

Peter Kien-hong YU

# Reinventing the Methodology of Studying Contemporary China

Re-testing the One-dot Theory

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*This book is dedicated to all the dialecticians in the world in general and CHEN Tuan, in particular, if he was, indeed, the Daoist, who, according to one account, was born around the end of the [Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period](#) (907–960 AD) and the start of the [Song Dynasty](#) (960–1279 AD), possibly in what is nowadays [LuYi County](#) in [HeNan Province](#) or [ZhenYuan of HaoZhou](#) ([AnHui Province](#)), and who created the original [TaiJiTū/TaiJi Diagram/Diagram of Cosmological Scheme/Supreme Ultimate](#), who may 100%, 50%, or 1% agree with me that dialectics can, in our mind and heart, perform intellectual magic, thus empowering us to rationalize everything MINUS ONE, and, more importantly, our dialectical approach and methods can enable us to be closer to 100% (alternative) reality than the non-dialectical studies on contemporary China, since the political (as opposed to legal) division of China in December 1949.*

# Preface

When we face an issue, a phenomenon, or a development, which constitute what I called (alternative) reality, there are two basic ways of conducting research and writing in social science(s), to wit, the purely classical way and the purely applied way. This dialectical study incorporates both, depending on the context. Differently put, I am not just describing, explaining, and inferring certain issue, phenomena, or development of something but also enabling statesmen, political figures, and politicians to apply the one-dot theory (of thought and action), which is derived from TaiJiTū/TaiJi Diagram/Diagram of Cosmological Scheme/Supreme Ultimate<sup>1</sup> and which, in turn, is equivalent to the (great) palm<sup>2</sup> of Buddha in *Journey to the West/The Monkey*, or, to be more precise, one-dot theory and non-one-dot theory, an example of which is TaiJiTū, by making sideway moves like a crab and by jumping or leaping like a frog from one crab and frog motion model to another crab and frog motion model for something, such as governing government agencies, common people, as well as land and territory, broadly defined. For example, one such model could be Taipei versus Beijing. Another model could be Beijing versus Taipei. A third model could be Taipei versus Beijing VERSUS Beijing versus Taipei. At a specific nodal point, one of them will change the fuller picture or emerge as the

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<sup>1</sup>“...there is in the Changes the Great Primal Beginning. This generates the two primary forces. The two primary forces generate the four images. The four images generate the eight trigrams. The eight trigrams determine good fortune and misfortune. Good fortune and misfortune create the great field of action.” Translated by Richard Wilhelm and Cary F. Baynes, *The I Ching or Book of Changes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 318–319. Zi Wei Dou Shu is an ancient Chinese astrology chart, which has been used as a tool to describe, explain, and infer a human being’s behavior. Heard from the Taipei-based Broadcasting Corporation of China’s radio program on February 24, 2017, from 4 to 5 pm. A short form or a further simplification of TaiJiTū is MengZi’s NeiFangWaiYuan/square internally, round externally. In other words, a person who has reached this level is said to be perfect, when facing other people, because he or she knows how to handle everything smoothly. On February 12, 2017, a Chinese herbal doctor in JinMen County, WANG Ching Hsiu/JingXiu, alerted me of MengZi’s NeiFangWaiYuan/square internally, round externally. Later, I searched the origin of these four Chinese characters. I found a gold mine, because what MengZi said was integrated into the TaiJiTū.

<sup>2</sup>Or WuZhiShan/Mountain of Five Fingers.

“winner” at time/space sequence [number (n)], if that is, indeed, the last time/space sequence.

Contemporary China is what you think it is or like it to be. This book does agree with what other academics and experts have already said: while no methodology should dominate the contemporary China studies field, no methodology should be left unexploited. Unfortunately, since October 1949, if not December of the same year, the field of contemporary China studies is fraught with modified and abandoned non-dialectical theories and models. Why is that so?

The sincere plea of this author is that we should start from scratch, that is, return to square one by conducting a paradigm shift and take the dialectical approach *first*, because there is no question that, on the whole, the Chinese (communist) mind and heart, especially in ancient times, have not been non-dialectical since TaiJiTu surfaced. Writings by Karl H. Marx, SUN Yat-sen, MAO Zedong, etc. are merely a partial dot of that diagram or the one-dot theory.

This book can enable readers to be closer to (alternative) reality by following a process of dialectically describing, explaining, and inferring modern China since January 1, 1912, in general and contemporary China, since October 1, 1949, if not December of the same year, in particular. This study focuses on ZhongGuoDaLu/mainland China, which in July 1997 became the NeiDi/Chinese mainland from the Beijing perspective, so as to embrace XiangGang Special Administrative Region (SAR)/Hong Kong SAR. Taiwan area (including JinMen/Quemoy County and Mazu County<sup>3</sup>) is part of the Republic of China (ROC) or mainland China from August 1945. XiangGang was returned to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) motherland in July 1997 and AoMen/Macau SAR in December 1999. Those four entities, including WaiMengGu/Outer Mongolia, constitute what I had been taught or indoctrinated since the primary school days, that is, one China, up to now. Readers will be able to see the expansion and contraction of this contemporary China, as time and space change.

Under the classical and/or applied ways, we have to continue to elaborate on methodology. The main emphasis of this book is actually placed on methodology, which is another way of saying means of generating knowledge and which basically refers to approaches, either dialectical or non-dialectical, and methods, such as non-dialectically either induction or deduction or dialectically, both. To this day, none of the books, monographs, journal articles, working papers, etc. published in the Chinese and non-Chinese academic world have ever dealt with what I have uniquely done. The Chinese translation of this book title is as follows: 徹底改造就研究當代中國的方法論:再度檢驗一點理論.

In April 2007, I created the One-dot Theory Center and formally put forward my one-dot theory,<sup>4</sup> which can describe, explain, and infer *all* tangible and intangible

<sup>3</sup>This minor archipelago was not occupied by the Imperial Japanese troops.

<sup>4</sup>At a meeting before July 2001, I urged the then prominent East Asian Institute (EAI) director, WANG Gungwu, and my colleagues at the National University of Singapore (NUS) to conduct research and writing by applying a specific, chosen theory, so as to make a real impact in the China studies community. After the meeting, the then director, WANG Gungwu, emailed us all, explain-

things in the nonhuman and human world from time/space sequence (1) to time/space sequence (n) MINUS ONE. What is that ONE? Readers can find out the answer in the third last paragraph of the last chapter. In any case, all the information, (scientific and technical) data, and analysis can be easily slotted into my one-dot theory.

When we talk about logic(s),<sup>5</sup> we have to eventually talk about the application of a theory and model. When we have a theory, we must have a (series of) model(s) to shore it up, and, in this study, the one-dot theory is accompanied by a big diagram or model and four small diagrams or models, or 1 + 4, for short, and contemporary China qua concept is simply defined as one dot, a dot, or “but a dot,” and, as for noncontemporary China, it is non-one dot, non-a dot, or non-“but a dot,” each one of which can still be a dot.

Trying to urge non-dialectical readers to start from scratch by shifting from their paradigm(s) to the one-dot theory paradigm, given that many Chinese and non-Chinese people have at least seen TaiJiTu, I have challenged 12 selected publications, long or short, which have been (co-)authored and/or (co-)edited by (preternaturally) learned, prolific scholars, who have a (quite) firm grasp on basic things Chinese. I have conducted a methodological critique of each publication, hoping to flesh out the kind of long-delayed, blatant, and yawning research gaps, inadequacies, problems, etc. that each publication has.

In this study, I have also challenged the selected non-dialectical theories and models, which are usually first generated in the West, such as the admittedly powerful game theory and rational (choice) theory. It is very doubtful that they can do a better job than the one-dot theory in describing, explaining, and inferring contemporary Chinese studies, past, present, and future.

At this juncture, I would like to mention that it is not easy to be an academic, because nobody can tell what life would throw at him or her. It took me some 3 years to finish the first draft of my doctoral dissertation. After more than 30 years of practice writing, it took me only 3 months to complete the first draft of this book. The number of words, as I recall, was about the same. This means that I was able to put my thoughts together rather quickly, decades later. I wish to thank Hans Kuijper, who is a sinologist turned system scientist, for his serious, meticulous advice on how to improve upon part of my manuscript’s first draft. He urged me to show my manuscript to the following academics, who are very knowledgeable on *yin* and *yang*: Chung-ying CHENG, Tze-ki Hon, Chenyang LI, LIU Da-jun, Robin R. Wang, Zhihe WANG, Wen-Ran ZHANG, and Tze-ki HON. Hans thinks that it is a must to understand what HU Wei (1633–1714) wrote in *YiTuMingBian/Clear Recognition of the Diagrams in the Book of Changes* plus mereology (from the Greek μέρος, ‘part’). I would urge readers to read Hans’ papers (uploaded to his [www.academia.edu](http://www.academia.edu) page), in particular the two complementary articles “Comprehending the

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ing his view. In the preface of my 2005 book, which was written in December 2004, I mentioned the same thing.

<sup>5</sup>A book title has the concept, logic. See Steven J. Rosen and Walter S. Jones, *The Logic of International Relations*, 8th ed. (Cambridge, MASS.: Winthrop Publishers, 1974).



Complexity of Countries” and “The Cinderella Complex: Putting Countries into Comparative Perspective,” which were uploaded in September and October 2016, respectively. I am also grateful to the three reviewers for their positive comments. Needless to say, I alone am responsible for the final version of this book.

Last but not least, I would like to mention Frederic Evans Wakeman, Jr.’s 2003 book, *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service*.<sup>6</sup> Bob Bergin, who is a former US Foreign Service officer and who writes about the history of aviation and Office of Strategic Services operations in Southeast Asia and China, reviewed this book. In the first sentence, Bergin wrote the following words: “*Spymaster* is a rich, but very complex book, difficult to read in places, but rewarding for the reader willing to struggle through the difficult parts.” I think many, if not most, readers of my book will have to struggle through to understand the internal logic(s) of my verbal model. Yes, once firmly grasped the difficult parts, they will agree with me, saying understanding and applying TaiJiTu as a social science tool is as easy as writing A, B, and C, just as DENG Xiaoping once said dialectics is PuShi/pure and simple/down to earth.

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April 2017, marking the tenth anniversary  
of the creation of the One-dot Theory Center

Peter Kien-hong YU/俞劍鴻

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<sup>6</sup>General LI Mi should be mentioned. In December 1949, CHIANG Kai-shek flew to Taipei, the LinShiShouDu/provisional capital of the Republic of China (ROC). From May to July 1951, LI’s troops, after receiving weapons from the Overseas Southeast Asia Supply Corporation (SEA Supply), recovered 14 counties in YunNan Province. However, by mid-July of the same year, his troops retreated to Burma. We also ought to remember the 30,000+ ROC (military) officials, soldiers, etc. who were forced to live in three places of the then Republic of Vietnam in the early 1950s.

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## About the Author

**Peter Kien-hong YU** (Ph.D., New York University, October 1983) is a Professor and a former director at National Quemoy University, Taiwan, Republic of China. From October 1983 up to now, he has worked in various capacities such as the Dean of Research and Development at an institution of higher education, full professor at the National SUN Yat-sen University, senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore, full professor (at the managerial level) at Swinburne University of Technology, Australia, and visiting scholar at the University of Illinois and visiting (research) professor at Xiamen University and the East China Normal University which is affiliated with NYU. He is the author, co-author, editor, and co-editor of some 20 books in both English and Chinese, and some 120 journal articles and book chapters published in the West. He is the recipient of many fellowships, awards, and grants.

# Chapter 1

## Launching a New Methodology for the Study of Contemporary China

We face many things in the world. An issue<sup>1</sup> could first surface, to be followed by a phenomenon, and vice versa. We may also see development of that issue or phenomenon. All of them constitute what I called (alternative) reality. How do we handle an issue, a phenomenon, or a development, individually or collectively? What should we do first? Dialectically, we can put issue at 5; phenomenon, 3; and development, 1, in my crab and frog motion model, which will be described, explained, and inferred later on. Non-dialectically, it is up in the air.

Basically, there are two ways of conducting research and writing in social science(s), to wit, either the 100% purely classical way or the 100% purely applied way, which is a synonym of nonclassical way. A third way can be both or a hybrid. This study dialectically incorporates both, depending on the context. On the whole, more description, explanation, and inference are related to the classical way.

The classical way has to do with the following: Something happened, be it an issue, a phenomenon, or a development, and we the researchers try to take a closer, dialectically and/or non-dialectically look at the issue, phenomenon, or development. As to the applied way, dialectical and non-dialectical moves, in terms of words and deeds, have to be made, so as to enable an actor or actors to fulfill the vision, mission, goal(s), and objective(s). Differently put, by applying my dialectical one-dot theory (of thought and action) or, to be more precise, one-dot theory and non-one-dot theory, I am not just describing, explaining, and inferring certain issue, phenomena, or development *of* something but also enabling statesmen, political figures, and politicians to apply the one-dot theory mimicking sideway moves and by jumping or leaping from one model, which could be the crab and frog motion or non-crab and frog motion, to another model *for* fulfilling the vision, mission, goal(s), and objective(s), if and when necessary. For example, one crab and frog motion model could be Taipei versus<sup>2</sup> Beijing. Another model could be Beijing versus Taipei, as readers will be able to see later on. A third model could be Taipei

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<sup>1</sup>Synonyms are problem and topic.

<sup>2</sup>Dui(Kang) in Mandarin Chinese

and Beijing. The next model could be Beijing and Taipei. And the last model could be Taipei versus Beijing versus Beijing versus Taipei. At a specific nodal point, one of them will change the fuller picture. As a reminder, under both the classical and applied ways, we have to know how to deal with methodology.

A big difference does exist between the study of natural science(s) and social science(s). In the former, we can generate a law, given time, whereas in the latter, it is impossible, even if we the human beings are able to exist one zillion more years. An example of the former is as follows: You mix two chemicals, and the result will be the same; if you do it, I mix it, and a third person one zillion years from now is doing it. We sometimes hear academics and experts talk about, for example, Drucker's law<sup>3</sup> [or the American oath, do you solemnly (swear/affirm) that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, (so help you God/under pains and penalties of perjury)], as if it can be evinced or is possible to generate a law in social science(s), including business and management. It is definitely misleading, because the expert who originally advanced this law has already made qualifications or confined himself within a framework or even a cage in the first place. So, what Drucker was talking about was merely theoretical. In addition, we need just to find a shred of evidence or one contrary instance to falsify/TuiFan this quasi-law, which is a generalization known to have at least one exception.<sup>4</sup> Yes, it is in that context, the Drucker law has been generated, which is tantamount to a theory reflecting partial (alternative) reality and nothing else. It is, at best, like what Henry Nelson Goodman, a philosopher known for his work on counterfactuals, has said lawlike.<sup>5</sup> To reiterate, if one were well versed in social science(s), he or she would realize that Drucker's law does not reflect 100% truth, because it is only part of a fuller picture. If it is partial, we are still in the realm of theory and model or the process of theorizing and modeling.

That being said, a conscientious and responsible social scientist at a university should in the first 3 min of the first class remind his or her students, especially the undergraduate ones, about this cruel and harsh (alternative) reality: Do you want to waste your time, effort, energy, etc. on studying, for example, political science that is ever changing and dynamic, and more importantly, is it never possible to get 100% truth, when a second human being existed? The student, after hearing that statement, should decide whether or not to further study political science, economics,<sup>6</sup> sociology, law, psychology, etc. Unfortunately, most professors have failed to do that, and some of them may even feel flattered, when, for example, news

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<sup>3</sup>Peter F. Drucker, who is a management consultant, with a nod to Murphy's Law, formulated his Drucker's Law, in dealing with management's complexity: If one thing goes wrong, everything else will, and at the same time. See his book, *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, and Practices* (New York: Truman Talley Books, E. P. Dutton, 1986).

<sup>4</sup>Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science* (San Francisco, CA.: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p.96

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p.92.

<sup>6</sup>Many, if not most, first year undergraduate students of business department do not know that business and management are only part of economics.

reporters or even their colleagues call them a great master or guru of something. One case in point: A Harvard University business professor was very popular, because he has been invited by many universities in the world to talk about his model for making (more) profit. Yet, after some 30 years, the company that he helped to cofound, ironically, was declared bankrupt in November 2012. Sadly, the then Republic of China (ROC) president, MA Ying-jeou, still invited him to visit the Taiwan area.

Let me elaborate on how I would introduce my current Department of Ocean and Border Governance, as opposed to Department of Political Science or, simply, Politics, Department of Economics, etc. to the incoming new batch of undergraduate and graduate students, some of whom, after a few years, may still wonder what is going on, regarding the courses or course design.

As a high school student, one may start looking for a university and a department. He or she may think about being a student of political science. Well, in terms of a Department of Political Science's courses, there are two dimensions: purely political and non-purely political. By the former, it is clear that we only focus on the core concept of power, which again could be purely related to power and non-purely related to power. For the latter dimension, there could be subdivided into economic, social, legal, and psychological, and so on and so forth levels. So, the course, constitution or comparative constitutions, could be taught in a Political Science Department or a Department of Law. As another example, the course, political sociology, could be taught in a Political Science Department or a Sociology Department. Sooner or later, a student of Political Science may realize that what the Department of Political Science offered is not enough, and therefore, the student would take some courses in pure economics. By the same token, after a while, he or she may again realize that it is better for him or her to take some courses related to law while still trying to absorb new knowledge related to politics and economics. After an extended period of time, the student may finally wake up, realizing that what he or she had been doing is tantamount to knowing all the social sciences or interdisciplinary. It goes without saying that at the end of the day, a social scientist must also embrace some knowledge related to natural science, such as knowing how to use a personal computer. Needless to say, when one becomes older, he or she may also explore things related to philosophy and religion.

No, in social science(s), we can only be closer to (alternative) reality. Asian students have usually been misled by multiple choice questions, as if there are only right and wrong answers. It is definitely not possible to get 100% truth, even if one were involved in an issue, phenomenon, or development. We can only say that we have a fuller (as opposed to complete) picture than some others.

All social scientists and, for that matter, natural scientists face a common problem of how to navigate within a turbid and perilous ocean of myriad contradictions. In other words, human beings definitely live in a world of contradictions. However, most of us can think, rationalize, and make sense as well as, as a next step, choose a better methodology to dissolve all the contradictions logically, systematically, and coherently. How can we be closer to (alternative) reality? In other words, how do we

approach<sup>7</sup> it? To this author, we have to first decide which way to adopt: the purely classical way and/or the purely applied way. In each of these three ways, we have to touch upon methodology. Then, we have to choose the dialectical and/or non-dialectical approaches, which will be elaborated later on.

To repeat, under both classical and applied ways, we have to face methodology. Methodology has to do with two core concepts, namely, approaches and methods or, in short, means of generating knowledge.<sup>8</sup> We definitely want to be closer to 100% (alternative) reality, and therefore, we acquire knowledge or generate it either dialectically and/or non-dialectically. Why do I say and/or? This is because some researchers may conduct a comparative dialectical and non-dialectical study of the same issue, phenomenon, or development. As a next step, we rely on methods, which would be much more complex and complicated. Arguably, the dialectical approach can enable us to be closer to (alternative) reality, when we study contemporary China. As to noncontemporary China, the same approach can enable us to be logical, systematic, and coherent. As a reminder, my one-dot theory, which was formally put forward in April 2007, when I created the One-Dot Theory Center, can describe, explain, and infer *all* the things in the human and nonhuman world in general and contemporary China in particular from time/space sequence (1) to time/space sequence [number (n)] MINUS ONE. What is that ONE will be answered in the third last paragraph in the last chapter.

What we write could be of little value and even be treated as garbage,<sup>9</sup> if our assumption turns out to be wrong in the first place. Game theory and/or rational (choice) theory, for example, assume that each one of us is rational. In October 2016, two professors became Nobel Prize winners in economics, applying the contract theory, which is derived from game theory. Is it possible for all of us to be rational all the time since Adam and Eve, if they were, indeed, the first human

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<sup>7</sup>Approach has been commonly translated as TuJing, which is misleading, because TuJing may also be way in classical way or applied way. To each social scientist, the term, approach, may be defined differently. To Allen S. Whiting, an approach can be conceptual or personalized. See his book, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975), p.viii and p.225. In the same book, he said his approach is perceptual analysis. See p.xxii. To Richard W. Wilson, when we study many voices of political culture, we can assess them, using different approaches, such as the hermeneutic or interpretative approach. Sometimes, he has been dialectical, such as mentioning on page 273 the culturalist-rationalist dichotomy. See his review article, *The Many Voices of Political Culture: Assessing Different Approaches*, *World Politics*, Vol.52, No.2 (January 2000), pp.246–273. Wilson authored the book, *Learning to be Chinese: The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan* (Cambridge, MA.: The M.I.T. Press, 1970). An approach can be inductivist or deductivist. See, for example, J. M. Bochenski, *Marxism in Communist Countries* in M. M. Drachkovitch, ed., *Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary World* (Palo Alto, CA.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966), p.67.

<sup>8</sup>To Allen S. Whiting, content analysis is a form of methodology. See his 1975 book, p.xxiii. See other books related to methodology: Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science* (San Francisco, CA.: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964); Howard Kahane, *Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason in Everyday Life* (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971); and Donald R. Cooper and Pamela S. Schindler, *Business Research Methods*, 10th ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2008).

<sup>9</sup>An academic in the West used the term, dross.

beings?<sup>10</sup> In this connection, some politicians in the Taiwan area say, for example, LaoTianYeBaoYouTaiWan/May Heaven Save or Bless Taiwan. A former Xiang/township head in the TaoYuan County said he is a Christian, and he hopes that the 14th and current Dalai Lama, [Tenzin Gyatso](#), would not visit his country again, because, after his visit each time in the past, a disaster would take place, due to ShangDiZhiNu/wrath of God.<sup>11</sup> In other words, an almighty, LaoTianYe, is involved. Can we apply game theory and play with LaoTianYe or another supernatural force? If we do not want to be shallow in our study of contemporary China, we should start from the first, highest level, religion (divinity):

Religion (divinity)

Philosophy

Natural science(s) and social science(s)

Paradigm(s)

Mainstream schools of thought

Theories

Model(s)

Concept(s)

In passing, if applying my crab and frog motion model, religion (divinity) would be put at (1); philosophy, (2); natural science(s) and social science(s), (3); paradigm(s), (4); mainstream schools of thought, (5); theories, (6); model(s), (7); and concept(s), (8). I will explain that later on.

Before discussing each level, we should first have a firmer grasp of ontology and epistemology. An atheist also has to ponder ontology. This is because, if it turns out that a supernatural force does exist, his or her scientific findings would be considered as falsified or garbage. I immediately have in mind Peter W. Higgs, who became a [Nobel](#) laureate for his work on the mass of [subatomic particles](#) in October 2013. Thinking like a dialectician, he in his September 1964 article, *Broken Symmetries, Massless Particles and Gauge Fields*, pointed out that it was *non-mass* which generated the mass of all particles. There are other natural scientists in the West,<sup>12</sup> who applied, for example, *yin* and *yang* to understand the mother nature. Niels H. D. Bohr is a well-known Nobel Prize winner in physics, who designed his own [coat of arms](#), which featured a partial TaiJiT<sub>u</sub><sup>13</sup> and the motto in [Latin](#), *contraria sunt*

<sup>10</sup>Given that the historical evidence is too sketchy to allow us to get a definitive dating of Jesus Christ's birth. According to the University of Barcelona statistician, Fergus Simpson, around 100 billion human beings have already lived. <https://uk.news.yahoo.com/one-500-chance-humankind-going-214405633.html>, accessed on November 18, 2016.

<sup>11</sup><http://www.CRNTT.com> 2016-09-16 00:13:58, accessed on September 19, 2016

<sup>12</sup>A Chinese mainland academic said Albert Einstein, who is a German theoretical physicist, does not understand dialectics. See *ZiRanBianZhengFaZaZhi/Natural Dialectics Magazine* (in literal translation), No.1 (Shanghai: ShangHaiRenMinChuBanShe, June 1976), pp.70–71.

<sup>13</sup>“... there is in the Changes the Great Primal Beginning. This generates the two primary forces. The two primary forces generate the four images. The four images generate the eight trigrams. The eight trigrams determine good fortune and misfortune. Good fortune and misfortune create the great field of action.” Translated by Richard Wilhelm and Cary F. Baynes, *The Iching or Book of Changes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp.318–319. ZiWeiDouShu is an



*complementa* (opposites are complementary), which is equivalent to 1 and 5 in my crab and frog motion model. An atheist, nevertheless, still has to ponder whether or not extraterrestrials (ETs)<sup>14</sup> exist or questions like whether or not (killer) (co-)robots would command and control human beings in the future.<sup>15</sup> In any case, when we see an issue, a phenomenon, or a development on earth and non-earth, we have to first take ontology and epistemology into consideration. After that, we have to choose either the classical way and/or the applied way as well as non-either the classical way and/or the applied way, a synonym of which is both classical and applied ways.

## 1.1 Ontology and Epistemology

Ontology, simply put, is the study of being. As can be seen, we already face a daunting task, and we can possibly go nowhere, because it is not possible for us to know whether Buddha,<sup>16</sup> God, Allah, and so on and so forth or a hybrid of (some of) them do exist. Even if a supernatural force does exist, we still have to figure out which force, be it Buddha, God, Allah is 100% the real one. Besides, if they are almighty, being able to control everything, we still have to make sure that the supernatural force can be 100% in charge while sleeping or being sick, if they do sleep or get ill. The safest way to resolve this problem is none other than to be dialectical, that is, writing at least three versions of the same manuscript but using the same, exact source materials: Yes (which is equivalent to 100% 1 in my crab and frog motion model), No (which is equivalent to 100% E), or being agnostic (which is equivalent to both 5 and A). An author could use 100 words to prove something to be yes. Yet, another author, using the same 100 words, can juggle with those words, to prove it the opposite way. It is still possible for the same author to spend additional time to use those 100 words to arrive at the conclusion of being both yes and no. It goes without saying that this kind of intellectual exercise is definitely overwhelming, because it would take a lot more time, effort, energy, money, etc. to complete the three versions.

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ancient Chinese astrology chart, which has been used as a tool to describe, explain, and infer a human being's behavior. Heard from Taipei-based Broadcasting Corporation or China's radio program on February 24, 2017, from 4 to 5 pm. A short form or a further simplification of TaiJiTu is MengZi's NeiFangWaiYuan/square internally, round externally. In other words, a person who attends this level is said to be perfect, when facing other people, because he or she knows how to handle everything smoothly. On February 12, 2017, a Chinese herbal doctor in JinMen County, WANG Ching Hsiu/JingXiu alerted me of MengZi's NeiFangWaiYuan/square internally, round externally. Later, I searched the origin of this four Chinese characters. I found a gold mine, because what MengZi said was integrated into the TaiJiTu.

<sup>14</sup>Or unexplained aerial phenomenon, unidentified aerial phenomenon, or anomalous phenomena

<sup>15</sup>In winter 2016, I began to realize that the fourth industrial revolution has to do with robots. In early 2017, a news report said that some three million French people would be jobless within 10 years, due to industrial robots replacing manpower.

<sup>16</sup>Regarding the ancient Chinese faith, see Olga Gorodetskaya/GUO JingYun, *TianShenYuTianDiZhiDao* (Shanghai: ShangHaiGuJiChuBanShe, April 2016).

We should not only discuss the supernatural force(s). We should also say something about the (killer) (co-)robots and co(laborative)-(ro)bots, which physically can interact with humans in a shared workspace since December 1996<sup>17</sup> and beyond as well as the ETs, which could have existed before contemporary China.

The first robots were constructed between 1948 and 1949, and they are performing some tasks that human beings find it tedious, difficult to carry out, or dangerous. What if some [killer] (co-)robots were programmed to be active 100 years later, destroying a country or even the entire earth and other habitable planets?

The existence of ETs has long been a conspiracy theory, and therefore, it is another issue. Aliens could help us or even do harm to us. Can National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) of the United States unveil the real truth? Vatican City State/The Holy See has made it clear that the existence of alien life is real, and we cannot have doubts.<sup>18</sup> In January 2017, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released sensitive documents about ETs.

That being said, our study of contemporary China would be much more complex and complicated. Even if we have resolved the ontology issue, we still have to discuss the epistemological issue, which has to do with two core concepts, that is, validity and limitation.

Certainly, we have limitations in this study. First, it is not possible for us to have a device or instrument to prove that the kind of supernatural force(s) and non-supernatural force(s) that we have talked about do exist. Faith, being a very abstract term, alone is no proof. (Feeling the existence of a supernatural force is also no proof.) Besides, we cannot skip logic and jump to faith, because, for example, the Bible dealt with logic, such that there is a sequence when we see the Old Testament and the New Testament or that it did not mention a single Buddhist or Daoist.<sup>19</sup>

Second, Buddhists speak of reincarnation. It is not clear whether we the human beings and, for that matter, plants, have to come to earth six or 20 times, before finishing our GongKe/homework, so to speak. Besides, if some of us did go to heaven, how come by now we are, yet, to see, in writing or digital image, that he or she in his or her second or even the 20th reincarnation on earth has met Buddha or even God or Allah in the heaven?

Third, Han Yü,<sup>20</sup> who was an essayist and poet from the Tang dynasty and who had a strong influence on the development of neo-Confucianism, once said WenQiongErHouGONG/scholarship gets better when one becomes poorer. Ideally, China students in general as well as sinologists, FeiQingZhuangJia/experts on Chinese Communist Bandits, China hands, China watchers, China specialists,

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<sup>17</sup>[http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-12-11/business/9612110101\\_1\\_hoist-assembly-worker-robotics](http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-12-11/business/9612110101_1_hoist-assembly-worker-robotics), accessed on August 31, 2016

<sup>18</sup><http://humansarefree.com/2015/08/the-vatican-about-ets-existence-of.html>, accessed on August 31, 2016. If so, why did the Bible fail to mention that?

<sup>19</sup>One practitioner is TU Jin-sheng, a QiGong master. In November 2006, he pulled an airplane attached to his genitalia in the USA.

<sup>20</sup>OuYangXiu also said the same thing.

Beijingologists,<sup>21</sup> and China romancers in particular should conduct a mixed qualitative/quantitative analysis on a chosen topic.<sup>22</sup> Due to lack of funding, it is not possible for me to conduct a quantitative analysis, such as (periodically) conducting public opinion polls on certain issues, phenomena, and developments.

Fourth, there is no way that I, as an observer, am able to tell whether the Beijing leaders and, for that matter, the Taipei leaders would perform, for a change, a *salto mortale* (a deadly jump or dangerous full somersault), leaping from dialectics to non-dialectics in the couple of decades ahead. If they do, my study can be said as being falsified. As for them, they could be in a mess and unable to lead, because they are so accustomed to the dialectical logic.

All told, let us begin to elaborate on each level. We can begin with the concept level, which carries the least weight in the crab and frog motion model.

The concept(s) level. When I was an undergraduate and graduate student, none of the professors, as I recall, had mentioned that it is important to define a concept. Even if they did, I did not understand the main reason at that time, given my poor knowledge in social science(s). In August 2015, a young professor who is my colleague asked me one question, that is, how do I define the term, governance, since I am trying to promote the study of it at various levels? I told him at first that it is a mind-boggling job, and therefore, we should avoid it, so that we do not have to invite more problems when we conduct research and writing. In my doctoral dissertation, I simply applied the board game of Chinese Checkers/TiaoQi,<sup>23</sup> forgetting to tell readers that the theory of power and exchange had been derived from the board game, in my study of the relationship among Beijing, Washington, and Moscow, from the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s perspective. In March 2016, I finally realized what my colleague meant, and I jot down my definition on governance in the preface of my forthcoming book, *Governing JinMen/Quemoy County: The International and Non-international Regimes Dimensions*.<sup>24</sup> For the record,

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<sup>21</sup>They focus on high politics in the power center of Beijing. See Shuisheng ZHAO, *Meeting the Challenge of Contemporary China Studies: The Journal of Contemporary China* in Andrew D. Marble, guest editor, *The State of the China Studies Field, Issues & Studies*, Vol.38, No.4/ Vol.39, No.1 (December2002/March2003), pp.332–336 at p.334.

<sup>22</sup>See, for example, Bruce Gilley and Heike Holbig, "The Debate on Party Legitimacy in China: A Mixed Quantitative/qualitative Analysis," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol.18, No.59 (March 2009), pp.339–358.

<sup>23</sup>At the oral defense of my dissertation, my mentor said the board game can be regarded as an isomorph. Another author in the Taiwan area has also mentioned this board game and XiangQi in the article. See <http://www.udn.com/2008/6/21/NEWS/OPINION/OPI1/4393958.shtml>, accessed on September 1, 2016.

<sup>24</sup>Objectively, governance has to do with a human being, to begin with, facing (mother) nature in general or environment in particular, and, when a second human being emerges, we the human beings have to additionally face the public dimension, such as the second person or the entity of a state; the private dimension, such as the entity of oneself or a company; and the interaction of both dimensions. The book is scheduled to be published in January 2017 by New Taipei City's Wun Ching Publishing Group. My definition for international regimes is as follows: a set (or sets) of at least 15 core elements/criteria/features (including those four as mentioned by Steven D. Krasner) in the contexts of (fragmented) issue area, (fragmented) issue areas, and issue regimes.

JinMen/Quemoy is an administrative region in the FuJian Province but again governed by the ROC Government, from August 1945.

Since we were born, we began to learn words, like mama and papa. It is said that, having learned 3000 Chinese characters, one can read a Chinese newspaper, either the traditional or simplified version.

A word can become a concept, when we conduct scientific enquiry about a certain issue, phenomenon, or development. It is within that realm and process that the term, conceptualization of certain issue, phenomena, or development becomes more meaningful. Some academics and experts are good at that, but most of them cannot, and therefore, the former can lead a discourse, thereby making the rest (somewhat) on the defensive.

Yes, it is important to define a concept, such as contemporary China,<sup>25</sup> however in disarray. This is because we need to eventually build at least a model and, if and when necessary, come up with a theory later on, based on that model or a series of models. I had never defined a term in the past, until recently, because I used to select nonverbal models in the form of a diagram, which can be seen, such as the board game of Chinese Checkers/TiaoQi and the game theory matrix. Then, I would simply slot in the relevant information, (scientific and technical) data, and analysis into that model. Having realized the important reason, my study of contemporary China has both verbal and nonverbal models, which can be seen in terms of a big diagram or model and four small diagrams or models, or 1+4, in short, which is derived from TaiJiTù/TaiJi Diagram/ Diagram of Cosmological Scheme/Supreme Ultimate<sup>26</sup> and which, in turn, is equivalent to the (great) palm<sup>27</sup> of Buddha in the sixteenth century popular folk novel, XiYou(Ji)/*Journey to the West/The Monkey*, which has strong roots in Daoist and Buddhist philosophies.<sup>28</sup> Can a human being like the monkey perform a somersault, trying to escape from that palm or TaiJiTù, as I said for the first time in January 2015? I am afraid that the answer is an astonishing NO.

Regarding that important reason, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, we ought to remember that, when we have a definition, we can, as the next step, pick a

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<sup>25</sup>An academic treated China as a concept. See Rana Mitter, *Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937–1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013). See also [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/books/review/forgotten-ally-by-rana-mitter.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/books/review/forgotten-ally-by-rana-mitter.html?_r=0), accessed on August 31, 2016.

<sup>26</sup>“... there is in the Changes the Great Primal Beginning. This generates the two primary forces. The two primary forces generate the four images. The four images generate the eight trigrams. The eight trigrams determine good fortune and misfortune. Good fortune and misfortune create the great field of action.” Translated by Richard Wilhelm and Cary F. Baynes, *The I Ching or Book of Changes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp.318–319. ZiWeiDouShu is an ancient Chinese astrology chart, which has been used as a tool to describe, explain, and infer a human being's behavior. Heard from Taipei-based Broadcasting Corporation of China's radio program on February 24, 2017, from 4 to 5 pm. In February 2017, I realized that a short form or a further simplification of TaiJiTù is MengZi's NeiFangWaiYuan/square internally, round externally. In other words, a person who has reached this level is said to be perfect, when facing other people.

<sup>27</sup>Or WuZhiShan/Mountain of Five Fingers

<sup>28</sup><http://www.aaronshp.com/stories/036.html>, accessed on September 4, 2016 and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journey\\_to\\_the\\_West](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journey_to_the_West), accessed on October 4, 2016

few or some words in the definition to form a framework. When we slot in information, data, and analysis, we will be able to test whether the framework is rigorous, being able to embrace more phenomena, the more the better, as China students' publications also need to be tested.<sup>29</sup> If so, we can regard the framework as a model, which is a more scientific word, implying that the application of that particular model could enable us researchers to be still closer to 100% (alternative) reality at the present and especially in the future.

In this study, my definition for the term, contemporary China is one dot, a dot, or "but a dot," as opposed to, for example, "[a] country in East Asia, the third largest and most populous in the world"<sup>30</sup> or China can be defined as LiShi/history and WenHua/culture, according to the PRC's constitution,<sup>31</sup> which can be further simplified as WenJiao/culture and education. A theory should have lesser words and be as (more) abstract as possible, so as to be able to embrace more concepts, the more the better. The term, contemporary China, already has two words. How do we justify the fact that, in my two out of three definitions, there are also two words? We can do it by reminding readers that we can look at the term or phrase, contemporary China, simply as one dot, whereas the model has two separate concepts, that is to say, non-dialectically, the first one is one and the second, dot. Dialectically, there would be at least four concepts, which should flash in our mind and heart: one, non-one, dot, and non-dot. The fifth one could be: one and non-dot, as one phrase. If readers realize, there is a zillion synonyms for the term, for example, non-one. And, if one chooses to be more complex and complicated, other concepts can be coined, such as one and non-one versus non-one and non-one as well as dot and non-dot versus non-dot and non-dot. If readers are still not convinced, we can say that we can add parenthesis on the word, contemporary, making it (contemporary) China, meaning that we can just first choose to look at China. In this context, China, as an entry in a dictionary or a concept, is but one dot or a dot. Expanded dialectically by, for example, building another crab and frog motion model, China could be (ancient) China as 5, (modern) China as 3, or (contemporary) China as 1, for example.

The model(s) level. It is basically a framework, be it verbal<sup>32</sup> or shown in terms of a diagram. The former is made up of at least two words, while the latter, something we can see on a piece of paper and relate to. It is better to show a diagram or drawing. It is not possible for us to remember all the words in a verbal model. As I have said earlier, a framework becomes a model when we test it, to see whether (additional) information and data can be slotted into that framework. In the process,

<sup>29</sup> CHAO Kang, "The China-Watchers Tested," *The China Quarterly*, No.84 (March 1980), pp.97-104

<sup>30</sup> <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/china>, accessed on January 2, 2017. Other words can be used, such as particle, period, round, circle, a full stop, etc. However, the next test is: Which is closer to reality: dot or another one?

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.CRNTT.com> 2017-01-02 00:16:46, accessed on January 2, 2017

<sup>32</sup> According to Hans Kuiper, "[t]here are different kinds of model: verbal, iconic, analog, symbolic, static, dynamic, deterministic, and stochastic... These kinds are often, but should not be, confounded with each other." Email from him, dated May 10, 2017.

we need to provide analysis of who (is involved?), where (did it take place?), when (did it take place?) what (happened?), and why (did that happen?) or the principle of 5Ws or 6Ws, embracing how can also cover what, when, or where.<sup>33</sup> A framework can be regarded as rigorous, if it can withstand the test of absorbing past information, data, and analysis, present information, data, and analysis, and, more importantly, future information, data, and analysis. For example, in ancient and modern China,<sup>34</sup> we cannot send an electronic mail. The same thing can speak for contemporary China up to sometime in late 1971, when the first email message was sent by an American computer programmer to himself<sup>35</sup> between two computers that were actually sitting beside each other. What I am saying is that, if a framework did not anticipate that email, the framework needs to be modified or even abandoned. So, as Lowell Dittmer wrote the following words: "... the methodological landscape of China studies is littered with models abandoned due to functional obsolescence, and the lack of a dominant paradigm or even an abiding constellation of 'schools of thought' mirrors the turbulent course of actual Chinese politics."<sup>36</sup> What he said applies to theories as well, not just models. Indeed, if, one day, an asteroid or comet strikes contemporary China, broadly defined, all the theories and models, with the exception of the one-dot theory if, for example, ETs and (killer) (co-)robots are still applying it, in the China studies will be at least 1% destroyed.

There are a few synonyms for the glib term, model, such as isomorph, mode, and pattern. Regarding isomorph, Abraham Kaplan has this to say: "... two relations are *isomorphic* [sic] to one another if a one-to-one correspondence can be established between their fields in such a way that whenever the first relation holds between two objects then the second relation holds between the corresponding objects, and vice versa. So defined, isomorphism is an equivalence relations – it is symmetrical and transitive. A *structure* [sic] is an equivalence class of isomorphs. It is in this sense that the relation which an object has to two others by virtue of being their combination has the same structure as the relation of number to two others when it is their sum,"<sup>37</sup> adding "... when one system is a model of another they resemble one another in *form* [sic] and not in content. More specifically, models are isomorphs of one another.... Both systems have the same structure, in the sense that whenever a relation holds between two elements to one system a corresponding relation holds between the corresponding elements of the other system. The systems need not stand in any casual connection, for what is required is only that the relations correspond, and to satisfy this requirement it is enough that we can *put* [sic] them

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<sup>33</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five\\_Ws](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Ws), accessed on January 27, 2017

<sup>34</sup> See, for example, Lynn T. White, III, ZHENG Yongnian, and LU Yiyi, co-editors, *The Politics of Modern China*, four volumes (London: Routledge, 2009).

<sup>35</sup> That programmer was not a good social scientist, because he forgot to tell us on which day and month was the first email sent.

<sup>36</sup> See his chapter, "Approaches to the Study of Chinese Politics" in Yu-min SHAW, ed., *Tendencies of Regionalism on Contemporary China* (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1997), pp.313–328 at p.314.

<sup>37</sup> Kaplan, p.185



into correspondence, that is, think of them as corresponding. Then, whether a system does or does not show a certain pattern in its own internal relations is plainly quite independent of what the other system shows. If there is an isomorphism, the systems significantly resemble one another only in their structural properties, additional resemblances, if any, being irrelevant.”<sup>38</sup>

Mode is, on the one hand, related to a statistical measure of central tendency that “accords with the views of more people than any other,”<sup>39</sup> such as mode of enquiry, mode of public opinion, mode of time or mode of development, or mode of transportation. On the other hand, mode is “to apply the political metaphor, governance by plurality: it is not a function of all the items, and not even of a majority of them, necessarily. Just what the mode is may vary with the interval chosen, the way in which the attribute space is sub-divided into distinct classes. What is worse, ‘the’ mode may not exist: several classes in the distribution may be equally numerous.”<sup>40</sup>

Pattern has to do with an order of doing things, for example, MAO Zedong would dialectically work at night, because, to him, day is night and night is day. He would ask his subordinates to send in to his office Edgar P. Snow, who wrote the 1937 book, *Red Star Over China*, at 9 pm and talk to the latter to over 2 am in the morning.<sup>41</sup> Pattern can also be an order exhibited in a system.<sup>42</sup> Whiting mentioned several models in his study. In the final chapter, suddenly a model basic continuity with incremental change rather than one of total unpredictability with wide fluctuations in behavior was mentioned.<sup>43</sup>

The theories level. We live in a world of contradictions. Thus, most researchers would ask: Why do some theories fail to describe, explain, and predict?<sup>44</sup> In late 2016, one of my colleagues said some theories are useless.<sup>45</sup> By accepting a certain theory, we live in a world of no contradictions, at least at that point in time and be confined to that space. So, a theory and model in a publication is like a birdcage and the bird is the reader. There is a thin line between a theorist and a model-builder, but the former, enjoying more prestige and respect, is certainly at a higher level than the latter. It is important to begin with defining a concept. After doing that, the theorist will work with those words generated by either compressing or simplifying those words into a theory. To put it another way, each word in the model is but part of the theory. Just as a model, the functions of a theory are to describe, explain, and infer certain issue, phenomena, or development. Above all, it can help us to dissolve con-

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<sup>38</sup>Ibid., pp.263–264

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p.237

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p.237

<sup>41</sup><http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2013/1203/c85037-23724492.html>, accessed on August 31, 2016

<sup>42</sup>Kaplan, p.263

<sup>43</sup>See his book, p.226

<sup>44</sup>See, for example, JIANG ChunQi, “Why Some Theories Fail to Describe, Explain, and Predict: Reconstructing the Future,” *The Social Science Journal*, Vol.35, No.4 (1998), pp.645–656.

<sup>45</sup>This colleague failed to understand that to her a particular theory is useless but to others it is useful.

traditions. This is important, because we must first convince ourselves before persuading others to accept your viewpoint. Otherwise, conscience will haunt us. Yet, it is a pity that most academics qua university administrators cannot rationalize what they do and say. At the end of the day, however sad, it is (petty) politics, which prevails, because a decision sooner or later must be made, regarding a certain issue, phenomenon, or development.

The mainstream schools of thought level. We only need to first mention several of them: (Neo-)Realism, centering on the core concept of acquiring power by an individual, political party, country, international organization, etc., respectively; (neo-)Liberalism, championing (free) market and signing of contract, if the volume of trade and commerce is big; (neo-)Marxism, emphasizing the thesis of class struggles from the primitive Communism stage to the final stage of Communism or Utopia<sup>46</sup>; Constructivism, emphasizing the argument that it is idea(s) (or shared ideas rather than material forces) and ideal(s), which propel, drive, or compel people, with at least one goal in mind and heart, to say this or act on that; and International and Global Governance, which promotes the study of an issue, a phenomena, or a development from the perspectives of public sector, private sector, and the interaction between them, in the context of environment, broadly defined, which may include cyber. We can add the sixth mainstream school of thought or even upgrade it to the paradigm level, to wit, one-dot theory, which is a compression and simplification of TaiJiTū, and it is at a higher level than TaiJiTū.

We can first briefly interpret contemporary China from each school of thought. Getting more powerful, broadly defined, is the thesis of the first mainstream school of thought. There are more than 200 countries,<sup>47</sup> regions, and political entities in the world in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Each one of them tries to become more powerful; even the sinking Tuvalu,<sup>48</sup> due to global warming, tries to struggle to remain as an independent, sovereign country, within the British Commonwealth.

In January and February of 1992, DENG Xiaoping conducted a much-publicized NanXun/inspection tour<sup>49</sup> of southern China, which ideologically signaled the shift from the mainstream economic policy of Socialism under the Maoist model of Communism versus Capitalism or 5 in the crab and frog motion model to market economy, which is another mainstream economic policy and which officially became the mainstream at the September 1997 15th National Congress of the CPC, under the Dengist model of Socialism versus Capitalism or 5 in the crab and frog motion model. In April of the same year, the same paramount leader instructed his subordinates to keep a low profile in the international society or community, under the strategy of TaoGuangYangHui/keeping a low profile. However, the Chinese

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<sup>46</sup>The antonym of utopia is dystopian.

<sup>47</sup>The Republic of China (ROC) was listed as 1 of the 197 countries. See <https://www.countries-ofthe-world.com/all-countries.html>, accessed on September 21, 2016.

<sup>48</sup>It means “group of eight,” that is, the eight traditionally inhabited islands. There is no convenient short form for this country’s official name.

<sup>49</sup>In ancient China, emperors would do that.



mainland or mainland China, which embraces XiangGang Special Administrative Region (SAR) and AoMen SAR, cannot hide its economic performance. As of December 2016, its Gross National Product (GDP), which is an important indicator of economic performance, ranked number two in the world, accounting for 15%,<sup>50</sup> and its foreign exchange reserve remains number one. By the year 2031, mainland China will become the world's largest economy, surpassing that of the United States, according to a study by the United Kingdom (UK)-based [Center for Economics and Business Research](#).<sup>51</sup>

To many people in the West, when a country is economically powerful, it will eventually have the appetite to become militarily (more) powerful. That was the experience of the United States and many countries in Western Europe. In other words, to those observers, contemporary China will not be different from the European colonial powers since the October 1648 Westphalia Treaty nor the United States before World War II.

People who subscribe to the second mainstream of thought are usually the capitalists or those who work at multinational or transnational corporations, conducting international trade and commerce as well as providing worldwide service. They perceive that most people on earth are only first thinking about making more money or profit, so as to live a better life. Only then would we see (petty) politics. So, we see the term, political economy, not the other way around, that is, economic politics. Hence, we see London School of Economics and Political Science, not London School of Political Science and Economics.

Economy is determined by the (size of a) market. When the volume of trade and commerce is big, parties involved would have to sign contracts, for the sake of mutual protection. Others like the insurance company and trucking company would also play a role.

After World War II, the principle of self-determination was prominently embodied in Article I of the United Nations (UN) Charter. It became clear that it would be more difficult to create new colonies, unless we are talking about Moon or Mars, which can be colonized (for a lack or want of a better word). In December 1960, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was adopted by the UN General Assembly. Thereafter, we see the birth of many new countries, especially in the underdeveloped and developing Third World. Given this trend, the only smart and intelligent way for capitalists and corporations to make more money or ensure bigger profit is to urge, if not force, the governments all over the world to reduce import and export taxes, so as to benefit not only themselves but the average consumers as well. It is under this kind of philosophy that the idea of having International Trade Organization (ITO), which is an organization proposed

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<sup>50</sup>The United States ranks number one, accounting for 24.5% of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). See <http://cn.knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2016-data-and-charts-forecast>, accessed on January 20, 2016. America's is RMB110WanYiYuan; mainland China's, 70, and Japan's, 20. For mainland China, first time over 70.

<sup>51</sup><http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015-12-28/americas-days-are-numbered-as-the-worlds-top-economy>, accessed on August 19, 2016

for regulating trade and reducing tariffs, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), etc. surfaced, even before the end of World War II. In December 1950, the then American President, Harry S. Truman, announced that he would no longer seek Congressional approval of the ITO Charter. In April 1994, the World Trade Organization finally began to operate, replacing the GATT. In December 2001, the PRC joined the WTO, and in January 2002, the ROC, under the name of Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu (Chinese Taipei), also became a member. If they do not become members, they will suffer in the long run, because the prices of their goods and services including import tax and export tax would be much more expensive than their WTO counterpart.

Needless to say, this mainstream of thought has its limitations in describing certain issue, phenomenon, or development. For example, from October 1, 1949, the Chinese mainland practices planned economy. It does not encourage international trade and commerce, especially during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which officially lasted from the months of May and August 1966 to October 1976. This means that a great portion of contemporary China was not directly involved in international trade and commerce. If the PRC, on the whole, in the first few decades of its existence has limited international trade and commerce, can we say that it was trying to be more (militarily) powerful? As to governance, if we only focus on the issue of environment, broadly defined, indeed, academics and experts in the Chinese mainland do use the term, *ZhiLi*, which means governance. For example, they would say *ZhiLi* a river. However, this term cannot be applied to the study of the interactions between the public sector and the private sector, because, up to the December 1978 Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the private sector was yet to flourish and blossom and be robust, until DENG Xiaoping's southern inspection in January and February 1992.

It seems that the second mainstream school of thought can also help us to be quite closer to (alternative) reality in describing, explaining, and inferring what was going on in the few decades of the existence of the PRC, because Beijing did not 100% oppose international trade and commerce. In GuangDong Province's GuangZhou City, we do see Canton Fair, which began in April 1957 and which was held twice a year in spring and autumn, respectively.<sup>52</sup> In October and November 2016, the 120th fair was held.

To the Chinese Communists, it goes without saying that the third mainstream school of thought is the proper one from October 1, 1949. It is also politically correct. If one wants to work in a government agency or get a promotion, he or she must toe the line. This is what ZHUANGZI, who was an influential Chinese philosopher and who lived around the fourth century Before Christ (B.C.) during the Warring States period, called *YuShiJuHua/YuShiJuJin*/abreast of modern developments, so as to keep up with the times. Paying a visit to XiaMen University's School of Marxism in June 2016 confirmed this. The academics over there are still very much so concerned about ideology. However, there are non-Marxist academics on that campus. It goes without saying that some of them would first try to describe, explain,

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<sup>52</sup>In spring 2007, it was renamed China Import and Export Fair.

and infer (alternative) reality from other schools of thought, and it is up to the faculty members and their students to appreciate one of them, all of them, or none of them.

Constructivism is the fourth important mainstream school of thought. It emphasizes two core concepts, namely, (shared) idea and ideal. Not many people like or play politics, which is usually dirty and ugly. So we often hear the Chinese idiom, ShengZheWeiWang, BaiZheWeiKou/Losers are always in the wrong. Yet, some people do, and they would usually lead by uttering this or that, such as independence or reunification. Each concept is an idea. Some people in the Taiwan area would agree with independence, and therefore, they would take steps to achieve their ideal, for example, creating the Republic of Taiwan (ROT). Needless to say, at the end of the day, we still have to see who will emerge as the winner, the result of which includes the possibility of revising, rewriting, or even abandoning history.

The Constructivists can make their presence felt, rather quickly since the early 1990s, because concepts like power, market, class struggle, and public sector are each but an idea, respectively. Needless to say, this mainstream school of thought has its limitations in describing, explaining, and inferring an issue, a phenomenon, or a development. For example, if we only talk about Adam and if he were the very first human being in the world according to the Bible, does he have to think about getting more power? Not really, because he does not have to compete with Eve, their children, and outsiders. Besides, if Adam was not a Chinese, we can skip him in the study of China, be it ancient, modern, or contemporary. By the same token, when Adam is alone, we do not have to speak about even primitive class. As to governance, Adam has to objectively face mother nature, if that constitute the public dimension. What about one dot? There is no problem in conceptualizing Adam as a dot, or Adam as a dot is a part of a larger dot, namely, mother nature, or even a supernatural force or (co-)robot.

A rising mainstream school of thought is international and global governance. In November 1989, the World Bank began to make an impact. In the foreword of its report on Sub-Saharan Africa, the term, (good) governance, was mentioned by its president, Barber B. Conable.<sup>53</sup> Its April 1992 report, *Governance and Development*<sup>54</sup> must have made a further impact in the academic world. In February 1995, the UN released a report, written by the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood*, which focused on global governance. We can look at the same phenomena from three perspective, that of the public sector, the private sector, and the interaction between the two sectors.

Come to think of it, this rising school of thought can also be persuasive to some quarters, because Adam by himself had to face the objective environment. We can regard that context as public. For the sake of survival, he had to manage things by himself almost all the time, searching for food and drinking water. After Eve's appearance, the context has been changed, and the issue of private and public sur-

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<sup>53</sup> World Bank, *From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long Term Perspective Study*, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989), p.xi

<sup>54</sup> World Bank, *Governance and Development* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, April 1992), 61 pages


faces. By himself or herself, we are talking about the private dimension, respectively. However, when they cooperate and coordinate with each other and even at odds or fight among themselves, the public dimension emerges. Adam may go hunting, while Eve fetching water or picking up some fruits. They may exchange what they have got. Power may also be exercised, because both Adam and Eve have to make decisions and they may agree or disagree with each other regarding how to solve or resolve certain issues, such as who should lead or does Adam or Eve eat three apples, where there are five of them?


In March 1602, considered by many as the first multinational corporation in the world, the United East Indian Company, headquartered in Amsterdam, was established, when the [Dutch Republic government](#) granted it to trade throughout Asia a 21-year [monopoly](#) on Dutch [spice trade](#). Here, we see interactions between the public sector and private sector.

Between both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s), we began to see, from January 1994, as unilaterally permitted by the PRC, an increasingly small amount of buying and selling among FuJian Province, ZheJiang Province, JiangSu Province, Shanghai Municipality, and ShanDong Province and Taiwan area in general and JinMen/Quemoy and XiaMen/Amoy, in particular, after the former was returned to civilian rule in November 1992 from the JinMenZhanDiZhengWuWeiYuanHui/Quemoy Military Administration, which began in July 1956.

