

GEORGE E. McCARTHY

Dreams in Exile

Rediscovering Science and Ethics in
Nineteenth-Century Social Theory

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*Rediscovering Science and Ethics
in Nineteenth-Century Social Theory*

GEORGE E. McCARTHY

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*For my son and daughter
Devin and Alexa*

Now that they have wings,
let them lead in
spirit and heart,
justice and compassion

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SILENT DREAMS

Shadowed by iron skies,
the mills, their sound and fury
merchandised, unleash
from blackened stacks plumes
of air-borne debris,
while tired workers grind,
in anger and fear, objects
replicating themselves
for the dark market of idols.
But a few dreamers, dissenters,
and artists crafted a voice—
the cry of eagles soaring
through clouds over Doric columns—
like a chorus of those in assembly
who discovered the human measure
of beauty, reason, and friendship,
to restore the values robbed
by those possessed by possessions.
These prophets foretold the day
when justice, beyond the gods,
is placed in our calloused hands.
Such classical dreams gave life
to social vision, moved
to show humanity
divine, creating wonder,
like a dazzling, dancing star.
Instead, a false facade
of ordered intellect,
prejudice, and madness—
choking justice—grew
from dreams not understood,
unleashing anger, fear
deaf to every cry
that marks a culture's death.
Hidden within our words,
crafted and handed down,
an urgent, prophetic sound,
an ethic to heal the heart,
is a wisdom still unspoken:
a voice for silent dreams,
a whisper of our rage.

—Royal W. Rhodes

“I say unto you, one must still have chaos in oneself to be able
to give birth to a dancing star.”

—Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*

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INTRODUCTION

CONVERSING WITH TRADITIONS

Ancients and Moderns in Nineteenth-Century Practical Science

The famous phrase from the prologue to Friedrich Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which is quoted above, refers to a society in which individuals are no longer capable of giving birth to a dancing star. It is a forceful and overpowering metaphor for the nineteenth-century critique of Enlightenment rationality and science, its lack of critical reason, and its loss of substantive imagination. Nietzsche views modernity as no longer capable of dreaming or of looking beyond the present to the historical past or to future possibilities. European social theory, developing as a critical response to this situation, blossoms from the cross-pollination of Greek political theory and the epistemology and moral philosophy of modern German thought. Aristotle and Immanuel Kant are arguably the two most important philosophers for the foundation of modern social theory. Aristotle's ethical theory of virtue and character development and his theory of justice and moral economics provide us with the most valuable and insightful criticisms of the growth of a market economy in the ancient world. From the modern perspective, Kant offers us a sophisticated critique of reason and science in his attempt to justify philosophically the claims of Newtonian physics and mathematics to universal knowledge. Although Kant's critiques of pure and practical reason are important, the philosophical reactions to his work in the nineteenth century in the form of phenomenology, existentialism, perspectivism, and neo-Kantianism permit us access to critical alternatives to the epistemology and methodology of the natural sciences. Both Aristotle and Kant present us with a view of ethics and science that challenges the assumptions and values of Enlightenment rationality, utilitarian ethics, and market economics. It is these two traditions that strongly influence the development of classical

sociology and the writings of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim. Thus it may be said that the theories of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim lie between the ancients and the moderns. They became the social dreamers who used their newly formed empirical and ethical science to study the culture, history, and institutions of capitalist society in order to transform the given reality according to practical social ideals.

Aristotle's devastating rejection of market accumulation and commercial trading, his defense of social solidarity and the political community, and his institutional analysis of the relationship between ethics and politics set the stage for European social theory in the nineteenth century. His observations about a market economy and social justice provide Marx with the starting point for his theory of alienation, his critique of industrial production and market exchange, and the anticipation of the fate of capitalism in his economic crisis theory. Aristotle will help Weber create a vocational and pedagogical science for the development of national policy, citizenship, and strong and self-directed personalities within the institutions of the everyday lifeworld. Durkheim, on the other hand, will use Aristotle's thought as the basis for his theory of functionalism, social solidarity, democracy, education, and the virtuous life. In all three cases, they rely upon ancient Greek philosophy as a way of countering what they perceive to be the social pathologies of modern life: alienation, rationalization, and anomie. The basis for social critique and practical action requires a critical imagination and institutional insight that lie beyond the structures and values of modernity. If industrial society is the cause of social illness, then only an alternative way of viewing the world can help provide a critical diagnosis and remedy for these forms of distorted development.

In Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, we are presented with a different vision of society than that offered by the overwhelming shallowness of self-interest and market competition, the stultifying banality of possessive individualism and economic materialism, and the limits of natural rights and unlimited property accumulation. Aristotle offers the moderns a way out of the distractions and distortions of a society founded on the leviathan principles of aggressive domination of others, unnatural wealth acquisition, and private greed. Rejecting the values of modern economics and utilitarian ethics, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim look to a different culture of civic virtue and honor, political participation and communal justice, which have been reduced in modern industrial society to issues of private property, efficient productivity, economic fairness, market distribution, and plebiscitary politics. Rejecting the values and institutions of liberalism, they return to a political lifeworld of social responsibility and concern for the public good, that is, to a world of happiness and justice.

Modernity for the classical theorists represents a world turned upside down where certain values, spurned in classical antiquity, now rise to be

the foundational principles of modern economics, politics, and science. They question a bureaucratic politics that immunizes itself against accountability and participation, an economy that destroys the social basis for politics, culture, and interaction, and a personality that promotes private motives, economic success, and consumer happiness. Sociology is, at its heart, indifferent to the seductions of liberalism, since it is a discipline forged in a different cultural experience of ancient natural law that stresses beauty and simplicity, grace and responsibility, and economic reciprocity and mutual sharing. To reflect on these past ideals is to recover a forgotten world of classical dreams. By looking at the foundations of sociology in an entirely new light, we are able to see a more comprehensive and enticing picture of the historical past and human possibilities, as science and justice are welded together in a single discipline. A detailed inquiry into Aristotle's main works on ethics and politics gives us a clue to the insights of nineteenth-century sociologists that have been lost today.

From the modern tradition, Kant outlines a Copernican revolution in epistemology as he attempts to integrate seventeenth- and eighteenth-century empiricism and rationalism into a critical theory of knowledge and science. For Kant, the experience and truth of objective reality lie in the forms and principles of human consciousness and not in empirical reality or innate ideas. The key to an understanding of the phenomenal world of experience is found deep within the complexities of subjectivity and its forms of consciousness. The universal laws of nature and therefore the truth of science itself are a transcendental construction of the human mind. Kant's major contribution to this discussion is his addition of the role of consciousness in organizing sensation and perception into a coherent experience of the objective world. From his perspective, objective reality and objective knowledge are products of pure subjective consciousness.

Kant's eighteenth-century epistemology and moral philosophy introduce a new theory of knowledge and science that is more compatible with Aristotle's philosophy of science and practical wisdom (*phronesis*). The former's theory of subjectivity is, in turn, later transformed by the critical reactions of nineteenth-century philosophers and sociologists who radically push for a rethinking of the characteristics of the constitutive process and concepts of the mind. These theorists introduce alternative accounts of human perception and knowledge that differ markedly from those of Enlightenment science. Although Kant's ideas are an expression of the remarkable achievement of the German Enlightenment, they contain within themselves the seeds of their own dialectical transformation. Responding to the inadequacies of both empiricism and rationalism, Kant rejects the existence of an objective reality independent of human consciousness to which the mind must conform. In the modern theory of knowledge, the debate between empiricists and rationalists revolved around a theory of substance and material objectivity—the external

physical world of empirical reality. Is this reality to be approached through sensuous impressions and empirical observations or by means of human reason penetrating into the conceptual heart of unchanging mathematical relations and quantifiable forms, shapes, and motion?

Within the tradition of early modern thought, the existence of external facts and independent substances that correspond to our ideas about nature was assumed in David Hume's empiricism and René Descartes' rationalism.¹ Although the ontological existence of an independent and objective reality was taken for granted, the procedures of the scientific method and the descriptive characteristics of objectivity were hotly debated. With Kant, however, all this changes dramatically in one revolutionary moment. His epistemological contribution was to introduce the force of subjectivity without losing the substantive objectivity of the natural world and science.

Access to reality, as a thing existing in itself, is rejected since all knowledge involves the transformative efforts of consciousness. The objects of experience are constituted and interpreted by the mind, forever changing reality in itself, and thereby making the latter inaccessible and unknowable. Science is always an interpretation of nature, not a reflection of it. The ocular metaphor of the passive mind copying reality is no longer applicable. Kant holds that the structure and principles of the mind are universal, a priori forms and categories that give rise to everyday experience and natural science. With the further evolution of philosophy and epistemology, a priori concepts are changed into social and historical ones in the critique of ideology and the sociology of knowledge of classical social theory. The categorial structure of the mind is reconfigured and with it the form in which objectivity is created. Modernity could not contain itself within the traditional limits of Enlightenment rationality and epistemology. Kant's revolution in thought explodes the boundaries of Western thinking about knowledge, truth, and science in the same way that the modern appropriation of Aristotelian economics and politics broke through traditional liberal categories of production, distribution, consumption, and exchange. Combining Aristotle and Kant in this classical period was an incendiary wonder and an imaginative dream for modern social theory.

With the stage apparently set in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for this critical view of science and reason with its classical ideals of democracy and social justice, things begin to change in unexpected ways. The institutional requirements and functional needs of advanced capitalist society push sociology away from these earlier and more critical traditions in order to create a social science in which objectivity is viewed as neutrality and scholarly distance, science as positivism and realism, and ethics as utilitarian morals and market freedoms. The very nature of sociology changes as epistemology is transformed into a philosophy of science and social theory into a methodology of empirical research. Ancient justice and

Kantian science are displaced by ideals that are more compatible with the new economic and scientific values of the Enlightenment. In turn, reflection on social pathologies is replaced by considerations of social problems, functional distortions by technical anomalies, and structural contradictions by social conflicts. All problems become amenable to the technological intervention of operational concepts and hypothetical constructs within social science whose goal is not the search for happiness, the good life, or a just society, but the reestablishment of a harmony and equilibrium lost by functional and social disturbances. Practical reason is jettisoned in favor of a disciplined technical rationality. Plato, Descartes, Hobbes, and Parsons would replace Aristotle and Kant as the foundation stones for the new interpretations regarding Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. Separated from the classical tradition that gave them birth, these social theorists became just the earliest manifestations of scientific positivism. Their theories of critical science and social pathologies were lost in a sea of empirical facts, accumulated data, and scientific laws.

Beyond general intellectual interests, what is the importance of linking the birth of historical science to the philosophical inquiry of classical antiquity? The answer to this question lies in the need to redeem both Aristotle and Kant for modern social theory by reclaiming the original design of classical sociology as a practical or ethical science. This book should be viewed as a companion volume to *Classical Horizons: The Origins of Sociology in Ancient Greece* (2003) as it examines in more detail what was only implicit in that monograph.² The earlier work uncovered the foundations of nineteenth-century social thought in classical antiquity and examined the biographical, historical, academic, scholarly, and theoretical evidence connecting the moderns to the ancients. The new work will not explore all these intricate connections between classical Greece and sociology. It will instead build upon the earlier effort and raise another series of questions: what is the impact on sociology of having its origins in classical antiquity; what is the relevance for historical science of the Greek influence on the theories of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim; and what are the implications for theory when classical sociology is viewed as an ethical science? In other words, this new project will examine classical social theory as a practical science and will detail its various attempts at a synthesis of science and ethics, a synthesis of empirical research and social justice. With the rise of German Romanticism and idealism, neoclassicism, ancient historiography and archaeology, and the German Historical School of Economics and Law, European social theorists moved away from the cold and confining restrictions of the Enlightenment and directed their collective gaze and moral sentiment towards the warm and enchanting Aegean. The theoretical, epistemological, and methodological implications of this redirection of attention offer new clues to the nature of nineteenth-century historical and cultural science. The Greek turn represents both a moving beyond

Enlightenment rationality and politics and the creation of an alternative science based on the theory of knowledge and moral economy of Aristotle and the critical and dialectical methods of German idealism.³

Chapter 1, “Aristotle on the Constitution of Social Justice and Classical Democracy,” outlines the various forms of production and acquisition, natural and unnatural economic exchanges, particular and universal justice, and types of knowledge within the Athenian polis. The chapter begins with an analysis of Aristotle’s critique of political economy in the *Politics*. Describing the difference in the local economy between household management (*oikonomike*) of the family and unnatural wealth acquisition (*chrematistike*) of the market, he sets the stage for a broader consideration of the relationship between the economy and the polity as he examines the forms of property and economic activity that strengthen and weaken the family and the state. He places economic activity within the context of the purpose of human life, the social forms of happiness (*eudaimonia*), and the goals of the political community. Clearly for the ancient Hellenes, production and exchange are only means to more fulfilling ends determined by the constitution of the polis. These goals are the social values which reject economic accumulation that is detrimental to the political realization of rationality, happiness, and justice.

Economic production and exchange have the underlying purpose of securing the livelihood and integrity of the family, ensuring social stability, and permitting political participation within the polis. Thus, economics is always a secondary activity geared to reciprocity, the common good, and mutual aid in which households share and exchange their surpluses as means for defining and protecting the family (*oikos*) and political community (*polis*). Families strive to be self-sufficient in the satisfaction of their basic physical needs. However, according to Aristotle, this represents only an important, necessary first step on the road toward the ultimate goal of human life: political virtue (*arete*) and practical wisdom (*phronesis*). Since the ultimate purpose or function of human life is realized within the political community, economics must also provide the agricultural and artisanal production necessary to ensure the leisure time to participate in the key institutions of Athenian society. This is an entirely different value system than that envisioned by modern political economists who stress the primacy of economics, property, natural rights, and market rationality.

In tracing the evolution of product exchange in the Athenian state, Aristotle describes the different economic forms—from barter, natural exchange, trade, and commerce to banking and interest—and their impact on the social values of the community. There is an attempt to integrate exchange with the development of social justice based on its various forms of economic and political justice. Rather than pursuing an ideal republic as Plato attempted to do, Aristotle is more concerned with articulating the

“function of man” within different social institutions which would nurture and encourage their preferred way of life. If the goal of human life is happiness and virtuous activity within the polis, then Aristotle’s work is an attempt to provide the sociological context within which this activity can be realized. This helps explain his broad emphasis on economics, political constitutions, civic friendship, and citizenship. Aristotle’s *Politics* expresses the institutional extension of his concern for moral and intellectual virtues (*episteme*, *phronesis*, and *techne*) and the good life. His social analyses of various Greek constitutions, as well as his theory of political economy and social justice, are further elaborations of his philosophy of virtue and the *telos* of human existence. The radical implications of his ideas in the fourth century BCE were not overlooked by the classical social theorists over two thousand years later. Profit acquisition and a developed market economy are inimical to the development of social solidarity, a strong and viable community, and the institutions of economic and political democracy for both the ancients and the moderns. In this way, the imaginative source for critically evaluating the social pathologies of modernity lies in the ethical and political writings of classical Greece.

In Book 5 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes between three particular forms of economic justice: distributive, rectificatory, and reciprocal. They are clearly related to his general theory of economic exchange and critique of chrematistics as an unnatural form of wealth acquisition. Distributive justice refers to the fair and proportionate distribution of society’s accumulated wealth and public offices based upon the criterion of merit. Rectificatory justice is the legal form of civil and criminal justice involving the reestablishment of equal proportionality after an injury, theft, fraud, or more serious infraction. The third form of particular justice, known as reciprocal justice, is perhaps the most important; it is clearly the most intriguing and complex. It, too, is based upon a proportionate equality that nurtures a fair exchange of material goods by which the physical needs and self-sufficiency of the family are ensured, the stability and solidarity of the polis are maintained, and the communal life is held together. Reciprocity protects both the “natural exchange” of local families with unmet material needs through barter, based on the ethical principles of grace and generosity, and the broader exchange of goods in a primitive money economy, based on the values of fairness and friendship established by law and custom. In these two types of natural exchange, the satisfaction of fundamental human needs is the primary ethical imperative of a just society that mediates the economic activity among families, friends, and citizens. Need is what motivates exchange and justice between participants: the need for material goods, self-sufficiency, and the material foundation of the political and cultural life of the community. Human need socially facilitated by grace and fairness, not property, money, market, or power, defines the parameters of economics and ethics.⁴

Within Aristotle's writings there is thus a close integration among his theories of justice, economic exchange, and the function of man. The economy and the market provide the material foundation for the development of human potential, as rational and virtuous individuals search for happiness and self-realization within the polis. Aristotle makes the connections among the function of man as a rational and virtuous being, the purpose of human life, and the forms of particular economic justice. From this perspective the unjust forms of market exchange based on profit making, commerce, banking, and unnatural property accumulation are rejected as undermining the possibilities of the good life, political community, and social justice. These connections between economics and politics, particular justice and the general values of the polis, are then, in turn, further developed in Aristotle's analysis of universal or political justice.

Universal justice provides the citizen with the social institutions and values that encourage rational activity and human self-determination in the public sphere. This includes discussion of political constitutions, forms of moral and intellectual virtue, friendship and citizenship, and the importance of a democratic polity. Political justice outlines the legal and ethical guidelines for a social system in which the good life is expressed as public involvement, civic virtue, practical wisdom, and political judgment and deliberation. Only in this social environment is happiness possible. Aristotle's discussion of particular and universal justice in Book 5 leads to his investigation of the various forms of intellectual virtue in Book 6 of his *Nicomachean Ethics*. According to him, there are three main forms of intellectual virtue and knowledge: scientific (*episteme*), political or practical (*phronesis*), and technical (*techne*). These forms of knowledge correspond to the three forms of social activity within the polis: the intellectual contemplation of the philosopher (*theoria*), the public deliberation and political activity of the citizen (*praxis*), and the fabrication and making of the artisan and manual worker (*poiesis*), respectively.

Science (*episteme*) seeks the philosophical knowledge of universal and necessary truths found in metaphysics, physics, and mathematics. Practical wisdom (*phronesis*), on the other hand, is concerned with the changing and contingent public opinions and the development of knowledge that is acquired over time through intellectual maturation and committed participation in the political process. Through the fine tuning of our judgment in self-deliberation and public discussion, the citizen begins to cultivate a nuanced familiarity with the fundamental political issues that affect the daily life of the polis. This knowledge, unlike philosophical contemplation, is not something that can be taught or learned in formal education. Rather, it is a form of ethical knowledge that develops over time through accumulated wisdom, shared experiences, and sensitivity to public arguments and dialogue. It is this knowledge of contingent deliberation and practical reasoning that

the political process tries to facilitate as the individual strives for happiness and a virtuous life. Instrumental knowledge (*techne*) of the technician and artisan is the expertise of making things in a mechanical fashion based on preconceived ideas of the anticipated finished product. Fit only for the lowest members of society, it does not prepare one for the demands of political participation or the rigors of citizenship. It is discounted by Aristotle as a means to the good life.

Chapter 2, "Aristotle and Classical Social Theory," outlines the ways in which Aristotle's economic, ethical, and political writings have influenced the development of nineteenth-century social theory. Marx, Weber, and Durkheim are steeped in the collective wisdom of ancient Greece and neoclassical German authors; they are university trained in the classical traditions. Each writes dissertations and early works on the ancients. Each emphasizes particular aspects of classical thought that they explore in different and unusual directions: Marx on Epicurus and Democritus, Weber on Roman agrarian society and ancient and medieval trading associations, and Durkheim on ancient law, labor specialization, and Aristotle and Montesquieu. They develop different social theories, different views of science, and different epistemological and methodological approaches to sociology. Marx evolves a critical science with a dialectical and teleological method; Weber builds an interpretive science with an historical method of understanding (*Verstehen*); and Durkheim applies a moral science to an early functionalist and later idealist method. These differences, however, have a common philosophical root in Aristotle's theory of knowledge based on *phronesis* and his theory of social justice, and it is upon this common foundation that they attempt to build a new ethical science. Through classical social theory, the Greeks were read with a clear German inflection: Aristötle, with an umlaut.

Marx stresses the importance of Aristotle's critique of political economy, theory of needs, and structural analysis of the Athenian democratic commune; Weber, as a member of the German Historical School, looks to ancient Hellenic ethics of virtue and character, the sociological relationship between personality development and political constitutions, the Greek view of the tragic fate of humanity, and *phronesis* as the ground for his theory of cultural hermeneutics and interpretive science; and Durkheim focuses on issues of civic virtue, moral education, and democratic participation. Much of the ethical and political criticism of modernity comes from their inspired borrowings from the ancient Hellenes. Aristotle provides their social analyses with an outsider's view of the rise of a market economy based on technical knowledge for material production. The resulting alienation of labor, rationalization of social institutions through the virulent spread of the instrumental knowledge of the last man, and anomic breakdown in cultural solidarity and political community are only further developments in a process initially examined by Aristotle.

In his dissertation on the post-Aristotelian philosophy of nature of Democritus and Epicurus, along with his extensive preparatory notes on Greek and Roman interpretations of their thought, Marx uses Epicurus to respond critically to both Aristotle and Hegel. Science, for Epicurus, was to be secondary to the goals established by ethics. Marx's writings during his early period focus on themes he borrows from Aristotle, including an emphasis on species being, happiness, and self-realization of human potentiality, critique of political economy and distributive justice, and the fulfillment of human needs and social emancipation. In his later works, Marx examines the issues of simple commodity exchange, a labor theory of value, the distinction between use value and exchange value, economics and chrematistics, commercial and industrial capitalism, and the historical forms of economic crises. During the various periods of his life in which different aspects of his overall social theory are stressed—an idealist philosophy of humanity, historical materialism and functionalism, economic disequilibrium and structural crises, and communal democracy—it is Aristotle's ethical and political writings that shape Marx's practical response to modernity.

Weber's earliest writings focus on the agrarian civilizations of ancient Greece and Rome and on the historical origins of ancient capitalism and the market economy. He tends to stress a darker and more pessimistic side of Hellenic culture by filtering his view of Aristotle and the Greeks through the prism of Nietzsche's focus on suffering and the tragic fate of humanity, Apollonian and Dionysian aesthetic drives, the anthropological and epistemological assumptions of early Greek materialist philosophy, and the critique of utilitarians, technicians, and bureaucrats as the last men in a rationalized cage of formal science. Less obvious in Weber, but no less important, are the methodological implications of *phronesis*, virtue, and the conduct of life, that is, the structures and constitutions of political life, for creating a cultural science. Elements of ancient law and politics are reformulated to accommodate the needs of an historical hermeneutics. *Phronesis* becomes a key principle in his interpretive sociology. In the end, it is Aristotle's theory of universal, productive, and practical knowledge which provides the philosophical legitimation and framework for Weber's theory of science (*Wissenschaftslehre*), historical hermeneutics of subjective and objective meaning, and sociology of understanding (*verstehende Soziologie*). Practical reason is infused throughout the methodology of Weber's hermeneutical science: understanding of culture and action, dialectic of logical inconsistencies and structural contradictions, judgment of ideals and consequences, and critique of social problems and public policy. Using this approach, Weber develops an understanding and explanation of culture, history, and structure. As in the case of both Marx and Durkheim, Weber too rejects abstract, idealistic moralizing and neo-Platonic valuation. He recognizes, however, that ethical values and social critique are essential parts of the epistemology and method

of historical science. Without ethics, there is no nineteenth-century social theory; without justice, there is no science.

Finally, Durkheim also writes his dissertations on ancient civilizations and political constitutions, stressing the themes of punitive law, division of labor, and communal solidarity. During his academic career, he offers lectures at a number of French universities on ancient Greece and the origins of society, as well as teaching specific courses on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* and on neoclassical political philosophy, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *The Social Contract* (1762) and *Émile* (1762) and Baron de Montesquieu's *The Spirit of Laws* (1748). Aristotle remains important to Durkheim throughout his life as the basis for his discussions about communitarianism, social justice, public moral education, professional ethics, citizenship, and democratic socialism.

In chapter 3, "Kant on the Critique of Reason and Science," the epistemological and moral writings of Kant will be examined. According to his own statements, Kant was awakened from a dogmatic slumber by the writings of David Hume. Considered by some to be the source of modern positivism, Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748) outlines his philosophy of knowledge and empiricism as well as his theory of skepticism and critique of the foundations of modern science. In the history of modern philosophy, there are two radically distinct ways of approaching Hume's philosophical positions. The first approach is to view him as the defender of objectivism (affirming the existence of an external knowable reality), realism (affirming that ideas reflect objective reality), and naturalism (asserting that universal laws of natural science are the only legitimate form of knowledge) found in his theory of impressions and ideas.⁵ The second perspective stresses his critique of the traditional philosophical discussions about the nature of substance, causality, and the self. Hume argues that there is, in fact, no philosophical justification for accepting the reality of independent objects, causal relationships in nature, or the existence of an autonomous self that comes to us through the act of knowing. The objective reality of the three foremost categories of Western thought—substance, causality, and self—is dissolved, and with it the science upon which it depends. Ontology and epistemology clash, as the latter is not capable of justifying or validating the former, and the former proves incapable of providing the physical and metaphysical foundations for the latter. According to Hume, perception is unable to provide us with an objective experience of the world around us. In turn, cause and effect relations cannot be justified either by reason or experience, by logic or empirical induction. To create the seemingly concrete world of external objects, causal interrelationships, and a unified, coherent knower who integrates a knowledge of objectivity requires the intervention of the psychological mechanism of habit and custom. Objectivity is the product of sensations and the imagination.

Agreeing with Hume, Kant argues that the organizational structure and systematic coherence of objectivity do not come from logic, experience, or the world. For him, they are a product of the a priori forms of sensibility and the understanding, that is, they arise out of consciousness itself. The associations of experiences are held together by the “synthetic unity of apperception” or the “I think” that accompanies all our representations and thoughts. Experiences and judgments are accepted as mine only because of the ability of the mind to give order and unity to representations over time. In the end, it is the unity of consciousness that provides the indispensable precondition for the constitution of empirical reality; it is this constitutive subjectivity and its synthesizing of ideas that create the unity of the external objects. The ability to refer to objects as coherent entities, or to create an empirical reality in which the sensations of perception inhere, results from the more fundamental power of the mind to organize the sensations and ideas into a unified and external substance. Abstract concepts help hold the world of perception and experience together, but this very world is made possible only by the objective coherence and synthetic unity provided by the transcendental categories of the mind.

Kant’s critical theory investigates the limits of human knowledge and pure reason and their application to human experience. This requires a detailed reflection on the types of legitimate and meaningful judgments about the world, as well as the nature of the two major components of cognition in sensibility and understanding. He begins his quest for the justification and grounding of modern science in the concepts and forms of subjectivity by first outlining and then expanding upon the types of judgment about the world. As he indicates in the introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781 and 1787), Kant’s work is concerned with the fundamental question of how a priori synthetic judgments are possible. How can we have universal and necessary (a priori) knowledge about the world yet at the same time expand our understanding of new experiences (synthetic); how can mathematics and natural science be philosophically validated after the criticisms found in Hume’s empiricist theory of knowledge? To accomplish this he will spend much of his academic career examining the nature of empirical judgments, since the laws of nature are ultimately manifestations of the subjective laws connecting everyday ideas and thoughts.

By accepting the two arguments that the mind plays an active role in knowing and that knowledge is based on sense impressions and intuitions, Kant attempts to integrate both rationalism and empiricism into his theory of subjective idealism. The result is his revolutionary theory of subjectivity. Concerning the importance of his insight, Theodor Adorno in his 1959 lectures at the University of Frankfurt remarked: “The Kantian theory of cognition proclaims that the world in its objectivity is actually the product of my subjectivity.”⁶ However, Adorno recognized that the theory of sub-

jectivity is only part of this Copernican revolution in thought. Kant is also concerned with firmly establishing the objective validity of ideas as they relate to nature, as well as establishing the existence of the objective reality of nature itself. All these components fit tightly together: the ontological dimension of reality, the validity of the concepts of natural science, and the objectivity of cognition. The tension between the subjective and nominalist constructivism of Kantian philosophy and its stated goal of justifying natural science as universal and absolute truth, that is, the tension between idealism and empiricism, is only one of many interesting conflicts running throughout Kant's theory of cognition that will be discussed by later philosophers and social theorists in the nineteenth century.

In the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* (1785), Kant turns his attention to moral philosophy and a critique of practical reason in which he attempts to establish the primacy of moral self-determination in human reason independent of any external religious, political, or moral authority. Reason, with its own powers of self-reflexivity, now becomes the supreme authority of cognitive and moral truths, as it ruthlessly rejects all forms of dogmatism, theology, and metaphysics. The basic principle underlying practical action is the categorical imperative, which supplies the logical structure for determining and judging moral activities. There are a number of principles which guide moral decisions: the principles of universalism, natural law, human dignity, individual autonomy, and the kingdom of ends. According to Kant, neither empirical interests, the search for happiness, nor good intentions can be the basis for moral action. The foundation for moral obligation cannot be found in empiricism, for example in self-interest and utilitarian happiness, or in rationalism, for example in natural rights and the state of nature, but lies in the a priori conceptions of practical reason itself. A particular action must be seen as abstract and universal, that is, as capable of serving as a natural law transcending individual interests and intentions.

Just as in Kant's theory of knowledge and critique of pure reason, the human mind as practical reason is capable of providing universal principles that give purpose and meaning to moral activity. There is also an underrepresented social component to his theory which stresses the centrality of moral autonomy and human dignity within a kingdom of ends. Persons must not be treated as means to ends but only as ends in themselves. Moral, political, and economic actions in which individuals are treated from a utilitarian or instrumentalist perspective are unacceptable and contradict the basic laws of Kantian moral philosophy. The ultimate purpose of practical reason is the self-legislation and self-determination of the will and the creation of a society in which individuals have innate dignity and freedom. Rather than building a moral philosophy on the market, on private property, or on natural rights, Kant stresses the importance of individual reason, human dignity, and

personal freedom. This position, although it contains elements of modern liberalism and individualism, certainly breaks with traditional Enlightenment values expressed in utilitarian philosophy and classical economics. Elements of this critical theory of moral knowledge will be accepted as the founding principles of nineteenth-century social theory and combined with Aristotle's theory of economic and political justice.

Chapter 4, "Kant and Classical Social Theory," summarizes the influence of Kant on later phenomenological, existential, and hermeneutical philosophies, which, in turn, frame the paradigm of discourse for classical social theory. The resolution of Kant's epistemological problems and the inconsistencies between his appropriation of elements of both empiricism and idealism, objective realism and constitutive nominalism, have been a familiar point of contention found in the writings of later followers of his philosophy. How they deal with these conflicting issues helps define their methodological approaches to questions of objectivity and science. Sociology is formed through the dialectical interrelationships between external objectivity and internal subjectivity, between explanation and interpretation, and between functionalism and justice. It also focuses on the relationship between ideas and reality, that is, how social consciousness constitutes the objective world at the same time as it claims objective validity for its ideas. This is the grand problem of objectivity; the dualism between ontology, or reality, and epistemology, or knowledge, reflects the heart of the methodological problem in the logic of the social sciences throughout the twentieth century. The more one side is emphasized, the more problematic becomes the other.

Kant claims that the formal principles and a priori laws of human thought and judgment rest in a universal and unchanging subjectivity. Later, Georg Friedrich Hegel expands this insight about the role of the mind in perception and thought in a theory of history and society in his phenomenological analysis of the Objective Spirit in the culture and institutions of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment; Arthur Schopenhauer further radicalizes the Kantian theory of knowledge by claiming that we can know only our own representations, which form the veil of Maya, and cannot escape the conceptual forms of our own mind; Friedrich Nietzsche pushes the perspective even further with his argument that there is no truth among the "shadows of God," and there is no objective reality, only subjective experiences and reified idols that have no objectively relevant meaning or purpose; finally, the neo-Kantians, Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, expand upon Kant's ideas of subjectivity and appearances for their relevancy for an interpretive and historical understanding of the social world. In turn, these theories of subjectivity are again modified by European theorists from philosophical categories into sociological categories. Constitutive subjectivity with a transcendental or phenomenological theory

of categories is transformed by the classical tradition into the political ideology and historical consciousness of Marx, the interpretive inquiry of value relevance and ideal types of Weber, and the pragmatic idealism of social facts and collective representations of Durkheim.

The philosophical discussion which follows the work of Kant centers on the nature of his theory of knowledge and the validity and applicability of the categories of the understanding. The epistemological, ontological, and methodological meanings of subjective concepts have enormous influence on the development of nineteenth-century sociology. Is there a social world that is knowable in itself and is reflected in sociological categories, or is the sociological experience always an interpretation of the constitutive mind? Is there an empirical reality in itself; are there social facts independent of consciousness; and what do they mean? How is knowledge about society validated if realism, objectivism, and naturalism are rejected by a Kantian theory of cognition and representations? What are the major differences within sociology between the tradition of scientific explanation of hypothetical and predictive laws and the tradition of interpretive understanding of meaningful intentions within social action? Are the methods of understanding and explanation compatible in the same social theory, and how do they affect one another? What is the epistemological justification of modern social science if empiricism and rationalism are replaced by radical variations on the themes of Kantian idealism found in phenomenology, existentialism, critical epistemology, and cultural hermeneutics?

The traditional methodological distinctions loudly expressed in the secondary literature between the early philosophical idealism and the later scientific positivism of Marx, between the neo-Kantian epistemology and the positivist methodology of value freedom and scholastic neutrality of Weber, and between the early functionalism and positivism and the later idealism and sociology of knowledge of Durkheim are illusions based on false premises and misinterpretations of their ideas. It may still be an unorthodox position, but the argument undertaken in the following pages is that none of the classical authors accepted the epistemological or methodological assumptions of positivism since all turned instead to Aristotle's *phronesis* and Kant's critique for philosophical guidance. This is what makes the classical period of sociology so distinctive and exciting. With later interpretations of these three key authors, their break with Enlightenment rationality and methods is displaced by alternative narratives which turn them into mainstream theorists. Over time, dogmatism and orthodoxy replace critical science. The philosophical traditions which gave rise to their ideas are repressed, their methodological and epistemological advances are glossed over, and their profound and radical criticisms of modernity are forgotten. As positivist social science advances, the relationships within social theory between *phronesis* and *praxis* are lost. In the meantime, a new discipline is created in which theory is replaced

by methodology, critique by a truncated empirical science, ethics by value neutrality, and historical analysis by quantitative and qualitative research.

The primacy of moral autonomy in Kantian philosophy is expressed by the primacy of self-determination and individual freedom in Marx, human dignity and professional integrity in Weber, and equality and justice in Durkheim. With the disenchantment of science, these ethical ideals and their accompanying classical horizons are forgotten along with their central focus on the relationship between political economy and social justice. The classical tradition raises questions about the structural contradictions of capitalism and their implications for the loss of creativity, self-determination, and species potentiality in Marx, the historical meaning of character formation and personal dignity in a cage of formal reason in Weber, and the loss of human freedom and social equality in a society characterized by functional and moral disequilibrium in Durkheim. Functionalism and social critique or science and social justice are not antithetical approaches, conflicting concepts, or antagonistic value systems but are integrated into a new form of critical social theory.

In the nineteenth century, Aristotle's political theories of justice, knowledge, and *phronesis* are integrated with Kant's moral philosophy of the categorical imperative, epistemological constructivism, and theory of interpretive understanding. The functionalism of both the early Marx and early Durkheim has usually been viewed as part of a positivist project used to predict functional breakdowns, economic crises, or the rise in suicide rates. By placing these authors within the ancient and modern ethical traditions and by viewing them in the context of Aristotelian and Kantian themes, an alternative interpretation evolves. In Marx's case, the critical functionalism of his early and middle period is connected to his theories of historical materialism, the logic of capital, and economic crises, whereas in the case of Durkheim, functionalism is based on cultural crises and anomic weakening of organic solidarity. In both situations, their analyses are bound to broader concerns with issues of social justice, equality, and freedom and not, as is generally supposed, with issues of social explanation, systems stability, or technological prediction. For both authors, functionalism is connected to deeper ethical questions about the direction of modern social institutions and their effects on human dignity and democratic participation. For Weber, as a neo-Aristotelian economist, it is his historical structuralism and study of the origins of modern capitalism that provide the content for his social ethics and critique of the formal rationality of the bureaucratic and technological iron cage. Through a rigorous examination of the disenchantment and prejudice of reason and a subsequent demystification of objectivity and science in his theory of science (*Wissenschaftslehre*), Weber reintroduces practical reason and ethics into the areas of social science, social problems, and public policy. In his historical writings on ancient Greece and Rome,

Weber also constructs an early economic and materialist functionalism which later evolves into an idealist functionalism of cultural and religious revolutions, personality developments within different societies, and a systematic sociology of knowledge and religion.

With their historical studies of the rationalization and domination of work and production, the colonization of the autonomous individual by the distorted values and priorities of possessive individualism, economic materialism, and utilitarianism, the functional instability of the capitalist economy, and the progressive disintegration of a narcissistic culture, the classical theorists reflect a profound loss of reason, ethics, and personal freedom in society. The rationalized institutions of the last man do not manifest the ideals of human dignity or the kingdom of ends. All three theorists attempt to give voice to these philosophical issues, but in the context of an historical analysis of the structures and institutions of modern industrial society. That is, they attempt to build an empirically based ethical science.

Philosophy evolves over time into sociology as the epistemological questions of the forms of constitutive subjectivity, the categories of the mind, and the nature of cognition change into questions about ideology, neo-Kantian methodology, and the social construction of reality. In the same way, the historical and social emphases on issues of individual autonomy, moral freedom, human dignity, critique of political economy, and the constitution of social justice transform moral philosophy into an ethical social theory. Science and ethics, like knowledge and justice, become inseparable in this post-Enlightenment view of critical theory. Sociology is forged as a collective witness to the rise of capitalist production and liberal democracy through a collaborative dialogue between the ancients and the moderns. The philosophical questions raised by Aristotle and Kant have not changed with the creation of sociology; they have been seamlessly embedded in a critical social science.

In the Conclusion, “Dreams of Classical Reason,” summary insights into the theoretical and metatheoretical implications of the Hellenic rebirth of art, politics, and practical science in classical sociology are offered. Marx, Weber, and Durkheim create a distinct new form of social science based on a critical theory of knowledge, that is, the sociological appropriation of Kant’s method of critique and Aristotle’s method of *phronesis*. Sociology becomes an historical conversation between converging traditions in which epistemological and methodological reflections develop out of the questions posed by social theory. In this process, an historical understanding and a real fusion of temporal horizons takes place.⁷ By this means, a critical and historical science is formed in the classical tradition. With these different schools of philosophy, the classical social theorists form three distinct views of critical and ethical science—*dialectical*, *interpretive*, and *moral*—which are designed to bring about an historical and cultural understanding as well as a structural

and functional explanation of modernity combined with a theory of social justice and individual freedom. Justice is to be found in economic production and exchange, personality development, and communal solidarity.

Science and ethics together provide a comprehensive analysis of the cultural values and social institutions of capitalist production and distribution. This represents a manifest unity of theory and practice in the early stages of the development of modern social theory. The social and political thought of the nineteenth century portrays the collective dreams of classical reason along with its hopes of imagining a dancing star, that is, the hopes of imagining possibilities beyond Enlightenment rationality, individual morality, and capitalist political economy.⁸ Their practical ideals soar to the heights of an ethical and historical science embedded in the principles of natural law, social justice, and classical reason. Their goal is to understand the moral quality and inherent nobility of human existence and the possibilities of human *praxis* expressed in the history, culture, structures, and functions of society; this is done in order that individuals and nations could make more rational choices about their own future.

At the beginning of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche narrates the story of a prophet who, having lived a life of solitude in the mountains for ten years, returned to the marketplace to deliver his message about the “overman,” a new type of emancipated and striving individual having characteristics quite different from the decadence of the last man. However, the prophet was not understood by those who heard him. In a similar fashion, the social theorists attempted to give voice to their classical vision of economic and political ideals and their rage against the darkness of modernity, but their hopes and ideals fell upon deaf ears, unappreciated and misunderstood. Their own dreams were exiled to a distant land, and the traditions that gave them birth were repressed and misplaced. It is to these silent dreams of practical reason that we now turn.

CHAPTER ONE

ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE AND CLASSICAL DEMOCRACY

Aristotle was born in Stagira in the northeastern part of Greece in the early part of the fourth century BCE. He was raised in a wealthy family and was provided all the privileges and benefits of his class position. His father was the physician to the king of Macedonia. Around 367 he joined the Academy of Plato in Athens. After twenty years of lectures, seminars, and research, he became tutor to Alexander the Great. In 335 he formed his own school of philosophy in the public gymnasium named the Lyceum. This chapter will focus on those ideas of Aristotle that were specifically influential on the development of the theories, methods, and ideals of nineteenth-century European social theorists, including his ethical and political writings on social justice, critique of political economy and unnatural market activities, theory of knowledge and science (*episteme*, *phronesis*, and *techne*), analysis of the virtuous life and political happiness (*eudaimonia*), and investigation into the social constitution of a democratic polity.¹

Aristotle's dreams of human potentiality and civic happiness were tempered by his sociological awareness of the institutional limits and structural possibilities of Athenian democracy. Dreams were always measured by potentialities, political values by social institutions, and the Athenian imagination by empirical reality. The deep-blue skies of Athens that inspired the mind to soar to unimagined and unimaginable heights of the sublime and the beautiful during the classical period were always restrained by the stark landscape of Attica. The blending together of the worlds of philosophy and social science led Emile Durkheim to the conclusion that this ancient philosopher, along with Plato, was one of the first sociologists.² To make this argument more precise, Aristotle was the first to examine a variation of the "AGIL" schema, that is, the interconnections among economics, politics, personality development (character, virtue, and cultural pedagogy),

and law and social institutions. He saw the complex interweaving between virtue and social institutions, ideas and structures, moral action and politics.³ The discussion of ethics was to be framed by a broader consideration of the legal constitution and moral economy of the Athenian polity. The fields of ethics, politics, and economics were to be the integrated basis of a critical moral philosophy of political science, as well as the social foundation for the realization of human nature.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*, Aristotle examines the relationship between the good and constitutions, that is, between the virtuous life and the political institutions that nurture and sustain it. These two works should be viewed as one joint statement about the nature of the good life. The *Nicomachean Ethics* begins with an examination of the “function of man,” moral and intellectual virtue, and political happiness, and it quickly opens two paths of analysis. The first is clearly philosophical, as each following book in the work details the specific ethical principles of virtue and the common good in terms of practical wisdom, social justice, and the friendship of virtue. The second path is sociological, as Aristotle attempts to give institutional life to his ethical principles. He knew that by themselves, without proper institutional support and protection, social ideals would wither and die. By means of empirical examples and historical research, he delves into the details of the ancient political constitutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage; he discusses the various forms of the correct and deviant political arrangements; he examines the democratic polity in general and the Athenian constitution from Solon to Pericles in particular; and he outlines the decline of a moral economy based on friendship and justice into a political economy of class, wealth, and power. The moral ideals of friendship, social justice, and practical knowledge are juxtaposed with their institutional counterparts of a moral economy, correct political constitutions, and ideal democratic polity. Philosophy and sociology are elegantly combined in Aristotle to offer the reader a delicate balance between principles and structures, ideals and reality, cultural values and social institutions. It is this very combination of ethical and political reflection within historical research—a practical science—that may be Aristotle’s lasting contribution to social theory in the nineteenth century.

HAPPINESS AS VIRTUE, NOBILITY, AND REASON

Immanuel Bekker, who was a classicist at the University of Berlin, created the first modern edition in Greek of Aristotle’s grand works in the nineteenth century. The *Nicomachean Ethics* examines the nature of virtue (*arete*), character, knowledge, and justice, whereas the *Politics* concentrates on the moral economy and political institutions that make the realization of virtuous living and the good life possible. Before Aristotle delves into these

issues, he focuses on the simple question of the ultimate *telos*, or purpose, of human existence. He characterizes this question as “the function of man,” which colors the development of his philosophical, historical, and sociological analyses. Some have argued that the *Nicomachean Ethics* deals with the moral life of the individual, whereas the *Politics* examines the social life. Although this is technically correct, it misses the necessary dynamic that Aristotle is making between the individual and social moments of human life; the two components are inextricably bound together since one without the other is impossible.

Aristotle raises the issue of the central function or activity of man as the crucial question that will permit the philosopher access to the nature of happiness and the highest good for humanity. Every activity, whether it is medicine, military strategy, or the arts, seeks some particular good as its goal. It may be health, victory in war, or the creation of a beautiful piece of artwork. Although Aristotle inquires into these particular activities, he is ultimately searching for the final good in itself. This is the good without qualification or reservation. He begins with a philosophical anthropology based on nature (*physis*) that grounds his understanding of the law, constitution (*politeia*), and moral economy. He rejects the notion that honor, pleasure, and virtue are ends in themselves, because they are used as means to further the happiness of the individual. He asks: what is that human activity which produces the greatest happiness and is an end in itself—that which is done for no higher good than the activity itself? The continuation of life, nutrition, growth, and perception are not characteristics specific to humans, as they are shared by all living animals. Further, Aristotle quickly and unceremoniously rejects the view of the individual that will become the foundation for modern natural rights and utilitarian thinkers. The function of man is to achieve a certain kind of distinctively human life that involves an “activity of the soul which follows or implies a rational principle.”⁴ Life means more than mere continuance of existence or search for private pleasure or personal happiness. Rather, it involves a rational activity undertaken for the moral perfection of goodness and nobility. Aristotle contends that the flute player, the sculptor, and the artist have distinct functions. It is in the performance of their activities according to the highest standards that the good of the activity resides. Whether it is playing a song, creating a frieze, or painting a fresco, the activity of each person expresses the highest good of each function. According to Aristotle, happiness is the final good without qualification; it does not require any further activity or purpose. Being self-sufficient and pleasant in itself, it is the end of all other action.

That activity, which is so distinctive of human beings in general, is the rational life in search of virtue and happiness.⁵ It is in the exercise and expression of rational thought and reflection in a good and noble manner that the defining characteristics of human life are to be found. Aristotle

proceeds to take the reader on a journey of profound significance as he outlines before us the nature of a life in pursuit of reason. Some secondary interpreters have stressed the moral autonomy, human dignity, and moral sensitivity within Aristotle's ethics. Although they are important issues, they must be connected in the end to the profoundly radical political dimension of his discourse.⁶ Practical reason is not a cognitive capability or philosophical contemplation that is exercised in isolation from others, but rather a political moment of intersubjective dialogue. It is the foundation of human happiness and a democratic polity. Aristotle turns to examine the nature of virtue as both intellectual (*episteme*, *techne*, and *phronesis*) and moral (courage, temperance, truthfulness, friendliness, nobility, honor, and justice). In the practice of virtue, the individual is bonded to the constitutional polity by practical wisdom, deliberative judgment, and social justice. The exercise of practical reason entails individual deliberation, a moral economy, political constitution, and the law. The individual and social elements are analytically distinct for the sake of analysis and clarity, but personality and politics are indistinguishable in reality.

Happiness, then, is the most prized, beautiful, and pleasant activity possible that realizes the full potential of human beings as political animals. It is that which is good and noble in itself, that is, self-conscious, virtuous activity within the polis. The concept that captures the full ramification of this activity is practical reason, which has both a micro and a macro component. Rejecting Plato's theory of the Idea of the good as the philosophical contemplation of the essential truths and absolute Forms, Aristotle views practical wisdom (*phronesis*) as the nurturing of reason and virtue within the more contingent and empirical process bounded by the political constitution. Action is framed by the historical circumstances and lived experiences of law, tradition, education, and politics. These institutions help create the firm and stable "states of character" or moral personality that rationally direct virtuous activity toward the good life. As Aristotle views it, all virtuous action is concerned with pleasure and pain, which are the passions that help motivate us in certain directions and ultimately define our moral character. But the passions are also the reason why certain individuals become bad. Virtue is measured by the rule of pleasure and pain and our reactions to them. In our search for moral excellence and in our reaction to pleasure and pain, character is formed. In some cases, pleasure may force us into disreputable and bad actions, while in others, the avoidance of pain could restrain us from noble and courageous actions. It is for these reasons that culture and education (*paideia*) are central to the full development of the proper moral character with its appropriate sensitivity to and balance of the passions under the guidance of reflective moderation and softened temperance. A cultured reason, matured over time and cognizant of tradition, helps the individual navigate carefully through the dangerous and

conflicting passions of Scylla and Charybdis. Reason restrains our passions and moderately guides our desires by applying the right rule. Only in this way is moral excellence possible.

Although Aristotle argues that the virtuous act must be pleasurable, pain too may be associated with virtue. Temperance is developed by the avoidance of certain extreme pleasures, while a courageous and noble reaction to pain and misfortune can be the basis for happiness and a “greatness of soul.” Happiness is measured by how the noble individual responds to the circumstances of life. Aristotle is aware, however, that in the case of Priam, who watched the fall of mighty Troy from its lofty towers, these circumstances on rare occasions may so totally overwhelm the individual that even a virtuous life cannot result in happiness. Virtue must be a self-consciously chosen pleasurable act undertaken in order to satisfy the state of the soul. But even an excess of pleasure and pain can be dangerous. For the lover of virtue, action is a pleasure which through learning and the law becomes ingrained in the citizen’s character. In Aristotle’s eyes, a person who does not receive pleasure from virtuous activity can never be virtuous. “Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world.”⁷ It is a way of life that realizes the natural potentiality of human beings by combining the passions and reason.

We become virtuous not by knowing about virtue, but by doing virtuous acts. Aristotle outlines the general conditions in which actions become moral: the actor must have clear knowledge of the goals and the proper means of reaching them; he must choose them freely; and the decision must come from his unchanging character. Knowledge, reason, self-determination, moral autonomy, and a virtuous character ground action as morally good. Activities undertaken for different reasons and under different conditions cannot be morally justified. Aristotle summarizes his argument: “Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.”⁸

The ultimate goal of practical wisdom is not knowledge but action. Just as the builder and lyre player excel only through continuous work and practice, the virtuous and just develop their abilities through the practice of virtue and justice. Over time this action becomes habituated into the character and values of the citizen. Individual experience becomes institutionalized in education, legislation, tradition, and the constitution. Aristotle contends that most people seek refuge in the abstract theory of philosophers in order to avoid the difficult task of implementing the principles of reason. He draws the analogy of the patient who freely seeks advice from a physician but who is equally loathe to act upon it. Knowledge offers us consolation and retreat while action requires a transformation of life and character. A life of virtue involves following the intermediate path, avoiding the extreme

vices of excess and deficit; it is a search for the middle. A moderate life of neither too much nor too little provides the moral guidelines for economic activity and communal participation. Just as in the creation of a great piece of art, any more or less would destroy its perfection. Excess or deficit of any virtue destroys that virtue and goodness. An extreme of courage, meaning too little or too much, could result in rashness or cowardice, and an excess of temperance could result in self-indulgence or a deficiency in sensitivity.

How moderation is to be achieved is not through a mechanical measurement of the mean, but through accumulated wisdom of the best course of action in particular cases resulting from years of experience and critical judgment. Although acting rationally with moderation is a universal principle, it must be applied in individual cases. The universal rule, the right rule of reason, must be adapted and adjusted to the particular circumstances of the moral situation. Thus, reason harmonizes the universal and the particular in each case. The result is a life of intermediate passions and actions. According to Aristotle, a virtuous life is one characterized by friendliness, generosity, magnificence, good temperament, modesty, temperance, truthfulness, courage, nobility, honor, and justice. When the goodness of character of moral virtues is joined to the virtue of practical reason and understanding, the result is happiness and a good life.

In the Athenian political community, three major types of persons inhabited the shops and the exciting arena of the agora: philosophers, citizens, and workers. Corresponding to them were three different life activities—theoretical contemplation (*theoria*), political activity (*praxis*), and utilitarian work (*poiesis*)—with their three corresponding forms of knowledge—*episteme*, or the universal and theoretical knowledge of the philosopher, *phronesis*, or the practical knowledge and political wisdom of the citizen, and *techne*, or the instrumental skills and technical knowledge of the artisan and worker. It is around these distinctions that Aristotle develops his theory of ethics and the virtuous life of practical reason. The *Nicomachean Ethics* is so structured that the central focus of the work involves an examination of the practical wisdom (*phronesis*) of the citizen in the discharging of his constitutional duties and obligations through political participation within the community. This analysis of practical wisdom is framed by the first few books on the particular nature of happiness and the good life, moral virtue, the good character, individual deliberation, and discursive rationality. This emphasis on the nature of the moral individual is balanced by a discussion of the structural features of the polity which encourage and habituate practical wisdom. These institutions include friendship, citizenship, household economy, and social justice. The *Politics* develops further this macro-sociological inquiry into the correct political constitutions, moral economy, and critique of unnatural wealth acquisition in the market. This relationship between the virtuous life and law is best articulated in the Greek word for

deliberation (*bouleusis*) and the word for one of the main political organs in Athenian politics besides the Assembly and the jury courts, that is, the *Boule*, or Council of Five Hundred. The distinction between the individual and society disappears in the act of personal reflection and public deliberation, as the citizen expresses his full potential as a rational human being with others in public speech. In the life of the Athenian citizen, equilibrium is established, virtue assured, and practical wisdom achieved. These are the highest aspirations toward which human beings strive and the basis for a virtuous and happy life; they are the fullest realization of human potential and the function of man.

Aristotle's remarkable achievement is to define the parameters of ethics and the function of humanity in terms of virtue, wisdom, and justice supported and nurtured through the historical and social structures of Athenian law and a moral economy based on the ethical priorities of family, friendship, and citizenship.⁹ Philosophy and sociology are integrated in a common cause of defining the ultimate goals and natural law of the ancient community. Aristotle's theory of ethics and politics represents the ancient response to the question of the ultimate meaning and purpose of human life. The following subsections of this chapter will outline the philosophical parameters of moral and intellectual virtue by examining the forms of happiness, knowledge, and friendship found in classical Greece. After this analysis, the argument turns to Aristotle's sociology, with an inquiry into the history and structure of the moral economy, social justice, and best political constitution. Virtue and reason can be given real existence, just as the good life and happiness can best develop within the concrete economic and political institutions of the ancient polis.

The political dimension of human beings, both as an integral part of the definition of humanity and as its ultimate goal of perfection and self-sufficiency, is not an arbitrary construction of a social contract among competing individuals or groups. Rather, it is the essence of humanity to be a political animal. Unlike other living species who associate in groups and even express feelings of pleasure and pain through vocalizations, humans are the only ones who can engage in speech and, thus, exercise reason. Aristotle views the ability to reason in philosophy and in public to be the highest expression of the essence and function of man. Only humans can reason about ethics and politics; only humans can deliberate about the meaning of life; and only humans can talk about the nature of a just society. In this way, humans are capable of living the good life according to the values of moral and intellectual virtue as they are publicly articulated in the agora and *Pnyx*. Speech and reason are, for Aristotle, civic qualities that can be manifested only in the public act of deliberation and discourse. In the end, the state, through which the good life and fullest development of human beings are accomplished, has a natural priority over all other forms of associations

because it is the final end of human existence. Just as the hand and foot act according to the broader purpose of the whole body, the family and village associations are subordinate to the overall design and goals of the political community. Humanity does not just engage in political activity by simply forming constitutions and creating laws; they define their very being, their very essence, by participating in politics. Every social action is simply a supportive activity bound to the ultimate purpose of nature. The end of the good life is public happiness, defined as a life of virtuous activity, that is, a moderate, just life based upon human reason. This is what Aristotle refers to as the superiority and beauty of the soul. He concludes Book 1 of the *Politics* with the comment that the true concern of the economic management of the household is not the acquisition of commodities but the cultivation of human excellence (*arete*) and the development of the virtue of citizens. Economics for the ancient Greeks is ultimately an ethical science.

DEFENDING MORAL ECONOMY (*OIKONOMIKE*) AGAINST
POLITICAL ECONOMY (*CHREMATISTIKE*)

Aristotle's theory of social ethics focuses on the relationship between morality and politics, between virtue and structures. In his subtle blending of empirical and philosophical reason, he concentrates mainly on the social structures that affect and nurture virtuous life. In response to Plato, he is concerned less with knowledge of the forms of virtue than acting in a moderate and temperate fashion. His purpose is to develop the personal dispositions, passions, and social foundations for happiness and a just society. Since his goal is action rather than simply knowledge, he emphasizes the social and political means for promoting practical wisdom. This explains why at the end of his work on social ethics Aristotle explicitly begins to direct his attention toward an examination of the structures of law, constitutions, and justice. In the last paragraph of the *Nicomachean Ethics* he writes, "Now our predecessors have left the subject of legislation to us unexamined; it is perhaps best, therefore, that we should ourselves study it, and in general study the question of the constitution, in order to complete to the best of our ability our philosophy of human nature."¹⁰ Since the virtuous citizen is by nature political, Aristotle sets out to examine the available empirical and historical evidence about the nature of Greek constitutions, their origins and development. He is specifically interested in how they are organized, administered, maintained, and which are the best. Virtuous activity and happiness are possible only within a well-ordered political community; politics structures the way people interrelate, deliberate, and decide the crucial public questions that affect their lives. Reason, freedom, and virtue are always aspects of political life for the ancients, and the structures of politics provide the context in which they are defined and developed.

Before Aristotle introduces his analysis of politics and constitutions in the *Politics*, he first examines the general nature of a moral economy at the level of the *oikos* (household) and the *polis* (state). In this first chapter, he also creates his masterful and influential critique of political economy and market exchange. Aristotle's theory of economics is developed in four chapters in Book 1 of the *Politics*.

Aristotle begins his study by outlining the natural ways of life through his analysis of slavery, the family, household economy, the historical development of the state, and the market economy. In each case Aristotle seeks the "natural law" that governs the social relationships within each association, thus examining the interactions between the master-slave, husband-wife, citizens in the state, and economic exchange (*metabletike* or *allage*) among polis members. His purpose is to portray the natural forms of family life, property acquisition, market exchange, and political constitutions. Since economics is embedded in and subservient to the general values of the political community, Aristotle's economics provides the foundation stone for the later development of his theory of law and politics. For him, there are two kinds of natural acquisition of material goods or property: barter (C-C) and limited exchange (C-M-C). Corresponding to them, there are the deviant forms of economic activity, which include market exchange for profit (M-C-M') and the financial gain of interest (M-M'). The natural forms of property acquisition are based on satisfying the needs of the household and maintaining self-sufficiency within the family and community. The formal goal of the household (and polis) is economic autonomy by which the family is capable of subsisting on the products of its own agricultural production (autarchy).

The unnatural forms of economy are based on self-interest and economic gain that undermine the natural forms of social existence in the polis. With unnatural acquisition, the law and constitution are unable to sustain themselves, thereby perverting the functions or goals of man and the state. With the development of a market economy, utilitarian values, and the unlimited accumulation of property, the natural law of the economy is unsustainable, and with it a society founded upon virtue, reason, and deliberation is unsustainable. More than any other aspect of his social theory, this critique of political economy—market and property—will have enormous impact on nineteenth-century social theorists. Aristotle asks whether economic management of slaves, wife, and children within the household is part of household management or whether it requires a different form of knowledge and set of skills than the acquisition of property in an agrarian economy. Recognizing that there are philosophers on both sides of the issue, he contends that family and farming are to be seen as part of wealth acquisition, since life and the good life require a firm economic foundation. For this reason he moves to a consideration of the nature of property.

Aristotle begins his study of property with an analysis of slavery and then turns to an examination of the natural acquisition of property within the family in household management. In Book 1, chapter 8, he outlines the history of material acquisition by which human beings have obtained the means of sustaining different ways of life. From nomadic living, hunting, warfare, piracy, and fishing to agriculture, Aristotle investigates the main forms of productive labor. Nature has provided humans with the means of sustenance. Because nature is teleological and formed in such a way that everything has a purpose, it has providentially provided the goods and modes of production necessary for the continuance of human life. "If then nature makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has made all of them [animals] for the sake of man."¹¹ The goal of productive labor and wealth acquisition is the economic self-sufficiency for the good life in the family and state, and it is this which is the crucial end of household management. Disagreeing with Solon, Aristotle argues that wealth acquisition and accumulation, as well as the tools of economic administration, have boundaries and cannot be limitlessly sought or acquired. He concludes this section of the *Politics* with the comment that there must be a "natural kind of property." By arguing that nature clearly provides for the good life, that there are limits to material accumulation, and that there are natural forms of property, Aristotle provides the conditions for a theory of moral economy (*oikonomike*) and critique of political economy and unnatural wealth acquisition (*chrematistike*) in chapter 9.¹²

Wealth is characterized as the legal control over material goods, property, and slaves, as well as the disposition over administrative tools and skills. According to Aristotle, every piece of property has two functions or uses: consumption and exchange. The first use is legitimate; the second is illegitimate. He offers the simple example of the shoe craftsman. The proper use of the artisan's work is to create a product for immediate use and the satisfaction of a particular need. But he also recognizes that in classical Athens, the work of the artisan has been applied to exchange in the market for money or other commodities. The latter, for him, is not the first or proper use of the shoe. However, Aristotle immediately qualifies this position by recognizing that although the exchange of the shoe was not natural in the original household, it became necessary due to the transformation and growth of the local communities. At first, there were only households, and later, because of population growth, other associations were formed, binding families into larger political associations of villages and then the polis. With these larger associations, some form of exchange of material goods was required, since families could not always be self-sustaining units in an evolving and more complex economy. They produced too much of one product and not enough of another. Aristotle is quite clear that this later stage of development is still natural. The limit to the natural use or exchange of a product

lies in the satisfaction of a need. Production and accumulation beyond that limit established by nature are always inappropriate.

In the earliest times, members of different households would share their property and goods in the same way that members within a family share their belongings. This may be the most interesting observation by Aristotle and the most salient point of his economic theory. Economics had a moral function in binding members of the household together for the purpose of sustaining life and living the good life. Goods were originally held in common in the family. As families grew, goods continued to be shared generally within the household and between families on the basis of human need. The primary focus was on the family and on the satisfaction of its fundamental material cares. Economics was embedded in society and did not represent an independent social institution with its own laws and autonomous values. Sharing, human need, and friendship or mutual caring (*philia*) became the basis upon which economic exchange took place in the earliest Greek associations.¹³ Since the moral integrity and good of the family were the central ends of the economy, it became an ethical obligation to contribute one's share in the production process. Contribution, effort, and hard work were necessitated by the moral demands of the family and the satisfaction of its material comfort. They were the result of one's familial obligations, not the basis for the distribution of goods themselves. Barter compensated for the unequal distribution of the social wealth and attempted to reestablish equilibrium within the community. "Mutual need of the different goods made it essential to contribute one's share and it is on this basis that many of the non-Greek peoples still proceed, i.e. by exchange."¹⁴ Families with surplus in one product would directly barter for items they lacked. Barter between families within a local village was founded upon the same principle of sharing as that among members of the same household. But as Aristotle points out, barter was based on need and not utilitarian calculation or material desire. Families were bound by a social ethic in which equal exchange was replaced by the fulfillment of mutual needs and reciprocity. Just as in a family, what members of the community drew from the common store of goods was not measured or calculated; they were simply there for the benefit of the individual and the association. Just as there was an obligation to share within a household, so too must households band together to share their surplus production for the common good. The example of exchanging a surplus of wine for corn is offered by Aristotle. "Members of a single household shared all the belongings of that house, but members of different households shared many of the belongings of other houses, also."¹⁵ The obligation to participate in this process is itself based on nature and the broader responsibility to the survival of these communal associations. Aristotle's theory of the moral economy thus grounds production, distribution, exchange, and consumption in the primacy of ethics and the integrity and solidarity of the family and

village community. Only when the self-sufficiency of the family is threatened is the individual use of the goods called into question and potentially limited. Nature strives toward equilibrium, with barter as the means by which it is reestablished in production and distribution. By this means the self-sufficiency of the family and village is maintained.

This view of an integrated moral economy becomes the basis for Aristotle's critique of the unnatural forms of production and wealth acquisition, that is, critique of political economy and chrematistics. Profit and private interests soon began to facilitate transnational trade (*kapelike*), exchanging the surplus of one city-state for that of another. The natural link to the community was broken, and wealth acquisition took on a life and purpose of its own. The moral economy was replaced by the commercial trade and financial banking of a political economy in which wealth became the sole end of economic activity. Commercial trade and commodity production replaced material exchange, as the unlimited pursuit of wealth pushed aside the ideals of self-sufficiency, public happiness, and the common good as the foundation of the political community. Coined money and property became the central focus of human existence, as they were bargained for and accumulated without limit. Aristotle included shipping, transportation, wage labor, and skilled and unskilled labor within his analysis of retail trade. Manual labor is especially interesting. In his study of labor, based on the writings of Charetides of Paros and Apollodorus of Lemnos, he contends that because of its emphasis on physical and repetitive labor, there is a marked deterioration of the body and a development of an ignoble, slavish nature which is least likely to be motivated by virtue or reason.

Virtue, wisdom, law, and happiness—the ground of social ethics—were displaced by class inequality, economic power, political discontent, and market competition. Aristotle describes a forlorn world turned upside down with an inversion of its social dreams and political ideals. Reading the first book of the *Politics*, one can easily hear the lament for a world that was rapidly disappearing. There is nothing like this form of critical analysis in Western thought until the arrival of nineteenth-century social theory.¹⁶ In the fourth century BCE, Aristotle was still in a position to see the remnants of the older and more traditional cultural values and social economy. The public sphere was being transformed into a private marketplace that was ready to trade virtue for vice and justice for profit. The commodification of economic exchange dissolved traditional community ties, undermined political constitutions, distorted interpersonal relations, and repressed the need for social justice. The economy was no longer morally embedded in the polity, providing the material sustenance for its ultimate natural purpose of developing the human soul in accordance with virtue. The goal now became market success and private wealth.

The heart of economic activity no longer involved an exchange between local neighbors and community farmers attempting to barter for

missing items in their household pantry, nor was it even an exchange by citizens in the local market of the agora to supplement their physical needs. It had been transformed into an activity with its own laws, logic, and moral priorities, in which the cultural and political life of the community was turned into an object having a market price. Trade now involved the commercial activity of foreigners and merchant capitalists. The natural limits of economic activity were abandoned in favor of unlimited production and accumulation. The original social goals of equilibrium, self-sufficiency, and the telos of virtue that had given the economy its moral direction were no longer in place. The economy was beginning to take on a life of its own in opposition to its underlying political and ethical values. It metastasized into unrecognizable and unnatural forms. Human needs were transformed into market wants; the community was abandoned for commercial success and the accumulation of profits and property; the polity undermined by values antithetical to public virtue and practical wisdom; and happiness and the good life redefined as personal pleasure and private happiness. Utilitarian consumption and commercial enterprise distorted the moral obligations of civic friendship and communal responsibility. The shadow of modernity was already visible in the new economic institutions of the ancients—its tragic fate was already set in motion—and Aristotle became the first to sketch the landscape of this new political economy.

With the development of the market economy—expanded commercial trade (M-C-M') and interest gathering (M-M')—the very nature and definition of virtue became distorted. The political community built upon the moral values of the ancients underwent a remarkable and tragic transformation. The highest aspirations of humanity were turned into means for further accumulation of money: moral steadfastness became a demand for hard work and persistence, ethical moderation became market cautiousness, military courage became entrepreneurial risk-taking and confidence, justice became fair-market price, and practical wisdom became technical calculations of business opportunities and profit maximization. Virtue itself became the technical basis for a new consciousness of property accumulation and money making. Morality and virtue evolved into the market skills (*techne*) used for maximizing commercial profitability and business success. According to Aristotle, "For where enjoyment consists in excess, men look for that skill which produces the excess that is enjoyed. . . . But these people [commercial traders] turn all skills into skills of acquiring goods, as though that were the end and everything had to serve that end."¹⁷ The means had now become the ends of the good life as virtue became a tool for an expanded utilitarian calculus. A political community built upon the self-sufficiency of the *oikos* and the *polis*, human need and friendship, reciprocity and mutual sharing, a sense of communal responsibility and political obligation, and upon dedication to the law and constitution is a different kind of society than that built upon the market, individual consumption, class power, and inequality.

Nature is transformed in this quest for riches, as the individual replaces the community, money replaces virtue, and pleasure replaces civic happiness. Chrematistics, or unnatural wealth accumulation, distorts the ideals of the political community, turns its economic foundations into a means for property acquisition, and results in the moral inversion of justice and reason. That is, it inverts moral virtue and practical reason by turning them into a means for business success. Virtue becomes simply another technical skill for increasing production and acquiring wealth. It converts human needs into market wants and consumer desires, and it turns the public good into private pleasure; it perverts the ideals of a moral economy and social justice into a political economy for expanded production and profits. Ultimately, it subverts the political constitution and law of a democratic polity for the ideals of market commerce and commodity exchange. Aristotle recognizes that production is not production “in the full sense but only through exchange.”¹⁸ The process of production makes commodities readily available only to those who have effective demand, not those who have real needs. In a market economy, this distinction is crucial. Needs may be met within a moral economy, however a market economy demands payment of money to complete the transaction and the vital connection between production and consumption. Those without money, although having strong and unmet needs, cannot satisfy their material deficiency. The market no longer serves the more profound ethical needs of the polity but only responds to the market incentives of supply and demand. Profits motivate economic activity, not self-sufficiency and reciprocal friendship. Coinage artificially limits exchange to those possessing the ability to pay for the satisfaction of their needs. Unnatural economic activity has displaced natural needs and ethical obligations to the family and the polis, and in the process, property and profits have redefined the function of man.

In this transformed and reified economy, money becomes the telos of humanity. What was originally intended as a mechanism for the convenient measure and circulation of goods turns into a means of profit making without limit. The foundations of the family and political community weaken, as citizens are viewed as exploitable commodities. Justice and politics are displaced by chrematistics and the market in this reification of human relations. The natural law limits to wealth were viewed by Aristotle as lying in the common good along with human need and the self-sufficiency of the family and the polis. Natural law, articulated in the laws and customs of the political community, acted as the limits on the art of household management and natural growth. “For the amount of property of this kind which would give self-sufficiency for a good life is not limitless.”¹⁹ To move beyond the boundaries established by nature is to undermine the foundations for communal life and the constitution.²⁰ The liberty to expand limitlessly one’s material holdings could only result in the loss of personal freedom and public happiness. This is certainly a lesson that was not lost on the nineteenth-century critics of

modernity. After reflection on the nature of the moral economy, the next stage in the analysis of Aristotle's theory of society is a consideration of his view of the values and institutions of social justice.

ANCIENT DREAMS OF RECIPROCAL GRACE AND COMMUNAL JUSTICE

Discussion about the nature of justice is really a deliberation about virtue and the constitution of the state. Since justice is concerned with the full development of citizens within the political community, Aristotle undertakes a more complete analysis of this theme in Book 5 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He distinguishes between two broad types of justice: particular and universal. Particular justice focuses on economic issues and the general disposition of the social wealth of the community, on civil and criminal law, and on fairness in market exchange. Thus, its main concern is for the distribution of the public and private wealth of the polis on the basis of merit and need, with its final goal of solidifying the possibilities of universal justice. Aristotle distinguishes among distributive (*dianemtikos*), rectificatory (*diorthotikos*), and reciprocal (*antipeponthos*) justice. Universal justice, on the other hand, concentrates on justice as a whole within politics and is concerned more with the overall structure of law and constitution, which provides the political and pedagogical framework for happiness and a virtuous life. Justice represents the institutional context within which the virtuous life is completed. Together these various forms of justice constitute Aristotle's theory of social justice.

As in his reflections on law and constitutions, Aristotle begins his consideration of justice with the empirical. That is, he starts with the commonsense beliefs about the nature of justice in the everyday world. He asks, "What do we mean by justice?" The first characteristic of justice is that it is an aspect of virtue and a reflection of the character of just individuals. He then examines the different meanings of *justice* and the "unjust man," as well as the differences between actions which are unjust and those that are unfair. He concludes that justice, considered as a part of virtue or virtue in a particular action, is concerned mainly, though not exclusively, with equality, fairness, and economic distribution of the common goods of the household and the polis. This is what he refers to as particular justice. In these cases, the just must be both law-abiding and fair. A just man is one who avoids the injustice of acting according to the moral wickedness of self-indulgence, cowardice, or anger. Alternately, justice is not simply another kind of virtue or even the greatest of virtues. Rather, Aristotle views justice, in the wider sense of political justice, as the completion of virtue as a whole, since it integrates all the different forms of virtuous action and results in the full perfection of the citizen in the public realm. A just society is one which facilitates the creation of laws which encourage the development of just

individuals and political happiness, as well as a virtuous attitude toward others. This is what Aristotle calls “the exercise of virtue as a whole” for the common good. Although he begins with a review of the general disposition of character and the complete form of virtue, Aristotle is quick to shift away from the abstract and philosophical consideration of a virtuous community to a more detailed analysis of the social conditions which facilitate that kind of political association. This initial general reflection on the nature of justice as a whole is a preparatory move in his more detailed analysis of particular justice and his consideration of the underlying fairness of the institutions that organize the economy and distribute the material products of society. Aristotle views the relationship between particular and universal justice as that between the part and the whole.

The first form of particular justice is *distributive justice*, which centers on issues of fairness and equality. It involves the relative and proportional relationship between individuals and the ethical allocation of the economic and social benefits of society. The main issue is the distribution of public property and offices within the polis. How are the public wealth, communal booty, economic prizes and imperial rewards of conquest and treaties, collective economic enterprises in silver mining and grain trade, political offices, and social honors to be shared among the citizens? To avoid any internal social unrest and conflict, Aristotle suggests that they should be divided among the citizens equally. But the question remains: according to what ethical criterion is the equal distribution to take place? Who are equals in the ancient polis? The answer comes quickly to Aristotle. Distribution of the common honors and social wealth of the state among its citizens should be based on the measurement (*axia*) of merit or status. This response is provocative but does not easily resolve the problem. It only offers us a direction for further inquiry. In Book 3 of the *Politics*, Aristotle will emphasize the political dimension of distributive justice—the sharing of political power, honors, and administrative offices—and its relation to the social contribution of the individual to the common good. Here it is a question of who is a citizen and who should participate in key public offices, the Assembly, the Council, and the law courts.

According to Aristotle, public awards and common possessions are to be distributed to full citizens justly in accordance with the communal standard of merit. The latter is defined differently according to the social context and constitutional arrangements of the polis organized around democratic, oligarchic, or aristocratic principles. Merit and citizenship are characterized in a democracy by the activities of the freeman, in an oligarchy by the status of wealth and power or noble birth, and in an aristocracy by the accomplishments of virtue and moral excellence. Injustice involves an unequal and unfair arrangement in this process, whereby unequals are given equal treatment and rewards. Equality, on the other hand, is the intermediate condition between persons and things that determines the proportion in

which honors, offices, and property are to be distributed among individuals. In this way human dignity is ensured and maintained. In different societies equality will be defined differently between individuals. In a democracy, it will be universal among citizens, but in both an oligarchy and an aristocracy, equals will be limited by particular claims to wealth or virtue. Equals are those who participate as equal citizens in defining the law and legislating within the political process. Thus, the issue of merit in distributive justice, though initially defined in the discussion of particular justice in Book 5 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is closely tied to the broader issues of law and the correct constitutions of a democratic polity, monarchy, and aristocracy in Books 3 and 4 of the *Politics*. In these famous portions of Aristotle's work on ethics, distributive justice is related to the definition of citizenship and equal participation within different forms of political constitutions.

Distributive justice is defined in terms of the correct mathematical balance between equal citizens, although it may not necessarily be an equality of abstract numbers. Aristotle is not always clear, but he seems to suggest that distribution is just, not if everyone gets a specific equal amount or number of goods but if everyone gets goods in proportion to their perceived status within the community. Person A will be awarded prize B and person C will be awarded prize D. The proportional relationship between the persons and their awards is determined by an institutional community standard. As Aristotle says, "The conjunction, then, of the term A with C and of B with D is what is just in distribution, and this species of the just is intermediate, and the unjust is what violates the proportion."²¹ Justice is geometrically proportional and communally relative to the political status or merit of each individual established by the cultural principles and institutional relationships of the constitution. Injustice violates these proportions and principles by giving unequals equal amounts and equals unequal amounts. In this process, one person has too much and another has too little of the good. Aristotle likens this form of justice to the manner of redistribution of the common funds found in an economic partnership. Proportionate distribution is determined on the basis of initial contribution to the business enterprise. The more one person invests, the more that person receives from the final dispersal of the profits.

The second form of particular justice is *rectificatory* or *corrective justice*. It, too, is concerned with equality, redistribution, and the application of a correct mathematical proportion to rebalance the effects of unjust actions in the area of civil and criminal law. Its purpose is to rectify injuries resulting from unjust behavior in economic transactions involving the voluntary sale or purchase of goods, loans, pledges, deposits, and other activities of economic exchange. It also responds to injuries resulting from involuntary interaction between individuals, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, assault, murder, robbery, or abuse of slaves. The law abstracts from consideration of the specific character of the individuals involved in the transaction and

deals only with the particular nature of the injury under consideration. Whether the people involved are moral or evil, good or bad is irrelevant to the resolution of the legal transgression. The judge, who treats everyone involved in the lawsuit with equal respect and concern, attempts actively to return the situation to the way things were before the economic transgression or personal injury. By intervening in the situation, he thus attempts to mitigate the advantage resulting from the unjust action, reestablish a lost equality by penalizing the advantage of the aggressive party, and reward the disadvantaged with damages. This, too, requires a redistribution of goods or action. In cases involving personal injury and violence, the pain and suffering are redistributed to establish justice and rebalance inequality.

Rectificatory justice is the intermediate or mean between loss and gain, greater and less, or good and evil. The extremes are moderated to establish the natural balance that existed before the injustice took place. It is a variation of one individual having too much and another having too little. Aristotle was critical of *pleonexia*, or the state of greediness and the passionate desire of wanting more goods than others. With fair judgments, equality is restored, the original share is reestablished, the initial immoderate advantage of one person over another is negated, and the arithmetical proportion is reaffirmed. According to Aristotle, the judge (*dicastes*) is one who takes the original two equal parts as they were before the infraction and proceeds to judge and bisect (*dichastes*) the whole amount. In this way, he redivides and redistributes the illegal advantage by adding to one and subtracting from the other. Justice here involves an intermediate and arithmetical proportion by which the original relationship is reconfirmed. It does not involve any other type of redistribution based upon the broader needs of the citizen or community. Aristotle summarizes this type of justice by writing, "But when they get neither more nor less but just what belongs to themselves, they say that they have their own and they neither lose nor gain."²²

The third form of particular justice is *reciprocal* or *commutative justice* and expresses the natural fairness within economic exchange between farmers, workers, artisans, and foreigners (*metics*).²³ Unlike the use of common goods within a household and the mutual sharing (*metadosis*) between households, Aristotle now considers economic activity between citizens in the agora. If love and kindness are the basis of exchange among family, friends, and neighbors, he searches for the basis of exchange among citizens and strangers in the city market. As he first considers the issue, he asks whether the idea of reciprocal justice refers to the returning of pain and injury. He states the ethical position of both the Pythagoreans and the mythical Rhadamanthus, found in the work of Hesiod, who argue for justice as "suffering-in-turn" or retaliation of wrong-doing. Aristotle quickly rejects these passionate and negative positions and begins his analysis with a reflection on the role of the Temple of the Graces in economic exchange.²⁴ It is reciprocal justice and mutual sharing which in associations of exchange are responsible for

providing communal solidarity and social obligations which integrate the parts and hold the city together (*summenousin*). This is to be the foundation of economic exchange in the urban marketplace. Prices are determined on the basis of reciprocal proportion and not precise equal return.

As in the case of particular justice, economic relationships are embedded in a complex web of ethical obligations and political goals that preclude exchange itself from setting the moral principles for the economy or polity. Similar to Aristotle's standards for economic allocation based on merit and the common good in his analysis of distributive justice, the definition of terms is open to public debate. What he means by proportional requital or economic reciprocity is not always clear. The same set of questions reappear: what are the ethical and political standards for the correct or just proportion in a market exchange, and are they the same as the standards for merit and distribution of public goods? What is the relationship between the public and private within the polis, and is this a real distinction in classical antiquity? If Aristotle is setting out to answer the question of the ethical foundation for social solidarity and the distribution of material goods within the community, he does not provide sure footing in his response. Ultimately grace is translated by him into the institutional form of need and friendship, and it is these two ethical norms which are institutionalized in economic exchange.

The Temple of the Graces was a religious institution intended to reinforce the need for economic justice. It was located on the Acropolis, but there were also smaller roadside shrines throughout Athens to remind the people of the need to be generous to others who had shown kindness and generosity to them. Aristotle sees these shrines as important reminders to encourage proportional reciprocity and kindness in economic exchange. He says, "This is why they [the Greeks] give a prominent place to the temple of the Graces to promote the requital of services; for this is characteristic of grace—we should serve in return one who has shown grace to us, and should another time take the initiative in showing it."²⁵ The Temple serves as an expression of the objective memory and ethical standard for the direction of the economy. Exchange is not to be based on market prices, profits, economic advantage, supply and demand, subjective desires, or marginal utility. Rather, economics is simply a means to maintain the all-important social solidarity that integrates the community for its common efforts and pursuit of happiness. Grace, gift-giving, and hospitality, rather than chrematistics and money accumulation, are the foundation for economic exchange among citizens in the market.²⁶ Exchanges do not result in a balanced and equal exchange of one good for another. It always results in one side of the exchange receiving a little more since its original goal was kindness and not profits. After the exchange is completed, the recipient of grace should seek opportunities to return the favor or gift at another time by initiating a similar kindness. If grace and gratitude are to facilitate economic exchange and reciprocal justice, what is the original reason for this kind of economic activity?

Aristotle delves into the idea of proportionate return in more detail in order to uncover the real bases of material exchange in the city. The exchange is now between skilled and unskilled workers, as well as between artisans and metics who inhabit the center of urban life in the ancient polis. Aristotle sets up his famous model of exchange between a house builder and a shoemaker. If A is the builder, B the shoemaker, C a house, and D a shoe, what is the basis for the exchange of so many pairs of shoes for a house? How are shoes and a house to be made equal so that a fair exchange is possible? This has been at the heart of a debate in Western thought from the ancients down to the present day. How are the two commodities made commensurable so that they could be exchanged fairly? This concern for proportionate equality is difficult, especially in a market where goods to be exchanged are the product of different types of work and workers. There are differences in the quantity and quality of the workmanship, the time expended in labor, and the status of the workers—farmer, artisan, and doctor, or freeborn and slave, or citizen and foreign resident. Some artisans work harder and are more efficient, while others are more concerned with detail, quality, and beauty. There are goods produced which satisfy our basic physical needs and others which contribute to the public good.

What is the mechanism by which these different individuals and different products are mixed in exchange and made comparable and equal to produce a proportionate equality between them? Social worth, quantity, and quality deserve some measure of consideration in the determination of price.²⁷ Tradition passed down within the community accomplishes this over time. In the end, it is grace, articulated by Aristotle as need and friendship, which navigates these differences and makes exchange possible, equal, and fair. Need is similar to wants in that they both express some aspect of human survival. However, the former is a natural aspiration to the fulfillment of a material, aesthetic, or ethical deficiency, while the latter are subjective desires connected to the market and a competitive economy. Needs are those things which are necessary for life and communal well-being—the good—while wants are artificial and contingent drives open to manipulation and distortion by wider market forces and advertisement. Needs differ from subjective wants and desires because they refer to physical, ethical, and political requirements for the continued existence and self-sufficiency of the household and the polis. They are not connected to the subjective basis for market activity because the latter can be artificially stimulated and unnaturally maintained. These subjective wants are more closely connected to unnatural property acquisition that Aristotle considers in the *Politics*. Needs are the natural and moral conditions necessary for the fulfillment of a virtuous and good life; they are the physical and spiritual side of the powers and capabilities of social beings which promote the avoidance of excess. There are personal and communal dimensions to human need,

which is the foundation for reciprocal justice in ancient Greece. On the other hand, need limits physical desires and market exchange because they are tied to the natural requirements and sufficiencies of the individual and the body politic. Need connects the individual to the community, the constitution, and the law, and thus it is an essential building block of the polis.²⁸ Desires separate the private from the public and pursue the former at the expense of the latter. Finally, human need is a natural part of physical life and an organic part of the broader life and self-sufficiency of the community. Aristotle was the first to note the possible disappearance of the political sphere resulting from its displacement by economic freedom and the accumulation of property.

Karl Marx, in *Capital*, was critical of Aristotle's approach to this particular topic, but he admitted that the market economy and capitalism had not fully developed to the point where Aristotle could have been expected to appreciate how abstract and surplus labor and economic organization provided the solution to his problem of the commensurability of commodities. But is Aristotle incorrect, or is he merely raising a different set of questions than those offered by Marx? Marx focused on the conditions for the possibility of commodity exchange in an unnatural and exploitative political economy. Aristotle, on the other hand, asks questions about the nature of natural or virtuous exchange among citizens. Marx concentrated on the mechanism or means of exchange in a capitalist economy. Aristotle focuses on the telos or end of exchange in an ideal ancient economy. He forcefully states that without the reciprocal equality of goods, there will be no exchange. He sidesteps the question of commensurability briefly by stating that it is money which provides part of the solution to the problem.

According to Aristotle, money is an artificial convention introduced to help solve the problem of comparability and commensurability. It is the means by which different commodities are measured, problems of excess and defect in exchange are adjusted, and a quantitative price is given to material goods. Money ensures a sense of moderation in which one person does not get too much or too little in the process. Shoes, food, and house, are made equal and proportional in the market. This response by Aristotle has led some to assume precipitously and incorrectly that the market is the ultimate arbiter of differences. All differences between quantity, quality, work, and status of the participants in exchange, all differences between persons and things are overcome through the means of the monetary calculation of prices. Money provides the objective criterion and ratio of equation between different objects of exchange. Nothing too much or too little is the standard of appropriate reciprocal proportion provided by communal law and tradition. Money provides a greater sense of security since it permits the deferral of exchange and consumption into the future when they are needed. The Greek word for money (*nomisma*) has the same etymological foundation as

the word for law (*nomos*) because money is created by consensual agreement as the legal standard of measurement between different products. Only then will reciprocity work and the shoe and house become equitable by some objective basis of exchange. Money is the means that facilitates exchange by producing equality and commensurability in the urban market. It permits the craftsmen of a bed and a house to exchange their products with each other or for money. However, money is only the objective and institutional measure of goods that makes things equal by convention. What is the real basis for the conventional agreement? What social force underlies money and makes solidarity within the community possible?

In Aristotle's economic theory, it is human need which provides this underlying basis for equality and measurement.²⁹ After considering money as the reflection and measurement of equality and proportion in the market, after considering money as the technical means by which exchange is made possible, he writes, "Now in truth it is impossible that things differing so much should become commensurate, but with reference to need (*chreia*) they may become so sufficiently. There must, then, be a unit and that fixed by agreement (for which reason it is called money)."³⁰ Human need underlies money and tradition, and need is ultimately what creates the possibility and guidelines for exchange; it is need, as Aristotle has already stated, which holds the city together (*summenousin*). (In Book 8, Aristotle will add the galvanizing force of friendship to need as that which integrates the various elements of the city.) Goods, status, and people are not made equal by money, since the latter only expresses the ruling consensus of law and tradition. This is done by mutual need. Money and price are simply the objective representations of these needs, and being artificial conventions they have no autonomy or independent existence beyond them.

To some scholars, Aristotle seems to be making the argument that the basis for the natural economy in the city is either determined by legislative practice and traditional obligations or by the economy itself. The state or the market decides the correct and fair proportion between objects of exchange. Some modern interpreters of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* even claim that it is not money but subjective demand and desires that provide the incentives to engage in market exchange and that the principles of the law of supply and demand are also applicable to the ancient economy. They have attempted to treat Aristotle's moral economy as an expression of modern economic theory with its emphasis on money, price, subjective demand, and the market. But this only distorts Aristotle's theory of moral economy and economic justice while repressing the truly radical nature of his critique of the market and political economy. These interpretations also run counter to the context of the argument in which Aristotle began his study of reciprocal justice. There the ideals of communal grace and shared

kindness provided the basis for exchange of material goods. Money and tradition are the objective facilitators of market exchange—they make it happen smoothly—but that which reduces all differences to an equitable relationship is need. Human need (*chreia*) is the basis for barter among families, friends, and citizens because need does not require everything to be made precisely equal. Grace and kindness require only a relative or proportional equality in the marketplace, since the goal of the economy is never a one-to-one utilitarian exchange or calculated accumulation of money. Its actual origins lie deep within the Homeric values of hospitality and gift-giving and the classical Greek ideals of self-sufficiency, virtue, and happiness.³¹ Mutual sharing on the basis of physical need, ultimately measured and defined by money, is the cornerstone of the ancient economy. The ethical and political implications of these criteria are profound for the development of Aristotle's broader theory of moral economy and social justice.

Aristotle concludes his analysis of reciprocal justice with a summary of his definitions of the just and unjust. Justice involves actions which are "intermediate between acting unjustly and being unjustly treated; for the one is to have too much and the other to have too little."³² Human need places natural limits on the economy. It avoids excesses and promotes moderation because it is tied to the material limits of self-sufficiency in a moral economy. Injustice is what is excessive and beyond moderation because it upsets the proportional balance among neighbors and citizens. Even justice could turn into injustice if it was excessive and too much was given to one's neighbor and not enough to one's own family. Thus, excessive liberality and benevolence would destabilize the natural equilibrium of the household and political community. This summary of Aristotle's theory of economic justice represents a powerful indictment of the structures of political economy which allow the market and property acquisition to become excessive and unjust, because they undermine the natural balance and harmony within the polity. Class inequality, poverty, and excessive economic and political power are destructive of a stable moral economy and a good and just society. In the end, however, the basis for reciprocal justice lies in human need and friendship. Reciprocity in exchange is always subsidiary, for Aristotle, to the broader moral and intellectual needs of the community for political justice, that is, the organization of the constitution and law around greater political participation within the judicial, legislative, and public offices of the polis. Reciprocity is not an end in itself but a necessary prerequisite in a moral economy designed to ensure self-sufficiency in the household and the polis for a life of civic virtue, public deliberation, and policy judgment in daily government and the affairs of state. It is only this form of activity which will realize the moral and political function of man as an "activity of soul in accordance with virtue."³³

FRIENDSHIP OF BROTHERS
AND COMMONWEALTH OF CITIZENS

Having completed his analysis of the forms of particular justice, Aristotle next turns his attention to an examination of universal or political justice. The study of justice here is disappointing and disjointed, quite possibly because it is less an analysis than an introduction to a more complex understanding of the question. Political justice is not simply a part of the classical discourse on the topic, but rather is “virtue entire” because it deals with the structures of society and the ultimate goals of humanity. If economic justice in the form of distribution and reciprocity provides the material foundation for the development of the polis, political justice is whole and complete because it permits the free exercise of practical wisdom, moral and intellectual virtues, and civic friendship and deliberation. In its widest terms, this kind of justice demands an inquiry into the nature of the best form of political constitution and the rule of law. It is the whole of justice since it frames the complex set of social relationships and character formation of the individual and allows for the creation of a virtuous life in a total commitment of citizens who are free, equal, and dedicated to each other. At this point in his analysis in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle is concerned with the rise of political tyranny, the disproportionate distribution of the good, and the maintenance of equal shares of honor and goods based on merit. Toward this latter end, he says that justice can only exist when citizens are governed by law and have an equal share in ruling and being ruled. Only by these means do citizens avoid problems associated with the rule of a self-interested tyrant.

Shifting ground at the very end of Book 5, Aristotle turns to consider a variety of different themes when reflecting upon the nature of justice: the distinction between justice as nature and as convention, the role of deliberation and judgment in just action, and the importance of equity (*epieikeia*) in applying universal standards of law in particular cases. What integrates these three themes is the importance of human freedom, intellectual creativity, and practical knowledge in acting justly. In the end, this short section in Book 5 is only a brief introduction to the consideration of the central elements of political justice—the nature of critical judgment, public discourse, and political wisdom in the good life and the role of friendship and solidarity in exchange and politics. It is to these areas that we now turn. Aristotle argues that besides human need, friendship is the other major ingredient in holding society together in dialogue and exchange. This is why two of the ten books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* are devoted to examining the various forms of friendship and their role in creating the conditions of social solidarity by providing the moral glue that binds individuals in responsible and moral obligations to each other. This is what Aristotle calls “the friendship of brothers.”

Friendship is a moral virtue that brings individuals together in a common brotherhood and call to noble action. In thought and action, the other person is the first object of consideration. Beneficence in peace and courage in war are natural responses to the perceived needs of others. Life becomes meaningless without friends, even for the most successful and wealthy. Friendship is such a natural expression of human life that Aristotle refers to it as a human need. It is a partnership and mutual love that provides the opportunity to be kind and generous, to secure property, to offer solace in times of misfortune and grief, to help educate the young, to protect the old and weak, to nurture practical wisdom, and to encourage noble and virtuous action. "To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other."³⁴ Friendship is a natural relationship of mutual respect and trust grounded in familial love and protection and the love of one's fellow citizens. It is appreciated by politicians and lawmakers because it is based on mutual recognition and goodwill, thus creating a strong sense of centripetal responsibility to others that counteracts any internal social discord and political factions. "Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than justice."³⁵ Consensus built around issues within the community is similar to the shared opinion of friends.

There are three kinds of friendship corresponding to the three kinds of objects of love, that is, love of others for their utility, for their pleasure, and for their virtue and character. Only the last form of love is the perfect kind as it is directed at the love of the good in others and for the good of others. There is an element of natural goodwill and care for the other. Friendships based solely on usefulness or pleasure are impermanent and last only as long as the contingent purposes themselves. True friendship is based on the best state of character and involves goodness and love which are permanent and pleasant. This form of friendship is a steadfast commitment for its own sake; it is rare; and it involves familiarity, time to develop, trust in each other, mutual love, and virtue. Aristotle concludes that only good men can be true friends. Bad men use friendship as a means to accomplish a perceived contingent advantage of commercial profit, usefulness, or temporary pleasure. They do not encourage or admire the good in themselves or in others. True friendship, based on awareness and self-conscious choice of the good without qualification, is also pleasant and desirable, but these are not the primary reasons for companionship. Delight in each other, pleasant company, love of the noble, and appreciation of the personality of the other are the grounds for a lasting friendship among equals. On the economic side of friendship, generosity and sharing are its central elements. "Friendships involve equality; for the friends get the same things from one another and wish the same things for one another, or exchange one thing for another."³⁶ Aristotle refers to this kind of friendship between companions

as the “friendship of virtue.” He recognizes that there is another kind of friendship which involves more inequality and disproportionate merit and power of those involved: the friendship of father and son, elder and younger, husband and wife, and ruler and subject. Their expressions of love and friendship are based on different functions in life and different priorities and goals. Each individual involved in these unequal friendships receives different benefits and disproportionate gifts. The good should receive more love and benefits from the relationship in proportion to their merits. This is the same standard of equality that exists in distributive justice. If the inequality between these individuals becomes too great, the possibility of friendship may become impossible. A friendship of virtue among brothers demands equality and love.

This discussion of friendship leads Aristotle to his real interest in public friendship among citizens and social justice. It is here that the full implications of the ancient role of friendship for the economy and polity become clear. Aristotle even writes that friendship is more important than justice, because it precedes justice as the basis for economic and political order and stability. Between friends there is no need for justice. Without the immediate and passionate binding of love between friends, there is a danger that justice becomes merely the technical application of dispassionate laws and formal duties. But when justice is founded upon the ties of friendship, there is an unbreakable unity that joins individuals together in a common cause and commonwealth. Friendship and justice have much in common, as both are concerned with similar intersubjective issues and are shared by the same individuals. Yet Aristotle seems to be making a more radical argument: friendship is the ultimate bond that provides the solidarity for civic virtue; it is the necessary condition for a just society. Justice holds political and economic associations together based upon proportional equality and distribution of merit. Friendship involves a more immediate equality based on love and companionship that ultimately permits justice to function. Justice seems to supplement friendship when distance and inequality replace the intimacy of family and friends; it is less grounded by familial love and tied more to a friendship of companions and comrades bound by the virtue, equality, and mutual respect of civic friendship and reinforced by tradition, law, and political participation.³⁷

Aristotle is well aware that within the various forms of association in the community—economic, military, and political—the organizational principle should be that of friendship. Justice provides the structures within which the various constitutions and associations are formed, but it is friendship which offers the ethical guidelines and moral principles that direct their interpersonal interaction. Friendship is not simply a class of expanded household interaction, an earlier and less developed form of social justice, or even an intimate private experience that offers continued

subjective comfort and affection in a harsh world. Aristotle's position has more radical implications for both economic and political theory, since it is upon friendship that the political and economic community ultimately rests. He places great weight on the proverb, "What friends have is common property." With the examination of the nature of political and economic justice, it is the common bond of friendship which cements the citizens' sense of moral responsibility and obligation to others within the polity. Goods are exchanged, wealth is accumulated, and public honors are distributed on the basis of a belief in the expanded ethical principles of the household. Although Aristotle rejects Plato's argument in the *Republic* for the common ownership of property among the warriors, his treatment of distributive and reciprocal justice assumes a common bond regarding public and private wealth. Property is private, but there are ethical and political aspects of ownership that must be guided by a friendship among citizens and a general commitment to virtue and the common good. The forces produced by these moral obligations are very powerful and similar to the imperatives of a common responsibility within the household. Property is privately owned, but there are real public obligations within this form of commonwealth. Friendship turns wealth into a communal responsibility to act with generosity and love toward one's fellow citizens, since in the end "friendship depends on community" and "brothers and comrades have all things in common."³⁸ Aristotle is aware that the claims of justice within a household and among fellow citizens are different; they reflect the different ends of the *oikos* and the *polis*.

Friendship is the foundation upon which a just society is built. As there are different types of friendship, there are also different forms of political constitutions which correspond to them. This typology is helpful for it sets the stage for Aristotle's analysis of a just society as a friendship of brothers bound together by passion and reason and moving toward the common good of a noble and virtuous life. The social forms of that life are articulated within a moral economy and a democratic polity. As already discussed, there are three forms of friendship: utilitarian, sensuous, and virtuous. So, too, there are three forms of corresponding constitutions: monarchy, aristocracy, and democratic polity. All forms of association within ancient Greece were only parts of a larger whole composed of the political community, and to that extent friendships reflected the wider values and structures of the state. For Aristotle, then, the paternal friendship of superiority between a father and son reflects the disproportional relationship found in a monarchy; the familial association of a virtuous and good man and his wife reflects that of an aristocracy; and the fraternal association of equal brothers reflects that of a democratic polity. In this way, a monarchy is based on the friendship of a father, an aristocracy on the friendship of a husband, and a democratic polity on the friendship of brothers. Friendship in each case is different and

based on the merit or worth of the parties involved. On the other hand, these political forms can transform into deviant constitutional regimes. If the rule of the father is overbearing, we get the perverted constitution of a tyranny and slavery; if the husband is oppressive and disrespectful to his wife, we get an oligarchy; and if the brothers are licentious and leaderless, we get a chaotic democracy.

Although it appears at first to be just another formal exercise in the academic prerogative of expanded and rhetorical analyses, the outline of the different typologies of constitutions and friendships has a very important role in the overall design of Aristotle's philosophy of ethics and politics. The central issue for Aristotle is that, in the end, constitutions are based on various forms of friendship (and justice) that hold the communities and their associations together in a unified whole. It is these friendships that provide the underlying ethical principles that guide and legitimate the state and economy. Therefore, the moral guidelines for the ideal constitution, social justice, and a moral economy will be the ethical principles underlying the polis. For reasons we will discuss later in this chapter, Aristotle will focus most of his attention in the *Politics* on the democratic polity and its principle of the collective sharing of virtue within a friendship of brothers. Aristotle's position is clear: "The friendship of brothers is like that of comrades for they are equal and of like age, and such persons are for the most part alike in their feelings and their character."³⁹ This familial relationship among brothers and comrades also reflects the ideals of a democratic polity whose ultimate goals are equality and fairness in the decision-making process in which citizens take turns ruling and being ruled. This kind of friendship is forged in living together with a common education, shared life experiences, and a similarity of age. The reciprocal love of the immediate household is extended to a larger family of associations based on a continuity of time and place. Social, political, and military comrades are brought into the extended web of brothers, cousins, and other relatives. Citizenship virtues of honor, courage, and nobility begin to be defined by familial feelings of mutual love, respect, and generosity. Economic and political associations look more like familial arrangements than legal conventions and artificial compacts. These relationships between family, friends, and citizens help explain much about the distinctive character of Aristotle's economic and political philosophy.

Since friendship may be based on an equality of brothers or an inequality of fathers, husbands, and gods, so too may political regimes be based on equality or inequality. Aristotle does not get into a discussion at this point in his analysis about the correct and worst forms of governments. For this we must wait until Book 2 of the *Politics*. He is only concerned at this point about making a clear connection between friendship and constitutions, since the former explains for him the nature of solidarity in economic and political associations. Friendship is the civic virtue that

integrates the ethical principles and social institutions together to form the ancient polis. The foundation for universal and particular justice, the distribution of public and private goods, the importance of reciprocity and mutual sharing, and the care about satisfying human needs all rest upon the quality and intensity of friendship. Without friendship, the economic and political foundations of the best constitution become impossible; without friendship there is no constitution. This is what makes both moral and intellectual virtue and public happiness possible. This is thus the reason the discussion of friendship occupies such a prominent place in Aristotle's analysis between justice and politics.

Toward the end of Book 8, Aristotle's analysis of the types of friendship returns to an earlier discussion about the appropriate form and moral standard of economic exchange, this time between friends and strangers, between persons who are equal, and between persons who are unequal. He distinguishes between different types of material exchanges based on friendships of equivalency, superiority of status or moral worth, and human need. If possible, the equivalent or a little more should always be returned in a market situation, especially if the interaction is not between friends. Someone should never benefit from an exchange between nonfriends. Aristotle does qualify this, however, by saying that equivalency is the basis for exchange when possible. If there is a dispute over the amount of the exchange, the benefit or advantage to the receiver should be the key factor in deciding the appropriate or just price. When there is an exchange based on a friendship of inequality between a superior good man and another, the better man believes he should get more, but Aristotle is quick to point out, More of what? The good man expects to receive more honor, while the inferior man expects to receive more material help. Human need is the criterion for this form of exchange between unequals. Aristotle comments, "But the man who is in a state of need and inferiority makes the opposite claim; they think it is part of a good friend to help those in need."⁴⁰ Honor and virtue are to be given to the superior, while material gain is the prize of the inferior. An exchange between equals in different households comes closer to direct barter as they are equal in virtue and need; exchange between unequals in the market is an interesting and complex relationship because it reflects the differences in a more developed society. Between friends, the market presents an opportunity to exchange goods and reaffirm the relationship; it is not an opportunity to take advantage or make a profit. Balance and equilibrium among the citizens should be the guiding principles here.

