with a broader reaffirmation of religion in the public sphere. Although the Diyanet is one of the actors most involved in managing the intertwined relations between religion and the state in Turkey (Berkes, 1998; Gözaydın, 2008; Yavuz, 2009), this change is not recent. It was crystallized in 1965 when Act no. 633 on the Organization and Duties of the Presidency of Religious Affairs was passed. As Gözaydın (2014: 6) notes, the Act no. 633 was a "sign of a different mentality compared with that of the founding elite": the duties of Diyanet were "to carry out affairs related to the beliefs, prayers and moral foundations of Islam, to enlighten society about religion and to manage places of prayer". In this sense, not only was the idea of a religion confined to the private space replaced by a nationalist view on Islam as a tool for education and control; but during the 1970s and the 1980s, the consolidation of a "Turk-Islam synthesis[15]" was instrumental for spreading religion within society.

Having said that, to employ women within a historically male-dominated institution entails a redefinition of female participation in the religious public realm. Concretely, what is generally referred to as the Diyanet's new gender policy "*Yeni Cinsiyet Politikası*" involved above all an increase in female religious education: Qur'an courses *in primis*, which were completely reorganized. New classrooms opened at the local Mufti offices, new books were published, and the services focused on guidance and supervision (Arslan, 2013: 40). The numbers of female students and teachers of Qur'an courses rose: in 2008/2009, the number of women attending Qur'an courses was 179,318, compared with 13,550 men, which provoked a reaction in the secular milieu (Arslan, 2013:45-47). Moreover, the feminization of religious education went hand in hand with an increase in activities for women. In 2009, according to a Diyanet's report, there were 67,517 such activities, which

14 Conversation with Prof. Huriye Martı, cit.

15 On the "*Turk-Islam sentezi*" please consider: Kaplan (2002) and Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar (2003).

largely consisted of 53,485 sermons (*vaaz*), 2,988 religious lessons in mosques, 1,780 conferences and 1,065 seminars (Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı, 2011: 15).

However, despite the fact that local Muftis have implemented projects facilitating women's participation in mosques, female preachers have often reported difficulties in their jobs. A Diyanet's *vaize*, for instance, has a weekly schedule that consists of giving sermons and seminars in the neighborhood mosques and Qur'an courses. Reaching women to invite them to attend religious ceremonies at mosques is often a difficult task – women are usually contacted by phone, text messages, notes posted at the mosque's entrance and word of mouth. Zeynep, the *vaize* of Istanbul's Kadıköy Müftülüğü, said: "for one year I worked, and there were no women. Nobody was coming, zero. Currently, in Göztepe [a district in Kadıköy], approximately 50 women are coming every week. There were also other obstacles: sometimes the imam did not agree [about our presence in mosque]; he went away after the prayer, and he closed the mosque's door so that we could not enter. Sometimes, the *cemaat* [religious communities] were against us; also, the husbands did not let women participate."[16]

In 2013, the topic of the "*Camiler ve Din Görevlileri Haftası*"[17] was "*Cami-Kadın ve Aile*" (Mosque Woman and Family) encouraging female participation in mosques and posters with Qur'anic verses relating to women and family were affixed outside the neighborhood's biggest mosques. Moreover, the female's active role within the religious community was the object of the week's Friday noon prayer (*hutbe*)[18] titled: "*Davet Hepimize, Hep Birlikte Camiye!*" The text referred first to the participation in public religious rituals of both Hacer (Sara), Abram's wife and the mother of Ismael, and Meryem (Virgin Mary), the mother of Jesus. Then, it reported on women's historical engagement in attending mosques and particularly in handing down religious knowledge. Quoting from the *hutbe*: "our women from time to time have been alienated from God's praying rooms, not able to practice rituals with their husbands and children; they were debarred from this joy. The mosque, a sacred place, should become a peaceful nest where women with their husbands and children could direct together toward Mecca, prostrating together to God and feeling joyful".

16 Conversation with the Kadıköy's vaize Zeynep at the *Fetva Odasi* (Fatwa Room), Nuruosmaniye Mosque, Istanbul, 9.1.2014.

17 From 1-7 October 2013 the Diyanet celebrated the Mosques and Religious Officers.

18 The *hutbe* "*Davet hepimize, hep birlikte Camiye!*" (Let's invite everyone, let's go all together to the mosque!) was read during the Friday noon prayer the 27 of September, 2013.

The reference to the downing of Islam as a sort of golden age where women actively participated in religious public activities is a leitmotif recurring in academic works (Yılmaz, 2007) and in Diyanet's official publications (Ramazanoğlu, 2013:73).

Fig. 1

Do not prevent them from coming to God!

"Do not keep women from going to the mosques!"

Fig. 2

Mosques are places of unity.

"People! You were created from a man and a woman..."

The reference to Islamic history for legitimizing female religious engagement also recurs in preachers' sermons and seminars. In preachers' weekly sessions, Mohammed's wives and his daughter Fatma are referred to as a role models. Although the topics of the seminars are in an outline established by the Mufti Offices, the *vaize* decides how to develop them and which rhetoric techniques to employ. Moreover, the activities differ considerably depending on the local and provincial Mufti offices. As Fatma Bayraktar affirms, the preacher should "listen to women request, adapting the contents to the ages, education and neighborhood's characteristics"[19]. In particular, the activities provided to women and families are labelled through the Islamic notion of *irşad*[20] (to enlighten, to guide toward the right path), that is to reach as much women as possible, enlightening them on matter of religious knowledge, practices and morality.

The guidance consists of projects and seminars held in mosques or in municipal cultural centers but also in the counseling activities offered by the Offices for Family Religious Guidance (*Aile İrşat ve Rehberlik Büroları,* AIRB)[21] and by the fatwa online/phone call services (*Halo fetva 190*). The AIRB organize and coordinate a number of programs: in the case of the Kadıköy Müftülüğü, for instance, there are specific projects, such as preparatory courses for weddings (*Evlilige Hazirlik Okulu*), where, in addition to religious officers, psychologists, lawyers and doctors are invited. There are also more general activities offered, such as weekly Qur'an lessons for families, evening courses for female workers, and Saturday morning seminars for teenagers.

This plurality of activities is significant for assessing the various typologies of women participating in them. Fatma, a computer engineer who retired and then decided to enroll in a faculty of theology, explains her choice as a personal will "to directly access religious sources"[22]. Wearing large pants and a long sweater, she covers her head just before entering the prayer room of the Beşiktaş Müftülüğü where the *vaize* gives weekly seminars. One afternoon, she introduced herself mixing Turkish and English, then she continued: "what do you think about Muslim women?" Suddenly, she took from out of her handbag a booklet titled "*Muhammad*

19 Conversation with Fatma Bayraktar 12.11.2013.

20 On the notion of *irşat,* please consider the voice of *İrşad* in the Diyanet's Islam Encyclopedia "İRŞAD (داشرلا) yıl: 2000, cilt: 22, sayfa: 454-455, last consulted online http://www.islamansiklopedisi.info.454 on 23.1.2015.

21 On 15/4/2002, the *Aile İrşat ve Rehberlik Büroları* was established for counseling activities concerning family problems and religious education; in 2013, these offices were in place in 49 local Mufti offices, 32 in Istanbul.

22 Fieldwork notes from Beşiktaş, 21.10.2013.

the Liberator of Women", saying, "You know this book? You should read it!" That is exactly what I did. The text, also available online, argues that before the advent of the Prophet, "women in all countries were in position of slaves and chattels". Islam provided women with rights over children, properties and divorce many centuries before the West (Ahmad, 1991:3.)

Concluding remarks

The increase in women's participation in religious activities organized for women in local Turkish mosques appears to be a multifaceted phenomenon – women from all walks of life ask for and obtain forms of religious support daily. A first remark is that this participation reduces the dualism between the public and the private sphere: religion definitely creates a personal "third space" (Aune, Sharma, and Vincett, 2008: 9-10) where the boundaries of what is inside and outside the home appear to be continuously fickle. Moreover, female religious activism questions the idea that a complete secularization makes public religiosity irrelevant (Aune, Sharma, and Vincett, 2008: 15). The activities carried out by the Diyanet's female personnel show the contrary: making mosques (also) a place for women is indeed an instrument that allows religiosity to go beyond the private realm. At this point, one could ask what the consequences are of female religious engagement for believers, society and, more generally, Islamic authority or, more explicitly, how this women's religious authority is concretely exerted.

The literature on female engagement in religious movements is dotted with "wishful thinking" about a female reinterpretation of sacred texts. However, female religious authority can also be an instrument for consolidating tradition and diffusing both doctrine and a sense of piety. Between the orthodox and the feminist interpretations, there is a continuum that is often eluded or not carefully taken into account. I argue that both the women who try to challenge the male domination and those who seem more bound to religious hierarchies are engaged in enlarging their authority; this is because even when women are using a traditional and orthodox discourse, their engagement raises questions about the transformation of Islamic authority and its structures (Bano and Kalmbach, 2012: 530-531).

Turkish female religious participation within the frame of the Diyanet's "New Gender Policy" is, it goes without saying, in line with the institution's dogmas and hierarchies. However, just the choice of a moderate path instead of more radical views facilitated a broader and longer lasting change. This paper outlines two of the major findings relevant to the understanding the increase in female religious

officers: firstly the political will to foster the role of religion in the public sphere and secondly the reinforcement of women's role within religious realm. Both these aspects emerged from the Diyanet's Bardakoğlu Presidency (2003-2010) when the female traditional Qur'anic readings, prayers and exegesis sessions organized in private houses come to the fore and entered the public and "official" place of the mosques.

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Personalistic Linkages and Persuasion in Turkish Party Politics

Kerem Yıldırım

Introduction

Establishing linkages between political elites and voters is fundamental for every political system. In democracies, elite groups are expected to be responsive towards different interest groups and the general public. By representing these groups, elites and decision makers are able to respond to the demands of voters. However, interest representation can take numerous forms. One of these forms is clientelistic linkages and it is based on a personal, one to one relationship between agents and voters. This chapter deals with clientelism in the Turkish context.

Despite several interruptions, Turkey has been holding free and fair elections regularly since 1950. During previous electoral campaign periods, political parties used personal interaction as a strategy and distributed goods and services in order to mobilize voters. This practice is especially criticized among some circles because clientelistic interaction may unduly influence the decision-making processes of voters.

This paper approaches clientelism in a critical fashion and argues that it is not only a strategy to mobilize voters and garner more votes, but it also allows populist and specifically Islamist parties to persuade voters through face-to-face interactions in the long term. In order to elaborate on this argument, the first part of the paper focuses on the role of clientelism's temporal dimension, clientelism's role in political persuasion, and the relationship between policy preferences and clientelistic interaction. The second part focuses on the history of clientelism among different political parties in the history of Turkish politics. After comparing selected Turkish political parties and their mobilization strategies, I argue that compared to their secular and leftist counterparts, Islamist and center of the right parties are more successful in establishing and sustaining clientelistic linkages. The third part is empirical and it focuses on the 2014 Turkish local elections and analyzes the temporal dimension of clientelism for the ruling Justice and Development Party's

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(*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP*) success. Some descriptive statistics from two representative surveys, as well as an online experimental survey are presented. The concluding part of the paper deals with the consequences of clientelistic exchange for the AKP's dominance in Turkish politics for the last twelve years.

Temporality in Clientelism and Political Persuasion

Clientelism is a redistribution strategy employed by political parties in order to garner more support and mobilize voters. Previous studies indicate that clientelism is a personalistic relationship, based on interaction between parties and voters (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984). These interactions can be employed in different periods, but parties rationally prefer to intensify these linkages during election periods. However, more than three decades ago, Landé argued that there was no agreement on "what is to be included in the study of patron-client relationships" (Lande, 1983). This conceptual problem bedevils studies on clientelism. An important conceptual challenge in the current literature is about the difference between patronage and clientelism. Some authors define patronage as non-programmatic benefits directed at party members, contingent upon individual's political support (Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, Brusco, 2013). Other scholars suggest that patronage is a special form of particularistic exchange of public sector employment within the general framework of patron-client relations (See: Kemahlıoğlu, 2012). Other scholars argue that patronage means benefits and goods that are distributed in an exclusionary way by public office holders (van de Walle, 2007).

This discussion necessitates conceptualizing and defining clientelism and patronage. This paper defines clientelism as a general term to capture non-programmatic distribution by political parties. Distribution is contingent on political support or the vote choice. In relation with the literature, patronage is defined as a specific type of clientelism in which those who hold public offices distribute public sector jobs which is similarly contingent on political support. In this respect, patronage goods, i.e. public employment, is a possible option only for incumbent parties. This paper deals not only with such employment strategies, but also goods and services distributed through other strategies to party supporters and undecided voters.

In his review of the topic, Roniger refers to Graham and underlines that clientelistic relationships are based on the principle of "take there, give here" (Graham, 2007). This principle categorically implies that there is a limited duration for the clientelistic transaction to be completed. In this respect, every clientelistic relationship has a temporal dimension. Every transaction takes time. However, I argue

that there are important qualitative differences between a single interaction and multiple, iterated interactions. A single interaction necessitates only the minimum duration while in a continuous clientelistic relationship, clients and political patrons interact over longer periods.

Previous research on clientelism indicates that many clients interact with political brokers who are highly connected and politically motivated individuals. These brokers tend to have a central place in neighborhood-level social networks (Szwarcberg, 2012). By monitoring needs and demands of their constituents, they are able to establish and sustain long-term relationships. In many respects, this is a global phenomenon. Various parties around the world form such personalistic, long-term relationships with voters. In addition, this does not only happen in the developing world or in nascent, unconsolidated democracies. Argentine brokers, for example, establish long-term networks in their *barrios*. Indian *naya netas* (new leaders) solve everyday problems of peasants.[1] What is common in in those two examples from different countries is a continuous interaction between brokers and voters. Party activists help voters not only during the election day. The relationship can become more intense during election periods, but brokers and clients generally maintain a relationship in their neighborhoods, mosques, coffeehouses and other similar public places. In return, brokers are able to monitor their clients, respond to their personal problems rapidly and request political support for the party in return when it is necessary. This reciprocity also creates a suitable environment for political interaction and persuasion. Stokes et. al. (2013) underline that brokers need to have a capacity to persuade clients so that they mobilize support during elections. Therefore, clientelistic continuity does not only influence the vote choice or whether clients show up in political rallies. Long-term clientelistic relationships can also persuade voters in their policy preferences and ideological positions over time.

Political persuasion takes time. In fact, numerous studies show that socialization during adolescence and long-term group attachments are some of the most important determinants of individual political positions.[2] However, continuous interactions between brokers and clients can influence the client especially on formation of new

1 For ethnographic case studies on Argentinian and Indian clientelistic linkages, see, Auyero, B. (2001). Poor people's politics: Peronist survival networks and the legacy of Evita. Duke University Press and, Krishna, A. (2007) "Politics in the middle: Mediating relationships between the citizens and the state in rural North India" in Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, ed. by Kitchelt, H and Wilkinson, S. I. Cambridge University press, pp.141-158.

2 For a critical review of theories on voting behavior, see Bartels, L. M. (2010). The study of electoral behavior. The Oxford handbook of American elections and political behavior, ed.by. Leighley, J. E., Oxford University Press. 239-261.

issue opinions for which these clients have to make a decision based on informational cues. Additionally, brokers and clients usually share a common history, living in the same neighborhood and sharing the same public space. As the Turkish example will also clarify, there is usually a personal bond between brokers and clients. Most of the brokers in Turkey were not strangers when they first contacted their clients for political interaction. They are usually prominent local figures with high influence and power to solve everyday problems in the neighborhood. They have the capacity to exert personal influence on clients. In the Turkish case, these brokers are also highly connected to political offices in their districts, municipalities, headman offices (*muhtarlık*) and even provincial headquarters of political parties. They are an indivisible part of the party organization and they form the backbone of a party's influence in the neighborhood level. In this respect, political clientelism requires a personal interaction between two individuals. This interaction happens in various places and periods, but most of the brokers establish long-term relationships. The temporal aspect of this interaction creates suitable conditions for further political discussions and persuasion of clients in their political attitudes.

Clientelism may not be a necessary condition for political persuasion but it contributes to the building up of the asymmetrical relationship between a patron and a client. It creates sunk costs and hinders volition and viable exit strategies for both sides of the relationship. These costs can be both psychological, for instance peer-pressure, and material. Most of the time, clients are from the lower levels of socioeconomic status groups. Brokers continue to provide these goods and services in the long term. This, in turn, creates a dependency in which clients feel the pressure to sustain the relationship. Therefore, volition is not always an option.[3] In such an environment it is likely that the clients adjust their attitudes to their relationship with the broker.[4] In other words, long-term clientelism intensifies the relationship between parties and therefore it also increases the chances and level of persuasion.

3 For a detailed discussion of characteristics of clientelism and whether volition is a necessary part of the concept's definition see, Hicken, A. (2011). Clientelism. Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 289-310.

4 For details of how people justify or cope with strategic political structures in the Turkish example see, Erdoğan, N. (1998). Making do with the State Power: Laughter, Grotesque and Metis in Turkish Popular Culture, PhD Dissertation. Lancaster University, Department of Sociology, England.

A Brief History of Clientelism in Turkey

Our current knowledge on the extent of clientelistic linkages and its role on persuading voter groups in Turkey is relatively limited. But, a short review of the historical literature indicates that there are strong clientelistic linkages in the country. According to Sunar, the Turkish political system is teeming with "parties of patronage, a patron state, and a client society dependent for its welfare on patronage parties which [use] the resource of the state to keep 'clients' happy" (Sunar, 1990: 32). Heper and Keyman (1998) trace the history of patronage in Turkey back to the Ottoman Empire. In the periphery of the Empire, *eşraf* and *ağa* classes were prevalent and they were both buffers and exploiters of peasant classes. This class situation continued well into the Republican period. During the single-party regime, secular Kemalist elites incorporated these local elite classes and used them for accessing rural Anatolia.

However, patronage networks changed tremendously with the introduction of a multi-party system in 1950. In this respect, Lerner's study can be read as a part of ethnographic works on agricultural societies that preceded studies on clientelism (Lerner, 1958). Although, Lerner does not mention any specific party broker or material incentive provided to the habitants of rural Ankara, it is clear from the massive transformation of the suburb that the town was one of the lucky places that benefitted from pork-barreling, i.e. collective distribution of clientelistic goods. It is important to note that the 'pork' was not distributed equitably or programmatically. But still, it is possible to see from similar other examples that something was changing during this period.

The 1950s was when patronage networks transformed Turkey. Heper and Keyman argue that the exercise of political patronage in return for votes became paramount only with the coming to power of the center right Democrat Party (DP) in 1950 (Heper and Keyman, 1998). Similarly, Çarkoğlu and Adaman suggest that the paternalistic mode of governance, a legacy of the Ottoman Empire, turned itself into a web of patronage-based networks with the introduction of multi-party democracy in the 1950s (Çarkoğlu & Adaman, 2001). During this period, the DP from the center right was the most successful party in establishing these clientelistic ties. According to Sayarı, the CHP also tried to do so, but it was not as successful. Also, discretionary benefits created a vicious circle: the CHP was not successful as a political machine so it could not garner votes to gain power and thus it lacked public funds to establish clientelistic ties (Sayarı, 1977). Similarly, Kudat (1977) indicates that the dyadic relationships between landowners and peasants turned into political ties during the 1950s. These dyadic relationships were especially prevalent in Eastern Turkey where an impoverished agricultural society remained intact

albeit the Kemalist efforts of modernization. During the 1970s, after two military interventions in 1960 and 1971, the CHP was also establishing such a clientelistic capacity in Anatolia.[5] However, this effort abruptly came to a halt after the third coup in 1980. In other words, the history of CHP's personalistic linkages is a history of discontinuities and failures. On the other hand, the Islamist and conservative political tradition was able to keep its hold on clientelistic relations even if party names and elite cadres changed over decades.

Clientelistic networks generally surround Turkish political life and features of this patronage network have been transforming. Despite the fact that patronage is common in Turkish politics, scholarly attention has been diverted to other topics in recent years. There are few case studies focusing on Turkish clientelism, and those that do usually concentrate on rural Anatolian towns. Several authors selected small towns from Anatolia to understand patronage and clientelism.[6] However, around 17% of eligible voters are registered to vote in İstanbul, the largest city in the country. İstanbul's voters constitute an important pool for possible clientelistic networks. Therefore, more recent research is focusing on urban, metropolitan municipalities in a comparative perspective.[7]

In this urban setting, White argues that the ruling AKP developed more horizontal interactions and effective ways of brokerage (White, 2012). This new urban relationship is based on mutual help (*imece*), and the AKP was influenced from earlier Islamist parties, specifically the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi – SP)*. In these informal networks, brokers are a part of the locality. Subcontracted goods and services are distributed within these networks. This type of clientelism requires immense organizational strength and social capital. If there is a voter whose child is sick, providing a washing machine may not be as relevant as providing assis-

5 According to Ayata, CHP was successful in establishing rapport with locals in various towns and cities in the 1970s. Her ethnographic work on two Anatolian towns indicates to CHP's efforts in clientelism. See, Ayata, A. (1992). CHP: Örgüt ve İdeoloji [*CHP: Organization and Ideology]*. Gündoğan Publishing.

6 For examples see, Alexander, C. (2002). Personal States: Making Connections Between People and Bureaucracy in Turkey. Oxford University. Also, Unbehaun, H. (2006). Türkiye Kırsalında Kliyentalizm ve Siyasal Katılım: Datça Örneği, 1923-1992 [*Clientelism and Political Participation in Rural Turkey: the Case of Datça, 1923-1992]* . Ütopya Press. And, Özbudun, S. (2005). "The Reproduction of Clientelism in Regressing Rural Turkey or "Why I Became an 'Erect Ear' ?", Dialectical Anthropology, no. 29: 241-272.

7 For recent scholarly work on clientelism in Turkish urban settings see, Kemahlıoğlu, Ö. (2012). Also, Arıkan-Akdağ, G. (2013) Incumbent Mobilization of Swing Voters: Voter-Party Linkages and Consolidation of Ethnic Votes in Istanbul. PhD Thesis, Sabancı University.

tance in health services. In this respect, the AKP's organizational capacity is able to redistribute incentives in an optimum manner.

Based on the results of a cross-country expert survey, Kitschelt argues that the AKP is a dominant clientelist party in Turkey. It is making a greater effort and it is also much more effective in producing votes with clientelistic techniques (Kitschelt, 2011).[8] In order to measure clientelistic linkages among politically relevant parties across countries, Kitschelt and his team initiated the Democratic Accountability and Linkages project. This project devised a composite index to measure clientelism. This index measures components on provision of consumer goods, preferential public benefits, employment opportunities, government contracts and regulatory proceedings. It ranges from a lowest value of 1 to highest value of 4. Findings from this 2008-2009 expert survey indicate that the AKP is dominating the clientelistic scene in Turkey with an index score of 3.93. The next highest score for a politically relevant party is from Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi – DTP*) with a score of 3.14. The average for seven most politically relevant parties is 2.91. People's Republican Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP)* was the main opposition party during this period. It had a staunch Kemalist and center of the left party platform and it had a score of 2.93. Islamist SP, the AKP's predecessor, had also a score of 2.91. This is not surprising given that the SP became marginalized over time, gaining around 2% of the total votes on average in the last three general elections. This imbalance in clientelistic success is related to the AKP gaining a dominant position in the Turkish politics over the last decade.

In 2001, the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi – FP)* was banned by the constitutional court after violating several secularist articles of the constitution.[9] Following its closure, the party was fragmented into two, the AKP and the SP. In the 2002 general elections, the AKP was able to gain 34% of the votes while the SP was able to get only 2.5%. The AKP formed a single party government with a moderate Islamist platform, while the SP clung to its traditional Islamist ideology. Over the last decade, the governing party was able to consolidate its power and remain in power while the SP could not compete with the AKP's organizational capacity. In fact, as of 10 April 2014, the AKP has the highest number of party members with a stunning figure of 8,698,551 (16% of the total eligible voters) while the SP only

8 For details of this expert survey project and datasets, visit https://web.duke.edu/democracy/index.html

9 In fact, the history of Islamist parties in Turkey is highly complex with 4 clear-cut Islamist parties banned between 1971 and 2001. Before AKP, SP and FP, Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi – RP)* was closed in 1998. However, RP was one of the biggest parties during the 1990s. It was the party with the highest votes in 1995 general elections.

has 210,521 members (0.4%).[10] The organizational capacity of AKP as well as its incumbency advantage is the reason why the AKP is able to dominate the scene of establishing clientelistic linkages. However, explaining clientelistic success with only an incumbency advantage is not enough. Tracing the history of clientelism reveals that conservative and populist parties had a comparative advantage over other parties in establishing rapport and providing benefits to the voters.

When the AKP succeeded the FP, it also took over a large organizational capacity established during the early 2000s. During the FP's rise to power in the 1990s, it was able to establish a large structure of interconnected informal networks. Through these networks, the party was able to link political elites with the masses. In fact, Toprak explains the rise of the Islamist FP in Turkey in relation to the socioeconomic conditions and the 1980 coup. She states that "… whereas the vote of the urban poor largely went to the *CHP* in the 1970s, it was transferred to the *FP* in the 1980s and the 1990s," (Toprak, 2005). This argument summarizes the shift in the post-1980 Turkish political life. Starting from the 1980s, Islamist political movement gained a momentum and during the 1990s, the FP was able to mobilize voters through a vast network of activists in urban areas. Even withouth the current technology, there were party activists and professional party workers who managed a database of voters at the neighborhood level. They collected information regarding the demands and needs of the locality. Additionally, there was "a network of headmasters and teachers (*hatipler ve öğretmenler*), who engaged people in discussion at the local coffee-houses and other gathering places," (Yeşilada, 2002: 30). A crucial part of this connected structure was the religious high schools for chaplains and preachers (*İmam Hatip Liseleri – İHL*).

In 1990-91, there were approximately 119,086 students studying in these religious vocational schools. This figure increased to 192,737 in 1996-97. Graph 1 shows the change in the percentage of high school students enrolled in İHLs over school years.[11] Islamist parties are especially successful in establishing a foothold in these schools and attracting the activists and sympathizers. In fact, several interviews that I have conducted with AKP officials in İstanbul underline this point. Most of the local party activists that went door to door to canvass votes and satisfy the demands of their supporters were graduates of the İHLs. Several other AKP activists indicated

10 Party with the second highest membership is the main opposition CHP, with 1.012.412 members, (%1.2 of total voters). Figures are taken from the Turkish Supreme Court information page on political parties: http://www.yargitaycb.gov.tr/Partiler/index.html

11 Enrollment figures are taken from Office of Religious Teaching, an institution working under the Ministry of National Education, http://dogm.meb.gov.tr/.

that their educational background, i.e. graduating from secular schools, limited their upward mobility within the party organization.



Graph 1 % enrolled in İHLs among 15-19 Age Group

These schools as well as other public religious practices and rituals can be defined as a part of the voluntary associations that are a necessary part of a functional democracy. However, Kalaycıoğlu indicates that "Participation in the activities of religious communities, theological seminaries, lectures, debates and the like would increase with higher levels of religiosity. However, such participation in religious associations and their activities may not automatically constitute a civic and individual voluntary act, per se," (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010: 5). In other words, these networks facilitate in-group solidarity and interaction with the clients over time. Although other parties also have informal networks and neighborhood organizations, they are not as efficient or wide spread as those established by the AKP's predecessor, the FP.

After its establishment, the AKP was able to use these networks to reach out to different voter groups. In fact, findings from my fieldwork indicate that not just the swing voters but also core constituents still benefit from goods and services distributed by the Party. As the historical context also underlines, the AKP has a relative advantage in using these strategies. During its 12 years incumbency, there were numerous articles and opinion pieces in the media on the prevalence of AKP's role in clientelistic redistribution. However, there is not enough academic research on this issue as well as on clientelism's impact on the Turkish voter. Therefore, de-

scribing the current clientelistic efforts as well as its impact on political attitudes is an important step in understanding the role of clientelism in Turkish politics.

The AKP's Clientelistic Efforts and Its Impact on Voters

In order to collect the empirical data on this topic, I used both quantitative and qualitative measures. An important source of data for this research was a representative survey conducted in February 2014.[12] An additional source is the online polling which included detailed experimental and open-ended questions on clientelism.[13] Also, additional research was conducted on local party officials in selected districts from İstanbul. Based on these different data sources, this empirical part intends to triangulate and suggest a causal relationship between clientelism and attitudinal change.

Studying clientelism has an important risk. Clients may tend to conceal their behavior because relationships with political parties based on personal exchange may have a negative connotation. Social desirability bias is a drawback of empirical studies on clientelism. This finding from previous studies[14] is in fact corroborated by the experimental online survey used in this paper. When asked whether the respondent took any gifts, services or material benefits before the 30 March 2014 local elections or 2014 Presidential elections, only 3.1% of the control group confirmed that they received a clientelistic benefit. However, the treatment group was subject to a priming example in which clientelism was normalized by defining it

12 This survey was conducted with 1666 respondents randomly selected to represent Turkish voters. In order to conduct experimental questions, respondents were randomly assigned to different questionnaires. Various t-tests on demographic variables indicate that there are no differences between randomly assigned respondent groups.

13 This survey started in May 2014. It is an online survey among Facebook users in Turkey. As of early September 2014, there were 440 completed responses. Although it is not repreentative of Turkey or Facebook users, vote choices of respondents were very close to the March 30, 2014 local elections as well as August 10, 2014 presidential elections.

14 Two studies on this topic are illuminating: Gonzalez-Ocantos and others indicate that social desirability bias is an important setback of observational studies. See Gonzalez-Ocantos, E., Kiewiet, C., Melendez, C., Osorio, J. and Nickerson, D. (2012).Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua, American Journal of Political Science 56(1): 202–217. Similarly, Gallego and Wantchekon use experiments to measure the social desirability effect. See, Gallego, J., & Wantchekon, L. (2012). Experiments on clientelism and vote-buying. Research in Experimental Economics, 15, 177-212.

as just another method to link political parties to the voters. Among the treatment group, 8% affirmed that they received such benefits. This indicates that empirical studies of clientelism need to calibrate their data collection procedures accordingly and take notice of the social desirability bias.

An important part of the relationship between clients and parties is about types of clientelistic interaction that would have an impact on voters. Clientelistic help can occur through direct cash transfers, petty goods or different types of services that require a long term relationship to understand the needs of clients. In order to research this topic, I devised an experimental question that I used in the representative survey conducted before the 2014 local elections. In this question, I tapped into the possible impact of different clientelistic goods. In order to measure this, I conducted a vignette experiment in which respondents were randomly assigned to one of the four different vignette stories. Then, they were asked to imagine a hypothetical situation in which a candidate running for the local office provided much needed help during a personal financial crisis. The nature and amount of this help changed across four treatment groups. In addition, I also controlled for the respondent's current socioeconomic situation by giving the vignette story in a way that the amount provided by the candidate referred to a monthly or a 6-month period income. Therefore, the clientelistic amount was relative to the income of the respondent. Graph 2 summarizes these different vignette stories and the respondents' answer. [15]

As the table shows, voters are more likely to accept socially meaningful help such as providing financial assistance during a surgery. A logistic regression indicates that voters are 80% more likely to accept voting for the patron when they are offered a high amount of help (6 months of income or a surgery). In addition, they are also 29% more likely when this assistance is socially meaningful (food assistance or a surgery) instead of direct cash transfers. Both effects are statistically significant. Likelihood of voting in these four different scenarios is given in Table 1.

15 62 individuals (3% of the sample) didn't have an answer to this question. In all of the analyses below, Don't know category was treated as missing. A similar vignette experiment is also being conducted in the online survey with more scenarios. Even if the early results corroborate findings in this paper, current number of participants (272) is not enough to make meaningful inferences.



