Language, Identity and Conflict

A comparative study of language in ethnic conflict in Europe and Eurasia

Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost

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Language, Identity and Conflict

In this innovative study of language and identity in recent and contemporary cases of ethnic conflict in Europe and Eurasia, Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost sets out a response to the limitations in the fields of linguistics and political science with regard to language policy and planning in conflict situations.

The key concerns of the book relate to the functions of language as a marker of identity in ethnic conflict, the extent to which theoretical conceptualisations of language in ethnic conflict studies adequately reflect the full range of these functions and the extent to which language may be a causal factor in ethnic conflict. The author also illustrates the possibilities for language policy and planning as tools in the resolution of conflict and examines the theoretical innovations necessary in fields of the sociology of language and political science in order to develop a more adequate framework for understanding the role of language in ethnic conflict and its resolution.

Key themes include:

- states, nations and their borders
- the physical and cultural environment
- mythology, ideology and technology
- politics, the state and conflict
- conflict resolution

Material from across a number of disciplines is drawn together in order to investigate the possibility of transcending the limitations of the social constructivist and primordial positions on ethnicity. Notions of language in competition and of language in socio-political conflicts are embedded in an ecological view of language in ethnicity, and finally, the prospects for reconceiving the issue of language as a means of conflict management and resolution are situated within cultural analyses of conflict.

This book will be essential reading for students, academics and researchers in the fields of sociology, geography and politics of language and also for practitioners of language policy, language planning and conflict resolution.

Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost has been a consultant and advisor to a number of national and international organisations. He is currently directing a new departure in language planning in Wales through establishing a strategic language planning agency in the form of an innovative arrangement between partners in higher education, local government and others.

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For Ioan Miles Williams

What has made it impossible for us to live in time like fish in water, like birds in air, like children?

(p. 146 in J.M. Coetzee *Waiting for the barbarians* Vintage: London, 1980)

The way of the world is to bloom and to flower and die but in the affairs of men there is no waning and the noon of his expression signals the onset of night.

(p. 146 in Cormac McCarthy *Blood meridian or the evening redness in the west* Picador: London, 1985)

Elisabeth Borcher said: I break open stars and find nothing, and again nothing, and then a word in a foreign tongue.

(p. 71 in George Steiner *Language and Silence* Faber & Faber: London, 1985)

Contents

List of illustrations ix
Acknowledgements xi

1 Introduction 1

PART 1
Initial theoretical interrogations 7

2 Language and society 9
3 Ethnic identity 26
4 Language in ethnicity 43

PART 2
Borders and frontiers 63

5 Histories and geographies of the nation-state 65
6 Language and ethnic frontiers 91

PART 3
Landscapes and institutions 109

7 Map, mythology and environment 111
8 Virtuality and propinquity 129

PART 4
Conflicts 147

9 Language movements, ethnic mobilisation and the state 149
10 Language conflict and language in conflict 164

PART 5
Resolutions 181

11 Beyond conflict 183

12 Globalities: comparative issues in extra-European théâtres 202

13 Conclusions 220

Bibliography 222
Index 239

Illustrations

Figures

1 Doxa and the universe of discourse 19
2 A taxonomy of the structural variables affecting ethno-linguistic vitality 45
3 Basic model of ecological relations 51
4 Resource utilisation and niche differentiation curves 58
5 Europe's cultural circles: an interpretation 76
6 East–West fault lines in Europe 77
7 Minority groupings in the borderland states 104
8 Signpost for the town of Bera/Vera in the village of Sara/Sare, the Northern Basque Country, France, adjacent to the French-Spanish border in the Pyrenees, August 2001 126
9 Signpost for Bera/Vera de Bidasoa on the outskirts of the eponymous town in the Foral Community of Navarre, Spain, adjacent to the French-Spanish border in the Pyrenees, August 2001 126
10 Signposts for France in the town of Bera/Vera de Bidasoa, the Foral Community of Navarre, Spain, adjacent to the French-Spanish border in the Pyrenees August 2001 127
11 Genesis and dynamics of protracted social conflict 161
12 Basic relations between self-identification and the categorisation of other ethnic groups 166
13 The identity process with regard to ethnic identity 168
14 The relationship of language and cultural behaviour 169
15 Life cycle of a conflict 186

Maps

1 Area of study 5
2 State building in Europe: tensions and processes 78
3 The geographic distribution of the Kurdish language 212
4 The linguistic composition of Kurdistan 213

Tables

1 National identity in Northern Ireland, 1968–1989 82
2 The language character of the African states 206–207
3 Official and national languages in French-speaking Africa 208
4 Official and local languages by state and territory in India 209

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Diarmait Mac Chríost, Llechwedd, May Day, 2002

1 Introduction

> Any assessment of conflict involving ethnic identity requires delicate treatment of language.
>
> (Independent International Commission on Kosovo. Introduction p. 5 http://www.kosovocommission.org/reports/3-introduction.html)

> [L]anguage is the ultimate measure of human society. More than any other of life's faculties, it is language that tells us who we are, what we mean and where we are going.
>
> (Fischer, 1999: 203)

> Europe, like nature itself, cannot abide a vacuum.
>
> (Davies, 1997: 1136)

Language, identity and conflict

This study arises from a widespread failure to respond to the way in which language functions in situations of conflict (e.g. Baker and Jones, 1998: 276–286 and 333–338; Fishman, 1989: 605–626). That problem results from the fact that language policy and planning as undertaken by linguists is inadequately grounded in political theory and that political scientists are inadequately versed in language policy and planning concerns. The primary aim of this work is to correct the resulting situation by responding to a number of critical questions regarding relationships between language and identity in recent and contemporary cases of ethnic conflict in Europe and Eurasia. These concern:

- i The functions of language as a marker of identity in ethnic conflict.
- ii The extent to which theoretical conceptualisations of language in ethnic conflict studies adequately reflect the full range of those functions.
- iii The extent to which language may be a causal factor in ethnic conflict.
- iv The possibilities for language policy and planning as tools in the resolution of conflict.

v The theoretical innovations which may be necessary in the fields of the sociology of language and political science in order to develop a more adequate framework for understanding the role of language in ethnic conflict and its resolution.

The need for the serious academic study of the relationships between language, identity and conflict has been made clear by some within the academic community itself and also by other institutions, agencies and professionals engaged with language issues. For example, some promotional material for the UNESCO World Languages Project highlights the following words of Felix Martí, President of the International Committee of LINGUAPAX:

> The observation of the fact that the conflicts which occur in the world are always linked to questions of cultural and linguistic identity leads us to realise that when a good linguistic policy is put into place, we are setting up bastions of peace.

An early reference to the neglect on the part of academia of 'the much more widespread and universal generation of conflict through cultural difference' explained that this was the result of the dominance of Marxist interpretations of the class-based nature of conflict (Carter in Williams, 1988: vii–viii; see also Carter, 1988). The postmodern shifts which have transformed European society in the last quarter of the twentieth century and the collapse of the Soviet order serve to add greater urgency to that insight. Phillipson affirms the salience of language issues in many of the major ethnic upheavals of recent decades and argues that language policy must become a central concern to sociology and political science:

> It is still widely felt that language policy and planning as undertaken by language specialists is inadequately grounded in political theory and that political scientists accord too little attention to language policy.
>
> (Phillipson, 1999: 94)

Similarly, Burke *et al.* assert that:

> Finding or articulating a voice has been the key aim of many previously silenced groups; insisting on a cultural identity has been the priority of others; fighting for the right to use a language has been an issue from Africa to Ireland. It is a modern fact that in situations of civil conflict or war, whereas in the past soldiers were used to defend (or storm) the palace or parliament buildings, in the last half century it has been at least as likely that they would have been employed to

> guard (or commandeer) the television and radio stations. Control over language has been a key priority.
>
> (Burke, Crowley and Girvin, 2000: 9)

This is the *raison d'être* of this text.

The work draws on material from a range of academic disciplines. The interdisciplinarity of the text is grounded, however, in the first place, in ecolinguistics (e.g. Haarmann, 1986) and, in the second place, structuration theory (Giddens, 1984 and 1985), and finally in cultural analyses in conflict resolution (Avruch, 1998). The interweaving of these conceptual frameworks provides a *prisme à thèse* through which the critical concerns regarding inter-relationships between ideas of the state, the individual, institutions and conflict are refracted and it is this theoretical innovation which is at the heart of the originality of the work. The model drawn from ecolinguistics is shown to open the possibility of arriving at the most comprehensive view of language in society but, it is also shown that this model does not encompass societies in conflict and language as a feature of conflict. Structuration theory is drawn upon as a sociological model which appropriately locates conflict in society. The particular attention given to fractures between individuals and institutions is demonstrated in this work to be clearly applicable to language in conflict. On turning to conflict resolution theory, ways are indicated in which language, while a feature of conflict, has enormous potential as a function of processes towards the resolution of conflict. These insights are applied to Haarmann's model thereby extending the descriptive reach and explanatory capacity of ecological views of relationships between language, identity and conflict.

The approach to ethnic conflict adopted in this work relates to Gottlieb's (1993) assertion that while no two conflicts are identical, many conflicts share certain features, thereby no single conflict is *sui generis.* This allows for this work to be set within a comparative framework, avoiding deterministic approaches to the subject and allowing for the illumination of transcultural and transnational patterns in language, identity and conflict. A range of sources (e.g. Bourdieu, 1977 and 1991) are drawn upon in critically reflecting upon models through which such language issues are currently viewed. A number of themes are integral to this comparative framework and these enable exploration of the structural, phenomenological and ideological factors underlying these issues. These themes comprise (i) states, nations and their borders, (ii) the physical and cultural environment, (iii) mythology, ideology and technology, (iv) politics, the state and conflict and (v) conflict resolution. Implications of the findings of the study for language policy and planning are offered, highlighting the value of language-driven strategies in three phases of conflict in particular (Lund and West, 1997), namely prevention, management and resolution.

The structure of the book orders these various concerns into five parts.

Part one outlines the theoretical context in which the work is set. Part two comprises an overview of the key issues in historical and geographical context. Part three moves the work beyond the traditional concerns of history and geography, and draws from a range of disciplines in examining further the key issues at the heart of the work. Part four draws together the reticulate conceptualisations of parts one, two and three, thereby illuminating the nature of contemporary ethnic conflict and the locating of language in fractious ethno-political landscapes. Part five explores the applications of the findings of the research to theory and to public policy in the area of study, while indicating fruitful points of reference for comparative work in areas of the globe beyond Europe and Eurasia.

This work takes Europe as its area of study. The idea of Europe as a particular space, however, has recently become problematic. For example, Ely (1992) notes a postmodern anxiety which is afflicting western Europe, a phenomenon which is reinforced by the collapse of the USSR. The historical juncture he describes as a constitution-defining epoch in which European identity is entirely recast. The sense of crisis is confirmed by others. Deighton, for example, diagnoses the postmodern condition of European identity in the following terms:

> The pressures of a global economy and global competition, of the imperatives of large-scale economic management, and of a European regional presence on the world political stage, on the one hand, and nationalism, social fragmentation, and disillusionment with integration, on the other, have never been more acute. Further, new issues of concern, ranging from uncontrolled nuclear proliferation to environmental hazards and social disaffection, present challenges of a quite different nature. Europeans are now trying to resolve the problems of defining their borders, especially to the east and south, without the presence of Cold War superpower hegemons, and to map out afresh the security, political, and social characteristics of a 'European' identity in the post-Cold War world.
>
> (Deighton, 1998: 201)

In working towards the idea of the identity of Europe, Delanty (1996) suggests that while Europe has always been characterised by diversity, the idea (never a reality) of unity was located in the imaginative frontier in the east and that due to the collapse of the USSR the frontier has at present 'lost its orientation, its driving force' (Delanty, 1996: 101). As a result there exists no bulwark in the east marking the limits of Europe. Smith (1999) explores this ambiguous post-Soviet space to the east from the perspective of Russian political rhetoric. He reveals a complex discourse on Eurasia as, variously, a bridging point between Europe and Asia and a Russian diasporic space. Elsewhere Robins asserts the necessity of

exposing the whole range of the European experience to its own conceptions of 'non-Europe' as '[h]istory is created out of cultures in relation and interaction: interrupting identities' (Robins, 1996: 82). This work, in engaging with issues in language, identity and conflict not only in what has been conventionally regarded as Europe but in the ambiguous space that is Eurasia as well, may also be regarded as a contribution to the current debate on the nature of the identity of Europe.



Map 1 Area of study

Adapted from Davies, 1997: 48

Part 1

Initial theoretical interrogations

2 Language and society

To say language is to say society.

(Lévi-Strauss in Duranti 1997: 337)

Habitus . . . in aliqua perfecta et constanti animi aut corporis absolutione consistit.

(M. Tullius Cicero *De Inventione Rhetorica* 2, 9, 30)

Introduction

The idea of language, in part, and especially of language in conflict, resides in a complexity of relationships between self-identification, group cohesion and world-view. In this opening chapter the trajectory of this work is set here with regard to these concerns. From this it will be clear that this work is related to a view of language and society in which the two are locked in a relationship which may be characterised as dialectic. In a general sense it may be seen to follow DeBernardi in this, for example:

> Contemporary ethnographic linguistics are driven by functional questions regarding the role of linguistic interaction in expressing social identity and shaping value. Research into the pragmatics of language use suggests that people not only speak about the world 'out there'; they also create a good deal of their social reality in the very act of speaking. Thus the acquisition of a language is not only the internalization of a linguistic code, but also entails the learning of status and role, of appropriate social effect, and (ultimately) of worldview. Language provides both the foundation of a shared cultural identity and the means for the reproduction of social difference.
>
> (DeBernardi, 1994: 861)

That language is central to the individuals' sense of place in the world is, in many ways taken as given and, while this chapter is not to be read as an attempt to engage with the extensive debate on the intrinsic nature of language, it is emphasised that both language and social reality are

dynamic and that a shift in one affects the other. It is also argued that the nature of the dialectic relationship into which language and society are locked is characterised by a constant state of tension or conflict and that in this way language, as culture or art, both condemns us to barbarism and also elevates us towards the sublime. For language in conflict, it is argued here, silence is not an alternative (cf. Steiner, 1967: 74).

Cultural and linguistic relativism

The idea of language as worldview finds its origins in the development of anthropology in North America. From the earliest beginnings of the discipline of anthropology in the USA the study of culture was held to be only possible through the language of the culture. This position has practical implications in requiring the researcher to acquire facility in the language of the culture under study. According to Boas, one of the founders of anthropology in the USA, this position on language was a not merely a practical issue but also theoretical:

> In all of the subjects mentioned heretofore, a knowledge of Indian languages serves as an important adjunct to a full understanding of the customs and beliefs of the people we are studying. But in all these cases the service which language lends us is first of all a practical one – a means of a clearer understanding of ethnological phenomena which in themselves have nothing to do with linguistic problems . . . It seems, however, that a theoretical study of Indian languages is not less important than a practical knowledge of them; that the purely linguistic inquiry is part and parcel of a thorough investigation of the psychology of the peoples of the world. If ethnology is understood as the science dealing with the mental phenomena of the life of the people of the world, human language, one of the most important manifestations of mental life, would seem to belong naturally to the field of work of ethnology.
>
> (Quoted in Duranti, 1997: 52–53)

The idea of the intimate connection between language and culture as perceived by Boas was developed during the first half of the twentieth century by a cohort of students of anthropology. The methodological implication of this position on the relationship between language and culture was that the linguistic system could be used as a means for reading the cultural system as a whole. Kroeber may be used to represent their position, writing in 1923 he stated:

> In short, culture can probably function only on the basis of abstractions, and these in turn seem to be possible only through speech, or through a secondary substitute for spoken language such as writing,

> numeration, mathematical and chemical notation, and the like. Culture, then, began when speech was present; and from then on, the enrichment of either meant the further development of the other.
>
> (Kroeber, 1963: 102)

In the course of his work Boas became convinced of the view that each culture could only be understood in its own terms. He came to this conclusion on observing that the various languages he studied were used to order and to classify human experience and the world in different ways. Moreover, Boas showed that this classification was arbitrary. This notion of cultural relativism was exemplified by the 'Eskimo' vocabulary relating to snow:

> It seems important . . . to emphasize the fact that the groups of ideas expressed by specific phonetic groups show very material differences in different languages, and do not conform by any means to the same principles of classification. To take again the example of English, we find that the idea of WATER is expressed in a great variety of forms: one term serves to express water as a LIQUID; another one, water in the form of a large expanse (LAKE); other, water as running in a large body or in a small body (RIVER and BROOK); still other terms express water in the form of RAIN, DEW, WAVE and FOAM. It is perfectly conceivable that this variety of ideas, each of which is expressed by a single independent term in English, might be expressed in other languages by derivation from the same term.
>
> Another example of the same kind, the words for SNOW in Eskimo, may be given. Here we find one word, *aput*, expressing SNOW ON THE GROUND; another one, *qana*, FALLING SNOW; a third one, *piqsirpoq*, DRIFTING SNOW; and a fourth one, *qimuqsug*, A SNOWDRIFT.
>
> (Quoted in Duranti, 1997: 55)

The significance of this insight is that a particular view or experience of the world is directly codified by language. Sapir, and subsequently Whorf, pushed this position further still in suggesting that if language does indeed possess such a property then it might also predispose the speakers of the language to certain particular views of the world. Sapir arrived at this position as early as 1929 and it is worth quoting from him extensively on this:

> Language is a guide to 'social reality' . . . Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality

> essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached . . . we see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.
>
> (In Mandelbaum, 1949: 162)

This insight was formulated by Whorf in subsequent years as the principle of linguistic relativity. In his work he took the sense of the determining power of language to its logical extreme in attesting that the language at the disposal of speakers did more than merely predispose certain possibilities on reality but contained within it the only worldview available to speakers of that language. In Whorf's own words this meant that:

> Users of markedly different grammars are pointed by the grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of extremely similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world.
>
> (Whorf, 1956a: 221)

It also meant that, for Whorf, that the grammatical structure of any language contains within it a theory of the structure of the universe or metaphysics:

> Thus, the Hopi language and culture conceals a metaphysics, such as our so-called naïve view of space and time does, or as the relativity theory does; yet it is a different metaphysics from either.
>
> (Whorf, 1956b: 58)

Structure

Some scholars have suggested that Whorf may well not have fully developed and clarified his ideas by the time of his early death at 44 and that because of this one should be cautious of the hypothesis (e.g. Fishman, 1982). Fasold summarises academic opinion on the subject in the following general terms:

> At the present time, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is accepted as having some validity, but few scholars would agree with the strong version

> that says a speaker of a particular language is locked into a particular world-view by that language.
>
> (Fasold, 1990: 63–64)

More significantly, from a critical point of view, it is the intervention of semiotics on the one hand and Marxist thought on the other on various disciplines in Europe in particular which has caused most academics to retreat from the strongest versions of linguistic relativism. Semiotics, the study of the meaning of language conceived of as a system of signs, flourished during the 1960s and 1970s and still echoes in contemporary postmodern thought (of which more later). However, its significance at this juncture is in the insight it offers that language does not actually reflect reality but rather that it signifies it. To paraphrase Eagleton (1991: 203), it carves reality into conceptual space. In other words, it is naïve to simply correlate language with world view. In borrowing the Hegelian concept of dialect through Marx, many (e.g. Dittmar, 1976) now consider it to be useful to argue that language both shapes and is shaped by social reality. For others, language in social context can be seen to operate at a variety of levels, or to put in another way, language may be manipulated by communicator and communicant to perform a variety of functions, for example:

> When people use language, they do more than just try to get another person to understand the speaker's thoughts and feelings. At the same time, both people are using language in subtle ways to define their relationship with each other, to identify themselves as part of a social group, and to establish the kind of speech event they are in.
>
> (Fasold, 1990: 1)

In this way language can be seen to transcend mere communication and fulfil a quite different role. Rather than merely communicating social reality, language actually plays a significant role in shaping it.

Most recently it is the work of Bourdieu, perhaps, that has been most influential in shaping the ways in which the relationship between language and social life is viewed. His approach to this relationship is derived from his fieldwork on education and culture conducted in French Algeria from the 1960s. His work borrows much from Marx, with its focus on the material structuring of society and dialectical relationships between features of this structuring process. Central to this is the conception of a dialectic of subjective aspirations and objective structures, in the context of which power is secured and hegemony exercised (Eagleton, 1991: 156). A concise indication of the nature of his approach with specific regard to language in society may be read in his own words as follows:

> Every speech act and, more generally, every action, is a conjuncture, an encounter between independently casual series. On the one hand,

> there are the socially constructed dispositions of the linguistic habitus, which imply a certain propensity to speak and to say determinate things and a certain capacity to speak, which involves both the linguistic capacities to generate an infinite number of grammatically correct discourses, and the social capacity to use this competence adequately in a determinate situation. On the other hand, there are the structures of the linguistic market, which impose themselves as a system of specific sanctions and censorships.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1991: 37)

For most scholars of language in society the two concepts of the habitus and the market, to which Bourdieu refers above, are held to be most crucial to understanding Bourdieu's position on language in society. His concept of the linguistic market is best understood as an economic marketplace which is structured by the various relationships between producers and consumers. The market is a site of struggle in which the competitive capacity of agents is determined by the volume of capital they possess. Capital can take many forms, including not only the economic but also the cultural and symbolic. These different forms of capital are, of course, convertible, but they carry varying values in the marketplace. According to Bourdieu, society as a whole is best understood as a series of marketplaces. Besides the economic market there are, for example, political, legal, religious and, of course, linguistic markets. In the linguistic market, competence in language functions as linguistic capital. The market value of certain languages varies from linguistic market to linguistic market according to the worth of the language as perceived by both producers and consumers. As a result language behaviour also varies according to the market value of the available languages, as certain languages have greater potential to yield advantage, or profit, than others. In short, in the linguistic market an individual will acquire and use a language, or those languages, which are most likely to realise cultural or symbolic capital, or both.

The second key concept is that of habitus (pl. habitus), derived by Bourdieu from classical philosophical language in which it is understood as an acquired ideal or perfect state or condition. More particularly, the concept is defined by in the following terms:

> The habitus is the product of the work of inculcation and appropriation necessary in order for those products of collective history, the objective structures (e.g. of language, economy etc.) to succeed in reproducing themselves more or less completely, in the form of durable dispositions, in the organisms (which one can, if one wishes, call individuals) lastingly subjected to the same conditions, and hence placed in the same material conditions of existence.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1977: 85)

> The habitus is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are 'regular' without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any 'rule'. The dispositions which constitute the habitus are inculcated, structured, durable, generative and transposable.
>
> (In editor's introduction to Bourdieu, 1991: 12)

A careful parsing of the work of Bourdieu allows this 'set of dispositions' to be understood in terms of its acquisition by the individual, the function of the environment and the nature of its operation upon the individual in society. In the first place, the dispositions are gradually acquired, especially during early childhood and in particular within the family unit and through the educational system:

> Unlike scientific estimations, which are corrected after each experiment in accordance with rigorous rules of calculation, practical estimates give disproportionate weight to early experiences: the structures characteristic of a determinate type of conditions of existence, through the economic and social necessity which they bring to bear on the relatively autonomous universe of family relationships, or more precisely, through the mediation of the specifically familial manifestations of this external necessity (sexual division of labour, domestic morality, cares, strife, tastes, etc.), produce the structures of the habitus which become in turn the basis of perception and appreciation of all subsequent experience.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1977: 78)

The dispositions are durable in that they are so deeply embedded in the individual that they are almost beyond awareness and barely capable of modification. Also, they are structured in that they reflect the social environment or conditions in which they are acquired:

> The habitus, the durably instilled generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1977: 78)

This embedding, or embodiment, may be so deep as to cause the individual to take the dispositions for granted, to be unconscious of the nature of their operation. It is for this reason that Bourdieu describes the habitus as history turned into nature and denied as such:

> In short, the habitus, the product of history, produces individual and collective practices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by history. The system of dispositions – a past which survives in the present and tends to perpetuate itself into the future by making itself present in practices structured according to its principles, an internal law relaying the continuous exercise of the law of external necessities (irreducible to immediate conjunctural constraints) – is the principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism discerns in the social world without being able to give them a rational basis.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1977: 82)

> The habitus – embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history – is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product. As such, it is what gives practices their relative autonomy with respect to external determinations of the immediate present.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1990: 56)

The dispositions are generative in that they enable the acting out of a wide range of practices and are transposable in that practices which can be generated may also be performed in fields beyond those in which they originated. Moreover, the habitus, despite the differing experiences individuals will have, also functions to homogenise practice and perception in all fields, the effect of which is to reinforce that which is taken for granted, the societal norms:

> One of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of habitus is the production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on meaning (sens) of practices and the world, in other words the harmonization of agents' experiences and the continuous reinforcement that each of them receives from the expression, individual or collective (in festivals for example), improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings), of similar or identical experiences. The homogeneity of habitus is what – within the limits of the group of agents possessing the schemes (of production and interpretation) implied in their production – causes practices and works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence taken for granted.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1977: 80)

Bourdieu's conceptualisations of linguistic habitus and market are also defined in relation to politically structured space. This aspect of his work is not articulated in relation to his fieldwork in Algeria but rather to the historical process of state building in France, with the revolution of 1789

as the significant point of reference. From this, Bourdieu indicates that the territorially bounded and politically sovereign nation-state may be characterised as a habitus and market. The effects of this upon language are profound, driving the market value of certain languages upwards and others downwards and arriving, ultimately, at the ascension of one language as the sole legitimate language of the nation-state:

> Thus, only when the making of the 'nation', an entirely abstract group based on law, creates new usages and functions does it become indispensable to forge a standard language, impersonal and anonymous like the official uses it has to serve, and by the same token to undertake the work of normalizing the products of the linguistic habitus.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1991: 48)

He accounts for regional variation within the nation-state, to the extent that it exists within a highly centralised state such as France, in terms of internal, or free, markets which can maintain their own values but are not autonomous from the national, or dominant, market (e.g. Bourdieu, 1991: 97–102). More to the point, he also suggests that the construction of the dominant linguistic market is dependent upon the process of state building:

> The official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses. It is in the process of state formation that the conditions are created for the constitution of a unified linguistic market, dominated by the official language.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1991: 45)

The significance of this for language is that Bourdieu conceives of it as a system which is actively defined by socio-political processes and, in particular, institutions. For him, language can only be understood with reference to the social conditions in which it is found. According to some readings of Bourdieu this means that language can only be understood as a form of habitus, a linguistic habitus:

> A language only exists as a linguistic habitus, to be understood as a recurrent and habitual system of dispositions and expectations. A language is itself a set of practices that imply not only a particular system of words and grammatical rules, but also an often forgotten or hidden struggle over the symbolic power of a particular way of communicating.
>
> (Duranti, 1997: 45)

From this it might appear that the spatial considerations central to the work of Bourdieu, and, as a result the idea of language as a system that is

actively defined by socio-political processes (Duranti, 1997: 45), are dependent upon autonomous and durable units of space. In European socio-political terms this means politically sovereign and territorially bounded conceptualisations of the nation-state. Indeed, some scholars of language whose own work draws inspiration from Bourdieu adopt this position (e.g. May, 2001; Ó Riagáin, 1992). According to others (e.g. Bauböck, 2001; Holton, 1998; Horsman and Marshall, 1994; Kearney, 1993; Vertovec, 2001) such views on the nation-state, considering the explicit nature of struggle in contemporary Europe across all domains, are becoming increasingly inadequate and this has radical implications for the relationship between language and society.

Fracture

The post-modern shifts that have so profoundly transformed European society and economy since the 1960s have, over more recent times, impacted greatly on political structures and ideological frameworks. Reflecting specifically on the short period 1989–1999, Ely, for instance, characterised the transformations of this 'remarkable moment of historical change' in the following terms:

> One of those few times when fundamental political and constitutional changes, in complex articulation with social and economic transformation, are occurring on a genuinely European-wide scale, making this one of several great constitution-making periods of modern European history.
>
> (Ely, 1992: 390)

Given these post-modern shifts, the work of Bourdieu is rendered redundant, if the reading of it is focussed upon the continuity of the nation-state characterised by a unified and homogenising national market in all fields of social life. That, however, is not necessary. Through refocussing upon the concept of doxa and the related terms of heterodoxy and orthodoxy, as understood by Bourdieu, the merits of his model are not lost, even in the absence of that which is most characteristic of the habitus, namely the 'stable, tradition-bound social order in which power is fully naturalized and unquestionable' (Eagleton, 1991: 157). It is in the breathing in and out of doxa that the contemporary shifts, fractures even, and their impact upon language in society are most effectively read. In this I draw further justification from Bourdieu:

> The relationship between language and experience never appears more clearly than in crisis situations in which the everyday order (*Alltäglichkeit*) is challenged, and with it the language of order.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1977: 170)



Figure 1 Doxa and the universe of discourse
Adapted from Bourdieu, 1977: 168

The postmodern condition may be located in a sense of structural crisis, of which the fracture of the modern matrix of the nation-state is a feature. Eagleton, a leading critic of postmodernism, summarises the postmodernist position on this specific period of rupture as follows:

> Postmodernity is a style of thought which is suspicious of classical notions of truth, reason, identity and objectivity, of the idea of universal progress or emancipation, of single frameworks, grand narratives or ultimate grounds of explanation. Against these Enlightment norms, it sees the world as contingent, ungrounded, diverse, unstable, indeterminate, a set of disunified cultures or interpretations which breed a degree of scepticism about the objectivity of truth, history and norms, the givenness of natures and the coherence of identities. This way of seeing, so some would claim, has real material conditions: it springs from an historic shift in the West to a new form of capitalism – to the ephemeral, decentralized world of technology, consumerism and the culture industry, in which the service, finance and information industries triumph over traditional manufacture, and classical class politics yield ground to a diffuse range of 'identity politics'.
>
> (Eagleton, 1996: vii)

Eagleton suggests a location for language in this politically disorientated epoch in relation to 'an exhilarated vision of ceaseless difference, mobility, disruption' (Eagleton, 1996: 3–4). Working in a similar vein, Phillipson relates postmodernism to the idea of ethnic identity and to its

relationship with language. He notes (1999: 95–97) that; 'Western concepts of language and ethnicity fail to capture the reality of complex, fluid and plural cultural and linguistic identities in many post-colonial contexts, both in Asia and in Africa' and that in Europe; 'new forms of political and cultural devolution and autonomy are being devised' and that these reorientations; 'are leading to new forms of postnational identity . . . at individual, group and state levels'. To put this in terms which relate to Bourdieu's theoretical position on language in society, this transformation of the system of traditional nation-states would appear to amount to a profound challenge to the hegemony of the various autonomous linguistic markets and habitus found across contemporary Europe, these being the products of the specific modern historical conditions in which such nation-states previously flourished unchallenged. And, as argued by DeBernardi (1994: 880), with reference to the case of the Quakers in early modern England, such challenges threaten the structural continuity essential to the functioning of the habitus. It is in this context that DeBernardi argues that language engages with heterogeneity and overlap rather than homology: 'Language is profoundly social, and language use both constitutes shared worlds and realizes social diversity in practice' (DeBernardi, 1994: 883).

For Bourdieu the continuity of the habitus arises from the dialectic of subjective aspirations and objective structures, the result of which is that the practices and perceptions of subjective agency reflect the structuring dispositions of the objective system – history turned into nature, power secures itself:

> Every established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and with very different means) the naturalization of its own arbitrariness. Of all the mechanisms tending to produce this effect, the most important and best concealed is undoubtedly the dialectic of the objective chances and the agents' aspirations, out of which arises the *sense of limits,* commonly called the *sense of reality,* i.e. the correspondence between the objective classes and the internalized classes, social structures and mental structures, which is the basis of the most ineradicable adherence to the established order. Systems of classification which reproduce, in their own specific logic, the objective classes, i.e. their divisions by sex, age, or position in the relations of production, make their specific contribution to the reproduction of the power relations of which they are a product, by securing the misrecognition, and hence the recognition, of the arbitrariness on which they are based: in the extreme case, that is to say, when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization (as in ancient societies) the natural and social world appear as self-evident. This experience we shall call *doxa,* so as to distinguish it from an orthodox or heterodox belief implying

> awareness and recognition of the possibility of different antagonistic beliefs.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1977: 164)

The threat posed to the structural continuity of the modern European habitus by these postmodern shifts, given the predisposition of the habitus to assert continuity and reproduction rather than transformation, is very substantial. This fact is underlined by the centrality to Bourdieu's model of the process of nation-state construction and the continuity of this particular form of polity. The contemporary interrogation of the nation-state by both macro factors, such as globalisation, and also micro factors, including the resurgence of ethnic separatism, points to the fracturing of the modern European habitus. This in turn suggests the emergence of different structuring forces and the forging of fresh perspectives and perceptions on language, in short, a new relationship between language and society. The prevalence of conflict in contemporary European society is alien to that idealised abstraction of society, the universe of doxa. Conflict is to be found elsewhere according to Bourdieu and, moreover, it serves the crucial function of uncovering what Bourdieu describes as the 'truth of doxa', for example:

> The truth of doxa is only ever fully revealed when negatively constituted by the constitution of a *field of opinion*, the locus of the confrontation of competing discourses – whose political truth may be overtly declared or may remain hidden, even from the eyes of those engaged in it, under the guise of religious or philosophical oppositions.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1977: 168)

Jameson, a key protagonist of postmodernism, is not far removed from this position when he claims that:

> Objective reality – or the various possible objective realities – are in other words, the function of genuine group existence or collective vitality; and when the dominant group disintegrates, so also does the certainty of some common truth or being.
>
> (Jameson, 1975: 178–179)

This process of the disintegration of the dominant group, according to postmodern thought, accounts for the social fragmentation which is inherent in the contemporary system. Similarly, according to Bourdieu, the contraction of the universe of doxa leaves a space for occupation by a diversity of new possibilities for society and that these possibilities are the product of the emergence of political consciousness:

> It can be seen that the boundary between the universe of (orthodox or heterodox) discourse and the universe of doxa, in the twofold sense of what goes without saying and what cannot be said for lack of an available discourse, represents the dividing-line between the most radical form of misrecognition and the awakening of political consciousness.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1977: 170)

The idea of awakened consciousness features in postmodern thought as a view on the fragmentary nature of contemporary society, characterised as a type of isolation. According to Jameson this condition is characterised by the 'linguistic fragmentation of social life itself to the point where the norm is eclipsed' (Jameson, 1991: 201). This is a crisis for collective identity which also has profound political implications:

> The stupendous proliferation of social codes today into professional and disciplinary jargons, but also into the badges of affirmation of ethnic, gender, race, religious, and class-fraction adhesion, is also a political phenomenon, the problem of micropolitics, sufficiently demonstrates. If the ideas of a ruling class were once the dominant (or hegemonic) ideology of bourgeois society, the advanced capitalist countries today are now a field of stylistic and discursive heterogeneity without a norm. Faceless masters continue to inflect the economic strategies which constrain our existences, but no longer need to impose their speech (or are henceforth unable to); and the postliteracy of the late capital world reflects, not only the absence of any great collective project, but also the unavailability of the older national language itself.
>
> (Jameson, 1991: 201)

The eclipse of the dominant group and the pushing back of the line of doxa, familiar to Bourdieu, reveal also the arbitrary nature of the universe of doxa. As a result, the legitimacy of power through its tacit endorsement, and its imposition through unspoken rules and symbolic violence are perceived as constructed devices requiring endorsement. Most fatefully, for this study, symbolic violence is recognised as violence and in that the use of conflict in the political structuring of space carries with it the perception of *a priori* justification. The contestation of hegemony through the redefinition of the social specifics of cultural and symbolic capital, in particular, language, is its result. In short, the contemporary challenge in Europe is to the *ancien régime* of nation-state hegemony and the place of language in society is a significant part of this challenge. If we accept the view of Bourdieu on the nature of language in conflict then the expansive nature of the contestation is overwhelming, language struggle is nothing less than the struggle over the very nature of society itself. In this sense there is no such thing as a conflict which is simply linguistic:

> Those who seek to defend a threatened linguistic capital, such as a knowledge of the classical languages in present-day France, are obliged to wage a total struggle. One cannot save the *value* of a competence unless one saves the market, in other words, the whole set of political and social conditions of production of the producers/consumers.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1991: 57)

The awakening of political consciousness which Bourdieu refers to above and which is also a feature of the postmodern condition, carries with it a task, characterised by Jameson as follows:

> There are, of course, ways of breaking out of this isolation, but they are not literary ways and require the complete and thoroughgoing transformation of our economic and social system, and the invention of new forms of collective living. Our task – specialists that we are in the reflections of things – is a more patient and modest, more diagnostic one. Yet even in such a task as the analysis of literature and culture will come to nothing unless we keep the knowledge of our own historical situation vividly present to us: for we are, least of all, in our position, entitled to claim that we did not understand, that we thought all those things were real, that we had no way of knowing we were living in a cave.
>
> (Jameson, 1975: 187)

Such awareness of disjointedness, possibility and action is characterised as heterodoxy by Bourdieu. Agency couched in heterodoxy is confined to his universe of discourse and, as we have already noted, the relationship between language and reality is, according to Bourdieu, at its most apparent in this context. Also, Bourdieu would appear to suggest that it is through discourse, or language as ideology, that this may be understood and in particular through the emergence of the 'extraordinary discourse' predicted by his model:

> The relationship between language and experience never appears more clearly than in crisis situations in which the everyday order (*Alltäglichkeit*) is challenged, and with it the language of order, situations which call for an extraordinary discourse (the *Ausseralltäglichkeit* which Weber presents as the decisive characteristic of charisma) capable of giving systematic expression to the gamut of extra-ordinary experiences that this, so to speak, objective *epoche* has provoked or made possible.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1977: 170)

Once again, Jameson is not far removed from this position in conceiving of postmodernism as cultural dominant:

> I have felt, however, that it was only in the light of some conception of a dominant cultural logic or hegemonic norm that genuine difference could be measured and assessed. I am very far from feeling that all cultural production today is 'postmodern' in the broad sense I will be conferring on this term. The postmodern however is the force field in which very different kinds of cultural impulses – what Raymond Williams has useful termed 'residual' and 'emergent' forms of cultural reproduction – must make their way. If we do not achieve some general sense of a cultural dominant, then we all fall back into a view of present history as sheer heterogeneity, random difference, a coexistence of a host of forces whose effectivity is undecidable. This has been at any rate the political spirit in which the following analysis was devised: to project some conception of a new systemic cultural norm and its reproduction, in order to reflect more adequately on the most effective forms of any radical cultural politics today.
>
> (Jameson, 1991: 193)

In this way the fractures perceived by postmodernism are not incompatible with the model of language and society articulated by Bourdieu. As a cultural dominant the postmodern condition may be comfortably located in the universe of discourse and heterodoxy. Key features, including the awareness of structural crisis, the conscious knowledge of the manipulation of ritual, and the realisation of the possibilities for the transgression of anachronistic norms are common to both positions. The sum of this is, in turn, to point to the potential for the radical transformation of self and society, of the individual and the collective. In such periods of radical transformation the structural continuity of the habitus is fractured, giving rise to diverse potential structural dispositions, some of which will be contradictory. In these particular historically produced material conditions it is diversity and conflict which are to the fore. As such, agency is differentially oriented in relation to the diversity of structural dispositions of the radical and contested present. What is at stake is the trajectory of society and the place of language in it. A retreat to the nation-state is essentially nostalgic, rehearsing the anachronistic habits or dispositions of a material way of life which is disappearing under the weight of macro pressures, such as globalisation and the ICT revolution, and micro pressures, including resurgent ethnic identities. What is required is a new sense of relationships between space, identity and language characterised as:

> An aesthetic of cognitive mapping – a pedagogical culture which seeks to endow the individual subject with some new heightened sense of its place in the global system – will necessarily have to respect this now

> enormously complex representational dialectic and to invent radically new forms in order to do it justice. This is not, then, a call for a return to some older kind of machinery, some older and more transparent national space, or some more traditional and reassuring perspectival or mimetic enclave: the new political art – if it is indeed possible at all – will have to hold to the truth of postmodernism, that is to say, to its fundamental object – the world space of multinational capital.
>
> (Jameson, 1991: 232)

Conclusions

The central concern of this text is to locate the relationship between language and society in the context of social fragmentation and identity conflict characterised as the postmodern condition. In viewing language conflict as a struggle for hegemony this work may be looked upon as a contribution to what may be regarded as the ideology of postmodernism, or, in another sense, the politicisation of globalisation:

> The concept of ideology aims to disclose something of the relation between an utterance and its material conditions of possibility, when those conditions of possibility are viewed in the light of certain power-struggles central to the reproduction (or also, for some theories, contestation) of a whole form of social life.
>
> (Eagleton, 1991: 223)

Engagement with ideology is no mere academic exercise but has profound practical implications:

> When men and women engaged in quite modest, local forms of political resistance find themselves brought by the inner momentum of such conflicts into direct confrontation with the power of the state, it is possible that their political consciousness may be definitely, irreversibly altered. If a theory of ideology has value at all, it is in helping to illuminate the processes by which such liberation from death-dealing beliefs may be practically effected.
>
> (Eagleton, 1991: 224)

Within some streams of postmodern thought it is in such engagements between the local and the global that the fragmentation of contemporary European society is most likely to be resolved, resulting in a ‘regenerated sense of community’ (Kearney, 1993: 154). It is with the issue of language in such ‘local forms of political resistance’ and the points of engagement with the global that this text is primarily concerned. And it is to what many consider to be the prime-mover in resistance at levels below the nation-state that we now turn our gaze, that is the question of ethnic identity.

3 Ethnic identity

> It was I, not he, who was teased by the flux of his identity: by the light or half-repressed Islam of all these lands, their diminished loyalty to clan or tribe, their Soviet veneer, their shallow-rooted sense of nation.
>
> (Thubron, 1994: 355)

> ETHNICK a. Heathen; Pagan.
>
> (Samuel Johnson's *Dictionary of the English Language*, Studio Edition 1994)

> Ethnic ME [ad. Gr. ἐθνικός heathen, f. ἔθνος nation; τά ἔθνη = the (non-Israelitish) nations, Gentiles.]
>
> (*The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles* 3rd edition vol. I A–M 1967)

Introduction

According to a number of commentators, including Taylor (1993: 191–228) and A.D. Smith (1995: vii), the resurgence of ethno-national conflicts beginning in western Europe in the 1960s and in eastern Europe in the 1980s was the cause of considerable surprise among political scientists. By the 1990s such was the prevalence of the issue of ethnicity that Eriksen (1993), writing specifically of the year 1991, claimed that of the 37 major armed conflicts current in the world 35 were internal conflicts and that almost all of these could be reasonably described as ethnic conflicts. The surprise noted by Taylor may be explained in part by inadequate conceptualisations of ethnic identity at that time. As recently as the early 1970s Glazer and Moynihan describe ethnicity as a 'new term' (1975: 1), claiming its first appearance in the *Oxford English Dictionary* in 1972. Connor accurately locates some of the difficulties in arriving at an understanding of ethnic identity in the considerable ambiguity which surrounds much of the use of the term ethnicity as well as various other pertinent terms, for example:

> With nationalism pre-empted, authorities have had difficulty agreeing on a term to describe the loyalty of segments of a state's population to

> their particular nation. Ethnicity, primordialism, pluralism, tribalism, regionalism, communalism, and parochialism are among the most commonly encountered. This varied vocabulary further impedes an understanding of nationalism by creating the impression that each is describing a separate phenomenon.
>
> (Connor, 1978: 386)

At around the time Connor was writing Isajiw (1980) remarked upon the fact that the majority of scholars who were making use of the term ethnicity in their work did not offer to define it. According to May (2001: 26); 'If a particular view of ethnicity was assumed in these studies it tended to accord de facto with the "cultural stuff" of ethnicity – ancestry, culture and language.' The literature on the topic has grown substantially during the 1980s and 1990s, encompassing a range of fresh insights into the nature of ethnic identity. In seeking to define the term it is argued here that ethnicity, certainly in contemporary European context, is best understood in the first place in the context of the development of national identity in the modern period and second in relation to the condition of postmodernity. To a certain extent what is offered here is an adaptation of the chronological and political framework sketched out by A.D. Smith (1986) with regard to the ethnic origins of nations.

Ethnicity, national identity and modernity

According to A.D. Smith the ethnic roots of modern nations extend deep into the ancient past. The cultures and identities of the premodern era from which the nation arises are characterised by subjective factors, described by A.D. Smith as the 'permanent cultural attributes of memory, value, myth and symbolism' (Smith, 1986: 3). In adopting a 'symbolic' approach to ethnicity it is intended that the 'primordialist' and 'instrumentalist' dichotomy regarding ethnic identity be transcended. The primordial view of ethnicity is that it constitutes a fundamental feature of society and that ethnic identity is natural and unalienable. That is, that all individuals possess a certain fixed ethnic identity from birth and carry that identity with them until death. Ethnicity therefore is defined by cultural and biological heritage and is territorially rooted. Historically this view on ethnicity is most closely associated with German Romantic nationalism, and the figures of Humboldt, Herder and Fichte in particular, through which the German *Volk* was defined by 'language, blood and soil'. More recently Geertz has argued for the primordial nature of ethnicity. In brief, his argument is that the actions of ethnic groups are often grounded in primordial ties, rooted in the earliest socialisation of the group members. It is not argued that these attachments are primordial in any real sense, but rather that they are perceived to be primordial by the group:

> By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' of existence, or more precisely . . . the assumed givens of social existence: immediate contiguity and live connection mainly, but beyond them the giveness that stems from being born into a particular . . . community, speaking a particular language . . . and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbour . . . as the result not merely of personal affection, tactical necessity, common interest or incurred moral obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself.
>
> (Geertz, 1973: 259)

Despite the flexibility of the view on primordialism offered by Geertz, most students of ethnicity dismiss the primordial position as cultural determinism. Also, the primordial approach is criticised for being inadequate for explaining the evolution of ethnic groups over time, for accounting for the emphasis given by some groups at certain times to some attributes of ethnicity and at other times to place emphasis on certain other attributes. A final criticism of the primordial position is its failure to account for the complexities and potential multiplicities of identity pertaining to the individual.

The instrumental approach to ethnicity attempts to account for these features. This approach to ethnicity, in emphasising the role of agency in the construction of ethnic identity, may be understood as a subjective position on ethnicity, in contrast to the objective position which characterises the primordialist approach in which ethnicity is primarily shaped by given social constraints. Barth, for example, argues that ethnic groups are not defined by given cultural attributes but in relation to other groups:

> [E]thnic categories provide an organisational vessel that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different sociocultural systems . . . The critical focus of investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses.
>
> (Barth, 1969: 14–15)

Specific cultural attributes become significant markers of ethnic identity not as the results of some intrinsic quality, but because of their salience in denoting difference in relationships between ethnic groups. That is, it is the purpose of specific cultural attributes to maintain boundaries between ethnic groups and in this way the significant cultural content of an ethnic group is the construction of the ethnic group members as a function of

the relationship between their ethnic group and other ethnic groups. In this sense ethnicity is a resource which is drawn upon in the interests of the ethnic group and its members. This explains the continuity in ethnic identity, construed as an interest group, as a mechanism for socio-political mobilisation. For example:

> Cultural traits are not absolutes or simply intellectual categories, but are invoked to provide identities which legitimise claims to rights. They are strategies or weapons in competitions over scarce social goods.
>
> (Worsley, 1984: 249)

In order to maximise the effectiveness of such a strategy, then, the cultural attributes of ethnicity must be capable of being manipulated in order to adapt the group strategy to the nature of the discourse which shapes the competition for social goods. That is, the ethnic group must be capable of being mobilised on the basis of any ethnic attribute useful in the particular socio-political circumstances. At its extreme the result is the construction of ethnicity based upon claims to cultural and other attributes of spurious authenticity, the literal invention of tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). For the individual seeking to maximise access to the scarce social goods it is inevitable that the various market advantages and disadvantages arising from ascription to specific ethnic groups will be measured and that the claim to membership of a particular ethnic group will be made accordingly. That is, under particular circumstances the individual will thus lay claim to the ethnic identity that would bring to them the greatest possible advantage from those circumstances. For example, as Nagel puts it, the:

> [C]hosen ethnic identity is determined by the individual's perception of its meaning to different audiences, its salience in different social contexts, and its utility in different settings.
>
> (Nagel, 1994: 155)

Thus the individual possesses a hierarchy of levels or layers of identity, any of which may be dominant given the particular circumstances of the individual. Taken to its extreme it would be possible for individuals to claim any ethnic identity.