By means of this proportional sharing of honor and wealth in the process of exchange, friendship, along with the polity, is maintained and prospers. Disproportionality of merit and status is balanced with a disproportionality of human need. Both parties are satisfied as both get exactly what they seek. "For friendship asks a man to do what he can, not what is proportional to the

merits of the case.”⁴¹ Earlier in his analysis of friendship, Aristotle made the statement that love was the main characteristic of friendship. Love between friends searching for virtue and utility is what supports the larger demands of the ancient Greek polity. In the end, Aristotle concludes that the model for the good man in market exchange should always be the natural relationship between friends. In cases where there is a disproportionality of virtue or wealth, the real basis for economic transactions should be the natural friendship between a father and son where the latter cannot always repay in equal amounts. Exchanges between people are ordered differently according to the worth of the persons involved. Thus, transactions involving parents, brothers, comrades, and superiors are treated differently and the return gift or price is adjusted accordingly. Since the friendship of brothers will be used as the guideline for a moral economy and best political constitution in the *Politics*, it is important that we notice that Aristotle maintains that between brothers and comrades “one should allow freedom of speech and common use of all things.”⁴² He concludes his analysis of friendship with a statement that will eventually be picked up in the nineteenth century by Karl Marx. Each group of friends will spend their lives together in a range of activities in which they share the values and loves that bring them closer together as friends, including drinking, gambling, athletics, hunting, and the study of philosophy.⁴³

Ideally, exchanges should appear fair to both parties and, if this is not possible, the recipient should set the price. The appropriate price between dissimilar citizens is publicly articulated in the form of money, which reflects the ideal values of the political tradition and convention. In the end, economic relationships between similar and dissimilar parties are measured in terms of how they affect the common good. This is the ultimate foundation of the constitution and of social justice, and it is the basis for our understanding of the nature of the moral economy and the good life of nobility and virtue. According to Aristotle, friendship and virtue are human needs, along with the physical needs that we associate with the economy; it is not just material goods which are to be shared among friends, there is also to be a “sharing in discussion and thought.” This idea of human need as referring to friendship, reason, and deliberation naturally leads Aristotle to a discussion of reason, practical knowledge, and the best political constitution. It is friendship that facilitates both economic exchange and rational discourse.

PRACTICAL WISDOM AS DELIBERATION AND DISCOURSE

As the moral virtues modulate the citizen’s passions and desires by applying the freely chosen right rule of reason and the intermediate mean between excess and defect, they form learned habits over time. In this way desires are rationally controlled. On the other hand, the intellectual virtues sys-

tematically offer the rational options for the final ends of the good life. In the search for the good, moral and intellectual virtues are integrated. In Book 6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle breaks intellectual virtue down into five distinct operations of the mind and their corresponding kinds of knowledge: scientific (*episteme*), art (*techne*), practical (*phronesis*), philosophic (*sophia*), and intuitive reason (*nous*). Since both philosophic and intuitive knowledge are aspects of scientific knowledge, Aristotle and the later traditions emphasize the first three forms of knowledge with barely a mention of the last two. Science is the theoretical knowledge of philosophical contemplation (*theoria*) which seeks invariant and eternal objects and universal truths. It has knowledge of the nature of the divine and requires a distance and removal of the philosopher from the act of investigation, that is, it requires a theoretical objectivity as it searches for the essential truths. This quest for the universal and unchanging aspects of reality (*episteme*) is found in Aristotle's works on physics, metaphysics, and mathematics. The methods applied in scientific knowledge are induction and deduction grounded in first principles. The former begins with the immediacy of empirical evidence and rises through the rational accumulation of facts to universal conclusions; the universal is implicit in the particular. Deduction begins with the universal derived from experience in order to reach necessary conclusions about the particular. Conclusions reached by both methods of demonstration connect experience and reason in order to arrive at universal and necessary results. This is the knowledge of the philosopher who contemplates the ultimate truths and causes of being. The first principles of science cannot themselves be scientifically demonstrated or known; they are self-evident truths and are independent of all empirical evidence. They represent the basic truths upon which rests syllogistic reasoning. "Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the contrary, knowledge of the immediate premises is independent of demonstration."⁴⁴ Philosophical wisdom combines the fruits of intuitive reason and scientific inquiry. According to Aristotle, it is the most perfect form of knowledge, as it is always in search of eternal truths about an unchanging reality. Demonstration and syllogistic inference provide the methods of scientific inquiry in philosophy.

Quite different from science and philosophy is the technical knowledge (*techne*) of the artist and artisan who focus on production or making (*poiesis*) based upon preconceived ideas about the final product. This form of utilitarian knowledge examines the contingent world of everyday life that is in a continuous process of coming-to-be and passing-away. As with philosophical contemplation, the knowledge of the artisan may be taught and learned. Technical knowledge is not a passive skill but intervenes in the world by transforming it according to administrative ideas and social blueprints. Aristotle summarizes the essence of practical reason (*phronesis*)

as “the quality of mind concerned with things just and noble and good for man.”⁴⁵ This third form of knowledge, which can neither be demonstrated nor instrumentally controlled, neither contemplated nor made, and neither proven nor produced, involves practical reason and deals with the variable world of moral and political action. This distinction between acting and making will be important for later philosophers in discussing the nature and role of political and social theory.⁴⁶ Practical knowledge is different from the other forms of knowledge because it cannot be learned or taught, is not based on preconceived rational designs or intuitively grounded first principles, nor can it be used as a means to a formal end. This knowledge is not derived from demonstration and logic or from technical success and social pragmatism. It is derived from dialectical reasoning about opinions that are generally accepted. In practical knowledge, demonstration and domination have been replaced by deliberation (*bouleusis*) and action (*praxis*). Aristotle summarizes these distinction when he remarks, “Practical wisdom cannot be scientific knowledge or art; not science because that which can be done is capable of being otherwise, nor art because action and making are different kinds of things.”⁴⁷ The knowledge of practical wisdom is applied to all forms of ethical activity about bodily health, friendship, wealth production, and so forth within the household, economy, legislature, and polity, and is concerned with the good and virtuous.⁴⁸

By the nature of its subject matter, its objects of inquiry, and its logic of analysis, practical reason cannot offer us universal truths or absolute knowledge about the world. Its ultimate goal is an excellence in deliberation and “a kind of correctness.” Aristotle quickly points out that the correctness found in practical knowledge shares nothing in common with realism, that is, with a correctness of knowledge or truth. The moral and political opinions it generates, the resolve to act justly and virtuously, and the quest for happiness and moral perfection produce a different type of wisdom than that found in science or philosophy, which correspond to nature and essential realities. Ideas do not reflect an objective reality to which they correspond, creating universal truths. Practical wisdom, along with moral virtues, results in a rational decision to act justly. The goal is not truth, being, reality, or God but rather the good. Thus, Aristotle says that “excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what conduces to the end of which practical wisdom is the true apprehension.”⁴⁹

This form of correctness consists of an excellence of deliberation by which the citizen understands the final end, or universal, and its dialectical relation to the particular situation. In this way, the citizen realizes the final end by choosing and acting upon the appropriate means to the end given the nature of the particular. This form of wisdom represents the ability to deliberate about the good life in general, the universal, and then to act upon it in the concrete, the particular. Deliberation and equity share the same concern for the relationship between the universal and the particular.

Knowledge without particulars is not wisdom; knowledge without action is not moral. Aristotle refers to the case of a person who knows about the health-producing properties of meat but does not know about the nature of particular meats. Just as that person will not be able to produce health, the individual who may know about political science, the true function of man, and the ultimate goal of happiness but who does not possess the lived experience of the particular is not wise. So too with the man of *praxis*. To accomplish practical wisdom is an acquired taste, not a learned truth. Practice requires particulars as the way to approach and realize the universal. The universal good establishes the ultimate limit to action, but the particular gives historical and social context, guidance, and resolve. In this way, deliberation mediates between the means and the ends, the particular and the universal, as it makes real that which is only an abstract idea and a contingent possibility.

Aristotle insists on a number of occasions that practical wisdom is achievable only after years of experience and accumulated knowledge. This accounts for how rare this form of knowledge is, especially among the young. “The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young man has no experience, for it is length of time that gives experience.”⁵⁰ This concern for the relationship between the universal and the particular has already been considered by Aristotle at the end of the Book 5, where he discusses the question of equity and the equitable judge. As friendship is superior to justice, so too is equity, because both are means by which the ideals and principles of justice are applied in an informal and immediate manner. Equity is not legal justice but the correction or modification of justice in a judicial setting. By the application of judicial prudence by the judge, the law, as a universal, is rationally adapted and applied to particular cases under review. This approach shows sensitivity to the relationship between the law and its application. The latter is not formal or oppressive but appreciates and understands the contingent facts of the case and how they relate to the universal. Aristotle uses the example of a case that is not covered by the law. In these circumstances, the judge must act as a legislator by asking the hypothetical question: what would the legislators have written if they were present and could consider the issues involved in this particular case? In this problem of legal hermeneutics and interpretive understanding of the universal law of the polis, the judge recognizes that the law can never be absolute but must be retranslated and reconfigured to fit the exigencies of the particular legal situation. The law must be equitably and fairly applied. “And this is the nature of the equitable—a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality.”⁵¹

Although the law is universally applicable in the abstract, it must be altered slightly to fit the indefinite particulars of the case. In its abstraction, the law is too general and too rigid to be universally applied. There are

instances when the law cannot be executed as it is presently represented. At this point Aristotle makes reference to the example of the leaden rule and Lesbian architectural molding. Architects on the island of Lesbos have the skills necessary to adjust the flexible rod in the measurement of the curves of fluted columns on the stone molding. The law must be like the metal ruler of Lesbos and adjust itself to the contours and distinctive patterns of the legal case under consideration. Legal understanding must keep the principles of the law intact while at the same time making them appropriate and applicable to the particular. Martha Nussbaum, in *The Fragility of Goodness*, has emphasized this point by stressing the process of perceptive discrimination in moral judgments. The goal of moral wisdom is not knowledge of universal principles for a deductive formulation of appropriate courses of action. Rather, the law should be viewed as a summary of legal precedents acquired over time; they are rules of thumb and summaries of good judgments that must be incorporated into the case with a sensitivity and subtlety acquired through mature judgment and years of public experience.⁵² As in the case of the Lesbos ruler, there must be an adaptability to the particularities of the moment and sensitivity to any changes in the contours of morality and politics that cannot be predefined or anticipated by the universal measure of the law. Nussbaum writes, "There is, thus, room for surprise, room for both the cognitive insecurity and the human vulnerability that the Platonic scientific concept is seeking to avoid."⁵³ Flexibility to changes in the particular and recognition of the fragility of the universal help make the application of law to particular situations more open to sensitive adjustment and reassessment. Nussbaum reiterates Aristotle's characterization of practical judgments—indeterminacy, mutability, and indefiniteness of moral rules—which make problematic their unmediated application to the circumstances of the particular moment. Aristotle makes this point very directly in the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

The cause is that such wisdom [*phronesis*] is concerned not only with universals but with particulars which become familiar from experience. . . . while practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of scientific knowledge but of perception—not perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle.⁵⁴

Here the discernment of practical perception refers to a responsiveness and intuitive sensitivity to the blending of the universal law to the particular case under consideration.

Prudence or practical knowledge (*phronesis*) considers more than moral action and the relationship between the universal and the particular.⁵⁵ It is

much more than personal reflection and individual moral action, since it also involves ethical and political decisions which can neither be scientifically demonstrated, philosophically contemplated, technically known, or socially engineered. The concept of *bouleusis* implies both deliberation and discussion. General deliberation about virtue and the good is the manner by which this form of knowledge is acquired and ethical and political actions (*praxis*) are undertaken. The final ends are considered and the means appropriate for reaching these ends are applied. The goal of this form of knowledge is never knowledge for its own sake but rather virtuous activity. Just as we have seen in Aristotle's analysis of the good life, happiness, and justice, and also in the case of the relationship between morals and politics, the types of issues that practical knowledge considers moves beyond the personal into the public arena of the common good. Reflective deliberation about the good is concerned only with the contingent world of our particular moral experiences and opinions, not with the world of pure theory or contemplation (*episteme*). It mediates between the universal articulated in the shared values and communal norms of the law and moral tradition, and its appropriate application to particular situations involving action (*praxis*). It should be noted that the relationship between the universal and the particular in Aristotle's theories of knowledge and judicial equity represent the beginning of a long philosophical tradition that evolves into the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Rickert, Max Weber, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This is the tradition of critical hermeneutics and interpretive sociology.

According to Aristotle, moral deliberation entails the different moments of self-conscious understanding of the utterances of others (*sunesis*), forgiveness or sympathy (*suggnome*), and mature judgment (*gnome*).⁵⁶ For understanding and judgment to be effective, they must be realized in concrete moral action (*praxis*) within the deliberative process of the political arena. But there has to be a clear understanding of the meaning of what others say and intend before action can take place. There must, therefore, be a sympathy or feeling for others in order to appreciate and understand one's particular situation, that is, the public statements, intentions, and meaning of others and the possible appropriate actions to be undertaken. Aristotle states that understanding is a form of learning that "is applicable to the exercise of the faculty of opinion for the purpose of judging of what someone else says about matters with which practical wisdom is concerned—and of judging soundly, for 'well' and 'soundly' are the same thing."⁵⁷ Understanding appreciates the immediate circumstances and varied opinions since it examines only that which can be deliberated and judged. For understanding to take place, there must be a common bond based on mutual caring (*philia*) and sympathy.⁵⁸

In fact, there is a common linguistic ground in *gnome* (judgment) and *suggnome* (sympathy) that lies in the sympathetic understanding of others.⁵⁹

For Aristotle, sympathy or moral sensitivity involves a judgment with others as to the right course of action. Judgment is always with others and on behalf of others. It is the ability of the virtuous man to be able to take the role of the other by empathetically projecting himself into the other's situation. Ronald Beiner, in *Political Judgment*, views this as the basis for friendship and citizenship within a just society. He holds that to appreciate the nature of understanding, we must keep in mind the connections among judgment, forgiveness, and sympathy.

We see now that the answer must reside in the capacity of the prudent man, the *phronimos*, not just to judge, but at the same time to judge-with (as among citizens)—judgment guided by shared concern, informed by reciprocal involvement in situations held in common. In this sense, sympathetic understanding and capacity for forgiveness are essential moments of any judgment upon human affairs, and all authentic judgment contains within it the potentiality for judgment-with.⁶⁰

The understanding reflects upon those subject matters that are part of a critical deliberation in which practical judgments about the social world are made. Understanding requires a self-consciousness about how the universal and particular, law and judgment, and tradition and the present intersect in a critical awareness of the nature of the good. Being connected to the state by bonds of citizenship forms a strong sense of political community, history and tradition of social justice, solidarity of friendship, and respect for the institutions of a constitutional government. Aristotle says that understanding is a “faculty of opinion for the purpose of judging of what some one else says about matters with which practical wisdom is concerned.”⁶¹ Understanding engages other citizens in a public discourse about matters relevant to the political community, interprets the meaning of their statements, evaluates the relevance of their ideas to the issues at hand, and makes judgments about their adequacy. First, other persons must be understood in any discussion, and then their opinions judged on the basis of the adequacy of their understanding of the good life and their concrete policy proposals to reach it. Since practical wisdom deals with good men, the intentions and rationality of the other must surely be considered when measuring the weight of their arguments, the seriousness of their purpose, and the wisdom of their ultimate intentions. Deliberation and judgment are not isolated states of mind. Rather, they occur within an open engagement with other equally committed citizens searching for the good in a free and equal political dialogue. Similar to issues raised with judicial equity, those engaged in serious dialogue must consider the hermeneutical moment as crucial to the appreciation of the meaning and intentions of others. This is what Aristotle means by “judging

soundly.” There is a fascinating synthesis here within Aristotle’s theory of deliberative understanding of legal hermeneutics and politics. This theory of sympathetic understanding, deliberative reason, and critical judgment will have important implications later for Weber’s theory of social understanding, intentionality, and practical action.

Although this section on practical wisdom and understanding is brief, it offers tantalizing suggestions that call out for further analysis. Aristotle comments that judgment must be sympathetic and adds that it also must have “the right discrimination of the equitable” both to know the law and to know the relevant application of the universal. This places the understanding squarely in the area of the universal and particular, of law and its application. The equitable judge must not be mechanically rigid or oppressively tyrannical when applying abstract and formal legal principles to particular situations. Equity and justice demand an understanding of the circumstances as well as a flexibility and sensitivity of application. “For understanding is neither about things that are always and are unchangeable, nor about any and every one of the things that come into being, but about things which may become subjects of question and deliberation.”⁶²

With political deliberation, citizens must judge on the basis of their knowledge of the constitution, of the good life, and how particular decisions will support those desired goals. In both equitable legal decisions and public deliberations, sympathy is what connects the abstract and the concrete, the universal and the particular, in a fair and reasonable manner. Equity and understanding share the same methodological approach as well as the same sympathetic relationship to objective reality, whether that reality is a constitution, a law, a public debate, or a political decision. Legal and political hermeneutics are both engaged in a critical examination and interpretation of objectivity. Past decisions and documents articulated in the law codes and expressed in the statutes of criminal and civil law are part of a common heritage shared by all members of the polis. They are part of a living community of shared cultural values and respected traditions that are in a continuous process of evolution and evaluation. No laws, traditions, or interpretations are unchanging or eternal. This is why Aristotle continuously makes reference to their variable nature throughout his work, and this is also why they must be applied sensitively and carefully, why they must be sympathetically understood and judiciously interpreted. The hermeneutics of law, practical wisdom, and discursive understanding cannot be reduced to scientific inquiry or absolute truths. They are judicial and political opinions that mature and change over time through experience and practice. They are something learned in perception, not scientific theory with its belief in universal objectivity. They are forms of knowledge and wisdom acquired in action by which the passions of youth are constrained and the reflection and judgment of maturity nurtured.

This common approach in legal hermeneutics and public deliberation is the basis for Aristotle's theory of practical knowledge (*phronesis*) and discursive rationality. The meaning of a particular text as legal document or public statement is something that the understanding must unravel. Its interpretation unfolds through the placing of the text within a broader understanding of the common traditions and customs. In this way the particular is examined as part of a much longer unwritten document by which the meaning of the text is to be interpreted. Political understanding is also something that is not given but develops in the course of public dialogue. This is why education and pedagogy are so important to Aristotle. Only in this way are ideas formulated and critical responses recognized and understood. The understanding and sympathetic judgment focus on those objects which are the central concern of political wisdom. There is an intriguing comment by Aristotle that the intuitive reason involved in practical knowledge is what highlights the particular through perception. Why this particular is chosen, why this question or issue is the object of consideration and interpretation, cannot be justified. It is the result of an unexplainable intuition. Understanding and judgment assist only after an object is chosen for consideration and discussion.⁶³ The wise citizen has a special insight into what is important, what is worthy of consideration, and what course of action is to be taken. None of these can be objects of demonstration, logical proof, or theoretical knowledge. The ability to pick out the particulars in thought and action results from the maturation of experience and the development of a critical eye.

Aristotle believes that this ability arises only from the actual practice of politics and engagement in public deliberation. Only practice makes practical, as only age constitutes wisdom. Practical wisdom combines an intuitive reason acquired over years of maturation and education in which the universal is distilled from the particular experiences rather than imposed upon them as is the case with moral *episteme* and *techne*. It is an intuition of reason that reconciles and balances the ideal of goodness within the particular circumstances demanding heroic excellence, strength of will, and just action. In this cognitive and political process of deliberation, it is virtue and character which motivate and guide the individual to the correct choice of means within the ultimate principles proffered by practical wisdom.⁶⁴ All individuals seek happiness, and it is through the integration of moral and intellectual virtue that this is accomplished. Practical wisdom presents the individual with the rational options available to reach the state of well-being. Aristotle often offers contradictory statements about whether this wisdom deals with means and ends or only the technical means themselves. The latter he refers to as "cleverness." From the perspective of his entire work, he seems in general to accept the idea that the union of moral virtue and practical wisdom dialectically shapes both the ends and means, as well as providing the courage and nobility to take the right action. Reason gives

us both the insight as to the available options and the foresight as to the nature of the good life. Practical reason encompasses the whole of virtue, because all the other virtues imply the exercise of this form of rationality. The good requires the presence of both practical reason and moral virtue, since the former initiates the rational principle and the latter the capacity and strength to act rationally. Knowledge without action is not practical or wise. A wise individual will possess all the virtues, not just a select few. This is best summarized by Aristotle at the very end of Book 6 when he says, "Choice will not be right without practical wisdom any more than without virtue; for the one determines the end and the other makes us do the things that lead to the end."⁶⁵

More than knowledge alone is necessary for practical wisdom. This also requires a special state of character which predisposes citizens to act on their knowledge of virtue and of the good. Aristotle never tires of reassuring the reader that the accomplishment of knowledge by itself does not represent practical wisdom. This occurs only when knowledge leads to moral action. Without virtue, knowledge is ineffective and useless. The same is the case for those who possess a knowledge of health and the art (*techne*) of medicine but do not know how to apply them. Without the application of the particular to the universal in hermeneutics and politics, there is no understanding or judgment; without the application of moral knowledge to the world, there is no practical wisdom, no purpose to human life, and no natural limitations to the application of technical knowledge, the art of commercial trade, or the acquisition of property.⁶⁶

Deliberative reason develops through a slow process of moral education and accumulated experience in politics. By weeding out the bad or inappropriate experiences, citizens begin to learn a wisdom founded on trial and error, a growing sensitivity to public need and the common good, knowledge of tradition and the law, and an acquired awareness of moral and social issues. It is an experiential capacity to know and to act upon the good. Logical demonstration and production destroy that which is different and essential to practical knowledge. Aristotle contends that Pericles is a fine example of a man who had this kind of knowledge, since he was someone who "can see what is good for [himself] and what is good for men in general."⁶⁷ Practical wisdom includes a wide range of social experiences, including knowledge of the personal good, household management, ethics, legislation, and politics. Aristotle further divides politics into judicial and deliberative. Whereas judicial politics deals with the universal in terms of creating law and constitutions, deliberative politics considers the application of the universal to particular circumstances. This concern for reason and application, the universal and the particular, follows the earlier consideration of the principle of equity found at the end of Book 5 on the theory of universal justice.

Being neither gods nor beasts, human beings realize their dignity and sovereignty only within the activities of the polis. Practical knowledge is not

only the basis for individual moral action and decision about the future, but develops its real potential for human excellence through political participation within the legislative, judicial, and executive activities of the government. It is really a form of political wisdom and discursive rationality.⁶⁸ In fact, Aristotle states that practical wisdom and political wisdom are the same state of mind.⁶⁹ This represents a direct challenge to and critique of Plato's political philosophy of the republic and theory of essential Forms. It was Plato who wished to combine *episteme* and *techne* into *phronesis*, that is, universal knowledge and utilitarian science into political philosophy by engineering the republic and technically applying universal forms to the administration of politics. In this way, philosophical wisdom could be joined to productive knowledge, making for an ideal, if not utopian, society. The ideal political form could be made into reality at the direction of the philosopher-king. Politics could be reduced to political architecture and social design. In the end, the universal could be made real by means of instrumental rationality, not by practical or deliberative action.

The individual good is inextricably bound to the common good, moral action to social justice, and practical deliberation to political participation. Since deliberation based on understanding and judgment always takes place in the political arena, it is a form of public discourse and political action. It is with the natural rights tradition of Hobbes and Locke, Kant's moral philosophy of practical reason and the categorical imperative, and the advent of Enlightenment liberalism that the political dimension of deliberation is finally displaced by modern theorists; it is then that the public, along with natural law, disappears among the ruins created by political economy. Although Aristotle does not directly discuss the issue of ethical objectivity, his critique of Platonic essentialism develops into a political epistemology grounded in discursive rationality and public discourse.⁷⁰ Law, hermeneutics, and politics entail a common method and interpretive understanding of the changing historical moment. The philosophical analysis of practical wisdom, political deliberation, and discursive rationality now leads in Aristotle's work to a consideration of the structural features of political constitutions and the best government, since the former ideals are realized only in and through the latter institutions. Knowledge and reason require actual structures and constitutions to be made real. Political philosophy is transformed by the requirements of the subject matter itself into a social theory of deliberative democracy.

CLASSICAL DEMOCRACY IN HERODOTUS, PERICLES, AND THUCYDIDES

The first extant reference to Greek democracy occurs in the second half of the fifth century BCE in the work of the famous historian of the Persian wars, Herodotus. In *The Histories*, he speaks about the distinctive characteristics of

democracy (*demokratia*) or power of the people (*demos*) through the person of Otanes, a Persian nobleman who plotted against the Magi, pretenders to the throne of the Persian Empire. Cambyses, the son of Cyrus and king of Persia, died in an accident, and a pretender to the throne secretly assumed the identity of the king's brother, Smerdis. Otanes and six other conspirators attempted to expose the pretender. After the plot succeeded, Darius became king, and it was he who would send his tremendous armies against the Athenians at Marathon in 490 BCE. Ten years later, his son, Xerxes, seeking to avenge the earlier defeats, would hurl his fleets and armies at Thermopylae and Salamis with similar results. After the original hoax of the king's steward was discovered and the reins of government seized by Otanes and his fellow conspirators, a general council was held among the Seven about the appropriate form of government to replace the oppressive tyranny of the false king. The discussion focused on three possibilities: the best democracy, best oligarchy, and best monarchy. Otanes spoke first, defending democracy:

What about majority rule, on the other hand? In the first place, it has the best of all names to describe it—equality before the law. In the second place, it is entirely free of the vices of monarchy. It is government by lot, it is accountable government, and it refers all decisions to the common people. So I propose that we abandon monarchy and increase the power of the people, because everything depends on their numbers.⁷¹

Democracy, for Otanes, is thus founded upon the principles of equality, self-determination, public responsibility, and the common good.

Alternately, according to Otanes, monarchies lead to oppressive behavior, no matter the moral quality or nobility of the king. This form of government creates only the conditions for absolute power, arbitrary license, and nonaccountability to the governed. Virtue is no protection against the power of the king, since, in the end, he turns to an excess of “arrogant abusiveness and envy.” Monarchy produces a society of sycophants and slaves. It turns against ancient customs, undermines the family, and destroys judicial and legal protections. The next speaker agreed with Otanes' critique of monarchy but argued that a democratic mob would be more violently despotic, uninformed, and destructive of traditional values. He instead argued for an oligarchy consisting of the best men who would make the best decisions. Finally Darius, who would eventually be made king, rose to defend a monarchy. Oligarchy, he said, produces internal conflicts and personal feuding among the ruling elite. If the best man is king, his domestic and foreign policy would be coherent and wise, not splintered and incoherent. Oligarchy results in factionalism, while democracy leads to corruption. For Darius, both systems of government logically end in a monarchy as an

escape from their own internally produced irrationality and crises. After the debate, a vote among the Seven was taken, and Darius's view of monarchy won. Herodotus used Otanes' speech to voice the political options available at the time, as well as to illuminate the distinctive aspects of Athenian democracy as *isonomia* (political equality) and *isegoria* (freedom and equal right of speech). It would certainly not have been lost on Herodotus that Athens would eventually bear the brunt of the new Persian monarchy with its desire to expand its empire and pacify its colonies. Athens will be the constitutional government that has the spirit to resist.⁷²

Thucydides develops similar political themes on classical democracy when he writes about the fratricidal conflict of Greece in the second half of the fifth century. During the winter of 431 BCE, at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, the Athenians gathered outside the walls of the city for a public funeral honoring those who had died in the war. As was their ancient custom, the most gifted and recognized citizen of the city was chosen to speak before the assembly of relatives and grief-stricken citizens to offer praise and honor to their fallen friends and comrades. This moving account of the war and Pericles' oration in defense of Athenian democracy has been handed down to us in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*.⁷³ As Thucydides recounts, Pericles climbed the platform and looked over the hushed crowd. To their palpable surprise and wonder, he begins not in the usual manner of honoring the bravery of the fallen soldiers, but by talking about the ideals for which they courageously surrendered their lives. He self-consciously breaks with tradition as he defends the indomitable spirit of the Athenians, their remarkable political constitution (*politeia*), and their admirable democratic ideals. This oration provides Pericles with the opportunity to express publicly the distinctiveness of classical Athenian democracy, its institutions, and its principles. Throughout his speech he emphasizes what he believes are the unusual political qualities of the Athenian people—their equality, freedom, self-determination, tolerance, and their communal bonds of civic friendship. Pericles declares that the people in general are highly committed and well-educated in public issues; they are also respectful of alternative opinions. Because these are the values they so admire, service to the commonwealth in politics and in the military are highly valued. Popular sovereignty and a participatory democracy are the remarkable qualities of this society that will hold its citizens together in times of future crises. This is what produces happiness and distinguishes the Athenians from their neighbors. With a self-assuredness designed to stir the crowd, he proclaims that it is because of these very virtues that the Athenians will ultimately prevail over the Lacedaemonians from the South.

Speaking in this manner, Pericles attempts to energize his compatriots and allay any fears about the future course of the war. It is also apparent that

he intends his message to be heard by the Spartans and their allies. To the political ideals of the Athenian people, Pericles adds their love of beauty and wisdom, art and philosophy—characteristics that make Athens great and prosperous. Sensitive to the martial virtues and military preparedness of the Spartans, he contends that the real deciding factor in determining the final outcome of the war will be the Athenians' love of politics, architecture, sculpture, painting, drama, science, mathematics, and theoretical contemplation. In fact, neither art nor philosophy would make the citizenry soft and unprepared for the rigors of the suffering that certainly await them in the spring and possibly many springs to come. Just the opposite is the case. Their love of proportion, harmony, and beauty is what makes them strong in the face of adversity; it is what will prepare them for the suffering that might otherwise undermine their courage and dampen their resolve. Pericles argues that it is their very culture and political institutions that will save them from a tragic fate.

Stating the obvious, he claims that Athens has a distinctive political system among the Greek city-states. Reinforcing the position of Herodotus, Thucydides contends that the Athenian constitution is a democracy, which he characterizes as a free and open government for the whole people, and not just for a minority of its citizens. Everyone is equal before the law, and those chosen for special positions of public authority are picked not on the basis of aristocratic birth or family wealth but because of their personal ability and accomplishments. Equality and freedom are the defining characteristics of democracy; these principles are based on mutual trust and respect among the citizens. Thucydides is following the path of Herodotus in his description of classical democracy. It is a self-government in which the major decisions of war and peace, taxation, property, and citizenship are decided by the citizens themselves.

Pericles adds another element, the rule of law, since in Athens laws are created by friends and comrades. While praising political equality, he is quite aware of the existence of economic inequality. Structures of class and poverty are not, however, to be a hindrance to any participation in the democratic process. It is interesting to note how long ago this discussion occurred and how relevant it is for us today. This issue of the relationship between economics and politics, class and democracy, will also be at the heart of social and political theory for well over the next two millennia. It certainly will occupy much attention by Marx and John Stuart Mill.⁷⁴ Pericles continues his speech by maintaining that laws are designed especially to protect the poor and oppressed in society. Privilege is to be used carefully, not extravagantly as a sign of social distinction or as an exercise of power. The Athenians are aware of their history and the potential dangers of social discord caused by economic conflict and personal envy. It is Pericles' view, then, that property ownership should not interfere with the social bonds of the community.

Mixing pride with grief, courage with anxiety, and the reality of death with the dreams of reason, Pericles reminds his fellow citizens of the greatness of their city and the importance of the relationships among economics, politics, and friendship. Although Athenians have strong commitments to their family affairs, it is to the affairs of state that they are truly born. This general involvement of citizens in the government and public discussions about social policy ultimately defines the nature of Athenian democracy. Decisions that affect the community as a whole are to be made by the whole. Communal deliberation also permits reason to modify and modulate any inappropriate and dangerous passions that could negatively influence public policy. Pericles emphasizes this point, because Athenian virtue and courage finally rest on reasoned decisions within the political community and not on a blood lust for war. Athens did not undertake the war with Sparta lightly or irrationally. Through long and reflective deliberations, the citizens made a clear decision for this course of action. It is the public nature of this process that will ensure continued bravery on the battlefield. By implication, on the other hand, their enemies rushed into the war without consideration of its real consequences. As a result, they will not be able to sustain their military losses for long. Bravery out of ignorance produces neither good policy nor strong resolve. Pericles then proceeds to expand the idea of political freedom to include self-determination within the private lives and personal feelings of his fellow citizens. Both the public and private spheres are to be respected. "We are free and tolerant in our private lives; but in public affairs we keep to the law."⁷⁵

Pericles next directs his rhetorical gaze onto Athenian friendship, its importance as a civic virtue, and its relevance to the economy. Stressing the difference between gifts and debts, he argues for a natural economy that does not produce debtors or class antagonisms but friends and citizens. "We make friends by doing good to others, not by receiving good from them . . . When we do kindnesses to others, we do not do them out of any calculations of profit or loss."⁷⁶ Relationships between friends should be based on goodwill, liberality, and kindness—not on a feeling of indebtedness or gratitude. Economic exchanges should be made to further increase the bonds of friendship, not to acquire more wealth or produce more servitude. The economy should not be in a position to threaten the political sovereignty or stability of the community. Each citizen is "rightful lord and owner of his own person" in the private and the public spheres and accomplishes this with "exceptional grace and exceptional versatility."⁷⁷ This is the classical definition of freedom. Sovereignty lies within the communal assembly as it deliberates about the key issues of the day. Anything that endangers personal and civic friendships must be rejected as dangerous to society as a whole. Although the remains of the fallen are interred in the tomb, it is Athens—its institutions, and its collective memory expressed in its architec-

ture, philosophy, and literature—where the final resting place of its glorious and valiant citizens is to be found. Their actions remain alive in the public speech and collective consciousness of the community.

Aristotle continues the classical Greek interest in detailing and contouring the nature of the democratic polity. He is credited with producing 158 historical and theoretical works on political constitutions, of which the only surviving treatise is *The Athenian Constitution*.⁷⁸ Written between 332 and 322 BCE, it outlines the social history and institutional development of the political values and legislation of Athenian democracy from Solon and Cleisthenes to Ephialtes and Pericles. Aristotle traces the evolution of classical democracy through the changes of its main political institutions of the Assembly (*Ekklesia*), Areopagus, Council of 500 (*Boule*), and jury courts (*Dikasteria*). These political institutions carried on the crucial legislative, executive, and judicial functions of Athenian society. At the beginning of the sixth century BCE under the archonship of Solon, new reforms were introduced that would change Athens forever by helping to set it on a path of democratization. Reacting to the disturbing crises of rising class inequality, poverty, debt slavery, and social discord, Solon, who had been chosen specifically to resolve these problems, instituted many desperately needed political and constitutional reforms. According to Aristotle, he was an impartial moderate who, caught between the demands of the aristocrats and the needs of the poor, attempted to steer a course between the classes for the benefit of communal accord. In the process, he weakened the power of the oligarchy and strengthened the democratic elements in the constitution.⁷⁹

Solon initiated agrarian reform by “shaking off the burdens” (*seisachtheia*) of the poor, implementing new constitutional policies such as forbidding loans on the security of persons that could end in slavery, cancelling private and public loans, dissolving the ordinances of Draco, and creating four new classes based on their wealth: aristocracy (*pentakosiomedimnoi*), cavalry (*hippeis*), hoplite warriors or rankers (*zeugitai*), and laborers (*thetes*). In this new timocratic system, public officials were appointed by lot from the three propertied classes, with the most important offices going to the highest class. The nine archons and treasurers came from the highest class. To the Areopagus, the political organ of the oligarchy, Solon gave the responsibility to guard and enforce the laws and constitution, deal with the city’s daily affairs, and punish criminals and those conspiring to overthrow the government. He also formed a new Council of 400 (100 selected from each tribe), changed the law so that the legal right of retribution lay in the hands of the state, and increased the power of the jury courts by placing in them the right of appeal in public and private legal matters. He created a mixed constitution with power shared among the different competitive groups. In addition to these reforms, Solon also undertook commercial reforms by changing measures, weights, and coinage.

The wealthy aristocrats had hoped that Solon would make only minor adjustments, further ensuring their positions of wealth and power, whereas the poor had hoped for a more radical redistribution of property. Solon attempted to follow a middle path that would maintain the general distribution of property but offer the poor some protection against a rapacious aristocracy and include them in the democratic process. Although public offices remained open only to the propertied classes, after the reforms the lower classes were provided new legal protections against economic exploitation and debt slavery, and at the same time they were permitted to participate in the Assembly and jury courts. Democratic rights were expanded, and the institutions of political power were thrown open to the laborers and poor for the first time. The aristocratic monopoly over the Assembly and jury courts was ended as a new era in democracy began. As Aristotle writes, "For when the people are masters of the vote they are masters of the state."⁸⁰ He credits Solon with establishing "traditional Athenian democracy" by balancing the constitution among the competing class interests. He accomplished this by having the oligarchy control the Areopagus, the aristocracy the public offices, and the people the local courts.⁸¹ In this way each major group was represented in the political institutions that shaped their everyday lives. Solon left Athens immediately after instituting these reforms; peace between the classes held briefly, but civil disagreements ensued not long afterward.

The temporary truce between the classes eventually broke down, and open conflict erupted when the tyrant Pisistratus and his sons seized power for about thirty-six years. With the overthrow of Pisistratus' son, Hippias, Cleisthenes assumed the archonship of Athens and began to reestablish a new social harmony and democratic order. For George Grote, the famous nineteenth-century ancient historian, it was during the rule of Cleisthenes and Pericles that Athens truly became a democratic society.⁸² Like Solon, Cleisthenes started to remake the Athenian constitution, first by weakening the influence of the oligarchy and by changing the structure of the tribes from the traditional number of four to ten. Each was to be organized around a *deme*, or local community, consisting of members from the three geographical areas of the Athenian city-state: the coast, the city, and the countryside of Attica. This would break down old family and kinship loyalties and shift traditional political obligations by forming new and more democratic alliances based on the geography of the local *deme*. Citizens were no longer named after their father's family but after their local *deme*. It was the goal of Cleisthenes to create an entirely new political organization which would increase the participation of a wider range of citizens in running the government. He also transformed the membership in the Council to fifty members from each tribe, forming what became known as the *Boule*, or Council of 500.⁸³ Finally, he introduced the law of ostracism, which was judiciously used to prevent despotism and to exile aristocratic members of the community who

were former friends of the tyrant Pisistratus and his family, or individuals distrusted for their power. Aristotle, in both the *Politics* and *The Athenian Constitution*, recognizes the importance of these acts and the positive effects they had on the evolution of Athenian democracy.

During and immediately after the Persian War, the power of the Areopagus was reestablished because of its prominent role in defending the state against invaders from the East. For the next seventeen years, the Areopagus controlled the direction of the Athenian state as it moved to become a powerful maritime empire in the Aegean. The political world began to change with the rise of Ephialtes, who, as the new “champion of the people,” started to dismantle the power of this oligarchic institution and its control over the constitution. Many of its members were brought to trial on corruption charges, and its control over the constitution was dissolved. Its powers were given to the other more democratically controlled institutions. Finally, it was Pericles who produced more democratic changes by continuing the erosion of the power of the Areopagus, building Athens’ naval power, and introducing payments for service on the jury courts and stipends for military campaigns. As a result of these changes, there was an increase in political freedom and popular sovereignty, since more citizens began to engage in public affairs and local administration. Because of their importance in maintaining Athenian naval supremacy, the people continued to gain more authority in local government.

After the death of Pericles, however, things began to deteriorate until 411, when there was an oligarchic revolution that was not long in duration. Classical democracy was soon restored and remained intact for about the next 100 years until it was overthrown in 321 by the Macedonians. This dismantling of democracy occurred about two years after the death of Alexander and one year after that of Aristotle. Although they were incorporated into the Macedonian and Roman Empires, the ancient dreams of democracy would live on in the romantic appropriation of the Athenian spirit by the social theorists of the nineteenth century. With the core values of ancient democracy firmly rooted in popular sovereignty and self-determination, they would later provide the all-important framework for a critical analysis of the economic and political institutions of modernity.

CONSTITUTION AND LAW IN THE IDEAL POLITY

Aristotle continues the discussion of the nature of constitutional democracy in ancient Greece in the *Politics*. He raises the issue in the context of his analysis of the correct forms of political constitutions for Greek city-states. Constitutions are the formal structures and institutional arrangements for the distribution of political offices and honors, the implementation of social justice, the determination of sovereignty and laws, and the defining of the

good life and civic happiness as the end of the polis. As we have already seen in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle states, though not very precisely or in much detail, that the objective standards for measuring equality, justice, and the fair distribution of private and public wealth among its citizens rest in the nature, organization, and principles of the political constitution. If one were to change the constitution, the nature of citizenship and justice would also change. This, in turn, influences the standards for the economic and political distribution of its social goods. It is, therefore, important to turn to the issue of the political structure of classical antiquity, its laws and constitutions. Limitations placed on full citizenship and the right to political participation are determined by whether the political community is governed by the one, the few, or the many. Aristotle argues that the correct forms of government are those organized around a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a polity or good democracy. Corresponding to them are three historically deviant forms: tyranny, oligarchy, and a false or extreme democracy. With these latter forms of government, rulership is grounded in the personal rule of an oppressive monarch, the wealthy, or the rabble. The key distinction between the two formal types is that the correct forms of government are based on a concern for the common good and are not oriented toward the accumulation and protection of wealth or private interests.

Aristotle spends more time in the *Politics* detailing the nature of the democratic polity than the other types of government, since this is his political ideal. He says that the primary principle of this form of government is liberty, which he defines as "ruling and being ruled." This is only one component of liberty, to which he adds that "the democratic idea of justice is in fact numerical equality, not equality based on merit; and when this idea of what is just prevails, the multitude must be sovereign, and whatever the majority decides is final and constitutes justice. For, they say, there must be equality for each of the citizens."⁸⁴ Justice in a polity consists of equality, freedom, and popular sovereignty. As was the case for Pericles, this also entails a private dimension in which citizens live the way they would like. The implication is that liberty is a household right so long as there is no interference with the primary principles of democracy or the rights of others. Equality of citizens undermines the importance of wealth and noble birth as primary factors in politics. These ideas are juxtaposed to the slave who is never free and cannot exercise any self-determination. To emphasize these very points in Aristotle, Ernest Barker has written: "That all should share, and all share equally, in the rights of government, may well seem an adoption of democratic principles; and one is tempted to speak of the Aristotelian ideal State as an idealized democracy, in which there is an equal distribution of property, and all are equal in material things . . ."⁸⁵ The deviant forms of government express the dependency and nonrationality of slavery. If the absolute ideal is not to be ruled by others since there is

always a danger of losing individual liberties, the most pragmatic alternative is to alternate ruling and being ruled. To accomplish this end, a democracy offers a certain structure of participation that allows its citizens to take part fully in the legislative, judicial, executive, and administrative functions of the government.

Just as all citizens must participate in the decision-making process, the elected officials must be drawn from the people. Officials are not to be directly chosen or hand-picked, but are to be drawn by lot from the masses; there is to be no property qualification, but Aristotle does include the provision that this applies only to the lesser administrative positions in the community. Those requiring financial, military, or engineering skills would be chosen from a small list of individuals. Once chosen by lot, individuals may not turn their offices into professional or hereditary positions. Aristotle stresses the importance of job rotation as a means of counteracting the rationalization and bureaucratization of politics. Offices are usually held for short periods of time, and once the term limits are up, citizens cannot hold the same office again, at least not immediately. Power lies in the assembly of citizens, not in birth or wealth. The jury courts occupy a central place in the polity, since they adjudicate all legal conflicts, especially those relating to the constitution, public funds, contracts, and public accountability in office.

Sovereignty rests with the whole population of adult male citizens. It is through this body, affirmed through its actions (*praxis*) in the Assembly and the Council, acting as the executive body of the Assembly, that the voice of the general will is expressed. The Assembly is the main legislative body, and officials have the function of carrying out its decisions and laws. Rotation in office and the alternation between ruling and being ruled are two crucial principles in a democracy. To permit all citizens to exercise these rights, Aristotle contends that payment for services in the Assembly, the Council, the law courts, and the offices is necessary so long as it is not too lavish. Aristotle is aware of the dangers that money produces. On the other hand, payment is necessary if all, especially the poor, are to be allowed the free time to participate in this life-affirming role.

A change in the nature of the political constitution results in a change in the nature of virtue, justice, and citizenship. In Book 3 of the *Politics*, Aristotle traces the relationship between the character of the citizen and the social forces of the constitution. "A citizen, therefore, will necessarily vary according to the constitution in each case."⁸⁶ This connection between character and constitution will certainly be important later for Weber's dialectic between personality (*Persönlichkeit*) and the course of life (*Lebensführung*) found in his theory of rationalization. Aristotle defines the citizen as someone who has a share in honors and actively participates in the deliberative and judicial offices of the state. Citizenship requires and permits participation in the administration of the domestic and foreign affairs

of state. While ruling, the citizen engages in rendering public judgments and in holding office. In this way discursive rationality, deliberative reason, and practical wisdom all converge in the activity of the citizen. The central characteristic of the good man and the good citizen come together in the exercise of human reason among fellow citizens and friends. Throughout his work, Aristotle points out that those who cannot develop these capabilities for rational discourse, or who do not have the free time to do so, cannot be real citizens. "The best state will not make the mechanic a citizen."⁸⁷ Aristotle thus excludes from citizenship manual laborers, skilled mechanics, and those engaged in trade and commerce because their occupations are manual and slave-like. An aristocracy is built on the principles of merit and virtue, while an oligarchy is based on wealth. In neither case will mechanics and hired laborers be admitted as citizens.

At this point in his analysis, Aristotle argues that not everyone who is functionally necessary for the state's survival should be a citizen. Yet he never clarifies whether his later arguments in favor of the payment for public service to the poor transcends these limitations. Are the limitations on participation based on occupation and nature, or are the limitations based on education and leisure? Only the latter can be amended by adjustments in the best constitution. The virtue of a good citizen is derived from a maturation process by which he learns rulership by an alteration of participation and work. Education is a form of political experience in which the participants learn over time how to rule others. The analogy of being a cavalry commander is offered as an instructive illustration of this point. One is not born into a leadership role, but one becomes a commander only after years of experience as a cavalry soldier or a leader of a company or battalion. In a similar way, the form of knowledge of a statesman is developed not through theoretical or technical knowledge but through the cultivation of political wisdom through accumulated experience. In Book 1 of the *Politics*, there is another hint at Aristotle's position. Here he fantasizes about the possibility that tools would themselves possess the ability to work without the need for masters or slaves. Machines would work and produce by themselves. This he likens to the Homeric myths of the statues of Daedalus and the tripods of Hephaestus, which, although human constructs, were so life-like that they eventually moved on their own and entered the assembly of the gods. Aristotle appears to leave open the imaginative possibility that there will be social and technical mechanisms that eventually do away with manual labor. Since there are several types of constitutions, there are several types of citizens.

The nature of citizenship is also tied back into the function of man as a political animal. There is a fundamental human need for community and political fellowship that goes well beyond the desire for military alliances, commercial treaties, and social contracts to protect property. These utilitarian devices help ensure mutual defense, commercial exchange of food and

material goods, prevention of injustice, protection of property, promotion of self-sufficiency, and even the facilitation of natural affection, but they do not make citizens virtuous or just. These pragmatic justifications for the social contract will be taken up by modern social and political theorists in their discussions of natural rights, property, and the legitimation of social institutions.⁸⁸ The ancient tradition, however, views society as having other goals and purposes. “So we must lay it down that the association which is a state exists not for the purpose of living together but for the sake of noble actions.”⁸⁹ The final end of the state is the good life (*eudaimonia*), a noble and virtuous life among fellow citizens engaged in rational dialogue about the future course of events. It is a community based on equality defined by the constitution. Justice is the giving of equal honors, offices, and rewards to equals. Injustice, as we have already seen, is the giving of equal rewards to unequals. In different constitutions, equality will have different meanings. Only in a democratic government will equality, along with honors and justice, be more evenly distributed among the population. Justice is thus relative to the type of constitution that organizes people’s political lives.

Having considered the purpose of the state, Aristotle next turns to reflect on the sovereignty of the state. This short section, along with his analysis of citizenship, offers interesting clues to his position on this question. He rejects sovereignty being limited by noble birth, wealth, and poverty because these have a tendency to impoverish and dishonor large numbers of people. Aristotle has already questioned whether the concept of citizenship is applicable outside of a constitutional democracy. Now he asks whether sovereignty has any meaning when it is reduced to a rule by the one or by the few. These inquiries have set up the heart of the argument in Book 3 that involves a considered defense of democracy that will be examined in the next section of this chapter.

Aristotle asks, in Book 4, What is the best constitution for the majority of the population which does not depend upon the accidents of either birth or natural ability? He argues that only in a constitutional democracy based on moral and intellectual virtue, moderation, social accord, friendship, and class compromise will the best constitution and happiness be attainable. Returning to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he reminds the reader that the virtuous and rational life involves moderation, or a middle path between extremes. He applies the same criterion to constitutions, as he seeks a moderate and mixed constitution that combines elements of democracy and oligarchy. “For this reason, it is a most happy state of affairs when those who take part in the constitution have a middling, adequate amount of property.”⁹⁰ The moderate constitution falls between the extremes of a false democracy with rule by the poor and an oligarchy with rule by the rich. There is a close relationship between the best constitution and the best form of property distribution, since the latter is important both for the self-sufficiency of the household and for the maintenance

of social stability and harmony within the state. In this way, the arrogance and injustice of the powerful and wealthy and the wickedness of the poor are avoided. Since the wealthy are too engaged in chrematistical and commercial activities, and the poor are too focused on simply surviving their apparent fate, Aristotle reasons that the moderates are most inclined to participate in the political process. The wealthy class, inspired to arrogance and crime, has no desire to surrender any of its power or submit to the rule of the other classes. In turn, the poor, lacking in honor while being too subservient and wicked, have not been properly acculturated into the positive values of virtue and political participation. In their attitudes toward politics, the wealthy have a tendency to turn into tyrants and the poor to act as slaves.

Aristotle is well aware that the middle constitution has important implications for his theories of distributive justice and private property. That is, there are crucial economic and institutional arrangements that best express the middle path between social extremes. Blending together ideas found in Books 4 and 6, we see a more complex view of the distribution of private property and economic power within the polis based on the delicate balance between private and collective property. While the emphasis in the *Politics* is on the nature of political constitutions and collective participation, scattered throughout the work are references to the question of the economic organization of the community. Aristotle writes, "It is essential that the citizens should have ample subsistence."⁹¹ The best constitution should include an economic arrangement that fosters virtue and happiness by forming a system based on the proper mixture among private property, common property, common meals, and collective subsidies to the poor for the purchase of their own agricultural farms or businesses. The appropriate distribution of property, as well as harmony between the classes, should be based on the ethical principles of equality, fairness, and mutual need.⁹² In the end, Aristotle seeks an economic moderation that ensures ample sustenance and social welfare for all citizens within the polis—certainly enough for a virtuous and happy life. Those at the bottom of the economic ladder or having no independent means of subsistence should be encouraged and financially subsidized to attain a moderate level of independence in order to participate more fully in the public sphere.

Although private property is neither an absolute nor a natural right, it is viewed by Aristotle as a practical measure to ensure the private space for personal development and pleasure, greater effort and efficiency, and more individual responsibility, generosity, and self-restraint for the maintenance of land and property. Economic distribution is rooted in the primary ethical values of political participation and power-sharing within the democratic polity. When necessary, private property is to be supplemented by some form of common property. Aristotle goes so far as to say that half the property of the polity should be private and half public. The common property is to

subsidize public worship and liturgies and the common meals. While private property is an important legal form of ownership, it must be supplemented by a greater concern for the practical legitimacy and functional stability of the political community. Property is to have the same role in society as exchange and distribution. Aristotle augments private property with the notion that it must have a dimension that permits its common use. Although he disagrees with Plato's ideal republic based on the common ownership of the guardians, he does maintain that "there should be a friendly arrangement for its common use, and that none of the citizens should be without means of support."⁹³ As already discussed and repeated here, according to his principle of justice, those in need have a right to share in the agricultural produce of the land. Among friends all things are held in common. Aristotle is clear that this is not an abstract ideal but an empirical state of affairs where there is a common use of private property among friends. This principle, in turn, must be supplemented by wise laws and educated habits in order to be extended to all citizens.

Human need creates a right to the common use of property. According to Aristotle, in some places in Greece part of the land is reserved for the production of material goods for the family and part is reserved for friends. He offers the example of Sparta, where there is a common use of slaves and farm animals. Even on a journey, a traveler may expect to be fed in a stranger's home. Other examples of the common sharing of land come from the Carthaginians and the Athenians, who require that the wealthy pay for public meetings to ensure a more general and democratic participation. In Tarentum the common use of property is permitted, especially for the benefit of those who have none. In each case, this was done to ensure the loyalty of those at the bottom of the economy. Nussbaum, in an important and insightful break with mainstream interpretations of Aristotle's political theory, has referred to Aristotle's ideal polity as a "social democracy" having much in common with present-day Scandinavian governments. Economic exchange and property distribution are secondary to the primary concern for democratic participation by the citizens. Distributive and reciprocal justice involve those economic arrangements that further the ideals of public life, civic brotherhood, political virtue, rational discourse, and self-realization. The economy is deeply embedded in the political community and has no separate ethical principle or functional prerequisite independent of these broader social goals. Aristotle blends together the ideals of Plato's theory of common property and Phaleas' egalitarian constitution based upon an equality of distribution and human needs. From this perspective of an embedded economy, there are no transcendent natural rights, no autonomous mechanics of the market, and no logic of an independent economy in ancient Greece.

Only in a mixed constitution are friendship and mutual sharing the real foundations of the polity. Aristotle exclaims, "The superiority of the

middle constitution is clear also from the fact that it alone is free from factions."⁹⁴ Because there is a much larger number of citizens to draw upon for the public offices and honors, there is greater legitimation and stability. Other forms of government have a tendency to fall into tyranny and slavery. Social factions and political discord are the norm in class societies based on animosity and envy. There is an historical tendency for economics to trump politics and for class antagonisms to destroy democratic institutions. Politics becomes simply the spoils of war in a competition of classes. To further justify his argument, Aristotle stresses that the great lawgivers, such as Solon, Lycurgus, and Charondas, have come from the middle class.

Finally, in Book 7 of the *Politics*, Aristotle returns to a theme discussed earlier in both the *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that is, the relationship between friendship and property. Aristotle reiterates the notion, though he never fully develops it in either text, that there is another moral component to property. Although it is privately owned to facilitate productive use and household responsibility, property should also be viewed as a common inheritance for a common use. This distinction between ownership and use will be important for later developments in natural law theory during the Middle Ages. Friendship and human need have a stronger moral claim to the use of property than legal ownership. This provides the justification for reciprocal justice, economic exchange, and self-sufficiency in the polis. Without it, personal and civic friendships are difficult to maintain. However, in order to balance the classes institutionally, Aristotle recommends that in the best constitution all citizens should be involved in the election to offices, public scrutiny, and law courts, while the most important offices are to be filled on the basis of property qualification. In this way, the democratic and oligarchic elements are balanced. Also in this way, offices will be filled by the most competent and educated people but chosen and scrutinized by the majority. Sovereignty will remain with the assembled populace in the Assembly and *Boule*.

COLLECTIVE JUDGMENTS AND DISCURSIVE RATIONALITY IN CLASSICAL DEMOCRACY

Of particular importance in Aristotle's *Politics* is the connection between his theory of the correct political constitutions and his theory of classical democracy. Along with his general analysis, another equally important connection exists between his ideas on practical wisdom and an ethic of public discourse, that is, between science and politics. The basis for his political defense of constitutional democracy lies in the overall moral values of expanded equality, freedom, and the good life; his defense of practical knowledge lies in communal deliberation, political participation, and public reason. Politics without a constitution and laws, without the means to integrate virtue and

action, leads to philosophical abstractions and universal theories (*episteme*), not to political wisdom and practical action. In Book 3, Aristotle outlines the correct forms of government, whereas in Book 4 he begins with an analysis of political theory and practical knowledge, reconnecting with Book 6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. It provides an intriguing interplay between politics and epistemology. Is Aristotle's theory of knowledge and intellectual virtue expanding our appreciation of the best polity, or is he using the concept of practical wisdom to justify a particular type of political community that encourages the widest possible form of political action and citizenship? Aristotle's justification of a democratic polity thus lies in both politics and epistemology, as both moral virtue and intellectual *phronesis*.

Aristotle claims that democracy is the best form of government because it promotes virtuous action and collective wisdom, social stability, better judgments and opinions, increased participation and friendships, greater contribution of the majority, justice and the common good, rationality and moderation, and respect for the law.⁹⁵ In his defense of democratic sovereignty, he maintains that the mass of people, due to its collective wisdom, may just be better than the enlightened few. In the same way, a feast to which everyone contributes is better than one supplied by a very wealthy benefactor. Individually the participants may not have the virtue or practical wisdom of the best citizens. However, Aristotle contends that collectively they constitute a more perfect moral character and intelligence. The mass is better at judging a work of poetry and music because they are able to bring a wider perception to the work of art. The collectivity in its constitution takes on a quality of life quite different from that of particular members. In effect, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This represents the superiority of the mass over the best few. As they congregate in the Assembly, the Council, and the law courts, as they deliberate and judge about the key issues of state, and as they reflect about what is best for the common good, this communal experience results in greater wisdom than any single individual could achieve.

Aristotle reminds his audience that Solon had given the people the power to choose their officials and the right of scrutiny (*eisangelia*) of their accomplishments in office. But should they have this power of sovereignty and evaluation? Should not the task of running the government be left in the hands of political experts and skilled technicians? This technical knowledge (*techne*) could provide the utilitarian skills that would be superior to the communal practical wisdom of the assembled citizens. Just as the sick seek out the skilled physician, the captain of a ship looks for a competent navigator and an athlete a skilled trainer, so too the body politic should look to a political elite to run the government. Aristotle's response is that "each individual will indeed be a worse judge than the experts, but collectively they will be better or at any rate no worse."⁹⁶ Although a carpenter will

be a better technician or a house builder a better contractor than the new owner, it is the latter who will ultimately be a better judge of the quality and construction of the house. The multitude will share better opinions because the collective will be able to draw upon the technical knowledge of experts, as well as the communal traditions and wisdom acquired by years of political participation in the organs of government.

Aristotle has already considered the nature of *phronesis* in Book 6. The considered opinions of the assembled citizens are formed through their collective experience as they examine, judge, and deliberate in the open spaces of the public sphere. Aristotle still voices reservation that the inferior should have such sovereign power over the superior individuals. In a constitutional democracy, there will be a blending of classes and a balancing of ability. The masses, many of whom have little or no property, will participate in the democratic institutions of decision making, whereas the superior individuals will occupy the higher positions in the military, treasury, and government, where a high property qualification is required. This mixture of classes and constitutions will create more harmony and social stability. Aristotle also argues that it is not the individual who rules, but the organization of the Assembly and courts. "So it is quite just that the mass of the people should be in sovereign control of more important things since people, council, and law-court all comprise many persons."⁹⁷ The constitution and the law are sovereign. The universal principles of the law must be adjusted to fit the circumstances, and this is the role supplied by the collective memory and political traditions manifested through the people engaged in public discourse. When the noble and the common are compared, the collectivity is superior to the one or the few sound men. Aristotle's view of democracy relies on his appreciation of the relationship between politics and pedagogy. Political participation is the most important form of moral education in the classical world. From this perspective, the multitude does possess the ability to nurture and broaden its moral and intellectual development under the best constitution.

Sovereignty and leadership are predicated on the superiority of individuals to whom equal honors and rewards are to be given for the benefit of the whole community. After Aristotle raises the question of the criteria for determining sovereignty, he asks it again in the context of justice and leadership. Just as the best pipe players should be given the best instruments to improve the overall quality of the music, so too in politics. Benefits and offices should not flow to individuals simply on the basis of their birth or wealth. Judging oligarchies and even aristocracies as too limited, he broadens his argument to include the notion of contribution to the community. People must be judged and rewarded on the basis of merit measured by their contribution to the virtuous life and social justice. The majority contribute the most to the whole in terms of military strength, finances, wealth, and

moral virtue by the sheer preponderance of their numbers. "For surely, whether their claim to sovereignty over the citizen body rests on wealth or on virtue, it remains true that against their arguments the multitude will have some justice on their side."⁹⁸ Aristotle asks if there are those who are so above the average citizen, then quite possibly they should rule over all others. But he is equally quick to point out that these individuals should rightly be considered divine rather than mortal beings due to the rarity of their existence. He at first appears to side with the monarchists and aristocrats but immediately takes it back, since this is not a real or likely scenario.

The superiority of birth or virtue is very rare, and these individuals are generally not superior to the average citizen.⁹⁹ In fact, the opposite may be true, and this is the reason for the creation of ostracism and the communal response to those who tyrannically reach too far for power. Too much power in the hands of a single individual produces a disharmony of proportion that is out of balance with the functional need for social stability. For a shipbuilder or chorus master, all components of their final product must be in proportion and in service to the whole. Ostracism is the political mechanism which is designed to reestablish harmony for the common good when one individual or group becomes immoderate and disproportionate. The final argument in favor of a democracy as the best constitution is that the majority are less corruptible than the one or the few. Aristotle offers the analogy of a large body of water which is difficult to pollute because of its size. Honesty and control over passions are more easily exercised by the majority of good men and good citizens than single individuals, who are more prone to swings of emotions and moments of irrationality, corruptibility, and dishonesty. Aristotle clearly has trust in the functions of government and the strength of law in a democracy, which tend to inhibit the importation of nonrational judgment into the decision-making process. In a very subtle fashion, he has joined elements of both democracy and aristocracy, or majority rule and rule by the virtuous few, into his view of constitutional democracy. To emphasize his point even more, he presents a short history of constitutional evolution in order to show the social implications of grounding a constitution on kingship and oligarchy. Because they logically lead to tyranny and false democracy as the competition for wealth and power corrupts both individuals and institutions, they cannot be the best forms of government. A true democracy does not commit these errors but fosters a collective virtue greater than any individual could have.

The last few chapters of Book 3 are devoted to a study of kingship as one possibility for the best constitution. As in the case with democracy and aristocracy, Aristotle defends and then criticizes this form of government. After an initial exasperation and frustration with determining Aristotle's ideal political community, it becomes clear that he rejects the notion of a utopian ideal that is independent of the social and historical conditions of

real city-states and constitutions. At the beginning of Book 4 of the *Politics* and the start of Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he connects practical wisdom and political science. The search for the political ideal cannot be made into a technical science (*techne*) or a theoretical ideal (*episteme*). Wisdom adapts to the concrete and particular circumstances of real life as it connects with history and social reality. Aristotle rejects the idea that political science can deal with objective reality, pure theory, or a contemplative ideal of the best constitution. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he formulates the issue in the following manner:

[F]or precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions which political science investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature . . . We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better.¹⁰⁰

Political science is a practical science which investigates political organizations and the good life only roughly and in outline. It is an historical science of the particular and contingent; it is not a theoretical science of universal laws and eternal political ideals. Aristotle criticizes a political science that seeks knowledge of the best political constitution whether that is knowledge of the absolutely best or knowledge of the best possible under the circumstances. If political science is a phronetic science, then it investigates the actual and real circumstances to uncover the minimally achievable and realistically attainable political knowledge. Toward this end, Aristotle adapts the constitutional typology or ideal types of Book 3—monarchy, aristocracy, and democratic polity—to the demands of practical knowledge and social reality. Political pragmatism seeks knowledge that is immediately applicable to actual reality. It starts from the given political institutions and traditions, saving what it can and changing what is appropriate to improve. This involves political renovation and slow evolution rather than the creation of entirely new political constructions from an ideal form; it requires wisdom and sensitivity as to what is salvageable and what is not worth saving. As we have already seen in our analysis of *phronesis*, this form of knowledge is acquired through political experience and years of participation in the political process to determine the positive and negative elements in the constitution. “Practical wisdom enables one to discern both which laws are best and which of them suit each constitution. For one ought to lay down laws to fit constitutions (as indeed is always done), not constitutions to fit

laws.”¹⁰¹ This requires a more subtle flexibility in determining the nature and makeup of constitutions in reality. It is this form of practical knowledge which nineteenth-century social theorists will respect and admire.

Political science moves away from the ideally perfect to the actual, away from pure theory and philosophical contemplation to practicality and action. Knowledge is acquired through action (*praxis*) which then informs practical wisdom. The latter, in turn, is a result of collective deliberation and communal judgment. Aristotle contends that the constitution and law are sovereign, since the majority exercise wisdom in particular determinations of legal equity in civil and criminal cases and in sound economic and political judgments in public policy.¹⁰² A polity is a living organism expressing a dialectic between its constitution and its laws, formal principles and practical applications. The ideal does not exist, cannot be engineered by technical rules, and is not owned by a particular individual (philosophering) or political elite. Implicit in Aristotle’s critique of Platonic rationalism and Sophist utilitarianism is his view of citizenship and freedom, as well as his rejection of both monarchy and aristocracy. Neither form of polity is able to provide a proper foundation for discursive rationality, collective wisdom, and practical reason. Only in a democracy are the personality and institutional conditions met which could realize this view of knowledge and wisdom in the public sphere. Under these conditions, a democratic polity has the distinct advantage of developing into an aristocracy of virtue and discourse. In the end, the ultimate condition for the best constitution lies not in a universal principle of sovereignty or ideal government but in the actual possibilities inherent in the collective rationality of the existing polity. The ideal comes from the rational dreams of its own citizens expressed in public speech and made permanent in written laws. In his *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* Aristotle offers us a discourse ethics grounded in a political theory of civic friendship and virtuous participation and in an economic theory of household management, property distribution, and social economy.

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CHAPTER TWO

ARISTOTLE AND CLASSICAL SOCIAL THEORY

Social Justice and Moral Economy in Marx, Weber, and Durkheim

Aristotle's influence on the rise of nineteenth-century European social thought was as profound as it was pervasive. Every aspect of classical social theory borrowed at least some elements from his philosophy. Although the substantive contributions of the Enlightenment in political science, economics, and classical history are well documented, the relationship of the ancients to the moderns in sociology is not as well represented in the secondary literature. It is the ideals of Aristotle which gave life to the substance and spirit of modern social theory and provided an entirely different paradigm than that presented by the Enlightenment. Aristotle's writings on economics and politics offered the moderns a challenge and encouragement to think outside the framework of formal reason and political economy. Seventeenth-century thinkers were concerned with justifying the state of nature and its contractual form of political sovereignty, as well as the new deductive method and analytical logic of Cartesian scientific rationality, in returning to ancient and medieval natural law principles. However, once their tasks were accomplished, they no longer needed natural law to justify either natural rights or modern science. The ancient principles were later discarded and forgotten by the Enlightenment. On the other hand, European social theorists in the nineteenth century began to rediscover and reappropriate the ethical and economic ideas of these traditions in exciting new ways in order to explore the limits of liberalism and capitalism. The philosophical context within which nineteenth-century social science, social theory, and social critique evolved may be analytically divided into the following subfields of inquiry: (1) social justice and classical democracy, (2) moral economy and critique of chrematistics, (3) ethics and social theory,

and (4) theories of practical knowledge and science. The broad framework of Aristotle's influence throughout the nineteenth century can be felt in four major areas: politics, economics, ethics, and science.

Social Justice and Classical Democracy

Aristotle was keenly aware of the relationship between virtuous action and the form of political constitutions, that is, the relationship between ethics and politics. The classical view of social justice, with its emphasis on economic distribution, reciprocal sharing and fair exchange in a moral economy, and political discourse and public happiness (*eudaimonia*) in the polis based on freedom, equality, and virtue, had a profound influence on Marx's theory of species emancipation and deliberative democracy, Weber's theory of freedom, self-realization, and the virtuous life, and Durkheim's view of communal solidarity, equality, and moral education. Their empirical and historical studies were closely tied to their theories of ethical and political ideals. Marx and Weber were trained in law, and all three were well versed in classical political science with its integration of ethics and political institutions. Weber and Durkheim were influenced by the German Historical School and its neo-Aristotelian empiricism and moral critique of political economy.¹

Weber accepts a parliamentary democracy based on moral autonomy, self-determination, and personal integrity. His view of social justice lies in his belief in the potential development of the powers and capabilities of the soul of humanity (*Menschen-tum*). Durkheim's sociology, on the other hand, is directed toward the moral education of the citizen for civic virtue, worker guilds, and democratic socialism. Both Marx and Durkheim develop a functionalist theory of society that outlines the relationship between systemic dysfunctions and distorted consciousness, that is, between economic crises and false consciousness on the one hand, and anomic egoism and suicide on the other. Functionalism in both their theories is intimately connected to the structures of social justice: Marx reaches out for both justice and economic democracy based on the principles of mutual sharing and human need within worker cooperatives for the collective ownership of production. Durkheim, in very similar fashion, focuses on the values of equality and the common good, distributive, reciprocal, and political justice, and the satisfaction of human need and personal dignity.

Moral Economy and Critique of Chrematistics

Underlying modern social theory was a critique of political economy as destructive of the broader interests of species being, virtuous action, and community solidarity. The market economy and bureaucratic structures of modern society produced economic oppression and distorted consciousness;

an iron cage of the last man and a disenchanting liberalism without spirit, heart, or substantive reason; and a narcissistic individualism and abnormal specialization of labor. These economic forces were destructive of the social bonds of communal friendship and the virtuous life of the citizen. Philosophy was always being compared and contrasted to sociology—political and ethical ideals to the existing structures of political economy—to determine if the realization of the former would be possible given the structural realities of the latter. A social economy built on moral grounds would be preferable to a political economy geared to profit maximization and self-interest.

Ethics and Social Theory

Out of their studies arise their criticisms of modern industrial society as expressions of alienation, rationalization, and anomie. In the process, they blend together rigorous empirical and historical research with ethical criticisms of the values and institutions of modern capitalism as destructive of individual freedom and communal solidarity.

Theories of Practical Knowledge and Science

Following the ancient Greeks, the modern social theorists develop alternative approaches to science which are incorporated into Marx's use of immanent critique and dialectical method, Weber's interpretive and historical sociology, and Durkheim's functionalist and moral science. They produce an empirical sociology of economic critique, cultural understanding, and collective representations that rejects any underlying metaphysical and epistemological realism, naturalism, or technical knowledge of positivistic science. Basing their arguments on the methods of law, hermeneutics, and interpretation, they develop in radically different ways a phronetic sociology built upon Aristotle's ethical theory of practical wisdom (*phronesis*). This discussion of practical wisdom, its elaboration, and its development will lead naturally to an analysis of Kant's methodological contributions in chapter 4. In its most succinct form, Aristotle provides much of the ethical, political, and economic content of nineteenth-century social theory, while Kant and his followers give it its logical and methodological form. From this vantage point, classical sociology lies between traditions, between the ancients and the moderns, between justice and science.

HUMAN NEED, EMANCIPATION, AND COMMUNAL DEMOCRACY IN MARX

Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the classical tradition in the nineteenth century is its integration of science and justice. As the other

social sciences rushed to distinguish and separate knowledge from ethics in the name of scholarly objectivity and value neutrality, sociology asserted the argument that social justice was an absolutely essential part of science. To separate the two would be to destroy reason itself. Not only were the two elements not contradictory, they were intimately bound in a dialectical dance to examine society empirically with a distinct ethical goal in mind: creation of the good life and public happiness. Science tended to focus on questions of social pathology because the structural deformities of industrial society stood in the way of individual freedom and social democracy. Marx, Weber, and Durkheim had different appreciations of what happiness would entail, just as they appropriated different traditions of Kantian thought and scientific inquiry. They rejected the ideas of possessive individualism, natural rights, and utilitarian theory with their strong dose of Enlightenment materialism, market rationality, and competitive self-interest. More spiritually demanding and ethically uplifting, they sought the creation of new social conditions for the development of humanity toward a free and just society.

It is in this context that our analysis begins in this chapter. For Marx, issues of social justice frame the entire corpus of his empirical and historical research. In his critique of political economy, from his earliest anthropological writings on species being and self-conscious productivity and the functionalism of historical materialism to his later works on the structural contradictions and economic crises of liberal capitalism, Marx sees no division between materialism and idealism or between science and justice. The purpose of scientific inquiry is to provide a meaningful context within which critique and praxis take place. This explains his criticisms of theoretical abstractionism and moral philosophy, as well as his acceptance of Hegel's critique of Kant and transition from issues of individual morality (*Moralität*) to social ethics (*Sittlichkeit*) in the "Critique of the Gotha Program" (1875).² Aristotle used justice as the focal point of his writings as he tied together ethics and politics with a concern for living the virtuous life, economic distribution, exchange based on familial love and citizen affection, fairness in market pricing, and a concern for public freedom and the common good through deliberation and dialogue. In this way, economic exchange was never to be the arbiter of reason or the facilitator of virtue or nobility, nor was it to aid in the accumulation of unnatural wealth or the acquisition of social status and power. It was to help ensure a material basis for the stability and self-sufficiency of the family and the polis. This, in turn, would provide for the material foundations for social justice and the good life, since they represented the ultimate telos of human existence. The economy would be subservient to the broader physical and spiritual needs of the political community.

Marx clearly recognizes that these ideals have been distorted under capitalism, with the economy now defining the nature of happiness, success,

and virtue.³ Ethics and politics have been inverted and reduced to being subservient to economics. From this perspective, Marx's early and later writings represent a conversation with classical Greece to reestablish the moral compass of the modern community. Toward this end, his earliest writings examine the philosophy of nature and science of Epicurus and Democritus, the theory of law and political constitution of Hegel, and the politics of praxis, need, and freedom of Aristotle. In both the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law* (1843) and "On the Jewish Question" (1843), Marx focuses on the relationship between the modern state and civil society. To establish the actual structural connections between politics and the economy is important for him because there was a disconnect in the German academy between the ideal and real. Hegel views the state, its offices, and its functions as independent of particular private interests and laws of the family and civil society. For him, they are the perceived attributes and presupposed characteristics of the concept of the state and not the actual state itself. They are produced by the necessary logic of the idea of a political constitution which, in turn, transforms them into metaphysical entities. Hegel contends in his *Philosophy of Law*: "This organism is the development of the idea into its distinct aspects and their objective actuality."⁴ That the idea of the state in Hegel's philosophy of law becomes the subject of analysis is a form of political mysticism for Marx. The political world becomes a product of the inner necessity and immanent development of the mind as the self-consciousness of the ethical spirit knows and wills itself. Marx critically writes in the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*: "He [Hegel] does not develop his thinking from the object, but expounds the object in accordance with a thinking that is cut and dried—already formed and fixed in the abstract sphere of logic."⁵

Marx calls for a philosophy that reverses the relationship between the subject and object in order to undo Hegel's reification of real human relationships. Instead, he wants to begin with a social analysis of the political constitution, family, and civil society and their functional interrelationships. History is to replace abstract logic in political and social theory; materialism is to be the ground of analysis and not an illusory speculative idealism. Although not mentioned by name, this represents a return to the approach undertaken by Aristotle in his *Politics*. The beginning point of his new approach was to be the conflict in civil society over scarce resources and property. Only with this method are the key relationships within the modern state—monarchy, executive (administration and bureaucracy), legislature (estates), and civil society, with its competing private economic interests—to be uncovered as a "war of all against all." Marx is aware that much of this analysis has already been undertaken by Hegel. However, the latter never developed the actual connections among the component parts into a comprehensive theory of the modern state.

Marx understands that the essence of the state lies not in the logic of its own idea but in the empirical reality of its relationship to the economy. In this critical essay on Hegel's theory of the state, he attempts to look behind the ideological facade of the state to its reality in class power over production. The essence of the state, its primary function, and its reason for being lie in a defense of private property: "The *illusion* that the state determines, when it is being determined. It does, indeed, break the *will of the family and society*, but only as to give existence to the *will of private property without family and society* and to acknowledge this existence as the supreme existence of the political state, as the supreme existence of *ethical life*."⁶ The very notion of property and person are a product of the state, justified by the legislature and judiciary, protected by its civil and criminal laws, and enforced by the executive branch of government. It is property that represents "not only the 'pillar of the constitution' but the 'constitution itself.'"⁷ The political constitution is not really about individual rights, public representation, or personal freedom but ultimately about the preservation and continuance of private property.

Marx's goal was ethical in the sense that his purpose was to show how the social values of industrial production, market economy, and class domination defined and informed the action of the state. These were not the social attributes of the idea of the state, but the actual foundations upon which the state rested. Hegel maintained the position that the role of the state was to realize the values of the ethical community in an institution that was universal and above partisan and class conflict. Politics, even when legislators were representing the interests of a crass state of belligerent nature, was able to transcend the limits of economic interests. It could express the interests of the common good. Marx, however, places the state directly in the middle of civil society and private property. He never lets the claims of universality blind him to the reality of the concrete particular. For him, the modern state is an unreal political abstraction when its essential role in a capitalist society—to ensure the maintenance of class property, production, and distribution—is overlooked. Hegel's concern for the nature of electoral reform in Europe is not shared by Marx, who thinks it is ultimately a false question. The consideration of whether the legislative branch should be elected by representatives or by all individually is to question only the method of political control exercised by civil society. He contends that a better approach would be to apply radical political measures to dissolve both the existing state and civil society. To reform elections without changing the underlying relationships between the two would be to maintain an alienated political system.

Aristotle took an entirely different approach to political theory than that offered by Hegel. He was aware that in order for the state to represent the universal and common good, it must rest upon a moral economy, not

a political economy of rapacious competition and chrematistic self-interest, that is, not upon the institutions of civil society. Once this was properly understood, classical social theory would have to construct an alternative view of politics, freedom, human rights, and universal emancipation that was no longer tied to the structure and logic of liberalism. The earliest of Marx's writings present an opportunity for him to contrast the political and economic theories of Aristotle and Hegel in an attempt to frame the issue of political justice in a broader historical context. Hegel's philosophy of law, founded upon estates' representation and civil society, undermines the political institutions which Aristotle argued lead to self-conscious rationality, public deliberation, and civic happiness.

Marx's central thesis in his early analysis of Hegel's political theory is that the values of civil society inform the workings of the state; he expands upon this thesis in "On the Jewish Question." Here, he concentrates on investigating how the logic of private property impinges on the principles of natural rights and political freedom. Marx rejects the underlying premises of political emancipation and reform of the state in order to incorporate Jews as citizens into the political community. The discussion was initiated by Bruno Bauer's response to the continued oppression of Jews in German society and their cries for full citizenship and civil liberties. Should members of the Jewish community be given the same rights as citizens in Germany? Ignoring for a moment whether Germans were actually citizens with rights themselves, Bauer saw the answer in the political reformation of the state. Marx's response was swift and dramatic. He moves beyond the limits of Bauer's position in this essay by offering a radical alternative. Agreeing with Bauer about the need to establish Jewish civil rights, he still maintains that the question leaves intact the existing political structure and never challenges its underlying social and legal forms. When political liberties and rights are discussed in an abstract void unconnected to history and society, there is a danger that freedom turns into a form of oppression. Traditional Lockean natural rights to life, liberty, and property, if universalized to all members of society, would only universalize the prevailing system of political categories. It would not call into question the power relationships, rights, and freedoms offered in bourgeois society. Marx is concerned with social justice, and this requires a more comprehensive critique of political economy and the deeper structures and functions of the state.

As with his direct engagement with Hegel's theory of law and politics, Marx continues to criticize the illusions of false universals and abstract political reasoning in this insightful essay on Jewish citizenship and civil liberties. Instead of representing the general interests of society, the modern state "has become the spirit of *civil society*, of the sphere of egoism and the *bellum omnium contra omnes*. It is no longer the essence of *community* but the essence of *differentiation*."⁸ According to Marx, religion had long ago become

a false universal. It gives the appearance of uniting all individuals within a spiritual community in the service and glory of God. But this turns out to be a false unity that expresses only a distorted relationship and an alienated consciousness. In a similar fashion, politics plays the same role in his time. It offers the ideal of uniting all groups and classes into a harmonious social system founded on individual rights and liberties, but this illusion collapses when it is discovered that “the members of the political state are religious, because of the dualism between individual life and species-life, between the life of civil society and political life.”⁹ Just as religion creates an artificial harmony embellished by a constructed theodicy and heavenly metaphysics, the reality of dogmatic politics is hidden beneath an elaborate constitution, bureaucracy, and litany of laws and rights. In the end, both religion and politics shield us from the reality of the contradictions of the capitalist economy and liberal individualism that hide beneath the surface of modern society. The transcendent community of believers and citizens is an imaginary and false world of impossible hopes and unmet expectations.

Following Rousseau, Marx distinguishes between the bourgeois and the citizen, between the “rights of man” and the “rights of the citizen.” The rights of man are the universal rights attributed to individuals as members of civil society. They are supposed to represent a presocial articulation of our sacred individual liberties within a state of nature which continue after the creation of a social contract and civil law. Marx views them as the rights of egoism and a separation from others and from the community. These rights by implication make a moral economy and democratic polity impossible since they reinforce social antagonisms and divisions, deify possessive individualism and personal isolation, and justify self-interest and natural necessity. The rights of man represent for Marx the right to engage in civil society and a market economy. In order to develop his argument in more detail, he examines the rights of liberty, equality, security, and property as they are articulated in the French constitution of 1793, *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*. Liberty is the right of an individual to undertake any course of action as long as it does no harm to others. It expresses a desire for action unlimited by arbitrary and coercive infringement by outside forces. Marx’s critical reaction to the French constitution lies in his argument that natural rights are forms of political alienation which undermine a sense of common responsibility and the general welfare in favor of the enhancement of the monadic individual. “But liberty as a right of man is not founded upon the relations between man and man, but rather upon the separation of man from man. It is the right of such separation. The right of the *circumscribed* individual, withdrawn into himself.”¹⁰ Rejecting Locke’s claim in the *Second Treatise of Government* (1690), Marx contends that these are not “natural rights” founded on the species or communal nature of human beings. Rather, they are rights based on civil society and private property,

and therefore they are historically grounded forms of liberties limited to a particular type of economic system. That is, they are the chrematistic rights of the bourgeoisie.¹¹

Freedom in this type of society is best expressed as the free disposal and enjoyment of one's own property and goods justified by human labor. There are no higher moral obligations to this form of individual happiness, since it is ultimately a right of the arbitrary market and competitive private interest. "It leads every man to see in other men, not the *realization*, but rather the *limitation* of his own liberty."¹² The rights of civil society undermine the whole foundation of Aristotle's theory of democracy and moral economy. They distort our relationships to other individuals and create a society based on competition and suspicion rather than love (*philia*) and citizenship. Justice under liberalism becomes impossible, since its structural and cultural prerequisites do not exist in a capitalist society. In the end, justice is reduced to fair economic distribution according to the distorted laws of competition within the marketplace. A distributive justice according to reciprocity, grace, and need becomes unimaginable. What binds individuals together is not a common love for the political community and family or responsibility to others but physical necessity and social fears.¹³ Irrespective of Locke's early attempts to justify natural rights on the tradition of natural law and God, Marx sees them as perversions of humanity for the protection of class property and inequality. Closely following Aristotle's *Politics*, he writes that the French constitution of 1793 "reduce[s] citizenship, the *political community*, to a mere *means* for preserving these so-called rights of man . . . it is man as a bourgeois and not man as a citizen who is considered the *true* and *authentic* man."¹⁴ Marx recognizes that political life is only a means used by civil society to protect the legal rights to property through the executive, legislative, and judicial power of the state. In times of emergency and social crisis, political life and its corresponding public "rights of the citizen" (rights of the species being) to political liberty, assembly, freedom of thought, and the practice of religion are suspended, since the real end of the state is security of person and property.¹⁵ The authentic rights of the citizen are only briefly mentioned by Marx in this essay because they are only fleeting and unattainable ideals in a capitalist state. They are a central part of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* but in the end are only idealized expressions of human religiosity. To focus on them in this context would be to miss the underlying rationale of the "materialism of civil society." This is the core reality and inner content of universal rights. Public rights that protect the political community require something beyond the revolutions of the eighteenth century. This is why Marx calls for a revolution in "human emancipation." Drucilla Cornell has noticed this crucial link between Marx and Aristotle on the issue of citizenship and freedom: "Marx with Hegel before him, was profoundly influenced by the

classical ideal of the citizen. The classical ideal of political freedom had to do with the freedom to be a full and participating member of the polis.¹⁶ According to Marx, the underlying value assumptions of the natural rights tradition undermine the very principles and institutions of the rights of the citizen: political freedom is undermined by market liberty, while collective responsibility and human rights are undermined by competitive self-interest and possessive individualism.

Marx's other early writings on the nature of property, production, and alienation in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* will continue this debate into the realm of economic justice: reciprocal exchange based on grace and need, democratic distribution, and economic self-sufficiency for families and citizens. Marx will show how alienated labor, disproportionate class power, and private property shape a system in which a moral economy becomes impossible. In a letter published in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in 1844, he writes: "The self-confidence of the human being, freedom, has first of all to be aroused again in the hearts of these people [Germans]. Only this feeling, which vanished from the world with the Greeks, and under Christianity, disappeared into the blue mist of the heavens, can again transform society into a community of human beings united for their highest aims, into a democratic state."¹⁷

In these essays, also known as the *Paris Manuscripts*, Marx directs his attention to the real content of politics—the sensuous and productive individual in civil society—in order to show how modernity has distanced itself from the ancient ideals and concrete possibilities of social justice. Capitalism produces an economic system that further estranges the individual from its own possibilities of self-realization and freedom. Turning into a commodity which inhabits an alien world whose structure and logic act independently of any self-conscious reason, the worker is alienated from the objects of production as private property, the process of production as the specialization of labor, the self as a social being, and the community as a moral whole. Marx's theory of alienation parallels the intentions of Aristotle by presenting the reader with a critique of a chrematistic economy that no longer provides the ethical foundations for the political well-being of the community. Public deliberation and happiness become irrelevant in a civil society characterized by the objectification of labor, inner spiritual poverty, loss of control over production, and class oppression. The world enclosing the worker is a world of lost possibilities and silent dreams. This alienation only dehumanizes the citizen and exhausts the moral content of social institutions as the latter become a mere means in the machinery of profit maximization. As Marx so powerfully explains, "The more the worker produces the less he has to consume; the more value he creates the more worthless he becomes; the more refined his product the more crude and misshapen the worker; the more civilized the product the more barbarous the worker."¹⁸

This examination of alienated labor is not a representation of the best polity, the ideal citizen, or the virtuous life that Aristotle outlined in the *Politics*. Rather, it is a picture of a deformed individuality upon which liberalism projects its misplaced ideals of freedom and liberty. Marx has moved beyond the limits of Aristotle's ethics to develop a more extensive theory of praxis in which production workers are the self-conscious creators of their own lives. The worlds of the citizen and the worker are integrated to form the foundation of a modern democratic polity. Following Aristotle's analysis of the deviant forms of politics (tyranny, oligarchy, and extreme democracy) and economies (chrematistics and commercial trade), all of which are forms of political and economic alienation, Marx adds a new dimension to humanity in the form of social praxis. Self-realization and human creativity are to be expressions of both democratic participation and the aesthetics and ethics of economic production of the material and moral life of the community. According to Aristotle, economics was to provide the material goods necessary for survival and self-sufficiency in order that the ultimate goal of humanity could be realized. Virtue, action, and happiness were its telos. Marx translates praxis into an expanded category sharing social as well as political characteristics. Human beings "rule and are, in turn, ruled" as both political and economic animals. Since the abstract citizen in modern society is already the full representative of the interests of the market and property, Marx now unites them at the conscious level. Modern science and technology in production have potentially liberated humans from subservient and dehumanizing labor. The dreams of democracy are now expanded to include all areas of public deliberation within society, including both the state and economy. *Phronesis* expands into areas formerly occupied by *techne* and *oikonomike* (natural wealth production).

Marx defines individuals as species beings who create their community as both a theoretical and a practical object. Praxis is not just a category of material production but also includes a cognitive and moral dimension in which work produces the technology and products, the social organization of production, and the political, ethical, aesthetic, and scientific values and institutions of cultural life. Work is not simply an economic category but an all-encompassing category of self-conscious human activity in which social institutions are the product of human labor and rational creativity. Humans produce their own history, culture, society, and nature in different social forms having different practical ideals. Unlike animals who act on the basis of instinct and survival, humans are the only beings capable of self-consciously creating according to the laws of beauty, that is, according to the highest ethical and aesthetic standards. The subject becomes conscious of his or her action and purpose only by means of the products of objectivity, that is, through the structural and cultural components that constitute society. These objects permit humans to view themselves from the

outside as social beings. "The object of labor is, therefore, the *objectification of man's species-life* . . . [since] he sees his own reflection in a world which he has constructed."¹⁹

The universality of human consciousness is manifested in its theoretical, aesthetic, and ethical expressions as self-conscious representations and creations of the community. In this way, Marx links being and thought, as workers constitute the immediate sensuous world around them that becomes the basis for their conscious life. "Productive life is, however, species-life. It is life creating life. In the type of life activity resides the whole character of a species, its species-character: and free, conscious activity is the species-character of human beings. Life itself appears only as a *means of life*."²⁰ These are the earliest expressions of Marx's theory of historical materialism; culture and society are manifestations of the deeper relations and logic of the production process. From this perspective, private property becomes the concrete sensuous expression of economic objectification. The result is an alienation of our consciousness and senses, an alienation of art (beauty), science (truth), and politics (justice) and a distortion of our relationship to the world, nature, and society. In a capitalist economy, these aspects of species being become stultified since they are no longer the product of a self-conscious and rational being. In seeming despair, Marx writes that the essence of species being in modern industrial society is private property. Capitalism is thus a form of deviant and pathological behavior, since it makes social justice and the rational, autonomous individual impossible. Justice is reduced in liberalism to the distribution of the commodities according to the principles of ownership and power. It says nothing about the quality of life, the ultimate goals of human existence as self-conscious creativity, the institutions of public happiness, or the aesthetics of human praxis. In this modern social system, the individual becomes a price, a commodity to be bought and sold on the market, just another cost of production to be configured based on utilitarian calculus.

Marx continues to expand upon his theory of social justice by moving away from his early philosophical anthropology of species being toward the beginnings of an historical materialism and critical functionalism. From the nature of the human species as rational creators (subjectivity) of their own social existence (objectivity) to an analysis of the history, structure, and logic of capital, the question of social justice remains central. Many of his later writings expand the details of what was only implied in his earliest works. Whereas Aristotle focused upon issues of virtue, reason, wisdom, justice, and political constitutions, Marx concentrates on an analysis of the actual mechanism of chrematistics through a critique of political economy. In the *Communist Manifesto* (1848), Marx and Friedrich Engels begin with a brief introduction to the transformation of the later medieval economy, with its enormous technological developments of the productive forces, market expansion throughout the world, advancements of scientific enlightenment,

and revolutionizing of the social organization of production. The inner contradictions between the productive forces and social relations broke the society apart because the medieval economy was no longer compatible with the new forces of capitalism tearing at the old system.

Although not fully developed by any means, there is the beginning of a functionalist analysis of the internal conflicts within the new social system that logically drive it to crisis. The contradictions within capitalism are not resolved, as there is a continuous tension between the material conditions of production—technology, science, and skills—and the social organization of power and decision making in the workplace: “Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and property . . . is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spell.”²¹ From the alienation of species being to the alienation of the mode of production, the structure of the workplace has become an unnatural force with its own internal logic of expansion and distribution. Just as medieval society was forced to change because of the inevitable tensions within it, modern capitalist society is facing the same difficulties due to the contradiction between its capacity to expand its material production and its inability to absorb the commodities produced. It is a logical flaw and a structural imbalance within the social system. Marx refers to this contradiction as a “state of momentary barbarism” and “a universal war of devastation” due to a crisis of overproduction: too much productive capacity remains idle because the class foundation of capitalism is unable to absorb the surplus goods. Technical progress driven by a competitive market economy combined with the private ownership of property produces an economy in a state of constant revolutionary change. These changes in the productive forces push against traditional social relations, causing serious economic tensions. Marx states that although the logic of the system propels this movement in a certain direction, there are ways that the economy can restabilize itself through serious economic downturns, creation of new markets, and increased exploitation of the workers.

Some scholars have maintained that there is no theory of social justice in Marx’s writings because his central concern was for scientific inquiry, especially in his later writings. In the “Critique of the Gotha Program,” he seems to give credence to this perspective with his disdain and criticisms of philosophical dogmatism, moral idealism, and theoretical ethics as “obsolete verbal rubbish” and “ideological nonsense.”²² This has been taken by some to be a universal condemnation of all concern with issues of ethics and justice. Although it was certainly intended as a critique of the abstract thinking of German philosophers and French socialists, it was not meant to be a blanket rejection of all normative criticism based on the principles of social justice. This position belies the subject matter of this critical essay on the Gotha Program, which suggests proposals about the nature of labor and

property, equal rights, fair distribution of social wealth, citizenship, equality, self-realization, human need, and the purpose of government. These questions, in turn, are a continuation and further elaboration on the issues of natural rights and human emancipation found in the essay, "On the Jewish Question." Marx rejects a consideration of these issues from a philosophical perspective but asks them from a sociological one. That is, questions of ethics and social justice are raised, but only in the historical context of an analysis of the structures of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption.²³ To circumscribe the discussion of justice simply to questions of market distribution, as occurs among vulgar socialists and bourgeois economists, arbitrarily limits its analysis to a narrow range of considerations; not considered is the relationship of justice to the organization of production, alienation of work, or the institutions of class power. Marx offers the public a new approach to ethics and politics which rejects moral abstractionism and speculative philosophy in favor of an Aristotelian theory that places these issues in an empirical context of political constitutions and concrete economic analysis, that is, in an historical, practical science.

In his response to the proposals announced in the Gotha Program, Marx develops a theory of distributive justice that incorporates his ideas about equal rights, human need, common property, and the socialization of production. He does this by returning to Aristotle and integrating his views of distributive and reciprocal justice into a comprehensive theory of social justice. This is accomplished because Marx is not specifically interested in the process of material exchange, since that only reproduces the structural problems in the social organization and class structure of production. He makes this point very clearly in the following sentence: "Any distribution of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production themselves. The latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production itself."²⁴ Although Aristotle was aware of the importance of limiting the scope of private property in a healthy democracy, he did not suggest the sweeping changes that Marx introduced. If democracy and capitalism are contradictory value systems, as Marx argues in "On the Jewish Question," then the latter must be completely transformed. Toward this end, property must be socialized and democratically controlled by worker cooperatives. Only then may the issue of a fair distribution be finally raised.

During the transition period toward a free and emancipated society, there will be a time when socialist distribution will be based upon the bourgeois principles of the equal rights and equal contributions of labor. These principles are those of liberalism, in which true equivalents are exchanged in the labor market, that is, equal payments for equal amounts of labor. Socialism thus realizes the potential and ideals of liberalism in the principle of equality of commodity exchange without accepting the corresponding

exploitation of surplus value. Thus, the labor theory of value without its internal contradictions is finally realized in a socialist society. The right of the worker is proportional to the product of his labor. However, Marx is disturbed that the economy and distributive justice are still imprisoned in liberal assumptions and economic values. Also, the liberal principle of equal rights is handicapped, because unfettered it produces general inequality based on differences of physiological strength and intensity of work. Those who work harder earn more. Marx characterizes the principle of equal rights as an “unequal right for unequal labor”; it is a right to an inequality of ability and an inequality of social consumption. This weakness within socialism is remedied when society moves into the higher stage of communism where the principle of distribution will be based on human need. Equality, labor, effort, and production will no longer be the basis for fair distribution in a participatory democracy. The guiding principle will be that underlying Aristotle’s theory of reciprocal justice: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his need.”²⁵ With the democratization of production, the distribution of the social product will be based on the satisfaction of fundamental physical needs but also on the fulfillment of aesthetic, ethical, and political needs of self-determination and self-realization within the political and economic community. Marx’s theory of need parallels his theory of praxis and radical emancipation in the *Paris Manuscripts*.²⁶ As it is with Aristotle, human need for Marx is connected to the broader concerns of political deliberation and democratic community through mutual sharing and love. Need is a manifestation of the essence of humanity as an activity of being and an expression of praxis; it is the creative and historical emergence of humanity: “The wealthy man is at the same time one who *needs* a complex of human manifestations of life, and whose own self-realization exists as an inner necessity, a *need*.”²⁷ According to Marx, what ultimately holds the economic and political community together is the need for others within a “brotherhood and nobility of man.” Marx ends his analysis of human need exactly where Aristotle completed his theory—with a society based on mutual respect, love, and virtue.

Marx’s objection to idealist and liberal moral philosophy is that it undermines the unity of reason and the integration of theoretical and practical knowledge (science and ethics); it creates a dualism between the sensuous world of experience and that of the mind; and it imposes transcendent moral principles upon an intransigent empirical reality. There is no connection between the real and moral worlds. Morality is unconnected to the world, nor does it deal with real social questions. It appreciates neither the structures, history, logic, nor immanent potentialities of the present moment and thus is incapable of offering concrete and pragmatic solutions for social action. Morality expresses an abstract imperative of pure reason that is unaware of real possibilities or real ethical issues. This produces a “ghostly

objectivity” that maintains the dualism between external moral principles and empirical reality. Morality cannot be imposed from the outside; this is an idealism that leads to idolatry and coercion. It can only arise from within the social system itself. Moral principles and action must come out of objective reality and not be imposed upon it. [Note that this approach will be accepted later as a key methodological component in Durkheim’s science of morality.] There is a danger inherent in moral philosophy since it abstracts from the reality of political economy and in the process becomes an impotent imperative, understanding little and changing nothing. On the other hand, it is a potentially dangerous tool in the hands of the moral authoritarian who is insensitive to what can legitimately be accomplished and illegitimately imposed.

Besides the alienation of reason, Marx recognizes, following in Hegel’s footsteps, that this type of distant morality will tyrannize reality. Both Hegel and Marx see this as the basis for the French Terror.²⁸ As with Hegel, Marx seeks the substance or essence of the appearances in the phenomenal world. That is, he looks for the underlying structural identity and logic of the institutions of political economy in order to uncover the irrational imperatives to crisis and the corresponding ethical alienation of humanity. This position has been denied by those scholars who argue that there can be no normative assumptions or morals in scientific inquiry. To justify this position, they usually turn to Marx’s analysis of simple commodity exchange (C-M-C) in *Capital* (1867). Marx writes in the first volume of this work:

The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundaries purchase and sale of labor-power take place, was in fact a true Eden of innate human rights. What alone here reign are freedom, equality, property, and Bentham. Freedom! For buyer and seller of a commodity, e.g., labor-power, are determined only by their free wills. They contract as free persons born with equal rights. Equality! For they relate to one another only as commodity possessors and exchange equivalent for equivalent.²⁹

Freedom, equality, and property are the key natural rights and political characteristics of simple commodity exchange; they are the foundations of the Enlightenment—both classical political economy and the socialism of Pierre Proudhon. Marx, however, does not rest his critique on an analysis of commodity exchange and the market, but moves beyond them to a detailed examination of money (consumption) and capital (production) which reveals a different picture of the nature of the capitalist economy. For him, the appearances are intimately connected to the essence of the system. Critics of a theory of justice in Marx emphasize a description of the economic and political values of simple exchange. Exchange occurs between equal and free

individuals based on mutual recognition of each other as abstract owners of property who make rational decisions in the market. When commodities are bought and sold, there is an exchange of equivalents, thus making the interaction just. In the labor market, this means that equal amounts of labor are exchanged for equal amounts of goods. Under these conditions there can be no exploitation or oppression, and the issue of social justice cannot arise. But this position only represents the ideology of commodity exchange and product circulation.

In the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858) and *Capital*, Marx does not end his analysis of value with simple exchange but expands it to include a theory of money and capital. By this means he develops a theory of justice based on his concepts of labor power, surplus value, and capital. Simple commodity exchange contains within it the distinction between use value (buying) and exchange value (selling) that reflects the whole contradiction of capitalist society. Marx is consciously taking these distinctions from Aristotle's economic theory in the *Politics*. The tensions between a society grounded in the satisfaction of human needs through consumption and the capitalist desire to accumulate surplus value and profit create an internal structural dynamic that splits the system into two irreconcilable parts. There is also a contradiction between the process of creating value in production and the difficulty of selling the commodity in exchange; at the systems level, this is a continuation of the contradiction between use value (consumption and needs) and exchange value (property and profits). One part of the system is attempting to reduce wages and production costs, resulting in lower consumption, and another part is trying to increase sales and profits by maximizing consumption; one part of the system is trying to rationalize production and technological efficiency to increase economic output, and the other part is having difficulty realizing or selling its products to workers whose wages are being reduced as cost-saving measures of industrial rationalization. This is the fundamental structural contradiction and internal logic of capitalism. The technological capability of the system is restricted by its social relations of production and class organization. The requirements for production and consumption rest on different priorities and structural prerequisites. The more profits are created, the more difficulty the economy has in realizing them; the more production expands, the more consumption is constricted until a system-wide crisis is reached. An appropriate analogy to explain this structural crisis would be to view the economy as two railroad trains, coupled back-to-back, pulling in opposite directions and tearing each other apart.

Surplus value, according to Marx, results from the distinction between labor and labor-power. It accrues to the capitalist, since the latter pays only subsistence wages that reproduce the labor-power or physiological capacity to work—necessary labor. However, in return for the wages, the workers give their entire capacity to labor beyond the reproduction of their physical

strength and family; this is unpaid labor and is the real basis for the surplus of value beyond wages. Thus, what appears as a noncoercive and equivalent exchange in the labor market becomes, under further analysis, an oppressive system of economic exploitation. This system is irrational and unethical because in a chrematistic economy production is not based on community support, family devotion, citizenship, or the satisfaction of human need. The economy is not the foundation for political action or democratic self-determination. In fact, capital, or private property itself, becomes the chief source of economic crisis, because it is the main barrier to closing the loop between production and consumption.

