MINORITIES AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

From War to Peace

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction. Minority History: From War to Peace

Hannah Ewence and Tim Grady

In 2012, Britain's then Prime Minister, David Cameron, gave a short speech in London's Imperial War Museum. Standing in the shadow of Paul Nash's suitably desolate "Menin Road", Cameron proceeded to outline the government's plans for marking the centenary of the First World War. He promised a transformation of the Museum's own Great War galleries, a series of national remembrance events, as well as financial support for community and schools educational programmes. "Our duty towards these commemorations is clear", concluded Cameron. It is "to honour those who served, to remember those who died, and to ensure that the lessons learnt live with us forever".[1] The rhetorical dressing that surrounded Cameron's speech contained many of the well-drilled elements of a popular British narrative of the First World War. At its heart, Cameron's was a story of brave "Tommies" fighting in a futile—yet ultimately "uplifting"—conflict in the mud of the Western Front.[2]

Trench warfare in the fields of France and Belgium was of course a significant element of the war, but it was merely one facet of a much larger

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history. Although Cameron managed a passing reference to the troops of the British Empire, by which was meant the Dominions, there was no real sense of the First World War as having been a global conflict.[3] However, even more startling for a leader of a distinctly multicultural nation, was Cameron's decidedly narrow sense of British—or for that matter French or German—national identity. According to the historical narrative carved out in Cameron's speech, the conflict had been a clash between almost homogenous nations with apparently fixed populations. Yet, the countries that went to war in August 1914 all consisted of a smorgasbord of ethnicities, religions and nationalities; a demographic hotchpotch that became more varied still as the war played out. This was as true of Britain as it was of Russia, Germany and of course the patchwork Austro-Hungarian Empire.[4]

Across the centenary period, David Cameron has not been alone in disseminating a worryingly incomplete version of the First World War. Since 2014, the proliferation of new exhibitions, television documentaries and even plays have, all too often, reverted to "type"; that is, fixating upon the drama, horror and human sacrifice of the war but relating it only or primarily to the very limited and limiting conceptualisation of "heroes", "victims" and "villains" as those espoused by the former British Prime Minister.[5] There has been in these cultural and intellectual platforms, as in Cameron's speech, a disappointing lack of innovation, vibrancy and diversity. This volume, therefore, sees its task as a crucial one: to move away from the tendency for "one dimensional", exclusionary histories of the conflict to focus instead on the experiences of "others" typically marginalised within the dominant narrative: non-"white" and/or non-Christian (often Protestant) soldiers and civilians, military prisoners and civilian internees, migrants, refugees and others seen not to "belong" within the tight strictures of the European nation-state.

A more befitting and all-encompassing term for such a diverse array of groups (as well as one which reflects the terminology adopted by academia and contemporary society alike in recent times) is "minorities". Although clearly much contested, the term "minority" as used here is less about group size, but rather about rights and access to power. The most visible sign of the war's many minority histories comes from the involvement of troops from the European powers' colonial empires. The British could draw on men from as far afield as India, Australia and South Africa, while the French more readily recruited soldiers from its East and

West African colonies. Within the established populations of all the belligerent countries, there was also considerable national, religious and ethnic diversity. Poles and Danes, for example, fought in the German army, while Irish soldiers joined the side of the British. Protestant, Catholic and Jewish men also added to the multiplicity of religions within the main armies.

All of these minority groups, whether religious, national or ethnic, found their loyalties questioned during the course of the war. This was most obviously the case with German Jews, who suffered the indignity of a military census in late 1916.[6] Other armies were not immune from discrimination and prejudices. The Irish in the British army, for example, were all too often portrayed as "excitable, gullible and incorrigibly ill disciplined", an attitude that only hardened after the 1916 Easter Rising.[7] During the war, the lives of civilians, who happened to be from a minority background, also came under immense pressure. Britain's German communities were the target of violent riots, while civilian internment became a global phenomenon during the course of the conflict.[8] The starting point of this volume, therefore, are these multiple "minority" histories of the First World War. The lives of these individuals constituted a crucial part of the conflict and as such should be seen as a central part of its history too.

The Centenary and the Politics of Integration and Separatism

The First World War, as the historical literature has increasingly emphasised, has to be written as more than just a history of battle; in each of the belligerent powers, societies as a whole were mobilised for conflict.[9] It was hard to discern the full reach of the conflict, however, from Cameron's speech of 2012, which focused almost entirely on "the sheer scale of the sacrifice", meaning military casualties. Indeed, when Cameron fired the starting gun for Britain's centennial commemorations, he did so by drawing on a host of old clichés. He spoke of the "excited" young men of 1914, for whom heading to the front was apparently a "rite of passage". There was certainly no mention here of the fears, curious crowds or anti-war protests that had actually shaped Europe's last summer of peace.[10] From the apparent excitement of the war's outbreak, Cameron moved rapidly to the so-called Christmas truce of 1914 and the mythologised

game of football that the British and German troops are supposed to have enjoyed.[11] The remainder of the speech sped through a number of the big name battles—Gallipoli, the Somme, Jutland and Passchendaele—before arriving at the 1918 armistice. Shining the spotlight on military losses, as well as valorising the war dead, was perhaps apt given that the setting was the Imperial War Museum, but the other theatres of conflict were noticeable by their very absence. Not only was the war at home missing, but so too was any discussion of the devastating impact of the First World War on civilians in Europe and beyond.

In Russia alone, the fighting displaced some seven million people; elsewhere Italians fled from Austria-Hungary and Belgians escaped to both Britain and the Netherlands in the face of the German advance.[12] The fate of those unable to flee was all too often internment. Over the course of the conflict, Britain and its Empire, Germany, Austria-Hungary and the United States all introduced policies of civilian incarnation.[13] Another crucial aspect of the war's history for civilians was that of food supplies. Civilians in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular, faced near starvation conditions in some urban areas as dwindling food supplies in the second half of the war hit home.[14] Later in the conflict, the influenza epidemic brought more misery as it swept through already weakened populations to claim more than 30 million lives.[15]

Against the backdrop of frontline slaughter and home front chaos, it is difficult to find too many positive transformations that stemmed from war. Cameron, though, gave it his best shot. He highlighted medical and technological developments as well as the strength of frontline comradeship or as he termed it: "mateship". However, the then Prime Minister's further suggestion that the First World War ushered in the "beginnings of ethnic minorities" being given "recognition, respect and equality" was far more disingenuous. The sinking of the South African troopship, SS Mendi, in February 1917, which Cameron cited, was certainly not a shining beacon of growing recognition.[16] Until the mid 1990s, when Queen Elizabeth II unveiled a new Mendi memorial in Soweto, the deaths of 607 black members of the South African Native Labour Corps barely registered in Britain.[17] Similarly the death of Walter Tull—another Cameron example—does more to highlight the persistence of prejudice than any upsurge in "recognition, respect and equality". Tull, who was one of the first black British professional footballers, lost his life on the Western Front in 1918. Celebrated in recent years as an example of

diversity, during the war he was actually passed over for decorations because of the racial underpinnings of the British army.[18]

The Socialist President of France, François Hollande, and the centre-right German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, also gave keynote addresses on the eve of the First World War centenary. In contrast to Cameron, both Hollande and Merkel tried to move beyond viewing the war entirely through a national lens and instead situated the conflict more in terms of European remembrance. These choices no doubt pointed towards British Euroscepticism, which culminated in the popular nationalism of "Brexit", while conversely they also highlighted France and Germany's more hopeful desire for European integration. For both Hollande and Merkel, then, the very antithesis of the First World War was European integration and closer ties across borders. "The European example shows us that people and nations are in a position to learn from history", Merkel suggested, before concluding—perhaps with one eye on Britain—that "a key lesson is: dialogue and integration instead of separation and a return to nationalism".[19]

Yet, despite their talk of viewing this history on a European level, the two leaders—like Cameron—still drew on particular aspects of the conflict that chimed with their own nation. Hollande, for example, spoke extensively about the First Battle of the Marne that had "saved France" in September 1914, while Merkel reflected on the horrors that the German military had inflicted on Europe during the course of two World Wars. In all of this discussion, there was again little space for the history of the First World War's other participants. Hollande may have mentioned "430,000 soldiers from the colonies", but he reduced these to merely another group of French soldiers. "They participated in it [the war] for France", Hollande added, which minimalised the complexities of the role-played by thousands of French colonial troops in the First World War.[20]

Locating Minorities in a Local Context

During the First World War centenary period, neither the French, nor the German, nor the British governments have brought much innovation to the way in which the conflict is understood or interpreted. Rather than the national, it has actually been local initiatives that have done the most to break free from existing narratives of the war. In Germany, for example, both museums and community groups have revisited the wartime experiences of German Jews with considerable success. Munich's Jewish

Museum led the way in this respect with its impressive exhibition: "War! Jews between the Lines".[21] This complemented a smaller exhibition on display in Berlin's Jewish Museum.[22] Further East, in Magdeburg, students at the city's university uncovered little-known regional histories of Jewish soldiers, while the Hatikva in Dresden have started a detailed project to document historic sites of memory for Jewish soldiers in Saxony and beyond.[23] In France, meanwhile, national, ethnic and religious minorities have also generally made an appearance in regional exhibitions on the war. In Charente, for example, the arrival of North African troops to Rochefort has been highlighted, while a small exhibition on Jewish experiences of the conflict has also been touring.[24]

Britain has witnessed a very similar pattern, with local projects showing far more willingness to engage with the minority experience in the conflict than grander national schemes. Cheshire in North West England provides an excellent example of this local work. As a fairly affluent, largely rural, region, there would appear at first glance little to uncover in the way of alternative histories; the county is certainly a long way from multicultural London, Manchester or Birmingham. However, a number of small, local projects have managed to free themselves from deep-rooted assumptions about Cheshire's Great War.[25] Stockport Museum made the first foray into this field with a ground-breaking exhibition on the war, which used oral histories and personal objects to draw out local experiences of internment, refugee aid and deportation.[26] A few miles down the road in Dunham Massey, the National Trust used their property to highlight the lives of wounded Canadian soldiers who had recuperated in Cheshire when the Stamford's family home had been turned into a military hospital.[27] In Chester itself, parishioners at St Werburgh's Catholic Church exhibited the history of Belgian refugees who had prayed in the Church during the war, while members of the University of Chester organised the "Diverse Narratives" project, which explores the wartime history of a range of minority groups who either lived in Cheshire or ended up in the county during the war.[28]

The success of small, local projects at drawing out diverse histories of the First World War surely rests on their proximity to events on the ground. Often these community groups did not set out to explore a minority history of the war, but as they began to investigate their local environment, these other histories emerged. Indeed, this is what happened with the parishioners of St Werburgh's. Their investigations into

the Church's war memorial led them by chance to the history of Belgian refugees. The innovations on a local level, however, do rather highlight the failings of national efforts during the First World War centenary period. Rather than embracing the public's interest in new narratives of the war, politicians in Britain, France and Germany have been content to offer a more comfortable and more familiar history of the war. As Cameron proved, it was easier to feed popular nationalist sentiment with a history of military valour than to challenge a popular view of the First World War with a more diverse and complex history.

Minority Experiences and the Discipline of Military History

More inclusive local histories of the First World, whether on display in Cheshire, Magdeburg or Munich, clearly did not take their lead from state-led initiatives. But at the same time, they were also not driven by developments in the broader field of military history. The discipline itself developed from a strategic need to examine examples of previous battle tactics and operational approaches.[29] Typical early work on the First World War included official histories of the conflict from the nations involved as well as general reviews of battles and diplomatic actions. These early practitioners of the military history of the First World War certainly needed to consider the fighting soldier, but in doing so they had very little requirement to explore a soldier's individual background. The real historical actors remained the generals, commanders and politicians that had directed the war.[30]

The emergence of the new military history in the late 1960s brought about many major historiographical shifts. Social historical approaches, working with ideas of gender, class and memory, came in to replace the tactical obsessions of earlier studies.[31] John Keegan, for example, stated in his monumental *Face of Battle* that he wanted to move beyond tactics, logistics and generals to consider instead those men who had to "control their fears, staunch their wounds [and] go to their deaths".[32] Yet in Keegan's study—and those that followed in his footsteps—the soldiers still remained as either "British infantrymen" or "German gunners".[33] The picture was very similar in Richard Holmes's *Firing Line*, which explored the way in which war shaped the lives of combatants. The men may have been named, but they were still assigned simply to one single

national state. In his detailed sketch of the German army's westward advance in 1914, for example, Holmes used the memoirs of a Stephen Westman to show the physical toils of days of marching. While Westman neatly illustrated this point, in all this there was no mention of the fact that he was actually a German-Jewish soldier.[34] The same was true for other new military histories; minority actors finally emerged, but they were rarely identified as such.[35]

It should be clear by now, therefore, that it was not the discipline of military history that bequeathed us the more innovative local studies of the First World War. Instead, much of the credit for these new approaches must rest with a small, though growing, body of work that has sought to combine ethnic and minority studies with the history of conflict. Surely the most influential in this respect has been Panikos Panayi's edited volume: *Minorities in Wartime*.[36] In this wide-ranging collection, the contributors explored issues of internment, displacement and genocide across Europe, North America and Australia during the two World Wars. One of the volume's most important findings was that it drew out differences in the way that minorities experienced conflict. On the one hand, minority groups suffered increased violence and hostility, while on the other opportunities sometimes emerged for groups to improve their position in society through their wartime contribution. What determined minority experiences, according to Panayi, were deeper "traditions of intolerance" in a given wartime society, as well as the circumstances of each particular minority. Clearly, during a period of conflict so-called "enemy aliens" faced far greater difficulties than neutral or "friendly" minorities.[37]

Panayi's volume stemmed from a conference held at Keele University in 1990. In the intervening quarter of a century, a large number of specialist studies have followed in Panayi's footsteps. The vast majority of this new body of work on war and minorities has concentrated on one specific group and often combined this with a focus on one single country too. As a result, comprehensive studies now exist of African, Indian and West Indian servicemen who served alongside the British forces in the First World War.[38] Similarly the literature on France's colonial troops, including their interactions with Germany, has also boomed in recent years.[39] These works have been joined by specific studies of Chinese labourers, Jewish soldiers and black African servicemen in the British, French and German spheres of the conflict.[40]

Significant new histories of Britain's black community during the war have also added to the richness of recent work.[41]

Another vast area of research has concentrated on the many national minorities who experienced the war either as "friendly" or "enemy" aliens within the main belligerent powers. The Irish in the British military and Poles, Danes and soldiers from Alsace and Lorraine in the German army have been the main focus of historical writing.[42] Turning to the so-called "enemy" aliens, the most important development has been the careful reconstruction of the life histories of civilian internees, who ended up behind wire in all of the main belligerent countries.[43] Collectively, these studies, whether on the experiences of groups, nations or on the victims of restrictive wartime policies, have helped to shed considerable light on the history of minorities during the First World War, although for the most part their focus has been on military service rather than on lives on the home front.

Broader considerations in the model of Panayi's original volume, which explore the wartime experiences of a range of different minorities, have been much thinner on the ground.[44] One incredibly rich study that has bucked this trend is Santanu Das's examination of the ways in which racial thinking shaped the experience of different racial, ethnic and national groups both at the front and behind the lines. The sheer breadth of Das's volume, which sees histories of the Irish in the First World War mingle with those of colonial prisoners of war and Jamaican war veterans, allows for points of convergence and difference to shine through.[45] To mention one of many interlocking themes: two contrasting essays—one on wounded Indian soldiers and one on the Chinese in Belgium—reveal that local responses to these outsider groups often went beyond racial prejudices. Indeed, on many occasions British nurses and local Belgians approached these groups with sympathy and care.[46]

This current volume also recognises the epistemological advantages of comparative history. For this reason, it includes case studies covering a range of geographical areas and minority group. However, in contrast to both Panayi's and Das's studies, this volume concentrates solely on European examples. This allows for more detailed coverage of one geographical area, thereby providing a model that could be applied in future studies to other theatres of the conflict. Even then, with such a large range of population groups involved in the European sphere alone, the volume can only ever touch on some of the many and varied minority experiences.

From War to Peace

Despite the innovations of this large and growing body of literature on minorities and the First World War, a temporal break tends to run through many of these studies, with narratives concentrating mainly on the war years themselves. Michelle Moyd's careful exploration of the *Askari* who fought with the German forces in German East Africa, for example, comes to a close with the surrender of their commander, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, in November 1918. Other than a few concluding sentences, there is little indication of how these African soldiers returned from war or attempted to reconstruct their lives in the wake of conflict.[47] Other important studies of minorities and the First World War also conclude around the time of the 1918 armistice. Richard Fogarty's detailed history of France's colonial soldiers in the war tip toes into the early post-war years with a discussion of how the conflict reshaped notions of citizenship, but then does not go much further.[48] George Morton-Jack's *Indian Army on the Western Front* ends even earlier. Presumably because many of the Indian army's infantry divisions departed for Mesopotamia in late 1915, the account ends at this juncture.[49] Yet, there is a long post-combat history of return, reintegration and re-civilisation of the Indian soldiers that would have been fascinating to explore.[50]

By ending their narratives in 1918 or shortly after, this existing body of work on minorities in wartime adheres to the notion of rupture.[51] This is the idea that the First World War marked a distinct break in modern history or as George Kennan so famously labelled it: "*the* great seminal catastrophe of this century".[52] But the practice of dividing the past into tight boundaries has long been challenged. Postmodernist thinkers, such as Michel Foucault and Fredric Jameson, critiqued longstanding attempts to impose historical metanarratives.[53] From a different direction, the influential work of Reinhart Koselleck, Peter Osborne and others laid the groundwork for a more general move beyond clearly defined historical periodisation.[54] This is particularly true of the history of conflict. When the fighting stops, the impact of war never simply vanishes; both the victors and the vanquished need to find way to rebuild societies and individual lives.[55]

Following this line of thinking, histories of the First World War have also sought to throw off the shackles of restrictive periodisation. Inspired in part by Eric Hobsbawm's concept of the "short twentieth century", historical writing has explored in detail the long-range legacies of conflict.

Effectively the First World War becomes part of a "new thirty years war" spanning from 1914 through until 1945.[56] This approach has been at its most effective when the focus has been on Central and Eastern Europe. These regions not only had to deal with the collapse of old empires and the emergence of new successor states, but often also with a prolonged period of violence. As Robert Gerwarth has recently noted, Britain and France may have enjoyed an interwar period, but for other parts of Europe, particularly further East, "there was no peace, only continuous violence".[57] Without such an obvious sense of continuity from the brutality of war to a violent peace, historical writing on Britain and France has been more cautious in stretching the First World War boundaries much beyond the Treaty of Versailles or even the armistice.[58]

A reluctance to explore the tumultuous transition from war to peace is also a notable feature of works on wartime minorities. One of the few studies to consider how this process affected minority groups also comes from Gerwarth's pen. Working in tandem with Erez Manela, Gerwarth's volume deftly explores the main powers' use of their colonial subjects in fighting the World War.[59] Crucially, Gerwarth and Manela's contributors push their narratives into the immediate post-war years, which allows scope for exploring how the war altered imperial relations. The demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire—as one of the volume's many examples—left a vacuum in frontier regions, which quickly filled with violence. In these spaces, as Peter Haslinger maintains, members of the Jewish communities suffered increased persecution and even fell victim to pogrom-like excesses.[60]

As with Gerwarth and Manela's volume, this current book also explores how minority groups experienced the transition from war to peace. In contrast, however, the focus is not on imperial structures and the politics of war, although these do of course feature, but rather on the micro level. The individual chapters explore the lives and experiences of minority groups both in the armed forces and on the home front, in each case looking at how these people manoeuvred from being part of a society at war to one at peace. This approach throws fresh light on the wider history of the First World War.

In making this transition, members of minority groups obviously faced the same emotional, physical and economic hardships as all other wartime participants. They had to cope with loss and absence, the wounded faced a future of pain and discomfort as they attempted to live with their injuries, and the impact of financial turmoil was particularly debilitating. Yet, there

was also a raft of additional challenges that affected minorities as they moved from war to peace. In the wake of war, old empires crumbled, borders shifted and new nations emerged. Amidst this upheaval, not only were new national minorities created, but existing minorities also struggled against the tide of uncertainty. In the new Polish state, for example, the bonds that had previously tied Galician Jews, Poles and Ukrainians together in the Habsburg army had all but vanished in the post-war world.[61]

Even supposedly far more stable regions struggled to return to the status quo of pre-war times. The conflict had had the effect of narrowing societies, as a fear of the enemy led to the creation of new outsiders.[62] In Britain, for example, anti-Germanism, which marked a dangerous high with the Lusitania riots, spread to affect other minorities, with the Irish and Jewish communities worst hit.[63] Once society had been constricted in this way, it proved very difficult to revitalise older structures at the war's end. One of the major issues that this volume explores, therefore, is the extent to which wartime prejudice continued post-war and whether the conflict permanently altered inter-group relations as a result.

It is important to emphasise that the impact of war differed between particular minority groups, but also between individuals within these groupings. There was certainly never a single war experience for minorities. The effect of war on a Jewish refugee fleeing the Eastern European war zone was clearly very different to the way in which a Sikh soldier serving in the Indian army might have experienced the war and its aftermath. In his original volume, Panikos Panayi applied three distinct categories to highlight these crucial differences. His first category—"enemy aliens"—drew in national minorities who found themselves suddenly on the wrong side as a result of war. German civilians living in Britain or France would be the prime example of this. The second category concerned those individuals who became outsiders as a result of wartime invasion. Germany's occupation of large parts of Eastern Europe during the First World War, for example, altered the local population's relationship to power. "Friendly" or "neutral" minorities was Panayi's third category, by which was meant refugees fleeing the conflict or religious and ethnic minorities fighting for one of the larger powers.[64]

While these categories are helpful for attempting to differentiate between experiences, it must be recognised that there is always likely to be considerable slippage between them. Individuals could easily move from one category to another during the course of the war. Americans

living in Germany, for example, started out in 1914 as "neutral", potentially even "friendly", minorities, but ended the conflict as "enemy aliens". Similarly, Russian Jews living in Britain should have been a "friendly" minority, but public hostility led first to violent riots and then later to state pressure on immigrant Jews to enlist.[65] Despite the inherent artificiality of fixed categorisations, there are still many advantages in trying to differentiate between a wide range of wartime experiences. With this point in mind, the current volume utilises the terms "friendly minorities" and "enemy aliens" to prefix the first two sections: "'Friendly' Minorities in War and Peace" and "The Wartime 'Enemy': From Internment to Freedom". The final section—"Remembering and Forgetting Minorities in Wartime"—employs memory as a means of thinking through the place of minority groups in national memory cultures.

Section One—"Friendly" Minorities in War and Peace

The first section of this volume brings together three groups whose wartime experiences partly overlapped: Muslims, Jews and refugees. Broadly conceived, these three groups can be classed as having been "friendly" minorities. Indeed, such was their perceived status that both the Entente and the Central Powers courted all three groups at various points during the war. British and German Jews, for example, both tried to woo the Jewish communities in the United States to their respective national cause, while in a global war Muslims were crucial to the interests of Britain, France and Germany. Most visibly, the British and the French made considerable use of Muslim servicemen recruited from their colonial empires. The Germans may not have had the same access to this manpower resource, but they still managed to use Muslims in their propaganda campaigns, mainly as a means to portray themselves as the true protector of Muslim rights.[66] Finally, the British, French and Germans all claimed to be helping Belgian refugees to bolster their own self-image abroad, as in the face of battle, Belgians fled in all directions for refuge.[67]

Nonetheless, the focus in this section is on the particular areas of the war where Muslims, Jews and refugees were most affected by its course. Humayun Ansari opens up this discussion with an exploration of Muslims within Britain and its Empire, focusing in particular on civilian members of Britain's burgeoning Muslim community as well as on soldiers, who were mainly part of the Indian army. Ansari's interest

lies with the question of how Muslims attempted to balance a diverse range of loyalties during the conflict. Not only did many Muslims harbour an attachment to the British Empire, but at the same time they also had a strong bond to a wider Muslim community, which included the Ottoman Caliphate. What was crucial to this history was the fact that at the war's end, these divergent loyalties remained open. With uncertainty over the future shape of the Ottoman Empire, British Muslims sought to persuade the British government to take a lenient line in shaping a post-war Turkey. Once these divided loyalties were on show again, this "friendly" minority faced hostility both at home and abroad.

As Sarah Panter elaborates in her chapter, the Jewish communities in Britain and Germany also faced similar questions over their loyalties during the war. The debate in both countries revolved around the issue of military service and whether Jews were dedicating themselves fully to their respective country's military cause. These issues remained alive after the armistice, as "peace" failed to heal wounds opened up by war. Even the Jewish communities in a victorious nation like Britain continued to face discussions about the boundaries of citizenship. Panter concludes with the clear observation that for Jews, the lines between "victory" and "defeat" remained imprecise and hazy.

If the historiography is to be believed, then the situation for Belgian refugees should have been clearer cut; this was a group of "friendly" civilians who had fled the German invasion for the safety of Britain. However, Hannah Ewence's chapter argues that the circumstances on the ground were often very different, particularly as Europe negotiated the transition from war to peace. On the one hand, the British government was only too keen to present the Belgians as the victims of German atrocities, against which the British were fighting. On the other hand, though, the government also wanted to ensure that these refugees returned to their own homeland as quickly as possible. Indeed, at the war's end it put in place a repatriation process, which saw Britain emptied of Belgians within a matter of months. For these Belgian refugees, just as had been the case for Muslims and Jews, the idea of a "friendly" minority went through many incarnations during the course of the conflict. Crucially, as far as this volume is concerned, even the cessation of hostilities failed to resolve debates about citizenship and questions of group allegiances; these issues remained in flux well into the post-war years.

Section Two—The Wartime "Enemy": From Internment to Freedom

The focus of the second section is on minority groups that at first glance appeared to fit squarely within the definition of wartime "enemy". However, as was the case with the so-called "friendly" minorities, this was also a category with considerable fluidity. Stefan Manz's chapter, which opens the section, considers the fate of German civilians interned in the Stobs Camp in the Scottish Borders region. In the early months of the war, German men from across Scotland and parts of England, many of whom had lived in Britain for decades, were transformed into "enemy" aliens, uprooted from their families and deposited in Stobs. Not all of these internees were British based; some were sailors or others were civilians captured in the German colonies. Stobs, therefore, was itself one small part of a larger, international system of internment. At the war's end, "internment amnesia", as Manz terms it, took hold. The prisoners were repatriated to Germany and Stobs itself returned to being a British military facility. Yet, for those who had been branded a wartime "enemy", erasing this stigma proved much harder. Their lives in Britain had been destroyed, while their position in Germany—a country many had left as children—remained precarious.

If there was considerable perversion in defining German civilians as "enemy" aliens, then this should have been even more the case with Ottoman Armenians and Russian Jews. The two groups are the focus of Mark Levene's thoughtfully written, comparative chapter, which explores the creation of internal enemies. During the conflict, both the Russians and the Ottomans started to view their respective minority with increasing suspicion, which spiralled into violence, persecution and, in the case of the Armenians, genocide. For Levene, the transition from war to peace only served to cement decisions taken during the conflict. Far from admonishing Russia and Turkey for their actions, the international community saw a model on which to build. In the new successor states of Eastern Europe, homogeneity trumped diversity. Effectively, the war had shown that minorities could be turned into enemies and then eliminated through ethnic cleansing, all in the name of internal coherence.

The "enemy" in Jacqueline Jenkinson's chapter was also one of the war's making. She explores the wartime experiences of black, South Asian and Arab sailors who the British had employed to fill gaps in the labour force. With the move towards peace, these seamen suffered violent attack

at the hands of the local white British population. In total, violence, rioting and even murder touched all corners of the country, hitting nine major seaports alone during 1919. Jenkinson outlines a series of trigger factors for the riots, ranging from unemployment, reduced living standards and depravation, while also acknowledging race as a factor through the targeting of ethnic minorities. What Jenkinson's chapter demonstrates once again is the fluidity between wartime categories of "friends" and "enemies". For the victims of the 1919 riots, peace did not usher in a new period of stability, but rather deepened dividing lines that had started to emerge during the conflict.

Section Three—Remembering and Forgetting Minorities in Wartime

The third section of the volume works with memory to explore the place of minorities' war experiences in the post-war world. Collectively, the chapters that make up this section suggest that there was an increasing politicisation of "memory" after the war, as groups rightly demanded recognition of their own "sacrifices". David Murphy establishes a number of these themes with his chapter on anti-colonial politics in post-war France. Focusing on Lamine Senghor, a Senagelese soldier who had fought for the French during the conflict, Murphy explores how war veterans used their experiences in the political arena. The example of Senghor is particularly instructive. As a veteran of the frontline trenches, he was able to tap into a discourse of sacrifice and valour to push forward an anti-colonial agenda. Senghor demonstrates, then, how many minority groups left the war with very different expectations to those they had held in the pre-war world. As Murphy concludes, the experience and then the memory of the First World War provided some French colonial veterans with the means to challenge the seemingly fixed structures of imperial rule.

Tony Kushner's chapter—the second of the section—traces the workings of memory over an ever longer timeframe. Using the example of British Jewry, the chapter explores how the "memory" of service in the First World War has been applied to wider debates over citizenship and belonging. This appropriation, as Kushner argues, began during and immediately after the First World War, when Britain's Jewish communities documented their war record, using notions of loyalty and sacrifice in a defensive fashion. Historians were quick to jump on these patriotic ideals,

often looking for solid examples of Jewish military sacrifice as evidence of the deep-rootedness of British Jewry. This approach has had its most recent outing in the London Jewish Museum's First World War centenary exhibition: "For King and Country?" In his chapter, however, Kushner is very careful to explain that these tendencies are not unique to Jewish communities in Britain, but filter more generally into the ways in which historical writing has considered the role of minorities in conflict.