Graph 2 Vignette Experiment on Attitudes Towards Clientelism (% of respondents)

Tab. 1 Predicted Likelihoods of Voting for the Candidate in Different Scenarios

Logistic Regression Results	Cash	Socially meaningful
Monthly Income (Montly Food Supply)	0.130	0.213
6 Months of Income (Expenses for a surgery)	0.163	0.259

These figures indicate that socially meaningful clientelistic relationships are categorically more effective in mobilizing voters. In such cases, voters trust brokers in fulfilling their different needs whether it's a surgery or food expenses. However, these meaningful interactions necessitate a period of time for brokers and patrons to monitor voters so that they can understand their clients' needs. In other words, parties need to establish rapport for potential clientelistic exchanges. This cannot happen in a single interaction. In this respect, long-term clientelism is a necessary condition for more effective persuasive processes.

Given the social desirability bias, asking voters directly about their clientelistic relationships is not a realistic strategy as mentioned above. Therefore, I followed a different path and tried to identify clients by asking two questions. One question is on whether voters contacted party officials in their neighborhood, district or province and if so, whether these local officials fulfilled the respondent's demands. An additional question asked whether any party activists visited the voter in the past election campaign period. Results indicate that 8% of the voters applied to

party officials to solve a problem and 5% indicated that these officials solved their problem. In addition, 9% indicated that a party visited the voter in the past election campaign period. Considering the overlap between the two groups, 12% in total indicated that they experienced some sort of clientelistic interaction in the past year. In Table 2, vote choices of these clients in 2011 general elections and 2014 general elections are given.

Tab. 2 Vote Choice of the Clients

	Reported Vote Choice in 2011 General Elections (%)	Vote Intention in 2014 Local Elections (%)
AKP	56.97	42.11
CHP	14.55	14.29
MHP	15.15	19.55
SP	2.42	1.5
Independent	0	0.75
Other Parties	10.3	12.78
Invalid-Blank (Undecided in 2014)	0.61	9.02

Similarly, 83% of the voters indicated that they currently support a party. Out of the clients among these party supporters, which make up 12.4% of total supporters, the majority (52%) indicated that they support the AKP. These findings corroborate Kitschelt's findings and indicate that the AKP dominates the clientelistic scene. This is not surprising given the Party's affinity to Islamists which form the majority of the voters in Turkey. Additionally, the AKP seems to benefit from its incumbency. Except from local problems that can be dealt with municipalities of other political parties, the party has the sole authority to solve personal problems.

Most of the personal interaction between the AKP and its clients were already based on another type of relationship prior to clientelistic interaction. For instance, half of those who were visited by Party officials for the first time indicate that these officials were their neighbors, friends or relatives. In this respect, AKP uses already existing personal ties to gain a foothold in the clientelistic scene. Additionally, the AKP's personal visits are more frequent than other parties. This also implies that the Party establishes long-term relationship with the clients. Graph 3 compares frequency of visits by three largest parties in Turkey. Because of the lack of enough data, the Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP),* the fourth

largest party in the parliament were not a part of this analysis. Although all three parties mostly visit voters during election campaign periods, the AKP also visits these voters in other periods as well.

In order to understand whether these visits have an impact on the ideological preferences of the client, I conducted a statistical analysis in which I try to explain the ideological positioning of the voters on a 10-point scale.



Graph 3 Frequency of Clientelistic Visits by the Three Largest Political Parties

I control for some important alternative explanations such as parents' party support, income level, religiosity and ethnic background which can influence ideological positioning in the Turkish political cleavage structure. After controlling for these variables, clientelism still has a substantive impact in the expected direction and this impact is statistically significant. A clientelistic benefit from the AKP shifts a client one full point to right in the 10-point scale. Therefore, compared to those who do not receive any benefits, clients identify more with the right wing ideologies, closer to the AKP's party position. After grouping clients across visit frequencies, I conducted the same analyses. Keeping every other control variable at their means, the more AKP visits its clients, the closer voters are to the Party. This relationship is not statistically significant, most probably because of the limits on the number of observations. However the direction of clientelism's impact on ideological persuasion is as expected by the theoretical implications. Conducting similar analyses among clients of the two other largest parties, the CHP and the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP*) indicates that frequency of visits also increase party-voter ideological convergence. However, substantively this is not as influential as the AKP's persuasive efforts. This is also not unexpected since AKP dominates

the clientelistic scene through informal networks and relatively cheaper costs of service and good provision given its incumbency advantage.

Conclusion

Impacts of clientelism in the long term can be very costly. However, parties may use such strategies especially when they take over a powerful party organization from their predecessor political movements or parties. In addition, constituents may expect such linkages to continue given the sunk costs of clientelism. The Turkish case is a suitable example of such continuity. The AKP's clientelistic linkages are well established, dating back to the 1990s and the Party does not find it hard to redistribute benefits.

The AKP also has a crucial comparative advantage over other parties. First of all, the Turkish party system evolved into a predominant type in the last decade. Although there is electoral competition in the country, the AKP has been forming single party governments for the last 12 years. During its tenure, the party removed most of the opposition from democratic checks and balances mechanisms. In bureaucracy and judiciary, those who could oppose the party's personalistic redistribution scheme were purged. This majoritarian understanding of democracy helps the party in promoting clientelism.

Additionally, the AKP benefits from its Islamist ideology. Most of the Turkish voters identify themselves as religious and conservative.[16] In this respect, the majority of the voters are religiously closer to the AKP rather than other more secular parties. However, the Islamist ideology is not enough to explain the AKP's dominant position. For instance, the Party lost a lot of support in 2009 local elections when the global economic crisis affected the pocketbook economic evaluations of voters. Therefore, economic incentives and the fact that the Party established an amicable, personalistic relationship with the voters are important determinants of the AKP's place in Turkish politics.

Another important point relates to the Turkish Islamism's success in establishing grassroots organizations. By using these networks, Islamists were able to develop their linkages with the voters even during periods when they were not in power. AKP combined these informal clientelistic networks with the utmost political authority. The result was the party's dominating existence both in elections and the

16 For a detailed analysis of conservatism and Islamism in Turkey, see Çarkoğlu, A., & Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2009). The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey. Palgrave Macmillan.

clientelistic framework in Turkey. If the corruption accusations in early 2014 have a grain of truth, then it can give us a hint about whether the AKP uses public tenders and bids for supporting pro-government business. Further research is necessary to understand the role of private businesses. Most of the local public services are subcontracted to private companies. In this respect, they may also be a part of the clientelistic structure through discretionary employment procedures with criteria such as party support and vote choice. This would create a vicious circle in which government would give tenders to pro-government corporations, which in return employ party supporters.

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Turkey's New Constitution-making Attempt and the Participation of Minority Organisations during the Pubic Consultation Process

Elif Gözler

In terms of its content and preparation process, the 1982 Constitution has been regarded as an obstacle to building a genuine democratic order. Its nationalist character also reinforced the status of citizenship as a national identity through articles related to language, education and cultural rights. Thus, the 1982 constitution helped to maintain the nationalisation of citizenship, which was employed as a state policy since the establishment of the Republic.

Naturally, ethnic, religious and linguistic communities were mostly affected by nationalist policies. The equal citizenship problems in Turkey arise from discriminatory policies and practices which originated from the nation-state perspective. Defining citizenship through ethnic terms in the constitutions has been one of the symbol indicators of the problems which is experienced by a minority citizens regarding their right to equal citizenship. Although the constitution declares everyone as equal, citizenship practices operated as an obstacle in enjoying the equal rights properly. In this respect, the new constitution is considered a solution to the equal citizenship problems of minority citizens.

The debates on the urgency of a new constitution reached its peak prior to the elections held on 12 June, 2011 and the new parliament agreed on establishing a Constitutional Commission in order to start the new constitutional process based on participatory models. Civil society organisations representing the various segments of society mobilised and participated in the process to a large extent. Ethnic and religious communities also showed a great interest to the new constitution- making process in an unprecedented scale because for the first time in Turkey's history they were officially invited by the state to contribute to an important decision-making process.

This study focuses on the preparations of the minority communities during the public consultation process organised for the new constitution. Overall, the constitution-making process for ethnic and religious communities can be evaluated in

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terms of content, participation methods, and meaning. The content of their demands and proposals have been declared at various platforms and can be accessed easily. In this respect, this issue will be out of the limits of this study. However, this issue is still worth analysis in terms of the conflict between their demands and the "red lines" of the parties. Each participating ethnic and religious community prepared a proposal report to be presented in the hearing sessions. The preparation method of these reports says a lot about the internal democracies and the level of representation of the participant organisation. In this respect, the method of participation and whether they used those methods effectively or not will be discussed in context with the proposal reports of each community.

The primary source of this study is the semi-structured interviews conducted with the groups which prepared reports and were represented in the hearing sessions. The reports written by these groups also compose the main resources in terms of their form and content. The list of the civil society initiatives which were interviewed are as follows: The Federation of Causassian Associations, Mor Gabriel Monastery, The Church of Latin Catholics, Association of Romas, Association of Protestant Churches, Association of Greek Orthodox Foundations, The Federation of Alevi Foundations, The Platform for Equal Citizenship for the New Constitution (Armenian Community of Turkey), Jewish Community of Turkey.

The following section aims to make a brief theoretical introduction to the notion of citizen participation during the constitution-making processes. Then, the meaning of the process for the minority participants will be explained. Finally, channels of participation preferred by those groups will be classified.

Citizenship, Participation and the Modes of Constitution Making

Considering citizenship and its relationship with participation, the field of citizenship becomes a space for democratic discussion and deliberation which directly creates an automatic inclusion of the participant citizens. According to Rousseau, legitimate authority and freedom can only exist where citizens exercise sovereignty through participating directly in making their own laws. Then, participation becomes a more powerful element of politics than "consent" for legitimising obligations and rights. Judging and deliberating on political affairs will differentiate citizens from private individual as the members of the public (Rousseau, 1762).

Similarly, as argued by Wiener, citizenship can be defined as the relationship between a polity and citizen. In the widest sense, this interaction can be identified

through the daily practices of citizen participation in the polity. In this respect, citizenship gains a meaning through belonging to a community. This relationship between the citizen and the nation state has prepared modern history with a basic citizenship model. Citizen, the polity and the interaction of these two must be considered together as the "constitutive elements of citizenship" (Wiener, 1998: 22).

Citizenship as the basic structure of the political community is regulated by the constitutions. In this sense, people's impact in shaping the political institutions should be considered as an important citizenship practice. This practice also contains an inevitable interaction between the state and the citizens. In this context, constitutions can be considered as the entities that contain a certain level of bargaining within. Its evolution throughout time had represented the ideas of both aristocratic and popular elements. It reflects a bargaining process between the governments' desires to extend its political or economic realm, and citizens' demands to live securely and enjoy basic rights. This form of constitutions can be called "mixed constitution" which reflects the combination of "top down" rule and "bottom up" consent (Ferejohn et al., 2001: 20). This order generated different models of constitution-making evolving over time.

Focusing on constitution-making models, Selassie (2002: 5) identifies three main approaches: the Philadelphia model, the Westminster (Parliamentary) model and finally, the Constitutional Commission model which unites the first two models. The Constitutional Commission model enabled the development of participative constitution making methods through the decline of the nation-state and the emergence of the new identities. The perceptions of sovereignty and citizenship are directly related to the concepts of the nation-state. In this sense, these concepts have been called into question when the nation state went through a crisis. This transformation has been influential at all levels of the public and political sphere as these concepts are the instruments of building political integration, stability, internal peace and ensuring the fundamental rights. Therefore, the crisis that occurred in the nation-state conception also transformed the state-centred policies and led to a sharp contradiction between sovereignty and citizenship and human rights and constitutionalism (Ferrajoli, 1996: 151). The decline and transformation of the nation-state system has affected the constitution as a foundational state institution. This transformation includes a shift of power from the state to the non-state actors which means a radical evolution in the position of the constitution compared to the foundation of constitutional nation-states in the eighteenth century (Grimm, 2005: 447). This shift not only transformed the actors involved in the constitution-making process but also changed the methods used in these processes. As noted by Andrew Arato (2000: 250), in today's world, it is impossible to imagine a constitution-making process which excludes the public discussion sessions. Opening

the process to the public discussions will enable the main actors to socialise and allow the underrepresented groups to express their views.

Channels of Participation and Inclusion of Minorities

Today, researchers and policy makers focus on the process of constitution-making rather than the actual content because the quality of constitution-making period is the indicator of the political culture of the country as well as the content of the final product (Moehler, 2008: 28). Accordingly, constitution-making periods can give a basic idea about the extent of the democracy in a particular country. Especially in multi-cultural societies, the constitution-making periods become a unique moment in a country's history as an opportunity to reach a consensus, and solve significant problems. In order to accomplish these ideals, constitution-makers must open up the whole process and consider the citizens' views as a serious reference point in making the decisions. In this sense, citizens from different ethnic and religious communities must be involved with a sense of responsibility for the new constitution-making process. Many experiences have indicated that when the particular actors are excluded from the decision making processes, political stability becomes more likely to collapse. Thus, the exclusion of key actors can undermine such a crucial moment (Brandt et al., 2011: 4, 108).

In a political platform, which is dominated by a particular group, it is likely that the decision-making process will reflect the perspectives and priorities of this group. On the other hand, inclusion of different groups can contribute significantly to the nature of the political decision making process. Especially if minorities will be affected by the result of a particular policy, the contribution of minorities to the decision making process becomes crucial for the sake of a democratic society. It is the minorities who can address their problems and propose possible solutions best. In this sense, minorities should participate effectively and be represented in decision making periods which will affect their status, such as drafting minority rights provisions or making a new constitution (Verstichel, 2009: 60, 66). Political participation of minorities is a crucial element for the prevention of discrimination based on religion, race, language and ethnicity. In this sense, the right to political participation was considered embedded in the minority rights provisions. Minority participation based on the equality principle, thus, helps to improve the mechanisms against assimilation and creates the opportunity to protect their identities. In this sense, basic electoral representation may remain inadequate in order to include minority groups in decision making processes. Guaranteeing the minor-

ity voice in public affairs and protecting their rights can only be realised through developing special legal, political and institutional mechanisms (Machnyikova and Hollo, 2010: 97).

During the decision making procedures, various consultative methods are adopted in order to enhance the minority participation. Weller (2010: 483- 486) classified four categories of minority consultative mechanisms: 1) co-decision mechanisms, 2) consultation mechanisms, 3) coordination mechanisms, 4) minority self-governance mechanisms. *Consultation mechanisms,* which fits into the Turkish case, can occur in different forms. Minority consultative councils, which are composed of different minority NGOs, can organise such consultation mechanisms. These organisations provide assistance as an umbrella institution and represent the demands and expectations from different levels of their communities. They also mobilise their communities and act as a discussion platform for the articulation of their interests.

The public consultation period for the last constitution-making attempt in Turkey used similar mechanisms as mentioned above in terms of minority representation. During the public consultation period, almost all ethnic and religious based minority NGOs were organised through discussion forums, meetings and panels to express their demands and expectations from the new constitution. While some NGOs applied individually to present their interests for the Constitutional Commission, other NGOs preferred to constitute an umbrella organisation to articulate their views as in the second category.

Participation of minorities is generally considered as a communal action rather than an individual involvement. In this sense, minority foundations and associations stand as the crucial elements of the consultation processes as it happened in Turkey. The ways of participation used by minority NGOs during the public consultation process are classified below along with brief information about the last constitution-making attempt of Turkey.

Public Consultation for the New Constitution of Turkey and Participation of Minorities Agenda: New Constitution

The 1982 constitution has been amended many times during the past thirty years. The latest amendments were made through the constitutional reform packages in 2001 and 2004 on the way to the European Union accession process. The most recent significant change in the current constitution is the 2010 package of constitutional amendments which was ratified by a referendum and caused great polarisation in Turkey's political agenda. These changes were also insufficient in meeting the needs

of different ethnic and religious identities because the undemocratic spirit of the constitution remained unaddressed.

The thought of drafting a new constitution has always been on Turkey's political and social agenda since the 1982 Constitution came into power with a coup d'état. There has been widespread consensus on which temporary changes cannot give a genuine democratic spirit to the constitution because of the undemocratic drafting process was conducted from an authoritarian perspective. None of Turkey's past constitution-making experience was based on the demands and the expectations of different social groups. In this respect, today, it is impossible to draft a new constitution which excludes the participatory methods from its making process. Therefore, following the emphasis over the contribution of civil society for the new constitution, various ethnic and religious community organisations considered the making of a new constitution as an answer for their equal citizenship demands.

Ongoing debates about the need for a new constitution have taken a new dimension prior to the elections on 12th of June 2011. All the major parties mentioned the urgency for a new constitution in their election programmes. In this sense, the four parties, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican People's Party (CHP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) reached a consensus on the making of a new constitution following the elections. Accordingly, these four parties agreed to establish a "Constitutional Reconciliation Commission" through sending three of their members to the board. The Commission was established as an *ad hoc* Commission which differed from the commissions which are based on the internal regulations of the parliament. The Constitutional Commission held its first meeting on the 19th of October 2011 and defined its working principles which were based on participatory methods. Thus, the new constitution-making process was officially started with this meeting.

Unfortunately, the Commission was dissolved without reaching its final goal after almost twenty months. The main reason for the dissolution was the lack of consensus and the ideological separation between the four parties of the Commission. However, the public consultation process remains a unique moment in Turkey's democratisation process which needs to be examined seriously along with its outcomes.

The public consultation period for the new constitution started at the end of October 2001 and finished in April 2012. During the six months period of the public consultation process, citizens, institutions and NGOs belonging to different parts of society declared their views via public meetings, community reports and online participation. The Commission's main activity during the public consultation process was the hearing sessions. Hearing sessions were conducted by three sub-commissions of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission in Parliament.

Sub-commissions were constituted of experts and three members from each political party for hearing different organisations such as constitutional institutions, political parties, trade bodies, unions and civil society organisations, including the organisations representing ethnic and religious communities living in Turkey.

In addition to the hearing sessions, an internet site was established in order to collect a broad range of individual views. This website was also used to inform the public about the steps of the process.

From the beginning until the end of the April 2012, 66,015 people logged their views on this web- site. Also, 1,872 people and institutions communicated their opinions via the e-mail address of the Constitutional Commission. Finally, 1,050 people sent letters via the national postal service.

Another source of obtaining data was discussion groups. This process was mainly carried out by an institution called TEPAV (Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey) with the coordination of the Commission. In order to reach a significant number of participants, TEPAV sent mails to thousands of people and arranged meetings with the ones who returned to their mails. The participants were mostly from different social classes, educational backgrounds, genders and ideologies. TEPAV managed to arrange twelve meetings in different cities of Turkey and reached approximately 5,500 people in total.[1]

The representatives of ethnic and religious communities generally preferred to prepare a proposal report and present it in the hearing sessions. These groups regarded the constitutional process as an opportunity to explain their demands on a legitimate platform. Many groups contributed to the process via community foundations, religious associations and federations. When all the reports written by those institutions were examined, a classification was composed in terms of the forms of participation. Some common points were specified as below considering all the groups participated in the process. However, before that, explaining the meaning of the process for those groups will briefly help us to understand the motivation behind their preparations.

The Meaning of the Process

Different groups attributed different meanings to the constitution-making process. The most notable point expressed by the Armenian and Greek Orthodox communities was their demand to be accepted free from Patriarchate. In the eyes of state,

1 http://www.tepav.org.tr/tr/calismalarimiz/s/360

these communities are described as religious communities within the influence of Ottoman Millet tradition. This perception prevents minority citizens from having any identity apart from a religious identity. In this respect, these communities see the constitution making process as a chance to express themselves free from religious bonds (*sivilleşme*) on the basis of equal citizenship perception. Therefore, they made a special emphasis on equal citizenship rights in their reports.

Almost all groups regarded the process and the parliament meetings as a legitimate platform to express their demands and problems. Normally, it is not very common for ethnic and religious groups to have the opportunity to make contact with the state. In this sense, the meetings and the reports were important mediums for them to indicate their problems. For some groups such as Catholics and Protestants, the process was a unique experience because it was their first official contact with the state. In this respect, they were quite pleased to have such opportunity. They appreciated the feeling of being taken into consideration, yet were suspicious about the continuation of the process.

It seems that most concerned parties and constituents were hopeful at the outset of this initiative. They saw the constitution as a solution for their basic problems. However, as continuation of the process become hopeless because of the conflict between commission members, they lost their faith to the making of the new constitution. Nevertheless, all participants regarded the public consultation process as an important action which created an awareness of civic culture among citizens.

The Forms of Participation and the Preparation of the Community Reports

The participation of the ethnic and religious communities, and the meaning they attributed to the constitutional process as their motivations behind their preparations give some important clues about the whole process. The process had different meanings for minority participants in terms of achieving equal citizenship. In this sense, their preparations were a way to express themselves and their demands.

Following the calls of the Constitutional Commission for the contribution of civil society, ethnic and religious communities started their own preparations to participate in the public consultation process. As it was observed from the interviews, the Constitutional Commission only invited religious communities and official minorities directly to the hearing sessions. The only religious community which was not invited directly was the Protestants. Also, Kurds and Circassians were not directly invited by the Commission. In this sense, these communities were invited

upon their requests to the Constitutional Commission. This can be explained by the state's perception of minorities on the grounds of religion. The majority of the community reports were written in broad terms and contained basic values. They were rarely written as article proposals.

Many organisations preferred to prepare their reports to express their demands from the new constitution. The preparation methods of these reports were generally shaped by the community's population size and the degree of organising capacity. Large communities which have a high and dense population managed to hold community meetings in different locations. Smaller communities preferred to prepare their reports through the initiatives of the community leaders and rarely organised communal discussions. An important point about the scope of participation is the representation of the communities. All the representative institutions that prepared reports and gave presentations in the hearing sessions described problem areas and the expectations of their communities. Although these institutions cannot represent every individual in their communities, a general view can be obtained from their preparations to make an overall assessment.

Depending on the community's population size and the organisational strength, more than one report was written for a community by different representative institutions. In this sense, almost all the reports prepared by ethnic and religious communities have been examined within the scope of this paper. An interesting point observed during the consultation process is the low level of participation of Kurdish-based civil society organisations except for a couple of pro-Kurdish parties. The reason behind this choice can be explained through the presence of the BDP in the Commission.

In the following section, the preparation methods of the community reports will be explained based on the interviews conducted with participant community organisations. For the first time in Turkey's political history it seems that ethnic and religious communities found the chance to express their views officially about a vital document like a constitution. The public consultation process symbolised a meaningful step for ethnic and religious communities because they found the opportunity to voice their views on their citizenship rights. Therefore, it is important to examine their preparations in order to understand their perspectives about the public consultation process itself.

Arranging Meetings among the Members of Community

This form of participation was generally preferred by relatively large and more organised communities such as the Armenians and the Circassians. Those groups arranged meetings among their members and prepared their reports based on those meetings. The forms of arranging meetings also varied from community to community. While Armenians arranged meetings for the individuals of their society, Circassians preferred meetings for the member associations. The exception to this was the Foundation of Mor Gabriel Monastery. Despite their small population, they tried to organise collectively as they reside around Mardin and Midyat.

Armenian Society – "Suggestions and Views of the Armenian Society for a New Constitution"

The Constitutional Commission invited the Armenian Patriarchate to hear their views about the process. The Armenian Patriarchate was directly invited yet the preparation process was conducted by a civilian initiative. Issues related to constitutional change were organised as a civil initiative under the name of "The Platform of Equal Citizenship for the New Constitution". Following the call of the Commission, they organised and called journalists, lawyers, academics and professionals to work in coordination. Then, they advertised their meetings in newspapers and called the Armenian community to participate in the public meetings. These meetings took place in five different locations in Istanbul. The meetings were moderated by an academic, a journalist or a public figure. Following an opening talk, people expressed their own views and questions about the process. Consequently, public views collected from these meetings were organised and classified by 25 experts. Finally, they composed the report in the form of basic values and demands. They only had problems with Patriarchate on the form of report yet overcame this problem.

Federation of Caucasian Associations- "What Kind of a Constitution do the Circassians Want?"

The Federation of Caucasian Associations is the most widespread institution established by the Circassians living in Turkey. Similar to the Armenians, the Circassians were aware of the problems originating from the current constitution. Therefore, The Federation of Caucasian Associations took the lead to represent the Circassians in the process. There was also a relatively small Circassian group that participated in the process. Following a series of meetings, the federation completed the report. They introduced this report to the community through meetings and brochures. Overall, the Federation suggested that the report should be prepared by widest

participation. Some members were suspicious about the content of the demands because those demands were also new for some of them. In this sense, representatives tried to explain the foundations of their demands and reached a consensus.

The Foundation of Mor Gabriel Monastery- "The Demands of the Assyrians Needed to be Taken into Consideration for the Preparations of the New Constitution"

Mor Gabriel Monastery was invited directly by the Commission for the representation of the Assyrian community of Turkey. They prepared their report in cooperation with the community lawyers and academics. They also consulted Assyrians of Istanbul as they participated in the joint report of the official minorities. They held several local meetings and asked their diaspora to send their views online. They detailed their demands in a form of concepts. They absolutely had no conflict over the report. They were very much supported by everyone because of this important and bold step.

Internal Discussions among the Interested Members

Unlike the reports prepared through the meetings held among the individuals of a particular community, some groups did not need to extend this consultation to all of their members and preferred to prepare their reports on the basis of existing problems. This was generally due to small population size and loose organisation. Jews and Protestants used this form in the preparation of their reports

The Jewish Community of Turkey- "Suggestions for the New Constitutions"

The Jewish Society did not consider meetings necessary to collect the views of their community. In this context, the Jewish community prepared a report under the consultation of the Rabbinate, the association executives and the community lawyers. The Jewish community was directly invited. They participated in the joint reports and also prepared their own report. The Turkish Jewish Community and Rabbinate cooperated with the community lawyer and prepared their report in the form of article proposals and concepts. The report was written in a consensual way and welcomed by everyone.

The Association of the Protestant Churches – "The Proposals of the Protestant Churches"

The Association of Protestant Churches unites the majority of the Protestants living in Turkey. This relatively new institution prepared a report reflecting their ongoing problems. The preparation method of this report was similar to the Jewish community's with the only exception of a religious head. They were invited upon their request following the guidance of a CHP member, Rıza Turmen. They used previous annual reports as a reference for their reports. They organised meetings with other churches and church leaders. They asked for the help of their community lawyers and academics. Their report was translated into English and attracted the interest of the international community. They did not have any disagreements and the report was welcomed and supported by the member churches.

Cooperation with the Other Ethnic or Religious Organisations

Official minorities of Turkey prepared a joint report about their expectations from the new constitution. Also, Kurdish-based civil society organisations and political parties prepared a joint report under the name of "Democratic Kurdish Opposition".

The Views and Suggestions of the Religious Minority Representatives for a New Constitution

Armenians, Greek Orthodox and Jews are deemed to be the official minorities in Turkey. In this sense, they saw the necessity of declaring their common problems in the same text as they are the subjects of the minority policies. Although the Armenians and Jews had their own reports, they also contributed to the joint report following the several meetings held with Rabbinate, Greek and Armenian Patriarchates. Official minorities were directly invited by the Commission. The Greek Orthodox community participated in the joint report of the official minorities and did not prepare a separate report. They held several meetings with representatives of the Armenian, Assyrian and Jewish communities. Religious leaders, lawyers and academics participated in the meetings. General demands and expectations were emphasised in the form of concepts and sometimes article proposals. They only had conflict over the definition of citizenship.

Democratic Kurdish Opposition

Kurdish based organisations such as, Peace and Democracy Party, Rights and Freedoms Party, Participatory Democracy Party, Kurdish National Union Movement, Freedom and Socialism Party, Congress of Democratic Society, Kurdish Revolutionary Democrats' Movement prepared a report and declared their unity for the democratic rights of Kurds in the drafting of the new constitution.

Through the Initiative of the Community Leaders

Due to the smaller size of certain communities and the lack of organization, some of the reports were prepared by the efforts of the association's leaders. The proposals of The Church of Latin Catholics and the Romas fell into this category.

The Church of Latin Catholics – Episcopal Conference of Turkey

The Church of Latin Catholics, as a relatively small community, prepared a limited report in cooperation with the Vatican Embassy. They were also directly invited by the Commission. Their report was written by church's spokesperson and a religious head. They expressed their demands in a very brief and simple way.

İzmir Roma Association for Cooperation and Solidarity

Following the invitation of the Constitutional Commission, the head of İzmir Roma Association for Cooperation and Solidarity prepared a report by his own efforts and delivered a presentation in the hearing sessions of the Constitutional Commission. They drew on the materials used during the "Roma Opening". They also used the reports prepared for the EU accession process. The community report was written by a member who has experience in the matter. He also consulted two other Roma associations. The report is reflected the different views of the Roma community. They did not encounter any problem with the members about the content of the report.

Cooperation with the Academic and Legal Professionals

Generally, all groups prepared their reports through grassroots meetings or institutional discussions. However, a group of Alevis conducted this preparation in cooperation with an academic project. In this sense, the work of The Federation of

Alevi Associations represented a different form of participation. Also, the Kurdish based Participatory Democracy Party prepared a report through the cooperation of academics, bar associations and civil society organisations.

The Federation of Alevi Associations- Religious Groups in Turkey: A New Framework for the Problems and Demands

This report was written by academics as part of a project in cooperation with the Federation of Alevi Associations. Although, this report was prepared through the initiative of an Alevi Association, it reflected the common problems of all the religious groups living in Turkey. The Federation of Alevi Associations was the umbrella organisation representing Alevis in the participation process. Their preparations had started in the "Alevi Opening" before the new constitution-making process. Their report was distinct from others as it covered the problems of all religious communities, not just the Alevis'. In the preparation process, they met and consulted the representatives of other religious communities. The report also included a research project written by academics. The report contained the demands and expectations of religious groups. It was also translated into English. As a distinctive method, the Alevi community also organised street meetings to express their demands for the new constitution. Some of the members disagreed on the content of particular demands, yet they reached a consensus at the end.

The Suggestions of Participatory Democracy Party for the New Constitution

The Participatory Democracy Party preferred to convene local public meetings with academics, legal associations and other civil society organisations. The outcomes of these meetings were used to shape their report which was presented in the hearing sessions.

Conclusion

The public consultation process for the new constitution finished in April 2012. However, following 20 months of the drafting process, the Commission could not reach an agreement and decided to dissolve itself. None of the 60 agreed articles sufficiently addressed the concerns the minority communities had articulated in the preparation process. Therefore, ideological differences or "red lines" of the political parties have been dominant in determining the vital principles of the new

constitution instead of the communities' expectations and demands on critical issues related to equal citizenship rights.

The issues regarding the problems of the ethnic and religious communities were the most controversial ones in the drafting process. As a matter of fact, these issues overlapped the "red lines" of the parties and eventually halted the process. When examining the proceedings of the drafting process, the demands and the problems of the ethnic and religious communities found very limited place in the discussions of the parties. In this respect, the traditional attitude of the state towards ethnic and religious communities was reproduced in the drafting process. Proposing a constitutional solution for these demands was the only way to make the new constitution to be truly "new". However, such an important process was greatly compromised due the political contention between parties.

The public consultation process was a unique moment for Turkey's democratisation. It contributed a lot to the culture of deliberation and civil society. It also promoted awareness among the minority communities who found the chance to realise their citizenship through participating in building a state structure. Although the future of the new constitution seems vague now, the data collected during the process is still a valuable source for further attempts.

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AKP's Implementation of a Risk Management Project of the World Bank

A Risk Management Project of the World Bank: Creating Entrepreneurial or Charity-Dependent Poor People?

Meltem Yılmaz Şener

Introduction

Development has, for a long time, been a major issue in the programs of key political actors such as governments, international institutions (IMF, World Bank, UN) and NGOs. Among these actors, especially the World Bank has emerged as a major authority, 'a chief arbiter' due to the development projects it applies all over the world and due to its position as a 'global knowledge bank', a source of ideas in the area of development (Goldman, 2005). From its establishment in 1944 during a conference in Bretton Woods, and with the participation of 44 government representatives, the World Bank has been active for more than sixty years as one of the world's largest sources of loans – especially for the Third World countries. In 2013, the World Bank provided $52.6 billion for projects in developing countries and was involved in a total of more than 1,800 projects worldwide[1].