Can the one-dot theory be considered as a mainstream school of thought, given that most Chinese have seen TaiJiTu since small? I happen to notice that I am not alone in the study of one dot in the East and West. In November 2013, one of my students, CHANG Chun-li, alerted me of the following fascinating link, which is prepared by ROC-based Heresy Cheng-wei KU, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-AHVpz2MKE#t=30>, in which you can see the vicissitude of *yin* and *yang*. I asked KU a follow-up tough question: Can your video apply to the Moon, Mars, our universe, and even multiverse? His reply in January 2014 was: The link is a hand-made video, which takes a lot of images and data-processing, adding it is hard to “apply” to other data. Indeed, solid data are hard to come by. Anyway, he has done us human beings a great visual service, confirming that TaiJiTu is derived from mother nature. It is interesting to read Stefan Jaeger’s *A Geomedical Approach to Chinese Medicine: The Origin of the Yin-Yang Symbol*, in which the following words were written on page 32: “The Yin-Yang symbol is tightly connected with the annual cycle of the earth around the sun, and the four seasons resulting from it. To investigate this cycle, the ancient Chinese used a pole that they put up orthogonally to the ground...” In July 2008, Theresa J. Thurmond Morris posted the Dot the Theory of Everything in the Unified Field of Origin. In October 2011, I came across terms like “dotting the dot map” and “zone of coalescing dots.” It is very interesting to note that, in the same month, I noticed that the then business school dean at Columbia University (CU), R. Glenn Hubbard, generated the “connect the dot,” “connect the dots,” or “connecting the dots” theory to study business and management. In February 2012, I found out that, in 1997, John E. Eck of the University of Maryland (UM) wrote a book chapter on the use of mapping in criminology and criminal justice research, and the title of the research paper is: What Do Those Dots

Mean? The Role of Theory in Crime Mapping. In May 2009, that is, before the May Expo 2010 Shanghai China, Beijing, with the Taiwan area in mind, publicized the following philosophical statement regarding the Taiwan Pavilion site, which can be derived from its perspective, “GeBiaoYiZhong/One China: Respective Interpretation.”<sup>55</sup>: “The location of the Taiwan Pavilion is a dot in Zone A, which hosts the China Pavilion and national pavilions for Asian countries except Southeast Asian ones. The China Pavilion is also a dot in Zone A.” In January 2010, the then American president, Barack H. Obama, II, referring to a December 25, 2009, plot to blow up an airliner with nearly 300 passengers on board, uttered the following remarks: Anti-terrorist agents “had sufficient information to have uncovered this plot... but our intelligence community failed to connect those dots.” In June 2005, Steve Jobs, the then Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Apple Computer and of Pixar Animation Studios, in his commencement address at Stanford University related his first story, which is about connecting dots in life. He then connected some of the dots that interest him. In September 2012, I also noticed a little book, written by Edgar H. Andrews, who is an emeritus professor of materials at the University of London: *Who Made God?: Searching for a Theory of Everything*. In March 2013, I came across an article, God as the Not-Dot, which was posted online 2 months earlier. In January 2014, my former student from the Republic of Indonesia, Ali MUHYIDIN, emailed Guneet KHURANA’s February 2013 PowerPoint presentation, Geometry of Islamic Architecture, to me. This person is an architect from the Republic of India (ROI). In the third slide, a question was posed at the outset: How is geometry seen to be spiritual? Point one has the following words, accompanied

by a diagram<sup>56</sup>:  Because circles have no end they are infinite and so they remind, for example, Muslims that Allah is infinite. And the first point in the fourth slide has the following words: The circle and its center at which all Islamic patterns begin. It emphasizes one god. I, in January and February of the same year, corresponded with my student, saying my one-dot theory has withstood another test, because the square/circle qua dot symbolizes both God and Allah. It is interesting to

note that heaven comes in the shape of a hexagon:  What about purgatory and hell in an afterlife? In January 2014, my son alerted me about the degree, doctor of philosophy. Matt Might, using circles or dots, illustrated what is human knowledge. Ultimately, the dent you made is called a PhD. In August 2014, I read the following nine words in *Auguries of Innocence*, which are written by a British mystical poet, William Blake, who was understood by few and misunderstood by many during his lifetime, to wit, to see a world in a grain of sand, which is but a dot. Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister, in an April 2015 report, US-China 21,

<sup>55</sup>To Taipei, it is the reverse: GeBiaoYiZhong/One China, Respective Interpretation.

<sup>56</sup>A Chinese mainland academic also mentioned the term, “YouXingDeShangDi/Tangible God/physical God. See *ZiRanBianZhengFaZaZhi/Natural Dialectics Magazine* (in literal translation), No.1 (Shanghai: ShangHaiRenMinChuBanShe, June 1976), p.63.

at Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs showed the *yin* and *yang* symbols or duality on the cover.<sup>57</sup> In September 2016, I learned a British idiom, off (one's) dot, which means "to be crazy or mentally unsound; to be extremely foolish or foolhardy,"<sup>58</sup> and later I noticed that one person posed the following question in the Internet: Is a semicolon two dots or one dot and a comma?<sup>59</sup> However, none of them applied the five interrelated diagrams qua models, as shown in this study. In a nutshell, we can certainly reinvent each mainstream school of thought as a dot.

The paradigm(s) level. TaiJiTu or, for that matter, one-dot theory, certainly constitutes a paradigm,<sup>60</sup> because, by 1945, the Chinese population as listed in the ROC's *China Handbook* was 454,928,992<sup>61</sup> and, as of August 2016, based on the latest UN estimates, there are 1,383,149,516 Chinese in this world, which may not include the HuaQiao/overseas Chinese. By 2020, there could be 1.42 billion Chinese, and by 2030, 1.45 billion, because Chinese mainland had stopped implementing the one-child policy, which was instituted in September 1980 and which mandated that the ethnic majority Han Chinese can only have one child in the family, and with effect from January 1, 2016, the PRC government permitted some HAN families to have a second child. Many, if not most, of the new born babies will eventually learn things related to TaiJiTu, which is but a dot, in the context of, for example, Buddha.

The natural science(s) and social science(s) level. According to Hans Kuiper, there are six clusters of science: physical sciences, life sciences, human sciences (humanities), social sciences, formal sciences, and applied sciences, adding "nobody has a thorough knowledge of all sciences."<sup>62</sup> How to logically, systematically, and coherently describe, explain, and infer the following core concepts in social science(s)?: (pure) political science, (pure) economics, (pure) sociology, (pure) law, (pure) psychology, discipline, interdisciplinary, and dimension(s)? Non-dialectically, especially the undergraduates, most of them definitely are confused. Did their professors try to rationalize those core concepts by not being contradictory in class, at a forum, or in their writings?

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<sup>57</sup>Rudd, Kevin. "SUMMARY REPORT: US-China 21." The Future of US-China Relations Under Xi Jinping: Toward a New Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, April 2015, available at <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf>

<sup>58</sup><https://www.google.com.tw/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=off%20one%E2%80%99dot>, accessed on September 13, 2106

<sup>59</sup><https://socratic.org/questions/is-a-semicolon-two-dots-or-one-dot-and-a-comma>, accessed on September 13, 2016

<sup>60</sup>See, for example, David D. Shambaugh, *Commentary on Civil-Military Relations in China: The Search for New Paradigms* in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., *Seeking Truth from Facts: A Retrospective on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era* (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND), Chap. 2.

<sup>61</sup>The 1952 *People's Handbook* cited a Chinese population figure of 486,571,237. See O. Edmund Clubb, advisory editor, *China* (New York: The New York Times Company, 1972), p.143.

<sup>62</sup>Email from him, dated April 21, 2017.



Rationalizing all the abovementioned core concepts in social science(s) can be done dialectically. When we were in high school, we may have to think about what to (double) major at a university or college. Most institutions of higher education have departments bearing a specific discipline, such as political science. Let us take that as an example. There is the pure political dimension of the political science discipline and the non-pure dimension. By pure, I mean strictly political, meaning pure political science would not involve, say, the economic dimension, sociological dimension, legal dimension, and the psychological dimension. For example, A forced B to do something that B was reluctant to do. This kind of phenomenon can often occur in a department at a university or what we called office politics or petty politics. Regarding the non-pure political science, we can mention the economic dimension, sociological dimension, legal dimension, and the psychological dimension. For example, A offered B a certain amount of financial assistance, and B cheerfully accepted it. Soon after that, B supported A in the UN Assembly or the Security Council.

If we were talking about a department, which has the following name, such as Chinese Studies, the same dialectical logic applies. We begin by saying there is the pure Chinese dimension, meaning students would start learning to write Chinese characters, excluding the ones that have been borrowed from abroad, for example, the English word, loser, has been transliterated as LuShe in the Taiwan area. Needless to say, there is also the non-pure Chinese dimension. Just like other languages, the Chinese have to borrow certain expressions from the non-Chinese civilizations and cultures. One example is: Slap in the face in the American society has been translated as DaLian in the Taiwan area. To be more well versed in Chinese studies, we have to also describe, explain, and infer them from the political, economic, sociological, legal, and psychological dimensions, respectively. It is also not possible for students in the Chinese Studies since the late twentieth century not to use personal computer, which is a product of natural science.

The same logic applies to natural science(s). In mother nature, we see at least a zillion dots, starting from the Big Bang.<sup>63</sup> In August 2016, the PRC launched the world's first quantum science satellite for communications. An article about the Chinese space program [published in the July 2016 issue of \*Nature\*](#) said any tinkering with quantum communications would be detectable. "Two parties can communicate secretly," the article said, and could be "safe in the knowledge that any eavesdropping would leave its mark."<sup>64</sup>

The secure satellite is called Quantum Experiments at Space Scale (QUESS) and nicknamed MoZi/Micius, after a Chinese philosopher and scientist in the fifth century

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<sup>63</sup> Some scientists in their essay put forward a new model with a much simpler idea of the beginning of the universe: There was not one, our universe has no beginning, or the Big Bang singularity or singular point never happened. See Ahmed Farag Ali et al. *Cosmology from Quantum Potential*, *Physics Letters B*, Volume 741 (February 4, 2015), pp.276–279.

<sup>64</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/world/asia/china-quantum-satellite-mozi.html>, accessed on August 19, 2016

B.C.,<sup>65</sup> who discovered the straight-line propagation of light or that light travels in straight lines, each one of which or collectively looked at in the distance is but a dot.

We ought to construct other crab and frog motion models, so as to make sense of those two branches of sciences, which may (somewhat) contradict with each other at certain time/space sequences or just the opposite. Two basic models are in mind: natural science(s) at 1 and social science(s) E as well as social science(s) at 1 and natural science(s) E. It is possible that a social scientist, who is sicken and tired of or no longer treasuring the study of social science(s), would place social science(s) at 5 (or even in the danger zone, given publish or perish or both publish and perish), instead of 1, because 5 carries a lesser weight. It is also possible that they may complement with each other at other time/space sequences. Two basic models can be constructed: Natural Science(s) at 1 and Social Science(s), 5, and vice versa. This is like saying that the Chinese herbal medicine doctors can cooperate and coordinate with the Western medicine doctors, among them the father of Western medicine, ancient Greek's Hippocrates of Kos, at certain time/space sequences, who may despise each other at other time/space sequences, since ancient times.

The philosophy level. When a person says "My philosophy is," he or she is actually talking about a long period of time. The time/space sequence component in the crab and frog motion model can enable us to be philosophical. MAO Zedong claimed (nearly) 4000 years of Chinese history; CHIANG Kai-Shek and JIANG Zemin, 5000; and SUN Yat-sen 6000.<sup>66</sup> In contemporary China after October 1, 1949, this author has seen a Chinese mainland academic, mentioned 10,000 years of Chinese history. The Taipei-based National Palace Museum also said it houses a collection of nearly 700,000 pieces of **ancient** imperial artifacts and artworks, stretching over 10,000 years of **Chinese history** from the **Neolithic** age to the late **Qing Dynasty**.<sup>67</sup> What Confucius said about, for example, the ZhongYongZhiDao/Middle Way/Doctrine of the Mean/a happy medium, which was taught by him some 2570 years ago, could be still relevant today and even beyond. So, the then assembly chairman of GaoXiong Municipal City, CHEN TianMao, said he had always been under the aura of the middle way, when playing politics.<sup>68</sup>

The religion (divinity) level. It is easier to first mention Buddha, because it comes in terms of a statue for believers to worship, whereas it would be more difficult for us to talk about God or Allah, or a hybrid of (some of) them as a dot, whereby we can only infer He or a hybrid of (some of) them as a dot, because each one of us as an individual dot is only part of God or a hybrid of (some of) them. It is possible for a human being to be a dot, if we look at him or her from the top of his or her head

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<sup>65</sup>The school of Mohism strongly argued against **Confucianism** and **Daoism**, emphasizing self-reflection and authenticity rather than obedience to ritual.

<sup>66</sup>See Fitzgerald's chapter in Goodman and Segal's book, p.33, p.35, and p.54 and CHAI Winberg and CHAI May-lee, editors, 2nd ed., *CHINESE Mainland and Taiwan: A Study of Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Relations, with Documents* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1996), p.308.

<sup>67</sup>See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Palace\\_Museum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Palace_Museum), accessed on September 3, 2016.

<sup>68</sup><http://home.gamer.com.tw/creationDetail.php?sn=3270742>, accessed on August 20, 2016



or in a distance. A dictionary included the following sentence, under the entry, Dian/dot: She watched the train until it was a dot in the distance.<sup>69</sup> The same thing can be said of the Great Wall of China, having a length of 21,196 km/13,171 miles,<sup>70</sup> when looking at it from (outer) space, it is but a dot.

Several caveats should be made at this juncture. First, by contemporary China, I mean the political division of China since October 1, 1949. Robert A. Scalapino also regarded that as a new era, when the ZhongGuoGuoMinDang/Nationalist Party of China (KMT) moved its central government to the provisional capital of Taipei City by the close of 1949 after military defeat on the Chinese mainland.<sup>71</sup> Some may argue that a politically divided contemporary China evolved from December 1949, when CHIANG Kai-shek flew to Taipei from the wartime capital of ChongQing City in SiChuan Province, with a brief stopover in ChengDu City.<sup>72</sup> To James C. Hsiung, it is appropriate to talk about the Taiwan experience from the year 1950 (or, to be more precise, March 1950), when CHIANG Kai-shek, who was elected as the president by the National Assembly in April 1947, resumed his presidency,<sup>73</sup> as opposed to either October 1949 or December 1949.<sup>74</sup> To this day, the political division is not yet a 100% legal one, at least from the ROC perspective, when we look at its constitution, because the PRC as opposed to China has never been able to rule the Taiwan area for one second, demanding, for example, the Taiwan area residents to pay tax. Thus, entities like XiangGang, AoMen, WaiMengGu/Outer Mongolia, XingJiang Autonomous Region (AR), and XiZang/Tibet AR could be mentioned. That is to say, each one of them is only part or a dot of contemporary China, which is a larger dot.

Second, the classical way usually refers to the macro-level, while the applied way usually micro-level. However, it is possible that, when we apply the classical way model or any one of the four small diagrams, it is empirically oriented. As to the applied way, it is almost always empirical.

Third, in this study, when I say A versus B, it means that I am putting 100% A at 1 and 100% B, E. However, if I say A and B, it could mean the following possibilities,

<sup>69</sup><https://tw.dictionary.yahoo.com/dictionary?p=dot>, accessed on August 20, 2016

<sup>70</sup>It is distributed throughout 15 provinces, autonomous regions, etc. Or 404 counties (meaning cities and districts). See <http://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/201612020033-1.aspx>, accessed on December 2, 2016.

<sup>71</sup>Robert A. Scalapino, "Introduction" in CHAI Winberg and CHAI May-lee, editors, 2nd ed., *CHINESE Mainland and Taiwan: A Study of Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Relations, with Documents* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1996), p.3

<sup>72</sup>Before going to Taipei, CHIANG Kai-shek flew to ChengDu City, mapping out his last strategy.

<sup>73</sup>In January 1949, CHIANG Kai-shek was forced to retire from a ruling position for the third time/XiaYe. However, he, in the capacity as the ruling party's ZongCai/president, was still behind the scene, mapping out his strategy.


<sup>74</sup>See James C. Hsiung, ed., *Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience 1950–1980* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981). In December 1948, some government officials, military figures, and politicians urged CHIANG Kai-shek to YinTui/resign or XiaYe/to step down from office. On January 2, 1949, he replied them. On January 10, 1949, he instructed his son, CHIANG Ching-kuo, to ship gold from Shanghai to XiaMen/Amoy and Taiwan. See <http://opinion.china-times.com/20160924003843-262107>, accessed on September 24, 2016.

since a scale, ranging from 1% to 100%, is involved: A at 1, carrying the most weight; B at 5, carrying the least weight, meaning the hybrid of A and B is at 3, which has a medium weight; A at 5, carrying the least weight; B at 1, carrying the most weight, meaning the hybrid of B and A is at 3, which has a medium weight; etc. In other words, A and B is like what MAO Zedong said in the February 1957 speech, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, in which the term, RenMinNeiBuMaoDun/contradictions among the people, was mentioned, meaning that the PRC people ruled by the government may still have differences, arguments, fist fights, conflicts, etc. and it would try to reconcile their problems over time by relying on the method of unity, criticism, unity. Here, readers must understand that the punctuation, 、, is not used in the West. The first unity may be put at 1; criticism, 3; and the second unity, 5, constituting a unique spectrum. It is also possible that A and B have been mentioned, respectively, and one of them could be placed at 1, carrying the most weight, and the other, 3, carrying the medium weight, respectively, without mentioning C, which could be mentioned at a later time/space sequence and which could be equivalent to 5, carrying the least weight.

Fourth, constantly making sideway moves is a must, and constantly leaping from one model to another model is indispensable. Otherwise, the logic will not be able to flow and, more importantly, to be able to trace back, say from the 100th crab and frog motion model to the very first crab and frog motion model.

**Approach** In this study, the dialectical approach has been chosen.

I. Ontology and Epistemology




It is my sincere belief that this approach can bring us closer to (alternative) reality. I am not saying 100% (alternative) reality, because it is not possible for us to get that 100% (alternative) reality at all in social science(s). For example, we are not able to tell whether Adam as mentioned in the Bible has Chinese deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or his personality.

Like Karl H. Marx, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is a dialectician. His version of dialectics in terms of a diagram has been introduced in Chap. 10 of a book published by the ROC’s Ministry of National Defense.<sup>75</sup> Since TaiJiTū preceded Hegel’s

<sup>75</sup> GuoFangBuZhongZhengZhiZuoZhanBy/Political Warfare Bureau, Ministry of National Defense, revised edition (Taipei: Political Warfare Bureau, Ministry of National Defense, November 1988), pp.179–202. For other drawings on dialectics, see BoGu, compiled and trans-

version, the former is original, while the latter both original and non-original, meaning it could be making a little bit of contribution to the study of dialectics and non-contribution to the study of dialectics. Nick Knight, who edited a book, *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism: Writings on Philosophy, 1937*<sup>76</sup> raised the issue of supposed plagiarism of Soviet sources related to dialectical materialism by MAO Zedong. Can we also say that MAO's *On Practice* and *On Contradiction* were but a version of TaiJiTu?

**Methods** Two American political scientists wrote the following statement: While no method should dominate the [China Studies] field, no method should be left unexploited.<sup>77</sup> This author concurs with what they said, and I would replace the term, method, with methodology, so as to have a (more) holistic picture at the outset, before we embark on research and writing. However, we should start from the scratch, that is, take the dialectical approach first, because there is no question that the Chinese (Communist) mind and heart are not non-dialectical.



lated, *BianZhengWeiWuLunYuLiShiWeiWulunJiBenWenTi (Er)*, 2nd ed. (Shanghai: SanLianShuDian, 1950), p.240; FANG NingShu, editor, *WeiWuBianZhengFaPingLunJi (Si)* (Taipei:LiMingWenHuaShiYe, October 1974), pp.193–212; and TANG Bo, “LunBianZhengFa/in literal translation, On Dialectics,” *GongDangWenTiYanJiu*, Vol.8, No.3 (March 1982), pp.15–22.

<sup>76</sup> (Armonk, NY.: M. E. Sharpe, 1990). See also Nick Knight, *Marxist Philosophy in China: From Qu Qiubai to Mao Zedong, 1923 to 1945* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), p.163.

<sup>77</sup> See Lowell Dittmer and William Hurst, *Analysis in Lmbo: Contemporary Chinese Politics Amid the Maturation of Reform*, in Marble, pp.11–48 at p.48.

Two points should be mentioned. The first one is inductive and the second one, deductive. Those academics and experts, who prefer cause and effect, usually heavily question the value of adopting the inductive method, because this method can only make the conclusion probable,<sup>78</sup> due to the fact that there could be still be contradictions between findings one and ten or even one million. In other words, induction “provides *good but not* [italics in original] conclusive grounds for the acceptance of its conclusion,” whereas deduction is: *If its premises are true, then its conclusion must be also true* [italics in original].<sup>79</sup>

Dialectically, both induction and deduction can be employed. What we see in the safe zone spectrum and the danger zone spectrum are the result of induction, which is normative or what ought to be, while what we see at each time/space sequence are moves made, which is empirical or what is.

The dialectical approach also welcomes both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. Qualitative refers to words used, while quantitative has do to with mathematical formulae.

My one-dot theory is at a higher level than the 1+4 diagrams, as mentioned earlier. 1 refers to TaiJiTū, and 4 the four small models. The fourth small model is a version of the third small one. The same logic speaks for the third one, which is a version of the second one, and the second small model is a version of the first small model.

*Yin* and *yang* can be regarded as a ErFenFa/dichotomy.<sup>80</sup> This point can be applied to both the Chinese and the Western philosophers. However, with that dot in *Yin* and that dot in *Yang*, dichotomy can be more complicated, meaning a process has already been involved. Regarding this point, the Chinese subscribers differ from those Western philosophers. In other words, the *Yin* and that dot become another dichotomy, and the same thing speaks for *Yang*, whereby the *Yang* and that dot are a third dichotomy. Would that dot in *Yin* and that dot in *Yang* constitute a fourth dichotomy? The answer is: Definitely it is possible, if one think creatively and normatively and empirically and when a process is involved.

All in all, a zillion crab and frog motion models can be easily constructed, justified, and applied in the study of contemporary China. However, we need only to pick those that are really basic and essential, and, sometimes, we have to learn to rationalize a crab and frog motion model within another crab and frog motion model, and within a third crab and frog motion model, that is to say, a window within another window and a third window so to speak, in order to make sense of everything.


Nonverbally, we see the following five (or 1+4) interrelated diagrams.

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<sup>78</sup> Kahane, p.218

<sup>79</sup> Ibid

<sup>80</sup> GuoFangBuZhongZhengZhiZuoZhanBy/Political Warfare Bureau, Ministry of National Defense, revised edition (Taipei: Political Warfare Bureau, Ministry of National Defense, November 1988), p.18.




Verbally, we see the following words, which have been (slightly) revised and modified more than ten times since September 1994, reflecting the Five (or 1+4) Interrelated diagrams:

In the above-depicted figure, we see five dots, the grand one and the four small ones. The grand one is the biggest, and it has everything in that square. Then, we see four small ones, and each one of them is part of the grand dot, constituting 1+4, with 1 referring to the grand diagram and 4, small diagrams. The Chinese people are fond of saying that the Chinese culture can be couched as a *Chi*/eating way of living. Therefore, another way of saying, for example, the crab and frog motion model is *YiChuanZongZi*/a string of Chinese glutinous rice dumpling, which the Chinese eat during the Dragon Chinese Festival. Indeed, if one has eaten the dumpling before, one can have the equivalent imagination.

In this figure, the dot on the upper left-hand side is the first small dot or a pure square, which can be likened to a circle. I can also draw a circle. In other words, I do not have to depict a square. To me, in this study, both a square and a circle are equivalent to each other or a dot, when we look at both of them in the distance. It should be noted that the square and the *yin* and *yang* circle or the second dot on the upper right-hand side are derived from MengZi/Mencius' writings, to wit, *NeiFangWaiYuan*/square internally, round externally. In other words, a person who has reached this level is said to be perfect, possessing integrity, honesty, etc., and when he or she faces other people, everything can be handled smoothly, such as by not scolding, offending, or punishing them, unless absolutely necessary. It should also be noted that, strictly speaking, my one-dot theory is at a level above MengZi's *NeiFangWaiYuan*/square internally, round externally, whereas MengZi's *NeiFangWaiYuan*/square internally, round externally, is again at a level above other

levels, such as the crab and frog motion model level. The square/circle diagram on the upper left-hand side represents a concept to begin with. The same concept can be elevated to, for example, a theory or a paradigm, as the context may be. If it is a theory, many academics would subscribe to it, and if it is a paradigm, more academics would embrace it. However, we have to immediately leap to the second diagram, when the second concept exists or materializes. If our subject of enquiry is contemporary China, contemporary China constitutes the first concept. Everything else is noncontemporary China. Examples of “everything else” could be a zillion, such as Big Bang, oxygen, stone, dinosaur, Adam and Eve, the Middle Kingdom, the United States, etc.

The second dot or diagram is on the upper right-hand side. It depicts two basic concepts, namely, *yin* and *yang*. To be more precise, we are actually first talking about the first concept, to wit, *Yin*. If *Yin* is the first concept, the second concept, namely, non-*Yin*, will emerge. Examples of non-*Yin*, again, are a zillion, and one of them is *Yang*. By the same token, if *Yang* is the first concept, we will have the second concept, namely, non-*Yang*. Examples of non-*Yang*, again, are a zillion, and one of them is *Yin*. Just as *Yin* does not exist by itself, however, *Yang* does not exist by itself, either. Hence, there is always the *Yin* dimension (and non-*Yin* dimension) of *Yang* and the *Yang* dimension (and non-*Yang* dimension) of *Yin*. It follows that we see the small black dot in *Yin* and another small white dot in *Yang*, as shown below.



*Yin* and Non-*Yin*, and One Example is *Yin* versus *Yang*

Thanks to a living Buddha who did not pinpoint to me the black dot but who shared it with me in April 2008 that the third small diagram emphasizes the black dot, which is equivalent to the curvy line or S-line in the second small *yin* and *yang* diagram, emphasizing *ZhongYongZhiDao* or *ZhongDao* for short (the middle way, with harmony in mind). The line is equivalent to either 5 (in the safe zone) or A (in the danger zone) in the crab and frog motion model. In other words, one should not go to an extreme, stressing either 100% *yin* or 100% *yang*, if and when *yin* and *yang* are at odds or if and when we do not know which one to choose. Hence, a hybrid of *yin* and *yang* should be sought after, such that both *yin* and *yang* would realize that the mixture can be mutually beneficial at a certain point in time. However, a caveat should be added here, that is, since the weight of 5 in the 1 2 3 4 5 spectrum or the

safe zone is only 1%, the implication for the weight of A would be 99%, because 5+A equal to 100%.

One may question how it is possible to say that the third small diagram is a dot, when it actually looks like a bow tie, toy racing car track, or 8 lying down. In a number of fields, predominantly [mathematics](#) and [physics](#), we do see such a symbol for infinity, which is introduced in the West in the mid-seventeenth century by John Wallis and which sometimes is called the [lemniscate](#). Come to think of it, the third small diagram is a version of the ball-like *yin* and *yang*. In the Daoist parlance, it is called *WuJiZhenYuan* (Limitless + Real or True *Yuan*), which can be expanded and contracted. For example, 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D E can become 1 2 3 A B C or 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 A B C D E F G H. Holding on the *yin* and *yang* ball with both hands and twisting it, you will see a shape in the form of a bow tie. As a next step, you would flip the bow tie and look at its cross section, which, in turn, is actually a line. A line is a dot, when looking at it in the distance.

The last small diagram is on the lower left-hand side. We can call it a crab and frog motion model. On the one hand, a crab is known for making sideway moves, to the right or to the left, e.g., moving from 1 at, e.g., time/space sequence (1) to 5 at the next time/space sequence and returning to 3 at the third time/space sequence and, ultimately, 1 again at time/space sequence (n) or the last sequence, resulting in a synthesis, which refers to the folding up of the dialectical box or the ending of the game. This corresponds to the dynamics of dialectical movement, which is teleologically moving from the right extreme or E to the left extreme or 1. A dialectical scale is involved. Hence, as a reminder, you see the arrow on top of 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D E. The arrow can be also seen in the upper half of the bow tie in the third small diagram. On the other hand, a frog leaps or jumps from one model to another (model). In short, an application of a series of crab and frog motion models is necessary throughout a study. As mentioned earlier, the crab and frog motion model is most complex and complicated and, therefore, needs to be elaborated.

The model in the fourth small diagram could be two half-dots (1 2 3 4 5 as the first half-dot and A B C D E as the second half-dot) or simply one dot, if we look at its entirety:

- 1 means 100% of a concept or whatever.
- 3 means 50% of a concept or whatever.
- 5 means 1% of a concept or whatever.
- E means 100% of a concept or whatever.
- C means 50% of the concept or whatever.
- A means 1% of the concept or whatever.

The 1 2 3 4 5 spectrum is equivalent to what the author call the safe zone, and the A B C D E spectrum the danger zone. To repeat, 5 is the middle way in the safe zone and A, the middle way in the danger zone. A creative dialectician would also, sometimes, treat 5 and A as a new model by leaping out of 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D E. If so, we see the following new configuration: 5 becomes 1, still in the same zone, and A, E.

When one makes a move at any time/space sequence, the dialectician is thinking of only one most important number, such as 3, or letter, such as A. Accordingly,



there will be no contradiction whatsoever from time/space sequence (1) to (n). One may also face a number of models at the same time. However, choosing one of them at a specific time/space sequence can also dissolve possible contradictions. In the course of making moves, the dialectician is performing a crab or sideways motion. For example, she/he began at 5 in the spectrum. In the next time/space sequence, she/he may go to A. At the third time/space sequence, the same dialectician may move back to the safe zone and stay at 1.

Time/space sequence (n) represents the last move, and as mentioned earlier, a synthesis would emerge, bringing an end to this dialectical game. In this connection, the phenomena of the negation of negation, the affirmation of negation, the affirmation of affirmation, and the negation of affirmation will appear before time/space sequence (n) is reached. If talking about the negation of the negation phenomenon, e.g., we are referring to a dialectician who is in the danger zone making a move, and his/her second move is still in the danger zone. This process is known as the sub-dialectical game or a smaller window within a larger window or even a larger window. It should be pointed out that there are three basic stages [or (nodal) points] of development: nascent, ascendant, and mature for the numbers and mature, descendant, and moribund for the letters. In other words, 5 is nascent; 3, ascendant; and 1, mature. On the other hand, E is mature; C, descendant; and A, moribund. Last but not least, a series of other, relevant dialectical, theoretical models must be applied, in order to amply describe, explain, and infer (or predict) more phenomena. When a dialectician no longer applies the first crab and frog motion model constructed by him/her, she/he is said to have leaped or jumped from the first crab and frog motion model to second or another crab and frog motion model. It is possible to link all the (seemingly contradictory) dialectical models deductively or like a train of thought in a linear fashion or cause and effect, if one knows how. And, in any model, it is possible for one dialectician to stick to, e.g., 1, from time/space sequence (1) to (n), and this is linear for sure.

At this juncture, a caveat should be added, i.e., whenever we use the word, versus, it means that dialectics is involved and that the concept or whatever on the left extreme, say absolute (100%) Yes or 1, will eventually defeat, co-opt, absorb, etc. the concept or whatever on the right extreme, say absolute (100%) No or E, at time/space sequence (n). However, in the process, the following arrangement may be necessary, such as flexibly positioning Yes at 1 and No at 5, with 3 being a mixture of both 1 and 5. In other words, a contradictory or even adversary relationship between yes and no in the beginning has been transformed into a noncontradictory, non-adversarial relationship later on for a period of time, and this kind of arrangement is called NiFanShi/DuiZhi/contrapositive, for the sake of eventually defeating, co-opting, absorbing, etc. the concept at E at the last time/space sequence. It means that whoever chose Yes or No should learn to tolerate the existence of each other for a period of time, because they are both in the safe zone spectrum.

To reiterate, several models or a series of them may be necessary for the sake of description, explanation, and inference. When we see more than one model at work, it means that one model may be again at odds with another existing model. The struggle between them will eventually end up with a synthesis at time/space sequence (n).



In sum, a crab and frog motion dialectician performs two roles when playing a game or games, that of a crab by moving sideways and a frog by leaping or jumping from one model to another model as she/he sees fit. Scientifically figuring out the nodal points, if possible, is very important. This is usually done inductively. One finest example is (Chu)Sheng/birth at 4、(Shuai)Lao/getting older/aged at 3、(Sheng)Bing/illness at 2、Si(Wang)/death at 1, involving a rhythm. That is the magic beauty of dialectics, because a dialectical/crab and frog motion remark is just the opposite of a non-dialectical/crab and frog motion [usually deductive, linear, or cause and effect] remark or at best, they must meet halfway or 50%.

At this juncture, we must credit and compliment CHEN Tuan for having integrated various writings of Chinese philosophers. He integrated LaoZi's *yin* and *yang*<sup>81</sup> plus WuJiBiFan/when things reach an extreme, they can only move in the opposite direction/things always reverse themselves, after reaching an extreme<sup>82</sup>; KongZi<sup>83</sup> (Confucius') middle way, as shown in the black dot of the third small diagram, with HeXie/harmony in mind; MengZi's NeiFangWaiYuan/square internally and round externally and *CiYiShiYe*、*BiYiShiYe*/this is now, and that was then<sup>84</sup>; ZhuangZi's *YuShiJuHua*/*YuShiJuJin*/abreast of modern developments, by keeping up with the times,<sup>85</sup> as reflected in the time/space component of the crab and frog motion model; XunZi's 1 (which is a version of the pure square/circle or either *yin* or *yang*) and 2 (which is a version of *yin* versus *yang*; *yang* versus *yin*; *yin* and *yang*; or *yang* and *yin*), as reflected from the first and second small diagrams plus his WanBianBuLiQiZong/many superficial changes but no departure from the original stand; and MoZi's coinage of Duan/端<sup>86</sup>、Chi/尺<sup>87</sup>、Qu/區<sup>88</sup>、Xue/穴,<sup>89</sup> which is equivalent to modern geometry's point, line, plane, and solid geometry/geometry of three-dimensional Euclidean space, respectively, as well as his discovery that light travels in straight

<sup>81</sup> It is not clear when he was born. Many academics say the Spring and Autumn Period or 771-475 B.C.E.

<sup>82</sup> <http://tw.websaru.com/%E7%89%A9%E6%A5%B5%E5%BF%85%E5%8F%8D.html> and <http://tw.ichacha.net/%E7%89%A9%E6%A5%B5%E5%BF%85%E5%8F%8D.html>, accessed on September 25, 2016

<sup>83</sup> 551–479 B.C.E.

<sup>84</sup> <http://tw.knowledge.yahoo.com>, accessed on November 5, 2012

<sup>85</sup> ZHUANGZi lived around the 4th century Before the Common Era (BCE) during the Warring States Period. He put forward the phrase, *YuShiJuHua*. The Chinese Communists changed the last Chinese character to read *jin*. LIU WenDian was the secretary of Dr. SUN Yat-sen. He studied ZHUANGZi's philosophy. He said there are only 2.5 people in the world, who understand the philosophy. One is him. The other is ZHUANGZi himself. And the third one who understood only 50% is a Japanese. See <http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/%E8%8F%AF%E5%BA%9C%E7%9C%8B%E5%A4%A9%E4%B8%8B%E5%BC%8D%E5%8A%89%E6%96%87%E5%85%B8%E8%B8%A2%E4%B8%AD%E8%94%A3%E4%BB%8B%E7%9F%B3LP-20130719000999-260109>, accessed on July 19, 2013.

<sup>86</sup> Dian in modern Mandarin Chinese

<sup>87</sup> Xian in modern Mandarin Chinese

<sup>88</sup> Mian in modern Mandarin Chinese

<sup>89</sup> LiTi in modern Mandarin Chinese

lines, which could be likened to each number or letter in the crab and frog motion model, that is, 1 (stands for light) E (non-light),<sup>90</sup> stretching from time/space sequence (1) to (n). We must not forget HanFei(Zi), whose allegory of a spear/Mao piercing a shield/Dun or contradiction is well-known. As a reminder, one dot is at a higher level than TaiJiTu, and it is possible to apply TaiJiTu 100,000 years from now and beyond, if there are still human beings. Ironically, CHEN Tuan or none of us can perform 72 transformations like the monkey<sup>91</sup> in that classical novel or even one somersault,<sup>92</sup> so to speak, trying to escape from, when we talk about ontology, the (great) palm<sup>93</sup> of Buddha, as mentioned in the sixteenth century popular folk novel, XiYou(Ji)/*Journey to the West/The Monkey*.<sup>94</sup>

To elaborate a bit, in case some readers could still not be able to figure out my logic, this is what we should know:

1. The upper, pure square/circle<sup>95</sup> on the upper-left hand side could mean anything, starting from the supernatural force, which could be a hybrid of supernatural forces or what some called religious hybrids.<sup>96</sup> Since supernatural force is not the only one in our world, we have to shift to the diagram, which is on the upper right-hand side, that is, *yin* and *yang*.
2. A number of possibilities can be seen, when we look at this diagram: *Yin* versus *Yang* or, in the crab and frog motion model, *Yin* at 1 and *Yang*, E; *Yang* versus *Yin* or, in the crab and frog motion model, *Yang* at 1 and *Yin*, E; *Yin* at 1 and *Yang*, 5; *Yang* at 1 and *Yin*, 5; *Yang* as a small dot in *Yin* or *Yin-Yang* at 3; *Yin* as a small dot in *Yang* or *Yang-Yin* at 3, etc.
3. The diagram at the lower right-hand side simply emphasizes two major points: Take the middle way if a dialectician faces a dilemma<sup>97</sup> and expand or contract the danger zone spectrum and the danger zone spectrum, as one sees fit and necessary. The middle way in the following model is 5 in the safe zone and A in the danger zone: 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D E, while the middle way in the following model is 8 and A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 A B C D E F G H.
4. The fourth diagram at the lower left-hand side will be employed very often, and the dialectician has to jump from one crab and frog motion model to another one

<sup>90</sup>Not, for example, 2D or 3C, because each number or letter must be 100%

<sup>91</sup>Allowing him to be various animals or obejects

<sup>92</sup>“[A] rolling movement or jump, either forwards or backwards, in which you turn over completely, with your body above your head, and finish with your head on top again.” See <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/somersault>, accessed on October 4, 2106.

<sup>93</sup>Or WuZhiShan/Mountain of Five Fingers

<sup>94</sup>See, for example, Scene 4 in the following link: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monkey:\\_Journey\\_to\\_the\\_West](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monkey:_Journey_to_the_West), accessed on October 5, 2016.

<sup>95</sup>It can also be a square. For the sake of consistency, I have mentioned square/circle.

<sup>96</sup><http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/06/01/religious-hybrids/>, accessed on September 1, 2016.

<sup>97</sup>See, for example, Syaru Shirley LIN, *Taiwan's China Dilemma: Contested Identities and Multiple Interests in Taiwan's Cross-Strait Economic Policy* (Palo Alto, CA.: Stanford University Press, 2016). Thomas B. Gold, in the blurb, said the author identified two contradictions: the consolidation of a Taiwanese identity and the contention among different cross-strait actors over the best approach to managing unavoidably deepening economic ties between the Taiwan area and mainland China. See <http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=23460>, accessed on October 21, 2016.

very often. If not, the logic would not be able to flow smoothly, and other dialecticians will be confused or not be able to follow. As can be seen, due to the fact that the number of CPC members has been increased by a lot from October 1949 up to now, it is not wise to indoctrinate them with too many crab and frog motion models. Picking one or a few of them would be ample enough.

If some readers still cannot grasp what I said in the paragraphs immediately above, perhaps the following words can clarify further: We can apply the one-dot theory or TaiJiTū to describe, explain, and infer what has been going on since the first human being, if not earlier. The *TaiJiTū* model or everything in the square can be seen in the middle, which is the biggest diagram. It is a dot, if we look at it in the distance. We can parse this diagram in terms of four smaller models, each one of which is but a dot. The first one is on the upper left-hand side. We see a blank square/circle or a dot. The second model is on the upper right-hand side. Another way of saying it is *yin* and *yang*. It is derived from the first model. The third one is at the lower right-hand side, which can expand and contract. It is a version of the second model on the upper right-hand side. Its emphasis is on that small dot, meaning the Confucian *ZhongYongZhiDao*/middle way, with harmony in mind. And the last model is at the lower left-hand side. It is a version of the third model on the lower right-hand side. The name for this model is called the crab and frog motion model. In other words, a dialectician would make sideways moves like a crab, and leap like a frog from this crab and frog motion model to that crab and frog motion model. 1 2 3 4 5 is the safe zone spectrum, whereas A B C D E, the danger zone spectrum. A dialectician may stand under 1, which refers to a concept and which is translated as 100%. Three would be 50%, and 5, 1%. The same logic applies to E, which is 100%; C, 50%, and A, 1%. A dialectician would refrain from entering the latter zone. Creatively, the dialectician can build a new model out of 5 and A, treating 5 as 1 and A, still E.

To reiterate, if a reader already has a firm grasp of the previous paragraph, he or she would realize that a dialectical/crab and frog motion remark is just the opposite of a non-dialectical/crab and frog motion (usually deductive, linear, or cause and effect) remark, or at best, they must meet halfway.

Information, data, and analysis can be easily slotted into those 1+4 diagrams. And this is the task of this author to decode and decipher the Chinese (Communist) moves on both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s), especially pointing out the nodal points. Depending on how one interprets it, the moves can be empirical and/or tactical as well as philosophical and/or strategic.

In sum, as Lynn T. White, III, has observed, we need fresh methods for adequate study of contemporary China.<sup>98</sup> The methodology of this book is strikingly different from publications written by other China-students. It is very easy for us to dialectically rationalize everything logically, systematically, and coherently and, more importantly, to be closer to (alternative) reality. As to non-dialecticians, they will have to struggle to make sense of the information and data collected.

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<sup>98</sup> See his article, "Chinese Political Studies," *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol.14, No.3 (September 2009), pp.229–251.

## Chapter 2

# Applying the One-Dot Theory Again to Describe, Explain, and Infer Contemporary China

Hans Kuijper is one of the few China students, who dares to assess the study of contemporary China, saying at first both good and bad things in the writings of others and later labeling many practitioners of HanXue (in Japanese, Shinagaku) or ZhongGuoYanJiu (in Japanese, ChuGoKu KenKyu) as pseudoscientists or fake, phony experts.<sup>1</sup> Hungdah CHIU was a law professor, who named names and questioned two books published by the Academy of Political Science of Columbia University and Harvard University Press.<sup>2</sup> Some readers may also throw the adjective arrogant at me, critically questioning that how is it possible for the one-dot theory to describe, explain, and infer *all* the things in contemporary China MINUS ONE, which can be logically traced back to modern and even ancient China?<sup>3</sup> The simple and straightforward answer, perhaps intriguing to some, will be provided in the third last paragraph of the last chapter.

I hope my study can refreshingly take all the Chinese students to return to the basics. There is no doubt whatsoever that the Chinese (communist) mind and heart, on the whole, is dialectical. If readers were non-dialectical, they would eventually realize that what they had said and written about contemporary China would had been 100%, 50%, or 1% the opposite of what had really taken place. To a non-dialectician, this is called paradox. If it is 100%, readers just have to remember that 100% 1 is the opposite of 100% E. As to 50%, the safe zone spectrum is 50% of the entire crab and frog motion model. The same logic applies to the danger zone, which is 50% of the entire model.

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
<sup>1</sup> See his publication in Chap. 3 of this study, pp. 9–10 and p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Hungdah CHIU, “Reviewing China-Watchers’ Evaluations” in Yu-min SHAW, ed., *Tendencies of Regionalism on Contemporary China* (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1997), pp. 307–312 at pp. 307–308.

<sup>3</sup> See Chap. 11 of my *Ocean Governance, Regimes, and the South China Issues: A One-dot Theory Application* (Singapore: Springer, 2015). See also John S. Major and Cosntance A. Cook, *Ancient China: A History* (Oxford, UK: M. E. Sharpe, 2016). However, a Chinese mainland scientist put forward an “Out of Egypt” argument, saying the founders of Chinese civilization were from ancient Egypt. See <http://www.businessinsider.com/a-decorated-scientist-has-ignited-a-passionate-debate-with-claims-that-the-founders-of-chinese-civilization-were-not-chinese-2016-10?ref=yfp>, accessed on October 9, 2016. However, this argument is questionable.

A word can also be added, that is, if we talk about 1%, to wit, 5 or A in the crab and frog motion model, the dialectician is actually embracing 99% of the opposite concept in the other spectrum. One finest example is as follows: If MA Ying-jeou and CAI YingWen stand at 5 in the model, both of them are actually accepting 99% of the PRC, in their game against the Beijing leaders. Needless to say, they, as politicians, would not say so publicly for fear of antagonizing their supporters, respectively.

MAO Zedong once said that he wanted to convert all the six billion Chinese to become dialecticians.<sup>4</sup> To be politically correct, at least from the Beijing perspective, one should fully grasp the following chart, when facing Taipei, so as to be YuShiJuJin/abreast of modern developments, by keeping up with the times:



- The Beijing versus Taipei chart will be elaborated later on in this chapter in the section under “Case Studies: Big and Small.” In this chart, I did not show JIANG Zeming’s YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue,<sup>5</sup> which was for the first time mentioned by him as a communist at the January 2001 Publicity Department of the CPC meeting. XI Jinping echoed what JIANG said in, for example, December 2016. When JIANG mentioned the term, which can be traced back to ancient China, he was at 1, which stands for YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue and

<sup>4</sup>See the page in Bertell Ollman’s 1971 book before the preface, *Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society*, in which MAO Zedong’s words were quoted.

<sup>5</sup>YiFaZhiGuo/government by law was for the first time mentioned in September 1997 at the 15th National Congress of the Party.

dialectical politics would ironically become A in the danger zone (as opposed to 5 in the safe zone), while rule of men (or Personality) politics<sup>6</sup> remains at E.

It is important to be politically correct, especially if one wants to become a public servant or is working at a government agency and hopes to climb the ladder faster and quicker. For example, from October 1, 1949, up to now, if you stick to 1 and if that 1 stands for communism in the Maoist model of communism versus capitalism, you are (considered to be) safe. However, after the 15th National Congress of the CPC in September 1997, you have to adjust yourself by wholeheartedly supporting market economy (under socialism with Chinese characteristics). This means that if you still stand under communism since September 1997, you, though still safe, will not be regarded as important most of the time, because JIANG Zemin at that national congress already in the political report philosophically said that it will take several generations, more than ten generations, or even more generations to finish marching this mainstream economic line. And, if you stand under capitalism since October 1, 1949, you will be definitely in (serious) trouble, especially during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This is because, from the CPC perspective, another term for communism is good, whereas for capitalism, non-good, and one of the synonyms is bad. Needless to say, there is a scale for goodness, such as by asking, at time/space sequence (100), is communism at 1 100% good or at 5 just 1% good? At time/space sequence (n), which is the last move, communism would be definitely 100% good, especially at the final stage of communism, which must be understood in terms of three stages, with the first nodal point or nascent stage weighing 1%; the second nodal point or ascendant stage, 50%; and the last nodal point or mature stage, 100%. The only two major problems that we face are (1) how to weigh the scale at each time/space sequence and, more importantly, who has the final say and (2) we do not know when would the first and second stages, or even the third stage, come about. To be sure, Dr. SUN Yat-sen also partially embraced communism, which is similar to what he had in mind and heart, and, therefore, he said the principle of livelihood/social well-being is communism, out of the three principles. However, because he is a member of the KMT, the term he coined was TianXiaWeiGong/the world community is equally shared by all,<sup>7</sup> which can still be seen in the Presidential Palace of NanJing City, the capital of the ROC<sup>8</sup> before October 1949, today in the twenty-first century. In other words, he cannot, as a

<sup>6</sup>Confucianism usually attaches greater emphasis on RenZhi/Rule of Men and less on FaZhi/Rule of Law. It also puts DaoDeZhiShangZhuYi/morality at the highest level. It does not really emphasize JinJiChu/economic foundation or base. See LING XiaoXiong, "Cong 'Wen Hua Hui Tong' Shi Jie Lun Xi MaKe Si Zhu Yi Yu Zhong Guo Chuan Tong Wen Hua De Rong He," *Journal of the Party School of CPC Jinan Municipal Committee*, No.4 (April 2016), pp.95-99 at 98.

<sup>7</sup>Confucius in LiYunDaTongPian/The Great Together said: DaDaoZhiXingYe, TianXiaWeiGong/ShiXingDaDaoDeShiHou, TianXiaShiWeiGongZhongDe/When the Great Way is practiced, the world is for the public, accessed on September 14, 2016. See [http://www.tsoidug.org/Literary/Etiquette\\_Great\\_Together\\_Comp.pdf](http://www.tsoidug.org/Literary/Etiquette_Great_Together_Comp.pdf), accessed on the same day and <http://forum.gamer.com.tw/C.php?bsn=02840&snA=1013>, accessed on September 21, 2016.

<sup>8</sup>See ZHENG Hong, *Nanjing Never Cries: A Novel* (Boston: The MIT Press, 2016). The book tells the story of four people caught up in the violence and tumult period from 1937 to 1945..



KMT member, support the term communism, although both TianXiaWeiGong/the world community is equally shared by all and communism overlap 99.9%. To the Chinese communists, they regard themselves as the true followers of Dr. SUN Yat-sen due to the fact that in January 1923 SUN for the first time signed a cooperation manifesto with Adolph A. Joffe, who was a communist representing the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and, therefore, the party commemorated the 150th anniversary of the birth of the founding father in November 2016.<sup>9</sup>

A Beijing academic, while referring to reform in the Chinese mainland, mentioned the Chinese character 之.<sup>10</sup> What does 之 have to do with dialectics? To be sure, this character reflects my crab and frog motion model or DuiLian/couplet, an example of which, as uttered by Dr. SUN Yat-sen, is GeMinShangWeiChengKong、TongZhiRenXuNuLi/we haven't succeeded in the revolution yet, so our comrades should still strive for it. For the record, this couplet can still be seen in, for example, NanJing's Presidential Palace today. [Another simple one is with Ren/human being qua HengPi/horizontal scroll bearing an inscription at the top and, under it, Nan/male on the left and female on the right (meaning just as the former is part of Ren/human being, the latter or Nv/female is also part of Ren/human being).] As the Beijing academic said, reform does not come in terms of a straight line, from here to the DuiAn/opposite bank, adding, often, one has to move backward half a step, in order to move forward a small step.

As opposed to the Chinese thinking, many, if not most, Western people's thinking is linear, treasuring cause and effect, for example, China is China is China.<sup>11</sup> We often hear the following sentence: A rose is a rose is a rose. As another example, a customer buys a 1-dollar ballpoint pen in a stationary store. He gives US\$10 to the cashier. The cashier would count US\$9 in the following manner, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5 4, 3, 2, and 1, as opposed to the typical Chinese, dialectical manner, US\$10 minus US\$1 = US\$9. Many, if not most, people in the Middle East would first figure out the outermost boundary of a certain phenomenon,<sup>12</sup> such as who are involved, where is the location, and when is it involved. After that, they would examine the details. On the whole, people in the West may argue that their method is better than others, when

<sup>9</sup>Thirty-seven retired generals of the Republic of China (ROC) attended this event in Beijing. XI Jinping at the occasion, for the first time, said: “絕不允許任何人、任何組織、任何政黨、在任何時候、以任何形式、把任何一塊中國領土從中國分裂出去/“Any attempt to split the country will be resolutely opposed by all Chinese people,” adding “we'll never allow anyone, any organization or political party to rip out any part of our territory at any time or in any form.” <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1017439.shtml>, accessed on November 16, 2016.

<sup>10</sup>XinBao/Hong Kong Economic Journal (Hong Kong), November 25, 2004, p. 23.

<sup>11</sup>David M. Lampton mentioned “China is China is China.” See his Editor's Response, “The Middle Way of Middle Theory” in Andrew D. Marble, guest editor, “The State of the China Studies Field,” *Issues & Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 4/Vol. 39, No. 1 (December 2002/March 2003), pp. 1–398 at p. 372. Hans Kuijper said “China is China and Taiwan is Taiwan.” See his article, “Is Taiwan a Part of China?” in Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ed., *The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order* (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996), pp. 9–20 at p. 20..


<sup>12</sup>In summer 2006, I read about this in an edition of *XinBao/Hong Kong Economic Journal*, published in the opposite-editorial page, which was written by a junior Chinese mainland academic.

we want to generate knowledge, because we can trace it backward, for example, from contemporary China to modern China and, finally, ancient China.

Actually, a Chinese dialectician can do the same thing as what linear thinkers have done, by first applying that pure square/circle on the upper left-hand side, such as by first thinking about the concept contemporary China. To him or her, this contemporary China is 100% at time/space sequence (1). As a next step, he or she would think of the opposite concept, that is, non-contemporary China. Voila, you already have a model, which is contemporary China versus non-contemporary China. Needless to say, one has to build other crab and frog motion models, so as to enable him or her to describe, explain, and infer certain (new) issue, phenomenon, or development. To the Middle East logician, non-contemporary China is not real. It is so at time/space sequence (1). But, at the next time/space sequence, contemporary China at 1 may have to interact with non-contemporary China, which could be the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is, for example, at odds with contemporary China. The dialectician, be it Chinese or non-Chinese, can certainly move sideways within this the model of contemporary China versus non-contemporary China. If he or she cannot, building a new model can immediately solve or resolve the logic problem. This is what I called jumping like a frog from model 1 to model 2 or model 100 or even the last model in a series. In this fashion, one can still trace back to the first model from the most recent model. In this connection, the contemporary China versus non-contemporary China model already constitutes a boundary, corresponding to what the Middle Easterners, on the whole, prefer to first figure it out. This model is, at least, half true, because the safe zone spectrum is 50% of the whole model, and the same thing speaks for the danger zone spectrum, which is only half of the whole model. Besides, the crab and frog motion model can enable us to figure out whether contemporary China that we are talking about is 100%, 50%, or 1% at each time/space sequence. If it is not 100%, 50% would be contemporary China and another 50% ancient China or modern China. By the same token, if it is not 100%, 1% would be contemporary China and another 99% ancient China or modern China.

The upper diagram on the upper left-hand side shapes like a pure square/circle. We can start by saying that it represents 100% contemporary China:





Since contemporary China is not the only dot in our world, we have to shift to the diagram, which is on the upper right-hand side, that is, *yin* and *yang*. Most China students should have seen this diagram.

A number of possibilities can be seen, when we look at this diagram: contemporary China versus non-contemporary China or, in the crab and frog motion model, contemporary China at 1 and non-contemporary China, E; non-contemporary China versus contemporary China or, in the crab and frog motion model, non-contemporary China at 1 and contemporary China, E; contemporary China at 1 and non-contemporary China, 5; non-contemporary China at 1 and contemporary China, 5; non-contemporary China as a small dot in contemporary China or contemporary China-non-contemporary China at 3; or contemporary China as a small dot in non-contemporary China or non-contemporary China-contemporary China at 3.

The diagram at the lower right-hand side simply emphasizes two major points: Take the middle way, if a dialectician faces a dilemma and expands or contracts the safe zone spectrum and the danger zone spectrum, as one sees fit and necessary, so as to rationalize everything regarding an issue, a phenomenon, or a development.

The fourth diagram at the lower left-hand side will be employed very often, and the dialectician has to jump from one crab and frog motion model to another one very often. If not, the logic would not be able to flow smoothly, and other dialecticians will be confused or not be able to follow. However, it should be noted that we do not have to remember all the crab and frog motion models. In other words, we only need to pick the important ones, so as to simplify or compress everything.

As mentioned earlier, information, data, and analysis can be easily slotted into those 1 + 4 diagrams. And this is the task of this author to decode and decipher the Chinese (communist) moves on both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s). Depending on

how one interprets it, the moves can be empirical and/or tactical as well as philosophical and/or strategic.