A resolution of the extreme subjectivity of the instrumentalist and objectivity of primordialist approaches to ethnicity is attempted by A.D. Smith in his exploration of the ethnic origins of nations. He describes the conceptual poverty resulting from a strong view of this dichotomy as follows:

> By fixing attention mainly on the great dimensions and 'fault lines' of religion, customs, language and institutions, we run the risk of

> treating ethnicity as something primordial and fixed. By concentrating solely on the attitudes and sentiments and political movements of specific *ethnie* or ethnic fragments, we risk being so caught up in the day-to-day ebb and flow of ethnic phenomena that we see them as wholly dependant 'tools' or 'boundary markers' of other social and economic forces.
>
> (Smith, 1986: 211)

Instead, A.D. Smith argues that a more comprehensive understanding of ethnicity may be arrived at by what may be described as the dualities which structure ethnic identity. That is, that ethnicity is both mutable and durable, static and fluid. Thus, according to A.D. Smith, by:

> [A]ttending to the complex of myths, symbols, memories and values that are handed down the generations of collectivities and which define them to themselves and those outside, we can treat *ethnie* as both mutable and durable at the same time, and ethnicity as both fluctuating and recurrent in history. Ethnicity and *ethnie* are no longer purely static attributes of humanity; but neither are they the instruments of other forces or boundary mechanisms of otherwise fluid cultures. The study of ethnicity through ethnic myths, symbols, memories and values allows us to grasp the dynamic and expressive character of ethnic identity, and its long-term influence on human affairs, while allowing for its changing content and meanings.
>
> (Smith, 1986: 211–212)

Thus the ethnic community, or *ethnie*, is characterised by the ascription of a collective proper name for the group, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, various peculiar elements of a common culture, an association with a homeland and a sense of solidarity (Smith, 1986: 22–30). In Smith's own words *ethnie* is defined as follows:

> [I]t relates mainly to a sense of communality based on history and culture, rather than to any collectivity or to the concept of ideology. In this, I follow the emendation proposed by Epstein to the literature of 'situational' ethnicity in which the growth of a sense of the collective self is treated as an important part of a group (especially ethnic) identity and solidarity. Only here, the sense of self is viewed through the prism of symbols and mythologies of the community's heritage . . . the core of ethnicity, as it has been transmitted in the historical record and as it shapes individual experience, resides in this quartet of 'myths, memories, values and symbols' and in the characteristic forms and styles and genres of certain historical configurations of populations.
>
> (Smith, 1986: 14–15)

Despite the flexibility and durability of ethnicity, however, the *ethnie*, being a particular mode of organising ethnicity, is in itself historically specific. For A.D. Smith it is primarily a premodern phenomenon. He contrasts 'modern national units' with 'the collective cultural units and sentiments of previous eras', termed *ethnie* [pl. *ethnies*] (Smith, 1986: 13). Elsewhere he locates the two in chronological context after the same fashion:

> [W]e may not find 'nations' in pre-modern epochs, at least not in the mass, legal, public and territorial form they took in recent centuries. On the other hand, we do find a number of looser collective cultural units, which we may call *ethnies*, and which we can define as 'named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites'.
>
> (Smith, 1995: 57)

The modern vehicle for ethnicity is the nation. For A.D. Smith the nation is the product of the *ethnie* and the nation defines the authenticity of its historical pedigree through ethnicity through its association with the *ethnie*:

> If nations are modern, at least as mass phenomena legitimated by nationalist ideology, they owe much of their present form and character to pre-existing ethnic ties which stemmed from earlier *ethnies* in the relevant area.
>
> (Smith, 1995: 57)

In this sense the modern condition of ethnicity is the nation. The transition to modernity, characterised by industrialisation, the bureaucratic state, mass education, print technology and secularisation is the mechanism whereby an *ethnie* might become a nation. The significance of the challenge of modernity for *ethnies* may be summarised by that prophet of the nation-state, Hegel:

> The rapid growth of language, and the progress and dispersion of Nations, assume importance and interest for concrete Reason, only when they have come in contact with States, or begin to form political constitutions themselves.
>
> (Hegel, 1956: 63)

The implication here is that a failure on the part of the premodern nation (or *ethnie* to use Smith's term) to respond effectively to the challenge of modernity is likely to be fatal to its continuity beyond the transition to modern period. A.D. Smith concurs in this view of the potentially terminal nature of the modern challenge for *ethnies*:

> In one very important sense, the old classical notion of a transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* finds confirmation in the more limited but vital sphere of ethnicity: in the modern era, *ethnie* must become politicized, must enter and remain in the political arena, and must begin to move towards nationhood, even if they have no intention of becoming full nations themselves. That is to say, they are forced to forsake their former isolation, passivity and cultural accommodation, and become activist, mobilized and politically dynamic. In order to survive, *ethnie* must take on some of the attributes of nationhood, and adopt a civic model; to that extent, they take on some of the attributes of *Gesellschaft*, with its features of rational political centralization, mass literacy and social mobilization.
>
> (Smith, 1986: 157)

The modern conceptualisation of identity of *ethnie* is national identity, the ethnic identity of the nation-sate. The development of the national identities in what could be characterised as the motor regions for nation-state building, that is Spain, France, Germany, Britain and Italy was a long historical process (e.g. Llobera, 1994) which culminated sometime during the nineteenth century when the aforementioned European nation-states exercised hegemony over the greater part of the globe. The ideal nation was homogenous in its unity, the union of nation with state was idealised as indivisible and homogenous in its constitution. German Romantic rhetoric best exemplifies this view: 'It [the state] is this matured totality which thus constitutes *one* Being, the Spirit of *one* People. To it the individual members belong; each unit is the Son of his Nation' (Hegel, 1956: 52).

The process of nation-state building in nineteenth century Germany is a significant point of reference for the idea of the nation as a politically-empowered ethnic group defined by in large part by language. Hobsbawm notes (1992: 98–99) that at this time, in the absence of a German nation-state and given the widespread distribution of German-speakers across Europe, the German language had long been regarded by German intellectuals and nationalists alike as the most adequate indicator of German national identity. More than this, according to a view shaped by German Romanticism – in particular Humboldt, Herder and Fichte, the language of the nation functions, in large measure, to define the particular world-view of the nation as a collective historical experience, as A.D. Smith notes:

> The art of tracing verbal roots, and explicating the meanings and synonyms of words and phrases, 'made sense' within a larger evolutionary framework in which language was seen as having an intimate and revelatory position within the collective memory and experience.
>
> (Smith, 1986: 181)

And in this way language relates to issues beyond simple communication:

> In this 'inner' or 'Herderian' sense of language, ethnicity places limits on communicability. That is to say, collective historical experiences find a peculiar and unique medium of expression, a 'language' or 'style' all their own. This may be a resurrected and renovated ancient tongue, or a style of dress, furnishings and architecture, or a special music or dance, or peculiar customs, institutions and manners, which bind those who possess and practice them.
>
> (Smith, 1986: 171)

At its extreme this view on the relationship between language and nation asserts that the nation is defined by language. Fichte, for example, put it as follows: '[I]t is beyond doubt that, wherever a separate language can be found, there a separate nation exists, which has the right to take charge of its independent affairs and govern itself' (Fichte, 1968: 184).

The position of European nation-states for *ethnie* who fail to adapt effectively to the orthodox discourse on nationhood is status as ethnic minorities to be assimilated, or worse. To a greater or lesser degree the national identities of these European nation-states conceived of those peoples found within the boundaries of the metropolitan state in particular as minorities who could, and indeed should, benefit from assimilation to the nation. For Michelet this ideal was realised in practice with the case of France. Accordingly, the French Revolution of 1789 gave birth to France as 'a whole nation, free from all distinction' (Michelet, 1967 [vol. 1]: 13). This event included the necessary assimilation of all diverse identities to that of France national identity:

> [T]his sacrifice of the diverse interior nationalities to the great nationality which comprises them undoubtedly strengthened the latter . . . It was at the moment when France suppressed within herself the divergent French countries that she proclaimed her high and original revelations.
>
> (Michelet, 1973: 286)

Michelet exalts in this suppression:

> Where, then, are the old distinctions of provinces and races of men? Where are those powerful and geographical contrasts? All have disappeared: geography itself is annihilated. There are no longer mountains, rivers or barriers between men . . . All at once, and without even perceiving it, they have forgotten the things for which they would have sacrificed their lives the day before, their provincial sentiment, local tradition, and legends. Time and space, those material conditions to which life is subject, are no more. A strange *vita nuova*, one

> eminently spiritual ... is now beginning for France. It knew neither time nor space.
>
> (Michelet, 1967 [vol. 1], 444)

Similarly for the English liberal humanist project diversity and in particular linguistic diversity was a nuisance, and a dangerous one at that:

> But, when a people are ripe for free institutions, there is a still more vital consideration. Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist.
>
> (Mill, 1972: 361)

Like Michelet, Mill points out the singular benefits to the Welsh and the Scots of assimilation to British national identity:

> When proper allowance has been made for geographical exigencies, another more purely moral and social consideration offers itself. Experience proves it possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another: and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race the absorption is greatly to its advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is not beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current of ideas and feelings of a highly civilised and cultivated people – to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French protection, and the dignity and prestige of French power than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own mental orbit without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish highlander as members of the British nation.
>
> (Mill, 1972: 395)

The privileged, assimilative position of national identity is sustained by some to date. It has been noted, for example, that the assumption that to describe a group as ethnic also of necessity means that it is a minority group is common in much of the literature on the subject of ethnicity in the USA (Isajiw, 1980). Miller, writing in similar vein, concedes the ethnic origins of the nation but argues for the ability of the dominant nation to incorporate other divergent and minority senses of ethnicity as well, for example:

> Typically, though not always, a nation emerges from an ethnic community that furnishes it with its distinct identity ... Even nations

> that originally had an exclusive ethnic character may come, over time, to embrace a multitude of different ethnicities. The clearest example of this is the American nation, originally ethnically Anglo-Saxon, but now incorporating Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, and many other such hyphenated groups.
>
> (Miller, 1995: 19–20)

And, similarly, Miller claims elsewhere in the same text that it is not uncommon for a state to construct a singular sense of national identity that also embraces ethnic diversity. Ethnicity and nationality, therefore, are to be understood as pertaining to senses of identity along a continuum and differentiated by levels of political awareness or engagement with political ambition:

> [H]istorically, national identities have very often developed out of prior ethnic identities, and where a cohesive ethnic group finds that its legitimate claims are ignored by the state, a natural response is for the group to begin to think of itself as an alternative nationality. But, equally, such a development is not pre-ordained. It is quite possible for a state to include several groups with several ethnic identities but a common national identity: Switzerland and the United States are both in their different ways good examples of this.
>
> (Miller, 1995: 112–113)

In the modern period, therefore, the differential use of the terms 'ethnic' and 'nation' is a function of status and power. In historical terms the employment of the term ethnic group by dominant nations signified the qualitative justification of their assimilation and suppression of the ethnicity of others. Morris, for example, notes:

> The European nation has, at least in principal, grown up around an 'ideal' of cultural homogeneity, established and reinforced through the state and controlled transmission of literate culture, alongside state control over entry and the acquisition of citizenship; thus the nation represents territorialized cultural belonging, while the state formalizes and controls legal membership.
>
> (Morris, 1997: 194)

It may be noted with some irony that the pursuit of multiculturalism during the last third of the twentieth century, intended as a corrective to the homogenising effect of the traditional nation-state, reflected much of this. Favell, for example, notes that within the practice of multicultural policy:

> [E]thnic minorities are offered cultural tolerance, even 'multicultural' rights and institutions, in exchange for acceptance of basic principles and the rule of law; they are imagined as culturally-laden social groups, who need to be integrated and individualised by a public sphere which offers voice and participation, transforming them from 'immigrants', into full and free 'citizens'; they are to become full, assimilated nationals, in a nation-state re-imagined to balance cultural diversity, with a formal equality of status and membership.
>
> (Favell, 1999: 213–214)

Rather than challenging the assumptions of the traditional nation-state in relation to the essential cultural core of national identity, an essentialised view of culture has also been observed at the centre of multiculturalism:

> In this set of understandings, 'culture' is: a kind of package (often talked of as migrants' 'cultural baggage') of collective behavioural-moral-aesthetic traits and 'customs', rather mysteriously transmitted between generations, best suited to a particular geographical locations yet largely unaffected by history of a change of context, which instils a discrete quality into the feelings, values, practices, social relationships, predilections and intrinsic nature of all who 'belong to (a particular) it'.
>
> (Vertovec, 1996: 51)

More to the point, the implicit essentialism of the multicultural project has been reflected in the discourse of both dominant nations and the ethnic minorities alike (Baumann, 1996). While some significant reworking of the multicultural project has occurred (e.g. King, 2000; May, 2001 and *The Parekh Report*) multiculturalism persists in its engagement with the 'container model' of the nation-state (Vertovec, 2001) and in its failure to engage with globalisation (Alibhai-Brown, 2000). For example, Vertovec observes that:

> Multiculturalism did away with the expectation of assimilation and acculturation, while the expectation of common attachment to the encompassing nation-state went unchallenged . . . Multiculturalism's relationship to the nation-state . . . seems to remain as was.
>
> (Vertovec, 2001: 5, 6)

At this point it is pertinent to recall Bourdieu's habitus as a means of reflecting upon the significance of the historical conjuncture, or fracture, between the premodern and the modern as a result of which *ethnies* are transformed into nations. The mechanism by which this transformation is realised is the transition to modernity and in order to survive this transition

the *ethnie* must adapt to political reality of the emerging hegemony of the nation-state. Given the apparent current decline of that particular form of polity and the challenge of postmodernity, it is pertinent to ask whether the contemporary historical conjuncture reflects a similar fracture of the structural features of the modern habitus. Such phenomena as the emergence of transnational forms of identity and the contemporary resurgence of ethnocentric political activity in the context of what some commentators describe as 'the postmodern anxiety' may suggest as much. If this is so, it is essential to consider the ways in which postmodernism is held to be transforming ethnicity and those myths, memories, values and symbols at its core.

Postmodernity

The protagonists of postmodernism assert that identity is being transformed at global and local levels and that national identity, as nation-state sponsored ethnicity, is being eroded. Central to this is the view that the nation-state is inadequate to meeting the challenges of globalisation. In a European context the nation-state is regarded by some as being 'too small to cope with the big issues, and too big to cope with the small ones' (Davies, 1997: 1120). As a consequence of this decline in the hegemony of the nation-state and the erosion of national identity new global and local identities are emerging as the key sites for ethnicity. Hall puts it in the following terms: 'Increasingly, the political landscapes of the modern world are fractured ... by competing and dislocating identifications' (Hall, 1992: 280). He elaborates on the various identifications, indicating the extent of continuity in relation to national identity and also ways in which it is being transcended:

> National identities remain strong, especially with respect to such things as legal and citizenship rights, but local, regional, and community identities have become more significant. Above the level of national culture, 'global' identifications begin to displace, and sometimes override, national ones.
>
> (Hall, 1992: 302)

Given the close relationship between ethnicity and the nation through national identity in the modern period, then this postmodern dislocation of national identity has ramifications for ethnicity in postmodernity.

Critics of the postmodern position on identity argue that the emphasis on the fragmentation of identity, its rootlessness and its contingent nature, understates the durable appeal of ethnicity. May, for example, notes that:

> The fragmented, dispersed and decentred individual of the postmodern world is supposedly able to choose from a bewildering range of

> identity styles and forms of political mobilisation, and ethnicity, it seems, is just one of them . . . [T]his position significantly understates the key role that ethnicity often assumes in the processes of identity formation and social and political mobilisation.
>
> (May, 2001: 24)

He claims that the postmodern disregard for the notion of historical continuity; ethnic, cultural and linguistic, means that the situational view of ethnicity is overstated (May, 2001: 39). In accordance with other critics of postmodernism he argues that the range of choices facing individuals in relation to ethnicity varies, with some having more limited choice than others, for example: 'A white American may have a wide range of ethnic options from which to choose on the basis of their ancestry. An African American, in contrast, is confronted with essentially one ethnic choice – black' (May, 2001: 40). And similarly Nagel:

> [T]he extent to which ethnicity can be freely constructed by individuals or groups is quite narrow when compulsory ethnic categories are imposed by others. Such limits on ethnic formation can be official or unofficial. In either case, externally enforced ethnic boundaries can be powerful determinants of both the content and meaning of particular ethnicities.
>
> (Nagel, 1994: 156)

Another criticism of the postmodernist position is that the 'cultural stuff' of ethnicity cannot be entirely invented. For example: 'Ethnic groups and their cultures are not merely a completely arbitrary construct: there is always a minimum of incontestable and noninterpretable facts necessary to win something from the opponent' (Roosens, 1989: 156). Our study of societies in conflict, ethnic conflict in particular, should teach us the lesson that there are no facts which may not be contested or otherwise interpreted by adversaries engaged in literal struggles of life and death. Eriksen is closer to the mark in stating that ethnic identity is fundamentally ambiguous and that this is related to 'a negotiable history and a negotiable cultural content' (Eriksen, 1993: 73). Roosens, too, concedes that ethnic identity is in reality 'very elastic' (1989: 156).

In seeking to answer some of the above criticisms, three aspects of what may be characterised as the postmodern condition of identity are applied to the question of ethnicity – identification, frontier effects and discourse. It must be stated from the outset that some postmodern views on ethnicity are neither ahistorical nor empty of the 'stuff of culture'. One of the most significant points to note with regard to postmodernism on this matter is in relation to the issue of closure. The postmodern take on identity is as

process, characterised as identification (Hall, 1996). According to Hall it is to be contrasted with other views on identity as follows:

> In common sense language, identification is constructed on the back of a recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation. In contrast with the 'naturalism' of this definition, the discursive approach sees identification as a construction, a process never completed – always 'in process'.
>
> (Hall, 1996: 2)

Contrary to some of the criticism of the postmodern position, this particular view of identity as process has regard for the myths, memories, values and symbols associated, but not exclusive to, ethnicity:

> It (identification) is not determined in the sense that it can always be 'won' or 'lost', sustained or abandoned. Though not without its determinate conditions of existence, including the material and symbolic resources required to sustain it, identification is in the end conditional, lodged in contingency.
>
> (Hall, 1996: 2)

Identification, as employed by Hall, is therefore avowedly anti-essentialist, for example:

> [T]his concept of identity does *not* signal that stable core of the self, unfolding from beginning to end through all the vicissitudes of history without change ... Nor ... that 'collective or true self hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed "selves" which a people with a shred history and ancestry hold in common' (Hall, 1990) and which can stabilize, fix or guarantee an unchanging 'oneness' or cultural belongingness underlying all other superficial differences.
>
> (Hall, 1996: 3–4)

Instead, identity is best regarded as 'strategic' and 'positional'. '[I]dentities are questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being' (Hall, 1996: 4).

Identity is constructed, therefore, with a view to shaping the trajectory of the group as one of the populations or cultures which have recently been disturbed by contemporary 'historically specific developments and practices', globalisation in particular, from their previously 'settled', stable condition. Modes of representation, including the symbolic, are central to the construction process and this, according to Hall, locates the identification

process in the field of discourse and, moreover, rather than bypassing the historicity of identity, it demands that it takes centre stage:

> Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity – an 'identity' in its traditional meaning (that is, an all-inclusive sameness, seamless, without internal differentiation).
>
> (Hall, 1996: 4)

Identities which claim such internal homogeneity are not the result of the unique 'stuff of culture' but are rather constructs of power, exclusion and closure:

> [T]he 'unities' which identities proclaim are, in fact, constructed within the play of power and exclusion, and are the result, not of a natural and inevitable or primordial totality but of the naturalized, overdetermined process of 'closure'.
>
> (Hall, 1996: 5)

The early work of Barth, whose view on ethnicity as the social organisation of cultural difference mediated by stable social interactions across group boundaries (Barth, 1969) continues to inform most critics of postmodernism. It is worth noting, however, that Barth asserted the historically specific nature of his view on the nature of ethnicity from the outset:

> These modern variants for poly-ethnic organization emerge in a world of bureaucratic administration, developed communications, and progressive urbanization. Clearly, under radically different circumstances, the critical factors in the definition and maintenance of ethnic boundaries would be different.
>
> (Barth, 1969: 35–36)

The most recent work by Barth reflects an adaptation of his position which echoes some of the language of postmodern perspectives on ethnicity, for example:

> [I]n our view of history we broke loose from the idea of history as simply the objective source and cause of ethnicity and approached it as a form of synchronic rhetoric – a struggle to appropriate the past, as one might say today.
>
> (Barth, 1998 [reprint of 1969; new preface pp. 5–8]: 6)

It is possible to read a certain foreshadowing of some of the concerns of his most recent work in the seminal text of 1969, in particular in relation to individuals who do not conform readily to the conception of dichotomised ethnic neighbours:

> What is surprising is not the existence of some actors that fall between these categories, and of some regions in the world where whole peoples do not tend to sort themselves out in this way, but the fact that variations tend to cluster at all. We can then be concerned not to perfect a typology, but to discover the processes that bring about clustering.
>
> (Barth, 1969: 29)

Also, with regard to institutions and ethnicity, Barth suggests that these function to constrain the meaningful expression of ethnic identity for minority groups and that the resultant 'inadequacy of performance in the widest system brings about frustrations and crisis of identity' (Barth, 1969: 32). More recently and in response to the changed circumstances of the postmodern challenge to ethnicity and its modern socio-political organisation, Barth (1998) identifies an amorphous mechanism, idealised as a current in a unifying river, at work in relationships between ethnic groups. This encourages one to focus on congruencies, or flows between, as well as dichotomies across, ethnic group identities:

> Whereas my effort until now has been to emphazise the search for distinctions, for the fuller delimitation of the contradictions of pluralism, any closer and fuller analysis forces us to acknowledge the relativity of these boundaries, or rather the interpenetration and constant interchange implicit in the imagery of currents.
>
> (Barth, 1998: 83)

In an appeal for a fresh, more relevant, view on ethnicity Barth directs our search to the locality, the community and beyond, asserting that a new view should offer concepts adequate to the cultural complexity of plural society. Again his language finds echoes in the postmodernist position in highlighting the contingent and transitory nature of ethnicity in contemporary context. For example, Barth argues that:

> Such concepts should serve to emphazise properties both of separability and interpenetration, suggested perhaps by an imagery of streams, or currents within a river: distinctly there, powerful in transporting objects and creating whirlpools, yet only relative in their distinctiveness and ephemeral in their unity.
>
> (Barth, 1984: 80)

Meanwhile, Hall asserts that: 'Identities are thus points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us' (Hall, 1996: 6). It is in such a spirit that Eade (1997) reports that educated young Bangladeshis in the East End of London select from a repertoire of identities depending on the circumstances of time, place and audience, reflecting Bhabha's 'anxious age of identity' and the emergence of strategies of belonging, including ethnic, characterised in the following terms:

> Here affiliation may be antagonistic and ambivalent; solidarity may be *only* situational and strategic: commonality is often negotiated through the 'contingency' of social interests and political claims.
>
> (Bhabha, 1996: 59)

Moreover, for migrant communities of this nature their diverse affiliations reflect 'degrees of entanglement in national/transnational orders' (Clifford, 1998: 365) made ever more possible by the shrinking postmodern globe. A likely consequence of this, to be explored in detail later, is to erode the monolithic claim of the nation-state to citizenship through which the ethnicity of the dominant nation is given exclusive civic identity.

Conclusions

Ethnic identity then, along with a myriad of other identities, is to be understood as a construct of a transitory quality, characterised as a process of identification. Also, it is, in the language of deconstruction, a concept 'under erasure'. That is, the idea of ethnicity as articulated in the modern period via the nation, the nation-state and national identity is dysfunctional to the extent that it no longer holds the meaning that it once held. In this sense the concept may be regarded as a device in a holding pattern, in that it serves to underline the historical transition of ethnicity as process via *ethnie* and nation and the transitory nature of its attachments in this contemporary period. The historic relationship between ethnicity and the modern nation-state invites, in the context of the erosion of the sovereignty of the nation-state and essentialist views of national identity, the closer examination of ethnicity in relation to the contemporary polities and the reformulation of the relationship between ethnic and civic identity or nationalism. That ethnicity may be understood as 'lodged in contingency' in the postmodern paradigm through focussing upon discursive practice serves to return us to Bourdieu's 'universe of discourse' and the fracturing of the structuring features of habitus. It also draws us towards Barth's 'streams of tradition' and 'universes of discourse' (Barth, 1984 and 1989). But these key issues are examined later. At this point our gaze must be averted to a question so far neglected and that is the place of language in ethnicity.

4 Language in ethnicity

Introduction

Developing an understanding of conflict in relation to language in ethnicity requires a language-specific model which accounts for the postmodern condition, characterised by society in a state of flux, instability and fracture. It has already been noted that Bourdieu's model, which centres on the concept of society as habitus, is most effective when applied to stable, bounded and homogenous societies:

> The single linguistic community, or the unified linguistic market, to which Bourdieu refers is most clearly represented in and by the homogenous civic culture of the modern nation-state.
>
> (May, 2001: 156)

So while the idea of discourse, adopted from this model, will be returned to at a later point in this work, habitus is not considered an option in seeking out an appropriate model. Regarding language-specific models, in this chapter it is noted that the ethnolinguistic vitality model, the most popularly applied model to language policy and planning situations, is of limited use also as it applies to a view of language in society which presumes the hegemony of the nation-state and places emphasis on top-down, macro-level approaches to language planning activity. This model also tends towards an essentialist and deterministic position on ethnic identity and the idea of ethnic groups. Such a view on language in ethnicity is much less applicable to contemporary language situations in Europe, given the parallel processes of globalisation and fragmentation. The idea of the nation-state, of simple bounded ethnic groups, and of language as given are all under siege. At this point, it is sought to resolve these tensions through adopting an ecological view of language in ethnicity (e.g. Haugen, 1972; Haarmann, 1986 and Mühlhäusler, 1996). From an ecological perspective, relationships between language, identity and conflict are located in an ecosystem, conceived of as a dynamic network of relations operating at a variety of levels. It is also argued, however, that it is

necessary to modify the predominant ecolinguistic position on conflict as reflected, for example, by Mühlhäusler: 'Functioning ecologies are characterised by predominantly mutually beneficial links and only to a small degree by competitive relationships' (Mühlhäusler, 2001: 1).

Theoretical innovations are offered, therefore, through close reflection upon the scope of ecology and its application to language in relation to ethnicity in contemporary social contexts. In particular, the ecolinguistic model proposed by Haarmann (1986) is adopted to provide an initial framework for developing an ecological perspective on language in ethnicity but the descriptive range and explanatory capacity of his model is extended, through reference to competition mechanisms in ecosystems, to include a more expansive view of language in conflict.

Ecological relations of language in ethnicity

As it is the most popularly applied model to understanding language change, it is necessary to spend a little time describing the ethnolinguistic vitality model in some detail. According to the authors of the model (Giles *et al.*, 1977) the vitality of an ethnolinguistic group is that which makes a group likely to behave as a distinctive and active collective entity in intergroup situations. Figure 2 shows the factors which determine the vitality of a given language community, an ethnolinguistic group. Three broad categories of variables are identified – status, demography and institutional support. Each of these are subdivided further. These three main categories may be described in general terms as follows. The first main category, status, comprises the prestige variables. The line of thought is that the more prestige a group is held to have the more vital it is as a collective entity. The second main category, demography, comprises sheer numbers and distribution. The more favourable the demographic trends the more vital the group is as a collective entity. The third main category is that of institutional support. This comprises both formal and informal representation in the various institutions of the nation, region and community of the group. The authors argue that in this case vitality seems to be related to language use in these domains of government, organised religion, business etc.

On considering the categories in more detail one sees that status is subdivided into a number of variables, namely economic status, social status, socio-historical status and language status, both within and without. Economic status is the extent to which a language community has access to and control over the material resources of the given political unit. In other words, the degree of control the group has over the economic life of its nation, region and community, in short, of its economic destiny. Social status is the value the language community gives to itself, it is the level of self-esteem enjoyed by the group. Socio-historical status is held to be important as ethnolinguistic groups may be distinguished by their histories. Moreover, regardless of the actual outcome of historical events in



Figure 2 A taxonomy of the structural variables affecting ethno-linguistic vitality
Adapted from Giles *et al.*, 1977: 309

the past of the group, they may be used to mobilise the group. On the other hand, there may be few such mobilising symbols in the historical past, or some events may even have the effect of de-mobilising. Language status is the esteem afforded to the language of the group from both within and without the language group. Minorities whose language is held in lower esteem than that of the majority will be less vital as a group. Minorities whose language is more prestigious than that of the majority group will in contrast be more vital as a collective entity.

Demographic factors comprise group distribution and group numbers. Group distribution factors include the relation of the language to national territory. The idea of an ancestral homeland is held to be very important as regards ethnolinguistic vitality. Groups which are split apart by imposed frontiers or which have been dispossessed of their traditional homeland may, it is argued, be less successful in maintaining collective vitality than those groups which have retained possession of their homeland. It is pointed out that immigrant linguistic minorities tend to assimilate more quickly that indigenous linguistic minorities who still occupy their homeland. Group concentration is significant. Diffusion is seen to discourage group vitality, whereas concentration of numbers enables frequent interaction between group members, thereby engendering feelings of group identity. Group proportion is crucial, as differing proportions of in-group and out-group speakers are likely to produce very different inter-group relations. Factors affecting group number include the processes of population change which affect language groups. The authors outline five factors,

namely: absolute numbers, birthrate, mixed marriages, immigration and emigration. Higher absolute numbers lead to a more vital ethnolinguistic group. On the negative side, it may be the case that there exists a minimum threshold beyond which the prospects for the survival of the group are limited. Birthrate is important in relative terms. A higher or lower birthrate in relation to the out-group can be a factor in determining vitality. Mixed marriages between in-group and out-group members often result in the higher status language displacing the lower status language as the language of the home.

Immigration is a variable which may enhance or decrease the vitality of the group. Immigrants, for example, may assimilate into the language community. On the other hand immigrants may well choose not to assimilate into a subordinate ethnolinguistic group and instead assimilate into the dominant group thereby detrimentally affecting the vitality of the former. It is also a variable which may be manipulated or planned so as to enhance, retain or decrease the vitality or dominance of particular ethnolinguistic groups. Emigration, largely economic, means the departure of the younger and often more able members of a group and their subsequent assimilation into a dominant other group. Often the mother tongue is lost in this process. This variable might also include forced migration or depopulation and at the worst extreme genocide. Institutional support factors comprise formal and informal sources of support. Informal support is the degree to which an ethnolinguistic group has organised itself to promote its self interest. This organisation could include lobby groups, ginger groups, pressure groups and similar movements. The higher the level of organisation the more vital the group is. Formal support is the degree of representation a group enjoys at the decision-making levels of state, business and cultural affairs. Crucial domains of use would include the mass media, education and government departments and services, state supported arts, the security services and the armed forces. Further domains include industry, organised religion and the workplace, in both the public and the private sector. The relevance of macro-level factors is noted, in particular the processes of modernisation, industrialisation and economic depression (Giles *et al.*, 1977: 316–317). Also, the authors suggest that a group's subjective perception of its vitality may be as important as its objective reality in relation to assessing levels of ethno-linguistic vitality (Giles *et al.*, 1977: 318).

A major critic of the model of ethno-linguistic vitality is Haarmann (1986). His main criticism of the model is that it fails to detail specific language relations. As a result, while the model may be effective for theorising language related factors at a macrolevel, it is inadequate for this purpose at microlevels. Haarmann argues (1986: 9–10) that an adequate theory of language ecology must take into account all possible variables, both general and specific, which either directly or indirectly affect language structure, choice and behaviour in ethnic groups. Haarmann there-

fore considers the range of factors affecting ethno-linguistic vitality as a partial inventory. According to Haarmann, only by adopting an ecological approach is a holistic view of language in ethnicity possible. For example:

> Following the basic assumption that the interaction between ethnic groups is the result of environmental factors influencing their members, phenomena have to be analyzed in terms of ecological relations. The ethnic identity of any ethnic group comprises elements which are the reflection of a sum of experiences in the group's ecological settings.
>
> (Haarmann, 1986: 1)

Haarmann asserts that 'Language ecology should cover the whole network of social relations which control the variability of languages and their modal speakers' behaviour' (Haarmann, 1986: 3).

Constructing an ecological perspective on language in ethnicity means the integration of the principles of ecology to the study of language (Haarmann, 1986: 3). The result of this is the model which Haarmann presents as a view of basic ecological relations. To begin with, the following basic relations are put forward as 'the most comprehensive as a general framework for an ecological system' (Haarmann, 1986: 4–5): INDIVIDUAL–GROUP–SOCIETY–STATE. This framework comprises a hierarchical structure, moving, in Haarmann's words, from the most specific (individual) to the most general (state). In order to dispel any ambiguity regarding the hierarchy pertaining to this 'string of concepts' Haarmann offers closer definitions of society and state. Society is regarded by Haarmann (1986: 5) as the 'most complex organization of social groups' and, as such, the social groups, including ethnic groups, are subordinate to society. State and society are then differentiated because of the 'political implications of state organization', that being that 'the societal organization is considered to be subordinate to the political relations of a given state' (Haarmann, 1986: 5). For Haarmann, society cannot exist without the leadership of the state but the state can exist without the support of society. Thus, the hierarchy is characterised as follows:

> Language ecology is primarily concerned with language in its fundamental forms of existence which correspond to the different levels in the above string of concepts: language behaviour of the individual speaker, the role of language in group relations, the functional range of language(s) in a given society, and language politics in a given state.
>
> (Haarmann, 1986: 6)

On the basis of this framework Haarmann proposes an inventory of ecological variables relating to language in ethnicity. It is underlined, however, that the inventory relates to groups of speakers rather than

individual speakers, as Haarmann believes the case of the individual to be too complicated to lend itself to the construction of an easily understandable model (Haarmann, 1986: 6). The inventory of basic ecological variables is extensive and comprises seven categories, which are characterised by Haarmann (1986: 7–9) in the following terms. The ethnodemographic range of ecological functions comprises the general demographic factors which are of importance to the evolution of communities in general. The ethnosociological range comprises the social conditions affecting the ethnic group in contact settings. The ethnopolitical range of ecological functions is those variables which influence relations between the social structure of the ethnic group and the political structures of state. The ethnocultural range of ecological functions is based upon the identified cultural traditions and behavioural norms specific to and distinctive of the ethnic group. The ethnopsychological range of ecological functions is defined as the set of attitudes relating to group solidarity which function as control mechanisms in relation to both intragroup and intergroup communication. The interactional range of ecological functions is the factors which control interaction in the speech community. The variables which comprise the ethnolinguistic range of ecological functions are those factors which are directly related to the language of the ethnic group. A detailed inventory of variables within the various ranges is offered by Haarmann (1986: 11–16) and is summarised as follows.

I Ethnodemographic variables

- i.i The size of an ethnic group.
- i.ii The polarity between focussed and dispersed population in ethnic groups.
- i.iii The polarity between ethnic homogenity and heterogenity in the area of an ethnic group's settlement.
- i.iv The polarity between urban and rural settlements within an ethnic group.
- i.v The polarity between static settlement and migration movement in an ethnic group.

II Ethnosociological variables

- ii.i The polarity between stability and dynamic change in the ethnic profile of areas of settlement.
- ii.ii The distribution of the population in an ethnic group by sex.
- ii.iii Age-group distinctions as an ecological variable influencing language choice and behaviour.
- ii.iv The specifics of social stratification in an ethnic group.
- ii.v The specifics of family relations in social structures of an ethnic group.

III Ethnopolitical variables

- iii.i The ethnos-state relation.
- iii.ii The speaker-language-state relation.
- iii.iii The institutional status of a community's language.
- iii.iv The reproduction potential of a community's language.
- iii.v The characteristics of the division of labour.

IV Ethnocultural variables

- iv.i Ancestry as a criterion of group solidarity.
- iv.ii The polarity between ethnocultural patterns and social distance in interethnic relations.
- iv.iii The relevance of cultural and/or political organisations for the promotion of a community's interests.
- iv.iv The relevance of a language's *ausbau* status.
- iv.v The specifics of a language's sociocultural potential.

V Ethnopyschological variables

- v.i The relevance of enculturation for ethnic identification.
- v.ii The relevance of self-categorisation among the members of a community.
- v.iii The relevance of and ways of categorising other ethnic groups among the members of a community.
- v.iv Language maintenance as a measure of ethnic identity.
- v.v The attitude of the members in a community towards interaction with members of contacting ethnic groups.

VI Interactional variables

- vi.i The relevance of communicational mobility in a language community.
- vi.ii Interactional determination in the use of communicational means.
- vi.iii The relevance of intra- and interethnic role relations for interaction.
- vi.iv The degree of routine interaction with members of other ethnic groups.
- vi.v The degree of publicity of speech settings.
- vi.vi The relevance of topic for intra- and intergroup interaction.

VII Ethnolinguistic variables

- vii.i The relevance of linguistic distance between contact languages.
- vii.ii The relevance of ethnically specific pragmatic strategies of verbal interaction.

vii.iii The role of grammatical determinism within the framework of deictic categories.
vii.iv The characteristics of language contacts with respect to the socio-cultural status of the contacting languages.

Central to Haarmann's model is the ethnic group as point of reference for language in ethnicity as an ecological system (Haarmann, 1986: 25–31). In seeking to delineate the nature of the interdependence of the various ecological functions Haarmann highlights the particular role of the ethnopyschological variables in intergroup relations. These, he claims, act as a set of filters which control the nature of interaction and relate to the ways in which the group views both its own ethnic identity and also that of contact groups. Unfortunately, Haarmann concedes (1986: 26), it is only possible to perceive these factors and their influence indirectly. The interactional variables are also claimed to possess filter type functions (Haarmann, 1986: 28), but this relates more generally to the other ranges of ecological functions – ethnodemographic, ethnosociological, ethnocultural and ethnolinguistic (enumerated above as I, II, IV and VII). The final functional range of ethnopolitical factors clearly possesses an overarching quality. While on the one hand Haarmann asserts that 'there is a close interdependence between all ecological ranges and that no range dominates the others' (1986: 9), this has to be qualified in the light of the subsequent explanation of the role of ethnopolitical factors in the model:

> The functional range of ethnopolitical factors is best understood as an embracing category comprising all other functional ranges. This indication of an outer framework of ecological relations implies that political factors influencing the behaviour of ethnic groups form a general background for all other societal and intergroup relations . . . As all social conditions of ethnic groups are bound to the political organization of the society in a given state, the components of the political systems must be indicated separately. It is assumed that the effect of ethnodemographic, ethnocultural or other factors on the behaviour of reference and contact groups can only be represented in an overall ecological system when these have been integrated into the general framework of a society's political foundation (or organization).
>
> (Haarmann, 1986: 28)

The resulting model is one which allows for the comprehensive viewing of the fundamental relationships between language and ethnicity incorporating community, ethnicity and language specific variables. Also, for Haarmann (1986: 29), the model is unique in integrating the shaping of communicational systems and the verbal interaction of ethnic groups.



Remarks:

RG = reference group, ethnic group of reference

CG = contact group, ethnic group in contact with the reference group

1 = ethnodemographic range of ecological functions

2 = ethnosociological range of ecological functions

3 = ethnopolitical range of ecological functions

4 = ethnocultural range of ecological functions

5 = ethnopsychological range of ecological functions

6 = interactional range of ecological functions

7 = ethnolinguistic range of ecological functions

All variable ranges with their corresponding ecological functions refer to the behavior of groups, not individual speakers.

Figure 3 Basic model of ecological relations

Adapted from Haarmann, 1986: 27

It is with the effectiveness of the model in analysing language in conflict that this text is especially concerned. In respect of this Haarmann considers boundaries to be artificers of difference and the particular phenomenon of boundary crossing to be the most common cause of ethnic conflict in Europe. For example:

> Ethnic boundaries . . . as a nexus of various features are an important subject in the study of ethnopolitical conflicts. In Europe, where the existence of ethnic groups is almost exclusively marked by language distinctions . . . the special relations between ethnicity and language are of vital importance in the analysis of ethnicity problems.
>
> (Haarmann, 1986: 40)

And also:

> Most ethnopolitical conflicts – at least in the European framework of comparison – result from the crossing of ethnic boundaries, which is typical of fusion processes categorized as incorporation [assimilation].
>
> (Haarmann, 1986: 57)

For Haarmann the idea of boundary crossing relates largely to what he describes as ethnic fusion (assimilation or integration) and ethnic fission (differentiation or segregation). Much of the ethnic friction described by Haarmann, including his study of the cases of the USSR, Turkey and France (1986: 89–99), but also much more generally as well (e.g. 1986: 57), appears to derive from the intense pursuit of policies of assimilation in ethnos-state relations. Haarmann proposes prestige planning as a strategy for reducing ethnic conflict. Prestige planning is defined by Haarmann as follows:

> [The] prestige range consists of a network of identity elements and evaluations, including many stereotyping components of self-identification and categorization of other ethnic groups and their languages. The term applied here refers to the whole mechanism of categorization which controls intragroup and intergroup relations.
>
> (Haarmann, 1986: 89)

Also, this type of planning can be operated in such a manner as to limit the conditions under which language conflict is likely to occur:

> Ideally, prestige planning in a setting of contact between a minority language and a dominant language is balanced so that the potential circumstances of ethnic friction and conflict can be reduced to a minimum.
>
> (Haarmann, 1986: 89)

Haarmann acknowledges that this general aspiration is difficult to realise in practice (1986: 89–90) but suggests how it might be achieved in France, where 'no serious language planner would agree that the conditions for planning activities are favourable' (Haarmann, 1986: 94). He stresses the importance of 'multiple identities' as components of prestige planning. Haarmann's conceptualisation of multiple identities does not refer to individuals claiming a range of ethnic identities, but rather groups defining themselves according to the various interests of the group – ethnic, social and political. Hence, the identity of the group is not only shaped by ethnicity but also by socio-economic interests and according to Haarmann (1986: 90–91) this can be used in the prestige planning process to ameliorate ethnic friction:

> The promotion of multiple identities could be considered a major target of prestige planning activities. 'It seems reasonable to assert that patterns of multiple identities will stimulate the maintenance of ethnic loyalties on one hand, but also weaken conflicts on the other' (Allardt, 1979: 40).
>
> (Haarmann, 1986: 91)

And also:

> Prestige planning warrants broad application because it can function as a strategy of activating those attitudes toward ethnicity which are likely to weaken ethnic conflicts and create patterns of multiple identities in speech communities.
>
> (Haarmann, 1986: 99)

In the case of France the most effective strategy in this respect amounts to what Haarmann describes as 'a sophisticated means of argumentation' (1986: 94), which would aim at 'diffusing the patois ideology as an active attitude among French mother-tongue speakers' and also 'promote a consciousness of the cultural heritage and the regional languages as an ethnocultural pattern among non-French communities in France' (1986: 93). The French state should, in this context, be challenged by the danger of state policy creating an image of the French language within France as a colonial language (1986: 94). For Haarmann, this strategy holds out greater prospect for success than conflict with the French state:

> Confrontation, which has been treated as a principle of planning strategy among politically and culturally active regionalists, is, in fact, not a strategy but an energy-consuming, ineffective tactic which only creates mutual resentment and ill will among both regionalists and patois ideologists, alike.
>
> (Haarmann, 1986: 94)

Similarly, Haarmann (writing prior to the collapse of the Soviet order in 1991) sees such a strategy being applied successfully to the USSR. In this case he sees the process of resolving ethnic friction in terms of 'strengthening' ethnic identities within a multiple identity with a dominant 'supranational' core:

> It would be reasonable and in complete accordance with official Soviet ideology to promote a movement for the preservation of mini-language groups and their cultures. An initial task of such a movement would not contradict the principles of Leninist nationality politics, would be the strengthening of ethnic identity among members of small nationalities. The integration of all Soviet nationalities is an additional component

> which requires the extension of ethnic identity to a multiple identity including a supranational element.
>
> (Haarmann, 1986: 98)

On this issue of conflict in ecological context, it is significant that the analyses of both of the case studies presented by Haarmann in 1986 have been overtaken by subsequent events. The USSR and the Soviet bloc imploded during the late 1980s and early 1990s due, in part, to a resurgence in ethnic conflict. More recently, the Matignon process, in offering a substantial form of devolution to Corsica, including considerable autonomy over language matters on the island, has had the effect of opening up a new chapter in language policy and planning in metropolitan France (e.g. see Cerquiglini, 2000). While it may be unreasonable to expect any model to predict such events, a more complete articulation of language in ethnicity as ecosystem must view conflict differently. Suffice to say that Haarmann asserts the incompleteness of his model (1986: 25). It is suggested here that the model indicates some of the key environmental factors towards understanding ecology of language but that some key mechanisms are missing or require modification. Weaknesses in the model with regard to the essentialist nature of its definition of ethnicity and the ethnic group and also with regard to its relative failure to interrogate adequately the concepts of state and of nation-state in particular are examined in the second part of this text.

Before considering the socio-political organisation of ethnicity in detail it is necessary to approach the idea of competition in ecological context. For a general ecological model, including an ecolinguistic model, the neglect of the crucial concept of competition is a serious omission. This mechanism is crucial to understanding language and conflict in ecological context. At this point, the descriptive and explanatory capacity of Haarmann's model is added to by applying the ecological concept of competition to ecolinguistics.

Competition in ecological context

All ecologists would probably concur with Odum in his agreement with the definition of ecology as offered in Webster's *Unabridged Dictionary*; 'The totality or pattern of relations between organisms and environment' (Odum, 1975: 1, 4). In this study of organisms in their environment ecologists identify two distinct components to the environment – the physical; comprising the climate, water, temperature, radiation and nutrients and the biotic; comprising the other organisms which co-exist in the environment. The impact of these upon an organism of study could include, for example, competition and adaptation. Ecologists study the complexity of relations between organisms and the environment at a number of levels, namely – individual, population, community, ecosystem and biosphere. In

ecological terms a population is understood as a group of organisms of the same species in a given area. A community is the sum, or assemblage, of species populations found in a given area. An ecosystem is the complexity of relationships between a biotic [organic or living] community and the physical environment. Odum defines ecosystem in the following terms; 'The community and the nonliving environment function together as an ecological system or ecosystem' (Odum, 1975: 4). And according to McIntosh; 'Ecosystem [is] . . . conceived to encompass the whole complex of biotic community and physical environment, and studies of this complex are commonly designated ecosystem ecology' (McIntosh, 1985: 196).

The biosphere is conceived of as comprising the global sum of ecosystems. The adoption of the term 'linguasphere' by a global language project (http://www.linguasphere.org and http://www.linguasphere. net) reflects this ecological conception. Odum notes that ecological awareness which is born of the study of ecosystems is summarised as follows: '[T]he living space functions of one's environment are interrelated, mutually restrictive, and not unlimited in capacity' (Odum, 1975: 204). Given the restrictive nature of the environment, its limited capacity, and the interrelations between and across the biotic community and the physical environment, competition results. Owen puts it in these terms:

> In view of the fact that the carrying capacity of an environment is limited it seems likely that there is competition among individuals for resources. Competition in this sense need not necessarily imply open conflict between individuals.
>
> (Owen, 1980: 63)

McIntosh credits Warming in foreshadowing the ecological study of competition:

> Warming (1895) reported the restriction of plant species from certain habitats by competition, forcing the species to grow in another habitat, which gave it the appearance of preferring that soil. He anticipated the interest in competition of later generations of ecologists: 'There is scarcely any biological task more attractive than of determining the nature of the weapons by which plants oust each other from habitats'.
>
> (McIntosh, 1985: 179)

Ecologists have come to define competition in relation to the use of the resources of the environment necessary to the survival of individual organisms and the continuity of the species. Competition may occur both between different species and also among members of the same single species. Also, the nature of competition is largely determined by what is known as the niche. A niche is the position a species occupies in its

environment and this comprises both the conditions within which it exists and also the resources it utilises. What ecologists describe as the 'fundamental niche' is the maximum potential niche which could, in theory, be occupied by a species in the absence of competition. In practice, in almost all cases, a species occupies a more reduced niche due to competition. This is termed the 'realized niche'. Competition is, therefore, in the words of Mackenzie *et al.* (1998: 92):

> [A]n interaction among individuals utilizing a limited resource, resulting in reduced fitness in the competing individuals. Competition occurs both between species utilizing a shared resource (interspecific competition) and among members of a species (intraspecific competition). The niche of an individual or species . . . is critical in determining the degree of competition with other species or individuals. Large niche overlap generally results in intense competition.

By now, competition is widely accepted in ecology as a fundamental 'clue to community organisation' (McIntosh, 1985: 93). In general terms the nature of competition varies and, depending upon the nature of the competition, the consequences will also vary. Odum puts it as follows:

> Where there are two or more closely related species adapted to the same or a similar niche, interspecific competition becomes important. If the competition is severe, one of the species may be eliminated completely, or forced into another niche or another geographical location; or the species involved may be able to live together at reduced density by sharing resources in some sort of equilibrium.
>
> (Odum, 1975: 130)

Whatever the nature of the competition it is widely agreed in ecology that competition is most effectively viewed as a mechanism for bringing about the displacement or exclusion of rivals from the environment. This mechanism is often termed 'competitive exclusion' and it remains fundamental to the study of ecology, for example: '[The] idea of competitive exclusion . . . continues as a cornerstone of population and community ecology' (McIntosh, 1985: 183–184). Exclusion does not have to entail the literal removal of the competitor from the environment but can manifest itself through adaptation. In some cases competition results in what is known as character displacement, that is behavioural and physiological changes in a species. Through their differential adaptation to the environment, and in particular to the way in which they exploit resources, species can aim to avoid competition. As Owen puts it:

> Competition for resources between individuals of a species is an essential part of the selective process that leads to adaptation: competition

> between species leads to a selection for differences in the way resources are exploited.
>
> (Owen, 1980: 179)

The implication of this, of course, is that competition leads to difference:

> Gause was perhaps the first to formulate the proposition that no two species found together are ecologically identical and that the differences between them result from and are maintained by competition.
>
> (Owen, 1980: 98)

Competition can operate in two main ways – exploitation (or resource) competition and interference competition (e.g. Krebbs, 1985). Exploitation competition is where individuals deplete the resource in limited supply; individuals thus interact indirectly. Reduced fitness, that is the ability of an individual or species to secure reproduction, arises from reduced resource availability. Interference competition is when individuals interact directly, through violent conflict. Reduced fitness in this case arises from injury and death, as well as reduced resource availability. In general, whatever the type of competition, the participants are unevenly affected so that the cost for one individual is greater than for the other. Adaptations to competition include; territoriality – the active interference of individuals or groups to maintain territory boundaries, thereby securing exclusive space for the species to the greatest extent possible; dispersal – the movement away from locations of high population density by organisms, commonly the younger members of a given species; and finally resource partitioning. This is the only option which does not result in either the displacement or expiration of organisms and allows for the coexistence of species. Ecologists accept that non-competitive co-existence is something which only occurs under particular circumstances:

> The competitive exclusion principle states that coexistence can only occur in a stable, homogenous environment if the species niches are differentiated, because if two species had identical requirements one would dominate and outcompete the other.
>
> (Mackenzie *et al.*, 1998: 103)

The extent of niche differentiation, according to ecological theory (Mackenzie *et al.*, 1998: 103), is the critical factor in enabling coexistence. This relates to the range and volume of resources utilised by a species. In theory, the ideal state of equilibrium allowing coexistence is characterised by a balance between narrowness of range – thereby reducing the likelihood of interspecies competition and flatness of volume – in turn reducing the likelihood of intraspecies competition. In practice, ecologists have found it difficult to identify such a scenario in real-life case studies.



