Transnational Histories of the 'Royal Nation'

Edited by
Milinda Banerjee, Charlotte Backerra
and Cathleen Sarti

Palgrave Studies in Modern Monarchy

Series Editors

Axel Körner
University College London, UK

Heather Jones
London School of Economics, UK

Heidi Mehrkens
University of Aberdeen, UK

Frank Lorenz Müller
University of St Andrews, UK

The death of Louis XVI on the scaffold in 1793 did not mark the beginning of the end of monarchy. What followed was a Long Nineteenth Century during which monarchical systems continued to be politically and culturally dominant both in Europe and beyond. They shaped political cultures and became a reference point for debates on constitutional government and understandings of political liberalism. Within multinational settings monarchy offered an alternative to centralised national states. Not even the cataclysms of the twentieth century could wipe monarchy completely off the political, mental and emotional maps.

Palgrave Studies in Modern Monarchy reflects the vibrancy of research into this topic by bringing together monographs and edited collections exploring the history of monarchy in Europe and the world in the period after the end of the ancien régime. Committed to a scholarly approach to the royal past, the series is open in terms of geographical and thematic coverage, welcoming studies examining any aspect of any part of the modern monarchical world.

More information about this series at
http://www.springer.com/series/14609

Milinda Banerjee • Charlotte Backerra • Cathleen Sarti
Editors

Transnational Histories of the 'Royal Nation'

palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Milinda Banerjee
Presidency University
Kolkata, India

Charlotte Backerra
University of Mainz
Mainz, Germany

Cathleen Sarti
University of Mainz
Mainz, Germany

Foreword

Transnational empires, incorporating populations of divergent cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic affiliations with different political and legal systems respectively, have constituted an important normality in world history. For such empires to last, they had to be ruled by dynasties because in premodern times, social and political cohesion on a supra-regional level was only possible within the frame of dynastic rule, combining a metaphysical concept of order and face-to-face relations of personal, princely rule at the centre of power. This was always much more important than national belonging in our modern sense. In early modern Europe, so-called composite monarchies were the rule, a prince wearing several crowns in personal union; thus, for instance, Aragon and Castile became 'Spain' only in the eighteenth century. Until recently, dynasties such as the German Hanoverians on the British throne have ruled over inhabitants from Quebec, Fiji, Bengal, Zanzibar, and Wales. Such dynasties did not refer to a concrete population or territory, but genealogically to their family or rather to a common ancestor (usually defined by patrilineal descent). Accordingly, for representation, dynasts chose symbols such as crowns and globes that suggested associations that were both ancestral and universal. The same applies, for example, to coins that rendered the ruler ubiquitous—not so much as a concrete individual but as a member of the legitimately acknowledged ruling family.

However, when the imperial idea waned and territorial states emerged in Europe, dynasties and their means of representation gradually became associated with one particular territorial or cultural entity: dynasties were, so to speak, 'nationized'. This was a prerequisite for those dynasts who

wanted to aggregate their now 'national' resources for overseas expansion, relying on a centralized bureaucracy, general conscription, a unified economy, culture and language, and so forth. These 'power tools' were interpreted as the 'offspring' of one particular 'nation', a cultural concept philosophers of the Enlightenment had developed for European populations and also applied to the seemingly homogeneous 'nations' in the East. 'Nation' had originally referred simply to common origins, namely those of the nobility in a corporative society. Now, it came to stand for a cultural entity, encompassing an entire population within a global constellation of separate, antagonistic (and competitive) civilizations. Non-European 'nations' gradually became integrated into this way of conceiving the world, and some were considered to be equal combatants. Thus, Leibniz rejected the arbitrary absolutist rule and plans for a universal monarchy of Louis XIV and welcomed what he conceived as a 'constitutional regime' in China where, in line with his interpretation, the emperor respected the laws of the nation in establishing social order. The positive example of China mattered for Voltaire, too, who admired it as the cultural nation per se due to its unified language (classical Chinese in its written form), a centralized bureaucracy (recruited through a 'nationally' organized examination system) and, what he conceived to be a rational, tolerant, and magnanimous public philosophy. At the same time, Montesquieu's criticism of oriental empires, and dynastic China in particular, underscoring their 'despotism', would, on the other hand, lead to his formulation of the concept of liberty as a phenomenon genuine only for European nations.

In this process of contrastive and polarizing deliberation during the eighteenth century, the cultural concept of nation was politicized and eventually became the source of all sovereign rights. In the enlightened reading of nation, then, the monarch was deprived of his status of being an exclusive member of a dynasty and became a regular member of the nation, its official and admittedly most prominent one. When Louis XVI had to attach the *cocarde tricolore*—the combined colours of King and Estates, symbolizing the values of the Revolution—after the fall of the Bastille, this was only a first step in a semi-intentional process of 'nationizing' the dynasty that would eventually lead to the plebiscitary national monarchies of the nineteenth century. In the constitution of 1791, Louis XVI eventually metamorphosed from the *roi de la France* to the *roi des Français*, thus becoming the most important 'representative' of the nation (and its citizens). The controversy of 1791/2 consisted essentially of a debate over what this symbolic representation would mean in concrete politics,

namely: was the king himself the nation, when he ruled, or did he act as the nation's, or more precisely, the parliament's mandatory?

From then on, and in different political contexts, dynasts were constantly faced with the question of whether to remain 'above the nation' and thus oppose it in potentially internecine strife, or whether to 'belong to the nation', thus forfeiting pre-eminence of descent and divine investiture. Hereditary rulers now had to prove that they were the best advocates of the nation's cause—a claim that was completely antithetical to their former legitimacy residing in divine right, history, and family tradition.

The question of how dynasties have been 'nationized' has rarely been studied either systematically, or from a transnational perspective: how and with what consequences did dynasties become 'nationized' and what is the role played by Asian and European models in these transformations? In 2009, a group of young scholars began to examine such questions under the auspices of a project entitled *Nationizing the Dynasty. Asymmetrical Flows in Conceptions of Government*, and constituted within the Heidelberg Cluster of Excellence *Asia and Europe in a Global Context: Shifting Asymmetries in Cultural Flows*. Their first step was to undo the a priori assumption of a Europe that conquered the world—a development that occurred only recently in human history and most probably remains short-lived. Instead, they began to focus on the importance of flows and movements of models and traditions, in different and shifting directions. No longer did they take for granted that royal rule, often presented in sacral metaphysics, must necessarily be considered the polar opposite of 'nation' as a political ideal. Such an antagonistic perspective had grown out of the French Revolution, which had resulted in declaring the nation—as a sovereign—to have superseded the dynastic principle.

As the 'nationized' imperial dynasties of Great Britain and France, but also of the Netherlands, became the leading forces in European expansion and conquest of the world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, thus, 'nationizing the dynasty' became an attractive imperative model in the eyes of some protagonists living in countries that were faced with the European threat, especially the Ottoman Empire, India, Japan, and China. Not unlike the Habsburgs or the Romanovs, the Mughals, Ottomans, or the Qing, too, had long since ruled over transnational polities that had aimed to mobilize the resources available not only within their own areas, but outside them as well. In China, for example, where the ruling Qing dynasty was of Manchu, not of Han-Chinese origin, this fact—already put forward by seventeenth-century Ming loyalists in the early years of their

reign—reappeared compellingly in the form of a 'dynastic crisis' at the end of the nineteenth century. The myth of sinicization (that is, Han-ization) thus emerged as one reaction to the multinational dynastic challenge. Accordingly, different ethnic groups in Asia had—from times immemorial—been assimilated within Chinese culture. The Manchu Qing Empire could thus be made to correspond to a (Han-)Chinese 'nation' even when it obviously embraced non-(Han-)Chinese ethnicities. This logic could and would be applied not only to the Qing but to all 'foreign' dynasties in China, retrospectively, including the Mongolians and Jurchen Jin. Political integration would be construed as an achievement of Confucian culture and history, the common language of the classics, and the belief in the Mandate of Heaven as the ultimate source of imperial legitimacy.

China was just one example studied by the Heidelberg research group, together with India, England, and France. The work of the young researchers involved in the project and their standing in international academia eventually culminated in the organization of a conference held at the University of California in Los Angeles in April of 2012. The aim of this conference was to gauge—from a transcultural perspective—the explanatory strength of concepts such as nation and dynasty and corresponding terms, as well as to track their transnational circulation and power of persuasion.

We are most grateful to Patrick Geary and Karen Burgess for hosting the conference and to the young members of our research group for organizing it. One of the group's members, Milinda Banerjee, together with two other participants at the conference, Charlotte Backerra and Cathleen Sarti, took on the task of editing some of the most stimulating papers presented at the meeting. In addition, in order to enhance this publication, the editors were able to extend considerably not only the number and regional scope but also the range of those papers originally presented in Los Angeles. We are greatly impressed by what they have achieved and would like to thank both the editors as well as the authors of this volume for bringing together fascinating answers to some of the questions originally posed in our research project. In an exhilarating manner, these essays situate individual case studies in a global perspective. In doing so, they can help us understand and better assess the impact of cultural flows and shifting power asymmetries in the past, the present and our futures to come.

<div style="text-align: right">

Thomas Maissen
Barbara Mittler
Gita Dharampal-Frick

</div>

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Academic books are never just the work of the people whose names are on the cover. Even more so with a book such as this, whose history goes back quite a few years. So, let us start right in the middle of this story: the editors met for the first time in spring 2012 in the balmy surroundings of Los Angeles, California, even though they all did their doctoral dissertations in the German towns of Mainz and Heidelberg, which are very close to each other. The conference *Nationizing the Dynasty–Dynastizing the Nation* was organized by members of the A5 Research Group of the Heidelberg University Cluster of Excellence *Asia and Europe in a Global Context*, among them Milinda Banerjee, on the kind invitation of Patrick Geary from the University of California, Los Angeles. The Romanesque Royce Hall of UCLA provided a hospitable space that spring for much brainstorming. Charlotte Backerra and Cathleen Sarti from the University of Mainz presented papers at this conference and later joined Milinda in his efforts to publish a book—this book—based on the discussions of this conference. A selection of chapters was made from the papers delivered at the conference; new contributions were added; and the whole volume was arranged to demonstrate—we hope, strikingly—that the construction of modern monarchies and modern nationalisms and nation states were (often) closely symbiotic, and globally connected processes.

The editors would like to thank everyone who has helped bring this book to life and paved the way for richer discussions of the future. First of all, we thank all the authors who contributed their work to this volume, and gifted us with their ideas and endless patience in a sometimes longer than expected editorial process, for which the editors and their

now finished PhD theses take all the blame. We would also like to thank everyone involved from the Heidelberg University Cluster of Excellence and UCLA, especially senior historians Thomas Maissen, Barbara Mittler, Gita Dharampal-Frick, Bernd Schneidmüller, and Patrick Geary. We are deeply grateful to Maissen, Mittler, and Dharampal-Frick for contributing a foreword to this volume, explaining the way they set about conceptualizing the A5 project *Nationizing the Dynasty*. A very special thanks to colleagues from A5—Ulrike Büchsel, Verena Gander-Lauer, Julia Schneider, and Elise Wintz—who helped organize the conference at UCLA and, together with Yasmin Gürkan, made A5 the most delightful and collegial of academic forums possible. We would of course extend our heartiest thanks to all the speakers in the conference, who made possible a tremendously exciting exchange of ideas: a special thanks to the keynote speakers, Joseph Esherick, Nile Green, and Liah Greenfeld.

In addition, our sincere thanks go to the series editors of the Palgrave Studies in Modern Monarchy, especially Heidi Mehrkens and Frank Müller, for accepting this book into the series, and for their encouragement, help, and critical feedback throughout the process of editing. At Palgrave, Emily Russell was absolutely vital in bringing this book to its completion.

We thank our families and friends for extending indispensable support and encouragement all the way.

And last, but not least, the editors would like to thank you, the reader, for your interest in the ideas presented in this volume, and we hope to carry on our conversations about royal nationhood into the future.

Contents

List of Contributors

Heta Aali holds a doctoral degree of the University of Turku (Finland) in cultural history. Her thesis is entitled 'The Representations of the Merovingian Queens in the Early Nineteenth-Century French Historiography'. Her research interests include cultural history, history of France, gender history, French historiography and history of queenship. She has also co-edited a book entitled *Memory Boxes: An Experimental Approach to Cultural Transfer in History, 1500–2000* (transcript, 2014). She is currently living in Estonia and working as an executive researcher.

Anne Anderson, FSA Hon. Associate Professor, Exeter University. With a first degree in archaeology and a PhD in English, Anne was a senior lecturer in the History of Art and Design at Southampton Solent University for 14 years. She is now a course tutor at the V&A, London, specializing in the Aesthetic Movement, Arts and Crafts, Art Nouveau and Modernism. She has published papers on royal and aristocratic cultural philanthropy and patronage in *Women's History Notebook* and the *Journal of the History of Education*. Anne's career as an international speaker has taken her all over the world, including Spain, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA.

Charlotte Backerra is a postdoctoral researcher of international relations and political culture in early modern Europe and a lecturer on early modern European history at the Universities of Mainz and Stuttgart (Germany). Her projects cover British–Habsburg relations in the early eighteenth century, intelligence and espionage of European powers, and the role of dynasties in politics and culture.

Milinda Banerjee is Assistant Professor at Presidency University, Kolkata, India. His doctoral dissertation (from Heidelberg University), now forthcoming as a book, focused on an intellectual history of notions of rulership and sovereignty in

colonial India, placed within a global history context. His current work focuses on a global intellectual history of ideas of sovereignty and legal philosophy in the Tokyo Trial (1946–1948) as well as on early modern and modern exchanges in ideas of rulership between India, Britain and France.

Amerigo Caruso is a postdoctoral researcher at the Saarland University (Germany). His PhD dissertation analysed the multiple temporalities and cultural transformations of conservative discourses on nationalism and nation state, comparing Italy and Germany in the mid-nineteenth century. Currently he is working on a research project on the resilience of the European nobility in the Age of Revolution (1770–1830).

Simon Cubelic (Heidelberg, Germany) has studied Classical Indology and Political Science of South Asia at Heidelberg University. His research focuses on intellectual history of legal and political thought in Sanskrit as well as history of Hindu legal cultures in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century South Asia. His PhD thesis investigates the codification of law of obligations in early colonial Eastern India.

Jia Feng (UCLA, USA) is a doctoral candidate in history at University of California, Los Angeles. Her research is concerned with political economy of the Qing, comparative fiscal institutions of the monarchy, and political and intellectual history of China's republican period.

Eva Marlene Hausteiner (University of Bonn/Harvard University) is a political theorist working on ideas of empire and federation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In her last volume, *Föderalismen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016), she examined competing ideas of federation as concepts of the international, while her dissertation *Greater than Rome* (Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 2015) explored the role of ancient history in models of empire in Britain.

Ulrich Hofmeister is an Assistant Professor at the University of Vienna, Austria. He is a specialist in the history of Russian colonialism in Central Asia and has conducted extensive work in Russia and Uzbekistan. His research, which has appeared amongst others in the *Journal of World History*, focuses on cultural encounters, questions of identity and legitimations of foreign rule.

Rajan Khatiwoda received his university education in Sanskrit philosophy and literature at Nepal Sanskrit University. His research interests are manuscriptology, ancient and modern legal history, and the religion and culture of South Asia. His current research focuses on the legal codification of the pre-modern Nepal.

Martin Kohlrausch (Leuven, Belgium) is Associate Professor for European Political History. He has published widely on the history of the monarchy and mass media and the German Empire. Currently he is preparing a study on the history of architects in the first half of the twentieth century.

Alexandre Lazzari (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) researches literary and political culture in Brazil in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His last project addressed the life and works of Brazilian writers who sought a synthesis of the local culture with national identity, as well as the uses of popular culture to build collective memory and cultural identity.

David Malitz is a lecturer at the Martin de Tours School of Management and Economics of Assumption University, Thailand. Current research interests include the history of the discipline of business administration and Japanese–Thai relations since the Second World War.

David Mednicoff (University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA) researches and teaches on the intersection of law, politics and policy in the contemporary Middle East. Recent publications discuss post-2011 comparative Arab constitutional politics, the thick meanings of the rule of law in Arab Gulf states, the legal politics of migration regulation in Qatar and the UAE, and the legal and political ideology of Arab monarchies.

Javier Moreno-Luzón is Professor of Modern History at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain. He has also been guest researcher at centres as the LSE, Harvard University, the EHESS of Paris and UCSD. He has worked on Spanish political history during the Restoration period (1875–1923) and has published several books and articles on political clientelism, liberalism, monarchy and nationalism. His last book is *Modernizing the Nation: Spain during the Reign of Alfonso XIII, 1902–1931* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).

Cathleen Sarti (Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, Germany) is a postdoctoral researcher of political culture in early modern Northern Europe (British Isles and Scandinavia). Her last projects include depositions of monarchs, the memory culture of the term 'providence', a literal analysis of the Bill of Rights (1689) as well as methodological studies on the fringe of literary and historical studies.

Daniel Wimmer (Würzburg, Germany) is a researcher of medieval history and its reception in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Lately he worked on the use of curricular narratives in relation to medieval history in contemporary European history textbooks, the history of the medieval Iberian Peninsula and the history of the Electorate Palatinate.

List of Figures

The Royal Nation in Global Perspective

Charlotte Backerra, Milinda Banerjee, and Cathleen Sarti

Of the 206 sovereign states in the world today, 44 are generally classified as monarchies. At present, there are 193 states which are members of the United Nations (UN); additionally, 13 states have a contested status. A recognized state, and monarchy, outside of the UN is the Holy See.[1] Monarchies still have a significant presence in large parts of the world, especially in Europe, in the British Commonwealth, and in West and South East Asia. In addition, various forms of kingly rulership survive in many societies and retain substantial social power, even if the states as such are not monarchic: examples can be found in Africa as well as India.

Adopting perspectives from transnational and global history methodologies (to be elaborated on later), this book suggests that the relationship between monarchies and nation state formation has often been one

Ch. Backerra (✉)
University of Mainz, Mainz, Germany

University of Stuttgart, Stuttgart, Germany

M. Banerjee
Presidency University, Kolkata, India

C. Sarti
University of Mainz, Mainz, Germany

of symbiosis, and that this symbiosis can only be adequately explained through a global perspective, going beyond the specific local histories of particular state systems. While the nation state has been the most influential concept of political community in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, royal dynasties have, however, often provided a centralized administrative–juridical–cultural locus around which a national community has crystallized. David Cannadine has argued that late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe (*c*.1870–1914) represented the heyday of royally legitimated nation-building programmes,[2] and also notes the global repercussions of this.[3] This can be seen especially in the British case, as Linda Colley has also shown.[4] On the other hand, dynasties have also changed by responding to the challenges posed by the idea of the nation: this is visible in case of the Habsburg and Romanov dynasties. In some cases, admittedly, dynasties lost against the challenge of a national idea and were forced into exile.[5]

This volume argues that monarchic rulerships played a central role in the emergence of modern nation states, which forms a crucial, if hitherto inadequately appreciated, aspect of modern global history.[6] Some historians, including notably Christopher Bayly and Jürgen Osterhammel, have briefly noticed the significance of monarchic nation states in their panoramic surveys of nineteenth-century global history.[7] What has been strangely missing until now, however, is a book-length globally oriented survey of the nexus between monarchies and nation-building across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: a forum which brings scholars with expertise in multiple languages and social contexts into a common platform of debate and conversation. We thus lack until today any substantial globally oriented theoretical reflection on the emergence of these modern national monarchies or royal nations. The ambition of this volume is therefore to concentrate on the relationships between royalty and nation states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The authors of this volume analyse correlations, interdependencies and interactions of royal dynasties, and the historical or on-going process of building nation states from a transnational perspective. In these relationships, political and cultural discourses have played as much a role as questions of representation, performance, media, and memorial culture.

We see the construction of the royal nation as a global phenomenon. As the authors in this volume underline, the different political agents discussed by them took part in transnational conversations and experiments, selectively adapting institutions and ideas from other societies, while also

exporting their own exemplars into other parts of the world. It is obvious that in understanding the emergence of nation states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—a period characterized by intense global circulation of ideas, information, capital, commodities, media, and of course people[8]—methodological nationalism would not suffice; one needs a transnational approach. This is also true in the specific case of conceptualizing the way that modern royal nations came into being. Hence this book interrogates the manner in which the construction of royal nations should be visualized as a complex globally entangled affair. Rulerships across different spaces and times have been used to conceptualize patriotic-nationalist civic communities, ensuring that the ruler and the ruling family often remained a nucleus of public identity and debate, even when political communities were being shaped by radically new ideas about popular sovereignty.

The analysis of concrete case studies shows that the term 'monarchy'—referring to the rulership of one—has taken different forms all over the world: for example, the category of *raja* in South Asia can refer to a spectrum of positions of rulership, instead of denoting only the monarchic tip of a pyramid of power.[9] European monarchies have their historical and ideological roots in various Judaeo-Christian, Celtic, Germanic, and Roman traditions.[10] Embedded in these multiple genealogies, concepts of monarchy or kingship in Europe have been characterized by conflicting ideas as well as divergent forms of implementation across different times and regions. Islamic offices of rulership, including those of the caliph and the sultan, have often lacked principles of succession by hereditary primogeniture or, more broadly, even a sense of dynastic fixity.[11] While we should be sensitive towards these crucial nuances, it also needs to be admitted that there are resemblances in the articulation of kingly rulership in different societies, across spatial and chronological divides. Monarchs have often differentiated themselves from subject populations on the basis of alleged divine or miraculous attributes, which have separated rulers and ruling dynasties from the masses.[12] How this mechanism of difference was transformed in modern times needs to be interrogated, as rulers had to project themselves as being 'similar' to their subjects, or at least as representatives of the nation, while also implementing monarchical principles of top-down rule.[13] The dialectics between an ordering of difference and an ordering of similarity constitutes an essential strand in the making of modern monarchies. How did this change in the modern world, consequent to processes of modernization and secularization, which also made ideas of popular sovereignty widespread, and which stood contrary to the

dynastic claims of a right to rule by divine and/or hereditary right? A critical global perspective helps to understand how different political actors, situated in different historical contexts, grappled with these fundamental political questions, while learning from examples in other contemporary polities, as well as exporting their own models beyond their state borders.

Monarchs are the heads of ruling families that have usually been present in the political field over several generations and ruling within a certain territory. They have often pursued a common goal of promoting the lineage interest, conflating the interests of the royal household with that of the broader state: instances include the Mughals in South Asia or the Hohenzollern in Brandenburg-Prussia. While an individual ruler may rule only for a few years, the dynasty, related to and intertwined with transnational high aristocratic networks, has offered a longer strategic horizon for ruling elites in various monarchic regimes.[14] Some dynasties traced their roots back nearly a thousand years, before their senior members became heads of nation states. Examples include the House of Hanover over Great Britain, the House of Nassau over the Netherlands, and the House of Yamato over Japan. Over centuries of reigning, they developed an established way of rule and political culture.[15] Representation, cultural politics, and dynastic interests were at the core of pre-modern forms of royal rule.[16] With the introduction of new ideas of nation, nation state, and constitutionalism, monarchs faced serious challenges that led to the fall of some of these dynasties; for example, France or Portugal before the First World War, and the empires of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany in the midst or immediate aftermath of this war. The Qings in China[17] and the Ottomans in the Middle East were among the most important non-European dynasties which lost out in the face of colonial onslaughts as well as indigenous (Chinese, Arab, and Turkish) nationalist politics. Interestingly, monarchs in exile were no longer treated as foreign rulers at the end of the nineteenth century; even though they were still respected as royalty, they could lose their legal and diplomatic immunity in certain circumstances.[18] Many, nonetheless, succeeded in adapting to the situation and continued to rule over their hereditary territories and/or their people, as the Oldenburgs over Denmark or the House of Yamato over Japan.

By using modern media and different forms of representation, monarchs changed their public roles to include modern ideas of national culture and national state.[19] Royalty used paintings, photography, architecture, and newly invented ceremonies and rituals to present themselves as symbols of

nationhood.[20] Modern civic values were also integrated into the representation of ruling families. And even more, they strove to become pioneers for these new ideas and values. Prominent examples of ruling couples or monarchs who presented themselves as leaders of bourgeois society and values included Victoria and Albert of Great Britain, Francis I of Austria, and Louis-Philippe of France. While memorial culture was always used by dynasties to represent themselves, this changed when coming into contact with the new nationalisms of the nineteenth century. On a national scale, memory culture was applied as a political means of drawing together a people, often by representing mythic, historical, or modern kings and queens as leaders and an essential part of this people.[21] Sometimes memorial cultures have invoked older (or even legendary) monarchs, like King Arthur in Britain, Frederick Barbarossa in Germany, Shivaji in India, Amir Timur in Uzbekistan, and Emperor Jimmu in Japan.[22]

Since the late eighteenth or at least the nineteenth century, the nation state has offered a new point of political reference for rulers in framing their political aims beyond dynastic interests. The connection between kingships and patriotic communities, however, is hardly new; such links often predated the nineteenth century. This was the case in early modern England and France, in some regional kingdoms in late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century South Asia (most notably, that of the Marathas), as well as in Tokugawa Japan. Such incipient patriotism was often embedded in frameworks of religious affiliation, whereby the ruler was seen as the agent of divinity and protector of a state or of 'public' religion(s). Christopher Bayly (for India), Caspar Hirschi (for Europe), Linda Colley and Steven Pincus (for Great Britain), as well as Kiri Paramore (for Japan), among others, have made powerful arguments for tracing the lineages of modern nationalism to older frameworks of patriotism; these frameworks were often institutionally related to specific royal regimes.[23]

Gradually, from the nineteenth century onwards, and with varying degrees of articulation in different societies, the nation came to be seen as the repository of sovereignty in a state. A nation was seen as a natural political element with a right, and sometimes even a duty, to form a nation state. This was seen as the only way to reach a nation's 'historical destiny'.[24] The idea that nations have a destiny was an increasingly dominant concept in nineteenth-century historiography, as is shown with examples from Great Britain and the German-speaking world in the chapter by Charlotte Backerra in this volume. In different societies across the world, dynastic historiography, which was the dominant model earlier,[25]

was increasingly challenged, and often replaced by a nation-oriented histo-riography across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. South Asia offers a classic instance of such a transition, whereby nineteenth-century Indian nationalist historiography modified, overwrote, and replaced earlier forms of royal dynastic genealogical construction.[26] If a state was felt to be inad-equately homogeneous in cultural-ethnic terms, then political elites tried to purposefully construct a national community, often through top-down programmes, involving some amount of coercion. The last was the case, for example, in France, as David A. Bell has impressively shown.[27]

Processes of institutionalization, professionalization, bureaucratization, mediatization, and the introduction of national institutions and symbols[28] often accompanied the construction of national identities and/or nation states.[29] This attitude sometimes coexisted with, but also often challenged, royal claims to rule based on the monarchical principle and hereditary right. The theory of the nation as the ultimate repository of sovereignty certainly offered a bold challenge to the principle of sovereignty as inher-ing in the authority of the monarch. The idea of the nation created a consciousness of belonging together, of having a shared history, of sharing enemies, and of having common moral, political, and civilizational goals for the future. Rulers could exploit such notions of common belonging, but were also sharply challenged by these notions.[30]

Across the world, old and established dynasties often used these new ideas of national belonging to once again situate themselves at the head of a changing political community, thereby continuing to rule in a new context and adapting to modern ideas of nations and states. Furthermore, even new royal dynasties began ruling over new nation states at a time when other monarchies lost their sovereignty to the people. It is often forgotten that in modern times creating new monarchies was seen as a widely acceptable way of creating new states which (eventually) promoted varying degrees of nationalist identity and autonomy. Examples include Afghanistan, Albania, Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Mexico, Nepal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, and Serbia/Yugoslavia. Some of these regimes drew on substantial public support, such as the Belgian monarchy in 1830/1. In the aftermath of the First World War, various Arab monarchies as well as Iran under Reza Shah Pehlavi (reigned 1925–41) sought to harness public support to build nation states while challenging Western colonial hegemony to a greater or lesser extent.[31] Some of these new monarchies eventually transformed into republics. Examples include Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Egypt,

Greece, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Mexico, and Romania. Occasionally, however, royalist parties remain significant even today in some of these states; they aim at strengthening the nation state by reintroducing the monarchy. These groups are sometimes part of transnational royalist networks. In India, while no national monarchy emerged as a political form, there were significant political imaginaries that used idealized models of kingly ruler-ship to articulate claims of a strong and unified nation state.[32]

Since these developments were transnational in nature and could in a time of growing globalization be observed all over the world, the present volume brings Asian, European, Russian, North African, and Latin American discussions into a connected frame of enquiry. Various authors in this book highlight the circulation of models of royal nationhood across borders, that is, from a transnational perspective. This was as much true of non-European exemplars (Japan or South Asia for instance) as of the more well-known European ones. As our various examples demonstrate, monarchies have exerted a powerful influence when they have been pack-aged successfully as representatives of nationalist aspiration and identity, and when political elites or even broader publics have aligned their goals with those of the royal dynasties. It is obviously not possible for us to be comprehensive, in terms of achieving coverage of all modern monarchies. The case studies presented in this volume therefore discuss different forms of monarchic rule and their interactions with emergent nation states. In order to allow for a certain spectrum of representativeness, the examples offer perspectives from kingdoms which had centuries-old traditions of centralization (like France, Spain, China, Siam and Japan), to nation states where the monarchy had only recently achieved national centraliza-tion, while building on older linguistic-cultural unities (such as Italy and Germany), to kingdoms where the monarch was nearly the only com-mon factor in an otherwise startlingly diverse ethno-geographic landscape (typified by Russia and the British Empire).[33] Through examples drawn from countries like India, Nepal, Brazil, and Morocco, the volume reflects on the importance of monarchic concepts and practices to anti-colonial state formation.

The discerning reader may be discomfited by many absences. Nevertheless, and in spite of these limitations, we do hope to offer a first attempt at achieving a book-length global history of royal nations, by which we imply the mutual entanglement of monarchy and nation-building in modern times. Future research on further case studies will undoubtedly broaden our understanding of the royal nation. We would

underline that the intention of the book is not to offer a singular hege-
monic interpretative framework for analysing the monarchy–nation nexus.
In line with recent discussions on transnational history, we highlight 'non-
teleological, contingent' stories, urging 'global history writing to keep
dynamics lines of political difference and entanglement in play'.[34] By using
the concept of 'royal nation' as a heuristic frame, we want to provoke a
recognition of the actual diversity of political, social, and cultural experi-
ences that characterized different trajectories of nation-formation, even as
these utilized various forms of kingly rulership to further their agendas. If
there is a common thread linking the different chapters, it is the realiza-
tion that political actors in widely dispersed societies referred to models
present in other contemporaneous (or even historical) societies, thereby
formulating their models of royal nationhood in a resolutely transnational
manner.

With a few notable exceptions, existing scholarship in this domain is
characterized by a certain 'methodological nationalism'. While historians
are all too aware of the global dimensions of monarchic nationalism, there
have been few attempts to go beyond area-studies approaches. Our book
tackles this problem head-on. It argues that the development of modern
national monarchies cannot be understood except in a global and trans-
national perspective. Such a frame is attempted in this book through the
juxtaposition of transnationally oriented case studies, and the construction
of a broader global historical argument in the introduction and conclusion
of the volume.

In methodological terms, adopting a self-consciously transnational
frame allows us to look at the construction of royal nations as a global
phenomenon. It enables us to track the manner in which different con-
cepts of monarchy interacted with analogous concepts and structures of
rulership present in other societies, and furthermore reacted dialogically
in conversation with the ideas of the nation and the nation state. Our
globally oriented approach permits us to compare institutions, concepts,
and sets of political assumptions surrounding the royal nation, which
have produced related as well as divergent politico-cultural forms in dif-
ferent parts of the world. Such institutions, concepts, and political ideas
include political instruments which evolved from monarchical councils to
representative legislative institutions and government departments. They
cover conceptions of authority which transformed to a significant extent,
but not completely, complementing and supplementing theories of the
divine rights of kings with notions of popular sovereignty and liberal

constitutional rule, while keeping a certain space for historical/invented traditions. And finally, these encompass different ideas about the position of a nation in the international state system, and about the role of the nation's royalty within this global order. By dealing with such common threads, the various chapters raise broader questions about the multifaceted relationships between centralized state-making, popular sovereignty, and dynastic interests; between social hierarchy and notions of equality; between older sets of politico-theological assumptions (for instance about the divine right of ruling persons and families) and newer assumptions about the nation.

The central question that this anthology asks, is: What does it mean for a nation to have a royally oriented institutional and imaginative basis, and what does it mean for a modern nation to have a powerful monarchic presence? Leading from this, further questions will be asked: How did monarchs and royal dynasties position themselves in their nation states? What were the challenges that they faced, and how did they respond to them? How did nationalism continue some of the basic institutional practices and conceptual assumptions behind monarchy? What advantages and disadvantages did these adaptions of nations and dynasties have for each of the participants, for instance, in terms of assertion of territorial prowess, genealogical memory, and ideas of glory?

In the first part of this book, the authors discuss how royal nations were conceptualized through new forms of public opinion and public culture, which also informed the making of institutions and laws. These new royal nations were visualized and performed through art, rituals, ceremonies, and public architecture, which are discussed in the second part of the volume. And finally, the third part analyses how these new concepts and visions of royal nationhood were remembered in public discussions, often even after the demise of monarchic regimes.

Part 1, 'Conceptualizing the Royal Nation' presents some of the basic intellectual, cultural, legal, media, and institutional networks through which royal nationhood was constructed in different parts of the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Milinda Banerjee argues that the royal nation should be seen as a distinctive global intellectual and political category. By comparing and connecting models of royal nationhood produced in diverse nineteenth- and twentieth-century societies, Banerjee suggests that many political actors saw in monarchies—present, historical, or even mythical—associated with their respective societies, conceptual pivots for crystallizing their ideas of national unity. The real or imagined

monarch offered a symbolic, and often theologized, centre for the nation. To understand the frequency of monarchic concepts, rituals, historicities, myths, and allegories in modern nationalisms, it is ultimately essential, he argues, to theorize about the very idea of a monocentric nation possessed of a unitary locus of sovereignty and identity. Amerigo Caruso's chapter offers an analogous argument by focusing on Prussia and Sardinia-Piedmont. He suggests that conservative politicians across nineteenth-century Europe engaged in transnational ideological networks and discussions that together played a significant role in giving new justifications for royal authority in the age after the French Revolution. Concepts of monarchist loyalty were bolstered by aristocratic and military cultures, by religious traditions, and by the ethos of public service. A crucial role in this positioning of monarchies at the centre stage of nation-building was played by law. The chapter on nineteenth- and twentieth-century Nepal by Simon Cubelic and Rajan Khatiwoda examines changing concepts of collective identity and territoriality in the Muluki Ain, the main law code of the Nepali state, to show how concepts of Nepali Hindu kingship were central to the way in which the modern nation state was imagined in the region, even as this legal transformation was embedded in Nepal's transnational entanglements with British India and China. Alongside intellectual, cultural, and legal formations, the press also contributed to the centring of monarchies at the heart of nationalist public spheres. Martin Kohlrausch explores this by focusing on the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II, and situating this within wider transnational European networks. Kohlrausch suggests that the Wilhelmine monarchy drew on traditional monarchic emphasis on visibility as well as on the mediatization of monarchies in other contemporaneous European states; in turn, this mediatization of monarchic legitimacy under Wilhelm II would influence other European regimes of the period. And finally, David Mednicoff examines the institutional and cultural underpinnings of the authority of the monarchy in Morocco. It presented itself as a supposedly neutral leader of the nation, situated above political conflicts and factionalism, and was simultaneously able to increase its leverage with the United States, with the Gulf Arab states, and with Jordan. Part 1 shows how, across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, actors in different countries took part in both locally embedded and transnationally oriented discussions as they sought to reconstruct monarchies at the centre of nation-building. This conceptualization of royal nationhood bridged different spatial and social strata, while also articulating socio-political contestations. Drawing on examples

from Asia, Europe, and North Africa, the authors present a global mapping of these networks as they conceptually reshaped monarchies as well as national public cultures.

The focus of the chapters in Part 2, 'Visualizing and Performing the Royal Nation' lies on different strategies used by royal dynasties and monarchs to represent themselves as national icons. Royal representations are among the most common tools of executing and claiming power, important since premodern times, when power and authority needed to be visualized and publicly performed in order to be understood by a mostly illiterate audience. The chapters in this section deal with the modern adaptation of royal representation to the challenges posed by public demands for a nation state; they study these representations in relation to changing media technologies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Ulrich Hofmeister looks at Turkestan under the Russian Tsars between 1867 and 1917. He shows how Russian colonial rulership was presented in public speeches by the governors, and the manner in which these discourses on monarchy drew on the changing politics of Central Asia, on the growth of Russian nationalism, and on trans-imperial comparisons with British and French Empires. David Malitz examines how transnational influences transformed the Japanese and Siamese monarchies, while also inaugurating paradigm shifts in ideas of political legitimacy. Varying representation strategies, including new forms of aesthetics, ceremonial, and public architecture, were used to give a more modern image to these old dynasties, but in the end they had the effect of overwhelmingly changing the societies concerned, imbuing their public cultures with an unprecedented focus on nationalism. In her chapter, Anne Anderson concentrates on the dukedom of Hesse-Darmstadt in the German Empire. Even though this was a rather small state, the Grand Duke Ernst-Ludwig managed to create a (sub-)national identity in the region through promoting an artistic renaissance. In these efforts, connections with other European dynasties and nations to which Ernst-Ludwig was related also played their part. His membership in transnational dynastic networks led to the emergence of new artistic conceptions that helped forge a distinct Hessian national cultural identity. The problem of the coexistence of several subnational identities within one state is taken up by Javier Moreno-Luzón, whose chapter deals with the Spanish monarchy. The Spanish elite's pursuit of different representation strategies, including royal and military ceremonies and forms of religious worship, aimed to make the young monarch Alfonso XIII acceptable to Spanish citizens, to consolidate his

constitutional power and influence, and to promote a strong sense of reformist Spanish nationhood. Spain's involvement with the politics of Latin America, its interventions in Morocco, and the exemplars of other contemporaneous European monarchies all had a constitutive impact on the reformulation of the Spanish royalty–nation nexus. The last chapter in this section, by Jia Feng, highlights the fascinating case of rival political legitimacies, as contested between the newly established Chinese Republic and the still influential (abdicated) royal Qing dynasty across the early to mid-twentieth century, and the manner in which this became entangled with interwar Japanese imperialism in East Asia.

In the last section of the book, Part 3, 'Remembering the Royal Nation', the authors analyse ways in which monarchical traditions and reflections on the role of royalty in a nation's history had a significant impact on the making of national identities and political cultures from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century. Intellectuals, historians, as well as politicians contributed to these processes, ensuring that memories of kingship continued to inform nation-making, sometimes long after monarchies themselves had ceased to exist as political institutions in the states concerned. Charlotte Backerra argues that British and German historians in the nineteenth century obscured the transnational politics of their monarchies in earlier times; they did this in order to legitimize processes of nation-building, and especially the formation of singular national identities. In their attempt to exemplify their nation's history and greatness over time, historians became very influential in defining the supposed essence of a nation. Heta Aali demonstrates that in France a perceived 'natural order' of gender asymmetries, involving the exclusion of women from the throne and from public power, was reinforced by nationalist historians in the first half of the nineteenth century. Through her analysis of the redefinition of French queenship within a broader European context, Aali offers a new transnational perspective on the construction of modern queenship and female rule in France. Alexandre Lazzari examines Brazil in the late nineteenth century, and focuses on the writer Afonso Arinos, a monarchist intellectual who campaigned for the re-establishment of a monarchy in the South American republic by linking the history of his country (including that of subaltern peasant communities) to a supposed shared spiritual-political heritage of the Iberian world. The impact of monarchic history is similarly apparent in the case of Barcelona and the Catalonian struggle for independence, as shown by Daniel Wimmer. By studying mass-media representations, Wimmer is able to show the centrality of this royal

history in today's Catalonian narratives. He suggests that with the integration of Catalonia into European and transnational or global frameworks, the representation of its historical rulers is also changing. The last chapter in this section focuses on significant continuities in concepts of rulership between different stages of Russia's modern history. Eva Marlene Hausteiner introduces a new concept of 'para-royalty' to show that central elements of Tsarism are integrated, albeit in a radically transformed manner, into today's Russian political culture through the public construction of a leader cult. The development of Russian para-royalty can only be understood, as Hausteiner demonstrates, by studying Russia's political connections with Central Asian regimes as well as with Europe and North America.

To summarize, the three parts of this book offer a diversity of case studies that substantiate the volume's central argument, namely, that monarchic rulerships have played a central role in the emergence of modern nation states, and that this forms a crucial, if hitherto inadequately appreciated, aspect of modern global history. In the conclusion, we bring together these case studies and present how royal rule has proved useful to a range of political actors in conceptualizing, performing, and memorializing nationhood. These historical agents have drawn on local or regional social contexts, as well as on transnational exemplars, while formulating their political ideas and practices; our book highlights their creativity in transforming their societies' political cultures in complex ways. While this concept of royal nation can be traced in all the case studies discussed, regional differences will also be highlighted to show the enormous heterogeneity of ways in which royalty and nationhood came to be intertwined from the nineteenth until the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. Cf. www.un.org/en/members, accessed 6 August 2015. For a classification of government types, see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2128.html, accessed 6 August 2015.
2. David Cannadine (1983), 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the "Invention of Tradition", c.1820–1977', in: Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition,* Cambridge, 101–64, here especially 161–2.

3. David Cannadine (2001), *Ornamentalism: How the British saw their Empire,* London.

4. Linda Colley (2009), *Britons. Forging the Nation 1707–1837*, New Haven. For more on the power and influence of premodern royal dynasties in a global perspective, see Jeroen Duindam (2016), *Dynasties. A Global History of Power, 1300–1800*, Cambridge.

5. Such displaced monarchs are discussed in Philip Mansel and Torsten Riotte (eds) (2011), *Monarchy and Exile*, New York.

6. Much of the discussions on modern monarchies tend to be focused on Europe. See, for example, Dieter Langewiesche (2013), *Die Monarchie im Jahrhundert Europas. Selbstbehauptung durch Wandel im 19. Jahrhundert*, Heidelberg.

7. Christopher A. Bayly (2004), *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914,* Malden, MA, especially 247–65; Jürgen Osterhammel (2014), *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century,* Princeton, especially 579–93.

8. For more on this, see Osterhammel (2014).

9. On historiographic debates about categorizing rulership in South Asia, see, for example, Burton Stein (1980), *Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India,* Delhi; H. Kulke (ed.) (1995), *The State In India, 1000–1700,* Delhi; Rahul Peter Das (1997), 'Little Kingdoms and Big Theories of History', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 117/1, 127–34.

10. See, among others, John Hirst (2009), *The Shortest History of Europe*, Brecon, or Stefanie Dick (2008), *Der Mythos vom 'germanischen' Königtum. Studien zur Herrschaftsorganisation bei den germanischsprachigen Barbaren bis zum Beginn der Völkerwanderung*, Berlin.

11. On Islamic idioms of rulership, see, for example, Aziz Al-Azmeh (1997), *Muslim Kingship: Power and the Sacred in Muslim, Christian, and Pagan Polities,* London; Kathryn Babayan (2002), *Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs,* Cambridge, MA; Muzaffar Alam (2004), *The Languages of Political Islam: India 1200–1800*, London; A. Azfar Moin (2012), *The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam*, New York; Mehrzad Boroujerdi (ed.) (2013), *Mirror for the Muslim Prince: Islam and the Theory of Statecraft*, Syracuse.

12. See Ronald G. Asch and Jörn Leonhard (2008), 'Monarchie', in: *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit (EdN)* 8, 675–96, here 675.

13. For more on this principle, see Wilhelm Brauneder (2008), 'Monarchisches Prinzip', in: *EdN* 8, 696–7.

14. See Matthias Schnettger (2006), 'Dynastie', in: *EdN* 3, 1–11, here 1.

15. For the concept of political culture, the definition by Almond and Powell is still useful: '[…] political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about politics current in a nation at a given time.' Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell (eds) (1978), *Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy*, Boston, 25. For the use of this definition by historians, see, for example, Lynn Hunt (1984), *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*, Berkeley, 12.

16. The following works are examples of a broad field of study: Clarissa Campell Orr (ed.) (2002), *Queenship in Britain, 1660–1837. Royal Patronage, Court Culture and Dynastic Politics*, Manchester; Vinzenz Czech (2003), *Legitimation und Repräsentation. Zum Selbstverständnis thüringisch-sächsischer Reichsgrafen in der frühen Neuzeit*, Berlin; Christoph Kampmann (ed.) (2008), *Bourbon, Habsburg, Oranien: konkurrierende Modelle im dynastischen Europa um 1700*, Köln; Joanna Marschner (2014), *Queen Caroline. Cultural Politics at the Early Eighteenth-Century Court*, New Haven.

17. For more on this, see Chap. 11 in this volume by Jia Feng.

18. See, for example, Torsten Riotte (2011), 'Hanoverian Exile and Prussian Governance: George V of Hanover and his Successor in Austria, 1866–1913', Mansel and Riotte (eds) (2011), 305–35.

19. For the impact of film and other visual media, see the special edition of the journal *The Court Historian*, guest-edited by Robert Lacey (2003), 'Royal Ritual in the Media Age', *Court Historian* 8/1. A closer look at monarchical representation of their respective nations is presented by Johannes Paulmann (2000), *Pomp und Politik: Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg*, Paderborn et al.

20. See, for example, Simon Schama (1986), 'The Domestication of Majesty: Royal Family Portraiture, 1500–1850', *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History,* 17/1, 155–83; Talin Der-Grigorian (1998), *Construction of History: Mohammad-Reza Shah Revivalism, Nationalism, and Monumental Architecture of Tehran, 1951–1979*, Master of Science in Architecture Studies Thesis, Cambridge, MA; Maurizio Peleggi (2002), *Lords of Things: The Fashioning of the*

Siamese Monarchy's Modern Image, Honolulu; Morris Low (2006), *Japan on Display: Photography and the Emperor,* London.

21. For an overview on memory cultures, see Astrid Erll (2008), *Cultural Memory Studies. An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, Berlin. Especially important are also the writings of Jan and Aleida Assmann as well as Maurice Halbwachs on collective and communicative memory, that is, on cultural memory.

22. See, for example, Inga Bryden (2005), *Reinventing King Arthur: The Arthurian Legends in Victorian Culture,* Farnham; Stefan Goebel (2004), 'Re-membered and Re-mobilized: The "Sleeping Dead" in Interwar Germany and Britain', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 39/4, 487–501; Prachi Deshpande (2007), *Creative Pasts: Historical Memory and Identity in Western India, 1700–1960*, New York; Laura L. Adams (2010), *The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan*, Durham, NC; Kenneth J. Ruoff (2010), *Imperial Japan at its Zenith: The Wartime Celebration of the Empire's 2600th Anniversary,* Ithaca. Sometimes modern rulers were commemorated as national symbols: see, for example, Chap. 10 in this volume by Javier Moreno-Luzón for the Spanish case.

23. See, for example, Steven C. A. Pincus (1996), *Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650–1668,* Cambridge; David Avrom Bell (2001), *The Cult of the Nation in France. Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800*, Cambridge, Mass; Kiri Paramore (2009), *Ideology and Christianity in Japan,* Abingdon; Christopher A. Bayly (2001), *Origins of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India,* Delhi; Caspar Hirschi (2012), *The Origins of Nationalism: An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to early Modern Germany,* Cambridge; Linda Colley (2009).

24. See Reinhard Stauber (2008), 'Nation, Nationalismus', in: *EdN* 8, 1056–82, here 1057. All translations—unless marked otherwise—are by the respective authors.

25. See, for example, Birgit Studt (2006), 'Dynastiegeschichte', in: *EdN* 3, 11–14, here 11.

26. See Partha Chatterjee (2001), *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories,* Oxford, 76–115.

27. See Bell (2001), especially 198–9 and 20. See also Stauber (2008), 1057.

28. See, for example, Michael E. Geisler (2005), *National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative,* Middlebury;

John Torpey (2000), *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*, Cambridge; Nils Freytag, 'Nationalsymbol', in: *EdN* 8, 1126–7; Elie Podeh (2011), *The Politics of National Celebrations in the Arab Middle East*, Cambridge.

29. See Benedict Anderson (2006, first published 1983), *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London and New York. Bell underscores the artifice and inventiveness underlying nation-construction, while referring to nations as 'man-made entities that humans freely create through the exercise of political will', Bell (2001), 199. This perspective also draws on the concept of 'invented traditions': see Eric Hobsbawm (1983), 'Introduction', in: Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds) (1983): *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge. See also Charles Tilly (ed.) (1975), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton; Wolfgang Reinhard (1999), *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt. Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich; Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle, and Derek W. Urwin (eds) (1999), *State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan: Based on His Collected Works*, Oxford.

30. See Stauber (2008), 1076.

31. Matthew H. Ellis (2005), 'King Me: The Political Culture of Monarchy in Interwar Egypt and Iraq', MPhil Thesis, University of Oxford; Afshin Marashi (2008), *Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870–1940*, Seattle.

32. Milinda Banerjee argues this in Chap. 2 in this volume; the expanded version of this idea can be found in his forthcoming book, Milinda Banerjee (2017), *The Mortal God: Imagining the Sovereign in Colonial India*, Delhi.

33. Even in seemingly homogeneous kingdoms like Spain or France, the differences between regions, regional laws, political institutions, and regional identities, remained significant, as Daniel Wimmer underlines in Chap. 15 in this volume on Catalonia/Spain. The notion of composite states, as framed by early modernist historians, can be stimulating in this regard: see John H. Elliott (1992), 'A Europe of Composite Monarchies', *Past & Present* 137, 48–69.

34. Kris Manjapra (2014), 'Transnational Approaches to Global History: A View from the Study of German-Indian Entanglement', *German History*, 32/2, 274–93.

Conceptualizing the Royal Nation

The Royal Nation and Global Intellectual History: Monarchic Routes to Conceptualizing National Unity

Milinda Banerjee

This chapter argues that perspectives drawn from the emergent field of global intellectual history can substantively enrich the ways in which we may conceptualize the symbiotic nexus between monarchic ideas and nationalist discourses across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In existing historiography on modern monarchies, intellectual history perspectives have not received adequate weight; this essay responds to this research vacuum. It is important to do this in order to understand a somewhat forgotten, but nevertheless historically significant, aspect of many modern nationalist discourses, namely, their reliance on ideas of monarchic rulership to crystallize concepts and myths of centralized national unity. Building on primary sources as well as secondary literature, I track different methodologies through which one can map the royal nation as a global intellectual phenomenon. My sources are mainly (though not exclusively) drawn from the period between the 1870s and the First World War, the epoch famously identified in a 1983 essay by David Cannadine as

M. Banerjee (✉)
Presidency University, Kolkata, India

21

marking an apogee of royal state ceremonial in Europe (and, as I would argue, beyond).[1] However, I make a broader argument that can potentially be applied to other decades of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well, regarding the centrality of monarchies to the construction of modern nationalist ideals of state unity and sovereignty. I argue that this ubiquity of royal–national concepts across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, beneath the wide diversity in actual formats of state construction, needs to be ultimately explained not merely in terms of premodern residues and historical accidents, or even in terms of simple transborder circulation of political models. Rather, it should be seen as a constitutively global phenomenon, embedded in the planet-spanning construction of modern state forms characterized by singular centres of sovereignty.

I suggest that monarchic concepts, rituals, theologies, and institutions often proved attractive to nationalist thinkers in widely dispersed spatial and temporal locations because of the perceived success of (some) monarchies in providing a monocentric visible focus of national authority and identity. By remembering this usage of monarchic concepts in modern intellectual discourses about nationalism, it is possible to critically interrogate, and perhaps to thereby ultimately also 'deconstruct', the dependence of many nationalist grammars on the unifying (and often, but not necessarily or inevitably, authoritarian) conceptual structures provided by monarchic rulership. This in turn can become a step towards problematizing historical narratives which narrate the rise of modern nationalisms and nation states in terms of the withering away of older forms of monarchic legitimacy. I would underline that many modern nationalist discourses have relied not (merely) on democratic–republican notions of popular sovereignty, but (also) on older genealogies of hierarchical royal command. To critique various authoritarian and exclusionary strands in modern nationalist politics and genealogy-making today, it becomes absolutely necessary to revisit historically the ways in which nationalisms have often (though obviously, not always) transfiguratively appropriated monarchic concepts of centralized vertical rule. The present chapter can be seen as a preliminary contribution towards opening up this wider conceptual critique of nationalist discourse, though a systematic pursuit of this theme lies beyond its scope. Simultaneously, it needs to be acknowledged that monarchic themes have also been subversively deployed to demand constitutionalization, decolonization, and/or subalternization of state sovereignty in multifaceted ways whose creative dynamics remain insufficiently appreciated.

Intellectual Histories of the Royal Nation: Problems and Prospects

Two somewhat related paradigms have fundamentally shaped the study of royal nations. Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1983), with its broad argument about nations as invented communities, devoted a distinct chapter to countries like Russia, Japan, Siam, and Iran (and, in differing ways, parts of the British and Habsburg Empires), where monarchic regimes sponsored what Anderson defined as (borrowing a phrase from the British historian Hugh Seton-Watson), 'official nationalisms'.[2] In Anderson's gaze, these projects aimed at 'stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire', embodying 'a certain inventive legerdemain […] required to permit the empire to appear attractive in national drag'.[3] He dismissed these nationalisms as a 'conjuring-trick', 'at bottom […] *responses* by power-groups—primarily, but not exclusively, dynastic and aristocratic—threatened with exclusion from, or marginalization in, popular imagined communities' [emphasis in original]. Further, intellectual transfer was, in his view, entirely unidirectional: non-European 'indigenous ruling groups' merely 'picked up and imitated' European-type nationalisms.[4] While Anderson thereby pioneered a somewhat global outlook of examining royal nationalisms, there was little space here for admitting the intellectual originality of authors of royal nationalisms; rather, they were simply cast as instruments of elite power-projects.

A more capacious view was visible in the volume *The Invention of Tradition* (1983), edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. Hobsbawm's introduction to the volume created a perhaps untenably sharp dichotomy between the premodern and the modern, relegating modern uses of pasts (including royal ones) to the simple modality of invention.[5] Nevertheless, David Cannadine's essay in the book foregrounded a resolutely transnational (pan-European) perspective on the monarchy–nation nexus. Cannadine was also prepared to give more argumentative dynamism to the actors he studied than Anderson.[6] In combination with various other writings of his, Cannadine showed how monarchic frameworks allowed social hierarchies to be both legitimated and contested. However, his main focus, like that of the 'invention of traditions' paradigm as a whole, was not on intellectual history.[7]

Subsequent studies have built on some of these early points of focus, while concentrating on specific national polities like Germany, Japan, Siam, and Iran. Often, political thought has not been a central

concern in these studies; ceremonies, court politics, public art and architecture, material culture, or royal dress have received analytical priority.[8] Admittedly, there are some exceptions. Notable thinkers about the monarchy–nation nexus, including the Italian Prime Minister Francesco Crispi (1818–1901), the British journalist Walter Bagehot (1826–77), and the Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909), have been subjects of stimulating studies.[9] Debates on monarchy and nation construction in the context of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ottoman Empire and Caliphate have received sophisticated treatment: a recent volume *Global Intellectual History* (2013), co-edited by Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, has a chapter by Cemil Aydin devoted to the theme.[10] Nevertheless, intellectual history studies on the world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries still largely tend to ignore monarchic–national discourses, or study such discourses only within area-specific frames rather than through capacious globally oriented interpretative scales.

COMPARATIVE FRAMES

As Moyn and Sartori have recently underlined, 'a global intellectual history might compare intellectuals or intellectual practices or ideas and concepts geographically or chronologically.' One particular objective 'might be to elaborate on processes or tendencies that developed on a global scale'.[11] Such an approach yields stimulating insights. For example, let us consider the following lines from Walter Bagehot's masterpiece, *The English Constitution* (1867), perhaps the most celebrated modern British constitutional treatise, pointing out the utility of the British monarchy:

> The nation is divided into parties, but the Crown is of no party. Its apparent separation from business is that which removes it both from enmities and from desecration, which preserves its mystery, which enables it to combine the affection of conflicting parties,—to be a visible symbol of unity to those still so imperfectly educated as to need a symbol.[12]

One may juxtapose this with the piece *Torniamo allo Statuto* (*Let us Return to the Statuto*, 1897) of the Italian politician and future prime minister Sidney Sonnino (1847–1922). Sonnino underlined the need for a powerful monarchy which would rise above all other factional interests, whose interests would indeed coincide with the interests of every Italian, with the

interests of the Italian nation itself ('l'interesse Vostro è sopratutto interesse nostro, interesse di tutti, interesse dell'Italia'); the king synthesized the general interest of the fatherland ('egli sintetizza l'interesse generale della patria').[13] As Christopher Duggan analyses it, this celebration of the monarchy as a superordinate pivot for the nation was not meant to constitutionalize the monarch in the British mode, but rather to strengthen the power of the royal executive; for Duggan, this prefigured the later Italian nationalist support for a non-monarchic (fascist) authoritarian executive.[14]

Finally, we may consider the celebrated pan-Asianist treatise, *The Ideals of the East* (1903), by the Japanese art critic Kakuzo Okakura (1862–1913). In this volume, Okakura juxtaposed the fall of India and China before Western colonial invasions with Japan's independence, while crediting the Japanese monarchy's role in this regard:

> We saw India, the holy land of our most sacred memories, losing her independence through her political apathy, lack of organisation, and the petty jealousies of rival interests—a sad lesson, which made us keenly alive to the necessity of unity at any cost. […] So the Meiji restoration glows with the fire of patriotism, a great rebirth of the national religion of loyalty, with the transfigured halo of the Mikado in the centre. […] In spite of political squabbles—natural–unnatural children of a constitutional system such as was freely bestowed by the monarch in 1892—a word from the throne will still conciliate the Government and Opposition, hushing both to mute reverence, even during their most violent dissensions.[15]

A juxtaposition of the three texts, all landmarks of late nineteenth-century political thought, demonstrates to what extent they shared a similar discursive framework, one which saw the monarchy as the centre of unity for the nation, a force that stood above conflicting interests which otherwise divided the people, and thereby made possible the very unity, integrity, and self-presence of the nation. In its far-flung spatial dissemination (Britain, Italy, Japan) we can already identify the marks of a resolutely global episteme, one which cannot, despite sometimes the intentions of the authors themselves (such as of Okakura), be tied to the specific national–civilizational traditions of their own individual countries. A historian cannot simply reduce the monarchy–nation nexus, or the construction of the royal nation as a historical phenomenon, to the (bordered) historicity of particular nations themselves.

Connected Histories and Travels

Further probing into this globality of the monarchy–nation symbiosis reveals fascinating connections linking seemingly rather distanced spaces. Sanjay Subrahmanyam's framework of 'connected history', and his plea that we 'transcend' 'boxes', 'not by comparison alone but by seeking out the at times fragile threads that connected the globe',[16] yields valuable hints. We notice, for example, that Bagehot was drawing on the same (supposedly) 'Italian' model of idealized royal strength as Sonnino, despite the differences between them in terms of expectations about the role of royalty in day-to-day governance. Bagehot underlined that the importance of 'constitutional royalty' was especially evident in transitional times in terms of strengthening a government. Thus 'it would have been impossible for Italy to have attained and kept her freedom without the help of Victor Emmanuel; neither the work of Cavour nor the work of Garibaldi were more necessary than his.' In contrast, Bagehot identified in the crisis of 1848 in France a failure of King Louis-Philippe to keep his government strong.[17] While Bagehot himself resorted to a classic comparison here, from today's perspective of connected history, it is easy enough to see Bagehot as a figure who discursively connected the French and Italian cases of royal nationhood, and further reframed British monarchic theory in terms of such models. To take another example of connected history, Nakamura Masanori has traced the impact of Bagehot's use of the term 'symbol', while describing the role of the British monarchy, on the post-Second World War democratic constitution of Japan,[18] which defined the Emperor as 'the symbol of the State and of the unity of the People' (Article 1).[19]

Such connections were frequently mediated through travel. To consider one example, from the late nineteenth century, Princes of Wales began travelling across the British Empire; to their subjects, the royal heirs embodied principles of constitutional monarchy which they hoped to imbibe into their own national societies. For instance, during the 1860 tour of Canada by the future Edward VII, addresses to the prince repeatedly stressed the loyalty of Canadians to Crown and Constitution; in his replies, the prince too connected monarchy and constitutionalism. Respect for the British monarchy was intimately related to aspiration for British constitutionalist principles, 'self-government', and 'free institutions'.[20] Emblematic is an address to the prince from the mayor and city council of Fredericton, which affirmed 'attachment to the Constitution

which admits of such a benign and maternal sovereignty in the person of Your Beloved Mother [Victoria]'.[21] Such addresses need to be contextualized within the long-term trajectory of gradual devolution of governmental powers to Canadians, even while keeping them within overall British sovereignty, symbolized by the ultimate authority of the British monarch. The British North America Act of 1867, which created a Parliament and separate constitutional framework for a united Canada, was a significant part of this historical process.

The situation was more complex for non-white colonies, where the British were less ready to extend representative, let alone parliamentary or constitutional, institutions. Nevertheless, the Indian nationalist leader Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866–1915), in his Presidential Address to the Indian National Congress in 1905, during a wave of militant anti-colonial agitation by Indian middle classes, urged Indians to give their 'most loyal and dutiful welcome' to the Prince of Wales (the future George V). He based his appeal on the assumption that the 'Throne in England is above all parties—beyond all controversies', and in the hope that King-Emperor Edward VII as well as the Prince would follow in the footsteps of Queen Victoria, whose Proclamation of 1858 gave a foundation to Indian 'constitutional struggle'.[22]

Royal national solidarities did not always follow imperial pathways. The Indian civilian and nationalist intellectual Romesh Chunder Dutt (1848–1909), for example, visited Germany in 1886, and later wrote a glowing account of German unification. Coming from a fragmented and colonized society, he sympathized with Germany since it was 'surrounded and hemmed in' by Russia and France; hence it 'must needs be strong, feebleness or disintegration would be national death'.[23] In this context, Dutt positively evaluated the nation-making role of the monarch. He saw Kaiser Wilhelm I in Berlin, and regarded him as 'the greatest of living sovereigns', 'beloved' by the 'loyal people'. Dutt emotively described how he, 'though a stranger in this land, raised my hat to the most powerful of the sovereigns of the earth and to one of the best of men'.[24]

THEOLOGIES OF MONARCHIC NATIONHOOD

We have seen earlier how Bagehot regarded the monarchy as a 'visible symbol of unity' for the nation. In fact, he extensively used theologically inflected terms, like 'mystic', 'religious', 'occult', and 'sacred'[25] to designate this integrative semiotic function of the monarchy. The monarchy

was 'paraded like a pageant' and yet was 'hidden like a mystery';[26] in either case, it 'strengthens our government with the strength of religion'.[27] Bagehot's formulation was not unique. William Kuhn notes how the British Liberal statesman William Gladstone (1809–98) believed, at least in his youth, that (to quote an 1840 memorandum) monarchy was 'the scheme of government most nearly analogous to the Divine gov[ernmen]t'.[28] Even as prime minister in 1871, Gladstone stressed that the monarchy should be exhibited through grand religious ceremonies, through what he called 'national acts of religion'. In Gladstone's words, 'Royalty was in one point of view a symbol', and yet 'of great consequence'.[29] I would argue that by the late nineteenth century this conceptualization of the monarchy as a religious 'symbol', and thus a reflection of divinity, became a globally proliferated trope; it allowed the monarchy to render national unity visible at the intersection of the human and the divine.

The papal monarchy (strengthened by the First Vatican Council of 1869–70 and the dogma of papal infallibility), and more broadly the Catholic Church, was a source of inspiration for many nationalist actors. Duggan notes how Italian monarchists envied the Church for its command of ceremonial communication. An 1882 report in Francesco Crispi's newspaper *La Riforma*, quoted by Duggan, shows some of the main operative terms of politico-theological semiotic: Catholicism 'through the ritualised forms of its displays […] appealed to the visual senses, and through the visual senses to the minds of the masses'.[30] For British elites, who were not placed in as direct antagonism to the papacy as was the Italian monarchy, the papal monarchy could even be a source of self-identification, especially in the aftermath of the nineteenth-century revival of Catholicism in Britain. In the celebrated turn of the century panegyric of empire *Imperium et Libertas* (1901), the British barrister Bernard Holland noted: 'As, without the relation of each of its provinces to the Supreme Pontiff, the cosmopolitan and many-nationed Church which centres at Rome could not hold together, so, without the relation of each of its parts to the King, the British Empire would fall asunder and be dispersed.' The monarch was thus 'at once the symbol and the actual bond of union' of the British Empire. To capture this paradoxical realism of a symbol, Holland—with some hesitation—used Catholic (or at least Anglo-Catholic) Eucharistic imagery; the monarch was a 'Real Presence, if one may so speak'. The monarch's utility derived from the fact that 'Ideas to rule men through imagination must be incarnate'.[31] This conflation of nation and empire through the symbolic framework of a 'Eucharistic'

monarchy was also expressed by the first British prime minister from the Labour Party, Ramsay MacDonald (1866–1937). In 1935, he commented on George V's Silver Jubilee, attended by the Dominion premiers: 'Here the Empire was a great family, the gathering a family reunion, the King a paternal head. We all went away feeling that we had taken part in something very much like a Holy Communion.'[32]

In India, the militant nationalist Hindu leader Bipin Chandra Pal similarly used Eucharistic imagery to forge a royal–national discourse. (Interestingly, he admired the Catholic Church and the Anglo-Catholic Oxford movement for visually representing divinity.[33]) Pal invoked the symbolism of the Real Presence in 1903, not to celebrate the British monarchy, but to commemorate (in a festival) an indigenous precolonial king, Shivaji, as a model of anti-imperial Hindu-Indian national rulership:

> We meet […] eager to accept and administer the holy sacraments of nationality and patriotism to ourselves and to the rising generation of our country. The Sivaji celebration is not, therefore, a demonstration, but a rite, a sacrament. We shall seek for its fruits, not in any change that it may possibly work in our outer condition, but above all, in the sanctification of our inner spirit through a new baptism in fire, in the birth of patriotic resolves, and in the consecration of our lives to the sacred service of the Fatherland. This Fatherland, gentlemen, is not however, a mere word, a mere abstraction, a mere idea. It is something very tangible, something very concrete. […] The vehicles of our national idea are, manifestly, our representative men.[34]

Christianity was not the only translocal point of reference for Pal. In 1906, to commemorate another Shivaji Festival, he used Sanskritic theological vocabulary to underline the importance of icons (*pratima*, *murti*), such as relating to Shivaji, in visualizing the nation. He further suggested that the Japanese, by worshipping and surrendering to the Mikado as the nation's manifest icon (*prakatamurti*) and directly visible form (*pratyakshavigraharupa*), fulfilled their devotion to the ruler (*rajbhakti*) and devotion to the nation (*deshabhakti*). To meet possible Christian, Muslim, and Brahmo (a reformist Hindu monotheistic sect) objections to iconolatry, Pal urged that such nationalist reverence for icons stemmed from the universally embodied presence of divinity.[35]

A little earlier, in Japan, Okakura was deploying the precolonial Indian Advaita (literally, non-dual) philosophy of monistic divinity, on which Bipin Chandra Pal also drew to theorize the relation of the universal

divinity and the particular national icon, to forge a royal–national discourse: 'Japanese national life is centred in the throne, over which broods in transcendent purity the glory of a succession unbroken from eternity.'[36] This 'strange tenacity of the race, nurtured in the shadow of a sovereignty unbroken from its beginning' was profoundly related to 'the fundamental imperative of that Adwaita idea to which she was trained by her ancestors', and which allowed Japan to 'remain true to herself, notwithstanding the new colour which the life of a modern nation forces her to assume'.[37] We observe in the Japanese reference of Pal and the Indian reference of Okakura a fascinating transnational template of what Andrew Sartori has referred to, studying the specifically late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Bengali case, as 'immanentist monism':[38] the nationalist discourse that monistic divinity was instantiated through the particularities of the ethnically bounded nation.

Admittedly, Japanese sacralized discourses on national monarchy were more often constituted independent of any 'Indian' philosophical citation. For example, one of the makers of the Japanese (Meiji) Constitution of 1889, and the country's first prime minister, Prince Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909), commenting on Article III of the Constitution ('The Emperor is sacred and inviolable'), simply embedded Japanese national sovereignty in a supposedly unique national heritage of an Emperor who was 'Heaven-descended, divine and sacred', citing the eighth-century Japanese chronicle *Kojiki* in support.[39] From a transnational and connected history perspective, it is fascinating to note that this apparently very local reference to a 'sacred and inviolable' monarch was however adopted by the Ethiopian Constitution of 1931 (Article 5), drafted during the reign of the Emperor Haile Selassie (1892–1975). With an avowedly Japanizing agenda, this Ethiopian Constitution linked two still independent non-European powers within a shared framework of national monarchy.[40] Such intertextualities, with their immense legal–political consequences, allow us to map the capaciously transnational—and not simply locally referenced—horizons of many late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century theological discourses on monarchic nationhood. We realize how it became plausible for spatially distanced actors across the world to converge on the idea that the monarch (contemporary or historical) was a 'symbol' who made the nation visible to its people, was a guarantee for the nation's unity and indivisibility, and reflected a sacrality that mirrored the supposed indivisibility and majesty of divinity itself. Such discourses, for example as manifest in British national–imperial, Hindu-Indian nationalist,

and Japanese racial–national formats, buttressed historically defined and ethnically stratified—and often aggressively exclusionary—concepts of national unity. They added the sanction of religious sectarianism to the authority of the nation.

Early Modern Histories and Methodological Lessons

To understand such discourses in a global historical vein, we may take cues from early modernist historians who have consistently underlined that processes of monarchic state formation were intensely transborder and transcontinentally entangled in nature. Historians like Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Tijana Krstic, and A. Azfar Moin have foregrounded the connected emergence of sacralized conceptions of monarchy, linking European states, the Ottoman Empire, Safavid Iran, and Mughal India: such notions ranged from messianic ideas of rulership to concepts (and practices) of confessionalization.[41] Kiri Paramore has demonstrated the manner in which entanglements between Europe and Japan produced new norms of sacral-monarchic patriotism in Tokugawa Japan, which would later mould the age of the Meiji restoration.[42]

Sanjay Subrahmanyam's concept of 'commensurability' provides a way to think about the globality of this early modern world as constituted and connected by norms of courtly behaviour and monarchic political imaginary.[43] It has long been known that eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinking drew on these early modern networks of knowledge to conceptualize the world in terms of comparable monarchic polities. If some, like Montesquieu (1689–1755), nevertheless sharpened the contrast between Europe and Orient, others, like Voltaire (1694–1778) and Anquetil-Duperron (1731–1805), argued for comparabilities between European and Asian regimes.[44] Nor was comparativism a monopoly of Europeans. Indo-Muslim intellectuals such as Tahir Muhammad ibn 'Imad-ud-Din Hasan ibn Sultan 'Ali ibn Haji Muhammad Husain Sabzwari[45] from the late sixteenth/early seventeenth century or Shah Wali Allah (1703–62)[46] alike offered comparativist studies of Islamic and Christian monarchies to arrive at broader generalizations about history and politics.

The very genesis of the modern concept of state sovereignty can, in a sense, be seen as a globally entangled phenomenon, rooted in the transcontinental early modern meeting points of knowledge about monarchies.

In his canonical volume, *Les Six Livres de la République* (1576; Latin edition, *De Republica Libri Sex*, 1586), Jean Bodin (1530–96) defined sovereignty through a resolutely comparative framework. A prince was absolutely sovereign (*absoluement souverain*), if, like the true monarchs (*vrais Monarques*) of France, Spain, England, Scotland, Ethiopia, Turkey, Persia, and Muscovy (the Latin edition adds: and of the Indians, *Indorum*, as well as giving a generic reference to different kingdoms of Africa and Asia), he did not share his sovereignty (*souveraineté*) with his subjects. The subjects here had no right to attack the honour or life of the monarch, since all power (*toute puissance*) and authority to command (*authorité de commander*) depended on the prince.[47] This first major European text on the modern concept of state sovereignty, at this foundational moment of defining the concept, was thus already part of a global intellectual framework. We may likewise consider Thomas Hobbes' (1588–1679) *Leviathan* (1651), which argued for the relation of state sovereignty, kingdom, and intellection in a comparativist vein: 'Where first were great and flourishing *Cities*, there was first the study of Philosophy. The *Gymnosophists* of *India*, the *Magi* of *Persia*, and the *Priests* of *Chaldaea* and *Egypt*, are counted the most ancient Philosophers; and those Countreys were the most ancient of Kingdomes.'[48] These two reflections can provoke us, in tandem with the wider spectrum of recent early modern monarchy studies, to reflect on the foundational, and very globally entangled, nexus between regimes of state sovereignty and concepts of monarchy. I would argue that this nexus between monarchy and sovereignty can be analogously used to interpret the nineteenth- and twentieth-century relation between nationalist discourse and monarchic concepts. From this perspective of sovereignty construction, often it was the monarchic concept, and not actual practice, which was significant. The imagination of the Indian nation offers an exemplar of this paradox.

MONARCHISM WITHOUT A MONARCHY, OR THE TRANSLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

In his famous essay *Dharmatattva* (Discourse on Dharma, 1884–6, 1888), the celebrated Indian nationalist writer Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay (1838–94) outlined a theory of *rajbhakti*.[49] While the term, in Sanskrit as well as related languages like Bengali, literally denotes devotion to a *raja* or ruler, Bankimchandra argued that such devotion could be directed

not only to national monarchs, as in Germany and Italy (by the people of those countries), but also to representative institutions in countries which were democracies (*sadharanatantra*). But if rulers behaved tyrannically—Philip II of Spain and the Mughal ruler Aurangzeb were cited—the people could revolt against them. Moreover, *rajbhakti* was due to every state official, and not merely to the ruler.[50] Bankimchandra thus transformed the terminology of loyalty to a king to something more abstract: the idea of loyalty to a state. Such an idea of loyalty to a state may have been present in earlier centuries too, in India as elsewhere, but Bankimchandra undoubtedly gave the idea radically new valence within colonial South Asia by framing it in a resolutely transnational manner, in relation to Euro-American models of national monarchy and democracy. In this late phase of his intellectual life, Bankimchandra also reframed precolonial Hindu myths, comparing the divine prince Krishna with Cavour and Bismarck in their supposedly shared role of unifying their nations. Krishna had supposedly created a unified Indian nation in antiquity by erecting a *dharmarajya* (righteous kingdom), as Italy and Germany had been royally unified in the nineteenth century. Bringing India under a monarchic rule (*ekachhatradhin*, literally, under one parasol) apparently ensured peace, popular welfare, and the nation's progress (*unnati*).[51]

Bankimchandra resembled many other Indians who used monarchic vocabulary and historicity, not to advocate the building of an actual national monarchy in India, but to envisage a unified Indian nation state. They negated the legitimacy of the British colonial state (and monarchy) by referring to precolonial or mythic–religious Indian rulers as normative exemplars. For example, the nationalist litterateur Bhudev Mukhopadhyay (1827–94), in his novel *Svapnalabdha Bharatavarsher Itihasa* (*History of India as seen in a Dream*, 1875), drew in part on the ancient Indian text *Rigveda* to imagine the Indian nation as the idealized body of a national monarch:

> As God's cosmic iconic form extends through the universe, so does the ruler's body extend throughout India. Agriculturist and industrial labourer subjects constitute the lower part of his body, merchants and wealthy individuals are the middle portion, warriors and royal officials are his arms, the scholars are his head, and this council is his mouth.[52]

This vision of a Hindu-Indian nation was clearly stratified according to caste and class hierarchies in its figuration of the national body politic.

To many late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Indians, the category of *dharmarajya* (literally, righteous kingdom/polity) offered another such mediating concept which used the terminology of kingship to talk of something broader: the idea of a righteous nation. The nationalist litterateur Nabinchandra Sen (1847–1909), in his epic trilogy *Raivatak-Kurukshetra-Prabhas* (1887–97), envisaged an Indian national *dharmarajya* based on *ek dharma, ek jati, ek simhasan* (one moral law, one nation, one throne), or (in another formulation) on *ek dharma*, *ek jati*, *ek rajya*, *ek niti* (one moral law, one nation, one kingdom/polity, one political ethics). For Sen, national unity was embedded in the monistic unity of the divine, denoted through the Advaita imagery of *parambrahma ekamevadvitiyam* (the ultimate divine, the one without a second).[53] Sen's focus on monotheistic-monarchic unity evidently privileged a high-caste Hindu understanding of nationalist centralization. Mir Mosharraf Hossain (1847–1912), in his novel *Vishad Sindhu* (*Sea of Sorrow*, 1885–91), similarly described the unity of an Islamic state by drawing on nationalist vocabularies of *janmabhumi* (land of birth) as well as on Islamic and Advaita-Indic concepts of monistic divinity, using the Arabic and Sanskrit terms, *wahdahu la sharikalahu*, *ekamevadvitiyam*, and *advitiya*. He also employed the category of *dharmarajya*.[54] In understanding such conceptual strategies, Benedict Anderson's formula of official nationalism proves inadequate. These Indians aimed at constructing national polities not from the secure vantage point of an imperial ruling class, but from a location of racial subalternity. Their objective was the constitution of a patriotic society which would free Indians from colonial heteronomy. Simultaneously, their usage of sectarian–nationalist theologies clearly revealed the ethnic and religious limits or frontiers of the nationalisms they imagined into being.

The poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) offers another example of such an effort, as he invoked Japan to imagine a future Indian national leadership in a celebrated 1904 lecture:

Japan has shown how machinery can be harmonized with the heart, and how the ruler (*raja*) can be connected to the nation (*svadesha*). If we remember this example, we shall be able to harmonize at the same time the master of society (*samajpati*) and the rule of society (*samajtantra*) in order to construct and administer the national society (*svadeshi samaj*). We shall be able to directly see the nation in a man, and by accepting his rule, we shall be able to truly serve the national society.[55]

Despite such discourses, however, no significant programme for instituting an Indian national monarch emerged in practice in late nineteenth- or twentieth-century India. What emerged instead was an Indian nationalist discourse on sovereignty. The politician Aurobindo Ghose (1872–1950) is representative of this irony, as (in a dramatic sketch authored around 1910) he subordinated the national monarch to the will of the people-nation:

> Loyalty to the sovereign of my choice, that is good; but loyalty to the sovereign of my nation's choice, that is better. The monarch is divine by the power of God expressed within him, but he has the power because he is the incarnation of the people. God in the nation is the deity of which the monarch must be the servant and the devotee.[56]

Indian intellectuals often produced such discourses not just for their countrymen, but also to convince Western audiences about the legitimacy of Indian nationalist political aspiration. For example, in a volume published in London in 1914, carrying a sympathetic introduction by Ramsay MacDonald, the historian Radhakumud Mookerji (1884–1964) interpreted titles used by ancient Indian kings, like *adhirat*, *adhiraja*, *chakravartin*, *ekaraja*, *rajadhiraja*, *samraj*, *samrat*, and *sarvabhauma*, as denoting 'sovereignty', 'suzerainty', and 'paramountcy'. Mookerji urged that India had emerged as a national political unity in the past, aided by indigenous rulers who aspired to be 'a paramount sovereign dominating the whole of India'.[57] To circumvent the objection that such rulers had been empire-builders with no sense of 'India', Mookerji argued: 'The Hindu king would also set no bounds to his political ambition. It was nothing short of universal sovereignty, which was reduced by the actualities of the objective environment into the sovereignty of the whole of India.'[58]

A comparable argument was offered by the nationalist intellectual and pioneer Indian sociologist and political scientist Benoy Kumar Sarkar (1887–1949) in an American journal in 1919, as he forged a Hindu-Indian national ideal of sovereignty by working through Sanskrit titles of kingship like *sarva-bhauma*, *chakravarti*, *samrat*, and *chatooranta*. He concluded:

> The conception of 'external' sovereignty was well established in the Hindu philosophy of the state. The Hindu thinkers not only analyzed sovereignty with regard to the constituent elements in a single state. They realized also

that sovereignty is not complete unless it is external as well as internal, that is, unless the state can exercise its internal authority unobstructed by, and independently of, other states.[59]

Sarkar found in precolonial Indian terms of rulership specific equivalents of European terms for sovereignty. For example, he noted in another American journal in 1921: '*Danda*, as interpreted by Manu, is obviously the very principle of omnipotence, comparable to the *majestas* of Bodin or the *summa potestas* of Grotius. It is the abstraction of that power whose concrete embodiment is sovereignty in a state.'[60]

In the 1910s, people like Mookerji and Sarkar were experimenting with different ancient Indic categories to indigenize the idea of sovereignty. Eventually, in most South Asian languages—including Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Marathi, Nepali, and Telugu—the ancient Sanskrit term of kingship *sarvabhauma* (literally, lord of all land) provided the standardized root word for 'sovereignty'. An ironic result of such acts of translation was a certain complicity between vocabularies of imperial monarchy and vocabularies of nationhood in their common reliance on the ideal of monocentric, and vertically enunciated, state power. Sarkar worked through this by positing the eminently paradoxical idea of 'imperial nationalism' as the objective of ancient Indian rulers.[61] Aurobindo Ghose suggested that the nation idea was often instantiated through imperial formats. The unification carried out by various empires ultimately facilitated the political self-realization of a nation: Ghose offered India, England, France, Germany, Greece, and the United States as examples.[62]

MONARCHIC CONCEPTS AND NATIONALISMS IN ROYAL AND POST-ROYAL SOCIETIES: CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

In understanding this widespread nationalist reliance on monarchic (and sometimes monotheistic) concepts of rulership, it is useful to refer to the controversial German jurist Carl Schmitt (1888–1985). Like many other intellectuals whom this essay discusses, Schmitt traced sovereign power to a monistic (and authoritarian) source: the idea of human sovereignty, including in non-royal societies, was a mirror of the idea of divine sovereignty. His book *Political Theology* (1922) observed: 'All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development—in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example,

the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but also because of their systematic structure […]'[63] As Schmitt's translator George Schwab notes, Schmitt, in reaction to modern developments in constitutional liberalism, 'was determined to reinstate the personal element in sovereignty and make it indivisible once more'.[64] On this basis, he was prepared to lend his support even to Nazi dictatorial rule. One may also note the case of the German historian Ernst H. Kantorowicz who continued Schmitt's focus on political theology by examining, in his famous book *The King's Two Bodies* (1957), the manner in which the modern concept of state sovereignty emerged from the notion of the European king's Christ-like undying, corporate, and almost mystical, body. Underlying Kantorowicz's researches on kingship, there lay, as Martin Ruehl has noted, his nostalgia for a monarchic nation, even as he lived in a 'time without emperors'.[65]

The reflections of Schmitt or Kantorowicz, in the context of post-monarchic Germany, cannot be seen in isolation. Various scholars have observed the resilience of monarchic concepts in societies which I would tentatively term as 'post-royal', that is, where kingships have ceased to exercise direct state sovereignty, though (and this is the paradox of the prefix 'post') kingships have not ceased to influence theories and practices of sovereignty as such. Martin Kohlrausch's chapter in this volume tracks the emergence of concepts of leadership (the very notion of a *Führer*) in the Germany of Wilhelm II, with dark future legacies.[66] William Scheuerman and Clement Fatovic have written about the impact of early modern thinkers on monarchy (like John Locke, Montesquieu, and William Blackstone) on the emergence of the United States presidency, with implications on the president's enormous powers today.[67] Matthew Ellis has observed how royal forms of nationhood, born in interwar Iraq and Egypt, moulded the later emergence of non-royal nationalist dictatorships in those countries.[68] Eva Marlene Hausteiner's chapter in this book introduces the framework of 'para-royalty' to analyse contemporary Russia and neighbouring Central Asian societies where various forms of executive power closely resemble monarchic forms of command.[69] And finally, there is a global 'subaltern' story to be told as well. Alexandre Lazzari's discussion in this volume about the royalism of late nineteenth-century Brazilian peasants,[70] William Pinch's study of ideas of royal identity among colonial Indian peasants,[71] or Marie Lecomte-Tilouine's analysis of the valence of royal concepts and identities among today's Nepali populations[72] offer variants of such subaltern 'patriotic' appropriations of kingship, often directed against ruling elites.

What explains this extraordinary, and yet only very inadequately theo-rized upon, traction of monarchic concepts in nineteenth- and twentieth-century constructions of nationalism? I have rejected the hypothesis that it can be explained only in terms of the residues of old local customs or (in the vein of Benedict Anderson) only in terms of the power drives of princely elites and ruling classes. I have pointed to widespread cross-national cita-tions of royal national models: British and German ones in India, Italian ones in Britain, Indian ones in Japan, Japanese ones in India and Ethiopia, and so on, Yet, even these transnational flows in royal–national models do not offer enough of an explanation. We need to explain the very con-text which made intellectual flows (transnational borrowings) at all pos-sible. As Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori have noted, the task of global intellectual history may be to explain 'not merely the channels that make mobility possible but also the social transformations that make specific intellectual practices and concepts plausible and meaningful across large spatial extensions'.[73] For me, the production of national sovereignty has offered this broader transformative rationale that made possible the trans-national flows in monarchic models. Through references to various case studies from across the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and with a somewhat detailed focus on colonial India, I have suggested that the reason political actors from around the world cited monarchic models from other societies (despite often wide differences in political systems and cultural ecologies) was because of the perceived desirability of construct-ing a strong sovereign nation state.

I have argued that the global valence and ubiquity of monarchic vocabularies in modern nationalist discourses thus needs to be ultimately explained in relation to the very emergence of nationalist polities across the world. The centrality of monarchic concepts to globally inflected polit-ical thinking about sovereignty goes back perhaps at least to the sixteenth century. However, across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many nationalist political actors began to discover in monarchies—present, his-torical, or mythical—associated with their respective societies, conceptual lynchpins for hinging their ideas of national unity. The real or imagined monarch offered a symbolic, and frequently sacralized, inspirational cen-tre for the nation. Monarchy, the very conceptual abstraction of the 'rule of one', offered a privileged way to think about the unity of the nation, of the nation as centralized around its monistic apex, a singular real or mytho-historical ruler. Concepts of monarchic rulership were used to rein-force the exclusionary aspects of nationalist identity and historicity, as well

as (sometimes) to destabilize hierarchies of power. Such discourses could be found in states which had actual national monarchies (like Britain, Italy, and Japan), as well as in those states (like India) where there was no national monarchy.