The final chapter in the section sees Tim Grady shine a light on the place of minorities within Britain and Germany's memory cultures for the war's military dead. The victims of war from both countries included large numbers of ethnic, religious and national servicemen; 12,000 Jews and 4,000 Danes lost their lives fighting in the German army, for example, while on the British side some 210,000 Irish and 75,000 Indians were also killed. During the war, these and other minority servicemen were generally commemorated with the other victims of the conflict; often consideration was also given to an individual's particular religious practices. However, in the post-war world, all belligerents sought to standardise their memory cultures; previous pockets of commemorative diversity evaporated as a result. These shifts from war to peace, as Grady points out, occurred amongst both the vanquished—Germany—and the victorious—Britain. The experience of moving from war to peacetime for minorities, therefore, transcended national boundaries; it was rather contingent on place, on the specific group involved and of course on the precise actions of individuals.

Notes

1. David Cameron, speech at the Imperial War Museum, October 11, 2012, Prime Minister's Office, accessed September 19, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-at-imperial-war-museum-on-first-world-war-centenary-plans.
2. For reflections on the dominance of these narratives, see Dan Todman, *The Great War: Myth and Memory* (London: Continuum, 2005).
3. For the war's global dimensions, see Hew Strachan, *The First World War. Volume 1: To Arms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Michael Neiberg, *Fighting the Great War: A Global History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Jörn Leonhard, *Die Büchse der Pandora: Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Munich: Beck, 2014).
4. Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 108–119; Abigail Green, *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century*

Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 291–300.

5. In Britain, see for example, Jeremy Paxman's BBC Series: "Britain's Great War" (2014) or the debate that erupted in 2014 over the causes of the conflict: Richard J. Evans, "Michael Gove shows his Ignorance of History–Again," *The Guardian*, January 6, 2014, accessed September 19, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/jan/06/richard-evans-michael-gove-history-education. In Germany, the *Deutsches Historisches Museum* offered its own fairly conventional take on the conflict: "Der Erste Weltkrieg, 1914–1918," (2014), accessed September 19, 2016, https://www.dhm.de/ausstellungen/archiv/2014/der-erste-weltkrieg.html.
6. On the so-called, *Judenzählung* or Jewish census, see Jacob Rosenthal, *"Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten": Die Judenzählung im Ersten Weltkrieg und ihre Folgen* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2007).
7. Terrence Denman, "The Catholic Irish Soldier in the First World War: The 'Racial Environment'," *Irish Historical Studies* 108:27 (1991): 365.
8. Panikos Panayi, *Prisoners of Britain: German Civilian and Combatant Internees during the First World War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).
9. See for example, Roger Chickering's magnificent "total history" of one city at war: Roger Chickering, *The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
10. Jeffrey Verhey, *The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth and Mobilization in Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Catriona Pennell, *A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Jean-Jacques Becker, *La France en guerre (1914–1918): la grande mutation* (Brussels: Ed. Complex, 1996), 22–43.
11. Terri Blom Crocker, *The Christmas Truce: Myth, Memory, and the First World War* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015).
12. Peter Gatrell and Philippe Nivet, "Refugees and Exiles," in *The Cambridge History of the First World War. Vol. III Civil Society*, ed. Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 186–215.
13. See for example, Jörg Nagler, *Nationale Minoritäten im Krieg: "Feindliche Ausländer" und die amerikanische Heimatfront während des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2000).
14. Belinda Davies, *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 117–118; Avner Offer, *The First World War: An Agrarian*

Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); Maureen Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 31–86.

15. Howard Phillips and David Killingray, "Introduction", in *The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919: New Perspectives*, eds. Howard Phillips and David Killingray (New York: Routledge, 2003), 4.
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17. "Queen Honours Black War Dead," *The Times*, March 24, 1995, 12.
18. Tony Kushner, "'Without Intending and of the Most Undesirable Features of a Colour Bar': Race Science, Europeanness and the British Armed Forces during the Twentieth Century," *Patterns of Prejudice* 46:3–4 (2012): 342–344.
19. Angela Merkel speech in the Deutsches Historisches Museum, May 28, 2014, accessed September 19, 2016, https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Rede/2014/05/2014-05-28-merkel-ausstellung-1914-bis-1918.html;jsessionid=163A0592D5D42DC0DAC2DB48CEA5F213.s7t1.
20. In general see Richard Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914–1918* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008); Joe Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom: A Sengalese Oral History of the First World War* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999).
21. Ulrike Heikaus and Julia Köhne, eds., *Krieg! Juden zwischen den Fronten, 1914–1918* (Berlin: Hentrich & Hentrich, 2014).
22. Jewish Museum Berlin, "Der Erste Weltkrieg in der jüdischen Erinnerung", accessed September 19, 2016, https://www.jmberlin.de/1914-1918.
23. Otto von Guericke Universität Magdeburg, "Projekt jüdische Soldaten", accessed September 19, 2016, www.projekt-juedische-soldaten.ovgu.de; Hatikva, "Datenbank zu den Denkmalen der Jüdischen Gefallenen des I. Weltkrieges", accessed September 19, 2016, http://hatikva.de/datenbank%20erster%20weltkrieg.htm. See also the work on the First World War that has emerged under the umbrella of the annual Laupenheimer Gespräche: Haus der Geschichte Baden-Württemberg, ed., *"Hoffet mit daheim auf fröhlichere Zeit": Juden und Christen im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Heidelberg: Winter, 2014).
24. "La Charente et la Grande Guerre": http://www.charente.gouv.fr/Politiques-publiques/Citoyennete-Election/Centenaire-de-la-Premiere-Guerre-mondiale/Exposition-La-Charente-et-la-Grande-Guerre-dans-les-salons-de-la-prefecture/Le-depliant-de-l-exposition-La-Charente-et-la-Grande-Guerre. "Les Juifs de France et la Grande Guerre": http://musees.regioncentre.fr/expositions/les-juifs-de-france-et-la-grande-guerre.

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33. Keegan, *Face of Battle*, 247–248.
34. Richard Holmes, *Firing Line Battle* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), 116.
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39. Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960* (London: Heinemann, 1991).

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41. See for example Stephen Bourne, *Black Poppies: Britain's Black Community and the Great War* (Stroud: The History Press, 2014); Ray Costello, *Black Tommies: British Soldiers of African Descent in the First World War* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2015).
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43. Tony Kushner and David Cesarani, eds., *The Internment of Aliens in Twentieth Century Britain* (London: Frank Cass, 1993); Matthew Stibbe, *British Civilian Internees in Germany: The Ruhleben Camp, 1914–1918* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).
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45. Santanu Das, ed., *Race, Empire and First World War Writing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). See also Eric Strom and Ali Al Tuma,

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46. Dominiek Dendooven, "Living Apart Together: Belgian Civilians and Non-White Troops and Workers in Wartime Flanders," in *Race, Empire and First World War Writing*, ed. Santanu Das (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Alison Fell, "Nursing the Other: The Representation of Colonial Troops in French and British First World War Nursing Memoirs," in *Race, Empire and First World War Writing*, ed. Santanu Das (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 103. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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48. Fogarty, *Race and War*.
49. George Morton-Jack, *The Indian Army on the Western Front: India's Expeditionary Force to France and Belgium in the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
50. See for example Andrew Jarboe, "The Long Road Home: Britain, Germany and the Repatriation of Indian Prisoners of War after the First World War," in *Colonial Soldiers in Europe, 1914–1945: "Aliens in Uniform" in Wartime*, eds. Eric Strom and Ali Al Tuma (New York: Routledge, 2016), 140–157.
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53. Lawrence Besserman, "The Challenge of Periodization: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives," in *The Challenge of Periodization: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*, ed. Lawrence Besserman (New York: Routledge, 2013), 3–28.
54. Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Peter Osborne, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde* (London: Verso, 1995). More generally, see Chris Lorenz and Berber Bevernage, "Breaking up Time – Negotiating the Boundaries between Present, Past and Future," in *Breaking up Time: Negotiating the Boundaries between Present, Past and Future*, eds. Chris Lorenz and Berber Bevernage (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 9.
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56. Helmut Walser Smith, "The Vanishing Point of German History: An Essay on Perspective," *History & Memory* 17:1–2 (2005): 289; Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (London: Abacus, 1995).
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SECTION ONE

“Friendly” Minorities in War and Peace

CHAPTER 2

"Tasting the King's Salt": Muslims, Contested Loyalties and the First World War

Humayun Ansari

During the early decades of the twenty-first century, as Western powers came to intervene militarily in predominantly Muslim societies, contemporary popular and official political discourse on the question of loyalties became increasingly salient, with serious implications for Muslim communities in contemporary Britain.[1] Born of both international and national events post-9/11, mutual suspicion fuelled political distance between Muslims and wider British society. British Muslims became the new "suspect community", a new "folk devil".

The following chapter explores how Muslims have juggled divergent loyalties within pluralistic societies. However, rather than discussing this challenge in relation to twenty-first century Britain, it investigates this "juggling act" in the context of developments taking place as a result of the First World War one hundred or so years earlier. This correlation is particularly pertinent when one bears in mind the government-sponsored effort expended during recent First World War centenary commemorations to get a positive message across to twenty-first century British Muslims about how far and in what ways their predecessors made a

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contribution to this earlier conflict.[2] But the First World War, in reality, generated complex questions regarding Muslim relationships with the British state, both in the wider British Empire and closer to home—as soldiers fighting against their co-religionists and as British imperial subjects in both Britain itself and the colonies. In this setting, it is important to recognise that Muslim responses tended to be ambiguous. Diversity, underpinned by religious and political concerns—rather than a uniform set of reactions—proved the hallmark of not just how Muslims interacted with the war effort, but also how the broader public in British society and its institutions engaged with them in return.

Accordingly, this chapter seeks to contextualise early-twentieth century Muslim anxieties and offer explanations for the variety of reactions that these produced. In the process, it addresses the parallel ebbs and flows of what being "loyal" meant in this context. By situating this discussion within both an ideological and a historical framework, it argues that—despite the capacity of religious, cultural and national identities and loyalties to transcend the specificities of particular geographical and historical settings—it is useful to consider contingent material factors, the broader social and political influences, and the complex circumstances in which their construction took place. It consequently highlights challenges of being Muslim in Britain and in its Empire during and after the First World War, particularly drawing attention to dilemmas that this conflict raised regarding being loyal to imperial Britain.

Dilemmas of Loyalty?

The first point to make here is that Muslim interaction with the war was far from uniform. For some Muslims, the conflict sharpened their consciousness about belonging to a global community that had been increasingly subjugated by European imperialism, including threats to the Ottoman Caliphate, the religio-political focus of Muslim identity. In particular, it prompted Indian Muslim awareness that they could (and should) be part of a broader colonised resistance to imperial rule. For others, however, it offered an opportunity to demonstrate their worth as loyal subjects of empire, and like many others living under British control, they engaged positively with the wider war effort, as civilians as well as combatants. Meanwhile, developments during the war years also highlighted the extent to which Muslims by the early twentieth century represented a diverse

community in Britain itself, made up of people from India, the Middle East, East Asia and Africa as well as indigenous converts, encompassing elite and subaltern members, and possessing a range of ideas about what loyalty to Britain meant under these particular challenging circumstances.

It is also important to note at the outset that Indians from a range of religious communities, including soldiers drawn from them, were divided in their responses to the First World War. The *Ghadr* (meaning "rebellion" in Urdu/Hindi) Party, for instance, comprising a predominantly Sikh membership, which attempted to initiate an insurrection in India soon after the eruption of hostilities, was founded by a Hindu, Har Dayal (1884–1939).[3] The Provisional Government of India, set up in Kabul in 1916 in opposition to British rule, included revolutionary Pan-Islamists Barkatullah Bhopali (1859–1927) and Ubaidullah Sindhi (1872–1944), but also appointed Raja Mahendra Pratap (1886–1979), another Hindu, as its President.[4] There were also both Muslim and non-Muslim revolutionary nationalists operating out of Europe, and Germany more specifically, who sought to undermine and overthrow the Raj.[5] Even the constitutionalists back in India were divided over how far to back the war effort: Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920), unlike M.K. Gandhi (1869–1948), offered only qualified support, helping to set up the All-India Home Rule League with Annie Besant (1847–1933) in 1916 to channel what was by then the growing demand for self-rule.[6] As these examples illustrate, there was a range of responses to the war in India, and this complexity mirrored the fact that Muslims, more generally, did not react as one, and their ranks contained opponents alongside supporters of the British authorities.[7]

Nonetheless, by the early twentieth century Muslims in India as elsewhere had become acutely aware of and concerned about how the expansion of European power—Russia, Italy, France and Britain—seemed to be increasingly subjecting their co-religionists to "Christian" rule. As conflicts intensified in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean between 1911 and 1913, anti-Muslim sentiment reached a new peak in Britain itself. Muslims along with the Ottoman Caliph were subjected to ridicule, even insults, captured in literature, painting and travel writing and reproduced in accessible media forms such as newspaper cartoons, music hall songs, novels and religious journals, photographs and the early cinema.[8] This growing antagonism galvanised an increasing number of Muslims across the Empire to defend the Sultan-Caliph as the key symbol of the *umma* (community), underlining just how conscious they were of belonging to a

supra-national Muslim community. As British foreign policy moved decisively away from its nineteenth-century support for the Ottomans in the latter's guise of the "Sick Man of Europe",[9] several strands of Pan-Islam emerged and converged as a potentially powerful and effective strategy to challenge and defy this dominant, and potentially destructive, British discourse. With regard to the conflicts in the Balkans—which the Bishop of Oxford described as "a Holy War of Cross against Crescent"—the *Islamic Review* (a key mouthpiece of Muslim opinion in Britain at the time) protested that British policy was aimed at engineering the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.[10] It similarly warned of the threatened "existence of the Muslim community" and drew attention to how far British policy towards the Ottoman Empire was alienating Muslims in India,[11] cautioning against the consequences of ignoring their deeply-felt disaffection: "You have the most loyal subjects in the Muslims", the *Islamic Review* told the British authorities, but

> We do feel for our brethren, and it is our religious duty to come to their help and defend our religion . . . I know for certain that the Muhammadans in India have no reason, or just occasion, to raise the standard of insurrection against the government, but it is their religious duty to help their brethren in Islam.[12]

Defending its criticism of British policy against allegations of "estranged loyalty", it asserted the "legitimate right to disapprove of any Government measure which, in our judgment, may affect adversely our interests in India or abroad. It is bad policy to curb expression of feelings. It leads to the adoption of heinous measures of passive resistance, which a Muslim by his nature and religion abhors".[13] But, these criticisms notwithstanding, the *Islamic Review*'s editor (and the first *imam* of the Woking Mosque in 1913), Khawaja Kamaluddin (1870–1932) took pains to reassure the Prime Minister that while Muslims were ordered by their religion to be loyal to their ruler, they were also "enjoined to use all . . . constitutional means to inform him of his defects and errors, if any, and get their grievances redressed".[14]

Loyalty Versus Jihad

The entry of Turkey into the conflict on the side of Germany and its subsequent proclamation of *jihad* on 11 November 1914, calling on Muslims all over the world to rise up against its enemies, complicated things considerably. In particular, it provoked complex questions about

the relationship of Muslims with the British people and state in the wider Empire as well as closer to home. Many were now faced with uncomfortable dilemmas regarding loyalty and allegiance, and the war, together with its immediate aftermath, tested the limits and frailties of Muslim loyalties.

By the end of 1914, with Britain desperately short of troops at the Western Front, India had quickly despatched two divisions of infantry and one cavalry brigade to Europe.[15] Muslims made up a very significant part of this early expeditionary force.[16] Like their counterparts in India and in Britain, these Muslim soldiers on the battlefield had a range of views on the rights and wrongs of fighting Turkey. Uncertainties were compounded by the *Sheikh-ul-Islam*'s declaration of *jihad* on behalf of the Ottoman government, which urged Muslims all over the world to take up arms against Britain, Russia and France. Desertions and even the odd mutiny followed.[17] When the 130th Baluchis in Rangoon were ordered to be deployed in East Africa, three companies of Pathans (a Muslim ethno-cultural group comprising dozens of tribes populating vast territories on either side of today's Pakistan—Afghanistan border) refused to go, expressing "a strong disinclination... to fight against Turks".[18] The high proportion of deserters from the North-West Frontier Province was particularly noticeable: by July 1915, there were reported to be 700 deserters hailing from Tirah (an area in the Khyber region of the North-West Frontier) alone. In due course, fear of swingeing punishments probably acted as a deterrent to such mutinous behaviour. In Singapore in February 1915 Indian Muslim non-commissioned ranks of the 5th Light Infantry Regiment mutinied in response to rumours circulating about them being sent to fight against their co-religionists. More than 200 of these "rebels" were tried, of whom 47 were publicly executed by firing squad.[19]

But the unease in this regard among some Muslim soldiers was so great that even such draconian penalties did not prevent occasional further revolts. In February 1916, as part of the Mesopotamian campaign, Muslim troops ordered to confront the Turks in Basra refused. Laying the Quran on their heads, the 15th Lancers took an oath "not to fight against Muslims", asking instead "to be sent to some other theatre of war".[20] In response, the British authorities meted out various terms of imprisonment to hundreds of the culprits. This did not prevent some sympathy being expressed for the mutineers: as one soldier wrote, "they

did not in reality decline to fight for the *Sirkar* [Government], and should not have been called upon to fight against the Turks against their wish".[21] In the opinion of another, "it is clear that they [the soldiers] were not to blame . . . [They] only made a respectful protest".[22]

On the whole, however, the British were able to retain Muslim soldiers' loyalty and cooperation; remarkably little seditious material, for instance, was detected. Moreover British censors were "surprised by the excellent spirit of the troops, who [they conceded] suffered so much and complained so little".[23] In effect, loyalty was being forged in two ways: it was encouraged, on the one hand, by Muslim soldiers' own demonstration of commitment to the national (imperial) cause and nation's (Empire's) most cherished values by fighting against Britain's enemies, including their co-religionists, the Ottoman Turks, and, on the other, by well-orchestrated public acknowledgement and honouring of their contributions and sacrifices.[24]

Hence, given that religion permeated most aspects of Muslim soldiers' practice, official sensitivity towards provision of appropriate food, accommodation of their religious ceremonies and ritual occasions, and meticulous attention to burial arrangements including full military honours was much in evidence on the battlefields and in hospitals alike.[25] For instance, in the early years of the war (1914–1915), when Indian soldiers were fighting on the Western Front, special hospitals were established in towns along the south coast, such as Brighton, Bournemouth and Brockenhurst. Here Muslims wounded in France were treated with due care and a reasonable degree of cultural sensitivity, visited by the King and Queen, and publicly rewarded for their gallantry. Those Muslims soldiers who died were necessarily buried according to their religious tradition at the Brookwood Cemetery near Woking and later in a dedicated burial compound close by. The *Islamic Review*, which covered these events closely, reported floral tributes being placed on their coffins, and made much of the fact that at one such funeral, the local commanding officer near Woking detailed 50 soldiers to offer military honours. Three rounds were discharged and the "Last Post" was sounded by regimental bugle boys.[26] Clearly, as these attempts at recognition and inclusion suggest, the authorities of the day were alert to the gains to be made from drawing public attention to the commitment, and ultimate sacrifice, of these apparently loyal servants of Empire. All the same, it is important to note that these encounters were not without their problems. What motivated such measures was not primarily cultural sensitivity but political

expediency. There were limits to such good measures. They could not be allowed to unsettle the assumptions that underpinned the colonial power structures. Since the safe-guarding of imperial rule required social separation between the rulers and the ruled, any inter-racial intimacy was seen as a force which might potentially undermine British supremacy. While British soldiers moved about freely, Indian soldiers were treated almost as prisoners as they recovered in hospitals surrounded by barbed-wire fences and allowed out only when escorted by their British counterparts. Any interactions between these men and English women, it was feared, "would be most detrimental to the prestige and spirit of European rule in India".[27]

From an official perspective both in India as well as in Britain, the prospect of white nurses tending to non-white wounded soldiers was profoundly disturbing, and risked upsetting the maintenance of racial distance on which British authority in India rested. This became clear in May 1915, when the publication of a photograph in the *Daily Mail* of an English nurse standing behind the hospital bed of a wounded Indian soldier provoked national outrage.[28] Sir Beauchamp Duff, Commander-in-Chief of British forces in India, dispatched a letter demanding "no nurses for Indians".[29] Measures were accordingly put in place in hospitals to regulate the contact between female nursing staff and their Indian patients, something that was also happening back in India itself during the war years. Even though it risked giving the impression that double standards were being applied regarding treatment of Indian and British men, the War Office complied and all female nurses of the Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service were withdrawn in June 1915 and replaced by male orderlies.[30]

This largely but not entirely inclusive strategy dovetailed with an unequivocal commitment to the Empire deeply instilled in military training. Disloyalty was viewed by many Indian Muslim soldiers as almost amounting to treason. Hence when mutinies broke out involving units at Rangoon and Singapore (130th Baluchis and 5th Light Infantry) in early 1915 and at Basra (15th Lancers) in early 1916, and Muslims refused to fight against their Turkish co-religionists, their actions were subject to severe censure from within the ranks: to quote one contemporary, "This [15th Lancers Mutiny] was a great mistake to behave to our King in this way. The enemy no doubt are Turks... [but] our men ought not to have been untrue to their salt".[31] They were bluntly reminded that while "Turkey, it is true, is a Muslim

power . . . the Turks are not our paternal uncle's children!" (a category of relative to whom—traditionally—loyalty would be owed).[32]

Indian Muslim soldiers tended to justify fighting the Turks on grounds of their government's earlier refusal to heed the British call to remain neutral: "The Turks made war against our *Sirkar* without any cause. Our *Sirkar* repeatedly told the Turks before the war to remain neutral, and that their security would be arranged for in every way. But Turks would not be advised, and now they are giving away their country with their own hands".[33] And yet there still remained concern for the Turks' fate: "you ask me to pray that Fateh Khan [code term for Britain] may obtain the victory. I however am concerned about Sultan Khan [code term for Turkey] because he is an honest person whereas Fateh Khan is a great rascal, and dishonest. I pray for Sultan Khan, that he may obtain his rights".[34] And when the latter's forces were defeated at Baghdad, "a great pity" for the outcome was expressed.[35] While the comments of these letter writers cannot be assumed to be completely representative of all soldiers fighting on Britain's behalf, as David Omissi has demonstrated, they were articulated by a sufficient number of correspondents to allow us to conclude that such expressions of loyalty must have been widely shared.[36]

Loyalty to What and/or to Whom?

By the time that the Armistice was signed in November 1918, it was recognised that, as a substantial proportion of the 1.27 million-strong Indian Expeditionary Force, Muslims had shed much blood on Britain's behalf.[37] If this—dying for the cause—was the litmus test of loyalty, then clearly loyalty had been much in evidence. But this then raises the question of "loyalty to what and/or to whom"? One way of addressing this involves reflecting on what exactly motivated these Muslims to join the war effort.

To a large degree, a carefully constructed system of inter-dependence and orchestrated loyalty was being played out during this period. Not all the recruitment was necessarily as voluntary as it might have first appeared. While there was no conscription in India, a "quota" system was in place, and it is certain that some coercion and use of bribery was also deployed.[38] Furthermore, while imperial loyalty and enthusiasm for "benevolent" Empire was much trumpeted as the driving impulse behind this recruitment, historians have shown that more mundane, even "mercenary" reasons played no small part as motivation for joining.[39] And even when

"military values" were real and deeply held, the exigencies of war meant that those who joined (like Irish recruits) increasingly did so to satisfy their or their families' basic needs. Hence, comments regarding material rewards for military service—allotment of land, supplementing agricultural income, promotion, pay rises, pensions, clothing—also featured prominently in the wartime letters of Indian soldiers (whether Muslim, Sikh or Hindu).[40]

But, at the same time, the British India Army had long drawn its recruits from particular communities, including Muslims from the Punjab and other parts of north and north-western India, to which it assigned so-called "martial race" qualities. In return, these communities had profited from the material rewards that came from serving the Empire, along with less tangible but still highly prized notions of *izzat* (honour). In this context, British officers' sensitivity to Indian soldiers' religious needs had encouraged a relationship with the Raj that was often referred to as "tasting the King's salt"—the salt of Britain—as the popular saying went. As one somewhat romanticised British account put it, "a close bond" or attachment existed between officers and their men, "from which the rest of the world was excluded... For him there was no halfway house; he must give total obedience, total loyalty, total devotion".[41] All this was born out of a relationship of "unilateral dependence" of the infantilised Indian charges on their white officers, whose superiority was accepted as part of the natural scheme.[42]

Hence, as many soldiers' letters during the First World War revealed, tied in with existing ideas and structures of loyalty were "traditional" concerns of shame and honour—standing, reputation or prestige—that remained deeply embedded in the particular agrarian communities and around which military service revolved.[43] Largely drawn from among the middle-ranking peasantry, the vast majority of Indian Muslim soldiers cherished such values greatly. For *izzat*, many of them seemed prepared to suffer and even sacrifice their lives when required. As Mahmud Mazafar Khan, a Punjabi Muslim soldier of the 19th Lancers writing from France in October 1917 put it, "I am suffering for one end only—*izzat*. My duty is to help Government and increase the reputation of our family".[44] This commitment dovetailed with one of the primary purposes of fighting—to raise the status of one's caste, clan and community. Consequently, British traditions of absolute loyalty to the regiment slotted neatly into these various conceptions of honour. For many,

loyalty to the regiment was accepted as paramount; they were convinced that "only in the army is any *izzat* to be acquired".[45]

But, while *namak-halaali* (literally, salt-forged faithfulness) for the King-Emperor was one of the criteria associated with *izzat*, and insubordination to authority was likely to damage it, there were other social spheres apart from the army where it could be acquired. Loyalty to family, caste, tribe and region were some of those with which the particular *izzat* attached to military service remained in fluid competition. As the wife of a Pathan officer demanded in a letter to her husband: either return home immediately "[i]f you want to keep your *izzat* [and] run your house" or go on hankering after "wealth" and "promotion" in the army, ending with a parting shot questioning his masculine honour, "[i]f you were a man you would understand, but you are no man".[46]

As the conflict dragged on, such loyalty to Empire came under further strain. "Patriotic" feelings were gradually eroded as Indian Muslim soldiers, like their Hindu and Sikh counterparts, grew more aware of the lack of respect from the British that translated into being regarded and treated in an inferior manner.[47] Likewise the absence of trust and even denial of liberty that the wounded experienced in hospitals, the double standards applied by the authorities towards their British and Indian personnel,[48] resentment at being disproportionately used as cannon fodder at the front,[49] and the "[disgraceful] manner in which the British Government treated their [Muslim] dead heroes", further undermined identification with the British cause.[50] Increasingly, as the war years passed, there is evidence of Muslim soldiers expressing discontent and frustration, privately and in public, and complaining bitterly of the contrasting treatment they were receiving despite having equally sacrificed all for "King and Country".

Away from the theatre of the war too, indifferent and negative British responses to Muslim efforts also affected existing sentiments of loyalty among civilians. For instance, in 1915, when the Pan-Islamist activist Duse Mohamed Ali (1866–1945), a supporter of the British war effort, set up the Indian Muslim Soldiers' Widows and Orphans War Fund to alleviate the sufferings of the most destitute of the bereaved families, his impassioned appeal to the British public for the modest sum of £10,000 for charitable giving—as a tribute to the valour of those who placed duty to the Empire over religion—proved a miserable failure.[51] The resulting amount collected was so little that according to the aristocratic Indian "agent" of the Fund, the Rajah of Mahmudabad, "if all the sufferers were

relieved, the [paltry amount of] money which each would receive... would impress Indians with the fact that their sacrifices for the cause of Great Britain have been very poorly appreciated by the British public".[52]

The British government's rejection of the prominent Muslim convert Lord Headley's suggestion that it should "mark our appreciation of the fidelity and bravery of our Indian friends by erecting a mosque in memory of our heroic Muslim soldiers who have fallen in defence of and now lie buried in the land that they died for" was again disappointing for those who wanted to strengthen the bonds. His argument that such "a gracious and spontaneous act of this kind would be returned to us a hundredfold"[53] cut little ice with the authorities, however, who thought otherwise "on grounds of both policy and religion".[54]

Defending the British Way of Life?

Away from the frontline, there was a similar range of responses among Britain's socially and ethnically differentiated Muslim community. Like most of the British press, the *Islamic Review*'s updates on the war were couched in patriotic language, in its case lauding Muslim heroism in poems and messages, and including photographs of Muslim soldiers in uniform joining Muslim congregational prayers at the Woking Mosque.[55] Soon after the war's declaration, Khawaja Kamaluddin unequivocally called upon Muslims to support the war effort as defending the British way of life. In response to Katherine Halkett's denunciation in the *Islamic Review* of "war in any form as a crime against humanity" and her demand for its cessation, he argued—in line with the dominant narrative of the time—that Britain had been compelled to enter into the conflict for reasons of self-defence and self-preservation.[56] Indeed, by going to war he suggested that the "English nation" was retracing the footsteps of the Holy Prophet of Islam some 1300 years earlier[57]: "From the Muslim point of view", his editorial asserted, "it was obviously necessary for Great Britain to declare war".[58] His response invoked the Quran to justify the "utmost" Muslim support and loyalty for the British, for even if they were of a different "race" or "creed" their rule provided the guardianship, protection, prosperity and the free exercise of Muslims' religious beliefs. In any case, "Great Britain [by virtue of its empire's Muslim population] is the greatest Muslim power of the present age... therefore in supporting Great Britain we support our own Muslim Government".[59] At the same

time, by arguing that the conflict could not be considered a "religious war", he implicitly rejected the Ottomans' call for *jihad*. As a key member of Britain's Muslim community at this time, and closely connected with the country's oldest purpose-built mosque that operated as a pivot around which wider British Muslim activities revolved, Kamaluddin seems to have felt it his duty as well as his right as a British subject to project a message of loyalty and allegiance.