At this point in his economic analysis, Marx reflects on how capital affects the issues of innate rights and alienated labor. Where exchange is incorporated into his theory of money and capital, there is an integration of his earlier ideas from "On the Jewish Question" and the *Paris Manuscripts* with his more mature writings on the critique of political economy. Exchange is no longer simple but contains within it the whole of alienated labor, property, and surplus value. These concepts are already contained in the underlying assumptions of simple circulation as its logical and historical foundations. However, the logic of capital takes us beyond the equivalency of simple exchange to a new order of production in which the laws of exchange are dialectically transformed into their opposite. By purchasing only labor power, that is, the ability of labor to reproduce itself, the capitalist gets access to living, or surplus, labor.

The exchange of equivalents, the original operation with which we started, has now become turned around in such a way that there is only an apparent exchange. This is owing to the fact, first, that the capital which is exchanged for labor power is itself but a portion of the product of others' labor appropriated without an equivalent, and second, that this capital must not only be replaced by its producer but replaced together with an added surplus.³⁰

Marx's analysis shows how the political ideals of freedom and equality, when viewed from the perspective of money and capital, turn into their opposites. With the intensification of labor through advanced technology and machinery, expansion of the working day through control over the workplace, and the increased exploitation of labor, the capitalist system of wage labor becomes a system of social slavery.³¹ Not only does capitalist production not support freedom and equality among individuals, but it perverts our understanding and implementation of these values. By expressing political abstractions and false universals, they hide the reality of the economic system from its participants.³² Marx is very clear on this point:

This kind of individual freedom is therefore at the same time the most complete suspension of all individual freedom, and the most complete subjugation of individuality under social conditions, which assume the form of objective powers, even of overpowering objects—of things independent of the relations among individuals themselves.³³

This form of macro-alienation only leads to an undermining of the public sphere and the possibilities of a democratic society. Marx and Aristotle are in perfect agreement here: capitalism (chrematistics) and democracy are incompatible and contradictory systems for arranging the lives of human beings. The ideals of species being and worker creativity are now combined in Marx's later writings with a detailed examination of the economic forces of structural alienation. The Aristotelian ideal of the full development of human potential is still very much in Marx's mind. He writes in the *Grundrisse*: "The free development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary labor time so as to posit surplus labor, but rather the general reduction of the necessary labor of society to a minimum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them."³⁴ An important goal of the economy is to set free the potentiality of human beings to express themselves in all forms of cultural identity and political creativity.

Aristotle argued in the *Politics* that with the development of a chrematistic economy, where the family and politics would become subservient to material acquisition, a number of important consequences would follow, including the distortion of human development by the imperatives of commercial exchange, perversion of the virtuous life into a means for economic success, transformation of practical reason (*phronesis*) into technical rationality, reduction of human needs into market wants, the loss of public space and political deliberation to private competition and public chatter, and the redefinition of happiness (*eudaimonia*) to pleasure and property.³⁵ All the social, cultural, and ethical supports for a moral economy have been displaced by the design and incentives of political economy. This is a world turned upside down. Marx has taken a very similar perspective by recognizing the disruptive tendencies of the modern economy. They turn production into alienated labor, economic means into social ends, species being into possessive individualism, labor into labor power, and democracy into political opportunism. Opposing classical political economy, he argues that capitalism produces an economy that lies outside human self-determination and sovereignty, is structurally irrational and contradictory, and has a tendency to develop toward crises of overproduction, fall in the rate of profit, and the continuous disproportionality between production and consumption.

The modern economy is chrematistic because it is unnatural; it leads to material waste and economic stagnation. The potentiality for rationality, freedom, and moral development are narrowed and stunted. People spend their lives accumulating, being successful, and achieving status and power. None of these things for either Aristotle or Marx can lead to true happiness and self-realization. Both social theorists approach the study of economics in very similar ways, have similar conclusions, and focus on the dangers of political economy to democracy and self-determination. Patricia Springborg summarizes their relationship with the words: "Thus Marx's theory of alienation may be seen as a full elaboration of Aristotle's distinction between *oikonomia*, economic activity geared to communal needs and the production of use values, and *chrematistike*, money-making in a society governed by *pleonexia* and oriented to the production of exchange values."³⁶

The final element in Marx's borrowings from Aristotle lies in his theory of communal democracy. He begins with an acceptance of the classical principles of democracy while expanding them to include a wider popular base along with the social ideals of human emancipation, human need, and universal rights.³⁷ In his famous funeral oration on the Paris Commune of 1871, we see a more concrete picture of his political ideals and social dreams.³⁸ After the defeat of the French army by the Prussians under Otto von Bismarck, the Second Empire of Louis Bonaparte collapsed, and the defenseless citizens of Paris created the Commune on March 28, 1871, for their protection. The Commune lasted only seventy-two days before it was suppressed by the military might of the newly formed French Republic led by Louis Adolphe Thiers. A few days after its fall, Marx read his oration to the International Workingmen's Association in London. Thucydides, in *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, had used the funeral oration of Pericles to commemorate the fallen Athenians at the end of the first year of conflict between Sparta and Athens as a vehicle to praise the latter's democratic polity.

Following the same rhetorical technique as Pericles, Marx uses this opportunity to eulogize the radical democracy of the Parisians as a reaching for heaven with their proletarian dreams. For him, it represents for the first time "the self-government of the producers by the producers." These revolutionaries were aware of the role of the modern state as a mechanism for the rationalization of production, structural integration, and social control built around the powers of the government bureaucracy, standing army, clergy, and judiciary. The state's main function was to maintain class privilege and ensure the protection of private property and personal liberties. This was to be accomplished by stabilizing the economy, legitimating its authority, legalizing its wealth and power, and repressing dissent. This form of state, through its power to maintain functional and cultural integration, to ensure social stability and loyalty, to protect individual rights and liberties, and to encourage market competition and wealth formation, is referred to by Marx as the "slaveholders' conspiracy." By means of its power over taxes, budgetary

priorities, and fiscal policy, the state controlled all aspects of society to ensure its national power, as well as its representation and protection of capital.

Reacting to the totalitarianism of Bonaparte's French Empire and Thiers' Republic, the citizens of Paris replaced these institutions with direct democracy, independent worker cooperatives, a new public education system, a decentralized federal state, and a working-class local government. They uprooted the institutions and power of property, capital, and the state as they attempted to dismantle the class structure of capitalism by recasting a more egalitarian society based upon worker control over production. Marx writes: "This was essentially a working class government, the produce of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labor. . . . The Commune was therefore to serve as a lever for uprooting the economic foundations upon which rests the existence of classes, and therefore of class rule."³⁹ All public offices were open to election by means of universal suffrage. Government officials were held responsible for their decisions by a political mechanism of accountability and recall. This new political arrangement had much more in common with Aristotle's description of classical democracy and moral economy than it did with modern liberalism.⁴⁰ What Marx adds to Aristotle is the notion of economic democracy: economic redistribution, dissolution of the divide between labor and capital, an egalitarian social system, and worker control over property. Inequality, wage slavery, and class power would slowly disappear, and a new political form would emerge which was a "government of the people by the people."

By borrowing directly from Abraham Lincoln's *Gettysburg Address* in his funeral oration, Marx introduces another element to his thought. After the crucial Civil War battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and his famous address four months later at the dedication of the cemetery to America's fallen citizens, Lincoln was calling for a new society without racial slavery based on the moral principles of Thomas Jefferson's *Declaration of Independence*. Lincoln universalized the rights articulated in that founding document to include the former slaves of the Southern states. Marx, in turn, now broadens the dream of emancipation from racial slavery to include the wage slavery of workers. With his defense of the political rights of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* from his earlier writings, his praise of the Paris Commune, and his return to the values of classical democracy found in Pericles' oration, we can see that Marx was attempting to reconcile the great political documents of the Western tradition in his call for a more egalitarian and democratic society. He was able to use the short-lived experiment of the working-class Commune as an opportunity to broaden and integrate the ideals of classical Greek democracy with the institutional arrangements and requirements of industrial society. Through Marx, Aristotle finds his voice articulated for modernity, and through Marx, classical democracy finds its modern expression.

UNDERSTANDING, HISTORICAL HERMENEUTICS,
AND PRACTICAL SCIENCE IN WEBER

Weber's approach to issues of social justice takes an entirely different and unusual turn from that of Marx and Durkheim. Whereas they see justice in terms of fairness in institutional arrangements and structural transformations, Weber views it as an issue of noble character and virtue; whereas they return to Aristotle's political and economic theory in the *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics* for guidance and inspiration, Weber looks to the earlier sections of the latter work with their emphasis on ethical virtue, self-defining character, moral deliberation, and practical wisdom. There are a variety of reasons for these theoretical differences, but an important one is that Weber's interpretation and appropriation of Aristotle's theory of virtue is filtered through the radical Kantianism of existential philosophy, in particular Nietzsche's moral nihilism and critique of Western culture and reason. Weber focuses more on different aspects of Aristotle's theory of social justice than the other two classical theorists. Unlike Marx and Durkheim, he does not develop his own theory, probably because the foundations of objective moral and legal arguments have been undermined by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.⁴¹ He does, however, conspicuously, but sparingly, borrow from Aristotle's theory of ethics with an emphasis on the following themes: intellectual and moral virtue, critique of formal rationality and utilitarian chrematistics, the good life as virtuous self-determination and moral commitment, science as interpretive ethics and practical knowledge (*phronesis*), and historical research based on tracing the relationships between types of personality (*Personalität*) and the rational conduct of life (*Lebensführung*).⁴² Much of Aristotle's theory of social justice becomes incorporated into Weber's social methodology and cultural hermeneutics. That is, justice becomes transformed into metatheory. Although these components never cohere in a systematic treatment of social justice, they do frame Weber's scientific and ethical examination of modern social pathologies—rationalization, disenchantment, the iron cage, and decadence of the last man.⁴³ Without Aristotle, Weber's critique of modernity and the Enlightenment would not have been sociologically possible.

Marx and Durkheim look freely to the ancients for their insights into the nature of participatory democracy, while Weber's borrowings from Aristotle are tempered by an anxious liberalism and cautious existentialism. The will to power and moral polytheism are mediated by an ethics of practical reason. With the growing rationalization of social institutions and with the increasingly oppressive and meaningless fate of human existence, the reasons for Weber's turn to classical antiquity are complex and nuanced. Ideas about social justice are used by Marx and Durkheim as opportunities to educate and enlighten the public for praxis and social change. For Weber, on the other hand, these same issues provide the possibility of creating an ethical

science based on the principles of justice but without the accompanying discussion of their political and economic arrangements. That is, Marx and Durkheim want to present some concrete, historical manifestation of these values; Weber merely wishes to justify the methodology which begins the academic deliberation about these issues, since science and politics are intimately joined.⁴⁴ In the end, the two socialists use Aristotle to create a modern theory of justice based on moral and political principles. Weber applies the same material to a philosophy of social science in order to allow him to integrate science with practical reason in his theory of historical and hermeneutical science.

As already mentioned in chapter 1, according to Aristotle there are three distinct forms of knowledge: *phronesis*, *techne*, and *episteme*. The distinctions between practical wisdom (*phronesis*), philosophical science (*episteme*), and technical knowledge (*techne*) are important to the social theorist's general critique of Enlightenment science and positivism. *Phronesis* is the prudential knowledge of tested experience accumulated by citizens and politicians through years of participation (*praxis*) with their friends and neighbors in the Assembly, the *Boule*, and the jury courts. A form of ethical and political knowledge of the world, it is open to deliberation and discourse. Aristotle compares this to *techne*, which is the technical knowledge of the artist, craftsman, and worker, who have the finished product already preformed in their minds. This utilitarian or instrumental knowledge helps facilitate the transition from the idea (*eidos*) to reality by providing the formal information and technical skills necessary for making (*poiesis*) the finished product. *Episteme* is the universal knowledge possessed by the philosopher who engages in theoretical contemplation (*theoria*) of the unchanging and absolute truths of the universe in metaphysics, physics, and mathematics. Also examined in chapter 1 is the issue of why Aristotle relies on *phronesis* as the basis for moral action and political knowledge and why he is so resistant to turning political science into a form of technical or theoretical knowledge. Critical of Platonic philosophy and the search for universal absolutes in ethics and politics, his approach provides an alternative solution to many of the epistemological problems raised by skeptics during and after the Enlightenment. By the nineteenth century these moral and cognitive questions had become serious reservations to the acceptance of objective validity in social science and the acceptance of objective morality in ethics. The whole issue of objectivity in science and ethics was being called into question. Just at a time when the classical social theorists were looking for ways out of the dilemmas and inconsistencies that resulted from modern positivism, Aristotle offered a new perspective. It was into this void of the Enlightenment that Aristotle rushed.

Let us turn to Weber in light of the tradition and spirit of Aristotle's concepts of *phronesis*, self-deliberation, understanding, and public judgment.

An important question at this point in the analysis is: how do these key ideas in Aristotle's ethical and political writings aid in the way we interpret Weber's methodology of the human sciences, that is, his cultural and historical hermeneutics?⁴⁵ Weber is generally viewed as part of the neo-Kantian tradition which will occupy our attention in chapter 4. However, he is also part of the hermeneutical tradition that has its origins in Aristotle's theory of practical reason and intellectual virtues. Hans-Georg Gadamer in his ground-breaking work, *Truth and Method* (1960), has written about this relationship between Aristotle and the rise of modern hermeneutics. He makes the crucial observation that it is an Aristotelian principle that "the problem of method is entirely determined by the object."⁴⁶ This applies to the analysis of moral knowledge, as well as to the study of history, culture, and society. Gadamer forcefully argues, "We find that Aristotle's analysis is in fact a kind of model of the problems of hermeneutics."⁴⁷ To understand, judge, and act (*praxis*) in a moral situation based on practical knowledge (*phronesis*) through deliberation (*bouleusis*) in the polis is methodologically similar to the dialogue between an interpreter and a text, which is absolutely necessary for access to the meaning of the written word. Politics, law, and hermeneutics share a common form of knowledge and being. In both moral deliberation and interpretive exegesis there is a similar concern with the meaning of a particular moment or passage in relation to the universal, whether the latter is a moral, legal, or historical text or set of principles. Weber will expand this commonality of interpretation (*Deutung*) and understanding (*Verstehen*) to include the historical and cultural sciences.

Gadamer is aware that Aristotle's philosophy has relevance for the methodological debates within sociology today. Although he does not mention Weber by name in this work, Weber should be included in a wider consideration of these issues, since he is certainly part of this epistemological and methodological tradition. Concerning the Greek theory of knowledge, Gadamer writes: "This is the point at which we can relate Aristotle's analysis of moral knowledge to the hermeneutical problem of the modern human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*)."⁴⁸ Gadamer recognizes that compared to the theoretical contemplation of the philosopher and the technical knowledge of the craftsman, practical or moral knowledge of *phronesis* has a different object and method more compatible with the needs of contemporary cultural science. Weber augments this notion of moral knowledge in order to apply it to his interpretation of sociology as a practical science whose origins can be traced back to classical antiquity. This move takes the social sciences out of the search for absolute truths and technically applicable laws and places them within the framework of the meaning and understanding of social action and historical events. Sociology as hermeneutics now reflectively touches areas of history, culture, and intentional meaning.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle lays out the different sciences, their methods, forms of inquiry, and objects of knowledge, and in the process

provides the later justification for a hermeneutical science of practical reason.⁴⁹ According to Gadamer, the analysis of practical and political wisdom in Aristotle clarifies and contextualizes the description of the hermeneutical inquiry into interpretive understanding and social meaning which have become important parts of the methodology of the cultural and historical sciences in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Aristotle's theory of theoretical, practical, and productive science ultimately defines the distinctive development of hermeneutics, ethics, and politics beyond the limits of natural science; it delineates and legitimates hermeneutics as a distinct area of historical and scientific inquiry. These different forms of knowledge are sciences in their own right with their own forms of rationality independent of the claims of metaphysics and physics. Transcending both the modern disenchantment of science and the existential groundlessness of reason and meaning requires a return to classical antiquity. About these issues, Gadamer summarizes his position in his essay, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness" (1963):

When Aristotle, in the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, distinguishes the manner of "practical" knowledge, determined in this manner, from theoretical and technical knowledge, he expresses, in my opinion, one of the greatest truths by which the Greeks throw light upon "scientific" mystification of modern society of specialization. In addition, the scientific character of practical philosophy is, as far as I can see, the only methodological model for self-understanding of the human sciences if they are to be liberated from the spurious narrowing imposed by the model of the natural sciences.⁵⁰

To expand upon this thesis, an argument can and should be made that there is a further compatibility and symmetry between Aristotle's theory of knowledge and Weber's theory of science (*Wissenschaftslehre*) and sociology of understanding (*verstehende Soziologie*). By offering a broader epistemology and methodology, as well as a more comprehensive and more inclusive definition of science, Aristotle provides the philosophical space for the development of a critical hermeneutics and dialectical social science. If the cultural sciences reject technical knowledge for instrumental and administrative control and demonstrative knowledge for explaining and modifying human behavior, then Weber's theory of science is comfortably embedded within the tradition of moral and legal hermeneutics begun by Aristotle.⁵¹ In this way, Weber's hermeneutics of the cultural sciences is a practical science.⁵² There is an important link to be established in this chapter between *praxis* and *phronesis* in Aristotle and understanding, meaning, and action in Weber, since practical reason holds both traditions firmly together.

Although there is no direct reference to Aristotle's theory of practical reason in Weber's epistemological and methodological writings, the parallels between the two theorists are clear and striking; incorporating Weber into this

philosophical tradition also offers a more comprehensive framework, logical coherence, and philosophical legitimacy to his metatheoretical works. Weber views science as an historical, interpretive, and cultural medium in which the investigator attempts to understand the cultural meaning and individual intentions of human action. This involves relating historical events to subjective intentionality and practical action. The text or law now becomes redefined as an historical event in which objective reality as a universal must be appropriated not as a reified object but as a living experience and a past tradition. These past experiences and events communicate to the present through the prejudgments of an interpreter as a dialectical fusion of horizons (*Horizontverschmelzung*). The traditional distance between subjectivity and objectivity in the social sciences is broken down. Just as Aristotle would reject legal objectivism and cultural historicism, Weber's methodological criticism is directed at scientific positivism which confuses the relationship between the subject and object, particular and universal, and nature and culture. The goal of historical knowledge is to understand the particular uniqueness of events and their cultural meaning, not to subsume them under universal laws of human behavior, as occurs in neoclassical and Marxist economics. From this perspective, Weber's writings are an expansion of the famous methodological dispute (*Methodenstreit*) in Germany and Austria in the nineteenth century.

Phronesis gives us ethical and political wisdom as a guide for determining the best course of action to take in the search for public happiness and the good life. Sociology as a science and passionate calling presents us with the historical framework and acquired experience to make more informed decisions about practical stands and public policy. At the end of his essay, "Science as a Vocation" (1919), Weber makes a revealing comment about the role of the scholar: "We can help him, to give himself an *account of the ultimate meaning of his own conduct*. This appears to me as not so trifling a thing to do, even for one's own personal life. Again, I am tempted to say of a teacher who succeeds in this: he stands in the service of 'moral' forces; he fulfills the duty of bringing about self-clarification and a sense of responsibility."⁵³ Science becomes ethical when it provides a self-enlightenment and an ethic of responsibility for our conduct in life by clarifying our ultimate values and their theoretical and practical implications. What begins as an attempt to understand historical and cultural meaning and the intentions behind social action turns into an act of self-deliberation and moral enlightenment. We have moved from history as a meaningful text and knowledge as a critical hermeneutics to science as a practical guide to self-determination and social action. That is, science is not simply intended as an objective reinterpretation of the past but as knowledge for ethical improvement and self-realization in the public sphere; it is both a means and an end for the development of better national policy and citizenship. Practical science seeks knowledge of the past in order to improve the moral quality and nobility of human life in the present and future.

Weber has incorporated himself into the Aristotelian tradition of political and legal hermeneutics. Aristotle defined practical wisdom in terms of individual deliberation, sympathetic understanding, and critical judgment as part of the virtuous and good life. The goal of practical knowledge was the discovery of the intentions and political meaning of fellow citizens in the public sphere where the major decisions affecting the polity were made. Weber takes hermeneutics (*verstehende Soziologie*) and creates a new theory of cultural understanding and critical judgment. The practical wisdom of ancient *sunesis* (understanding), law (equity), and public deliberation are replaced by modern historical science with its quest for the interpretation of the meaning and significance of cultural events and the intentionality of social action. As a science of meaning and understanding, hermeneutics develops from classical politics and *praxis* to the modern interpretation of culture and history. The object of exegesis evolves throughout Western thought from politics, theological texts, legal history, language, and existential being (*Dasein*) to historical consciousness and social action.⁵⁴

Upon assuming the editorship of the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* in 1904, along with Werner Sombart and Edgar Jaffé, Weber pens his most famous methodological essay “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy.” Attempting to answer questions about the methodology, objectivity, and standards of value judgments of the journal, Weber divides the application of practical knowledge into three distinct areas of *social science*, *social criticism*, and *social policy*, while rejecting the use of both *episteme* and *techné* in the cultural sciences.⁵⁵ By this means, he expands the role of the understanding and judgment in his history of science (*Wissenschaft*) to include not only hermeneutics and historical science but also social criticism and social policy. All these areas of sociology involve value judgments and practical knowledge in some way or another. Although it cannot provide the objective foundations to particular questions of moral choice or the meaning of life, social science does aid in the making of such a choice by clarifying the assumptions, options, and effects of all decisions within the public dialogue of the universities, scholarly journals, and academic conferences. Science is a means to promote meaning and practical action by providing the logical basis for moral self-determination and social justice. This is why science is a vocation; it is a way of life, a form of *praxis*; it does not provide a justification for any particular moral belief or action but is nevertheless an expression of practical reason. As Weber puts it, it does not help us choose among the warring gods we serve. “The ultimate possible attitudes toward life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion.”⁵⁶ Universal moral objectivity had been undermined by nineteenth-century German philosophy. In its place is a new moral polytheism, grounded in Schopenhauer’s existentialism, Nietzsche’s nihilism, and John Stuart Mill’s political agnosticism; this relativism joined to empirical research is what distinguishes the historical and cultural sciences

from moral philosophy and political theory, the teacher from the prophet and demagogue. Science cannot adjudicate between the competing practical values, but it can aid in how we choose them through logical analysis and the search for clarity, how we implement them and anticipate the adequacy of the means applied, and what consequences we can expect to occur from our learned experience.

The distinction between what is—empirical reality—and what ought to be—morals—does not represent an unbridgeable ontological divide. Weber's view is much more nuanced, since value freedom is connected to value relativism and not to value neutrality. Cultural values and valuation are distinct from empirical science not because of any inherent dualism between the spheres of science and ethics but because of the loss of moral objectivity in theoretical reason. There are no universally accepted values within the community, nor is there a consensus among scholars as to what is important and what is to be valued in scientific research. Science does not involve a contemplative search for objective moral truths (*episteme*) but conveys a practical wisdom about how we think about them, logically clarify them, and act on them. This issue is made even more complex as Weber makes an important distinction between theoretical and practical values. That is, he distinguishes between values that are part of epistemology and method and values involved in praxis and action. We will discuss the importance of this relationship between values, or ethics, and science more in chapter 4 when the radical Kantians and neo-Kantians are examined.⁵⁷

As Weber states in "Science as a Vocation," science is more of a handmaiden to ethics as it presents the empirical context within which moral ends are chosen. The research scholar can "tell you that if you want such and such an end, then you must take into the bargain the subsidiary consequences which according to all experience will occur."⁵⁸ The sociologist cannot validate any particular chosen course of action, nor can she justify the validity of the underlying values used in making choices. Science is simply a moral and technical guide using prudential wisdom to determine the full ramifications and meaning of action itself. This is how science becomes a form of practical reason. It does not provide universal knowledge for the contemplation of the moral truths behind action. It cannot answer the questions of Tolstoy about what we should do with our lives and which moral ends we should choose. Value judgments are beyond its legitimate realm of inquiry. Science cannot justify ethics; logic cannot objectively ground social ideals. Science does, however, present us with the accumulated experience of years of research and knowledge to help us make an informed choice about value-laden action (*praxis*). This connects the sections in the essay on objectivity, value relevance (*Wertbeziehung*), and social policy. Once a moral decision has been made based on an "ultimate *weltanschauliche* position," science can only aid in the discussion about appropriate objective means to a subjective end that is immanent in life.

In this turn-of-the-century essay on objectivity in social science and politics, Weber puts forward a more extensive argument on the relationship between science and ethics. His position here is that science plays an important role in practical decisions: "We can also offer the person, who makes a choice, insight into the significance of the desired object. We can teach him to think in terms of the context and the meaning of the ends he desires, and among which he chooses. We do this through making explicit and developing in a logically consistent manner the 'ideas' which actually do or which can underlie the concrete end."⁵⁹ In addition to the empirical and technical analysis of the cultural values which constitute the meaning of social action and historical events, science can also criticize these ends by revealing the direct and indirect consequences that follow from their application in history. Science has a hermeneutical dimension, since it must articulate and clarify the cultural ideals that inform human intentionality and action, but it also has a practical dimension in that it helps provide civic choices about issues of public policy within an ethic of responsibility. Weber is aware that neoclassical economists had gone beyond these methodological limits as they derived their ethical ideals and normative judgments directly from empirical reality. It is modern economics, according to Weber, which blends science and ethics in a nonreflective and uncritical manner by assuming the objective validity and neutrality of the values of capitalist productivity, liberal psychology, and class relations.⁶⁰

The legitimate range of questions and areas of scientific investigation using practical reason include the following: (1) the cultural values underlying the meaning of social action and institutions; (2) the logic and inner consistency of the ideals themselves; (3) the means necessary to reach certain practical ends; (4) comparison of the ideals of social action and policy and the ideals of the social critic; (5) the historical origins of culture and social institutions; (6) the implications of the effects, outcomes, and unintended consequences of individual action; and (7) the conflict between ideals and institutions. Weber views science as performing a variety of empirical research tasks, including hermeneutics, analytic logic, comparative cultural studies, historical studies, technical applications and implications of ideals, and cultural dialectics. These areas cover the full range of issues found in Weber's historical sociology: cultural phenomena (*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 1904–1905, and *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*, 1916), origins of capitalism (early writings on Greece, Rome, and medieval cities), unconscious structures (*Economy and Society*, 1922), and social consequences of modernization ("The Conditions of Agricultural Workers in East Elbian Germany," 1892, "Politics as a Vocation," 1919, and "Science as a Vocation," 1919). In order to investigate these substantive areas of social history, consideration must be given to their various methods of inquiry, including social philosophy and hermeneutics, and historical, interpretive, and structural sociology. Weber's approach parallels Aristotle's

historical investigations into the different types of political constitutions as a way of empirically guiding moral decisions. In fact, Weber's method recapitulates not only the classical Greek tradition and Aristotle's theory of *phronesis*, but also the modern ethical tradition with his ideas about the nature of critique (Kant), dialectic (Hegel), and praxis (Marx).

There is another methodological element in his essay on objectivity besides the hermeneutical understanding and technical analysis of the empirical evidence acquired through the cultural sciences, that is, social criticism. Weber writes that science can also critically evaluate and judge the material under investigation. For him, the scholar can examine the historical evidence in a dialectical fashion only. The notion of dialectic in this philosophical context connotes a side-by-side comparison of competing or alternative value systems; analysis of the logic of different values; examination of the relationship of the cultural values to the social structures; and, finally, a judgment on the adequacy of the social means to reaching ideal ends. Weber reiterates that he is aware that the scientist cannot impose a set of value judgments on the already given cultural values. There can be no positive or negative statement as to the essential worth or validity of the values themselves. Even if culture cannot be examined with an eye toward establishing the universal justification of its values, the sociologist may judge it by means of its inner logic and dialectic, that is, by means of its cultural *consistency*, *consequences*, and *contradictions* between means and ends. Weber maintains in a very unusual and provocative sentence that science not only understands and analyzes cultural ideas, but also judges them. Regarding understanding values historically, he argues, "It can also 'judge' them critically. This criticism can of course have only a dialectical character, i.e., it can be no more than a formal logical judgment of historically given value judgments and ideas, a testing of the ideals according to the postulate of the internal *consistency* of the desired end."⁶¹ Science cannot authoritatively impose values on historical reality through idealistic valuation or gnostic moralizing; it can, however, review the logical inconsistencies and dialectical contradictions of society's cultural values and its own standards of social measurement. According to Weber, the goal of this form of knowledge is to "aid the acting willing person in attaining self-clarification concerning the final axioms from which his desired ends are derived."⁶² Empirical knowledge cannot determine value judgments, but value judgments are absolutely necessary for empirical science (*Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*). For, in the end, historical science relies on subjective value judgments for its concepts, methods, and theories.⁶³

Science, from this perspective, is a form of prudential wisdom and moral *phronesis* whose purpose is the clarification of the meaning and conduct of human life, its ultimate goals, and the institutions that facilitate or hinder reaching them. Weber moves imperceptibly beyond the orthodox approach to objectivity in the social sciences in this section of the essay. However,

he never develops the full implications of his own analysis. In spite of this limitation, it does open the door to the idea of immanent critique utilized in Hegel's phenomenological analysis of false consciousness and Marx's theory of ideology. It is a method of social criticism whose standards are derived from within the historical setting and not imposed arbitrarily from the outside by the scientist. The latter uses the culture itself to judge society on the basis of its own objective values, expectations, hopes, and forms of legitimation. In this way objectivity is maintained at the same time that social criticism is introduced. The internal consistency of the ethical and political ideals is examined for clarity, hidden assumptions, and possible logical and social problems. Through an historical, cultural, and structural analysis of industrial society, that is, through empirical science, Weber is able to formulate a social criticism based on the internal logic of cultural values and political ideologies, intended and unintended consequences of social action and public policy, and the structural contradictions between social ideals and institutional reality. Social criticism based on moral philosophy, ethical theology, or political theory has no relevant impact because it is not grounded in empirical reality and is external to the social life of the community; that is, it is abstract, arbitrary, and utopian moralizing that cannot justify itself either theoretically or morally. Speculative idealism and gnostic moralizing have no power to act on the moral imperative of practical reason because they do not understand either history or society. For ethical critique to be effective and valid, it must come from within the historical and sociological reality itself through the investigations of critical hermeneutics and political economy; meaning, actions, policy, and institutions must reveal themselves to the scholar as immoral, irrational, oppressive, or ideological. The methodological position based on the principle of value freedom marks the distinction between practical philosophy and practical science. History and society are capable of criticizing themselves while leading to social action when sociology becomes a practical or ethical science in Marx's historical materialism, Weber's historical sociology, and Durkheim's science of morality.

By means of the application of both analytical and dialectical logic, the true scholar uncovers the logical status of the validity claims of values, internal inconsistency of ideas, conflicts between opposing values, the derivation of cultural ideals and norms from ultimate value standards, and the contradictions between values, courses of action chosen, and historical results. In the final analysis, dialectics cannot establish the ultimate validity of any practical standard. "An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he *should* do, but rather what he *can* do, and under certain circumstances what he *wishes* to do."⁶⁴ Weber's critical method can logically investigate cultural and political values by examining their unarticulated assumptions and a priori presuppositions, unintended and incidental consequences, social

norms and structural imperatives, and at times their deleterious effects. "The question of the appropriateness of the means for achieving a given end is undoubtedly accessible to scientific analysis."⁶⁵ From this perspective, science is a practical activity engaged in relating politics to policy and to the deep structures of social meaning and action. Although Weber initially appears to reject the valuation of historical phenomena, he is also aware that values are present in concept formation, theory construction, and social critique. (More on this in chapter 4.) According to Weber, objectivity does not mean that values have no role in scientific enquiry; nor is there an unbridgeable divide between facts and values. Although values develop from personal faith and political deliberation, they remain part of every aspect of scientific epistemology and methodology. The traditional, positivistic view of the neutrality and methodological distance of the scientist from normative assumptions and practical principles is not just an illusion. Without values, science cannot be undertaken since it is both critical and dialectical in nature.

Aristotle had outlined his philosophy of mind and *phronesis* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* with its various elements of understanding, judgment, self-deliberation, sympathy, pathos, civic friendship, and political wisdom. Weber, in turn, develops a similar theory of practical knowledge by outlining the various scientific methods and logics of inquiry necessary to answer the types of questions mentioned above. His theory of critical judgment and the dialectic rests on his analysis of *meaning* (cultural and interpretive method), *causes* (historical and structural origins), *consequences* (intended and unintended effects of social action), and *contradictions* (logical and historical conflicts between means and ends, values and action, and values and institutions).⁶⁶ This theory of action later becomes incorporated into his analysis of the culture, functions, and structures of modern social institutions. In "Science as a Vocation," he inquires into the nature of democracy. His approach to the question is surprisingly similar to Aristotle's orientation in the *Politics*. Weber examines the relationship between the various forms of democracy, their different functions, results, and effects on the "conditions of life." Democratic forms of government are then juxtaposed to nondemocratic forms, and finally a comparison is made between the institutions of democracy and their different ultimate ideals. He even ends his analysis by stating that it is unfair to students to let the facts of research speak for themselves. Comparisons must be made between different forms of democracy and the political and ethical ideals upon which they are based.⁶⁷ He recognizes the importance of comparing ideals to empirical reality as the basis for scientific inquiry. What is rejected is the arbitrary and unconscious imposition of values into the discussion without an empirical and historical context for the dialectic to function properly. This is the method of the positivistic prophet and liberal preacher who unreflectively accept the objectivity and reality of surface phenomena.

Using the dialectical method in his critical sociology, Weber is able to convey the historical impact of the Protestant ethic on the formation of commercial and industrial capitalism. Clarifying the values of Enlightenment science, formal rationality, and utilitarian ethics, he attempts to show empirically how the realization of these values turns reason and pleasure into an oppressive iron cage of bureaucracy, plebiscitary democracy, and an alienated economy. His scholarly research reveals how certain cultural traditions, such as Protestant theology and Enlightenment rationality, have functional consequences and unintended effects. Under these normative conditions, the structural contradictions between culture and social institutions limit the free exercise of human potentiality and, in the process, make self-determination problematic if not impossible. The modern drive to self-consciousness and freedom, the Enlightenment project, leads to its opposite in the tragic fate of modernity. The critical method and dialectical logic employed by Weber are certainly within the tradition of Hegel's phenomenology, Marx's economic theory, and Nietzsche's theory of Greek tragedy. Perhaps this is the reason he characterizes the iron cage as being without spirit, that is, without the self-consciousness of the Objective Spirit, praxis, or the art of music in human creativity. Weber's dialectic is part of his theory of practical knowledge and understanding, intentionality, action, and disenchantment, whereas Marx's use of this method is part of his critique of ideology, false consciousness, and the structural contradictions of capitalism.

Although not clearly stated, Weber's argument seems to be for the role of "contradiction" (*Widerspruch*) in the historical sciences. Contradictions arise over different assumptions in values, between competing and conflicting values, and between values deeply embedded in social structures which unconsciously affect the meaning of social action. As we move from logic to methods, the sociologist is in a position to examine questions of the adequacy of social meaning, action, and policy in terms of broader issues of the irrationality of actions, the inadequate appreciation of underlying values and their implications, the contradictions between thought and reality, between false consciousness and ideology, and between the class interests that play a role in the acceptance of certain cultural values. These are the types of questions that lead Weber to his ultimate critique of modernity. Logic and method in sociology provide the foundation for social criticism as well as the basis for his nuanced distinction between value judgments and empirical science. These are not entirely separate and independent areas, as they appear today. Weber is not critical of value judgments per se, but of inappropriate valuation and utopian moralizing. He recognizes the role of practical reason in the understanding of cultural values, historical reconstruction, critique of dialectical logic, and social action of the practical and political will. Science can show the values implicit in philosophical epistemology, scientific methodology, and political decisions that make for better science, criticism, and public policy.

Although Weber's critical method employs practical reason, he is adamant throughout his writings that the demagogue and preacher are "out of place in the lecture-room."⁶⁸ These comments have been confusing and have given apparent credibility, in spite of contradicting his own published statements, to the naturalistic fallacy in his methodology. However, a closer look reveals that his objection is to the arbitrary introduction of ethics and politics into the classroom, unguided and untutored by historical science and dialectical critique. Science, its concepts, theories, methods, and ideas are all grounded in cultural values and a priori assumptions; the dialectic requires values as the basis for both historical judgment and the application of the critical method. Values are essential to every aspect of science; they have no independent existence of their own in a speculative metaphysics. As with Aristotle, Weber rejects the use of disembodied political and subjective moral values in the classroom unaided by historical and empirical research. He is opposed to a transcendent metaphysics of morals based on German idealism or British materialism. Science cannot determine whether a particular set of values or way of life is worth living, but it can link those values to an historically specific conduct of life and type of humanity (*Menschentum*). It can dialectically judge and critically evaluate the formal foundations of a set of ideals and their historical impact as they lead to an eclipse of the objective spirit (*Geist*) and a disenchantment of the heart (*Herz*) of compassion; they lead to a modern industrial society without freedom, power, or meaning.⁶⁹ Both Weber and Marx use a form of historical science that employs a critical and dialectical method of social analysis. Weber is suspicious that a naturalistic science would impose its hidden epistemological and anthropological assumptions and political laws on society. This is crucial for him, since the unconscious values and prejudices of science represent the distortions and repressions of the last man, who is no longer able to imagine a dancing star and thus is no longer able to dream. During the process of rationalization, we lose the possibilities inherent in the dreams of classical reason.

Besides its role in social criticism, science also has an important function in politics and social policy, since it can estimate the chances of success, the possible outcomes, and the likely relations among concepts (means and ends), actions, and effects. Cultural values, as products of conscience and subjective choices, cannot be criticized objectively on their own merits in determining and implementing social policy (*praxis*). They can come under intense practical scrutiny because of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of their means, the content and meaningfulness of their ends within a broader historical context, and the possible consequences and costs of their implementation. Regarding the central role of value judgments in the formation of social policy, Weber recognizes that scholars must "keep the readers and themselves sharply aware at every moment of the standards by which they judge reality and from which the value judgment is derived."⁷⁰

Social policy, as in the case of both social science and practical action, involves value judgments regarding the framing of social problems and the determination of the various courses of political action available to legislators. Judgments about values and actions are a necessary part of this theoretical activity. Weber reiterates that his major concern is not the pollution of science by ethics but the distortion of ethics by the unconscious metaphysics of science. Finally, he is aware that even the ends of action may receive a critical interrogation as the scientist examines the significance of the meaning of the desired ends beyond social philosophy. This is the basis for his interpretive method in the sociology of religion. Weber is aware that the motivation for doing science is itself practical. Thus he maintains that the participants in the *Archiv* must state for its readers the underlying standards that influence their judgments of social reality. This, too, must be a subject for public deliberation in sociological conferences and publications.

In a later methodological essay entitled “Basic Sociological Terms,” written as the prefatory note to chapter 1 of *Economy and Society*, Weber expands his early hermeneutics to include issues of historical origins, social structures, unconscious action, and repressed motives. Neither clearly developed nor sufficiently incorporated into his historical sociology, they are merely inchoate ideas and metatheoretical whispers. Weber appears to be moving from a focus on culture and subjectively intended meaning to a hermeneutics of objective meaning and “historical interpretation.” This expanded methodology integrates a wider range of hermeneutical issues to include questions of objective meaning, hidden social structures, and unconscious repression. Cultural hermeneutics is supplemented with a more comprehensive “context of meaning” in an analysis of history and structure from historical materialism and repressed and forgotten meaning from depth hermeneutics.⁷¹ According to Weber, sociology is a science based on interpretive understanding and causal explanation that has moved beyond simple understanding of the subjective meaning of social action:

Thus for a science which is concerned with the subjective meaning of action, explanation requires a grasp of the complex of meaning in which an actual course of understandable action thus interpreted belongs. . . . but no matter how clear an interpretation as such appears to be from the point of view of meaning, it cannot on this account claim to be the causally valid interpretation. . . . In the first place the “conscious motives” may well, even to the actor himself, conceal the various “motives” and “repressions” which constitute the real driving force of his action.⁷²

Weber’s early concern with cultural phenomena and interpreted meaning of rational social action—social philosophy and hermeneutics—

broadens to include meaning that is distorted, repressed, and alienated in a critique of ideology. He intimates that the role of sociology is to reveal how structures and institutions affect the intended meaning of individual action, thus producing unintended and unconscious consequences. From this perspective, meaning results from both conscious intention and unconscious repression of motives, action, and social ideals. Weber's theory of science begins to incorporate the hermeneutics of suspicion of Marx and Freud into the earlier legal and cultural hermeneutics of Aristotle, Windelband, Nietzsche, and Rickert.

Returning to his early writings, Weber articulates the role of the dialectic in history. Dialectical logic and phenomenological analysis are employed by Weber as mechanisms for moving beyond the simple connections between consciousness and action to more comprehensive analyses of the sociological influences on action and history. The idea of unintended consequences is a further development of this relationship, although it is still grounded in the idea of subjectivity. The latter was the general approach offered in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. In his later writings Weber begins to develop a structuralist paradigm by which he attempts to detail the political, economic, and cultural foundations of modern industrial society. In "Science as a Vocation," he outlines the dialectical unfolding of the fate of humanity, which at first appears grounded in Enlightenment rationality but devolves into formal rationality and utilitarian meaninglessness as individuals pursue private happiness instead of vocational virtue and self-determination; Weber traces the descent of humanity into the decadence of irrationality and madness. In the search for knowledge and truth, modern society has produced the decadence of the last man; in its attempt to create rational social organizations, only bureaucracy, alienation, and mass democracy have resulted; and in its desire to create a rational, meaningful world, the iron cage of formal reason has been constructed. The modern search for freedom, justice, and equality has produced its dialectical opposite because of the clash between conscious intentions and unconscious social structures with their own normative assumptions, structural prerequisites, and functional imperatives. Weber chronicles the historical process of alienation, domination, and distorted consciousness as they appear in modern society. The more human freedom and democracy are nurtured, the more plebscites and the crushing of individuality result.

This relationship between dialectical logic and empirical science is central to Weber's criticism of Eugen von Philippovich's presentation at the September 1909 annual meeting of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* in Vienna.⁷³ Philippovich's paper, entitled "The Essence of National Economic Productivity," summarizes his views on the nature of productivity in the national economy to which Weber reacts strongly and critically. Weber asks whether the idea of productivity should so effortlessly and unreflectively be associated

with economic expansion and profit making. For his argument, Philippovich assumed the validity of the neoclassical economic view of productivity as the basis for national prosperity. Weber criticizes him for being a demagogue who smuggles hidden assumptions into his theoretical concepts at the very moment he claims that his ideas are without value judgments. Weber contends that beginning the argument about national prosperity with the ethical values of social justice, instead of productivity and property, would lead to entirely different results and different public policy recommendations. He has more important things to do than just criticize Philippovich's presentation. He would like a more general consideration of the relationships between science and value judgments to be discussed by the *Verein*. His concern is to examine the facile manner in which issues of moral values (*Seinsollen*) are intermixed with those of being and empirical reality (*Seiende*) and the ease with which social ideals are reduced to technological questions. This juxtaposition of two apparently conflicting positions makes Weber difficult to understand. At times he appears to want to clearly separate ethics from science, but in the next sentence he makes a judgment himself about the reduction of substantive rationality to technical reason. In the process, he seems to offer a value judgment about the course of social history, thereby undermining his own position. Philippovich wishes to reduce productivity to money acquisition in a neoclassical market economy while ignoring other possible interpretations of productivity and national prosperity, which could include issues of class consciousness, the common good, and social justice. At this crucial meeting in which the issue of value freedom (*Wertfreiheit*) figures so prominently for Weber, he justifies his critical outburst by saying:

The reason why I am so extraordinarily critical at each occasion, with a certain pedantry peculiar to me, of the fusion of ought (*Seinsollens*) and is (*Seienden*), is not because I undervalue the problem of the ought, but just the opposite: because I cannot tolerate when problems of world-shaking meaning, of immense ideal significance, in a certain sense those which deal with the most important issues that can move a human being, are here transformed into technical-economic "questions of productivity" and into an object of discussion within a specialized discipline.⁷⁴

This may be Weber's clearest and most revealing statement regarding the relationship between science and values. The distinction between the two had been somewhat confusing since the main thrust of Weber's criticism of values had been against false moralizing (valuation) and the establishment of absolute universals. In this comment at the Vienna meeting, Weber is adamant that empirical research cannot justify value judgments because of the nature of the technocratic values that orthodox economic science

ultimately validates. In this statement he is concerned about value freedom as a freedom from the unconscious metaphysics of science and the distorted ethical and political values of liberalism. On the other hand, Weber is equally adamant that practical values do play an important and appropriate role in sociology, even beyond epistemology and concept formation; social criticism and judgment are introduced into the academy by means of the logic of science and the dialectic. "[I]n social sciences the stimulus to the posing of scientific problems is in actuality always given by *practical* 'questions.' Hence the very recognition of the existence of a scientific problem coincides, personally, with the possession of specifically oriented motives and values."⁷⁵ The dialectic can investigate the consistency, causality, and consequences of the application and legitimation of cultural values within social action. In the process, it can and does make practical judgments as to the substance and rationality of the values, the formal procedures applied to accomplish them, and the broader implications of their realization. Weber's theory of rationalization is based on his understanding of the irrationality of utilitarianism and Enlightenment reason, an internal contradiction within society between substantive rationality (*Wertrationalität*) and formal rationality (*Zweckrationalität*), and the structural consequences of the fate of humanity as it devolves into an iron cage of bureaucracy without cultural imagination or hope.

Weber's moral science guides us into a more critical evaluation of the structures and culture of modernity. In his works he examines the rise of corporate and state bureaucracies, political decisionism and the disappearance of the public sphere, and the loss of substantive reason (*Wertrationalität*) which gives meaning and purpose to human life. His empirical description of the process of rationalization is part of his historical method of juxtaposing institutional change with the development of a certain type of personality. When examining modernity, he traces the development of a culture in which reasoning about the substantive values of truth (science), beauty (art), and the good (politics) has been displaced by the rise of a new technical rationality and social engineering. It is this transformation of substantive reason into technical reason (*Zweckrationalität*) and the latter's permeation of all spheres of social life that compels the fate of humanity toward the iron cage of the last man. The crucial ability of humanity to reason, critically evaluate, and insightfully judge has been compromised and replaced by a form of reason whose underlying presupposition is technical control and mastery of nature and society. It is this type of reason which, in turn, informs political, economic, and social relationships. From Weber's perspective, it is a retreat from reason into administrative rationality and technical domination.

Science portrays the internal logic of social action and social structures, thereby undermining society's own objective and institutional claims to truth.

Critique, as a sociological method, develops out of the logical analysis of society's own internal contradictions based on a phenomenological analysis of Western science and politics, the hidden assumptions of natural science, and the implications of its application to social institutions beyond the alienation of the economy. Since social action is covered in value judgments, since Western science contains an abundance of value judgments deeply embedded within its logic, methods, and theories about nature, and since this form of rationality has been used to build the modern edifice of capitalist society and the German academy, social criticism is dialectical as it develops from within the logical analysis of society's own claims to truth. Thus, for Weber, the attempt to separate ethics and science is not an attempt to ground knowledge in a transcendental objectivity or metaphysical realism. Rather, it is an attempt to understand the values and assumptions of science, limit its scope of truth claims, appreciate the relationship between practical knowledge and science, and develop a social critique that is not ethically arbitrary or politically demagogic. It is because of this aim that logic and ethics are methodologically inseparable.⁷⁶ The result is that Weber turns sociology into a practical science of the moral life of the community through the understanding and explanation of its ethical and political ideals and their relation to the origins, meaning, and consequences of social action for the purpose of the perfection of individual virtue and implementation of rational national policy.⁷⁷

In politics, Weber sees the genuine or mature individual as integrating an ethic of absolute ends with an ethic of responsibility. This is the key political implication of his views on science as a practical science. As opposed to the last man of Nietzsche, Weber's mature man is one who is able to combine a belief in moral principles filtered through the wisdom of responsibility, integrity, and a strong inner sense of self. In his essay, "Politics as a Vocation," Weber writes: "However, it is immensely moving when a *mature* man—no matter whether old or young in years—is aware of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with heart and soul. He then acts by following an ethic of responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where he says: 'Here I stand; I can do no other.'"⁷⁸

Weber never pursues the issue of the right course of particular actions, since he was limited by his underlying belief in the relativism and perspectivism of moral objectivity and by his reliance on the neo-Kantian tradition. Some scholars, however, have attempted to reconstruct a general sense of Weber's underlying moral directives found in his own research, thereby giving voice to the normative values which guide his theory of science, criticism, and policy.⁷⁹ What is so distinctive about Weber's appropriation of Aristotle is that it is done within the context of his appreciation of the Kantian values of personal integrity, dedication to work, and moral autonomy. Human

dignity and moral virtue provide him with guiding principles by which he judges social institutions of different historical and cultural epochs. Aristotle is thus integrated into a more liberal and individualistic view of justice which encourages self-determination and individual freedom. This integration of Aristotle, Kant, and Nietzsche provides the reader with a complex and often confusing view of social justice, since it lacks the traditional elements of natural law which include an emphasis on both economic and political, both particular and universal justice. These ideas are missing in Weber and are replaced by the principles of Kantian moral philosophy. Nor does his ethic become a pedagogical tool for creating social dreams about alternative forms of social democracy and economic justice.

Continuing his analysis of "Science as a Vocation," Weber briefly outlines the history of "science" (*Wissenschaft*) from the ancients to the moderns, with special attention on the Archimedean turn of the Enlightenment. This is the key historical nexus which explains the change in the nature of the modern logic of analysis, method of inquiry, and technique of verification. If this represents a distortion or disenchantment of reason, then Weber's own historical sociology is an attempt to revive science as a form of practical reason and ethical science which could give guidance about public policy options to politicians and citizens caught in a cultural void of existential meaninglessness and metaphysical nothingness. As affirmed in his *Freiburg Inaugural Address* of 1895 and his membership in the German Historical School, Weber views science from within the classical tradition as a form of practical wisdom. The ultimate goal of sociology is the public and civic education of the German nation to the real possibilities of its fate, to the virtue of political action, and to the nobility of humanity. Weber's central concern is with the dignity and beauty of the human soul in its rational calling as a political and cultural being:

The question which leads us beyond the grave of our own generation is not 'how will human beings *feel* in the future' but 'how will they be.' We do not want to train up feelings of well-being in people, but rather those characteristics we think constitute the greatness and nobility of our human nature. The doctrines of political economy have alternately placed in the forefront or naively identified as standards of value either the technical economic problem of the production of commodities or the problem of their distribution, in other words "social justice." Yet again and again a different perception, in part unconscious, but nevertheless all dominating, has raised itself above both these standards of value: the perception that a *human science*, and that is what political economy is, investigates above all else the *quality of the human beings* who are brought up in those economic and social conditions of existence.⁸⁰

Beyond the methodological debate between the productive science of neoclassical economics, with its concern for solving technical and procedural problems, and the normative science of the German Historical School, with its interest in social justice, Weber follows an alternative path of the practical science of classical Greece, with its focus on the quality and virtue of humanity (*Menschentum*). Whereas one school of economics focuses on production, the market, and efficiency, the other addresses issues of economic fairness and market distribution; Weber looks beyond the moderns to the ethical and political questions about the nature of self-realization, practical knowledge, moral virtue (courage, commitment, responsibility, and self-determination), and the institutional conditions of the social life. This latter perspective builds on the writings of the members of the Historical School, since they too look back longingly to the ancients for guidance. Weber simply pushes the argument back in time more completely and more radically. In his *Inaugural Address*, he is in agreement with his German colleagues as he states: "The science of political economy is a *political* science," that is, a science in the classical tradition.⁸¹

Aristotle attempted in his political science to integrate empirical science and ethics with detailed studies of the relationship between different historical constitutions and the corresponding values and character of the citizens in each distinctive polity. He was looking for an empirical connection among constitutions, virtuous life, and citizenship. If the polis was grounded in different foundational principles of equality and freedom, wealth, virtue, or noble birth, what effect would that have on the nature of the citizen formed within its borders? In the *Politics*, he wrote, "A citizen, therefore, will necessarily vary according to the constitution in each case."⁸² How extensively citizenship is defined, how broadly participation occurs, and how committed the citizens are to the public institutions will have a profound impact on the definitions and standards of virtue and justice within each community. Aristotle searched for an answer to his main question: which forms of political community were more conducive to the nurturing of happiness and justice? He looked closely at the institutions of monarchy, aristocracy, and democratic polity to answer these questions. This type of "political science," as we have already seen, does not produce universal or absolute knowledge but rather a practical wisdom and moral commitment to inquire into the nature of virtue, social responsibility, and the good life.

Modern social science, built on these very principles, has as its goal the construction of an industrial society based on the hope for the common good and for social justice. It is also a science that is critical of neoclassical economics, whose goal is the building of a chrematistic economy founded upon an acquisitive market economy and wealth accumulation. This Aristotelian element in Weber and the other members of the German Historical School, helps to orient him in his general critique of modern capitalism and

the structural process of rationalization. It turns sociology into an ethical or practical science whose ultimate goal is the cultivation of the historical potentiality of humanity, the nurturing of an inner core personality based on reason, freedom, and human dignity, and the education of citizens about possible policy options for the nation; in short, it encourages virtuous living, commitment, and citizenship. Science is a form of knowledge geared to public education that is classical in character, ancient in design, and practical in orientation.

Aristotle held that the ultimate good of human beings, and that which produces real happiness, is a life based on reason and virtue. Only in this way will the innate potentiality of humanity be actualized. Moral virtue develops not out of nature but from habit that is a product of education, law, and political participation in the judgments, deliberation, and public offices of the polis. The central importance of the socializing process among the ancient Greeks in forming a rational character is the cornerstone to understanding Aristotle's integration of ethics and politics; virtue and justice are realized only through *praxis* or activity. Virtue requires concrete social institutions to blossom. Strength, courage, temperance, honor, reason, and nobility are virtues fostered through the right education in the political process. In order for individuals to be morally autonomous, self-determined, and self-conscious, a long-term commitment to the community and the common good is required. Virtue is a state of character requiring a state. Individual moral development is always a political process and occurs within the public sphere. To inquire into the nature of moral and intellectual virtues requires the skills of philosophy; to inquire into the nature of politics requires a political sociology.

In the *Politics*, Aristotle sociologically examined various forms of political constitutions with a focus on their views of equality, property, and distributive justice. His inquiry included the historical constitutions of ancient Athens, Carthage, Crete, and Sparta and the theoretical constitutions of Plato, Phaleas, and Hippodamus.⁸³ Wilhelm Hennis, professor emeritus at the University of Freiburg, in his many publications on the subject, has convincingly argued that Weber's central theme was not an analysis of the historical origins of capitalism or the characterization of the process of rationalization. Rather, according to Hennis, Weber's attention focused on the relationship between the institutions of society and the social creation of a particular type of human being (*Menschen-tum*). As in the case of Aristotle's analysis of different forms of virtue, citizenship, and constitutions, Weber stresses the interaction between certain civilizations (*Lebensführung*) and their corresponding types of individuals (*Personalität*): nineteenth-century commercial estates in Prussia and self-sufficient German farm laborers, Chinese civilization and the utilitarian literati, early modern capitalism and the ascetic Protestants, and advanced capitalism and the last man. The culture of civilizations produces

certain types of individuals, and Weber's moral science helps orient citizens and politicians through the concrete empirical ramifications of their political and economic policy choices. He does not offer utopian ideals of the best society. Instead he presents citizens with options of empirically detailed studies of the history, institutions, culture, and personality in order to help them make more prudential and rational choices in the political realm about the impact of their social policies. If their goal is equality, freedom, and justice, then certain social and structural arrangements may hinder these social values, and other choices will nurture them.

SCIENCE OF MORALITY, FUNCTIONALISM,
AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM IN DURKHEIM

Durkheim's indebtedness to Aristotle permeates the whole corpus of his writings from his dissertation on Montesquieu to his later writings on education and civic morals. From his earliest works, Durkheim self-consciously sought the methodological foundations for a new social science. Critical of what he believed was the subjective intentionality and latent psychologism of German sociology, he sought to establish his science on the firm foundation of social facts and empirical evidence. Toward this end, he began to focus his attention on the functional relationships between legal, political, economic, and religious institutions in order to determine the internal equilibrium and social order created by a healthy and balanced society. In his Latin dissertation, *Montesquieu's Contribution to the Rise of Social Science* (1892), Durkheim summarizes Montesquieu's outline of Aristotle's analysis of the correct types of political constitutions in ancient Greece based on the rulership of the one, the few, or the many: monarchy, aristocracy, or polity. Aristotle was interested in the relationship between the correct constitutions and the types of virtue and citizenship they produced. Montesquieu changed the direction of his research by focusing upon a new classification of the various forms of government: republic (aristocracy and democracy), monarchy, and despotism.⁸⁴

Montesquieu placed his typology within history, as he characterized the republic as the form of government associated with ancient Greek and Roman city-states and medieval Italian cities. Monarchy was associated with European governments after the breakup of the Roman Empire and despotism with the governments of the Near Eastern empires of Turkey and Persia. According to Durkheim, it was the focus of Montesquieu's research that made his writings distinctive. Using a method developed by Aristotle, Montesquieu changed its original purpose by emphasizing other types of questions, such as the nature of structural differentiation, separation of powers, and functional stability characteristic of each new social system. His concern was to examine not the nature of the good life and happiness

in terms of rulership, citizenship, and virtue, but the structural stability of society affected by its internal division of labor and functional responsibilities. According to Montesquieu, a republic is not a static structure but more like a living organism with a complex set of interrelationships among its institutional parts for the purpose of maintaining the stability of the whole. This is accomplished by a strong sense of communal responsibility, civic participation, and concern for the common good. By a careful examination of the different forms of government and their distinctive structural identities, he determined that, as societies become more complex, more differentiated, and more class divided, they have difficulty sustaining their earlier social cohesion by balancing the competing political and economic interests. In a monarchy, concern for social cohesion and the strategic balancing of competing interests replaces civic virtue and public consensus as the binding force in society. With despotism, social cohesion weakens with a resulting breakdown in the internal division of society. Durkheim sees in Montesquieu the beginnings of a new social science which stresses the functional division of institutions and labor that produces social order and moral cohesion. Montesquieu's philosophy of history and government provides the grounding for Durkheim's theory of social solidarity and functional integration. Durkheim refers to his new social theory as a "sociology of morals." He aspires to an ethical functionalism in which issues of order and harmony are connected to those of equality and justice.

Durkheim wishes to develop an ethical theory grounded in history that explains human institutions in terms of their moral possibilities to further human potentiality and development. Philosophy must be integrated with sociology in order to become relevant. Having studied in Germany during the academic year 1886-1887, he fell under the influence of the academic socialists (*Kathedersozialisten*) Adolf Wagner, Gustav Schmoller, and Albert Schäffle, who along with Weber, were members of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*. They represented the German Historical School of thought, which attempted to integrate the science of economics with ethics. In his extended essay, *Ethics and the Sociology of Morals* (1887), Durkheim relies heavily on their insights as he, too, wishes to construct a social theory of ethics that incorporates issues of science and social justice. About this group of economists and theorists, he quotes favorably from Gustav von Schönberg, the editor of the *Handbook of Political Economy* (1882), who wrote: "Social economy (*Volkswirtschaft*) does not consist simply in corporate production. What is important above all is not knowing how to produce as much as possible, but to know how people live, to know the extent to which economic activity attains the ethical goals of life, the demands of justice, humanity, and morality which impose themselves upon every human society."⁸⁵ Durkheim understands that political economy and ethics cannot be separated into distinct disciplines without seriously violating the integrity of both. He says that

political economy addresses questions that by their very nature are ethical because they go to the heart of what it means to be human.

In *The Division of Labor* (1893), *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895), and *Suicide* (1897), which have become known as his early Bordeaux writings, Durkheim is interested in empirically measuring and distinguishing between a healthy and normally functioning society and its pathological or deviant forms.⁸⁶ It is in this context that the foundations of social solidarity lie in the representations and institutions of social justice. Justice provides the modern functional ideal for solidarity, which is a cultural synthesis of two diverse philosophical traditions: the individual freedom and moral duty of Kant and the social justice of Aristotle. In Durkheim's later pedagogical writings, the moral ideals are developed in more detail independent of any functional prerequisites or systems implications they may possess. It will be this singular focus on social justice which ties his early and later writings into a comprehensive whole, even though the particular themes of his writings vary during the course of his academic career.⁸⁷ Durkheim begins with an examination of the pathology of modern industrial society, its description, origin, causes, and effects on the specialization of labor, structural differentiation, social solidarity, and rates of suicide. The role of the new discipline of sociology will be to explain the new social phenomena and their structural realignments, as well as to offer practical (moral) suggestions of ways to rediscover and reconstitute the lost solidarity and community sentiment that give collective purpose, meaning, and cohesion to society. Like the other classical social theorists of the nineteenth century, Durkheim rejects the Enlightenment separation of facts (science) and values (ethics) in bringing together theoretical and practical reason. The particular methodological importance of the formal and logical relationship between functionalism and ethics, theoretical and practical reason will be examined in chapter 4.

With the evolution of modern society, there have been a number of objective changes in the institutional framework of capitalism away from the repressive law of ancient mechanical solidarity to the restitutive law of modern organic solidarity.⁸⁸ With the organizational (workplace and professions) and structural (social system) specialization of commercial and industrial liberalism, along with the disappearance of self-sustaining agrarian societies, there has been a change in the institutional interrelationships within society, especially in the areas of production and distribution. These profound changes have resulted in a transformation of the collective conscience and public moral values that bind the different elements of society together into a unified and coherent social whole. As a result, Durkheim has noticed that along with increased structural differentiation and diffusion, there has occurred rising industrial production, increased consumption, economic crises, and a loss of cultural integration of the individual into the

collective. In this historical context, there has been a measurable increase in the various forms of social pathology, such as the abnormal division of labor, anomie, and suicide. In his early writings Durkheim will very briefly compare the social morbidity of economic expansion and market crises with a picture of a healthy society based on the moral principles and collective representations of social justice.

In both *The Division of Labor* and *Suicide*, Durkheim presents a narrative of the history of modern society as it evolves from the ancient institutions of mechanical solidarity and the *conscience collective* to the hierarchical and formal organic solidarity of modern capitalism. The traditional institutions that provided the integration and order necessary for a healthy and vibrant society have vanished and been replaced by the machine-like and corporate integration of the industrial division of labor. Durkheim describes these revolutionary changes as a great transformation characterized by an external and internal division of labor manifested as structural differentiation (economy, state, and culture), a new diversity of institutional and cultural functions, and workplace and scientific specialization. With the evolution of liberalism, integration was to be achieved by means of an organic solidarity sculpted around the specialization of labor, diffusion of power, structural differentiation of institutions, and the ideals of possessive individualism and a market economy. One result of these transformations has been that the individual no longer has a sense of belonging to a larger whole and consequently feels lost and estranged from the community. This leads to a monadic existence, increasing the sense of personal isolation and dispossession. Along with the rise of Enlightenment science, state bureaucracies, market competition, mass consumption, decline of the public sphere, and breakdown of traditional occupational groups, there is also a corresponding decline in the influence of religion, marriage, and the nation as forces of social union.

The excessive diversification of moral functions and the displacement of traditional institutions and cultural values require new forms of mutual interdependence and moral uniformity based upon a moderation of market demands and individual passions, a regulation of self-interested competition, dampening of class conflict between capital and labor, and coordination of production and consumption.⁸⁹ Institutional regulation and reorganization were supposed to be the function of the modern state, but the latter has instead simply turned into a promoter of economic accumulation and cultural legitimation. Durkheim thinks that occupational groups, similar to the old guild system with its regulation of standards, quality, wages, and production, would provide the same calming and moderating functions, but to no avail. According to neoclassical economics, the market was to produce these ameliorating effects of moral equilibrium and social accord and halt the disintegration of community bonds. It was to be a self-regulating system based on a spontaneous consensus among its competing parts that would harmonize the integration

of its social functions. Also to no avail. In the end, there was only a further decomposition of the common good and the general welfare. Natural law has been replaced by natural rights, economic self-sufficiency by unlimited acquisition of private property, and the order of household economy in an agrarian economy by the mechanized system of factory production. Individuals became functions of a mechanical and deterministic culture. The world has been turned upside down as the material production for the improvement of human life has become the ultimate goal of human existence. There is a new freedom of emancipated appetites and economic expansion.

At the same time, there is no longer any "limiting authority" that transcends the structural imperatives of market success and economic growth; there is no longer a set of natural law principles to guide individual behavior to higher standards of human perfection and happiness. Everything is reduced to the base postulates of economic materialism and anomic egoism. Durkheim describes these changes as producing a reality devoid of meaning: "Reality seems valueless by comparison with the dreams of fevered imaginations; reality is therefore abandoned, but so too is possibility abandoned when it in turn becomes reality. A thirst arises for novelties, unfamiliar pleasures, and nameless sensations, all of which lose their savor once known."⁹⁰ What is left is a sterile, bland, and unimaginative universe of restless suffering, perpetual disillusionment, and infinite futility. There is nothing to be hoped for, nothing to be dreamed, and nothing to be created. In a vocabulary reminiscent of Nietzsche's description of the "last man," Durkheim paints a bleak picture of this barren industrial landscape in which life becomes a series of consumer moments without a past and future. In this moral condition, there is only hopelessness and resignation waiting for humanity over the horizon; certainly there is no longer anyone dreaming of dancing stars. This is a state of social madness and pessimistic disintegration, that is, anomie. With Durkheim, as with Weber, liberalism has created the moral decay of existentialism, market deregulation of orthodox economics, and the anomie and egoism of a pathological society. Economic success has resulted in a "poverty of morality" and a disappearance of the collective conscience.⁹¹

In the face of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, the individual is left naked and defenseless, alone and frightened before forces which it no longer understands or controls. The sense of personal identity within a shared life of collective values and sentiments has been replaced by a consumer society characterized by self-interest and the "disease of the infinite." In language similar to Schopenhauer's description of the pain and suffering of the will-to-live, Durkheim historicizes this metaphysics of experience and projects it as a form of life defined by liberal capitalism.⁹² By this means, he sociologizes Schopenhauer's existentialism. As Durkheim transforms existential philosophy into functionalist sociology and the conditions of human nature into social institutions, he characterizes modernity

as anomic (derangement and madness), egoistic (existential alienation and loneliness), and centrifugal (tangential motion away from social unity).⁹³ Medieval Christianity, the Renaissance, and the Reformation offered a set of social values to give meaning and purpose to human life, which Weber will later call substantive reason. However, the centrifugal forces of modernity sent the new social system off its orbit onto a collision course with individual insanity and social chaos, measured by the increased suicide rates in Protestant and capitalist Europe.

For Durkheim, anomic and egoistic suicide is the disease of modern liberalism. This form of suicide increases with the occurrences of industrial and financial crises that disrupt the collective life and equilibrium of society. Economic crises are identified by Durkheim in terms of both economic downturns and industrial expansion. It is the latter which he characterizes as giving fuel to the disease of the infinite:

Unlimited desires are insatiable by definition and insatiability is rightly considered a sign of morbidity. Being unlimited, they constantly and infinitely surpass the means at their command; they cannot be quenched. Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture. . . . To pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness.⁹⁴

The market economy encourages this mind-set of unhappiness and torture in order to encourage consumption and further industrial expansion. It results in enormous and powerful strains on the social order at the same time that it fosters perpetual dissatisfaction and restlessness. As science and technology aid in economic expansion exponentially, social solidarity and the collective conscience weaken. Unable to restrain their consumer desires, individuals are forced to live in a world of perpetual discontent and existential crisis. The institutions which could serve to moderate these desires have been replaced by those that encourage the social disease and derangement of the individual.

It is at this point of existential and social despair that pathology is replaced by physiology, as Durkheim begins the slow process of offering insights into the possibility of new forms of moral regulation and social solidarity that express institutional forms of social justice. Toward this end, he begins to develop an alternative horizon at the end of *The Division of Labor*. In terse and underdeveloped language, he outlines the beginnings of a theory of justice based on a deconstruction and reconfiguration of Marx's labor theory of value, Kant's theory of personality and human dignity, and Aristotle's theory of reciprocal justice. Combining the communalism of the ancients with the individual freedom of the moderns, he presents an early articulation of his views on moral representations and social ideals. These, he

believes, will ameliorate some of the disastrous consequences of the abnormal division of labor in industrial society and reintegrate “individual natures and social functions.”⁹⁵ Durkheim attempts to establish a clear relationship between justice and solidarity, since the former will supply the answers to the problems created by the disruptive forces of the unnatural division of labor. Since the latter is only the necessary consequence of the developments in industrial production and population density, it cannot be the cause of the problem. The cause lies in society’s inability to provide for the conditions of its own organic solidarity and system of economic regulation.

Durkheim begins his theory of social justice by reconstituting Marx’s labor theory of value within a new social worth theory of value. As we have seen earlier, Marx had outlined the revolutionary moments of socialism and communism as stages toward the ideal society in his “Critique of the Gotha Program.” During the socialist stage, workers would be paid fair wages based on the principles of equal rights and the exchange of equivalents. In his analysis of socialism, Marx was following the thoughts of Proudhon. Wages would be determined by the amount of labor contributed in the workplace. According to Marx, wages and labor became equivalents, but this social form eventually led to an inequality of wages because of an inequality of natural ability. He found this an unacceptable moral principle as the basis for his ideal society. In the later communist stage, distributive and reciprocal justice were to be founded upon the principle of human need and not the amount of specific contribution or particular effort in production. This represented a theoretical change from an attempt to realize the bourgeois ideals of market equality and value fairness to Aristotle’s view of the political community based on reciprocity, friendship, and human need. Durkheim, however, jumps immediately from Proudhon to Aristotle, as he begins his ethical theory with a rejection of labor in itself as the legitimate foundation for the principle of distributive justice.⁹⁶ He makes a break between labor and property since, he argues, the rights to the latter are not derived from the former; it is society, not labor, which establishes property rights and the just allocation of scarce resources. By taking this position, Durkheim is also making a break with the whole tradition of possessive individualism.⁹⁷ Social value is not an economic abstraction that attempts a quantitative determination of the measurement and value of commodities. Rather, it is a borrowed Aristotelian concept which states that a moral economy balances needs and labor in a measured way for the encouragement of the good of the community.

In *The Division of Labor*, Durkheim argues that the determination of a product’s final value is based on the quantity of “useful labor” contained in its production along with the moral demand that the object meets “normal needs” and benefits society. The notion that commodities have exchange value simply because of the social organization of capitalist production and

the quantitative amount of labor that is incorporated in the production process is rejected. Simple labor does not produce value which can be accumulated infinitely as private property. The fair price of a product—its social worth—is determined by the quality and purpose of the labor itself in an open and free exchange without external coercion of any kind. “It (fair price) represents the quantity of useful labor which it contains. By that must be understood, not the integral labor which it might have cost, but that part of the energy capable of producing useful social effects, that is, effects which reply to normal needs. . . . They are, above all, the sum of efforts necessary to produce the object, the intensity of the needs which it satisfies, and finally the extent of the satisfaction it brings.”⁹⁸ In Aristotelian fashion, social worth is measured by the satisfaction of human need.

Any inequalities in society should only be the result of inherent inequalities of talent and not the structural and power relations of wealth and class. All forms of external inequality produce pathological specialization of work and a moribund production process. A division of labor that is grounded in natural ability produces an organic relationship and not social anarchy. Durkheim’s functionalism is again tied to his belief in social justice, since only in organic solidarity infused with equality and natural ability do we have healthy production. It is this social relationship which maintains a harmony between personal freedom and social function, between individuality and corporatism. Equality attenuates organizational conflict and promotes organic solidarity and the social value of production.

In his discussion of social justice in *The Division of Labor*, it is clear that Durkheim insists that production must respect social responsibility, that is, it must serve moderate human needs and the common good; there must be a balance among nature and humanity (living organism), material needs, and technical means. The product created must meet a real need and not a falsely created appetite within a consumer society artificially stimulated by unconscious desires and infinite passions. The price of an object is thus determined by labor, human needs, the social good, and the moral attitude of the public conscience. Durkheim is intensely obtuse and disarmingly terse in these passages, and he unfortunately leaves an enormous hermeneutical gulf between his social categories. This literary approach makes exegesis and interpretation extremely difficult and frustrating. However, in spite of these obvious and disturbing limitations, he indicates that the price of a commodity is determined by both labor and social tradition. He attempts to reestablish on Aristotelian grounds a natural-law foundation for market prices and market exchange. Rejecting orthodox economics, Durkheim contends that it is not the market or the cost of labor which should determine prices. Exchange must respond to the basic human needs and the community priorities articulated in its law and traditions. Durkheim writes, “It finds unjust every exchange where the price of the object bears no relation to the trouble it cost and the services it renders.”⁹⁹

Durkheim's interpretation of Aristotle is as interesting as it is idiosyncratic. In response to the question of how the division and specialization of labor lead to the intensification of work and the broadening of the horizons of the personality, Durkheim contends that Aristotle's main ethical principle was that human beings must realize their essential nature in household work (*oikeion ergon*). The goals of the household economy in ancient Greece were different from today; the ancients integrated a self-sufficient economy, political community, and economic justice based on grace, reciprocity, and human need in the service of a virtuous and rational life. The nature of this social integration and functional solidarity through work changes over time as does the division of labor and social organization of production. Durkheim argues that the new moral imperative of a progressive and enlightened society involves the nurturing of the respect for the individual personality. According to him, there is no contradiction between social integration resulting from the division of labor and increased human freedom and dignity, since it is modern specialization which brings about both results. Social equilibrium and social worth are complementary functional attributes of a healthy society.

Durkheim refers to the wage contract and reciprocal justice as the spontaneous "equilibrium of wills" in which the worker and owner receive true value for their product. Moderation and regulation of individual desires and ambitions are necessary aspects of this contractual relationship between labor and capital. Justice is the equilibrium of values exchanged in the market producing a just wage based on post-capitalist representations. If Durkheim returns to both Aristotle and Marx to reestablish the natural law tradition as the foundation for economic exchange, he also incorporates in his theory of social justice the modern respect for individual freedom, equality, and dignity. This is the Kantian dimension that introduces the notion of the "cult of the individual" as a replacement for the pathological egoism of the natural rights tradition of possessive individualism, British moral philosophy of utilitarianism, and the individualism of Herbert Spencer.¹⁰⁰ In fact, Durkheim is critical of the natural rights tradition because of its state of nature model, which defines individuality and liberty in limited ahistorical and asocial ways; he is also suspicious of the idea that political sovereignty is artificially and contractually imposed from the outside by individual agreement. For Durkheim, society is not a consensual product artificially constituted by a fear of violent death or the desire to protect property, but an entity that evolves out of the social and interdependent nature of human beings. He summarizes his moral ideal of human dignity in the following words: "[T]here is in all healthy consciences a very lively sense of respect for human dignity, to which we are supposed to conform as much in our relations with ourselves as in our relations with others, and this constitutes the essential quality of what is called individual morality."¹⁰¹ This is the moral postulate at the heart of the Kantian categorical imperative. Kant's moral philosophy will be a focus of our investigation in chapter 3.

Liberty, too, is something that derives from social restraint and the exercise of personal natural abilities; it has an inherent philosophical meaning and is a functional correlate of distributive justice. "Just as the ideal of lower societies was to create or maintain as intense a common life as possible, in which the individual was absorbed, so our ideal is to make social relations always more equitable, so as to secure the free development of all our socially useful forces."¹⁰² Justice thus takes on unusual characteristics having both a structural and individual component; it has a functionalist element requiring the reestablishment of social equilibrium within the exchange process to stabilize and ensure social solidarity. There is also a moral dimension whose purpose is to project the ideals of society based on individual freedom and equality. Durkheim is quite insistent throughout the last section of his dissertation that the two go hand in hand. Justice produces both fairness and social responsibility, as well as both functional stability and moral integration. The modern division of labor fulfills the dual requirement of protecting social solidarity and the moral order.¹⁰³ "But, in more advanced societies, his nature, is, in large part, to be an organ of society, and his proper duty, consequently, is to play his role as an organ. Moreover, far from being trammelled by the progress of specialization, individual personality develops with the division of labor. To be a person is to be an autonomous source of action."¹⁰⁴

Durkheim uses the term *personality* as a way of highlighting his opposition to the limitations of utilitarian egoism and possessive individualism. In this manner, he is also able to place his theory within the Kantian notion of the person. The exercise of practical reason and the moral will of the individual is what constitutes human dignity and equality. Human beings are rational, free, and inherently worthy of respect and dignity; they are ends in themselves and should never be treated as means or prices in the market.¹⁰⁵ What is to be protected above all else is moral autonomy and individual freedom. Although there is no direct reference to the Kantian notion of the kingdom of ends, the return to Aristotle's theory of justice places the Kantian person within a social framework. There is a fusion of horizons and an integration of the ancients and moderns as Durkheim blends together these traditions, emphasizing the individual's social being and moral freedom. Individuality and liberty are ideas taken out of the natural rights and neoclassical traditions and thus out of the context of property, production, and consumption. Freedom is ultimately a concept in which the individual exercises its practical will toward self-determination in a social context.

With the continued specialization of the economy with its laws, legal rights, and moral duties, the teleology of social life develops toward emancipation from the physical and social environment. In this way, "the individual becomes more of an independent factor in his own conduct."¹⁰⁶ The moral consensus of the collective conscience rises with the increase in recognition

of human dignity and freedom of self-expression. Thus, for Durkheim, the division of labor of social functions and the cult of the individual bring with them new forms expressing personality and natural ability.¹⁰⁷ Work becomes more intense, imaginative, and creative the more specialized it becomes, resulting in greater self-expression of talent and sentiments. Self-realization is an expression of an individual's inherent abilities and is the basis for the proper distribution of work and social positions. The key teleological concept of Aristotle's ethical and political writings, "the function of man," is retranslated into Kantian categories of self-expression and self-determination, that is, the realization of individual potentiality, talents, and abilities. There is no mention of rational discourse within a political constitution. Unfortunately, in the early works the political strength underlying Aristotle's theory of distributive and reciprocal justice is lost and replaced by the Kantian notion of the person. Although Durkheim is critical of the asocial and ahistorical view of human nature in the natural rights tradition, he falls into a similar problem in his treatment of the cult of the individual.

The nature of the social is seen from the perspective of functional rationality within a healthy organism and not from the perspective of discursive rationality within the public sphere. Although there is mention in *The Division of Labor* of the role of the state, intermediate corporate associations, and worker guilds, not much emphasis is placed on them at this time. Functionalism displaces politics, and justice is portrayed in terms of moral regulation and social order. With a general moderation and regulation of market activity and economic appetites, there is greater coordination and collective collaboration leading to a lessening of egoistic conflicts and international disagreements. Durkheim transforms the Kantian categorical imperative into a social category which he describes in the following manner: "It asks that we be thoughtful of our fellows and that we be just, that we fulfill our duty, that we work at the function we can best execute, and receive the just reward for our services."¹⁰⁸ He contends that because this imperative is made by the individual for the individual, human beings are free since restrictions are self-imposed. In a specialized society without justice, this becomes impossible and leads instead to alienation and continued conflicts. In its ideal form, individual freedom is based on social regulation, moderation, and pacification of economic and political discord; liberty is derived or justified not from a hypothetical state of anarchic nature but from the design and imperatives of society. Human reason and freedom are social constructs.

With functionalism and justice used interchangeably, there is a danger that the functional needs for organic solidarity in a diffuse and anomic society will replace the inherent values and ideals of moral representations themselves. This reductionism has the potential to turn ideals into means for the purpose of solving the Hobbesian problem of social stability. (This

is the theoretical path chosen by Talcott Parsons.) A second difficulty with this position is its depoliticization of the public sphere. For both Aristotle and Marx, the economic realm was secondary to broader principles and institutions of universal political justice. The ultimate purpose of material production was self-sufficiency, supplying the material foundations for a moral economy and participatory democracy. In Durkheim's early writings, there is a too uncritical blending of Aristotle and Kant that loses key political principles of the former's ideas, including an analysis of the democratic polity, civic virtue, and public happiness (*eudaimonia*). The issue of democracy is not raised in the dissertation, but it does take a central position in his lectures at the University of Bordeaux.

In a series of lectures first given after the completion of his dissertation at the University of Bordeaux between 1890 and 1900 and later collected in the work *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, Durkheim expands upon and clarifies his theory of social justice, develops a theory of contract law and property rights, and introduces a theory of democracy and intermediate political associations of professional groups and worker guilds. He also extends the political dimensions of his view of the social worth of labor.¹⁰⁹ The topics of these lectures range from issues of civic virtue, moral education, and citizenship to democratic socialism. They also contain a more developed treatment of fair price, human need, and distributive and reciprocal justice. Whereas his dissertation stressed functional differentiation within society, his university lectures outlined his thought in political sociology, thereby balancing the dialectic between function and politics started in his earlier writings. He firmly and unequivocally reiterates the argument from *The Division of Labor* that the basis for exchange will not be the equitable exchange of the value of labor but an equitable exchange of the social worth of labor:

[I]t is not the amount of labor put into a thing which makes its value; it is the way in which the value of this thing is assessed by the society, and this valuation depends, not so much on the amount of energy expended, as on the useful result it produces, such at least as they are felt to be by the collective. . . . An idea of genius, flowering without effort and created with joy, has greater value and merit than years of manual labor.¹¹⁰

The merit of an exchangeable product, and thus its fair market price, rests not on the effort expended in the workplace or on the individual status of the worker, but rather on society's view of its inherent value to the common good. Like Marx, Durkheim does not want to make labor the moral foundation for a just distribution but looks to some other ethical principle that would pull society together for its general welfare. Marx found the reciprocity of human needs and friendship as the binding social forces upon which to

build a theory of distributive justice and communal democracy. Durkheim eventually grounds his moral economy in the same values of need, charity, and human sympathy.¹¹¹

In language very close to Aristotle's description of reciprocal justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Durkheim describes the fair price in exchange as not giving too much or receiving too little in return. The fair price and just legal agreement should be set by a spontaneous and equitable exchange following uncoerced mutual consent. Throughout the contractual exchange, human sympathy or fraternal compassion for another's suffering, which is articulated in the opinions and customs of the public conscience, becomes the yardstick for what is just and unjust social value. Durkheim is not interested in quantitatively calculating the mechanism of price but in recognizing that it is the social worth of labor that defines its fair market value. A price set too high ultimately "wounds our sense of sympathy" and "rouses our indignation."¹¹² The first principle of the contractual rights is that "things and services should not be given except at the fair price."¹¹³ The second principle is that each individual engaged in exchange is to be treated with equal respect and human dignity. Durkheim is aware of the social movement in Europe to transform these moral rights into industrial law. He recognizes that the call for social welfare regulations through a minimum wage and old age, accident, and sickness insurance is an attempt to redress grievances built into industrial relations between labor and capital. By this means, public policy is able to compensate for an imbalance in contract and wage settlements. It is the collective articulated in social representations and democratic socialism, not utilitarian labor, that is to provide the moral justification for economic exchange.

The Bordeaux lectures supplement Durkheim's earliest theory of social justice, as they represent a synthesis of Aristotle's *Politics* and Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, but within a more sophisticated political theory of participatory democracy, worker organizations and professional associations, and moral education.¹¹⁴ The goals of human dignity, equality, and freedom are now embedded in an institutional framework whose telos is not functional stability but democracy and political *praxis*. Where Aristotle's theory of ethics was subsumed and overwhelmed in his dissertation by Kant's moral philosophy, the lectures supply a more equitable balance between function and politics. Since they were also delivered at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1904 and again in 1912, they represent a continuity of perspective in his social theory throughout his academic life. The methodological debates and controversies about an early positivism and later idealism in the secondary literature surrounding his works do not consider the broader framework of these lectures on collective morals and human rights. There is less a major break between his early and later writings than a slow development and clarification of his fundamental ideal of social justice.

These lectures also contain a more critical approach to contracts and property rights. Durkheim's intentions and directions are clearer here as he moves toward a socialist theory of property.¹¹⁵ Beginning with equality and fairness in the workplace, he expands his socialist principles to include an assault on both property and inheritance. Contract relations and fair wages should be defined by equal respect, sympathy for the situation of others, concern for the common good, individual merit, and the nature of the services provided. The social worth of labor must be articulated in an industrial setting characterized by equality and justice. Durkheim is critical of a class structure that is supported by institutions of private property and legal inheritance which foster only inequality and injustice. Class undermines the "reciprocity of contracted services" and the social value of the worker's services: "Therefore as long as such sharp class differences exist in society, fairly effective palliatives may lessen the injustice of contracts; but in principle, the system operates in conditions which do not allow of justice."¹¹⁶ Class inequality is incompatible with the ethics and institutions of democratic socialism. The principle of the equal exchange of goods based on their social value is invalidated when the structure of exchange expresses deeper power relations within society. Durkheim emphatically argues that "inheritance, by creating inequalities amongst men from birth, that are unrelated to merit or services, invalidates the whole contractual system at its very roots."¹¹⁷ Even this insight is quickly transcended as he gravitates to the position that a principle of merit based on an inequality of talents and abilities is fortuitous and arbitrary and does not belong to a social ethics of just distribution. Pushing his original theory of justice from his doctoral dissertation to its logical and radical limits, he contends that talent in a specialized occupation is just as inappropriate a basis for moral worth and consensus as wealth and birth.¹¹⁸ The traditional moral connections between reward and merit, on the one hand, and between productivity and effort, on the other, have been broken by Durkheim. S.J.D. Green has argued that this places a limit on the principle of individual responsibility because individuals cannot be held accountable for the vagaries and blindness of biology. Justice cannot be reduced to physiology, just as it cannot be reduced to class and family position.

Under capitalism, contractual reciprocity and exchange of equivalents are incompatible forms of moral representation of the public conscience. Inequalities based on class, property, and inheritance support a social system that is inimical to fairness and social justice, given the disparity of power in the social contract. Distributive justice follows the moral principle of an equal exchange of value and services to the community. In Book 5 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle comments that the just distribution of public offices, wealth, and honors should be based on an equality of merit. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, there has been much discussion about the meaning of the term *merit* depending on whether it is defined within a democracy based on citizenship, an oligarchy based on wealth, or

an aristocracy based on moral excellence. In each case, distributive justice is characterized as a moderate proportionality and an equilibrium between extremes.¹¹⁹ Durkheim bases his critique of private property, contract relations, and inheritance on this Aristotelian principle of distributive justice, where merit implies the value or worth of the services given to society in exchange for just wages. Realization of this principle is derived not from practical reason but from the sentiments and conscience of human sympathy.¹²⁰ Durkheim then contends that the principles of equality and fairness at the heart of the wage contract should also be foundational principles for any theory of property. This explains his desire for economic redistribution of individual and social wealth, which necessitates the dismantling of the property and inheritance laws that buttress class inequality and structural power. This also clarifies how he views the dialectic between reciprocal (commutative) and distributive justice. As the forms of justice underlying property and distribution rights, they eventually have a bearing on wage and exchange contracts, thereby further intensifying the legal and economic inequality of the distribution of the goods of society. The equity and reciprocity of exchange are undermined by the class inequality of property.

The right to property is ingrained in the consciousness and law of Western society. Durkheim asks: If titles and rank can no longer be inherited, why should not property be placed in the category of outmoded tradition that no longer has a place in modern society? He is aware that resistance to changing property laws lies in the family's fear of disadvantaging the children of fortunate families. But he contends that this too would disappear, since all families and individuals would be placed on an equal footing with a dismantling of property rights and inheritance laws. Individual merit, rather than family fortune, would determine the course of human life and economic success.¹²¹ Some limited inheritance would be permitted within reason, but the bulk of large fortunes would go to professional groups and worker associations to support the intermediary democratic institutions in a socialist society. The central place of the family in relation to the economy has changed with the modern division of labor; it has been replaced by these decentralized and more flexible political and economic entities.

With the further refinement of his theory of social justice, the radical egalitarianism of Durkheim's socialism finds final expression in his critique of biological and physiological inheritance—individual merit and ability. This, too, is similar to Marx's critique of the inequality of socialist distribution caused by an inequality of talent in his analysis of distributive justice in the Gotha Program. According to Durkheim in *The Division of Labor*, natural abilities should be the moral basis for the allocation of work and professional occupations. However, in his later lectures he maintains that natural abilities eventually produce an inequality of distribution of material goods due to the strength, endurance, and effort of differently endowed individuals. In the end, biology is not based on moral categories, and therefore is an inadequate

foundation for a social economy. Natural abilities are a good standard for the functional distribution of work (equality of opportunity) but not for reciprocal justice (equality of results). In a truly egalitarian society, justice is trumped by human sympathy or love for others.¹²² Following Aristotle closely, both Marx and Durkheim return to friendship (need and love) as the ultimate basis for social justice. The moral imperative demands that any natural advantage or superiority derived from physical, mental, or emotional inheritance be rejected in favor of charity towards others as social beings. Every form of physical inequality along with economic and political inequality is to be rejected as Durkheim makes the final nod to Aristotle's ethic of civic friendship. Durkheim concludes his argument on public morals and legal rights with the statement that at present this ideal of distribution based on feelings of fraternity and the belief in our "fellow-creatures as brothers" is still some time off in the future. But it does not deter Durkheim from accepting this view of justice as a dream for the future.

Brief mention should be made of how these moral postulates of social justice would be made concrete and real in the institutional forms of democracy. In his discussion about the nature of the state and democracy in *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, Durkheim begins with Aristotle's and Montesquieu's theory of political constitutions and the distinctions among a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy. They are forms of the state governed by constitutional law enacted by the one, few, and the many, respectively. Durkheim does not accept this characterization of the forms of government since, for him, the defining aspect of democracy is the breadth of the participation in its communal life: "The State is an organ of social thought."¹²³ It is the objective manifestation of the collective representations in conscious thought. By this means, the collective can develop new critical ideas and representations of the future. This is an unusual way of defining the state until we realize that it is the main political organ for the articulation of the collective beliefs, sentiments, and ideals of society. Democracy for Durkheim is "the political form by which society arrives at the purest consciousness of itself. A people is more democratic in so far as deliberation, reflection and the critical spirit play a more considerable role in the conduct of public affairs."¹²⁴ In very Aristotelian language, the self-consciousness of the community is formed through participatory deliberation, reflection, and judgment. Durkheim's understanding of the state is that of a collective psyche with deliberative and conscious functions keeping unconscious desires under control; there is a continuous conflict between the conscious and the unconscious collective life expressed in governmental organs. The state is the ego writ large. Through the ministries, agencies, and government councils there is a continuous flow of information and discussion about the key political issues of the day. Citizens are able to share in this collective consideration of public issues. There is an informal dialectic between the government and the other more remote parts of society. Communication

between the “governmental consciousness” and the rest of society is crucial, although Durkheim does not mention any formal or constitutional mechanism for this process. Again he uses the model of depth psychology as his example for explaining the functioning of government.¹²⁵ Democracy is the means by which the conscious life of the community penetrates into the deeper unconscious layers of the collective mind. The public discussions of the state filter to the deeper levels of society, awakening a broader public interest and dialogue on important social issues. With enlightenment comes consciousness, knowledge, adaptability, and change.

Aristotle had written in the *Politics* that the key to a democratic polity was public deliberation and sovereign rule by citizens. Durkheim focuses upon the former, whereas Rousseau stressed the latter with his concept of the general will. Durkheim acknowledges that if there was broad participation in the state, it would not be able to function as a consciousness-forming body politic. He does not accept the idea that the role of citizens is to participate directly in the decision-making process of the state, that is, to rule and be ruled. This latter position is central to Rousseau’s analysis of the political community and popular sovereignty. Here justice and function begin to diverge. According to Durkheim, the majority of people simply do not deliberate, and their sentiments and beliefs remain indeterminate and inarticulate. They live their lives at the unconscious level, motivated by confused ideas, unrecognized prejudices, and diffuse motives. The modern state has changed all this, opening up areas of discussion in religion, economics, education, law, and so forth, which were formerly the discrete responsibility of other areas of society. General communication throughout society is the foundational principle of democracy. As Durkheim says, “If ideas or sentiments are to be modified, they must first be brought into view and grasped as clearly as possible and their nature realized. This explains why the more an individual is conscious of himself and able to reflect, the more accessible he is to change.”¹²⁶ This is the role of democracy in the formation of collective representations: it permits greater public deliberation, reflection, and conscious change in modern society; it opens the horizons of the community to its own future, as opposed to traditionalism, which only locks society into a limited form of an opaque and unreflective reality. This view of democracy is also compatible with Durkheim’s cult of the individual and its goal of moral autonomy and individual freedom.

In spite of these advances in his political theory, Durkheim’s theory of democracy has serious limitations. He maintains the Kantian dualism at the level of the state between reason and the will, reflection and political action. He contends that a direct democracy or majority rule in which citizens participate in the decision-making process would have two negative consequences: First, there is a danger that the state would overwhelm and impose its will directly upon the people, thereby undermining the principles and institutions of democracy. Secondly, the distinction between the state

and society would disappear, resulting in a mass democracy and diffusion of reason. In this way the people with their unreflective and unconscious motivations would dismantle the deliberative and communicative function and harmony of the modern state. The state's role of giving clarity to mass sentiments and transforming vague beliefs into rational ideas would be undermined in a flurry of political anomie. Compared to Marx's theory of democratic socialism, Durkheim's view is piecemeal and disappointing in its lack of radical insight into the main thrust of Aristotle's view of citizenship, deliberation, and political rule. However, Durkheim appears to be responding to the technical complexities and rational bureaucracy of the modern state as he integrates reason and will by introducing Alexis de Tocqueville's notion of intermediary associations, which would mediate the distance between the state and the individual with professional and workmen's associations.¹²⁷

In an attempt to understand the direction of Durkheim's political sociology and theory of democracy, it is necessary to appreciate the historical conditions of the abnormal division of labor, anomie, and suicide. If his view of democracy is limited, this may be a factor of the social and structural problems of his time. In order to counter the political distance of the state from the community, Durkheim proposes the development of intermediary institutions, professional and business organizations, and worker associations that would supply the missing ingredients necessary for a more participatory society. These democratic organizations would decide the standards and quality of production, price, distribution, and so forth. They would provide unity and continuity to their diverse fields and act as means by which their membership could participate at a local level in the important craft and professional decisions that affect their economic well-being and common good. Durkheim offers these organizations as a way of modulating the workplace, industrial expansion, market competition, and the increasingly strained relations between classes. In this way, issues of fair wages and working conditions, just prices, unfair competition, economic exploitation, industrial health, and child and female labor could be raised in a rational and deliberative manner. One result would be a new professional ethics and civic morals that are useful for the regulation and possible redistribution of the means of production, the clarification of worker rights and responsibilities, and the reconsideration of the laws of property. This new ethics would encourage a morality of public duty and social responsibility toward the commonwealth. According to Durkheim, a new corporative system and a public morality based on a revival of the principles of the communal guild system are necessary to develop the ethical ground for social justice. It is to be the practical role of sociology in the future, as an ethical science, to aid in the development of a sociology of morals which would be able to offer guidance in the implementation of these new values and collective ideals.

CHAPTER THREE

KANT ON THE CRITIQUE OF REASON AND SCIENCE

Having discussed the importance of the ancients, we turn now to the role of the moderns in the creation of classical social theory. The key figure in the modern tradition is Immanuel Kant, who brings together the widely different philosophical strands of epistemological and moral thought of the past while providing fertile ground for the disputes of the future. Kant was born in Königsberg, East Prussia, in 1724. Educated in the local Gymnasium and university, he never ventured far from his hometown, teaching physics, mathematics, and philosophy at the university. He died in 1804. His major philosophical works emphasized a theory of knowledge based on his new method of critique: *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781 and 1787) on epistemology and metaphysics, *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) on moral philosophy, and *Critique of Judgment* (1790) on aesthetics. The three *Critiques* were expressions of Kant's division of the cognitive process into understanding (science), practical reason (morality), and aesthetic judgment (art). These major works are extremely dense and interspersed with various attempts at more accessible and less scholarly clarifications. In epistemology, he writes the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783), and in moral philosophy, he pens the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* (1785) and *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). Throughout his life, Kant's main goal was to firmly ground the philosophical foundations of modern science and morality in the a priori or transcendental principles of pure reason. These are the concepts that exist in the mind prior to perception and experience. By establishing that the underlying universal conditions for objectivity, experience, and reflective thought lay within subjectivity or consciousness, Kant was able to develop a radically new theory of knowledge based on the representations of the phenomenal world.

Critical idealism is a philosophical method by which to test the limits and applicability of the a priori categories of reason in epistemology, morals, and metaphysics. By constructing a metaphysics of nature and morality, Kant was able to discover the universal foundations of Newtonian physics and the categorical imperative in the structure of the mind itself.¹ That is, the human understanding of nature and morality rests within itself, since the universal laws of physics and moral conscience are constructions of human activity. The critical method provides an analysis of the limits and applications of reason in the understanding and interpretation of nature and science. It seeks objective knowledge and an end to dogmatic and unjustified moral assertions. Application of a priori categories beyond the realm of scientific and moral experience to the metaphysical realm of speculative reason, that is, to questions about the nature of God, freedom, and immortality, rendered them spurious and foundationless. The goal of a critique of pure and practical reason is to disclose the fallacies and distortions of reason that end in philosophical and religious dogmatism in idealism, rationalism, and theology. When reason is applied to philosophical questions beyond experience, it becomes an ungrounded and transcendent fantasy. On the other hand, metaphysics as a science is something different. It is legitimate only when a priori concepts are applied to empirical reality, where they become the foundations of empirical, scientific, and moral knowledge. Without them, experience and judgment are impossible and all knowledge becomes an illusion. According to Kant, the two appropriate uses of reason are to create objects, and thus bring forth the appearance of nature according to the laws of the mind, and to create universal moral laws that guide human action. The purpose of the critical method in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was to delineate the various functions and limits of the mind—sensibility, understanding, and reason—uncover the a priori concepts that order perception and experience, and justify—by deduction of objective validity—the applicability of these pure concepts in the creation of a world of objective reality.

The first two major sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic, examine the role of the nonempirical or a priori categories in the process of perceiving and experiencing the natural world. They provide the material upon which most of Kantian scholarship about his theory of knowledge and cognition is based. In the preface to the second edition of the work, Kant makes the observation that his work examining the different roles of the mind represents a revolution in Western thought. Previously the emphasis had been on examining how the mind conformed to natural objects in its perception and judgments about nature. With Kant all that changes, as he argues that now “objects must conform to our knowledge of the world.”² There had been a continuous debate between empiricists and rationalists since the seventeenth century revolving around an objective theory of knowledge and privileged access to

truth. Absolute truth could be obtained by applying the right method and getting access to the objects of knowledge through the impressions of the senses or the clear and distinct ideas of the mind. Sensation and reason were the two ways of accessing objectivity, defined as empirical facts of sensibility or the primary qualities of the understanding.

Kant offers a different perspective in his theory of knowledge. He moves the discussion away from the objects investigated to the subjectivity or consciousness of the investigator. Herein lies the path to truth, for it is in the prior structures of the mind that perception and thought are formed. This change from an emphasis on objectivity to subjectivity, from an immediately given object to a mentally constructed substance, and from a correspondence theory to a constitution theory of truth, dramatically alters the European philosophical landscape. Knowledge is no longer acquired through the passive reception of sensations or the active inquiry of the mind in its search for innate ideas. Truth does not reside in a reality in itself as either sensuous impressions or universal ideas. Objectivity and truth are not reified things waiting to be discovered by the mind. Rather, it is the mind itself that participates in the creation of what it sees and knows. Objectivity can no longer remain indifferent to the a priori principles of consciousness. Objectivity is a subjective or transcendental construction by which reality is legislated as a phenomenal appearance by the mind. The reader can almost anticipate the sublime confusion and exhilarating excitement generated in nineteenth-century philosophy and sociology when the Kantian tradition revives consideration of the issues of the subjective construction of reality, the ontological dimension of objectivity, the objective reference or validity of ideas to the external world, and the methodological objectivity of science. Once the traditional positivist view of epistemological and ontological objectivity is transcended, both philosophy and social science become more complex and demanding. With the notion of subjectivity, the Enlightenment stands on the abyss of its own creation as it moves to more subtle interpretations of the laws of nature and the importance of the synthetic unity of experience created by self-consciousness.

HUME'S EMPIRICISM AND THEORY OF SENSUOUS IMPRESSIONS

In the more accessible and popular work on his theory of knowledge, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, Kant states that it was David Hume who awoke him from a "dogmatic slumber" of rationalist indolence.³ It is Hume's theory of impressions and his skeptical criticism of the foundations of Newtonian science that provide Kant with an initial critique of both rationalism and empiricism. Hume advances his theory of the different powers and elements of the mind in his epistemological works in the first volume of *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739) and in *An Enquiry Concerning Human*

Understanding (1751) by introducing an important analysis of perception. He divides the perceptions of the mind into two categories: impressions and ideas. Impressions are the sensations of immediate experience which strike the knower with such “force and vivacity” that they impart a direct access to objective reality (objectivism). They mirror the external world and provide us with immediate access to objectivity (realism). Ideas are secondary perceptions, or faint images that are faithful resemblances and reproductions of the original sensations but lack their initial force and clarity. The sensations of touch, sight, sound, feeling, and passions present the world to us without the intermediary of other resources of the mind. Hume describes impressions in the following manner: “By the term *impression*, then I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.”⁴ Impressions are self-contained packets of empirical information that reflect the reality of the objective world.

Impressions are immediate, unfiltered, and internally coherent reflections of nature that are collected by a passive reason which then proceeds to organize and classify them for later reference and use. Hume contends that abstract universal concepts have no independent reality, since they are only collections of ideas which are ultimately traceable back to sensuous impressions. Reason, as subjectivity, has no other responsibility than to serve as a mirroring device, as well as an organizing and filing system for simple and abstract ideas. Only the objects of sensuous impressions have reality and objectivity. Subjectivity, or consciousness, plays no active role in the process of knowing and, for the most part, is irrelevant in Hume’s empiricist theory of cognition.