Many scholars portray the World Bank, as well as the IMF and the World Trade Organization, as imposing neoliberal economic policies on countries all over the world (see for instance Peet, 2003). For some of these critics, although the World Bank is a defender of neoliberalism, still it is also a progressive development institution, which is concerned with local participation and needs (Boas & McNeill, 2003: 47). Pincus and Winters (2002) critique the Bank's involvement in social issues and argue that it should return to its original task of providing loans for economic development but become more decentralized and pluralistic. Cammack (2004) argues that one common issue in such evaluations is the idea that the Bank needs reforming so that it can become more democratic and pluralistic. However,

1 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20103853~menuPK:8336850~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html (accessed on September 30, 2014)

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according to Cammack, these expectations about the Bank are unrealistic because they are not in line with the logic that characterizes the activity of the Bank:

> "… a logic that is heavily disguised in its systematic representation of itself as a voice for women and the poor, a 'Knowledge Bank' seeking partnership with donors, other international organizations, non-governmental organizations and civil society, and an advocate of country ownership of anti-poverty and development strategies." (2004: 190)

Especially regarding the Bank's involvement in poverty, Cammack argues that the goal of poverty reduction is secondary to a broader goal, which is changing the social relations and the institutions in the developing world to enable proletarianization and capitalist accumulation on a global scale. He sees the Bank's approach as neoliberal in character. During 1980s and part of the 1990s, what was called the Washington Consensus was the dominant framework in development theory and policy. "Washington Consensus" referred to some neoliberal measures which were claimed to drive developing countries to economic growth, such as fiscal and monetary austerity, elimination of government subsidies, liberalization of foreign trade, privatization, deregulation, encouragement of foreign direct investment (Fine, 2001). The guiding argument was that free market economics would solve the problems of developing countries. The Consensus was especially advocated by the World Bank and the IMF, and the loans that were provided by both institutions depended on the condition of adopting policies in line with the Consensus. During the debt crisis in early 1980s, many Third World countries could not meet their debt obligations. As the banks did not have the capacity to control or regulate their debtors, the IMF and the World Bank assumed a central banking or debt manager role for the world (McMichael, 1995). Although some of the countries started to apply neoliberal measures by their own initiatives, the rise of neoliberalism in the global South was mainly enforced by the IMF and the World Bank through the structural adjustment programs imposed on the indebted countries. With the state's regulatory functions also disappearing, these programs led to enormous harm on the economic and social conditions of especially poor people in these countries, which has been a major point that has been emphasized by the critics of the IMF and the World Bank.

Civil society actors have been critical of the social consequences of the Bank's development activities and trying to formulate alternatives at local, national, and transnational levels (Rich, 1994). Especially during the second half of 1990s, the Washington Consensus has been seriously questioned, as the related policies had not proven successful in bringing economic growth or poverty reduction in developing countries. The emergent post-Washington Consensus depended on the notions of market failure and importance of institutions, such as governments, in

economic activity. By recognizing the importance of institutions, the crucial role of social factors for successful development was acknowledged. As Goldman (2005) argues, the World Bank responded to the critiques about and resistance against its activities by reinventing its neoliberal agenda to contain some social dimensions. According to the new framework, then, development emerges as a more complex social process, rather than depending solely on economic growth. Concepts like social capital, participation, and empowerment have become buzzwords for the Bank, at a time when its legitimacy was in crisis. However, as Fine emphasizes, although the new Consensus aims to broaden the agenda of development economics, it still remains within the same reductionist, neoliberal framework of the Washington Consensus (Fine, 2001).

This paper focuses on the implementation of a poverty alleviation project of the World Bank in Turkey. This project was formulated alongside the Bank's social risk management framework, which the Bank presents as a more comprehensive approach to poverty alleviation. After a discussion on how the World Bank describes social risk mitigation, I will approach it using the concept of neoliberal governmentality, arguing that this is a neoliberal framework through which the Bank attempts to create responsible, entrepreneurial poor subjects who can manage social risks on their own. I will then show what kind of consequences emerged when this framework was implemented in the case of the Social Risk Mitigation Project in Turkey, with an emphasis on how the AKP government used this project for its aim of retaining popular support. Relying on interviews with individuals who were involved in the implementation of the project in different capacities, I will show how they all talk about the emergence of a culture of poverty in Turkey during the AKP government period and the role of especially the conditional cash transfer (CCT) component of this World Bank project in this process. Lastly, I will comment on the gaps between what the Bank intends to do through a social risk management project and what happened when the framework was implemented as a project in the Turkish case.

Social Risk Management

In its 2000/2001 World Development Report, the World Bank introduced "social risk management" by claiming that it is a wider approach that considers different dimensions of poverty and it offers a more extensive program for poverty reduction (World Bank, 2000). According to a World Bank document prepared by its Social Protection Department (2003), the aim of social risk management is: to provide instruments to the poor and the vulnerable to decrease the impact of being ex-

posed to risk; to help them to change their behavior so that they can exit poverty and lower their vulnerability. According to these documents, the poor are typically exposed to diverse risks, which range from natural (such as earthquake and flooding) to manmade (such as war and inflation), from health (such as illness) to political risks (such as discrimination). The poor also have the fewest instruments to deal with these risks (such as access to government provided income support and market-based instruments like insurance). Accordingly, the poor are the most vulnerable in society as these risks have the strongest welfare consequences for them (Holzmann & Kozel, 2007). Therefore, it is claimed, they should have increased access to social risk management instruments. Lastly, it is argued that their vulnerability makes them risk averse and they become unwilling to engage in higher risk/higher return activities. If they have access to social risk management instruments, they will take more risks and they will have an opportunity to gradually move out of poverty. Hence, the claim is that the framework of social risk management provides the poor not only a 'safety net' but also a 'springboard' to move out of poverty (Holzmann & Jorgensen, 2000).

Social risk management strategies fall under three broad categories:

- Risk prevention strategies aim to reduce the probability of risks and are introduced before a risk occurs.
- Risk mitigation strategies are also employed before a risk takes place and they aim to reduce the potential risk impact if the risk occurs.
- Risk coping strategies aim to relieve the impact of the risk after it occurs (Holzmann & Jorgensen 2000, p.14-15).

Reflecting on the main actors of social risk management, Holzmann and Jorgensen state that much of the risk management can take place at the household or individual level (ibid. p.16). The emphasis in the 2000/2001 World Development Report was also on "helping poor people manage risk". This was the title of the section which explained social risk management framework. Explaining the World Bank's social risk management approach, Neuborg & Weigand also emphasize that the management of risks is not only the responsibility of public authorities, but markets and families are also important institutions in this process (Neuborg & Weigand, 2000). According to all of these accounts, the burden of risk management is mostly on the shoulders of individuals and households. The World Bank, through its social risk management framework, aims to provide the appropriate risk management tools to the individuals and families so that they can manage risks on their own.

Social Risk Management as Neoliberal Governmentality

These are descriptive studies of the World Bank's new approach and they lack a critical perspective. Although there are few articles written on the approach of 'social risk management', there are even fewer studies with a critical point of view. In contrast to scholars who consider social risk management as providing the poor 'a springboard' to move out of poverty, I approach risk management using the concept of neoliberal governmentality. The concept of governmentality is a key notion of Michel Foucault's work. He developed the concept to refer to an idea of government that is not only limited to the control by states, it includes various control techniques, varying from control of the self to the 'biopolitical' control of the populations (Foucault, 1999). For Foucault, government, in general terms, means 'the conduct of conduct' or "…a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons." (Gordon, 1991: 2). As Lemke argues, Foucault introduced governmentality to reflect on the autonomous individual's capacity for self-control and how it is linked to political rule and economic exploitation (Lemke, 2000: 4). Foucault also suggests that with neoliberalism, a new set of notions about governing have emerged. The individuals try to improve their lives through making choices, under neoliberalism. The individuals are governed through the conversion of the goals of the political, economic and social authorities into their own choices. This new configuration brings new obligations and duties to individuals (Rose, 1996).

I argue that it is possible to interpret the World Bank's risk management framework using the concept of neoliberal governmentality and to accept it as an approach that tries to produce 'responsible poor citizens' during a time when the provision of social services is transferred to the private sector and to the domestic sphere according to neoliberal principles (Clarke, 2004). Social services that are provided to the poor are now either provided in the market or are the responsibility of the individuals and families who are now projected as 'responsible subjects' competent in self-management of chronic conditions (Fraser, 2003). In this framework, instead of social insurance, we now have privatization of risk management. Insurance against conditions of unemployment, illness, aging, etc. all become private issues. Market values penetrate all institutions and social actions (Brown, 2003). In this context, poverty becomes an essential field of government and poor become subjects that will be recreated to manage themselves to get out of poverty. Governing poverty means the production of poor as subjects who are responsible for their own situation and who depend on their own resources to deal with the 'risks' that they encounter. Therefore, I argue that the World Bank seeks to reconstruct the poor

as self-dependent, entrepreneurial subjects through its social risk management framework and projects.

Although neoliberal governmentality can be a useful concept in accounting for the kinds of subjectivities the World Bank intends to produce through its projects, it may not necessarily explain the ways in which the local dynamics can also have an impact on the consequences of these projects. There is always a gap between ambitions and reality – what the Bank aims to do is not necessarily realized once the projects are implemented. The aim here is to point out that gap between ambitions of the social risk management framework and the reality experienced after its implementation as a project by focusing on the implementation of the Social Risk Mitigation Project in Turkey. Drawing on field research in the cities of Ankara and Diyarbakir, and interviews with eighty people including people from the Project Coordination Unit, General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity, World Bank Turkey Office, State Planning Institute, Turkish Treasury, Social Solidarity Foundations, universities, NGOs, and also the recipients of the project, this paper aims to reflect on to what extent the World Bank has been successful in creating the "entrepreneurial poor" by the implementation of the Social Risk Mitigation Project in Turkey.

The Social Risk Mitigation Project (SRMP) in Turkey

The Social Risk Mitigation Project (SRMP) was initiated after a serious economic crisis in Turkey in 2001. The World Bank approved a $500 million loan for Turkey for the project. The declared aims were to mitigate the impact of the crisis on the poor neighborhoods and to increase their capacity to deal with other risks in the future. The project had two main components: 1) *adjustment portion (rapid response)*: to provide immediate support to the poorest groups to decrease immediate social risks and 2) *investment portion:* to support programs for social risk mitigation, prevention, and management in the medium or long term. The project was presented as providing not only a 'safety net' but also a 'springboard' to the poorest to move out of poverty through not only decreasing but also preventing and managing the social risks.

The *adjustment portion* of the project is also known as the rapid response element. It aimed to give immediate support to the poorest, who were affected by the 2001 economic crisis. Through the adjustment portion, school attendance packs (uniforms, shoes, stationery, textbooks), pharmaceuticals and medical supplies,

food and heating support were provided to the poorest households. The *investment portion* was composed of three elements:

Institutional development: to build the capacity of state institutions which provide social services and assistance to the poor through strengthening policy research, monitoring and evaluation capacities; information technology development; staff development and training; and public information campaigns

Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs): to put into action a social assistance system which aims to help the poorest six percent of the population, with the condition of using basic health and education services for their children,

Local initiatives: to increase the income and employment opportunities of the poor through supporting the local initiatives proposed by the provinces and local communities.

As its name also suggests, the main aim of the project was to lessen the impact of the economic crisis on the poor in Turkey and to help them deal with similar situations in the future. After the crisis, there were a lot of debates in Turkey about whether there would be large-scale demonstrations because of the negative impacts of crisis and the possibility of a "social explosion". Analysts were pointing out the similarities between the crises in Turkey and Argentina, and arguing that mass protests can also occur in Turkey in a similar way with the Argentine case. Implementation of a "social risk mitigation project" as soon as possible was needed for preventing the potential social risk situations. During my interviews, both the state officials and the consultants from the World Bank talked about the urgency of the situation and how important it was to put into practice a poverty alleviation project as soon as possible after the economic crisis. The suggested social risk in this context refers more to the possibility of protests and demonstrations, and also a likely increase in criminal activities, than the risks that the poor will encounter in the form of worsening economic and social conditions after the crisis.

An initial search of both academic and also media resources about the project provided a few academic articles which were accompanied by countless news stories on project implementation. How could all these diverse programs ranging from cash support for education and health, and loans for the establishment of small enterprises, to various social service programs, be implemented under the same project? The simple technical answer to this question was that the project consisted of multiple components. However, this diversity also pointed out significant problems regarding the project. The state officials who were critical of the project repeatedly complained that activities which had nothing to do with poverty alleviation were included in the program, and the aim of using up the loan money before the project deadline was an important motivation for the inclusion of all these activities.

Although the World Bank presented the SRMP as a successful project, the reports written by the Treasury and the State Planning Institute, alongside what I heard from my interviewees from different state institutions, NGOs, scholars, and "beneficiaries" of the project, did not confirm that success story. As the major intention was to immediately put the project into implementation and to distribute money as quickly as possible because of the strict deadlines of the Bank, the result was a chaotic experience that intervened in the lives of many people all over the country without having much positive permanent impact. Local implementers and the officials in central state institutions complained about the problems caused by the standard project mentality, short-term thinking, and strict deadlines of the World Bank. Several different activities, which have nothing to do with poverty alleviation, were executed under this project mostly because of the target of using up the loan money before the deadline. Moreover, the implementation took place without first developing the institutional infrastructure of the local implementing agencies (SYDVs) and the central state institution (SYDGM), and this created enormous problems. As the project was carried out by a Project Coordination Unit (PCU), which is composed of consultants who are hired and compensated by the Bank and who work according to the World Bank's procedures and principles, this two-headed structure created tensions between the PCU and the state institution, SYDGM. Moreover, the project has been instrumentally used by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) for getting popular support, which is a subject that will be discussed in the next section.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Social Assistance as Charity

The 2001 economic crisis had a negative impact on the electoral success of established political parties in the 2002 general elections in Turkey, and the three parties that made up the coalition government following the 1999 elections (Democratic Left Party, Nationalist Action Party, Motherland Party) experienced a major decline in their electoral support in 2002 (Öniş, 2004). The newly established AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*- Justice and Development Party) came to power after the elections getting the majority of the seats in the parliament. One important factor behind the AKP's success was the party leaders' emphasis on social justice issues, which also involved distribution of material benefits. During the election campaign, they had made promises of poverty reduction and greater economic equality. As Patton argues, during his election campaign "…Erdoğan raised popular expectations that

(he) would immediately tackle problems of growing poverty, distorted income distribution, and social inequality…" (Patton, 2006: 514) but when he came to power, he remained very much within the neoliberal framework and conformed to the IMF program. According to Coşar and Özman, the neoliberal leaning of the AKP was apparent both in its pre-election discourse and also practices after the election. The neoliberal orientation of the Party could be observed in the emphasis on making Turkey an international trademark, and accompanying policies of privatization, creating incentives for foreign investment, and acting in line with the IMF's criteria. The implications of the neoliberal framework for social policies could be seen in the Labor Law that gave priority to providing flexibility in the workplace (Coşar & Özman, 2004: 63). Then how could the AKP pursue a neoliberal agenda while at the same time not ignore the popular expectations about social inequality?

As Buğra argues, the 'mutually reinforcing role of Islam and neoliberalism' (Buğra, 2007: 46) helped the AKP to handle the problem of how to fulfill the social promises while, at the same time, abiding by a neoliberal program, which necessitates minimizing social spending. The central role of the Islamic references in the party's perspective is beyond doubt. Contrary to the belief that there are inherent contradictions between capitalism and Islam, the AKP as a 'moderate Islamic' party has had no problem in aggressively pursuing a neoliberal agenda. The AKP's emphasis on private benevolence, philanthropy, and voluntary initiatives took place in an ideological context created by the mutually reinforcing role of Islam and neoliberalism. This combination provides a strong support for decreasing the responsibilities of the political authorities in poverty alleviation (ibid). Patton identifies the AKP's strategy as a neo-communitarian, neoliberal one, which prioritizes individual rights and which has its ontological roots in Islamism. The Party encourages people to take more responsibility for themselves, while also emphasizing the importance of family ties (Patton, 2009). Therefore, the AKP's social policy emphasis on education and self-help can be explained with reference to this aim of developing self-sufficient individuals who will create strong communities. The roles of the family, voluntary initiatives and Islamic charity are repeatedly referred to in the current social policy discourse of the AKP. These alternative institutions are expected to decrease the responsibilities of the state institutions in dealing with the problem of poverty. Depending on Islamic references, the AKP considers social justice and human welfare as moral issues. When defined in these terms, social issues cease to be the responsibilities of the state and are pushed to the realm of ethics, and personal and communal responsibilities.

AKP's Implementation of the Social Risk Mitigation Project (SRMP)

The Social Risk Mitigation Project, as a project that depended on the World Bank's social risk management framework, was a perfectly fitting poverty alleviation project for the AKP government, with its aim of improving the capacity of poor households to endure social risks. The SRMP's target of creating self-sufficient individuals and households which can struggle against risks on their own is also a broader objective for the AKP. The loan agreement for the SRMP was signed in 2001 and when the project was first initiated the AKP was not in the government. However, when it became the governing party, the AKP saw it as a big opportunity to publicize the SRMP in order to get the support of the masses, especially of the support of the lower classes and the poor. There were several news stories in the media which covered this project or the components of the project (especially CCT) as an achievement of the World Bank and the AKP government. Although the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund (SYDTF) and the related Social Solidarity Foundations (SYDV) were established back in 1986 and have been providing social assistance to the poor since that time, during the AKP government period the social assistance by the Foundations became largely publicized. However, one major change during the period of this government was the increase in the amount of assistance provided.

Many of my interviewees from different groups (scholars, state officials, officials working at SYDVs, people from NGOs) talked about how the poor are getting used to living on social assistance especially because of the CCT component of the SRMP with its more than two million beneficiaries, as well as social assistance provided from other channels. There were scholars who argued that it has become a full-time job for the poor to learn which social assistance institution is giving what kind of aid, and to periodically visit different institutions. They argued that a 'culture of poverty' is emerging in Turkey and the AKP government and international institutions like the World Bank are responsible for the creation of this culture:

> What is worst about these poverty alleviation projects is that they create expectations from outside sources. I am poor; I don't have any qualifications. I don't have any chance. So somebody should give me a hand. With these projects, this kind of a culture is reproduced. In other words, poverty alleviation projects have been functional in creating a culture of poverty.

> People come and say, the government is giving money so getting that money is my right. They say, you have to give it to me. Because of these policies, an unintended consequence came out… During the last couple of years, because of the policies of the international institutions like the World Bank, people now say that it is their right to get assistance. They have become professional beggars…He goes to the governor

> to get something, sends his wife to the governor's wife, goes to another institution to receive something else… And the prime minister had just made a public statement addressing the governors, telling them that they should distribute all the money that was sent to them. As a result, people now see it as their right to receive assistance.

What I heard during my interviews in the State Planning Institute were also in line with those arguments:

> …vegetables, fish, stationery, coal, clothing… a lot of things are distributed currently (by the municipalities). Before, when the people were asked, they were embarrassed to accept that they needed assistance. There was no habit of demanding aid. However, it is now changing very fast. We are poor so the state should help us… A culture of poverty will develop soon…Social assistance should not encourage laziness…As there is no good database, same individuals get assistance from multiple sources and in a society which is getting used to this culture of poverty, this is becoming widespread. They get aid from the municipality, from the Foundation, from benevolent people, from NGOs…

> For us, the biggest problem related to the implementation (of the SRMP) was the massive increase in the scope of the CCT component. This and the fact that the Fund's resources are used for other purposes led us to ask the question, whether a culture of poverty is emerging.

Also, in my interviews with the local Social Solidarity Foundations, the local implementers of the SRMP, I repeatedly heard that there are several different organizations that distribute aid and there is almost no coordination among them. Officials working in the local Foundations, who work with the poor on a daily basis, were complaining that especially poor women are now spending their time waiting in the queues for getting assistance from different institutions.

> You know what, these people, in a sense, have a job. Today, they come here; tomorrow they go to the Lighthouse; the following day they go to another NGO and another day, they go to the municipality. They spend most of their days visiting these places to apply for aid, and later to get the results of their applications. Social assistance has recently become like a new job sector in Turkey.

The officials working at the Foundations also argue that poor people have started to see it as their right to receive aid from every institution, and the SRMP, especially the CCT component of the project, contributed a lot to this understanding. The CCT is regarded by the SYDV officials as a major factor that encourages poor people to live on assistance:

> Education support is something that I am absolutely in favor of…However, we should not give it like this. We should not give it in a way which discourages people from working. At present, those people who get 350-400 YTL a month from CCT do not work any more. It is a pity that our people are in this state.

This clearly seems far from the SRMP's objective of increasing the capacity of poor households so that they can deal with future risks on their own. On the one hand, the poor are portrayed as rational, calculating subjects who try to maximize their families' resources. As a survival strategy, they apply to multiple institutions for assistance and do not reveal that they are receiving assistance from other sources. Most types of assistance is given with the condition that the applicants prove that they are the 'real poor' so they learn what to reveal, and what to withhold when they make applications to different institutions. In this context, they might look like rational, calculating subjects, individual entrepreneurs of neoliberalism. However, the creation of neoliberalism's rational, calculating subjects goes together with their dependence on social assistance, which does not really fit with a neoliberal framework.

When the formal mechanisms which provide assistance as a citizenship right are replaced with multiple public and private organizations which give aid on the basis of means-testing, the poor try to survive by going from one institution to another one to get assistance and they are constantly expected to prove their poverty by making their lives transparent. In fact, I, as a researcher, also faced an ethical challenge, when I was, without any difficulty and much questioning, allowed to join the Foundation officials in their visits to people's houses and to ask questions. Although I was introduced as a researcher who is studying the social assistance systems and never asked questions about the extent of their poverty, the people whose houses we visited constantly tried to prove to me that they are 'really' living in poverty, telling details about their deprivation or assuring me that any aid given to them is/will be used for relevant purposes. With reference to this situation, many of my interviewees from the academia and the local Social Solidarity Foundations repeatedly talked about the emergence of a 'culture of begging' (dilencilik kültürü) and a process during which the poor are divested of their pride and dignity (onursuzlaştırma süreci). According to most, these two are the products of the AKP government's policies.

Conclusion

In its social risk management approach to poverty alleviation, the World Bank aims to provide risk management instruments to the poor so that they can better manage the risks that they encounter and also take more potentially high-reward

risks to gradually move out of poverty (Holzman & Kozel, 2007: 10). Using the concept of neoliberal governmentality, it is possible to interpret the World Bank's social risk management framework as aiming to create responsible poor subjects who can deal with the risk situations on their own, during a time when the role of formal mechanisms in the provision of social services is undermined. In the case of the SRMP, a World Bank project that depended on its social risk management framework and that was implemented in Turkey, in one sense, the neoliberal program of the World Bank was supported by the neoliberal orientation of the AKP government. However, in another sense, the AKP's efforts to maintain its popular support changed the direction of the interventions by the World Bank. Although the World Bank was attempting to create entrepreneurial subjects who would be able to manage future 'risk situations' and even take more high-reward risks to get out of poverty, the AKP's populist interests and use of the Social Risk Mitigation Project (especially its CCT component) for those interests led to the emergence of charity-dependent poor people. This is a very different outcome than what the World Bank aimed to create.

To avoid the type of discourse that blames the poor for their opportunism or lack of pride, one note is crucial here. The SRMP and CCT, together with other types of social assistance, might have made it possible to get assistance from multiple sources, and currently there may be poor individuals and families who are getting assistance from multiple institutions. However, rather than considering it as the poor people's opportunism or lack of pride, I argue that these are natural ways through which poor households try to improve their lives in the absence of resources or opportunities to reach them. Poor people are as rational as anybody else and they are doing their best to survive under hardships.

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Power and poetry: Kanuni Sultan Süleyman`s Third Divan

Christiane Czygan

What do the poems of Sultan Süleyman, 1520-1566, have in common with the Gezi events? At first glance, they seem to have nothing in common. The Gezi events concern us as current political movements, while the Ottoman poems are distant, often highly conventional works of the imagination, and it is seldom possible to identify any particular event behind them. However, both phenomena employ imagery to appeal to emotions.

Ottoman poetry often reproduced traditional lyrical models. Nevertheless, alternative themes were available and therefore it might have been a matter of choice that such a powerful ruler as Kanuni Sultan Süleyman focused on love poetry as a central genre. In this paper I will argue that Ottoman ruler poetry was more than a kind of elaborated art and entertainment, but a powerful instrument of political communication.

History of Emotion

The History of Emotion forms an important approach in analysing poems, not only within the specific frame of their craft, but within their larger context and their socio-political impact. Emotions are complex phenomena that are specific to cultures and historical periods, and they may be analysed in terms of various interpretive frameworks. For example, they may be explored as the reflection of a specific *Zeitgeist* (Pernau, 2011:233-262) or they can be understood as a result of an individual's Freudian Oedipus Complex (Brausewein, 2012: 14). Brausewein underscores the significance of the social influence on emotions when she defines the emotion in terms of morality. In her view, "emotions are the result of assessments

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within a moral order – an order that prescribes certain values and shapes certain goals" (Brausewein, 2012: 13).

The German historian Ute Frevert uses the term *Gefühlspolitik* to describe the kind of politics that uses emotion as a tool (Frevert, 2012:16). Ute Frevert divides power into two types: a negative type based on the fear of sanctions, and a positive type created through belief in the ruler's legitimacy. The second type is based on emotions such as devotion, admiration, love and gratitude and these must be carefully cultivated if they are to be effective in producing submission from those who are to be ruled. Rulers use a variety of methods to create the appropriate emotions in their subjects, but a particularly effective method is the ruler's demonstration of these emotions in himself (Frevert, 2012:19-22). The emotions need not be authentic, but they must be expressed so as to create a specific reaction among the ruled (Frevert, 2012:10).

In Ottoman literary history, Walter Andrews referred to the History of Emotion and outlined a *Cycle of Emotions* on the basis of a methodology borrowed from social and natural science and an immense data-base of poems (Andrews, 2012: 25). With this *Cycle of Emotions* Andrews highlighted the importance of the notion of love and drew a parallel between physical and spiritual needs. In this context he provided a starting point for an understanding of the erotic as a mystical fusion (Andrews, 2012: 26f).

Ottoman ruler poetry

Ottoman rulers connected with a long tradition of ruler poets in the Middle East by participating in the art of poetry. Barbara Flemming indicates the competitive character of imperial poetry between Timurids and Ottomans in the 15th century and points to the Türkmen and Mamluk rulers and their different predilections (Flemming, 1990: 280). Ruler poetry excelled in the Classical Age of the Ottoman Empire and was elaborated by Mehmed II (1451-1481) under the pen name ʿAvnī (pertaining to divine aid) and continued to be created by Bayezid II (1481-1512) under the pen name ʿAdlī (pertaining to justice and equity). Selim I (1512-1520) is known for his poems under the *maḥlaṣ* Selīmī (pertaining to unwounded and free from danger). Kanuni Sultan Süleyman was, however, the most productive of these. He created thousands of poems under his *maḥlaṣ* Muḥibbī (The Lover or the God Lover). Although in a much less extensive way, ruler poetry was also produced by Selim III in the 19th century. Georg Jacob seems not to have given much credit to ʿAvnī`s lyrical skills, describing him as having "little genius and much

talent" (Jacob, 1904:11). In contrast, as a poet, Selīmī was held in high esteem and enthusiastically lauded by his contemporaries. (Ak, 2001:154).

According to Suraiya Faroqhi, until Mehmed II a relative permissiveness existed in communication between the ruler and his subjects, and criticism was openly articulated by legal representatives towards the sultan. This changed in the later reign of Mehmed II (Faroqhi, 2000:30f). As a stricter separation between the ruler and his subjects came about, ruler poetry might have served as a means to bridge the distance in a strongly formalized structure. Today these poems are among the few documents in which the rulers expressed themselves poetically.

With the establishment of Ottoman ruler poetry, the reference to concrete events as exemplified in the case of Murad II (Inalcık, 2011:252) became less frequent. However, occasionally such events can be noted, e.g. when Sultan Süleyman decided to have his son Bayezid killed (1562), Bayezid wrote a poem begging his father to pardon him.[1] As some theorists have pointed out, Ottoman rule may have been less idealistic than previously thought. Indeed, recent research indicates that rulers often acted as strategic pragmatists (Kafadar, 1995). In the light of rising conflicts with the Safawids in the era of Sultan Selim I and of Sultan Süleyman, Ottoman poetry might have served as a means of demonstrating cultural confidence in the war against the Persian neighbours, as Persian poetry was admired by the Ottomans and in the whole Middle East for its imagery. In this respect the abovementioned Ottoman pragmatism might have found its expression in their endeavours to develop poetry in the Ottoman-Turkish language. Nevertheless, the Persian influence in structure and imagery remained in Ottoman Gazel poetry. Barbara Flemming has delineated its assimilative mode throughout the centuries (Flemming, 1990: 278).

The image transferred in ruler poetry was sometimes ambiguous, as Emine Fetvacı has pointed out with Murad III (2013).[2] Kanuni Sultan Süleyman seems to have been a complex and dazzling personality who occasionally set precedents through his display of emotion towards both a woman and a friend. However, what becomes clear in contrast to Murad III is that the image constructed around Süleyman is coherent and corresponds to the lyrical *persona* of a deeply pious man.

1 http://cihanhukumdari.istanbul.edu.tr/cihan-hukumdari-kanuni-sultan-suleyman-siirler.html, visited 02/18/2015.

2 According to Fetvacı, Murad III presented himself as a sufi-mystical poet, but was a man focussed on material values. Fetvacı 2013: 44.

Ottoman Poetry in the era of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman

The effect of poetry was based on its aesthetic mode. Poetry has always been a craft – a craft of building up words in terms of rhyme and meter. Gazel poetry, which was love poetry, was very popular in the era of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, and it achieved a high level of social significance.[3] Andrews (1985) has pointed out that Gazel poetry was used as a means of communication expressing submission to God, devotion towards the ruler and/ or to a beloved person. Some years later, Andrews and Kalpaklı (2005a) highlighted the worldly character of Gazel poetry in the 16th century, revealing that often real love was meant (2005b). Furthermore, Erika Glassen reminds us of the mystical connotation of *'işḳ* (love) in Gazel poetry, describing it as *iridescent* and regarding its divine and worldly fusion as characteristic of the mystical mind of the educated Ottoman (Glassen, 2014: 49). Walter Andrews concurs with Erika Glassen´s description and also explores the great importance of spirituality in literature and pre-modern Ottoman daily life.

In Istanbul, in addition to the small number of court poets, there was also a much larger group of poets who are said to have offered their services to people of various social strata (Andrews and Kalpaklı, 2006: 160). There is evidence that some poets survived outside the palace. Sultan Süleyman`s inclination to poetry, as well as his generous support of it, is likely to have encouraged the popularity of poetry beyond the court. As Selim Kuru has pointed out, Ottoman poets identified themselves less with power or status than with the *locus* of *şu'arā-ı Rūm*. With this denomination they pointed to urban Anatolia with Istanbul as the centre (Kuru, 2013: 586). Following this argument, it could also be assumed that the sultan only joined a trend instead of shaping it. Beyond the discussion of influence, consensus exists about the significance of poetry, and it is fair to say that poetry crossed gender and strata from the Sultan down to the modest manufacturer, from the Sultan`s wife down to the illiterate lady (Andrews and Kalpaklı, 2006: 160).

Controversial positions seem to exist concerning the representative character of the poet Ẕātī. While Halil İnalcık sees him as an extraordinary individual who revolutionized poetry (İnalcık, 2011: 173), Walter Andrews and Mehmed Kalpaklı interpret his life and art in the context of a larger group of poets who are said to have shared the worldly-erotic character of their Gazel poetry (Andrews and Kalpaklı, 2006).[4] Their suggestion to label the 16th century *the Age of Beloveds* points to the

3 Hatice Aynur and Angelika Neuwirth both emphasized the Ghazel as a mirror of communication. (Neuwirth 2006: 23; Aynur 2006: 496)

4 According to Andrews / Kalpaklı the poets İshak Çelebi, Yaḥyā Bey. Fevrī and Emrī all promoted love poetry with a strong worldly impetus. (Andrews / Kalpaklı 2005b: 356f).

spread of poetry throughout society and indicates that poetry was a substantial element of cultural life (Andrews and Kalpaklı, 2005a).