The reactions of English converts at times, however, revealed a duality between their loyalty to "King and Country" and their sympathy for the worldwide Muslim *umma*. Abdullah Quilliam (1856–1932)[60] (upon whom the Ottoman sultan had conferred the title of "*Sheikh al-Islam* of the British Isles") had earlier, together with his embryonic Muslim community in Liverpool, exhorted Muslims to resist British military expeditions in the Muslim world.[61] But once Britain was at war with Turkey he instead proclaimed that "Our Holy Faith enjoins upon us to be loyal to whatever country under whose protection we reside".[62] To convey the genuineness of his loyalty, and to express his own commitment to the national cause, he resigned as Vice-President of the Anglo-Ottoman Association (under suspicion for "undesirable activities" in relation to Turkey) and made an offer of help to the British government to instil a greater sense of loyalty among the Empire's Muslims.[63] Yet, after the war ended, Quilliam's efforts to ensure that a defeated and humiliated Turkey received a fair hearing at the post-war peace conferences occasionally threatened to undermine his attempts to appear conspicuously loyal to Britain.[64]

The case of Marmaduke Pickthall (1875–1936)—who publicly converted to Islam in 1917 and later (1930) wrote *The Meaning of the Glorious Quran*—reveals similar dilemmas.[65] Pickthall was an ardent monarchist and by his own admission "a patriotic English Tory". His position as a (former) insider allowed him to take a particularly public critical stance, which was not such a straightforward possibility for Indian Muslims. At the same time, though not a pacifist, he opposed the war between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, for holding what seemed like contradictory political positions, his close friend and Conservative MP, Aubrey Herbert, portrayed him as "England's most loyal enemy".[66] Pickthall himself was acutely aware and troubled that some people regarded him as a traitor to his country. Consequently, he stressed that it was possibly because he cared "so much about the British Empire in the East" that he was "trying to make England realise" the "terrible effect" of its Turkish policy. Time and again he insisted, "I am pro-Turk, but not anti-British". While categorically

refusing to "serve against the Turks", he offered himself as a military interpreter in October 1914 and then joined when called up for military service in 1918.[67]

A third prominent convert, Lord Headley (1855–1935), was less ambiguous in his pronouncements of loyalty to the British Empire.[68] Though uneasy about the conflict with Ottoman Turkey, he was happy to propose a resolution in support of the British troops at a meeting of the British Muslim Society—seconded by the then *imam* of the Woking Mosque, Maulvi Sadr-ud-Din—stating: "We desire to offer our wholehearted congratulations to our eastern brethren now at the front, and to express our delight to find that our co-religionists in Islam are fighting on the side of honour, truth, and justice, and are carrying into effect the principles of Islam as inculcated by the Holy Prophet Mohammad".[69] Even Mushir Hussain Kidwai (1877–1937), an ardent and leading Indian Muslim Pan-Islamist activist based in London, felt that since for him the war between Turkey and Britain was "a secular war... Mussalmans... [would] remain faithful to their obligations, and [would] be ready to fight under the flag beneath which they have lived and been sheltered".[70]

However, given the apparent ambivalence of their position, many of Britain's most respectable and prominent Muslims fell under suspicion and were kept under official surveillance during the war years. The extent of official paranoia was reflected in the Foreign Office's curious labelling of two of them—the Rt. Hon. Ameer Ali (1849–1928), the first Indian to sit as a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and Dr. Abdul Majid, a barrister and lecturer at the Colonial Office—as "fanatics". Kidwai was considered even more threatening—the Director of Intelligence "looked upon [him] as an enemy to this country" and he was subjected to much more intense surveillance than his equally pro-Turkish co-activist, Marmaduke Pickthall, who was judged "in all probability, at heart [to be] a loyal British subject".[71] This differential treatment clearly revealed how far notions of loyalty could fracture along racial lines. Writing in the *Islamic Review*, Kidwai described how the police had tracked him down to a retreat where he had gone for his health and questioned him as to "whether [he] had any sympathy with Turkey". His response summed up what was likely to have been a broadly held Muslim attitude:

> Could I or can I deny that I had or have great sympathy for Turkey?... Indeed the greater the danger for Turkey, the greater the sympathy for her

> of every true Muslim. The Turks might have made mistakes, but as long as they remain Muslims the other Muslims cannot but have sympathy for them: they both hold the same cord, the cord of Allah.[72]

But Kidwai was also adamant that "sympathy" and "loyalty" were two separate things and that, while his sympathy lay with Turkey, he had given his loyalty unequivocally to Britain.

This duality of feeling, which the British authorities seemed unwilling to tolerate in the case of "native" (non-white) Muslims, was—in striking contrast—deemed more acceptable in the case of their British co-religionists. But this different approach was perhaps not wholly unjustified. Some tangible differences between the approaches of "native" and "convert" Muslims to imperial loyalty and patriotism, it could be argued, did exist. For converts, loyalty and patriotism were emotionally deep-rooted and ultimately fundamental to their identities. As John Yehia-Nasr Parkinson, writing in the *Islamic Review,* avowed: "As a Britisher I would support my country in the contest [the war] by every honourable means in my power, to bring matters to a victorious ending". Though he regretted the necessity of having to fight Turks with whom he sympathised and to whom he felt bound, he was prepared to assist them only "so long as that help [did] not interfere with our greater duty to our own Empire, to our native land".[73] For Indian Muslims, in contrast, expressions of loyalty to the British Crown were more likely to be a matter of political expediency, born out of a concern for wider community self-interest. The following statement by Shaukat Ali—co-editor of the popular Indian Muslim weeklies *Hamdard* (in Urdu) and *Comrade* (in English), and who with his more famous nationalist brother, Muhammad Ali, later led a delegation to Britain and Europe pleading for the preservation of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1920—probably reflected the sentiments of many ordinary Muslims, whether in India or Britain:

> There is not a Musalman who in [his] heart does not pray for the victory of the Caliph and the defeat and destruction of his enemies, including Britain.[74]

Many Muslims thus perceived British machinations in the Middle East during the war as a stratagem that was intended to lead to the imperial carving up of the Ottoman Empire. Their fears were confirmed when the Bolsheviks, in November 1917, revealed the proposed Anglo-French

division of the post-war, post-Ottoman, Middle East into future British and French spheres of influence and control. They saw Hussein, the *Sherif* of Mecca (historically, an honorific for the governor of Mecca, descended from the Prophet Muhammad), as a puppet, manipulated by the British into betraying the Pan-Islamic cause, and so they reacted to this policy with considerable hostility. They condemned the anti-Ottoman Arab rebels "as enemies of Islam" and denounced Hussein as a "traitor".[75] One Indian Muslim slammed the Arab uprising as "a British-engineered stab in the back of the Islamic polity".[76] In Britain, intelligence reports alleged that Marmaduke Pickthall had "insinuated" that "our ally King Hussein is a venal traitor"[77] and that the British government was seeking "to pit the Arabic-speaking Muslims against the Turkish-speaking Muslims" on the "false ideal of nationality and patriotism".[78] Then, in concert with South Asian Muslims, when the British government set out the proposal, under the Balfour Declaration in November 1917, to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine, Pickthall once more intervened, likening this taking of territory from the Muslim government to "a world-disaster".[79] Inevitably, such views and statements brought their loyalty under the spotlight. The Foreign Office was quick to deem these Muslims "seditionists" and "C[ommittee of] U[nion and] P[rogress] agents".[80]

At the other end of British society—the subaltern end—Muslims were also labelled as a suspect community, their loyalty and belongingness questioned during and after the war. Between 1914 and 1918, for instance, thousands of Indian, Yemeni and Somali *lascars* (seamen) were recruited by the merchant navy to replace white seamen required for the armed forces. When the war ended, returning soldiers, after they had been demobilised, demanded the *lascars*' expulsion from jobs to which they claimed a greater entitlement than these "aliens". Britain-based Arabs and their supporters rebutted these attacks vigorously, asserting that they were loyal British subjects, who had "adopted European life and customs to a large extent and in sympathy and in their domestic life they [were] English".[81] Ali Said, one of the leaders of Arab seamen in South Shields, responded to accusations in a letter from a self-styled "True Briton" to a local newspaper: "The Arab for whom he has such contempt, I would point out, are all British subjects", and so not aliens whose loyalty could be mistrusted in any way.[82] Contrary to allegations that the relatives of these Arabs were "conspiring against our lads in the desert", a British ex-seamen agreed with Ali Said that Arabs were actually "fighting on our side" and had taken a heavy toll.[83] Indeed, some of them had even ended up as

prisoners of war in Germany along with British soldiers. Every day, such reports pointed out, these *lascars* had run the gauntlet of enemy warships, endangering their lives in performing vital tasks to keep Britain supplied with food and other essentials. Many had perished in the line of duty. Surely, it was argued, these sacrifices deserved equal acknowledgement and recompense. But even when it was accepted that as British subjects these seamen had served the country well, it was contended that they did so for money and not for love of the country.[84]

So for large numbers of Muslims living within the Empire, whether in Britain or elsewhere, the outcome of the war was little short of a catastrophe. With the Ottoman Empire defeated, any tension between competing loyalties should have ended, at least in theory. But it did not, thanks to the continuing uncertainty over the ultimate fate of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph—an outcome in which Britain played a key international role and which prompted British Muslims to lobby the government for a sympathetic response to the fate of Turkey. This controversy helped keep alive questions about loyalty long after the war had ended because those Muslims who argued Turkey's case seemed to be continuing to support strongly and energetically a state that had so recently been Britain's explicit, and defeated, enemy.[85]

On their return to India, Muslim soldiers like their non-Muslim counterparts encountered a country struggling with rapidly rising prices, unemployment and disappointed expectations. No longer preoccupied with fighting the enemy, the survival of the Ottoman Caliphate now loomed large in their concerns. Accordingly, many found themselves having to cope with the challenges of the growing mass civil unrest led by Pan-Islamist/nationalist forces in the years from 1919 onwards. Many soldiers were badly affected by the fall-out from the infamous massacre at Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar, Punjab, in April 1919, fuelling anti-British resentment. Pan-Islamic sentiment was also given a fillip. When the Amir of Afghanistan declared *jihad* against the British in May 1919, local Indian Muslims, particularly Pathans, faced another potential conflict of interest. This Afghan call to arms tested the loyalty of many returning men. While the regular army remained unaffected, irregular forces proved less able to resist the demands made on them by their religion, and desertions became a major problem. In due course, the Khilafat Movement of 1919–1924 made efforts to disentangle them from the loyalty to the Raj that military service had instilled and to recruit them instead for their seditious schemes.[86] But the strategies that had made such loyalty possible (and lucrative), and which had kept Muslim

soldiers "onside" during the war, continued to be successful in the post-war years. The British military authorities in India executed careful plans to cater for the material welfare of soldiers, whether able-bodied or incapacitated, as well as their families. Cash and land grants, pensions, rewards for distinguished service, and relief for dependents combined to trump nationalist and religious sentiment in the large majority of cases. And counter-propaganda was likewise deployed to negate the effects of mounting political agitation and prevent Muslim soldiers from succumbing to any future call of Islam.[87]

Muslims back in post-war Britain, meanwhile, faced the full force of residual anti-Muslim anger from the general public and a government that saw itself as unreservedly triumphant over Islam. When Prime Minister David Lloyd George called the military operation in Palestine "the British crusade" and described the conquest of Turkey as "a great civilising duty... a mission, which Providence had assigned our race", this, in the view of a prominent Muslim publication *Muslim Outlook*, added further insult to injury.[88] Between 1919 and 1924, when Turkey's new leader Ataturk finally abolished the Caliphate, Muslims based in London, in concert with the mass protest in India, used memorials, resolutions, newspaper articles and petitions to put pressure on the British government to keep its pledge of January 1918 to preserve the Caliphate.[89] Rather than receiving serious consideration, these pleadings were not only largely ignored but also perceived as decidedly "un-British" by the authorities, casting further suspicion on Muslims' collective loyalties. The upshot was that these so-called agitators, seemingly "in communication with the most dangerous conspirators in this country and abroad", were kept under surveillance, even once the war had ended.[90]

As the Khilafat agitation intensified, so were these Muslims and the organisations in which they participated vilified as "anti-British". But this hostility only further heightened their identification and solidarity with the Ottoman entity. While aspersions regarding their loyalty undoubtedly caused them personal distress, they now campaigned even more vigorously, arguing that the change in Britain's policy away from dismembering Turkey would be in the best interest of the British Empire.

Muslim engagement with the First World War on the side of Britain was clearly complex and, on occasion, contradictory. That it was also self-reflexive is evidenced by the debates conducted among Indian Muslim soldiers and Muslims in Britain and elsewhere over their religion and loyalty to the King-Emperor. It raised questions about how should they

understand religion in order to resolve the tension, if and when this existed, between faith and loyalty. Should they put loyalty to their religion above allegiance to the Empire? Throughout the war, Muslims represented and had to contend with a range of positions and arguments. Some denounced the British as an enemy of Muslims and encouraged their co-religionists to desert.[91] Others asserted that "our religion teaches us to be in accord with our King".[92] Still more sought to justify their identification with, and commitment to, the British war effort in terms of broad Muslim values.[93] The disparities, at times, were stark and dramatic. Take the story of the two brothers, Jemadar Mir Dast and Jemadar Mir Mast, both deployed at the Western Front. The latter deserted, became part of a *jihad* mission from Germany to Kabul and then found his way back to Tirah, his home base on the Indo-Afghan frontier. The former remained loyal, fought with great valour and when wounded was transferred to Brighton where he was decorated with a Victoria Cross by the King-Emperor.[94]

As this chapter has sought to highlight, issues of identity and loyalty were key concerns for Muslims for the duration of the war years and, indeed, several years after. But what the variety of Muslim responses to the war suggests is that this identity and any accompanying sense of loyalty were shaped by and contingent on the changing context of the time. Connected as well as separated by a multitude of intersecting identities—ethnicity, kinship, tribe, nationality, geographic and regional location, as well as doctrinal and sectarian traditions, practices and interpretations—Muslim soldiers clearly attached at least as much importance (in some cases, more) to these forms of identification as to their religion, Islam. Throughout the conflict, therefore, such men were forced to reconcile their ethnic, religious and other affiliations at community and individual levels, buffeted (at least to some degree) by rapid change, all of which compelled them to adapt and negotiate, consciously as well as unconsciously. The diversity of their values, symbols and aspirations, approaches to issues of identity, strength of adherence to ritual and loyalty to kin and tribal networks, and involvement in a secular institution such as the British army meant that, despite the ethics, discipline and the duty of loyalty to their respective realms imposed by such an organisation, their responses were not undifferentiated.

Hence, Muslim loyalties, whether back in Britain or on the battlefields during and after the war, were appealed to and negotiated with

on the basis of a mass of instincts, prejudices, customary ideas, traditions and assumptions, ethical strivings and corporate egoisms, all mixed up together in varying permutations. Put simply, Muslims at the time of the First World War—as in the early twenty-first century—were shaped by, and themselves shaped, multiple loyalties that competed and conflicted with each other. These loyalties ebbed and flowed depending on their circumstances. Loyalty to imperial Britain was neither unequivocal nor, necessarily, emotionally based. "My country, right or wrong" did not often serve as a moral injunction for them because, despite the propaganda, in their perception it was not India but British colonial rule that they were being asked to defend.[95]

For many Indians Muslim and non-Muslims, especially from the emerging middle classes, the war was certainly about more than just making sacrifices for the causes of the Raj. Against the backdrop of an emerging national consciousness, their loyalty to the Empire was increasingly qualified by the expectation that war service would lead to greater political autonomy. As the war progressed, the experience and discussions of their involvement moved them further away from attachment to the Raj. The war offered an opportunity to build confidence and self-esteem deeply corroded as it was by colonialism; by matching the British on the battlefield there was the possibility of being recognised on level terms with them. In this purpose they partially succeeded. By explicitly committing to the policy of preparing India for responsible government, the Montague Declaration of 20 August 1917 accepted a move towards greater self-rule as the *quid pro quo* for Indian cooperation during the war. The confidence and the momentum generated by the war were carried through to the Khilafat/Non-Cooperation Movements, mobilising millions and further advancing the process of freeing India from British control between 1919 and 1924.

That said, it is important not to overlook the fact that most soldiers, predominantly hailing from a peasant background, were likely to have little conception of "patriotism", were usually poor, apolitical and often joined the army as a matter of practical necessity rather than political commitment. Even British officers realised that these men had "no personal interest in the quarrel".[96] Such individuals cared little for either nationalism or imperialism, and for them army service represented a realistic way out of their poverty-stricken lifestyle. Soldiering was simply another job, steadier than most, if occasionally rather hazardous, with a pension waiting at the end.

More generally, the loyalty offered by Muslims, whether combatants or civilians, during the war years was contextual and contractual. Imperial service was entered into not because of an overt patriotic devotion to Britain, the British and the Empire, but rather was largely motivated by specific circumstances, calculations and reasoning, and, indeed, complex feelings towards a variety of persons, objects and causes. The British recognised the instrumentalist (as opposed to altruistic) character of Muslim loyalties and put in place mechanisms through which they could be successfully negotiated, purchased, reciprocated, harnessed and mobilised in the service of imperial obligations.

Notes

1. Loyalty has been defined in a variety of philosophical, psychological and sociological ways over time. Josiah Royce's understanding as "the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause" no longer seems sufficient. See Josiah Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (Toronto: Macmillan & Co., 1908), 16–17. For James Connor, "loyalty is a socially negotiated, contested and re-enforced emotion". It is an individual's "feelings and motivations wrapped up in the web of social interactions" and "operates within a web of power structures". James Connor, *The Sociology of Loyalty* (New York: Springer, 2007), 13. "[T]he primary objects of loyalty tend to be persons, personal collectivities, or quasi-persons such as organizations or social groups. Some argue that it is only to such that we can be loyal. But that is at odds with the view that almost 'anything to which one's heart can become attached or devoted' may also become an object of loyalty—principles, causes, brands, ideas, ideals, and ideologies", see "Loyalty", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed 14 April 2015. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/loyalty/#ObjLoy.
2. The Government effort in this regard was impressive. It was initially spearheaded by the then Conservative Party Minister Baroness Sayeeda Warsi who announced a "flagship" programme on the Commonwealth contribution to First World War, including the delivery of 50 lectures to schoolchildren and wider public. See "Commonwealth Contribution to First World War to be Commemorated", accessed 9 January 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/commonwealth-contribution-to-first-world-war-to-be-commemorated. At the beginning of August 2014, a substantial presentation (along with a mobile exhibition) was given at the Living Islam festival pointing to the role of 400,000 Muslim soldiers from pre-partition India who fought on Britain's side; Muslim civic leaders hoped that this would help counter anti-Muslim prejudice and, potentially, tackle "alienation and the lure of violent

extremism among some young Muslims". See "The Muslims who fought for Britain in the First World War", accessed 9 January 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/02/muslim-soldiers-first-world-war. The then Culture Secretary, Sajid Javid, in his speech at a multi-faith evening event to commemorate the centenary of the second battle of Neuve Chapelle, praised the courage and commitment of the Indian troops saying: "Events in France a century ago are still relevant in Britain today". See "The 'forgotten' army of 400,000 Muslim soldiers who fought in Great War trenches for Britain". Accessed 9 January 2016. http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/forgotten-army-400000-muslim-soldiers-10325190. A new national project—"An Unknown and Untold Story: The Muslim Contribution to The First World War" —was funded by the Heritage Lottery Fund. It aimed to deepen engagement and understanding amongst both British Muslims and the wider public of the Muslim contribution. By exploring the various perspectives that people might bring to this aspect of Britain's history, the project's stated objective was to find out how and why people thought that this had relevance to contemporary questions of identity and integration. See "Indian troop contribution to First World War honoured", accessed 9 January 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/indian-troops-contribution-to-first-world-war-honoured. Finally, a BBC TV documentary was broadcast on 3 January 2016. It told the story of the restoration (in time for the First World War centenary commemorations) of a forgotten and dilapidated burial ground for 27 Muslim soldiers who gave their lives fighting for Britain in the two World Wars. The film ended with the voices of modern Muslims who believed this shared narrative was one of the ways that prejudice and distrust of Islam in modern Britain might be overcome.

3. The *Ghadr* Party was founded in 1913. See Tilak Raj Sareen, *Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad (1905–1921)* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1979), 72–73; when Maulana Barkatullah Bhopali (1859–1927), a Pan-Islamic revolutionary, arrived in San Francisco in May 1914, he was apparently appointed its vice-president. In Har Dayal's absence, Barkatuallah also edited the organisation's periodical, *Ghadr*. See Harish K. Puri, "Revolutionary Organisation: A Study of the Ghadar Movement," *Social Scientist* 9:2–3 (September-October 1980): 61.
4. Humayun Ansari, *The Emergence of Socialist Thought Among North Indian Muslims (1917–1947)* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 20.
5. See Humayun Ansari, "Maulana Barkatullah Bhopali's transnationalism: Pan-Islamism, colonialism and radical politics", in *Transnational Islam in Interwar Europe: Muslim Activists and Thinkers*, eds. Götz Nordbruch and Umar Ryad (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 181–210.

6. See D.V. Tahmankar, *Lokamany Tilak: Father of Indian Unrest and Maker of Modern India* (London: John Murray, 1956). In contrast to Irish nationalists who historically saw "England's difficulty" as "Ireland's opportunity", Gandhi "thought that England's need should not be turned into our opportunity', though even he calculated that India's contribution to the war effort could be used to push for 'responsible self-government". See Mahatma K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments With Truth* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 317.
7. See Yuvaraj Deva Prasad, *The Indian Muslims and World War I (A Phase of Disillusionment With British Rule 1914–1918)* (New Delhi/Patna: Janaki Prakashan, 1985).
8. The Ottoman Caliph, for instance, was caricatured as "The Unspeakable Turk" in the popular satirical magazine *Punch*. See Humayun Ansari, *"The Infidel Within": Muslims in Britain since 1800* (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), 81.
9. "The Salt Water Cure," *Punch*, 12 August 1908, 111.
10. "Cross versus Crescent," *Muslim India and Islamic Review*, 1:1 (February 1913): 36. This journal was renamed as *Islamic Review and Muslim India* in 1914 and then *The Islamic Review* in January 1921 (hereafter *Islamic Review*).
11. "Letter from the Editor Muslim India and Islamic Review (London) To the Members of the All-India Muslim League (Lucknow)," *Islamic Review*, 1:2 (March 1913): 65.
12. "Cross versus Crescent," 39.
13. "The Estrangement of Mohammedans," *Islamic Review*, 1:2 (March 1913): 47.
14. Khwaja Kamaluddin, "An Open Letter to the Prime Minister II," *Islamic Review*, 1:5 (July 1913), 164.
15. Speech by the Viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge, *Islamic Review* 2:9 (October 1914): 428. By December 1919, around 1.7 million Indians, combatants and non-combatants, had been recruited to the Indian Expeditionary Force. See *India's Contribution to the Great War* (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1923).
16. While precise figures are not available, if we extrapolate from figures for 1904, we can estimate that just over 35% (over half a million) of these would have been Muslims. See David Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860–1940* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), 20.
17. Geoffrey L. Lewis, "The Ottoman Proclamation of Jihad in 1914," *Islamic Quarterly: A Review of Islamic Culture* 19:1–2 (January–June 1975).
18. Lal Baha, "The Trans-Frontier Pathan Soldiers and The First World War," *Islamic Studies* 25:4 (Winter 1986): 388.

19. For a comprehensive exploration of this event, see T.R. Sareen, *Secret Documents on Singapore Mutiny 1915* (New Delhi: Mounto Publishing House, 1995).
20. David Omissi, ed., *Indian Voices of the Great War: Soldiers' Letters, 1914–18* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 167, 199.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 232.
23. Ibid., 14.
24. See "The King-Emperor and the Viceroy of India's message," *Islamic Review*, 2:9 (October 1914): 428–429. Also "The Proposed Muslim Cemetery" (reproduced from the *Woking Herald*), *Islamic Review*, 2:11–12 (December 1914): 533.
25. See "WW1 and the Royal Pavilion", accessed 11 April 2015. http://brightonmuseums.org.uk/royalpavilion/history/ww1-and-the-royal-pavilion/ "The exalted Government has showered every blessing on us here, which I shall remember all my life, and which will bind me in complete loyalty", quoted in Omissi, *Indian Voices*, 137. See also Ibid., 86, 307.
26. "Muslim Burial," *Islamic Review*, 3:6 (June 1915): 322.
27. E.B Howell's Censor Report, 19 June 1915, British Library (hereafter BL), MSS EUR F 143/83.
28. "First World War Hospital—My Brighton and Hove", accessed 9 January 2016. http://www.mybrightonandhove.org.uk/page_id__8764.aspx.
29. Letter from Sir Beauchamp Duff, July 2 and 4, 1915, BL, MSS EUR F 143/66.
30. "Hospital Staffing", Royal Pavilion Hospital, accessed 9 January 2016. http://www.sikhmuseum.com/brighton/doctor/pavilion/staff.html.
31. Omissi, *Indian Voices*, 186.
32. Ibid., 175.
33. Letter from Sirfaraz Khan to Dafedar Alam Khan (Baluchi Muslim, 18th Lancers, France), 16 April 1916, Ibid., 175.
34. Letter from Abbas Ali Khan to Karam Ali Khan, 8 January 1917, BL, IOR L/MIL/5/827, Part 1.
35. Letter from Sawar Gul Mohamed Khan to Mohamed Nur Khan, 18 October 1917, BL, IOR L/MIL/5/827, Part 5.
36. Omissi, *Indian Voices*.
37. Ibid., 4. See also Jahan Mahmood, "The stories of Muslim soldiers on the Western Front; WW I", accessed 8 May 2010. http://www.britainsmuslimsoldiers.co.uk/images/wI.pdf.
38. Santanu Das, "Responses to the War (India)," *International Encyclopaedia of the First World War*, accessed 9 January 2016. http://encyclopedia.1914-1918online.net/article/responses_to_the_war_india.

39. See Aravind Ganchari, "First World War: Purchasing Indian Loyalties: Imperial Policy of Recruitment and 'Rewards'," *Economic and Political Weekly* 40:8 (19–25 February 2005).
40. Omissi, *Indian Voices*, 322, 272.
41. Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour* (London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), 406.
42. Jeffrey Greenhut, "Sepoy and Sahib: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the British Officers and Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army," *Military Affairs*, 48:1 (1984): 18.
43. "Muslim Tommies," BBC One, broadcast 19 October 2009.
44. Omissi, *Indian Voices*, 328.
45. Santanu Das, *Race, Empire and First World War Writing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 83.
46. Omissi, *Indian Voices*, 248.
47. Censor of Indian Mails, 1914–1918, BL, IOR L/MIL/5/828, pt. 2, ff. 203–408, 405. See also DeWitt C. Ellinwood and S.D. Pradhan, eds., *India and World War I* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1978), 224.
48. Letter from Rajah Khan, BL MSS EUR F 143/66. See also Letter dated 26 September 1915 and, Letter dated 19 January 1916, BL, MSS EUR F 143/86. Major E.W.C. Sandes, *In Kut and Captivity, with the Sixth Indian Division* (London: John Murray, 1919), 285, 287.
49. Letter from Gunga Ram to Iance Naik Suji Ram, 4 May 1915, BL, MSS EUR F 143/83.
50. Statement by Maulvie Sadr-ud-Din to the India Office, "Woking—Arrangements, with Imam of the Mosque at-," 27 August 1915, BL, MSS EUR F 143.80.
51. Ian Duffield, "Duse Mohamed Ali, Afro-Asian solidarity and Pan-Africanis in early twentieth-century London," in *Essays on the History of Blacks in Britain: From Roman Times to the Mid-twentieth Century*, eds. Jagdish S. Gundara and Ian Duffield (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), 136.
52. Supplement to *The Gentlewoman*, 15 July 1916, n.p.f, cited by Ian Duffield, "Duse Mohamed Ali and the Development of Pan-Africanism, 1866–1945" (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1971), 505.
53. Lord Headley to Austin Chamberlain, 23 March 1916, BL, IOR L/MIL/7/18861.
54. Sir Arthur Hirtzel's note on Lord Headley's letter to Austen Chamberlain, March 31, 1916, Ibid.
55. See Eric Hammond's poem, "Salutations to Indian Soldiers," *Islamic Review*, 3:8 (August 1915): 412; "Muslim Greetings from Woking to the Front," *Islamic Review*, 2:11–12 (December 1914): 534; Photograph of Muslim soldiers, *Islamic Review* 4:9 (September, 1916): inside front cover;

Photograph of Muslim soldiers joining in congregational prayers, *Islamic Review*, 3:11 (November 1915): after contents page.

56. *Islamic Review* 2:8 (September 1914), 394–395.
57. Ibid., 385.
58. Ibid., 395.
59. Ibid.
60. See Ron Geaves, *Islam in Victorian Britain: The Life and Times of Abdullah Quilliam* (Leicester: Kube, 2010).
61. "Abdullah Quilliam's *Fatwa* (Legal Opinion)," *The Crescent*, VII, 167, 25 March 1896, 617.
62. Resolution of the British Muslim Association, 1914, The National Archives Kew (hereafter TNA), FO 371/2173, 44432.
63. Letter from Henri Leon to Sir Edward Grey, 6 November 1914, TNA, FO 371/2146, 68803.
64. His presiding over the reception of The Indian Khilafat Delegation at the Woking Mosque (under the name of Prof. H. M. Leon), at which vigorous speeches were made in support of the Ottoman Caliphate, would not have gone un-noticed in official circles. See *Islamic Review*, 8:4 (April 1920): 139.
65. Anne Fremantle, *Loyal Enemy* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1938); P. Clark, *Marmaduke Pickthall: British Muslim* (London: Quartet Books, 1986).
66. Ibid., 7.
67. Fremantle, *Loyal Enemy*, 272, 286, 289.
68. Jamie Gilham, *Loyal Enemies: British Converts to Islam, 1850–1950* (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), 130–136.
69. "A Resolution," *Islamic Review*, 2:9 (October 1914): 421.
70. "Turkey and Great Britain," *Islamic Review*, 3:1 (January 1915): 36–37.
71. Director of Intelligence to the Foreign Office, 10 January 1920, TNA, FO 371/4155, 169869.
72. "Turkey and Great Britain," 36.
73. "Turkey and the Crisis," *Islamic Review* 2:11–12 (December 1914): 588–589.
74. Azmi Ozcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877–1924)* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 179–181.
75. Prasad, *The Indian Muslims and World War I*, 108–109.
76. Mohammad Naeem Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918–1924* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 83.
77. Eastern Report XLVI, 1917, TNA, FO 395/144, 235916.
78. Marmaduke Pickthall, "Asia for the Asiatics," *The Worker's Dreadnaught* 4:50 (1918): 964.