Figure 4 Resource utilisation and niche differentiation curves
Adapted from Mackenzie *et al.*, 1998: 103

In the cases of those ecosystems in which competition does not appear to feature, ecologists assert that the observed patterns arise, for the greater part, from historical competition rather than niche differentiation:

> Evolution may act to reduce the degree of competition of species – thus current patterns of resource utilization are a result of competition over time, even though little or no competitive interactions are currently observed. This phenomenon is known as 'the ghost of competition'.
>
> (Mackenzie *et al.*, 1998: 103)

The concept of the 'ghost of competition' is reminiscent of the symbolic violence crucial to Bourdieu's habitus, understood of course as a stable and homogenous form of environment. Ecological diversity is more likely to be explained by dint of the fact that natural environments are not stable or homogeneous entities. The spatial and temporal heterogeneity of the environment means that the physical conditions and the resources necessary to the continuity of species undergo modification and that the resulting changes may produce greater or fewer opportunities for the various species populations which comprise the community of a given ecosystem. The effect of this environmental heterogeneity is to constantly alter the interrelationships between the component parts of the biotic community and the physical environment. As a result there is no permanent disposition in an ecosytem which works inevitably in the favour of certain species over others, thus environmental heterogeneity fosters ecological diversity. Notions of change in time and space bring us to the last point to be made regarding the scope of ecology, which is that ecology is only understandable in the light of evolution:

> The huge diversity of organisms, and the wealth of variety in their morphologies, physiologies and behaviour are all the result of many millions

> of years of evolution. This evolutionary history has left an indelible impression on each and every individual. It is only possible to make sense of the patterns we find today in the light of this evolutionary legacy.
>
> (Mackenzie *et al.*, 1998: 5)

It is also the case that an ecological approach to language is suggestive of the ethos of conservation which is at the heart of natural ecology. This may be viewed as the management of competition. Here, the key concept is 'biodiversity'. This encompasses not only individual species but also the variety of species, the range of interactions between species, and the various process in ecosystems. The Earth Summit of Rio de Janeiro in 1992 sets indigenous people's rights within context of biodiversity conservation through a document known as Agenda 21 (Mackenzie *et al.*, 1998: 272) and while it is the case that the Earth Summit underlined cooperation in this field between nation-states, it is also the case that much of the diplomatic product at the heart of the treaty and other similar agreements in this field, is the result of the activity of NGOs and global pressure or lobby groups, such as Greenpeace, and other bodies which transcend the traditional national interests of nation-states, including the World Conservation Union. Such organisations operating at both global and local levels echo the view that the nation-state is both too small and too big to cope with contemporary concerns. To put it another way, the discourse of biodiversity conservation is 'postmodern' to the extent that it engages with the natural world as a feature of globalisation.

This exploration of the nature of competition in ecological context can be moved beyond mere biological metaphor through reference to the interweave of ecology and structuration theory achieved by some scholars working in the field of human ecology (Steiner and Nauser, 1993). A number of the different contributors to this particular volume highlight a number of points of engagement. In general, Giddens' reworking of conceptions of social reproduction and social transformation is regarded as a crucial means of theoretical engagement. In seeking to transcend the subject-object dichotomy which has bedevilled the social sciences, he introduces the notion of the duality of structure. In this, action and structure are to be regarded as a dialectical process whereby the rules and resources of society are recursively involved in social reproduction, for example: '[T]he structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise' (Giddens, 1986: 25). Structure, in this context, refers to the systemic ordering of societal rules and resources. A number of key structures for engaging ecology and structuration are identified (Werlen, 1993) as follows:

- systems of semantic rules – structures of *Weltanschauungen*;
- systems of resources – structures of domination, and;
- systems of moral rules – structures of legitimation.

These structures, Giddens argues, only become real or meaningful through action. Structuration comprises 'the dynamic process whereby structures come into being' (Giddens, 1976: 121). The idea of structuration, therefore, implies the structuring of social relations as a result of the duality of structure and, in this sense, structure is both constraining and enabling (Giddens, 1986: 376). As it is only through action that the social world is constituted, it follows that the concept of interaction is critical in understanding social reproduction and transformation. It is in this context that contestation arises. This will be in either of two forms, according to Giddens. They are 'conflict' and 'contradiction'. The former may be described as a type of competition in which the interacting agents operate according to the same structuring principles. This type of contestation is most likely to arise in relation to resources. Contradiction reflects, in some ways, a more profound form of contestation relating to actual structural oppositions. It should be noted at this point that the term conflict as employed in this text may be taken to embrace both of Giddens' terms, as in contested societies it appears that the distinctions drawn by Giddens are rarely identified in isolation. At this point one can borrow from Lawrence (1993: 217–224) in identifying several key concepts in structuration theory which help to develop an ecological view of language in relation to ethnicity and conflict. These are locale, purposive behaviour, power and resources. In ecological context the significance of Giddens' term 'locale' is that it embraces both the physical and imaginative environment, it encompasses not merely geographical location but contextual meaning as well. Place-names, for example, are a feature of this contextuality. It is contended that through this contextuality, the locale is also constitutive of action. Thus the environment, in its widest meaning, is deployed by social agents to enable or to constrain social reproduction and transformation:

> The communication of meaning, as with all aspects of the contextuality of action, does not have to be seen merely as happening 'in' time-space. Agents routinely incorporate temporal and spatial features of encounters in processes of meaning constitution.
>
> (Giddens, 1986: 29)

In his exploration of the significance of purposive behaviour for human ecology Lawrence (1993: 219–220) notes the limitations of structuration theory in explaining the mechanisms of social change due to Giddens' preoccupation with the related concepts of 'reiteration' and 'routinization'. In viewing institutionalised societal practices in terms of the reiterative and routine quality of group and individual interaction with institutions, Giddens provides a conservative view of society. For Lawrence, however, the notion is useful in that it also embraces the idea of what Giddens describes as the 'unintended consequences of intentional

conduct' (Giddens, 1986: 12), whereby institutional practices are made aware of the impact of those practices upon issues which do not relate directly to the institutional perspective in the first instance. In environmental context this would include the impact of industrial activity on the natural landscape; for language in ecological context this would include, for example, the impact of housing policy upon language communities. The innovation of language impact assessments could be a response to this type of purposive behaviour and the resultant unintended consequences. Power, according to Giddens, is not necessarily related to either conflict or oppression. Rather, power can be both enabling and constraining:

> [P]ower is the capacity to achieve outcomes; whether or not these are connected to purely sectional interests is not germane to its definition. Power is not, as such, an obstacle to freedom or emancipation but is their very medium – although it would be foolish, of course, to ignore its constraining properties . . . Power is generated in and through the reproduction of structures of domination.
>
> (Giddens, 1986: 157–158)

Conflict is usually avoided in society through regulatory mechanisms based upon 'tacit knowledge', a set of rules which includes symbolic exchange and the sharing of information. Generally speaking, in the modern nation-state, these rules are explicit, absolute, fixed and prescribed, most commonly in the form of written constitutions. In themselves such regulatory mechanisms are a significant resource available to administrators, politicians and other officers of the state:

> Explicit regulators usurp many implicit customs, norms and rules; they may challenge 'the knowledgeability' of some people, and they become a resource of abstract power and social control in human groups and societies. One consequence is that face-to-face conduct is gradually replaced by technical forms of communication and administrative controls which increasingly regulate daily affairs.
>
> (Lawrence, 1993: 222)

Lawrence (1993: 223–224) notes that the concept of resources is an obvious point of engagement between human ecology and structuration theory, while underlining the view that issues of power and conflict bear a strong relationship to the exercise of control over and the gaining of accessibility to resources. Giddens identifies two types of resources which are useful with regard to conceiving of language-centred resource issues. They are allocative and authoritative resources and he defines these in the following terms:

> Allocative resources refer to capabilities – or, more accurately, to forms of transformative capacity – generating command over objects, goods or material phenomena. Authoritative resources refer to types of transformative capacity generating command over persons or actions.
>
> (Giddens, 1984: 33)

In general, these various considerations, drawn from both human ecology and structuration theory, cut across the range of ecolinguistic variables identified by Haarmann. In ecological context, language can be regarded as both a resource in itself as well as something which is demanding of resources. For example, within Haarmann's ethnocultural range of variables the specifics of a language's sociocultural potential and its *ausbau* status may be viewed as linguistic resources. Similarly, the different variables which fall within the ethnolinguistic range, noted earlier in this chapter, may also be viewed in terms of language resources. The idea of power, when set in ecolinguistic context, is particularly relevant to Haarmann's ethnopolitical range of variables. Here one may identify the 'structures of domination' in the relationships between the ethnic group and the state, and between the individual, language and state. This would imply that this is the main point wherein the issue of competition, or conflict, arises. Accepting the contours of Haarmann's basic model of ecological relations, then the conflict identified by structuration theory is mediated via the interactional and the ethnopsychological range of variables. The task of more closely defining language conflict, therefore, requires a closer examination of language in relation to these ecological factors. In modern and contemporary European context this means the study of language and its management in conflict in relation to the nation-state and to ethnicity.

Conclusions

The model proposed by Haarmann may be regarded as providing a template for tracing the structural factors in the ecology of language, similar to the ecological conditions and resources noted in the natural world – climate, water, temperature, radiation, nutrients. To this, competition must be added as a crucial element in understanding the evolution of language in society and the interrelationships between language and the various features of its whole environment. In order to locate competition or conflict within an ecological perspective on language it is necessary to take issue with the prevalent over-emphasis in ecolinguistics on the discrete nature of group organisation. It is also necessary to address the inadequate exploration of nation-state which is equally characteristic of this view of language in society. In the next chapter an understanding of the social and political organisation of ethnicity is developed in this context.

Part 2

Borders and frontiers

5 Histories and geographies of the nation-state

> The so-called Nation State . . . is . . . only an increment of the general insecurity and menace . . . and the hunt for happiness will never be greater than when it must be caught between today and tomorrow.
>
> (Nietzsche quoted in Kaufmann, 1974: 166)

> Questions of language are basically questions of power.
>
> (Chomsky, 1979: 191)

> Les nations ne sont pas quelque chose d'éternel. Elles ont commencé, elles finiront.
>
> (Renan in Thiesse, 1999: 12–13)

Introduction

In contemporary Europe issues in language, identity and conflict relate in large part to the idea and the reality of the nation-state. In this chapter the centrality of language to the modern nation-state and the ethnic and civic dimensions to its identity is examined. This builds upon the view of the construction of the nation-state as the result of the adaptation of premodern *ethnie* to the challenge of modernity in tracing the specific function of language in this process. This includes language as a function of the political mobilisation of *ethnie* through the ideology of nationalism, and also, language as a function of the bureaucratic integration of the nation to the state as citizens. Language is reviewed, therefore, in relation to two formulations regarding the community of the nation-state, that is as an 'imagined community' and as a 'conceptual community'. Language competition, even language death, in this context develops the biological metaphor beyond reductionist views on social Darwinism in underlining the constructed (May, 2001: 3–4), rather than intrinsic, nature of language fitness while not losing sight of the fact of language change and loss as an integral feature of social and cultural evolution (Fischer, 1999: 58–59 and 84–85). It is an important consideration of this chapter that, unlike a number of other works in this area, the continuity of the

nation-state is not taken for granted. Language is examined in relation to the contemporary crisis of the nation-state and the increasing diversity of new forms of polity; but, whatever the ultimate fate of the nation-state, it is concluded here that this particular form of polity remains crucial to understanding the modern and contemporary trajectory of questions of language, society and power in Europe.

Language and the modern necessity of the nation-state

According to many the idea of the nation-state has become so deeply embedded in our socio-political vocabulary that it is almost impossible to conceive of other forms of socio-political organisation or expression without reference to it. As Taylor, for example, puts it:

> [T]he idea of nation is so embedded in our consciousness that it is even reflected in the use of terms that describe counter-national arrangement: 'supra-national', 'multi-national' and 'trans-national' all assume the prior reality of nations (Tivey, 1981: 6). Similarly the two great liberal organizations of states in the twentieth century have found it unnecessary to mention the states themselves – we have successively the League of Nations and the United Nations. Of course 'nations' that do not possess states, such as Kurds, cannot join these organizations but states without nations, such as most newly independent African states, do join immediately to reinforce their sovereign status.
>
> (Taylor, 1993: 195)

In teasing out a more detailed understanding of relationships between language and the modern nation-state it is of significance that there is widespread agreement among academics that the nation is a political community. In this respect most scholars follow Weber (e.g. 1962) in describing a nation as a prestige community with a sense of cultural mission along with an affiliation to an ethnic community as a population unified by a myth of common descent. Also, a nation has a commitment to a political project. Guibernau (1998) is broadly representative of this view of the nation, that is; as a named people who acknowledge their identity by virtue of a common culture, a shared history and a specific territory; is distinguished from other forms of identity in its engagement, through the ideology of nationalism; with a political project which secures, or seeks to secure, sovereignty for the nation in the form of a nation-state. The origins of the nation and the mechanics of the nation-state are more complex, however. In order to trace the significance of these complexities for language, three views on the nation-state are explored, beginning with the modernist position on this topic.

For Gellner (1983), the nation arises only in the context of the

processes of modernisation and industrialisation. According to Gellner, modernisation comprises the various social changes that transform rural, agricultural societies with stable patterns of hierarchy and religious integration into complex industrial, secular societies with shifting patterns of hierarchy and bureaucratic integration. Societies undergoing such a transformation, it is argued, require a common language and culture. Modern bureaucracies integrate the nation to the state via a paper chain of memos, circulars, minutes etc. which, in turn, requires a literate population. Mass, compulsory education is necessary for this. Mass education also serves as a vehicle for promoting the shared cultural values and norms of the nation-state, effectively those of the dominant ethnic group within the nation-state. In knitting nation and state together Gellner argues that while nationalism may draw upon prior cultural forms he asserts that: '[T]he cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism are often arbitrary historical inventions. Any old shred and patch would have served as well' (Gellner, 1983: 56).

Hobsbawm develops this view of the nation as a peculiarly recent invention to be understood only in the context of modernisation. He insists that the nation, as an effective form of polity, can only be realised under very particular circumstances:

> Nations only exist as functions of a particular kind of territorial state or the aspiration to establish one . . . but also in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development . . . Nations and their associated phenomena must therefore be analysed in terms of political, technical, administrative, economic and other conditions and requirements.
>
> (Hobsbawm, 1992: 10)

Before these conditions are met the nation is largely an aspirational concept. It is in this context that Hobsbawm notes the emergence during the eighteenth century of what he describes as the principle of nationality, namely that every nation has a right to its own state. This principle becomes a part of usual political language from around 1830 onwards (Hobsbawm, 1992: 142–143 and 1992: 18). According to Hobsbawm, the use of the term nation in this period presumed a political dimension to the idea, for example:

> The primary meaning of 'nation', and the one most frequently ventilated in the literature, was political. It equated 'the people' and 'the state' in the manner of the American and French Revolutions.
>
> (Hobsbawm, 1992: 18)

While this echoes Gellner's (1983) definition of the term nationalism, as 'a political principle, which holds that the political and the national

unit should be congruent', Hobsbawm notes that it was not until the last quarter of the nineteenth century that the term was actually coined. For Hobsbawm, the significance of this is that nationalism as a popularly understood form of politics only comes into its own at this point. Part of the reason for this is that it is only in this period that compulsory mass primary education is introduced in the larger European states. According to Hobsbawm, this is the single most crucial innovation to the invention of the nation and it carries special significance for the role of language as in the era before general primary education there could be no such thing as a national language (Hobsbawm, 1992: 52). Modernists argue that the adoption of an official national language is essential to the state in this modernising process. As Hobsbawm points out, the direct and effective administration of citizens by the modern government requires a literate citizenry and this in turn demands universal basic education. The most effective means of achieving this was through the raising of levels of literacy in a single language rather than in the full range of languages and dialects within the territory of the nation-state. It is only through a system of centralised, state-sponsored mass education that the chosen language of the bureaucratic state could be imposed upon a polyvernacular and, up to that point, largely illiterate citizenry. The choice of national language in the nineteenth century was thus not merely a pragmatic issue but was related to the identity of the nation at the heart of the state (p. 95), for example: 'At all events problems of power, status, politics and ideology and not of communication or even culture, lie at the heart of the nationalism of language' (Hobsbawm, 1992: 110).

The standardised and homogenised national and official language would be fashioned out of a dialect chosen by the bourgeois state. According to Hobsbawm, the class with greatest vested interest in this issue was the lower middle and middle classes, those whose modest rise up the socio-economic ladder in the modernising nation-state was dependent upon their success in the education system in which proficiency in the language of the nation-state was essential. In this sense the project of linguistic nationalism is peculiarly the property of these classes, caricatured by Hobsbawm as 'the lesser examination-passing classes' (Hobsbawm, 1992: 118). Any further reinforcement of the status of the national official vernacular further reinforced these vested interests. In this sense language, therefore, is the invention of the state:

> In fact, the mystical identification of nationality with a sort of platonic idea of language, existing behind and above all its variant and imperfect versions, is much more characteristic of the ideological construction of nationalist intellectuals, of whom Herder is the prophet, than of the actual grassroots users of the idiom. It is a literary and not an existential concept.
>
> (Hobsbawm, 1992: 57)

Anderson offers a variation on the view which locates the origins of nations and nationalism in the process of modernisation. Rather than focussing on industrialisation and the education system, Anderson places emphasis on the revolution in print and less formal relationships between individuals, their nation and its state. This view has other implications for the significance of language in relation to the nation-state. According to Anderson, the nation is most usefully conceived of as an imagined community:

> [I]t [the nation] is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or ever hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion. The nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminus with mankind . . . It is imagined as *sovereign* because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.
>
> (Anderson, 1983: 15–16)

The type of imagining which distinguishes the nation from other impersonal forms of social organisations turns on its limited and sovereign nature. The nation is a limited community in that it exists in relation to numerous other similarly constructed nations. It is sovereign community in that it governs itself independent of other nations. Nations, according to Anderson, begin to arise in the modern period as early as the seventeenth century. It is during this period that the conditions which make such national imaginings possible arise. They are, according to Anderson, the abandonment of script-language as the only possible means of access to ontological truth, the abandonment of the belief that society is naturally organised around the figure of the divinely ordained monarch and the erosion of the conception of temporality in which cosmology and history are conflated. These conditions emerge in western Europe gradually during the early modern period, but the most important factor, the keystone factor, is the advent of print, together with free-market capitalism [print-capitalism]. Print-capitalism allowed for the development of language defined markets, communities of readership – largely educated, lay and middle-class. Therein lie the conditions for the emergence of modern national identities and ultimately, largely through warfare, the construction of nation-states. The language of print [print-language] is

central to this process in a number of respects. Print-languages, according to Anderson (1991: 44–45), create the basis for national imaginings in three ways:

- they create unified fields of exchange and communication,
- they give a new fixity to language,
- and also, the vernacular dialects adopted as print-languages become languages-of-power.

Through print-language an elite community can be created and if this can be made to coincide with a particular territory it can function as the core from which the nation will emerge. The printed book and, in particular, the newspaper as an extreme form of the book (Anderson, 1991: 34–35) enable the periodic, and subsequently daily, ritual of the simultaneous mass consumption of the world refracted through the printed word, print-as-commodity. The significance of this is that this ritual is performed in privacy by each reader or communicant and yet the individual communicant is also aware of the fact of their partaking in this ceremony with unknown numerous other individuals who share the views expressed in the reading material. In this sense print-language and print-as-commodity allow for the imagined community to be rooted in everyday immediate and personal experience. The new fixity of language arises from the necessity for print capitalism to seek out, or to define, the largest possible market place for print-as-commodity. In seeking to define these markets print-languages impose a certain tendency towards homogeneity and standardisation. Also, the new fixity given to certain vernaculars, besides reinforcing the standardising of languages, also lends an elevated status to the languages of print capitalism:

> [A]s literacy increased, it became easier to arouse popular support, with the masses discovering a new glory in the print elevation of languages they had humbly spoken all along.
>
> (Anderson, 1991: 80)

Finally, it is these languages which tended to become the official national languages and ultimately the popular languages of European nation-states through the education system and public administration. The dominant script-language of western Europe, Latin, while also adopted as a print-language, did not come to fulfil a role as a power-language in modern Europe. Anderson notes (1991: 40–41) that despite its universality in medieval western Europe it never coincided with a universal political framework, unlike Mandarin in Imperial China. The political fragmentation of western Europe following the collapse of the Roman Empire in the west meant, for Anderson, that:

> [N]o sovereign could monopolize Latin and make it his-and-only-his language-of-state, and thus Latin's religious authority never had a true political analogue.
>
> (Anderson, 1991: 41)

In achieving the status of official national language it is irrelevant whether the language is that of a minority or otherwise. The critical issue is whether the speakers carry sufficient political weight. So, it was the language of metropolitan revolutionary France, and of Paris in particular, the 'langue d'oui', which was adopted as the French language for the purposes of the revolutionary new state, even though most of its citizens did not speak the language (Weber, 1976). This also accounts for the linguistic nationalism which was a feature of the processes of both Italian and German unification during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

Another approach is characterised by the work of A.D. Smith. While he acknowledges the importance of modernisation and industrialisation he argues that the nation is not constructed *ex nihilo* but arises from premodern ethnic communities or *ethnies.* The metamorphosis from the one to the other occurs, as we have already noted in Chapter 3, in context of the emergence of modern Europe. For the purpose of this line of thought, modern Europe may be defined in a number of ways, including with reference to the emergence of new economic relationships, mercantilism or political economy and the development of capitalism; the decline of feudalism; the processes of expansion and colonisation and the subsequent impact of the New World on the Old; new forms of professionalised warfare; increasingly centralised and secular institutions of government and state; the Reformation and the Counter-reformation and other developments in philosophy including the Scientific revolution; Renaissance art; the emergence of new forms of vernacular literature, especially the novel and theatre; and print (e.g. Berce, 1987; Burke, 1978; Cipolla, 1965; Field and James, 1993; Green, 1964; Greengrass, 1991; Kearney, 1964; Koenigsberger, 1987; Koenigsberger *et al.*, 1989; Lee, 1984; Maland, 1990; Parker, 1979). Modern nations are to be distinguished from pre-modern *ethnies* through their possession of a number of characteristic features comprising:

- an historic homeland or territory,
- common myths and historical memories,
- a common, mass public culture,
- common legal rights and duties for all members of the nation,
- and finally, a common economy with territorial mobility for members of the nation.

Smith argues that language is not the sole, and probably not the main, distinguishing feature of ethnicity (Smith, 1986: 26–28 and 181). Rather, the

significance of language in the pre-modern period is to be understood in the interplay of various factors:

> [L]anguage is one of the most malleable and dependant cultural categories; apart from the great language fissures (for example, between Romance, Slavonic and Germanic language groups in Europe), particular linguistic formations are largely the product of the interplay of religion and political organization in a given area.
>
> (Smith, 1986: 27)

In contrast to the positions outlined so far, in this model language plays a role in engaging with an observably real past in its relationship to landscape and memory. Modernity merely reinforces the process of cultural homogenisation already underway in parts of western Europe for centuries including, for example, France and England (Smith, 1986: 108–109). Smith is in agreement with Anderson on the immediate impact of modernisation on the emergence of languages of state, for example:

> In the West, however, territorial centralization and consolidation went hand in hand with a growing cultural standardization. Administrative languages played a vital role in producing a standard mode of communication, not only at the practical level of state regulations, but more subtly by making it possible for the educated classes to imagine their unity and homogeneity. As Anderson so vividly illustrates, the technology of printing and the vast outflow of books and newspapers it spawned, published in the standardized administrative languages of centralized bureaucratic states, turned the shadowy framework of sovereign states into a living reality of limited communities, imagined rather than seen.
>
> (Smith, 1986: 133)

In this way language is not artificed by the state from 'any old shred' but rather it is a feature of the continuity between certain premodern *ethnies* and their modern nations:

> [E]thnic nationalists appeal to the customary and linguistic ties which they then set out to standardize and elaborate, elevating customs into rules and laws, and turning dialects (some of them) into languages.
>
> (Smith, 1986: 137–138)

The issue of language is not unproblematic, however. Smith identifies in modern European context a preoccupation with the authentification of the nation through language. That is, the new imaginings that are the nation (Smith, 1986: 170–171, borrowing from Anderson) made possible through new modes of communication, require rudimentary education in

literacy and through this education the cultural values at the core of the nation are also transmitted and acquired. More often that not this includes 'a resurrected and renovated ancient tongue' (Smith, 1986: 171) and, while this is advantageous for some, it is at the same time a source of conflict:

> The European emphasis on language as a criterion of the 'genuine' nation has erected new barriers within and outside the community. But it has also given new opportunities for hitherto despised and depressed minority communities. This is seen most obviously in Canada, Belgium and Yugoslavia, where the formerly depressed communities of Flanders, Quebec and Macedonia are now accorded greater respect and have been able to take advantage of new opportunities and openings. At the same time, these three states are good examples of the heightened inter-ethnic tensions generated by cultural pluralism seeking political expression. Language introduces a new and powerful dimension of identification and community, but it also becomes a barrier to mobility, especially for the vernacular intelligentsia and their rivals (in both directions), and a new principle of cleavage and antagonism, superimposed on other cultural differences.
>
> (Smith, 1986: 220)

In drawing together these lines of thought on relationships between language, ethnicity and the nation-state it is useful to underline one other point regarding the nature of the modern nation-state which carries considerable significance for the issue of language. In a further elaboration upon the idea of the nation A.D. Smith (1995) shows how the apparent dichotomy which some see between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism in relation to the modern nation-state is overstated (e.g. Breton, 1988; Brubaker, 1992 and 1996; McCrone, 1998). He argues that in reality the civic identity of the modern nation-state is constructed around the ethnic values of a single dominant ethnic group. The modern nation-state, therefore, is both an ethnic and a civic construct:

> In other words, modern nations are simultaneously and necessarily civic and ethnic. In relation to the national state, the individual is a citizen with civic rights and duties, and receives the benefits of modernity through the medium of an impersonal, and impartial, bureaucracy. Hence the nationalism of the state is bureaucratic as well as civic . . . However, in relation to the ethnic community or 'the people', individuals are members with ties and affinities based on history and vernacular culture and for that reason are accorded the rights of citizenship (and the benefits of modernity) of the national state that represents, contains and protects the community. Hence the nationalism

> of the national community, of the territorial community of history and culture, is popular as well as ethnic . . . The nation . . . represents a sometimes uneasy but necessary symbiosis of ethnic and civic elements.
>
> (Smith, 1995: 99–100)

A.D. Smith's reading of this modern interlock of civic and ethnic values demonstrates that civic nationalism, contrary to its self-image, as well as ethnic nationalism is repressive of minorities. Civic nationalism is not culture-neutral, it is not inherently more open to the possibilities of institutionalised cultural plurality than is ethnic nationalism. Giddens offers the notion of the 'conceptual community' as a means of conceptualising the engagement between the civic and the ethnic via the relationship between the nation as an ethnic community and the institutions of the nation-state:

> Nationalism is the cultural sensibility of sovereignty, the concomitant of the co-ordination of administrative power within the bounded nation-state. With the coming of the nation-state, states have an administrative and territorially ordered unity which they did not possess before. This unity cannot be purely administrative however, because the very co-ordination of activities involved presumes elements of cultural homogeneity. The extension of communication cannot occur without the 'conceptual' involvement of the whole community as a knowledgeable citizenry. A nation-state is a 'conceptual community' in a way which traditional states were not. The sharing of a common language, and a common symbolic historicity, are the most thorough-going ways of achieving this.
>
> (Giddens, 1985: 219)

Of course the realisation of a single bureaucratic language in the interests of national efficiency entails the reduction of other languages to non-official and non-national status which in turn reinforces the status of the ethnic communities pertaining to those languages as minorities. In this way the existence of minority cultures is counter to the best interests of the nation-state and requires to be suppressed. On this matter of minorities others put the case most forcefully, for example:

> [T]he birth of nations implies many artifices: not only are they constituted in an active struggle against the imperial or evolved systems, the feudal systems, and the autonomous cities, but they crush their own 'minorities', in other words, minoritarian phenomena that could be termed 'nationalitarian', which work from within and if need be turn to the old codes to find a greater degree of freedom.
>
> (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 456)

This interplay between civic and ethnic nationalism, and between nation and state, in the modern era has resulted in a particular configuration of language in identity and conflict during that period. For example, the development of a limited number of powerful unitary nation-states in western Europe – the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain ensured that actual linguistic diversity was pushed, in some cases literally, to the margins.

In these parts of modern Europe what we see is, in ecological terms, the ghost of language competition. As Giddens (1985) notes, in these cases the position of the national language was so long since secured that it appeared natural, the inevitable result of the superior fitness of those languages for the modern world, and language conflict is confined to nation-states which have been inadequately structured to meet the challenge of modernity. It is because of that, or at least partly, that the idea of state-sponsored multiculturalism does not figure in the western European tradition according to one recent historical and geographical framework employed to illustrate the configuration of the identity of Europe (see Figure 5). This ghost of competition, in this context, is most visible along the interface of the various dominant national unitary states in modern Europe. This comprises both borderland regions where the boundaries of such states actually meet, such as the Pyrenees, and also the geo-political spaces between such states filled by smaller nation-states, such as the region between France and Germany (see Figure 6). This interface includes the bilingual areas of modern western Europe as identified by Williams (1988) (see Map 2).

The idea of this interface also applies to the other parts of Europe. At one point in this interface, in south-eastern Europe, three continental Empires, the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire meet. Here, one may perceive the interplay between language, identity and conflict in less ghostly apparel, but also the attempt to reduce the conflict in that region to that ghost of competition which characterises the dominant nation-states of that time. With the collapse of all of the three Imperial polities as a result of war and revolution and the subsequent power vacuum in this region in the immediate aftermath of the First World War the notion of linguistic nationalism is applied, with success, by Serbian nationalists. This follows a period of intermittent nationalist unrest in the region, particularly in the period from 1879 up until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, set against a background of the declining capacity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire to manage affairs there as they once did in the past (Bideleux, 1998; McCarthy, 2001; Weiner, 1982).

The mapping of language in the area known as Macedonia by the Serb geographer Jovan Cvijic is shown by Wilkinson (1951) to play a crucial role in successfully furthering Serbian territorial claims during the negotiations at the Versailles peace conference. In a series of ethnographic maps



Figure 5 Europe's cultural circles: an interpretation
Adapted from Davies, 1997: 1238)

produced by Cvijic between 1906 and 1918 the Serbian claims to increasing amounts of territory were justified through the identification of ethnolinguistic groups as Serb. The innovation of the Macedo-Slav for the people of Macedonia disguised their part-Bulgarian identity to the American, British and French brokers of the peace talks and the reduction of their tongue to a dialect of Serbo-Croat enabled their incorporation into a greater Serbian nation as Serbs. Following the Second World War, Macedonia was included within the territory of a reconstructed



Figure 6 East–West fault lines in Europe

Adapted from Davies, 1997: 18



Map 2 State building in Europe: tensions and processes

Adapted from Williams, 1988: 98

Yugoslavia and, for many commentators, was notable for the apparent absence of ethnic tensions (Friedman, 1982). Recently, moreover, in comparison with the other polities which emerged from the wreckage of the former Yugoslavia in 1992, Macedonia was regarded as a stable democratic entity in which only the ghost of ethno-linguistic competition could be perceived (Burg, 1997). The most recent political vicissitudes in the region, however, have uncovered the limitations of this view (Daftary, 2000; Human Rights Watch World Report, 2001) and also further exposed the very limited capacity of the modern-nation-state as an effective framework for realising the political expression of ethnic and cultural plurality.

Language, conceptual communities and globalisation

Processes relating to the reconfiguration of relationships between nation and state are to be seen across all of Europe, notably from the 1960s in western Europe and post-1989 in central and eastern Europe. Some commentators assert that the nation-state, in the context of the emergence of post-industrial society in the west, is both too small and too big (Bell, 1976 and 1989). The argument is that the nation-state is too small to effect for example the critical economic issues relating to the rise of global capitalism or the matter of global environmental degradation; the nation-state is too big to engage in a meaningful manner with issues which are of principal concern to local communities. This is a crisis for the state rather than for the nation. Guattari, writing in 1989 prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, also suggests that it is a crisis of the state and indicates that this has profound implications for the idea of the nation as a modern political project as well:

> It must be stressed that this promotion of existential values [e.g. deterritorialized nationalities which contrast, according to Guattari, with the cases of both the Irish and the Basques] and the value of desire will not present itself as a fully-fledged alternative. It will result from widespread shifts in current value systems and from the appearance of new poles of valorization. In this respect it is significant that, over the last few years, the most spectacular social changes have resulted from precisely these kinds of long-term shifts; on a political level in the Philippines or Chile, for example, or on a nationalarity level in the USSR.
>
> (Guattari, 2000: 65–66)

Phillipson notes (1999: 97) that in Europe 'new forms of political and cultural devolution and autonomy are being devised' and that these reorientations; 'are leading to new forms of postnational identity . . . at individual, group and state levels'. The contemporary reformulation, for some decline, of the nation-state – a key feature of postmodernism – and the construction of a variety of alternative polities across Europe indicate the rethinking of the role of language in national identity as defined by modern nation-state in particular and the reconfiguration of relationships between language, identity and conflict in general. Responses to the challenge of postmodernity via the nation-state amount to a sophisticated decoupling of nation from state characterised, on the one hand, by processes of devolution and decentralisation to accommodate charges that the nation-state fails to engage with local communities and, on the other hand, by deepening European integration to meet the challenges of globalisation. These various processes are not uncontested and, indeed, contain within them contradictory tensions. As a result other responses

which are not articulated via the nation-state include a reinvigorated ethno-nationalism and a loose coalition of anti-capitalists and self-styled eco-warriors. The nature of the shift away from the nation-state may be understood through an examination of the contemporary interlock between the related concepts of civic and ethnic nationalism. These complexities are distinctively manifest in the UK, and currently figure prominently in debates relating to the devolutionary agenda. For example, with regard to Wales some commentators contend that:

> The challenge for the National Assembly for Wales will be to both embody and imbue a sense of national identity which can incorporate all those living in Wales. Given the heterogeneous nature of the Welsh population this must inevitably be a civic identity based on identification with institutions and place, and the values they represent, rather than ethnic markers such as place of birth and ancestry.
>
> (Jones and Trystan, 1999: 90)

For Northern Ireland [NI] one commentator claimed that the newly devolved institutions were designed to fulfil a specific function; 'The intention of these structures is to move our conflict away from the blood-lines of ethnicity to the lifelines of human rights' (Attwood, 2001). With regards to Scotland, some commentators on the one hand contend that; 'there is no reason to think that the Scottish Parliament is primarily about articulating a sense of Scottishness' (Surridge and McCrone, 1999: 51), others argue that the greater sense of Scottish national identity is part of the reason so many Scots voted in favour of having a Parliament for Scotland: 'In part, the contrast in the outcome of the two referendums (in Wales and Scotland) does reflect differences in the pattern of national identity in the two countries. Scots are indeed more likely to think of themselves as a nation that is distinct from the rest of the UK' (Curtice, 1999: 142). This interlock is studied in detail here in relation to language issues in NI but the themes and tensions which are uncovered carry a more universal significance. These include in particular the emergence of novel forms of nationalism, along with the parallel manifestation of an essentialist reflex among other nationalists, and the diffusion of nation-state sovereignty. The complexity of these changes means that the modern geo-political template indicating the prevalence of conflict at the interface of extensive polities is inadequate for the mapping of contemporary relationships between language, identity and conflict.

Language and ethnic identity in Northern Ireland

It has been noted many times that language has played an important rôle in the development of nationalist rhetoric in Ireland, Scotland and Wales during the modern period. Davies, for example, states that; 'From the

early nineteenth century onwards, language has assumed a repertoire of new roles in modern society that was at best latent in former times . . . language has become a vehicle for new forms of national consciousness, in particular for contemporary national movements' (Davies, 1999: 964). Because of this engagement between nationalist separatism and the other languages of Britain, Davies identifies the politics of the Celtic languages in this period as a centrifugal force to be countered by the British state (Davies, 1999: 963–979). The case of the Welsh language illustrates the point, for example; 'The [Welsh] language remains the toughest element in the national personality, the rallying cry of the most stubborn defenders, the springboard of the most successful counter attacks . . . A language is also far more than a means of expression: it is a way of thinking and feeling, even a way of life' (Edwards *et al.*, 1968: 221). With regard to the Irish language, Boyce notes that; 'The driving force behind the Gaelic Revival was nationalism, for it was nationalism that rescued the language from mere antiquarianism to become a powerful political force' (Boyce, 1991: 238). Closer regard to the contemporary socio-political landscape in NI reveals that the modern historical relationships between language and national identity are being subtly transformed.

The Irish language has not been the subject of substantial interest in NI, political or otherwise, until very recently. Concern has been expressed at the politicisation of language matters, as some national politicians seek to align themselves with the Irish language in an exclusive manner and other Unionist politicians seek to adopt the language of Ulster-Scots as their own language in reaction (Mac Póilin, 1998, 1999). Claims have been made that contemporary attitudes to the language amongst Protestants and Unionists have been determined, negatively, by the events of the early part of the century (King, 1997). To support the argument, data from the 1991 Census can be cited which confirms very low levels of engagement with the Irish language on the part of Protestants, almost 90 per cent of Irish-speakers having returned themselves as Roman Catholics. However, it is far from the case that language issues in the region reinforce the traditional cleavages in society in NI. There are very powerful structural reasons for the low incidence of Irish-speaking amongst Protestants, in particular the absence of the Irish language from the curriculum of the state (almost wholly Protestant) educational system in the region, and in the very low status afforded the language by the former government of NI seated at Stormont (Andrews, 1991 and 1997).

Other sources actually point to a depth and variety of interest in the language amongst Protestants and Unionists. This includes members of the middle-class (Glendinning, 1994), some with connections with loyalist paramilitary organisations (Smith, 1994), and also an all-female group of adult learners in the Protestant working-class enclave of the Shankill in Belfast (Lá, 24 November 1994). A social attitudes survey found that 23 per cent of Protestants agreed that the Irish language should be a

compulsory part of the curriculum of secondary schools (Stringer and Robinson, 1991). Other sources indicate the success in educational initiatives in the fields of Cultural Heritage and Education for Mutual Understanding arising from the Education Reform Order (NI) 1989 in raising awareness and enabling a positive engagement with aspects of Irish culture including the Irish language in schools from across the traditional divides in the region (Smith and Robinson, 1996: 82 and Farren, 1996: 61).

Writing before the political agreement of 1998, Ned Thomas suggested that the Irish language transcended some of the traditional cleavages in society in NI in so far as it was 'a uniting factor at the level of nationality', noting also however that it was 'a divisive one at the level of ideology' (Thomas, 1995: 120). The complexity of identifications that Protestants and Unionists make with the Irish language has yet to be fully unravelled, but research by McCoy (1997) among learners of the Irish language in this particular section of the community suggests that they identify with the language in a general sense as a part of their heritage, a feature of their sense of being in Ireland. It would appear to be the case that members of the middle-class perceive this heritage as something which they share in a cultural or a regional sense with the rest of the community in NI, without compromising their sense of Britishness. Those belonging to the working-class, however, see the Irish language as a means of authenticating a sense of Ulster identity. Some others identified themselves as Irish and nationalist.

While complexities of identity are not new amongst Protestants in Ireland in the modern period (Smyth, 1993), recent sociological surveys reveal an ongoing and significant process of change with regards to national identity amongst Protestants (Table 1). In 1968 20 per cent of Protestants identified themselves as Irish, by 1978 the figure had dropped to 8 per cent, and by 1986 it was 3 per cent. Proportions of Protestants who related to a sense of Ulster identity are also seen to shrink in this period. While adherence to British and Irish national identity remains

Table 1 National identity in Northern Ireland, 1968–1989 (%)

	1968		*1978*		*1986*		*1989*	
	Prot.	*Cath.*	*Prot.*	*Cath.*	*Prot.*	*Cath.*	*Prot.*	*Cath.*
Irish	20	69	8	69	3	61	3	60
British	39	15	67	15	65	9	68	8
Ulster	32	5	20	6	14	1	10	2
British/Irish	6	3	3	8	4	7	–	–
Anglo-Irish	2	1	2	2	–	–	–	–
Northern Irish	–	–	–	–	11	20	16	25

Source: Adapted from Whyte, 1990.

consistently high amongst Protestants and Catholics respectively, increasing proportions from across the religious divide identify themselves as Northern Irish.

Similar adjustments of identity are to be seen with regards to the Irish language and Irish national identity. Data from several surveys would suggest that the early twentieth century link between the Irish language and a separatist national identity is being eroded. The results of the national surveys on language in the Republic of Ireland, conducted in 1973, 1983 and 1993, indicate a consistently lower level of ethnic regard for the language as a symbol of a rigorous and distinctive Irish national identity (Ó Riagâin and Ó Gliasâin, 1984, 1994). Research from NI in particular would reinforce this view of a relationship undergoing transformation. The results of work amongst Roman Catholic learners of the Irish language led Northover and Donnelly to assert that the acquisition of the language is not driven by an enhanced sense of Irish national identity they state that; 'those who do not learn Irish are not essentially different in their self-perception of ethnic identification from learners' (Northover and Donnelly, 1996: 45). This dislocation of the Irish language from other markers of Irish national identity and its repositioning with regards British national identity makes clear the complexity of contemporary transformations in this field. Moreover, in this context the Irish language has an important rôle to play in transcending traditional divisions in society in NI as the meanings of British and Irish national identity are adjusted to the new political realities of devolution.

Language and civic identity in Northern Ireland

For the nation-state, a single official and national language serves as the most efficient medium of realising the bureaucratic integration of the citizenry. For modern Britain, the English language fulfilled this function, thereby denying the possibility of a civic identity for the Celtic languages of the state. The institutional restructuring of the state in Britain opens up fresh possibilities in this matter. The Parliament in Scotland and the Assemblies in NI and in Wales will give new expression to the identities of these regions and in this respect language will, as a traditional marker of group identity, have important functions to fulfil in both policy and planning contexts. Moreover, language policy in the devolved institutions of NI, Scotland and Wales is most likely to impact further on the issues of politics and identity. In the light of the broader socio-political context in which devolution is taking place the resultant changes may be dramatic. In this evolving context the Irish language in NI should not be seen as a centrifugal force within the new polities but to operate with considerable complexity in relation to the contemporary interlock of ethnic and civic forms of nationalism.

In the document known simply as 'The Agreement' (NIO, 1998) it is clear that many of the values which the new institutional arrangements

aspire towards are couched in the language of rights and equality. The detail of the text shows that very many of the values relate directly to the European Convention on Human Rights. It is equally clear that the new institutions will be in a position to newly define certain rights which reflect the particulars of NI and that it is anticipated that such rights will relate to the root causes of the conflict in the region (NIO, 1998: 16–17). In other sections of the text it is transparent that issues of identity are at the heart of the political conflict in NI. For example, under the important opening section *Constitutional Issues* the signatories of the document agree that they will:

> Recognise the birthright of all the people of NI to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change in the status of NI.
>
> (NIO, 1998: 27–29)

Moreover, issues of ethnic and cultural identities are formulated in 'The Agreement' in relation to the Irish language. Thus, under the section entitled *Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity. Economic, Social and Cultural Issues* it is stated that:

> All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in NI, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland.
>
> (NIO, 1998: 19)

The document continues in Clause 4 to outline a series of commitments on the part of the British government to the Irish language in the region in the domains of education, administration and the broadcast media. The likelihood of these commitments being realised has since been strengthened by the undertaking of the British government to sign the Council of Europe Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Ultimately much will depend upon the good will of the local politicians elected to serve the Assembly in NI, an institution which will have a Unionist majority.

Despite the long historical interest of Protestants and Unionists in the Irish language in Ireland, the issue was divisive in the key period in modern Irish history during which both NI and the Irish Free State (latterly the Republic of Ireland) were created. The capture of the leadership of *Conradh na Gaeilge* [the Gaelic League] by militant Irish nationalists in 1915 drew the language firmly into the political arena as an important

part of the nationalist agenda. The subsequent elevation of the Irish language to the status of the national language and first official language[1] was justified on the grounds that the language, while not a substantial feature of the sociolinguistic reality of the new state, was a critical signifier of national identity for the Irish people, Irish-speaking or otherwise (Ó Murchú, 1992: 489).

Aspects of the commitments to the Irish language on the part of the UK government in 'The Agreement' (NIO, 1998) reflect concerns which are informed by a top-down (Kaplan, 1989) approach to language planning. The statements in relation to the domains of education, public administration and the broadcast media (NIO, 1998: 19–20) anticipate, to some extent, macro-level language planning. That said, given the heterogeneous ethnic geography of NI (Graham, 1997: 200–201), whereby Catholics, Protestants, Irish-speakers and non-Irish-speakers are unevenly distributed throughout the region and attitudes towards the Irish language fluctuate in large part in relation to this variegated sociocultural landscape (Mac Giolla Chríost, 2001), it is rightly anticipated in 'The Agreement' that the implementation of much of government policy would not be effective were it largely driven by a top-down, state-centred approach. Instead, it is stated that language planning activity will take place with regard to 'the desires and sensitivities of the community' (NIO, 1998: 20) and in locations 'where people so desire it' (NIO, 1998: 19) thus inviting engagement with language issues in local communities.

Irish language policy, as framed in 'The Agreement', is intended to facilitate the broad socio-political goal of achieving the resolution of the conflict in NI (Mac Giolla Chríost, 2000). It is the case that fractious relationships between the state and the people governed by the state have been at the heart of this conflict (Whyte, 1990). In a general sense these tensions between the state and people, in which legitimacy and authority have been contested, are issues of power. It is rightly claimed (Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997: 195–215) that language planning impacts upon the reticulate mediation of power in society, this is especially the case in societies experiencing or coming out of ethnic conflict. Also, according to Kaplan and Baldauf, language planning activity will be most effective through engaging with the discourse of the speakers of the language being planned:

> Power is about the agency use of language planning for social, economic and political ends as opposed to the social aspects of discourse, the condition of language in actual use. To put it another way, while language can and will be planned, language planning is most effective when it is adopted as part of the discursive strategies of language users.
>
> (Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997: 196)

Language planning activity in NI must be informed by the discursive strategies of Irish language users in the region. O'Reilly notes the adoption of three discursive strategies by various individuals and organisations engaged with Irish language activity in NI, centering on the concepts of decolonisation, cultural identity and civil rights (O'Reilly, 1999). According to O'Reilly the discourse of decolonisation is to be most closely associated with Sinn Féin and the politics of traditional, Irish republicanism. This discourse has been overshadowed by the discourse of cultural identity in what O'Reilly describes as the public transcript of many Irish language activists and organisations, funding agencies and the British government. The predominance of this discourse is reflected in the partial institutionalisation of the language in this context as reflected in the form of UK government-funded bodies such as the Cultural Traditions Group and the Ultach Trust. Rights discourse is described as being as widespread in its adoption among Irish language activists and organisations as is cultural identity discourse. Part of its usefulness, it is claimed, lies in its suitability for fusion with either the discourse of cultural identity or that of decolonisation. It was not noted to be a feature of the public transcript, as O'Reilly puts it, of the UK government. Language planning activity should therefore engage with these discursive strategies, not on their own terms but in the context of the unfolding institutional and policy frameworks. The nature of the political agreement reached in NI in 1998 and the subsequent evolution of events have dramatically altered the place of the Irish language in the socio-political landscape of the region and also, the significance of the discursive strategies of Irish-speakers and government alike.

Part of the contemporary complexities with regard to language planning in NI is the revival of interest in Ulster-Scots [or Ullans], a dialect of the Scots language in Scotland which has been recognised by the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages as an official autochthonous lesser-used or regional language in NI. Mac Póilin (1998), writing in the period following the signing of the Agreement and prior to the drawing together of the Implementation Bodies Agreement (NIO, 1999), was concerned that the two languages would be drawn into the political landscape in such a way as they serve merely to reinforce traditional political tensions. The potential for the specific translation of the broader socio-political conflict in the region into domains of culture was first highlighted by Miller (1994). He noted the origins of such a shift in the late 1980s in relation to the work of the Community Relations Council. Summarising his line of argument very briefly, it appeared that the simple structuring of core cultural values in the institutional framework for the two main cultural traditions in NI would serve merely to reinforce the political divide as political representatives of the two traditions set crude measures of government support for their communities through the support given to project bids from cultural activists within their electorate.

The solution, as Miller saw it, lay in addressing issues of power: 'In the community relations approach all cultures are equal; in reality, some cultures are more equal than others' (Miller, 1994: 76). A recognition of this reality side-steps simplistic readings of parity of esteem (Ó Muirí, 1999). The fact of the incorporation of both the languages into the legislative framework communicates the parity of esteem afforded to them both in general terms, but the broader remit for the Irish language reflects the greater awareness of the Irish language across society as a whole in NI and the historical pressure in key domains.

The consociational coupling of the respective interests of the Irish language and the Ulster-Scots language under the Implementation Bodies Agreement carries with it the risk of affirming sectional interests in the languages and of institutionalising the political conflict. Through this agreement a cross-border implementation body for language, to be known as 'The North–South Language Body' (in Irish *An Foras Teanga*, in Ulster-Scots *Tha Boord o Leid*) is to be established (NIO, 1999: Article 1). The two separate parts of this body have the function of serving the interests of the two languages. The remit for the Irish language includes the promotion of the language in general, encouraging, facilitating and advising upon the use of the language in private and public domains, supporting Irish-medium education and undertaking research and the development of corpus status. This is also clearly set in the context of Part III of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (NIO, 1999: Part 5). The remit for Ulster-Scots is much narrower, being confined to the 'promotion of greater awareness of the use of Ullans and of Ulster Scots cultural issues, both within NI and throughout the island' (NIO, 1999: Part 5). The necessity of such action is reflected in the low status of Ulster-Scots and in the ambiguity surrounding its status as a distinct form of language at all (Kallen, 1999 and Montgomery, 1999).

The sections on the 'Exercise of Functions' and 'Structure' are critical in understanding the dynamics of *An Foras Teanga*. Two distinct agencies of the body will service the needs of the two languages. According to this legislation, 16 members with a perceived interest in the Irish language will be appointed to the board of *An Foras Teanga* by the North–South Ministerial Council (NSMC), the body with overall responsibility for the range of cross-border implementation bodies. These members will exercise the functions of the Irish language agency, and a Chairperson for the agency will be appointed by the NSMC from their number. The other eight members of the board of *An Foras Teanga*, including a Chairperson for the Ulster-Scots agency will be similarly appointed, due to their perceived interest in the affairs of Ulster-Scots. These two Chairpersons will serve as joint Chairpersons of *An Foras Teanga*.