The ruler poet Muḥibbī and his *dīvāns*

It is common knowledge that Muḥibbī is the pseudonym for Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, a sultan whose leadership influenced the 16th century in a variety of ways:

- through his extraordinary long rule of more than forty years
- as a commander of an extraordinary powerful army
- as actor and strategist in Middle Eastern and European geopolitics
- as a ruler with an affinity to art
- as a personality that recognised extraordinary skills and supported them generously
- as a decisive proponent of Sunni-Islam.

It seems that Sultan Süleyman was already of an advanced age when he ordered the composition of poem collections, the so called *dīvāns*. There is evidence that 19 *dīvāns* of Muḥibbī exist (Ak, 2006:35).[5] The oldest dated *dīvān* of Muḥibbī is the *Third Dīvān* completed in 961/1554.[6] Although the contribution of a variety of professions was required for the production of manuscripts, the involvement of individuals is often hard to single out and sometimes not even possible (Neumann, 2005:63). Concerning the *Third Dīvān,* circumstances are more favourable, as Ḥāccı Muḥammed as calligrapher and Ḳara Memī as illuminator are explicitly named in the colophon.[7] Claus P. Haase revealed Ḥāccı Muḥammed as Meḥmed Şerīf (Haase, 1986: 27f). Nevertheless, the question about the existence of an editor remains open, as well as that of the involvement of assistants who could have influenced the shape and content as well.

Andrews and Kalpaklı illustrate the mundane character of 16th century poetry, referring to the poets Nihālī, Me'ālī, Mesīḥī, Nişānī, Helākī, Deli Birāder and the poetess Mihrī Ḫātūn, who is said to have occasionally produced poems for a beloved man. (Andrews / Kalpaklı 2006: 160).

5 According to other delineations there should be thirty three in number. As the criteria relevant for *dīvāns* are not indicated, doubts arise about their *dīvān*-nature and as a first step we might assume them to be manuscripts only. www.yazmalar.gov.tr viewed 17.07.2014.

6 MKG 1886.168. Folio_212.

7 MKG 1886.168. Folio_212.

Coşkun Ak (2006) published 3,016 poems of Muḥibbī. Repetitions of the imagery and of specific tropes often occurred. However, every poem is singular, and there is no line or hemistich identical to the other. This singularity of the distiches contrasts with the repetition of whole poems, which were often "recycled" in different *dīvāns* with little or no variation. Analogous to the Koran, a *dīvān* is structured according to the Arabic alphabet with its poems being ordered in a similar way. Specifically, the last syllable forms the rhyme and denotes the alphabetical position. In general, it was essential that all letters of the alphabet were represented in the *dīvān* by several poems (Flemming, 1990: 278f). The existence of poems in the oldest *dīvān* that do not recur in the younger, sister-manuscripts has been hitherto unexplored. As Claus P. Haase has pointed out (personal communication), the difficulty in creating poems for some letters might have favoured the multi-use of specific poems. A further conundrum is presented by the numbering of the sister-manuscripts as – according to our knowledge today – one *First Dīvān*, two *Third Dīvāns* and a *Fifth Dīvān* exist, whilst the numbering is not chronological.[8] Therefore, we have to take into account completely different criteria of arrangement. The *Third Dīvān* of Muḥibbī in the Hamburg manuscript contains 657 poems and although the Gazel genre was favoured, there are *na'ts* (praising the Prophet Mohammed) to be found in accordance with the *dīvān*-structure at the beginning and end of each alphabetic section. In addition, 12 *murabba'* (four distiches) exist, and 58 *müfreds* (epigrams) were placed at the end.

Since the time of the ruler poet 'Avnī, a poet was obligated to illustrate his expertise through inter-textual references to Persian as well as contemporary poets. Muḥibbī met this maxim in a variety of references. Coşkun Ak revealed in Muḥibbī`s *dīvāns* inter-textual references to Aḥmed Paşa, Necātī, and Ḫayretī (Ak, 2001:186f). Furthermore, we can assume that Muḥibbī knew the poems of his forefathers as well as those of the Persian poets Niẓāmī and Sa'dī, and explicit references are to be found in the *Third Dīvān* to Selmān.[9] In Ak`s edition of Muḥibbī`s poems, the Persian poet Cāmī and the Turkish poet Mesīhī are both explicitly named. (Ak, 2006: 446). Georg Jacob (1903) delineated a variety of tropes paralleled in the *Dīvān* of the Persian poet Ḫāfıẓ. We can assume that the significance of Ḫāfıẓ for Muḥibbī was high; however, as long as we do not have empirical data, there is no evidence for

8 The *First Dīvān* IÜK No. 5477. Istanbul University Library. [no date]. (Türkçe Yazma Divanlar Kataloğu 1947: 151). The *Third Dīvān* of the current research belongs to the Museum of Art and Manufacture. Hamburg. 1886. 186. A second *Third Dīvān* is mentioned by Vahit Çabuk. (Çabuk 1980: 30). The Fifth *Dīvān*. Nuruosmaniye No. 3873 is dated with 971/1564. (Türkçe Yazma Divanlar Kataloğu 1947: 148).

9 MKG, folio_005a.

its scope. What we can exclude is Muḥibbī`s sole imitation of Ḫāfıẓ. In this regard I have to thank Erika Glassen who indicated that Muḥibbī`s imagery varied from that of Ḫāfıẓ (personal communication), e.g. in the trope of the hospital, only once used by Ḫāfıẓ.[10] Therefore, the poet Bāḳī´s eulogy of Muḥibbī`s originality in imagery might, to a certain extent, be given as evidence (Kuru, 2013: 758).

Muḥibbī´s lyrical skills might be evinced in contrast to heretofore Ottoman ruler poets in his command of rhetoric – *ʻilm al-balaġat*. To his favourite rhetorical figures belonged tenāsüb (concept of harmony), which I would like to illustrate in two examples in the frequently used meter *remel*:

İşidüb nālemi ebr oldı yine zār baŋa /	Cözdü sünbül sacını aġladı kuh-sār baŋa.
The clouds heard my moan and all became wretched for me /	The hyacinth withered, the mountain range cried for me.[11]
Bu Muḥibbī vādi-i hicre yöneldi zād içün	Ḫūn-i dil yeter şerāb ey ġam gelüb āş ol baŋa.
It is this Muḥibbī who turned to the desert of separation for recreation	Heart blood is wine enough, oh, sorrow come and be my fare.[12]

In this light it might be assumed that it pleased Muḥibbī to implement rhetorical figures. The imagery is melancholic and often refers to an ideal based on renunciation. Neither Muḥibbī nor Kanuni Sultan Süleyman were rebels, but both characterized the realization of some licit innovations. Whilst Sultan Süleyman produced personal precedents, Muḥibbī created some original images. This provided both ruler and poet with authority and appreciation (Czygan, 2014: 87). Mourning and tears were in this context part of an apt staging.

The audience

It is useful to distinguish between the actual audience and the intended audience, sometimes also called the abstract audience (Kahrmann, Reiß and Schluchter, 1996: 48f). A further distinction should be made between *dīvān* manuscripts and the oral

10 I thank Ramin Shaghaghi for finding this reference. Ḫaṭīb Rahbar, Ḫalīl. 1378/1999-2000. Dīvān-e Ḫʷāǧe Şams ad-Dīn Moḥammed Şīrāzī. 23th edition. Tehrān. 357-358.

11 MKG, folio_005a. Translated by the author.

12 MKG, folio_003b. Translated by the author.

performance of single poems. In this part the actual audience will be discussed, while the lyrically intended, or abstract audience, will be analysed in the following part. Concerning manuscripts and oral performances, it has to be emphasized that manuscripts were read aloud and were shared by a larger audience (Fetvacı, 2013: 26). In this context Paul Zumthor highlights the difference between reading and recitation. Although both situations are characterized by verbal presentation, the authority differs. Reading aloud underscores the authority of the manuscript, while a memorized recitation lends authority to the voice, which may create new meaning (Zumthor, 1994: 32f).

It is also important to consider the context of the poetry recitations. These poems were recited during specific events such as – the *Ḫāṣṣ-baġçe 'işret meclisler* – drinking parties of Iranian origin (İnalcık, 2011:18). Halil İnalcık (2011) illuminates the socio-political function of these parties as a means to strengthen the relationship between the palace and the military. From the 13th century the Seljuks used these parties to honour subjects through the award of positions and gifts, and performances of the *Belles Arts* belonged to these ceremonies. In this respect drinking parties operated as a kind of arena where artistic competitions were held and awards given. Furthermore, these drinking parties created a bond between the palace and the people. Specific parties, the so-called *toys*, were thrown to celebrate spring or royal circumcisions and weddings (İnalcık, 2011:60-64)[13].

Halil İnalcık reveals the intersection between deeds in support of Sunni-Islamic institutions on the one hand, and Sufi lodges on the other. Nevertheless, they continued to perform drinking parties according to the Iranian model. According to İnalcık this phenomenon indicates the partial internalization of the caliphat (İnalcık, 2011:18). However, Thomas Bauer (2011) pointed out that in the 19th century a turn in perception occurred and the former coexistence of different social orders became impossible. For this reason, it is likely that our perception is strongly influenced through the shift in paradigm that happened in the nineteenth century.

Emine Fetvacı (2013) provides evidence for the circulation of manuscripts through borrower lists which are reported to have been kept with the date and name of the borrower. Records indicate that sultans were among the borrowers, and manuscripts were read and listened to in the Palace (Fetvacı, 2013: 29). Moreover, Fetvacı points

13 İnalcık illustrated the functionality of the *toy* by the great *toy* celebrated by Kanuni Sultan Süleyman after the successful battle of Mohács (29.08.1526) in Belgrad. The poet Revānī (1475-1524) dedicated an *'İşretnāme* to Sultan Selim I in which he highlighted the four good qualities of wine, which were that wine causes no suffering for the soul, puts a shine on memory and face and makes man talkative. İnalcık 2011:165.

to two libraries in the Palace: one for the common use of the courtiers, and a second for the sultan`s personal use (Fetvacı, 2013: 37). Yet it remains unclear where the sultans` *dīvāns* were located and who their borrowers were. In other words, we do not know whether royal *dīvān* manuscripts were accessible to all courtiers or only to the sultans and the royal family. Nor do we know how often they were lent out.

Sultan Süleyman was already sixty when the first *dīvān* of Muḥibbī – hitherto known – was completed in 1554. When we consider his increasingly ascetic lifestyle in his later years, the question about the performance of the poems arises. Can we assume a continuity of performances? Were Muḥibbī`s poems recited in a *işret meclisler* at all? Beyond these questions, it seems clear that Muḥibbī shared with his audience the Ottoman Turkish language as the base for a common identity, a knowledge of Persian lyrical models, and a predilection for an imagery based on the cosmos and well-established prosody.

General intentionality

If we assume that ruler poems were not produced solely as *l`art pour l'art* or as a licit outlet in a highly controlled and predetermined environment, then we must consider what purposes they were meant to serve. The *Gefühlspolitik* formulates this question on two levels:

1. Who did the lyrical *persona* want to impress?
2. Which purposes did the poems serve? [14]

First: The historically actual audience may not have been identical to the intended audience. In the light of Muḥibbī´s self-description as intercessor for the other book religions, and regarding the number of *na'ts* evoking an internal colloquy with God himself, it seems that his poems were not only related to this world, but also to the divine (Czygan, 2014: 94). The rationale to impress God seems appropriate for a ruler who had few real counterparts. This seems to be shared ground in research, especially in the light of his pious attitude. Moreover, as sultans perceive themselves in the dynastic genealogical line, further generations of rulers might have been an intended audience too. However, why should the call for sympathy in emphasizing love not also have been directed to the contemporary court and subjects at a time

14 Ute Frevert`s main questions provided the input and were applied to the lyrical level (Frevert 2012: 13).

when warfare demanded great sacrifice in terms of life and costs? Moreover, the struggle for Sunni-Islamic hegemony erupted in the form of uprisings and threatened social cohesion. In this respect the suppression of their fellow Muslims was demanded. When one considers that such demands were related to a *persona* who was himself suffering, people were little able to disapprove of such demands. In this light it appears as a subtle form of manipulation. To argue in a quite utilitarian way: To impress the court and the people was of high value in order to get things done.

Second: Which purposes did the poems serve?

It has been argued that court poetry, in addition to the function of edification, had a further purpose: In the ideal performance the ruler was reminded by the poet of the moral good, the finiteness of human beings and the maxims of rule (Meisami, 1987: 7).[15] The ruler poet Muḥibbī referred in his poems to the model of the ideal man – the *insān-ı kāmil* – who constantly loved and suffered.

The suffering formulated in Muḥibbī`s poetry formed a topos around which a whole aesthetic world was created in which longing, admiration and suffering expressed a love that favoured submission to God, the moral good and implicitly to the ruler (Czygan, 2014: 96). This construct went much further through its inherent ambiguity that formed cohesion between humans and objects, the world and God, the erotic and the mystic (Meisami, 2003: 9).[16] In this respect the poet constructed a whole framework in which God, the ruler and the individual have a place and are inseparably intertwined in their love for each other. For the single poem the actual moment was important and through allusions to love and devotion the ruler poems became human and therefore, appealed to the addressee`s sympathy. However, *dīvāns* were poem collections which reached beyond daily life, love or manipulation because they were intended to establish the poet in memory. The making of a specific image seems to me an important purpose of Muḥibbī`s poetry with the *insān-ı kāmil* in the centre – be it mystical, political or both. The deep, almost perfect coherence of this image makes it extremely difficult to achieve an understanding of the concrete person behind the abstract.

15 İnalcık highlighted in this respect the poet Seyhi, who is said to have reminded the sultan that justice, *adalet*, was connected with law and therefore essential to the security of the people?. (İnalcık 2011:246).

16 Andrews made it more concrete in revealing the lyrical image of the garden as the motif that connects spiritual / physical and worldly / divine. (Andrews 2012: 33)

Conclusion

An analysis of the Muḥibbī`s poetry in terms of a *Gefühlspolitik* suggests the various ways in which he may have used emotions as instruments of communication and manipulation. Nevertheless, important questions related to the lending out of *dīvān* manuscripts, the performance of their poems, the organisation of a *dīvān* and the personality behind it remain open. Furthermore, a number of questions related to the interpretations to the poems suggest the need for consideration: How can we understand the *iridescent* of the spiritual/ mystical and the worldly/erotic? When did the shift in paradigm occur? Was it the 19th century that operated as a curtain veiling the past, or was it in pre-modern or medieval times, as Meisami (2003) postulates? Time creates an immense obstacle for understanding and *Gefühlspolitik* could be useful to allow glimpses behind the curtain. In most current research love has been given highest priority. However, beauty might be the link that connects the inward and the outward, the divine and the mundane.

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Locating the German-Turks: Transnational Migration to Turkey and Constructions of Identity and Space

Aylin Yıldırım Tschoepe

Almanya'da yabancı,
Türkiye'de Almancı.
In Germany a foreigner,
In Turkey someone Germanized.
(Turkish Expression)

The (re)migration of the *Almancılar* – specifically the *gastarbeiter* (Turkish workers in Germany) and their offspring – from Germany to Turkey, and their experiences of a double alienation as expressed in the quote above- partly a self-fulfilling prophecy as a result of self-stereotyping and stereotyping – is one of the phenomena discussed, but also challenged by ethnographic research of migrants' everyday practice in this chapter. In order to locate the German-Turkish migrants and constructions of identity and space, this chapter deals with migrant homescapes that expand beyond spatial and cultural boundaries.

The construction of identities in the context of homescapes is essential to the migratory experience: the German-Turks will inevitably become actors but also subjects of the transforming urban (social, political, economic, cultural) landscape(s) in Turkey. Enhanced mobility has its consequences in a heightened nostalgia, that is, a longing for (a return to) home and raises the contest of global culture versus cultural intimacy.

My central argument is that a diverse group of identities such as the German-Turks can only be located through their flexible constructions of a transnational homescape as common denominator. Homescapes emerge in the transnational migratory space from migrants' tactics to counteract alienation and (re)insert themselves. The migrant is a very central, contemporary figure. Therefore, theoretical discussions and research findings should not only be relevant for scholars of Turkey, but give

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insight on migratory phenomena and their impact on notions of fluid identities and spaces in other regions of the world as well.

Background and Main Arguments

In the 1960s, the German writer Max Frisch coined the expression *"Man hat* Arbeitskräfte gerufen, und es kamen Menschen" – We called for labor force, and human beings came. The labor contract between Germany and Turkey in the years 1961-1973 brought the first generation of guest workers to Germany. Both sides believed the stay was temporary: the German government decided on importing human labor to rebuild their industries and, once the job is done, send them back home to Turkey. The guest workers believed they could make a small fortune abroad and then return home as if they had never left. The German government saw no need to provide sufficient means for integration, a political and social mistake. The first generation of guest workers grew older and second and third generations became part of Germany's social landscape. The guests stayed, married Germans or brought their wives, relatives, and friends during the 1970s, a decade of reunification migration. Ultimately a majority of guest workers ended up staying in Germany, with varying degrees of acculturation.

The awareness for a lack of integration of migrants and measures to improve their socio-cultural situation was predominantly spurred by the "Leitkultur" (leading culture) discussions in the 1990s and young generations with a migratory background, more eloquent than their parents and ready to demand equal participation in social, economic, political activities in Germany. Transnational and return migration have their beginnings in the 1980s and have gained a new momentum since the 2000s with the stabilization of the Turkish economy. Migration has taken on speed with the retirement age of the first guest worker generation and mobile and skilled filial generations who escape discrimination in Germany based on their migratory background, seek their roots, and come equipped with the advantage of multi-lingualism (German, Turkish, English, etc), as well as experiences and an educational background from abroad. Some 193,000 Turks have left Germany between 2007 and 2011, and the trend continues (Hurriyet Daily News, 03/14/2013). Istanbul as Turkey's largest city is the main destination of German-Turkish (re)migration.

The German-Turks find their identities compromised first in their host community and then by fellow citizens who consider them not as Turks, but as Almancılar- the Germanized. Some of my Turkish interlocutors even apologized to me for using the term: "…but you don't mind if I say *Almancı*, do you? I, of course, don't refer to

you...". A classic situation between awkwardness and preconceived notions when confronted with the Other. As far as my own subjectivity as an ethnographer is concerned, I grew up with an extended German and Turkish family, both in Bavaria and on the Eastern Black Sea Coast. While I might not count as a "typical" *Almancı*, I can relate to the feeling of inbetweenness, common among individuals with a migratory background. Through ethnographic research, I have carried out participant observation and open interviews among 27 primary informants, and have been following various German-Turkish circles in the city of Istanbul and on online platforms from which I have also drawn information from a larger pool of secondary informants. I made sure to cover different generations, both male and female. Among my informants were workers, nurses, restaurant and shop owners, architects, lawyers, craftsmen, writers, call center agents, and students. I present evidence from a group of identities, from which main tendencies can be drawn, but I acknowledge that there might be exceptions given the large variety of this cultural group. It is not my goal to reify the German-Turks as a vulnerable group of Others; instead, I would like to show how many of them have emancipated themselves from autochthonous cultural concepts of the nation-state and construct their hybrid identities in the transnational homescape.

The German-Turkish diaspora, more specifically the guest workers and their offspring, are a heterogeneous group. Group affiliation and identities are flexible and negotiable, corresponding with hybrid spaces, permanent and temporary, often liminal, that emerge from migrant practices as part of what I refer to as homescape. The homescape is the imaginary and materialized landscape of collective memory and notions of belonging, as well as shared diasporic cultural intimacy, expressed most clearly in German-Turkish semiotics. It will be useful to contrast the guest worker generation with their offspring, who, well-adapted to Germany and many of them German citizens, are identified through names as symbol of their migratory background.

Esra Özyürek explains that contemporary Turkish citizens have a shared desire for memory and counter-histories based on suppressed pasts and shows how Turkish individuals and groups today define their identities through the way they represent their pasts (2007:2-3), but also past and present experiences of living here and there. It is along those lines that we can expect that differences in lived experience of Turks in the home country and the diaspora abroad to result in variations of identity construction, and cultural interpretations and understanding.

German-Turkish Constructions of Identity

The German-Turkish diaspora is a collection of identities. As a matter of fact, this is the case for any group of individuals, but it is curious how often this is overlooked, and attributes of one individual from a minority are ascribed to the whole group. Rather than acknowledging the complexity of identities (see also Herzfeld, 1997), essentialization reduces the Other to a stereotype, a manageable entity, and makes believe we can define and know the Other. This is why the use of stereotypes is tempting, but also misleading.

Binaries of Self and Other are constructed through hegemonic identity discourses. Thus looking at everyday spatial and cultural practice, we can question these binaries and show the fluidity of identity constructions. Breaking with notions of homogeneous (imagined) communities and showing how individuals negotiate their identities in context of social and cultural experiences in various places instead, I hope to open up new avenues for the reinterpretation of what constitutes Turkishness.

Social and cultural engineering of the nation-state, and the production of Turkish citizens take an important role in the diaspora: The case of the German-Turks shows that we need to move away from imagined communities (Anderson, 1996) to imagined commonalities (Herzfeld, 1997). Very soon upon moving to Turkey, my informants realized that apart from their national identity, they share certain cultural intimacies, as well as transcultural practices across national boundaries with others who have moved. Many of my informants were unaware to what extent their migratory experiences have shaped their diasporic nostalgia and expectations from Turkey. It happens upon a permanent move to Turkey that German-Turks come to understand these experiences in Germany as formative: "Alman oldum/ Almanlaştım -I realized how German/ Germanized I have become" is an expression I heard from almost all of my informants.

In the scope of this chapter, I distinguish between those German-Turks who spent their youth in Turkey and came to Germany as *gastarbeiter* (guest workers), and those who where born or mainly grew up in Germany with a higher social and cultural capital.[1] What supports a differentiation along these lines is the general

1 Carrying out this research settled in the disciplines of anthropology and urban studies, I have gathered more material to ask further questions. First and foremost, gender differences also play an important role. I have shared findings with a focus on female migrants' identity construction at the "15th International Cultural Symposium in Izmir", May 2015, in a presentation entitled "'Haymat' in Turkey- Bodily and Spatial Practice in the Female German-Turkish Diaspora in Istanbul." My female informants strongly identified through their professional roles. Through their bodily and spatial practice, they provoke a counter-hegemonic (female, Almancı) discourse that challenges a dominant

tendency of greater identification with both countries among those who were born in Germany and, at the same time, have acquired higher socio-cultural status than other migrants: they speak multiple languages, are skilled in various ways through their educational development, possibly hold double citizenship (Kaya & Kentel, 2005: 92, 155ff), and are those who maneuver the inbetween. My informants who fall into this category negotiate their identities more comfortably in the transnational German-Turkish space. Integration happens through the right to participate in urban space and daily life, and language is key to participate and identify. Those with lower socio-cultural profile tend to identify more with Turkey, but have a selective perception of reality in Istanbul and are less engaged in becoming agents of change.

Without simplifying the matters of the migrant offspring too much, a tendency becomes visible in terms of mobility and adaptability depending on parental attitudes. Those of the second and third generation who navigate most easily in the transnational space, are also those whose parents – regardless of parental level of education, social status or religious affiliation – have seen their children's road to success and independence through a good education, and have been open to cultural and social experiences in Germany themselves without denying their Turkish origins.

Those parents who have been less encouraging in their children's educational development and who have kept them behind an invisible fence from "cultural contamination", were the ones who projected their own nostalgic desires for a long-lost Turkey onto their children and have made their cultural mobility a more difficult endeavor. Nevertheless, the invisible fence was for many of my informants just another challenge that juvenile ingenuity knew how to cunningly circumvent. This meant a balancing act and role-play between their identity as dutiful child at home and self-standing individual in outside social interactions.[2]

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one (male, Turkish) in the current making of female Turkish identity. Other aspects to be dealt with include the socio-cultural and urban environment of the place of origin, the diaspora in Germany and then in Turkey with attention to reciprocal changes. Furthermore, factors such as family history and personal history, upward mobility, ambitions and aspirations for oneself and children. The tracing and time-mapping of these migratory movements and multiscalar effects will become a useful tool to visualize the spatial implication. The quantitative study of Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel shows the complex and diverse composition of the diaspora, integration potential, and a heightened sense of belonging through social, cultural and political participation (2005). Their study is a rich basis for further qualitative research along the issues mentioned above.

2 More can be read about experiences and everyday practices that explain integration processes and the varied identities of German-Turks in Germany in the works of Horrocks 1996, Soysal 1999, Cağlar 2004, Knecht & Soysal 2005, Gülçiçek 2006, Hinze 2013.

Othering and Diasporic Cultural Intimacy

The migration between Turkey and Germany reached a turning point at the end of last century – as of 1999, outmigration of Turks from Germany to Turkey outnumbered immigration (Kaya & Kentel, 2005:17). Apart from the heretofore mentioned pull factors like nostalgia and seeking roots, the push-factors slightly vary between the guest worker generation and their offspring. While the first generation mainly took issue with moral, cultural, and societal values in Germany, their offspring, well-adapted in terms of language and customs, have mainly reported difficulties in finding a work position (see also Kaya & Kentel, 2005). The "Allgemeines Gleichstellungsgesetz" (General Equality Act) of 2006, which prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, was put to the test with regard to Turkish applicants and their German competitors.

Researchers sent two similar applications for student internship positions to over 500 employers, one with a Turkish name, the other with a German name. The average amount of callbacks for the German application was 14% higher in general, and 24% higher when taking only smaller firms into account (Kaas & Manger, 2010). At the basis of this discrimination is the persistence of negative stereotypes in connotation with a Turkish name.

Mandel (2008) explains that the terminology used for Turks in Germany already suggests temporariness and exclusion: *Gastarbeiter-* guest worker, *Ausländer-* outlander/foreigner, *ausländische Mitbürger-* foreign fellow-citizens, *Deutsche ausländischer Herkunft-* Germans of foreign descent. Germanness appears to come in stages, which has changed somewhat since the enactment of new citizenship laws in the late 1990s. Otherness, however, remains over generations: the German-Turkish offspring is well acculturated; the family name, however, is what differentiates them as *Deutsche mit Migrationshintergrund-* Germans with a migratory background, a term that has gained (un)popularity in recent years. This alienation remains one of the main push factors. Diasporic nostalgia and the desire to (re)migrate to Turkey are shaped by this experience of othering.

My Turkish interlocutors in Istanbul call the German-Turks, *Almancı*. It is evidently a derogatory term for a culturally inferior Other. Stereotypically, the *Almancı* is described as an ostentatious figure who is described by exaggerated performance of Turkishness while, at the same time, lacking cultural sensitivity and proper language. *Almancı* comes close in meaning to "Germanized", and my informants interpreted it as a mix of "German" + "foreigner": *Alman* + ~~yaban~~cı = *Almancı*. In the eyes of many of my Turkish interlocutors, most of whom have never left Turkey, the *Almancıs* have abandoned their homeland and have led an easy life abroad. The undeserving German-Turkish Others who supposedly left without

money and skills, together with their offspring, (re)turn to Turkey as financially potent but culturally (Western/German) corrupted Others. They are seen to infiltrate the Turkish landscape with conspicuous consumption and implementing their European-Turkish hybrid lifestyles.[3]

The "Almanc*ı* Other-Turkish Self" relation is a curious case of othering, which can be understood through what Said describes as the Other's uncanny closeness, geographically and culturally, to the Self (1978). Apart from othering German-Turks as undeserving and culturally inferior, the uncanny closeness is overcome by deeming German Turks the allochronic Other: supposedly stuck in an earlier moment of time, the German-Turk is considered to be more conservative, more traditional, all in all, less modern.[4] While this is partly owed to how some might express their nostalgia, the German-Turks have indeed moved on, just not along the same (cultural) trajectory because of differences in lived experience.

More than imagined territories and communities, imagined commonalities tighten the bond among the members of a group. It is through shared pasts in Germany and in Turkey and resulting German-Turkish semiotics that connect German-Turks. "Diasporic intimacy" is constituted by the collective experience of uprootedness and de-familiarization, and longing for home without belonging (Boym, 2001: 251). This concept is based on Herzfeld's notion of "cultural intimacy"; that is, a collective understanding of embarrassment and self-recognition, but also source of solidarity among a cultural group and is not to be shared with others (1997:3). Connecting these concepts, German-Turks can be identified through a shared "diasporic cultural intimacy" rather than cultural intimacy with their fellow Germans or Turks. German-Turkish semiotics play an important role in diasporic cultural intimacy and the emergent homescape, which I would like to exemplify through the following key situation:

A female informant told me that she had spoken Turkish most of her life in Germany before she retired and returned to Turkey in 2014. She explained that it was incomprehensible to her how people in Istanbul did not understand her Turkish.

Later that day, I was present during a conversation with one of her Turkish acquaintances:

"…simitçi ve ben kanka olduk.	(the bread ring seller and I became buddies/bros)
Dün iki saat onun yerine çalıştım.	(yesterday I did his work for two hours)

3 See also McMurray 2001 with similarities in the Moroccan case.

4 See also Fabian 2002 for his critique of uneven power relations between ethnographic Self and an Others that deny them contemporaneity.

Her acquaintance asked her:
Neden?? (why [did you do that]??)

My informant responded:
"***Spaß** olarak görüyorum*." (I consider it **fun**)

While I could immediately relate to what I understood as my informant's harmless story of helping out a friend, her Turkish acquaintance listened in disbelief. Their complications in understanding each other took place on two levels: a semiotic and a socio-cultural one. First, many German-Turks unconsciously mix the languages like in the example above, where my informant used the German word *Spaß* for fun instead of the Turkish word *eğlence*. Her interlocutor would have had to know both languages to follow her explanations. Second, her interlocutor could not fathom why my female middle class informant would do a *simitçi's* job and find joy in selling bread rings, and, on top of that, would become friends with the bread ring seller, a male of a lower social status. I have included this situation as a paradigmatic one that I have observed in similar ways in other contexts; many times my informants found themselves in complete confusion regarding the reaction of their Turkish interlocutors.

Diasporic Off-Modernism and the Diaspora at Home

To analyze diasporic reconstructions of home, more needs to be said about the constituents of this reconstruction: first hand and passed on individual and collective histories, experiences and memories of culture, space and community, and home constructs and imaginaries. All of these real and imaginary elements are sifted through what I refer to as the "nostalgic filter" and come to form reconstructions of home. In this context, nostalgia is what Boym explains as "... a longing for a home that no longer exists or has never existed. Nostalgia is a sentiment of loss and displacement, but it is also a romance with one's own fantasy." (Boym, 2001: 13) Building on Ramaswamy, I analyze guest worker nostalgia in the context with her concept of "labors of loss" (2004). Labors of loss are the construction of an imagination of something lost and of an imagination that it once existed. The task is not simply to reconstruct the imaginary home, but to enchant a modern world with a past, lost to modernization processes (Ramaswamy, 2004).

The widespread notion that the diaspora are frozen in the past is incorrect. Those who consider them not contemporaneous fall into the trap to generalize

from the sentiments and perceptions of home of the guest worker generation that are rooted in Turkish modernity. This modernity is located in the nation's past, not present or future (Özyürek, 2006). Particularly those who left their country in the 1960s and 1970s recollect a golden age of their homeland when it comes to sense of community, moral values and urban space – this, at least, is the image that has passed the "nostalgic filter" and, at the same time, becomes the second-hand experience of home for their offspring.

Expanding beyond the imaginary to spatial manifestations, migrants (re)make their homescape through productive labors of loss, creating various liminal, temporary and permanent places for themselves within the larger urban space, filtered through their nostalgia. Labors of loss do not work along the lines of progress and deterministic narrative, but take an oppositional stance to modern practice (Ramaswamy, 2004: 16). Therefore, productive labors of loss, too, are hybrids of past and present, of tradition within modernity, which Boym calls off-modern (2001). Diasporic off-modernity is therefore a product of imaginary and productive labors of loss, and nostalgia.