**The Upper Diagram on the Upper Left-hand or Contemporary China** In this study, the term contemporary China can begin from October 1, 1949, when MAO declared the creation of the PRC. To this author, contemporary China became politically divided, since that time. To the non-dialecticians, there are, undoubtedly, Two Chinas, to wit, the ROC and the PRC from October 1, 1949, up to now, or even One China, One Taiwan, or Taiwan independence. Readers should ask himself or herself: Which version is closer to (alternative) reality? A caveat should be mentioned at this juncture; some dialecticians, on purpose, make a non-dialectical remark to enable them to be on an upper hand at one time/space sequence or benefit themselves, knowing that they should be dialectically consistently from time/space sequence (1) to time/space sequence (n).

Strictly speaking, that pure square/circle refers to the ROC at least on January 1, 1912, if not after that date, and we only need to first discuss the ROC qua contemporary China, because it was established before the PRC. However, if we chose October 1, 1949, as the starting point for contemporary China, we can in that context remind readers the following points: First, the period from January 1, 1912, to September 30, 1949, can be regarded as modern China. Second, we have to discuss the PRC, because it dialectically qualifies to be a second contemporary China, politically, and if non-dialectically, both politically and legally. And, third, let us say, after 200 years, both ROC and PRC still exist. If so, the period from January 1, 1912, to, say, December 31, 2111, could be regarded as at least 1% modern China, if not at least 1% ancient China as well.

The ROC, from January 2, 1912, to September 30, 1949, certainly was politically divided. In April 1949, when the Chinese PLA crossed the ChangJiang/Long River and captured the ROC capital NanJing City, it became clear that the days of the ROC on the mainland were numbered.<sup>13</sup> As can be seen, the ROC was not a pure square/circle representing *yin*. Although, culturally, China was still one, a dot, politically and militarily, JunFa/warlords were tearing contemporary China apart, and some of them would sometimes form coalitions, for the sake of survival.<sup>14</sup> We see the AnHui clique, with DUAN QiRui,<sup>15</sup> as one of the most important figures. Others in this military group include XU ShuZheng (FuJian Province), JIN YunPeng (Shandong Province), DUAN ZhiGui (HuBei Province), FU LiangZuo (HuNan Province), and NI SiChong (AnHui Province). Another major military group is called the FengTian clique, and the most important figure is ZHANG ZuoLin, who was the governor of FengTian Province or today's LiaoNing Province, who was able to control local potentates, and who had a lot of power, like WU JunSheng

<sup>13</sup>The ruling party before April 1949 under the policy of HuaJiangErZhi hoped that it can still rule the southern part of the Chinese mainland, with the ChangJiang/Long River as the dividing line.

<sup>14</sup><http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Rep/warlords.html>, accessed on August 26, 2016

<sup>15</sup>He later became the the **provisional chief executive of ROC** (in Beijing) or acting president from November 1924 to April 1926.

(HeiLongJiang Province), ZHANG ZuoXiang (Jilin Province), SUN LieChen (HeiLongJiang and Jilin Provinces), as well as ZHANG JingHui, YANG YuTing, and ZHANG ZongChang (ShanDong Province). Some of other major examples include GuangDong clique, GuiZhou clique, YunNan clique, and Zhili clique.

We can borrow the dialectical term HeJiuBiFenFenJiuBiHe/empires wax and wane and states cleave asunder and coalesce/<sup>16</sup>the empire, long divided, must reunite; long reunited, must divide<sup>17</sup> from first sentence in the well-known *SanGyoYanYi/Three Kingdoms*, to say that was exactly what was in the mind and heart of CHIANG Kai-shek, when he was the then commander in chief of the National Revolutionary Army and led the Northern Expedition/Northern March. What CHIANG Kai-shek did was considered the second successful example from southern part of mainland China, that is, GuangZhou City, to northern China for the purpose of reunifying China in the Chinese history. The first time was when the Ming dynasty succeeded in expelling the Yuan dynasty from mainland China.

Supported by the former Soviet Union in terms of weapons, the first round of expedition began in July 1926 and the second round, April 1927. The march symbolically ended in December 1928, when ZHANG XueLiang, whose father was the FengTian warlord, ZHANG ZuoLin, and who was a powerful warlord or effective ruler of northeast China, agreed to be under CHIANG's leadership, 6 months after his father's death in June 1928.<sup>18</sup> Needless to say, some historians still argue that modern China at that time, though began to have a more effective central government, was not 100% reunified.

Although the CHIANG Kai-shek march basically ended disorder, we still see, for example, the rise or existence of ManZhou/Manchuria's Aisin Giorro PuYi. So, the ROC was not a square/circle representing *yin*. PuYi's father served as a regent until December 6, 1911, when the penultimate emperor of the Qing dynasty,<sup>19</sup> Empress XiaoDingJing of DeZong, better known as Empress Dowager LongYu, took over, following Dr. SUN Yat-sen's October 10, 1911, revolution. She later endorsed the "Imperial Edict of the Abdication of the QING Emperor" in February 1912, under a deal brokered by YUAN ShiKai, who was a general of the Beijing-based BeiYang government and who became the second provisional ROC president in March 1912.<sup>20</sup>

Due to the agreement between the Qing imperial house and the YUAN ShiKai government, PuYi was required to live within the walls of the Forbidden City, and he was allowed to use the Summer Palace. PuYi and his family retained the use of the inner court, while the outer court was handed over to the ROC authorities. To be

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<sup>16</sup>Translated by C. H. Brewitt-Taylor.

<sup>17</sup>Translated by Moss Roberts.

<sup>18</sup>In June 1928, his father was assassinated by a bomb exploded above his train, which was planted by an Imperial Japanese officer.

<sup>19</sup>When the ManZhou for the first time occupied the HAN people's territory, they only had ShuShiWan/hundreds of thousands. At that time, there were ShuQianWan/tens of millions HAN people. See <http://udn.com/news/story/7340/1990548>, accessed on September 29, 2016.

<sup>20</sup>In December 1915, YUAN ShiKai erected ZhongHuaDiGuo/Empire of China. He died in June 1916.

sure, this kind of arrangement is typically *yang* as a small dot in *yin*. In 1917, ZHANG Xun, who was a royalist general qua warlord with very conservative, Confucian views, tried to restore the PuYi monarchy from July 1 to July 12 but failed. However, in March 1932, ManZhouGuo/Empire of ManZhou (EOM) in Northeast China and NeiMengGu/Inner Mongolia was created by Imperial Japan, and the latter installed the 12th or the last emperor of Qing dynasty, PuYi, as the chief executive of this puppet state of the Empire of Japan, but who would, in his inner heart, rather be fully restored as the emperor of the Qing dynasty and who had to step down at the end of World War II in August 1945.

WANG JingWei's ROC is another indication of a politically divided China. It is another example of *yang* as a small dot in *yin*. As can be seen, the ROC was again not a pure square/circle representing *yin*. WANG JingWei was initially a member of the left wing of the KMT, and he was often at odds with CHIANG Kai-shek. Later, he became increasingly anti-communist after his efforts to politically collaborate with the CPC, ending in failure. In December 1938, he was regarded as having surrendered to the Imperial Japanese. In March 1940, WANG JingWei felt that the ROC under CHIANG Kai-shek could not stop, let alone defeat, the invading Imperial Japan troops; he, after obtaining Tokyo's approval, headed the Nanjing-based [Reorganized National Government of China](#), claiming to represent all of the ROC, except EOM, which had been recognized by WANG JingWei in November 1940 as an independent state,<sup>21</sup> and WANG's ROC was confined to those places occupied by Imperial Japan. Under WANG JingWei, the ROC's "blue-sky white-sun red-earth" national flag and the KMT flag did not really change, but a pennant was added to the national flag, stating, for example, HePingFanGongJianGuo/peace, anti-communism, national construction. As can be seen, WANG JingWei's political stance changed sharply to the right, after joining the Imperial Japanese. In November 1944, WANG JingWei, who had been labeled as a HanJian/traitor of China by many, if not most, Chinese historians in both Taiwan and mainland China, for having collaborated with Imperial Japan, died in Japan.

The period roughly from 1927 to 1937 was dubbed by some historians the golden 10 years for the development of the ROC. If the ROC is *yin*, this pure square/circle is becoming bigger and more robust. However, CHIANG Kai-shek still had to face the Chinese communists, meaning the ROC was not a pure square/circle representing *yin*. In June and July 1921, that is, before the existence of the CPC, some members who had faith in communism were organizing the very first national congress in Shanghai City's concession area,<sup>22</sup> which lasted from November 1845 to August 1943. Thirteen members, representing more than 50 members at that point in time,

<sup>21</sup> <https://read01.com/AzMx2E.html>, accessed on September 27, 2016. The PuYi regime was recognized by 23 countries. See *ibid.* WANG JingWei and his Japanese counterpart signed a treaty in August 1940, which is another way of saying they mutually recognized each other, for the first time..

<sup>22</sup> In Mandarin Chinese, it is ShangHaiFaZuJie. In August 1921, the first JiGou/organization or BuMen/department of the party was for the first time publicly set up in Shanghai City. In July 1922, the Second National Congress was again held in Shanghai. There were 12 representatives, representing 195 CPC members.

secretly attended the first national congress of the CPC. Ironically, none of them remembered the exact date of the congress, because all of them, including MAO Zedong, were afraid of CHIANG Kai-shek's hot anti-communist pursuit. So, was the congress held on July 1st, the 23rd, or even 1 day in the month of August? There was a lot of debate among the CPC theoreticians. At the end, it was decided that July 1 would be the official founding date of the party.<sup>23</sup>

Maybe we should go back a little. In March 1925, Dr. SUN Yat-sen passed away in Beijing. As mentioned earlier, before his death, he welcomed the Chinese communists to join the KMT, under the January 1923 policy of LianERongGong/<sup>24</sup> political arrangement of cooperation between the KMT, the former Soviet Union, the Communist Internationale, and the CPC.<sup>25</sup> In June 1923, the CPC at the Third National Congress agreed to form the first united front with the KMT, allowing, at first, selected CPC leaders to join the former and all other communists to be a member of the KMT in an individual basis. In May of 1923, the CPC led an anti-imperialism movement in Shanghai, which soon spread to other parts of the ROC, involving 1.7 million supporters and sympathizers from all walks of life.<sup>26</sup> In May 1926, CHIANG Kai-shek at the KMT national congress began to grab more power, squeezing out the communists within the leadership.<sup>27</sup> Before and after April 1927, CHIANG Kai-shek tried to wipe out the Chinese communists in SiChuan Province and six other provinces.<sup>28</sup> On April 12, 1927, he specifically targeted the communists in Shanghai City, and what CHIANG did was considered massacre by some historians. Thereafter, the CPC's morale dropped to its lowest point. By July 1927, the first round of cooperation between the KMT and the CPC can be said as ended. CHIANG Kai-shek's son, CHIANG Ching-kuo, who was living in the former Soviet Union, wrote a personal letter to his father, accusing his father, saying he should not have done that, and severed his relationship with his father. The content of the said letter was published in a Moscow weekly magazine.

In September 1927, the CPC at an ad hoc meeting decided to first create a self-government region in RuiJin Town, JiangXi Province. In November 1931, the Soviet Republic of China (SRC)<sup>29</sup> was created and was only recognized by the former Soviet Union. As can be seen, the ROC was still not a pure square/circle repre-

<sup>23</sup> <http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/234123/16184168.html>, accessed on August 28, 2016

<sup>24</sup> Literally, unite with the Soviet Union and accommodate the Communist Party of China

<sup>25</sup> This term was coined by WU ZhiHui, who was an elder, anti-Communist Nationalist Party of China/KMT member, later on, probably in or before the March 1927 preparatory meeting held in Shanghai, in which CAI YuanPei, who headed Peking University, talked about purging the Chinese communists within the KMT. WU met WANG JingWei in the following month in Shanghai, and the latter also mentioned the same term.

<sup>26</sup> <http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/234123/16184168.html>, accessed on August 28, 2016

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Many of those Chinese communists were jailed at NanJing City's JunRenJianYu/jail for military personnel. During the 8-year war against Imperial Japan, the Chinese communists and JinBuRenShi/progressive personages were jailed at GuiZhou Province's XiFengJiZhongYing/XiFeng concentration camp from November 1938 to July 1946.

<sup>29</sup> <http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/234123/16184168.html>, accessed on August 28, 2016. Some observers say that is the beginning of Two Chinas. See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiangxi%E2%80%93Fujian\\_Soviet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiangxi%E2%80%93Fujian_Soviet), accessed on August 28, 2016.

senting *yin*. The SRC had its own flag, bank, tax-collecting bureau, silver dollars, and stamp and lasted until October 1934, which marked the beginning of the epic Long March by the CPC<sup>30</sup> and which ended a year later. Due to CHIANG Kai-shek's fifth campaign to totally annihilate the Chinese communists, the CPC had no choice but to move the capital from RuiJin to YanAn,<sup>31</sup> traversing over 9000 km/5600 miles<sup>32</sup> and spending 370 days. At that time, the escaping communists numbered a total of 72,313 combatants, according to the *Statistical Chart of the Field Army Personnel, Weaponry, Ammunition, and Supply*, which was completed by the Red Army on October 8, 1934, that is to say, 2 days before the Long March had begun.<sup>33</sup>

CHIANG Kai-shek enjoyed the highest personal prestige and felt the greatest ascent of power in his career soon after the defeat of Imperial Japan in August 1945. However, the following model must be applied from June 1946, when the civil war broke out in mainland China: weak ROC versus non-weak ROC. When we read the following statistics, the ROC was certainly at 1, representing 100% weak, as a result of World War II: 35 million Chinese were either dead or wounded; direct economic loss amounted to US\$100 billion+ and indirect loss, US\$500+ billion.<sup>34</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, who was a Japan student or Japanologist working for the US Army Intelligence Service during World War II and a former US ambassador to Tokyo, in an August 1983 article published in *Boston Globe*, said the atomic bombs had hastened Tokyo's surrender to the Allied Forces,<sup>35</sup> much to the chagrin of many Japanese.

Although CHIANG Kai-shek and MAO Zedong signed the Double Tenth Agreement in October 1945<sup>36</sup> plus a cease-fire agreement in January 1946, the KMT began to again fight against the CPC in June of 1946 in the ZhongYuan/Central Plains of mainland China,<sup>37</sup> when the former ordered some 300,000 troops to attack the communist-controlled or liberated areas.<sup>38</sup> From that month in 1946 to December 1949, CHIANG Kai-shek mainly held on to the urban areas, especially the cities. In his perception, the KMT can maintain its ruling power status in this way, because

<sup>30</sup> See <http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1043/8/6/6/104386625.html?coluid=93&kindid=17211&docid=104386625&mdate=0910233033>, accessed on September 11, 2016.

<sup>31</sup> [http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?\\_\\_biz=MzA5NDg1OTQ3MQ%3D%3D&mid=403924111&idx=1&sn=ace0c6901554b86cb15aea2dbf13442d&mpshare=1&scene=1&srcid=0930kJst2H1G9i0RfdbUUYhi#rd](http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzA5NDg1OTQ3MQ%3D%3D&mid=403924111&idx=1&sn=ace0c6901554b86cb15aea2dbf13442d&mpshare=1&scene=1&srcid=0930kJst2H1G9i0RfdbUUYhi#rd), accessed on October 14, 2016.

<sup>32</sup> The distance is like going to California to New York and from the latter to the former.

<sup>33</sup> <http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/234123/16184168.html>, accessed on August 28, 2016.

<sup>34</sup> <http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/234123/16184168.html>, accessed on August 28, 2016.

<sup>35</sup> Many Japanese did not agree with him.

<sup>36</sup> From April to June 1945, the United Nations (UN) passed its charter, and DONG BiWu, who was a member of the Communist Party of China (CPC), was in the ROC delegation, which signed the document.

<sup>37</sup> It is said that the 100 largest last names/family names of Taiwan can be traced back to the Huang River/Yellow River, which is part of the Central Plains. See <http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1044/9/3/0/104493032.html?coluid=5&kindid=23&docid=104493032&mdate=1203100933>, accessed on December 5, 2016.

<sup>38</sup> In August 1945, the CPC controlled an area close to 100 WanPinFangGongLi/1 million km<sup>2</sup> and ruled close to 100 million Chinese. See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiangxi%E2%80%93Fujian\\_Soviet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiangxi%E2%80%93Fujian_Soviet), accessed on August 28, 2016.



cities usually have more resources. MAO Zedong changed his policy in January 1930, trying to mainly control as much as possible the countryside, so as to encircle the cities. Earlier in late September 1927, the CPC decided at JiangXi Province's SanWan Village, YongXin County, to have tighter control of its Red Army, which was formally named in May 1928 and which, later at an enlarged Political Bureau meeting held at XiPaiBo Village, PingShan County, HeBei Province,<sup>39</sup> in September 1948, became the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). MAO and others hoped to build 5-million armed forces in 5 years, counting from July 1946, so as to strategically wipe out the CHIANG Kai-shek reactionaries.<sup>40</sup>

WaiMengGu/Outer Mongolia was another issue, reflecting the fact that the ROC government could still not be the pure square/circle representing 100% *yin*. In January 1923, Dr. SUN Yat-sen and Adolph A. Joffe, who was a communist revolutionary, a Bolshevik politician, and a Soviet diplomat, issued a joint manifesto, and the fourth points said:

M. Joffe has categorically declared to Dr. Sun Yat-sen (who has fully satisfied himself as to this) that it is not and never has been the intention or purpose of the present Russian Government to pursue an Imperialistic policy in Outer Mongolia, or to cause it to secede from China. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, therefore, does not view an immediate evacuation of Russian troops from Outer Mongolia as either imperative or in the real interest of China, the more so on account of the inability of the present Government at Peking to prevent such an evacuation being followed by a recrudescence of intrigues and hostile activities by White Guardists against Russia and the creation of a graver situation than that which now exists,<sup>41</sup>

thereby implying that the former Soviet Union recognizes the ROC's sovereignty on WaiMengGu/Outer Mongolia. In October 1945, a plebiscite, conducted in accordance with the August 1945 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and between the ROC and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter the 1945 treaty) and monitored by the Soviet troops, was held in WaiMengGu/Outer Mongolia. The result was that almost 98% of the voters agreed to independence. In January 1946, the ROC government recognized the independence of WaiMengGu/Outer Mongolia, confirming that the existing boundary markers constitute the boundary. To be sure, did the local voters really understand what are the differences between nation, country, and state, let alone the concept, (residual) sovereignty?<sup>42</sup> On October 3, 1949, the former Soviet Union became the first country in the world to recognize the PRC. In the same month, the ROC ambassador, FU BingChang, left Moscow on the 11th, meaning that the former can still regard WaiMengGu/Outer Mongolia as its GuYouJiangYu/inherent territory, according to its constitution and in view of the fact the diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed. Besides, Article VIII of the 1945 Treaty stated that "... each of the High Contracting Parties being able to terminate its operation by giving notice to that effect one year in

<sup>39</sup> In March 1948, the central committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was relocated to Beijing from XiBaiPo Village.

<sup>40</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiangxi%E2%80%93Fujian\\_Soviet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiangxi%E2%80%93Fujian_Soviet), accessed on August 28, 2016

<sup>41</sup> <http://www.geocities.ws/paultabaka/sun/-/joffe.html>, accessed on August 28, 2016

<sup>42</sup> The term, residual sovereignty, was coined by the United States, regarding the administration of TiaoYuTai/Senkakus. It means reversion at some future date.

advance.” When the PRC was created, MAO Zedong also did not really fight hard to get WaiMengGu/Outer Mongolia back. At that time, he needed Soviet assistance very much and, therefore, did not have much bargaining power or to make exchanges.

Can the PRC qua contemporary China be the pure square/circle on the upper left-hand side? It is possible if we first shift to the *yin* and *yang* diagram, which is on the upper right-hand side. In this context, the PRC is *yang*. However, in the context of *yin*, which represents the ROC, the PRC is that dot in *yin*. That dot in *yin* can become the pure square/circle, as a next step. In this context, *yin* can be the PRC qua contemporary China. If we see the demise of the ROC someday, the PRC as 100% *yin* will be confirmed. As to that dot in *yin*, we can refer it to as, for example, the ROC, unless the ROC becomes history. If the PRC qua contemporary China is *yin*, *yang* would be non-PRC qua contemporary China, and one of the synonyms for the latter would be the ROC, if it has not become a “gone country.”

There are many examples of the PRC qua rising contemporary China. Here, we are actually looking at the time/space sequence component of the crab and frog motion model. First, on February 2, 1949, the Chinese PLA paraded in the Beijing streets, after the peaceful liberation. It, on purpose, passed through DongJiaoMinXiang/DongJiaoMin Alley, symbolizing the end of the “state within a state” arrangement, which was designed by the September 1901 unequal treaty, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, the United States, and China—Final Protocol for the Settlement of the Disturbances of 1900. Second, on October 25, 1949, HaiGuanZhongShu/customs was established, meaning the beginning of a new era with no more foreign interference in the import and export business of China. Third, except Xizang/Tibet,<sup>43</sup> Taiwan, and ShaoShuJiGeDaoYu/a number of remote islands, the CPC by June 1950 was able to rule the Chinese mainland.<sup>44</sup> Fourth, from October 10, 1950, to October 1952, the CPC basically completed its campaigns, smashing the counterrevolutionaries. Fifth, from May 1949 to the close of 1953, the CPC brought an end to (Dao)Fei(Huo)Huan/banditry/scourge of banditry across the country. Sixth, in January 1960, the agreement concerning the question of Burma between China and the Union of Burma was signed, to be followed by a border treaty in October of the same year, superseding all the past ones. As of May 2017, 12 out of 14 land neighbors had signed documents related to border with the PRC, which also faces eight maritime neighbors. In short, Beijing acquired better reputation than before. Seventh, on January 27, 1964, the Republic of France (ROF)

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<sup>43</sup>In May 1951, the CPC peacefully liberated Xizang/Tibet. In October of the same year, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began to station in that area. On March 10, 1959, the 17 articles agreement between Beijing and the Xizang authorities were scrapped. On the 20 of the same month, the Chinese PLA engaged in warfare, so as to counter those who resist the CPC rule. By the end of 1960, the feudal system in Xizang/Tibet was eradicated.

<sup>44</sup>In July 1949, OKAMURA Yasuji et al. recruited some former professional soldiers of Imperial Japan to assist CHIANG Kai-shek to recover mainland China. They arrived in Taipei in November 1949. OKAMURA was the commander in chief of the [China Expeditionary Army](#) from November 1944 to August 1945. Later, he became a military advisor of CHIANG Kai-shek. OKAMURA was able to earn US\$100 per month at that time. ZhongGuoGuangBoGongSi’s radio program in Taipei, dated October 10, 2016, at 4 pm.



established diplomatic relations with the PRC. It was the very first Western power to do so. Eighth, in October 1964, the PRC tested its first atomic bomb and announced that it would not use the weapon first. Ninth, in November 1971, the PRC delegation began to attend the UN meetings in the General Assembly and the Security Council. Tenth, in August 1974, the Chinese PLA's first nuclear submarine, ChangZhengYiHao/No.1 Long March/Han class, was commissioned. Eleventh, in January 1979, the PRC and the United States established diplomatic ties. Twelfth, in September 1986, the very first, genuine opposition party was established in the Taiwan area. Bearing the key concepts in its name, democratic and progress, Beijing leaders seemed to be on the defensive. It should be noted that the CPC is already in its third stage of practicing democracy, since October 1949.<sup>45</sup> It seems that the party does not want to have extremely shallow democratic roots internally. In other words, since the late 1970s, it is not 100% being defensive. For the record, in November 2015, LiangAnLingDaoRen/leaders (as opposed to party) on both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) for the first time met each other in the Republic of Singapore (ROS). The last time was from August to October 1945, and the venue was the war-time capital of the ROC. Thirteenth, in March 1996, the Taiwan area held its very first direct presidential election.<sup>46</sup> This is historic in the Chinese history. If Beijing were to announce that one day it will allow PRC citizens to directly choose their president, the announcement can deflect pressures from the Taiwan area. Fourteenth, in May 2000, for the first time in the Chinese history, an opposition political party peacefully became the ruling party in the Taiwan area. However, in the late 1990s, Beijing leaders have already accommodated some non-CPC members to become, for example, vice-mayors of its capital.<sup>47</sup> Fifteenth, in October 2003, the first Chinese *taikonaut*,<sup>48</sup> YANG LiWei, was sent into space by the China National Space Administration program, making the PRC the third country to independently launch human beings into space. In January 2016, Beijing approved a mission, that is, by 2020, its first Mars probe will be launched to carry out orbiting and roving exploration. Sixteenth, the PRC for the first time hosted the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. Seventeenth, from May 1 to October 31, 2010, Expo 2010 Shanghai China was held on both banks of the [HuangPu River](#) in Shanghai Municipality, Chinese mainland. In short, the PRC square/circle has become larger.

**The Upper *yin* and *yang* Diagram on the Right-hand Side or Contemporary China Versus Non-contemporary China** Vis-a-vis the PRC, the ROC, which was created earlier than the PRC, is the big brother, so to speak, although territory-wise,

<sup>45</sup><http://theory.people.com.cn/BIG5/49150/49152/9583132.html>, accessed on September 29, 2016. The first stage was from 1949 to 1957. The second one was from 1957 to the beginning of DENG Xiaoping's era. And the party is in its third stage since the late 1970s.

<sup>46</sup>Indirectly, it can indicate how many voters are for the Chinese reunification or against it. If the CPC dares to hold the same election in the Chinese mainland and wins the election, then we can say that it deserves to remain as the ruling party.

<sup>47</sup>When Shanghai City was liberated in May 1949, a DangWai/ex-party forces figure became the vice-mayor.

<sup>48</sup>Astronaut usually refers to the Americans, while cosmonaut, the Russians.

after October 1, 1949, the territory under the ROC administration had shrunk. There is no doubt that in the minds of CHIANG Kai-shek, YAN JiaGan, and CHIANG Ching-kuo, Taiwan area (including the remote islands like JinMen/Quemoy County and Mazu County) is part of China, just as mainland China is part of the ROC. Hence, we can put ROC at 1, while non-ROC, a synonym of which is PRC, E. In this model, we clearly see that the ROC wants to defeat, co-opt, etc., the PRC at time/space sequence (n). In the early 1960s, the Chinese mainland had man-made famine for 3 years. In April 1961, CHIANG Kai-shek was very serious about conducting a mainland recovery by military means, choosing GuangDong Province's coast, as the landing points,<sup>49</sup> although, in the October 1958 joint communique with the United States, Taipei, dubbed Free China, agreed to no use of force against the Chinese mainland.<sup>50</sup>

If we discuss the PRC, then it would be put at 1, while E is equivalent to non-PRC, a synonym of which is ROC. The logic is the same for the PRC, at time/space sequence (n); it would defeat, co-opt, etc., the ROC. In this crab and frog motion model, PRC is part of contemporary China.

The Chinese communists seized state power in October 1949. At that time, many pro-ROC Chinese were not able to migrate or flee to the Taiwan area. They remained a potential threat to the PRC's national security. However, MAO Zedong wanted to militarily defeat his archenemy, CHIANG Kai-shek. In the October 13, 1950, secret report, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States said MAO Zedong's Third Field Army mobilized some 600,000 troops from XiaMen of Fujian Province, Shanghai City, and WenZhou City of ZheJiang Province, for the purpose of attacking JinMen County, which was ruled by CHIANG Kai-shek, and Taiwan Province.<sup>51</sup>

In passing, it should be noted that in the early 1960s, as mentioned earlier, CHIANG Kai-shek also missed the golden chance during the Chinese mainland's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which was very chaotic. The death of LIN Biao, CHIANG Kai-shek's student at HuangPu/Whampoa Military Academy, in a mysterious airplane crash in Ondorhaan, a town in Outer Mongolia located 290 km from Ulaanbaatar, the capital, in September 1971, totally shattered CHIANG Kai-shek's dream of recovering the Chinese mainland.<sup>52</sup> LIN Biao officially became the PRC's second in charge in April 1969, following the First Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the CPC. LIN Biao's position as Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms and successor" was recognized, when the party constitution was formally revised to reflect his future height of power. There were reports speculating

<sup>49</sup><http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014-10-27/1657807773.html>, accessed on September 27, 2016.

<sup>50</sup><https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d209>, accessed on September 27, 2016.

<sup>51</sup> However, MAO Zedong changed his mind, after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. See: <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/crest-25-year-program-archive>, accessed on January 20, 2017.

<sup>52</sup> He suffered cardiac arrest and fell into coma from July 1972 to January 1973.

that, before his death, he still wanted to cooperate with CHIANG Kai-shek, so as to oust MAO Zedong. Upon hearing LIN Biao's death, CHIANG Kai-shek shed tears.

As can be seen, a third dialectical game is at work, namely, ROC versus non-ROC (or PRC) versus PRC versus non-PRC (or ROC). Which one will emerge as the victor at time/space sequence (n) remains to be seen. Beijing faces the serious problem of corruption, while Taipei increasingly can become a state within a state.

For contemporary China, we still need to discuss that small dot in *yin* and that small dot in *yang*. First, it is possible that, if we only talk about the ROC qua contemporary China, that small dot could be ancient China, modern China, or even PRC. That small dot could be, for example, ancient China, because the ROC still maintains national treasures found in thousand years ago in Taipei City's National Palace Museum, which was established in November 1965, plus the Southern Branch of the National Palace Museum in TaiZhong City, which opened its door in December 2015.

We should also bear in mind the following possible models, which correspond to the previous paragraph: *yin* at 1 and *yang*, 5 as well as *yang* at 1 and *yin*, 5. In both models, what we should remember is that *yin* at least tolerates the existence of *yang* for a period of time and vice versa, because they are all in the same safe zone. In this context, E would be, for example, non-*yin* at 1 and *yang*, 5. One example is as follows: When was ruling the Chinese mainland, MAO Zedong would call that RenMinDeNeiBuMaoDun/contradiction between the people. The November 1992 consensus between Taipei and Beijing or Beijing and Taipei is a perfect example. From that point in time and up to now, we have witnessed four versions, according to a Chinese mainland academic, WANG ZhiGuo.<sup>53</sup> To Beijing, for example, the definition for the consensus is LiangAnTongShuYiGeZhongGuo/both the mainland and Taiwan belong to One China.<sup>54</sup> The term LiangGeBanGeZhongGuo/two half Chinas, as a synonym, which was coined by James C. Hsiung, can be applied here. The November 1992 consensus will be elaborated later on.

### **The Diagram at the Lower Right-hand Side, Emphasizing the Middle Way and Expansion or Contraction of Contemporary China and Non-contemporary China.**

We can first talk about the middle way. Throughout contemporary China, both ROC and PRC had to face many national and international dilemmas. Typically, a Chinese dialectician would choose to go to 5, which is a mixture of 1 and E. This is called the middle way with harmony in mind in the safe zone. There could also be a middle way with harmony in mind in the danger zone. One way of making a side-way move toward A but still be in the safe zone is to jump out of that crab and frog motion model. In other words, the dialectician would construct a new model by flexibly converting 5 versus A as 1 versus E. That is to say, 5 becomes 1 and A, still E. In other words, between 5 and A, there will be a new middle way. One perfect

<sup>53</sup> See <http://www.CRNTT.com> 2016-12-08 00:27:25, accessed on December 10, 2016. On November 14, 2016, I conceived the Beijing logic, and I discussed with my graduate students. For my explanation, see <http://www.ipreview.com/index.php/Home/Blog/single/id/311.html>, accessed on December 20, 2016.

<sup>54</sup> This translation is taken from the March 2005 Anti-Secession Law of mainland China.

example is the March 2007 WuQuanFa/property law of the PRC in which the CPC, for the first time, since October 1949, allowed common people to own private properties,<sup>55</sup> except land. By doing so, actually, the PRC has moved a step further closer to capitalism or E. However, the ruling party on the Chinese mainland justified this move, by arguing that the CPC members should always remember HU Jintao's Scientific Outlook on Development, in which, one day, which could be more than ten generations later, contemporary China will re-embrace socialism (as opposed to socialism and market economy with Chinese characteristics) as the new mainstream economic line.

Let me give some examples of the middle way with harmony in mind, which have to do with both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s):

1. In July 1995, the Chinese PLA's Second Artillery Force fired a total of six missiles at an area 80 miles to the north of Taiwan Province. In March 1996, the Chinese PLA launched four missiles within 32 miles of the same province, and one of them flew over JiLong Port in the northern part. This move is considered at 5 from the Beijing perspective, because all of the missiles were unarmed. During that period of time, JIANG Zemin was under heavy pressure from the Chinese PLA to do something to thwart LEE Teng-hui from taking more creeping moves toward Taiwan's de jure independence, after the presidential reelection. JIANG Zemin also had to face the moderates on the Chinese mainland, regarding the Taiwan issue, who argue that they should handle the Taiwan issue politically.
2. Taiwan and mainland China's special state-to-state relationship was a short-lived, 5-day policy put forward by the then president, LEE Teng-hui, in July 1999, with the help of CAI YingWen and TIAN HongMao,<sup>56</sup> and it does not say that the former is a 100% country and the same thing speaks for the latter.
3. The November 1992 consensus was a term accepted by the PRC, 3 days after LEE Teng-hui's special state-to-state relationship policy,<sup>57</sup> although many credited the term to SU Chi of the ROC in April 2000, so as to rationalize the relationship between his country and Beijing after CHEN Shui-bian became the president in May 2000. From the Beijing perspective, it was at first reluctant to accept the consensus. Later, it is willing to treat the term as something equivalent to YiZhongGeBiao/under One China, each side of the Taiwan Strait(s) can refer to its national title, while, to the ruling party of the KMT in the Taiwan area, it is GeBiaoYiZhong/each side of the Taiwan Strait(s) can refer to its version of national title in the international society and community. For both CPC and the KMT, it is a middle way with harmony in mind or a modus vivendi, which is a

<sup>55</sup> From March 2007 to March 2017, the property price jumped by 10 times.

<sup>56</sup> <http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1043/7/4/7/104374701.html?coluid=93&kindid=13691&docid=104374701>, accessed on September 4, 2016. TIAN HongMao helped LEE Teng-hui in August 1996 in front of the members of National Assembly to utter the following Chinese characters qua policy, so as to, for example, enable the government not allowing any investment over US\$50 million in the Chinese mainland: JieJiYongRen/no haste, be patient.

<sup>57</sup> <http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1043/6/8/5/104368539.html?coluid=217&kindid=0&docid=104368539&mdate=0827152853>, accessed on August 27, 2016.

mixture of the ROC at 1 and the PRC, E, or PRC at 1 and the ROC, E, in the international society and community. For example, Beijing can tolerate the following: Should negotiations take place, the PRC delegation would at least say, in the UN, the (contemporary) China delegation can be comprised of delegates from the Chinese mainland and the Taiwan area, and the latter can utter matters related to them at the UN podium or meetings. As another example, in Beijing's embassy in Washington, D.C., we can see a (former or incumbent) ROC diplomat being the ambassador for a period of time, so long as such a rotate arrangement would not create Two Chinas, One China, One Taiwan, or Taiwan independence.

4. In September 2016, some pro-green camp politicians, such as the Taiwan UN Alliance, went to New York City to promote Taiwan as opposed to the ROC, for the purpose of returning to the UN Assembly. To CAI YingWen, the crab and frog motion model that she uses from May 20, 2016, up to now under the TaShi/steadfast diplomacy, is as follows: ROT at 1; Taiwan Guo/Taiwan state or in the capacity as a country, 2; Taiwan, 3; Chinese Taipei, <sup>458</sup>; and maintaining the status quo, which is equivalent to MA Ying-jeou's ROC (Taiwan), 5.<sup>59</sup> That is to say, to her, Taiwan is in the middle way of that safe zone spectrum, and she would navigate in between 3 and 5, with 3 representing 50% and 5, 1%. So, while in the Republic of Panama in August 2016, she referred to herself, in writing, as the president of Taiwan (ROC). However, in August 2016, a Chinese mainlander by the pseudonym of LengPo warned that if Taipei uses Taiwan to return to the UN, the consequence will be disastrous.<sup>60</sup> And, in October 2016, extending her condolences to the Thailand king, who passed away, CAI YingWen referred to herself as the president of the ROC (Taiwan) at the Thailand Trade and Economic Office in Taipei.

As to expansion, the following models could be applied: (1) ROC versus non-ROC, (2) PRC versus non-PRC, (3) territory versus non-territory, and (4) non-territory versus territory. It is very easy to slot in information, data, and analysis into any one of them.

To repeat, ROC could be 100% ROC, 50% ROC, and 1% ROC. The same logic applies to other number or letter. For example, territory could be 100% of territory, 50%, and 1%. If we see the demise of the ROC at time/space sequence (n), we would have to build and apply a new model at the time/space sequence preceding time/space sequence (n), that is, non-ROC or non-territory, because this means that non-ROC at 1 will have defeated, co-opted, etc., ROC, which is at E.

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<sup>58</sup>The World Economic Forum (WEF)'s annual competitiveness report in September 2016 for the first time referred to the ROC as Chinese Taipei rather than Taiwan, China. In early October 2016, WEF used Taiwan, China again, treating it as a technical matter and adding "no way signifies a lack of support by the World Economic Forum on the People's Republic of China's 'One China Policy'." See <http://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201610020251-1.aspx>, accessed on October 3, 2016.

<sup>59</sup>For example, the ROC (Taiwan)-US-Japan and Asia-Pacific Regional Partners Security Dialogue was held in Taipei City, bringing together foreign senior officials, scholars, and experts from the United States and Japan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Minister David Tawei LEE and the pro-green camp Prospect Foundation Chairman CHEN Tan-sun were the participants.

<sup>60</sup><http://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/201608250512-1.aspx>, accessed on August 26, 2016.

Let me give some examples of expansion, which have to do with both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s):

1. During the 8-year War<sup>61</sup> of (Long) Resistance against Imperial Japan/Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, MAO Zedong unabashedly described his efforts as "70 percent self-expansion, 20 percent temporization, and 10 percent fighting the Japanese." From the KMT perspective and even the CPC perspective, whenever the 8-year war was mentioned after October 1, 1949, what MAO Zedong said would be often mentioned. At that time, the ruling political party weighs a lot more than the government.
2. In September 1951, the ROC, despite the fact that it, like the PRC, was not invited to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference, was confirmed to be able to get back Formosa/Taiwan, PengHu/the Pescadores, the NanShaQunDao/Spratly Islands, and the XiShaQunDao/Paracel Islands, because at that time, the ROC still maintained diplomatic relations with the United States.
3. The PRC was able to get back XiangGang and AoMen in July 1997 and December 1999, respectively, from the hands of the British and Portuguese.
4. Both the ROC and PRC had launched their satellites in outer space, respectively. The former succeeded in January 1999 and the latter, April 1970.
5. The PRC wants to operate something like the International Space Station. In September 2011, it launched its first-ever 9.4-ton/8.5 MT space laboratory, [TianGong-1/literally Heavenly Palace 1 spacecraft](#), which will likely fall back to Earth in the second half of 2017. In international law, TianGong-1 is part of the PRC.
6. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) can manage cyberspace.
7. The PRC navy, paying an annual fee, will be able to operate its very first overseas naval base or officially a logistics support base for a minimum of 10 years in the Republic of Djibouti (ROD), which is in the pirate-infested Horn of Africa, sometime after May 2017, and this base is only 13 km from the United States in that African country.

As to contraction, the following models could be applied: (1) ROC versus non-ROC, (2) PRC versus non-PRC, (3) territory versus non-territory, and (4) non-territory versus territory. Again, it is very easy to slot in information, data, and analysis into any one of them.

To repeat, ROC could be 100% ROC, 50% ROC, and 1% ROC. The same logic applies to other numbers or letters. For example, territory could be 100% of territory, 50%, and 1%. If we see the demise of the ROC at time/space sequence (n), we would have to build and apply a new model at the time/space sequence preceding time/space sequence (n), that is, non-ROC or non-territory, because non-ROC at 1 will have defeated, co-opted, etc., ROC, which is at E.

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<sup>61</sup>In January 2017, Beijing dated Septemer 18, 1931, as the beginning of the war. From spring 2017, school children's textbooks in the Chinese mainland will no longer mention eight.



Let me give some examples of contraction, which have to do with both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s):

1. The May 1991 Sino-Soviet Border Agreement was a **treaty** signed between the **PRC** and the former **Soviet Union** that set up demarcation work to resolve most of the border disputes between the two neighboring countries. In December 1999, there was another one. For the first one, initially signed by the PRC and the former **Soviet Union**, the terms of the agreement were resumed by the Federation of Russia after the breakup of the former Soviet Union. The treaty resulted in some minor territorial changes along the Sino-Russian border.<sup>62</sup>

For the record, some mainland Chinese questioned whether JIANG Zemin had made too much territorial concessions at HeiXiaZi Island/Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island in December 1999 to the Russians. In addition, it should be noted that the ROC does not recognize any Chinese territorial changes regarding any border agreements signed by the PRC with any other countries, including the ones mentioned above, due to the requirements, as stipulated in the ROC **Constitution** and its additional articles.<sup>63</sup>

2. DiaoYuTai/Senkakus has been administered by Japan since May 1972.<sup>64</sup> In September 2012, the Japanese government nationalized its control over Minami-kojima, Kita-kojima, and Uotsuri islands. To this day, the PRC could not get DiaoYuTai/Senkakus back,<sup>65</sup> although its naval ships in June 2016 had for the first time sailed into the contiguous zone and its China Coast Guard ships had for the first time entered into the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of the DiaoYuTai/Senkakus, challenging the Japanese counterpart.
3. The ROC versus DangWai/the ex-party forces and, later, mainly the MinZhuJinBuDang/Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).<sup>66</sup> To the closing of the CHIANG Ching-kuo era, the KMT was able to rule the Taiwan area, if not with an iron hand. This can be reflected from the following facts: (1) When the June 1989 incident took place in Beijing, almost all the residents of the Taiwan area sided with the students and common people who challenged the CPC and the corrupted officials and businessmen in the Chinese mainland, and (2) by the end of the twentieth century, most ROC citizens still regard themselves as Chinese or either both Chinese and Taiwanese. Knowing that his health was failing, DangWai/the ex-party forces became emboldened to challenge the ruling party. In July

<sup>62</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Sino-Soviet\\_Border\\_Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Sino-Soviet_Border_Agreement), accessed on September 27, 2016.

<sup>63</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Sino-Soviet\\_Border\\_Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Sino-Soviet_Border_Agreement), accessed on September 27, 2016.

<sup>64</sup>In June 1971, the United States argued that it possesses residual sovereignty over those islands. The June 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty gave those islands to Tokyo.

<sup>65</sup>In September 2013, it for the first time QuanMianXunShi/went around and inspected waters surrounding DiaoYuTai/Senkakus.

<sup>66</sup>The five Chinese characters were proposed by LIN ZhengJie. See <http://www.CRNTT.com> 2016-11-12 15:16:07, dated November 13, 2016. It was XIE ChangTing, who uttered those characters on September 28, 1986, when the opposition party was abruptly created.

1987, the martial law, which was activated by the martial decree, was lifted after 38 years, counting from May 1949. The very first opposition party with many supporters, DPP, was created in September 1986. In May 2016, it returned to the ruling power status for the second time, after 8 years. Its record was historic, because it has a madam president and got the majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan (branch), which can make reforms according to its agenda. On October 31, 2016, the KMT chairwoman, HONG XiuZhu, while paying tribute to Dr. SUN Yat-sen in NanJing City, uttered WoMenBiJiangZaiQi/we will definitely be able to ascend again. It is doubtful that the KMT, with dwindling assets, could recuperate in the foreseeable future, along with the fact that the ROC is almost dying.

A hybrid of expansion and contradiction also exists. The notable example is that of XiangGang. In July 1997, the former British colony returned to the embrace of motherland, meaning the PRC. This is a plus for Beijing, because historians will record it down as such and credit the Chinese communists.

From July 1997 to early September 2016, two camps existed in the XiangGang Legislative Council (LEGCO)<sup>67</sup>: the binary of pro-establishment, to wit, pro-Beijing loyalists or XiangGang government supporters<sup>68</sup> and pan-democrats, with the former usually on the upper hand, due to the fact that the rules and regulations of the electoral game almost always favor Beijing. In 2014, we witnessed the Occupy Central with Love and Peace protests, which was regarded by some as a civil disobedience campaign and which lasted from September 28 to December 15 of that year, signaling a demand for a sea of political change. In early September 2016, a record of 2.2 million XiangGang voters or 58% of the electorate enabled a new breed of localists,<sup>69</sup> some of whom advocate separation of XiangGang and the Chinese mainland and, therefore, labeled as radicals, to capture seats in the LEGCO.<sup>70</sup> The localists and pan-democrats combined won 30 of 70 seats, allowing the opposition parties to retain its critical minority of 24 seats, which are needed to block constitutional changes in favor of the pro-establishment camp. The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the PRC State Council, on the fifth in the same month, after seeing the elections outcome, already warned that “[w]e resolutely oppose any form of activities for ‘Hong Kong independence’ in and out of LEGCO....” In October 2016, two members of the opposition camp for the first time uttered that “Hong Kong IS NOT China” in the LEGCO, treating the SAR as a nation.

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<sup>67</sup> *South China Morning Post*, September 6, 2016, p. A1.

<sup>68</sup> The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong remained the biggest party, with 12 seats in the council.

<sup>69</sup> XinXingZiJue and JiJingBenTu. In October 2016, when making their pledge, the lawmakers, such as YAU Wai-ching, unprecedentedly uttered Hong Kong Nation and Hong Kong are not China in the council.

<sup>70</sup> The prodemocracy camp gained the medical and architectural, surveying, planning, and landscape seats, both of which were previously occupied by pro-establishment legislators. On October 1, 2016, banners written in Chinese characters saying XiangGang Independence were hung at XiangGang's universities.



There are some symbolic or possible middle way cases:

1. In March 1955, the United States urged the ROC to trim down its troops in JinMen/Quemoy and Mazu, making them outposts, as opposed to strongholds. In October of the same year, CHIANG Kai-shek publicly excluded the option of withdrawing troops from those “infernal (Ike’s term)” remote islands. One author observed that “... so far as the danger of war was concerned, [the United States]’ proposal looked like jumping out of the frying pan into the fire.”<sup>71</sup>
2. Shipping tycoon, ZHANG RongFa, in the early 1990s, offered to make his company ship as a meeting venue, so as to enable LEE Teng-hui and JIANG Zemin to talk to each other in the middle line of the Taiwan Strait(s).<sup>72</sup>
3. In September 2016, a high-ranking Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)<sup>73</sup> official, LIN ZhengYi, speaking at the Brookings Institution, said the DPP used to refer to mainland China as China. After CAI YingWen became the president, she started to refer to mainland China as ZhongGuoDaLu/China Mainland,<sup>74</sup> implying the use of the other term, ZhongGuoTaiWan/ChinaTaiwan, which is preferred by the CPC. In other words, the two terms mean One China. However, the premier of the ROC, LIN Qian uses the term ZhongHuaMinGuoTaiWan/ROCTaiwan, the abbreviation of which could be ZhongGuoTaiWan, because the ROC can be shortened to be ZhongGuo/China. To LIN ZhengYi, Taipei has already made a friendly gesture to Beijing leaders.<sup>75</sup> He at the same forum also said that CAI YingWen has accepted the first two Chinese characters of JiuErGongShi/92 consensus, to wit, JiuEr,<sup>76</sup> which is equivalent to 50% or the middle way in my one-dot theory. In this connection, TIAN HongMao, instead of saying JiuErGongShi/92 consensus, uttered NaSiGeZi/those four Chinese characters, without really mentioning JiuErGongShi/92 consensus.<sup>77</sup> Yet, on the 30th anniversary of founding the DPP, CAI YingWen, in her capacity as the party’s chairwoman, made the following remarks in her open letter: “LiKangZhongGuoDeYaLi/We need to resist pressure from China,” as opposed to mainland China. Some political observers regard that controversy as inviting deeper mistrust between Taipei and Beijing.

There are some symbolic or possible expansion cases:

1. DENG Xiaoping in September 1988 mentioned that during the October 1, 1988, National Day of the PRC, he would hang the portrait of Dr. SUN Yat-sen, instead of the portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in Beijing’s Tiananmen

<sup>71</sup> <http://soc.history.what-if.narkive.com/ok9pBliG/us-blockades-china-coast-1955>, accessed on November 2, 2016.

<sup>72</sup> <http://bbs.wenxuecity.com/memory/397660.html>, accessed on September 30, 2016.

<sup>73</sup> This is a cabinet-level administrative agency under the ROC’s Executive Yuan/branch.

<sup>74</sup> <http://www.CRNTT.com> 2016-09-18 00:15:04, accessed on September 23, 2016.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> <http://udn.com/news/story/7338/1982293>, accessed on September 25, 2016.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

Square, although this did not materialize until April 26, 1989, which marked the Labor Day.<sup>78</sup>

2. The November 1992 consensus from the Beijing perspective refers to the PRC at 1 and the ROC, 5. Beijing hopes that the PRC can go to 3 and the same thing speaks for the ROC, meaning that compromise has been made on both sides, but still tilting in favor of the Chinese mainland, because, when time is ripe, it would return to 1, in accordance with HU Jintao's Outlook. If so, both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s)'s territory from an outsider's perspective would be expanded. Why is that so? This is because some of the ROC politicians, for example, can play politics at a higher level in the Chinese mainland, not just the Taiwan area. The same thing speaks for the PRC; their territory can be said as been extended to the Taiwan area.

There are also some symbolic or possible contraction cases:

1. DENG Xiaoping, in September 1988, said he knew that many people in the Taiwan area support the independence movement, and he knew LEE Teng-hui, who unquestionably is in favor of Taiwan's independence.<sup>79</sup> On September 6, 2003, LEE spearheaded the so-called "Right Name" movement in the Taiwan area, advocating the name Taiwan, so as to replace the ROC.<sup>80</sup> In August 2016, he made the same remark at important functions.
2. Although Beijing in early 1959 had liberated those native Tibetans, who were at the lowest social strata for centuries, there are still many Tibetans who do not appreciate the PRC rule of their autonomous region.

### **The Diagram at the Lower Left-hand Side, Showing the Crab and Frog Motion Model**

In this study, a zillion of them could be applied, and a dialectician can jump at liberty from the first model to the 1000th and even the one zillionth, only to return to time/space sequence (n), when the time is ripe.

However, a crucial question must be posed at this juncture: Do we need to know or show *all* the crab and frog motion models? It is definitely not necessary, as mentioned earlier. This is because (1) this will only confuse many, if not most, (younger) dialecticians and (2) at least from the CPC perspective, since April 1927, all the members, under centralism versus democracy model, should comply with the Central Political Bureau's instructions, although DENG Xiaoping admitted that during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the centralism versus democracy model malfunctioned or even abandoned; and (3) some models are within a bigger crab and frog motion model, such as the following: YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by

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<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>79</sup>See WEI's book, pp. 51–52 and pp. 67–68. See also LIN LiYun, *QingShuiZhiGuang/The Glory of QingShui* (Beijing: HuaLingChuBanShe, January 2010). LIN, who was authorized by the Communist Party of China (CPC) met PENG Ming-min. See PENG's book, *A Taste of Freedom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1972).

<sup>80</sup>WEI, p. 75.

virtue<sup>81</sup> at 1; rule of law politics/government by law, 3; rule by law politics/legal system, 5 versus non-YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue at 1; rule of law politics/government by law, 3; and rule by law politics/legal system, 5. What should we do? Very simple and straightforward: We need only to pick the most important ones at each time/space sequence. We must also remember what MENGZi said, that is, CiYiShiYe,BiYiSHiYe/this is now, and that was then.

**Case Studies: Big and Small** We can empirically discuss, explain, and infer cases from I to X. My main purpose is to show different techniques of applying my one-dot theory. I can first compress an issue, a phenomenon, or a development, as a dot. I can also simplify a case study, so as to show the major, relevant, and interrelated models. As a third technique, I can build a crab and frog motion model or a series of (interrelated) models and, then, slot in the relevant information, data, and analysis. There could be other techniques of conducting dialectical research and writing, for example, quantifying the information, data, and analysis. We will begin with the dialectical game of Beijing versus Taipei, which embraces a series of interrelated models or dialectical games.

I. The harmonious versus non-harmonious dimensions of the One China Principle<sup>82</sup>: from LaoZi to HanFei(Zi), etc. At the outset, I would like to introduce my one-dot theory, because I will apply it to describe, explain, and infer the harmonious dimension of the One China principle, ever since the then paramount leader of the PRC, DENG Xiaoping, returned to the center stage for the third time in July 1977, who followed the footsteps of ZhuangZi's *YuShiJuHua/YuShiJuJin*/abreast of modern developments, by keeping up with the times.<sup>83</sup>

My one-dot theory is at a higher level than what readers see, namely, *TaiJiTū/TaiJi* Diagram/Diagram of Cosmological Scheme/Supreme Ultimate.

The *TaiJiTū* model or everything in the square can be seen in the middle, which is the biggest diagram. It is a dot if we look at it in the distance. It was MengZi who first talked about *NeiFangWaiYuan*/square internally and round externally, and a person who has reached this level can be said as perfect when facing other people. We can parse this diagram in terms of four smaller models, each one of which is but


<sup>81</sup> See John Plender, *Capitalism: Money, Morals and Markets* (London: Biteback Publishing, 2015). Plender is a *Financial Times* journalist. In this book, he pointed out that under capitalism, powerful elites are able to have a larger share of collective wealth.

<sup>82</sup> See <http://www.ipreview.com/index.php/Home/Blog/single/id/357.html>, accessed on February 23, 2017.

<sup>83</sup> ZHUANGZi lived around the fourth century before the common era (BCE) during the **Warring States Period**. He put forward the phrase *YuShiJuHua*. The Chinese communists changed the last Chinese character to read *jin*. LIU WenDian was the secretary of Dr. SUN Yat-sen. He studied ZHUANGZi's philosophy. He said there are only 2.5 people in the world who understand the philosophy. One is him. The other is ZHUANGZi himself. And the third one who understood only 50% is a Japanese. See <http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/%E8%8F%AF%E5%BA%9C%E7%9C%8B%E5%A4%A9%E4%B8%8B%EF%BC%8D%E5%8A%89%E6%96%87%E5%85%B8%E8%B8%A2%E4%B8%AD%E8%94%A3%E4%BB%8B%E7%9F%B3LP-20130719000999-260109>, accessed on July 19, 2013.

a dot. The first one is on the upper left-hand side. We see a blank square/circle or a dot. The second model is on the upper right-hand side. Another way of saying it is *yin* and *yang*. It is derived from the first model. The third one is at the lower right-hand side, which can expand and contract. It is a version of the second model on the upper right-hand side. Its emphasis is on that small dot, meaning the Confucian *ZhongYongZhiDao*/middle way, with *HeXie*/harmony in mind. And the last model is at the lower left-hand side. It is a version of the third model on the lower right-hand side. The name for this model is called the crab and frog motion model. In other words, a dialectician would make sideways moves like a crab and leap like a frog from this crab and frog motion model to that crab and frog motion model. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 is the safe zone spectrum, whereas A, B, C, D, and E, the danger zone spectrum. A dialectician may stand under 1, which refers to a concept and which is translated as 100%. Three would be 50% and 5, 1%. The same logic applies to E, which is 100%, C, 50%, and A, 1%. A dialectician would refrain from entering the latter zone. Creatively, the dialectician can build a new model out of 5 and A, treating 5 as 1 and A, still E.

If a reader already has a firm grasp of the previous paragraph, he or she would realize that a dialectical/crab and frog motion remark is just the opposite of a non-dialectical/crab and frog motion (usually deductive, linear, or cause and effect) remark, or, at best, they must meet halfway.



According to one account, the person who drew the TaiJiTū diagram may well be CHEN Tuan, who has been regarded as a legendary Daoist sage. He was born

around the end of the **five dynasties and ten kingdoms period** (907 AD–960 AD) and the start of the **Song dynasty** (960 AD–1279 AD).<sup>84</sup>

Just as my one-dot theory is derived from TaiJiTu, CHEN derived his diagram from the following well-known Chinese philosophers, LaoZi, KongZi, MengZi, ZhuangZi, XunZi, MoZi, HanFei(Zi), etc., by way of simplifying or compressing their writings. In other words, the Daoist integrated core concepts out of those philosophers. There is no problem for me to describe, explain, and infer the One China principle in terms of what I wrote in this paragraph. Let me elaborate.