79. Marmaduke Pickthall, *Muslim Interests in Palestine* (Woking/London: Central Islamic Society, 1917), 10.
80. Resolution of the Islamic Society, Undated Minutes, 7 November 1917, TNA, FO 371/3054, 217355.
81. "Interview with Dr. Abdul Majid," *Shields Daily Gazette*, 11 March 1919, 2.
82. "Ali Said's letter to the editor," *Shields Daily Gazette*, 9 May 1916, 2.
83. Ibid.
84. "Letter to the editor," *Shields Daily Gazette*, 11 January 1930, 4.
85. See "Pleading the case of the Ottoman Caliphate: Indian Khilafatists' Endeavours in Europe," in Mohammed Naeem Qureshi, *Ottoman Turkey and Muslim South Asia, Perspectives, Perceptions and Responses* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014), 76–142.
86. For instance, "in 1922, it was reported that they [the Mujahidin of Chamarkand, a colony of mainly Pathan Muslims on India's North West Frontier, who had been engaged in anti-British subversive activities, including armed uprisings, since 1916] were receiving Rs. 1000 per mensem from the Central Khilafat Committee in India", Lal Baha, "The Activities of the Mujahidin 1900–1936," *Islamic Studies*, 18:2 (Summer 1979): 111.
87. For more on different aspects of the challenges facing returning soldiers to India after the war, see Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj*, Chapter 4, and Ansari, *The Emergence of Socialist Thought*, Chapter 2.
88. "The Burden of Civilisation," *Muslim Outlook*, 6 November 1919, 1; "The Premier's Ignorance," *Muslim Outlook*, 30 October 1919, 2.
89. The terms of the Treaty of Sèvres which the Ottoman Sultan/Caliph was compelled to sign in August 1920 ran counter to this pledge. See statement by the British Prime Minister Lloyd George, January 5, 1918, www.gwpda.org/1918/waraims.html, accessed 12 October 2016. For the provisions of The Peace Treaty of Sèvres regarding Turkey's borders see The Peace Treat of Sèvres, http://www.hri.org/docs/sevres/, accessed 12 October 2016.
90. Minute regarding Sheikh Kidwai, Future of Turkey, 31 July 1919, TNA, FO 371/4233, 110154.
91. Apart from Ottoman and German propaganda, some religious leaders also encouraged desertion.
92. Letter from Hamidullah Khan to Kot Dafadar Mohamed Wazir Khan, 5 May 1916, BL, IOR L/MIL/5/826, Part 5.
93. "Comrades in Arms," *Islamic Review*, 2:10 (October 1914): 421–423.
94. Das, *Race, Empire and First World War Writing*, 1. Also see fn. 1 on 25–26.
95. During the War, the recruitment posters were pitched to appeal at several levels: one had a "sipahi" (Indian soldier) with a pink map of India as background with the following caption: "This soldier is defending Hindustan (India); he is defending his home and his household. The best way to help your family is to join the Army". Another read: "who is going to

receive this money, gun, uniform? The one who will join the Army". See "Who will take this Uniform, Money and Rifle," 11 Amazing First World War Recruitment Posters, accessed 11 April 2015. http://www.iwm.org.uk/history/11-amazing-first-world-war-recruitment-posters. Another with "Recruitment: His Majesty the King-Emperor needs recruits for his Indian Army" in the middle, flanked by the Union flag on the left and a photo of the King-Emperor on the right, gave details offering "Reward", "Food", "Allowance" and "Arrangement for home remittances of pay", Imperial War Museum IWM_PST_012579: Recruitment, Imperial War Museum. In Britain, the *Islamic Review* 2, 11 (November 1914), reproduced Lord Kitchener's famous poster "Your King & Country Need You! A Call to Arms!" on its back cover. Accessed 11 April 2015. http://www.exploringsurreyspast.org.uk/themes/subjects/military/india-woking/islamic-review/.

96. John Charteris, *At G. H. Q.* (London: Cassell and Company, 1931), 66.

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CHAPTER 3

Between Friends and Enemies: The Dilemma of Jews in the Final Stages of the War

Sarah Panter

On October 11, 1918, the leading Anglo-Jewish newspaper, the *Jewish Chronicle*, called for Jews in Britain to take a more aggressive stance against anti-Semitism, seeing such an activist turn as the *only* option to ensure the community's future well-being: "Hit back! Hit back! Hit back! is the lesson for us, to be learnt by us from the ages through which we have lived".[1] This appeal, giving voice to the perception that the war had threatened Jewish integration in Britain, was published only four weeks before the armistice was to be signed, marking the first step in the victory of the allied powers. With the conclusion of hostilities in November 1918 the war-exhausted societies—including their Jews—now became categorised into "winners" and "losers", enjoying either the fruits of victory or suffering the consequences of defeat.[2] Like the wartime classifications of societies into "citizen and alien, friend and enemy", the notions of "winners" and "losers" did not necessarily match the experiences of its minorities.[3]

During the war, Jews fought alongside all belligerent parties as subjects or citizens of different nation-states and multi-ethnic empires, often facing

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a dilemma concerning their multiple bonds of loyalty: many Jews defined themselves first and foremost as citizens of a specific political community denying thereby the existence of peculiar bonds of solidarity with Jews across national borders. Others, however, put more emphasis on a transnational understanding of Jewishness, displaying either a strong sense of solidarity with co-religionists abroad that was based on aspects of "ethnicity", or a longing to be part of a Jewish "nation" (either in Palestine or, as it was often the case in Eastern Europe, in the diaspora). In times of national crisis it was, however, exactly this ambiguity of Jewish belonging(s) that made Jews as a minority especially prone to accusations of disloyalty and treason. In such a state of emergency the societies at war searched for clear-cut loyalties within "their" narrowly defined political communities, triggering sometimes—in quite a paranoid manner—psychological and physical attacks on so-called internal enemies.[4]

Studies on the First World War have, however, only recently begun to attribute more attention to the complex situation of religious, ethnic or national minorities between 1914–1918 and the transition of the early post-war societies to peace in 1919–1920.[5] In Jewish history—though slightly asynchronously—a similar trend can be observed since the 2000s in terms of reinterpreting the First World War as a watershed event.[6] Irrespective of this important historiographical shift over the last decades, the multi-sidedness of Jewish experiences of the First World War continues to remain largely at the margins of more general historical works on the early twentieth century.

This chapter discusses the dilemma of Jews as a supposedly "friendly" minority in the final stages of the war, focusing on the case studies of Germany and Britain yet without ignoring the war's transnational dynamics. Prior to this, the chapter concentrates on two central themes that shaped how Jews in both countries interpreted their war experiences: Jewish participation in the war effort and the challenges Jews faced during the years 1918 to 1919–1920 amidst demobilisation and the transition to peace. Both communities standing on opposing sides of the conflict considered themselves as "friendly" toward the state and as an integral part of society at-large, though this self-perception was tested heavily, in particular after 1916. Despite their peculiarities, regarding, for example, their size, the ratio between "native" and "foreign" Jews and their cultural profile, both Jewish communities were confronted with the question of the war's immediate as well as future impact on Jewish integration in general and Jewish self-perceptions in particular.[7] Analysing the dilemma

of Jews in the final stages of the war, this chapter will demonstrate how comparing the multi-facetted experiences of Jews in Germany and Britain can open up a discursive space in-between that helps to avoid rather one-dimensional narratives along the lines of Jewish "victory" or "defeat".

Contested Inclusion: Jewish Participation in the German and British War Efforts

After Germany had declared war on Russia on August 1, 1914, its Jewish citizens had hoped that their full-fledged participation in it, as Germans and as Jews, would further their integration into German society. Although anti-Jewish attitudes had not vanished overnight from the ranks of German society—as some eager optimists might have wished for—they also did not start systematically to affect public opinion at the German home front before 1915–1916. There, against the background of the German occupation in the East, fears connected to an alleged mass-immigration of Eastern European Jews—the so-called "Eastern Jewish question"—began to influence debates about Germany's war goals and cultural "mission" in Eastern Europe.[8] At the same time, heroic narratives and accounts of Jewish military participation, pointing also to potentially integrative aspects of the war, became thereby partly repressed within the German-Jewish public sphere. Many integrationist Jews felt increasingly threatened by an anti-Semitic propaganda that pushed the "Eastern Jewish question" to the centre of the debate. Yet many German Jews responded to it not necessarily by defending Eastern European Jews but often by marking clear boundaries separating them from their co-religionists beyond the borders; for integrationist, anti-Zionist Jews regarded themselves first and foremost as "German citizens of the Jewish faith". Such a self-understanding implied a strong commitment to place civic loyalties above Jewish loyalties, especially in times of crisis.[9]

German Zionists, by contrast, who argued along the lines of ethnically defined Jewish bonds of solidarity with Eastern European Jews, took quite a different stance on this issue. In this respect, they showed some parallels with orthodox leaders who projected onto their Eastern European co-religionists all their hopes to find Jewish authenticity and deepen Jewish religiosity in Western Europe. Before the war, Zionists (as well as orthodox Jews) had held, however, a clearly marked minority position within German Jewry.[10] Attacking the integrationist point of view on the

"Eastern Jewish question", they continued to stress their pre-war credo: that all anti-Semitic attacks on Eastern European Jews would ultimately aim at Western European Jews. In the Zionist mind, creating distance from the Eastern European Jews was not an apt strategy for fighting anti-Semitism in Germany, regardless of the current state of emergency and its homogenising pressure on national unity.[11] At first, then, the war triggered an intense confrontation not so much with the question of German Jews' contribution to the war effort, but rather with Eastern European Jews who German Jews had been viewing since the enlightenment as both "brothers and strangers".[12]

The longer the war lasted with its hardships at home and rising casualties at the front, the more discontent within German wartime society grew. In this climate, anti-Semitic activists focused more systematically than before on pushing German Jews to the margins of society, which led to Jews being singled out as scapegoats and enemies from within. This dynamic manifested itself in particular in the allegation that Jews, who were drafted on equal terms like other Germans, were "shirking" from war service. Individual instances of discrimination against Jewish soldiers in the army had been reported since the beginning of the war and were furthermore a well-known phenomenon of the past.[13] Nonetheless, the "Jew count" of October 11, 1916, ordering a census of all "conscripted members of the mosaic faith" in the German army for November 1, raised such attempts to exclude Jews from the community of the nation to a more general level.[14] Though the exact wording of the decree, referring to Jewish conscripts only as members of a religious community, might indicate otherwise, the proponents of the "Jew count" targeted Jews as members of a particular "race" and thus as *the* nation's enemy within.[15]

As more recent scholarship has pointed out, it is important to keep the ambiguity of individual Jewish responses to the "Jew count" in mind and avoid prematurely marking this event as a watershed in German-Jewish history.[16] Yet, two ways as to how it challenged the *self*-perceptions of Jews in Germany during the final stages of the war can be identified. First, the "Jew count" legitimised anti-Semitism as a state-approved, discriminatory measure against its own Jewish citizens who regarded themselves as deeply rooted in German culture. Second, it constructed a symbolic line of demarcation between non-Jewish soldiers and those Jewish soldiers who before had emphasised their Germanness over their Jewishness. Hence, the "Jew count" had not only a symbolic meaning at a political level but, to an even greater degree, signified the psychological dimensions of it in

Germany. It singled out Jews, insisting that they identify themselves to the Prussian War Department, to their superior officers, as well as their comrades—and thus figuratively to the German home front. This interpretation is strengthened further by two other aspects. The German authorities never published the results of the "Jew count" during the war, thereby deflecting attention from concrete facts (such as the large proportion of Jews in the military) and instead attributed greater meaning to its outcome on a symbolic level. Moreover, German-Jewish organisations had already in 1914–1915—and hence quite early on during the war—started to collect their own statistics on Jewish wartime participation. Sometimes, as in the case of Leopold Rosenak, who was an army rabbi, Jews also aided such attempts in the trenches.[17] So it would also clearly miss the point to argue that German Jews were completely overwhelmed and surprised by such allegations of Jewish shirking during the war. Yet what unsettled German Jewry arguably the most was not that pre-war stereotypes were re-emerging during the conflict but that they were now transformed into a discriminatory anti-Jewish measure, questioning their status as a "friendly" minority.

Intense protest by German Jews outside the political arena of the Reichstag, where German-Jewish representatives, as well as non-Jews like Philipp Scheidemann, heavily criticised the military's actions, was limited. This might help to explain why the unsettling impact of the "Jew count" did not always surface during the war in a more specific Jewish public sphere. This, in turn, was not all too surprising given the general restraint on public opinion that reflected itself, for example, in a circular of the Association of German Jews. After the Association's intervention at the Prussian War Department, it informed all Jewish newspapers in February 1917 that "[d]etailed reports about the concrete measures we have undertaken will be advisable only at a later point".[18] Nonetheless, integrationist, Orthodox as well as Zionist periodicals covertly started to criticise the "Jew count" before the war's end, addressing not so much the act itself but rather its unintended consequences. From a strategic point of view, this moderate agenda avoided an open attack on the government while it enabled German Jews at the same time to "silently" criticise the "Jew count".

In Britain, by contrast, the issue of contested Jewish loyalties in times of war at first followed a different logic. Although questions of belonging became increasingly tied to the depths of Jewish participation in Britain's war effort, the issue itself was also interconnected with what could be

called a "German" or "alien" spy fever: associating thereby a negatively connoted "Germanness" with Jews in Britain.[19] A further reason for this asynchrony was, among other things, that unlike Germany and many other continental armies, Britain had not traditionally relied on conscripts but instead drew upon voluntary enlistment to preserve its combat power during times of war. This changed only in January 1916, when the Military Service Act was passed by Parliament and the model of organising military service by conscription was introduced to Britain, albeit with the exception of Ireland.

From a Jewish point of view, an even more decisive factor was the introduction of universal conscription, first for unmarried and shortly afterwards for married men between the ages of 18 and 41. Conscription brought up claims that "friendly" alien Jews, principally Russian Jews living in Britain, should voluntarily enlist. Hence, right from the outset the political nuances of the British debate about the military service of Jews were layered differently compared to Germany and related to the war alliance between Britain and Russia. By voluntarily enlisting for British military service, Jewish immigrants could give something back to the country that had sheltered Jewish refugees since the 1880s. But on top of this, by sacrificing their lives as Russian subjects for the British nation, as the argument of its proponents ran, they could also strengthen their bonds of allied loyalty. The sensitivity of this issue becomes clear when the precise statistics are viewed. By July 1916, a report of the Aliens Enlistment Committee estimated that there were altogether about 30,000 "Russian Jews" in Britain who were of recruiting age.[20]

Strictly speaking, only non-naturalised Jewish immigrants in Britain should have stood at the centre of the conflict. Nonetheless, the boundaries became increasingly blurred between Jewish citizens, whether born to British or foreign parents, more recently naturalised Jewish citizens with an Eastern European family background and Jews who were legally "friendly" aliens.[21] This confusion also manifested itself in the imprecise usage of the notion "Russian Jews", and despite all attempts by Anglo-Jewry's integrationist leaders to draw boundaries between native and immigrant Jews, this dynamic had a negative impact on the status of Jewish integration in Britain as a whole.

Adding fuel to the fire of this Jewish "conscription crisis" was the fact that public opinion in Britain increasingly perceived the attitude of Eastern European Jewish immigrants as symptomatic of the disloyal behaviour of all Jews.[22] Sections of the right-wing press, in particular, had stirred up

fears, claiming that whereas married Englishmen had to serve and die in the trenches, "foreigners" would benefit in manifold ways from staying at home.[23] Furthermore, this accusation applied equally to non-naturalised "friendly" aliens as well as to naturalised ones who claimed exemption from military service on grounds of being conscientious objectors or Jewish ministers.[24] This was, by contrast, no major issue in Germany during the war, not least because its Jewish recruits were, as a whole, like their native counterparts in Britain, more acculturated and secularised in outlook and considered military service as a way of expressing patriotism towards *their* nation.

Following the implementation of the Military Service Act in 1916, the debate over the Jewish share in Britain's war effort took a more aggressive shape. For now, under the framework of conscription, the question arose as to whether Russian Jews as "friendly" aliens should *have to* enlist for war service with the British army. Because of its increasing focus on Jewish immigrants from Russia and its repercussions on the status of Anglo-Jewish integration as a whole, it thereby featured emotional parallels to both the "Jew count" and to the "Eastern Jewish question" in Germany. The main proponents of such a lobbying for "voluntary enlistment", who would, at a later stage of the war, become the founders of the anti-Zionist League of British Jews, portrayed such an option as an offer to "alien" Jews to become a valuable part of the British nation. This argument has also influenced later assessments by those historians who have put forward a rather whiggish narrative, claiming that the military service of Jewish immigrants had a "positive" impact on their acculturation process.[25] Though such an assessment might possibly be accurate for some Jewish immigrants, it ignores, however, the multiple ways Jews in Britain experienced the war "at home" and the deep emotional conflicts it entailed for them in the present.

The majority of British Jews supported the option of voluntary enlistment for Jewish foreign nationals from Russia in principle. Hence, in this respect they showed the same level of war enthusiasm as Jews in so many other European societies striving for deepening their integration through their patriotism. Yet almost in chorus with non-Jewish voices, members of the Anglo-Jewish establishment, such as the Conjoint's secretary and self-proclaimed anti-Zionist, Lucien Wolf, called for a compulsory enlistment of "friendly" alien Jews.[26] On June 2 Wolf had explained his point of view in a statement addressed to Lionel de Rothschild, a leading member of the Jewish War Services Committee (JWSC) that had been established at the

end of 1915 in order to recruit all eligible British Jews for war service.[27] In his statement Wolf argued that the military service of "friendly" alien Jews in Britain's time of crisis had to be "compulsory" for two reasons. First, because the individuals in question were actually obliged to participate in war service in their home country and, second, that keeping up a scheme of voluntary enlistment would not produce the results Anglo Jewry and public opinion wished for.[28]

Wolf's rationalisations as to why military service should be made compulsory for "friendly" alien Jews points to a major Anglo-Jewish *leitmotif* in the last stages of the war: the fear that an on-going opposition of Jewish "friendly" aliens to join the nation's war effort would endanger not only the present but also the future status of Jews in Britain. Trying to avoid just such a scenario, Wolf, who had coordinated his efforts with Claude G. Montefiore, president of the Anglo-Jewish Association, and David L. Alexander, president of the Board of Deputies, suggested the following scheme:

> What then we propose is that all subjects of Allied powers residing in this country who are of military age shall be offered the choice of joining the British Army, or of going back to their own countries to perform their military obligations there. We think, however, that aliens so recruited—that is, recruited to fight for England—should be allowed, if they so desire, to be ipso facto naturalised as British subjects.[29]

Wolf's attitude was well known to Home Secretary Herbert Samuel, himself a member of the Anglo-Jewish community, and therefore in constant need—at least publicly—to balance his sense of loyalty towards Jews and the British nation. Nonetheless, when Samuel announced the Home Office scheme pertaining to the military service question of "friendly" aliens in July 1916, not all of Wolf's expectations were met, especially with regard to the immediate naturalisation of "friendly" alien recruits. Since many Russian Jews had—or at least claimed to have—fled their home country to avoid military service in the Tsarist army, and the general Jewish situation in Russia had further deteriorated during the war, most of them saw the repatriation clause as an inhumane measure. As a consequence, the public responses to the Home Office scheme focused on issues of deportation, repatriation and naturalisation, as well as on the larger question of Britain's position as an asylum for refugees.[30]

Not all British Jews, whose (relief) institutions, such as the Board of Jewish Guardians, had selectively implemented the repatriation of poor Jewish immigrants between 1881 and 1914, were fully convinced that the option of deportation was the right way to handle the on-going opposition of "friendly" alien Jews to the proposed scheme.[31] Nonetheless, they—as many German Jews had done so during the war regarding the "Eastern Jewish question"—did not blame so much the government as the Jewish immigrants' own attitude for adopting such a harsh line on this question. In the end, this line of argument reflected, among other things, that both groups' concepts of Jewish belonging showed remarkable differences.

The emancipation of Jews in Russia during the course of the February Revolution of 1917 did not really help to change the situation of "friendly" alien Jews in Britain.[32] Violent attacks on Jews happened, for example, in Leeds (June 1917) and London (September 1917). Some contemporary Jewish observers even regarded these attacks as "a pogrom . . . in an English City".[33] From a general perspective, such attacks, which were aimed at Jews in a local context, symbolised as much the shattered status of Jewish integration in Britain during the final stages of the war as they gave a violent expression to the stereotype of "the alien" onto whom all the problems of the war-exhausted nation could be projected.[34] Those "friendly" alien Jews who, after the implementation of the Military Service (Conventions with Allied States) Act in July 1917, neither chose to go back to Russia nor were granted exemption from military service by local tribunals, had no option but to join the British army. Arriving in one of the many military training camps across the country, many Jewish recruits described their experience there in letters, addressed, for instance, to Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz, as a very alienating one. In this way, they also appealed to their highest community representative for action on their behalf. He, in turn, often forwarded letters to local Jewish communities and chaplains when it concerned the equal treatment of the Jewish religion in the camps.[35] Although this encounter with non-Jewish customs and practices might in hindsight have speeded up the acculturation process of some Jewish immigrants, not all contemporaries did necessarily see it as an accomplishment. In an article, printed in the *Jewish Chronicle* in February 1919 and sarcastically titled "The Bacon Tasted Good", Arthur Barnett, for example, stated quite the opposite: "Men who before had lived a fairly Jewish life, will now, after those years of de-Judaising tendencies and influence, find it difficult to recover their faded Jewish consciousness".[36] Barnett, who had served as a Jewish

chaplain with the British forces in France, issued therefore a clear warning to Anglo Jewry not to ignore the war's negative aftershocks and its impact on Jewish soldiers returning home.

Placed together, then, the debates among Jews in Germany and Britain about Jewish military participation in the war effort, particularly after the watershed year of 1916, illuminate two issues. On the one hand, they shed light on the place of Jews in their respective nations and on the other they serve as a seismograph for how the two societies (and their Jews) handled their own diversity. Yet the specific relationship between Jews and the military was linked not only to the war's emerging situational dynamics but also to structural trajectories, like the organisational schemes of military service (conscription or voluntary enlistment) in general and each nation's past military traditions.[37]

Jewish "Victories" and "Defeats": The Ambivalent Road to Peace and Post-War Stability

Jewish responses to the crisis of conflicted loyalties after 1916 were quite ambivalent in both countries. They were also shaped, furthermore, by transnational dynamics stemming from three major events in 1917: the entry of the United States into the war on the side of the allies, the October Revolution in Russia and the Balfour Declaration concerning the future of Jews in Palestine, as well as the war's political and social consequences at home. In this context, it became rather complex to evaluate what aspects and outcomes of the war should and could be viewed as a "victory" or "defeat"—an ambiguity that extended further into the immediate post-war period.

During 1917–1918, the attitude of German Jewry oscillated even more so than before between expressions of disillusionment and claims for a reorientation of Jewish life and politics. Attempts to question the current relationship between Germanness and Jewishness by highlighting the latter's public visibility had been, in essence, a side issue during the first years of the war. Now, however, due to the wartime empowerment of Zionism, among other things, such a re-alignment became an alternative option for "being Jewish" in Germany and was even publicly discussed by integrationist Jews. In April 1917, Bernhard Breslauer, for example, born in 1851 in the East Prussian province of Poznan and actively engaged in German-Jewish affairs, asked vehemently for a reorientation both in the

trenches as well as at home. "The times are over", he wrote in Germany's leading Jewish newspaper *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, "when the individual could believe that he was far better off not to be recognised as a member of the [Jewish] community: . . . everyone should confess to his Jewishness publicly".[38] Together with other aspects bound to the Jewish war experience, like the blossoming of Eastern European Jewish culture in the 1920s in the so-called *Scheunenviertel* of Berlin, such demands for a reorientation were the first manifestations for the nascent "[r]enaissance of Jewish culture" in the Weimar Republic.[39] Hence, resentment and hope as well as forgetting and cherishing the Jewish military participation did not necessarily exclude each other as the war drew to a close.

With the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk in the spring of 1918, Germany was finally able to end the war in the East. Optimism due to this Pyrrhic victory was, however, short-lived. Ever since the summer of 1918, after German troops had lost decisive battles as well as manpower at the Western front, popular mood turned into disillusionment, undermining the last remaining pillars of Imperial Germany. Discontent and political unrest on the German home front intensified further as the German army began to disintegrate. In this crisis a new wave of anti-Semitism, characterised by its ruthlessness and broad mass support swept Germany and its fragmented political scene.[40] Many Jews were well aware of this "new" anti-Semitism. Else Dormitzer-Dorn, a female voice of German Jewry, for example, complained at the end of July 1918 that compared to earlier anti-Semitic incidents, "the mass of the people" was no longer able to fairly judge allegations against Jews. Hence, what before the war could have been regarded as an "isolated occurrence", an "exception" had now become a "norm", a "habit".[41] Yet at that point, the manifold consequences of wartime anti-Semitism had just begun to be openly debated amongst German Jews, unfolding in much greater depth in the aftermath of the war.[42]

From the perspective of Jews, the struggle over their place within Germany, therefore, did not end with the signing of the armistice in November 1918. Faced with the loss of war and its psychological repercussions but also with turmoil amidst demobilisation, and in particular the German Revolution, this instability created a civil war-like situation in the spring of 1919, when the full potential of the "revolution from below" unfolded. As a result, German society became polarised into radical left-wing and extremist right-wing groups both destabilising the early Weimar Republic but not, as more recent

scholarship has shown, leading directly to its "failure" as a laboratory for parliamentary democracy and political culture in Germany.[43] Despite all this, Jews had to adapt to the new political order of the Weimar Republic. In November 1918, the publicly voiced expectations of German Jews bore a remarkable resemblance to the hopes they had expressed when going to war in summer 1914: to achieve the level of "true equality" that had previously been denied to them.[44] Indeed, Jews were now more visible than ever before in German politics and public affairs. Yet, already in the last weeks of the war, German society had started to search for scapegoats to blame for the nation's defeat, giving rise to many transnational conspiracy theories concerning supposedly subversive forces (Jews, pacifists and Bolshevists).[45] In the 1920s, this popularising stab-in-the-back myth gradually started to focus on Jews as being singly responsible for the lost war and contributed therefore in the long run also to a turning inward of German Jewry.[46]

Interconnected but differently shaped dynamics and trajectories confronted British Jews in the final stages of the war. During this period, anti-Jewish stereotypes were reshaped linking already prevalent stereotypes of Jews as "aliens" and "Germans" with a new one: Jews as "Bolshevists" and thereby mediators of "foreign" political radicalism to Britain. Such fears within British society would not disappear at the official close of the war and continued to remain visible during the country's transition from war to peace. They were further reinforced by legal measures, such as the Aliens Restriction Act of 1919, which decreed even harsher restrictions for aliens than those, which had been enacted under the circumstances of the war's state of emergency in 1914.[47] Hence, the legacies of war extended way beyond the Jewish sphere.

Whereas some British Jews seemed, at least on the surface, unaffected by the combined manifestations of anti-alienism, anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism, many others started to pledge for changing means of communal self-defence. Compared to the situation of Jews in Germany, British Jews called far less frequently for an intellectual turning inward as the war drew to a close. Instead they pushed for a more aggressive stance in practice towards those groups, attacking their status of integration.[48] As a consequence, Anglo Jewry's perceptions of the arriving "peace", though marked by honouring declarations towards king and country, were not necessarily as euphoric as may have been expected from a group on the winning side. During the war, British Jews had been forced to fight the

war on so many "fronts" that it is clear that the community had been tested to a previously unparalleled degree.[49] "Victory" was reached, therefore, but only amidst partial disillusionment.

However, from 1919 to 1920, those who tried to shape a glorifying post-war narrative of the Anglo-Jewish experience of the First World War, such as chaplain Michael Adler, pushed for a process of selective forgetting. This placed the emphasis on the positive aspects of the Anglo-Jewish experience of the war, such as the fraternisation of soldiers of all denominations in the trenches. Hence, Adler's interpretation was based primarily on the religious implications of the Jewish soldiers' "Jewishness" in the trenches, and not so much on the war's potential for social and ethnic conflict among Britain's minorities. Thereby, many leading British Jews, like their counterparts in Germany, but under quite different circumstances, partly denied the huge emotional toll the four and a half years of war had taken on Jews.[50] Nonetheless, the process of renegotiating the war's impact and legacies in the 1920s would continue to be linked to divergent interpretations of the relationship between anti-Semitism, liberalism and cultural diversity in Britain. The question of the future place of Jews within British society might have gradually lost its acuteness in the post-war period, but not its relevancy.

Negotiations at Versailles: An Outlook at the "Jewish Question" in 1919

As discussed so far, the status of Jews as a "friendly" minority in Germany and Britain became increasingly contested between 1916 and 1919. To turn for a brief and final moment to events on an international level: here, it becomes clear that the question of Jewish loyalty emerged in quite a different form, focusing in particular on the idea of Jewish minority rights and the issue of cultural autonomy for Jews in Eastern Europe. German Jews had been primarily occupied with the future status of East European Jews as strategic allies during the German occupation of the region from 1915 to 1918. In contrast, Jews in the entente countries had intensely debated Jewish minority rights, as well as ways to protect Jews threatened by violent pogroms in the emerging states of Eastern Europe. Fearing that the newly drawn borders, which aimed to create homogenised ethnic nation-states, would further hinder the status of Eastern European Jews, Lucien Wolf and Louis Marshall, from Britain and the United States

respectively, were sent to Versailles to put the "Jewish question" on the international agenda. During the Paris Peace Conference, Wolf and Marshall not only counselled their respective governments on the question of Jewish minority rights, but also actively negotiated in the "Committee on New States".[51]

As had been the case during the war concerning the entangled issues of the Jewish future in Palestine and the diaspora, the attitudes of the Anglo American Jewish leaders at Versailles were shaped by a strong commitment to universalist liberalism and not to Jewish (or any other) nationalism; only liberal states fashioned after the "Western" model were thought to be able to safeguard Jewish rights around the globe. Yet, like the earlier attempts of German Jewry to bring "light to the East" such ideals more often than not did not take into account the divergent self-identifications and local conditions of Eastern European Jews. Hence, their actual situation was very different from that of the Jewish diplomats who intended to speak for the former's "rights" on the international stage. In this respect, the pre-war East-West or nationalist-integrationist divide between Jews in the diaspora remained remarkably intact at the highest level of international politics. For German Jews, by contrast, the central question at that time focused less on Germany's or Jewry's future in the East than on the outcome of the peace negotiations regarding their country's future status, its territorial ambitions in Europe and the post-war stability of post-imperial German society. Although many Jewish newspapers reported intensely on the goals of the German delegation to Versailles, their influence on the future of Jewish minority rights at the Paris Peace Conference was only marginal. Germany would, however, take up the case of minority rights in the 1920s, portraying itself as the defender of all those ethnic minorities who felt disadvantaged by the peace treaties and the selective implementation of national self-determination.[52] In this respect, then, the situation of German Jews was paradoxically fairly similar to that of other "ethnic" Germans.