While migrants' imaginary labors of loss include narrative, songs and memories of a lost place and time, productive labors of loss manifest themselves in tangible form as a homescape, including traces of home, that is, artifacts of a lost place that also help reconstruct it. Their homescape in Germany arises from social and spatial practices of the diaspora in the form of homemaking (house), associations, festivals, Turkish stores and groceries, institutions (language, religion, folklore and arts). Accordingly, a similar homescape emerges among the German-Turks in Istanbul.

The Emergence of a Homescape in Istanbul

The diaspora – as any group – needs to be considered as a collection of identities, who, despite varieties, share certain commonalities and intimacies. Above all, they share a particular homescape in its imaginary and materialized form through which they are locatable.

Home is a complex, much discussed concept. Within the scope of this chapter, I suggest the following definition as suitable and productive:

> The sign of being at home is the ability to make oneself understood without too much difficulty, and to follow the reasoning of others without any need for long explanations. (Augé, 1995: 108)

As a consequence, homescape ends where one ceases to be understood in terms of ideas, thoughts and actions. I propose that this mutual understanding and shared cultural intimacy creates home beyond the rhetorical and emotional space. Landscapes, spatial structures, architectures and objects of home are material translations of this understanding. With this notion of home as material and materialized, I aim to go beyond the emotional and imaginary (Bachelard, 1958, Bloch, 1985, Chambers, 1994, Jackson, 1995, Ramaswamy, 2004, Bertram, 2008). My observations depart from the view that each new home aspires to be the original (Bachelard, 1994), yet I agree that certain traces linger on. They can become part of a new home, but each home is itself an original that mirrors the particular moment in time of the place-maker. I also contest the notion that migrants have lost their past; it is there to dwell with them, encoded as spatial memory in tastes, smells, objects, layouts, architecture, land- and cityscape. The German-Turks (re) turn to their homeland and, through their productive labors of loss, reconstruct a *diasporic homescape* at home.

To locate the German-Turks, we need to understand their home-making practices in liminal, temporary and permanent spaces of the homescape.[5]

This process happens, according to what Hannerz calls, sequential models of diasporic space (1996: 126-137). The diaspora at home participates (once again) in the cultural market.The German-Turkish homescape is the location of diasporic identities, shared cultural intimacy, and a series of places that emerge from and transcend these concepts.

Various scholars have influenced my understanding of the production of diasporic space as hybrid and heterotopic, both in its liminal, temporary and permanent form (Turner, 1967, Foucault, 1986, Lefebvre, 1991, Augé, 1995, Soja, 1996, Bhabha, 2004). Augé points out that the current age of supermodernity is one of excess, predominantly in terms of time (overabundance of events), spaces (globalization and technologies) and individual references (as opposed to a reliance on collective identification and history) (1995: 30-31, 40). While new spaces arise from heightened mobility through contemporary globalization, they also trigger a search for symbolic stability in the form of peaceful homes and mother countries (1995: 33-34). Populated with an organic society, homescape is not an Augéan non-place; rather, it can be defined through the concept of heterotopia, hybrid or third space.

The homescape of the German-Turkish diaspora in Turkey is the space of embodied diasporic cultural intimacy and a result of productive labors of loss, that is, individualized practices of homemaking in imaginary and materialized forms.

5 I use de Certeau's notion of spaces as identified by movement and relation of objects and bodies who transform places at given moments (1984).

This homescape is a hybrid or collage of different cultural practices and elements in all its complexity. While the rhizomatic nature of culture makes clear separations impossible without the danger of falling into stereotypes, I will attempt to extract some of the significant characteristics of this homescape. In the vast landscape of home, I would like to focus on two patterns that became dominant in my research: the liminal and temporary space of the ritual or organized social encounter, and the permanent individual house as container of identities and memories.

To grapple with the liminal and temporary homescape as first recurring pattern, Victor Turner's work is a starting point (1967). While Turner sees liminality in the context of a passage as unilinear process to a higher state, I consider the passage as a transitioning in and out of the respective liminal space, without necessarily changing the individual as a consequence. The rituals or events in the German-Turkish liminal space serve the purpose to re-connect or re-establish individuals as part of a group with shared attributes. The space relates to a passage of time by re-creating moments and experiences from a shared past.

Diasporic liminal spaces are temporary, serving the purpose of celebrating a state of cultural hybridity. An example for such hybrid expressions is Christmas, an imported ritual, re-interpreted and experienced in the German-Turkish community in Istanbul, with *Kestane Kebap* and *Glühwein* (grilled chestnuts and hot mulled wine). These kind of rituals are understood among the participants as a particular experience of their identity as German-Turk, exclusive to insiders. Apart from rituals, the organization of lectures and receptions around questions of common interest to the community, such as integration, Turkish language and gestures, or the future of relations between Germany and Turkey are organized in liminal spaces. Other events fall under the category *Stammtisch*, which is a term for a regulars' table that takes a special position in German pubs and is not to be occupied by outsiders of the group.

In this context, German-Turkish *Stammtisch*-meetings are organized to reminisce, discuss everyday life in Turkey and support each other. Liminal spaces can be found throughout Istanbul, for example on the top floor of the Suriye Passage on Istiklal Avenue, the Cezayir conference salons in Beyoğlu or various coffee places and pubs that become temporary meeting spots for the German-Turkish community of Istanbul. The *Stammtische* are divided along socio-cultural background, political interests, and stance toward life in Germany and Turkey. The tone and atmosphere ranges from professional business circles and social gathering to groups with aggressive performances of hegemonic Turkishness. The socially, professionally and culturally minded *Stammtisch*e actively condemn racist politics and ideology among their members, which is why certain groups do not intermingle. The diversity

within the German-Turkish diaspora in Istanbul is mirrored through the various *Stammtische* and their corresponding Facebook groups.

The second recurring pattern within the homescape is the permanent space of the house. It is a symbolic universe, a container where memories and markers of the owner's identity are stored. The permanent spaces become more powerful than liminal ones in their possessive nature: they represent themselves as manifestations of events and times in a given place, they become agents. The house as home is paradigmatic for this agency: as much as the owners believe to possess their home, it possesses them and locates them on social, cultural, temporal and spatial axes (Miller, 2001).

I will attempt to identify a few elements that are most clearly foreign to local (architectural) culture. In other words, despite being symbolically German, they acquire a hybrid character through their deconstruction, re-interpretation and re-appropriation by my informants. From observations of German-Turkish homes in Turkey, it becomes evident that objects encode their owners' memories of the past. Apart from items such as German kitchen appliances and beer mugs, a particular object that receives a prominent and central place in the German-Turkish house is a computer or laptop with virtual communication applications such as Skype. This fills the emptiness of absent family members so that the family can gather regularly in the living room. With regard to comparisons between architectural layouts of German-Turkish homes and their Turkish neighbors, boundaries seem to shift toward porosity and diminishing thresholds between representational and private space, partly owed to changing gender roles and functions within the household. An example of this is an open kitchen, oriented to the living room, which in turn has a large opening to the garden, connecting inside and outside, guests and owners with each other. Another conspicuous element of German-Turkish homes is "placeholder space": rooms kept for the children or relatives who are supposed to occupy them. These rooms bear the promise of temporal presence of the occupant in the parental house during holidays, and, at the same time, are painful reminders of the loved ones' absence and expectation of their subsequent move, which might never happen. "My Turkey is in Germany" were the words of a young German-Turkish woman in Berlin.

The German-Turkish diaspora's every practice of making themselves at home in Turkey consists of tactics to counteract alienation and to (re)insert themselves into Turkish communities. At the same time, these tactics are the very means of creating a diasporic homescape in Istanbul. While "diasporic homescape" might suggest that it is occupied by the Other, it is instead both a source of diasporic cultural intimacy and empowerment of the diasporia as another Self. I suggest thinking of the emerging German-Turkish homescape in Turkey not as another cultural form

against an autochthonous Turkish landscape for the simple reason that "pure" cultural forms and identities only exist in the minds of those who instrumentalize them. By instrumentalization, I refer to the use of architecture and the forging of the "good citizen" as hegemonic tools of the nation-state.

A Troubled Gaze Toward Home

Diasporic off-modernism should not be disregarded when seeking explanations for the support of the Gezi movement from abroad, both on the streets and in social media. The transformation of urban spaces that carry high symbolic value triggers off-modern labors of loss among the diaspora with tha aim to preserve a homescape from the past against top-down urban transformation. Many German-Turks abroad have met the Gezi protests with sympathy and organized supporting movements in various German cities. Aware of the internet and social media restrictions within Turkey, they took upon the task of public voice for their fellow citizens at home whose possibility of free expression was questionable at times. While the social transnational space between Germany and Turkey has already expanded into the virtual realm, the political engagement of the German-Turkish diaspora in matters of Turkey is a more recent one: the diasporic political space has expanded with the possibility to vote abroad.

Over one million Turks in Germany were eligible to participate in the 2014 Turkish presidential election through absentee voting according to legal changes implemented by the Turkish government (deutschlandfunk.de, 2014). Less than 10% of eligible voters, however, took advantage of their right. This circumstance is owed to the complicated bureaucratic process to obtain permission to vote, technical failures of a complex online application system, logistical costs of taking days off of work to travel to polling stations, assignment of different voting dates and times among family members, lack of interest in Turkish politics, lack of trust in the process as votes were not counted on site in Germany but shipped to Turkey (Abadan-Unat, 2014), and the spatial distribution of mega-polling stations onto only seven locations in Germany- Frankfurt, Hannover, Munich, Berlin, Dusseldorf, Essen, and Karlsruhe (tagesschau.de, 2014). The question remains whether absentee voting is a means of touting votes or a deliberate attempt to connect the diaspora more strongly to the homeland through political participation.

Abadan-Unat and her team explain that the first and second generations of German-Turks follow Turkish politics on a daily basis, while the third and fourth generations tend to be more interested in German politics, defining themselves as

rather German/German-Turkish instead of Turkish (2014: 27). Despite these differences, all voters agreed that political developments in Turkey will have an effect on how they are perceived in Germany. While the more secular voters were worried that Turkey's turning into an authoritarian Islamic state would reflect negatively on them, religious-conservative voters believed that the economic development of Turkey would have a positive impact on the image of Muslims in Europe (2014:31). With a troubled gaze toward Turkey, the diaspora awaits developments around the next elections.

Destination Turkey and Inbetweenness

Economic promise attracts many German-Turks to Turkey. Istanbul is an ideal site that creates an atmosphere of local cosmopolitanism (Boym, 2001): encounters between local and global cultures take place in the physical space of the city. Facilitated by globalizing processes, Istanbul departs from its character as industrial city and moves into services. Most of my informants describe it as a dynamic, lively place, with stronger support for entrepreneurship than in any place in Germany. Why, then, do some of the multi-lingual, highly skilled German-Turks depart again for Germany? Between spaces and identities, the younger German-Turks understand themselves as bridges between their two homes- and when in one, always longing for the other. Even those who are well adjusted in both Germany and Turkey report recurring sentiments of inbetweenness. The reasons for an unfulfilling move to Istanbul range from misunderstanding the needs of the Turkish market to unwillingness to compromise socially and culturally. Areas of complaint voiced by my informants include working conditions and practice, Turkish bureaucracy, traffic in Istanbul and lack of courtesy toward pedestrians, the role of women, littering and environmental preservation, and attitudes toward child rearing and education. The main factor of frustration are conflicts arising in daily work situations. One could get a glimpse of other areas of life experience during short stays of vacation. Those insights, however, are insufficient preparation for a permanent move into a work life in Turkey.

The Turkish market needs more than individuals with an education and language proficiency moving from Germany. What is key in finding a job is the personal network. Individuals can distinguish themselves from competitors with their intercultural competencies in connection with required qualifications. My informants mentioned differences in terms of work routine, ethics and practices, planning processes and precision. Those who have successfully established them-

selves in the job market are flexible and creative thinkers, willing to compromise. A German-Turkish restaurant owner who has lived in Istanbul for18 years explained that "the most difficult part is to synchronize the image you have in your head with the image your Turkish interlocutor has in mind after you explained yours. With 99% certainty our images differ when we first talk about it." Therefore, cultural intelligence, tact, sensitivity and patience are essential attributes for successful collaboration and communication.

Each market is governed by its own laws, and each culture has its own intimacies. If this is understood and accepted, German-Turks will find a dynamic job market ,which is upwardly mobile and diverse.

Conclusion: Locating the German-Turks

Once and for all, we should do away with notions of the migrant as stuck in the past, and instead accept a multiplicity of cultural trajectories that do not (have to) converge. While hybrid spaces emerge in reciprocity with hybrid identities, one needs to bear in mind that the condition of a hybrid is far more complex than adding A plus B; a hybrid is also always something new. At the same time, hybrids do not stand against any autochthonous culture or space- these concepts are, in fact, rhizomatic and interwoven. There is no such thing as "pure" culture and space: this notion only exists in the nation-state imaginary. Therefore, a shift in focus from the nation-state and ethnic groups to urban space and localities, as well as considering transnational communities and urbanization processes in flux, is necessary. Scholarship on the nexus between migratory movements and urban landscapes in an age of urban transformation (Mitchell, 1996, Glick-Schiller & Cağlar, 2010) has paved the way for this approach.

Migration is unfolding in social, cultural and physical space. Particularly the offspring of the guest worker generation returns to Turkey with relative wealth in terms of social, cultural, economic capital, which turns them into so far underestimated actors in the production of social, cultural, and urban space in Turkey. Hence, the rewriting of social, cultural and urban orders is made possible through the migrant's presence.

Inbetweenness is as significant for the condition of modernity as is the preoccupation with loss (Ramaswamy, 2004). Therefore, the German-Turk – in fact, any migrant – must be a very central, contemporary figure: "the migrant's sense of being rootless, of living between worlds, between a lost past and a non-integrated present, is perhaps the most fitting metaphor of [the] (post)modern condition" (Chambers,

1994:27). German-Turkish labors of loss are imaginary, but also productive, materializing as homescapes. The homescape becomes the means through which to locate the migrant. Collective history has never been as relevant for individual histories as today, whereas individual production of meaning is necessary when reference points for collective identification become vague (Augé, 1995: 37). De Certeau describes how individuals engage tactics to maneuver this identification, the "art of being in between" (1984:30). This art becomes a central migratory practice. Inbetweenness can be a source of empowerment instead of alienation, precisely when it gains a value in the sense of distinction. Some of the younger German-Turkish professionals in Istanbul embrace their transnational background and refer to themselves as *Deutschländer* – someone belonging to Germany – a term that is positively charged and represents their empowerment and affiliation. I believe that inbetweenness- the initial source of alienation and frustration- is in fact a competitive advantage that helps the migrant to a higher position in the "global hierarchy of value" (Herzfeld, 2004) – if the individual understands maneuvering the inbetween as a skill, and if this is acknowledged as such by social, cultural and professional environments.

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A Turkish Epistemic Community: Sociology of a Foreign Policy Brainstorming

Jean-Baptiste Le Moulec

Introduction

The involvement of scholars in politics or in policymaking is not new in Turkey. National identity construction and state construction received an important contribution from scientific circles starting from the creation of the Turkish Republic. It was even part of the modernity of the political project to be constructed on a "scientific basis" (Boğaç & Turan, 2004). Nevertheless, it appears that academic participation in foreign policy making has never been so important and so structured in Turkey. It is the structuring of this academic intervention that is the focus of this paper.

The French scholar Dorronsoro (2009), influenced by the Turkish scholar Yavuz, underlined that in Republican Turkey the reshaping of foreign policy was generally linked to a prior shift in identity politics. Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP government tried to launch such an identity reformulation, sometimes calling it a "restoration policy"[1] – a series a measures aimed at a restitution of Turkey's supposedly true Islamic and Middle Eastern identity. Turkey's foreign policy towards the Arab Middle East – countless diplomatic, humanitarian and commercial initiatives (Oran, 2012) – between 2003 and 2010 has therefore been a manifestation of this policy.

1 Presenting it as a restoration, as a brand new policy in Turkish history may be considered also as a discursive element and a part of the packaging of this policy. However, it does not stand in front of historical analysis. Indeed, previous Middle Eastern oriented policy –if not aiming the region as a whole, as least targeting some countries regarding to their vicinity or to their resources- were performed in Turkey before the AKP period. One of these anterior policies have noticeably been conducted by Prime Minister and then President Turgut Özal in the 80' and beginning of the 90'.

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In search of legitimacy and theorization, but also because AKP supporters include several categories of intellectuals – scholars, journalists, writers – the government found it convenient to lean on "experts" with academic credentials, field experience or media visibility. While looking at this relationship from the scholars' side, one is struck by the institutional organization, as well as by the volume of academic production on Middle East-related subjects in recent years in Turkey. Understanding these institutional mechanisms, identifying in sociological terms the diverse actors behind it and trying to assess the development of this constellation of actors through changing national and international conditions is the aim of this contribution.

This chapter is based on three series of semi-structured interviews conducted in Istanbul and Ankara in 2013 and 2014.

A need for putting in perspectives/context

The 2000s became known as the 'Middle East decade' in Turkish foreign policy. An academic interest in Arab societies that goes beyond the geopolitical discourse on the Middle East[2] seems to have emerged on behalf of several actors operating inside or on the edges of the Turkish academic arena. Although it may seem belated to some observers unfamiliar with Turkey's history, the birth of this field of expertise was politically inconceivable until the late 1990s. The main reason of this inconceivability was the ideological function played by the estrangement from the Arab Middle East in the Kemalist conception of Turkish identity and international vision (Özdalga, 2006). Indeed, the social and political upheavals that occurred in Turkey when the Ottoman Empire fell led Mustafa Kemal to help define a set of principles on which a "modern" political system and state could be founded. In the Kemalist view, political, social and economic modernity was hampered by traditions, especially regarding the place of Islamic rules and clerics in the political arena. While Kemalism was becoming the ideological basis of the new regime, the Arab countries, whose nationalism was considered as one of the causes of the break-up of the Ottoman Empire (Arsel, 1973), became an anti-model, a symbol of political and cultural obscurantism, unable to achieve economic progress. Consequently, those advocating rebuilding ties with these Arab countries were suspected of harbouring reactionary politics and endorsing military separatism.

2 Convenient term that refers to different sets of countries and areas, hence becoming vague.

The 1997 "post-modern" coup was the ultimate manifestation of this "anti-Arab" attitude of the regime keepers[3]. Disdain and distrust towards the "Arab" had been fueling stereotypes and antipathy for many generations of Turks. Still, a review of Turkish foreign policy reveals that from the 1950s the Menderes government planned to develop the ties with some Near East governments and Gulf States (Oran, 2001). Later, in the 1970s, in a period of political and social unrest in Turkey, some left-wing militants joined the PLO camps in Lebanon, thereby developing transnational partisan networks on which, for instance, the Halk Demokratik Kongresi capitalized to gather two Middle East Conferences in 2012 and 2013 in Istanbul[4]. In the 1980s and 1990s, Turgut Özal and his economic partners tried to launch at a much larger scale a new sets of relationships with Arab countries, with several aims: geostrategic security (water and oil), economic expansion lead by the emerging Anatolian industry and stemming the Kurdish issue (Oran, 2001 & Picard, 2000). After Özal's death, Turkish-Middle East policy continued to develop while "Islamist" parties were slowly gaining legitimacy in the Turkish political landscape, a rise that was stopped in 1997. The peace process negotiated with Syria in 1998 after a crisis that brought the parties on the threshold of war is rightly considered a positive development in Arab-Turkish détente[5]. In this respect, the "Davutoğlu effect"[6], in the foreign policy arena as well as among scholars[7], created by this former scholar's books and diplomatic initiatives appears as a powerful incentive triggered in a new political context rather than an actual origin of the constitution of a Turkish expertise on the Middle East.

3 http://www.haber365.com/Haber/28_Subat_Surecinde_Yasananlar/

4 http://www.ertugrulkurkcu.org/haberler/hdk-ortadogu-konferansi-tamamlandi/#.VDeaPvl_uOk

5 Interview with B.P. Ankara, December 2014. Interview with N. Mert, Istanbul, November 2012 (especially concerning the "Ortadoğu Kadınları" movement).

6 This is an allusion to G. Zengin's biography of A. Davutoğlu entitled *Hoca: Dış politikada Davutoğlu etkisi* (2012).

7 It is interesting to note that not only did A. Davutoğlu, as a thinker and as a teacher, had had a deep influence on his former students, he is also considered a major theorist by scholars standing clearly outside of Islamic political thought. Once we also take into consideration some of the institutions founded by the Hoca (Bilim ve Sanat Vakfı in particular made me think of a "tekke"), one might be tempted to draw a parallel with the inter-individual ties and institutional organization Sufi brotherhoods (such as described by Zarcone,

Social sciences in Turkey

Turkish social sciences developed at Dar-ül-Fünun University and at the Mülkiye School of Public Administration in the last century of the Ottoman Empire. Once the Republic was founded, social sciences continued to develop at Istanbul and Ankara University, but were also deepened at METU and Bosphorus Universities (Şahin, 2013). To sum up, Turkish political science on the one hand was, until recently, a state-centered subject that mainly focused on constitutional issues and administrative technicalities. On the other hand, sociology (heavily influenced by Ziya Gökalp's writing through the 1940s) seems to have been continuously accused by some Turkish intellectuals of being too exogenous. Regardless, even if political science soon showed an interest in international comparisons (Boğaç & Turan, 2004), Turkish social sciences only manifested a late attention to foreign societies.

The successive reorientations of foreign policy objectives after the Cold War, towards Central Asia, the Caucasus and eventually the Middle East (Oran, 2001 and 2012), may have been a first incentive for the diversification of social research toward transnationalism. Private research foundations were integral in this transformation from the 1970s through the 2000s, and were at the cutting edge of expanding the field.

In addition, sociopolitical processes such as the expansion and internationalization of political Islam and the re-emergence of the Kurdish issue in the Turkish political and media agenda since the 1980s heightened interest in funding of more reseach facilities. A proliferation of private universities (Béhar, 2009) and Ph. D. programs grew as a result, catering to this new direction in Turkish social sciences. This new field, or sub-discipline, is by nature interdisciplinary – international relations, sociology, political science – interinstitutionnal, based on a partnership between universities and think tanks.

The following analysis of the emergence of a Turkish-Middle East expert community and the politicization of the academic arena is a critical element to understand how this sub-discipline took shape. Indeed, politicization reached such a high level of polarization between radical left and ultra-nationalists in the 1970s that the Army coup in the 1980s opened the way to deep structural reforms in humanities and social sciences fields (Turan, 2008). Again, in 1997, the high command of the military forces published a message on its website that identified, among other targets, the students and teaching personnel of humanities and social science accused of excessive Islamization[8]. These disciplines were considered 'dangerous'

8 See note 3.

and a potential threat to national character of Republicanism and (Gourisse, 2012) that the state must be protected from these influences.

1 Turkish Middle East expertise: A State-driven capacity building enterprise

As of the late 1990s, Turkish experts on the Middle East gained greater profile academically and on the foreign policy stage (Le Galès & Thatcher, 2000), influencing the AKP's stance to the Middle East.

A Human resources

This foreign policy academic network is made of academic and non-academic actors. All parties involved share a common goal: to develop Turkish knowledge of the Middle East, as well as self-promoting themselves in at least one of these three fields: academia, media and state administration. Many key individuals were drawn from ex-left-wing activists[9], journalists and columnists, university professors at the height of their career, young scholars willing to promote new subjects or new approaches, foreign-trained think-tank managers and host-scholars coming from the Middle East.

Journalist played a double role, usually as a specialist of an issue and/or a region or country on the one hand, and as media agents who collect and amplify the diffusion of information collected from specialists of an issue. Their access to the public through communication channels is an asset that can be envied by speech-producers such as scholars. Journalists can also borrow a great deal from the analytical and theoretical frames developed in the academic field. This partially explains the collaboration of scholars and journalists on Middle East expertise in Turkey[10]. This teamwork has taken different shapes, from the coproduction of think tank reports to the publication of analytical books.

University professors are another key group. In addition to national and international academic credentials, some Turkish-Middle East-specialist professors may also hold a management position in the higher education system (state research institute, department head, YÖK membership), have a consultative or/and man-

9 A very restrictive number even started from the 80'. The icon of this micro-phenomenon being one of Radikal's columnist : Cengiz Çandar.

10 One can think, among others, of Cengiz Çandar, Mete Çubukçu, Fehim Taştekin, Hahkan Albayrak.

aging function in a private research foundation, good visibility in national media though a press-column, a TV program or appear as a frequent guest-"expert" on television shows.[11] This multiposition leads to a concentration of relational influence and control over material resources in the hands of a few actors. This concentration and the circulation trends taken by these resources can be seen as another sign of the consolidation of the network.

The "Strategic Depth generational" group

As it happens, many experts are usually age between 25 and 45 years of age. Despite two series of interviews, and the fact that the majority professed an ideological alignment with the AKP party (Islamic conservatism; high sense of civilizational particularism), it was not possible to discern other unifying characteristics shared by these actors. In this sense, Islamic conservatism sometimes seems a weak link (Granovetter, 1973) compared to other shared characteristics such as the common generation, city/region, university, class etc.

Success in the Turkish school system and the efficient use of meritocratic mechanisms is another of the elements the members of this group have in common. For instance, we note that most of them went to an "Anadolu lisesi", a selective high school in which part of the curriculum is taught in a foreign language. Most pupils go onto (often) a prestigious Turkish university. Studying in a private educational foundation – dershane – while also studying at university is a way for some students to maintain their Turkish Islamic cultural background that is less apparent in the western-shaped top universities such at METU, Bosphorus University or Bilkent.

Some of these students pursue post-graduate degrees as well. Doctoral supervision with one academic in Turkey and one abroad is not uncommon, and is seen to aid entry into Turkish academia.

On the ideological level, this group seems to share the conviction that the Islamic identity of Turkish society has been systematically erased by the state under military control. Many of those interviewed saw it as their duty to redress this. In this regard, the 1997 coup, also called Process of the 28th of February (Yavuz, 2003), by which the military command cracked down on what they saw as anti-Kemalist manifestsations of Islamization, plays a critical in the narratives of many inter-

11 TRT hosts several programs invited or even presented by scholars and or researchers. For instance "Küresel Siyâset" presented by Mesut Özcan (director of SAM, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 's think tank) and Ufuk Ulutaş (Foreign Policy Research Director at SETA, an prominent Ankara think tank with offices in Istanbul, Cairo and Washington). Another example could be Yiğit Bulut's program called Sansürsüz that brought him to invite several think tanks researchers.

viewees who had to subsequently abandon academia, or heavily proscribe their academic interests and pursuits[12].

Foreign education nurtured bonds between Turkish students abroad, and those intereviewed commonly suggested that it was studying in the West which showed them exactly how Anglo-centric world history and politics is. Coming from a country that, in other times, used to perceive itself as the center of the world, some students found this reality challenging.

This feeling of "being absent of History" has been detailed by Ahmet Davutoğlu in Küresel Bunalim (2002), a series of interviews published just one year after the Stratejik Derinlik (2001). The reason why I call this group the "Strategic Depth generational group" is because echoes of Davutoğlu's philosophy were present in the students that I interviewed. These students often make up a dynamic minority of high-achieving academics with regional specializations relevant to the interests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In addition to these main characteristics, some minor features can be observed with quite a high frequency in this group. For instance, because of the limited or mainly theoretical knowledge of Middle Eastern languages, such as Arabic, field studies remain quite rare amongst Ph.D. candidates. Students of international relations, for example, favor second hand sources and theoretical discussions[13]. The dominance of international relations scholars over political and social science personnel partly explains these trends, and the fact that academic production favors regional approaches to country-based and micro-sociologic studies[14]. Last but not least, a phenomenon of disciplinary or regional "transhumance" is observed regarding the elder scholars who specialized in another discipline or region of interest – Central Asia, Caucasus, Turkey-US relationships, European studies – fifteen to twenty years ago and then started focusing on the Middle East in the early 2000s.

12 Interview with T.K., Bilim ve Sanat Vakfı, December 2012, Istanbul. See also: http://www.minaret.org/allman.htm

13 We will see below how think tank research differentiate themselves and attract scholars in these concerns: language and fieldwork.

14 According to the analysis of about 450 contributions linked to Middle East related topics out of 2500 articles published in 8 "academic" journals, 5 of which coming from think tanks (Perceptions; Insight Turkey; Ro'ya Turkiyya ; Ortadoğu Etütleri ; Turkish Policy Quarterly ; Turkish Yearbook ; Istanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi ; Akademik Ortadoğu), 120 were dealing with region in general terms through a transversal theme and 115 were taking "Arab countries" as a whole.

The US-trained think-tankers

Among the members of this "Strategic Depth" generational group who studied in the United States, some enrolled in American private research to finance their studies and/or enrich their work experience. The know-how and the relationships they cultivated there was reinvested when they came back to Turkey in the creation or the management of strategic thinking foundations close to the AKP government. These networks that were engendered in the US were often constructively transplated back to Turkey once their time in the US ended.

Foreign contributors

Actors of many nationalities play a role in shaping Turkish-Middle East expertise. As note 17 above explains, the documentary analysis in this study reveals that apart from approximatively 250 Turkish contributors, there were 80 Arab and Iranian editors, as well as about a hundred western authors. Since the late 2000s and even more since 2011 and the beginning of the Arab Spring, the number of Arab scholars invited to academic events such as the Arab-Turkish Congress of Social Science[15] taking place in Turkey or for longer stays as lecturers, has increased in significant measure.

Knowledge brokers on the one hand, they also play the role of legitimizing agents both for the academic institutions and journals that call on them and for the administrative elite that interacts with these institutions.

B A chain of "expertise" production based on social networks : from universities to think-tanks

How did it begin? The pacification of Turkey-Syria relations followed by the extension of the pacification-expansion policy under Davutoglu's " mastermindship" creates a window of opportunity for a number of scholars who had a direct or indirect interest in the Middle East, Arabic-speaking individuals in particular. However, this is insufficient to explain the growth of this Turkish-Middle East expertise. How come that so many vocations – shown in the increase of Ph. D. candidates

15 ATCOSS, is an association whose function is to organize this annual congress that takes place alternatively in Turkey and in Arab capitals. It is backed up by the Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü (SDE), an Ankara think-tank whose president is a founding member of the AKP. The president of ACOSS is a member of SDE as well as a professor at Marmara University Middle Eastern Research Institute.

and master's degree student[16]- for Middle Eastern Studies declared themselves since the late 1990s? This question might partly be answered by looking at the role of think tanks and the ties these organizations keep with some state administrations.

The birth and development of private social and economic research

The first Turkish think tanks were born in the 1970s on the initiative of business executives interested in the extension of policy debate to a larger group than the sole State elite (Turan, 2008). Turkish think tanks offer a mix of functions that are reflected in their organization or in their activities[17]. Since 1990s the number of Turkish strategic thinking entities – be it the Vakıf Foundation, Dernek Association, inter alia – have dramatically increased in the 2000s. Turkish think tanks, even if not all organized identically, still develop the same functions which are slightly different from their American or European counterparts, themselves relying on several strategic thinking organizational models. There are about ten Turkish think tanks that are highly regarded and relied upon for policy formation. Importantly, more than a third of their research deals with Middle Eastern countries –societies, international relations.

Turkish think tanks are usually made of four main organs: the administrative board, the scientific board, the research team, and the consultative board in which occasional contributors are also brought on. These actors also personally benefit from access to material resources, personal relations. The "Strategic Depth Generation" can be found among the permanent research teams – they are often MD holders and PhD candidates – or in the occasional contributors' list[18].