Facing the dilemma of having to handle Two Chinas, One China, One Taiwan, or Taiwan independence, Beijing's dialectical One China principle can be said as having surfaced a few months before the signing of a mutual defense treaty between Washington and Taipei in December 1954.

However, CHIANG Kai-shek passed away in April 1975, while MAO Zedong died in September 1976. When they were around, we can first regard the square/circle on the upper left-hand side as the ROC, which was created in January 1912.

In October 1949, the PRC was established. Hence, we have to shift to the model on the upper right-hand side. Here, we must mention XunZi.

XunZi is noted for having uttered 1 and 2 or 1 evolves into 2 and, later, 2 folded or collapsed into 1 again. Differently put, XunZi's 1 (which is a version of the pure square/circle or either *yin* or *yang*) and 2 (which is a version of *yin* versus *yang*, *yang* versus *yin*, *yin* and *yang*, or *yang* and *yin*) can be reflected from the first and second small diagrams plus his WanBianBuLiQiZong/many superficial changes but no departure from the original stand.

Applying XunZi, from the CHIANG perspective, ROC is *yin* and PRC, *yang*. And, from the MAO perspective, PRC is *yin* and ROC, *yang*. In short, they were struggling against each other, with no end in sight. At this juncture, MoZi's writings become relevant.

*The Book of MoZi* (collected writings of those in the tradition of MoZi, some of which might have been written by MoZi himself) contains speculations in optics that are similarly strikingly original, such as the straight-line propagation of light.<sup>85</sup> Where can we find this discovery of light, which travels in a straight-line fashion in TaiJiTu?

It is not difficult to pinpoint it. We just have to look at the crab and frog motion model in the lower left-hand side. CHIANG is known for his staunch stance: HanZeibuLiangLi/gentlemen and thieves cannot coexist/both cannot coexist under TianXia/heaven, while MAO was equally stubborn, who vowed to liberate the Taiwan area by all ways and means. In other words, we can put, from the CHIANG perspective, CHIANG at 1 from time/space (1) to the last time/space or (n) and MAO, E. The same logic applies to MAO: From the MAO perspective, MAO was at

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<sup>84</sup>On January 23, 2015, I had an opportunity to talk to another living Buddha, HUANG QiuFang. I asked her what did I do in my previous life? She replied, saying I was a WenGuan/official in the civil service of the Song dynasty and I had helped many people. I forgot to ask her whether this was my previous life or a life even earlier.

<sup>85</sup><https://light2015blog.org/2015/02/18/optics-in-ancient-china/>, accessed on February 7, 2017.

1 from time/space (1) to time/space (n) and CHIANG, E. In short, none of them deviated from their original stance or shifted to 2, 3, 4, or 5, when China was politically divided in December 1949.

However, a qualitative and/or quantitative change can take place at a nodal point. LaoZi is well known for what he said, that is, WuJiBiFan/when things reach an extreme, they can only move in the opposite direction.

Indeed, at the Third Plenum of the 11th Congress of the CPC, we began to see the emergence of the harmonious dimension of the One China principle, similar to Confucius' middle way. To reiterate, DENG stuck to ZhuangZi's *YuShiJuHua/YuShiJuJin*/abreast of modern developments, by keeping up with the times,<sup>86</sup> as reflected in the time/space component of the crab and frog motion model, thereby choosing the harmonious dimension of the One China principle. Should dialectical 2, namely, ROC and PRC, become 1 again, MengZi's *CiYiShiYe*, *BiYiShiYe*/this is now, and that was then<sup>87</sup> will be applicable to describe and explain the new development.

When XI Jinping received LIAN Zhan, who was the then honorary party chairman of the Nationalist Party of China/GuoMinDang in Beijing in February 2014, he said LiangAnYiJiaQing/people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) are all of one family. The five-Chinese-character phrase is similar to what Confucius stressed, to wit, the middle way, with HeXie/harmony in mind. Where can we see it? It is reflected in “*yang in yin*” and “*yin in yang*.” In other words, Beijing being at 5, in the crab and frog motion model, which refers to 1% of the PRC, has begun to accept 99% of the ROC, at least ideologically. If Taipei is also at A, it would mean even greater harmony, because it is embracing 99% of the PRC. Such is the paradox.

Sadly, CAI YingWen is not fully aware of that. She at the May 2016 presidential inaugural speech uttered the ROC four times, while Taiwan, 41 times. When she mentioned the ROC, she was basically referring to MA Ying-jeou's ROC (Taiwan), which is equivalent to her jargon, the status quo, and which is also positioned at 5 in MA's ROC versus PRC model. However, Taiwan is placed at 3 in CAI's crab and frog motion model: Republic of Taiwan at 1; Taiwan Guo/Taiwan nation, country, or state, 2; Taiwan, 3; Chinese Taipei, 4; and the status quo or ROC (Taiwan), 5.

If readers still have not figured out CAI's logic, I can rephrase what I said: When she was standing at 5, she is, like MA, equivalent to accepting 99% of the PRC, because 5 only stands for 1% of ROC. Ninety-nine percent of this China +1% of that China = One China. However, when CAI shifted to Taiwan or 3 in her ROT, Taiwan

<sup>86</sup>ZHUANGZi lived around the fourth century before the common era (BCE) during the [Warring States Period](#). He put forward the phrase *YuShiJuHua*. The Chinese communists changed the last Chinese character to read *jin*. LIU WenDian was the secretary of Dr. SUN Yat-sen. He studied ZHUANGZi's philosophy. He said there are only 2.5 people in the world who understand the philosophy. One is him. The other is ZHUANGZi himself. And the third one who understood only 50% is a Japanese. See <http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/%E8%8F%AF%E5%BA%9C%E7%9C%8B%E5%A4%A9%E4%B8%8B%EF%BC%8D%E5%8A%89%E6%96%87%E5%85%B8%E8%B8%A2%E4%B8%AD%E8%94%A3%E4%BB%8B%E7%9F%B3LP-20130719000999-260109>, accessed on July 19, 2013.

<sup>87</sup><http://tw.knowledge.yahoo.com>, accessed on November 5, 2012.

Guo, Taiwan, Chinese Taipei, The Status Quo versus PRC model, her distance is farther away from the PRC, which is still positioned at E, and that is why XI was very concerned, for example, in March 2015, ominously warning “ShanDongDiYao/ the earth will move and the mountains will shake,” should the new president in the Taiwan area does not accept the November 1992 consensus.

To sum up, three observations are in order. First, if CHEN, the ancient Daoist, were alive today, he should be able to receive numerous Nobel Prizes, in addition to the TANG Prize in sinology. The TaiJiTu definitely is more sophisticated and can be more rigorously tested than other theories developed in the West, such as game theory, rational (choice) theory, etc. Second, the kind of harmony I am referring to is at the macro-level. It is usually not possible at the microlevel, especially at the individual level, whereby we often see debates, games, and fights among human beings. Last but not least, does the American new president understand the One China principle, as described, explained, and inferred above? It is very doubtful, although Donald J. Trump for the first time on February 9, 2017, in the evening had a lengthy telephone conversation with XI Jinping, assuring the latter that he would honor the “One China” [sic] policy. What about Trump’s advisors, such as General “Mad Dog” James N. Mattis and Steve Bannon? I doubted very much, too. This calls for grave concern, because distortion of your counterpart’s logic can be easily translated as undesirable consequence.

II. PRC versus ROC. First, readers should familiar himself or herself with the Beijing versus Taipei chart, which was first constructed in October 2000. When I showed it to a division head of the MAC in Taipei, he was surprised, adding that in his 10-year service at that government agency, which was established in January 1991, he has never seen any academic or expert presenting a similar chart.<sup>88</sup> Please refer to the first few pages of this chapter. Let me elaborate on the chart.

1 We should first understand that the CPC adopts a world view of historical materialism, which should be understood dialectically. The party believes that what you see will necessarily and directly affect your words and deeds. For example, strolling on a street, you see an envelope containing US\$800. After picking it up, you will ponder what to do next. In the chart, we see the middle way, that is, dialectical politics at 5, which is in between or a hybrid of rule of law politics/government by law or 1 and rule of men (or personality) politics, which is RenZhi in Mandarin Chinese. In this context, you may want to wait at the same place for a while, hoping that the person whoever lost the money would come forward to get it back. After waiting for few hours, you may report it to a police station, reflecting your compliance with the rule of law politics/government by law or 1.

Government by law is a Chinese communist term which is equivalent to rule of law politics in the West. Because the CPC wants to keep a distance from the political

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<sup>88</sup> Later, he presented the chart to CAI YingWen, who later wrote a letter, thanking me. He is still working for CAI after May 2016, in the central government.



party system in the West, it coined the term government by law. The same logic applies to the term legal system, which is equivalent to rule by law in the West.

The CPC could be under the legal system. For example, during the Maoist era, the party was the only powerful one. It can dictate the National People's Congress (NPC) to pass laws, which are favorable to it. All eight paraphernalia or window-dressing parties must stick to all those laws. Otherwise, they will not be able to receive funding to carry out activities.

When the CPC becomes more liberal, that is, when it chooses to listen and accept some proposals put forward by the paraphernalia and integrate them into law proposals, such proposals become part of the government by law, if passed by the NPC. In other words, all the parties in the Chinese mainland must adhere and comply with the government by law.

Differences indeed exist between rule of law politics and rule by law politics in the West. Usually, a ruling political party, which could be a coalition of two or more parties, in, for example, the US Congress, passes a series of laws, which would be at least 51% favorable to it. Just as the majority party in the West wants to maintain its ruling power status for as long as possible, the CPC, perceiving that only it can bring the Chinese people at least to the primary or initial stage of communism, according to what Karl H. Marx had preached, has the same sacred mission. However, under rule of law politics, no matter which political party is in power or whether leadership has been changed, all the parties must comply with the existing laws.

The political system in the Chinese mainland has been evolving. The CPC can be said as being totalitarian from October 1949 up to the Third Plenum of the 11th National Congress in December 1978, emphasizing the party's work and the attention of the people of the whole country to socialist modernization. That is to say, from the late 1970s up to now, the political system of the Chinese mainland is authoritarian, meaning politically the ruling party still tries to firmly hold on to power, while, economically, it encourages common people to be more wealthy.

More and more Chinese mainlanders must comply with government by law. This means that government officials and party members, who are not in charge of matters related to money, can still play what I called dialectical politics, which is a hybrid of rule of law politics/government by law and rule of men politics, the latter of which means that a paramount leader can make decisions by himself or herself, without having to consult others.

In September 1997, at the 15th National Congress, JIANG Zemin, for the first time, mentioned YiFaZhiGuo/law-based governance of the country,<sup>89</sup> in his political report. In June 2000, for the first time, and later in January 2001, he put forward the concept YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue, which must be dialectically and strategically tied to YiFaZhiGuo//law-based governance of the country.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>89</sup>In December 2012, no long after becoming the general-secretary of the CPC, XI Jinping said YiFaZhiGuo's foremost priority is YiXianZhiGuo/constitution-based governance of the country, to be followed by YiFaZhiZheng.

<sup>90</sup><http://theory.people.com.cn/BIG5/49150/49152/4826061.html> and <http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JXSH200203032.htm>, accessed on September 28, 2016.



JIANG Zemin was very proud of advancing the term YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue, because this tied to what the party has been promoting, to wit, socialism with *Chinese* characteristics, meaning socialism adapted to contemporary Chinese conditions, while reminding the common people that the Chinese mainland is still in the primary or initial stage of socialism. For this reason, the party does not have to change its name. As early as October 1938, MAO Zedong, acknowledging that China is not peopled by workers but peasants, said the CPC must MaLieZhuYiZhongGuoHua/convert Marxism and Leninism into the Chinese conditions. In other words, modern China should not blindly accept what Karl H. Marx et al. had theoretically said and written, treating them as doctrines, which can be applied everywhere. Rather, MAO Zedong pointed out what Marx and others said and wrote should be the guidelines for actions of the CPC.<sup>91</sup>

To be sure, JIANG Zemin is the very first communist in the world, who integrated the concept YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue, which is uniquely Chinese, in the communist movement worldwide or when we look at the communism versus primitive communism model. However, to be fair to the ancient Chinese, what JIANG Zemin said, actually, can be traced back to their writings. Ban Chao, who was a general, explorer, and diplomat of the [Eastern Han dynasty](#), wrote that rulers should YiDeFuRen/win people by virtue/overcome people by virtue/compel submission by kindness or generosity.<sup>92</sup> In Chap. 36 of *Confucian Analects*, as translated by James Legge in the late nineteenth century, we see the following passage: Good is not to be returned for evil; evil to be met simply with justice. (1) Someone said, “What do you say concerning the principle that injury should be recompensed with kindness?” (2) The Master said, “With what then will you recompense kindness?” (3) “Recompense injury with justice, and recompense kindness with kindness.”

In the West, virtue and morality usually do not carry much weight, and they can be sidelined or dismissed, when there is a conflict of interests. This kind of value judgment can be exemplified by Francis Yoshihiro Fukuyama’s well-known book, *The End of History and the Last Man*,<sup>93</sup> the shorter version of which was first published in summer 1989, that is, before the demise of the former Soviet Union. Fukuyama’s view is typically Western, although his ancestors were from Japan, a country which has embraced, for example, Confucianism. In the shorter version, a question mark was placed after the article title, *The End of History?* In other words, he was not 100% sure about human development. In the summer 1989 article, he argued that “[w]hat we may be witnessing is not just the end of the [Cold War](#), or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western [liberal democracy](#) as the final form of human government.”<sup>94</sup> Later in 2002, the author conceded in

<sup>91</sup> <http://theory.people.com.cn/BIG5/49157/18163941.html>, accessed on September 28, 2016.

<sup>92</sup> <http://www.ichacha.net/%E4%BB%A5%E5%BE%B7%E6%9C%8D%E4%BA%BA.html>, accessed on September 28, 2016.

<sup>93</sup> (New York: Free Press, 1992).

<sup>94</sup> <http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm>, accessed on September 28, 2016.

*Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution* that his original thesis was incomplete, that is, he should have said that there can be no end of history without an end of biotechnology revolution, as the subtitle indicates. In any case, to the ancient Chinese and the Chinese communists, YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue will ultimately triumph or prevail over Fukuyama treasured, that is, freedom, rule of law, market, and technology. According to my mentor, Hsiung, the Chinese culture will prevail at the end, because since small we were taught about Qing and Yi/ties of friendship/ties of comradeship/justice/righteousness.<sup>95</sup>

At least in pockets of ancient China, YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue was practiced, can we the human beings expand the practice all over the world, even if it may take 1 million years for us to achieve it? This possibility certainly cannot be ruled out. The number of people on Earth can be reduced to one million. What if they can enjoy and share the best quality of life on Earth? In the year 2025 or 2030, some human beings will flock to Mars. Would their life be communist or international regime-oriented? Thus, when JIANG Zemin in his political report mentioned YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue, the previous model, to wit, rule of law politics/government by law, 1; rule by law politics/legal system, 3; and dialectical politics, 5, versus non-rule of law politics/government by law, 1; rule by law politics/legal system, 3; and dialectical politics, 5, was transformed into the following new model: YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue at 1; rule of law politics/government by law, 3; and rule by law politics/legal system, 5, versus non-YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue at 1; rule of law politics/government by law, 3; and rule by law politics/legal system, 5. In other words, dialectical politics, which is 5 in the safe zone of the old model, will become A in the danger zone in the new model. This is definitely a dramatic change. However, when JIANG Zemin finished mentioning YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue in the new model, he leaped back to the old model, that is, rule of law politics/government by law, 1; rule by law politics/legal system, 3; and dialectical politics, 5, versus non-rule of law politics/government by law, 1; rule by law politics/legal system, 3; and dialectical politics, 5, or, for short, rule of law politics/government by law versus rule of men politics. If he did not jump back to the old model, he would not be able to continue to play what I called dialectical politics. That is to say, all those five models as shown in the Beijing versus Taipei chart would have to be scrapped, because they will be dialectically in the danger zone. This point must be remembered by readers.

After having grasped the nodal points in the previous ten paragraphs, we can move on to first look at the ZhuLiuJingJiLuXian/mainstream economic line of the CPC. As a next step, the party would talk about GuoJia/nation, country, or state. The third step is YiShiXingTai/ideology. The next step is to focus on ZhengZhi/politics and the last one, military affairs. To be sure, politics and military affairs constitute the superstructure. The PRC has not changed a whit, since its founding. So, for the international society and international community, the CPC coined the term, for example, economic globalization, which, to them, is the mainstream economic line, at least in the foreseeable future.

<sup>95</sup><http://dict.site/%E6%83%85%E7%BE%A9.html>, accessed on January 28, 2017.

Second, we can see many nodal points, when we look at the COM versus CAP model in the same Beijing versus Taipei chart. COM stands for communism, while CAP is equivalent to capitalism. This model is Maoist. That is to say, MAO Zedong played dialectical games within this model. For Karl H. Marx and Marxists, it is COM versus primitive COM, which is the biggest crab and frog motion model. As for Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov and followers of Leninism, it is COM versus feudalism, which is the second biggest model, because Lenin was the first communist who overthrew the czarist system in feudal Russia.

MAO Zedong adopted socialism (SOC) or 5 in the COM versus CAP model in October 1949. To him, the SOC mainstream economic line is the middle way for the CPC. It is the first mainstream economic line. However, lacking experience to rule a country, the CPC tried to comply with Karl H. Marx's writings. It is called MaKeSiZhuYiZhongGuoHua/whatever Marx said we the Chinese follow. In the first few years, the Chinese mainland's performance in producing goods and services was considered good. The Chinese mainland people, on the wholes, were in high spirits.

New development took place in the latter half of 1957, when MAO Zedong began to deviate from (alternative) reality. He gradually shifted the original mainstream economic line to COM, and this is the second mainstream economic line. For example, in October 1957, MAO Zedong in an article mentioned YouHongYouZhuan/both red<sup>96</sup> and expert/be faithful to communism and well trained for a certain profession,<sup>97</sup> which is a term applied to intellectuals. Three possible models can be put forward: red at 1 and expert at 3 in the crab and frog motion mode, red vs. expert, and expert vs. red. As another example, in April 1958, we began to see the first RenMinGongSe/commune, which was created in SuiPing County, HeNan Province. However, Nikita S. Krushchev, for example, in July 1959, criticized the people's commune to foreign visitors.<sup>98</sup> What he wanted to say is that even the former Soviet Union dared not to practice communism, how can the PRC? In short, time is not ripe yet.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution prolonged the second mainstream economic line. After the death of MAO Zedong, the gang of four was arrested in October 1976.<sup>99</sup> This clique tried to oppose the original mainstream economic line and CAP. It also wrongly labeled DENG Xiaoping as a ZhongGuoDiErHaoZouZiBenZhuYiDangQuanPai/No. 2<sup>100</sup> capitalist roader in China. To straighten the record, DENG Xiaoping only accepted 50% of capitalism, that is, the good portion. What DENG did was taken the middle way, with HeXie/harmony in mind.

<sup>96</sup>Hong has to do with politics and zhuan, YeWu/expertise.

<sup>97</sup><http://www.wordreference.com/zhen/%E5%8F%88%E7%BA%A2%E5%8F%88%E4%B8%93>, accessed on September 21, 2016.

<sup>98</sup>[https://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2009\\_823-10g\\_Jersild.pdf](https://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2009_823-10g_Jersild.pdf), accessed on October 4, 2016.

<sup>99</sup>Marshall YE JianYing played a crucial role. At that time, HUA GuoFeng, who was MAO Zedong's successor, went along with YE's decision to arrest the gang of four. See <http://www.chinaitimes.com/realtimenews/20161004003128-260409>, accessed on October 5, 2016.

<sup>100</sup>The first one was LIU ShaoQi.

In July 1977, DENG Xiaoping returned to the center stage for the third time<sup>101</sup> and became the paramount leader of the PRC, until his death in February 1997. In July 1952, DENG assumed the posts of vice-premier and deputy chair of the Committee on Finance, and he worked under ZHOU Enlai, who was then the premier. DENG Xiaoping did not have the real power to shift the original mainstream economic line further closer to CAP. He believed that one cannot just shout slogans, if the Chinese mainland wants to economically develop into a modern country. He thinks that manufacturing goods and products is very important, and he chose not to side with the gang of four.

After July 1977, DENG Xiaoping tried to again shift the mainstream economic line by moving from COM to SOC. What he had in mind can be labeled as MaLieZhuYiZhongGuoHua/localize Marxism and Leninism into the Chinese conditions. This new mainstream economic line is the third one, and it is different from the original mainstream economic line.

Because SOC, which is an acronym for socialism, and, for that matter, COM can be practiced flexibly, there is no static model for practicing SOC.<sup>102</sup> In November 1979, DENG Xiaoping, for the first time, told American visitors that SOC can also have market economy, just as CAP has market economy. DENG Xiaoping was thinking about the term GongTongZhiFu/GongTongFuYu/all people will be able to possess wealth with no exploitation and there would be no gap in having wealth. To him, only by doing this can all the human beings enter into the highest stage of communism faster one day. So, DENG Xiaoping publicly pointed out that, since the second half of 1957, it was a mistake for MAO Zedong to move under 1, which stands for COM. Yet, DENG Xiaoping cannot scrap the Maoist model of COM versus CAP. If he does that, the logic of linking Marxism, Leninism, and MAO Zedong Thought would be lost or cannot flow smoothly. What he could do is to say that MAO Zedong had 70% achievements and 30% shortcomings throughout his career.<sup>103</sup> In order to make sure more party members can accept his new mainstream economic line, DENG paraphrased what his comrade, LIU BoCheng, who crossed the Huang He/Yellow River in June 1947 with him, in July 1962, said: It does not matter whether a cat is black or white, so long as it can catch mice. DENG Xiaoping also asked his party members to think whether or not XingSheHaiShiXingZi/which name to adopt: SOC or CAP? However, due to resistance by some CPC members who want to stick to COM, DENG could not smoothly practice the fourth mainstream economic line, that is, SOC versus CAP, with the socialist version of market economy at 5, which reflects the middle way, with HeXie/harmony in mind. As can be seen, DENG Xiaoping dared to leap out of the Maoist model of COM versus CAP for a period of time. It should be noted that DENG Xiaoping's model is even

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<sup>101</sup> The first downfall was in the early 1930s. The second time took place in the late 1960s. The third fall was in the year of 1976.

<sup>102</sup> YUAN GuiRen, *DangDaiZhongGuoDeWeiWuBianZhengFa/Contemporary China's Materialistic Dialectics* (in literal translation) (Beijing: ZhongGuoQinNianChuBanShe, February 1995), pp. 78–81 and p. 88.

<sup>103</sup> SanQiKaiQueDianHeChengJi.

smaller than the Maoist model or the former is part of the latter. Needless to say, this latest mainstream economic line may take at least several generations to march, as mentioned by JIANG Zemin at the 15th National Congress in September 1997.

In March 2007, when the WuQuanFa/property law was passed by the NPC, the CPC, in effect, jumped out of the SOC versus CAP model again by applying an even smaller model, that is, socialist version of ME (market economy) versus capitalist version of ME. As a result, the Chinese mainland's mainstream economic line has become even closer to CAP. This is because, in October 1949, a lot of private properties were nationalized or communized; how to justify the fact that the PRC citizens can own private properties, except land, again? In any case, the fact that membership in the CPC has been increased by leaps and bounds is due to the fact that those business people and entrepreneurs with socialist heart and practice are welcomed to join the party, so long as they do not exploit peasants and workers by giving wage as stipulated by law and providing, for example, medical care and benefits to their employees.

As can be seen, the CPC will first figure out what the mainstream economic line is. After that, they will talk about the superstructure like GuoJia/nation, country, or state, which is related to, for example, the national title, to be followed by ideology, politics, and military. In October 1949, MAO Zedong and his supporters chose the PRC. This national title is equivalent to the COM and SOC spectrum in the safe zone. So long as the mainstream economic line is SOC, the national title of PRC can be maintained. What about SOC and market economy as a spectrum in the safe zone? For SOC or 1, it is still the PRC. For this reason, CHEN Yun, who was an elder party member and who put forward the theory of caging the bird, said it is not necessary for the CPC to change its name, because communists are also responsible for building socialism. As to ME, it can be changed to something else. So, DENG Xiaoping put forward one, and the Chinese characters for that one was ZhongHuaGongHeGuo. Translated, it is the ROC in English, which is exactly the same as the ROC in the Taiwan area since January 1, 1912. For that reason, DENG Xiaoping scrapped that version. Later, the CPC decided on a simple and straightforward national title, that is, China. So, it would divide mainland China into four parts, NeiDi/Chinese mainland; XiangGang, China; AoMen, China; and Taiwan, China. Beijing leaders can also make further concessions by saying just as mainland China is part of China, so is Taiwan. In a nutshell, the national title can be flexible.

From October 1949 to the late 1970s, the PRC definitely wants to eliminate the ROC from our planet. In its eyes, the ROC is already history. If one sees the national title and the ROC flag in television programs, the CPC is treating it as a thing of the past. However, because, as early as the Third Plenum of the 11th National Congress of the CPC in December 1978, DENG Xiaoping perceived that the mainstream economic line eventually will be shifted from the third one to the new one, to wit, from COM and SOC to SOC and ME, the CPC can tolerate the existence of the ROC for a period of time, until one day the party would chart a new mainstream economic line again by moving back from SOC and ME to COM and SOC, which would be in the second stage.

If the superstructure of SOC is PRC, the superstructure of ME can be ROC in the SOC versus CAP model, signifying a return to the KMT rule under SanMinZhuYi/

Three Principles of the People before October 1949. To be sure, from the Chinese communist perspective, SanMinZhuYi/Three Principles of the People can be new and old, and it is toeing the new version, while CHIANG Kai-shek and his followers are old. A non-dialectician would be definitely confused. However, Beijing is willing to make further concessions by willingness to accept the middle way, that is, in between the superstructure of PRC and the superstructure of ROC, it would be the superstructure of simply China. Since establishing diplomatic relations with the United States on January 1, 1979, the PRC has been referred to itself simply as China, in the international society or community. In the UN, the seat is simply called China. Once Taipei accepts China, it becomes part of China, to a third party, such as the United States and Japan. This kind of arrangement is what HONG XiuJu, KMT chairwomen from March 2016, has been referring to, that is to say, YiZhongTongBiao/both the Taiwan area and the Chinese mainland can be called China, respectively. As a next step, Beijing would practice “One Country, Three Systems,” if Taipei leaders do not understand the CPC dialectical logic.

Since July 1997 and December 1999, the PRC vis-à-vis XiangGang and AoMen has been practicing “One Country, Two Systems,”<sup>104</sup> respectively. Beijing is willing to give each one of them 50 years to adjust themselves to be part of the PRC political system. It is confident that it can succeed in doing so, given the size of those former colonies, which are dependent upon the Chinese mainland for daily necessities, such as vegetables and poultry. However, trust of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy began to be called into a big question in November 2016, when two elected pro-independence or pro-separatism lawmakers in XiangGang were disqualified by the Standing Committee of the NPC for failing to properly take the LEGCO oath of allegiance in October 2016.

As to the ROC, the PRC knows that it is harder. Thus, Beijing can practice “One Country, Three Systems” vis-à-vis Taipei. The PRC leaders have pledged that the latter can have its armed forces, independent judicial system, etc., that is, the kind of privileges that both XiangGang and AoMen do not enjoy after the reunification. In passing, it should be noted that, before and after the LEE Teng-hui era, Beijing refers to the ROC armed forces as YouJun/friendly forces. When the mainstream economic line goes back to the second stage of SOC, “One Country, Three Systems” will no longer be practiced, to be sure. The same thing speaks for YiGeZhongGuo, JiuErGongShi/One China, 92 consensus or its variation,<sup>105</sup> which is acceptable since November

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<sup>104</sup> This kind of arrangement can be traced back to the Qin dynasty of One Country, Two Systems and the Hand dynasty of One Country, Multisystems. The DENGist arrangement can also be referred to the systems between the Chinese mainland and XiZang/Tibet Autonomus Region before the fleeing the spiritual leader Dalai Lama in March 1959. Dialectically, it is called XU/virtual or window dressing. After July 1997, One Country, Two Systems is SHI/real or applied in XiangGang/Hong Kong.

<sup>105</sup> Inductively, according to WAN ZhiGuo of Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, four versions have been emerged: the original version; the one uttered by the incumbent mayor of Taipei; the JiaQiang/reinforced November 7, 2015 version between XI Jinping and MA Ying-jeou; and the LiangDuanBan/two phases version between the Communist Party of China and the ruling party in the Taiwan area since May 2016.



2016 for the sake of ending the stalemate between the CPC and the DPP, the latter of which argued that the November 1992 consensus was reached between the CPC and the KMT.

Needless to say, Beijing is not in favor of One Country, Multisystems, a synonym of which is the American version of federalism and the US political system. Therefore, that term is put in the danger zone, as shown in the fourth model in the Beijing versus Taipei chart.

Rationalizing all the five dialectical models or games in the Beijing versus Taipei is important, so that most CPC members would not be confused as to what to do when Beijing leaders instruct them from time to time. The fourth dialectical model or game in the Beijing versus Taipei chart has to do with one-party dictatorship versus multiparty system.

During the Cold War, which was perceived as inevitable by, for example, Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill at the closing of the World War II, there was a power struggle between the so-called Free World camp led by the United States and the communist camp championed by the former Soviet Union. Because of that, the former had to smear the term one-party dictatorship, especially the last word. On October 1, 2016, XiangGang government celebrated the national day of the PRC. Yet, the pan-democrats in the LEGCO called upon the CPC to scrap its one-party dictatorship.<sup>106</sup> What it really meant is that the CPC is doing things on behalf of common people in general and peasants and workers in particular, the latter of whom constitute the majority. To those who were liberated from the KMT or CHIANG Kai-shek yoke would appreciate what the CPC had done to them in October 1949. For example, many Chinese peasants would revere MAO Zedong as a Shen/god.

Certainly the CPC regards itself as in the safe zone spectrum. It would interpret multiparty system as a tool of the capitalists in capitalist countries, promoting their own interests. What is good to the capitalists is bad to peasants and workers. What boils down is the dialectical game of good versus bad.

There is one issue outstanding, that is, what to do with the status of nation, country, or state, since the CPC was created first, to be followed by country or state? There is no question that the status of the party is higher than the PRC. In this context, being a party secretary enjoys more respect and prestige than being a government official at the same level.

However, things have changed in the last few decades, and the CPC needs to rationalize the relationship between the party and the PRC again. That is to say, should the CPC continue to emphasize that it is above the nation, country, or state? Or should it say that the order has been reversed, to wit, the nation, country, or state comes first? There is an alternative. What about the two in parallel? However, this kind of arrangement still has not resolved a crucial problem, that is, which comes first at a national ceremony or function? In December 2014, XI Jinping emphasized SiGeQuanMian/Four Comprehensives/Four-pronged Comprehensive Strategy, and the last one is QuanMianCongYanZhiDang/comprehensively strictly govern the

<sup>106</sup> <http://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201610010051-1.aspx>, accessed on October 1, 2016.



party/comprehensively governing the party in a strict manner, which is the theme of the October 2016 6th Plenum of the 18th National Congress, which, for the first time, confirms XI Jinping as the core leader.<sup>107</sup> On January 1, 2016, the CPC officially began to practice a policy, stating that the party's discipline and rules would be stricter than the government's.<sup>108</sup> By implementing this new policy, XI Jinping wants to maintain the ruling power status of the CPC.

The party commands the gun versus the gun commands the party is the last important dialectical game. To be sure, the Chinese PLA is the last bastion of the PRC. If the former no longer supports the nation, country, or state, it would mean literally the end of the PRC.

By mid-2016, the CPC has some 88.8 million members. However, it is definitely not an easy task for any political parties to command and control the armed forces.<sup>109</sup> The latter, armed with lethal weapons of one kind or another, including (killer) (co-)robots, can conduct coup d'état, rebel, revolt, mutiny, etc., at any point in time, even though the then Chinese Defense Minister General LIANG GuangLie<sup>110</sup> told the 10th Shangri-La Dialogue on June 5, 2011, in the ROS that there is a big 20-year gap between the Chinese PLA and the US military in equipment, weapons, and systems.<sup>111</sup>

There are at least three theories to answer the question as posed in the topic: (1) The CPC is relying on Marxism-Leninism, which was adopted at the First National Congress of the Party; MAO Zedong Thought, which was adopted at the 7th National Congress; DENG Xiaoping Theory, which was adopted at the 15th National Congress; JIANG Zemin Important Theory or the important thought of Three Represents, which was adopted at the 16th National Congress; HU Jintao Scientific Outlook on Development, which was adopted at the 18th National Congress<sup>112</sup>; and XI Jinping's SiGeQuanMian/Four Comprehensives/Four-pronged Comprehensive Strategy, referring to comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society, comprehensively deepen reform, comprehensively govern the country according to the law, and comprehensively apply strictness in governing the party, power, charisma, transforming seven military regions on the last day of 2015 into five north, south,

<sup>107</sup> JIANG Zemin for the first time received the same designation after the June 1989 massacre.

<sup>108</sup> <http://udn.com/news/story/7331/1414828-%E4%B8%8D%E5%BE%97%E5%A6%84%E8%AD%B0-%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%B1%E6%9C%80%E5%9A%B4%E9%BB%A8%E7%B4%80%E4%B8%8A%E8%B7%AF>, accessed on September 29, 2016.

<sup>109</sup> For their dialectical close relationship, see my article, "The Dialectical Relationship of the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA," *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (August 2000), pp. 203–217 and especially the first chapter of my book, *Hu Jintao and the Ascendancy of China: A Dialectical Study* (Singapore; Marshall Cavendish International Academic Publishing, 2005).

<sup>110</sup> In public office from March 2008 to March 2013.

<sup>111</sup> <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6736116>, dated October 31, 2011.

<sup>112</sup> At the 18th National Congress held in November 2012, XI Jinping, who took the reins of power for the first time, confirmed the WuWeiYiTiZongTiBuJu/the congress theme is closely interlinked with the overall plan for promoting economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress in the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

east, west, and central ZhanQu/battle zones; and so on and so forth<sup>113</sup>; (2) as in the West, the Chinese communist leaders practice various military laws especially the March 1997 National Defense Law (NDL); and (3) the party foremost relies on the dialectical model of the party commands the gun versus the gun commands the party to command and control the active Chinese PLA personnel, which has been reduced to 2.3 million by December 31, 2005. The April 2013 white paper released by the State Council said, after reduction for ten times since the creation of the PRC, the total number of armed forces is still 2.3 million. However, marking the 70th anniversary of defeating Imperial Japan, XI Jinping on September 3, 2015, said the Chinese communist troops will be reduced to two million.

A theory must be able to describe, explain, and infer (or predict) more phenomena for a longer period of time in order for more academics and experts to appreciate and eventually accept it. The first theory could describe and explain the Chinese communist politico-military phenomena only up to February 1997, because MAO Zedong passed away in September 1976 and DENG Xiaoping, February 1997.

In this connection, there are some weaknesses in this theory. First, it is not possible for MAO Zedong or DENG Xiaoping to be immortal. Even though the Chinese PLA constantly and consistently brainwashes its officers and soldiers, new comers may have different feelings toward the two Chinese communist leaders. Many of them and their relatives and friends may still remember that some of MAO Zedong's erroneous or grave policies had led to the death of many people, especially during the disastrous Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which began from the months of May and August<sup>114</sup> 1966 up to October 1976. After coming back to the center stage for the third time in July 1977, DENG Xiaoping described MAO Zedong as having 70% achievements and 30% shortcomings. Although DENG Xiaoping was credited for opening up the Chinese mainland to the outside world, it was he who made the final decision to use the Chinese PLA to crack down on the student and civilian demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, resulting in heavy bloodshed. Witnessing that, many countries in the West conducted sanctions against the then Chinese mainland regime. For the record, on September 4, 1989, DENG Xiaoping tendered his resignation letter and recommended JIANG Zemin to take over the Central Military Commission (CMC) chairmanship at the 5th Plenum of the 13th National Congress of the CPC in November 1989.<sup>115</sup> Second, MAO Zedong or DENG Xiaoping can personally reward those military officers and soldiers if and when they see fit. There are many ways of going about it. If one performs well, he or she would serve in the CMC. One can also get a senior, prestigious command post in the military regions/battle zones, provincial military regions, NPC, etc. Arguably, the latter figures who benefited from the promotions would be, most likely, personally loyal to the two Chinese communist leaders.

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<sup>113</sup>The 19th National Congress of the CPC may adopt XI Jinping's YiGeZhongXin LiangGe JiBenDian. It is as important as Marxism-Leninism, etc. XI's differs from DENG Xiaoping's catchphrase, namely, YiGeZhongXin LiangGe JiBenDian./One Center, Two Basic Points.

<sup>114</sup>The 11th Plenum of the 8th National Congress of the CPC was held.

<sup>115</sup>See <http://www.chinareviewnews.com>, dated 2008-10-30 10:41:44. In October 2011, JIANG Zemin said he did not expect to be the successor. He was thinking of becoming a professor.

But, would the same officers and soldiers and, for that matter, their subordinates be personally loyal to HUA Guofeng, JIANG, Zemin, HU Jintao, and XI Jinping? There could be some of them. But, due to passage of time, the number should be zero by now.

Although military laws, which are structured dialectically, existed before the enactment of the NDL, such laws did not weigh heavily when MAO Zedong was around, because he was playing what I called dialectical politics, which is a mixture of both rule of men politics and rule of law politics/government by law (as opposed to rule by law politics/legal system) politics. To be sure, MAO Zedong once said that he would like to convert all the 600 million Chinese people as dialecticians, as mentioned earlier. DENG Xiaoping, on the other hand, after consolidating his political power in the late 1970s, equally enjoyed high respect among the senior and junior professional soldiers, and he was very popular among the common people. DENG Xiaoping can rule the Chinese PLA by slighting the military laws. But he knew that, after his death, not a single military figure can be as powerful, charismatic, and influential as MAO Zedong, if not himself as well, in the decades to come. Therefore, he must play safe by emphasizing law. It follows that, soon after JIANG Zemin became both the CMC chairman of the party in late 1989 and the PRC president in later months, he was instructed by DENG Xiaoping to draft and pass many laws related to military affairs. Such laws were publicized in *People's Liberation Daily* (PLD) and other publications to this day.

We must remember that, in March 1997, the party commands the gun was included in the NDL for the very first time. This inclusion has far reaching implications. On the one hand, it definitely means that the Chinese PLA will not be 100% nationalized.<sup>116</sup> On the other hand, non-party members can serve in the Chinese PLA and be promoted, so long as they observe the CPC commands the gun clause. They will, under the ZhuZhiYuanZhe/organizational principle of *MinZhuJiZhongZhi*/democratic centralism or centralism versus democracy, to be more precise, not be allowed to form their own cells within the troops.<sup>117</sup> Today, this author has heard of at least two retired ROC professional soldiers who are serving in the Chinese PLA.<sup>118</sup> In October 2012, a news report said an incumbent professional soldier of the ROC navy joined the CPC.<sup>119</sup> Although the NDL can be modified, the CPC commands the gun clause will remain intact, even when the NDL becomes nonexistent. In a word, the third

<sup>116</sup> *China Times* (hereinafter CT) (Taipei), April 20, 2007, p. A13.

<sup>117</sup> <http://www.chinareviewnews.com>, dated December 17, 2006.

<sup>118</sup> In October 2008, the Minister of National Defense in Taipei said retired military officials can talk to their counterpart in the mainland face to face. See *ibid.*, October 29, 2008, A.5. During the 8-year-long Anti-Japanese War (AW), there were native Taiwanese serving in the Red Army of the party. See *Jiefangjunbao* (hereinafter JFJB), July 1, 2005, p. 8. A Republic of China (ROC) police-woman (mistakenly) said her superior/*shangji* is the People's Republic of China (PRC), adding "*kebukeyi?*" when on duty, with pan-green camp protesters gathering along Ketagalan Boulevard shone. See *CT*, October 26, 2008, p.A5 and *Liberty Times* (hereinafter LT), October 26, 2008, p.A5. The 2015 calendar, which was printed by the National Defense Ministry (MOND) in Taipei, included a Chinese Communist professional soldier who died in May 1942 in the AW.

<sup>119</sup> <http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%BD%9B%E4%BC%8F%E6%96%BC%E4%B8%AD%E8%8F%AF%E6%B0%91%E5%9C%8B%E5%9C%8B%E8%BB%8D%E4%B8%AD%E7%9A%84%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%B1%E9%96%93%E8%AB%9C%E5%88%97%E8%A1%A8>, accessed on March 25, 2013.

theory still weighs heavier than the military laws or it is closer to (alternative) reality, for the simple fact not all the military officers can remember all the laws.

At least on three occasions, MAO Zedong and DENG Xiaoping were not around. These facts simply tell us that it is the dialectical framework, which is at work, ensuring that the Party can still command and control the Chinese PLA. First, right after the death of MAO Zedong in September 1976, no one was the chairman of the CMC of both the CPC and the PRC. To be sure, HUA Guofeng did not take over the Party and the PRC's CMC chairmanship until later in October, and YE Jianying's position in the CPC was lower than DENG Xiaoping's; (2) when DENG Xiaoping passed away in February 1997, the NDL was yet to be passed by the NPC. Out of respect for DENG Xiaoping, the party under JIANG Zemin did not ask the NPC to pass the NDL, although it had been already drafted, and (3) there is a gap between the time when HU Jintao of the CPC's CMC can legally take over the PRC's CMC chairmanship in March 2004 and when JIANG Zemin still held on to the same, last post at the national (as opposed to the party) level for several months when the NPC passed HU Jintao's appointment. XI Jinping can be said as being able to command and control the Chinese PLA by December 2015, when the five battle zones began their operation, because that is one way to weed out the undesirable, corrupt, high-ranking military officials. After the 18th National Congress, the CPC is very serious about getting rid of corrupted "LaoHu/tigers" and "CangYing/houseflies." In May 2016, to crack down on military corruption, the CMC, for the first time, assigned anti-graft inspectors to different theater commands and key military departments, where they would be accountable to top military authorities to assure independence when carrying out the task.

From the above discussion, arguably, it is the core dialectical framework of the CPC commands the gun versus the gun commands the CPC, which helped the party to control and guide the PRC armed forces, since the founding of the PRC, if not the Red Army as well. Although the CMC members may have heard of game theory; systems theory; rational (choice) theory; SWOT (which is an acronym for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis, which can help one to understand strengths and weaknesses as well as identify opportunities open to him or her and the threats that one faces; plan do check and act; and so on and so forth, their political language will remain dialectical. To this day, military officers still have to learn MAOist military dialectics. In other words, MAO Zedong and DENG Xiaoping also had to observe the model, although many, if not most, academics and experts in the West may think that the model was of secondary importance or even out of date. JIANG Zemin, HU Jintao, and XI Jinping in addition to their successors have to rely on the NDL and other military laws to shore up or to make sure that the dialectical model can work well.

Needless to say, in the last few decades, more military officers and soldiers had failed to observe or comply with the model as compared to the first few decades after the creation of the PRC. In the mid-1990s up to March 1999, a major-lieutenant, LIU Liankun, began to work for the ROC, providing the latter with valuable secret intelligence that the ballistic missiles lobbed into the waters off Gaoxiong

Port and Jilong Port, Taiwan Province, in March 1996, were unarmed.<sup>120</sup> Another example has to do with Lieutenant General WANG Shouye, who was involved in scandals, arrested in late 2005, and removed from office.<sup>121</sup> In December 2006, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.<sup>122</sup> The most recent example is related to General XU CaiHou, who was expelled from the CPC in June 2014 and who died of cancer in March 2015, without being really prosecuted. State media described his crimes as abuse of power, accepting bribes directly or via family members in exchange for promotions and advancing the self-interests of those close to him through the powers vested in his public office. Therefore, we see that they, being regarded as part of the gun commands the CPC spectrum, were tried by the military court, sent to jail, and put to death. Of course, some of them were guided to enter or reenter the party commands the gun spectrum. In passing, it should be noted that, in January 2006, *Xinhua*/New China News Agency reported that Beijing plans to audit more than 4000 military officers, and among them more than 100 will be army commanders or above, especially those taking charge of expenses, officers whom people complain about, etc. In the 10th 5-Year (2001–2005) Plan, the mainland audited 77,000 military institutions and projects and 7890 military officers, reaping economic benefits valued at 6.8 billion *yuan* (850 million American dollars). After the 18th National Congress, 45 senior corrupt military officials were brought to justice;<sup>123</sup> plus, in April 2016, General GUO BoXiong, who was a former vice-chairman of the CMC, was prosecuted for illegally receiving bribes, amounting to at least 80 million *yuan*. Three months later, he was guilty as charged and his military rank was stripped off. And, over the last 15 years or so, Beijing has been more transparent regarding their negative words and deeds. In October 2006, a division of the Chinese PLA has been criticized for its poor performance during the Quenshan-2006.<sup>124</sup> The division's faults were listed. For example, the attacking troops shot five missiles, but only two hit their intended targets. As another example, the commander of the attacking division postponed the attack three times, resulting in it being left in a vulnerable position for 50 min in front of the enemy lines. As a third example, the division requested firepower support; it did not give the precise timing and location.

In sum, since March 1997, it is still the party commands the gun—not JIANG Zemin, HU Jintao, XI Jinping, and their CMC successors nor military laws in general and the NDL in particular—which is reminding the CPC to command and control the Chinese communist armed forces. Needless to say, this dialectical model plus other related ones can be used to train foreign military forces, because there are still communists in Kingdom of Nepal (KON) and the ROP, for instance.

To conclude, the following point should be remembered—the party commands the gun versus the gun commands the party should be understood as follows: First, we can coin the term, as what MAO Zedong had done, the party commands the gun.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., November 15, 2007, p. A12 and December 1, 2007, p. A6.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., April 8, 2006, p. A13.

<sup>122</sup> See *Hua Daily News* (Sarawak, Malaysia), February 6, 2007, p. A31.

<sup>123</sup> BeiDaLaoHu.

<sup>124</sup> [http://english.people.com.cn//200610/19/eng20061019\\_313205.html](http://english.people.com.cn//200610/19/eng20061019_313205.html), dated October 19, 2006.

As a next step, we should think of non-the party commands the gun, and one synonym is the gun commands the party. In this connection, a few models may also have to be remembered by heart: the party commands the gun versus the gun commands the party and the party commands the gun as a dot in the NDL and vice versa.

### III. ROC versus PRC.

In January 1963, the then premier, ZHOU Enlai, inductively formulated the YiGangSiMu/One Program and Four Compendiums policy on how to handle the Taiwan area question. Before signing the December 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the ROC, Beijing, worried that Washington would create Two Chinas, unveiled its One China principle. LEE Kuan Yew passed away in March 2015. He was a keen political observer of local, regional, and world politics,<sup>125</sup> even though Thomas Phillip “Tip” O’Neill, Jr., was well known for what he said, that is, all politics is local.<sup>126</sup> In April 1993, LEE Kuan Yew perceived that, in the next 10 years, the ROC would be able to remain on an upper hand vis-à-vis the PRC. Indeed, if we discuss, explain, and infer from the CAI YingWen’s dialectical games to CHIANG Kai-shek game(s).

CAI YingWen<sup>127</sup> officially became the ROC president in May 2016. In her inaugural speech, she mentioned the ROC only four times, while Taiwan, 41 times.<sup>128</sup> Her justification was: So many people voted for her 5 months earlier. Her crab and frog motion model is as follows, as mentioned earlier: 1 is equivalent to the ROT; 2, Taiwan Guo/state; 3, Taiwan; 4, Chinese Taipei; and 5, WeiChiXianZhuang/maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait(s), which is a synonym for MA Ying-jeou’s the ROC (Taiwan), that is, the ROC is politically equivalent to the Taiwan area, which includes JinMen/Quemoy, Mazu, and Taiping Dao/Itu Aba Island.

Soon after, she visited military establishments, and she mentioned the ROC. That is to say, she was standing under 5. She went to the Republic of Panama (RP) in June 2016, and she referred to herself, in writing, as the Taiwan president, adding (ROC). In other words, she was looking at the spectrum of Taiwan, Chinese Taipei, and WeiChiXianZhuang/maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait(s). In September 2016, CAI YingWen held a meeting, sang the ROC national anthem, and bowed three times to the portrait of the ROC founding father, Dr. SUN Yat-sen. Needless to say, her enemy is still the PRC, which is put at E.

Earlier in July 2016, the ruling party, Democratic Progress Party (DDP), held its national congress. One delegate, for the first time, proposed to change the national

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<sup>125</sup> See his book, *One Man’s View of the World* (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2013). It is a summation of his understanding of geopolitics and global affairs as well as how the world might look like in 20 years. He also talked about death.

<sup>126</sup> See his book, with Gary Hymel, *All Politics Is Local: and Other Rules of the Game* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1993).

<sup>127</sup> In November 2016, LIAN ShengWen referred to her as ET, which is an acronym for English TSAI. YingWen is translated as English.

<sup>128</sup> On October 10, 2016, she mentioned the ROC 3 times and Taiwan, 19 times.



title of ROC to something else, for the sake of becoming a normal country in the international society and community.

CAI YingWen is definitely promoting de-China-ization or, in the words of Hsiung, expurgating anything Chinese or Chinese expurgation. One keen observer said that the United States is cultivating a new two-party system in the Taiwan area, that is, the DPP would struggle against the ShiDaiLiLiang/New Power Party as opposed to the KMT, which does not seem to be able to recuperate from its January 2016 electoral defeats.

CAI YingWen also made concessions to the PRC. For example, in the May 2016 inaugural speech, she called the PRC ZhongGuoDalu/mainland China or LuFang/the mainland side. As another example, she tried to continue to implement the 23 agreements with the Chinese mainland. However, she still has to find ways and means to deflect pressures from XI Jinping's Taiwan policy: (1) the JiChu/basis of formulating it, which has to do with RenZhi/perception and facts, and the term for it is called LiangAnYiJiaQing/people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) are all of one family, which was put forward in February 2014, when XI Jinping received LIAN Zhan in Beijing; and (2) the HeXinLiNian/the core idea of LiangAnMingYunGongTongTi/the same community of destiny for both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s), when XI Jinping told a group of visitors from the Taiwan area in September 2015.

To MA Ying-jeou, who became the ROC president in May 2008 and stepped down in May 2016, his crab and frog motion model is as follows: ROC (Taiwan) at 5; ROC (Taiwan + XiangGang), 4; ROC (Taiwan + XiangGang + AoMen), 3; ROC (Taiwan + XiangGang + AoMen + another place in the Chinese mainland), 2; and the entire China, 1. MA started from 5 at time/space sequence (1), emphasizing BuTongBuDuiBuWu/No (Chinese) Unification, No (Taiwan's de jure) Independence, and No Use of Force as well as WaiJiaoQiuBin/diplomatic truce. He tried to move to 4, if and when possible. Right after fulfilling his presidency in May 2016, he applied to attend a conference in XiangGang, although the CAI administration did not approve his application. Come to think of it, by moving to 4, 3, 2, and eventually 1, MA's distance between him and Beijing leaders, who have been put at E, in (alternative) reality, becomes greater or wider. In other words, should Beijing want to be closer to Taipei, it has to make concessions to the latter. When the Chinese mainland moves to D, its distance between both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) would be reduced. For example, Beijing in July 2009 began to treat PingTan Dao, a county in FuJian Province and a testing ground for cooperation between the two sides, as a comprehensive pilot zone, meaning that the zone would be administered by both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s).

It should be noted that we were only able to see publication on Kingdom WEI written by the Chinese mainland academics, when both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) can conduct direct shipping or commercial flight service in December 2008. We still remember Emperor QIN Shihuang (259 BC–210 BC) even up to this day. It was he who first reunified China more than 2000 years ago, except Kingdom WEI in



ZhongYuan/Central Plains and several remote areas,<sup>129</sup> even though by force. Why can we read that publication? This is due to the materializations of the three links between both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) in December 2008. On January 1, 1979, Beijing proposed the links of postal, commercial, and transportation. To Beijing, economic relations with the Taiwan area will eventually bring about political reunification between both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s). In November 2012, XI Jinping for the first time uttered the term, ZhongGuoMeng/China's Dream, referring to a reunified, prosperous Chinese nation. In September 2016, MA Ying-jeou, in a university lecture in Taipei, said, looking at Chinese history, we see that 70% of time China has been united.<sup>130</sup> Earlier in November 2015, he, for the first time, met XI Jinping in the ROS. This was a historic event since October 1945, as mentioned earlier.

CHEN Shui-bian also held a two-term presidency. In August 2002, he, borrowing from SHEN Fu Qiong, is well known for verbally uttering the YiBianYiGuo/One County on Each Side of the Taiwan Strait(s). His crab and frog motion model is similar to CAI YingWen's. He began at time/space sequence (1) by saying he is adopting a XinZhongJianLuXian/new middle way policy, that is, to him, the ROC is equivalent to 5 in the model. In his May 2000 inaugural speech, he mentioned ROC more than CAI YingWen. In the same speech, he said TaiWanZhanQiLai/Taiwan, Stand Up. Taiwan in the model is equivalent to 3. ROT stands for 1. Indeed, during his presidency, if one verbally advocates Taiwan's de jure independence, it is regarded as in the realm of freedom of speech. In short, CHEN Shui-bian tried to garner support from all quarters, especially during his first few years in the presidency, because never in the contemporary Chinese history do we see an opposition party successfully taking over the presidency. In the Chinese history, it may also be the very first peaceful, democratic transfer of presidential power. Needless to say, PRC, to CHEN Shui-bian, is placed at E.

LEE Teng-hui preceded CHEN Shui-bian. His presidency lasted from January 1988 to May 2000. He is still influential today. In summer 2016, he said he can live for another 5 years. At time/space sequence (1), he had to be extremely careful, because the KMT was peopled by ultraconservatives from mainland China, and the power was shared by high-ranking government officials and politicians, who can be more or less trusted by CHIANG Ching-kuo. So, LEE Teng-hui began at 1, which stands for the whole of ROC and 5 would be ROC = Taiwan area. After the March 1996 presidential election, he was emboldened to go to 5. The election may well be the very first direct one in the 10,000-year Chinese history, involving 23 million people. In other words, all the eligible voters can, without fear, cast a vote of his or

<sup>129</sup> <http://www.chinareviewnews.com>, dated 2009-08-25 09:49:57 and accessed on September 24, 2009. Between the North and the South Korea, they lost seven chances for the reunification: August 15, 1945; December 27, 1945; April 1948; June 25, 1950; April 19, 1960; July 4, 1972; and December 31, 1991. See <http://www.chinareviewnews.com>, dated 2009-10-15 00:44:38 and accessed on October 15, 2009.

<sup>130</sup> <http://www.chinatimes.com/news/papers/20160927000325-260102>, accessed on September 27, 2016.

her choice. The subsequent presidential elections can enable us to tell what is in the minds of voters. Each election is like a plebiscite, as opposed to referendum.

LEE Teng-hui, with the help of CAI YingWen and others, put forward the special state-to-state relations in September 1999. He thinks that what he had done can protect the Taiwan area. No really. This is because the jargon special state-to-state relations can be put at 5 in the ROC versus PRC model. As such, 5 means 1% of the ROC, while the remaining 99% actually refers to the PRC. As can be seen, the distance between 5 and E (i.e., PRC) is, ironically, shorter than that between 1 and E.

There is no question that CHIANG Ching-kuo has a greater China mind-set, even though his father suffered from another heart attack in July 1972. When Washington and Taipei signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, he realized that it was not possible for his country to return to the Chinese mainland, because the treaty itself was tantamount to a message signaling Taipei that it should give up its dream of recovering mainland China by force. During his presidency, he would still stand under 1, which refers to the whole of China. However, as his health began to deteriorate, he said, after having worked in the Taiwan area for 40 years, he is both a Chinese (at 1) and a Taiwanese (at 5), meaning he is at 3. When Washington in December 1978 officially announced that it would switch diplomatic relations from the ROC to the PRC, the younger CHIANG began to move to the right in the safe zone spectrum. For example, he proposed to have special government-to-government relationship with the United States after January 1, 1979. This proposal is definitely not 100% One China.