The institutional suture in which the two languages find themselves may well serve to foster co-operation between representatives of the two languages and to arrest the potential for competition between these

groups, thereby decreasing the vulnerability of both of the languages to inimical political interest. Favell and Martiniello (1999), in a discussion of the governance of Brussels, highlight some of the possibilities in such systems. The inherent advantage of consociationalism is described as follows:

> Whilst the consociational elements of Belgian politics perpetuate a situation of permanent 'crisis' and potential gridlock between two rival linguistic communities, it also ensures that progress is only made at the mutual benefit of both parties and is never zero-sum.
>
> (Favell and Martiniello, 1999: 9–10)

The potential risk of the complete internalisation within élite organisations of decision-making and the resultant distancing from popular participation is a matter of concern. The multi-levelled feature of the proposed structure of governance for NI must have a critical rôle to play in this. This feature includes a number of proposed new institutions – the NI Assembly, the North–South Implementation Bodies, the North–South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council and would anticipate working relationships with existing local polities. For *An Foras Teanga* the translation of macro-policy on the Irish language to micro-levels across NI requires that a local hurdle be overcome on the measurement of local demands and sensitivities. That said, it is in this complex interlocking and overlapping of powers and competencies that Favell and Martiniello see further opportunities that will produce:

> [D]ifferent kinds of access points for actors and the expression of interests, which also widen the potential forms of interest representation and aggregation, enabling new forms of non-traditional and unconventional political activity to find a place and take root.
>
> (Favell and Martiniello, 1999: 9)

Thus, those promoting the interests of Ulster-Scots could forge energising linkages with the Scots language community in Scotland. Likewise, the dynamics of the Irish-speaking community in NI could be informed by conceptions of an island-wide Irish-speaking population characterised by regional and local variations in the nature of the different Irish-speaking communities in NI and in the Republic of Ireland and also, within and outwith the *Gaeltacht*. Such structures would also be a useful vehicle for the operation of informed connections with Celtic-speaking communities elsewhere in the UK. In this way a new space may be opened up for the political expression of cultural plurality in NI through the institutionalisation of language as a marker of both ethnicity and citizenship. The mapping out of this space, however, will remain problematic. In some ways the contestation of public space in NI, into which the Irish language

has been drawn (Mac Giolla Chríost, 2000), is deeply embedded. It is suggested (Ruane and Todd, 1996: 194–195 and 202–203) that the historical experiences of conquest and colonisation have submerged native Irish cultural signifiers and that as a result Irish nationalists have to excavate, in Seamus Heaney's meaning of the word, the cultural landscape in order to trace their sense of identity in its structure and symbols. Unionists, it is argued, are determined that the public sphere appear and feel British and that this includes, among other things, the exclusion of the Irish language. Yet, as Nash (1999) points out in relation to the recent community-based projects on Irish language placenames in NI, one of those submerged cultural signifiers, this excavation is more complex than the traditional dichotomies of socio-political rhetoric in the region:

> Placenames can always be enlisted in essentialist articulations of identity, but what is so notable about contemporary approaches to them in Ireland is the expression of a critical but inclusive recuperation of located tradition.
>
> (Nash, 1999: 475)

Similarly, the progressive institutionalisation of the Irish and Ulster-Scots languages within the diffuse political framework which pertains to NI holds within it the potential to realise such an 'inclusive recuperation' of a greater magnitude.

Conclusions

In drawing these reticulate lines of thought together one can suggest that it is in the context of the contemporary relocation of civic and ethnic values in relation to the political institutions of innovative polities characterised by a diffusion of sovereignty that new spaces are being opened up for language in identity. The post-modern shifts that have so profoundly transformed European society and economy since the 1960s have, over more recent times, impacted greatly on political structures and ideological frameworks. Reflecting specifically on the short period 1989–1992, Ely characterised the moment of these changes in the following dramatic terms:

> One of those few times when fundamental political and constitutional changes, in complex articulation with social and economic transformation, are occurring on a genuinely European-wide scale, making this one of several great constitution-making periods of modern European history.
>
> (Ely, 1992: 390)

Citizenship is not constructed *ex nihilo*, it is not merely an abstraction but, to use Davies' words (1999: 1040), 'is granted by the state' and

reflects the various values of the state. For the modern nation-state these values have invariably been the values of the national community, popularly imagined or structurally conceived of in culturally homogenised terms. For contemporary Europeans such a formulaic view of citizenship is clearly inadequate. The development of new senses of citizenship would be better informed by the redefining of citizenship in relation to the cultural diversity of contemporary polities than through reference to the increasingly redundant frame of reference defined by the traditional European nation-state. In this way citizenship, which has social, political and cultural, as well as institutional expression (Rex, 1996), encompasses adherence to both institutions and also to the diversity of values that they must incorporate.

Note

1 *Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937* [*The Constitution of Ireland*], article 8.

6 Language and ethnic frontiers

Introduction

In many parts of contemporary Europe, language can be seen to transcend the socio-political and ethnic dichotomies which were so characteristic of modern relationships between language, identity and conflict. This is not to suggest the emergence of the 'still centre' sought after by some who meditate upon the troubled condition of much inter-ethnic contact. Rather, it is argued that this is, in part, the result of the different ethnic groups seeking identification with the language which facilitate and reinforce senses of belonging, place and authenticity. The closer analysis of these powerful identifications shows that the outline of such socio-cultural flows may be traced in the different parts of Europe. This includes novel adaptations in nationalist rhetoric, increasing fluidity in the nature of ethnic identity and a deepening culture-ideology dichotomy. Significant variations in relation to these developments are traced across Europe, highlighting in particular the influence of the post-Soviet reordering of society throughout eastern and central Europe.

Cultural flows

According to some, understanding the interplay of culture, community and institutions in societies in conflict is central to bringing about the end of conflict. For example, according to Ruane and Todd (1996), moving beyond the mere regulation of the conflict in NI towards its resolution requires the construction of a new sense of community based on civic rather than ethno-cultural criteria and that these would emerge in the course of negotiation and institutional reform. While some might be willing to accept that the agencies of government can intervene effectively in the domain of identity planning (Lamy, 1979) such intervention is likely to be less successful in societies in conflict. The momentum for changes in the nature of communal identity can only come from within the community itself, or at least be perceived as such, or be driven by other forces external to the conflict and all its players. Such forces appear

to be at work across contemporary Europe and language, despite vulnerability to the viscosity of political discourse, is playing a part in facilitating change of this nature.

Since the shattering of the modern matrix for ethnic and national identities, the focus of much academic enquiry in the field of ethnicity has shifted from the function of boundaries in the social organisation of ethnic groups. Instead, an increasing preoccupation with the transgression of boundaries, characterised as cultural flows, is emerging and ethnic identity is viewed as an overlapping and multidimensional phenomenon. Hannerz (2000: 6) reflects this perception of the declining value of the boundary as a tool for understanding contemporary ethnic group interaction as follows:

> We may recognize some of the difficulties with the notion of boundary, a sharp and more or less continuous demarcation line, when applied to the realities of cultural diversity, not least in the present.

Fresh conceptualisations of ethnicity identify frontiers, rather than boundaries, as best characterising the locale of contact between ethnic groups. The differing function of frontiers and boundaries is critical in understanding this contemporary re-fashioning of ethnic group identity. Ambivalence may be identified as the chief characteristic of the ethnic frontier or borderland; 'These latter, however, are terms not for sharp lines, but for zones, where one thing gradually shifts into something else, where there is blurring, ambiguity and uncertainty' (Hannerz, 2000: 9).

For our purposes it is useful to note both the shifts and the potential for the reconciliation of tension in this zone of postmodern ethnic contact. Since Barth (1969, 1998 reprint) conceived of ethnicity as the social organisation of cultural difference our understanding of how ethnic borders function to maintain senses of ethnic identity has deepened. Following Barth much of the attention given by academic enquirers to ethnic identity has focussed upon boundary-connected features of group identity. It is via these features that stable ethnic distinctions are sustained and this is done despite the transgression of borders by members of ethnic groups. This is characterised by Barth as; 'a dichotomization of others as strangers, as members of another ethnic group' (Barth, 1998: 15). According to Barth this allows us to understand a particular of boundary maintenance described as; 'situations of social contact between persons of different cultures' (Barth, 1998: 15–16) and that despite congruencies of culture in these situations there exists a structuring of interaction which sustains cultural difference. This understanding of ethnicity is grounded in a particular setting:

> These modern variants for poly-ethnic organisation emerge in a world of bureaucratic administration, developed communications, and pro-

> gressive urbanisation. Clearly, under radically different circumstances, the critical factors in the definition and maintenance of ethnic boundaries would be different.
>
> (Barth, 1998: 35–36)

Contemporary socio-political fractures suggest these new circumstances. In another recent work, Barth (1984) identifies an amorphous mechanism, idealised as a current in a unifying river, at work in relationships between ethnic groups. This allows one to focus on congruencies as well as dichotomies across ethnic group identities:

> Whereas my effort until now has been to emphazise the search for distinctions, for the fuller delimitation of the contradictions of pluralism, any closer and fuller analysis forces us to acknowledge the relativity of these boundaries, or rather the interpenetration and constant interchange implicit in the imagery of currents.
>
> (Barth, 1984: 83)

Barth concludes with a plea for new departures in the examination of cultural plurality and the process of change within the context of the locality, the community and beyond. According to Barth, the key points of reference in this are with regard to social organisation, distribution in space, history and prospects and within this the issues of socio-cultural reproduction, shifting historical contexts, diaspora and boundary crossings all carry significance in locating language in this approach to plurality. Contextualising the idea of frontier in relation to ethnic identity engages with Barth's idea of ethnicity as the social organisation of culture but it also moves our understanding of plurality forward. The frontier as a dynamic, fluid and ambiguous space, sits in contrast to the inherently conservative nature of the linear border. This frontier can be said to structure the ethnic interactions in a very different manner to boundaries, across which ethnic dichotomies are defined and sustained despite cultural commonalities. Rather, the frontier is to be perceived as a zone in which ethnic identities are negotiated and reformulated and that transformations in the nature of a form of ethnic identity are realised. According to Barth, in this process the critical mechanism is for the meaningful depiction of the complexity of cultural patterns in plural societies is an amorphous flow, characterised in part by its ambiguity. In his appeal for fresh, more relevant concepts he argues:

> Such concepts should serve to emphasize properties both of separability and interpenetration, suggested perhaps by an imagery of streams, or currents within a river: distinctly there, powerful in transporting objects and creating whirlpools, yet only relative in their distinctiveness and ephemeral in their unity.
>
> (Barth, 1984: 80)

Language has a privileged function in transformations in the nature of ethnic identity and it is to this in particular that we now turn our attention.

In the case of NI, Ruane and Todd (1996: 59 and 71) regard the Northern Irish sense of identity to be of particular significance. They contend that Northern Irish identifiers perceive greater degrees of cultural overlap between Britain and Ireland in the region of NI and are sensitive to British, Irish and European dimensions to their identity. Trew, in a further examination of the Northern Irish sense of identity, asserts that; 'the Northern Irish identity is being used by the young, the educated and the middle class. It is particularly widely used by well educated young Protestants' (Trew, 1998: 66). In the same survey data on identity preferences are cross-tabulated with stated constitutional and political preferences. This exercise showed that Northern Irish identifying Catholics did not vary significantly from other Catholics in their disposition towards Irish nationalist aspirations. Similarly, Northern Irish identifying Protestants did not vary significantly in their disposition towards unionist aspirations. In other words, the Northern Irish sense of identity unites at the level of culture but divides at the level of ideology. This echoes an observation made by Thomas that the Irish language in NI appeared to be 'a uniting factor at the level of nationality', but, 'a divisive one at the level of ideology' (Thomas, 1995: 120). Similar adjustments of identity are to be seen with regards the Irish language and Irish ethnic identity.

Data from several surveys would suggest that the early twentieth-century link between the language and a separatist nationalist identity is being eroded. The results of national surveys on language in the Republic of Ireland, conducted in 1973, 1983 and 1993, indicate a consistently lower level of ethnic regard for the language as a symbol of a rigorous and distinctive Irish identity (Ó Riagáin and Ó Gliasáin, 1984, 1994). This dislocation of the Irish language from other markers of Irish identity and its repositioning with regards Northern Irish and British identifiers makes clear the complexity of contemporary transformations in this field. The results of recent research (Mac Giolla Chríost, 2001) on the Irish language in NI indicate an intricacy of attitudes towards the Irish language across the community as a whole and particularly so amongst Protestants. The data suggest that Catholics and Protestants hold the language in the same general regard. A majority of both Catholics and Protestants disagreed with the statement *'The Irish language should be discarded and forgotten'*. Similarly, majorities of both Catholics and Protestants disagreed with the statement *'In order to be truly Irish one must be able to speak Irish'*. Taken together, these responses strongly suggest that Protestant regard for the language is more positive than the politics of the language would lead one to believe. They also suggest that the language is not commonly perceived as an exclusive indicator of Irish ethnicity. Beyond this platform deeper complexities may be perceived as Catholic and Protestant attitudes

diverge significantly in relation to other statements specific to perceptions of communal and self-identity. The statement *'The Irish language belongs to all the people in Northern Ireland'* met with overwhelming agreement amongst Catholics. While around one in three of Protestants from both age groups surveyed concurred, around one quarter felt otherwise and of these almost one in every three disagreed strongly that the language was owned by all the people in NI. The statement *'The Irish language is an important part of my heritage'* met with higher levels still of agreement amongst Catholics with an overwhelming majority expressing very strong agreement with the statement. The largest proportion of Protestants, almost half, very strongly disagreed with the statement, although a significant minority (around 19 per cent) agreed that the Irish language was an important part of their heritage.

The data from this particular study allow for inferences to be drawn with regard to relationships between the Irish language and a number of forms of ethnic identity in NI. Substantial numbers of respondents returned themselves as British, Irish or Northern Irish. Variations in attitude towards the Irish language can be read across these identity types. Irish identifiers may be characterised by their clear support for the Irish language across a wide range of issues. Northern Irish identifiers, including significant proportions of both Catholics and Protestants in their numbers, tend to concur with Irish identifiers in their regard for the Irish language while they are more divided in their responses to specific policy issues such as the broadening of the place of the language in the education system. British identifiers, almost exclusively Protestant, are characterised by their ambiguity towards the language. For example, they were very evenly divided in their responses to the statement '*The Irish language should be discarded and forgotten*' and, in contrast to Irish and Northern Irish identifiers, tended to agree that the Irish language should be preserved only in the *Gaeltacht*. They were divided as to whether the Irish language belonged to all the people of NI but were rather more definite in asserting that it wasn't a part of their individual heritage. Despite these variations it its none the less significant that clear majorities of British, Irish and Northern Irish identifiers disagreed with the statement '*In order to be truly Irish one must be able to speak Irish*' thereby rejecting linguistically exclusive definitions of Irish identity.

Research in other parts of Europe, such as the *Països Catalans,* reinforces this perception. Immigrants from Spain to Catalonia are shown to display considerable facility in acquiring a Catalan dimension to their identity and that some acquisition of the Catalan language is instrumental in this (Romaní and Strubell i Trueta, 1999 and Strubell i Trueta, 1984). In North Catalonia a sense of dual identity (French-Catalan) has been noted by some commentators (Marley, 1993 and O'Brien, 1993). This duality is said to be at its most prevalent amongst older members of the Catalan-speaking community and that this is a because of their enculturation by the French

state. It is also clearly manifest among younger respondents who see the language as reinforcing of their *catalanitat*, that is, their sense of being Catalan. The identification they make with France is with the apparent cosmopolitan cultural values of the French metropolitan rather than as political citizens of the French state. Finally, an overlap of identities is clear from the data derived from a recent survey among Catalan-speakers in Majorca (Euromosaic: Catalan in Majorca). Almost all respondents (93 per cent) express a very strong sense of regional identity – *mallorquí*, as well as relating to Spanish, Balearic and Catalan dimensions to their identity.

An overlap of identities in the Basque Country can be read from the 1996 survey data irrespective of attitudes towards the language (EJ:GV, 1999). This overlap varies significantly across the Basque Country. For example, in the Northern Basque Country seven per cent of respondents describe themselves as only Basque, 30 per cent as only French and 59 per cent as both Basque and French. The highest proportions of French-identifiers are to be found among immigrants and non-Basque-speakers, although 41 per cent of immigrants and 52 per cent of non-Basque-speakers consider themselves to be both Basque and French. This duality is at its most prevalent among native (75 per cent), Basque-speakers (72 per cent) and passive Basque-French bilinguals (75 per cent). In the BAC, 32 per cent of respondents describe themselves as both Basque and Spanish. Only eight per cent were returned as simple Spanish-identifiers (EJ:GV, 1999: 26–27).

As with the Northern Basque Country, identity appears to be related to both the origins of the respondents and their linguistic profile. In this case the greatest proportions of dual Basque-Spanish identifiers are to be found among immigrants (62 per cent) and those natives with immigrant parents (64 per cent). Most natives (56 per cent) consider themselves to be simply Basque although a substantial minority (38 per cent) identify themselves as both Basque and Spanish. This duality relates to the language profile of the respondents. Proportions of dual-identifiers are greater among passive bilinguals (55 per cent) and monolingual Spanish-speakers (65 per cent) than they are among Basque-speakers (18 per cent).

The data from Navarre reflect the greater complexities of identity in the province (EJ:GV, 1998). An overwhelming majority of respondents (86 per cent) consider themselves to be Navarran and of those, 45 per cent also identified themselves as Basque. Basque-Navarran-identifiers are most dominant in the northern part of Navarre, in the Basque-speaking (80 per cent) and bilingual or mixed zones (56 per cent). A minority of respondents (18 per cent) in the southern and non-Basque-speaking zones share this duality of identity. Finally, only 11 per cent of immigrants in Navarre identify themselves as being Basque in any sense. Read as a whole, the evidence from the various parts of the Basque Country serves to

underline Douglass' observation regarding the myriad dimensions to relationships between language, identity and place in the western Pyrenees.

Contemporary nationalist rhetoric and ethnicity

Adaptations in nationalist rhetoric coincide with changing conceptualisations of ethnic identity. Certain patterns can be discerned in this unfolding landscape of language, identity and conflict. In Corsica, for example, recent anthropological studies have hinted at some duality of French-Corsican identity (McKechnie, 1993). This has been confirmed by the results of the most substantial and academically rigorous survey to date on the Corsican language on the island. The data are derived entirely from a survey population with some knowledge of Corsican. The results indicate that in relation to ethnic identity and attitudes towards the language very few respondents (less than one per cent) claimed an exclusively French identity. Around 37 per cent claimed an exclusive Corsican identity. The greatest proportion of respondents, at just over 50 per cent, claimed a joint French-Corsican identity. The results of the survey (Euromosaic: Corsican language use survey) also show that the overwhelming majority of respondents (68 per cent) agreed that *'Corsica would not be Corsica without Corsican-speaking people'* thereby locating the language at the heart of the identity of Corsica in a general way. This sentiment enjoys considerable currency beyond the island and appears to be the key signifier of Corsican ethnic identity.[1]

Unfortunately, the survey does not allow for more sophisticated insights to be drawn with regard the closer relationship between speaking Corsican and being Corsican and the role of the language in political discourse. That said, it is claimed in a related report that:

> A social and cultural revival of the Corsican language has been underway for some twenty years, helped by the fact that certain nationalist movements operating on the political stage have seized upon these linguistic aspirations.
>
> (Corsican in France, 1 September 1999, http://www.uoc.es/euromosaic)

Thus, it was as a result of the pressure of nationalist parties that the Deixonne Act was extended to Corsica in 1974, signifying the recognition of Corsican as a language by the French state for the first time. Similarly, in 1983 the French government were obliged to perform a *volte face* and allow the Assembly for Corsica to implement the compulsory teaching of the language in the education system of the island. The significance of the language in Corsican nationalist discourse is clear from a motion of 1988 adopted by the Assembly at the behest of the nationalist parties:

> L'existence d'une communauté historique at culturelle vivante regroupant les Corse d'origine at les Corse d'adoption: le peuple corse. [The existence of a living cultural and historical community comprising the Corsicans by origin and the Corsicans by adoption: the Corsican people.]
>
> (*Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 1995 'La Corse, désespérément humaine, gagnée par la violence', p. 16)

The openness of Corsican identity implicit in this statement is borne out to a degree in the extent to which French/Corsican identifiers are engaged with the language. While the results of the Euromosaic survey show that Corsican-speakers themselves are divided as to whether non-Corsicans are positively engaged with the language, they are felt to have more positive attitudes than central government and the Church.

It is the case that Corsican nationalists have been accused of linguistic tokenism, of manipulating the language for purely political purposes (e.g. *Le Monde*, 5 July 1996) and that despite many impressive declarations of intent it is suggested that many Corsican-speakers feel that little has actually been done for the language (Euromosaic: Corsican in France). Some commentators have long held the view that a significant change in the fortunes of the Corsican language could only be brought about in the context of a transformation of the political culture of the French state in general (Marcellesi, 1979: 76). Since the early 1980s French national politics have been increasingly characterised by more plural attitudes in relation to the cultural and linguistic diversity of *l'Hexagone* (Laroussi and Marcellesi, 1993: 97–98). The current socialist government has expressed positive intentions towards the signing of the European Charter for Lesser Used or Regional Languages, although progress towards this goal has been slowed by constitutional concerns. Most recently, discussions between the French government and the elected political representatives of Corsica have reached an agreement on further reforms to the government of the island, variously described as *les accords de Matignon* or *le processus de Matignon*. If implemented, the commitments to the Corsican language outlined in the proposals for reform would serve to further reinforce the language.[2] Moreover, this present approach to the Corsican question is set to transform the nature of the French state, something which has given rise to political tensions at the heart of government in Paris:

> Le Gouvernement est favorable à ce que les langues régionales retrouvent ou développent leur vitalité. L'apprentissage de la langue française par tous a été un élément important de constitution de l'unité nationale; aujourd'hui c'est aussi la richesse que représente la diversité de notre patrimonie linguistique qu'il faut préserver. C'est dans cet esprit que le Gouvernement était favorable à la ratification

> préalable par la France de la charte européenene des langues régionales et minoritaires, qui nécessite une révision constitutionnelle préalable que le président de la République ne souhaite pas engager. [The Government is favourably disposed to the regional languages rediscovering or developing their vitality. The learning of the French language by all has been an important element of the make-up of national unity; today it is also the richness which characterises the diversity of our linguistic patrimony which must be preserved. It is in this spirit that the Government was in favour of the preliminary ratification of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, which necessitates a preceding constitutional revision which the President of the Republic does not wish to commit to.]
>
> (p. 7 in 'Propositions pour la Corse' at http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/ 7 February 2000)

That these tensions have included the resignation of the Interior Minister serves to indicate the fragile nature of the Matignon process. Daftary (2000b: 48–49) highlights a number of significant obstacles to the process including political divisions within the French government, political divisions within Corsica, the widespread corruption of an entrenched local élite and the prospect of the renewal of political violence. Despite these obstacles Daftary suggests that the sense of crisis which currently characterises both the French state and French national identity is driving the process of change towards a goal which may have profound implications for France:

> These events might signal the end of the era of the single institutional model and increased openness to novel solutions, including a subject long considered taboo and contrary to the founding principles of the French Republic: autonomy.
>
> (Daftary, 2000b: 51)

A scholarly analysis of the specific constitutional significance of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages for France seeks to demonstrate that the signing of the charter does not entail constitutional change as the preamble to the document conceives of a European cultural patrimony as well as national cultural patrimonies, rich in their linguistic diversity. Accordingly the various other languages of France can be viewed a parts of an indivisible French national cultural patrimony:

> Ce qui invite la République française à reconnaître les langues de la France, comme éléments du patrimonie culturel national. [It is this which invites the French Republic to recognise the languages of France, as elements of the national cultural patrimony.]
>
> (Cerquiglini, 2000: 1)

Where questions do arise is in relation to the ratification of part three of the charter whereby a range of commitments are to be undertaken by the government on behalf of the regional or minority languages found within its national territory. Beyond the complexities of giving careful attention to the detail of such commitments in the context of the whole of the French state – *France métropolitaine*, *Départements d'Outre Mér* and *Territoires d'Outre Mér*, it is suggested that the most profound issues may very well be with regards immigrants to France, the status of their own different languages and their integration as citizens of the French state:

> Il conviendrait sans doute de réactualiser le dispositif, dès lors que certaines langues (le berbère et l'arabe dialectal, notamment) posent des questions nouvelles à l'intégration, dont l'enjeu reste fondamental. [It would be appropriate no doubt to bring the system up to date, since certain languages (Berber and dialectical Arabic, notably) pose new questions regarding integration, for which the stakes remain fundamental.]
>
> (Cerquiglini, 2000: 5)

The nature of these questions is such that it would entail, it is argued, the most comprehensive examination of the linguistic patrimony of France since the earliest construction of the Republic itself:

> La dernière grande enquête sur le patrimonie linguistique de la République, menée il est vrai dans un esprit assez différent, est celle de l'abbé Grégoire (1790–1792). [The last great enquiry into the linguistic patrimony of the Republic, conducted it is true in a quite different spirit, is that of Abbot Grégoire (1790–1792).]
>
> (Cerquiglini, 2000: 5)

Transformations in relationships between language and identity in the context of radical political restructuring may also be perceived in the Basque Country, straddling the West Pyrenean littoral. Basque ethnic identity is also characterised by its diversity. According to Douglass (1998) this diversity arises from the fact that Basque ethnic identity is configurated at a critical interstice of language and geography. *Euskadi*, or 'the place where the Basque-speakers dwell' is a construct of nineteenth century Basque nationalist rhetoric. Since then, the concept of the Basque country has occupied a place in the popular imaginative geography of the Basques. This country comprises seven different provinces, three in France and four in Spain. This territory is also the meeting point for two other languages, French and Spanish – hence Douglass (1998: 88) reads both multivocalities and multilocalities in this border landscape.

Perhaps the most clearly defined of these multiplicities is the case of Navarre, a province situated in Spain. In this province the post-Franco

political settlement has seen a revival of regional identity termed *navarissmo*. MacClancy (1993) claims that *navarissmo* functions largely in reaction to Basque nationalism and that when the latter is resurgent then the former is at its most vociferous. *Navarristas* emphasise the historical continuity of the province of Navarre, in particular its ancient administrative identity. In the medieval period Navarre was a foral territory, that is a territory with special fiscal rights granted by charter (*fuero*). Equally, *navarristas* stress the plurality of the identity of Navarre in linguistic, cultural and ethnic terms. For example, the Statutory Basque Language Law refers to both the Basque and Spanish languages as the 'natural languages' of Navarre.[3] The pre-eminence of language with regard cultural heritage and also the value of the plurality of languages of the province are also highlighted; 'For Communities such as Navarre, it is an honour to avail of a heritage of more than one language' (p. 1 Legal Framework: Statutory Basque Language Law, 6 May 1998, http://www.cfnavarra.es.htm). This diversity is reflected in the mosaic of language zones identified by the regional government of the Autonomous Community of Navarre. Certain zones are identified as Basque-speaking, non-Basque-speaking and bilingual. Support for the Basque language varies according to the type of linguistic zone. The Basque-speaking zones tend to be located in the northern and mountainous parts of Navarre and the non-Basque-speaking zones are situated in the low-lying alluvial plains of the south of the province. The *montañeros* and the *ribereños* are derived from this sociocultural dichotomy as popular stereotypes (MacClancy, 1993: 95).

As already noted, many in Navarre contend that their attitudes towards the Basque language and the idea of being Basque are a reaction to militant Basque nationalism. Historically speaking Basque nationalist rhetoric has been race-centred and exclusive (Douglass, 1998: 75–76). According to MacClancy (1996: 211) and Tejerina Montaña (1996: 222–225) this nineteenth century formulation of Basque nationalism was first reworked in the 1960s. In this period ETA [*Euskadi ta Askatasuna* – Basque Homeland and Freedom] was created and the language was adopted as the definitive symbol of Basque identity. Some note a further contemporary shift in this position:

> The Basque language in the main cultural prop, a besieged form of distinctiveness which must be maintained. Marrying nationalism and socialism, they define a Basque as someone who sells his labour in Basqueland. The point of this shift in definition is that it includes migrants from other parts of Spain.
>
> (MacClancy, 1993: 86)

This openness appears to some extent to be manifest among the immigrant population. The 1991 survey on the Basque language revealed that 64 per cent of immigrants to all parts of the Basque Country were in

agreement with the statement *'Es imprescindible que todos los niños aprendan euskera'* [It is necessary that all children learn the Basque language] (EJ:GV, 1995: 286). The regional government of Navarre notes from the same body of survey data increasingly favourable attitudes towards the Basque language throughout the province and especially so amongst younger sections of the population in the Basque-speaking zones. The shift is less marked in the non-Basque-speaking zones though noteworthy nonetheless.[4] It is also noted that the most substantial area of growth for the language is with regard to passive bilinguals and that the largest decline is in the proportion of monolingual Spanish-speakers.[5] In the Basque Autonomous Community [BAC] (comprising the territories of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa) this evolution in attitude is similarly reflected. In the BAC the Basque language enjoys considerable institutional support throughout the territory. Adopting from the Catalan model, the regional government has succeeded in implementing positive and pro-active policy and planning initiatives while seeing, at the same time, increasingly plural attitudes towards the Basque language. Such attitudinal change is especially prominent among the younger sections of the population.

The summary results for the second sociolinguistic survey for 1996 show that less plural attitudes with regard to the relationship between Basque ethnic identity and the ability to speak Basque were less widely held. The proportion in agreement with linguistically exclusive definitions of Basque identity fell from 41 per cent to 33 per cent. In contrast, in the Northern Basque Country, where no such policy and planning initiatives have been undertaken, attitudes towards the Basque language are rigidly polarised. For non-Basque-speakers of the population of the BAC the attraction in the Basque language appears not to lie in its potential ethnic significance nor in its instrumentality, although they are factors of attraction for some, but rather in the identification of the language with the Basque country; *'porque es la lengua del País Vasco'* [because it is the language of the Basque Country] (EJ:GV, 1997: 31). In other words, for those from non-Basque-speaking backgrounds the Basque language appears to facilitate an authentic, cultural engagement with their locality.

The primordial reflex

The disintegration of Soviet and Communist hegemony in central and eastern Europe and in Eurasia has exposed a set of relationships between language, identity and conflict which are, in some ways, at variance with the patterns highlighted in this text for western Europe. The dynamic nature of developments in this part of the area of study is best seen through reference to two texts drawn together by G. Smith, and published at either end of the 1990s (Smith (ed.), 1990 and *et al.* 1998). He notes that in post-Soviet Europe:

> [T]here is only limited evidence to suggest that the post-Soviet borderland states are on the threshold of entering such a post-national era in which national and ethnic identities have been superseded by understandings of cultural difference based on a broader and more inclusive vision of political community . . . [T]he ethnification or even racialisation of identity politics remains an important ingredient of borderland politics and cultural life . . . [I]dentity in the post-Soviet borderlands is being shaped as much by the ethnic politics of exclusion and division as it is by inclusion and coexistence.
>
> (Smith *et al.*, 1998: 1)

Contemporary articulations of nationalist sentiment seem to reflect the dominance of a primoridal reflex regarding definitions of ethnicity in post-Soviet political discourse in places as different and as far apart as the Baltic States to Transcaucasia and in many cases language is to the fore (e.g. Schopflin, 1996; Suny, 1993; Szporluk, 1994; Tishkov, 1997; Waters, 1998). For example, the issue of language has been a very prominent feature in essentialist definitions of national identity and citizenship in the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, cases which prompted a considerable crisis for both the EU and Russia (Kionka, 1990; Smith, 1990; Smith *et al.*, 1998: pp. 93–118). In the Balkans region, differences between the various forms of Serbo-Croat have been accentuated in order to reinforce ethnic boundaries (Sucic, 1996). Elsewhere in the region, friction exists between Bulgaria and Macedonia regarding the status of Macedonian as a language distinct from Bulgarian (Vatchkov, 1998) and, in Croatia, attempts by the county of Istria to adopt Italian as a second official language remain a considerable source of tension (Obradovic, 2001). G. Smith, in his last overview of the question of nationalism in the post-Soviet space, adopts the concept of habitus from Bourdieu in outlining the function of ethnicity in this form of traditional nationalist political discourse in those various parts of eastern and central Europe. In this respect he underlines three structuring features, or boundary marker tendencies (Smith *et al.*, 1998: 15), namely:

- essentialism,
- historicism,
- totalism.

The idea of historicism follows A.D. Smith, reviewed previously in this volume, in so far as it encompasses the rediscovery of the ethnic past, a ‘Golden Past’ which acts as inspiration for the ethnic group in its contemporary situation. It is outlining G. Smith’s understanding of the other features as they are very relevant to issues relating to language and ethnic identity in contemporary conflicts in this part of the area of study. In his own words they defined as follows:

> First, there is a tendency to *essentialise*, to identify one trait or characteristic in codifying a national or ethnic grouping. Here it is assumed that there is some intrinsic and essential context to any identity which is defined in terms of oppositions by either a common origin ... or a common structure of experience ... [I]dentities are therefore represented as linear, continuous and above all singular ... [T]o totalise ... is to turn relative differences into absolute ones. Individuals are thus collectivised and ascribed to or squeezed into particular categories: one is either a Tajik or a Russian; one cannot be both. Inter-ethnic sameness is repackaged and fetishised as difference.
>
> (Smith *et al.*, 1998: 15–16)

It is in this context that he identifies a number of types of minority ethnic groups of varying geopolitical significance (see Figure 7). Those groups which are associated with a state patron and which also possess a specific regional identity pose the greatest threat to the integrity of the post-Soviet organisation of nation-state. A less immediate threat, but substantial nonetheless, is posed by a second set of minority groups. These exist as regionalised communities but are not associated with an external, other state patron. A final set of groups comprises those minorities who have neither a strong regional identity nor an external state patron. These last two sets of groups are most likely to suffer marginalisation, assimilation and oppression under a highly centralised nation-state.

In many regions nationalist political rhetoric does not mirror sociolinguistic reality. Despite assertions of ethnic homogeneity by nationalist protagonists the cultural flows identified in contemporary ethnic conflicts in western Europe can be discerned in the context of even the most brutal conflicts in the rest of the area of study (e.g. Armstrong on Slovenia

		REGIONALISED COMMUNITY	
		YES	*NO*
STATE PATRON	*YES*	Russians in TransDniester, North-East Estonia, Crimea; Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh; Lezgins in Azerbaijan; Poles in Lithuania; Uzbeks in Osh region of Kyrgyzstan.	Russians in Belarus, Uzbekistan, Georgia.
	NO	Abkhazians, Adzharians, Crimean Tatars, Gagauz in Moldova.	Gypsies in Moldova, Belarus, Lithuania, Ukraine; Meskhetian Turks in Central Asia.

Figure 7 Minority groupings in the borderland states

Adapted from Smith *et al.*, 1998: 18

(1998) and Bringa on Bosnia (1993)). Ascherson offers an erudite *tour d'horizon* on this disparity between the exclusive and militant rhetoric of many nationalist movements and the historical and contemporary experience of many peoples in the area of the Black Sea. For example:

> Those who cherish and revive their 'native' language usually have ancestors who spoke a different one. Those who claim 'pure' lineage, in the genetic sense, are all to some degree mongrels. Even a secluded hill people like the Abkhazians might find in their pedigree . . . a Greek waitress, a Jewish pedlar, a Mingrelian cattle-dealer, a Russian officer's widow, an Armenian tinker, a Circassian slave-girl, an Eastern Alan bandit, a Persian refugee, an Arab magistrate.
>
> (Ascherson, 1995: 273)

Other interrogations, perhaps more academic, on language, identity and conflict further illustrate the point. In Georgia, for example, the Georgian language has become an integral feature of an exclusive nationalist discourse in the region (Smith *et al.*, 1998). This is despite the enormous linguistic and ethnic diversity that is Georgia. It is estimated that around one million of the Georgian-speakers recorded by the 1989 census are in fact speakers of the Mingrelian language (Smith *et al.*, 1998: 167–196). According to Arutiunov, such is the linguistic proximity of Georgian, Mingrelian, Lazic and Svan that very high levels of bilingualism exist among the population as a whole. According to G. Smith, however, it is this linguistic proximity which makes the language vulnerable to the manipulation of national politicians:

> It is in this climate that language history finds a role, functioning as a substitute for an unsatisfactory ethnohistory. The new and hotly contested picture of distinct ethnic identities stretching back millennia, united only fitfully and under compulsion, gives way to the cherished image of harmonious voluntary in the common heritage at once symbolised and created by the Georgian language.
>
> (Smith *et al.*, 1998: 193)

The case of the Azeri-Turkic (Azeri) language in Azerbaijan reinforces this view of the fluidity of language-identity interstices in the Transcaucasian region. The language is endowed with a number of features which make it accessible, on many levels, to manipulation in relation to ethnonationalist rhetoric. The language appears to have been brought to Azerbaijan by Turkic immigrants to the area sometime around the second century. Under Soviet rule the script of the alphabet was changed from Arabic, to Latin and then to Cryllic. It has, most recently, been cased to revert to Latin script. Under Stalin the borders between Azerbaijan, Daghestan and Iran were closed at various points, thereby fragmenting the

Azeri-speaking community for much of the Soviet period. Azerbaijan is made more complex again by the diversity of other ethnic groups found within its territory. This includes Armenians, Daghestanis, Jews, Tatars, Ukrainians, Georgians, the Talysh and the Tats and others besides. Added to that is the persistence of ancient tribal, kin-centred affiliations in rural areas and the fact that the region is also the historic meeting place of Islam and Christianity.

Safizedh shows how Azerbaijani identity is negotiated with regard to these various points of reference. For example, to many urban, middle-class and well-educated Azerbaijanis the classical Persian literary inheritance is critical to their sense of cultural identity. This relationship lends a cultural genealogy and a sense of historical authenticity to Azerbaijani national identity through attachment to a body of learning of considerable antiquity. It is problematic in another sense in that it requires that Azerbaijani identity be partly set in relation to Iran as the contemporary guardian of Persian identity. For many such Azerbaijanis, also increasingly urban-dwelling and secular in their views, this carries negative connotations associated with anti-modern, anti-western and fundamentalist Islam. Both Safizadeh and Arutiunov point to the retention of the Russian language, first acquired under Soviet rule, as a means of sustaining a 'western' and 'modern' identity. Interestingly, the census data pertaining to Azerbaijani during the period 1970 to 1989 show that while the numbers of ethnic Russians resident in the region was in decline the rate of acquisition of the Russian language among the Azerbaijanis increased, outpacing other non-Russian nationalities such as the Uzbeks.

Other complexities of language and ethnicity may be noted in other regions, despite enormous socio-cultural variation and despite ongoing ethnic conflict. For example, research on relationships between ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan suggests that Uzbek-Tajik relations do not operate in relation to the structuring properties of a linear boundary. Rather, the idea of cultural flow seems to be very applicable in seeking to conceptualise the nature of ethnicity in this case. It is worth quoting extensively from the work in question:

> As with so many laws promulgated in the post-Soviet states, language legislation in Uzbekistan proclaims to fulfil two competing objectives: it seeks to entrench the hegemony of the language of the titular nation on the one hand while claiming to safeguard the rights of non-titular minorities on the other. In so far as a substantial proportion of the country's Russian population has come to view it as a hallmark of the nationalising state, language legislation has served to rigidify Uzbek-Russian group divisions. However, it has had little, if any impact on Uzbek-Tajik group boundaries which are remarkable for their high degree of fluidity. Although Tajik (and Uzbek) ethnic entrepreneurs have promoted the principle that ethnicity and lan-

> guage must coincide, in regions where concentrated groups of Tajiks and Uzbeks live side by side most are still able to regard themselves as united by a common culture and religion.
>
> (Smith *et al.*, 1998: 223)

Something similar may be claimed for the situation in the Ukraine. For example:

> The range of identity options in Ukraine is clearly wider than in many other post-communist states, despite the best efforts of ethnic entrepreneurs both to reify their own group and to firm up its boundaries by 'other-ing' outsiders. Significantly, survey evidence . . . indicates that some 25–26 per cent of the population of Ukraine continue to think of themselves as somehow *both* Ukrainian and Russian. Moreover, the boundary between the Russian and Russophone Ukrainian 'groups' is as fluid as that between Ukrainophones and Russophone Ukrainians.
>
> (Smith *et al.*, 1998: 138)

Despite such cultural complexities, language is clearly a valuable resource in ethnic mobilisation for nationalist movements seeking to construct and to sustain various newly independent nation-states throughout the territories formerly dominated by Soviet and Communist regimes. This has laid down foundations for further considerable conflict in this part of the area of study. Put simply, the primordial reflex of this ethnonationalist resurgence has resulted in the construction of nation-states which do not allow for the political expression of cultural plurality, despite constitutional claims to the contrary.

Conclusions

While ethnicity seems to be increasingly characterised by a diversity of cultural flows and the transformation of inter-ethnic borders into frontiers throughout area of study, there is a significant fracture in this dimension of the study. A new nationalist rhetoric is emerging in western Europe. This is accompanied by the diffusion of nation-state sovereignty and the increasing facility of the political expression of cultural plurality. In contrast, in post-Soviet central and eastern Europe, modern-style nation-states have asserted a certain hegemony. This is set in the context of a nationalist rhetoric which, despite constitutional claims to the contrary, amounts to a primordial reflex. Thus, while issues of language and identity resound in various conflict situations across Europe, the dynamics of the inter-relationships are significantly different. In parts of western Europe one can anticipate a role for language in transcending conflict whereas in much of central and eastern Europe, while the same potential role may be perceived, the nature

of the political framework holds within it the seeds of further conflict driven by unresolved issues relating to ethnicity, nation-state sovereignty and minority rights and the political expression of cultural plurality.

Notes

1 For example, *'Pour seules armes: une langue, un patrimonie et une mémoire. Pour mission: un désir-restaurer une vie culturelle spécifique ouverts aux autres. Un enjeu réellement universel.'* [*For their weapons: a language, a heritage and a memory. For their mission: a wish – to restore a specific cultural life open to others. A truly universal prize.*] p. iv in 'Enquête. Culture Corse, les cartes de l'identité', *Le Monde*, 5 July 1996.
2 See 'L'enseignement de la langue corse' in 'Propositions pour la Corse' at http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/ 7 February 2001.
3 Article 2.1 in 'Legal Framework: Statutory Basque Language Law', 6 May 1998, http://www.cfnavarra.es/euskera/english/ilegalc1.htm.
4 pp. 2–3 in 'The Basque Language Today in Navarre', 6 May 1998, http://www.cfnavarra.es/euskera/english/iactuac.htm.
5 Ibid. p. 1.

Part 3

Landscapes and institutions

7 Map, mythology and environment

> How much more individual still was the character that they assumed from being designated by names, names that were only for themselves, proper names such as people have . . . But names present to us – of persons and of towns which they accustom us to regard as individual, as unique, like persons – a confused picture, which draws from the names, from the brightness or darkness of their sound, the colour in which it is uniformly painted, like one of those posters, entirely blue or entirely red, in which, on account of the limitations imposed by the process used in their reproduction, or by a whim on the designers part, are blue or red not only the sky and the sea, but the ships and the church and the people in the streets.
>
> (from Marcel Proust, *Swann's Way* [*Du Côté de Chez Swann*] translated by C.K. Scott Moncrieff, Penguin Books, 1957 [first published 1913]: 452)

Introduction

The possession of territory has long been the key to political power and, as a result, many of the issues central to understanding conflict relate in turn to the contestation of territory. In this chapter it is shown that language plays a significant role in the functioning of territory in conflict. According to A.D. Smith (1986), notions of national identity are in many ways communicated through idealisations of territory as landscape in the form of, for example, sacred places and national historic monuments. It is in this context that language too is employed as a device for the ethnic encoding of landscape. Place-names, or rather the practices of naming places, are shown to be critical in assertions of the ownership and identity of territory in both exclusive and inclusive manners. For modern societies the craft of cartography, the construction of the map, is central to relationships between language, ethnicity and space. In contemporary conflicts from the Basque Country, to Chechnya, Kosovo and Northern Ireland the politics of map-making is a critical feature of the language-driven dimensions relating to these contested societies. Understanding language as landscape, or perhaps linguascape, comprising an interweave of place-names and the ethnic contextuality of locale, is fundamental to a comprehensive view of language in conflict. In short, the linguistic environment is not merely a part of the furniture, a passive backcloth.

Instead, it should be seen as an interactive partner in relationships between language, identity and conflict.

Landscape

The significance of the environment for ethnicity and the construction of national identity is related to ways of reading landscape. According to A.D. Smith most communities in their continuous occupation of an area of land develop an intimate relationship with a certain territory and that populations through their 'ceaseless encounter with a particular environment' (1986: 183) are both shaped by the geography of their environment but also use that environment in defining their sense of who they are. The landscape which an ethnic community identifies with must be ethnically encoded therefore in order that it may be read for ethnic meaning. As A.D. Smith puts it:

> But for all [ethnic communities] what counts is their internalization of certain territorial features and life-styles, and its contribution to an individual atmosphere and tradition in which successive generations are steeped. While crude geography may set limits to certain ways of life and encourage certain modes of production and patterns of settlement, national identity and 'national character' is more directly influenced by collective perceptions, encoded in myths and symbols, of the ethnic 'meanings' of particular stretches of territory, and the ways in which such stretches (and their main features) are turned into 'homelands' inextricably tied to the fate of 'their' communities.
>
> (1986: 183)

It is in this way that A.D. Smith claims that 'communities are inseparable from particular habitats' (1986: 183). Landscape is used in a number of ways in realising this intimate relationship between community and habitat. According to A.D. Smith, this relates specifically to three key points on the use of landscape as follows:

- the antiquity of the ethnic territory;
- the fusion of community and terrain;
- and the wholeness of ordinary landscapes.

The antiquity of the territory associated with a particular ethnic community relates to the group's perceptions of its own primordial origins. The 'remote inaccessibility of the ancestral terrain' (Smith, 1986: 183) reflects the ancient and mysterious origins of the ethnic community. In some cases the ethnic community may have been displaced from the territory it identifies with, its homeland, in other cases the relationship is characterised by largely uninterrupted generations of occupation of the

homeland. Whatever the history, A.D. Smith notes that the 'nationalist spatial vision' is at the same time characterised by 'an element of archaic mystery' and also demanding of a physical reality 'a terrain on which nations can be built' (1986: 184). For A.D. Smith ethnic communities engage with their territory through processes of fusion of community and terrain. This may work in two ways, either natural features become historicised or historic sites and monuments become naturalised. In the case of the former, A.D. Smith refers to the natural landscape of Russia by way of example:

> In Russia also the whole landscape has become the partner of Russian history and people in nationalism imagery. The birch trees, the great river Volga, the endless plains, the distant steppe and long, severe winter have all left their mark on the outlook and cultural products of the Russians, notably the landscape painting of artists like Ivan Shishkin and Isaac Levitan with their wide open spaces and vast forests set beneath distant lonely skies. The same 'landscape' has entered into the melancholy spirit of their music, in Borodin's *In the Steppes of Central Asia* or Stravinsky's *The Rite of Spring*.
>
> (Smith, 1986: 185)

The other fusion process regarding community and terrain, that is the naturalisation of historic sites and monuments, is more common a feature of this nationalist spatial vision. Ancient ruins are identified as the locations of significant events in the past of the ethnic community and may function as memorials, emblems or repositories of that history. Such 'national monuments' lend a sense of authenticity and permanence to the ethnic group in relation to the exertion of power over a territory, as A.D. Smith puts it: 'The monuments, then, bear witness to and express a sense of unique identity based upon a claim to a valued terrain in virtue of age-long residence and possession' (1986: 187). Ordinary landscapes are also employed by nationalists for the same reason. In this case, despite the absence of exceptional natural or historical monuments, the everyday is appropriated by an urban-dwelling, middle-class intelligentsia because of its immemorial simplicity and unadorned naturalness, and thus apparent purity and authenticity. From Russia to Ireland, A.D. Smith argues, this explains the appeal of national folk museums:

> Their displays of ethnic cultures, of peasant costume, rural customs, village architecture and furnishings, evoke for the blasé or anxious city-dweller images of holy simplicities and dignities of an unhurried and tranquil existence lived in and by a community of like-minded and close-knit families, of a kind that city life has all but destroyed. In these ways, even the ordinary landscapes which lack holy places and monuments acquire an ethnic significance in the increasingly urbanized

> consciousness of modern generations; for they are witnesses and reservoirs of the authentic and simple life-styles and ideals that belonged to former epochs in the history of the community.
>
> (1986: 190)

What is absent from A.D. Smith's study of the ethnic encoding of landscape is the function of language in this practice. Others, writing on similar themes, infer the relationship. For example, Schama suggests an intimate relationship, if negatively construed, between landscape, language and identity in Wales in the imagination of visiting Enlightenment intellectuals:

> The starkness of Welsh scenery had long been imagined in London as the epitome of barbaric rudeness, and the language spoken by the natives as the phonetic equivalent of the landscape.
>
> (Schama, 1995: 469)

Cultural commentators are more explicit in their recognition of such a link. For example, Robinson on Ireland notes:

> The most immediate connection between language and reality, the one first made by children and by language learners, is that of naming things. Placenames are the interlock of landscape and language.
>
> (Robinson, 1996: 155)

Others in the field of cultural geography are equally direct. Monmonier, for example, contends that place-names play an important role in the ethnic encoding of a landscape:

> Naming can be a powerful weapon of the cartographic propagandist. Place-names, or *toponyms*, not only make anonymous locations significant elements of the cultural landscape but also offer strong suggestions about a region's character and ethnic allegiance. Although many maps not intending a hint of propaganda might insult or befuddle local inhabitants by translating a toponym from one language to another (as from Trois Rivières to Three Rivers) or by attempting a phonetic transliteration from one language to another (as from Moskva to Moscow) and even from one alphabet to another (as in Peking or Beijing), skilful propagandists have often altered map viewer's impressions of mutliethnic cultural landscapes by suppressing the toponymic influence of one group and inflating that of another.
>
> (Monmonier, 1991: 110–111)

Map

Place-names take on a significance for questions of language and identity in the modern nation-state beyond their immediate locality through the map. Before exploring that assertion in more detail it is necessary at this point to make some observations on the idea of the map as a feature in narratives of identity and place. To begin with, it has become increasingly clear to many human geographers that the map is not merely an objective outline of uncontestable reality, rather the map is best viewed as a construct, a representation of a particular perspective. According to Wood, for example:

> The historian's problem is everybody's problem: our willingness to rely on the map is commensurate with our ability to suspend disbelief in its veracity, but this amounts to a willingness to accept the map as an eye where the eye too no more than selectively brings into being a world that is socially construed.
>
> (1992: 19–20)

Wood continues to elaborate upon some of the key features of the map as a construct, noting that the mapping of territory is not merely the simple mapping of locations but also their identification with particular, exclusive ownership. For example, Wood makes the following claim in relation to the mapping of the armistice (1949) and the ceasefire lines (1967) pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East:

> But because the map does not *map locations* so much as *create ownership at a location*, it is the ownership – or the ecotone or the piece of property or the population density or whatever else the map is bring into being, whatever else is making it real – that is fought over, in this case, to the death.
>
> (1992: 21)

Given the peculiar territorial nature of the nation-state and the effectiveness of the map in denoting the ownership of territory, the implications for the activity of map-making in relation to the processes of state-building and maintenance are profound. Map and state are intertwined in a complex narrative of power, place and identity:

> Thus the state, in its premodern and modern forms, evolves together *with* the map as an instrument of polity, to assess taxes, wage war, facilitate communications and exploit strategic resources . . . Against this background, it will be argued that cartography was primarily a form of political discourse concerned with the acquisition and maintenance of power.
>
> (Wood, 1992: 43)

The idea of the map as construct has been applied by Anderson to notions of how national identity functions. The map, as a form of literature or cultural artifact, is an instrument for imagined community and, for Anderson (1991: 170–178), is crucial in the following ways:

- in communicating the separation of nation-states by unambiguous boundaries;
- in authentifying the antiquity of specific, bounded territories and;
- as logo.