To understand this important role of monarchic concepts, rituals, historicities, myths, and allegories, it is ultimately essential to reflect upon the very idea of a monocentric nation, the idea that a nation state should have a unitary locus of sovereignty and identity. This chapter should provoke the reader into thinking more critically about the dependence of many nationalist discourses on vertical notions of royal command, about the complicities and continuities between monarchic and nationalist imaginings of hierarchical authority and ethnic/class exclusion, as well as to reflect on how monarchic images can be subversively hijacked and redeployed to challenge various asymmetries of power.

Notes

1. David Cannadine (2000), 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the 'Invention of Tradition', c.1820–1977', in: Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, 161–62.
2. Benedict Anderson (2006), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, 86.
3. Anderson (2006), 86–7.
4. Anderson (2006), 109–11.
5. Eric Hobsbawm (2000), 'The Invention of Tradition', in: Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds) (2000), 1–14.
6. Cannadine (2000), 101–64.
7. For example, David Cannadine (1981), 'Conflict and Consensus on a Ceremonial Occasion: The Diamond Jubilee in Cambridge in 1897', *The Historical Journal*, 24/1, 111–46; David Cannadine (2001), *Ornamentalism: How the British saw their Empire*, London.
8. It is impossible to summarize the vast scholarship here. As representative examples, see John C. G. Röhl (1994), *The Kaiser and His Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany*, Cambridge; Eva Giloi (2011), *Monarchy, Myth, and Material Culture in Germany 1750–1950,* Cambridge; T. Fujitani (1996), *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan*, Berkeley; Kenneth J. Ruoff (2010), *Imperial Japan at its Zenith: The Wartime*

Celebration of the Empire's 2,600th Anniversary, Ithaca; Maurizio Peleggi (2002), *Lords of Things: The Fashioning of the Siamese Monarchy's Modern Image*, Honolulu; Afshin Marashi (2008), *Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870–1940*, Seattle.

9. For example, Christopher Duggan (2010), 'Francesco Crispi, the Problem of the Monarchy, and the Origins of Italian Nationalism', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 15/3, 336–53; William M. Kuhn (1996), *Democratic Royalism: The Transformation of the British Monarchy, 1861–1914,* NewYork; DavidM.Craig(2007), 'Bagehot's Republicanism', in: Andrzej Olechnowicz, *The Monarchy and the British Nation, 1780 to the Present*, Cambridge, 139–62; Takii Kazuhiro (2014), *Ito Hirobumi – Japan's First Prime Minister and Father of the Meiji Constitution,* Abingdon.

10. Cemil Aydin (2013), 'Globalizing the Intellectual History of the Idea of the "Muslim World"', in: Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds), *Global Intellectual History*, New York, 159–86.

11. Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (2013), 'Approaches to Global Intellectual History', in: Moyn and Sartori (eds) (2013), 7.

12. Walter Bagehot (1867), *The English Constitution*, London, 70.

13. Sidney Sonnino, 'Torniamo allo Statuto', https://archive.org/details/TorniamoAlloStatuto_201407, accessed 21 May 2016, 21, 26.

14. Duggan (2010), 350.

15. Kakuzo Okakura (1905), *The Ideals of the East with Special Reference to the Art of Japan*, London, 212–16.

16. Sanjay Subrahmanyam (1997), 'Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia', *Modern Asian Studies* 31/3, 761–62.

17. Bagehot (1867), 81–82.

18. Masanori Nakamura (1992), *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931–1991,* Armonk.

19. The Constitution of Japan, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html, accessed 21 May 2016.

20. Henry James Morgan (1860), *The Tour of H.R.H. The Prince of Wales through British America and the United States*, Montreal, vii–viii, 44–45, 81, 85, 128, 212, 233–34, 241, 247, 249, 254–55, 257.

21. Morgan (1860), 45.
22. G. K. Gokhale (1908), *Speeches of the Honourable Mr. G. K. Gokhale*, Madras, 467–68.
23. Romesh Chunder Dutt (1896), *Three Years in Europe*, Calcutta, 302.
24. Dutt (1896), 285.
25. Bagehot (1867), 4, 9, 67.
26. Bagehot (1867), 70.
27. Bagehot (1867), 63–64.
28. Kuhn (1996), 34.
29. Kuhn (1996), 40.
30. Duggan (2010), 341.
31. Bernard Holland (1901), *Imperium et Libertas: A Study in History and Politics*, London, 317–19.
32. David Marquand (1977), *Ramsay MacDonald*, London, 774.
33. Bipin Chandra Pal (1909), *Jeler Khata*, Calcutta; Bipin Chandra Pal (1958), *The Soul of India: A Constructive Study of Indian Thoughts and Ideals*, Calcutta, 194.
34. Bipin Chandra Pal (1954), *Swadeshi and Swaraj*, Calcutta, 84–87.
35. Bipin Chandra Pal (1906–7), 'Shivaji-Utsava o Bhavanimurti', *Vangadarshana (Navaparyaya)*, 6/6, 296–305.
36. Okakura (1905), 207.
37. Okakura (1905), 222.
38. Andrew Sartori (2008), *Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital*, Chicago, 142–55.
39. Hirobumi Ito (1906), *Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan*, Tokyo, 6–7.
40. Donald N. Levine (2007), 'Ethiopia, Japan, and Jamaica: A Century of Globally Linked Modernizations', *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, 3/1, 44–45.
41. Sanjay Subrahmanyam (2003), 'Turning the Stones Over: Sixteenth-century Millenarianism from the Tagus to the Ganges', *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 40/2, 2003, 129–61; Tijana Krstic (2011), *Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, Stanford; A. Azfar Moin (2012), *The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam*, New York.
42. Kiri Paramore (2009), *Ideology and Christianity in Japan*, Abingdon.

43. Sanjay Subrahmanyam (2012), *Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia*, Cambridge, MA.

44. See, for example, Michael Curtis (2009), *Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and India*, Cambridge; Frederick G. Whelan (2009), *Enlightenment Political Thought and Non-Western Societies: Sultans and Savages,* New York.

45. Sanjay Subrahmanyam (2005), 'On World Historians in the Sixteenth Century', *Representations*, 91/1, 26–57.

46. Vasileios Syros (2012), 'An Early Modern South Asian Thinker on the Rise and Decline of Empires: Shah Wali Allah of Delhi, the Mughals, and the Byzantines', *Journal of World History*, 23/4, 793–840.

47. Jean Bodin (1577), *Les Six Livres de la République*, Paris, 222; Jean Bodin (1586), *De Republica Libri Sex*, 210. On Bodin's evaluation of Islamic monarchy, see Thierry Hentsch (1992), *Imagining the Middle East*, Montreal, 68–76.

48. Thomas Hobbes (2003), *Leviathan*, Cambridge, 459.

49. This section draws on my doctoral dissertation, defended at Heidelberg University in 2014, on ideas of rulership and sovereignty in colonial India (*c.*1858–1947). It is now forthcoming as Milinda Banerjee (2017), *The Mortal God: Imagining the Sovereign in Colonial India*, Delhi.

50. Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay (1994), *Bankim Rachanavali*, Calcutta, 555–56.

51. Chattopadhyay (1994), 828.

52. Bhudev Mukhopadhyay (1957), *Bhudevarachanasambhara*, Calcutta, 342–43.

53. Nabinchandra Sen (1904), *Navinachandrer Granthavali,* vol. 1, Calcutta, 795, 1006–7.

54. Mir Mosharraf Hossain (2005), *Vishad Sindhu*, Calcutta, 32, 38–39, 283.

55. Rabindranath Tagore (1990), *Ravindrarachanavali*, vol. 13, Calcutta, 53.

56. Aurobindo Ghose (2003), *The Complete Works of Sri Aurobindo*, vol. 1, Pondicherry, 483.

57. Radhakumud Mookerji (1914), *The Fundamental Unity of India (from Hindu Sources),* London, 116.

58. Mookerji (1914), 88–89.

59. Benoy Kumar Sarkar (1919), 'Hindu Theory of International Relations', *The American Political Science Review,* 13/3, 400.
60. Benoy Kumar Sarkar (1921), 'The Hindu Theory of the State', *Political Science Quarterly*, 36/1, 88.
61. Sarkar (1919), 410.
62. Aurobindo Ghose (1997), *The Complete Works of Sri Aurobindo*, vol. 25, Pondicherry, 307–8.
63. Carl Schmitt (2005), *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, Cambridge, MA, 36.
64. Schmitt (2005), xvi.
65. Martin A. Ruehl (2000), ''In this Time without Emperors': The Politics of Ernst Kantorowicz's *Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite* Reconsidered', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 63, 187–242.
66. Martin Kohlrausch (2017), 'Loss of Control: Kaiser Wilhelm II, Mass Media and the National Identity of the Second German Reich', in: Banerjee, Backerra and Sarti (eds), *Transnational Histories of the Royal Nation* [Chap. 5 in this volume].
67. William E. Scheuerman (2005), 'American Kingship? Monarchical Origins of Modern Presidentialism', *Polity,* 37/1, 24–53; Clement Fatovic (2009), *Outside the Law: Emergency and Executive Power*, Baltimore.
68. Matthew H. Ellis (2005), 'King Me: The Political Culture of Monarchy in Interwar Egypt and Iraq', Masters of Philosophy in Modern Middle Eastern Studies Thesis, University of Oxford, 104–5.
69. Eva Marlene Hausteiner (2017), '"Para-Royalty" Between Nationalism and Transnationalism: Russian Images of Personal Rule', in: Banerjee, Backerra and Sarti (eds), *Transnational Histories of the Royal Nation* [Chap. 16 in this volume].
70. Alexandre Lazzari (2017), 'Celebrating and Reinventing Brazil: Monarchy and Nation in the Works of Afonso Arinos, 1897–1900', in: Banerjee, Backerra and Sarti (eds), *Transnational Histories of the Royal Nation* [Chap. 14 in this volume].
71. William R. Pinch (1996), *Peasants and Monks in British India*, Berkeley.
72. Marie Lecomte-Tilouine (2009), *Hindu Kingship, Ethnic Revival, and Maoist Rebellion in Nepal,* Delhi.
73. Moyn and Sartori (2013), 24.

Resilient in Adversity: The Monarchical State in Prussia and Sardinia-Piedmont, 1847–51

Amerigo Caruso

In looking back at the European and Atlantic Revolutions between 1770 and 1850, a rapidly growing audience in Italy and Germany imagined new ways of patriotism, loyalty, and political participation. The transnational circulation of experiences and narratives of revolution generated new discourses of political legitimacy and deeply influenced the controversial relation between change and continuity in nineteenth-century Europe. Fear of revolution and disorientation coexisted with an increased belief in progress and with teleological concepts of modernization and nationalism.[1] This chapter aims to understand how the monarchical states in Prussia and Sardinia-Piedmont—the leading players in Germany and Italy respectively—were able (at least in the medium-term) to deal with the big impact of the revolution of 1848 on the transformation of political sentiments, argumentative patterns, and communication forums.

The resilience of the monarchical state included the reinvention of historical continuity as well as the rearrangement of the leading concepts of

A. Caruso (✉)
Saarland University (Germany), Historisches Institut, Saarbrücken, Germany

political legitimacy and participation. The semantic and ideological construction of this complex balance between tradition and modernity opened new political channels to carry out long-awaited constitutional reforms and to rethink nationhood after the Age of Revolution. This conservative-led juxtaposition between traditional and modern notions of legitimacy and patriotism was based on inclusion/exclusion mechanisms. The resilience of the monarchical state involved progressively liberal ideas and networks, but staunchly refused democratic and revolutionary concepts.

1848: Resilience Between Reform and Revolution

As David Cannadine has pointed out, the reinvention and modern renaissance of the British monarchy occurred between the Napoleonic Wars and the early twentieth century.[2] The monarchical states in Prussia and Sardinia-Piedmont were resilient in adversity too. To find out the reasons behind the gradual and very slow collapse of the Old Regime between 1789 and 1918, the concept of resilience is more adequate than the static and passive notion of persistence which was the leading notion in Arno Mayer's classic work on aristocratic elites in the long nineteenth century.[3] The meaning of resilience incorporates dimensions of persistence, change, and vulnerability.

The liberal revolution of 1848 in Europe was a key moment in the resilience process of the monarchical state, even though the major interpretative traditions did not take the 'Springtime of Peoples' seriously.[4] Many scholars focused on the failure of the mid-century revolutions and dismantled 1848 as a farce, directed by romantic heroes and fractious leaders who were dilettantish in political issues and did not have a long-lasting influence on European history. Scholars like Dieter Langewiesche, Axel Körner, Jonathan Sperber, and, more recently, Mike Rapport, Christopher Clark, and Enrico Francia launched a new narrative of the year 1848.[5] They opened a comprehensive approach to the European revolutions by focusing on the variety of transnational and social experiences during the 'long' revolution between 1847 and 1851. The memory of 1848 deeply influenced a major discursive process about political legitimacy and nationhood during the second part of the nineteenth century.

Ideological paradigms and symbolic languages used to imagine and communicate political authority and cultural identity operated in nineteenth-century Europe in a more complex framework than ever before. Aside from the growing transnational mobilization of revolutionary ideas and

networks, conservative and moderate opinion makers actively engaged with the challenge of complementing or reinventing the institutional, cultural, and social justification of the established order. On the one hand, they partially attempted to assimilate notions, codes of communication, and expectations associated with modern forms of political legitimacy. On the other hand, leading moderate politicians intended to rearrange the nexus between dynastic rulership, public opinion, and nationhood in post-revolutionary Europe. They were against the revolution and, for the most part, loyal monarchists. This emerging liberal-conservative elite assumed, however, that 'political and economic change was unstoppable' and the progress of society inevitable.[6]

Reinhart Koselleck's theory of multiple temporalities and the concept of *Sattelzeit*—the transitional period between the eighteenth and the nineteenth century—provide a solid theoretical framework for comparing traditional and modern definitions of nationhood. Koselleck outlines the change in meaning of existing concepts as the key element behind historical transformations.[7] The Enlightenment ideas created new political notions and aspirations, but they were, at the same time, a source of conflict and crisis which culminated in the Atlantic Revolutions.[8] The emergence of liberty and nationality as dominant political concepts reshaped perceptions of tradition and modernity; this involved (conceptually embedded) experiences of Enlightenment and revolution as well as of romantic, religious, and monarchical sentiments.

The making of a modern world and the notion of a nation state were the result of intercultural transfers and international transformations.[9] After the Napoleonic Wars, and more systematically since the 1840s, intellectual elites and the political establishment in Berlin and Turin increasingly strengthened their efforts to redefine cultural identity and political legitimacy. They learned from multiple sources (such as moderate Enlightenment ideas, the English model of balanced powers, American constitutionalism, the Napoleonic Empire, and the July Monarchy of 1830) how to rearrange the existing ideological paradigms in order to complement the visual and verbal representations of political authority with democratic populist legitimation. Influential members of the social elite in Prussia and Sardinia-Piedmont used their ability to travel and to read foreign publications to develop the idea that limited political reforms and economic progress were the best antidote to the revolution. In 1835, Count Camillo Cavour travelled from Turin to Geneva, Paris, and London to observe political 'moderatism' in action. The young aristocrat showed

great enthusiasm for Adolphe Thiers', François Guizot's and Robert Peel's parliamentary speeches and, after the revolutions of 1848, he urged the Piedmontese Parliament to maintain the reform momentum: 'because, only if reforms come at the right time, they can consolidate the status quo. On the contrary, if they come too late, they will reinforce the revolutionary spirit.'[10]

The emerging liberal-conservative elites tried to avoid a revolutionary clash between the 'sentiment that public opinion had become the sovereign judge' and the authority of the king as the final arbiter.[11] In order to achieve this goal, they proclaimed that only the king was the voice of the nation and could understand public opinion. The European monarchies combined different paradigms to communicate this political message: the symbolic power of religion and paternalism, the legacy of the Enlightened Absolutism, and the romantic suggestions of honour and patriotism.[12] After the revolutions of 1789, 1820–21, 1830 and 1848, almost all European monarchies agreed to renegotiate their power legitimation by granting liberal constitutions. Following the Spanish Constitution of 1812 and the French *Charte constitutionnelle* of 1814, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, Norway and the South German states approved liberal-conservative constitutions too. In 1848, Frederick William IV, King of Prussia, and Charles Albert, King of Sardinia-Piedmont, also decided to move their countries into a constitutional system. Constitutions in the early nineteenth century were mainly anti-revolutionary devices to support the collaboration of liberal and conservative moderates or, after 1848, to promote nationalism.[13]

By the early 1840s both Frederick William IV and Charles Albert were in a contradictory situation. They did not explicitly reject the liberals' and nationalists' hope to obtain long-awaited constitutional reforms, but they were absolutist-minded, deeply religious, and surrounded by conservative advisors. Their decision to grant a constitution in 1848 was not just a desperate reaction against the 'violent storm of revolutions' which tore through Europe.[14] This provides only a partial explanation of the problem. The emerging ideas of constitutional *octroi* (an imposed constitution) and national mission of the monarchy were also part of a long-lasting process of resilience, put in place to avoid or dismantle revolutionary change by approving reforms in order to support a revolution from above (or, to repeat Robespierre's sarcastic remark, a 'revolution without revolution').[15]

The monarchical state had been dealing with the major discursive process of creating modernity and nationhood since the late eighteenth century. After the French Revolution and the Anti-Napoleonic Wars, the

monarchy and the old elites reactivated and reoriented the state-building experience and the legacy of Enlightened Absolutism. New argumentative patterns such as the *juste milieu* (the notion of middle way which led to widespread debate after the July Revolution in 1830) and the ideal of citizen king envisioned by Louis Philippe I circulated transnationally. They involved different political networks which had a big impact on institutional and cultural transformations between 1847 and 1851.[16]

Influential liberal-conservative politicians like Cesare Balbo and Massimo d'Azeglio in Piedmont or, in Prussia, Joseph Maria von Radowitz and later Otto von Bismarck proclaimed constitutionalism and nationalism as the best possible and even natural compromise to dismantle the revolution and prevent future instability. Both Balbo and Radowitz argued that the monarchies had an unescapable burden of choice between reform and revolution. Therefore, they asked for reforms aimed to satisfy the 'real needs' of constitution and nationhood.[17] The political framework needed to achieve these conservative reforms was, at least in the 1840s, very indeterminate. Balbo and Radowitz, as well as Cavour and Bismarck, communicated, by contrast, a more and more aggressive and teleological construction to encapsulate their innovative, but indeterminate and highly contested political platforms. They stressed the necessity and coherence of the nexus between dynastic rulership, constitutionalism, and nationhood. Several charismatic leaders like Cavour, Bismarck, Robert Peel, Benjamin Disraeli, François Guizot, Louis Napoleon, Abraham Lincoln, and Costa Cabral rearranged the rhetoric of the *juste milieu* with populistic slogans about the will of the people, the teleological mission of the nation, and the idea of modernity.[18]

The European Revolution in 1848, as well as the downfall of the framework of international politics, which referred to the Congress of Vienna settlement, contributed to establishing the ideology of *Realpolitik*. The transnational and bipartisan development of 'realistic politics' had had a massive impact on political discourse since the late 1840s. After the experience of failure in 1848, influential and transnationally connected organizations in the nationalist networks such as the *Società Nazionale* and the *Nationalverein* attempted to find common ground with the monarchical state by using the same language of realism and progress as Bismarck and Cavour.[19] Despite protestations to the contrary, *Realpolitik* was not more pragmatic or as modern as concurrent political positions. The language of 'realistic politics' was, rather, the most credible and attractive political message after the shock of 1848.[20] Both liberal and conservative historians,

philosophers, jurists, and journalists contributed to creating a semantic, emotional, and intellectual background to support the emerging real-political ideology. They largely refused to join any 'unpatriotic' opposition against the monarchy. Above all, historians had to be loyal monarchists. Heinrich von Treitschke, the editor of *Preußische Jahrbücher* and a strong advocate of German nationalism, enthusiastically supported the Prussian war effort in 1866. He emphasized the importance of national unification: 'no matter what strategy we pursue'.[21] The Piedmontese historian Luigi Cibrario also aimed to connect the traditional dynastic history with new legitimation sources like constitutionalism and nationhood. He argued that the king's power had been tolerant and paternal since the Middle Ages and, therefore, constitutional reforms and national unification were the natural development of monarchical authority.[22]

The German and Italian historiography established a new nexus between constitution, nationality, and the monarchy in the second half of the nineteenth century.[23] After the revolution of 1848, conservative and liberal opinion makers tried to redefine constitutionalism and nationhood as the realistic and even predetermined next step of the Prussian and Piedmontese mission.

Teleological Conceptions of Modernization and Nationalism in Post-Revolutionary Europe

Continuity through change enabled monarchies to be resilient in revolutionary Europe. Almost all European monarchs were able to restore their power and reputation after 1813, but the monarchical state was still struggling against a deep legitimation crisis and disaffection.[24] The Prussian and Piedmontese monarchical system maintained its authority by adopting an elite-based, and increasingly popular, political discourse that arranged a nexus between the symbolic power of religion, paternalism, and the modern notions of patriotism and, later, constitutionalism.

Clemente Solaro della Margarita, a young aristocrat who made a successful career as a diplomat and advisor to King Charles Albert, published an enthusiastic pamphlet to celebrate the 'liberation of Piedmont' from the revolutionary 'pest' in 1814.[25] He attempted to assimilate notions, codes of communication, and expectations from the modern concept of patriotism. His monarchical political credo remained, however, focused on the theory of legitimism and the philosophy of natural law. This nexus between different concepts of political legitimacy and nationhood

involved only the monarchical state in Piedmont and did not include a sense of patriotism for the rest of the Italian peninsula. Solaro's national pride had typical elements of pre-modern patriotism based on religion and monarchism.

After the French occupation between 1796 and 1814, the Savoyard monarchy reaffirmed its political independence and possessed 'a sense of identity remarkable in states of its size'.[26] The king of Sardinia ruled over many different territories: the Duchy of Savoy, the homeland of the dynasty; the Duchy of Piedmont in north-west Italy; the kingdom of Sardinia which gave the ruler of all these territories his royal title; as well as the former domain of the Republic of Genoa, and Nice. The resilience of the monarchical discourse was based on the capability to connect hybrid ideas and networks: French and Italian cultures, the efficiency criteria of the modern state building, and also the traditional privileges and the symbolic power of religion and nobility.[27] In addition, the public service ethos and the rise of professionalism in bureaucracy and the military, along with dynastic loyalty were key resilience-strengthening resources that consolidated the monarchical system during the *Sattelzeit*.[28]

Looking back at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Leone Costa di Beauregard, a member of the Savoyard military nobility, wrote in his memoirs: 'The monarchy in Piedmont was our nation and a second religion too. The King personified the State, he was our father and master, and he was really recognized in his own divine authority.'[29] Similarly, Ignazio Thaon di Revel, who served as vice-king of Sardinia, outlined in his *Testament politique* the cultural and social preconditions of the monarchical state. Revel proclaimed that the 'royalisme' was not only the 'sentiment national' in Piedmont, but also a bipartisan platform which could find a compromise between conservative and liberal 'affaire de parti' against the revolution.[30]

Along with patriotic monarchism and the public service ethos, Revel also stressed other elements of continuity such as 'la Religion, l'honneur, la fidélité', in order to justify the resilience of the Old Regime in the nineteenth century.[31] Ottavio Thaon di Revel, Ignazio's son and a leading moderate conservative, reproduced his father's argumentative pattern after the revolution of 1848. He presented cultural paradigms of the old order such as honour and dynastic loyalty as the interface between absolutism and constitutional monarchy and between Piedmontese patriotism and Italian nationalism.[32] The new generation of the Revel family—brothers Ottavio, who acted as finance minister; Adriano, who was a high-ranking

Piedmontese diplomat; and Genova, who served as war minister—symbolized the persistence of the nobility's power in the second half of the nineteenth century. The legacy of the nobility's patriotism and public service ethos helped secure political legitimacy after the dramatic crises of 1797, 1821, and 1848.

The politics and self-perception of the Piedmontese nobles in the king's entourage aimed to conserve tradition, but not only by maintaining the status quo. To avoid a new revolution they also tried to redirect Enlightenment ideas, the emerging liberalism and, finally, patriotic sentiments in a conservative way. Leading liberal-conservative politicians like Cesare Balbo, Massimo d'Azeglio and the theologian Vincenzo Gioberti struggled to convince the recalcitrant King Charles Albert to grant moderate reforms.[33] They gave a description of the Italian Risorgimento as the best possible and even natural compromise to overcome revolution and prevent future political instability. The argument that constitutional reforms and nationalism could reproduce the conservative power and renegotiate the political legitimacy of the Old Regime was the only realistic background which could arrange a common conservative and liberal platform after 1848. The elites subsequently looked at the rapidly spreading national discourse no longer as a dangerous revolutionary process, but more and more as an attractive option to consolidate the established order.

Balbo, D'Azeglio, Gioberti, and Cavour were able to dominate politics as they could clearly demonstrate that moderate reforms were the sole alternative to a new revolution. However, this happened only after 1848. With the argument to prevent revolution, the Piedmontese moderates succeeded in convincing King Charles Albert to grant the *octroi* constitution and to support the revolution of Italian patriots in Austrian-dominated Lombardy-Venetia. Even the king's most conservative advisors, such as Ottavio Thaon di Revel, accepted the necessity of constitutional reforms ('with a heavy heart').[34] The king and the leading moderates imagined a federal Italy led by Piedmont (which would annex Lombardy).[35] Family networks helped to connect the moderate movement in Piedmont and Lombardy-Venezia: D'Azeglio and Balbo were cousins, D'Azeglio married the daughter of the famous novelist Alessandro Manzoni, and Balbo was a friend of the patriotic poet Silvio Pellico.[36] Manzoni's, Balbo's, Pellico's, Gioberti's and D'Azeglio's books were closely related and belonged to a 'Risorgimento canon'.[37] Their political thought was linked to the political discourse in Paris, London, Berlin, and Frankfurt. The politics of moderate conservatives in both the Italian and German states was inspired by the

French Charter of 1814, and especially by the English model of liberty and constitutionalism.[38] The major effort to renegotiate the legitimacy of the new constitutional and 'national' monarchy originated from the participation of European political elites in transnationally-inflected debates on *juste milieu*, constitutionalism, and nationality.

Conservative and liberal elites in both Prussia and Piedmont urgently needed to legitimize the new political situation after the constitutional reforms in 1848. They integrated the traditional monarchical discourse into a new hybrid narrative identity, which included constitutionalism and nationhood. In addition, they attempted to connect constitutional monarchy and nationalism to the persisting legacy and the symbolic power of religion, royalism, warfare, paternalism, and the public service ethos. It was not only the aristocracy, but also, more and more, Piedmontese and Prussian politicians, journalists, and intellectuals who associated the premodern paradigms of patriotic monarchism with the new enthusiasm for constitutional reforms and nationalism. They mutually adapted the paternalistic, aristocratic, and religious narratives of the monarchical discourse with the liberal concepts of political legitimacy and nationhood. New political networks and institutions as well as the symbolic language of patriotic songs, slogans, flags, popular literature, and memorabilia played an important role in mobilizing the emerging mass media audience after 1847 and in proclaiming a nexus between monarchy, constitution, and nationality.[39]

Many popular patriotic songs, poems, and anthologies praising the king's religious, paternalistic, and military virtue were printed and distributed in Turin. They introduced the *Statuto* and the national war as the natural and teleological mission of the Royal Nation. In 1847, the historian Luigi Cibrario enthusiastically mentioned that 'the King would never betray the mission to protect his people and to secure the entire Italian peninsula'.[40] Charles Albert and his successor, Victor Emanuel II, presented themselves as liberal reformers and protectors of Italy after 1848. Very popular slogans like 'Re galantuomo' ('Honest King') and 'Padre della patria' ('Father of the Fatherland') demonstrated the emerging hybrid identity of the monarchy between traditional and modern notions of political legitimacy and nationhood.[41] The rearrangement of the king's political authority led to a major communicative effort to redirect the revolutionary movement.

The revision of the national mission of the dynasty of Savoy—which had 'a history that was as French as Italian and had been slow to accept the

idea of unifying the peninsula'[42]—reached a new peak due to the dramatic increase of plurality and availability of political information, opinions, and networks after 1847. A wide range of political statements, monarchist publications, and memorabilia played a large role in increasing the resonance of the monarchy's new self-understanding. The authors of patriotic pamphlets, illustrations, and songs were not only members of the political establishment, but also teachers, students, or clerks like Domenico Biorgi and Giuseppe Bertoldi. The political demonstrations in 1847 and 1848 demanded reforms and national independence and attempted to rearrange the ideological paradigms of dynastic rule, religion, militarism, and paternalism. Ordinary people called for constitutional reforms praising the army, and glorifying religion and monarchy. They flew the blue banner of the House of Savoy, even more than the Italian tricolour.[43] Most of these (white) revolutionaries spoke the Piedmontese dialect or French more often than Italian.[44] Liberal-minded writers such as Baroness Olimpia Savio of Turin noticed with disappointment that just a few Piedmontese spoke the 'language of Dante', while the majority of them pointedly used dialect or French.[45]

During mass demonstrations on 1 November 1847 and again on 27 February 1848 the population of Turin celebrated the new constitution in front of the Gran Madre di Dio church. This church was the neoclassical symbol of the monarchical restoration after the Congress of Vienna. It was built between 1818 and 1831 to celebrate the return of Victor Emanuel I. A French journalist noticed the hybrid manifestation of November 1847, which included liberal, monarchical, and patriotic sentiments: 'The population of Turin walked through the streets wearing their best clothes with the blue rosette which symbolized the nation. At half past nine, the king left his palace, escorted by a numerous and magnificent General Staff. When the whole crowd saw him, they started to sing together: Viva Charles Albert.'[46]

Both liberal and conservative newspapers wrote that the citizens wore the blue monarchical rosette and more than 2000 blue Piedmontese flags had been sold in just a few hours during the large demonstration of 1 November 1847.[47] As long as the liberal demonstrators respected the Catholic Church and demanded reforms by singing *Vive le Roi*, or by flying the monarchical blue banner, there was no reason for conservative elites to reject constitutional reforms once again and cause a quick escalation of the protest. It was in the nature of this largely moderate movement that the political demonstrations in 1847 and in 1848 took place in an emotionally charged, but largely peaceful atmosphere.[48]

The nexus between patriotism and royalism persisted again as the monarchical state plunged into a dramatic crisis after the Piedmontese defeat at Novara and after Charles Albert's abdication in favour of his son Victor Emanuel at the end of March 1849. The liberal-conservative Piedmontese elite, led by Massimo d'Azeglio, managed to consolidate their power and avoid revolution and civil war. To meet this challenge, they interweaved the traditional monarchical discourse based on paternalism, loyalty, and honour with the emerging political culture which attempted to legitimate itself with ideals of liberty and nationalism. The king symbolized this emerging juxtaposition between traditional and modern sources of political legitimacy. On 1 January 1850, the president of the Piedmontese Chamber of Deputies, Carlo Boncompagni, gave a famous speech reporting how Piedmont successfully overcame the crisis. Boncompagni affirmed that 'patriotism' and 'harmony between king and people' provided the main reason for the resilience of the monarchical state after the revolution and the dramatic defeat in 1849.[49]

Along with Boncompagni, a large number of journalists, historians, and officers celebrated Charles Albert's wisdom and provided an adulatory image of the king as the 'angel' who protected the nation and granted reforms.[50] Aside from these enthusiastically patriotic statements, new bourgeois and popular heroes like the common soldier Pietro Micca served to make the old 'elite-based symbolic language' suitable for a broader audience and to rearrange the existing patterns of hegemony.[51] Popular hagiographical books like *I Piemontesi Illustri* (1781), *Piccolo Panteon Subalpino* (1858) and Carlo Botta's *Storia d'Italia* (1835) emphasized the melodramatic story of Pietro Micca's self-sacrifice during the siege of Turin in 1706.[52] Several novels, illustrations, theatre performances and, finally, a representative memorial of Micca's heroic death, which was built across from the citadel of Turin in 1864, also presented this new monarchical mythology.[53]

Reinventing the Monarchical Discourse: Constitutional Reforms and National Mission

Beginning in the late eighteenth century, but increasingly after 1814 and 1848, monarchist political discourse across Europe referred to new popular patriotic heroes like Pietro Micca or, in Prussia, the officer Ferdinand von Shill and Queen Luise. This had a major impact on the self-understanding of both the Prussian and Piedmontese monarchies,

especially during Charles Albert's and Fredrick William's reigns in the mid-eighteenth century. The monarchical discourse combined the traditional paradigms of the *roi sacre* and *Soldatenkönig* with the post-revolutionary concepts of *roi bourgeois*, *roi constitutionnel*, and ' Father of the Fatherland'.[54] After Charles Albert and Fredrick William IV, Victor Emanuel II and William I also reluctantly accepted the rearranging of monarchical discourse in order to include constitutionalism and nationhood as the new legitimation sources for the monarchical state. The mass-compatible transformation of the monarchy's public perception and function as well as the invention of popular pantheons opened new channels of communication and created an 'emotional identification' between the old elites, the bourgeoisie, and the masses of Prussian and Piedmontese subjects.[55] Public opinion was more and more interested in the king's private life and imagined the royal family as having a bourgeois habitus. A wide range of popular literature, paintings, and mass-produced objects (like calendars, handkerchiefs, and tobacco boxes) played a large part in mobilizing the emerging mass media audiences of both conservative and liberal patriots.[56] Despite political crises and revolutions, the incorporation of material culture of the monarchy into the daily life of Italian and German subjects made a significant contribution to strengthening the resilience of the old elites.[57] Scholars like Eva Giloi and Karen Hagemann have shown how a rapidly growing audience consumed the monarchical discourse and took part in modern political legitimacy and national identity controversies.

Popular patriotic songs such as *Inno al re*, *La coccarda*, *Preußenlied*, and *Schwarz und Weiß* circulated in several small publications and were printed—together with idealized illustrations of the king—on flags, handkerchiefs, and decorative plates.[58] The same paternalistic conception of the king was effective in Turin and Berlin and demonstrated the transnational validity of conservative values such as loyalty, honour, and patriotism. The idea of 'national honour' and the metaphor of the king as 'father' of the nation characterized patriotic songs and royalist petitions in Prussia and Piedmont as well as the monarchical discourse in post-revolutionary France, the revival of traditional paternal ideals in nineteenth-century Britain, and 'imperial paternalism' in the Habsburg Empire.[59] In addition, patriotic songs, memorabilia, political statements, and hagiographies suggested that the monarchy embodied the Prussian and Piedmontese tradition and, at the same time, the emerging Italian and German nationalism. The material culture of the monarchy presented the monarchical state not

only as a hybrid integration of both regional and national identity, but also as the transitional ideology between absolutism and constitutionalism. The new symbolic language of the monarchical discourse and its public resonance was well connected with the transformation of the leading notions of political legitimacy. The concepts of honour, loyalty, progress, and national destiny created a common political space to adapt the emerging ideas of constitutional reforms and nationalism to the persisting power of absolutism and local patriotism. This juxtaposition between different notions of political legitimacy and nationhood persuaded both liberal and conservative opinion makers that the kind of ambiguous and moderate reforms granted in 1848 were coherent and inevitable. Modernity seemed to be less dangerous, because it preserved a reasonable level of continuity with the past.

After the shock of 1848, Prussian conservative monarchists organized several modern political forums to fight against the 'seduction' of revolution. The *Neue Preußische Zeitung* celebrated reaching 20,000 subscribers just a few months after it was founded by leading conservative politicians, including Ludwig von Gerlach and Friedrich Julius Stahl.[60] In addition, more than 300 conservative and patriotic monarchical clubs such as the Patriotischer Verein, the Preußenverein, and the Verein für König und Vaterland had 60,000 active members by the mid-nineteenth century.[61] Along with these traditional methods of creating political consensus, political pamphlets, sermons, and novels played an important role in putting emphasis on conservative values. These publications used a popular and aggressive language in order to reach a broader audience. Lieutenant Colonel Griesheim wrote an influential pamphlet on the revolution of 1848, emphasizing that 'against democrats, only soldiers can help'.[62] The bestsellers of Ida Hahn, Luise Hensel, and Marie Nathusius, as well as Antonio Bresciani's and Cesare Cantù's novels in Italy, are other examples of this very popular conservative literature in the Age of Revolution.[63] These books were translated into several European languages and not infrequently reached more than 20 editions.

Leading Prussian politicians also increasingly discussed the reform of the monarchical state using the same arguments as Balbo and Cavour. They emphasized the necessity of approving moderate reforms in order to avoid radical change. In 1848, a rapidly growing number of pamphlets, petitions, and political clubs asked for 'modern' constitutional reforms, but they rejected the 'spirit' of revolution and harshly criticized republicanism.[64]

Similar to Charles Albert and his entourage, Fredrick William IV and Prince William of Prussia also rearranged their self-perception and political communication by the mid-nineteenth century. Before 1848, they demonstrated hostility or, at least, indifference to constitutional reforms and to the idea of unifying the German states under the hegemony of Prussia. Fredrick William IV described the freely elected National Parliament as 'Satan's headquarters'.[65] In April 1849, the deputies of the Frankfurt Parliament that approved the 'Lesser German solution' tried to convince the Prussian king to lead the new German nation state. But Fredrick William IV brusquely refused any 'gift' from the revolution. In a letter to his advisor Bunsen, he pointed out that a Prussian king would never accept the 'dirty' crown that the National Parliament was offering him.[66] Prince William, later the German emperor, also regarded the German unification under Prussian leadership as a step of 'vainglory' and supported Fredrick William IV in rejecting any constitutional reform: 'No power on earth will ever be able to move me to change the traditional relations between prince and people by granting a simple piece of paper [the constitution].'[67]

Fredrick William IV and his brother William stressed the core ideas of honour and independence as antithetical to the 'dull and miserable' spirit of the time.[68] Because of the growing political mobilization after 1847, they were increasingly disoriented. At the same time integration was nearly inevitable or, at least, had to take into account public opinion. Prince William tried to use positive semantics and notions to make a distinction between revolution and 'true' or 'necessary' reforms. William, who was nicknamed 'Cartridge Prince' because of his reactionary militarism, began to defend the idea of moderate reforms as 'reasonable compromises at the right time' or 'opportune transformations within the regime'.[69] This emotional, communicative, and semantic shift in the meaning of key political concepts like constitution, modernity, patriotism, and nation was the core precondition in shaping a 'revolution without revolution' after 1848. The monarchy re-established itself as the symbol of the new institutions and notions of political legitimacy based on the controversial juxtaposition between conservative experience and emerging liberal theories.

The Piedmontese *Statuto* and the Prussian *Verfassung*, which was revisited in 1850, had plenty of ambiguities. This was not exactly their weak spot, but rather the reason why they were generally accepted by conservative political elites and could survive into the twentieth century. The new constitutions allowed for a free press and elections through a system of censitary suffrage, but the percentage of the population entitled to vote

was extremely low: less than 1.5 per cent in Prussia and not more than 2 per cent in Piedmont. Furthermore, at least after 1850, the vast majority of newspapers imposed upon themselves patriotic self-censorship. The lowest common denominator of the Members of Parliaments in Turin and Berlin, and of the intellectuals who did not go into exile was to adulate or, at least, not explicitly criticize, the monarchy. With the proclamation of Moncalieri, Victor Emanuel II affirmed on 20 November 1849 that the ideas of constitution, liberalism, and nationalism had to coexist with monarchical discourse and traditional paradigms of loyalty, honour, and paternalism.[70] In other words, the king and his liberal-conservative ministers conceded a weak foundation to develop the political values of liberty and nationality. Fredrick William IV and Charles Albert still called themselves 'by grace of God', but presented themselves as *rois bourgeois* or Fathers of the nation. The ideological and semantic ambiguity of the political legitimation of the constitutional monarchy in Prussia and Piedmont was a key resource for resilience.

The narrative scheme of a broader dynastic mission of the House of Savoy and Hohenzollern to lead Italian and the German unification respectively reached a culmination point between 1858 and 1871.[71] The monarchical state achieved great successes in reinventing the patriotic legacy and in establishing a credible nexus between the growing nationalist euphoria and the monarchical discourse. After Cavour's and Bismarck's 'Revolution from above', opposition to the king's government 'could be easily attacked as unpatriotic'.[72] The monarchy legitimated itself with both regional patriotism and emerging nationalism. In 1858, William I launched the slogan of the *moral* conquest of Germany and in 1859 Victor Emanuel II affirmed with pathos that he could not remain insensible to the 'cry of pain' coming from the other Italian states. The retrospective narrative of the new nation states reinvented significant historical events such as the Anti-Napoleonic Wars, the Revolution of 1848, and the German and Italian Unification Wars. Contrary to this teleological supposition, Prussian- and Piedmontese-led unification was neither predetermined nor desirable for political elites in 1848. Liberal-conservative elites also refused the concept of national war as well as the ambivalent idea of national unification and, by contrast, promoted a traditional dynastic expansion in order to enforce hegemony in northern Germany and Italy. 'I achieved the national unification *sans le vouloir*,' said William I emblematically after he was triumphantly proclaimed German Emperor in Versailles on 18 January 1871.[73]

Resilience: The Main Agent of Change in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Italy and Germany

The integration of premodern and modern ideas of nationhood emerged from the intellectual construction of coherence and continuity between the heritage of the Prussian and Piedmontese monarchical states and notions of liberty and nationalism. The incorporation of the material culture of the monarchy and mass media circulation of popular songs, patriotic symbols, and souvenirs created a hybrid narrative identity after 1848. The Prussian Iron Cross or the blue banner of the House of Savoy along with new historical societies, cultural academies, museums, commemorative events, and royal travels communicated a mosaic of dynastic, regional, and national sentiments to the public.[74] Furthermore, a public pantheon of Prussian/German and Piedmontese/Italian heroes like Pietro Micca and Louise of Prussia made significant contributions to rearranging the juxtaposition between the sense of progress and the idea of a national mission of the monarchy.

The transnational circulation of elite-based political debates helped to strength the resilience of the monarchical state in the Age of Revolution. Influential pamphlets such as Balbo's *Le speranze d'Italia* and Radowitz's *Deutschland und Friedrich Wilhelm IV* upgraded the experience of previous revolution. They referred to counter-revolutionary mobilization after 1789 and were closely linked to the ideas of Burke, De Maistre, Haller, Chateaubriand and, above all, to the *juste milieu* debate in the 1830s. The mosaic foundation of this liberal-conservative political thought emerged as a dominant historical teleology as the nation state narrative spread more rapidly after 1848.

The resilience-strengthening transformation of monarchical discourse had a major impact in both Prussia and Sardinia-Piedmont. The idea of *roi constitutionnel* and a rearrangement of the national mission of the monarchy developed, on the one hand, from multiple temporalities and deep-seated elements such as paternalism, religion, warfare, and public service ethos and, on the other hand, by a post-revolutionary monarchical discourse that integrated modern notions of political legitimacy and nationhood. The monarchical state was resilient to adversity because of its ability to change by maintaining its core identity founded on the symbolic powers of honour, loyalty, and paternalism. The old elites made an effort to lead political and cultural transformations as long as they were able to control the revolution. The narrative perception of the expected 'revolution

without revolution' belongs to a polyvalent monarchical discourse, which harmonized traditional and modern notions (and emotions) of political legitimacy. After 1814, 1830, and 1848, the resilience in the face of adversity of the monarchical state incorporated a plurality of historical teleologies and was the main agent of change in mid-nineteenth-century Italy and Germany.

Notes

1. On narratives of modernity and nationalism as dominant teleological conceptions of history, see Chris Wickham (2009), *The Inheritance of Rome*, London, 3–4; Caspar Hirschi (2011), *The Origins of Nationalism*, Cambridge, here 20–49. On the plurality of historical teleologies in the Modern World: Henning Trüper, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Sanjay Subrahmanyam (2015), 'History and Teleology – Nineteenth Century Fortunes of an Entlightenment Project', in: Henning Trüper, Dipesh Chakrabarty and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), *Historical Teleologies in the Modern World*, London, 3–24.

2. David Cannadine (2012), 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: the British Monarchy and the Invention of Tradition, c.1820–1977', in: Eric Hobsbawm (ed.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, 101–64.

3. Arno Mayer (1981), *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War*, New York.

4. Mike Rapport (2009), *1848: Year of Revolution*, New York, 112.

5. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Dieter Langewiesche (1998), *Die Revolution in Europa 1848*, Bonn, 28–41; Axel Körner (2000), *1848: A European Revolution? International Ideas and National Memories of 1848*, Basingstoke; Jonathan Sperber (2005), *The European Revolutions 1848–1851*, Cambridge, 1–4; Rapport, *Revolution*; Christopher Clark (2012), *After 1848: The European Revolution in Government*, in: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 22, 171–97; Enrico Francia (2012), *1848. La rivoluzione del Risorgimento*, Bologna.

6. Christopher Duggan (2007), *The Force of Destiny. A History of Italy since 1796*, London, 144.

7. Reinhart Koselleck (2004), *Future Pasts. On the Semantics of Historical Time*, New York.

 8. See Reinhart Koselleck (1988), *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*, Cambridge (MA).

 9. Thomas Adam (2012), *Intercultural Transfers and the Making of the Modern World, 1800–2000*, Basingstoke. See also, Oliver Janz and Lucy Riall (2014), *The Italian Risorgimento: transnational perspectives*, Modern Italy 19:1, 1–4.

10. Camillo Cavour (1850), *Atti del Parlamento subalpino, Sessione del 1850*, Vol. 1, 894.

11. James B. Collins (2009), *The State in Early Modern France*, Cambridge, 291 and 322.

12. See Birgit Aschmann (2013), *Preußens Ruhm und Deutschlands Ehre*, Munich.

13. See Kelly E. Grotke and Marcus J. Prutsch (2014), 'Constitutionalism, Legitimacy and Power: Nineteenth-century Experiences', in: Kelly E. Grotke and Marcus J. Prutsch (eds), *Constitutionalism, Legitimacy and Power*, Oxford, 3–22.

14. Rapport, *Revolution*, IX.

15. See Christof Dipper (1998), *Revolutionäre Bewegungen*, in: Dieter Dowe, (ed.), *Europa 1848. Reform und Revolution*, Bonn, 555.

16. Louis Philippe I chose the title 'King of the French' instead of 'King of France' in order to underline the supposed new relationship between crown and citizens.

17. Walter Möring (1922), *Joseph Maria von Radowitz: Nachgelassene Briefe und Aufzeichnungen*, Berlin, 18 and 52. See also Rosario Romeo (1998), *Vita di Cavour*, Rom, 106.

18. See James Retallack (2006), *The German Right 1860–1920. Political Limit of the Authoritarian Imagination*, Toronto; Enrico Dal Lago (2015), *The Age of Lincoln and Cavour. Comparative Perspectives on Nineteenth-Century American and Italian Nation-Building*, Basingstoke.

19. John Breuilly (2013), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*, Oxford, 158–60. On transnational connections between these networks: Mark Gellert (1999), *Die Società Nazionale Italiana und der Deutsche Nationalverein. Ein Vergleich der Organisationen und ihrer Rolle in nationaler Bewegung und Einigung*, Aachen.

20. See Harald Biermann (2006), *Ideologie statt Realpolitik. Kleindeutsche Liberale und auswärtige Politik vor der Reichsgründung*, Düsseldorf.

21. Ernst Engelberg (1998), *Bismarck. Urpreuße und Reichsgründer*, Berlin, 556. See also Niklas Lenhard-Schramm (2014), *Konstrukteure der Nation. Geschichtsprofessoren als politische Akteure in Vormärz und Revolution 1848/49*, Munich.
22. Luigi Cibrario (1861), *Economia politica del Medioevo*, Turin, 133.
23. Denis Mack Smith (1989), *Italy and its Monarchy*, New Haven, IX.
24. On the devastating defeat in 1806, its perception and memory, see Karen Hagemann (2015), *Revisiting Prussia's Wars against Napoleon. History, Culture and Memory*, Cambridge, 31–46.
25. Clemente Solaro della Margarita (1814), *La Liberazione del Piemonte*, Turin, 3–10.
26. Michael Broers (1997), *Napoleonic Imperialism and the Savoyard Monarchy 1773–1821*, Lewiston, 51. See also Michael Broers (2013), 'Transformation and Discontinuity from the old order to the modern state in the Piedmontese and Ligurian Departments of Napoleonic Italy', in: Gabriele *B. Clemens* (ed.), *Napoleonische Expansionspolitik. Okkupation oder Integration?*, Berlin, 41–52.
27. See Ricuperati, Giuseppe (1994): *Le avventure di uno stato ben amministrato. Rappresentazioni e realtà nello spazio sabaudo tra ancien régime e rivoluzione*. Turin.
28. Broers, *Imperialism*: 61.
29. Carlo Alberto Costa di Beauregard (1897), *Un uomo d'altri tempi*, Torino, IV.
30. Ignazio Thaon di Revel (1826), *Testament politique*, Turin, 266.
31. Revel, *Testament*: 113.
32. *Atti del Parlamento subalpino* (APS), Discussioni, Sessione del 1857–58, Leg. 6, Vol. 4: 1221–3.
33. See Giuseppe Talamo (2000), *Società segrete e gruppi politici liberali e democratici fino al 1848*, in: Umberto Levra, ed., *Storia di Torino*, Turin, Vol. 6, 461–92.
34. Luigi Ciaurro (1996), *Lo Statuto albertino illustrato dai lavori preparatori*, Rom, 199.
35. See Martin Clark (2009), *The Italian Risorgimento*, Abingdon (OX), 47.
36. See Derek Beales and Eugenio Biagini (2013), *The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy*, London, 62.
37. See Alberto Mario Banti (2000), *La nazione del Risorgimento*, Turin, 45–53. In the last two decades, scholars like Alberto Mario

Banti, Silvana Patriarca, and Lucy Riall have revisited the cultural history of the Italian Risorgimento.

38. See Maurizio Isabella (2013), 'Aristocratic Liberalism and Risorgimento: Cesare Balbo and Piedmontese Political Thought after 1848', *History of European Ideas* 36/6, 835–57. See also Hans-Christof Kraus (2006), *Englische Verfassung und politisches Denken im Ancien Régime: 1689 bis 1789*, Munich; Gunter Heinickel (2014), *Adelsreformideen in Preußen: Zwischen bürokratischem Absolutismus und demokratisierendem Konstitutionalismus (1806–1854)*, Berlin.

39. On the conservative counter-mobilization in the mid-nineteenth century, see Wolfgang Schwentker (1988), *Konservative Vereine und Revolution in Preußen 1848/49*, Düsseldorf.

40. Luigi Cibrario (1847), *Sulle riforme di Carlo Alberto*, Turin, 15.

41. Umberto Levra (2010), *Vittorio Emanuele II*, in: Mario Isnenghi, ed., *I luoghi della memoria*, Rom, 49–50.

42. Mack Smith, *Italy*, 3. See also Duggan, *Force*, 183 ('Very few Piedmontese had first-hand knowledge of central or southern Italy […] this small kingdom straddling the Alps was the least Italian region in the peninsula').

43. Article 77 of the *Statuto* reads: 'the blue banner remains the only national symbol'.

44. The French historian Edgar Quinet remarked in his essay *Les Révolutions d'Italie* (1848–1851) that the Italian Risorgimento was 'not a question simply of resurrecting a nation, but rather of creating one'. See Duggan, *Force*, 90.

45. Olimpia Savio (1911), *Memorie*, Milan, 294.

46. *Archivio triennale delle cose d'Italia* (1850), Serie 1/1: 105.

47. See Francesco Cognasso (2002), *Storia di Torino*, Florence, 499.

48. See Kerstin Singer (2008), *Konstitutionalismus auf Italienisch. Italiens politische und soziale Führungsschichten und die oktroyierten Verfassungen von 1848*, Tübingen.

49. *Atti del Parlamento Subalpino*, Sessione del 1850, Vol. 1, 120.

50. *Raccolta delle varie poesie pubblicate in Piemonte nell'occasione delle nuove riforme […] accordate da S.M. Il Re Carlo Alberto* (1847), Turin, 6, 51 and 66.

51. Eveline Bouwers (2012), *Public Pantheons in Revolutionary Europe. Comparing Cultures of Remembrance 1790–1840*, Basingstoke, 10. See also Peter Burke (2010), 'Foundation Myths and Collective Identities in Early Modern Europe', in: Bo Stråth

(ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, Brussels, 113–22.

52. See Carlo Botta (1835), *Storia d'Italia continuata da quella del Guicciardini*, Lugano, 43–6; Felice Daneo (1858), *Piccolo Pantheon Subalpino*, Turin, 61; Felice Durando (1781), *Piemontesi Illustri*, Turin, 363.

53. See Umberto Levra (1992), *Fare gli italiani. Memoria e celebrazione del Risorgimento*, Turin, 125; Isabel Skokan (2009), *Germania und Italia. Nationale Mythen und Heldengestalten in Gemälden des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, 151–3.

54. See Jörn Leonhard (2009), *Un'erosione scaturita dai successi? Il problema della legittimità nella Prussia del xix secolo*, in: Giulia Guazzaloca (ed.), *Sovrani a metà: monarchia e legittimazione in Europa tra Otto e Novecento*, Soveria Mannelli, 163–81.

55. Christopher Clark (2006), *Iron Kingdom. The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600–1947*, Cambridge (MA), 318.

56. See Karen Hagemann (2002), *Mannlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre: Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preußens*, Paderborn, 245–54.

57. See Eva Giloi (2011), *Monarchy, Myth and Material Culture in Germany 1750–1950*, Cambridge.

58. See, for Piedmont, Giuseppe Bertoldi (1847), *Canti patriottici*, Turin; Domenico Biorgi (1848), *Due inni nazionali recitati ai patriotici banchetti della capitale*, Turin. For Prussia, see Wilhelm von Merckel (1848), *Der Ehrliche Preuße. Sammlung von Gedichten*, Berlin; Anonymous (1849), *Schöne neue Lieder, zu singen überall im Preußenlande*, Berlin; Wilhelm von Merckel (1849), *Preußisches Liederbuch. Vaterländische Gesellschaft zu Berlin*, Berlin; Wilhelm von Merckel (1849), *Festgesänge der Vaterländischen Gesellschaft*, Berlin; Wilhelm von Blomberg (1850), *Liederbuch für die Mitglieder des Treubundes mit Gott für König und Vaterland*, Berlin.

59. Jennifer N. Heuer, (2007), *The Family and the Nation. Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary France, 1789–1830*, Ithaca NY, 192; Kim Lawes (2000), *Paternalism and Politics. The Revival of Paternalism in early Nineteenth-Century Britain*, Basingstoke; Maureen Healy (2004), *Vienna and the Fall of Habsburg Empire*, Cambridge, 258–299. See also Aschmann, *Ruhm*, and Jörn Leonhard (2008), *Bellizismus und Nation. Kriegsdeutungen und*

Nationsbestimmung in Europa und in den Vereinigten Staaten, 1850–1914, Munich.

60. See Dagmar Bussiek (2002), *Mit Gott für König und Vaterland!: die Neue Preußische Zeitung 1848–1892*, Münster.

61. See Schwentker, *Vereine*. More than 200 newspapers along with many political clubs were established in Prussia in 1848: Mark Hewitson (2010), *Nationalism in Germany 1848–1866*, Basingstoke, 37 and 119.

62. Gustav von Griesheim (1848), *Gegen Demokraten helfen nur Soldaten*, Berlin.

63. See Antonio Bresciani (1849), *L'Ebreo di Verona*, Milan; Cesare Cantù (1839), *Margherita Pusterla*, Florence; Luise Hensel (1867), *Lieder*, Paderborn; Ida Hahn (1861), *Doralice. Ein Familiengemälde aus der Gegenwart*, Mainz; Marie Nathusiums (1855), *Tagebuch eines armen Fräuleins*, Halle.

64. See Karl Friedrich Straß (1848), *Preußen – keine Republik – und seine Verfassung oder wie ist Preußens Verfassung zu gestalten, um dasselbe vor Anarchie und Republik zu bewahren*, Berlin.

65. Radowitz, *Briefe*, 45.

66. Ernst Rudolf Huber (1978), *Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte*. Vol. 1: *Deutsche Verfassungsdokumente 1803–1850*, Stuttgart, 327.

67. Karl Heinz Börner (1977), *Prinz Wilhelm von Preußen an Charlotte. Briefe 1817–1860*, Berlin 1993: 292. See also Eduard Bleich (1977), *Der erste Vereinigte Landtag in Berlin 1847*, Vol. 1, Vaduz, 22.

68. Ermisch, *Briefwechsel*, 125.

69. Börner, *Wilhelm*, 281 and 283.

70. Denis Mack Smith (2010), *Il Risorgimento italiano*, Rome, 322–325.

71. See Breuilly, *Nationalism*, 149–174.

72. Frank Lorenz Müller (2011), *Our Fritz. Emperor Frederick III and the Political Culture of Imperial Germany*, Cambridge (MA), 8.

73. Johannes Schultze (1929), *Kaiser Wilhelms I. Briefe an seine Schwester Alexandrine*, Leipzig, 115 and 131.

74. Clark, *Kingdom*, 387. See also: Catherine Brice (2010), *Monarchie et identité nationale en Italie 1861–1900*, Paris.

Nepalese Monarchy in an Age of Codification: Kingship, Patriotism, and Legality in the Nepalese Code of 1854

Simon Cubelic and Rajan Khatiwoda

Introduction

In legal history, the period from the second half of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century is portrayed as an *age of codification* (*Kodifikationszeit*). From the eighteenth century onward, from Prussia (1794), France (1804), and the Habsburg monarchy (1812), the idea of legal codification spread in different waves throughout Europe.[1] According to the 'standard narrative' of a growing number of legal specialists, two driving forces were behind these processes of rationalization and modernization of legal systems—an ascendant bourgeoisie with its need for a rational, abstract, and predictable legal framework; and the spread of legal ideas of liberalism operating within the framework of the

S. Cubelic (✉)
Heidelberg Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Research Unit "Documents on the History of Religion and Law of Premodern Nepal", South Asia Institute, Heidelberg, Germany

R. Khatiwoda
University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany

emerging nation states in Europe. Furthermore, it is argued that this eventually paved the way for the idea of constitutionalism, which fundamentally altered the basis for legitimation of state power in Europe.[2]

However, the *Kodifikationszeit* did not remain restricted to the Western world, but manifested itself powerfully in non-colonial Asia as well. In this region, the Nepalese Code (*Ain*) of 1854, widely known as the *Mulukī Ain* (hereafter MA)[3]—a law code with constitutional character—posed a major challenge to the standard narrative.[4] In Nepal in the first half of the nineteenth century, there had been neither a strong corps of professional jurists, nor a politically conscious bourgeoisie that were able to foster such a codification project, nor was there any colonial authority urging the implementation of a legal code. Furthermore, the alleged conceptual substratum for legal codification—ideas of social contract and sovereign legislative power—did not shape the political discourse, which revolved around divine kingship. How did the political vision underpinning this major project of codification alter the pre-existing political theology of divine kingship in Nepal?

This chapter sheds light on this question by focusing on the role of the king and regulations applying to him in the MA of 1854 from a transnational perspective. We argue that the legal discourse is an important source for the study of kingship in nineteenth century Nepal and supplements existing approaches that focus on the political theology of divine kingship and end up arriving at conclusions based on the ritual roles of the king. In our opinion, Nepalese divine kingship in the early Rāṇā period (1846–1951) was part of a more complex and unique ideological formation that comprised notions of legality and religious patriotism. Therefore, we argue that the composition of the MA cannot simply be understood as the manifestation of a 'derivative discourse',[5] but as a conscious political act to constitute a specific notion of kingship, statehood, and community which had its roots in both global and regional legal entanglements, as well as in local reconfigurations of power. Consequently, the MA rejects a simple classification along the lines of monarchy versus nationalism, or patrimonial state versus rational-legal bureaucratic state.[6]

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first section discusses existing scholarly approaches to kingship and identity formation in nineteenth century Nepal. The political and legal background leading to the composition of the MA is briefly sketched in the second section, along with an overview on the structure of the law text. In the third section,

selected regulations relating to kingship in the MA are discussed in the light of shifting notions of statehood and political identity.

KINGSHIP AND NATIONALISM IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEPAL

Nepal's kingship in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is often interpreted from the angle of premodern forms of Indic 'divine kingship' according to which the king is regarded as a vessel of divine substance, as an incarnation (*avatāra*) of Viṣṇu, and as the ritual focal point of polity as well.[7] For example, Richard Burghart states that 'at the turn of the nineteenth century the king of Nepal saw himself as a divine actor in his realm. He considered himself to be an embodiment of the universal god Vishnu and his palace was known as a temple.'[8] According to Burghart's groundbreaking account on the history of the concept of the nation state in Nepal, the differentiation of the royal household from the state took place after the demise of the Rāṇā regime in the 1950s. Burghart observes only from the 1960s onwards the emergence of a feeling of 'Nepaliness' as the source of a collective political will.[9] In a similar vein, Gérard Toffin summarizes that 'all through the twentieth century, the Shāh sovereigns of Nepal were crowned according to Vedic rituals, which gave them divine status. They were revered as incarnations (*avatāra*) of the god Vishnu and associated with old Tantric conceptions.'[10] The importance of an ethnohistorical perspective on Nepalese kingship for the conceptualization of processes of state and nation formation in South Asia without taking recourse to both anachronistic and Eurocentric models of the Western nation state is beyond doubt. Yet we argue that it is not enough to focus on the ritual roles of the king in order to grasp nineteenth century notions of kingship. From a transnational angle, Nepalese political elites participated in a heterogeneous and plural ideological space that provided them with a large repertoire of articulating and legitimizing power which cast a different light on the nature of the godlike king. In our context, two ideological formations seem to be especially important. First, since the early modern period, and especially during the eighteenth century, the South Asian subcontinent has witnessed, besides divine kingship, other idioms for constituting and expressing political identities. C. A. Bayly has referred to these as *Landespatriotismus* (territorial patriotism).[11]

According to Bayly, the respective genealogy of these old patriotisms differed from region to region. In some places it coincided with the creation of regional languages, in other places it extended kinship networks, religious sentiments, or an expanding loyalty to the dynasty to include loyalty to the homeland (*deśabhakti*) which laid the basis for these identity formations (often many factors at once).[12] Kingship played a role in the formation of these *patriae*, even if other considerations were equally important for the attempt to make identity tangible in the form of territoriality. Another potential resource of identity formation which needs to be considered is the emerging anti-colonial religious discourse in the latter part of the first half of the nineteenth century.[13] Such movements often emerged in response to missionary activities or colonial economic policies reframed as attacks on the purity of the sacred land of India. John Whelpton counts Nepal among those polities in South Asia in which notions of patriotism were firmly rooted. He argues that Nepal 'more than other units in South Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, […] was a nation-state in embryo, with a distinct identity rooted in territorial and cultural factors'[14] and consequently possessed a 'concept of the state […] as an entity to be protected and preserved independently of allegiance to an individual'.[15] Even though Whelpton's 'nation-state in embryo' describes rather the political imagination of the ruling elites than a firmly rooted socio-political category, it indicates that the attempt to found statehood in terms other than divine kingship had been present in Nepalese political discourse from the late eighteenth century onwards. As will be shown below, both notions—independent statehood and territorial political identity—were consolidated in the MA next to kingship.

The second ideology, legality, had gained a powerful presence in South Asia due to the establishment of the colonial state and its increasing recourse to rational-bureaucratic procedures of governance and legal codification.[16] Even though the rule of law in colonial South Asia often served as a rhetorical device to veil despotism and injustice,[17] it had a tremendous impact on the semantics of the political vocabulary. As the language of bureaucracy, law shapes the schemes according to which state actors perceive and act on society, and in its manifestation as 'legality'—the imperative that state action needs to conform to a body of universal rules and procedures—it legitimizes and authorizes the exercise of state power.[18] There is no evidence of any direct influence on the MA of British legal codification projects in South Asia, and it remains unclear whether the MA was really supposed to imitate the Code Napoléon, as the

hagiographies of Jaṅg Bahādur Rāṇā claim.[19] Yet it is hard to imagine that the Rāṇā aristocracy, which cultivated highly Anglicizing modes of representation within court practices, forms of commodities, and architecture,[20] could ignore such a powerful idiom of grounding authority. As will be shown below, legality as a symbol of statehood as distinguished from the royal household affected the notion of kingship in the MA.

Before we discuss some of the relevant passages of the MA of 1854 mirroring this unique ideological blend in which premodern ideas of kingship are interlinked with concepts of legality and religious patriotism in greater detail, a short introduction to the political and legal background of the MA has to be provided.

The Formation of the *Mulukī Ain*

The project of promulgating a comprehensive national legal code was linked to the formation of the Nepalese state in the second half of the eighteenth century. The foundation of modern Nepal goes back to King Pṛthivī Nārāyaṇa Śāha (1722–75), who initiated the unification by conquering the *bāisī rājya*, 'twenty-two principalities'—a group of petty kingdoms centred in the Karṇālī-Bherī river basin—and the *caubisī rājya*, 'twenty-four principalities'—a group of sovereign and intermittently allied petty kingdoms in the Gandakī river basin. However, even though in Nepalese nationalist historiography Pṛthivī Nārāyaṇa Śāha's wars of expansion have been often portrayed in terms of unification,[21] they were rather an attempt to enlarge the territory of the Gorkhā kingdom. Nevertheless, his expansion reached a climax when he conquered the economically and culturally rich Malla kingdom of Kāntīpura (Kathmandu) in 1768, which indeed provided a solid base for a unified Nepalese state. Pṛthivī Nārāyaṇa Śāha's reign represents both in institutional and ideological terms a critical juncture in that it set the course for the formation of a Nepalese state, identity, and ideology. The state continued to follow the pattern of patrimonialism according to which the state was organized as an extension of the monarch's household.[22] Monarchy itself was defined in religious terms and the king portrayed as the upholder of the purity of the realm and a bulwark against Indian polities, which had been defiled by foreign rulers.[23]

Several authors argue that the idea of Hindu kingship mirrors a larger tendency of the cultural politics of the Nepalese state leading to Hinduization, Sanskritization, and the application of Brahmanical norms

to larger segments of society.[24] Yet, taken together, continuities in the state and identity formation processes do not provide a sufficient explanation for the composition of the MA of 1854. Even though Pṛthivī Nārāyaṇa Śāha expressed a wish to lay down edicts of his own in the political testament attributed to him, the *Divyopadeśa* (*c*.1774), the document rather has to be interpreted as an attempt to emulate legitimatory practices of preceding rulers than as formulating a systematic and comprehensive legislative statutory law.[25] Therefore, legal initiatives during his and his successors' times largely consisted in orders reacting to particular cases of limited scope and were embodied in such types of documents as *rukkā*s (missives), *lālamohara*s (deeds with the royal red seal), *sanada*s (regulations or orders, especially from a prime minister)[26] or royal edicts.

However, even though the MA reflects the state building and identity formation processes of the Śāha period, it owes its existence to one of the major turning points of that period: the establishment of the oligarchy of the Rāṇā family.[27] After the Kot Massacre (1846), during which many leaders of the main political families lost their lives, Jaṅga Bahādura Kūvara of the Rāṇā family declared himself prime minister and commander-in-chief of the army. From that time on, both positions were reserved for members of that family, with the Śāha kings being reduced to ceremonial rulers. Although the Rāṇā rulers continued to follow in many respects the path of cultural isolationism and conservatism, they also showed certain openness to Western forms of conspicuous consumption, political aesthetics, and governmental strategies.[28] This led to small-scale administrative and economic reforms.[29] One major example for the greater willingness to engage with foreign ideas is Jaṅga's state visit to England and Paris in 1850. The inspiration to draft the MA is often attributed to this journey undertaken by Jaṅga and his exposure to Western legal ideas.[30] The latter are embedded within the larger narrative of Jaṅga as the first modernizer of state and society in Nepal.[31] In the nationalist historiography, the introduction of a uniform legal code serves as a symbol for the advent of a modern nation state and underlines its status as a non-colonized sovereign polity.

Although the exact circumstances of the emergence of the MA remain obscure, what is known is that as soon as Jaṅga returned from his state visit, he convened a Law Council (*Ain kauśala*) consisting of high-ranking Rāṇā family members, army, civil and judicial officials, royal priests, and religious judges (*dharmādhikārin*), to discuss the nature of the purported law code. After continuous efforts lasting about two and a half years, the MA was finally promulgated in 1854

(7 Pauṣa 1910 VS[32]) during the reign of King Surendra Vikrama Śāha (reigned 1847–81).[33] The MA codifies a wide range of social, customary, and religious practices, such as civil and penal regulations dealing with the caste system, rules of purity and impurity, land ownership, debt, inheritance, deposits, marriage regulations, commensality, homicide, witchcraft, slavery, adultery, arson, street cleaning, and deforestation. Furthermore, besides civil and criminal law, it also covers such aspects of public law and constitutional provisions as the appointment and renewal of civil servants, revenue arrangements, and foreign policy. As a strong foundation for the unification of diverse judicial, administrative, and social practices, the MA was a turning point in Nepalese legal history and indeed a watershed in the legal history of South Asia. Whereas the textual foundations of classical Hindu law in Sanskrit often resemble scholastic exercises rather than engaging with the 'law of the land',[34] the MA represents a vernacular codification to a great extent based on social practices. Therefore, András Höfer was right when he stated that the MA 'has the great advantage of offering the representation of an entire traditional society—not as a utopia of the moralists and not as reflections of the learned, but as law for immediate application'.[35] However, like its European counterparts in the age of codification,[36] the Nepalese code did not only collect and harmonize existing customs and regulations, but represented state legislation providing new legal norms. The regulations relating to the king, especially, are an important source for learning how kingship was interpreted in the governmental discourse at the onset of Rāṇā rule.

Kingship, Law, and Patriotism in the *Mulukī Ain*

In this section of the chapter, we have collected regulations from the Articles On the Throne (*gaddiko*), *On Royal Affairs* (*rājakājako*) and *Gūṭhī-endowments*[37] (*datta gūṭhī*) that reflect changing notions of the role of the monarch, state power, collective identity, and territoriality. Since there is no complete translation of the MA available, all translations are ours. The Nepali sources are based on Feza's (2000) and the Ministry of Law and Justice's (2022 VS) editions. Our examples will elucidate the following four interrelated patterns: first, a conceptual differentiation between the monarch and the state; second, the establishment of state control over royal tenurial sovereignty; third, limitations on royal sovereignty through the subordination of the king to state law; fourth, the reconfiguration of the royal sacred realm as a source of patriotic sentiment.

That the state was no longer entirely conceived of as an extension of the royal household, but metamorphosed into an autonomous agency, defined by 'national' state interests, is especially evident in those regulations which refer to diplomatic affairs with China and the Company state in India. They show that the monarch's room for autonomous political and legal action in foreign policy was subordinated to the higher-ranking state principle of maintaining non-hostile relationships with the two neighbouring empires.[38] This directive reflected the foreign relations and military experience Nepalese political elites made during the era of Nepal's military expansion in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Countering the Nepalese occupation of Tibetan territory in 1791, Chinese troops invaded Nepalese soil and inflicted a defeat on the Nepalese army in 1792.[39] The second major setback for Nepal's expansionist ambitions was the British victory over Nepal during the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814–16) which broke out over disputes on certain border districts. Following the terms of the peace treaty of Sugaulī (1816) Nepal lost around one third of its territory to colonial India with the cession of the Terai and Kumaon regions.[40] Therefore, peaceful relations with British India and China became a precondition of Nepal's survival as an independent state. Nepal's transnational engagement in the course of its geopolitical set-up contributed to the emergence of a concept of 'state interest' and thereby to the redefinition of royal authority in Rāṇā Nepal. In this context, Article 1 section 17 *On the Throne*, is especially revealing—it states that a king who acts against existing arrangements with the two powers without prior sanction by the prime minister is to be removed from the throne. The same applies if he conspires with state or military officials or his subjects:[41]

> If an enthroned king gives, without the advice of the chief minister (*mukhya bajira*) (that is the prime minister), an order which [is likely to] spoil friendly relations with the emperors of the south and north, engages in domestic conspiracy (*ghara jālasāja*) and gives orders which corrupt [his] own *umarāva*s (high-ranking military commanders),[42] *bhārādāra*s (high-level functionaries),[43] army and subjects, he shall be dismissed from the throne and it shall be granted to the [next] one on roll and [that one] shall [further] reign.[44]

Both offenses can only be understood if one presupposes a conception of the state according to which the king is regarded only as *part* of the polity

but not as the polity himself. The exigencies of interstate communication affected also the ritual authority of the king over his realm. The second Article of the MA contains the following legal regulations on crimes committed by Chinese or British envoys or within the extraterritorial spaces of their residencies:[45]

> If an envoy or resident of China or England commits homicide or any other crime, having come to our realm, the courts of [our] own government shall not investigate the case. One shall write to their [own] government.[46]
>
> If somebody who lives inside a territory (*khalaṅgā*) where the British and Chinese envoys or residents live commits homicide or any other offense, [one] shall arrest and bring such offender to his [own] master and inform him that such and such a person committed such and such homicide or offense.[47]

The two passages not only bear evidence that the Nepalese state had internalized interstate norms of diplomacy like diplomatic immunity, but was applying limits to the king's authority as well. According to Richard Burghart, one major expression of the king's sovereignty over the sacred realm was his duty to keep the realm pure from defilement by punishing criminals and maintaining social order.[48] Therefore, these two regulations can be interpreted as a restriction on the universal punitive power of the king and consequently his unlimited supremacy over the sacred realm.

The MA deprives the king not only of autonomy in foreign affairs and the right to punish envoys; royal possessions (*muluk*), too, were subordinated to higher state interests. The realm is no longer conceived of as solely at the king's disposal, but is regarded as integral to the territorial integrity of the state. Sections 34 On the Throne and 61 *On Land* contain regulations that prohibit the king, prime minister, and council from selling land to foreign governments or foreign private persons:[49]

> If an enthroned king, irrespective of whatever the highest sum he receives out of it, sells his own land which has been forbidden by the minister [or] Council to neighbouring emperors or kings, the subjects are permitted to substitute such king. If the minister, Council or an officer sells the land of his own territory to the neighbouring emperors and kings—irrespective whether [he does it] by order or not, by his own decision or he has received a lot of money for a small [piece] of land—they shall be ascertained as untrue to the salt (*nimaka harāma*) (that is disloyal).[50] One shall know that such [persons] are untrue to the salt. One is allowed to sell land to

[those] inhabitants and subjects who possess land, house and household within [our] own territory.[51]

An enthroned king shall not sell own land to neighbouring emperors or kings irrespective of whatever large amount he receives [for it]. Even if an enthroned king orders [it] to be sold, ministers or the Council shall not sell it. If the ministers or the Council—with or without orders [from the king], or for reasons of their own, [such as] receiving a large sum for a small [piece] of land—sells land within their own boundary to neighbouring emperors or kings, they shall be considered as rebel (*apsara*) and untrue to the salt. All shall know them as untrue to the salt. One can sell land to those who have come with their family and reside as [our] own subjects inside [our] own boundary.[52]

Especially interesting in this context is the phrase 'untrue to the salt' (*nimaka harāma*). In these two passages, a person can stand accused of being disloyal even if he has acted on the king's order, which implies that the state has emerged as a partly autonomous entity to which one owes loyalty prior to the monarch. But loyalty to the state was not only expected from government officials and council members; exclusive allegiance to one's state was also made incumbent on ordinary subjects, as the following section, which prohibits the selling of land to subjects of foreign origin, shows:

Subjects and so forth are allowed to [engage in] selling and buying land with subjects from their own realm and with those who have come from foreign realms together with their family and children and [now] reside [here] as subjects. If [anybody from the realm] sells land to subjects of foreign emperors and kings, the government shall have the buyer give [back] the amount under consideration (*thaili*) and the land seized. If the seller has already spent the amount under consideration, the government shall have the seller [re]pay the amount under consideration [to the buyer] from his other available [property or goods] and the land seized. If [the seller] has no other property, the government shall pay the amount under consideration to the [buyer] and seize the land.[53]

Only a few decades before this regulation was written, it was common practice for tenants to enter into contractual relations with all manner of rulers. Against this background, the politics of exclusivity regarding the possession of land not only reflects the birth of a concept of a well-defined governmental territory, but also that of a 'national population'

which enjoys legal privileges over foreigners. This fits well into the larger picture of emerging patriotic sentiments, which will be discussed below.

The third major restructuring of the notion of kingship stems from the concept that governmental territory was envisaged as a homogeneous jurisdictional space. Of course, the major expression of this was the creation of a comprehensive caste order in which all societal and ethnic groups were classified in order to effect a more standardized treatment before the law. Since this topic has been covered exhaustively in András Höfer's extensive study we will not elaborate further on the caste system.[54] However, what is striking is that the concept of legality was extended to the monarch himself, who was constrained to subject himself to the regulations of the MA. This can be extracted from the preamble:

> [Regarding the] following, since there have been dissimilarities [lit. less than enough for some and more than enough for others: '*kasailāi kami kasailāi baḍhatā*'] in punishment [imposed] in the same [kinds of] lawsuit (*ekai bihorā*) until today, therefore, in order to achieve uniformity of punishment in accordance with the crime committed, this is the *Ain* (that is MA) prepared in response to the following order to the thrice venerable Mahārāja Jaṅga Bahādura Rāṇā G. C. B. Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief: 'Call a Council meeting including the following *bhāradāra*s and prepare an Ain (that is law code) as ascertained in the Council.' It is declared on Thursday, the 7th of the bright fortnight of the month Pauṣa in the [Vikrama] year 1910 with the approval of us [members of] three generations [that is, King Father Rājendra, King Surendra and Crown Prince Trailokya]. When it is necessary [for a portion] to be corrected or rejected by order of the Council and witnessed by us, it should be corrected or rejected and should be added as a new law (*ain*), and all should act and render court decisions as written in this code. Whoever does not render court decisions and oversteps bounds in rendering court decisions or in other acts shall be punished as written in the *Ain* (that is MA) on the same subject. […] Having said this, we three generations have ordered that we shall obey this *Ain* (that is MA) along with our subjects. All officials (*kārindā*s) including the prime minister shall act in accordance to this *Ain* (that is MA).[55]

This passage is of great importance for a reconstruction of the legal ideology underlying the MA. First, it expresses the core rationale of the MA, namely the formulation of uniform applicable legal regulations within the jurisdictional space of the polity. The MA still acknowledges different legal norms for different categories of people, but the plural regulations derive

their legitimacy by conforming to the principles of legality. Even the king and all state officials are depicted as being subjected to the rule of law of the MA, and prospective amendments are to be authorized by a legislative council.[56] Still, these legal restrictions upon the king are styled as ones self-imposed. The will of the king is still the rhetorical locus of sovereignty.

However, in the MA the relationship among king, subjects, and state is defined not only in legal and/or bureaucratic terms. The government's sphere of activity was also portrayed on its own terms as a prerequisite for the collective prosperity and the protection of a shared religious identity.[57] Such notions of religious patriotism find remarkable expression in the chapter on religious endowments (*datta gūṭhī*) in the MA.[58] The chapter starts with cautionary tales aimed at persons spending money for religious purposes or making cash investments in British India. Due to the fact that Nepalese endowments had been expropriated by the British, the MA prohibits both charitable transactions and cash investments in foreign countries, and gives the following reasons:

> There is a Hindu kingdom whose law (*ain*) is such that it bans the kill-ing of cows, women, and Brahmins; an independent land of such merit, with a palace, [situated] in the Himalayas (*himavatkhaṇḍa)*, the land of the [*nāga*] Vāsukī (*vāsukī kṣetra*), a pilgrimage place of Āryas (*ārjyātirtha*) [the one] that contains Paśupati's *jyotirliṅga* and the venerable Guhyeśvarīpīṭha [This] is the only Hindu kingdom in the Kali era.
>
> Henceforth whoever wishes to construct a Śiva temple [or] *dharmaśālā* [or] establish a *sadāvarta*[59] [or] *gūṭhī* shall find a pilgrimage place in [his] own realm and construct the Śiva temple [or] *dharmaśālā* [or] establish the *sadāvarta* [or] *gūṭhī*. No one—from king to subjects—shall construct a Śiva temple or *dharmaśālā* in a foreign realm. Because if [it] has been constructed in [one's] own realm, [one's] own offspring can repair it at the slightest damage, [one's] own realm will be adorned, and whatever realm has a multitude of *dharma*, no disease, illness or epidemic will come upon it [and] no starvation will occur in it. When one obtains fame for [one's] own realm, [the result] will be splendour: the architects of [one's] own realm will become skilful. The poor will be protected since they will receive a salary, and the wealth of [one's] own realm will not go to foreign wealth or to a foreign realm.[60]

On the one hand, this passage illustrates the above-mentioned features of premodern forms of South Asian patriotism. The *patria* is constructed around sacred localities and pilgrimage places, and defined in religious

terms as a space of purity, merit, and the protection of sacred values. Within this framework, the monarch plays an important role as 'Hindu king', symbolizing the purity and uniqueness of the polity. On the other hand, the king is here only one among several identity markers of this 'Hindu identity', others being the protection of cows, women, and Brahmins. Therefore, the collective sentiment suffusing the *patria* rests on a higher-ranking category than the monarch alone. However, there are indications that the collective identity expressed in this passage goes beyond the 'old' or early modern forms of patriotism. The idea that investment in one's own country contributes to economic development and prevents the out-flow of wealth seems to be an early testimony for economic nationalism in Nepal.[61] Here, the space of collective spiritual flourishing merges into a progressive narrative of joint material advancement. Nepal's self-portrayal as a symbol of Hinduism is vividly expressed in this passage and was later integrated into the nationalist discourse in colonial India which then reinforced the self-perception of the Nepalese political elites[62] and reflected the highly entangled nature of identity formation processes in nineteenth-century South Asia.

CONCLUSION

Even though the 'divine king' was still the rhetorical source of sovereignty, the monarch in the MA was tied down in manifold ways. His legislative power and punitive capacity (his ability to dispose of his property and to define relations with foreign powers), are both restricted by a legal framework which mirrors a growing conceptual separation of the state from the king's household. We argue that this process was accompanied by the integration of two additional sources of legitimation of state power into the governmental discourse which supplemented the institution of kingship: the idea of legality or rule of law, and that of religious patriotism, which reflected Nepal's transnational entanglements with colonial India and China. Therefore, in contrast to Richard Burghart's periodization of nation state formation in Nepal, there is strong evidence that the emergence of both separate statehood and a collective identity had a visible pre-history already in the mid-nineteenth century. What was the rationale behind this reordering of the ideological space? Two sets of reasons seem to be plausible. First, the necessity to transform Nepal into a member of the Westphalian system of sovereign states defined by a fixed territory; the related articulation of 'national' interests that transcended the particular

interests of rulers and specific social groups; the exigencies of diplomatic communication with its neighbours (especially India and China); and an associated idea of legitimacy based on a shared collective identity which established exclusive moral affective ties between the state territory and subjects. Second, the institutionalization of the new political order under the oligarchy of the Rāṇā family, which provided the prime minister with sweeping powers and restricted the actual political influence of the king considerably. Consequently, in its quest for legitimacy the Rāṇā state created a polyvalent ideology which amalgamated kingship, legality, and religious patriotism.

Even though the reconceptualization of kingship in the MA marked a radical break, to what extent these new ideas trickled down into the wider society is still subject to speculation. Although current research suggests that the degree of implementation of the MA was probably higher than expected, the circulation of the text and its use in the courtroom may still have been rather limited during the 1850s and 1860s.[63] Popular images of kingship may have been derived less from law books or administrative manuals than from rituals and other forms of the public staging of power. Yet it is still remarkable that such visions of kingship, identity, and territoriality were circulating among the elites exercising central power and at the highest level of state administration. They were deemed of such great acceptability that they were incorporated into a legal code, there to remain as crucial testimony to the self-understanding and self-representation of the state, and thus exceedingly relevant to the intellectual and ideological history of Nepal. The specific way in which concepts of patrimonialism and independent statehood, royal sovereignty and legality, and divine kingship and patriotism were integrated within a single ideological framework is on the one hand a reminder that global concepts require careful historical contextualization if the rationality of their national and especially transnational trajectories are to be reconstructed. On the other hand, Eurocentric grand narratives like that of the 'age of codification' need to be opened up for historic experiences of extra-European and non-colonized societies to retain their heuristic salience.[64]

Notes

1. Inge Kroppenberg and Nikolaus Linder (2014), 'Coding the Nation. Codification History from a (Post-)Global Perspective', in: Thomas Duve (ed.), *Entanglements in Legal History: Conceptual*

Approaches, Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Open Access Publication, Frankfurt am Main, http://dx.doi.org/10.12946/gplh1, 67–99, here 72.

2. Inge Kroppenberg and Nikolaus Linder (2014), 70–4.

3. We have used two different editions of the *Mulukī Ain*; one is the edition by Jean Fezas (2000), *Le Code Népalais (Ain) de 1853*, Torino. The other was published by the Ministry of Law and Justice of His Majesty's Government of Nepal: *Śrī 5 Surendra Vikrama Śāhadevakā Śāsanakālamā Baneko Mulukī Ain*, Kathmandu 2022 VS [1965]. The name of this code originally was given as *āīn*. In later emended versions starting from 1927, the term *mulukī* (Arabic, *mulk*) was prefixed to it.

4. Other examples include *A Digest of Hindu Law, on Contracts and Successions* (1801) in colonial India and the Thai *Three Seals Code* (1805).

5. This term is adopted from Partha Chatterjee's famous study on Indian nationalism. See Partha Chatterjee (1993), *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, Minneapolis.

6. For various attempts to transcend the dichotomy between patrimonial and rational-bureaucratic state, see the essays in Mounira M. Charrad and Julia Adams (eds) (2015), *Patrimonial Capitalism and Empire*, Bingley.

7. The literature on the topic is too vast to be discussed here. A good survey of the existing approaches to premodern Indic kingship can be found in Burkhard Schnepel (1997), *Die Dschungelkönige. Ethnohistorische Aspekte von Politik und Ritual in Südorissa/Indien*, Stuttgart, here 13–72. A concise introduction for the Western Himalayas can be found in William Sax (2006), 'Divine Kingship in the Western Himalayas', *European Bulletin of Himalayan Research* 29–30, 7–12. A survey of the literature on kingship in the Malla period is available in Bronwen Bledsoe (2004), *Written in Stone: Inscriptions of the Kathmandu Valley's Three Kingdoms*, Diss. Univ. Chicago, here 89–100. An overview of the history of Nepal's monarchy during the Śāha and Rāṇā period is provided by Anne Taylor Mocko (2012), *Demoting Vishnu: Ritual, Politics, and the Unmaking of Nepal's Monarchy*, Diss. Univ. Chicago, here 47–109.