YAN JiaGan became the ROC president in April 1975. As a technocrat, he faithfully followed the elder CHIANG Kai-shek's line of unwaveringly One China. He also knew that his presidency was a temporary arrangement, because the younger CHIANG would eventually become his presidential successor.

As to CHIANG Kai-shek, his policy was HanZeiBuLiangLi/insurgent coexistence/a legitimate government does not coexist with rebels. In other words, he was always under 1, which refers to the whole of China or 100% ROC. He almost always believed that he can recover mainland China. Even knowing that the ROC would be expelled from the UN in October 1971, he chose not to hold on to the UN Assembly seat, as opposed to both the Assembly and Security Council seats.<sup>131</sup> Needless to say, CHIANG Kai-shek had always perceived that the American leaders have been consistently using those pro-de jure Taiwan independence activists to topple his government.<sup>132</sup>

<sup>131</sup> CHIANG Kai-shek held a very important ruling party meeting on November 17, 1971, and one of the participants, YANG XiKung, proposed a new national title, that is, ZhongHuaTaiwanGongHeGuo/the Chinese Republic of Taiwan. LEI Zheng earlier referred to the ROC as Free China and later proposed ZhongHuaTaiWanMinZhuGuo/the Democratic State of China-Taiwan. CHIANG jailed LEI. See <http://www.wufi.org.tw/%E8%AA%B0%E6%96%B7%E9%80%81%E4%BA%86%E4%B8%AD%E8%8F%AF%E6%B0%91%E5%9C%8B%EF%BC%9F/>, accessed on January 11, 2017.

<sup>132</sup> <http://www.msn.com/zh-tw/news/other/%E6%B1%AA%E6%B5%A9%E8%A7%80%E9%B%9E%E8%94%A3%E4%BB%8B%E7%9F%B3%E7%82%BA%E4%BB%80%E9%BA%BC%E6%80%95%E5%BD%AD%E6%98%8E%E6%95%8F%EF%BC%9F/ar-AAkLj5?li=BBwCXIn&ocid=mailsignout>, accessed on November 20, 2016. Many anti-CHIANG Kai-shek figures

In a nutshell, the ROC seems to be sooner or later listed as a “gone country,” because, as more and more youths, under the DPP’s de-sinifying program, regard themselves as Taiwanese, as opposed to Chinese, while activists of pro-Taiwan’s de jure independence are pushing toward Taiwan Guo/state or even the ROT. For this reason, CAI YingWen was reluctant to acknowledge the 1992 consensus, since becoming the president. She only acknowledged the 1992 HuiTanLiShi/meeting history on May 20, 2016, which is a synonym for 1992 CongShi/consensus, LiangJie/understanding, ShiShi/fact, HuiTan/meeting, JingSheng/spirit, and RenZhi/cognition. Actually, all those synonyms can be lined up in the safe zone spectrum of the crab and frog motion model, and Beijing is fully aware of that.

Beijing will meet those who resist Chinese reunification with the following models: PRC versus ROT, PRC versus Taiwan Guo/state, (military) attack versus non-(military) attack, etc. For the (military) attack versus non-(military) attack model, we should refer to the March 2005 FanFenLieFa/Anti-Secession Law, some clauses of which were derived from the US experience regarding secession, such as shown in *Texas v. White* in the nineteenth century.

IV. JinMen/Quemoy.<sup>133</sup> Three major crab and frog motion models could be mentioned at the outset. Politics versus economics is JinMen/Quemoy a county of Fujian Province or Taiwan area and JinMen/Quemoy as a ShiJianChangSuo/practicing place for the November 1992 consensus versus non-JinMen/Quemoy as a ShiJianChangSuo/practicing place for the November 1992 consensus.<sup>134</sup>

From the late 1940s up to November 1992, JinMen/Quemoy and, for that matter, Mazu were regarded as a bastion for recovering mainland China. At its height, there were some 80,000 troops in JinMen/Quemoy.<sup>135</sup> For propaganda purpose, the num-

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wanted to assassinate him. For example, since April 1927, WANG YaQiao attempted to assassinate CHIANG three times. In February 1936, WANG was killed by DAI Li’s subordinates. MAO RenFeng was a classmate of DAI. In July 1944, Adolf Hitler survived another assassination plots. It was one of the 40+ attempts. In November 2016, Raúl Casro passed away. According to his own count, he faced 634 assassination attempts. See <http://udn.com/news/story/6947/2147735-%E8%87%AA%E7%A8%B1%E8%BA%B2%E9%81%8E634%E6%AC%A1%E6%9A%97%E6%AE%BA-%E5%86%B7%E6%88%B0%E6%A0%B8%E5%BF%83%E4%BA%BA%E7%89%A9%E5%8D%A1%E6%96%AF%E6%A5%9A%E9%9B%A2%E4%B8%96>, accessed on December 7, 2016.

<sup>133</sup> JinMenXue/JinMenology/noted school of thought can be defined as a dot, because it is a concept, just as China is a concept. For the latest publication on JinMen County, as opposed to HaiNanology, see CHEN C. T., ed., *JinMenXueGaiLun* (Introduction to JinMenology) (Taipei: TungHua Book, Ltd., January 2017). While the author of the first chapter, YANG ShuQing, mentioned terms like theoretical framework, methodology, and LiLunTiXi/a system of theories on pages 3 and 6, the book did not apply them.

<sup>134</sup> This remark was made by the JinMen/Quemoy County Magistrate, CHEN FuHai, in October 2016. See <http://www.CRNTT.com> 2016-10-04 17:05:06, accessed on October 7, 2016.

<sup>135</sup> In October 1949, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ordered more than 9,000 troops to land on JinMen/Quemoy. See, for example, XIAO HongMing et al., *JinMenZhanYiJiShiBenMou/The JinMen Battle from the Beginning to the End* (Beijing; ZhongGuoQingNianChuBanShe, January 2016).

ber was inflated to 100,000. Indeed, many ROC citizens were fooled or misled to believe that JinMen/Quemoy is a lighthouse for recovering mainland China. After working at National Quemoy University did I realize that almost all the daily necessities had to be transported from Taiwan Province to JinMen/Quemoy, even today. That is to say, the Chinese PLA just has to cut the supplies off in the middle line of the Taiwan Strait, as opposed to Strait(s), and that would mean almost the end of JinMen/Quemoy.

If the relationship between JinMen/Quemoy and XiaMen/Amoy Special Economic Zone, which was established in June 1980, can be maintained in a good manner, it will affect the Taiwan Province. If it is the other way around, more and more people of the Taiwan Province will distance themselves from the Chinese mainland. If a bridge or a tunnel can be built linking JinMen/Quemoy and XiaMen/Amoy, the economic relationship would be closer between those two islands. However, the DPP is still worried that, one day, the Chinese PLA's 31st JiTuanJun/Group Army/Combined Corps, which became part of the DongBuZhanQu/Eastern Theater Command since February 2016, could use the bridge or the tunnel to liberate JinMen/Quemoy at either QingYu or XiYuan of JinSha Township, connecting XiaMen/Amoy's new XiangAn International Airport at DaDeng Island.<sup>136</sup> In sum, politically, the residents of JinMen/Quemoy would be with the central government in Taipei, and economically, it tries to be closer to XiaMen/Amoy.

V. The 2008 Summer Olympics torch relay.<sup>137</sup> It was run from March 24 to August 8 of that year, that is, prior to the ceremony of the [2008 Summer Olympics](#), with the theme of "One World, One Dream." In April 2007, Beijing announced its plans for the 137,000 km/85,000 miles relay, also known as "Journey of Harmony."

Pure sports should be apolitical, because the term, sport, means "[a]n activity involving physical exertion and skill in which an individual or team competes against another or others for entertainment."<sup>138</sup> After reading the following account, the following major crab and frog motion model should be adopted: Purely "[a]n activity involving physical exertion and skill in which an individual or team competes against another or others for entertainment" at 1 and non-purely "[a]n activity involving physical exertion and skill in which an individual or team competes against another or others for entertainment," 5, because the latter is unavoidable:

After being lit on March 24, 2008 at the birthplace of the Olympic Games, that is, the Olympia sanctuary, in the Republic of Greece, the torch first traveled to the [Panathinaiko Stadium](#) in Athens. After that, it arrived Beijing on March 31st.

From Beijing, the torch followed a route passing through several [continents](#). The Olympic torch visited cities along the [Silk Road](#), symbolizing ancient links between China and the rest of the world. In many cities along the North American and

<sup>136</sup> *Kinmen Daily News*, October 11, 2016, p. 7.

<sup>137</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008\\_Summer\\_Olympics\\_torch\\_relay](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Summer_Olympics_torch_relay), accessed on September 25, 2016.

<sup>138</sup> <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sport>, accessed on September 25, 2016.

European route, the international relay was protested by, for example, [Tibetan independence](#) activists and [animal rights](#) advocates, resulting in confrontations at locations here and there, forcing the path of the torch relay to be changed or shortened. The torch was extinguished by the PRC security officials several times during the Paris leg for security reasons. Needless to say, Beijing condemned them, for example, as having tarnished “the lofty Olympic spirit.” Large-scale counterprotests by pro-Beijing [overseas Chinese](#) became prevalent in later segments of the international torch relay. In San Francisco City, for example, the number of supporters was much more than the number of protesters. A couple of skirmishes between the protesters and supporters were reported in mass media. No major protests were visible in the Latin America, Africa, and Western Asia stops of the relay.

Because the PRC hosted the Olympic Games, it had to face another thorny issue, that is, how to handle the Taiwan Province question. Some facts may be first noted: (1) In February 2007, both Taipei and Beijing reached a consensus in writing on the stop. The planned route originally included a leg in [Taipei](#) between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)’s [HO Chi Minh City](#) and XiangGang, but there was disagreement in Beijing and Taipei over language used to describe whether it was an international or a domestic part of the route. (2) While the Olympic Committee of China and Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC) reached initial consensus on the approach, the government of the ROC under CHEN Shui-bian intervened, objecting that the arrangement is placing Taiwan on the same level as XiangGang and AoMen, because Beijing designated the Taiwan stop as “JingNeiGuanWai/in its domestic leg relay” and demanded an extra condition, saying the CTOC “is responsible for coordinating all relevant parties to not use any flag, emblem, or anthem other than those [described by the IOC] during the torch relay.” In other words, the relay should not enter or exit Taiwan Province via NeiDi/Chinese, XiangGang, or AoMen. Rather, it prefers to reverse the order, for example, from Taipei to Hanoi. (3) In August 2007, a consensus was reached in which the Chinese Taipei leg would be defined as JingWaiLuXian/an overseas city/overseas route/a city of an outside territory/part of China’s domestic route rather than in the international circuit. (4) In September 2007, the Beijing Organizing Committee for the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG)’s official website stated that the torch’s journey will take in five continents and 22 cities, including London, Paris, San Francisco, Canberra, and Mumbai, plus 31 provinces, cities, and autonomous regions in China. (5) The Beijing Organizing Committee attempted to continue negotiation, but further disputes arose over the [flag](#) or the [anthem](#) of the ROC along the 24 km route in Taiwan Province. By the midnight deadline for concluding the negotiation on September 21, 2007, both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) were unable to come to terms with the issues at stake. In the end, both of them decided to eliminate the Taipei leg. (6) On September 21, the IOC announced that “[t]he route will now have to go ahead without a stop in Chinese Taipei.” The ROC became the first country to decline or reject the relay in the IOC history.

Some questions can be posed: Do we regard Olympic Games as purely sports? Do we regard Olympic Games as purely politics? Do we regard Olympic Games as a mixture of (pure) politics and (pure) sports? Do we regard Olympic Games as a

mixture of (pure) sports and (pure) politics? How do we separate (pure) politics from (pure) sports? And, can we separate (pure) sports from (pure) politics?

The following models may be applied: pure sports versus pure politics; pure politics versus pure sports; and sports at 1, politics, 5, and non-“sports at 1, politics, 5” at E. Three would be a hybrid of sports and politics. The parties involved would constantly make sideways in the safe zone spectrum or jump from one model to another one, so as to rationalize their words and deeds, respectively.

VI. Expo 2010 Shanghai China. In May 2009, that is, before the May Expo 2010 Shanghai China, Beijing, with the Taiwan area in mind, publicized the following philosophical statement regarding the Taiwan Pavilion site, which can be derived from its perspective, “YiZhongGeBiao/Respective Interpretation of One China:”<sup>139</sup> “The location of the Taiwan Pavilion is a dot [sic] in Zone A, which hosts the China Pavilion and *national* [italics mine] pavilions for Asian countries except Southeast Asian ones. The China Pavilion is also a dot in Zone A.”

Decoded and deciphered, China Pavilion is a dot in itself at the national level. However, in the context of zone A, it is a partial dot. The same thing can be said of the Taiwan Pavilion. It is a dot but a partial dot in the context of China. So long as interactions take place between the China Pavilion, for example, at 1, and the Taiwan Pavilion, for example, at 5, from the very beginning, Beijing will not be worried that the two pavilions are not side by side to each other. This is because 3 reflects interactions or mixture. That is to say, the Chinese mainland visitors were inside the Taiwan Pavilion and vice versa. Besides, the exposition is not really related to politics. Even if petty politics is involved, Beijing can justify its words and deeds by saying they are at both 5 (which is equivalent to 1% of non-politics) and A (which is equivalent to 1% of politics) in the crab and frog motion model. By jumping out of 12345ABCDE, 5 becomes 100% non-politics and A, 100% politics. In a word, Beijing can always justify its dialectical moves.

VII. The Chinese U-Shaped Line in the SCS.

The U-shaped line in the SCS in general and Taiping Dao/Itu Aba Island in particular has been in the hands of the ROC since August 1945.<sup>140</sup> In December 1947, the ROC government, for the first time, publicized the following maritime boundary or 11-dashed line, which is borrowed from the Chinese land boundary marker and which later became popularly known as the U-shaped line: -(·)-(·)-(·)-(·)-(·)-(·)-(·)-(·)-(·)-(·)-(·).

In the September 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan, Tokyo in Article 2 renounced all right, title, and claim to the NanShaQunDao/Spratly Islands, which includes Taiping Dao/Itu Aba Island, and to the XiShaQunDao/Paracel Islands and in Article 10, all special rights and interests in China.

<sup>139</sup>To Taipei, it is the reverse: GeBiaoYiZhong/One China, Respective.

<sup>140</sup>See, for example, ZHANG WeiYi, *NanHaiZiYuanKaiFaYuZhuQuanWeiHu/Development of Resources in the South China Sea and Protection of Sovereignty* (in literal translation) (YongHe City, TaiBei County: PanShiTuShuGuanTuDiZiYuanYanJiuWeiYuanHui, December 1994).



In November 1949, the 11 lines were reduced to nine by the PRC government, and, in May 2009, Beijing submitted the same map to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS). And, in June 2014, we see a new, official PRC map, and the dashes were increased by one to ten.

Since the June 2000 international conference on the SCS, which was held in Oslo, more and more foreign critics, for example, at the Annual CSIS SCS Conference, which began in June 2011, have increasingly questioned the line, demanding both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) to offer a clear explanation.<sup>141</sup>

As a result of drawing the Chinese U-shaped line, China is entitled to 3 million km<sup>2</sup> of water territory, which would include about 2 million km<sup>2</sup> of sea area. If we treat the entire body of waters within this line as historic waters, and among one of the definitions is internal waters, there would be no logic problem, even though some critics in the West have labeled it as excessive or expansive.

Because many, if not most, countries do not have historic waters, the UNCLOS had ignored or neglected to mention it. However, the preamble of UNCLOS does have the following important wording for the States Parties to the Convention to observe, and the UN Secretariat does have the March 9, 1962, document, *Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays: Affirming* in that matters not regulated by this convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general or customary international law (italics in original).

Certain passages in the document do favor both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s): (1) on page 6, giving a definition for historic waters is not possible and (2), on page 12, juridical regime of historic waters or the notion that the regime of historic waters is an exceptional regime, which cannot be based on the general valid rules of general or customary international law.

Some law professors and legal experts may not buy the (colonial) term, historic waters, arguing that we are already in the twenty-first century, and, therefore, we should look forward. Here, the term nonhistoric waters comes in.

If we strictly look at the UNCLOS, we see the following legal terms: internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf. Certainly YongXingDao/Woody Island can have all of them. The same thing speaks for Taiping Dao/Itu Aba Island. The question remains: What about the remaining body of water? We can propose to treat the remaining body as maritime commons, a term for the first time designated for Asia, as mentioned by the then American Secretary of State, Hillary Diane Rodham Clinton, in July 2010.

Although she did not specifically mention the SCS, she certainly implies it. Since the United States does not recognize the Chinese sovereignty within the U-shaped line, Clinton can propose to treat the entire body of the SCS as commons, which has the international regimes dimension and the non-international regimes dimension, for the international maritime community. To be sure, maritime commons can be

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<sup>141</sup> See, for example, James T. Shen, *Political and Legal Implications of the Concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone as Applied to the Republic of China* (Taipei: Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation, January 1998), 60 pages.



shored up by armed forces of each country, so as to bring about common good to all parties concerned.

If the international community sides with the American proposal, something like the following privatization would inevitably surface: Mark J. Valencia in March 1994 proposed the multilateral Spratlys Development Authority (SDA) or in October 1995 with two others, Spratly Management Authority (SMA), in which, under a cooperative regime, the Chinese (communist) side can have a 51% share of the SDA, by first laying aside the historic claim to the SCS region.<sup>142</sup>

However, the Chinese (communist) side should take the initiative by surveying the entire body of waters in the SCS and treating the remaining body of waters, for example, as mentioned earlier as maritime commons (as opposed to Clinton's version). Needless to say, both Taipei and Beijing can individually or bilaterally utilize military, paramilitary, and coast guard forces in furtherance of their sovereignty.

In sum, a state and/or non-state entity in Taiwan area, the Chinese mainland, XiangGang, and/or AoMen should govern and manage the commons. If operated well, *all* the parties in the world can be benefited.

Nonetheless, in July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the ruling of *The ROP v. the PRC* rejected the Chinese U-shaped line in the SCS, although Beijing did not show up in the court and the PRC President XI JinPing said that his country will never accept any claim or action based on those awards. What they have been doing since August 2006 is relied on the usage of Fa/law, Li/sensible reasoning, Qing/sentiment. The first term can be put at 1; the second term, 3; and the third term, 5, and the Chinese (communists) would navigate within that spectrum.

At this juncture, we can apply the TaiJiTū or five (or 1 + 4) figures to describe, explain, and infer the SCS issues, as mentioned below.

As mentioned earlier, in July 2010, at the 17th Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") Regional Forum ("ARF"), which was held in the SRV, Hillary Diane Rodham Clinton tried to advance American interests and to "upgrade" the SCS into commons.<sup>143</sup> She announced that: "The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to *Asia's* maritime commons, and respect for international law in the [SCS]."<sup>144</sup> In January 2014, a US official for the first time challenged the Chinese U-shaped line in the SCS.<sup>145</sup> In the following month, Washington asked Taipei to define it,<sup>146</sup> because the term, "historic waters," is not

<sup>142</sup>Mark J. Valencia, "A Spratly Solution," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereinafter FEER), Vol. 157, No. 3(March31,1994),p.30and<http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/10/news/10iht-edmark.t.html?pagewanted=all>, accessed on October 14, 2011.

<sup>143</sup>Email from my mentor, James C. Hsiung, dated December 20, 2011.

<sup>144</sup>Associated Press (AFP), July 25, 2010, accessed on July 25, 2010. As of April 2015, the United States became the third largest producer of petroleum, after the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Russian Federation. [Emphasis added.]

<sup>145</sup>See my book, *Ocean Governance, Regimes, and the South China Sea Issues*, p. 153.

<sup>146</sup>*Ibid.* In March 2015, the Republic of China (ROC) president said it is unconstitutional to abandon the U-shaped line. See <http://news.cts.com.tw/crntt/politics/201503/201503251596691.html#.VRYHmbf919A>, accessed on March 28, 2015. In May 2015, he proposed the peace initiative in the

mentioned in the UNCLOS, yet. The Preamble of the UNCLOS provides that “[a] firming that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law.” It also mentioned the December 1970 resolution 2749 (XXV), which preceded the UNCLOS, meaning that we can use any published sources to defend or to document one’s position. To be sure, the term, “(global) maritime commons,” is the other matter, because nowhere in the UNCLOS can this term be found. So, is it legal and legitimate to utter such a term, which can be studied from the international regimes and non-international regimes dimensions, for the Asia-Pacific region, if not elsewhere?

In May 2015, testifying before the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, the then assistant secretary of State Daniel R. Russel said for nearly 70 years, the United States and its allies and partners have been trying to sustain an Asian maritime regime, based on international law.<sup>147</sup> Later in the same month, the then US Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, in the ROS mentioned the term, “international [dispute settlement] mechanisms,” in a speech referring to the SCS.<sup>148</sup> In the twenty-first century, there is still a group of countries possessing historic waters. Hence, the concept, historic waters qua exceptional regime, which can be further shored up by, e.g., a state property rights regime,<sup>149</sup> has continuing relevance in contemporary international law. In August 2014, my fifth, new explanation, interpretation, and meaning of everything within the U-shaped line were published in Chinese<sup>150</sup>: a double-insurance package of historic waters and nonhistoric waters.<sup>151</sup>

It differs from the four explanations, interpretations, and meanings below, which have been put forward by Taipei and/or Beijing, but it does not contradict with them: (1) boundary line (國界線), (2) historic waters (歷史性水域線), (3) historic rights of line (歷史性權利線), and (4) Chinese possession of the NanShaQunDao/Spratlys (島嶼歸屬線或島嶼範圍線).

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SCS. In July 2015, reportedly, the US government asked the ROC to abandon the dashed line. See <http://udn.com/news/story/6656/1078155>, dated July 25, 2015. In late July 2015, the presidential candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) said her party has not abandoned the NanSha sovereignty.

<sup>147</sup> In February 2014, he testified before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.

<sup>148</sup> <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-china-stop-throwing-elbows-south-china-sea/> accessed on September 18, 2016.

<sup>149</sup> See, for example, M. Mellett, et al. “Attainment of Ecosystem Based Governance in European Waters—a State Property Rights Regime Approach for Ireland,” *Marine Policy*, Vol. 35, No. 6 (December 2011), pp. 739–747.

<sup>150</sup> Peter Kien-hong YU, “FaLiShangZhanDeZhuJiaoDeNanHaiU-XingXian,” *ZhongGuoPingLun/China Review*, No. 200 (August 2014), pp. 53–55.

<sup>151</sup> 作為一個雙重保險包裹的歷史性水域與非歷史性水域線(等同於內水、領海、毗連區、專屬經濟海域和大陸架加上1982年前後所有的海洋法並未提到的 maritime commons [海(洋)事(務)公共(或者共同)疆域]的總和)/a double-insurance package of historic waters and “nonhistoric waters,” which is equivalent to the sum total of internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, plus a term not mentioned in all of the sea laws before and after 1982, maritime commons.

Dialectically, arranging all of the five would constitute what I called the “exceptional regime.” Adhering to what the UNCLOS Preamble said, this statement can be derived from the report of the UN the International Law Commission (ILC): “Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, including Historic Bay.”<sup>152</sup> We certainly can draw from this document the Chinese position since the HAN dynasty 2000 years ago, regarding the U-shaped line and, for that matter, (exceptional) internal waters, (exceptional) territorial waters, (exceptional) contiguous zone, (exceptional) exclusive economic zone (EEZ), (exceptional) (extended) continental shelf, and (exceptional) other sea areas/*QiTaHaiYu* currently still under the Beijing jurisdiction following the December 1999 Marine Environment Protection Law, respectively.

In the ILC’s 1962 report, we could once again remind readers that it is not possible to define the term, historic waters.<sup>153</sup> Another document of the UN regarding “historic bays” provides: “Historic rights are claimed... in respect of maritime areas,... such as the waters of archipelagos and the water area lying between an archipelago and the neighboring mainland... and other similar bodies of water. There is a *growing tendency* to describe these areas as ‘historic waters.’”<sup>154</sup>

In *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* case, the International Court of Justice adjudicated that: “Waters which are treated as internal waters but which would not have that character were it not for the existence of an historic title.”<sup>155</sup> The ILC’s 1962 report regards “historic waters” as an exceptional regime in *general or customary* international law or an exception to the general rules of *general or customary* international law.<sup>156</sup>

Xinyue ZHANG, project coordinator of the Institute for China-America Studies and research assistant with the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, in replying my question, said: “The most direct distance between Zengmu Ansha and Jinmu Jiao, the southern most base point for Hainan Island is more than 1600 [kilometers].” The coordinator added Beijing has not issued baselines for the Nansha Islands yet.<sup>157</sup> Internal waters in the U-shaped line are exceptional, because some

<sup>152</sup> Documents of the 14th session including the report of the Commission to the General Assembly, *reprinted in* [1962] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, UN Doc. A/CN.4/143, available at [http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc\\_1962\\_v2.pdf](http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1962_v2.pdf) (last visited on Sept. 16, 2016).

<sup>153</sup> *Supra* note 30, at 6.

<sup>154</sup> Historic Bays Memorandum by the Secretariat of the United Nations, Extract from the Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea vol. I (Preparatory Documents), UN A/CONF.13/1 (Sept. 30, 1957), at 2, *available at* [http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1958/docs/english/vol\\_I/4\\_A-CONF-13-1\\_PrepDocs\\_vol\\_I\\_e.pdf](http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1958/docs/english/vol_I/4_A-CONF-13-1_PrepDocs_vol_I_e.pdf)

<sup>155</sup> *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* (UK v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 130 (Dec. 18), available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/5/1809.pdf> (last visited on Sept. 16, 2016). See also Lowell B. Bautista, “Philippine Territorial Boundaries: Internal Tensions, Colonial Baggage, Ambivalent Conformity,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol.16, Issue 1 (December 2011), p. 36.

<sup>156</sup> *Supra* note 30, at 7, 10, and 12. See also Clive R. Symmons, *Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern Reappraisal* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008).

<sup>157</sup> Email from her, dated May 5, 2015. My student, CHIEN Tsung-yao, said when he was in the grade school, he read such a figure and it should be more than 1,600 nautical miles, dated June 1, 2015.

foreign academics and experts, such as Mark J. Valencia, say it is excessive. Regarding territorial waters, it is exceptional, because this regime does not really apply to, e.g., what the Chinese called ZhongShaQunDao/Macclesfield Islands, which is an elongated atoll consisting of many submerged or underwater geological features, such as shoal, bank, or patches.<sup>158</sup> Regarding contiguous zone, it is exceptional, because both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) may choose not to exercise the necessary control by installing artificial islands on the U-shaped line, so as to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws, and regulations within its territory or territorial sea. Regarding EEZ, it is exceptional, because the Chinese fishing vessels can catch fish anywhere within the U-shaped line, even if no Chinese lives on any one of the SCS islands within the U-shaped line.<sup>159</sup> Regarding (extended) continental shelf, it is exceptional, because, measured from the baselines of the Chinese mainland, the length of the U-shaped line is more than 200 or 350 nautical miles, i.e., all the natural resources in the seabed within the line can belong to both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s). And regarding other sea areas, it is exceptional, not only because we cannot find this term in the UNCLOS but also because portions of those areas qua historic waters could possibly become the maritime commons one day to be governed by Taipei and Beijing's private multinational or transnational corporations, which can, in turn, be protected by the armed forces of both Taipei and Beijing, including the latter's Rocket Force (formerly Second Artillery Corps).

At this juncture, I should show some crab and frog motion models, so as to reflect the Chinese dialectical mind and thinking. To be sure, the Chinese mind would leap like a frog from one model to another model and move sideways like a crab within a specific model, such as from 1 to 5, 5 to C, C to 3, 3 to 1, etc.

First, exceptional regime at 1 and non-exceptional regime at E. We must bear in mind that, if we maintain and sustain international regimes, the final result is common good for all of us. If the regime is at 1, it means that it is working 100%, while at 5, it means 1% or it is almost failing. In this connection, if this regime, which can be at 1, flashes in our mind and heart, we need mechanism(s), which can be put at 3, and measure(s), which can be placed at 5, so as to maintain and sustain this specific regime.

If adversary regimes can still be formed, maintained, and sustained,<sup>160</sup> we can challenge Russel's May 2015 remarks that Beijing's words and deeds are contradictory. Use of force could also constitute a regime within the U-shaped line on matters related to, e.g., preventive self-defense or use of force for humanitarian purposes.<sup>161</sup> So, there is nothing wrong for both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) to stick to the exceptional regime by staying at 1, which reflects 100%.

<sup>158</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macclesfield\\_Bank](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macclesfield_Bank), accessed on March 28, 2015.

<sup>159</sup> The term regime of islands, strictly speaking, comes and goes. It is in our mind and heart. In other words, if there is no one on a specific island, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) does not exist.

<sup>160</sup> See Chap. 8 of my 2015 book.

<sup>161</sup> Nicholas Tsagourias, "Necessity and the Use of Force: A Special Regime" in I. F. Dekker and E. Hey (eds.), *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law*, Volume 41 (2010), Chap. 2.

Out of those three regimes, I would build another crab and frog motion model and put the exceptional regime at 1, carrying the most weight; the use of force regime at 3; and the adversary regime, 5, carrying the least weight. Both Taipei and Beijing would move sideways in between 1 and 5 at any point in time.

Second, we can first still focus on the exceptional regime dimension of maritime commons. As such, the following model could be constructed: exceptional regime at 1, maritime commons at 5, and a hybrid of them would be 3.

This kind of arrangement can certainly resolve the December 2013 incident,<sup>162</sup> which is believed to be the first occasion involving an American surface warship, after World War II. In other words, Beijing and/or Taipei in future can first declare the maritime areas 1, 2, 3, etc. as maritime commons, to be governed by a private Chinese multinational or transnational corporation. Therefore, foreign entities must first respect the Chinese private property. For the record, in that incident nearby Hainan Province, a Chinese Navy vessel, escorting the Chinese first aircraft carrier, LiaoNing, which was carrying out scientific research, tests, and military drills, almost collided with a US navy guided missile cruiser, USS Cowpens, which justified itself as exercising freedom of navigation rights in international waters. They were both within what the Chinese call an inner defense layer, designated maritime area, or non-sail zone, which had been publicized through the official websites of the PRC Maritime Safety Administration and the Ministry of National Defense, or avoidance zone/exclusion zone, as foreign observers name it, having a circle [with a diameter](#) at least 60 miles across, spanning over 2800 mi<sup>2</sup>. And the coordination points for the lines drawn to demarcate the related prohibited waters are as follows<sup>163</sup>:

Maritime area 1: 18-25N/110-15E;  
18-25N/110-56.67E;  
17-45N/110-56.67E;  
17-45N/110-15E.

Maritime area 2:  
18-03.50N/109-23E;  
18-03.50N/109-55E;  
17-38.50N/109-55E;  
17-38.50N/109-23E.

Maritime area 3:  
18-50N/111-30E; 18-50N/111-56E;  
18-25N/111-56E;  
18-25N/111-30E.

Third, my explanation, interpretation, and meaning as mentioned above can be placed at 1. As to the first four, boundary line could be at 2; historic waters, 3; historic rights of line, 4; and Chinese possession of the NanShaQunDao/Spratly Islands, 5. At any point

<sup>162</sup> See Chap. 10 of my 2015 book.

<sup>163</sup> [http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2013-12/17/content\\_5694627.htm](http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2013-12/17/content_5694627.htm), accessed on September 18, 2016.

in time, the Chinese could look at all of them or just 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, or both 1 and 2, etc. Given this kind of dialectical arrangement, we would not see contradiction at each time/space sequence, because, at each point in time, the Chinese would just think of one number or alphabet.

Fourth, we can put historic waters at 1, carrying the most weight; (exceptional) internal waters, 2; (exceptional) territorial waters, 3; (exceptional) contiguous zone, 4; (exceptional) EEZ, 5; (exceptional) (extended) continental shelf, 6; and (exceptional) other sea areas, 7. In other words, E stands for non-(exceptional) internal waters, (exceptional) territorial waters, (exceptional) contiguous zone, (exceptional) EEZ, (exceptional) (extended) continental shelf, and (exceptional) other sea areas, carrying the least weight.

In sum, dialectically speaking, the Chinese have never been vague in what they say and do and they are not manufacturing (residual) sovereignty. It is non-Chinese, who choose not to be dialectical. As a result, misinterpretation, miscommunication, and misinformation inevitably surface, which calls for serious concern.

VIII. Vatican City State/The Holy See versus PRC as well as Vatican City State/The Holy See and PRC, since February 1981.<sup>164</sup> When the ROC government was ruling the Chinese mainland, there were many Catholics, Christians, Muslims, etc., besides Buddhists, Daoists, and so on and so forth. After the Chinese communist takeover, the CPC did not 100% forbid such religions. As early as July 1950, 40 representatives of Christianity for the first time made a declaration/XuanYan, Chinese Christianity Works for New China's Construction, saying their church activities would sever ties with imperialism, including Vatican City State/The Holy See.<sup>165</sup> From July 22 to August 6, 1954, the First National Conference on Christianity in China was held in Beijing. It was anti-imperialist, patriotic, and love under the premise of teaching. In short, it is pro-Beijing, and the Chinese characters for that are DiShangJiaoHui/legally established churches, while those Catholics who still loyally follow Vatican City State/The Holy See's instructions have been dubbed DiXiaJiaoHui/underground churches.

The ROC has been able to maintain diplomatic relations with Vatican City State/The Holy See since October 1942. However, when Pope Saint John Paul II began his papacy in October 1978, we began to witness a gradual change. In February 1981, he at Manila's Chinese Catholic Church expressed his wish to have dialogue with Beijing leaders. In November 1983, the Pope wrote to DENG Xiaoping, requesting direct contact with the PRC government.<sup>166</sup> In February 1999, Angelo Sodano, who was Cardinal Secretary of State from June 1991 to June 2006, said the Vatican City State/The Holy See was ready to transfer its nunciature from Taipei to Beijing "not tomorrow, but this very night, if Chinese authorities were to permit it..., [which is] a

<sup>164</sup> See, for example, Beatrice Leung, "Sino-Vatican Relations at the Century's Turn," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 14, No. 43 (May 2005), pp. 353–370.

<sup>165</sup> <http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/234123/16184168.html>, accessed on August 31, 2016.

<sup>166</sup> [https://books.google.com.my/books?id=DB7gQb5n0VIC&pg=PA438&lpg=PA438&dq=Pope+Saint+John+Paul+II,+letter+to+DENG+Xiaoping,+1983&source=bl&ots=XlkzxpS4D3&sig=OCrrXncXSaW0F6ar62hCWLlIhKQ&hl=en&sa=X&redir\\_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Pope%20Saint%20John%20Paul%20I%20II%20letter%20to%20DENG%20Xiaoping%201983&f=false](https://books.google.com.my/books?id=DB7gQb5n0VIC&pg=PA438&lpg=PA438&dq=Pope+Saint+John+Paul+II,+letter+to+DENG+Xiaoping,+1983&source=bl&ots=XlkzxpS4D3&sig=OCrrXncXSaW0F6ar62hCWLlIhKQ&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Pope%20Saint%20John%20Paul%20I%20II%20letter%20to%20DENG%20Xiaoping%201983&f=false), accessed on September 3, 2016.



returning of the nunciature to its initial location.”<sup>167</sup> In January 2007, Vatican City State/The Holy See held its first Bishops Council in China meeting, during which various ecclesiastics, including some from the Chinese mainland, took part. In May 2007, Pope Benedict XVI wrote an important letter to the Catholics who live in the Chinese mainland, offering some guidelines concerning the life of the church and the task of evangelization in the Chinese mainland.<sup>168</sup> In April 2016, XI Jinping citing two versions of the PRC Constitution, for the first time, talked about religion from the Marxism perspective.<sup>169</sup> In October 2016, Pope Francis in a historic move received a group of legally established church from the WenZhou Diocese, Chinese mainland, in Saint Peter’s Square, Vatican City State/The Holy See.<sup>170</sup> Later in the same month, both sides, meeting each other halfway, historically finalized a deal on the ordination of bishops on the Chinese mainland. And, in December 2016, the Ninth National Assembly of Catholic Representatives was held, which is the highest authority governing the church in the Chinese mainland and appoints the heads of the most important state-backed Catholic institutions on the mainland, namely, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Chinese Catholic Bishops’ Conference. In other words, Vatican City State/The Holy See officials for the first time allowed those who sided with them to participate the assembly.

Toeing the line, a Chinese mainland researcher on religions at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, pointing out that the Catholic population in China is less than 1% of the whole population and counts the least among the five major religions in the Chinese mainland, said<sup>171</sup>:

Episcopal appointments must be left in the hands of the Pope, but the Vatican must better understand the reasoning of the Chinese government and learn to trust more.... [M]uch still needs to be done to convince China that the Holy See is not a political body.... [A]mid the Cold War atmosphere, the Holy See... sternly rejected the list of bishop candidates. Thus, the [Catholic] Church in China, under such political environment, began a history of ordaining bishops without papal appointment and walking on a path with detours of bishop elections and ordinations without the Pope’s participation and appointment. Until the 1980s and 1990s, the practice of papal appointment of Chinese bishops was quietly and privately restored. In May 2006, Xinhua News Agency published a statement of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, stating that after a bishop candidate in China was elected, the list was reported to the Holy See. Because of this, contacts and dialogue between the Chinese government and the Holy See have been in progress over the matters related to the... Church.... Unfortunately, our Chinese government and the Catholic Church, local and abroad including the Vatican, have obvious differences on certain issues of the

<sup>167</sup> [http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/6974?eng=y&refresh\\_ce](http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/6974?eng=y&refresh_ce), accessed on September 3, 2016.

<sup>168</sup> [http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/letters/2007/documents/hf\\_ben-xvi\\_let\\_20070527\\_china-note.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/letters/2007/documents/hf_ben-xvi_let_20070527_china-note.html), accessed on September 1, 2016.

<sup>169</sup> <http://www.CRNTT.com> 2016-04-25 14:51:10, accessed on September 29, 2016.

<sup>170</sup> <http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/pope-francis-and-china-attempts-for-a-thaw-78134/>, accessed on October 15, 2016.

<sup>171</sup> <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Relations-between-China-and-the-Vatican:-cooperation-and-especially-patience-in-overcoming-impasse-35644.html>, accessed on September 1, 2016. A December 2016 report said the number of Catholics has increased by a lot, around ten million.



Catholic Church. Therefore, even in the beginning of the twenty-first century, certain bishops in the open Church in China carried out 'illicit ordinations' without Rome's approval. Such terms now become synonym of being in conflict with the Holy See.... Besides the bishop appointment issue, there are other problems between China and the Holy See that need to be resolved, such as the inconsistencies in the administrative divisions of dioceses; how to resolve the question on the religious identity of bishops and priests who are not recognized by the Chinese government, and those known as 'illicit' bishops according to the Church documents (government); whether the Church in China should keep 'archdioceses' and 'archbishops'; and articulation of certain terms or references in the documents approved by the [Bishops' Council in China] and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association.... Both sides may start with discussions on issues that easily lead to conflicts, or with problems urgently require [sic] solutions, such as the appointment of Chinese bishops, and how to avoid conflicts caused by ordination of unilaterally recognized bishop candidates. According to some basic facts and common sense (knowledge of), the Church in China, as one of the mass organizations on Chinese soil, must act in accordance with the Church's universal religious canons and faith regulations in order to maintain their own religious identity, but also to respond to the basic requirements of the Chinese government in order to prove that it is willing to comply with state laws and regulations on religious organizations.

In August 2016, it was reported that there could be a breakthrough pretty soon. That is to say, Vatican City State/The Holy See, treating the appointment matter as purely religious, would, out of both DiShangJiaoHui and DiXiaJiaoHui, pick one of the candidates, and as a step further, a la the Vietnamese model in June 2010, the PRC government would confirm the bishop appointment.<sup>172</sup> It is definitely a compromise. Beijing needs to play the dialectical game, so as to justify the future development and enable to it retract its current decision. However, in September 2016, a Catholic in Taipei said Vatican does not have the habit of making the first move to break up diplomatic relations with other countries.<sup>173</sup> However, in February 2017, Cardinal John TONG Hon of the Roman Catholic Church and the first native Bishop of Hong Kong said further progress has been made, regarding important issues, except three, such as how would Beijing recognize more than 30 underground ZhuJiao/bishops.<sup>174</sup> Would there be a domino effect during the CAI YingWen term? In December 2016, an African country made the first move by breaking diplomatic ties with the ROC, because the latter could not provide more than US\$200 million of foreign aid to the former.

During MA's terms, he implemented the policy of BuTongBuDuiBuWu/No (Chinese) Unification, No (Taiwan's de jure) Independence, and No Use of Force and stuck to the November 1992 consensus. As such, the number of countries which have diplomatic relations with the ROC remained at 23. Gambia, which failed to get

<sup>172</sup> See *Hua Daily News* (Sarawak, Malaysia), August 6, 2016, p. 13 and p. 17. In January 2011, Vatican City State/The Holy See appointed the first envoy to Hanoi.

<sup>173</sup> <http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1044/0/4/3/104404360.html?coluid=192&kindid=0&docid=104404360&mdate=0927004859>, accessed on September 27, 2016.

<sup>174</sup> <https://www.thestandnews.com/international/%E6%B9%AF%E6%BC%A2-%E5%BE%9E%E6%95%99%E6%9C%83%E5%AD%B8%E8%A7%92%E5%BA%A6%E5%B1%95%E6%9C%9B%E4%B8%AD%E6%A2%B5%E4%BA%A4%E8%AB%87/>, accessed on February 10, 2107.

foreign aid from the ROC as demanded, made the first move to sever diplomatic relations with the latter. To elaborate a bit, in March 2016, the Islamic Republic of Gambia (IROG) resumed its diplomatic relations again with the PRC,<sup>175</sup> after a number of twists and turns. In November 1968, Gambia established diplomatic relations with the ROC. On December 14, 1974, Banjul and Beijing established diplomatic relations. Two weeks later, Taipei cut its diplomatic ties with the African country. In July 1995, the ROC and the IROG resumed diplomatic ties. Later in the same month, Beijing cut its diplomatic ties with Banjul. And, during CHEN Shui-bian's terms, he lost diplomatic ties with nine countries, which have about 50 million people, while gained three, which have about 250,000 people.

In sum, the only meaningful boost is that 4 days before CAI YingWen's inauguration as the new ROC president, the US House, for the first time, put in writing, reaffirming the then US President Ronald W. Reagan's six assurances, which were verbally transmitted to the then President CHIANG Ching-kuo in July 1982, which serve as cornerstones of [US-Taiwan relations](#), and which have been reaffirmed by each successive US Administration, including the Donald J. Trump administration since January 2017.<sup>176</sup>

IX. WangGuo/destroy a nation, country, or state/the nation, country, or state will perish, WangDang/subjugate a political party/the political party will perish.<sup>177</sup> The KMT would often use those four Chinese characters. The same thing speaks for the CPC. As for the DPP, I have not yet seen it in writing.

Because the party was created first, when we look at those characters, we usually first sense urgency to do something, so as to revive or resuscitate the party and/or the nation, country, or state. This logic can still be applied to the DPP, because some members want to create a Taiwan Guo/Taiwan state or even the ROT.

Because WangGuo, WangDang carries a negative connotation, we can put them in the danger zone. In other words, non-WangGuo, WangDang would be the safe zone spectrum. At each time/space sequence, the party in question would try to make moves to revive or resuscitate itself.

The Chinese are fond of performing BiaoYanShuangHuang/playing a double reed<sup>178</sup>/give a two-man show. A similar term is BaiLian/white face/play a good person and HeiLian/black face/play a bad person in the Taiwan area or HongLian/red face/face painting in Beijing opera, etc.,<sup>179</sup> traditionally for the heroic or the honest and BaiLian/white face, face painting in Beijing opera, etc., traditionally for the villain,<sup>180</sup> in the Chinese mainland.

<sup>175</sup> On September 1, 2016, the Beijing ambassador handed his credentials to that country's president.

<sup>176</sup> <http://udn.com/news/story/10575/2101685>, accessed on November 13, 2016.

<sup>177</sup> <http://www.ichacha.net/%E4%BA%A1%E5%85%9A%E4%BA%A1%E5%9B%BD.html> and <http://www.1stenglish.com/wiki/index.php?doc-view-33854>, accessed on October 5, 2016.

<sup>178</sup> <https://www.google.com.tw/#q=%E9%9B%99%E7%B0%A7+%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87>, accessed on October 5, 2016.

<sup>179</sup> <http://dict.site/%E7%B4%85%E8%87%89.html>, accessed on October 5, 2016.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

One example is as follows: Some political observers would say “[t]he duet was being acted by CHIANG Kai-shek and WANG JingWei” during World War II.<sup>181</sup> What about the KMT and the DPP in the Taiwan area? Such a possibility cannot be ruled out. As another example, when the DPP was abruptly created in September 1986, it was XIE ChangTing who first uttered the name, Democratic Progressive Party, at the function. That is to say, the younger CHIANG at that time perceived that the only way for the KMT and the ROC to have a new lease on life is to promote democracy in the Taiwan area. On the one hand, the United States would be willing to continue its support of the ROC. On the other hand, Taipei can put pressure on the Chinese mainland to be democratic. Because it is ahead of the Chinese mainland, the Taiwan area can be regarded as being progressive.

Decades ago, one of my former colleagues, who was a native Taiwanese from southern Taiwan Province, said to me that, when one day the Chinese mainland becomes truly democratic, it will be the end of the ROC, because the ruling party and the opposition parties in the Taiwan area will have no more dramas to perform. Yes, in the long run, it seems to be that way, given the size of the Taiwan area.

In the preface of my 2009 book, *The Second Long March: Struggling Against the Chinese Communists Under the Republic of China (Taiwan) Constitution*,<sup>182</sup> I said only two major issues are left between both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s): Chinese reunification and when can we see the demise of the corrupted CPC as the ruling party of the Chinese mainland.<sup>183</sup> The first Long March was led by MAO Zedong et al., and it had to do with the FanShen/liberation/emancipation of the peasants, thereby turning the social strata of the Chinese mainland 100% upside down. And the second Long March will be making the whole of China democratic.<sup>184</sup> Which one will come first? None of us can be 100% sure.

X. The era of non-globalization or intercelestialization has already begun.<sup>185</sup> According to the Oxford dictionary, the word, globalization, was first employed in the 1930s. The Merriam-Webster dictionary included it as an entry in 1951.<sup>186</sup> The term began to be widely used by social scientists in the 1960s. H. Marshall McLuhan, who analyzed the impact of mass media on society, coined the term

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<sup>181</sup> <http://www.iciba.com/%E5%94%B1%E5%8F%8C%E7%B0%A7>, accessed on October 5, 2016. However, in May 2017, Taipei-based Academia Historica for the first time released 4,683 items or official documents written by DAI Li, who was the ROC spymaster from April 1, 1932 to March 17, 1946. WANG JingWei was instructed by DAI as one of the targets to be assassinated.

<sup>182</sup> (New York: The Continuum, 2009).

<sup>183</sup> For the Chinese Communist style, see PEI MinXin, *China's Crony Capitalism—the Dynamics of Regime Decay* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2016).

<sup>184</sup> A few decades ago, I proposed to have five capitals after the Chinese reunification, such as the executive capital to be located in Beijing; legislative capital, Nanjing; judicial capital, Taipei; control capital, Guangzhou; and examination capital, ChongQing.

<sup>185</sup> The tenth case study was published on January 27, 2017. The copyeditor of *IPP Review* changed the title to *The Era of Deglobalization Has Already Begun*. See <http://www.ippreview.com/index.php/Home/Blog/single/id/340.html>, accessed on February 12, 2017.

<sup>186</sup> <http://www.mrglobalization.com/globalisation/252-globalization--origin-of-the-word>, accessed on December 21, 2016.

“global village” in *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man* (1962) and *Understanding Media* (1964).

Since its inception as a hot topic, the concept of globalization has inspired competing socioeconomic definitions, to name but several:

1. Robert T. Kudrle mentioned that there are three varieties of globalization, namely, communication, market, and direct which can be further divided into palpable and psychological.
2. Roland Robertson treated globalization as a compression of the world.
3. Jan A. Scholte defined globalization as deterritorialization.
4. Bill J. Clinton, who is the former US president, likened globalization to be interdependence.
5. Tony Smith offered a Marxian account of historical dialectic of globalization, arguing that, to get rid of uneven development, overaccumulation crises, and financial crises, there must be a revolutionary rupture from the existing capital form.<sup>187</sup>
6. In *Global Transformations*, David Held and his co-writers put forward a typology of globalization and stated the following words at length: “Although in its simplistic sense globalization refers to the widening, deepening and speeding up of global interconnection, such a definition begs further elaboration. Globalization can be located on a continuum with the local, national, and regional. At one end of the continuum lie social and economic relations and networks which are organized on a local and/or national basis; at the other end lie social and economic relations and networks which crystallize on the wider scale of regional and global interactions. Globalization can refer to those spatial-temporal processes of change which underpin a transformation in the organization of human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents. Without reference to such expansive spatial connections, there can be no clear or coherent formulation of this term. A satisfactory definition of globalization must capture each of these elements: extensity (stretching), intensity, velocity, and impact.<sup>188</sup>

According to some Third World academics and experts, the first wave of globalization began with Western colonialization. In the last several decades, we see Americanization or internationalization. I think Held et al.’s dialectical treatment of globalization as a continuum plus mainland China’s dialectical usage, that is, economic globalization, can help us to be closer to reality, challenging what some observers may argue, that is, the truth may not be evinced.

However, by now, we have already seen a lot of contradictions, because, for example, interdependence is not the same as Americanization. The former implies a hybrid of East and West (as opposed to East is East and West is West), while the latter has become US-dominated. Globalization also differs from colonialization or deter-

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<sup>187</sup> Tony Smith, “Systematic and Historical Dialectics: Towards a Marxian Theory of Globalization” in Robert Albritton and John Simoulidis, eds, *New Dialectics and Political Economy* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 24–39.

<sup>188</sup> David Held, David Goldblatt, Anthony McGrew, and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 25.

ritorialization. Colonialization is turf-minded, while the latter signifies the breakdown of national boundaries. Facing a myriad of contradictions, what should we do?

I would like to first point out that the globe that we are talking about so far refers to our Earth. Time has definitely changed, due to scientific and technological advancement. Many human beings want to go to, for example, Mars and settle over there.

In October 1958, National Aeronautics and Space Administration opened its doors. As early as October 1960, some Mars supporters at Lewis Research Center, which is a National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics laboratory in Cleveland, Ohio, completed the first piloted nuclear-propulsion Mars expedition study. In August 2012, *Curiosity* rover landed in the [Gale Crater](#) of the Red Planet for the first time.

By relying on itself, mainland China for the first time launched a spaceship in October 2003. In September 2008, its *taikongnaut* (astronaut) walked in outer space for the first time. In January 2016, the PRC approved a mission, that is, by 2020, its first Mars probe will be launched to carry out orbiting and roving exploration. It will take about 7 months to reach the Red Planet. In December 2016, the PRC State Council issued a white paper on space activities, following those issued in 2000, 2006, and 2011.

It is time to offer my own framework, that is, globalization versus non-globalization and, for that matter, globalization *and* non-globalization. One synonym for non-globalization is intercelestialization. After testing both frameworks, each framework becomes what I called a model in social science.


At this juncture, I would like to introduce my one-dot theory, because I will apply it to describe, explain, and infer what is going on since the first human being.

My one-dot theory is at a higher level than what readers see, namely, *TaiJiTū/TaiJi* Diagram/Diagram of Cosmological Scheme/Supreme Ultimate.

The *TaiJiTū* model or square can be seen in the middle, which is the biggest diagram. It is a dot if we look at it in the distance. We can parse this diagram in terms of four smaller models, each one of which is but a dot. The first one is on the upper left-hand side. We see a blank square/circle or a dot. The second model is on the upper right-hand side. Another way of saying it is *yin* and *yang*. It is derived from the first model. The third one is at the lower right-hand side. It is a version of the second model on the upper right-hand side. Its emphasis is on that small dot, meaning the Confucian *ZhongYongZhiDao*/middle way, with harmony in mind. And the last model is at the lower left-hand side. It is a version of the third model on the lower right-hand side. The name for this model is called the crab and frog motion model. In other words, a dialectician would make sideway moves like a crab and leap like a frog from this crab and frog motion model to that crab and frog motion model. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 is the safe zone spectrum, whereas A, B, C, D, and E, the danger zone spectrum. A dialectician may stand under 1, which refers to a concept and which is translated as 100%. Three would be 50% and 5, 1%. The same logic applies to E, which is 100%; C, 50%; and A, 1%. A dialectician would refrain from entering the latter zone.

If a reader already has a firm grasp of the previous paragraph, he or she would realize that a dialectical/crab and frog motion remark is just the opposite of a non-

dialectical/crab and frog motion (usually deductive, linear, or cause and effect) remark, or, at best, they must meet halfway.



At the outset, we can regard the square/circle with nothing inside on the upper left-hand side as a globalized world. It is said that our ancestors or the four races, namely, black, brown, yellow, and white, originated in East Africa about 150,000 years ago. According to the Bible, Adam and Eve were the first human beings. If so, they were already living in a globalized world or in the nascent or primary stage of being globalized. (There are two other stages, namely, ascendant stage and mature stage for each number or letter in my crab and frog motion model.) So, we can put the term, a globalized world, at 1 of the crab and frog motion model.

Next, we have to look at the *yin* and *yang* diagram, which is on the upper right-hand side. This is because their children plus others definitely tried to explore the possibility of living in other places, resulting in what we see today a localized world, and I would put this term at 5.

Once localized, some human beings want to be globalized again. In June 2005, mainland China publicized its theme for the 2008 Summer Olympics, to wit, One World One Dream. Hence, we can conceive a new term, globalizing world, and I would put this term at 3. Here, we see a process or interplay of localization and globalization.

Sony Corporation is a Japanese conglomerate founded in May 1946, and its chief executive officer coined a term glocalization. This new term or a glocalizing world can be placed at 4, which is a mixture of a localized world and a globalizing world. What does this new term mean in my article?

To reiterate, some human beings want to live in a globalized world again, while some multinational or transnational corporations want to provide and sell their ser-

vices and products globally, as opposed to intercelestially. However, the problem is that they are still thinking of our planet. I am very sure that many Martians and their descendants living in that planet want to sip at least a drop of a globalized product, to wit, coca cola.

To be sure, on the one hand, we the human beings can *never* be globalized again as a family in terms of the global village, that is, we can never return to the ascendant stage and mature stages of 1, which stands for a globalized world. On the other hand, the US president, Donald J. Trump, wants Americans to first take care of themselves, that is, to stay at 5, that is, to be localized.

To repeat, once we the human beings went to Mars, perhaps many, if not most, of them would choose not to return to Earth.

Death in space or outer space has also occurred many times. Under the internationally accepted definition, one of the examples is the death of seven crew members in the American Space Shuttle Challenger, which disintegrated 73 s after launching off the Florida State coast in January 1986. The members did leave Earth and yet they did not reach Moon, for example. I would put this phenomenon in between 5 and A, so as to be able to rationalize everything logically, systematically, and coherently. That is to say, we can restructure 5 and A to become a new model, to wit, A B C D E versus 1 2 3 4 5. The American astronauts were alive in the safe zone spectrum or 1 2 3 4 5. At the 73th or the last second, they perished in the danger zone or A B C D E.

If some of the Martians do return to our Earth, the phenomenon of intercelestial interplay between our planet and the Red Planet would surface. However, we can perceive power struggles between earthlings and Martians over, for example, the question of whether or not to welcome some sick Martians with deadly new diseases to come back to Earth.