Ideas are the faint reconstruction of the sensations in the mind and have validity only when they faithfully reproduce the original impressions. Hume is quick to point out that unbounded flights of fantasy, of which the mind is capable, are illusions to be rejected. Ideas, to be valid, must be accurate copies of sensations. The role of the mind is to organize, systematize, and classify the information processed by the senses and experience. Thus, when thinking about a “virtuous horse,” the mind conjoins two separate ideas into one while creating an object that has no apparent reality. Separately we have experience of virtue and a horse but never of the two combined outside the power of the imagination to bring disparate and familiar objects derived from immediate experience together in one idea. It is a false impression, since there is nothing in reality that corresponds to a virtuous horse. The creative power of the mind is capable of multiple combinations that join opposites and contraries together to form a coherent idea that has no expression in experience. For Hume, this imaginative power of the

mind is what produces metaphysics, theology, and rationalism. His goal is to reconnect impressions, thereby placing science on the firm foundation of reproducible experience and testable knowledge.

All complex ideas must in the end be reducible to simple ideas, and these, in turn, reflect simple impressions. "When we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or sublime, we always find that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment."⁵ This connection between impressions and ideas permits Hume to attack the heart of Cartesian rationalism with its rational proofs for the existence of God. Descartes, in *The Meditations Concerning First Philosophy* (1641), had argued that philosophers have an idea of God who is an infinite substance—an eternal, immutable, omniscient, and omnipotent being. Since the human being is finite, it could not be the source of the idea of the infinite; the finite could not be the cause of the idea of the infinite. Descartes expands his proof for the existence of God by philosophically examining the perfection of the idea of God, the causality of the idea, the existence of clear and distinct ideas, and the essence of the idea that necessarily includes existence. Therefore, for him, the idea of God could only come from an infinite being who exists.⁶ Hume contends that Descartes' argument is faulty because it is based on an indiscriminate and unbounded use of the imagination projecting from human powers and abilities to a being without limit. He has transgressed the legitimate functioning of the mind by combining ideas that have no basis in empirical fact. The metaphysical foundations and deductive logic of the Cartesian system, according to Hume, come crashing down because they are not based on objective experience or empirical reality but on the inappropriate power of the mind to limitless and illusory flights of the imagination. Science must have a firmer and more legitimate basis for claiming absolute truth and universal knowledge than simply rationalist dogmatism. Hume contends that the scientific method must be based on the impressions of sense experience. It is for this reason that he is referred to by some as the originator of modern positivism.

With the basis of knowledge firmly implanted in sense experience, Hume turns to the foundations of science itself. It is here that things begin to unravel slowly. Hume asks the ontological question about the nature of the objects which reason considers as the basis for its propositions and judgments. He divides them into "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact." The former propositions are found in mathematics by means of intuition and demonstration. They require only a thorough working through of the laws of logic without reference to the world of experience. For the most part, Hume is unconcerned with this type of knowledge. Matter-of-fact statements, which he finds more interesting and fruitful, will occupy most of his attention. They are different in that they are empirical facts which must accord with our impressions of the world. The opposite of every matter of fact becomes

a possible statement since it does not contradict the original observation. Reality, and not logic, becomes the mediator between two different contrary statements. For example, Hume states “*that the sun will not rise tomorrow* is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, *that it will rise.*”⁷ Though they are completely contrary statements about the world, and one is obviously false, they are not logically contradictory because either one could be correct. The truth claim of one does not discount the empirical possibility of the truth of the other. Both cannot be true at the same time, but they are not logically incompatible or contradictory. This latter possibility occurs only with relations of ideas. Since the truth of each is based on experience and not on internal demonstrative logic, one statement cannot contradict the other. The truth or falsity of each statement is not determined by the principle of noncontradiction. Experience is the only arbiter of truth claims for matter-of-fact propositions. But it is the next sentence in his work that proves to be the most interesting and the most philosophically unsettling for Hume and for philosophers over the next 250 years: “It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to inquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the record of our memory.”⁸ This is the line that will awaken Kant from his peaceful academic life and keep many others in a similar state of epistemological uncertainty, philosophical anxiety, and cognitive despair. Hume then turns to the consideration of the nature of causality, which lies at the foundation of the principles of modern science.

SKEPTICISM AND THE CRISIS OF MODERN REASON

The consideration of cause and effect in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* is only part of Hume’s broader analysis of the existence of an objective reality that is external to the knower. If sense impressions are the only basis for knowledge of the objective world of nature, then how are we able to justify philosophically the existence of these objects? How do we know that there is a world external to our ideas about it? That is, how do we know objectivity, and how do we know that objectivity exists? These issues of objectivism and realism were taken for granted in section 2, “Of the Origin of Ideas,” in his theory of impressions and ideas. Now in section 4, “Skeptical Doubts Concerning the Operation of the Understanding,” they come under the close scrutiny of his critical skepticism. Descartes, in *The Meditations Concerning First Philosophy*, had earlier asked similar questions when he raised the possibility that our sensory experience of the world may be an illusory product of our dreams and madness brought about by an evil and deceiving God.⁹ With entirely different intentions, Hume, too, is asking the key question about the relationships between knowledge and reality,

epistemology and ontology. If these relationships are problematic and not capable of being validated, then there is a distinct danger that the whole foundation of Western science is in serious jeopardy. Hume, singularly aware of the importance and dangers of the question he has raised, attempts to stiffen the resolve of reticent and anxious readers by encouraging their intellectual curiosity and their spirit of adventure. He raises questions about the reality of the objects of perception, an independent and continued world of substances, causal relationships between them, and a coherent, immaterial self. His skepticism will ultimately call into question the existence of causality, objectivity, and the self. He is determined to uncover which aspect of the human mind produces our naive realism regarding an independently existing world. Is it to be found in the senses, in reason, or in the imagination?

In the *Enquiry*, he starts with an examination of the nature of causality with his comment that “all reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation between *cause and effect*.”¹⁰ Whether it is receiving a letter from a friend, finding a watch on a desert island, or hearing a rational voice in the dark, Hume maintains that the mind automatically assumes the presence of a person behind these objects of experience. All thinking about matters of fact or empirical reality in terms of the relation between objects **a** and **b** is done within the framework of causal relationships. The basis of all human thought and science is grounded in this fundamental principle. However, the central question raised by Hume is: how is the principle of causality itself justified? What aspect of the mind is capable of justifying this law of nature; is it an inference from a priori reason or from experience? Can it be deduced by reason from the initial effect, as might occur in the logical relation of ideas that the cause of an object or occurrence **b** must be **a**, or can it be inductively derived from the reservoir of individual experiences that **b** is always preceded by **a**? His fascinating conclusion and the heart of his skepticism is that neither reason nor experience can justify the principle of causality, which is ultimately based on the natural instincts and custom of humans to perceive the world in terms of causal relations. According to Hume, “no object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact.”¹¹

At the start of his analysis, Hume turns first against rationalism, as he offers the example of Adam, who would have been unable to infer the various effects of water and fire from a reflective consideration of their general physical properties. Moving from a consideration of a causality of objects to a causality of events, he considers a billiard ball moving in a straight line toward another, but stationary, ball on the table. He argues that reason is unable to deduce the various possible consequences of the anticipated contact from the characteristics of the ball initially struck by

the player. He theorizes that there are a variety of possibilities arising from the momentum and contact from the immediate return of the first ball in a straight line to its point of origin, or the movement of the second ball in a number of different directions. As in the earlier case of whether the sun will rise or not in the morning, there are a number of logically conceivable and internally consistent possibilities, none of which are precluded by reason. Since the cause can never be found in the effect, all operations of the body and laws of nature, including the laws of gravity and motion, are known only by experience. Hume concludes that "all our reasoning *a priori* will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference. In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, *a priori*, must be entirely arbitrary."¹² Reason cannot determine the cause of an object or event from pure thought alone; all its considerations are contingent and arbitrary. Disposing of rationalism as providing an answer to the problem, Hume turns to empiricism with its focus on experience, observation, and inductive reasoning, but unfortunately with the same dissatisfying results.

Since our knowledge of the world and causality must be derived from experience, Hume anticipates that experience could be used to justify rationally the cause and effect relations. On closer scrutiny, he finds that this path, too, leads to a skeptical conclusion. He refers to this as a "dangerous dilemma." If from inductive reasoning derived from experience, we know that object or occurrence **b** always follows **a**, then we can assume that **a** is the cause of **b**. Experience provides the justification for making any future necessary connections between **a** and **b**. To clarify his position, he offers the example of bread. From impressions of the color, taste, and feel of bread to its effects of nourishment and support, from the sensible qualities to its underlying powers, the conjunction of cause and effect is based on a temporal connection and resemblance of the future to the past. But Hume argues that by using experience in this way to derive experimental conclusions about the future based upon our trust in the past, we are engaged in a circular and logical fallacy. By attempting to justify induction, basing the future on past experiences, we are applying the method of induction by anticipating that the future will generally correspond to the past. The problem with this line of reasoning is that we are assuming, or taking for granted, the very thing we are attempting to justify philosophically. Hume is quick to point out that only a madman or fool would deny the validity of this kind of knowledge by rejecting experience as the basis for causality. However, the philosopher, perhaps being both, must reject experience and induction as providing rational proof for these empirical connections. The question remains: if cause and effect arise out of experience but cannot be justified by either reason or sensation, from whence come causality, the laws of nature, and the foundations of modern science? Hume is further critical

of experience as the justification of causality, since no one familiar with a description of the effects can infer the secret powers and qualities that produced them. Inferring the existence of the cause from the perception of the effects is not justifiable. Hume also presents another argument for the contradictions of causality based on experience. Since we have only perceptions of the effects, there can be no impressions of the cause. The cause remains unknown and unknowable, as there is no proof for the existence of an independent and distinct world of self-sustaining objects.

In the same manner as his treatment of causality, Hume also considers in section 12, "Of the Academical or Skeptical Philosophy," the formation of the objectivity and externality of experience. The objects of the world appear to have a continuous and independent existence beyond our immediate perceptions, that is, they seem to exist whether we see them or not. But Hume's skepticism follows him further into this quagmire of epistemology and ontology:

It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it; our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence, uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.¹³

According to Hume, the evident objectivity of experience, the existence of an external and independent world of substances, is one of the taken-for-granted assumptions of naive realism. "Tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses."¹⁴ This assumption of empiricism is also the foundation stone of modern science and positivism. But he continues unrelentingly to the logical conclusions of his theory of knowledge and impressions to undermine the existence of even this assured and unassailable reality. If the impressions of perception provide us with our only access to objective reality, and the knowledge they give us is only a product of our sensations, then how is objectivity created? Is there a difference between the sensations of a table and the real table itself, that is, between the subjective impressions and objective reality? This was certainly the case for Descartes, who made a distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of objects. For him, the secondary qualities were the subjective mental projections of sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch. The primary qualities of material bodies

were a reflection of their essential reality as measurable and quantifiable extensions, shapes, motion, and numbers. Descartes makes the distinction between the subjective and impermanent sensations of the individual and the objective understanding of a mathematical reality.¹⁵ Hume, instead, argues that both primary and secondary qualities are perceptions having the same subjective characteristics that Descartes attributes only to the latter. That is, Descartes' distinction between what exists in the mind as sensible qualities and what exists in the object itself is rejected. For Hume, the ideas of extension and shape are also acquired through the senses of sight and feeling. Thus, there can only be secondary qualities of objects which are products of sensible ideas.

Hume now raises the key question about the nature of objectivity—the independent existence of external and continuous objects—when he writes, “By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit. . . .”¹⁶ Are the objects of nature conceived by perception truly distinct and outside the mind; do they still exist after we perceive them and turn away our gaze? Another formulation of this question is: what do we really know through internal perception? Do we know an external reality or only the subjective world of our own mental activity? Finally, how is a world of temporal constancy, coherence, and regularity of appearances created from the fleeting and fragmentary impressions of the senses? Hume knows there is no rational necessity in supposing that objects exist when we do not perceive them.¹⁷ He argues that the mind presents the world to us through our perceptions, and thus we know only our subjective perceptions of it, which are always particular, broken, and interrupted. “No beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions.”¹⁸ We see an object having a certain color, smell, taste, shape, and texture, but we never see the “object” itself. Impressions alone do not allow for this type of knowledge. A single perception can never provide us with the idea of a double existence. That is, it is a gross delusion and fantasy, according to Hume, to suppose that we can have a perception of both the impressions of an object and the object itself.¹⁹ We can never know the independent objects themselves, since they are always the product of rational inferences from the initial impressions. What one perceives is not the external world of substances, but only the mental perceptions we have of them. Following the logic of his empiricism to its conclusions, the very foundations of objectivism and realism have collapsed beneath the weight of Hume's skepticism, and with them Enlightenment rationality itself.

Justification of an independent world is not sustainable if our only contact with that world is through the senses. According to Hume, “We

must altogether reject the opinion, that there is such a thing as a continued existence, which is preserved when it no longer appears to the senses."²⁰ Hume writes that knowing only perceptions, we can never justify through experience or reason the objective reality of that world. The conclusion he reaches is that the mind can know only perceptions and not the objects themselves or the causal connections between them. Perceptions are not physical objects but mental projections and representations of the mind.²¹ They cognitively reproduce the world in the mind but are not the objects themselves. He concludes that we "can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove that the perceptions are connected with any external object."²² At this point in his skepticism, Hume's ideas resemble more the idealism of Berkeley than the empiricism of Locke.

To further distinguish between physical objects and mental objects, Hume presents a series of experiments to show that perception is also contingent on the subjective conditions of sensing. The pressing or rubbing of one's eyes results in an individual's seeing two chairs in a room where there is only one. The objectivity that is seen is dependent on perception and the organ of perception. As in the case with causality, our ideas about external objects are crystallized by a natural activity of the imagination that creates the independent objectivity and externality we experience in the world. We see only the subjective and fleeting impressions of the mind, never the world itself. To infer the existence of an objective world from our impressions is to base our reasoning on the principle of cause and effect. For Hume, the argument appears to be going in a contradictory and vicious circle since we can never know the causes as independent objects from the effects which are always subjective impressions. Caught in his own skepticism, he maintains that we can never get outside our own minds to justify rationally the existence of an external world of objects. We are locked into and cannot get beyond our own mental impressions and ideas. Because of this startling and profound insight, Gerald Galgan has argued in *The Logic of Modernity* that it is Hume and not Kant who should be recognized as precipitating a Copernican revolution in philosophy.²³

The conclusion that Hume reaches is that there is nothing in the object or event itself (a priori reasoning) or in the inferences of experience which creates a necessary and causal connection between various particular impressions of perception. This means that the philosopher must search for some mechanism other than the cognitive functions of the mind to connect experiences into coherent causal relations, thereby creating an objective reference. He accomplishes this by turning to the psychological operation of the imagination in producing contiguity, resemblance, and causality. It is here in the customary conjunction and constant connection of objects in past experiences that the necessary unity and coherence of the world is to be found. Temporal correlatives, spatial familiarities, and often repeated

associations reproduce connections as contingent sentiments that over time become accepted as naturally and permanently related associations and relationships. The belief in the continued and independent existence of objects and a unified self capable of knowing this reality is an extrarational feeling about the causal functioning of the world that is maintained by the natural propensities of the imagination and our memory of past experiences. Justus Hartnack has written in mild exasperation about the implications of Hume's theory of knowledge: "Humean empiricism has therefore disastrous consequences for our view and understanding of reality. . . . The result of Humean empiricism, the result of thinking that knowledge builds upon and contains nothing other than that which is given in sense experience, is consequently a denial of knowledge and the collapse of those concepts we necessarily must employ to speak about and to understand reality."²⁴ It is to these very difficulties created by Hume's theory of impressions and skepticism that Kant's own idealist theory of knowledge is directed.

KANT'S CRITICAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND JUDGMENT

Hume jolts Kant out of a dreamlike daze created by the dogmatic impasse between the rationalists and empiricists and by a later skepticism that calls every theory of knowledge into question. Building upon Hume's epistemology, Kant develops a radical alternative to the former's theory of objectivity with his own theory of subjectivity. In it, he attempts to respond to the questions raised by Hume's skeptical inquiry concerning human understanding. Issues of natural causality and independent substances are resolved, according to Kant, by investigating the a priori structure of consciousness and the role of pure reason in the creation of knowledge and science.²⁵ The method Kant applies is that of critical science, which deconstructs sense impressions and the role of the understanding and pure concepts in thought and judgments. The two most relevant parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* for Kant's theory of cognition are the Transcendental Aesthetic, which examines the place of intuitions and sensibility in the formation of objects of perception, and the Transcendental Analytic, which examines the understanding and thought in the formation of objects of experience.²⁶

Kant starts the introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason* by stating that although knowledge of empirical objects begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises out of it. As in the case of the empiricists, knowledge begins with sensations as the raw material of the sensible impressions.²⁷ But whereas Hume's impressions reflected distinct and coherent external substances, Kant separates perception and understanding. The relationship between these two crucial components of knowledge has become the basis for the extensive secondary literature on Kantian epistemology.²⁸ An important question raised is whether the distinction between perception (sensation)

and understanding (thought) is an analytical or an ontological distinction. That is, do they represent separate cognitive faculties or just separate logical points of departure for Kant's analysis of a theory of knowledge? Kant himself is not always clear on this point, which accounts for the cottage industry of interpretations. In any case, the distinction exists; whether it is an epistemological or an ontological distinction will be discussed below.

The key idea comes quickly in the introduction, where Kant argues that it "is especially noteworthy, that even into our experiences there enter modes of knowledge which must have their origin *a priori*, and which perhaps serve only to give coherence to our sense-representations."²⁹ These regulative principles, or transcendental concepts in pure reason, are logically independent and prior to sense experience and impressions. They provide the foundational and formative rules for our ontological and linguistic reality; without them there is no objective reality and no knowledge about nature. Although they are not derived from experience, they provide the very possibilities and conditions for all empirical knowledge and science. Without them, empirical judgments and scientific knowledge would be impossible. They present us with the subjective forms of consciousness that permit the world to appear to us. Without them, we have no access to external reality; without them, there is no experience and no knowledge of objectivity. The latter is now viewed as a construct of the mind in relationship to the world of experience. Consciousness is a constitutive element in the process of knowing the appearances of the world. It is Kant's main purpose in this massive work to examine and justify these *a priori* principles of reason—synthetic *a priori* judgments—as the foundation of the natural world of our experience. He views his project as a revolution in epistemology as he moves from an emphasis on objectivity to subjectivity.

Kant likens his theory of subjectivity and objectivity to a Copernican revolution in philosophy. Just as Copernicus, the Polish astronomer, transformed the way we think about the universe by taking the spectator from his privileged position at the center of the cosmos and making him revolve around the sun, Kant takes the objective world from the center of knowing and replaces it with our mental consciousness. In this way, instead of the knower conforming to and reflecting the central world of objects, the objects now must conform to the *a priori* structure of the subject. Knowledge about objects is not a reflection of nature but a cognitive projection and interpretive ordering of the pure categories of the mind. Objectivity is a construct of subjectivity. Reason seeks in nature that which it has already placed there through its *a priori* concepts.³⁰ On this point Kant writes, "For experience is itself a species of knowledge which involves understanding; and understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being given to me, and therefore as being *a priori*."³¹ What was lost in astronomy has been replaced in epistemology. At a time when

human beings were becoming just a speck of matter in the boundlessness of astronomical space, consciousness and reason were returning to the center of the universe, thereby reinforcing the theoretical and practical dignity of humanity. In the process, Kant radically alters the epistemological forces of the cosmos so that empiricism, rationalism, and skepticism no longer play such key roles in philosophy.³²

The first obvious question that arises is: what permits someone to assume the existence and necessity of a priori and objective principles of the mind? Kant believes there is a simple response to the question, since there are already forms of human knowledge which are necessary, universal, and do not rely on experience for their origin or validity, that is, there are already examples of pure a priori judgments. He contends that the propositions of mathematics and physics provide obvious and convincing evidence of such models in the faculty of judgment. From the very beginning Kant claims that there are some aspects of empirical knowing which are independent of both impressions and experience. Once the existence of a priori knowledge is intuitively confirmed, the next step is to outline other types of knowledge that contain a priori principles. This takes us to his early clarification of the various forms of judgment that the mind can make about the world. They are framed in terms of subject-predicate relations.

As we have already seen, Hume had divided meaningful propositions into the relations of ideas (analytic) and matters of fact (synthetic). Kant adds two more forms of knowledge—a priori and a posteriori, based on reason and based on experience—to these forms of judgment. Knowledge is a priori if it is universal, necessary, and logically independent of experience; a priori concepts are transcendental or pure categories which transform and reconstruct nature in itself into the appearances of the mind. Knowledge is a posteriori if it is dependent on contingent and particular experiences; a posteriori concepts are empirical abstractions which describe the given physical world of the senses and are therefore, by definition, synthetic.³³ Statements based on analytic and synthetic propositions have their criteria of truth and objective validity grounded in the relationship between the subject and object of a statement. Judgments are analytic if the predicate is already contained in the subject of the statement; its opposite implies a contradiction and is characterized as “thought through identity.” Since experience is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of analytic thought, the latter is thus also a priori. Clarity and precision are fostered, but no new information is given as the identity of the subject is divided into more refined and detailed concepts. Kant provides the example of “All bodies are extended.” Extension, along with impenetrability and figure, are contained in the very idea of an external body; there is no need to go beyond the concept of body for its predicates. The object, or predicate, of the sentence adds nothing new to our knowledge of the world. Analytic judgments are thus based on the rules of logic and the law of contradiction.

Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, present us with additional information about the world beyond the rules of logic, thereby expanding our knowledge of it. In the sentence, “All bodies are heavy,” the adjective *heavy* is derived from accumulated experience and not logical analysis. The predicate does not contradict the content of the subject. To acquire this information, the knower must go beyond the initial concept found in the subject of the sentence and experience the world directly. All synthetic statements are based on empirical knowledge; thus the former are also, by definition, a posteriori, or dependent on experience. Kant accepts these two initial forms but argues that we have knowledge that goes beyond formal logic and empirical facts. When combined with a priori and a posteriori knowledge, analytic and synthetic judgments create three types of meaningful statements about the world. By adding a priori and a posteriori elements to his general theory of judgments, Kant arrives at the following arrangement of judgments: analytic a priori, analytic a posteriori, synthetic a priori, and synthetic a posteriori propositions.

Types of Judgment

	a priori	a posteriori
synthetic	mathematics natural science	empirical judgments
analytic	tautologies concept of subject rules of logic	no such judgments possible

Kant moves beyond this fourfold theory of judgments to his analysis of the a priori elements in synthetic judgments in general. Synthetic a priori principles are what make scientific and empirical statements about the world possible. Stephan Körner emphasizes this point when he writes that these types of judgment “are presupposed in commonsense and scientific thought about nature.”³⁴ Kant’s central concern in the first two parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to develop a theory of knowledge which firmly establishes the a priori elements in both synthetic a priori judgments of mathematics and science and in the synthetic a posteriori judgments of the everyday world. The form of a priori judgments is applicable to both judgments, since pure transcendental concepts are necessary preconditions of all empirical experience and thought. Although from the very beginning he is interested in questions surrounding the universal and necessary foundations of mathematics

and science in the pure concepts of the mind, it is the less obvious and more subtle a priori dimension of empirical judgments and experience that occupies most of his attention. The first form of judgment is the synthetic a posteriori statement, which represents the objectivity of empirical knowledge that we gain everyday as we interact with reality. These statements add to our knowledge of the world through the descriptions of our impressions and experiences. Based on sensuous experience, they are judgments of facts and represent a synthetic unity of both empirical and a priori elements. That is, they contain indeterminate and indifferent sensations that are organized into a systematic and coherent unity that is re-presented as external objects held together by a priori concepts and principles. In the process, the world appears as made up of independent substances containing contingent and changing qualities and properties in time and space. This type of judgment is verified by empirical evidence and facts.

The second form of statement is the analytic a priori, which are the tautologies that express the unity of identity in which the predicate is logically contained in the subject. This is the case with the sentence, "All bachelors are male." To be a bachelor is logically to be a male. There are no examples of analytic a posteriori statements, since they are logically contradictory and substantively meaningless. One could not have a statement that is both analytically and logically self-contained at the same time that it is dependent on experience. Finally, there are the synthetic a priori judgments of mathematics and natural science, which provide knowledge that is logically independent of experience, is universal and necessary, but which also adds to our knowledge of the world since the predicate is not logically contained in the subject itself. Examples of synthetic a priori knowledge are found in the principles of natural science, such as in the law of the conservation of matter in the universe and the law of motion, stating that for every action there is an equal and subsequent reaction. They are also contained in mathematics, as in the arithmetic proposition of $7+5=12$ and in the geometric law that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points. Synthetic a priori propositions are the forms of judgment found in mathematics, Euclidean geometry, and Newtonian physics. They are forms of knowledge that represent universal judgments that increase our understanding of the world; they are not based on experience but on the principles of pure reason. Because of the creative and dynamic role that the a priori principles of the mind play in these two fields of scientific thought, Kant is convinced that he has uncovered a major discovery of the constitutive powers and potential of human reason that will radically alter traditional theories of knowledge. Therefore, in his search for the foundations of scientific reason and synthetic a priori knowledge, Kant begins his classical study with an analysis of a priori judgments in general.

TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC AND THEORY
OF REPRESENTATIONS

The philosophical reach in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is almost overwhelming in its breathtaking scope and unparalleled ambition. Kant wishes to investigate the nature of knowledge and science along with the limits and applications of pure a priori reasoning. Knowing that the formal principles of a priori judgment are contained in the construction of the immediate forms of intuitions and representations (Transcendental Aesthetic), in the transcendental categories underlying sense experience and thought (Transcendental Analytic), and in their purest, but illegitimate and delusional, forms in traditional metaphysics that lie beyond the concepts of experience in questions of ontology, rational cosmology, and natural theology (Transcendental Dialectic), Kant undertakes an analysis of pure reason.³⁵ In the preface he states, “For reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of a priori knowledge. Pure reason is, therefore, that which contains the principles whereby we know anything absolutely a priori.”³⁶ He hopes to uncover the legitimate applications of the principles of reason and the proper role of the creative mind in everyday judging and thinking. The analysis of the various forms of judgment and concepts provides access to the manner in which experience is obtained, thought is constructed, and the mind functions. The philosophical investigation into questions about the source, foundation, limits, and functioning of the mind is what Kant refers to as the critique of pure reason. However, the other side of the issue is also important to him. Kant also wants to show the objective validity of a priori concepts and their relationship and relevance to the constitution of experience.

Seeking answers to his fundamental question of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible and recognizing the legitimate parameters of meaningful statements, Kant now inquires into the nature of the forms of theoretical science and empirical judgments. Both are grounded on the foundation of a priori principles of pure reason. To undertake his critical theory of knowledge, Kant in the first two major parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* details the cognitive structure of the mind and its three main faculties of sensation, understanding, and reason. How they interact, affect, and transform one another, as well as the objects of experience, becomes the basis for his epistemological ruminations. Kant’s revolution in epistemology occurred because philosophical access to truth now revolves around the contours of subjectivity and not the independent orbits of substantive objectivity. He seeks the a priori or transcendental conditions for the possibility of knowledge in the subjective consciousness of sense impressions and reflective thought, that is, in the workings of perception and the understanding. He states, “[P]ure a priori principles are indispensable for the possibility of experience. For whence

could experience derive its certainty, if all the rules, according to which it proceeds, were always themselves empirical, and therefore contingent?"³⁷ It is this epistemological turn against the dogmatism of both rationalism and empiricism that will have such important ramifications for later philosophical and sociological thought.

The Transcendental Aesthetic begins with the idea that our immediate contact and knowledge about the external world start with our empirical intuitions in sense perception. Accepting the initial assumptions of Hume's empiricism, our relationship to the world is initiated through the sensations upon the receptive faculty of our sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*), and it is upon them that thought is ultimately based. Objectivity is given directly to us by our intuitions as representations (*Vorstellungen*) of what we perceive through the senses. They are not given to us as immediate, self-sufficient, and independent impressions. "Objects are *given* to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us *intuitions*; they are *thought* through the understanding, and from the understanding arise *concepts*."³⁸ Kant is already in disagreement with naive realism, since he contends that our empirical knowledge as intuition (*Anschauung*) consists of subjective representations. We have knowledge of the world only as it appears to us or is re-presented by us, not as it truly is in itself. This helps delineate his distinction between appearances (*Erscheinungen*) and the thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich*), as well as the different functions of perception and the understanding so early in his analysis. The distinction, and the philosophical issues surrounding it, have become the basis for the primordial disagreements about the relative importance of empiricism and idealism in his thought. What has epistemological prominence in Kant's critical theory of knowledge—empirical reality or subjective consciousness, sensibility or the understanding? That which is received through the senses is a reconstruction or representation of reality as it appears to us transformed by the faculty of sensibility and its a priori forms of intuition, that is, space and time.

The object consists of an undetermined and unordered manifold of appearance—sense data—that must be organized into a coherent object by the inner forms or structure of intuition. Kant divides sensation into its components of matter and form. The material element consists of a disparate and untutored manifold of intuitions that are given to the sensibility through its receptive faculty. These are the inarticulate and unformed sensations of color, sound, hardness, and noise. They are then reconstituted within the act of perception by the organizing principle of the internal forms of time and space provided by the mind. He affirms that "while, the matter of appearance is given to us *a posteriori* only, its form must lie ready for the sensations *a priori* in the mind. . . ."³⁹ Time and space, as the pure forms of intuition that reside in the a priori structure of the mind, participate in giving the indeterminate manifold or material content some initial semblance

of organization and coherence. They precede the objects as they provide their formal structure and place them in temporal and spatial relationships to each other. Out of the multiplicity of sensuous intuitions, constantly shifting movements of impressions, and changing subjective presentations, objects are created when the mind helps combine and organize these incoherent and private sensations into an objective perception. Coherent substances and an objective world are formed only through the power of the mind to unify these intuitions into a systematic and unified representation within time and space. Thus, for Kant, the primary qualities of Cartesian rationalism of extension, shape, and relation reside not in the objective world but rather in the pure forms of subjective consciousness.

The mind does not passively receive data and information imprinted upon it from the senses but actively engages this material and creates the appearances seen by intuition. The objects that we see, hear, and touch are not the already completed, preformed, and discrete impressions of Humean empiricism but are the constructed appearances of the phenomenal world. The world is determined by a subjectivity that is instructed by its spatial and temporal forms. These a priori forms do not reflect the actual properties of the world as they are in themselves before the addition of time and space. The pure forms of intuition exist in us and not in the world. Access to the world independent of its a priori characteristics is therefore impossible and meaningless. The thing-in-itself is inaccessible to the mind. Kant emphasizes the point when he writes, "Properties that belong to things in themselves can never be given to us through the senses."⁴⁰ The purpose of the *Transcendental Aesthetic* is to examine the principles of a priori sensibility and intuition in its two forms of space and time. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, reality in itself was construed as either the innate ideas and primary qualities of Cartesian rationalism or the immediate impressions and secondary qualities of British empiricism. Kant rejects these traditions in his argument that both primary and secondary qualities are only the a priori conditions of sensibility that lie in the subject. Empiricism and rationalism are integrated into his critical theory of subjective idealism.

The external world is continuously represented to us through the outer sense of the mind in terms of the spatial contours of figure, magnitude, and relations between objects. Objects do not just exist in the world ready to be perceived but are formed by quantifiable spatial attributes that locate them in a physical universe of extension and shape. Space is the outer form in which the world is given to us; it is the subjective condition of sensibility. There is also an inner state and determinate form that locates objects within a subjective line of temporal succession. Kant argues that objects are thus mere re-presentations of our sensibility that do not reflect reality in itself but a reality perceived and affected by our sensations; these are appearances only. Kant further argues, "We then realize that not only are the drops of

rain mere appearances, but that even their round shape, nay even the space in which they fall, are nothing in themselves, but merely modifications or fundamental forms of our sensible intuition, and that the transcendental object remains unknown to us.”⁴¹ Kant, like Hume, is concerned with the relationship between epistemology and the metaphysics of perception. He asks about the status of time and space, as he inquires whether they are real and express self-sufficient existences and inherent properties. As defining aspects of objective reality, are they themselves real, or do they exist only as subjective and formal determinations of consciousness? What is the nature of the metaphysics of space and time? Kant, referring to both space and time as examples of transcendental ideality, concludes that they are mental forms of intuition that are derived not from empirical concepts but from a deduction arrived at through the analysis of the necessary role of pure intuitions as subjective conditions of sensing the world. The notions of past and present and distance and shape are ways in which the mind organizes the representations we receive through the senses. They provide the formal context within which we perceive the material world.

Like space, time has no independent or absolute reality belonging to things, since it does not exist independently of the knowing individual. It is, however, an inner sense which determines our perception of the appearances. Knowing the world, even at the initial stage of sensibility through the pure intuitions of time and space, is an act of interpretation rather than an act of reflection and reproduction. Our knowledge is always interpretive because it is filtered through the subjective conditions of our mental faculty of perception. Empirical reality is bathed in a subjective flow of temporal moments. It is an inner sense that gives a particular form of past, present, and future to our way of knowing nature and ourselves and carves out a world of being from the process of becoming. Without the ability to view the world in terms of alterations, successions, and movements, there would only be a chaos of unarticulated instances and sensations that have no connection or coherence to anything outside themselves. There would be no sense of location, motion, or force; no sense of change, coexistence, or endurance. Representations would follow one another without a point of reference or meaning, nor would we be conscious of them as distinct aspects of a particular objective reality that we were perceiving. Nothing would precede a representation or be subsequent to it. Time would disappear, as there would only be an inarticulate series of deadening nows. Nothing would exist except the impact of confusing and meaningless sensations. There would be a pyrotechnical explosion of sounds, sights, and emotions but no clear voices and music, no clear objects and images, and no clear feelings and passions. Human cognition, however, is organized in such a manner that time and space do structure our every representation. Objects appear and disappear, move and develop, and have a physical place and relationship to other objects. “If the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of the

senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish. As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us.”⁴²

Kant is aware that the forms of intuition, as well as our mode of representation and empirical knowledge, have limits since they are the transcendental conditions of sensibility and cannot be applied to anything beyond appearances. This insight will provide the foundations for his later critique of traditional metaphysics and religion in which a priori concepts are utilized beyond their legitimate applications in experience. In the introduction to the first *Critique*, Kant asks how synthetic judgments using a priori concepts are possible. His answer in the *Aesthetics* is that this possibility lies in the constitution of pure a priori intuitions of the mind. Mathematical propositions are possible because perception of appearances is possible. Our representations place us in contact with the world of objects, since they are created with the help of a priori forms of space and time which are the very principles at the heart of geometry and arithmetic. The synthetic a priori judgments of mathematics define and describe the spatial and temporal dimensions of a universe which is actually a mental projection and representation of our own conceptual constitution. We live in a world created by our own consciousness. The key ontological question becomes: are we alone, or is there an external material world beyond our consciousness?

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC, CATEGORIES OF THE UNDERSTANDING, AND THEORY OF OBJECTIVITY

Continuing to develop his theory of representations in the next major section of his work, the *Transcendental Analytic*, Kant moves beyond the a priori dimension in perception and examines the a priori elements within the understanding. The *Transcendental Analytic* is divided into two main areas: justification and application. The *Analytic of Concepts* (*Metaphysical and Transcendental Deduction*) deals with the identification, justification (deduction), and objective validity of the formative categories of the mind; the *Analytic of Principles* (*Schematism, System of All Principles of the Understanding, and Phenomena and Noumena*) investigates the application of the a priori principles and categories to objective reality.⁴³ Leaving the immediacy of intuitions in the *Aesthetic*, Kant now considers the logical and conceptual foundations of thought and judgment. It is in the understanding that he finds the complimentary cognitive faculty which takes private perceptions and subjective feelings and organizes them into reflective thoughts and objective judgments about the world. They become publicly recognizable experiences. Empirical knowledge is constituted by means of both intuitions and concepts. In one of his most forceful and often quoted lines from his writings, Kant says, “Without sensibility no object would be

given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."⁴⁴ Kant is arguing that thoughts without intuitions are empty forms of metaphysical speculation that do not refer to any concrete reality; they are impossible and irrelevant ideas spinning off without any material basis. Concepts without empirical content and applicability are transcendent and thus meaningless. Sensations, on the other hand, without concepts are a blind stream of indistinguishable and disassociated impressions lacking any coherent structure or form. H. J. Paton offers an example of the perception of a chair in his attempt to show the necessary integration of intuitions and understanding. "What is given to us is, for example, a color. We think that it is the color of a chair. Without thought, although we might see a color, we could not know that it was the color of a chair, or indeed of anything. This is what Kant means when he says that intuitions without concepts of thought are blind. Hence without thought there is no determinate object, no phenomenal object in the strict sense."⁴⁵ Without thought, only the immediate intuition of color is given as an indeterminate object of private sensation. A more formal way of expressing this idea, taken from the logical structure of the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself, is that both the Aesthetic and the Analytic are necessary for the formation of the objects of phenomenal reality.⁴⁶

We may be standing in front of a large, beautiful tree, but sensations alone produce only a flow of indeterminate temporal moments and visual impressions, just as concepts alone are irrelevant and vacuous. Our faculty of sensibility, by which intuitions are received, is incapable of reflective thought, and our understanding cannot receive sensations. The ability to see, hear, and touch the world and make judgments about our perceptions is contingent on the transcendental logic and a priori conditions of the mind, which rearrange and reorder the initial impressions into coherent patterns of intersubjectively shared experiences and publicly communicated thoughts according to necessary and universal rules. It is only then that experience can be objective and thus communally shared. Reflection without the manifold of intuitions would offer no experience of the world as it appears to us, no ability to make comments about it, and no capacity to make statements which would reflect our understanding of our natural surroundings. On the other hand, intuitions without a priori concepts would contain a massive amount of sensory data that is private, unorganized, and uncommunicable. Lacking coherent unity that would make sense to anyone experiencing the world, there would only be a hum of continuous, nondiscrete, and meaningless sensations. We would perceive something but not know what it is. The objects of the appearances must first be given to us through the nerve modifications of our sensibility, to which the categories of the understanding are then applied.

Kant seems to be arguing that the senses provide the raw materials which are then subsumed under the prior constitution of the mind to

form objects and relationships found in experience. In perception, we are consciously aware of the world, our receptivity to it, and its effect on our personal faculties of sensation and pure intuitions. We feel warmth, see colors, and perceive objects located in an external world changing positions over time. However, there is nothing in the act of perception itself that gives these intuitions a unity of perception or a recognition that there is a self-consciousness behind the bundle of impressions. Everything appears to us in certain ways that we feel directly and subjectively. But it is in the activity of experience that objects take on their completed forms and are organized into a coherent whole with substances, accidents, and causal relationships related to a unified self. It is at this point that we experience self-subsistent objects as integrated and independent substances moving and being acted upon in an external world. A pattern of objectivity takes shape through the cognitive intervention of the critical mind.⁴⁷ Concepts of the understanding help facilitate the organization of experience in two main ways: abstract concepts, as everyday universals such as the words *house*, *dog*, and *humanity* act to combine, systematize, and classify a number of particular impressions and empirical concepts into one unified and determinate representation. The application of these concepts is facilitated by our use of language to organize our sensible intuitions about the world in order to recognize and comprehend what we see, hear, touch, and so forth. Although these abstract concepts are necessary for the organizing of and making statements about experience, they are not what Kant refers to when he talks about the transcendental logic and categories of the understanding. They are not the logical preconditions of experience but the means of systematizing and organizing our impressions in a more universal and comprehensive way. The transcendental concepts, on the other hand, refer to the a priori foundation of logic itself and the universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. The use of transcendental concepts, as a priori forms of thought, makes possible our ability to experience and to judge the world of natural objects to which we apply the standards of traditional logic, reason, and abstract empirical concepts (universals). The a priori forms make possible the use of the concepts of everyday conversational language.

The faculty of the understanding takes the given intuitions received by the sensibility and makes judgments about them through the application of these two types of concepts. The empirical concepts are used to connect representations together in general terms to describe particular objects or events in experience, while the transcendental concepts are the logical presuppositions that make the application of abstract concepts to experience possible. Thus, in the sentence, "The tree is green," the subject and object are both empirical concepts employed by using the general rules of Aristotelian logic for internal consistency and agreement. But Kant is concerned with a deeper and more subtle question: what makes the application of

traditional logic to experience possible? The discursive ability to conceive of the tree as an independent substance having particular accidental and changing properties over the course of seasons is the result of a different set of a priori categories. In this example of an empirical judgment, concepts are used to hold together many different representations. In the case of the use of the empirical categories of "tree" and "green," perception of a complex variety of many different intuitions is delineated and made more precise and clear. However, it is only by means of transcendental concepts, which underlie the faculty of thought and judgment, that the experience of substances is formed. One set of concepts helps us express and organize our impressions of a tree, and another set helps us experience the tree as an objective experience within a subject-predicate relationship. The former set of concepts are empirical and universal, whereas the latter set are a priori and transcendental. The a priori permits the application of ideas in synthetic judgments; the a priori permits us to judge nature universally.

If our intuitions are to be known and our perceptions formed into a coherent unity and constructed order, they must be organized according to certain universal rules and principles which create the foundations for objective experience and correct judgments. Individuals cannot just have perceptions and impressions in a contingent and haphazard fashion. There must be a logical structure and regulative "function of unity" among our representations that prevail throughout our experience, thus making thought and judgment possible. Knowledge is created by this spontaneous synthesis of the mind acting to coordinate and to synthesize our material intuitions and perceptions into a unified experience of the world. It requires a synthesis of this manifold of intuitions and representations with the pure intuitions of time and space and the categories of the understanding.⁴⁸

To explain the objective coherence and logical integrity of the world we experience, Kant turns to an analysis of the traditional forms of judgment in the section of the *Analytic* entitled "The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding." He later refers to this section as the *Metaphysical Deduction*. According to him, a comprehensive list of the full range of a priori concepts of the understanding may be found by first examining Aristotle's analysis of formal logic, categories, and forms of judgment in general.⁴⁹ From this analysis of traditional discursive logic, its abstract concepts, judgments, and inferences, Kant develops his own list of transcendental categories underlying our experience of the world. Transcendental logic, by enabling the examination of the pure and a priori foundations of experience and judgment, makes the use of formal logic possible. The function of thought is to permit connections between empirical concepts that are used in everyday language. When saying, "The tree is green," we attempt to show a perceived causal relationship between an object and its color. Kant is interested in showing how we are able to make this connection

in the first place, especially since, as Hume had shown, the relationship is not inherent in the world itself. The conditions that make logical analysis and judgments possible Kant calls the transcendental logic and categories. They lie in the mind prior to their application in experience and prior to the use of abstract categories of everyday language.

Kant wishes to discover these transcendental concepts by closely examining the forms of judgment of traditional logic. He believes that it is within the latter that the former are to be uncovered. Within each form of judgment, a particular type of pure category is used, and it is from the former that the latter is derived. Without these categories or concepts of the understanding, intuitions would not be integrated into perceptions, objective experience would not be possible, and traditional Aristotelian logic would not be applicable to our assertions and statements about the world. Concerning this process, he writes, "The same function which gives unity to the various representations *in a judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concepts of the understanding."⁵⁰ This synthetic and integrative functioning of the understanding is what Kant refers to as "the pure synthesis of representations" or the "manifold of intuition in general." In this manner the world that we see and know has objective validity, and there is a universal and necessary consensus about its external appearance and reality. Its validity and necessity are maintained by this synthetic activity of sensuous consciousness. In this way the formal unity and empirical objectivity of reality are maintained by the synthetic capability and a priori structure of the mind.

Kant argues that this new science of transcendental logic would give us the rules for the correct and universal application of the a priori principles of the understanding. Transcendental concepts are the a priori forms which make the synthesis of intuitions, abstract concepts, and thought possible. In this sense, they are prior to and independent of experience, but at the same time they are applicable to it; they are its universal and necessary preconditions, and thus they are that which make experience and synthetic a posteriori judgments about the world possible. Every objective empirical judgment about the world contains a manifold of intuitions and representations, abstract concepts, and pure a priori concepts, which are brought together in a synthetic unity by the understanding. For Kant, there are four types of judgments from which he hastily distills the four types of fundamental categories of human experience: Quantity (universal, particular, and singular statements), Quality (affirmative, negative, and infinitive statements), Relation (categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive statements), and Modality (problematic, assertoric, and apodictic statements). Every empirical judgment has elements of these distinct forms. The categories are those underlying pure elements of the understanding which

make our four types of judgments possible. In the *Metaphysical Deduction*, Kant emphatically states that the table of twelve categories contains all the elementary concepts of the understanding that make experience and thought possible. Without the ability to combine and connect concepts and representations, the mind would not be able to form rational thoughts or see systematic relationships between objects and events in the world. Within each division there are three other subcategories, with the third category arising from a combination of the first two categories in each group. As some interpreters have noticed, the implications of this tripartite arrangement are later picked up in Hegel's dialectical treatment of logical categories. The formal structure of every empirical judgment about the world, and thus the cognitive foundation of our relations to nature, are formed around these categories which are deeply embedded in our consciousness. They are hardwired into our being. The unity of our interaction with the external world is functionally organized around these a priori categories of the mind. Körner has argued that the application of a priori categories occurs in both perception and experience:

To apply a category is thus, to confer objective reference by unifying our manifold of pure perceptions. It is impossible to confer objectivity by a judgment unless the bearer of objectivity, the object as opposed to a mere collection of subjective impressions, is produced in perception. Unless we confer objectivity by applying a category there is no object in perception. Unless we produce an object in perception by unifying a pure manifold there is no characteristic of objectivity.⁵¹

Objectivity is, therefore, a constitutive product of the internal dynamics of the mind. As Kant has stressed from the start of his work, it is not an inherent characteristic of nature itself.⁵² In every judgment, statements are organized around certain universal features that give objective meaning to them. With each judgment there are certain formal categories which organize the continuous and unsystematic stream of representations that strike our sensibility to create our experiences. When we claim that the tree is green, there are a number of operations that are going on simultaneously to create the self-conscious thought by which we experience both the tree and its accidental property of color. When we experience and reflect upon the world and then make assertions about it, the formal structure of our rational statements is filtered through the categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. It is this which gives our intuitions integrity, coherence, and meaning. Without this working of the understanding, we would receive sensations that appear in time and space, but they would not make any sense, nor would they form any coherent picture of the intuitions we

were receiving. In making conscious observations, pictures of the world, judgments about our experiences, and propositions connecting subjects and objects, the mind utilizes these pure categories, since only through them will a rational and universal paradigm develop. The first two classes (quantity and quality) Kant refers to as mathematical, since they refer to objects of intuition in time and space; the second grouping of classes of concepts of the understanding (relation and modality) he calls dynamic, because they refer to the relations of objects to each other or to the knower.⁵³

Making the transition within his transcendental logic from a theory of judgments to a theory of categories, Kant outlines the first class of transcendental concepts, which are the categories of Quantity (unity, plurality, and totality). They initiate the organization of perception around quantitative numbers in such a way that they create a synthetic unity of objects, common characteristics shared by a distinctive plurality of things, or an observation about the nature of a single object. These concepts express quantity or magnitude having numerical values. With the categories of Quality (reality, negation, and limitation), we affirm or disaffirm the particular properties or qualities of things. The magnitude of objects is viewed as having a certain intensity, expressed by its predicates in the form of a certain color, taste, or feeling. These are the qualitative characteristics expressed by objects. The categories of Relation (substance, causality, and community) may be the most interesting, since they create the categorial nature and systematic format of our judgments about the world in subject-object statements. They help us in forming our experiences of self-subsisting substances, or things existing in time having certain perceived accidents, attributable properties, and causal effects. They connect indiscriminate intuitions and promiscuous representations by general cognitive rules into substances that seem to be intrinsically inherent and temporally subsistent in things. In this way objectivity is formed. Descriptive and clarifying predicates are provided to objects; they form a community of causally interrelated entities reciprocally determining one another. The world is inhabited by independent things or autonomous substances having certain empirical characteristics and causally interacting with other entities. This is the world of objective reality that we experience every day. The pure concepts of relation permit us to see independent objects move in a universe of cause-and-effect relationships; they change, reciprocally interact, and causally influence one another. They thus make possible a whole universe of associated experiences which are important to everyday life and the formation of the laws of modern physics. An apparent ontology of objective being is created by means of these a priori and relational categories.

The fourth type, the categories of Modality (possibility, existence, and necessity) are distinctive in that they contribute nothing to the content of a judgment but are the ways thought develops logically from the problematic to certitude. They permit us only to view our judgments of intuitions as

either logically possible and problematic, factually assertive of existing reality, or apodictic statements about logical necessity. Kant supplies the example, "There is a perfect justice" to clarify this class of categories. Although it may not be true, it is still quite possible. By applying these pure categories of the understanding, the world comes into focus as a natural existence in which objects appear as possible, existing, or necessary. The four classes of categories constitute the a priori forms of judgment by which experience and thought are made possible.

These supposedly transcendental predicates of *things* are, in fact, nothing but logical requirements and criteria of all *knowledge* of things in general. . . . But these categories, which, properly regarded, must be taken as material, belonging to the possibility of the things themselves [empirical objects], have, in this further application, been used only in their formal meaning, as being of the nature of logical requisites of all knowledge. . . .⁵⁴

The understanding, as the faculty of judgment using concepts as the ground of experience, thus applies both empirical concepts of traditional logic (general everyday concepts) and the pure transcendental categories which make the application of general concepts to intuition possible. It is by this means that objects are constructed and formed into cognitive judgments about nature. Only in this way is it possible to say, "The tree is green."

REVOLUTION IN SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY

Kant now turns to the philosophical justification and validation of his theory of the pure concepts of the understanding in the section of the *Analytic* entitled the "The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding." This section is more commonly referred to as the Transcendental Deduction. For many, this is the most important part of his work, for in it he attempts to justify his transcendental theory of categories, their objective validity, and their application to the workings of the understanding in thought and judgment. That is, he tries to piece together the different strands of consciousness as self-reflective thought, consciousness as the application of pure concepts to perception, and consciousness as the representation of empirical objectivity (intuitions). In it the various forms of consciousness as reflective activity, application, knowledge, and object are integrated into a comprehensive theory of subjectivity. He articulates in more detail the mechanics of how concepts and consciousness are related to the objects of experience and how the objects of experience are formed. Not only that, but he attempts to show that these a priori concepts are the necessary preconditions for objects to be thought. It is in this section on the deduction or transcendental justifica-

tion that we find a more comprehensive analysis of the interplay between epistemology and ontology, or between consciousness and objective reality. By showing the employment of the pure concepts of the intuition and the understanding to both perception and experience, he also acknowledges their applicability to mathematics and physics. How is it possible to have empirical knowledge that contains objectively valid representations and at the same time does not reflect an arbitrary combination of intuitions or a contingent connection between consciousness and external reality? In Kant's theory of representations, unlike traditional rationalism and empiricism, to perceive (consciousness) also means to be perceived (object). The relationships between the realm of objects and the act of knowing are intimately interconnected and must be justified before Kant can proceed.⁵⁵

Georg Simmel, the famous German sociologist and philosopher, has highlighted this aspect of Kant's thinking in his lectures at the University of Berlin during the winter semester of 1902–1903. Simmel criticizes a popular misconception of Kantian philosophy that the world is my representation and outside of it is nothing. In this view, the world is an evanescent product tantalizingly placed before us by our own consciousness. With truth in itself unreachable, we are locked into the limits of our own arbitrary ideas and fantasies. This is the fear of some who view Kant as a radical idealist. The emphasis in this idealist perspective is on the personal and egoistic, almost to the exclusion of the imprint of the sensible world itself. Another popular misunderstanding arises from the Cartesian worldview in which an independent reality and objective truth are waiting to be discovered by consciousness in the form of primary characteristics. This world is split between a thinking substance of consciousness (*res cogitans*) and an extended substance of material being (*res extensa*). Simmel attempts to reestablish the link between the two elements of knowledge and stresses the synthetic balance in which both the mental and sensible, the spiritual and material, are united in consciousness. The mind takes the meaningless flow of sensibility and transforms it into a given world of objects, predicates, relationships of causality and descriptive properties, and reflective judgments. According to Simmel, this is the key foundational principle of Kant's theory of knowledge which contains his view of the structure of the world as lying in the union between consciousness and reality. From this perspective, consciousness is not a separate feature of sensuous reality, but an intimate aspect of it as it forms the very content of thought itself. Objectivity is a constitutive part of self-consciousness, and the latter is the form in which objectivity appears.⁵⁶ In another of his works, *Kant and Goethe* (1924), Simmel articulates the dilemma of modernity in terms of the great divide between consciousness and reality. Referring to the split between the mechanistic worldview of nature and the meaning and values of culture, he writes, "In both cases, the self-determination of the subject threatens either to be intertwined with an

alien objectivity or to fall into an anarchistic arbitrariness and isolation.”⁵⁷ He sees Kant as offering a way of transcending these antagonistic dichotomies of mechanical petrification and epistemological nihilism.

Reviving a word used by eighteenth-century jurists to denote the right or legal claim of an argument, Kant refers to the process of the justification of the concepts of the understanding as a “deduction.” His ultimate goal is to validate the forms of objective knowledge we have in our everyday experiences and in modern mathematics and physics. By this means he wishes to establish the foundations and validation for synthetic a priori judgments. The Transcendental Deduction thus attempts the justification of the application of pure concepts to experience; the justification of empirical knowledge as objective and necessary; and the justification that concepts have objective validity, relate to the sensuous world, and represent an objective reality. They are not mere judgments of perception which rely on subjective feelings and personal impressions having no objectively shared or accepted validity. Perceptions are particular sensations lacking unity and coherence and, therefore, any universal set of principles that constitute a shared and meaningful universe of objects. Kant restates that all experience requires both matter and form; that is, it requires the empirical sensations and the ordering principles of pure intuition and concepts. He maintains that the deduction or validation of a priori concepts cannot proceed by means of abstraction from particular perceptions to universal concepts such as house, dog, and tree. The ultimate goal of the deduction is to prove the necessity of the antecedent and subjective conditions of thought without which empirical knowledge and science would be impossible. Kant is still wrestling with the ghost of Hume.

Kant appears in a serious quandary. He recognizes that it is possible that we can have experiences that are not formed by the synthesizing and unifying force of the understanding. There is no logical or empirical necessity that requires us to accept the position that objects must appear to us in the manner they do under the functioning and ordering of the understanding. He has shown in the Aesthetic that we cannot think of objects of the intuition without at the same time immediately thinking of them in time and space. Without time and space, the objects of intuition could not be perceived. The relevance and application of a priori categories of the understanding to experience are not immediately justifiable. Kant forcefully argues, “That objects of sensible intuitions must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility which lie *a priori* in the mind is evident, because otherwise they would not be objects for us. But that they must likewise conform to the conditions which the understanding requires for the synthetic unity of thought is a conclusion the grounds of which are by no means so obvious.”⁵⁸ Even though we cannot conceive of intuitions without time and space, it is still difficult to make the corresponding argument for the subsumption of

the intuitions under the rules of the pure forms of the understanding. Appearances could very well appear without any determinate order or unifying structure. That they do so must first be philosophically and transcendently justified. Kant is raising the fascinating question: why is there order and not disorder, that is, why do we see the world in the way we do?

Kant had earlier argued that perception must conform to the universal and necessary rules of thought. In order to explain this point, he refers to the example of cause and effect. There are a number of questions that he wishes to make clear and justify. Why must our experience of the world be rendered possible only when considered under the laws of causality? What justifies the application of these a priori concepts of the mind to our knowledge of the senses? How do the concepts of the understanding necessarily relate to the objects of experience and why are these concepts necessary in order for objects to be thought? Objects cannot be intuited or thought without these antecedent conditions of the mind. The purpose of the transcendental deduction is to justify this relationship between concepts and intuitions. This dilemma is wonderfully articulated by Kant in the following sentence: "Either the object alone must make the representation possible, or the representation alone must make the object possible."⁵⁹ In the former, the representation as sensation empirically reflects the object, whereas in the latter, the representation as an idea determines the object by its a priori conditions. Both are partially true, since sensibility is the passive acceptance of the sensations, and in the understanding the representations conform to the a priori structure of the mind.

Behind this drive for a justification of the subjective conditions of thought lies the skepticism of Hume. Kant is extremely frustrated by what he calls "these toilsome enquiries." Experience itself presents us with more than enough empirical examples of the application of these a priori concepts. On initial consideration, abstracting the concept of causality from it would seem an adequate justification of its continuous use in empirical judgments. However, as Hume has already shown, experience and induction cannot provide the basic legitimation for the application or objective validity of these universal and necessary concepts to perception. Causality cannot be derived from experience or an empirical rule of association because there is no logical necessity in it; the connections that are produced result from frequent contingent associations, temporal succession of impressions, and the habitual repetition of events. These are psychological conditions of causality, not logical or empirical proofs. The deduction must then either be transcendental (a priori) or must be finally rejected as a phantasm of the unrestrained imagination. If the latter is our final result, we must conclude with Hume and accept his skeptical conclusions about the nature of scientific knowledge and causality. Rules for the cognitive ordering of intuitions may be derived or abstracted from experience, but they do not have the logical

and necessary proof that science requires of them. So Kant proceeds with his deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding. His purpose is to show conclusively the cognitive requirement and necessity of pure a priori concepts as the basis for all possible experience and objective knowledge. His inquiry moves in the direction of explaining how pure concepts are possible and how the conditions of their applicability to the material content of intuitions are necessary. Without these foundational principles, experience becomes impossible, because there is nothing which holds the impressions together in a determinate and universally coherent manner. Without them, experiencing substances in nature or causal relationships would be impossible, as would reflection and thought. He concludes his introductory comments on the deduction with the sentence, "If we can prove that by their means [pure concepts] alone an object can be thought, this will be sufficient deduction of them, and will justify their objective validity."⁶⁰

A serious and persistent problem related to subjectivity, the nature of concepts, and their application to the content of perception is the meaning of the term *objects* mentioned throughout his work. What is the status of an object of sensible intuition received by the sensations but not formed by the categories of the understanding? Kant certainly wants to clarify analytically the two elements in the process of knowing the world through experience. Do these appearances of perception first exist as independent objects, which are then incorporated into the understanding, or are they merely blind and meaningless sensations? Are we self-conscious of the sensations if they do not form determinate and coherent objects? What are the prior conditions for the possibility of objectivity? Do they lie in the sensations or the understanding or both? Is Kant making an ontological distinction or a logical distinction with the division between the Aesthetic and Analytic?⁶¹ Is this another way in which the conflict between empiricism and rationalism is played out within Kant's own mind? The empiricist side dictates that the sensations produce primary objects and appearances that are later incorporated into rational thought through the understanding, while the idealist side of his work stresses the role of universal rules of thought in the formation of the objects of both perception and experience.

IMAGINATION AND THE SYNTHETIC UNITY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

The second section of the Transcendental Deduction in the first edition of the *Critique* is known as the Subjective Deduction. The Transcendental Deduction was later completely rewritten and reduced in the second edition, while the Subjective Deduction was eliminated entirely, as Kant sought to emphasize the transcendental conditions of knowledge over the empirical and psychological process of knowing. In the latter, Kant turns his attention

to how the pure concepts relate to intuitions as the necessary and universal ground of all possible objective experience. An interesting aspect of this section is his initial focus on an idealist interpretation of epistemology, as both perception and experience are subsumed under the synthetic power of the mind to unify and order intuitions and empirical knowledge.⁶² The Subjective Deduction (A 95–114) begins with an analysis of the reproductive and synthetic powers of the mind and the subjective or psychological conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Kant is interested in uncovering the transcendental construction of the synthetic unity of objects out of the diverse manifold of intuitions. How are objects created from the immense number of mental representations received by the senses, especially after Hume's rejection of causal necessity within and between impressions? Kant's purpose here is to show how the multiple parts of sensation fit together based on necessary laws and universal rules of association to form external objects of representation.

According to Robert Paul Wolff, Kant develops his argument in the Subjective Deduction by moving through four preliminary versions, as he examines the cognitive process by which objectivity is created through various forms of transcendental subjectivity: (1) the concept of the object = x ; (2) categories of the understanding; (3) threefold synthesis of the imagination; and (4) the necessary rules of consciousness governing experience and critique of Hume.⁶³ These are four distinct stages in the articulation of Kant's theory of subjective deduction and the role of the synthetic unity of the mind in reflective thought. The argument moves from an emphasis on the transcendental categories, the understanding, and the imagination to the universal laws of self-consciousness. Each stage appears to have been a working hypothesis in the development of his critical theory of subjectivity and cognitive synthesis. Some of these ideas were incorporated into later ones and some were simply rejected, never to appear again.

It is clear to Kant that it is human consciousness which unifies the content of sensations and combines them into an object of reality. "For this unitary consciousness is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation."⁶⁴ In the section "On the Recognition in a Concept," Kant undertakes his most extensive analysis of the Transcendental Deduction and faculty of the understanding. He begins with the question about the nature of the object of representation. It is a variation on the theme of the relationship between appearances and the thing-in-itself as he pursues a metaphysics of experience. What does it mean to have knowledge of an object, and what actually corresponds to that knowledge? It is a difficult question because we do not know the world in itself, while at the same time, our knowledge of it is not the product of mere mental fantasy. Kant is caught between the impressions of Hume and the dreams of Descartes. To what does our knowledge correspond?

This is a question of the objective reference and intersubjective validity of our concepts and the reality behind them. Kant asks the all-important question, "What, then, is to be understood when we speak of an object corresponding to, and consequently also distinct from, our knowledge? It is easily seen that this object must be thought of only as something in general = *x*, since outside our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to it."⁶⁵ That which grounds our knowledge is a transcendental concept of the object in general acting as a universal and objective law—a categorial imperative—that guides our perception of reality. Our representations are channeled into certain relationships by a natural cognitive predisposition of the logical functioning of the understanding.⁶⁶ This notion of "the concept of the object" is used as a transcendental argument for the integration of intuitions and ideas into coherent patterns of objectivity.

Empirical objects are formed by the antecedent structure of the mind to organize its perception around logical forms which project specific relations between representations. Since representations themselves do not produce necessary connections but only a continuous and disjointed stream of meaningless impressions, Kant maintains that the object that holds them together in a coherent package is the a priori concept of the understanding. He characterizes it in the very obtuse phrase, the "concept of the object = *x*." The unity or necessary connections of representations which form our perception of reality lie in the transcendental abstraction or concept and not in the empirical object, experience, or thing-in-itself.⁶⁷ When we look at the table in a small classroom, what do we see? We see the shape, form, and colors of the table; we hear noises when books are dropped or moved; there is a smell to a newly polished table surface; and there is a sense that the table is hard and heavy. It appears to be a permanent substance having particular and discernable properties. It is a permanent existent being outside of consciousness that expresses clear regularities. When I leave the room and return a few minutes later, I expect that the table will be in the same place and have the same characteristics as before.⁶⁸ Both Hume and Kant recognize that the arbitrary stream of intuitions is incapable of supplying this constitutive activity of organizing the perceptions into a picture of an independent substance with distinctive and coherent characteristics. Since this is shared by human beings, the substance created is done so according to some universal and necessary principle that, although it precedes experience, permits us to make objective statements about the table: "The table is rectangular and brown." The unity of consciousness creates the transcendental unity of the object. Kant summarizes the importance of the role of the transcendental object in the process of synthetic unity: "The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality throughout all our knowledge is always one and the same, is what can alone confer upon

all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality.”⁶⁹ The pure concept provides the rules for synthetic unity by which the object appears as a unified and systematic representation. The necessary relationships among the manifold of intuitions are, in reality, a logical product of “the necessary unity of consciousness.” This is why Kant refers to it as the “I think” that underlies all experience and thought.

The a priori unity of constitutive rules, acting as a natural law of logic, permits us to form the substantive appearance of unified objects. The transcendental categories, along with the unity of consciousness, integrates our intuitions and empirical concepts as various kinds of representations and directs us in the formation of objective reality. But the question on Kant’s mind is: where is the table itself, and what is the table itself?⁷⁰ What holds the representations together in a coherent unity which we describe as the substance or object of experience? In the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, he makes the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience.⁷¹ A statement reflecting the former type of judgment would be, “The table seems brown to me.” A judgment of experience, on the other hand, would be expressed as, “The table is brown.” In the latter, the judgment is not one of personal and fleeting impressions or an immediate reaction that would be true only for the individual articulating the sensations. Rather, it is an experience that has objectivity, since it conforms to a principle or rule of the understanding that has consensual validity; it is shared by others experiencing the same object. A judgment of experience results in an agreement that the table is, in fact, rectangular and brown, and does, in fact, exist. In this way the physical world conforms to the consensual and transcendental structure of subjectivity.

Kant’s response to the epistemological problem about the nature of substance is that the concept of “substance” is an a priori category of the transcendental object or the logical form of judgment as quantity, quality, and relation. The organizational and ordering principle of our representations lies in the logical form of the mind. There is nothing in the sight, sound, or touch of a table to lead us to other representations or to a unified and necessary pattern of relationships, that is, to the empirical concept of table itself. The impressions are so discrete and contingent that feeling hardness or seeing a particular shape does not encourage us to conclude other corresponding physical characteristics or assume that they adhere to a concrete substance. Substances cannot be produced by sensations, and predicates cannot be based on the relationships between impressions. Sensibility is indifferent to substance, just as sensation is indifferent to objectivity. The affection of taste does not lead to the sensation of sound, the smell of odors, the image of shape, or the anticipation of hardness or weight. Kant stresses the transcendental option: “The object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines

them *a priori* in some definite fashion. For in so far as they are to relate to an object, they must necessarily agree with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object."⁷² The unity and connection among the senses forming a concrete image of a particular substance before us comes not from sensation or the object in itself but from the concept of the object in general that lies in consciousness prior to our experience of the world. The mind is structured in such a way that it provides a unity to the diversity of impressions it receives in sensations. Since the sensibility itself is merely a passive receptacle of nerve endings, it is incapable of producing objective substances or necessary causal relations between impressions. Kant concludes that "the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations."⁷³

The manifold or material content of intuition is received and re-presented by consciousness in a form that constitutes a systematic unity among the representations and has an objective validity shared by others. Since the organizing principle is not an empirical concept, but a transcendental one, our experiences produce an objectivity that has objective necessity; it relates to and represents a real world. Knowledge is not a subjective impression or vague awareness of something by which we are sensitive to the effects on our receptive nerve endings. It is a picture of the world produced by the transcendental categories. The mind continuously reshapes and molds the information provided by the senses into a specific form that has been patterned on the basis of universally shared logical principles. All knowledge requires rules supplied by the pure concepts that project universal laws of association that result in the forming of objects with an outer semblance of predicates and causal relations. These rules of intuition re-present the manifold of the appearances in the form of objective judgments about an external reality in which there are independent bodies with extension, shape, color, weight, and hardness. The manifold is synthesized by consciousness to form the appearance of a unitary thing. The grounding principle of Kant's theory of substance is the concept of objects in general (concept of the object = x) without which it would be impossible to think about objects external to the mind; it is this principle which makes judgments possible. Without it, thought and experience would be impossible.

Kant also refers to this unity of consciousness that grounds all objective knowledge as the "transcendental apperception." As he argues, this is not an empirical consciousness of self which alters with time but an *a priori* logical form of the self in which all intuitions are integrated and organized. That is, it is the logical subject which makes formal logic and forms of judgment possible. "There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of the intuitions, and

by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible.”⁷⁴ Although Kant’s use of the transcendental concept is an attempt to answer the question about what makes the unity of consciousness possible, it remains very abstract and opaque.⁷⁵ As many questions are raised as are answered. This unity is also present when the a priori concepts of time and space are applied to the intuitions of sensibility. In the Subjective Deduction of the *Critique*, Kant appears to side with the idealists, since consciousness and concepts are necessary for both perception and understanding. It is this unity produced by self-consciousness which legislates the impression of objects and our thoughts about them. We are able to see the colors, shapes, and odors of a particular table or tree, as well as make statements about them. “This transcendental unity of apperception forms out of all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws.”⁷⁶ The unity of consciousness and creation of the objects of experience require a synthesis of the intuitions and understanding. That is, it requires a synthesis of the irregular and inconsistent manifold of the intuitions with the concept of objects in general to constitute the phenomena of objectivity. Necessity is grounded in the application of transcendental concepts that act as natural laws integrating and forming representations.

The second version of Kant’s theory of synthetic unity replaces the awkward notion of the transcendental object with the productive synthesis of the categories of the understanding. At this point in the Subjective Deduction, objective being is constituted as a synthesis of the manifold (content of intuitions) and pure concepts of the understanding. Unlike in the empiricist and rationalist traditions, there is no objectivity independent of the process of knowing. The act itself transforms what is perceived and understood, and in the process, direct access to the original manifold becomes impossible. As we have already seen, knowledge of the thing-in-itself is meaningless since there is no knowledge without the pure a priori concepts and the unity of consciousness. Objective reality is the product of a universal and necessary interpretation according to specific formal rules of the synthetic unity of apperception.⁷⁷ All objectivity is constructed and interpreted. In this manner intuition is combined with concepts to form experience. As an aside, the reader can anticipate that if and when these categories and consciousness are questioned by later Kantians in the nineteenth century, when they are viewed through the prism of social, historical, cultural, and existential categories, the universality and necessity of objective knowledge will be called into question, and Kantian idealism will be transformed into cultural historicism and moral relativism.

Intuitions without concepts may result in inarticulable feelings and sensations that appear and disappear without any temporal or spatial order. They would irrationally flow in and out of our awareness without a sense

of an inner or outer reality. Although Kant thinks it may be possible for such feelings to exist, he contends that they would be good for nothing and produce no experience or knowledge. Concluding this second section of the deduction, he concludes that the a priori conditions for the possibility of experience in general are also the a priori conditions for the possibility of objects of experience. Experience is the product of a synthetic unity whereby knowledge is created and objectivity is formed by means of a priori categories. It is the identity of the self which produces the identity of the representations of nature. Knowledge and objects are constituted in the very act of making judgments about the world we know, because we have produced it according to the inner laws of human consciousness. We know the world because we have constituted it. Since the categories by which we organize this world of objects are projections of our own self-consciousness, both empirical knowledge and natural science are the result of the same process of knowing and the same function of synthetic coordination according to concepts—synthetic a priori judgments. They are both grounded in the same a priori conditions of the understanding out of the dreamlike “blind play of representations.” Kant has answered the question he initially asked at the beginning of his work about the justification of natural science. Since both empirical knowledge and physics share the same foundations of synthetic a priori principles, science becomes possible because the universal laws of the mind are projected onto nature in terms of our everyday experience and our theories of physics. Thus the sources of the laws of nature lie in the a priori foundations of objective experience; they lie within self-consciousness itself.⁷⁸

Because knowledge is always the interplay between the intuitions and pure concepts, it is a synthesis of the thing-in-itself and self-consciousness as the unity of apperception. The passive role of sensibility, the receptivity of the sensations, the subjection of appearances to a priori concepts, the application and projection of logical laws, and the external positing of an effective association of the manifold of the intuitions, all presuppose the existence of something beyond the subjective. Although the reality which conforms to our concepts is empirically real, the objects of nature can never be known in themselves. Kant has integrated the key components of both empiricism and rationalism into his critical theory of knowledge. However, when the notion of the thing-in-itself is called into question by later philosophers, the empiricist dimension is lost; the world we know is not only a product of the mind but becomes, in the thought of Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche, the mind itself. As Schopenhauer so succinctly and powerfully puts it, “The world is my representation.”⁷⁹

After considering the transcendental object and the categories of the mind as the integrating forces in the construction of objectivity, Kant introduces in the third stage of his argument within the Subjective Deduc-

tion the notion of the synthetic properties of the creative imagination. He begins by contending that the manifold or content of sensation is not just passively received by consciousness but is actively engaged through the faculty of spontaneity and what he refers to as the threefold synthesis of the understanding “which must necessarily be found in all knowledge.” The mind does not merely receive sensations but apprehends, reproduces, and thinks its representations in a concept. For Kant, these are the three sources of subjectivity, and it is through them that knowledge is made possible.⁸⁰ It should be noted that this part of the *Critique* is a complex and at times confusing attempt at validating his transcendental philosophy. Even Kant offers a warning about the difficulties in following his analysis of the role of the understanding in the construction of experience and thought. In his theory of representations, the sensations are subjectively re-presented to consciousness through the intuitions, and the intuitions, in turn, are objectively re-organized and re-presented through empirical concepts.⁸¹ Both emphasize the foundations of knowledge in the a priori rules of a dynamic mind in which consciousness creates the necessary conditions for both perception and experience.

It is the synthesizing and integrating activity of the mind which produces the outer coherence of objects in the act of knowing and the holding together of their representations in a determinate and objective order. According to Kant, the ultimate proof of his deduction lies in showing this association between representations and how the ordering principle inherent in the unity of consciousness itself creates knowledge about the objective reality of nature. In his attempt to justify objective experience and natural science, he views the unity of consciousness itself as the foundation for the unity of objects. He considers this dynamic mental activity in three distinct areas of the synthetic unification of our experiences, that is, in the synthetic apprehension in intuition, synthesis of reproduction in the imagination, and synthesis of recognition in a concept.⁸² The subjective preconditions for the possibility of knowledge have changed according to whether Kant emphasizes the synthetic unity and creative activity of the transcendental concept, understanding, or the imagination in the act of knowing. Whatever aspect of the transcendental activity he emphasizes, it is clear that the synthesizing capacity of the mind unites the various elements of experience together into a cohesive representation of objectivity.

Kant undertakes an analysis of the process of synthesis within the faculty of the understanding by returning to Hume’s theory of impressions. He is aware, as was Hume, that if the data provided by sensations are isolated and foreign to each other, we could not possibly experience a unified external world, nor could we think about it in any coherent fashion. For Kant, judgment involves the comparing and connecting of the content of representations received by the sensibility. However, he is well aware that

for thought to occur there must also be an element of spontaneity that pulls together these disparate, disconnected, and unformed sensations into a picture of reality that makes sense universally. This requires the threefold synthesis of the understanding in apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. They are moments of the unity of consciousness that integrate the world within time. The initial apprehension of representations occurs through the changes introduced by the inner sense of time. By this means they are connected in the form of a coherent and independent object. Time organizes the manifold of sensations to create a succession of clearly defined moments that constitute an absolute unity. This is also the very process that makes perception possible. Moments and sensations appear and disappear, come and go, without any unity giving the perceiver a sense of something whole and permanent. This unity of intuition comes as the chaotic effects of sensations are reorganized and systematically connected into a succession of meaningful moments. These associations of successive moments are coordinated by a priori rules that determine events according to the necessary and universal laws of the synthetic mind. Thus the necessity of association is produced by a synthesis of the mind.⁸³

In addition to the activity of the temporal dimension, there is the reproduction of the appearances by the imagination. At this stage, Kant clarifies his point by using a number of concrete examples. If cinnabar were at times one color and then another, if human beings were described as one form of animal and then another, and if a country was described as being covered by fruit and then by snow and ice, we would never be able to join together representations to form a consistent and persisting image of cinnabar, human beings, or a particular country. Nor would we be able to jump easily from sensations to images based on our accepted knowledge of the connections of sensations. The sight of red, the form of a human being, or the smell of fruit would not automatically produce the corresponding image of cinnabar, human beings, or a particular country. Kant claims that there must be an a priori rule for joining together sensations, otherwise we could not have objective knowledge. Conflicting impressions would counteract the natural propensity of the mind to form unified and consistent impressions of objects. The same confusion would result if we constantly and arbitrarily changed the name of objects. There would be no rule to the ordering of appearances. The role played by the imagination to restabilize the representations is central here. "There must then be something which, as the *a priori* ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances, makes their reproduction possible."⁸⁴ The pure forms of intuition and the playful representation of impressions in the imagination reproduce in the memory old impressions according to necessary a priori rules that connect sensations to ideas. In this way, representations are united in such a way as to produce a coherent world of experiences by which we recognize the objects of cin-

nabar, a human being, and a particular country having multiple attributes and similar characteristics over time.

If a person attempts to draw a line in thought or count a series of numbers without the imagination, he or she would forget the preceding mark or number, and the project would become impossible. Breaks would occur in the series of representations and the linear or numerical succession would be interrupted. If the earlier part of the drawn line or number sequence was forgotten, the project would have to be abandoned. Objects must be perceived in time and over time; representations must be held together from moment to moment and from past to present, otherwise each moment would be perceived as radically distinct and different from the preceding one. No objects would be formed. It would not occur to me that the object I was looking at a few seconds ago was the same as the object I now see. Things just do not appear as independent and complete. There are no necessary connections within and between representations of the appearances that would force this continuity over time. This can only be added by the powers of the a priori and synthetic unity of the mind. As Kant so succinctly says, "If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless. For it would in its present state be a new representation. . . . The manifold of the representations would never, therefore, form a whole since it would lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it."⁸⁵

The fourth and final version of the Subjective Deduction summarizes elements of the previous stages in a more comprehensive and forceful response to Hume's theory of knowledge. Kant ties the subjective sources of knowledge into the unity of consciousness. By this means intuitions are received, reproduced, and recognized to form the identity and unity of objective representations in empirical consciousness. Without this subjective reformulation and reconfiguration of the manifold of the senses, intuitions could never become the foundation for knowledge. The idealist side of Kant becomes more obvious when he writes, "And since it [appearance] has in itself no objective reality, but exists only in being known, it would be nothing at all."⁸⁶ Kant reiterates his key point that representations have no inherent unity or particular identity and thus require consciousness to provide the organization and form to the appearances of intuition. The faculty of the mind which integrates the content of the intuitions and the a priori categories of the understanding is the imagination.

By apprehending the manifold of the intuitions, by giving them an order and series of connections they do not inherently possess, consciousness produces an image of reality based on a connecting and ordering of perceptions. An identity of substance and objects is created from a series of uncoordinated intuitions having no relation to each other in quantity,

quality, or relation. Perceptions come and go, appear and disappear, change and develop with no determinate order or purpose other than that projected by the mind. The reproductions of intuitions in the memory are the imaginative reconstructions of appearances that re-present a semblance of stable objects and a unity of association based on their own qualitative predicates and causal relations with other objects. But this must be done according to some standard law that provides an objectivity of universal and necessary relations between representations. Otherwise, there would be no commonly accepted knowledge but only the accidental and undetermined coming-to-be and passing-away of a multitude of unintelligible and unapprehended impressions having no real content or form. Beyond a vague sensation in the receptive facilities, there would be nothing that would have any meaning or sense.

The same transcendental quality that characterizes the categories and activity of the understanding is also expressed in the reproduction of the imagination. For it to possess an objective validity and a universal and necessary association of past representations of objects and relationships, the ground of the appearances must be based upon a transcendental law of affinity. In this manner, the appearances are subsumed under a transcendental self-consciousness possessing a dynamic imagination capable of forging the appearances into a series of unified associations. Representations make sense because the past and present are integrated by the imagination into a subsisting entity. The entity is never real, since it is the constitutive result of the productive imagination and synthetic understanding. Kant emphasizes that "the objective unity of all empirical consciousness in one consciousness, that of the original apperception, is thus the necessary condition of all possible perception."⁸⁷ This element of his philosophy has its roots in the Cartesian theory of knowledge, where the constitution of objectivity, as well as its validity, requires that all experience and knowledge occur under the universal form of "I think." The coherent awareness of the subjective moments in knowing is held together by the common logical bond of self-consciousness.

The subjective foundations of objective empirical knowledge may be seen more clearly by referring back to an example already used in this chapter, "The tree is green." The sensibility receives the disparate and formless intuitions as objects of appearances, reproduces their representations in the memory to form a current, steady image of a thing, and simultaneously and spontaneously applies the pure categories of the understanding. It is in this last and most important part of the total process by which the appearances are conceptually determined that an object is truly constructed. As the confusing and unordered sensible characteristics of the color, smell, shape, and form of a tree are received at any one particular moment, they are reproduced in the memory to give the impression of a substantive continuity and identity over a continuous period of time. This may

last for a few seconds or a few minutes while the tree is being perceived. The appearance of the same object and its qualities seems to be present at every distinct moment when there is nothing in the intuitions themselves which would permit this intuitive inference. Even when I turn away from the object and the intuitions stop, I can turn back a few minutes later and the same object reappears possessing the same definable characteristics. The imagination works in unison with the a priori forms of time and space of the intuition. Kant does not examine how this is accomplished, nor how the temporal and spatial dimensions of the imagination and understanding interact with the a priori forms of the intuition, other than saying that the sensibility gives us the forms of intuition, and the understanding gives us the rules by which pure concepts are applied. The constitution of nature as a series of objects, predicates, and causal relationships is a product of human subjectivity. Consciousness transforms the material content of sensibility into a unified and identifiable natural world of universal laws and associations. Kant concludes his path-breaking position with the words, "Thus the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle *nature*, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there."⁸⁸

The laws of association are products of our apprehension and recognition, by which necessary forms are projected onto the natural world in order to give it a semblance of identity in difference which does not exist in itself. Human beings are the "lawgivers of nature" since it is through human self-consciousness, as the unity of apperception, that the impressions are unified into a coherent picture of the world of appearances according to subjective a priori rules. "All empirical laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of understanding."⁸⁹ The laws of physics and mathematics are projects of the underlying laws existing in human subjectivity. If we attempted to derive these universal laws from the objects themselves, they would be empirical and, therefore, not universal and necessary. If they were derived from the self, how could they be applied to and determine a world of external, physical objects? Neither the empiricist turn to the objects themselves nor the rationalist faith in pure consciousness of the thinking substance proves a justification for objective knowledge. In both forms of traditional epistemology, the objects and consciousness are viewed as radically distinct entities. Taking Hume's theory of impressions and his own theory of the thing-in-itself and appearances as his baseline argument, Kant ultimately concludes that the subjective concepts underlying the unity of self-consciousness are the defining principles in the formation of all possible experience and empirical knowledge. According to Kant, objective validity is convincingly demonstrated, since without this synthesis there would be no unity in nature, no valid science, and no integration of the external world in intuitions according to the universal laws of subjectivity. The deduction represents a regressive analysis of the pure conditions without

which experience and knowledge would be impossible. Representations, as merely sensible appearances and perceptions, cannot produce universal and necessary knowledge and science. Only the understanding, acting as the faculty of rule giving, creates the sovereign laws of nature through subjective reproduction, projection, and recognition, and only it justifies the objective validity of the pure concepts.

This section of the *Critique* on the Subjective Deduction, with its emphasis on the psychology of experience and the cognitive process of the imaginative subjectivity, is followed by the Objective Deduction, with its examination of the logical conditions for objective validity, that is, justification for the relationship of a priori concepts and their application to external objects. In the Objective Deduction, Kant develops a theory of objectivity tied to the broader metaphysical questions of the nature and existence of an objective reality in realism and idealism. The central issue under consideration is the ontological status of empirical entities, that is, whether they are subjective associations, illusions, logical constructs, or empirical realities. The ontological status of objective reality in time and space is made more difficult because access to the thing-in-itself is denied, and all perceptions are appearances and representations of the mind. Inquiry into these questions requires that Kant unpack the natural order of things and the relationship between perceptions and objects. These issues further unfold in three sections of the *Analytic of Principles*: the First and Second Analogies on substance and causality and the Refutation of Idealism.⁹⁰ Many later German existentialists and neo-Kantians wishing to emphasize the subjective and more idealist side of Kant have argued that the *Transcendental Deduction* of the first edition is the authoritative presentation. This is the position taken by Schopenhauer and Martin Heidegger.⁹¹ With the *Transcendental Deduction*, the first part of the *Analytic* is completed, and with it the examination of the origins, nature, function, and justification of the pure concepts of the understanding and the a priori structure of subjective consciousness in its relation to experience.

The remaining part of the *Analytic*, which Kant refers to as the *Doctrine of Judgment*, contains two major sections divided into the analysis of the schematism of the understanding and the synthetic principles of pure understanding. The first part of the *Doctrine of Judgment* begins with the question of the procedures by which concepts are employed and conjoined to the natural world. Kant's central concern here is to find the mechanism of the mind that integrates concepts with intuitions in experience and thought. He emphasizes in this section the difficulties of the formal application of the pure concepts of the understanding to the appearances of the intuition, since they are entirely different entities. Because empirical intuitions and categories are not homogeneous components in the process of knowing, there must be something else which joins them together while at the same time sharing elements of both. Pure concepts are neither empirical nor derived from the

empirical but must be connected to sensible intuitions in order for there to be objective knowledge. This faculty of the mind that helps synthesize sensations and empirical concepts with a priori categories, Kant calls the schematism of the understanding. Only in this way could intuitions be brought into harmony and conformity with the transcendental categories of the mind. The subsumption of intuition under categories requires a “transcendental schema” or representation, which contains parts of both the sensibility and the intellect. The content of the schema, according to Kant, is time, which acts as the homogeneous and mediating link since, as the a priori form of intuitions, it contains a transcendental determination of empirical impressions and ideas; it is time which is the a priori bond that joins appearances to pure concepts. “The schemata are thus nothing but *a priori* determinations of time in accordance with rules.”⁹² These transcendental rules are the determinate formal conditions which make the application of pure categories to nature possible within time. By this means intuitions are integrated with and subsumed under categories in thought and judgment. The schema are the rules by which empirical concepts and experiences are created.

For Kant, schematism solves the problem of application. The problem of the application of transcendental concepts is resolved for Kant as the understanding and perception—pure concepts and sensible intuitions—are connected together by means of the schematism of the imagination. This is accomplished by the schema, which helps form empirical images that connect the category of substance with abstract concepts such as “tree.”⁹³ By creating images in time through the power of the imagination, it bridges the gap between matter and form. Images also aid in thinking because they mediate between abstract concepts and particular impressions. I can have an image of a determinate dog, which as a product of the imagination is concrete and empirical but which is neither a universal concept nor a particular perception of a dog. It falls somewhere in between the two. As Kant has already shown, since categories provide the formal rules for ordering empirical concepts, nature conforms to our way of thinking. And we are able to form images about particular things within nature because of the transcendental quality of the mind that constrains human beings to think in terms of substances. The transcendental schema is an imaginative construct that helps facilitate this connection between the intuition of appearances and pure concepts by the creation of images having a temporal dimension.

Having discussed the employment of the pure concepts of the understanding through the use of schematism, Kant next turns his attention to the different types or principles of judgment that come from the application of these a priori concepts. He reiterates his claim that the existence of objectivity rests on the synthesis and combination of representations. This requires the a priori foundation of knowledge in the inner sense (time), imagination (reproduction of intuitions), and apperception (self-consciousness). The rules for applying the a priori concepts and faculties of the mind to

the sensible intuitions are called the “principles of pure understanding.” “Everything that can be presented to us as an object must conform to rules. For without rules appearances would never yield knowledge of an object corresponding to them.”⁹⁴ These principles are the means by which the understanding employs its ability to organize and arrange experience to create the laws of nature. They are the rules for the a priori conditions for all experience and objectivity.

Another section of the *Transcendental Analytic* examines the Analogies of Experience. The three principles of the analogies of experience are the rules that define the appearances as substantive objects relating to other objects in time as duration (substance), succession (causality), and co-existence (reciprocity) of objects. These principles are the determinations of beings through time. Only in this way is the phenomenal world apprehended as representing both the permanent and the changing, both the simultaneous and the successive. The coming-to-be and the passing-away of being are the temporal keys to the understanding of our reality of appearances. Experience as empirical knowledge is possible only through an objective and necessary connection of the subjective representations of perception. Since intuitions in perception are accidental and contingent, they do not form objects of knowledge. One impression follows another without an order or purpose. They are not joined together to form a coherent object of perception. Kant writes, “In experience, however, perceptions come together only in accidental order, so that no necessity determining their connection is or can be revealed in the perceptions themselves. For apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition; and we can find in it no representation of any necessity which determines the appearances thus combined to have connected existence in space and time.”⁹⁵ For objectivity to take place, there must be the synthetic unity of the understanding to provide a cohesion and coherence to the cascade of senseless sensations. Kant stresses the crucial point here that the a priori forms of time and space are not operable without this synthetic unity and creative subject, thereby integrating sensibility (aesthetic) and experience (analytic) more forcefully. This is important because it is another way of justifying the necessary and essential relations between intuitions and the understanding in the formation of objectivity. With this perspective in hand, Kant returns to his critique of Hume’s theory of empiricism and causality in the *Second Analogy*.

Out of the continuous flow of impressions, the manifold of the appearances are now systematically represented in a coherent unity of successive representations over time. A world outside of us as a series of appearances within time begins to appear with a clear shape, form, and unity of perception as an objective representation. The rules supplied by the Analogies of Experience, being given prior to experience, are the rules of time by which perceptions are synthesized within a temporal context. All perceptions must be

brought under these a priori rules in order to be represented. Kant recognizes that “an analogy of experience is, therefore, only a rule according to which a unity of experience may arise from perception.”⁹⁶ Only with this temporal “law of empirical representations” can objectivity be created and something experienced and known. Prior to this state, something can be received by the sensibility and an awareness of it made, but it is not a thing or object until it is experienced. This is the power of Kant’s subjective idealism and the centrality of self-consciousness in the process of knowing. The rules of integration and temporal order are regulative of our perceptions, since they are only analogous to the constitutive and creative dynamic of the a priori forms of intuition and the understanding. They are the rules by which the latter are integrated with the appearances of perception.

Objectivity appears and being is formed only when the objects of perception stand under the rules of the understanding. Only in this way does the house which I see before me become an object of my perception; only in this way are my subjective representations of affected sensibility formed into an objective reality. Just as in the perception of an object, Kant explains how the perception of an event follows a necessary path of temporal succession. As a ship sails down a river, a necessary connection is formed of its appearances at one moment in time and at the next moment farther down the river. Time and distance have changed, but our awareness of the ship remains the same. “But in the perception of an event there is always a rule that makes the order in which the perceptions . . . follow upon one another a *necessary* order.”⁹⁷ The world we inhabit takes shape in the appearances in which one event is necessarily followed and determined by a preceding event according to a universal cognitive law connecting our perceptions into an objective and unified series of experiences.

PRACTICAL REASON, MORAL AUTONOMY, AND THE KINGDOM OF ENDS

Turning from the clockwork mechanism of Newtonian physics to issues of meaning, values, purpose, and moral freedom, we look at the foundations of Kant’s theory of morality. The key ideas of his moral philosophy are contained in two of his major works, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals* and *Critique of Practical Reason*. His philosophy of morality is built upon a metaphysics of morals with its search for the a priori and universal principles grounding moral decisions of right and wrong. Moral judgments differ from empirical judgments in that they inform us about what we ought to do and what course of action we ought to take according to pure moral principles. Not based on sensuous experience, they are a priori, independent of experience, and acted upon out of a sense of moral obligation or pure duty. Free from the taint of contingency and relativity, they are thus universal

and necessary judgments. Kant's goal is to justify and ground the objective validity of these a priori principles of moral knowledge.⁹⁸ The foundations of Kant's moral thinking rest upon his arguments that humans are rational, free, and autonomous beings possessing an inner personal dignity and moral responsibility. Rejecting the views that we are innately short, brutish, nasty, and forced into a convenient social contract, that we have natural rights to property and liberty, or that we are utilitarian maximizers of our own self-interest and material pleasures, Kant develops an alternative view of human nature that is grounded in practical reason and moral autonomy. As self-legislators of their own natural laws, human beings are creators of their own moral identity and values. Their actions are moral to the extent that they conform to their subjective a priori rationality. As in the case of his critique of pure reason, Kant's theory of moral reason is defined by his view of the inner worth, moral creativity, and constitutive productivity of human subjectivity. In matters of morality, universal and objective laws cannot be expressions of needs, wants, or desires, nor are they delineated by a cosmic principle of the natural order of things. Rather, it is the power of human reason which assigns itself its own limits and laws of nature.

Kant expands the Copernican revolution in epistemology to moral philosophy by redefining the nature of subjectivity. Similar to his critical theory of knowledge, his moral philosophy is based on a theory of subjectivity as determining and constituting objectivity whether it be the objectivity of experience or the objectivity of moral choices. In both cases, a priori reason applies concepts to the organizing and structuring of our theoretical and practical experiences. Continuing his revolution in epistemology, Kant expands the role of consciousness to include the legislation of moral values and natural law, as well as the determination of the objects of experience and the laws of physics. Pure reason in its two forms of application represents the ground of experiential knowledge and the will. Relying on Rousseau's theory of popular sovereignty and communal legislation, Kant's philosophy of morality is the product of humanity's ability to self-legislate universal laws articulated by practical reason.⁹⁹ The origins of material and moral objectivity and the laws of physics and morality—the laws of being—are carried within us as the form and function of our own self-consciousness. This is the foundational principle of Kantian idealism and the source of our sovereignty over nature and culture.¹⁰⁰ At this point, the critique of practical reason is a complement to the critique of pure reason. While the world of nature and theoretical reason spins around according to mechanical and deterministic laws of causes and effects, the human world of morality is one of freedom and rationality. This division between nature and culture will become important to later nineteenth-century Kantians and social theorists.

The analysis of the universal forms of practical reason entails a critique of both moral empiricism and rationalism. Neither can fulfill the requirements

of a morality based on a priori and universal principles. About empiricism, Kant writes, "Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an aid to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to the purity of morals."¹⁰¹ The moral values and absolute good that guide the human will must be free of empirical determinants, since only in this way can they be universal and necessary; only in this way can reason determine itself from its own inner laws. The empirical contains the particular and contingent which cannot possibly serve as the foundation for practical reason. Thus empirical psychology and utilitarian philosophy are inadequate bases for moral action since their criteria of action are always indeterminate and changing. Kant rejects the idea that the search for hedonistic pleasure or the pursuit of happiness—our needs and inclinations—can be the basis for morality.¹⁰² On the other hand, he refuses to accept the notion that moral direction can arise from an examination of innate ideas of human nature in a rationalist state of nature. "The basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but *a priori* simply in the concepts of pure reason."¹⁰³ Empiricism and rationalism are rejected as inadequate to the task of discovering the universal principles of morality in human reason itself, since they search for moral foundations in psychological and anthropological laws of nature.

The question Kant raises is: what is the basis for moral decisions if it cannot be empirical inclinations and desires? In the preface to the first *Critique*, he takes the position that pure reason can be related to the external world in one of two ways: either through its theoretical application in its a priori constitution of the external world and its concepts or through its practical application in moral action. Only pure reason can become the basis for morality, since only it possesses the a priori and necessary foundation for determining unchanging and universal standards for all rational creatures, including human beings. The ultimate standard is that which is good in itself and not what is a utilitarian means to some other good. The *Grundlegung* or *Fundamental Principles* begins with the sentence, "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a *good will*."¹⁰⁴ Rejecting temperament, talents, gifts of fortune and nature, instincts, happiness, and even the Aristotelian virtues of moderation, courage, and deliberation as the basis for morality, Kant argues that it can only be the good will acting as the principle of moral obligation in practical reason that provides the ground for morality. Although the supreme good of his moral philosophy is quite different from that of Aristotle's, with his emphasis on political happiness and communal deliberation within the polis, they both agree that the true noble end of existence lies in human rationality and freedom, and not in the satisfaction of the base physical and material wants of the moment. Self-legislation is the final goal of humanity. For the ancients it lies in public

discourse and dialogue, while for the moderns it is expressed in the self-determination of the individual practical will. Although worlds apart, there is still a commonality of reason between the ancients and moderns, between the self-legislation of communitarianism and liberalism. This commonality is highlighted when compared to the other philosophical perspectives in the history of Western thought.

Continuing this line of argument in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant rejects the traditional groundings and justifications of morality based on the subjective principles of education (Michel de Montaigne), political constitution (Bernard de Mandeville), physical feeling of happiness (Epicurus), and moral feeling (Francis Hutcheson), and based on the objective principles of internal perfection (Christian Wolff and the Stoics) and the highest perfection of the will of God (Christian August Crusius). All these principles of morality share a common foundation in that they provide concrete material for the will. As empirical content they are “wholly unfit to be the supreme moral law [and] it follows that the formal practical principle of pure reason . . . must constitute the supreme and direct determining ground of the will.”¹⁰⁵ Kant is very emphatic when he contends that if these were to be the empirical goals of moral action, nature would have placed them in the service of instincts, rather than in ineffective and inefficient rational thought. Reason as the foundation for the enjoyment of life and happiness only leaves individuals uncertain, dissatisfied, and envious. Morality must be based on pure reason and a priori formal criteria, rather than on specific material content in determining the object of moral choice. It is the logical form of practical reason which is to be the universal determination of the will.¹⁰⁶ In addition, the ends of human action must be more noble than the search for individual happiness and the satisfaction of private inclinations. In the end, it is the good will as expressed in self-conscious rationality, moral obligation, and individual freedom that is the ultimate core of moral thought and action and thus the supreme good in itself. “For reason recognizes the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination.”¹⁰⁷ In spite of critically distancing himself from Enlightenment rationality, classical economics, utilitarianism, and natural rights theory with his criticisms of empiricism and rationalism, Kant places the key to his moral philosophy firmly within the formal rationality of modern liberal individualism.

Kant now turns from an analysis of the role of moral obligation or duty to the practical implementation of the absolute dictates of pure reason. By this means he is able to further delineate the moral distance between practical reason and personal inclinations. To clarify his point, he offers the example of a merchant who offers trade goods at a fair and constant price, even to the young and economically uninformed, based on principles of honesty, communal responsibility, and good business sense. Kant claims that although the economic activity of the merchant is commendable, he is not acting out of

the a priori and rational dictates of practical reason and duty that a particular course of action is morally right. Moral actions “should be determined solely from a *priori* principles without any empirical motives.”¹⁰⁸ These principles are the a priori laws for the determination of the practical will. Even though it appears that the action is morally correct and praiseworthy, the underlying reasons for the action rest in the self-interest and personal inclinations of the merchant. Even a person who takes real joy and pleasure from doing the right thing in the market is not acting out of moral duty. Thus, for Kant, although the action of the merchant may be economically beneficial and socially useful, it has no moral worth. For morality to be universally and necessarily binding on all rational beings, it must be grounded in the moral concept and formal logic of pure reason. Kant concludes the preface to the *Fundamental Principles* with the comment that it is this a priori element, the categorical imperative, which is the “supreme principle of morality.” It is from this pure concept of practical reason acting as the categorical imperative that particular a priori moral principles and laws are derived. The relationship between the supreme principle of morality and the a priori principles of pure reason is not clearly articulated by Kant. He appears to use the terms indiscriminately throughout his work. Are the moral principles derived from the one supreme principle, are they various reformulations of it, or are they concrete expressions of an applied ethics and application of practical reason to concrete situations? Whatever the connection between the supreme categorical imperative and the moral principles of reason, they are both forms of a priori reason, independent of all experience and contingent knowledge and thus unmixed by empirical anthropology, physics, or theology.

Only activities which are defined by the a priori demands of practical reason directing the course of the will can become legitimate moral actions. The purpose, intentions, or effects of action cannot supply a justification for the moral value of human decisions. The absolute and unconditional basis for morality must lie in the duty and obligation to act according to the dictates of a priori principles and moral laws provided by practical reason and implemented by the will. Thus specific moral laws and rules such as the Ten Commandments found in the Old Testament would only be moral refinements of pure reason. Kant defines duty as “the necessity of acting from respect for the law.”¹⁰⁹ He continues to develop this position when he writes, “The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than *the conception of law* in itself, *which certainly is possible in a rational being*, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will.”¹¹⁰ Rational self-determination of the will according to the dictates of a universal law is the highest form of morality deserving of respect and obligation; it is this which makes humans free. According to Kant, the universal law and a priori moral principles that guide our activities in everyday life are inherent in common human reason. And it is by means

of this reason shared by common people that the good and bad, virtuous and wicked, can easily be distinguished. This respectful subordination and conformity of the will to the pure concept of law and duty is the supreme moral principle that Kant investigates in more philosophical detail in the second and most important section of his work. Although the goal of the *Fundamental Principles* is to move beyond the common reason of humanity in order to examine the a priori principles or metaphysics of moral law, the middle section of the book does make a connection between the pure logic of the categorical imperative and its application to specific empirical cases. In it the distinction between pure and applied ethics is blurred.

Deducing its course of action from the principles and commands of practical reason, the will dutifully acts to realize the logical imperatives of its own reason. "Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the *conception* of laws—that is, according to principles, that is, have a *will*. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires *reason*, the will is nothing but practical reason."¹¹¹ Certain actions are objectively and necessarily commanded by the dictates of practical reason, but since they are a product of human reason and will, they represent the autonomous decisions of the individual subject. According to Kant, there is no tension between the commands of the object and the will of the subject. For him, the obligation to act morally is both an objective and a subjective necessity in which the person follows his or her own practical reason. Actions are not arbitrarily imposed from the outside but are the result of an inner rational self-determination of the will. Objective moral laws result from subjective moral autonomy. The command of an objective law to act is self-imposed and directed by practical reason. This relationship between the objective and subjective dimension of moral action will be the focus of much nineteenth-century criticism.

Kant distinguishes between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. The former is an action and technical skill which is useful to accomplish something else, usually the quest for happiness. However, if the action is viewed as objectively good in itself and is thus a moral law, then it is a categorical imperative. An imperative is categorical when "it concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result."¹¹² The categorical imperative is a moral imperative or command to act in a certain way based on a pure or unconditioned concept that is objectively valid because of its logical and absolute form. Kant rejects the ancient idea that a categorical imperative could be either a technical command or a prudent action because both are based on the principle of happiness and the contingency of experience. He rejects Aristotle's claim that morality lies in the accumulated wisdom, public maturation, and political insight of the counsels of prudence, since they ultimately rest on experience and the final goal of communal welfare and well-being. For Kant, only when there is moral and cognitive self-legisla-

tion based on transcendental logic is there freedom and morality. Aristotle's ethics cannot present moral actions as objectively necessary because they are based on the opinions of wise counsel rather than the commands of a priori reason. Kant finally rejects Aristotle's theory of happiness as a possible foundation for morality, because it cannot become an ideal of reason since it is grounded in experience and the imagination. It cannot become a law requiring respect and commanding necessity and universal conformity.