Anderson draws largely from the work of Thongchai on what was known as Siam in the period 1850 to 1910 in explaining the significance of the map with regards to the conceptualisation of the geographical space occupied by the nation-state:

> Thongchai notes that the vectoral convergence of print-capitalism with the new conception of spatial reality presented by these maps had an immediate impact on the vocabulary of Thai politics. Between 1900 and 1915, the traditional words *krung* and *muang* largely disappeared, because they imaged dominion in terms of sacred capitals and visible, discontinuous population centres. In their place came *prathet*, 'country', which imaged it in the invisible terms of bounded territorial space.
>
> (Anderson, 1991: 173)

Regarding the authentification of the antiquity of specific, bounded territories Anderson argues, again through reference to Southeast Asia, that the map was used by European colonists to legitimise their territorial hegemony. The colonists, through the drawing up of maps which purported to outline the historical ownership of certain defined territories traced a pedigree of possession and domination which served to underscore the naturalness of their inheritance. Also via the map, the colonial powers were able to convince themselves of the conformity of this territorial expansion to European concepts of the legal inheritance territory and, in Anderson's words, 'the legal transferability of geographic space' (Anderson, 1991: 174). After the retreat of the European colonial powers from this part of Asia during the second half of the twentieth century, Anderson notes that this function of the map was also exploited by the newly independent states:

> Hence the appearance, late in the nineteenth century especially, of 'historical maps', designed to demonstrate, in the new cartographic discourse, the antiquity of specific, tightly bounded territorial units. Through chronologically arranged sequences of such maps, a sort of political-biographical narrative of the realm came into being, some-

> times with vast historical depth. In turn, this narrative was adopted, if often adapted, by the nation-states which, in the twentieth century, became the colonial states' legatees.
>
> (Anderson, 1991: 175)

The idea of map-as-logo concerns the map as 'pure sign' (Anderson, 1991: 175). In this sense the map does not function as a means of navigating geographical space but instead renders geographical space as symbol or icon. By way of example Anderson records how the British maps of the globe showing the British Empire in imperial pink-red allow for the world to be viewed in terms of the extent of this empire. In this way individual colonies are merely parts of a greater entity which, in its abstraction from immediate geographical context, is imagined and consumed as a complete and independent construct. Such an icon requires none of the usual cartographic notations such as the key, scale, contour lines, place names and topographical features. As Anderson notes (1991: 175), the map as an icon can be reproduced for consumption in myriad guises 'posters, official seals, letterheads, magazine and textbook covers, tablecloths, and hotel walls'. In this emblematic form, the map powerfully impresses upon the popular imagination the notion of the nation-state.

While Anderson is a very competent guide on the significance of the map in processes relating to the construction of ethnic and national identity he pays insufficient attention to the particular significance of language in this specific context. Wood's interrogation of the notion of map relates directly to language. According to Wood, the map, as a representation, is both iconic and linguistic (Wood, 1992: 122). He elaborates upon the point as follows:

> The map is simultaneously . . . language and image. As a word lends icon access to the semantic field of its culture, icon invites word to realize its expressive potentials in the visual field. The result is the dual signification virtually synonymous with maps as well as the complementary exchange of meaning that it engenders. The map image provides a context in which the semantics of the linguistic code are extended to embrace a variety of latent iconic potentials; to the same end, it imposes a secondary syntax that shapes entire linguistic signifiers into local icons.
>
> (Wood, 1992: 123–124)

What is asserted here is that language, as it appears on the map, does not simply have a toponymic function. Language does not merely denote features such as towns and rivers but it indicates also certain qualities pertaining to the various features mapped such as the relative status of different urban centres or the significance of various types of border. More particularly with regard to issues of identity and conflict, the work of Jackson

(1989) may be drawn upon to indicate how the mapping of the landscape through language, a key feature of language in ecological context, functions in relation to the assertion and contestation of the legitimate possession of territory. Jackson's central premise is that language can function 'as a key point of entry into the analysis of social distinctions' (1989: 161). He notes that in the work of both Giddens and Foucault language can be seen to trace systems of power, domination and inequality. For example he states that:

> The structuring of language into systems of dominance and subordination, as described by Giddens' theory of structuration for example, provides a way of understanding how the negotiation of meaning between groups becomes sedimented into more permanent structures and relations of inequality. Foucault (1980) makes a similar point by describing the way that discourses develop around particular ideas, reflecting and reproducing existing power relations.
>
> (Jackson, 1989: 161)

Jackson argues that the map can be employed in realising such sedimentation:

> Like any cartographic image, 'maps of meaning' codify knowledge and represent it symbolically. But, like other maps, they are ideological instruments in the sense that they project a preferred reading of the material world, with prevailing social relations mirrored in the depiction of physical space. Some meanings are dominant; others result from struggle against the dominant order.
>
> (Jackson, 1989: 186)

Jackson draws from Carter's work on the European 'discovery' of Australia in showing how place-names in particular relate to power and possession:

> The naming and renaming of places is a crucial aspect of geographical 'discovery', establishing proprietorial claims through linguistic association with the colonizing power. The same logic applies in every episode of 'spatial history' . . . Spatial history 'begins and ends in language'; by the act of naming, space is symbolically transformed into place, a space with a history.
>
> (Jackson, 1989: 168)

This transformation of space into place through the naming of places is as an act of encoding which, according to Jackson (1989: 185), may be viewed through the work of Bourdieu as a process whereby the landscape is invested with a particular cultural capital. Jackson also notes (1989:

161–162) that the reading of this encoded landscape is not a simplistic affair, rather it requires a complex act of translation(s) in the manner of Steiner. In this act it is emphasised that landscape and map may be read for multiple readings (Jackson, 1989: 171–185). It is in this context that the significance for issues of language identity and conflict of place-names in both the 'cumulative texture' of local cultures and also in the institutions of government is to be understood.

Toponymy

The observation that the craft of the cartographer is not value free has substantial implications for understanding the function of place-names as a feature of language in contested societies. In some cases toponymy relates directly to serious ethno-political conflict and the map, being widely regarded as the most efficient vehicle for the diffusion of toponyms (e.g. 'Topónimia y cartografía' http://www.euskadi.net 2 July 2001), is the usual means by which this particular contestation of territory and identity is made manifest. For example, during the recent conflict in Kosovo both the Serbian government and the ethnic Albanian Kosovars made maps available via the Internet with a view to promoting their very different claims to the disputed territory. The Serbian map provided the names of places in Cyrillic script as well as marking hundreds of Serb Orthodox monuments (http://www.gov.yu/kosovo_facts/enter5.html 30 August 1999). The Albanian map showed the same territory but mapped entirely using exclusively Albanian forms of the names of places (http://www.kosova-state.org 30 August 1999). Since the political settlement in Kosovo a Serbian map of Kosovo now shows the same ethnically encoded landscape but with numerous places aflame, allegedly deliberately destroyed by NATO. Similarly, during the course of the ongoing conflict in Chechnya a number of maps have appeared from among Chechen nationalist groups showing the place-names of the region only in the Chechen language. A very recent version of this Chechen linguascape admits to the non-authoritative status of the place-names thereby underlining the constructed and contested nature of the act of naming places.

The ethnic encoding of the landscape through place-names, however, is not necessarily a process which is exclusive and conflictual. In some cases it is a process which can, in local context, be inclusive and plural despite being set in the broader context of ethno-political conflict. In the case of Northern Ireland, for example, nationalists and unionists have contested the symbols and emblems associated with public space. It has been suggested (Ruane and Todd, 1996) that as a result of the historical experiences of conquest and colonisation that Irish cultural signifiers, such as Irish-language place names, have been submerged and that the only immediately visible cultural signifiers are British, such as English-language names of places or the Anglicised versions of original Irish-language

forms. According to Ruane and Todd (1996: 194–195, 202–203) Irish-identifiers, in seeking the affirmation of their identity and of their sense of place, must recover these submerged emblems. In contrast, the British-identifiers are determined that public space continues to reflect British values and that this precludes the possibility of such things as Irish-language street names. Yet, the cumulative texture of local culture to which we have already referred holds within it very different possibilities to those confined to the traditional dichotomies of political discourse in the region. As Nash points out (1999) the excavation (to borrow from Seamus Heaney, 1972) of the names of places as practised in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland suggests a complex relationship between notions of authenticity and belonging and ideas of pluralism and diversity:

> Placenames can always be enlisted in essentialist articulations of identity, but what is so notable about contemporary approaches to them in Ireland is the expression of a critical but inclusive recuperation of located tradition.
>
> (Nash, 1999: 475)

Nash offers a critique of the recovery of the pre-colonial Irish past in relation to place names as envisaged by Irish nationalists. She underlines (Nash, 1999: 462–463) the value of the anti-colonial recovery of the 'living landscape' for cultures in contexts of colonial domination. The notion of living landscape refers to the historical and mythological meaning of locale embedded in the cumulative textures of local folklore and wisdom. For post-colonial societies, however, Nash suggests that the dangers of a simplistic anti-colonial reading of the 'coded land' lie in articulating essentialist and primordial views of ethnicity (Nash, 1999: 462). It is in this context, she claims, that the diversity of influences on the place names of Ireland, Celtic, Scandinavian, Norman, English, Scots and Gaelic, must enter narratives of identity:

> In a context of cultural antagonism or ethnic conflict, located identities expressed through attachments to place or tradition, or in this case placenames, can help shape a plural sense of culture . . . By divorcing Gaelic placenames from an exclusively Catholic identity, by emphasizing the diverse cultural origins of placenames in Northern Ireland, or by mediating between a desire for authenticity and sense of a multicultural Irish history, in the different sorts of names in Ireland or the meaningful but always mutable nature of an individual name, contemporary discourses of place and identity surrounding these toponymic projects offer suggestions for rethinking the geographies of culture in Ireland and theories of cultural geography.
>
> (Nash, 1999: 476)

For Nash, therefore, the names of places can be read at local level for multiplicities of meaning. Most significantly, they may facilitate engagement with the post-colonial recuperation of oppressed cultures but in their diverse origins they also counter essentialist definitions of ethnicity.

The question arises now of how such functions of toponymy might be realised beyond the level of local communities. In the Basque Country the issue of toponymy reflects similar concerns with cultural recuperation. In contrast to the situation of the Irish language in Northern Ireland, Basque language toponyms have been the subject of a substantial process of institutionalisation. In this case, therefore, it is in the interplay between the diversity of local culture and the institutionalisation of toponymic forms that our interest resides. In this region the local governments of the Basque Autonomous Community, the Foral Community of Navarre and the Departments of the Northern Basque Country in France have been engaged in toponymic projects relating to the recovery of Basque language place names and their application in public domains. For example, the government of the Basque Autonomous Community have sponsored a toponymic project which seeks to recover Basque language names of places with the ultimate aims of creating a publicly accessible multilingual database of place names and a map of the region using the Basque language place names.

In contrast, however, to the post-colonial cultural plurality Nash sees in the case of Ireland, it appears to be the case in the Basque Country that the issue of place names relates more closely to a traditional nationalist view on cultural recuperation and that the process of institutionalisation is having the effect of suppressing the cumulative text of locale. Douglass (1998) intimates that the issue of place names in this region is firmly set within the anti-colonial mode, that is in the context of colonial domination. Reflecting upon the contested perspectives, or 'overlapping and competing views', of the physical and social landscape in the Basque Country as a border region straddling international boundary between France and Spain he suggests the following:

> In this regard, one line of suggested inquiry is how multivocality *from the borderlanders'* viewpoint intersects with multilocality. That is, within the western Pyrenean borderlands three languages (French, Spanish and Basque) collide and intermingle. Geographical features thereby assume more than one toponym and the use of any of the available ones in a particular instance immediately accesses a particular discourse that excludes competing ones. For example, to employ the French, Spanish or Basque toponym for a mountain peak is to invoke entirely different worlds. From French and Spanish perspectives the discourse is political, geological, etc., whereas from the Basque perspective it invokes the enchanted landscape of dolmens, cave

> paintings, witches' covens, summer pastures, the seasonal hunt for migratory birds and wild boars, and so on.
>
> (Douglass, 1998: 90)

In contrast to the political-mythological dichotomy which Douglass intimates, the ongoing toponymy project sponsored by the regional government of the Basque Autonomous Community claims a scientific methodology and objectivity, removed from notions of living landscapes. In this exercise an effort is made to set the project within an international framework in this field through making direct reference to previous UN sponsored discussions. For example, in a document relating to the toponymy project entitled 'Fundamentos sobre la toponima y la normalización de los nombres de lugar' the Basque regional government note their conformity with UN guidelines. But, it is also noted that the particular source for the principles which underlie their project are derived from the experience of the French-speaking community of Québec (Québec, 1987). These principles are formulated as follows:

Los principios fundamentales adoptados son los siguientes:

1 El respeto al uso,
2 La unicidad del nombre de lugar, cada lugar un único nombre,
3 El respeto a la voluntad de las poblaciones afectadas,
4 La no traducción de nombres propios,
5 El respeto a los nombres autóctonos.

[The fundamental principles have been adopted as follows:

1 Respect for use,
2 The uniqueness of the place-name, each place having a unique name,
3 Respect for the volition of the effected populations,
4 The non-translation of proper names,
5 Respect for autochthonous names.]

(http://www.euskadi.net/euskara 'Toponimia' 2 July 2001)

The outline of the rationale for the project is only suggestive of the poetic vision of the Basque cultural patrimony described by Douglass, although gestures are made towards a discourse in which the folk-memory of local rural Basque-speaking populations enjoys high esteem:

> El proceso urbano ha provocado y está provocando, especialmente el el área rural, la pérdida de un patrimonio cultural es la denominación de los lugares. Este fenómeno ha sido aún más acusado en el área vascófona debido a; desconocimiento del euskera por una parte

importante de la población que ha alterado o, sencillamente, cambiado las denominaciones preexistentes.

Hay que tratar, por ello, de evitar la pérdida de lo que todavía hoy se emplea y de enriquecer este patrimonio recuperando aquellos topónimos que aún previven en la memoria de una parte, cada vez más reducida, de la población.

[The urban process has provoked and is provoking, especially in the rural area, the loss of a cultural patrimony in the naming of places. This phenomenon has been yet more pronounced in the Basque-speaking area proper; for an important part of the population, ignorance of the Basque language has altered or, simply, changed preexisting place-names.

In treating the matter of avoiding this loss one may yet employ the toponyms which survive in the memory of a successively smaller part of the population and enrich this recovered patrimony.]

(http://www.euskadi.net/euskara 'Toponimia' 2 July 2001)

Elsewhere (Decreto 156/1996, de 18 de junio, de transformación del Consejo Asesor del Euskera http://www.euskadi.net 2 July 2001), the emphasis is placed upon the recovery, through Basque language toponyms, of an historical socio-cultural unity:

A fin de preservar la unidad sociocultural y de fomentar la vitalidad etnolingüística de Euskal Herria se propicia la presencia en el Consejo Asesor del Euskera de vocales procedentes de los distintos territorios de Euskal Herria y se prevé la presencia de representantes de organismos y entidades de gran raigambre en el país y de personalidades de reconocido prestigio en el ámbito del euskera.

Además, dentro de este Consejo Asesor se crea la Comisión Especial de Toponimia, con funciones de asesoramiento y propuesta en lo que se refiere a la fijación, modificación y recuperación de topónimos de la Comunidad Autónoma Vasca.

[The presence on the Advisory Council on the Basque Language of the members derived from the distinct territories of the Basque Country create favourable conditions for preserving the sociocultural unity and promoting the ethnolinguistic vitality of the Basque Country along with, it is anticipated, the presence of representatives of organisations and entities relating to the grand traditions of the country and of renowned personalities from the Basque language world.]

(http://www.euskadi.net/euskera 2 July 2001)

The work sponsored by the Basque regional government specific to the particular provinces of Alava and Guipuzcoa may be read in terms of the interplay, identified by Jackson (1989) and noted earlier in this text,

between the diversity of local culture and the institutions of government. This project is set in the context of a process of linguistic normalisation, a process which aims towards the normalisation of the Basque language in all spheres of society in the Basque region. Normalisation encourages, among other things, a certain standardisation in a number of respects and for toponyms in particular this entails a certain homogenisation. This is manifest in a number of ways. For example, on the matter of linguistic origins only Basque, Romance and Obscure roots are recognised. Also, the varieties of generic terms for geographical features are noted as problematic:

> Una denominación genérica en castellano muchas veces tiene varias correspondencias en euskera dependiendo del pueblo donde se emplean ('avenida': pasealekua, etorbidea, ibilbidea...) o de la entidad investigadora: DEIKER, ELHUYAR, Euskaltzaindia, Gobierno de Navarra ... Por ejemplo, se recognieron 7 términos diferentes para denominar la palabra 'pico': gallur, haitzorrotza, haizpunta, mokorra, mokoa, punta, tontorra...
>
> [A generic denomination in the Spanish language very often has various corresponding forms in the Basque language depending upon popular use ('avenida': pasealekua, etorbidea, ibilbidea...) or on the investigating entity: DEIKER, ELHUYAR, Euskaltzaindia, Gobierno de Navarra ... For example, 7 different terms are recognised as denominating the word 'pico': gallur, haitzorrotza, haizpunta, mokorra, mokoa, punta, tontorra...]
>
> (http://www.euskadi.net/euskera 2 July 2001)

The project operates through a combination of archival research on post-medieval historical sources and fieldwork comprising the gathering of oral evidence in order to arrive at definitive Basque language and Spanish language versions of place names. Variations between contemporary oral and historically documented versions of place names are resolved through arriving at what is described as 'Topónimo Propuesto-Normalizado' [Proposed-Normalised Toponym]. While such a standard version of a toponym can be arrived at by linguistic experts and administrative authorities through this process of normalisation, the authors of the project are at pains to deny any imposition of particular forms of toponyms. It is suggested that a toponym arrived at via this process may only be considered to be effectively devised if it is adopted for daily popular use:

> En efecto, el topónimo normalizado para poder sobrevivir y perdurar tiene que acercarse todo lo posible al topónimo vivo, de uso corriente. Para ello debería existir una coordinación entre las correspondientes entidades administrativas, autoridades lingüísticas y usarios para lograr una óptima oficialización de las topónimos.

[In effect, the normalised toponymy, so as to be able to survive and to endure, has to approximate as close as possible to the living toponym, that of accepted use. For this there should exist a co-ordination between the corresponding administrative authorities, linguistic authorities and users in order to obtain the optimum officialisation of the toponyms.]

('Elaboración de la toponimia para la cartografia a escala 1:5000 de Alava y Guipuzcoa' http://www.euskadi.net 2 July 2001)

With regard to the actual mapping of the toponyms, problems of scale and the greater density of toponyms in urban as opposed to rural areas means that many names of places are simply not recorded on the map which is intended as the endpoint of the toponymic project as a whole ('Elaboración de la toponimia para la cartografia a escala 1:5000 de Alava y Guipuzcoa' http://www.euskadi.net 2 July 2001). While the toponymic projects in general have the effect of reducing the cumulative texture of local communities it is in those parts of the Basque Country where the demographics of the language is weakest that tensions are most obvious. Perhaps the most visible means for the diffusion of toponyms from the point of view of the general public is in the form of road signs. In the various parts of the Basque Country much of the road signage is bilingual – either Basque-Spanish or Basque-French. Elsewhere in Europe this feature of the linguistic environment, an extension of the toponymic landscape, is regarded as a relatively cost-effective means of ameliorating language-driven tensions. For example, it has been claimed that the bilingual (Welsh-English) road signs in Wales are non-conflictual in nature and that they have the capacity to change attitudes towards the Welsh language in a positive manner (Grin and Vaillancourt, 1999).

However, in the Basque Country, and in particular in the Northern Basque Country in France and in Navarre, not only are monolingual French or Spanish language signs points for local resistances but bilingual signs are similarly targeted. For example, in the village of Sara/Sare, which is to be found in the Northern Basque Country adjacent to the international border between the French and Spanish states high in the Pyrenees, the monolingual signpost for the nearest town, found across the international border within the Spanish state, gives the name of the town only as Vera. Transcribed on top of the letter 'V' is the letter 'B', thereby transforming the name into its Basque language version (Figure 8). On the Spanish side of the international border road signs indicate that the town is known as Vera de Bidasoa or Bera. In some cases the Spanish language version has been entirely defaced, despite the fact that the signs are bilingual (Figure 9). On other signs in this border region the title Francia has been painted out (Figure 10). Such adaptations of this feature of the linguistic environment arise from an anti-colonial sentiment which fears the linguistic and political domination of the Basque Country by the

Figure 8 Signpost for the town of Bera/Vera in the village of Sara/Sare, the Northern Basque Country, France, adjacent to the French-Spanish border in the Pyrenees, August 2001 (author's own)

Figure 9 Signpost for Bera/Vera de Bidasoa on the outskirts of the eponymous town in the Foral Community of Navarre, Spain, adjacent to the French-Spanish border in the Pyrenees, August 2001 (author's own)

Figure 10 Signposts for France in the town of Bera/Vera de Bidasoa, the Foral Community of Navarre, Spain, adjacent to the French-Spanish border in the Pyrenees, August 2001 (author's own)

French and Spanish states. They also suggest a local resistance to the dualities or even multiplicities of identity which are documented in a number of sources and which have been examined earlier in this work.

This may be explained in local perceptions regarding the vulnerable position of the Basque-speaking community in Navarre (EJ:GV, 1998) and the Northern Basque Country (EJ:GV, 1999a) in contrast to the relative strength of the Basque language in the BAC (EJ:GV, 1999b), not only in demographic terms but also with regard to institutional status. It has already been noted elsewhere (Mac Giolla Chríost, 2000) that the comprehensive institutionalisation of the Basque language in the BAC has coincided with more plural views regarding the significance of the language for Basque ethnic identity and more moderate views on the politics of language. In contrast, no similar adjustment in the field of attitudes can be traced among Basque speakers in either the Northern Basque Country or in Navarre where language policies are characterised by their *ad hoc* and reactive nature. In this context bilingual road signs function as platforms for the expression of the frustrations and fears of an embattled community. It would appear that only within a broader framework of support for the language is the institutionalisation of the toponym likely to be non-conflictual and to have a significant positive impact on language attitudes.

Conclusions

Language has a vital role to play in understanding landscape as a vehicle for the articulation of national identity. Through the ethnic encoding of landscape in the form of place-names, the map and other visual expressions of the toponym become sites which may variously reinforce patterns of contestation or open up possibilities for plural and inclusive readings of territory. In this respect the critical conjuncture is that between the cumulative texture of local communities and the values reflected by institutions. In this case government policy is vitally important in setting out an effective policy framework which is necessarily broad, embracing the linguistic environment as an animated partner in the search for plural readings of senses of place which transcend the patterns of ethnic conflict while at the same time sustaining the dynamic link between local communities and the encoded landscape with which they are immediately familiar.

8 Virtuality and propinquity

> Gradually the comfortable reach of the nation-state as revenue raiser and infrastructure provider has collapsed into jobless growth, fiscal crisis, and investor relocation. Borders criss-crossed by road, rail, and fibre-optic cable become more permeable to goods, services, finance, and knowledge. Control over space, the geographic buffers of the nation, started to melt away with the decline of the so-called Golden Age of mass production. Compounding these changes in what, how and where we produce are the profound changes in East–West and North–South relationships as the binary balance of terror decentralises into a multiplicity of local conflicts.
>
> (Tapscott, 1996: 310)

Introduction

The information technology revolution of recent years has been characterised by the massive growth of new electronic technologies. These new technologies promise to fundamentally transform society. Some initial reactions to the likely impact of these developments on linguistic diversity have been negative (e.g. Dixon, 1997; Fischer, 1999; Laver and Roukens, 1996). Insights into the real impact of these technologies, however, are only now beginning to emerge. In some cases the impact runs counter to that which had been anticipated (e.g. Crystal, 2001). This impact, which may properly be only understood in the social context of the use of new technologies, appears to relate to how people behave, organise and interact and to be manifest as shifts in the nature of interpersonal relations, communications, social control, participation, cohesion, identity and trust (Woolgar, 2000 and 2001 http://www.virtualsociety.org.uk). Underlying all of this, however, is a tension between a view that the effects of the new technologies are not determined but rather are socially constructed yet, at the same time, the users of the new technologies are 'configured', or defined, enabled and constrained, by the technology itself. This, it is suggested (Woolgar, 2001), contributes to the emergence of new forms of sociality as concepts of information, power, organisation, discourse and knowledge are reshaped. To this extent the information technology

revolution is suggestive of the emergence of a virtual society in which the issues at the heart of this work, language and identity, are situated not so much in landscape but rather in '*e*-scape'. In this context questions of conflict do not relate to territory, that ceaseless encounter between ethnic group and a particular geographical environment, but to access to technology. Notions of community and sovereignty, however, remain common denominators.

Community

According to many commentators (Guéhenno, 1995; Rondfeldt, 1992 and Solomon, 1997) the new technologies, as one of the defining features of globalisation, have the effect of fragmenting existing social organisations. They enable, instead, the development of electronically linked, 'wired' or 'networked', communities defined by especial single interests including those of language and ethnicity. Such virtual communities are not fixed to specific geographic locations, nor are they restricted by political boundaries and in this way they are removed from the structures of power and authority associated with traditional, territorially bounded and sovereign nation-states. The term 'virtual community' might suggest that the community in question lacks a sense of real, that is physical, presence. Fornäs (1998) offers clarification on this matter. For him a virtual community is an imaging community. It has both an on-line and off-line reality. The 'virtual community' may be dispersed in both space and time but yet it functions as a community via the new technologies of the electronic media in much the same way as Anderson (1991) conceives of the nation functioning as a community through the technology of print. The relationship between on-line and off-line domains is fundamental. It is of considerable significance that the new technologies tend to supplement rather than to substitute for existing practices and forms of organisation (Woolgar, 2001). In this sense virtual communities are not created *ex nihilo*.

Everard (2000) pushes the case for the realness of virtual communities further in another direction. Drawing from the work of Turkle (1996), he argues that through membership of on-line communities the individual, understood as the product of a process of social formation within a given symbolic order (e.g. language), is able to articulate a range of personae or identity structures (Everard, 2000: 125) which is more expansive than that normally available to the individual. The result of this is to enable the individual to achieve a fuller sense of self:

> For Turkle (1996) the use of multiple identities in cyberspace merely extends the range of selves available, thus making the individual in a sense more complete, and more comfortable insofar as it is possible to 'try out' or model a range of points of view. In short, the notion of

> individuals being unitary is itself an illusion. The self of language and of the symbolic order at large is always 'virtual' – a simulation. Thus moves into other modes of mediation are metonymic rather than metaphoric – an extension, rather than a different order of existence, that is, an interplay among a matrix of alternatives, rather than the more hierarchical binary dichotomies that characterised modernist thought.
>
> (Everard, 2000: 125)

In cyber space, therefore, the multidimensionality and fluidity of identity, so crucial to developing inclusive notions of relationships between language and identity, are reinforced.

Everard also asserts (2000: 126–127) that on-line communities can be more meaningful to individuals than other more immediate, in the geographical sense of the word, communities to which the individual could potentially claim membership. Accepting that this is the case, it may be of particular significance for language communities whose geographical integrity is greatly threatened. For example, in the case of the Welsh language in Wales a number of commentators suggest that the traditional Welsh-speaking heartlands of rural west and north Wales are currently so vulnerable as to be on the verge of an irreversible fragmentation. In this scenario Welsh-speaking communities would be so dispersed as to be 're-constituted as nodes within a more fluid and plural socio-linguistic context' and in turn become 'communities without propinquity' (James and Williams, 1997: 295). Something of the urgency of the issue may be underlined upon noting the re-appearance of the language issue as a matter of substantial controversy in the broadcast and print media in both Wales and the UK since the 'language war' which was declared by some Welsh nationalist politicians to be at an end several years ago (Aitchison and Carter, 1994, 2000). In such a situation the notion of virtual community may offer particular advantages in seeking to sustain a reality of community. This point is also clear with regard to diaspora or, to give the postmodern monicker, transnational communities. Karim (1998) shows how new communication technologies, digital broadcasting technologies in particular, are being increasingly deployed by such communities in their efforts to sustain a coherent sense of cultural identity across international borders, between continents even. Karim, while underlining the preliminary nature of academic observations in this field, also notes that the impact of the new technologies upon members of transnational communities is uneven. It would appear to vary according to a number of factors including socio-economic class, age and gender.

The case of the substantial Kurdish community in Europe may be used to illustrate the point. In 1998, following the Gulf War during which the Kurdish population of Iraq were attacked by the Iraqi armed forces with gas and chemical weapons, the issue of the state of the Kurds in the

Middle East was at its most prominent in the European media. The *Independent* newspaper (9 March 1998) in the UK carried a story entitled 'The Kurds fight back on guerrilla TV'. The article recounts how a unique Kurdish language television service, styled Med-TV, is made available free from state censorship via satellite technology. It continues, claiming that the service is having a galvanising effect on the Kurdish diaspora:

> Kurds separated by borders, languages and political differences have unanimously embraced the intrepid station. In south-eastern Turkey, satellite dish sales have soared. People sell their livestock to scrape together the money ... Throughout the diaspora, cultural centres turn into mini-cinemas at news time. As one viewer in Paris explains, 'Med-TV has helped many people realise what it means to be Kurdish.'
>
> (Serafin, 1998: 5)

Wahlbeck (1998) concurs on the general assertion that modern technology has greatly facilitated the creation and maintenance of the social networks necessary to the functioning of the Kurdish transnational community as a whole but also notes that the expense of new technologies is also prohibitive for many individuals. Graham previously noted similar inequalities in other more prosperous societies, including the USA (A. Graham, 1997: 3). Besides the rather material barrier of cost, other more conceptual challenges relating directly to the idea of attachment to territory may be noted. While adapting to the revolution in new technologies may well, as Appadurai claims, enable embattled groups to 'create more effective national and global strategies of self-representation and cultural survival' (Appadurai, 1995: 218) through the construction of virtual communities, the accompanying distancing from territory dislocates group identity from sense of place in traditional geographical terms. Some view this process of de-localisation as emancipatory:

> In our Global Age, communities have become liberated from dependence upon direct inter-personal relations and, like cultures, from the need to operate primarily within the limits set by particular physical locations. Locality is no longer the only or even the primary vehicle for sustaining community.
>
> (Kennedy and Roudometof, 2001: 21)

Whatever its merits, this process sets afresh the challenge of constructing meaningful senses of place. Geography, however, is not dead for as Woolgar notes, the meaningful use and experience of new technologies, notwithstanding the attractiveness of the abstract notion of virtual community, is at its most meaningful when built upon existing social relations (Woolgar, 2000, 2001). Therefore, the notion of virtual space is best

viewed as an extension of locale and not as an alternative. In the context of the proliferation of diverse virtual communities and the increasing virtuality of all communities, Guéhenno (1997) anticipates the greater need for institutions to facilitate interaction and cohesion between such communities across *e*-borders. Existing institutions may well need to respond through becoming increasingly virtual and entirely new forms of virtual institutions may need to be devised. Present trends suggest that virtual states and city polities may be the key drivers in such transformations.

Virtual states, city polities

For some commentators the revolution in information technology is as significant for contemporary society as was the invention of the printing press for early modern European society (Guéhenno, 1997; Laver and Roukens, 1996). If this is the case it has profound implications for conceptualisations of the nation as an imagined community and also for the idea of the nation-state and its institutions. Castells (2000) has asserted that most social institutions, including government, have not yet been transformed by the advent of new technologies, in particular the Internet. What has happened so far, he claims, is that governments have been forced to react to the information technology revolution because of the new economy, characterised by the centrality of the Internet and networking to economic activity in general, which has resulted from it. It is this new economy with its very different social and institutional requirements which is driving changes to the institutions of society. Part of the challenge facing the nation-states engaged in this new economy is increasing and irreversible multi-ethnicity. The resultant changes will, he asserts, reflect the national and local cultural contexts but the institutions of the nation-state will have to be radically overhauled resulting in the emergence of a new form of state which he terms the 'network state' (Castells, 2000: 2–3). This network state will comprise, briefly, nation-states in conjunction with international institutions, transnational institutions, local and regional government and NGOs functioning together in a complex interaction. The exact nature of this conjunction is not clear but the immediate implications of the information technology revolution appear however, in the first instance, to turn upon notions of the sovereignty of nation-states and, second, upon the matter of the relationship between state and citizen. Castells (1997: 42–50) has previously identified the Autonomous Community of Catalonia in Spain as an exemplar response to the challenges of the global economy:

> This differentiation between cultural identity and the power of the state, between the undisputed sovereignty of apparatuses and the networking of power-sharing institutions, is a historical innovation . . . It

> seems to relate better than traditional notions of sovereignty to a society based on flexibility and adaptability, to a global economy, to networking of media, to the variation and interpretation of cultures. By not searching for a new state but fighting to preserve their nation, Catalans may have come full circle to their origins as people of borderless trade, cultural/linguistic identity, and flexible government institutions, all features that seem to characterize the Information Age.
>
> (Castells, 1997: 50)

Others have pointed to an unresolved geographical tension relating to Catalonia. Morata (1997), for example, notes that the Autonomous Community of Catalonia and the city of Barcelona are engaged in strategies which are in competition. The regional government of Catalonia is committed to the idea of Europe of the Regions. To this end it has constructed what is described as a western Mediterranean Euro-region, a cross-border entity which includes Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées. In contrast, Barcelona has created a network of cities, described as the C6 network, including Montpellier, Palma de Mallorca, Toulouse, Valencia and Zaragoza. Morata (1997: 297) notes these two projects as representing two very different ways in which the space that is Europe might be shaped. For Taylor (1999) the tension is characterised as that between a territorially based strategy and a network based strategy and that, given the nature of the forces of globalisation, the latter was most likely to prevail:

> [I]t is at this continental level that the emergence of competition between alternative spatial configurations is occurring as network versus territorial strategies. This competition is expressed as a choice between a Europe of Regions and a Europe of Cities . . . In general, with the Maastricht Treaty setting up the Committee of Regions the territorialist strategy has a head start over the Euro-cities approach but, in contradiction to this, contemporary forces of globalization would seem to privilege a space of flows in a world city network.
>
> (Taylor, 1999: 9)

The view that power is increasingly distant from territory is confirmed by others. Brown (1997), taking her cue from Guéhenno (1995), notes a profound transformation in the location of political power resulting from the information technology revolution:

> Power bases . . . are shifting from territory and material wealth to ‘accessibility’, that is, constant access to a vast global electronic network. What follows from this premise can only be described as the turning upside down of international political structures: territory as

> the primary basis of power in the international system is on the way out, while a yet-to-be-identified integrator of global networks is on the way in.
>
> (Brown, 1997: 2 http://www.usip.org 17 September 2001)

Few claim, however, a total shift in the location of power from landscape to *e*-scape and the nature of the use of maps during the Dayton negotiations of 1995 which brought the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina to a close illustrates the point (Johnson, 1999). In this case the full range of GIS technology was made available to the various negotiating teams from all sides of the conflict in the construction and production of an extensive series of maps aimed at facilitating the course of negotiations. For the protagonists in the conflict the new technology was only useful to the extent that it enabled them to negotiate the ownership and identity of real territory and, as Johnson points out (1999: 9 and 12), at crucial points the technology was abandoned in favour of more laborious and mechanical means of dealing with the map. The reasons for this do not appear to have been a matter for the record but Johnson offers some suggestions that the technology may have provoked a certain sense of threat and loss of power on the part of the Serb team in particular:

> Negotiators may have been intimidated by the technology, felt a loss of control and privacy by having to work with a computer operator not on their negotiating team, distrusted computers generally, or simply enjoyed the opportunities to consult at their own pace and deliver proposals at the most propitious times.
>
> (Johnson, 1999: 12 http://www.usip.org 17 September 2001)

Therefore, it is with some caution that the nature of the distancing of power from territory may be traced. The contemporary proliferation of politically significant organisations whose authority does not reside in territorial propriety is held by Rosenau (1999) as an indicator of the dislocation of territory as the sole determinant of power. This he characterises in the following terms:

> [T]he upward shift of authority to integrative political institutions, corporate alliances, and transnational regimes; the sideward shift to NGOs and social movements; and the downward, fragmenting shift to a wide range of subnational entities.
>
> (Rosenau, 1999: 15–16)

For Rosenau the upward shift is exemplified by organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank and the leverage they exercise over many of the world's less wealthy nation-states on matters of political culture and government policy. The downward shift he illustrates through highlighting the

influence a credit-rating agency has on this same category of states through its capacity to adversely affect global investment in the national economy by withholding blue-chip grading from its bonds. Others, such as Everard (2000: 95), note that nation-states are not merely economic constructs but also fulfil a number of other critical functions hence, while the economies of nation-states are undoubtedly more porous, and organisations such as the IMF exacerbate that porosity, it is not necessarily the case that the other functions will be yielded up (or down). Everard (2000: 7–9) characterises the effect of the top-down and bottom-up pressures of globalisation upon the state as dissaggregation. This is to be understood as a set of complex functional transformations in the role played by the nation-state in a number of arenas including security, economics, culture and the environment.

Everard asserts (2000: 8) that under the conditions of globalisation other agencies have increasingly come to play important roles in a number of these arenas, including for example the European Union, and that the effect of this is to confine the power of nation-states but not to render the death of the nation-state inevitable. For Everard the relative vitality of the nation-state may wax and wane across a number of arenas, signalling relative and partial contractions rather than absolute and comprehensive decline. The matter on which the modern nation-state feels most threatened, according to Everard, is that relating to 'sovereign identity' (2000: 7) and associated 'identity-making practices' (2000: 9), that is the capacity of the state to construct and reconstruct national identity. Here Everard sees the state continuing to assert its role with regard to the 'constitution of identity' and its 'traditional security role' and that the tensions resulting from these efforts of assertion will only become more intense as the various boundaries which define nation-states are increasingly tested (Everard, 2000: 45). The systematic dispersions via the Internet of, for example, notions of authority (following Foucault) and territory (following Deleuze) are characteristic features of the global economy which Everard feels challenge specific facets of the nation-state. Responses to these systematic dispersions vary but Everard perceives a general trend amounting to a 'radical break with the past' which he formulates as follows:

> By that I want to suggest that the break is not a break with continuity, but with the *discourses* of continuity – the narratives, or mythos of continuity. The state is always already becoming. It is always in a state of flow and its identity emerges from the focus of narrative upon this or that confluence of flows, be it economic, military or cultural, or some combination or mixture of the three.
>
> (Everard, 2000: 54)

Following Foucault, Everard conceives of the nation-state in terms of subject function. In this way the nation-state, as an articulation of the

boundaries between Self and Other, can be viewed not as a unitary actor but rather in relation to the various narratives through which the state is identified. He relates this in particular to notions of sovereignty, democracy and human rights and cultural identity (Everard, 2000: 44–55) and, alternatively, to three arenas defined as follows (Everard, 2000: 76):

- war – the articulation of political space;
- economy – the articulation of value and its exchange and;
- society – through the articulation of identity, the nature of community, gender issues and the nature of work.

Some of the transformations across these arenas include the increasing emergence of ICT nodes as sites of conflict, giving rise on the one hand to novel forms of warfare and, on the other hand, effecting the marginalisation of conflicts due to their deprivation of access to new technologies media (e.g. Rubin, 2000; Schmitt, 1997; United States Institute of Peace, 2001). In the economic arena Everard notes the transnational electronic transfer of massive volumes of capital, by-passing the traditional checks and barriers of modern nation-state economies and deepening disparities in development derived from the unequal accessibility of the new technologies across the globe, marking out a new form of technology-driven colonialism which he terms 'informational colonialism' (Everard, 2000: 23).

In general terms, the implications of the weaker attachments between territory and power for territorially defined polities are profound, most particularly they amount to an erosion of the modern hegemony of the nation-state (e.g. Guéhenno, 1995). In itself this has certain consequences for language in socio-political context for, as we have already seen, the nation-state is a polity which is disposed towards the adoption of a single official and national language for all the business of the state, including relationships between the citizen and the state and, in many cases, relationships among the citizens as private individuals. Returning once more to Everard, it is the transformations pertaining to questions of cultural identity which he claims are most significant: 'It is this shift of power into the cultural sphere that perhaps most marks the shift into a globalised political milieu' (Everard, 2000: 53). For the postmodern state the most fundamental challenge of all resides in charting the flows of the identity economy and in this language remains, and is likely to remain, a critical point of navigation:

> Language influences the way we come to conceive of ourselves – our identity – and, as we have seen, identity is at the seat of power, politics and the global economy. So an information technology that changes the terms by which we see the world is also a technology that shapes the way we structure the world.
>
> (Everard, 2000: 158)

In this respect, the global dominance of the English language constitutes a formidable challenge to all other languages. May (2001: 198) records that English-speakers presently number at least 700 million world-wide. This is accounted for in part by historic structural reasons, such as the British Empire, but also by the place of English in globalisation. Crystal summarises the contemporary foundations of English language hegemony as follows:

> English is used as an official or semi-official language in over 60 countries, and has a prominent place in a further 20. It is either dominant or well-established in all six continents. It is the main language of books, newspapers, airports and air-traffic control, international business and academic conferences, science, technology, medicine, diplomacy, sports, international competitions, pop music, and advertising. Over two-thirds of the world's scientists write in English. Three quarters of the world's mail is written in English. Of all the information in the world's electronic retrieval systems, 80% is stored in English. People communicate on the Internet largely in English. English radio programmes are received by over 150 million in 120 countries. Over 50 million children study English as an additional language at primary level; over 80 million study it at a secondary level (these figures exclude China). In any one year, the British Council helps over a quarter of a million foreign students to learn English in various parts of the world. Half as many again learn English in the USA.
>
> (Crystal, 1997: 360)

Picking up on Crystal's observation on English as the predominant language of electronic information systems at that point in time, Fischer locates the English language at the heart of the transformations associated with globalisation; 'English is at the forefront of international linguistic change, riding the new techno-language wave' (Fischer, 1999: 214). He claims that the English language is on the verge of becoming a 'natural world language', an assertion which follows from his observation that '[t]he world's economic and political future is now being secured on a technological basis that is English-speaking and English-defined' (1999: 218). Everard concurs to the extent that '[t]he Internet, for all its rhetoric of globalisation, is primarily conducted in English' (2000: 36). He continues to note the broader socio-economic and cultural ramifications of this in that the acquisition of English necessary to gaining such access to the Internet requires education which may or may not be available at public expense. Also, engagement with the Internet as an English language domain carries with it, on the part of many users whose first language is English, a presumption of knowledge of the cultural framework associated with the English language by all other users they encounter. Everard also notes a significant technical problem, namely that scripts

other than Roman and Cyrillic, such as Japanese, Hangul or Hindi, are difficult to deploy on electronic information systems. As a result in South Africa, for example, while there are 12 official languages of state only English is available on the Internet (Everard, 2000: 37). Thus the dominant position of English as the language of the Internet raises questions of sovereignty, or empowerment and disempowerment, for both the networked individual and wired communities where English may be the second or third language of users (Everard, 2000: 54–55). The acquisition and use of English, therefore, can be both empowering and disempowering. In some situations of conflict the relationship between language and the new technologies media can impact at more mundane levels, literally on-the-street – Everard again:

> Among the processes of change being brought about by globalisation and the advent of digital communications is the change in the face of the political. When demonstrators in Russia and Albania hold up placards and banners written in English, it is clear that electronic media and the adoption of English as the lingua franca of the electronic media has rewritten the nature of political life at a global level.
>
> (Everard, 2000: 52–53)

Woolgar draws a cautionary note in the face of the hyperbole, euphoric or apocalyptic, which appears to typify much debate on the impact of new information technologies on society. He points out that many of the more fashionable visions of the information revolution are based upon intuitions derived from top-down views of the relationship between technology and society, too little attention has been paid to real, mundane applications of ICT in local social contexts (Woolgar, 2000 and 2001). Recently, Crystal has attempted to remedy this situation with particular reference to relationships between language and the Internet (2001). Counter to the conclusions reached by some by the mid 1990s that the most telling impact of the information revolution would be to further underscore the role of the English language as the natural global tongue, the Internet and the World Wide Web are becoming increasingly multilingual. Crystal reports (2001: 218) that some commentators are now suggesting that the World Wide Web will very shortly be predominantly non-English. Crystal concludes (2001: 218–219) that the virtual presence of languages on the World Wide Web is increasingly a reflection of their presence in the 'real' world.

> A Global Reach survey estimated that people with Internet access in non-English-speaking countries increased from 7 million to 136 million between 1995 and 2000. In 1998, the total number of newly created non-English Web sites passed that for newly created English Web sites, with Spanish, Japanese, German, and French the chief

> players. Alta Vista had six European sites in early 2000, and were predicting that by 2002 less than 50% of the Web would be in English.
> (Crystal, 2001: 218)

Crystal also suggests that this medium is not the exclusive domain of imperial-style languages. He also asserts that the World Wide Web is 'the ideal medium for minority languages' (2001: 221) due to the relatively low levels of cost and the moderate technical difficulties encountered by comparison with other media. Thus, he is able to find a virtual presence for the European minority languages and estimates that around a quarter of all of the world's languages have a presence on the World Wide Web (Crystal, 2001: 219–220). Ongoing developments in the field of machine translation, the extension of the character set which may be supported by operating systems coupled with an increasing concern with localisation 'the adaptation of a product to suit a target language and culture' (Crystal, 2001: 223) indicate to Crystal that the future of the World Wide Web and the Internet is multilingual. Thomas (2000: 1), however, sounds a note of caution. He points out that while languages other than English are increasingly marking out a presence on the Internet and that the Internet will become increasingly multilingual, the costs for deepening the virtual presence of a minority language are likely to be prohibitive, at least in the short term. Therefore, investment in multilingual infrastructures will probably be limited to an 'inner circle of languages for which it is commercially viable' (Thomas, 2000: 2). The ongoing struggle between Iceland and Microsoft regarding the localisation of products is, perhaps, going to be more typical of relationships between smaller language communities and ICTs than that relating to the Basque language whereby the government of the Basque Autonomous Community commissioned Microsoft, at very substantial cost, to localise Word and Windows into Basque.

The results of some research on certain social impacts of ICTs is beginning to emerge and, while the original research is largely non-language specific, some of the results have a bearing upon language with regard to notions of citizenship and relationships between individuals, specific interest groups and institutions. Some of the possible implications may be briefly noted. For example, Liff's (2001) work on *e*-gateways such as Internet cafés, community technology centres and telecottages enabled the identification of three types of user group behaviour, namely as consumer, communicator and citizen. Liff suggests that the notion of virtual citizenship, that is the fostering of a greater engagement between the citizenry and the institutions of governance through the use of ICTs, would appear to be difficult to develop. Users are more likely to seek out ICTs as a consumer or as a communicator than as a citizen, for example:

> The consumer role involves people being able to competently use information services and other facilities for a range of purposes. Com-

> municators participated to a greater degree in *e*-mail, chat rooms, communities of interest etc. Citizenship type activities involve an active engagement in the terms of information or service provision or in one's own content creation in the virtual world . . . Citizenship roles generally seemed to be more difficult to develop and particularly to sustain.
>
> (Liff, 2001: 2)

Another project on engendering public participation in local decision making (Carver and Turton, 2001) examined the potential applications of the Internet and the World Wide Web (in particular the use of Web-based GIS) as means of increasing public participation in local decision-making. The research was concerned with environmental matters and focussed on three case studies entitled 'Virtual Slaithwaite', 'Dales Woodland Planting' and 'Nuclear Waste Disposal'. The aims were to improve public involvement in decision-making and ultimately the accountability of decisions made through Virtual Decision-Making Environments [VDMEs]. Unfortunately, the live testing of the VDME did not occur with regard to the case on the disposal of nuclear waste due to the 'sensitive nature of current Government policy and the desire on the part of the research team not to jeopardise future funding opportunities with UK Nirex Ltd' (Carver and Turton, 2001: 11). Despite this the research team noted that:

> The research has proved successful in that the local and regional case studies have been seen to have had a positive impact on real decision problems and have created genuine opportunities for public participation in the decision and policy making process.
>
> (Carver and Turton, 2001: 13)

Some areas of difficulty were also revealed. The main issues related to accessibility, particularly the location of public access points to the VDME, the understandability of the material made available via the VDME and also to accountability, the task of ensuring the fullest possible representation of the community within the decision making process.