By 2024 or 2033, some human beings would be able to land and live on Mars. However, I would put them in the danger zone spectrum. In this spectrum, E stands for 100% non-globalization and one of the synonyms is the Red Planet.

In October 2014, a group of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) engineering graduate students released a 35-page analysis of Mars One's plans and found it would take about 68 days on Mars for the first fatalities due to suffocation.<sup>189</sup> If the human adventurers do not mind about dying over there, it is another matter. I am pretty sure that one of them, in order to be recorded in human history, may well want to die first on that planet. The model of globalization at 1 and non-globalization at 5 would be appropriate when earthlings and Martians can live peacefully together.

In a nutshell, application of my globalization versus non-globalization model and globalization and non-globalization model demonstrates that those six definitions mentioned earlier are not in-depth and cannot rigorously meet the repeated

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<sup>189</sup> <http://www.geek.com/science/mit-students-predict-mars-one-colonists-will-suffocate-in-68-days-1606559/>, accessed on December 29, 2016.



tests, especially after landing of human beings on Mars. One way of slotting all the definitions into my crab and frog motion model is to put my models at 1, carrying the most weight, while other definitions at 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, respectively.

In sum, all the ten cases can be slotted into the safe zone spectrum, because we have discussed, explained, and inferred all of them. Needless to say, we need to construct other crab and frog motion models, so as to enable us to describe, explain, and infer more information, data, and analysis.

## Chapter 3

# Conducting a Critique of the Non-one-dot-theory Study of Contemporary China

A publisher in New York City bears an original, attractive name, 12 Books. Its mission is to publish only 12 fiction and nonfiction books each year:

Twelve strives to publish singular books, by authors who have unique perspectives and compelling authority. Books that explain our culture; that illuminate, inspire, provoke, and entertain. Our mission is to provide a consummate publishing experience for our authors, one truly devoted to thoughtful partnership and cutting-edge promotional sophistication that reaches as many readers as possible. For readers, we aim to spark that rare reading experience – one that opens doors, transports, and possibly changes their outlook on our ever-changing world.

The acquisition editors of that book company may well believe that the book proposals that they have chosen from the first stage to the final stage of releasing them can make a real impact in the world of books. Some academic journal editors and contributors plus those who are seeking promotion in their academic profession are also obsessed with impact factor.

I did not approach the 12 Books, because my manuscript has to do with, for example, Chinese (strategic) culture. But, I do like that publisher's choice of the number, 12. For the purpose of comparing and contrasting the methodologies of them with my one-dot theory application and writings, I have selected the following 12 publications in English on contemporary China:

1. O. Edmund Clubb, advisory editor, *China*<sup>1</sup> (New York: The New York Times Company, 1972)<sup>2</sup>
2. Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975)

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<sup>1</sup>It was published under “the great contemporary issues.”

<sup>2</sup>See also his book, *Twentieth-Century China*, 2nd revised edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

3. James C. Hsiung and nine others,<sup>3</sup> ed., *Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience*<sup>4</sup> 1950–1980 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981)
4. David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., *China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism* (London: Routledge, 1994)
5. CHAI Winberg<sup>5</sup> and CHAI May-lee, editors, 2nd ed., *CHINESE Mainland and Taiwan: A Study of Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Relations, with Documents* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1996)
6. Yu-ming SHAW, ed., *Tendencies of Regionalism in Contemporary China* (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1997)
7. Andrew D. Marble, guest editor, “The State of the China Studies Field,” *Issues & Studies*, Vol.38, No.4/Vol.39, No.1 (December2002/March2003), pp. 1–398<sup>6</sup>
8. Hans Kuijper,<sup>7</sup> “The Study of China: A Critical Assessment,” paper presented at the Deuxieme Colloque International de Sinologie, de l’Universite Fu Jen/ Catholic Fu-jen University, Taipei, November 5–6, 2004, 83 pages
9. WEI Wou,<sup>8</sup> *China: In Search of the Wealth and Power-Deng Xiao-ping and the [sic] SUN Yat-senism* (Taipei: Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University, 2009)
10. John F. Copper, *Taiwan: Nation-state or Province*, 5th ed., (Philadelphia, PA: Westview Press, 2009)
11. Baogang GUO and Chung-chian TENG, eds., *Taiwan and the Rise of China: Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century* (Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2012)
12. GUO Sujian,<sup>9</sup> ed., *Political Science and Chinese Political Studies: The State of the Field* (Berlin: Springer, 2013)

Some features may be noted. First, the 12 books are listed in the order of publication date. Two books were published in the 1970s; one, 1980s; three, 1990s; and six, the twenty-first century.

Second, all the publications cover political, military, social, and other dimensions.

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<sup>3</sup>Cho-yun SHU, Theodore H. E. CHEN, Yuan-li WU, Jan S. Prybyla, Yu-ming SHAW, Hungdah CHIU, John F. Copper, Winberg CHAI, and Michael Ying-mao KAU

<sup>4</sup>He coined this term in January 1981.

<sup>5</sup>He is the editor of *Asian Affair* (US). James C. Hsiung was also the editor.

<sup>6</sup>Before that, there was another special issue, “Chinese Modernization and the Methodology of Evaluation,” *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (February 1987), pp. 19–81.

<sup>7</sup>See also his seminal paper, “The Cinderella Complex: Putting Countries in Comparative Perspective,” which was uploaded to his [www.academia.edu](http://www.academia.edu) page in October 2016. See also his paper on the Taiwan area, “A Proposal to Solve the ‘Taiwan Problem,’” *China Report*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May 2004), pp. 189–208.

<sup>8</sup>He is the author of an important book, written in Chinese, *ZhongGuoGuoFuLun/Wealth of Nations: A Chinese Version* (Taipei: China Times Publication Company, May 2000).

<sup>9</sup>He is also the editor in chief of *Journal of Chinese Political Science*.

Third, each (co-)author and (co-)editor are very knowledgeable about basic things in Chinese, and I have met and interacted with most of them in person or had correspondence with them. Given their meticulous or photographic memory and painstaking passion for research and writing, they have also written many books, monographs, journal articles, working papers, etc. on contemporary China. It is worthwhile to look at those 12 publications, meaning that in no way am I suggesting that they are more representative and comprehensive than those left out,<sup>10</sup> such as David L. Shambaugh's *American Studies of Contemporary China*, and to make a critique of their methodology, respectively.

Fourth, some publications are edited, and others not. I may only choose two chapters, to wit, the introduction and the concluding one, or a few chapters, as opposed to the whole book, which may lack a logical, systematic, and coherent framework to begin with. In Whiting's book, he said his book is for laymen and specialists, and he urged the political scientists to skip some chapters.<sup>11</sup> In other words, no book can please all readers. To be sure, either the title or the subtitle should be clear to readers what theory and model has been applied. Lack of it or not being aware of this technique already means that the (co-)author or the (co-)editor has not done a good job, methodologically speaking.

Fifth, both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s)<sup>12</sup> were mentioned at least once in one way or another in each publication. It is not possible to isolate one's study only on either the Taiwan area, XiangGang/Hong Kong, AoMen/Macao, and the Chinese mainland.

Sixth, my main concern of each methodological critique is to find out whether the (co-)authors and (co-editors) have at least in their publication presented a logical, systematic, and coherent framework, as opposed to a more rigorous term, model or theory in the social science(s) parlance. In short, theoretical coherence is definitely called for.

Seventh, a few scholarly or learned journals carry the concept, contemporary, in its name, such as *Journal of Contemporary China*,<sup>13</sup> and a few others only invite submissions of theoretically and empirically based research papers on contemporary China in the fields of politics/international relations, economics, society, law, and culture, such as *China: An International Journal*. They are not included in my consideration or the study in the content. This is because it is good enough if we can illustrate from those 12 publications the kind of methodological issues that concern

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<sup>10</sup> Some nonselected ones are as follows: Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Dennis V. Hickey, eds., *New Thinking About the Taiwan Issue: Theoretical Insights into Its Origins, Dynamics and Prospects* (London: Routledge Publishers, 2012); Thomas E. Stopler, *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for Outer Mongolia and Sino-Soviet Relations* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1985); and Michael Szonyi, *Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

<sup>11</sup> See p. xiii of his book.

<sup>12</sup> If we regard waters between Penghu County and Taiwan the island as another strait, we have two straits.

<sup>13</sup> It enjoys a very high impact factor. The mentor of ZHAO SuiSheng is Susan Shirk. On November 23, 2016, HE YuXing sent an email to many China students about ZHAO's journal.

me, if not others as well. Otherwise, this book will be too big, meaning that it will take me more time, effort, and energy to accomplish the same task.

Eighth, how to apply a series of crab and frog motion models? We may need a few of them. In the first model, we see Contemporary China Studies versus Non-Contemporary China Studies. Contemporary China Studies is equivalent to 12,345 and non-Contemporary China Studies E. A mixture of them would be either 5 or A, and this is possible, because some books may talk about both contemporary China and, for example, Antarctica.<sup>14</sup> However, there are 12 publications. So, the safe zone should be expanded to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 and the danger zone to A B C D E F G H I J K L. We can put Clubb's publication at 1 and GUO Sujian's 12. Since some publications carry more weight than others in the eyes of the beholder, for example, some may value publications which include news reports and documents, that book may be first mentioned at time/space sequence (1).

Ninth, of all the (co-)authors and (co-)editors, seven were born in China and broadly defined and seven were non-Chinese, plus one co-editor of the Chinese origin but born and educated in the United States. Among them is Clubb, who was one of the China hands of the American Department of State, the last American diplomat stationed in Beijing in January 1950 after the Chinese Communist take-over, and who was attacked by McCarthyism in the 1950s and blamed for "losing China" to MAO Zedong.<sup>15</sup> Probably due to this reason, the *New York Times* (NYT), to strike a balance, invited him to be the advisory editor of *China*.

Tenth, all told, all of the 12 valuable books can fill in the research gap. They can still be consulted by generalists and the specialist of contemporary China at the present and in the future.

Eleventh, most of them are bilingual, and a few, trilingual. It is not easy to be well versed in two languages, let alone three or more. It is definitely an advantage to be able to read original sources and publications, written in Chinese.

Last but not least, out of the above-mentioned books, only two specifically mentioned the adjective, contemporary.

As early as January 1971, the study of contemporary China, in writing, has been regarded as in crisis.<sup>16</sup> This may well mean that many, if not most, publications from the late 1940s to 1960s on contemporary China lack sound or scientific methodology. The situation has not changed much. Kuijper, presenting a paper in November 2004, made the following candid remarks:

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<sup>14</sup> See, for example, Anne-Marie Brady, "China's Rise in Antarctica?" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July/August 2010), pp. 759–785.

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/11/obituaries/o-edmund-clubb-is-dead-at-88-china-hand-and-mccarthy-target.html>, accessed on August 22, 2016

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Richard W. Wilson, "Chinese Studies in Crisis," *World Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (January 1971), pp. 295–317. This article is a critique of descriptive analysis by A. Doak Barnett, John F. Fairbank, and their students, respectively. Wilson was worried that some China students had been perniciously influenced by China scholarship. Email from him, dated September 13, 2017.

To mark the 50th anniversary, ...the editors of *Issues and Studies* decided to produce a special, double issue of their journal on 'The State of the China Studies field'. The reasons given for this laudable initiative were (a) the 'major jump in both data output within China and access to this data by scholars from outside the PRC' and (b) the 'dramatic increase in the number and types of individuals analyzing China'. However, the reader who expects to find a critical assessment of the study of China, as practiced in the traditional manner or since the 'dramatic diversification, specialization, and sophistication of methods of social scientific inquiry', will be disappointed. The contributions to the special only beats around the bush – occasionally, to be sure. None of them is daring enough to grasp the nettle by posing the following poignant question: Of all the scholars having occupied themselves with the country, who has shown himself a true scientist, broadly defined (*vide supra*). In other words, who has been in the business of 'analyzing China' (*sic*)? I think the sad answer to this perfectly legitimate question should be: Nobody has!

Before Kuijper, we hear the following questions, but there is no one like Kuijper who dared to say "Sinologists are holding their own territory, but do not have their own theory, for which reason they disqualify as scientists"<sup>17</sup>: What is wrong with each publication's methodology, if any?<sup>18</sup> Which social science theories should we apply, when we search for contemporary Chinese (alternative) realities?<sup>19</sup>

Critique of the first publication's methodology. Several points can be discussed. First, Clubb is not really a news reporter<sup>20</sup> for *The NYT*, although in his book, we do see his reports on pages 497–498 and pages 531–534. In the first dispatch, we only saw one term related to our methodology, that is, the phrase, nonhostile disposition toward China, was mentioned.<sup>21</sup> The opposite of nonhostile is hostile. Is Clubb's approach dialectical? If not, this calls for methodological concern, because one cannot be dialectical here and non-dialectical there in the same publication, unless the same author is conducting a comparative study, using the same sources, when conducting research on an issue, a phenomenon, or a development. In Clubb's second, lengthier article, several methodological terms were mentioned, such as approach, patterns of imitation, theorize, in theory, logic, and theoretical possibilities, and several dialectical terms were mentioned, such as "the right of reactionaries to voice their opinions must be abolished and only the people are allowed to have the right of voicing their opinions," as uttered by MAO Zedong, and zigzagging from extreme left to moderate and back time and again. Again, one cannot be dialectical and non-dialectical in the same writing, unless the same author is trying to compare and

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<sup>17</sup> Kuijper, p. 10.

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, "What's Wrong with Chinese Political Studies," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 6 (1982), pp. 12–28. Also published in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 22, No. 10 (1982), pp. 919–933.

<sup>19</sup> See WEI Yung, "Social Science and the Methodology of Contemporary Chinese Studies: A Critical Evaluation" in Yu-ming SHAW, *Power and Policy in the PRC* (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 321–339 and Lucian W. Pye, "Review Essay: Social Science Theories in Search of Chinese Realities," *The China Quarterly*, Vol.132 (December 1992), pp. 1161–1170.

<sup>20</sup> Journalism has also to do with methodology. See, for example, Andrew G. Walder, "Methodological Note: Press Accounts and the Study of Chinese Society," *China Quarterly*, No. 79 (September 1979), pp. 568–592.

<sup>21</sup> See his book, p. 497.

contrast certain issue, phenomenon, or development using the same sources. In this connection, how many readers at that time or even now really understand the difference between dialectics and non-dialectics? The former is definitely esoteric, embracing two other terms, dialectical and dialectic.

Second, what about other reports? I saw on page 180 the following byline: MAO AIDE GIVES ASIA “LIBERATION” PATTERN. To be sure, the term, pattern, is related to behavior, and it is a synonym for model, isomorph, or mode. And, on page 461, I saw the following byline: FRUGAL WORKER A MODEL IN CHINA. It is in this dispatch that I saw typical dialectical remarks by a Chinese Communist party member, and the *NYT* reporter said what the party member said is a theory: “Waste and nonwaste are relative terms, not absolutes. Waste in one place may not necessarily be waste in another.” However, can the reporter compress or simplify his report in terms of a theory and model? Intuitively, he cannot.

Third, on page 262, we see the following byline: PEIPING EXPANDS STATE CAPITALISM, with the following as the sub-byline: Food Nationalization Decree Bars Private Grain Sales – Canton Controls Tight. On page 254, we see the following byline, dated August 22, 1956: PEIPING RETAINING SOME CAPITALISM, with the following as the sub-byline: Private Businesses Operate in Partnership with State – But End is Expected. Is this economic line not too different from DENG Xiaoping’s market economy under socialism with Chinese Characteristics, which became official at the September 1997 15th National Congress of the CPC? How would Clubb rationalize it by including that fact and by *not* applying a dialectical model, which can embrace the past, present, and future, due to the time/space sequence component in the crab and frog motion model?

Fourth, an experienced journalist and/or editor would realize that the headline or byline of that piece of news should be the theory, and readers *qua* social scientists will be able to see a framework in the sections that follow. Has Clubb done that, so as to qualify himself as a social scientist? It is doubtful, because, in Chap. 8, we see the title: “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1965–1969.” To Beijing, as mentioned earlier, the official period is from the months of May and August in 1966 to October 1976. In that month of 1976, with army backing and the support of Marshal YE Jianying, the Special Unit 8341 arrested all members of the Gang of Four in a bloodless coup. Clubb’s book on page 536 mentioned that the revolution erupts in June 1966 with the purges of Peking University and Communist Party. As a reminder, Clubb’s book was published in early 1972 or right after the then American President Richard M. Nixon’s historic sojourn in Beijing, during which he, according to Henry A Kissinger, agreed on the One China principle.<sup>22</sup> In other words, Clubb did not fully realize that the revolution was still going on in the Chinese mainland, although it gradually declined since the death of LIN Biao in September 1971, and, therefore, on page 534, he clearly mentioned the term the end of the revolution. This has but led me to ask the following question: Did American

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<sup>22</sup><http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1044/3/2/7/104432707.html?coluid=1&kindid=0&docid=104432707&mdate=1020045649>, accessed on October 20, 2016



senior officials know that the revolution was not yet over? If not, Nixon certainly was misled by his natural security advisors, including Henry A. Kissinger.

Critique of the second publication's methodology. Several points can be discussed. First, in Whiting's book, he used some dialectical terms, such as continuity and change,<sup>23</sup> the role of civilian versus military interests in foreign policy, a broad spectrum of situations,<sup>24</sup> class struggles,<sup>25</sup> contradictions,<sup>26</sup> etc. Citing the book's front flap, it is said that his "blend of documentary analysis, both qualitative and quantitative, and logical inference strips away much of the myth of mystery surrounding Chinese [Communist] behavior to reveal an intelligibility and predictability not so far removed from that demonstrated by other governments." However, nowhere do I see the terms, as mentioned earlier, dialectical, which is an adjective; dialectic, which has to do with the philosophy; and dialectics, which is "the art of investigating or discussing the truth of opinions"<sup>27</sup> being used. After leaving government service in September 1968, he undertook what he called a systematic reconstruction of the Chinese Communist decisions, which had led to war with the ROI.<sup>28</sup> He, with the help of LIAO Kuang-sheng<sup>29</sup> and later Michel C. Oksenberg,<sup>30</sup> both of whom moved between academia and policy work, should have alerted readers in the Preface and the first chapter or even the Index about the fact that the Chinese Communist leaders perceive the world dialectically, sizzling with ups and downs, twists and turns, and zigs and zags. If the book is a reconstruction of the Chinese Communist decision, Whiting should have simplified the decision-making process in terms of a model, to wit, a diagram. He should be able to do it, given that he must have the privilege of possessing most information at that time as a top government official. To be 100% sure, PRC leaders think, speak, and write dialectically. Such politico-military behavior<sup>31</sup> can be easily seen in documents, published by Beijing. If analysts in those days do not have a chance to read the original documents, they should still be able to read *RenMinRiBao/People's Daily*, *Peking Review*, *Ta Kung Pao*, *Wen Hui Pao*, etc.,<sup>32</sup> which should be understood in terms of dialectics, if they want to really decode and decipher the messages. Otherwise, distortion of the Chinese Communist words and deeds would inevitably result, an issue in which

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<sup>23</sup> Whiting, p. xx

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. xii.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 229.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. xv, p. xvii, and p. 229.

<sup>27</sup> [https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&rlz=1C1SKPL\\_enMY429MY429&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=dialectics](https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&rlz=1C1SKPL_enMY429MY429&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=dialectics), accessed on September 2, 2016

<sup>28</sup> Whiting, p. viii

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. x. From his publications, we know that Oksenberg was fully aware of the fact that Chinese Communist leaders are dialectical. See, for example, "Sources and Methodological Problems in the Study of Contemporary China," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), p. 605.

<sup>31</sup> Whiting used the term, Chinese behavior. See *ibid.*, p. ix.

<sup>32</sup> Whiting was able to read them. See p. 290.

Whiting and others were very concerned about, meaning a distorted analysis as well.<sup>33</sup> Needless to say, as an outsider, WaiDaZhengZhao/scoring by mistake is always possible. As a reminder, in the last page of his book, he wrote the following words: "... understanding China's international behavior is both possible and essential. Understanding is not sufficient to guarantee peace, but misunderstanding increases the risk of war ...." After reading it, I have but to say he has not captured the fuller, if not complete, dialectical mind and heart of the Chinese Communists.

Second, Whiting mentioned several models in his study, such as the rational actor model, rationality model, and the mediated stimulus-response model.<sup>34</sup> In the final chapter, suddenly the phrase, a model basic continuity with incremental change rather than one of total unpredictability with wide fluctuations in behavior, appeared.<sup>35</sup> What he had done certainly had confused many readers, at least to me, to say the least. Is this because the Political Bureau or Central Committee of the CPC members in Beijing do understand that, for example, rational choice models (in plural) do exist<sup>36</sup> and, more importantly, what if the first rational choice model contradicts with the second rational choice model and both of them again contradict with the last rational choice model? If there are no contradictions whatsoever among those models, how do they link with each other?

Third, Whiting's study focused on the PRC's conflicts with India and Indochina. Yet, he also in some pages (briefly) mentioned or covered the August 1958 JinMen County/Quemoy County blockade<sup>37</sup> and the Sino-Soviet relations plus the 1969 undeclared border conflicts, which lasted from March to September.<sup>38</sup> Are they strictly related to his study? How does he justify that?

Critique of the third publication's methodology. Several points can be discussed. First, the ROC is an example of contemporary China, broadly defined. The PRC can also be regarded as contemporary China. The convenient short form for ROC and, for that matter, PRC can be both China. From January 1, 1912, up to September 10, 1949, the ROC was dialectically and legally divided between it and Pu Yi's ManZhou/Manchuria, which was a puppet of Imperial Japan. From October 1, 1949, up to now, China has been non-dialectically and politically divided, meaning that some countries choose to recognize and establish diplomatic ties with either the ROC or the PRC or both of them only very briefly as in the case of the Republic of France's China policy, which established diplomatic relations with the Chinese mainland in

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<sup>33</sup> See p. xxi and p. 225 and Shelley Rigger, "Political Science and Taiwan's Domestic Politics: The State of the Field" in Marble, pp. 49–92 at p. 53. See also Howard Kahane, *Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason in Everyday Life* (Belmont, CA,: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971), p. 36.

<sup>34</sup> See Whiting, p. xiv, p. xv, p. xx, and p. 231.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 226

<sup>36</sup> See, for example, Victor C. Falkenheim, "Rational Choice Models and the Study of Citizen Politics in China," *Contemporary China*, Vol.3, No.2 (Summer 1979), pp. 93–101.

<sup>37</sup> Whiting, p. 235 and p. 246

<sup>38</sup> See pp. 32–33 and pp. 72–75 and p. 232.

January 1964,<sup>39</sup> and dialectically not divided, not for a second. Had all the editors realized that or shared the same view, when they write their pieces, respectively?

Second, Hsiung is my mentor at New York University (NYU). I had assisted him in collecting and evaluating the literature on the book. He is well versed in social science(s) in general and theory in particular. So, whenever I write or edit a publication, he would remind me to spell out a logical, systematic, and coherent framework in the manuscript at the outset. In this edited book, there are eight sections, which are laid out to highlight the thesis of socio-political overhead of economic development in the Taiwan area. We just have to cite what has been written in the front and back flaps to know that Hsiung is conscious about the importance of having a framework, and he specifically mentioned the adjective, coherent and a few important terms related to methodology, such as thesis and method:

This book about Taiwan is probably the first attempt to tackle *coherently* [italics mine], in one volume, the various aspects of the island's developmental experience in 30 years, 1950–1980, delving into the socio-political 'overhead' of its phenomenal economic success. It is a success story noted not only for its economic growth but, more important, for its achieving of a more *equitable distribution* [sic] of income (i.e., fruits of economic growth). The latter, which is probably unrivaled in the developmental experience elsewhere, goes against a common pessimistic belief among Western economists that the trade-off between growth and equity is inevitable. Both these achievements – growth and equity – have been brought about by the conscious efforts of both government planners and private entrepreneurs, collaborating within a non-socialist but closely drawn public-private framework. All this, in turn, is the result of a purposeful blending of modern and traditional values and methods ... The Taiwan experience is not only a case of development-by-design, but one of development under great adversities. From its loss of the China mainland (1949) to its expulsion from the United Nations (1971) and derecognition by the United States (1979), the ROC has weathered many an international storm. Its impressive economic and other achievements to date are, thus, a testament to the island's political and social attributes.

In short, were other (co-)authors and (co-)editors aware of what Hsiung said at least in the same wavelength?

Third, there are eight sections in the edited book, involving ten social scientists, including the editor in chief Hsiung. How many (excerpted) chapters are related to methodology, if we only look at the titles? The answer is short: unfortunately, none. From page 497 to 514, we see a selected bibliography. How many of them are related to methodology, if we again only look at the titles? To my utter dismay, only two: One by J. Bruce Jacobs, which is entitled "Preliminary Model of Particularistic Ties in Chinese Political Alliances,"<sup>40</sup> and the other by WEI Yung, which has to do with a methodological critique of current Chinese studies on Chinese political

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<sup>39</sup>The January 27, 1964, joint communiqué establishing diplomatic ties between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of France (ROF) was extremely short—only 45 Chinese characters. Some major powers in the West were not happy about it. On February 10, 1964, Taipei, opposing two Chinas, severed diplomatic relations with Paris.

<sup>40</sup>See Hsiung's edited book on page 507.

culture,<sup>41</sup> while the dialectical term, rural-urban continuum, was mentioned by D. Y. YUAN and Edward G. Stockwell.<sup>42</sup>

Fourth, the term, Taiwan experience, is eye-catching. In other words, HSIUNG led the discourse. He is very good at that. However, is the term close to (alternative) reality, when we look at JinMen/Quemoy, Mazu, and TaiPingDao/Itu Aba Island? Are they included in the term, Taiwan? Or should we say the Taiwan area experience? What about the Taiwan miracle, which was coined by others?<sup>43</sup> This is due to a number of reasons. Ralph N. Clough's book is entitled *Island China*.<sup>44</sup> His term is also a catchphrase. Can we also say JinMen/Quemoy is Island China and Mazu another Island China? And the same thing speaks for TaiPingDao/Itu Aba Island, which in July 2016, ironically, has been unfairly downgraded to a status of rock by the PCA in the Hague.

Fifth, some academics prefer to use the term, Taiwan miracle. Which one is closer to (alternative) reality: Taiwan experience or Taiwan miracle? It seems to me that the former can be philosophical and be able to embrace the two different interpretations of the Taiwan miracle, while the latter cannot, because the concept, miracle, suggest a one-shot phenomenon regarding a certain issue, which could mean either the mainstream account, that is, as argued by some academics, the ruling party in the Taiwan area before the lifting of the martial decree which enacted the martial law in July 1987 was able to successfully achieve growth with equity, or the then non-mainstream point of view, arguing that the masses, who are determined to push for freedom and democracy, are not satisfied with just economic development.

Critique of the fourth publication's methodology. Several points can be discussed. First, in their respective chapters, both Goodman and Segal are more like social scientists, for example, the former said, "... the attempt to treat history as though it were an independent variable is clearly fraught with difficulties,"<sup>45</sup> who are more interested in the present and the future, while John Fitzgerald is more of a historian or a mixture of social scientist and historian, who dealt more on the past, who agreed with MAO Zedong that we cannot chop off history even if you want to,<sup>46</sup> and who applied non-Chinese terms, like protonation, contingent variable, and model to study contemporary China.<sup>47</sup> They could complement each other, so as to enrich and fertilize all of their chapters. For example, Segal may not understand the ancient Chinese term, as mentioned in Fitzgerald's article, Zheng/rectitude or

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 509

<sup>43</sup> See Thomas B. Gold, *State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986) and Murraray A. Rubinstein, ed., *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).

<sup>44</sup> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978)

<sup>45</sup> David S. G. Goodman, "The Politics of Regionalism" in Goodman and Segal, pp. 1–20 at p. 7

<sup>46</sup> See Fitzgerald's chapter in Goodman and Segal's book, p. 21.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 25, p. 31, p. 39, p. 43, p. 48, and p. 55

rightTong/unification or unity.<sup>48</sup> This term is not the same as the Western concept, regime or legitimacy, as discussed in Fitzgerald's chapter. Regime usually has a negative connotation when we talk about domestic politics, whereas legitimacy usually is related to politics. Caution, therefore, needs to be exercised.

Second, Fitzgerald noticed that the term, ZhengTong, is often framed within a Daoist cosmology of waxing and waning.<sup>49</sup> What he is talking about is definitely related to dialectics. He should have dialectically conducted his research and writing of his chapter, if not other publications as well, meaning that he should not have included the word, often, in his sentence. Otherwise, the logic will not flow smoothly among his publications.

Third, as early as the late 1960s, TSOU Tang noticed that there are some Western concepts that the Chinese statesmen, political figures, and politicians do not use or are not familiar with.<sup>50</sup> The latter before the First Opium War (March 1839-August 1842)<sup>51</sup> would not understand the distinction between nation, country, and state, which were coined by Westerners, let alone international law. It was not until 1864 that the Chinese began to understand international law, when an American Presbyterian missionary to Qing Dynasty, William Alexander Parsons Martin, also known as DING WeiLiang, translated an important 1836 Western treatise into Chinese, namely, Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law/WanGuoGongFa*.<sup>52</sup> There are also some concepts, civilization and culture, the meaning of which are just the opposite of each other. In the West, civilization has a broader connotation, while culture, a narrower one. To the Chinese, it is just the opposite. So, even today, you will see notices saying be civilized when you drive in the streets of FuJian Province's XiaMen/Amoy City.<sup>53</sup> Caution, therefore, is needed, in order not to distort the analysis.

Fourth, Fitzgerald is serious about writing his chapter, which has a total of 86 endnotes. There is one important book, which he missed, and that would make a lot of difference. The name of that book is *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, written by Lucian W. Pye, reminding readers that China is but a culture, as opposed to what Hegel said about China, that is, China was nothing more than a state<sup>54</sup>; Kuijper, "... a dynamic system closely intertwined with rest of the world;"<sup>55</sup> or Rana Shantashil Rajyeswar MITTER, a concept. What the American political scientist said was closer to (alternative) reality. Until the First Opium War, it is safe to say that 99.9% of the Chinese people think about family or a loose aggregate of families first. Mitter was quite close to reality, when he made the following observation: In the early decades of the twentieth century, "many felt that China was a geographical expres-

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 26, p. 27, and p. 52. On page 26, the author translated the term as legitimate succession.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 52

<sup>50</sup> See his review article, "Western Concepts and China's Historical Experience," *World Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (July 1969), pp. 655-691.

<sup>51</sup> The second one was from October 1856 to September 1860.

<sup>52</sup> The author is an American lawyer, jurist, and diplomat.

<sup>53</sup> Outside of this city, the traffic can be said as being messy.

<sup>54</sup> Cited in Fitzgerald's chapter in Goodman and Segal's book, p.51

<sup>55</sup> See his paper, p.23.

sion rather than a country.” The invasion by the Japanese—once mentors to the Chinese but now seen as monsters—created a sense of national identity. In early 1938,<sup>56</sup> after the first Nationalist battlefield victory, China’s people for the first time began to care who governed them... “China” as a concept became personal and meaningful.<sup>57</sup> William T. LIU made the following related observation: “... for Chinese, the significance of *Chineseness* is not based on how much one understands the full significance of Confucian percepts and moral premises. Nor is it based on their willingness to accept Confucian teachings as the moral basis of behavior. Few Chinese are privileged to understand the essence of classical writings, even fewer are able to relate such writings in the structure of values in a generalized and abstract manner. Yet, *filial piety* as a practical means to relate father and sons [sic] presented most Chinese with no moral alternatives,” adding “... the leaders in Beijing, over the past 40 years, have not destroyed the Chinese family.”<sup>58</sup> It is only from the May 4th movement in 1919 that the Chinese intellectual gradually began to be aware of what is going on in the international society. What about Hegels’ remark? He liked other statesmen, political figures, and politicians in the West, especially after the October 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, and tried to impose non-Chinese political systems onto China, making the Middle Kingdom very uncomfortable to adjust to the new environment and situation.

Fifth, the Chinese to this day still attach great importance on their traditional culture. During the 8-year war against Imperial Japan from July 1937 to August 1945, many students would yell the slogan, ZhongGuoBuHuiWang/China will not die. It is good that Goodman cited the following book, which was published in the Chinese mainland a few years after the June 4, 1989 massacre or incident: *NanBeiQunQiu: ZhongGuoHuiBuHuiFenLie/The History of the North Versus the South: Will China Disintegrate?*<sup>59</sup> They are not just thinking about the ROC but the Chinese culture as well. This is because the Chinese in their inner heart believe that the country may disappear from the face of our earth but their culture will triumph ultimately and come back. If so, there is still hope for them. If not convinced, they would tell you to look at the Yuan Dynasty, as a historical aberration, and the Qing Dynasty, as another historical aberration. The Middle Kingdom was ruled by those Mongolian and ManZhou/Manchurian<sup>60</sup> barbarians, but the latter, mesmerized by the Chinese culture, eventually submitted themselves as Han Chinese by having adopted the Chinese characters for the name of their dynasty, respectively. It is

<sup>56</sup>From March to April 1938, the KMT for the first time tactically defeated the Imperial Japanese troops at TaiErZhuang in southern part of the Shandong Province.

<sup>57</sup>[http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/books/review/forgotten-ally-by-rana-mitter.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/books/review/forgotten-ally-by-rana-mitter.html?_r=0), accessed on August 31, 2016

<sup>58</sup>TONG in CHAI and CHAI, p. 59 and p. 63

<sup>59</sup>QIN XiangYin and NI JianZhong, eds., *NanBeiQunQiu: ZhongGuoHuiBuHuiFenLie/The History of the North Versus the South: Will China Disintegrate* (Beijing: ZhongGuoChuBanShe, 1993)

<sup>60</sup>They lived for many centuries mainly in Manchuria/Northeast and adjacent areas of mainland China.

couched in this sense that China is said to be resurrected from the grave. So, is it proper for Fitzgerald to proceed with his analysis from the nation, country, or (unitary) state perspective?

Critique of the fifth publication's methodology. Several points can be discussed. First, the editors examined both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, as a modern state,<sup>61</sup> from the historical, cultural, economic, and political dimensions. To Winberg CHAI, they are what he called "a united China of one country, many systems," as opposed to WEI Yung's multi-system nations, referring to divided countries after World War II. In the Foreword, the editors mentioned that from July 1995 to March 1996, the PRC conducted three military exercises involving 400,000 troops along the Chinese mainland coast and the United States, just before the first direct presidential election in the history of China, in early 1996 deployed two nuclear-armed aircraft carriers into the tense area, and, in Introduction, the first concept written by Robert A. Scalapino was wars and, in later pages, asking the following question: "... can the military – always an important force in Chinese politics – remain untied and under civil control? In the event of internal disorder – or regional upheaval – the military may be called upon in the future, as in the past. How will it respond?"<sup>62</sup> On the following page, the issue of whether or not to accept the ROT by major states was mentioned. How come there was no chapter specifically devoted on the military dimension, in view of the fact that (nontraditional) armed conflict between Taipei and Beijing could still be possible after May 2016? When Donald J. Trump became the 45th president of the United States in January 2017, would he often deploy aircraft carriers to the Taiwan waters?

Second, having taught Chinese history at Columbia University and lived in contemporary China, Te-kong TONG is one of the few scholars who was well versed in both the (chaotic) Chinese and American political systems. Did Goodman, Segal, and Fitzgerald have a chance to consult with TONG, regarding the comparison and contrast between the two systems, so that the former will be closer to (alternative) reality?<sup>63</sup> TONG has this say:

It has taken the Chinese nation about two hundred years since the First Opium War to perform [the] socio-economic and political transformation. That is the transformation of the traditional state under the Qin [sic] System, in which the *state* is too much stronger than the *society*, to a modern system of the people, by the people and for the people in which the *state* and the *society* balance each other.<sup>64</sup>

When TONG used the word, balance, he may well have the dialectical wax and wane harmony in mind.

Third, LIU wrote the following words in Chap. 2: "The concept of a modern nation-state depends less on cultural homogeneity than it does on administrative

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<sup>61</sup> Winberg CHAI, "Political Relations" in CHAI and CHAI, p. 99

<sup>62</sup> CHAI and CHAI, p. 11

<sup>63</sup> See, for example, John Foster, *Chinese Realities* (London: Church Missionary Society, 1928). The Church Missionary Society (CMS) came into being in April 1799.

<sup>64</sup> See his article, "Historical Relations" in CHAI and CHAI, pp. 15–54 at p. 45.



authority.”<sup>65</sup> A few questions can be posed: If there are three types of China, namely, ancient, modern, and contemporary, does each type have cultural homogeneity and administrative authority? Can ancient China do without administrative authority? And, should we follow TONG’s footsteps by saying (1) both cultural homogeneity and administrative authority can be balanced, (2) both of them can be in parallel, (3) the former carries more weight than the latter, (4) the latter carried more weight than the former, and (5) a mixture of 1–4?

Fourth, LIU made the following observation:

... The competition of true genealogical heritage as to which part of divided China is the real China only signifies that, without identity with the cultural past, Taiwan would have been a rich man without a name or identity.... Mainland China obviously does not have to prove its case. Regardless what form of political system that people have chosen, the fact is that these are the people who are located in the ancient land of China. If China is defined not by its geographic location, it must be defined by the abstract cultural values and symbolic meanings of institutional norms ... This should stimulate us to think about the impact that sharing the same cultural identity has on ultimate journey – the road to reunification.<sup>66</sup>

Powerfully expressed, he is actually talking about the political reunification, because, culturally, both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) have never been divided since October 1, 1949. To this day, the residents in the Taiwan area still observe the three important events, Chinese Lunar New Year, Dragon Boat Festival, and Moon Festival.

Critique of the sixth publication’s methodology. Several points can be discussed. First, we only need to focus on Part VI, which is entitled *China-Watching After a Quarter of a Century*, and we ought to ask the following tough question: Why is this part not the first part? This is because it is my firm belief that, once well versed in methodology, we can rationalize all the information, data, and analysis, be it past, present, or future. The only problem is how many of us can do that? And the answer to this question is not many, including the editor, who missed a golden chance to invite the best and the brightest China students to make a real impact on contemporary China studies, and we see only one interesting game-theoretic model on pages 221–222 and page 280 of the edited book. Birdcage theory was only mentioned on page 315 but not elaborated, and it is not directly related to the Chinese mainland and the Taiwan area. As to the “output model” and “withinput model” on page 316, are they really related to the Chinese mainland and the Taiwan area? It is very doubtful that Chinese (Communist) government officials and politicians have heard of such terms.

Second, again, one cannot be dialectical and non-dialectical in an (edited) publication. Lowell Dittmer mentioned (dynamic) synthesis on page 328, which is a dialectical term, for sure. Thomas G. Rawski on page 348, while reminding readers that the Chinese mainland’s system is in motion and nothing stands still, noted the following dialectical terms: red vs. experts, state vs. non-state, plan vs. market, and democrats vs. Communists. Did the editor realize that the two authors’ logic is not really 100% dialectical throughout their writings?

<sup>65</sup> See his article, “Cultural Relations” in CHAI and CHAI, pp. 55–65 at p. 55.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 63–64

Third, given the editor's tangible and intangible resources, he should have invited those retired FeiQingZhuanJia/experts on Chinese Communist bandits in his institute to discuss those conference papers from a dialectical perspective and tell us what is wrong with the methodology, so as to make the scholarly gathering more significant and meaningful.

Critique of the seventh publication's methodology. Several points can be discussed. First, Marble failed to, in the Introduction, spell out what methodology, approach(es), method(s), theory, model, etc. are. This is very important, because, for example, to Kuijper, methodology is philosophy of science.<sup>67</sup> What about others? If all the contributors follow Marble's wavelength of defining what is methodology and so on and so forth, readers will not have a hard time in following each contributor's writings. Having failed to do that, we see confusion begets confusion. Marble used the terms, methodological approaches (and techniques)<sup>68</sup> and methodologies, and placed the following article as the first one, "Analysis in Limbo: Contemporary Chinese Politics Amid the Maturation of Reform," which, for example, mentioned flagging approaches and methods.<sup>69</sup> Later, he admitted that the China studies field is "... marked by a dizzying array of participants who pursue a wide variety of substantive concerns and employ a diverse range of methodologies across differing levels of analyses"<sup>70</sup> and, in the chapter written by Shelley Rigger, we see term, policy-oriented or theoretical approaches and qualitative and quantitative methods.<sup>71</sup> We see another problem; Lowell Dittmer and William Hurst mentioned the MAO Zedong in command model<sup>72</sup> and TSOU Tang's model of an inevitable "struggle to win all or lose all."<sup>73</sup> Are they linked with each other or not? If so, how? No explanation was given. Has Marble corresponded to those coauthors for clarification, so as to dissolve the contradictions?

Second, one can suppose that the guest editor had some tangible and intangible resources to invite the real, serious China students, given that he worked at that institute. We see, in Marble's edited volumes, 25 contributors. In the opinion of Kuijper, most, if not all, of them can be sadly dismissed as pseudoscientists, because, for one reason, they are not in search of systematized knowledge of China *qua* China and, as another reason, they do not have their own theory.

Third, Kuijper said "... the Chinese are alien to the concept of ontology,"<sup>74</sup> which has to do with the study of being. Is that really true? Can we neglect and ignore religion in contemporary China's politics, economics, sociology, etc.? To be sure, in

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<sup>67</sup> See his paper, p. 16.

<sup>68</sup> Lowell Dittmer and William Hurst also employed the confusing terms, methodological approaches and conceptually innovated approaches. See Marble's edited volumes, p. 12, p. 37, and p. 48.

<sup>69</sup> See Marble's edited volumes, p. 3, p. 7, p. 12, and pp. 11–48.

<sup>70</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>71</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 54–55, p. 61, and p. 79.

<sup>72</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17

<sup>74</sup> See his paper, p. 12.

Marble's special issue, we do see, for example, a paper on religion being cited.<sup>75</sup> What theory should we apply to study contemporary China's religious dimension, if not other dimensions as well?

Critique of the eighth publication's methodology. Several points can be discussed. First, Kuijper's conference paper is a critique of other people's works on (Western) Sinology (*Zhōngguóxué*, as distinct from *Hànxiué*, which is a kind of old-fashioned philology).<sup>76</sup> I am conducting a critique of his critique. I do see a section devoted to the discussion of a new research model, undertaken along three imaginary, interconnected axes, to wit, geographical, historical, and sociocultural; each one of them is affecting, and affected by, the other two. I was excited, thinking that he can offer an even theory or a better model than others, including mine. No, his effort is incomplete, because he failed to show us a diagram, which can help us to follow his logic(s) or he did not include, for example, the economic axis, as he mentioned on page 25. To be honest, nobody can remember every word that he wrote in the verbal model. When one day Kuijper became old, he also cannot really remember each word in the verbal model. So, drawing a model in terms of a diagram is necessary and indispensable.

Second, he champions his own approach, that is, interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary, and he used the verb, champion, in his paper. He also mentioned the adjective, dialectical, in his paper. For me, how do we be closer to (alternative) reality? There are only two basic approaches, that is, dialectical and non-dialectical. The former can help us to be closer to (alternative) reality. Can the interdisciplinary perform a better result? This is because, by being interdisciplinary, I can put political science at (1); economics, (2); sociology, (3); etc. in my crab and frog motion model.

Third, as a Marxist, why would Kuijper not think about dialectics first as an approach? How would he dissolve that contradiction?

Fourth, I do fully agree with him that we should look for a study, which gives us a holistic picture at the very outset, not patchwork, as he said, which renders sets of statements, the interaction of which is empty. However, can he and I work hand-in-hand, searching for systematized knowledge or can I say the one-dot theory has already been systematized, incorporating his system theory? Even if we can, would others resist and even oppose us?

Fifth, Kuijper discussed his new model for the study of China. In an earlier publication, he pointed out that Sinologists must have a model of China that fits into a general country theory.<sup>77</sup> Would Kuijper be able to compress or simplify his paper in terms of what he also said in the same paper about China—"China reminds us of a brilliant-cut diamond, that only sparkles in the light?" A follow-up question is: Can diamond be a good theory to study contemporary China?

<sup>75</sup> See Marble's special issue, p. 385: James L. Watson, "Anthropological Analyses of Chinese Religion," *The China Quarterly*, Vol.66 (June 1976), pp. 355–364.

<sup>76</sup> <http://revije.ff.uni-lj.si/as/article/view/973>, accessed on August 14, 2016

<sup>77</sup> See his article, "Is Sinology a Science?" *China Report*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (July-September 2000), pp. 331–354 at p. 1.

Critique of the ninth publication's methodology. Several points can be discussed. First, WEI, who was a devotee of Dr. SUN Yat-sen, the founding father of the ROC,<sup>78</sup> had the honor of speaking to DENG and YANG ShangKun in person in September 1988, discussing China's modernization, Dr. SUN's SanMinZhuYi (SMZY)/*Three Principles of the People* (nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood/social well-being), which interwoven with and inextricably linked to Confucianism and Mengcianism, the Chinese reunification under the ideal model of freedom, democracy, and JunFu/equal distribution of wealth<sup>79</sup> and market economy. Did WEI sense that the ruling party on the Chinese mainland will get into deep trouble less than a year later and that the ruling party in the Taiwan area will lose power in May 2000 and that, by May 2016, SanMinZhuYi can be said as being 99% irrelevant in the Taiwan area's political arena, although three intellectuals *qua* supporters of the ROC from the Chinese mainland, who basically surfaced in one heart after the June 4 TianAnMen Square incident, publicly visited Taiwan Province in summer 2015?<sup>80</sup>

Second, soon after HU Jintao became the party leader, he visited Xibaipo Village, which is a township-level division of Pingshan County, Shijiazhuang City, Hebei Province, in December 2002 and announced Scientific Outlook on Development Doctrine, which had been incorporated into the CPC Constitution in October 2007.<sup>81</sup> Related to that doctrine, HU, speaking at the Central Party School in February 2003, mentioned "QuanWeiMinSuoYong/Power to be used by the people, QingWeiMinSuoXi/concern to be showered on the people, LiWeiMinSuoMou/benefits to be enjoyed by the people," which has been interpreted by many academics and experts on both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s), including ZHENG Yongnian, who was born in the Chinese mainland, as a people-centered concept or *new* SMZY. In other words, would WEI feel that he, as a KMT member, is holding on to an old version of SMZY? To be sure, MAO Zedong referred to SMZY as XinMinZuZhuYi/new SMZY, so as to keep a distance from the KMT, because he is a founding member of the CPC.<sup>82</sup>

Third, WEI wrote the following words in the front flap: "The economic system in Taiwan, in contrast to the People's Republic of China on the mainland, adopted a system of capitalism with Chinese characteristics." Applying my Beijing versus Taipei chart, as shown in Chap. 2 toward the end, what WEI said would be, from the Beijing leaders' perspective, in the danger zone. Has WEI realized that?

<sup>78</sup> See WEI's book, p. 80.

<sup>79</sup> See his book, p. 17. On page 30, he said the Chinese people should find an appropriate theoretical model. See also SU AiRong and LIU YongWei, editors, *SUN ZhongShan YanJiuZongMu/Compilation of Studies on SUN Yat-sen* (in literal translation) (Beijing: TuanJieChuBanShe, March 1990).

<sup>80</sup> <http://www.msn.com/zh-tw/news/other/%E5%85%A9%E5%B2%B8%E5%86%B7%E5%B0%8D%E4%B8%8B%E7%9A%84%E5%A4%A7%E9%99%B8%E6%B0%91%E5%9C%8B%E6%B4%BE%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E8%A1%8C/ar-AAIWjZl?ocid=mailsignout>, accessed on January 27, 2017.

<sup>81</sup> Some reports say that the doctrine is yet to be included in the PRC Constitution.

<sup>82</sup> MAO Zedong became a member of the KMT after Dr. SUN Yat-sen new policy of, for example, accommodating the Chinese Communists within his party. MAO received stipend from the KMT.

Fourth, WEI proposed a new national title for both sides of the Taiwan Strait, namely, Democratic Republic of China (DROC) and/or People's Democratic Republic of China or China for short. WEI is a staunch supporter of the KMT, saying, since he was born "a son of the KMT," he would be "a ghost of the KMT" after his death.<sup>83</sup> If SUN were alive today, how would the latter comment on the new national title? Would WEI be labeled as a traitor? If DENG Xiaoping were still alive today, what would he think about this title? To be sure, DENG did propose a new national title for both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s), that is, ZhongHuaGongHeGuo (ZHG HG).<sup>84</sup> However, at the advice of the then Vice-premier, WU XueQian, he dropped the proposal, because the English version for ZHG HG is the same as the ROC *in or on* Taiwan.

Critique of the tenth publication's methodology. Several points can be discussed. First, the subtitle of this book is sensational, if not provocative: nation-state or province? In the blurb, we see the following words: Copper argues that Taiwan's very rapid and successful democratization suggests Taiwan should be independent and separate from the PRC, while increasingly important economic links between both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) indicate the opposite. Is he for or against the Chinese reunification? In the bibliography of Hsiung's publication, we see Copper's one coauthored work, which is entitled *A Matter of Two Chinas* and which was published in 1979.<sup>85</sup> How to rationalize them? The best way is to argue that, dialectically, there are only one contemporary China or two halves China/LiangGeBanGeZhongGuo<sup>86</sup> and non-dialectically two. In other words, one China can be put at 1; two China, 5; with a hybrid of them at 3 in my crab and frog motion model.

Second, Copper's first edition was originally published in 1990 and the sixth, 2013. This means that the book is well received, as a textbook in many academics' syllabus. We do see jargons like model country, the Taiwan model, an economic common market solution might be the best model, and the role model.<sup>87</sup> However, in the fifth edition's index, no where do we find concepts related to methodology, such as theory, model, induction, deduction, etc.

Third, in the Preface, we see dialectical terms like contradictory, nonnegotiable, and nonexistent. In the last chapter, we see, for example, the term, dichotomy or "New Taiwanese."<sup>88</sup> Actually, we can treat Taiwan as a nation-state *qua* theory or

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<sup>83</sup> See his book, p. 48.

<sup>84</sup> Dr. SUN Yat-sen also considered this national title, with the same Chinese characters.

<sup>85</sup> There are some publications which mentioned two Chinas. See, for example, Ramon H. Myers, ed., *Two Chinese States: US Foreign Policy and Interests* (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978). See also another title: Myers and Jialin ZHANG, *The Struggle Across the Taiwan Strait: The Divided China Problem* (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Press, 2006).

<sup>86</sup> This term was coined by James C. Hsiung. Richard H. Yang coined the term, LiangAnZhongGuo/Bicoastal China, and he asked Harry Harding what does he think about the term. Bicoastal China can also be LiangAnGongTongDeZhongGuo.

<sup>87</sup> See his book, p. xi, p. 247, p. 248, and p. 249.

<sup>88</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 234 and p. 239.

Taiwan as a province *qua* theory, because some academics and experts subscribe to them, respectively. In Chap. 2, Copper treated Taiwan as the ROC. This phrase can also be treated as a theory. However, non-dialectically, Taiwan as a nation-state is Taiwan as a nation-state is Taiwan as a nation-state, and the same thing speaks for Taiwan as a province: Taiwan as a province is Taiwan as a province is Taiwan as a province. As to Taiwan as the ROC, it follows the same logic. However, dialectically, we can embrace all of them in the safe zone spectrum of the crab and frog motion model, by putting, for example, Taiwan as a province, at 5 and Taiwan as the ROC, at 1, thereby dissolving the contradictions, because one should tolerate all of them.

Critique of the 11th publication's methodology. Several points can be discussed. First, this book is one of the selected few which has not really dealt with the methodological issues. I only see a figure, presented in a model, having to do with assumptions and variables on current Taiwanese rapprochement with Chinese mainland.<sup>89</sup> It is basically dialectical, mentioning the trust and reciprocity assumptions, the necessity and imposition variables, and a framework conducive to (re)unification or independence.

Second, it is not clear why would the title of the edited book use the term, rise, while, in the Introduction, as written by the two editors, we see both terms, ascendance<sup>90</sup> and rise?<sup>91</sup> To a native speaker of English, he or she may know that the term, rise, connotes a negative consequence, such as perceiving threat, whereas the other term carries a positive connotation, benefiting at least some countries. Do the editors know that?

Third, the two editors perceive that the relationship between both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) has evolved from hostility to detente.<sup>92</sup> A few questions regarding the usage of the term, detente, can be posed, that is, how to rationalize the past, present, and future: When Nixon visited the Chinese mainland in February 1972, the media in the West used the term, detente, which carries a positive connotation. However, the Chinese characters used by the ROC newspapers at that time were DiDang, which carries a negative connotation, because Di can be translated as low. In May 2016, CAI YingWen became the ROC president; can we say, up to now, the relationship between Taipei and Beijing is still low? In other words, can we dialectically change the wording to read detente (as the safe zone) and non-detente (as the danger zone), so as to embrace all the positive and negative possibilities?

Fourth, the two coeditors are not for "two Chinas."<sup>93</sup> Yet, the book title can make us but to wonder whether the proper noun, China, includes or excludes Taiwan, WaiMengGu/Outer Mongolia, etc. In this connection, what theory or model can they generate to enable the two coeditors to describe, explain, and infer all those proper nouns?

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<sup>89</sup> See GUO and TENG, p. 148.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., p. 1

<sup>91</sup> In the last paragraph on this page, both terms were mentioned. See *ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>92</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 2–7.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. 7

Critique of the 12th publication's methodology. Several points can be discussed. First, I thought about choosing WU Yu-shan's journal article, *Theorizing on Relations Across the Taiwan Strait [sic]: Nine Contending Approaches*, which was published in November 2000.<sup>94</sup> He is known to have made a critique of Gordon Chang's *The Coming Collapse of China and the Question of Methodology*.<sup>95</sup> Then, I decided to conduct a methodological critique of GUO Sujian's edited book, because I wanted to learn something new and indigenous from an academic, who has lived and was educated in the Chinese mainland. However, did the editor 100% focus on the methodological issues? I am afraid not. As a matter of fact, I emailed him, asking him why did he ignored or neglected dialectics?

Second, GUO wrote the following words:

We have witnessed the substantial transformation of China studies, particularly Chinese political studies, in the past 30 years due to changes in China and its rising status in the world as well as changes in our ways of conducting research. As area studies specialists, we are no longer 'isolated' from the larger disciplines of Political Science and International Relations (IR) but an integral part of them. This book contains theoretically innovative contributions by distinguished political scientists from inside and outside China, who together offer up-to-date overviews of the state of the field of Chinese political studies, combines empirical and normative researches as well as theoretical exploration and case studies, explore the relationship between Western political science scholarship and contemporary Chinese political studies, examine the logic and methods of political science and their scholarly application and most recent developments in the study of Chinese politics, and discuss the hotly-contested and debated issues in Chinese political studies, such as universality and particularity, regularity and diversity, scientification and indigenization, main problems, challenges, opportunities and directions for the disciplinary and intellectual development of Chinese political studies in the context of rising China.

The editor is sincere in promoting the Chinese political studies. However, he has failed to include the dialectical approach. Why did he also fail to include the substantial study of the Taiwan area, since he invited Lynn T. White, III, to contribute a chapter, and in the latter's chapter we see the following words: "Will there be a Sino-American war over Taiwan, which Chinese take to be their province"<sup>96</sup> and since he requested a Taiwan studies academic, Shelley Rigger to write a chapter?

Third, GUO Sujian included Jon R. Taylor's contribution in Chap. 15, and the latter mentioned the quantitative versus qualitative methodology in the American political science discipline, which is barely 100 years old.<sup>97</sup> What Taylor categorized vastly differed from my understanding of the term, methodology. I would only treat the terms, quantitative and qualitative, as two different methods, not 100% methodology, which is at a higher level.

<sup>94</sup> See his article, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 9, No.25 (November 2000), pp. 407–428.

<sup>95</sup> Yu-shan WU, "Gordon Chang's *The Coming Collapse of China* and the Question of Methodology," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 235–238

<sup>96</sup> See his chapter, "Chinese Political Studies," pp. 11–36 at p. 12.