Toward the middle of the second section of the *Fundamental Principles*, Kant begins to clarify the nature of the a priori moral imperative by showing its application in particular moral instances. The five distinct formulations of the principles of practical reason include the principles of universalism, human dignity, moral sovereignty, the kingdom of ends, and individual autonomy.¹¹³ Kant's consideration of the principles starts with the sentence, "There is, therefore, but one categorical imperative, namely this: *Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.*" This principle of universalism abstracts from all concrete moral ends and goods. It argues that in any moral situation only purely logical considerations of the correct course of action are allowed. The necessity and duty of action are determined not by the substantive merits, ends, or ideals of the situation, which are empirically relative and constantly changing, but by whether the moral individual can universalize his or her personal action. The individual must be able to decide whether the moral law is universalizable and thus the same for everyone. The specific moral action of an individual must be capable of being made into a universal, logical imperative. That is, it is not just a private form of moral knowledge and action, but it can be willed into a universal law of nature by practical reason. Also, according to this principle, all action is to be judged by the same unchanging universal moral standard. There is a final component to this practical principle which is that an action cannot contradict itself or its underlying moral principle. Kant refers to this aspect of the categorical imperative as the principle of noncontradiction.

It is at this point that Kant moves from his metaphysics of morals to examine its application in empirical settings. He offers four famous examples of concrete moral situations in which the categorical imperative as the principle of universalism is applied: suicide, the lying borrower, unused and unexpressed personal talent, and the general good of the community.¹¹⁴ In a situation of deep despair and serious personal misfortune, an individual contemplates suicide as a way of ending the unendurable pain and suffering of the moment. Acting on a principle of self-love, he thinks that by ending life he will be able to end the suffering, thereby making things better. The utilitarian calculation of the relative balance between the pain of suffering and the pleasure of life is the basis for self-love and the principle upon which his moral decision is made. Release from suffering

through suicide is the answer to the problem of unbearable agony. Kant asks whether a moral action based on the principle of universalism could permit such an action. His response is that this particular course of action could not be made into a universal law of nature; it cannot be universalized since that would be self-contradictory. The moral duty to act out of self-love and to continue life is contradicted by suicide and the ending of life; death is a contradiction to life. Kant's response is as follows: "Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself, and therefore could not exist as a system of nature."¹¹⁵ A second example is that of the lying borrower. In cases of extreme financial emergency, it is morally permissible to borrow money without any intention of repayment. The moral agent cannot admit this, so he borrows the money by means of a lie. Kant asks again whether this principle of convenient lying and immediate advantage may be turned into a universal law. As quickly as he formulates the question, his response is negative. It could never become the basis for a universal law since it necessarily contradicts itself. One cannot begin a promise with a lie. The very idea of a promise or binding contract would be undermined, and if it were to be universalized into a categorical imperative, it would end the possibility of making promises in the future. After a brief consideration of the other two examples, Kant concludes that any course of moral action and its underlying moral principle cannot be empirically contingent and relative but must possess the logical principles of universalism and natural law. For knowledge and action to be moral, they must be necessary for all rational human beings and must be capable of being made into a universal law of nature without contradiction. These are a priori logical criteria that must be fulfilled before the subjective will can be turned into an objective moral law having the force of a categorical imperative.

The second principle of practical reason contains the moral imperative of human dignity: "*So act as to treat humanity whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.*"¹¹⁶ Humanity is an end in itself and may never be used as a means toward some greater good of happiness or pleasure. This principle is somewhat different from the first moral principle with its abstraction, formality, and exclusion of all direct reference to material content and ends. However, with this second principle, Kant introduces in an understated way some material content to his a priori reason. Applying this practical principle as an a priori concept of law to his four examples of moral action, he argues that in considerations of suicide, lying, personal pleasure before perfection of human capacities, and private happiness before the public good, it is necessary for human beings to be treated with respect. Persons cannot be used as a means to avoid painful circumstances, gain immediate monetary advantage, indulge in immediate self-gratification, or pursue personal happiness at the expense of others. To

do so would be to treat individuals as reified things having no inherent dignity, beauty, or inner moral worth. Individuals cannot be killed to avoid pain, manipulated for personal advantage, thwarted in the development of nature's rational potentialities and capacities by a hedonistic life, or treated as objects of personal happiness and advancement. To act upon this moral imperative, we must treat others as ends in themselves. For Kant, this means that life is to be ensured, property obligations and contracts protected, the future of humanity nurtured, and public happiness pursued. This practical principle to be implemented in natural law supplements Kant's initial abstract and logical formulation of the categorical imperative with a social responsibility to the life, property, potentiality, and happiness of others. According to Kant, the limits of individual subjective activity are to be found in these objective laws.¹¹⁷

The third practical principle of pure reason is based on the idea of the moral sovereignty of the will as the supreme lawgiver of natural laws. This is the imperative to act toward others as rational human beings because they are universal legislators: "Thus the *principle* that every human will is a *will which in all its maxims gives universal laws*."¹¹⁸ For Kant, the practical will is subject to the law because it is the subject of law. As a universal legislator, reason does not mechanically conform to externally imposed moral constraints in an arbitrary and despotic manner, since it is reason itself which creates these very laws. The result is that the individual is following itself by following the dictates of its own practical reason. The principle of moral sovereignty and universal self-legislation holds that individuals seek more than pleasure and the avoidance of pain; their hopes are for more than the acquisition of property and the protection of natural rights; and their desires are for more than material satisfaction and market consumption. Human beings are due an inherent respect and dignity as ends in themselves, since they are creators of their own cultural and political worlds; they are rational beings. Through their values, laws, and institutions, humans have constructed a world of meaning and purpose built on the moral principles of social interaction. The nature of this practical activity as the self-determination of the will is the creative and productive life of moral action.¹¹⁹ Its purpose is to build a community of rational and free human beings based on self-imposed and self-legislated moral laws. Kant views this principle as a supplement to the second principle of humanity as an end in itself. It helps clarify why humanity is a final and unconditional end at the same time as it emphasizes the rational dimension of the will and its rejection of all empirical interests and inclinations. Kant is aware that the self-creative dimension of the laws represents its most important aspect, since in the end "he is only bound to act in conformity with his own will."¹²⁰ But his subjective will is at the same time a provider of universal laws.

The fourth principle is that of the kingdom of ends. This principle integrates the two previous ones into a more general law of action. In a

kingdom of ends, individuals would be viewed as ends in themselves and as universal self-legislators. "A rational being belongs as a *member* to the kingdom of ends when, although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it *as sovereign* when, while giving laws, he is not subject to the will of any other."¹²¹ This synthetic unity of personal and communal sovereignty affirms further the reasons why moral imperatives are objective and necessary. The justification of this fourth principle of the kingdom of ends lies in the fifth principle, which is the autonomy and freedom of the individual will. Without the latter, the former is impossible; without individual autonomy, a kingdom of ends would be an illusion. The principle of autonomy is characterized by Kant in the following manner: "*Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same time will [it] to be a universal law.*"¹²² The moral will is autonomous when it has the potential to constitute universal legislation by its own powers of creativity, that is, when it is free to create and obey its own laws. He sees moral freedom as the supreme principle of autonomy because it is inherently deserving of respect and is the foundation of human dignity.¹²³ Dignity and sublimity are manifested through the different forms of these practical principles of reason. The highest moral ideals of human beings are expressed in the principles that they are self-conscious and rational, create their own universal laws of nature, treat others as ends in themselves, are universal legislators of their own morality, and have an inner moral autonomy and freedom. It is because of this that humanity has an intrinsic worth and profound dignity. Without the autonomy of the will to be the absolute moral legislator, there would be no basis upon which to distinguish human beings from animals caged in a web of mechanical and deterministic causal relationships in which there is no freedom of action. Everything would follow according to the physical laws of nature. However, according to Kant, there is another element in nature outside the phenomenal world, and that is the autonomous will and the moral self-determination of practical reason. He affirms, "It is this that makes every rational subject worthy to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends, for otherwise he would have to be conceived only as subject to the physical law of his wants."¹²⁴

The five distinct principles of practical reason thus appear to be so intimately interconnected that they represent more reformulations of the same unconditional and supreme principle of pure reason. In the secondary literature, it is the first two moral principles which occupy most scholarly attention as the basis for judging the moral worth of an action. The principle of universalism provides the abstract logic, whereas the principle of humanity as an end in itself gives us a more material and concrete form of the supreme principle of the good will. All the reformulations after that are attempts at an articulation and justification of this principle of humanity as an end in itself. In the end, the necessity to act on the basis of the categorical imperative rests upon the autonomy of the practical will as a sovereign and universal legislator.

CHAPTER FOUR

KANT AND CLASSICAL SOCIAL THEORY

Epistemology, Logic, and Methods in Marx, Weber, and Durkheim

Among the many influences on nineteenth-century social theory, Aristotle is central among the ancients, whereas Kant is the key modern figure. It is Immanuel Kant, along with his followers and critics, who helps in the development of the epistemology, logic, and methods of classical sociology. He provides the formal structure and philosophical justification for different views of science than those offered by modern psychology, political science, and economics. He extends to the classical tradition of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim an alternative to the Enlightenment view of technical rationality and positivism. The major metatheoretical themes around which the classical social theorists coalesced in their radicalization of Kant include: (1) theory of subjectivity, representation, and the critique of positivism; (2) issues of epistemology, logic, and methods in the social sciences; (3) ethics and science as critique; and (4) Kantian morality and German existentialism. These four general areas represent the range of issues that bind classical social theory into a coherent and systematic critique of modernity.

Subjectivity, Representations, and the Critique of Positivism

In his epistemology, Kant rejects the idea that nature exists as an objective reality independent of consciousness as a thing-in-itself, since it is constituted by the mind as a phenomenal representation (*Vorstellung*). This Copernican revolution in philosophy precipitates an intense discussion by Georg Friedrich Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Friedrich Nietzsche over the nature and relative contributions of subjectivity (consciousness) and objectivity

(external reality) in the process of knowing. Reacting to the Kantian critique of pure reason, German idealism, existentialism, nihilism, neo-Kantianism, and Anglo-American pragmatism set the stage for a sociological rethinking of different theories of knowledge. And it is this very philosophical debate that undermines traditional epistemological claims to truth grounded in empirical facts (empiricism) or mathematical relations (rationalism). Their thought also calls into question the existence of an autonomous reality that could be examined by a neutral and objective observer. Modern sociology is more nuanced in its appreciation of the nature of truth and methods of justification than other forms of social science. From Kant's theory of knowledge, with its stress on the role of consciousness in the act of perception and experience, Hegel develops his idea of theoretical work (*praxis*) and the self-formation of the human species throughout history in the Objective Spirit that creatively transforms objective reality as it moves toward self-consciousness and enlightenment; Schopenhauer's view of phenomenal reality as a representation or veil of Maya further radicalizes Kant's theory and makes the connection between thought and reality, or consciousness and truth, more tenuous by emphasizing the one-sided role of subjectivity; and Nietzsche's theory of perspectivism, with its concomitant relativism and nihilism, completes the direction of Schopenhauer's thought. These philosophers undermine the notion that there is an objective reality out there simply waiting to be examined and explained. They move epistemology from a copy theory of truth based on an ocular metaphor of mirroring reality to a constitution theory of truth. They also call into question the notion that social science is a form of instrumental rationality and social engineering whose purpose is to control the immediate environment through the formation of social hypotheses, explanatory laws, and technical predictions. Rather, science, as *Wissenschaft*, is ethical and critical in its various forms of dialectical, interpretive, and moral science. These terms are generally not associated with a description of science in its mainstream and orthodox incarnation.

These more skeptical theories of knowledge would have important implications for the theories and methods of classical theory. In addition to the philosophical questions, sociology, too, begins to raise issues about the social construction of reality; as epistemology is transformed into social theory, these Kantian theories of knowledge evolve into sociological theories of political ideology, cultural representations of morality and religion, and elementary forms of experience and knowledge. Epistemology becomes a sub-area within sociology as consciousness is broadened to include issues of class consciousness, intersubjectivity, and the social forms of the understanding.

Epistemology and Methodology

Based on the Kantian constitution theory of truth and the philosophical traditions he inspires, all three European theorists reject the role of posi-

tivism and its application in the logic and methods of the social sciences. If access to objectivity or the external world becomes more problematic, then new methods of scientific inquiry must be developed to express these epistemological complexities and subtleties. To fill this vacuum, Marx's view of science incorporates a dialectical, immanent, functionalist, and ethical critique of the structures of production and their tendencies toward systems crises. Economics, as it turns back to Aristotle's moral economy, is subordinated to the more important concerns of ethics and politics in the creation of human happiness and fulfillment.

Weber's method is also dialectical since his main concern throughout his writings is to reveal the interrelationships between values and institutions, personality and the conduct or constitution of life. Weber is aware of the infinite flow of history from which only a finite portion of information is chosen for investigation. By means of the "value relevance" and "value freedom" of the inquirer, the choice of topics and direction of research are delineated. As with Kant, objectivity is a construct of consciousness by which sociological categories or ideal types are formed. As a result, access to objectivity is always mediated by subjectivity. Durkheim, in turn, views social facts not as unmediated data of the social system, but as re-presentations of the external world that are expressions of the collective conscience and moral sentiment of the community. His writings effortlessly move from his early idealism (social facts as ideas and representations) to his later pragmatism and Kantian sociology of knowledge.

In all three theorists, a scientific methodology is created which questions false objectivity and the realism of empiricism and rationalism. Truth is no longer defined in terms of the myth of objectivity but seeks its foundation in the contours of subjectivity itself. If critical knowledge leads to self and collective enlightenment and communal democracy (Marx), virtuous action and individual character development (Weber), or increased social solidarity, moral education, and citizenship (Durkheim), then knowledge is pragmatically true. Truth can no longer rest on pure facts or deductive reasoning but must look to the other side of the epistemological equation: the centrality of consciousness itself in the process of knowing. Each author adopts a method appropriate to the reality of Kantian epistemology and to the types of social and historical questions raised—questions about historical structures and the institutional origins of modernity, the meaning and intentions of social action, the creation of functionalist models of social systems and the social origins of consciousness, and the emancipation of classes from economic oppression. Methods are directly related to the content of social theory and not to a particular philosophy of science or theory of knowledge. That is, methods are built upon the need to access the substance of history, culture, and social institutions and not upon a prior theory of scientific truth and empirical verification.

Ethics and Science as Critique

Out of phenomenology, existentialism, neo-Kantianism, and pragmatism, the classical tradition develops new forms of science based on Kant's critical method: the dialectical science of Marx, the interpretive science of Weber, and the moral science of Durkheim. Critique as a sociological method implies the rejection of realism and objectivism, recognition of the interplay between subjectivity (knower) and objectivity (known), development of a theory of representations, and awareness of culture and values implicit in all scientific inquiry, that is, the values implicit in the concepts, logic, and methods of inquiry of historical science. Out of their historical investigations come the critiques of alienation and political economy, rationalization and the bureaucratic cage, and anomie and the derangement of the self and community.

Kantian Morality and German Existentialism

The classical tradition reintegrates science and ethics in its social theory and critique of modernity. For Marx, the purpose of self-consciousness is to produce a free society founded upon human rights, emancipation from exploitation, and self-realization within a democratic community. Only when class boundaries are broken, along with the spell of the private ownership of the means of production, will the praxis of species being become an opportunity for moral self-determination and individual creativity. Moral issues are to move from philosophical abstractions to concrete analyses and proposals for social change. Weber views science as the means for defining the topography of the social environment within which self-determination and human dignity are to flourish. Certain societies are not capable of nurturing these vocational and civic virtues or forms of social life. They structurally restrict the development of a strong, self-directed individual geared to public participation in a democratic and free society. Durkheim, too, views science in these terms. Science is a means for the moral education of a free people against the functionally disruptive forces of liberal egoism and a divisive and abnormal social organization of production. Without this moral pedagogy and instruction into the institutional functioning of capitalism, political participation and the virtuous life are crushed beneath the weight of modernity.

DIALECTICAL SCIENCE AND THE CRITIQUE
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN MARX

Kant undertakes his critical philosophy in order to establish the transcendental logic that would deductively justify the categories that make experience and knowledge possible. Hegel rejects this static transcendental approach to the formation of consciousness and instead sees it as an historical and

social process in which the human species comes to a consciousness of itself as the creator of its own objective cultural and social institutions.¹ After the phenomenological dialectic and movement of self-consciousness replace the transcendental logic of subjective consciousness, Marx takes the process one step further. He applies the dialectic beyond the internal and idealist contradictions within consciousness in the physical and social worlds. He replaces phenomenology with a critique of the structural fissures and institutional contradictions of capitalist society based on their conflicting anthropological premises, class interests, structural imperatives, and political ideals. Evolving from Hegel's idealist philosophy, Marx materializes the dialectic by expanding the analysis of self-consciousness to include the structures and functions of social institutions as they develop independently of intentionality and consciousness in history and political economy. This would include issues of false consciousness and ideology. Marx thereby transforms the critical method from epistemology and phenomenology to a social theory of political economy.² The dialectic develops from a metaphysics and logic of abstract and transcendent concepts within German idealism to an analysis of the logic of production and social relations inherent in capitalist society. Marx traces this logic in the dialectical contradictions, structures, and functions of an historically specific set of economic and social relations within political economy.³

As we have already seen in chapter 3, Kant inquires into the epistemological conditions for the possibility of experience and knowledge by showing the necessary connections between perception and consciousness, or between sensuousness and the subjective categories of the mind. By rejecting the naive realism of the empirical world and the autonomous existence of objectivity, Kant shows the importance of the human mind in the process of knowing. Objectivity without subjectivity is impossible as he integrates both empiricism (sensuous experience) and rationalism (mind) into a comprehensive theory of the interaction of the mind and body. The critical method developed by Kant stresses the importance of concepts in forming images and judgments about the world, as well as understanding their limits of applicability. Responding to the skeptical criticism of David Hume, Kant views the role of epistemology as reestablishing the foundations of knowledge on a firm logical ground. He sees the use of "critique" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781 and 1787) as "a treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself. But, at the same time, it marks out the whole plan of the science, both as regards its limits and as regards its entire internal structure."⁴ The critical method is the means by which Kant seeks to investigate and justify the a priori elements in consciousness that make perception, experience, and judgments about the natural world possible.

Hume had undermined both inductive and deductive logic, as well as the ideas of substance and causality, as the philosophical foundation of

science. He raised the issue of the “dilemma of objective validity” and the adequacy of our understanding of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, thought and reality. Kant’s response is his critique of pure reason, by which he investigates the universal and necessary (transcendental) conditions for the possibility of knowledge. By delving into the structure of the human mind, its a priori categories, and the manner in which objective reality is constructed from the forms of consciousness, he thinks he is able to save epistemology from skepticism, justify the process of knowledge, and reestablish the philosophical legitimacy of scientific inquiry as knowledge of objective reality. To these ends he raises questions about the nature of subjective consciousness, the validity of the concepts of pure reason, and the transcendental construction of nature.

Kant transforms epistemology in this Copernican revolution by showing how knowledge does not conform to the objects of experience, but rather how objects conform to our ways of knowing based on the subjective conditions of our own consciousness. Rather than reflecting objectivity, knowledge reflects subjectivity. Just as the sun is the center of our universe, so too is subjectivity the center of objectivity. Using his method of the transcendental deduction, Kant is able to detail these a priori concepts of the understanding that make experience and knowledge possible. In the process, he undermines traditional epistemology, which maintained that there was an objective reality waiting to be discovered. The only philosophical debate among these philosophers was whether access to objectivity would be through inductive (empiricism) or deductive (rationalism) reasoning. By his rigorous examination of the component parts of knowledge in sensuous intuition (perception) and experience, Kant uncovers the crucial role of consciousness in the formation of the objects of our knowledge of the phenomena or appearances. “The objective validity of the categories as *a priori* concepts rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become possible.”⁵

Because the human mind is active in the process of experiencing and judging the world, there is no unmediated or privileged access to reality. Everything we see and know is filtered through the structure of our mind. Consequently, we do not experience an unvarnished reality—a thing-in-itself—but only our representations or ideas of this underlying and unmediated reality. We know that it exists, since it is the epistemological presupposition of our experience. However, we can never know the uninterpreted world in itself and, thus, the concept of the thing-in-itself is meaningless. We can have knowledge only of the world as it appears in our representations (experience and judgment), that is, only as it is constructed through the synthetic unity of the logical subject (I think). It is only the latter which provides the formal and logical unity to the unarticulated material provided by perception and experience. This is where the categories of substance and

causality, and thus the very foundations of Newtonian science, are to be found. Kant writes, "The unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations."⁶

Although Hegel's critique accepts aspects of this Copernican revolution, he replaces epistemology with phenomenology, since he believes that the former involves a logical contradiction. Each theory of knowledge must be based on some transcendental principle that, in turn, requires further justification *ad infinitum*. His critique of epistemology is a rejection of foundationalism. Concepts cannot ground themselves in objectivity, in themselves, or in the transcendental or logical subject. He also contends that Kant's transcendental subject is too formal, static, and removed from the real human experience of the social world. His dialectical approach portrays cognitive concepts as dynamic and historically developing. Hegel changes the epistemological question from the transcendental conditions for the possibility of knowledge to the historical and social conditions for the possibility of self-consciousness of the human species in history. The ground of knowledge no longer rests in the formal unity of the mind, but in the development of humanity as it moves toward greater wisdom and enlightenment in modern society. Thus, his major work, *Phenomenology of the Spirit* (1807), is divided into two main parts: development of experience (consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason) and development of social experience (Objective Spirit in the family, economy, and state, and Absolute Spirit in religion, art, and philosophy). There is no universal or absolute list of concepts that could justify by a transcendental deduction the means by which we organize our experience of the physical world. Rather, according to Hegel, concepts develop along with the self-consciousness of the human species itself as it moves toward greater enlightenment. The critical method, which begins with Kant's attempt to justify a new role for subjectivity in the process of knowing, is expanded by Hegel to include the study of intersubjectivity in the self-formative process of species development.⁷ Both focus on the importance of consciousness and mental categories in our mediated relationship to nature and society.

With Marx the method of critique moves from the transcendental object of experience and the phenomenological analysis of self-consciousness in history to an analysis of the history and logic of capitalist social relations (concept of capital). Critique evolves from a transcendental and phenomenological knowledge of self-consciousness to a method of ethical and historical science. Marx relies on this critical method as he continues to radicalize its logic and application by applying it to the categories of classical political economy, not to transcendental categories of the mind or the historical categories of the phenomenal spirit of the species. He rejects the absolute and universal character of German idealism, its identity theory, as

well as the mechanical and lawlike reproduction of the surface appearances and status quo in positivism. Instead, he develops a critical materialism that places the formation of consciousness in the realm of work and economics. Questions of the objective validity of economic categories, the adequacy of our knowledge of social reality, the limits of the concepts and their applicability to the social world, and the foundations of social science become central to his thought. He, too, is concerned with issues of praxis and the social construction of objective reality, false objectivity, and distorted consciousness (repression and ideology). How is our social world constructed, how adequate are our concepts and understanding of that world, and how objective and reliable is our social science? He wishes to show the interrelationships among various economic concepts as a means to delve deeper into an analysis of historical structures and functional patterns. He rejects both idealism, as dealing only with abstract philosophical and moral concepts that have no real connection to the empirical world, and positivism, as accepting the empirically given surface phenomena as the only empirical world to be scientifically investigated.

The critical method of historical materialism allows Marx to move deeper into the unconscious historical and structural influences that affect human behavior, cultural values, and consciousness formation. Marx writes in *Capital* (1867), "The categories of bourgeois economy . . . are forms of thought expressing with social validity the conditions and relations of a definite historically determined mode of production, *viz*, the production of commodities."⁸ This approach also permits Marx to examine the dialectic between concepts and reality, since the former are not static categories but products of a certain type of society. The danger of examining the abstractions and static categories of classical political economy or acquiring empirical evidence as simply surface facts is that theory then reflects an uncritical and unmediated reality. The fetishized social relations find their way into a form of empirical science that simply reflects the reality as it is given in immediate experience and does not take into consideration the inner conflicts, structural tensions, or functional crises that seethe just beneath the surface phenomena.

About the method of critique, Patrick Murray writes in *Marx's Theory of Scientific Knowledge*: "Marx's critical science shatters the immediacy of 'facts' through a principled inquiry into their history and inner logic, an inquiry which both respects the autonomy of the object studied and delves deeply into the necessity of its movement."⁹ Science examines the empirical world but is leery of accepting facts as immediately given objects of reality. Since the objective world is always mediated through concepts, science must develop a more sophisticated appreciation of the categories of political economy, their logic and internal relationships, and their expressions in the external world. They are the means through which our world is given to

us at the theoretical level; they provide our only access to objective reality. Marx investigates the underlying assumptions and values of the categories of classical political economy and the natural rights tradition. In “On the Jewish Question” (1843), he examines the hidden assumptions of liberalism and the natural rights to liberty, equality, property, and security in order to show how these values when connected to their assumptions lead to their opposites: inequality, loss of communal bonds that hold society together, and a society based on the Hobbesian principle of a war of all against all. In the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law* (1843) and *The German Ideology* (1845), Marx rejects the Enlightenment dualism of Cartesian rationalism and German idealism, which considers only the realm of ideas, leaving the empirically given to uncritically reign supreme. That is, he rejects the metaphysical view that concepts are transcendent abstractions independent of the world of experience with their own logic and teleology.¹⁰ The idealism of Hegelian philosophy and the materialism of the Left Hegelians (Max Stirner, Bruno Bauer, and Ludwig Feuerbach) abstract from the intimate interconnections between concepts and reality as they fetishize the products of the human mind into a philosophy of history. They fail to see the empirical as the origin of the conceptual or the organic relationship between thought and reality. Concepts take on a fanciful and spiritualized life of their own as they are used to criticize the empirical without being grounded in it. Both abstract idealism and materialism divorce concepts from reality and end in imaginative but impotent and uncritical speculation. They distance and disarm concepts from critique by never dealing with the real world and its actual economic and social problems. They turn revolutionaries into house conservatives who neither engage empirical reality itself nor develop alternatives based on the real potentialities of a given historical moment.

Marx rejects the idea that science can be based on indeterminate facts or concepts. Only a dialectical interaction between the two can satisfy the demands of scientific inquiry that move beyond the surface to challenge the authority of the immediately given world of power, class, and domination. On the other hand, he looks to concepts and theories as means to discern the logic or rationality of capitalist development that reflects distinctly both the inner conceptual necessity of capital accumulation and its empirical and historical reality. As he writes in the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858):

The exact development of the concept of capital is necessary, since it is the fundamental concept of modern economics, just as capital itself, whose abstract, reflected image is its concept, is the foundation of bourgeois society. The sharp foundation of the basic presuppositions of the relation must bring out all the contradictions of bourgeois production, as well as the boundary where it drives beyond itself.¹¹

This is the role of dialectical social critique: to balance abstract concepts and material reality in order to move beyond speculative abstractions in economic theory and bare surface facts in research to conceptually deeper levels of human understanding, that is, beyond the appearances to the historical and logical essence of society's power structure and organizational relationships. Science as critique becomes the dialectical unfolding of the inner workings of the logical contradictions of bourgeois society resting on unresolvable conflicting assumptions and institutional directives.¹² Unlike Kant, critique for Marx is a method which lies in the reflective mind of the scientist, since it is an approach expressing the concrete totality of concepts and thought. Marx's goal is to develop a science founded upon the categories of political economy which are historically specific and conceptually concrete and determinate. That is, the empirical and moral categories are not arbitrarily imposed from the outside on a contingent and recalcitrant empirical reality, nor are they simply a summary of the inductive lessons and accumulation of facts that do not challenge the validity or wisdom of modernity. Both traditional methods leave intact the immediately given social world as unexamined and unquestioned; both methods reinforce the alienation of reason and the social reality; and both methods develop an objectivity that is an idol or fetish of human construction. According to Marx, the economic concepts "express the forms of being, the characteristics of existence, and often only individual sides of this specific society."¹³ Science pulls these categories together in a more comprehensive and theoretically sophisticated manner so as to reveal their inner connections and logical possibilities. They are deeper reflections on the economic and political reality. Concepts can be examined in terms of history, structure, function, logic (contradictions), and ideology; they highlight the key issues found in empirical reality.

The purpose of a dialectical critique is to develop categories which are neither philosophical abstractions from reality (Hegel and the Left Hegelians) nor superimposed economic laws or metaphysical value systems (classical political economy and utilitarianism). Rather, the goal of a critical theory of historical materialism is to reflect on the deeper economic and social contradictions and crises of modern capitalist economy. By blending elements of both rationalism (consciousness) and empiricism (sense data), the critical method respects the integrity of the object of inquiry (its history, structure, and function), as well as the political values used to criticize it (immanent critique). The scientific method cannot impose its predetermined approach on the material, distorting it for its own normative purposes as in naturalism, nor can it apply moral categories at a distance without touching the inner logic of the social system. Neither domination nor reification is the guiding principle of a critical method. Both these approaches are forms of metaphysics which do not respect the nature of the object itself. In this way positivism distorts objectivity through inductive indifference to the deep

structures and internal contradictions of political economy. The role of the dialectic in Marx's social theory will be to counteract these methodological weaknesses. With the rejection of empiricism and rationalism as inadequate to the foundations of social science, Marx, along with the other classical theorists, sought a new understanding of science as critique. Weber and Durkheim will be faced with similar epistemological and methodological problems and deal with them in their own theoretically imaginative ways. In spite of their differences, critique is a common approach underlying their distinctive methodologies.

Access to the depth structures of political economy is reached by means of Marx's theory of value, with its examination of the historical forms of value expressed in commodity exchange, money circulation, and capital production. As previously mentioned in chapter 2, Marx begins *Capital* with an analysis of the commodity as having a twofold nature: a use value and an exchange value. These two elements of the commodity express different and conflicting economic intentions between an economy based on the satisfaction of human needs and one based on the realization of profit.¹⁴ This antagonistic relationship between need and profit reflects the distinction that framed Aristotle's theory of moral economy, which was based on the difference between economics (*oikonomike*) and chrematistics (*chrematistike*). *Capital* starts with an analysis of the commodity and simple market exchange but framed within Aristotle's theory of ethics and politics. The same antagonisms between human needs and property, community and self interest, and moral economy and market economy that Aristotle feared were tearing classical Athens apart were having similar effects on modern society. According to Marx, in order to delve deeper into the structures of political economy, its class conflicts and underlying antagonisms, its unconscious system of power and domination, and its unjust organization of production and distribution of social goods, scientific categories have to be related dialectically. This was necessary in order to show the continuing tensions and fundamental contradictions within society between the structural imperatives of economics and chrematistics as they are expressed in their modern forms—use value and exchange value, abstract labor and concrete labor, necessary labor and surplus labor, and production and consumption. It is these contradictions which reveal the injustice and irrationality of capitalist society. Marx recognizes that classical political economy simply articulated a series of categories such as property, division of labor, population, and production without seeing any internal dynamic or logical connection between them. These categories were naturalized so that they expressed universal characteristics of human nature and society rather than historical and social relations of production. The critical method was intended to demystify these categories in order to reveal their dialectical unfolding as they uncovered the inner logic of capitalist production (functionalism). In

this manner, Marx's major work joins together Aristotle's critique of political economy with David Ricardo's theory of value in order to highlight the modern historical form of a chrematistic economy.

The analysis of the commodity is situated within Marx's theory of value. The latter is a theory of the exchange, distribution, and production of wealth in a capitalist society, its internal structural contradictions, and its tendency to develop social conflicts and economic crises. It examines society dialectically because it views the economy in terms of irreconcilable tensions brought about by the requirement to continuously produce goods for the market at the same time that it must sell and consume those goods to ensure stability and harmony within the economy. Goods left unpurchased produce a crisis of overproduction. However, a political economy based on property, inequality, and class cannot maintain indefinitely a healthy balance between production and consumption. Critical theory by its very dialectical formulation attempts to answer a number of historical and theoretical questions about the nature of exchange and capital.

The value of an exchangeable good is derived from an abstraction from all particular sensuous qualities within a commodity and is the common element and quantitative measure that makes all exchangeable goods in the market commensurable. It is the substance which makes market exchange possible. Since it is constituted by the expenditure of undifferentiated or abstract human labor, it is an historical product of a specific type of economic system. Each commodity contains a particular use value that is designed to satisfy a human need, along with its abstract form as exchange value. Marx writes in the first chapter of *Capital*: "Tailoring and weaving are necessary factors in the creation of the use-values, coat and linen, precisely because these two kinds of labor are of different qualities; but only in so far as abstraction is made from their special qualities, only in so far as both possess the same quality of being human labor, do tailoring and weaving form the substance of the values of the same articles."¹⁵ The forms in which value as abstract labor historically appears in a capitalist society are commodities, money (universal equivalent or commodity in market circulation), and capital (productive property), which all express a certain type of historically specific economy based on the private appropriation of the means of production, free labor, and the alienation of raw materials and workers. Marx makes this point explicitly in *Capital*: "The historical conditions of its [capital's] existence are by no means given with the mere circulation of money and commodities. It can spring into life, only when the owner of the means of production and subsistence meets in the market with the free laborer selling his labor-power. And this one historical condition comprises a world's history. Capital, therefore, announces from its first appearance a new epoch in the process of social production."¹⁶ In the first notebook of the *Grundrisse*, Marx outlines the historical developments that prepared the way for com-

modity production and exchange value, including the disappearance of an independent peasantry, family farms, extended family, local community, and the social welfare system.¹⁷ These changes gave way to the factory system with its mechanization of production and wage labor.

According to Marx, capital is the concrete and determinate logical form that follows from the contradictions inherent in commodity exchange and money. Capital is the self-movement of the concept (*Begriff*) of the commodity as it expresses the contradiction between use value and exchange value in logic and history. It also represents the historical conditions which make simple commodity circulation possible. In this way the categories of political economy are both logical and historical, since the former is a particular manifestation of the latter. If the commodity manifests the objective contradictions of society with its distinction between use value and exchange value, then money (circulation) and capital (production) continue to express these inner economic tensions in more developed social forms of commercial and industrial capitalism. The analysis of economic crises in volume 3 of *Capital* is only the further articulation in more concrete form of these underlying structural and logical contradictions of commodity exchange. Capitalism is a social totality in which its potentiality is already visible in its simplest and most abstract category of commodity. In Marx's dialectical view of science, the end (economic crises) already exists logically at the beginning (commodity). His goal in this work is to demystify these economic categories as independent entities in order to show how they are expressions of capitalist social relations. This also entails unveiling the ideology that supports simple commodity exchange as a reciprocal relationship based on the trinitarian values of property, equality, and freedom. In this particular case, these values are contingent on the commercial transfer of exchange value. This, Marx argues, is the real foundation of the values of equality and freedom.¹⁸ The early writings of Marx stressed the contradictions inherent in the values and ideals of political theory and economics; the later works emphasized the contradictions inherent in the deep structures of industrial production. The former leads to a cultural crisis of legitimation and self-consciousness, whereas the latter tends toward a structural crisis of the economy. As he states in the *Grundrisse*, "The *presupposition* of exchange value as the objective basis of the whole system of production, already in itself implies compulsion over the individual since his immediate product is not a product for him, but only *becomes* such in the social process."¹⁹ The actual process of exchange in a money economy represents the further appearance of the underlying social relations of production.

Science, as a reflective critique, undermines the false universality and cultural values that attempt to legitimate simple exchange as fair, open, and rational. Marx unveils how the utilitarian categories of freedom and equality do not reflect the process of exchange, circulation, or production.²⁰ When

they become the categories of the understanding, perception and knowledge of the social world become distorted and false. As already discussed in chapter 2, market decisions appear to be based on rational choice and free will; the contractual obligations are grounded upon self-interest, an exchange of equivalent for equivalent, and the legal right to property ownership. Those who argue that there is no violence or domination in capitalist circulation, because each individual enters into the exchange process as a willing participant and equal owner of property, fail to follow Marx's theory of value into the arena of production, surplus value, and profits.²¹ Natural rights theory and Enlightenment social theory, which attempt to universalize a particular philosophy of humanity, reach their conceptual limits with commodity circulation and do not consider the nature of production at the micro or macro levels. Only with the analysis of merchant capital in commerce, banking capital in finance, and surplus value creation in production does the essential exploitative nature of capitalist social relations become manifest. Marx argues that the law of appropriation, based upon commodity production and circulation, represents an ideological distortion of the actual process of exchange, based on class inequality. Disproportionate power in the workplace forces workers to accept wages for their labor power as they surrender their full ability to labor.²² The apparent justice of market exchange is transformed into the oppression of class warfare with the analysis of the social organization of work. What appears to be an exchange of equivalents between the capitalist and worker in the market (circulation and distribution) is in fact a contrived deception that hides the underlying relations of power and control within the workplace (production).

Marx borrows Ricardo's theory of value from his work *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817), but unlike Ricardo he sees labor as an historical and social phenomenon. In his analysis of value in volume two of *Theories of Surplus Value* (1863), Marx praises Ricardo for moving beyond the surface phenomena of classical political economy into the physiology of contradictions that inhabit the capitalist economy. However, in the same breath he faults him for failing to examine the historical and structural dimensions of labor that produce exchange value. "The labor which posits exchange value is a specific social form of labor. For example, tailoring if one considers its physical aspect as a distinct productive activity produces a coat, but not the exchange value of the coat. The exchange value is produced by it not as tailoring as such but as abstract universal labor, and this belongs to a social framework not devised by the tailor."²³ Ricardo examines neither the historical foundations of modernity, the analytical relations between the concepts of political economy—abstract labor, exchange value, profit, labor-power, and surplus value—nor the internal crises of capitalism resulting from the profound contradictions within the social system. The tensions within logic (categories) and history (structures) are

left uninvestigated and unquestioned. For Marx, Ricardo stresses the nature of labor as a distinct magnitude in a commodity directly proportionate to other comparable commodities having the equivalent quantity of labor or exchange value.

Marx rejects Ricardo's analysis of the substance of commodities of exchange in *Theories of Surplus Value* as inadequate. The real nature of commodities and labor in exchange is not critically examined. Writing about the value of commodities, he says: "Their [Commodities'] substance is labor. This is why they are 'values.' Their magnitude varies, according to whether they contain more or less of this substance. But *Ricardo does not examine* the form—the peculiar characteristic of labor that creates exchange-value or manifests itself in exchange-value—the *nature* of this labor."²⁴ According to Marx, this is the fundamental problem in Ricardo's economic theory, since his labor theory of value does not entail a theory of abstract labor. Abstract labor is undifferentiated and indeterminate labor that is removed from the sensuous and particular nature of labor itself; labor's connection with creativity and praxis is broken as it becomes a mere means to life. It is a form of homogeneous, indifferent, and formal labor abstracted from all self-conscious activity (*praxis*), art, beauty, skill, needs, and self-determination within a natural or moral economy. Abstract labor is produced only under certain social conditions characterized by the privatization of production, deskilling and fragmentation of labor, mechanization of the workplace, and an economy based on exchange value and profits. This historical form of labor is connected to the Industrial Revolution and the structures of factory production. In this way, Marx's theory of value and labor is the means he employs to get access to the deeper social structures of market exchange and industrial production. He rejects classical political economy for its inability to examine the social relations beneath surface phenomena and for its unconscious acceptance of capitalist social institutions and values.

Marx continues the analysis of chrematistics begun by Aristotle by examining the social organization and value of work as the common substance of exchange in a market economy. He articulately contends that abstract labor is a social construction of labor. Money and capital are just its further development in property, commerce, and production. A revolution must occur in consciousness and institutions before material goods and human needs are transformed into commodities and market wants.

The existence of value in its purity and generality presupposes a mode of production in which the individual product has ceased to exist for the producer in general and even more for the individual worker, and where nothing exists unless it is realized through circulation. . . . This determination of value, then, presupposes a given historic stage of the mode of social production

and is itself something given with that mode, hence a historic relation.²⁵

In his earlier writings, Marx refers to this as alienated labor, which is an historical form of labor that produces value for exchange in the market. However, over time he becomes more interested in the question of the reciprocal exchange of quantitative equivalents. To investigate the question, he begins to consider the social organization of labor in the workplace, its characteristics of use value and exchange value, the historical origins of value in abstract labor, and the generation of surplus labor through a restructuring of the social organization of work and private property. Value in labor is produced not by labor itself but by the socially necessary labor time objectified in commodities within an historically specific kind of economic system—abstract labor—that is the product of private property, class division of labor, mechanization of production, and alienation. The ethical and aesthetic qualities of labor are eliminated in the alienated production of the factory system. What remains is pure abstract labor appropriated by capital.

Ricardo stressed the quantification of value and labor in price, while Marx turns his attention to the social and historical form in which labor appears. The former is an attempt at determining the market mechanism and price determination of a capitalist economy, whereas the latter tries to locate the process of alienation within a particular sociological and historical framework that will ultimately provide a scientific and ethical critique of capitalism and a demand for social change. Marx is more interested in establishing the social foundations of modernity than he is in developing a utilitarian theory of price. The central question that occupies his attention is the Kantian question of the historical conditions for the possibility of capitalism. What are the key institutions and structures that make exchange value, surplus accumulation, and capitalist production possible? In the *Grundrisse* and in *Capital*, he applies different aspects of the method of critique. In the former, which is the more Kantian work, he focuses on the historical and structural issues, whereas in volume 1 of *Capital*, he turns to Hegel for guidance as he traces the dialectical interrelationships between the categories of political economy. In volume 3, he examines the historical and logical implications of the internal dynamic of the capitalist system as it evolves into economic crises based on its own internal logic and history. Commodity production and reciprocal exchange are the real foundations for both the political ideals of liberal democracy and the deepest contradictions of capitalism. In the final analysis, the true values of democracy and capitalism, once the veil of ideology is lifted, “prove to be inequality and unfreedom.”²⁶ In Marx’s mind, his analysis of the inherent contradictions of exchange value and commodity production are intimately linked to issues of social justice and economic crises, that is, ethics and functions.

As Marx's explanation of capitalism moves from the analysis of exchange value and abstract labor to surplus labor and capital, he turns from questions of exchange and commerce to the social organization of the workplace, private property, and production. Critical of classical political economics, he rejects the idea that surplus value and profits arise out of property, technology, or exchange, but argues instead that they come from the production process itself. The secret to the creation of surplus labor is the difference in the market between labor power and labor. In the supposedly fair exchange of equivalents, the laborer receives wages in exchange for the replenishment of his or her labor power expended in the act of working. However, the capitalist gains not only the products of the worker's labor power but the surplus of work beyond that in the form of the worker's continuous labor. It is in this social difference between labor power (labor capacity) and labor (living labor) that Marx finds the source of surplus value and profits in a capitalist economy. The worker is not remunerated for all the work expended in the workplace—the unpaid surplus labor. The former's loss of control over the means and social organization of production, and thereby abstract labor, is a direct result of the class structure in the factory; it is this fact which is central to understanding the appropriation of surplus in production. Marx makes the distinction between necessary labor, which appears in the form of wages, and surplus labor, which accrues as profits to the capitalist. He summarizes this position in the *Grundrisse*: "We see therefore that the capitalist, by means of the exchange process with the workers . . . obtains two things free of charge, first the surplus labor which increases the value of his capital; but at the same time, secondly, the quality of living labor which maintains the previous labor materialized in the component parts of capital and thus preserves the previously existing value of capital."²⁷

The internal divisions and economic foundations of a society built upon commodity production, the different structural dynamics and priorities of exchange, consumption, and production, and the fundamental contradictions within the social system as a whole produce an historical and categorical dialectic that continuously revolutionizes capitalist production but also leads to a tendency toward constant economic and social crises. The contradictions between the structural requirements of the production of use value and exchange value—an economy based on the satisfaction of needs and the realization of profits—produces unresolvable tensions, fissures, and structural constraints on stability and equilibrium. Although there was unanimity among the political economists, including Ricardo, John Baptist Say, and John Stuart Mill, that there was an inner harmony between supply and demand, production and consumption within capitalism, Marx sees only internal barriers to the self-realization of profits and capital. The inner limits to a stable economy rest with the production of exchange value over the production of social goods, that is, the necessity to purchase and consume

what is produced in order to continue the rhythm of production. The contradictions within capital between use value and exchange value, supply and demand, production and consumption, necessary labor time (subsistence wages) and surplus labor (profits)—that is, the social organization of work and the production of exchange value—create the pulls and tensions on the system that eventually lead to some form of economic crisis. Because they are logical contradictions that lie at the heart of capitalist institutions, they are in the end not resolvable; they do appear in different economic forms at different times in history.²⁸ Solutions on one side of the equation only exacerbate the problems associated with the structural element on the other side. In order to solve problems of production and profit accumulation, consumption is affected and vice versa. The underlying problem for Marx is the economy itself, based on commodity production and exchange value, that is, on a class structure of power and exploitation. All the structural deficiencies, social problems, and economic crises are products of these initial logical and historical faults.

Each side of the economic equation, production and consumption, has structural requirements and system prerequisites which usually are antithetical to other interests in the broader social system. For example, one of the main imperatives of the production process is to keep costs, especially wage costs, to a minimum by improving the scientific and technical forces and exploiting the labor process by increasing the pace, hours, or intensity of work. It is only by these means that more surplus value, and, ultimately profits, are created (*Verwertungsprozess*). However, there are limits to how long workers can work, how much intense labor the body can handle, and how much surplus labor may be extracted in one day. Also, because the capitalist keeps wages to a minimum in order to sustain higher profits, there are also limits built into consumption (*Realisierungsschwierigkeiten*). Workers simply do not have the wages to absorb what is produced by the ever-increasing rationalization of production. The use of improved technology and mechanization results in expanding class conflict among the bourgeoisie themselves. Growing competition and globalization force each owner to expand production and intensify exploitation in the quest for greater surplus value. Thus the class structure and social relations of production (organization of work) act as internal barriers to the amount of commodities that can be both produced and consumed.

In the necessary cycle of production, consumption, and renewed production, the creation of exchange value and surplus value acts as an inherent contradiction within the social system causing serious breaks in the production loop. Use value and human needs cannot be satisfied, if ever, until profit is first secured; this is implied in the concept of effective demand. If profits are not realized, the economy could slip into recession or worse. Viewing capital through the eyes of Aristotle's moral economy, Marx's fundamental criticism of the modern economy is its underlying institutional injustice. People go hungry and are without basic necessities not because

the economy cannot provide the appropriate goods and services. Rather, deprivation within society results from having too much rationality, too much production, and too many commodities. This is why Marx maintains in the *Grundrisse* that overproduction is “the fundamental contradiction of developed capital.”²⁹ This overproduction expresses itself as an overproduction of capital and property, an underconsumption of market commodities, and a tendential fall in the rate of capitalist profit.³⁰

Marx’s method of critique emphasizes the inner dynamic and development of capital as a result of its own contradictions and dialectical logic. The structural contradictions between production and consumption, which have their origin in the contradictions between use value and exchange value, Marx refers to as the problem of disproportionality. The objective and natural law of value evolves into a law of economic crisis: disproportionality, overproduction, the tendential fall in the rate of profit, growing immiseration of the working class, and the concentration and centralization of capital. This is why Marx relies on Hegel’s dialectic in *Capital* to view the logic of capital as the phenomenological development of the concept (*Begriff*) of capital itself. The inner logic of history is not the result of the development of self-consciousness, as Hegel had argued in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but the inner logic inherent in the fundamental contradictions of capitalism that move the economy to higher and higher stages of crises. Although the limits to production are structural problems, they are themselves grounded in the social or class relations of production. This balance in Marx between economics and sociology creates the dynamic that sees society as moving closer and closer to serious institutional crises of production and legitimation. Crises result not from the inability of the economy to produce material goods but from its inability to produce and realize exchange value. Marx is aware that by the examination of the logic of capital, he is not predicting economic crises or the inevitability of social breakdown. In volume 3 of *Capital*, he writes, “But proceeding from the nature of the capitalist mode of production, it is thereby proved a logical necessity that in its development the general average rate of surplus value must express itself in a falling general rate of profit.”³¹ Marx is tracing the internal rationality of the concepts of political economy and the logic of capital which ultimately manifest the irrationality and injustice of modern society. He is not attempting to develop historical laws of social evolution, nor to articulate naturalistic laws of positivism.³² Marx’s goal was not to paint a comprehensive historical picture of capitalism but to outline its structural and conceptual contradictions by means of the labor theory of value and the corresponding laws of the concept of capital.

Noting this distinction between logic and history, between dialectical science and positivism, Paul Mattick has written, “The value analysis of capital development postulates the possibility of crises by a mere consideration of the general nature of capital, without regard to the additional and real

relations that form the conditions of the real production process.”³³ Mattick distinguishes between the logical and historical conclusions of Marx’s writings. The logic of capital reveals logical and structural tendencies, not historical inevitabilities, within the system. They are what Friedrich Schelling once called *Seinsmöglichkeiten* (possibilities of being); the concept is not a reflection of being or actual reality but of the logical possibilities inherent in reality. Thought and being remain distinct. Marx rejects Hegel’s identity theory, in which logic and being are united in the self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit. The issues of the objective validity of concepts and their relation to historical reality are continuously being revisited throughout Marx’s writings. He holds that logical possibilities may be temporarily transcended (*Aufhebung*) in the historical reality with the application of improved workplace technology, increased exploitation of surplus value, state interventionism, expansion of overseas markets, and intensified colonialism. The contradictions and dialectic of the economy are themes related not to the foundation of a positivist social science but to a critique of ideology based on practical reason. It is the latter which integrates the Hegelian dialectic with Aristotelian ethics; Marx’s method represents a call to radical praxis.

The central question that arises from Marx’s economic theory is: why is there so much emphasis on the dialectic, structural logic, and internal contradictions of capitalism? If Marx is not applying the traditional approach of classical economics, with its explanatory laws and universal predictions, what are the intentions behind his critical science? By uncovering the underlying economic reality as crises oriented, exploitative, irrational, immoral, and wasteful, he turns science into a form of practical wisdom in which knowledge is to be used as the starting point of deliberative reason in a communal democracy. As he clearly states in his examination of the Paris Commune, the dialectic was not to be used as the private property of a revolutionary elite or the technical knowledge of radical engineers. Its goal was to unmask the shadows of the Enlightenment and the real dangers to the objective possibilities of self-realization, human emancipation, and the rights of the citizen. Dialectical science was to be an ethical and critical social theory.

Viewed from the perspective of both production and consumption, the capitalist economy produces a social system in which there is an abject suppression of individual freedoms and rights. According to Marx, the initial praise of equivalent exchange in the market, upon closer inspection into the nature of exchange value and commodity production, turns out to be a complete distortion of individual freedom and repression of human reason. The earlier pronouncements of market equality and commercial freedom have dissolved into ideological garbage and abstract metaphysics that distort the possibilities of practical action and self-realization in the economy and the polity. As in the essay, “On the Jewish Question,” liberalism is again found

wanting as it is unable to justify its own ethical and political ideals. Equality and freedom turn into their opposites. Marx's later economic writings are thus further explorations into the nature of structural alienation in the workplace that he began with the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. Just as Aristotle tied ethics to classical political science, Marx ties ethics to sociology and political economy using the critical method that developed out of Kantian and Hegelian philosophy. In the end, the ethical ideals of liberalism—equality and freedom—are unable to justify economic alienation and exploitation; the technical ideals of rationality, progress, and efficiency do not reflect the underlying irrationality, waste, and crises of capitalism; and social science is not able to predict or determine the future of social events. Under these circumstances, a turn to ethics and reason results in a social science which enlightens us with the critical and historical information necessary for practical wisdom that allows for participation and deliberation within a broader democratic community.

DISENCHANTMENT OF REASON AND DEMYSTIFICATION OF OBJECTIVITY IN WEBER

Like Marx, Weber returns to Kant's critique of pure reason for guidance in his understanding of the logic, method, and concept formation of historical science.³⁴ He relies heavily on the philosophy of social science in the neo-Kantianism of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, the theory of causality in the legal hermeneutics of Johannes Kries and Gustav Radbruch, and the nihilistic relativism of Friedrich Nietzsche.³⁵ These traditions are combined in a creative and exciting way as they form the epistemological and methodological foundation of Weber's theory of science (*Wissenschaftslehre*). They return to Kant's critique of traditional epistemology, his theory of transcendental subjectivity, constitution theory of knowledge, and synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. Kant, as we have already examined in this work, disputes the notion that reality in itself can be known as an autonomous object independent of the act of knowing. Knowledge and science are constitutive events in which the human mind as subject affects the reception and arrangement of the empirical intuitions that arrive at our senses. They are reconstructed on the basis of the priority of the categories and principles of pure reason. What we know are the representations of the external world to consciousness based on transcendental logical presuppositions.

Epistemological constructivism is the basis for Kant's critical method and marks his response to the skeptical challenge of Hume's critique of foundationalism in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748). Since the primary category of Western science, causality, could not be justified either through reason or experience, Hume argues that it must be a psychological predisposition that has a subjective utility that is useful in helping us adapt

to the world of experience. It is formed through repetition, continuity, and resemblance of occurrences over time. Logical necessity is thus a product of psychological habit. The faith in objectivism and realism, that is, the belief that there is an external world of objects that can be reflected in our thoughts, is simply an instinct of nature without epistemological grounding. Neither experience nor reason can validate the existence of autonomous substances and causality; neither experience nor reason can justify science. The result is a deep skepticism about Enlightenment rationality and the nature of modern science.

Kant's theory of knowledge is both a direct response to Hume and an attempt to rescue and reconstruct the foundations and justification of Newtonian physics. If Hume's objections were left unanswered, modern science would rest on a utilitarian and psychological belief without rational validation. Science would still be useful, but it would be based on arbitrary and contingent grounds, thus the need in Kant's mind for a critique of pure reason and the establishment of the universal and necessary foundations of science in the transcendental deduction. Kant's response to Hume's theory of impressions is that the latter's critique of rationalism and empiricism is correct. The solution to the dilemma of causality and substance is that neither can be found in the sensuous impressions or primary qualities. Kant attacks the basis for metaphysics and dogmatism, a belief in the existence of an independent objectivity outside of human experience. In its place he melds together a complex web of interaction between subjectivity and objectivity, as human experience and thought contain synthetic a priori elements that are transcendental constructs of the human mind. His goal was to show how the principles of pure reason, which frame human experience, also provide the universal laws of nature and thus the final rationale for Newtonian science. Objects are formed by means of a priori categories and the innate structure of consciousness, which make the process of experiencing and knowing the world around us possible. With the coming of classical sociology, the central points of contact between Kant's philosophy of knowledge and pure reason and Weber's theory of science lie in the formation, existence, and causality of the objectivity of experience.

The neo-Kantians, especially Windelband and Rickert, are less concerned with examining the foundations of natural science than they are with establishing the philosophical basis for the distinctive method and theories of historical science. Their cognitive interests take them beyond pure reason to a critique of historical reason and an analysis of meaning, action, intentionality, and culture. As with Kant, they are focused on an epistemological critique that attempts to establish the universal logical conditions for historical representations, objectivity, and science. Many of the broad epistemological issues discussed by Kant were incorporated into their new theories of knowledge and history with their concomitant questions of

objective validity and foundationalism. Like their colleagues interested in the natural sciences, however, those interested in history and social science are already partaking in an intellectual adventure precipitated by the slippery slope of subjectivity. Once subjective consciousness becomes part of the construction of history and nature, the traditional validation of methodological objectivity in science no longer rests on the old metaphysical assumptions of an objective reality outside of experience. The transcendental subject in historical science and natural science opens new questions about validity and truth, as well as the role of reason in nature and history. These issues of subjectivity and objectivity become major philosophical questions throughout this period of the nineteenth century and remain so even today.

Rickert in his major work, *The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science* (1902), begins his critique of historical reason with a direct assault on the metaphysics of positivism and realism. Natural and historical reality are not given in experience or reflective thought. They are transcendental constructs of the inquiring scientist. From this perspective, metaphysics is a construct of logic and methods, or being and reality, and therefore a creation of thought. There is no historical or natural reality ready to be discovered by impressions (empiricism) or deduced by reason (rationalism). Instead, these realms are the product of different conceptual frameworks that create history and nature by the very inquiries pursued. Rickert's position is that "empirical reality becomes nature when we conceive it with reference to the general. It becomes history when we conceive it with reference to the distinctive and individual."³⁶ Since the sciences ask different questions, the method and logic of the natural sciences cannot be applied to the study of history. The cognitive interests of the science of nature and history are different; the former seeks utilitarian knowledge, predictive results, explanatory laws, and subsumes the particular under the universal, whereas the latter seeks to understand the meaning and intentions of particular cognitive acts. These are the formal differences between the two sciences. The logic, method, and concept formation of natural and historical science construct out of the indeterminate and indistinct manifold of empirical information those facts that are relevant to the questions they raise. At this point in his analysis, Rickert is following Windelband's famous distinction between nomothetic and idiographic methods from his 1894 rectorial address at the University of Strassburg, entitled "History and Natural Science."³⁷

History is concerned with significant individualities and particular cultural events in time, along with their discrete and unique causes; natural science searches for simplified physical laws abstracted from the irrationality of the infinite in order to explain individual occurrences as concrete instances of the universal. Science involves a process of generalization from the particular. The meaning and relevance of the particular object or event is unimportant and disappears as it simply becomes another manifestation of

the absolute laws of nature. The formal and logical characteristics of the differences between the natural and historical sciences rest upon this distinction between the universal and the particular. Each method requires different ways of organizing the information provided to it and results in fabricating different realities. The scientist does not discover the particular or the universal but constructs it from the infinite possibilities offered by the heterogeneous manifold of the world of experience. Natural science creates a metaphysical world that appears in the form of objectivism, naturalism, and realism out of its general concepts. But this is an interpretive creation of reality based on transcendental and a priori principles of methodological selection and organizational simplification. Rickert rejects the epistemology of positivism and conceptual realism. Concepts do not reflect or mirror a prior existing reality. As he writes, "No knowledge can possibly provide a reproduction. This is because every knowledge claim must take the form of a *judgment*. In other words, it is impossible, as this is usually expressed, for the truth of knowledge to consist in the 'agreement of the *idea* with its object.'"³⁸

The science of history examines particular cultural phenomena as having meaningful and significant values for society. The values are not real in themselves but must be embedded in individual action or institutions. It is an evaluative and interpretive science since it defines the area of historical objectivity and makes judgments about what is essential to study. There can be no correspondence between concepts and reality, as historical concepts do not replicate empirical reality. Inductive description and scientific reproduction are logically impossible, because there can only be interpretive re-presentations of the manifold or content of perception. It should be noted that this epistemological distinction between reproduction and representation will also be an important distinction for Durkheim's theory of knowledge and methods. Because reality is infinitely diverse and boundlessly meaningless, there can be no conceptual framework which can encompass its totality. According to Rickert, historical reality is a transcendental construct where the epistemology and methodology of positivism are inapplicable to a world of culture, process, and meaning. Although both the natural and historical sciences form sensuous representations out of the indiscriminate and meaningless world, they do so using different sets of normative priorities and goals and in the process create different empirical realities. These values represent the "existential judgments" and common sense of the community encapsulated in a theoretical perspective or *Weltanschauung*.

For Rickert, then, the historian does not make arbitrary decisions about what is important, and the ultimate validity of scholarship does not rest on a correspondence between concepts and reality. It is the application of universal communal values to history that forms historical representations. Justification refers to the validity of the selected values and not the reproductive adequacy of the concepts. From politics, law, art, religion, and

morals, judgments are made as to what deserves further scholarly recognition and investigation. "The fact that *cultural values are universal* in this sense is what keeps concept formation in the historical sciences from being altogether *arbitrary* and thus constitutes the primary basis of its 'objectivity.' What is historically essential must be *important* not only for this or that particular historian, but for *all*."³⁹ Empirical objectivity is thus created by a value consensus within a community of scholars. Facts and evidence are created on the basis of their historical effectiveness and material importance and do not exist outside waiting to be discovered. There is no historical science without values. "Reference to values is an indispensable factor in their scientific activity."⁴⁰ The positivist split between science and ethics, its belief in objectivity as metaphysical realism, and its naturalistic method based on the physical sciences are complete distortions of the method of historical science itself.

As with Kant, reality for Rickert is always a transcendental construct of phenomenal appearances and not a reflective copy of a metaphysics of being. Empirical reality cannot be psychologically relived or re-experienced (Wilhelm Dilthey); it cannot be mechanically duplicated in thought (Auguste Comte); and it cannot be exactly described as it really is (Leopold Ranke). Reality, as the data of immediate experience, can only be reconstructed and transformed according to a theoretical reference to values.⁴¹ This is what Rickert means by his term *heterogeneous continuum*. The ideas of the Thirty Years War, the Renaissance, and the Reformation, as well as the figures of Caesar and Luther, are theoretical products of scholarly judgment and historical selection by which objects of historical inquiry are created by science. The values of the community and the historian have helped form these historical concepts. However, values cannot make the next step to evaluate their worth as historical objects.

The natural and historical sciences also differ substantively since their content, as well as their logical form, is specific to their logic and methods. Historical representations or objects are created by the scientist in an attempt to understand the meaning of social action and cultural experience. A cultural spirit pervades the community of scholars who are trained in a tradition that values and stresses certain types of cultural issues as important. This relevance to values (*Wertbeziehung*) of the community provides the guiding selective principle of historical reason that differentiates what is meaningful and relevant to the investigator. It is this set of presupposed principles and cultural values which produce the unique historical occurrence and object. Objectivity is a selective process by which representations of history are formed within a scholarly consensus (philosophy of history) about the important cultural values within society. The ground of scientific objectivity lies in subjectivity. It is at this point in his analysis of historical reason that Rickert introduces his crucial distinction between theoretical

value relationship (*Wertbeziehung*) and practical valuation (*praktische Wertung*). He says that “history is *not a valuing science* but a *value relevant science*,” as values only guide the formation of historical concepts and representations (ideas).⁴²

Value relationships are a key to the building of historical concepts which individualize particular and unique moments in the infinite flow of time. Historical objectivity is formed by a process of simplification from the infinite complexity and diversity of empirical reality by the values of the historian who highlights and stresses specific elements for further investigation. Only individuals are the objects of study in historical science, but this may be a person, an event, or a complex of meaning. Rickert uses the word *culture* as having the same range of meaning as Hegel’s notions of Objective and Absolute Spirit. The term refers to the objects of mental life and spiritual processes. Rickert even goes further in his arguments when he contends that it is the philosophy of German idealism that gave birth to historical science in the nineteenth century. It is culture which creates the singular event or person of importance for closer historical examination. Historical representations of the individual are constructed. As concepts, they do not reflect an already existing empirical reality *that is* ready to be copied in thought. In his work *Science and History* (1898), Rickert argues:

One and the same historical fact receives very different emphases according to the difference in the context in which the historian views it. . . . It is precisely for this reason that, concomitantly with the difference in context, i.e. in the values that serve to determine the point of view from which the historian theoretically *contemplates* the object, there can also be a difference in ‘emphasis,’ in the importance given to the object in various historical accounts in which different cultural values are taken as the criterion of relevance. . . . Values serve as the criterion that determines the selection of what is historically essential.⁴³

The historian creates the relevant representations and historical objects by emphasizing different aspects of the manifold of experience but can never evaluate by praise or blame the practical worth of any event. Evaluation is central to the epistemology and methodology of historical science. According to Rickert, however, it cannot be introduced at the ethical level in the form of value judgments. This is why the study of culture and history is a theoretical science, and not a practical one. There can be no moral judgments about persons or events because this is not the role of the historian and scientist. This distinction between historical reason and practical reason, that is, the distinction between the application of values in concept formation of historical representations and values in moral judgments, is not as

analytically clear as Rickert would like and becomes a more open problem in Weber's theory of knowledge. In his work, *The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science*, Rickert emphasizes this distinction:

In opposition to the volitional person, the historian as a scientist is not practical but theoretical. Thus his mode of activity is always *representational*, and not *judgmental*. In other words, he shares the perspectives of considering something with the practical person, but not the activity of willing and valuing itself. This can also be expressed in the following way: History is *not a valuing* science but a value-relevant science.⁴⁴

Rickert's theory of value and representation also states that besides the values of the historian regarding what is relevant in history "for us," the scientist must also consider what was culturally relevant and meaningful to the participants at the time, that is, relevant "for them" as valuing agents in history.⁴⁵ Although the latter is mentioned, the emphasis throughout Rickert's writings has clearly been on the methodological importance of value relevance for concept formation in the historical sciences. Do the values which create historical objects and representations have any judgmental influence on the outcome of scholarship? Rickert refers to the natural sciences as value free and limits this term to positivist science. The cultural and historical sciences always require theoretical values to formulate the issues and questions under scholarly consideration. Without values, there is no history; without a prior normative selection, there is no concept formation (*Begriffsbildung*); and without ethics, there is no science. The relationship between value relevance and value freedom is relatively unproblematic for Rickert, since they refer to logical processes and methodological issues in different sciences, each having different transcendental constructions. It will become a more important issue with Weber and the traditions that follow when the distinctions between concepts and reality, between facts and values, become even more problematic and intriguing.

Weber writes on methodological issues throughout his career and, like Rickert, is deeply indebted to Kant's theory of knowledge. Although the neo-Kantian influence of Windelband and Rickert may be the strongest on the development of his theory of science (*Wissenschaftslehre*), his ideas are also informed by the German Historical School of Economics, German existentialism and radical Kantianism, and jurisprudence and legal hermeneutics. His dozen methodological writings are framed over a period of fifteen years by the essays "Roscher's Historical Method" (1903), "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy" (1904), "Science as a Vocation" (1919), and "Basic Sociological Terms" (1922).⁴⁶ Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* remains the central guiding thread running throughout the

philosophy of German idealism and Weber's theory of science. The distinction between value relevance (*Wertbeziehung*) and value freedom (*Wertfreiheit*) is the defining characteristic of Weber's theory of value judgments and best expresses the complexity and ambiguity of his methodological works. The role of values and moral judgments in the formation of historical concepts, empirical objectivity, and social critique has been at the heart of the major controversies surrounding Weber's method. Some have argued that although he begins his scholarly career as a committed neo-Kantian with an emphasis on the method of interpretive understanding of culture and subjective meaning, he ends with a focus on sociological explanation, causality, and value neutrality. They contend that as he moves from an interpretive to a realist science, he loses his neo-Kantian heritage and gains the naturalist outlook of the physical sciences. The apparent split between his early epistemology and later methodology—the Weberian divide—has caused concern among some scholars that Weber was inconsistent and unsystematic, leading in the end to the abandonment of his early sociology of understanding and the later acceptance of methodological positivism.

The controversy over epistemology and methodology sets the broader philosophical context within which to better appreciate Weber's theory of value and the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, that is, between values engaged in concept and theory formation and values found in normative willing and valuative action.⁴⁷ The split manifests itself as a methodological divide between history and science, between understanding and explanation, and between interpretation and causality. What is the role of ethical and political values in historical research and the construction of science, if any; is social critique possible and what are its limits; and may values be applied to social action and political change? Just as Rickert's critique of positivism actively enjoined the discussion of the relation between ethics and science, Weber continues to advance it to the end of his career. The position taken in this chapter is that there is no fundamental split between Weber's early and later writings, certainly no split between his neo-Kantian epistemology and later scientific methodology. There is, however, a change in emphasis within his historical science and Kantian philosophy: Weber evolves from an early focus on the interpretive understanding of religion, culture, and subjectively intended meaning to his later concentration on issues of empirical explanation and causal analysis of the structural foundations and historical origins of capitalism, unconscious meaning, and unintended consequences of social action. The attention of his historical science changes from culture and subjective meaning to structure and objective meaning.

As we have already discussed in chapter 2, Weber develops a theory of science based on principles of social justice and practical science. Coupled with his adaptation of Kant's critiques of pure and practical reason, a new

social science evolves in the nineteenth century which combines elements of Aristotle's theories of knowledge and justice with Kant's transcendental subjectivity and epistemological constructivism—*phronesis* and critique. Weber creates a phronetic and critical science based upon his ideas of historical judgment, dialectical analysis, immanent critique, value relevance, phenomenology of Spirit and formal rationality, and social justice based on character and virtue development. The last element involves the cultivated relationship between personality (*Personalität*) and conduct of life (*Lebensführung*), civic virtue and social structures. The presumed split between the relevance of values to concept and theory construction and the applied scientific method of social research remains a false distinction that does not capture Weber's general theory of science or the methodological importance of his later empirical research on social structures, functions, and historical origins of modernity. These diverse elements must first be integrated into a comprehensive theory of knowledge and method. The Aristotelian and Kantian components of his *Wissenschaftslehre* have to be more systematically reconnected in order to appreciate his distinctive and innovative approach to historical science, as well as the creative advances by Rickert and the other neo-Kantians. It is this discursive integration of Aristotle and Kant that gives us a better insight into the full range of Weber's theory of historical science.

One of Weber's most fruitful and earliest considerations of his theory of science may be found in his 1904 essay, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy." Here he recapitulates much that is found in Rickert's epistemology and philosophy of science, which translates Kant's critique of pure reason into a critique of historical reason. The essay examines the central role of values in the formation of social science, social critique, and social policy. Weber also begins reflecting on the importance of objectivity, scholarly integrity, and the scientific method in his journal *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* at this time. He contends that the function of the journal is to educate its readers about contemporary social problems and social policy. Since it is a scientific journal, Weber's goal is to outline the scientific method and its form of historical knowledge, which includes questions about social meaning, standards, objective validity of value judgments in science, and the status of practical action as it relates to legislative and administrative state policy.

The essay on objectivity within historical science attempts to cover the role of values in the formation of history, science, and public policy while focusing upon the epistemological importance of objectivity, validity, and truth. Weber begins his analysis with a seemingly intractable methodological dilemma in the social sciences: the relationship between objectivity and subjective values, science and practical (moral) valuation. On the one hand, he clearly and unequivocally makes the argument: "It can never be

the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directive for immediate practical activity can be derived."⁴⁸ This response appears to be very direct, precise, and analytically clear: there can be no value judgments in social science that could undermine, distort, or invalidate the integrity and objectivity of scientific inquiry. On the other hand, Weber writes shortly thereafter that "an *attitude of moral indifference* has no connection with scientific 'objectivity.'" How does the reader square the circle of Weber's epistemology? The answers have generally been that Weber's theory of science is inconsistent or contradictory. These and other similar passages have led interpreters in the end to an epistemological despair of finding any coherence in Weber's philosophical ruminations on historical knowledge and the scientific method. The question remains: are they really contradictory? Do they not evolve into the distinction between value relevance (*Wertbeziehung*) and value freedom (*Wertfreiheit*) or between neo-Kantian epistemology and positivist methodology? Can one maintain that science cannot provide or justify value judgments about the world and at the same time argue that values are central to the formation of science itself (*Begriffsbildung*)? Is this not a restatement of Rickert's distinction between theoretical and practical values, that is, values in concept formation and values in practical willing and action? Weber certainly borrows freely from Rickert, but he quickly moves beyond the limits of the latter's theory of value into the realms of social critique and social policy.

Thomas Segady has written that there are four basic Kantian themes appropriated in Weber's historical method. These include his use of the transcendental method, the importance of concepts in the creation of experience and knowledge, the distinction between knowledge of phenomenal appearances and the unknowability of reality in itself, and the objectivity of research and methods as resting on subjectivity and values.⁴⁹ Weber wishes to create an empirical science of concrete reality (*Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*). The language employed in the essay on objectivity is taken directly from Rickert's treatise on cultural and historical science. As with Rickert, Weber characterizes the formal aspects of science as it attempts to understand the meaning and causes of unique and particular cultural events. Life is a continuous and meaningless process consisting of "an infinite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emerging and disappearing events, both 'within' and 'outside' ourselves."⁵⁰ Since external reality is in continuous flux and is infinite in scope, there are no objects of experience, no distinct personalities or events, no autonomous substances, nothing which gives stability and order to the constantly changing world we live in. There is no being or material substance, only process and becoming. Only a small portion of this infinite reality is available to human conceptualization, and it is the latter which creates what we see, experience, and know. Weber contends, "Only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the objects of scientific investigation."⁵¹

The infinite reality is a thing-in-itself, since it is devoid of all meaning and human understanding. The constitution of historical representations and objectivity is the result of values relevant to the investigator. The principles of positivism—realism, naturalism, and explanatory laws—cannot be the architect of cultural objectivity because of the logical absurdity of understanding individually unique events by subsuming them under a universal system of nomological laws. Weber recognizes that positivism undermines the empirical basis for cultural science, since it reduces particular events to accidental occurrences and arbitrary residues of scientific analysis. Their distinctive and unique character as historical objects is lost as they become just another example of the hypothetical construction of analytical laws (*Gesetzesbegriffen*). In the end, they are just “objects of idle curiosity.” This criticism of positivism is intended by Weber to be a rejection of the methods of both neoclassical utilitarianism and Marxism.⁵² It should be noted that his rejection of both schools of thought rests on their formal and logical structure and not on their political or economic ideals. His is not an ideological or political objection but a methodological critique. Neither school of economic thought is capable of grounding historical science in an interpretive method of critical reason. Neither borrows from Aristotle’s theory of legal hermeneutics and political wisdom or from Kant’s critique of reason in their general approach to social science, and thus neither is open to the logic, method, and theory of historical science. Weber explicitly states his position regarding positivist science: “In neither case can concrete reality be deduced from ‘laws’ and ‘factors.’”⁵³

Historical science examines objective reality as it has been configured by phenomena of cultural significance. From the multiplicity and chaos of infinite reality a small portion has been chosen and isolated for empirical study because it has significance as a cultural event. Returning to Rickert for guidance, Weber borrows his theory of value relevance. A cultural experience or occurrence has been created by valuing human beings, since the object of study is the result of the value orientation and selective process of the investigator. Applying a value-relevant criterion, she creates the object of study from the infinite and indeterminate flow of history which, in itself, has no inherent meaning or representation. It is only an inarticulate and indiscriminate movement of becoming that has no internal focus or direction. Historical ontology is a methodological construct based on the relevant values of science. Just as Kant had realized that Hume’s substances and impressions were transcendental products of the knowing subject, so too Weber sees that the historical world we inhabit, with its important factual events, figures, and dates around which we locate our culture and navigate our lives, is a conceptual product of historical consciousness and subjective representations.

The social world, which seems so concrete and real, so bound to substances and real objects, is a transcendental construction of the mind. The

term *transcendental* here is used only in the formal sense. The categories of historical understanding are not universal or necessary but change over time according to the interests of the investigator. We create the phenomena and representations we see according to cultural values which are significant to us as living human beings. According to Kant, our perceptions, experiences, and judgments are impossible without the a priori categories of the mind organizing and constituting objective reality. Weber transfers Kant's theory of knowledge and critical method to a discussion of social science and historical objectivity. The filtering and measuring mechanism through which historical experience is formed is a product of a value-relevant science, that is, the categories of scientific understanding. He writes,

To be sure, without the investigator's evaluative ideas, there would be no principle of selection of subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge of the concrete reality. Just as without the investigator's conviction regarding the significance of particular cultural facts, every attempt to analyze concrete reality is absolutely meaningless, so the direction of his personal belief, the refraction of values in the prism of his mind, gives direction to his work.⁵⁴

The metatheoretical analysis about objectivity shifts to a consideration of the selection and ordering process of experience, which, depending on the type of approach, may be transcendental, phenomenological, dialectical, or value relevant. The method by which historical reality is formed by the categories of the mind remains an open and fascinating discussion affected by whether one turns to German idealism, Marxism, existentialism, or neo-Kantian philosophy.

We choose what is relevant to us, and it becomes an object of historical analysis. What appear to be historically given facts of external reality are only mental phenomena and subjective representations. In order to clarify his position, Weber provides the example of a "money economy" whose cultural significance and historical origins must be explained in order for history to be important to us. What are its relevant features, especially when compared to a moral economy outlined by Aristotle? Such an investigation would require a detailed examination of the principles of formal reason, possessive individualism, market competition, private property, and natural rights. The breakdown of Catholic natural law and its replacement by the Protestant ethic would be central to an understanding of this experience. Only within this broader context would a money economy have any meaning. Weber emphasizes that knowledge of a market economy could not be derived from an examination of economic laws. He emphatically states that "there is no absolutely 'objective' scientific analysis of culture."⁵⁵ The word *objective* in

this sentence refers to the traditional positivist use of the term; it denotes a pre-existing and presuppositionless world beyond human consciousness.

Weber maintains that historical science must also examine the nature of causality as a product of the investigator's choices, along with the understanding of the meaning and intentions of cultural occurrences. The historically relevant factors in defining the origins of events are products of a transcendental subjectivity. From out of the confusion of the infinite multiplicity of reality, historical phenomena are created; there are no presuppositionless facts or concepts. Even when considering causality, there are an infinite number of possible causes from which the scientist must chose the most important. Weber writes, "Order is brought into this chaos only on the condition that in every case only a part of concrete reality is interesting and *significant* to us, because only it is related to the *cultural values* with which we approach reality."⁵⁶ Just as quickly as Weber attributes cultural significance as the major influence on deciding causal explanations, he is critical of the positivist explanation of causality in history. The particular cannot be subsumed under general nomological laws. Causality, like the events and personalities themselves, must be examined in their concrete relationships. Toward this end, Weber begins to articulate a new theory of causality based on the principles of "adequate causality," "objective possibility," and historical laws. To help explain the nature of causal relationships, he turns to legal hermeneutics and the methods of ancient historiography. He borrows these ideas from Kries, Radbruch, and Eduard Meyer. Their ideas have been examined more fully elsewhere.⁵⁷

According to these theorists, the notion of causality is to be understood not in the context of the natural sciences but from the perspective of criminal and civil law. The determination of the guilt of a defendant in a court of law and the subsequent punishment or legal indemnity require a specifically defined idea of causation. There is a connection between objective guilt delineated by law and subjective intentions and actions that must be carefully navigated in the final determination of guilt or innocence. With Weber's training in legal hermeneutics, he argues in his essay, "The Logic of the Cultural Sciences" (1906), that both law and history share a common logical form of causality. This is the basis for understanding historical causality as both law and history deal with human beings in practical situations.⁵⁸ From the infinite manifold and causal possibilities, the drama of history and the court must be carefully sifted through in order to create historical and legal facts. Only the most significant elements in both situations can make it into a final decision about intentions and causality. Added to this idea of adequate causality, Weber introduces Meyer's notion of objective possibility. Through a complex use of abstractions in thought experiments, the scientist is able to determine what events are primary to

the perceived historical outcome. In this way, Meyer was able to state that without the Athenian success at the battle of Marathon, the flourishing of Hellenic culture would have been impossible.

From what we have just discussed, the answer to the Weberian dilemma of objectivity, as a form of value relevance, is that his theory of value permeates all aspects of his social theory from social science to social policy. With the application of the principle of *Wertbeziehung* to historical science, values affect the concepts formed, the questions raised, the areas investigated, the methods employed, and the theories constructed. Science is permeated by values at every level of epistemology, methodology, research, and theory. With changes in concept formation and substantive areas of inquiry, there are also changes in the methods employed to acquire the information requested. When interested in issues of meaning and values, Weber turns to cultural hermeneutics; when asking questions about the consequences and implications of action and policy, he directs his gaze at technical analysis; and when focused on unconscious motives or historical origins, he develops a structuralist or historical analysis of modern society. The distinction between science and value judgments disappears because values, ideals, and ethics directly influence the accumulation and interpretation of data and the analysis of results.⁵⁹

Guy Oakes in his work *Weber and Rickert* rejects the value relevance and value freedom distinction found in Rickert because the former is ultimately based on the latter: "Valuations form the grounds on which choices among alternative value relevances are made. . . . Thus it is an error to claim that value relevancies are independent of value judgments."⁶⁰ If the distinction between value relevance (*Wertbeziehung*) and value freedom (*Wertfreiheit*) collapses, so too does the distinction between empirical science and value freedom. Valuations now play a central role in all aspects of scientific inquiry from its initial stage of determining the substantive area of investigation to its final theoretical conclusions. The question remains: what then does Weber mean by objectivity in social science under these conditions of value relevance and value judgments? Although Weber is not always clear on this issue, the logic of his argument directs him down a certain path of inquiry. Science and ethics are not independent in his theory of practical science. In the end, Weber's criticism of the misunderstanding and misapplication of value judgments lies not in the epistemological or methodological use of values in the construction of scientific knowledge. Rather, his concern is with the manner of application of values in abstract moralizing and inappropriate social criticism in the classroom; his central concern at this point is, like Marx, not with metascience but with utopian idealism and authoritarian domination in the academy. For more on the distinction between value judgments and ethical moralizing, see the Weber section in chapter 2.

The general difficulty that has kept us from appreciating Weber's consistent theory of science and values has been the Enlightenment prejudice to insulate and protect science from disruptive incursions of subjective ethics and competing moral values. An epistemological theory in which values permeate every aspect of social theory runs counter to positivistically trained minds. As we have already examined, the resolution of the apparent inconsistencies and contradictions rests in the realization that Weber was not protecting science from ethics but rather ethics from science.⁶¹ As unusual and discordant as this may sound, he was attempting to insulate ethics from the unconscious metaphysics and hidden assumptions of modern science (*Herrschaftswissenschaft*). It is Enlightenment science which imposes a set of values on concept formation, research standards, and social theory, which distorts the epistemology and methods of historical science, as well as imposes a universal set of principles and values on the scientific world. In Weber's analysis of the phenomenology of Western science from substantive to formal rationality in "Science as a Vocation," he articulates the hidden assumptions of utilitarian logic and administrative control which pervade the formal rationality of modern science. To apply the methods of natural science to the study of history and society is to distort the latter and further incorporate the social sciences into the narrowing and eclipsing of reason. Weber's theory of values in historical science was an attempt to free sociology from the process of rationalization and disenchantment and to separate method from technique, empirical research from formal rationality. The metaphysical distinction between empirical knowledge and value judgments in positivism is ultimately a false distinction because values are so intimately interwoven into scientific inquiry and our everyday knowledge of the social world. In the end, Weber's purpose was to free science from the limits of concept formation in the natural sciences, whose goal is the production of explanatory hypotheses and universal laws for the technical and administrative control over social reality. His purpose was to free values from a narrow definition of science so that the academy could begin to raise the more important questions in practical and critical science concerning the nature of the modern individual and the last man in the iron cage who invents happiness. Early in the essay on objectivity and science, Weber writes:

It is true that we regard as *objectively* valuable those innermost elements of the "personality," those highest and most ultimate value judgments which determine our conduct and give meaning and significance to our life. We can indeed espouse these values only when they appear to us as valid, as derived from our highest values and when they are developed in the struggle against the difficulties which life presents. Certainly, the dignity of the "personality" lies

in the fact that for it there exist values about which it organizes its life;—even if these values are in certain cases concentrated exclusively within the sphere of the person’s “individuality,” then “self-realization” in *those* interests for which it claims *validity as values*, is the idea with respect to which its whole existence is oriented.⁶²

Wilhelm Hennis has stressed this particular theme in Weber’s “science of man” as the key to understanding his massive body of scholarly work. Underlying Weber’s historical writings is the knowledge of different cultures and civilizations which allows social theorists the option of making judgments about the standards and types of individual self-realization and the forms of social organization that will protect and nurture those cultural and individual ideals. It is another form in which Weber expresses his belief that historical science is an ethical science in the classical Greek tradition of *phronesis*. Weber clearly favors a strong inner personality that is directed toward a moral calling rather than the reality of the last man without ethical hope or political imagination.

Eventually, Weber raises the all-important question of justification and validation: if existential judgments and evaluative ideas are the constitutive principles through which historical substance and causes are formed, how is objective validity to be determined? What determines the correct choice of cultural values necessary for the formation of historical objects? Rickert wrestled with this problem and ultimately grounded objective validity on both communal consensus and a philosophy of history. He never clarified the relationship between the two. Weber’s response to the question takes an interesting and unsettling turn. It is at this key point that another philosophical tradition influencing his metatheoretical direction plays such an important role. The radicalization of Kant in Nietzsche’s theory of knowledge results in epistemological perspectivism and moral nihilism; this pushes Weber toward a freedom from values. Weber repeats Tolstoy’s question about which of the warring gods or values we should serve. This does not result in the traditional objective or neutral stance toward values. It simply means that there are no objective criteria in the choice of values relevant to the formation of historical categories. This concept of “value freedom” would be more accurately translated as “freedom from values,” thereby implying the epistemological subtleties and complexities of moral relativism.⁶³ In the end, Weber holds that the objective validity of historical concepts resides in the character and scholarship of the researcher. This means that the main criterion of objectivity rests in subjectivity, or the commitment, integrity, and courage of the scholar.

It is at this point in his essay “Science as a Vocation,” focusing on the phenomenology and transformation of modern science (*Zweckrationalität*), that Weber juxtaposes two interesting, but not immediately relatable, concepts:

disenchantment and academic prophecy. The two ideas are intimately related, since the historical stage of disenchantment and the rise of formal rationality have undermined the objective foundations of political, philosophical, and theological knowledge. The result in the German academy has been a loss of the search for objective truth and the “ultimate meaning of his [the individual’s] own conduct” and a turn toward utilitarian and political preaching, that is, the technical mastery of nature and society with state bureaucracy, market imperatives, and formal reason.⁶⁴ Richard Wellen attempts to reconnect objectivity to practical knowledge by uncovering the relationship between Weber’s notion of disenchantment and the methodological pragmatism and antifoundationalism of John Dewey and Richard Rorty.⁶⁵ Disenchantment is the beginning of practical and critical thinking based on value freedom since there are no longer any firm foundations for objective truth. There is only moral pluralism spurred on by a diversity of competing gods within a nihilistic and skeptical universe. However, this leads Weber neither to epistemological despair nor to theoretical agnosticism. In his search for practical knowledge, he attempts to ground academic freedom in the subject—a professional calling—and not in the object of study—neutrality and historical distance. Wellen summarizes this methodological perspective:

And yet, anyone, who reads Weber knows that he does not want the commitment to value-freedom itself to undermine the reasons intellectuals might have to make their work relevant to the concerns of politics and social criticism. . . . Value-freedom, on this view, is a pedagogical matter, an injunction for the academic teacher to stimulate his or her students to push their examination of policy alternatives and moral commitments toward relentless self-clarification, highlighting the competing ultimate evaluative standpoints they entail.⁶⁶

Wellen also notices that value freedom in the context of the German university system entails a freedom from the institutional authority and control of the state bureaucracy and the market forces of the greengrocer. These powers push Weber to rely on the objectivity of personal integrity, academic responsibility, professional calling, and the intellectual strength of the scholar within an open and dialogical academy. Although social science cannot establish its own moral standards for social action and criticism—in this sense it is not a social philosophy—it can apply the cultural and moral standards already debated within society by the application of its “ethics of critical thinking.”⁶⁷

Since the formation of concepts, rules of logic, and methods of inquiry of both the social and natural sciences are permeated by a priori assumptions

and hidden values, there can be no distancing of ourselves from values. Freedom in this neo-Kantian context is a conscious recognition of the values and their influence on scientific investigation. Thus true objectivity means that our values are not unconscious or disruptive of serious scholarship. As Weber is quite aware and as already discussed in this chapter, even natural science has a “practical evaluative attitude” because of its underlying metaphysics of realism and naturalism, its technical orientation to the world through abstract generalizations and analytical laws, its drive to dominate and control nature, and its utilitarian optimism and materialist faith in progress.⁶⁸ In the context of the metaphysics and history of science, value freedom and moral neutrality simply express the disenchantment of formal reason. Modern concepts are infused with the principles of rationalization and disenchantment. It is this moral perspective that makes the objective grounding of evaluative ideas and cultural values logically impossible. Weber takes Kant’s transcendental subjectivity and a priori categories and transforms them into the basis for a philosophy of historical science. Returning to his earlier path-breaking essay on objectivity in the social sciences, he writes, “If one perceives the implications of the fundamental ideas of modern epistemology which ultimately derives from Kant; namely, that concepts are primarily analytical instruments for the intellectual mastery of empirical data and can be only that, the fact that precise genetic concepts are necessarily ideal types will not cause him to desist from constructing them.”⁶⁹ He replaces the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic with Nietzsche’s radical treatment of Kant’s transcendental subjectivity and categorical imperative. The will to power is beyond all conceptual limits in both knowledge and morals. There are no apparent limits to action placed on human beings either from the objective world of experience (empiricism and rationalism) or from the structure of consciousness itself (innate ideas or a priori categories).⁷⁰

The issue of ideal types represents a methodological clarification of the nature of historical representations with an emphasis on their heuristic importance. Ideal types accentuate the essential elements of historical events by creating mental constructs (*Gedankenbilder*) which cannot be found in reality.⁷¹ This is why Weber characterizes these concepts as utopian. They do not exist outside of consciousness. They highlight those aspects of history which investigators deem important for the development of their analyses, for example, the relationship between religion and modern capitalism. Historical categories, such as the Protestant ethic, feudalism, capitalism, imperialism, and so forth, are conceptual abstractions from reality. “It [Ideal type] has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components.”⁷² Ideal types are usually used in conjunction with the application of the concept of objectivity possibility.

Weber's later social and economic writings contain an entirely new appropriation of Kantian methodology that has not been fully explored at this point. Based on his writings in the *Sociology of Religion* (1920), lectures in *General Economic History* (1919—1920), and *Economy and Society* (1922), he develops an historical method which is outside the parameters set by the neo-Kantian school of thought.⁷³ Moving away from issues of subjectively intended meaning and cultural significance, he emphasizes the structural foundations of modern capitalism. That is, Weber moves from a sociology of subjective cultural meaning and understanding to a sociology of historical structures and collective patterns of objective meaning. In his early theory of knowledge, he borrows from Rickert the question of the transcendental conditions for the possibility of historical knowledge. Toward the end of his academic career, he shifts his attention to the social and institutional conditions for the possibility of capitalism. Some interpreters have speculated that Weber's shift of emphasis implies a recognition that his liberal and German idealist assumptions of methodological individualism and self-conscious intentionality and action can no longer be accepted as the basis for historical research since most significant events occur behind the backs of individuals as a result of the deep and pervasive structures in society. From their perspective, consciousness has been replaced by deep structures and a theory of the social unconscious.

The Reformation, the Enlightenment, capitalism, and rationalization are historical moments resulting from unconscious collective behavior and the structural imperatives within social systems. Individuals are only vaguely aware of the intentions or the consequences of their actions but are blindly and mechanically caught up in the maelstrom of the structural transformation of modernity. In the later introduction of 1919 to *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber writes, "The capitalist economy of the present day is an immense cosmos into which the individual is born, and which presents itself to him, at least as an individual, as an unalterable order of things in which he must live. It forces the individual, in so far as he is involved in the system of market relationships, to conform to capitalistic rules of action."⁷⁴ As religion is replaced by natural science and Enlightenment rationality, the cultural values of the Reformation become less relevant as explanations for social behavior in a market economy. This objectification of individual intentions and the reification of social institutions occur more frequently as society is transformed by formal rationality and purposive rational action. Georg Stauth recognizes that the incorporation of meaningful action into instrumental action has had important implications for Weber's research and method: "It is the conviction of Weber that modern society wins its special status in history because it produces the tentative identity of structure and action."⁷⁵ Intentionality and substantive rationality of ultimate values are

lost within the structural directives of modern bureaucracy and its hidden assumptions of technical reason. Calculation and mastery replace meaning, intentionality, and self-determination. Methodology, therefore, must adapt to changing social realities; methodology follows history and social theory from the study of the Protestant ethic to the uncovering of the structures and origins of capitalism.

In his lectures, *General Economic History*, Weber turns his attention to the historical origins of capitalism resting in rational law, the medieval city and entrepreneurial commerce, the modern nation state, natural science and industrial technology, and the new social organization of production based on private property, free labor, and class power.⁷⁶ In his work on China, he stresses those aspects of Chinese society which inhibited or discouraged capital formation and industrial production, such as the existence of prebends and a patrimonial bureaucracy, empire and the literati, the temple courts and local village self-government, and the welfare system of the sib. Weber never wrote a methodological treatise that incorporated his reflections on his later historical writings. This was a serious omission and has led to enormous confusion in the debates about the relationship between his early epistemology and later methodology. The discussion about causality and explanation would have taken a different tone and direction if it had been placed within this context of historical structuralism. His methodological position shifts, not because he abandons neo-Kantian philosophy for positivist naturalism, but because his social theory itself changes, forcing him to adapt to a new set of questions about the historical origins of modern capitalism and the unconscious structures affecting human behavior and the fate of humanity. The differences between interpretive and explanatory sociology are less the result of philosophical disagreements between conflicting methodologies and theories of knowledge than they are substantive differences between evolving social theories. As Weber moves away from an emphasis on conscious intentions in human action and toward the unconscious effects and historical origins of social institutions, the types of questions he raises change along with his social theory and methods of inquiry. And these changes must be understood within the framework of an Aristotelian theory of sociology as a practical science. The goal of this form of historical knowledge is not theoretical science or technical control but practical wisdom about the changing patterns of social life in history in order to live a life of personal and civic nobility and virtuous self-determination.

MORAL IDEALS AND SOCIAL THEORY OF REPRESENTATIONS IN DURKHEIM

Just as in the case of Marx and Weber, there has been an intense debate within the scholarly community about the divide between Durkheim's early

and later writings. Many have assumed that the early Durkheim, from his dissertation on the division of labor and his methodological writing to his work on suicide, reflected a strong positivist orientation. In these writings, it is maintained, there was an emphasis on social facts and the application of the method of the natural sciences with its realism and copy theory of truth. After this period, he began to be influenced more by German idealism and Anglo-American pragmatism in his social theory of knowledge and sociology of religion. This methodological divide between positivism and idealism is also reflected in Durkheim's social theory, with its early functionalism and later social constructivism. A closer and more critical look reveals an entirely different story. An alternative perspective will unfold in this section, as we will see that Durkheim's early examination of the scientific method in sociology is grounded in his theory of representations, which has its roots in Kant's critique of pure reason and Schopenhauer's radicalization of subjective idealism. Viewed from within this philosophical context, there is no logical or epistemological break between his early and later writings since both are grounded in a Kantian theory of knowledge and critique of positivism.⁷⁷

Durkheim's theory of methods, articulated in *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895), outlines his theory of science that sociology studies social phenomena which are to be treated as social facts or things. This work, nestled between his doctoral dissertation, *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893), and *Suicide* (1897), sets the framework within which his early works are to be interpreted. This central position has led many to believe that he was attempting to establish the foundations for a positivist methodology. However, a closer reading of the work reveals something altogether different. In the preface to the second edition of *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim provides a warning to the reader when he writes, "The proposition which states that social facts are to be treated as things—the proposition at the very basis of our method—is one of those which have provoked most contradictions."⁷⁸ He is aware that it has been considered by some to be both "paradoxical" and "ridiculous" to confuse the method of the natural sciences with that of the social sciences. Bearing this in mind, Durkheim's obtuse reference to the primary data of social science as social facts which are to be treated methodologically as things needs some deconstruction and unpacking of its implications. He starts by claiming that he has been misinterpreted, since he claims that he was not guilty of reification or reductionism—reducing social to natural facts. His argument is that he was providing the formal and logical foundations to the social sciences by making them equal in status to the natural sciences. He was not, however, either reducing the former to the latter or claiming the same material or ontological status for the social sciences. He clearly states: "To treat the facts of a certain order as things is not, then, to place them in a

certain category of reality but to assume a certain mental attitude toward them. . . . Our principle, then implies no metaphysical conception, no speculation about the fundamental nature of beings."⁷⁹ The reference to social facts is not an attempt to justify a state of being (ontology) or a claim to reality (epistemology), since it is only a methodological statement that facts are external and unknown to the investigator. As a result, they require serious empirical study. The designation of social facts as things was intended as the logical basis for rejecting the claims of psychology and subjective introspection as appropriate methods for the study of the characteristics, causes, and functions of social phenomena. One could argue that this work on methods is theoretically awkward, epistemologically naive, and methodologically underdeveloped. That having been said, it does not represent a formal defense of objectivism or naturalism. It remains a methodological statement and not a metaphysical one. Durkheim's goal was apparently to claim that society has as much reality as physical and psychological nature and can thus be studied objectively through observation and experimentation.⁸⁰

This distinction between method and metaphysics leads us naturally to the issue of the Kantian foundations of Durkheim's theory of knowledge. He describes sociology as the scientific study of institutions, which are defined as the collective representations and social practices of a society. Durkheim's method is distinctive in its study of representations as having particular social functions. The first and most important question to be raised is: why does Durkheim describe the basic building blocks of sociology using a theory of representations which has its origins in Kantian epistemology?⁸¹ A neo-Kantian theory of representations was central to Weber's *Wissenschaftslehre*. For Durkheim, his theory of representations grounds his thesis that the basic building blocks of information in science are social facts as things having objective reality. Much of the secondary literature on Durkheim has emphasized the reality of social facts yet until recently overlooked his ideas on the nature of social representations. The theory of representations is epistemologically nuanced, and its application by him has changed our interpretation of his theory of social facts. This is the basis for what Durkheim would later call his "renovated rationalism." The reference to objective things was an attempt to locate sociology as having the same formal and logical status as natural science: it is empirical, objective, and scientific. From the material constitution of the discipline, it differs from natural science in that it deals with representations which are mental constructs manifested as immaterial beliefs, ideas, and traditions. According to Susan Stedman Jones, representations are objects constructed by consciousness which order and systematize our sensations, integrate the subject and object, reject the epistemology of empiricism and naive realism, and combine morality and science. She also argues that Durkheim's theory of representations rejects the problematic idealism and skeptical solipsism of Descartes and Berkeley; there is an objective

reality beyond the inner experience of human consciousness. Judgments of perception refer to a real world outside of the synthetic unity of the mind, thereby integrating the mind and the body, understanding and sensibility. A theory of representations forces us to reconsider the nature of empirical reality, as well as the origins of the categories of the mind and the collective forms by which experience takes shape. She writes, "All knowledge of experience is mediated, and is mediated through the terms and conditions of representations."⁸² It certainly calls into question the traditional Anglo-American approach to Durkheim's sociology with its methodological dualism and defense of naturalism.⁸³

Representations, as concepts and ideas, are objectively manifested in the social practices and institutions of religion, science, law, state, family, and so forth, and can be scientifically organized around the areas of history, functions, and laws. This clarification and modification of facts as representations is Durkheim's way of integrating in a revised Kantian fashion the traditional distinctions between empiricism and rationalism for the new method of sociology. Critical of the empiricism of Comte and the rationalism of Spencer, Durkheim is attempting to build sociology on the firm foundations of the form and matter of collective representations. He contends that "this science, indeed, could be brought into existence only with the realization that social phenomena although immaterial, are nevertheless real things, the proper objects of scientific study."⁸⁴ To help explain his position, Durkheim offers moral maxims and legal rules, the universal acceptance of a national language, and the use of local currency as examples of social facts which coercively constrain the conduct of individual citizens. Acceptance of these public norms depends on individual representations and actions, but the social dimension is distinct, objective, and independent and can be empirically studied. The collective emotions of a crowd have both an individual and a social dimension, but the latter is not reducible to the former, nor does the former express the distinctive power of the latter. The whole system of beliefs and institutions can be found in the particular parts but is not reducible to the sum of the parts themselves. And when this is placed in the context of his dialogue with the Aristotelian tradition of *phronesis* and moral science, Durkheim's sociology takes on an entirely different presentation. As in the case with the other classical social theorists, science for him is formed by a conversion of the philosophical horizons of Kant and Aristotle.

The subject matter of sociology, as the collective beliefs and practices within society which are external to the individual, has its own objective reality and traditions, is uniform and systematic, and exercises a causal and coercive moral force on individual consciousness and behavior. The manner of the description of social institutions in Durkheim's early works indicates that he views these ways of thinking and acting as the social construction

of the world as representation and will. Sometimes the representations or social ideas themselves are difficult to observe scientifically and can only be studied in their objective form as social institutions. Durkheim writes that the domain of sociology is characterized by the following: "A social fact is to be recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals, and the presence of this power may be recognized in its turn either by the existence of some specific sanction or by the resistance offered against every individual effort that tends to violate it."⁸⁵ Social facts are objects of scientific study because they manifest the concrete form of representations in their coercive strength, ability to generate individual resistance, and power to elicit public sanctions. A second major aspect is that they are independent of any individual expression they may take historically. Externality, coercion, and universality are the characteristic forms of social representations. In many cases, social facts such as death rates, marriage, and suicides are open to quantitative measurement.

Durkheim describes social facts in this way as a means to differentiate them from unmediated empirical facts or products of individual consciousness that are open to private introspection. He rejects the methods of uncritical induction and rationalist reflection on abstract and transcendent ideas. Durkheim is especially critical of the sociological method which examines isolated ideas of law, morality, state, and so forth as independent of the institutional forms they take in society. Borrowing from Schopenhauer, he refers to these ideas as "illusions that distort the real aspect of things [and] are nevertheless mistaken for the things themselves."⁸⁶ Representations, separated from objective institutions, history, and functions, form the illusions that Durkheim believes are the dreams and deceptions of the veil of Maya that keep us from seeing reality. These illusions are what Francis Bacon referred to as "idols." According to Durkheim, the use of idols is usually characteristic of the early stages of scientific development when investigators turn to their own conscious ideas about a subject matter rather than directing their attention to empirical inquiry. Social science at this stage of development contains more philosophical anthropology and political philosophy than it does science. The examination of society is reduced to the study of our ideas about society. Durkheim likens the discourse about these issues to the repetition of concepts used in everyday conversation where emotional attachments and commonsense ideas about the world are taken for reality. When he refers to these ideas as 'representations,' the latter term is enclosed in single quotation marks to indicate his rejection of this subjective and arbitrary approach to science, which he claims is symptomatic of the method employed by Comte. Durkheim contends that the first rule of sociology is to turn from ideas to social facts as objectively measurable social institutions, artifacts, and modes of behavior. The issue of the objective validity of social concepts in Marx was defined by the ideologi-

cal standards of classical economics, in Weber by the quality and character of the individual scholar in determining the value-relevant concepts, and in Durkheim by the essential properties of social phenomena as empirical, external, and coercive ideals and institutions.