In the final stages of the war, Jews in Germany and Britain, like so many other religious, ethnic or national minorities in and beyond Europe, had to face the complexities that stemmed from their entangled wartime national and transnational loyalties. Although both Jewish communities shared a similar challenge when it came to asserting their loyalty vis-à-vis the state and nation in times of crisis, the way this manifested itself was shaped by different circumstances and structural settings at the respective home fronts. In Germany where "native" Jews clearly outnumbered

Jewish immigrants, it was initially the "Eastern Jewish question" that emerged as an important discursive battlefield, linking fears of immigration with radicalised anti-Semitic stereotypes at home. Though showing some remarkable psychological parallels when it came to the question of how Jews themselves handled Jewish "difference", the situation of Jews in Britain was quite different. For there, it was not so much the "imaginary" question of future Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe but rather the practical question of how to handle the integration of "foreign", that is, religiously observant, Yiddish-speaking, working-class Jews living in their midst. In both Jewish communities the war's main impact was therefore its catalyst effect on pre-war Jewish fissures: for these questions had already been discussed in Germany and Britain for several decades. Under the circumstances and in the aftermath of the war, both Jewish communities, who had previously constructed ways of managing the integration of Eastern European Jewish immigrants on both a local and national level, were now challenged to rethink them.

From 1916 Jews in both Germany and Britain were plunged into debates about the Jewish share in the nation's war effort. Although the boundaries between citizenship and ethnicity were blurred in both nations along the way, peculiarities have to be acknowledged. In Germany this debate, crystallised by the "Jew count", aimed not at "foreign" Jews in a legal sense who could furthermore be easily identified as such, for example, by their language, religious practices or political leanings. On the contrary, it aimed at those Jews who were, for the most part, highly acculturated, middle-class citizens and saw themselves as deeply rooted within German culture.

Paradoxically, then, in Germany it were exactly those Jews who maintained a strong willingness to place their civic loyalties above their bonds of Jewish solidarity who got pushed to the margins of German society. The war, therefore, set in motion two differently layered logics of Jewish integration in Germany and Britain that were connected to both communities' historical roots as well as their peculiar institutional trajectories: On the one hand, the highly acculturated German Jews experienced a turning inward in the final stages of the war, on the other, many Jewish immigrants in Britain experienced a turning outward because of their intensified (but at least partly "forced") encounter with non-Jewish and, in particular, military life. Both dynamics of turning inward or outward were, however, really to unfold only in the 1920s. Hence, such processes say as much about the *Jewish* experiences of the war as the search by German and British society for post-war stability.

Compared to the Jewish situation in Germany the construction of a heroic narrative of war service for king and country would turn out, at least in the long run, to be a more successful endeavour for British Jews. For despite all political and social aftershocks on the road to "peace", British society, and with it its minorities, was spared the violent collapse of its political system as well as the same level of radicalised anti-Semitism that had by then made deep inroads into German society. This does not mean, as the war had shown, that "liberal" states were always able to handle cultural diversity more humanely or effectively than "non-liberal" ones. The multi-sidedness of the Jewish experiences of the war is rather a case in point for questioning whether the two regimes in Britain and Germany can really be defined in such clear cut-terms with regard to the ways and means they handled Jewish "difference". Indeed the complex realities in both societies produced not linear outcomes but a situation in flux.[53]

Hence, analysing the entangled perceptions of Jews as both "friends" and "enemies" in the final stages of the war highlights that the experiences of religious, ethnic or national minorities cannot be told as one-sided narratives of "victory" and "defeat". Rather, this decisive historical moment bore both fears of aftershocks *and* the hope for a democratic progress of humanity. The impact of the war, therefore, left contradictory and sometimes heavily contested legacies for Jews: pointing to dynamics of disillusionment as well as to empowerment.

Notes

1. "In the Communal Armchair. Hit Back! Hit Back! Hit Back!," *Jewish Chronicle*, October 11, 1918, 7.
2. Whereas the armistice of November 11, 1918 marked the official endpoint of the war, the violence that erupted in the course of it continued afterwards, creating many "new" fronts in times of peace, especially in Eastern Europe but also elsewhere. On the ambivalent outcomes of the war and its consequences in the immediate post-war period, see Jörn Leonhard, *Die Büchse der Pandora: Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2014), 939–978.
3. Ben Peter Gidley, "Citizenship and Belonging: East London Jewish Radicals, 1903–1918" (PhD diss., University of London, 2003), 194. On the recent interest in "aliens" and "enemies" at the home fronts during the war, see Daniela L. Caglioti ed., *Aliens and Internal Enemies during the First World War* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2014).

4. For a more detailed analysis of Jewish war experiences in Europe and the United States, see Sarah Panter, *Jüdische Erfahrungen und Loyalitätskonflikte im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014).
5. Panikos Panayi, ed., *Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia during the Two World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Panikos Panayi, ed., *Germans as Minorities during the First World War: A Global Comparative Perspective* (Ashgate: Farnham, 2014). One early exception for the Jewish case is: David Cesarani, "An Embattled Minority: The Jews in Britain during the First World War," *Immigrants & Minorities* 8:1–2 (1989).
6. David Rechter, *The Jews of Vienna and the First World War* (Oxford: Littman Library, 2001); Marsha Rozenblit, *Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Tim Grady, *The German-Jewish Soldiers of the First World War in History and Memory* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011); Derek Penslar, *Jews and the Military: A History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Christopher M. Sterba, *Good Americans. Italian and Jewish Immigrants during the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Ulrich Sieg, *Jüdische Intellektuelle im Ersten Weltkrieg: Kriegserfahrungen, weltanschauliche Debatten und kulturelle Neuentwürfe* (Berlin: Akademie, 2001); and for the British case, in particular Anne Lloyd, "Jews under Fire: The Jewish Community and Military Service in World War I Britain" (PhD diss., University of Southampton, 2009).
7. On the eve of the war, Jews in Germany numbered 615,021, including 70,000 Eastern European Jews. In Britain, in contrast, Jews numbered only about 257,000, yet included a much larger proportion of Eastern European Jews, that is, mainly urbanised, working-class and Yiddish-speaking Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe. These numbers for Jews living in Britain are, however, a conservative estimate and others put them higher, at around 300,000. Between 1881 and 1914, about 120,000 to 150,000 foreign Jews, in particular from the Russian Empire, had made their new home in Britain. "Statistics of Jews, A. Jewish Population of the World," *American Jewish Year Book* 19 (1917–1918): 409–410; Jack Wertheimer, "'The Unwanted Element': East European Jews in Imperial Germany," *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 26 (1981): 32; Todd Endelman, *The Jews of Britain, 1656 to 2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 127, 129.
8. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

9. Willy Cohn, "Die Zukunftsfragen des deutschen Judentums, " *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, November 26, 1915, 566; Kurt Alexander, "Deutschland und die Ostjudenfrage. Eine Erwiderung, " *Im deutschen Reich*, January 1916, 25.
10. Though remaining a numerical minority within the Jewish communities across Central and Western Europe, Zionists would experience in many respects a process of self-empowerment during the war. See Michael Berkowitz, *Western Jewry and the Zionist Project, 1914–1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 7–25.
11. M.R., "Die Ostjudenfrage I," *Ost und West*, February 1916, 79; Leo Herrmann, "Das Kredo der Assimilanten," *Jüdische Rundschau*, January 14, 1916, 9–10.
12. Steven E. Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and German Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982).
13. Panter, *Erfahrungen*, 180–185. There were, however, not only many Jewish conscripts but also many others, like the Jewish chaplain Aaron Tänzer, who served as war volunteers with the German army. In Britain, the sons of Anglo-Jewry, who like their German counterparts belonged mainly to the acculturated middle-class, had also volunteered eagerly before the introduction of conscription in 1916. See Endelman, *Britain*, 185.
14. Abschrift. Kriegsministerium. An das Kaiserliche Generalgouvernement Warschau, October 11, 1916, Bundesarchiv Freiburg, Nr. 247/8. 16 C 1 b, PH 30/II/19, 28.
15. Panter, *Erfahrungen*, 265
16. For a nuanced interpretation of the German-Jewish soldiers' war experiences, avoiding the pitfalls of earlier scholarship, see Penslar, *Military*, 166–194; Grady, *Soldiers*.
17. Protokoll der Sitzung des geschäftsführenden Ausschusses, June 30, 1915, Archiv der Stiftung Neue Synagoge Berlin—Centrum Judaicum (CJB), 1, 75 C Ve 1, Nr. 398 (13020).
18. Rundschreiben des Verbands der deutschen Juden an alle jüdischen Zeitungen, February 4, 1917, CJB, 1, 75 C Ve 1, Nr. 226 (12849).
19. On the importance of "spy fever" and the fears associated with it in particular during the first weeks of the war, see: Catriona Pennell, *A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 102. For a more detailed analysis of the general situation of "Jews", "Germans" and "aliens"—three notions that were used interchangeably during the war, see Susanne Terwey, *Moderner Antisemitismus in Großbritannien, 1899–1919: Über die Funktion von Vorurteilen sowie Einwanderung und nationale Identität* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006), 179; Panikos

Panayi, *The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World War* (Oxford: Berg, 1991), 8.

20. Report of the Aliens Enlistment Committee, July 26, 1916, 3, The National Archives Kew (TNA), HO 45/10818/318095. During the war, approximately 41,500 Jews from Britain, most of whom were drafted after the passing of the Military Service Act in 1916 (including 8,000 Russian Jews, which meant "foreign" Jews, in 1917/18), would serve with the British Army. These figures are quoted from Anne Lloyd, "Between Integration and Separation: Jews and Military Service in World War I Britain," *Jewish Culture and History* 12:1–2 (2010): 43.
21. On the difficulty of distinguishing between naturalised and non-naturalised Jews, see also Sascha Auerbach, "Negotiating Nationalism: Jewish Conscription and Russian Repatriation in London's East End, 1916–1918," *Journal of British Studies* 46:3 (2007).
22. The idea of a "conscription crisis" is usually associated with resistance to the Military Service Act in Ireland in 1918 but it is equally apt for characterising the cultural and political aspects of the Jewish situation. On the conscription crisis in Ireland, see Thomas Hennessey, *Dividing Ireland. World War I and Partition* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 214–221.
23. See Newspaper Clippings. "The Shamelessness of the Foreign Jew," August 5, 1916; "The Future of the Foreign Jew," August 12, 1916, TNA, HO 45/10818/318095.
24. For more details on this debate, see Panter, *Erfahrungen*, 223–227.
25. William D. Rubinstein, *A History of the Jews in the English-Speaking World: Great Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 194.
26. On Wolf's role as Jewry's main "diplomat" during the war, see Mark Levene, *War, Jews, and the New Europe. The Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914–1919* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
27. On the JWSC, see Anne Lloyd, "War, Conflict and the Nation: Between Integration and Separation: Jews and Military Service in World War I Britain," in *Whatever Happened to British Jewish Studies?*, eds. Hannah Ewence and Tony Kushner (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2012), 48–51.
28. Lucien Wolf to Lionel de Rothschild, June 2, 1916, London Metropolitan Archives—Board of Deputies of British Jews (LMA), ACC/3121/C/11/002/009/001. Wolf would later expand on his arguments publicly: "The Alien and the Army. Can We Conscript Foreigners?," *Daily Chronicle*, September 6, 1916, TNA, HO 45/10819/318095.
29. Wolf to de Rothschild, 2.
30. "Deportation of Jews: Alarm of Jewish Population of East London," TNA, HO 45/10818/318095; Enlistment or Deportation of Russians. "The Light of Asylum," *Manchester Guardian*, ibid.

31. See Severin Adam Hochberg, "The Repatriation of Eastern European Jews from Great Britain, 1881–1914," *Jewish Social Studies* 50 (1992).
32. On the impact of the Russian Revolution on Anglo Jewry, see Harold Shukman, *War or Revolution: Russian Jews and Conscription in Britain, 1917* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2006); Sharman Kadish, *Bolsheviks and British Jews: The Anglo-Jewish Community, Britain, and the Russian Revolution* (London: Frank Cass, 1992).
33. "In the Communal Armchair. The Trouble at Leeds, and Other Places," *Jewish Chronicle*, June 22, 1917, 8.
34. For different interpretations concerning the complex relationship between anti-alienism and anti-Semitism during the war, see Colin Holmes, *Anti-Semitism in British Society, 1876–1939* (London: Arnold, 1979), 136; Tony Kushner, "Jew and non-Jew in the East End of London: Towards an Anthropology of 'Everyday' Relations," in *Outsiders & Outcasts. Essays in Honour of William J. Fishman*, eds. Geoffrey Alderman and Colin Holmes (London: Duckworth, 1993), 42–44.
35. See, for example, the letters contained in the Chief Rabbi's correspondence with chaplains and military personnel, LMA, ACC/2805/04/04/011.
36. Arthur Barnett, "The Bacon Tasted Good, 1919," *Jewish Chronicle*, February 28, 1919, in *A Documentary History of Jewish Immigrants in Britain, 1840–1920*, ed. David Englander (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1994), 351.
37. On the differences, see, for example, Alexander Watson, "Voluntary Enlistment in the Great War: A European Phenomenon?" in *War Volunteering in Modern Times: From the French Revolution to the Second World War*, eds. Christine Krüger and Sonja Levsen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
38. Bernhard Breslauer, "Neuorientierung," *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, April 20, 1917, 183.
39. Anne-Christin Saß, *Berliner Luftmenschen. Osteuropäisch-jüdische Migranten in der Weimarer Republik* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012); Michael Brenner, *The Renaissance of Jewish Culture in Weimar Germany* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
40. Werner Jochmann, *Gesellschaftskrise und Judenfeindschaft in Deutschland 1870–1945* (Hamburg: Christians, 1988), 118.
41. Else Dormitzer-Dorn, "Wir wollen sein ein einig Volk von Brüdern," *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, July 26, 1918, 349–350.
42. "Vom Kriegs-Antisemitismus," *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, November 22, 1918, 560–562.
43. Alexander Gallus, "Revolutions (Germany)," in *1914–1918 online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, accessed August 11,

2015, http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/revolutions_germany/2014-10-08.

44. M.R., "Die Revolution," *Neue jüdische Monatshefte: Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Literatur in Ost und West*, November 10, 1918, 49.
45. On the stab-in-the-back myth in Germany, see Boris Barth, "Dolchstoßlegende und Novemberrevolution," in *Die vergessene Revolution von 1918/19*, ed. Alexander Gallus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2010).
46. Cornelia Hecht, *Deutsche Juden und Antisemitismus in der Weimarer Republik* (Bonn: Dietz, 2003), 72–97; Paul Mendes-Flohr, "Im Schatten des Weltkrieges," in *Deutsch-jüdische Geschichte in der Neuzeit, Vol. IV: Aufbruch und Zerstörung, 1918–1945*, eds. Avraham Barkai and Paul Mendes-Flohr (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1997), 28–36; Peter Pulzer, "Between Hope and Fear. Jews and the Weimar Republic," in *Jüdisches Leben in der Weimarer Republik = Jews in the Weimar Republic*, eds. Wolfgang Benz, Arnold Paucker and Paul Mendes-Flohr (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 271–279.
47. See Endelman, *Britain*, 200–202; David Cesarani, "An Alien Concept? The Continuity of Anti-Alienism in British Society Before 1940," in *The Internment of Aliens in Twentieth-Century Britain*, eds. Tony Kushner and David Cesarani (London: Routledge, 1993), 37–38; Susan Kingsley Kent, *Aftershocks: Politics and Trauma in Britain, 1918–1931* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
48. "League of British Jews," *Jewish Opinion*, April 1919, 1; "In the Communal Armchair. The Means for 'Hitting Back'," *Jewish Chronicle*, October 18, 1918, 7.
49. "In the Communal Armchair. Peace: Some Thoughts," *Jewish Chronicle*, November 1, 1918, 7; "To the King," *Jewish World*, November 13, 1918, 5.
50. See, for example, Michael Adler, *British Jewry Book of Honour, 1914–1918* (London: Caxton, 1922).
51. On the debate about Jewish minority rights in Eastern Europe and the role of Anglo American Jewry, see Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and more recently, Liliana Riga and James Kennedy, "Tolerant Majorities, Loyal Minorities and 'Ethnic Reversals'," *Nations and Nationalism* 15 (2009).
52. Mark Mazower, "Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe," *Daedalus* 126 (1997): 52.
53. See David Cesarani et al., "England, Liberalism and the Jews: An Anglo-Jewish Historikerstreit," *Jewish Quarterly* 44 (1997); Till van Rahden, "'In Defence of Differences': A Comment on Tony Kushner," in *Two Nations. British and German Jews in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Michael Brenner, Rainer Liedtke and David Rechter (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 111–115.

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CHAPTER 4

Bridging the Gap Between "War" and "Peace": The Case of Belgian Refugees in Britain

Hannah Ewence

August 2014 marked the beginning of a four-year long period of international commemorative activities to honour the centenary of the First World War. The magnified significance awarded to the conflict has brought with it a vigorous national appetite in Britain to locate examples of sacrifice, heroism, and the force of the human spirit. The experience of refugees from Belgium, given shelter in Britain from the earliest days of the conflict, has provided just such a ready-made narrative for a "useable past", which has allowed British politicians to claim moral cache for the historical treatment of immigrants.[1] Similarly, within the retelling of that history, the British public have been encouraged to accept the hugely simplistic and yet comforting narrative of their nation as a bulwark of long-entrenched liberal values.[2]

In reality, whilst the estimated 250,000 so-called "Belgian refugees" that found their way to Britain, largely between August 1914 and the end of 1915 (for exiles from other beleaguered continental nations who had arrived via Belgium also found themselves inaccurately characterised thus), were the recipients of an unprecedented

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outpouring of localised philanthropy, labour initiatives and an (initially) warm welcome, their treatment fell far from the model of amiable relations often claimed. This was never more apparent than in the British government's scheme for the repatriation of the refugees at the end of the war, which descended into an exercise in hasty, even brutal efficiency to rid the country of any refugee that remained. The 12,000 who, by January 1920, had not returned to the continent under their own steam, or taken up the government's offer of "free" (that is, predicated on certain draconian conditions) passage to Belgium, found themselves the object of increasingly stringent rhetoric that reframed them as a "problem" and their "option" of repatriation replaced by the prospect of forced deportation.[3]

Although the pace of scholarship about the experience of Belgian refugees in Britain has increased exponentially in recent years, going some way towards rescuing this episode of displacement and exile from oblivion, attention paid to the final stages of that experience has been sorely lacking.[4] Besides the often cursory mention of the repatriation scheme, typically used to provide a neat ending to accounts of the refugee movement, few histories have examined in detail the particulars of the government policy to extract Belgians from villages, towns and cities across the country.[5] Neither has there been any sustained consideration of the conditions that the returned faced once they arrived back in their war-torn, economically devastated and socially traumatised homeland. Instead the scholarship has often sadly echoed the attitude of the British state towards the refugees; that is, once the refugees were "out of sight" of Britain, they found themselves "out of mind" too. Yet, as Colin Holmes pointed out in his seminal study of immigration to Britain from the Victorian period onwards, traces of the Belgians remained, often in very tangible forms, "in the shape of the National Projectile Factory at Birtley, the run-down Kryn and Lahy works at Letchworth [...], "the Belgian houses" in Derby, the painting by Franzoni on the "Landing of the Belgian refugees August 1914"...and [at the time of writing at least] the existence of women, now growing old in Belgium, whose name of Angele commemorate their birth in England".[6] Such legacies of the wartime refugee presence linger not only in Britain's built environment but also in the local histories of communities who provided housing, jobs and charity to arriving Belgians. Their memories of this exceptional time did not cease with the ending of hostilities but often stayed with families and communities for many years. In a no doubt far larger number of cases

than have been documented, for example, relations between the hosts and the hosted after 1918 frequently endured through regular postal correspondence and even mutual visits to one another's homelands.[7]

This rather glaring neglect of the various facets of the refugees' negotiation of the bridge between "war" and "peace" speaks perhaps of the more widespread tendency within the historiography to bracket First World War histories with the somewhat artificial chronological construction "1914–1918". Whilst these years certainly mark the "official" start and end point of the conflict, they make no allowances for either the long build-up to the outbreak of hostilities, nor the human "fall-out" and long and often immensely difficult period of national reconstruction which many states faced in and beyond the inter-war years. So too, however, does this lacuna reflect the void that refugees often find themselves cast into when what should be "their" history comes to be written. Even in the retelling of the trans-national histories of international conflict, refugees have and continue to "fall into the cracks" of history, typically falling outside of national histories whilst also sitting uncomfortably with the cross-national tendency (in First World War studies at least) to prioritise front line action over home front experience; bloody sacrifice and heroism over civilian displacement.[8] As Peter Gatrell has pointed out in his history of refugees from the Russian Empire during the First World War, "soldiers had a chance to become heroes; but no refugee was lionized. Even in death, military and civilian casualties were accorded different treatment. There are no war graves for the thousands of refugees who died en route to a 'place of safety'".[9]

This chapter will seek to correct this oversight by arguing that these latter stages of the Belgian refugee experience offer more than simply a bookend to a four-year long period of international conflict. Indeed, a closer examination of the processes whereby those in exile found themselves returned to the continent reveals much about both the continued erosion of British Liberalism, as well as the anxieties of a nation emerging from a prolonged period of international uncertainty to face, once again, the challenges of domestic volatility, economic fragility and social unrest. So too, however, does attention paid to the early days and months of peacetime offer an opportunity to touch upon, albeit briefly, the "twilight zone", which returning refugees, retreating armies, displaced civilians and others navigated; a strange temporal and spatial "no-man's-land" between the official ending of hostilities and the beginnings of national reconstruction schemes. Examining this much overlooked "twilight zone" helps to

expose the fallacy of the immediate aftermath of war as a time of "peace". For refugees returning to Belgium, the point of arrival back "home" marked, instead, the commencement of a long period of turmoil and transition, the traumas of which entered and still remain evident in Belgium's own First World War memory culture.

From Repatriation to Deportation

The logistics of managing both small- and large-scale repatriation schemes had long been on the wartime government's agenda. From the earliest weeks and months of the conflict, the Foreign Office had grappled with the challenge of extracting British citizens from German-occupied zones of France and Belgium. As the curtain of war descended across northern Europe, hundreds of Britons found themselves trapped on the wrong side of the front line, stranded there in some cases after a short, but poorly timed sojourn to the continent. For others, Belgium or France had provided opportunities for work, for family life and for cultural enrichment—all sadly curtailed in the summer of 1914 under the shroud of war. Yet securing the release of civilians was no easy feat and, even after two years of war, the Foreign Office remained extremely busy with the task of fielding communications from Britons increasingly desperate for news of their family members all but incarcerated behind enemy lines.[10]

The British government also found itself facing the inverse scenario: what to do with "enemy aliens" living in Britain. At the outbreak of war, parliament wasted little time deciding upon the necessity of encouraging the departure or hastening the deportation of German and Austro-Hungarian citizens. The Aliens Restriction Act, a stringent modification of the Aliens Act of 1905, rapidly reconfigured under cover of war to restrict and exclude all "undesirable aliens", passed into law after its first reading in the House of Commons on August 5, 1914.[11] Under the terms of the legislation, "undesirable" women, children and men who were unable to join up (the elderly and the invalided), as well as doctors and church ministers, were identified as prime targets for repatriation.[12] By May 1915, in the wake of the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the shift towards a far more uncompromising policy of interning male enemy aliens, those who were not at immediate threat of incarceration (women and men beyond military age) nonetheless had to justify why they should be allowed to remain.[13] This state-led determination to "root out" any

possible threat to national security resulted, by the end of 1919, in the repatriation of almost 30,000 aliens.[14]

Belgians who lived out the war in Britain were also subject to a catalogue of policy manoeuvres by the British state that may have been different in tone but differed little in their overarching ambition. Indeed, whilst Belgians had been broadly welcomed to Britain as "friendly aliens" at the outbreak of war, their plight and presence becoming a useful emblem of German tyranny, and a ready weapon for the fierce Germanophobic propaganda campaign waged in Britain, they too found themselves subject to the draconian measures enacted under the Aliens Restriction Act. This determined where refugees were allowed to settle as well as where they might visit, excluding them from port towns, seaside resorts and coastal locations more broadly.[15] Moreover, whilst the refugee population was spared the threat of internment and, during the war years at least, forced deportation, it was always the intention of the British government that the refugees should be returned *en masse* to Belgium after the war. Herbert Samuel, President of the Local Government Board (LGB), the parliamentary body charged with supervising the relief of the incoming Belgians, had been careful to temper expectations about the duration of the Belgians' stay in Britain from the outset. In a speech to the House of Commons in September 1914, Samuel took great care to caveat his confidence that "many individuals throughout the country will be ready to join in offering asylum here" with the assurance that such hospitality would only be expected "until conditions in Belgium enable the refugees to return".[16] State hospitality towards "Brave little Belgium" appeared, then, when seen in this light, as little more than a useful tool to nurture the impression of a continued commitment to liberalism, tolerance and the right of asylum. So too was it a useful weapon of propaganda in the fight against the "evil Hun". Yet, hospitality was, in reality, bestowed on a temporary basis only. Repatriation, rather than naturalisation was, from the inception of the relief scheme, the ultimate goal.

This commitment to repatriation was in evidence at a local, national and even international level from the early stages of the war, even when its foresighted aspirations was seen to be at odds with the more immediate need to provide relief.[17] The Belgian Repatriation Fund, established by the English wife of the Belgian Secretary of State, had been set up to anticipate the needs of Belgian people who chose to return to liberated zones in advance of state-funded repatriation initiatives. Its early establishment was an indicator of the assumption—pervasive even into 1915—that

the war would be short.[18] Madam Vandervelte, the mastermind behind the fund, disseminated appeals across Britain and its Empire, beseeching the Empire's citizens to give generously.[19] Local communities in Britain also found themselves the objects of this charity drive to secure donations to the fund. Posters disseminated across the country placed the onus on "English men and women" to "remember August, 1914", a sentiment accompanied by a cartoon from *Punch* showing a belligerent Germany confronted by a diminutive and yet determined Belgium blocking their passage. This lobbying for funding positioned Britons as owing a "moral debt" to Belgium for its early sacrifices. The Repatriation Fund—distinct from the objectives of the later Repatriation Committee—also looked to shift the onus onto the British people, reminding them that "The Governments of England and Belgium are doing much, but they cannot do everything. Individual cases of hardship must be met by individual generosity. Do not allow Government to pay all your debts".[20]

However, from August 1916 the government took over the mantel of co-ordinating and driving forward the arrangements for the inevitable task of repatriation. Planning began even whilst war still raged and any prospect of returning the refugees to their besieged homeland was unrealistic at best. The LGB nonetheless pushed on with the task of appointing a committee to examine the question of how the repatriation of the Belgian exiles should be managed. The aptly named Repatriation Committee, headed up by Basil Peto, Conservative MP for Devizes, took a full year to investigate the matter, reporting in July 1917. From the earliest pages of the committee's interim report it became evident that finding a method of repatriating whilst hostilities continued was not as remote a possibility as was at first assumed. However, the decision, the committee concluded, "must be governed in the first instance by the views of the General Headquarters Staffs of the Allied Forces in the West". Of secondary consideration were the conditions in Belgium itself. These would come into play only if and when the war had come to an end. In those circumstances, the committee magnanimously agreed, "the economic and industrial conditions prevailing in Belgium will be the deciding factor upon which the arrangements for the return of refugees will depend". Indeed, the committee acknowledged, feeding, housing and finding employment for the returning refugees were "all so intimately connected" with the broader challenges of national reconstruction in Belgium that any repatriation scheme had to be considered in relation to these issues. [21]

Whilst a large number of refugees had taken it upon themselves to return to Belgium or neighbouring states during the course of the First World War, a sizable number still remained by the war's conclusion. The central register of refugees, collated in early August 1919, calculated that 12,408 Belgians still resided in various districts across England, Scotland and Wales. However, the majority had come to congregate in the capital either for the purposes of work, to be closer to the cultural core of the Belgian expatriate community or, as became increasingly the case as the war reached its zenith, to be the first in line when the provisions for repatriation to Belgium had been put in place.[22] This was a point of concern for the committee, not least because few options for housing a large influx of refugees in the capital existed. Whilst the refugee camps set up in Earls Court and Alexandra Palace to deal with the inward flow of migrants could accommodate approximately 4,000 and 3,000 respectively, few other sites across London were equipped to accept a large, transient and unemployed community of aliens.