The notion of exclusion or marginalisation is also noted by Morley and Robins (1995), and in this case it is with specific regard to the televisual media. According to them, ICTs have a special role in mediating what they describe as the global-local nexus, the dynamic tension noted previously in this text between the global and the local, and in contributing to 'a new geographical disposition and new senses of community' (Morley and Robins, 1995: 5). This causes us to reconfigure the idea of the border:

> Increasingly we must think in terms of communications and transport networks and of the symbolic boundaries of language and culture –

> the 'spaces of transmission' defined by satellite footprints and culture – as providing the crucial, and permeable, boundaries of our age.
>
> (Morley and Robins, 1995: 1)

In the context of the televisual media, this tension between the global and the local, configurated as an *e*-border, is manifest as a conflict between network and community, for example:

> These global systems in information networks, satellite 'footprints' – also lay an abstract space over concrete territorial configurations. Consequently, older communities and older, localised, senses of community are undone. The question then is how network and community can be reconciled.
>
> (Morley and Robins, 1995: 75)

Reconciliation may be sought in balancing 'market integration and market diversity' (Morley and Robins, 1995: 17), that is a balance between the global possibilities of the technology and the local cultural specificities. A response in many European regions, typified by local televisual institutions such as ETB [The Basque Autonomous Community] and S4C [Wales], has been to seek to re-territorialise using the regional vernacular as the critical point of reference. As Maxwell (1996) notes, however, the aspirations of ETB have not been entirely realised in this respect and a part of the reason for this is due to the diverse nature of the Basque language community which the broadcaster seeks to address as a single unified market. To this extent one might agree with Morley and Robins in that the global-local nexus is not merely dynamic but also ambiguous, while failing to concur with the implicit suggestion of hierarchies of identity:

> Local cultures are overshadowed by an emerging 'world culture' – and still, of course, by resilient national and nationalist cultures. It may well be that in some cases, the new global contest is recreating sense of place and sense of community in very positive ways, giving rise to an energetic cosmopolitanism in certain localities. In others, however, local fragmentation may inspire a nostalgic, introverted and parochial sense of local attachment and identity. If globalisation recontextualises and reinterprets localism, it does so in ways that are equivocal and ambiguous.
>
> (Morley and Robins, 1995: 118)

The notion of *e*-borders might even be extended to within the home. Graham (1997), for example, expresses concern with regard to the matter of Monopolised Gateways. Gateways will be essential to digital TV in the form of Electronic Programme Guides [EPGs]. Only through one of these will the user gain access to the full range of digital channels. Eventually

the TV will be reception for all sorts of services including shopping, advice, education, entertainment etc. and, similarly, access to these will only be gained through an EPG. For Graham the question is which one and who will control it for the issue at stake is not merely a matter of ease of viewing but of exposure to content and the control the individual will be able to exercise over it. For example:

> Moreover EPGs could be much more influential than a reception service. They will set the agenda and, by highlighting some things rather than others, they will have the ability to guide both consumers and citizens to the areas the designer of the EPG wishes them to see first.
>
> (Graham, 1997: 4)

According to Graham government regulation on this matter is the answer in order to make EPGs subject to public interest considerations and also in order to ensure that content be local and interactive, that is reflective of local priorities and to involve local input (Graham, 1997: 6–7). The defining and maintenance of electronic borders then is a critical issue for local culture on the one hand and government on the other. For minority language communities the negotiation of culture and boundary which this entails is certain to be problematic.

A final observation on the impact of new technologies relates to the unevenness of distribution. A number of commentators confirm that the take-up rate of ICTs is much higher in urban centres than elsewhere (e.g. Tsagarousianou, Tambini and Bryan, 1997; Loader, 1998). This may encourage agreement with Taylor's view on the relative strengths of the networked, as opposed to the territorial, response to globalisation. For Taylor the networked, de-territorialised urban centres hold many attractions and opportunities in the postmodern realm of identity:

> *Fin de siècle* opportunity: cosmopolitan cities. With cities to the fore, cosmopolitan identities can again begin to rival national identities. The world of global cities is also the world of global diasporas leading to multiple layers of identity with state, national, regional, diasporic and city identities all available.
>
> (Taylor, 1999b: 10)

Cities could function in the global world as vital multi-ethnic and multilingual polities. If this were to happen it would represent a significant transformation in the relationship between urban centres and linguistic diversity. Historically the city of the modern nation-state has been a graveyard for languages other than the language of the state (e.g. Withers, 1991). There are some indications that such a transformation might already be underway. In the case of the Welsh language in Wales, Aitchison

and Carter (1987) have outlined a 'quiet revolution' in the capital city, Cardiff. In this 'transactional city' the Welsh language has undergone something of a renaissance, driven in part by the increasing institutionalisation of the language in the education system and also by a burgeoning Welsh-medium televisual industry. Such is the extent of the transformation that the ability to speak Welsh would appear to offer considerable socio-economic advantages. The concentrations of Welsh-speakers in the upper levels of the socio-economic register suggests to Aitchison and Carter that Hechter's model on the cultural division of labour in Britain's Celtic fringe requires modification. The fact that a similar phenomenon has been identified in relation to the Irish language in Northern Ireland (Mac Giolla Chríost and Aitchison, 1998) serves to reinforce the point.

While the urbanised autochthonous language communities in these cases appear to be breaking free from a disadvantageous cultural division of labour there is evidence from research on other urban centres of a new cultural division of labour (Castells, 1989: 172–228; Sassen, 1991: 299–317). In this case it is recent immigrants who are the victims. In European context the new immigrations are as much a consequence of Empires coming home (to paraphrase Taylor) and of the collapse of the USSR as they are a consequence of the various challenges and opportunities presented by the new global economy. The fact of these new migrations open up, for many, new questions of citizenship and rights:

> [T]raditional conceptions of the citizen and citizenship are vigorously in question at every geographic level of the world system – for we are all of us rapidly coming to be, at one and the same time, participants in local, national, plurinational, and global communities – but nowhere as immediately or urgently as in the large global city-regions of the new world system.
>
> (Scott, 2000: 8)

In this context, the appeal by Williams and Van der Merwe (1996) for more sustained and interdisciplinary research on urban multilingualism becomes more urgent again. Also in this regard, relationships between language planning and citizenship are of central concern:

> [T]he plight of minority cultures and of ethnolinguistic religious groups have become central in the social fabric of metropolitan life. This has a number of implications for urban planning, particularly in the fields of education, social services and employment. Central to such service provision is the question of language choice and official usage in the public domain . . . This, in turn, leads to the wider question of the balance of rights between the individual and the group, and between constituent groups and the sovereign state.
>
> (Williams and Van der Merwe, 1996: 49)

Williams and Van der Merwe draw on a substantial body of literature in which it is demonstrated that language in urban context is best understood in terms of social networks rather than territory. For example:

> Community without propinquity seems a more accurate characterisation of contemporary social interaction for many urban residents. Thus attention has switched somewhat from an analysis of cities as containers to an analysis of cities consisting of transaction flows and competing social networks.
>
> (Ibid., 1996: 53)

Given this complexity, they argue, urban sociolinguistics requires GIS applications to discern language behaviour in the urban realm. The more sensitive analytic tools available via GIS should enable more effective language planning on the basis of much more sophisticated insights into the working of language in urban context. As we have seen earlier, the same GIS apparatus could also be used to engage community level participation in language planning processes and decision making.

Conclusions

Such developments raise a critical issue in planning strategy for those who seek to defend a language community. It has been the case that language planning strategies have been territorially based. In this new context of flows, networks and global cities such strategies fail to engage with the new nodalities of power, and empowerment is crucial to the continuity of a language community. Castells puts the notion of cultural resistances to globalisation in general in the following terms:

> The meaninglessness of places, the powerlessness of political institutions are resented and resisted, individually and collectively by a variety of social actors. People have affirmed their cultural identity, often in territorial terms, mobilizing to achieve their demands, organizing their communities, and staking out their places to preserve meaning, to restore . . . control . . . in the midst of abstraction of the new historical landscape . . . Faced with the variable geometry of the space of flows, grassroots mobilizations tend to be defensive, protective, territorially bounded, or so culturally specific that their codes of self-recognizing identity become non-communicable, with societies tending to fragment themselves into tribes, easily prone to fundamentalist affirmation of identity.
>
> (Castells, 1989: 349–350)

Avoiding this descent into tribalism, according to Castells, requires a strategy which operates on three levels – cultural, political and economic. In

the operation of strategy it is local, not national, government which holds the key. This, Castells claims (1989: 351), is because the critical issue for the global economy is the possibility of adaptation to the forces of globalisation 'in each specific location as it relates to a given locality'. In this, national government is too remote from the local and exercises no control over the global. Local government, in partnership with others, has the greater potential to respond effectively:

> [I]f innovative social projects, represented and implemented by renewed local governments, are able to master formidable forces unleashed by the revolution in information technologies, then a new socio-spatial structure could emerge made up of a network of local communes controlling and shaping a network of productive flows. Maybe then our historical time and our social space would converge towards the reintegration of knowledge and meaning into a new Informational City.
>
> (Castells, 1989: 353)

In the context of such resistances language planning strategies should, therefore, be local, networked and urban.

Part 4

Conflicts

9 Language movements, ethnic mobilisation and the state

> The height of a political language conflict is reached when all conflict factors are combined in a single symbol, language, and quarrels and struggles in very different areas [politics, economics, administration, education] appear under the heading language conflict. In such cases, politicians and economic leaders also operate on the assumption of language conflict, disregarding the actual underlying causes, and thus continue to feed 'from above' the conflict that has arisen 'from below', with the result that language assumes much more importance than it had at the outset of the conflict. This language-oriented 'surface symptom' then obscures the more deeply rooted, suppressed 'deeper causes' [social and economic problems].
>
> (Nelde, 1987: 35)

> A fundamental problem that exists in the modern world is the imbalance between the number of languages that are spoken and the number of autonomous states.
>
> (Wardhaugh, 1987: 23)

Introduction

Conflict in Europe has been an extremely common phenomenon throughout the modern period, including two global conflicts as well as numerous inter-state conflicts. Since 1945, however, it is another type of conflict which has been most common. Indeed, it is the case that since the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent implosion of the USSR in particular, that conflicts of this nature predominate globally. In the literature on conflict a variety of terms are used to describe this new type of conflict. These include 'internal conflict', 'ethnic conflict', 'intractable conflict', 'protracted social conflict', 'deep rooted conflict' and 'international social conflict'. Obviously no two conflict situations are exactly the same but it is the case that there exist a range of shared features. It is not our aim to underplay the myriad causes of conflict but given the expansive nature of the literature on many individual cases of conflict (e.g. Gow, 1997 on ex-Yugoslavia) it is necessary to distil the material in

order to hope to begin to effectively manage and ultimately to resolve conflict. In many of the contemporary conflict situations in Europe and Eurasia ethnicity is a central feature and, in many cases, language issues are significant. It is argued here that questions of language, identity and conflict relate in general terms to the relationship between ethnicity and the modern notion of state, that is the nation-state. Language conflict, however, is not merely a matter of *realpolitik*. In an attempt to sketch an outline of the characteristic patterns in this relationship we draw upon a number of theoretical perspectives on conflict from within the discipline of political science. In this way, the issue of language as it relates to conflict is located within a framework which enables us to not only discern the causal factors in conflict and to trace the course of conflict but also to reasonably consider both the management and resolution of conflict with specific regard to language in social context.

Language conflict

Of the very few scholars of language who have directly approached the issue of language in conflict, C.H. Williams offers the most coherent socio-political perspective on language in conflict. He suggests (1984) that language largely relates to a particular form of conflict in western Europe which he describes as 'ethnic separatism'. The phenomenon arises in the context of the nation-state building processes of the nineteenth century. The various attempts at the construction of the ideal form (for nineteenth century nationalists) of this polity resulted in states which were defined by a homogenous and exclusive national identity while, in most, cases incorporating a multiplicity of ethnic groups. The goal of state formation, which was to realise a single citizenry despite ethnic or cultural variety, would be achieved through resolving a series of crises. These related to the following (Williams, 1984: 183):

- identity: the extension of an active sense of membership in the national state community to the entire populace;
- legitimacy: securing a generalised acceptance of the rightness of the exercise and structure of authority by the state;
- participation: the enlargement of the numbers of persons actively involved in the political arena;
- distribution: ensuring that the valued resources in society such as material well-being and status are available on equal terms to all persons;
- penetration: extending the effective operation of the state to the periphery.

Those ethnic groups which found themselves to be minorities within these nation-states, argues Williams, were vulnerable to assimilation in the

name of maximising the efficacy of the nation-state building process. Under such circumstances some minorities feel the continuity of their group identity threatened and hence, it is these groups who are prone to ethnic separatist tendencies:

> The great transition in state-formation and nationality-formation which the age of nationalism ushered in is of tremendous import as a precedent for the use of language as the prime cultural marker in the definition of political territories. Though not a complete process this attempt to co-relate nationality and statehood in the nineteenth century has provided the framework within which our more current concern with ethnic separatism may be set.
>
> (Williams, 1984: 188)

The manifestation of ethnic separatism requires certain preconditions. According to Williams they comprise the existence of three things – a core territory which the ethnic group identifies as its 'homeland', a cultural basis of community from which the identity of the group may be fashioned, and opposition groups which are associated with the threats to the continuity of the group. As we have already seen, language is useful as a potential marker of ethnicity and hence is also useful to ethnic separatists as a means of group mobilisation. Language, therefore, functions as a political resource (Williams, 1984: 187–188). Williams puts it in the following terms:

> Language is a means of mediating between the past and the present; it is the repository of a group's collective identity, rooted in a national territory. Attempts to challenge this arrangement . . . often lead to reactive ethnic assertion . . . [L]anguage promotion [is] not mere cultural attachment, but often a rational and instrumental attempt to reduce socio-economic inequality, to wrest more power from the state and opposition groups, and to determine an increasing amount of the ethnic group's role in the wider political structure.
>
> (Williams, 1984: 215)

Williams concludes that the result of this politicisation of language is that matters of language in conflict largely relate to the contestation of state policy and the distribution of resources. Some work on conflict theory in the field of political science would appear to confirm this view of language in conflict. For Lake and Rothchild (1996) conflict in general relates to resources, for example:

> Competition for scarce resources typically lies at the heart of ethnic conflict. Property rights, jobs, scholarships, educational admissions, language rights, government contracts, and development allocations

> all confer particular benefits on individuals and groups. Whether finite in supply or not, all such resources are scarce and, thus, objects of competition and occasionally struggle between individuals and, when organized, groups.
>
> (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 7)

In turn, resources competition relates directly to the state as the redistributive agent:

> Politics matter, in turn, because governments control access to scarce resources and the future income streams that flow from them. Individuals and groups that possess political power can often gain privileged access to these resources and, thus, increase their welfare. Because it sets the terms of competition between groups, the state itself becomes an object of group competition. Accordingly, the pursuit of particularistic objectives often becomes embodied in competing visions of just, legitimate, or appropriate political orders.
>
> (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 7)

Others, however, have demonstrated that issues in conflict cannot be reduced to the politics of material concerns alone. Some conflicts in western Europe have endured beyond the point despite wide-ranging responses meeting the concerns expressed by participants in conflict regarding the allocation of resources. In seeking to build upon the work of Williams we necessarily make reference to the recent and rapid expansion of literature on conflict in the field of political science. Some of the limitations of the work on language in conflict to date may be explained by the simple matter of timing. Williams was writing in 1984, prior to a number of developments which have substantially revised views upon the contemporary nature of conflict.

A more extensive and more subtle range of causal factors in conflict are to be sought out, as Rupesinghe and Tishkov suggest:

> [T]he viability of political arrangements between groups is only part of the intricate matrix of most conflicts, which can involve issues of governance and authority as well as issues of ideology, identity, economic disparity, competition for resources, and other factors, most often in complex combinations.
>
> (Rupesinghe and Tishkov, 1996: 1, 19 December 2000 http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unubooks/uu12ee/uu12ee03.htm)

For others (Last and Carment, 1995) it is not the process of state formation which is the source of conflict but rather the declining legitimacy of the state:

> [W]e may have relied too much on states to provide security, when they have often been the source of insecurity for their citizens. Internal conflicts often arise from the declining legitimacy of states as their governments indulge in repression and collective punishment, or simply fail to meet citizens' needs for security, welfare and identity.
>
> (Last and Carment, 1995: 1–2)

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR have preceded a period characterised by the proliferation of diverse forms of conflict beyond the industrialised western world. One of the particular limitations we seek to address relates to the insight that language only features in conflicts which are 'ethnic'. The failure to encompass conflicts in which language is clearly a feature, but not a causal factor, precludes the possibility of language as key to managing and resolving conflict. In a survey of conflicts in the area of the ex-USSR Tishkov (1996) finds that what are usually categorised as ethnic conflicts are in fact much more complex than that. For example, Tishkov observes that many experts on the ex-USSR regarded the movements for independence in the Baltic states as cases of ethnic conflict having developed within the USSR. Tishkov counters this, noting the involvement of many ethnic Russians in the different independence movements cutting across ethnic divisions in a political conflict with the USSR as a hegemonic and ineffective state structure. As the conflict unfolded other tensions emerged which served to greatly complicate the nature of the conflict:

> In this Baltic case, it is not so easy to distinguish inter-ethnic parameters from the predominantly vertical political struggle between the periphery and the centre. In spite of inter-ethnic tensions between titular groups and that part of the Russian-speaking population which showed solidarity with the agonizing all-Union structures, it would be an oversimplification to put all these contradictions in a category and analyse the tension as an ethnic conflict per se.
>
> (Tishkov, 1996: 1)

In short, Tishkov emphasises the multifaceted nature of conflict and the inherent capacity of conflict to be driven by a range of factors, some of which are contradictory.

Many commentators agree that the contemporary resurgence in conflict, including conflicts which are driven by issues of ethnicity and language, is derived from the perceived inability of the nation-state to deliver as that guarantor. For example, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development asserts that it is the:

> [N]ation-state's ineffectiveness at meeting basic human needs, which leads to social insecurity that sets the stage for social tensions ...

> [F]uture security in the world would require a shift of focus from a narrow notion of state security towards concern for human security, by bringing issues such as poverty, unemployment and environmental degradation into the realm of security concerns. The upsurge in ethnic conflict today is proof that security defined narrowly in national or military terms may be ineffective, or even counter-productive, without a long-term global commitment to promote human security.
>
> (UNRISD, 1995: 15)

This claim merits some interrogation in the context of our particular area of study. The effectiveness of the nation-state is, to some extent, relative to the other available polity options. In this context issues of language and identity vary in their relationship to conflict across Europe and Eurasia and do so largely according to macro-political shifts. For example, throughout the greater part of eastern Europe and Eurasia the collapse of the USSR is the defining factor. This works in two ways. In the first place, the end of the Cold War meant that conflicts which were previously only to be understood as a dimension of the Cold War required other explanations. In the second place, and perhaps more significantly, the collapse of the Soviet experiment in socialism served to fatally undermine the legitimacy of the USSR as a state. The UNRISD (1995) puts it in the following terms:

> The post-Cold War rise in ethnic conflict is thus due, in part, to definitional changes, since similar conflicts had previously been interpreted within the Cold War paradigm of bipolar blocks. Second, severe social and economic disruption in much of the world has resulted in widespread poverty, unemployment and insecurity, especially in Africa, Eastern Europe and the former USSR. The failure of many socialist and developmentalist states has led to disillusionment with development policies and ideologies, and a loss of state legitimacy . . . [I]n most instances, violent ethnic conflict was the result of the collapse of the state, rather than the cause of the collapse of the state.
>
> (UNRISD, 1995: 14)

Throughout the territory of the ex-USSR the conflict process may be outlined, very briefly, as follows:

- collapse/decline of the state;
- transition of power;
- nation-state building;
- institutionalisation of reformulation of civic/ethnic values.

A power vacuum is the most obvious result of the collapse of a state. What

is less certain is the nature of the mobilisation strategies which will be adopted by those interested in securing power. With the collapse of the state the notion of civic-based forms of identity is redundant as, by definition, no institutions exist which command the allegiance of society as a whole. Other bases for identity must be sought. In the territory of the ex-USSR ethnicity and, in particular, language, have been to the fore as features in mobilisation (e.g. Tishkov, 1997; Waters, 1998). One of the main reasons for this is that almost all protagonists in the post-Soviet conflicts set out as their aim the construction of a nation-state to succeed the quasi-imperial order of the USSR. From the point of transition of power from the former Soviet structures to new political operators, Williams' work (1984) on language issues in state formation is of some general relevance to the extent that the evidence from the various nation-state building processes in this post-Soviet landscape (Hunter, 1994; Smith *et al.*, 1998) shows that most adopted the classic, modern form of the nation-state as a template. That is the nation-state as a culturally homogenous and absolutely sovereign socio-political entity. That which Chilton (1997), however, rightly claims for language and conflict in nineteenth century nation-state building projects does not hold true for these post-Soviet projects:

> From the linguistic point of view, Haugen (1966: 922–935) distinguishes four phases of national language construction which have historically been part of state construction in Europe. First, a dominant elite 'selects' a dialect, second the social and political functions of the language are 'elaborated', third dictionaries and grammars 'codify' and prescribe the language, and finally it is 'standardised' through education and public media. It may be argued that such a process yields communicative and social benefits. Equally it can be argued that it leads to infringement of the rights of minorities and may produce conflict. Certainly, oppressive measures have been used within emergent nation-states in order to impose linguistic uniformity and political adherence – for example, in the Celtic fringe in nineteenth-century Britain, and throughout France following the Revolutionary zeal for the destruction of supposedly disloyal or backward 'patois'. Concentrating on war *between* sovereign states can obscure violence *within* states arising from the exploitation of linguistic and cultural differences, whether by established governments or by competing political groups . . . [P]articular languages become national languages only as a result of the political processes that produce separate and potentially conflicting sovereign entities. In the course of, and as a result of linguistic homogenisation states may use violence or may provoke it.
>
> (Chilton, 1997: 177 and 186–187)

Under the Soviet system the Russian language was adopted as the *lingua franca* of the multilingual federation that was the USSR and was ultimately intended at the natural language of a new socialist people, *Sovetskii narod.* At the same time the other languages of the USSR underwent codification and standardisation and some of them were elevated to the state of co-official language, alongside Russian, in the various constituent political units of the Soviet state. Hence, the process of the construction of a national language for the post-Soviet nation-states has been very different. The main characteristic of the process has been the relegation of Russian and the exclusive entrenchment of the formerly co-official titular languages. This response by the various post-Soviet regimes has led to new conflicts, therefore, in particular regarding citizenship (e.g. Birckenbach, 1997; de Varennes, 1996; Hallik, 1996; Laitin, 1998) and the status of the post-Soviet Russian diaspora (e.g. Pilkington, 1998; Smith, 1999). According to many, language issues are likely to be a cause of future conflicts (e.g. Fierman, 1997).

Similarly, Tilly's model of nineteenth century state formation as an explanation of language in conflict is problematic in its application to the Balkans. This region has been most deeply shaped by what may be characterised as 'End of Empire' events. It is in this south-eastern part of Europe that the boundaries between the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian Empires shifted to and fro during much of the modern period (Bideleux, 1998; McCarthy, 2001). Their simultaneous collapse during the First World War left the region in a constant condition of power-in-transition until the creation of the federal socialist state of Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the Second World War. Even then the region remained an enigmatic borderland between the Cold War hegemons – the USSR and the USA. The long historical function of this region as the confluence point of imperial powers and their attendant differing cultures has left its mark on the ethno-linguistic landscape. The region is defined by a variegated socio-political cleavage which is shaped, in part, by language. Serbian and Croatian nationalists disagree on many things but are able to agree upon the distinctiveness of the Serb and Croat languages contrary to the widespread recognition of a single Serbo-Croatian language up until the point of the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Ramet, 1996; Sucic, 1996). Language grievances were a central issue for the Albanian-speaking population of Kosovo in their conflict with Serbia (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2001). Similarly, language is an integral feature of the current conflict between the Albanian-speaking population of Macedonia and the state but in addition there is considerable tension on the matter of the status of Macedonian as a language distinct from Bulgarian (Daftary, 2000).

The depth of this cleavage in south-eastern Europe may find a parallel elsewhere in our area of study in the form of the Lotharingian axis. In the premodern period this cultural and linguistic borderland between

French-speaking and German-speaking Europe was the site of enduring hostilities. By the modern period it coincided with a series of nineteenth century conflicts between two nation-states, France and Germany, both of which viewed the other as inferior including in cultural terms (it is not a coincidence that, for many, Germany and France embody two distinct pathways to nation-state). This hostility culminated in two global conflicts which were only resolved with development of what is now known as the European Union. The purpose of this brutally truncated history is to suggest that, given the multiple historical cleavages in south-eastern Europe, the resolution of conflict in this region is likely to require a response as radical as was the original notion of the EEC to both West Germany [as it was] and France in the wake of the Second World War and at the outset of the Cold War. In contemporary northern and western Europe the processes relating to language and identity in conflict are shaped by other issues. Again, they confound the state formation model as an explanatory framework of language in conflict. Here, the nation-state is undergoing a profound reconfiguration which some characterise as decline and, as we have seen earlier in this study, this is being effected from above and below, that is at both local and global level. From the 1960s in particular there has been increasing pressure for autochthonous devolution processes in all nation-states. In many cases, especially in France, Spain, Italy and the UK, language was a feature in mobilisation. By the last decade of the twentieth century this had resulted in various forms of devolved government. By now the language tensions relate to the civic-ethnic identity of institutions and language reproduction.

At a pan-European level the impact of globalisation upon framing language in conflict has to be accounted for. As has already been noted, in this context the idea of homogenous and exclusive national identity has been undermined by notions of the plurality and permeability of identity, of identity as process and of the possibilities of multiple citizenship. New forms of governance including the continued evolution of the European Union and the emergence of novel forms of multi-levelled government and the potentiality of virtual institutions all impact upon the social encounter between individuals, groups and institutions. All of this indicates the inadequacy of the state formation model as a means of explaining the dynamics of language in conflict. Also, rather than restricting our vision to conflicts which are, *prima facie,* driven by issues of ethnicity, including language concerns, we contend that it is more useful to embrace a broader definition of conflict than Williams. This may embrace both ethnicity and language as features of and factors in conflict while not necessarily requiring that, in order to merit the attention of academics and policy makers in the field of conflict studies, they be defining issues. Given the complex evolution of conflicts, it is argued here that the identification of the functioning of language in conflict in general is important with regard to understanding particular conflicts

and in seeking ways of managing and resolving them. In order to achieve this it is necessary to recourse to a rather diffuse field of study termed conflict studies.

Language in conflict theory

It is our aim, of course, to set out proposals on the management and resolution of conflict from the perspective of language issues but in order to reach that point it is necessary first of all to locate language in theoretical perspectives on the causes and nature of conflict. Language in contemporary conflict is being shaped by forces which are driving in different directions, that is, across the area of study we are able to trace a number of contradictory socio-political shifts which are impacting upon language in conflict situations. These may be characterised as 'End of Empire' events and associated nation-state building processes, the post-modern reconfiguration of the nation-state and globalisation. In all of these, the transition of power is a common denominator. But power is not the only issue. The notions of 'basic human needs' and 'interests' as understood in conflict theory, while problematic, are also of significance. It is through the critical exploration of these concepts that a better understanding as to why it is that ethnicity has emerged as a crucial mechanism for mobilisation in conflict situations is sought. Here, we return to Barth's conceptualisation of the ethnic flows or frontiers and to Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital. The application of these notions to theoretical perspectives on conflict helps us to explain how language is often a key to ethnic mobilisation and a consistent feature of contemporary conflict situations.

For many scholars within conflict theory the notion of 'basic human needs' is understood to be central to explaining the causal factors of conflict. The concept is most closely identified with the work of Burton (1969, 1987, 1990) on what he described as 'deep rooted conflict'. He draws upon human biology in delineating the range of fundamental and universal human needs which, if threatened or unfulfilled, result in conflict. The list varies but includes the following:

- physical and psychological security;
- basic survival needs;
- identity needs;
- economic needs;
- political participation;
- and freedom.

According to Burton, these needs are different from interests in that they are non-negotiable and are equivalent to 'values that are not for trading' (Burton, 1987: 23). The basic human needs are not in and of themselves

the source of conflict but conflict will arise from the 'ignoring, suppressing or failing to promote revealed, non-negotiable needs' (Burton, 1987: 23). Also, the resources pertinent to fulfilling these basic human needs are not, according to Burton, in finite supply. Conflict, therefore, is not an issue of simple shortage of resources but rather relates to the relative accessibility of resources. The control of access to the resources necessary to meeting the demands of basic human needs is the key to understanding the needs theory in conflict.

Taking his cue from Burton, Azar identifies four causal categories in what he terms 'protracted social conflict'. They are as follows:

- communal content;
- human needs;
- governance and the role of the state;
- and international linkages.

Communal content refers to the communal composition of society and according to Azar protracted social conflicts are most likely to arise in multicommunal societies, for example:

> If a society is characterized by multicommunal composition, protracted social conflicts are most likely to arise. (We use the term community as a generic reference to politicized groups whose members share ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural 'identity' characteristics.)
>
> (Azar, 1990: 7)

As we have already noted, however, almost all societies (or nation-states) contain within their boundaries more than one ethnic, or otherwise defined, group (e.g. Wardhaugh, 1987: 22–26). This in itself, however, does not explain the manifestation of conflict. This is to be explained by the uneven or unjust distribution of the resources for meeting the basic human needs of the various constituent groups of a society. It is this relative deprivation which 'cultivates a niche for protracted social conflict' (Azar, 1990: 9). In other words, conflict is derived from a lack of access to the control of the allocation or exchange of resources as the means of satisfying needs. Such access to socio-political institutions, that is the effective participation in society, is in itself a need. Moreover, it is a need which relates directly to issues of identity and language, that is to needs of acceptance:

> In many cases . . . deprivation of physical needs and denial of access are rooted in the refusal to recognize or accept the communal *identity* of other groups. Formation and acceptance of identity thus also may be understood as a basic developmental need, with collective identity

> manifest in terms of cultural values, images, customs, language, religion, and racial heritage.
>
> (Azar, 1990: 9)

Security needs, the other category of needs defined by Azar are also related to the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of access and acceptance needs. Azar puts the case in the following terms with particular reference to the Lebanon:

> The satisfaction of needs for communal security, fair governance by the ruling elites, and acceptance and recognition of cultural diversity, are all basic to nation-state building in that country. The deprivation of security cannot be understood without reference to equitable access to the institutions of government, cultural tolerance and acceptance of diversity. The deprivation of one form of developmental need usually leads to problems in other areas.
>
> (Azar, 1990: 10)

The third causal factor in conflict relates to the role of the state. According to Azar, it is the state in its role as the regulator of social, political and economic interactions which enables the deprivation of needs for physical security, access to the social superstructure and the acceptance of communal identity. The domination of the state by one group or a very narrow range of groups, as is usually the case with nation-states, allows for this deprivation to arise. The failure of a state to insulate what Azar (1990: 11) describes as its policy capacity or decision-making machinery from the pressures of the dominant identity group limits the ability of the state to meet the needs of other groups. Under circumstances in which the state is unable or unwilling to meet the needs of certain groups a crisis of legitimacy for the state is often the result. Finally, according to Azar (1990: 11) the policy capacity and, by extension, the legitimacy of the state will be undermined through international linkages relating to economic dependency and political cliency. In the latter relationship the state, in sacrificing a level of autonomy for the protection of a more powerful patron state, may be induced to pursue policies which are 'disjoined' or 'contradictory' to meeting the needs of society. It is the former which is most inimical to the state:

> [A] dependent relationship not only limits the autonomy of the state, but also distorts the pattern of economic development, impeding the satisfaction of security needs. Moreover, dependency often exacerbates denial of the access needs of communal groups, distorting domestic political and economic systems through the realignment of subtle coalitions of international capital, domestic capital, and the state.
>
> (Azar, 1990: 11)



Figure 11 Genesis and dynamics of protracted social conflict

Adapted from Azar, 1990: 8

In this sense conflict, therefore, relates to the unfulfilment of the basic human needs of certain identified groups within society. The failure to fulfil these needs is the result of the interplay of a number of different factors including the identity composition of society, the role of the state and the nature international economic and political relationships. Azar summarises it as follows (Figure 11):

> In brief, protracted social conflicts occur when communities are deprived of satisfaction or their basic needs on the basis of their communal identity. However, the deprivation is the result of a complex causal chain involving the role of the state and the pattern of international linkages. Furthermore, initial conditions (colonial legacy, domestic historical setting, and the multicommunal nature of society) play important roles in shaping the genesis of protracted social conflict.
>
> (Azar, 1990: 12)

While the notion of basic human needs remains central to much of the theoretical work on conflict (e.g. Burton, 1990; Last and Carment, 1995; Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 1996; Zartman and Rasmussen, 1997) it has been criticised in a number of quarters. In the context of this study we must take issue with the idea of conflict as understood by the proponents of basic human needs theory on a number of points. Mitchell (1990) notes that basic human needs theory is derived from a biological view on the behaviour of individuals and, as a result, its application to the complex dynamics of group behaviour is problematic. Indeed, much of the literature on groupness in this body of work conceives of ethnic and other groups as homogenous and bounded entities. Given the fundamental nature of the notion of group to understanding the functioning of

conflict, it is necessary to be reminded that groupness is not given. In problematising the notion of group in relation to ethnic and cultural identity previously in this study it was concluded that A.D. Smith's conceptualisation of ethnic group as *ethnie* allowed us to bridge the apparent dichotomy between the primordial and instrumental/social constructive views of ethnicity. It was also demonstrated that *ethnies* are not by nature homogenous and bounded entities but rather they are characterised by their multidimensionality and also by their porosity. In this way the interactions groups occur within a frontier of interaction rather than across excluding borders.

Väyrynen (2001) seeks to modify the bio-genetic determinism of Burton and basic human needs theory through placing emphasis on the salience of culture in the functioning of conflict. In brief, she adheres to the view that social actors are not driven by universal needs but that; 'social actors are constructed in the social world and . . . they, in turn, construct their reality, needs and identity in that world' (Väyrynen, 2001: 105). Needs, therefore, are produced in specific social practices. In short, they are socially constructed. In this context, conflict is understood to arise not merely from differences of interest but also from the management of meaning and the collapse of shared realities. More to the point, she also claims to accommodate the following: 'How ethnic identities are formed in the process of conflict and how the dominant definitions of ethnicity are reconstituted through and in conflict resolution processes' (Väyrynen, 2001: 143).

The critique of the work of Burton offered by Väyrynen serves to highlight the deterministic limitations of basic human needs theory. In adopting a straightforward social constructive position we must part company with Väyrynen. The reduction of language in ethnicity to instrumentality has already been rejected in this study. We should turn instead to an anthropological perspective on conflict. Avruch (1998) suggests a reorientation of Burton's view of cultural identity through the recognition of the duality of culture – generic and local. Generic culture is 'foundational' in its universality whereas in local context culture it is characterised by variability and diversity: 'Generic culture directs our attention to universal attributes of human behaviour – to "human nature". Local culture diverts our attention to diversity, difference, and particularism' (Avruch, 1998: 10).

This allows us to recognise the possibility of general universal needs but that in particular conflict situations these needs can only be properly understood with reference to the local context. This task can only be accomplished through giving due regard to the specificity of culture in conflict theory. This specificity derives from the fact that culture is differentially distributed within society. In this sense, individuals embody multiple cultural identities and within groups culture is both socially and psychologically distributed. The significance of the differentiated distribution of culture, defined as 'ideational codes, schemas, metaphors, or cog-

nitive models' (Avruch, 1998: 57), within a population for developing an understanding of conflict is that the resulting variations in perception and belief directly effect calculations of interests, resources and power. In this way Avruch modifies what he terms as the realist paradigm of conflict in which conflict is reduced to competition over limited resources and all politics are defined in terms of power. For Avruch, power is neither 'an existential primitive' nor 'monolithic'; 'there are varieties of power ... power is never fully divorced from questions of legitimacy, and the bases of legitimacy are always cultural ones' (Avruch, 1998: 54). Culture is, therefore, central to understanding power. Understanding culture in this way also allows Avruch to reject what he describes as the idealist paradigm on conflict which relates the causes of conflict to cultural difference. The idealist view is that conflict resolution can be engineered through the building of common ground, through placing emphasis on that which is held in common. This has the effect of suppressing heterogeneity. Moreover, it is, of necessity, built upon the assumption that the root causes of conflict are cultural difference. The idealist position is the result of a confusion which Avruch describes as follows: 'This view makes "culture" into a cause of conflict. On the whole, it is a specious view, one that confuses deeply rooted and constitutive *cultural* difference with socially constructed and politically motivated *ethnic* difference' (Avruch, 1998: 29).

This echoes the primordial and social constructive dichotomy which is bridged with regard to ethnicity in the concept of *ethnie* and with regard to language in the concept of cultural capital. In this way language may be regarded as relating to both generic and local culture, as understood by Avruch. The implications of this insight for conflict theory is deceptively simple; it allows Avruch (1998: 100–103) to collapse the two views of conflict into a dialectical relationship embracing both divergent material interests and divergent cognitions.

Conclusions

The state formation model does not provide an adequate explanation of language in conflict. In the context of conflict theory in general, language in conflict may be understood as a need or interest which variously relates to issues of identity, ideology, resources and governance. It relates to both the cultural bases of communities in conflict, to constitutive cultural difference and also to the material needs or interests of groups, that is to socially constructed and politically motivated ethnic difference. It is both a socio-political resource and an interest which itself requires resourcing. These conclusions require that we revisit ecolinguistics with a view to modifying conceptions of language and ethnicity in a network of ecological relations.

10 Language conflict and language in conflict

> When we ask why, in a certain inhabited area of a country, such and such a language is no longer used ... we are faced with a limited number of answers ... The causes and the processes of such language shifts are worthy of study, not only because they are so often the indicators of actual or impending language conflict, but also because they are intimately related to the life and death of languages.
>
> (Mackey, 1980: 36)

> Most contact between ethnic groups does not occur in peaceful, harmoniously co-existing communities.
>
> (Nelde, 1987: 34)

Introduction

We have already seen how competition, or conflict, is central to the operation of ecosystems. It is a concept which is fundamental to our understanding of ecology in all its guises. It follows that a comprehensive ecological view on language in society will identify the function of conflict with regard to language issues. It is necessary, therefore, to locate the notion of conflict in the field of ecolinguistics. In doing so, the centrality of the group in ecolinguistics is extended to the operation of conflict in ecological context, that is to say that conflict is a function of group dynamics. At the same time, however, the notion of the group in ecolinguistics is problematised. The idea of ethnically exclusive language groups is shown to be a construct necessary to societies in conflict. Also, the work of Giddens is adapted and borrowed from in identifying violent socio-political conflict within a hierarchy of competition. In this context, language is identified in relation to the function of conflict as a mechanism of reproduction and also in relation to notions of power, material resources and cultural capital as the focal points of conflict. As a result, language is located at the heart of the matter of conflict in a manner which illuminates both the causal factors in conflict and the dynamics of conflict.

Groupness in a network of ecological relationships

Our review of the key literature on conflict theory has revealed the central function of groups in conflict. It appears to be the case that conflict, or competition, is driven by individuals who are organised or mobilised as groups. These groups may take a wide variety of forms including, for example, lobby or special interest groups, ethnic groups, nation-states and multi-state organisations. In this way, it is appropriate that the notion of the group is equally critical to understanding conflict in the field of ecolinguistics. Groupness, however, requires problematisation in this context.

Haarmann confronts the notion of groupness directly but in his exploration of the topic, in particular in relation to ethnic group boundaries and multiple identities, he adopts a rather rigid position on ethnic identity (Haarmann, 1983, 1986). With regard to ethnic group boundaries, Haarmann draws from the early work of Barth (1969) and the work of Horowitz (1975) in arriving at his position on ethnic boundaries. He borrows from Barth the idea of the ethnic boundary as a mechanism, for which he uses the term *Aberenzungmechanismen*, for maintaining ethnic difference. In turn, he adapts two critical processes from the work of Horowitz (1975) which may operate within this mechanism. They are characterised as ethnic fusion and fission. For Haarmann, these are the keys to understanding the dynamics of language in relation to the phenomenon of ethnic boundaries – *Aberenzungsphänomene*. This implies that intergroup ethnic relations are only dynamic in so far as one group may be assimilated by another (fusion) or, alternatively, that groups are progressively differentiated (fission) from each other.

It has already been demonstrated in this study that interactions between ethnic groups are best viewed in the context of Barth's later work. In this, relationships between ethnic groups are characterised as flows, suggesting a permeability and fluidity of boundaries. This conceptualisation of boundaries is to be found in the work of others in the field of ecolinguistics. For example, Mühlhäusler asserts that '[E]cological LP [language planning] encourages permeable boundaries' (2000: 360). Also without offering any extensive theoretical exposition, Denison notes that in the context of European linguistic ecology 'group membership [is] ill-defined, blurred at the edges and non-exclusive, since membership of different language-communities typically overlaps to a considerable extent' (Denison, 2001: 76).

In a manner similar to his treatment of ethnic boundaries, Haarmann's view upon multiple identities is suggestive of rigid group identity. For Haarmann multiple identity is understood to mean the various ethnic, political, cultural, occupational affiliations that individuals may claim. It does not encompass the possibility of multiple ethnic affiliations, nor is there any particular recognition of the internal complexities of ethnic group identity, that is the potential for individual members of the same

ethnic group to perceive and to articulate their sense of self and belonging in very different ways. The phenomenon of multiple identities is correctly seen by Haarmann as a potential mechanism for reducing conflict (e.g. Haarmann, 1983: 31*ff*; Haarmann, 1986: 90, 91, 98), for example:

> Die Entwicklung multipler Identitäten ist aus dieser Perspecktive ein entschneidener Wirkungsfaktor, die Isolation ethnischer Gruppen su verhindern und durch deren Einbindung in die sozialen strukturen der einzelstaatlichen Gesellschaft interethnische Konflikte einzudämmen, abzubauen oder vermeiden zu helfen. Allardt (1979: 40) hebtzurecht hervor, daß es sich dabei nicht um ein Art Automatismus handelt, sozusagen um eine mechanische Konfliktstrategie.
>
> [The development of multiple identities is from this perspective a certain determining factor, preventing the isolation of ethnic groups and through binding it to the social structures of the singular state, helps to reduce, avoid or to break down inter-ethnic conflict. Allardt correctly emphasises that this does not involve a form of automatism, that is to say a mechanical conflict strategy.]
>
> (Haarmann, 1983: 33–34)

It is, however, at a more complex level than that conceived by Haarmann that multiplicities in identity are a key to conflict. Put generally, Haarmann's model (Figure 12) reflects an exclusive and impermeable notion of ethnic groupness.

It has already been claimed in this study that ethnic groupness is a construct without being invented *ex nihilo*. Through A.D. Smith's concept of *ethnie*, the primordial and social constructivist views on ethnicity are



Figure 12 Basic relations between self-identification and the categorisation of other ethnic groups

Adapted from Haarmann, 1986: 31

bridged. The frontiers between ethnic groups operate as a mechanism for enabling multiplicities of identity which are not mutually exclusive. Hence, under certain circumstances an individual is able to manipulate ethnicity within certain given societal expectations. Under circumstances of conflict the pressures on identity choices appear to tend towards exclusive and inimical senses of groupness. That is, ethnic mobilisation operates to maximise human resources at the expense of diversity and ambiguity in matters of identity. A model which views ethnic identity and groupness in terms of the mechanics of excluding boundaries best applies to ethnic groups only under the circumstances of such mobilisation and conflict.

Through reference to the work of Liebkind and Eastman this may be put in the same processual terms as Haarmann. For example, Liebkind identifies the ethnic ego-identity as the crux of the matter. This 'locus of agency' (Figure 13) is the point around which tensions regarding the ethnic individual and group identity turn. Under the circumstance of conflict and through the pressuring or oppressive mechanism of mobilisation, according to Liebkind, individuals become group types. It is necessary to see the group type as a natural and authentic phenomenon. This authentification may be achieved at a behavioural level. For example, Eastman shows how the performance of ethnic identity may be seen as a reflection of a primordial sense of ethnicity (Figure 14). In this sense, in conflict situations certain social actions will be deemed contrary to the exclusive norms of the ethnic group and be proscribed while certain other patterns of behaviour will be deployed or manipulated so as to confirm the primordial dimension to group identity. As a result the naturalness of the exclusive ethnic group is made a social reality.

Matters of language and identity in conflict can only be understood, managed and resolved in addressing the myriad dynamics of groupness. If ecolinguistics is to provide the conceptual framework for the interrogation of these matters, this means that the relationships between the individual, group, society and state as conceived of by Haarmann should be reconfigured. The general framework for an ecological system or ecological relationships outlined by Haarmann (1986: 4) as follows – INDIVIDUAL–GROUP–SOCIETY–STATE – and conceived of as a simple hierarchical string should be reworked in two respects.

First, relationships between the individual and group should be, to use an anthropological term, thickened. That is, it has already been demonstrated that the individual may claim association with more than one group. Group membership is not exclusive. Dualities and pluralities of identity are characteristic of the functioning of ethnicity and even under the stresses of protracted ethno-political conflict the phenomenon may persist. It is also the case that individual members of the same ethnic group may perceive of that ethnicity in contrasting terms. In this sense, it would be useful to conceive of individuals and groups in a multi-node network of relationships. This complexity can be further extended upon



Figure 13 The identity process with regard to ethnic identity

Adapted from Liebkind, 1989: 27



Figure 14 The relationship of language and cultural behaviour

Adapted from Eastman, 1984: 268

reconsideration of the relationships between the individual as citizen and the state. Just as the individual may claim pluralities with regard to cultural or ethnic identity, similar claims may be made with regard to citizenship – identification with a state. Hence, perceiving of the reticulate interrelationships between these three fundamental notions would require one to focus upon critical nodes in a network of relations, for example:

1 GROUP–INDIVIDUAL–GROUP
2 GROUP–STATE–GROUP
3 STATE–INDIVIDUAL–STATE
4 STATE–GROUP–STATE

This modification, based upon a thick view of groupness, also effects the distinction Haarmann draws between what he describes as the 'REFERENCE GROUP' on the one hand and the 'CONTACT GROUP' on the other. Haarmann claims that the distinction between the reference and the contact group is only 'relevant from the standpoint of the viewer' (1986: 25). Given Haarmann's perspective on groupness, however, the implication of the terminology is that the individual actor performs in relation to his or her own specific ethnic group of reference, that being the central point or focus of Haarmann's model, and interacts with other external contact groups. Having already demonstrated the plurality of the associations forged by individuals with identity groups, the notion of reference and contact groups becomes more apparent than real. That is to say, for the individual social actor the idea of groups of reference and of contact is a question of perspective. The characterisation of a group in such a manner relates to a situational rather than an absolute sense of relationship. In conflict situations exclusive groups may be constructed which aim to require individuals to conceive of groupness in such terms but even then group identity is fashioned from multiplicities of individual senses of identity. In short, Haarmann's assumptions regarding the control of interaction between groups through group self-categorisation may require modification. Perhaps the notion of interactional distance, perceived of as dynamic, elastic, constantly shifting frontier, could be a useful adjustment to the filter function of ethnopsychological variables as 'they control intergroup relations' (Haarmann, 1986: 27). This would embrace the possibility of overlap or spaces between groups, enabling the manifestation of multiplicities and ambiguities of identity.

The second point of re-working relates to the SOCIETY–STATE relationship. Haarmann separates the two terms out on the basis of the subordination of the organisation of society to the functions of the state. According to Haarmann while the state might exist without the support of society; '[a] society cannot exist without or outside the governmental leadership of a state' (1986: 5). This view of the state is in Haarmann's words; 'particularly suited to conditions in modern industrialized soci-

eties' (1986: 5) and is, by implication, largely informed by the classical conception of the western European nation-state. As we have already seen in this study, the Westphalian notion of a system of international relationships determined by the nation-state has been substantially modified in western Europe in particular with the emergence of diverse political structures which serve to both undermine and transcend the hegemony of the nation-state. In this context it would be best to view relationships between the state and society, along with groups and individuals as the component parts of society, in a non-hierarchical network of relationships. The significance of the new diversity of polities may be encompassed within Haarmann's ethnopolitical range of ecological functions.

Locating conflict in ecolinguistics

As we have seen, competition, or conflict, is central to the function of eco-systems. Despite this, many in the field of ecolinguistics seek to emphasise non-competitive relationships. For example, Fill (1993: 57–80) argues for the replacement of Darwinian metaphors on the struggle for life with ideas of interdependence and co-operation – 'the ties that bind'. Others go further again. The implication of Mühlhäusler's claim that; '[f]unctioning ecologies are characterised by predominantly mutually beneficial links and only to a small degree by competitive relationships' (Mühlhäusler, 2001: 1) is that the presence of competition renders an eco-system non-functional. Mühlhäusler elsewhere (2000) identifies eco-systems of this type. Among a range comprising a total of six different typical ecologies is included a 'Type 3'. This is described as 'Competitive Ecologies' and is defined by Mühlhäusler as follows:

> The stability of Types 1 and 2 is a result of the relative lack of power of the communities that inhabit these ecologies whilst Type 3 is characterised both by power differential and constant restructuring of the ecology. The link between political and linguistic power is not a necessary one. Before the advent of European nation states, for instance, centralised power and tolerance of linguistic diversity were not mutually exclusive, with Austro-Hungary before 1918 and Yugoslavia before its disintegration after Tito's demise being examples.
>
> (Mühlhäusler, 2000: 327)

In this sense, language in competition is related to the asymmetric distribution of power within the eco-system. Unequal power relations are, in turn, a function of the nation-state. It is in this context that Mühlhäusler, via specific reference to the language situations in contemporary France and ex-Yugoslavia, asserts 'the non-ecological nature of nation states' (2000: 345). By extension, therefore, competitive ecologies are also in some sense non-ecological.

It is not the intention to take issue with the historical reality of language-power relationships prior to the advent of the nation-state in modern Europe but, in the case of France, French was made the sole language of state by an edict of 1539 (Giddens, 1985: 119) and the following remark, revealing similar sensitivities to associations between language, power and status, is attributed to Charles V of France (1364–1380): 'I speak Spanish to God, Italian to women, French to men and German to my horse'. The link between political power and language is not unique to the nation-state. Mühlhäusler himself implicitly concedes as much through referring to the language competition which is the result of 'differential power' in the European Union – a multi-state organisation (Mühlhäusler, 2000: 346–347); for example:

> This differential power has led to intense competition among the larger languages for status as official supernational languages, and competition for recognition as a minority language and access to EU finance by small ones.
>
> (Mühlhäusler, 2000: 347)

If taken at face value such a constrained view of ecolinguistics condemns our entire area of study as, in Mühlhäusler's words, 'non-ecological'. An intellectual *cul de sac* may be avoided, however, by addressing ecolinguistics to a number of issues aired at an earlier point in this study. Through this, the specific ecological identity of our area of study is defined as a mosaic of what Mühlhäusler describes as 'competitive ecologies'.