Apart from research and producing analysis that is disseminated in a variety of ways (journal, magazine, reports, policy briefs etc.), these strategic thinking entities organize workshops, conferences and meetings on a regular basis. The invitee list is informed by considerations regarding building the institution's network by mixing categories of actors (scholars, media, state officials and foreign diplomats) on the one hand, and self-promotion of the institution as an influential stakeholder of

16 YÖK statistics only show partially this raise (from 1 in 1984 to 9 in 2011) since most Ph.Ds are still achieved abroad. In this case the only way to assess the increase is to proceed to a biographic review of scholars (yet unfinished concerning this research).

17 Considering the limited length of this contribution, it appeared more practical to describe Turkish Think tanks as a whole here. From an entity to the other however, significant differences are found in the prioritization of the activities, hence in the main functions of the think tank. This aspect is to be developed in further papers and in the thesis.

18 In this case, they are found as authors or one or more articles in the think tanks' publications.

policy definition by presenting its output to government representatives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs' or PM's cabinet members among other), on the other.

What struck me in the first place is the apparent prosperity of this sector. The question of the origin of funds remains unanswered since it was not possible to obtain a budget from any of these organizations. The managers usually claim to have achieved independence, getting the major part of their resources from private donators. As far as public funding is concerned, these managers assert that, besides research funds granted for specific projects by the TÜBITAK or similar state agencies funding reasearch, they occasionally benefit from public resources, notably when they work with universities. Nevertheless, some observers who have shared their insight with me during the survey strongly questioned this version of think tanks' funding. These persons firmly maintained, for instance, that Turkish prominent think tanks rely mainly on three administration's payrolls: the MOFA's, the PM's office's and the President of the Republic's office. Even if these arguments feed a suspicion regarding the actual impartiality of these institutions, the modality of this funding remains unclear. It would seem in addition that, following an old practice already used under military rule, some private companies – or their main shareholders – contribute to the budget of state-related private organizations to show their allegiance to the ruling powers.

This prosperity has a collateral effect on some university departments – international relations, political science, sociology- that constitute the recruiting ground for think tanks. Beside a better visibility and growing prestige –and the indirect material compensation associated – think tanks are very attractive for young university scholars willing to do field work and/or be more involved in policy-making. Hence, the shortage of human resources claimed by some university departments in which this survey was conducted. Attracted by relatively better remuneration, field work, frequent international academic gatherings and a way to develop their competence, some skillful MD holders[19] seem to have preferred in the last years to join a think tank rather than financing their Ph. D by applying to university office positions disguised under the "research assistant" – *araştırma görevlisi*-, ill-paid and undoubtedly less prestigious.

In short, Turkish think tanks have developed a range of complementary functions, which includes managing a pool of scholar contributors to act as an interface between the academic arena and state administrations, and to carry out its mission as knowledge producers.

19 The think tanks managers I met, usually put forward the selectivity of their recruitment procedures, starting with the language skills (English + one foreign language among Russian, Arabic, Chinese, Persian in particular).

2 The impact of foreign… and national politics on Turkish-Middle East expertise

The successive collapse of authoritarianism in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and the rebellion against Bashar Al-Assad's regime in Syria was largely unforeseen, even for experts. However, this wave of revolutions, the Syrian conflict more than the others, had serious repercussions on the AKP government's foreign policy, as well as on Turkey's homeland security. Many experts (Brint, 1990; Stampnitzky, 2011; Lima, 2009) were assigned to crafting Middle East policy[20], drawing on the many resources available in think tanks.

What could be described as a heterogeneous thematic network (Rhodes et Marsh, 1995) in terms of generations, status, social and ideological background, appears to have transformed into a much more exclusive epistemic community (Haas, 1992), or even into a public policy community (Richardson et Jordan, 1983) only made of experts who, first of all, abide by the ruler's need for legitimacy and produce a discourse labelled as "scientific" or "academic".[21]

A Direct repercussions on academia : practical constraints to conduct research

Physical access to countries that were – and still are – the scene of sociopolitical upheaval has become increasingly difficult. On top of that, the Turkish government's position on certain policy matters in the region also limits access to these countries as well. [22] Fieldwork has therefore become problematic for Turkish social science researchers who heretofore had relied on field surveys, especially in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Israel-Palestine and Lebanon. Syria has long been deemed virtually totally

20 By the way, we note that « Foreign Policy Experts" and "Middle East Experts" are two porous categories. Since the Middle East was the main target of the AKP government's foreign policy on the regional level, foreign policy experts were "invited" to produce an analysis on this region, sometimes appearing as region experts. At the same time, experts from other neighboring regions were also attracted to the area, a position justified by the transnational aspect of some questions (ethnic minorities, terrorism, energy, migrations…) or by converting first into foreign policy analysts

21 I noted throughout my fieldwork the manipulation of these words' meaning by the actors. For instance, "academic" is often used in think tanks instead of "scientific". Is it not it a way to "grasp" the legitimacy of the scholars who actually produce think tanks analysis without explicitly claiming that this production fits scientific criteria?

22 E.g., after the impeachment of President Morsi does not help Turkish government-linked experts to look impartial. The same happens in other countries in which the Turkish government supports parties labelled as "Islamists".

inaccessible. Northern Iraq has now become inaccessible due to ISIS' presence. The instability in the region means that access to these regions may remain limited for an unforeseeable amount of time.

This regional instability causes anxiety in both the Turkish population and the government administration. Information and knowledge production is, arguably, more important than ever to counteract potential security threats within Turkey. Consequently, there has been an outcropping of media appearance by Middle East experts, high-level meetings between experts and administration representative organized by think tanks, and a marked increase of academic articles related to this.

In short, the growing crisis in the region has heightened the need for experts and increased the government's reliance on them, despite limited access to on-the-ground information gathering to inform analyses.

B Transformation of an expertise network into an exclusive public policy community

The AKP's policy orientation towards the Middle East has been criticized from the beginning by various intellectuals who regard Turkey as attempting to punch above its weight in a western dominated international arena[23]. Anti-AKP semtiment has grown, culminating in the Gezi Parkı protests of May 2013, alongside these Middle Eastern revolts. Erdoğan-Assad comparisons are not infrequent nowadays privately and in the media.

The eruptions across the Middle East and in Turkey have divided opinion among Middle East experts as to how to remedy these problems and prevent future eruptions. What was a reasonably homogenous opinion of experts has been sharply divided by these recent events.

If we look at the evolutions of the categories of actors and institutions mentioned above in recent years (since 2012), we note that the "Strategic Depth" generational group is becoming the core of a public policy community that tends to marginalize the other categories. Members of the old guard of experts are still present, but are increasingly outnumbered by this new generation. The foreign contributors are also still present but there is a clear preference for Arab specialists now, less so specialists from the West.

On a practical level, having already described the concentration of control and resources in the hands of a few scholars and the politicization of the academic

23 A good summary of this trend can be found in K. Gürsel's columns in Milliyet newspaper but also on behalf of other columnists at Cumhurriyet and some more radical left newspapers. Many scholars with strong secularist beliefs also expressed firm critics on Davutoğlu's policy.

arena in Turkey, it stands to reason that 'compliant' scholars who do not challenge the AKP's stance are favoured in terms of access to funds and resources than more outspoken and critical experts. Academics working between think tanks and universities have also feel pressure to tow the AKP's line. Reshuffling of employees has become more recent as well.[24]

Conclusion

Middle Eastern expertise in Turkey, once unpopular and therefore a less desirable career choice, has become an elite field of knowledge production. For historical reasons and in regard to the nature of their contribution, its actors come from diverse professional sectors. Middle Eastern Studies is a multidisciplinary field which is highly politicized and is perceived to serve the interests of the AKP. Turkish foreign policy was built in cooperation with some authoritarian regimes that have been ousted or strongly challenged since 2010. The future of Turkish-Middle East policy, as well as the cadres of experts which inform it, is at a critical juncture given the ongoing instability in the region. The future is yet to be seen, but the need for robust and impartial social science research is greatly needed.

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24 For instance, the president and founder of ORSAM was replaced in January 2014 by a scholar much closer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. TEPAV, a TOBB strategic tkinking organization (Türk Odaları ve Bursları Birliği, Turkish Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges), have renewed almost half of its domestic researchers at spring 2013. Some of the former researchers seem to have left their position deliberately, "due to a disagreement on management methods" (Interview with B.P., Ankara, December 2013).

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Recalibrating Turkish Foreign Policy After the Arab Uprisings: From Pro-activism to Uncertainty by Easing Off Ideational and Liberal Goals

Birce Altıok Karşıyaka and Sinan Karşıyaka

Introduction

The western-oriented foreign policy tradition changed in the last decade under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP – *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*), and the previously fragmented relations between Turkey and the Middle East (ME) has entered into a new phase. Turkey has increased the level of interactions with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries in terms of political, economic, and cultural affairs. This shift in Turkish foreign policy (TFP) has paid off, the uprisings in MENA countries – also referred to as the Arab Spring – became a breaking point for the whole region. Inevitably, TFP's focus on the relations with these countries was seriously affected. In this turmoil of events, Turkey's policy choices have been widely debated and criticized.

In this paper, we examine recent TFP chronologically, using the Arab Spring/uprisings a critical juncture and an important game changer in the region. The meta-comparison before and after the Arab uprisings give clues as to why the so-called "zero-problem with neighbours" has turned into "problems-all-around". The main aim of this paper is to analyze Turkey's new foreign policy adjustments in the ME from a comparative theoretical framework of Davutoğlu's foreign policy vision and the actual foreign policies on the ground before and after the Arab uprisings. We argue that the continuance of over a decade of foreign politics has recently distanced itself from the main objectives that the foreign ministry had previously emphasized. The paper conceptualizes this distancing as a recalibration of foreign policy as a response to external changes led by the Arab Spring.

However, new directions in foreign policy also emerged with miscalculations in an atmosphere of uncertainty in the region. Understanding the effects of recalibration in TFP and putting into a theoretical framework with empirical support will provide a valuable contribution to the study of TFP and the politics of the region.

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The first section provides a theoretical inquiry into Davutoğlu's foreign policy vision categorized across the main disciplines of international relations (IR). The second section divides Turkey's foreign relations during the AKP era into three phases and focuses on the pre-Arab uprisings period with changes in TFP until 2011. Finally, the third section gives a synopsis of changes in TFP after the Arab uprisings and focuses on the recalibrating elements and consequential effects in TFP in the ME.

Theoretical inquiry into Davutoğlu's foreign policy vision – Different paradigms in a single vision

Theoreticians debate different paradigms becoming intertwined and feeding one another in IR (see Keohane & Nye, 1977; Legro & Moravcsik, 1999; Banchoff, 2001). Davutoğlu's strategic vision of Turkey's foreign politics, *Strategic Depth* (2001), also contains different elements from various IR theories. Davutoğlu emphasizes the importance of Turkey's geo-strategic location together with economic, political and cultural links fostered by shared history, values and security. Davutoğlu's theoretical perspective encompasses elements of distribution of preferences (liberalism), capabilities (realism), the role of information (neoliberal institutionalism) and constructivism. Davutoğlu, having served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and now as the prime minister, has had a long period of time in office to implement his vision of foreign relations. This generates an opportunity to compare his theoretical vision and how it is being put into practice in TFP.

Theoretical inquiry into Davutoğlu's foreign policy vision can be divided into three main IR theories: liberalism, realism and constructivism. As shaped under the leadership of Davutoğlu, liberalism is one of the paradigms in which soft-power goals are enriched with political mediation and conflict-resolution. As a degree of cooperation increases, liberalism turns out to be a positive-sum-game in relations with the neighboring countries. An increase in dialogue means intensification of prosperity and wealth in the region but also indicates an escalation of common-security and peace realization in the region. Being a regional broker is the goal in pursuing these objectives. As part of neoliberal institutionalism, Davutoğlu's search for an active role in the institutions of modern international politics highlights his prioritization of mutual cooperation and dialogue by giving information an important role with a higher chance of gain rather than actors preferring to cheat in an atmosphere with no participation in any international institution. Under his leadership in the MFA, bidding for a non-permanent seat in the United Nations

Security Council (UNSC), appointing a General Secretary to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, current Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu's previous Presidency at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and Turkey's hosting various summits at home and undertaking mediator roles are examples of TFP objectives that envision benefiting from intensive international societal interaction. Through such liberal principles, Turkey seeks to increase its visibility by increasing its leadership positions and becoming part of the decision-making process in the international arena.

Constructivism is the second IR paradigm to analyze Davutoğlu's foreign policy vision. Briefly, constructivism theorizes how foreign relations of countries are shaped by norms, ideas, identities, and ideologies by taking into account the value and norm-based interests and "mutually constitutive social facts" (Wendt, 1999). Davutoğlu, influenced by the Kemalist ideology of "peace at home, peace in the world" with the protection of national sovereignty and integrity, uses a value-based discourse frequently together with ideational references to common history and shared identity to mutually create an environment of peace and dialogue. The "zero problem with neighbours policy" is the policy objective that Davutoğlu aims to construct as part of Turkey's foreign political identity being the peace promoter with a mediator functioning. Finnemore and Sikkink present a "life-cycle of a norm" thesis to explain how change occurs in ideational terms and fractionalize the process of how a norm emerges until it is widely accepted (1998). Applying Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) theory to Davutoğlu's thesis, he emerges as the "norm entrepreneur" in the region aspiring to play a role in the process of "norm emergence" via his book, *Strategic Depth* (2001). This means Davutoğlu actually conveyed the message of his foreign policy direction before he actually put zero-problem argument into practice by taking an office as the Foreign Minister.

Additionally, from a post-structuralist account of constructivism, the rhetorical uses of common identity and values across the region are also connected to morality and national security whereby Turkey seeks to construct its moral responsibility to act, legitimize its own actions and pursue a goal to promote an image of a powerful regional actor (Demirtaş-Bagdonas, 2014). Moreover, Günay and Renda's cognitive analysis on TFP stresses that the discourse used for the ME benefits highly from the European discourse on norms and values; for instance, the foreign ministry frequently emphasizes freedoms and democracy, economic integration and security as the common objectives of Turkey in the ME (2014). The authors contend that, in return, these cognitive uses offer a discursive strategy that aims for legitimization, persuasion and cognition while indicating that they are not the only source of legitimization (*Ibid*: 62).

Finally, realism is the third main theoretical perspective we examine in Davutoğlu's foreign policy goals. According to Davutoğlu's thesis, security and order have a special place and are meaningful for Turkey's maximization of power in the region. That is why he presents the "central country" argument instead of Turkey being a bridge country. As Davutoğlu asserts,

Turkey should make its role of a peripheral country part of its past, and appropriate a new position: one of providing security and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighbouring regions. Turkey should guarantee its own security and stability by taking on a more active, constructive role to provide order, stability and security in its environs (2008).

Davutoğlu envisions an increase in Turkey's area of influence while decreasing its vulnerability by being too attached to US and NATO decisions. In addition to the assertion of independent foreign politicies, the central country thesis needs a connection to different realist paradigms for further explanation. If we were to define the source of power from a classical realist perspective as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men", as Morgenthau argues (1993 [1948]: 30), Davutoğlu's assertion of being a regional power is different than controlling the region, and his power definition additionally includes cooperation, dialogue and economic relations. Yet, as Carr argues, power can also be defined by other means like military, economics, or ideology (1961 [1946]). In that sense, attaching a "centrality" over matters in the region maintains a realist argument. In other words, this "centrality" means to increase Turkey's right to have a say over the matters in its region. Yet, different than offensive realism as Mearsheimer equates regional hegemon with the capability to control the region (2001), Davutoğlu's "central-country" argument cannot be considered as equal to the regional hegemony debate. Different than classical realism and offensive realism, Davutoğlu sees cooperation as more meaningful than competition; he prioritizes diplomacy over military power for Turkey to become a regional power. Turkey, with strong capabilities, is referred to for defensive purposes and as a prerequisite for Turkey to be a regional power according to Davutoğlu's thesis.

With these three main branches, Davutoğlu's foreign policy vision encloses a multi-dimensional active foreign policy prioritizing the preference model. Therefore, when these preferences intervened with a powerful external dynamic like that of the Arab uprisings, inconsistencies emerged as Turkey tried to adapt to the emergence of new actors and recalculate its own preferences. Recalculations necessitated a bigger role for security concerns and led Ankara to take pragmatic steps rather than following principles. Turkey, taking a clear side in the case of Syria, Egypt and Israel means de-legitimization of the mediation role that Turkey had previously set as the ultimate agenda in the region.

We begin our analysis of TFP before the AKP era, follow with the pre and post-2011 periods during the AKP terms, and then compare the two periods by emphasizing new directions in TFP, which we define as *recalibration*.

Turkish Foreign Policy before the AKP Era

According to Baskın Oran, since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, TFP has had two basic principles: maintenance of the status quo and Western orientation (Oran, 2010: 19). Until the end of World War II, Turkey preferred a low level of foreign political involvement and preferred neutrality (Turan, 2011). Turkey's membership in the Council of Europe in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, signing the Ankara Agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963, and submitting full membership in 1987 sealed Turkey's integration into the Western camp. Yet, the Cyprus conflict and the Cuban missile crisis shook relations with the US and led Turkey to normalize its relationship with the Soviet Union and their rapprochement with the ME because of disappointment with Western policies, and a search for new markets and growing Islamic sentiments (Sümer, 2013). During the Cold War, with some exceptions like the 1974 Cyprus intervention, TFP was mostly in parallel with the Western camp.

The post-Cold War period marked the start of increased foreign political activism when Turgut Özal became the prime minister (1983-1989) and continued as the president until his death (1989-1993). During these periods, Özal started neoliberal reforms that also improved relations with countries in the ME and Turkic states (Kut ,2001; Murinson, 2006; Grigoriadis, 2010). However, the sudden death of Özal ended this active period, and the zero-sum approach that had previously been made during the Cold War period re-dominated TFP once again (Karşıyaka, 2011). The Aegean Sea and the Cyprus dispute with Greece, the PKK (Kurdistan's Workers Party – *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*) conflict, water debates with Syria and Iraq, the Armenian issue and ideological concerns with Iran, constituted Ankara's main foreign policy agenda. To sum up, "a Turk has no friend but a Turk" belief can be seen in the TFP mentality in this period that made Turkey a "post Cold-War warrior" (Kirişci, 2007: 52).

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era

The first phase of foreign politics 2002-2007

In order to evaluate TFP categorically under the AKP, we divided the era into three phases. The first phase covers the time period between 2002-2007. One of the most important milestones of this phase is 2005 when accession negotiations officially started with the European Union (EU). Commitment to the EU membership process was crucial for the AKP for various reasons. As a political party whose cadre were former members of the Islamist-oriented *Milli Görüş* tradition, there was serious skepticism about the agenda of the party (Toktaş & Kurt, 2010). Referring to the liberal actor-centered approach in IR theory (Moravcsik, 1997), the AKP strategically used the Europeanization agenda as a tool to eliminate domestic threats (Kemalist-military elite) against its rule and aimed to establish its own power of dominance against other future political alternatives and nondemocratic political threats (Altıok, 2010). Another important political event of this phase was the Iraq War and the memorandum requested by the US to use Turkish territory to open the north front against Saddam Hussein. As the Turkish Parliament rejected the memorandum in 2003, the reliability of Turkey as a partner and Turkey's traditionally fixed western-orientation were questioned. According to Öniş and Yılmaz, "While the March 1 decision on not to allow US troops increased the interests towards Turkey in Arab states, at the same time, it harmed the relations between Turkey and the US" (2009: 10). Therefore, the March 1 decision presented two important outcomes. First, it was a sign that Turkey could pursue an independent foreign policy agenda, although it does not refer to a dramatic break from the Western camp. Secondly, the decision also displayed limitations of TFP since the relations between the US and Turkey was affected, as Turkey desired to pursue an active and gradually independent foreign policy.

Another important move of TFP in this period was the developing relations with MENA countries or, as Öniş describes, "re-discovering" neighbors (2011). Davutoğlu introduced four main principles of Turkey's regional policy, "security for everyone", "dialogue as a means of solving crisis", "economic interdependence" and "multicultural co-existence" (2010). Diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations were prioritized and Turkey started to pursue an assertive multi-dimensional foreign policy. In 2005, for the first time, the Turkish Arab Economic Forum was held in Istanbul and Prof. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu became the first elected Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation. Trade was an important component of this policy. Free Trade Agreements were signed with Syria, Palestine, Tunisia, and Morocco in 2005, and with Egypt in 2005. Foreign direct investment

rose from 1 billion US dollars to 22 billion US dollars from 2002 to 2007. In parallel, trade volume (export plus import) increased to 277 billion US dollars from 87 billion between the years of 2002 and 2007. The percentage of Near and ME countries in Turkish exports rose from 10% to 14% and the percentage of Organization of Islamic Cooperation countries from 13% to 19% in this period. (Karşıyaka, 2011).

The second phase in TFP – 2007-2011

In the second phase, with increasing confidence in domestic politics and economic gains, the period 2007-2011 was a period of mediation, facilitation and active foreign politics. While the first phase helped the AKP to legitimize itself, the confidence Turkey gained during the first phase helped Turkey to widen the playing field in foreign policy. According to Barkey this second phase is characterized by Turkey's gradual attempt at becoming a more forceful player in its immediate region and beyond (2012).

While political, economic and cultural relations continued to develop in this period, Turkey also took a mediator role in the conflicts in the neighboring regions. Considering that the crisis and instability in the region would be harmful for Turkey, according to Davutoğlu, Turkey needed to present herself as a mediator for solving "chronic regional problems" (Mercan, 2009) in order to establish a "belt of peace" (Kornilov & Suleymanov, 2010).

Turkey served as a broker in indirect talks between Israel and Syria on the issue of bilateral relations in the Golan Heights in 2008. However, the talks broke after the *Operation Cast Lead* of Israel to Gaza (2008-09). Turkey also acted as a mediator between Serbia and Bosnia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, groups in Palestine and Lebanon, and between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq. Additionally, Turkey played an active role with Brazil to reach an agreement between Iran and P5+1[1] on Iran's nuclear activities. Similarly, in 2010, the *Group of Friends of Mediation* was founded in the UN "to promote and advance the use of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution" by the initiative of Turkey and Finland.[2]

Relations with the ME continued to advance in this phase and Turkey's stature in the region increased considerably. Turkey and the Arab League signed the *Turkish-Arab Forum Framework Agreement* in 2007, and in 2008 the first summit

1 Five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the US, Russia, China, Britain and France, plus one, Germany.

2 See peacemaker.un.org/friendsofmediation

of the forum was held in Istanbul and the second in Damascus in 2009. Similarly, in 2009, Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council established the High Level Strategic Dialogue. The fifth *Turkish-Arab Economic Forum* was held in Istanbul in 2010. Once problematic relations with Syria were also restored and developed noticeably in this period. Davutoğlu claimed Syrian-Turkish relations to be "a model of progress for the rest of the region" (2008: 80). Turkey and Syria signed the *Joint Political Declaration* on establishing the *High Level Strategic Cooperation Council* in 2009 during President Bashar al-Assad's visit to Turkey. The first meeting of the Council was held in 2009 at the ministerial level in Gaziantep and Aleppo and then in Damascus at the prime ministerial level. Following these meetings, two sides signed the *Visa Exemption Agreement* on the Turkish-Syrian border in 2009 and an additional 50 agreements including areas ranging from political, security, commerce, culture, education and transportation were also signed.

Polls conducted in seven countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq) stressed that 80% of the participants had a positive view and sympathy towards Turkey (Akgün et al., 2010). The report (based on the results of the polls) reached four main conclusions: first, sympathy for Turkey in surrounding countries has gained a structural nature; second, Turkey's mediator role is embraced in the region; third, the economic existence of Turkey in the region has created an understanding of a common awareness; finally, Turkey's visibility in the region is not only limited to political and economic sphere,s but has also started to share cultural elements, for instance, 78% of the participants answered that they watch Turkish soap operas (*Ibid*).

A general evaluation of these two phases displayed a track of following a principle-oriented foreign policy in a fashion; yet, this track did not mean that Turkey was free from problems and disputes. Activism in foreign policy and a continuous reference to Turkey's responsibility in regional disputes due to historical ties disturbed some groups in the region who felt Turkey had a neo-Ottoman agenda, referencing the imperial goals, despite the fact that Davutoğlu repeatedly rejected neo-Ottoman claims. Another problematic aspect in the second phase was that the relations with Israel almost collapsed due to first, Israel's operation in Gaza, then in 2009 Prime Minister Erdoğan's open criticism to Israel on the Palestinian conflict at the *World Economic Forum* in Davos, followed by cutting diplomatic ties after Israel's attack on the *Mavi Marmara* flotilla. Another troubling element of the second phase was the relations with the EU. While the first phase occurred in the heyday of EU-Turkey relations, in this period relations deteriorated. The Cyprus dispute, strong opposition against Turkey's membership in the EU, especially by France and Germany, and dialogue fatigue are major reasons for the decreasing pace of the negotiation process. Nonetheless, in the third phase, we see a clear

deviation (recalibration) in the foreign vision that Davutoğlu had in the previous phases in the ME.

The third phase in TFP after 2011 – Recalibration in foreign policy objectives: from mixed paradigms to realpolitik goals in the ME

Before the Arab uprisings, the established relations with the neighboring countries were less complicated in the eyes of Ankara since there was limited number of actors. In that sense, Henri Barkey rephrases "zero problem with neighbours" as "zero problem with the regimes" (Barkey, 2012: 4). Yet, the Arab uprisings have brought new actors onto the scene like opposition groups, rebel groups, and transitional governments – meaning more external and regional actors. In this picture, the uprisings against the authoritarian regimes pushed Turkey to take a more partisan position while continuing with pro-active foreign policy on matters happening next door. However, pro-activism for matters after the Arab uprisings jeopardized previously envisioned long term foreign policy objectives. Some political scientists and policy analysts have asserted their concerns for such assertive pro-activism to be unproductive and ineffective (see Öniş, 2014).

Upside down policies – Turkey-Syria Relations

The policies before the Arab uprisings were generally based on Turkey's bilateral relations with the regimes in the ME and MENA. Yet, since the Arab uprisings, the political environment has become more multilateral in the ME. Before the Arab uprisings, Turkey facilitated important mediation efforts between Israel and Hamas in the years of 2006 and 2008, as well as between Syria and Israel. Considering the relations and political atmosphere in the post-Arab uprisings period, such a mediation role seems not possible in the short run. Dalay and Friedman argue that

> Turkey's chosen approach damaged relations with Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Turkey lost diversity and depth in its regional relationships –and the capacity to employ facilitation and mediation in the Middle East – without demonstrating a capacity to effect change in Syria (2013: 134).

We also refer to this elimination of mediation compared to previous phases in TFP as part of *recalibration* not only because Turkey's mediation-centered for-

eign policy has diminished, but also the policies have focused more on *realpolitik* concerns. As Turkey started to take sides in the conflicts, its foreign policy was no longer perceived as objective and dialogue-oriented. Turkey failed to persuade Bashar Al-Assad to make necessary reforms in order to end the unrest in Syria. The golden age of relations with Syria left its place to Turkey retaliating with artillery fire against Syria as a response to Syria downing a Turkish jet and firing artillery across the border into Turkey (Dalay & Friedman, 2013). This recalibration could be perceived as a tactical move against the changing dynamics; yet, taking a clear side against previously established ties led Turkey to focus more on realist concerns rather than liberal and constructivist objectives which had together given credit to Davutoğlu's success in the international arena. While the previous foreign policy objectives aimed longer shots of success in the region by establishing diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, the recalibration of foreign policy aims lower, meaning seeking gains in a shorter period of time.

Uncertainty in the region is one of the reasons behind miscalculations and the change in TFP. The issue of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) shows how difficult it is to create a foreign policy free from prioritizing national interests, but at the same time, displays the sensitiveness of actions taken against radicalism. While Turkey constructed its foreign policy based on a post-Assad Syria, the radicalization of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the emergence of groups such as Al-Nusra and ISIS changed the dynamics in Syria. As ISIS became the main concern of the West, removal of Assad from power turned out to be of secondary importance while it continued to be first in TFP. Armed groups fighting against ISIS in Kobane such as the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and PKK, whom Turkey considers a threat to its national security, received international support which eventually pushed Turkey to make a policy choice whether to support PYD and PKK in their resistance against ISIS or to stay out of this conflict but jeopardize its reliability as a trusted partner in its fight against terrorism. This again shows the limits of Turkey to lead an independent foreign policy. As Turkey hesitated to support the defense of Kobane, international pressure on Turkey increased. In the long run, Turkey will continue to oscillate between its interests and the interests of different actors in the region.

Turkey has tried to stay on the right side of history in conflicts in the ME and MENA, but miscalculations and uncertainty caused Turkey to be perceived as disputed. Erdoğan's strong refusal of NATO to intervene in Libya, but then Turkey's decision to be part of the intervention, showed Turkey's dilemma. One reason for that dilemma is the easing-off with liberal and constructivist objectives of previous terms. Secondly, Ankara misapprehended previous phases' self-confidence of taking a pro-active stand surrounded by idealist concerns as part of its power and right to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors. Yet, the recalculations as

a result of the Arab uprisings distanced themselves from the soft-power objectives while displaying the limits of previous terms.

The Arab uprisings intervened in the picture as a disruptively exogenous variable for Davutoğlu's *Strategic Depth* thesis to follow "norm cascade" and "norm internalization" phases after its "emergence" as Finnemore and Sikkink's theory presents (1998). As the neighboring states adjusted to TFP's cooperation-based dialogue and peace, a tipping point could not be attained as new non-state actors emerged with no interests to accommodate his vision. The previous states like that of Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Israel that had previously accepted the norm of mediation also discredited TFP as Ankara preferred a more assertive role distancing itself from the normative dialogue. Here, in line with constructivism, it is important to note that during previous phases, Turkey also started to send, as well as receive messages that it had become an accepted, legitimate soft power in the region and had a say over the matters and relations in the ME. According to TESEV, Turkey's mediator role was appreciated by over 60% of the people in the region; yet, just after the Arab uprisings, the percentage falls below 50% (Akgün et al., 2010).

After the Arab uprisings, Turkey entered a competition phase. Davutoğlu's vision saw cooperation more meaningful than competition, yet the third phase of TFP is much more connected to competition rather than a country capable of establishing dialogue and corporation in the ME. Evidence for competition is seen in Turkey's effort to call for action against Assad as well as Turkey's own initiative to support the opposition while competing with other actors in the UN, NATO and major powers like Russia, Iran, China and the US. Renouncing the legitimacy of the coup d'état in Egypt has displayed another realm of competition with Ankara expecting support to legitimize the Muslim Brotherhood in the international arena. Since Turkey knows the irreparable part of its rebounded action, Turkey has shown an eagerness to change the players in accordance with its interests. Aiming for control over regional matters directs global attention away from liberal and constructivist positions like playing a mediator role towards adopting realist goals which prioritize control, power and competition.

Pragmatism or principles? – Saudi Arabia and Turkey's response to the Arab uprisings

A comparison between two Middle Eastern countries could help understand change in the order of liberal, constructivist and realist paradigms in TFP. Ennis and Momani's study (2013) rejects that there has been a change in Turkey's foreign

policy principles. They compare Saudi and Turkish foreign policy strategies in the midst of the Arab uprisings, and argue that while both countries have been doing a "precarious dance" benefiting from ideology and symbolism along with patronage and diplomacy, Turkey continues with a "principled approach" with economic interests still on the table and a willingness to re-carve a space for itself in the wider MENA region. According to their analysis of Turkey, "support for the will of the people" underlines the longevity of TFP, and, optimistically, dialogue will continue to be on the table. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, sought to consolidate its position in the region and viewed the containment of the Arab uprisings with a mixture of concern and skepticism against the uprisings. While Saudi Arabia's long term antagonism towards Gaddafi informed their support for NATO-led intervention during the Bahrain uprisings, Saudi Arabia's initial responses were to financially support the monarchical rule of a Sunni family in a predominantly Shia society, to help Bahrain suppress democratic protests by sending Saudi forces along with Emirati troops, and to diminish any chance of Iranian influence (Ennis and Momani, 2013: 1135). In terms of rhetoric, Turkey's frequent statements on their support for the will of the people and their decisive no tolerance against authoritarian leaders aiming guns at their own people appears to be principled when compared to the foreign policy steps taken by Saudi Arabia.