However, this was more than a logistical problem, as the committee acknowledged. The "danger of friction" arising between the refugees and "our own people" as wartime labour opportunities dried up and many Belgians of working age were forced out of work loomed large as a potential flashpoint for antagonism between the hosts and the hosted.[23] Certainly, some isolated cases of visible discontent had arisen in the course of the war, usually predicated on localised frustrations about the perceived "privileges" that the Belgians were enjoying at the expense of the local population. This was the case in Fulham, West London, where refugees were accused of the dual crimes of occupying in-demand housing stock as well as being in receipt of more favourable relief packages than that received by the families of British soldiers.[24] Yet violent manifestations of such tensions were largely limited to locations of concentrated Belgian presence. At the munitions works at Birtley in Tyneside, employer of 6,000 Belgians (overwhelmingly conscripted soldiers), it was the Belgians themselves who in December 1916 turned to violent means to express their discontent with the conditions that they were subject to.[25]

Such episodes were rare; more typical was a general apathy towards the "plight" of the Belgians as the war dragged on, manifesting, on occasion, into an outspoken disgruntlement that the Belgian community appeared to enjoy the "benefits" of philanthropy, hospitality and goodwill, whilst avoiding the "hardships" of wartime shortages and conscription.[26] This

disgruntlement was compounded still further as the war dragged on and pressures on local communities to give up their men to conscription increased. Belgian refugees, more difficult to conscript because of their dispersion across Britain and other allied nations, found themselves labelled as "shirkers".[27]

However, the drive to repatriate the Belgians did not emanate solely from the British hosts. The Belgian government was also keen to encourage the return of their exiled citizens.[28] Yet organisation on this front, at least during the war itself, was fragmentary. Instead, a "home-grown" drive to bring the refugees home more typically emanated from locally concentrated bodies such as religious congregations. Their efforts however were, and could only ever, be advisory, using the force of rhetorical persuasion and patriotic sentiment to keep the notion of "return" ever present in the refugees' mindset. The tone of sermons delivered by Father Callewaert, priest to refugees in Stockport and surrounding districts, typified such efforts. As one Belgian congregant recalled in the refugee's magazine *Echo de Belgique* in August 1916, Father Callewaert had spoken "so movingly" to the group of refugees there gathered of their future return that "our hearts beat with heartfelt enthusiasm as we imagined how the church bells of Mechelen, Bruges and Antwerp would once again ring out with our song of redemption".[29] Hence, whilst few or possibly no grass-roots organisation to manage the logistics of repatriation emerged from within the refugee community itself, the decision taken by many individuals and families to return to Belgium or one of the neighbouring countries, even whilst war continued, suggests the success of such rhetoric.[30] Indeed, the steady flow of Belgians back to the continent from 1915 onwards did much to confirm the hopes of the delegation of Belgian officials posted to Britain to oversee the welfare of the Belgian community resident there that, for those who had not opted to self-repatriate by the war's conclusion, rapid return as soon as circumstances allowed would be their primary objective. As Count Goblet d'Alviella, Vice-President of the Belgian senate, confidently asserted, "It goes without saying that the refugees, although proclaiming their indebtedness to the English nation, anxiously await the end of their exile".[31]

In light of the Belgian state's eagerness to guarantee the future loyalty of their citizens, the Repatriation Committee acknowledged the need to give the Belgian government some degree of regulatory power over the process of repatriation when the time came. From the outset, the committee agreed that "every person who desires to return, except at his own

expense, must apply to the Belgian Repatriation Office, and that in no case will any facilities be given by the British Authorities until an individual authorisation has been sent from Belgium".[32] This appeared to bestow a degree of control upon the Belgian authorities to manage the flow of returning migrants. In reality, however, the Repatriation Committee harboured its own ambitions as to which "type" of refugee they felt should be of preference. These were, in the main, unemployed Belgians, prioritised for return to subvert the possibility of antagonism arising between Britons and Belgians.[33] The rapidity with which the 6,000 Belgians employed at the Birtley munitions work found themselves shipped back to Belgium at the close of the war is a telling manifestation of the British government's nervousness on this point. The Ministry of Munitions, charged with the task of overseeing the Birtley community, grappled with the question of what to do with the Belgians employed there as the prospect of peace seemed ever more likely. It became, for Maurice S. Gibb, Representative of the Ministry of Munitions, by far the most "pressing question" concerning the factory's future. However, options for "managing" the refugee population under peacetime conditions seemed limited. Whilst the sudden mass unemployment of the Belgian munitions workers was the most likely outcome of the transition from war to peace, this outcome was to be avoided if at all possible. Indeed, so desperate was Whitehall to avoid this scenario that Gibb declared it "better to waste steel" by continuing to employ Belgians to manufacture shells rather than "allow[ing] the Belgians to do nothing, and so get into mischief, and possibly, on account of the amount of time on their hands, commence quarrelling with the neighbouring miners and others".[34]

This very scenario remained a core concern of the committee who, as the weeks passed by, insisted that, under no circumstances should Belgian munitions workers be allowed to remain at Birtley "in idleness".[35] Whilst the logistical arrangements for transporting the sizable Birtley community to Hull and from there on to Antwerp were not straight forward, this did little to deter the government from prioritising their departure above all other communities and regions. By February 1919, virtually all of the 6,000 Belgians previously housed in the refugee village of Elisabethville and employed at Birtley had returned to Belgium. By June 1919, after a nine-day auction, all of their furniture and household items that they were unable to fit within their meagre 300 pounds allowance had been sold off.[36] In less than eight months after the end of hostilities, few obvious signs of the Birtley Belgians remained. Whilst the buildings that had

housed them still stood, at least until the 1930s, the site itself was put to different use after the Belgians' departure, helping to erode still further the memory of their presence.

Whilst the Ministry of Munitions had managed the mass repatriation of the Birtley Belgians with ruthless efficiency, the Repatriation Committee had less success orchestrating the return of Belgians dispersed elsewhere in the country. Notices warning of an impending repatriation scheme had been placed in the local and national press, as well as being distributed to the refugees directly, in Flemish, French and English by way of the LGB and the Belgian Legation.[37] However, the War Relief Committee (WRC)—the conglomerate of philanthropic and charitable bodies who had facilitated aid for the Belgians from the earliest months of the war—increasingly found itself excluded from the discussions surrounding repatriation. By the final days of 1918, the WRC was forced to relinquish all responsibility for the refugees' welfare and return, disbanding by the close of the year.

This rapid dismantlement of the WRC and the complete transference of power to the LGB severely hindered the establish lines of communication between the British authorities and the refugee community, as well as removing individuals "on the ground" who, ordinarily, could have helped to orchestrate the process of repatriation.[38] In the event, the police service was called upon to help with the registration of all remaining refugees, a vast undertaking that required the distribution and subsequent collection of a form to be completed by all refugees "as a preliminary to their return".[39] Reaching refugees who remained in the provinces proved the most challenging task for such police forces. Despite the best efforts of the various regional police forces, by February 1919 the LGB had begun to express serious misgivings about the administration of the scheme noting that, of the roughly 14,000 refugees who still remained in Britain, only about half had returned the required form which would trigger their repatriation. The remainder, the LGB concluded, have "either not received the forms, or else having received them are lying low and making no sign".[40]

Matters were to take a decidedly more serious turn as another government department took note of the refugees' reticence to make themselves known to the authorities. Just a week later, the failing scheme found itself the central topic of discussion at the Aliens and Nationality Committee, chaired by the Principle Assistant Secretary at the Home Office, Sir John Pedder. Pedder and his committee colleagues displayed little of the

ambiguity about the process of repatriation articulated by the Repatriation Committee. Now considered a Home Office matter, Belgian refugees found themselves the object of both a far more stringent tone and far more stringent state policy. Talk no longer rotated around how the remaining Belgians in the country could be persuaded to return but instead prioritised the much more direct approach of serving notices upon any refugee who could be located, requiring them to explain why they had not yet taken up the offer of funded repatriation. Deportation, although a "last resort", nonetheless remained on the table. To enact the agreed upon measure, police forces up and down the country were once again called upon to serve the refugees with notices and "warnings" to take advantage of the provisions in place for their repatriation "at their earliest opportunity".[41]

The looming prospect of the expiration of available shipping to transport the refugees back to the continent partly explained the sudden change of tact towards the refugees. The Ministry of Shipping could only guarantee ships until the end of March.[42] On that basis the LGB declared themselves particularly anxious to "get rid of as many as possible" before that date.[43] To hasten the Belgians' departure, the LGB decreed that threats, such as the withdrawal of free passage and any other assistance from the British government, should be now be deployed indiscriminately. Only those who had good reason not to avail themselves of the government scheme—the sick and wounded—would be spared the nationwide crackdown. What followed was the imposition of a final three-day deadline for refugees to complete their application form to expedite their return. Failure to do so meant the forfeiting of any further opportunity for assistance, financial or otherwise.[44]

By the early autumn of 1919 the British government had all but washed their hands of any refugees who still remained in the country, withdrawing all financial assistance and drawing the repatriation scheme to a close. In the aftermath of war, priorities and resources had shifted to more pressing domestic matters; a change of tact welcomed by the British public.[45] In mid-October the Home Office wrote to the Chief Constable of the Police to inform him that any remaining formal avenues of repatriation were now being managed entirely by the Belgian government although this too would be withdrawn at the end of November.[46] The Belgian government, now solely in charge of extracting any Belgians who remained in Britain, turned to a heady mix of patriotic sentiment, emotive

persuasion and guilt-ridden reproaches, issuing notices in English, Flemish and French beseeching all remaining refugees to return to Belgium to assist with the enormous task of "national reconstruction".[47] The time had come for moving on and moving forward, especially as the hospitality of the British could no longer be relied upon.

Entering the "Twilight Zone"

For those Belgians who did avail themselves of the opportunity to return to their homeland, either during the war years, or immediately after its conclusion, via the British government's repatriation scheme or by other means, the country that they arrived in was a place often starkly and terribly different from the one they had left behind in 1914. Four years of warfare and occupation had left gaping physical scars on the Belgian landscape, cut through by trenches, weapons dug-outs and corpse-strewn battlefields. Many villages, towns and cities across the country had suffered under repeated bombardment, military action, occupation and looting, some affected on a massive scale, with physical devastation most evident in the northern provinces of West and East Flanders. Although the ruination was not as extreme as in parts of northern France, the war and its aftermath had nonetheless left a severely depleted nation and people in its wake. During the German occupation and eventual withdrawal, Belgian industrial sites and infrastructure had been a particular target for partial or complete sabotage or demolition, often as a means to cripple Belgian efforts to oppose the occupation, as punishment for non-cooperation, or, as appeared to be the objective of the departing German army, to hinder Belgium's economic recovery in peacetime.[48]

However, arguably the most significant impact of warfare as four years of conflict, death and destruction inched painstakingly slowly to a negotiated ceasefire was the protracted and deep-rooted effects felt by the people of the newly liberated nation. In Belgium, even the inevitability of the German surrender by the early autumn of 1918 brought little stability for the population of villages and towns directly in the path of the retreating armies. As the *Liverpool Daily Post* reported towards the end of October, as the war entered its final throws "processions" of men, women and children from Belgium and France as well as detachments of German soldiers had begun to flee over the border into Dutch territory away from the remnants of the conflict zones, "their condition every bit as bad" as that of the medley of human traffic which had criss-crossed the

continent at the beginning of the war. Even Belgium's major urban centres could not escape the turmoil of the war's final days. Whilst the newspaper reported that Antwerp was "quiet", Brussels experienced "hours of the tensest emotions and excitement" as "nearer and nearer" came "the sound of the guns heralding delivery". German civilians who had spent the war in the city now began to depart *en masse* and German soldiers left their posts, both to be replaced by a reported 150,000 refugees who had poured into the city from surrounding regions. Hence, in the maelstrom of the war's conclusion, as war receded but peace was not yet within grasp, the line between soldiers, civilians and refugees, conflict zones and civilian zones became ever more blurred.[49]

As "peacetime" arrived after the November 11 armistice, only slowly did the true human and material cost of war and occupation begin to dawn. The *Exeter and Plymouth Gazette* typified the impassioned (and yet often poorly informed) stance adopted by many whose demands for recompense for Belgians depended upon sensationalist details about the manner of the peoples' suffering. Under occupation, the *Gazette*'s special correspondent claimed, Belgians had been "reduced to eating mangold wurzels, turnips, and beetroots, robbing the cattle to keep themselves alive".[50] Other British newspapers adopted a more restrained stance to Belgian anguish, juxtaposing the bittersweet sorrows caused by four long years of war against the unbridled elation that war was finally over. One regional British newspaper, for example, tempered their account of the scenes of joy in Mons, in the west of Belgium, with the evident misery felt by the town's people for the "gallant comrades who had fallen". As the national anthem was sung and crowds lined the streets to cheer, "bronzed and hardened soldiers" stood erect, many unable to sing for the tears pouring down their faces. This paradox of joy and sorrow found a strange echo in the town's architecture where "faces peer[ed] forth from the shattered windows and twisted iron balconies" to throw flowers and wave flags. Into this scene entered "a pathetic stream of returning refugees, with their bedding and household goods on small borrows", symbols of the many thousands of refugees who returned to Belgium from Britain, the Netherlands and other surrounding neutral and allied nations as war drew to a close.[51]

Mons was hence just one of hundreds of towns and cities to witness a near continuous returning flow of refugees in the early weeks and months of peacetime. As one British correspondent rather poetically suggested, by the winter of 1918 Belgium and France were awash with weary "pilgrims"

travelling by any and every means to reach their long abandoned home. Cecil Roberts, author of the "pilgrim" moniker and Special Correspondent for the *Liverpool Echo*, submitted a moving account of just such a spectacle as he and a travelling companion attempted the long overland journey between Cologne and Lille by way of Germany, Belgium and France's creaking rail networks. The final leg of their journey, when train travel became impossible, was undertaken by lorry; their travelling companions a motley assortment of soldiers and released prisoners (of various nationalities) and returning Belgian refugees. Whilst in transit, Roberts reported that one elderly lady recounted her tale of finding herself trapped near Brussels in 1914 unable to return to her home in Tournai. It was with trepidation that she now returned, uncertain if her husband would still be alive and her house still standing "for she had received no word during all that time". Nonetheless, Roberts insisted, the storyteller was a "cheerful old lady" who "joined in" with the singing of the other inhabitants of the lorry, remaining stoical and uncomplaining in the face of such adversity.[52]

This valorisation of Belgians as noble victims of a belligerent aggressor—a distinct echo of the propagandist rhetoric crafted in Britain about "gallant little Belgium" in the early months of the war—goes against the reading offered by various scholars which suggests that, by the war's conclusion, Belgians had begun to lose their heroic status.[53] Yet, that image clearly continued to exist in certain circles at least; in this instance to provide an appealing media narrative of forbearance and hope.[54] So too did the persistence of such rhetoric help to shore up the government's insistence that the war had both necessary and morally justifiable. This was a particularly crucial message to convey as the true human and material cost of four years of conflict became a source of consternation and despair for many Britons once the euphoria of early November was over.[55] Moreover, the unremitting demonisation of Germany also helped to firm up the resolve of the nation to impose severe penalties upon the now-chastened country as negotiations began over the terms of the peace treaty. A report by Francis Hyde Villiers, Minister to Belgium, at the end of December 1918 to former Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, now Foreign Secretary, about the condition of Brussels after the evacuation of the Germans, demonstrated the government's commitment to this type of rhetoric: Villiers insisted that the "hardship" suffered by "almost every class" of Brusselois society was a direct consequence of the "odious character" of the occupying forces. As Villiers explained, "The arrogance of the Germans, restrictions, house-to-house raids, requisitions,

fines, trials and condemnations, the uncertainty as to what each day might not bring forth produced a strain which was hard to bear". Nonetheless, Villiers concluded, "with but few exceptions, the attitude of the [Belgian] people remained admirable". [56]

In Britain at a local level too there appeared to be an appetite for persisting with the presentation of Belgian refugees as pathetic and aggrieved. A letter from Jean Meunes, a recently returned Belgian refugee, to Mr W. Cuthbert of Carlton Place, Glasgow, demonstrating this trend found its way into the *Scotsman* in early January 1919 (presumably because Mr Cuthbert felt there would be a ready audience for Meunes' "pathetic letter"). "It was a very poor view when we arrived" back in Hoboken, Antwerp, the letter began. "All the cranes for loading and unloading the goods of the steamers were stolen and sent to Germany . . . the grass was growing between the pavements like a meadow, that were [sic] our first impression when we arrived, and a very poor one". Meunes went on to give an account of the severe food shortages, the "exhausted", "pale and grey faces" of the people of Antwerp, only "covered in rags", the city's industry laying "idle" because the machinery has been looted or destroyed, and the lack of jobs for the city's inhabitants.[57]

Whilst the letter served as a pertinent reinforcement of the image of a courageous yet broken Belgium, it also operates as an important reminder that, whilst the war may have come to an end this did not automatically signal the end of relations between Britons and Belgians. Instead, some Britons, especially those who had directly hosted refugee families, remained concerned for the welfare of "their" Belgians long after their return. Moreover, the frequent local press reports into conditions in Belgium into the early 1920s seemed to address a demand for "follow up" that the haste of the government's repatriation scheme had abruptly curtailed, on a formal level at least. This was nowhere more apparent than in the visit of the former Mayor and Mayoress of Preston and the city's Town Clerk to devastated regions of Northern France and Belgium in the spring of 1920. At the wartime Mayor's behest, a fund to help relieve the suffering of the people of Le Bassee on the French-Belgian border, had been launched in Preston "some time ago". The Preston delegation's visit thus served the important purpose of seeing how those funds would be spent, as well as offering the opportunity to report back on conditions in the border region to the curious and concerned people of Preston. The visit was, according to the *Lancashire Daily Post*, characterised by moments of delighted

encounter between the British visitors and Belgians formerly resident of Preston who "impressed upon the visitors time after time their everlasting gratitude to Preston people". Such open displays of indebtedness were sufficient to "satisfy" the former Mayor that "what we are doing [in providing financial assistance] is right".[58]

However, relations between Britons and Belgians were not always as affectionate as the example of Preston suggests. Certainly not all former hosts seemed willing to reflect upon their interactions with their Belgian guests as an unconditionally positive experience. Indeed, it was frequently the moment at which the long-awaited departure of the Belgians occurred which seemed to bring forth such reservations, as a report in the *Sheffield Independent* implied. Whilst the local "colony" of refugees were declared to have been "good", this judgement was made almost entirely based upon the refugees' willingness "to assimilate and learn English" as well as their efforts to support themselves through finding suitable employment. There was little space in such relations for unadulterated sympathy for the Belgians as refugees and exiles facing many years of personal and national reconstruction in a country devastated by war.[59]

Other isolated cases suggest that the impending moment of departure brought its own traumas for refugees who knew they would soon be repatriated. For some, this no doubt manifested itself in the unpleasant and unsettling task of selling off furniture and personal possessions accumulated in the course of the war.[60] For others, the rupture occasioned by the prospect of return migration found a more dramatic outlet. In December 1919, for example, Jeanne de Lattin, a refugee resident in Blackpool, took her own life "rather than return to her husband in Belgium".[61] Indeed, even if the challenges and trauma of departure from the security and sanctuary offered by Britain were overcome, then many former refugees still found that they had to surmount the trials of reintegration in Belgium and acceptance by their fellow Belgian citizens. In the early weeks and months after return, as well as the logistical and practical hurdles of trans-national travel, finding employment and locating food and clothing, returning refugees also had to face the stigma frequently foisted upon them by their fellow countrymen. As one account given in the *Yorkshire Evening Post* from a former refugee now returned to Belgium implied, those who had endured the German occupation resented those sectors of the population who had lived out the war in Britain, convinced that they had enjoyed the "double advantage" of "making money and living free of rent and rates, with food and clothing provided".[62]

However, this source of tension between Belgian and Belgian was far more complex than the newspaper appeared to realise, so emotionally deep-rooted and divergent were the wartime experiences of the "home-stayers" and "those of the Yser". Henry de Man, a prominent Belgian socialist who enjoyed a spell as a lecturer in Sociology at the University of Washington after the war, attempted to articulate the extent of this fissure for a North American audience in an article for *The North American Review* in May 1920. In his wide-ranging article, Man, in a clear departure from the account offered in the *Yorkshire Evening Post*, saw little advantage for those who had spent their war away from Belgium, whether serving on the front line or in self-exile in Britain or France. For Man, all such exiles had occupied the front line, either literally or figuratively, and thus the "shock of disappointment" upon return, of "finding that nothing had changed" despite their experiences in the "fermenting world" beyond their homeland served only to drive a wedge between themselves and those who had remained behind.[63]

With the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, Belgium's fragile post-war social infrastructure came under even further strain. The disappointment of few territorial gains and a sense of betrayal at the comparatively meagre reparations awarded to Belgium compared to that negotiated for the other Allied nations engendered bitterness and resentment towards foreign neighbours, especially those who had appeared, through four long years of conflict, to be Belgium's friend and protector.[64] As Henri Jaspar, Belgium's Foreign Minister, complained in a speech to the British Institute of International Affairs in May 1924, the retraction of guarantees to enshrine the "inviolability" of Belgian territory, a principle that Jaspar regarded as fundamental to her establishment in 1830, signified the "gravest" and "one of the most incomprehensible omissions" of the treaty. So too was the diminishing prospect of financial support, either by way of reparations or from international aid to help Belgium with the considerable task of national reconstruction, a source of considerable consternation. Whilst Jaspar insisted that such developments were "but an episode in our history"—a "serious but temporary" one—that in time would be overcome, relations between Belgium and Britain had noticeably soured by the mid-1920s. Even the "admirable and disinterested" help offered by Britain to "unhappy Belgium in the most tragic hours of her life" at the outbreak of war seemed poor compensation for the more immediate and critical material needs of a nation suffering under the prolonged traumas of the destructive legacies of war.[65]

For Jaspar, the thousands of Belgian refugees who had been hosted by Britons during the First World War featured as little but an afterthought in his lengthy invective, despite the "everlasting memories" he assumed they held of their experiences in "British homes". Far more serious were the physical scars left upon the nation's landscape, the "systematic destruction" of many of her industrial sites and residential areas, and the deportation and massacre of her civilians. The ordeal of exile and displacement endured by Belgians who had chosen or been forced to flee made little discernible impression upon Jaspar's tangled and complex sense of national loss and suffering.[66]

This marginalisation of the refugee experience was to become a staple of both Belgium's post-war reconstruction programme and of the nation's culture of memory and remembrance about the conflict. The establishment of a national compensation scheme for "war victims" that included within its provisions "civilian invalids" made no allowances for the psychological injuries caused by the traumas of flight, exile and refugeedom.[67] Neither has there been any formal acknowledgement of the refugee experience within Belgium's centenary commemorations, although one of the Belgian government's stated core commemorative themes is "collective remembrance".[68] Sophie de Schaepdrijver has suggested that this absence of a concretised "locus of tragedy" in Belgium in the post-war period, of which the exclusion of the refugee experience is one particularly glaring omission, can be partly explained by Belgium's loss of status as "heroic" and "gallant" as the war dragged to its bloody conclusion. According to Schaepdrijver, once the "body count" came to "overshadow" the founding myths of the war—Germany as belligerent aggressor being the most fundamental of these—the "culture of war" itself was rapidly dismantled and with it the image of Belgium as the antithesis to German belligerence. The final death knell to Belgium's wartime image was signalled by the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, by which point "'Belgium', once shorthand for the moral issues of the war, had become a by-word for propaganda". For Belgian society, already fractured internally along linguistic, religious and cultural fault lines, this stark shift in her externally projected and accepted identity exacerbated these fissures. Divergent wartime experiences as well as further social splintering in the post-war years as Flemish nationalism came increasingly to the fore made the possibility of coming together as a "community of fate" —of which the former refugees might be a part—ever more remote in the decades since the war's conclusion.[69] The internal ruptures of the Belgian nation

hence mimicked the "refugee experience" itself: far from singular and uniform, and an improbable candidate (as a collective episode of trauma) through which to unify the nation.

As Anton van den Braumbussche has intonated, "The many centrifugal forces within the Belgian nation have undeniably prevented Belgium from coming to terms with a sometimes difficult, compromising, and unbearable past". This blinkered view, according to van den Braumbussche, has extended to the skirting of necessary national debates on not least Belgium's "historical responsibilities" but also its "traumatic experiences".[70] In Belgium, the refugee experience of a possible two million of its citizens, caught up within this broader culture of avoidance, has thus enjoyed little of the elevated treatment that has been bestowed upon in it in Britain.[71] This is in part, perhaps, because of the lingering stigma attached to the status of being a refugee, even in a global society increasingly conversant with the plight of refugees. So too, however, does it speak of a very particular culture of remembrance of the First World War (so often replicated for other episodes of conflict), which valorises combatant contributions and civilian sacrifice but has not yet extended its sympathies to those who were forced to flee the zones of conflict.

In Britain, however, there has been far less reticence to make "use" of her historic role as a "protector" and "saviour" of "needy" refugees from Belgium. Doing so has helped to uphold Britain's vaulted image as a beacon of tolerance, however inaccurate the record of her treatment of aliens and newcomers across and beyond the twentieth century has shown this image to be. However, in the case of the episode of Belgian presence in Britain, the perpetuation of this image has come at the expense (or the advantage, depending upon your perspective) of sidelining the realities of the final stages of war for the refugee community. The process of repatriation and return was disruptive at best and deeply distressing and enduringly traumatic at worst for many refugees; an experience helped little by the rather mercenary manner in which it was managed by the British government. The haste with which the state-funded repatriation scheme was enacted was promoted as the "generous" final act of a benevolent Britain but operated, first and foremost, to serve Britain's own interests. Removing refugees as swiftly as possible served to neutralise possible sources of localised tension between the hosts and the hosted, address domestic anxieties about Britain's own task of recovery and reconstruction, and reaffirm the government's promise that the incomers would be but a temporary presence only.

The continued concern of individuals, families and local relief organisations for the fate of returning Belgians was a far cry from the political use made of the repatriation process by the British state. Many communities were, instead, in the main motivated by a genuine humanitarian instinct to inquire about the welfare of "their" Belgians long after the war's conclusion, although they too were not immune to the moral elevation that exuberant displays of gratitude by their former guests bestowed upon them. Indeed, these differing responses to the conclusion of the refugee episode demonstrates how divergent and distinctly regarded was the experience of playing host in "real" terms (that is, for local people as against the "remote" hospitality offered by the British state). The "end" of the war marked only a new stage in relations as former refugees left behind the traumas of exile for the challenges of return, reconstruction and recovery.

Notes

1. See, for example, William Hague, "Humanising Hell: Our Restless Conscience and the Search For Peace", October 23, 2014, Prime Minister's Office, accessed August 28, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/humanising-hell-our-restless-conscience-and-the-search-for-peace-2014-one-people-oration.
2. See, for example, the article by Evan Bartlett, "The Origin of the Biggest Flow of Refugees in Britain's History May Surprise You," *Independent*, September 6, 2015, which linked David Cameron's change of stance towards Syrian refugees to Britain's "long and celebrated history of welcoming those fleeing war and persecution". Accessed August 28, 2016, http://indy100.independent.co.uk/article/the-origin-of-the-biggest-flow-of-refugees-in-britains-history-may-surprise-you–bydS_L0oSe.
3. The figure of 12,000 is based upon the number of refugees on the Central Register, according to Police Districts, August 7, 1919, The National Archives, Kew (TNA), HO 45/10882/344019. Although the Aliens and Nationality Committee, which met in late February 1919, agreed that deportation should be a last resort, they nonetheless debated how to "exercise compulsion" and apply "pressure" to force refugees to accept the British government's timeframe for repatriation. See Aliens and Nationality Committee minutes of proceedings of second meeting, February 28, 1919, TNA, HO45/10882/ 344019.

4. The recent special issue of *Immigrants and Minorities* devoted to Belgian refugees is a case in point: whilst the regional experience of the refugees is given much needed attention, none of the seven article address the process of repatriation in a sustained way. See *Immigrants and Minorities* 34:2 (2016).
5. Although Tony Kushner briefly raised the issue in comments to a BBC article on Belgian Refugees. See Denise Winterman, "World War One: How 250,000 Refugees Didn't Leave a Trace," *BBC Magazine*, September 15, 2014, accessed August 28, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-28857769.
6. Colin Holmes, *John Bull's Island: Immigration and British Society, 1871–1971* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1988), 91.
7. This is evident in the case of two families—the Hicksons of Barnton, Cheshire and their wartime neighbours the Melsens from Antwerp. The daughters of these two families kept in touch for several decades after the war. Twenty years of correspondence were passed to the author by a descendent of Annie Hickson.
8. Tony Kushner, "Local Heroes: Belgian refugees in Britain during the First World War," *Immigrants and Minorities* 18:1, (1999), 1–2.
9. Peter Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia During World War I*, paperback edn., (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005), 2.
10. Foreign Office file on the reparation of British women and children detained in Belgium and Northern France, 1916–1918, TNA, FO 383/133.
11. House of Commons Debate, 05 August, 1914, vol. 65, c. 2041.
12. The Aliens Restriction Act, 1914.
13. Holmes, *John Bull's Island*, 96.
14. Ibid.
15. Aliens Restriction Act, 1914.
16. Herbert Samuel, House of Commons (Hansard), vol. 66, col. 558, September 9, 1914.
17. Peter Cahalan, *Belgian Refugee Relief in England during the Great War* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc, 1982), 466–467.
18. Ibid., 478.
19. See, for example, "Belgian Repatriation: An Appeal to Australia," *The Age*, June 12, 1915, 18.
20. Belgian Repatriation Fund Poster, undated, Cheshire Record Office (CRO), ZRP 14/39.
21. Repatriation Committee Interim Report, July 4, 1917, TNA, HO45/10882/344019.
22. Refugees on Central Register by Police Districts, August 7, 1919, TNA, HO 45/10882/344019.