8. Richard Burghart (1996), 'Gifts to the Gods: Power, Property and Ceremonial in Nepal', in: Richard Burghart, *Conditions of*

Listening: Essays on Religion, History and Politics in South Asia, edited by C.J. Fuller and Jonathan Spencer, Oxford, 193–225, here 193. The identity of god and king in nineteenth-century Nepal is also asserted in Axel Michaels (2005), *The Price of Purity: The Religious Judge in Nineteenth Century Nepal*, Torino, 5–6.

9. Richard Burghart (1984), 'The Formation of the Concept of Nation-State in Nepal', *The Journal of Asian Studies* 44/1, 101–25, here 119–21.

10. Gérard Toffin (2013), 'The Politics of Hinduism and Secularism', in: Gérard Toffin, *From Monarchy to Republic: Essays on Changing Nepal*, Kathmandu, 47–74, here 59.

11. Christopher A. Bayly (1998), *Origins of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India*, Delhi, 28.

12. Bayly (1998), 26–8.

13. Bayly (1998), 79–85.

14. John Whelpton (1991), *King, Soldiers and Priests: Nepalese Politics and the Rise of Jang Bahadur Rana*, 1830–1857, New Delhi, 24.

15. Whelpton (1991), 25.

16. For the bureaucratization of the state administration see, for example, Malik Martin (2015), 'Patrimonialism, Bureaucratization, and Fiscal Systems of British Bengal, 1765–1819', in: Mounira M. Charrad and Julia Adams (eds.) (2015), *Patrimonial Capitalism and Empire*, Bingley, 191–216. A fresh interpretation of the nature of legal codification is given by Jon E. Wilson, 'Anxieties of Distance: Codification in Early Colonial Bengal', *Modern Intellectual History* 4/1, 7–23.

17. See, for example, Elizabeth Kolsky, *Colonial Justice in British India*, Cambridge.

18. Pierre Bourdieu (1994), 'Rethinking the State: Genesis and the Structure of the Bureaucratic Field', *Sociological Theory* 12/1, 1–18, here 10.

19. András Höfer (2004), *The Caste Hierarchy and the State in Nepal: A Study of the Muluki Ain of 1854*, Lalitpur, xix–xx.

20. Gérard Toffin (2008), 'Royal Images and Ceremonies of Power in Nepal (17th-21st Centuries)', *Rivista du Studi Sudasiatici* III, 145–80, here 156.

21. Hem Narayan Agrawal (1976), *The Administrative System of Nepal: From Tradition to Modernity*, Delhi, 4; Tulasi Vaidya and

Tri Ratna Manandhar (1985), *Crime and Punishment in Nepal: A Historical Perspective,* Kathmandu, 121; Devi Prasad Kandel (2068 VS) [2011]*, Pre-Rana Administrative System*, Kathmandu, 5.

22. John Whelpton (2011), *A History of Nepal*, first edition 2005, Cambridge, 49, and Daniel W. Edwards (1977), *Patrimonial and Bureaucratic Administration in Nepal: Historical Change and Weberian Theory*, Diss. Univ. Chicago.

23. Whelpton (2011), 56.

24. See, for example, Whelpton (2011), 55–60 and Toffin (2013), 58.

25. 'I observed the arrangements of King Ram Shah. I saw the arrangements of Jayasthiti Malla, also. I saw, too, the arrangements of Mahindra Malla. If it is God's will, I would like to make this sort of arrangement for the 12,000.' L. F. Stiller, S. J. (1968), *Prithwinarayan Shah in the Light of Dibya Upadesh,* Ranchi, 43.

26. Madhav Lal Karmacharya (2001), *Ten Documents from Mustang in the Nepali Language (1667–1975 A.D.)*, Bonn, 93.

27. For the rise of the Rāṇā regime, see M. S. Jain (1972), *The Emergence of a New Aristocracy in Nepal (1837–1858)*, Agra.

28. Toffin (2008), 163.

29. Edwards (1977), 161–162, and Mahesh C. Regmi (1988), *An Economic History of Nepal*, *1846–1901*, Varanasi, 77–90 and 122–79.

30. For a further discussion of this point, see Whelpton (1991), 218.

31. See, for example, Puruṣottama Śamaśera Ja. Ba. Rā. (2059 VS) [2002], *Śrī 3 harūko tathya vṛttānta*, Kathmandu, and Maheśarāja Panta (2070VS) [2013], *Nayarāja pantako dṛṣṭimā śrī 3 jaṅga bahādura rāṇā*, Kathmandu.

32. Pauṣa is the ninth month of the year in the Vikrama calendar, corresponding to December/January in the Gregorian calendar. VS is the abbreviation for Vikrama Saṃvat (Vikrama era) named after the Indian emperor Vikramāditya. The Vikrama calendar is 56.7 years ahead of the Gregorian calendar.

33. Michaels (2005), 7–9.

34. Ludo Rocher (1993), 'Law Books in an Oral Culture: The Indian Dharmaśāstras', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 137/2, 254–67.

35. András Höfer (1979), *The Caste Hierarchy and the State in Nepal: A Study of the Muluki Ain of 1854*, Innsbruck, 37–8.

36. See Pio Caroni (2016), 'Kodifikation', *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online*, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_a2151000, accessed 17 July 2016.

37. *Gūṭhī*s are 'endowed lands or other sources of revenue for financing religious and charitable functions' (Mahesh Raj Pant (2002), 'Documents from the Regmi Research Collection I', *Ādarśa* 2, 61–152, here 132).

38. The Rāṇā rulers were aware that only a peaceful and cooperative relationship with British India could secure their survival: see Regmi (1988), 9–10. However, the insight that the political autonomy of Nepal was dependent on its good diplomatic relations with India and China dates back to the *Divyopadeśa*, which states: 'This country is like a gourd between two rocks. Maintain a treaty of friendship with the emperor of China. Keep also a treaty of friendship with the emperor of the southern sea (the Company).' L. F. Stiller, S. J. (1968), 42.

39. See Leo E. Rose (1971), *Nepal: Strategy for Survival*, Berkeley, 52–67.

40. See Rose (1971), 79–85.

41. *On Royal Affairs*: MA 1854-Fezas/2 §10.

42. Whelpton (1991), 287.

43. M. R. Pant (2002), 'Documents from the Regmi Research Collection I', *Ādarśa*, 61–152, here 131.

44. *On the Throne*: MA 1854-Fezas/1 §17.

45. For an overview on the history of the British residency in Nepal, see Michael H. Fisher (1991), *Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency System 1764–1858*, Delhi, 414–8.

46. *On Royal Affairs*: MA 1854-Fezas/2 §17.

47. *On Royal Affairs*: MA 1854-Fezas/2 §18.

48. Burghart (1984), 104.

49. The term *kauśala* is probably a corrupt from of the English term 'council'. Adhikari argues that the already existing *Bhāradārī-sabhā* (State Council) was renamed as *kauśala* by Jaṅga Bahādura. According to him, it was an executive, legislative, and judicial body; see Krishna Kant Adhikari (1984), *Nepal under Jang Bahadur 1846–1877,* Kathmandu, 70–1.

50. According to Richard Eaton, salt was an important metaphor for patron–client relationships and goes back to Persian usage: '"Eating the salt" or "fidelity to salt" refers to the oath that binds a patron

and client through mutual obligations of protection and loyalty—an idea that, owing to Britain's former connection with India, survives in English to this day (e.g. to be "true to the salt").' Richard Eaton (2005), *A Social History of the Deccan, 1300–1761*, Cambridge, 114.)

51. *On the Throne*: MA 1854-Fezas/1 §34.
52. *On Land*: MA 1854-Fezas/5 §61 and also MA 1854-KM/2 §61.
53. *On Land*: MA 1854-Fezas/5 §63 and also MA 1854-KM/2 §63.
54. Höfer (1979).
55. *Preamble*: MA 1854-Fezas, pp. 3–5, and also MA 1854-KM, pp. 1 and 2.
56. Consequently, a king convicted of murder is to be removed from the throne. However, he is not subjected to the usually prescribed punishment, but enjoys a privileged status: 'If a crowned king, without any reason and unlawfully, takes anybody's life by his own hands, he shall be banished from the throne, put under detention outside the place and respectfully provided lodging and food. [Further,] a lawful successor shall be raised to the throne (MA 1854-Fezas/1 §11).
57. Earlier and less elaborated notions of religious patriotism are mirrored in the famous phrase of Nepal as 'true Hindustan' (*asal Hindustān*) in Pṛthivī Nārāyaṇa Śāha's *Divyopadeśa* (Stiller 1968, 44).
58. *On Religious Endowments*: MA 1854-Fezas/4 §1 and also MA 1854-KM/1 §1.
59. 'Sadāvartta is an endowment for the provision of uncooked food to pilgrims, mendicants, and other needy persons in specified quantities at prescribed temples or other places', M. C. Regmi (2002), *Nepal: An Historical Miscellany*, Delhi, 302. For more information about the *sadāvarta* endowed by King Raṇa Bāhādura at Kedāranātha Temple, see Regmi Research Series 1988; year 4, no. 20, 55–6.
60. *On Religious Endowments*, MA1854-Fezas/4 §1 and also MA 1854-KM/1 §1.
61. Similar ideas which can be found in the *Divyopadeśa* (Stiller 1968, 43) are rather based on a ruler-centred mercantilism than a collectively shared economic patriotism.
62. Axel Michaels (2008), 'The King and the Cow: On a Crucial Symbol of Hinduization in Nepal', in David N. Gellner, Joanna

Pfaff-Czarnecka, John Whelpton (eds.), *Nationalism and Ethnicity in Nepal*, Kathmandu, 79–99, here 92–5.

63. Rajan Khatiwoda (2015), 'Documented Evidence relating to the Implementation of the Mulukī Ain in mid-19th Century Nepal', Presentation at the Conference "Studying Documents in Pre-modern South Asia and Beyond: Problems and Perspectives," 05–06 October, Heidelberg.

64. The necessity of releasing non-European historical norms and practices into the vocabulary of political modernity has been stated by Dipesh Chakrabarty (2008), *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton, 20.

Loss of Control: Kaiser Wilhelm II, Mass Media, and the National Identity of the Second German Reich

Martin Kohlrausch

The idea that particular political systems fitted specific nations or even expressed their character traits was well established around 1900. What did this idea imply for the institution of the monarchy in a period when both the monarchy and the idea of the nation were being redefined? This chapter will connect both processes for Germany. I will argue that only by highlighting the critical role mass media played as an 'ingredient' of an imagined new German monarchy, and as a means of comparing different systems of government in Europe, may we understand the relation between national identity and monarchy.

Therefore, this chapter will analyze how mediatization created new concepts of relating the monarch and the nation, but also created new expectations that the monarchy was unable to meet. Though the use of mass media helps to explain the dynamic redefinition of the relation between the monarchy and the nation in Germany, we cannot explain

M. Kohlrausch (✉)
KU Leuven, Faculteit Letteren, Leuven, Belgium

this relation without considering the peculiar development of a national monarchy in Germany.

The monarchy in Germany had a long history and preceded the German nation state by some 1000 years. A German monarchy in the narrower sense, however, only emerged with the foundation of the new *Reich* in 1871. And even then the monarchy's constitutional status was far from clearly defined. While the newly created office of a German Emperor was formally only the title of the president of the *Bundesrat*, the federal assembly of the predominantly monarchical German states, the title elevated the existing Prussian monarchy and its Hohenzollern dynasty to national relevance. The Prussian king became automatically German Kaiser while the Prussian kingship remained his power base. On the surface this situation resembled the national role the house of Savoy acquired in Italy. However, the German situation differed in important ways.[1] Underneath the new German Kaiser, 21 ruling dynasties remained in place, often representing centuries of monarchical continuity in large regions like Bavaria and extremely small entities like Reuss in Thuringia.[2]

Moreover, there was, at least in a certain historical reading, a German monarchy that was much older than any Prussian or Hohenzollern tradition: the Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire or *old Reich*, which had been ruled by the Habsburg dynasty almost continuously since the fifteenth century. This monarchy, with its universalistic ambitions, shifting dynastical basis, ambiguous territorial orientation, and multi-ethnic composition, could hardly be called a German monarchy in a nationalist sense. Consequently, for the dominant part of the German nationalist movement, the liberal Protestant strand, the old Reich embodied all the shortcomings that the new Reich had to overcome. Through liberal reforms in the 1870s, including a comparatively liberal press law of 1874, it was in many respects transformed into an efficient and modern political entity and soon became a European and even global economic powerhouse.

In order to understand the challenge the German monarchy confronted, it helps to recall that the German Empire was not only called an Empire but, as recent historical research has stressed, also on many respects carried the traits of an empire.[3] The diversity of different minorities posed considerable obstacles to national integration. The issue of national loyalty was fiercely debated in the national discourse of Imperial Germany, especially with regard to the substantial Polish minority.[4] While the nation state had to be achieved internally, the new German Empire aspired to reach out

beyond its borders. After the dismissal of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1890, noteworthy parts of the German elite voiced their belief that Germany had to enter the race with the old and new empires in Europe and the Americas. Famously, Max Weber declared: 'We must grasp that the unification of Germany was a youthful spree, indulged in by the nation in its old age; it would have been better if it had never taken place, since it would have been a costly extravagance, if it was the conclusion rather than the starting-point for German power-politics on a global scale.'[5] Related hopes and expectations, soon popular under the signifier *Weltpolitik*, focused on the Emperor as the symbol of the Reich's political ambitions.[6]

Despite its dynamic economy, mighty military, and grandiose *Weltpolitik* schemes, the German empire remained a fragile construction. This was due to the enormous social tensions, reflected in the rapid and continuous rise of the Social Democratic Party, but also to the ongoing tension between dominant Prussia and southern Germany. In addition, the outward-looking forces in Southern Germany, parts of the Catholic West, and in formerly Polish territories in the East should not be underestimated. Like important parts of the working class, these milieux were not immune to a new popularized national agenda of an aggrandized Prussia, but were much more sceptical than other parts of Germany.[7]

In fact, addressing the president of the new federation with the vague title Kaiser could be seen as a compromise bridging these tensions. In defiance of all the historical burdens the title carried, it was also a rather modern notion. The title promised integration not yet achieved and allowed the federal princes to keep their titles and play their integrative role in the regions.[8] In fact, despite its ancient origins, the office and the title of the German Emperor turned into the dynamic elements of the constitution. The Emperor was one of the few symbolic representations of the newfound unity. The expansion of the new nation states' political scope, into colonialism and naval policies for example, was closely connected to the emperor. Moreover, the office of the emperor served as an instrument for the personal integration of a scattered political landscape.

More by instinct than judgement, Wilhelm II replied to the expectations his office demanded. He expanded those aspects of the office of the Emperor his father already regarded as critical. Friedrich III, for all we know, would have stressed the supremacy of the Kaiser over the federal princes. He would also have elevated the Prussian court in Berlin to a German court if his reign had exceeded the 99 days before

a fatal illness took his life.[9] During Wilhelm II's reign, beginning in 1888, *Kaiserreden* (imperial speeches), *Kaisertage* (imperial days), and *Kaiserwetter* (the good 'imperial' weather, which was expected on these days) became household names, signifying the inroads the Kaiser's office had made into areas not explicitly foreseen in the constitution.[10] The formerly somewhat modest court in Berlin became more glamorous but also socially encompassing and—with varying success—integrated the South German and Catholic elites.[11] With the forced departure of Bismarck in 1890 and the subsequent introduction of the *Weltpolitik*, marking Wilhelm II's and Germany's aspiration to enter the imperialist race, dynasty and nation merged for the outside world. Thus it could be argued that in many respects Wilhelm II became the personification of the new Germany.

Forging the Nation Through the Dynasty

In order to understand why so many nationalist hopes were projected onto Wilhelm II in 1888, one needs to recall the role the Hohenzollern dynasty played in the process of German unification. The dynasty profited from a growing perception that only strong monarchic leadership could achieve what the liberal-democratic movement of the 1848 revolution let slip away. This interpretation was particularly promoted after Wilhelm II came into power. His attempt to establish a cult around his grandfather Wilhelm I as Wilhelm the Great, the true founder of the Reich (with Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke only in the position of helping hands), took things to the extreme. The manifold officially sponsored monuments for his grandfather were strikingly less popular in Southern Germany than in the Prussian-dominated north of the country.[12] Still, it is hard to overestimate the influence of this officially sponsored fusion of dynasty and new nation state. The version of the 'German mission' of the Hohenzollern dynasty, which—contradicting a more critical reading of history—always strove to achieve a powerful Germany, came to dominate school books, national festivities, and the uncountable associations of veterans and other patriots.[13] The unity of Germany and the Hohenzollern was celebrated throughout the country on 27 January, the Kaiser's birthday, an occasion which increasingly acquired the role of an official holiday. The celebration of the emperor's birthday not only signified a successful fusion of dynastic and

nationalist programmes. These celebrations also marked the partially successful expansion of the originally rather technical idea of the Kaiser as a president into a true *Reichsmonarch*, a monarch representing the German nation.[14]

A more intellectual and academic discourse generally likened the monarchy as a form of government to the German people for historic reasons and as allegedly representing particularly well a specifically German idea of leadership, trust, and deliberate followership.[15] The flip-side of this discourse was the perception of other forms of government as not only potentially less efficient but specifically un-German. This was certainly true for France, connoted with moral decay as well as a lack of organizational proficiency. The regime of Napoleon III was not only famously criticized by Karl Marx as Caesarism or Bonapartism, but critically used by those who believed Wilhelm II would take the new interpretation of the imperial office too far.[16] After all, the combination of universal suffrage on the level of the Reich, an outspoken imperialism, and a flamboyant and self-assured monarch made comparison with the ill-fated emperor west of the Rhine a rather obvious matter. In 1900, the well-known theatre critic Alfred Kerr came to the conclusion: 'I'm not sure why it constantly appears to me as if Germany nowadays resembles the state of France under Napoleon III. In this time everybody succumbed to the imperial gloss and true characters were in short supply, and a delirium of an undefined nature grabbed the whole society.'[17]

While Kerr's statement targeted the extremes of Wilhelm II's style of government, the negative perception of French republicanism in general and Russian autocracy helped to establish an affirmative reading of the German model as superior. Interestingly, this critical assessment of foreign forms of governments increasingly also included the British system—that is a parliamentarian monarchy which for a long time the German elite had regarded as a model: 'The times when our liberalism looked with admiration to the "mother of parliaments" are over for good. Our liberalism has fully broken with the mad assumption that the aristocratic oligarchy beyond the canal would be a democratic polity' one commentator concluded in 1912.[18] Also reflecting a growing rivalry in international politics, German commentators complained that British parliamentarianism would only serve a small plutocratic elite.[19] After 1900, only a few decision makers proposed a direct transfer of elements of French or British parliamentarianism.[20]

The Monarch as the Anchor of a National Discourse

It is, however, not sufficient to analyse the relation of dynasty and nation in Germany only in constitutional terms. There are good reasons to describe Wilhelm II as a media monarch who as such profoundly changed the perception but also the political and social role of the monarchy in Germany.[21] This development had repercussions far beyond Germany as Wilhelm II came to personify the role model of a monarchy—be it positively or negatively perceived—throughout Europe and thus also forced the other European monarchs to react.

Around 1880, mass media in the modern sense emerged also in Germany. With the extremely high number of newspapers in Germany (as in other European countries) competition was fierce and not entering into the hot issues of critical political discourse was no longer an option, even for the conservative newspapers supporting government and state representatives.

At first glance, paradoxically, no other political institution was as much affected by the rise of mass media as the monarchy. This public come-back of the monarchy, an institution highly endangered only a few decades before, was caused by a number of reasons which were particularly pronounced in Germany. Popular monarchism centred around sentimental issues and focusing on the royal family had had a long tradition—it was now amplified by the mass reproduction of texts using new printing technology that allowed, in particular, new opportunities to print pictures of monarchs in a wide variety of publications.

Cinema became the most potent form of visualizing the monarchy, as it was particularly in tune with the visual programme the monarchy had to offer. In this the cinema exemplified a mechanism that also applied to postcards, illustrated journals, or other visual material.[22] By 1900, Wilhelm II had become the most filmed person in the world. Consequentially, a number of leading international film companies celebrated Wilhelm as 'the most interesting personality ever caught by the lens of the cinematograph'.[23] This reflected the remarkable fact that Wilhelm II came to personify a specific 'brand' in other European countries and even worldwide. When the peace activist Hermann Fried tried to win Wilhelm II over to his cause, he did so because he regarded him as 'the most famous individual on Earth'.[24] Fried had probably come across an observation made by the literary critic Alfred Kerr in 1899: 'in the past ten years no-one in Europe

has been discussed as much as he [the emperor] has'.[25] More often than not, and certainly in times of international tension, the image of the Kaiser abroad was negative, but this was not necessarily so, not even in France. Kerr observed: 'A good listener will, in the course of a few weeks, hear more critical remarks on Wilhelm II in Germany than in France. Here [in France] one talks about him almost exclusively with esteem. One expects something of him.'[26]

In the words of John Thompson, the 'transformation of visibility' in the nineteenth century served monarchs particularly well—from childhood on they were exposed like no one else to public scrutiny.[27] Two characteristics of the monarchy played a decisive role here. First, the distinction from all other political actors through tradition and political power: strong iconic symbols—in Prussia/Germany the military iconography—were the prerogative of the royals.[28] As attention spans became shorter and the media drifted from one story to another, these resources of visibility lifted monarchs, at least potentially, far above other politicians. If a monarch such as Wilhelm II also possessed a number of unmistakable features like his moustache or distinctive uniforms and helmets, they certainly helped his media affinity, even though they might have seemed ridiculous to some of his contemporaries. In an age of trademarks, *the Kaiser* became a particularly successful label; the advertising pioneer Ludwig Roselius called him an impressive early example of brand development: 'Propaganda needs a symbol, a flag, a focal point around which everyone can rally. […] For the Islamic religion this is Mohammed, for the Social Democrats it is Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, for businessmen the brand—and for the German Empire it is the Kaiser.'[29]

Second, European monarchs at the close of the nineteenth century profited from the personalization inherent in the DNA of mass media.[30] The portrayal and reception of monarchs were prime examples of what Thompson called 'mediated intimacy', that is a personal interest in affairs far beyond one's immediate sphere.[31] The enormous coverage of royal trivia illustrates this well.[32] With the rapid expansion of the press for social, cultural, technical, and economic reasons around the 1880s, almost everyone could, and more often than not did, turn into a 'monarchy-expert'.

With the central political role attributed to Wilhelm II this mechanism was particularly pronounced in Germany. Tellingly, in Germany different intellectuals reflecting on what these changes meant for the monarchy observed that a *Publikum*, an audience, constituted itself vis-à-vis the monarch and substituted the *Volk*, the nation, of earlier times: 'The crowns are

today not endangered by the heroic but the trivial […]. The people turned into an audience, and this audience demands comedies in which the Prince only pretends to be a hero.'[33] Newspaper comments increasingly entered a meta-level, discussing the effect of certain monarchical actions or aspects of the personality of royals on monarchic sentiment rather than assuming a natural unity of prince and people or nation. Indeed, we cannot separate the political dimension of the monarchy from its public dimension. Political relevance formed the basis for the visibility of monarchs and for the interest of the media. How far political acting was commented upon, and thus amplified, in the media, and how far the media created new scope or restrictions for political action depended on the constitutional prerogatives of monarchs. But also the monarch's personality and personal concept of rule played an important role. Again, this was no exclusively German phenomenon, but it is important to recall decisive differences between countries' constitutions and political cultures.

Also, in Victorian Britain, often seen as an ideal example of a secluded monarchy, the media demanded a strong public presence from the royal family.[34] Moreover, something which is often forgotten on the continent, British engineers of monarchism in the Victorian age, from Prince Consort Albert to Benjamin Disraeli, advocated a stronger monarchy in reaction to the rise of mass society and media:[35] 'Public opinion has a more direct, a more comprehensive, a more efficient organ for its utterance, than a body of men sectionally chosen,' Disraeli had one of the figures in his novel *Coningsby* explain in 1844.[36] The revival of the monarchy is here directly linked to new opportunities offered by the press, first developed on a new scale in Britain.[37] Both in Britain and Germany, as well as in many other European countries, it became more of a structural development that the monarch was exposed in the media than a matter of personal preference and decision.

In Germany, such ideas could gain more concrete grounding with the strong political role the German Kaiser had as Prussian king and supreme warlord, but also as the focal point of traditions and new unificatory expectations. Journalist Maximilian Harden, though a strong critic of Wilhelm II, wanted to preserve the monarch as a politically influential player and polemicized against turning the monarch into a 'Dalai Lama in uniform'.[38]

It is striking to note how early on and in a radical way both the new influence of the mass media and its consequences for politics were reflected by journalists. They understood that a monarchy covered intensely and increasingly without inhibition in the press would transform into a new

institution. Wilhelm II was expected to find and establish a societal consensus using the new media means at his disposal.[39] Political thinkers and many newspaper commentators explained that, now that mass media was within reach for almost anyone, it should also become the preferred mode of political communication. With the monarch setting the political agenda, the public sphere discussing his proposals, and the monarch channelling its conclusions into the political machine, a new powerful mechanism seemed at hand. This mechanism promised at the same time to be democratic, fast, and effective, in short 'modern' and superior to political systems elsewhere. Given the central role the media played in this imagined new form of political communication, it is unsurprising that journalists eagerly endorsed the model of a direct exchange between monarch and people.[40] While the liberal politician Friedrich Naumann addressed Wilhelm II as 'Signalperson', setting the agenda of the political discussion,[41] more critical commentators insisted on the Kaiser's duty to listen more carefully to his people: 'Only if the Emperor mingles himself with the people, when he exchanges the uniform with civil cloth, when he takes the feelings and demands of his people into account positive change will be possible.'[42] Former US President Theodore Roosevelt noted with some disappointment during his stay in Germany in 1909, 'that both the men highest in politics and the administration, and the people at large, took evident pleasure in having him [Wilhelm II] understand that he was not supreme, and that he must yield to the will of the Nation on any point as to which the Nation had decided views'.[43]

In this understanding, but also to some extent in reality, the monarchy became a programmatic institution, aligning itself with causes such as welfare, the fleet, or colonialism. In particular the latter two projects obsessed the nationalist camp and were ideally suited to align the dynasty and the great things the German nation was to achieve in the future. This fusion of interests was not only achieved by concrete measures, but through an intense discourse in which the Kaiser often functioned as the one setting the tone. After all, Wilhelm II was the first German monarch to use political speeches to rally the people behind his political programme.[44] These *Kaiserreden*'s strong catchphrases suited the needs of the new mass media. The Kaiser's speeches regularly set the parameters of national debates, as the monarch aspired to a decisive role in shaping political consensus in an increasingly complex society. That the Kaiser's speeches were excessively criticized does not diminish their significance, but rather underlines the importance that contemporaries attributed to them.

The increasingly critical reception of the speeches, in particular after the turn of the century, reflects not only their often controversial content, but also marks the collapse of the idea of the monarch as a moderator of national discourse. Tellingly, this crisis regularly emerged along the fault-lines of the national and the dynastical. There were risks involved for the monarchy in such intense media coverage, characterized by the eschatological dimension of a media-driven programmatic monarchy with its high-flying goals associated with the monarch, and the almost boundless scrutinizing of the monarch's person, who after the turn of the century featured in hundreds of caricatures. The famous scandals centring around the German Kaiser between 1906 and 1909, the Eulenburg scandal addressing allegedly homosexual courtiers, and the Daily Telegraph affair (the printing of Wilhelm II's diplomatically damaging statements), are not conceivable without the developments described. But they also reflect a growing uneasiness on the part of large sections of the German people over what they regarded as being in the national interest. At the height of Anglo-German tension and the ensuing crisis of Wilhelm II's monarchy in the Daily Telegraph affair even conservative newspapers began questioning the monarch's national loyalties: 'The German Kaiser should not be the personal friend of England or any other power but he should be the friend of the German nation.'[45]

In the two scandals the press applied clear parameters for performance on the royal stage. Aspects of the relation of monarch and mass media—such as which newspapers the monarch read or how his advisors channelled the communication between monarch and people—came to be seen as essentially political issues.[46] The scandals, damaging as they had been for the monarchy and in particular for the personal reputation of Wilhelm II, reconfirmed the relevance of the communicative space emerging around the monarch in Wilhelmine Germany. In some respects the monarchy's now apparently overstretched position stemmed from the very tension between well-developed participatory demands and a more sober monarchic reality. Content wise, both scandals expressed the uneasiness of a new right with what it regarded as the meagre results of the goals which stood central in Wilhelm II's programmatic monarchy. While the journalist Harden, originally with rather liberal convictions, accused Wilhelm II of softness in his dealings with France, the nationalist camp in particular attacked the Kaiser's alleged closeness to Britain—being the son of a British princess and grandson of Queen Victoria—and as being both nationally unreliable and an inefficient advocate of German interests.[47]

While the argument that an 'audience' supplanted the people vis-à-vis the mediatized monarch certainly has something to it, it obscures the fact that this very audience was still nationally defined. The scandals, however, also raised doubts about the assumed superiority of the German monarchical model, as one newspaper remarked: 'The pride on the moral quality of our public life, which we have in mind when normally looking self-assured down on the degeneration of the leading circles in France and England, has been put into question. We see disdainful, sickly effeminate men who were part of the national leadership or at least stood close to it.'[48]

Scandals accentuated the advantages and disadvantages of different political systems and the national overtones they came with. Scandals intensified comparisons, but even now, only a few voices presented the United Kingdom as an example. Harden, in contrast to earlier statements now held affirmatively that 'there are signs that the position of our monarchy will come close to the English one'.[49] However, the influential intellectual Ernst Horneffer phrased the opposition to this idea in lengthy words:

> The German Emperor reduced to an empty formula, only a trimming of the German state? This would mean to neglect the very meaning of the German past, the spirit of a tradition of more than a thousand years. I must admit, if only out of defiance, I do not like to recommend the English ideal as the goal of our development.[50]

Others even argued that the English monarchy, which gained influence under Edward VII, and the strong role President Roosevelt played in the USA, would prove the need for a strong monarchy in Germany 'because we think modern'.[51]

The Limits of National Integration Through the Dynasty

Of course, in a European situation in which it was more the norm than the exception that ruling dynasties from Belgium and the Netherlands to Bulgaria and Rumania did not originate from the countries they ruled, national loyalty to the dynasty was sometimes controversial within the context of rising nationalism.[52]

But in Prussia and Germany, at least in its northern part, where generally little doubt as to the national credentials of the Hohenzollern dynasty prevailed, the problem was of a different order.[53] The dynasty was charged

with achieving internal social integration and with finding a strong position for Germany in a globalizing world. Wilhelm II accepted these tasks and set himself ambitious goals. The tensions arising from entrusting the monarch with a national agenda were aggravated, and to a certain extent caused, by the fact that the monarch provided the very communicative space in which new hyperbolic nationalist demands could be voiced. If we take a closer look at those groups voicing a new nationalist agenda going beyond what the Empire under Bismarck had achieved, we find numerous pamphleteers, journalists who earlier on had invested considerable energy in defining a newly styled monarchy.[54] Interestingly, those who had phrased such demands soon moved from criticizing certain actions of the monarch to questioning the very assumption of the monarchy, at least in its form at the time, as the type of government most in line with the traditions and particularly the needs of the new nation state.

Initial calls for the need for a true *Führer*, a leader of the nation, were voiced in the course of the Eulenburg scandal. The term leader was so popular also because it could refer both to the monarch or an alternative, no longer dynastically legitimized, contender.[55] Yet, in both cases the term referred to a leader of the nation, a political figure whose legitimacy was derived from the followership of the nation. Briefly before the First World War, the well-known historian Friedrich Meinecke declared ambivalently: 'We demand a leader for whom we may walk through the flames.'[56] Hermann Oncken, also a historian, addressed the emperor at the same time as 'Leader of the nation', who would stand 'right in the glaring light of the day […] at every moment visible and sought-after, observed and criticized, loved and reproached'.[57] Heinrich Class' book *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär* (*If I Were the Emperor*) had a whole chapter on the theme 'Der Kaiser als Führer' ('The Emperor as Leader').[58] The monarch could be a leader, but, as a growing strand of right-wing commentators stressed, he was only accepted under the assumption that he would justify the trust placed in him through political achievements. The notion of the *Führer* entailed the assumption that followership was voluntary and could be withdrawn as soon as the monarch no longer served the needs of the nation. Already in addressing the monarch as a leader, the shortcomings of the reigning monarch were stressed. The notion of the leader as a political alternative to the monarch was bound to the notion of the nation's precedence over the ruler and dynasty. The pan-German right wing publicist Ernst von Reventlow, one of the fiercest critics of the Kaiser, expressed this sharply in 1906. Wilhelm II, he argued, acted too

much as a 'Dynast', a dynastic ruler, and not, as Edward VII in Britain, preferentially in the national interest. Von Reventlow lamented: 'Edward VII travels as representative of his nation and acts in her interest, quasi on behalf of her, while in the case of Wilhelm II the dynastic element is decisive.'[59] Another commentator positively described Edward as the 'secret Emperor of England'.[60]

A much discussed pamphlet of the same year argued that the nation had the right to 'push aside' the Hohenzollerns without breaking the law if it no longer felt adequately represented. The future, the pamphlet's author who certainly did not belong to the left camp, argued, would belong to democracy.[61] As another commentator added in 1909, pomp and glamour of the court had distracted the emperor from his people. Yet there was, he argued, not only a rule by divine right but also a rule by the right of the people (*Volksgnadentum*).[62] It was this new right which claimed democracy on national grounds, which challenged the Wilhelmine monarchy more directly after 1900 than the 'classic' social democratic threat. The challenge of the right was aggravated by the fact that it proved more difficult to suppress criticism from the right than from the left.

The uncoordinated attempts to answer this sort of critique by connecting the monarchy even more with the symbols of *Weltpolitik* hardly sufficed. On the contrary, these attempts elevated tensions in international politics considerably and exposed the monarchy to even more criticism.[63] It would be too easy to see the path to the First World War sketched out here. But the fact that in the decisive weeks and months of 1914 Wilhelm II was apparently neither willing nor any longer able to follow a more dynastic logic instead of what he apparently perceived as a national logic is rather evident. His quote 'I know no parties anymore, I know only Germans!' of 4 August 1914 in front of the Reichstag,[64] regarded as perhaps the most successful of his uncounted sound bites, thus also included the Kaiser himself.

In 1913, briefly before the Great War, the Austrian writer Carl Techet held: 'The future menacing with the most dreadful struggles does not seem to embody a threat for the Princes but rather strengthens their position.'[65] But it was doubtful what would happen if decades of accumulated hatred would collapse on Europe. After all, the peoples had lived and sacrificed for nation and fatherland, not for their princes. Though the German monarchy survived four years of extreme warfare, indeed none of the dynasties, including the Hohenzollerns, would survive still ruling or in power by the end of the struggles and German defeat.

Conclusion: The European Dimension

This chapter has stressed the specifics of the German monarchy, stemming from the tensions caused by the late establishment of a German nation state, and between political integration via the monarchy and the radicalization of German nationalism, but it has also suggested that these can only be understood in a transnational context. Of course, the notion of a specifically German model of monarchy only made sense when it was distinguished from other models associated with foreign countries. On the other hand, the structural changes to which the German monarchy reacted, such as the rise of mass media and political mobilization, were of a transnational order.

Historiography on nineteenth- and twentieth-century monarchies through a comparative perspective have always been foremost a history of constitutional differences. Even while acknowledging that political reality and constitution might differ considerably, this historiography still stressed qualitative differences between limited, constitutional monarchies like those in Britain or Belgium, and the more autocratic monarchies of Russia, Austria, and also Germany. Focusing on the relation of mass media and monarchy allows for a more complex picture, without doing away with the unquestionable implications the constitutional prerogatives had. The high expectations created through mediated communication between the traditional ruler and a modern public offered potential for disillusionment, but might also have served as a bridge to forms of political leadership which could do without dynastic legitimacy. In its alliance with the national movement, the Hohenzollerns, and Wilhelm II in particular, were simultaneously forging and competing with this movement. The figure of the Kaiser was the focal point for national loyalty and served indirectly to create a space for national political communication. At the same time, and relatedly, the (democratic) potentials unleashed pointed beyond the dynasty. In the long run, the monarchy lost out. It did so due to the dramatic gap between Wilhelm II's national visions—the glorious times ('herrlich[e] Tag[e]') he promised—and the many shortcomings of his political performance.[66] But it also lost out because the German monarchy had to align itself more closely with an extremely dynamic national movement. Moreover, the immense integrative needs of the only recently unified and internally diverse German nation, which were partially projected onto the monarchy, overburdened the institution.

Was this thus a specifically Germany story? For the reasons given, the answer needs to be nuanced. After all, the monarchy placed itself and was placed—much more than other political institutions—in a European framework of comparison.[67] Attention on the German Kaiser was widespread outside Germany as well, albeit often with differing connotations. The fact that as soon as the First World War started the dynasty was pushed to the background reflected the ruler's inability to meet these expectations. But this fact also reflected the rise of a new, more radical nationalism. This strand of national identification questioned more decisively what the ruler had achieved for the nation. Ernst Jünger, the famous nationalist chronicler of the German front experience, for example, demanded that the monarch stand the test in military action himself.[68] Indeed, after the war, such comments escalated in the intense and long debates on Wilhelm II's 'desertion' and national betrayal.[69] Unsurprisingly, the topic of Wilhelm II's 'international descent' was also raised again by the nationalist camp and served as a confirmation that the Kaiser allegedly had never really felt nor acted as a German.[70]

During the First World War the Germans began to doubt quickly if Wilhelm II was still an adequate representative of their nation. In many respects, Hindenburg soon took over the public role of the monarch. The entente camp, however, did not hesitate about how to personalize the German enemy. This happened predominantly, and apparently effectively, through visually evoking the Kaiser. Thousands of caricatures, songs, and pamphlets portrayed a bearded monster with an eagle helmet, the *Beast of Berlin*, as an American film had it, and thus combined national characteristics and the dynasty more effectively than the Kaiser was ever able to do. Advertising lines like 'An Amazing Exposé of the Intimate Life of the Mad Dog of Europe' (for the film *The Beast of Berlin*) do not only testify to the dynamics of war propaganda but also to the global celebrity status of Wilhelm II, which was a precondition for the effectiveness of such propaganda. Overall, this combination reflected the transnational mechanisms in which an authoritarian monarchy was perceived not only as a symbol, but a logical consequence, of the detested German character.[71]

When, in 1917, the famous author H. G. Wells published his booklet *In the Fourth Year*, a staunch plea for erecting an anti-imperialist League of Nations to end the war and forestall future wars, he added a chapter on 'The Future of Monarchy'. He argued that the German Kaiser had not only unleashed the war, but had destroyed the 'Teutonic' monarchic system—based on marriages of families of mostly German descent—that

had dominated Europe throughout the nineteenth century. This system, he argued, was meant to maintain peace, but was structurally unable to do so due to its ties to German authoritarianism. As a consequence, Wells demanded a complete 'Anglicization' of the dynasty in Britain—which had rebranded itself 'Windsor' during the war—as a precondition for its survival: 'The security of the British monarchy lies in such a courageous severance of its destinies from the Teutonic dynastic system.' After all, Wells underlined, 'We have fought in this war for Belgium, for France, for general freedom, for civilization and the whole future of mankind, far more than for ourselves. We have not fought for a king.'[72]

Wells' argument re-emphasizes the need to understand the nationalization of dynasties and the influence of dynasties on nation building as a process that was not confined to a single country. This chapter has shown, for the example of Kaiser Wilhelm II, how the establishment of a mediatized monarchy generated a specifically intense fusion of the nation and dynasty. The dynamics unleashed in this process could not be controlled by the monarch and decisively contributed to the end of the monarchy in Germany.

NOTES

1. For the Italian example, see Chap. 3 by Amerigo Caruso in this volume.
2. For a particularly illustrative example, see Werner Greiling and Hagen Rüster (eds) (2013), *Reuß älterer Linie im 19. Jahrhundert. Das widerspenstige Fürstentum?*, Jena.
3. Edward Ross Dickinson (2008), 'The German Empire: An Empire?', *History Workshop Journal* 66, 129–62.
4. Robert Spät (2014), *Die 'polnische Frage' in der öffentlichen Diskussion im Deutschen Kaiserreich, 1894–1918*, Marburg.
5. Max Weber (1988), *Gesammelte politische Schriften*, ed. by Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen, 26, cited from Max Weber, *Selections in translation*, ed. by W.G. Runciman, Cambridge 1978, 266.
6. Elisabeth Fehrenbach (1969), *Wandlungen des deutschen Kaisergedankens (1871–1918)*, München, Wien, 28, 30–1; Frank Lorenz Müller (2011), *Our Fritz. Emperor Frederick III and the Political Culture of Imperial Germany*, Cambridge Mass., 88–92.

7. Werner K. Blessing (1979), 'Der monarchische Kult, politische Loyalität und die Arbeiterbewegung im deutschen Kaiserreich', in: Gerhard, A. Ritter (ed.), *Arbeiterkultur*, Meisenheim, 185–208.

8. Martin Kohlrausch (2005), *Der Monarch im Skandal. Die Logik der Massenmedien und die Transformation der wilhelminischen Monarchie*, Berlin, 26–33.

9. Müller (2011), 88–104.

10. See Thomas A. Kohut (1991), *Wilhelm II and the Germans. A Study in Leadership*, New York, Oxford, 127–31.

11. Martin Kohlrausch (2008), 'Zwischen Tradition und Innovation. Das Hofzeremoniell der wilhelminischen Monarchie', in: Andreas Biefang, Michael Epkenhans, and Klaus Tenfelde (eds), *Das politische Zeremoniell im Kaiserreich,* Bonn, 31–51.

12. Reinhard Alings (1996), *Monument und Nation. Das Bild vom Nationalstaat im Medium Denkmal – zum Verhältnis von Nation und Staat im deutschen Kaiserreich 1871–1918,* Berlin, New York.

13. Thomas Rohkrämer (1990), *Der Militarismus der 'kleinen Leute'. Die Kriegervereine im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871–1914*, München; Peter Sprengel (1991), *Die inszenierte Nation. Deutsche Festspiele 1813–1913*, Tübingen.

14. Fritz Schellack (1988), 'Sedan- und Kaisergeburtstagsfeste', in: Dieter Düding, Peter Friedemann, and Paul Münch (eds), *Öffentliche Festkultur. Politische Feste in Deutschland von der Aufklärung bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, Reinbek, 278–297; Frank Bösch (2008), 'Das Zeremoniell der Kaisergeburtstage', in: Andreas Biefang, Michael Epkenhans, and Klaus Tenfelde (eds), *Das politische Zeremoniell im Kaiserreich*, Bonn, 53–76.

15. Dieter Groh (1972), 'Cäsarismus, Napoleonismus, Bonapartismus, Führer, Chef, Imperialismus', in: Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland I*, Stuttgart, 726–71, here 764–71.

16. Karl Holl, Hans Kloft, and Gerd Fesser (2001), *Caligula – Wilhelm II. und der Cäsarenwahnsinn. Antikenrezeption und wilhelminische Politik am Beispiel des Caligula von Ludwig Quidde*, Bremen, 68, 108.

17. Alfred Kerr (1997), *Wo liegt Berlin? Briefe aus der Reichshauptstadt*, ed. by Günther Rühle, Berlin, 564.

18. Lookout (1912), 'Englands Weltherrschaft und die deutsche Luxusflotte', Berlin, 8, quoted in: Christian Fälschle (1991), *Rivalität als Prinzip. Die englische Demokratie im Denken des wilhelminischen Deutschland 1900–1914*, Frankfurt/Main, 180. For the more and more negative perception of Britsh parliamentarism see: Christoph Schönberger (1997), *Das Parlament im Anstaltsstaat. Zur Theorie parlamentarischer Repräsentation in der Staatsrechtslehre des Kaiserreichs (1871–1918)*, Frankfurt/Main, 282–3 and 291–3.

19. For the general mechanism of 'reading' the other country through the Emperor: Lothar Reinermann (2001), *Der Kaiser in England. Wilhelm II. und sein Bild in der britischen Öffentlichkeit,* Paderborn; Jan Rüger (2011), 'Revisiting the Anglo-German Antagonism', *Journal of Modern History* 83/3, 579–617.

20. Mark Hewitson (2001), 'The *Kaiserreich* in Question: Constitutional Crisis in Germany before the First World War', *Journal of Modern History* 73, 725–80, 726.

21. The arguments expressed in the following paragraphs are partially based on my article, Martin Kohlrausch (2010), 'The Workings of Royal Celebrity: Wilhelm II as Media Emperor', in Edward Berenson and Eva Giloi (eds), *Constructing Charisma: Celebrity, Fame, and Power in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, New York, 52–66.

22. Eva Giloi (2007), 'Royally Entertained: Visual Culture and the Experience of Monarchy in Wilhelmine Prussia', *Intellectual History Review*, 17, 203–24.

23. Martin Loiperdinger (1997), 'Kaiser Wilhelm II.: Der erste deutsche Filmstar', in: Thomas Koebner (ed.), *Idole des deutschen Films*, Munich, 41–53.

24. Alfred Hermann Fried (1905), *Kaiser werde modern!*, Berlin, 5.

25. Alfred Kerr (1997), *Wo liegt Berlin? Briefe aus der Reichshauptstad*, Berlin, 496.

26. Kerr (1997), 497.

27. John B. Thompson (2000), *Political Scandal. Power and Visibility in the Media Age*, Cambridge, 33–40.

28. Martin Kohlrausch (2009), 'Der Mann mit dem Adlerhelm. Wilhelm II. – Medienstar um 1900', in: Gerhard Paul (ed.), *Bilderatlas des 20. und beginnenden 21. Jahrhunderts*, vol. 1, Göttingen 2009, 68–75.

29. Gerhard Voigt (1975), 'Goebbels als Markentechniker', in: Fritz Haug (ed.), *Warenästhetik. Beiträge zur Diskussion, Weiterentwicklung und Vermittlung ihrer Kritik*, Frankfurt/Main, 231–60, here 234.

30. See Franziska Windt, Jürgen Luh, and Carsten Dilba (2005), *Die Kaiser und die Macht der Medien*, Berlin, 67–76.

31. Thompson (2000), 40.

32. Richard Williams (1997), *The Contentious Crown. Public Discussion of the British Monarchy in the Reign of Queen Victoria*, Aldershot, 7.

33. Otto Julius Bierbaum (1907), *Prinz Kuckuck. Leben, Taten, Meinungen und Höllenfahrt eines Wollüstlings*, Munich, 590 and 595; Rudolf Borchardt (1908), 'Der Kaiser', *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, 5, 1908, 237–52, here 240, 247; Thomas Mann (1909), *Königliche Hoheit*, Berlin 1909, 258.

34. Williams (1997) 14, 32–4. Generally: John Plunkett (2003), *Queen Victoria. First Media Monarch*, Oxford.

35. Antony Taylor (1997), *'Down with the Crown'. British Anti-monarchism and Debates about Royalty since 1790*. London, 28.

36. Benjamin Disraeli (1844), *Coningsby, or the New Generation*, Oxford, 266.

37. Plunkett (2003), 115. For Germany: Monika Wienfort (1993), *Monarchie in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Deutschland und England von 1640 bis 1848*, Göttingen, 163.

38. Maximilian Harden (1992), 'Monarchen-Erziehung', *Die Zukunft* 1, 625–32, 630 a.

39. See Kohlrausch (2005), 73–83.

40. Martin Kohlrausch (2010), 'Die Politik der Medien. Der Aufstieg der Massenmedien und das politische System in Deutschland und Großbritannien um 1900', in: Ute Daniel and Axel Schildt (eds), *Massenmedien im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Köln, 305–30.

41. Friedrich Naumann (1909), 'Das Königtum III', *Die Hilfe* 4 , 48–50.

42. Aristides (1909), *Der Kaiser und die Nation*. Leipzig, 7.

43. Roosevelt to the British historian Sir George O. Trevelyan, 1911, quoted in: Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase (2003), 'The uses of "friend-ship". The "personal regime" of Wilhelm II and Theodore Roosevelt, 1901–9', in: Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist (eds), *The Kaiser. New Research on Wilhelm II's Role in Imperial Germany*, Cambridge, 143–75, here 158.

44. Friedrich Wilhelm IV used speeches, but not in the political sense as Wilhelm II did. See the manifold examples in Michael A. Obst (2010), '*Einer nur ist Herr im Reiche'. Kaiser Wilhelm II. als politischer Redner*, Paderborn.
45. *Der Reichsbote*, 29. Oktober 1908.
46. Kohlrausch (2005), 238–43.
47. Kohlrausch (2005), 226.
48. *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, 27. Oktober 1907.
49. Maximilian Harden (1908), 'In usum delphini', *Die Zukunft*, 62, 73–7.
50. Ernst Horneffer (1909), 'Der Kaiser und die Nation III', *Die Tat,* I, 5, 279–291, 285.
51. Karl Kormann (1909), 'Zum 50. Geburtstag des Kaisers', *Akademische Blätter*, 23, 353–55, here 353.
52. Dieter Langewiesche (2013), *Die Monarchie im Jahrhundert Europas. Selbstbehauptung durch Wandel im 19. Jahrhundert*, Heidelberg.
53. For the background, see Manfred Hanisch (1989), 'Nationalisierung der Dynastien oder Monarchisierung der Nation? Zum Verhältnis von Monarchie und Nation in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert', in: Adolf M. Birke and Lothar Kettenacker (eds), *Bürgertum, Adel und Monarchie. Wandel der Lebensformen im Zeitalter des bürgerlichen Nationalismus*, München, 71–91.
54. See the examples in Kohlrausch (2005), 290–301.
55. Yves Cohen (2013), *Le siècle des chefs. Une histoire transnationale du commandement et de l'autorité*, Paris. Moritz Föllmer (2014), 'Leadership in Modern Times – Reflections on Yves Cohen's Le siècle des chefs', *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*, 2/1, 65–81.
56. Friedrich Meinecke (1913), 'Deutsche Jahrhundertfeier und Kaiserfeier', *Logos* 4, 161–75.
57. Hermann Oncken, *Der Kaiser und die Nation*, Heidelberg 1913, 16.
58. Daniel Frymann (i.e. Hinrich Class) (1912), '*Wenn ich der Kaiser wär'. Politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten*, Leipzig.
59. Ernst von Reventlow (1906), *Kaiser Wilhelm II. und die Byzantiner*, Berlin, 39.
60. Rudolf Martin, *Kaiser Wilhelm II. und König Edward VII*, Leipzig 1907, 31.

61. Anonym (1906), *Unser Kaiser und sein Volk. Deutsche Sorgen. Von einem Schwarzseher*, Freiburg, Leipzig, 85.

62. Aristides (1909), 5.

63. Jan Rüger (2007), *The Great Naval Game. Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire*, Cambridge.

64. Speech of Emperor William II for the Opening of the 2nd Session of the Reichstag, 4 August 1914, in: (1916) *Verhandlungen des Reichstags.* XIII. Legislaturperiode, II. Session, vol. 306, Stenographische Berichte, Reichstagsprotokolle, Berlin, 2, http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt_k13_bsb00003402_00013.html, accessed 4 October 2016.

65. Carl Techet (1913), *Völker, Vaterländer und Fürsten. Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung Europas*, München, 441.

66. Speech on the occassion of the Brandenburg Provincial Diet, 24 February 1892, cited from Johannes Penzler (ed.) (1897), *Die Reden Kaiser Wilhelm II. in den Jahren 1888–1895*, vol. 1, Leipzig, 208–9, here 209.

67. Daniel Schönpflug (2013), *Die Heiraten der Hohenzollern. Verwandtschaft, Politik und Ritual in Europa 1640–1918*, Göttingen; Johannes Paulmann (2000), *Pomp und Politik. Monarchenbegegnungen zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg*, Paderborn.

68. See e.g. Ernst Jünger (1922), *Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis*, Berlin, 52.

69. Kohlrausch (2005), 346–61.

70. Erwin Wulff (1918), *Die persönliche Schuld Wilhelms II. Ein zeitgemäßer Rückblick*, Dresden, 40–2.

71. See the manifold telling examples in Paul van Damme (2013), *Vriend over Vijand. De Grote Oorlog in Spotpringen*, Tielt.

72. Herbert George Wells (1918), *In the Fourth Year*, London, 86–95.

The Comparative Endurance and Legacy of Morocco's Royal Nation

David Mednicoff

Introduction

If royal nations in the form of ruling monarchies seem passé, Islamic legitimation has proven significant for contemporary political systems in the Arab world. The notion that a postcolonial government needed to pass muster as 'Islamic' might have seemed archaic in the ashes of the premodern caliphate and the Ottoman Empire a mere 50 years ago. Yet Arab efforts to frame national identity largely in non-religious terms foundered for political reasons that had to do with the highly authoritarian nature and tactics of most colonial and postcolonial Arab governments. In the wake of secular Arab nationalist leaders like Egypt's Gamal abd-el-Nasser, the late 1970s ushered in an ongoing era of Arab politics in which political contestation framed around Islam is central.

Remarkably, the Arab political systems that currently appear most stable are monarchies, and, more specifically, monarchies that have tied their nationalist ideology persistently to Islamic symbols and regime forms. Morocco, the Arab world's western terminus, has deployed this strategy arguably most successfully. While Moroccan politics have included state

D. Mednicoff (✉)
University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Amherst, MA, USA

coercion, Islamic political framing has been too constant to be ignored. What is the nature and political legacy of Morocco's Islamic royal nation?

This chapter addresses this question directly. While it was by no means inevitable that the Moroccan monarchy would endure as the country's prime postcolonial political institution, its conscious branding by the nationalist elite as the symbol of authentic political identity in the 1940s and 1950s gave it space to reinvent itself. This, in turn, allowed the succession of Morocco's three postcolonial kings to reconfigure Islamic political symbols for prophylaxis against the level of Islamist opposition and interrelated government repression that have marred recent politics in most Arab states.

I proceed below to discuss the tendentious origins of the modern Moroccan state, highlighting how the postcolonial monarchy injected Islamic symbolism and pluralism into its constitutions and general politics to help its control, to consider possible transnational dimensions, and to ponder its broader relevance. The overall thrust of this discussion is neither to praise nor bury Morocco's Islamist monarchy, but rather to interrogate the possible contemporary relevance of political identity based on an official triad of 'God, the Nation, the King'.

The Phenomenon: An Unexpected Contemporary Islamist Monarchy?

When Morocco moved towards independence from the French following the Second World War, nationalist activists hardly suspected that postcolonial politics would centre around a ruling king.[1] Through a peculiar anticolonial struggle, the form of which was hardly inevitable, Muhammed V, the occupant of Morocco's long-ruling 'Alawi dynasty, became the symbol of national independence for his country, reinvigorating, and re-Islamicizing, what easily could have been an antiquated polity.

The 'Alawi dynasty began in 1672, continuing a series of patrilineal dynasties that had kept Morocco mostly autonomous from Middle Eastern-based Arab or Ottoman rule. The 'Alawis developed a style of rule based on fusing two strands of Islamic affiliation common in precolonial Morocco. On the one hand, each 'Alawi as a *sharif*, a descendant of the prophet Muhammed, combined aristocratic and religious status. Conversely, the 'Alawis incorporated into their pattern of rule rituals of obedience from elites drawn from folk religious traditions revolving

around saintly figures. This dual Islamic legitimation may have served the dynasty well before French colonialism, but seemed an unlikely basis for a modern nation.

This comported with the apparent French perspective during the colonial period. The formal French mechanism for taking control of Morocco in 1912 was a Protectorate treaty between France and the 'Alawi sultan that left the latter formally in control. The French left the 'Alawis in titular charge of Morocco with little evident concern that the old dynasty threatened their interests. Until the outbreak of popular Moroccan anti-colonial sentiment, the 'Alawi sultans cooperated with French rule.

A French historian during the colonial period summed up what must have seemed a sage assessment of the dynasty's weakness:

> This politics, turned towards the past in its methods and narrow present in its goals, prevented any large plan or future vision. 'Alawite Morocco was unable to take advantage of its final period of total isolation to reform itself. Despite its continuity, adroitness and specific merits, this impoverished conservative politics could not result in anything but failures.[2]

If French colonial ideology and history discredited the idea that Moroccan national identity existed before the Protectorate,[3] the "'Alawi' formula for political legitimation had not created an unbreakable bond among Moroccans. There seemed little reason to believe that a precolonial, premodern dynasty held relevance in the twentieth century. That is, until the aged dynasty earned a new lease on life. As in other anti-colonial struggles, a mass political party coordinated Morocco's independence struggle. The *Istiqlal* (Independence) Party naturally sought a symbol in its early organization stages in the 1930s to focus Moroccans' frustration with the French and willingness to push for their ouster. Because the 'Alawi sultanate's actual power seemed unthreatening to the Istiqlal, it publicized Sultan Muhammed, to exemplify how France subordinated indigenous Moroccan symbols.

Yet Sultan Muhammed, as well as the Istiqlal, gained boldness after the Second World War. If the French evinced little postwar intention of leaving Morocco easily, the Istiqlal agitated vocally for full independence. The 'Alawi sultan joined these calls expressing increasingly open public sympathy with the Istiqlal. Unable to dominate the 'Alawi they had appointed as their symbolic source of local legitimacy, French officials deposed Sultan Muhammed in August of 1953, claiming that a rural Moroccan *sharif* had

spearheaded a populist revolt against Muhammed's authority. The French move to replace the sultan came after assiduous efforts to imprison or exile most of the Istiqlal's leadership. But these French actions only served to enrage Moroccans and to infuse greater popular legitimacy into the now-martyred Sultan Muhammed, whose exile was portrayed by the Istiqlal as a symbol of the repressed dignity and autonomy of the Moroccan people. The independence struggle intensified into a series of religious protests, economic boycotts, and armed attacks.

The Sultan's deposition and exile created a symbolic focal point for Moroccan nationalism, concretizing Istiqlali efforts to build up Muhammed's image as the essence of Morocco's independence hopes, although party members assumed the sultanate had little place in postcolonial governance. The Istiqlal depicted its campaign to end Muhammed's forced deposition as the 'revolution of the king and the people'.[4] Meanwhile, France faced a much more violent situation in its colony to the east, Algeria, which it was determined to hold. Retaining Morocco as a French Protectorate in light of the solidity of Moroccans' opposition was no longer an option for an overtaxed postwar French system.

The French began negotiations with Muhammed, culminating in the sultan's triumphant return to his homeland on 16 November, 1955, and full Moroccan independence the following March. Muhammed's return from exile was a landmark of twentieth-century Moroccan history, and the power of symbolic politics more generally. According to one scholar, 'rejoicing nearly reduced the country to anarchy.'[5] Stepping forth from one of his palaces, Muhammed was greeted by crowds numbering over a million.[6] He praised God and thanked his people for their fidelity, striking a complex mélange of nationalism, religion, and paternalism that would become major leitmotifs of the soon-to-be king and his sons who succeeded him.

The 'Alawi dynasty was back with new life and mass support. But would it be able to govern a newly independent postcolonial state? Now king, Muhammed V wasted little time theorizing an answer. He moved quickly to establish ruling authority, ceding little to the Istiqlal party, and using his symbolic popularity to build on prior French political centralization during the colonial period. The new Moroccan king built on three legacies from French rule to ground political control. First, the French, and concurrent Istiqlali, strategy of assuming the legitimacy of the 'Alawi dynasty helped the status of a member of that dynasty determined to actually govern, especially after the French exile that amplified his symbolic legitimacy. Muhammed V's second legacy from French rule

was the Protectorate officials' governance tactics of co-opting and dividing local political elites. French rulers consistently deployed this strategy, which built on less explicit precolonial 'Alawi patterns of rule. Ironically, the postcolonial Moroccan king's third legacy from the French was the strong nationalist sentiment Moroccans shared because of Protectorate officials' mistakes in their actual practice of 'divide and rule'. These mistakes, including Muhammed's exile, aided the Istiqlal's ability to mobilize Moroccans under its broad independence banner.

If French colonialism's legacy helped Muhammed V consolidate authority, Morocco's comparatively peaceful independence struggle provided an incentive for good relations with France. This is significant in that the ruling monarchy, which Muhammed and his successors institutionalized, fused centralized control drawn from postwar French Republics, and revitalized Islamic rule in a series of modern constitutional documents that represented joint Franco-Moroccan effort.

Moroccan constitutionalism was a major component of the reign of Muhammed V's successor, son Hassan II. When Morocco's 'authentic popular hero'[7] died unexpectedly in 1961 from complications after surgery, his 31-year-old heir faced long odds for ruling monarchs who were losing their thrones throughout postcolonial Africa and Asia. Yet Hassan consolidated his rule, remained in power for 38 years until his death, and passed on without challenge political power to his son, who has ruled the country for over 16 years as King Muhammed VI.

Thus, Morocco's monarchy consolidated control through strategies that built both on mistakes and remnants of French rule. Basically, the king fused contemporary state institution-building, constitutionalism, and coercion, but with Islamic symbolic political manipulation (henceforth SPM) as a common thread.[8] The next section elaborates Morocco's ongoing Islamist nationalism, as it has grown and faced changing socio-political conditions in the Middle East and beyond.

'God, the Nation, the King': Morocco's Nationalist Glue

When Muhammed V died, postcolonial regimes eschewed kings in favour of secular military or party-based systems. Morocco in 1961 was dominated by both institutions, with military leaders and Istiqlal and splinter party elites building themselves up to dominate the country's politics. New king Hassan had both strong party and military leaders to contend

with in the first 15 years of his rule; his father had only partially weakened the Istiqlal during his brief rule. Hassan almost lost his throne, and his life, in coup attempts from 1971 to 1972.

Despite this, the legacy of comparatively non-violent transition from French colonialism, and Western powers' predilection towards connecting with countries that eschewed a non-aligned or state-managed socialist agenda, intensified ties between Morocco and Paris, as well as other Western capitals, under Hassan II, who allied with the West early into his reign.[9] This, in turn, built on legacies of French colonialism noted above and helped Hassan to streamline control. Morocco's steady links to Western powers allowed easy movement for both people and goods between Morocco and Europe. It also lessened the unpredictability and coercion that characterized Arab governments with bolder anti-Western nationalist ideologies and low integration to the global economy, such as Egypt, Iraq, or Syria.

Hassan II hardly eschewed coercion.[10] Indeed, his first decades of rule are known as the 'years of lead' for the assassinations, arrests, notorious political prisons, and other forms of intimidation against anti-monarchical activists, which increased after the coup attempts of the early 1970s. Morocco's secure relations with France and other Western powers featured steady economic and political links to the monarchy, facilitating government coercion.

Links to Morocco's closest Western ally had a softer political influence in helping the Moroccan king formalize his regime. Complementing the throne's use of coercion against leftist and army challengers, the top-down promulgation of a series of constitutions approved by popular referendum codified the monarchy's power in a manner that drew from France. The French constitution of 1958 that influenced Morocco's first postcolonial constitution, through the means of French and French-trained jurists among the king's advisors, shared a strong executive, a Parliament with restricted power, and an emphasis on citizen referenda as a means of limiting elected officials' power.[11] In short, Morocco adapted, with French expert help, a constitutional skeleton that, in its centralized and semi-presidential nature, could accommodate a strong king, analogous to France's president, ruling alongside a weaker prime minister.

Onto this recognizably European constitutional skeleton, Hassan and his advisors added Islamist national flesh that merged Western politico-legal forms with reinvented religio-nationalist norms. In effect, the Moroccan constitution of 1962 and its successors under Hassan (1970, 1972, 1992,

and 1996) adapted France's dual-authority semi-presidentialism to set up a king and parallel government. Simultaneously, the document attempted to stack the system in the king's favour by investing him with nationalist and religious authority.

Constitutional provisions that fused nationalism, Islam and the monarchy, and a broad insertion of the monarchy into Moroccan political life, include first of all the designation of the country's official slogan as 'God, the Nation, the King'. Further parts were the innovation for a postcolonial state of the claim that the king is the 'Commander of the Faithful' (*amir-el-mu'minin*, a term for the head of the premodern Arab Islamic political community); the inviolability of the king and his status as the state's main representative; the established provision for patrilineal succession; the king's powers to conduct foreign relations, promulgate law, and declare a state of emergency; his authority over the cabinet and the army; and his ability to pardon convicted criminals.

These considerable royal powers not only put the monarchy at the centre of Moroccan political power, but connected it to Islam. Article 19 of the set of constitutions in place under Hassan II[12] summarizes these various themes well:

> The King, Commander of the Faithful (*amir el-mu'minin*), supreme representative of the nation, guarantor of the eternity and the continuity of the State, supervises respect for Islam and the Constitution. He is the protector of rights and freedoms for citizens, social groups and mass organizations.

Hassan II did not simply add royal powers to the French-inspired constitutions he promulgated to sacralize a contemporary polity. He worked to institutionalize and routinize the Islamic side of the Moroccan monarchy. Using the term *amir el-mu'minin* was a step in this direction; it was not something that other Arab leaders dared. Hassan II coupled this with concrete scheduled symbolic events, including sacrificing a ram on behalf of the Moroccan nation for a major annual Islamic holiday; holding a formal allegiance (*bey'a*) ceremony in which representative elites renew their fealty to the throne garbed in white ceremonial robes; presiding over religious conferences (the 'Hassanian lectures') during the holy month of Ramadan; and underscoring his dynasty's continuity from 1672 and descent from the Prophet Muhammed. Hassan's efforts to imbue his throne with quasi-religious, neo-papal legitimacy only increased after the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts.

Indeed, in the wake of these challenges, the Moroccan king undertook his broadest effort to unite in large swaths of the population the fusion he developed of neo-religious sentiment, nationalism, and monarchy. In 1974, Spain began pulling out of territories it had occupied in the Western Sahara desert south-west of Morocco that would be subject to a United Nations (UN) referendum and possible self-determination. Not only did these territories have potentially valuable coastline and phosphate deposits, they could be argued to be historically Moroccan.

As soon as the Spanish raised the issue of what might become of the territories, Hassan II, emphasizing his role as the head of the country's foreign policy, mobilized the Moroccan elite around the need for Moroccan control over the Western Sahara. This was a prelude to whipping the country into a nationalist frenzy around retaking the Western Sahara for Morocco, culminating in a bold mass-mobilization that served a dual goal of encumbering international efforts to keep the territories free of Moroccan control and associating the monarchy with a quasi-sacred nationalist cause, as in 1956. With careful coordination of national and local officials, Hassan paved the way for a group of 350,000 Moroccans from throughout the country to embody Morocco's determination to annex the Western Sahara by walking from south-western Morocco to the territorial frontier en masse. The number was chosen in principle because it represented the number of Moroccans born each year at the time, and in practice, because it was perhaps the largest group that could be sustained.[13] Hassan chose the colour green, symbolizing Islam, further fusing nationalism and faith.

The 1975 Green March included more than 350,000 Moroccans, accompanied by 20,000 soldiers. The marchers arrived in the territories without incident, and with the rapt attention of Moroccans and much global media; Hassan then ordered them to turn back. With this clear demonstration of Moroccan national will, the Spanish withdrew from the Western Sahara with a vague self-determination formula that put off a planned referendum until Morocco could participate in organizing it. In practice, this left the area a combat zone, with Moroccan troops entering immediately, and eventually establishing Moroccan de facto control after a bloody, long-standing conflict. The Green March is acknowledged within Morocco as a pivotal point in the regime's history.[14] By launching it, Hassan followed his father's model—he found a nationalist cause that he himself could embody. Soon after the king focused Moroccans' attention

on the Western Sahara, government-sponsored media began referring to Hassan as 'the Reunifier'; 5 November became an annual national holiday.

Much of the power of the Green March as mass political theatre came from the king's conscious choice of an action that would amplify several central features of Moroccan popular identity. Obviously, the march was strong SPM, pushing Moroccans who had experienced first-hand the struggle for independence to act out the event of recovering territory from European occupiers. Hassan overlaid territorial nationalism with Islamic identity and role-playing. Not only did Green March participants carry Qur'ans; many draped themselves with parchment containing Qur'anic verses or national flags. By physically dressing up as Islam beating back the Western invaders or Morocco liberating itself from modern imperialism, marchers embodied central religious and nationalist tropes. It is thus not surprising that, for some, the march's success had religious significance,[15] which state media linked to Hassan's constitutional status as head of Moroccan Islam.

The Green March helped restabilize, and perhaps resacralize, the Moroccan monarchy, after over a decade of secular party and military plots against it. Yet the regime's Islamic self-inflation was not a claim that the country's politics were a theocratic throwback to an earlier era. Islamic SPM was instead part of a broader political theory of contemporary monarchy that, according to the king, combined traditional local legitimacy with the attributes of Western democratic theory. Hassan defended his claim to be Commander of the Faithful as a religio-political social contract. He discussed this claim in a book intended for Moroccan and French elites, as follows:

> The commitment of the Commander of the Believers is to protect and promote the law, conforming to its letter in religious matters and conforming faithfully to its principles for worldly affairs. On the other hand, on the part of the believers, the contract of allegiance expects their fidelity and obedience to the person who holds legitimate authority. This is conditioned on the ruler's satisfaction of the criteria connected to his method of designation and to his demonstration of the capacity to carry out the duties of his mission. […] The Commander of the Faithful must watch over the proper function of institutions.[16]

Hassan claimed to have adapted this theory from classical Islamic jurisprudence:

This [set of duties just enumerated] corresponds to the list of duties established by classical jurists, a list which encompasses maintaining the religion within the limits of principles fixed by a consensus of the most ancient Muslims. These principles are to defend the nation, to build respect for and apply law, to watch over public morality, to watch over the proper execution of court rulings, to expect competence of everyone in public administration, to keep abreast of economic politics and finance in order to encourage a spirit of morality in business and to discourage obstacles to personal initiative. Thus, my duties are those of a chief of state.[17]

While eliding classical Islamic political theory and his throne's legitimacy, Hassan also connects his politics of an Islamic state (*imamate*) to Western social contract theory:

The contract of the imamate is more comprehensive than the historical types of contracts thought up by theorists like Locke, Hobbes or Rousseau. These revitalized ideas, renewed today notably by John Rawls and the discussions around his Theory of Justice, don't embrace the broader aspects of the contract of the imamate. This is even the case if one concedes a richer social understanding of these ideas, taking into account modern political thinking on the classical theorists. The important distinction is in the area of the *bey'a*, a reciprocal contract between the Emir and the community of believers. It is a contract of mutual confidence, which establishes institutions along with promoting peace and equity. We have at our disposal the same procedures of the rule of law. Yet Islam […] makes use of a law independent of human power and doesn't grant sovereign power to anyone, since God is the only Sovereign. This bilateral contract that I've just invoked, a contract of allegiance, creates a state under the ambit of law, the sense and direction of which is determined by jurists.[18]

Hassan's arguments suggest a deliberate effort to situate the regime in an idea of kingship that functions on both quasi-religious and contemporary secular political registers. Such an effort, pursued through state bureaucracy and coercion, helped sustain a monarchy that corresponded somewhat with Moroccans' self-image of bridging the Arab world and the West, in turn appearing palatable to Western leaders. Indeed, this latter point helps explain the monarchy's determination to be explicitly constitutional.

If the regime's political theory fits somewhat with secular government, its Islamic dimensions have provided insulation from, and enabled the regime to justify forceful tactics against, anti-state Islamist political activ-

ism that has characterized Arab politics increasingly in recent decades. Morocco never faced the level of Islamic opposition that provoked Algeria's civil war or massive state crackdowns in Tunisia or Egypt. Rather, Islamist movements were either repressed before they could become large, co-opted into broader politics, or, more recently, allowed to emerge as the country's governing party.

In all cases, the king has retained political control. The failure of Islamist movements to destabilize the regime could have had mostly to do with the monarchy's constant Islamic self-legitimation, its security institutions, or Morocco's broader pattern of political party competition because of its French-style dual authority system.[19] Either way, the monarchy has not faced an existential threat from Islamists, and largely avoided the pattern of increasing repression from the early 2000s into the 2011 uprisings of its Arab peers, despite its potentially vulnerable transition from Hassan II to Muhammed VI after the former's death in 1999.

Along with resort to coercion when necessary to solidify control, and fusing non-religious and Islamic nationalism, the Moroccan monarchy's use of political pluralism has been among its signal features. The regime has permitted the widest range of political parties and unions of any postcolonial pre-2011 Arab state. Yet Moroccan multi-partyism has not decreased the monarchy's self-ascribed centrality, largely because of the motivation and tactics it pursued with respect to party pluralism.

Since the Istiqlal was both Morocco's pre-eminent anti-colonial movement and the major threat to 'Alawi postcolonial primacy, Hassan followed his father Muhammed V's lead in seeking to water down the party's influence. This turned into a longer-term strategy of maintaining party pluralism by (1) co-opting parties with autonomous bases of support like the Istiqlal, and (2) fostering the emergence of political parties of expedience consisting of elites beholden to the regime. The consistency of this royal strategy during the nearly four decades of Hassan's rule meant that autonomous parties lost credibility over time and parties of convenience generally dissipated and were recreated. Thus, numbers of Moroccan political organizations have been high but their salience low.

Hassan II was able to achieve this strategy of managed pluralism not only by dividing the political elite, but also by taking advantage of the dual political system he established constitutionally, and making broad appeals to Moroccans to rise above politics. The constancy of this theme in his speeches coincided with media, at least tolerated by the throne, which poked fun of political figures and portrayed them as self-serving.[20]

The combined effect of broad cynicism towards particular political figures and central strategies of political divisiveness reinforced an odd duality in which Moroccan parties and Parliament have been perhaps the most open and long-standing in the Arab world, while never posing any real challenge to the king's authority. French-inspired constitutionalism, direct royal appeals to quasi-sacred status within a secular polity, and a history of controlled dual-authority multi-party political pluralism have thus combined to reinforce Morocco's ruling monarchy.

A Revitalized, Reinvented Ruling Monarchy in Morocco: What Kind of Royal Nation?

A common frame for analysing the world's few remaining ruling monarchies is that they are archaic and dying forms of government, as Samuel Huntington argued decades ago, and with particular reference to Morocco.[21] This is based implicitly on a model of political evolution derived from Western Europe, where ruling monarchs gave way to parliamentary democracies, and the USA, where an elected president emerged after an anti-monarchical revolution. If the inevitable decline of ruling monarchs is a starting point, remaining kings need to be explained as exceptions. Given the Middle Eastern concentration of remaining ruling monarchies, this may suggest ideas of Arab cultural exceptionalism or, in the Gulf region, oil wealth-funded political apathy to an outmoded form of government.

Perhaps a less Western-centric approach is that Arab monarchies like Morocco satisfy political functions or processes, such as postcolonial state-building or strategic planning, that regimes more generally have deployed for survival.[22] Yet one can take a step further and ask what a reinvented ruling monarchy like Morocco's says about comparative political history more broadly, if we deploy it as a model for generalization, rather than as an exception to be explained. Asking the question this way neither endorses the system nor turns a blind eye to the coercive and contingent way that modern Moroccan 'Alawis realized renewed political control.

In terms of what the Moroccan monarchy suggests about royal and other political history more broadly, the system's recent legacy is enlightening. In the 16 years that Muhammed VI has ruled Morocco as its third postcolonial king, three major socio-political developments stand out, in comparison with other Arab states. These are (1) the regime's relative continued resilience, (2) the period of public stock-taking for some of

Hassan II's human rights abuses, and (3) an increase in civil rights for Morocco's women and indigenous (Berber) people.

The starting point for possible lessons from a still-ruling monarchy like Morocco's is its continued survival after the seismic regional events of 2011. Unlike the oil monarchies, Muhammed VI had no major financial incentives to offer millions of Moroccans at the moment in which socio-political discontent with economically challenged authoritarian systems throughout the Arab world exploded.

Nonetheless, the king could take stock in one accomplishment in his first decade of power, a reduction in Morocco's overall poverty rate from 16.2 to less than 9 per cent of the population, no small achievement in a country of over 30 million people and no petrodollars.[23] Neither poverty reduction, nor Muhammed VI's self-applied symbolic title of 'King of the Poor', stopped inequality between haves and have-nots, or a stratospheric growth of the monarchy's wealth, with little public accountability.[24] At the same time, the main Arab uprising states, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, lacked Morocco's level of tangible progress against poverty in the run-up to 2011.

The king did face significant protests and calls for greater separation of powers soon after Tunisia and Egypt overthrew their leaders. In response, he promulgated a new constitution and submitted it to a national referendum, as his father had done. This 2011 constitution, unlike earlier ones, was exclusively a product of Moroccan advisors, but retained its earlier emphasis on connecting contemporary power and quasi-traditional sacred status in the monarchy. To deter challenges to the king's actual political power, the 2011 constitution separates the king's religious and political functions into two distinct articles, where previously they had been one. Several years after the new constitution, the monarchy appears to have weathered the 2011 storm. The Arab world has snapped back into a pattern of reaction, rather than revolution, where many fear civil war and massive misery as in Syria. This is not to say that all Moroccans favour the monarchy's present level of control, but instead that the monarchy continues to be a central, generally accepted core of the government.

The monarchy's resilience has been based on two sets of initiatives around political accountability and pluralism that elucidate Morocco's potential comparative lessons. One initiative happened early in Muhammed VI's reign, when the king provided the first example in the Arab world of a public accounting for past human rights abuses. In 2004 and 2005,

Morocco's Equity and Reconciliation Commission determined the status of 742 individuals who were subject to strong coercion under Hassan II's reign, compensating their families in most instances. While the commission, known as the IER, did not name, or pursue prosecutions against, individual state agents, its existence represented the first instance of a political system in the contemporary Arab world admitting accountability for rights abuses. This was remarkable given that the IER was not investigating a prior political system, but the previous ruler of the system in place. The IER showed that the king could retain control, but use his political resources to distance himself both from leaders outside of the royal family, and even, selectively, from his father.

The IER functioned in a broader environment of managed political rights that also encompassed improved status for women and the country's indigenous linguistic and ethnic Berber peoples. This happened through two major sets of legal reforms, the *mudawwana* change in 2004, and gradual steps to legalize and embrace Amazigh, the dominant Berber language, from 2001 onwards. Similar to the IER, Morocco's family code reform is unique both in its demonstration of a controlled pluralistic process and its outcome in comparison to other Arab states. In response to mobilization by women's and other activist groups against Morocco's paternalistic marriage and other conservative Islamic family practices, the king felt pressured to oversee a major overhaul in the country's family code. The reform process, which resulted in more egalitarian protections for women in marriage and divorce, and made polygyny more difficult, notably brought together religious and non-religious activist groups.[25]

These significant legal changes early in Muhammed VI's reign paralleled changes in cultural and linguistic pluralism. Since the French attempted unsuccessfully to shore up their colonial authority in the 1930s by dividing Morocco's indigenous non-Arabic speaking Berbers from the Arab urban elites, Morocco's politics of Berber identity have been tricky. The nationalist movement united its primarily urban-based Arab leaders with influential Berbers from the more rural parts of Morocco; yet the latter sided with the monarchy in post-1956 politics, given their concern around excessive Arabization and urban influence. Hassan II worked constantly to co-opt Berbers, while also pushing the image of a united, variegated, national culture. Despite this, demands for official recognition of Berber language and culture percolated, alarming a political system aware of the combustible nature of Berber-Arab politics in neighbouring Algeria.[26] In this context, Muhammed VI acted quickly after assuming the throne to stay ahead of

the Berber issue, by endorsing Amazigh as a key component of Moroccan identity in a 2001 speech, and creating in 2002 a large national centre to foster and manage Amazigh culture. Following the institutionalization of this well-funded centre, Amazigh became an official language of instruction in elementary schools in 2003. The monarchy's politics of co-option did not forestall autonomous Berber activism, in the form of a Berber party that was founded with Amazigh in its name, contrary to a national law prohibiting parties with ethnic titles. Although this party, the PDAM, was suppressed, regime concerns about possible Berber anti-state activism as the Arab uprisings began helped fuel a significant addition to the 2011 constitution. Article 5 reads: 'Amazigh constitutes an official language of the State, in its status as common heritage to all Moroccans without exception.'[27]

What do Morocco's recent comparative regional successes in political stability, past regime accountability, and marginal increase in plural rights suggest of possibly general value with respect to Morocco's contemporary royal nation? Three lessons stand out. These are the Moroccan monarchy's comparative political resources that help explain its relative pluralism, the transnational contributions to, and appeal of, the monarchy, and the irony of this transnational appeal in a contemporary age that tends to regard the royal nation as passé.

On the first issue of 'Alawi resources, the utility of an analytical frame such as the royal nation lies in its sidestep of a one-dimensional, if common, view of the Moroccan regime as either anti-democratic or optimally stable. A focus on the monarchy as a set of contingent, accumulated, contested political resources underscores that the royal nation is dynamic, rather than either culturally essential or repressively artificial. Prime among the Moroccan monarchy's comparative political resources is enhanced access to claims of historical continuity. The presumption of legitimacy for the core of a polity that traces its roots back hundreds of years is not unique to Morocco's monarchy, but applies to countries like the UK and the USA. One of the signal features of a contemporary royal nation, then, may be that the significance of the throne is not that distinct from a non-ruling monarch, or a long-standing constitution, in a Western country. In all three cases, an established political structure's long-term continuity may help stabilize a contemporary polity, even if the continuity is symbolic and contestable. Another key facet of the Moroccan monarchy's political resources is its status as the dominant partner in the country's dual authority system. By distancing itself from elected parliaments and ministers, the

throne preserves the idea that it acts in the best interests of the country overall, even as it hoards power. In this, it is again similar to other polities that maintain a relatively unaccountable piece of authority that is wielded ostensibly in the broad public interest, such as the unelected federal court system in the USA. Of course, even if it has evinced a gradual political loosening in the past 50 years, the Moroccan monarchy's accumulated power is far from democratic. It is, rather, a relative political constant that has resorted frequently to blaming particular policies on parties or people in the elected legislature, thereby increasing its room to manoeuvre.

The Moroccan throne portrays the country as a royal nation, and itself as the institution that embodies the overall national interest and the interest of national Islam. With the self-aggrandizing contrast it has drawn consistently between itself and the more parochial loyalties of political parties, it has also been strategic about pluralism and diversity. In other words, the Moroccan monarchy's ability in the dual authority system to pivot across fixed ideological or partisan positions, coupled with its natural tendency to co-opt potentially challenging groups, have facilitated championing the rights of less dominant groups, such as religious minorities, Berbers, and women. In comparative Arab terms, this throne-based pluralism has spared Morocco much of the violence, extreme coercion, and segmentalism that is notable in countries like Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon, respectively. Moreover, comparatively greater pluralism also occurs in Jordan and many Arab oil monarchies, and contrasts with the instability and violence of the non-monarchies more generally. Thus, Morocco may not be unique in the advantage its throne enjoys of depicting itself as acting in the broad national interest in the context of having a counterweight in an alternative elected political authority.

As discussed earlier, Morocco's dual political authority stems in language and structure, if not particular monarchical content, from France's Fifth Republic system. This is part of a broader phenomenon of Morocco's transnational political connections, which are both attracted by and supportive of the royal system. Despite Western powers' professed preference for democratic political systems, they have often allied with authoritarian rulers. In particular, both the UK and France had a practice during colonialism of recruiting, as in Jordan, or retaining, as in Morocco, kings as a personal focal point for power, whom they expected to control. While this strategy backfired in Morocco, postcolonial Western governments continued to connect to Middle Eastern monarchs, perhaps because royal

regimes resembled superficially Western political systems past and present to a much greater extent than military juntas.

Whether or not monarchies comprise a familiar political touchstone to Western powers, the latter have maintained consistent ties to these political systems. This, in turn, had benefits in terms of financial help, security, global flows across the Mediterranean, and minimal Western responses to rogue transnational behaviour, such as Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara following the Green March. Among other things, Morocco's long-term links to Europe have accorded it more favourable status vis-à-vis the European Union, and generally higher levels of aid, than other Mediterranean Arab states.[28] Similarly, the long-term nature of US relations with 'Alawi Morocco, often claimed as the first political system to recognize the USA, involves a range of consistent commitments and strategic partnerships.[29]

Western country involvement in Morocco has also meant that Western-based transnational economic organizations, like the International Monetary Fund, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), like human rights movements, have pushed for intrusive reforms. While such international pressure may be bothersome or constraining for a country like Morocco, the level of pressure may suggest a deeper reason for the West's long-term engagement in Morocco, one that Western leaders themselves may not realize, but which relates to Morocco as a royal nation.

The point is that it is tempting for Western social science thinking, and international NGO's based in the West, to adopt a frame for political development based on Western history. This helps provide a leitmotif for organizations like the World Bank's emphasis on free market reforms projected from Western economic history or Amnesty International's traditional focus on civil and political rights. If Western models of development are an implicit reference point for dominant Western transnational relations, then it stands to reason that a ruling monarchy is recognizable as a political form from many Western country's histories. Implicitly, the ease of seeing in a regime like Morocco's prior stages on the road to contemporary Western politics may help solidify mutual bonds, in contrast to military regimes like Egypt's and, particularly, more blatantly theocratic polities like Iran. Given this, Morocco's earlier adoption of a constitutional model linked to contemporary France, but reiterating aspects of France's royal past, could be especially cogent in contextualizing the link between these polities.

In any case, Morocco's strong connections to Western countries have enmeshed the country in transnational networks and dependence. The country has relied for decades on its numbers of expatriate workers in Europe; this long-standing connection to Europe has also led to a complex set of identity issues across generations of Moroccans and Moroccan Europeans. Yet, in the midst of Moroccans' diverse embeddedness in the global economy, the nature of the royal nation continues to foster flare-ups in nationalist ideology, such as widespread domestic opposition in early 2016 to the UN Secretary General's implication that the Western Saharan territories are not indisputably Morocco's.[30]

Conclusion: Morocco and Rethinking the Royal Nation more Generally

Morocco's global openness and appeal may be grounded partially in a level of comfort that Westerners unknowingly feel with a stable monarchy that reminds them of their own royal histories. At the same time, the continuing vitality of a monarchy like Morocco's invites us to reconsider quasi-teleological assumptions that the royal nation is dysfunctional and outdated.

Western countries have moved away from ruling monarchies for the twin reasons of the latter's assumed non-democratic, unelected nature and their hereditary authority. Yet, political echoes of the royal nation remain. For one thing, non-ruling monarchs continue to exercise authority and influence, and play a broadly unifying role, in Europe. The USA itself, despite its partial anti-monarchical roots, has an odd propensity towards embracing political families as chief executives, from the Adamses to the Bushes. Morocco's reconstruction of its first constitutions for a postcolonial ruling royal nation on the skeleton of France's postwar dual authority Republic hints at overlaps between the world's few extant ruling monarchies and post-monarchical states.