Durkheim also questions the applicability of the Cartesian method of analysis and synthesis, since this only reduces the scientific data to their simplest components. This approach fails to capture the integrated totality of the social system reflected in its ideas, values, and beliefs. Just as life cannot be found in the various discrete elements of a living substance, so too society is not a simple summation of its individual parts and cannot be reduced to them. The collective representations are manifestations of a society's consciousness of itself as a total entity. It is "the way in which a society thinks of itself and its environment."⁸⁷ Sociology empirically examines ideas and consciousness in historically formed institutions and social practices. In this way, Durkheim has methodologically blended the methods of empiricism (sensuous perception and facts) and rationalism (consciousness and ideas) into his "renovated rationalism," since "the organization of family, of contracts, of punishment, of the state, and of society appears thus to be simply the embodiment of the ideas we hold concerning society, state, justice, etc."⁸⁸ There is a dialectic between methods, as well as between representations and objective institutions, since it is the latter which gives substantive and concrete voice to the former. Moral, legal, and religious restrictions, punishments, ideals, and cultural values are institutionalized and become social facts. Subjective representations must be crystallized into coherent, objective forms to be made scientifically viable.

Even assuming the possibility that social life is merely the development of certain ideas, these ideas are nevertheless not immediately given. They cannot be perceived or known directly, but only through the phenomenal reality expressing them. . . . We must, therefore, consider social phenomena in themselves, as distinct from the consciously formed representations of them in the mind; we must study them objectively as external things, for it is this character that they present to us.⁸⁹

Durkheim argues that social institutions are the conscious product of our representations and engagement with the world around us. His critique of illusory idols leads him back to an analysis of Hume's theory of impressions and sense perceptions. The question remains why he uses the Kantian notion of "representations" rather than the Humean idea of "impressions" to reflect on issues of method, logic, and science in sociology. That is, why does he eschew empiricism and turn instead to a critical idealism? Durkheim's view of science, based on a theory of representations, redirects sociology from an

analysis of capital and the social relations of production (Marx) and cultural meaning and historical structures (Weber) to an emphasis on the collective representations of a society articulated in its social institutions. Although the scholarly focus of Durkheim's sociology is quite different from that of Marx and Weber, they share a common theoretical interest in the history, structure, and function of modernity. They also share a common philosophical heritage that contends that historical science is a critical and ethical science. Kant's theory of representations becomes the basis for Schopenhauer's existential philosophy in *The World as Will and Representation* (1819, 1844).⁹⁰ Following Kant's transcendental subjectivity, Schopenhauer outlines his belief that the logical and formal structure of the world around time, space, and causality are products of the a priori in human consciousness. "[T]he whole of this world is only object in relation to the subject, perception of the perceiver, in a word, representation. . . . Everything that in any way belongs and can belong to the world is inevitably associated with this being-conditioned by the subject, and it exists only for the subject. The world is representation."⁹¹ Representations are mental constructs of both the sensibility and the understanding. They are the means by which objectivity and the external world are created. However, according to Schopenhauer, they do not allow us to get to reality as the thing-in-itself. Representations are not the ground of being and do not privilege impressions or ideas as reality. Instead, they produce a construct of phenomena and appearances.

Durkheim's use of the term *representations* was quite likely an attempt to place his methodological reflections into a Kantian universe that questioned the transcendent and absolute ontological status of sensuous impressions and ideas. Ideas and perceptions just don't exist as reified idols autonomously in the external world but are constructed from the collective experiences and habits of individuals in society who are influenced by years of education, tradition, authority, and socialization. It is these very cultural conditions which replace the transcendental subject and a priori forms as the mediating categories in human experience. Transformed by Durkheim, representations are the collective thoughts and general cultural beliefs that influence social action, the conduct of human life, and the formation of crystallized patterns of meaning in institutions. Institutions are embodied symbols that have a coercive effect on human action. The result is a new sociological method which could not appropriate the naturalism and realism of the natural sciences but requires a new philosophical foundation in a Kantian theory of knowledge. The dialectic between representations and institutions, ideas and objective organizations, requires a method that is sensitive to both the perception of empirical reality and the understanding of collective meaning. Weber turns to a critical hermeneutic to deal with these issues, while Durkheim emphasizes a critical empiricism. Representations are to be studied not only to elicit their cultural meaning but to outline

their institutional and functional network—their effects on human praxis. The reciprocity of the conscious subject and empirical object would have to be explained by renovating Kant's theory of representations. This, in turn, requires a rethinking of the nature of objectivity and the objective validity of social concepts and theory.

Before proceeding to Durkheim's social epistemology with its historical and social theory of categories, the all-important question of science and values in his method should be considered. He turns to perhaps the most vexing and interesting problem in the social sciences when, at the beginning of chapter 3 of *The Rules of Sociological Method*, he writes, in a way similar to that found in Weber's theory of knowledge, that "science can teach us nothing about what we ought to desire. It is concerned, they say, only with facts which all have the same value and interest for us; it observes and explains but does not judge them. Good and evil do not exist for science."⁹² According to this Enlightenment theory of knowledge, science is value free and neutral and cannot make value judgments or teleological comments about the ultimate values and goals of society. It cannot make normative judgments about the movement of history, the structure of society, or the substance of its underlying cultural ideals. Durkheim recognizes the various elements of the positivist position which he mistakenly attributes to both Marx and Weber; but as he begins to formulate an alternative perspective based on sociology as a practical science, he unintentionally moves closer to their actual epistemological positions. All three classical social theorists rejected Kantian dualism and sought to integrate theoretical and practical reason into a sociology that should become a moral guide to theoretical insight and practical action, and all three accepted in the final analysis the position that science can empirically examine, judge, and validate ethical norms.

In *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim stresses that the criterion for empirical objectivity and scientific validity lies in the facts as social phenomena. As in the epistemology of Weber, Durkheim blends together empiricism and rationalism when he claims that "science can only attain facts through art."⁹³ He is critical of empiricism for the distance it creates between facts and values and of rationalism for the isolation it enforces on its natural law. Durkheim, in language very similar to Weber, fears that science will formally enlighten the world but "leave darkness in our hearts." The basis for critical judgment cannot come from immediate impressions or thought but must develop out of the subjective representations as they are reflected in measurable institutions and social action. In this way, there are objective criteria found in the social phenomena themselves from which the distinction between physiology and pathology, normal and abnormal, can be derived. Durkheim writes, "If, then, we can find an objective criterion, inherent in the facts themselves, which enables us to distinguish scientifically between health and morbidity in the various orders of social phenomena,

science will be in a position to throw light on practical problems and still remain faithful to its own method."⁹⁴ Science is thus intimately involved in ethical issues and is able to make interpretations and evaluations about the structure and direction of the social system as a whole. The norms of practical reason are derived from the organization, history, and consequences of the structures of society. The traditional separation of facts and values has been transcended. The use of immanent and dialectical critique becomes the basis for the practical science of classical sociology.

The characteristics of a healthy social organism include development of vital forces in social and cultural institutions, adaptation to its environment, and ensuring of the maximum chances for continued functioning and survival. Although his analysis is quite vague and imprecise in this early monograph on the rules of method, Durkheim is confronting the vexing problem of the objective validity of sociological concepts as well as his formula for the validation of critical judgments and practical reason. He even takes the position that science needs ethics in order to re-present the facts, just as much as ethics requires an empirical investigation into the historical and cultural structures of society to be made relevant. It is recognized in the secondary literature that deducing ethics from social structures could result in an ethical naturalism which merely reproduces conformity and the power relationships of the status quo. On the other hand, deriving ethics from history and evolving societies could result in ethical relativism. Durkheim is aware of the dual dangers of naturalism and relativism, and it is this which explains his turn to Aristotle's ethical and political philosophy for moral guidance.

By means of a careful analysis of social phenomena, Durkheim argues that the distinctive features of a healthy social system will emerge and be used as the normative framework for guiding and maintaining a moral and stable society. The question arises almost immediately in the analysis: are functional equilibrium and social survivability ends in themselves or are they only means to some other goal? Have practical reason and social theory been reduced to technical rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) with its imperatives of functional adaptability and systems rationalization? By examining a society's evolution over time, scientists uncover those institutions which are generally distributed throughout society and have resulted in physiological stability and order. *Normalcy* is defined as the average or characteristic rate of social phenomena for a society or social group; health is expressed by regularity and generality—the statistical norm for the majority of people. In turn, empirical analysis also uncovers those irregular and pathological relationships which tend toward social morbidity and disease. Normalcy can only arise in the historical context of system survival and can never be projected as a cultural ideal independent of a healthy functioning of society. Durkheim is critical of Marxist and neoclassical economics because of their a priori

imposition of moral categories from outside the structural constitution of society. “The common flaw in these definitions is their premature attempt to grasp the essence of phenomena.”⁹⁵ From his perspective, it is structure and function which provide the ethical basis for practical science.⁹⁶ These should provide the normative justification for the formulation of social policy. Durkheim reinforces this when he argues that the statesman should not impose abstract and external ideals upon society but should act as a good physician, maintaining the health and hygiene of the patient when possible and intervening and curing when necessary.

It would be an error to mistake the analysis of the logical foundations of science for the substantive or material analysis of the norms guiding practical reason and social action. Although functional stability is useful for determining the constitution of a healthy organism, it does not provide us with its substantive ethical requirements. In *The Division of Labor*, Durkheim outlines in more detail the particular normative elements of practical science in the ethical principles of social solidarity, equality, and justice. His theory of science is based on the fundamental premise that the goal of knowledge is to observe, describe, and classify. However, he also acknowledges that science has other goals, such as critical evaluation, promotion of rules of action, and improvement of society.⁹⁷ He forcefully states that theoretical science without practical science is worthless. In the preface to the first edition of the work, he advances his position on the nature of science in the following manner: “We shall see that science can help us adjust ourselves, determining the ideal toward which we are heading confusedly. But we shall attain this ideal only after observing reality, and separating it from the ideal. . . . Some will object that the method of observation lacks rules to judge the collected facts. But this rule grows out of the facts themselves.”⁹⁸ In this earliest of his writings, Durkheim refers to the social ideal, derived only from facts, as the moral health of the organism.

In the end, we see that the classical social theorists—Marx, Weber, and Durkheim—all develop a critical and ethical science based on Kantian philosophy and informed by history, dialectics, and social criticism. They reject any method that does not respect the idiosyncrasies and meanings of social phenomena. This is not to say that there are not major substantive or methodological differences among them. What is being claimed is only that they share a common intellectual tradition that rejects Enlightenment positivism as applicable to the understanding (cultural meaning), interpretation (social intentions and action), and explanation (historical causes and institutional functions) of social reality. Without morals, science is blind, and without science, morality is meaningless since it cannot approach, speak to, or engage social reality in any relevant dialogue.

Talcott Parsons claimed that the ideal directing Durkheim’s research was the issue of social order manifested in the different types of legal systems in

ancient and modern societies. The explanation for the collective conscience, social solidarity, and the differences between repressive and restrictive laws was based on society's need to maintain order and stability, especially in a society characterized by liberal capitalism, market competition, and self-interested utilitarianism. As liberalism and social differentiation were pulling the social ties apart, Durkheim's theory was attempting to reconnect the key elements which would make them integrated and cohesive. This is what he called "organic solidarity." The ideal was to stop the disruptive and disintegrating drift of modernity and to strengthen the solidarity that held the different elements of society together in a comprehensive and functioning whole. According to Parsons, social equilibrium and functional stability were the key normative features of social science. But the question remains: is this an accurate picture of Durkheim's social theory?

Durkheim is critical of treating sociology as a technical and value-free science to ensure social order and stability. He maintains that this is a "prejudice" that must be rejected in favor of a dialectical functionalism in which the normal type of healthy society is compared to its actual historical conditions. By comparing the ideal to the real, the contradictions of the social system will provide the researcher with the practical basis for making recommendations for social policy and change. In this way, "the antithesis between science and ethics, that formidable argument with which the mystics of all times have wished to cloud human reason, disappears."⁹⁹ Durkheim is suspicious of science only when the ethical dimension is introduced arbitrarily from outside of empirical research in the form of a philosophical anthropology and external critique; it is the functional moral health of society which is the guiding imperative of his social theory. Parsons had located the functionalism of Durkheim in the tradition of Thomas Hobbes and his concern for social order and stability in the midst of an English civil war.¹⁰⁰ This position has become part of the folklore of American sociology. A closer reading of Book 3 of *The Division of Labor* reveals, however, that Durkheim's view of a healthy society does not correspond to that suggested by Parsons' structural functionalism. Instead, he locates his ethical functionalism within the traditions of Aristotle and Kant, as he places emphasis not on the maintenance of order and the status quo but on social justice resting upon the principles of equality, social worth, reciprocity, just price, fair market exchange, communal solidarity, and the cult of the individual. These issues have already been considered in chapter 2 of this work.

Durkheim never wavers in claiming that his goal is to develop an empirical and historical sociology of morals. Morality is examined in terms of its causes (origins), evolution (history), and functions (normalcy and stability). Nor is there any doubt about his defense of practical reason and the imperative to change society rationally according to the principles and laws of moral reality. Knowledge of these moral rules would be very helpful

in reestablishing healthy relationships within a dysfunctional and pathological society. However, having said this, there remains a methodological gulf and broad misunderstanding about the exact nature and role of the art of morality. The dialectical relationship between functionality and the human ideal—between normalcy and perfection—is never explicitly made clear. Does functionalism serve a higher moral purpose of human development in a social economy and communal democracy, or do these social ideals serve the functional need and structural imperative for greater social solidarity in a complex and changing society? In chapter 2, the argument was made that functionalism and solidarity were to be understood within a broader context of social justice. In his earlier writings, there is a greater emphasis on morality and functional solidarity, whereas in his later works there is more emphasis on issues of education, civic morality, and democratic ideals. One possible explanation for these differences is that in his earlier writings Durkheim's central focus was on the methodological issue of establishing social representations as explainable social facts. Ideals were expressed through institutions and social action; functional normalcy and pathology were the means by which they could be objectively measured. In his later writings, the methodological emphasis shifted from a sociology of morals to a sociology of knowledge, from methodology to social epistemology, and with it the ideals took on a more independent and prominent role in his social theory.

In a very clear statement of his intentions, Durkheim writes in his 1911 essay "Value Judgments and Judgments of Reality" that at the heart of society lie its moral ideals of goodness, beauty, truth, and utility, and these collective ideals should never be displaced by the priority of functionality and stability. A false and deceptive conception of society, Durkheim maintains, is a society that is "presented as a system of organs and functions, maintaining itself against outside forces of destruction just like a physical organism whose entire life consists in appropriate reactions to external stimuli. Society, is, however, more than this, for it is the center of a moral life. . . ."¹⁰¹ It is in these ideals that the collective "soul" of a society rests as an expression of its hopes, aspirations, and imagination. The functional question of health and normalcy is no longer raised as having sociological importance; it is simply assumed. From this perspective the movement in Durkheim's social theory is not from positivism to idealism but from ethical functionalism to ethical idealism.¹⁰²

The moral ideals in science, art, ethics, politics, and economics do not lie isolated in speculative reason and abstract theories, or what Durkheim refers to as "cloud cuckoo land," but in social relations and institutions. The ideals are not beyond society and history but are representations embodied in the institutions of empirical reality. They are the common ideas, collective wisdom, and imaginative hopes that sustain a society's need for moral

meaning and purpose. "A society cannot be constituted without creating ideals. These ideals are simply the ideas in terms of which society sees itself and exists at a culminating point in its development."¹⁰³ These ideals also serve an important critical function of establishing the guidelines by which reality is examined and evaluated. Value judgments are an essential part of the scientific inquiry, as the ideals are compared to reality in the same way that actuality is measured against potentiality, and the future is anticipated from the past and present. Durkheim convincingly argues: "A value judgment expresses the relation of a thing to an ideal. . . . The function of the others [ideals] is to transfigure the realities to which they relate, and these are the ideals of value."¹⁰⁴ There is an intricate union of empirical research in the judgments of reality and in the ethical evaluation of the judgments of value. Durkheim's view of science is embedded in a theory of value that integrates empiricism and idealism.

The notion of moral ideals continued to have a central place in Durkheim's thought. In fact, the last piece he wrote, which was the introduction for his planned major work on morals, simply entitled *Ethics*, is important in helping to locate this concept in his broader methodological concerns. The ideas contained in this short piece represent his last thoughts on these issues, since it was written just prior to his death in 1917. Durkheim differentiates between two distinct aspects of social science: speculative reason and the "spontaneous judgment of moral conscience." These two dimensions of science correspond to the ideas of scientific explanation and ethical justification. The former directive of science collects, classifies, and analyzes the rules of morality incorporated into the different cultures, institutions, and traditions of everyday life; they are derived from the moral and historical evidence produced by inductive empirical studies. The second component of science is the critical and evaluative dimension whose purpose is to evaluate, judge, and possibly reform these institutions.

The chief object of the rules of morality is to direct action. So speculation as to the rules of morality cannot be dissociated from action. There is no science worthy of the name which does not ultimately become an art [ethics], otherwise it would be no more than a game, an intellectual pastime, erudition pure and simple. . . . The moralist, who went no further than studying morality as a theorist, without seeking to anticipate the ideal form it is destined to realize, would therefore be fulfilling only part of his task.¹⁰⁵

Durkheim reaffirms in this introductory statement his integration of theoretical and practical reason in social science. Evaluation and critique are as important as the collection of moral facts and the development of explanatory laws. The foundation for social critique lies in the moral ideal,

which is not derived from philosophical argument about the laws of nature but from the empirical data themselves. Traditional moralists arrive at ideals through speculative introspection of their conscience (categorical imperative) or through an analysis of human psychology (natural rights theorists). Both approaches believe in self-evident truths that are absolute, unchanging, and derived from the laws of practical reason or universal human nature. Durkheim takes an entirely different approach to morality, as he argues that social theorists should examine the collective representations within society as they have appeared over time. Moving from the earlier cultures to the Greeks and Romans, the Medieval Christians to the moderns, the sociologist is able to gather a clear overview as to how moral, political, and religious values have been expressed in different cultures and societies. There are no universal values or self-evident truths. The moral ideal (*morale*) must be deduced from the common opinions and generally accepted values of the social norms (*moeurs*) as the scientist searches for the essence contained in the cultural representations.

Moral ideals are distilled from the particular historical reality of moral facts by theoretical reason, while the social norms are collected by descriptive reason.¹⁰⁶ Durkheim writes, "The idea of morality, if it is to be other than a matter of mere common sense, can only be arrived at by the scientific study of moral facts."¹⁰⁷ The moral ideal is arrived at through scientific inquiry. It is the job of the art of morality to determine the underlying moral ideal within each culture by reconstructing it from empirical evidence.¹⁰⁸ Although there are interesting and tantalizing theoretical notions in this introduction, they were never developed and only leave us wondering what Durkheim would have done with them. Science can examine values (hermeneutics), their causes and origins (history and ethnography), their place in society (functionalism), and even use them for social critique (moral ideals), but it cannot formulate or create new values.¹⁰⁹ This is very similar to the way both Marx and Weber utilize the dialectic in social critique. In language reminiscent of Aristotle's notion of *phronesis*, Durkheim argues that practical reason is a moral art. As historical beings, we must first study the empirical rules of morality and then use the science of morals as the basis for practical application. This form of knowledge is not grounded in absolutes (*episteme*), nor is it a form of technical knowledge (*techne*). It is an art of morality which acts on the basis of historically changing, imperfect, and partial knowledge that produces only "vague approximations."¹¹⁰ Moral decisions are made with changing facts and imprecise knowledge of what seems rational at the time. It is an imaginative construction based on contingent information. In order to clarify his position, Durkheim uses the example of a physician who does not have a solution to a serious medical problem but acts on the basis of accumulated wisdom and the best judgment possible under the situation; the social theorist must act in society using practical wisdom.

The critical method for practical action employed by Durkheim contains two distinct elements: the first is the application of moral ideals as a possible immanent critique of the relationship between the ideal and the real; the second is the moral art which moves beyond the empirical to the imagined possibilities contained in actuality. Durkheim never develops the methodological or practical implications of these ideas for social change, but there are clear similarities to the method of theory and practice in Marx's writings. Both moral science and moral art seek the essential moral ideal which may be used for social critique and public policy. Articulated by Durkheim, the moral ideal consists of the principles of socialist justice informed by egalitarianism, wealth redistribution, economic democracy and self-government by worker and employer professional associations, industrial planning and market regulation, and solidarity and community that respects human dignity and freedom.¹¹¹ The "ideal of human fraternity" becomes the basis for social critique. Stedman Jones nicely summarizes the critical purpose of Durkheim's theory of value with her words: "The moral failure of a society must then be judged in terms of how well it has realized its own ideal. It is in the immanent processes of the real that the effective basis of critique will be found. For contemporary European societies, the ideal has been that of humanism and of egalitarianism."¹¹² She sees this as a form of practical reason that can only realize its ideals within a democratic community.

In an essay written a few years earlier, entitled "A Discussion on the Notion of Social Equality" (1909), Durkheim argues that there is no scientific or philosophical reasoning which can justify the morality of one epoch or country over another: "All moral systems have their own morality. . . . All of them are natural and consequently rational, like the rest of nature."¹¹³ This passage reads like the immanent critique in Marx, nihilism in Nietzsche, and relativism in Weber. The social inequalities of the caste and class systems in ancient societies were no less or more rational than the more egalitarian societies of modern times. Durkheim contends that these inequalities would not have continued over time if they did not satisfy the nature and conditions of things. In this sense, they were justified. They were appropriate for the collective needs and harmony of their societies, just as the moral values of modern society fit the needs of today's community.¹¹⁴ Durkheim rejects moral foundationalism or the ability to make evaluative and comparative judgments about the rationality and morality of different societies based on a set of universal standards. There is no objective morality by which we can judge social reality; the standards are those which arise out of society itself. The moral codes and rules of society express deeper moral ideals which change over time and adjust to the transformation of institutions and circumstances.

A neglected element in Durkheim's thought has been his analysis of epistemology and the central role of representations in it.¹¹⁵ Much attention

has been directed to his later sociology of knowledge, but this has tended to deemphasize his general theory of knowledge and its relevance for his methodological studies. Durkheim's theory of method and representations occupied his attention in *The Rules of Sociological Method*. This work, as we have just seen, focused on the logical procedures of concept and theory formation in social science. In other writings, especially "Individual and Collective Representations" (1898), *Primitive Classification: Contribution to the Study of Collective Representations* (1903) with Marcel Mauss, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1912), and *Pragmatism and Sociology* (1913–1914), he begins to build the foundations for a Kantian social epistemology as well as a critical sociology of knowledge.¹¹⁶ Bringing together these writings, we see the grander architectonic of his epistemology and methodology. He is quite aware of the philosophical debates surrounding eighteenth-century theories of knowledge. Although Hume is not mentioned by name, Durkheim summarizes the former's skeptical response to traditional empiricism and rationalism. In *Primitive Classification*, he outlines the breadth of the epistemological dilemma that the logic, concepts, and systematic categorization of the world into a coherent system cannot be philosophically justified. Neither induction, deduction, nor the basic categories which structure our impressions and thoughts can be justified by rational inquiry. After his comprehensive and path-breaking analysis of these problems in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Hume ultimately concludes in skeptical exhaustion that the ability of the mind to show connections of images and ideas by resemblances in time, contiguity in space, and associations of causality is a psychological product of human habit or custom. Through resemblance, contiguity, and association, the universe of thought and reality is created; through categories forging the universal and particular, class and species, hierarchy and coordination, the relationships between things in syllogisms and judgments are formed. Differentiations and demarcations are defined by concepts as groups of objects are classified and ordered.

The foundations of rational thought and modern science are based on nothing other than a mental predisposition to view the world in an accustomed manner. Experience and science are unable to be rationally justified. They produce knowledge that does not give us access to a universal and necessary reality of natural laws. The world we see is a product of psychological fictions in which the illusory categories of force, energy, causality, time, and space are imposed by the fertile imagination of consciousness. Reality is an uninterrupted succession of events which have no inherent rational order or necessary connections. Hume questioned the very foundations of the Western Enlightenment, but was brought back from the brink of total skepticism and despair by his commonsense theory of sensations and impressions.¹¹⁷ In his theory of knowledge, reason becomes indifferent to the world it examines, as its only function is to reflect in sensation and thought an already-formed

objective reality. Hume writes that “the mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions.”¹¹⁸ Over time, the Enlightenment emphasized Hume’s empiricism and critique of Cartesian rationalism. The sections of Hume’s work which engaged his skeptical argument were displaced in the history of philosophical discourse for an extended period of time.

As we have seen in chapter 3, the architectonic of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* was built upon his theory of transcendental subjectivity in the Aesthetic and his theory of the a priori categories of the understanding and transcendental deduction in the Analytic. Dissatisfied with the purely abstract and philosophical manner of the Kantian approach, Durkheim attempts to solve the question of the origins of the categories which give coherence and meaning to human experience. He, too, was awakened from a dogmatic slumber by Hume’s skepticism but differed from Kant in turning to sociology and not philosophy or psychology for a solution to the problem of the origins of human experience and knowledge. According to Durkheim, the origins of logic and reason do not lie in the principles of syllogism and judgment (Aristotle), perception (Locke), innate ideas (Descartes), psychology (Hume), or the a priori structure of transcendental consciousness (Kant). Rather, they develop out of the social organization of human interactions. Hegel had helped in this transition, since he rejected the Kantian formal subject and replaced it with the self-movement of the Spirit in history. Durkheim replaces a philosophical theory of knowledge and science with a social epistemology that locates the foundations of our logical analysis, scientific method, abstract definitions, systematic thought, and transcendental concepts in the very constitution and organization of society.¹¹⁹ Abstract concepts are replaced by social representations, transcendental concepts by the structure of society.

In *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Durkheim begins his analysis of totemism and primitive religious forms in order to uncover the historical and social origins of rationality. Here, he deconstructs the traditional epistemological debates and concludes that neither experience nor reason can be the origin of the categories of the understanding. They cannot be derived from the external world in the discrete elements of sensuous perception, and they cannot be deduced from the nature of the mind. They rest neither in subjectivity nor in objectivity. Relationships that organize our experience of reality and form the metaphysical and logical foundations of thought are built, according to Kant, around the categories of the intuition and understanding. Durkheim, too, has a different approach:

At the root of all our judgments there are a certain number of essential ideas which dominate all our intellectual life; they are what philosophers since Aristotle have called the categories of the understanding: ideas of time, space, class, number, cause, personal-

ity, etc. They correspond to the most universal properties of things. They are like the solid frame which encloses all thought. . . . They are like the framework of the intelligence. Now when primitive religious beliefs are systematically analyzed, the principal categories are naturally found.¹²⁰

By means of concepts, the contours of empirical reality and the relationship between the objects of experience are formed. As Durkheim summarizes these discussions, the logical conclusions of the arguments of empiricism result in nominalism, skepticism, and a loss of reason. Following closely Hume's critique of empiricism and science, Durkheim reinforces the idea that the universal cannot be grounded upon contingent appearances. He realizes the serious epistemological implications of Hume's philosophy, which "forcing reason back upon experience causes it to disappear."¹²¹ In turn, the arguments of rationalism end in the loss of sensuous, objective reality. Imposing reason and logic on the world without adequate explanation or justification leaves rationalism without reason. If the categories of human thought do not come from experience of the external world and do not come from reason itself, from whence do they come? How is objectivity, based upon empirical observation and the systematic application of the scientific method, constructed? What is the organizational principle around which the universal laws of natural reality are formed? For many, Kant's synthesis of both traditions made the most sense until the idealism and existentialism of Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche began to slowly erode the integrity of his logical subject and the laws of physics. The Enlightenment paradigm based on the objectivity and universality of experience and reason was in the nineteenth century in serious disarray and fighting for its theoretical life.

Into this vacuum Durkheim begins to resubmit these fundamental questions to critical scrutiny with startlingly new conclusions. He writes about the foundations of the universal principles of logic: "These variations through which the rules which seem to govern our present logic have passed prove that, far from being engraven through all eternity upon the mental constitution of men, they depend, at least in part, upon facts that are historical and consequently social."¹²² The conceptual ordering principles through which the natural and social worlds are framed in the mind are products of social representations. "The categories are essentially collective representations."¹²³ In this epistemological context, Durkheim characterizes society as the transcendental subject informed by language, culture, and institutions. Religion is the most simple form of human classification and thus represents the empirical beginning point of his analysis. It is out of these simplest forms of systematic ordering that logic, reason, philosophy, and science evolve.

Durkheim treats the origins of concepts, classifications, definitions, logic, and thinking—the whole theoretical mechanism of the mind's ordering of reality—as a social phenomenon. Toward this end, he undertakes his massive study of totemism and primitive religions, by which he intends to examine the social nature of the structure of the mind. Totemic religion is the most elementary form of human classification of the external natural world into a binary system of the sacred and the profane.¹²⁴ Individual members of a tribe and clan are grouped around a totem or natural object representing the human group. Once Kant introduced the notion that subjectivity (consciousness) played an essential role in knowing the objective world of phenomenal experience, the continued separation of empiricism and rationalism became impossible. With this revolution in epistemology, the idea that there was a privileged access to truth or God's-eye-view of the natural world through the senses or reason also fell by the wayside. By conceptually filtering and thus radically transforming our knowledge of the world, the aesthetic and metaphysical distance between objectivity and subjectivity was irrevocably broken. For Durkheim, then, the manner in which our world of experience and thought is organized is a social phenomenon and can thus be studied empirically and historically. Durkheim's later sociology of knowledge provides a more detailed appreciation of the epistemology that grounds his methodology of social science.

The main thesis of this argument is that the logical structure of the universe is created as a projection of the social relations between humans. Nature and the human mind are unable to construct such a complex system of classification. Just as individuals in primitive societies were grouped into different moieties (genera) and clans (species), the rest of nature was also organized in this way. Durkheim contends that “the first logical categories were social categories; the first classes of things were classes of men, into which these things were integrated. It was because men were grouped, and thought of themselves in the form of groups, that in their ideas they grouped other things.”¹²⁵ By examining different tribes in Australia, New Guinea, the United States, and China, Durkheim is able to show how the various social groups became the model by which indigenous tribes organized the animal, plant, and mineral world into a coherent system of classification. The organization of thought was a mirror of the organization of society. Systematically dividing society into the tribe, moiety, clan, and subclans provided the framework for the logical distinctions between genus and species. It provided the conceptual structure into which all the various parts and divisions of nature were divided and recognized as part of a coherent whole. Durkheim writes, “Thus logical hierarchy is only another aspect of social hierarchy, and the unity of knowledge is nothing else than the very unity of the collectivity, extended to the universe.”¹²⁶ In turn, the other formative principles that logically constructed the world in terms of

time, space, and causality were a product of the collective representations of primitive society. Time became an expression of the movement of social life, space the physical organization within the tribe's territory, and causality the coercive moral force of the community.

In *Primitive Classification*, Durkheim offers the example of the Sioux Indians, who organized part of the tribe around the color red. Included in this symbolic classification were the violent animals such as the mountain lions, buffalo, and elk. Another class was organized around peaceful animals. Warriors came from the first group and farmers the second. In this way, their world was not just technically organized around a series of useful concepts; it became more intelligible as the concepts organized the world of the Sioux into homogeneous groups and definable classes of things having common characteristics. At first, the world was integrated into systematic patterns of kindred relationships, while the logical forms continued this process of conceptual and speculative organization. Concepts were just another way of expressing social relationships; logic was another way of reflecting moral relationships. This, in turn, created meaningful knowledge about the universe they inhabited. All objects in nature were related to each other based on the underlying principles of social organization and collective representations. With these extensive anthropological and ethnographic studies in his sociology of religion, Durkheim believes he has transcended the epistemological dilemma of the dialectic between nature and consciousness by showing how the foundations of logic, classification, and science are grounded in the actual structure of society. In this way, he completed the Kantian project by transforming transcendental epistemology into a social theory of knowledge.

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CONCLUSION

DREAMS OF CLASSICAL REASON

Historical Science Between Existentialism and Antiquity

It is difficult to offer a summary of the ideas and theories contained in this book because of the expanse and complexity of the material. Marx, Weber, and Durkheim have much in common and, at the same time, differ greatly on some very important issues. Their major contribution to modern social theory is their initiation of a conversation between the ancients and moderns by integrating Aristotle's theory of moral economy and practical wisdom (*phronesis*) with Kant's theory of pure reason and moral autonomy. By opening this public discourse, they create a new human science that joins the methods of empirical research and the ideals of social justice. Knowledge of the past obtained through history, political economy, and cultural science is informed and guided by the principles of economic reciprocity, mutual sharing, civic friendship, and communal responsibility. Science and ethics are rediscovered as building blocks for a critical knowledge of the social world as it moves toward dreams of political and economic justice.

The secondary literature has characterized their writings in similar ways: the early writings of Marx and Weber are viewed as having an emphasis on philosophical idealism—Marx's Hegelian anthropology and dialectical philosophy and Weber's neo-Kantian epistemology and cultural hermeneutics. According to these same interpretations, their later works move away from philosophy toward scientific methodology and positivism. In such an approach, there is an emphasis on natural laws, scientific predictions, economic crisis theory, and social breakdown in Marx's *Grundrisse* and *Capital* and on objective and neutral inquiry based on value-free science, causal explanations, and the use of the empirical-analytic method in Weber's *Economy and Society*. Durkheim, on the other hand, reverses the process, as he first appears as a methodological positivist in his earliest writings with his use

of social facts, statistical evidence, functional analysis, and systems stability in *The Rules of Sociological Method* and *Suicide*. He later relinquishes this positivism as he moves into idealism and a radical Kantianism through a critical epistemology, theory of religion, and sociology of knowledge. This apparent split between early and later writings, between philosophy and positivism, and between idealism and naturalism, has been rejected in this work. In its place is a view which stresses a common intellectual tradition in these theorists that lies between the ancients and the moderns.

Instead of the abrupt methodological dualism between philosophy and science, the argument here has focused on the philosophical continuity within and among the theorists themselves. There is a more seamless development of critical and historical science in the classical tradition than has been previously recognized: Marx's early anthropological idealism of species being and creative self-realization develops into his Hegelian and dialectical critique of capitalism accompanied by his call for communal socialism; the ethical imperatives of a 'science of man' based on the quality, greatness, and nobility of human beings expressed in Weber's *Freiburg Inaugural Address* evolves into his empirical science of human possibilities (*Menschentum*), personality (*Personalität*), and social institutions (*Lebensführung*); and Durkheim's later theories of property, economic reciprocity, and democratic socialism rest on his early views of equality and social justice within a functionally integrated community expressing a modern division of labor and organic solidarity. Empirical validation of science as *Wissenschaft* is achieved not through empirical verification (logical empiricism) or scientific falsification (critical rationalism), but through enlightenment, emancipation, and praxis (Marx); the fostering of moral character, individual integrity, and an ethic of responsibility through scholarly vocation, virtuous life, and citizenship (Weber); and an education toward social ideals, political freedom, and democracy (Durkheim). Truth is not reflected in theory based on an ocular metaphor of positivist knowledge but is maintained on the basis of practice, vocation, and pedagogy.

For the classical theorists, social justice and moral virtue become the foundation for social science—its cause for being and its final goal. They are not searching for knowledge of absolute and universal truths or laws (*episteme*) about history, culture, and social institutions, nor are they looking for instrumental knowledge (*techne*) to engineer social improvements or solve technical problems. They reject the naive realism, naturalism, and scientism of positivist philosophy. Theirs is an ethical science of *phronesis* (practical wisdom) in which knowledge is pursued in order to create a fair and just society by understanding its cultural traditions, past and present institutional arrangements, and future human possibilities. Aristotle's theories of universal, productive, and practical knowledge, economic and political justice, and moral economy provide classical theory with a framework within

which to understand better the limits of modern science, the emancipatory possibilities of social justice, and the oppression of the institutions of political economy. Marx and Durkheim borrow frequently from Aristotle's theory of justice and *phronesis* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Books 5 and 6, and the *Politics*, whereas Weber looks more to the early books in the *Nicomachean Ethics* for his theories of character development, moral virtue, and cultural hermeneutics (Books 2–4 and 6). Both Weber and Durkheim were heavily influenced by the neo-Aristotelianism of the German Historical School of Economics. During the classical period of social science, it was their reading of Aristotle that set the broader philosophical context for the modern discussions about the nature of science, methodology, and social justice. The functionalism of Marx's historical materialism, Weber's historical sociology, and Durkheim's moral science are intimately tied to issues of social justice, whether this concept is defined, respectively, as economic democracy, human rights and a dignified and self-determined person, or a free individual in an integrated, moral community.

It has been written that *phronesis* is the "insightful deliberation about what to do that ascertains which actions constitute the actor's good on the basis of knowledge of general matters and familiarity with particular phenomena . . . *Phronesis* is a political process in which citizens publicly deliberate about and decide on ends and policies. The issue of how social science can matter once again is the issue of how social science can matter to a democracy."¹ Bent Flyvbjerg has argued in his work *Making Social Science Matter* that four questions form the heart of practical science: where is society going? Who are the winners and losers in society, and what is the mechanism of power that enforces these relationships? Are these social relationships desirable? And what should be done?² The theoretical side of *phronesis* involves reflection on the history and institutions of industrial capitalism, its cultural ideals of the human good that legitimate the present and beyond, and the hidden structures of power that inhibit their realization—all this in the name of creativity and self-determination, nobility and civic responsibility, and equality, freedom, and democracy. This form of social inquiry assumes democratic deliberation and a discursive ethics about the ideals and direction of society for the common good.

Immanuel Kant stands at the beginning of a long philosophical movement that starts to unravel the traditional epistemology of empiricism and rationalism from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By introducing the importance of subjectivity in the formation of empirical and scientific knowledge, a new theory is created which argues for the central role of consciousness and transcendental categories in the formation of the objects of perception and experience. Because subjectivity is constitutive of knowledge and science, all reality is interpreted and filtered through the universal concepts of the mind. Later, even the existence of this reality will

be questioned by some existential philosophers. There is no direct access to an independently existing, external world of objects (the thing-in-itself). With development over time and the maturation of science and philosophy, the concepts of the understanding lose their transcendental and permanent character; they become historical and social as they are transformed by Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert. In this way, the ground is prepared for Marx's dialectical critique of bourgeois science, ideology, and the categories of classical political economy; Weber's constructionist epistemology of ideal types and neo-Kantian theory of science; and Durkheim's theory of representations, pragmatism, totemic religion, and social construction of knowledge. Early sociology builds its theory of knowledge and empirical methodologies on a common acceptance of Kant's theory of the understanding and constructed experience in structural (political economy), historical (particular events and ideal types), and representational (collective consciousness) concepts. In this way, historical science becomes dialectical and critical, not positivistic and predictive.

Classical social theory participates in a dialogue with Aristotle and Kant by examining theories of justice, democracy, pathology, and power, as well as by reflecting on the empirical and historical methods of social inquiry adequate to these substantive questions. Sociology in the nineteenth century is driven by empirical, historical questions about the nature of society, to which the appropriate methods of research are applied. It is not directed by a pre-established philosophy of universal science. The distinctive aspect of this new social science is that it is an ethical science which applies interpretive and explanatory methods to uncover the contradictions between dreams and power as they are expressed in the social pathologies of modernity. Comments made by Jürgen Habermas about the need to transcend differences and integrate strengths within the social sciences are also applicable to the classics in their attempts to combine the methods of interpretive understanding and causal explanations:

The historian will not be able to limit himself in his explanations to a logic of action that incorporates the hermeneutic understanding of meaning, for the historical context is not exhausted by the mutual intentions of human beings. Motivated actions are embedded in a quasi-natural context that is mediated by subjectively intended meaning, but not created by it. For this reason the historian cannot limit himself to the "inner side of events," as Collingwood's idealist proposal would have it; he must also analyze the causal context in which intentions are entangled.³

Marx, Weber, and Durkheim share a commonality of methods since they rely on various combinations of historical analysis, hermeneutical

understanding, structural explanations, and critical method. Besides the conscious norms and cultural values that define and legitimate social action, there are underlying structures of alienation and rationalization that remain hidden, repressed, and unconscious. The classical theorists borrow from a number of metatheoretical traditions—political philosophy, idealism, hermeneutics, and positivism—because of the need to understand and explain the social pathologies which suppress conscious thought and distort rational reflection in the social sciences. The historical and structural context within which praxis, action, and cultural meaning take place cannot be explained by hermeneutics alone. Interpretation of history and culture must be supplemented by the political economy and historical materialism of Marx, the explanatory and causal science of Weber, or the sociology of morals and functionalism of Durkheim. In a disenchanted and oppressive world, the underlying institutions of the economy and the state, of labor and domination, act in a mechanical and deterministic fashion outside of rational control. Because of this, these institutions are amenable to examination by causal science and historical laws. Marx's critique of ideology, labor theory of value, exploitative relations of production, and economic crisis theory; Weber's theory of culture and meaning, social institutions, repression, and the unconscious; and Durkheim's theory of moral ideals, distorted specialization, abnormal egoism, and institutions of political oppression, all incorporate the need within the classics for different methods and logics of inquiry for both an understanding of culture and an explanation of social institutions and structures of power. Synthesis of the methods of history and political economy is a distinctive feature of the classical period, even though it remains unclear how conscious each of its representatives was of its application and implication for social theory.⁴

What is extremely interesting and methodologically provocative for social theory is that the dialectical method is used by all three theorists. Dialectical reason helps the social scientist measure the discrepancies between society's projected ideals and its economic and political reality. For Marx, dialectics helps him engage a critique of ideology, class structures, and the inner contradictions of capital; Weber applies dialectics to uncover the consequences and implications of social action and public-policy recommendations, the conflict between substantive and formal rationality in the decadence of the iron cage, and the interplay between personality and the social conduct of life (*Lebensführung*). Dialectical critique also lies at the foundation of Durkheim's science of morals as he investigates the tensions and contradictions between the empirical ideals of organic community and democracy and the institutional reality of anomie, abnormal division of labor, and class property.

The application of dialectics is framed by both hermeneutics and historical science. Values are not imposed from the outside in terms of

philosophical or theological discourse, nor is science itself capable of imposing values on critical reason. Marx and Durkheim use immanent critique by examining society's own objective or institutional values of democracy and justice as the basis for social criticism. The normative standards for critique are empirically studied by cultural hermeneutics and the critique of ideology (depth hermeneutics). In this way science reproduces those cultural values which are expressions of the highest ideals of a society's own political, economic, and cultural institutions. The conflict between the objective values used to validate authority and the empirical arrangement of social institutions is the real basis for historical science. On the other hand, Weber's view of moral polytheism, borrowed from Nietzsche and John Stuart Mill, holds that values are subjective, with their ultimate validity as well as the corresponding validity of empirical research and scientific objectivity resting on the integrity of the scholar and the discursive reasoning of the academy.

Social theory is viewed by the classical theorists as an agency of ethical critique and social change, whether in the form of revolutionary praxis, national policy and scientific vocation, or social pedagogy and democratic revitalization. There is always a question of the limits of immanent critique: where do new values or alternative ideals rejecting the status quo come from? This is not explicitly dealt with by them. Whether using a critique of ideology, cultural hermeneutics, or science of morals, the focus is on the dreams which give birth to social ideals, hopes, and legitimation within society. Implicit in classical theory is a partial answer to this question: besides immanent critique, Marx and Durkheim borrow directly from Aristotle's theory of political democracy and social justice, while Weber relies on moral pluralism and subjective consciousness within a disenchanted world of warring gods. In this way, social dreams are reflective of both actual ideals and a dialogue between the nineteenth century and classical antiquity.

The theory of knowledge and critical methodology employed by Marx, Weber, and Durkheim may be characterized in general, respectively, as dialectical, interpretive, and moral science. These distinctions accurately reflect the epistemological and methodological orientation of their classical roots. As we have seen in this work, the later writings of Marx and Weber represent only a further development of their early ideas as they attempted greater clarification of their critical and interpretive methods. Durkheim, in turn, goes through similar changes as his later works in the sociology of knowledge, pedagogy, and political sociology expand upon his earlier insights into the complex nature of modern industrial society. They also share, however, a common ground in historical science, critical analysis, and the dialectical method. What the three theorists have in common is an attempt throughout their academic careers to integrate historical science and social justice. Their common goal is to make ethics sociologically relevant, historically concrete, and institutionally real by placing it in the context

of history, social institutions, and cultural ideals. They wish to take theory out of the metaphysics of idealism and the abstract, gnostic moralizing of social prophets in order to examine the real potential for historical and social happiness (*eudaimonia*) and the good life. For them, alienated and disenchanting moralism is simply the other side of formal rationality and technical science, resulting in the loss of a substantive ethical critique of modern social institutions.

These theorists focus on different social problems which direct them in different methodological directions. In order to respond to these fundamental questions, they concentrate on the broad sociological areas of culture (hermeneutics and sociology of knowledge), institutional origins of capitalism (structuralism and history), production, wealth, and class (political economy), internal contradictions of capitalism (historical materialism and functionalism), and the unconscious social pathologies and hidden structures of power (depth hermeneutics and pragmatic realism). Rather than establishing positivism as the foundation for the historical and cultural sciences, they integrate the ethics, politics, and economics of Aristotle with the epistemology and methodology of Kant and the phenomenology, existentialism, and neo-Kantianism of his followers. The result is a new practical science that joins together the methods of *phronesis* and critique within an empirical and historical science. They create a science between traditions that represents a dialogue between Aristotle and Kant. Knowledge is understood as being directly connected to practical interests and human emancipation.

The debates over the logic and methods of social science have raged throughout the last two centuries. They reflect the rise of Marxism, historicism, *Lebensphilosophie*, and positivism in the nineteenth century, the "back to Kant" movement begun in the 1860s, the *Methodenstreit* of the 1880s between the German economic historians and the Austrian marginal utility theorists, and the *Werturteilsstreit* within the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* in the early twentieth century. They continued into the midcentury with the heated discussions on the logic and methods of the social sciences at the German Sociological Congress in Tübingen in 1961 between the critical theorists (Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas) and critical rationalists (Karl Popper and Hans Albert). A few years later, there were real differences of opinion voiced regarding the relationship between Weber's metatheory in his *Wissenschaftslehre* and positivism at the famous Heidelberg Conference of 1964. Epistemological and methodological discussions have taken place and continue to this day with profound scientific disagreements among the representatives of numerous schools of social thought, including neo-Marxism (Louis Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas, E. P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill, David Gordon, Samuel Bowles, and Thomas Weisskopf), critical theory (Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and Jürgen Habermas), phenomenology (Alfred Schutz, Alan Cicourel, and Harold Garfinkel),

hermeneutics (Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and Charles Taylor), pragmatism (George Herbert Mead, Richard Bernstein, and Richard Rorty), functionalism (Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann), psychoanalysis (Sigmund Freud, Alfred Lorenzer, and Habermas), French poststructuralism (Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu), scientific realism (Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Sayer, Ian Shapiro, and Erik Olin Wright), phronetic social science (Bent Flyvbjerg, Theodore Schatzki, and Sanford Schram), and neo-Aristotelianism in communitarianism (Robert Bellah, Michael Sandel, and Alasdair MacIntyre), communicative or discourse ethics (Habermas, Albrecht Wellmer, Seyla Benhabib, and Alessandro Ferrara), and political theory (Martha Nussbaum, Ronald Beiner, and Joseph Dunne).⁵

The core of classical sociology lies in its analysis of the history, structure, function, and pathology (loss of control in production, meaning in culture, and identity in community) of modern capitalism as it responds to the existential dilemma of modernity: what is the meaning of human existence in a world deformed by alienated labor, rationalized institutions, distorted personality, and an anomic self? This is a world characterized by private property and class power, formal reason and disenchantment, and an abnormal division of labor and breakdown of communal solidarity. German existentialism of the nineteenth century blossoms out of the fundamental Kantian question of human creativity and the transcendental subject in science and morality; it then expands into Hegel's philosophy of human productivity, phenomenology of spirit, and the rise of enlightened self-consciousness in history, Schopenhauer's theory of representations and social constructivism, and Nietzsche's theory of perspectivism and moral nihilism. All these distinct traditions flow from Kant's original insight into the essence of humanity as an imaginative creator of its own theoretical and moral universe through pure and practical reason. This philosophy of creative subjectivity and moral autonomy is then transformed in sociology into class consciousness and productive work by Marx, the inspired and devoted personality in art, science, and politics by Weber, and the social representations and moral ideals by Durkheim. The radical Kantianism of phenomenology and existentialism also provides the common epistemological framework for classical theory, with its myriad of scientific methods and sociological questions about economic crises, historical origins, and abnormal psychology.

The Kantian perspective is adopted and radicalized by philosophers and sociologists as they turn epistemological, moral, and metaphysical questions into historical and social ones. They confront the queries of existentialism by returning in one form or another to ancient Greece and Aristotle's theory of social justice and practical knowledge. The empty void of modern society is filled by the ethics and politics of classical antiquity: Marx raises questions about the meaning of species being, self-realization, social praxis, and participation in communal democracy; Weber turns to issues of science and

critical hermeneutics, civic and vocational responsibilities, human nobility and dignity, and personality development; and Durkheim, moved by these same broad issues, looks into the nature of community solidarity, moral ideals, democratic socialism, and individual freedom. With the classical moderns, the kingdom of ends becomes the *oikonomike*, as Kant's moral autonomy is retranslated and fused with Aristotle's moral economy. The institutions of modernity create an economic, social, and psychological crisis that is interpreted by sociologists as an historical and institutional crisis of meaning to be resolved by reconfiguring social relationships that reconnect with fundamental human needs for purposeful work, universal rights, political freedom, community identity, and the common good. Historical science examines a social reality that finds its theoretical completion in the dialectic between existentialism and a longing for the ancients (*Griechensehnsucht*); in fact, the turn toward the ancients is a critical reaction to the institutional pathologies and gnostic existentialism of post-Enlightenment society as theorists search for personal and public meaning in a world suffering from the deformation of reason and the exile of social dreams.

Representatives of classical sociology offer the social sciences alternative views about the nature of equality, freedom, democracy, and social justice. Not tied to capitalism or liberalism, they emphasize the Kantian imperatives of moral autonomy and human dignity as visions for the future. The kingdom of ends replaces the state of nature, human fraternity replaces market competition, and charity and friendship replace utilitarian calculus and legal contracts. The critical theorists project ideals that take humanity to the top of the Acropolis, from where they can view an exciting new world that respects human reason, individual freedom, and communal responsibility. If a person only stares long enough at the enticing sky caressing the Aegean, one's soul can be moved with tears and one can dream of heaven with reason. Spirit and heart, reason and compassion, are joined together in historical science as the disenchanting past becomes a distant memory of a forgotten Enlightenment. These scholars do not reduce all values to crude materialism and economic accumulation; they do not define humanity in terms of the lowest and meanest categories of economic greed, self-interest, and business manipulation. They characterize themselves as political animals for whom creativity, nobility, and virtue become the goal of human existence and the meaning of life. The existential crisis, precipitated by capitalist production and sustained by thoughtless bureaucracy and uncaring force, finds its solution in the classical horizons.

The social theories of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim represent the nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries synthesis of the methods of interpretation and explanation, understanding and causality, history and science, that is, an integration of historical science and classical antiquity. In many ways, this perspective frames the ever-present discussions that we have about

the philosophy and methods of the social sciences today. By returning to the classics, we gain a renewed insight into the critical imagination striving for social justice and the accompanying scientific methods that have been repressed and forgotten.⁶ This may help us unravel the complex world of the competing schools of metatheoretical thought mentioned above. By rediscovering the past, we will be better able to move beyond the present impasse within epistemology and methodology by recovering the role of philosophy, history, and political economy in contemporary social theory. By this means we move away from the narrow specialization and disenchantment that characterize sociology today. Blending together empirical science and social ethics, practical science gives us a better understanding of the nature of the human and moral sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*). The dialogue between horizons continues to expand the classical gaze in an environment of alienation, rationalization, and anomic dislocation. In this way, practical science represents not only an empirical inquiry into areas of culture, structure, and society, it also offers hope for the future of humankind. With this method, it becomes possible to touch our dreams while grounded in history. The rediscovery of sociology and ethics is a forceful and compelling narrative about how science dreams justice.

AGAINST THE DARKNESS

When will our days of suffering come to an end?
 We questioned the sky, grown silent and covered by clouds,
 when the weapons of terror had dropped from the terrible hands
 of the gods that we made in the war of all against all.
 As the faces of children stared at us out of the flames,
 we saw their sweet flesh and their names that were burning like paper.
 In place of such darkness, repeated again and again,
 we said we invented new light and followed new freedom.
 Reason was set, a mechanical, clockmaker thing,
 and the body of earth was divided, its spirit and heart
 made into things we could purchase and sell in a market.
 But when will the days of our suffering come to an end?
 And dreaming the dreams of the past, in the voices of prophets,
 Oracles saw us as blind as Tiresias was.
 They told us to look in the fire, the heavens, and heart.
 Under the shadows we made was sensuous reason,
 glowing with anger and outrage, frustration and loss,
 but ready to craft the marvels of art and of science,
 to build from a milltown, Olympus, a city of friends.
 It is written that "Truth that is great contains greater silence."
 With such truth we make beauty whenever we dare to touch pain,
 when the voice we create to speak to the gods is justice.
 Such dreams are not seen in our sleep but when fully awake,
 when we rise to the place we can dance in the circle of stars,
 and like diamonds from dust, we will never return to the ashes.
 They spoke this great truth; but will anyone listen and act?
 Will we rage against darkness and seize the Promethean fire?
 Will any remain who can hear this great challenge: Sin boldly?
 And when will this life of our suffering come to an end?
 The voices of truth do not fit any narrative frame.
 Injustice is better addressed by people of hope.
 Darkness and silence seemed all that was left of the past.
 In our time, cunning tongues could elide any human emotions
 and fashion a phantom whose power fed off of our fear,
 consuming our vision. But soon this exile of reason
 will be ended, while dreams—what is real—reach out to be free.

—Royal W. Rhodes

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NOTES

INTRODUCTION: CONVERSING WITH TRADITIONS

1. See Gerald Galgan, *The Logic of Modernity* (New York: New York University Press, 1982), pp. 53–74; and Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 136–137, 139–140, and 158–160, for a more subjective and postmodernist reading of Descartes' metaphysics and epistemology.

2. George E. McCarthy, *Classical Horizons: The Origins of Sociology in Ancient Greece* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).

3. Critical reason or method has a long philosophical history beginning with the epistemological and moral critique in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781 and 1787), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), and *Critique of Judgment* (1790), expanding into the phenomenological critique of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) and the economic theory of Marx's *Capital: Critique of Political Economy* (1867). With this foundation, the critical method continues to develop into existentialism (Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche), phenomenology (Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz), pragmatism (Charles Peirce, John Dewey, and Emile Durkheim), neo-Kantianism (Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, and Max Weber), hermeneutics (Hans-Georg Gadamer), psychoanalysis (Sigmund Freud), and critical theory of the Frankfurt School (Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse).

4. Aristotle's theory of need will evolve historically into the later medieval theory of natural law and just price: Ernst Bloch, *Natural Law and Human Dignity*, trans. Dennis Schmidt (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1986), pp. 25–35; Richard Schlatter, *Private Property: The History of an Idea* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1973), pp. 33–76; Lloyd Weinreb, *Natural Law and Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 43–66; Odd Langholm, *Price and Value Theory in the Aristotelian Tradition: A Study in Scholastic Economic Sources* (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1979) and *The Legacy of Scholasticism in Economic Thought: Antecedents of Choice and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Diana Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

5. Positivism and the Enlightenment: Positivism is the epistemological and methodological term that has a long and complicated history from Enlightenment empiricism and rationalism and the social theory and methods of Henri de Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte to the revisions of critical rationalism of Karl Popper and Hans Albert and the criticisms of the critical theory of Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas. In this work it will be used to express the epistemology and method

behind the empirical-analytic sciences: Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Continuum, 1947), pp. 3–57; Leszek Kolakowski, *The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought*, trans. Norbert Guterman (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1968), pp. 31–46; Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. by Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 3–5 and 67–90 and *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jerry Stark (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988); Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, “Sociology and Empirical Social Research,” in *Aspects of Sociology*, trans. John Viertel, preface Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), pp. 117–128; Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), pp. 3–42; William Leiss, *The Domination of Nature* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974); I. S. Kon, *Der Positivismus in der Soziologie. Geschichtlicher Abriss* (Berlin: Verlag das Europäische Buch, 1973); Anthony Giddens, ed., *Positivism and Sociology* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1978); Theodor Adorno, “Sociology and Empirical Research,” in *Critical Sociology* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 237–257; Jonathan Turner, “In Defense of Positivism,” *Sociological Theory* 3, 2 (Autumn 1985): 24–30 and *Classical Social Theory: A Positivist’s Perspective* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1993); Gerard Delanty, *Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 12–13; and George E. McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason: Weber, Habermas, and the Methodological Disputes in German Sociology* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001).

Turner limits his discussion and defense of positivism to Comte’s doctrine (*System of Positive Philosophy*, 1830) that science attempts to develop abstract or natural laws testable by empirical observation that reflect fundamental properties of society; these laws do not focus exclusively on issues of causality or function (“In Defense of Positivism,” p. 24). Whereas Turner focuses upon Comte’s critique of empiricism, Habermas, Kolakowski, and Giddens give broader definitions to the concept of positivism emphasizing instead the long philosophical traditions prior to Comte which include both empiricism and rationalism. Habermas, in his *Frankfurt Inaugural Address* of June 1965, attempts to connect the cognitive interests or underlying normative assumptions of modern science to the structural imperatives and hidden norms of the social institutions of work (economy), language (culture and community), and power (state) (*Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 286–289 and 308–313). He characterizes positivism in terms of realism, objectivism, empiricism, naturalism, scientism, and utilitarianism. Kolakowski defines positivism in terms of the rule of phenomenalism, the rule of nominalism, denial of cognitive value to value judgments and normative statements, and the unity of the scientific method (*The Alienation of Reason*, pp. 1–10). In his introduction to *Positivism and Sociology*, Giddens views it as a science of society which applies the methodology of the natural sciences to the study of society (naturalism), creates social laws, and provides technical, instrumental, and neutral knowledge (pp. 3–4). Horkheimer and Adorno characterize the Enlightenment as an “arid wisdom” in which hope and dreams are abandoned to the courtesan of pleasure, domination of privilege, adaptation of self-preservation, disenchantment of the herd, and the “obedient subjection of reason to what is directly given” (*Dialectic of Enlightenment*, pp. 3–42).

6. Theodor Adorno, *Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* trans. Rodney Livingstone, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 135.

7. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, revised trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1994), p. 307.

8. A few words about the phrase, "dreams of classical reason," should be made. Many will recognize the commonly accepted title of Francisco Goya's etching from the famous *Los Caprichos* series (1799) by the name, "Dreams of Reason." Goya, as with Hegel, Nietzsche, and the classical theorists, was suspicious of the claims of Western science and formal rationality which, he believed, led to the monsters of the Napoleonic era. Science produced dreams of pleasure and domination over nature. But Goya, as with other Romantic artists and writers of the period, was unwilling to abandon reason to its simple technological and administrative operations of wealth and power acquisition. The caption of the work written on the desk is, "The sleep (or dream) of reason produces monsters." However, the commentary added by Goya expands upon this for the purpose of reintegrating imagination and reason: "Imagination, deserted by reason, begets impossible monsters. United with reason, she is the mother of all arts, and the source of their wonders" [Folke Nordström, *Goya, Saturn, and Melancholy: Studies in the Art of Goya* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1962), p. 116]. Also see George Levitine, "Literary Sources of Goya's *Capricho* 43," *The Art Bulletin* 37 (1955): 56–59; and Francisco Goya, "The Sleep (or Dream) of Reason" (plate 43), in *Goya and the Spirit of Enlightenment*, Alfonso Pérez Sánchez and Eleanor Sayre (Boston: Museum of Fine Arts, 1989), pp. 116–117.

The terms *classical reason* and *classical dreams* used throughout this work refer to the political theory, ethics, and epistemology of classical Greece, classical German philosophy from Kant to Hegel, classical existentialism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and the classical thought of nineteenth-century social theorists—Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. Nineteenth-century social theorists did not abandon reason but only questioned its eclipse and limited applicability to a narrow range of questions articulated by the methods of natural science. With the rise of classical social theory, reason and ethics were no longer limited to metaphysics, theology, rationalist ethics, and political ideology. They were now tied to a practical wisdom based on an empirical and historical analysis of the institutions, culture, and structures of modern industrial society; only in this way would science and ethics be integrated and made relevant to the real world. The notion of the dreams of classical reason refers to the overcoming of Western dualism in the creative force and synthetic unity of practical wisdom and sympathy in Aristotle, which is then further expressed in the modern union of theory and practice in Marx, spirit and heart in Weber, and science and morals in Durkheim.

Weber makes an important point about Western reason quite succinctly and poetically at the end of the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* with his critique of the disenchantment of reason in the last man whom he characterizes as "Specialists (*Fachmenschen*) without spirit (*Geist*); sensualists (*Genussmenschen*) without heart (*Herz*)" [Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 182]. Weber and the other classical theorists were critical of the Enlightenment, not of reason itself; they were critical of sleeping dreams, not of waking ideals. They rejected the Platonic forms with their death of reason as they turned to Aristotle for imaginative guidance and

practical wisdom. It was Aristotle who inspired their ethical dreams. Their hopes and ideals were not unattached Platonic nightmares but were deeply embedded in the very economic and political reality they sought to transform. Their highest ideals of social justice were not ethereal monsters or speculative dreams of utopian fantasies producing only terror and oppression. They did not represent a retreat from reason. Rather, they were the product of a scientific understanding and empirical explanation of their concrete social and cultural environment. Radical ethical science of the nineteenth century connected to the imagination—empirical and historical research (past) and practical knowledge and moral action (future)—thereby producing a form of cognition capable of destroying the nightmares and pathologies of modernity. The classical theorists possessed the insight and will to power to imagine a dancing star. In the process, they hoped real democratic communities could be created based on a mutual-sharing citizenry and a social economy of justice. The classical theorists held together ethics and historical research—*justice* and *science*—in their imaginative dreams of practical reason.

CHAPTER ONE: ARISTOTLE ON SOCIAL JUSTICE AND CLASSICAL DEMOCRACY

1. Central to the study of Aristotle's practical philosophy (*praktische Philosophie*) is the interconnection among ethics (virtue, justice, science, and friendship), economics (economics and chrematistics), and politics (law and best political constitution): Wilhelm Hennis, *Politik und praktische Philosophie. Schriften zur politischen Theorie* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1977), pp. 30–52 and 184–197; and Peter Koslowski, *Politik und Ökonomie bei Aristoteles* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1993), pp. 49–51.

2. Emile Durkheim, "Sociology in France in the Nineteenth Century," in *Emile Durkheim On Morality and Society: Selected Writings*, ed. Robert Bellah (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 3; and Charles Ellwood, "Aristotle as a Sociologist," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 19 (1902): 227–238.

3. Talcott Parsons, in *The Working Papers in the Theory of Action*, with Robert Bales and Edward Shils (1953), *Economy and Society*, with Neil Smelser (1956), *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (1966), *The System of Modern Societies* (1971), and "Social Systems" in *Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory* (1977), developed his theory of society in terms of the AGIL schema. The latter refers to the necessary structural and functional prerequisites that every society must sustain in order to maintain its integrity and stability over time. The AGIL schema refers to the structural features and roles in which there is adaptation of the economy (A), goal attainment of the state (G), integration and legitimation of law and social institutions (I), and latency of the cultural patterns, personality, and socialization (L). Jürgen Habermas, in his work *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2: *Lifeworld and Systems: A Critique of Functionalist Reason* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), pp. 235–273, adapts Parsons' model by replacing the AGIL with the ARAR schema: alienation of Marx (A), rationalization of Weber (R), anomie of Durkheim (A), and repression of Freud (R). That is, he replaced the emphasis on structural equilibrium, functional integration, and systems stability with the classical theory of communicative interaction, uncoupling of systems, social integration, and the

rationalization and colonization of the cultural lifeworld. Structural functionalism is replaced by a theory of pathology and power.

Aristotle provides a twofold theory of ancient functionalism: one is a teleological functionalism tied to his theory of metaphysics, nature, and happiness, and the other is a social functionalism which views society as a living organism whose various parts are functionally interrelated for the purpose of promoting the harmony and self-sufficiency of the moral economy and virtuous life. The latter is an early form of the development of modern functionalism in classical social theory.

4. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, in *Introduction to Aristotle*, trans. W. D. Ross, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 1947), book 1, chapter 7, 1098a7, p. 318.

5. *Ibid.*, book 1, chapter 7, 1098a15, p. 319.

6. Roger Sullivan, *Morality and the Good Life: A Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Memphis, TN: Memphis State University Press, 1980), pp. 129–133. Although Sullivan mentions the political aspects of ethics, he never truly incorporates them into his analysis.


7. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 1, chapter 8, 1099a19, p. 321.

8. *Ibid.*, book 2, chapter 6, 1107a1–2, p. 340.

9. Aristotle's social theory based on his ethics and politics may be more easily understood within the framework of a revised AGIL schema. If Parsons's theory of systems theory and social stability is replaced by Aristotle's theory of the self-sufficiency of the *oikos* and *polis* and public happiness, it takes the following form:

Parsons's Social Theory: Modern Welfare State

Adaptation Goal-Attainment



Social Institutions

Culture

Aristotle's Social Theory: Ancient Polity

Moral Economy Political Constitutions
(mutual sharing (best constitution:
reciprocal needs democratic polity)
friendship)



Law
(deliberation
community
solidarity)

Social Ethics
(virtue
practical wisdom
social justice)

10. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 10, chapter 9, 1181b14–15, p. 543.

11. Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, revised Trevor Saunders (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1981), book 1, chapter 8, 1256b20, p. 79.

12. For a fruitful discussion of these differences, see Moses I. Finley, "Aristotle and Economic Analysis," in *Articles on Aristotle*, vol. 2: *Ethics and Politics*, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 15–152.

13. Aristotle's Theory of Need: For an analysis of Aristotle's theory of human need, see Patricia Springborg, "Aristotle and the Problem of Needs," *History of Political Thought* 5, 3 (Winter 1984): 393–424; and Martha Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution," in *Marx and Aristotle: Nineteenth-Century German Social Theory and Classical Antiquity*, ed. George E. McCarthy (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), pp. 175–211. For an examination of the relationship between *philia* (friendship) and the *oikos* (household), see William James Booth, *Households: On the Moral Architecture of the Economy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 36–37, 46–47, and 53–55. Within a moral economy and democratic polity, politics becomes a journey with friends where needs are defined in terms of social justice and mutuality and not economic demands. This is what distinguishes a social or moral economy from a market economy (pp. 55–66).

14. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 1, chapter 9, 1257a5, p. 82.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Of course, the clear exception to this is Catholic social doctrine based on the principles of natural law: R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1926), pp. 3–62; John Baldwin, "The Medieval Theories of the Just Price," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 49, 4 (July, 1959): 3–80; Peter Phan, *Social Thought* (Wilmington, DE: M. Glazier, 1984); Justo González, *Faith and Wealth: A History of the Early Christian Ideas on the Origin, Significance, and Use of Money* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1990); S. Todd Lowry, "Social Justice and the Subsistence Economy: From Aristotle to Seventeenth-Century Economics," in *Social Justice in the Ancient World*, ed. K. D. Irani and Morris Silver (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 9–24; Joel Kaye, *Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange, and the Emergence of Scientific Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); J. Neves, "Aquinas and Aristotle's Distinction on Wealth," *History of Political Economy* 32, 3 (September 2000): 649–657; and Diana Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Tawney has famously argued in *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* that Marx represents "the last of the Schoolmen," that is, the last of the Aristotelian natural law theorists (p. 36). This idea about Marx's place in intellectual history explains much about the foundations of classical social theory, as well as Marx's labor theory of value and critique of the ethical principles underlying possessive individualism. It also begins to help clarify the differences in Marx between property rights and human rights, political emancipation and human emancipation, and natural rights and natural law.

17. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 1, chapter 9, 1257b40, p. 85.

18. *Ibid.*, book 1, chapter 9, 1257b10, p. 84.

19. *Ibid.*, book 1, chapter 8, 1256b26, p. 79.

20. This conflict between a moral economy and market economy, between natural law and later natural rights theory, may be found in the 1690 work of John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government* (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1952), pp. 22–23, 28, and 29. Relying on the Aristotelian argument of Richard

Hooker in *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, Locke is caught between the ancients and moderns with his theory of the state of nature and natural rights. It is C. B. MacPherson's thesis in *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 203–220, that Locke resolves the conflict by ultimately renouncing the natural law limits of spoilage, sufficiency, and the common good in favor of unlimited accumulation of capital and property. Many nineteenth-century European social theorists, too, are caught in a similar dilemma between the ancients and moderns but, unlike Locke, return to the older tradition of natural law with its emphasis on community, social responsibility, and the law.

21. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 5, chapter 3, 1131b8, p. 404. For an introduction to the forms of justice in this work, see Ernest Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906), pp. 321–356.

22. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 5, chapter 4, 1132b17, p. 407.

23. Aristotle's position is that reciprocal justice is quite different from both distributive and rectificatory justice. Some have argued that it is not even a form of particular justice. Its exact place in Aristotle theory of justice has been a topic of much discussion. See D. G. Ritchie, "Aristotle's Subdivision of 'Particular Justice,'" *The Classical Review* 8, 5 (May 1894): 191–192; Joseph Soudek, "Aristotle's Theory of Exchange: An Enquiry into the Origin of Economic Analysis," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 96, 1 (February 1952): 49–54; F. Rosen, "The Political Context of Aristotle's Theory of Justice," *Phronesis* 20 (1975): 237; and Scott Meikle, "Aristotle on Equality and Market Exchange," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 8 (1991): 195.

24. Grace and Reciprocal Justice: The reference to the "Temple of the Graces" in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is to the three Graces in classical Greece. They are the three goddesses—Aglaiā (brightness), Euphrosyne (joyfulness), and Thalia (bloom)—who, according to Greek mythology, are either the children of Zeus and Eurynome or Dionysus and Aphrodite. They are the goddesses of wealth and virtue and represent the values of love, beauty, wisdom, joy, pleasure, beneficence, and gratitude. They are usually associated with drink, festivals, poetry, music, and singing (Muses). For an analysis of the relationship between grace and reciprocity, see Bernard Jacob, "Aristotle and the Graces," *Legal Studies Research Paper Series*, Hofstra University School of Law, research paper no. 04-14 (October 2004): 1–39.

25. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 5, chapter 5, 1133a2–4, p. 408. Mentioning the Temple of the Graces is also Aristotle's way of referring back to the ancient custom of gift giving. Homer narrates the story in *The Iliad* about the relationship between Glaukon and Diomedes in the middle of the Trojan War. During a respite from their life and death struggle, they exchanged their armor sharing a moment of familial hospitality and friendship (*The Iliad* VI). Gifts were usually exchanged on the basis of the status and inequality of those involved; Glaukon and Diomedes exchanged unequal gifts of gold and bronze armor. The concept of need (*chreia*) is complex but should not be confused with the idea of market demand in neoclassical economics. *Need* refers not to the market but to deficiency and thus implies an imperative toward self-sufficiency. The word also encompasses both physical and moral needs. Thus, there is a need for self-sufficiency, as well as a need for friendship, self-realization, virtue, and political deliberation, that is, a need for political justice as the ultimate function of man.

26. Later in Aristotle's analysis of friendship in Book 8 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he likens economic exchange to a friendship of moral utility, where exchange is characterized as a gift to a friend. The giver shares his surplus in an exchange but expects to receive over time the same or more than originally given. There have been some attempts to connect Aristotle's theory of grace and reciprocity to the rituals of gift giving found in primitive societies. Examine the following: Karl Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy," in *Primitive, Archaic, and Modern Economics: Essays of Karl Polanyi*, ed. George Dalton (Boston: Beacon Press: 1971), pp. 78–95; and Desmond McNeill, "Alternative Interpretations of Aristotle on Exchange and Reciprocity," *Public Affairs Quarterly* 4, 1 (January 1990): 55–68.

27. Market Exchange, Fair Price, and Reciprocal Justice: A veritable cottage industry of secondary interpretations has arisen due to the lack of clarity and precision in the terminology and analysis of Aristotle's theory of reciprocal justice. There are a number of different theories attempting to explain the basis for equivalency and fair exchange between individuals (C-M-C). There are the two forms of natural exchange: direct barter between friends and households (C-C) and exchange between citizens and strangers (C-M-C), and there is the unnatural retail and commercial trade in the market (M-C-M'). Aristotle examines material exchange in two places: In Book 5, chapter 5 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he discuss exchange between craftsmen and in Book 1, chapter 9 of the *Politics*, he looks into the nature of interhousehold exchange. As examples of natural exchange between producers, he gives the example in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of the house builder and the shoemaker and the doctor and the farmer. Scott Meikle began a useful outline of the various theories of the foundation for fair exchange in his essay "Aristotle on Equality and Market Exchange," pp. 193–196 and in *Aristotle's Economic Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 132–134. Although not everyone mentioned fits neatly into just one category, one can get a sense of the possibilities involved. That distinctive element or substance which differentiates goods and services in exchange and makes them equal or commensurate in the process range from: (1) the social worth of the producers: Robert Williams, *The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1879), and Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy"; (2) quality of labor: Alexander Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1866); (3) social status of producers: H. Rackham, *The Nicomachean Ethics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947); (4) unequal friendship: John Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (New York: Arno Press, 1973); (5) status and skill: Ronald Meek, *Studies in the Labor Theory of Value* (New York: International Publishers, 1956); (6) skill alone: Soudek, "Aristotle's Theory of Exchange," and J. Spengler, "Aristotle on Economic Imputation and Related Matters," *Southern Economic Journal* 21, 3 (April 1955); (7) labor time: D. Ritchie, "Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice," W. D. Ross, introduction to the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), W. F. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), Joseph Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis*, ed. Elisabeth Boody Schumpeter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), and Barry Gordon, "Aristotle and the Development of Value Theory," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 78 (1964); (8) human need and friendship: Finley, "Aristotle and Economic Analysis," Thomas Lewis, "Acquisition and Anxiety: Aristotle's Case Against the Market," *Canadian Journal of Economics* 11 (1978), Delba Winthrop, "Aristotle and Theories of Justice,

The American Political Science Review 72 (1978), George E. McCarthy, *Dialectics and Decadence: Echoes of Antiquity in Marx and Nietzsche* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1994), Booth, *Households*, and Fred Miller, "Was Aristotle the First Economist?," *Apeiron* 31, 4 (1998); (9) friendship: Scott Meikle, "Aristotle on Equality and Market Exchange"; (10) self-sufficiency: Thomas Lewis, "Acquisition and Anxiety"; and (11) social worth of products and their functional contribution to the common good and civic excellence: W. von Leyden, *Aristotle on Equality and Justice: His Political Argument* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).

Von Leyden makes an interesting argument when he maintains that proportionate equality and commensurability are defined by the type of democracy in which the citizens live. Thus, in a middle-class democracy, proportionate equality is determined by the general equality of its citizens as friends (*Politics*, Book 3, chapter 9). On the other hand, in an organic polis the functional requirements of moral self-sufficiency and integration require the balancing of its different interests and the unequal social worth or value of its component parts: farmers, craftsmen, soldiers, wealthy, virtuous, and administrators (*Politics*, Book 7, chapter 8) (p. 47).

Finally, in opposition to Ritchie, Meikle argues that reciprocal justice is the most important form of justice because it "provided *philia* for an activity which he [Aristotle] knew to be more basic than any other in the life of the polis" ("Aristotle on Equality and Market Exchange," p. 193). Also, he argues that craftsmen engaged in exchange are equals, whereas Lewis contends that exchange between craftsmen is an inferior activity between individuals who are neither heads of households nor full citizens. One way of solving this debate over the substance of commensurability is to reject the issue as false. This is the position taken by H. H. Joachim, in "Commentary" to *The Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), and Finley, in "Aristotle and Economic Analysis" and *Studies in Ancient Society*. Aristotle's goal is not to establish the substance connecting individuals in a fair exchange but the moral basis for exchange in the first place. The search for a quantitative equivalency is a search for a reified thing that misses the ethics and politics underlying the issues of reciprocity and fairness. It is ultimately not a question of economics or exchange. That is, the question is not how exchange takes place, but the why or function of exchange. It is not a measurement issue, but a teleological one.

28. Has not the criterion of measurement of proportionate equality been simply displaced by giving it the name of "human need"? How is need measured and calculated for an equality and fairness of exchange? How is reciprocal justice to be determined using need as the final arbiter of distribution? Is it not the role of citizens to decide the nature and scope of social justice within a particular constitution where decisions are made by the many (democratic polity), the few (aristocracy), or the one (monarchy)? The ethical foundations of justice keep getting pushed back until one reaches the constitution and its deliberative functions. For a detailed analysis of the various forms of democracy and who would make these decisions in a democratic polity, see Mortimer Chambers, "Aristotle's 'Forms of Democracy,'" *Transactions of the American Philosophical Association* 92 (1961): 20–36; and von Leyden, *Aristotle on Equality and Justice*, pp. 17–25.

29. Reciprocal Justice of Family and Friends: This emphasis on human need moves the discussion about the foundations of Aristotle's economic theory of justice away from a theory of value and market prices. A theory of value stresses that the

worth of commodities is determined by their utility, market demand, or the labor used to produce them. Both the labor theory and the utility theory of value have produced a number of scholarly supporters: The former is represented by Van Johnson, "Aristotle's Theory of Value," *American Journal of Philology* 60 (October 1939): 445–451; and Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis*, pp. 57–65. Those who trace the connections between Aristotle and the Austrian marginal utility school include, Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson, *The School of Salamanca* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), pp. 19–22; Soudek, "Aristotle's Theory of Exchange," pp. 45–75; Emil Kauder, "Genesis of the Marginal Utility Theory from Aristotle to the End of the Eighteenth Century," *Economic Journal* 63 (September 1953): 638–650; and Joseph Spengler, "Aristotle on Economic Imputation and Related Matters," pp. 371–389; and the last three articles mentioned above may be found in the anthology, *Aristotle (384–322 B.C.)*, ed. Mark Blaug (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1991). There is a third group of authors who contend that Aristotle made no attempt to develop a theory of value. Instead, they argue that his purpose was to propose a theory of reciprocal justice and household management as the basis for living the virtuous life of public participation and political deliberation. These authors include Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy," Finley, "Aristotle and Economic Analysis," Lewis, "Acquisition and Market," and Scott Meikle, "Aristotle on Equality and Market Exchange" and "Aristotle and the Political Economy of the Polis," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 99 (1979): 57–73.

Reciprocity is a form of economic redistribution in which goods between households are transferred based on human needs and the collective moral imperative to maintain the self-sufficiency of the household and polis. In the end, much of the discussion surrounding Aristotle's search for the correct mathematical formula for equivalency exchange and fair price misses the point. He is not searching for a utilitarian scheme or model that makes five beds equal to one house. Rather, he is attempting to describe the moral foundations for a just society and the connection between reciprocal justice and the economy, friendship, and politics. An informal redistribution within the family is based on love (*philia*), common use, and familial devotion; barter and natural exchange between households is based on friendship (*philia*), mutual sharing, neighborly responsibility, kindness toward others, and gracious generosity precipitated by need and self-sufficiency. Families accept the burdens of sharing because of their greater commitment to the life of the community and their expectation that when they need something others will come to their aid. Thus, need is always different and unequal and requires continuous economic rebalancing. (McNeill, "Alternative Interpretations of Aristotle on Exchange and Reciprocity," pp. 60–62). Need is also expressed not in utilitarian terms of individual desires and market demands but as a deficiency within household production. It is a reflection of household survival. In the local market of the agora, natural exchange between artisans and producers (shoemaker and house builder), who may not be full citizens because of the nature of their work and life activities, is based on fairness and justice established by constitutional law and custom within the community. The key to appreciating the nature of proportional equality of exchange is that reciprocal justice is subsidiary to the ultimate telos of society: the virtuous and rational life of the soul in public discussions and debate. In the final analysis, for Aristotle, sharing of material goods is essential for the sharing in deliberating and judging, and this is the ultimate criterion by which equality of exchange is measured; reciprocal justice is

the basis for universal or political justice. Therefore, the goal of proportional equality (Pythagoras) is not to establish the equivalency or guidelines between producers or between products making them equal. The goal is to reestablish equality and freedom within a self-sufficient democratic community of needs. This is opposed to a chrematistic economy based on unnatural exchange for profit and property. Reciprocal justice requires us to reconsider the nature of property in ancient Greece. Although there was private property, there were strict limitations placed upon it reflecting a sense of collective responsibility to the common good and communal survival (sufficiency limitations, see Finley, "Aristotle and Economic Analysis," p. 150) that outweighed individual rights to private ownership and use. For an analysis of democratic citizenship and the moderately wealthy farmer, see Lewis, "Acquisition and Anxiety," pp. 84–87; and Thomas Lindsay, "Aristotle Defense of Democracy through 'Political Mixing,'" *Journal of Politics* 54, 1 (February 1992): 109–112. For an analysis of the role of friendship in Aristotle, see John Cooper, "Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship," *Review of Metaphysics* 30 (1976–1977): 619–648; Philip Shuchman, "Aristotle's Conception of Contract," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 13 (1962): 257–264; On the nature of friendship in Aristotle, see Suzanne Stern-Gillet, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995); and Lorraine Smith Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

30. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 5, chapter 5, 1133b19–20, p. 410.

31. Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: Forms and Function of Exchange in Archaic Societies* (New York: Norton, 1967).

32. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 5, chapter 5, 1133b32–33, p. 410.

33. *Ibid.*, book 1, chapter 7, 1098a15, p. 319.

34. *Ibid.*, book 8, chapter 2, 1156a4–5, p. 473.

35. *Ibid.*, book 8, chapter 1, 1155a22–23, p. 471.

36. *Ibid.*, book 8, chapter 6, 1158b1–3, p. 480.

37. Jill Frank, *A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 156–163.

38. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 8, chapter 9, 1159b31–32, p. 484.

39. *Ibid.*, book 8, chapter 11, 1161a24–26, p. 488.

40. *Ibid.*, book 8, chapter 14, 1163a23–24, pp. 493–494.

41. *Ibid.*, book 8, chapter 14, 1163b15, p. 494.

42. *Ibid.*, book 9, chapter 2, 1165a30, p. 499. Also see book 8, chapter 12, 1162a24, p. 490.

43. Because of the similar wording in their accounts of friendship and freedom, it would be interesting to compare Aristotle's theory of friendship and social activities to Marx's theory of freedom and praxis: See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 9, chapter 12, 1172a1–8, p. 518 and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, ed. R. Pascal (New York: International Publishers, 1965), p. 22.

44. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, in *Introduction to Aristotle*, trans. G. R. G. Mure, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 1947), book 1, chapter 3, 72b18–20, p. 14.

45. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6, chapter 12, 1143b21–22, p. 438. Also see Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, pp. 237–251; and James Bernard Murphy, *The Moral Economy of Labor: Aristotelian Themes in Economic Theory* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 87–112.

46. Jürgen Habermas, “The Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to Social Theory,” in *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 41–81. Also see Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 220–230. Arendt shows how Plato substituted making (ruler-ship) for action (*praxis*) in his theory of ideas. In the *Republic*, the philosopher-king by combining *episteme* and *techne* makes the city in the same way that a craftsman or sculptor creates an object of use or beauty. In the process, technical and administrative fabrication replaces practical action and political knowledge (p. 225).

47. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 5, chapter 6, 11401-2, p. 428.

48. Hardie, in his work *Aristotle’s Ethical Theory*, notices the egoistic element in Aristotle’s account of practical reason and ethical conduct in which the individual can deliberate about what is good for himself and also what is good for the health and well-being of the community (pp. 215–216). On this issue of individual and political *phronesis*, see Thomas Smith, *Revaluing Ethics: Aristotle’s Dialectical Pedagogy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), p. 164. It is the concern for the good of others (noble friendship and self-sacrifice) which is the true defining characteristic of human beings and the polity.

49. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6, chapter 9, 1142b33–34, p. 435.

50. *Ibid.*, book 6, chapter 8, 1142a14–16, p. 433.

51. *Ibid.*, book 5, chapter 10, 1137b27, p. 421.

52. Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 299–305 and “Saving Aristotle’s Appearances,” in *Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen*, ed. Malcolm Schofield and Martha Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 267–293. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 5, chapter 10, 1137b27–33, p. 421. Also Winthrop in “Aristotle and Theories of Justice” emphasizes the point that the demand for moral universality is contrary to nature which Aristotle views in terms of potentialities and becoming. She sees a danger in “the tyrannical imposition of human will over nature” (p. 1208).

53. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, p. 300.

54. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6, chapter 8, 1142a14–15, p. 433 and 1142a24–29, pp. 433–434. Martha Nussbaum in her essay, “Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,” in *Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), reiterates the key point that friendship or love is crucial to the process of perception. “Trusting the guidance of a friend and allowing one’s feelings to be engaged with that other person’s life and choices, one learns to see aspects of the world that one had previously missed” (p. 44). Friendship permits new horizons and perspectives to open up and is, thus, part of the process of deliberation and practical wisdom. In another essay in the same volume, she contends that “good deliberation is like theatrical or musical improvisation, where what counts is flexibility, responsiveness, and openness to the external” (“The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality,” in *Love’s Knowledge*, p. 74). The whole personality is involved through thought and sympathy for the other bound in friendship and common commitment. This is an important essay for she shows Aristotle’s integration of both intellect and emotions (deliberative imagination, love, and historical vision) in the cognitive process. This point may also help clarify Max Weber’s reference in *The Protestant Ethic and the*

Spirit of Capitalism to the “sensualists without heart.” With her analysis of sympathy and understanding, she also places the focus on perception and the particularity of the case under consideration (pp. 37–40).

55. *Phronesis*, as practical knowledge, is a very complex idea that is expressed in a variety of forms: the character and virtue of moral action, the equity and fairness of judicial review, the public deliberation and engaged discourse of political wisdom, and the mature wisdom and accumulated opinions of political science (metatheory on deliberation). The relationship between the universal and the particular in Aristotle’s theory of knowledge and equity represents the beginning of a long philosophical tradition that runs from Friedrich Schleiermacher to Hans-Georg Gadamer. This is a tradition that begins in ancient politics and law, and develops into modern hermeneutics and interpretive sociology. For insightful readings on Aristotle’s concept of *phronesis*, see Nicholas Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 3–46; Ronald Beiner, *Political Judgment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 72–82 and 90–101; Joseph Dunne, *Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1993), pp. 235–356; Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, revised trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 312–324; and Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, pp. 290–317.

56. J. O. Urmson, *Aristotle’s Ethics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 81–82.

57. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6, chapter 11, 1143a11–15, p. 436.

58. Beiner argues in *Political Judgment* that friendship mediates between virtue and justice. Borrowing from Gadamer’s analysis of Aristotle’s practical reason in *Truth and Method*, Beiner stresses the nature of understanding and judgment as intimately and necessarily connected with friendship. Critical understanding and evaluation of the moment for virtuous and noble action require more than individual conscience. Right action requires a common cause (pp. 78–82). For Gadamer’s analysis of sympathetic understanding, *phronesis*, and friendship, see *Truth and Method*, p. 323.

59. This point is stressed by Beiner in *Political Judgment*, p. 76. Sympathy, Friendship, and Political Judgment: The Greek notion of judgment or insight (*gnome*) has the connotation of forgiveness of others or empathetic understanding (*suggnome*) and being considerate (*eugnomon*). Sympathy literally translates as judgment on the side of others and feeling or suffering with others (empathy). Beiner writes: “Thus judgment, sympathy, and forgiveness are conceptually interconnected in a manner that would not be immediately evident in English translations . . . This suggests that to judge is to understand, to understand is to sympathize, and to sympathize is to be able to forgive” (ibid.). At the root of both understanding and judgment is *pathos*, or the ability to feel the suffering and pain of others. This all presupposes the foundation of the political constitution, community, and justice in the intimacy (*philia*) of citizenship and civic friendship (*homonoiia* as being of the same mind) (pp. 70–82). Beiner then goes on to distinguish between *praxis* (action) and *pathos* (suffering).

60. Ibid., p. 79. See also, Sullivan, *Morality and the Good Life*, pp. 110–111.

61. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6, chapter 11, 1143a23–25, p. 436.

62. Ibid., book 6, chapter 10, 1143a5–7, p. 436.

63. This idea of the role of intuitive reason in the logic of inquiry of practical knowledge seems to be similar to the application of reason in the neo-Kantian

tradition and the distinction in Rickert and Weber between value relevance and value freedom. More on this topic in chapter 2.

64. On the question of the relation between means and ends and whether practical wisdom deals with only means or with both means and ends, see Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*, pp. 213, 232, and 235; Gadamer, "Hermeneutics and Social Science," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 2 (1975): 312–313 and *Truth and Method*, pp. 321, n. 259 and 322; John Cooper, *Reason and Human Good in Aristotle* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 19; David Wiggins, "Deliberation and Practical Reason," *Proceedings of the Aristotle Society* 76 (1975–1976): 2951; Sullivan, *Morality and the Good Life*, p. 98; Urmson, *Aristotle's Ethics*, pp. 83–84; Beiner, *Political Judgment*, pp. 93–94; and Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pp. 147 and 251, n. 46. Beiner quotes two places in the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle connects practical knowledge to a deliberation of ends: book 6, chapter 9, 1142b27–33, p. 435 and book 6, chapter 5, 1140a25–30, p. 428. For example, Aristotle writes about the relationship between practical knowledge and the purpose of human existence: "Now it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect . . . but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6, chapter 5, 1140a25–29, p. 428). On the role of intuitive reason and its relation to *phronesis*, see Hardie, pp. 233–234; and Sullivan, p. 107. Relying on Wiggins' interpretation of Aristotle, Nussbaum, in "The Discernment of Perception, in *Love's Knowledge*, writes that the sentence "We deliberate not about the end, but about the means to the end" is a mistranslation of the sentence that deliberation is "what pertains to the end" (p. 61). See also *The Fragility of Goodness*, pp. 296–297.

65. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6, chapter 13, 1145a5–7, p. 442.

66. Wayne Amber, "Aristotle on Acquisition," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 7 (September 1984): 495–502; and Lewis, "Acquisition and Anxiety," pp. 74–75.

67. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6, chapter 5, 1140b10, p. 429.

68. Aristotle's idea of *phronesis*, practical knowledge, may be further broken down into moral knowledge (virtue), political wisdom (public discourse), judicial prudence (equity), and political science (happiness and the good).

69. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6, chapter 8, 1141b23, p. 432.

70. The ideas of discursive rationality and public discourse have been further developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the writings of John Stuart Mill with his theory of epistemological agnosticism, political opinions, and representative democracy in *On Liberty*, ed. Currin Shields (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1976), pp. 19–28; and Jürgen Habermas's theory of ideal speech situation and rational and distorted communicative action in *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1995), and *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vols. 1 and 2.

71. Herodotus, *The Histories*, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), book 3, chapter 80, p. 205. For an examination of the relationship between Herodotus and democracy, see Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, *Athens on Trial*:

The Antidemocratic Tradition in Western Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 35–36.

72. In his description of the Constitutional Debate in Herodotus' *The Histories*, Kurt Raaflaub, *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece*, trans. Renate Fancisco (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), emphasizes the idea of *isonomia* (equality) in terms of both *isegoria* (equality of speech) and *isokratia* (equality of power). Political rights (equality of speech and participation) are viewed within the broader context of the political and social institutions which distributed power equally among the citizens in ancient Athens (pp. 95–96, 99–101, 203–249, 254–256, and 262–264). Raaflaub makes a very important point when he writes, "Finally, I consider it significant that the protection of freedom never appeared as an issue of concern either in Athenian laws against subversion of the constitution and the establishment of tyranny . . . or in the oath of the councilmen" (pp. 95–96).

73. George E. McCarthy, "In Praise of Classical Democracy: The Funeral Orations of Pericles and Marx," *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 27 (November 2006): 205–227.

74. John Stuart Mill and Classical Antiquity: The ancient Greeks were a source of constant philosophical inspiration to Mill. He began his study of Greek at the age of three and completed his studies of Greek literature and philosophy at seventeen. He also started studying Latin at the age of eight. By twelve he was reading Greek and Latin classics in the original. For some of his translations of ancient sources from the mid-1830s, see his *Essays on Philosophy and the Classics* in the *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, vol. 11, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), pp. 39–238. In this volume may be found his translations of the *Protagoras*, *Phaedrus*, *Gorgias*, *Apology of Socrates*, *Charmides*, *Euthyphron*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, and *Parmenides*. For further analysis see Geraint Williams, "J. S. Mill on the Greeks: History Put to Use," *The Mill News Letter* 17, 1 (1982): 1–11; T. H. Irwin, "Mill and the Classical World," in *Cambridge Companion to Mill*, ed. John Skorupski (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1998), pp. 423–463; Francis Sparshott, introduction to John Stuart Mill, *Essays on Philosophy and the Classics*, in the *Collected Works*, vol. 11, pp. vii–lxxv; Frank Turner, *The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981); and Nadia Urbinati, *Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to Representative Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

75. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner, intro. Moses I. Finley (London: Penguin Books, 1972), book 2, chapter 37, p. 145.

76. *Ibid.*, book 2, chapter 40, p. 147.

77. *Ibid.*, book 2, chapter 41, pp. 147–48.

78. P. J. Rhodes, introduction to *The Athenian Constitution*, Aristotle, trans. P. J. Rhodes (London: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 29. For the sake of convenience and to avoid unnecessary confusion, the author of this work will be referred to in this chapter as Aristotle. It was accepted as written by him in antiquity, but modern scholars believe that it was a product of one of his pupils at the Athens School.

79. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 2, chapter 12, 1273b35–38, p. 160. Economics and Classical Democracy: For a brief overview of the political structures of Athenian democracy, see John Thorley, *Athenian Democracy* (London: Routledge, 1996). Josiah Ober offers a more comprehensive investigation into the evolution of the Athenian

constitution in *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 53–103. And for an analysis of the role of class in Aristotle, as well as the debate between G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981) and Moses I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) turn to Ober's essay, "Aristotle's Political Sociology: Class, Status, and Order in the Polis," in *Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science*, ed. Carnes Lord and David O'Connor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 112–135. The distinctive social and economic foundations of the Athenian polity were examined by Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood in *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), pp. 21–64; and Ellen Meiksins Wood in *Peasant-Citizen and Slave: The Foundations of Athenian Democracy* (London: Verso, 1989). They concluded that classical democracy rested not upon chattel slavery but upon an independent, working citizenry of peasant-farmers and artisans (pp. 98–125). See also Michel Austin and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *The Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece*, trans. and revised Michel Austin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); and S. C. Humphreys, "Economy and Society in Classical Athens," in *Anthropology and the Greeks*, ed. S. C. Humphreys (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 136–158.

80. Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution*, chapter 9, p. 50.

81. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 2, chapter 12, 1273b37, p. 160.

82. George Grote and Classical Antiquity: Kyriakos Demetriou, *George Grote on Plato and Athenian Democracy: A Study in Classical Reception in Koinon. Sozialwissenschaftliche interdisziplinäre Studien*, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999), p. 96. It should be noted that Demetriou traces the influence of ancient German historiography on Grote. He is indebted to three representatives of the *Altertumswissenschaft*: August Böckh, *The Political Economy of Athens* (1817), Karl Otfried Müller, *On the Isle of Aegina* (1817), *History of Greek Peoples and Cities* (1820), and *History and Antiquities of the Doric Race* (1824), and Barthold Georg Niebuhr, *Lectures on the History of Rome* (1811–1832). Demetriou writes: "Böckh's erudition and painstaking search for documentary materials, Müller's comprehensive historical outlook, and Niebuhr's political insights and scepticism are blended in Grote's *History of Greece*, producing a historiographical method that sought to present a faithful and sympathetic picture of ancient Greek society and its institutional surroundings" (p. 74). On this topic see also Harriet Grote, *The Personal Life of George Grote* (London: J. Murray, 1873); E. F. Dow, "George Grote, Historian of Greece," *Classical Journal* 51 (1956): 211–219; Martin Clarke, *George Grote: A Biography* (London: Athlone Press, 1962); Arnaldo Momigliano, "George Grote and the Study of Greek History" (1952), in *Studies in Historiography* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), pp. 56–74; Mogens Herman Hansen, "The Ancient Athenian and the Modern Liberal View of Liberty as a Democratic Ideal," in *Dēmokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern*, ed. Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 96, 99, and 103, n. 56; Roberts, *Athens on Trial*, pp. 236–255; William Calder III and Stephen Trzaskoma, eds., *George Grote Reconsidered* (Hildesheim, Germany: Weidmann, 1996); Arlene Saxonhouse, *Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theorists* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), pp. 18–21; and Kyriakos Demetriou, introduction to *Classics in*

the *Nineteenth Century: Responses to George Grote*, ed. Kyriakos Demetriou (Bristol, England: Thoemmes Continuum, 2003), pp. v–li.

83. Political Institutions of Athenian Democracy: By the fourth century BCE, participation in the deliberative process of the political community of Athens was extensive. The Assembly met 40 times a year; the Council of 500 (*Boule*) about 260 days a year; and the jury courts between 150 and 200 days a year. Some combination of these activities was common and by any standard this represents a very high commitment to civic participation. See R. K. Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation in Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 107 and 129. Sinclair views the pay scale for participation in the judicial and legislative process as a social welfare system designed to supplement the daily wages of the working poor in Athens. Also examine A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), pp. 23–38, 49–50, 54–57, and 78–96; Moses I. Finley, *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece*, ed. Brent Shaw and Richard Saller (New York: Viking Press, 1982), pp. 77–94; P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 30–48; Mogens Herman Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly: In the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 30–37 and 113–114 and *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles and Ideology*, trans. J. A. Cook (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 97–99, 130–138, 186–189, 250–255, and 313–320; Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*, pp. 127–148 and “Public Speech and Power of People,” in *The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 18–31; and David Stockton, *The Classical Athenian Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 67–116. For an analysis of the distinction between Athenian democracy as a republican rule of law (courts) or as a participatory and deliberative democracy (Assembly), see Saxonhouse, *Athenian Democracy*, pp. 6–7 and 132–135.

84. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 6, chapter 2, 1317a40, p. 362. Aristotle summarizes the structural features of classical democracy as follows: (1) elections to office by all open to all; (2) ruled and being ruled in turn; (3) offices filled by lot; (3) no property qualifications for holding office; (4) no bureaucracy or careerism; (5) term limits and office rotation; (6) jury service open to all; (7) unquestioned sovereignty of the assembly; and (8) payment for services in the assembly, law courts, and public offices (*Ibid.*, book 6, chapter 2, 1317b17–1318a3, pp. 363–364). Hansen, in “The Ancient Athenian and the Modern Liberal View of Liberty as a Democratic Ideal,” affirms that the description of democracy by Aristotle in Book 6 of the *Politics* was confirmed by Thucydides in Pericles’ funeral oration (pp. 91–92).

85. Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, p. 422. Aristotle’s Ideal Political Constitution as Participatory Democracy: For the connection between citizenship and statesmanship, democracy and aristocracy in Aristotle, see Mary Nichols, *Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics* (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), pp. 84, 88, 121–123. Barker also makes a similar argument since he views Aristotle’s democracy (“though it is always termed an aristocracy”) as the foundation for a virtuous and righteous society. That is, it is a moral community: “For it has set virtue before its eyes for the aim and purpose of its life; it has made virtue the measure by which its citizens receive the honors it has to bestow. It is in a word a State where ‘the best’ rule, though all are the ‘best’ ” (p. 422). Ultimately, it is in the collective that the faculty of public judgment rests.

In this form of self-government, offices are to be filled by lot (democracy) and by choice (virtuous aristocracy). Some scholars have defended the position that Aristotle's ideal society is an aristocracy of philosophers and gentlemen found in Books 1, 7, and 8. However, Nichols rejects this interpretation and, quite correctly, argues that his ideal polity is a democracy based on practical wisdom articulated in Books 3, 4, 5, and 6 (pp. 1–6, 126, 169, and 200, n. 44). She also rejects the commonly held notion that Aristotle distinguishes between the ideal or best regime (aristocracy or kingship) and the actual or imperfectly realizable one; democracy is, according to her reading of Aristotle, the best form of polity (pp. 199, n. 43 and 200, n. 44; and Barker, pp. 417–422). For an extensive overview of the literature defending this more democratic reading of Aristotle's *Politics*, see William Bluhm, "The Place of 'Polity' in Aristotle's Theory of the Ideal State," *The Journal of Politics* 50, 4 (November 1962): 743–753; Delba Winthrop, "Aristotle on Participatory Democracy," *Polity* 6 (1978): 151–171 and "Aristotle and Theories of Justice," pp. 1201–1216; Lindsay, "Aristotle's Qualified Defense of Democracy through 'Political Mixing,'" p. 103, n. 5; Nichols, *Citizens and Statesmen*, pp. 1–6 and 177, ns. 1–7; McCarthy, *Dialectics and Decadence*, p. 329, n. 8; and Frank, *A Democracy of Distinction*, pp. 6, 8, 81–137, and 163–164. Frank argues that in order to appreciate the full ramifications of Aristotle's theory of law and political constitutions, it must be examined in the broader cultural, social, and economic context of the polity: that is, Aristotle's political theory must be viewed as part of his theories of action, moral and intellectual virtue, practical wisdom, character development, property, virtue friendship, the middle class, and citizenship. She concludes that from this broader perspective his ideal polity is an "aristocratic democracy" or "democracy of distinction" in which democratic freedom and aristocratic virtue are combined in a single polity (pp. 142 and 169–180).

86. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 3, chapter 1, 1275b5, p. 170. It should be noted that immediately after this quotation, Aristotle stresses that the concept of citizenship has relevance only in a democratic society. Although it may be applicable in other societies, there are no real citizens in a monarchy, aristocracy, or oligarchy. There is no public assembly of citizens representing the mass in the decision-making process. The concept would have only limited and problematic applicability in these other societies. This is another confirmation of the primacy of the democratic polity as the best constitution.

87. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 3, chapter 5, 1278a10, p. 184. On this point, see Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, p. 296.

88. Frank, *A Democracy of Distinction*, pp. 54, n.1 and 56, n. 7.

89. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 3, chapter 9, 1281a2–3, p. 198.

90. *Ibid.*, book 4, chapter 11, 1295a1–3, p. 268.