Briefly, in our review of ecology it was demonstrated that competition is central to the operation of eco-systems. Competition is the mechanism by which participants seek to gain the means of survival, of both physical and cultural reproduction. The means or the necessary conditions of reproduction are resources and in human ecology this includes material and non-material resources. Power, understood as the capacity to allocate resources, is the focal point of competition. As a result, power may be seen to similarly function in all societies. Giddens puts it as follows:

> In all societies, traditional and modern, administrative power is the core of domination generated by authoritative resources, although it is not the only such resource that exists (there is in addition power deriving from control of sanctions and from ideology).
>
> (Giddens, 1985: 46)

By administrative power we mean the institutions of state. Although it is important to understand that power is not of necessity an oppressive source of conflict. Giddens (1986: 157–158) regards power as both enabling and constraining. It can be the medium of either freedom or oppression but above all, it is best conceived of as the capacity to achieve outcomes.

It must also be emphasised that there is no natural distribution of power within any given society. Rather, the asymmetric distribution of power in society is the result of certain types of competition. That is to say that in eco-systems there exists a hierarchy of power. That power may not merely relate to a sense of control or authority over other actors or resources in the eco-system but may also relate to the extent to which the eco-system as a functioning entity is defined by an actor. The notion of 'keystone species' may be a useful analogy. In an eco-system a species may gain a position of integral importance to the extent that the loss of the keystone species will result in the dramatic transformation of the complete eco-system. When viewed as a form of contestation, the culmination of the nation-state building process is the privileged empowerment of the dominant ethnic group, that is 'the nation' by which the nation-state is defined. The dislocation of the titular nation from the nation-state, whether psychological or physical, results in what Giddens describes as 'power deflation' and herein lie the roots of many conflicts (Giddens, 1985: 202).

The tensions which result from the complex interplay of identity, power and institutions may be manifest in competition or conflict in a number of possible guises. There exist varieties and degrees of competition in ecology, some of which may accrue mutual benefits for the participants and some of which will not. In terms of human ecology, violent socio-political conflict is but an extreme form of ecological competition. Hence, the notion of scale is a significant initial consideration towards understanding language in conflict. The intensity of a given conflict in ecological context relates to the perceived level of threat to the physical or cultural survival of one or more of the participants. With particular regard to protracted social conflicts as the type of conflict under consideration in this study, a critical feature of the complexity of perceptions of threat and actual use of politically motivated violence is the notion of a legal monopoly over violence. In short, nation-state violence is sanctioned by law, while the violence of others is not. This monopoly is one of the defining features of the nation-state; Giddens, again, for example:

> The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence.
>
> (Giddens, 1981: 190)

That the legal framework which sanctions such violence has been fashioned by an international system determined by nation-states is of no comfort to others, including 'nations-without-states'. The point is that with

regard to conceptualising competition in ecological context, understanding perceptions of violence as well as notions of power are central concerns. As Avruch (1998) might put it, conflict is a question of both base of material interests and of cognition or cultural mind-set. With regard to framing insights on the patterning of language and identity in conflict across our area of study in general terms, this means that the cultural histories and geographies for Europe sketched out by Davies (Figures 5 and 6) may be seen to bear directly upon developing an understanding of the diverse European language ecologies.

Basic ecological variables revisited

The ranges of ecological variables drawn up by Haarmann (1980 and 1986) are useful in that they indicate, in a manner that ethno-linguistic vitality type models do not, the diversity of factors affecting language in social context. That said, the list format which Haarmann adopts for his inventory of specific variables has the appearance of being both restrictive and prescriptive. The German-language text (Haarmann, 1980: 220–234), from which the inventory of basic ecological variables is derived, appears to be especially prescriptive. It would be useful if the ecological indicators were regarded as relative rather than absolute values. Also, it is the case that Haarmann eschews the notion of competition in ecological conflict and that this is reflected in the manner in which the ecological variables are presented. In order to locate competition in ecologies of language we note here some points of engagement with contestation or conflict in the realms of material interests and cognition. The framework of ranges devised by Haarmann is employed, with suggested modifications, so as to ease the task of navigating the complex ecology of language, identity and conflict.

Ethnodemographic variables

Haarmann notes that the size of an ethnic group is an important ecological variable (1.2 in his inventory). The effort of the collection and the interpretation of demographic data in an attempt to measure the size of minority populations is a point of contestation in modern, bureaucratic societies. For example, Hobsbawm (1992: 98) records the considerable controversy which surrounded the inclusion of language questions on census forms in the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the second half of the nineteenth century. Similarly, Jenkins (Jenkins, 1999a and b and also preface to Parry and Williams, 1999a) notes the considerable controversy which surrounded the inclusion of a question on the Welsh language in the UK census of 1891. Urla (1993) correctly points out that the enumeration of a language community is a matter of extreme political sensitivity as the results of the survey may be used in a number of ways. In the case of

the Basque Country she notes that census data on the language is used by nationalists to indicate both the substance of the Basque nation and also to underline the threats posed to the continuity of Basque nationhood by the ongoing erosion of the Basque language. It is for similar such reasons that Nelde advocates the exclusion of a language question on census forms. He cites the case of Belgium as good practice in this regard. In this case, questions on language were dropped from census forms from 1947 due to language conflict and because of this, he argues, the Flemings were able to gain more rights and concessions than would have been justifiable were this proportionate to the relative size of Flemish-speaking population.

Also within this range of ecological variables, Haarmann identifies the polarity between focussed and dispersed population in ethnic groups (1.2) and the polarity between ethnic homogeneity and heterogeneity (1.3) as important demographic considerations. Again, these issues are a matter of considerable contestation by ethnic groups. We have seen how the cartography of the Balkans region post-Versailles (Wilkinson, 1951) was used to construct a particular perspective on the ethnic geography of the region with the effect of the drawing of new international borders which did not reflect the reality of the ethnic kaleidoscope which is the socio-cultural landscape of the region. Most recently in the region of ex-Yugoslavia the inconveniences, for the resurgent nationalisms of Serbia and Croatia, of the diverse distribution of ethnic groups in this particular part of Europe resulted in what is now popularly known as 'ethnic cleansing'.

A final and very different point on this matter of population concentration is that the impact of new technologies upon the functioning of the ecology of diffuse language communities must be a feature for consideration. The unstated assumption which underlies these variables as formulated by Haarmann is that the vitality of a given language is better served by a densely concentrated and linguistically homogeneous population. New technologies, given their levels of penetration throughout the greater part of Europe, have the potential to modify such an assumption.

Ethnosociological variables

Certain issues relating to language and identity in conflict situations are pertinent to the possible application of this range of ecological variables to actual case studies. For example, the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing, noted with regard to the ethnodemographic variables, and other population movements motivated by perceptions within a group of critical levels of threat to its physical and/or cultural survival relate directly to Haarmanns' variable on the polarity between stability and dynamic change in the ethnic profile of a region (2.1). Features of what Haarmann describes as 'family relations' (e.g. endogamy vs. exogamy) (1986: 11) also

relate to language in conflict situations. In the case of Northern Ireland, Whyte (1986) identified the socio-cultural prohibition upon inter-faith (i.e. Catholic-Protestant) marriage as a critical element in maintaining exclusive ethnic group boundaries in the region. This had the unintended consequence of further reinforcing the relative inaccessibility of the Irish language to non-Catholics as it was also the case at that time that the language was only taught within the Catholic sector of the educational system. The Irish language was isolated, therefore, as the language of a minority within a minority.

Finally, age is included as a variable in this particular ecological range as a factor influencing language (2.3). With specific regard to understanding the dynamics of language in conflict, we have seen that age is an important consideration. For example, on the matter of attitudes towards the politicisation of language in both the cases of the Basque Country and Northern Ireland age is a determining factor in understanding the primordial attachments to language in ethnicity which are often manifest in conflict situations. It is also a key to understanding transformations in such attitudes and, as a result, is useful in seeking resolutions of issues of conflict.

Ethnopolitical variables

It has already been noted in our review of conflict theory that the state itself often becomes the focus of competition, hence, considerations of Haarmann's variable termed the 'ethnos-state relation' (3.1) should be read with this in mind. In this context, issues of language and identity in conflict situations relate in particular to Haarmann's variables 3.2 and 3.3 on the speaker-language-state relationship and the institutional status of language respectively. In the context of conflict theory, institutions are of particular importance. They are the focal point of policy making capacity of the state. That is to say that, through their role in the allocation and distribution of material resources, institutions are the hub of power in the modern, industrial, bureaucratic state.

A further modification on this range of variables relates to the notion of the state. Haarmann clearly has the modern nation-state in mind when reflecting upon the state as a feature of his general framework of ecological relations. It has already been shown in this study that the various pressures from both above and below, at global and local levels, are serving to underscore the adequacy of the nation-state with regard to meeting contemporary challenges in a number of domains including the economy, the environment, human rights and cultural identity. The innovation of a variety of other forms of polity are a feature of the response by political players to the emerging limitations of the nation-state. In this context, certain contradictory forces appear to be at work as the diversity of polities are being arrived at, on the one hand, through

processes of devolution in the case of regional governments in the UK and Spain for example. On the other hand, it is through processes of centralisation that other significant political entities, such as the European Union, are being devised. Within this polity framework the individual citizen or ethnic group is not bound to an exclusive political relationship with the nation-state but rather may identify with, be represented by or make representations to a number of different political entities. As result, in the analysis of language in ecological context consideration must be given to the ethnos-state relation as a multi-polar complex rather than as a bi-polar and simple linear relationship.

A final point is to underline, again, some of the connections between conflict and the identified ecological variables. Within this range of variables it is the case that the division of labour (3.5) can be manipulated as a function of exclusive group boundaries. As we have already seen, language is an important indicator of cultural divisions of labour in a number of different geographical locations across our area of study from the Baltic region to the Celtic-speaking UK. It is also worth recording that the significance of the notion of the reproduction potential of a language is not merely a question of the mathematics of demography and institutional support but it is also a question of the perceived vitality of the language and the nature of the perceived threats to its continuity. Continuity is not capable of reduction to the mechanical certainties of numerical equation but is very much a question of cognisance, of frame of mind.

Ethnocultural variables

One suggestion is made with regard to this range of variables. The variable identified as the polarity between ethnocultural patterns and social distance in interethnic relations (4.2) should be read from the perspective of the dynamic and shifting nature of groupness. Cultural pattern and social distance should not be seen as absolute features in ethnicity. Instead, and especially in the case of conflict situations, they should be seen as the products of processes of group mobilisation in which increasingly exclusive notions of groupness are developed as a function of conflict. The result of adopting a more rigid perspective on this issue is to conceive of ethnicity in a manner tending towards biological determinism. For example, Haarmann presents the variable of ancestry [Abstammung] as if it were a relatively clearcut matter of either one of two options characterised as 'Monoethnische Abstammung' and 'Polyethnische Abstammung' (Haarmann, 1980: 226). Social survey material from the Basque Country, for example, shows that the notion of ethnic descent is much more complex when applied to questions of language and identity in social context. The full range of complexities pertain more to the ethnic or cultural identity of the individual than to any notion of group identity. In any case, the appeal of the notion of the common ethnic descent of a

group as a factor in group solidarity lies in the idea of an authentic and primordial root to that identity which lies beyond the possibility of doubt. In short, it requires the reduction of historical ambiguity and complexity to the certitudes of an unchallengeable biological past.

Ethnopsychological variables

The rather rigid perspective adopted by Haarmann on groupness has implications for some of the variables in this range. This perspective on groupness, along with the rather prescriptive manner in which Haarmann outlines the different ecological variables, appears to reduce some aspects of group identity to stereotypes. For example, according to Haarmann the variable of self-categorisation or self-identification as it relates to the members of an ethnic group may be typically manifest in a number of ways, including as follows with regard to the Basque Country and to Ireland:

> Die ethnische Gruppe tritt insgesamt stark selbstbewußt auf, ihre Angehörigen haben überwiegend ein aktives Selbstbekenntnis zur eigenen Ethnie entwickelt (z.B. Basken in Spanien, Iren in Irland).
>
> [The ethnic group has emerged on the whole as self-confident/self-aware, its members have developed an active self-knowledge of their own 'ethnie' (e.g. the Basque in Spain, the Irish in Ireland).]
>
> (Haarmann, 1980: 228)

The suggestion for modification here, therefore, is a general one. The hierarchical list-style format which Haarmann seeks to apply to the variables within the ethnopsychological range should be abandoned as it tends to effect a reduction of the psychological complexities of actors. For conflict situations in particular there would appear to be difficulties in dislocating the imagery identity as communicated by the political rhetoric of groups from the social reality of the daily experience of identity. As we have already seen, work in the field of conflict studies shows how the notion of discourse can effect such a critical dislocation. This allows for the complex psychological factors which are operating at the level of individuals and also at the level of groups to be traced in a meaningful form. The adoption of the conceptual tools provided by discourse analysis, therefore, is advocated as a means of escaping the methodological *cul de sac* framed by such an approach to ecolinguistics.

Interactional range variables and ethnolinguistic variables

No particular modification is suggested with regard to these two ranges of ecological variables, although some points of contact with conflict issues

as conceived by this study are noted. In some parts of our area of study we saw how linguistic factors featured as points of conflict. In the territory of the ex-Yugoslavia certain linguistic features of Serbo-Croatian, such as the alphabetic script and lexicon, were manipulated by both Serbian and Croatian nationalists in order to ethnically encode the diverse forms of the language. The process was effected to the extent of constructing two ethnically distinct languages where previously there was only one language. In the case of language issues in Northern Ireland, various actors use linguistic variables for particular effect. For example, some have used the short linguistic distance between Ulster-Scots and English in contrast to the much greater linguistic distance between Irish and English as a means of highlighting the contrived nature of Ulster-Scots as a language. Hence, according to the logic of their argument, the unprincipled engineering of the politicisation of language issues by Unionists is revealed.

Another feature of the situation in Northern Ireland is the ascription by some Unionists of the term 'learners Irish' for the Irish spoken in the region. In this context the use of the term signifies the disparities between the Irish spoken in Northern Ireland with that spoken by 'natural Irish-speakers' in the *Gaeltachtaí* of the Republic of Ireland. As we have already noted, very few Irish-speakers in Northern Ireland have acquired the language as their mother-tongue, that is as the language of maternal (or paternal) transmission in the home. The argument follows that the 'artificial' language found in Northern Ireland does not merit the support of the state in they way in which a 'natural' language does. With regard to understanding language in conflict situations, therefore, the variables identified by Haarmann in these ranges remain pertinent but should also be read as points of connection between language, identity and conflict.

Conclusions

Competition, or conflict, is central to understanding the functioning of ecologies. A comprehensive view of language in ecological context must, therefore, encompass the issue of conflict. In order that this is accomplished, some key modifications of ecolinguistic theory in general and the work of Haarmann in particular are necessary. It is argued that language, as it relates to identity in conflict situations, is best understood as a function of the shifting nature of groupness. In conflict situations language often features as a defining characteristic of ethnic group identity. In this context, the concept of *ethnie* is applied as a bridge between the primordial and social constructive views on ethnicity following May (2001) and in this way we can understand language at the locus of agency for the individual experiencing group mobilisation. From an ecological perspective, language in conflict, for both individual and group, relates to power, to material interests and to perceptual concerns; a variety of resources which

may be encompassed by Bourdieu's term 'cultural capital'. Thus, the basic framework of ecological relations for language in ethnic requires modification which embraces individual, group, and state in a network of relationships. Also, while many of the ecological variables noted by Haarmann remain useful, they are to be read for the vital connections with issues of language and identity in conflict. Reaching an understanding of conflict in ecolinguistics illuminates, in turn, the means by which conflict may be managed and ultimately resolved and it is this which is our concern in the next chapter.

Part 5

Resolutions

11 Beyond conflict

Introduction

In relating language to the matter of conflict in ecological context there is an obligation on the author in determining, in an applied manner, the means of transcending the inimical effects of conflict on linguistic vitality. It should be emphasised that one is not seeking to delineate a universal model which may be applied to all situations of language in conflict, for as has been pointed out elsewhere (Nelde *et al.*, 1992: 389) no such model could be reasonably brought into existence. Rather, it is intended to indicate a framework, or a set of procedures, which enable the prevention, management and resolution of conflict with specific reference to language interests. At this point in the study, therefore, it is necessary to draw from the work of practitioners in the field of conflict prevention, management and resolution. Work in this field is characteristically policy-driven and may be usefully described as applied research. This work is geared towards meeting the practical needs of the full spectrum of end-users at local, regional, national and international levels. This might include, for example, project staff in the field, heads of mission, managers of NGOs, ambassadors, programme administrators, politicians and policy-makers. As Fitzduff notes, these end-users, in contrast to the academic research community, operate in an environment in which the focus is upon generating policy options and local capacity building. Policy-makers in particular require 'clear summaries of finding[s], findings which are free of methodological caveats, and unambiguous conclusions' (Fitzduff, 2000: 5). This chapter in particular, therefore, comprises an attempt to 'mediate' (Fitzduff, 2000: 5) the research encompassed in this study with a view to meeting the demands of such end-users.

An applied framework

The framework extrapolated by Creative Associates International, Incorporated [CAII http://www.caii.net] (1996, 1997a–f, 2001)[1] is adopted here for the purposes of enabling the generation of policy options and

capacity building as it is both accessible to end-users and is also based upon certain assumptions regarding the nature of conflict which connect with the theoretical insights developed in this study. For example, the position taken by CAII on ethnic identity rejects both the primordial and instrumental view of ethnicity as extreme views. The primordial position is rejected by CAII as it attributes the causes of conflict to ancient, deep-rooted hatreds which are so deeply ingrained in historical cultural traditions that perennial conflicts are an inevitable feature of the relationship between the groups in conflict. Notwithstanding the historical determinism, this view renders conflict beyond control. Neither ethnic group leaders nor external other parties might hope to intervene with a view to shaping the ebb and flow of the conflict as it has, in a sense, a life of its own. No-one who believes in the possibility of preventing, managing and resolving conflict can adopt such a position of helplessness. The instrumental view on ethnicity is also rejected by CAII as it reduces explanations of conflict entirely to the actions of élites and individual leaders who, through the manipulation ethnically potent symbols, mobilise a population in the pursuit of specific political goals. According to CAII, the instrumental position significantly underplays the long-term and systematic conditions of conflict while focussing almost wholly upon the proximate enabling factors and the more immediate trigger factors in conflict. They conclude, without articulating a substantial theoretical examination of the nature of ethnicity, that a middle ground must be occupied as follows:

> A reasonable position to take in this debate is not to accept either extreme. We can acknowledge that some societies' history and physical circumstances may have fostered a much stronger sense of identity in some groups than in others, the amount of 'pull' a particular identity has on behaviour can be affected by economic interest, history, political persuasion, and other factors. Thus, many analysts prefer to call conflicts with ethnic overtones 'ethno-political', suggesting that wilful activity may cause feelings of identity to become linked to political causes.
>
> (CAII, 1997a: 9)

This coincides with the position taken on ethnicity in this study. Moreover, the manner of the bridging of the primordial and instrumental [or social constructive] views on ethnicity through the concept of *ethnie* lends the necessary intellectual rigour to the applied framework (Fitzduff, 2000).

It is also important that the CAII framework places the notion of interests at the centre of understanding the causes of conflict, for example:

> *Conflict* is present when two or more parties perceive that their interests are incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or ... pursue their

interests through actions that damage the other parties . . . Interests can diverge in many ways:

- Over *resources* – territory, money, energy sources, food – and how they should be distributed.
- Over *power*, how control and participation in political decision-making are allocated.
- Over *identity*, concerning the cultural, social and political communities to which people feel tied.
- Over *status*, whether people believe they are treated with respect and dignity and whether their traditions and social position are respected.
- Over *values*, particularly those embodied in systems of government, religion, or ideology.

(CAII, 1997a: 2–3)

In this framework, interests are understood to relate to both subjective and objective conditions, that is material interests such as the standard of living as well as what CAII describe as 'emotional states and mental outlooks' (CAII, 1997a: 3). This conceptualisation of interests in conflict connects with the theoretical position adopted on conflict in this study in which questions of interest related both to issues of power and also to culture, or cognition.

Language is only mentioned specifically by CAII in the abridged version (2001) of the framework. In this document, language is counted as an interest which pertains to identity. Language, however, is an issue which ought to be threaded throughout the framework. This is my final point on the key merits of the CAII framework. The structure of this work, which very strongly reflects applied research context, allows for language as a potential policy tool to be inserted within the framework in a coherent manner. To conclude, therefore, this framework enables clarity of application without sacrificing important theoretical nuances.

Before looking at language within this framework it is necessary to define some terms which are commonly used in the various guides to the framework (CAII, 1996, 1997a–f, 2001) and pertain to our understanding of language within it. CAII conceive of levels of conflict within a continuum of interactions ranging from harmony to war. Rather than viewing 'peace' and 'war' as absolute extremes, CAII sees overlap in the form of gradations of conflict. These gradations are defined as follows (CAII, 1997a: 4–5):

- Harmony – is a relationship between communities and nations in which there are virtually no conflicts of interest or values.
- Durable peace – is characterised by a high level of co-operation while there exists an awareness and pursuit of conflicting interests. Conflicting

parties, however, value their overall relationship more than sectional interests. Divergent interests are pursued within pacific, institutionalised mechanisms. In this sense conflict is co-operative and regulated.

- Stable peace – is a relationship of limited communication and co-operation within a context of basic order, mutual respect and general absence of violence. Competition, or conflict, follows accepted rules and are usually resolved in a non-violent manner.
- Unstable peace – is characterised by palpable tension and mistrust, there are few or no explicit mutual agreements. The conflicting parties recourse to violence on occasion in order to realise specific objectives. This condition is sometimes described as one of structural violence.
- Crisis – is a level of conflict in which the conflicting parties are in a perpetual state of armed confrontation. Law and order has broken down and violence is regularly and routinely employed in order to achieve objectives.
- War – is all-out, sustained violent conflict.

CAII recognise that in actual situations the differences between the gradations of conflict are not clear-cut and, it is suggested, that in some conflict situations several levels of conflict may be manifest (CAII, 1997a: 5). The gradation, however, serves to outline crudely the typical life cycle of a conflict (Figure 15).

This is important in understanding the general dynamics of conflict and in identifying possible different points of intervention in conflict with a view to implementing the effective management or resolution of conflict



Figure 15 Life cycle of a conflict

Adapted from CAII, 1997a: 1

or even the prevention of violent conflict. Depending on the particular stage of a given conflict certain types of intervention will be more appropriate and likely to be more successful than others:

> [E]fforts to intervene in conflicts can be and are taken by any party at all stages of the conflict – pre-violent, violent, or post-violent. Successful intervention depends on whether actions are appropriate to the conflict's sources and stage.
>
> (CAII, 1997b: 2)

Hence, CAII also identify a continuum of interventions which can be undertaken equally by parties to the conflict or by external third parties. The following types of intervention characterise this continuum:

- conflict prevention – actions undertaken in order to avoid the threat or use of violence to settle conflicts of interest. Conflict prevention can also occur after post-violence in that it is intended to prevent the recurrence of violence.
- crisis management – actions undertaken in order to control situations in which there is a manifest threat of violence.
- conflict management – actions taken to contain and to reduce violence and to engage the competing parties in dialogue with a view to terminating the violence.
- peace-making – armed intervention by an external third party with the aim of deterring, suppressing or otherwise terminating the use of violence by the competing parties.
- conflict termination – the termination of violence between the competing parties.
- peace-keeping – actions, usually by an external third party, to maintain the cessation or absence of violence between the competing parties.
- conflict resolution – actions to increase co-operation, promote trust, enable non-violent interaction between the competing parties.

CAII point out that these phases of intervention are not in themselves techniques for intervention. Such techniques, termed policy tools (CAII, 1997b: 4), are regarded as the methods for realising the aims of intervention and they vary enormously according to the aspects of the conflict being addressed. In this context, language planning may be characterised as a specific policy tool.

Language in the policy toolbox

According to the framework devised by CAII policy tools may be brought to bear on specific causes of conflict across a number of different functional

areas. The functional areas are categorised and the 90 policy tools identified by CAII relate to the functional categories as follows (1997b: 4–8):

- official diplomacy – mediation, negotiations, conciliation, informal consultations, peace conferences, unilateral goodwill gestures, conflict prevention or management centres, special envoys, diplomatic sanctions, international appeal/condemnation, crisis and war diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, diplomatic recognition, withdrawal of recognition, certification/decertification and hotlines.
- non-official conflict management tools – mediation, support to indigenous dispute resolution and legal institutions, conflict resolution or prevention centres, peace commissions, civilian peace monitors, visits by eminent organisations/individuals/'embarrassing witnesses', 'friends' groups, non-violent campaigns, non-official facilitation/problem-solving workshops, cultural exchanges, civilian fact-finding missions, humanitarian diplomacy.
- military measures – preventive peace-keeping forces, restructuring/integration of military forces, professionalisation/reform of the armed forces, demobilisation and reintegration of armed forces, military aid, military-to-military programmes, alternative defence strategies, confidence-building and security measures, non-aggression agreements, collective security or co-operation agreements, deterrence, demilitarised zones, arms embargoes or blockades, threat or projection force, disarmament, arms control agreements, arms proliferation control, crisis management procedures, limited military intervention, peace enforcement.
- economic and social measures – development assistance, economic reforms, economic and resource co-operation, inter-communal trade, joint projects, private economic investment, health assistance, agricultural programmes, aid conditionality, economic sanctions, humanitarian assistance, repatriation or resettlement of refugees and displaced people.
- political development and governance measures – political party-building, political institution-building, election reform, support and monitoring, national conferences, civic society development, training of public officials, human rights promotion, monitoring and institution-building, power-sharing arrangements, decentralisation of power, trusteeship, protectorates, constitutional commissions and reform.
- judicial and legal measures – commissions of inquiry/war crimes tribunals, judicial/legal reforms, constitutional commissions, police reform, arbitration, adjudication, support to indigenous legal institutions.
- communications and education measures – peace radio/TV, media professionalisation, journalist training, international broadcasts, promote alternative information and communication sources, civic education, formal education projects, peace education, exchange visits, training in conflict management, resolution and prevention.

As a policy tool, language planning impacts upon all the functional areas but it is the area of 'Political Development and Governance' which may be regarded as pivotal for therein policy capacity is generated. Of the policy tools identified by CAII in this functional area a number are of particular significance for language planning and they are:

- political institution-building,
- civic society development,
- human rights promotion, monitoring and institution-building,
- power-sharing arrangements and,
- decentralisation of power.

By way of illustration, language as a dimension to the above policy tools can be detailed, following CAII (1997b), with specific regard to a range of matters of immediate concern to policy-makers. They are, in the first place, the tool description – the objectives, expected outcome or impact and the relationship of the tool to conflict prevention; the implementation of the tool – organisers, participants, activities, the set-up time and the timeframe to see the results of implementation; the conflict context in which tool should be applied – the stage and the type of conflict, the prerequisites for the tool's effective implementation; and, finally, offering an evaluation of the tool's strengths and weaknesses.

Language interests in political institution-building (a. CAII, 1997c)

Description

Political institution-building comprises the construction of effective, responsive and formal democratic institutions. In this context, language planning entails the enhancement of institutional capacity through the development of executive, legislative and bureaucratic institutions and systems, including the skills of officials, with regard to responding to the language interests of the different parties to the conflict.

Objectives

To improve individual and institutional governance and administrative language competencies so as to reflect the different societal language interests.

Expected outcome or impact

The improvement of authorities' professionalism in general enhances engagement with and representation of the local community, thereby contributing to stability. The institutionalisation of language lends legitimacy

and status to the party for whom the language is a recognised interest, to the political institutions and to the language itself.

Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation

Effective, responsive and representative administration and government can contribute to the prevention and management of conflict. The efficacy of institutions in conflict depends upon their capacity to mediate the competing demands of sectional interests.

Implementation

ORGANISERS

These may include international organisations, domestic governments, professional associations, universities and regional organisations. Programme designers and trainers could include former public officials as well as academics and professionals in language planning with skills in and knowledge of public administration.

PARTICIPANTS

Government officials from all levels.

INTERVENTION PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES

Training of officials in appropriate language competencies and in linguistic awareness and sensitivity. Support for bureaucratic operational demands such as a multilingual ICT environment and translation facilities. Pro-active recruitment of officials with appropriate language skills.

SET-UP TIME

Interventions in this functional area can be quickly planned and implemented.

TIMEFRAME TO SEE RESULTS

The enhancement of the linguistic capacity of institutions generally impacts gradually upon a conflict situation. Outcomes can be long lasting given the retention of trained officials.

Conflict context

STAGES OF CONFLICT

Likely to be most effective for conflict prevention, management and resolution during post-termination of conflict transitions.

TYPE OF CONFLICT

Ethnic conflicts, crises of government.

PREREQUISITES

Some existing institutional structure is necessary as well as the resources to support and sustain institution-building.

Evaluation

STRENGTHS

Enhances the legitimacy and accountability of institutions. Enhances the legitimacy and status of languages and the speakers of languages. Facilitates communication and engagement between institutions, officials and the different language communities in society.

WEAKNESSES

Inflexibility in decision-making process due to translation of documents. Cost management. Requires long-term planning horizons especially with regard to changing institutional attitudes or memory on language interests.

Language interests in civic society development (a. CAII, 1997d)

Description

Civic society is defined as 'the political space between the individual and government, expressed by membership in NGOs, social groups, associations, and other organisations which may, among other activities, advocate political positions on behalf of their members' (CAII, 1997e: 1). In this context, organisations with a specific concern with language issues may be facilitated, supported or otherwise developed.

Objectives

Civic society development aims to support a democratic pluralist society through increasing the opportunities for individuals and groups to engage with government and, hence, to contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. Linguistic diversity would be recognised as an integral feature of pluralist society.

Expected outcome or impact

Civic society contributes to an informed, participatory and tolerant society. It can facilitate the expression of the language interests of non-dominant groups and cause government to be accountable and responsive to these concerns.

Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation

The advocating, lobbying, scrutinising and challenging of government and other pertinent institutions on language interests are functions which civic society groups adopt. Through acting as an alternative non-violent channel for representing language interests within a given language community, to society as a whole as well as to government civic society groups can enable pro-active citizen participation in society. Civic society can lessen the likelihood of political violence through providing other channels of expression and engagement with government.

Implementation

ORGANISERS

The organisation of language interest groups in the context of civic society-building is most effective when undertaken by local actors. They may, however, usefully engage with external other organisations in effecting organisation.

PARTICIPANTS

Local non-governmental groups and individual members of society.

INTERVENTION PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES

Support can be provided towards strengthening the research, training and advocacy skills and capacities of language organisations in civic society. Training could include grant proposal writing, project management, public opinion polling, media management and data analysis.

SET-UP TIME

Civic society-building is a gradual process.

TIMEFRAME TO SEE RESULTS

Some activities can yield immediate short-term results. The greater part of the work, however, will only yield results over the longer-term.

Conflict context

STAGES OF CONFLICT

Most effective at conflict prevention and conflict resolution phases.

TYPE OF CONFLICT

All types of conflict.

PREREQUISITES

Civic society development is dependent upon the funding via non-governmental instruments. Civic society does not constitute political opposition to government and operates most effectively in the presence of formal and organised party-political opposition to the party of government.

Evaluation

STRENGTHS

The existence of language interest groups in civic society can facilitate the prevention and resolution of conflict by enabling substantive civic engagement through the non-violent mobilisation of citizens. Innovative and proactive strategies for realising political goals may be devised via networks of civic associations.

WEAKNESSES

Not all civic society organisations and activities are benign in their intentions and impact, in some cases they agitate tensions, destabilise institutions and undermine the state.

Language interests in human rights promotion, monitoring and institution-building

Description

This is the development of a political culture which enshrines human rights as fundamental principles of operation and entails the building of institutions to implement political commitments on human rights. Language specific human rights for groups and for individual speakers will impact upon language planning.

Objectives

The adoption of linguistic human rights intends to provide an agreed framework on fundamental and absolute rules governing the treatment of non-dominant language groups and individual speakers of non-dominant languages thereby by discouraging recourse to violence as a means of settling conflicts of interest.

Expected outcome or impact

The application of human rights in general contributes to a moderate, tolerant and pluralist society. It helps regulate the exercise of power with regard to non-dominant groups and individuals in society.

Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation

The implementation of a language rights agenda helps to rationalise action on language interests. It provides a common point of reference for the resolution of conflicts of interest by non-violent means.

Implementation

ORGANISERS

These should include international organisations and NGOs, domestic governments, the judiciary, civic society organisations and academics. An external third party NGO with expertise in human rights will probably be required for mediation purposes. If multiple citizenship is under consideration then two or more states will be involved.

PARTICIPANTS

All potential end-users.

INTERVENTION PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES

Training of officials in language rights. Provision of expertise on language rights legislation.

SET-UP TIME

In European context a framework for language issues in the context of human rights exists in the form of a number of charters, protocols and conventions including for example 'The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities', 'The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities', 'The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages', 'The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' and 'The International Bill of Rights'. The negotiation of a written constitution which reflects language rights along with the building of appropriate institutions, however, will take at least one year, and likely longer.

TIMEFRAME TO SEE RESULTS

Once the legal and institutional framework is in place tangible results can be perceived in the short to medium-term, especially if rigorous monitoring of enforcement is applied.

Conflict context

STAGES OF CONFLICT

Post-conflict termination or conflict prevention immediate to the crisis stage.

TYPE OF CONFLICT

All types but especially those in which rights discourse is a feature of the rhetoric of non-dominant groups.

PREREQUISITES

The successful implementation of a rights agenda requires appropriate constitutional and legal reform along with the construction of robust human rights institutions independent of the political executive.

Evaluation

STRENGTHS

Provides a regulatory benchmark, a set of absolute rules of conduct in all conflict contexts and also a channel for the expression of grievances and the resolution of conflicts of interest without the necessity of recourse to violence. The systematic monitoring of efficacy in the application of rights can provide an early warning mechanism for indicating the possible transition of a conflict towards crisis and war.

WEAKNESSES

Aspiration and practice may diverge. Abuses may be difficult to adequately monitor and to rectify without regular external third party intervention.

Language interests in power-sharing arrangements (a. CAII, 1997e)

Description

Power-sharing arrangements are defined by CAII as 'multiple vehicles to create broad-based governing coalitions of a society's significant groups in a political system that provides influence to legitimate representatives of minority groups' (1997e: 1). With regard to language interests this could mean the construction of institutions with specific functions with regard to language planning and that within this framework distinct agencies for given languages would be interlocked into a sharing of power over all language interests.

Objectives

To establish a more equitable balance of power, broaden representation and participation and to facilitate negotiation as the only strategy for determining the exercise of power and the distribution of resources.

Expected outcome or impact

The inclusion of political minorities in the institutions of governance and, as a result of inclusive access to policy capacity, increasing moderation and the general reduction in levels of violent conflict.

Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation

Power-sharing arrangements contribute to the management of conflict through transcending the demands of self-determination within multi-

ethnic polities. It encourages the representatives of ethnic groups to resolve conflicts of interest through negotiation in the context of institutionalised competition.

Implementation

ORGANISERS

The representatives of the parties to conflict ought to be the prime-movers in delineating power-sharing arrangements. External other organisations may facilitate the development of such arrangements through the provision of expert advice from academics and administrators with knowledge of and experience in forms of power-sharing.

PARTICIPANTS

With regard to language interests, this should comprise representatives of civic society language interest groups and representatives of political parties, as well as the involvement of the populations these groups and parties represent.

INTERVENTION PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES

For language planning this could include the recognition of territorial autonomy in the form of differentiated language districts and the acknowledgement language group rights within the form of a written constitution.

SET-UP TIME

Arriving at power-sharing arrangements through negotiation is time-consuming, the time-scale varies in practice. Implementation usually takes at least a year, often more.

TIMEFRAME TO SEE RESULTS

Power-sharing arrangements, upon successful implementation, usually yield substantial results over the medium to long term.

Conflict context

STAGES OF CONFLICT

Appropriate at all stages of conflict but most likely to be successful at post-conflict termination phase.

TYPE OF CONFLICT

Conflicts in which the ethnic identity of territory and group rights are central issues.

PREREQUISITES

Coherent, representative and formally conceived political parties and civic society language organisations through which the power-sharing arrangements are arrived at.

Evaluation

STRENGTHS

Expands political participation and generates a political culture of negotiation, compromise through institutional competition. Avoids fragmentation of multi-ethnic states and resultant attempts to create ethnically homogenous alternative states.

WEAKNESSES

CAII point out (1997e: 4) that some critics of power-sharing arrangements suggest that they can have the effect of encouraging the maintenance of exclusive ethnic group boundaries. This would result in the petrifaction of the inimical pursuit of ethnic group interests within the political institutions thereby perpetuating the dynamics of the conflict.

Language interests in decentralisation of power (CAII, 1997f)

Description

State power is decentralised to distinct political units through administrative arrangements such as devolution, regional autonomy and federalism. Language planning, in this context, is one of the administrative capacities which may be transferred from the central state.

Objectives

To create a political environment in which access to resources pertinent to language interests is realised at levels of government other than the centre of the nation-state.

Expected outcome or impact

Decentralised forms of autonomy enable language groups to pursue their interests with greater independence and expectation of achieving goals. Decentralisation can enable the recognition of group and individual language rights.

Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation

Decentralisation of power legitimises the claims to power of groups other than the dominant group of the centralised nation-state. It reduces the likelihood of violent conflict between the central state and potentially secessionist groups through their empowerment.

Implementation

ORGANISERS

Central government and opposition groups. An external third party could act as a mediator.

PARTICIPANTS

Participation in the design and implementation of decentralisation should be as wide as possible; that is, it should not be confined to likely power-takers alone. For language planning it should include political parties, groups and movements with specific language interests as well as civic society language organisations.

INTERVENTION PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES

Decentralised legislatures could be endowed with policy capacity on language issues across the full range of societal domains. Constitutional amendments could recognise group and individual language rights.

SET-UP TIME

Decentralisation is a continuous and gradual process not an event.

TIMEFRAME TO SEE RESULTS

Successful decentralisation yields long-term effects on preventing and managing conflict.

Conflict context

STAGES OF CONFLICT

Effective at any stage other than during peak of armed, violent confrontation.

TYPE OF CONFLICT

Most appropriate for national-level conflicts.

PREREQUISITES

Agreement between the central government and opposing regional groups. The re-allocation of resources along with political and administrative responsibilities.

Evaluation

STRENGTHS

Decentralisation can prevent, mitigate and resolve tensions in contested societies through the limited empowerment of non-dominant, marginalised and disenfranchised groups. The central state is no longer the focal point of the competition for resources as decentralisation can generate locally-owned policy capacity and decision-making.

WEAKNESSES

Decentralisation can appear to reward groups engaged in the promotion or the actual use of political violence and hence encourage the continuation of the application of violence as an effective political tactic. Decentralisation can create new relationships of dominant and non-dominant groups and, therefore, may simply shift conflict to other levels of government.

As a dimension of the above policy tools, language of necessity permeates other policy tools in the various functional areas identified by CAII and outlined at an earlier point in this chapter. For example, the adoption in full of the charter ‘The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages’ in the context of the policy tool ‘Human Rights Promotion, Monitoring and Institution-Building’ would have a direct impact upon the functional areas of ‘Communications and Education Measures’, ‘Judicial and Legal Measures’ and ‘Economic and Social Measures’ with regard to other policy tools such as ‘Civic Education’, ‘Exchange Visits’ and ‘Constitutional Commissions’. In other words,

with the institutionalisation of language as an interest at the heart of policy capacity, language planning will permeate all functional areas as a holistic policy tool.

This approach to language interests in conflict prevention, management and resolution also embraces the application of the principles of territoriality and personality which have identified elsewhere as being central to the amelioration of language conflict (Nelde *et al.*, 1992). These principles may be defined briefly in the following terms. According to the principle of territoriality, language rights apply to a given geographical area; according to the principle of personality, rights apply to individual speakers or groups of individual speakers of a given language. The application of these principles in the context of the policy tools outlined above will depend upon the dynamics of the specific conflict and the full range of policy tools which are identified as being necessary features of intervention. For example, if decentralisation is identified as the key policy tool then it follows that the principle of territoriality will be fore-grounded. If, however, power-sharing is the key policy tool then it equally follows that it is the principle of personality which will be fore-grounded. In many situations, however, a range of policy tools will be adopted. This could include, for example, a complex set of institutional arrangements which combines features of both decentralisation and power-sharing. In such a scenario, it follows that the principles of territoriality and personality will be applied as a suture of rights.

Conclusions

The ultimate aim of intervention in protracted social conflicts is to institutionalise an effective strategy for the management and resolution of conflict with a view to preventing the manifestation of violence. In this context, language planning can be a critical policy tool. The key responsibilities of policy-makers with regard to the design and implementation of a systematic approach to language interests in conflict turn upon arriving at a clear understanding of the nature of language as a factor in conflict, determining strategic priorities, identifying significant functional areas in which to focus intervention, choosing appropriate policy tools according to specific strategic objectives, engaging key internal and external partners, timing intervention according to the dynamics of the life-cycle of the conflict, co-ordinating actions and, for external parties, terminating intervention. The indicative framework provided in this study offers an entry point into the myriad concerns which pertain to planning language as a crucial interest in conflict situations.

Note

1 All of which is summarised most brutally by Lund and West in a text entitled 'A toolbox to respond to conflicts and build peace' at http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/guides/themes/pp5a.htm 14 February 2001.

12 Globalities

Comparative issues in extra-European théâtres

He gave them languages for different places and sent them off. That's why we talk in different ways – he created things that way. Giving [one group a certain] language, he sent them off [to one place]. Those speaking another language he sent elsewhere . . . We too, having been given a language, stayed here at this place.

(Kashaya [USA] origin myth, as told by Herman James, http://www.terralingua.org/ip%261gs.html 18 October 2001)

Introduction

This study of the relationships between language, identity and conflict in Europe has implications for understanding ecolinguistic systems in other parts of the world. There exist certain common points of reference such as the centrality of the notion of competition to the functioning of ecosystems, the salience of power and culture to the understanding of the dynamics of conflict and the applicability of concepts such as cultural capital and interest to language in socio-political context. There are also, however, some considerable divergences. The global language ecology, the linguasphere, is not a seamless entity. Rather, deep ruptures are signified by diverse perspectives on the nation-state, the global economy, the environment and political violence. It is argued here that despite such fractures, the outline framework for preventing, managing and resolving conflict with regard to language issues has global applications. The globality of the framework, however, may only be realised through the construction of policy tools specific to the particular conflict situation as configurated locally. It is not the intention here either to detail the local dynamics of conflict or to re-iterate the global framework but instead to indicate those matters pertaining to conflict in language ecology which are most critical in shaping the global-local nexus. In this way, those actors who seek to intervene in a conflict from within the conflict might conceive of issues globally and thereby transcend the discursive strictures which drive the conflict at a local level. In this way also, the interventions of external actors may be informed by local perspectives in their engagement

with the interests which lie at the heart of the conflict and thereby circumvent the incipient neo-colonialism which appears to characterise the approach of some actors to conflict in many parts of the globe.

The post-colonial nation-state

Notions of political institution building, civic society development, power sharing and decentralisation along with principles of human rights have been identified as being crucial to the management and resolution of issues of language in conflict situations. Their operation as effective policy tools in the European théâtre is shaped, in large part, by the socio-cultural heritage and the contemporary dynamics of the nation-state. Of course, the nation-state is a European construct and its design and form therefore reflects European historical socio-cultural sensibilities. A number of commentators have commented upon how the condition of the nation-state outside of Europe is shaped by this. For example, some argue that the state system in Africa has been inherited from the European nation-state system and, accordingly, that as this system in itself was the direct result of a prolonged period of conflict and war then it is inevitable that the process of nation-state building on the African continent is characterised by endemic political violence (Mazrui and Mazrui, 1998: 4). Others put it more simply (e.g. Asiwaju, 1985), arguing that the partitioning of Africa by the resident European imperial powers during the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries bequeathed a set of political borders to contemporary Africa which reflect nothing other than the results of imperial *real politik.* The result is that in much of Africa the nation-state is a very underdeveloped form of polity and lacks historical authenticity. In the context of the post-imperial necessity of state building, the idea and the meaning of the nation-state in Africa had to be constructed *de novo.* Thus, the legitimacy of the state is so weak in many parts of Africa that the art of governance on this continent is characterised by some commentators as; 'governance as conflict management' (Zartman, 1997). It is crucial not to fall into the trap of historical determinism, however. It has been noted by a number of authorities (e.g. UN[DPCSD] http://www.un.org 6 June 2001) that while the historical context is important, other factors such as the quality of political leadership and the range of achievable alternative political structures are often as important in shaping the nature of conflict. It is also worth underlining the fact that socio-political tensions in which language and ethnicity are features are common to the nation-state across much of the rest of the globe including, for example, in Asia (Tonnesson, 1996) and equally among what Hopwood defines as Arab nations (Hopwood, 1999).

Extra-European and post-colonial adaptations and adoptions of the nation-state, therefore, carry with them this European inheritance but, of necessity, the nation-state in these parts of the globe must somehow also

reflect local priorities. As such, while the nation-state is a global phenomenon, its interpretation varies enormously according to local conceptions of nation, ethnicity and language. As a consequence of these complexities, the nation-state beyond Europe is a very imperfect political device. As an import with a clearly defined and widely understood form it does not have the benefit of indigeneous historical evolution and innovation. That is, it has never at any point been accepted as an idealisation of proper government and natural sovereignty, rather, it is solely regarded as a device for the realisation of political power. As a result, the most significant of the flaws which are characteristic of the nation-state form, largely relating to the persistence of a single dominant ethnie at the heart of policy capacity, are much less tolerated outside of Europe. Thus, as a form of polity with very shallow roots beyond Europe, the legitimacy of the nation-state is very much contested. It is in this context that the nature of politically motivated violence beyond Europe, both state sponsored and as a challenge to the state, is best conceived as one seeks to apply the insights gained from the study of the dynamics of language, identity and conflict in European context to the field of conflict management and resolution more generally.

The peculiar limitation of the idea of the nation-state outside of Europe is most clearly manifest with regard to language. For example, it has already been noted that according to Anderson (1991, 1983) the vernaculars of Europe, as languages of print-capital, play a crucial role in enabling the imagining of the nation as a coherent social and cultural space. With the construction of the nation-state, such print-languages become the languages of political power. Others, such as Hobsbawm (1992) and Gellner (1983), argue that the nation-state as a modern bureaucratic polity has room for just one language of state. Thus the nation-state will fashion a single national and official language despite any given linguistic diversity. Accepting that there is merit to both lines of argument, and they are not contradictory, there exists a dialectic relationship between language and nation in which the one and the other are both defined by and defining of each other. This helps to explain the platonic and even mystical relationship between language, nation and state in Europe. No such dialectical can be adequately argued for in those parts of the globe in which the nation-state is not an indigenous innovation and where the incongruities of language, ethnicity and state do not easily allow for the shaping of such nation-states without resort to oppression, coercion and violence. Thus, according to Calvet (1988, 1998) the problem of language-state relationships in, for example, India and Guinea is that 'they are attempting to reproduce a model imported by the colonial powers they wish to free themselves from, a model of the unilingual state' (Calvet, 1998: 135). As a result, language has consistently featured in the various partitionist and secessionist conflicts of the late-imperial and post-colonial Asian sub-continent (e.g. Talbot, 2000).

State building processes on the African continent have also been scarred by conflict and, here too, complexities of language are contributory to this. Defining, in Anderson's terms, the coherent social and cultural space that is the nation and giving political form to that space appears impossibly challenging upon consideration of the linguistic complexity of the continent. For example, what single language could define a coherent social and cultural space in relation to the Democratic Republic of Congo where over 200 languages are recorded (Webb and Kembo-Sure, 2000: 314)? Which language could possibly be chosen as the undisputed national and official language of the state? The response of many states in Africa faced with such diversity, according to Ismagilova (1999) in a study of 21 African states, has been to grant official sanction through written constitutions to varieties of linguistic diversity. More expansive surveys show that the other states of Africa are equally characterised by such linguistic diversity and policy complexity (Table 2). Global surveys (e.g. Crystal, 1997; http://www.ethnologue.org; http://www.linguasphere.com; MRG, 1997) illustrate that such linguistic diversity is a common denominator for almost all nation-states. In this case, allowance for multiple imaginings must be the only *modus vivendi* and that which Bhabha claims to be true of the nation-state, that it is 'a liminal signifying space that is internally marked by the discourse of minorities, the heterogeneous histories of contending peoples, antagonistic authorities and tense locations of cultural difference' (Bhabha, 1994: 148), is surely beyond contention.