Whilst this comparison reveals that Turkey is rich on pursuing a principle-centered foreign policy compared to Saudi Arabia, other analysts argue that Turkey is artificially inflating its mediator potential by lack of effective mediation among the regional actors like in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and with international actors like the US that have real leverage in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Tocci, 2011: 4). Tocci also gives credit to Turkey's overall mediating role; yet, she stresses that its potential is limited and "does not extend to protracted Israeli-Arab quagmire" (*Ibid*). Aras and Akarçeşme connect Turkey's longevity and leadership in the ME to declining US hegemony in the region (2012). Conversely, Steven Cook bases Turkey's previous active role in the Arab world to the region being "politically dead and devoid of authentic leadership" (Cook, 2011). Although analysts like Cook do not give Turkey a decisive role in the future, as the Arab uprisings began, it is also important to stress that Turkey had a stronger voice for humanitarian concerns in the ME (Oğuzlu, 2012: 3).

TFP in this final phase has similar concerns by opening its borders to mass influx of refugees and loudly voicing its concern against massacres and violation of humanitarian law in the ME especially in the cases of Syria, Israel and Egypt. However, the TFP direction prefers a lower or no tone at all for Bahrain, Oman, Tunisia or other regions that also need a humanitarian focus. This does not mean Turkey is insincere in its humanitarian agenda, yet, the discriminative usage of

the humanitarian discourse supports the argument that TFP follows a more interest-oriented direction.

Turkey's Relations with Egypt – deterioration of relations

In the case of Egypt, TFP taking a clear side against the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état elucidates three important effects, as Alper Dede contends: the first effect of the coup in Egypt is Turkey's alienation by losing an important ally in the region; the second, in a more general sense, is that Morsi's removal by the military made other monarchs and autocrats relieved and obstructed Turkey' previous policies to be implemented easily; third, it weakened other pro-democratic groups across the region (Dede, 2013). Zero problem with the neighbors/regimes turned problematic with almost no dialogue in the case of Egypt, Israel, and Syria which were previously considered as the major successes of Turkey's foreign policies under Davuoğlu's principled and multi-sided approach. In ideational terms, Turkey's stand against the military coup can be evaluated with Turkey's emphasis on democratic principles; on the other hand, Turkey did not voice any concerns against Morsi passing authoritarian laws and non-democratic measures during his term (Dede, 2013: 61). Turkey's actions also blur the ideational image and signal interest-based objectives. As a result of the coup, Turkey again did not show any willingness for good-will besides challenging the legitimacy of the regime and mutually downgrading its diplomatic ties with Egypt.

Beyond uprisings – Israel and the continuing activism

In Israel's case, the confrontation with Israel as a result of the *Mavi Marmara* incident raid by Israeli soldiers in 2010 tensed Turkey's relations with the US as well as led to Israel and Turkey cutting diplomatic relations. Yet, on the other hand, Turkey emerged as a country that gives a voice to the Palestinian cause. The confrontation with Israel started at Davos during the World Economic Forum in 2009, known to be the "one-minute" incident in which Erdoğan reacted against the moderator for cutting off his response to Israeli President Shimon Peres, which elicited applause from people who defended the Palestinian cause. Yet his stand turned out to be fruitless in the international arena and echoed weakly in terms of turning Israel's violations of international law into a foreign policy action point. This showed lim-

itations of TFP. A solid policy orientation against Israel meant entering into competition with US interests, and furthermore, Western countries were also reluctant to support any radical Islamists in return for condemning Israel's crimes against humanity and violations of international law. Yet, in principle, Turkey claiming to be the regional decision maker and taking a mediator role damaged its credentials to be a legitimate mediator for the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition to tensions with Israel, Turkey's overall policy orientation towards the ME after the Arab uprisings contributed to Turkey's de-legitimization of its mediator role in the region.

Turkey could have chosen to be more careful and cautious rather than take a clear side after the Arab uprisings. Turkey's policies in the ME have had a reactionary effect on Turkey's other foreign policy preferences. A recent example of that reactionary effect occurred as Turkey announced its second bid for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC for 2015-2016 under the AKP era, but this time its votes dropped down to 60 in the third ballot against Spain. Comparing this drop to Turkey's record of securing 151 of the votes out of 193 in the first round back in 2008 for its bid for 2009-10 UNSC seat displays an image of waning acceptance of Turkey's third term foreign policy activism. Assertive policies accompanied by pro-activism in the ME is one of the points that emphasizes failure. In other regions, Turkey continues to pursue an active foreign policy in a multisided fashion and more in line with previous terms' foreign policy objectives.[3] For this reason, according to Sümer, the Arab uprisings neither changed the goals nor the multi-directional active foreign policy but showed the limits of autonomous foreign policy (2013: 23); yet, TFP preferring to side with new actors, discredited previous mediation efforts in the ME.

3 Yet, Turkey continues to be highly active. Only since the beginning of 2014 has Turkey been admitted as a member of the *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs* (OCHA) *Donor Support Group* on 1 July; assumed the *Chairmanship of the Global Forum on Migration and Development* (GFMD) for 2014-2015; hosted the third mediation conference on 26-27 June under the theme *The Increasing Role of Regional Organizations in Mediation* as continuation of the *Mediation for Peace* initiative Turkey had launched together with Finland in the UN in 2010; held ministry meetings with 14 Small Island Developing States in the Pacific (Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Micronesia, Marshal Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) on 7-8 June; was elected to the *Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage* for the 2014-2018 period in which Turkey previously served on the Committee in the 2006–2010 period; realized mutual visa abolition with Moldova, Belarus, Mongolia and continued to take a mediatory role in negotiations with countries like Somalia and Iran (see mfa.gov.tr *Press Releases*).

Concluding Remarks

Due to the progressively evolving nature of Turkey's foreign pro-activism since 2002 with widening scopes from Latin America to Africa, the Arab uprisings have damaged the bigger picture of political goals that Turkey aims to assert in the region. Turkey, willing to be the agenda-setter in its region by playing the economic, cultural and diplomatic cards, is suddenly faced with uncertainty and security concerns. We argue that prioritizations of foreign policy objectives changed in the post-2011 period compared to the previous terms during the AKP era. For the issues unrelated to turbulence in the ME, Turkey continues its pro-activism in a multidirectional manner. Yet, for MENA, the pro-activism in foreign policy recalibrated its activism towards realist concerns with a diminishing part for liberal and constructivist policies. Immediate short-term responses have dampened the charm of previous liberal and constructivist foreign policy objectives and have led TFP to focus more on realist and interest-driven policies.

It is possible to see realism, liberalism, and constructivism as the components of the TFP vision. Previously, these approaches were not in competition but coexisted in harmony before the Arab uprisings. Liberal and constructivist instruments have become less effective during and after the Arab uprisings. Since the political atmosphere prioritized certain concerns such as survival of the regimes and security in the countries where uprisings occurred, rhetoric that used to be an important part of TFP has materialized as having a limited capacity.

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Chaldiran 2.0: Conceptualizing Iranian-Turkish Relations after the Arab Spring

Magdalena Kirchner and Şafak Baş

When Turkey and Iran join hands, this will [...] become the backbone of regional stability

Ever since the so-called Arab Spring caught the regional powers by surprise in late 2010 and early 2011, Iranian-Turkish rivalry in Syria and other countries has not only exacerbated local conflicts in their mutual neighbourhood but has also impeded cooperation in other areas. These days, however, it seems as if the emergence of a common threat – the rise and aggressive expansion of the recently established *Islamic State Organization* – could lead to a situation where cooperation among them, just as demanded by Turkey's Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu during his 2013 visit to Tehran, would help to re-stabilize a region in turmoil (Hurriyet Daily News, 2013).

Yet, how much do we really know about the dynamics of Turkish-Iranian relations and the factors at play in tumultuous times such as these? Moreover, how do we explain respective policy changes in a systematic way? After the Cold War, literature and academic research on bilateral relations was no longer limited to journalistic descriptions and focused subsequently on four areas: Geopolitical rivalry in the post-Soviet space of Central Asia and the Caucasus; joint attempts to contain Kurdish nationalism in northern Iraq and within their own borders; energy security and mutual economic interests; and the rise of political Islam both as a uniting and dividing factor. While interchanging patterns of conflict and cooperation have always characterized bilateral relations between the two regional powers, mutually perceived security challenges created new opportunities for tailor-made cooperation. This has been especially true in the case regarding energy security, the threat of Sunni Jihadi terrorism, and the containment of Kurdish nationalism both inside and outside their own territories (Olson, 2008).

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Nearly all studies on Turkish-Iranian relations resort either to cultural/religious or strategic/geopolitical explanatory models to explain interaction between Ankara and Tehran. Among the many branches of Foreign Policy Analysis, neoclassical realism aims at reconciling these two models by conceptualizing external state behaviour as the result of systemic incentives (distribution of power, change of security environment) being filtered by unit-level factors (ideas, autonomy in state-society relations) (Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, 2006, S. 11; Taliaferro Jeffrey W., E., & Ripsman, 2009, S. 7f.). By integrating these factors systematically into structural realist approaches centring on the international distribution of power capabilities, neoclassical realist analysis enables a thorough assessment of key factors shaping interstate relations in general and the emergence of cooperation/conflict in particular.

Being placed at the upper level of the Middle Eastern power structure, Turkey and Iran are considered by many as natural rivals for at least sub-regional hegemony. Both command large territories and populations, with more than 20 million men available for military service and spend approximately two percent of their annual GDP on defence. In addition, both share a substantial sense of regional entitlement and leadership, deeply entrenched in their political and cultural history and a narrative of an ever-present imperial past (Ehteshami, 2002, pp. 286-288; Robins, 2002, p. 314f.). While both countries established patterns of cooperation in many fields, such as in terms of economic and many political issues, Turkey's rise to a more assertive foreign policy through a strategy of *soft* power accumulation in the last decade has made bilateral relations more difficult. In the course of the Arab Spring, soft power rivalry and a battle over influence in the Arab world entrapped both countries in a proxy war especially in Iraq and Syria with tremendous repercussions on regional stability.

This is, however, not the first time that they have found themselves at loggerheads. 2014 marked the 500th anniversary of the Battle of Chaldiran, where Sultan Selim I defeated Shah Ismail I, and which enabled Ottoman troops to conquer the Safavid capital of Tabriz. While many saw the government's recent decision to name the third Bosporus Bridge in Istanbul after Sultan Selim as part of a societal "wider 'war on symbols'" within Turkey, it could also be seen as a message eastwards (Kincal, 2013). On the one hand, it was Selim, who doubled the size of the Ottoman Empire's territory within only eight years, prevented the export of Shia Islam to Anatolia, and became the first Sultan to officially take the title "Caliph of Islam". On the other hand, Safavid balancing and exploitation of internal and external problems of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of Chaldiran entrapped both of them in a war over Iraq, which resulted in the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639, establishing a border respected by both ever since and also an equilibrium of power in the

region. The diplomatic relationship eventually created by the Treaty indicates that the *de facto* acceptance of a formal, regular diplomatic relationship had the power to endure despite its uneasy existence against a constant background of *de jure* hostility (Tucker, 2012). And yet, there is widespread agreement among analysts that the above-mentioned equilibrium has been at least challenged by the domestic upheavals in their immediate and wider neighbourhood (Uzun, 2013). If the Arab Spring has been Turkey's Chaldiran 2.0, what are the odds that current initiatives will eventually restore the power equilibrium?

This article addresses firstly Turkey's foreign policy responses to challenges and opportunities emerging from the upheavals in North Africa and Syria, as well as the simultaneous U.S. disengagement from the region in general and Iraq in particular. Secondly, it examines the effect of these policy choices on Turkey's relations with Iran and thirdly Tehran's policy responses to the shifting security environment in its Western neighbourhood. It argues that it was Turkey's misperception of the actual power distribution in the initial phase of the uprisings and a series of domestically generated policy choices reflecting maladaptation to systemic incentives that led Ankara to pursue an overassertive policy towards the Arab world. By failing to anticipate the perception of other actors in the region in general and Iran's in particular, Turkey faced both the limits of its leverage over regional actors and the negative and destabilizing repercussions of Iranian counterbalancing.

Theory – foreign policy as a means of adjustment

Every student of International Relations knows the structural realist notion that the material and objective distribution of power capabilities under the condition of international anarchy sets the incentives for state behaviour in general and foreign policy in particular. Structural realism assumes that the international system encourages similarly placed states to behave in a similar way due to strong incentives for functional similarity and emulation of successful practices. The transformation of this encouragement into state behaviour, however, is a process to be found at the national level, thereby exceeding the realm of structural realism (Schweller, The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism, 2003; Ripsman, 2002, S. 72; Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, 2006, S. 127). Unit-level factors come into play only if they impede effective self-help and thus provoke a punishing response by the system (Waltz, Evaluating Theories, 1997; Rathbun, 2008). Such a situation emerges if ideas or internal fragmentation prevent

states from clearly perceiving and assessing systemic constraints (Sterling-Folker, 1997, S. 19f.; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979, S. 22).
Domestic politics even cause functional dissimilarity, if states cannot mobilize the resources needed to pursue a certain strategy and thus fail to respond accurately to systemic constraints (Schweller, The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism, 2003; Rathbun, 2008, S. 340f.). Eventually, all structural realists agree that those who misread and/or are maladapted to systemic incentives and thus deviate in their behaviour from the path laid out to them are likely to be punished (Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979, S. 127; Walt, 1987, p. 2). Taking these unit-level factors seriously and aiming at tracing the process of policy deviation, neoclassical realists place ideas and domestic factors as a conditional variable systematically in the causal chain between systemic incentives and actual policies (Figure 1). Such a "theory of mistakes" as Randall Schweller put it, could help to explain, how and why states pursue policies that firstly reflect a misperception of systemic incentives (or maladaptation to correctly perceived ones) and secondly produce unintended and negative policy outcomes.

Fig. 1 Causal chain in neoclassical realist FPA

A pleasant surprise? Turkey's ideology driven foreign policy and the Arab Spring

Although no one would deny that the Arab upheavals had a tremendous effect on the region and changed the status quo fundamentally, the direction of their impact substantially changed over time. The dynamics of the Arab Spring initially coincided with a trend in Turkish foreign policy to re-engage the Middle East, re-establish Anatolia as the hub of regional power, and access new markets for Turkey's growing and export-oriented economy (Habibi & Walker, 2011). It also came at a time when Arab perception of Turkey had reached an all-time high. Polls indicated in late 2010 that more than two thirds of the Arab respondents saw Turkey as a good

role model for the region and 80 percent wished for further cooperation (Kayadibi & Birekul, 2012, p. 266f.; Salem, 2011).

While the replacement of autocratic secular regimes by advocates of a democratically legitimized political Islam led many to think of the governing AKP as a successful role model worth being exported to other countries, the Arab Spring also limited the leeway of Turkey's foreign policy (Kayadibi & Birekul, 2012). This is – besides the disruptive effect of instability on local markets – mainly based on the fact that domestic turmoil in numerous states and increased interstate polarization in the region made it much more difficult for Turkey to uphold one of its key principals of neutralizing conflicts in its neighbourhood: a "zero-problems" approach of equidistance and non- interference (Zalewski, How Turkey Went From 'Zero Problems' to Zero Friends And lost its leverage everywhere, 2012). Assessing Turkey's policy towards post-Mubarak Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, it will be examined in the following, how Ankara's waiving of equidistance triggered a counterbalancing response by others and led to outcomes unfavourable to Turkey's own interests.

Bringing local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, as well as to the leadership of the Western-backed Syrian National Council, the immediate outcomes of the Arab Spring served Turkey's interest of increasing its influence in the region and establishing itself as a model of emulation. Overwhelmed by the rise of the Brotherhood as the key player in rapid democratic transformation processes, Turkish foreign policy makers anticipated that their interests in the region could be served much better through democratically legitimized politicians such as Rached Ghannouchi, calling Turkey in March 2011 a "true example" to the Arab world, than through siding with their longstanding allies Hosni Mubarak, Ben Ali, and Muammar Gaddafi (Kayadibi & Birekul, 2012, p. 268). This, however, backfired when Turkey's new allies in the region failed to deliver on their promises both in economic and security terms. This put Ankara between the rock of abandoning key ideological allies and the hard place of putting one's own economical and stability interests at risk.

This dilemma became especially present in the context of the military ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt on July 3, 2013. Although the domestic and regional balance of power had clearly shifted against President Morsi, Ankara threw all its weight behind him instead of resorting to non-interference. Thereby, Turkey deliberately worsened not only its relations with the interim government but also the latter's main international backer, Saudi-Arabia, and a number of Western allies. Besides the fact that diplomatic relations have been severed ever since and imports of Turkish products to Egypt were reduced, Turkey's reputation as an honest broker and future regional powerhouse declined substantially after the coup. As polls indicate, Turkey was positively perceived by 78%of the Arab

public in 2011 (86% in Egypt), and only 59% in 2013 (38% in Egypt). More specifically, Turkish foreign policy has recently been seen as much more sectarian by the Arab public in general and the Egyptian public in particular (2012: 24%; 2013: 45%). Furthermore, only 37% believe (in contrast to 56% in 2011) that Turkey had a positive effect on the Arab Spring. While those who still argue that Turkey can be a model for the region mostly refer to economic aspects, those who opt against it emphasize Ankara's foreign policy interventionism (Akgün & Gündogar, 2014).

Also, Iran has portrayed its own revolution of 1979 as a source of inspiration for the Arab uprisings. Yet despite the fact that the success of this attempt was limited for several reasons, the aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution turned out favourably for Tehran, ending more than three decades of diplomatic hostility (Göksel, 2013; Rafati, 2012). In contrast to Turkey, however, Iran chose to abandon the Muslim Brotherhood in the course of the coup and sided, at least informally, with the new government of Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi. Immediately after the coup, Egyptian leaders rushed to declare their continuing interest in maintaining relations with Tehran and both showed their mutual recognition when Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir attended the inauguration ceremony of al-Sisi as President in June 2014 (Daily News Egypt, 2014; Hashem, 2014). Also relations with Tunisia and Libya improved significantly (Zarrabi-Kashani, 2014).

The Case of Syria

Turkey's power as a mediator in regional conflicts and its equilibrium with Iran was tested when the Arab Spring reached Syria, which had previously been the cornerstone of Ankara's strategy towards a Mesopotamia-Persian Gulf 'axis' since the mid-2000s (Kouskouvelis, 2013, p. 51). In the previous course of its zero problems through non-interference equation – at times even termed an "inclusionary foreign policy" – Turkey had backed Syria during the 2005 Lebanon crisis and preferred talks behind closed doors as much more effective means than public criticism to promote human rights and democracy (Zalewski, The self-appointed super power: Turkey goes it alone, 2011, p. 99f.).

All this seemed to be forgotten in August 2011, when then-foreign minister Davutoglu travelled in a highly public manner to Damascus, trying to persuade President Bashar al-Assad to agree to constitutional reform. When this initiative failed, Turkey changed its approach to the crisis, started to back the uprising and opened its borders for refugees and recruits of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) (Bakri, 2011; Cagaptay, The New Davutoglu. The Next Prime Minister's Game Plan, 2014).

Despite massive diplomatic (and increasing military backing from Turkey), the Arab Gulf states, and large parts of the Western world, both the FSA and the Syrian National Council, all failed to deliver on their promise to oust Assad within six months (Burch & Cameron-Moore, 2011).

While overestimating the military and political cohesion and strength of the Syrian opposition and its own power to shape the outcome of the crisis, Turkey clearly underestimated both the resilience of Assad and the willpower of Russia and Iran to keep him in power (Ertugrul, 2012). Reportedly, Iranian military officials such as the Commander of the IRGC' Quds force, Ghassem Suleimani, also built up a physical Iranian presence in Syria throughout the last two years (Filkins, 2013). While Tehran had vocally supported the protests in North Africa, and especially in Bahrain, as legitimate popular resistance to oppression, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei denounced the events in Syria as a United States' plot and accused indirectly also Turkey of supporting terrorist groups by bankrolling the FSA (Zarrabi-Kashani, 2014; Rafati, 2012, p. 51). When Turkish-Syrian relations further deteriorated amid border skirmishes in mid-2012, Iranian officials reportedly threatened Ankara that Tehran would retaliate against NATO and U.S. bases in Turkey in case of the latter supporting a U.S. intervention in favour of the opposition (Uzun, 2013, S. 158).

As the influx of foreign money and fighters facilitated a massive fragmentation of rebel factions especially in the border area, Turkey and its allies suffered a number of major strategic setbacks in the summer of 2013. In June, the regime managed, together with an increasing number of Hezbollah troops and active help of Iranian Revolutionary Guards, to recapture the strategic town of Qusair and turned the war over the central provinces in Assad's favour (Nakhol, 2014). Hopes for an international intervention despite the ongoing blockade of the UN Security Council dissolved in September 2013 when the U.S. refrained last minute from a military strike against the regime for the alleged use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians (Maddy-Weitzmann, 2013). And yet, the fact that the survival of the regime seems irrevocable is more than an embarrassment to Turkish foreign policy makers.

While Turkey's Open Door Policy enabled the sheltering of over 1.5 million Syrian refugees, the government failed to develop any political strategy of how to reduce the massive influx of refugees, which steadily turns into an economic and political burden in the country's already troubled South-eastern regions (Bahadır Dinçer, Federici, & Ferris, 2013). On the other side of the border, Sunni-jihadist forces exploited the political-military vacuum and the chaos created by a strategic withdrawal of the regime and the inability of Turkey's proxies to generate stability in these areas. As the Syrian Army, as well as most of the at least 10,000 foreign

fighters in support of the regime, most of them of Lebanese, Iranian, and Iraqi, focus on containing the rebellion to the periphery away from the central region and urban centres, Turkey recently found itself having lost not only the battle for Damascus but also facing a strategic nightmare of either having to enter a war that in the end might help the Assad regime against a Sunni uprising or waiving its recent success of containing Kurdish nationalism in the region by abandoning the pressured Syrian Kurds in Kobane.

The Case of Iraq

Despite the fact that there was no "Iraqi Spring", the regional upheavals also affected Turkey's relationship with Iraq to a substantial degree. Until 2010, when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was re-elected, Ankara had favoured deeper ties with the central government and supported Baghdad's centralization policy also as a means of countering Kurdish nationalism. Also in this case, a policy of non-interference was supposed to allow for economic expansion and increasing influence. And yet, Turkey opposed Maliki's re-election amid the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and supported his competitor Ayad Allawi of the Iraqiyya bloc. Clearly, Ankara sensed an opportunity "to strike a more cross-sectarian balance in Baghdad" (Cagaptay & Evans, Turkey's Changing Relations with Iraq: Kurdistan Up, Baghdad Down, 2012, p. 3). Bilateral relations further worsened in mid-2012 when the Turkish government publicly sided with Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, a key rival of Maliki, and offered him refuge after an arrest warrant had been issued by Baghdad on charges of terrorism (BBC, 2012). Only a few months earlier, Hashemi had publicly called on Turkey to fulfil its "destiny" by watching out for the people of Iraq and to counterbalance an increasing Iranian influence over the country as the key outcome of the U.S. disengagement from the region (Sunday's Zaman, 2011).

The perception of a Turkish-Iranian rivalry in Iraq was severely intensified by the Arab uprisings in general and the Syrian Civil War in particular. Especially Iraq's *de facto* support for Assad further convinced Ankara that Maliki was falling under the sway of Iran, which had openly sided with Damascus against the opposition backed by Turkey. Furthermore, Maliki's pro-Assad stance became clear in several statements already an early stage of the crisis. In August 2012, for instance, he demanded that the protesters should use the democratic process, not riots, to voice their displeasure (Schmidt & Ghaziaug, 2011). To the dissatisfaction of Ankara, Maliki thereby clearly took up the rhetoric of Assad's key backer: Tehran (Simsek, 2012). And yet – as this coincided with increased flexibility on Turkey's

Iraq policy generated by the peace process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and therefore a decrease in the perceived threat of Kurdish nationalism, Ankara clearly prioritized closer cooperation with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) over intervening in the Arab Sunni-Shia conflict. Hence, instead of bolstering the marginalized and *de facto* non-existing Sunni Arab opposition to Maliki, Ankara improved its relations with the KRG to contain Iranian influence on the one hand and anti-Turkish Kurdish nationalist sentiments on the other.

Ankara and Erbil quickly realized the opportunity for closer cooperation and aimed at security gains on several fronts. First, from Turkey's point of view, cooperation with the KRG has proved to be more viable in counterbalancing Maliki and Iran's influence in Iraq. Second, KRG President Masoud Barzani turned out to be a *de facto* advocate of Turkish interests in the Syrian Civil War managing to bring the main Syrian Kurdish groups together in Erbil in 2012. As a result of this meeting, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is closely linked to the PKK, agreed on renouncing its support for latter and joining the struggle against the Assad regime. As Barzani's success in appeasing the PYD was particularly important for Ankara, he proved to be a useful powerbroker for Turkish interests in Syria and "positioned himself as counterweight to prevent the PKK from establishing roots in post-Assad Syria" (Cagaptay & Evans, Turkey's Changing Relations with Iraq: Kurdistan Up, Baghdad Down, 2012, p. 7).

Ankara's new alliance with Erbil worsened interstate relations and facilitated – to a minor extent – the weakening of governmental control in the northern and western provinces as one of the causes of the rise of the Islamic State Organization (Hurriyet Daily News, 2014). The fall of Mosul and the central government's inability to successfully fight the *Islamic State* initially weakened Baghdad and Tehran, while boosting the KRG's role in the region – particularly in the perception of Western leaders. And yet, Ankara remained initially hesitant to provide military support for the KRG against the advancing IS-fighters in mid-2014 and aimed at re-establishing its ties with Sunni Arab tribes (also as Turkey was relying on them to assist Ankara in solving the Mosul hostage crisis). This led Kurdish activists to publicly voice their disappointment, calling the Turkey-KRG alliance a «myth» (Chomani, 2014).

These tensions allowed Iran to re-enter the Kurdish stage by helping the Peshmerga to push back IS and to benefit from a Kurdish adjustment of a previously rather critical position towards Iran. Tehran's new pragmatism amid the emergence of the *Islamic State* which became obvious with its abandonment of Nouri al-Maliki and its support for the KRG turned out to be quite successful both in terms of decreasing regional and international isolation and influence gaining in Iraq itself.

Conclusion

Of course, some of the Arab Spring events really have moved fast. But that is different from the time it takes to see all of the effects and implications (Pillar, 2013).

If we understand foreign policy as an adjustment of a state to a change in its security environment, how can we measure both the development and impact of specific policies, when this environment is undergoing not only rapid but also highly complex changes? Although it remains to be seen whether the Arab Spring and the U.S. disengagement from the region have fundamentally changed the dynamics of the regional security system, it certainly affected Turkey's and Iran's policies in the Middle East.

In all three cases, we observed a tendency towards more assertiveness in Turkey's Middle East policy in the first two years of the Arab Spring and the course of U.S. disengagement from the region. Also on the grounds of economic success, AKP-ruled Turkey was seen as a model for the new democratic governments in North Africa and Egypt. Four years after the first stage of the uprisings, Ankara faced severe isolation in the very same region, which it claims as its natural sphere of influence – both in strategic and ideological terms. Two factors seemed to be decisive also in the cases observed: First, by assuming that the process of political transformation was already completed after the ousting of dictators and a first round of elections, Ankara (as with many other Western governments) inadvertently sided not with the winners, but with old rivals (and other new) elites and alienated them. When the domestic tide changed again, especially in Egypt, Ankara seemed to have lost the ability to pursue the very same pragmatism (zero- problems) on which it had built its foreign policy success in the first place. Also in its immediate neighbourhood, Turkey gave up its traditional policy of non-interference by siding with the Syrian rebels and intervening in Iraqi politics, thereby exacerbating local conflicts and exposing itself to counterbalancing strategies by both domestic rivals of its allies and their respective regional backers.

Ankara's domestically generated over-estimation of local partners (Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt/ FSA in Syria), the misperceived power re-distribution in the region and its desire to export the "Turkish Model" convinced Turkey's foreign policy makers of shifting their foreign policy strategies from non-interference (zero-problems) to interventionism (sectarianism). The outcome of this foreign policy shift turned Turkey into a party in highly internationalized conflicts (Egypt and Syria). Turkey's image in the region changed from a powerful mediator to a meddler, subsequently resulting in strategic setbacks of Ankara and its local allies in 2013. Ironically, it was Hossein Mousavian, the former spokesman for Iran's nuclear negotiators, who advised Turkey in an Op-Ed published in the Saudi-owned

newspaper *Asharq al-Awsat* to revive its failed zero-problems-policy by maintaining its policy of non-interference and cooperate with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Egypt on regional crises (Mousavian, 2013). Tehran itself displayed, especially in the case of Egypt, a strong sense of pragmatism and abandoned their local allies when they seemed to no longer prove useful. In the case of Syria, however, such a flexible approach was precluded by the fact that regime change in Damascus was understood as an existential threat to Iranian interest in the Levant.

Both Turkey and Iran responded to imbalances created by the Arab uprisings and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. In the case of Turkey, domestic politics played a role in foreign policy considerations towards the Arab Spring states, subsequently decreasing foreign policy flexibility to adjust to material changes in its security environment. The timing of Ankara's interference and the choice of local partners turned out to be disadvantageous. Furthermore, Turkey's over-assertiveness in North Africa and Syria backfired, caused reputational damage, worsened bilateral relations, and even opened room for Iranian manoeuvres. Pragmatic policy choices, however, dominated Turkey's Iraq policy after 2010, when foreign policy flexibility generated by the peace process with PKK allowed for a rapprochement between Ankara and the KRG. Iran on the other hand, suffered setbacks in Iraq as its increased cooperation with the central government fuelled the Sunni-Shia conflict and resulted in the emergence of the *Islamic State*. In any case, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over what both perceived as a power vacuum generated by the U.S. disengagement and the fall of its traditional allies in the region exacerbated local conflicts and contributed to regional destabilization that is unlikely to serve their own interest in the long run.

While this process of success and setbacks can be traced back by structural realism, stressing the fact that policies fail if they are not based on a thorough and objective assessment of changes in the security environment, neoclassical realism can help us to understand in a more detailed manner the process of policy formulation. This article especially stressed the importance of the perception of foreign policy makers in both capitals regarding their own leverage and the strength of their allies and rivals as the key risk to the Turkish-Iranian equilibrium. Future research, however, should also turn to the role of domestic politics and the nexus between interstate relations and state-society relations inducing in many cases ambiguous strategies likely to result in mixed policy outcomes. Moreover, questions like to what extent Iran – in comparison to other factors – played a role in Ankara's foreign policy decision making and whether other dimensions of bilateral relations, such as economy and energy security were affected, need to be assessed. Finally, future empirical research needs to assess the perception of Iranian foreign policy makers both of Turkey's post-zero-problems-policy in the Arab world and the challenges

and opportunities created by regional turmoil and Western disengagement from the Middle East.

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Turkish National Movement, Mass Mobilization, and Demographic Change in Istanbul, 1922-1923

Erol Ülker

Introduction

The Turkish national movement emerged following the Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I (Zürcher, 1984). After the signing of the Mudros Armistice on October 30, 1918, the Allied powers began to occupy Ottoman territory. Meanwhile, a number of regional movements arose throughout Anatolia and Thrace (Tanör, 2002). In September 1919, a congress convened in Sivas centralized them under the Society for the Defense of National Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia. The Representative Committee of this federation led the initial stages of the War of Independence (1919-1922) against the Greek army that occupied parts of Asia Minor. In April 1920, the Turkish Grand National Assembly was inaugurated in Ankara, which was then a provincial town located in central Anatolia.

Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, remained under Allied occupation during the War of Independence (Criss, 1999). The *de facto* occupation by the British, French, and Italian armies began in November 1918. In March 1920, the Allied authorities established military control over the city by formally occupying it. Only after the ultimate defeat of the Greek army in September 1922 did the national government in Ankara take over Istanbul. On October 19, Refet (Bele) Pasha entered the city as the official representative of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. On November 1, the Ottoman Sultanate was dissolved. Three days later, the Ankara government announced to have established its sovereignty over Istanbul. The Allied forces completely evacuated the city by October 6, 1923.