Indeed, Morocco highlights the possible political functions that are included in, but not limited to, monarchies. Chief among them has been the throne's ability to resist being tarnished by a specific unpopular policy because its dual authority structure allows ministers and parties to shoulder the blame. A less visible corollary of this ability is that the throne's ability to transcend specific politics may allow it more leeway to advance plural rights than non-elected rulers who are more grounded in the support of a particular subpopulation.

Morocco has had a better record than most other Arab states of allowing and legislating minority religious, ethnic, and women's rights, particularly in recent decades. Without suggesting that Morocco's ruling monarchy is universally accepted, the regime's historical roots and constant efforts to tack between Islamic and non-religious identities may have helped its relative success at improving civil and political rights. The Arab countries that have the strongest record of violence-free accommodation of religious and other pluralism have been mostly monarchies.

In short, Morocco's royal nation combines a traditional political form with contemporary pluralism, at least in comparison with most other non-democratic Arab polities. And here is where this unusually continuous ruling monarchy may illustrate a broader point. Whereas a typical Western image of political progress is a steady, inexorable path from authoritarian, hereditary monarchy to democracy, the reality is that polities have both authoritarian and democratic features and tendencies. Though it may seem a contemporary outlier, by suggesting the unusual proposition that a ruling monarchy may allow for more prospects for pluralist inclusion than other forms of authoritarianism, Morocco's royal nation deserves further scrutiny for parallels it may raise with ostensibly more democratic former royal nations as well.

Notes

1. For general background on Moroccan history and monarchical politics, see Jamil Abun-Nasr (1987), *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, Cambridge, UK; Abdellah Hammoudi (1997), *Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism*, Chicago; Abdallah Laroui (1995), *L'Histoire du Maghreb: Un Essai de Synthèse*, Casablanca; David Mednicoff (1999), 'Civic Apathy in the Service of Stability? The Cultural Politics of Monarchist Morocco', *Journal of North African Studies* 3/4, 1–27; Henry Munson (1993), *Religion and Power in Morocco*, New Haven; Mohamed Tozy (1999), *Monarchie et Islam Politique au Maroc*, Paris; and Pierre Vermeren (2006), *Histoire du Maroc depuis l'indépendance*, Paris.
2. Henri Terrasse (1950), *Histoire du Maroc des Origines à l'Établissement du Protectorat Francais*, Casablanca, volume 2, 190–1. French translations here and below are mine.

3. Germain Ayache (1983), *Etudes d'Histoire Marocaine,* Rabat, 177–8.
4. John Waterbury (1970), *The Commander of the Faithful,*New York, 47.
5. Douglas E. Ashford (1961), *Political Change in Morocco,* Princeton, 89.
6. Marvine Howe (2005), *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges.* Oxford, 89.
7. Clifford Geertz (1968), *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*, Chicago, 80.
8. I discuss SPM in the Moroccan context in detail in David Mednicoff, *The King's Dilemma Revisited* (Harvard University Department of Government unpublished dissertation 2007), from which portions of the discussion in the first part of this chapter are adapted.
9. See Susan Gilsen Miller (2013), *A History of Modern Morocco*, Cambridge, UK, Chapter 6.
10. For additional background on postcolonial Morocco, see Mednicoff (2007), as well as Miller (2013) and Michael Willis (2014), *Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring*, Oxford.
11. Omar Bendourou (1986), *Le pouvoir executif au Maroc depuis l'independence*, Cahors, 89–90.
12. For texts of earlier versions of Morocco's constitution, see Driss Basri, Michel Rousset and Georges Vedel (1993), *Trente Annees de Vie Constitutionelle au Maroc*, Paris. Translations of constitutional provisions listed below are mine.
13. Hassan II (1993), *La Mémoire d'un Roi.* Paris, 190–192. See also on the Green March, Marvine Howe (2005), *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and other Challenges*, Oxford, 114–5.
14. See, for example, Bernard Cubertafond (2001), *Pour Comprendre la Vie Politique au Maroc*, Paris, 24–25, John Entelis (1989), *Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics*, Boulder, CO, 59, and James A. Miller (1984), *Imlil: A Moroccan Mountain Community in Change*, Boulder, CO, 189.
15. Bendourou (1986), 235.
16. Hassan II (2000), *Le Génie de la Modération:Réflexions sur les Vérités de l'Islam*, Paris, 121–2.
17. Hassan II (2000), 122.

18. Hassan II (2000), 123.

19. Willis (2014), 176–9.

20. For example, *el-usbu' al-Dahik el-Siyyasi* (*The Week of Political Humor*), a satirical weekly inspired loosely by the French magazine *Charlie Hebdo*, was published in the mid-1990s in Moroccan Arabic dialect, a specific sign that the vulgar, cynical satire of political figures (other than the king) was intended for a broad audience of Moroccans. Owned by elites with close ties to the royal family, this journal was one of several that featured unrelenting negative depictions of electoral politics and politicians. For more, see Chap. 5 of Mednicoff, 2007.

21. See Huntington (1968), Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, 177–191.

22. On the first idea, see Lisa Anderson (1991), 'Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East', Political Science Quarterly 106/1, 1–15. On the second, see Gregory Gause, 'Kings for All Seasons: How the Ruling Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring', http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/09/24-resilience-arab-monarchies-gause/resilience-arab-monarchies_english.pdf , accessed 7 March 2016.

23. Lahcen Achy, 'Morocco's Experience with Poverty Reduction: Lessons for the Arab World,' Carnegie Middle East Center Paper 25, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/morocco_poverty1.pdf, accessed 6 March 2016.

24. Ali Anouzla (2014), 'Morocco's "King of the Poor,"' *Middle East Eye*, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/moroccos-king-poor-389544184, accessed 11 March 2016.

25. Fatima Harrak (2009), 'The History and Significance of the new Moroccan Family Code,' http://buffett.northwestern.edu/documents/working-papers/ISITA_09-002_Harrak.pdf, accessed 22 March 2016.

26. On the issue of Berber/Amazigh reforms under Muhammed VI, see Willis (2014), 218–222, as well as Paul Silverstein and David Crawford (2004), 'Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State,' *Middle East Report* 233, 44–8, and Imad Statou, 'Morocco's Amazighs still feel Marginalized,' http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/Morocco-language-Amazigh-constitution-education.html, accessed 14 March 2016.

27. Translation is mine from the official text, which can be found in French or Arabic at http://www.maroc.ma/fr/content/constitution-0, accessed 27 July 2014.

28. See, for example, Ivan Martin, 'The EU has strengthened its relations with Morocco, but not to the extent required to bring about real change in the country,' *LSE Blog*, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/08/11/the-eu-has-strengthened-its-relations-with-morocco-but-not-to-the-extent-required-to-bring-about--real-change-in-the-country/, accessed 15 March 2016.

29. See, for example, Ahmed Charai (2013), 'The Great Potential of a US-Morocco Relationship,' *The National Interest*, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-great-potential-us-moroccan--relationship-8234, accessed 15 March 2016.

30. See, for example, 'Up to 1 million Moroccans march through their capital to protest the U.N. chief's remarks about the contested Western Sahara territory', *US News and World Report*, 13 March 2016, http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-03-13/huge-moroccan-protests-against-un-chief-stance-on-w-sahara, accessed 21 March 2016.

Visualizing and Performing
the Royal Nation

From the *White Tsar* to the *Russian Tsar*: Monarchy and Russian Nationalism in Tsarist Turkestan, 1867–1917

Ulrich Hofmeister

INTRODUCTION

The half-century of Tsarist rule in Central Asia was framed by the administration of the region's most prominent Governors-General—Konstantin P. von Kaufman (1818–82) and Aleksei N. Kuropatkin (1848–1925). As the highest civil and military authority in the newly established province of Turkestan between 1867 and 1881, Kaufman shaped Russian rule in Central Asia more than any of his successors, so that in Russian historiography he is to this day celebrated as 'the founder of Turkestan'.[1] Kuropatkin, on the other hand, had less than a year in office until he was removed by Russia's Provisional Government in March 1917. Still, as a former Minister of War he enjoyed great esteem among the Russian personnel in Central Asia.[2]

Notwithstanding the fundamental differences that characterized the tenures of Turkestan's first and last Governors-General, they shared a pronounced awareness for questions of representation and had an equally

U. Hofmeister (✉)
Institute of East European History, Vienna University, Vienna, Austria

high self-esteem. Both pursued a strongly centralized governing style in their province and strove to concentrate all power in their own hands, and both epitomized a patriarchal style of leadership that derived its might from their personal appointment by the Tsar.[3] At the same time, Kaufman and Kuropatkin personified two opposite strategies in representing Russia and the Tsar vis-à-vis the native population of their province, as this chapter shows by an analysis of speeches, decrees, reports, and diary entries of Turkestan's first and last Governors-General. Kaufman displayed the monarchy as a supranational institution and strove to tie it to precolonial forms of rule in Central Asia—a strategy that is epitomized by his frequent use of pseudo-indigenous titles as *White Tsar*. Kuropatkin, on the other hand, presented the Tsar as an essentially Russian ruler and demanded certain exclusive rights for the Russian population. This chapter argues that the contrast between Kaufman and Kuropatkin reflects not only different biographical backgrounds and experiences but also the profound changes Russian political thinking underwent during the 50 years between the establishment of the General Government of Turkestan in 1867 and the downfall of Tsarist rule in 1917. Influenced by the rise of nationalism in the Tsarist Empire and elsewhere in Europe, Russian ideologists increasingly emphasized the Russian character of the Empire, downplaying its multinational roots and demographical composition.

At the time of Kaufman's appointment as Turkestan's first Governor-General in 1867, the conquest of the region was still underway. Until 1885, Russia subdued a vast territory consisting of steppes, deserts, oasis settlements, and mountains with a predominantly Muslim population.[4] Although these territories included ancient and prestigious centres of Islamic learning like Samarkand or Bukhara, most Russians looked on the local population with contempt, regarding the nomads as backward and the settled population as fanatical. Although Turkestan was not officially recognized as a colony, the region came under special administration of the Ministry of War, while the natives maintained autonomy at the local level.[5] The military administration was headed by a Governor-General with extensive authority, reporting solely to the War Minister in St Petersburg and the Tsar himself.

The *White Tsar*: The Monarchy as a Supranational Institution

Konstantin P. von Kaufman, Turkestan's first Governor-General, was a descendent of an old European noble family.[6] Both his grandfather, who had moved to Russia and converted to Orthodoxy, and his father had

made their careers in the Tsarist military. K. P. von Kaufman himself served during the 1840s and 1850s in the Caucasus wars and later in the administration of the War Ministry. After a short interlude as Governor-General in Vilnius, in 1867 Kaufman was transferred to Tashkent, the capital of the newly established General Government of Turkestan. Here, he not only successfully resumed the military advance but also had to build up a new administration and win over the trust of the native population (Fig. 7.1).

   The monarchy played a central role in Kaufman's style of representing the Empire, as he considered the Tsar the sole legitimate source of authority. In his public appearances as well as in internal communication with his subordinates, loyalty to the Tsar was displayed as the most important virtue, and Kaufman derived his own position as Governor-General exclusively from the will of the 'Lord Emperor'.[7] Being the direct deputy of the Tsar in this remote province, Kaufman epitomized the 'face' of the sovereign vis-à-vis Turkestan's population, both native and European. He strove to import the glory of the Tsarist court in St Petersburg into Tashkent by surrounding his own person with monarchic flair as well.[8] He signed his orders as 'Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman I', as if he

Fig. 7.1 K. P. von Kaufman (Turkestanskii al'bom, chast' istoricheskaia, 1871–1872, part 4, pl. 4, no. 2 (Case Z). Library of Congress Prints & Photographs Division, LC-DIG-ppmsca-12261)

occupied the position not of Governor-General but rather of a monarchic ruler. His public appearances were styled in a similarly royal manner, starting with his first arrival in Turkestan, which was carefully orchestrated to resemble a triumphal procession.[9] Instead of taking the direct way from St Petersburg to Tashkent, Kaufman chose to take a much longer route. His journey to Tashkent took two months, and in the cities on the way, his arrival was staged like a victory parade. According to an observer in Vernyi,[10] the Governor-General entered the city on a splendid horse; he was followed by an 'enormous entourage' of high-ranking officers, officials, and local dignitaries, all of them in full dress, while an impressive convoy of Cossacks made up the last part of the procession.[11] During the following years, Kaufman was met in a similarly ceremonious way each time he returned to Tashkent after longer absences.[12]

Some officials voiced criticism of Kaufman's pompous appearance, as such ostentatious ceremonies were generally reserved for members of the royal family.[13] Kaufman's immediate superior, War Minister Dmitrii A. Miliutin, also mildly derided the Governor-General's desire 'to play the role of a little Tsar'.[14] Kaufman supporters, though, argued that this extravagant way of holding of court did not rival the Tsar's glory but rather served to increase the prestige of the state and thus the grandeur of the monarch.[15] Nikolai P. Ostroumov, one of Turkestan's leading school functionaries, defended in his memoirs not only the pomp the Governor-General cultivated but also his frequent and arbitrary interference into judicial affairs. In doing so, Ostroumov argued, Kaufman boosted his authority,

> and this was especially in Turkestan of great importance, because the natives understand and respect only 'strong' power that embodies the law itself. Moreover, the point is that the natives are used to a despotic regime and do not understand our legal procedures.[16]

This reference to Central Asia's past indicates that Kaufman presented himself not only as the deputy of the Tsar but also as the heir of the Khans and Emirs, the native rulers of the region. Accordingly, foreign visitors claimed that the etiquette at Kaufman's 'little court' was not only much stricter than at St Petersburg but was also reminiscent of the surrounding oriental rulers.[17] Kaufman himself admitted that this appeal to local tradition was fully intentional. In his last report to the Tsar, Kaufman argued that the natives were not able to understand a more modest appearance, as 'under the rule of the Khans they got accustomed to splendour'.[18]

The significance of Asian traditions of rule for Kaufman's staging of the monarchy is also revealed by his frequent use of oriental (or pseudo-oriental) titles in his communication with the native population. When the Governor-General spoke to so-called 'native dignitaries'—men perceived by Tsarist officials as influential representatives of the local population—he regularly referred to the Emperor as the *White Tsar* [*Belyi Tsar'*]. This title was widely used in Russian communication with Asian or Muslim peoples during the nineteenth century and derived its attraction from its 'Asian' appeal.

The historical origin of the designation *White Tsar* is not entirely clear. Although some newer research derives the label 'white' from ancient Slavic traditions,[19] until recently it was generally believed that it had a Tatar-Mongolian background. So in late Tsarist times the expression *White Tsar* was perceived as a specific 'oriental' title for the Russian Tsar that was rooted in Mongolian traditions.[20] It was used by Russians exclusively in two situations: firstly, it appeared when Russians quoted native usage of the title, especially when they referred to the alleged wish of Asian peoples to join the Russian Empire.[21] In this context, the title *White Tsar* served to prove the good reputation of the Russian Tsar among the population of Russia's neighbouring states in order to justify future expansion.[22] The second occasion was in direct communication with non-Russian subjects of the Tsar, as in Kaufman's speeches to native dignitaries. This usage implied a paternalistic gesture that put the audience into the role of small children whose language the speaker takes over. Besides, it had strong ideological implications, as it suggested that the Tsar was not only a 'Russian Tsar' but rather had a special affiliation to his Asian subjects as well. The title *White Tsar* thus implied continuity and legitimacy of the monarchy in Central Asia—even though no ethnic, religious, or cultural kinship could be referenced in order to justify Russian rule in the region. When Kaufman spoke to Central Asia's native population, he frequently evoked the image of the *White Tsar*. Thus, after the conquest of the city of Samarkand, Kaufman assembled local dignitaries and announced to them the will of the *White Tsar*:

Having assembled the representatives of different towns and villages who wish to obtain the patronage of the Great Russian White Tsar, I declare to all of them in the name of my most gracious Lord, so it will be known to everyone: […] The Sharia stays in its former force, this is the law of the White Tsar. Pray according to your law as you have been taught, pray in the Mosques for the health of the White Tsar, who is gracious to you, and for the health of his most August family![23]

In this speech—and others like it[24]—Kaufman inscribed the Tsar and the monarchy into local understandings of just rule by explicitly declaring that the new rulers of the region respected the established social order and let Islamic law stay in force.[25] The frequent use of the title *White Tsar* adds to the impression that Kaufman sought to present the autocracy as a quasi-indigenous form of rule. His call to pray for the Tsar's health can be read as an allusion not only to the prayer for the Tsar, common in Russian orthodox churches (and in Russian mosques, too), but also to the Islamic tradition of mentioning the ruler's name before the sermon preceding Friday communal prayers.[26]

When Kaufman's speeches were translated into Turkic, one of Central Asia's historical literary languages, the equivalent for *White Tsar/Belyi Tsar* was usually *oq podsho*, or in the common Russian rendering of that time *Ak-Padishakh*. So the term 'Tsar' was replaced for the natives by 'Padishah', a title that was used in several Islamic states and was one of the official titles of the Ottoman Sultan.[27] Since the seventeenth century, Ottoman sources had sought to establish this term as an equivalent to the title 'Emperor' of Christian Europe and used it to address the Habsburg emperors and later Russian Empress Catherine II.[28] In Russian Turkestan, the expression *Ak-Padishakh* gained wide popularity both in official and non-official local discourse on the Russian monarch.[29] This officially sponsored expression thus replaced the term *Great Beg* [*Velikii Bek*], a designation for the Russian Tsar that was widespread in Central Asia until the 1860s but which Tsarist officials obviously did not consider suitable for the sovereign of the Russian Empire.[30]

Kaufman extended his efforts to translate Central Asia's new regime into a pseudo-indigenous language to his own person as well. According to his own monarchic aspirations, he was pleased to be addressed by the native population as *Jarym-Padishakh* (*Half-Padishah*), which was translated into Russian as *Polu-Tsar'* (*Half-Tsar*).[31] So Turkestan's quasi-monarch adorned himself also with a quasi-indigenous title.

Kaufman's pompous holding of court and his allusions to indigenous forms of rule resembled that of functionaries of other colonial empires of that time. In British India, civil servants similarly lived in greater splendour than at home, and when Queen Victoria was proclaimed as Empress of India in 1877, the ceremony intentionally made references to South Asian ceremonies in order to style the queen as the successor of the Mughal emperor.[32] Kaufman was most likely aware of these practices, as the British Empire served as a permanent point of reference for the Russian adminis-

tration in Turkestan. Tsarist ideologists and officials closely followed the practices of the British in India and frequently tried to draw lessons from them.[33] Kaufman himself also occasionally compared his province with British India.[34]

All in all, reminiscences of local styles of rule played a major role in Kaufman's representation of monarchical power in his province. Referring to both the Tsar in St Petersburg and his own person, Kaufman resorted to allegedly oriental titles in order to give the new rulers of Central Asia a local colour. The Russian nation, however, was nearly absent in Kaufman's staging of the monarchy. Even though he occasionally referred to the 'Great Russian White Tsar', he generally avoided portraying the Tsar as a specifically Russian monarch. The notion of Russianness did not figure importantly in his speeches. When, after Kaufman's death in 1882, several colonial officials published their memoirs of Turkestan's first Governor-General, most of them found it necessary to underline Kaufman's patriotic convictions in order to dispel any doubts about his true Russian identity.[35] However, this was most likely related to the climate of growing Russian nationalism from the 1880s on, when Kaufman's German surname already sufficed to create doubts about his religious and political loyalties.[36] In Kaufman's own notes and in his representation of the Empire in his province, though, the Russian nation played no major role. He instead presented the monarchy as a supranational institution. For him, the Tsarist Empire was not an exclusively Russian state, and it was supposed to derive its cohesion not from a specific ethnicity but from the shared devotion of all the Tsar's subjects to the ruler.

Neither did religion play a major role in Kaufman's representation of the Tsarist Empire in Turkestan.[37] According to the memoirs of one of his subordinates, Kaufman declared that he did not pay much attention to anybody's religious beliefs. According to Kaufman, it was sufficient to lead a good and honest life to inherit paradise—be one a Jew, a Sart (a sedentary Muslim), or a Russian.[38] These convictions, which laid little emphasis on national identities and religious beliefs, bore practical outcomes as well. Kaufman's main principle in ruling Turkestan was ignoring Islam, as he called it, and non-interference into native ways. He claimed that the superiority of the Russian civilization was so obvious that Turkestan's native population inevitably would voluntarily give up their customary ways of life and join Russian culture. Administrative pressure was not only unnecessary, Kaufman announced, but also harmful, as it would stir up Muslim fanaticism, lead to popular unrest, and thus obstruct the natural assimila-

tion process of the native population. Therefore, Kaufman avoided interfering in Islamic schools and banned any missionary activity of the Russian Orthodox Church in his province.[39] When in 1869 Dmitrii A. Tolstoi, the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod, announced his plans to send missionaries to Turkestan, Kaufman rejected them politely but firmly, claiming that Turkestan's Muslims 'have not matured enough to embrace the idea of Christendom'. For Kaufman, the Russian mission in Turkestan was an entirely secular one: 'Our mission here can be conducted not with a cross in the hand, but only with a book.'[40]

Kaufman's way of governing Turkestan was highly successful in the medium term—if measured by the stability of Russian rule. There were no uprisings during his tenure, and even during the Russo-Turkish War (1877–8) Turkestan remained calm.[41] Kaufman's strategy to largely refrain from interventions into native societies and to take over local notions of legitimate rule was appreciated by the traditional elite of the region, especially by the religious leadership. As the colonial administration allowed Islamic law to remain in force, Muslim intellectuals reconciled themselves with Russian rule for the time being,[42] and Kaufman even obtained a legal judgement, a *fatwa*, that declared Tsarist rule as legitimate.[43]

From a long-term perspective, however, Kaufman's predictions of an imminent decline of Islam proved to be false. Already shortly after his death in 1882 it became clear that Russian state schools and Russian culture in general were not as attractive to the natives as Kaufman had hoped. What followed were lengthy discussions on a new Islam policy, but in the end, Kaufman's reputation remained strong enough that his principles were not substantially changed, and his strategy of non-interference stayed in force until the breakdown of the Tsarist Empire in 1917.[44] In fact, Kaufman's authority seemed to increase even more in the decades after his death, when his person became the centre of an outright memory cult.[45]

THE TSAR AS A RUSSIAN RULER

Kaufman's rule in Turkestan built in many ways on Russia's traditional strategies of managing a multi-ethnic empire: cooperation with native elites and non-interference into local affairs had been the main pillars of how Moscow and St Petersburg had dealt with the non-Russian population of the growing Empire since the sixteenth century.[46] For ages, a non-ethnic state patriotism, based on the loyalty to the Tsar, had been the main legitimizing ideology of the Russian state.[47] This approach, however, came

under attack at the middle of the nineteenth century, as the rise of nationalistic ideas all over Europe affected the Tsarist Empire as well. Under the influence of the wars of Italian unification, the idea of the nation as the main reference point of politics gained popularity in Russia, too. At the same time, the Tsarist Empire's defeat in the Crimean War and the Polish January uprising of 1863 led to the postulation of a 'Russian question' by conservative publicists. So, by and by, the conventional dynastic-imperial patriotism of the Empire was supplemented with explicit references to the Russian nation.[48] Under the reign of Alexander II from 1855 to 1881, these ideas were already partly adopted by the Imperial government, but it was only Alexander III (reigned 1881–1894) who started to implement a consistent Russian nationalist policy, which was continued by his successor Nicholas II.[49] In Turkestan, the new tone started to spread during the 1880s. With the military advance having come to an end, the integration of the General Government into the structures of the Empire became more urgent: this was often interpreted in terms of the expansion of Russian legal and administrative norms into Central Asia as well.[50]

Apart from that, the demographic composition of the General Government started to change slightly. During the first decades of Russian rule, only a small number of officers, soldiers, and merchants had settled in the newly conquered region, but with the construction of the Trans-Caspian Railway during the 1880s, ever more immigrants from European Russia and the Caucasus entered Turkestan. Rising tensions between the different population groups of the Empire now started to affect Turkestan as well. The success of non-Russian merchants and artisans—local Muslims, but also Jews, Armenians, and Muslims from the Volga-Ural region—aroused Russian fears that they might be commercially marginalized in this newly gained province.[51] At the same time, the increasing inflow of East Slavic settlers into the Central Asian steppes caused severe problems in the most affected areas, as more and more nomads were driven out of their pastures. This was one of the main reasons for the devastating uprising in 1916, when in the midst of a disastrous world war Tsarist rule in Turkestan came close to breakdown.[52]

The immediate cause of the revolt was the untimely and ill-prepared introduction of a government decree that ordered Turkestan's native population, until then exempted from conscription, to rear-area labour service for the Russian military. Only a few days after the announcement of the decree, an uprising broke out, first in the oasis settlements in the south, but then also among the nomads of the steppe. In this critical moment,

Tsar Nicholas II and the War Ministry decided to resort to Kuropatkin, the former War Minister and one of the most prominent veterans of the 'glorious days' of Central Asia's conquest. As a young man, Kuropatkin had served for several years under Kaufman's command in Turkestan, and during the 1890s he was the head of the Central Asian province of Transcaspia. So when he was appointed as Turkestan's new Governor-General in 1916, he was already familiar with the conditions in his new province. Kuropatkin, however, drew not only from his experiences in Central Asia itself. In the 1870s, the Russian General Staff had sent him on a lengthy tour to Germany, France, and Northern Africa, where he studied European techniques of colonial rule. After returning to Russia, he published several articles about French colonialism in Algeria, from which he attempted to draw lessons for Central Asia as well.[53] It seems likely that during these travels Kuropatkin came into contact with Western European ideas of nationalism, and it is possible that this experience left its mark on his style of ruling Turkestan (Fig. 7.2).

When Kuropatkin was summoned to return to Turkestan in 1916, he chose Kaufman as his role model for governing the province.[54] His sense

Fig. 7.2 A. N. Kuropatkin (1915) (Library of Congress Prints & Photographs Division, LC-DIG-ggbain-19365)

for triumphal representation was clearly no less pronounced than that of the first Governor-General, but for him the staging of power was not only a way to satisfy his vanity but also a means of establishing and demonstrating imperial hierarchies. He had already made clear how much value he placed on ceremonial manifestations of power in 1890, when he had just been appointed to head the Transcaspian province. At his first arrival in the province capital Askhabad he had been met by deputies of the different population groups of the city. In his memoirs, Kuropatkin recalled his consternation when he saw that the welcoming committee was led by representatives of Askhabad's Armenian colony, while the Russian deputies stood somewhere in the background. Kuropatkin interrupted the speech of the Armenian representative and ordered the whole committee to regroup. By his order, the Russian deputy 'naturally' had to preside over the committee; after him came the Turkmen and the Kirgiz ('the former masters of the region, before the Russians conquered it'); and only then came the other Christian subjects of the Tsars, including the Armenians. All the other population groups of the city made up the last section of the committee.[55]

Apart from underlining Kuropatkin's sense of the importance of representation, this episode demonstrates how Turkestan's last Governor-General established a clear ethnic hierarchy among the different subjects of the Tsar. For Kuropatkin, the Tsarist Empire was a distinctively Russian one, and the Russians were entitled to be the leading nationality. This becomes clear also from his diary, where he complained that the Russians played only a minor role in trade and craft among Turkestan's immigrants from the Empire:

> Jews, Armenians and diverse immigrants from the Caucasus have pushed the Russians aside. The government has founded Russian villages [in Turkestan], but it did not care to give the Russian population the means and the ability to stand at the top of the industrial and commercial activity of the region.[56]

Accordingly, Kuropatkin saw his main task in Central Asia as 'putting the Russian tribe [*plemia*] in Central Asia to a special height', as he noted in his memoirs. During Kaufman's governance, Kuropatkin claimed, the natives had looked upon the Russians 'as beings of a higher rank than the natives', and it was natural that a native had to give way to a Russian soldier. Such a relationship did not correspond to the idea of equality, Kuropatkin admitted, but he claimed that in Central Asia it was necessary and inevitable.[57]

Two weeks after Kuropatkin arrived in Tashkent as the new Governor-General, he gave a speech to representatives of Tashkent's population in order to announce the principles of his rule. At that time, his troops had put down the rebellion in the settled regions with brute force just as the nomadic population was rising up, thus bringing Turkestan into a state close to civil war. Kuropatkin, however, reminded the assembled population of the benevolent politics the colonial administration had exercised during the last decades. For him, Turkestan's well-being was owed to 'Russia's protection', and he demanded that the native population accept the leading role of the Russians:

> Russia is great and mighty. But it was foremost the Russian tribe that has played the leading role in building, strengthening and enlarging Russia. One can hardly enumerate the sacrifices it made during one and a half millennia in order to build up Russia's greatness and mightiness. The first place anywhere in Russia must belong to the Russian tribe, which had put most work and sacrifices into building Russia.[58]

In his speech, Kuropatkin again and again emphasized that the Russians were entitled to play the leading role in the Empire. He explained this by a popular metaphor:

> The numerous tribes inhabiting Russia are all children of one father, the Great Sovereign, the Emperor. All these numerous tribes are children of one mother—Great Russia. But in this large family the Russians must be the elder brothers of all the others.[59]

The depiction of the Russian Empire as a family of different peoples was not new. It drew on the mythological connection between *Batiushka Tsar* (*Father Tsar*) and *Matiushka Rossiia* (*Mother Russia*).[60] When Turkestan's Governors-General had used the family metaphor before, they usually did so in order to emphasize the need for close collaboration and a good relationship between the different nationalities of the region.[61] Kuropatkin, however, used it to establish an ethnic hierarchy by calling the Russians the elder brothers of the other peoples.[62] Kuropatkin characterized the Tsar as the father and the head of the family and thus seemingly gave him a supranational position by presenting him not as a member of any of the Empire's national groups but as the father of all of them. However, by calling Russia the mother of the different peoples, Kuropatkin announced

a special relationship between the Tsar and the Russian nation. The preeminence of the Russian nation and the power of the Tsar thus were used to reinforce each other. The might of the Tsar and of the Russian nation went hand in hand, being just two sides of a single coin. So in his speech to the population of Tashkent, Kuropatkin reminded the native deputies of their obligations all at once to 'the Imperial Sovereign, to Russia, and to your elder brothers, the Russians'.[63] The Russian representatives, on the other hand, were warned that within a diverse family of peoples, the younger children must not be insulted and that the Russians' rights had to be reinforced by their adherence to the throne and the fatherland.[64] So Kuropatkin bolstered the ethnic hierarchy he strove to establish by a paternalistic and ostentatiously benevolent approach to the 'younger brothers' of the Russians. Referring to the throne and the fatherland in the same breath, Kuropatkin invoked both national and monarchical loyalties, thus suggesting that the monarchy was essentially a Russian one.

A similar impression arises by the way Kuropatkin declared that the natives always had to comply with the will of the Tsar. He announced that otherwise there would emerge an alienation between natives and Russians and they would become enemies instead of members of one family.[65] Assuming a natural congruence of the will of the Tsar and that of the Russian nation, Kuropatkin thus again suggested that the Tsar was essentially a Russian national monarch. In doing so, he resorted to an image that had been cultivated at the St Petersburg court from the mid-1860s, when the future Tsar Alexander III was carefully educated and styled as a symbol for the Russian nation—despite the German roots of the Holstein-Gottorp-Romanov dynasty that had ruled the Russian Empire since 1762.[66]

Moreover, the family metaphor, used so often by Kuropatkin,[67] evoked a blood relationship between the ruler and his subjects and expressed an understanding of the state as an ethnic community, relying on common ancestry, and not as a supranational community that was bound together by common loyalty to the Tsar or to the state.

In marked contrast to Kaufman's staging of imperial rule, there were no allusions to precolonial forms of rule in Kuropatkin's appearance, and the expression *White Tsar* was completely absent from his speeches. After 50 years of Russian rule, Central Asians were already familiar enough with the Tsarist Empire, so that Kuropatkin did not consider it necessary to use special terminology to address them. But apart from that, it seems likely that Kuropatkin deliberately avoided any allusions to indigenous forms

of rule, as this would have threatened the exclusive relationship between the Tsar and the Russian nation that the Governor-General constructed.[68] It is also significant that Kuropatkin did not make use of the distinction the Russian language offers between two different forms of 'Russian'— namely, *russkii* and *rossiiskii*. Even though in pre-revolutionary times usage was not always consistent, *russkii* generally meant the Russian people in an ethno-cultural sense (usually including Ukrainians and Belorussians as well), while *rossiiskii* referred to the political body of the Empire and thus indicated the institutions of the state and included all subjects of the Tsar, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation.[69] Kuropatkin, however, consistently resorted to the word *russkii*, even when he spoke about the government in St Petersburg—clearly an imperial institution, and not just a Russian national one.[70] This usage suggests that Kuropatkin did not distinguish between the Russian nation and the multi-ethnic Tsarist Empire. For him, the Empire belonged exclusively to the Russian nation.

Kuropatkin's preference of the Russians over Turkestan's other population groups was not just a rhetorical figure—it had profound political implications as well. During his military campaigns to suppress the uprising, Kuropatkin several times expressed his determination to take relentless retribution for 'Russian blood' that had been spilled during the revolt.[71] In a report to the Tsar, Kuropatkin stated that severe punishment was necessary wherever the natives had forgotten their subservient obligations to the Tsar and the fatherland. Kuropatkin announced that punishment of not only those with immediate personal guilt was 'inevitable'. Indeed, wherever had been 'spilled Russian blood', all land had to be taken away from the natives, as they had proven 'unworthy to possess it'.[72] All the inhabitants of villages where Russians had suffered where to be expelled, regardless of the particular circumstances and their personal involvement. Furthermore, Kuropatkin claimed that Russians and native nomads could not live peacefully together anymore, so that their areas of settlement should be separated as strictly as possible. He ordered the expulsion of Kirgiz nomads from large areas in the present-day border regions of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and the establishment of a reservation for them far up in the mountains.[73] The expulsions started soon after and were conducted until October 1917.[74] With his brute measures, Kuropatkin succeeded in putting down the rebellion and pacifying Turkestan to a large extent. It is, however, hard to judge whether the symbolical side of his style of ruling was equally successful. The preference of the Russian settlers vis-à-vis Turkestan's native population bore certainly

the risk of further alienation of the province's non-Russian population. However, the time of the Tsarist Empire was already up. When the Tsar abdicated in March 1917 and the Provisional Government took power in St Petersburg, it abolished all privileges and special rights based on religion or nationality.[75] So Kuropatkin's model of privileging the Russians was officially discarded, and only a few days later he himself was removed from office.

While Kaufman and Kuropatkin shared a marked sense for representation, their conceptualization of the Tsarist monarchy differed significantly. Kaufman presented the Empire as a supranational state, which had not only Slavic but also Mongolian roots and equally incorporated Christians, Muslims, and adherents of other religions. Kuropatkin, in contrast, defined the Empire as a specific Russian state where the non-Slavic, non-orthodox population was confined to the role of 'younger brothers'. Kuropatkin's preferential treatment of the Russians in his province might have been influenced by his personal experience with nationalism in Western Europe, and Kaufman's German roots might also have played a role in shaping his national policy. Still, the difference between these two conceptions originated not only from individual political attitudes, but reflected the general rise of Russian nationalism during that time.

Benedict Anderson has interpreted the increasingly Russian styling of the Romanov Tsars as a purely defensive measure in order to protect the dynasty against the assault of nationalism.[76] It seems, however, that Anderson overestimated the antagonism between dynastic and national legitimation in Tsarist Russia. When he quotes the famous three principles of Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality, which had been suggested by Count Sergei S. Uvarov as the ideological base of the Empire in 1832, he erroneously cites the latter principle as *natsional'nost'*, and calls its introduction as 'premature in an age where half the "nation" were still serfs, and more than half spoke a mother-tongue other than Russian'.[77] Uvarov, however, did not speak about *natsional'nost'*, but rather *narodnost'*. He thus used a Russianized version of the concept of the nation which explicitly lacked its notions of popular sovereignty and constitutionalism and which therefore was much more compatible with the interests of the monarchy.[78]

The emphasis on Russianness, so clearly displayed in Kuropatkin's speeches, was neither the desperate attempt of a declining Empire 'to appear attractive in a national drag', as Anderson has claimed, nor did it rival the claims of the Tsar.[79] The Romanov ruler embodied the Russian

nation and the Empire at the same time. Until the very end, the Tsarist polity remained a dynastically defined Empire, and the Russian nation never did fully replace the dynasty as the main source of legitimacy.[80] Kuropatkin rejected Kaufman's strategy of giving the Empire an indigenous outlook, and his depiction of the Russians as elder brothers met the growing demands of Russian nationalism for a more visible representation. This strategy, however, did not challenge the outstanding position of the Tsar and the monarchy. On the contrary, by claiming the Tsar for the Russian nation, Russian nationalism and the demand for loyalty to the monarchy reinforced each other. For a Russian nationalist such as Kuropatkin, the *White Tsar* was in fact a *Russian Tsar*.

Notes

1. D. V. Vasil'ev (2002), 'Ustroitel' Turkestanskogo kraia. K biografii K. P. fon-Kaufmana', *Sbornik Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva* 5(153), 45–57. For Kaufman's biography, see also A. A. Semënov (1910), 'Pokoritel' i ustroitel' Turkestanskogo kraia, General-ad"iutant K. P. fon Kaufman. Materialy dlia biograficheskogo ocherka', in: *Kaufmanskii sbornik, izdannyi v pamiat' 25 let, istekshikh so dnia smerti pokoritelia i ustroitelia Turkestanskogo kraia General-ad"iutanta K. P. fon-Kaufmana I-go,* Moscow, III-LXXXIV; Ulrich Hofmeister (2015), 'Der Halbzar von Turkestan. Konstantin fon-Kaufman in Zentralasien, 1867–1882', in: Tim Buchen and Malte Rolf (eds), *Eliten im Vielvölkerreich. Imperiale Biographien in Russland und Österreich-Ungarn, 1850–1918*, Berlin and Boston, 65–89.

2. For Kuropatkin, see David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye (2001), *Toward the Rising Sun. Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan,* DeKalb, 82–103.

3. Officially, Peter I replaced the title 'Tsar' with the Latin-based title 'Emperor' (*imperator*) in 1721. Since then, the full title of the ruler of the Russian Empire started with the words 'By the grace of God, All-Russian Emperor and Autocrat'. The title Tsar remained in force only for some territories of second rung, as in 'Tsar of Kazan' and later 'Polish Tsar'. See B. A. Uspenskii (2000), *Tsar' i imperator. Pomazanie na tsarstvo i semantika monarshikh titulov,* Moscow, 48–52. In unofficial usage, however, Tsar remained the main designation for the supreme ruler of the Empire. This chapter

reflects this usage by generally referring to the ruler of the Russian Empire as 'Tsar', and not as 'Emperor'.

4. For a discussion of Russia's aims in Central Asia, see Alexander S. Morrison (2008), *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910. A Comparison with British India*, Oxford, 30–6.

5. Daniel R. Brower (2003), *Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire*, London.

6. Semënov (1910), III, IV.

7. K. P. fon-Kaufman ([1868]), *Slova, skazannye g. Turkestanskim General gubernatorom, 22 Ianvaria 1868 goda, imenitym liudiam goroda Tashkenta, v prisutstvii Voennogo gubernatora Syr-Dar'inskoi oblasti, pravitelia kanceliarii, nachal'nika okruzhnogo shtaba, uezdnykh nachal'nikov Syr-Dar'inskoi oblasti i chlenov komissii po ustroistvu goroda Tashkenta*, [Tashkent], 3. See also K. P. fon-Kaufman, 'Prikaz Nr. 68', Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan (TsGARUz), f. I-1, op. 27, d. 2, ll. 3/3ob.

8. D. V. Vasil'ev and N. A. Nefliasheva (2006), 'Konstruiruia imperiiu. Islamskie periferii Rossii. Vyzovy, praktiki, uchastniki', *Nauchnye trudy Instituta biznesa i politiki, vol. 1: Vostok. Istoria, politika, kul'tura*, Moscow, 8–51.

9. Jeff Sahadeo (2007), *Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865–1923,* Bloomington and Indianapolis, 26–8.

10. Today Almaty (Kazakhstan)

11. D. G. Kolokol'tsev (1887), *Vospominaniia General-leitenanta Kolokol'tseva 1887 goda. O Konstantine Petroviche Kaufmane,* Moscow, 20–1.

12. N. P. Ostroumov (1899), *K istorii narodnogo obrazovaniia v Turkestanskom krae. Konstantin Petrovich fon-Kaufman – Ustroitel' Turkestanskogo kraia. Lichnye vospominaniia N. Ostroumova 1877–1881 g.g.,* Tashkent, 157; Eugene Schuyler (1877), *Turkistan. Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja*, vol. 1, New York, 81–2.

13. Kolokol'tsev (1887), 23.

14. D.A. Miliutin (2010), *Dnevnik 1882–1890,* Moscow, 34.

15. Kolokol'tsev (1887), 19, 20, 32.

16. Ostroumov (1899), 205.

17. Schuyler (1877), 81–2.

18. K. P. fon-Kaufman (1885), *Proekt vsepoddanneishego otchëta Gen.-ad"iutanta K. P. fon-Kaufmana I po grazhdanskomu upravleniiu i ustroistvu v oblastiakh Turkestanskogo general-gubernatorstva. 7 noiabria 1867 – 25 marta 1881 g.*, St Petersburg, 126.

19. V. V. Trepavlov (2007), '*Belyi Tsar'. Obraz monarkha i predstavlenie o poddanstve u narodov Rossii XV-XVIII vv.*, Moscow, 13–22.

20. *Ėntsiklopedicheskii slovar' F. A. Brokgauza i I. A. Efrona*, vol. 5, St Petersburg 1891, 249, s.v. Belyi Tsar'.

21. See for example N. P. Stremoukhov (1879), 'V Srednei Azii. Iz zapisok russkogo puteshestvennika', *Niva* 24, 462–4, http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/t209.html, accessed 20 April 2016.

22. Marlène Laruelle (2008), '"The White Tsar". Romantic Imperialism in Russia's Legitimizing of Conquering the Far East', *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 25, 113–34.

23. K. P. fon-Kaufman, *Vozzvanie zhiteliam Samarkanda i okrestnykh kishlakov s ob"iavleniem ikh prav i obiaziannostei v sviazi s prisoedineniem ikh k Rossii*, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGIA), f. 954, op. 1, d. 113, l. 1.

24. fon-Kaufman ([1868]); K. P. fon-Kaufman, *Vozzvanie Turkestanskogo General-gubernatora K. P. fon-Kaufmana zhiteliam Urguta i okrestnykh selenii s priglasheniem vernut'sia v pokinutye zhilishcha i podchinit'sia Russkoi vlasti*, RGIA, f. 954, op. 1, d. 113, l. 1.

25. For Central Asian conceptions of legitimate rule, see Anke von Kügelgen (2002), *Die Legitimierung der mittelasiatischen Mangitendynastie in den Werken ihrer Historiker, 18.-19. Jahrhundert,* Würzburg, 378–80.

26. See Robert D. Crews (2006), *For Prophet and Tsar. Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia,* Cambridge, MA and London, 85–6.

27. Gustav Bayerle (1997), *Pashas, Begs, and Effendis. A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire,* Istanbul, 123.

28. Einar Wigen (2013), 'Ottoman Concepts of Empire', *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 8/1, 44–66, here 52; Christoph K. Neumann (1999), 'Devletin Adı Yok: Bir Amblemin Okunması', *Cogito* 19, 269–80, here 274.

29. See, for example, the collection of documents containing *ak-padishakh* at http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/c6958.html, accessed 20 March 2016.

30. V. V. Bartol'd (1977), 'Vostok i russkaia nauka', in: V. V. Bartol'd, *Sochineniia*, vol. 9, Moscow, 534–45, here 536. For the title 'Beg' see Bayerle (1997), 19.

31. V. I. Chizhov (1915), *General-ad"iutant inzhener – General Konstantin Petrovich fon-Kaufman 1818–1882. Biograficheskii ocherk,* Petrograd, 16; Semënov (1910), XLII; A. N. Kuropatkin (1994), '70 let moei zhizni. Iz vospominanii Generala A. N. Kuropatkina, 1867–1882 gg', *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 4, 185–95, here 190, 194.

32. David Cannadine (2001), *Ornamentalism. How the British Saw Their Empire*, London, 45–6, 128.

33. Ulrich Hofmeister (2014), 'Zwischen Kontinentalimperium und Kolonialmacht. Repräsentationen der russischen Herrschaft in Turkestan, 1865–1917', in: Martin Aust and Julia Obertreis (eds.), *Osteuropäische Geschichte und Globalgeschichte*, Stuttgart, 27–47, here 30–1.

34. K. P. fon-Kaufman, 'Polozhenie del v Srednei Azii', *Turkestanskie vedomosti*, 28 April 1870.

35. Kolokol'tsev (1887), 3–4; G. P. Fëdorov (1913), 'Moia sluzhba v Turkestanskom krae', *Istoricheskii vestnik* 133, 786–812, here 805; Ostroumov (1899), 102–3; E. M. Tolbukhov (1909), 'V bor'be za Russkoe delo. Ėpizod iz godusarstvennoi deiatel'nosti K. P. fon-Kaufmana', *Istoricheskii vestnik* 116, 91–131.

36. See for example E. L. Markov (1901), *Rossiia v Srednei Azii*, vol. 2, St Petersburg, 21.

37. For Kaufman's reserved relationship to the Russian Orthodox Church, see Sahadeo (2007), 49.

38. Ostroumov (1899), 43.

39. fon-Kaufman (1885), 207–8, 438–40; K. P. fon-Kaufman ([1871]), *Ob"iasnitel'naia zapiska,* [Tashkent], 105–8. See Brower (2003), 30–5.

40. See A. G. Propashchin (1913), *General-ad"iutant Konstantin Petrovich fon-Kaufman kak ustroitel' Turkestanskogo kraia 1867–1882,* Tashkent, 69, 78.

41. See David MacKenzie (1967), 'Kaufman of Turkestan. An Assessment of His Administration 1867–1881', *Slavic Review* 26/2, 265–85.

42. Bakhtiiar Babadzhanov (2004), 'Russian Colonial Power in Central Asia as Seen by Local Muslim Intellectuals', in: Beate Eschment

and Hans Harder (eds), *Looking at the Coloniser. Cross-Cultural Perceptions in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Bengal, and Related Areas*, Würzburg, 75–90; Hisao Komatsu (2007), 'Dār Al-Islām under Russian Rule as Understood by Turkestani Muslim Intellectuals', in: Tomohiko Uyama (ed.), *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia*, Sapporo, 3–21.

43. Propashchin (1913), 30.
44. See, for example, 'Protokol Nr. 5 Komissii po voprosu o razvedke vne i vnutri Turkestanskogo kraia', TsGARUz, f. I-1, op. 31, d. 540, l. 61. For the discussions on a new Islam policy, see E. I. Vorob'ëva (1997), 'Vlast' i musul'manskoe dukhovenstvo v Rossiiskoi imperii. Vtoraia polovina XIX v. – 1917 g.', *Istoricheskii ezhegodnik*, http://www.omsu.omskreg.ru/histbook/articles/y1997/a040/article.shtml, accessed 20 June 2014.
45. Jeff Sahadeo (2004), 'Empire of Memories. Conquest and Civilization in Imperial Russian Tashkent', *Canadian Slavonic Papers* XLVI/1–2, 141–63.
46. Andreas Kappeler (2001), *The Russian Empire. A Multiethnic History,* Harlow.
47. Andreas Renner (2000), *Russischer Nationalismus und Öffentlichkeit im Zarenreich, 1855–1875,* Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna, 37–41.
48. Renner (2000), 110–2, 376.
49. Geoffrey Hosking (1997), *Russia. People and Empire, 1552 – 1917,* London, 374–6; Richard S. Wortman (2000), *Scenarios of Power. Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, vol. 2: From Alexander II to the Abdication of Nicholas II,* Princeton, 526; Eric Lohr (2003), *Nationalizing the Russian Empire. The Campaign Against Enemy Aliens During World War I*, Cambridge, MA and London, 5–6; Aleksei Miller (2002), 'Rusifikatsii. Klassifitsirovat' i poniat'', *Ab Imperio* 2002/2, 133–48, here 145–6.
50. V. V. Korneev (2001), 'Upravlenie Turkestanskim kraem. Real'nost' i "pravovye mechtaniia" (60-e gody XIX v. – fevral' 1917 goda)', *Voprosy istorii* 2001/7, 56–70.
51. Sahadeo (2007), 76, 154–5. For the demographic composition of Turkestan in 1897, see Henning Bauer, Andreas Kappeler, and Brigitte Roth (eds) (1991), *Die Nationalitäten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszählung von 1897, vol. B: Ausgewählte Daten zur sozio-ethnischen Struktur des Russischen Reiches,* Stuttgart, 221–2.

52. Daniel R. Brower (1996), 'Kyrgyz Nomads and Russian Pioneers. Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Turkestan Revolt of 1916', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44/1, 41–53; Jörn Happel (2010), *Nomadische Lebenswelten und zarische Politik. Der Aufstand in Zentralasien 1916,* Stuttgart.

53. A. N. Kuropatkin (1877), *Alzhiriia,* St Petersburg, 285–309.

54. In his memoirs, Kuropatkin drew a heavily idealized picture of Kaufman, see Kuropatkin (1994).

55. A. N. Kuropatkin (1910), *Zadachi Russkoi armii, vol. 2: Zadachi armii, ne sviazannye s Russkoiu natsional'noiu politikoiu,* St Petersburg, 124. There is a very thoughtful analysis of this scene in Dov Yaroshevski (1997), 'Empire and Citizenship', in: Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini (eds), *Russia's Orient. Imperial Borderlands and Peoples 1700 – 1917,* Bloomington and Indianapolis, 58–79, here 58–9.

56. A. N. Kuropatkin (1929), 'Iz dnevnika A. N. Kuropatkina s 23 iiulia po 22 dekabria 1916 g', *Krasnyi arkhiv* 34, 45–67, here 63–4.

57. Kuropatkin (1910), 122–3, 47; Kuropatkin (1994), 186.

58. A. N. Kuropatkin, 'Rech' Turkestanskogo General gubernatora General ad"iutanta Generala ot infanterii A. N. Kuropatkina, ska-zannaia 21 Avgusta 1916 g. deputatiiam ot naseleniia g. Tashkenta', *Turkestanskie vedomosti,* 28 August 1916. For similar statements, see A. N. Kuropatkin, 'Prikaz po Turkestanskomu kraiu Nr. 220', *Turkestanskie vedomosti,* 23 August 1916.

59. Kuropatkin, 'Rech''.

60. Michael Cherniavsky (1961), *Tsar and People. Studies in Russian Myths,* New Haven and London, 83–4.

61. See, for example, N. O. Rozenbakh, 'Tsirkuliar Turkestanskogo General-gubernatora po uchebnomu vedomstvu', *Turkestanskie vedomosti,* 14 October 1886; S. M. Dukhovskoi, 'Islam v Turkestane', RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 612, ll. 107–17, here l. 109ob.

62. See, similarly, Kuropatkin (1910), 125.

63. Kuropatkin, 'Rech''. Similarly, A. N. Kuropatkin (1929a), 'Raport A. N. Kuropatkina na imia Nikolaia Romanova', *Krasnyi arkhiv* 34, 67–94, here 86.

64. Kuropatkin, 'Rech''.

65. Kuropatkin, 'Rech''.

66. Wortman (2000), 177–88.

67. See also Kuropatkin, 'Prikaz'; 'V geograficheskom obshchestve', *Turkestanskie vedomosti,* 18 September 1916.
68. How little value Kuropatkin attached to an indigenous legitimation of Tsarist rule in Turkestan becomes apparent in his sketches for an autobiography, where he confounded the terms *Yarym-Padishah* (Half-Tsar, as Kaufman had been called) and *Ak-Padishah* (White Tsar); see Kuropatkin (1994), 190.
69. *Slovar' sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo iazyka*, ed. Akademiia Nauk SSSR, vol. 12 (1961), s.v. 'russkii,' 'rossiiskii'. See also Hosking (1997), XIX.
70. See for example Kuropatkin (1929a), 86–7.
71. Kuropatkin, 'Rech''; Kuropatkin (1929a), 86.
72. Kuropatkin (1929a), 86; Kuropatkin, 'Rech''.
73. Kuropatkin (1929), 60–1; 'Proekt obrazovaniia Przheval'skogo uezda s chistorusskim naseleniem', TsGARUz, f. I-1, op. 27, d. 246. See also Brower (2003), 167.
74. Happel (2010), 142.
75. 'The Abolition of Restrictions Based on Religion and Nationality, 20 March 1917', in: Robert Paul Browder (ed.), *The Russian Provisional Government 1917. Documents,* vol. 1, Stanford, 211–12.
76. Benedict Anderson (1991), *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* London and New York, 86–8.
77. Anderson (1991), 87.
78. For the distinction between *natsional'nost'* and *narodnost'*, see Aleksei Miller (2010), 'Priobretenie neobkhodimoe, no ne vpolne udobnoe. Transfer poniatiia Natsiia v Rossiiu, nachalo XVIII-seredina XIX v.', in: Martin Aust, Rikarda Vul'pius, and Aleksei Miller (eds.), *Imperium inter pares. Rol' transferov v istorii Rossiiskoi imperii, 1700–1917*, Moscow, 42–66, here 57; Renner (2000), 50–57.
79. Anderson (1991), 87.
80. Theodore R. Weeks (1996), *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia. Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914*, DeKalb, 195.

The Monarchs' New Clothes: Transnational Flows and the Fashioning of the Modern Japanese and Siamese Monarchies

David Malitz

INTRODUCTION

The last decades of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries saw the creation of royal nations and modern monarchs. Through intimately intertwined processes, nations were imagined with dynasties as their symbolic core, while monarchies reinvented themselves as national institutions. This development was not limited to Europe, but was a global phenomenon, as evidenced by the monarchies of Japan and Siam/Thailand.[1] The reigns of the two Asian monarchs, King Chulalongkorn (1853–1910, reigned since 1868) of Siam and Emperor Meiji (1852–1912, reigned since 1867) of Japan, did not merely coincide with the European era (between 1870 and 1914) of the 'mass-production' of invented traditions when modern monarchies were created, but were part of this transnational process.[2] This is evident in the contemporary depiction of the two monarchs. Their official

D. Malitz (✉)
Martin de Tours School of Management and Economics, Assumption University of Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand

155

portraits and photographs mostly show them dressed in Western military uniforms rather than in indigenous costumes, with moustaches and short hair, closely resembling their royal peers in Europe.

At the same time, such sartorial similarity points to the difference between them and their European peers. In Japan and Siam, the adoption of new behavioural norms and consumption patterns at court, such as the introduction of military uniforms and the invention of new pageantries during which the uniforms were worn, was the outcome of a negotiation between national authenticity and universal modernity. In the late nineteenth century, the latter was of course more often than not presented as European and Christian in nature. In this sense, both can be said to resemble the colonized world rather than Europe.[3] Another commonality between the monarchs is that they represented more than national authenticity and continuity.[4] The modern monarchs worshipped today as guardian deities of their nations can be seen as embodying the successful negotiation between authentic national identities and modernity that made the latter compatible with the former.[5]

Comparisons between nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japan and Siam have become unfashionable since Benedict Anderson's criticism of such attempts in the line of classical modernization theory.[6] This chapter, however, differs from such comparisons in that it neither presupposes existing nations before the nineteenth century nor attempts to investigate similarities and differences in the two countries' trajectories towards capitalist modernity in general. Instead, it focuses on one aspect of the creation of their respective modern monarchies, the monarchs' new clothes.

Semi-Colonial State-Building

In the early nineteenth century, diplomatic intercourse and trade between Europe and the United States on the one hand and Japan and Siam on the other hand was very limited. Against the backdrop of the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26) and the First Opium War (1839–42), however, rulers of both countries accepted unequal treaties which granted extraterritorial jurisdiction and favourable customs duties to European countries as well as the United States.[7] Yet, this treaty system of informal colonialism cannot be described as a zero-sum game in which the sovereignty of existing Japanese and Siamese nation states was compromised. When the two traditional monarchies with their respective centres in the *shōgun*'s court in Edo and the royal court in Bangkok were integrated into the global

economy in the early to mid-nineteenth century, both differed considerably from the ideal type of the modern nation state. Both were ritual polities possessing heterogeneous and socially stratified populations. Neither centre exercised much direct control over territory and populations.[8] The acceptance of the stipulations of the unequal treaties and thus of an inferior status provided King Chulalongkorn in Siam as well as the political leaders of Meiji Japan with the international recognition and the material and symbolic capital to build modern centralized states with monarchs as heads of state. Homogeneous nations were built around these monarchies providing the new nation states with legitimacy by virtue of a sense of continuity and authenticity. This necessitated fundamental changes in the way the monarchy was represented and how it interacted with subjects and foreign sovereigns. Previously unseen by the vast majority of their subjects, and in the Japanese case invisible to foreign envoys, the modern monarchs took possession of their realms by traversing them, and presented themselves as the equals of European royalty and thus as the betters of their subjects through pageantries and the distribution of their portraits. A crucial element of this process was the replacement of traditional court costumes with military uniforms favoured by European monarchies, thus presenting the two East Asian monarchs as members of a transnational ruling elite of civilized royalty. This was possible because, as David Cannadine pointed out for the British case, the mutually recognized status of royalty could still trump differences in race in the late nineteenth century.[9]

Japan Before Meiji

Before the reign of Emperor Meiji, the highest authority of the Japanese archipelago was the *shōgun*, a member of the estate of the *samurai* rather than of the distinct court nobility of which the emperor was the highest-ranking member. Since 1603, this office was occupied by members of the Tokugawa family. The political organization of Tokugawa-era Japan was legitimized by a complex assemblage of arguments derived from Buddhist, Confucian, and original Japanese sources which informed spectacles of power with the *shōgun*'s court in Edo (renamed Tōkyō in 1868) as its exemplary centre. The investiture of the *shōgun* by the emperors was only one of several sources of legitimacy and did not pose a challenge throughout the greater part of the Tokugawa period,[10] as the imperial court was literally kept out of sight behind the palace walls in Kyōto, far from Edo.[11] Therefore, the very existence of the emperor was not known to the total

population. Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909), main author of the Meiji constitution promulgated in 1889 and the country's first prime minister, did not know of the emperor's existence when a child.[12] At the beginning of Emperor Meiji's reign, others confused the person of the emperor with otherworldly beings.[13] Especially towards the end of the Tokugawa period, however, the imperial court was increasingly associated with a unique Japanese identity by scholars.[14] This idea was seized by the *shōgun*'s domestic opponents, following the conclusion of a series of unequal treaties which were signed after the arrival of an American squadron that demanded the opening of the country to trade in Edo Bay in July 1853.

At this time, Japan already faced a deep socio-economic crisis. The stability brought by Tokugawa rule had resulted in increasing urbanization and monetization of the economy, impoverishing *samurai* and farmers alike but greatly benefiting the lowly estate of the merchants. The impact of the unequal treaties worsened the crisis by causing inflation and the inflow of cheap manufactured products.[15] The end of the Tokugawa rule, however, can be attributed just as much to ritual blunders which opened the political arena and moved the exemplary centre from the *shōgun*'s to the emperor's court. A simple rejection of the American demand for trade in line with the long-established control of foreign trade was not a feasible option. Therefore, the feudal lords were invited for the first time to give their opinions on a matter concerning the whole realm, demonstrating the weakness of the Tokugawa in this affair.[16] Unable to reach a consensus supporting the conclusion of the unequal treaties and confronted with a movement which combined the demands of loyalty to the emperor with the expulsion of the foreign barbarians, imperial approval of the first of the unequal treaties was unsuccessfully sought from Emperor Meiji's father Emperor Kōmei (1831–1867, reigned since 1846).[17] Finally, the last *shōgun* travelled to Kyōto himself in 1863 to request the revocation of an imperial command to expel the barbarians, the first such visit in over 200 years. The *shōgun* had thus demonstrated his acceptance of the emperor's higher authority.[18] Weakened in this manner, an agreement was reached in November 1867 that would result in shared power between the *shōgun* and the other lords, under the formal authority of the emperor. It fell apart when forces from the powerful Western domains of Satsuma and Chōshū conspired with a faction of the court nobility and seized Emperor Meiji, who had ascended the throne in February 1867, in December of that year and had him declare the return to direct imperial rule on

3 January 1868.[19] Even though Emperor Meiji had little influence on the men governing in his name, and despite the characterization of his reign as a 'modern revolution' of fundamental socio-economic and political change and the mass-production of invented traditions,[20] it was framed as a restoration of imperial rule and a return to the pre-feudal past.

Siam in the Early Nineteenth Century

Siamese kingship in the early nineteenth century was conceptualized according to the cosmography of Theravāda Buddhism, which accords a place in a cosmic hierarchy to all beings, based on merit accumulated over multiple lifetimes. Kings expressed their storage of merit and thus their authority over lesser rulers by ritually and discursively associating themselves with the exemplars of virtuous kingship provided by the Theravāda tradition, but also with the Buddha's incarnations prior to his enlightenment. Brahmin court rituals additionally linked monarchs with deities, who were accommodated within the Buddhist cosmology.[21] Despite this exalted status, the authority of King Chulalongkorn during the first years of his reign was rather limited. Actual power was wielded by members of the nobility, who monopolized influential offices and the kingdom's main revenue sources, depriving the crown of wealth and the opportunity to establish and sustain patronage networks.[22] With the support of nobles who had vested interests in overseas trade, King Chulalongkorn's father King Monkut (1804–1868) came to the throne in 1851. He was regarded as the best candidate to support the conclusion of a treaty with Britain, as the highly profitable trade with China had suffered since the Taiping rebellion and the colonial entrepôts offered promising alternative markets.[23] During a period of 27 years spent in the monkhood prior to his enthronement, King Monkut had not only learned English, but had also regularly conversed about matters of religion and the natural sciences with missionaries who held him in high regard. His rejection of the traditional cosmography in favour of the natural sciences allowed for the creation of a modern Siamese Buddhism reconciling science with the law of *kharma* as the explanation of differences in social status. The Buddhist conceptualization and legitimization of kingship could thus be retained.[24]

Following an invitation from the court in Bangkok, the governor of Hong Kong Sir John Bowring arrived in Siam in 1855 and successfully negotiated the first of Siam's unequal treaties, integrating Siam into the

global economy. The subsequent increase in trade fulfilled the aspirations of the nobles,[25] but the international recognition of the Siamese monarchs as members of transnational and modern royalty would also support the project of King Monkut's son Chulalongkorn to build an absolute and modern Siamese monarchy.

The Emperor's New Clothes

In the weeks following the Meiji Restoration, the new imperial government was far from able to exercise the authority it claimed.[26] Tokugawa forces still controlled Eastern Japan, raising the spectre of foreign intervention, as they rejected the new government's claim to represent the country in a meeting with the foreign ministers.[27] International recognition of the imperial government's legitimacy was therefore a pressing issue. This was complicated by the fact that the new government was necessarily associated with groups of *samurai* who had not only supported the return to direct imperial rule, but also continued to attack Europeans in an attempt to re-establish the seclusion of the archipelago.[28] When the British interpreter Ernest Satow was informally interviewed on 15 January 1868 and asked how recognition of the imperial government could be achieved, he stressed that a 'clear proof of the position held by the Mikado' was necessary. This meant that the Emperor had to officially receive the foreign envoys in Kyōto in accordance with European diplomatic norms.[29] Such an unprecedented reception would be irrevocable proof of the Emperor's acceptance of the unequal treaties and was therefore strongly opposed by the conservative faction.[30] At the same time, the request of an audience by foreign envoys played into the hands of a group of low-ranking *samurai* and court nobles who envisaged the end of the feudal political system. Iwakura Tomomi (1825–83), a minor court noble who would become one of the political leaders of Meiji Japan, had already proposed to achieve 'the return to the Emperor of administrative authority over the country, under the guise of handling foreign affairs' several months prior to the actual restoration.[31] Once the audience had been agreed to, one of the pressing intermediary goals of the new government could be achieved. On 15 February 1868, the foreign envoys declared their neutrality and halted the delivery of armaments to the Tokugawa.[32] The protocol for the imperial audience, which took place the following month, was a negotiated compromise as the memoirs of Algernon Mitford, at the time the second secretary to the British Legation, reveal.[33] Mitford was the only member

of the legation permitted to attend the audience together with the British minister Sir Harry Parkes. Its occurrence was unprecedented in Japan, but it did not entirely follow European diplomatic standards either. Parkes wore full dress uniform including boots and stood opposite the Emperor, whom he greeted with a European bow, on a low dais. Emperor Meiji, who had been sitting on a chair located on a dais under a canopy, rose once Parkes had entered the hall. Both men exchanged short addresses with the help of an interpreter, and the ceremony quickly came to an end. During the audience, the Emperor's physical presentation was still in conformance with the traditional norms of the court. He wore court robes, had shaven eyebrows, blackened teeth, rouged cheeks, and lips coloured in red and gold.[34]

This physical presentation of the Emperor remained the same during a second audience granted to Parkes after the surrender of Edo to imperial forces on 22 May 1868 in Ōsaka, and during a third audience on 5 January 1869 after the Emperor's arrival in Edo. In Ōsaka, the British minister presented the Emperor with a letter of credence from Queen Victoria, which addressed Emperor Meiji as the queen's 'good brother and cousin'.[35] Not only had the imperial government become firmly recognized by the European powers, but the Emperor himself had become adopted into the transnational family of royalty. A curious detail of this second audience shows the negotiated and hybrid nature of the diplomatic rituals. Emperor Meiji was seated on a dais under a palanquin, the blinds of which had been rolled up. When he stood up to receive the letter directly from the hands of Parkes, in accordance with European diplomatic protocol, the lower end of the blinds covered the upper part of his face.[36] The Emperor's body was neither invisible behind the palace walls, as before the restoration, nor highly visible as it would become in the following years.

Equality between the Japanese monarch and European royalty, as members of a transnational royal class, manifested itself in accordance with European diplomatic protocol when the Duke of Edinburgh became the first European royal to visit Japan in the summer of 1869. In addition to an official reception, a private meeting also took place. Yet, the Emperor and his court in their unchanged costumes remained 'living pictures out of the dark centuries' for Mitford.[37]

At the same time, a vigorous debate took place in Japan about appropriate clothing for the reign of Emperor Meiji. Conservatives wanted a literal restoration and unsuccessfully attempted to rediscover and reintroduce pre-feudal dress. They also strongly favoured the retention of sumptuous

rules distinguishing between the different estates.[38] Modernizers on the other hand aimed to build a modern empire by embracing 'civilization and enlightenment'. They thus favoured the adoption of European dress. They could assert themselves, as far-reaching socio-economic reforms such as the abolition of the feudal social order and the introduction of modern institutions like the military made the complete rejection of Western clothing unfeasible.[39] This sartorial modernization was symbolized by the defeat of a large uprising of disgruntled *samurai* in 1877. Contemporary prints show them in their traditional armour unsuccessfully challenging the modern military in Western uniforms, formed after the introduction of universal conscription.[40]

A crucial argument in this debate was the need to make Japan look civilized according to Western standards in order to renegotiate the unequal treaties. This made the acquisition of the 'true philosophy of clothes', as the American educator William Griffis put it, necessary. To be recognized as the 'equals of Occidentals', one first had to appear sartorially similar.[41] This became apparent to the members of a diplomatic mission headed by Iwakura, lasting from December 1871 to September 1873. The high-ranking delegation travelled through the United States and Europe to study how to best pursue progress and renegotiate the unequal treaties. As an accredited imperial embassy, its members were received with the appropriate diplomatic honours and had the opportunity to study the monarchies of Europe and their pageantries first hand.[42] The delegates only wore Japanese costume during the first official reception in Washington DC by President Ulysses Grant. It quickly became evident to them that rather than appearing dignified and expressing a unique Japanese identity as they had probably intended, their costume appeared 'grotesque' and 'feminine' to their hosts. They therefore quickly changed into formal European dress.[43] Before their return, the decision had already been made for the Emperor and high officials to adopt French-style uniforms, short hair, moustaches, and European dress-swords. From October 1872, this would be the image of Emperor Meiji shown to the world on postcards and in books throughout his reign, and the public image of the Emperors of Japan until the end of the Second World War.[44] Mitford described the Emperor as a 'modern of the moderns' after seeing him in his new costume in 1873.[45] The audience and meetings between Emperor Meiji and the former American president Ulysses Grant during his visit to Japan in the summer of 1879 on his round the world tour followed other European patterns beyond the dress-code as well. The Emperor now also

shook hands and conversed with his visitors informally, even though an interpreter was necessary.[46]

The King's New Clothes

Unlike the Japanese emperors, Siamese kings had not remained invisible to Western envoys. In 1822, John Crawford arrived at the court of King Phraphutta Loetlanaphalai (Rama II), grandfather of King Chulalongkorn, as an envoy from the Governor-General of India. This was at a time when there was still little interest in trade with the British and little concern about British military power. The envoy was granted an audience which largely followed Siamese protocol. He had to enter the audience hall unarmed and without shoes. Direct communication between the monarch and the envoy did not take place, and the former was hardly visible to the latter due to distance and lighting, making him appear to the visitor as a statue.[47] The audience granted to Sir John Bowring 23 years later differed considerably, combining elements of Siamese and European diplomatic protocol. Prior to the official reception, the King met the envoy, informally conversing with him in English, offering him cigars directly from his hand. For the audience, Bowring entered the throne hall with his shoes and sidearm and conversed directly in English with the King, who remained seated ten feet above the ground on his throne wearing 'golden garments'.[48]

The change of the presentation of the royal body was not limited to audiences with foreign diplomats. King Monkut was aware that Siamese clothing, or rather the relative lack thereof, was regarded as uncivilized by Western observers. He therefore actively promoted an image of his court which was more in accordance with European norms. He ordered nobles attending royal audiences to wear shirts and sent photos of himself in European uniform to foreign sovereigns.[49]

King Chulalongkorn succeeded his father to the throne in 1868 and continued to present the Siamese monarchy according to European norms. Having been taught English and keen to reform the administration of his kingdom, he travelled to Singapore, Batavia, and British India to study the colonial administration in person during the regency period, which lasted until 1872.[50] For these trips, a hybrid costume was created which combined a sarong folded in a way that made it resemble trousers, with a jacket.[51] This costume has been described as making the Siamese look 'one-half European, one-half Oriental'.[52] In the colonies, the young King was received with the honours befitting his status as a member of

transnational royalty. In Singapore, the ceremonial welcome was the same as for the Duke of Edinburgh, who had visited the island earlier and was to meet Emperor Meiji later that year.[53] King Chulalongkorn also actively played the role of a modern royal by, for example, presenting generous gifts to schools and orphanages when visiting Java.[54]

The King's and his entourage's clothing styles and acceptance of British social norms was positively remarked upon by officials in charge of their visits.[55] After King Chulalongkorn's second enthronement, which followed the end of the regency period in 1873, the British Governor of the Straits Settlement, Sir Andrew Clarke (1824–1902), extended his congratulations, which were also printed in the Singapore press, expressing not only the King's recognition by the British Empire as a legitimate and enlightened ruler, but also as a member of transnational royalty.[56]

The hybrid royal costume remained the Siamese court's uniform until the 1890s and was used when the Austrian diplomat J. Camille Samson visited Bangkok in 1889. In contrast to the audiences his father had given, however, King Chulalongkorn received the diplomats following European protocol, standing and accepting their accreditations directly. This closer interaction with foreign dignitaries made one more change necessary, namely to at least temporarily cease the chewing of betel, which stained the teeth. Samson notes twice in his short description of his stay in Siam that the King's teeth were white.[57]

Self-presentation was necessarily a major concern for King Chulalongkorn when he departed for a tour of Europe in 1897, resulting in the adoption of full European uniform. The tour was a reaction to clashes with French colonial forces in 1893. The clashes had ended in a humiliating defeat for Siam when two French gunboats steamed up the Chaopraya River to threaten the royal palace. The subsequent French-Siamese treaty ceded the territories on the eastern bank of the Mekong and granted extraterritorial rights to people of Lao and Khmer descent residing in Siam. While a subsequent agreement between France and Britain guaranteed an independent Siam in the Chaopraya basin in 1896, the outlying provinces had not been included in this agreement nor was the problem of the extraterritoriality solved. The journey to Europe aimed to strengthen Siam's negotiating position by having the kingdom's status as an equal and sovereign state ceremonially confirmed during official receptions in the European capitals. This would make it difficult for the colonial lobby in France to present King Chulalongkorn as an Oriental despot, with whom it was permissible to deal with force. Both the coverage

in the European press and the diplomatic records show that this strategy was very successful. The English-speaking and well-dressed King, who had now replaced the hybrid court costume with military uniforms, including trousers, and European suits, impressed his hosts with his sound knowledge of European etiquette and was received with full diplomatic honours befitting a modern monarch.[58]

Class, Costume, and the Meiji State

Emperor Meiji was also the first emperor, who was visible and widely seen by his subjects. As one of the political leaders of the restoration, Ōkubo Toshimichi (1830–78), argued in February 1868, to unite the archipelago politically and make the establishment of imperial rule a reality, the Emperor had to come out from the 'jeweled curtains' and be seen ruling by his people.[59] During the first two decades of his reign, Emperor Meiji thus traversed nearly his entire realm, visiting not only famous shrines but also observing his subjects, and being observed by them.[60] As was the case with audiences given to foreign dignitaries, he could only be seen wearing the court costume of the past during the first years of his reign. From October 1872 onwards the Emperor appeared only in his uniform.[61] The imperial portrait, which was distributed to schools throughout the county from the early 1880s onwards, shows him in uniform with short hair and moustache, grasping the handle of a dress-sword. By the late 1890s, all schools had a copy of their sovereign's portrait.[62] This did not mean discarding the traditional costume altogether. From the promulgation of the imperial constitution in 1889 onwards, it was known that while the Emperor wore military uniform in public, he was clad in the court's traditional robes when conducting rites within the palace sanctuary.[63]

The Emperor's new clothes made him appear civilized in the eyes of the Western world and enabled him to avoid looking anachronistic when ceremonially opening modern institutions such as railway lines in his court costume. Simultaneously, this sartorial strategy was part of the Meiji state's larger project to pursue 'civilization and enlightenment' and the goals of 'a rich nation and a strong army'.[64] A common dress code was deemed necessary for the Meiji state's new elite, initially consisting of the sartorially distinct court nobility, feudal lords, and lower-ranking *samurai*. The adoption of a new uniform, alien as it was to all of them, symbolized the abolition of the feudal system as well as confirmation of their new common class identity.[65] For them as well as for the elected notables of

the prefectural assemblies introduced in 1878 and of the lower house of the Imperial Diet, which first met in 1890, the adoption of Western dress not only served to symbolize Japan's equality with the European powers, but also their higher status relative to the vast majority of Japanese who neither possessed the knowledge nor the economic resources to adopt the new fashion. This is evident in the satirical songs and magazines which appeared from the 1880s onwards and targeted precisely this adoption of Western fashion.[66]

The association of social class with Western fashion was noted in contemporary travelogues as well. The Americans who had come with the former president Grant noted that in the countryside only the policemen in their uniforms were wearing Western clothes.[67] Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who visited Japan in 1893, noted that European dress was practically the norm among the Japanese upper classes.[68]

Class, Costume, and Siamese Absolutism

An important difference between the establishment of modern monarchies in Japan and Siam in the late nineteenth century lies in their respective domestic objectives. In Japan, as in Europe, the modern, and from 1889 also constitutional, monarchy, served to mobilize the total population.[69] In contrast, the modern monarchy in Siam was founded to 'wrest political power from the great nobles'.[70] Only after the reign of King Chulalongkorn were attempts made to mobilize the population beyond the ranks of the nobility and bureaucracy.[71] Nevertheless, the adoption of a new costume also became a symbol that signified the common status of an emerging new elite in Siam.

As was the case in Japan, international recognition of the court was a valuable asset in Siam, which was employed in the project to establish a new centralized authority. King Monkut's weak position vis-à-vis the nobility had been demonstrated by cases where the nobility refused to attend court ceremonies.[72] The conclusion of the unequal treaties, beginning with the treaty negotiated with Great Britain and the diplomatic protocol surrounding the new diplomatic relation now confirmed his supreme status, as did the King's continuous correspondence and exchange of presents with other heads of state.[73] The significance of the recognition of the Bangkok court by Great Britain would become evident in the early years of King Chulalongkorn's reign, when, as he would later remember, he was a mere puppet king.[74] The King's attempts after the end of the regency to

centralize the country's administration and revenue collection challenged the nobility directly, nearly leading to clashes between the King's men and the forces of the highest ranking noble known as the Second King in 1876. This raised the spectre of foreign intervention and ultimately direct colonization, as the noble sought refuge in the British consulate and additionally involved the French consul. King Chulalongkorn's authority was confirmed by the strong support he received from Sir Andrew Clarke, who had hosted him earlier in Singapore and now travelled to Bangkok. Clarke's private letters show that he had a high opinion of the young King, but they also reveal that the notion of an absolute monarchy was projected upon Siam at a time when this was an objective of the envisaged reforms rather than the political reality.[75] The crisis was thus resolved in favour of the King, who nevertheless realized his weak domestic position and refrained from directly challenging the nobility for the time being. King Chulalongkorn's reforms were therefore only to begin in earnest during the 1880s, when he could employ the royal prerogative to appoint high officials to place close relatives and confidants in the most important positions once the former occupants had died. The subsequent introduction of a centralized administration and other modern institutions resulted in a new class of bureaucrats loyal to the King alone, the highest ranking of whom were his close relatives.[76] In this process, the opportunity for conspicuous consumption increasingly became exclusive to the high aristocracy. They grew more distinct from the noble families, which was expressed not only by the consumption of products from Europe, but also by the opportunity to study in Europe, as well as through court ceremonies and language.[77]

The changed dress code introduced during King Chulalongkorn's early journeys abroad became the uniform of the court, worn by the kingdom's new governing elite. Its adoption presented its members not only as civilized in Western eyes, but also differentiated them from the vast majority of the realm's population.[78] This association between the new dress and status was made explicit in the autobiography of King Chulalongkorn's half-brother Watchirayanwarorot (1860–1921), published in 1915 when he was the Supreme Patriarch of the Siamese monkhood. Recalling his first order of clothes, he wrote that 'To have my clothes made at a Chinese shop was as they said not appropriate for me. They had many kinds of cloth, but I would have been ashamed to wear them. Having my clothes made at the European store was more expensive and therefore I desired to go there first.'[79]

THE NATURALIZATION OF FOREIGN DRESS

The reigns of King Chulalongkorn and Emperor Meiji saw far-reaching socio-economic and political transformations. One way to explain these changes and to legitimize the political authorities overseeing them was to invoke continuity and thus to localize the foreign. The state's demands on its people, such as paying taxes and serving in the military, for example, were justified in Japan as new incarnations of ancient practices, as evident in Itō Hirobumi's commentaries on the Meiji constitution.[80] In Siam the fulfilment of these demands was explained as the practice of Buddhist virtues in textbooks written by the Prince-Patriarch Watchirayanwarorot.[81] Similarly, it appears that at least initially the foreign dress newly adopted by the very monarchs embodying continuity had to be localized.

On 4 September 1871, the 'Imperial Edict on the Reorganization of Dress' was issued in Japan. The edict, which was aimed at Japanese court nobility reluctant to accept Western clothes, stipulated that because the court's traditional robes were 'weak' and based on 'medieval Chinese clothes', a return to the clothes worn at the time of the mythical foundation of the empire was in order. This ancient costume was understood to resemble trousers and long-sleeved shirts rather than the court's robes. The compulsory introduction of Western court uniforms for the nobility in the following year was thus framed as a restoration of authentic Japanese dress rather than the introduction of a foreign costume.[82]

In Siam, King Chulalongkorn had been reluctant to introduce full Western dress early in his reign and had developed the hybrid costume, which was discarded for his first journey to Europe in 1897. Here one could argue that just as the concept of civilization was localized by writing the transliterated term '*siwilai*' in a manner which implied a Sanskrit rather than English origin,[83] the royal uniforms became Siamese by virtue of the terms describing them. In his letters from Europe, King Chulalongkorn consistently used Siamese terms to refer to worn uniforms and orders exchanged between him and his hosts.[84] In contrast, transliterations are common for other terms, ranging from European titles like 'grand duke',[85] technological innovations such as 'motor cars',[86] and other terms for which no Siamese equivalent existed, such as 'evening dress' or 'dinner'/'gala dinner'.[87] This linguistic taking possession of European dress is most evident in a letter from the King's second visit to Europe. When having his portrait painted in Heidelberg, he initially thought of wearing casual European dress, but was convinced by the artist to wear full

military uniform. In a letter home, he remarked that it would have indeed been odd to be painted in casual dress, because he would have looked like a European. His uniform, in contrast, was well known in Bangkok.[88] Arguably, the successful negotiation between authenticity and modernity seen today as being embodied by King Chulalongkorn, was possible due to the King's remaining a Buddhist sovereign.[89] Traditional performances of merit-making, expressing the authenticity of kingship, could be conducted in the King's new clothes, which expressed his modernity, just as well.

Summary

The creation of modern monarchies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was not limited to Europe, but also extended to Asia. In the mid-nineteenth century, the polities of Tokugawa Japan and the Kingdom of Siam were integrated in the world economy through unequal treaties which granted the colonial powers extraterritorial rights and favourable customs duties. While this system of informal colonialism limited the sovereignty of both countries, it also necessitated the recognition of King Monkut, his son King Chulalongkorn of Siam, and Emperor Meiji of Japan as legitimate rulers and members of a transnational family of royalty, thus strengthening their domestic authority.

Despite the fundamental differences in the subsequent socio-economic and political developments and in the respective roles of the individual monarchs in those processes, Japan and Siam share that their modern monarchies were constructed during the age of invented tradition. Today, these modern monarchies continue to serve as the symbolic cores of royal nations. The adoption of military uniforms en vogue among their European royal peers by the two monarchs served a double function. On the one hand it demonstrated their similarity and thus equality with European royalty. At the same time, European fashion and the uniforms of the monarchs and their officials served as a status symbol, differentiating the ruling elite of the modern monarchies from the vast majority of their subjects.

What separates the modern monarchies of Japan and Siam from those of Europe is that the former embody a successful negotiation between national authenticity and modernity. Such a negotiation was also necessary for the adoption of Western dress, which was obviously foreign yet adopted for formal functions by the sovereigns embodying continuity and authenticity.

Different strategies were employed to overcome this contradiction. In Japan, conservative nobles favouring the retention of the established court costume were reminded in an imperial edict that their dress was of Chinese origin. The subsequent introduction of European uniforms was framed as a restoration by establishing similarity between the new foreign and the ancient authentic clothes, in order to overcome domestic resistance. Later on, distinct times and spaces were allotted to the embodiment of authenticity and modernity respectively. The Emperor's traditional court vestments were worn in private in the palace sanctuaries, the military uniforms during public appearances.

In Siam, in contrast, King Chulalongkorn had first favoured a hybrid design that combined a Siamese sarong worn in a fashion that resembled trousers with a jacket. For his first trip to Europe in 1897, however, European military uniforms with trousers were adopted, which were retained after his return. The aporia between foreign and modern costume on the one hand and continuity and authenticity symbolized by the monarchy on the other hand was partly overcome by virtue of the use of Siamese terms in describing them, thus making them Siamese.

Notes

1. Thailand was officially known as Siam until 1939. Accordingly, the latter name is used here. The terms 'modern' and 'traditional' are used as heuristics in this chapter. Neither a clear-cut dichotomy between the two nor the existence of a homogeneous and stable 'tradition' before the incorporation into the treaty system are implied for either case. The same applies for the synonymous use of the terms 'Western' and 'European'. In fact, neither the Japanese political leaders who travelled to Europe and the United States nor King Chulalongkorn, who travelled to Europe twice, considered the 'West' to be homogeneous. Nevertheless established terms for the 'West' were often used for simplicity's sake.
2. Eric Hobsbawm (2010), 'Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870–1914', in: Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, 263–307, Cambridge, here 263.
3. Partha Chatterjee (1999), 'Whose Imagines Community?', in: Gopal Balakrishnan and Benedict Anderson (eds), *Mapping the Nation*, 214–25, London and New York, here 217.

4. Prasenjit Duara has made the point that royalty can embody time-lessness. (Prasenjit Duara (2004), *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*, Lanham, here 31).

5. Irene Stengs (2009), *Worshipping the Great Moderniser: King Chulalongkorn, Patron Saint of the Thai Middle Class*, Singapore and Seattle, here 19. Donald Keene (2002), *Emperor of Japan Meiji and His World, 1852–1912*, New York, here x.

6. Benedict Anderson (1978), 'Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies', in: Eliezer Ayal (ed.) *The State of Thai Studies: Analyses of Knowledge, Approaches, and Prospects in Anthropology, Art History, Economics, History, and Political Science*, 193–247, Athens, here 198–201.

7. Jürgen Osterhammel (1995), *Kolonialismus: Geschichte – Formen – Folgen*, Munich, here 24, 39. The Bowring Treaty with Britain, signed in 1855, was the first unequal treaty with Siam. The first such treaty signed by Japan was the Harris Treaty of 1858, signed with the United States.

8. Luke S. Roberts (2012), *Performing the Great Peace: Political Space and Open Secrets in Tokugawa Japan*, Honolulu, here 3–8. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Christopher J. Baker (1995), *Thailand, Economy and Politics*, Oxford, here 211–6.

9. David Cannadine (2001), *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire*, Oxford, here 8–10.

10. Watanabe Hiroshi (2010), *Nihon seiji-shisōshi: Jūnana-jūkyū seiki*, Tōkyō, here 55–68.

11. Richard A. B. Ponsonby-Fane (2013), *Studies in Shinto and Shrines*, here 105, 116–7.

12. Mori Kōichi (1979), 'The Emperor of Japan: A Historical Study in Religious Symbolism', *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 6/4, 522–565, here 527.

13. Fujitani Takashi (1998), *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan*, Berkely, 7–9.

14. Klaus Antoni (1998), *Shintô und die Konzeption des Japanischen Nationalwesens (Kokutai): Der religiose Traditionalismus in Neuzeit und Moderne Japans*, Leiden, here 131–73.

15. Andrew Gordon (2003), *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present*, New York and Oxford, here Chapter 2, 50–1.