Across the greater part of the globe there are further linguistic complexities which do not pertain to European patterns in language, identity and conflict. The global expansion of a number of European languages, in particular English, Spanish, French and Portuguese, throughout the modern period has resulted in their being adopted as local languages, after a fashion. Part of the reason for this lies in the nature of the encounter between the European languages and indigenous tongues. In many cases the latter only took oral form and, as such, was regarded by both native and newcomer alike as an inferior version of language. For example, Mazrui and Mazrui (1998: 5) contend that the non-literary status of the indigenous languages of Africa at the point of colonisation was extremely disadvantageous to those languages in terms of their perceived prestige, utility and status in the modern world. This they contrast with the situation of certain native languages under similar circumstances of colonisation, such as Hindi in India. The status of the former imperial languages in many contemporary post-colonial societies reflects both the historical status of these languages as the languages of power and also the difficulties in determining the status of the various indigenous languages of the post-imperial nation-state (e.g. Obeng and Adegbija, 1999). For example, all of the 53 states in Africa have adopted a former imperial language as an official language of state and in 30 of those cases the

Table 2 The language character of the African states

Country	*Number of languages*	*Main languages*	*Official languages*
Algeria	No figures	Arabic, French, Berber	Arabic
Angola	11 (42)	Umbundu, Kimbundu, Congo, Chokwe, Portuguese	Portuguese
Benin	No figures	Fon, Yoruba, Bariba, Adja, Fulani, French	French
Botswana	9 (26)	Setswana, English	Setswana, English
Burkina Faso	No figures	Moore, Manding, Fulani, French	French
Burundi	1 (3)	Kirundi, French	French, Kirundi
Cameroon	239	Fang, Bamileke, Fulani, English, French	English, French
Cape Verde	No figures	Portuguese-Creole, Portuguese	Portuguese
Central African Republic	No figures	Sango, Banda, Baye, Zande, French	French
Chad	No figures	Sara, French, Arabic	French, Arabic
Comoros	3	Comorian, Swahili, French, Arabic	French, Arabic
People's Republic of Congo	15 (27)	Kongo, Lingala, Kituba, French	French
Cote d'Ivoire	No figures	Anyi, Baule, Bete, Manding, Senufo, French	French
Democratic Republic of Congo	220 (212)	Lingala, Kongo, Luba, Mongo, Kiswahili, French	French
Djibouti	No figures	Afar, Somali, French, Arabic	Arabic, French
Arab Republic of Egypt	No figures	Arabic	Arabic
Equatorial Guinea	No figures	Bubi, Fang, English, Spanish	English, Spanish
Eritrea	No figures	Tigrinya, Amharic, Afar (Arabic, English, Italian)	None
Ethiopia	No figures	Amharic, Afar, Oromo, Sidamo, Somali, Tigrinya	Amharic
Gabon	42 (38)	Fang-Mbeti, Shira-Punu, French	French
The Gambia	No figures	Wolof, Mandinka, Fulani, English	English
Ghana	No figures	Asante, Fante, Ewe, Ga, Dagombe, English	English
Guinea	No figures	Fulani, Malinke, Susu, French	French
Guinea-Bissau	No figures	Creole, Balanta, Bijago, Fulani, Portuguese	Portuguese
Kenya	42 (59)	Kikuyu, Dholuo, Luhya, Kikamba, Kalenjin, English, Kiswahili	Kiswahili, English
Lethoso	4	Sesotho, English	Sesotho, English
Liberia	No figures	Kpelle, Bassa, Creole/ Merico, Vai, English	English
Libya	No figures	Arabic	Arabic
Madagascar	1 (3)	Malagasy, French	Malagasy, French

Country	*Number of languages*	*Main languages*	*Official languages*
Malawi	8 (14)	Chichewa/Chinyanja, Chitumbuka, Ciyao, English	English, Chichewa
Mali	No figures	Bambara, Dogon, Fulani, Manding, Senufo, Songhai, Tamasaq, French	French
Mauritania	No figures	Wolof, Berber, Soninke, Fulani, Arabic	Arabic
Mauritius	No figures	Creole, Hindi, English, French	English, French
Morocco	No figures	Arabic, Berber	Arabic
Mozambique	24	Imakwa, Xitsonga, Portuguese	Portuguese
Nambia	21	Herero, Kavango, Ovambo, Nama	English
Niger	No figures	Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Songhai, Tamasheq, French	French
Nigeria	400	Haussa, Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, Efik-Ibibio, English	English
Rwanda	1 (3)	Kinyarwanda, French	Kinyarwanda, French
São Tomé	No figures	Portuguese Creole, Fang, French	Portuguese
Senegal	No figures	Wolof, Serer, Diola, Fulani, Manding, Creole, French	French
Seychelles	No figures	French Creole, English, French	English, French Creole
Sierra Leone	No figures	Temne, Mende, Creole, French	French
Somalia	No figures	Somali, Arabic	Arabic, Somali
South Africa	25–80	isiZulu, isiXhosa, Afrikaans, Sepedi, English, Setswana, Sesotho	Afrikaans, English, isiZulu, isiXhosa, isiNdebele, Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga
Sudan	No figures	Arabic, Dinka, Pari	Arabic
Swaziland	1 (4)	Siswati, English	English, Siswati
Tanzania	150 (127)	Kiswahili, Kisukuma, English	Kiswahili, English
Togo	No figures	Ewe, Grusi, Gurma, French	French
Tunisia	No figures	Arabic, French	Arabic
Uganda	41	Luganda, Kiswahili, Lango-Acholi, Lusoga, English	English
Zambia	40	Chibemba, Chinyanja, Lozi, Tonga, English	English
Zimbabwe	8+ (19)	Chishhona, isiNdebele, English	English

Source: Adapted from Webb and Kembo-Sure, 2000: 312–321.

ex-imperial language is the sole official language. Only 22 have adopted an indigenous tongue (including Arabic) as an official language.

South Africa is exceptional in elevating so many native languages to official status (Table 2). It is the case that very many native languages have the status of national, as opposed to official, language (an important distinction and one that is not drawn by Webb and Kembo-Sure). Calvet (1998) explains the significance of the differences in these two forms of status in the following terms, however. Official language status is that of the language of the state, of the educational system, of the print and broadcast media and so forth. The status of national languages varies enormously. In Burundi, for example, the national language, Kirundi, is a language of education and administration. In Zaire, where Calvet records 250 languages, French is the official language and while four national languages along with 35 regional languages are variously recognised they are marginal to the critical institutional domains of language use. More to the point, whatever the status of national and regional languages, Calvet asserts that; 'in all cases it is the official language that is the language of power . . . the social key' (Calvet, 1998: 35) (Table 3).

The post-colonial elevation of former imperial languages to official status is also common outside of Africa. English is to be found as an official language in places as far apart as Singapore and Fiji, while French is an official language in Laos, Lebanon and the Seychelles. A similar pattern may be noted in India. In this case different types of status have been formulated and variously ascribed to the both ex-imperial and native languages. The range of local and regional official languages is impressive (Table 4). Briefly, the status of languages in India relates to the Amendment Act of 1967 as follows: 'the amended Act of 1967 established a two-language policy for official transactions while the accompanying resolution authorised a three-language policy for the school system and a regional language policy for Union public service examinations with a requirement in the addition of a knowledge of Hindi or English. Given the nature of the Indian language situation, it is hard to

Table 3 Official and national languages in French-speaking Africa

Country	*Number of languages spoken*	*Official languages*	*National languages*
Burkino Faso	70	French	70
Burundi	1	French, Kirundi	Kirundi
Central African Republic	65	French	Sango
Chad	100	French	–
Guinea	20	French	8
Zaire	250	French	4

Source: Adapted from Calvet, 1998: 35.

Table 4 Official and local languages by state and territory in India

Polity	*Official language(s)*	*Principal local language (%)*	*Principal minority language(s) (%)*
States			
Andhra Pradesh	Telegu	Telegu, 85.9	Urdu 7.1, Lambadi 1.62, Tamil 1.55
Assam	Assamese	Assamese 57.14	Bengali 17.6, Hindi 4.4, Bodo 2.9
Bihar	Hindi	Hindi 44.3	Bihari 35.39, Urdu 8.93, Santali 3.57
Gujarat	Gujarati and Hindi	Gujarati 90.5	Urdu 2.8, Sindhi 2.42, Bhili 1.34
Haryana	Hindi	Hindi 88.6	Punjabi 8.1, Urdu 2.77
Himachal Pradesh	Hindi	None	Pahadi 38.4, Hindi 10.6, Mardeali 16.7
Jammu and Kashmir	Urdu	Kashmiri 54.4	Dogri 24.4, Pahar 6.84
Kerala	English		Malayalam 95.04
Madhya Pradesh	Hindi	Hindi 78.07	Rajasthani 4.9, Marathi 3.8, Gondi 3.2
Maharashtra	Marathi	Marathi 76.5	Urdu 6.8, Hindi 3.1, Gujarati 2.7
Mizoram	English	Kannada 65.1	Telegu 8.6, Urdu 8.6, Marathi 4.5
Nagaland	English	None	Konyak Ao 15.4, Sema 12.8, Angamai 11.4
Orissa	Oriya and English	Oriya 82.3	Kui 2.9, Telegu 2.2, Santhali 2.1
Punjab	Punjabi	Punjabi 67.2	Hindi 35.2
Rajasthan	Hindi	Rajasthani 56.49	Hindi 33.32, Bhili 4.13, Urdu 2.5
Tamil Nadu	Tamil	Tamil 83.1	Telegu 9.9, Kannada 2.8, Urdu 1.8
Uttar Pradesh	Hindi	Hindi 85.3	Urdu 10.7, Kumauni 1.3, Garhwali 1.0
West Bengal	Bengali	Bengali 84.28	Hindi 5.4, Santhali 3.27, Urdu 2.3
Territories			
Andaman and Nicobar Islands	English and Hindi	None	Nicobar 21.9, Bengali 21.8, Malayalam 10.5
Chandigarh	English	No figures	
Dadea and Nagar Haveli	English	Varli 51.47	Gujarati 19.5, Konkani 12.9, Dhodia 6.9
Delhi	Hindi and English	Hindi 77.3	Punjabi 11.9, Urdu 5.7, Bengali 1.3
Goa, Daman and Diu	English	Konkani 88.8	Gujarati 5.5, Marathi 1.8, Urdu 1.5
Lakshaadweep	English	Malayalam 83	Mahl 16.7
Manipur	English	Manipuri 64.46	Tangkhul 5.6, Thado 3.6, Mao 3.6
Pondicherry	English and French	Tamil 88.2	Malayalam 5.6, Telegu 4.4
Tripura	Bengali	Bengali 65.2	Tripuri 24.8, Manipuri 2.4

Source: Adapted from Calvet, 1998: 129.

imagine a more acceptable solution than this compromise' (Das Gupta, 1970: 259).

Das Gupta continues to explain that the compromise is in the interest of 'national consolidation' or 'national integration' (1970: 259), while referring to the 'loose-ends' of minority languages in regions (1970: 260). This is the post-colonial dilemma in a nutshell, the political necessity of the construction of a functional nation-state in a global system of nation-states on the one hand and the facilitation of the expression of ethno-linguistic diversity on the other. The nature of this dilemma is compounded by difficulties in identifying individual languages. For example, Calvet notes that the 1951 census in India records 782 languages while according to the 1961 census there were 1,652 languages. Add to this the non-literary condition of very many local languages, the low levels of literacy in all language, the uncertain status of pidgins and creoles as identifiable languages together with the existence of regional *lingua francas* [Calvet prefers the term *langue véhiculaire* and the director of the linguasphere project suggests the term 'arterial language' http://www.linguasphere.org] as a fluid *mélange* of a number of languages in contact, then the sensitivities which will necessarily inform language policy as a tool in conflict management and resolution in local contexts will require the most careful consideration.

Peninsular European concerns with the condition of the extra-European nation-state are most intimately manifest in relation to the potential accession of Turkey to EU membership and the situation of the Kurds as a minority within the Turkish state. The incorporation of Turkey into the EU would require that a number of considerable difficulties be addressed. The Kurds are a people who, for many, constitute the definitive 'nation without a state'. They comprise *c.*22 per cent (13 million) of the total population of Turkey (MRG, 1997). Their history states that they were resident in this part of the world prior to the arrival of Turkic-speaking peoples sometime around the tenth century AD. They lay claim, therefore, to an ancient and intimate relationship with their geographical environment (e.g. Bulloch, 1992). Upon the collapse of the Ottoman Empire their relative autonomy shattered as Turkey emerged in the form of the classical monolithic nation-state. Throughout the twentieth century Turkey has displayed a hostile attitude towards its ethnic minorities ranging from aggressive assimilation to genocide (e.g. Rugman, 1996 and McCarthy, 2001). On the matter of language, a 'catastrophically successful' (Lewis, 1999) policy of promoting a purged form of Ottoman Turkish has been vigorously pursued and other languages severely repressed. Despite liberalisation in the area of language policy during the 1990s very considerable restrictions upon languages other than Ottoman Turkish remain (e.g. HRW, 1999, 2000). For example, it is still the case that according to article 42.9 of the Turkish constitution no language other than Ottoman Turkish is to be either studied or taught to Turkish citizens as their mother tongue. As these various restrictions amount to substantial

contraventions of internationally recognised human rights, as well as a raft of legislation specific to membership of the EU, a number of recommendations have been put to Turkey by the EU on the matter of the abolition of those language restrictions as a precondition to Turkey seeking to formally apply for membership of the EU.

The question is made profoundly more challenging with specific regard to the Kurds, for not only are the Kurds a very substantial minority of the population of Turkey but they also comprise sizeable autochthonous minorities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkmenistan (e.g. Clement, 1996) (Map 3). This overlap implies strategic geopolitical sensitivities when considering the status of the Kurds as a nation without a state. These sensitivities are only underlined by the existence of an extensive and politically engaged Kurdish diaspora in Europe and the effective harnessing of the new technologies of the ICT revolution by Kurdish political activists (e.g. Karim, 1998 and Wahlbeck, 1998).

Understanding the conflict between the Kurds and the various states in which they are resident is complicated by the fractures of language, tribe, ethnicity and religion within that which is understood to comprise the Kurds as a people, or nation (e.g. P.A. Andrews, 1989 and McDowall, 1999). There are enormous dialectical differences within what may be described as the Kurdish language (Map 4). In some cases the differences are so great as to encourage the view that the different dialects are in fact separate languages. Some Kurds claim other languages, such as Gurani, Kirmanshah, Lak and Zaza as their mother tongue (e.g. MRG, 1997). Broadly speaking then, if the situation of the Kurds is to be regarded as a litmus test for extra-European issues of language, identity and conflict then it is clear that the global-local nexus is extremely problematic. Under these circumstances, the likelihood of immediately successful external intervention with a view to managing or resolving conflict is modest, as shown by the failure of the UN intervention in the conflict between Iraq and its Kurdish minority in 1991. That said, the significance of this event is not to be found in its immediate failure but rather in the unprecedented nature of the intervention of the UN in an internal conflict. It is in the possibility of this challenge to the absolute sovereignty of the nation-state that one may perceive a means of progressing the amelioration of such conflicts.

As has been noted elsewhere in this text, many commentators see the nation-state as the most uncompromising of opponents to cultural diversity. Any weakening of the hegemony of this polity as the pre-eminent form of political organisation offers new opportunities for the shaping of alternative polities. Such polities must be concerned with facilitating the political expression of diversity, the suppression of which has often been the cause of apparently intractable conflicts in the era of nation-states. A quantum leap of this sort requires more than propitious material circumstances, it also requires a transformation in the realm of imagination, as



Map 3 The geographic distribution of the Kurdish language

Adapted from Izady, 1998 http://www.kurdish.com/kurdistan/maps/map-03.html, 19 July 2001



Map 4 The linguistic composition of Kurdistan

Adapted from Izady, 1998 http://www.kurdish.com/kurdistan/maps/map-05.html, 19 July 2001

understood by Anderson (1991, 1983). That is, the discourse of political possibilities must be entirely reformulated, beginning with the rejection of the notion of the inevitable longevity or continuity of the classic European form of the nation-state and recognising the decisive nature of the shift towards globalisation in both the material and the imaginative realms. In this sense, the forces of globalisation and ecological rhetoric might have a potentially decisive role to play in informing a strategic approach to peace-making activities.

A discourse on language, ecology and globalisation

According to Guattari (2000), the shift towards globalisation is defined as a sense of ecological crisis and the depth of this crisis demands what he terms as a 'new aesthetic paradigm' through which society might hope to ascertain the appropriate responses to the challenges or questions posed by this shift. This aesthetic paradigm, comprises social, mental and environmental ecology as follows: '[O]nly an ethico-political articulation – which I call *ecosophy* – between the three ecological registers (the environment, social relations and human subjectivity) would be likely to clarify these questions' (Guattari, 2000: 28). In this manner it is possible to 'illuminate a possible escape route out of contemporary history' (Guattari, 2000: 43–44). In seeking this exit from history, a brief consideration of some emergent issues with regard to language and identity in certain conflict situations might allow us to trace some routes along which it may well be possible to make progress.

In the first place, and partly re-submerged within the new post-September 11 global re-ordering of conflict, is a critical manifestation of local identities. Finding the means of facilitating the political expression of these local identities has been an extremely painful and often violent process for many states. In some cases innovations in notions of citizenship have been implemented in an effort to achieve the peaceful resolution of conflict. For example, in Guatemala a long and bloody civil war, begun during the 1970s, was brought to a close during the first half of the 1990s. In this particular case part of the peace process involved a reframing of definitions of citizenship. A majority (*c.*59 per cent) of the population of Guatemala are indigenous, that is descendants of the pre-Colombian Maya population (MRG, 1997: 92). This indigenous population is comprised of 21 different Mayan peoples, each defined by their own particular Mayan language, and two other groups – the Garífuna and the Xinca peoples. In the civil war many Mayans in particular joined guerilla groups in opposition to the military government following the failure of social reform movements during the 1960s. During the civil war the Mayans suffered considerable repression, described in their terms as their 'Third Holocaust' (MRG, 1997: 92), despite the nominal recognition of various languages and other rights granted under the 1985 constitution.

The Mayans countered the failure to implement laws to make effective the constitutional commitments by creating a new infrastructure for Mayan civic society and effectively lobbying the UN and other international organisations on their cause and doing so in the context of the rights of indigenous peoples globally. One of the results of this was, during the peace process that brought the civil war to an end, the reaching of an agreement between the government and the guerillas on indigenous rights in 1995 (Sieder, 2001).

This agreement, termed 'The Indigenous Rights Accord. Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (Indigenous Rights Accord – Guatemala [IRAG]), attempts to accomplish a delicate balancing act between defending the integrity of Guatemala as a nation-state and enabling the transformation of the state to accommodate the diversity that Guatemala is recognised to comprise. For example, it states that, on the one hand 'the Guatemalan nation is multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual in nature' (IRAG: Pretext) while also asserting the 'unity of the Guatemalan nation' and 'the indivisibility of the territory of the Guatemalan State' (IRAG: Pretext). It is recognised in the accord that questions of identity and rights have been central to the conflict and that the resolution of the conflict can only be brought about by addressing these questions directly. Thus, the accord states that

> all matters of direct interest to the indigenous peoples need to be dealt with by and with them and that the present agreement seeks to create, expand and strengthen the structures, conditions, opportunities and guarantees regarding participation of the indigenous peoples, with full respect for their identity and the exercise of their rights.
>
> (IRAG: Pretext)

It is possible to discern, both in the detail of the accord and in the rhetoric of the activists for the Mayan peoples, an engagement with a discourse on ethnicity and the state, upon which the new Guatemalan concept of citizenship is based, that is both local and global. For example, in part one of the accord the identity of indigenous peoples is recognised in a way which locates them in their locality in an almost primordial manner:

> In the case of the Mayan identity, which has shown an age-old capacity for resistance to assimilation, those fundamental elements are as follows:
>
> a Direct descent from the ancient Mayas;
> b Languages deriving from a common Mayan root;
> c A view of the world based on the harmonious relationship of all

elements of the universe, in which the human being is only one additional element, in which the earth is the mother who gives life and maize is the sacred symbol around which Mayan culture revolves. This view of the world has been handed down from generation to generation through material and written artifacts and by an oral tradition in which women have played a determining role;

d A common culture based on the principles and structures of Mayan thought, a philosophy, a legacy of scientific and technical knowledge, artistic and aesthetic values of their own, a collective historical memory, a community organization based on solidarity and respect for one's peers, and a concept of authority based on ethical and moral values; and

e A sense of their own identity.

(IRAG, Part 1: 2)

Other sections on, for example, temples, ceremonial centres and holy places (IRAG, Part 3: D) tend to reinforce this engagement with the local.

It is in the rhetoric of activists that the engagement with the global is most clearly manifest. Notions of international human rights, identification with the cause of indigenous peoples in other parts of the globe and recognition of the power of international organisations vis-à-vis the nation-state all informed an important shift in the manner in which the indigenous peoples of Guatemala shaped their conflict with the government. Participation in protests on a continental scale to coincide with the 500th anniversary of the 'discovery' of America by Columbus was a significant point of departure. The creation, in 1994, of the umbrella organisation *Decenio Maya* to join with the campaigns of indigenous peoples world-wide represents a similar such step. Sieder puts this two-way engagement as follows:

> In making this strategic shift, Mayan leaders and intellectuals had various motivations. One of these was a recognition of the power of pre-colonial history as a tool to mobilise and extend their own interests and those of their numerically large but politically marginalised constituence. Another was the belief that ideologies emphasising indigenous world-views as harmonious and conciliatory resonated deeply with the majority of Guatemalans and stood in stark contrast to the discriminatory and authoritarian practices of the Guatemalan state.
>
> (Sieder, 2001: 2)

It is not without significance that the establishment of *Decenio Maya* in 1994 was partly prompted by the newly adopted UN position on indigenous peoples, reflected in their initiation and sponsorship of an Inter-

national Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples to run from 1994 to 2004. The decision by the UN in 2000 to establish a Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues (Press Release ECOSOC/5932, 31 July 2000 http://www.un.org) is an indication of the increasing capacity of indigenous peoples to impact upon government at all levels and in different parts of the globe. A number of nation-states have been moved to be much more proactive in this matter as indicated by, for example, the various contributions of representatives of the national governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Russian Federation and New Zealand to the progress being made within and by the UN (e.g. Press Release GA/SHC/3594, 16 October http://www.un.org) in this field. That the UN has become a significant forum for indigenous peoples is significant on the level of discourse. The struggle of indigenous peoples is deeply embedded in the ideology of globalism while retaining an intimate attachment to the local. During the course of the 1980s, this has been effected through the coupling of notions regarding the unique and fragile cultural identity of indigenous peoples with the similarly unique and fragile environments they inhabit. Concern with irreversible environmental degradation has, since the 1960s, been a political issue that recognises no borders *ergo* the emergence of global environmental lobby groups such as Greenpeace. The case of the various indigenous peoples of Canada illustrates the point for they simultaneously engage with, for example, international environmental issues (e.g. Canadian Arctic Resources Committee http://www.carc.org) and the meaning of traditional placenames for micro geographical features (NPC Newsletter, 1999: Story 5 http://www.npc.nunavut.ca) in the context of their struggle to find political expression for their identity.

The ecological metaphor which relates biodiversity with linguistic diversity must not, however, be overstated. While it may well be the case that some of the most diverse language ecologies coincide with the most astounding cases of biodiversity (e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000), there is no evidence to suggest a causal relationship between the two phenomenon. It is, nonetheless, the case that some of the most pressing environmental situations bear a relationship to some of the most fragile language communities, as with the ongoing conflict of economic development and ecological conservation in the Amazon basin. In this way, one may regard the environmental-cultural nexus as significant while avoiding ecological determinism. A pathway of this nature leads to an exit from history similar to that of exclusive and chauvinistic nationalist rhetoric. The case of Quebec, when also viewed from the perspective of the indigenous peoples (e.g. http://www.autochtones.com), serves to underline the inadequacy of such forms of nationalist rhetoric while reinforcing the shift towards a new discourse on language, identity and conflict. As a result of a varied campaign, the indigenous peoples of Quebec have won concessions from the territorial government including specific rights for indigenes. A feature of

this struggle has been the use of the term 'first nations' by the indigenous peoples to describe themselves. This rhetorical flourish has served to suggest that Quebec francophone nationalism is a colonial or creole nationalism (Anderson, 1991 and 1983). Within the confines of nationalist discourse this implies a certain lack of authenticity and, as such, it relates to a transient form of national identity – as with the colonial nationalism of late eighteenth century Protestant Ireland (e.g. Boyce, 1991).

Engagement with the global-local/cultural-environmental discourse of indigenous peoples as a means of managing and resolving conflict, as manifest in Guatemala, remains fairly novel in those parts of the world where the ecological crisis, both cultural and environmental, is most critical. If further attempts in this direction, such as in the Philippines where an Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act has been adopted (e.g. Headland, 1998), are to become the rule rather than the exception then, in order for this to happen the absolute and exclusive sovereignty of nation-states must be further eroded and the means of intervention of international organisations in such conflict situations expanded. The question of intervention is most crucial. For intervention to be effective it is necessary to further develop the legislative and executive infrastructure that justifies and enables such action. Post-Cold War and post-September 11 notions of sovereignty and legitimate intervention are in greater flux than ever before. The CAII framework, discussed previously, is an important part of that infrastructure but does not adequately indicate the most appropriate agencies for intervention. These could include the usual suspects, such as the USA, the UN, NATO and various NGOs.

The CAII framework, however, favours the intervention of the USA. This cannot be the way forward, even in a world of one superpower. The USA is not answerable for its actions to any other than itself. As a result, the intervention of the USA is most likely to be in its own self interest. In order to avoid the charge of neo-colonialism it is necessary to enable intervention by other means. Here, the UN in association with NGOs may provide the best way forward, despite recent severe blows to the credibility of the UN and in particular with regard to Rwanda. That is not to suggest that the role of the UN is to reduce intervention in conflict situations to a singular template for universal application. Instead, the UN must seek mutliple means of intervention through innovative conflict-specific partnership arrangements, set in the context of universally recognised rights while accepting the necessity of conflict-specific applications of these rights, so that strategic approaches to the management and resolution of conflict reflect both the local and the global. In this way such strategic approaches avoid reductionist perspectives on conflict and enable engagement with particular conflict situations in their full complexity. Guattari puts this global-local nexus in the following terms:

> One might object that large-scale struggles are not necessarily in sync with ecological praxis and the micropolitics of desire, but that's the point: it is important not to homogenize various levels of practice or to make connections between them under some transcendental supervision, but instead to engage them in processes of *heterogenesis* . . . Particular cultures should be left to deploy themselves in inventing other contracts of citizenship. Ways should be found to enable the singular, the exceptional, the rare, to coexist with a State structure that is the least burdensome possible.
>
> (Guattari, 2000: 51)

In seeking this heterogenesis as an exit from conflict, therefore, the global linguasphere is a most critical resource.

Conclusions

Patterns of relationships between language, identity and conflict outside of Europe are differentially shaped by the diversity of global perspectives on the post-colonial nation-state. Notions of nation and nationalism and the place of language in society and the state vary to such an extent that it is not possible to construct a singular framework that would pertain equally to all situations of language conflict except on a superficial level. It is useful, however, to conceive of such conflict in ecological terms. The contemporary shift towards globalisation, characterised in part by the parallel rise of the ideology of globalism and senses of the local, facilitates an extra-European view on language, identity and conflict which transcends the narrow discourse of the nation-state. In the context of this global-local nexus, notions of identity, culture and rights can be reconfigurated, thereby enabling our escape from contemporary history. In this sense, language diversity is not a fundamental cause of conflict, rather it is one of our most valuable resources in its management and resolution.

13 Conclusions

> The evils of ethnolinguistic violence will probably never totally disappear . . . but the ethnolinguistic link will also always be related to much of what is best and most treasured about humankind.
>
> (Fishman, 1999: 453)

Notions of culture, discourse and ideology are central to the cartography of relationships between language, identity and conflict which is this study. This is necessarily the case as language planning is not a simple empirical or positivist science, it is not value-free. The act of language planning engages with struggles over the nature of society itself, the craft of language planning lies in sensitising policy processes to the nature of the struggle. As such, policy processes in contemporary Europe turn upon a number of concerns. A most important point to note is that the nation-state may no longer be regarded as an unrivalled policy capacitator. The postmodern challenge to the nation-state is effecting a re-ordering of the global-local nexus and, in this context, the nation-state is found to be both distant from the contemporary citizen and irrelevant to the transnational organisations of global capital. Therein lies one of the functions of language with regard to identity issues in conflict situations – it is an authenticator of the sense of self in society, spatially and temporally ordered; thus it is also a critical marker of difference. Language has other functions in conflict as well. Ethnic difference is not absolute, fixed nor impenetrable. Identity, imagined and conceptual, is defined in process rather than event. It is in the streams of tradition, the ebb and flow of culture, that identity is navigated and it is in this navigation that the tensions and competitions which relate to language are to be found.

The application of language policy as a tool for the management and resolution of conflict, while engaging with the realm of discourse, must be grounded also in political realities. An ecological approach that has due regard to the place of competition in ecology offers much in the way of understanding both the dynamics of conflict and the modes of its resolution. Key concepts, therefore, in this integrated perspective on language

in conflict are resources, power, identity, status and values. As a policy tool in conflict management and resolution, language has a significant role to play in the building of political institutions, the development of civic society, the promotion and monitoring of human rights and in processes of decentralisation and political power-sharing arrangements. Effective intervention in a conflict situation by language planners and policy-makers, however, relates not merely to understanding the causes of conflict but also to the life cycle of conflict. The timing and the nature of intervention in conflict situations is most critical for the success or failure of all policy tools. Finally, there is no single template that may be applied to all conflicts. A framework for the management and resolution of a conflict is not available *prêt-à-porter* but must instead be tailored according to local specificities.

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Index

Page numbers in italic refer to illustrations.

'*accords de Matignon*': Corsican reforms 98–9
administrative languages 72
Africa: language 205–8, *206–7, 208*; nation-state building 203, 205
'Agreement, The': Northern Ireland 83–5
Aitchison, J.: Welsh language 143–4
Albanian Kosovars: toponymy 119
Albanian speakers 156
American nation 34–5
Anderson, B.: map-as-logo 117; nationalism 69; print languages 69–70; significance of the map 116–17
Andrews, L.S.: Irish language 81
An Foras Teanga: Irish languages 87–8
Appadurai, A.: de-localisation 132
'arterial language' 210
Asian sub-continent 204
Attwood, A.: devolution in Northern Ireland 80
Austro-Hungarian Empire 75
Avruch, K.: causes of conflict 163; cultural analyses in conflict resolution 3; duality of culture 162
Azar, E.E.: 'protracted social conflict' 159–61, *161*
Azerbaijan *104,* 105–6
Azeri-Turkic language 105–6

Baldauf, R.B.: language planning 85
Balkan states 103, 156
Baltic States: causes of conflict 153
Barth, F.: cultural patterns 93; ethnic groups 28; on ethnicity 40–1; poly-ethnic organisation 92–3
basic human needs 158–61, *161*
basic human needs theory: critics of 161–3
Basque Country 96, 100–2; census data 174–5; road signs 125–7, *126, 127*; toponyms 121–8
Basque ethnic identity 100–3, 127
Bhabha, H.K.: ethnic choice 42
biodiversity conservation 59
Boas, F: language and culture 10, 11
boundaries 92–3; aspects of information technology 141–2; ethnic group 165; in ethnopolitical conflicts 51–2
Bourdieu, P.: doxa, heterodoxy and orthodoxy 18, *19,* 20–3; habitus 14–17, 36–7; language and social life 13–14; linguistic market 14–17; political consciousness 23
Boyce, D.G.: Irish language 81
British languages 80–9
British national identity 34, 83
Brown, S.: shift of power bases 134–5
Burg, S.: Macedonia 78
Burton, J.W.: human needs 158–9

CAII (Creative Associates International, Incorporated): causes of conflict 184–5; conflict management 186–201; continuum interventions 187; framework 183–9, 218; gradations of conflict 185–6, *186*; intervention 218; policy tools 187–201; position on ethnic identity 184
Calvet, L.-J.: language-state relationship 204
Carment. D.B.: sources of conflict 152–3
Carter, A.: Welsh language 143–4
cartography 111, 114–28
Carver, S.J.: public participation in local decision making 141
Castells, M.: Catalonia 133–4; globalisation 145–6; social institutions 133
Catalan language 95–6
Catalonia 95–6; Autonomous Community of 133–4
Catholics 94–5
Celtic languages: politics of 81
census forms 174–5
Cerquiglini, B.: linguistic integration in France 100
Chechnya: maps 119
Chilton, P.A.: nation-state building 155
citizenship 144; in Europe 89–90
civic nationalism: repressive of minorities 74–5
civic society development: language interest in 191–3

civil rights: Irish language 86
cognitive mapping 24
colonial powers 116–17, 118
communal identity 91–2
communalism 26–7
communication technologies: use by transnational communities 131
Communist collapse: consequences of 102–3
communities: virtual 130–2
competition 151–2, 172–4
competition in ecology 55–9; 'ghost of competition' 58; niche differentiation 57–8, *58*; resource utilisation 57–8, *58*
competitive exclusion: in ecology 56
conflict: causes of 152, 184–5; gradations of 185–6, *186*; language factors 150–8; life cycle of *186*
conflict management 186–201
conflict theory 158–63; language in 158–63
Connor, W.: ethnicity 26–7
conservation organisations 59
continuity: of language 177
Corsica: identity 97; language 97–9
Creative Associates International, Incorporated *see* CAII
Croatian nationalists 156; manipulation of linguistic features 179
Crystal, D.: dominance of English language 138; non-English websites 139–40
cultural analyses: in conflict resolution 3
cultural attributes: as ethnic boundaries 28–9
cultural flows 92
cultural geography 114
cultural homogeneity 35
cultural identities: Irish language 86; in post-colonial contexts 20
culture: cause of conflict 163; duality of 162; relationship with language 10–13
Cvijic, Jovan: Serb geographer 75–6

Daftary, F.: autonomy in France 99; Macedonia 78
Das Gupta, J.: the Amendment Act 208, 210
data, demographic 174–5
Davies, N.: languages of Britain 80–1
DeBernardi, J.: ethnographic linguistics 9
decentralisation of power: language interest in 198–200
decolonisation: Irish language 86
Deighton, A.: European identity 4
Deleuze, G.: minority cultures 74
de-localisation 132
demographic data: controversy over 174–5
demography: as a ethnolinguistic vitality model variable 45, *45*
devolution 79, 176–7; in the UK 80
Dexionne Act: French government 97
digital TV 142–3
dissaggregation 136
Donnelly, S.: Irish language 83
Douglass, W.A.: Basque ethnic identity 100; Basque place names 121–2

doxa 18, *19*, 20–2, 21–2
dual identity 95–7
duality of culture 162

Eagleton, T.: postmodernism 19; practical implications of ideology 25
Earth Summit of Rio de Janeiro 59
Eastman, C.M.: language and cultural behaviour 167, *169*
e-borders 142–3
ecolinguistic model 44
ecolinguistics 3
ecological determinism 217
ecological variables 174–9
ecology: competition in 55–9; Odum's definition 54–5
ecosophy 214
ecosystem: definition 55
education: in literacy 72–3
Edwards, O.D.: Welsh language 81
EEC (European Economic Community) 157
electronic technologies 129–46
Ely, G.: post-modern shifts in Europe 18
end-users 183
English language: as an official language 208; global dominance 138
English liberal humanist project 34
environmental-cultural nexus 217
essentialism 103–4
Estonia 103, *104*
ETA *(Euskadi ta Askatasuna)*: Basque identity 101
ethnic boundaries 92–3; in ethnopolitical conflicts 51–2
ethnic choice 37–8, 42
ethnic conflicts 153; surprise at resurgence 26
ethnic ego-identity 167
ethnic friction 52
ethnic group boundaries 165
ethnic group identity 92
ethnic groups 150–1, 162; minority 104, *104*
ethnic identity 26, 42, 167, *168*, *169*; Basque 100–3; CAII position 184; changed by language 94–7; defining 26–7
ethnicity 26–7, 29–30, 40–1, 92; as biological determinism 177–8; defining 26–7; definitions of in post-Soviet discourse 103; instrumental approach to 28–9; in postmodernity 37–42; in the USA 34–5
ethnic nationalism: repressive of minorities 74–5
ethnic separatism 150, 151
ethnies 30, 162; modern challenge to 31–2
ethnocultural variables 62, 177–8; language ecology model 49, *51*
ethnodemographic variables 174–5; language ecology model 48, *51*
ethnographic linguistics 9
ethnolinguistic variables 178–9; language ecology model 49–50, *51*
ethnolinguistic vitality model 43, 44–6, *45*; criticism of 46–7

ethnolinguistic vitality model variables: demography 45, *45*; immigration *45,* 46; institutional support *45,* 46; status 44–5, *45*
ethnonationalistic rhetoric: Transcaucasian region 105–6
ethnopolitical conflicts 51–2
ethnopolitical variables 50, 176–7; language ecology model 49, *51*
ethnopsychological variables 178; language ecology model 49, *51*
ethnosociological variables 175–6; language ecology model 48, *51*
Europe *77*; citizenship 89–90; cultural circles *76*; definition of modern 71; identity of 75, *76, 77*; as a particular space 4; state building *78*
European Economic Community (EEC) 157
European identity 5, *5*; post-modern condition 4
European nation 35
Everard, J.: dissaggregation 136; information colonialism 137; the Internet 138–9; nation-states 136–7; virtual communities 130, 131
exclusion: from modern technologies 141

Favell, A.: multiculturalism 35–6
Fichte, J.: nations defined by language 33
Fitzduff, M.: end-users 183
flows, cultural 92
Fornäs, J.: virtual communities 130
France 98–100; 19th century conflicts 156–7; national identity 33–4; prestige planning strategy 53
French: as an official language 208, *208*
French state 98–100
Friedmann, F.: Macedonia 76, 78
frontiers 92–3

Geertz, C.: primordialism 27–8
Gellner, E.: concept of nation 66–7
geography, cultural 114
Georgia *104,* 105
German language: as indicator of national identity 32–3
German Romantic nationalism: ethnicity 27
Germany: 19th century conflicts 156–7; 19th century nation-state building 32–3
'ghost of competition' 58
Giddens, A.: national languages 75; power 61, 172–3; structuration 59–62
Giles, H.: ethnolinguistic vitality model 44–6, *45*
Glazer, N.: ethnicity 26
globalisation 157, 214; cultural resistances to 145; English language 138–9
global language ecology 202
global-local nexus 141, 142
Gottlieb, G. 3
governments: implication of information technology for 133
gradations of conflict 185–6, *186*
Graham, A.: digital TV 142–3
group identity: stereotypes 178
groupness 165–71
Guatemala: citizenship 214–16
Guattari, F.: globalisation 214; heterogenesis 218–19; minority cultures 74; nation-states 79
Guéhenno, J.-M.: nation-states 137
Guibernau, M.: concept of nation 66

Haarmann, H.: ancestry 177–8; boundaries in ethnopolitical conflicts 51–2; ecolinguistic model 44; ecolinguistics 3; ecological relationships 167, 170–1; ecological variables 174–9; ethnic friction 52; ethnocultural range of variables 62; ethnolinguistic vitality criticism 46–7; groupness 165–6, *166,* 167, 169; language ecology model 47–52, *51*; prestige planning 52–3; prestige planning strategy 53–4
habitus 14–17, 36–7
Hall, S.: identity 37, 39–40
Hannerz, U.: ethnic frontiers 92
Hegel, G.W.F.: nation-states 31
heterodoxy 23
historicism 103
Hobsbawm, E.J.: concept of nation and nationality 67–8; demographic data 174; German national identity 32–3; national language 68
homogeneity, cultural 35
human needs 158–63, *161*
human rights development: language interest in 194–6

ICTs *see* information technology
identification 39–40
identity: Corsican 97; in Northern Ireland 89, 94–5; Protestants *82,* 82–3
identity process: of ethnic identity *168*
ideology: practical implications 25
immigrants: to France 100
immigration: as a ethnolinguistic vitality model variable *45,* 46
India: official languages *209,* 210; status of languages 208, 210
indigenous peoples rights 59, 215–18
information colonialism 137
information technology: impact on society 129–46; revolution 129–32; user group behaviour 140–1
instrumentalist approach: to ethnicity 28–9
interactional variables 178–9; language ecology model 49, *51*
Internet, the 138–41
intervention 218–19; techniques for (*see* policy tools)
interventions: in conflict resolution 186–201; continuum identified by CAII 187
NI Assembly: language policies 83

Irish language 94–5, 176; civil rights 83–4; in education 81–2; policy in Northern Ireland 85–9; politicisation of 81
Irish speakers 81–3

Jackson, P.: maps 118
Jameson, F.: cognitive mapping 24–5; postmodernism 21–2, 24
Jenkins, G.H.: demographic data 174
Jones, R.W.: Welsh devolution 80

Kaplan, R.B.: language planning 85
Karim, K.H.: communication technologies 131
Kennedy, P.: de-localisation 132
Kosovo 156; maps 119
Kroeber, A.L.: language and culture 10–11
Kurdish community 210–11, *212, 213*; Med-TV 131–2
Kurdish language 211, *212, 213*

Lake, D.: competition 151–2
Lamy, P.: identity planning 91
landscape: ethnic encoding through place names 119; as idealisations of territory 111–16; living 120
landscape mapping: through language 118–19
language: as defining nations 32–3; as a political resource 151 *see also* national languages; official languages
language conflict 150
language ecology: Haarmann's model 47–52, *51*
language ecology model: variables 47–50, *51*
language factors: in conflict 150–8
language in conflict theory 158–63
language in ethnicity: ecological view 43–4
language planning 2, 85–6, 145–6, 220; as a policy tool 187–9
language policies: of the NI Assembly 83; of the Parliament of Scotland 83; as tools for conflict resolution and management 220–1; of the Welsh Assembly 83
language-state relationship 204
Last, D.: sources of conflict 152–3
Latin: as a power-language 70–1
Latvia 103, *104*
Lawrence, R.J.: structuration theory 60–1
'learners Irish' 179
Leibkind, K.: ethnic ego-identity 167, *168*
Liff, S.: user group behaviour 140–1
LINGUAPAX 2
linguascape 111
linguasphere 202
linguistic diversity 75; in Africa 205
linguistic identities: in post-colonial contexts 20
linguistic market 14–17
linguistic policies 2
linguistic relativism 13
'living landscape' 120
Lotharingian axis 156–7

MacClancy, J.: Basque nationalism 101
Macedonia 75, *76, 77,* 78, 156
Mackenzie, A.: competition in ecology 56; 'ghost of competition' 58
Mac Póilin, A.: Irish languages 86; politicisation of language in Northern Ireland 81
mapping: cognitive 24–5; of territory 115
maps 115–19, 117; as icons 117; politics of making 111
marginalisation: from modern technologies 141
market: linguistic 14–17
Martí, Felix: linguistic policies 2
Marxist interpretations: of class-based nature of conflict 2
Marxist thought 13
Matignon process: Corsican reforms 98–9
May, S.: English language 138; postmodernism 37–8
Mayan identity 215–16
Mayan peoples 214–16
McCrone, D.: devolution in Scotland 80
McIntosh, R.P.: competition in ecology 55–6; competitive exclusion 56
Mediterranean Euro-region 134
Michelet, J.: France's national identity 33–4
Mill, J.N.: British national identity 34; ethnicity in the USA 34–5
Miller, D.: political divide in Northern Ireland 86–7
minorities 74–5, 150–1
minority groups: post-Soviet states 104, *104*
minority languages 74–5, 139–40; in France 99–100
Mitchell, C.: basic human needs theory 161
modernity 71–2
Monmonier, M.: place names 114
Morley, D.: televisual media 141; world culture 142
Morris, L.: cultural homogeneity 35
Moynihan, D.: ethnicity 26
Mühlhäusler, P.: ecology types 171; political power and language 172
multiculturalism 35–6
multiple identities 52–3, 130–1, 165–6

Nagel, J.: ethnic choice 38
Nash, C.: place names 89, 120–1
National Assembly for Wales 80
national identity 32–7, 37–8, 80; in Northern Ireland *82,* 82–3
nationalism 67–8, 80; repressive of minorities 74–5
nationalist spacial vision 113
national languages 70–1, 75; establishment of 68; for post-USSR states 156 *see also* official languages
nations: defined by language 32–3; modern 71; relationship with language 204; as vehicles for ethnicity 31
nation-state building 32–5, 150–1, 155–7, 203, 205; processes 158

nation-states 17–18, 20, 37, 137, 173–4, 211, 214; adequacy 176–7; biodiversity conservation 59; centrality of language to 65–73; civic and ethnic nationalism 80; effectiveness 153–4; as ethnic and civic constructs 73–4; global capitalism 79; implications of information technology 133; local communities 79; outside of Europe 203–4
navarissmo: regional identity 100–1
Navarre 96, 100–2
Nelde, P.H.: census forms 175
network state 133
NI *see* Northern Ireland
niche: competition in ecology 55–6
niche differentiation: competition in ecology 57–8, *58*
Northern Ireland (NI): cultural signifiers 119–20; devolution 80; identity 84, 94–5; inter-faith marriage 176; Irish language policy 85–9; language education 176; national identity *82,* 82–3; Protestants 81–3; Roman Catholics 81, 83, 94–5; 'The Agreement' 83–5; Unionists 81–2; use of linguistic variables 179
Northover, M.: Irish language learners 83
'North-South Language Body, The': Irish languages 87–8

Odum, E.P.: definition of ecology 54–5
official languages: in Africa 205–8, *206–7, 208*; in India 208, *209,* 210 *see also* national languages
Ó Gliasáin, M.: Irish language and identity 83
Ó Murchú, M.: Irish language and identity 85
on-line communities 131
O'Reilly, C.: Irish language strategies 86
Ó Riagáin, P.: Irish language and identity 83
orthodoxy 18, *19,* 20, 22
Ottoman Empire 75
Ottoman Turkish 210–11
Owen, D.F.: competition in ecology 55, 57

Parliament of Scotland: language policies 83
parochialism 26–7
personality: principle of 201
Phillipson, R.: nation-state in Europe 79; postmodernism related to ethnic identity 19–20
place names 111, 114–15; in the Basque Country 121–5, *126, 127*; in Northern Ireland 89, 119–22; relating to power and possession 118–19
pluralism 26–7
policy options: framework for 183–9
policy tools 187–201
political institution building: language interest in 189–91
political power: link with language 172
politicisation of language: in Northern Ireland 81, 176, 179
poly-ethnic organisation 92–3
post-Cold War 154–5
post-empire events 158
postmodernism 19–20, 21–2, 25, 37–42; critics of 37–8; as a cultural dominant 24; related to ethnic identity 19–20
postmodern shifts 21, 158; in Europe 18–22
post-national identities 20
post-Soviet: conflicts 154–5; states 102–7
power: Giddens' definition 61, 172–4
power bases 134–5
power-sharing arrangements: language interest in 196–8
prestige planning 52–3; France 53; USSR 53–4
primordialism 26–7, 27–8; approach to ethnicity 29–30
print languages 69–70
Protestants 94–5; identity *82,* 82–3; in Northern Ireland 81–3
'protracted social conflict' 159–61, *161*
purposive behaviour 60–1

Quebec 217–18

regionalism 26–7
relativism: cultural 10, 11; linguistic 10
resource utilisation: competition in ecology 57–8, *58*
road signs: Basque Country 125–7, *126, 127*
Robins, K.: televisual media 141; world culture 142
Robinson, G.: Irish language in education 81–2
Robinson, T.: place names 114
Rosenau, J.N.: dislocation of territory 135–6
Rothchild, D.: competition 151–2
Roudometof, V.: de-localisation 132
Ruane, J.: cultural signifiers 119–20; identity in Northern Ireland 89; resolution of conflict 91
Rupesinghe, K.: causal factors of conflict 152
Russia: landscape 113 *see also* USSR
Russian Empire 75
Russian language: as *lingua franca* 156

Sapir-Worth hypothesis 12–13
Schama, S.: Welsh landscape 114
Scotland: devolution 80
Scots: assimilation to British national identity 34 *see also* Ulster-Scots (Ullans)
Scott, A.J.: citizenship 144
Seider, R.: indigenous rights 215
self-identification *166*
semiotics 13
separatism, ethnic 151
Serafin, A.: Kurdish Med-TV 132
Serbian government: maps 119
Serbian nationalists 156; manipulation of linguistic features 179
Serbian territorial claims 75–8
Siam 116
signposts *see* road signs

Sinn Féin: Irish language 86
Smith, A. D.: civic nationalism 73–4; ethnicity 29–30; *ethnies* 30–1; folk museums 113–14; landscape 112–13; language in the pre-modern period 71–2; modern challenge to *ethnies* 31–2; national identity 111; nations defined by language 32–3
Smith, G.: linguistic proximity 105; post-Soviet Europe 102–4; Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 106–7
social reality: defined by language 9–14
socio-political shifts 158
Soviet collapse: consequences of 2, 4, 102–3, 153–6
Spain 95–7, 100–2
'spatial history' 118
state building *see* nation-state building
status: as a ethnolinguistic vitality model variable 44–5, *45*
stereotypes: in group identity 178
Stringer, P.: Irish language in education 81–2
structuration 59–62
Surridge, P.: devolution in Scotland 80

Tajikistan *104,* 106–7
Taylor, P.J.: concept of nation 66; ethnic conflicts 26; geographical tension 134; urban centres 143–4
techniques for intervention *see* policy tools
televisual media 142
territoriality: principle of 201
territory: antiquity of 112–13; contestation of 119; political power 111, 116
Tha Boord o Leid: Ulster–Scots language 87–8
Thailand: political vocabulary of 116
Tishkov, V.A.: Baltic States 153; causal factors of conflict 152
Todd, J.: cultural signifiers 119–20; identity in Northern Ireland 89; resolution of conflict 91
toponymic projects 121–5
toponyms *see* place names
toponymy 119–28
totalism 103, 104
Transcaucasian region 105–6; manipulation of Azeri 105–6
transnational communities 131
Trew, K.: identity in Northern Ireland 94
tribalism 26–7
Trystan, D.: Welsh devolution 80
Turkey: EU membership 210–11
Turkle, S.: multiple identities 130–1
Turton, I.: public participation in local decision making 141

Ukraine 107
Ullans *see* Ulster-Scots
Ulster identity 82, *82*
Ulster-Scots (Ullans) 81, 86–9, 179
Unionists 179; Northern Ireland 81–2
urban centres: information technology 143–4
urban planning: implications for 144
Urla, J.: census data 174–5
USA: intervention 218 *see also* American nation
USSR: collapse of 2, 4, 102–3, 153–6; prestige planning strategy 53–4
Uzbekistan *104,* 106–7

Van der Merwe, I.: language in urban context 144–5
Väyrynen, T.: basic human needs theory critique 162
VDMEs (Virtual Decision-Making Environments) 141
Vertovec, S.: multiculturalism 36
virtual communities 130–2
Virtual Decision-Making Environments (VDMEs) 141
virtual society 129–30

Wales: devolution 80; National Assembly for 80; road signs 125
Weber, M.: concept of nation 66
websites: non-English 139–40
Welsh: assimilation to British national identity 34
Welsh Assembly: language policies 83
Welsh language 81, 143–4; UK census 174
Werlen, B.: structuration 59
Whorf, B.L.: linguistic relativity 12; worldview 11–12
Whyte, J.: inter-faith marriage 176
Wilkinson, H.R.: Serbian territorial claims 75–8
Williams, C.H.: language conflict 150; language in urban context 144–5; politicisation of language 151
Wood, D.: the map 115, 117
Woolgar, S.: virtual communities 132
world culture 142
worldview: language as 10
World Wide Web 139–41

Yugoslavia 78, 156