<sup>97</sup> "Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let One Hundred Thoughts Contend" in GUO, pp. 263–284 at p. 263



How do we slot in the 12 publications, dialectically, in terms of the one-dot theory? We again need a series of models to describe, explain, and infer everything. Why do we still need to infer some phenomena? Wasn't the most recent book published in 2013, which is already a thing of the past? This is because some (co-)authors and (co-)editors at one point or another mentioned certain issue, phenomenon, or development dealing with the future. For example, is Copper's book subtitle nation-state or province? It is still an ongoing process for the ROC, which has been referred to as Taiwan authority of China by the PCA in July 2016, because it is still alive at least as a political entity.

We can start by applying the model on the upper left-hand side. That square/circle with nothing inside can be regarded as contemporary China. Since contemporary China is not the only concept in the world, we have non-contemporary China. This means that we have to move to the second small model, which is the model on the upper right-hand side or *Yin* and *Yang*. Indeed, it is not possible for all the publications to just describe, explain, and infer the period from October 1, 1949 up to now and even beyond, we can easily find some passages in those publications, which deal with ancient and/or modern China. So, when we talk about contemporary China as *Yin*, aspects of ancient China as that small dot could be included in the discussion. The same logic speaks for modern China. In other words, modern China is that small dot in *Yin*. Because each selected publication is related to contemporary China, modern China, and even ancient China, we have not been going to the extreme. This means that we are now applying the third small model, which is at the lower right-hand side, by being at 5. What do we do next?

We can build a series of crab and frog motion models. The number of them could be infinite. This is the fourth small model at the lower left-hand side. The first one is as follows: Contemporary China versus Non-Contemporary China. The second one is Non-Contemporary China versus Contemporary China. The third one is Contemporary China at 1 and Non-Contemporary China at 5. E in this context would be Non-Contemporary China at 1 and Non-Contemporary China at 5. One example for Non-Contemporary China at 1 and Non-Contemporary China at 5 is CHINESE (with each alphabet uniquely capitalized by the two coeditors in that 1996 edited book by Winberg CHAI and May-lee CHAI but with no explanation being offered by both editors for capitalizing all the letters) Mainland or the Republic of TaiPingDao/Itu Aba Island, which is yet to surface in the international society. The fourth model is The Chinese Mainland at 1; Taiwan area, 2; XiangGang/Hong Kong, 3; and AoMen/Macau, 4. By just looking at the selected title, we see one publication strictly mentioning China; one publication strictly bearing the words, contemporary China; and so on and forth. That is to say, we can easily rationalize everything, without being contradictory, and this is the main point.

In sum, we do see the need to greatly improve upon the methodology in studying contemporary China in the future. When will the China students be able to achieve that? I do not know. I may not be able to see that.

## Chapter 4

# Challenging Other Theories and Models in General and Those Related to Contemporary China in Particular

My dialectical study is theoretical. It is doubtless that, up to now, in terms of numbers, there are more brilliant theorists and creative model builders in the West than the East. Thus, most universities in East Asia and elsewhere adopt textbooks published in the West. It is about time to reverse that unhealthy trend.

If I were to cite and to make a critique of definitions on theory and model generated by other academics and experts in the West, would be it similar or different? Let me first quote some theories as put forward by those Western academics and experts:

1. Common *qua* theory. In December 2015, I was again invited by the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University to give a public lecture on a topic related to contemporary China in general and the South China Sea in particular. At the question and answer session, a co-moderator said, in the West, the concept, common, has existed a long time ago, and it seems to be better than the one-dot theory, because everything can be labeled as common.

A few points can be discussed. First, in the last few decades, we often hear people say that the common denominator of the Taiwan area is the ROC. After returning to the National Quemoy University, I realized that, at that point in time, I should have replied by saying, when we have a theory, we should have a model or a series of model to accompany it. It is very powerful for the theory, common, or, for that matter, the rational (choice) theory,<sup>1</sup> to say that everything can be regarded as being common or whatever one do and say is rational, including those pilots who on

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<sup>1</sup>Whiting in his book mentioned, such as the rational actor model and rationality model. To him, “[r]ationality in an initiatory policy is the pursuit of likely attainable goals through available means where perceived costs are outweighed by anticipated gains.” See p. xiv, p. xx, and p. 231. In his *China Crosses the Yalu*, he said it can be characterized as a mediated stimulus-response model, as exemplified by the works of Robert North, Nazli Choucri, Ole Holsti, and others. See p. xv. However, did the Chinese Communist leaders like MAO Zedong understand what is a mediated stimulus-response model or what Whiting called a unitary model in the same paragraph of the same page?

purpose crashed their airplanes on the twin towers in New York City's lower Manhattan Borough and elsewhere in the American homeland on September 11, 2001, thinking that it is rational for them to do so, because they, as crusaders, can go to Heaven for what they have done. However, where are the model(s)? If we have only one model, there will be no contradiction. However, what if there are two or more models? To be sure, each pilot in that airplane can be a theory or model, because they exist and they represent partial reality. The answer is as follows: The probability of having contradiction thickens. Intuitively, all those models must be contradictory, and, therefore, those model builders are doing a great disservice by misleading beginners, unless a student of theory and model already knew that the application of theories and models is for the sake of dissolving all the contradictions and, therefore, he or she would try to logically, systematically, and coherently link them.

Second, the origin of the word, common, is from Middle English *comun*, from Anglo-Norman *comun*.<sup>2</sup> If common can be defined as “the same in a lot of places or for a lot of people,”<sup>3</sup> then it is less powerful than the one-dot theory, which is the same in all areas (as opposed to places) MINUS ONE and the same for all the people, since the first human being. What I am saying is that the common denominator of all things, tangible and intangible, is one dot. This statement should be closer to (alternative) reality.

2. The one and the many. As pointed out by Kuijper, “the one and the many has been a perennial problem in Western philosophy.”<sup>4</sup> This is not really a problem in Chinese philosophy. In Chap. 2, readers have seen the Beijing versus Taipei chart. There is one dialectical model, for example, one-party dictatorship versus multiparty system. It has to do with one and many.

Several points can be discussed. First, it is part of the biggest model, which, in turn, is still part of one dot or TaiJiTū in the palm of (great) Buddha.

Second, if one refers to the supernatural force, many would be seen from the Big Bang.

Third, many can be folded or collapsed as one. Treating many as either the safe zone spectrum or the danger zone spectrum is always possible. In other words, each spectrum is one or a dot.

Fourth, if there is no supernatural force, we can also describe and explain that, if one is the biggest dot, many could be those things in that biggest dot.

By having pointed out some problems in the one and the many, readers should embrace one dot or TaiJiTū, for a paradigmatic change.

<sup>2</sup><http://www.yourdictionary.com/common>, accessed on September 3, 2016.

<sup>3</sup><http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/common>, accessed on September 3, 2016.

<sup>4</sup>Email from him, dated October 25, 2016.

3. My one-dot theory and, for that matter, TaiJiTu, differs quite a lot from J. V. Stalin's *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, which was published in September 1938.<sup>5</sup>

Several points can be discussed. First, can Stalin and his theorists compress or simplify their contribution into a theory and model? If they can, they would show us at least one diagram. But, they would be reluctant to, because as politicians they cannot reveal their bottom line, just as a businessman cannot tell his or her clients or customers the amount of money needed to manufacture a product.

Second, speaking of Stalin's dialectical method, I can slot their four principle features into, for example, my crab and frog motion model: Put nature connected and determined at (1); nature is a state of continuous motion and change, (2); natural quantitative change leads to qualitative change, (3); and contradictions inherent in nature, (4). In other words, E would be 100% non-1 2 3 4. The question is how to weigh each feature. This is because all the dialecticians may not agree with each other. However, after complying with the Centralism versus Democracy model, which can be credited to Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known by the alias Lenin, they can come to at least a tentative conclusion, when facing an emergency.

Third, can we really say that contradictions are inherent in nature? Not really, if we talk about mother nature. If an atheist looks at the Big Bang *qua* the very first dot, would there be contradiction on the surface at that point in time? Needless to say, if the religious people look at the Big Bang and the world before that, there could be contradiction, because we are talking about at least two beings, which could become one someday or certain time/space sequence.

Fourth, we must not forget what Engels said in the following words: "All nature from the smallest thing to the biggest. from grains of sand to suns, from protista (the primary living cells ...) to man, has its existence in eternal coming into being and going out of being, in a ceaseless flux, in unresting motion and change."<sup>6</sup> In other words, Engels, Stalin, and so on and so forth did not remind their followers that a grain is a dot; a sand is a dot, a sun is a dot, and a cell is a dot. So, dot is the common denominator of all their words and deeds.

Fifth, when we read the following sentence, we also realize that Engels, Stalin, etc. were aware of the jump or frog motion at a certain nodal point: At certain definite nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a qualitative leap.<sup>7</sup> However, they did not provide us with the time/space sequence component. At least to a researcher who applies, for example, the crab and frog motion model, he or she can, in retrospect, tell readers who (is involved?), where (did it take place?), when (did it take place?), what (happened?), and why (did that happen?) or the principle of 5Ws or 6Ws, embracing how can also cover what, when, or where.

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<sup>5</sup><https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1938/09.htm>, accessed on August 22, 2016.

<sup>6</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*

By having pointed out some problems in Stalin's contribution on dialectical and historical materialism, it is safe to say that there is room for improvement in his writing.

4. Kurt Lewin's: There is nothing more practical than a good theory.<sup>8</sup>

Several points can be discussed. First, this is a seminal statement. However, it is not a definition.

Second, to a beginner, one may be easily lost between what is practical and what is a theory. After looking at the book title, one may guess that information and data gathered from a field trip are something called practical, while theory is related to one's mind and heart. No, something in one's mind can also be a theory. For example, in ancient days, a human being may wonder why he or she cannot fly? In early twentieth century, human beings succeeded in flying, and we coined a term for that historic feat.

Third, a good and, for that matter, bad theory refers to partial (alternative) reality, respectively. Either one can be practical. The only problem with the bad one is that it may not be able to describe, explain, and infer more phenomena than a good or better theory.

Fourth, can nonpractical be embraced in a theory? Dialectically, it can. Non-dialectically, the theorist must exclude the nonpractical dimension.

By having pointed out some problems in his statement, Kurt should come up with his own definition of theory.

5. Robert W. Cox's: "Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspective derives from a position in time and space, specifically social and political ... There is ... no such thing as theory itself, divorced from standpoint in time and space."<sup>9</sup>

Several points can be discussed. First, does Cox also include theories related to mother nature and natural science, since we the human beings are part of that nature, which include cyber space? If "someone" refers to certain human beings, my one-dot theory can be applied to describe oxygen, stone, dinosaur, etc., which are, on surface, not 100% related to human, although we know that oxygen are in our body and some people do eat stones.

Second, because I can say Buddha is a dot and no Buddhists would be unhappy, perspective can be religious, philosophical, etc., too. Has Cox realized that?

Third, Cox said we must take time and space into consideration, when we generate a theory. If Buddha as a dot is a theory, can we prove that in the Buddha world there is time and space as well other dimensions?

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<sup>8</sup>Kurt Lewin (1952). *Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers* (London: Tavistock), p. 169.

<sup>9</sup>See his article, "Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory" in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 204–255.

Fourth, if we were to link with what Cox wrote about theory to Abraham Kaplan's *The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science*, in which we see concepts like God, God's purpose, and Devil,<sup>10</sup> an additional question can be posed: If "someone" refers to only human beings, why would Kaplan mention, for example, Devil?

By having pointed out some problems in his definition, Cox cannot say that theory is *always* for someone and for some purpose.

6. Kuijper's: "A theory is not a doctrine or procrustean bed, but an imaginative construction suggested by the outcome of critical and exhaustive investigation. It has been devised to guide research and understanding. A theory, rather than being a dispensable luxury [*sic*] or unnecessary encumbrance to empirical research, provides a sophisticated way of seeing, an important source of conjectures, and a handy tool for investigation. It is a coherent, yet developing scheme, according to which the scientist expounds a topic or covers a field. A theory is an ideational structure, which people may or may not agree with. As the facts that do not square a theory accumulate, the pressure to revise, or to replace, it will be mounting."<sup>11</sup>

Several points can be discussed. First, I do agree that a theory is not a doctrine, which has to do more or less with ideology and politics. However, it could be a procrustean bed, because, in the West, the theory, common, does exist, and some academics have been led to believe that the theory, common, can enable us to describe, explain, and infer *all* the phenomena. Needless to say, I do not 100% agree with that theory, because can we say, for example, God is common (to you, me, and a third party)?

Second, to him, theory is an imaginative construction. No, theory could surface, after seeing the very first stone on our earth by Adam, if he were the very first human being. Because that stone is part of (alternative) reality, it can be called a theory, unless it has disappeared. Even if it disappeared, when a second stone appears, that could still be called a theory.

Third, he said: "A theory ... provides a sophisticated way of seeing, an important source of conjectures, and a handy tool for investigation." My one-dot theory is very simple. It is not sophisticated, while TaiJiTu is, indeed, very sophisticated, allowing a dialectician to rationalize everything MINUS ONE.

Fourth, Kuijper wrote the following words: "A theory is an ideational structure, which people may or may not agree with." Would all the people agree that since the Big Bang, each phenomenon is a dot? Yes, is the answer, for sure. However, critics may still argue that some people cannot see and, therefore, they may not agree on something that they have not seen. I do not see that as a problem, because my one-dot theory still reflects partial truth—yes, in the context of a larger dot. However, what if I say that we should look at everything since the Big Bang or even the world before it, entirely as a dot? In this connection, Buddhists would not regard the statement that Buddha is a dot as being controversial, while many, if not most, Catholics, Christians, and Muslims may or may not agree that God is a dot. One of

<sup>10</sup> See p. 296, p. 363, and p. 379.

<sup>11</sup> See his paper, p. 7.

my former students from the Kingdom of Swaziland said if that dot is the original, almighty dot, he can accept it.

By having pointed out some problems in his definition, Kuijper cannot say that his definition is perfect.

7. Donald R. Cooper and Pamela S. Schindler's: Theory is "a set of systematically interrelated concepts, definitions, and propositions that are advanced to explain or predict phenomena (facts); the generalizations we make about variables and the relationships among variables," and, as to model, it is defined as "a representation of a system that is constructed to study some aspects of that system or the system as a whole," adding "[m]odels differ from theories in that a theory's role is explanation whereas a model's role is representation."<sup>12</sup>

Several points can be discussed. First, concepts, definitions, and propositions do not equivalent to each other. When we think or write down a concept, we then define it. So, I would not mention definitions and propositions in the definition.

Second, the definition could be made of at least two words, which may or may not be related. So, I have reservation regarding the term, interrelated concepts. In this connection, a theory could have only one word, such as the game theory.

Third, a theory has three basic functions, that is, description, explanation, and inference. If we want to mention the fourth one, it is the function of dissolving contradictions. So, I would not just mention explanation and prediction.

Fourth, the two coauthors mentioned the word in plural, phenomena, to be followed by another word in plural, facts. A theory may only first flash in one's mind and heart, such as I want to fly, as mentioned earlier. Before December 17, 1903, it was not possible for us human beings to fly. But, there must be at least one person who thought about flying in ancient days. Thinking alone could be a theory. When the Wright brothers succeeded in flying, "I want to fly" became a fact.

Fifth, I prefer to use the terms, simplification and compression, as opposed to generalization, when we talk about theory. A theory is simply a simplification and compression of a model, which could consist of at least two concepts, as opposed to variables, a term which I would not use.

Sixth, I would again reiterate that a model is a simplification or compress of certain issue, phenomenon, or development, not a representation of a system as said by Cooper and Schindler. In this connection, there could be many systems with certain issue, phenomenon, or development.

Seventh, both theories and models can enable us to describe, explain, and infer certain issue, phenomenon, or development. So, I disagree with what they said: "Models differ from theories in that a theory's role is explanation whereas a model's role is representation."


By having pointed out some problems in their definition, Cooper and Schindler cannot say that their definition is persuasive.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Donald R. Cooper and Pamela S. Schindler, *Business Research Methods*, 10th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2008)

<sup>13</sup> On page xii in the Preface, they said their book is now published in five international editions and in five languages.



8. Min Gyo KOO's game-theoretic models.<sup>14</sup>




Territorial bargaining game process: initiation stage



Territorial bargaining game process: challenge-the-status-quo stage and beyond

<sup>14</sup> See his book, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place* (New York: Springer, 2009), Chapter 2.



A bargaining game approach to territorial disputes

Several points can be discussed. First, like my problem, KOO has to use different models to conduct research and writing. To some researchers, this may mean cumbersome and even contradictory.

Second, would international actors in East Asia perform rationally at all times? I am not so sure. One of them may fire the first shot under panic.

Third, game theory cannot escape from dialectics. We see many dialectical terms, such as tangible and non-tangible value of goods, that is, intangible value of goods, and challenge and non-challenge, that is, no challenge.

Fourth, the book explores the three most prominent island disputes in East Asia: the Dokdo/Takeshima, the DiaoYuTai/Senkakus, and the XiSha/Paracel and NanSha/Spratly Archipelagoes in the SCS. Does KOO know that the Chinese mind and heart is dialectical?

Fifth, it would be interesting to see how many game theorists can accept his models.

By having pointed out some problems in his model, it is suggested that he should simplify or compress all the models into one theory.

9. TianRenHeYi, which is a Chinese idiom, can be treated as a theory. Translated, it means that man is an integral part of mother nature/unity of heaven and man/mother nature and human in harmony. Tian can be mother nature, environment, or heaven, while Ren refers to man.

A few points can be discussed. First, if applying a series of my crab and frog motion model, everything becomes clearer. I can mention a few important ones: (1)

Tian at 1 versus Ren, E; (2) Ren at 1 versus Tian, E; (3) Tian at 1 and Ren, 5 versus Non-Tian at 1 and Ren, 5; and (4) Ren at 1 and Tian, 5. In ancient days, man, fearful of the supernatural forces, is almost always at the mercy of Tian. So, the first crab and frog motion model applies. In modern and contemporary days, we the human beings can sometime beat or overcome landslides, storms, earthquakes, typhoons, etc. So, the second and/or fourth model usually applies. What the third model is emphasizing that we the human beings must be humble, by acknowledging that our weight is lesser than Tian, which carries the most weight, and we the human beings should strive to go to 3, meaning we must still respect Tian but at the same time we can improve upon our standard of living by relying on cutting-edge science and technology, resulting TianRenHeYi.

Second, if we apply the admittedly powerful game theory, can we do a better job? Not really. This is because the game theory assumes that we are all rational at all times. Is this possible? Never 100%. Besides, in the basic matrix of game theory, we see two players and four cells. Can one of the players be one of the supernatural forces? Can we negotiate and bargain with those supernatural forces? It is difficult, if the supernatural force is God, Buddha, or Allah and they do exist.

By having pointed out the basic problems with regard to the game theory, it is suggested that we should first apply the one-dot theory, which is more flexible and dynamic than the game theory, rational (choice) theory, etc., which were first developed in the West.

What about theories and models generated which are related to contemporary China, including mine? We can select and discuss several of them.

First, I have a paper published in October 2007 and, in that paper, I have constructed the CHINA, China, and china theory.<sup>15</sup>

Several points can be discussed. (1) In retrospect, I had failed to specify a number of core crab and frog motion models. I only mentioned the threatening versus non-threatening model in the subtitle. There should be more models. We ought to remember that when we have a theory, we do need a model or a series of models to shore it up, and, when we have a model (or a series of models), we do not have to build a theory. Here, I should add several important models as well, such as CHINA, China, and china versus Non-CHINA, China, and china; Non-CHINA, China, and china versus CHINA, China, and china; and CHINA, China, and china as well as Non-CHINA, China, and china versus Non-CHINA, China, and china as well as Non-CHINA, China, and china. (2) my CHINA, China, and china theory, accompanied by a series of crab and frog motion models, certainly differs from China is China is China, although we can say, as most Chinese are fond of saying, ChaBuDuo/about the same/similar/six of one and half a dozen of the other.<sup>16</sup> (3) my CHINA, China, and china theory can be parsed into three other crab and frog motion models:

<sup>15</sup>Peter Kien-hong YU and Shawn S. F. KAO, "Whither CHINA, China, and china: Threatening or Non-Threatening," *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XI, No. II (October 2007), pp. 73–118.

<sup>16</sup><https://tw.dictionary.yahoo.com/dictionary?p=%E5%B7%AE%E4%B8%8D%E5%A4%9A>, accessed on September 3, 2016.

CHINA versus Non-CHINA, China versus non-China, and china versus Non-china. By standing at 1 in the China versus Non-China model, we actually see China (at time/space sequence 1) is China (at time/space sequence 2) is China and China (at time/space sequence 3). Can the reverse be true, if and when we try to match China is China is China with that of the China versus Non-China model? And (4) I wonder how many academics and experts have studied my model(s). More importantly, have they ever thought of applying my CHINA, China, and china theory?

By having pointed out a few problems in the above, we can say that my CHINA, China, and china theory is closer to (alternative) reality but needs elaboration.

Second, David M. Lampton in the December 2002/March 2003 special issue of *Issues and Studies* advanced the following linear-thinking sentence: China is China is China.<sup>17</sup>

Several points can be discussed.

1. China is certainly not necessarily China, if we make qualifications, because the first China could be ancient, while the second China, modern, and the third, contemporary.
2. If China is China is China refers to contemporary China, this contemporary China certainly cannot last forever. So, what we know about this contemporary China would become modern or ancient China, x-number of years from now.
3. China is China is China is part of my CHINA, China, and china theory, as mentioned earlier. If so, which theory is more power or closer to (alternative) reality?
4. When Andromeda Galaxy collides with the Milky Way Galaxy one day, everything on earth will be gone. When that tragedy takes place, can we still say China is China is China? In other words, we have to by then say China was China was China or contemporary China would be in the danger zone of Contemporary China versus Non-contemporary China.

By having pointed out several problems in the above, I can confidently say that my CHINA, China, and china theory is closer to (alternative) reality than Lampton's.

Third, LIN Gang, who is a Chinese mainland academic, put forward the following model<sup>18</sup>:

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<sup>17</sup> See page 372.

<sup>18</sup> In his 2016 book, *China's Long Quest for Democracy*, LIN Gang predicted a *dichotomous*, that is, qualitative and quantitative, change in the Chinese mainland political system. See also his article, "Beijing's New Strategies Toward a Changing Taiwan," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 25, Issue 99, published online January 26, 2016, pp. 321–335.



*from the Beginning to A.D. 1760; The Sources of Social Power, Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914; The Sources of Social Power: Volume 3, Global Empires and Revolution, 1890–1945; and The Sources of Social Power: Volume 4, Globalizations, 1945–2011.* Mann is a sociologist by training and he, in his writings, showed us two critical elements, that is, the ideological, military, economic, and political (IMEP) model or the four irreducible and interdependent sources of social power as well as the theory of social change and power interstices.<sup>19</sup> Patrick Kuang-hao HOU applied Mann's model and the theory to study Nationalist China's state domination from July 1926, when we witnessed the Northern Expedition conducted by CHIANG Kai-shek, and Communist China's domination from October 1949, arguing "... China is neither an exceptional, exotic case falling outside the parameters of comparability with other countries, nor does it require a unique Sino-specific analytical framework of its own,"<sup>20</sup> adding, after his study, the IMEP model [sic] fits the Chinese historical contexts or it can be successfully applied to the Chinese context.<sup>21</sup>

Several points can be discussed.

1. HOU's book covered important Chinese figures like CHIANG Kai-shek, MAO Zedong, and DENG Xiaoping. Mann's books were published separately, that is, in 1986, 1993, 2012, and 2013. There is no question that the Chinese mind and heart is dialectical. HOU in the methodology and method section of the first chapter mentioned the word, dialectic.<sup>22</sup> A number of questions can be posed: Was Mann's model (m in the lower case) dialectically, non-dialectically built, or even both? In other words, did Mann mention dialectic, dialectics, or dialectical in his volumes? If not, would that contradict with HOU's logic(s)? I can arrange the four most important sources of social power by putting ideological power at 1; military power, 2; economic power, 3; and political power, 4 in my crab and frog motion model. I can also juggle around, for example, ideological power at 1 and military power at 5. Differently put, there is a zillion ways of arranging them. I can also expand the safe zone spectrum of my crab and frog motion model to be: 1 2 3 4 5. While ideological power is still at 1; military power, 2; economic power, 3, and political power, 4, 5 could be science and technology power. Can Mann do that?
2. Since Mann studied globalization, had he ever thought about intercelestialization? In this book, I did devote one section in the second chapter, discussing intercelestialization, reminding readers that the process of deglobalization has already begun.

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<sup>19</sup> See Patrick Kuang-hao HOU, *State Domination in Modern China: An Examination of the Applicability of the IMEP Model for the Analysis of Chinese Politics in the Twentieth Century* (Heidelberg, Victoria, Australia: Heidelberg Press, 2012), p. 10.

<sup>20</sup> HOU, p. 1.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36 and p. 213.

<sup>22</sup> On pages 36 and 37, HOU also mentioned the word, zigzag, which could be dialectically understood.

3. Mann attached great importance on the ideological power and political power, the least in his analytical framework. However, if we were to again look at the Beijing versus Taipei chart, we see economic power in general or the mainstream economic line in particular being *the* most important source in the eyes of the Chinese Communists. Everything else is relegated to the superstructure. So, Beijing would coin the term, economic globalization, as opposed to merely mentioning the term, globalization. In other words, the Chinese mainland leaders differ from Mann, and the former knows that they have to comply with the mainstream economic line first, to be followed by country, ideology, politics, and military in that order of importance. In this connection, readers should be reminded that JIANG Zemin put forward YiDeZhiGuo/rule the country by virtue. Virtue is not equivalent to ideology. So, in order to be closer to reality, can we say Mann's model is equivalent to "one size fits all" or what HOU said, that is, a unique Sino-specific framework is not necessary?
4. Can Mann show us his model in terms of a diagram? This is important, because sometimes military power and political power, for example, are intertwined or interdependent. In my crab and frog motion model, if military power is placed at 1 and political power, 5, 3 would be a hybrid of the two powers.
5. HOU on page 194 reminded readers that he followed the thread of the argument to summarize the theory of social change. Again, can he show us in a diagram about the structure-agency problem or the party-state issue? It is possible to apply TaiJiTu to parse structure-agency as the structure and the agency as well as to dissect the party-state as the party and the state.

By having pointed out several problems in the above, I can confidently say that my application of the one-dot theory can enable me to be closer to (alternative) reality than both Mann and HOU's.

All in all, a lot of work must be done in order to generate theories and models in a sharper resolution, so as to enable us to be closer to (alternative) reality.



## Chapter 5

# Sharing Some Major Findings in This Study of Contemporary China

When we have new, the opposite of that is non-new, and one of the synonyms for non-new is old. Because the thinking is dialectical and non-linear, non-new could mean a zillion of other things, tangible and intangible.

Throughout the writing of this book, some related things have from time to time flashed in my mind or struck me as “new” in the context of my one-dot theory, and I would like to list them, accordingly, and to briefly discuss each one of them.

### 5.1 Preface

First, Buddha’s (great) palm<sup>1</sup> was mentioned. It was also mentioned in the first chapter. In real life, we do see the palm in the statue. Does God or Allah have palm? I am not sure. Can we find it out?

Second, do the keywords constitute a framework and, after testing it, becoming a model? Ideally, it should be that. In other words, in the title or subtitle of any publication, readers can know right away about the theory, and, in the keywords part, a framework or model. If not, the table of contents should reflect a framework or model. However, I mentioned the following five keywords: methodology, one-dot theory, TaiJiTu, *Yin* and *Yang*, Taiwan, and Mainland China. Arrangement should be made, so that the most abstract keyword should appear first and the least abstract keyword, last. Hence, one-dot theory should be mentioned first and Taiwan and Mainland China, last. The main reason to put methodology as the first keyword is to emphasize that the study of contemporary China should engage in a paradigm shift, starting from the dialectical approach, if we want to be closer to (alternative) reality.

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<sup>1</sup>Or WuZhiShan/Mountain of Five Fingers.

## 5.2 Chapter 1's Findings

First, it is definitely a mistake to think that the theories and models described and explained in textbooks are the only ones. No, theories exist everywhere since the Big Bang, if not earlier. My one-dot theory perhaps was never mentioned, in writing, before December 2004 by anyone in the world. I for the first time mentioned it in a 2005 book on HU Jintao and the ascendancy of mainland China.

Second, in physics, we have the theory of everything (ToE) or final theory, ultimate theory, or master theory. Can the dialectical one-dot theory be non-dialectical? This is possible, if we trace it back to the Big Bang *qua* the first dot, if there were no world before that. To put it another way, if the Big Bang is the second dot, the world before that would be the first dot, and we can say: the Buddha is the Buddha. In April 1927, it was Georges Henri Joseph Édouard Lemaître, who was a Belgian [priest](#), [astronomer](#), and professor of [physics](#) at the [Catholic University of Leuven](#) and who put forward the Big Bang theory, but he chose not to talk about the world before the Big Bang, although some observers say the father of Big Bang had shown that religion and natural science – or at least (theoretical) physics – did not have to be incompatible.

Third, can the one-dot theory be the final theory, ultimate theory, or master theory? The answer is not conclusive, because one of my graduate students, challenging me, said he would put forward his particle theory.<sup>2</sup> That is to say, to him, everything including God is a particle, as opposed to one dot. To be sure, we the human beings are made up of particles.

Fourth, up to May 2017, it is said that the common denominator of the Taiwan area is the ROC. For both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s), it is Dr. SUN Yat-sen's thought.<sup>3</sup> In my study of contemporary China, one dot is the common denominator.

Fifth, can one-dot theory or TaiJiTu help us to predict, forecast, or guess the future? It is possible, because we can build an infinite number of, for example, crab and frog motion models. That is to say, if this model does not apply, simply jump to the other one, so as to be closer to (alternative) reality. If none of them applies, just build, for example, a new crab and frog motion model.

Sixth, Michael D. Myers pointed out that research can be positivist, interpretive, or critical. My one-dot theory has its empirical dimension. I can easily slot in information, data, and analysis into the theory. My study attempts to offer a vastly different interpretation from the previous publications. And, readers should agree by now that I have DianFu/upset previous positivist and interpretive publications, and, therefore, I have been critical.

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<sup>2</sup>See my book, *Interantional Governance, Regimes, and the South China Sea Issues: A One-dot Theory Intepretation* (Singapore: Springer, 2015), p.263.

<sup>3</sup>See <http://www.CRNTT.com> 2016-10-15 00:12:24, accessed on October 16, 2016. Former ranking official of the ROC, XU ShuiDe, said Dr. SUN Yat-sen's LiNian/idea/belief can be communicated with/interlinked/connected with/XaingTong XI Jinpong's ZhongGuoMeng/Chniese Dream. See <http://www.CRNTT.com> 2016-10-15 00:11:40, accessed on October 16, 2016.

Seventh, instead of saying one dot, TaiJiTū, or *Yin* and *Yang*, some dialecticians and politicians, such as SONG ChuYu of the ROC, would simply mention Fang/square and Yuan/circle. Fang is the square in TaiJiTū, and Yuan, that *Yin* and *Yang*, which are shown inside the square. Needless to say, he should have credited MengZi/Mencius, strictly speaking.

Eighth, Carl G. Jung, a well-known non-Chinese psychologist in the West, wrote the following words, regarding YiJing: to quote him at length: “Just as causality describes the sequence of events, so synchronicity to the Chinese mind deals with the coincidence of events. The causal point of view tells us a dramatic story about how D came into existence, how it took its origin from C, which existed before D, and C in its turn had a father, B, etc. The synchronicity view on the other hand tries to produce an equally meaningful picture of coincidence. How does it happen that ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, etc., appear all at the same moment at the same time and in the same place? It happens in the first place because the physical events ‘A’ and ‘B’ are of the same quality as the psychic events ‘C’ and ‘D’, and further because all are the exponents of one and the same momentary situation. The situation is assumed to represent a legible or understandable picture.”<sup>4</sup> I have read this invaluable passage many times. However, I could not 100% capture what he is trying to describe, explain, and infer. Does this mean that it is his fault or my problem? We know that John F. Nash, Jr. is a well-known game theorist, who taught at Princeton University. However, some of his students do not understand what he was lecturing in class. Therefore, at one point in time, he lost his full-time teaching job. Whose fault? In this connection, do readers understand what I wrote in the following words: A dialectical/crab and frog motion remark is just the opposite of a non-dialectical/crab and frog motion (usually deductive, linear, or cause and effect) remark, or, at best, they must meet halfway. I hope so. Actually, in the West, a very close term to what I said is paradox.

Ninth, under materialism/WeiWuLun, as opposed to idealism/WeiXinLun, in the West,<sup>5</sup> only dichotomy exists, that is, one divides into two and we do not see a process. So, DuiLi/in opposition to each other, DouZhen/struggle, and FenLie/divide(d), to the people in the West, are the norm. In Chinese philosophy, it is possible to have HeErWeiYi/two combined into one/be made one. As Hsiung pointed out, in the West, the mainstream philosophy, as reflected from Prometheus and Zeus, taught us TianRenDuiLi/man being a disintegral part of heaven or mother nature/heaven and man, opposing each other, while the Chinese tells us TianRenHeYi/that man is an integral part of mother nature/unity of heaven and man/mother nature and human in harmony.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Cited in the Preface of my book, *The Crab and Frog Motion Paradigm Shift: Decoding and Deciphering Taipei and Beijing's Dialectical Politics* (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 2002), p. ix.

<sup>5</sup> See HE Jun Yuan, “LiangAnBenShuWuFaFenLideTongYuanGongLiuGuanXi,” *ZhongGuoPingLun/China Review* (HongKong), pp.44–46 at p.46.

<sup>6</sup> See James C. Hsiung, “ZhongXiWenHuaChaYiYuZhongHuaFuXingZhiBiYao,” *ZhongGuoPingLun/China Review* (HongKong), pp.26–31 at p.26.

Tenth, dialectics is not something that many academics and experts in the West prefer, and some of them would associate it with Marxism. Would it be possible for someone to apply dialectics, without letting readers know about the fact that he or she is applying it? In 2005, W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne published a book by Harvard Business School Press, *Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant*. Soon after its release, the book became a best-seller. In this connection, the Federation of Malaysia (FOM), in order to achieve its goal of becoming an advanced country by the year 2020, adopted the Blue Ocean strategy in its strategic planning and operations, so as to deliver high impact services to the public at low cost. To implement that strategy, in August 2016, International Conference on Blue Ocean Strategy was held in Federal Territory of Putrajaya, FOM. After NAJIB Razak<sup>7</sup> became the prime minister in April 2009, he put forward the slogan, One Malaysia. He also calls for the middle way, when it comes to governance.<sup>8</sup> If we reinvented Kim, Mauborgne, and NAJIB's works, can we say that they are actually dialecticians, at least in their inner heart?<sup>9</sup>

Another example is the term, out of the box. It "is an expression that describes nonconformal, creative thinking. The term is said to derive from a famous puzzle created by early twentieth century British mathematician Henry Ernest Dudeney, in which someone is asked to interconnect nine dots in a three-by-three grid by using four straight lines drawn without the pencil leaving the paper. In order to be successful, the puzzle solver has to realize that the boundaries [sic] of the dot array are psychological. The only way to solve the puzzle is to extend the lines beyond the artificial boundary [sic] created by the nine dots. One also thinks of the expression 'boxed-in,' or having reduced choices. In the fast-paced world of information technology, employers often say they are looking for someone who thinks "out of the box."<sup>10</sup> Whoever coined this term, out of the box, can be regarded as a dialectician, because he or she would first think of a box, whatever that is. Then, as a next step, he or she would think of another term, non-box, which can mean a zillion things in the world, including extend the lines beyond the artificial boundary. As to boxed-in, it would mean only stick to or confine oneself within the box, and each model in TaiJiTu has that function.

To be sure, it is possible for me to slot in the information, data, and analysis from the blue ocean and red sea book into my one-dot theory. The same thing speaks for

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<sup>7</sup>The name, Razak, is a [patronymic](#), not a [family name](#), and the person should be referred to by the [given name](#), NAJIB. The [Arabic](#) word "bin" ("b.") or "binti"/"binte" ("bt."/"bte."), if used, means "son of" or "daughter of," respectively.

<sup>8</sup>ZhongYongZhiGuo in Mandarin Chinese. See, for example, *See Hua Daily News* (Sarawak, Malaysia), August 19, 2016, p.2. NAJIB Razak opened the Institute of Wasatiyyah Malaysia (IWM) in March 2013, emphasizing the practice of moderation.

<sup>9</sup>See Peter Kien-hong YU, et al., "International Regimes and Non-Regimes in Confucian (Corporate) Governance: A Critique of Blue Ocean Strategy's Metaphor and Methodology" in *id.*, ed., *International (Corporate) Governance: A One-dot Theory Interpretation* (New York: Nova Business and Management Publications, Inc., 2011), pp.75–90.

<sup>10</sup><http://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/out-of-the-box>, accessed on August 30, 2016.

One China, One Malaysia, One Taiwan, and even One Sarawak, which has excited many Sarawakians since July 22, 2015.

11th, to some people, mathematical formulas can more readily convince them. In August 2012, for the first time, my one-dot theory was shored up by my student, CHANG Chun-li, who knew how to apply mathematical formulas, due to his engineering background. In July 2013, he again reminded me that dialectics embrace induction, deduction, and analogy. If interested, please read the first chapter of my edited, 2011 book in English, *International (Corporate) Governance*<sup>11</sup>:

12th, on September 6, 2016, I found a gold mine.<sup>12</sup> It has to do with a French Jesuit and sinologist, Joachim Bouvet (born in Le Mans City, Maine, France in July 1656 and passed away in Beijing in June 1730). He focused his research on *YiJing/The Book of Changes*, which was published more than 3,000 years ago.<sup>13</sup> Trying to find a connection between the Chinese classics and the holy Bible, Father Bouvet came to the conclusion that the Chinese had known the whole truth of the Christian tradition in ancient times, and that this truth could be found in the Chinese classics. In the year 1701, Bouvet sent a diagram of *YiJing* BaGua/hexamagrams/the eight-sided symbols/tri-grams<sup>14</sup> to Gottfried W. Leibniz, who was a German lawyer, philosopher, and mathematician. Leibniz was perhaps the first major European intellect to take a close interest in Chinese civilization, and he noted with fascination how the *YiJing* hexagrams correspond to the binary numbers from 000000 to 111111, concluding that this kind of mapping was evidence of major ancient Chinese accomplishments. In short, *YiJing* and TaiJiTu are definitely related to each other.

13th, in TaiJiTu, we see hexagrams. We can convert them to the crab and frog motion model, respectively, making it social science(s) oriented. Perhaps I am the first very researcher to do so. In September 2016, it has occurred to me for the first time that the fourth, small model on the left lower-hand side can still describe and explain each symbol or trigram. A broken line stands for YIN, and a straight line stands for YANG:

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<sup>11</sup> I coined this new term, embracing the following: international governance and international corporate governance.

<sup>12</sup> See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gottfried\\_Wilhelm\\_Leibniz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gottfried_Wilhelm_Leibniz), accessed on September 6, 2016.

<sup>13</sup> It is said that, as early as the XIA dynasty (c.2070–c.1660 B.C.) *YiJing* appeared. XIA is the first dynasty in traditional Chinese history. However, the original version of *YiJing* was lost. What we see today is from the ZhouYi/The Book of Changes, published around Western ZHOU dynasty (1046–771 B.C.), which is near present-day XiAn, the capital of ShaanXi Province. *YiJing* mentioned YiYinYiYangZhiWeiDao. Yang is thesis/Zheng, while Yin anti-thesis/Fan. DaJiHe is synthesis. TaiJiTu is more sophisticated than thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel said his dialectics is derived from Plato, who was the student of Socrates and the teacher of Aristotle.

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, E. G. Stinling, "Chinese Divining Blocks and the 'Pat Kwa' or Eight-sided Diagram," *Journal of Malaysian Branch of Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol.2, No.1 (June 1924), pp.72–73.



For example, if a trigram figure is QIAN and its symbol would be as follows, having three straight lines:



Since there are eight symbols, we can treat each Number, that is 1 2 3 4 5 in the crab and frog motion model individually, meaning that we have already covered five symbols. As to the sixth one, we look at 1 2 3 4 5 as a block, while the seventh symbol is 1 2 3 and the eighth, 3 4 5. The same logic applies to letters and both numbers and letters.

14th, non-political scientists like Howard Kahane face the same challenge as political scientists, economists, sociologists, law professors, and psychologists, that is, does the theory that an academic or expert picked or applied 100% match (alternative) reality? In June 1971, Kahane wrote the following words in his Preface: “Today’s students demand a marriage of theory and practice. That is why so many of them judge introductory courses on logic, fallacy, and even rhetoric not relevant to their interests.”<sup>15</sup> Almost five decades have been swept away, the nagging question remains: Have we succeeded? I dare to say that 90% of the social scientists in the West have failed, while 95% of the social scientists including those full professors in the East are still struggling to even understand what is a theory, a model, and the basic distinctions between them. In passing, it should be remembered that, when, for example, a phenomenon surfaces and yet there is a lack of theory for it, we can always coin a new word or concept to describe that new phenomenon. Hence, a theory can always match 100% reality.

15th, students of social science(s) usually are at odds with students of area studies. Their relationship can be likened to that of Western medical doctors and Chinese herbal medicine doctors. Do we put the study of contemporary China in the former category or the latter category? As an alternative, can we say that area studies are a critical discipline, as what Benjamin I. Schwartz addressed in the late 1970s?<sup>16</sup> To me, what Schwartz had done is like considering the following crab and frog motion models: area studies versus non-area studies and non-area studies versus area studies. He prefers to apply the first model, and he chose to be at 5, which is a hybrid of the two extremes, 100% area studies at 1 and 100% non-area studies E. We can tell that scholars like TSOU Tang would choose the second model, when we look at the

<sup>15</sup> See his book, p.vii.

<sup>16</sup> See his article, “Presidential Address: Area Studies as a Critical Discipline,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol.40, No.1 (November 1980), pp.15–25.

title of his journal review article published in *World Politics: Western Concepts and China's Historical Experience*.<sup>17</sup>

16th, a 100% grasp of methodology can enable a student of social science(s) to conduct research and writing on any topic. He or she can also embrace natural science(s). As a matter of fact, we since the late twentieth century cannot escape from using computers. The problem is how many undergraduates and even graduate students pursuing master and doctoral degrees plus academics at universities and research institutions possess that skill?

17th, does each selected publication mentioned at least one concept related to methodology, such as theory or model? The answer is: Very close to the (alternative) reality. However, the problem remains, that is, almost all the 15 (co-)authors and (co-)editors did not map out a logical, systematic, and coherent framework at the outset.

18th, YiWuKeYiWu is a Chinese term or theory, which cannot be easily translated. A foreigner, whose mother tongue is not Chinese, may also not be able to easily grasp the essence of that term. Literally, it means one thing beats another.<sup>18</sup> We see two definitions for the term: (1) There is always one thing to conquer another; and (2) everything has its vanquisher.<sup>19</sup> We can give three examples. First, the term international regimes can make a country, which claims that it is independent and sovereign, irrelevant, because each regime transcends national boundary. Second, CHIN Peng/CHEN Ping was born in the Malaysian state of Perak. However, he headed the Malayan Communist Party. In his book, *My Side of History*, he, a determined anti-colonialist, wrote the following words: "Colonial exploitation, irrespective of who were the masters, Japanese or British, was morally wrong." In December 1989, he, after coming out of the jungle, separately signed peace accord with the Malaysian and Thailand governments. CHIN said there are two things that Communism cannot defeat, to wit, religion and nationalism. As a third example, a democratic Taiwan area can easily deflect the non-democratic Chinese mainland's pressure, until that day when the Chinese mainland adopted Western style of democracy.

19th, regarding a non-dialectical prediction of dialectical words and deeds, WaiDaZhengZhao/scoring by mistake is possible, because, as I have said many times in the past, after having tested more than 100 cases, big and small, a dialectical/crab and frog motion remark is just the opposite of a non-"dialectical/crab and frog motion [usually deductive, linear, or cause and effect] remark," or, at best, they must meet halfway or 50%. Hopefully, what I said can be understood by at least the dialecticians.

20th, it is sad that many, if not most, academics cannot put scholarship in the first place.<sup>20</sup> For the sake of survival, they play petty politics. This applies to both the

<sup>17</sup> See Vol.21, No.4 (July 1969), pp.655–691.

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.wordsense.eu/%E4%B8%80%E7%89%A9%E5%85%8B%E4%B8%80%E7%89%A9/>, accessed on August 30, 2016.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Michel C. Oksenberg, "Can Scholarship Flourish When Intertwined with Politics?" *APLS Newsletter*, (Winter-Spring 1986), pp.48–59.



East and West. Sometimes, self-interest can overwhelm one's rationality. This phenomenon applies to the world of East and West, as the Chinese would say TianXiaWuYaYiBanHei/all crows under the sun are black/evil people are bad the world over/one devil is the dead spit of another. If a publication has been written logically, systematically, and coherently, we should all accept it. Yet, sinologists like John K. Fairbank were a target of attack by some academics and experts.<sup>21</sup> In this connection, because some of us cannot distinguish between, for example, criticism, which only say negative things; critique, which is balanced, by presenting positive, negative, and, toward the end, the reviewer's own suggestion; and critical thinking, which, if handled well, can 100% DianFu/upset the original writer's definition, for example, and usher a new way of looking at the original definition. A publication draft submitted for possible publication would be easily (politically) rejected, because the editor in chief just have to say that what you have written does not fit our mission, goal(s), and objective(s), instead of admitting that his or her company is only interested in making profit.

21st, if a supernatural force does exist, it constitutes the very beginning of all things. However, this is non-dialectical, because we are only talking about Him. With the Big Bang, dialectics came about: The supernatural force and the Big Bang in the safe zone of the crab and frog motion model or the supernatural force versus the Big Bang.

22nd, we read the following words: "In Hebrew, the title 'God Almighty' is written as *El Shaddai* and probably means 'God, the All-powerful One' or 'The Mighty One of Jacob' (Genesis 49:24; Psalm 132:2,5), although there is a question among most Bible scholars as to its precise meaning. The title speaks to God's ultimate power over all. He has all might and power. We are first introduced to this name in Genesis 17:1, when God appeared to Abram and said, 'I am God Almighty; walk before me and be blameless.'<sup>22</sup> If God is almighty, He should be able to make arrangements for us all. However, does He sleep or does He get sick? During those periods, would He still be all powerful? There is no way for us to find it out.

23rd, if one-dot theory can describe, explain, and infer all things MINUS ONE, can we regard it as sophistry? No, this is because one day the theory can be falsified, when, for example, Buddha is gone.

24th, the one-dot theory is accompanied by a big diagram or model and four small diagrams or models, or 1 + 4 in short. Do we need to parse TaiJiTu again, so as to come up with a few more new models? Is it necessary? It would be very interesting, if a researcher can come up with a new, useful, and applicable model, which is social science(s)-oriented.

25th, am I alone in toiling the vineyard of dialectical study of contemporary China? If all contemporary China students by now have realized that the Chinese mind and heart are dialectical, would there be a 100% paradigm shift? No, not to them, but to those who have no idea about contemporary China, they would. It is

<sup>21</sup> See, for example, Leonard H. D. Gordon and Sidney H. Chang, "Fairbank and his Critics in the Republic of China," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol.30, No.1 (November 1970), pp.137-149.

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.gotquestions.org/God-Almighty.html>, accessed on August 14, 2016.

never too late, if we all want to be closer to (alternative) reality when it comes to our research outcome.

26th, the one-dot theory is definitely not Marxist. At most, it is Marxian. This is because CHEN Tuan, the creator of TaiJiTu, preceded Marx. To this author, CHEN is much greater than Marx plus others such as LaoZi, KongZi, MengZi, ZhuangZi, XunZi, MoZi, HanFei(Zi), etc., and he, if still alive today, should be able to receive Nobel Prize or TANGJiang/TANG Prize<sup>23</sup> many times for his substantial contribution.

27th, just as there are epochal developments, so are epochal crab and frog motion models. We need only to carefully select those and apply them accordingly. So, I do not agree with Dittmer, who presented his paper in June 1996 and who said that Franz Schurmann's *Ideology and Organization* is now completely out of date,<sup>24</sup> because, depending on the crab and frog motion model, what Schurmann wrote could still be logically, systematically, and coherently be part of the larger model. This is like saying Schurmann's writings are equivalent to that small dot in either *Yin* or *Yang*, if a researcher wants to focus on ideology from the late 1940s to even the late 1970s. To be sure, MAO Zedong or his thought is still alive, and it is part of that Beijing versus Taipei model.

28th, the one-dot theory can be applied flexibly, and, therefore, it is not 100% history bound or, using the Marxist parlance, historically determined,<sup>25</sup> ideologically ending at a specific core concept, which is of paramount importance, as wished for or teleologically or apocalyptically<sup>26</sup> designed. This implies that a dialectician can still err. One finest example has to do with MAO Zedong, who in July 1947 said he would, counting from July 1946, spend 5 years to JieJue/settle CHIANG Kai-shek. Yet, in January 1948, his troops peacefully liberated PeiPing/Peking and, by June 1950, although practically all the Chinese mainland became Communist, Xizang, Taiwan, and a handful of islands remained non-Communist or even anti-Communist. In other words, MAO somewhat miscalculated the development totally in his favor. Another example is related to DENG Xiaoping, who predicted on January 1, 1980 that, within that decade, both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) would be (peacefully) reunified. Yet, there is no such a thing in sight.

29th, if one-dot theory and TaiJiTu are superior, when it comes to the study of contemporary China, would the academic world be one voice? No really, because we can always conduct a comparative study, using the same sources, to really figure out which method (as opposed to approach) can enable us to be closer to (alternative) reality.

30th, the crab and frog motion model can be applied flexibly. In this study, I often say that I can describe, explain, and infer certain issues, phenomena, or developments. By that, I mean I am putting, for example, description at 5; explanation, 3; and inference, 1. To me, inference carries the most weight. This is because it is more

<sup>23</sup> Created in December 2012. The first award was inaugurated in Taipei in June 2014.

<sup>24</sup> See SHAW's edited book on page 328.

<sup>25</sup> Kaplan, pp.121–122 and pp.124–125.

<sup>26</sup> See *ibid.*

difficult for a social scientist to predict, conjecture, forecast, and take an educated guess of the future, whereas a historian just needs to dwell on the past. However, this model allows a social scientist to be just able to describe and explain certain phenomena at, for example, times/space sequence (1), (2), and (3). What I said can be applied to many, if not most, academics, who just received their doctoral degree or who have no experience in teaching.

31st, I had a wrong impression that all the crabs in real life can only move side-ways. In the early second decade of the twenty-first century, one of my graduate students alerted me, saying ZhongHuaHuTouXie/Orithya Sinica/tiger (face) crabs found in JinMen/Quemoy County, which is part of Fujian Province, move in straight fashion. I was struck by what he said. This is because how can I slot in that piece of vital fact into my crab and frog motion model, without being contradictory? To be sure, a rigorous model can accommodate new information, data, and analysis without having to modify anything. So, in ancient China, computer did not exist. However, a Chinese with a dialectical mind and heart would immediately construct the following crab and frog motion model: A world with no computer versus non-A world with no computer. This model is closer to (alternative) reality, because A world with no computer is a fact in ancient and modern China, and the Chinese would be in the same zone for making such a remark. However, when the Chinese does have a computer, he or she would jump to another crab and frog motion model, that is, non-A world with no computer at 1 and a world with no computer at 5, thereby still being logical, systematic, and coherent. The same logic applies to crabs which move in a straight fashion. In other words, that tiger (face) crab would be at, for example, 3 and, instead of moving side-ways by going to 3 from 1 at time/space sequence (1), from 3 to 4 at time/space sequence (2), and from 4 to 2 at time/space sequence (3), it would be at, say 5, all the time from times/space sequence (1) to the time/space sequence (n). In short, there is no contradiction whatsoever.

32nd, it is not possible not to be dialectical. Game theory's matrix is definitely dialectical. We see player A and player B; the two numbers in each cell; the first cell (or choice) and the second cell (or choice); the second cell (or choice) and the fourth cell (or choice), etc. How to rationalize the dialectical and non-dialectical flow of inconsistent logic?

33rd, my study is focused on the period from October 1, 1949, when the PRC was created and ended on a few months before its publication. Yet, it is not possible to just touch upon this period of time, because we all have to mention at one point or another the period before that or what we call history or ancient China and modern China. In this connection, some passages may still be relevant 1 million years from now, when social scientists at that time were looking back to the contemporary China experience from October 1, 1949 up to the publication date of this book. Hence, a tough question must be posed: How do we rationalize it? It is possible, if one applied my one-dot theory, especially with regard to the crab and frog motion model, because the time/space sequence component enables us to deal with the past, present, and future. Thus, instead of saying time/space sequence (1) refers to October 1, 1949 from the PRC perspective, we can reserve that sequence (1) as the period before October 1, 1949, which could stand for ancient China and time/space

sequence (2) as modern China, meaning that time/space sequence (3) refers to October 1, 1949. Likewise, time/space sequence (n) could mean 1 million years later, and this unique arrangement can enable us to include phenomena related to contemporary China, as defined in our study, if the ROC or the PRC were still alive or being revived by at least one Chinese or non-Chinese.

34th, Paul K. Feyerabend in his 1975 book, *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge*, which was revised in 1988, argued that science is epistemologically anarchic. To him, there is no single methodology, if we want to have scientific progress. [In passing, we should also bear in mind (existential) nihilism.<sup>27</sup>] I disagree, because my one-dot theory can be applied since the Big Bang, if not the world before that. It can also be applied 1 zillion years from now, if we the human beings, (killer) robots, co-robots, ETs, etc., still exist.

35th, many, if not most, publications' logic do not flow. One cannot be dialectical here and there, as I said before. He or she must be dialectical throughout the writing. Hence, once detected, that publication can be said as being already falsified. The only excuse one can give is that he or she is editing a book. In that case, the (co-) editors cannot rewrite other authors' writings. What if an author argues that he or she belongs to the transdisciplinarity (TD) camp: "the existence of different levels of (alternative) reality governed by different types of logic," whereby logics (as opposed to logic) apply? In other words, they allow different logic to be applied at different levels. To them, it is still systematic and coherent. This author definitely disagrees, because TD must pass the test of past, present, and future, so as to fit in the mainstream of social science(s).

36th, many, if not most, Marxists would not refrain from studying and applying dialectics, which refers to, in the Marxist-Leninist terminology, "both to a set of ontological theories and to a method," the second aspect of which is thought to be of a paramount importance.<sup>28</sup> Joseph M. Bochenski noticed that "some Marxist-Leninist methodologists seem to be aware of the ... criticism and try to find a better way of dealing with dialectics. One quite radical solution, the denial of dialectics as a method altogether, is that of a leading Soviet philosopher, [K.S.] Bakradze. Others, like [A.A.] Zinoviev, seem to be of the opinion that dialectics, while having nothing to do with formal logic, may be useful as a set of guiding principles for philosophical research. But the majority retain [*sic*] Engels' and Lenin's confused notion of dialectics, at one and the same time a logic, a method, an ontology, and a theory of knowledge."<sup>29</sup> No, there is no confusion at all in the reasoning of Engels and Lenin, if we apply the crab and frog motion model. That is to say, we can put a logic at 1, a method at 2, an ontology at 3, and a theory of knowledge at 4. E would be non-1 2 3 4. At each time/space sequence, the dialectician would choose only one number, be it 1, 2, 3, or 4, and there would be no contradiction or, for that matter, confusion,

<sup>27</sup> Basically, it means that knowledge is not possible or reality does not really exist.

<sup>28</sup> J. M. Bochenski, "Marxism in Communist Countries" in M. M. Drachkovitch, ed., *Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary World* (Palo Alto, CA.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and War, 1966), p.66.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.67–68.

at all. Needless to say, one may put “an ontology” at if he or she, after weighing it, feels that it carries the least weight. Alternatively, keeping the model as it is, at time/space sequence (1), the dialectician can choose 3, which stands for “an ontology,” and at the next time/space sequence, still 3 or another number. Again, there would be no contradiction at all.