16. Gordon (2003), here 51.

17. Gordon (2003), here 52.
18. Gordon (2003), here 55.
19. Gordon (2003), here 58.
20. Gordon (2003), here 60.
21. Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit (2009), *A History of Thailand*, Cambridge, here 19–21, 31–2.
22. Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead (2004), *The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism*, Abingdon and New York, here 32–5, 38–9.
23. Kesboonchoo Mead (2004), 26–29.
24. Craig J. Reynolds (2006), *Seditious Histories: Contesting Thai and Southeast Asian Pasts*, Seattle, here 172–177.
25. Kesboonchoo Mead (2004), here 31–2.
26. William G. Beasley (1972), *The Meiji Restoration*, Stanford, here 314–5.
27. Ernest Satow (1921), *A Diplomat in Japan*, London, here 304.
28. Beasley (1972), here 314.
29. Satow (1921), here 307.
30. John Breen (2011), *Reigi to kenryoku: Tennō no Meiji Ishin,* Tōkyō, here 126.
31. Beasley (1972), here 315.
32. Satow (1921), here 324, 328–32.
33. While initially it was planned that all envoys were to meet the Emperor jointly on 23 March 1868, an attack on the British delegation on their way to the palace delayed the audience with the Emperor and the British representative until the 26th.
34. Algernon B. Freeman-Mitford, Baron Redesdale, (1916), *Memories, Vol. II*, New York, here 459–61.
35. Breen (2011), here 129.
36. Satow (1921), here 369–71, 400–1. Breen (2011), here 128–31.
37. Freeman-Mitford (1916), here 495–500.
38. Osakabe Yoshinori (2010), *Yōfuku, sanpatsu, datsutō: Fukusei no Meiji Ishin*, Tōkyō, here 13–9.
39. Osakabe (2010), here 29–38, 41.
40. Osakabe (2010), here 111–2.
41. William E. Griffis (1915), *The Mikado: Institution and Person*, Princeton, here 194.
42. Ian Nish (2009), 'Introduction', in: Kume Kunitake (author), *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe*, xi–xxix, Cambridge, here xxiv.

43. Samuel Mossman (1873), *New Japan: The Land of the Rising Sun; Its Annals During the Past Twenty Years Recording the Remarkable Progress of the Japanese in Western Civilization*, London, J. Murray, here 433. Also Freeman-Mitford (1916), here 458, 460.

44. Julia Meech-Pekarik (1986), *The World of the Meiji Print: Impressions of a New Civilization*, New York, here 102–5.

45. Freeman-Mitford (1916), here 500.

46. John R. Young (1879), *Around the World with General Grant: A Narrative of the Visit of General U. S. Grant, Ex-President of the United States, to Various Countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa, in 1877, 1878, 1879, Volume II*, New York, here 522–3, 526–534, 541–2.

47. John Crawford (1830), *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China: Exhibiting a View of the Actual States of Those Kingdoms, Vol. I*, London, here 139–47.

48. John Bowring (1857), *The Kingdom and People of Siam With a Narrative of the Mission to that Country in 1855, Volume II*, London, here 267–73, 300–12.

49. Maurizio Peleggi (2002), *Lords of Things: The Fashioning of the Siamese Monarchy's Modern Image*, Honolulu, here 46–8.

50. Udomporn Teeraviriyakul (2014), *Bangkok Modern: The Transformation of Bangkok with Singapore and Batavia as Models (1861–1897)*, Bangkok, here 6.

51. Peleggi (2002), here 48–9, 59.

52. Young (1879), here 254.

53. 'Our Policy Towards Native Rulers', *Straits Times Overland Journal*, 15 March 1871, here 2.

54. 'Java', *Straits Times Overland Journal*, 12 April 1871, here 3.

55. Sahai Sachchidanand (2003), *India in 1872: As Seen by the Siamese* (trans. into Thai by Kanthika Sriudom), Bangkok, here 496.

56. 'Congratulations', *Straits Times Overland Journal*, 18 December 1873, here 4.

57. J. Camille Samson (1901), *Meine Reise nach Siam 1888–1889*, Vienna, here 84–89, 96.

58. Niels P. Petersson (2000), *Imperialismus und Modernisierung: Siam, China und die europäischen Mächte 1895–1914*, Munich, here 97–8.

59. Breen (2011), here 105–6.
60. Fujitani (1998), here 13–4, 47, 83–4.
61. Meech-Pekarik (1986), here 105.
62. Fujitani (1998), here 84, 177–8.
63. Fujitani (1998), here 107–10, 113–4, 119–20.
64. Carol Gluck (1985), *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, Princeton, here 18.
65. Osakabe (2010), here 12–4, 40–5. This mixture of costumes had been noted by Satow when he witnessed the Emperor's arrival in Tōkyō (Satow (1921), here 391).
66. Jason G. Karlin (2002), 'The Gender of Nationalism: Contesting Masculinities in Meiji Japan', *Journal of Japanese Studies* 28/1, 41–77, here 76–7. Gluck (1985), here 62, 70.
67. Young (1879), here 552–3.
68. Franz Ferdinand Carl Ludwig Joseph Maria von Österreich-Este (1896), *Tagebuch meiner Reise um die Welt, 1892–1893, 2. Band*, Vienna, here 287.
69. Fujitani (1998), here 9–18.
70. Kesboonchoo Mead (2004), here 2.
71. Baker and Phongpaichit (2009), here 106–7.
72. Kesboonchoo Mead (2004), here 34–5.
73. Barend J. Terwiel (2011), *Thailand's Political History: From the 13th Century to Recent Times*, Bangkok, here 161.
74. David K. Wyatt (2008), *Studies in Thai History: Collected Articles*, Chiang Mai, here 275.
75. Robert Hamilton Vetch (1905), *Life of Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir Andrew Clarke*, London, here 133–43.
76. Wyatt (2008), here 281.
77. Nakharin Mektrairat (2010), *Kan patiwat Sayam P.S. 2475*, Bangkok, here 33–50.
78. Peleggi (2002), here 59, 61–2.
79. Prince-Patriarch Watchirayanwarorot (2001), *Phraprawat Tratlao*, Bangkok, here 34.
80. Itō Hirobumi (1906), *Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan*, Tōkyō, here 43–6.
81. Prince-Patriarch Watchirayanwarorot (1963), *Essays on the First and Second Steps of Advantage*, Bangkok, here 31–2.
82. Osakabe (2010), here 42–5.

83. Peter A. Jackson (2010), 'Afterword: Postcolonial Theories and Thai Semicolonial Hybridities', in: Rachel V. Harrison and Peter A. Jackson (eds), *The Ambiguous Allure of the West: Traces of the Colonial in Thailand*, 187–205, Hong Kong and Ithaca, here 198–9.

84. King Chulalongkorn (2003), *Die Erste Europareise des Koenigs Chulalongkorns 1897*, Center for European Studies Chulalongkorn University (ed), Bangkok, here 77, 91, 141, 153, 174, 185, 212, 257, 259, 269, 284. King Chulalongkorn (1997), *Klai ban Fern von Zuhause Far from Home Loin des Siens*, Bangkok, here 27, 37, 86, 90.

85. King Chulalongkorn (1997), here 44.

86. King Chulalongkorn (1997), here 53.

87. King Chulalongkorn (1997), here 37. King Chulalongkorn (2003), here 213, 232.

88. King Chulalongkorn (1997), here 27.

89. Stengs (2009), 31, 36, 42, 67.

'Mein Hessenland blühe und in ihm die Kunst'. Ernst Ludwig's Darmstädter Künstlerkolonie: Building Nationhood through the Arts and Crafts

Anne Anderson

For a brief moment, around 1900, many philosophers, theorists and artists, believed that the arts, meaning architecture, sculpture and painting as well as the so-called applied arts, had the power to transform daily life. The arts were given a social mandate, to reform 'all the conditions of human life, a symbiosis of art and life, with the express aim of overcoming the outdated conditions of the nineteenth century and achieving the humanist vision of a cultivated and spiritually fulfilling existence'.[1] Forging a link between art and society evidently promised cultural and spiritual rejuvenation as well as economic regeneration. Those in search of national and regional identity—identities threatened by new political alliances,

---

'May my Hessen flourish and the Arts in Hessen too'. Frank Lorenz Müller (2016) 'The German Monarchies', in Matthew Jefferies (ed.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Imperial Germany* (London and New York: Routledge), 67.

A. Anderson (✉)
Exeter University, Exeter, UK

industrialization and urbanization—also saw art as a means of reasserting cultural differences and even supremacy. Across Europe, this development in the arts was dubbed *Art Nouveau* (New Art) and *Jugendstil* (Youth Style) in German-speaking regions, while in Barcelona it was lauded as *Catalan Modernisme*.[2] As the embodiment of social regeneration this New Art signalled reform. This could only be achieved by unifying all the arts, a synthesis expressed as the *Gesamtkunstwerk* or total art work.[3] The concept of Art for Life's Sake was embodied in the House Beautiful, an epithet coined from Clarence Cook's *The House Beautiful: Essays on Beds and Tables, Stools and Candlesticks*.[4] German scholar Jakob von Falke (1825–93) deemed it a 'woman's aesthetic mission' to create a beautiful home, as an appreciation of the 'lesser or industrial arts' would cultivate good taste.[5] Falke declared art had the power to refine manners, to 'divert our thoughts from low and vulgar things'; 'it humanizes us and idealizes our life'.[6] In England William Morris (1834–96) hoped 'everyman's house' would 'be fair and decent, soothing to his mind and helpful to his work'.[7] Wallpapers and textiles were now deemed to be works of art, becoming the remit of the artist rather than just the manufacturer. Leading architect Joseph Maria Olbrich (1867–1908), titular head of the Darmstädter Künstlerkolonie, foresaw a 'house of work' where artists and craftsmen would work alongside one another 'until both would, so to speak grow together as a single person'.[8] But the real challenge lay in convincing the public, converting them to the ethos of the New Art and stimulating a demand for well-designed and crafted commodities.

In England, one of the first nations to industrialize, the catalysts for change were John Ruskin (1819–1900) and William Morris. For Morris, who gave his first public lecture on the *Decorative Arts* in 1877, architecture or the 'art of house-building begins it all'; it stood to reason that 'if we want art to begin at home […] Have nothing in your houses that you do not know to be useful, or believe to be beautiful'.[9] As beauty was a 'positive necessity of life', he was determined to transform the world with beautiful things.[10] In Germany, Alfred Lichtwark (1852–1914), first director of the Kunsthalle Hamburg, fostered *Museumspädagogik* (museum education) in order to inform and elevate the taste of the public; by buying and commissioning modern art he also hoped to transform the Kunsthalle into a leading institution. In Munich and Vienna the revolt came from below, led by artists, designers and architects who were frustrated by conservatism. But in the German principality of Hesse-Darmstadt innovation came from above; Ernst Ludwig Grand Duke of Hesse and by Rhine (1868–1937), 'the most

artistically gifted of the German monarchs', was the agent for reform.[11] His intervention, providing stipends for artists and underwriting exhibitions, was an exemplary reform programme of royally aided nation construction. Frank Müller recognizes 'Cultural Kingship' as a common contemporary phenomenon, as the German crowned heads still wielded considerable influence over the arts and culture.[12] Ernst Ludwig, 'more artist, writer and composer than statesman or soldier', made cultural policies the centrepiece of his activities.[13] The Grand Duke patronized a Darmstädter Renaissance, his civic programme cultivating a strong local identity rooted in modernity; Hesse-Darmstadt was moulded into a distinct and credible Fatherland.

In this chapter I intend to show why Ernst Ludwig embraced *Jugendstil* in order to rejuvenate his principality and as a means of nation building. By exploring his birthright and international connections, it can be shown he was familiar with developments in England and France as well as further afield in Germany. I argue he embraced the Arts and Crafts in order to achieve cultural and economic reform. His outlook was not retrogressive; he hoped the artists and designers he summoned to create the Darmstädter Künstlerkolonie would revive the fortunes of local industries. He also recognized the potential of an alliance of the Arts and Crafts to forge a distinct identity for his principality. Above all he wanted Hesse-Darmstadt to be a beacon of modernity. I also hope to establish the position of Hesse-Darmstadt within the newly created Kaiserreich; commentators have recognized Ernst Ludwig as an exemplary German citizen. His nation building clearly began at home, in Hesse-Darmstadt, but his allegiance was to Germany. His vision was essentially pan-German; all the artists called to Darmstadt were German nationals, except for one foreigner, the Viennese architect Olbrich. It could be said that his reform programme revealed the shortcomings of the Kaiser and the German princes who were not striving to bring Germany into the twentieth century. In the vanguard of reform, both regional and national, Ernst Ludwig promoted a modern Germany. Various initiatives in Weimar and Hagen may have been inspired by Ernst Ludwig's Darmstädter Künstlerkolonie; in the opening years of the twentieth century *Jugendstil* became a pan-German phenomenon.

Ernst Ludwig: A Modern German Prince

Ernst Ludwig had a remarkable vision for his principality when he came to power in 1892. Annexed by Prussia in 1866, becoming one of the 25 federal states which made up the German Empire, the nationhood of

Hesse-Darmstadt had been eroded. The Grand Duke was determined to put Hesse-Darmstadt back on the map by personally leading an artistic renaissance. He built on past precedents, as traditionally patronage had been state-based with artists and musicians depending on German princes for their livelihoods. Ernst Ludwig also needed to ensure his popularity; as Franz Müller argues, he needed to win the loyalty of his subjects, to achieve 'successful salesmanship'.[14] He needed, like Prince Regent Luitpold of Bavaria, to be indelibly associated with his kingdom, to create the 'cult of monarchy'. Ernst Ludwig's concerted attempt to generate a public culture was predicated on a 'cosy monarchical loyalty and regional belonging'.[15] His programme of cultural reform was intended to create a distinct and credible Fatherland: 'In this enterprise strong local identities—the famous notion of *Heimat*—and regional monarchies were tied into a symbiotic relationship.'[16]As Abigail Green argues, state level and national level were interconnected; 'interest in the particular Fatherland was an expression of interest in the greater, national Fatherland'.[17]

Ernst Ludwig's concept of constitutional monarchy was shaped by his birthright. Influenced by his mother, Princess Alice of the United Kingdom (1843–78), his grandmother Queen Victoria (1819–1901) and his five sisters, Ernie, as he was known in the family, grew up in a cosmopolitan milieu.[18] Harry Graf Kessler (1868–1937) observed the Grand Duke was simultaneously 'English Gentleman and German Patriot': 'Of all the German Princes he was the one who made the impression of […] a man of the world most naturally.'[19] Self-assurance shines through Franz von Stuck's elegant portrait (1907), revealing something of a dandy.[20] Ernie's sense of social justice and humanitarianism, as well as his love of the arts and music, was indubitably instilled by Princess Alice.[21] Her mother claimed Alice had 'darling Papa's nature, and much of his self-sacrificing character and fearless and entire devotion to duty!'[22] Open-minded, with a progressive outlook, Alice was an ideal role model for a modern prince. Ernst Ludwig was determined to actively demonstrate his ability to reign, securing his position not by divine right but through personal achievements. Cast in a mosaic near the Municipal Exhibition Hall (1905–08) on the Mathildenhöhe, the site of the Darmstädter Künstlerkolonie, the Grand Duke declared his commitment: 'Have respect for the old—And courage to take a chance with the new—Remain faithful to your own nature—And true to the people you love.'[23] Theodor Heuss, first President of the Federal Republic of Germany, went so far as to declare Ernie's liberalism 'avant-gardist': 'For our youthful con-

sciousness Hesse's last Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig was the spiritually and intellectually most important personality among the German monarchs of his time.'[24]

Compared to the authoritarian Kaiser, Wilhelm II, Ernie's views verged on socialism; he was dubbed the 'Revolutionary Prince' or the 'Red Grand Duke'.[25] Against the conservatism of Prussia, the subnational identity of Hesse-Darmstadt was invested in cultural reform and economic development. On an international stage, the enlightenment nurtured by Ernst Ludwig was projected as German nationalism; the first exhibition on the Mathildenhöhe was entitled *Ein Dokument Deutscher Kunst* (*A Document of German Art*). This was a matter of national pride as well as economic survival. Alexander Koch (1860–1939), founder of *Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration*, feared German artists and craftsmen were 'being held spellbound by a foreign language of form; the idiom of a domestic, individually German art language is in danger of being lost'.[26] Rather than copying Franco-Belgian Art Nouveau or English Arts and Crafts stylistic forms, Germany needed to develop its own, independent, modern art. This dream would be realized at Turin's *Prima Esposizione Internazionale d'Arte Decorativa Moderna* (*First International Exposition of Modern Decorative Arts*) held in 1902. In the *Hamburger Vorhalle des Deutschen Reiches* (*Hamburg Vestibule of the German Reich*), Künstlerkolonie artist Peter Behrens expressed Germany's cultural identity in *Jugendstil* forms.

By personally initiating an arts and crafts reform programme, Ernst Ludwig hoped to regenerate and transform the cultural identity of Hesse. He was clearly aware of the artistic and financial success of Morris & Co. and Liberty's of Regent Street in London and the artistic revival in Nancy, Lorraine, following the Franco-Prussian War. Here the local economy had been turned around by fostering so-called art industries. In 1897, Ernst Ludwig commissioned Mackay Hugh Baillie Scott (1865–1945) and Charles Robert Ashbee (1863–1942) to transform two rooms in the Neue Palais (Fig. 9.1). A year later the *Erste Darmstädter Kunst- und Kunstgewerbe-Ausstellung* (*First Darmstadt Exhibition of Fine and Decorative Art*) showcased the Art Nouveau glass and furniture of Emile Gallé, the progenitor of *l'École de Nancy.* This transnational venture convinced Ernie that the economic fortunes of his small principality, which boasted few natural resources, could be revived by rejuvenating local industries: the seven artists/architects called to create an artists' colony on the Mathildenhöhe in 1899 were expected to reform and stimulate

SITTING-ROOM IN THE
NEW PALACE, DARMSTADT
DESIGNED BY M. H. BAILLIE SCOTT

Fig. 9.1 'Sitting room in the new palace, Darmstadt, designed by M. H. Ballie Scott', in M. H. Baillie-Scott, 'Decoration and Furniture for the New Palace, Darmstadt', *The Studio*, Vol. 16, 1899, 107–115; here 111 (Image: Anne Anderson)

local manufacturers by providing direct examples. Paid a stipend and provided with a communal studio, Ernie's princely patronage was not an exercise in altruism.[27] By forging a Darmstadt *Jugendstil* ethos, nationhood could be vested in cultural progress; Darmstadt would be at the cutting edge, a beacon of German modernity. Inevitably, architect Peter Behrens (1868–1940), one of the original seven called to Darmstadt, foresaw the limitations of working in a provincial capital, leaving the Künstlerkolonie in 1903. Behrens looked beyond Ernie's vision of unifying Art and Life in Hesse-Darmstadt; he hoped his experiential *Nietzschean Stil* (*Great Style*), a synthesis of Art and Life, could be disseminated throughout the German Empire. Behrens would lead the way forward, via the *Deutscher Werkbund*, to the rationality and functionality of the Bauhaus (1919–33). The seeds of Modernism were undoubtedly sown in Darmstadt.

The New Art: An International, National and Regional Phenomenon

In order to appreciate why Ernest Ludwig embraced *Jugendstil*, one needs to understand why and how the New Art emerged in Germany. In January 1896 *Jugend: Illustrierte Wochenschrift für Kunst und Leben* was launched in Munich, giving its name to the movement; this magazine, founded and edited by Georg Hirth, was aimed at a young, upwardly mobile generation, who, on the cusp of the twentieth century, sought to embrace modernity. Through a plethora of such specialist journals, numbering *The Studio* (London, 1893), *Pan* (Berlin, 1895) and *Dekorative Kunst* (Munich, 1897) artists and architects, inspired by the ideology of Ruskin and Morris, advocated a programme of Aesthetic Socialism that sought to unify art and life by reforming the applied arts. Morris, who declared it was the 'right of everyman' to have a 'beautiful home' argued convincingly that wallpapers, textiles, ceramics and even books demanded the same imaginative approach as painting and sculpture.[28] This elevated status encouraged artists to diversify: Edward Burne-Jones (1833–98), Morris' lifelong friend, widened his portfolio to encompass designs for stained glass and tapestry. Inspired by the building of his own home, *Bloemenwerf* in Ukkel, the Belgian artist Henry van de Velde (1863–1957) abandoned painting in favour of designing furniture, textiles, ceramics and metalwork. Behrens followed suit, also inspired by the building of his own house for the first Künstlerkolonie exhibition in 1901.

The quest for unity encouraged architects to design or control all aspects of interior decor, especially furniture and lighting. Individual arts were subordinated to a common purpose, the house being transformed into a *Gesamtkunstwerk*. Exteriors, interiors, furnishings and even landscape were to be conceived and directed by the vision of one man—the architect. Charles Rennie Mackintosh (1868–1928) exemplifies this desire to achieve an overarching harmonization, or *tout ensemble*, which even extended to the choice of door handles and window catches. In their own homes, architect designers even attempted to assimilate the occupants through dress and accessories. Maria van der Velde and Margaret Macdonald Mackintosh were completely harmonized through their attire to the point where one speculates whether they were trapped in the *Gesamtkunstwerk*![29]

Specialist journals and international exhibitions highlight the transnational spirit of Art Nouveau/*Jugendstil*: by 1900 readers were aware of

the cosy English Arts and Crafts houses of C. F. A Voysey (1857–1941), the glass and furniture of Emile Gallé (1846–1904), the stained glass of American Louis Comfort Tiffany (1848–1933) and the latest designs of the Vienna Secession. Although international in scope, the New Art also fostered localized responses such as the Glasgow School and Catalan Modernisme. Here a distinctive regional identity can be seen to reflect resurgent nationalism. In the Nordic countries this was expressed through National Romanticism, which drew on folk culture to articulate nationhood. Darmstadt's distinctive *Jugendstil* was a similar response, asserting the principality's unique position within the German Reich.

The global/local variations of Art Nouveau/*Jugendstil* were made manifest at the international exhibitions held in Chicago (1893), Brussels (1897), Paris (1900), Vienna (1900), Glasgow (1901) and Turin (1902), the latter an exemplary modern city.[30] Turin's *Prima Esposizione Internazionale d'Arte Decorativa Moderna* was explicitly 'up-to-date': 'Only original products that show a decisive tendency toward aesthetic renewal of form will be admitted. Neither mere imitations of past styles nor industrial products not inspired by an artistic sense will be accepted.'[31] Generating intense competition, such global events offered ample opportunity for nationalistic drum-beating; in the run-up to the Turin exposition one French art journal foresaw 'one of the battles in the war involving all nations for supremacy in industrial art, perhaps even a decisive battle'.[32] Responding to this battle cry, Kaiser Wilhelm II generously subsidized the mounting of the Imperial German display.

Darmstadt had its own 'media' activist, Alexander Koch, whose influence on the founding of the Künstlerkolonie was considerable. Educated in Cologne and Stuttgart, Koch married the daughter of Carl Hochstätter, a wallpaper manufacturer. Joining his father-in-law's business, Koch took a keen interest in contemporary interior design, developing a number of influential trade journals. The *Tapeten-Zeitung* (*Wallpaper News*) appeared from 1888, with *Zeitschrift für Innendekoration* (*Interior Decoration*) launched two years later. Van de Velde contributed substantially to *Innendekoration*, again highlighting the transnational character of the New Art; for a few years a French-language edition of the journal was available. Koch himself showed a preference for British design, being especially fond of Mackintosh and Baillie Scott.

Koch's *Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration* (1897) would become the platform for launching the Darmstädter Künstlerkolonie and transmitting its ethos. In the first issue Koch urged his readers to integrate art into their

daily lives, echoing Morris' clarion call that 'everyman' deserved a beautiful home. Like Morris he also advocated good craftsmanship and the use of high quality materials, condemning shoddy mass-produced commodities. Koch railed against the commercialization of Art Nouveau/*Jugendstil* so graphically seen at the Paris Universal Exposition 1900. Already the New Art had been discredited by crass exploitation and commercial imperatives. Commoditization had debased Art Nouveau; perceived as merely another style, a transient fashion, it had been taken up by the masses for the sake of keeping up appearances. The ill-informed subscribed to the trappings of the New Art without its substance. Such superficial phoniness threatened to derail genuine reform. Ideologically, the New Art required making lifestyle choices that went beyond simply selecting wallpapers and carpets; the House Beautiful promised social transformation. For Morris a 'good house' was the outcome of moral, aesthetic and social reform.[33]

Promising so much, the English House was meticulously researched by architect Hermann Muthesius (1861–1927), who as cultural and technical attaché of the Prussian embassy in London from 1896 to 1903 was instructed to report on the English way of life, particularly architectural developments. Muthesius' mission for the Imperial German government was tantamount to cultural espionage undertaken 'for a divided and backward country which had become a major power'.[34] According to Dennis Sharp, Wilhelm II was personally responsible for this mission.[35] Muthesius' final summation, published as *Das englische Haus* (1904–05), privileged function, advocating honesty in construction and truth to materials as alternatives to ostentatious historicism and excessive ornament.[36] The cultural superiority of *Das englische Haus* was not just its comfort; it was also its convenience and practicality. Muthesius also foresaw the potential of a craft revival, as higher standards would be of national economic benefit. Informed by Muthesius' thinking, as articulated in *Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration* and *Dekorative Kunst*, Ernst Ludwig also took the high ground, ensuring the Darmstadt experiment was informed by an Arts and Crafts ethos.

ERNST LUDWIG: PATRON OF THE NEW ART

As patron of the Darmstädter Künstlerkolonie, Ernst Ludwig actively supported a daring experiment which broke with tradition. There was no need for artists to break away or 'secede' from Hessian state institutions: as Olbrich observed, as Darmstadt did not possess an academy

it was not bound by 'confined norms and standards'.[37] Darmstadt was not a battlefield, where the intensive struggle between old and new still persisted; rather it was a place free from all associations, free from 'all regards and obligations to Art Ministries'; here new ideas would 'take a form that doesn't correspond to today's usual sort, but moves far ahead and embraces the future'.[38]

The artistic revolt in Darmstadt was led from the top rather than instigated from below by a disgruntled younger generation. This was not the case in Munich, Berlin or Vienna, where forward-looking artists, designers and architects inevitably had to break with tradition or 'secede' from conservative art institutions. Georg Hirth coined the term 'Sezessionismus' (Secession) to characterize this dissent. The first German artists to 'secede' broke away from the Munich Artists' Association in 1892. Matters had come to a head the previous year when Prince Regent Luitpold of Bavaria had founded *Prinzregent-Luitpold-Stiftung zur Förderung der Kunst, des Kunstgewerbes und des Handwerks in München*, which promoted traditional history painting in the service of the state; conservative factions were opposed to impressionism, symbolism and other progressive trends in the art world. The Berlin Secession was prompted when a landscape by Walter Leistikow was rejected by the state-run Association of Berlin Artists. Similarly in Vienna, a group led by Gustav Klimt resigned from the Association of Austrian Artists, based at the *Künstlerhaus*, in 1897.

For the most part these breakaway groups were supported by wealthy industrialists; the Vienna Secession had the backing of August Lederer and Karl Wittgenstein. A nationalistic impulse led Karl Ernst Osthaus (1874–1921), son of the Hagener banker Carl Ernst August Osthaus, to transform his home town into a leading centre for the European *avant-garde*; he is credited with initiating the Hagener Impuls. Collecting works by Cézanne, Gauguin, van Gogh, Hodler, and Matisse amongst others, Osthaus' ambitions were realized in the Folkwang Museum which opened in 1902. An architectural masterpiece by van der Velde and Behrens, the Folkwang, deemed the world's first museum for contemporary art, was hailed by Danish-German painter Emil Nolde as a 'Beacon for western Germany'.[39] Osthaus also attempted to construct a garden suburb in Hohenhagen, Hagen-Eppenhausen. Although the First World War prevented the completion of this project, the focal point of the villa Hohenhof (1906–08), an exemplary *Gesamtkunstwerk* masterminded by van de Velde, was created as a residence for Osthaus. Munich-born archi-

tect Richard Riemerschmid (1868–1957) was called to design the work-ers' housing complex in Walddorfstraße (1907), eighty-seven dwellings with community facilities including a kindergarten, while the Dutch artist Jan Thorn Prikker was commissioned to design a stained glass window for the main station in Hagen known as 'The Artist as Teacher of Commerce and Industry'. Enlightened patronage transformed Hagan into a symbol of national progress.

There were other German princes besides Ernst Ludwig who real-ized the economic and social benefits of embracing art as the 'Teacher of Commerce and Industry'. As early as 1860, Karl Alexander August Johann, Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach founded the Weimar Saxon–Grand Ducal Art School, engaging the painters Arnold Böcklin and Franz von Lenbach, and sculptor Reinhold Begas. His grandson and successor Wilhelm Ernst, the last Grand Duke, invited van de Velde to Weimar in 1902; the Grand Ducal School of Arts and Crafts, established in 1905, would evolve into the Bauhaus under the leadership of Walter Gropius. Although indelibly associated with the emergence of functional utilitarian Modernism, the Bauhaus programme was initially rooted in the romantic Arts and Crafts tradition.

Whether instigated by artists, entrepreneurs or even princes the zeal for reform was undoubtedly pan-German. Nevertheless Ernst Ludwig led the way as early as 1897, modernizing three rooms in the Neue Palais; Renate Ulmer regards this as 'trend-setting', declaring the Grand Duke to be one of the first princes to 'bring the new style to life in his own quarters'.[40] Baillie Scott was commissioned to redecorate and furnish the dining and drawing rooms, while Ashbee was called upon to design the light fittings; both were made under Ashbee's guidance by the Guild of Handicraft. Ernst Ludwig was able to experience at first hand the aesthetes of the handcrafted, as this 'work possesses [...] what an artist would call "feeling". The surface of the metal bears the evidence of the tool and is delicately modelled.'[41] This feeling was achieved, as far as possible, by granting the craftsman autonomy; each workman was 'responsible for his own work' with as little subdivision of labour as possible. Ideally each piece was 'carried through by one man'.[42] Although craftsmanship was recast as art, speed was also of the essence; Ernst Ludwig wanted the rooms com-pleted as Tsar Nicholas II, his brother-in-law, was due to visit. The Grand Duke showered Ashbee with telegrams and 'visits from imperious German dignitaries'.[43] These new rooms were designed to impress, asserting Ernst Ludwig's commitment to a modern lifestyle.

Writing about the project in *The Studio*, Baillie Scott noted the difficulties often arising when working for a private patron:

> the artist who designs the decoration and furniture of rooms which are to be lived in cannot be quite so independent of his clients […] From the first he is largely influenced by the particular tastes of a particular client and the owner and occupier of a room must needs set a mark of individuality on its final effect in a thousand subtle ways.[44]

All too often this influence was 'baneful', but in this case it was a 'distinct artistic gain': 'The cultivated taste of the Royal Highnesses, the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Hesse, here so much influenced the final result of the decoration of the room that one is dubious in accepting the credit which belongs to the occupier'.[45] Promoting local industry, the breakfast room was furnished by Julius Glückert, a furniture manufacturer who soon recognized the potential of the New Art. A prominent patron of the Künstlerkolonie, Glückert used one of the show houses for the display of his *Hofmöbelfabrik*.

Jugendstil was officially introduced at the Hessian court in 1898, when the *Darmstädter Erste Kunst- und Kunstgewerbe-Ausstellung* (*First Arts and Crafts Exhibition*) was held in the Hall of Art under the patronage of the Grand Duke. Although the exhibits were transnational, with Gallé's glass and furniture displayed in a separate room, a pan-German emphasis was perhaps intended to spur local manufacturers into action. Innovative German applied arts were represented by tapestries from the Art Weaving School Scherrebek, ornamental glass by Karl Koepping, ceramics by Max Laeuger, Theo Schmuz-Baudiss and Max Heider, and metalwork by Richard Riemerschmid. Rather than being arranged by materials, objects were presented within room settings. As Ulmer notes this presentation of 'modern, artistically fashioned dwelling rooms and high quality craftsmanship … showed in an exemplary way the possibility of reviving old craft traditions and thereby gave impulses to the local small-scale industry'.[46] The *Blaue Zimmer* was dominated by the Munich school, with furniture by Wilhelm Michael and the decorative wall patterns of Otto Eckmann (1865–1902). Munich is regarded as the birthplace of *Jugendstil*, being the first German city to respond to the New Art. A campaign demanding the inclusion of the applied arts in the international Munich Glaspalast Exhibition (1897) led to the founding of the Vereinigte Werkstätten für Kunst im Handwerk (United Workshops for Art in Craft). The designs of

Richard Riemerschmid, Bruno Paul, and Peter Behrens were fabricated by a skilled team of craftsmen; by 1899 the *Vereinigte Werkstätten* was a successful commercial enterprise employing more than 50 workers. The economic success of this venture would not have escaped the attention of the Grand Duke. Eleven members of the Darmstadt Artists' Colony were drawn from Munich, numbering Peter Behrens, Patriz Huber, Paul Haustein, Henrich Jobst and Ernst Riegel. Munch would forfeit is role as pacemaker to Darmstadt, Hagen and Weimar.

DARMSTÄDTER KÜNSTLERKOLONIE

Koch hoped the 1898 Arts and Crafts Exhibition would inspire in the 'not too distant future […] an applied art exhibition in modern style with exclusively Hessian products'.[47] This hope was soon realized. Failing to establish a school of art, Ernst Ludwig conceived the idea of a freelance community of artists working alongside one another in a collegial relationship. His concept was clearly shaped by Koch, who issued a memorandum, aimed at the Grand Duke, Parliament and local industrialists, proposing a centre or school of 'modern crafts', a *Künstler-Gewerbe*.[48] Koch feared that Munich, Karlsruhe, Dresden or Berlin, would get ahead leaving Darmstadt behind; only two months later the first artist arrived in Darmstadt.

The first seven artists called to Darmstadt numbered the Viennese architect Joseph Maria Olbrich, pupil and collaborator of Otto Wagner. Painter, architect and later AEG (Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft) industrial designer Peter Behrens, graphic designer and painter Paul Bürck (1878–1947) and interior designer Patriz Huber (1872–1908) came from Munich. Painter, graphic and stained glass designer Hans Christiansen (1867–1938) and medallist and sculptor Rudolf Bosselt (1871–1938) arrived from Paris. Sculptor Ludwig Habich (1872–1919) was the only local man. With Olbrich the only foreigner, Ernst Ludwig assembled a pan-German group, his selection undoubtedly informed by Koch's laudatory articles in *Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration*. In total, 23 artists would be appointed to the colony before its closure in 1918. The original seven were contracted for three years, their basic stipend determined by their age, marital status and reputation. From 1903 the yearly salaries were paid by the Ernst Ludwig Fund, which also received public subsidies. The artists were not precluded from deriving extra income from private commissions; the Grand Duke openly encouraged collaboration with local

craftsmen and manufacturers. As the foremost architect Olbrich naturally assumed leadership of the coterie; a strong bond developed between architect and patron. Ernst Ludwig declared:

> The greatest of them all was Olbrich. I met him by chance. I saw his drawings for the Secession Exhibition in Vienna and a sketch for a portable candlestick, quite personal and different from the direction at that time. I felt immediately there's something fresh, something that suits me, something sunny that I didn't feel for all the others. […] He was enthusiastic about my ideas and he appeared extremely sympathetic to me from the beginning. […] I felt that more levity and taste was necessary for the German spirit and that he was exactly the right man as this finesse lay in his nature. […] He helped realise many of my dreams—of which I was full.[49]

The *Darmstadt Zimmer* was successfully shown at the 1900 Universelle Exposition Paris, encouraging a major exhibition the following year styled *Ein Dokument Deutscher Kunst von bleibendem Wert* (*A Document of German Art with Lasting Value*). A conventional exhibition with temporary structures was rejected in favour of permanent building prototypes.[50] In effect Olbrich laid out a small suburb, the seeds of an exhibition town: Ernst Ludwig's dream of building an Acropolis on the Mathildenhöhe was realized. The House Beautiful, in Olbrich's words a 'space for life', dominated, with every fitting, however humble, artistically conceived.[51] Olbrich's vision was driven in part by Koch and Muthesius: in December 1900 *Innendekoration* launched an international competition for a *Haus eines Kunstfreundes* (*House of an Art Lover*), 'a refined family dwelling' for a 'Kunst-Freund'.[52] The editorial announced 'the competition is intended to help discover and promote young talents', for those who had 'little opportunity to appear before the public' and every object 'was to speak of the hopes and concerns, the dreams and desires of its creators'.[53] Only 'genuinely artistic' modern designs were acceptable; the goal was a 'model home in the modern sense' embracing the latest technological achievements.[54] Being conceived on paper, the project was not constrained by a client; however, there was a budget of 100,000–120,000 marks for the construction. This Dream House was to be judged by a top-notch jury numbering Olbrich, Christiansen, van de Velde, Hans Eduard von Berlepsch-Valendas, Otto Wagner, Alfred Messel and Paul Wallot. Adjudication took place on 16–17 May: of the 36 designs accepted, 16 made the first cut. The first prize was not awarded, as apparently no design

had successfully met the brief. Baillie Scott was awarded second prize, the third slot going jointly to Leopold Bauer, Oskar Marmorek and Paul Zeroch. The results and analysis were published in June: as Mackintosh's project, *Der Vogel* (*The Bird*), had failed to follow the guidelines it was unplaced. Despite this failing, a portfolio of Mackintosh's Dream House was issued, alongside Baillie Scott's and Bauer's, as they shared a 'distinct personal trademark' or individuality.[55]

Reflecting this ideal, eight model homes were created on the Mathildenhöhe embodying a 'Celebration of Life'; Olbrich provided the architectural plans for all, apart from the *Haus Behrens–Haus Ludwig Habich*, *Haus Olbrich*, *Haus Christiansen*, *Haus Keller*, *Haus Deiters*, the *Kleines Glückert Haus* (*Rudolf Bosselt House*) and *Grosses Glückert Haus*.[56] Drawing on both German vernacular traditions and Mediterranean classical prototypes, each house was individually conceived. With its central double-height living hall, the *Haus Olbrich* was derived from English Arts and Crafts precursors. The *Grosses Glückert Haus*, which betrays the influence of Mackintosh in its external, graphic linear ornamentation, was conceived as a *Gesamtkunstwerk*. Patriz Huber supplied the interiors for the *Kleines Glückert Haus* (*Rudolf Bosselt House*) and the *Haus Ludwig Habich*. Olbrich had already declared his intentions:

> We must build a city, a whole city! Anything less would be pointless! The government should give us […] a field, and there we shall create a world. To build a single house means nothing. How can it be beautiful if an ugly one stands next door? What good are three, five, even ten beautiful houses […] if the armchairs inside are not beautiful or the plates are not beautiful? No—a field […] then we shall show what we can do. From the overall design down to the last detail, all governed by the same spirit, the streets and the gardens and the palaces and the cottages and the tables and the armchairs and the lamps and the spoons all expressions of the same sensibility …[57]

The engine of this utopia was 'The Temple of Work', akin to a 'temple in a sacred grove, a house of labour, both artist's studio and craftsmen's workshop […]' where labour was conceived as 'hallowed divine service'.[58] As completed, the communal studio, the *Ernst-Ludwig-Haus* (1899–1901), recalls Olbrich's Secession House (1898) an exhibition hall built for the breakaway Viennese group (Fig. 9.2). The building is approached through a ceremonial arched recess inscribed with the slogan *May the artist show his world that never was and never will be*, attributed

Fig. 9.2 The Ernst-Ludwig-Haus (1899–1901), Darmstädter Künstlerkolonie, in 2015 (Image: Anne Anderson)

to Austrian poet Hermann Bahr.[59] This is flanked by Habich's gigantic figures of Man and Woman, embodying 'Strength and Beauty' and 'Youth and Creativity', the keystones of the new art. This provided the backdrop to the opening on the 15 May 1901, a festival conceived by Behrens and writer and theatre manager Georg Fuchs (1868–1949) with costumes reminiscent of priestly robes designed by Olbrich (Fig. 9.3). Set to music by Willem de Hann, *Das Zeichen* (*The Sign*) was inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (1883–91). At the climax a priest-like character bestowed upon humanity a crystal emblematic of the New Life.[60] *Das Zeichen* was intended to express a new feeling for life, the yearning for beauty and desire for a noble existence. In its appeal to the soul as well as the body *Jugendstil* aspired to make man whole; art was to serve as a 'cultic extension of existence, beauty to penetrate and imbue all areas of life'.[61] Pursuing a practical expression of a Nietzschean lifestyle, Behrens also designed his very own *Zarathustrian* villa replete with crystals, diamonds and the *Edelstein* that 'radiates the virtues of a world that is not yet here'.[62] He hoped to realize Nietzsche's vision of a 'great

FESTLICHE HANDLUNG ZUR ERÖFFNUNG DER AUSSTELLUNG. ◦   VERANSTALTET AM 15. MAI 1901 VO
PETER BEHRENS. DICHTUNG VON GEORG FUCHS, MUSIK VON W. DE HAAN.   DAS AUFTRETEN DES »VE
KÜNDERS«.   NACH EINER ORIGINAL-AUFNAHME VON HOF-PHOTOGRAPH WILHELM PÖLLOT IN DARMSTAD'

Fig. 9.3 'Das Fest-Spiel. Festliche handlung zur eröffnung der ausstellung. Veranstaltet am 15. Mai 1901 von Peter Behrens', in Alexander Koch (ed.), *Grossherzog Ernst Ludwig und die Ausstellung der Künstler-Kolonie in Darmstadt von Mai bis Oktober 1901: ein Dokument Deutscher Kunst* (Darmstadt: Verlag Alex. Koch, 1901), 61 (Image: Anne Anderson)

style' (*Stil*) despite the obvious contradiction between an elite residence for the 'Artist as Superman' and a habitable 'House of the Future for Everyman'.[63] Steven E. Aschheim argues that Behrens' social application of Nietzscheanism sought to 'fuse beauty with power and individual will with state authority'; here Nietzsche 'symbolised not revolutionary transvaluation but Germany's contemporary economic and political power'.[64] Behrens' would clothe German nationalism in Nietzschean symbolism at the 1902 *Turin Prima Esposizione Internazionale d'Arte Decorativa Moderna* (*First International Exhibition of Modern Decorative Arts*).[65]

TURIN 1902

Appointed to the advisory committee, Koch ensured that Behrens, who fulfilled his ideal of the all-round artist, was allocated an important commission, the entrance hall of the Imperial Germania pavilion, the *Hamburger Vorhalle des Deutschen Reiches*. For George Fuchs the *Hamburger Vorhalle*, dubbed the 'Tomb of the Unknown Superman', was the 'Ideal Palace of Power and Beauty' an architectural symbol that embodied the German Empire.[66] Cloaked in architectural forms Behrens' Nietzschean message proclaimed a new dawn; a cave-like structure, illuminated by a stained glass sunburst in the central vault, framed a richly bound copy of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* displayed in a shrine-like cabinet (Fig. 9.4). The cover took as its leitmotif *das Zeichen*, the crystal, symbol of 'Life as Art', echoing the last section of *Zarathustra* titled 'Das Zeichen' (Fig 9.5):

> 'This is my morning, my day begins:
>   rise up now, rise up, great noontide!'
>   Thus spoke *Zarathustra* and left his cave, glowing and strong, like a morning sun emerging behind dark mountains.[67]

Stanford Anderson concludes that Behrens' Palace of Power and Beauty embodied 'the form of life of the citizens, the representational needs of the state and the whole expression of a culture'.[68] Behrens' ambitions transcended even Ernst Ludwig's; his *Nietzschean Stil*, first conceived in Darmstadt, now defined the emerging industrial order of the Reich. The New Order, a quest for synthesis, would find full expression in Behrens' completely integrated branding for AEG.

Nationalistic, even xenophobic, Turin was nevertheless a transnational event. Koch exhibited the portfolios of Mackintosh, Baillie Scott and Bauer,

Prof. Peter Behrens—Darmstadt.   Hamburger Vorhalle
des Deutschen Reiches.   Ansicht vom Eingang nach rechts.

Fig. 9.4 *Hamburger Vorhalle des Deutschen Reiches*, in George Fuchs, 'Die Vorhall zum Hause der Macht und der schönheit', *Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration*, Vol. 11, October/March, 1902–03, 1–43; here 15 (Image: Anne Anderson)

Prof. Peter Behrens — Darmstadt. Buch=Einband mit Hand=
Vergoldung. Ausgeführt von Wilhelm Rauch — Hamburg.

Fig. 9.5   Peter Behrens, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, in George Fuchs, 'Die Vorhall
zum Hause der Macht und der schönheit', *Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration*,
Vol. 11, October/March 1902–03, 1–43; here 26 (Image: Anne Anderson)

which were available for purchase. Mackintosh, who was invited by Francis ('Fra') Newbery, organizer of the Scottish section, to draw up an overall design, travelled to Turin in late April to supervise the installation. On 1 May Mackintosh dined with Olbrich, Hans Berlepsch-Vanedas, organizer of the German section, and Walter Crane, organiser of the English section; Ernst Ludwig later joined the party.[69] Art Nouveau/*Jugendstil* was simultaneously an international, national and regional phenomenon. In bringing the New Art to Darmstadt, Ernst Ludwig promulgated a Darmstadt *Jugendstil* ethos that satisfied both local and national goals.

CONCLUSION

Ernst Ludwig's position, within the multi-monarchical structure of the German Empire, reveals a complex federalism that combined Prussian hegemony with regional loyalties. The Grand Duke's Darmstädter Renaissance did not conflict with the Imperial Idea. Through personal intervention, Ernst Ludwig placed modern art at the centre of Darmstadt's public cultural policy. Given his Anglophone leanings, he was inevitably drawn to the 'Art for Life' ethos; the life of the citizen would be elevated by improving and beautifying their everyday surroundings. Rather than placing before the public an imitative style, the 'exhibition town' created by the Künstlerkolonie advocated function and utility ameliorated by beauty. Architectural spaces, uncluttered, opened out and filled with light, embodied a cultural, even ethical, enlightenment; these new ways of living were seen to reflect the health of the nation.[70] By taking a personal lead Ernst Ludwig hoped to motivate his citizens; as a practical experiment the Künstlerkolonie fostered cultural innovations.[71] His programme of re-education can be read as patriotic. Alongside other city states, Hagen and Weimar, Darmstadt led the way. On the global stage Darmstadt's modernity would be appropriated by the Imperial German Empire.

Believing in monarchical agency, the Grand Duke led by example; when revolution engulfed the nation in 1918, he passed the harshest verdict on his fellow performers, recalling '[many of them] had no idea how to go with the times […] They were swept away without leaving anything behind, for they were, after all, complete nonentities.'[72] Ernst Ludwig has left much behind; through the Künstlerkolonie, Hesse-Darmstadt is still indelibly linked to the personality and liberal ideology of its last ruler.[73] The distinctive cultural identity of Hesse-Darmstadt has been preserved, enshrined in the buildings of the Mathildenhöhe and the Sprudelhof in

Bad Nauheim. By investing in modern art, the last Grand Duke achieved his ambition; today his city state is identified with *Jugendstil* and the emergence of Modernism.

NOTES

1. Lord Mayor Peter Benz (1999), 'Greeting', in: *Künstlerkolonie Mathildernhöhe Darmstadt* 1899–1914 *The Museum Book*, Darmstadt: Insitute Mathildenhöhe Darmstadt, 7.
2. The term Art Nouveau is derived from *Maison de l'Art Nouveau* (*House of New Art*), a Parisian gallery opened by German art dealer Siegfried Bing in 1895.
3. The concept of the *Gesamtkunstwerk* is associated with the aesthetic ideals of composer Richard Wagner, who used the term in two essays dating to 1849. Wagner's 'Artwork of the Future' was to be a synthesis or integration of the arts within the context of the theatre. This meant the unification of all works of art, overcoming the fragmentation that had occurred since antiquity.
4. Clarence Cook (1877) *The House Beautiful, Essays on Beds and Tables, Stools and Candlestick*, New York: Scribner, Armstrong and Co.
5. Jacob von Falke (1878) *Art in the House, Historical, Critical and Aesthetical Studies on the Decoration and Furnishing of the Dwelling*, translated from the third German edition by Charles C. Perkins, Boston: L. Prang and Company, 311–4.
6. von Falke (1878), 316.
7. William Morris (1882), 'The Lesser Arts', in: *Hopes and Fears for Art: Five Lectures Delivered in Birmingham, London, and Nottingham, 1878–1881*, London: Ellis & White, 1–37, here 36.
8. Ian Latham (1980) *Olbrich*, London: Academy Editions, 48.
9. William Morris (1882), 'The Beauty of Life' in: *Hopes and Fears for Art*, 71–113, here 110.
10. Morris (1882), 'The Beauty of Life', 75.
11. Müller (2016), 67.
12. Müller (2016), 66.
13. Müller (2016), 67.
14. Müller (2016), 63.
15. Müller (2016), 63.

16. Abigail Green (2001), *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth Century Germany*, Cambridge: CUP, Chapter 3.

17. Green (2001), 98.

18. His younger sister Alix of Hesse (1872–1918) became Tsarina Alexandra Feodorovna, Empress consort of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia.

19. Harry Graf Kessler (1962), *Faces and Time: Memoirs* [1935], Berlin: S Fischer, 219.

20. Penny Wilson has suggested that Ernst Ludwig married for dynastic reasons imputing he was homosexual. His first marriage to Princess Victoria Melita of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, known as Ducky, was not a success, although he was devoted to his daughter, Elizabeth until her tragic death aged eight. His second marriage, which produced the desired son and heir, appears to have been happy. See 'Diaries and Letters – Ernst Ludwig, Grand Duke of Hesse', http://forum.alexanderpalace.org/index.php, accessed 11 April 2016.

21. Alice's compassion for other people's suffering established her role as the family caregiver. Befriending Florence Nightingale, she took her advice regarding cleanliness and ventilation in hospitals; she founded the Alice-Hospital in Darmstadt in 1869.

22. Jerrold M. Packard (1998), *Victoria's Daughters*, New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 169.

23. Renate Ulmer (1997), *Jugendstil in Darmstadt*, Darmstadt: Eduard Roether Verlag, 251.

24. Hans-Günther Patzke (2015), 'Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig of Hesse and by Rhine – initiator and patron of Jugendstil (Art Nouveau) in Hesse', Reseau Art Nouveau Network, www.artnouveau-net.eu/.../GrandDukeErnstLudwig, accessed 6/12/2015.

25. Patzke (2015), 2.

26. Koch quoted in Ulmer (1997), 52.

27. By initiating art industries modelled on English and French precedents, Ernst Ludwig rejuvenated the local economy; Darmstadt would eventually be recast as a *ville et métiers d'art*. The Grand Duke's Ceramics Factory, supervised by Jakob Julius Scharvogel (1854–1938) operated from 1904 to 1906; the Precious Glass Factory under Josef Sckneckendorf (1865–1949) commenced in 1906; while the Ernst-Ludwig-Presse, directed by Frederick Wilhelm Kleukens (1878–1956) from 1907, could be likened to

Morris' Kelmscott Press. But this alliance of the arts and crafts was no utopian dream; if a venture proved unprofitable it was closed.

28. William Morris (1882), 'Making the Best of It', in: *Hopes and Fears*, 115–68, here 122.

29. Anne Anderson (2010). 'She weaves by night and day, a magic web with colours gay': trapped in the Gesamtkunstwerk or the dangers of unifying dress and interiors', in: Alla Myzelev and John Potvin (eds.)**,** *Fashion, Interior Design and the Contours of Modern Identity*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 43–66.

30. The headquarters of Fiat Automobiles was established in Turin in 1899.

31. Richard A. Etlin (1989), 'Turin 1902: The Search for a Modern Italian Architecture', *The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts*, vol. 13, Stile Floreale Theme Issue (Summer) 94–109, here 95.

32. Roderick Conway Morris (1994) 'Turin 1902', *International Herald Tribune*, 17th December 1994, accessed 12/1/2016.

33. Morris (1882), 'The Lesser Arts', in: *Hopes and Fears*, 1–37.

34. Dennis Sharp (1988), 'Mackintosh and Muthesius', in: Patrick Nuttgens (ed.), *Mackintosh and his Contemporaries*, London: John Murray, 8–17, here 15.

35. Sharp (1988), 15.

36. Muthesius was not the first to coin the expression *Das englische Haus*; Robert Dohme, curator of the Prussian royal art collection, published a book bearing the same title as early as 1888.

37. Joseph M. Olbrich (1900), 'Unsere nächste Arbeit', *Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration,* 6, 366–69, here 366.

38. Olbrich (1900), 366–67.

39. OSTHAUS MUSEUM HAGEN, www.saatchigallery.com/museums/museum-profile/Karl Osthau, accessed 12 April 2016.

40. Ulmer (1997), 22.

41. M. H. Baillie Scott (1898), 'Some Furniture for the New Palace, Darmstadt', *The Studio*, 14, 91–96, here 94.

42. Baillie Scott (1898), 94.

43. Alan Crawford (1985), *C.R. Ashbee Architect, Designer and Romantic Socialist*, New Haven and London: Yale PU, 78.

44. M. H. Baillie Scott (1899), 'Decoration and Furniture for the New Palace, Darmstadt', *The Studio*, 16, 107–15, here 107.

45. Ballie Scott (1899), 107–8.

46. Ulmer (1997), 56.

47. Ulmer (1997), 57.

48. Gerda Breuer (ed.) (2002), *Haus eines Kunstfreunde, Mackay Hugh Baillie Scott, Charles Rennie Mackintosh and Leopold Bauer*, Stuttgart: Axel Menges, 19. Hilary J. Grainger (2004), 'Darmstadt, Germany', in: R. Stephen Sennott (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Twentieth Century Architecture*, Vol.1, A–F, New York and London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 343.

49. Eckhart G. Franz (ed.) *Ernst Ludwig Grossherzogs von Hesses und bei Rhein, Erinnertes*, Darmstadt: Eduard Roether Verlag, 1983 (reprint), 115. Following Olbrich's premature death, Albin Müller (1871–1941) assumed leadership of the Künstlerkolonie.

50. Some of the buildings were temporary: the ticket booths, flower house, theatre, restaurant and the art gallery were swept away. But the eight houses and the studio complex remained permanent fixtures.

51. Breuer (2002), 23.

52. 'Entscheidung des Wettbewerbes zur Erlangung von Entwürfen für ein herrschaftliches Wohnhaus eines Kunstfreundes', *Innendekoration*, 12, 1901, 109–13.

53. Breuer (2002), 11 and 7.

54. Breuer (2002), 13.

55. Breuer (2002), 15. Published as *Meister der Innen-Kunst: Haus eine Kunstfreundes.*

56. Olbrich's dominance caused some resentment; three founding members left after their contracts expired in 1902—Bürck, Huber and Christiansen. Behrens withdrew the following year. Appointed director of the Applied Art School in Düsseldorf he also secured a position for Bosselt. Johann Vincenz Cissarz, Paul Haustein and Daniel Greiner were appointed in their place. It was this team which staged the second exhibition on the Mathildenhöhe in 1904. Despite economic ups and downs, alongside the comings and goings of the artists, more exhibitions followed in 1908, 1914 and even 1918.

57. Latham (1980) 48; Herman Bahr (1901), *Ein Dokument deutscher Kunst: die Ausstellung der Künstler-Kolonie in Darmstadt, 1901*, Munich: Festschrift [Ernst Ludwig, dem Großherzog von Hessen und bei Rhein], 6.

58. Latham (1980), 48.

59. Ulmer (1997), 89.
60. Wilhelm Holzamer's mystic *Lebensfeier* or *Life Ceremony*, commissioned by Ernst Ludwig, also expressed the idealistic spirit of the Künstlerkolonie.
61. Ulmer (1997), 92.
62. Steven E. Aschheim (1981) *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany: 1890–1990*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 33.
63. Aschheim (1981), 34.
64. Aschheim (1981), 34.
65. The exhibition was organized by artists and architects of the Circolo Artistico di Torin, under the patronage of King Vittorio Emanuelle II, who hoped to stimulate the renewal of Italian art and architecture.
66. Stanford Anderson (2000) *Peter Behrens and the New Architecture of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge and London: MIT, 33. The central motif does indeed look like a sepulchre but the two guardian figures are guarding a fountain.
67. Anderson (2000), 33.
68. Anderson (2000), 33.
69. 'Turin Decorative Art Exhibition', *Glasgow Herald*, 27 February 1902, 7.
70. Olbrich (1900), 366–9.
71. Franz (1983), 111–34.
72. Franz (1983), 8.
73. "We have to build a town, a whole town."–The Darmstadt Artists' Colony on the Mathildenhöhe, International Conference, 17–19 April 2016.

Performing Monarchy and Spanish Nationalism (1902–13)

Javier Moreno-Luzón

The Performing Monarchy

During the final third of the nineteenth century and the first 14 years of the twentieth, a new 'performing monarchy' was unveiled in the majority of European states.[1] In many cases, the success of this type of monarchy resided in its capacity to represent the nation, its historical continuity, its greatness, and its unity. Moreover, monarchical institutions, which became more visible than ever at this time, were converted into a fundamental element in nationalist imagery and in the efforts that were then being made to disseminate and promote national identities.

J. Moreno-Luzón (✉)
Departamento de Historia del Pensamiento y de los Movimientos Sociales y Políticos, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

Historians have studied this phenomenon with increasing attention over the last 30 years. This interest began in the 1980s, when a number of influential studies appeared, the most important of them that of David Cannadine on the invention of tradition in the British monarchy between 1870 and 1914.[2] Other historians have questioned some of Cannadine's premises, such as the concept of the invention of tradition (since this was rather more a matter of renovating or modifying traditions that were already established) or his chronology (since the 'performing monarchy' had already existed much earlier).[3] Nevertheless, the importance of the 1870–1914 period has remained: an era in which expansive and culturally based nationalisms proliferated, in the midst of the rise of mass politics and in a social context in which the press was acquiring great importance.

Given the importance of the nation as the basis of politics in the modern world, monarchist regimes had no alternative but to gain legitimacy through it, even in absolutist states. In contrast to the situation half a century earlier, just having a king was no longer suitable for any country, but rather monarchs needed to identify with their respective nationalities and present themselves as the nation's father figures, protectors, and military chiefs, at the service of their progress and their greatness. Furthermore, the monarchies became some of the most effective actors in the processes of nationalization of the masses that were in progress in many countries.

In addition to Great Britain, the most widely studied example, in-depth studies have been made of other cases such as Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, or the Austrian Empire in the last few years.[4] And this recent work has modified our initial impressions regarding the modern performing monarchy. The possibility has been accepted that monarchs with strong political powers could still be converted into national symbols, and not only those, as in Britain, who were losing power in favour of parliamentary governments. Attention has been given to a broad range of actors who were implicated in the transformation of different monarchies. In contrast to perspectives that only considered the plans formulated by governmental or courtly elites, from the top down, other views have come to the fore that underline the relevance of local elites and civil society, from the bottom up. At the same time, as tends to happen with a great many manifestations in cultural history, some authors have regretted the absence of a greater degree of interest in the way that certain messages were received, a factor that is difficult to capture.[5] To which we could add other recommendations, such as to not forget the problematic, and not always consensual, nature of monarchical regimes. In any case, it seems clear that monarchy has become established as one more aspect of the study of political cultures.

My intention here is to incorporate the Spanish case into this body of research on the links between monarchy and nation in the period referred to, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, one that coincided with a critical stage in the process of nation building in Spain. This is a fundamental issue in Spanish history, in which until recently it was commonly asserted that national construction had failed.[6] In particular, I will centre my study on the first decade of the effective reign of Alfonso XIII, from 1902 to 1913, a period during which a number of crucial conditioning factors could be observed; above all, the reinforcement of Spanish nationalism after Spain's defeat in the colonial war with the United States in 1898, known in Spain as 'the Disaster'. This defeat implied, like other similar reverses for Italy or Portugal, a profound crisis of national identity, and provided a very powerful incentive for the formulation of nationalist political projects. At the same time, the rise of substate nationalisms opposed to Spanish nationalism itself, like those of the Basques and above all the Catalans, obliged Spanish nationalists to respond. As a body the nationalist proposals of this era are known as regenerationism (*regeneracionismo*); if the fatherland was degenerate, it had to be regenerated. National regeneration of some kind was a dominant theme in many political projects, often contradictory in their solutions for achieving it.[7] And the young King Alfonso, who attained his majority at the age of 16 in 1902, figured in many of these projects, to the point that many Spaniards of the time, from a variety of political viewpoints, looked to him as the saviour of Spain.

I explore here three manifestations of the Spanish performing monarchy: the great royal ceremonial events, royal visits, and military ceremonies. All three of them had transnational characteristics, not only because of the many features shared between European monarchies in that same period, but also because of the way some of them were particularly influenced in the Spanish case by Spain's historic, and continuing, presence in other continents such as Africa and Latin America. The discourses and practices that were articulated through these rituals indicate the successes, the limits, and even the risks of the conversion of the Spanish monarchy into a national symbol.

Court Ceremonies, Royal Celebrations

In order to be popular and national, a monarchy had to be visible. When Britain's Queen Victoria withdrew into seclusion, republicanism enjoyed a brief moment of notoriety.[8] The Portuguese monarchy, dilapidated and discreet in its public appearances, did not manage to turn itself into a national symbol.[9] This public aspect emerged as the crown's principal

reason for existing. And within this, a prime position was occupied by the great dynastic ceremonies which adapted an etiquette inherited from the *ancien régime*, but now with the addition of being followed by the mass media. The press of all kinds, and very soon movies too, acquired more and more weight in the public sphere of European countries, Spain included, and monarchies attracted a growing interest from the public.[10]

In the Spain of the early twentieth century, religion coloured all the court's ceremonies. The calendar was set by religious festivals, with those of Easter or the Holy Week as the most important. The same occurred in other Catholic monarchies like the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which shared some spectacular ceremonies such as the washing of the feet of the poor by the monarch on Holy Thursday. This close connection between monarchy and Catholicism could indicate a nationalist deficit in the Spanish crown. However, rather than that, it testified to its association with one of the versions of Spanish nationalism.[11] Praising the Catholic king did not signify any dispensing with his national dimension, but a reaffirmation of one way of being Spanish. This brought the Spanish case close to those of other dynasties that attached themselves to a confessional nationalism, such as those of the Balkans, although the conceptual tension between the nation and Catholic universality also distanced it from the monarchies that headed national churches, as in England or Norway. However, in the Spanish context—as in Italy and Portugal—the links between the state and the Church caused profound divisions. In the case of Italy, the question of Rome (the capital city of the Popes becoming the capital city of the new state) prevented the monarchy from being blessed by the Church. In Spain, the first decade of the century was characterized by confrontation between clericals and anti-clericals.[12] In political terms, the Spanish monarch maintained a certain equilibrium, but on a symbolic level this dispute was a victory for the Church, aided by the confessional status of the state that was recognized in the constitution.

The Spanish monarchy did not create new commemorations through which to enact its greatness. This separated it from the greater part of European royal houses, who were immersed in a search for exceptional occasions, such as the Victorian jubilees or the ceremonies of Franz Joseph of Austria and Wilhelm II of Germany. Among the most significant ceremonies were those that consecrated the constitutional principle of shared sovereignty between the *Cortes*, the Spanish Parliament, and the king: as in other liberal monarchies, the Spanish Constitution of 1876 established that the king could name and dismiss his ministers and dissolve Parliament, but the government also required the support of the bicameral *Cortes* which

was primarily elected by the citizens, and from 1890 through universal male suffrage, for passing legislation and motions of confidence.[13] The first of these ceremonies was performed on the occasion of the opening of Parliament, as in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands, but with less frequency. On these occasions the royal household's impressive collection of carriages came out onto the streets. Once at Parliament, the king read a speech from the throne with the programme of the government. The opening of the *Cortes* symbolized, better than any other event, the regime of constitutional monarchy. Conversely, on the king's saint's day and his birthday parliamentary delegations went to the palace to congratulate the sovereign. In the absence of a single national day in the strict sense of the term, in Spain the Saint's day or name day of the king, which for Alfonso XIII was the day of San Ildefonso, 23rd of January, became the most important date in the official calendar, in the same manner as the official birthdays of the monarchs in the British Empire or the Netherlands. Receptions and celebrations were organized around the provinces, in rituals that eulogized the political and social order.[14]

Beyond these regular events, the reign of Alfonso XIII opened with two extraordinary celebrations: those around his swearing of an oath to the constitution, when he reached his majority in 1902, and those for his marriage to a British princess—Victoria Eugenie of Battenberg, granddaughter of Queen Victoria—in 1906. On both occasions, the Liberals then in power sought to popularize the monarchy and offer a good image of Spain abroad, as a country that was arising again after the defeat of 1898.[15] Consequently, these ceremonies included an abundance of nationalist messages, in which the young king represented a glorious past and a promising future.

In the ceremonies around the oath, and still more for the wedding, the principal parade was marked by courtly pomp, in which the aristocracy exhibited its wealth. No court in Europe at that time dispensed with this kind of display. However, the fundamental content of these ceremonies was elsewhere. The ceremonies around the royal oath, in particular, displayed ideas that fused together nation and monarchy. The press recalled the dynasty's history of service to the fatherland, and recommended to the newly enthroned monarch that he should take inspiration from the best kings of earlier epochs, such as that of his own father, Alfonso XII; it was not by accident that a giant nationalist monument to Alfonso XII was erected at this time in Madrid. Paid for by public subscription, it presented the king as a peacemaker after the last civil war and showed images representing all the country's provinces arranged around him, for the exaltation

of Spain. The project was inspired by other European national monarchical monuments, such as those devoted to Prince Albert in London and to Tsar Peter the Great in Moscow, and, above all, by that to Emperor Wilhelm I in Berlin as well as by the *Vittoriano*, the memorial to King Vittorio Emanuele II, in Rome. 'Spain has been an exception in this kind of cultivated, patriotic, and artistic demonstrations,' wrote its author, and it was time to fill the gap.[16]

When it came to defining the role of the monarch the concepts that predominated were those of novelty and youth. The new reign brought with it an era of confidence in the regeneration of Spain, which would be achieved thanks to the close harmony between the people and their king. And a feature in accord with this new age would be the direct intervention by Alfonso XIII in political life. This was a point on which very different political sectors coincided; while Conservatives and Catholics called for the union of crown and altar to be safeguarded, for monarchist Liberals the monarchy guaranteed stability, and was needed to encourage progress, the development of constitutional rights and liberties, and a democratic future. In the words of one Liberal politician,

> the people sees in its young King the instrument that Providence has set aside for us so that he may undertake, at the head of the nation, the march along the rocky road that will lead us to the heights of that prosperity and greatness, never forgotten, but from which centuries ago our own dear Spain began to descend.[17]

Outside the capital, the effective coronation represented by the taking of the oath was celebrated with receptions, masses, military parades, decorations and illuminations in the streets, dances, and acts of charity. However, the response was not unanimous. Some municipal councils with Republican or Catalanist majorities refused to organize celebrations.[18]

The royal wedding was an event that was less political and more courtly than the taking of the oath. The dominant tone was that of a fairy tale between a beautiful princess and a king in love, with nothing that would not have been made use of by monarchist propaganda in any other country. As regards national self-esteem, the marriage was related to Spain's growing closeness to the Franco-British *entente*. The fairy tale was brusquely interrupted due to a terrorist attack, which, paradoxically, had the effect of benefiting the image of the king: not as a martyr, but as a hero capable of showing serenity in the face of an attack.[19]

The interest that these events aroused is beyond doubt. They were spectacles, and, in addition to attending the events themselves, the public bought special editions of newspapers, saw films that made these ceremonies special occasions in the cinema, and took home souvenirs that proliferated in every part of monarchical Europe.[20] There was thus an extension of a form of *banal monarchism*.[21] Many interpreted the public's enthusiasm as an expression of their confidence in the king as the regenerator of Spain: in the judgement of one newspaper, this was 'the manifestation of a hope for the future, embodied by the young Monarch'.[22]

The Magic of the Royal Visit

In all the European monarchies, royal visits within their own countries became instruments of nationalization, like those of Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, or the German Kaiser Wilhelm II.[23] The objective of these visits was that the general population should come into contact with the monarch, so that loyalties would be strengthened and the populace would feel part of a political community.

In the initial stages of the reign of Alfonso XIII, royal tours constituted the principal means employed to help the crown set down roots. In accordance with the dominant discourses of the time, the young king had to inform himself of the needs of all his provinces in order to be able to attend to them. In turn, Spaniards would feel more closely connected to the national state that the sovereign represented. This strategy appeared necessary to the majority of politicians, although its most committed supporters were the Conservatives. In their judgement, the king personified the concept of the nation: according to Antonio Maura, Conservative leader and prime minister, 'in the same way that a woman, in order to raise up her prayers to the Virgin, needs an image to form an idea of her, so too the idea of the Fatherland is not conceived without the King'.[24] Consequently, the regeneration of Spain required the monarch's symbolic activation, and, in the plans of the frustrated Maura, less direct royal intervention in the affairs of political parties.[25]

Contact with the people pleased the king, who showed disdain for security measures. As a young man surrounded by the elderly, he was always determined to go further than his accompanying retinue. And the public responded with applause and ovations. It was not unusual to see him surrounded by crowds. Reporters highlighted the enthusiasm of women, with a male chauvinist *machista* slant that saw women as prisoners of their

emotions. Overall, the impression gained ground that Spaniards and their sovereign could communicate without difficulties.

Royal tours, arranged mainly by successive governments, extended to all the Spanish regions, even to the distant Canary Islands. And, in general, they followed the same pattern. This was a well-established ritual, the effectiveness of which was seen as being reliant on the repetition of the same basic outline. As in ceremonial events in the capital, religious elements were omnipresent. The monarch attended masses and offered general's batons to local images of the Virgin Mary, a symbol of his submission to the power of religion and, indirectly, of the Church. Together with religion, another permanent presence was that of the armed forces, with inspection visits to military installations.

As to civil powers, royal visits included receptions for mayors and leaders of local society, known in Spain at that time as the *fuerzas vivas* or 'living forces' in each province and locality. Great local notables, essential to the political system, played a decisive role. As in Italy, it was local elites who showed the greatest interest in royal tours, competing with each other and exerting pressure in the capital to obtain them.[26] Through them they reasserted their own attributes as intermediaries between the citizens and the state. To these were added the support of a diverse range of associations: business and trade bodies, recreational societies, sports clubs, student associations, workers' mutual-aid societies, and so on. One could speak here of an authentic monarchist civil society, which was broader than the governmental parties. In addition, in each visit praise was given to the local or regional identity, conceived of as a means of access to the national identity.[27]

Among the people who approached Alfonso XIII on these visits one can distinguish a variety of attitudes. It was not exceptional to find attribution to the king of a sacred aura, likening him to a saint or a priest, as in the case of the country people who asked for his blessing and placed his portrait next to religious images, with occasional extra superstitious touches such as keeping the pieces of a mirror that had been broken during a royal tour.[28] There were also demonstrations of nationalist support, like the one from the tobacco factory workers of Seville, who declared that, '[as] Spanish women in body and soul, they love their King with the noble heart of the Spanish woman, and so, when Your Majesty honours our house with your visit, we do not wish to present you with any other statement than this: Long live Spain! Long Live Alfonso XIII!'[29] Popular

monarchism was notably expressed in comments on the king's accessibility and warmth.

However, the representations that were most commonly made were petitions for favours in matters related to public administration. Petitions were delivered to the king to request the moving forward of every kind of bureaucratic procedure, and that a fresh prod be given to the government in dealing with them. As in premodern times, this was a manifestation of the clientelist culture that impregnated relations between Spaniards and the state. Something similar occurred in Italy, where the concept has been discussed as a 'royal clientelism'.[30] These favours implied loyalty to the monarch, although they also made this loyalty conditional on the result of the recommendations: it showed a persistent, though fragile, form of integration. This was not just a matter of individual favours, but also collective ones, such as public works to reduce unemployment, or protection for specific economic interests. Concern for the local economy in each area went beyond material considerations, since it created an image of a monarchy linked to national progress. The king inaugurated urban improvements and visited the industries of each locality, where he received tributes from deferential workers, a barrier against revolutionary and trade union-led subversion.

Also important in the relationship between monarchy and nationalism was the contemporary re-actualization of the past: a feature that was common in all monarchies, and most notably in Germany, where the Kaiser presented himself as the heir to the glories of the German people.[31] In Spain, Alfonso renewed the titles of his ancestors, and contributed to many acts of homage to great figures of the national past such as Miguel de Cervantes, author of the greatest national literary work in the Spanish language, *Don Quixote*. He also set out to link himself to the great landmarks of Spanish nationalist history, a narrative that had been constructed during the nineteenth century, and was subject to a powerful commemorative impulse, involving the celebration of episodes such as the resistance to the Romans in ancient times, or the reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the Muslims. However, most important of all was the centenary of what is known in Spain as the War of Independence, the Peninsular War against the invasion by Napoleon at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which had been converted into the great national epic.[32]

The nationalizing capacity of the monarchy was put to the test in Catalonia, where an indigenous nationalist movement had grown most strongly. For the monarchist governments, this was a matter of taking

advantage of the king's visits to reintegrate the Catalan identity into a general Spanish one. In spite of terrorist threats, these visits were a complete success: a monarchist, Catholic, and bourgeois public felt more inclined towards the king, and yet nevertheless continued to be Catalanist.[33] Underlying the king's visits to Catalonia was a confrontation between different conceptions of the state and of the political role of the crown. Among Conservative monarchists the idea was in circulation of the king as the head of a dynastic union of all the regions of Spain, an entity that was more politically than ethnically based. This was similar to the case of the United Kingdom, where the monarchy had adapted to this multiform political or civic identity, which could be differentiated from the emotive ethnic identities of England, Scotland, or Wales.[34]

On the other hand, Catalanism thought in terms of various nations, and not of a single Spanish political nation; it dreamt of a confederated state structure based on some European examples. The most important exemplar was that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose *dual monarchy* of 1867 could serve as a model: if the emperor of Austria was at the same time king of Hungary, the king of Castile would be able to act as Count of Barcelona. As a Catalanist message to the Queen Regent in 1888 had put it, Hungary was the 'mirror of Catalonia'. Even the example of Czech nationalism, which demanded autonomy for a region as rich as Catalonia, was relevant.[35] An actual political arrangement was not possible, but Catalanism and the crown played with symbols. In his visits to Catalonia, Alfonso XIII, like his father before him, did perform the role of Count of Barcelona, when he accepted honours at this capital's cathedral and visited the tombs where the medieval Catalan counts were buried.[36] He also promised to learn the Catalan language, a crucial issue for Catalanism as it was for Flemish nationalism in the Belgian monarchy, but he never fulfilled this commitment.[37]

At the opposite extreme of the nationalist spectrum, Liberal Spanish nationalists hoped that the royal visits to Catalonia would contribute to renationalizing the region, but feared that the Conservatives' strategy would fail and ultimately reinforce centrifugal tendencies; as one influential Liberal newspaper put it, the Conservative government 'has not succeeded in making Catalanism become monarchist and has forced the monarchy to become Catalanist'.[38] Nevertheless, the monarch's popularity signified to them that the fatherland remained intact.

The royal visits were primarily the business of the king, but not his alone. Other members of the royal family—his wife, his mother, and his

sisters—had their own diaries of royal duties and events. An outstanding character among them was the Infanta Isabel, the king's oldest aunt and the most popular member of the royal family at that time. She travelled a great deal around the country, was welcomed by local authorities and strengthened the symbolic role of the crown. This elderly lady, who was very accessible to common people and devoted to charities, represented a motherly figure, like other European royal women headed by Queen Victoria of Britain.[39] Moreover, the king—and the queen—travelled abroad to represent a new Spain, a country that had overcome its backwardness and abandoned its traditional isolation. The king's international image, however, worsened suddenly in 1909, when Francisco Ferrer, a well-connected anarchist educationalist, was unjustly condemned and executed by a military court. In liberal and left-wing European circles, King Alfonso was linked to the resurrection of the Spanish Inquisition and was the subject of much criticism. A French journal called him 'the young royal monkey' and threatened his life; while in Italy some protesters shouted 'Death to King Alfonso!' ('*Morte al re Alfonso!*').[40] For some years subsequently, he was forced to support progressive policies in order to improve his image.

Outside Spain, Hispanic America played a crucial role for Spanish nationalism. Ever since the loss of the last American colonies in 1898, many intellectuals and politicians had thought that Spain could recover part of its international prestige by presenting itself as the head or mothernation (the *madre patria*) of a vast cultural community, called *la raza* (the race) united by history, language, and religion. The King was seen as one of the chiefs of that transnational community and his qualities were praised not only by Spaniards but also by some Latin Americans, both sets of actors promoting the idea of a royal visit to the former colonies. The Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío, for instance, portrayed the monarch as a 'gentleman king'. The Peruvian José Santos Chocano wrote, in a poem dedicated to Alfonso, 'Oh King of the Spains: enter my forest! / The muse that inspires me is just a savage / who will kneel before the royal power!'.[41]

The time to prove this strong relationship between the crown and America arrived when several Latin American republics commemorated their centenaries of independence in 1910–11 and invited Spain to be part of the celebrations. This was a paradoxical matter, since by taking part the old colonial metropolis thus agreed to celebrate the independence of its colonies, but this was presented positively as the reconciliation of the *madre patria* with her beloved daughters. Alfonso XIII did not travel to

the Americas himself, but sent royal delegations to the events, the most successful that of Infanta Isabel to Argentina, where she became the incarnation of Spain, surrounded by cheering crowds of Spanish immigrants and locals in Buenos Aires.[42]

Uniforms and Flags

If in the major ceremonies and royal visits Spanish nationalist messages appeared alongside content of other kinds, there was one area in which the nexus between monarchy and nation lacked any ambiguity: that of the military. Alfonso XIII was trained as a soldier and, like other monarchs of his time, had reserved to him the constitutional role of head of the armed forces. This was, along with foreign policy, the last prerogative of kings. However, in Spain this role had very profound political repercussions. Some of the ministerial crises of his reign were due to disagreements with the politicians in government over these matters. Even more, in the conflicts that arose between military leaders and the civil powers, which re-emerged with new vigour after the defeat of 1898, the king always took the side of the military.[43] Like the Italian king Victor Emmanuel II and the German emperor Wilhelm II, Alfonso XIII, who was nearly always seen in uniform, identified himself with his army.

These functions of the crown took on a new significance when Spain's international commitments led to its intervention in northern Morocco, and thus another colonial war. The royal family threw itself into support for the conflict, awarding decorations and providing aid for the troops, and similarly took part in campaigns to commemorate heroic episodes in the war. The king and queen especially praised the memory of Corporal Luis Noval, who supposedly sacrificed himself to save his fellow soldiers in battle, and was seen as a paradigmatic hero of humble origins. Alfonso XIII and Victoria Eugenie even sponsored a monument devoted to him in front of the royal palace in Madrid. The expansionist policy followed in Morocco, promoted by Liberal governments, increased the involvement of the monarch. He travelled to the battlefields, and his official speeches emphasized the indissoluble union of country and monarchy in the colonial endeavour. He was even given the sobriquet 'Alfonso the African', and saw himself as the head of an army 'that was shedding its blood for the Fatherland, civilizing distant lands'.[44] This policy gave concrete form to one of the nationalist goals of his reign, that of putting Spain back on the international map, with a place that was secondary but still visible in the Mediterranean.[45]

After 1898, and in response to the challenge of Catalanism, military officers encouraged 'nationalizing' activities to cultivate Spanish patriotism, in which they were joined by the royal family. This was done through shooting associations or youth and children's organizations, such as the *batallones escolares* or 'school battalions' that gave military training to schoolboys, or the Boy Scouts, the Spanish branch of which was founded by one of the king's aides. And, given the deficiencies of the education system in Spain, it was necessary to make the barracks into seedbeds of patriots. Hence the growing interest that was shown in providing education for the army's recruits, in which they were indoctrinated with heroic stories from history and a fresh stimulus was given to their emotional ties to the nation and the king.[46]

In these efforts to promote nation building and national regeneration through closer links between patriotism, the army, and the king, there were some foreign examples to follow. Although French influence was strong, the favourite ones were monarchies. Britain, firstly, provided an ideal but unattainable model for Spain. More useful seemed Japan, a seemingly 'backward' country which in a few decades had become a world power, as evidenced by its victory in the 1904–5 war with Russia, which had a major impact on Spanish public opinion. This victory was attributed to several factors, but primarily to a rapid process of educational and technical modernization that was fuelled by patriotism. In this process the Japanese emperor, seen as an engine of change and the object of nationalist worship, had been essential. A Spanish journal called the Meiji Emperor, when he died in 1912, 'the most glorious sovereign of our era'. The same role, with less of a religious component, corresponded to King Alfonso.[47]

However, the Spanish military found their main inspiration in the German Empire. Although the army's officers were not educated in Germany, they admired the Prussian army, its discipline, and its visibility, and, as in Japan, the pre-military formation of youth. The nationalist feelings they cultivated around the concept of honour were inspired by German models. And their press highlighted the prestige of the army as the backbone of the German nation, exactly what they missed in Spain. One major newspaper observed with praise, 'the German people in love with its army, the aristocracy dressed in military uniform, the rail network with military officers, the diplomatic service recruited in the regiments, public instruction given by veterans'.[48] In this context, Kaiser Wilhelm II, engaged in the expansion of nationalism, was presented as the driving force behind German military power, both in the army and the navy.

The best expression of these concerns was found in the ceremonies of taking an oath to the flag, the *juras de bandera*, which were developed and expanded upon in this period to an extraordinary extent. In these ceremonies soldiers, and particularly each recruit at the end of his basic training, 'swore to God and promised the king to follow his banners and to expend for them even the last drop of their blood'. Officers in particular, but also ordinary soldiers, also renewed their oaths at subsequent ceremonies throughout their military career. These ceremonies were inspired by Germany, where the act of the oath, as a well-known military writer put it, had 'brightness and truly exemplary force'.[49] In 1903, General Arsenio Linares, Minister of War in a Conservative government, established that these annual rituals should come out of the barracks, where they had previously been held, and take place in the main streets and squares of every city with a military garrison. The central ceremony was held each year in Madrid, and presided over by the king, who reviewed the troops and headed a parade.

Ceremonies of the oath to the flag grew to such an extent that they began to resemble authentic national holidays. Their theatrical impact was accentuated with the participation of schoolchildren and groups of workers and students. In addition, the Moroccan war added unquestionable emotion to these ceremonies, since soldiers could die for the fatherland at the front, and the approval of the law on compulsory military service by a Liberal majority in Parliament, gave ceremonies a decisive impetus.[50] The Spanish army thus appeared more similar to a national army in the French style. And Alfonso XIII, identified with the nation, merited the sacrifice of all, as was asserted in the pamphlets that were distributed among soldiers to remind them of the commitment they had acquired with their oath, which declared, 'He who loves his Fatherland, has to begin by loving his King, who represents it, in the same way. If he would die for his Fatherland, he should die for his King.'[51] He cultivated a military image, active and virile, with a valour hardened in difficult situations. Alfonso XIII appeared like a young emperor Wilhelm II, comforted by the warmth of his people, and whose popularity inspired him to intervene more in political life and save Spain.

The Centre of Politics

In conclusion, it can be said that in the years before the Great War the Spanish monarchy shared some of the features of the performing monarchies that were being put on display around contemporary Europe in

order to associate them with their respective nationalist imaginations and create a national consensus around the crown.

Like other dynasties, the Spanish royal house shared in the hegemonic nationalist discourse of the time. If in Italy the intention had been to consolidate a recently united nation, in Germany this goal had been supplemented by another converting this new nation into a great power. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom had embarked on the exaltation of an imperial nationalism.[52] In Spain, the majority of nationalist manifestations were adapted to the narrative of national regeneration after the disaster of 1898, a narrative that implied an admission that the nation found itself sunk in backwardness and needed to unite its energies to escape it. The solutions offered frequently counted on action by the king, who aroused great expectations. Alfonso XIII appeared as a figure at the centre of a resurgence of nationalism.

With regard to the effectiveness of its ceremonial, the crown demonstrated a notable power of attraction. There was of course a broad sector of monarchist opinion, which ran from elites to a good part of the middle classes and some workers, and one could even speak of a political culture that associated the monarchy with the nation. However, this did not signify a complete consensus, since republicanism remained strong, and the political decisions of the king were disputed in both Parliament and the press.

In Spain, this political culture coexisted with the enormous political power that the crown still enjoyed. In contrast to the situation in Great Britain, two key factors did not exist: a Parliament legitimized by free elections and governmental parties capable of imposing their will upon the monarch.[53] The Spanish case was more similar to other European examples. In the greater part of the continent, monarchs, even constitutional ones, continued to act as the head of their respective governments, although there was a great difference between Spain and the situation in Italy, where the country was in transit towards a parliamentary system, and that of Germany, with an authoritarian government style. The Spanish position would be half-way between these two.

In Spain, the king acted as arbiter of political life and, in the absence of clean elections, the appointment of cabinets depended upon the unity of the political parties. The more divided they were, the greater the political importance that was acquired by the king.[54] Instead of transforming himself into an integrating force *supra partes*, Alfonso behaved like one more actor in the political scene, making crucial decisions in favour of

some parties and against others, so that he was even perceived as a 'politician king'. The crisis of the monarchist parties gave a providential aura to the figure of Alfonso XIII, since many actors trusted that he would help modernize the country. The Conservative politician Juan de la Cierva, for instance, thought that the king had been 'called by Providence to guide the Spaniards through the path of good and progress'. Scientist Santiago Ramón y Cajal, who received the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1906, summarized this idea saying that Alfonso, 'inspired by noble purposes, goes before the nation, driving her resolutely towards Europe'.[55]

In this way the Spanish monarchy moved further away from the British model with its symbolic status above party politics. The monarch was not the father of the nation, nor even her young symbolic child, but the patriot king, an active protagonist in public life. As we have seen, a crown that still held effective power was glorified as a national institution. Spain's transnational entanglements, notably with Latin America and with Morocco, promoted such royal interventionism, as did European exemplars (above all the Prussian German model) which inspired Spanish publics. Even the Habsburg and Japanese monarchies proved instructive here. A good part of Spanish nationalism, whose ideas were shared by Alfonso XIII, thus ultimately promoted the figure of a monarch who exercised full powers. By 1913, monarchist discourses and ritual practices, true nationalizing experiences, had spent more than a decade exalting, with considerable success, the patriotic mission of a young man in close contact with Spaniards and at the front of his army. A national king was thus born.