23. Reparations Committee, Interim Report.
24. Katherine Knox and Tony Kushner, *Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives during the Twentieth Century* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 57.
25. Daniel Laqua, "Belgian Exiles, the British and the Great War: the Birtley Belgians of Elisabethville," *Immigrants and Minorities* 34:2 (2016): 117–118. Reference to these riots as well as anxiety that they might be repeated were made as decisions were taken by the Ministry of Munitions about demobilisation, TNA, July and August 1918, MUN 5/78/327/4.
26. See, for example, "Our Belgian Guests," *Birmingham Daily Post*, October 3, 1916, 7.
27. Sophie de Schaepdrijver, "Death is Everywhere: The Shifting Locus of Tragedy in Belgian Great War Literature," *Yale French Studies* 102 (2002): 108–109.
28. This became particularly apparent at the war's conclusion. See, for example, E. A Bouchout, "To the Belgian Refugees," September 1919, TNA, HO45/10882/344019.
29. Louise Perée, Echo de Belgique, August 4, 1916, 8. I am grateful to Andrew and Stella Pleass for providing this translation from the original.
30. The departure of large numbers of Belgians was raised in parliamentary questions. See House of Commons Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), vol. LXXIV, col. 725, September 28, 1915.
31. Ministry of Health, Report on the Work undertaken by the British Government in the Reception and Care of the Belgian Refugees, 1920, accessed August 18, 2016. https://digital.slv.vic.gov.au/view/action/singleViewer.do?dvs=1471529721835~423&locale=en_GB&metadata_object_ratio=10&show_metadata=true&VIEWER_URL=/view/action/singleViewer.do?&preferred_usage_type=VIEW_MAIN&DELIVERY_RULE_ID=10&frameId=1&usePid1=true&usePid2=true
32. Repatriation Committee, Interim Report.
33. Ibid.
34. Correspondence between Maurice S. Gibb to C. H Stevens, Ministry of Munitions, Whitehall, July 30, 1918, TNA, MUN 5/78/327/4.
35. Council Committee summary report on Demobilisation and Reconstruction, August 29, 2018, TNA, MUN 5/78/327/4.
36. Catalogue listing furnishing for sale from Belgian township of Birtley, May 26, 1919, TNA, MUN 5/78/327/11. See also Joseph Schlesinger and Douglas McMurtrie, *The Birtley Belgians* (Durham: North East Centre for Education about Europe, 1990), 31–32 for further details about the departure of the Belgians from Elisabethville.

37. See, for example, "Repatriation of Belgians," *The Times*, November 6, 1918, 3. "Repatriation of Belgians: A Warning to Refugees," *The Scotsman*, November 6, 1918, 6; Draft notice "Belgian Refugees in Great Britain," undated, TNA, HO45/10882/344019.
38. Cahalan, *Belgian Refugee Relief*, 444–446.
39. Correspondence from Moylon to the Chief Constables of West Riding, Lancashire, Worcestershire, Warwickshire, Leicestershire, Gloucestershire, Shropshire, Herefordshire, Cambridgeshire, Glamorganshire, Monmouthshire, and Cheshire, undated, TNA, HO45/10882/ 344019.
40. Local Government Board minutes, February 20, 1919, TNA, HO45/ 10882/ 344019.
41. Aliens and Nationality Committee, minutes of proceedings at the second meeting, February 28, 1919, TNA, HO45/10882/ 344019.
42. Letter from Mr Legget to Mr Streatfield, February 20, 1919, TNA, HO45/ 10882/344019.
43. Ibid.
44. Basil E. Peto (LGB), "Terugkeer der Belgische Vluchtelingen;" "Rapatriement des Refugés Belges," March 1919, TNA, HO45/10882/ 344019.
45. Gerard J. DeGroot, *Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War* (London: Longman, 1996), 312–333.
46. Letter from the Home Office to the Chief Constable, October 14, 1919, TNA, HO45/10882/344019.
47. Bouchout, "To the Belgian Refugees".
48. Henry de Man, "Revolution or Evolution in Belgium?," *The North American Review*, 211:774 (1920): 601–602 and Larry Zuckerman, *The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2004), 203–204; 215–219.
49. "Stream of Refugees from Belgium: Scenes on Dutch Border," *Liverpool Daily Post*, October 23, 1918, 5.
50. "Punishment for Guilty. Promised on Proof. Belgium's Sufferings. Food Stolen by the Enemy," *Exeter and Plymouth Gazette*, November 27, 1918, 1.
51. "Scene in Mons," *Liverpool Echo*, November 12, 1918, 3.
52. Cecil Roberts, "The Journey Home," *Liverpool Echo*, December 21, 1918, 3.
53. See, for example, Zuckerman, *The Rape of Belgium*, 219–222 and Schaepdrijver, "Death is Everywhere," 108–110.
54. A key document for constructing this image of the Belgians was the Bryce Report. See Viscount Bryce, "Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages" (London, 1915).

55. Jay M. Winter, *The Great War and the British People* (London: Macmillan, 1986), 65–99; Adrian Gregory, "Britain and Ireland" in *A Companion to World War I*, ed. John Horne (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 414–415.
56. Confidential report by Sir F. Villiers to Mr Balfour about the condition of Brussels after the evacuation of the Germans, December 30, 1918, TNA, FO 608/217/5.
57. "Belgian Refugees' Return Home," *The Scotsman*, January 8, 1919, 7.
58. "Preston and La Bassee: Mayor and Town Clerk's Visit to War-Stricken Areas," *Lancashire Daily Post*, March 11, 1920, 3; "Refugees' Gratitude," *Lancashire Evening Post*, May 28, 1920, 5.
59. "Belgians to Return," *Sheffield Independent*, January 23, 1919, 3.
60. Under the terms of the British government's repatriation scheme, each refugee returning to Belgium by sea was restricted to a 300 pound luggage allowance.
61. "'Sick of Life': Belgian Woman's Suicide at Blackpool," *Lancashire Evening Post*, December 13, 1919, 5.
62. "Returned Refugees' Troubles," *Yorkshire Evening Post*, May 12, 1919, 5.
63. De Man, "Revolution or Evolution," 604–605.
64. The British Government were very aware that relations with Belgium had soured in the wake of the Peace Conference. See, for example, British Special Commission to Belgium Report, compiled by Herbert Samuel, July 31, 1919, TNA, WORK 6/362/8.
65. Henri Jaspar, "Belgium and Western Europe Since the Peace Treaty," *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs* 3:4 (1924): 172–173; 189.
66. Ibid., 165.
67. Loi sur les réparations à accorder aux victimes civiles de la guerre/ Wet op het herstel te verlenen aan de burgerlijke oorlogsslachtoffers (Law on reparations for civilian war victims), 1919. Confirmed in correspondence between author and Gert De Prins of Directorate General War Victims Service, July 2016.
68. See, for example, ".be 2014-18," accessed August 18, 2016.http://www.be14-18.be/en.
69. Schaepdrijver, "Death is Everywhere," 102, 113; Karen D. Shelby, "National Identity in First World War Belgian Military Cemeteries," *First World War Studies* 6:3 (2015), 257–258.
70. Antoon van den Braembussche, "The Silence of Belgium: Taboo and Trauma in Belgian Memory," *Yale French Studies* 102 (2002): 38.
71. This figure has been suggested by Larry Zuckerman, *The Rape of Belgium*, 85.

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SECTION TWO

The Wartime "Enemy": From Internment to Freedom

CHAPTER 5

"Enemy Aliens" in Scotland in a Global Context, 1914–1919: Germanophobia, Internment, Forgetting

Stefan Manz

Wilhelm Kröpke had been living and working in British colonies for 15 years before settling in Nigeria in 1913. After the outbreak of war, he was declared an "enemy alien" and detained in Lagos prison on August 9, 1914 together with a number of his German countrymen. After several weeks, the cohort was transported to the central Nigerian internment camp, Ibaddan, about 250 miles inland from Lagos. This was a former banana plantation surrounded by barbed wire where many prisoners contracted malaria. In mid-November, the group was taken back to Lagos and shipped to Britain on board the *Accassa*, on its way picking up more Germans in other West African ports. After arriving in Liverpool on December 22 in a "sick and run-down state", the prisoners were distributed to internment camps throughout Britain.[1] Kröpke was first taken to the Handforth Camp in Cheshire, a converted factory building, then to an

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internment ship in Portsmouth harbour, followed by the Queensferry Camp in Wales. After an unsuccessful escape he was sentenced to five months labour in Knutsford prison. This was followed by a five-month spell in the main Scottish camp, Stobs near Hawick, in the Borders region. By the time Kröpke arrived there in September 1915, the camp held its maximum number of around 4,600 detainees. These were equally divided into military Prisoners of War and civilian "enemy aliens". The former had been taken from European battlefields and sunken ships. The latter were composed of members of the German migrant community in Britain such as August Blume, whose boarding house in Edinburgh went bankrupt during his absence, of travellers taken off ships such as the German-American Dr Walter Gellhorn, who committed suicide in Stobs because "I really cannot help it being sick and tired of everything", and of colonial expatriates such as Wilhelm Kröpke.[2] After an "agreeable Christmas celebration under the circumstances", Kröpke was taken to the Alexandra Palace Camp in London in early January 1916, from where he managed to escape and make his way back to Germany.[3]

During the First World War, Britain was the epicentre of global mass internment and deportation operations. 91,428 military Prisoners of War and 24,522 civilian "enemy aliens" of German, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish nationality were held in numerous camps on the British Isles by November 1918. The peak number of civilian internees was 29,511 in November 1917.[4] A further 10,000 civilians such as Wilhelm Kröpke were interned in the colonies and dominions, having either settled there in the decades before the war or after deportation from seized German colonies in Africa and the South Pacific. The latter policy of "ethnic cleansing" played into British war aims of colonial expansion. Many were transported across the globe. Those living in German East Africa (Tanzania), for example, were either deported to the Ahmednagar Camp in India or the Sidi Bishr/Maadi camps in Egypt, and then to British camps such as Knockaloe (Isle of Man), Handforth or Stobs, before final repatriation to Germany during or after the war.[5] These British operations have to be seen in a wider European and global context. In total, belligerent nations interned nine million military POWs and 450,000 civilians of enemy nationality in Europe, plus a further 50,000 to 100,000 non-combatant civilians across the globe.[6]

Within this global framework, a closer analysis of the Stobs camp gains a significance which far transcends the local level. It constitutes a representative case study in a camp system which spanned the globe and was, in

turn, fed by deported enemy minority populations from across the world. This empirical level, which has started to be scrutinised by scholarship only recently, leads to more general and probing questions about the nature of the First World War. First and most obviously, it de-centralises our lens away from the European frontlines and instead stresses the globality of warfare. Popular imagination had relegated operations in the colonies to mere "eccentric side-shows" of the European battlefields.[7] Focusing on minority persecution shows how integrated, in fact, these two spheres were, and how central internment operations were to the war effort as a truly globalised war. Second, this perspective touches on historiographical debates on the "totalisation" of war, especially when it comes to the question as to whether this was a soldiers' or a civilians' war.[8] Scholars such as Heather Jones and Tammy Proctor stress the exclusion of the civilian experience. They argue that remembrance of civilian suffering and victimhood in all nations has been overshadowed by soldiers' narratives and that scholarship should aim to redress this imbalance.[9] The following chapter not only supports their argument through the theme of internment, but also integrates it spatially into the framework of overseas and colonial contact zones. Worldwide, no civilian of Central Power enemy nationality was unaffected by wartime occurrences, whether through official government measures such as internment, deportation or expropriation; or through informal hostility, dismissal, rioting of premises, suppression of ethnic life and general discrimination.[10] The chapter will concentrate on the situation in Scotland with regard to the impact on the local ethnic community, public reactions, displacement and internment operations, and camp life. The final section will outline the transition from war to peace by tackling the problematic areas of repatriation, reintegration and remembrance.

"The Enemy Within": Exceptional Scottish Liberal Imperialism?

For most of the nineteenth century, German-speaking migrants constituted the largest ethnic minority group in Britain, numbering 62,522 in the 1911 census. Ethnic neighbourhoods sprang up in London, Manchester, Bradford, Liverpool and other urban centres. North of the border, the main destinations were Glasgow and Edinburgh. The most numerous professional groups consisted of merchants and clerks, mainly trading with their mother country. Other professional groups were teachers and lecturers, brewers, musicians,

waiters and hoteliers, hairdressers, bakers and confectioners, glass bottle makers and miners. Those women who were not confined to their role as housewives mostly worked as teachers, governesses and domestic servants. A dense network of ethnic organisations developed, including social clubs and Protestant congregations.[11]

These activities went largely unnoticed by the host society. The outbreak of war, however, radically altered the position of minority groups who were soon perceived as a potential danger to the safety of the British home front. In the pre-war years, popular spy novels such as Erskine Childers' *The Riddle in the Sands* (1903) or William Le Queux's *Invasion of 1910* (1906) had set the scene: an army of reservists, disguised as innocent civilians, were preparing a German invasion. From August 1914, these notions had a detrimental effect on minority treatment. The situation in Scotland mirrored the general British one, including that of overseas territories.[12] In Edinburgh, for example, Lord Provost Inches referred to the "German Spy Peril" at a meeting of Edinburgh Town Council in October 1914:

> A detestable system of espionage practised for many years by the German Government in this and other countries had, he said, been unmasked, and even the greatest friends of Germany had been appalled by the revelations of treachery everywhere rampant on the part of a nation pretending to be on friendly terms with us. He was not going to minimise the dangers of this plague which, he feared, had not yet been eradicated.[13]

Police stations received a flood of notices from alerted citizens, following requests from the authorities to "all patriotic people" to "exercise every vigilance by day and by night on land and on sea".[14] In Newport, for example, two concerned citizens wrote to Secretary of State McKenna after a furniture warehouse had burnt down: "It occurred to me it might be a German plan to have to fire and make use of the position as a gun stand". Some citizens expressed their annoyance at the fact that their luggage had not been investigated for explosives before crossing the Tay Bridge by train.[15] Vague hints about sighted aeroplanes and motor noises led to the suspicion of a German air base in some secluded part of the Scottish highlands.[16]

Anti-German riots broke out after the sinking of the passenger liner *Lusitania* by a German submarine on May 7, 1915. General patterns are discernible on a global scale. An elaborate "Imperial press system",

whereby stories produced in London, most notably the Northcliffe Amalgamated Press, were quickly disseminated throughout the Empire, triggered strikingly similar reactions.[17] In Johannesburg, for example, the cost of rioting and looting of German-owned property was estimated at £750,000. This included private homes as well as commercial premises such as merchants' firms, butchers or public houses. All this was fired up by the press writing about "German beer halls, where they are holding festivities for the murder of innocent women and babies".[18] In Britain, riots occurred in most urban centres, but also in small towns with a negligible German presence. Again, Scotland was a representative case history of a global pattern, although, as Catriona MacDonald argues, local factors such as political proclivities of local newspapers should not be discarded as specific triggers. Riots broke out in Greenock, Annan, Dumfries, Perth, Alloa and Edinburgh Leith.[19] In Perth, for example, these occurred on the night of May 15, 1915:

> A cry was raised suddenly to raid premises occupied by persons of German birth or descent. Pork butchers' shops in High Street and South Street, and a hairdresser's saloon in the latter thoroughfare were visited by the angry mob, which in a short time had assumed extraordinary dimensions, and matters looked decidedly ugly … Close to the shops up to midnight large and excited crowds paraded the principal streets of the city.[20]

In the early days of the war, some cautious voices had warned that a wholesale condemnation of Germany and internment of Germans would contradict British liberal traditions.[21] Although the Scottish press continued, to some degree, to be guided by "a distinctive Scottish Liberal Imperialism", these voices were increasingly replaced from May 1915.[22] A flood of newspaper comments and letters to the editor demanded tougher government measures against enemy aliens: wholesale internment and deportation; confiscation of property; exclusion from trade; revocation of naturalisation; internment of naturalised British subjects. A reader of the liberal *Glasgow Herald*, for example, demanded: "All should be cleared out … We can only act for our own city; but we ought to do it, and do it at once".[23] Another reader, signed PATRIA, suggested that the municipal authorities of Glasgow should lead the rest of Britain by refusing to supply water, gas, electricity and tramway facilities to enemy aliens. Thereby, the city could be "purged" of enemies.[24] Throughout the war, the vast majority of readers criticised government measures as being too weak.[25] This chapter argues from a global

perspective that regional Scottish factors only account for gradual deviations from a pattern which was discernible throughout Britain and its Empire. In the end, Scotland followed similar Germanophobic patterns as, for example, Australia, where Prime Minister William Morris claimed that his internment policy responded to "patriotic popular pressure to fight energetically the 'enemy within the gate'", or New Zealand where "to be truly British we must be anti-German".[26] The official government measures discussed in the following section have to be seen within this overall Germanophobic context.

Government Measures: Arrest, Displacement, Repatriation and Internment

The Aliens Restriction Act, the Defence of the Realm Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act were all passed in the first weeks of the war. They gave British wartime governments legislative power to deal with "enemy aliens" as they saw fit in order to protect the home front. Henceforth, the movement of Germans, Austrians and Turks who happened to be living or staying in Britain after the outbreak of war was tightly controlled. All "enemy aliens" had to register with the local police station. Up to the end of August 1914, 50,633 Germans and 16,141 Austrians were registered. They were not allowed to travel more than five miles from their place of residence without permission of the police authority. All areas on the British South- and East Coast were declared "prohibited areas", that is areas of strategic importance. No enemy aliens were allowed to reside in these areas and were displaced. Trade with enemy countries was prohibited, and businesses whose activities were seen as detrimental to the interests of the British Empire were wound up. This affected a large number of German-owned businesses. Male enemy aliens of military age were interned at a peak number of 29,511 in 1917. Knockaloe on the Isle of Man was the biggest camp with 23,000 inmates. Women, children and men above military age were repatriated. This affected over 10,000 individuals in 1915 and 1916 alone. After the termination of war many internees were deported as well. The census for 1921 records 12,914 Germans in Britain, a fraction of the pre-war figure.[27] The British legislative and organisational framework provided a blueprint for similar frameworks in the dominions such as the War Precautions Act in Australia or the office of Commissioner for Enemy Subjects in the Union of South Africa.[28]

The focus on Scotland will now help to illustrate the mechanics and impact of the government measures introduced by Whitehall. Whilst the War Office was responsible for the running of the internment camps, the police undertook to register and arrest the "enemy aliens". Police officers appeared on the doorstep without warning and took the prisoners to the local police station. After registration of their personal data and possibly one or two nights in a prison cell, the detainees were handed over to the military authorities. They had to pass through two transit camps, first a local one such as the Maryhill Barracks in North Glasgow, then the Redford Barracks in Edinburgh, which acted as the central Scottish transit camp. From there they were transported to the permanent internment camps all across Britain.[29]

One detainee was the chief chemist of the Tennents Brewery in Glasgow, Arno Singewald. After his repatriation in 1916, he reported his experiences to the German military's Reich-commissariat, which was specifically set up to collect evidence of "atrocities against German civilians in enemy hands" as material in the propaganda war over moral hegemony:

> I was arrested on the 11 September 1914 at 7 in the morning by two policemen. They ordered me to the police station of Craigendoran, my Scottish place of residence. I was not allowed to take an over-coat or any toiletries. I was then taken to the Maryhill Barracks in Glasgow by train and locked up in a detention cell together with a waiter. Another young gentleman had already spent the night there on a wooden plank-bed without a cover. In the afternoon nine of us were marched through the streets of Glasgow, guarded by a Sergeant and six soldiers. Bystanders frequently threw things such as orange peel at us. From the station we were taken to the Redford Camp near Edinburgh.[30]

The internees usually stayed between one and four weeks in the Redford Barracks transit camp. The compound was surrounded by barbed wire fences and was patrolled by guards on raised platforms. Twelve internees shared one tent in which sleeping accommodation consisted of a sack of straw and two woollen covers. From Redford, the prisoners were transported to internment camps all over Britain. Friedrich Bernhard Wiegand, for example, a hairdresser from Glasgow who had to leave behind his pregnant wife and ten year old daughter, came straight to Knockaloe. His wife Rebecca was British-born but, through marriage, had adopted the nationality of her husband and now faced all the restrictions attached

to the "enemy alien" status.[31] Arno Singewald was first sent to the Leeman Road Camp near York, but was soon released, only to be interned again after the *Lusitania* sinking. He now came to the middle-class Lofthouse Park Camp near Wakefield and finally to Stratford Camp in London before being repatriated in summer 1915.[32]

Repatriation went along with internal displacement. The whole of the Scottish East Coast was declared a prohibited area. This meant the "enemy aliens" were not allowed to reside there and were displaced. The mechanics of displacement can be illustrated by taking Fifeshire as an example. In August 1914, 109 enemy aliens were registered. Up to October, all male aliens under 45 were either interned in Redford or deprived of their permit of residence. Three men in the latter category refused to move away and were imprisoned in Dundee. The policy also applied to women. By October, 21 women were left with a permit of residence. Some of them were wives of internees. 11 were British-born wives of Germans. The others were domestic servants. All seamen landing in the ports of Methil and Burntisland were interned in Redford. By November, of the original 109 aliens, 17 were left with a permit of residence, 13 had been interned, and 79 had been removed to non-prohibited areas—and possibly interned or repatriated at a later stage.[33]

Repatriation was first undertaken on a voluntary basis, but later enforced together with internment, especially during the last months of the war. Amongst those now interned were F. Laurenz from Glasgow, a cabinetmaker and aged 64 who had been living in Britain for 46 years, and Louis Hanway from Lanarkshire, a furrier suffering from a heart disease who had left Germany at the age of nine. Both Laurenz and Hanway had British-born wives. Amongst those now repatriated were Mrs Leibfried from Edinburgh, a mother of six British-born children and wife of an interned "enemy alien", and Martha Mutzke, a domestic servant, aged 28, whose father and brothers were interned. Leibfried and Mutzke had been resident in Britain for 28 years and 15 years respectively.[34]

This information provides the background to some figures that give an overview of the forced movement of people in Scotland during the course of the war. The number of "enemy aliens" resident in the country stood at 3,170 in August 1914, of whom 1,073 had been interned by November 1914. As a result, the numbers resident in Scotland dropped to 1,390, to 770 in 1917 and only to 644 in August 1918. Numbers for the immediate post-war period—when further repatriations were carried out—could not be obtained. The number of 566 Germans in Scotland as recorded by the

1921 census cannot be directly correlated with the above figures due to differing registration methods.[35]

Whereas internment only affected men, the measures discussed above—displacement, repatriation, but also general hostility—affected both sexes. Women suffered economic hardship through the internment of the main breadwinner and, in the case of repatriation, ended up in their "homeland" where ties had been severed and that offered few opportunities during the war and post-war period. In British possessions in sub-Saharan Africa, India and Australia women were also interned, albeit on a smaller scale. Reviewing the impact of internment policies by belligerent states generally, Matthew Stibbe rightly comes to the conclusion that women have been "forgotten victims of internment ... In general, internment was a gendered and gendering experience, emasculating men and disempowering women".[36] It is important to look beyond the internment camps in order to understand the full impact of government measures on enemy minorities.

"Barbed Wire Disease": Life in the Stobs Internment Camp

Internment in Britain during the First World War—if known at all—is usually associated with the Knockaloe Camp on the Isle of Man. This was the largest camp with a maximum capacity of 23,000. Mainland Britain, however, was also dotted with smaller camps, and these tend to fall under the radar of scholarship. Panikos Panayi, in his constitutive study on the topic, makes important inroads into a more comprehensive understanding of the "camp system" spanning Britain.[37] The national and Imperial context puts life in the Stobs Camp in perspective and allows for wider conclusions. Features of camp life as described in the following were strikingly similar around the world.

Stobs near Hawick in the Scottish borders region had been a military training ground before being converted into an internment camp. Within the British context, it seems to have been one of the few camps that simultaneously held civilians and captured POWs, at least during the first two years of its existence. The two groups were accommodated in separate, but mutually accessible compounds, each consisting of 20 huts measuring 120 feet in length and 20 feet in width and sleeping 33 people on average. When Stobs was made into a purely military camp in June 1916, the civilians were moved to Knockaloe and other camps, and their

places filled with further captured combatant soldiers and sailors. The camp was dissolved in spring 1919.[38]

The balance between civilian and military internees fluctuated during the course of the war. In February 1915, Stobs housed a mere 300 civilians and no POWs. By June of the same year, the figures had rocketed to 1,098 civilians and 1,278 POWs. A year later, the balance remained similar, but by now there were 2,269 civilians and 2,323 POWs.[39] Based on an inspection report by US Embassy official Edward Lowry, more detailed statistical data can be given shortly before the conversion of Stobs into a military camp. Compounds A and B were civilian and compounds C and D military. Each compound held roughly the same number (Table 5.1).

The inspection report also gives a snapshot of camp organisation and some of the activities pursued by the inmates. As it points out, "this Camp seems to be thoroughly well organized with respect to committees governing the various activities of the prisoners". Committees were set up and run by the prisoners themselves and included sport, industrial work and education. The Education Committee oversaw the camp school, which offered 61 lessons weekly to 611 pupils, taught by 22 teachers. The camp newspaper incessantly reminded its readership that it was important to keep busy and learn new things to avoid the debilitating effects of idleness and prepare for professional life after release.[40] An elementary school taught German orthography and grammar, arithmetic, geography and

Table 5.1 Stobs Camp—sample date February 4, 1916. (Table S. Manz)

	Civilians	*POWs*
Nationality and Type	German: 2,098 Austrian: 181 Turkish: 3 Bulgarian: 1	All German, except 3 Alsatians Sailors: 504 Soldiers: 1,829
Total	2,283	2,333
Of these:		
Patients	49	17
Hospital orderlies	22	6
In cells	1	1
Grand total	4,616	

Report American Embassy, German Division, February 17, 1916, TNA, FO 383/162. The three Alsatians are specifically mentioned in this report.

elementary history. Advanced courses included mathematics and physics, business skills (book-keeping, shorthand), agriculture, gardening and forestry, foreign languages (English, French, Spanish), law, political economy and drawing. The Educational hut contained a library consisting of 750 books. Many of these and other educational materials such as blackboards and tables were donated by Dr Markel, a London-based chemist of German extraction who aimed to alleviate life for inmates all across Britain. Other materials provided by him included tools for craftsmen and dentistry equipment. In Stobs, "there is a dentist (a German prisoner) who, by an arrangement with Dr Markel, treats poor patients and supplies them with false teeth at no cost to themselves".[41]

Work, recreation and education were the only ways to escape boredom. Some prisoners set up workshops where they pursued occupations they had held in private life such as hairdressing, tailoring and watch repairs. Elaborate woodworks were produced in the workshop, and competitive exhibitions were organised for displaying carved items such as boxes, toys and frames. Gardening was popular. By April 1916, there were skittle alleys and equipment for gymnastics. Two tennis courts and a recreation ground were in the making. "Sport-Feste" were organised on a regular basis. The spiritual needs of both Lutherans and Catholics were catered for by visiting clerics from outside the camp. Arts played an important role to fill the prisoners' time and to distract them from their isolation. An orchestra and various other instrumental groups existed, several singing societies, a library with English and German fiction, and a theatre society. For Christmas 1915, for example, under the title "Hallo Stobs!!" a *Grosse Weihnachtsrevue mit Musik (Chor u. Orchester), Gesang und Tanz* [Great Christmas Show with Music (Choir and Orchestra), Song and Dance] was staged. The show was organised by the theatre committee of the civilian camp.[42]

Visits by relatives and friends were restricted to Saturdays and were attended by an interpreter. All incoming and outgoing mail had to bear the censor's mark. This ensured that only trivial information—and certainly no criticism—could reach the outside world. Alluding to an alcohol ban that existed in the camp, the prisoners' newspaper fittingly remarked:

> Sometimes a letter comes flying across the barbed wire. From Germany or from the English home. Anything we want to know is not mentioned. Of course not. Parcels also arrive. If something very desirable is heard babbling inside the censor keeps it. Of course.[43]

A letter from E. Willinger, who had been living in Middlesbrough before the war, gives an insight into the nature of outgoing mail. The letter was addressed to Gerhard Abraham, the pastor of the German Protestant Congregation in Middlesbrough, and is quoted verbatim. Its content is almost devoid of any significant information. The writer was possibly an industrial labourer in the shipyards:

> Dear Mr. Abraham,
>
> this to let you know that we are here in Stops Camp A now. That is to say not all of us from the Ship. there are only about 10 from M'borough and Southbank here. there is quit a young Pastor coming here from Edinbrough (I forgotten his name) but he says he may see you some day, I hope so. It is quit all right here. The Air is splendit. I understand you are going to Lancaster and Lofthouse Park [two camps, S.M.] as well. Please remember me to Paul Schulz, Franz v. Rohn and some of the old M'brough boys. I hope Your Wife and Child are quit well same yourself.
> My Adress is E. W. Concentration Camp A. Hut q.a., Stops, Hawick, Scotland.
>
> Gruß
>
> E. Willinger[44]

Long periods of internment and isolation caused those mental problems that were aptly described by contemporaries as *Stacheldrahtkrankheit* (barbed wire disease), a term coined by the Swiss psychiatrist and camp inspector, Dr. Vischer. The inmates had nothing meaningful to do and often felt bored and depressed. An article in the camp newspaper, *Stobsiade*, addressed this condition:

> By now, our minds have become a bit simple, or even get crackers, and get into a state of sentimental delirium. Our brains are contracting. Life before internment appears very distant. When was it again that we gave our darling a farewell kiss? Does this darling exist at all, or is she also part of our fantasies? God alone knows.[45]

Serious cases of mental illness had to be treated in the camp hospital. An inspection report from April 1916 reported:

> Unfortunately there had been three deaths during the last few days before my visit, which had told very much upon the nerves of the interned soldiers

> and civilians, as they have so little to think about … Most of the prisoners in the hospital were suffering from nerves, colds, wounds, or tuberculosis.[46]

Some committed suicide. Karl Klein, a sailor from the SMS *Blücher*, hanged himself in September 1915.[47] A compelling self-analysis was written by the aforementioned German-American medical doctor, Walter Gellhorn. By the time he wrote his farewell letter he had already taken six grains of morphia hypodermically and was beyond rescue. The letter was addressed to the camp surgeon-in-chief, Capt. C. B. Dobell, and stated that "under the circumstances I have been treated decently, but I complain that I have been interned at all. The sudden change from an active practice into a life without adequate occupation and this awful time for brooding is too much". He thanked Dobell for his "personal kindness" and bequeathed to him his thermometer as a collegial "token of my esteem". There was also "an old steamer trunk which contains clothes and underwear. This I wish to leave to the poor prisoners of the camp".[48]