91. *Ibid.*, book 7, chapter 9, 1329a17, p. 416. For more information on the economic side of the democratic polity as a middle constitution see *Politics*, book 2, chapter 5, 1263a37–39, p. 115; book 2, chapter 7, 1267a37–b8, p. 131; book 4, chapter 4, 1291b30–38, p. 250; book 5, chapter 8, 1309a14, p. 327; book 6, chapter 4, 1319a5–7, p. 370; book 6, chapter 11, 1295a34–b12, p. 266; book 6, chapter 11, 1295b36, p. 268; book 7, chapter 1, 1323b38–1324a4, p. 393; book 7, chapter 5, 1320a35–b9, p. 375; book 7, chapter 9, 1329a17–26, p. 416; and book 8, chapter 9, 1330a1–2, p. 419.

92. W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, vol. 1: *Introduction to the Politics* (New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 199. Martha Nussbaum, in her essay “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in *Liberalism and the Good Life*, ed. R. Bruce Douglas, Gerald Mara, and Henry Richardson (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 203–252, makes a strong argument that Aristotle’s ideal polity is a social democracy that has important similarities to the Finnish and Swedish governments. She argues that “Aristotle never seriously considers the possibility that all ownership should be private. This he considers highly divisive, inimical to sociability, and subversive to the stability and security of the polity” (pp. 231–232). Nussbaum interprets the central question raised by Aristotle as: what is structurally necessary to treat citizens as free and equal? She is also aware that Aristotle is in opposition to the Athenian state when he argues that those involved in agricultural labor, craft, and commerce should not be made citizens (*Politics*, book 3, chapter 5, 1277b33–1278a25, p. 184; book 7, chapter 9, 1328b33–1329a1, p. 415; and book 7, chapter 9, 1329a25, p. 416). Also see her essay, “Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities: A Response to Antony, Arneson, Charlesworth, and Mulgan,” *Ethics* 111 (October 2000): 102–140, especially her analysis of Aristotle as a social democrat and the distinction in the *Politics* between *dēmokratia* (degenerate democracy) and *politeia* (true democracy) (pp. 109–112).

Bluhm, in “The Place of the ‘Polity’ in Aristotle’s Theory of the Ideal State,” makes the same case but more pointedly when he writes about Aristotle’s *Politics*: “In the first place, the avowedly best regime detailed in Books VII and VIII is obviously not a monarchy, nor an aristocracy in the sense of a government by the ‘Few,’ the patrician families. Even Barker, who refuses to see the similarity between this society and the polity of Book IV, calls it an ‘idealized democracy’” (p. 751). Bluhm makes this case in spite of the fact that he has already stated in the previous paragraph that Aristotle explicitly argues at the end of book 3 and beginning of chapter 2 of book 4 that “monarchy and aristocracy are the best forms of government.” Bluhm attempts to solve the apparent inconsistency by maintaining that aristocracy is a government of virtue and the best citizens which is synonymous with the way Aristotle describes a democratic polity. He also notices that Aristotle equates polity and aristocracy in Book 2. Passages in which he appears to defend a monarchy are on closer scrutiny inconsistent and merely preparations for its later rejection as an ideal state (pp. 751–752).

93. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 7, chapter 10, 1330a1–2, p. 419.

94. *Ibid.*, book 4, chapter 11, 1296a7, p. 268.

95. In book 3, chapters 11–13 of the *Politics*, Aristotle defends a democratic constitution; and in chapters 14–18, he outlines the positive elements of a kingship.

96. *Ibid.*, book 3, chapter 11, 1282a16–17, pp. 204–205.

97. *Ibid.*, book 3, chapter 11, 1282a36–38, p. 205.

98. *Ibid.*, book 3, chapter 13, 1283b29–31, p. 212.

99. *Ibid.*, book 3, chapter 13, 1284a8–10, p. 213 and book 7, chapter 14, 1332b28–30, pp. 431–432.

100. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 1, chapter 3, 1094b14–23, pp. 309–310.

101. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 4, chapter 1, 1289a11–13, p. 237.

102. There is a creative dialectic and fusion of horizons within law, political discourse, and critical hermeneutics that joins these separate fields together in a common philosophical tradition that will be crucial for the foundation of social theory in the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER TWO: ARISTOTLE AND CLASSICAL SOCIAL THEORY

1. Aristotle and the German Historical School of Economics: Birger Priddat and Eberhard Seifert, "Gerechtigkeit und Klugheit. Spuren Aristotelischen Denkens in der modernen Ökonomie," in *Ökonomische Theorie und Ethik*, ed. Bernd Biervert and Martin Held (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1987), pp. 51–77; Wilhelm Hennis, "‘A Science of Man’: Max Weber and the Political Economy of the German Historical School," in *Max Weber and his Contemporaries*, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), pp. 25–58 and in *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction*, trans. Keith Tribe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp. 107–145; Keith Tribe, *Governing Economy: The Reformation of German Economic Discourse, 1750–1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 149–209 and *Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse, 1750–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 66–94; Birger Priddat, "Die politische Wissenschaft von Reichtum und Menschen. Aristotelische Reminiszenzen in der Politische Ökonomie des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Archiv für Rechts und Sozialphilosophie* 75 (1989): 171–195, "Schmoller on Ethics and Economics," *International Journal of Social Economics* 16, 9–10–11 (1989): 47–68, *Der ethische Ton der Allokation. Elemente der Aristotelischen Ethik und Politik in der deutschen Nationalökonomie des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991), and *Die andere Ökonomie. Eine neue Einschätzung von Gustav von Schmollers Versuch einer ‘ethisch-historischen’ Nationalökonomie im 19. Jahrhundert* (Marburg: Metropolis Verlag, 1995); Peter Koslowski, ed., *The Theory of Ethical Economy in the Historical School* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1995); Bertram Schefold, "The German Historical School and the Belief in Ethical Progress," in *Ethical Universals in International Business*, ed. F. Neil Brady (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1996), pp. 173–196; Heino Heinrich Nau, "Von der historischen Nationalökonomie zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft," *Neue Politische Literatur* 42 (1997): 70–99; Helge Peukert, "The Schmoller Renaissance," *History of Political Economy* 33, 1 (2001): 71–116; Yuichi Shionoya, ed. *The German Historical School: The Historical and Ethical Approach to Economics* (London: Routledge, 2001) and *The Soul of the German Historical School: Methodological Essays on Schmoller, Weber and Schumpeter* (New York: Springer Verlag, 2005); Heino Heinrich Nau and Bertram Schefold, eds. *The Historicity of Economics: Continuities and Discontinuities of Historical Thought in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Economics* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2002); Heino Heinrich Nau and Philippe Steiner, "Schmoller, Durkheim, and Old European Institutional Economics," *Journal of Economic Issues* 36, 4 (December 2002): 1005–1024; Erik Grimmer-Solem, *The Rise of Historical Economics and Social Reform in Germany, 1864–1894* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003); and Mohammad Nafissi, *Ancient Athens and Modern Ideology: Value, Theory and Evidence in Historical Sciences: Max Weber, Karl Polanyi, and Moses Finley* (London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2005), pp. 57–123.

Grimmer-Solem examines the German Historical School of Economics and the role of the *Staatswissenschaft* in the school of law in German universities. *Staatswis-*

senschaft was closely connected to the fields of *Nationalökonomie* and *Volkswirtschaft* (On the connection among law, political science, and economics, see also Hennis, “‘A Science of Man,’” pp. 109–117). Oriented to the study of political economy and ethics, members of the German Historical School introduced students to a very critical appraisal of the German social and labor questions, especially questions of community, class, inequality, and social justice (Grimmer-Solem, *The Rise of Historical Economics*, pp. 35–61). For Gustav Schmoller of the German Historical School, economics was an ethical science (p. 138). Schmoller’s theory of objectivity and nonpartisan science anticipated some of Weber’s key ideas in his *Wissenschaftslehre* (theory of science); his theory of the worker’s question, rapid industrialization, division of labor, intermediate economic and legal associations, moral sentiment, and community cohesion led the way for Durkheim’s later thought (pp. 89–168). For his discussion of social justice, see Schmoller, “Justice in Political Economy,” trans. Ernest Halle and Carl Schutz, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 4 (March 1894): 725–737.

In an analysis of the various goals of political economy (*Nationalökonomie*) in his essay, “‘A Science of Man,’” Hennis stresses its critique of theoretical or neoclassical economics and the education of humanity to its highest spiritual potentialities and social ideals: ethics and practical philosophy (virtues of nobility, dignity, responsibility, and happiness), state policy (social question, social reform, and activist economic policy), politics (constitution and law), social economy (human need, social justice, and the critique of possessive individualism, productivity, and market economy), classical political science (political judgment and public deliberation), and the German Historical School (ethical science and the science of man) (pp. 115–129).

2. Aristotle and German Hellenism: It was mainly Georg Friedrich Hegel’s work which precipitated in the nineteenth century a renewed interest in the writings of Aristotle. In fact, the year of Hegel’s death in 1831 was the year that Immanuel Bekker’s edition of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* appeared. For further analysis, see J. Glenn Gray, *Hegel and Greek Thought* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), pp. 53–89; Reimar Müller, “Hegel und Marx über die Antike Kultur,” *Philologus* 116 (1972): 1–31 and 3, n. 4; Enrico Berti, “Ancient Greek Dialectic as Expression of Freedom of Thought and Speech,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 39, 3 (July/September 1978): 347; T. A. Sinclair, translator’s introduction to Aristotle, *The Politics*, revised Trevor Saunders (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 17; and Riccardo Pozzo, introduction to *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*, ed. Riccardo Pozzo (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), pp. viii–ix. For an analysis of Aristotle’s philosophy of metaphysics and physics and its relation to classical social theory, see Carol Gould, *Marx’s Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx’s Theory of Social Reality* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1980), pp. 44–46 and 78–80; Jonathan Pike, *From Aristotle to Marx: Aristotelianism in Marxist Social Ontology* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999), pp. 112–135; Alfredo Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and George E. McCarthy, *Classical Horizons: The Origins of Sociology in Ancient Greece* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), pp. 51–59. For an understanding of the rise of German Hellenism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Arnaldo Momigliano, “New Paths of Classicism in the Nineteenth Century,” *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History* 21, 4 (1982): 1–64; Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, *Athens on*

Trial: The Antidemocratic Tradition in Western Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 208–255; Suzanne Marchand, *Down From Olympus: Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1850–1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Esther Sünderhauf, *Griechensehnsucht und Kulturkritik. Die deutsche Rezeption von Winckelmanns Antikenideal 1840–1945* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004); Paul Bishop, ed., *Nietzsche and Antiquity: His Reaction and Response to the Classical Tradition* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2004); and Neville Morley, “‘Unhistorical Greeks’: Myth, History, and the Uses of Antiquity,” in *Nietzsche and Antiquity*, pp. 27–39 and 38, n. 1 and *Antiquity and Modernity* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008). Finally, Charles Taylor, in *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), nicely summarizes the relationship between Hegel and the Greeks when he writes: “In putting *Sittlichkeit* [community ethics] at the apex Hegel is—consciously—following Aristotle: and in following Aristotle, the ancient Greek world . . . Hegel’s notion of *Sittlichkeit* is in part a rendering of that expressive unity which his whole generation saw in the Greek *polis*, where—it was believed—men had seen the collective life to their city as the essence and meaning of their own lives, had sought their glory in its public life, their rewards in power and reputation within it, and immortality in its memory” (p. 84). Hegel’s theory of the state represents a critical response of the nineteenth century to the distortions and deceptions of technical rationality, utilitarianism, and atomistic liberalism (pp. 72 and 94).

3. Aristotle and Marx: Richard Miller has written on the extensive overlap between Aristotle and Marx, especially regarding their common views on self-realization, mutual caring and friendship (*philia*), human need, the good life and happiness, human potentiality, self-expression, and rational deliberation in his essays “Marx and Aristotle: The Unity of Two Opposites,” *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association* (1978): 12–20 and “Marx and Aristotle: A Kind of Consequentialism,” in *Marx and Aristotle: Nineteenth-Century German Social Theory and Classical Antiquity*, ed. George E. McCarthy (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), pp. 275–302. For an overview of the literature on Marx and Aristotle turn to Robert Padgug, “Selected Bibliography on Marxism and the Study of Antiquity,” in *Marxism and the Classics, Arethusa* 8, 1 (Spring 1975): 201–225; and George E. McCarthy, “Visions and Vertigo: Viewing Modernity from the Acropolis,” in *Marx and Aristotle* and “Karl Marx and Classical Antiquity: A Bibliographic Introduction,” *Helios* 26, 2 (September 1999): 165–173. There are a number of important works in German on Marx and ancient Greece, including Johannes Irmscher, “Karl Marx Studiert Altertumswissenschaft,” *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl Marx Universität Leipzig, Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe* 3, 2–3 (1953–1954): 209–215; Rolf Sannwald, *Marx und die Antike* (Zürich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1957); Abram Ranowitsch, “Marx über die Antike,” in *Aufsätze zur Alten Geschichte*, ed. Gabriel Bockisch (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1961), pp. 25–34; Elisabeth Charlotte Welskopf, “Wiederentdeckung und Weiterentwicklung Aristotelischer Gedanken über die Musse bei Marx und Engels,” in *Probleme der Musse im Alten Hellas* (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1962), pp. 278–317 and “Marx und Aristoteles,” *Antiquitas graeco-romana ac tempora nostra*, ed. Jan Burian and Ladislav Vidman (Prague: Academia, 1968), pp. 231–239; Helmut Seidel, “Das Verhältnis von Karl Marx zu Aristoteles,” *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 27 (1979): 661–672; and Panajotis Kondylis, *Marx und die Griechische Antike: Zwei Studien* (Heidelberg: Manutius Verlag, 1987).

4. Georg Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Law*, quoted in Karl Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, in *Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), pp. 11 and 13.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 100. See also Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, ed. and intro. R. Pascal (New York: International Publishers, 1965), pp. 40–41; and Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 284–285.

7. Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, p. 107.

8. Karl Marx “On the Jewish Question,” in *Karl Marx Early Writings*, trans. and ed. T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 15.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 24. Stephen Lukes recognizes the inherent ideological and class bias of natural rights principles in *Marxism and Morality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 30.

11. Ronald Commers, “Marx’s Concept of Justice and the Two Traditions in European Political Thought,” *Philosophica* 33 (1984): 107–129.

12. Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” p. 25.

13. Marx and Classical Antiquity: Marx builds his vision of a communist society on the foundations of the ancient *oikos* and *polis*: William James Booth, “The New Household Economy,” *American Political Science Review* 85 (1991): 59–76, “Households, Markets, and Firms,” in *Marx and Aristotle: Nineteenth-Century German Social Theory and Classical Antiquity*, ed. George E. McCarthy (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), pp. 243–271, and “The Aristotelian Foundations of Marx’s Economics,” in *Households: On the Moral Architecture of the Economy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 246–296; James Bernard Murphy, *The Moral Economy of Labor: Aristotelian Themes in Economic Theory* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 146 and 172–173; and Claudio Katz, “The Socialist Polis: Antiquity and Socialism in Marx’s Thought,” *Review of Politics* 56, 2 (Spring 1994): 237–260 and “The Greek Matrix of Marx’s Critique of Political Economy,” *History of Political Thought* 15, 2 (1994): 229–248. Murphy summarizes his position with the comment that labor has become a moral category as “Marx has democratized Aristotle’s polis” (p. 172).

14. Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” p. 26.

15. Mehmet Tabak, in his essay, “Marxian Considerations on Morality, Justice, and Rights,” *Rethinking Marxism* 15, 4 (October 2003): 529, maintains that Marx’s view of the political rights of the citizen (as opposed to the economic rights of the bourgeois) to free speech, thought, assembly, and so forth, are quite similar to the individual rights and freedoms voiced by John Stuart Mill in *On Liberty*. This is a position also held by Joseph Neyer, “Individualism and Socialism in Durkheim,” in *Emile Durkheim, 1858–1917* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1960), p. 32. See also Tabak, “A Marxian Theory of Democracy,” *Socialism and Democracy* 14, 2 (2001): 104–108. Tabak stresses that Marx in the “Critique of the Gotha Program” expands the notion of human rights to include the rights to collective ownership of the means of production, social and catastrophic insurance, health care, and education. For an interesting analysis of Hegel’s critique of liberalism and his theory of natural rights, see Merold Westphal, “Hegel, Human Rights, and the Hungry,” in

Hegel on Economics and Freedom, ed. William Maker (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987), pp. 209–228; and Steven Smith, *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 98–131.

16. Drucilla Cornell, “Should a Marxist Believe in Rights?,” *Praxis International* 4, 1 (April 1984): 50. It is at this point that Marx also relies on Rousseau’s theory of the general will: See Norman Fischer, “Marx’s Early Concept of Democracy and the Ethical Bases of Socialism,” in *Marxism and the Good Society*, ed. J. Burke, L. Crocker, and L. Legters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 63.

17. Karl Marx, letter published in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in 1844, in *Karl Marx/ Frederick Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), p. 137.

18. Karl Marx, “Alienated Labor,” in *Karl Marx Early Writings*, trans. and ed. T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 123.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

21. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ed. Lewis Feuer (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1959), pp. 12–13.

22. Karl Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Program,” in *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ed. Lewis Feuer (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 120.

23. *Ibid.* See Marx’s outline of his analysis of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption in the appendix to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. S. W. Ryazanskaya, ed. Maurice Dobb (New York: International Publishers, 1970), pp. 188–205. Also see Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 5–6 and 13–14.

24. Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Program,” p. 120. The modern term “distributive justice” in classical social theory generally incorporates the ancient ideals of both distributive and reciprocal justice. “Social justice” refers to the just distribution of private property, social wealth, and industrial capital and to the just reciprocity of productive labor and material goods in economic exchange.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

26. See the essays by Karl Marx on “Alienated Labor” (pp. 120134), “Private Property and Communism” (pp. 152–167), and “Needs, Production, and Division of Labor” (pp. 168–188), in *Karl Marx Early Writings*, trans. and ed. T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964).

27. Marx, “Needs, Production, and Division of labor,” p. 176.

28. Patrick Murray, in his work *Marx's Theory of Scientific Knowledge* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1988), pp. 81–88, shows the connections between Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* with his chapters entitled “Virtue and the Way of the World,” “The Unhappy Consciousness,” and “Morality” and Marx’s critique of the distant and speculative method of the Left Hegelians (Bruno Bauer, Max Stirner, and Ludwig Feuerbach). Murray writes: “The theoretical philosophy of the Young Hegelians fails to challenge the given ‘facts’; it does not see the sensible world as a specific, historical product in a process which has determinate potentialities. The Young Hegelians prefer to soar above the empirical into a transcendent realm of ‘ideas’ of pure consciousness” (p. 82). Murray refers to the moral approach of both

the idealist and the materialists as pitiful and fearful. On this issue he concludes: “According to Marx, transcendence [of the Left Hegelians and bourgeois economists], by satisfying itself with its own subjective, moral proclamations to the actual world, never attains a critical grasp of that world and its internal conflicts. As a result, it fails to relate to the world in a self-conscious and free manner. Transcendence’s ignorance of the actual world blinds it to the very world it seeks to transcend” (p. 95). The false juxtaposition of political ideals and economic reality simply creates a form of “applied metaphysics.”

29. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1: *The Process of Capitalist Production*, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Frederick Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 290. For a more detailed analysis of simple commodity exchange, see the *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 239–250. Marx mentions Aristotle thirty times in his dissertation *The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature (1840–1841)*, eight times in *The German Ideology (1846)*, four times in the *Grundrisse (1857–1858)*, eight times in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859)*, and seven times in the first volume of *Capital (1867)*. The early Marx stresses Aristotle’s themes of ethics, virtue, and happiness, whereas the later Marx emphasizes his theories of politics, democracy, justice, and economics.

30. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 583.

31. Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Program,” p. 124.

32. Bertell Ollman, *Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 62–71 and 134–136.

33. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 652.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 706.

35. In his work, “Das Verhältnis von Karl Marx zu Aristoteles,” Seidel argues that Aristotle’s theory of empirical science, his method of seeking the potentialities (form) inherent in reality, and his critique of political economy represent the pre-history of Marx’s historical materialism (pp. 661–672).

36. Patricia Springborg, “Aristotle and the Problem of Needs,” *History of Political Thought* 5, 3 (Winter 1984): 419.

37. Marx and Aristotle On Need and Reciprocal Grace: For a more detailed analysis of Marx’s theory of need, see Agnes Heller, *The Theory of Need in Marx* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976); Springborg, “Aristotle and the Problem of Needs,” pp. 393–424 and “Marx, Democracy and the Ancient Polis,” *Critical Philosophy* 1, 1 (March 1984): 47–66; Norman Geras, “The Controversy about Marx and Justice,” *Philosophica* 33 (1984): 33–86; Philip Kain, *Marx and Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 25–33 and 51–82; and Martha Nussbaum, “Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution,” in *Marx and Aristotle: Nineteenth-Century German Social Theory and Classical Antiquity*, ed. George E. McCarthy (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), pp. 175–211.

38. Alan Gilbert, in *Democratic Individuality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), writes: “He [Marx] offered a rich, Aristotelian portrait of intrinsic goods and human senses realized in the history of their embodiments . . . Aristotle stressed the political association of citizens, who rule and are ruled in turn, as a defining human characteristic. Despite an inversion of the ancient scorn for manual work,

Marx insisted, the Commune was a ‘*republic* of labor,’ the Commune a *political animal*” (p. 267). Gilbert views Marx as so closely following Aristotle’s theory of happiness and the good that he refers to him as the “German Aristotle.” The Commune becomes the concrete, historical means for the realization of species being and Aristotle’s ethics in modern society. In an earlier essay, “Historical Theory and the Structure of Moral Arguments in Marx,” *Political Theory* 9 (May 1981), Gilbert wrote: “In some fundamental respects, therefore, Marx could have regarded his argument as a correction and refinement of Aristotle’s eudaimonism, not a replacement of it” (p. 193). From a broader horizon, some of the most interesting and insightful essays written on ancient and modern democracy are contained in the anthology edited by Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick, *Dēmokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). These essays show the relationship within Athenian democracy (*dēmokratia*) of the dynamic triad among equality (*isotēs*), liberty (*eleutheria*), and freedom of speech (*isēgoria*): “For if, as is held by some, freedom is especially to be found in democracy, and also equality, this condition is most fully realized when all alike share most fully in the constitution. But since the people are a majority, and the decision of the majority is sovereign, this must be a democracy” [Aristotle, *Politics*, book 4, chapter 4, 1291b34–38, p. 250]. Of special interest in *Dēmokratia* are the works of Martin Oswald, Sheldon Wolin, Mogens Herman Hansen, Ellen Meiksins Wood, Robert Wallace, and Kurt Raaflaub.

39. Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (New York: International Publishers, 1972), pp. 60–61. Secondary literature investigating the Paris Commune includes Prosper Olivier Lissagaray, *History of the Commune of 1871*, trans. Eleanor Marx Aveling (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); Frank Jellinek, *The Paris Commune of 1871* (London: V. Gollancz, 1971); Stewart Edwards, *The Paris Commune, 1871*, trans. Jean McNeil (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973); and Roger Gould, *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

40. Katz, “The Socialist Polis,” pp. 249–260.

41. Weber and Nietzsche: Richard Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 46–49; Robert Eden, *Political Leadership and Nihilism: A Study of Weber and Nietzsche* (Tampa, FL: University Presses of Florida, 1986); Wilhelm Hennis, “The Traces of Nietzsche in the Works of Max Weber,” in *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction*, trans. Keith Tribe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp. 146–241; Lawrence Scaff, “Weber before Weberian Sociology,” in *Reading Weber*, ed. Keith Tribe (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 17, 20–21, 31–32, and 34 and *Fleeing the Iron Cage: Culture, Politics, and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 127–133; Bryan Turner, “Nietzsche, Weber and the Devaluation of Politics: The Problem of State Legitimacy,” in *Max Weber: From History to Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 185–190; Isaac Finkle, *Nietzsche and Weber: A Dissertation in Sociology*, doctoral dissertation from the University of Pennsylvania (Ann Arbor, MI: Dissertation Services, 1998); and George E. McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason: Weber, Habermas, and the Methodological Disputes in German Sociology* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 69–125.

42. Weber’s ‘Science of Man’ as *Menschentum* and *Lebensführung*: It is the thesis of Wilhelm Hennis that the main theme found in Weber’s “science of man” is

the relationship between the personality development of certain types of human beings (*Menschentum*) and their social institutions and conduct of life (*Lebensführung*). For a summary of his thesis, see Wilhelm Hennis, "Max Weber's 'Central Question,'" pp. 24–46, "Max Weber's Theme: 'Personality and Life Order,'" pp. 69–72 and 88–94, and "Voluntarism and Judgment: Max Weber's Political Views in the Context of his Work," pp. 192–196, in *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction*, trans. Keith Tribe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988); and McCarthy, *Classical Horizons*, pp. 103–110. Peter Lassman and Irving Velody, in their essay "Max Weber on Science, Disenchantment and the Search for Meaning," in *Max Weber's 'Science as a Vocation,'* ed. Peter Lassman and Irving Velody with Herminio Martins (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), examine Hennis' thesis in the context of Weber's later writings on the vocation of science and politics (p. 188). Questions about ethical polytheism of gods and demons, a politics of responsibility, existential nihilism, fate of humanity, the nature of the personality, science as a calling, etc., are classical issues redefined for modernity (pp. 178 and 188). "Weber is essentially correct in saying that the ultimate moral purpose of *Wissenschaft* in a 'disenchanted' world is to create clarity and a sense of responsibility . . ." (p. 204). Weber's theory of science represents a synthesis of Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Rickert, that is, practical knowledge, perspectivism, and epistemological constructivism. Fritz Ringer examines these 'values of characterology' and the 'freedom of the autonomous personality' as they apply to Weber's theory of political liberalism and constitutional government in his work, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 55–75.

Finally, to view Weber in the broader context of practical philosophy, examine Gregor Schöllgen, "Max Weber in der Tradition der praktischen Philosophie," in *Handlungsfreiheit und Zweckrationalität. Max Weber und die Tradition praktischer Philosophie* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1984), pp. 112–116. Weber's ethical science of political economy is based on a complex integration of the historical and cultural sciences with practical philosophy as he follows in the path of the German Historical School of Law (Otto von Gierke, Johannes Kries, and Gustav Radbruch), German Historical School of Economics (Wilhelm Roscher, Karl Knies, Gustav Schmoller, Karl Bücher, Lujo Brentano, and Werner Sombart), Southwest School of Neo-Kantian Cultural Science (Kuno Fischer, Wilhelm Windelband, and Heinrich Rickert), Aristotle's theory of ethics and practical wisdom, Kant's metaphysics of morals, and Nietzsche's existential nihilism. Only in this philosophical context does Weber's approach to sociology as a practical science, based on the methodological principles of a science of man, interpretive sociology of meaning and ideals, and an ethic of responsibility, make sense.

43. Karl-Otto Apel, "The Common Presuppositions of Hermeneutics and Ethics: Types of Rationality Beyond Science and Technology," *Research in Phenomenology* 9 (1979): 42.

44. Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter, *Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics and Methods* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 76–112.

45. Aristotle and Weber on *Phronesis* (Practical Wisdom): For a more comprehensive understanding of Aristotle's notion of *phronesis*, see Alasdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1971), pp. 57–83 and *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 103–145; Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Hermeneutics and Social Science," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 2, 4 (1975): 307–316, "Practical Philosophy as a Model of the

Human Sciences,” *Research in Phenomenology* 9 (1979): 74–85, “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy” and “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” in *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1983), pp. 88–112 and 113–138, respectively, *Truth and Method*, revised trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 312–224, and *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, trans. and intro. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 159–178; Roger Sullivan, *Morality and the Good Life: A Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics* (Memphis, TN: Memphis State University Press, 1980); W. F. R. Hardie, *Aristotle’s Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Ronald Beiner, *Political Judgment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 72–97; Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1983), pp. 150–165; Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 290–317; Joseph Dunne, *Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), pp. 104–167 and 237–356; and Bent Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again*, trans. Steven Sampson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 55–65. It is Stephen Smith in his work, *Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism*, who concludes with the warning that *phronesis*, as political judgment, requires a critical, historical, and structural analysis of social institutions to frame ethical reason and make it socially concrete and politically relevant. Otherwise, moral philosophy, as in the case of Kant’s categorical imperative and Habermas’s ideal speech situation, would be comprised of empty universals (pp. 220–222 and 245–246).

The integration of *phronesis* and historical science by Aristotle is continued in the classical tradition of nineteenth-century ethical science. This view of science integrates *ethics* (virtue, *phronesis*, and social justice), *politics* (democratic polity and public participation), and *social economics* (moral economy and critique of chrematistics): Marx’s theory of historical structures, critique of political economy, and human emancipation and communal democracy; Weber’s theory of political judgment, national policy, character development, and the social conduct of life (*Lebensführung*); and Durkheim’s theory of social justice, functionalism, and democratic socialism. Therefore, a critical social theory must include *social analysis* (history, structures, functions, and depth hermeneutics), *social critique* (logic of political economy and critique of ideology), and a *theory of the good* (human dignity and individual freedom, social justice, democracy, and practical wisdom and political judgment). Ethics without science is blind and leads to philosophical abstractionism and political mysticism, while science without ethics is meaningless and leads to technical and administrative knowledge without purpose or ideals. According to Hegel in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Philosophy of History* (and later Hannah Arendt), the disembodied ethics of Kant’s categorical imperative led to the law of the heart of the beautiful soul and the obsession with sincerity and subjective moral purity which ultimately ended in the fanaticism and terror of the French Revolution. According to Max Horkheimer, liberalism and disenchanting Enlightenment science contributed to the rise of the terror of Nazism. In both cases, Enlightenment morals and social science were too abstract and too weak—not tied to social reality—to resist the terror of

radical change. See Smith, *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism*, pp. 77–79 and 91–92; Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Viking Press, 1965), pp. 136–137; Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Continuum, 1974), p. 20; and Murray, *Marx's Theory of Scientific Knowledge*, pp. 37–39. Smith summarizes Hegel's critique of Kant and theory of natural rights, as well as the former's recognition in the *Philosophy of Right* (para. 126) of the dangers inherent in the failure to recognize the distinction between an ethic of intention (moral abstraction) and an ethic of responsibility (recognition of the social and political reality). This Hegelian distinction with its attending critique of Kantian ethics is later repeated by Weber in his essay, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968) as an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility (pp. 120–128).

46. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 313. Theory of the Understanding in Aristotle and Weber: Aristotle's theory of practical knowledge, based on its constitutive elements of understanding, deliberation, and judgment, is central for appreciating Weber's theory of cultural science founded upon understanding, interpretation, and application. It is the dialectic between the universal (laws and moral principles) and particular (legal cases and moral situations) that distinguishes practical from other forms of knowledge because it not only determines the method of application and justification, but also defines the nature of humanity as a striving and creating moral being. Law and science are forms of moral *praxis*. A text as law, moral action, or historical event is understood and interpreted within a general legal (equity), categorical, or cultural and institutional context which takes years of accumulated experience and practical insight to understand. This form of knowledge is not shared by either philosophical (*episteme*) or productive (*techne*) knowledge. Interpretation is neither philosophically knowable or technically applicable; it cannot be universally demonstrated, theoretically justified, or instrumentally created. Understanding is not reducible to the universal ideas of contemplation or the artifacts of making and engineering. Practical knowledge involves changing moral opinions in a contingent and variable world where experience is fragile and fluid. There is no objective moral reality based on unchanging natural laws. Rather law and morality are based on the collective experience of the community articulated in established rules, customs, and political institutions grounded in economic self-sufficiency, friendship, mutual respect, citizenship, and personal commitment to the common good of the polity. In the writings of Aristotle, understanding is part of practical knowledge (*phronesis*) and related to personal moral deliberation and political discourse; in Weber it is part of a practical science that seeks to interpret and comprehend the meaning, intentions, and actions of "historical centers" for individual moral development (dignity, integrity, and responsibility in an academic vocation) and public social policy (justice, progress, and social stability of the nation). It is Aristotle's theory of science and the understanding which ultimately explains and justifies Weber's theory of the understanding and his *Wissenschaftslehre*. The latter's ethical science is part of the history and genealogy of Western practical philosophy (*praktische Philosophie*).

47. *Ibid.*, p. 324. In another work by Gadamer, "On the Origins of Philosophical Hermeneutics," in *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, trans. Robert Sullivan (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1985), he writes: "The Aristotelian

program of a practical science seems to me to present the only scholarly model according to which the interpretive sciences can be thought out . . . Aristotle shows that practical reason and practical insight do not possess the ‘teachability’ of science but rather win their possibility in *praxis* itself, and that means in the inner linkage to ethics . . . This model must also be held out as a contrast to all those who bend human reasonableness to the methodological thinking of ‘autonomous science’” (p. 183). For an overview of the influence of Aristotle on modern German philosophy, see Frank Volpi, “The Rehabilitation of Practical Philosophy and Neo-Aristotelianism,” trans. Eric Buzzetti, in *Action and Contemplation: Studies in the Moral and Political Thought of Aristotle*, ed. Robert Bartlett and Susan Collins (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 3–26.

48. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 315. Aristotle, Gadamer, and Hermeneutics: According to Gadamer, the application of the method of the natural sciences to these types of questions only produces a false objectification and the alienation of reason. He writes in *Truth and Method*: “For moral knowledge, as Aristotle describes it, is clearly not objective knowledge—i.e., the knower is not standing over against a situation that he merely observes; he is directly confronted with what he sees. It is something that he has to do” (p. 314). He continues this line of argument when he affirms that “the task of making a moral decision is that of doing the right thing in a particular situation—i.e., seeing what is right within the situation and grasping it” (p. 317). See also James Hans, “Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hermeneutic Phenomenology,” *Philosophy Today* 22 (Spring 1978): 7–14; Paul Schuchman, “Aristotle’s Phronesis and Gadamer’s Hermeneutics,” *Philosophy Today* 23 (Spring 1979): 41–50; Joseph Dunne, “Aristotle after Gadamer: An Analysis of the Distinction between the Concepts of Phronesis and Techne,” *Irish Philosophical Journal* 2 (Autumn 1985): 105–123; Francis Ambrosio, “Gadamer and Aristotle: Hermeneutics as Participation in Tradition,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 62 (1988): 174–182; Robert Sullivan, *Political Hermeneutics: The Early Thinking of Hans-Georg Gadamer* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), pp. 33–52; Franco Volpi, “*Being and Time*: A ‘Translation’ of the *Nicomachean Ethics*,” trans. John Protevi, in *Reading Heidegger from the Start*, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 195–211; and Enrico Berti, “The Reception of Aristotle’s Intellectual Virtues in Gadamer and Hermeneutic Philosophy,” in *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*, ed. Riccardo Pozzo (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), pp. 285–300.

49. Gadamer, “Hermeneutics and a Theoretical and Practical Task,” in *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 115. The idea that practical philosophy could provide the foundation and justification for hermeneutics and social science can be found in a number of Gadamer’s writings, including “The Problem of Historical Consciousness,” *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 5, 1 (1975): 30–38, Gadamer, “Practical Philosophy as a Model of the Human Sciences,” p. 77, “On the Origins of Philosophical Hermeneutics,” in *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, trans. Robert Sullivan (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1985), p. 183, and *Truth and Method* pp. 312–324. Both Gadamer and Karl-Otto Apel published papers in the same volume of *Research in Phenomenology* 9 (1979) criticizing what they saw as Weber’s restriction of scientific rationality to the method of the natural sciences (Gadamer, “Practical Philosophy as a Model of the Human Sciences,” p. 77 and Apel, “The Common

Presuppositions of Hermeneutics and Ethics,” pp. 36–37). For a critical analysis of Gadamer’s position, see Jean Grondin, *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 109–110.

50. Gadamer, “The Problem of Historical Consciousness,” p. 5.

51. Attempting to demystify modern technical science in his essay “Hermeneutics and Social Science,” Gadamer emphasizes the importance of Aristotle’s theory of knowledge for a rethinking of the nature of practical reason and the crisis of modern science: “In my own eyes, the great merit of Aristotle was that he anticipated the impasse of our scientific culture by his description of the structure of practical reason as distinct from theoretical knowledge and technical skill . . . In all the debates of the last century practice was understood as application of science to technical tasks” (p. 312). Gadamer continues that the history of modern thought reflects the degradation and deformation of *praxis* and *phronesis* to technical and administrative control; prudence and political deliberation are replaced by the skill of the craftsman and technician.

However admirable his appreciation of the hermeneutical problem of understanding, meaning, and interpretation in the historical sciences, Gadamer misses the key point that classical social theory did not fall victim to this process of scientific and technological rationalization. Rather, Weber’s *Wissenschaftslehre* and theory of disenchantment attempt to address this very “crisis in method of the modern humanities” (p. 311). By returning to Aristotle’s theory of knowledge and practical reason, Weber seeks a resolution of the hermeneutical problem with epistemological and metatheoretical issues borrowed from idealism, romanticism, and existentialism, while, at the same time, reintroducing practical reason and dialectical critique back into scientific inquiry. Gadamer ends his essay with the comment that the task of philosophical hermeneutics—practical and political reason—is to correct “the peculiar falsehood of modern consciousness: the idolatry of scientific method and the anonymous authority of the sciences” (p. 316) along with the reaffirmation of the nobility of the citizen toward self-determination and public responsibility. This, too, is the goal of the nineteenth-century classical theorists. According to Gadamer, the crisis of modern science with its loss, repression, and fetishism of meaning was precipitated by Nietzsche’s epistemological and ethical radicalism; it led to a revisiting of the issues of meaning, understanding, and interpretation in hermeneutical science, psychoanalysis, and the Marxist critique of ideology (“Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” in *Reason in the Age of Science*, pp. 99–100).

52. Leo Strauss, in *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), misses this key point about the methodological relationships between Weber’s theory of science and Aristotle’s philosophy of practical knowledge (pp. 40–42). Contrary to Strauss, Weber’s *Wissenschaftslehre* is a form of *phronesis*. Weber’s own theory of science and values is not systematically examined in his writings, but includes some of the following areas of consideration in epistemology and methodology: (1) neo-Kantian theory of value judgments, value freedom, and value relevance in scientific research; (2) theory of empirical research, social criticism, and the dialectic: relationship among cultural meaning, social action, and unanticipated and contradictory consequences; (3) ethical knowledge as empirical research (value relevance), practical wisdom (*phronesis*), social criticism (dialectic), public policy (practical will), and social action (*praxis*); (4) unconscious values found within

the disenchantment and rationalization of modern science; (5) “freedom from” the values of the metaphysics of science, utilitarian domination of nature, religion of the established church, and political policies of the state bureaucracy and German academy; (6) defense of academic freedom and political diversity in the university for anarchists and socialists; (7) articulation of the political values implicit in national public policy construction using the example of Eugen von Philippovich’s conference presentation on national prosperity; (8) defense of moral polytheism and value relativism borrowed from Nietzsche and J. S. Mill; (9) critique of politics in the classroom: rejecting preachers, prophets, and greengrocers as scholars; (10) existentialism and the crisis of meaning in modern science, politics, and society; and (11) cultural decadence and the values of the last man in the iron cage: positivism (philosophy of science), utilitarianism (invention of happiness), and formal rationality (bureaucracy of social institutions).

53. Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 152. On the role of this late essay in defining the nature of practical science and value freedom (*Wertfreiheit*), see Wilhelm Hennis, “The Meaning of Value Freedom—Impulse and Motive for Max Weber’s ‘Postulate,’” in *Max Weber’s Science of Man: New Studies for a Biography of the Work*, trans. Keith Tribe (Newbury, England: Threshold Press, 2000). Hennis writes: “‘Science as a Vocation’ is a last despairing effort to save some remnant of science conceived as a force in the guidance of life, a conception that goes right back to the Greeks . . . Even if science could not instruct anyone on the manner in which they should lead their life, it could provide some assistance, by accounting for the ultimate meaning of one’s own actions.” (p. 156). According to Hennis, science so understood “was serving ethical powers: ‘which created duty, clarity, and a sense of responsibility’” (p. 157). This essay by Weber on modern science expresses a practical critique of the idolatry of formal reason and technical science. In this way science becomes an ethic or vocation.

54. Weber and Critical Hermeneutics: Heinrich Rickert’s metatheory of the cultural sciences and theory of knowledge reflect his interest in examining subjectively intended meaning in social action—“historical centers”—in his work *The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science: A Logical Introduction to the Historical Sciences*, trans. and ed. Guy Oakes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 121–127. Weber, on the other hand, who is concerned with the problem of psychologism, develops his theory of historical science within the framework of ideal types of meaningful action. For him, values and cultural significance are attached to more abstract social institutions and structures: the spirit of feudalism, capitalism, bureaucracy, and rationalization. Going beyond the understanding and explanation of individual events, Weber wishes to examine broader social movements and macro changes in terms of the economic, political, and cultural transformation of feudalism and the Industrial Revolution as they are manifested in and impact individualism, imperialism, mercantilism, capitalism, and so forth. See Max Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. and ed. Edward Shils and Henry Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949), p. 92.

The ancient and modern traditions of critical hermeneutics have been grounded in a theory of understanding and judgment based on self-deliberation, equity in the law, and public dialogue (Aristotle), cultural hermeneutics of history, meaning, and

intentionality (Weber), modes of Being-in-the-world, *Dasein*, fore-structures of the understanding (fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception), and existential care (Heidegger), and textual exegesis, dialogue between traditions, historical consciousness, and the fusion of horizons (Gadamer). Gadamer views the developments of hermeneutics through the writings of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, Emilio Betti, and Rudolf Bultmann as critical hermeneutics evolves from politics, law, theology, and ontology to literature and social science. See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 162–173 and 289–305.

55. In “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” Weber recounts the origins of social science in the practical questions of state economic policy. He then argues that it can never be the objective of empirical science “to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived” (p. 52). This is perhaps the most forceful and most obtuse statement about the relationship between science and ethics. It has certainly produced more confusion within the secondary literature about the nature of objectivity in the social sciences. To add to this confusion Weber argues: it is certainly not that value judgments are to be withdrawn from scientific discussions in general simply because in the last analysis they rest on certain ideals and are therefore “subjective” in origin (*ibid.*). According to Weber, sociology is subdivided into social science, dialectical critique, and public policy as each expresses aspects of practical reason and differ on how they acquire and apply ethical norms and social ideals.

56. Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” p. 152. Weber holds firmly to the position that “the inward interest of a truly religiously ‘musical’ man can never be served by veiling to him and to others the fundamental fact that he is destined to live in a godless and prophetless time by giving him the *ersatz* of armchair prophecy” (p. 153). Combining Schopenhauer’s theory of the illusions of the veil of Maya and Nietzsche’s theory of the spirit of music and Greek tragedy, Weber poetically writes that the experience of humanity’s tragic fate cannot be hidden beneath the veil of technical and predictive (prophetic) science. However, in spite of the existential crisis and formal rationalization of modernity, human beings must resist the fear of resignation and hopelessness as they struggle for self-determination within a life of public and private meaning: that is, within a life of *Geist* characterized by political, economic, and cultural values and institutions of the Objective and Absolute Spirit or the substantive rationality (*Wertrationalität*) of truth, justice, and beauty: *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 1807 and *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*, 1872; and a life of *Herz* or passion and moral sentiment: David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. 3: *Of Morals*, 1739 and Schopenhauer, *On the Basis of Morality*, 1841.

57. Value Judgment Debate in Social Science: The famous *Werturteilsstreit* (value judgment dispute) in Germany begins in earnest with the Vienna Conference in September 1909 of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* on the theme of economic productivity. Eugen von Philippovich, a noted Austrian economist, presented his paper, “The Essence of National Economic Productivity” and was immediately criticized by Weber, Werner Sombart, and Friedrich Gottl for introducing unarticulated values into the conference and empirical science. They disagreed with the underlying assumptions of his view of productivity based upon neoclassical economics. This may be Weber’s clearest and most precise statement on the relationship between science and ethics. See Max Weber, “Ebenselbst zu den Verhandlungen über die Produk-

tivität der Volkswirtschaft,” in his “Diskussionsreden auf den Tagungen des Vereins für Sozialpolitik” (1905, 1907, 1909, 1911), in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr Verlag [Paul Siebeck], 1924), pp. 416–423. The epistemological and methodological problems of historical science are based on the process of disenchantment and technical specialization within the academy, and reflect the historical transformation of questions of *Wertrationalität* (search for truth, justice, and beauty) into questions of *Zweckrationalität* (technical reason). This will be examined further in Weber’s phenomenological analysis of the disappearance of the Objective and Absolute Spirit in “Science as a Vocation” (1919). In his critical comments about Philippovich, Weber refers to his dialectical logic of examining the hidden value assumptions, interests, and value judgments within scientific discussions, along with the adequacy of the methodological means for reaching certain cultural ideals (pp. 417–418). With the dialectic, discussion about practical issues and moral ideals is permissible. Practical reason and empirical science are joined in a common cause. In this way, science serves ethics.

In 1911 Weber suggested at the meeting of the *Verein* that they engage in an open debate on the value freedom question at the Nuremberg General Meeting one year later in November 1912. He convinced Schmoller, who was the chair of the *Verein*, to send letters to all members announcing the debate and requesting submissions on the topic of science and value judgments. Delays occurred and fourteen papers were eventually submitted by April 1913 under the title “Die Äusserungen zur Werturteildiskussion im Ausschuss des Vereins für Sozialpolitik.” These manuscripts were not to be published so as not to be used at a later time against the members or the *Verein*. The actual discussion took place on January 5, 1914 with fifty-two members of the *Verein* present. For more information, see Weber, “Ebendasselbst zu den Verhandlungen über die Produktivität der Volkswirtschaft,” pp. 416–423; Franz Boese, *Geschichte des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, 1872–1932* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1939); Ralf Dahrendorf, *Essays in the Theory of Society* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 1–6; Lawrence Scaff, “Max Weber’s Politics and Political Education,” *American Political Science Review* 67, 1 (March 1973): 128–141; Dirk Käsler, *Max Weber: An Introduction to his Life and Work*, trans. Philippa Hurd (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 184–196; Heino Heinrich Nau, ed. and intro., *Der Werturteilsstreit. Die Äusserungen zur Werturteildiskussion im Ausschuss des Vereins für Sozialpolitik (1913)* (Marburg: Metropolis Verlag, 1996); Heino Heinrich Nau, “Zwei Ökonomien. Die Vorgeschichte des Werturteilsstreits in der deutschsprachigen Ökonomik,” in *Der Werturteilsstreit*, pp. 9–64 and *Eine ‘Wissenschaft vom Menschen.’ Max Weber und die Begründung der Sozialökonomik in der deutschsprachigen Ökonomie 1871 bis 1914* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997), pp. 216–309; and Hennis, “The Motive of Value Freedom,” in *Max Weber’s Science of Man*, pp. 139–157. Hennis refers to the principle of value freedom as the freedom from the presupposed norms and values of the German academy (official prophets of the *Kathedersozialisten*, including Schmoller and Wagner), church (*Kulturkampf* and Protestant Social Congress), and state (Wilhelminian ministry) for the purpose of creating a life of ethical and professional responsibility (pp. 149–157). In an earlier article in this same work, “The Pitiless ‘Sobriety of Judgment’: Max Weber between Carl Menger and Gustav von Schmoller. The Academic Politics of Value Freedom,” Hennis summarizes Weber’s theory of value freedom: “Stripped of its ‘logical’ gloss this is the formulation that lies at the heart of Weber’s postulate of value freedom: the

facilitation of a ‘pitiless sobriety of judgment,’ the recognition of practical ‘problems’ in their full ‘consequence,’ a precondition for the attainment of complete insight” (p. 119). Finally, for an insightful comparison of Weber’s analysis in 1909 of the value assumptions underlying Philippovich’s report on economic productivity and prosperity and his statistical survey of the negative consequences of capitalist grain productivity among the German and Polish peasants on the large rural estates in East Elbia in 1892 (discussed at the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* in 1893), see Hennis, “The Meaning of Value Freedom,” pp. 141–149. Hennis argues that these two scholarly papers are examples of Weber’s practical science.

58. Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” p. 151. See also Max Weber’s “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics” (1917), in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. and ed. Edward Shils and Henry Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 19–26. This essay on value neutrality was first printed (1913) and later presented as a special-topic paper (*Gutachten*) for a meeting of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* in 1914; later revised it was published in *Logos* in 1917.

59. Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” p. 53.

60. In a later essay, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics,” Weber makes an interesting and enlightening observation. He is critical of those scholars who hide behind and abuse the principle of value neutrality as they use it as a normative and political weapon against those who make “political value judgments”: “The indubitable existence of this spuriously ‘ethically-neutrality’ tendentiousness, which (in our discipline) is manifested in the obstinate and deliberate partisanship of powerful interest groups . . .” (p. 6).

61. *Ibid.*, p. 54. Weber’s theory of science, social critique, and the dialectic is found in his essays, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” pp. 53–55 and “Science as a Vocation,” pp. 150–153. The concept of the dialectic is again raised in Weber’s discussion about the nature of productivity in political economy (*Volkswirtschaft*) and his critique of von Philippovich in his presentation to the *Verein* in 1909: “Ebendasselbst zu den Verhandlungen über die Produktivität der Volkswirtschaft,” in “Diskussionsreden auf den Tagungen des Vereins für Sozialpolitik,” in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*, pp. 417–418. In this brief presentation, Weber reiterates the same arguments from his earlier work on the theory of objectivity: The dialectic is used as a logical tool to investigate the underlying assumptions of value judgments and any contradictions between normative ends and technical means, as well as a means to trace the implications of contradictory results and unintended consequences following from the intentions of social action. Unlike the dialectic found in Marx’s writings, it is a dialectic stripped of any remaining vestiges of teleological and Hegelian metaphysics.

62. “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” p. 54.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 52. It is not the function of science to generate or validate subjective values which arise out of chance or faith. This is the generally accepted position of Anglo-American sociology. This tradition, however, does not follow Weber’s argument beyond this point. Weber continues to make the case that although science does not create these ideals, they are, in fact, the foundation stone upon which is constructed sociological concepts, theories, policy, and critique. Without social ideals, there is no science. According to Weber, values are the product of conscience, personality, and public dispute—integrity and deliberation (pp. 55–57). Unarticulated, and certainly undeveloped, there is an implied consensus theory of truth underlying

Weber's theory of science that incorporates the role of universities, academic conferences, and scholarly journals into the deliberative process of scientific validation. If objective validity cannot be determined by a naturalistic correspondence of concepts to reality, then it falls to the scholarly calling of the person and the public structure of the academy to define objectivity and validity.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 54. The immanent critique of Marx and Weber is also the method of social criticism employed by scientific realism as described by Keith Topper in his work, *The Disorder of Political Inquiry* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 116 and 262, n. 20.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

66. It is clear that Weber has moved beyond Rickert's theory of values and critique of valuation: For Rickert, history is not a science of valuation but a science of value relevance (*The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science*, p. 88). Weber has incorporated into his theory of science the practical reason of the German Historical School. Also note that, according to Weber, sociology rests upon issues of *meaning, causes, consequences, and contradictions*. He is critical of positivism because this philosophy of science with its naturalistic method cannot raise these types of sociological issues or apply these types of methodological and theoretical orientations. This eliminates from public discourse and the human sciences questions of culture, ideology, history, political economy, and social justice; it eliminates the methods of hermeneutics, historical analysis, structuralism, and social critique; and it represses them into a enforced academic exile through scholarly professionalism and disciplinary rationalization. In the process, alternative forms of science (*Wissenschaft*) are lost to history and reflection.

67. Weber, "Science as a Vocation," pp. 143–144.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

69. Marx offers a similar insight when he examines the alienation of species life as a theoretical (cognition) and practical (moral) alienation. The loss of the theoretical and practical activity of praxis in Marx corresponds to the loss of spirit (Objective and Absolute Spirit of substantive reason) by the technical specialists and the loss of heart (compassion and sympathy of practical reason and morality) by the utilitarian sensualists in Weber. For both social theorists, modern society produces a loss of the universal producing characteristics of human activity and creativity. See Marx, "Alienated Labor," pp. 127–128; and Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons, foreword R. H. Tawney (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 182.

70. Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," p. 60.

71. Critique of Ideology and Hermeneutic of Culture, History, and Structure: These very divisions within his historical science are what constitute Weber's early theory of science, critical hermeneutics, and return to Aristotle's philosophy of practical knowledge (*phronesis*): social science (public deliberation and value relevance), social criticism (dialectical critique and practical judgment), social policy (praxis and social action), and ethical relativism (perspectivism and nihilism). The emphasis on a hermeneutics of the human sciences continues to remain a central focus of Weber's later methodological work, "Basic Sociological Terms" (1922), in *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, trans. Ephraim Fischoff, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) [first

appeared as “Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology,” in *Logos*, 1913 and revised 1917]. Here he writes: “Sociology is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences” (p. 4). Further on in this analysis, he adds: “Thus, for a science which is concerned with the subjective meaning of action, explanation requires a grasp of the complex of meaning in which an actual course of understandable action thus interpreted belongs” (p. 9). To the subjective meaning of action and ideas, Weber adds the broader “context of meaning,” as well as any “social collectivities” (pp. 12–15), underlying structures (p. 7), “repressed” or hidden motives of social action (pp. 9–10), and unconscious meaning (p. 21). The structural and functional ideas of Marx and Freud are later additions to his cultural hermeneutics: See Johannes Weiss, *Weber and the Marxist World*, trans. Elizabeth King-Utz and Michael King (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 49–51, 56, and 67; Tracy Strong, “Weber and Freud: Vocation and Self-Acknowledgement,” in *Max Weber and his Contemporaries*, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), pp. 469–470; Fritz Ringer, *Max Weber’s Methodology: The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 155–162; and McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason*, pp. 180–190 and 209, n. 109. Finally, to this is also added a methodology of scientific explanation, empirical causation, and objective validity based on the writings of the German legal scholars Kries and Radbruch [Gerhard Wagner and Heinz Zipprian, “The Problem of Reference in Max Weber’s Theory of Causal Explanation,” *Human Studies* 9 (1986): 23 and 27–28]. Although there is a complex diversity of approaches here, there remains a systematic continuity of method whose foundation lies in Weber’s theory of practical reason (*phronesis*). The ultimate purpose of practical reason is not to offer universal moral standards, but rather, to provide empirical and historical information about the implications, consequences, and possibilities of various forms of the good life in a “science of man”; it permits self-deliberation about the ethical and political meanings of human life. By this means it also presents options and ideals for public policy and political action.

Although moving in the direction of a critical hermeneutics that integrates meaning, culture, institutions, power, and a critique of ideology into a comprehensive social theory and methodology, Weber never completes his thought in any systematic fashion. However, it is there in very rough and uneven form. One result of taking this perspective is that it affords a more comprehensive unity to his works thereby overcoming Weber’s dilemma of the apparent contradiction between his early neo-Kantian epistemology and later positivistic methodology. Weber’s theory of hermeneutics and practical reason runs throughout his writings in different forms. His dialectical method of the science of “understanding explanation” first hermeneutically understands (*verstehen*) cultural ideals and then juxtaposes them to their empirical—historical and structural—implications, consequences, and contradictions. This application of practical reason—science, critique, and policy—reflects the same logical principles as Marx’s method of immanent critique; both methods were critical of the abstract moralizing of the naive materialists and idealists and both are examples of a hermeneutic of suspicion. To place these developments within the history of hermeneutics, thereby connecting Weber’s hermeneutics with Aristotle’s practical knowledge, see Michael Gibbons, “Hermeneutics, Philosophical Inquiry, and

Practical Reason," *American Political Science Review* 100, 4 (November 2006): 563–571. With his historical hermeneutics, Weber combines the methods of understanding and explanation, while rejecting positivism. In the process, he moves beyond the dichotomy of *Verstehen* (understanding) and *Erklären* (explanation) articulated by Windelband, Johann Gustav Droysen, and Wilhelm Dilthey. See Georg Henrik von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 5–7.

72. Weber, "Basic Sociological Categories," in *Economy and Society*, p. 9.

73. Weber, "Ebendasselbst zu den Verhandlungen über die Produktivität der Volkswirtschaft," in "Diskussionsreden auf den Tagungen des Vereins für Sozialpolitik," in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*, pp. 416–420. According to Edward Bryan Portis, *Max Weber and Political Commitment: Science, Politics, and Personality* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* was founded to promote scholarship and politics by reform minded activists through public debate on German social policy (pp. 24–25). Their main interest was to advance rational discussion about public policy, economic and industrial development, political economy, national priorities, and social justice. Many of the academic members were referred to the *Kathedersozialisten* (socialists of the chair). Differences among its members as to the role of politics and scholarship in the *Verein* would eventually explode into the famous *Werturteilsstreit* (value judgment dispute). At the turn of the twentieth century, there would be a great deal of discussion about the relationship between value freedom and objectivity in the social sciences that remains quite relevant today.

74. Weber, "Ebendasselbst zu den Verhandlungen über die Produktivität der Volkswirtschaft," in his "Diskussionsreden auf den Tagungen des Vereins für Sozialpolitik," in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*, p. 419. Having examined the history, epistemological traditions, and academic debates surrounding Weber's theory of value freedom, the concept takes on a fuller meaning: value freedom is an methodological concept in practical science that represents a "freedom from" the values of Church and state, metaphysics of science, moral universalism, ethical moralizing, and the unconscious ethical and political assumptions of science and liberalism. In a society characterized by formal science, rationalized bureaucracy, depoliticization, plebiscitary and mass democracy, party machine, and political decisionism, Weber calls for a vocation of science focused on the meaning and ideals of social life and built around personal commitment, moral virtue, and individual responsibility, as well as national enlightenment, academic pedagogy, and public discourse about policy options. Because of Weber's inherent pessimism about the fate of humanity and disenchanting direction of society, science plays the role of social praxis in his theory.

75. Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," p. 61.

76. Hennis, "Max Weber's Central Question," in *Max Weber*, p. 52; and Georg Stauth, "Kulturkritik und affirmative Kultursociologie. Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber und die Wissenschaft von der menschlichen Kultur," in *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre. Interpretation und Kritik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994), p. 176.

77. Max Weber, in his early *Freiburg Inaugural Address* of 1895, "The National State and Economic Policy," trans. Ben Fowkes, *Economy and Society* 9, 4 (November 1980), introduced himself to the academic community at the University of Freiburg

by saying: "The ultimate goal of our science must remain that of cooperating in the political education of our nation. The economic development of periods of transition threatens the natural political instincts with decomposition." The ultimate purpose of "human science," according to Weber, is to document and confront the issues of the social unification of classes, political education of the nation, social peace, economic policy of the German state, ameliorating the misery of the masses, "responsibility before history," freedom, and maintaining the passion and nobility of political ideals (pp. 347 and 447–448). Human science is a practical science since value judgments are part of the very nature of science itself: "[A]nd if we abandon the evaluation of economic phenomena we in fact abandon the very accomplishment which is demanded of us"—as human beings (p. 440). Science makes clear the meaning of the political ideals that are at the foundation of national policy, individual action, and scientific judgment (*ibid.*).

78. Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," p. 127. Note that the theme of responsibility is also found in the essay, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," p. 53.

79. Practical Science and the Ethics of Self-Determination: David Rasmussen, "Between Autonomy and Sociality," *Cultural Hermeneutics* 1, 1 (April 1973): 7–10 and 29–38; Peter Roche de Coppens, *Ideal Man in Classical Sociology: The Views of Comte, Durkheim, Pareto, and Weber* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976), pp. 127–141; Portis, *Max Weber and Political Commitment*, pp. 117–144; Marianne Weber, *Max Weber: A Biography*, trans. and ed. Harry Zohn (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 88–90; Hennis, "Max Weber's Theme," p. 82 and "Voluntarism and Judgment," pp. 192–197, in *Max Weber*; Scaff, *Fleeing the Iron Cage*, pp. 112–120, 127–133, and 190–192; Georg Simmel, *Schopenhauer and Nietzsche*, trans. Helmut Loiskandl, Deena Weinstein, and Michael Weinstein (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), pp. 161–181; Nau, *Eine "Wissenschaft vom Menschen"*, pp. 301–302; Lassman and Velody, "Max Weber on Science, Disenchantment and the Search for Meaning," pp. 177–178, 189–190, 193–197, and 201–204; Sven Eliaeson, *Max Weber's Methodologies: Interpretation and Culture* (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2002), pp. 26–28, 114–117, and 165–166, n. 46; and Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs, eds., *Weber: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. vii–xxv. In his essay, "Science as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber*, Weber exclaims: "For nothing is worthy of man as man unless he can pursue it with passionate devotion" (p. 135). Weber rejects the greengrocer or utilitarian approach to the university where specialized knowledge is sold for money in order to sustain the bureaucracy of politics and the academy and the marketplace of democracy and self-interest (p. 149). Rather, his educational ideal is more classical in form, ancient in content: it represents an inner calling, a cultivation (*Bildung*) of spirit, and a gift or inspiration for the creation of art, life, and the public sphere that finds its completion in the dignity of the individual person (pp. 134–137). The Kantian imperative of rational self-determination is found throughout Weber's social theory: political ethic of responsibility, science and politics as a professional calling, culture of national economy and public policy, critique of rationalization and disenchantment, epistemology and metatheory, value relevance and value freedom, cult of personality, and thesis of the Protestant ethic. Along with the Kantian is the Aristotelian element: Lassman and Velody argue that Weber's reference to sociology as a cultural

science “implies a moral and political dimension in which the question of the possible forms of existence for mankind under modern conditions is raised.” For them this is “clearly an extension, in a different vocabulary, of the classical question of ‘the good society’ ” (p. 188). Weber’s writings on objectivity must also be viewed in the context of the Western history of social and political theory. In a world characterized by disenchantment—“devastating senselessness,” existential meaninglessness, and human suffering—it is heroic rationalism, the ascetic ideal of science, reason, and politics, and an ethic of responsibility that creates a strong personality and the possibility of self-redemption. In a nihilistic universe, a sense of personal identity is formed by following a vocation and choosing a this-worldly god among the pantheon of secular deities. Weber rejects Georg Lukács’ ethic of brotherliness and socialism in his essay “Zwischenbetrachtung,” or “Religious Rejection of the World and Their Directions” (1915), in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans., ed., and intro. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 355–357; see the section on Weber in Julius Rubin, *The Other Side of Joy: Religious Melancholy Among the Bruderhof* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 35–41.

Hennis in his essay “Voluntarism and Judgment” examines Weber’s critique of liberalism (Weber’s defense of liberalism may be found in the writings of Wolfgang Mommsen, Reinhard Bendix, Friedrich Tenbruck, Guenther Roth, and Wolfgang Schluchter) and his turn to the alternative philosophical tradition of Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Tocqueville which had strong roots in the tradition of classical political science with its emphasis on the values of proportion, calmness, responsibility, prudence, and *phronesis* as rational and passionate judgment (p. 192). Hennis’ position relies heavily on his interpretation of Weber’s “The National State and Economic Policy” and “Politics as a Vocation.” For a further analysis of Weber’s political writings with their criticisms of plebiscitary democracy and their defense of constitutional democracy, rational deliberation, self-government and popular sovereignty, and human rights, see Ringer, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography*, pp. 55–75. Ringer’s thesis (along with his rejection of Wolfgang Mommsen’s thesis about Weber’s nationalistic, elitist, and anti-democratic liberalism) is that there are a number of important influences on the formation of Weber’s liberal thinking about political freedom and the “rights of man,” including Georg Jellinek’s “The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen” (1895), the English Puritan Levellers, and the early American state constitutions, especially the Virginia Constitution (p. 57). For a similar reading of Weber’s theory of liberalism, see Scaff, *Fleeing the Iron Cage*, pp. 11–25 and 152–185. For a collection of Weber’s essays on political sociology, see *Weber: Political Writings*, eds. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs. Finally, for a brief statement on Weber’s theory of the “Weimar Problem” with the conflicts between pluralism (antifoundationalism) and liberalism (need for legitimacy and justification), see Peter Lassman, “Disenchantment and the Liberalism of Fear,” in *The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism*, ed. Mark Evans (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001), pp. 141–144.

Lassman and Velody have written very eloquently on the subject of the meaning of science and politics in Weber’s later writings: “Weber is, despite first appearances, struggling to create meaning in history when we cannot find meaning for history. . . . the ultimate moral purpose of *Wissenschaft* in a ‘disenchanted’ world is to create clarity and a sense of responsibility in which the individual cannot be relieved from the burden of decision” (pp. 203–204). The ultimate goal of science

is thus moral and political since its imperative is to detail empirically “the possible forms of existence for mankind under modern conditions” (p. 188). For them, Weber’s theories of disenchantment and vocation within an ethic of academic and political responsibility are simply restatements of the classical questions of the nature of civic happiness and the good life. Classical political science and modern existentialism are both forms of inquiry questioning the meaning and purpose of human life.

There is also an argument proposed by Thomas Burger in *Max Weber’s Theory of Concept Formation: History, Laws and Ideal Types* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1976), who maintains that there is a close connection between Weber’s theory of science and politics. That is, the purpose of his *Wissenschaftslehre* is to logically ground his ethics of responsibility and practical reason (p. 6). See also Alexander von Schelting, *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre. Das logische Problem der historischen Kulturerkenntnis* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag [Paul Siebeck], 1934), pp. 9, 9–10, n.2, 54, n. 1, 55, 207–208; and Robert Eden, “Weber and Nietzsche: Questioning the Liberation of Social Science from Historicism,” in *Max Weber and his Contemporaries*, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 409–410.

80. Weber, “The National State and Economic Policy,” p. 437. Sociology as Classical Political Science: *The Freiburg Inaugural Address* already contains in seminal form Weber’s later expanded theory of science, especially his principles of objectivity and value freedom. These principles first find developed expression in his 1904 essay on social science and social policy. In this famous address, Weber calls for an economic science (*Nationalökonomie*) and social policy based on fundamental value judgments of building and encouraging political education of the nation, social responsibility, and political leadership. Weber believes that these ideals of nation building are the “old-established human ideals” of classical Greece (“National State and Economic Policy,” p. 440). See also Hennis, “Max Weber’s Theme,” pp. 87–88 and “‘A Science of Man,’” pp. 115–118, 123–125, 221, n. 92, and 231, n. 82 (political economy as social economy), in *Max Weber*; Jack Barbalet, “Weber’s Inaugural Lecture and Its Place in his Sociology,” *Journal of Classical Sociology* 1, 2 (2001): 147–170; Rita Aldenhoff-Hübinger, “Max Weber’s Inaugural Address of 1895 in the Context of the Contemporary Debates in Political Economy,” *Max Weber Studies* 4, 2 (February 2004): 143–156; Ola Agevall, “Science, Values, and the Empirical Argument in Max Weber’s Inaugural Address,” *Max Weber Studies* 4, 2 (February 2004): 157–177; and McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason*, p. 198. About the same time as the *Inaugural Address*, Weber offered over a number of years an introductory lecture course on the theoretical and historical foundations of political economy. The course at the University of Freiburg (1894–1896) and Heidelberg (1897–1898) included a structural outline and list of readings. They are contained in his work, *Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen über Allgemeine (“theoretische”) Nationalökonomie (1898)* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1990). Also see Richard Swedberg, “Max Weber as an Economist and as a Sociologist: Towards a Fuller Understanding of Weber’s View of Economics—Critical Essay,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 58, 4 (October 1999): 561–582 and “Afterword: The Role of the Market in Max Weber’s Work,” *Theory and Society* 29 (2000): 373–384.

81. Weber, “The National State and Economic Policy,” p. 438. Hennis, in “‘A Science of Man,’” outlines the importance of the German Historical School for Weber’s view of “economics as a science of man.” He quotes extensively from

Karl Nies' *The Political Economy* that political economy is a "moral and political science" in the classical Greek tradition (p. 120). Priddat follows this line of argument in his analysis of Weber's moral science in his essay, "Die politische Wissenschaft von Reichtum und Menschen," pp. 189–193. See McCarthy, *Classical Horizons*, pp. 103–110 for a detailed analysis of the contribution of Wilhelm Hennis to this discussion of the relationship between Weber's science of man and Aristotle's ethical and political writings.

82. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 3, chapter 1, 1275b4, p. 170.

83. Weber on Classical Antiquity: For Weber's early sociological writings on the Greeks, see "The Social Causes of the Decline of Ancient Civilizations" (1886) and *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations* (1897, 1898, and 1909), trans. R. I. Frank (London: NLB, 1976). Important secondary literature on the topic includes the following works: John Love, *Antiquity and Capitalism: Max Weber and the Sociological Foundations of Roman Civilization* (London: Routledge, 1991) and "Max Weber and the Theory of Ancient Capitalism," *History and Theory* 25 (1986): 152–172; and Mohammad Nafissi who has written a useful introductory piece to Weber's early essays in "On the Foundations of Athenian Democracy: Marx's Paradox and Weber's Solution," *Max Weber Studies* 1, 1 (November 2000): 56–83 and *Ancient Athens and Modern Ideology*, pp. 57–123.

84. W. Watts Miller, "Durkheim's Montesquieu," *The British Journal of Sociology* 44, 4 (December 1993): 693–712; and Douglas Challenger, *Durkheim through the Lens of Aristotle: Durkheimian, Postmodernist, and Communitarian Responses to the Enlightenment* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1994), pp. 85–106.

85. Emile Durkheim, *Ethics and the Sociology of Morals*, trans. Robert Hall (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), p. 61.

86. Durkheim's Academic Career: After completing his three-year studies at the École Normale Supérieure at the age of 24 and passing his state examinations in philosophy, he began teaching at the secondary school in Sens during the 1882–1883 and 1883–1883 academic years. (In 1995, eighty lectures of his year-long introductory philosophy course were discovered hidden away in the library of the Sorbonne, entitled "E. Durkheim—Lectures on Philosophy Given at the Lycée de Sens in 1883–1884.") He then went to Germany to study during the academic year 1885–1886. He traveled to Berlin, Leipzig, and Marburg where he met Gustav Schmoller, Adolf Wagner, and Albert Schäffle, the neo-Aristotelian academic socialists. Over the next few years he completed his secondary dissertation in Latin, *Montesquieu's Contribution to the Rise of Social Science* (1892) and his primary dissertation, *The Division of Labor* (1893). Between 1887 and 1902, he taught at the University of Bordeaux and from 1902 until his death in 1917 he lectured at the Sorbonne in Paris.

87. Durkheim on Social Justice: For an analysis of the importance of social justice and political ideals in the writings of Durkheim, see Anthony Giddens, "Durkheim's Political Sociology," *Sociological Review* 19 (1971): 477–519 and "Weber and Durkheim: Coincidence and Divergence," in *Max Weber and his Contemporaries*, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), p. 183; Theodore Kemper, "The Division of Labor: A Post-Durkheimian Analytic View," *American Sociological Review* 37 (1972): 739–753 and "Emile Durkheim and the Division of Labor," *Sociological Quarterly* 16 (Spring 1975): 190–206; Carmen Sirianni, "Justice and the Division of Labour: A Reconsideration," *Sociological Re-*

view 32 (1984): 449–470; Stjepan Mestrovic, *Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1988), pp. 7 and 132; Eugen Schoenfeld and Stjepan Mestrovic, “Durkheim’s Concept of Justice and It’s Relationship to Social Solidarity,” *Sociological Analysis* 50, 2 (Summer 1989): 111–127; S. J. D. Green, “Emile Durkheim on Human Talents and Two Traditions of Social Justice,” *British Journal of Sociology* 40, 1 (March 1989): 97–117; and Susan Stedman Jones, *Durkheim Reconsidered* (Oxford: Polity Press, 2001), p. 6. Stedman Jones contends that the argument made by Talcott Parsons, Lewis Coser, Robert Nisbet, Alvin Gouldner, and Steven Lukes that Durkheim was a conservative positivist interested in systems, functional stability, and equilibrium must be rejected: “Just as Parsons has no theory of conscience, conscience collective, or collective representation, so Durkheim lacks the Parsonian concept of the functional prerequisites of a system, a concern with latency, equilibrium, and the problem of social control” (p. 5). Function has nothing to do with “the equilibrium of a homeostatic system” (p. 8). Durkheim’s view of function is closer to that of Aristotle’s than Parsons’ with his concern for goals (telos), values, contributions to the common good, self-sufficiency, and common needs and solidarity. Stedman Jones also holds the view that Durkheim’s concern with morality reflects his underlying values of democracy, socialism, republicanism, and individual human dignity and self-realization (pp. 57–61 and 111–131). Summarizing his theory of equality and the social value of labor, she maintains that Durkheim accepts both an equality of opportunity, as well as a structural equality of condition (p. 130).

88. It is interesting to view the relationship here between Hegel and Durkheim. It was Hegel in one of his earliest works, “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate,” in *On Christianity: Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox, intro. Richard Kroner (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), who writes about the relationship between the individual and society, and moral transgressions and punishment. The disturbance to the moral totality caused by individual transgressions requires a repressive response on the part of the community which Hegel characterizes as the “dialectic of moral life.” This “causality of fate” reestablishes the moral whole when the transgressor realizes his or her mistake and begins to identify with the injured party. See also Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 56.

89. Robert Hall, *Ethics and the Sociology of Morals* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 149–155, 172–173, and 204–210.

90. Emile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study of Sociology*, trans. John Spaulding and George Simpson, ed. George Simpson (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 256.

91. Durkheim, *Suicide*, p. 387. Sociology as an Ethical Science: Marx comments in the “Critique of the Gotha Program” that he has no new ideals to realize. His goal was to help bring forth those ideals already embraced by society but freed from the structure of the capitalist social relations of production. Durkheim voices a similar attitude at the end of *Suicide* when he writes that the only way to “check this current of collective sadness” is not to reestablish the older social order or to create something entirely new without precedent. Rather, he argues that “we must seek in the past the germs of new life which it contained, and hasten their development” (p. 391). Durkheim rejects the abstract and bold plans of political philosophers because they have not given specific direction or empirical details to

their grand proposals. This is the phronetic obligation of social science. Similar ideas are also voiced on the last page of his work where he reiterates that his goal is not the revival of old traditions which are no longer applicable to the present social conditions. His goal is a healthy functional interdependence among social institutions based upon the principles of social justice and equality. The goal of sociology is to reflect upon (reason) and construct (will) this new social justice. He concludes with the sentence: "But the service that thought can and must render is in the fixing the goal that we must attain" (p. 409). In *Ethics and The Sociology of Morals*, Durkheim writes: "One cannot construct an ethic in its entirety and impose it on reality later; one must rather observe reality to infer morality from it" (p. 61). He makes a similar observation in *Socialism and Saint-Simon*, trans. Charlotte Sattler, ed. and intro. Alvin Gouldner (Yellow Springs, OH: The Antioch Press, 1958). In this work, which was first given as a series of lectures at the University of Bordeaux from 1895–1896 and later formed into the first part of a longer, but never completed history of socialism, he writes: "But in order to know what the family, property, political, moral, juridical, and economic organization of the European peoples can and ought to be, even in the near future, it is indispensable to have studied this multitude of institutions and practices in the past . . . And only then will it be possible to ask oneself rationally what they ought to be now—under the present conditions of our collective existence" (p. 6). This is the manner in which a scientific and empirically grounded ethics—a social ethics—should be constructed. Values are derived not from philosophical speculation and abstract thought but from the empirical conditions of the collective ideals embedded in society. For an analysis of the German Historical School and Wilhelm Wundt's moral psychology, see Durkheim, *Ethics and the Sociology of Morals*, pp. 69–74, 108–109, 130, and 134–135. The philosophical categories of English utilitarians and German rationalists, that is, the good, duties, and rights cannot be the basis for philosophical speculation on the nature of universal morals. A social ethics requires that these values inhere in particular historical institutions. For an analysis of the relationship between ethics and science, see Hans Joas, *The Creativity of Action*, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 49–65.

Whereas Marx developed a dialectical method of imminent critique (values comes from the objective ideologies of political and cultural legitimation) and Weber created a critical method based on the perspectivism of Nietzsche's subjective nihilism, Durkheim's approach is to derive the values for social evaluation and critique from the objective cultural representations and institutions. These values are taken from the possibilities inherent in the social institutions themselves. That is, he develops a critical theory of immanent possibilities. This becomes a major methodological concern in classical social theory that is never resolved because, for all three sociologists, science and ethics are intimately bound in a practical historical science.

A real and unavoidable difficulty with this position is that it assumes as a sociological fact that there is always human sympathy for equality and justice (reciprocal and distributive) and substantive rationality (*Wertrationalität*) in collective representations and, therefore, rational moral ideals by which society can be examined and judged. Durkheim, unlike Weber, does not raise the issue of the disenchantment and rationalization of reason into technical and administrative means (*Zweckrationalität*). Some critical theorists from Marcuse to Habermas have argued that historical

and social developments of advanced capitalism have undermined the possibility of immanent critique requiring a methodological rethinking of critical social theory. In spite of this, Durkheim spends time in his pedagogical writings uncovering the substantive rationality and ideals of ancient cultures in his attempt to make morality concrete, historical, and practically relevant in sociology. See Emile Durkheim, *The Evolution of Educational Thought in France*, trans. Peter Collins (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 320–348 and *Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education*, trans. Everett Wilson and Herman Schnurer (New York: Free Press, 1973), pp. 95–126.

92. Compare the suffering and illusions connected to Schopenhauer's notion of the will-to-live in *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 1, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), p. 196 to the suffering and unhappiness in Durkheim's analysis of the disease of the infinite in *Suicide*, pp. 247–248. The idea of madness and insanity is also discussed in Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 1, pp. 191–192.

93. For an interesting analysis of the etymological origins and meaning of Durkheim's concept of anomie as derangement and madness, see Stjepan Mestrovic and Helene Brown, "Durkheim's Concept of Anomie as Dérèglement," *Social Problems* 33, 2 (December 1985): 81–99.

94. Durkheim, *Suicide*, p. 247. Compare this quotation from Durkheim with a passage from Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 1, p. 196.

95. Durkheim, *The Division of Labor*, p. 376. The last three chapters of this work contain Durkheim's earliest theory of social justice (pp. 374–409).

96. Durkheim and Marx on Social Justice: The real difference between Marx and Durkheim is that the former defines distributive justice as the satisfaction of human needs, whereas the latter defines it as the production of useful goods for the satisfaction of human needs. Marx places the criterion of distribution in the fulfillment of needs; Durkheim places it in the production of goods having social worth based on human need. Marx recognizes inequalities based on biological and physiological differences between individuals in the socialist phase of development in his essay, "Critique of the Gotha Program" (pp. 118–119). In the communist phase, inequalities would be eliminated. Durkheim retains the belief that social inequalities are acceptable only if they are based on individual talent in the distribution of work and social functions, as well as in the production of social worth: "[This] same feeling requires that there shall be no social inequalities, as between one man and another, except those that reflect their own unequal value to society" [*Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, trans. Cornelia Brookfield (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 219]. But as a final reflection in this work, Durkheim asks, Are not "even these inequalities of merit fortuitous, too?" He raises the question whether the social value of labor is itself not ultimately based on inherited natural inequalities which brings us back to the question of distributive justice based on biology. Natural talents, like inheritance, is a form of wealth and ultimately dangerous to the collective moral sentiment of the community. In the end, Durkheim, following Marx, wishes to eliminate all vestiges of inequality in society. The moral sentiment of charity has the imperative of ridding society of this form of inequality of natural talents: "Charity is the feeling of human sympathy" that "ignores and denies any special merit in gifts or mental capacity acquired by heredity. This, then, is the very acme of justice. It is society . . . to set

this moral equality over physical inequality which in fact is inherent in things" (p. 220). On these issues, see Gouldner's introduction to Durkheim's *Socialism and Saint-Simon*, p. 30. Bryan Turner in the preface to the second edition of *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* concludes his prefatory analysis of Durkheim with the comment that Gouldner's introduction to *Socialism and Saint-Simon* "provides us with one of the most accurate insights into the real nature and purpose of Durkheimian sociology" (p. xxxix). Durkheim's real concern in these lectures is the development of a sociology of morals based on the principles of social justice and democratic socialism. Also see Anthony Giddens' introduction to *Durkheim on Politics and the State*, trans. W.D. Halls, ed. Anthony Giddens (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), pp. 30–31.

97. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, p. 215. Durkheim is aware that his questioning of this traditionally privileged position between labor and property as the foundation of distributive justice represents a fundamental break with both classical economics and socialism (p. 216). The value of labor is determined not by the quantity of labor in a product but the quality of its worth to the community. Also see C. B. MacPherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).

98. Durkheim, *Division of Labor*, p. 382.

99. *Ibid.*, pp. 382–383.

100. Durkheim's views on the individual, freedom, self-realization, and human rights are taken from the traditions of Kant, Rousseau, and the French *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*: Emile Durkheim, "Individualism and the Intellectuals," in *Emile Durkheim On Morality and Society: Selected Writings*, ed. and intro. Robert Bellah (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 45. The social imperative of moral education is to develop the individual to the fullest extent of his or her abilities and potentialities (p. 56).

101. Durkheim, *The Division of Labor*, p. 400.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 387.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 401.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 403.

105. Immanuel Kant, *The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Thomas Abbot (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Publishers, 1949), p. 51.

106. Durkheim, *The Division of Labor*, p. 404.

107. Charles Marske, "Durkheim's 'Cult of the Individual' and the Moral Reconstruction of Society," *Sociological Theory* 5 (Spring 1987): 2–3.

108. Durkheim, *The Division of Labor*, p. 407.

109. These lectures, entitled "The Nature of Morals and of Rights," which detailed Durkheim's theory of political and economic ethics (science of morality) at the University of Bordeaux (1890–1900), were later offered again at the Sorbonne in 1904, 1912, and again before his death in 1917. They emphasized the history and importance of the guild system in the medieval European economy, the role of the modern state, civic morals and democracy, a new theory of property and contract relations, a critique of inheritance and class inequality, and concluding remarks on the moral sentiment and collective sympathy of distributive and reciprocal justice. The first three of these lectures were published in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* in 1937.

110. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, p. 216.

111. *Ibid.*, pp. 219–220. It is here that Durkheim examines the relationships between reciprocal and distributive justice and the moral sentiments of charity, love, sympathy, and fraternity. It is in *On the Basis of Morality*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995) that Arthur Schopenhauer unifies the ideas of sympathy (charity) and justice. This approach to justice later becomes part of Durkheim sociology of morals.

112. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, p. 210.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

114. These ideas may be found in Emile Durkheim, *Education and Sociology*, trans. Sherwood Fox (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956), *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, *Socialism and Saint-Simon*, and *Ethics and the Sociology of Morals*. For an analysis of Durkheim's theory of justice as a kingdom of ends, see W. Watts Miller, *Durkheim, Morals and Modernity* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), pp. 117–137.

115. Durkheim and Socialism: It should be noted that Durkheim never claimed adherence to socialism although many of his students did. Secondary interpreters of his work have argued that although he could not form an official alliance with socialism and although he rejected its call for class conflict and revolutionary change, his social theory contains many of its elements, including his theory of contract and law based on egalitarianism, human dignity, and economic redistribution of wealth. Gouldner, in his introduction to Durkheim, *Socialism and Saint-Simon*, has argued that Durkheim had tried to synthesize Marxian and Comtean philosophy in ways similar to Saint-Simon whom he claimed was the real father of modern sociology (pp. xxiii–xxvii). Gouldner also attempts to make the case that Durkheim followed Marx's historical materialism in arguing that it is the social being who frames the collective consciousness and representations. For Gouldner, the socialist principles in Durkheim appear in the following issues: (1) rejection of class power, structural inequalities, and economic exploitation at the heart of modern social problems and social anomie; (2) critique of testamentary inheritance and the need for economic redistribution; and (3) a call for wealth redistribution to intermediate corporative organizations and the need to revive aspects of the older guild system (pp. xxvi–xxvii).

116. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, p. 213.

117. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

118. Green, "Emile Durkheim on Human Talents and Two Traditions of Social Justice," pp. 100–101.

119. See also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 5, chapter 3, 1131b17–19, p. 404.

120. The emphasis on sympathy and social sentiments represents a distinct break with the rationalism of Kant's theory of practical reason and the categorical imperative. Mestrovic has argued that the turn to human feelings and compassion away from reason reflects the influence of Schopenhauer on the thought of Durkheim. See Stjepan Mestrovic, "Moral Theory Based on the 'Heart' versus the 'Mind': Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's Critique of Kantian Ethics," *Sociological Review* 37, 3 (August 1989): 431–457. In his *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, Durkheim writes: "The distribution of things amongst individuals can be just only if it be made relative to the social deserts of each one . . . We have greater sympathy

for those who serve the collectivity better and our goodwill towards them is all the greater” (pp. 214–215).

121. Durkheim in *Socialism and Saint-Simon* makes a similar argument from the socialist perspective that the principle of individual freedom requires a dismantling of the laws of property since they are based on an older system of patrimony and primitive communism. True private property “is that which begins with the individual and ends with him” (p. 13). Although Durkheim claims not to defend this argument, he does accept elements of it elsewhere.

122. In modern political and social philosophy, both Hegel and Schopenhauer have rejected Kant’s moral philosophy and the dualism between inclinations of desires and moral duty of practical reason. In his essay, “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate” (1798–99), Hegel argues that it is human love and the virtuous community—articulated by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount—which transcends the dichotomy of inclinations and law. For Hegel, love is the highest moral principle, whereas for Schopenhauer in *On the Basis of Morality*, it is compassion. See Hegel, “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate,” pp. 182–301 and Schopenhauer, *On the Basis of Morality*, pp. 144–209.

Both Hegel and Schopenhauer see elements of the Terror of the French Revolution in Kant’s imposition of a fanatical and totalitarian rationality upon the individual in the form of practical reason and the categorical imperative. Hegel argues in the *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) that this leads to a “fanaticism of destruction—the destruction of the whole subsisting social order” (p. 22). For further analysis of this problem of Kantian ethics from Hegel’s perspective, see Louis Dupré, *The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), pp. 20–21; Alasdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), pp. 197–198; Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 370–378; Murray, *Marx’s Theory of Scientific Knowledge*, pp. 83–84 and 206–207; and Steven Smith, “Hegel and the French Revolution: An Epitaph for Republicanism,” *Social Research* 56, 1 (Spring 1989): 233–261 and *Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism*, pp. 85–97 and 237–238. For an analysis of the relationship between Schopenhauer’s critique of Kantian moral philosophy as moral egoism based on fear and authority in which the principle of noncontradiction applies to moral and immoral actions, see Mestrovic, “Moral Theory Based on the ‘Heart’ versus the ‘Mind’: Schopenhauer’s and Durkheim’s Critiques of Kantian Ethics,” pp. 435–438. Finally, for a consideration of Hegel’s influence on Durkheim, read Peter Knapp, “The Question of Hegelian Influence on Durkheimian Sociology,” *Sociological Inquiry* 55 (19): 1–15.

123. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, p. 79. Giddens, in his introduction to *Durkheim on Politics and the State*, argues that Durkheim’s view of democracy is not that of a direct democracy in the traditional sense in which the mass of citizens participate in the decision-making process (pp. 6–11). Democracy occurs at the level of occupational associations and not that of the state.

124. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civil Morals*, p. 89. Steven Lukes, in *Emile Durkheim: His Life Work, A Historical and Critical Study* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), places Durkheim’s theory of democratic socialism within a wide range of democratic traditions, including the participatory democracy of Rousseau and J. S. Mill, the deliberative democracy of Aristotle and Hegel, the

guild democracy of R. H. Tawney, and the liberal democracy and social pluralism with its intermediary associations of Baron de Montaigne, Alexis de Tocqueville, and T. H. Green (pp. 264–274).

125. Democracy is also the political form of government which best expresses Durkheim's model of the psychology of the unconscious mind.

126. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, p. 87.

127. Following the works of Lorenz von Stein, Rudolf Gneist, and Otto von Gierke, Schmoller had taken a similar position on the importance of self-governing corporate bodies, industrial partnerships, worker cooperatives, and intermediate associations in his famous essay, "Die Arbeiterfrage," *Preussische Jahrbücher* 14, 5-5 (1864) and 15, 1 (1865). Also, see Grimmer-Solem, *The Rise of Historical Economics and Social Reform in Germany, 1864–1894*, pp. 142–144.

CHAPTER THREE: KANT AND THE CRITIQUE OF REASON AND SCIENCE

1. The term *metaphysic of experience* is mentioned by two major interpreters of Kant: H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience: A Commentary on the First Half of the 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft,'* vol. 1 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1951), p. 72; and Robert Paul Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity: A Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic of the 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 302–303.

2. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), B xvi, p. 22.

3. Hume and Kant: Wolff states in his work, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, that Kant's knowledge of Hume's theory of knowledge came from his reading of the latter's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (p. 170). In fact, according to both T. D. Weldon, *Introduction to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945) and Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), Kant never read Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (Weldon, p. 35; and Allison, p. 216). However, Wolff believes that Kant had read James Beattie's *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of the Truth* (1770) which was translated in 1772 and through this work had viewed extensive excerpts from Hume's *Treatise*. It is from Kant himself that we know that it took twelve years of reflection and hard work (1769–1780) to develop the arguments that appeared in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; the actual book was written in four to five months, which accounts for its problematic structure and clarity [Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. xxviii–xxix]. He first became acquainted with Hume's work around 1760. Kemp Smith takes a more critical attitude as to whether Kant actually read Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (pp. xxxiii–xl).

4. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, in *The Empiricists* (Garden City, NY: Dolphin Books, 1961), p. 317.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 317–318.

6. Rene Descartes, *The Meditations Concerning First Philosophy*, in *Discourse on Method and Meditations*, trans. Laurence Lafleur (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1960), pp. 101 (first proof of God's existence in the idea of perfection

and the infinite), 99 and 105 (second proof in efficient causality), and 121 (third proof in the ontological argument of essence and existence).

7. Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, pp. 322–323.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

9. Descartes, *Meditations Concerning First Philosophy*, pp. 77–80.

10. Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 323.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 324.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 326.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 419. Also see David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. 1: *Of the Understanding*, part 4, section 2, in *The Philosophical Works*, ed. Thomas Green and Thomas Grose (Aalen, Germany: Scientia Verlag, 1964), p. 479. Regarding Hume's theory of substance and impressions, Wolff, in *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, writes: "Kant agrees completely with Hume's insistence that there is nothing in the representations themselves linking them together" to form a coherent object or autonomous substance (p. 113). The source of the unity of the object—the coherent integration of the multiplicity of intuitions—can never be found in the object itself but must be in the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. All the impressions and experiences are connected in the thought of one unified consciousness—the "I think." It is this unified consciousness which provides the transcendental framework for all possible experience and knowledge. Wolff argues that this consciousness is not a collection of habitual resemblances and repetitive associations of ideas but a unified a priori field that integrates thought in an individual's mind. He maintains that the "real heart" of the deduction lies in the third stage on the "synthesizing activity" of the imagination. He claims that "the result is to give us our first real insight into the nature of synthetic unity" (p. 120).

14. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. 1, part 4, section 2, p. 481.

15. Descartes, *Meditations Concerning First Philosophy*, pp. 87–88.

16. Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 420.

17. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. 1, part 4, section 2, pp. 485–488.

18. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, part 4, section 2, p. 499.

19. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, part 4, section 2, pp. 479–480 and 491.

20. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, part 4, section 2, p. 501.

21. At this point in his analysis, Hume moves beyond the naive realism of the vulgar perspective in which perception is conflated with objects to the phenomenological theory of representations of the philosopher in which we know only the impressions as re-presentations and re-constructions. Hume contends that philosophers have not drawn the proper conclusions from their own insights due to the dangers and fears of epistemological skepticism. See *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 421 and *Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. 1, part 4, section 2, p. 483.

22. Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 420.

23. Gerald Galgan, *The Logic of Modernity* (New York: New York University Press, 1982), pp. 135–136. There have been a number of articles written on the subject of Hume's anticipation of Kant's Copernican revolution by H. H. Price, F. W. Dauer, Robert Paul Wolff, and W. H. Walsh. See Lewis Beck, "A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant," in *Essays on Kant and Hume* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 111.

24. Justus Hartnack, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, trans. M. Holmes Hartshorne (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), pp. 9–10.

25. For an analysis of the different interpretations of natural causality in Hume and Kant, see Jonathan Bennett, *Kant's Analytic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 153–163.

26. Structure of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' and Kant's Topology of the Mind: Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason

(I) Transcendental Aesthetic: space, time, and sensuous perception

(II) Transcendental Analytic: pure concepts of the understanding, experience, and judgment

1. The Analytic of Concepts

a. Metaphysical Deduction: Identification of Categories in Table of Judgments and Table of Categories—quantity, quality, relation, and modality

b. Transcendental Deduction: Psychology of Categories in Subjective Deduction and Justification and Objective Validity of Categories in Objective Deduction of the first edition (A) and transcendental unity of apperception as the synthetic unity of self-consciousness in the second edition (B)

2. The Analytic of Principles: Application of Categories and Justification of individual categories and Newtonian Physics

a. Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding: imagination and synthesis

b. Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding: synthetic a priori judgments—Four Principles of the Understanding:

1. Axioms of Intuition: quantity as extensive magnitude

2. Anticipations of Perception: quality as degree or intensity

3. Analogies of Experience: relations of substance, causality, and community

4. Postulates of Empirical Thought: three postulates or modalities of existence: possibility, actuality, and necessity and the special section on the Refutation of Idealism: problematic idealism of Descartes, dogmatic idealism of Berkeley, and critical idealism of Kant (Refutation found in Fourth Paralogism of Pure Reason in the first edition)

c. Phenomena and Noumena

(III) Transcendental Dialectic:

1. The Concepts of Pure Reason

2. The Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason

a. Paralogisms of Pure Reason: substantiality, simplicity, personality, and ideality (A)

b. Antinomy of Pure Reason: two mathematical antinomies on space and time and two dynamic antinomies on causation

3. The Ideal of Pure Reason

It might be helpful at this point to outline the structural architectonic behind the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The book is divided into three main parts: the Transcendental Aesthetic, Transcendental Analytic, and Transcendental Dialectic. This follows Kant's breakdown of the faculty of the mind into sensibility, understanding, and reason. The Aesthetic examines the passive role of sensibility in acquiring the

fundamental empirical information of perception in the manifold of the sensations and the sensuous intuitions within time and space. Next, the Analytic investigates the nature and role of the understanding and the a priori categories or pure concepts in the construction of experience, thought, and synthetic a priori judgments. It is divided into two main areas: the Analytic of Concepts and the Analytic of Principles (Schematism of the pure concepts and the phenomena and noumena). It is within the Analytic of Concepts that we find the key epistemological arguments of the *Critique* in the Metaphysical Deduction (“The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding”) and the Transcendental Deduction (“The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding”). The former focuses on determining the number of categories and their origin in the understanding [Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience*, vol. 1, pp. 240–241]. Kant derives the actual twelve categories of the understanding from the twelve forms of judgment. The categories are broken down into four main groups: quantity, quality, relation, and modality. The Transcendental Deduction examines the justification for the application of the pure concepts to empirical objects in order to demonstrate by a regressive analysis the objective validity of the categories. Otfried Höffe summarizes the difference between the two deductions preferring the second edition himself: “The Metaphysical Deduction discloses the pure concepts of the understanding; the Transcendental Deduction shows that they are indispensable for all knowledge . . . They form the necessary building blocks of all objectivity” [*Immanuel Kant*, trans. Marshall Farrier (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 74].

The Transcendental Deduction is the only part of the first *Critique* entirely rewritten for the second edition; the first edition contains the Subjective (synthetic reproduction of representations in the imagination) and the Objective Deductions (knowledge of empirical objects that is universal and necessary, not contingent and particular and the critique of subjective idealism). The Subjective Deduction (section 2: A 95–114) analyzes the psychological conditions of experiential knowledge; the Objective Deduction (section 3: A 115–130) deals with issues of objective validity, as well as the reality and existence of empirical objects, that is, a metaphysics of experience. Both Arthur Schopenhauer (*The World as Will and Representation*, appendix: *Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy*) and Martin Heidegger (*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, para. 31) were very critical of the second edition of the deduction. Following Norman Kemp Smith, Robert Paul Wolff contends that Transcendental Deduction is the most important part of Kant’s work, especially the section on the Subjective Deduction with its analysis of the imagination and the synthetic unity of consciousness which give order and coherence to the multiplicity of representations (Wolff, *Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity*, pp. 100–164; and Smith, *Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason,’* pp. 234–245). Although no longer seen as essential by Kant, sections 2 and 3 were replaced in the second edition. Wolff writes that, in spite of this, section 2, the Subjective Deduction “is the key to the interpretation of the entire *Critique*” (pp. 78–80). Paton takes a different view arguing that although the Subjective Deduction is of “great importance,” it is the Objective Deduction which is central and “conclusive by itself” (*Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience*, vol. 1, p. 240). Paton also takes the position that in the first edition the Subjective and Objective Deduction were not separated. Kemp Smith defends the importance of the issue of the subjective conditions of knowledge and the psychological unity underlying empirical objectivity. He assures the reader of its continued relevancy to

Kant throughout his work and argues that it remains an assumption in the deduction in the second edition (*A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* pp. 236–238). Finally, the four principles of the pure understanding of the Analytic of Principles correspond to the table of four categories (Analytic of Concepts) and the schematism of the principles (Hartnack, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 46, 62–67, and 68–87).

The final division of this massive work is the Dialectic which seeks the ideal of pure reason and the answer to the question of the possibility of the application of the concepts of pure reason in the area of metaphysics beyond experience. It seeks the answer to the question, Can metaphysics become a science? Weldon, *Introduction to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* offers a helpful outline and summary of the structural framework section by section of the *Critique* in his work (pp. 88–111).

27. The very use of the term object (*Gegenstand*) in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* has been open to an intense debate. According to Allison, Kant uses the term *Objekt* to refer to the logical subject of an empirical judgment, while *Gegenstand* refers to an empirical object in objective reality. The latter term has been used to describe intuitions, appearances, experiences, and phenomena. See Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 6: *Modern Philosophy*, part II: *Kant* (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1964), pp. 21–23 and 31; and Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 135–136. An analysis of the concept of representation has a similar history: intuitions, perceptions, ideas, categories, and empirical concepts. See Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, p. 109.

28. The Patchwork Thesis of the 'Critique of Pure Reason': There has been an extensive discussion over the years detailing the consistency or lack of consistency in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Some have argued that the work is an unfortunate "patchwork" of inconsistent and contradictory themes and arguments. The main representatives of the patchwork thesis include: Hans Vaihinger, *Die transcendental Deduktion der Kategorien* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1902) and *Kommentar zu Kants 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft,'* vol. 2 (Stuttgart: W. Spemann, 1922), pp. 42ff; Erich Adickes, *Kants Lehre von der doppelten Affektion unseres Ich als Schlüssel zu seiner Erkenntnistheorie* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag [Paul Siebeck], 1929); Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* pp. xxi–xxii and 202–204; and Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, pp. 78–85.

Representatives of those who contend that Kant's work represents a consistently unified theory of knowledge include: Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, vol. 1, pp. 37–56; and A. C. Ewing, *A Short Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 4–9 and 95–105.

29. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 2, p. 42.

30. Stephan Körner, *Kant* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 54; and Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 28–30.

31. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B viii, pp. 22–23.

32. Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*, p. 38.

33. Körner, *Kant*, p. 20. In his analysis of these distinctions Kant differentiates between judgments and knowledge. Analytic and synthetic are forms of judgment about the relationship between representations and ideas, whereas a priori and a posteriori are forms of knowledge based on reason and experience: Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 78–80; and Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*, pp. 38–44.

34. Körner, *Kant*, p. 43.

35. Kant summarizes the range and types of a priori judgments in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 5, pp. 44–45. In the preface to the second edition, he distinguishes between two distinct types of metaphysics: He refers to the application of a priori concepts to the experience of objectivity as “metaphysics in its first part,” while issues of cosmology and theology, which transcend experience, he refers to as “metaphysics in the second part” (B xix, pp. 23–24). Körner in *Kant* states that the goal of Kant’s critique is “to show how the proper application of such concepts [a priori concepts] leads to those synthetic *a priori* judgments which, he believes, are presupposed in common sense and scientific thought about nature” (p. 43). The overall architectonic of Kant’s critical method is as follows: He hopes to clarify the synthetic and a priori foundations of mathematics in the Aesthetics by delving into the nature of a priori elements of everyday intuitions and perceptions; the a priori foundations of physics and natural science in the Analytic by looking at a priori reasoning in experience and reflective thought; and, finally in the Dialectic, the a priori concepts of reason as they are applied beyond the limits of experience in dogmatic metaphysics.

36. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 25, p. 58.

37. *Ibid.*, B 5, p. 45.

38. *Ibid.*, A 19, p. 65. Representations, Appearances, and Sensible Intuitions: An overview of Kant’s theory of sensible knowledge would include the following: the receptive faculty of knowing is sensibility; the mode of knowledge is sensation; the immediate objects known through intuitions; and the type of objects received by intuitions are representations. Graham Bird, in *Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Outline of One Central Argument in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), describes the appearances of sensibility as “nondescript” and “indeterminate” sensations or sense data. More cannot be said because that would involve the descriptive use of concepts of the understanding (pp. 55–56). In a strange epistemological way, there is thus a similarity at the transcendental level between appearances and noumena. The appearances are representations and not things-in-themselves but cannot be described without the understanding (pp. 77–78). It is the understanding that eventually connects the sensibility to the thing-in-itself. Jonathan Bennett, in *Kant’s Dialectic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), states that the term *representation* used by Kant refers to both intuitions and concepts (p. 18). See also Wolff, *Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity*, pp. 108–109, 111–164, and 262–268.

39. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 21, p. 66.

40. *Ibid.*, A 36, p. 78.

41. *Ibid.*, A 46, p. 85.

42. *Ibid.*, A 42, p. 82.

43. For an overview of the structure of the Transcendental Analytic, see endnote 25. For a scathing critique of this section of the *Critique*, read Bennett, *Kant’s Analytic*, pp. 164–167.

44. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 51, p. 93. Kant’s Theory of Representations: Objects or representations of perception are not true objects but rather are helpful analytic constructs used for the purpose of clarifying the foundations of knowledge in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Although organized, the sensibility in time and space cannot be experienced or known as determinate objects or substances. Kant says at the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic that “objects are given to us in sensibility” (A 19–20). But he also says later at the beginning of the Deduction

B that “the combination of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses . . . It is an act of the self-activity of the subject” (B 129–130). Representations of objects of intuitions and representations of the understanding are analytical distinctions because only representations created by the synthetic and spontaneous unity of consciousness can produce real objects. To be an object is to be thought through a concept; to be an object is to be a representation of an idea. Things that result from the manifold of intuition are only sense impressions having no unity, order, or comprehensibility. These sense impressions or sensations must first be organized by the understanding to be true representations. The fact that Kant uses the term *representation* in a number of different ways and in different contexts is sometimes confusing. He has used the term to define both objects of the sensibility and objects of the understanding.

45. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, p. 96. Connecting Sensibility to Understanding: For an analysis of the relationship between the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic, also see Ewing, *A Short Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, p. 71. In Höffe's book, *Immanuel Kant*, he uses the example of a chair to explain the logical origins of objective experience: “In order for unstructured sensations to become something objective (a chair, for example), which is present in the same manner for everyone and about which one can communicate with others, one needs a rule. This rule is the concept of a chair, according to which sensations are combined into the unity of a bundle of sensations and the unity is then referred to as a certain form and structure” (pp. 66 and 54–55). Körner in his book, *Kant*, writes: “[T]he production of the object in perception and the application of a category are two aspects of the same process” (p. 54). Objectivity is conferred by subjectivity—by the power of thought and imagination—through the transcendental unity of apperception (pp. 27, 54, 60–63, and 77). See also Dieter Henrich, “Identity and Objectivity: An Inquiry into Kant's Transcendental Deduction,” in *The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant's Philosophy*, trans. Jeffrey Edwards, ed. Richard Velkley (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 130–133 and “The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction,” *Review of Metaphysics* 22 (June 1969): 645–646. In the second essay, Henrich argues that the intuitions (representations) already possess a clear unity through the forms of time and space. He holds that the transcendental deduction permits Kant to develop separately the argument for the representations in sensibility and the understanding; he then brings them together in the deduction.

46. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, vol. 1, pp. 52–53 and 98.

47. Kant's Theory of Objectivity: For an analysis of Kant's theory of objectivity, see H. W. Cassirer, *Kant's First Critique: An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954), pp. 148–185; Bennett, *Kant's Analytic*, pp. 126–134; Bird, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 76–81; and Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, pp. 166–173, 236–238, and 260–293. Wolff maintains that throughout the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant was torn between a subjectivist interpretation of representations where “phenomenal objects are merely representations in the mind resulting from a synthesis of the manifold of intuition.” The alternative perspective is the theory of double affection (from Erich Adickes, *Kants Lehre von der doppelten Affektion unseres Ich*, pp. 6–11, 15–22 and 35–46) which “distinguishes between perceptions and phenomena within

the world of experience. Perceptions are the (empirical) effects of an interaction between phenomena and the sense-organs" (p. 236). The main difference between the two Kantian positions—representations and double affection—is that the former emphasizes the idealism of subjective consciousness and deemphasizes the issue of an independent world of objects. The realist theory of double affection assumes the existence of independent phenomenal objects of perception. Throughout the sections of the *Transcendental Analytic* on the Axioms and the Anticipations, Kant attempts to examine in more detail these problems of objectivity and the metaphysics of perception, that is, the nature of the content (substance) and reality (objective affinity and universal connections) of the objects of perception. The central questions are: are objects mental entities (representations) or physical entities (objects of perception); what is the physiological cause of perception; and is the thing-in-itself a physical being or transcendental object (Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, p. 169)? Gerold Prauss, in *Erscheinung bei Kant. Ein Problem der 'Kritik des reinen Vernunft'*, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1971), refers to this as the problem of the external world (*Aussenweltproblem*) (pp. 147–151). Wolff's position is that the best response by Kant to the questions of objectivity raised in the Objective Deduction may be found in the Analogies of Experience (p. 173).

48. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, vol. 1, p. 97.

49. Jonathan Barnes, *Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 40–43.

50. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 104–106, p. 112.

51. Körner, *Kant*, p. 54. This passage is instructive and controversial since Körner interprets Kant as applying the categories to the act of perception, as well as to experience. These relationships between sensibility and understanding, perception and experience, intuitions and thought, have been vigorously debated in modern philosophy because there are many important issues surrounding these distinctions. The question is quite simple: are the categories of the understanding applied to preformed independent perceptions and objects or are they part of the very a priori conditions for perception and objects? Is perception an empirically given fact that precedes the process of empirical judgment, or is it synthetically bound to the understanding? Are intuitions and thought distinct entities or are they merely analytical distinctions within the same process of knowing? These two interpretations have split Kantian research into two distinct schools of epistemological and metaphysical thought: empiricism and idealism.

Realism and Idealism: Those secondary interpreters who stress Kant's empiricism and realism argue that the perceptions as appearances represent an objective reality to which concepts and rules are later applied. They include H. A. Prichard, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), pp. 27–28, 71–100, and 136–139; Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*; P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (London: Methuen, 1966), pp. 38–42, 91–92, and 235–262; Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, pp. 31, 72–75, and 94–95; Richard Aquila, *Representational Mind* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 141–146 and *Matter in Mind* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 2, 5, 17, and 26; Eckart Förster, "Kant's Refutation of Idealism," in *Philosophy and Its History and Historiography*, ed. A. J. Holland (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985), pp. 287–303; Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims*

of *Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 237–266 (Second Analogy), 279–316, and 317–329 (Refutation of Idealism); and Wayne Waxman, *Kant's Model of the Mind: A New Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 14–17 and 183–267.

Those who emphasize Kant's idealism and the constitution theory of knowledge, include Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 110; Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, vol. 1, pp. 93–98, 262–279, 336–347, and 359–366; Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, pp. 234–238 and 319–324; Ewing, *A Short Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* p. 62; H. W. Cassirer, *Kant's First Critique*, pp. 34, 44, 60–61, 67, 77–79, and 83; Körner, *Kant*, pp. 37, 54, and 60–64; Bird, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 52–64; Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 6, part II: *Kant*, p. 33; Hartnack, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 32; Bennett, *Kant's Analytic*, pp. 126–134 and *Kant's Dialectic*, pp. 26–29; Prauss, *Erscheinung bei Kant*, pp. 144–158; C. D. Broad, *Kant: An Introduction*, ed. C. Lewy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 73–74 and 81; J. N. Findlay, *Kant and the Transcendental Object: A Hermeneutic Study* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 115–116; Gordon Nagel, *The Structure of Experience: Kant's System of Principles* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 6–8 and 27–29; Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 27–28, 219–222, and 294–309; Stephen Houlgate, "Kant, Nietzsche, and the Thing in Itself," *Nietzsche Studien* 22 (1993): 116–118; Henrich, "Identity and Objectivity," pp. 153–155; and Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*, pp. 58 and 66–69.

The contemporary debate over whether Kant was an idealist or empiricist focuses upon the ontological status and relationship between the appearances and thing-in-itself (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 367–380, pp. 344–352 and A 490–497/B 518–525, pp. 439–443). When the intuitions and appearances are interpreted as reflecting empirical reality in itself, independent of consciousness, he is seen as a realist; when intuitions are viewed as "mere representations" or subjective ideas of the mind having no objective, independent existence outside of thought, he is held to be an idealist (Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 14–134). This debate over the metaphysical and transcendental meaning and relevancy of Kant's theory of appearances and the thing-in-itself has, according to Karl Ameriks, gone through three distinct philosophical periods. Each period is represented by key philosophers holding the realist and idealist positions: (1) Norman Kemp Smith and H. J. Paton (in reaction to the writings of Hermann Cohen); (2) P. F. Strawson and Jonathan Bennett; (3) and more recently Paul Guyer and Henry Allison [Karl Ameriks, *Interpreting Kant's Critiques* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), pp. 1–2]. Allison, in turn, was heavily influenced by the works of Bird, Henrich, and Prauss. Allison's account of Kant's theory of knowledge (Aesthetics and Analytic) and the metaphysics of empiricism and idealism (Dialectic) is an attempt to save him from an epistemological incoherence (contradictions between his claims of realism and idealism) and a radical skepticism (no knowledge of objective reality). Ameriks emphasizes that those defending Kant's idealism in the contemporary discussions have moved away from a radical idealism where there exists only mental representations to a position where knowledge of the object is dependent on the subject or representations as particular points of view (pp. 70–73). For a further discussion of this debate, also see A. B. Dickerson, *Kant on Representation and Objectivity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 11–13.

52. This issue of objectivity as a product of consciousness and subjectivity will form the basis for many lively discussions in epistemology and methodology about the interpretive nature and distinctive methods of sociology.

53. George Schrader, "Kant's Theory of Concepts," in *Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Robert Paul Wolff (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967), takes the position that the a priori concepts of quantity, quality, causality, and substance are "rules for the combination of empirical concepts" and thus absolutely necessary for the creation of phenomenal objects (p. 136). He concludes with the comment, "Kant's argument appears to be that the categories of quantity and quality are constitutive of the space-time manifold as such, while the relational categories are constitutive of objects in space and time" (p. 139).

54. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 114, p. 118.

55. Ewing, in *A Short Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* argues that the objective validity or justification of the categories of the understanding in the Transcendental Deduction is achieved not "by showing that they [categories] are dependent on the mind but by showing that 'experience' would be impossible without them" (p. 105). Kant's goal is not to show the psychological origins of the categories but their epistemological and logical necessity.

56. Georg Simmel, *Kant. Sechzehn Vorlesungen gehalten an der Berliner Universität* (München: Duncker & Humblot, 1921), pp. 67–80.

57. Georg Simmel, *Kant und Goethe. Zur Geschichte der Modernen Weltanschauung* (Leipzig: Kurt Wolff Verlag, 1924), p. 8.

58. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 123, p. 124.

59. *Ibid.*, B 125, p. 125.

60. *Ibid.*, A 97, p. 130.

61. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 6, part II: *Kant*, pp. 46–47. Schopenhauer and Kant: This is also the problem seen by both Schopenhauer and Heidegger who viewed the split between the Aesthetic and Analytic, between perception and experience, as a metaphysical dualism which was never resolved by Kant. The central questions for Schopenhauer in *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 1: *Appendix: Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1969) revolve around the content and timing of the creation of representations and objects (pp. 438–441). Schopenhauer in complete frustration over this central issue writes: "But about this the whole of Kant's teaching really contains nothing but the oft-repeated meaningless expression: 'The empirical part of perception is given from without'" (p. 438). Are objects given to us through the sensuous impressions or are they a product of thought? Are they the result of sensations (perception) or the categories of the understanding? Schopenhauer rejects the metaphysical and epistemological split between the Aesthetic and the Analytic as he argues that the sensations and intellect are both necessary for the formation of representations and objects of experience. See George E. McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason: Weber, Habermas, and the Methodological Disputes in German Sociology* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), p. 119, n. 15.

62. Ewing, *A Short Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* examines the distinction in the Transcendental Deduction of the first edition of the *Critique* between the Subjective and Objective Deduction. The former examines the manner in which the understanding using the subjective or psychological imagination

integrates intuitions and the categories, whereas the latter focuses upon the a priori categories and their validity and justification (pp. 69–70).

63. Architectonic of the Transcendental Deduction: Kemp Smith and Wolff have referred to these different formations as stages in the development of Kant's argument in the Transcendental Deduction. These stages represent an articulation of the patchwork thesis. Kemp Smith in *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* outlines four stages of the Transcendental Deduction (pp. 202–231): (1) transcendental object without the categories of the understanding (A 104–11; A 84–92/ B 116–124); (2) categories without the productive imagination (A 92–94/B 124–127, A 95–97, A 110–114); (3) productive imagination without the threefold transcendental synthesis (A 119–123, A 116–119, A 94–95, A 126–128, A 128–130, A 123–126, A 115–116, A 76–79/B 102–104; and (4) the threefold synthesis (A 98–104 and A 97–98). Following Smith's provisional divisions of the Transcendental Deduction but substantively altering them, Wolff, in *Theory of Mental Activity* (pp. 111–164), focuses upon the Subjective Deduction of the first edition of the *Critique* (A 95–114): (1) concept of the object = x (transcendental object = x) at A 104–110; (2) categories of the understanding as conditions for the possibility of experience at A 95–97; (3) subjective deduction: synthetic unity of consciousness and the reproduction of representations in the imagination at A 97–104; and (4) response to Hume at A 110–114. Wolff's thesis is that the final version of Kant's theory of synthetic unity in perception is to be found in his analysis of the principle of causality in the Second Analogy of Experience (A 190–211) where objectivity is viewed not as a phenomenalist collection of the material content of sense data but as a collection of empirical judgments (pp. 110–111). Wolff also concludes that Kant ultimately rejects the phenomenism of objects without the understanding (A 89–91 and A 111) when he argues that both perception (manifold of intuition) and understanding (a priori categories) must be integrated for objects to appear and empirical knowledge acquired (A 93–94 and A 121–122). "The end result, reached in Section 3 of the Deduction, is that no perception could ever enter consciousness save under the condition of having been synthesized according to the categories" (Wolff, *Theory of Mental Activity*, p. 157); on this point also see Körner, *Kant*, p. 63. Necessity and universal laws of causality and substance exist in judgment and not in the objects themselves.

64. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 103, p. 134.

65. *Ibid.*, A 104, p. 134.

66. *Ibid.*, A 93/B 126, p. 126: "Now all experience does indeed contain, in addition to the intuition of the senses through which something is given, a concept of an object as being thereby given, that is to say, as appearing."

67. Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, p. 114. Wolff argues that if the unity of objectivity rested in the empirical object then empirical concepts would be analytical (pp. 112–113).

68. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

69. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 109, p. 137.

70. Metaphysics of Objectivity and Experience: Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 8–16; Theodor Adorno, *Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* trans. Rodney Livingstone, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 101–102; and Wolff, *Kant's Theory of*

Mental Activity, p. 99. For an interesting summary of Kant's critique of Hume's theory of knowledge, see *Critique of Practical Reason*, pp. 52–59. Kant's theory of objectivity—the coherence and consistency of objects—is based on the synthetic unity of consciousness and the incorporation of intuitions under the conceptual rules of an object (A 111, B 125–126, and B 197–198). From this perspective, objective reality (and validity) is defined as intersubjective agreement (transcendental unity of the subject) according to logical rules of application and public experiences (*Critique of Pure Reason* (Analytic of Principles, B 125–126, A 111, B 197–198). Unlike empiricism and rationalism, objective reality does not consist of Cartesian substances or Humean impressions, nor does objective validity refer to the realist correspondence between concepts and an objective world independent of consciousness. According to Kant, representations are sensible intuitions and appearances of particulars as they affect the sensibility and also abstract ideas of the universal as they are constructed by the understanding. If material objects are sensible representations and not substances or impressions, Kant raises the crucial question of the nature of these objects and whether they exist outside and distinct of our consciousness of them. The Kantian theory of knowledge describes objectivity with the phrase “something in general = x” (*Critique*, A 104–110, pp. 134–138). Both Bird, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (pp. 80–81 and 88–90) and Bennett's *Kant's Analytic* (pp. 126–138 and 184–187) focus on Kant's theory of objectivity found in the Analytic of Concepts (Transcendental Deduction), Analytic of Principles (Schematism and Analogies of Experience: substance, time, and causality), and *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1950), para. 18–20, pp. 45–50. For a discussion of objects as appearances (intuitions) and phenomena (understanding), see Bird, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 53–64.

The question of objectivity has also taken an ontological turn in the secondary literature: Interpreters have wrestled with the issue whether external, permanent objects refer to things-in-themselves as in Prichard, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 322–323, Broad, *Kant*, pp. 198–199, and Pierre Keller, *Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 208–216. The position of transcendental idealism (*Critique*, A 30/B 45 and B 276–277) has been argued by others who contend that objects are merely representations of our sensibility appearing outside of us: Barry Stroud, “Kant and Skepticism,” in *The Skeptical Tradition*, ed. M. Burnyeat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 421.

71. Judgments of Perception and Judgments of Experience: Kant distinguishes between judgments of perception and the judgments of experience in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. There seems to be a noticeably higher standard of universality, necessity, and objectivity in this work than in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; there also seems to be a more rigid and unbridgeable distinction between perception and experience. This difference between the two forms of judgments comes closer to reflecting the distinctions in Descartes' *Meditations Concerning First Philosophy* between secondary (particular, contingent, and subjective) and primary (universal and necessary) qualities: review the Cartesian theory of wax in *Meditations*, pp. 87–89. Kant rejects Descartes' position in the *Critique*. In the *Prolegomena*, Kant differentiates between subjective feelings and mathematical statements. In the *Critique*, this distinction between the subjective and objective mirrors the differences between the subjective impressions of the *Aesthetic* and the objective experiences of the *Analytic*.

Universality and necessity do not express relations within the laws of nature and science but the a priori and transcendental conditions of all experience. The *Prolegomena* details statements about universal science, whereas the *Critique* examines the nature of synthetic a priori judgments and the common a priori foundations of empirical judgments in general. In fact, it is unlikely that the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience would make sense in the *Critique*. Perceptions in that work would be incapable of forming coherent objects, ideas, or judgments. The footnote on page 49 of the *Prolegomena* does attempt to ameliorate these differences somewhat as Kant differentiates between the judgment of perception, “When the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm,” and the judgment of experience, “The sun warms the stone.” To the original judgment of perception is added a concept of the understanding—the concept of cause.

72. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 104–105, pp. 134–135. Also Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 117–119.

73. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 105, p. 135.

74. *Ibid.*, A 107, p. 136. In B 139 Kant writes: “The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in the concept of an object” (p. 157).

75. It is here that Kant is caught in a serious dilemma for he maintains that it is in the process of organizing the manifold of intuitions in experience that this unity is constituted. The unity of the object is formed by the synthetic unity of consciousness.

76. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 108, pp. 136.

77. H. W. Cassirer, *Kant’s First Critique*, argues that the sensible manifold of intuition is not a true object according to Kant since this requires that objects be unified by the pure form of self-consciousness—what Kant calls the “transcendental unity of apperception” (pp. 67–68 and 77–79). Cassirer writes referring to Kant: “His contention is that sensible manifolds are not, properly speaking, objects, in so far as they are simply given to us in space—or in time, for that matter . . . His contention is that sensible manifolds, inasmuch as they are merely given, are wholly indeterminate in character: they acquire definiteness and determinacy only through being dealt with by the unity of apperception” (p. 77). Cassirer also writes that the sensibility and understanding are two aspects of knowing but “have no separate existence of their own” (p. 53).

78. “‘The principles of possible objective experience are at the same time general laws of nature which can be known a priori’ (*Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, para. 22, p. 53). For clearly, if they express necessary conditions of objective experience they express a fortiori necessary conditions of natural science; since natural science describes, interprets, and predicts objective experience. These conditions have their source in the relation between thinking and perceiving” (Körner, *Kant*, p. 77). Objective experience and theoretical science are based on the same synthetic a priori principles of the mind. Kant believes he has found in the metaphysical and transcendental deduction the logical foundations of all possible experience—both everyday experience and scientific theory.

79. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 1, p. 3.

80. Radical Idealism and Empiricism in Kant: It is important to recognize that both Schopenhauer (*The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 1, p. 436) and Heidegger (*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 110) have argued that, in the

first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), there is an emphasis on the subjective foundations of knowledge which represents the radical and idealist side of Kant's thinking. They also contend that the purpose of the second edition was to adjust his idealism with a balance of empirical realism. The issue of the substantive philosophical relationship between the first (1781) and second edition (1787) of the *Critique* has important implications in the history of ideas. For an overview of the literature on the distinction between Kant's idealism and realism and between his first and second editions of the *Critique*, see McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason*, pp. 61–62, n. 8 and pp. 62–63, n. 29, and endnote 51 in this chapter.

Warren Schmaus, in *Rethinking Durkheim and His Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), references these differences by examining the early reviews of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. In a review written in 1782 by Christian Garve and heavily edited by J. G. Feder in the *Göttinger Anzeige*, the author claims that Kant's transcendental idealism of the first edition represented a restatement of the idealism of Berkeley. Both Garve and Feder were defenders of Lockean empiricism. From their perspective, Kant's epistemology reduced all reality to a mere illusion or dream. Schmaus quotes from the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetics that everything intuited in space or time, and therefore all objects of any experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, that is, mere representations, which, in the manner in which they are represented, as extended beings, or as series of alterations, have no independent existence outside our thoughts" (A 490–491/B 518–519, p. 439). This review of Garve is also examined in Frederick Beiser's *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 172–177. According to Beiser, Kant rejects this characterization of the *Critique* as he argues that his representations are not mere perceptions or ideas, or "modifications of ourselves," but appearances of the thing-in-itself. The empiricist critics argue that Kant, like Berkeley, conflated the object of perception with the act of perception. Beiser contends that both the second edition of the *Critique* and the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783) are a direct response to the Göttingen review (pp. 174).

Kant issued a forceful response to his empiricist critics and a refutation of the radical idealism of Berkeley in the *Prolegomena*: appendix (pp. 120–133), remarks 2 and 3 of section 13 (pp. 36–41), section 39 (pp. 69–74), and sections 46, 48, and 49 (pp. 81–86) and in the *Critique*: "Refutation of Idealism" in the second edition (B 274–279, pp. 244–247), sections of second edition at the conclusion of the Aesthetic (B 69–73, pp. 88–91), the general notes at the end of The Postulates of Empirical Thought (B 291–294, pp. 254–256), and the footnote in the preface (B xxxix–xl, p. 34). For earlier comments on idealism in the first edition of the *Critique*, see the Fourth Paralogism (A 366–380, pp. 344–352) and section 6 of The Antinomy of Pure Reason (A 490/B 518–A 497/B 525, pp. 439–443). Summary of this argument may be found in Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* pp. 298–321. Further clarification of Kant's idealism may also be found in the First (substance) and Second (causality) Analogy of Experience (Transcendental Dialectic, A 177–211/B 218–256, pp. 208–233), Fourth Paralogism of Pure Reason of the first edition (Dialectic, A 366–380, pp. 344–352), and the Antinomy of Pure Reason (Dialectic, A 490–497/B 518–525, pp. 439–443).

Schmaus turns to Friedrich Jacobi, an early interpreter and critic of Kant, who immediately recognized the implications of “transcendental idealism” as an assault on the Enlightenment belief in an objective reality outside of consciousness. If, however, our reality consists simply of our representations of the appearances then there is only nihilism, skepticism and solipsism—that is, there is no objective reality outside of consciousness, since there is nothing except what we create in the act of knowing. This is why the concept of the “thing-in-itself” was introduced to save Kant from his own radical idealism. Schmaus writes that Jacobi viewed Kant’s notion of the thing-in-itself as “a desperate, inconsistent attempt to avoid this nihilism” (p. 55). There was a response by Kant to Garve in the appendix to the *Prolegomena* (pp. 120–133). Although the distinction between Kant’s idealism and realism is based mainly on the differences between the first (A) and second (B) editions of the *Critique*, it is the deduction in the second edition which, according to Schmaus, “attempts to make clear that the mind does not find the representations ordered in time by sensibility and then bring them under concepts . . . Rather, Kant intended to say that the pure concepts of the understanding are brought into play from the very start” (Schmaus, *Rethinking Durkheim and His Tradition*, p. 48). There Kant argues against the distinction between sensibility and understanding by contending that the categories must be applied from the very beginning of perception and the synthesis of intuitions in the appearances in time and space for there to be a unity of the object. Despite this, it remains true, however, that the radical idealism of the first edition had been moderated in the second.

Beiser outlines Jacobi’s description of Kant’s philosophy as an example of “nihilism” and “egoism” since it rejects the existence of all objective and independent reality outside of the sensations and thus outside of consciousness (p. 82). All reality is reduced to nothingness as the fleeting impressions of the moment. That Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* ends in nihilism is, according to Beiser, the revenge of Hume. “The ghost of *le bon David* stood above the twilight of the Enlightenment only to sigh ‘I told you so’” (p. 3). On these issues Manfred Kuehn is also helpful: *Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768–1800: A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987).

For an analysis of the relationship between Berkeley and Kant, see Colin Murray Turbayne, “Kant’s Relation to Berkeley,” in *Kant Studies Today*, ed. Lewis Beck (La Salle, IL: Open Court 1969), pp. 88–116; R. C. S. Walker, “Idealism: Kant and Berkeley,” in *Essays on Berkeley*, ed. John Foster and Howard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 109–129; and Kuehn, *Scottish Common Sense in Germany*, p. 178, n. 32. The issue of the nature of Kantian transcendental idealism has been at the heart of contemporary debates between the realists and idealists. For an analysis of Kant’s theory of objectivity and Berkeley’s idealism, see Bennett, *Kant’s Analytic*, pp. 127–129 and 184–187. Of special interest are the epistemological and ontological implications of the relationship between the representations of appearances and the thing-in-itself. For an introduction and overview of these discussions, see Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 237–254.

81. Kant’s Theory of Representations and Classical Sociology: Kant’s theory of representations summarizes the whole of his epistemology since it is concerned with the formation of the objects of intuition and the understanding and their

corresponding two kinds of knowledge as sensation and thought; the nature of objectivity of impressions and thought; the relationship between appearances and the thing-in-itself; the conformity of the objects to the a priori conditions of the mind; access to nature and nature in general (concept of nature); and justification by the transcendental deduction. Representations can appear as representations of intuitions, as sense impressions, or as the mediated representations of abstract concepts. Kant's theory of representations is important for nineteenth-century social theory, especially Emile Durkheim, because of his frequent use of the term *collective representations* to describe the methodological and epistemological implications of social facts and the theoretical implications of social and cultural phenomena.

82. The second edition has a different version of the transcendental deduction in which the initial subjective synthesis of the manifold in sensation is displaced to the faculty of the understanding. See Hartnack, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 52–53.

83. Findlay, *Kant and the Transcendental Object*, pp. 117–121 and 145–146.

84. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 101, p. 132.

85. *Ibid.*, A 103, p. 133.

86. *Ibid.*, A 120, p. 144.

87. *Ibid.*, A 123, p. 145.

88. *Ibid.*, A 125, p. 147.

89. *Ibid.*, A 128, p. 148.

90. For examples of the different interpretations of the metaphysics of experience, see Wolff's turn to realism in *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, 164–182 and 319–324 and Allison's turn to critical idealism in *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 14–34, 133–172, and 216–234.

91. For a critique of this position and defense of the second Deduction, see Henrich, "The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction," pp. 640–659. Henrich puts forward the argument that the Objective Deduction justifies the application of concepts to the intuitions, while the Subjective Deduction examines how this is accomplished in a psychology of the mind. In a critical reaction to Schopenhauer and Heidegger, he claims that the second edition is a clearer and more accurate statement of Kant's philosophy of knowledge (p. 641). However, as in the case of many other interpreters of Kant, he admits to being confused by the general lack of clarity in Kant's main arguments in the Deduction.

92. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 184, p. 185.

93. Epistemology and Theory of Schematism: In a very interesting and potentially helpful note, Copleston in his *History of Philosophy*, vol. 6, part II: *Kant*, contends that the mediating function of the image in Kant's doctrine of judgment has its origins in medieval Aristotelianism (p. 51). In the process of clarifying Kant's example of the number five, Copleston views the schema as permitting the forming of the image of the number five or the image of a dog. But even in Copleston's work, the relations between transcendental and empirical concepts are not made clear. Is schematism a rule underlying conceptual abstraction and thus the formation of universal concepts, such as dog, or is it a rule for joining pure categories and empirical intuitions? In his discussion of the topic of schematism, W. H. Walsh writes there is some confusion over the use of the term *schema*. He

contends that sometimes it refers to a third mediating element between intuitions and the understanding and sometimes Kant uses it as a formal procedure for the transcendental rules of applicability. See W. H. Walsh, "Schematism," in *Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Robert Paul Wolff (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 77.

94. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 159, p. 195.

95. *Ibid.*, B 219, p. 209.

96. *Ibid.*, A 180, p. 211.

97. *Ibid.*, A 193, p. 221.

98. H. J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 23. According to Paton, "The Groundwork [Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals] may be regarded as setting forth the core or kernel of a critique of practical reason" (p. 31). Paton distinguishes between the supreme principle of pure ethics (categorical imperative) and the particular moral laws (ten commandments) and rules (duty of a soldier to kill) of applied ethics. He states that Kant had a "dangerous tendency" to mix the two together. There is a complementary issue involved here also. The supreme moral principle of practical reason is the categorical imperative but Kant offers five different formulations of it. How they are related is an important point not examined by him. Are they entirely different formulations, different a priori principles, or even different moral imperatives? These reformulations also make the relationship between practical reason and moral law even more complicated and confused. Within the extensive secondary literature on this topic, there is a debate over whether there is only one supreme moral principle of practical reason or whether there are multiple principles of pure reason. See the introduction by James Ellington to Kant's *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. by James Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), p. vi.

99. Körner, *Kant*, pp. 139–140. Körner stresses the relationship between Rousseau's social theory of the general will and Kant's theory of practical reason and principles of moral law.

100. Simmel, *Kant. Sechzehn Vorlesungen*, pp. 134–135.

101. Immanuel Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. Thomas Abbott (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1949), p. 43.

102. Kant contends, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Lewis Beck (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956), that the main purpose of the critique of practical reason is to determine the grounds of the will as practical reason. In this section he rejects the faculty of desire and the search for pleasure and happiness as determining grounds of the will (pp. 19–24 and 62–74). Kant likens the subjective inclinations of the body and senses to Rousseau's concept of the "will of all" which, being accidental and arbitrary, are unable to legislate a universal moral order (p. 27).

103. Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 5.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

105. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 42.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

107. Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 14.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 6. For an analysis of the role of duty and respect in Kant's moral philosophy, see the *Critique of Practical Reason*, pp. 83–92.

109. Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 18.

110. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

113. For an alternative interpretation of the arrangement of these five practical principles, see Paton, *The Categorical Imperative*, pp. 129–132. Paton's thesis is that as we move through the list of practical principles "we are moving from the form to the matter of moral action" with the principle of the kingdom of ends being the most important of his moral principles (p. 131). In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant says that "the *autonomy* of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them" (p. 33).

114. Kant's Moral Philosophy and Natural Rights Theory: The examples of suicide, the lying borrower, use of natural talents, and the general welfare seem to be taken from two different traditions: modern natural rights and traditional natural law. The first three deal with issues of life, property, and liberty from the natural rights and utilitarian traditions, whereas the fourth and part of the third deal with issues of the common good of the community and the natural capacities and potentiality of the individual from the Aristotelian tradition. By using these specific examples, Kant wants to reconcile the ancient and modern traditions under the banner of his new theory of natural law and the absolute good. However, a problem arises when the abstract logical principles of universalism and noncontradiction of practical reason and the categorical imperative assume the validity of the substantive moral and political claims of the natural rights tradition. In this way moral idealism turns into the vacuity of moral empiricism. See Louis Dupré, *The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), pp. 20–21; and Alasdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966), pp. 197–198.

115. Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 39. Just as suicide is a contradiction to life, so too is a promise contradicted by lying, development of human reason contradicted by hedonism, and the common good by narcissism and private happiness.

116. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

117. Note how different the Kantian approach to the social limits of individual activity are from those of the neoclassical economist Milton Friedman who writes that the limits of my freedom to move my hand lie in the physical presence or chin of others: *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1974), p. 26.

118. Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 49.

119. This is a central theme running throughout Kant's epistemology and moral philosophy. The notion of praxis is key to an understanding of humanity's drive to create the laws of physical and moral nature. Productivity and creativity define the essence of a human being for Kant. Later philosophers and sociologists will take these ideas and apply them to history and society for a more fully developed understanding of human potentiality and creativity beyond the life of morality. They will be later expanded into the areas of aesthetics, economics, and politics.

120. Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 49.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

123. *Ibid.*, p. 53. J. Kemp, in his essay, “Kant’s Examples of the Categorical Imperative,” in *Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Robert Paul Wolff (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967), contends that it is the principle of autonomy and not that of universality that is the supreme principle of morality (p. 247).

124. Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 56.

CHAPTER FOUR: KANT AND CLASSICAL SOCIAL THEORY

1. Jürgen Habermas, in *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), summarizes the transition in critical philosophy from Kantian epistemology to Hegelian phenomenology in the following manner: “Hegel radicalizes the approach of the critique of knowledge by subjecting its presuppositions to self-criticism. In so doing he destroys the secure foundations of transcendental consciousness . . . Phenomenological experience moves in a dimension within which transcendental determinations themselves take form” (p. 19). Everything from the transcendental subject to the a priori categories of the mind lose their absolute and universal character and become cultural and historical phenomena in the movement of the Objective and Absolute Spirit toward self-consciousness in the Enlightenment. See also Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 156–157. It is Habermas who in his analysis of Hegel’s Jena lectures on the philosophy of nature and mind (1803–1806) replaced Kant’s transcendental categories and subjectivity with the historical constitution of the Spirit formed by labor (production and instrumental reason) and interaction (reciprocal recognition and communication). Habermas would add a third element to this historical process—the formation of power (state, critique of ideology, and repression of needs and desires) (pp. 142–169). This would become the foundation for Habermas’s later social theory of communication built on the legacies of Hegel, Marx, and Freud, and expanded further into the contemporary fields of pragmatism, hermeneutics, critical theory, and psychoanalysis.

For an historical overview of these philosophical traditions, see Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought*, trans. David Green (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1967); Georg Iggers, *The German Conception of History* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1968); Fritz Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969) and *Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, *Contemporary German Philosophy and its Background* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1973); Thomas Wiley, *Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860–1914* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978); Rainer Prewo, *Max Webers Wissenschaftsprogramm. Versuch einer methodischen Neuerschliessung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979); Hans-Ludwig Ollig, *Der Neukantianismus* (Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag, 1979); Rüdiger Bubner, *Modern German Philosophy*, trans. Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and *The Innovations of Idealism*, trans. Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Herbert Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany, 1831–1933*, trans. Erik Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Erhard Wagner, *Geltung und normativer Zwang. Eine Untersuchung zu den neukantianischen Grundlagen*

der Wissenschaftslehre Max Webers (Freiburg: Alber, 1987); Peter-Ulrich Merz, *Max Weber und Heinrich Rickert. Die erkenntniskritischen Grundlagen der verstehenden Soziologie* (Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann, 1990); Klaus Köhnke, *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism: German Academic Philosophy Between Idealism and Positivism*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Klaus Lichtblau, *Kulturkrise und Soziologie um die Jahrhundertwende. Zur Genealogie der Kulturosoziologie in Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996); Terry Pinkard, *German Philosophy, 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Manfred Frank, *The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism*, trans. Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004); Robert Zimmerman, *The Kantianism of Hegel and Nietzsche: Renovation in 19th-Century German Philosophy* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2005); and Tom Rockmore, *In Kant's Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

2. Critical Methods of Practical Science: Dialectical, Interpretive, and Moral Science: The method of critique or critical science develops from the epistemology and moral philosophy of Kant, the social and cultural phenomenology of Hegel, the existentialism of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, and the economic crisis theory of Marx to the Kantianism of Weber's and Durkheim's methodology and philosophy of social science. It is out of these sociological variations on Kantian themes that the integration of historical science and social justice comes. The critical method of the historical and cultural sciences affects all aspects of nineteenth-century methodology, including the formation of its concepts, logic, and methods of inquiry.

I. Marx On Dialectical Science: He applies a number of different methods of critique throughout his writing career. Although all aspects of his critical theory will not be examined in this short section of the chapter on Kant and Marx, he does use the method of critique in a number of ways: (1) Immanent Critique: comparison of ethical and political ideals of bourgeois economists to actual structures of political economy; (2) Dialectical Critique: functionalist analysis of contradictory imperatives, requirements, and goals of capitalist institutions and structures; (3) Substantive Critique: early philosophy of species being, human rights, total emancipation, political and aesthetic praxis, and communal democracy; (4) Ethical Critique: Aristotle's theory of economics and chrematistics, as well as his theory of need and social justice in *Capital*; and (5) Economic Critique: labor theory of value and the dialectical unfolding of the logic (concept) of economic crisis theory.

II. Weber On Interpretive or Historical Science: He, too, employs a variety of methods of ethical science: (1) Critique of Historical Reason: concept and theory formation based on value judgments and value relevance; (2) Historical Critique: social problems, public policy, and social critique infused with social ideals; (3) Empirical Critique: history (origins), structure (depth hermeneutics), and function (causality) of social institutions; (4) Dialectical Critique: contradictions between social action and consequences, means and ends, ideals and logic, and social ideals and structures and functions; (5) Critique as a Science of Man: historical relationship between the personality (character) development of a certain type of humanity (*Menschentum*) and the historical and institutional context of a conduct of life (*Lebensführung*).

III. Durkheim On Moral Science: He continues this critical and ethical tradition with his emphasis on (1) Functionalist Critique: functional relationship among

collective representations, organic solidarity, psychological breakdown, and anomie; (2) Ethical Critique: equality, social justice, and functionalism; (3) Social Critique: judgments about social normalcy and social pathology; (4) Dialectical Critique: social criticisms based on immanent historical moral ideals; and (5) Political Critique: pedagogy and critique through the principles of democratic socialism.

For an overview of the critical method as applied to the social and historical sciences, see Max Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," in *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew O'Connell (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), pp. 188–243; Paul Connerton, introduction to *Critical Sociology* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 15–22; Seyla Benhabib, "The Marxian Method of Critique: Normative Presuppositions," *Praxis International* 4, 3 (October 1984): 286–291 and *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 1–143; George E. McCarthy, "Development of the Concept and Method of Critique in Kant, Hegel, and Marx," *Studies in Soviet Thought* 30 (1985): 15–38 and *Romancing Antiquity: German Critique of the Enlightenment from Weber to Habermas* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), pp. 10–11; and Jacques Rancière, "The Concept of 'Critique' and the 'Critique' of Political Economy," in *Ideology, Method and Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster, ed. Ali Rattansi (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 74–177. For a more detailed analysis of the range of critical social theory in Marx, see Benhabib's works mentioned above where she distinguishes between the various forms of social critique as immanent, defetishizing, and crisis diagnosis.

The details of Weber's neo-Kantian method of critique are explored by H. H. Bruun, *Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber's Methodology* (Copenhagen, Denmark: Munksgaard, 1972), pp. 78–144; Thomas Burger, *Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation: History, Laws, and Ideal Types* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1976), pp. 57–93; and Guy Oakes, *Weber and Rickert: Concept Formation in the Cultural Sciences* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988), pp. 18–40.

Durkheim's adherence to the Kantian method is examined in Susan Stedman Jones, "Charles Renouvier and Émile Durkheim: *Les Règles de La Méthode Sociologique*," *Sociological Perspectives* 36, 1 (1995): 27–40 and *Durkheim Reconsidered* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp. 63–87; and Warren Schmaus, *Durkheim's Philosophy of Science and Sociology of Knowledge: Creating an Intellectual Niche* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 190–191, 201–205, 216–222, and 237–243, "Kant's Reception in France: Theories of the Categories in Academic Philosophy, Psychology, and Social Science," *Perspectives on Science* 11, 1 (2003): 3–34, and *Rethinking Durkheim and His Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Classical social theory was influenced by the existential Kantianism of Nietzsche: John Wilson, *Truth and Value in Nietzsche: A Study of His Metaethics and Epistemology* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), pp. 98–154; Georg Simmel, "Nietzsche und Kant" (1906), in *Das Individuum und die Freiheit* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1984), pp. 41–47 and *Schopenhauer and Nietzsche*, trans. Helmut Loiskandl, Deena Weinstein, and Michael Weinstein (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991); Babette Babich, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 49–134; George E. McCarthy, *Dialectics and Decadence: Echoes of Antiquity in Marx and*

Nietzsche (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1994), pp. 221–259 and 343, n. 7, 355, n. 3, 357, n. 17, and 371, n. 77; R. Kevin Hill, *Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), pp. 52–61 and 68–77; Zimmerman, *Kantianism of Hegel and Nietzsche*, pp. 5–39; and Philip Kain, *Nietzsche and the Horror of Existence* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), chapter 3. For Hume, Kant, and Nietzsche there is no unified, autonomous object, cause, or self. Experience is synthetically apprehended, reproduced, and recognized as an integrated and coherent picture of the world of objects by the imagination, transcendental subject, and the will to power, respectively. There are a number of authors who begin with Weber's neo-Kantian epistemology but combine it with empirical science. They see no contradiction between epistemology and science in Weber: George E. McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason: Weber, Habermas, and the Methodological Disputes in German Sociology* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), p. 192, n. 4.

Critique and Dialectic are the forms in which historical science is presented; they are the logical content of a phronetic or practical science. With the rationalization and mathematization of sociology, substance was displaced, and with it the intellectual heart of the discipline. Its guiding spirit and historical content in history, philosophy, and political economy were lost. Engaging the nineteenth century in an open dialogue results in a rediscovery of the original integration of science and social justice. In this archaeology of sociology, we find that Marx, Weber, and Durkheim come out of the philosophical traditions of German idealism and existentialism: they share a common heritage of the critical method in epistemology (theory of knowledge), phenomenology (history), and existentialism (subjectivity)—with an emphasis on subjectivity, creativity, and self-determination which express themselves in species being and human productivity, individual calling and nihilistic freedom, and the social categories of consciousness and collective moral sentiment. Finally, although they appropriate the method of critique in different ways, there is a common underlying approach to their use of the dialectic and immanent critique in their analyses of alienation, rationalization, and anomie.

3. The dialectical method is tied to the metaphor of Hegel's owl of Minerva. In the preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), Hegel writes: "The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk" (p. 13). Suspicious of establishing a theory of the state on abstract ideals, subjective opinions, and ethical illusions, Hegel, and later Marx, contend that the rational ideal is visible only at the end of an historical process. For Marx, the purpose of the dialectical method is to anticipate the logical and necessary end as it develops out of its own internal contradictions formed by conflicting social and political institutions. Critique cannot establish what ought to be but it can show what logically should be. In his later economic theory, this method is transformed from the analysis of logical to historical and structural contradictions as they are manifested in the contradictions between the social relations of production and productive forces, use value and exchange value, and capitalist production (need) and consumption (profit). Marx's crisis theory is thus a product of a critical and ethical method, not a positivist social science of explanatory laws and economic predictions. As a nineteenth-century method, critique develops from Hegel's logic

and phenomenology of spirit to the analysis of the logic (concept) and structure of capital. The dialectical method is used not only by Marx but also by both Weber and Durkheim.

4. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929), B xxii, p. 25.

5. *Ibid.*, B 126, A 94, p. 126.

6. *Ibid.*, A 105, p. 135.

7. Hegel's Critique of Kant: The literature on Hegel's critique of Kant is extensive and includes some of the following works: Joseph Maier, *On Hegel's Critique of Kant* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939); Louis Dupré, *The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), pp. 19–21; Alasdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), pp. 197–214; W. H. Walsh, *Hegelian Ethics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969); Georg Lukács, *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1976), pp. 146–167 and 283–300; Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 72–95; Robert Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G. W. F. Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit'* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 490–579; Joachim Ritter, *Hegel and the French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1984), pp. 151–182; Stephen Priest, ed., *Hegel's Critique of Kant* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); and Stephen Smith, *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 70–80, 91–92, 108–111, 173–180, 221–222, and 246.

8. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1: *The Process of Capitalist Production*, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Frederick Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 76.

9. Patrick Murray, *Marx's Theory of Scientific Knowledge* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1988), p. 43.

10. Hegel in the *Encyclopedia Logic* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* dialectically argued that scientific empiricism with its categories of matter, force, universality, and infinity is fundamentally an unconscious and uncritical form of metaphysics. Its dogmatic values are hidden within its claims to sensuous immediacy and factual validity. Both Kant and Hegel had argued that facts were always constructs whether transcendental or social. See a later development of this idea in E. A. Burtt, *Metaphysics of Modern Science* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954); and Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

11. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 331.

12. According to Marx, science cannot express the truth as a simple and positive reflection of empirical reality. It must be involved as a moment in a broader field of social action or praxis. This is the practical concept of truth based on the relationship between theory and practice. Czesław Prokopczyk, *Truth and Reality in Marx and Hegel: A Reassessment* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), pp. 56–68.

13. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 106.
14. Moishe Postone and Helmut Reinicke, "On Nicolaus: 'Introduction' to the *Grundrisse*," *Telos* 22 (Winter 1974–1975), examine the social totality and double character of the commodity as a use value and exchange value which dialectically unfolds into money and capital (p. 136). On this same issue, also read Moishe Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 168–170 and 184–185. Finally, it is Ronald Meek, in *Studies in the Labour Theory of Value* (New York: International Publishers, 1956), who argues that, for Marx, "the task of showing 'how the law of value operates' was virtually identical with the task of showing how relations of production determine relations of exchange" (p. 156). On this issue also see Ernest Mandel, *The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 79–99; I. I. Rubin, *Essays on Marx's Theory of Value* (Detroit: Black and Red, 1972), pp. 21–43; and Geoffrey Pilling, "The Law of Value in Ricardo and Marx," *Economy and Society* 1 (1972): 401–413 and Marx's "*Capital*": *Philosophy and Political Economy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). On the integration of the moral philosophy of Kant with the economic theory of Aristotle, see Philip Kain, *Marx and Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 51–82.
15. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 45.
16. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 170.
17. See Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).
18. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 245.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 247–248.
20. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 176.
21. Marx's Theory of Social Justice: The famous Tucker-Wood thesis maintains that Marx did not have a theory of morality or social justice since he ultimately accepted the principle of fair exchange within market circulation. See Robert Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 18–21, 222–223, and 231 and *The Marxian Revolutionary* (New York: Norton and Company, 1969), pp. 35–53; and Allen Wood, "The Marxian Critique of Justice" and "Marx on Right and Justice: A Reply to Husami," in *Marx, Justice, and History*, ed. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 2–41 and 106–134, respectively, and *Karl Marx* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981). For a critical response to the Tucker-Wood thesis, read Ziyad Husami, "Marx on Distributive Justice," in *Marx, Justice, and History*, pp. 42–79; the essays by William Shaw, Derek Allen, Allen Buchanan, Jeffrey Reiman, and Richard Miller in *Marx and Morality*, ed. Kai Nielsen and Steven Patten (Guelph, Ontario: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1981); Allen Buchanan, *Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1982), pp. 52–85; George Brenkert, *Marx's Ethics of Freedom* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 131–163; Driscilla Cornell, "Should a Marxist Believe in Rights?," *Praxis International* 4, 1 (April 1984): 45–56; Philip Kain, *Marx and Ethics*, pp. 135–138; R. G. Peffer, *Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 169–211 and 317–360; Lawrence Wilde, *Ethical Marxism and its Radical Critics* (Houndmills, England: Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 41–46; and Robert Sweet, *Marx, Morality and the Virtue of Beneficence*

(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002). For an overview of this debate about whether there is a moral philosophy and theory of social justice in Marx, see Norman Geras, "The Controversy about Marx and Justice," *Philosophica* 33 (1984): 35–50; Anton Leist, "Mit Marx von Gerechtigkeit zu Freiheit und zurück," *Philosophische Rundschau*, ed. R. Bubner and B. Waldenfels (Tübingen: J. S. B. Mohr, 1985): 202–229; Steven Lukes, *Marxism and Morality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 48–70; and Alan Gilbert, *Democratic Individuality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 203–205 and 227–229. There are many others who have defended Marx's moral theory in their writings, including Eugene Kamenka, Shlomo Avineri, Bertell Ollman, and Louis Dupré. An insightful commentary on the issue of Marx's theory of ethics and social justice was written by Richard Bernstein in *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971). Examining Marx's theory of self-actualization, he argues that "the metaphysical and epistemological implications of his [Marx's] position echo a more classical Greek, especially Aristotelian, view of man that maintains that it is only by understanding what man is—actuality—that one can appreciate what he can become—his potentiality" (p. 70). History and science frame the question of justice in both Aristotle and Marx. Any consideration of justice from a transcendent theoretical perspective outside of empirical reality is rejected by Marx as Kantian utopianism.

22. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, pp. 582–584.

23. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. S. W. Ryazanskaya, ed. Maurice Dobb (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 36.

24. Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, vol. 2, ed. S. Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 164.

25. Marx, *Grundrisse*, pp. 251–252.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

28. John Maynard Keynes places himself in the position of rejecting Say's Law at the same time as he rejects the irreconcilable contradictions of Marx. His solution will be for the state to resolve these inner structural conflicts and economic dislocations between production and consumption through the mechanism of state interventionism and "priming the pump": Paul Mattick, *Marx and Keynes: The Limits of the Mixed Economy* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publications, 1969), pp. 109–118 and 150–168.

29. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 415.

30. Marx's economic crisis theory is the direct logical and historical result of his theory of value. He examines the crisis of the tendential fall of the rate of profit in the seventh notebook (pp. 699–880) and his theory of overproduction in the fourth notebook of the *Grundrisse* (pp. 373–479). The tendency of the rate of profit to fall as a result of the rising organic composition of capital is further investigated in the third volume of *Capital—The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole*, ed. Frederick Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1975), pp. 293–370.

31. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3: *The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole*, p. 213.

32. Much of the discussion in the extensive secondary literature concerning Marx's method focuses upon issues of the critical method, the objective validity of his

concepts of commodity and capital, and the relationship between history (economic crises) and the dialectic (internal contradictions and logical tendencies). A frequently raised question is that of the methodological connection between social concepts (abstract and concrete) and empirical reality. Marx expresses this in *Capital*, vol. 1, as the relationship between the *Forschungsmethode* (method of empirical research) and *Darstellungsmethode* (method of dialectical presentation) (p. 19). The structural problems of capitalism are manifested in terms of dialectical concepts expressing logical and structural contradictions within the social system. Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), takes the position that the iron law of history and the capitalist breakdown thesis must be seen as logical necessities that do not immediately reflect concrete reality (p. 317). This point is central to Jindřich Zeleny, *The Logic of Marx*, trans. Terrell Carver (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980), pp. 35–40 and 51–65.

33. Mattick, *Marx and Keynes*, p. 61.

34. Summary of Weber's Critical Method: Weber, too, develops a social theory and practical science based on a method of critique that looks somewhat different from that employed by Marx. It also takes many different methodological forms: (1) immanent and dialectical critique of social norms and moral values based on an analysis of their internal logic, underlying assumptions, historical causes, eventual effects, and policy implications (traditional Hegelian method); (2) substantive or ethical critique based on core values of noble dignity, personal integrity, and self-determination within a calling (method of classical political science and the German Historical School); (3) comparison of humanity (*Menschentum*) and personality (*Personalität*) with a particular historical conduct of life (*Lebensführung*)—employed by Aristotle in the *Politics*; (4) social policy within the national economy (goal of moral development for justice and virtue of the nation); (5) neo-Kantian epistemology and methodology of value relevance and value freedom; (6) critique of positivism, realism, and naturalism in science and education, and among the prophets and demigods in the German university; (7) critique of values and assumptions of natural science as *Herrschaftswissen* (control and manipulation of a disenchanted and rationalized nature), technical and formal reason—loss of substantive rationality, objective and absolute spirit, and the heart of morality and social justice to the non-objective values of self-interest and productivity in utilitarian, neoclassical economics; and (8) the epistemological and moral nihilism of the radical Kantianism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.

35. Kant's theory of subjectivity also influenced the development of romantic poetry and European existentialism: See Mark Kipperman, *Beyond Enchantment: German Idealism and English Romantic Poetry* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986). For an overview of the influence of German existentialism on the formation of Weber's social theory, see McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason*, pp. 69–125 and 144–155.

36. Heinrich Rickert, *The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science: A Logical Introduction to the Historical Sciences*, trans. and ed. Guy Oakes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 54.

37. Paul Honigsheim, in *On Max Weber*, trans. Joan Rytina (New York: The Free Press, 1968), claims that Windelband's rectorial address at Strassburg marks the beginning of Weber's reflections on methodological issues (p. 15). H. Stuart Hughes,

in *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890–1930* (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), quotes one of Windelband's contemporaries as saying that the address was a "declaration of war against positivism" (p. 47). For members of the Southwest German School, which included Windelband and his pupil Rickert, this was certainly the case.

38. Rickert, *The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science*, p. 43.

39. Heinrich Rickert, *Science and History: A Critique of Positivist Epistemology*, trans. George Reisman, ed. Arthur Goddard (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1962), p. 97.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 31–34 and 86–103.

42. Rickert, *The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science*, p. 88.

43. Rickert, *Science and History*, p. 91.

44. Rickert, *The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science*, p. 88.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 127. Neo-Kantian Epistemology and History: Rickert stresses that the relationship between historical representations and the valuation of historical characters as mental beings is not fortuitous or arbitrary. Historical science creates its own objects and representations by the knowing subject but creates them on the basis of the "historical centers"—the historical and cultural context within which historical personalities and individuals create their own worlds through valuation. The importance of a particular historical object is the result of subjective norms or transcendental values "for us," while science also attempts to understand history from within the value perspective of the historical personalities themselves. "[T]he values governing conceptualization are always to be derived from the historical *material itself*. That is, they must always be values in regard to which the beings or centers themselves—the objects of the representations—act in a valuative fashion" (p. 127). For further clarification of this point, see pages 127, 145, 147, and 233.

46. Weber's theory of science traces the changing role of the scholar and teacher in the German academy, the changing role of objectivity and value judgments in science, and the changing role of politics and ethics in the classroom. Weber had engaged in various metatheoretical debates prior to 1900, including the debate over methods (*Methodenstreit* between theoretical and practical science, neoclassical and cultural science), over value freedom (*Werturteilsstreit* between positivism and neo-Kantianism), over the national economy (Austrian liberal political economy and neo-Aristotelian German Historical School), and over ancient historiography (Karl Bücher-Eduard Meyer controversy over the household economy in ancient Greece). See Hans Albert and Ernst Topitsch, eds., *Werturteilsstreit* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971); Lawrence Scaff, "Weber before Weberian Sociology," in *Reading Weber*, ed. Keith Tribe (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 15–41; Heino Heinrich Nau, *Eine "Wissenschaft vom Menschen."* *Max Weber und die Begründung der Sozialökonomik in der deutschsprachigen Ökonomie 1871 bis 1914* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997), pp. 288–303; and Erik Grimmer-Solem, *The Rise of Historical Economics and Social Reform in Germany, 1864–1894* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), pp. 246–284.

47. Neo-Kantian Epistemology and Methodology in Weber's Theory of Science: For a further consideration of the split between Weber's epistemology and

methodology, see Julien Freund, *The Sociology of Max Weber*, trans. Mary Ilford (New York: Vintage Books, 1969) pp. 39–40; Bruun, *Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber's Methodology*, p. 80; Barry Hindess, *Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences* (Sussex, England: Harvester Press, 1977), pp. 24, 33–39, 48, and 232; Oakes, *Weber and Rickert*, pp. 146–52; Werner Cahnman, “Max Weber and the Methodological Controversy in the Social Sciences,” in *Weber and Toennies: Comparative Sociology in Historical Perspective*, ed. and intro. Joseph Maier, Judith Marcus, and Zoltan Tarr (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995), pp. 35–48; and Fritz Ringer, *Max Weber's Methodology: The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 155–162.

48. Max Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. and ed. Edward Shils and Henry Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949), p. 52. Disenchantment and Historical Science: Weber makes the rationalization and disenchantment of the gods (substantive reason) important parts of his metatheoretical reflections in his theory of science (*Wissenschaftslehre*) thereby integrating history and methods. The goal of his theory of science is to examine the rationalization and reification of modern science and, in the process, to uncover the prejudice of dogmatism and the mythology of science. Only in this way would it be possible to demystify objectivity. Karl Löwith, in his perceptive essay, “Max Weber's Position on Science,” trans. Erica Carter and Christopher Turner, in *Max Weber's 'Science as a Vocation,'* ed. Peter Lassman and Irving Velody with Herminio Martins (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), writes about Weber's theory of value freedom: “What Max Weber's call for a value-free science sought none the less to demonstrate was that, in spite of science's emancipation, its ‘facts’ were underpinned by specific preconceived value judgments of a moral and semi-religious type, some of which even approximated to fundamental principles” (p. 146). According to Löwith, only by bringing these non-justifiable values of scientific objectivity to light is it possible to move beyond the shadows of Enlightenment science. He concludes his analysis of Weber by arguing that “the actual and very positive goal of his epistemological essays is the *radical dismantling of 'illusions'*” for the purpose of showing the problematic nature of modern science without spirit (reason) or heart (ethics) (p. 148). On these points, see also Karl Löwith, *Max Weber and Karl Marx*, trans. Hans Fantel, ed. Tom Bottomore and William Outhwaite (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 30–33. In the same anthology edited by Lassman and Velody and mentioned above, Siegfried Landshut, in his contribution, entitled “Max Weber's Significance for Intellectual History,” trans. R. C. Speirs, writes that Weber's historical theory of disenchantment is merely the continuation of Marx's critique of ideology and Nietzsche's intoxicated anticipation of the twilight of idolatry (pp. 103 and 108). In this essay Landshut offers an enticing insight into the underlying motivation of Weber's entire corpus: “How does a man sustain himself in a public world that no longer offers him any binding criterion for his own life” (p. 109). For Wilhelm Hennis, the central question was the nature of humanity—*Menschentum*—in the modern world resulting from the rationalization of Christian asceticism and its *Lebensführung* (rational conduct of life in a calling) [“Max Weber's ‘Central Question,’” in *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction*, trans. Keith Tribe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp. 43–61]. Hennis places Weber's central question in the historical context of classical Greek political science with its

public search for political meaning and the practical knowledge of the human good within a broad philosophical anthropology and social ethic. The image of man was the central question at the heart of his theory of science. For Hennis, metatheory was intimately linked to political and social theory: Weber's "heroic endeavour [was] to 'save the problem'—to express it in an Aristotelian manner—of the old 'moral sciences,' of the old 'practical philosophy' for a modern 'empirical' social science. This is the core of Weber's so-called *Wissenschaftslehre*" (p. 58). Landshut emphasizes more the centrality of the medieval natural law tradition in Weber's central plan and critique of modernity. Both see Weber as integrating modern historical science with ancient practical knowledge and moral wisdom.

49. Thomas Segady, *Values, Neo-Kantianism, and the Development of Weberian Methodology* (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), pp. 42–43.

50. Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," p. 72.

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 68, 72–76, and 85–88.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

57. Theory of Historical Causality and Objective Possibility: Dieter Henrich, *Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre Max Webers* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag [Paul Siebeck], 1952), pp. 82–83; Freund, *The Sociology of Max Weber*, pp. 71–79; Irving Fetscher, "Zum Begriff der 'Objektiven Möglichkeit' bei Max Weber und Georg Lukács," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 27 (1973): 504; Stephen Turner and Regis Factor, "Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in Weber's Methodological Writings," *Sociological Review* 29 (1981): 5–28; Gerhard Wagner and Heinz Zippran, "The Problem of Reference in Max Weber's Theory of Causal Explanation," *Human Studies* 9 (1986): 23 and 27–28; Johannes Weiss, *Weber and the Marxist World*, trans. Elizabeth King-Utz and Michael King (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 49–51, 56, and 67; and McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason*, pp. 139–144, 195–196, n. 21, and 207–208, n. 92.

58. Max Weber, "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences: A Critique of Eduard Meyer's Methodological Views" (1906), in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. and ed. Edward Shils and Henry Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949), p. 168.

59. Weber's Theory of Value: Apparent inconsistencies arise in Weber's theory of epistemology where concepts, theories, and methods are informed by values and in his methodology where social science, social criticism, and social policy are value-laden. How are the inconsistencies between science and values resolved in Weber's *Wissenschaftslehre*? How can Weber accept values in science at the same time that he rejects value judgments in the classroom? The answer lies in his critique of positivism, theory of value judgments, historical and cultural hermeneutics, and dialectical method. That is, values are inherent in all aspects of the construction of social theory, including positivistic sociology. Weber's critique of value judgments ends in a critique of positivism (naturalistic fallacy and the domination and disenchantment of a rationalized method) and utopian moralizing. Values are inherent in his application of the principles of dialectical and historical science. In fact, the

fundamental difference between Weber and Marx is that Marx uses a ‘dialectic without disenchantment.’ Marx’s dialectic relies on the acceptance of the universal values of classical economics and liberal democracy—utilitarianism and natural rights theory—to be effective. Weber’s dialectic is based on the notion of the warring gods of modernity—the moral polytheism of Mill and the perspectivism and relativism of Nietzsche. For Weber, there is no universal grounding of the dialectic. Although Weber’s theory of value accepts the application of values in concept, theory, and method formation, it does not represent a critique of the embedded values of science, only their free-floating and non-empirical application in utopian moralizing. Science and ethics are intimately part of empirical and historical hermeneutics. It is only when science turns into political philosophy and social theology that Weber’s critique of academic prophets and preachers engages. Weber’s critique of value judgment is a critique of the separation of values from scientific inquiry.

60. Oakes, *Weber and Rickert*, p. 114. It should be mentioned that in its underdeveloped form, value relevance refers to value-laden questions; in its more developed stage, value relevance refers to social theory. Theory defines both method and empirical research.

61. See chapter 2, note 57. Also Dieter Krüger, “Max Weber and the Younger Generation in the Verein für Sozialpolitik,” in *Max Weber and his Contemporaries*, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), pp. 71–87; Herbert Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in Max Weber,” in *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 202–203; Ringer, *Max Weber’s Methodology*, pp. 134 and 141; and George E. McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason*, pp. 197–199, n. 34 and *Classical Horizons: The Origins of Sociology in Ancient Greece* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), pp. 180–181, n. 58. These secondary sources argue that Weber was protecting ethical polytheism and value relevance from institutional rationalization, cultural disenchantment, and the metaphysics of scientific positivism. Marcuse holds that technical reason based on the repressed principles and metaphysics of *Herrschaftswissen* is a form of political reason and ideology (“Industrialization and Capitalism in Max Weber,” p. 225). These are the shadows of the Enlightenment which only produce disenchantment and reification. Both Marx and Weber reject the modern forms of idolatry, whether it is the idolatry of economics and liberalism or the idolatry of science and formal reason. Following the unrelenting pessimism of Nietzsche, Weber views the Enlightenment as a reflection of the suffering, violence, and barbarism of reason. His turn to the nobility and virtue of classical antiquity is a recognition of the fate of humanity, as well as a mournful cry against the darkness of modernity. For him, positivism is the philosophy of disenchantment and rationalization.

62. Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” p. 55. A similar position emphasizing moral self-determination in an age of routinization is also stated later in Weber’s career in his essay, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics” (1917), in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. and ed. Edward Shils and Henry Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949): “The fruit of the tree of knowledge . . . consists in the insight that every single important activity and ultimately life as a whole, if . . . it is to be consciously guided, is a series of ultimate decisions through which the soul—as in Plato—chooses its own fate, i.e. the meaning of its activity and existence” (p. 18).

63. Ethics, Value Freedom, and Critique of Positivism: Weber's call for value freedom represents a critique of positivism, the fallacy of naturalism, and a *Wertmetaphysik* (metaphysics of value). For a broader discussion of the relationship between ethics and science in Weber, see R. König, "Einige Überlegungen zur Frage der 'Werturteilsfreiheit' bei Max Weber," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 15 (1964): 1–27; Bruun, *Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber's Methodology*, pp. 123–137; Wolfgang Schluchter, "Value-Neutrality and the Ethic of Responsibility," in *Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics and Methods*, ed. Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 65–116 and *Unversöhnte Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996), pp. 37–70; Stephen Turner and Regis Factor, *Max Weber and the Dispute over Reason and Value: A Study in Philosophy, Ethics, and Politics* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 57–64 and 81–83; Krüger, "Max Weber and the Younger Generation in the Verein für Sozialpolitik," p. 83; Hennis, "Max Weber's Central Question," in *Max Weber*, pp. 44–46 and 181–183 and "The Pitiless 'Sobriety of Judgment': Max Weber between Carl Menger and Gustav von Schmoller. The Academic Politics of Value Freedom," in *Max Weber's Science of Man: New Studies for a Biography of the Work*, trans. Keith Tribe (Newbury, England: Threshold Press, 2000), pp. 105–138; Wolfgang Mommsen, *The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 111–120; Georg Stauth, "Kulturkritik und affirmative Kulturosoziologie. Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber und die Wissenschaft von der menschlichen Kultur," in *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre. Interpretation und Kritik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994), p. 176; Alan Scott, "Between Autonomy and Responsibility: Max Weber on Scholars, Academics and Intellectuals," in *Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie*, ed. Jeremy Jennings and Anthony Kemp-Welch (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 45–64; and Ringer, *Max Weber's Methodology*, pp. 134 and 141. Stauth fears that the process of rationalization would lead to a loss of all values not compatible with the demands of technical, economic productivity (*Entwertungspotential*) (p. 176).

The idea of value freedom (*Wertfreiheit*) has been a much discussed concept within Weberian scholarship: its meaning has ranged from objective neutrality (Parsons), freedom from the values and prejudice of science (Brunn, Krüger, and Hennis), freedom from civil and Church authority (Ringer and Scott), freedom from value judgments (König), lack of value consensus (Scott), theoretical agnosticism and ethical polytheism (Schluchter), pluralism and relativism (Nietzsche and Hennis), ethic of responsibility (Schluchter), freedom of speech (Turner and Factor), and so forth. Hennis holds the position that the concept of value freedom (*Wertfreiheit*) in Weber represents a freedom from the hidden metaphysics of positivism and assumptions of modern science of domination, control, prediction, disenchantment, and rationalization: "Weber's crusade, so often in the style of Don Quixote, was for *freedom as a practical value*, free of a tutelage exercised by the presuppositions of science . . . His struggle over the so-called 'freedom from evaluative judgment' (*Wertfreiheit*) is no more or less a struggle for impartiality, that is, intellectual freedom in an era in which ('bourgeois science') had laid its prejudice like mildew upon the imagination—especially in the belief in a 'progress' that it alone could orchestrate" (Hennis, "Max Weber's Central Question," in *Max Weber*, p. 52). According to Hennis, the substantive content of Weber's key epistemological and methodological principle of

“value relevance” lies in producing an empirical science interested less in questions of production, pleasure, and property and more in issues of the quality, nobility, and virtue of human existence. Weber’s central concern with issues of ethics and freedom reflects the influence of classical Greek political science on his metatheory. Hennis concludes that Weber’s critique of bourgeois science places him in the same tradition of practical science as Marx and Nietzsche (p. 58).

Weber’s critique of the underlying assumptions and unconscious values of natural science was a metatheoretical critique which included epistemology (realism, naturalism, and objectivism), methodology (positivism, scientism, explanation, and predictive laws), and sociology (rationalization, disenchantment, political decisionism, and formal reason). From this perspective, Weber’s “Science as a Vocation” and “Politics as a Vocation” represent metatheoretical inquiries into the assumptions of modern science, as well as social forms of the critique of pure and practical reason.

64. Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” pp. 152–153.

65. Richard Wellen, “The Politics of Intellectual Integrity,” *Max Weber Studies* 2, 1 (2001), writes: “What Weber does share with pragmatism is a specific understanding of how social science must function as moral inquiry: its goal is not to supply more objective standards for moral argument and social criticism, but rather to recast the terms of moral argument by offering new ways of thinking about and interpreting the problems of one’s culture” (p. 95). The scholar does this by first identifying and clarifying the underlying cultural values of any social criticism or public policy initiative, comparing these values to the factual reality, and showing the implications (origins, means, ends, and consequences) of their acceptance for politics and social policy. Science cannot determine the values themselves but can clarify their history, concrete implementation, and anticipated effects which are then factored into the moral equation of practical reason for social action. Science can determine if the values are logically coherent and consistent, are adequately reflected in the policy proposals themselves, and if there are any contradictions between the value assumptions and practical principles and their actualization in policy. Edward Bryan Portis, in *Max Weber and Political Commitment* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), takes the position that teaching, in fact, is an expression of practical reason and a preparation for citizenship and statesmanship. It is the general foundation for a life of an ethic of responsibility to the nation. Science itself cannot justify particular policy options based on the substance of their inherent values. Portis argues that scholarship and teaching have a political function. They are both forms of “political activity” since “exploring the subject matter for itself, his ultimate aim and justification was to change the orientation of students in order to help meet Germany’s post-war needs” (p. 165). All this was to be undertaken within a public deliberation and social critique of policy options among social scientists sharing a common set of social values. Portis explicitly connects Weber’s political and scholarly activities as part of one common thread: “Political economy, as defined by Weber, was the *application* of scholarship to an overriding political end” (p. 27). Lawrence Scaff, in his essay “Max Weber’s Politics and Political Education,” *American Journal of Political Science* 67, 1 (March 1973): 128–141, relates Weber’s later methodological writings to his political theory. For an analysis of pragmatism and Durkheim, see endnote 116 in this chapter.

66. Wellen, "The Politics of Intellectual Integrity," p. 86. Weber's *Wissenschaftslehre* (Theory of Science): Further creative discussions on the issue of objectivity and value freedom may be found in the following: S. Hekman, "Max Weber and Post-Positivist Social Theory," in *The Barbarism of Reason: Max Weber and the Twilight of Enlightenment*, eds. Asher Horowitz and Terry Maley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 271–275; Siegfried Landshut, "Max Weber's Significance for Intellectual History" (pp. 99–111), Karl Löwith, "Max Weber's Position on Science" (pp. 135–156), and Peter Lassman and Irving Velody, "Max Weber on Science, Disenchantment and the Search for Meaning" (pp. 159–204), in 'Science as a Vocation,' ed. Peter Lassman and Irving Velody with Herminio Martins (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Jay A. Ciaffa. *Max Weber and the Problems of Value-Free Social Science* (Lewislburg, NJ: Bucknell University Press, 1998), pp. 97–125; and M. Weaver, "Weber's Critique of Advocacy in the Classroom: Critical Thinking and Civic Education," *Political Science and Politics* 31(1998): 799–801. What at first may appear to be an incoherence of method within sociology with its confusion over the nature of objectivity and its contradictions between epistemology (neo-Kantian value relevance and theory of concept formation) and methodology (positivistic value freedom and method of causal analysis), that is, a contradiction between the subjectivity of values and the objectivity of explanatory laws, becomes on closer scrutiny a call for greater freedom from externally imposed values of institutionalized authority within and without the "knowledge factory" of the German academy. Ciaffa summarizes the dispute between the neo-Kantian defenders of *Wertbeziehung* (Thomas Burger, Guy Oakes, and Toby Huff) and the positivist representatives of *Wertfreiheit* (Talcott Parsons, Karl Popper, Hans Albert, and W. G. Runciman).

It is Oakes in his *Weber and Rickert* who examines the apparent contradiction in Weber's *Wissenschaftslehre* between a neo-Kantian epistemology and a positivist methodology (pp. 147–150). Ciaffa considers the nature of value judgments as he divides the question into "a methodological dispute about the influence of shifting sociocultural values on the social science" and the "practical dispute about whether the social sciences can validate moral and political claims" (Ciaffa, *Max Weber and the Problems of Value-Free Social Science*, p. 14). The dispute turns on the nature of objectivity and value freedom in science: "Once factual statements in the social sciences are understood as being conditioned by historically contingent value categories, as they are from Weber's transcendental perspective, empirical analysis and validation can no longer be insulated from extrascientific values through appeals to the value-neutrality of empirical method . . ." (p. 60). According to Ciaffa, both he and Oakes interpret Weber as arguing that since the theoretical concepts and cultural objects of historical science are formed by valuation, there can be no real independence or distinction between *Wertbeziehung* (value relevance) and *Werturteil* (value judgment) (Ciaffa, p. 65 and Oakes, pp. 111–114 and 122–128). Ciaffa appears to be confusing epistemology and methodology and, in the process, never gets to the decisive distinctiveness of Weber's dialectical method of social critique. He does, however, place the issue of value freedom within the field of practical reason and public deliberation (p. 97): "Under this rubric, Weber outlines a type of scientifically informed logical analysis that attempts to clarify the structure of practical problems [social policy], and to thus provide knowledge for maximally rational and

efficient social action, *without* actually prescribing courses of action for individuals or groups engaged in practical deliberation. In other words, Weber's technical criticism endeavors to delineate what is at stake in practical problems and disputes, and to thereby assist social agents in choosing courses of action that science itself is not competent to dictate. More precisely, for any given practical problem, technical criticism endeavors to clarify the range of possible solutions to that problem, the means necessary to achieve those solutions, and the repercussions that are likely to result from both the realization of desired ends and the employment of specific means to attain such ends" (pp. 99–100).

67. Wellen, "The Politics of Intellectual Integrity," p. 86. Weber is clearer about the social and historical context of "academic freedom" in his essays on university problems and state power in *Max Weber On Universities: The Power of the State and Dignity of the Academic Calling in Imperial Germany*, trans. and ed. Edward Shils (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 17–23 and 52–53. In the methodological essay in this volume, "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics," which also appears in the *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Weber forcefully argues for the inclusion of socialist and anarchist professors in the academy since they would introduce different perspectives: "An anarchist can surely be a good legal scholar. And if he is such, then indeed the Archimedean point of his convictions, which is outside the conventions and presuppositions which are so self-evident to us, can equip him to perceive problems in the fundamental postulates of legal theory which escape those who take them for granted" ("The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality,'" in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, p. 7). Weber is critical of reducing the German university to either a specialized technical school of loyal civil servants or a theological seminary of metaphysical and political sycophants and patriots (pp. 7–10): "If, however, one wishes to turn the university into a forum for the discussion of values, then it obviously becomes a duty to permit the most unrestrained freedom of discussion of fundamental questions from all value-positions" (p. 8). Weber is critical of both the "ethical economists" and "ethically-neutral prophets" because both mistake the nature of the academic calling (p. 9). Moral prophecy is not to be mistaken for scientific criticism based upon empirical research. Weber sounds distinctly similar to Marx with the latter's criticism of moral abstractionism and speculative philosophy as the basis for a theory of social justice. Criticism cannot occur in a categorial vacuum but requires the integration of values and empirical reality. Weber is critical of turning science into a practical philosophy but takes a more integrated approach of blending the categories of reason with the empirical evidence of experience in a practical science. On the use of value freedom in the scientific academy as the basis for a critique of the transformation of the German university into a training ground for bureaucratic officials and political technicians, see Fritz Ringer, "The German Academic Community, 1870–1920," *Internationales Archiv der deutschen Literatur* 3 (1978): 110 and *Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography*, pp. 55–57 and 104–112; and Harvey Goldman, *Politics, Death, and the Devil: Self and Power in Max Weber and Thomas Mann* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 25–50.

68. Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," pp. 85–88 and "Science as a Vocation," pp. 138–139.

69. Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," p. 106.

70. Aristotle and Nietzsche: As we have seen in chapter 2, there are inherent limits to Nietzsche's will to power which lie in his appropriation of the ideal character of the *Übermensch* from Aristotle's theory of virtue and the great-souled man (*megalopsychos*) in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*: Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 382–384; Bernd Magnus, "Aristotle and Nietzsche: *Megalopsychia* and *Übermensch*," in *The Greeks and the Good Life*, ed. David Depew (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), pp. 260–295; Robert Solomon, "A More Severe Morality: Nietzsche's Affirmative Ethics," in *Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker*, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht, Holland: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), pp. 69–89 and *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great "Immoralist" Has to Teach Us* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 93, 122, and 130; Lester Hunt, *Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue* (London: Routledge, 1991); Thomas Brobjer, *Nietzsche's Ethics of Character: A Study of Nietzsche's Ethics and its Place in the History of Moral Thinking* (Uppsala, Sweden: Department of the History of Science and Ideas, Uppsala University, 1995), pp. 241–262, "Nietzsche's Reading of Aristotle and his Return to *Megalopsychia*," unpublished manuscript, and "Nietzsche's Affirmative Morality: An Ethics of Virtue," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 26 (2003): 64–78; and Michael Slote, "Nietzsche and Virtue Ethics," *International Studies in Philosophy* 30 (1998): 23–27. For an alternative and critical position, see Kain, *Nietzsche and the Horror of Existence*, chapter 6.

71. McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason*, pp. 174–180.

72. Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," p. 93.

73. Structure and History: This area of the relationship between Weber's later methodology and his historical publications has only recently been explored. There is a growing chorus of commentaries which suggest that Weber's later writings move away from issues of intentionality and consciousness to issues of historical and social structures. See Johannes Berger, "Die Grenzen des handlungstheoretischen Paradigmas am Beispiel der soziologischen Grundbegriffe Max Webers," in *Materialien aus der soziologischen Forschung. Verhandlungen des 18. Deutschen Soziologentages*, ed. Karl Bolte (Neuwied: Herman Luchterhand Verlag, 1978), p. 1085; Bryan Turner, "Weber and Structural Marxism," in *For Weber: Essays on the Sociology of Fate* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 48–60; Gordon Marshall, *In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism: An Essay on Max Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 58–60; Weiss, *Weber and the Marxist World*, pp. 66–71, 80–81, and 84–122; Gianfranco Poggi, *Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit: Max Weber's Protestant Ethic* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1983), pp. 16–26; Lawrence Scaff, "Weber before Weberian Science," pp. 15 and 27 and *Fleeing the Iron Cage: Culture, Politics, and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 41–65; Stephen Kalberg, *Max Weber's Comparative-Historical Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 155–162; Stauth, "Kulturkritik und affirmative Kultursociologie," p. 176; Fritz Ringer, *Max Weber's Methodology*, pp. 155–162; and Richard Swedberg, *Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 17–20.

74. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parson, foreword R. H. Tawney (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 54. Also see Turner, *For Weber*, p. 54. For a further analysis of the Protestant Ethic

thesis and the controversy surrounding it, examine Max Weber et al., *The Protestant Ethic Debate: Max Weber's Replies to His Critics, 1907–1910*, trans. Austin Harrington and Mary Shields, ed. David Chalcraft and Austin Harrington (Liverpool, England: Liverpool University Press, 2001), along with the following secondary interpretations of the dispute: Robert Green, ed. and intro., *Protestantism, Capitalism, and Social Science: The Weber Thesis Controversy* (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1973); Hartmut Lehmann and Guenther Roth, eds., *Weber's Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts* (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 1993); David Chalcraft, "Reading Weber's Patterns of Response to Critics of *The Protestant Ethic*," *Journal of Classical Sociology* 5, 1 (2005): 31–51; and William Swatos and Lutz Kaelber, eds., *The Protestant Ethic Turns 100: Essays on the Centenary of the Weber Thesis* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2005).

75. Stauth, "Kulturkritik und affirmative Kultursoziologie," p. 177. Stauth writes that Weber is aware of the symbiotic relationship between meaning and structure, intentional action and technical rationality but it has not been incorporated into the psychology of interpretive sociology (*verstehende Soziologie*).

76. Weber and Marx: There have been some interpreters who have argued that Weber's later works represent a movement toward a more Marxist methodological approach. This is the position of Johannes Weiss in *Weber and the Marxist World*. Weiss argues that Marx joined together praxis and alienated labor, self-conscious life activity and the reification of social institutions, human intentionality and unconscious class power. According to Weiss, the notion of "alienation" implies both an interpretive and explanatory approach to social science thus making a connection to Weber's methodology (pp. 49–56). See also G. E. M. De Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests* (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1981), p. 85; Löwith, *Max Weber and Karl Marx*, pp. 28–67; Mommsen, *The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber*, pp. 55 and 149; and Keith Tribe, introduction to *Reading Weber*, ed. Keith Tribe (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 1–15.

77. Durkheim's Critique of Positivism: The position that Durkheim's early writings do not reflect a positivist perspective has been slowly gaining strength. There has been a growing number of authors who have made this argument, including Carmen Sirianni, "Justice and the Division of Labour," *Sociological Review* 32 (1984): 449–470; Anthony Giddens, "Weber and Durkheim: Coincidence and Divergence," in *Max Weber and his Contemporaries*, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Allen & Unwin Hyman, 1987), pp. 182–189; Stjepan Mestrovic, *Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1988), p. 92; Douglas Challenger, *Durkheim through the Eyes of Aristotle: Durkheimian, Postmodern, and Communitarian Responses to the Enlightenment* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1994); Anne Warfield Rawls, "Durkheim's Epistemology: The Neglected Argument," *American Journal of Sociology* 102 (1996): 468–479; and William Pickering, ed., *Durkheim and Representations* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2000). Charles Marske, in his essay "Durkheim's 'Cult of the Individual' and the Moral Reconstruction of Society," *Sociology Today* 5 (Spring 1987): 5 and 8, contends that it is Talcott Parsons in the *Structure of Social Action*, vol. 1: *Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 307 and Alvin Gouldner, introduction to Emile Durkheim, *Socialism and Saint-Simon*, trans. Charlotte Sattler,

ed. and intro. Alvin Gouldner (Yellow Springs, OH: The Antioch Press, 1958), pp. xi–xii, who make the argument for positivism in Durkheim.

78. Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, trans. Sarah Solovay and John Mueller, ed. George Catlin (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. xliii.

79. *Ibid.*, pp. xliii and xiv.

80. Challenger, *Durkheim through the Lens of Aristotle*, pp. 146–148 and 155, n. 25. Neil Gross in his introduction to Emile Durkheim, *Durkheim's Philosophy Lectures: Notes from the Lycée de Sens Course, 1883–1884*, trans. and ed. Neil Gross and Robert Alun Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), holds that Durkheim in these early lectures is critical of the unreflective empiricism of Wilhelm Wundt, Gustav Fechner, and Ernst Weber (p. 23).

81. Kant and Durkheim on Representations: For an introduction to his theory of representations, see Emile Durkheim, “Individual and Collective Representations,” in *Sociology and Philosophy*, trans. D. F. Pocock, intro. J. G. Peristiany (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 2–10. Durkheim’s theory of representations has its origins in the Kantian tradition in philosophy that includes the existential Kantianism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the neo-Kantianism of Charles Renouvier, Emile Boutroux, and Octave Hamelin, the Kantian school of psychology of Léon Dumont, M. Rabier, William James, and Wilhelm Wundt, and the eclectic spiritualism of Victor Cousin, Maine de Biran, and Paul Janet. For a different perspective on the history of ideas and the origins of Durkheim’s theory of collective representations and sociology of knowledge, see Schmaus, *Rethinking Durkheim and His Tradition*, who connects Durkheim to the eclectic spiritualism of Cousin, de Biran, and Janet. See the recently discovered 500 page hand-written manuscript of lecture notes taken by André Lalande from Durkheim’s course on philosophy at the Lycée de Sens, 1883–1884, “Cours de philosophie fait au Lycée de Sens,” *Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne*, manuscript number 2351 and *Durkheim's Philosophy Lectures: Notes from the Lycée de Sens Course, 1883–1884*. Schmaus examines the importance of the Sens lectures on Kant for insight into the development of Durkheim’s early philosophical thought (pp. 96–119). Stedman Jones in *Durkheim Reconsidered* spends much of her time examining the influence of the neo-Kantian Renouvier and the theory of representations on Durkheim from his *The Division of Labor* to *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*.

Stedman Jones, in her essay, “Representation in Durkheim’s Masters: Kant and Renouvier, no. 1: Representation, Reality and the Question of Science,” in *Durkheim and Representations*, ed. W. S. F. Pickering (London: Taylor & Francis, 2000), pp. 37–58, stresses the influence of Renouvier and Boutroux, two neo-Kantian professors of Durkheim and their influence on his appropriation of Kant’s theory of representations. She contends that objects are given in the Transcendental Aesthetic and thought in the Transcendental Analytic (p. 49). For a further analysis of Durkheim’s theory of representations as a critique of economic materialism, positivism, physicalism (Huxley), and Marxism, as well as a defense of the activity of individual and collective conscience, intentionality, and subjectivity, see Susan Stedman Jones, “What Does Durkheim Mean by ‘Thing?’,” *Durkheimian Studies/Etudes Durkheimiennes* 2 (1996): 43–59 and “Représentations,” *Durkheimian Studies* 9 (2003): 14–19. In her analysis of Kant, Renouvier, and Boutroux, she writes, “He [Kant] had transformed the question of knowledge and reality from the logic of empiricism, materialism, and realism: his

Copernican revolution showed that thought does not gravitate around things but things around thought . . . Kant had shown that representation is the condition of our knowledge of reality and therefore of science, and had destroyed the idea of realism and shown that there can be no unproblematic or direct reference to reality” (“Représentations,” p. 17). However, as already discussed in chapter 3, this is a very contentious view in Kantian literature depending upon whether one wishes to emphasize the idealism (I think) or empiricism (phenomenal reality) of Kant.

Finally, Theo Verheggen, in “Durkheim’s ‘Représentations’ Considered as ‘Vorstellungen,’” *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* 16 (1996), examines the use of the term *representation* and its relation to the metaphysical question of the existence of society as an autonomous entity. He claims it is real, a conscience collective, and it is sui generis. On the other hand, it is neither a thing-in-itself nor a reified, autonomously existing substance (pp. 201–203 and 211–212). It has the connotation of idea or spirit that exists only through individual consciousness, but, nevertheless, acts as a real external moral force on the individual will. Ernest Wallwork also examines the substance of society in terms of metaphysical nominalism and substantial realism. He concludes with the idea of “relational realism” in *Durkheim: Morality and Milieu* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 18. An historical and philosophical overview of this period is provided by Klaus Kohnke, *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism: German Academic Philosophy between Idealism and Positivism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Stjepan Mestrovic had written extensively in the 1980s on the importance of Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s theory of representations for Durkheim’s epistemology (see endnotes 77 and 90 in this chapter).

82. Stedman Jones, “Representations in Durkheim’s Masters,” p. 38 and “Représentations,” pp. 14–17. She is critical of the position taken by Stephen Lukes in his work, *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work, A Historical and Critical Study* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), for stating that Durkheim’s notion of representation was first used in 1897 in *Suicide* (p. 6). She contends quite correctly that he used the idea throughout his early period, including *The Division of Labor* and *The Rules of Sociological Method*.

83. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, vol. 1: *Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim*, pp. 305–307. For an overview of the literature defending this position, see McCarthy, *Classical Horizons*, p. 188, n. 50.

84. Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, p. lvii.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 10. For a further analysis of social facts as external and coercive, see “Individual and Collective Representations,” pp. 24–26.

86. Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, p. 17.

87. *Ibid.*, p. xlvi.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

89. *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

90. Kant, Schopenhauer, and Durkheim: George Catlin in his introduction to Durkheim’s *The Rules of Sociological Method* makes the case that Charles Renouvier, a neo-Kantian scholar, had already used the notion of “collective representations” that would later influence Durkheim. Stjepan Mestrovic, in his essay, “The Social World as Will and Idea: Schopenhauer’s Influence upon Durkheim’s Thought,” *Sociological Review* 36, 4 (November 1988): 676, argues that both Renouvier and T. Ribot had written important essays on Schopenhauer that made an impact on Durkheim. See also Mestrovic, “Durkheim’s Renovated Rationalism and the Idea that ‘Collective

Life Is Only Made of Representations,'” *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* 6 (1985): 199–216, “Durkheim, Schopenhauer and the Relationship Between Goals and Means,” *Sociological Inquiry* 58, 2 (Spring 1988): 163–181, “Searching for the Starting Points of Scientific Inquiry: Durkheim’s *Rules of Sociological Method* and Schopenhauer’s Philosophy,” *Sociological Inquiry* 59, 3 (Summer 1989): 267–286, “Rethinking the Will and Idea of Sociology in the Light of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy,” *British Journal of Sociology* 40, 2 (June 1989): 271–293, and “Moral Theory Based on the ‘Heart’ versus the ‘Mind’: Schopenhauer’s and Durkheim’s Critiques of Kantian Ethics,” *Sociological Review* 37, 3 (August 1989): 431–457. Bryan Turner, following Mestrovic, has written in “Interpreting Emile Durkheim,” the preface to the second edition of *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, trans. Cornelia Brookfield (London: Routledge, 1996), that Durkheim’s turn to German philosophy, especially to Schopenhauer over Kant, was “to place particular weight on Durkheim’s sociology as a science of morality” (p. xxvi).

91. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 1, trans.

E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), p. 3.

92. Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, p. 46.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

94. *Ibid.*

95. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

96. The next line in this chapter of *The Rules of Sociological Method* on the normal and pathological can only raise scholarly eyebrows. In a startling and provocative sentence he postulates that he does not once and for all deny the eventual applicability of social philosophy and ethics to science. That is, the ethics embedded in Marxist or neoclassical ethics is an attempt to grasp the essence of social reality which “can be proved only at a more advanced stage of science” (pp. 54–55). This juxtaposing of values and structures represents a dialectical science (p. 74). At this level of abstraction, the healthy characteristics of an organism are logically deduced from the average type and refer to characteristics such as essence, nature, and being.

97. Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. George Simpson (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 33.

98. *Ibid.*, p. 34. The ethical basis for social criticism lies in the cultural ideals of society articulated in religion, law, morality, economics, politics, and so forth. It is only with members of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory that the issue of the flattening and depoliticization of cultural ideals is considered seriously. What happens when substantive rationality is reduced to formal rationality and technical reason (Weber)? What happens with the approach of a one-dimensional society (Marcuse)? And what happens when social integration is reduced to functional integration and culture is colonized under the needs of administration, rationalization, and systems functioning (Habermas)? Ideals are displaced by the social imperatives of efficiency, stability, and equilibrium of the social order; the ideals disappear as a means for social critique.

99. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

100. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, vol. 1: *Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim*, pp. 318–324; and Jürgen Habermas, “The Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to Social Philosophy,” in *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 41–81.

101. Emile Durkheim, "Value Judgments and Judgments of Reality," in *Sociology and Philosophy*, trans. D. F. Pocock, intro. J. G. Peristiany (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 90–91.

102. Wallwork also examines the relationship between Durkheim's early and later ethical theory in *Durkheim: Morality and Milieu*, pp. 159–181. Durkheim takes the position that a positive sociology must not be a slave to the fetishism of facts but must include an analysis and judgment about the social ideals contained in religion, morality, law, economics, and art. "Sociology cannot deal with the ideal except as a science" (Durkheim, "Value Judgments and Judgments of Reality," p. 96) since ideals are only manifested through material objects (p. 94).

103. Durkheim, "Value Judgments and Judgments of Reality," p. 93. This is very similar to the positions taken earlier by Marx and Weber: Karl Marx, *Civil War in France: The Paris Commune* (New York: International Publishers, 1972), pp. 61–62; and Max Weber, "The National State and Economic Policy" (*Freiburg Inaugural Address of 1895*), trans. Ben Fowkes, *Economy and Society* 9 (1980): 440. Both see the need for integrating social ideals (value judgments) and social science but are critical of imposing these ideals from the outside in the form of Platonic rationalism, Kantian morality, technocratic rationality, and class power.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

105. Emile Durkheim, "Introduction to Ethics," in *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*, trans. H. L. Sutcliffe, ed. W. S. F. Pickering (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 82.

106. W. S. F. Pickering, introduction to *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*, p. 23.

107. Durkheim, "Introduction to Ethics," p. 89.

108. Durkheim is aware that individual action is influenced by "vulgar and base" motives and that there is a distortion of morality in everyday life. He states quite explicitly that the search for the moral ideal is not concerned with the unnatural or deformed that result from an imperfect expression of the ideal in everyday practice and behavior. What is missing in Durkheim's social theory is a theory of ideology and false consciousness (Marx), rationalization of reason by technical or formal rationality (Weber), and the repression of needs and thoughts in the unconscious (Freud). They will be incorporated into a later theory of symbolic interaction and distorted communications (Habermas).

109. Pickering, introduction to *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*, p. 19.

110. Emile Durkheim, "Review 'Lévy-Bruhl, *La Morale et la science des moeurs*,'" in *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*, trans. H. L. Sutcliffe, ed. W. S. F. Pickering (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 32; and Pickering's introduction to *Durkheim*, pp. 18–21. Durkheim views science and art as the key components in the formation of a theory of education. Art in this context does not refer to technique (*techné*) which for Durkheim applies only to the application of the natural sciences. Art refers to ethics. See, "Review 'Albert Bayet, *La Morale scientifique: essai sur les applications morales des sciences sociologiques*,'" in *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*, p. 38; Durkheim, "Introduction to Ethics," pp. 89–92; and Pickering, introduction, pp. 19–20.

111. Joseph Neyer, "Individualism and Socialism," in *Emile Durkheim, 1858–1917: A Collection of Essays*, ed. Kurt Wolff (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1960), p. 56; and Frank Pearce, *The Radical Durkheim* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 57.

112. Stedman Jones, *Durkheim Reconsidered*, p. 200. She also has a useful section in this work on Durkheim's use of Kant's critical method and theory of representation as the basis for his renovated rationalism (pp. 63–87).

113. Emile Durkheim, "A Discussion on the Notion of Social Equality," in *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*, trans. H. L. Sutcliffe, ed. W. S. F. Pickering (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 66.

114. This relationship between explanation and justification is the basis for Durkheim's theory of moral ideals and social equality. He is critical of basing social critique on pure moralizing and philosophical speculation divorced from the institutional realities of society. There is a similarity here with Marx's ethical argument in the "Critique of the Gotha Program" in *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ed. Lewis Feuer (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1959), where he comments: "Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and the cultural development conditioned by it" (p. 119).

115. For a more comprehensive overview of the role of representations in Weber's theory of knowledge, see McCarthy, *Classical Horizons*, p. 187, n. 46.

116. Durkheim's Epistemology: Schmaus, in *Rethinking Durkheim and His Tradition*, details the theory of categories in Kantian epistemology and Durkheimian social theory. Schmaus stresses the difference between Kant and Durkheim by introducing the critical literature in Kantian scholarship which rejected key elements of Kant's theory of categories. He notes that Johann Georg Hamann in his *Metakritik über den Purismus der reinen Vernunft* (1784) rejects the distinction between the forms of intuition of time and space and the categories of the understanding, that is, the distinction between the sensibility and the understanding (p. 39). Schmaus notes that Cousin, the founder of eclectic spiritualism in France, makes a similar observation. Schopenhauer, too, will offer a comprehensive criticism of the categories of the understanding in *The World as Will and Representation*, appendix: *Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy*, pp. 415–534. Schmaus makes the distinction between Kant's and Durkheim's theory of categories continuously throughout his work as he stresses the former's logical and transcendental method and deduction and the latter's sociological use of the categories as a means for organizing experience based on social organization (space), rhythm of daily life (time), moral force of the community (causality), and cultural values (collective conscience). According to Schmaus, Durkheim challenged the psychological interpretation of Kantian categories that was prevalent among the French eclectic spiritualists of his time.

Warfield Rawls argues, in "Durkheim's Epistemology," that Durkheim's theory of knowledge had been lost because it was confused with his later sociology of knowledge helping to pave the way for the "two-Durkheim thesis"—early positivism and later idealism. A revival of his Kantian epistemology undermines any dualism between positivism and idealism in his writings (pp. 468–477). On this issue, see John Allcock, introduction to Emile Durkheim, *Pragmatism and Sociology*, trans. J. C. Whitehouse, ed. John Allcock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

According to Warfield Rawls, Durkheim's social constructivism undermined any claims to positivism in his early works (p. 476). She also views Durkheim as having solved "Hume's dilemma" of the objective validity of concepts (substance and causality): "If Durkheim secured a basis for the concept of causality in direct experience of the social, he achieved something of great importance that has serious implications for current methodological and theoretical debates" (p. 442). Hume rejected any foundation of science based on experience or reason. However, Durkheim claims to have found the origins of the categories of the mind in an empirical analysis of the organization, social practice, and perceptions of totemic societies (pp. 442–446). For a general introduction to the importance of Durkheim's radical appropriation of nominalist pragmatism and its underlying Kantian epistemology for his social theory of knowledge in his 1913–1914 lectures at the Sorbonne, see McCarthy, *Classical Horizons*, pp. 124–131. Finally, for a further analysis of Durkheim's theory of categories, see Terry Godlove, "Epistemology in Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 24 (1986): 341–401; Robert Alun Jones, "Ambivalent Cartesians: Durkheim, Montesquieu, and Method," *American Journal of Sociology* 100 (1994): 1–39; and Deniz Tekiner, "German Idealist Foundations of Durkheim's Sociology and Teleology of Knowledge," *Theory and Science* 3, 1 (Winter 2002): 1–8.

117. Leszek Kolakowski, *The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought*, trans. Norbert Guterman (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1968), pp. 31–46.

118. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, in *The Empiricists* (Garden City, NY: Dolphin Books, 1961), p. 421.

119. Peter Hamilton, *Knowledge and Social Structure: An Introduction to the Classical Argument in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 103–119.

120. Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 21–22. According to Schmaus, *Rethinking Durkheim and His Tradition*, there is a qualitative difference between Durkheim's and Kant's theory of the categories: "Whereas for Kant the categories are the logically necessary conditions of the unity of the object of agreement, for Durkheim the categories provide a common language or medium for thought and expression. For Durkheim they are thus psychological or social conditions in the empirical realm rather than logical conditions of universal judgments, as they are for Kant" (p. 54). Schmaus stresses that Durkheim viewed the categories as cultural and historical social representations that were derived from social experience—"from our experience of the patterns, rhythms, and forces of collective life"—and thus could not have the same transcendental or logical force as they did for Kant (pp. 17 and 121). Durkheim does not emphasize the logical importance of categories, but the role they play in facilitating communicative interaction and social life.

121. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, p. 27. Durkheim's Theory of Social Categories: For a useful summary list of the secondary literature which examines the philosophical origins of Durkheim's theory of the categories, see Schmaus, *Rethinking Durkheim and His Tradition*, p. 155, n. 13. Schmaus breaks with the tradition that Durkheim relied upon two main groups—the French neo-Kantianism of Renouvier and Hamelin—see Stedman Jones, *Durkheim Reconsidered*; Donald

Nielsen, *Three Faces of God* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); John Brooks, *The Eclectic Legacy* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1998); and Terry Godlove, "Is Space a Concept? Kant, Durkheim, and French Neo-Kantianism," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 32, 4 (1996): 441–455—and Kant himself—see Emile Benoît-Smullyan, "The Sociologism of Emile Durkheim and his School," in *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, ed. Harry Elmer Barnes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 499–537; Mary Douglas, *Implicit Meanings* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975); Anthony Giddens, *Emile Durkheim* (New York: Viking Press, 1978); Robert Alun Jones, "Demythologizing Durkheim," *Knowledge and Society* 5 (1984): 63–83; W. Paul Vogt and Robert Alun Jones, "Durkheim's Defense of *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*," *Knowledge and Society* 5 (1984): 45–62; Steven Collins, "Categories, Concepts, or Predicaments?" in *The Category of the Person*, ed. M. Carrithers, S. Collins, and S. Lukes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 168–228; Steven Lukes, *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work*; Stjepan Mestrovic, "Reappraising Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* in the Context of Schopenhauer's Philosophy," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 28, 3 (1989): 255–272; and William Pickering, "The Origins of Conceptual Thinking in Durkheim," in *Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Moralist*, ed. Stephen P. Turner (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 52–70.

122. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 25.

123. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

124. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

125. Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, *Primitive Classification*, trans., ed., and intro. Rodney Needham (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 82.

126. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

CONCLUSION: DREAMS OF CLASSICAL REASON

1. Theodore Schatzki, "Social Science in Society," in *Making Political Science Matter: Debating Knowledge, Research, and Method*, ed. Sanford Schram and Brian Caterino (New York: New York University Press, 2006), p. 126. Classical social theory is an ethical, critical, and historical science. Marx defines historical science as the study of political economy, history, culture, structures, functions, and the logic and dialectic of capital. In a very similar way, Weber views science and objectivity in terms of cultural meaning, historical causes, structural and policy consequences, and dialectical contradictions, while Durkheim views it as a form of cultural idealism, functionalism, hermeneutics, and moral contradictions. All three understand historical science as combining elements of history, social critique, dialectics, and the structural and functional analysis of the institutions of modern industrial capitalism for the ultimate purpose of establishing a practical theory of social justice modeled on Aristotle's theory of virtue, *phronesis*, and distributive and reciprocal justice.

2. Bent Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again*, trans. Steven Sampson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 162.

3. Jürgen Habermas, *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jerry Stark (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988), pp. 35–36. Habermas sees the need to supplement interpretive sociology

with a critical functionalism and depth hermeneutics that incorporate “subjective meaning” into the structures of “objective meaning,” that is, into the structures of power and domination within the economy and state, and, in the process, results in distorted communication and repressed needs (p. 187). These same issues already exist in the classical tradition.

4. For an analysis of problems related to the great divide within social science and the relationship between the methods of understanding and explanation in Marx and Weber, see Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 25–63; Guy Oakes, *Weber and Rickert: Concept Formation in the Cultural Science* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988), pp. 145–152; and George E. McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason: Weber, Habermas, and the Methodological Disputes in German Sociology* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 174–190 and 207–208, n. 92.

5. H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890–1930* (New York: Vintage Books, 1958); Fritz Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); Otto Stammer, ed., *Max Weber and Sociology Today*, trans. Kathleen Morris (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971); Theodor Adorno, et al., *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1976); Richard Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976) and *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1993); Fred Dallmayr and Thomas McCarthy, *Understanding and Social Inquiry* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977); Thomas Wiley, *Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860–1914* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1978); Fred Dallmayr, *Twilight of Subjectivity: Contributions to a Post-Individualist Theory of Politics* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981); Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Habermas, *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*; Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr, *The Communicative Ethics Controversy* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1990); David Rasmussen, ed., *Universalism vs. Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1990); Samuel Bowles, David Gordon, and Thomas Weiskopf, *After the Wasteland: A Democratic Economics for the Year 2000* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990); Harvey Kaye, *The British Marxist Historians: An Introductory Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter*; McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason*; Ian Shapiro, Rogers Smith, and Tarek Masoud, eds., *Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ian Shapiro, *The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Keith Topper, *The Disorder of Political Inquiry* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); and Sanford Schram and Brian Caterino, eds., *Making Political Science Matter: Debating Knowledge, Research, and Method* (New York: New York University Press, 2006).

6. It is Habermas who introduces Freud and psychoanalysis as important elements in depth hermeneutics to recover lost and repressed meaning in both social

action and metatheory, that is, in both the substance and logic of social science. Dreams and meaning are not exhausted in the intentions and actions of conscious life. Due to the reification and alienation of modern political economy, individual needs, social ideals, and intersubjective meaning are suppressed. Since mainstream sociology is almost exclusively methods-driven by the imperatives of empirical-analytic science, questions critical of the values and institutions of capitalism cannot be articulated and are repressed into the unconscious by the logic of positivist inquiry. See Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 214–273 and *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*, pp. 171–189; and McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason*, pp. 299–327.

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