NOTES

1. Jaan Van Osta (2006), 'The Emperor's New Clothes. The Reappearance of the Performing Monarchy in Europe, c. 1870–1914', in: Jeroen Deploige and Gita Deneckere (eds), *Mystifying the Monarch. Studies on Discourse, Power, and History*, Amsterdam, 181–92.
2. David Cannadine (1983, 1992), 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the "Invention of Tradition", c. 1820–1977', in: Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, 101–64.
3. For example, William M. Kuhn (1996), *Democratic Royalism. The Transformation of the British Monarchy, 1861–1914*, New York.

4. Catherine Brice (2010), *Monarchie et identité nationale en Italie (1861–1900)*, Paris; Henk te Velde (2006), 'Cannadine, Twenty Years on. Monarchy and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Centry Britain and the Netherlands', in: Deploige and Deneckere (eds), 193–203; Richard S. Wortman (2006), *Scenarios of Power. Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy from Peter the Great to the Abdication of Nicholas II*, Princeton, NJ.; Daniel L. Unowski (2005), *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism. Imperial celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848–1916*, West Lafayette, Indiana.

5. Andrzej Olechnowicz (2007), 'Historians and the Modern British monarchy', in: Andrzej Olechnowicz (ed.), *The Monarchy and the British Nation. 1780 to the Present*, Cambridge, 6–44.

6. Fernando Molina and Miguel Cabo Villaverde (2012), 'An Inconvenient Nation: Nation-Building and National Identity in Modern Spain. The Historiographical Debate', in: Maarten Van Ginderachter and Marnix Beyen (eds), *Nationhood from Below. Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*, Basingstoke, 47–72.

7. Javier Moreno-Luzón (2012), *Modernizing the Nation. Spain during the Reign of Alfonso XIII, 1902–1931*, Brighton.

8. David M. Craig (2003), 'The Crowned Republic? Monarchy and anti-Monarchy in Britain, 1760–1901', *The Historical Journal* 46/1, 167–85.

9. Rui Ramos (1998), *A Segunda Fundaçao (1890–1926)*, Lisboa, 88–96.

10. John Plunkett (2003), *Queen Victoria. First Media Monarch*, Oxford.

11. José Álvarez-Junco (2011), *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations*, Manchester.

12. Julio de la Cueva Merino (1996), 'The Stick and the Candle: Clericals and Anticlericals in Northem Spain 1898–1910', *European History Quarterly* 26, 241–65.

13. Joaquín Varela Suanzes-Carpegna (2009), *La Constitución de 1876*, Madrid.

14. *Abc*, 23 January 1906 and 24 January 1908.

15. During this period, two big parties—Conservative and Liberal—alternated in power in Spain. This is why it is commonly called the era of the 'pacific turn-around' ('*turno pacífico*'). Both of them supported the constitutional monarchy against its enemies, traditionalists on the right and republicans on the left.

16. *Blanco y Negro*, 17 May 1902. Architect José Grases Riera, in: (1905), *Mejoras y reformas en Madrid. Memoria del monumento que se erige en Madrid a la Patria Española personificada en el rey D. Alfonso XII*, Madrid, 6.
17. *El Año Político*, 22 May 1902.
18. *El Imparcial*, 18–19 May 1902.
19. *El Año Político*, 31 May 1906.
20. Julio Montero Díaz et al. (2001), *La imagen pública de la monarquía. Alfonso XIII en la prensa escrita y cinematográfica*, Barcelona.
21. Olechnowicz (2007), 33, inspired by Michael Billig (1995), *Banal Nationalism*, London.
22. *El Año Político*, 17 February 1902.
23. Thomas A. Kohut (1991), *Wilhelm II and the Germans. A Study in Leadership*, Oxford.
24. Parliamentary speech, *El Año Político*, 21 June 1907.
25. María Jesús González Hernández (1997), *El universo conservador de Antonio Maura. Biografía y proyecto de Estado*, Madrid.
26. Axel Korner (2008), *Politics of culture in Liberal Italy: from Unification to Fascism*, London.
27. See, for example, Ramón A. Urbano (1904, 2000), *La visita regia*, Málaga. Xosé M. Núñez Seixas (2001), 'The Region as Essence of the Fatherland: Regionalist Variants of Spanish Nationalism (1840–1936)', *European History Quarterly* 31, 483–518.
28. María Elsa Melián González (2001), *Alfonso XIII en Canarias. El debate sociopolítico que dio origen a los Cabildos*, Santa Cruz de Tenerife.
29. *El Año Político*, 9 May 1904.
30. Brice (2010), 66–87.
31. Elisabeth Fehrenbach (1982), 'Images of Kaiserdom: German attitudes to Kaiser Wilhelm II', in: John C.G. Röhl and Nicolaus Sombart (eds), *Kaiser Wilhelm II. New Interpretations*, Cambridge, 269–85.
32. Javier Moreno-Luzón (2007), 'Fighting for the National Memory. The Commemoration of the Spanish 'War of Independence' in 1908–1912', *History & Memory* 19/1, 68–94.
33. See, for example, *La Vanguardia*, 11 April 1904.
34. Krishan Kumar (2003), *The Making of English National Identity*, Cambridge.

35. Àngel Guimerá, 'Missatge a S.M. Dª. Maria Cristina d'Habsburg-Lorena, Reina Regent d'Espanya, Comtessa de Barcelona'. *La Renaixença*, 3 June 1888, 3336. Enric Ucelay-Da Cal (2003), *El imperialismo catalán*, Barcelona, 496–505.
36. *El Año Político*, 23 October 1908 and 6 November 1908.
37. (1904), *Viaje regio. 1ª jornada. Cataluña. Narración hecha por un paje. Mayo 1904*, Barcelona. Mark van den Wijngaert, Lieve Beullens, and Dana Brants (2002), *Pouvoir et Monarchie. La Belgique et ses rois*, Brussels.
38. *El Imparcial*, 27 October 1908.
39. María José Rubio (2005), *La Chata. La infanta Isabel de Borbón y la corona de España*, Madrid. Richard Williams (1997), *The Contentious Crown. Public Discussion of the British Monarchy in the reign of Queen Victoria*, Hants.
40. *La Guerre Sociale*, 8 September 1909. Juan Avilés Farré (2006), *Francisco Ferrer y Guardia. Pedagogo, anarquista y mártir,* Madrid, 255.
41. Rubén Darío (1921), 'Alfonso XIII (1909)', in: Rubén Darío, *Alfonso XIII y sus primeras notas*, Madrid, 22. '*¡Oh Rey de las Españas: entrad en mi boscaje! / La musa que me inspira sólo es una salvaje / que se echará de hinojos ante el poder real*', José Santos Chocano (1906), *Alma América. Poemas indo-españoles*, Madrid, vi.
42. Javier Moreno-Luzón (2010), 'Reconquistar América para regenerar España. Nacionalismo español y centenario de las independencias (1910–1911)', *Historia Mexicana* LX, 1/237, 561–640.
43. Carolyn P. Boyd (1979), *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain*, Chapel Hill.
44. *El Año Político*, 20 June 1913.
45. Sebastian Balfour (2002), *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War*, Oxford.
46. José Sañudo y López-Talaya (1909), *Compendio de instrucción militar*, Santander. Luis Rodríguez García (1907), *Teoría de la educación e instrucción del recluta*, San Sebastián.
47. *Alrededor del Mundo,* 21 August 1912, quoted in Florentino Rodao and David Almazán Tomás (2006), 'Japonizar España. La imagen española de la modernización del Japón Meiji', in: Guadalupe Gómez-Ferrer Morant (ed.), *Modernizar España 1898–1914*, Madrid, 4–5, http://www.academia.edu/778306/Japonizar_

Espa%C3%B1a_La_imagen_espa%C3%B1ola_de_la_modernizaci%C3%B3n_del_Jap%C3%B3n_Meiji, accessed 4/10/2016.

48. Geoffrey Jensen (2000), 'Military nationalism and the State: the case of *fin-de-siècle* Spain', *Nations and Nationalism* 6/2, 257–74. *La Correspondencia Militar,* 13 November 1905.

49. José Ibáñez Marín (1903), 'Juramento de banderas', *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, 30 April 1903, 198–9.

50. *Abc*, 30 March 1911, 24–25 March 1912, 12–15 April 1913.

51. (1913), *La jura de la bandera. A S.M. el Rey, los reclutas de la Primera Compañía del Primer Batallón de Regimiento de León*, Madrid, 15–6.

52. Williams (1997).

53. Vernon Bogdanor (1995), *The Monarchy and the Constitution*, Oxford.

54. Morgan C. Hall (2005), *Alfonso XIII y el ocaso de la monarquía liberal, 1902–1923*, Madrid.

55. (1914), *Así es nuestro Rey. El libro de 'La Monarquía'*, Madrid, 30 and 117.

The Dragon Flag in the Republican Nation: The Dowager Empress Longyu's Death Ritual in 1913 and Contested Political Legitimacy in Early Republican China

Jia Feng

INTRODUCTION

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the histories of many countries saw replacements of monarchical sovereignty by a republican form of government, many of which were not smooth transitions. Following the Meiji Restoration in Japan, loyalist movements that attempted to resuscitate the Tokugawa order continued.[1] After 1918, although the Weimar republican government set up a rigid rule to restrict the abdicated royal family from involvement in politics and took measures to forestall a Hohenzollern return, the monarchy still held considerable currency with the German population.[2] Immediately after the demise of dynastic rule, the new republican government often found itself beleaguered by the shadow of the dynastic legacy. Monarchical representation seemed to have an afterlife; as recent scholarship suggests the idea of popular sovereignty, in many respects, "is an intellectual replica of the idea of monarchical sovereignty"

J. Feng (✉)
UCLA Department of History, Los Angeles, CA, USA

and democratic representation by no means escapes from the king's shadow.[3] The influence of the abdicated monarch did not die out right after the republican government took its place. Needless to say, the king's shadow in the republican era was a global phenomenon.

This chapter discusses what it meant for a modern nation to have a monarchical presence through the lens of a symbolic representation of the abdicated monarch in early republican China. Situated in the context of the early years of the Republic of China (1912–1949), which were marked by extraordinary political uncertainties and ambiguities, the chapter addresses the question of what political legitimacy entailed during a time when national politics coexisted with a nominal dynastic sovereign. Understanding politics both as a realm for the exercise of force and as a symbolic system absorbed in the ritual preservation of status, this chapter will focus on the death ritual of dowager empress Longyu in 1913, a symbolic moment of the contested political legitimacy between the republic and the throne. Analyzing rituals and disputes over rituals between the Republican government and the court of the Qing dynasty, I argue that although forced to descend from the national center of political rule, the Qing court continued to serve as an important source of political legitimacy, thanks to its routine performance of court rituals. When the territorial sovereignty of the Qing court changed hands to the succeeding republic, its part in the ritual sovereignty survived. Tellingly, the latent legitimacy of the Qing court re-emerged in the center of national politics in the 1930s, when its political ambition of restoring the glory of the Manchu "ancestral enterprise" aligned with a Japanese imperialist project in Manchuria.

In October of 1911, an accidental bomb explosion in Hankou ended in a watershed event in modern Chinese history. Within months, it brought an end to the over two-and-a half-century-old Qing dynastic rule. However, the peace negotiation in early 1912 between the Manchu throne and the revolutionary party left a confusing settlement: while a republican form of government was established, Puyi (1906–1967; Qing Emperor of China, 1908–1912; Emperor of Manchukuo, 1934–1945), the last emperor, retained the full imperial title under the terms of "the Articles of Favorable Treatment," and besides having ownership of his property confirmed, he was granted a large annual subsidy "for the continued maintenance of his court in one of the imperial palaces."[4] As a result of this remarkable settlement, the emperor, shorn of all political power, continued to hold court and to occupy the Dragon throne. The revolution,

which initially set up its political agenda of "expelling the Manchu rule" (*quzhudalu*), left behind a perplexing political scene: from the spring of 1912 to the winter of 1924, there resided in Beijing, in the heart of the capital, a president and an emperor.

While from the perspective of the nationalism narrative of the revolution the year of 1912 was immediately seen as a watershed because it removed the Qing imperial rule from the center of China's national politics the question of political legitimacy was not as obvious. Because the imperial title continued to exist, many loyalists remained assured that the dynasty was still alive and that to restore the monarchy, one just needed a good chance.[5] The anomalies of Chinese political life during the early years of the republic also helped keep alive this expectation.[6] The years between 1912 and 1924 witnessed the rise and fall of numerous republican cabinets.[7] Armies fought one another within the walls of the capital. Presidents themselves were set up by one clique and pulled down by another. The familiar scenes of republican political life were "turmoil, disruption, banditry, famine and civil war."[8] Plots and stratagems were politicians' games. Those disgraceful dramas were colorfully realized through "the truculence of military adventures and the antics of hot-headed students."[9] For several years, the republic and parliamentary politics did not seem to do "more than anything else to paralyze the administrative organism."[10] After Sun Yat-sen established an independent Parliament in Canton, China had no central government recognized by all the provinces. People became highly suspicious about the prospects of republicanism in China, which made the scheme of the monarchists to restore the young emperor to power a reasonable alternative.

Contrasting with the political turbulence outside the walls of the Forbidden City was the routine practice of splendid court rituals. They immediately became a relevant part of monarchists' restoration efforts because the tranquility, stability and dignity of the court promised a ready solution by going back, if to move forward as a republic would be a doomed failure. The juxtaposition of the emperor and the president hence offers a rare chance to look at the contested arena of political legitimacy that arose in the terrain of republican politics because of the remarkable abdication settlement that enabled the cohabitating of the ritual sovereignty of the vanishing dynasty with the territorial sovereignty of the newborn republic.

The continued exercise of imperial court rituals constituted the ritual sovereignty of the Qing, despite the fact that its territorial sovereignty had

passed into the hands of the republic immediately after the abdication of the throne. While this ritual sovereignty was reflected in a daily routine of court manners and rituals, it became more salient in the diplomatic occasions between the republic and the court during such major Chinese holidays as Chinese New Year, the dragon boat festival, and mid-autumn, as well as during the birthdays of the emperor and the empress. On New Year's Day of 1913, when Yuan Shikai as president of the republic sent the officer of state rituals to pay respect to the court, he addressed the emperor as "his majesty of Great Qing."[11] For foreign diplomats residing in Beijing in the post-abdication period, they addressed the abdicated court in the same stately ritual as they did for any reigning monarch. The dignity of the abdicated throne did not disappear immediately after the revolution, and the retaining of the imperial title of the court further assured Manchu loyalists that the abdication of the Qing court was only a temporary "experiment" of a republican form of government, which meant that the edict that granted the "experiment" could be revoked if it proved a failure.[12]

The twilight of the Qing court in the post-revolution period was remarkable also because the ironic coexistence of monarchy and nation challenges not only accepted knowledge concerning the nation state, but the kind of concept of time implied in the linear, teleological model of historiography since the Enlightenment. In *Rescuing History from the Nation*, Prasenjit Duara argues that, "National history secures for the contested and contingent nation the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time." Deriving from this version of history, "it allows the nation-state to see itself as a unique form of community which finds its place in the oppositions between tradition and modernity, hierarchy and equality, empire and nation." Molded on the version of the linear, national history, those histories that were dispersed, contingent, ambiguous, changeable, and conflicted were ignored. Situating his critique of the national form of history in early twentieth-century China, Duara proposes an alternative history which emphasizes "the dynamic, multiple, and contested nature of historical identities."[13]

I find the concept of "bifurcated history"[14] a particularly useful analytical category to understand the conflicted political legitimacy of early republican China, because it helps elucidate the contradictions, dialectics, and ambiguities of history as it actually was. Tellingly, in 1913, just one year after the abdication of the emperor, when the dowager empress

Longyu died, the memorial ceremony quickly turned into a national ritual event that brought together both the abdicated throne and the republican government. The episode that took place during this remarkably confusing time then offers us a good opportunity to closely examine the contradictions concerning political legitimacy between the republic and the court through the lens of rituals. It was a staging of contested political legitimacy between dynasty and nation; it was a display of a latent possibility that lingered over the republic for two decades and eventually found a venue to be realized when Japan's imperialist project in Manchuria needed the last emperor's lasting legacy to help solve its own legitimacy crisis; and last but far from the least, it was a confrontation between the dynastic calendar and that of the nation, a contrasting of "ritual time" to "linear time," which constantly reminded us of the very existence of anomalies, dispersions, and confusions of history that a linear, evolutionary history of nation can never fully grasp.

Retaining the Ritual Sovereignty: Court Rituals, Daily Routines, and the "Ritual Time" of the Abdicated Qing Court

The year of 1912 in China, so soon to witness the fall of the Qing dynasty, opened in doubt and confusion. When Sun Yat-sen had been elected president of the republican government in Nanjing, battles between imperial and revolutionary forces were ongoing, while peace negotiations were underway. The perplexing situation, however, gave Yuan Shikai (1859–1916; President of the Republic of China, 1912–1915), the Qing court's senior reformist bureaucrat and leader of its most powerful military force, the Beiyang Army, tremendous room to impose his own terms. After all the parties to the negotiations arrived at a compromise, Yuan went to the court to take his last step by threatening to agree to abdicate.[15] Although still holding the option to retire back to its old Manchurian home, the panic-stricken Manchu court was too scared to resist. In February of 1912, the dowager empress Longyu, acting on behalf of the 6-year-old emperor, formally announced to the country the abdication of the dynastic rule.[16]

Having given up its territorial sovereignty to the republic, the Manchu court was still allowed to retain its ritual sovereignty through a remarkable compromise arrived at in peace negotiations between the throne and the

revolutionary party.[17] Yuan Shikai's maneuvers of deluding each of the contending parties to believe that it had scored a victory over the other played a critical role in the negotiating process. The end of the game was the creation of a situation that left the substance of power in Yuan's own hands.[18] The result of the negotiations, meshed with Yuan's own ego from beginning to end, was a remarkable compromise and replete with ironies.[19] The republican form of government was established by an imperial decree issued on February 12, 1912. Since the emperor announced his abdication out of his "august benevolence for his people's good," the republic guaranteed that he should be allowed to keep various privileges, including retention of the full imperial title, and that besides having ownership of his property confirmed, he should be granted an annual subsidy for the continued maintenance of his court in one of the imperial palaces.[20] The result was neither a form of constitutional monarchy (a format that had been experimented with by the Qing court over a decade before the revolution), nor a pure republican form of government, but a paradoxical compromise of both.

Over the years after the abdication, within the Forbidden City the luxurious daily routines of the court remained untouched. To make an entrance into the Forbidden City in the 1910s was to enter a new world of time and space, exquisitely constituted by a luxurious corpus of court rituals. It was a world of high court officials "in loose-sleeved sable robes," of "young nobles and court-chamberlains on horseback," of "eunuchs standing respectfully to attention, each attired in the uniform of his class," and of "officers of the household scrutinizing the lists of those who were to be admitted to audience."[21] In the Forbidden City, the lunar calendar was still observed, along with innumerable other customs and practices of Old China, such as the continued use of the emperor's reign title. The issuing of a court gazette, a time-honored tradition passed down from the Tang dynasty, continued. Old religious rites at the Altar of Heaven continued to be observed. During the emperor's own birthday and on New Year's Day, one could see the most spectacular of court ceremonies being performed. After the abdication of the emperor, the Gate of Spiritual Valor symbolically separated the worlds within and without: while at the outer side of the gateway reckless changes were fast taking place, its inner side saw the ancient rituals of imperial court life being routinely acted out.[22]

Although three of the imperial throne rooms had passed into republican hands, the most important of the great ones was still in the possession

of the emperor. It was in the Palace of Heavenly Purity (*Qianqinggong*) that the emperor still held court on great occasions and anniversaries. In front of the Palace of Heavenly Purity was a large quadrangle in which members of the court and imperial family would assemble to do homage to their sovereign. Every day, row upon row of officials either in Manchu or Western dress were bowing and performing the decreed triple kowtow. For the boy emperor, the scale of imperial procession that accompanied him to his schoolroom remained a large retinue, something that he had grown up to accept:

> Every time I went to my schoolroom to study, or visited the high Consorts to pay my respects, or went for a stroll in the garden I was always followed by a large retinue. Every trip I made to the Summer Palace must have cost a great deal; the New Republic's police had to be asked to line the roads and I was always accompanied by a large motorcade consisting of dozens of vehicles. Whenever I went for a stroll in the garden a procession had to be specially organized. In front went a eunuch from the administrative bureaus whose functions was roughly the same as a motor horn, he walked twenty or thirty yards ahead of the rest of the party intoning the sound, "Chir … chir …" as a warning to all who might be in the vicinity to withdraw at once. Next came two eunuchs advancing in a crabwise fashion on either side of the path; ten paces behind them came the center of the procession, myself.[23]

The court, however, was maintained through a huge expenditure. Its routine outlay included 389,200 tales of silver for imperial mausoleum sacrifice; 727,700 tales for court daily maintenance; 577,360 tales for court staff's salaries; 396,200 tales for imperial guards salaries; 138,010 tales for yamen officials' stipends; 299,480 tales for Imperial Household Department maintenance; and 172,000 tales for miscellaneous expenditures such as imperial rewards and relief aids. These costs added up to about 2.7 million tales of silver, a remarkably conspicuous consumption especially given the devastated economy of the republican government at that time.[24] Surviving records of the supplies consumed in one month of 1912 offer us a glance at the uncompromising conspicuous consumption of the abdicated court: 13,192 catties of meat; 27,583 catties of vegetables; 156.8 catties of soy sauce spiced meat; 160.8 catties of salted meat; 32 hams; 47 pigs; 964 fat turkeys; 2481 regular turkeys; 1261 fat ducks; and 57 regular ducks, not including other miscellaneous food.[25] Although the "Articles of Favorable Treatment" discontinued the enrollment of new eunuchs, after the abdication the court continued

to maintain a huge body of eunuch population. In 1913, there were 1517 eunuchs from the upper three banners (*shangsanqi*). For court members, eunuchs were not only necessary for the daily operation of court life, but more importantly, their presence at court helped maintain its splendid appearance. Thus, it is of little surprise that in 1923 Pu Yi's proposal to expel all eunuchs from the court encountered fierce opposition from the imperial concubines and the Imperial Household Department (*Neiwufu*).[26]

This conspicuous consumption of court life was crucial to maintaining the ritual sovereignty of the court, because the unparalleled luxuriousness not only transmitted the vanishing dynastic glory to the twilight period of the Manchu court but also helped sustain the magnificence of the court. Imperial bonds of the Qing court with Mongol noblemen and Tibetan Buddhist monks, dated back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries thanks to Manchu patronage of Tibetan Buddhism and the Qing imperial marriage alliance projects with Mongols, were not immediately cut off by the changed political situation.[27] After the emperor's abdication, Manchu and Mongolian princes, loyalists and monarchists, and Buddhist lamas came in and out, and paid respects to the boy emperor, as before. Even high officials of the republic regarded the opportunity of paying respects to the emperor in the Forbidden City as a great honor. In occasions such as birth and death, to have obtained a memorial tablet from the president was still not enough, unless one could also obtain it from the emperor.[28] Guangxi warlord Lu Rongting, the first republican official who was awarded permission to ride a horse in the Forbidden City, did not forget to pay his respects to the emperor during the visit of Duan Qirui, the incumbent president of the republic.[29] High republican officials prized a reward from the court. So did social elites who enjoyed great wealth. Wang Jiucheng, a merchant who made his fortune as a supplier of military uniforms for the warlord's troops, tried every means possible to get a reward from the emperor of wearing a yellow mandarin jacket.[30] In the post-revolution era, shorn of all political power, the court continued to be valued as the legitimate source of social prestige and honors.

The continued functioning of those dynastic rituals and customs was important, especially given the context of the intensified warlord struggles of the early republic. Living in tremendous political turbulence, people found salvation in the peace, stately decorum and tranquility that the Forbidden City symbolically represented. Blind to the

newest political updates, in their casual conversations rural people continued to ask, "How is the Xuantong emperor? Who is now reigning over the country? Should peace immediately be restored as soon as the dragon throne were restored?"[31] In the 1910s, as the ancestral lands of the Qing court, north China had never been enthusiastically pro-republican. Beijing, for centuries in the neighborhood of a royal court, had never ceased to be monarchist. Ironically, the high frequency of changes in republican offices made "the docile citizens of Peking or of any other city in China" always ready to "display or the flag of the reigning political authority, which, they believe, would help protect them from the violence."[32]

The growing political confusion also helped strengthen loyalists' identities with the dynasty, making them believe that the issuance of the decree of abdication could be taken back at any time if the republican "experiment" proved a failure. Many years after the abdication of the emperor, the Manchu loyalists continued to demonstrate their loyalty to the old dynasty by continuing to use the dynastic calendar. When the outside world was restlessly embracing new ideas, new education, and new science prompted by a vernacular movement, the loyalists still regarded a continued use of classic Chinese and an engagement with classic poems, calligraphy, and traditional literati gatherings as ways to periodically display their dynastic identity.[33] Even in 1925, one year after the emperor was exiled from the Forbidden City, such Manchu loyalists as Wu Tao still felt more comfortable using the calendar based on the reign title of the emperor.[34]

The continued court daily routines helped make the "Great Within" (*danei*) a point of honor, because years after the abdication the Qing imperial family remained the wealthiest in the country—no single individual could compete with their affluence. M. Henri Borel, a Dutch scholar, wrote down his impressions of the Forbidden City of Beijing in those days: "Behind the walls of the Forbidden City, ever haughty and unapproachable, remains the solitary emperor whom no one knows, who never surrendered his individuality to anyone, and never will."[35] In the post-revolution era, loyalists highly valued the opportunity to be invited to the inner side of the "haughty and unapproachable walls." In 1922, the emperor's wedding provided a splendid opportunity for the court to display its elaborate rituals, for loyalists to refresh their nostalgic reminiscence of the past. Luo Zhenyu, a renowned Chinese classic philologist and scholar, continued rejoicing after he returned to Tianjin from his

observance of the emperor's wedding ceremony, during which he was received privately by the emperor and awarded the privilege of riding a horse in the Forbidden City. Luo recorded his gratitude in his diary: "as a humble servant, I cannot ever repay the grand grace upon me by his majesty."[36]

In short, the walls of the Forbidden City separated the inner world of "circular time" constituted by continued and repetitive performance of court rituals and the outer world of "linear time" with the republican nation as the subject. The ambiguities of the abdication settlement resulted in a disassociation of the ritual sovereignty that the court continued to represent years after the revolution with the territorial sovereignty of the republican nation. Just as Reginald Johnston, the tutor to Emperor Puyi, pointed out,

> [in] the heart of Peking were two adjacent palaces. In that which still retained the distinction of being the "Forbidden City" dwelt a titular monarch; in the other resided the chief executive of the republic. In the latter was a presidential chair occupied by one who exercised the powers of an emperor without the name; in the former was a throne on which sat one who was an emperor in name alone. He who ruled the vast realm of China was called a president; he whose rule did not extend an inch beyond his palace walls was called an emperor.[37]

The retaining of ritual sovereignty by the court offered an unusual but important angle to understand the dispersions, chaos, and ambiguities of the republic because, as later trajectories of republican history indicated, contests in the arena of ritual sovereignty mattered hugely in real political struggles. During the early years of the republic, while it was domestic politicians' view that "the emperor did not give up the throne; he transmitted the executive powers to Yuan Shikai, with instructions to restore the union between North and South and to form a republican government,"[38] it was foreign diplomats' opinion that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population did not even have "the slightest idea what a republic means."[39] In 1915, Yuan Shikai's failed attempt as president of the republic to become an emperor of a new dynasty of his own and in 1917 the loyalist Zhang Xun's mistaken confidence of his chances of restoring the Manchu court, all suggested that in early years of the republic constitutional monarchy remained a living alternative.

Thanks to the continued performance of the court's daily routines and its great wealth, the court retained its deity and dignity, making

itself a good candidate in contending to fill the vacuum of political legitimacy. In the post-revolutionary era, time in the Forbidden City did not proceed in a linear manner. Instead, it was circular, repetitive, indistinguishable between today and yesterday, and by nature ritual.[40] In the calendar of the court, the death of dowager empress Longyu in 1913 brought an abrupt rupture to the tranquility of indistinguishable time constituted by the repetitive acting out of imperial rituals. It stood out as a remarkable moment, and for that reason it has entered our historical memory.

Contested Sovereignties: The Ritual Dispute in Dowager Empress Longyu's Funeral Between the Manchu Court and the Republic

Born in 1868, the empress dowager Longyu was the empress consort of the Guangxu emperor (reigned 1875–1908). As an ordinary court woman, Longyu is however remembered because she signed the abdication documents on behalf of the boy emperor in 1912. The republican media praised her role as having facilitated "the transition from the monarchical to the republican form of government."[41] She was praised for having complied with the wills of the people and having saved the country from a civil war.[42] For her contribution in the abdication process Longyu continued to be celebrated as a heroine of the republic in the post-revolution era. In 1913, only one week after dowager empress Longyu's birthday, an acute backache quickly turned into a deadly disease. She died on February 22, 1913, at the age of 45.

Upon the news of empress dowager Longyu's death being made public, the republican government responded quickly by setting up national memorial agendas. According to *Ta Kung Pao*, a leading newspaper of the day, the republican government took it seriously, because the way that the government handled it "will matter on various aspects." The media praised empress dowager Longyu as "hav[ing] made [a] great contribution to the founding of the republic. Because of her crucial decision concerning the abdication of the throne, the nation was able to enjoy peace, and would not have to suffer from a prolonged civil war. Could the subjects of the old dynasty not mourn over her death?"[43]

Thanks to the preparation conference held on February 22, the agenda of the national funeral was meticulously carried out over the

following four days. On February 23, Yuan Shikai, president of the Ministry of Revenue ordered his department to reimburse funeral expenses and requested that state bureaus outside Beijing flew flags at half mast, "according to the standard of a funeral for a foreign monarch."[44] On February 24, Yuan ordered the prime minister and all state council personnel to attend court to pay their respects, and Parliament was adjourned for one day.[45] On February 25, the state council approved a preliminary subsidy of 30,000 yuan to the court.[46] On February 26, Yuan sent the fiscal proposal of another 2 million yuan to Parliament for approval. Yuan also dispatched ritual officer Wang Shiduo as special ambassador of the republican government to the court to take care of funeral affairs and the boy emperor.[47] On February 27, Yuan invited the Manchu princes and nobles to Beijing, "to dispel clouds of suspicion of the *Zongshedang* [Manchu loyalist party]." The republican government also planned to take the opportunity to make up its annual subsidy to the court, which had been delayed.[48]

Behind the republican government's careful handling of dowager empress Longyu's funeral lay its pragmatic political concern. In the early years of the republic, the Manchu loyalist party remained active. The activities of this party dated back to the moment of the signing of the abdication documents.[49] While Manchu loyalist proposal to move the imperial court to Manchuria was repressed, in the post-revolutionary era loyalist efforts to restore the monarchical system never ceased. For the newly founded republic, the threat was imminent and real. Republican politicians feared that if the loyalist party became powerful enough to wage a civil war, one "might have ended in the partition of China."[50]

How to assess Longyu's role in the founding of the republic became a politically sensitive issue, because it touched upon the legitimate question of the creation of the republic. After the news of dowager empress Longyu's death was released, the republican state council highly praised her great contribution to having fostered the founding of the republic.[51] Looking back on the imminent threats of a civil war following directly after the Wuchang uprising in 1911, the army celebrated Longyu as a wise decision-maker who judiciously perceived the people's willingness for the republic and by abdicating the throne saved the country from a potentially unending and destructive civil war: "given her wise decision that laid

the foundation of [the]'republic of five ethnic nations' (*wuzugonghe*) and rooted out thousands of years' despotism, she deserves to be celebrated as a female Yao and Shun."[52] The republican government then proposed to cast a bronze statue to memorialize dowager empress Longyu, ironically along with those heroes of the republic who raised arms to revolt against the Qing court.[53] This elaborate media project to situate dowager empress Longyu in the genealogy of the founding heroes of the republic enabled the republican government to legitimate its own dubious origins. In effect, by manipulating the discourse concerning the change from dynasty to nation, the nation justified its own legitimacy.

While celebrating empress Longyu's contribution to the republic in a way that did not reflect reality, the republican government meddled in court affairs to exert more direct control. To administer the funeral preparation, the president's office established a "special office for Qing Court Affairs" (*banli qingshi shiwuchu*). While the establishment of this office demonstrated how seriously the republican government took the funeral, it also helped break the monopoly of the Imperial Household Department (*Neiwufu*) in managing the funeral affairs.[54] Moreover, Longyu's death left a power vacuum, which led to squabbles among imperial concubines contending for influence. At that point, the court had lost the authority to solely decide the nomination of the succeeding empress. Instead, the court's nomination had to be approved by the republican government. This could not make it clearer how far the republican government had gone to intervene court affairs.[55]

While in diplomatic affairs with the court the republican government demonstrated more intervention and control, rituals spoke differently. On such occasions of sacrifice ceremonies and chanting scriptures, republican officials were advised to respect and follow old dynastic ritual procedures. The dynastic ritual guideline for an imperial funeral required all officials in Beijing coming to pay respects, attired appropriately based on official ranks. For descendants belonging to the eight great clans, ceremonies of "three-fold kneeling and the nine-fold prostration" were performed within the gate of the Palace of Tranquil Longevity (*Ningshougong*), and also for those outside the gate. Funeral ceremonies were held twice daily, and they were continued until the dowager empress's coffin was transferred to the imperial mausoleum. The shrine within the Palace of Tranquil Longevity showed a luxurious display of the finest handicrafts. They vividly reminded the ceremony attendants of the past glory of the vanishing dynasty.[56]

In stark contrast to the dynastic ceremonies were western ceremonies performed by republican officials. "Behind the walls of the Forbidden City, in the mourning cries of eunuchs were black-green gowns and western-styled suits coming in and out."[57] Specific requirements were set for political and military personnel who were attending the memorial ceremony, including the presentation of wreaths and fruits, garments to be worn, frequency of visits, and etiquette. Instead of performing the triple kowtow, republican personnel bowed; instead of Manchu funeral costumes, they wore dark-colored Western-style suits.[58]

For the newly founded republic, to hold a national ceremonial event was a process of learning by doing. On February 26, president Yuan held a conference with top republican officials for more than an hour to discuss how to fittingly arrange the funeral, and particularly on how to receive foreign diplomats who were to attend the memorial ceremony.[59] The ambiguous status of the Qing court confused both the republican government and foreign embassies. The foreign ambassadors who planned to regard the court as a reigning foreign sovereign were advised that the government would represent the reigning sovereign on the court's behalf.[60]

The question of political legitimacy during the early years of the republic was confused at best. Right after the founding of the republic, Sun Yat-sen went to the Ming imperial mausoleum to pay his respects as if the republic was a revival of the Han-Chinese dynastic continuity after the rupture of the Manchu rule. Republican officials were a combination of westernized elites and traditional Confucian scholars. This divergent background turned into a dispute over using vehicles or four-horse carriages to make up a solemn procession.[61]

The memorial ceremony held in Beijing from February 22 to March 20, 1913 quickly turned into a nationwide ritual event,[62] which offered a rare chance for public gatherings when most people of the country only had a limited sense of the "nation." In Beijing, within three days, tens of thousands of people voluntarily attended the ceremony held in the Gate of Supreme Harmony (*Taihemen*).[63] On the day when dowager empress Longyu's coffin was transferred to the Manchu imperial mausoleum, many people kneeled and wailed along the road as the escort passed by.[64] In Tianjin, many public associations launched large-scale memorial gatherings.[65] The solemnity of the memorial event excited loyalists of the court, who went to Beijing to witness it from all parts of the country.[66] The fact that the republican government was paying the highest respects

to the diseased Qing empress strengthened their belief that with the imperial title being retained, it was just a question of time before the dragon throne would return to power and bring back the political order that those republican politicians had failed to realize.

Concluding Remarks: The Significance of the Manchu Court in Early Republican Politics

Since the abdication of the emperor in 1912, the efforts of the court to restore the imperial rule never ceased. While the dubious peace negotiation process in 1911 and the ambiguity of its resultant document of "Article of Favorable Treatment" contributed to the lingering possibility of a restoration of the monarchy, growing political confusion in the early republic was also responsible. In the opinion of Chen Baozhen, one of the most prominent Manchu loyalists, when unending warlord struggles became self-destructive, it would then come the time that the imperial family returned to the throne.[67] However, this expectation to maintain the legitimacy of the court by making it independent of any external political entity, met many difficulties in reality. Not only did financial problems of the court continue to worsen due to the failure of the republican government to fulfill its promise on annual subsidy, but growing political confusion increased uncertainty over its future. In 1917, the court failed its attempt to include "Article of Favorable Treatment" in the constitution of the republic. It then was forced to sell treasures send out brides for political protection.[68] In short, from 1912 onward the court faced an immense paradox of attaching itself to a strongman in power to survive the political turbulence of warlord struggles while trying to stay detached in order to maintain its divinity. This paradox continued, which in part explains why in the 1930s the court in exile eventually chose to attach itself to the Japanese imperialist, willing to become his puppet in Manchuria, and why this choice was self-destructive and presaged its failure.

The lingering political legitimacy of the Qing abdicated court offers a unique angle to look at the causes that led to the turbulence at the core of early republican politics. If in 1912 the hasty peace negotiation saved the country from an imminent civil war, it took more than a decade for the immaturely founded republic to earn its due. The process of transition from a dynastic monarchy to a national republic was not a linear one. In some cases, the replacement of a dynasty by a nation was successful and certain; here is one example where it was not.

NOTES

1. Tetsuo Najita and J. Victor Koschmann (eds) (1982), *Conflict in Modern Japanese History: The Neglected Tradition*, Ithaca, 143.

2. Eva Giloi (2014), *Monarchy, Myth, and Material Culture in Germany 1750–1950*, Cambridge, 345.

3. Philip Manow (2010), *In the King's Shadow: The Political Anatomy of Democratic Representation*, Cambridge, 3.

4. Reginald Johnston (1995), *Twilight in the Forbidden City*, New York, 86.

5. Ding Yanshi (ed.) (1984), *Pu Yi he manqing yilao* (Pu Yi and Manchu Loyalists), Taipei, 10.

6. For a discussion—in light of Jürgen Habermas' concept of "legitimation crisis"—of public discourses of universal disappointment about the newly founded republican government, see Yang Nianqun (2012), 'Qingchu xunwei yu tongzhi hefaxing de queshi' (The Qing Abdication and the Legitimation of Crisis), *Lishijiaoxue* 5, 35–40.

7. For the high frequency of changes in office and the flourishing of political parties in the early republic, see Munakata Kotaro (2007), *Yijiuyi'er nian zhongguo zhi zhengdangjieshe* (Political Parties of China in 1912), Feng Zhengbao trans., Beijing.

8. Johnston (1995), 168.

9. Johnston (1995), 168.

10. Johnston (1995), 162.

11. Qin Guojing (1985), *Xunqing huangshi yishi* (The Anecdotes of the Qing Abdicated Court), Beijing, 35.

12. Aisin Gioro Pu Yi (1965), *Wo de qianbansheng* (The Former Half of My Life), Beijing, 88.

13. Prasenjit Duara (1995), *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*, Chicago, 4–5, 16.

14. By "bifurcation," Duara means "the process whereby, in transmitting the past, historical narratives and language appropriate dispersed histories according to present needs, thus revealing how the present shapes the past." See Duara (1995), 5.

15. For the negotiation concerning the abdication of the Qing emperor in 1911–1912, see Li Jiannong (1980), *Wuxu yihou sanshinian zhongguo zhengzhishi*, Beijing, 126–39. For what happened in the imperial conference that decided the abdication of Manchu court,

see Pu Wei (1982), pp.171–173. 'Xunguo yuqian huiyi riji' (The Diary of the Imperial Conference on the Abdication of Manchu Court), *Shehuikexue zhanxian* 3.

16. Robert L. Jarman (2001), *China: Political Reports 1911–1960*, vol. 1, Slough, 67.

17. For the full text of the abdication document, see 'Qingdi xuanbu tuiwei zhi,' (The Imperial Edict of Declaring Abdication), in: Second Historical Archive (1979) (ed.), *Zhonghua minguoshi dang'an ziliao huibian di'er ji* (The Collected Archives on the History of Republican China, vol. 2), Nanjing, 72–76.

18. Johnston (1995), 101–2.

19. Johnston (1995), 95.

20. Johnston (1995), 87, 98–9.

21. Johnston (1995), 196.

22. Johnston (1995), 197–207.

23. Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi (1989), W.J.F. Jenner trans., *From Emperor to Citizen: The Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi*, Beijing.

24. Qin Guojing (1985), 79. Because of tremendous political turbulence and lack of national authority during the early republic, inflation was common, resulting in a chaotic currency market. Several kinds of currency were in circulation, including silver tales (*yinliang*), silver dollars (*yinyuan*), bronze dollars (*tongyuan*), and paper notes (*zhibi*). But, since silver was the conversion standard of the day, silver tales were considered the most reliable and consistent. For the currency market during the early republic, see Ma Dongyu (1990), 'Minchu de bizhi gaige yu jingchao fengchao' (Currency Reform of the Early Republic and the Peking Currency Unrest), *Lishijiaoxue*, 3, 35.

25. Qin Guojing (1985), 79.

26. Qin Guojing (1985), 20.

27. For the Qing's imperial patronage of Tibetan Buddhism and the role it played in consolidating Qing rule, see Evelyn S. Rawski (1998), *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions*, Berkeley, 231–63; Johan Elverskog (2006), *Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China*, Honolulu.

28. Zhou Junshi (1984), *Pu Yi he manqingyilao* (Pu Yi and Manchu Loyalists), Taipei, 158–69.

29. Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi (1965), 97.

30. Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi (1965), 115.

31. Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi (1965), 115.
32. Johnston (1995), 139.
33. Ding Yanshi (1984), 15–7.
34. 'Wu Tao riji xuanlu' (A Selection of the Diary of Wu Tao), in: The Institute of Modern History of Chinese Academy of Social Science (ed.) (1984), *Jindaishi ziliao zong 55 hao* (Sources on Modern History 55), Beijing, 186.
35. Johnston (1995), 179.
36. Luo Zhenyu (1973), *Jiliao bian*, *Luo Xuetang xiansheng quanji wubian yi* (The Complete Collection of Mr. Luo Xuetang's Works), Taipei, 40.
37. Johnston (1995), 179.
38. Daniele Vare (1936), *The Last Empress*, New York, 291.
39. Johnston (1995), 90.
40. Pu Yi's diaries between 1912 and 1924 offer another angle to look at the repetitive and circular nature of "time" in the Forbidden City during the post-revolution era. See Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi (2009), *Pu Yi riji quanben shang* (The Complete Diary of Pu Yi, vol. 1), Tianjin.
41. *Shun-tian shibao*, June 19, 1912.
42. Johnston (1995), 95, 101.
43. *Ta Kung Pao*, February 23, 1913.
44. *Minlibao* (Lifting People News), February 23, 1913.
45. *Minlibao*, February 24, 1913.
46. *Minlibao*, February 25, 1913.
47. *Minlibao*, February 26, 1913.
48. *Ta Kung Pao*, February 27, 1913.
49. Johnston (1995), 106.
50. Johnston (1995), 107. For the restoration activities of the loyalist party during the early years of the republic, see Hu Pingsheng (1986), *Minguo chuqi de fubipai* (The Loyalist Party of the Early Republic), Taipei.
51. Museum of National History (ed.) (1990), *Zhonghua minguo shi-shi jiyao* (Collected Sources on History of the Republic), vol. 1–6/1913, Taipei, 174.
52. *Minlibao*, March 19, 1913. Yao and Shun were legendary leaders of ancient China, celebrated in Confucian classics as moral sages.
53. *Ta Kung Pao*, February 26, 1913.
54. *Ta Kung Pao*, February 26, 1913.

55. *Ta Kung Pao*, February 27, 1913.

56. Fuchadunchong (1981), *Longyu huangtaihou dashi ji* (A Journal of the Imperial Funeral of Empress Dowager Longyu), in: Shen Yunlong (ed.), *Jindai zhongguo shiliao congkan xubian* (A Continued Collection of Sources on Modern China, vol. 82), Taipei, 2, 3, 6, 31.

57. *Asiana Daily* (Yaxiya ribao), February 25, 1913. Aisin Gioro Pu Yi (1965), 87.

58. *Pingbao Newspaper*, March 17, 1913; *Minlibao*, March 21, 1913.

59. *Ta Kung Pao*, March 1, 1913.

60. *Ta Kung Pao*, February 28, 1913.

61. Museum of National History (ed.) (1990), 31.

62. *Shun-tian shibao*, March 2, 1913; *Shanghai gongbao*, 1913 (6), 14–39.

63. Fuchadunchong (1981), 54.

64. Fuchadunchong (1981), 138–9.

65. *Minlibao*, March 11, 1913.

66. 'Qingshi yiwen,' (Anecdotes about the Qing Court), Huang Yuanyong (1984), *Yuanyong yizhu* (Posthumous Works of Yuanyong 2), Beijing, 79.

67. Aisin Gioro Pu Yi (1965), 121.

68. Qin Guojing (1985), 80.

Remembering the Royal Nation

Losing Monarchs: The Legacy of German and English National Historiography

Charlotte Backerra

Introduction

During the nineteenth century, Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–84), and other German or German-speaking historians established an alleged 'scientific' approach to history, based on the so-called historical method. Equally important was their understanding of history as determined by great ideas, such as nation, state, and religion, which were embodied by great men. Every age supposedly had its own characteristics, and the historian could find the underlying condition, the idea, by reading between the lines of the sources. In addition, history was understood as leading to a providential goal—a telos. In the case of some German historians, this telos was the unification of Germany under the Prussian monarchy. This approach to history was christened *Historismus*.[1] In a comparable manner, the British Whig interpretation of history conceptualized history as a continuous ascending process, in which Great Britain established a civilized, modern empire spanning territories on all continents: one which was based on personal rights, a parliamentarian

Ch. Backerra (✉)
University of Mainz, Mainz, Germany

University of Stuttgart, Stuttgart, Germany

constitution for Great Britain, and scientific progress. Research into the development of historiography has increased in recent decades; in Europe, it focused up to this point mainly on nation and nation-building strategies employed, as will be discussed in the following section. This chapter, however, will assess the influence of nationalist historiography in obscuring the transnational politics of earlier royal dynasties, a stance that emerged in order to legitimate processes of nation construction in the nineteenth century, with consequences until the twenty-first century.

Histories of dynasties were written into chronicles and other kinds of texts long before the nineteenth century. Since the nineteenth century, the history of dynasties was seemingly discarded in favour of a history of nations and nation states. But even then, dynasties—or rather particular monarchs—were seen as contributing to, or damaging, the national development. And, at least in Germany, historians largely influenced by contemporary dynasties wrote this history. In this chapter, I argue that monarchs of earlier times became lost—that is, not considered noteworthy—when their rule did not fit into the process of construction of the nation state within the interpretation of German[2] historism (*Historismus*)[3] and British Whig historiography.[4] The focus then shifted to persons seen as responsible for leading the country and/or nation in the right direction. This was the case especially for British history of the eighteenth century, which was written as a history of parliamentary men such as Sir Robert Walpole (1676–1745) or William Pitt the Younger (1759–1806).[5] Another strategy could be to focus on a dynastic successor better fitted to a national history. Austrian historians would therefore favour Maria Theresa (1718–80, reigned 1740/45–80), who was perceived as the mother of modern Austria, instead of her husband, Emperor Francis Stephen (1708–65, reigned 1745–64), or her father, Emperor Charles VI (1685–1740, reigned 1711–40). Given their methodological biases, generations of historians neglected various aspects of the historical significance of past monarchs and dynasties. I argue that this legacy of national historiography is influential even in today's historiographic publications. The problem is that historians have rarely discussed their point of view vis-à-vis dynasties and monarchs in a general and abstract way. Therefore, the chapter concentrates more on a conceptual analysis rather than attempting an in-depth examination of the writing about royalty in specific works.

Historism and Whig history influenced each other in many ways, as recent research has discovered.[6] Superficially, German and British historiography of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has seemingly

focused on 'great men', either to further the 'great idea' of the age (historism) or to bring order to a chaotic time (Whig interpretation). But in interpreting historical events from a national point of view, German and British historians have tried to find processes and individuals who contributed towards the emergence of the perceived natural state of territorial government in the nation state. In works on British history since the late eighteenth century, the natural state of a constitutional monarchy was supposed to be rooted in 'British' tradition, such as in the belief in Protestantism or in the concept of England/Britain as a blessed nation. Rulers with ties to realms outside the British Isles did not fit into this natural order of history. But starting in 1714, two kings reigned who were born in Germany and had strong ties via territories and duties to the Holy Roman Empire: George I (reigned 1714–27) and George II (reigned 1727–60) were not only kings of Great Britain and Ireland, but also prince electors of Brunswick-Luneburg (often named 'Hanover' after its capital city). They also focused large amounts of their efforts and time on their German territories. This only changed with the third king of this dynasty, George III (1738–1820, reigned 1760–1811/20), who was born in England and stayed there his whole life. But for Whig historiography, not only were these monarchs problematic, but rather the whole concept of dynastic rule itself proved to be difficult. For them, the focus shifted therefore from individual monarchs to the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688/89 and its aftermath. Historians such as Henry Hallam (1777–1859), Thomas Macaulay (1800–59) and the latter's great-nephew, George Macaulay Trevelyan (1876–1962), replaced (in part) transnational dynastic history with a parliamentary and nationalist history of the British people.

Similarly, German historians could only grant long-term relevance to those secular great men who influenced their nation's history. In line with this interpretation, monarchs ruling a composite monarchy[7]—and composite rule more generally—had to become less relevant or even irrelevant for a national history. For German history, the emperors with their inherent status above all *nationes* of the Holy Roman Empire were therefore seen as less important compared to rulers of single territories which turned into nation states in the nineteenth century. Pre-eminent among the latter was Prussia, which became the nucleus of a united German nation state. The history of the Habsburg hereditary territories was similarly narrated in terms of the emergence of Austria. Examples of such narratives can be found in the works of Leopold von Ranke or Alfred von Arneth (1819–97).

I will undertake the proposed analysis by first looking into recent research of nineteenth-century historiography. The transformation from dynastic histories to national histories will be assessed in the next part of the chapter, in relation to the personal and professional background of several leading historians of the age. Furthermore, with two separate micro-studies of selected texts, I shall look into the opinions on monarchy and royal rule offered by historical writers and historians, the British Henry Hallam, Thomas Babington Macaulay, and Frederic William Maitland as well as the German-speaking Johann Gustav Droysen and Alfred von Arneth.

Transnational Exchange of Histories and Historiographies

Research into the European history writing of the nineteenth century has gathered momentum over the last two decades. This is partly due to the European Science Foundation (ESF) funded research programme *Representations of the Past: The Writing of National Histories in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe* (NHIST), with over 200 historians working together between 2003 and 2008 to discover the relations between historical writing and constructions of national identity.[8] Book series such as 'History of Historical Writing' (Oxford University Press)[9] or 'Writing the Nation' (Palgrave Macmillan)[10] have helped to spread the outcome of this massive project. The focus of most works is on national historiographies since the French Revolution. Not unexpectedly considering the overall objectives of historical research for that period, most writers look at the development of the nation state in these centuries. They reflect on the relationship of a 'scientific' approach to history, on historiography, historians, and history-writers. In the nineteenth century, the development of history as a subject at universities was combined with the progress in historiographic methods, the expansion of sources and subjects, as well as the distinct connection between writers and readers of national histories.

Influenced by the time and circumstances in which those historical studies were written, most publications have a decidedly transnational or even global approach. By looking at publication and translation practices of historical writing, the influences of published histories can be traced. The results show that readers normally favoured works which could be read as comments on their own age. So, in the mid-nineteenth century, the history of the English Civil War as well as the Glorious Revolution

and its effects on English history were seen as past examples showing how the events of 1848–49 could play out for German history.[11] On the other hand, the scientific approach to history with a fixed method and largely unknown sources fascinated British writers and readers.[12] As historians such as Ranke published on various, mostly Western European, territories and states, these were received and reviewed in those countries.[13] Unfortunately, and in contrast to German historiography, the research into Austrian historical scholarship is nearly non-existent.

The relationship between British and German historiography has been researched especially. Partly, this goes back to a century-old relation. Since the late nineteenth century, German history teaching at universities was (and is) seen as a role model to follow. A substantial number of British historians studied at least for a semester or year at one of the modern German universities.[14] On the other hand, this is an indicator for the still strongly felt connection between British and German scientific communities to this day.

But the focus of the research into historical writing rarely is on the question of how historians and writers of historical studies dealt with dynasties, monarchs, and their transnational basis.[15] It has been a well-known and accepted fact for some time that the history of early modern Europe can only be understood by looking at dynastic networks, dynastic politics, and members of ruling houses.[16] Looking at the later centuries, there still seems to be a sense that these dynastic elements were not as influential in the nineteenth century; rather they were replaced by parliamentary or even democratic values and connections. While this is perhaps partly true, this volume argues that it is not the whole story. At least for German and British historiography, this view might however also be related to a shift in historical writing in the last two hundred years.

Dynastic Histories to National History?

In early modern historical writing, the history of dynasties was at the core of most serious studies.[17] This went back to a time when historical writings on a larger scale were basically chronicles of a certain ruler's or dynasty's era. In early modern Europe, most dynasties felt the need to know more about their own history. On the one hand, these histories of ruling houses served as examples for teaching the younger members of a dynasty on how to rule as well as how to hold or enlarge the dynasty's territories and powers.[18] On the other hand, they were a manner of establishing seniority vis-à-vis other

ruling houses. To be able to trace one's own family history far back into the past, possibly even to ancient times, meant to be able to command more respect and influence due to 'old' age—researching history was therefore a matter of political legitimation. Dynastic history also endeavoured to praise the house's accomplishments for its territories, its people, and its members.[19] One of the most famous writers of historical topics of the eighteenth century was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). He was charged with the monumental task of establishing the age and history of the Guelph dynasty. This was in preparation for the expected succession to the English throne after the death of the last Protestant Stuart. When he was able to trace back the Guelph history into the Middle Ages and rediscovered an earlier English-Guelph connection,[20] this strengthened the claim of the Hanoverians to the throne of Great Britain and their relation to the British political nation, in Germany as well as in England.[21]

This dynastic history as the core of historical writing was later replaced by a history of nations. As Stefan Berger has pointed out, this development was based on the Enlightenment and the Romanticism movements. To find 'an explanation of human development through history, Enlightenment historians established some of the grand narratives of modern historical writing'.[22] In fact, their historical writing was in turn based on developing concepts of the law of nations, the balance of power in Europe, and in turn the expansion of international relations in the eighteenth century.[23] After the revolutionary years, it was felt that the revolution and its participants had lost the connection to the past in their search for modernity. The gap between past and present was to be filled with history and historical writing.[24]

In English written works, this step has been traced back to at least the mid-eighteenth century. Then, based on the idea of a supposed ancient constitution, the concept of a government by the king-in-parliament was used to strengthen the compromises found after the restoration of the Stuart dynasty in 1660, the Glorious Revolution in 1688/89, and the Act of Settlement and its consequences in 1701 and 1714. Most writers of historical studies were theologians or lawyers or had at least been introduced to general humanities at one of the few universities in the British Isles.[25] Ideas about a progressive English or rather British nation, successful internally because of a solid system of checks and balances for monarchical power, prosperous on a global scale because of its geographical advantages as an island surrounded by defendable water, and with a people blessed by God because of their strong Protestant faith, were very

much in place even before the turn of the century. The nineteenth century, with the re-establishment of the British Empire in Asia and Africa after losses in America in the previous century, therefore seemed to be the logical consequence of the previous century's politics.

In German-speaking countries, a change came with the newly established reform university in Göttingen in the late eighteenth century, and definitively by the end of the Napoleonic era. The foundation of the modern universities and the introduction of history as a subject for university studies in German, and later Austrian, universities by the 1850s[26] combined with an intense fight between academic historians and practitioners of history (those in charge of archives and museums, school teachers, etc.), meant that only professional historians and their writings were accepted as genuine historical scholarship in Germany since the mid-nineteenth century.[27] These historians developed the methods used to this day in regard to sources and interpretation.[28] Most writers later classified as being part of historism were drawn to the idea of a 'national' history, meaning that history had to show the progress of *nationes*, people speaking the same languages and/or having the same cultural values, into nations with a constant territorial boundary.[29] But one interesting fact has often been overlooked. Most of the historians known to this day were employed by and financially dependent on a king, a prince, or even the (Austrian) emperor. Leopold von Ranke[30] was installed into a full professorship with the complete support of the Prussian king. After the Revolution of 1848, he was appointed as a member of the state council (1854), but even before that he acted as an adviser to the king and his ministers. Ranke was even appointed 'court historian' in 1841 (*Hofhistoriograph*)—it is of no surprise that he would then go on to write a history of Prussia which placed the Hohenzollern dynasty at the heart of the German nation's development.[31] Alfred Arneth, Ritter von Arneth (the Knight of Arneth), began his career as a civil servant in the *Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv* in Vienna—the archive of the House of Habsburg, its courts, and the governed states—in 1841. He then held posts in the court chancellery of the Austrian Empire (since 1841). In 1860, he became deputy director of the *Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv*. Later, when Arneth was the director of this archive (since 1868), he worked together with the crown prince and one of the archdukes to set up the Museum for Military History (*Heeresgeschichtliches Museum*) in Vienna.[32] There and in his other works, he emphasized the Habsburg rulers' impact on, and their reign over, Austria.

As Philipp Müller has recently pointed out, historians and historical writers of the nineteenth century were also bound by the constraints of

archival policy. To gain access to state archives—house archives or secret archives—a special dispensation was needed, as archival material was still very much used in day-to-day politics and was therefore seen as a necessary political *arcanum* until the last third of the century. Access was granted after a process which included approval at the highest levels of government—and therefore, a critical, published opinion about the government, i.e. the ruling house or monarch, could led to the exclusion from archival use.[33] This was still true for dynastic archives after the Second World War, and historians were told to do their duty to the monarchy when writing biographies of monarchs or studies of monarchical rule.[34]

Parallel to the undoubted process of professionalization and institutionalization of history and historiography, the nineteenth century was also marked by a rising popular interest in historical topics. This can be seen in popular publications as well as 'historical' festivals, the founding of historical associations by local elites, which in turn established museums and journals. It can also be traced into the arts and architecture, which looked back to classical ancient times or the renaissance for historical examples. This was used and in fact cultivated by monarchs as well, especially in Germany, where after the turmoil of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and the secularization and the mediatization of a majority of German principalities and cities, territories and people needed to be integrated into existing monarchical polities. School and university teaching as well as celebrations and publications based on a dynastic orientation of historical policy were seen as the basis to establish loyalties to the monarchical system as well as to form a national conscience. Therefore, history and historical writing were means to further unity of the people and to internalize the feeling of and sense for the nation.[35] Such an imperative was in direct contrast to any transnational dynastic approaches to historiography, as well as to monarchs who had dual or multiple responsibilities as rulers of territorially plural or ethnically different dominions.

BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE MONARCHY: HALLAM, MACAULAY, AND MAITLAND

For Henry Hallam (1777–1859),[36] who introduced the study of the constitution to English historical writing, 'the history of England and its constitution were synonymous.'[37] His *Constitutional History of England*[38] is based on the presumption that there had always been a system that restrained royal power through parliamentary actions.[39] When recounting the Hanoverian Succession, the limited influence of George I is explained for Hallam's

readers as the natural result of him being 'a stranger to his people and their constitution, [who could not] have undertaken without ruin that most diffi-cult task of balancing parties and persons, to which the great mind of William had proved unequal'.[40] For the following decades after the Hanoverian Succession—Hallam calls it 'the age of Walpole'[41]—parliamentary struggles are at the centre of his constitutional history. The only time kings are present as prince electors is in regard to the War of the Austrian Succession, which was fought for 'the purposes of Hanover' rather than England.

> […] George I and George II, in whom the personal authority seems to have been at the lowest point it has ever reached, drew their ministers, not always willingly, into that course of continental politics […]. It is well known that the Walpoles and the Pelhams condemned in private this excessive predilec-tion of their masters for their native country, which alone could endanger their English throne.[42]

So these kings, when mentioned at all, are always presented in a dark light by Hallam.[43]

Thomas Babington Macaulay's[44] *The History of England from the Accession of James II*[45] and *History of England from the Accession of James I to that of the Brunswick Line*[46] were written some decades later at a time when Prince Albert was criticized because of his German origin and ties to European courts, and Disraeli was accused of un-Englishness.[47] The view of political development on the British Isles is focused on the events of the growing empire, the political events and constellations.[48] Macaulay's main theme is the unity and progress of the English people, their economic success, and political stability.[49] For him, this was based in the political unity that ended the 'long struggle between our sovereigns and their parliaments' binding 'together the rights of the people and the title of the reigning dynasty'.[50] Even on the isles themselves, he wanted to show 'how Scotland, after ages of enmity, was at length united to England, not merely by legal bonds, but by indissoluble ties of interest and affection'.[51] A separate entity outside of these bounds and territorial borders—another principality ruled by the British king for example—did not fit into such a picture. But Macaulay's historical writing influenced generations into believing that while England or Great Britain was a place of national his-tory, everything outside—be it the British Empire or the Hanoverian elec-torate—were places without significance and worthwhile history.[52]

One of the critics of Whig history was Frederic William Maitland (1850–1906).[53] His *Constitutional History of England*, published

posthumously, is based on legal texts and other sources. Maitland was heavily influenced by the German historism and its methods for reading and interpreting sources.[54] In fact his first interest was not in history, but rather in philosophy and law. Legal history in his point of view could show the 'progress, the contribution of successive generations and men'.[55] But, when reviewing the development of public law, the transnationality of royal power never goes beyond England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland on the British Isles, and the dependencies and colonies in the British Empire.[56] In the chapter 'The Sovereign Body: The Kingship', he discusses the various changes to dynastic succession since the Act of Settlement. Not once does he refer to the Hanoverian Succession, or draw attention to the fact that with Queen Victoria's accession, the personal union of Great Britain and Hanover came to an end.[57] The only reference to this is in a later chapter on the 'Cabinet': 'George I ceased to attend the meetings of the Cabinet. He and George II could not speak English, and felt little concern as to the internal policy of England; they were more concerned for Hanover. The Cabinet then begins to meet without the king's presence.'[58] As we now know, neither of these assertions was in fact true. But Maitland looks at the ministers and parliamentarians, because the king's powers were constrained to act only in accordance with the ministers: 'We cannot trace step by step the process whereby the king's personal will and pleasure has come to count for very little in our government. The reigns of the two Hanoverians, George I and George II, had much to do with it.'[59] Interestingly enough, George III is not included in this statement; born in England, he was subjected to English law, as Maitland points out previously.[60] As Maitland's example proves, if one was interested in English or British history, the persons and reigns of George I and George II could be neglected, as these kings contributed nothing to it.

As we have seen, if the monarchy was discussed, a constitutional or limited monarchy was the centre of historical writing about the British constitutional history, even if Britain was not seen as a non-monarchic republican polity.[61] Jonathan Parry has pointed out that the British monarchy is still widely accepted for reasons that resemble those of the Whig tradition. Then, the monarchy was associated with 'national identity, with constitutional balance and liberty, and with exemplary public values'; now it is supported because it 'has provided a symbol of national unity in times of crisis' and of old traditions, because it balances politicians and parties while at the same time the dynasty's members 'sacrifice' their personal

life for public duty.[62] But the research into the Hanoverian age of British history and especially the rule of George II has suffered from these century-old ideas. This has really changed only during the last decade with several publications on the relationship between Great Britain and Hanover[63] as well as the first two scholarly biographies of George II in English.[64]

<div align="center">

German and Austrian History and the Great Rulers: Droysen and Arneth

</div>

For German and Austrian historians after Ranke, historiography had to follow the history of successful nations developing into nation states. These states were based on the concept of one territory, one language, one nation, even though such a notion was modified for the case of Austria. As will be shown by Arneth's writings, the Habsburg rulers and the 'Austrian nation' were then seen as the source of the Austrian empire of the nineteenth century,[65] while the multi-national character of this empire was not mentioned explicitly.

Macaulay's *History* offered a—limited—example for German historians such as Droysen.[66] To write a conclusive history, 'from the end' and with the 'benefits of hindsight', was to establish the history of a great nation.[67] But unlike Macaulay, Droysen believed in a reconstructed history with details drawn from original sources to satisfy historism methods, not in 'painting' the historical age through language.[68] By training and inclination, Droysen was first a historian of ancient times, before the events of the revolution initiated his interest in Prussian history. In his mind, politics and historiography had to be one.[69] As he was an advocate of the so-called *kleindeutsche* (small-German) solution to German unification—meaning a Germany without the territories ruled by the Habsburg dynasty, but based on the Prussian dominions—he wanted to educate his readers to become 'Prussians'. Therefore, he wrote the *Geschichte der preußischen Politik*,[70] reconstructing first the Prussian history from its foundation in late medieval times to the early eighteenth century. The great man of Prussian history, Frederick 'the Great' and his achievements are the topic of the second part, which Droysen wrote in four volumes after the foundation of the Kaiserreich in 1871.[71] At the same time, he abhorred the eighteenth-century idea of a balance of power, as the states of early modern Europe were for him absolutist, corrupt, and violent. A Europe of nation states—his ideal for the future—would be 'a great, peaceful union, distinguished [only] by the differences of the individual people, organized in states based on

their [cultural/political] variations, with these states themselves [all having] a constitutional order'.[72] In the introduction to his first book on Frederick the Great, he paints a terrible picture of the consequences of personal unions across nations. Not only were the emperor's territories often outside of the Empire, but the 'people and countries were foreign to one another and sometimes even bitter enemies', held together by nothing else but the emperor, and—and here Droysen argues as a convinced Protestant—the 'bigoted' Court of Vienna, 'the Roman religion and its hierarchies'.[73]

But even more problematic was, according to Droysen, the fact that 'such exemptions, such fusions with foreign people and countries'[74] existed for many of the principalities and territories of the Holy Roman Empire: 'In the "German dominions of the King of England" now ruled "royal British privy councillors delegated to the electoral government of Brunswick-Luneburg".'[75] The 'German dynasties [...] followed the example of the Austrian, they de-germanised themselves'. These distributions of German territories and people were the cause of stagnation and corruption, as there was no 'national community' any more.[76] Emperor Charles VI's efforts to create a legal basis for the dynastic succession of his daughter, Maria Theresa, were dismissed by Droysen as futile efforts to preserve Austria in contradistinction to an awakened Germany, powerful in its own right.[77] This Germany would be based on the strong example of a Prussian-German leader, Frederick the Great. The latter was the one to enlarge German territories by conquering Silesia from Austro-Habsburg rule after the accession of Maria Theresa.

Alfred von Arneth, the most known representative of Austrian historism, wrote his most famous books about 'the greatest statesman and most noble commander' of Austria,[78] Prince Eugene of Savoy, and 'the most illustrious character' of Austrian history and 'the monarch who acted more than any monarch before or after her for the good of the Austrian territories', namely Maria Theresa.[79] For Arneth, Maria Theresa was responsible for remodelling the 'Austrian' empire.[80] After taking over the government, she reorganized the broken and scattered lands she had inherited from her father: 'She was able to create, with ingenious action, starting from an unconsolidated federation of dominions that were diverse, and always foreign to one another, a united governed empire.'[81] In contrast, her father Charles VI was an undecided character, who—politically gullible—had promised too much to other monarchs and states for guarantees of his daughter's inheritance, while only he himself was sure that

they would hold beyond his death.[82] Accordingly, the Habsburg territories had suffered economically, lost territories and populace, and experienced especially a loss of confidence in its ruler and government.[83] Prince Eugene of Savoy understood this better than his emperor. In regard to the Habsburg monarchy, the prince had done everything to foster the greatness of the imperial court as well as the power and well-being of Austria.[84] But in the end, he followed his duty and obeyed his monarch's commands.[85]And Arneth also offers the prince's stance on Germany—meaning the Holy Roman Empire. He wanted at the same time to reduce the quarrels between the princes and to strengthen and to enlarge the emperor's power; in his mind, these two conditions were dependent on one another: 'He did whatever possible to support the unity and by it the prestige and greatness of Germany.'[86] In contrast to Droysen, Arneth's historiography has not been analysed according to his stance on nation, the nation state, or types of government. These few remarks should therefore be seen as a first glimpse into his historical writing, while future research is definitely needed to understand his relationship to German historism as well as his influence on later works of Austrian history.

In Search of the Loss of Monarchs: Conclusion

This chapter has interrogated the perspective of German-speaking and British historians on monarchs, monarchy, and dynastic rule, even as they remained entrenched within the methodological framework of the 'great idea' of the nation. It has been shown that historians of the nineteenth century mostly had a connection to monarchy or monarchical rule, in their life and/or in their historical writings. Some were employed by royal houses or rulers as university teachers, archivists, court historians, or at scientific academies. Others at least hoped for, or were dependent on, royal favour to access sources in formerly closed political or royal archives. I have not talked about personal royal favours, such as publication money, grants, stipends, or pensions, which sometimes also would be granted by rulers to historians.

Most historians saw, however, the unity of nations and territories as essential prerequisites for an orderly, peaceful, as well as powerful rule. Royal actors who were seen as contributing to the consolidation of a nation were placed in the historical limelight, whereas rulers who were seen as privileging multinational dynasties were projected (as George I and George II were) as incompetent or anachronistic figures. On the other hand, strong

monarchical rule with royal rulers working towards a united nation state was not only accepted, but rather emphasized by nineteenth-century historians. A tendency existed to overlook any transnational history of monarchies, even though composite monarchies were the rule rather than the exception in premodern Europe. And at the time of Hallam, Droysen, and the others, their own national background was not within territorially constrained countries, but rather (globally) expanding empires with a nucleus of one nation state.

To this, we have to add the often criticised tendency of historiography—which is nonetheless almost unavoidable—to focus on topics and persons analysed beforehand, leading to the neglect of certain monarchs by historical science until far into the twentieth and even twenty-first centuries, such as George II or Charles VI, who to this date has found no scholarly biographer. In British historiography, even critics of the Whig history followed the scheme set in place by their predecessors: Namier's actors were the members of Parliament, not the kings and queens.[87] This chapter can only serve as a starting point for further research. The transnational history of royal studies as well as the interdependence of dynastic and national viewpoints should in future be conducted on at least a European, if not a global scale.

Notes

1. Friedrich Jaeger and Jörn Rüsen (1992): *Geschichte des Historismus: Eine Einführung*, Munich.
2. I will also consider an example of Austrian historism; at the time, and till today, there are strong connections as well as a marked exchange of ideas between German and Austrian historians.
3. I follow Stefan Berger's definition and translation of *Historismus* as historism 'associated with Leopold von Ranke […] as an evolutionary, reformist concept which understands all political order as historically developed and grown […]'. Stefan Berger (2015), 'Introduction—Constructing the Nation through History', in: Stefan Berger and Christoph Conrad: *The Past as History: National Identity and Historical Conciousness in Modern Europe*, Basingstoke, 1–27, here 22, fn. 58.
4. The most known critical assessment of British historiography of the early nineteenth century as 'Whig history' was first published

in 1931: Herbert Butterfield (1931), *The Whig Interpretation of History*, London.

5. See Stefan Berger (2007), 'The Power of National Pasts: Writing National History in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe', in: Stefan Berger (ed.), *Writing the Nation: A Global Perspective*, Basingstoke, 30–62, here 35.

6. Stefan Berger and Peter Lambert (2003), 'Intellektuelle Transfers und geistige Blockaden: britisch-deutsche Historikerdialoge', in: Stefan Berger, Peter Lambert and Peter Schumann (eds), *Historikerdialoge: Geschichte, Mythos und Gedächtnis im deutsch-britischen kulturellen Austausch, 1750–2000*, Göttingen, 63–119, here 78–9.

7. John H. Elliot (1992), 'A Europe of Composite Monarchies', *Past & Present* 137, 48–71; Helmut G. Koenigsberger (1986), 'Dominium regale or Dominium politicum et regale: Monarchies and Parliaments in Early Modern Europe', in: Helmut G. Koenigsberger (ed.): *Politicans and Virtuosi: Essays in Early Modern History*, London, 1–25.

8. It led, for example, to the list of national historians in Europe, published in Berger and Conrad (eds) (2015), 380–483. For British history, as early as 1978, a study by a Dutch historian examined the works of Whig historiography: Petrus Benedictus Maria Blaas (1978), *Continuity and Anachronism: Parliamentary and Constitutional Development in Whig Historiography and in the Anti-Whig Reaction Between 1890 and 1930*, The Hague.

9. Stuart Macintyre, Juan Maiguashca and Attila Pók (eds) (2011), *The Oxford History of Historical Writing. Volume 4: 1800–1945*, Oxford.

10. See, for example, Matthias Middell and Lluis Roura (eds) (2013), *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing*, Basingstoke.

11. Patrick Bahners (2003), 'Der tiefe Stachel: Zorn und Eifersucht der deutschen Leser Macaulys', in: Berger, Lambert, and Schumann (eds), 157–196, here 162–4.

12. Benedikt Stuchtey and Peter Wende (2000): 'Introduction: Towards a Comparative History of Anglo-German Historiographical Traditions and Transfer', in: Benedikt Stuchtey and Peter Wende (eds), *British and German Historiography, 1750–1950: Traditions, Perceptions, and Transfer*, Oxford, 1–24, here 11–14.

13. Peter Bahners (2000), '"A Place among the English classics': Ranke's *History of the Popes* and its British Readers'", in: Stuchtey and Wende (eds), 123–57.

14. See, in general, Stuchtey and Wende (2000).

15. The noteworthy exception to the rule are some chapters in the edited volume by Andrzej Olechnowicz (ed.) (2007), *The Monarchy and the British Nation, 1780 to the Present*, Cambridge.

16. Christoph Kampmann, Katharina Krause, Eva-Bettina Krems, and Anuschka Tischer (2008): 'Einleitung', in: Christoph Kampmann, Katharina Krause, Eva-Bettina Krems, and Anuschka Tischer (eds), *Bourbon—Habsburg—Oranien: Konkurrierende Modelle im dynastischen Europa um 1700*, Cologne, 1–12.

17. Birgit Studt (2006), 'Dynastiegeschichte', *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit (EdN). Vol. 3*, col. 11–14, here col. 11.

18. János Kalmár (2009), 'Ahnen als Vorbilder: Der vom späteren Kaiser Karl VI. in seinen Jugendjahren verfasste Kanon der Herrschertugenden', in: Gabriele Haug-Moritz, Hans Peter Hye, and Marlies Raffler (eds.), *Adel im 'langen' 18. Jahrhundert*, Vienna, 43–60.

19. Studt (2006), col. 13–14.

20. Princess Matilda Plantagenet, daughter of King Henry II of England and Queen Eleanor of Aquitaine, was married to the Duke of Bavaria and Saxony, Henry the Lion, and gave birth to three sons: Emperor Otto IV; Henry the Elector Palatine; and William, the founder of the Brunswick line of the Guelph dynasty.

21. Georg Schnath (1982): *Geschichte Hannovers im Zeitalter der neunten Kur und der englischen Sukzession 1674–1714. Volume IV: Georg Ludwigs Weg auf den englischen Thron: Die Vorgeschichte der Thronfolge 1698–1714*, reprint, Hildesheim, 28. See also Kurt Müller and Gisela Krönert (1969), *Leben und Werk von G. W. Leibniz: eine Chronik*, Frankfurt, 173. For Leibniz's work on Guelph history and the English connection, see the letter by Leibniz to the Hanoverian minister Ludolf Hugo, 18: Medaillenentwurf anlässlich des Act of Settlement, Hannover, 008.1701 (L Konzept: MsXXIII289, 11Bl.5–5a.1Bog.8o.), in: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (2006): *Sämtliche Schriften*, edited by the Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften and the Akademie der Wissenschaft in Göttingen, 1st series (General historical and political correspondence), vol. 20, Hannover, 24–5.

22. Stefan Berger (2011), 'The Invention of European National Traditions', in: Macintyre, Maiguashca, and Pók (eds), 19–40, here 23.

23. Ian McBride (2005), 'The Nation in the Age of Revolution', in: Len Scales, Oliver Zimmer (eds), *Power and the Nation in European History*, Cambridge, 248–271, here 255–260.

24. Berger and Conrad (2015), 95–100.

25. Michael Bentley (2011), 'Shape and Pattern in British Historical Writing, 1815–1945', in: Macintyre, Maiguashca, and Pók (eds), 204–224, here 205.

26. Berger and Conrad (2015), 144–5, 147.

27. Berger and Lambert (2003), 90.

28. Johann Gustav Droysen (1977), *Historik. Historisch-kritische Ausgabe von Peter Lehy. Volume 1: Rekonstruktion der ersten vollständigen Fassung der Vorlesungen (1857), Grundriß der Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857/58) und in der letzten gedruckten Fassung (1882)*, Stuttgart. These methods were based on the teaching of 'auxiliary sciences' at the University of Göttingen and other Protestant universities in Germany. Berger and Conrad (2015), 71.

29. Berger (2011), 29.

30. Alfred Dove (1888), 'Ranke, Leopold von', *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* 27, 242–269, online: https://www.deutsche-biographie. de/gnd118598279.html#adbcontent, accessed 20 Sept. 2016; Ulrich Muhlack (2003), 'Ranke, Leopold von', *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 21, 140–142, online: https://www.deutsche-biographie. de/gnd118598279.html#ndbcontent, accessed 20 Sept. 2016.

31. Dominik Juhnke (2015), *Leopold Ranke: Biographie eines Geschichtsbesessenen*, Berlin, 95, 99, 117, 144–5.

32. Anonymus (1957), 'Arneth, Alfred von', *Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950*, vol. 1, Vienna, 29; Hanns Schlitter (1902), 'Arneth, Alfred von', *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (ADB)*, 46, Leipzig, 45–51, https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/ gnd116344857.html#adbcontent, accessed 20 Sept. 2016; Alexander Novotny (1953), 'Arneth, Alfred Ritter von', *Neue Deutsche Biographie (NDB),* 1, Berlin, 364–5, https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/ gnd116344857.html#ndbcontent, accessed 20 Sept. 2016.

33. Philipp Müller (2016): *Die geöffneten Archive: Historisches Forschen und Arkanpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert*, paper given at the

51st German Historikertag, Hamburg, 23rd September 2016. See also his articles: Philipp Müller (2014), 'Die neue Geschichte aus dem alten Archiv: Geschichtsforschung und Arkanpolitik in Mitteleuropa ca.1800-ca.1850', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 299/1, 36–69; Philipp Müller (2013), 'Archives and History: Towards a History of 'the Use of the State Archives' in the 19th century', *History of the Human Sciences*, 26/4, 27–49. Arneth challenged this practice and achieved a change in policies, see the notes on his biography in the online catalogue of the *Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv*, Arneth's archival bequests, AT-OeStA/HHStA SB Nl Arneth Nachlass, http://www.archivinformationssystem.at/detail.aspx?ID=1225, accessed 20 Sept. 2016.

34. Andrzej Olechnowicz (2007), 'Historians and the modern British monarchy', in: Olechnowicz (ed.), 6–44, here 10.

35. For Bavarian and Saxon dynastic historical politics, see Simone Mergen (2005), *Monarchiejubiläen im 19. Jahrhundert: Die Entdeckung des historischen Jubiläums für den monarchischen Kult in Sachsen und Bayern*, Leipzig, especially 34–40. Another example is George IV's interest in genealogy, the celebrations of the Hanoverian succession in 1814, and the foundation of the Guelphic order. Clarissa Campbell Orr (2007), 'The Feminization of the Monarchy 1780–1910: Royal Masculinity and Female Empowerment', in: Olechnowicz (ed.), 76–107, here 82.

36. Timothy Lang (2005), 'Hallam, Henry (1777–1859)', *Oxford DNB*, online edn., http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12002, accessed 20 Sept. 2016.

37. Anthony Brundage and Richard A. Cosgrove (2014), *British Historians and National Identity: From Hume to Churchill*, London, 58.

38. Henry Hallam (1827–1829), *The Constitutional History of England, from the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of George II*, second edition, 3 vols, London.

39. Brundage and Cosgrove (2014), 59.

40. Hallam (1829), vol. 3, 309.

41. Hallam (1829), vol. 3, 353.

42. Hallam (1829), vol. 3, 393.

43. This is also true for another paragraph, where Hallam states the problematic relationship of George II to the Catholic Stuarts and their supporters, the Jacobites; according to Hallam, the king was

convinced by Walpole to regard all Tories as Jacobites as well. Hallam (1829), vol. 3, 339–43.

44. William Thomas (2015), 'Macaulay, Thomas Babington, Baron Macaulay (1800–1859)', *Oxford DNB*, online edn., http://www. oxforddnb.com/view/article/17349, accessed 20 Sept. 2016.

45. Thomas Barbington Macauly (1848–61), *The History of England from the Accession of James II*, 5 vols., Chicago.

46. Thomas Barbington Macauly (1763–83), *History of England from the Accession of James I to that of the Brunswick Line*, London.

47. Jonathan Parry (2007), 'Whig monarchy, Whig nation: Crown, politics and representativeness 1800–2000', in: Olechnowicz (ed.), 47–75, here 50–1.

48. Jürgen Osterhammel (1991), 'Thomas Barbington Macauly', in: Rüdiger vom Bruch and Rainer A. Müller (eds), *Historikerlexikon. Von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert*, Munich, 193.

49. Thomas Barbington Macauly (1849)*, The History of England from the Accession of James II*, Volume 1, copyright edition, Leipzig, 276.

50. Macauly (1849), 13.

51. Macauly (1849), 1.

52. Brundage and Cosgrove (2014), 77.

53. Stroud Francis Charles Milsom (2007), 'Maitland, Frederic William (1850–1906)', *Oxford DNB*, online edn., http://www. oxforddnb.com/view/article/34837, accessed 20 Sept. 2016.

54. James Campbell (2000), 'Stubbs, Maitland, and Constitutional History', in: Stuchtey and Wende (eds), 99–122, here 114–6.

55. Campbell (2000), 109–10.

56. Frederic William Maitland (1908): *The Constitutional History of England: A Course of Lectures delivered by F. W. Maitland*, Oxford, 330–343.

57. Maitland (1908), 343–6.

58. Maitland (1908), 395.

59. Maitland (1908), 397.

60. Maitland (1908), 341, 346.

61. 'If the absolution of the Tudors must in a measure answer for the sins of the Stewarts, and the sins of the Stewarts for the miseries of the Rebellion, the republican government must in like measure be held responsible for the excesses of the Restoration. […] the nation, church, peers and people, emerge with a strong hold on

better things […].' William Stubbs (1896), *Constitutional History of England in its Origin and Development*, vol. 3, 5th edition, Oxford, 524, cited from Michael Bentley (2005), *Modernizing England's Past: English Historiography in the Age of Modernism, 1870–1970*, Cambridge, 32.

62. Parry (2007), 66–9.
63. Brendan Simms and Torsten Riotte (eds) (2007), *The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714–1837*, Cambridge; Andreas Gestrich and Schaich, Michael (eds) (2015), *The Hanoverian Succession: Dynastic Politics and Monarchical Culture*, Farnham; Ronald G. Asch (ed.) (2014), *Hannover, Großbritannien und Europa: Erfahrungsraum Personalunion 1714–1837*, Göttingen.
64. Jeremy Black (2007), *George II: Puppet of the Politicians?*, Exeter; Andrew Thompson (2011), *George II: King and Elector*, New Haven.
65. See, for example, the edition of treaties, which took all treaties between the Holy Roman emperor and other powers to be 'Austrian state treaties': Alfred Francis Pribram (ed.) (1907), *Österreichische Staatsverträge England. Vol. 1: 1526–1748*, Innsbruck.
66. Theodor Schieder (1959), 'Droysen, Johann Gustav', *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, 4, 135–137, online ed., https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/gnd11852755X.html#ndbcontent, accessed 20 Sept. 2016.
67. Bahners (2003), 176–7.
68. Bahners (2003), 193–4.
69. Jörn Rüsen (1968), 'Politisches Denken und Geschichtswissenschaft bei J. G. Droysen', in: Kurt Kluxen, Wolfgang J. Mommsen (eds), *Politische Ideologien und nationalstaatliche Ordnung: Studien zur Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, Munich, 171–188, here 171.
70. Johann Gustav Droysen (1855–69), *Geschichte der preußischen Politik*, 4 vols, Leipzig.
71. Johann Gustav Droysen (1874–1886), *Friedrich der Große*, 4 vols, Leipzig.
72. Johann Gustav Droysen (1886), *Vorlesungen über das Zeitalter der Freiheitskriege*, 2 vols, 2nd edition, Gotha, vol. 2, 458, cited from Ulrich Muhlack (2006), 'Das europäische Staatensystem in der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung des 19. Jahrhunderts', in: Notker

Hammerstein, Gerrit Walther (eds), *Ulrich Muhlack: Staatensystem und Geschichtsschreibung. Ausgewählte Aufsätze zu Humanismus und Historismus, Absolutismus und Aufklärung*, Berlin, 313–353, here 341 [original in German; all translations are by the author].

73. Johann Gustav Droysen (1874), *Friedrich der Große*, vol. 1, 9.
74. Droysen (1874), 9.
75. Droysen (1874), 10.
76. Droysen (1874), 10.
77. Droysen (1874), 15.
78. Alfred von Arneth (1858), *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen. Nach den handschriftlichen Quellen der kaiserlichen Archive*, 3 vols, Vienna.
79. Alfred von Arneth (1863–79), *Geschichte Maria Theresias*, 10 vols., Vienna, here vol. 1: 1740–1741 (1863), v.
80. Further research is needed to determine if Arneth was of the opinion that Maria Theresa wanted to create an Austrian nation as well—but clearly, he saw the state he lived in as a direct result of her reign.
81. Arneth (1863), vol. 1, vi.
82. Arneth (1863), vol. 1, 56.
83. Arneth (1863), vol. 1, 57–61.
84. Arneth (1858), vol. 3, 487.
85. For the relationship between Charles VI and Prince Eugene as seen by Arneth after his analysis of their personal correspondance, see Arneth (1858), vol. 3, 30–59.
86. Arneth (1858), vol. 3, 488.
87. Lewis Namier, John Brooke (eds) (1964), *The House of Commons, 1754–1790,* 3 vols., London.