37th, Dittmer and Hurst mentioned the risk of tautology.<sup>30</sup> I can be easily accused for writing this tautological study. This means that readers do not have to read this book, because the answer of this study has already been out, by merely looking at the one-dot theory, which is accompanied by TaiJiTu or a series of 1+4 models. No, I am not 100% tautological, because I am taking the lead in the field of contemporary China, which is a new adventure. Arguably, I have succeeded in testing my one-dot theory once more, because information, data, and analysis can be easily slotted into the theory. This is a major contribution. As to political figures, they, while wheeling and dealing, would have to construct new crab and frog motion models at all times, so as to slot in information, data, and analysis. In doing so, am I or the political figures being tautological? Not really is the dialectical answer, meaning I am at least 50% not being tautological. This is because I can sometimes correctly predict what the CPC would do. For example, On November 14, 2016, I told my graduate students that I have coined a synonym for the November 1992 consensus, which can be accepted by the Chinese Communist leaders. That is to say, I had reversed the Chinese characters of JiuErGongShi to read ShiGongErJiu. One of the students said it is meaningless. Yet, in late November 2016, a mainland Chinese academic at an academic conference said it is all right for CAI YingWen to coin a new term to replace the November 1992 consensus, but the new term must be rooted in One China principle. In short, was I tautological? The answer is a resounding no, because I had correctly deciphered the Chinese Communist mind and heart, without interacting with any CPC member.

38th, does my one-dot theory suffer from synecdoche, which refers to saying a part that is put for the whole or the whole for part?<sup>31</sup> In (alternative) reality, the one-dot theory can be both regarded as a part and a whole, depending on the context.

39th, Kuijper and others say that if you do not apply a theory and model to study China, you are a pseudoscientist. However, if you do apply a theory and model, which could be put forward by you, you are being tautological. Is there a way out? Or should one conduct both types of the studies? One can surely conduct both types of studies, and one can argue that, when testing a dialectical model, it can set aside the issue of tautology, because science has to do with a series of (laboratory) tests.

40th, imagine if we live in a world peopled only by dialecticians. In other words, there is no non-dialectical thinking. Would that be tautological? Not really, because there would be a zillion dialectical models cooperating and competing with each. In short, our world will still be sizzling with splendid and colorful dialectical models.

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<sup>30</sup> See Marble, p.38.

<sup>31</sup> See Donald K. Emmerson, “ASEAN as an International Regime,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.41, No.1 (Summer-Fall 1987), pp.1–16 at 1.

Needless to say, another study must be carried out, in order to find whether, in this kind of world, there will be more or less cooperation or more or less competition.

41st, Abraham Kaplan is a philosopher by training. Yet, he in the early 1960s was writing a manuscript related to methodology of contemporary behavioral science or social enquiry.<sup>32</sup> This calls for concern, if he is not familiar with the fields that he discusses. In the words of Leonard Broom, who wrote the Foreword, Kaplan “has no philosopher’s stone that will turn empirical dross into theoretical gold or even empirical mud into theoretical pots. He does make it easier to distinguish the dross from the gold and the mud from the clay.” That is to say, what Kaplan had done was “... the simple is said simply and the difficult is said clearly,” thereby making me but to wonder had I done the same thing in the first chapter of this book?

42nd, on August 10, 2016, I for the first time came across the term or belief, as noted by David M. Lampton in the December 2002/March 2003 special issue of *Issues and Studies*, China is China is China.<sup>33</sup> In the eyes of J. David Singer, Lampton is a sinologist, and the former pleaded that he and other sinologists should not follow the mistaken footsteps of Sovietologists, who treated the then Soviet Union as exceptional.<sup>34</sup> A close to (alternative) reality response to Singer should be: China students should realize by now that sinology is both a *sui generis* and distinctive case that defies even modest middle-level (second-level) generalizations and a non-*sui generis* and distinctive case. The Chinese application of TaiJiTu is definitely *sui generis* and distinctive, as demonstrated in my CHINA, China, and china theory, while a non-application of TaiJiTu will make China students non-*sui generis* and distinctive.

43rd, unfortunately, in the academic world, fashion or fad also exists, which can lead China students astray, flocking to study a hot topic, which only turns out to be a drop in the pond. China threat became a popular topic, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Tomohide MURAI at that time taught at Japan’s National Defense Academy. He may well be the first one churning out the PRC threat thesis. In May 1990, his article written in Japanese on the potential Beijing threat was published in a magazine.<sup>35</sup> Many China students followed his footsteps, perceiving that Beijing will do something harmful to, for example, the Taiwan area. I have not seen literature on the Moscow threat since December 1991. Yet, in March 2014, the Federation of Russia annexed Crimean Peninsula. Comparing and contrasting Moscow’s words and deeds, can we say Beijing is hardly a threat, including what it did up to now in the SCS? Or should we simply say that we should be against the Beijing threat thesis?

44th, Jean-Pierre Cabestan wrote the following words: European methodology and conceptual approaches in the social sciences can sometimes be quite different

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<sup>32</sup> Kaplan, p.xvii.

<sup>33</sup> See page 372.

<sup>34</sup> Christopher Ruddy, a chief executive officer of Newsmax Media, Inc., wrote the following words, dated July 26, 2016: We believe America is an exceptional place, as the then American president, Abraham Lincoln, called it: “The last great hope of mankind.”

<sup>35</sup> See *YaZhou ZouKan* (Hongkong), Vol.17, No.38 (September 21, 2003), p.31.



from the ones adopted by our American colleagues.<sup>36</sup> If so, the European and American methodologies, intuitively, should be sometimes quite different from the native Chinese ones, some of whom may serve as West-watchers, trying to understand and outwit the “inscrutable Occidentals,” in the words of Richard L. Walker.<sup>37</sup> This means that it will take a long time to consolidate all the methodologies into one mainstream, which can be logically, systematically, and coherently presented.

45th, Kuijper wrote the following words: “Shall we advise all ‘China-professionals’ to go home, and to look for another job?”<sup>38</sup> I agree but with some reservation. There are simply too many academics, who should change their profession. For example, 1 day, I passed through a classroom, hearing a young assistant professor who introduced concentric circle/TongXinYuan theory, which is a circle within a circle, with innermost circle representing the core circle, to the students. This academic wanted to teach a course in research methods. He is good at quantitative methods and weak on qualitative methods. Can we apply the concentric circle/TongXinYuan theory in the middle of a semester? No, for the simple and straightforward reason that, if we apply a theory and model, we should mention it at the first second of the first class in the semester, reminding the students that all the information, data, and analysis are related to that theory. If one wants to mention a second theory, it is still all right, if the course has to do with comparative studies. However, the professor must use the same information and data. Because no two theories are 100% the same, by doing so, different interpretations will definitely surface sooner or later.

46th, this dialectical study of contemporary China incorporates both the purely classical way and the purely applied way, depending on the context. On the whole, the former way weighs heavier than the latter way.

47th, XunZi’s WanBianBuLiQiZong/many superficial changes but no departure from the original stand needs to be elaborated. One example of what he said is the One China principle. The following terms are all derived from his idiom: MAO Zedong’s 1.5 Chinas,<sup>39</sup> DENG Xiaoping’s 1.25 Chinas,<sup>40</sup> ZHOU Enlai’s YiGangSiMu, the November 1992 consensus, two-halves China/LiangGeBanGeZhongGuo, multisystem nation, etc.

48th, in the first chapter, classical way and applied way have been mentioned, and I have also introduced the third way, which is a hybrid of them. At least in the Taiwan area, most social scientists have translated the term, approach, as TuJing, in Mandarin Chinese. I would treat that as a mistake. Way should be translated as TuJing, while approach, KaoJin or TieJin. In English, approach means “to come near or nearer to something or someone in space, time, quality, or amount.”<sup>41</sup> Thus, when we study social science(s), we want to be closer to (alternative) reality. If

<sup>36</sup> Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China Perspectives and Perspectives Chinoises” in Marble, pp.340–343 at p.343.

<sup>37</sup> See Shaw’s edited book, p.306.

<sup>38</sup> See his paper, p.17.

<sup>39</sup> He is against having 1.5 Chinas.

<sup>40</sup> He is against having 1.25 Chinas.

<sup>41</sup> <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/zht/%E8%A9%9E%E5%85%B8/%E8%8B%B1%E8%AA%9E/approach>, accessed on October 25, 2016.



approach is TuJing, we may be saying that it is possible for us researchers to get to 100% truth, (alternative) reality, etc.

49th, the Chinese strategic culture<sup>42</sup> can be more or less seen in the first chapter and the second. What about other China students' writings? In November 2016, the National Bureau of Asian Research published Christopher A. Ford's article, *Realpolitik with Chinese Characteristics: Chinese Strategic Culture and the Modern Communist Party-State*.<sup>43</sup> In 2010, the University Press of Kentucky published his second book on the PRC: *The Mind of Empire: China's History and Modern Foreign Relations*, mentioning writings of Confucius and his heirs, Legalists, and Daoists. Ford thinks that he has a firm grasp of the idiosyncratic "Chineseness" of China's strategic culture and the CPC's legitimacy discourse. Has Ford compressed or simplified his publications in terms of a (series of) (verbal) models for us to see? No, he cannot and did not, and this fact constitutes a limitation in his study.

50th, I have mentioned the game theory, rational (choice) theory, etc. A theory that is similar to them is the contract theory. In October 2016, the two theorists received the Nobel Prize. One author defended them, saying they deserve to receive the prize.<sup>44</sup> However, can those theories rationalize the following sentence: Yes, 1 s ago, I said Yes and now (after one or 2 s), I am saying No (to the same issue). I doubted at least 1%. As for the dialectician, he or she just has to apply the following crab and frog motion model: Yes at 1 and No, 5. Since both are placed in the safe zone, there is no contradiction at all. We must keep in mind that at each time/space sequence, the dialectician only thinks about one number (such as 5) or one letter (such as C).

Last but not least, Franklin YANG Chen-Ning is a Nobel laureate in physics. However, he is very critical of YiJing.<sup>45</sup> In his December 2004 public lecture in Beijing, he said, due to YiJing, the Chinese reasoning does not have the deductive method.<sup>46</sup> This is not true, because in my study I do include the deductive method, as can be reflected from the time/space sequence component or from one model to another model. In other words, all the words can be traced back to the origin.

Should the above-mentioned professor, who failed to describe and explain the concentric circle/TongXinYuan theory at the very beginning of the semester, be dismissed from his profession? Should he be allowed to have more time, because the professor has the potential of becoming a full professor, with many solid publications at home and abroad, later on?

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<sup>42</sup>R. James Ferguson and Rosita Dellios have pointed out that the Beijing strategic culture is basically Confucian and Daoist. See their book, *The Politics and Philosophy of Chinese Power* (Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2016). Invited to write on Taiwan's strategic culture, Steven M. Goldstein, referring to Taiwan as the Republic of China, did not even mention it as such. See his article, "Taiwan: Asia's Orphan?" *NBR Special Report 62* (December 2016), pp.1–18.

<sup>43</sup>See his article in Ashley J. Tellis, et al., eds., *Strategic-Asia 2016–17: Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, November 2016, chapter 2.

<sup>44</sup><http://bigthink.com/laurie-vazquez/what-contract-theory-is-and-why-it-deserves-a-nobel-prize>, accessed on November 30, 2016

<sup>45</sup>See his critique: <http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/wenhua/40462/40463/3049020.html>, accessed on September 21, 2016.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

### 5.3 Chapter 2's Findings

First, I have also put forward some theories and models and applied others throughout my career. Can my one-dot theory still be able to describe, explain, and infer them? If so, this may well mean that my one-dot theory is rigorous. A follow-up question ought to be asked: What about the other way around, that is, looking through the lens of those theories and models, can they still carry out the same tasks, to wit, describing, explaining, and inferring certain phenomena of contemporary China?

Second, contemporary China has been defined as one dot, a dot, or “but a dot.” There should be no quarrel regarding the first two phrases. One dot is one dot is one dot or a dot is a dot is a dot, or even one dot is a dot. What about “but a dot”? In the context of a supernatural force, contemporary China is ultimately at the mercy of that force. So, it is but a dot in the palm<sup>47</sup> of Buddha, so to speak, or it can never escape from TaiJiTu. In the context of philosophy, contemporary China cannot last forever in the long history of China. Someday, the ROC will become history, and the same thing can be said of the PRC. In the context of natural science(s), contemporary China, still behind in some scientific areas, is also sometimes at the mercy of mother nature. In September 2016, both JinMen/Queomy and XiaMen/Amoy were struck by the biggest typhoon in 50 years. How to weather many a storm, such as typhoon, earthquake, *tsunami*, global warming, etc.<sup>48</sup> In the context of social science(s), there is still a long way for the people in the West to really dialectically understand and trust contemporary China and, vice versa. In the context of paradigm(s), there is still a long way for people in the West to learn to speak Mandarin Chinese and to be able to read and write. If not, they may not know that all the couplets must be understood in terms of dialectics, so as to grasp a closer meaning. In this connection, many, if not, most Chinese idioms must be understood in terms of dialectics. In English, there is no such punctuation as *DunHao!* or “、 ”. This punctuation is alerting readers that a scientific rhythm is involved. Sheng/birth, Lao/getting older/aged, Bing/illness, Si/death is the finest example of a pattern, regarding the vicissitudes of life, which can also be applied to countries like contemporary China, although some babies may die right away after birth without being sick.

Third, noted historian WANG Gungwu said that there were many problems with Western books on ZhongGuo/China.<sup>49</sup> Does that mean that the Chinese writings, including mine, on ZhongGuo is closer to (alternative) reality? I am not so sure, because two other noted Chinese academics wrote the following words: YU Ying-shih, another historian, stated that it was not proper to apply theories in the West to

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<sup>47</sup>Or WuZhiShan/Mountain of Five Fingers.

<sup>48</sup>See, for example, Martin Rees, *Our Final Century: The 50/50 Threat to Humanity's Survival* (Oxford, U.K.: Heinemann, 2003).

<sup>49</sup>See the front flap of my book, *Hu Jintao and the Ascendancy of China* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International Academic Publishing, 2005).

study ZhongGuo. TU Wei-ming wrote that any approach we choose to study ZhongGuo is inevitably theory laden and value laden, adding it is naive to believe that we can ever arrive at a totally objective analysis or strictly factual explanation of ZhongGuo and that our interpretation is value-free. Having read those statements made by Chinese academics, are readers more or less confused? I, for one, am more confused, while knowing that it is possible to apply theories and models in the study of any country's history.

Fourth, serious misunderstandings do still exist between the East and West. LIU GuoShen of XiaMen University pointed out that what *Guo* or *GuoJia* (nation, country, or state) means to the Chinese since ancient times basically differs from what the people in the West understand. To the former, *Guo* refers to each *ZhuHou*/prince or duke under heaven or emperor, further translated refers to *BuTongZhenYing* or *BuTongTuanDui*/different camp or different team; while, to the latter, each *Guo* is independent and sovereign.<sup>50</sup> In short, in order to be closer to (alternative) reality, contemporary China should be described, explained, and inferred dialectically.

Fifth, if we apply the DENGIST socialism versus capitalism model, how do we weigh the scale at each time/space sequence? It seems that the only best way is to alert readers that, since you are the author, who is equivalent to the driver of a car, you are in charge in deciding the weight of the scale at each time/space sequence. To be sure, there is a better way to determine the weight of the scale at each time/space sequence, that is, you would conduct public opinion survey, just as what MAO Zedong did at his native Hunan Province in March 1927. However, this would require a lot of funding from independent, nonpartisan resources, which are hard to find nowadays.

Sixth, DENG Xiaoping said SOC has market economy, just as CAP has market economy. By extension, we can say that COM has market economy, just as SOC has market economy.

Seventh, Chris Buckley reported on XI Jinping's Four Comprehensives. In the first paragraph, it is quite correct for him to write the following words: "Slogans studded with numerals and abstract exhortations are central to the dramaturgy of the Chinese Communist Party, intoned like spells to exalt leaders, cajole citizens and malign enemies. Yet as President Xi Jinping's latest contribution shows, the magic of a party slogan often works through its supple vagueness."<sup>51</sup> In the same report, he also interviewed Perry Link, who has a highly original theoretical study of Chinese political language,<sup>52</sup> and Sebastian Heilmann. However, the Chinese Communists, just as the Chinese non-Communists, know what they are talking about logically, systematically, and coherently. In other words, Link, Heilmann, and Buckley are yet to learn not to be baffled by the Chinese Communists and other Chinese non-

<sup>50</sup> <http://hk.cmtt.com/doc/1044/8/0/6/104480693.html?coluid=93&kindid=15730&docid=104480693&mdate=1126003347>, accessed on November 26, 2016.

<sup>51</sup> [http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/the-evolution-of-xi-jinpings-four-comprehensives/?\\_r=0](http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/the-evolution-of-xi-jinpings-four-comprehensives/?_r=0), accessed on November 30, 2016.

<sup>52</sup> See his book, *An Anatomy of Chinese Rhythm, Metaphor, Politics* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2013).

Communists. For example, Link said: “Even the rhythms in the slogans, rooted in the cadences of traditional Chinese, can add some kind of exalted feeling, and enumeration adds an aura of definitive, scientific truth,” adding “[t]hey finalize the result. One, two, three, four – you absorb things and that’s it...” and “[i]t’s got that comprehensive feel about it that, if you’ve got this, then you’ve got everything.” If applying my 1 2 3 4 A B C D model, the first comprehensive or comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society, [sic] would be equivalent to 1; the second one or comprehensively deepen reform, [sic] 2; etc. In short, we must not forget the punctuation mark, to wit, (or, to be original, ) and, therefore, the safe zone spectrum is definitely not what Link said a theoretical cudgel.

Eighth, Dali L. YANG wrote the following words, amid all the fashionable talk and lingering disbelief: “Bedazzled by China’s star economic performance, virtually every business or public affairs publication hopped on to the bandwagon of remaking China’s image from that of pariah of the international community to that of a giant reawakening.”<sup>53</sup> My study of ancient China, modern China, and contemporary China remains the same, that is, the study of one dot to begin with and ending and non-ending with a dot. This has let me but to say that while contemporary China as a dot may fall apart or ought to fall apart, the very first dot itself will not, because each thing can be regarded as one dot, but the first one will remain the same, until the demise or disappearance of this very dot.

Ninth, in Fitzgerald’s chapter, we see a clinical case report, whereby a patient, G., by the first name of Jimmy approached a neurologist, Oliver W. Sacks, saying he has a clear memory of what had happened to him as a mariner until the end of World War II but lost the capacity, due to [Korsakoff’s syndrome](#), to store new memories after that time, including events that happened only a few minutes ago. Meeting the same patient in the early 1980s, Sacks was told by the former that he believes it is still 1945 (the segment covers his life in the 1970s and early 1980s). Would this case of the “Lost Mariner” be applied to the experience of a nation, country, or state?

It is still not possible. If some people have programmed (killer) robots to abduct people in that nation, country, or state to another planet from 1945 up to the early 1980s, those people would still be able to remember (some of) their experiences in the new planet from 1945 up to the early 1980s. In other words, those people may still have no memory of everything, but they can have a past, that is, from 1945 up to the early 1980s and a future, to wit, from the time they returned to their nation, country, or state from 1980s. If we substitute (killer) robots with ETs, the answer would be the same.

10th, can my one-dot theory be applied to study, for example, One Malaysia and the middle way, which were put forward by NAJIB Razak?<sup>54</sup> It is not difficult at all.

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<sup>53</sup> See his chapter, “Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local Relations,” in Goodman and Segal’s book, pp.61–98 at p.61.

<sup>54</sup> The name, Razak, is a [patronymic](#), not a [family name](#), and the person should be referred to by the [given name](#), NAJIB. The [Arabic](#) word “bin” (“b.”) or “binti”/“binte” (“bt.”/“bte.”), if used, means “son of” or “daughter of,” respectively.

11th, readers may not feel that I am deductively telling a story in chapter two. They may feel disjointed. It is like saying there is a lack of train of thought. However, government officials and politicians who play games dialectically may feel that it is to their advantage. The Chinese Communists unabashedly say that their approach is dialectical. However, they would not usually reveal, for example, which crab and frog motion model they are applying at each time/space sequence.

12th, in the first paragraph of the second chapter, I put a footnote, regarding ancient China. I wrote the following words about the claim: A Chinese mainland scientist put forward an “Out of Egypt“ argument, saying the founders of Chinese civilization were from ancient Egypt. Regarding that argument, Hsiung persuasively had this say: “That was a rumor I heard long time ago. In the early years of the Republican period, after Sun Yat-sen’s revolution, there was a saying that even the earliest ancestors of the Chinese came from Africa. That ‘claim’ stimulated a serious search by Chinese paleo-anthropologists, which led to the ‘discovery’ of the Peking Man, near a place called ZhouKouDian, near Beijing, dating back to zillions of years before. That ended the allegation of the African ancestry of the Chinese race. The allegation that Chinese civilization dated from Egypt, I think, came from the same source. The ‘discovery’ of the Peking Man should also lay to the rest the allegation about the Egyptian origins of Chinese civilization. Besides, although it is often said that the Chinese civilization is 5,000 years long, more recent excavations found artifacts at HeMuDu/河姆渡, near YuYao/余姚, ZheJiang Province, that should add 2,000 more years to the 5,000 years, making the Chinese civilization 7,000 years long. As such, it should be longer than the Egyptian civilization (6,000 years),” adding “Chinese civilization did NOT originate from the Yellow River valley, as is generally assumed, but from the Loess Highland in today’s Northwest China, where our ancestors survived on cereals. It was thousands of years later that they descended to the Yellow River Valley. Then they learned how to plant and eat rice, after it had been first introduced from India. This, too, can be found in the same chapter of my books, relying on impeccable archaeological sources.”<sup>55</sup> A day later, Hsiung added the following words: “Let me add something to what I said regarding the Loess Highland origins of Chinese civilization. A popular and allegedly scientific theory, accepted for a very long time in the past, was the one advanced by Karl A. Wittfogel, on the origin of the autocratic nature of Chinese governments, which he called *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*.<sup>56</sup> It was based on the hypothesis that the need for highly coordinated management of the scare irrigational water, as required by the Chinese people for rice planting, brought in the coercive power, hence autocracy, of the government to bear. And, Wittfogel coined

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<sup>55</sup> Email from him, dated October 10, 2016.

<sup>56</sup> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). By taking Marxism as a starting point, not a sacred text, his book applied to non-Western societies, Karl A. Wittfogel heralded at the time as “a watershed in political theory and social thought,” by the *Saturday Review* and “a major contribution to the understanding of human history” by *The New York Times*. See <https://www.washington.edu/research/showcase/1949b.html>, accessed on October 12, 2016.

a term for the ancient Chinese society, the ‘Hydraulic Society.’<sup>57</sup> But, the fallacy of the theory is that during the formative period of ancient Chinese civilization, our ancestors had not even seen rice before its introduction from Indian thousands of years later, after they had descended from the Loess Plateau where they had been residing for generations and where they had survived on cereals that they, with their primitive farming implements, could plant in the loose soil surrounded by the semi-arid temperature – where they needed no irrigational water. Subsequent excavations which established the latter point convincingly refuted Wittfogel’s theory.”<sup>58</sup> He should also be credited for having cogently straightened out some foreign Chinese students’ erroneous understanding of ancient China, saying the Chinese in ancient China were no different from the imperialists in the West, occupying this place or that place as colonies: “The point made by the reviewer was that if China had always been peaceful and non-aggressive,... then how come China could have expanded to its present sub-continent-wide size from its Upper Yellow River base. This is easy to answer. Chinese civilization came from agrarian origins (as opposed to either nomadic origins as did the Abrahamic cultures, or islander origins as did ancient Greece or Japan), and it reflected a continental farmer’s mentality and his sedentary life style, as distinct from the mobility-oriented life style of the nomadic tribes or islanders, who had to grid for change at any moment’s notice. Besides, Confucianism, after it was adopted as the ‘national teaching’ in 136 B.C.E., served as a cultural unifier for the various ethnic groups populating the Chinese subcontinent.” He continued by saying: “A combination of the agrarian sedentary life style and Confucian culture (emphasizing attraction, rather than coercion/conquest) accounted for the gradual but steady extension of an emergent common consociational solidarity to neighboring groups beyond the Upper Yellow River center. This process took nearly 2,000 years if counting from the first appearance of an imperial structure under QIN-HAN times [third century Before the Common/Current/Christian Era (B.C.E.)] that came down to us until the end of 1911. All neighboring tribal groups were ‘absorbed’ into, rather than being conquered by the mainstream HAN ethnic group, in a steady Sinification process. (Note: Chinese style of leadership is by *YiDeFuRen*/ win people by virtue; overcome people with virtue; compel submission by kindness (generosity), so that others flocked under the HAN roof mainly on their own accord, in a spontaneous process). The only exception to this peaceful extension of HAN influence was the suppression and conquest of the Uighurs in today’s Xinjiang, during the QING Dynasty; and this is the reason why so many and so frequent Uighur revolts have erupted even in today’s Xinjiang. But, then, the Manchus are not HAN Chinese, and that may explain why this only exception happened. Another exception from the HAN Chinese pattern of expansion by attraction was during the YUAN Dynasty, which died, for example, try to invade Japan twice, but met disastrous results (when their ships capsized in the Sea of Japan). Again, these two exceptions, happening under two separate alien dynasties, simply served to prove that the HAN ‘norm’ (i.e., extension of Chinese influence through cultural attraction and assimila-

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<sup>57</sup> Wittfogel coined the term, “hydraulic empire.”

<sup>58</sup> Email from him, dated October 11, 2016.



tion) was all the more consistent and real. Granted, this experience is totally alien to Western history.”<sup>59</sup> In the footnote, he reminded me, saying he relied on impeccable archaeological sources: Chinese civilization did NOT originate from the Yellow River valley, as is generally assumed, but from the Loess Highland in today's Northwest China, where our ancestors survived on cereals. It was thousands of years later that they descended to the Yellow River Valley. Then they learned how to plant and eat rice, after it had been first introduced from India.” In short, my mentor had solved my enquiries, clearing my puzzles and confusions.

13th, LaoTiaYe/heaven has been mentioned in this study. Chinese people like to say TingTianYouMing/resign oneself to heaven's will/let us leave our fate to God<sup>60</sup> and TianJiBuKeXieLou/God's design must not be revealed to mortal ears/heaven's secrets must not be divulged.<sup>61</sup> However, Robert Carl Cohen, who arrived in the Chinese mainland for the first time in August 1957 and who later filmed a classic Beijing opera, showing the rebellious Monkey King triumphing over heavenly gods,<sup>62</sup> noticed that, in ancient days, an emperor would pray to ShangTian/heaven, hoping the latter would bless the empire, while, in today's China, it has become a habit to refer to LaoBaiXing/common people as Tian/heaven.<sup>63</sup>

Last but not least, regarding what Hsiung said in the previous point, a biomedicine scientist pointed out that it is all in the genes. She said the genes we are born with determine our peace-loving potential. Jokull Johannesson wrote the following words: “Perhaps she has a point, the ruling class in Europe are mostly of Viking heritage; and, perhaps, you may see the same in China. The Mongols ruled China for a long time. The British elite trace its origin to the Vikings, too.”<sup>64</sup>

## 5.4 Chapter 3's Findings

First, it is very easy to be contradictory, if a reader compares and contrasts all of our writings, including mine. In this connection, textbooks have been constantly updated, modified, revised, and even placed on a dusted book shelf. This has but led me to think of the following question: What is scholarship, when readers can be easily misled?

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<sup>59</sup> Email from him, dated July 23, 2013. See his book, *China into Its Second Rise: Myths, Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Challenge to Theory* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2012), chapter 1.

<sup>60</sup> <http://www.ichacha.net/%E5%90%AC%E5%A4%A9%E7%94%B1%E5%91%BD.html>, accessed on December 4, 2016.

<sup>61</sup> <http://tw.ichacha.net/%E5%A4%A9%E6%A9%9F%E4%B8%8D%E5%8F%AF%E6%B3%84%E6%BC%8F.html>, accessed on December 4, 2016.

<sup>62</sup> [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-08/17/content\\_8575923.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-08/17/content_8575923.htm), accessed on December 4, 2016.

<sup>63</sup> <http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1044/9/0/4/104490464.html?coluid=49&kindid=972&docid=104490464&mdate=1202101536>, accessed on December 4, 2016.

<sup>64</sup> Email from him, dated December 2, 2016.



Second, what is common denominator for the following 12 titles: *China; The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina; Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience*<sup>65</sup> 1950–1980; *China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism; CHINESE Mainland and Taiwan: A Study of Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Relations, with Documents; Tendencies of Regionalism in Contemporary China*; “The State of the China Studies Field”; “The Study of China: A Critical Assessment;” *China: In Search of the Wealth and Power-Deng Xiao-ping and the SUN Yat-senism; Taiwan: Nation-state or Province; Taiwan and the Rise of China: Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century*; and *Political Science and Chinese Political Studies: The State of the Field*. The best one should be one dot. If not, all the words are contradictory. Even if we simply state them in terms of the proper noun, China, contradictions still cannot be resolved. This is because, for example, the second book touched upon non-contemporary China, namely, India and Indochina and, as another example, the last book did not mention China or even contemporary China.

Third, Whiting in the introduction and in the last chapter of his book acknowledged that several limitations must be recognized at the outset,<sup>66</sup> such as paucity of information. Does my study also have limitations? I had noted a few in the first chapter. Most leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait(s) are dialectical or they play what I called dialectical politics. However, each one of them could have a (slightly) different version of dialectics. It is not possible for me to compress or simplify all of their words and deeds in terms of, for example, a series of crab and frog motion models, unless I treat all of their words and deeds in terms of, for example, the following model: All of their words and deeds at 1, and non-All of their words and deeds at E.

Fourth, I can apply the following model to slot in all the 12 publications, so as to see whether each of them has a 100% satisfactory methodology or not: satisfactory methodology at 1 and non-satisfactory methodology at E. Clubb’s edited book certainly does not have a methodology, and I would put his book in the danger zone spectrum, while Whiting’s could be placed at either 3 or 5, because, to me, the latter’s methodology, lacking a clear theory from the first word in the book title to the last period on the last page, is quite confusing and therefore not very satisfactory. For example, while a section of his book has been devoted to methodology in the introduction chapter, can he tell us the exact Chinese characters for his term, Chinese calculus of deterrence? If he does not have one, Whiting and (his colleagues) may well have distorted MAO Zedong et al.’s logic from the very beginning. We all know that the Chinese PLA do study MAO’s dialectical strategy. So, this author puts a big question mark, when Whiting said “[a]fter the initial fighting occurred in October [1962] as predicted [*italics mine*],....”<sup>67</sup>

Fifth, the publication date of all the publications has been listed chronologically. However, it is impossible to link them non-dialectically. For example, we do not see

<sup>65</sup> He coined this term in January 1981.

<sup>66</sup> P.xxii–xxv and p.224.

<sup>67</sup> See his book, p.viii.

continuity between Clubb's edited book, the last news report of which has to do with the then President Richard M. Nixon's February 1972 trip to the Chinese mainland, and Kuijper's November 2004 paper, which was presented in Taipei. That is to say, how do we link the two? However, dialectically, it can be done. I just have to put them in the safe zone spectrum, one at 1 and the other, 5. Voila, there is the linkage, because (1) I can accept all of them; (2) I can always say that 3 is a hybrid of those two different publications, because both mentioned contemporary China and Taiwan.

Sixth, Hsiung once advised me not to write esoteric things. Maybe what he meant was my publication may not be able to reach more audience. He fully understands dialectics. This can be seen from his well-received book, *Ideology and Practice: Evolution of Chinese Communism*<sup>68</sup>, and he has an edited book on paradox, *Hong Kong the Super Paradox: Life After Return to China*.<sup>69</sup> However, if an author has to make contribution to the literature, one has to write something which is different from others. Otherwise, it would be difficult to make contribution.

Seventh, I will first mention what Donald R. Cooper, who is a business management professor, said in the dedication page of his co-authored book, *Business Research Methods*, 10th edition: To my sons.... And to my friends and colleagues in China for opening my eyes to new ways of seeing and understanding the world. He added the following four Chinese characters or idiom: HuangRanDaWu/ have an epiphany about something/to suddenly see the light/to suddenly realize what has happened. In this book, six non-Chinese authors or (co-)editors and six authors or (co-)editors who were born and perhaps educated in contemporary China were chosen, plus a Chinese-American co-editor, who was born and basically educated in the United States. One may argue that the methodology of the latter should be closer to (alternative) reality, when it comes to the study of contemporary China. However, I must say that I am very disappointed by the edited book by GUO Sujian. He knows for sure that the Chinese mind and heart are dialectical. Has GUO noticed what ZHU SongLing of Beijing Union University in January 2017 said about XI Jinping's way of handling the Taiwan issue, incorporating Marxist dialectics, MAO Zedong's ShiSHiQiuSHi/seeking truth from facts, and the Chinese Guan/outlook of yin and yang?<sup>70</sup> Yes, GUO did not devote at least one chapter in his edited book. This calls for great alarm and concern. Is it because he knows that dialectical studies and writings are not the mainstream in the Western academic world? In other words, was he

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<sup>68</sup> (New York: Praeger, 1970)

<sup>69</sup> (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). The author identified three aspects of the XiangGang paradox: "The first source for the paradoxes basically explains why the doomsday commentators came to acquire those pessimistic views about China's stance after 1997.... As a second source for the paradox identified by Hsiung, the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the economic downturn in Hong Kong is obvious. The third aspect of the paradox, i.e., the deterioration of Hong Kong's international status and its source, constitute the most important contribution of the present volume to the discussion about post-1997 development in Hong Kong." Cited in <http://www.cefc.com.hk/article/james-c-hsiung-ed-hong-kong-the-super-paradox-life-after-return-to-china/>, accessed on September 21, 2016.

<sup>70</sup> <http://www.CRNTT.com.2017-01-22> 00:16:53, accessed on January 29, 2017.

fearful that he would not be able to find a publisher, including the top ones, who almost always think about the number of copies that a book can be sold? In the 1950s, 1960s, and even the 1970s, China students in the Taiwan area analyze the Chinese mainland dialectically. After the return of many academics with a doctoral degree from the United States, the United Kingdom, etc., they tried to apply non-dialectical theories and models to study the Chinese mainland. Intuitively, would their research products be closer to (alternative) reality? I would put a big, big question mark. It is my sincere belief that we should first figure out the Chinese (Communist) methodology, before embarking on something else, unless one is only fond of merely conducting a purely intellectual exercise, whereby so long as you have presented everything logically, we should all accept and it does not matter what political stand you hold. Why do I say that? I first visited Beijing in January 1991. A Chinese Communist senior academic said academics and experts in the West do not really understand China, without further elaboration. I did not pursue the subject matter. The June 1989 incident was still very much in my mind. After returning to the National SUN Yat-sen University in southern Taiwan Province, I began to think that it is because a non-dialectical study of contemporary China in general and the Chinese mainland in particular has distorted what I called dialectical politics in the Chinese mainland. I hope readers can go back to the first sentence in this point, by following the footstep of Cooper, that is, admitting that he or she has finally woke up.<sup>71</sup> However, how many of them dare to make or heed such a remark? In February 2017, I received an email publicizing the 30th annual meeting and international symposium to be held in June 2017: Three Decades of Chinese Political Studies: Reflecting the Past, Prospecting the Future, which is sponsored by the US-based Association of Chinese Political Studies.<sup>72</sup> Sad to say, in the Call for Proposals, although embracing a rich variety of new data sources, methodological approaches, and interdisciplinary lenses, not a single word or phrase was mentioned about the dialectical studies of contemporary China.

Eighth, in SHAW's edited book, it was good to see that Richard L. Walker in his chapter alerted us about the hagiography built around MAO Zedong. He also wondered why so many sophisticated China romancers were so wrong about the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.<sup>73</sup> Hungdah CHIU in his chapter, on the one hand, pointed out that very few Western publications on the Chinese mainland have withstood the test of time.<sup>74</sup> He even named names. On the other hand, he said the ROC on Taiwan's publications have more accurately reflected the real situation on the Chinese mainland over the past decades. If CHIU were alive today, would he say

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<sup>71</sup>The closest dialectical terms as shown in the index of Donald R. Cooper's *Business Research Methods*, 10th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2008) are dichotomous questions and dyads.

<sup>72</sup>Its flagship journal is *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, which was accepted into Thomson Reuter's *Emerging Sources Citation Index*, a new index in the Web of Science Core Collection. The journal is, as of this writing, also under review for acceptance into *Social Science Citation Index*.

<sup>73</sup>See SHAW's book, p.xvi.

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, p.xvi and p.307.

the same thing about this book, in which the time/space sequence component in the crab and frog motion model can enable us to stretch our description, explanation, and inference for a long period of time, hence to become philosophical?

Ninth, at first, I was wondering why would Hsiung's publication covered only the 30 years after the relocation of the ROC government in Taiwan from 1950, when we know that the elder CHIANG flew to Taipei in December 1949 or that MAO Zedong seized state power on October 1 in the same year? In this connection, can we say that the Taiwan experience actually began in August 1945, when, for example, YAN JiaKan, who later became the vice-president of the ROC, and SUN YunXuan, who later became the Premier, were already assigned to work in Taiwan Province? A reason was given by Hsiung to justify what he has consciously done: references to the pre-1950 mainland phase of the ROC are occasionally made for the sake of comparison or to highlight continuity.<sup>75</sup> In August 2016, I came across a passage mentioned by WEI, who said "[i]n the fall of 1949, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek removed [sic] his military and administrative staff to Taiwan and on March 1, 1950, resumed presidency of the Republic of China...."<sup>76</sup> The date, March 1950, may well be the main reason why Hsiung covered only 30 years of the Taiwan experience from 1950 to 1980. However, he in his edited book did not mention CHIANG's resumption of his presidency in the Taiwan area.

Tenth, if all the people in the world by the turn of the twenty-second century think and act dialectically, would they be in the comfort zone? Would there be more cooperation and less conflict? And, how to rationalize the fact that some people before twenty-second century are dialectical, and some non-dialectical and all the people from the twenty-second century become dialectical? What to do with those who resist to be dialectical, even if they know that dialectics is superior than non-dialectics? Such questions must be studied and answered in the early twenty-second century. However, it is not possible for me to conduct the new studies now or when time comes.

11th, it is easy to find fault with other China students' writings. Just to think of the following question: Would the logic(s) of this article and that article on the same topic by the same author flow? Intuitively, it is very doubtful. Or should I name one author?<sup>77</sup> WEI in his book would thank those who had adjusted his biases,<sup>78</sup> and this is laudable. As a related question, would that author forgive me for publicizing his or her name? In April 2010, Elizabeth J. Economy moderated a panel, which is entitled *Explaining the Rise of China: A Challenge to Western Social Science*

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<sup>75</sup> See the front flap of his edited book.

<sup>76</sup> See his book, p.12.

<sup>77</sup> Ezra F. Vogel, who assumes a posture of China student, has a book, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1979), describing and explaining why that island nation can return from the World War II ashes. However, when he gave a public lecture at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, he admitted that he was basically wrong.

<sup>78</sup> See his book, p.10. On page 15, he mistakenly said the Chinese mainland should rank number two in terms of Gross National Product (GNP) after 2020.

Theories and which is sponsored by the Harvard-Yenching Institute and the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University.<sup>79</sup> Questions like “Is China on a trajectory that defies standard Western predictions about the connections among markets, civil society, and democratization? Or is the People’s Republic of China simply a case of democracy delayed? If the Chinese case does indeed depart significantly from standard models of transition and transformation, what wider lessons can we draw about this experience?” were asked. What these questions imply is that many, if not most, academics and experts in the West know that they do not know enough about things Chinese. Hsiung in August 2001 made the following observation: non-unilinearity or a “non-unilinear” view for comprehending the logic of developments in East and Southeast Asia, as contrasted with the habitual Western unilinear view of world development (“one size fits all”).<sup>80</sup> The ultimate question is: How many China students would have a chance to read and absorb this remark and, more importantly, integrate the remarks in their future writings?

12th, Kuijper can enjoy as a critic more than others, because he was a civil servant and never an academic, and, therefore, he does not have to be worried about promotion, in which one has to basically base on his or her representative work. That is to say, Kuijper does not need to think about whether he should be careful when critically assessing other China students’ works in the scholarly circle. In this connection, I am not sure whether he has encountered the problem of finding a suitable publisher for his writings.

Last but not least, Kuijper said, as of November 2004, no China students have written a text- or handbook comparable to, e.g., Barrie Axford’s *Politics*, Paul Samuelson’s *Economics*, John Macionis’ *Sociology*, Rita Atkinson’s *Introduction to Psychology*, etc. I happened to have corresponded with him in the summer of 2003. In September 2016, I invited him to conduct a critique of my draft manuscript of this book, so as to see whether what I have done is satisfactory to him. Up to May 2017, I had also invited him a few times to set aside or ignore my verbal model as presented in the first chapter and generate a new verbal model by himself by looking at the TaiJiTu, so that more readers can appreciate TaiJiTu.

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<sup>79</sup> [http://www.harvard-yenching.org/sites/harvard-yenching.org/files/featurefiles/Rise%20of%20China%20Transcript\\_final.pdf](http://www.harvard-yenching.org/sites/harvard-yenching.org/files/featurefiles/Rise%20of%20China%20Transcript_final.pdf), accessed on August 13, 2016. One of the panelists was a Japanese, who said “[i]n the 1980s, the emergence of Japan was debated everywhere in the world and the theory of the Japanese threat also appeared. It was even called an evil empire – more dangerous than the Soviet Union!” See *ibid*.

<sup>80</sup> See the dedication page of my book, *International Governance and Regimes: A Chinese Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2012). James C. Hsiung made this observation in August 2001.

## 5.5 Chapter 4 and 5's findings

Are there any new findings for these two chapters, which deserve to be pointed out? Not really so, unless we pose the following question: Is it possible to reinvent my contemporary China study in terms of, for example, game theory, systems theory, rational (choice) theory, etc. by using the exact words, no more, no less? Honestly speaking, it is very easy to find fault with each publication, including my previous non-dialectical writings. In February 2017, for the first time, I came across a January 2006 journal article written by ZHAO Gang on reinventing China, pointing out that by the early twentieth century, educational institutions had facilitated the ManZhou efforts to gain the hearts and minds of the Han intellectual elite, who embraced the idea that China was a multiethnic state.<sup>81</sup> However, he focused on QING dynasty ideology and the rise of modern Chinese national identity in the early twentieth century. In any case, would we the human beings be able to ever bring about 100% perfection in social science(s)? No is the simple and straightforward answer. Hence, should we remain in the academia, in which it is not possible for us to get 100% truth?

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<sup>81</sup> <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0097700405282349>, accessed on February 4, 2017.

## Chapter 6

# Closing and Non-closing This Book on the Study of Contemporary China

In concluding this book, I would like to share some thoughts with readers. Some of them are derived from my 30+ years of experience of teaching and conducting research and writing, which should complement each other. A good university professor cannot be good, if he or she has no original research outcome, which can be shared with the academic community. But, I must admit that it seems to be more difficult for social scientists to advance novel theories and models in the future.

Many academics and experts in the academic world are not aware that there should be three stages in being well versed in social science(s). In passing, it should be noted that, in my crab and frog motion model, there are three phases in each stage. At the first stage, usually around 40 or 50 years old, a serious academic or expert should firmly grasp social science(s), realizing that each discipline is not isolated or we can say that no discipline is an island, and each course should be taught interdisciplinarily. Most students and even many academics after becoming full professor and experts have failed to understand that and, therefore, I have observed that, for example, some law professors would feel uncomfortable if they do not belong to the department of law or some students would say “Professor, I came here to study law,” as if law overrides or prevails other disciplines in importance. I, however, would remind them that we can study, for example, political science, from the economic dimension, sociological dimension, legal dimension, psychological dimension, etc. If we study contemporary China, we can do the same, describing, explaining, and inferring it from those dimensions, one by one. At the second stage, one has to put forward his or her own original theory and model. I had tried to do that when I wrote my doctoral dissertation at NYU by applying the game of Chinese Checkers/TiaoQi *qua* model to describe, explain, and infer relations between Beijing, Washington, and Moscow, from a Chinese perspective. However, I did not invent that board game. So, what I had done was not that original. For the record, a good theory for this board game can be power and exchange, because, in the course of playing the board game, power and exchange are involved. When it is one’s turn to make a move, it is power. When he or she needs the help of the second or third player, so as to make a greater and farther leap, exchange is involved. At the



third or final stage, if one's theory and model have been popularly applied by other academics and experts, senior and young, the said academic or expert can be said as having entered the trance-formations or the highest stage of social science(s). So, we often see theories and models, which can be categorized as belonging to this or that mainstream schools of thought, such as (neo-)Realism, (neo-)Liberalism, (neo-)Marxism, Constructivism, and International and Global Governance, plus the one-dot theory. On the one hand, non-dialectically, they are competing with each other, with no victor yet in sight. Thus, whenever something big happened, mass media in the West would inevitably interview those academics and experts who subscribe to (neo-)Marxism. In October 2016, Igor Ashurbeyli announced the historic creation of a new nation state by the name of Asgardia in the heavens above our earth. Would the free and unrestricted society, peopled by rich and wealthy residents, be Communistic? On the other hand, dialectically, all the mainstream schools of thought can be properly be placed in the safe zone spectrum of the crab and frog motion model. If a reader subscribes to (neo-)Realism, this mainstream school of thought would be put at 1. The same logic applies to other mainstream schools of thought.

Scholarship/XueShu, to me, means the following: logic(s) + contribution, + application of the same theory and model throughout the study + closeness to (alternative) reality + preciseness in the choice of words, etc. People often ask what your logic is. Whenever we hear that question, we must understand and realize that eventually we cannot escape from not posing the following question: What is your theory and model? When you have a theory, as I said before, you have to have a model or a series of models to accompany it. This author definitely rejects the TD logics, because such self-deceptive logic(s) do not flow. We can certainly reinvent such logics dialectically, by applying my one-dot theory's crab and frog motion model. For example, the first type of logic is placed at 1, while the second one, five, and so and so forth. As to contribution, what I have done in this study has been definitely original. The only worry that I have is that how many readers do apply my one-dot theory. If they do, this would mean that they have conducted a paradigm-shift. If so, I will have a higher sense of achievement. I do have a sense of better achievement up to now, because, in this study, I have applied my one-dot theory throughout the chapters. Due to neglect or ignorance, I may have skipped the application of the theory somewhere. However, I can always defend myself by pointing out that a word, a phrase, a sentence, a paragraph, a section, a chapter, or the whole book is individually but a dot, thereby being able to escape from criticism, as opposed to critical thinking and critique. I also believe that my study is closer to (alternative) reality. It is like conducting a fundamental study of basic physics. There is no doubt that the KMT, CPC, and DPP are still obsessed with dialectics, and they (inevitably) have to continue to play a series of dialectical games with each other and, therefore, my study should be very close to the (alternative) reality. The only problem is to precisely find out which dialectical model each party is adopting or has adopted at this time/space sequence and the next, which could be half-a-second from now. Dr. SUN Yat-sen, according to a Chinese mainland academic, sometimes apply

dialectics,<sup>1</sup> CHIANG Kai-shek, a few years later after flying to the provisional capital of Taipei City in December 1949, instructed his subordinates to study dialectics. After that, we see many writings related to dialectics in the Taiwan area. The problem is that not many dialecticians become heavy-weights, influencing others. At the age of 44, from April to July 1937, MAO Zedong, speaking at YanAn-based Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, confidently lectured on dialectics,<sup>2</sup> not to mention other Chinese Communist leaders such as ZHOU Enlai, DENG Xiaoping, etc., who are well versed in dialectics. Speaking of preciseness in the choice of words, dialectics can enable a dialectician, at each time/space sequence, making side-way moves and jumping, for example, from this crab and frog motion model to another crab and frog motion model, to think twice and thrice about which number or letter in the model to stick to, each one of which stands for a concept in terms of a scale.

I was extremely fascinated when I first saw the title of John Fitzgerald's book chapter, "Reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated": The history of the death of China.<sup>3</sup> The issues of a state survival, the (imminent) collapse of a regime, and a demised regime or state resurrected from the grave were discussed. In the late nineteenth century, a British lord who had a chance to observe China's commerce, currency, waterways, armies, railways, politics and future prospects, wrote a book arguing that China is breaking up.<sup>4</sup> In early 1990s, David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal were asking, after seeing the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991: Is China Breaking up?<sup>5</sup> And, as recent as March 2015, David D. Shambaugh offered his rhetoric, predicting the coming crack up of the PRC, whereby the endgame of Communist rule has already begun.<sup>6</sup> Has it? There is no denial that China would be literally swept away by the prediction that a collision between our Milky Way Galaxy and the Andromeda Galaxy, which is approximately 780 Mpc/2.5 million

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<sup>1</sup> See also ZHANG YiHong, *SunZhongShanXianShengDeBianZhengFa/The Dialectics of Sun Yat-sen* (in literal translation) (Taipei: no publisher, 1951). See <http://www.sunyat-sen.org:1980/b5/www.sunyat-sen.org/sundb/sundbjwx/show.php?id=6886>, accessed on September 1, 2016.

<sup>2</sup> See Nick Knight, *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe 1990).

<sup>3</sup> In David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., *China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism* (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 21–58. As Imperial Japanese troops advanced on the Chinese capital of Nanjing in July 1937, raping not only women but children as well, ZHOU FoHai, a then senior official in the Republic of China (ROC) government, wrote in his diary of the panic and fear consuming the city, anticipating the destruction and its implications for his country: "China will have no more history." Cited in <http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21579797-how-struggle-against-japans-brutal-occupation-shaped-modern-china-start-history>, accessed on August 19, 2016.

<sup>4</sup> Lord Charles Beresford, *The Break-Up of China, with an Account of its Present Commerce, Currency, Waterways, Armies, Railways, Politics and Future Prospects* (London: Harper & Brothers, 1899).

<sup>5</sup> See the sensational blurb in the back cover of David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., *China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism* (London: Routledge, 1994).

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198>, accessed on August 17, 2016

light-years from Earth, 4.4 billion years later, would take place, as forecasted by some natural scientists. So, on the one hand, depending on the context, Fitzgerald's reminder that the death of contemporary China can be exaggerated or should be dismissed should be incorporated into the model of Close This Study on Contemporary China versus Non-Close This Study on Contemporary China. On the other hand, it will have to be based on one's confidence, that is, would contemporary China be able to survive as a nation, country, or state from October 1, 1949 up to the end of the twenty-first century?

However, a tough question ought to be asked at this juncture: Would contemporary China be transformed into the following, if we merely look at the title of many academic journals related to China?: *Early China*; *Early Medieval China*<sup>7</sup>; *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies*<sup>8</sup>; *Late Imperial China*; *Ming Studies*<sup>9</sup>; and *Modern China/JinDaiZhongGuo*. Journals like *The China Review* cover both contemporary and modern China and *China Report* covers both China and its East Asian neighbors. This author is not worried at all, because we can always equate contemporary China at 1, if one treasures such a study, ancient China (or *Early China*) at 5, and *Modern China* at 3. *Early Medieval China* could be put in between 5 and 3. The same thing speaks for *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies*. For *Ming Studies* and *Late Imperial China*, they are synonymous with modern China. In short, a non-dialectical arrangement could be tougher, because ancient China is not 100% the same as modern China or contemporary China, and modern China certainly is not 100% contemporary China. Strictly speaking, when we talk about contemporary China, we should not mention ancient and modern China, because how can we jump from ancient China to contemporary China by skipping modern China? Dialectically, we can present everything logically, systematically, and coherently. We need at least six models: Ancient China = *Yin* and that small dot in *Yin* = either modern China or ancient China; modern China = *Yin* and that small dot in *Yin* = either ancient China or contemporary China; contemporary China = *Yin* and that small dot in *Yin* = either ancient China or modern China. Specifically applied, we can, for example, equate contemporary China as *Yin* and those who are fond of the TANG Dynasty in the (early) medieval period or chose to live in such civilization and culture from October 1, 1949 up to now are tantamount to that little dot in *Yin*. That is how the dialecticians rationalize everything.

In the same book chapter, Fitzgerald also reminded us to contemplate alternative models for the Chinese community and state.<sup>10</sup> Unfortunately, he can only offer a brief verbal model, which is not accompanied by at least a diagram for us to see and to be able to relate to, hence making some readers confused, to say the least.

<sup>7</sup> Covering from the late HAN and WEI-JIN NanBeiChao period through the early TANG

<sup>8</sup> Promoting scholarship in all disciplines related to the SONG, LIAO, JIN, XIA, and YUAN dynasties

<sup>9</sup> Concerning with scholarship on all aspects of Chinese society and culture from the 14th to the 17th centuries

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, p.43 and p.48.

A book can rectify some of the distortions in history<sup>11</sup> and non-history. Has my book again distorted the past and present or has it not? The issue of falsification must be discussed, as mentioned in the first chapter. Karl Popper is well-known for pointing out that all the theories in social science(s) can be falsified/TuiFan. To put it cruelly and harshly, what you have written are of little value and even garbage. In the dedication page, abstract, the first chapter, and the second chapter, readers may be astonished when he or she feels that I said that my one-dot theory can describe, explain, and infer *all* the things in the non-human and human world from time/space sequence (1) to time/space sequence (n) MINUS ONE. Yes, in this third last paragraph of this chapter, I still repeat that remark, unless there are no more human beings and non-human beings in the world, who can apply my one-dot theory. Ontologically speaking, if (killer) robots and co-bots exist after the demise of human beings and if they have been programmed to apply the one-dot theory, my one-dot theory would be still alive. In summer 2004, I was a visiting research fellow at Nanyang Technological University. My roommate was a computer science professor from Beijing-based QingHua University. I asked him a question, that is, can we say that the binary of 0 and 1 in computer science is equivalent to the *Yin* and *Yang*? In less than half a second, he said: Yes. In other words, the ancient Chinese were ahead of the twentieth century computer scientists. In this connection, even if, 1 day, there are no more (killer) (co-)robots and co-bots, so long as the ETs exist, they can apply my one-dot theory and, therefore, my one-dot theory cannot be said as being falsified. And, if Buddha would still be around after the demise of human beings, ETs, etc., HE remains as a dot. His palm still bears the TaiJiTu.

There is another perplexing issue remaining, that is, does non-dialectics or one-dot existed before dialectics? If a supernatural force started in the first place, then it is not dialectical, unless we are saying there is another supernatural force before the existence of Buddha, God, or Allah or a hybrid of (some of) them. How do we prove it? Is there any way to find out the 100% truth? If not, my book has not yet been completed, even if it is published, because contemporary China is still in HIS or a hybrid of (some of) their palm(s).

Last but not least, I am unable to close this study, if a supernatural force exists, because this force will make a final arrangement for me regarding this book, which is beyond my control.<sup>12</sup> So, Non- Close This Study on Contemporary China in this context could be placed at five of the crab and frog motion model. To me, it is still acceptable at this point in time.

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<sup>11</sup> <http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21579797-how-struggle-against-japans-brutal-occupation-shaped-modern-china-start-history>, accessed on August 19, 2016

<sup>12</sup> In January 2017, spanning from the 1940s to the 1990s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) puts almost 12 million declassified files online for the first time, including Unidentified Flying Objects (UFOs). See. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/crest-25-year-program-archive>, accessed on January 20, 2017.

# Appendix

# 一點理論研究中心

(The One-dot Theory Center)

## 是誰在治理這個世界：大自然或者人類？

(Who Governs: Nature or Man ?)


God



Allah



The Yin and Yang




Source: 朱慧慈/Judith JOO/ZHU  
Huici Laoshi



1 2 3 4 5 A B C D E


time/space sequence (1)  
time/space sequence (2)  
.....  
time/space sequence (n)

Source: 俞劍鴻/PeterKien-Hong YU,  
September 1994



Sub-atomic particle, known as the Higgs Boson, which gives everything in the universe mass

Source: European Organization for Nuclear Research, almost pinned down in March 2013



Source: Antony Garrett Lisi,  
Our universe, November 2007



The egg and the sperm