By the end of the Greek-Turkish military confrontation, the population in Istanbul was quite heterogonous in terms of its ethno-religious composition (Criss, 1999: 20). According to the available statistics, the Muslims numbered 560,434 in 1920. There were around 385,000 Greeks, 118,000 Armenians, and 45,000 Jews in

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addition to a large number of Levantines and foreign citizens residing in Istanbul.[1] The Greek and Armenian subjects had long been alienated from the Ottoman state especially by the nationalist policies of the Young Turks.[2] They were, for the most part, sympathetic with the Allied occupation. On October 30, 1922, C.R. Ballard, the British president of the Allied police commission in Istanbul, noted that

> Under Allied protection they [the Christian population in Istanbul] considered themselves quite safe, and foolish enough in some cases to adopt provocative attitudes towards their old enemies the Turks; for instance, during the Greek advance towards Angora.[3]

While the city was undergoing a transition to the Turkish national rule in the last quarter of 1922, a strong sense of insecurity prevailed among the non-Muslim subjects. In his important research about the Greek minority of Istanbul, Alexis Alexandris (1974: 80) states that

> Unable to tolerate the attitude of the minorities, who for three years made no secret of their delight in the Allied occupation of Ottoman territory, the Turks demanded the expulsion of the Christians from Istanbul.

According to Alexandris (1974: 79-83), the panic of the Constantinopolitan Christians was aggravated by the Turkish mob that became increasingly bold and unruly. The nationalists used different tactics to force them to leave the city and the mission of Refet Pasha put more pressure on the Christians by initiating the arrest of hundreds of them for high treason.

Turkish economic nationalism was launched in this context of mounting tensions between the Muslim and Christian elements. Alexandris (1974: 106) identifies this policy with "… a sustained assault against local Christian business interests and commercial institutions…", arguing that "the first step towards the turkification

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1 For a review of the statistics produced on the population of Istanbul until 1921, see Richard and Johnson (2008: 24-27). According to a booklet prepared by the National Congress in 1919, there were 700,000 Muslims, 180,000 Greeks and 65,000 Armenians in Istanbul. *L'Asie Mineur et ses Populations. Pour la Défense des Droits Légitimes de la Nationalité Turque,* (Lausanne: Imprimerie A. Bouvard Giddey, 1919), p. 5. Yet these statistics aimed for propaganda in Europe are far from being reliable

2 For the nationalist population policies of the Young Turks, see Üngör (2008). In his article, Üngör addresses the implemetation of social engineering tecqhniques against various minority populations in the "broader Young Turk era (1913-1950)".

3 Public Records Office, Foreign Office Catalogs (FO), 371/7960, Memorandum: The Civil Population of Constantinople, 30 October 1922.

of the economy was the foundation of the National Turkish Commercial Union in 1923". Ayhan Aktar (2001) and Murat Koraltürk (2011) provide a more comprehensive account of the *Turkification* of the economy following the establishment of the national regime in Istanbul. They show the way in which Turkish economic nationalism led to the exclusion of non-Muslims from the bureaucracy, commerce, labor force, and many other professions.

This article aims to contribute to the existing literature by discussing how this nationalist campaign against non-Muslims, especially the Greek and Armenian communities, emerged. I argue that it was not a spontaneous development originating only from xenophobic attitudes widespread among the Muslim population in the city; this nationalist movement was, rather, the product of a carefully planned and centrally administered process. I will concentrate below on the formation and activities of the National Defense Committee (NDC), the principal organization of the Turkish resistance movement in Istanbul under occupation. The available sources suggest that the NDC played a considerable part in a series of demonstrations in which thousands of Muslims took part between September and November 1922. More importantly, the NDC provided the initial impetus for the rise of Turkish economic nationalism as a popular movement before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in October 1923.

National Defense Committee

There is considerable scholarship on the formation of the Turkish national movement. One of the most important studies in this respect belongs to Eric Jan Zürcher (1984). His book, *The Unionist Factor*, establishes that it was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that laid the foundations of the movement. The CUP, which had ruled the Ottoman Empire in an authoritarian manner during World War I, was formally dissolved in November 1918. Zürcher demonstrates, however, that the Unionists, i.e. the CUP cadres, took the initiative in organizing a resistance movement. At the beginning of the armistice period, they founded in Istanbul a secret organization, the Karakol society, to protect the CUP members, and, more generally, the Muslim population from the reprisals of the occupation forces and Christian elements.

More research has been carried out on the development of the Turkish resistance movement in Istanbul since the publication of Zürcher's crucial book in 1984. In her study, entitled *Istanbul under Allied Occupation*, Nur Bilge Criss points out that the Karakol society lost its significance after the Allied powers formally occupied Istanbul in March 1920. Both Criss and Zürcher argue that the National Defense

(Müdafa-i Milliye) Committee (NDC) replaced the Karakol society and became the main organization of the resistance movement in the Empire's occupied capital. This committee's membership consisted mostly of former Unionists and Karakol activists. The existing literature shows that the NDC cadres smuggled men and ammunition to Anatolia, and provided intelligence for the Ankara government (Aydın, 1992; Çukurova, 1994; Yıldırmaz, 2002). The NDC was also very well organized in the Muslim populated neighborhoods of Istanbul, where its activists formed armed committees of resistance. For some of the available sources (Aydın, 1992: 84-85; Himmetoğlu, 1975: 96-97), there were around 10,000 men associated with the district groups of this sort.

In what follows, I will demonstrate that the NDC became much more than an armed committee of resistance after the War of Independence concluded in Anatolia in September 1922. Thereafter, the NDC leaders embarked on an effort of building a popular movement and strengthening the ties of the organization with different segments of the Muslim population in Istanbul. To analyze how they did so, I will first examine the mass demonstrations that took place between September and November 1922.

Mobilization of the Muslim Masses

The events I examine in this section started when the news of the Turkish national forces' victory over the Greek army reached the capital at the beginning of September 1922. On September 2, the Friday prayers in various mosques invoked Muslims to pray for the national army and the martyrs of the War of Independence.[4] Thousands of Muslims took to streets to celebrate the victory in the next days.[5] The process gained momentum especially when the Turkish army entered İzmir (Smyrna) and expelled the Greek army from Anatolia on September 9.[6] Refet Pasha's arrival in Istanbul on October 19 revitalized the popular mobilization.[7] The most crowded event of this

4 "İstanbul Dün Bir Tek Kalp Gibi Çarptı," *Vakit*, 2 September 1922, p. 1.

5 Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (AMAE), Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 97, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 164.

6 A detailed coverage of the mass meetings can be followed from the Turkish press. See, for example, the following news items: "Fener Alayları," *Vakit*, 9 September 1922, p. 3; "Fener Alayı" and "Dün Akşamki Tezahürat," *Vakit*, 10 September 1922, p. 3; "İstanbul'da Vatanperverane Tezahürat," *Vakit*, 11 September 1922, p. 2.

7 Refet Bey was welcomed in his official visits and other public encounters with banquets, parades, and demonstrations. On October 21, for example, the Istanbul Municipality

period occurred on November 5, the day after the city was taken over by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, a development described by the French diplomatic mission as a "revolution peacefully accomplished."[8] Although the largest manifestation took place in the Sultanahmet Square, many other meetings were organized across the city.[9] The street actions continued during the evening in many parts of Istanbul.[10]

The popular movements that arose between September and November had certain characteristics. They were, reportedly, very well organized and the Muslim people from the "low classes of the population" attended them in large numbers.[11] Many of the demonstrations took place in the evenings. The demonstrators first gathered across different quarters of the city and then began marching. They carried flags, torches, and the posters of Mustafa Kemal.[12] The groups that came from different directions met at the larger squares in Sultanahmet, Fatih, Kadıköy, or Üsküdar. In some cases, the crowds that united in the squares continued their processions. They usually marched on the direction of Sirkeci or Beyoğlu in the European side of the city, passing through the areas inhabited mostly by foreign nationals and non-Muslim subjects.

NDC and Demonstrations

The mass movements under study do not seem to have been completely spontaneous actions. No available document provides information about the degree to which the NDC was involved in their organization. As noted above, however, the NDC

gave a banquet in Fatih for the honor of Refet Pasha, which set off a large demonstration that continued during the night. "Şehremanetinin Muhterem Paşamıza Ziyafeti," *Vakit*, 22 October 1922, p. 1; "Evvelki Gece Yapılan Tezahürat," *Vakit*, 23 October 1922, p. 2. On November 2, for example, the Darülfünun students organized a large public demonstration in the Sultanahmet Square. "Dünkü Tezahürat-ı Milliyemizden," *İleri*, 2 November 1922, p. 1

8 "Une révolution s'est accomplie pacifiquement aujourd'hui à Constantinople," AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 98, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 20.

9 "Saltanat-ı Milliye'yi İçin Dün Yapılan Tezahürat," *Vakit,* 6 November 1922, p. 1.

10 AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 98, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 26.

11 "Les manifestations qui ont eu lieu dans la soirée étaient visiblement préparés; elles étaient composées des plus bas éléments de la population". AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 98, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 35.

12 That demonstrators carried the posters of Mustafa Kemal was reported in "İstanbul'da Vatanperverane Tezahürat," *Vakit*, 11 September 1922, p. 2.

was well established in Istanbul's Muslim-populated areas. At one point, there were more than 20 district committees in the İstanbul, Üsküdar, and Beyoğlu divisions of the city (Aydın, 1992: 285-297). It is, therefore, difficult to imagine how the manifestations that started from separate neighborhoods and then merged in large squares could have been organized without the initiative of the district committees operating under the NDC's command.

There is more direct evidence with respect to the NDC's role. It is clear that the Darülfünun (which would receive the name of Istanbul University in 1933) students union played an active role in the process. On September 10, for example, this union called for a torchlight procession in the evening. The resistance movement had been in contact with the nationalist Darülfünun students since the earlier times of the armistice period.[13] More importantly, the NDC was quite influential in the administration of the union that included representatives from the different faculties of the school. A document dated 13 December 1922 states that the union was informally part of the NDC, for three members of its executive committee were associated with the NDC.[14] This possibly means that the union's role in the organization of the street actions was not independent from the NDC's initiative.

In any case, the NDC was not able exercise full control on the mass movements of the period. The non-Muslim communities were exposed to the occasional aggressions of the Muslim demonstrators in spite of the NDC whose leaders did not desire to give the Allied authorities any pretext to interfere in security matters. The most violent event took place on the night of September 10, when a crowded group of demonstrators moved on the direction of the Pera, Beyoğlu, Şişli area in which a large number of non-Muslims lived. The crowd attacked some residences and stores, breaking their windows.[15] The Turkish press sought to exonerate the Muslim community, claiming that there were non-Turkish provocateurs among the aggressors, and that the owners of some of the stores and residences attacked were Muslims.[16] According to an Allied police report, however, a Greek was killed and several others were injured during the night. Some 20 aggressors were arrested in the meantime.[17]

This incident had significant repercussions. A few days after it occurred, General Fevzi (Çakmak) Pasha made a public statement claiming that the security forces in Istanbul had taken all necessary measures to protect the honor, lives, and properties

13 FO, 371/6573, "The Nationalist Committee in Constantinople", pp. 11-12

14 Türkiye İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Arşivi (TİTE), 42/53, 13 December 1922

15 "Kırılan Camlar," *Vakit*, 12 September 1922, p. 2.

16 Ibid.

17 AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 97, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 164.

of the inhabitants of the city as a whole.[18] This was a very important statement because Fevzi Pasha was the Chief of General Staff in Ankara and the NDC was formally attached to the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff (Himmetoğlu, 1962: 165-167). The NDC's attitude vis-à-vis the assaults against Christian elements became more obvious with another statement by Esat Bey, who was not only the chief of the Istanbul police but also the NDC's president. Towards the end of September, Esat Bey announced to the Istanbul press that additional measures would be taken to protect the public order in the city.[19]

NDC and Economic Nationalism

Although violence was prevented to some degree, the national regime introduced in November made it clear that it would not tolerate the existence of a large and economically prosperous non-Muslim community in Istanbul. At the beginning of the month, Refet Pasha warned that the *Rums* (Orthodox Christians) who identified themselves as Greek subjects rather than Ottomans should leave the city by November 18 (Criss, 1999: 151). Meanwhile, the Turkish press published news items about the journey to Istanbul of Armenian revolutionaries with the object of creating disorder and assassinating national leaders. For the British High Commission, such news had the definite object of creating panic to drive the Armenians out of Istanbul.[20]

At the same time, the nationalists were engaged in an effort to purge the economy from non-Muslim elements. To this end, they exerted pressure on the foreign companies for the use of Turkish as the only language of all commercial and bureaucratic activities. The companies were also required to dismiss not only foreigners but also Ottoman Christians, and to replace them with Muslim and Turkish employees. This was a *de facto* policy implemented through demands extended by the Turkish authorities, above all the mission of Refet Pasha, to the company administrations.[21] In February 1923, the use of Turkish in business was

18 "İstanbul'un Asayişi," *Vakit*, 20 September, 1922, p. 2

19 "İstanbul'un Asayişi," *Vakit*, 28 September, 1922, p. 1

20 FO, 371/7960, 1 December 1922.

21 Some of such correspondences between the Turkish authorities and company administrations are available in Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (BOA), HR.İM, 37/12, 10 December 1922; and HR.İM, 37/13, 22 November 1923. The dates on these files would be misleading. Although the first one is dated December 1922, it comprises a series of correspondences from 1923 as well. The earliest document in this file is from 27 November 1922. It is a note of protest addressed by the French High Command to Refet

made mandatory by the Ankara government.[22] Furthermore, all foreign firms in Istanbul accepted employing only Turkish personnel at the end of May.[23] Meanwhile, the NDC leaders sought to popularize this nationalist campaign by mobilizing the Muslim merchants, artisans, and workers around it. They founded the commission of economic organizations to this end.

Commission of Economic Organizations

The *Turkification* of the economy appears to have come onto the agenda of the NDC's nationalist cadres long before the Ankara government seized control of Istanbul. One of the leading members of the organization, Ahmet Hamdi (Başar) had concerned himself with this issue by then. He was an NDC activist and the editor-in-chief of the Economy Journal of Turkey (Türkiye İktisat Mecmuası), which began publishing in June 1921 (Aktar, 2001: 55-58; Koraltürk, 2011: 123-128). In June 1922, Ahmet Hamdi initiated the founding of the Incorporation of Economic Investigations, Publications, and Transactions (İktisadi Tetkikat, Neşriyat ve Muamelat A.Ş). This agency embarked on an activity that can be described as economic intelligence. Under the guise of preparing a commercial yearbook, it conducted an investigation about the ethno-religious backgrounds of those involved in Istanbul's economic life.

According to the results of this investigation, there were 4,267 commercial enterprises of all sorts in Istanbul (Aktar, 2001: 55-57; Koraltürk, 2011: 125-128). The Muslim-Turkish subjects owned 1,202 of them, which amounted to no more than 28% of the total. This proportion was even smaller in other sectors. The proportion of Muslim-Turkish entrepreneurs in the business of import and export was 4%, and it was approximately 3% in brokerage. The Muslim-Turkish element had almost no influence over the economy concentrated around the Istanbul port, where the languages of business were Greek, Italian, and French rather than Turkish. The majority of the foreign company employees were non-Muslims. The Muslims who could find jobs in such companies were employed in relatively inferior positions for lesser salaries.

Pasha about the deportation of some of the İzmir-Kasaba Railways' Christian personnel. This note also clarifies that the company administration fired a number of its Christian employees as demanded by the Turkish authorities.

22 "Şirketlerde Türkçe," *Vakit*, 9 February 1923, p. 3.

23 "Şirketlerde Türk Memurlar," *Vakit*, 1 June 1923. In May, delegates from all foreign companies in Istanbul convened in Ankara to conduct negotiations with the Turkish government about the legal framework of their operations.

Ahmet Hamdi appeared as one of the founders of the Commission of Economic Organizations on November 3, 1922, the day before the Ankara government took over the governance of Istanbul.[24] The duty of this commission was to form grassroots organizations uniting all occupational groups in the city under the NDC. The commission was intended to create a new network of relations between the NDC and the Muslim population next to the armed district groups associated with the resistance movement. In addition to Ahmet Hamdi, the executive committee of the economy commission comprised Vehbi Bey and Mehmet of Topkapı Bey.[25] The other four members were Seyfi, İsmail Hakkı, Hilmi, and Ali Cemal Beys, who were also involved in the NDC's commission of financial works (Maliye Encümeni).

Right after it was founded, the commission embarked on a wide range of organizing activities. It was in close touch with the aforementioned union of Darülfünun students.[26] But the commission concentrated particularly on forming new federations by which the administration of the existing or newly created guilds, chambers, labor unions, and other sorts of trade bodies would be centralized. By the initial days of January 1923, the commission succeeded in founding three important confederations: the Federation of Istanbul Artisan Associations (İstanbul Esnaf Cemiyetleri Heyet-i Merkeziyesi), the Turkish National Commerce Union (Milli Türk Ticaret Birliği), and the General Union of Workers (Umum Amele Birliği).[27]

Federation of Istanbul Artisan Associations (FIAA)

The FIAA was the first confederation founded by the economy commission on November 12, 1922.[28] It incorporated 22 different associations that reportedly represented more than 20,000 artisans.[29] Among them were the associations of grocers, drivers, butchers, and hotelkeepers. An important one of them was the

24 TİTE, 43/8, 3 November 1922.

25 Ibid. For a recent study providing detailed information on Mehmet of Topkapı and his roles in the development of the resistance movement, see Özkan (2013).

26 TİTE, 42/153, 13 December 1923.

27 It seems that preparations for the establishment of both the FIAA and TNCU was started before November 1922. On October 24, Refet Pasha accepted two separate missions representing the coalitions of the city's Muslim artisans and merchants. "Refet Paşa Hazretleri Amele ve Esnaf Heyetleri Arasında," *Vakit,* 25 October 1922, p. 1.

28 TİTE, 42/159, 10 December 1922.

29 See the notes of the commission's meeting on December 13, 1922, TİTE 42/153.

Artisan Association of All Porters (Umum Hamallar Esnaf Cemiyeti), which had some 4,000 members.[30] The Association of Bargemen and Lightermen (Mavnacılar ve Salapuryacılar Cemiyeti) was another important corporation that had 3,000 members. There were also some 1,200 dockers united by the Association for the Solidarity of the Workers of Shipment and Unloading (Tahmil ve Tahliye Amele Teavün Cemiyeti).

The FIAA was recognized as a special department of the NDC.[31] It had an executive committee of 5 members, who were also accepted as members of the NDC. This committee applied for official recognition to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The application included the draft regulations, a statement of the Federation's goals, and a petition justifying the establishment of the confederation.[32] The petition put forward the view that once prosperous Ottoman economy controlled by Muslims and Turks had declined because of the rulers' indifference to progressive developments in industry and technology.[33] This, it was argued, had gradually paved the way for the elimination of Muslims and Turks from commercial activities since the majority of their most enlightened elements preferred to take bureaucratic positions rather than dealing with business and industry. Thus all aspects of economic life had come under the control of non-Muslims privileged by capitulations. The FIAA's objective was to unify all Muslim and Turkish artisans to help re-establish national control over the economy dominated by non-Muslims.

The FIAA aimed to promote cooperation between the existing corporations in accordance with national interests, regulate their internal and external affairs, and increase their capital for the development of the national economy.[34] It would establish a national bank with the objects of increasing the revenues of the corporations and lending funds to their members[35]. All such measures, it was hoped, would turn the corporations controlled by Muslims into strong industrial and commercial entities. They would thereby compete with foreign companies and their protégés; namely, the Christian subjects, who had exclusively enjoyed the privilege

30 At least 2,500 of them were allegedly loyal to the NDC. Yet another faction of the porters led by Raşid Ağa, a steward known to have been an opponent of the national movement, controlled a considerable part of the porters as well. Ibid.

31 TİTE, 42/194, 18 November 1922; TİTE, 42/153, 13 December 1923

32 A report of the British High Commission in Istanbul provides both the regulations and the petition in French. The authority to which the petition in question was addressed was the Turkish Grand National Assembly's Commissariat of Economy. FO, 371/7969, from acting High Commissioner Mr. Anderson, Constantinople, 19 December 1922

33 "Au Commissariat d'Economie de la Grande Assemblée National de Turquie," ibid.

34 "Règlement Intérieur de la Confédération des Corporations," Article 1-3. Ibid.

35 Ibid. See Articles 23-36.

of benefiting from the protection of the existing financial institutes.[36] Hence, when the Christian elements leave the country, Muslim and Turkish entrepreneurs would replace them and work for the benefits of the national economy.[37]

Turkish National Commerce Union (TNCU)

The TNCU was the second economic confederation founded by the NDC's commission of economic organizations. This confederation was formally established in a public meeting of its founders on December 1, 1922.[38] It was Ahmet Hamdi (Başar) who first introduced the idea of creating this organization to unite the Muslim-Turkish merchants and businessmen.[39] He was then elected secretary-general of the TNCU. Of the members of the TNCU's administrative board, Hilmi Bey and İsmail Hakkı Bey were affiliated with the commission of economic organizations as well.

The TNCU was based largely on the Incorporation of Economic Investigations. A number of Muslim-Turkish merchants who had worked together under the roof of this incorporation formed the nucleus of the TNCU's leading members along with the cadre of the economy commission (Aktar, 2001: 57; Koraltürk, 2011:123-131). Among these merchants were Necati Bey, (Hacızade) Mehmet Mesut Bey, and (Yelkencizade) Rıfat Bey. The president of the administrative board was (İbrahim Paşazade) Hüseyin Bey of Kavala, and the vice-president was (Hacı Hüzeyinzade) Ali Haydar Bey. The inspector of accounting was (Boldanlızade) Ahmet Bey.[40] The first meeting of the TNCU took place in the executive office of the Incorporation of Economic Investigations, which was located in the same building as the Turkish Red Crescent in Cağaloğlu (Koraltürk 2011: 128).

Ahmet Hamdi's opening speech at the meeting on December 1 made clear the goal behind the founding of the TNCU.[41] He stated that the economy was under the control of "anti-national hands" and foreigners in Istanbul, and the TNCU's aim was to mobilize the Muslim-Turkish merchants – who were devoid of all kinds of economic privileges provided for Christian entrepreneurs – to change this situation. The TNCU was intended to achieve national independence in the sphere of econo-

36 "Exposé des Motifs". Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 FO, 371/9113, *Union Nationale de Commerce Turquie*, 13 January 1923.

39 TİTE, 42/53, 13 December 1922

40 FO 371/9113, *Union Nationale de Commerce Turque*, 13 January 1923.

41 FO 371/9113, *Le Règlement Organique de l'Union Nationale de Commerce Turque*

my. The first chapter of the Union's bylaws seconded Ahmet Hamdi's statements by defining one the TNCU's primary goals as establishing the economic independence of the Turkish merchants in Istanbul, the most important commercial center of Turkey, by forming trusts and consortiums among them.

It seems that the TNCU went into action towards these goals soon after its formation. According to the British Commercial Secretary of Istanbul, two important Turkish enterprises were created in the city during the first days of the national regime installed by the Ankara government.[42] One of them was the *Société Anonyme Nationale d'Importation et Exportation en Turquie*. This company was built on a capital of 1 million Turkish Liras and there were 50 deputies from the Turkish Grand National Assembly who took part in this enterprise. The other one was the *Société Turque de Commerce National*. The initial capital of this Turkish company amounted to 100,000 Turkish Liras, divided into the capital shares at the value of 25 Liras each. It was reported that the formation of both companies had to do with the desire of the nationalist government to eliminate the Christian element from the economy.

General Union of Workers (GUW)

The GUW was the third confederation created by the commission of economic organizations. It was established on December 20, 1922 (Tunçay, 2009). The president of the GUW was Mehmet of Topkapı, one of the founding members of the NDC's economy commission.[43] Just as the FIAA and the TNCU, so was the GUW incorporated into the organizational structure of the NDC.[44] The central offices of these three economic confederations were located in the same building (Koraltürk,

42 FO, 371/9114, Office of the Commercial Secretary, British High Commission, Constantinople, 28 March 1923.

43 "Amelemizin İttihadı," *Tevhid-i Efkar,* 4 January 1923, p. 3; Mete Tunçay, *1923 Amele Birliği,* p. 25. See Mehmet Bey's identity card from GUW in TİTE 70/10. Mehmet Bey was also involved in the administrative board of the Association of Turkish Employment (Türk Çalıştırma Derneği), TİTE, 70/31, 24 December 1923. For more information on Mehmet of Topkapı, see Özkan (2013).

44 The fact that the economy commission formed the GUW is noted in a correspondence of Fevzi Pasha and Hüsamettin Ertürk, TİTE, 46/22, 12 January 1923.

2007: 135). Ahmet Hamdi, the secretary general of the TNCU, was also a member of the GUW's commission of labor.[45]

It was on January 4 that the Istanbul press announced the GUW's founding also by printing Mustafa Kemal's telegram congratulating this development, wired on January 2.[46] It was underlined that the GUW did not have any political agenda or whatsoever other than protecting workers' rights in accordance with national interests. This organization was intended to struggle with the foreign companies that pursued only their own selfish economic interests at the expense of labor rights. The GUW's delegates expressed this view in a report submitted to the administration of the TNCU on January 23 (Ökçün, 1981: 161-163). The report emphasized that there was no class conflict between Turkish merchants and workers. It was only the foreign capital owners, not the Turkish merchants, who represented the real capitalist class in Turkey.

The GUW was first organized among a group of tram workers recruited by the commission of economic organizations by mid-December 1922.[47] The Union's first branch was founded on January 1 among the tram workers of the Aksaray depot, and the second one in the Şişli depot of the Tramway Company (Tunçay, 2009: 25). It seems that the GUW owed its influence over the tram workers to Şakir Rasim, who had served as the manager of the Tramway Company's Aksaray depot for a long time, at least since April 1916.[48] In June 1922, Şakir Rasim had taken part in the establishment of the Independent Socialist Party (Müstakil Sosyalist Fırka).[49] He then became the secretary general of the GUW.[50]

Shortly after its establishment, the GUW shifted the focus of its nationalist agitation from foreign companies to non-Muslim workers. On August 16, the Şakir Rasim organized a press conference in the union's central bureau with a group of employees from the Tramway and Funicular Companies.[51] The aim of this meeting was to draw attention to the employment of a great number of non-Muslims by the

45 In August 1923, Ahmet Hamdi accompanied Mehmet Bey in this capacity to Ankara. They reportedly made this trip to conduct negations with the national government. "Amele Birliği Reisi Ankara'ya Gidiyor," *Tevhid-i Efkar,* 7 August 1923, p. 1.

46 "Amelemizin İttihadı," *Tevhid-i Efkar,* 4 January 1923, p. 3

47 TİTE, 42/53, 13 December 1922. This report by the economy commission speaks of a tram workers union to be formed within several days.

48 Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivleri, 230.87.17.2, 18 April 1916

49 "Amele Cereyanları", *İleri,* 5 July 1922, p. 2.

50 "İstanbul İşçileri Arasında," *Aydınlık*, no: 12, 6 January 1923, p. 317.

51 "Türk Amelenin Şirketlerden Haklı Şikayeti," *İleri*, 17 August 1923, p.1; "Şirketler Müslüman Amele Kullanmalıdırlar," *Vakit*, 17 August 1923, p. 1; "Tramvay ve Tünel Şirketlerinin Milletimize Hakareti," *Tevhid-i Efkar*, 17 August 1923, p. 1.

foreign companies in Istanbul. Apart from the foreign company managements, the labor delegates accused the state commissars, who represented the government in the administration of public utilities, of not protecting the Muslim and Turkish employees against the non-Muslims and foreigners.

This proved to be an effective strategy. Two days after the GUW's press conference, the state commissars felt the need to publicly defend themselves by highlighting their ongoing efforts for the employment of more Muslim workers.[52] On the same day, the commissars submitted a common petition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They asked the Ministry to put more pressure on the foreign companies for the replacement of Christians and foreign nationals with Muslim employees.[53]

The rise of the GUW's xenophobic campaign in this particular period was not a coincidence. The TNCU was one of the three organizations associated with the NDC's economy commission. At the beginning of August 1923, a few days before the GUW launched its campaign against the participation of non-Muslims in the labor force, the TNCU initiated the *Turkification* of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Koraltürk, 2011: 130-142). Since its formation in 1880, non-Muslims had been dominant in the activities and administration of this important institution, which organized and recorded all kinds of commercial activities in Istanbul (Nezihi 1932; Koraltürk 2002). At the Chamber's annual congress in August, all non-Muslims were excluded from its board of directors. The members of the TNCU were brought to key positions in the administration of the Chamber. Hüseyin Bey of Kavala, president of the TNCU, was also elected president of the Chamber in the congress.

Concluding Remarks

At the end of the Greek-Turkish war in Anatolia, the ethno-religious composition of Istanbul's population was far more heterogonous than it was a few years later. As mentioned above, there were around 560,000 Muslims, 385,000 Orthodox Greeks, 118,000 Armenians, and 45,000 Jews inhabiting the city in 1920. According to Turkey's first official census in 1927, there were 547,126 Muslims, 100,214 Orthodox Greeks, 53,129 Armenians and 47,035 Jews in Istanbul (Dündar, 2000: 158).

52 "Şirket Komiserleri Kendilerini Müdafaa Ediyorlar," *Tevhid-i Efkar*, 19 August 1923, p. 2.

53 BOA, HR.IM, 20/99, 18 August 1923.

Evidently, the population significantly declined as a whole. Yet the number of non-Muslims declined much more dramatically than Muslims even though the Ottoman Greeks residing in Istanbul had been exempted from the exchange of Orthodox and Muslim minorities between Turkey and Greece in 1923.

This dramatic decline both in proportion and absolute numbers can be accounted for by reference to the mass departure of non-Muslims from Istanbul during the period studied in this paper. According to the statistics provided by Alexandris, only between October and December 1922 around 50,000 Orthodox Greeks from the wealthiest segments of the population fled Istanbul (Alexandris, 1974: 82). In his letter to the British High Command on December 1, the Orthodox Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis pointed to the prevailing state of insecurity as the main cause of the exodus. The atrocities inflicted upon the Christian communities of Asia Minor had terrorized the Orthodox Greeks of Constantinople to the extent that he was unable to prevent them from leaving the city at all costs.[54]

What I have tried to show in this paper is that the Orthodox Greeks, and the non-Muslims in general, had valid reasons to be anxious about their security and future in Istanbul. In view of what has been discussed so far, it can be concluded that their sense of panic stemmed not only from the conditions of the Orthodox Greeks in Asia Minor but also from the taut political atmosphere in Istanbul. The NDC considerably broadened the social base of the Turkish national movement, turning it into a large popular movement that was not sympathetic with the existence of an economically powerful Christian community. The demonstrations that started in September as well as the economic confederations formed between November and December 1922 made it clear that the nationalists were not planning to keep Istanbul as a cosmopolitan city.

As a result, the exodus of the Ottoman Christians from Istanbul greatly increased by the initial months of 1923. According to a report published in March 1923, the number of Christians that had left Istanbul since the introduction of the national regime was around 330,000, and 400,000 for the entire Vilayet of Istanbul.[55] More than 200,000 of them were Greeks, and some 85,000 were Armenians, although it was not specified how many of them were Ottoman subjects. Around 30,000 houses, 20,000 shops and other premises, as well as 74,000 acres of land had been aban-

54 FO, 371/7960, Letter from the *Patriarcat Oecuménique* to the British High Command, 18 December 1922.

55 FO, 371/9114, Office of the Commercial Secretary, British High Commission, Constantinople, 28 March 1923. This report was based on a recent article published by *Economiste d'Orient*, which was allegedly based on another report by the Turkish Ministry of the Interior. Alexandris (1974: 107) refers to the same report.

doned The report also mentioned that in addition to hundreds of small businesses, 21 Armenian textile houses and 110 important Greek firms had been closed down.

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