Constructing Queenship in Early Nineteenth-Century French Historiography

Heta Aali

French queenship, the French monarchy, and the whole of French society went through extensive changes between 1789, the French Revolution's beginnings, and 1848, when the French monarchy was overthrown for the last time. The monarchy was restored after the Napoleonic reign in 1814 and 1815, but it was not the same monarchy it had been in 1789 and during the *Ancien Régime*. Monarchies are not separate from society, and thus they were also affected by the social, political, and economical changes that took place in early nineteenth-century Europe. Queen became to be seen as a private figure rather than as a public one, a shift that had already started long before the Revolution. In the early nineteenth-century public discourse, an ideal queen became associated with a bourgeois lady rather than with a political figure. In this chapter, I will argue that historians sought justifications from history to exclude women from public power, and that this tendency coincided with a larger European tendency to create gendered separations between public and private spheres. Furthermore, I will examine how, in the context of restored monarchy and the July Monarchy,

H. Aali (✉)
University of Turku, Turku, Finland

early nineteenth-century historians argued for women's exclusion from the French throne using examples from the history of other, mostly European dynasties, such as the English or Austrian, and from the house of Medici, to justify this exclusion. Due to the limited space, I will leave aside any questions related to the infamous Salic law.

Marie Antoinette was the last queen of France, since by the time they acceded to the throne the brothers of the guillotined King Louis XVI were at a very advanced age and both were widowers. Bourbon King Louis XVIII (reigned 1814/1815–1824) continued through the restoration period as a pale image of the kings of France.[1] His brother Charles X (reigned 1824–1830) tried to strengthen the restored monarchy and the king's position, but, following the 1830 revolution, the king of France was replaced with the king of the French: Louis Philippe from the house of Orléans accepted the throne that by then had lost most of its sacral dimensions.[2] Louis Philippe acceded to the throne with his spouse Marie Amelie, who was Marie Antoinette's niece and the daughter of Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies. Marie Amelie was very different from her aunt, but neither of them seemed to have been very popular among their contemporaries.[3] The July Monarchy needed to reinvent itself after the king's sacred position no longer justified the monarchy. The royal family needed to position itself within the French 'nation', a concept especially popular in its new form since the 1820s and visible in all levels of French society, in particular in historical writing. History, which was increasingly popular among readers of all social classes in the nineteenth century, was employed by historians and politicians to justify and to challenge the French monarchy that had an unstable position in these decades.

In fact, historians had a considerable role in French politics in the first half of the nineteenth century: for example, the historian François Guizot became prime minister in the 1840s during the July Monarchy. History was (and is) an essential part of nation-building processes, and in early nineteenth-century France, historians actively created narratives about French history to support the idea of a unified French nation. History was studied for didactic and pragmatic reasons, to find instructions for contemporary society, and to give examples of rightful behaviour and morals. Through their writings, historians took part in defining the role of the monarchy in French society.

France has never had a queen regnant, a ruling queen who would have inherited the throne by her own right. Women's exclusion from the throne was justified with various reasons since the Hundred Years War

with England. Specific laws in the charters of 1814 and 1830 excluded women from the throne.[4] Yet, the exclusion was not conclusive, because there was discussion on women's rights to inherit the throne both in the early 1820s and in the early 1830s, but the discussions only concerned situations where the future of the monarchy was at stake.[5] Overall, the exclusion was justified repeatedly in historical writings; this attests to the point that the exclusion was not as definitive, or 'natural', as its supporters would have wanted it to be. There were several examples of queens regnant in Europe. In France several queens had used supreme power as regents, so women using power were not entirely unknown to the French. But what meanings of queenship were presented in historiographical works, especially vis-à-vis kingdoms where women could inherit the throne?

This chapter focuses on three works from the 1820s and 1840s by three very different authors in order to discover how they represented women using public power as sovereigns and how they compared French queenship to other institutions of queenship in Europe, either contemporary or historical. I have chosen the works of these authors because they had simultaneously unique, yet representative approaches to the question of queenship: the changed norms of queenship are well visible in their works, but unlike many contemporary authors, two of them also examined queenship as an institution.

Louis Marie Prudhomme (1753–1830) was a well-known bookseller, publisher, historian, and political activist.[6] He was especially active in politics during the Revolutionary years. Prudhomme continued to be a publisher in the beginning of the nineteenth century after his political career had ended. He was in favour of the restoration of the monarchy, and in 1826 he published the work relevant for this chapter: *Répertoire universel, historique, biographique des femmes célèbres, mortes ou vivantes,*[7] a multi-volume collective biography of famous women from all around the world. The work was republished in 1830 (*Biographie universelle et historique*).[8] The work demonstrates very well the comparative and biographical view on famous women that was popular all over Europe in the nineteenth century. Prudhomme's collective biography offered not only ideal role models for female readers, but also presented 'notorious' women from history.

Prudhomme was an important voice on French queenship, because he had published collective biographies on queens already in the 1790s. In 1791 and 1792, Prudhomme had published two quite similar works both entitled *Les crimes des reines de France depuis le commencement de la monarchie jusqu'à Marie-Antoinette.*[9] According to these earlier works, it seems

that he fiercely supported the Revolution and that he wanted to depict the French royals, from the Merovingian period onwards, as guilty of crimes against the French 'people'. This was not an uncommon accusation, as Lynn Hunt, for example, has shown; Marie Antoinette represented all the vices of the monarchy to the revolutionaries and to the critics already before 1789. The revolutionaries attacked above all her sexuality and they blamed her for having corrupted the king, his political entourage, and even their son with her 'sexual body'.[10] Yet Prudhomme, like many other revolutionaries, gradually changed his mind as the revolutionary events advanced and the Terror started claiming more and more lives.[11]

Philippe Antoine Merlin (1754–1838), also known as Merlin de Douai, was a lawyer, a politician, and an author. Similarly to Prudhomme, he was politically most active during the revolutionary years. He was a deputy at the National Convention and he voted for the death of King Louis XVI in 1793. He was appointed president of the National Convention in August 1794.[12] He was forced to go into exile in 1815, after the monarchy was restored and the brother of the guillotined Louis XVI acceded to the French throne. Merlin was able to return to France in 1830, when the July Revolution brought the constitutional monarchist Louis Philippe to the French throne, the son of Philippe Égalité, who had also voted for the death of the king in 1793.[13]

Most of Merlin's publications were treatises of legal and political questions, speeches and letters (*mémoires*).[14] The work that is most interesting for this chapter is *Répertoire universel et raisonné de jurisprudence*.[15] The *Répertoire* is a legal encyclopaedia[16] that had five editions, of which the last one was published simultaneously in Brussels (1825–1828) and Paris (1827–1828). In the *Répertoire*, which examined jurisprudence and legal concepts in alphabetical order, Merlin studied quite extensively the legal questions related to queenship and to women's position in France both from the contemporary and from the historical perspective. Most importantly, he did not reduce queenship to individual queens and to their lives, but studied queenship as an institution and examined the rituals and duties related to it in different times of history. He was one of the rare ones to examine queenship as an institution as there was no sudden interest to study queenship in this manner in the early nineteenth century. He made it clear that the 'nation is submitted to the power of only one', to the power of the king and not of the queen.[17] Yet, Merlin had unique views on the kings' marriages, illustrated by his approval of the 'left hand' marriage. He thought this institution to be common in Germany; according to him,

it was possibly contracted between Louis XIV and Madame de Maintenon. The 'left hand' marriage was promised tied for love after the king had fulfilled his royal duties, that is, after he had produced an heir, and it would therefore not disturb the order of succession for the throne.[18]

The third writer, Édouard Laboulaye (1811–83), was a jurist, a historian, and a politician.[19] He was famous for his lectures and his enthusiasm for the United States of America, and even though he never visited the country, he spoke and wrote extensively about democracy in the United States.[20] Most of Laboulaye's publications were related to law and to legal history.[21] He was a supporter of the July Monarchy and in 1845 he was elected to the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres.[22] In 1843, he published a work entitled *Recherches sur la condition civile et politique des femmes, depuis les Romains jusqu'à nos jours*,[23] which will be the focus of the following analysis. In this study, Laboulaye examined inheritance laws concerning women from Roman times to the modern age. The work won an award from the Académie des sciences morales et politiques in 1842, which points to the fact that it represented well the general perception of women's rights, abilities, and position in French history and in contemporary society. Laboulaye also examined women's rights to inherit the throne and he compared the situation in France to other European countries, where women could inherit the throne or use supreme power. In general, however, Laboulaye did not show any special interest in women's rights in his other writings or teaching, which makes this work, published in 1843, a peculiar one among his output.

The three works, one collective biography, one encyclopaedia, and one full monograph, are good examples of the way queenship was perceived and examined in early nineteenth-century France. Collective biographies were popular readings in nineteenth-century Europe, and both women and men wrote them.[24] The nineteenth century is often called the century of Great Men, which corresponds to readers loving to learn about the lives of remarkable individuals in history. The history of queenship was almost always perceived through the lives of individual queens; very rarely did historians examine the history of the rituals or duties associated with queenship. As a rule, except for the works of Merlin and Laboulaye, queenship as an institution was not examined in popular or academic historical writing.[25] Perhaps one reason why queenship was so seldom examined as an institution was the general change that took place in France and in the French monarchy during and after the Revolution. Queenship was perceived, like all areas related to women's lives, to belong to the

'private' or domestic area of society: whereas being a queen had been (or had had been) a public role in the eighteenth century, the role had now changed to be quite similar to that of any wife. A queen was a king's spouse,[26] the mother of his children, and in theory she had no official role in the kingdom. An ideal queen started to resemble a bourgeois lady, whose main tasks were marriage, bringing up the children, and taking care of the family's religious education and charitable works.[27] Many historians presented historical queens as role models for female readership by characterizing them as bourgeois ladies in order to highlight queens', and all women's, 'natural' roles as wives, spouses, and mothers. By not describing queenship as an institution, historians emphasized that ideally queens were no more than wives of kings and had no special power in the kingdom. Historians portrayed ruling women in a negative light in order to highlight this message.

Furthermore, in 1791, women were excluded by law from regency, which had been practically the only way women could use power comparable to that of a sovereign in France. The exclusion from regency highlighted the wishes of the revolutionaries to preserve political power for men and to exclude Marie Antoinette in particular from any use of power as mother of the possible future king. Yet, the exclusion was not absolute and not all subsequent French sovereigns supported it.[28] Merlin brought this up in a chapter concerning regency in his 1828 edition of the encyclopaedia. In the same piece, he also showed exemptions made to the law in 1813. One exemption stated that an empress-mother could act as a regent on behalf of her underage son. And furthermore, in 1813, Napoleon appointed Empress Marie Louise as a regent while he was away from France.[29] It seems, however, that Marie Louise had no real power, and the regency was in her case mostly an honorary position while Napoleon was at war. The fact that women were denied the possibility of regency in the early 1790s goes well together with the tendency to restrict women to the 'privacy' of their homes and to define motherhood and marriage as women's most important roles.

Collective biographies, a genre of popular historical writing, displayed that royals were still at the heart of historiography and, as always, their 'private' lives interested the readers the most, even though reading was considered dangerous for volatile minds, and therefore, there was a lot of discussion about what was suitable reading for young girls and for uneducated readers, who were seen by historians as prone to immoral ideas.[30] Collective and individual biographies can be divided into two groups:

those that describe only virtuous role models to (young) female readers, and those that present all kinds of virtuous and notorious women, as in Prudhomme's works. In the first genre there were no 'notorious' queens but mostly (saintly) queens who were shown behaving like bourgeois women. The motivation for Prudhomme to publish the collective biography was, in his own words, that after 1769 only five works had been dedicated to the sex that gives 'glory' and 'happiness' to society.[31] Prudhomme conveniently 'forgot' the two collective biographies he had published in the early 1790s and only mentioned the works that offered interpretations favourable to the monarchy.[32] It is understandable that Prudhomme left his previous works unmentioned, since he also stated that the focus of his current work was on the heroic actions of women during the revolutionary years in the late eighteenth century.[33]

Merlin, however, approached the question of queenship from a very different angle compared to Prudhomme and did not provide any biographies of historical queens. On the contrary, he asked questions that were related to queenship in general. His experience as a jurist becomes obvious as he concentrated on comparing laws in various kingdoms in order to discover what queenship signified, who could become a queen, and what rituals and duties were associated with queenship.[34] Merlin only briefly referred to the current situation of queenship in early nineteenth-century France, but he described in considerable length the history of various practices related to queenship.[35] It seems that he considered the current state of women's exclusion as the norm and he examined how queenship had evolved to this state. He focused, at length, on the marital habits of the early Frankish kings, whom he, however, called 'corrupted', owing to their polygamous marriage patterns, and he even called King Clovis I, the most famous of the early medieval Merovingian kings, an 'adulterous bastard'.[36]

Merlin's analytical approach to queenship was quite rare, but he did not explain why women were excluded from the throne in France, when in many other countries they could inherit the throne. Merlin wrote in the 1812 edition of his encyclopaedia in the chapter 'femme' that

> [T]hus, among us the women do not inherit the throne, even though this is different in certain countries such as in Russia, Austria and England. Following the law in France, women cannot take any judicial offices; however, women have been seen functioning as peers and to sit as a peer in parliament; but this does not happen anymore.[37]

Here, Merlin did not make judgemental observations on how the inheritance should be, but merely stated that in other countries women could inherit the throne. Interestingly enough, he also mentioned women acting as peers and even sitting in the parliament. He did not, however, elaborate when the practice had ended and why, and if women functioning as peers were unique to France, or if it was possible in other countries as well.[38] He made it clear, as already noted, that women had no direct political power in France.

Whereas Prudhomme and Merlin took a quite neutral tone regarding women's exclusion from the throne and from regency, the third author, Laboulaye, strongly argued for exclusion. Apparently Merlin and Prudhomme did not have such strong views against women's political participation, perhaps because they had lived the first half of their lives in a monarchy where queenship was not defined by bourgeois, domestic ideals. Laboulaye on the other hand stated at the end of his work *Recherches sur la condition civile et politique des femmes* that:

> [L]et's say, moreover, that women's appearance in the public scene is not favourable for them. […] the power does not suit them: their weakness, their spirit, education, grace even should keep them away from stormy positions. Their kingdom is elsewhere; it's in the home, in the family's sanctuary where they are really the sovereigns; gentle sovereignty that will not trouble the peacefulness of their hearts, that no ambition would make jealous of or a revolt would disturb […].[39]

Laboulaye saw women as incapable of any public role and their rightful place to be at home where they could act as (spiritual) heads of the family, even if he saw man as the 'natural' ruler of the family. In his mind, women were too weak to endure any public position, let alone to rule a country such as France. Laboulaye's view was not an isolated one; according to the French historian Michèle Riot-Sarcey, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the new social sciences, the sciences of 'men', contributed to this view of women, reducing them to their 'sex', signifying that their primary role was considered to be reproduction and that women would destabilize the 'natural' order of society and of mankind if they practised any intelligent activities.[40] Laboulaye also wrote: 'For couple of happy reigns, so many troubled ones, so many factions! and for one Elisabeth how many Mary Stuarts! Kingship in their hands is a fateful weapon […].'[41] By proclaiming that for every 'good' queen there was a greater number of 'bad'

queens Laboulaye wanted to convince the reader that it was safer for a society to exclude women altogether from power. This justification is quite obviously a flawed one from our point of view, because it would have justified the destruction of the whole monarchy based on a few 'bad' kings. For Laboulaye, any example of 'bad' female rulership in any monarchy was enough to justify the exclusion of women in France. In general, women seemed to be all the same, whereas men were individuals.

And indeed, this misogynist view of women's incapability won the award from the prestigious learned society for Laboulaye. It is also consistent with the well-known situation from the 1840s, when women's possibilities in French society were narrow outside the domestic sphere. Laboulaye did not mention Marie Antoinette or Marie Amelie in his work, which also, like Merlin's work, did not focus on the lives of individual queens but on legal history from which Laboulaye drew moral conclusions. It seems that Laboulaye, like so many other historians and authors, such as Augustin Thierry and François Guizot at the beginning of the nineteenth century, saw history as a progressive movement towards contemporary 'civilized' society. In this progressive view, the possibility of women ruling, either as regent or as queen regnant, was seen as part of past and as belonging to less-developed societies. It appears that for Laboulaye a woman ruling over men was a sign of unnatural society and should be avoided in France.

Whereas Laboulaye's work on inheritance laws ended with a strong moral judgement on women's political and intellectual capabilities, Merlin did not make a similar deduction, yet he made equally interesting conclusions on English queenship. According to Merlin, since the 'queen', strictly defined, only referred to queen regnant, a woman ruling in her own right, there were no queens in the kingdoms where women could not inherit the throne. He continued that this had been the case with the West Saxons, and that they forbade the king's spouse [*l'épouse*] to be called a queen—if the king broke this law, he would lose all his royal power. Merlin argued that this tradition continued to be visible in the English language, because it still did not have a word corresponding to the French expression 'reine'. According to him, the English called the queen 'the queen, la compagne', and that originally the word 'queen' referred to both women and men, and that in the beginning, the word applied to companions of princes, thus men. The word 'comte' was derived from the 'compagne', and this 'compagne' also designated a spouse and a king's companion, thus the queen. Merlin thus wondered that despite the fact that in England women could inherit the throne, the English had not

given any special name to queens regnant other than the 'the queen, la compagne'.[42]

It is quite difficult to understand where Merlin's inspiration for his theory on the etymology of the English word 'queen' derived from or how he came to the conclusion that the word would have originally referred to men. The word 'compagne' could mean both men and women, but Merlin did not explain how it was associated especially with queens. In general, Merlin did not mention any references, exact dates, or sources in relation to this theory, so it is very difficult to follow his line of inquiry. It seems that Merlin did not understand why queens regnant were not given any other name to tell them apart from other queens, who did not rule in their own right. Laboulaye examined the English practices of transmitting the throne as well, but he did not study the etymology of the words 'reine' or 'queen'.

According to Laboulaye, the problem with a queen regnant (or regent) was that she would always be at the mercy of her ministers, because she was not 'enlightened' enough on foreign matters and she did not have a strong enough will, which, according to Laboulaye, comes from the 'conviction de l'esprit', the 'strength of mind'.[43] He did not explicitly state it, but it appears that this 'conviction de l'esprit' is something only men could have. Laboulaye continued that the English had solved the problem of weak female sovereigns by giving the governing power to the House of Parliament (*les chambres*). Laboulaye argued that this situation of 'royauté de parade' where the queen regnant had no real power (only 'paraded') was very compatible with women having the right to inherit the throne, because women in general had weaker minds and therefore they were satisfied with brilliant grandeur that surrounded the queenship without wanting to have real power besides the title.[44] Even in this English example, where women could inherit the throne, Laboulaye wanted to argue that women did not 'really' have sovereign power like the kings had, but that they were only puppets in the hands of the House. The author, however, did not explain how the situation of a sovereign being submitted to the power of the chambers was different for kings. Were they not submitted to the rule of the chambers the same way as the queens were? Perhaps he wanted to indicate that men naturally had more willpower, and therefore they could overpower the chambers simply with their masculine virtues. Similarly to Merlin, Laboulaye did not give any dates, names, sources, or references to justify his theory. He, for example, did not name any of the 'weak' queens regnant.[45]

Yet, according to Laboulaye, the situation in countries like England where queens regnant had no real power was much better than that in those kingdoms where women could inherit the throne and have supreme power in their hands. These courts were full of scheming owing to the sovereign's lack of strength to resist it. The queen regnant would become intoxicated with passions. '[W]hat a spectacle, my God!', Laboulaye wrote about women acting as queens regnant.[46] A kingdom with women having access to royal power was thus doomed to be full of intrigues due to the weaknesses of the queen. Laboulaye cited at length Jean Bodin, a sixteenth-century jurist and political philosopher, on the impossibility of women's government. Bodin argued, and Laboulaye echoed, how women's reigns, 'Gynécocratie', was in all ways unsuitable and against nature, and moreover, against the interests of any kingdom.[47] Bodin gave a great number of mostly European examples of troubles that had followed when women had been able to inherit the throne. The time span of the examples ran from ancient Rome to the sixteenth century, and even though the number of examples seemed quite large, Laboulaye did not make any comparison between these cases and those from the 'troubles' that followed when men inherited the throne. The impression that Laboulaye gave in his work was that only when women were involved in inheriting the throne were there civil wars and revolts. Laboulaye also brought up the famous eighteenth-century political thinker Montesquieu and his famous *Esprit des lois* where the philosopher made, unlike Laboulaye, positive remarks on women using royal power. Laboulaye was sure that the only reason why Montesquieu had accepted the idea of women ruling a kingdom was to flatter the Empress Elisabeth of Russia and the memory of Queen Anne. He refuted the examples offered by Montesquieu of women successfully ruling in India and Africa as inferior examples compared to Bodin's reasoning when he ridiculed the idea of 'Gynécocratie'.[48]

In fact, Montesquieu wrote only a very brief section about women's administration, less than a page. He did see women as weak; too weak to rule at home, but this 'weakness' was strength in ruling a kingdom. He stated, without further justification, that among the Egyptians women ruled at home and that this was against 'reason' and 'nature'. But for a good government female kindness and moderation were assets that outweighed masculine 'hard' and 'ferocious' virtues. Montesquieu, like Laboulaye, was very vague in giving examples on kingdoms where women had had good governments. The eighteenth-century philosopher mentioned India,

England, Moscow, and Africa, but he gave no details such as names, years, or sources.[49] Whereas Montesquieu used foreign monarchies to prove women were in some instances capable of ruling, Laboulaye refuted these examples and only used those that proved women incapable of ruling, especially in France. In order to prove his point, Laboulaye disregarded contextual differences between the works of Bodin from the sixteenth century and Montesquieu from the eighteenth century, and treated their philosophical treatises identically.

The readership of Laboulaye's and Merlin's works appears to be quite similar: an educated one, most likely consisting of male readers. Despite the word 'research' in the title of Laboulaye's work, the aim was mostly to confirm the idea of male superiority. The point of view left no room for discussion, and the examples drawn from foreign monarchies were only used to highlight Laboulaye's theory on female inferiority and on the superiority of the French way. The idea of writing about women's inheritance laws was not solely Laboulaye's own, but the work was written to take part in a competition organized by the Académie des Sciences morales. Since the competition was set up by one of the French national institutions, reinstituted in 1832 by François Guizot, it is no wonder the winning work emphasized the superiority of French inheritance laws.

When examining French queenship as it was perceived in the early nineteenth century, one must keep in mind that practically all the famous queens of France have been foreigners and that France, especially in the *Ancien Régime*, has never had a 'French' queen. French kings had a habit of marrying foreign princesses; they did not marry a French subject except in some rare cases.[50] Therefore, all the *Ancien Régime* queens of France could be accused of not being French enough, or of favouring their own country or kingdom of origin. Prudhomme wrote in the preface of his collective biography that '[t]he contemporary writers should make known how much the French women have surpassed the celebrated heroines from Rome, Sparta and Athens.'[51] Yet this praise did not refer to the queens of France, many of whom Prudhomme criticized with strong words. For example, he characterized both the sixteenth-century queen and regent, Catherine de Médici, and the seventeenth-century queen and regent, Anne of Austria, as power-hungry and only caring for their position at court. He wrote that Catherine was famous for her crimes and he called Anne lazy and '[n]ée pout être gouvernée', 'born to be governed'.[52] Prudhomme did not write as explicitly as Laboulaye on women's role in governing France, but he presented the women that had used the highest

power in France as driven by their own agenda and passions, committing 'crimes' against the kingdom and the people.

Of course, Prudhomme was not alone in criticizing 'foreign' queens, because a long tradition of accusations of various vices existed already before 1789. In fact, according to Katherine Crawford, the discourse started as early as 1559 with Catherine de Médici, when her husband died and her power over her son was being discussed.[53] A juxtaposition of the 'foreign' queens and true French heroines existed in Prudhomme's collective biography, and it emphasized the grandeur of the French nation because it gave prominence to women born in France over queens who had been born in other countries. Perhaps Prudhomme wanted to show that these French women understood their rightful role in creating the French nation as mothers and wives, while the foreign queens did not understand their 'natural' place in 'civilized' society and wanted to use more power than was suitable for a woman.

In the biographies of Anne of Austria and Marie Antoinette, Prudhomme specifically stated the foreign origins of the queens and portrayed them as having had harmful influences from their birth families. Such rhetoric was also present in the works he published on French queens in the 1790s, and apparently it did not fully disappear at any point. Yet, Marie Antoinette's short biography in Prudhomme's 1830 work also highlghted the new way of describing and portraying queens that took place in the 1820s. Now Prudhomme focused almost uniquely on Marie Antoinette's positive features and defended her against accusations of superficiality and vanity. He pictured her as a beautiful, warm-hearted, caring, and charitable queen, who did a lot of good and wanted the best for her people. She was characterized as a good mother and in no way involved in politics. Her 'foreign' origin was mentioned in connection to her involvement in ruling France: '[m]isled by her birth, after seeing her mother governing by herself, she had difficulties understanding that in France the queen was nothing but the spouse [*l'épouse*] of the king.'[54] Prudhomme argued that Marie Antoinette had thought she would be ruling alongside her husband, the king, taking as her role model her mother Empress Maria Theresa, and that she was disappointed she had no role to play in the governing of France. Even though here Prudhomme did not explicitly criticize the 'Austrian' way of permitting women to inherit the throne, in the next sentence he claimed that due to the feudal system in Austria, the distance between a noble and the people was immense, unlike in France where nobles often visited places where the classes 'blended with each other and

touched each other'.[55] According to Prudhomme, the various classes had been in harmonious contact with each other even before the Revolution. He went on to argue that some 'mean voices' saw Marie Antoinette as having remained Austrian at heart, and therefore a proud and natural enemy of the French, whose happiness she could never achieve.[56] Prudhomme did not seem to believe these accusations.

After a quarter of a century in which the French monarchy and society as a whole had been thoroughly shaken, the restored monarchy needed to legitimize its existence vis-à-vis its historical position, alternative forms of government, and in regard to other European countries. In the first half of the nineteenth century, nationalism was not yet the ideology of the masses in France, but it flourished in writings of intellectuals, including many historians, who gained more and more political power during the decades of the July Monarchy. The comparisons taken from the works of the three authors I have presented in this chapter were a part of this nationalistic revival that started in the 1820s. The nationalistic resurgence coincided with the so-called bourgeois ideal of 'natural' gender roles in society that defined and emphasized the role of women in the intimate sphere and excluded them from any public role, reserving that for men only. Indeed, the discussion of queenship at that time was not limited only to female inheritance of the throne, but extended to their use of any kind of public power over men. Throughout history monarchies and royalty had justified their existence and use of power by detaching themselves from their subjects. But in the early nineteenth century, the discussion was no longer only about the royal houses; now the idea of a nation included, at least on a theoretical level, the whole of France, in which the monarchy was only one part.

Merlin, Prudhomme, and Laboulaye did not value some foreign monarchies over others, because essentially they were all considered less civilized than the French monarchy; this was especially true for those monarchies which allowed women to inherit the throne. It is clear that the authors, and many of their contemporaries, did not need to find justifications for the exclusion because it was presented, more or less explicitly, as a self-evident feature of the French monarchy, even though it was reinforced by comparisons made to monarchies that had different rules of inheritance. This is visible, paradoxically, in a negative way: many historians or writers did not extensively discuss women's right to inherit the throne. Perhaps no one wanted to open the door for the discussion and, despite the popularity of queens in historiography and literature, the institution of

queenship was of no interest to many. Yet, the three works examined in this chapter reflect well the coeval view of 'weak' women and women without 'reason', and the general perception of women's rule as being against 'nature'. Women's exclusion from political power and the public sphere was presented by French historians, politicians, scholars, and writers as the 'natural' outcome of civilization and the progress of history.

Notes

1. Alain Boureau (2001), 'The King', in: Pierre Nora (ed), *Rethinking France. Les Lieux de Mémoire*, Chicago, 180.
2. For Charles X and the Cathedral of Reims, see Christian Amalvi (1996), 'Le Baptême de Clovis: Heurs et Malheurs d'un Mythe Fondateur de la France contemporaine, 1814–1914', in: Olivier Guyotjeannin (ed.), *Clovis chez les historiens*, Paris and Geneva, 241–272, here 243–4.
3. For more on Marie Amelie, see, for example, Florence Vidal (2010), *Marie-Amélie de Bourbon-Sicile. Épouse de Louis-Philippe*, Paris, 2010.
4. Jo Burr Margadant (1999), 'Gender, Vice, and the Political Imaginary in Postrevolutionary France: Reinterpreting the Failure of the July Monarchy, 1830–1848', *The American Historical Review*, 104/5, 1468.
5. See Hélène Becquet (2009), 'Une royauté sans reine: les princesses de la Restauration', in: Hélène Becquet and Bettina Frederking, *La Dignité du roi. Regards sur la royauté en France au premier XIXe siècle*, Rennes, 137–52. In 1820 the discussion revolved around the duchess of Angoulême, Marie Thérèse Charlotte of France, the daughter of Marie Antoinette and Louis XVI, and her possible right to the throne.
6. About Prudhomme, see, for example, the data from the French National Library "Louis Marie Prudhomme", http://data.bnf.fr/12239382/louis-marie_prudhomme/ (accessed 12.1.2015); Joseph Zizek (2003): '"Plume de fer": Louis-Marie Prudhomme Writes the French Revolution', *French Historical Studies* 26/4, 619–660; Richard Ballard (2012), *New Dictionary of the French Revolution*, London and New York, 285–6.
7. Louis Marie Prudhomme (ed.) (1826), *Répertoire universel, historique, biographique des femmes célèbres, mortes ou vivantes*, Paris.

8. Louis Marie Prudhomme (1830), *Biographie universel, historique, biographique des femmes célèbres, mortes ou vivantes,* Paris.

9. Indeed, both works had the same title but the earlier one was written by Louise-Félicité Guinement de Keralio Robert (1758–1822) and was published in Paris, whereas the later work has no named author and was published in London. It appears that the 1792 work is a slightly abridged version of Keralio's earlier and longer work.

10. Lynn Hunt (1992), *The Family Romance of the French Revolution*, Berkeley, 89–95.

11. Prudhomme published in 1797 a six-volume work, *Histoire générale et impartiale des erreurs, des fautes et des crimes commis pendant la Révolution française* which focused on the crimes and atrocities that took place during the revolutionary years. According to Joseph Zizek, the work embodies the dilemma of '[h]ow to comprehend the Revolution's history in light of an individual's own revolutionary participation', especially since Prudhomme was one of the proprietors of the best known revolutionary newspapers, *Révolutions de Paris*. See Zizek (2003), 623.

12. Merlin had significant political positions during the Directory (1795–1799), but after 1799 he had to retire from the active political scene. He had minor positions during Napoleon's reign.

13. About the life of Merlin, see Hervé Leuwers, 'Chronologie de la vie de Merlin de Douai (1754–1838)', http://irhis.recherche. univ-lille3.fr/dossierPDF/Leuwers/ChronologieMerlin.pdf, accessed 12 January 2016.

14. Hervé Leuwers has compiled a bibliography on Merlin's works: Hervé Leuwers, 'L'oeuvre juridique et politique de Merlin de Douai', http://irhis.recherche.univ-lille3.fr/dossierPDF/Leuwers/ OeuvreMerlin.pdf, accessed 12 January 2016.

15. Philippe Antoine Merlin (1825–28), *Répertoire universel et raisonné de jurisprudence*, Brussels.

16. The *Répertoire* was already started in 1775 by Joseph Nicolas Gyot (1728–1816). Merlin collaborated with Gyot right from the start. The *Répertoire* published in Paris in 1827–8 had 18 volumes whereas the one published in Brussels in 1825–1828 had an astonishing 36 volumes.

17. Merlin (1828), vol XXVII, 403. 'La nation s'est. soumise à l'empire d'un seul […]'.

18. Merlin (1828), 399.
19. In 1849, Laboulaye became a professor of comparative law at the Collège de France and in 1876 he was appointed the head administrator. He was elected to the national assembly after the Paris Commune of 1870.
20. For more on Laboulaye, see Stephen W. Sawyer (2009),'Édouard Laboulaye et la Statue de la Liberté: l'élaboration de l'expérience démocratique', *La lettre du Collège de France,* June 2009, 53–5.; Marc Kirsch (2013), 'Un portrait d'Édouard Laboulaye', *La lettre du Collège de France,* June 2009, 56–58; Stephen W. Sawyer (2013), 'An American Model for French Liberalism: The State of Exception in Édouard Laboulaye's Constitutional Thought', *The Journal of Modern History*, 85/4, 739–71.
21. For example, in 1845 he published a work entitled *Essai sur les lois criminelles des Romains concernant la responsabilité des magistrats* which focused on Roman criminal laws. He was interested in German history and he translated German works into French. After 1848, he published, for example, on the French Revolution, translated works of American intellectuals into French and wrote extensively on American democracy: *La Révolution française étudiée dans ses institutions* (1850); *Oeuvres sociales de W. E. Channing, traduites de l'anglais, précédées d'un essai sur la vie et les doctrines de Channing et d'une introduction* (1854); *Histoire politique des États-Unis: depuis les premiers essais de colonisation jusqu'à l'adoption de la Constitution fédérale, 1620–1789* (1855–66). Both Merlin and Laboulaye commented on the same legal questions regarding the Civil Code and problematic concepts such as property and possession. It is thus likely that Laboulaye knew Merlin's works. See Donald R. Kelley and Bonnie G. Smith (1984), 'What Was Property? Legal Dimensions of the Social Question in France (1789–1848)', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 128/3, 200–30, here 208.
22. Sawyer (2013), 748.
23. Édouard Laboulaye (1843), *Recherches sur la condition civile et politique des femmes, depuis les Romains jusqu'à nos jours,* Paris.
24. See, for example, Alison Booth (2004), *How to Make it as a Woman. Collective Biographical History from Victoria to the Present*, Chicago and London. See also Isabelle Ernot (2006), 'Masculin / Féminin Dans Les Dictionnaires et Recueils de Biographies

Féminines (début XIXe Siècle—Années 1860)', in: Nicole Pellegring (ed.), *Histoires D'historiennes*, Saint-Etienne, 67–84.

25. See Fanny Cosandey (2000), *La reine de France. Symbole et pouvoir: XVe-XVIIIe siècle,* Paris, 8.

26. Laboulaye, Merlin, and Prudhomme had two different words for the spouse of the king: *l'épouse* and *la femme*. It is difficult to determine if the authors saw any difference in the use of these terms or if the expressions were used synonymously, but *l'épouse* seems more official than *la femme*.

27. See, for example, Jo Burr Margadant (2008), 'Les représentations de la reine Marie-Amélie dans une monarchie "bourgeoise"', *Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle*, 36, 93–117; Jo Burr Margadant (2008), 'The Perils of the Sentimental Family for Royalty in Postrevolutionary France: The Case of Queen Marie-Amélie', in: Anne Walthall (ed.), *Servants of the Dynasty: Palace Women in World History*, Berkeley, 299–326.

28. See Margadant (2008), 300–1.

29. Merlin (1828), 314–5.

30. About the interest in 'private lives', see, for example, Robert Darnton (1996), *The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France*, London, 77, 138.

31. Louis Marie Prudhomme (ed.) (1826), *Répertoire universel, historique, biographique des femmes célèbres, mortes ou vivantes*, vol I, Paris, v.

32. He also left out, knowingly or unknowingly, the small collective biographies written by Gabrielle de Paban in the early 1820s.

33. Prudhomme (1826), vi.

34. The three authors did not use this term in their works to refer to queenship.

35. See Merlin (1828), 390–410.

36. Merlin (1828), 392, 394.

37. Philippe Antoine Merlin (1812), *Répertoire universel et raisonné de jurisprudence*, vol V, Paris, 193. 'Ainsi, parmi nous les Femmes ne succèdent pas à la couronne, quoiqu'il en soit autrement dans certains États, tels que la Russie, l'Autriche et l'Angleterre. Suivant le droit de la France, les Femmes ne peuvent exercer aucune charge de magistrature; cependant on en a vu faire les fonctions de pair, et siéger en cette qualité au parlement; mais cela ne se pratique plus.'

38. There were at least two female peers in France at the end of the eighteenth century, Sophie de France (1734–1782), and Marie-Adélaïde de France (1732–1800). It seems that at this time peerage in France was mostly an honorary position and had no legal power.

39. Laboulaye (1843), 528. 'Disons, d'ailleurs, que l'apparations des femmes sur la scène publique, ne leur est pas favorable. […] le pouvoir ne leur va pas: leur faiblesse, leur esprit, leur éducation, leur grâce même doivent les tenir à l'écart de ces fonctions orageuses. Leur royaume est. ailleurs; c'est au foyer domestique, c'est dans le sanctuaire de la famille, qu'elles sont vraiment souveraines; douce souveraineté qui ne trouble point la tranquillité de leur coeur, que nulle ambition ne jalouse, que nulle révolte n'ébranle […].'

40. Michèle Riot-Sarcey (2015), *Histoire du féminisme*, Paris, 21.

41. Laboulaye (1843), 528. 'Pour quelques règnes heureux, que de troubles, que de factions! et pour une Elisabeth combien de Marie-Stuart! La royauté dans leurs mains est une arme funeste […]'.

42. Merlin (1828), 390.

43. Laboulaye (1843), 520.

44. Laboulaye (1843), 520.

45. Laboulaye did not make any references to Queen Victoria in his work, even though she had acceded to the throne only six years earlier.

46. Laboulaye (1843), 520–521. '[Q]uel spectacle, bon Dieu!'

47. Laboulaye (1843), 514–520.

48. Laboulaye (1843), 521–522.

49. Jean Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu (1748), *De l'esprit des lois, ou Du rapport que les loix doivent avoir avec la constitution de chaque gouvernement, les moeurs le climat, la religion, le commerce, &c.; à quoi l'auteur a ajouté. Des recherches nouvelles sur les loix romaines touchant les successions, sur les loix françoises, & sur les loix féodales*, Geneva, 175.

50. Cosandey (2000), 74–5.

51. Prudhomme (1826), vi. 'Les écrivains contemporains doivent faire connaître combien de Francaises ont surpassé les célèbres héroïnes de Rome, de Sparte et d'Athènes.'

52. Prudhomme (1826), 180. Catherine's biography, Prudhomme (1830), 73.

53. Katherine Crawford (2007), 'Constructing Evil Foreign Queens', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 37/2, 393–418.

54. Louis Marie Prudhomme (1830), *Biographie universel, historique, biographique des femmes célèbres, mortes ou vivantes*, vol III, Paris, 408. 'Trompée par sa naissance, voyant sa mère gouverner par elle-même, elle put difficilement se persuader qu'en France la reine n'était que l'épouse du roi.'

55. Prudhomme (1830), 408.

56. Prudhomme (1830), 408–9.

Celebrating and Reinventing Brazil: Monarchy and Nation in the Works of Afonso Arinos, 1897–1900

Alexandre Lazzari

During the last decade of the nineteenth century, newspapers in major Brazilian cities published passionate debates about Brazilian national identity and the ideal political regime for the country. A frequent topic of discussion was the viability of concepts of civilization modelled on European imperial nations for Brazil, particularly when Brazilian racial diversity and customs were considered. For many writers and journalists, the suppression of the monarchy in 1889 and the alignment with other republican nations in the Americas represented one more step towards the redemption of a nation that just had emancipated its slaves.[1] There was intense controversy on this point, however, and it aggravated the political intolerance between republicans and defenders of the monarchy after the change of regime. Monarchists claimed the values of tradition, social hierarchy and order, which were supposedly destroyed by the republicans.[2] They also claimed that the royal institutions were profoundly connected

A. Lazzari (✉)
Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

to the historical roots of a national identity, which, in turn, was based on a comprehensive Latin and Iberian cultural identity.

This chapter examines the monarchist militancy of writer, lawyer and journalist Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco (1868–1916), an intellectual opponent of the republican regime together with his most influential friend and sponsor, Eduardo Prado. As was the case with many other men with cosmopolitan education emerging from the Brazilian rural elite of their time, these two men combined the rhetoric of national originality with transnational intellectual references, especially European ones.[3]

Afonso Arinos, especially, argued a connection between monarchy and a supposed deeper popular culture infused with the spirituality of Iberian roots. The monarchy and its state elite, synthesizing and personifying a certain collective 'soul' of a racially diverse population spread over a large territory, were considered essential for the maintenance of national unity and patriarchal hierarchy in Brazil's post-slaveholding society.[4] Arinos' defence of a monarchic nation, which failed as an immediate political project, articulated, nonetheless, ideas about the interdependence of popular culture and hierarchical values, which have indirectly influenced national imagination of conservative writers and intellectuals from Brazil in the decades that followed.

Monarchy and Nation in Brazil

The monarchy as a Brazilian institution dates back to the settlement of the Portuguese absolutist court in Rio de Janeiro in 1808, as an act of voluntary exile from Napoleonic forces. The political culture of the former colonial capital inhabitants changed as it became the main site of the Portuguese Empire, particularly embracing privileges and possibilities of court life.[5] After King João VI returned to Portugal, following a constitutional uprising in 1821, his son Pedro I continued reigning in Rio de Janeiro, which would become the capital city of an independent empire in the following year. The constitution of the Empire of Brazil then sought to strike a balance between liberal principles and absolutist tradition. It stated that the nation was formed by citizens who were born free (therefore, excluding the wide slave population) and were granted representative institutions, but living under the guardianship of the 'moderating power' of the Emperor, who was proclaimed 'Brazil's Perpetual Defender'.[6] Stability, however, would come only after suppression of many provincial rebellions and a conservative consensus under the Brazilian-born succes-

sor to the throne, Pedro II, prematurely crowned at fifteen years old in 1840. Thereafter, the monarchy was seen as a guarantor of unity and hierarchy, considered of the greatest importance for the continuity of social order and slavery.[7]

During the almost fifty-year-long rule of Pedro II, the spread of a wide political message linking the Brazilian Imperial Crown to the nation did not happen fully. From the official point of view of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute (IHGB), there was the belief that the Brazilian monarchy represented the continuation of the civilizing mission of Portuguese colonization, implanting social order, material progress and Christian civilization in a territory that had led a savage existence until that point.[8] However, linking the monarchy with this transnational ideal clearly would create contradictions in light of the principle of national originality and the reality of slave labour. A solution coming from the field of natural sciences was the theory of a nation still in formation and depending on the miscegenation of three races (white Portuguese, indigenous people, and black Africans), devised by the German botanist Karl Friedrich Phillipp von Martius (1794–1868), while travelling through Brazil.[9] Discussions amongst institute staff, however, mobilized only a small state elite. It was literary nationalist movement that possibly had the most significant impact on the awakening of a national imagination on the issue of the Empire. Poets and novelists constructed the myth of a founder conflict between Portuguese and indigenous people as the origin of a national synthesis, establishing miscegenation between conquerors and conquered under the exoticism of encounters in a tropical climate.[10] Notably, however, expressive poetry on indigenous heroes and historical romances did not praise the monarchy itself.

Notwithstanding that the emperor as father figure was frequently evoked in popular religious celebrations, Pedro II himself seemed not to appreciate such public exposition.[11] The monarch preferred to be seen as discreet, austere, and very dedicated to his political responsibilities, but also liberal, attentive to scientific progress and a patron of the arts.[12] Nevertheless, the positive view of a monarch who was white, patriarchal and enlightened, a guardian of the constitutional order and the values of Western civilization over a large tropical empire of the American world, was eroded over time. Inside Brazil, the public figure of the monarch itself was, in the last years of the regime, frequently discredited by the press and even in satirical performances in carnival parades.[13] This was especially true as public opinion began to put pressure on him to abolish slavery, which was seen as a civilizing and modernizing reform.

Even though the royal family showed itself to be somewhat sympathetic to the abolitionist cause, there was a growing feeling that the monarchy was a backward and ineffective institution, unable to deal with the urgent challenges that nineteenth-century progress asked of the Brazilian nation. This might be explained, partially, by the education of Brazilian intellectual elites during the second half of the nineteenth century, which was largely influenced by liberal laicism as well as by positivism, both of which were becoming popular among recruits at the Military Academy and law students.[14] The political ideas of the new generation were divided between advocacy for constitutional reform preserving the monarchy and suppression of monarchic rule in order to replace it with a republic. Thus, the 1889 civil and military republican coup was enabled by, among other reasons, a discredited monarchy, internal divisions between political elites of the Empire, and uncertainties pertaining to the succession of the old emperor by his daughter Isabel.[15]

When the republicans overthrew the monarchy without significant resistance, it showed how fragile support for monarchical rule was at that time. On the other hand, the republic faced much instability for almost ten years after its creation and even had difficulty establishing its own identity and symbolic patriotic repertoire: the anthem and the national flag, for example, were adapted from those of the former regime.[16] Nowadays, historians are still intrigued by the apparently passive attitude of the people concerning the fall of the monarchy.[17] During the troubling years after the coup d'état, both monarchists and republicans hesitated to appeal to massive popular mobilization, even though there were some localized military insurgencies and violent rivalry over political influence between regional elites. In turn, the historiography dedicated to the monarchist resistance emphasizes its impotence in face of the repressive measures taken against it; while it also reveals the existence of an insistent activism for the monarchic restoration, which would come to calm down just after the first decade of the Republic.[18]

After the republican proclamation, Pedro II and the royal family were immediately sent to exile in France, where the former monarch would die some years later. The vacant place of a tutor and guardian of the nation was then occupied by the army, and any type of opposition to the new status quo was persecuted. Tensions decreased under the first republican civil government after 1894, which enabled monarchist political organization. In the State of São Paulo, a 'Monarchist Party' launched a manifesto in defence of religion against Auguste Comte's atheist philosophy and

against 'Republican opportunism'.[19] Soon, however, the police forbade monarchist associations and they could continue their propaganda only through the press. It was in this context that Afonso Arinos, in 1896, took the position of editor-in-chief of the newspaper *O Commercio de São Paulo*, which had been recently bought by his friend Eduardo Prado. Before that, although he was a determined monarchist, he had managed his career as a lawyer and teacher without any problems with the ruling republicans in the state of Minas Gerais.[20]

All the efforts that Arinos put into monarchist propaganda were in step with the persistent campaign that Eduardo Prado had carried out against the Republic since it had begun. Prado, who was born into a rich family of landowners and had become a cosmopolitan *bon vivant*, came to be one of the most active supporters of the restoration of the old regime.[21] Together with other important people from the imperial aristocracy who did not join the new regime, such as Joaquim Nabuco and Afonso Celso, he led intellectual battles against republican principles. All of them strongly condemned, among other things, the military government, the influence of French positivism and the imitation of the United States constitutional model.[22] Prado, especially, was a fierce critic of American influence on Brazilian republicans, and the authorities banned and confiscated his book *A Ilusão Americana* (*The American Illusion*, 1893), a vehement anti-American manifesto:

> The American spirit is a spirit of violence; the Latin spirit transmitted to Brazilians, more or less distorted by the centuries and different Iberian amalgams is a legal spirit, in spite of so many reprobate law graduates, but always retains a certain respect for human life and freedom.[23]

In the 1890s, Afonso Arinos and Eduardo Prado were convinced that a Latin and Iberian cultural inheritance shaped Brazilian national character and made monarchy the most sensible ruling option to safeguard people's customs.[24] The influence of the 'seventies generation' from Portugal is significant,[25] with such intellectuals as writer Eça de Queiroz and historian Oliveira Martins dedicated to the interpretation of the fate of the nation as part of an Iberian identity in a European and world context.[26] They were extremely critical of what they called the 'decay' of the adventurous spirit of a national foundation. As they abandoned the republicanism of their youth, they now became endorsers, in the former European metropolis of Lisbon, of their Brazilian monarchist friends.

Although Prado and Arinos shared a common understanding and were influenced by the same sources, this study claims that some aspects of Arinos' intercession reveal a special sensibility concerning the imagination of a nation. He was seeking to update the meaning of the Brazilian monarchy for political elites more through popular culture than Prado did. His focus was on the relation between elites and common people as well as on the principles of national unity, in such a way that it could attach hierarchy, unity and diversity. A monarchical nation, in this way, was seen as the way to reconnect state elites to the supposed national, and also transnational, Iberian feelings of Brazilian common people.

Reinventing a Monarchy for the Nation

Afonso Arinos started publishing chronicles and editorials for monarchist propaganda in 1897. Later, in 1900, he compiled those works he considered the most important for publication.[27] The book *Notas do Dia—Comemorando* (*Notes of the Day—Celebrating*), as the title suggests, celebrated dates and dignitaries from the nation's past, as well as contemporary events. Articles varied from the praise of great persons and national symbols to the interpretation of historical events and civic dates. Using European and Brazilian historical examples, his aim was almost always to exalt the political and moral values that were seen as inherent in monarchic regimes.

Republican propaganda could be recognized in campaigns to reform the civic calendar and create new national heroes, in the large production of newspapers and brochures, along with particular lectures within positivist circles.[28] *Notas do Dia* could be considered a somewhat late counterpoint to an earlier work devoted to national memory and civic education, but from the Republican point of view. It was the book *Festas Nacionais* (*National Festivals*), published in 1893 by the lawyer and republican activist Rodrigo Otavio, which was a didactic explanation of each of the nine patriotic days proclaimed by a government decree of 1890. Otavio defended republicanism as a historic cause of Brazilians since colonial times, defeated many times by the domination of the Portuguese absolutist monarchy but never abandoned by the people.[29]

Although Afonso Arinos did not directly cite Rodrigo Otavio, many of his 22 essays offer an alternative interpretation of the same Republican national days, challenging Otavio's interpretation of the memory of great names, feats and significant dates from national history. The first two arti-

cles, for example, were originally published much earlier than the others and close to the release of *Festas Nacionais*. The discourses *O Passado de Minas e a Inconfidência* (*The Past of Minas and the Inconfidence*) and *Cristóvão Colombo e a Descoberta da América* (*Christopher Columbus and the Discovery of America*) were made available to students in 1895, when Afonso Arinos was still a teacher.[30] They showed his concern with the mission of teaching the new generation examples from the past, thus giving the sons of the wealthiest families the intellectual background for leading the nation. Nevertheless, those two articles, which were strategically placed in the beginning of the book, reveal also something else. Through them, the reader could learn about the historical interpretation in which the author's monarchism was grounded.

In such lectures, the young teacher narrated the past of the Brazilian nation as an uninterrupted drama, which had begun with the saga of Iberian knights, continued with Portuguese navigators, and was followed by pioneers and miners who conquered and occupied the inner lands of the colony. Unlike the story of Portuguese decline after the great sea expeditions, according to the interpretation of Portugal's history by Oliveira Martins, Arinos saw the continuity of the Iberian saga of heroism in the conquest and colonization of Brazil's backlands:

> That adventure spirit, created and developed in the Iberian Peninsula in eight centuries of daily struggles against the Arabs, that same spirit closely allied with Christian faith […] produced—as everybody knows—the *a lo divino* cavalry and the cavalry of the sea. […]
> The discoveries were works of the cavalry of the sea; and this adventurous genius could not but act very deeply in the conquests and also in Portuguese or Spanish colonies.[31]

According to Arinos, the Brazilian people were formed directly as a continuation of the colonial past and the mystical and warlike traditions of the Portuguese people; the country was a product of the vitality of these transnational roots. By publishing this discourse, he intended to show, indirectly, that the instability of the republican regime was a proof of its cultural inadequacy given Brazil's historical origins. Throughout the book, the author always returns to the argument that Brazilians would be much more inclined to be guided by a Christian and enlightened monarch than by positivist military officers.

Even the historical figure Joaquim José da Silva Xavier, known as *Tiradentes*, who had been celebrated as a martyr of the republican cause,

was offered as a great example of someone who had inherited the mystical and adventurous Iberian style. For Arinos, *Tiradentes* was not an enlightened leader of rebellious citizens, but rather a prophet according to his racial origins:

> The great propagandists, the prophets and missionaries, are preferably found in races whose imagination and feeling outweigh reflection and positive spirit of the peoples who are builders and organizers.
>
> So, Aryans of Europe founded not a great religion. In addition, in the genius of the Iberian people, if there is a quality, mysticism is undoubtedly a dominant trait.[32]

According to Arinos, *Tiradentes* was only an impetuous hero who preached one of many rebellions of specific regions against the colonial power, and he did not even consider national unification. Arinos believed that the real historical hero of Brazilian independence was Emperor Pedro I, 'because without the chivalrous move of this prince soldier, Brazil would have emancipated, it is true, but the name—Brazil—would not designate a united country'.[33] For him, *Tiradentes* was a smaller hero for the nation, only a public speaker and a visionary, nothing else. Notably, the hierarchical difference between them—one was a modest military officer and the other was a prince regent—seems to be decisive for the author's assessment.

One of Arino's most deeply rooted certainties, proclaimed in the book *Notas do Dia*, was the belief that monarchic institutions guaranteed national unity. For this reason, in the article celebrating 7 September, Independence Day, he praised Pedro I because he had decided to liberate Brazil from Portugal by means of imposing his authority throughout the territory of the former colony and then represented that new state in his own person.[34] The role that the young prince had played had been decisive for the preservation of a centralizing tradition, thus avoiding the fragmentation and anarchy experienced by the former Spanish colonies.[35] Arinos even pondered that other Latin American liberator heroes, such as Manuel Belgrano and San Martin, had tried to maintain unity by suggesting a monarchic regime, but 'circumstances did not allow [it], and the desired unity broke'.[36] The monarchy, at the same time, kept Brazil united, ensuring 'our only clear source of pride'.[37]

The monarch had unified Brazil from above, not only by reason of his will but because of his 'bright bravery of a paladine' and his remarkable

'rudeness of a common man',[38] determined by the collective personality inherited from the ancient Iberian knights. Arinos still remembered that Pedro I had become a legend even in Portugal, where he fought for the constitutional campaign after his abdication of the Brazilian throne, thus reinforcing a superior moral purpose for monarchies above 'merely nationalist movements'.[39] In this sense of shared heritage, it was natural that heroes of Portuguese history, such as the navigator Vasco da Gama, were also celebrated by Brazilians as heroes of their own country.[40] When Arinos was invited to join the Brazilian Historical and Geographic Institute, then a surviving conservative institution created by Pedro II and still composed of notable people of the extinct monarchy, he reasserted the conviction that Brazil's first emperor must always be remembered as legendary hero.[41] He frankly admitted that his major concern was not to narrate history as it had been, but to consolidate an inspiring narrative for disseminating a patriotic sentiment among the people.[42]

On the other hand, the posthumous memory of Pedro II received public honours in chronicles that celebrated the anniversaries of his birth and death.[43] It was important for remembering the supposed great virtues of the regime and the emperor who had ruled the country for almost 50 years: political stability, national unity, economic and scientific progress, military honours, social harmony, peaceful abolition of slavery, and international respect. The Empire of Brazil was depicted as a genuine golden age, while the republican regime represented the worst values, such as the victory of greed, anarchy, violence and selfishness. At this point, Arinos reproduced a common idealization in the monarchist's reasoning and asserted that, more than ever, the monarchic cause was the cause of 'civilization of Brazil'.[44]

Because of his devotion to tradition and continuity, Afonso Arinos was shocked by the attempts of Brazilian republicans to eradicate symbols of the imperial regime, as well as the use of Pedro II's name itself, in public spaces. He found this denial of the past, 'erasing from our memories what we were', to be unacceptable.[45] He classified as 'an unbelievable stupidity' the removal of the coat of arms of the Royal House of Braganza from the Royal Galliot, an old rowing ship that served Portuguese regent João VI in his exile in Brazil that had recently been restored to serve in official ceremonies, and their replacement with the coat of arms of the Brazilian Republic.[46] By attacking those attitudes and even inventing traditions, Afonso Arinos established the field of memory and national history as his favourite battlefield and manipulated, in his way, the meaning

of events and historical dates.[47] In this case, he was using history as a tool for the moral education of the elites, and also as a way to fight republicans' attempts to reconstruct national memory.

Arinos always used historical reasoning to justify his political preference and frequently cited European thinkers and historians who were representative of the scientism of his time, such as Herbert Spencer, Hippolyte Taine and even Oliveira Martins. Despite his preference for values of political and religious conservatism, Arinos did not fail to make use of an appeal to scientific objectivity against his positivist opponents. Admittedly using Brazil's history for the benefit of his cause, he argued that official documents and historians' 'unprejudiced authority' protected him.[48] Thus, he intended to prove, for example, that the army's action in the resignation of Pedro I, in 1831, had been legitimized by national sentiment because it preserved the empire and the unity of the country. On the other hand, in the proclamation of the Republic, in 1889, the armed forces would have acted just in the name of their own class interests. Although he asserted that he neither considered himself a proper man of letters nor a historian, Arinos tried to use both the imagination and the authority of professional historians in his favour, in order to contest the legitimacy of the republican regime.[49]

Inventing a People for the Monarchy

Among the miseries that the Republic had brought to Brazil, Arinos often mentioned the War of Canudos. 'It was from the core of our nationality that emerged the fight of the backlands,' he asserted, thus disagreeing with the widespread contempt for that popular movement.[50] The journalists and politicians of the coastal capitals of Brazil were unable to understand the uprising of poor peasants from very distant and arid lands in the state of Bahia. Organized around a Catholic religious leader, Antonio Conselheiro (Antonio the Counsellor), they founded the village of Belo Monte and did not recognize the authority of the republican government. According to the Counsellor, only the monarchy could be legitimated by divine right to rule a people of believers. He demanded that acts subjected by the Republic to civil law, such as marriage, should return to religious tutelage.[51] More than merely a religious rebellion against the secular Republic, Belo Monte also allowed an autonomous life for the peasants, away from the oppression of the authorities and rural landowners.[52] Initially only a local problem, tensions around Belo Monte suddenly

grew and shook the Republic. The royalist elite and its press were accused of conspiracy, but strongly denied connections with the movement. Even so, republican persecutors destroyed the printing shops of *O Commercio de São Paulo* when they heard the news about the army expedition being defeated, in the most dramatic episode of the war for the government.[53]

Although Arinos condemned the challenge to the state's authority posed by the *sertanejos* (the settlers of Bahia), he suggested they had reached a state of religious fanaticism as a consequence of their abandonment by the Republican elites. He claimed that the intense Catholic faith and the loyalty of those poor peasants to the monarchy were evidence of a simple and profound manifestation of the national character. In a remarkable article, Arinos explained that the tragedy of Canudos was a result of the contradiction between the rude and authentic life of the people and a government based on the conventions of an artificial civilization.[54] Incapable of recognizing the realities that ruled life in the hinterlands, the republican regime saw the peasants as a threat and chose to exterminate them in a criminal way. But, Arinos believed, the war of the army against its own people was useful, at least, for showing the true face of the nation to the public. He took comfort in thinking this face could not be ignored any longer:

> Until now, only the inhabitants of the big cosmopolitan cities of the coast were Brazilians; until now, all the government's attention and the most part of its financial resources were spent on immigration or on the foolish intention of mimicking institutions or exotic customs. The centre of Brazil was ignored; if in the backwoods there is a population, nothing about it is known, the government does not take care: and so it emerges, in a strange and tragic manifestation of energy, asserting its existence and furrowing with blood a vehement protest against the contempt, or the oblivion, it had been relegated to. […]
>
> And this power, which appeared this way, will be incorporated in our nationality and will get into it as a perpetual affirmation of such nationality. Assimilated by civilization, it will assure our independence, by imposing on foreign nations a respect for us.[55]

Arinos pondered, thus, that the existence of Brazil itself as a strong and independent nation depended on the formation of people adapted to the harshness of the wild nature of the tropics. Those rough *sertanejos* should not be seen as a threat to the state; for if they were instructed, disciplined and politically educated, those men would become the civil and military

human force that was necessary for the progress of the nation. Their religious demand for the return of the king was not simply due to a supposed madness based on Sebastianism, a common pejorative accusation among the critics of the movement. This popular Portuguese belief in the mystical return of King Sebastião, who disappeared in battle against African Muslims in the sixteenth century, was present in some form in the inner lands of Brazil and encouraged messianic expectations of the rebels.[56] Arinos did not endorse those beliefs, but even used biological determinism to explain such behaviour as closer to nature than civilization: 'Left to the law of Nature, they have taken of Nature what she spreads with profuse hand by the flora or by wildlife.'[57] He recognized, however, besides the authority of natural science at that time, the cultural fact that the values of liberal civilization and the secular republican institutions were strange and hostile to the peasants.

In order to explain his interpretation, which was contrary to widespread opinion, Arinos wrote a semi-fictional narrative, a saga novel of Canudos. The chapters were first published in the press and later in a book titled *Os Jagunços* (*Backlands Gunmen*).[58] The long narrative ranges from the earliest preaching of Antonio Conselheiro to the final debacle of the massacre at Belo Monte, using the daily lives of the *sertanejos* as a structural framework. His intention was to recount the events from the standpoint of the men and women who constructed and defended Canudos, transforming them into characters with voice and power to decide, and to explain the circumstances and reasons for their behaviour. This work is similar in many aspects to the fictional narratives in his book *Pelo Sertão* (*Through the Backland*), published in 1898,[59] which can be described as a mosaic of stories and descriptions of the past, as well as of the human figures and remote landscapes of Brazil's rural area. The main characters are rude and violent peasants, full of a vitality originating in their racial mixture and exuberant American nature.[60]

In both books, the writer created a common people of noble values, but full of passion and violence. 'We live!—They say in my mouth'—Arinos thus proclaimed himself spokesman of his genuine characters before a sophisticated urban readership.[61] Despite the aristocratic ideals he professed, Arinos intended to show that he was somewhat sympathetic to the poor and humble workers who were neglected in Brazilian backlands. He shared with some other literates, who had come from the hinterland of Brazil, a recognition of the illiterate popular culture as an element of national cohesion and a source of originality and vitality.[62] In this way, strongly influenced

by a wide range of European folkloric nationalisms, he was an enthusiast of the preservation of the songs, dances, beliefs and dialects of the *sertanejos*.[63]

Arinos' appreciation for the culture of the poor, however, was condescending and paternalistic. When arguing for the monarchy, he saw as impossible any real autonomy for these violent peasants, arguing that they would accept a sacred and paternal authority in a natural and spontaneous way. For him, political leadership of a nation should be an essentially aristocratic art practised only by men in high social positions and full of generous conscience of their civic duties. As he stated in his lecture to the students of Ouro Preto, political leaders who emerged from the people should be limited to the role of propagandists who translate great ideas for the common people's comprehension, such as *Tiradentes* had supposedly done. In contrast, the statesman 'has something aristocratic and proud and this puts him out of the intimate contact with the people'.[64]

Far from being an egalitarian democrat, Afonso Arinos gave the humble people recognition only for their inferior political role. Regardless, in his way of thinking, they were seen as central to the formation of the Brazilian nationality, not exactly as citizens with political rights, but as holders of the cultural originality and necessary energy to populate the large country. According to his last speech, the issue between the Republic and the poor peasants was the extreme superficiality and selfishness of Brazilian social elites, who had abandoned the traditional paternalistic bonds that could keep them connected with the popular sensibility.[65] The greater risk brought by republican pride was the loss of social harmony and the rupture of national unity.

Arinos thought of himself as an example of an aristocrat who did not intend to lose his affinity with popular culture. Since he had moved to Paris, after Prado's death, he made a point of returning to Brazil occasionally. He went on journeys through the backlands of Minas Gerais and Goiás, accompanied by cattlemen and rural workers, such as the ones who inspired his literary stories. Nonetheless, although he somewhat encouraged a paternal affection for the common people, he did not tolerate the inversion of hierarchies. The republican militarism at the time was condemned not only for its authoritarianism but mainly for the lack of social 'quality' of its more enthusiastic supporters. Arinos derogatorily named them 'Jacobins' and 'populace in military garbs' or, even more ironically, patriots.[66] These were the radical middle-class Republican agitators, who also called themselves 'Jacobins' and patriots, but in a proud sense, and who became the most violent enemies of the monarchists.[67]

The use of the political vocabulary of the French Revolution was intended more to reveal a state of mind than adherence to a revolutionary programme. Strongly influenced by positivist ideas, Brazilian Jacobins manifested sympathy for a conservative and authoritarian modernization of society. Arinos, in turn, used the French Third Republic as an example of liberalism and stability to combat them, arguing that the French president would be nothing more than an 'elective monarch' of a country that remained aristocratic and centralized. Besides, French history consisted of an 'uninterrupted chain since the times of the feudal monarchs'.[68] The popular insurrection, however, constituted a curse in that history, a danger to be permanently expelled by representative institutions. According to him, the best legacy of the French Revolution would be 'the empire of law and justice, reason and liberty', which would have survived popular despotism.[69]

Since French influence was omnipresent in the literary and political culture of Brazilian elites, manipulating an interpretation of the history of France in their favour was crucial for both sides. Furthermore, for the monarchists, it was a way to celebrate a Latin nation as a supplier of aristocratic universal values for all other nations, even if in a more rationalist manner than that of its Iberian relatives. The royalists took advantage of international political models as examples, especially those in Europe. In contrast to the threat represented by the anonymous urban rabble, Arinos praised the honourable figures of European monarchies, which could personalize an entire nation and keep them united. The list of aristocratic statesmen presented in *Notas do Dia* was significant: the British prime minister W. E. Gladstone, the Spanish minister and historian Cánovas del Castillo, the German leader Otto von Bismarck, and the Austrian empress Elizabeth of Bavaria. Each of them were depicted as syntheses of the national soul of their countries, some of them being wise and humanitarian whereas others were cruel and aggressive. Gladstone embodied humanitarian and progressive values, while Bismarck was strongly devoted to his own nation.[70] Elizabeth met the tragic fate of the Austrian imperial family and Cánovas, in turn, was the Iberian tragicomic spirit, 'restless and idealistic', away from the Anglo-Saxon pragmatism.[71] The latter fought decadence by strengthening the monarchy, embodying the synthesis of chivalrous pride that could unite Spain. In each of these cases, the nation did not remain united by the will of its people, but mainly because their statesmen could 'express the collective energy' and embody the 'national soul.'

Following this same laudatory style, some of Arinos' articles in *Notas do Dia* were also dedicated to the memory of distinct Brazilians, particularly

the ones who were loyal to Pedro II until the end. Among these illustrious people was the General Couto de Magalhães, a loyal servant of the monarchic state and leader of the expeditions to the backlands and frontiers of the country.[72] Subjugation of the indigenous population of the empire's large territory, in this case, was treated as part of the necessary process to form an ethnically singular nationality. Especially selected as expressive of a miscegenated nationality was the engineer André Rebouças, to whom Arinos paid homage because of his choice of voluntarily following the emperor into exile, embodying 'the gratitude and loyalty of people for the imperial family'. He was appointed as 'a *mestiço* and a common man', thus representing an imagined social and racial harmony under the monarchy.[73]

Probably, Rebouças himself would find it very strange to be seen as a 'common man' by reason of his colour, since he had always lived among the elites of the imperial court. Furthermore, the colour distinction was not so explicitly admitted by that society at that time, including Rebouças' own family.[74] Here, Afonso Arinos expressed his discomfort in the absence of manifestations of solidarity to the emperor, but also revealed a deep racialized concept of social hierarchy. In another article, Arinos exalted the Viscount of Taunay, a prestigious writer and military man of French descent, and a member of an aristocratic family who was anti-republican and enthusiastic about the liberal reform of the monarchy.[75] Again, a racial approach is revealed when he describes Taunay with emphasis on his 'white colour and blond hair' to attest to his European and knightly lineage. It is evident that Taunay represents, in Arinos' chronicles, an aristocratic counterpart to André Rebouças, who had been a courtier as Taunay but was described as someone of mixed blood and therefore seen as a 'common man'. Afonso Arinos, after all, dreamed of a liberal monarchy where racial determinism would continue serving status differences.

CONCLUSION

After 1901, Arinos no longer worked in publishing and moved to Paris with his wife, Antonieta Prado, who was Eduardo's niece. Even though he held prestige in Brazilian literary circles, he preferred a self-exile dedicated to business activities and touristic trips to Europe. Temporary returns to Brazil, however, were frequent and marked by conferences on Brazilian folklore and nostalgic journeys to the hinterlands of the country.[76] He died while he was returning to Europe after one of these trips, in 1916. At that point, the restoration of the monarchy was no longer contemplated by

Brazilian political elites, but a certain nationalism of folkloric and patriarchal inspiration remained alive. During the 1920s, Arinos' works inspired both regional cultural movements and national intellectual and artistic vanguards.[77] In a new intellectual and political context, the Brazilian state, in the 1930s, finally began to have effective policies on cultural nationalism, fostering the national memory and the patriotic school education.[78] Arinos, then, was remembered as a defender of tradition and political centralism, but ultimately forgotten as a monarchist, paradoxically receiving a monument placed at *Praça da República* (Republic Square) in the capital of his home state.[79]

This study of Afonso Arinos' political action reveals more than details about the ideological struggle in which republicans and monarchists confronted each other. It represents not only the debate about the regime most consistent with expectations of progress and civilization, but still the most adaptable to the supposed social need for authority and hierarchy. Arinos considered that both material progress and hierarchical traditions were absolutely necessary to the nation's survival. For him, the defence of the representative and liberal monarchic regime was inseparable from the defence of the dynastic centralization necessary for the unification of a nation so diversified by race, custom and geography.

However, Afonso Arinos went beyond mere propaganda of political ideas and proposed a diagnosis of the nation's identity that would reconcile the political system with the popular culture. His view on Brazil was dedicated to expressing a desired and imagined spiritual continuity between the past and the present, as well as between the elites and the people. Precisely for having roots in the ideal of a Latin and Iberian transnational cultural tradition, his view of the symbolic power of the monarchy provided a meaning for national community, which should overcome the huge and violent inequalities of the country and, at the same time, preserve them.

NOTES

1. On these literary and political debates, see Roberto Ventura (1991), *Estilo Tropical*, São Paulo; Lilia Schwarcz (1993), *O Espetáculo das Raças*, São Paulo; Ângela Alonso (2002), *Ideias em Movimento*, Rio de Janeiro; Nicolau Sevcenko (2003), *Literatura Como Missão*, São Paulo; Carolina Dantas (2010), *Brasil Café com Leite*, Rio de Janeiro; Jeffrey Needell (1987), *A Tropical Belle*

Époque, Cambridge; Thomas Skidmore (1993), *Black into White*, Durham.

2. On the monarchist critics, see Angela Alonso (2009), 'Arrivistas e Decadentes', *Novos Estudos*, 85, 131–148; Maria L. M. Janotti (1986), *Os Subversivos da República*, São Paulo.

3. On national rhetoric in 1890s Brazil, see Ventura (1991). On literary imagination as a foundation of modern nationalisms, see Benedict Anderson (1991), *Imagined Communities*, New York and London.

4. See Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco (1969), *Notas do Dia*, in: *Afonso Arinos—Obra Completa*, São Paulo, 609–88.

5. See Kirsten Schultz (2001), *Tropical Versailles*, New York and London.

6. The Constitution of 1824 established the legal prerogatives of the Emperor of Brazil as a moderating power (in Portuguese, *Poder Moderador*), above the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. See pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/brazil.html, accessed 4 October 2016.

7. On the political system of the monarchy, see José Murilo de Carvalho (2003), *A Construção da Ordem*, Rio de Janeiro; Ilmar R. Mattos (1990), *O Tempo Saquarema*, São Paulo.

8. Founded in 1838, the IHGB intended to construct a historical narrative to the nation, as well as to enlarge Brazil's territorial and ethnographical understanding. See Manoel Luiz Salgado Guimarães (1988), 'Nação e Civilização nos Trópicos', *Estudos Históricos*, 1, 5–27.

9. Karl von Martius was sent to Brazil for a scientific expedition by the king of Bavaria and travelled inside the country between 1817 and 1821 collecting data of flora. See Manoel Luiz Salgado Guimarães (2000), 'História e Natureza em von Martius', *História, Ciências, Saúde—Manguinhos*, 7, 2 and Guimarães (1988), 16–17.

10. On Brazilian literature, see Antonio Candido (2000), *Formação da Literatura Brasileira*, Belo Horizonte.

11. On religious festivals, see Martha Abreu (1999), *O Império do Divino*, Rio de Janeiro.

12. For detail on Pedro II, see Lilia Schwarcz (1998), *As Barbas do Imperador*, São Paulo; José Murilo Carvalho (2007), *D. Pedro II*, São Paulo; Roderick Barman (1999), *Citizen Emperor*, Stanford.

13. For the press and the emergence of a new public opinion, see Mello (2009); on carnivals, literature and politics, see Leonardo Pereira

(2004), *O Carnaval das Letras*, Campinas; Maria Clementina Pereira Cunha (2001), *Ecos da folia*, São Paulo. On the satirical press, see Marcelo Balaban (2009), *Poeta do Lápis*, Campinas.

14. See Alonso (2002).

15. For a broad analysis of the fall of the monarchy, see Emilia Viotti Costa (2000), *The Brazilian Empire*, Chapel Hill and London; on the monarchy's political crisis, see the doctoral dissertation of Amanda M. Gomes (2013), *Fragilidade Monarquista*, Rio de Janeiro.

16. See José M. Carvalho (1990), *A Formação das Almas*, São Paulo.

17. See José M. Carvalho (1987), *Os Bestializados*, São Paulo; Maria T. C. Mello (2009), 'A Modernidade Republicana', *Tempo*, 26, 15–31; Ronaldo P. Jesus (2009), *Visões da Monarquia*, Belo Horizonte.

18. For a long time, the Republic was perceived as result of an almost spontaneous consensus among elites, legitimized by the people's indifference. Nowadays, the process is better understood as a turbulent course of action for change that combined ruptures and continuities, even though uncertainties were prevalent, and no longer a period of political apathy. See Costa (2000), 202–33, Janotti (1986), Alonso (2009) and Gomes (2013).

19. See Janotti (1986), 98–9.

20. See Franco (1969), 13–38.

21. See Thomas Skidmore (1975), 'Eduardo Prado', *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 2/12, 149–61; Sérgio P. Rouanet (2007), 'Eduardo Prado e a Modernidade', *Revista Brasileira*, 53, 88–110.

22. On the ideas of the anti-Republican campaign, see Janotti (1986).

23. See Eduardo Prado (1917), 'A Ilusão Americana', São Paulo, 107. My translation.

24. See José M. Carvalho (2007), 'Eduardo Prado e a Polêmica do Iberismo e do Americanismo', *Revista Brasileira*, 53, 71–87.

25. See José Campigoto and Élio Serpa (2012), 'Oliveira Martins e Afonso Arinos: Regiões e Tragicidades', *História da Historiografia*, 10, 54–74.

26. See Álvaro Manuel Machado (1986), 'A Geração de 70—uma revolução cultural e literária', Lisbon.

27. See Afonso Arinos (1900), 'Notas do Dia—Comemorando', in: Franco (1969), 609–88.

28. See Carvalho (1990) and Lucia Lippi Oliveira (1989), 'As Festas que a República Manda Guardar', *Estudos Históricos*, 4, 172–89.
29. See Rodrigo Otávio (1893), *Festas Nacionais*, Rio de Janeiro.
30. See Arinos (1900), 611–28, 621–9.
31. See Arinos (1900), 612. My translation.
32. See Arinos (1900), 619. My translation.
33. See Arinos (1900), 641. My translation.
34. See Arinos (1900), 641–3.
35. The 'anarchy' of the neighbour Republics was a traditional argument to justify monarchical centralization, see Carvalho (2003) and Mattos (1990).
36. See Arinos (1900), 641.
37. See Arinos (1900), 642.
38. See Arinos (1900), 642.
39. See Arinos (1900), 642.
40. See Arinos (1900), 659.
41. On the IHGB under the Republic, see Lucia Guimarães (2007), *Da Escola Palatina ao Silogeu (1889–1938)*, Rio de Janeiro.
42. See *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*, 66/2, 1905, 215–20 and 74/2, 1912, 673–80.
43. See Arinos (1900), 649–53; 677–83.
44. See Arinos (1900), 679.
45. See Arinos (1900), 642.
46. See Arinos (1900), 685–8.
47. On invented traditions, see Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds) (1983), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge.
48. See Arinos (1900), 683.
49. See Arinos (1900), 683–5.
50. See Arinos (1900), 679.
51. See Janotti (1986), 154.
52. For a synthetic view of the Canudos War, see José Rivair Macedo and Mario Maestri (2004), *Belo Monte*, São Paulo. See also Robert Levine (1992), *Vale of tears*, Berkeley and London. For a classical account of the war, see Euclides da Cunha (1944*), Rebellion in the Backlands*, Chicago.
53. See Arinos (1900), 672.
54. See Arinos (1900), 643–6.
55. See Arinos (1900), 645.

56. On a study of Sebastianism in European messianism and its history in Portugal until the nineteenth century, see José van den Besselaar (1987), *O Sebastianismo – História Sumária*, Lisbon.

57. See Arinos (1900), 646.

58. See Afonso Arinos (1898a), 'Os Jagunços', in: Franco (1969), 121–383.

59. See Afonso Arinos (1898b), 'Pelo Sertão—Histórias e Paisagens', in: Franco (1969), 47–120.

60. On Arinos' literary experience, see Alexandre Lazzari (2010), 'O Buriti Solitário e outras Invenções', in: Martha Abreu and Carolina Dantas (eds), *Anais do I e do II Encontro de Pós-Doutores*, Niterói, 27–54, online, http://www.historia.uff.br/stricto/files/public_ppgh/cap_2009_forumPosgrad_anais_i_ii.pdf, accessed 4 October 2016.

61. See Arinos (1900), 875.

62. See Claudia Matos (1994), *A Poesia Popular na República das Letras*, Rio de Janeiro.

63. About intelectuals and folklorism, see Michel de Certeau (1995), 'A Beleza do Morto' in: *A Cultura no Plural*, Campinas, 55–86.

64. See Arinos (1900), 618.

65. See Afonso Arinos (1917a), 'A Unidade da Pátria', in: Franco (1969), 883–95.

66. See Arinos (1900), 670.

67. On the Brazilian 'Jacobins', see Suely Reis de Queiroz (1986), *Os Radicais da República*, São Paulo.

68. See Arinos (1900), 636.

69. See Arinos (1900), 634–7.

70. See Arinos (1900), 629–30; 659–63.

71. See Arinos (1900), 663–5; 637–41.

72. See Arinos (1900), 665–8.

73. See Arinos (1900), 653–5.

74. See Leo Spitzer (1989), *Lives in Between*, Cambridge; Keila Grinberg (2002), *O Fiador dos Brasileiros*, Rio de Janeiro.

75. See Arinos (1900), 680–3.

76. See Afonso Arinos (1917b), 'Lendas e Tradições Brasileiras', in: Franco (1969), 689–786.

77. See Alceu Amoroso Lima (2000). *Afonso Arinos.* Rio de Janeiro; Nicolau Sevcenko (1992), *Orfeu Extático na Metrópole*, São Paulo.

78. On politics of culture in Vargas' regime, see Angela de Castro Gomes (1996), *História e Historiadores*, Rio de Janeiro; Daryle Williams (2001), *Culture Wars in Brazil*, Durham and London.
79. See Lazzari (2010), 29.

Catalonia: Medieval Monarchs Testifying for Democracy, Nation, and Europe

Daniel Wimmer

Master-narratives about the homogeneity of European nations are inventions of the nineteenth century, the classical era of European nationalisms. The Middle Ages, as the 'closest other' of European notions of modernity, have provided since then a cultural foundation for narratives of collective, including nationalist, identity.

The present-day Spanish autonomous community of Catalonia that—because of its language, its culture and, of course, its history—is still perceived as a nation by a big part of its population and its political representatives, also tracked its national roots back to medieval times in the nineteenth century. The result of this effort to expose Catalonia's national roots was a powerful historical narrative which is essentially tied to a putative 'national' dynasty founded by the ninth- and tenth-century counts of Barcelona, Guifré el Pelòs (*c.*840–897) and Borrell II (*c.*920–992). These two counts stand for the birth of Catalonian national glory and independence, as does their descendant King Jaume I (1208–1276) who initiated the conquest of vast territories throughout the Mediterranean region

D. Wimmer (✉)
University of Applied Sciences Würzburg-Schweinfurt, Würzburg, Germany

making the Crown of Aragon an influential maritime power. Finally, there was King Martí I (1356–1410) whose death represents the end of the dynasty of the *Casal de Barcelona*—and therefore (in this nationalist narrative) also the end of Catalonia's national glory—since he did not leave any descendants. Nineteenth-century nationalist thinkers have combined the history of this medieval dynasty with a contemporary concept of nationhood to form a collective and normative Catalan national identity.

The emergence of the European Union as a supranational actor and the effects of different processes of globalization have today made the simplifying equation of territorial and normative identity constructions questionable. Transnational and transcultural identities have emerged; formerly separated normative cultures now interweave. Ideas of territorially and culturally defined nationalism persist, though. An analysis of conventional mass-media (for example, historical novels, textbooks used in schools, exhibitions and the press) published or created between 1975 and 2010 shows that the narrative tie between a presumed Catalonian nation and medieval counts and kings still exists.

However, despite the obvious continuity regarding the narratives' contents focusing on the medieval counts of Barcelona and the kings of Aragon, the actual narratives today differ from their nineteenth-century predecessors: nowadays, the normative narratives that emphasize assumed characteristics are combined with other identitarian elements influenced by current flows of migration and globalization, including interactions with the European Union. Thus the stories about Guifré el Pelòs and Jaume I still represent Catalonia's national glory, but the meaning of glory is enriched by new—contemporary—contents. Their history is now reconceptualized to make them appear as prototypes of political rulers who knew how to reign over a peaceful and multicultural European society.[1]

The aim of the present chapter is to highlight the development (reconceptualization) of the narratives focusing on the medieval counts of Barcelona and kings of Aragon as political leaders depending on changes in politics and society. The Swiss historian Valentin Groebner described this dependence in *Das Mittelalter hört nicht auf* (*The Middle Ages Never End*) referring to history in general as a reconstructed narrative: 'Images of medieval history do not only inform us about texts […] of the seventh, eleventh or fourteenth century and about their authors […]. These reconstructions of the medieval past inform us at least as much about the medievalists themselves, about their readers and about collective desires and obsessions of the times they emerge in.'[2] Analysing narratives linked to

the medieval counts of Barcelona and kings of Aragon and carving out the time of their appearance and re-conceptualization will highlight the dependence of Catalonian nationalism's 'collective desires and obsessions' on changes in European and global politics with regard to Europeanization and globalization.

THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY IMAGINATION OF CATALAN HISTORY: A NARRATIVE CYCLE

To carve out the continuity of nineteenth-century narratives on medieval counts of Barcelona and kings of Aragon representing a presumed Catalan national glory, it is necessary to highlight the setting of Catalonia's national myths referring to the Middle Ages. In 2006, Magí Sunyer published a compendium of Catalan historical narratives and how they were disseminated by nineteenth-century Catalan literature.[3] Sunyer describes the imagination of Catalan history as a narrative structure including national rise, culmination and decline in which every narration is depending on and referring to the respective others. After its birth as a nation during the early Middle Ages, Catalonia experienced a period of consolidation in which a first integration of neighbouring territories took place. This time was followed by the reign of King Jaume I who conquered the Moorish kingdoms of Valencia and the Balearic Islands and promoted distant Catalan trade throughout the Mediterranean. Due to his leadership, Catalonia was able to become a maritime power that even ruled parts of the Eastern Mediterranean. After this culmination of Catalan power was reached, an era of crisis arose which led subsequently to Catalonia's national decline ending with the accession of the Castilian dynasty of the Trastàmara to the throne after the death of Martí I.[4] Looking into contemporary Catalan schoolbooks, one can discover that this structure still determines the narrations on Catalonia's medieval history: 'Contemporary Catalonia rises from the ninth century, when the Catalan counties were established. Until the fifteenth century Catalonia, then united with Aragón, experienced a period of expansion which came to an end by the beginning of the sixteenth century.'[5]

However, it is not possible to transfer all nineteenth-century narrations entirely to a late twentieth- or early twenty-first-century context. Some of them have lost their importance and cannot be observed unless occasionally in current day mass media.[6] Others have become parts of the general

conception of Catalonia's glorious past, serving as testifying arguments, but not existing individually without the support of other narrations.[7] Again, others have disappeared completely from the mass media and have no importance for present-day reconstructions of Catalan history.[8] But, there are also narrations that have persisted since the nineteenth century to the present day. These are narrations linked to a group of counts and kings who ruled in times of change: Guifré el Pelòs, Borrell II, Jaume I and Martí I. Their histories serve as 'narrative building blocks'[9] to give structure to the conception of Catalonia's—putatively national—medieval history.

Guifré and Borrell: Two Medieval Counts of Barcelona as Fathers of the Nation

Focusing on the presentation of Guifré el Pelòs and Borrell II, two medieval counts who ruled the majority of ninth- and tenth-century Catalan counties, it is possible to analyse the initial narrative building block on Catalonia's birth as a nation, to which all following narrations refer in a certain way. An excerpt from a primary school textbook of 2007 shows which elements this narrative building block is combining:

> At the beginning, the Catalan counts were named by the Frankish kings. Step by step they acted with more independence. Count Guifré el Pelós ceded the counties he owned to his sons. From that moment, the counties became hereditary. In 988, Borrell II decided not to renew his oath of fidelity to the Frankish king. From that moment, the Catalan counties were completely independent.[10]

The twofold use of the word 'independent' in a text about the history of the early Middle Ages emphasizes the importance that is conceded to these two counts: were supposed to have led Catalonia to its independence. The first step was purportedly made by Guifré when he succeeded in introducing hereditary succession in the Catalan counties; the second was Borrell's refusal to continue showing loyalty to the Frankish kings, following an ignored plea for assistance after a Moorish attack on Barcelona in 985 by the Frankish crown.

But the image of Guifré, especially, is not a modern imagination—it had already been used in medieval historiography when the history of Guifré was written down in the twelfth century, for example in the *Gesta comitum*

Barcinonensium. Back then, a part of his grandson Borrell's vita—that of the presumed 'independence' of the Catalan counties as a consequence of his refusal to pledge loyalty—was transferred into his newly written history to give more legitimization to the Catalans' rejection of the French crown's requirements south of the Pyrenees, by dating Catalan independence two generations further back. Therefore, the linking of Guifré to the independence of the Catalan counties was not an invention of the nineteenth century; but equating medieval Catalan counties with a presumed Catalan nation was.[11] And it is exactly this equation that still can be discovered throughout contemporary Catalan mass media.

On 10 September 1982, an advertisement was published in the major newspapers of Catalonia to promote the inauguration of the newly erected tomb of Guifré el Pelòs in Ripoll that took place the following day, the *Diada*—Catalonia's national holiday. In addition to the programme of events, the advertisement presented an artist's impression of Count Guifré with long hair, holding a blazon showing the Catalan coat of arms and highlighting the importance of this man as the supposed founder of Catalonia's 'national dynasty'.[12] The advertisement is proof that the nineteenth-century re-conceptualization of Guifré el Pelòs was still in use at the end of the twentieth century. An excerpt from another schoolbook—published in 2008—shows how the two concepts of dynasty and nation are narratively combined, deliberately embedding the history of Guifré el Pelós into the wider frame of the narrative structure of Catalonia's national history: 'Installing the hereditary succession, Guifré founded the dynasty of the Casal de Barcelona. This dynasty of 21 count-kings ruled from the ninth until the fourteenth century, headed the union with Aragón and the Catalan-Aragonese expansion to the South and to the Mediterranean.'[13] Corresponding to this text, being the founder of the dynasty of the *Casal de Barcelona* means also being the forefather of Catalonia's medieval glory, a content that is linked to the narrative building block referring to King Jaume I.

It was not only the advertisement that refreshed the national re-conceptualization of Guifré's history on this occasion. Jordi Pujol, Catalonia's nationalist[14] prime minister from 1980 until 2003 held two speeches highlighting the importance of Guifré el Pelós for Catalonia: On 1 August 1982, he explained:

If someone asks us, why we want the autonomy, […], we have to say: […] because Catalonia is a nation. That is because of many reasons, but the

main reason is that a thousand years ago Count Guifré el Pelós laid […] the foundations of our Catalan nationality. […] That is why it is our right to remember […] the founder of our nationality! [To remember], that we succeeded in conserving the heritage of the founder of the Catalan nation. Let us follow his spirit.[15]

Following this argument, having introduced hereditary succession in the ninth century also meant having established Catalan nationality—and in consequence also the Catalan nation. But, this excerpt also shows how the nineteenth-century re-conceptualization of Guifré's history became a historical argument in present day politics. 1982 was a time when it was important to argue constantly for the region's interests in Spanish politics—this was one year after the attempted coup by General Tejero in the Spanish Parliament to end the process of decentralization and democratization.

One month later, Jordi Pujol gave another speech:

If they ask you, why we came to Ripoll, [if they ask you] what it is all about the restoration of the tomb of Count Guifré, answer that this is nothing romantic nor sentimental. It is patriotic, it is moral confirmation. It is an event that brings us back to the origins of our people, that for us Catalans are a fountain of energy and believing. The moral energy and the believing in ourselves that we need to finish our work, to reconstruct our land, Catalonia. For more than 1,000 years, since the times of Guifré, Catalonia was a nation. And that is the reason why it will always be.[16]

Remembering Guifré thus meant receiving inspiration as a community to face the future, receiving strength and self-confidence. The history of Guifré represents a personalized plea aimed at all Catalans to form a collective consciousness after four decades of Franquism. Guifré became a point of reference of a collective sense of belonging.

In 1988, the history of Count Borrell II became a historical argument in present-day politics as well. It was the year Catalonia celebrated the *Mil·lenari*, the presumed millennium of its political independence. The Catalan government launched an advertising campaign in all media to promote the millennium's celebrations—for example a two-page newspaper advertisement speaking of the 'Millennium of the political birth of Catalonia':

When Borrell II refused in 988 to go to Aquitaine to take the oath of loyalty to the Frankish king, no one thought that this would be the beginning

of the political independence of Catalonia. But it is certain that from that moment on, we Catalans always succeeded in maintaining our identity. In 1283, Catalonia created the first parliament in Europe, progenitor of a continuous will of liberty and democracy. Over the centuries, Catalonia formed its own culture, to which it remains faithful, and found in hard work the key to economic progress. Now, in 1988, Catalonia is pursuing new roads to the future. A future that is possible thanks to all of us, men and women that we live and work in this country. Now and in 1,000 years![17]

Count Guifré el Pelòs and Borrell are presented as the forefathers of Catalonia's glory during the high Middle Ages. By deciding not to go to Aquitaine Borrell II became the father/builder of Catalonia's political independence and passing centuries allowed the Catalan identity to be maintained. Freedom and democracy, culture and prosperity would not have been possible without his act of disobedience.

The main event of the celebrations in 1988 was the opening ceremony in the *Palau de la Generalitat* presided over by their Royal Majesties the King and Queen of Spain on 22 April. On this occasion, Jordi Pujol showed again his determination to set Catalonia's medieval history as a source of inspiration for contemporary politics:

> We desire that the Mil·lenari helps us reflect deeply about Catalonia. [That it helps us] to remember where we come from, what we have done, what we did well and what we did not do well. To remember, what we are. And [that it helps us] to think about how to direct our collective actions into the future. […] Once clarified that we are a people aged 1000 years […] once clarified that we owe our existence to nothing but the work of generations and generations that built and rebuilt Catalonia, once clarified all this, I have to say that I do not want to talk about past times but about today.[18]

Similar to the use of Guifré's history as a political argument six years earlier, Borrell's history also served as a source of inspiration to sketch the future of Catalonia. The late 1980s were a time of major arguments between Jordi Pujol's Catalan government and Felipe Gonzalez's Spanish central government because of the definition of each other's political competences. So what did Pujol say? Alluding to the reason for the celebration he refers once more to the necessities of present-day politics. Catalonia's millenary tradition as a presumed independent—and democratic—nation had to be considered while dealing out political competences between Barcelona and Madrid.

An analysis of the coverage of other official celebrations and political campaigns in the following decades shows that not only were the medieval counts of Barcelona often used in political arguments, but that the nineteenth century re-conceptualization of Guifré el Pelòs and Borrell II continued. For example, in 1997, on the occasion of the 1100th anniversary of the death of Guifré el Pelós, Jordi Pujol expressed his opinion that 'out of his grave, Guifré would say: These are the people that have to move on, and we are willing to do so.'[19] And in 2006, Pujol's successor as president of the Catalan nationalist party and later Catalan prime minister, Artur Mas, visited the tomb of Guifré in Ripoll the day before the election, laid some flowers and gave a patriotic speech about his personal and political commitment to the Catalan nation.[20]

JAUME I: A KING TO REPRESENT CATALONIA'S NATIONAL GLORY

King Jaume I is another member of the *Casal de Barcelona* that plays a major role in the imagination of Catalonia's medieval history. His history is linked to the presumed culmination of Catalonia's national glory in the high and later Middle Ages, an era which an excerpt from the textbook *Mediterrània 4* (1997) summarizes concisely:

> During the thirteenth and fourteenth century, Catalonia—being a part of the Crown of Aragon—faced an era of important economic and political changes. The Balearic Isles and the Kingdom of Valencia were conquered and military campaigns to the islands of Sicily and Sardinia were completed successfully. A genuine military and economic empire was established in the Western Mediterranean. Those were some outstanding years, some of the richest moments of Catalan history. The kings established a form of government balanced with the representatives of the reign's elite (nobility, church, patriciate) and known as *pactisme*: The Corts, the Generalitat and the municipal governments. Barcelona became a port of the international maritime commerce which outreached to Alexandria and Beirut, to the Middle East and Northern Africa.[21]

Analysing nineteenth-century Catalan literature, Magí Sunyer observes a multitude of different narratives referring to Catalonia's medieval glory.[22] Their constant re-conceptualization throughout the decades has provoked a quantitative reduction to two powerful and self-explaining narratives,

just as the example of the 1997 schoolbook shows: the account about the successful conquest of large parts of the Mediterranean and the importance of Catalonia as a maritime power. But, there is another powerful picture that has emerged over the years: the formation of Catalonia's assembly of the estates, the so-called *Corts*, and its permanent representation, the *Generalitat*, as presumed roots of Catalan parliamentarianism and the *pactisme* as a putative origin of Catalan democracy. In the nineteenth century, this narration was still completely unknown, as it would have been unthinkable to place the general re-conceptualization of parliamentarianism as a glorious element of a nation's history inside a schoolbook.

In this narrative frame, King Jaume I is the dominant figure; every element used to present Catalonia's national glory in medieval times is linked to this king, as shown in this excerpt from a 1983 schoolbook:

> Jaume I was King of Catalonia [*sic*] and Aragon. He conquered Mallorca (1229) and Valencia (1238) from the Saracens. In his time the Corts, the assembly of noblemen, clergymen and representatives of the cities, began to assemble to discuss corporately with the King the problems of the reign. In this era, Catalonia became a merchant's empire that soon was supposed to dominate the Mediterranean.[23]

And indeed, this re-conceptualization of the history of King Jaume I that in large parts originates in the attempts of the era of the *Renaixença*, the 'national awakening' of the Catalans in the nineteenth century is still much in use.[24] The permanent exhibition of the Museu d'Història de Catalunya (MHC) in Barcelona is a good example. In form and content, the section that is dedicated to Jaume is presented as a turning point in Catalonia's glorious national history and as a tie between the sections of the territorial expansion of the Crown of Aragon north and south of the Pyrenees and the expansion throughout the Mediterranean: 'In the thirteenth century, the military and commercial expansion throughout the Mediterranean that lasted until the fifteenth century, began with the conquests of Mallorca and Valencia.'[25] It was Jaume I that supposedly left Catalan ambitions on the mainland and decided to head to the Mediterranean, a decision that makes him appear to be the initiator of the most important elements of the narrative building block of Catalonia's national glory: the Catalan maritime expansion throughout the high and late Middle Ages.

However, it is not only his presumed decision to head to the Mediterranean, but also the 'loss' of the Occitan territories north of the

Pyrenees that supports the image of Jaume I being the king who made Catalonia's history glorious. In addition, this history helps to build a narrative link between Jaume I and his early medieval predecessors. When the schoolbook *Història de Catalunya* (2000) refers to the Treaty of Corbeil that Jaume I concluded with the French King Louis IX in 1258, it states: 'When Borrell II represents the factual independence, it was Jaume I that symbolized legal independence.'[26] Conceding most of the territories north of the Pyrenees to the French crown in exchange for the French renouncing feudal overlordship of the March of Hispania and the March of Gothia (and furthermore being limited by Castile in expansion territorially to the south of the Iberian Peninsula), medieval Catalonia was forced to focus on expansion throughout the Mediterranean. In fact, the history of the Treaty of Corbeil is presented as a good deal for King Jaume I (and in consequence also for Catalonia). When he understood that he was not able to compete successfully with the French crown in this region, he tried to 'sell Occitania dear'. And he succeeded: he got 'legal independence' for leaving the Occitan territories to the French kings. This reference to Catalonia's independence helped to create a narrative tie between Guifré el Pelòs and Borrell II on one side and Jaume I on the other. In fact, giving a new direction to Catalonia's history, Jaume I was supposed to finish the era that Guifré and Borrell II established in the early Middle Ages. Only by doing that could he give way to the era of Catalonia's national glory.[27]

Coming back to the important narrative about Catalonia's maritime expansion, the history of this putatively continuous movement of Catalan merchants and soldiers throughout the Mediterranean is presented as unthinkable without Jaume I's initial decision to negotiate over territory with Louis IX, a fact confirmed by MHC's permanent exhibition:

> In the beginning of the thirteenth century the kings of Catalonia and Aragon [*sic*] direct their expansionary policy to the Mediterranean. The conquest of Mallorca by Jaume I is the initial point of a path that also his descendants follow until the fifteenth century. Even facing Genovese rivalry, the Crown of Aragon succeeded in establishing a hegemony in the Western Mediterranean. [...] The armed fleet, the company of the Almogavars and the merchant fleet were the basis of the expansion.[28]

It turns out that this narrative is still so powerful that it even gives structure to the storyline of historical novels, for example *The Cathedral of the Sea*, written by Ildefonso Falcones in 2006, which is entirely dedi-

cated to Catalan expansion in the Mediterranean in the fourteenth century. Referring to and partially even paraphrasing medieval chronicles, it presents the Almogavars, the mercenaries of the Catalan Company, as powerful, prestigious, courageous warriors fighting for the glory of Catalonia and the novel even lets the children in the streets chant the story of Catalonia's national glory: 'Our enemies have better ports than we do?—Josep asked—But we defeated them! We're the masters of the Mediterranean—he shouted and repeated the words he heard so often from the mouth of his father.'[29] Catalonia's military and mercantile expansion throughout the Mediterranean is presented—and is surely also perceived as such by the readers—as some sort of 'natural', unquestioned background of the storyline. And this background itself is linked to King Jaume I.

In the twentieth century, the emergence of the third narration about Jaume I being the presumed father of Catalan parliamentarianism still emphasized the image of his reign as both a turning point in Catalan history and a proof of Catalonia's medieval glory: 'To enact laws and to rule the country, Jaume I established the Corts, an institution that assembled three social groups: noblemen, clergymen and citizen. The Corts of Catalonia were one of the first democratic institutions of Europe.'[30] Jaume I is supposed to have had an active role in the development of modern Catalan democracy; it even appears to be his will as medieval leader to share his power with his subjects, aiming to guide Catalonia to modern times. Of course, the continuity of the institution's names, *Corts* and *Generalitat*, from medieval to present times facilitates the creation of this image of a putative premodern Catalan democracy similar to Spain's actual constitutional monarchy—an image that was already being used in 1988 during the advertisement campaign *Catalunya 1000 anys*. But, the current-day impression of Jaume I being himself the progenitor of Catalan parliamentarianism is supported by the frequent use of a miniature of the medieval *Usatges de Barcelona* showing him presiding over an assembly of the estates. In more than half of the analysed schoolbooks—and in the permanent exhibition of the MHC—this miniature is used to illustrate the history of the medieval *Corts* and *Generalitat*.

This short overview of three of the most important nineteenth- and twentieth-century re-conceptualizations of the history of Jaume I testifies to his almost mythical importance. And indeed, analysing more than 90 different poems, legends and chronicles originating from different centuries about Jaume I and his life, philologist Caterina Valriu has showed

that he can truly be called a 'father figure' for Catalonia and the Catalan-speaking countries.[31] A schoolbook from the year 2000 even attributes the same importance to him as had 'George Washington for the United States, El Cid for Castile and Joan of Arc for France'.[32]

Martí I: The King's Death as an Initial Point of National Decline

The era of Catalonia's national medieval glory, however, was only to last until the unfortunate *Compromis de Caspe* in 1412, when the majority of the representatives of the different kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon decided to elect Ferran d'Antequera of the Trastàmara dynasty as the successor to King Marti I who had died in 1410 without leaving any descendants.[33]

Nineteenth-century literature and historiography declared the Trastàmara dynasty's accession to the Crown of Aragon to be the initial point of Catalonia's national decline.[34] Magí Sunyer resumes:

> Seen from the perspective of Romanticism, the Compromis de Caspe does not only represent the substitution of the Catalan dynasty by another, foreign, Castilian one, but also the beginning of decline which will know still more negative incidences throughout the fifteenth century—the Hispanicization of the Court, […] the Civil War during the reign of King John II, […], the marriage of the Catholic Monarchs—which will open the path to the decline of a brilliant literature, to the Guerra dels Segadors and finally to the deprivation of all rights and to the assimilation to Spain after being defeated in the War of the Spanish Succession.[35]

Catalan historian Eulàlia Duran showed that this way of attributing the *Compromis de Caspe* as the initial point of Catalonia's national decline is still older than the nineteenth-century attempts to give a narrative foundation to the newly developed concept of a Catalan nation state.[36] Sources originating from the fifteenth century had already reported attempts by various representatives of the Catalan estates to denounce the kings of the Trastàmara dynasty as foreigners, obviously to delegitimize the monarch with whom they had been in conflict.

Nowadays, the nineteenth-century-re-conceptualization of history presenting Martì's death and the *Compromis de Caspe* as the starting points of Catalonia's decline is still actively used—unlike the other incidents that

were mentioned in Magí Sunyer's summary: they all lost their relevance in current imaginations of Catalan history. As consequence, the *Compromis de Caspe* testifies to a presumed long-lasting desire of Castile to dominate Catalonia. In a 1978 article, *Catalonia: Subordinated Nation*, Catalan journalist Felix Cucurull stated:

> Since the eighth century, Catalonia appears as a community, clearly distinguishable from others, as an ethnos and as a nation: And step by step it started to organize itself politically. It creates its own state, […]. This powerful and democratic Catalonia, that creates itself assemblies of the estates, […], that legislated for Athens, […]. Since the marriage of Fernando and Isabella, even since the Compromis de Caspe, the Castile aristocracy's will to dominate became evident.[37]

The seeming foreignness of the Trastàmara dynasty and other unfortunate incidents over the decades and centuries may well have facilitated the perception of the *Compromis de Caspe* as responsible for Catalonia's decline, but the country's glory as a maritime nation and its expansion throughout the Mediterranean were far from over. However, the presumed 'loss of their own dynasty that originated from the ninth century' caused by the death of Martí I was elevated to the status of a national catastrophe.[38]

Catalonia's Medieval Counts and Kings and the Effects of Europeanization and Globalization

This variety of examples has proved the narrative continuity of the nineteenth-century re-conceptualization of the history of several members of the medieval *Casal de Barcelona* until present times. But it is obvious that the world, in which the nineteenth-century concept of the nation state emerged, has changed quite fundamentally. Regarding the formation of the European Union as a supranational actor and the effects of the different processes of globalization on the fields of culture, economy and technology, European societies are facing quite different challenges today than they did in the nineteenth century. The equation of territorial and normative identities, which is important in creating a sense of belonging amongst members of a nation state, is problematic today. Due to global migration flows, transnational and transcultural identities emerge; and formerly clearly defined normative cultures interweave.[39]

Taking into account Valentin Groebner's argument that reconstructions of the medieval past always inform about collective desires and obsessions of the times they describe, this would imply that these substantial life changes should also affect narratives about the medieval counts of Barcelona and kings of Aragon. The example of the twentieth-century re-conceptualization of the history of Jaume I to make him appear as the progenitor of Catalan parliamentarianism provides a first hint that Valentin Groebner was correct with regard to contemporary times. And, analysing actual narratives of medieval counts and kings, it turns out that the concepts of Europeanization and globalization really do leave traces.

Guifré el Pelòs and Borrell II Testify to Catalonia's European Identity

The effect that Europeanization has on the representations of Catalonia's medieval history can be perceived 'between the lines'; it is the re-conceptualization of Catalonia's history inside a European framework. At the end of 1985, Jordi Pujol held a televised speech on the occasion of Spain's impending entry into the European Community. Catalan newspaper *Avui* reported on this speech using the headline *It's the Catalans who can enter the EC with the most self-confidence*: 'And finally, there's a vicinity to Europe's ideas and conduct. In this regard, Jordi Pujol reminded us that the Catalans always wanted to be Europeans. "Since Charlemagne, the founder of the March of Spain 1200 years ago, and since Count Guifré, the founder of the Catalan nation."'[40] Due to Jordi Pujol, the time of the supposed birth of the Catalan nation proves Catalonia's putatively 'natural' European character. Charlemagne and Guifré el Pelòs testify to Catalonia's belonging to a modern Europe. But the permanent exhibition of the MHC also highlights that Catalonia has belonged to Europe since the times of Guifré el Pelòs and Borrell II. The section that is entirely dedicated to their history is entitled *Europe's Frontier* while the explanatory text emphasizes: 'The development of the Carolingian Empire assigns the step from the Europe of Late Antiquity to the Europe of the Middle Ages. It's at the margins of this Empire where the future Catalonia initiates its construction at the gates of the Islamic world.'[41] This text presents future Catalonia as part of Europe, but on the fringes, which also implies that everything beyond Catalonia's borders does not belong to Europe anymore. In fact, this way of presenting Catalonia's medieval history inside a European framework is reflecting Jordi Pujol's political conviction that

Catalonia needs to be a 'bridge' between Europe and Spain, a negotiator of European values on the Iberian Peninsula.

Jaume I: The Tolerant King that Knew How to Rule a Diverse Society

The processes of globalization also affected the image of the medieval members of the *Casal de Barcelona*. For example, in 2008, on the occasion of the celebration of the 800th birthday of Jaume I in Poblet monastery, the abbot Josep Alegre highlighted his ability to 'adapt the characteristics of each of his realms, to promote the respect for the identity of the countries that together formed the Crown of Aragon and to invite them to preserve their own language and tradition, to avoid the loss of their roots'.[42] Jaume I was still being presented as one of the most important persons in Catalonia's history, but it was the assumption that he supposedly ruled successfully over a heterogeneous people that was more important than 'only' being the initiator of Catalonia's national glory. He has been attributed with the ability of knowing how to deal with diversity—a capacity that was not very important in nineteenth-century historiography when the perception of the nation state as a united and powerful entity was the main objective of historical narratives. But at the beginning of the twenty-first century, when almost 30 nation states have to deal with their diversity to agree on a common strategy in developing the European Union, or, on the level of Spanish politics, the representatives of the different autonomous regions need to find a way to manage their respective interests, this skill is the key to success.

And indeed, Catalan politicians also made other references to Jaume I at the beginning of the twenty-first century which reached far beyond the conceptual limits of a presumed Catalan nation. For example, in 2002, the later socialist prime minister of Catalonia, Pasqual Maragall presented his idea to establish a 'eurorégión del Pirineo' including the actual French and Spanish regions whose territories formed the Crown of Aragon in medieval times. The necessity to establish this 'eurorégión' was derived from the challenges of the globalized world, as an article summarized in 2008:

> The complexity of the world forces us to define what we have in common and what differentiates us from each other, to achieve our goals that are supposed to give benefits to all of us, but also to avoid that diversity becomes an obstacle. The Balearic Isles, Valencia, Aragon and Catalonia share, beyond

the common history, common interests for the future […]. Anniversaries like this one of King Jaume I shall help us to grade differences.'[43]

But the legitimization was derived from medieval times: it was King Jaume I who was supposed to testify with his personal history for this concept to combine regional structures to face the challenges of globalization. On various occasions, Pasqual Maragall explained that 'the idea of the euroregión was a child of this monarch who was born in Montpellier, raised in Aragon, became Count of Barcelona and conqueror of the Balearic Isles and Valencia'.[44] Following this argument, an intercultural upbringing—the capacity to look beyond the limits of one's own culture and nation—helps best to cope with the challenges of the modern world.

Reflecting Modern Times by Telling Medieval Histories

It is obvious that history—and especially medieval history—is today still an enormously important element of Catalonia's nationalist self-perception. Because of the equation of the medieval Catalan counties with a presumed Catalan nation, the counts of Barcelona and the kings of the Crown of Aragon and their political actions play a major role in the imagination of Catalonia's national history.

To some extent, traditional historiographical narratives created in the nineteenth century or even earlier are used, but in a modified way and adapted to contemporary times. What makes these re-conceptualizations of medieval history so important is their omnipresence in public. They can be found in textbooks, historical exhibitions and political debates, but also in historical novels. Therefore, these historical narrations have a heavy influence on the Catalans' general knowledge about history, and in consequence, also on their collective self-perception. But how is it possible that still today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, these nineteenth-century re-conceptualizations of history have so much influence on people's minds? In reference to this phenomenon, German sociologist Eugen Buss argues that in Western societies a certain desire can arise to accentuate commonalities in today's assumed confusingly globalized world, to re-establish a 'traditional order' of how the world should be by emphasizing the importance of small, manageable entities of collective references—just as was the case in the nineteenth century when Western societies faced the consequences of industrialization and social individualization.[45]

It is an attempt to historicize the present-day or future characteristics of a territorially defined community by 'telling' medieval history. But, does this presentation of a putative national medieval past with the help of the dynasty of the *Casal de Barcelona* have to be considered as just another attempt to create—or maintain—a sort of collective national identity as was the case in the nineteenth century?

Indeed, there is an obvious persistence of the normative and territorially linked—national—re-conceptualizations of the histories of the medieval counts and kings. Also, these re-conceptualizations are used to historicize and to legitimize Catalonia's present-day nationalist politics. But nevertheless, they still differ from their nineteenth-century predecessors. Nowadays, the normative narratives that emphasize Catalonia's assumed national glory—independence, freedom, democracy and power—are combined with other identitarian elements impressed by the current flows of migration and globalization; historicizing cultural and ethnic pluralism within today's collective identity constructions of European receiving societies aims to reduce the feeling of otherness on both the migrant's and the receiving society's sides.

Due to the current processes of globalization, European societies are becoming more and more diverse. One of the main goals of current re-conceptualizations of the histories of Guifré el Pelòs and Jaume I is to prove that cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity has been a central element of Catalan civilization for centuries. The key message that was supposed to be transmitted by these inherent narrative substructures, is that the current processes of Europeanization and globalization are nothing to fear. There have always been diverse multicultural societies; we are even children of their heritage. Global migration and the exchange of knowledge and expertise will help us to cope with the challenges of globalization, as it did in our common European and national past. Seen from this perspective, Valentin Groebner may have been right saying that current reconstructions of the medieval past sometimes give us more information about present times and their obsessions and desires than it does about the Middle Ages itself.

Notes

1. This chapter is based on a case study on the image of medieval history in Catalan mass-media between 1975 and 2010 which appears in Daniel Wimmer (2016), *Mit dem Mittelalter die Gegenwart*

erzählen. Eine ferne Vergangenheit als Vermittlungsinstanz in Weltentwürfen des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts, Hamburg.

2. Valentin Groebner (2008), *Das Mittelalter hört nicht auf*, München, 126.

3. Magí Sunyer (2006), *Els Mites Nacionals Catalans*, Vic.

4. This structure is not limited to the Catalan imagination of national history: Michail Bojcov (2007), 'Zaubermärchen, Mythos und symbolische Figuren im sowjetischen und postsowjetischen historischen Metanarrativ', in: Frank Rexroth (ed.), *Meistererzählungen vom Mittelalter: Epochenimaginationen und Verlaufsmuster in der Praxis mediävistischer Disziplinen*, München, 87–106; Peter Štih (2004), 'Slowenische Geschichtsmythen und Feindbilder', *Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereins der Steiermark* 95, 59–68.

5. Carme Ortoll, Agustí Alcoberro (1997), *A prop. Medi Social i Cultural. Cicle Superior. Educació Primària*, Barcelona, 64.

6. The history of Count Arnau which uses the Catalan county Ripollès to title a marketing brochure: 'Centre d'Interpretació del Mite del Comte Arnau', published by Ripollès county.

7. The history of Count Ramón Berenguer II. In 1982 there was an official commemoration on the occasion of the 900th anniversary of his death: 'Brillant commemoració de la mort de Ramon Berenguer II', *Avui*, 4 December 1982, 10; the history of Saint George, the patron saint of Catalonia, the permanent exhibition of the Museu d'Història de Catalunya dedicated a section to him; more examples are compiled by Magí Sunyer: Sunyer (2006).

8. For example the mythical stories on Otger Catalo and the nine barons, Francesc de Vinatea, Lampègia and the family of Count Ermengol d'Urgell, Sunyer (2006).

9. Term adapted from the studies of Nora Berend to describe those long-lasting narrative elements that are results of continuous re-conceptualizations: Nora Berend (2012), 'The Medieval Origins of Modern Nationalism? Stephen of Hungary and El Cid of Spain', Leidulf Melve; Sigbjørn Sønnesyn (eds.), *The Creation of Medieval Northern Europe. Christianisation, Social Transformations, and Historiography. Essays in Honor of Sverre Bagge*, Oslo, 219–45).

10. Margarita García Sebastián, Cristina Gatell Arimont (2007), *Terra 5. Social i Cultural, Barcelona*, 122.

11. Miquel Coll i Alentorn (1993), *Llegendari*, Barcelona; Nikolas Jaspert (2003), 'Karolingische Legitimation und Karlsverehrung

in Katalonien', Klaus Herbers (ed.), *Jacobus und Karl der Große. Von Einhards Karlsvita zum Pseudo-Turpin*, Tübingen, 121–60.

12. *La Vanguardia*, 10 September 1982, 19; *El Periódico de Catalunya*, 10 September 1982, 13; *Avui*, 10 September 1982, 12.

13. Xavier Gomez Cacho, Jaume Reula Biescas (2008), *Ciències Socials. Primer Cicle d'Educació Secundària Obligatòria 2*, Barcelona, 128.

14. Term used in reference to the Spanish and Catalan *nacionalista* describing a person who adheres to the political idea of Catalan nationalism. For further information about the history of Catalan Nationalism, please see: Albert Balcells (2004), *Breve Historia del Nacionalismo Catalán*, Madrid; 243–74, which gives an overview of the different varieties of Catalan nationalist political parties. Jordi Pujol and his Catalan Nationalist electoral alliance, Convergència i Unió (CiU), stood for a moderate nationalism based on centre social liberalism. In recent years, Catalan independence has become more important and has led to a separation of CiU into a secessionist and liberal CDC (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya), and a federalist and Christian democrat UDC (Unió Democràtica de Catalunya).

15. 'Reclamem autonomia de debó, perquè som una nació', *Avui*, 3 August 1982, 8.

16. 'Pujol inauguró la tumba de Guifré', *La Vanguardia*, 12 September 1982, 10.

17. 'Catalunya 1000 anys', *El Periódico de Catalunya*, 11 September 1988, 8–9.

18. The whole speech was printed in: *Avui*, 23 April 1988, 11.

19. 'Pujol asegura que Guifré el Pelòs 'nos anima a ir más allà' desde su tumba', *La Vanguardia*, 12 August 1997, 10.

20. 'Mas crida a un triomf rotund de CiU davant 14000 persones', *Avui*, 30 October 2006, 8; 'Mas promete mejorar como 'president' el legado de Pujol', *Periódico de Catalunya*, 30 October 2006, 3; 'La promesa de Ripoll', *Avui*, 31 October 2006, 8; 'Compromiso solemne de Mas con la 'patria catalana' en Ripoll', *Periódico de Catalunya*, 31 October 2006, 8.

21. Margartia Garcia Sebastián, Cristina Gatell Arimont, Montserrat Llorens Serrano, Rosa Ortega Canadell, Joan Roig Obiol (1997), *Mediterrània 4. Ciències Socials. Educació Secundària Primer Cicle*, Barcelona, 18.

22. Magí Sunyer regrouped these narratives into myths of abundance and imperial myths: Sunyer (2006), 119–84.
23. Antonio Ramos (1983), *Societat 5. EGB Cicle Mitjà*, Barcelona, 107.
24. Sunyer (2006), 133; José Enrique Ruiz-Domènec (2011), *Catalunya, Espanya. Acords i Desacords*, Barcelona 153.
25. *La Mar Nostra*, information panel, *Museu d'Història de Catalunya*, Barcelona.
26. Cristófol Trepat, Roser Masgrau (2000), *Història de Catalunya. Batxillerat*, Barcelona, 88.
27. Ruiz-Domènec (2011), 119.
28. *L'hegemonia catalana a la Mediterrània*, information panel, *Museu d'Història de Catalunya*, Barcelona.
29. Ildefonso Falcones (2006), *La Catedral del Mar*, Barcelona, 72.
30. Anna Grau (1999), *Coneixement del Medi Social i Cultural. Primària 5*, Barcelona, 111.
31. Caterina Valriu (2001), 'El cicle llegendari del rei Jaume I: 'La primera proesa del rei en Jaume', llegenda iniciàtica del recull d'Alcover', *Ronda* 47, 132–39; Caterina Valriu (2005), 'La figura mitica del heroi: el cicle llegendari del rei en Jaume', *Revista d'Etnologia de Catalunya* 27, 114–25.
32. Trepat, Masgrau (2000), 90.
33. Jocelyn Hilgarth (1987), *The Spanish Kingdoms 1250–1516*, vol. 2: *1410–1516. Castilian Hegemony*, Oxford, 229–38; Klaus Herbers (2006), Geschichte Spaniens im Mittelalter. Vom Westgotenreich bis zum Ende des 15.Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart, 246–9
34. Ruiz-Domènec (2011), 148.
35. Sunyer (2006), 185.
36. Eulalia Duran (2004), 'La funció de les llegendes en la historiografia', *Història i llegenda en el Renaixement* (=*Estudi General* 23–24), 63–79.
37. 'Catalunya, nació sotmesa', *Avui*, 13 March 1978, 3.
38. Jaume Sobrequés i Callico (2008), *Història de Catalunya*, Barcelona, 42.
39. Wolfgang Welsch (1998), 'Transkulturalität. Zwischen Globalisierung und Partikularisierung', Paul Drechsel (ed.), *Interkulturalität—Grundprobleme der Kulturbegegnung*, Mainz, 45–72.
40. 'Pujol: ,Qui amb més confiança pot entrar a Europa són els catalans'', *Avui*, 31 December 1985, 3.

41. *Frontera d'Europa*, information panel, *Museu d'Història de Catalunya*, Barcelona.
42. 'El rei Jaume I', *La Vanguardia*, 31 March 2008, 20.
43. 'El rei Jaume I', *La Vanguardia*, 31 March 2008, 20.
44. 'Montilla reivindica Jaume I', *La Vanguardia*, 18 March 2008, 2.
45. Eugen Buss (2002), *Regionale Identitätsbildung. Zwischen globaler Dynamik, fortschreitender Europäisierung und regionaler Gegenbewegung. Die Bedeutung für Westfalen*, Münster.

'Para-Royalty' Between Nationalism and Transnationalism: Russian Images of Personal Rule

Eva Marlene Hausteiner

INTRODUCTION: MONARCHS WITHOUT MONARCHY?

One century after the Russian Revolution and the execution of Nicholas II and his heirs, the definite end of monarchy in Russia seems undisputed. And yet, among both non-expert journalists and knowledgeable commentators, it has become highly popular to call President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin the country's 'new tsar', 'last tsar', or simply 'Putin the Terrible'. References to the trope of Putin as monarch and, ultimately, Oriental despot, are apparently irresistible.[1] But how can there be a monarch in a polity that is not a monarchy—are these framings of Putin's position merely polemical and without any analytical value to Russia's political situation? And how can a political system frequently described as an 'imitated democracy'[2]—an authoritarian state that emphasizes a democratic surface—feature an openly monarch-like leader figure? This chapter tries

E.M. Hausteiner (✉)
Institut für Politische Wissenschaft und Soziologie, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

to reframe the observation of a new tsarism in Russia, arguing that the figure of the current president functions as an equivalent of a monarchical position in a non-monarchical polity. At the same time, it will show that this form of what will be tentatively called 'para-royalty' is a transnational and imperial phenomenon.[3] The current political situation in Russia and especially the prevalent leader cult conspicuously reflect the ambivalence and connections between *de jure* democracy, *de facto* oligarchic authoritarianism, and the public projection of one-person rule. The Russian case will thus serve as a testing ground for transferring and adapting useful aspects of the concept of monarchy to an age of post-monarchical hybrid regimes.

The Concept of 'Para-Royalty'

Describing the current political condition of the Russian Federation has been an on-going conceptual challenge since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. How can a regime be categorized that seems to be in constant flux? What concepts can plausibly integrate the diverse characteristics of Russia's political, geopolitical, social, and economic situation? How significant are continuities and breaks from previous phases of Russian and Eurasian history?

In the course of the past 25 years, many observers have attempted to devise new descriptive formulas for Russia's regime type. Some have framed the political development of the country (as well as its neighbours) after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a more or less teleological, albeit slow, transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy; but around the turn of the millennium and in the face of Russia's increasing deviation from this course, the binary narrative of authoritarian versus liberal democratic polities proved unsatisfactory.[4] Scholars like Daniel Treisman and Lilia Shevtsova reverted to speaking of a 'hybrid' regime[5]—a term convincingly integrating elements both authoritarian and democratic, but also rather non-definitive and relying on ideas of irregularity. Other commentators, trying to acknowledge the solidly continuing process towards authoritarianism, have seen Putin's Russia as an oligarchic, neo-patrimonial, or plebiscitarian patrimonial system.[6]

Integrative concepts such as hybrid rule and patrimonialism, which try to describe an entire system, have at least two weaknesses. First, as Dmitri Shlapentokh has shown, integrative approaches are largely unable to address the contradictions between multiple social, political, and economic dimensions that are characteristic of a specific constellation.[7] Moreover, although they are able to—as in the case of 'neo-patrimonialism'—capture

the tension between institutional arrangement and factual (formal as well as informal) power relations, they are less sensitive towards performative and representational aspects, and thus to the relationship between symbols and performances of power and underlying power relations.

The concept central for this chapter—'para-royalty'—is certainly no contender for an exhaustive description of the Russian constellation; however, it nonetheless avoids fallacies highlighted by Shlapentokh. Integrative approaches tend to marginalize or ignore contradictory elements, while para-royalty tries to highlight the contradictions between symbolic surface and institutional framework.[8] The concept's analytical strengths therefore are concerned precisely with the performative and representative dimension of power. The historian Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger's observation that constitutional and political histories are intimately tied to a history of rituals and symbolic forms is not only true for premodern polities.[9] Understanding and contextualizing commonly used symbolic resources can be useful in order to identify both the distinguishing and the typical features of complex political constellations.

What, then, are the implications of modes of political representation in hybrid or patrimonial regimes such as the Russian federation? While representative and performative practices in premodern monarchies, authoritarian regimes, and democracies have been the subject of much theoretical reflection and empirical research,[10] this has been much less the case for regimes with both authoritarian and democratic elements such as Russia. At first glance, the role of ritual and symbolic practices seems to be markedly less pronounced in the modern, democratic context of a written constitution.[11] However, the fact that the Russian ruling elite is in various ways defying the written constitution, in favour of informal ruling techniques masked (or revealed) by symbolic practices, suggests that these practices carry significant weight. Seeing that Russia is not a constitutional democracy, an analysis of the regime has to take into account non-constitutional factors—and specifically the symbolic relationship between president, people, and other sources of legitimation.

A description of leader-centred practices as allusions to monarchical constellations offers one possible entry point for describing the connection between power relations and symbolic practices in contemporary hybrid regimes. In the following section, two key elements of the concept of para-royalty will be further explored and examined for their analytical value by applying them to the case of Putin's leadership cult in its various symbolic dimensions.[12] These are (1) references to a web of sources of legitimacy, instead of a central focus on popular sovereignty, resulting in

a complex representational relation of the ruler to the country's population,[13] and (2) a particular emphasis on dynastic and divine legitimacy. Para-royalty is, then, a functional equivalent to the monarch's leader figure in a non-monarchical polity. While Vladimir Putin is no king or tsar in a strictly nominal or institutional understanding, it can be argued that he fulfils symbolic functions of a royal figure in a hybrid regime, and that his status as a para-royal leader is intimately tied to Russia's imperial self-perception, with all its transnational repercussions.

PUTIN AND PARA-ROYALTY: PATTERNS OF PERFORMATIVITY IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

Recent analyses of the political situation in Russia have highlighted some ideological continuities between different stages of Russia's modern history—especially regarding the continuation of foreign policy aspirations from the Russian empire to current expansionist tendencies in the Russian Federation. Imperial expansionism and its sources of legitimation have been shown to follow continuing traditions and even path dependencies, in that pre-existing factors such as Russia's former geographical expanse seem to determine, if not necessitate, more recent political dynamics. The institution of monarchy, by contrast, has so far been frequently considered a phenomenon of the distant past. Russian monarchy from the early Rus' to the Russian Revolution has been the focus of rich scholarly work for decades, analysing a variety of dimensions from political ideology and ceremonials to dynastic dynamics.[14] But Tsarist royalty is deemed to have been fully supplanted by other forms of electoral authoritarian and autocratic rule or, in more lenient interpretations, by a super-presidentialism pushing the constitution to the edge of its democratic design.[15] Even though, in this view, there are ideological continuities in Russian history, the country's institutional history has undergone drastic transformations.

Within this descriptive framework of authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin is to many observers a political figure of tremendous interest, fraught with contradictions and enigma. Is he a solitary leader, or is he dependent on the larger circle of the ruling elite he is surrounded by? How resilient is his popular approval,[16] and what are its roots? Is popular approval even constitutive to Putin's political status, or is it only an element of imitated democracy—a façade, generated through media manipulation, that barely conceals the president's autocratic attitude? These questions are further

complicated by a number of factors: the inscrutable power structure inside the Kremlin (and its connections to the economic sector), the somewhat erratic ideological messages emanating from the power centre, and the appearance that Putin's popular image is both imposed from 'above' and shared from 'below'.

What is openly visible, meanwhile, is the symbolic surface of Putin's popular image: the carefully staged and (by some) enthusiastically shared and perpetuated cult of the president as Russia's leader. The symbolic qualities of this 'cult' are manifold, or at times even polysemic—but the resulting image is unequivocally one of Putin as the paramount political figure in the country.

In previous publications on the practices and products of these image campaigns, especially the mass-cultural depictions of Putin as a sober and knowledgeable technocrat as well as a hyper-masculine omnipotent figure—and their affirmation among his followers in the population—have been highlighted.[17] Popular depictions have taken a number of forms and shapes. On the one hand, there are carefully staged official portraits, photo-ops and video clips featuring the president in various active situations—animal or treasure hunting, horseback-riding, child-kissing,[18] body-building and judo-fighting.[19] In many respects, these images—despite their strange exaggeration and occasional crassness—bear a distinct resemblance to leaders' portraits from other democratic and especially presidential contexts, be they contemporary France, Italy, or the United States.[20] On the other hand, the official visualizations have had, practically since Putin's rise to power in 2000, a popular-driven counterpart more clearly deviating from performative usages in Western liberal democracies. Unofficial depictions of Putin in popular culture and local contexts tend to carry the praise of the president to the extremes of sacredness and royalty. Two examples illustrate this. In 2015, the Cossack community in Putin's hometown of St Petersburg funded the design and execution, by sculptor Pavel Grezhnikov, of a bust unequivocally depicting the president as a Roman emperor, possibly Augustus.[21] The sculpture alludes to a non-democratic, monarchic repertoire of political iconography. The genre of a heroic bust and the emperor's posture and clothes, complete with the Russian state seal in lieu of, for example, the imperial breastplate ornaments of the statue of Augustus of Primaporta, evoke anti-democratic and military traditions of premodern one-person rule. In addition, Putin receives, on a regular basis, gifts and tokens of feudal submission. In 2002, on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday, jewellers

from the Ural region crafted in Putin's honour a replica of the *Shapka Monomakha*, the Tsarist equivalent to the royal crown, which had to be insured for USD 10 million[22] July Cassiday and Emily Johnson are correct in highlighting the capitalist, user culture driven character of 'Putinism' that has brought about a large supply of only partially Kremlin-controlled, but often consumer-generated Putin-themed merchandise and artwork— setting it apart from the more monolithic and less polysemic leader cult of Stalinism.[23] A core message of the different products remains, however, unaffected, and distinguishes it from political cultural products in most democratic contexts: the emphasis on Putin as the single most important political figure in the Russian Federation, with a position apparently comparable to that of a king.

Aside from official and unofficial pictures and sculptures glorifying the president, his public image encompasses very frequent media appearances. In addition to Putin's omnipresence in Russian newspapers and, more importantly, on public television, a number of specific formats are interesting here. The most important, in terms of public impact and regularity, may be the *Direct Line*—an annual live broadcast established in 2001 during which Putin answers questions from citizens from various Russian regions. Far from being a forum for open critique and debate, the broadcast serves the 'construction of a national space'[24] through an emphasis on the centrality of the presidential figure in a gigantic country. Putin not only replies to praise and demands from various corners of the Russian expanse, but he does so in the manner of a benevolent despot. He consistently promises to take care of problems of corruption or mismanagement 'himself', thus granting favours to humble suppliants. This elevated role is, apparently, not contingent on the office of president, but solely on the figure of Putin. In the years 2008 through 2011, Putin conducted the programme as prime minister. He thus does not appear to represent popular interests in a complicated and contested political process, but as a distant though potent personal ruler, and rewarding whoever manages to 'get through' to him with gracious favours. In the broadcast ritual of *Direct Line* (which is getting longer and more devotional each year), Putin appears consistently as a benevolent ruler with all the nation's might in his hands, regardless of scarce resources or legal and procedural restrictions.

Another noteworthy aspect in Putin's image in the mass-media is his symbolic proximity with the Russian Orthodox Church. In contrast with his predecessors—and, of course, with past Soviet leaders—Putin has fostered close relations with Orthodox leaders and institutions. This

is true with regard to political co-operation, for example in view of the punishment of unwelcome opposition as in the many cases of 'hooliganism' or the 'violation of religious feelings'. But the co-operation is also reflected on a performative level: through frequent public appearances with Patriarch Kirill, Putin's personal comments on his Christian beliefs (one of his very rare remarks on his private persona is an admission of having been secretly baptized as a child[25]) and the emphasis on the role of the Church for Russia's identity. In contrast to Boris Yeltsin's inauguration, Putin's accession was a sacralized event with Patriarch Aleksi II in an active role (Fig. 16.1).[26]

It has since become customary for events of national importance to be celebrated in a religious setting, with the central office holders present. More importantly, the president repeatedly stresses the importance of religious faith and institutions for Russia, for instance in 2015 on the occasion of the millennial anniversary of the death of Vladimir, the first Christianized ruler of the Rus': 'The Christianization of the Rus' lay the foundation for a united Russian nation.'[27] Putin and the patriarchs Aleksi II and currently Kirill explicitly share the idea of a spiritual unity of church and state in Russia, in the service of the country's civilizational

Fig. 16.1 Vladimir Putin's inauguration (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_inauguration_7_May_2012-25.jpeg)

autonomy,[28] and the president continues to praise the Church's ongoing—not just historical—patriotic contribution: As recently as in 2015, he repeatedly emphasized his gratitude for 'strengthening the unity of the Russian people'[29] and for 'raising the young generation in a spirit of patriotism and civic duty'.[30] This stands in contrast with the government's policies since the fall of the Soviet Union—fostering a religious pluralism and mostly upholding the separation between Church and state.[31] By contrast, on a performative level, Putin highlights not just his personal affinity to the Russian Orthodox Church, but its essential role for the Russian state. Patriarch Kirill on his part reciprocates on a regular basis, for example calling Putin's political reign a 'miracle of god',[32] thus supporting Putin's claim to divine legitimation.

These symbolic practices—the official and unofficial depiction of Putin as the nation's pre-eminent heroic figure with a benevolent but strong position towards the population and an intimate relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church—are arguably reminiscent, on a surface level, of royal and specifically Tsarist symbolism and ritual. These superficial resemblances, visuals, and ceremonials are likely what inspired the initially mentioned depictions of Putin as Russia's 'new tsar' in Western media. He is upholding the appearance of holding court, granting favours, dictating *ukazy*—a presidential decree, with roots in the Tsarist past—and occasionally influencing the validity of the law.[33] The resemblances, however, are more profound. What Putin is evoking is not only the general symbolic language of royalty, but more specifically the symbolism of legitimation. This repertoire evokes—as Richard Wortman and Ronald Suny have shown for Russia's monarchic tradition—a complicated web of legitimation between state, empire, ruler, population (organically understood as *narod*), and God. This web finds a condensed expression in the idea of *samoderzhavie* as a 'fusion of absolute monarch and imperial state',[34] forming, together with the tenets of *pravoslavie* (orthodoxy) and *narodnost'* (popularity) a triangle of legitimation. If monarchy is, in Wortman's words, understood not as a succession of individual royal rulers, but as an 'ongoing institution and political culture',[35] Putin's strategy of para-royal performative acts, emphasizing his role as loved by the people, sanctioned by the church and powerful in his reign, can be interpreted as an allusion to the allegedly legitimate forms of personal rule—and as a continuation of the political culture of monarchy.

While divine legitimation, popular acclamation, and the emphasis on personal power and strength can thus be plausibly seen as evoking

royal patterns, one could object that they are simply tools of 'popular autocracy'.[36] There is, however, one more performative feature alluding to royalism that sets Putinism apart from an image of mere autocracy. A truly unique characteristic of monarchical rule—especially in contrast with other types of personal rule—is a mode of succession regulated through authorization instead of contestation. The dynastic and hereditary element of monarchy, with its far-reaching regime implications, comes with a distinct idea of symbolic legitimation. The royal ruler is seen in a direct line of authorized succession with his predecessors. This transfer of power is an essential source of monarchic legitimation, much more so than for example the defeat of potential adversaries. The dynastic mode of authorized succession exempts the monarch from political contestation and competition. Here lies the inherently anti-democratic core of hereditary rule: the emphasis on the pre-selection (hereditary or through authoritative selection) of the sole leading figure of the polity renders public approval a merely stabilizing or even ornamental feature, but not a locus of sovereignty.

To be sure, in the modern Russian Federation—as in the Soviet Union— there has never existed a hereditary rule of succession; formally, all three presidents have been (re-)elected according to the regulations of the democratic constitution of 1993. Despite this, however, the motif of direct and personally authorized succession plays a significant role in Putin's public perception. In spite of the contrast in public images between Putin and Yeltsin, the nomination by the predecessor (carefully initiated through Putin's prime ministry as a 'test phase') has been perceived as an important source of the president's authorization—an act many had expected to repeat itself when Putin named Medvedev as his successor, with the election as the mere formality of anointment of the 'heir' carefully selected from a flock of contenders, as a decade earlier.[37] In the public communication of the Kremlin's leader selection, the location of sovereignty becomes evident: while the president graciously submits himself to periodic rituals of acclamation—during elections as well as during his public questioning rituals like *Direct Line*—it is he who makes the central decisions. Putin decides on the duration of his reign, on the amendment of the official constitution in order to fit his needs, and, in the case of Medvedev, on the appropriate (if only provisional) heir to power. Conversely, the current—and seemingly indiscriminate—tendency to integrate or even 'recycle'[38] Tsarist and Soviet symbolism into the state symbols—'rebuilding a world of familiar symbols'[39]—and to rehabilitate leading (and contrasting)

figures from problematic chapters of Russian history, from the Romanovs and Pyotr Stolypin to Stalin himself,[40] might be understood less as a glowing endorsement of the specific personae, but as an attempt to derive legitimacy from tradition. Russian history appears, in the light of a succession of strong leaders, as a chain of legitimation largely unbroken—regardless of geopolitical turmoil and formal shifts in the political regime.

In sum, diagnoses of Russia as an 'imitated democracy' are only partially accurate, in that they fail to consider important elements of Russia's political façade. While some democratic procedures such as elections are indeed continuously—though often faultily—employed, certain political practices, rituals, and symbols alluding to royal rule are openly embraced. Not even the democratic façade, then, is consistently upheld. In public discourse, the Russian leader successfully claims the position of an equivalent to the monarch by highlighting his authorization through multiple sources of legitimation—God, public acclamation by 'the people', and the quasi-hereditary perpetuity of lines of autocratic tradition. Vladimir Putin thus has, in his 16 years of rule, established an image that makes casual Western phrasings of a 'Tsar Putin' ring true at a very fundamental level. Even though the formal design of the Russian Federation is largely democratic, and even though the political power structure might be oligarchic, patrimonial or authoritarian, on the surface the Russian presidency has para-royal features, with Putin as its sovereign-seeming monarch.

A TSAR OF KINGS: IMPERIAL AND TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF RUSSIAN PARA-ROYALTY

At first glance then, para-royalty appears to be a straightforward strategy of defending authoritarianism in the normative environment of democracy by referencing ideas of strong 'national' leadership. However, the reincarnation of Russian royalty in the figure of Vladimir Putin is more complicated than the narrative of a strong connection between a unified, perpetual Russian nation and its sovereign ruler might suggest. If Putin's performative strategy relies on symbolic traditions of royalty, it can hardly be understood without considering the pronouncedly 'transnational' character of Russian monarchy and of its contemporary reincarnations.

The strong transnational dimension to Russian monarchy and to contemporary para-royal elements is threefold. First, the symbolic repertoire of Russian monarchy and para-royalty relies on transnational sources. If

Richard Wortman speaks of the 'foreign sources of [royal] authority', he specifically means the fact that tsars, from early tsarism to Nicholas II, derived their public image from Viking, Roman, Byzantine, and Western repertoires alike.[41] The symbolic repertoire of Russian monarchs has for centuries been a patchwork of transnational borrowings, and the same is arguably true for the continuation of para-royal political culture in the current presidency. Putin perpetuates the Russian concept of the 'third Rome'[42] and plays with the symbolic language of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russian rulers, but he also borrows from contemporary transnational sources, for example media strategies of Western presidents.

Second, the audience of the performative strategy of para-royalty is not, in a narrow sense, national. It would be too simplistic to regard the relationship between the para-royal figure and the intended audience as a national dynamic between a ruler addressing a prefigured nation and a nation acknowledging the ruler's authority. Historically, Russia has never—neither in Tsarist times nor during the Soviet Union—constituted a nation in any clearly, let alone ethnically, delineated sense of the word. Instead of constituting a firmly established imagined community with a shared and congruent identity, its many ethnic and linguistic groups were only vaguely united by centripetal hierarchical power structures,[43] with unifying ideologies of the late nineteenth century such as 'Russification'[44] or 'official nationality' producing mixed results at best. Even though, by comparison, the contemporary Russian Federation more closely resembles a clearly defined multinational state, the Russian power centre still governs a complex and decentralized space and population. Accordingly, the audience of Putin's para-royal performances is more heterogeneous than they would be in an ideal, typical, nation state scenario. The president has largely moved away from addressing the diversity of the population on Russian territory—he has rather shifted to targeting ethnic 'Russian' (*russkiy*, in contrast to *rossiysky*, that is Russian by nationality) populations, both within the country and beyond the borders of the Russian Federation.[45] The focus of Russian foreign policy and public diplomacy has increasingly become the *Russkiy Mir'* (Russian World), as a cultural foundation, instituted by Putin's *ukaz* in 2007 and promoting Russian soft power in the near abroad and beyond.[46] The imperial aspiration of Russian rule, which has been more pronounced since Putin's rise to power, is manifest not only in foreign policy, but equally in the target audience for Putin's self-representation as supreme ruler.

Finally, this transnationally extended audience comprises not only the population, but other rulers as well. Russian para-royal symbolic repertoires seem to be partially shared or even emulated by other autocratic leaders in the region. There appear to be not just transnational influences, but a transnational audience of rulers aspiring to an equally para-royal status. For instance Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Republic of Chechnya, has since his accession in 2007 developed a ruling style that, while occasionally invoking popular approval, predominately relies on demonstrations of power and visualizations of autocratic potency.[47] He not only presents himself as a militant for and envoy of (Islamic) faith,[48] but as a glamorous and heroic jack-of-all-trades (doubling, for example, as a movie star and professor of economics).[49] More importantly, he permanently demonstrates his omnipotent position and his arbitrary, though 'benevolent', ruling style towards the population. He publicly practices and defends the coercion and submission of his citizens and at the same time styles himself as the 'father of the nation' with his own dedicated youth organizations, large portraits covering the buildings of Grozny,[50] and enormous holiday celebrations taking place on his birthday.[51] Finally, he derives the authorization to rule not from fair and free elections, but from dynastic inheritance as well as appointment. His father, jihadist mufti and later Chechen president Akhmad Kadyrov, groomed Ramzan to be his successor, and Vladimir Putin had him pass the customary test for becoming the republic's leader by naming him prime minister before installing him as president by decree.[52]

Another exemplar of a long-term autocracy veiling itself in pseudo-democratic and para-royal elements is Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Russia's neighbouring country Kazakhstan and after the death of Turkmenistan's 'Turkmenbashi' Niyazov arguably one of the more flamboyant of the region's rulers. Nazarbayev, head of the republic since Soviet times, is—albeit with a more technocratic and less arbitrary-masculinist twist than Kadyrov—styling himself as the father of the country, with his own national holiday, two museums dedicated to his person, and an exemption from presidential term limits under the 'Leader of the Nation Law' of 2010. Like Kadyrov, and perhaps as his role model in this regard, Nazarbayev has invested himself in the project of a glamorous capital to be forever connected with his name. As Marlène Laruelle has shown, this spectacular and long-lasting leadership cult of *Nazarbayevism* is not only nationalist (in both a civic and an ethnic sense), but also intimately connected to transnational legitimation, not least through the President's engagement in the Putin-led Eurasian Union.[53]

Geographically, Putin's realm is thus surrounded by states and countries such as Chechnya, Kazakhstan, but also Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan[54] with symbolic styles similar in core aspects to his own. Can this regionally clustered pattern be solely attributed to a post-Soviet destabilization that has fostered the emergence of 'Oriental despots'?[55] Or is there a transnational effect, a travelling practice of para-royalty at play? The spatial clustering of para-royal performative strategies of authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet region should not be underestimated: the resemblance with monarchical regimes bears insight—if closer attention is paid to the question of what kind of royal figure Putin tries to incarnate and if the long-term patterns of the political culture of Russian monarchy are acknowledged. The figure of the Russian Tsar has never been identical to that of the king of a Westphalian-style nation state: Russian monarchy, as well as its transformation into para-royalty, is deeply imperial in character. If Russian monarchy is *eo ipso* imperial, this, however, does not imply a colonial imperialism of the British model either: the realm of Russian rule has always been continental and contiguous, rendering any clear-cut contrast between metropolis and periphery difficult and up for political contestation.

The recent renaissance of Russian imperial aspiration—precisely in the form of regional assertion and contiguous expansion by means of soft and hard power—finds ideological reflection in many forms in current Russia. The ideological movement of Neo-Eurasianism,[56] the proponents of Novorossiya, and believers in the Doctrine of Orthodox Civilization[57] and Holy Russia[58] propagate the idea of a Russian Federation belonging to a Greater Russia—an imperial argument that is often (if not always) accompanied by invocations of imperial leadership. In his *Manifesto of Eurasianism*, the often-quoted Aleksandr Dugin, self-declared leader of the Neo-Eurasian Movement and member of the high-profile conservative think tank *Izborskyi Klub*, for instance, has formulated the devotion to President Putin as 'radical centrism': 'We are centrists to the extent that the President and the authority act for the sake of the Power, for the sake of the people. And not in a populist and transient way, but in a medium and long-term perspective. Here again we will be for the President fervently, radically, up to the end.'[59] The escalating para-royal representations do not merely coincide with these imperial aspirations: they are also the most recent episode of Russian claims for an 'imperial' leadership integrating larger geographical spaces and many nations. Russian para-royalty thus has to be seen in the long-term context of Russian imperiality.

It is a composite practice of nationalist leadership cult and imperial ideas of 'imperator'-ship with transnational repercussions.

If the tsar's full official title since Peter the Great was 'by the grace of God, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias' and enumerated all of these dozens of 'Russias' by name, this illustrated that the tsar's claim to power rested on a feudal hierarchy of princes, counts, and (originally in the Rus') boyars. The imperiality of this claim to power lay in its boundlessness. The official title phased out with the phrase 'and so forth, and so forth, and so forth', which was even included in the canonization of the title in the constitution of 1906. The Russian monarch's reach went even beyond the many officially incorporated territories and was essentially open-ended. Today, the para-royal analogue to this feudal hierarchy between monarch and his imperial 'lower princes' finds the most clear illustration in the case of Chechnya: Ramzan Kadyrov is actively and publicly emphasizing the fact that he is ruling by the grace of Vladimir Putin. In 2010, he renounced the title of 'president' of Chechnya, stressing that there could be only one president in a country.[60] Kadyrov seems to own a collection of various t-shirts praising the Russian president and proclaimed in an interview that he would give his life for Putin, whose superiority he wholeheartedly recognizes: 'I would die a hundred times for Putin.'[61] On numerous occasions, Ramzan Kadyrov has pledged personal—not political or institutional—allegiance to Vladimir Putin. This public devotion culminated in an 'Oath to the Country and Putin', proclaimed in a sold-out stadium in Grozny, in which he declared himself an infantrist to the President and which ended in the battle call 'Allahu Akbar'.[62] The trifold web of legitimation in which Kadyrov presents himself is constituted by God, People, and Putin.

While Kadyrov is acting like a monarch towards the Chechen population, he is himself acknowledging Putin as the superior royal figure—as a tsar reigning over a far-flung imperial realm the parts of which are administered by smaller kings. If Kadyrov is the 'Chechen Putin',[63] this is true only within a feudal hierarchy of lower vassals, the tsar (not just the king) of whom is Putin himself.

Conclusion

The Russian Federation is no monarchy, but neither is it an 'imitated democracy' in a full sense. On a surface level, the conduct and treatment of the head of state emphatically embraces royal practices, making the

constellation in some respects—with regard to the ruler's symbolism—like a monarchy. Even though this partial, though certainly not systemic resemblance mainly comprises symbolic practices, it bears some insights on the sources of the president's legitimation. With his para-royal style, Putin continues a long-standing political culture of monarchy, performing and activating a repertoire of legitimation—through reference to God, authorized succession, and popular acclamation—that resonates with the Russian audience. And yet, the transnational component of this ruling style—in its sources but more importantly its popular and political audiences—points to a core characteristic of the Russian political framework that is often neglected, especially when domestic and foreign policy are treated separately. Russia continues to be (facilitated by its ruling elite) an imperial polity, in the sense that its imperial past and its current aspirations decisively influence the relationship between politics and population. Russia's imperiality is a decisive factor in domestic politics and domestic political culture. If the fashionable trope of 'Tsar Putin' is thus to unfold its full heuristic potential, it has to take into account its imperial content. Current Russian politics rely not just on royal imagery—with them comes the idea of a Russian claim to power reaching beyond the borders of the country. Even though, then, Putin and the Central Asian autocrats populate a shared symbolic system of para-royal legitimation, the Russian ruler claims for himself a role substantially different from the 'parochial' despotic figures in the imperial periphery, namely that of a sovereign over a vast geographical space transcending national and ethnic borders.

Notes

1. Ben Judah, 'Behind the Scenes in Putin's Court: The Private Habits of a Latter-Day Dictator,' *Newsweek*, 23 July 2014, http://europe.newsweek.com/behind-scenes-putins-court-private-habits-latter-day-dictator-260640, accessed 29 December 2015; Joseph V. Micaleff, 'Putin the Terrible: Understanding Russia's New Tsar', *The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-v-micallef/putin-the-terrible-unders_b_8200544.html, accessed 29 December 2015; Tom Parfitt, 'Vladimir Putin: The Tsar Who Won't Thaw,' 25 July 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/10991116/Vladimir-Putin-the-Tsar-who-wont-thaw.html, accessed 29 December 2015; Kondrad Putzer, 'Putin, The Man Who Would Be Tsar',

World Policy Institute, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/08/05/putin-man-who-would-be-tsar, accessed 29 December 2015; 'The Last Emperor: Why Putin Will Rule Russia for the next Quarter-Century, and What Does That Mean for the West', *Free Online Library*, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+last+emperor%3A+why+Putin+will+rule+Russia+for+the+next...-a0371282819, accessed 4 January 2016.

 2. Lilia Shevtsova (2007), *Russia. Lost in Translation*, Washington et al., 49ff.; Dmitri Furman (2008), 'Imitation Democracies: The Post-Soviet Penumbra', *New Left Review* 54, 29–47.

 3. In the following, I will refer to para-royalty, not para-monarchy, in order to highlight the leader figure as the focal point, instead of making a broader, systemic claim.

 4. Thomas Carothers (2002), 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', *Journal of Democracy* 13/2, 5–21.

 5. Daniel Treisman (2011), 'Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin', *American Journal of Political Science* 55/3, 590–609; Mark H. Eckert and Lilia Fedorovna Shevtsova (2001), 'Russia's Hybrid Regime', *Journal of Democracy* 12/4; 65–70.

 6. Stephen E. Hanson (2011), 'Plebiscitarian Patrimonialism in Putin's Russia: Legitimating Authoritarianism in a Postideological Era,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 636/1, 32–48.

 7. Vladimir Shlapentokh (2007), Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society: A New Perspective on the Post-Soviet Era, New York.

 8. Shlapentokh (2007), 16.

 9. Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger (2008), Des Kaisers Alte Kleider. Verfassungsgeschichte und Symbolsprache des Alten Reiches, Munich.

10. As the classical contribution, see Hanna Fenichel Pitkin (1967), *The Concept of Representation*, Berkeley; cf. more recently Paula Diehl (2015), *Das Symbolische, das Imaginäre und die Demokratie. Eine Theorie politischer Repräsentation*, Baden-Baden; Mónica Brito Vieira and David Runciman (2008), *Representation*, Cambridge and Malden.

11. Stollberg-Rilinger (2008).

12. This goes beyond state symbols in two respects. On the one hand, symbolic forms beyond visual imagery (like flags or coats of arms)

are included, such as public appearances or actions and speeches of symbolic importance; on the other hand, symbols that are not authorized by the state but are introduced 'from below', as in the case of Putin fan materials, will be considered. Cf. Isabelle de Keghel (2008), *Die Staatssymbolik des neuen Russland. Traditionen—Integrationsstrategien—Identitätsdiskurse*, Hamburg; Julie A. Cassiday and Emily D. Johnson (2010), 'Putin, Putiniana and the Question of a Post-Soviet Cult of Personality', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 88/4, 681–707.

13. This point will be further elaborated in section "A Tsar of Kings: Imperial and Transnational Dimensions of Russian Para-Royalty", where the representational relation between nationalist and imperial para-royalty will be explored in the comparative and transnational context of Russia's 'near abroad'.

14. Scholars such as Richard Wortman and Ronald Suny have especially emphasized the ambivalent character of the institution of the tsar when it comes to the integration and maintenance of the Russian polity. See Richard Wortman (2013), *Russian Monarchy: Representation and Rule*, Boston; Wortman (2013); Ronald Grigor Suny (2006), 'Learning from Empire: Russia and the Soviet Union', in: Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore (eds), *Lessons of Empire. Imperial Histories and American Power*, New York and London, 73–93. See also Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel (eds) (1998), *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire*, Bloomington; Geoffrey Hosking (1998), *Russia: People and Empire, 1552–1917*, Cambridge.

15. Vladimir Shlapentokh has remarked on the sporadic application of the monarchic label in Russian scholarship (Vladimir Shlapentokh (2007), *Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society: A New Perspective on the Post-Soviet Era*, New York, 11). Other observers, in contrast, discount the validity of the monarchic interpretation. Lilia Shevtsova, for instance, writes: 'Putin's style, unlike that of his godfather, is not remotely monarchic. He appears to see himself as the "CEO of Russia" and he and his colleagues view Russia as a business corporation. […] If Yeltsin's model can be classified as a moderately authoritarian oligarchic regime, then Putin's role resembles the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s' (Lilia Shevtsova (2007), *Russia. Lost in Translation*, Washington, 40). I agree with Shevtsova insofar as I

reject a systemic interpretation of Russia as a monarchy, while at the same time emphasizing the importance of the transformation of one monarchical element—the ruler's presentation—into contemporary politics.

16. After more than a decade of seemingly monolithic approval for Putin, the Bolotnaya Square protests of winter 2011/12 cast significant doubt on the stability of his popularity; the following demonstrations of an aggressive foreign policy can be plausibly read as attempts to both overplay this loss of popular legitimacy and to win back traditional and rural parts of the 'electorate' in order to stabilize the regime and at least make the illusion of valid elections less implausible.

17. Helena Goscilo (ed.) (2013), *Putin as Celebrity and Cultural Icon*, Abingdon; Vladimir Shlapentokh (2008), 'Putin as a Flexible Politician. Does He Imitate Stalin?', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 41/2, 205–16; Regina Smyth (2014), 'The Putin Factor: Personalism, Protest, and Regime Stability in Russia', *Politics & Policy* 42/4, 567–92; Stephen White and Ian Mcallister (2008), 'The Putin Phenomenon,' *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 24/4, 604–28.

18. Tatiana Mikhailova (2013), 'Putin as the Father of the Nation: His Family and Other Animals', in: Helena Goscillo (ed.), *Putin as a Celebrity and Cultural Icon*, Abingdon, 82–103.

19. Note the statue of Putin as a judoka in Moscow's Zurab Tsereteli Art Gallery in Helena Goscilo (2013), 'Russia's Ultimate Celebrity. VVP as VIP Objet D'art', in: Helena Goscillo (ed.), *Putin as a Celebrity and Cultural Icon*, Abingdon, 6–36, here 11. Overall, the image of the heroic ruler is not new to Russian history, in contrast to fundamental patterns of Western royal ceremonials: 'The sophisticated distinction between the "body-mortal", and the "body-politic", which was made to a greater or lesser degree in the absolute monarchies of the West, did not take hold in Russia. Russian monarchs themselves had to display the transcendent features of the political order in performances constantly reaffirming the superhuman, heroic attributes attached to the state' (Richard Wortman (2013), *Russian Monarchy: Representation and Rule*, Boston, 8).

20. Cf. Diehl (2015); Philip Manow (2010), In the King's Shadow: The Political Anatomy of Democratic Representation, Cambridge and Malden.

21. Shaun Walker, 'Why a giant statue of Vladimir is causing a public outcry in Moscow', http://abcnews.go.com/International/cossacks-install-monument-russian-president-vladimir-putin-roman/story?id=31121574, 18 March 2015, accessed 2 February 2016. Incidentally, a second, much larger statue is currently in the making in Moscow, praising Vladimir, the first Christian ruler of the early Rus' (Patrick Reveel, 'Cossacks Install Monument of Russian President Vladimir Putin as Roman Emperor Near St. Petersburg', http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/jun/11/moscow-vladimir-the-great-statue-public-outcry, 11 June 2015, accessed 2 February 2016. Here, Putin seems to be continuing the Russian monarchic tradition of naming buildings after historic namesakes (Richard Wortman (2013), *Russian Monarchy: Representation and Rule*, Boston, 273).

22. Helena Goscilo (2013), 14.

23. Julie A. Cassiday and Emily D. Johnson (2010), 'Putin, Putiniana and the Question of a Post-Soviet Cult of Personality', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 88/4, 681–707.

24. Lara Ryazanova-Clarke (2013), 'The Discourse of a Spectacle at the End of the Presidential Term', in: Helena Goscillo (ed.), *Putin as a Celebrity and Cultural Icon*, Abingdon, 104–32, here 109.

25. 'Vladimir Putin rasskazal o svoem taynom kreshenii', http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/633721/, 22 July 2013, accessed 2 February 2016.

26. Svetlana Solodovnik (2014), 'Russia: The Official Church Chooses the State', *Russian Social Science Review* 55/6, 62.

27. http://www.tvc.ru/news/show/id/73343, 28 July 2015, accessed 2 February 2016.

28. John Anderson (2007), 'Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia', *Journal of International Affairs* 61/1, 191–3; Viktor Davydov (2013), 'Dangerous Alliance between Church and State', *The Current Digest of the Russian Press* 65/32, 14–15.

29. 'Putin poblagodaril patriarkha za ukrepleniye edinstva rossijskovo naroda', http://politrussia.com/news/putin-poblagodaril-patriarkha-974/, 2 February 2015, accessed 31 March 2016.

30. 'Greetings for Orthodox Easter', http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49240, 12 April 2015, accessed 31 March 2016. This message has also been distributed abroad by the governmental cultural foundation Russkiy Mir' (http://www.russkiymir.ru/news/188688/, April 12, 2015, accessed on March 31, 2016).

31. Anderson (2007), 192.
32. 'Russian Patriarch calls Putin Era "Miracle of God"', *Reuters*, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-putin-religion-idUK-TRE81722Y20120208, 8 February 2012, accessed 31 March 2016.
33. The impression that Putin applies, interprets, and bends the law according to his interest and will is an outcome not only of the various political show trials of recent years—from Khodorkovsky and Pussy Riot to Nadya Savchenko—but also of the likely political murders and the reinterpretation of International Law for the purpose of an expansionist foreign policy in the case of Crimea.
34. Richard Wortman (2013), *Russian Monarchy: Representation and Rule*, Boston, xv; Ronald Grigor Suny (2006), 'Learning from Empire: Russia and the Soviet Union', in: Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper and Kevin W. Moore (eds), *Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power*, New York, 73–93.
35. Richard Wortman (2013), Russian Monarchy: Representation and Rule, Boston, xiv.
36. Martin K. Dimitrov (2009), 'Popular Autocrats', *Journal of Democracy* 20/1, 78–81.
37. '[T]he core of the monarchic principle of transition from one leader to another is not so much a succession on a kinship basis, but the power of the current leader to appoint an heir and disregard the will of the people and many elites. This circumstance was of greatest importance for contemporary Russia, where a sort of feudal monarchy emerged, with succession based not on kinship but on the choice of the current leader from a few candidates, a practice that was elaborated in the Roman Empire' (Vladimir Shlapentokh (2007), *Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society: A New Perspective on the Post-Soviet Era*, Basingstoke, 164).
38. Paula Diehl (2011), 'Symbolrecycling als Politische Strategie. Das Beispiel von Herkules während der Französischen Revolution,' in: Harald Bluhm, Karsten Fischer and Marcus Llanque (eds); *Ideenpolitik*, 141–62.
39. de Keghel (2008), 239.
40. Miguel Vazquez Linan (2010), 'History as a propaganda tool in Putin's Russia', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43, 167–78; Dina Khapaeva (2016), 'Triumphant memory of the perpetrators: Putin's politics of re-Stalinization', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 49/1, 61–73.

41. Richard Wortman (2013), Russian Monarchy: Representation and Rule, Boston, 140.

42. Ilya Kozyrev (2011), Moskau—das dritte Rom: Eine politische Theorie mit ihren Auswirkungen auf die Identität der Russen und die russische Politik, Göttingen.

43. 'The Russian nation was defined not as an ethnic entity, but by the utter devotion of the Russian people to their rulers, which set them apart from western peoples, seduced by liberal ideas', Wortman (2013), 156. Cf. Geoffrey Hosking (1998), *Russia: People and Empire, 1552–1917*, Cambridge.

44. See Chap. 7 in this volume by Ulrich Hofmeister.

45. On Russia's public diplomacy towards Russian-speaking minorities abroad cf. Marcel H. Van Herpen (2015), *Putin's Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy*, Lanham, Boulder, New York and London; Andri Kudors (2010), '"Russian World"—Russia's Soft Power Approach to Compatriots Policy', *Russian Analytical Digest* 89/10, 2–4.

46. 'On the foundation', http://www.russkiymir.ru/fund/, accessed 31 March 2016.

47. Joshua Yaffa, 'Putin's Dragon', http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/08/putins-dragon, 8 February 2016, accessed 18 February 2016.

48. See, for example, 'Kadyrov: Dlya muzul'manina religiya bolshe, chem zakony', http://tass.ru/obschestvo/1944062, 30 April 2015, accessed 5 February 2016.

49. 'Kadyrov sygral glavnuyu rol' v gollivudskom fil'me', https://lenta.ru/news/2015/05/25/kadyrov/, 25 May 2015, accessed 2 February 2016.

50. Maryam Nashkhoeva, 'Molodyozhnaya Politika R. A. Kadyrova: Realizaiya i Mekhanizmy Sovershenstvovaniya', http://www.grozny-inform.ru/news/express/48583/, 22 December 2015, accessed 30 January 2016; Anna Shamanska, 'Kadyrov shames Chechen Social Worker on TV', http://www.rferl.org/content/chechnya-kadyriv-social-worker-tv/27443034.html, 22 December 2015, accessed 1 February 2016.

51. Lilia Biryukova (2011), 'Kadyrov City', *Vedomosti,* October 6, 2.

52. Ivan Sukhov (2006), 'Hereditary Office. Ramzan Kadyrov Is Elected President of Assembly of Peoples of Chechnya', *Russian*

Digital Digest (originally appeared in: *Vedomosti*) 58/44, November 29, 12.

53. Marlène Laruelle (2015), 'The Three Discursive Paradigms of State Identity in Kazakhstan. Kazakhness, Kazakhstanness, and Transnationalism', in: Mariya Y. Omelicheva (ed.): *Nationalism and identity construction in Central Asia: dimensions, dynamics, and directions*, Lanham: 1–20; Dmitriy Verkhturov, 'Nazarbayev kak glavniy arkhitektor Evraziyskovo Soyuza', http://ia-centr.ru/expert/11921/, 2 November 2011, accessed 31 March 2016; 'The Cult of Heydar Aliyev Marches on', *Radio Free Europe*, http://www.rferl.org/content/heydar-aliyev-personality-cult/24968616.html, 25 April 2013, accessed 31 March 2016.

54. Michael Denison (2009), 'The Art of the Impossible: Political Symbolism, and the Creation of National Identity and Collective Memory in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan', *Europe-Asia Studies* 61/7, 1167–87.

55. John Keane, for example, has subsumed the regional cluster of authoritarian regimes 'new despotisms', although he does not seem to consider the transnational effects—nor the pitfalls and historical baggage of the trope of 'Oriental despotism' (John Keane (2014), 'The New Despotisms of the 21st Century', Abdelwahab Elmessiri Memorial Lecture, London, 5).

56. Eva Marlene Hausteiner (2010), 'Imperium Eurasien? Großraumdenken zwischen imperialer Ambition und Globalisierungskritik', *Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte* 11/2, 145–60.

57. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/71509.html, 20 January 2016, accessed 1 February 2016.

58. M. D. Suslov (2014), 'Holy Rus': The Geopolitical Imagination in the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church', *Russian Politics and Law* 52/3, 67–86.

59. Aleksandr Dugin, 'Eurasia Above Everything', http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1838, accessed 31 March 2016.

60. Majnat Kurbanova, 'Ramzan Kadyrov, Father of the Nation, http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-and-countries/Chechnya/Ramzan-Kadyrov-father-of-the-nation-92026, 13 April 2011, accessed 31 March 2016.

61. 'Ramzan Kadyrov: Ya sto ras umru za Putina', https://versia.ru/ramzan-kadyrov-ya-sto-raz-umru-za-putina, 11 January 2010, accessed 2 February 2016.
62. 'Oath to the Country and Putin', https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eHqKEC1m63I, 29 December 2014, accessed 31 March 2016.
63. Joshua Yaffa, 'Putin's Dragon', http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/08/putins-dragon, 8 February 2016, accessed 18 February 2016.

Conclusion: Transnational Histories of the 'Royal Nation'

Charlotte Backerra, Milinda Banerjee, and Cathleen Sarti

The main contribution of this volume has been to locate, and indeed foreground, the 'royal nation' as an autonomous historical category in transnational and global history. Following an introductory chapter which presented the conceptual and methodological agenda of this project, the book has set out 15 case studies to demonstrate the different ways in which the royal nation, as a historical phenomenon, offered answers to the challenges posed by nationalism in different parts of the modern world, among widely varying sets of political actors.

The authors in this volume have underlined that, across the nineteenth and twentieth and indeed into the twenty-first centuries, political actors have compared and contrasted rulerships in their own societies with those

Ch. Backerra (✉)
University of Mainz, Mainz, Germany

University of Stuttgart, Stuttgart, Germany

M. Banerjee
Presidency University, Kolkata, India

C. Sarti
University of Mainz, Mainz, Germany

in others in order to articulate new forms of national politics and gover-
nance. This intermeshing of monarchy and nationalism cannot be under-
stood merely in terms of the circulation of a pre-existing module of official
nationalism (as Benedict Anderson implies). Rather, we have to think in
terms of a multifaceted and multi-sited explosion of political activities cen-
tring on monarchic imaginaries and institutions. The authors have stressed
the originality and creativity of these experiments. What this book has also
underlined are the varied and contradictory political implications of such
interventions, as royal national projects have been used to reinforce exist-
ing power hierarchies, as well as to profoundly challenge or even destabi-
lize them.

The unique feature and connecting thread of this volume is its argu-
ment about the transnational underpinnings of royal nationhood. The
transnational connections were often quite far-ranging, spanning conti-
nents or, in other instances, clustering in specific trans-regional spaces. We
have suggested that the mutual imbrications of the royal and the national
did not just erupt separately in different modern societies; rather they were
actually mediated through exchanges of conceptual models and political
frameworks across spatial borders. We need to ask the obvious question:
what made this transnational phenomenon at all historically possible? We
shall take a cue from the different contributions in this volume to suggest
some possible answers.

First, we need to factor in the phenomenon of resilience. For various
reasons, royalty seemed compelling to actors across the world, even, and
especially, in the aftermath of revolutionary challenges that destabilized
or even brought to an end formal monarchies. From German and Italian
elites in the wake of 1848, to Brazilian intellectuals after the demise of
the monarchy in 1889, to Russian ruling classes in the early twenty-first
century: the resurgence of monarchic imaginaries in the aftermath of revo-
lutionary disruptions is an extraordinary phenomenon that has scarcely
been adequately theorized upon in transnational terms. The chapters have
shown that while there have been obvious (and well-known) cases of revo-
lutionary nationalist challenges to monarchies, there have been (often, less
well-studied) cohabitations between monarchies and nationalisms, allow-
ing monarchies to enjoy post-revolutionary afterlives. Even where the
royal dynasty was definitely overthrown, para-royal rule could re-emerge,
as in modern Russia. The resulting persistence of monarchical concepts—
in political culture, constitutional form, historicity, and memory—needs
to be juxtaposed against other cases where the monarchic influence is per-

haps less obvious, as in post-Second World War Germany, modern China, or twentieth-century France. Did the strong monarchical influences on political culture which remained immediately after the abolition of the monarchy (as Martin Kohlrausch has shown for Germany, and Jia Feng for China) still remain strong decades after the abolition of kingship? How should we relate monarchic afterlives to the kind of para-royalty that Eva Marlene Hausteiner has conceptualized for contemporary Russia and Central Asia? And what should we think about the role of modern intellectuals, journalists, politicians, or academics vis-à-vis these lingering remains of monarchy? How should we regard those states—such as interwar Germany or contemporary China—where monarchies have not returned, and yet visions of strong statehood have proved extraordinarily attractive? Has transnational reinforcement of monarchic imaginaries itself been an agent of resurgence and resilience of royalty or emergence of para-royalty? And finally—and perhaps this is the elephant in the room question—to what extent can we speak about 'modernity' or 'modern political cultures' as a definable political or intellectual category, marked by the assumed antithesis of the premodern and the modern, or of the monarchic and the republican-national, when monarchic imaginaries, which long predate modernity (however capaciously conceived), have interrupted so frequently into contemporary political forms and horizons? The royal nation resolutely puts into question many assumed binaries here, and provokes us to interrogate, or perhaps to entirely rework, what we understand by modern nationhood.

Second, we need to reflect on the issue of geographical scale. Monarchic imaginaries were often important in political spaces where the match between territory and nationality was not definitively settled, as Javier Moreno-Luzón and Daniel Wimmer have shown for Spain, and especially for Catalonia. How far have monarchic influences been especially strong in instances where regional nationalisms, established nation states, and more expansive identities (such as the European one) have had to converse and contest with each other? Similar questions are raised by the malleability of monarchic imaginaries in contexts of imperial negotiations with nationhood, as shown by Ulrich Hofmeister for Turkestan vis-à-vis Russian rule, by Anne Anderson with respect to the relation between Hesse and the German Empire, and by Alexandre Lazzari in terms of Brazil's fraught relationship with its neighbours in Latin America, its 'mother-country' in Iberian Europe, as well as with its indigenous and mixed-race populations. Some of the authors have identified regional clusters of royal nationhood.

In the crossroads of Russia and Central Asia, in the relations between Spain and Latin America, in the Arab world, in Europe as a densely interconnected continent: we can see certain forms and zones of articulate royal nationhood emerging. Indeed, one of the most important attractions of monarchic imaginaries lies in the way they allow for capacious political imaginings and geographies of nationhood: to think, for example, about federalism or about a European or a pan-Ibero-American identity, without sacrificing the perceived advantages of national sovereignty.

Other authors have pointed out mobilities of monarchic imaginaries across more far-flung regions, indeed, often across continents. Colonialism has obviously played a crucial role in this, including through the dialectics of anti- or post-colonial political mediations. We need to think further about how monarchic centres have held together—or often, pulled apart and disintegrated—ties of ethnicity, language, and other forms of political solidarity. Royal nationhood operates through and against multiple geographical scales: from closely-knit regions (like Catalonia), to multi-regional kingdoms (like Tsarist Russia), to transcontinental empires (such as the British), to postcolonial geographies (for example, the British Commonwealth, or the Organization of Ibero-American States) marked by long-distance monarchically inflected cultural ties. Monarchic structures and imaginaries have been central to the production of such multi-scalar nationalisms, and this line of enquiry needs to be explored further in future. And finally, as Milinda Banerjee's chapter argues provocatively, the 'global' itself may be seen as the proper scale of analysis for thinking about the royal nation: not at the cost of other scales (regional, transcontinental, and so on), but in complementarity and connection to them, as the very platform for enacting discourses and practices of national unity and sovereignty in monarchic garbs on an absolutely planetary scale.

Third, the book has emphasized the role of intensified—and increasingly transnationalized and globalized—uses of media and political legitimation for the establishment of royal nations. While laws, ceremonies, dress, religion, or the military have also been used before the nineteenth century to express forms of command and rule, they have since been used to further the connection between royal power, emerging nationalisms, and nation states. The last two centuries have seen the advent of an intensified globalization of new media and tools of publicity: newspapers, television, the internet, photography, legal codes, and constitutions. The authors in this book have selected one or more of these forms to show how they became central nodes for a transnationally oriented production

of royal nationhood. Rulers gained new popularity through their presence in newspapers, television, and everyday objects. Pictures and films focused consumers' attention on simplified, perhaps banalized, depictions of monarchs or rulers as singular entities located at the centre of national politics and cultures. The new worldwide media made possible new globalized publics and consumers of royal nationhood. The legitimacy of rulers was reshaped in legal codes. Their subjects compared and contrasted them with rulers in other parts of the world to demand better national governance. Political ceremonies, from royal anniversaries and tours to funerals, were often prime spaces for deploying and debating such representations of power. Language itself was reshaped in newer ways, to produce new concepts for and against monarchy, and in relation to the production of the nation as a category which could be sustained by, or be in mutiny against, kingships. We thus need to think about how structures of governance, communication, and public debate have travelled, and deepened and widened the reach of royal nationhood. We have shown that far from diminishing the aura of royalty, these new tools of modernity (media, constitution, internet, and so on) have often placed royalty at the centre of public spaces, while also putting new demands and constraints on them to respond to such intensified and globalized public pressure.

Finally, as in any volume on transnational and global history, we need to focus on agents of cultural transfer, referring here not just to strategies of rule, mediatization, and so on (discussed above), but also to physically mobile human actors. It is a truism to say that the nineteenth century inaugurated an age of global travel; what is often forgotten, however, is that these travels exposed and connected an ever-expanding array of actors to monarchic political forms beyond their own social borders, and rendered them into agents of cultural transfer. British artists in Germany; Indian or Nepalese intellectuals and politicians in Europe; French or French-trained experts in Morocco; Siamese royalty across South East Asia and India—these have all been agents of hybridization and globalization of monarchic politics. We hope that future research will build on our focus on transnational biography, and expand our understanding of the role of these actors—rulers, statesmen, artists, architects, intellectuals, and reporters, among others—in shaping the royal nation as a global category.

In any case, this volume will have achieved its ambition if we can persuade our readers that any future reckoning with the globally entangled emergence of the modern world, and specifically of modern political forms, cannot afford to neglect the centrality of the monarchy–nationalism nexus

in world history since the nineteenth century. There is a certain irony in the way in which modern nation states have often been constructed transnationally, even when (some) nationalists—and historians consuming their rhetoric—have cast transnationality as the dyadic opposite of nationhood. The resulting symbioses between transnational horizons and nationalist frames, between kingships (real and imagined) and nations, have resulted in the proliferation, across the modern world, of the globalized category of royal nations.

Index

Note: Page numbers followed by "n" denote notes.