Within the British and, indeed, Imperial context Stobs was one of the best organised and well-attended camps. Conditions worldwide differed widely. At the low end of the scale stood camps such as Stratford in London, which drew internees' comments such as "horrible hole" or "dirty, cold and draughty", or Amherst in Nova Scotia, which drew a litany of complaints about hygiene, food, cramped conditions, prisoner treatment and so on.[49] Comments on Stobs from differing sources, in contrast, were mostly positive. Its commandant, Major Bowman, supported prisoners' activities within the framework set by the war office and was repeatedly praised by actual and former inmates for his endeavours and fair treatment.[50] A camp inspector observed "how cordial and pleasant are the relations between the prisoners in this camp, civilian, military and naval, with the Camp authorities. The Camp Captains [internees, S.M.] and the others, who spoke to me, explicitly stated that any complaint or request they had to make, was not to be taken as reflecting in any way on the Commandant or the officers under his command".[51] Albert E. Rosenkranz, who had been the pastor of the German congregation in Liverpool before the war, wrote in 1921 that those of his flock who came to Stobs had no reason to complain about their treatment.[52] And the above-mentioned Wilhelm Kröpke, with his first-hand experience of several camps in Nigeria and Britain, found that he had it nowhere as good as in Stobs.[53] He praised Commandant Bowman who took a keen interest in prisoners' cultural activities, such as attending the weekly concerts. "He

was generally respected and appreciated, a Scotsman by nationality. We were grateful to him for many agreeable things".[54]

The geographical cross-references and differences help to emphasise that a purely systemic analysis of the Imperial camp system with Stobs as a case study has its limits. It needs to be complemented with a behaviourist element. To be sure, for Britain and the colonies the system was centrally administered and tightly controlled from Westminster; the dominions largely followed the policies set by Westminster. Within these parameters, however, local conditions were set by individual camp commandants and their staff. Their decisions and behaviour could have immediate effects on camp conditions and prisoner morale. Again, this can be backed up by examples of prisoners' utterances. Merchant Otto Krueger in the Amherst camp found that the good intentions of commandant Major Oulton were often contravened by his adjutant, Captain Ridout, "who is one of the main reasons for dissatisfaction amongst prisoners". Through petty directives he spread "unrest and dissatisfaction". The inmates felt that he "pesters them on purpose and wants them to feel his power wherever he can".[55] In the Fort Napier camp (South Africa), Commandant Colonel Manning was temporarily replaced by Colonel Clarke in autumn 1917. Prisoner representatives begged the camp inspector, Justice Boshoff, to argue for an extension of Clarke's tenure. This was because "Col. Manning talks . . . to the men in the camp, as if they were criminals and not civilian prisoners of war, many of them are educated gentlemen".[56] Clarke relaxed the rules on visits between different compounds, but this was stopped again when Manning returned—much to the annoyance of the inmates.[57] Arbitrary treatment induced by individual command decisions, in combination with general frustration about captivity and boredom, could lead to outbreaks of violence. One example was a three-day riot in Fort Napier in August 1917, when prisoners burnt down buildings and destroyed barbed wire. Another example was a "mutiny" in the Douglas camp on the Isle of Man in November 1914, when "a disciplinarian commandant, Colonel Henry Madoc, who had previously worked in the Transvaal police force, added to the charged atmosphere". During both incidents guards shot at prisoners, killing and injuring several of them.[58]

No disturbances of this kind took place in Stobs. This was not due to systemic differences between Scotland and other parts of Britain and the Empire. It was rather due to the tone set by a specific camp commandant in communicating government policies and granting certain liberties to alleviate the prisoners' lot. In spite of differences in camp conditions and administration, however, the Empire-wide camp system led to broad

similarities in facilities around the world. Most importantly, there was no deliberate maltreatment. Prisoners received adequate food rations, and the framework of international conventions on prisoner treatment was generally respected, not least to avoid reprisals against British prisoners in German captivity. Canada constituted an exception amongst the dominions, using its civilian internees as forced labour to develop its national parks.[59]

After the removal of civilian prisoners in July 1916, Stobs was turned into a purely military POW camp. It then developed into the organisational and logistical parent camp of at least 30 further labour camps, which spread across Scotland and Northern England. The structure in Stobs was representative of the camp system as a whole. Prisoners were first concentrated in a bigger camp, from where they could be sent on to smaller work camps. These held between 50 and several hundred and often existed only for certain periods of time. The nature of labour was connected to local conditions and infrastructure needs, for example Dalmellington—Loch Doon (road and water pipe building; stone breaking), Glendevon (water dam), Crawford (rail), Raasay—Inner Hebrides (iron ore mining), Port Clarence—Tyne (coal waste disposal) and Lentran (forestry work).[60]

Return and Remembrance

Following the armistice in November 1918, the *Stobsiade* published its last two issues in December 1918 and in January 1919. These were full of anticipation of release, but also uncertainty about when this would actually happen. The library was cleared, instruments were packed away for shipping, and waiting was the main theme during these last few months. Whereas Britain was willing to release its captives straight after the armistice, France decided to use its own German POWs for forced labour such as mine clearing and reconstruction work, as well as a bargaining tool during negotiations at Versailles. Britain and the United States did not want to break ranks and released their prisoners only after the Treaty of Versailles in summer 1919, whilst France held out until spring 1920.[61] With its typical bitter humour, the *Stobsiade* published a fake advert appealing to "Capitalists! Property Speculators! The pending vacation of a large prisoner camp in the Scottish hills (near Hawick) offers an opportunity for a forward-looking pedagogue to establish an ideal Girls' Boarding School. The extensive grounds are surrounded by double barbed wire, which makes any unwanted approach impossible in this area of moral impeccability".[62] The "opportunity" was not taken up.

After the release of the last prisoners in spring 1919, the camp was returned to its original function as a military training ground.

After repatriation, then, German society and authorities had to cope with the reintegration of approximately 1.2 million returnees. These consisted of two groups. First, prisoners of war, and second, civilians who had in many cases spent their whole working lives abroad and had little personal and professional contacts in their "homeland". Although Reinhard Nachtigal is certainly right in arguing that returning British, American and German POWs received a more positive welcome than French and Russian ones, the sources do not necessarily back up his claim that German returnees were received "with open arms and minds", in particular as the 1920s progressed.[63]

Various local associations started to emerge from autumn 1918, which came together in January 1919 as the *Volksbund zum Schutze der deutschen Kriegs- und Zivilgefangenen* (Peoples' Federation for the Protection of German Military and Civilian Prisoners of War). It had over 3,000 local associations across Germany and several hundred thousand members. The *Volksbund* cooperated closely with a second group, the *Reichsvereinigung ehemaliger Kriegsgefangener* (Reich Association of former Prisoners of War). Their aims were threefold: first, to influence international public opinion for the speedy release of the captives; second, to awaken public interest and empathy within Germany for the returnees; third, to fight for their economic demands such as restitution of property or state support.[64] As early as 1916 a specific interest group was founded in Berlin for those expelled from Britain and its territories. It was chaired by the former German consul in Hartlepool, E. W. Peters, under the name *Ausschuss für Vertriebene Reichsdeutsche aus Großbritannien, Irland und den britischen Kolonien* (Committee for Expelled Reich Germans from Great Britain, Ireland and the British Colonies).[65]

State coordination rested with the *Reichszentralstelle für Kriegs- und Zivilgefangene* (Reich Central Office for Military and Civilian Prisoners of War), which, however, stressed that support for civilians was the responsibility of individual federal states.[66] This task was taken on in particular by Württemberg through the *Hilfsstelle für Auslandsdeutsche* (Support Office of Germans Abroad), which acted on behalf of all Germans whose place of residence on August 1, 1914 had been abroad and who were forcibly relocated. The Office stated in 1921 that its work was indispensable to keep returnees away from state poor relief.[67] The situation of former civilian prisoners was, indeed, problematic. A report by the Bavarian Red

Cross explained that state support was too much directed towards former military POWs and that destitution amongst returnee civilians was comparatively higher: "They only have what they wear on their bodies and absolutely nothing else. Their existence is utterly destroyed, they lost their possessions and have here, in their homeland, nowhere to live, not even bed-linen or furniture as bare necessities of life".[68] Federal state authorities agreed that the discrimination of civilians created potential for social protest, but that their hands were tied in light of the dire post-war state budgets. Their analysis of the situation was poignant:

> [The civilians] are severely disadvantaged in integrating swiftly and independently into professional life, first because of the detrimental bodily and mental effects of internment, and second because of their lack of knowledge of the domestic situation, since their whole development was geared towards life abroad … The situation of returning civilian prisoners is extremely deplorable, and since the current structures do not allow for sufficient support, their dissatisfaction is constantly growing. Very recently it has taken on dimensions which are most disturbing. This dissatisfaction has been increased through the fact that former military POWs have recently been granted special support of 150 million Mark from the federal budget.[69]

Throughout the 1920s, the above-mentioned pressure groups agitated for public acknowledgment of their suffering in captivity. They felt unduly perceived as malingerers and "second class war participants".[70] The Munich-branch of the Interest Group of Former Military and Civilian Prisoners complained:

> Our Fatherland, the Government and the people have forgotten that the former military and civilian prisoners fought and suffered for the Fatherland. [They] have forgotten that men who are now broken in body and spirit have sacrificed the most valuable things in their lives: health and happiness. It is true: the former prisoners are never mentioned. People pretend they do not even know that these poor people still existed.[71]

The cult of military heroism in the Weimar Republic was mostly confined to active combatants. Prisoners felt left out of narratives of the war experience, which were a crucially defining element of *Volksgemeinschaft* (national community) creation. In 1933, the *Reichsvereinigung* willingly merged with the new associational apparatus of the National Socialist regime. After 1945, far more substantial streams of POWs and civilian

expellees had to be accommodated, mostly from East Central and Eastern Europe. Once again, the story of the First World War internees had no place within these new patterns of memorialisation. The same was true for Britain. The notion of the Great War as a *bellum iustum* has been an important cornerstone of national identity construction ever since 1914; interning tens of thousands of civilians never fitted into self-perceptions of this kind. On both sides, commemoration was simply confined to the private sphere. Stobs provides two examples. Wood carvings, drawings and other handicraft items made by internees were displayed in the homes of Germans in Glasgow and Edinburgh until long after the war, reminding members of the particular ethnic minority of their plight.[72] The second example concerns the camp graveyard. Throughout the 1920s a visitor from Germany came once a year to mourn at the grave of his interred son. He was always invited for a meal by a family living nearby. In 1962, the German War Graves Commission decided to bring together all German graves on British soil and established the German War Cemetery in Cannock Chase, Staffordshire. The 36 soldiers and six civilians buried in Stobs were disinterred and taken to their new resting place.[73]

Recent indicators suggest that Britain's "internment amnesia" might finally come to an end. In the context of centenary commemorations—and in the footsteps of academic research—the media and general public have become more receptive towards a differentiated representation of the First World War, one that also includes "enemy aliens". Their plight has found its way into media outlets; conferences for the general public in 2014 (Isle of Man) and 2016 (Hawick) focused on Knockaloe and Stobs as internment sites.[74] Key heritage players such as Historic Scotland and the Royal Commission on Ancient and Historic Monuments of Scotland have "discovered" Stobs as a potential commemoration site. Archaeological excavation, site accessibility and explanatory boards are planned to communicate the history of the site to the general public. The Arts and Humanities Research Council facilitates integration of these local endeavours into a larger research context.[75] It has taken a century for this to be set in motion. The story of commemorating Stobs has only just begun, with this chapter providing an empirical framework to support the process. Crucially, it goes beyond the local and national context, expanding the perspective to the global and Imperial contexts. It is only within the framework of the Imperial camp system that Stobs gains its significance as a case history of "enemy alien" and Prisoner of War internment during the First World War. Civilians have to be seen as an integral part of this history.

Notes

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3. Kröpke, *Meine Flucht*, 39.
4. Panikos Panayi, *Prisoners of Britain. German Civilian and Combatant Internees during the First World War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 44.
5. Daniel Steinbach, "Challenging European Colonial Supremacy: The Internment of 'Enemy Aliens' in German East Africa during the First World War," in *Other Combatants, Other Fronts: Competing Histories of the First World War*, eds. James E. Kitchen et al. (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2011), 153–176; Mahon Murphy, "German Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees from the German Colonies in Captivity in the British Empire, 1914–1920" (PhD diss., London School of Economics, 2015).
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14. "Germany's Scottish Airbase," August 5, 1914, National Archives of Scotland (NAS), HH 31/6/25478/267.
15. "Germany's Scottish Airbase," August 24, 1914, NAS, HH 31/6/25478/267.
16. *Scottish Field*, December 1914; "Germany's Scottish Airbase," NAS, HH 31/6/25478/267.
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23. "Letters to the Editor," *Glasgow Herald*, May, 17 1915, 5.
24. "Letters to the Editor," *Glasgow Herald*, June, 9 1916, 3.
25. "Letters to the Editor," *Glasgow Herald*, September 9, 1914, 3; October 21, 1914, 3; December 12, 1914, 3; March 10, 1915, 3; May 15, 1915, 3; April 3, 1916, 3; June 12, 1916, 3. Similarly, see letters to *Scottish Field*, February 1917, June 1915.
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28. Fischer, "Integration"; National Archives of South Africa (NAZA), CES-files; Dedering, "Avenge".
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32. Arno Singewald to Reichskommissar zur Erörterung von Gewalttätigkeiten gegen deutsche Zivilpersonen in Feindeshand, May 8, 1916, 25, Bundesarchiv Freiburg, PH 2/588.
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34. "Alien Enemies," *Glasgow Herald*, August 14, 1918, 3; "Enemy Aliens in Scotland," *Glasgow Herald*, August 24, 1918, 4.
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41. Report American Embassy, German Division, February 17, 1916, TNA, FO 383/162, 5.
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43. *Stobsiade*, September 5, 1915.
44. May 11, 1915, THLLA, TH 8662/68.
45. *Stobsiade*, September 5, 1915.
46. *Parliamentary Papers*, misc. 30 (1916), Report American Embassy, German Division, 16.
47. "News in Brief," *The Times*, September 22, 1915, 5.
48. Walter Gellhorn to Capt. C. B. Dobell, July 11, 1916, TNA, FO 383/293.
49. Quotes in Panayi, *Prisoners*, 91; various Red Cross and consular files in Bundesarchiv Berlin (BArch), R901/83088 to 83090.
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CHAPTER 6

"The Enemy Within"?: Armenians, Jews, the Military Crises of 1915 and the Genocidal Origins of the "Minorities Question"

Mark Levene

In 1919 as a corollary to the victorious Allies' Versailles imprimatur for the creation or expansion of several east European nation-states (the so-called "New Europe"), a series of Minorities Treaties were enacted with each of them. As the nomenclature implies, the purpose of these treaties was to protect the lives and cultural integrity of a wide-range of minority groups within these states. The first model treaty for Poland, for example, specifically set out the linguistic, religious and educational rights of Jews.[1] Four years later at the Treaty of Lausanne between these same Allies and the newly recognised Turkish republic—effectively the last act in the post-Great War settlement—the whole minorities idea was turned on its head. In this treaty it was the compulsory removal of unwanted minorities which was the order of the day. But one key community—the Armenians—were not only omitted from the protocols but were treated "as if the Armenian Question or the Armenian people themselves had ceased to exist".[2]

At first sight, this stark contrast might suggest some radical rupture in the course of events *after* the Great War. If Lausanne would seem to

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represent the overthrow of a more benign Allied formula, by which non-dominant communities were recognised as having their own legitimate entitlement to a space within otherwise culturally homogenising polities, by the same token the 1923 Treaty could be taken as a harbinger of the altogether more unforgiving world of inter-war dictatorships, the most extreme outcome of which, a world war later, would be the Holocaust. If that were our precise focus, the significance of the First World War would seem to lie in the way that it spawned radical ideological tendencies—fascism, Nazism, totalitarianism, racism—which in turn made genocide possible.[3]

Here, this chapter offers a different approach. First of all, the Minorities Treaties and Lausanne were less polar opposites and more part of the same atrocity-laden "learnt" experience of the First World War. Nor was genocide something waiting in the wings. It had already happened within the context of the life and death struggles of 1914–1918. Second, if we were looking to a First World War moment which informed *both* the Minorities Treaties and Lausanne, as good a contender as any would be the parallel Russian and Ottoman military crises of the high spring and summer of 1915 in which the domestic butt of state-military anxieties came to rest heavily on their respective Jewish and Armenian populations and in which both communities suffered wholesale deportations. There, one might say, the similarity ends. In the former case, genocide was avoided, in the latter, terrifyingly sustained. Yet it is precisely in this dichotomy that we can discern how the Minorities Treaties and Lausanne were part of the same crystallisation of state responses to alleged enemies within, the combined trajectory of which was towards a "normative" post-1918 nation-state building and in which vulnerable, "problem" minorities were at best marginalised, at worst marked down for complete obliteration.

To be sure, proposing that there is a transmission belt between the events of 1915 and the behaviour of post-1918 states involves more than one paradox. The Ottoman and Romanov polities that carried out the deportations were imperial ones, neither of which in practice—alongside Habsburg Austria-Hungary—existed after the end of the Great War. By any contemporary standard these were outmoded *anciens régimes* ostensibly far removed from the forward-looking, consciously modernising and above all national states that succeeded them. The Soviet Union also advocated national self-determination for its many peoples. Yet it is the argument of this chapter that it was precisely in the act of the deportation of whole populations on the grounds of their alleged threat to state

security that we can discern a classic, if pathological signature of modernising regimes, albeit ones operating in crisis mode. Or put another way, the very effort of attempting to cleanse themselves of "foreign bodies" suggests a last-ditch effort by Petrograd and Constantinople to redefine and reforge their societies along more consciously ethno-national lines and as if they were seeing themselves—correctly or incorrectly—through the prism of Western nation-statehood. The further paradox, however, is that in actually translating an aspiration for the mass removal of unwanted peoples into practical action, they offered a precedent, even model—for their more overtly national successors to do the same. That much of the impetus for the 1915 deportations came through respective Russian and Ottoman military leadership provided both apparatus and method for the achievement of such goals. And, moreover, this serves as a reminder that the opportunities for far-reaching demographic, social and economic transformation by way of state-led violence were that much greater under cover of war. Set against these emerging tendencies, the Minorities Treaties together with Lausanne might be seen less as attempts by the Allied guardians of the new liberal order to deny to the "New Europe" their own underlying premise of national self-determination so much as the setting of boundaries to accommodate that order to the new operational realities.

The implicit weakness of this system *tout ensemble* certainly alarmed the international lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, to such an extent that he began searching in the inter-war years for another formula for the international legal protection of minority groups. The search would lead him eventually to articulate the concept of "genocide".[4] This is perhaps just as well given that the very unravelling of the 1919 minorities system ensured that after the Second World War, the liberal West—for all its charters of human rights—was more than ready to dump the system in favour of a further expansion of the Lausanne model. In seeking evidence in support of this, one need go no further than the post-1944 Allied sponsored mass population exchanges of millions of ethnic Germans and others from the "New Europe".[5] Indeed, one might even thereby read the long-term legacy of our 1915 events as proof of the way that the international community had so absorbed mass deportation—even under the more toxic term, ethnic cleansing—into its normative fabric, that it could actually endorse Lemkin's worst nightmare without uttering its true name.

But then what of the two groups—Armenians and Jews—whose wartime fate was to suffer genocide? Here, however, we seem to run into a

further methodological problem. Among genocide scholars the relationship between the *Medz Yeghern* (the Armenian "catastrophe") and the Holocaust has become almost axiomatic.[6] That, however, assumes a diachronic comparison between the events of the *Two* World Wars. This may be perfectly valid in itself, even if it is predicated on an Armenian need—in the face of on-going Turkish and other states' denial—to demonstrate that the catastrophe was indeed an optimal genocide like the Holocaust. But what may be gained on that front may equally be lost in the much more exact and synchronous comparison between what happened to *both* communities in 1915. Each was effectively accused of representing internal threats to state security in the time of war, necessitating pre-emptive action against them. Moreover, in both instances, the implication was that this supposed existential threat came not from some dangerous individuals within these communities but as a function of their very ethno-religious existence. As such, the Russian and Ottoman violent removals of whole swathes of their borderland populations—men, women and children—were as if they were engaged with some mortal foe. The difference is that in the Russian case the potential for this trajectory spilling over into actual genocide was deflected. It is this, perhaps, that explains why most scholars in the field are either unaware of or ignore the parallels.

But does not that make some of the questions one might ask all the more compelling? What was it about these two communities that made them stand out, among so many other borderland peoples, as particularly subversive? Were they intrinsically dangerous anti-state groups or should we understand such accusations in terms of the *mentalité* of those who were making the charge? If the latter is true, are we looking at a possibly latent psychopathology of response that needed a very specific crisis of war to be activated? And does that lay a particular responsibility on the way these states' military elites at the cutting edge of the deportation agendas chose to confabulate these two communities into Trojan horses, regardless of the evidence to the contrary? If the implication here is that the deportation sequences had little to do with anything we might call the precautionary principle and everything to do with the nature of collective *ideé fixes* (obsessions), then an explanation of how a worst case scenario in the Russian instance was deflected becomes all the more acute.

Because this is an exploratory essay it comes with only schematic answers to such complex questions. Even so, they require a form of ordering. Consequently, this chapter proceeds through three linked sections. The first outlines what happened in 1915. The second provides a

brief comparative profile of Armenians and Jews in Russia and Ottomania as these empires threw themselves into the First World War. Third, the chapter offers a further short assessment of their military elites and the degree to which their extreme actions were conditioned or catalysed by their respective obsessions. In conclusion the chapter brings these elements together to consider how far the 1915 crises were a signpost to the post-war "minorities" condition.

1915: A Year of Genocidal War

None of the major belligerents had gone into the war imagining that this might spell their demise and subsequent disintegration. For Petrograd, the war seemed to offer opportunity for not just a domestic *union sacrée* after the 1905 traumas of war and revolution but a territorial expansion, especially embracing fellow Slavic populations. This aspiration was seemingly realised at the war's outset when Russian forces broke through the Carpathians into Austrian Galicia. Similarly, on the other side, the goals of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) were geared towards an aggressive breakout from the near-collapse and catastrophic loss of territories in the Balkan Wars and with a proposed thrust eastwards across the Russian Caucasus as well as into Russian-controlled Persian Azerbaijan aimed at creating a new pan-Turanic empire. In both instances expansion was intended to reinforce a more overtly national, domestic socio-economic reorientation, in both instances that also raised significant questions about the future of each empire's wider, still sprawling multi-ethnic components. Yet by the end of 1914 or early 1915 those questions were wrenched in new and entirely more toxic directions as the initial military successes were blown away in monumental military disasters.[7] Faced in the following year with a war of attrition for which they were totally ill equipped and with no let-out in sight, Russian and Ottoman military febrility exposed underlying societal and, more particularly, ethnic tensions. In 1915 these exploded in the face of full-blown military emergencies.

For the Russians, the high summer 1914 rout and near-annihilation of two giant Russian armies, at Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes, ended Petrograd's hopes for the defeat of Germany but were not decisive in taking Russia out of the war. However, in the high spring of 1915 that possibility seriously presented itself. Concentrating forces in the Galician region where the Russians had made their initial autumn breakthrough

into the Habsburg empire, von Mackensen's joint Austro-German offensive, initially against the Russian Third Army in Galicia, turned into a sustained assault along the entire front. By late August this had forced a Russian retreat from not just the previously captured territories but also the entirety of Congress Poland, much of the Baltic region and swathes of Podolia and Volyhnia.

The so-called "Great Retreat" opened up the possibility of a general societal breakdown. In the line of retreat the Russian high command, Stavka, ordered a scorched earth policy and the evacuation of everything moveable, including people. The result of this was that, by early 1916, the majority of the over 3,300,000 internal refugees came from this disaster zone.[8] But if this threw up logistical and relief problems of themselves that would have taxed any and every state infrastructure to the limit, Stavka's response to the crisis took on a peculiarly ethnic dimension. Some of this was in line within the wave of anti-German xenophobia that swept metropolitan Russia as the spring crisis reached its height. Late May, for instance, saw terrible grass-roots pogroms against Germans in Moscow that the authorities were notably slow to disperse.[9] Yet behind the hysteria was also a calculated state-cum-military reasoning. For example, General Bonch-Bruevich, the head of the Petrograd Military District, and a notable figure in fanning spy mania throughout Russia, proposed to General Ianushkevich, Stavka's chief of staff, that this was an opportunity "to liquidate without a trace this entire alien element at the end of the war".[10] Drives to cleanse large swathes of the western borderlands of ethnic Germans were thus conducted from the beginning of the war through into the Brusilov campaign of 1916 and with the ostensible justification of "military necessity" actually used as a pretext for a programme of targeted ethnic economic expropriation.[11]

But if ethnic Germans were one communal scapegoat, the historic and concentrated Jewish population of the western region were arguably even more so. Again, the sweeping powers granted to the military had been used by Stavka to order mass Jewish evacuations from the war's very outset. The notion that Jews were not just an unreliable but were actually a subversive fifth column busily acting as spies and saboteurs for the Germans thus paved the way for a Stavka proclamation in late November 1914 that declared that Jewish hostages would be taken and executed "in cases of necessity". The practice became a standard operating procedure, especially where the army suffered military reverse, as too did repeated military pogroms.[12]

The 1915 retreat, however, saw these tendencies take on a considerably more dramatic and dangerous turn. Now, it was not just whole districts from which Jews were deported but whole provinces. In three out of six of the northern Baltic zones—Kovno, Grodno and Suvalki where Jews were significant proportions of the population—mass compulsory Jewish evictions were activated at the end of April. On just two days alone—April 30 and May 3—on the orders of its commandant, General Grigoriev, a staggering 190,000 Jews were eructed from Kovno as well as from neighbouring districts of Kurland. Kovno's total of some 300,000 Jewish expellees thus made up a very large proportion of almost 750,000 Jews deported during the Great Retreat from the Baltic in the north to Bessarabia in the south. Such expulsion orders usually came with just a few hours' notice, the expellees forced to leave either on foot or in goods trains "like cattle packed one on top of the other". Jewish soldiers were also disarmed and arrested and in the case of Kovno divested of their military uniforms and sent shoeless and half-naked to the Vilna rear area.[13] Such operations were carried out by relatively low-level officers, gendarmerie or political counter-intelligence personnel, though clearly acting at Stavka's behest. Everywhere too, a mounting range of anti-Jewish violence committed by Cossacks and other soldiers in the line of retreat sparked off a much wider sequence of anti-Jewish grass-roots violence, robbery and arson, often incited by Polish nationalists.[14]

It could be argued that this brutal process of deportation was, in and of itself, sub-genocidal rather than actually genocidal. Random killings by ill-disciplined men in or out of uniform threatened to become endemic. Starvation, plus the rapid spread of disease, where, for instance, deportees were left in cattle trains in railway sidings for days on end, presented another epidemiological route towards mass death.[15] But if Jewish relief organisations did their best to meet these challenges, there was another factor that threatened not just to overwhelm them but to turn a mounting tragedy into a catastrophe. Since the Russian takeover of most of the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom in the 1790s, the growing millions of its Jewish population were largely barred from moving eastwards from this "Pale of Settlement" into Russia *integrale*. This meant that when the Russian military in 1915 began forcing Jews in this direction, they would inevitably arrive at an internal boundary beyond which they were technically not allowed to go. How would this potential log jam be resolved? Local administrations were already complaining to Stavka and the government in Petrograd that they could not, in any

case, cope with the influx. In late 1941, when the Nazi German advance was forestalled before the gates of Moscow and Leningrad, German SS commanders, put on the spot when presented with trainloads of German Jews arriving at key rail termini in Minsk, Kovno and Riga, resolved a very similar situation through extermination.[16] No such resort to mass murder was carried through in 1915, but not because it was not contemplated by the officer class. It was interventions from civil society within Russia—but more particularly through back channels, largely British diplomatic *viva-voces*—that the immediate crisis was averted. In the upshot, what could have turned into mass murder was prevented because the Council of Ministers bowed to these pressures and took the extraordinary step to allow Jews—supposedly temporarily, in practice forever—to enter into Russia proper, thus breaking the log jam.[17]

The fact that the reasons for the British intervention were entirely pragmatic rather than humanitarian might not otherwise concern us here, except for the compare and contrast elements with what simultaneously happened to the Armenians. Just as most Central Power, Ottoman-assigned military officers and diplomats at the Porte tended to accept the CUP line that the Armenians were somehow collectively responsible for whatever insurrectionary potential came from a turncoat Armenian minority, most *in situ* British observers in Russia equally bought into the argument that the Jews were somehow to blame for reverses at the front and the collapse of morale in the rear. The British Ambassador Sir George Buchanan wrote, for instance, in spring 1915, to his own Foreign Office: "There cannot be the slightest doubt that a very large number of Jews have been in German pay and have acted as spies during the campaigns in Poland. Nearly every Russian officer who returns from the front has stories to tell on the subject".[18] What worried the British, however, was the possibility that newspaper reports of mass anti-Jewish violence would undermine the sympathies of a still neutral United States for the Allies. Fixated on the notion that American credit to them was dependent on New York-based German Jewish banking houses, Russian anti-Semitism, noted the British government minister, Lord Robert Cecil, would make "Jewish financial assistance to the Allies very difficult to obtain and this war may well turn on finance".[19]

Such an assumption was based on a fundamental misconception about Jewish influence—indeed it offers evidence of how prevalent the international Jewish conspiracy canard was in high-level circles not usually noted for their anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, what matters here is the way it

offered a form of albeit temporary prophylactic for Russian Jewry entirely absent in the Armenian case. Or, put another way, while the Ottoman Armenians were slaughtered because they had no geopolitical leverage with which to protect themselves against the entirely confabulated charge of *collectiv*e treachery, Russian Jews charged with the same thing, were this time around spared; not because they tangibly possessed power but because all the Great Powers—often in the most phobic and paranoid terms—believed it.

Even so, we may consider how the actual wartime sequence pushing Ottomania towards Armenian annihilation had key aspects in common with its Russian counterpart. In the Porte's first major military campaign in the winter of 1914–1915, the Minister of War, Enver Pasha, led the Ottoman Third Army towards Sarakamish in the Caucasus intending a decisive confrontation with the Russians that would liberate the Turkic peoples of Central Asia. Instead Sarakamish became a disastrous rout, which in turn provided for a first Russian push into eastern Anatolia—the heartlands of Ottoman Armenia. But just as the Great Retreat seemed to presage a complete Russian collapse, the Anglo-French spring 1915 assault on the Dardanelles threatened not just military defeat but imperial eclipse. When the British were about to land troops on Gallipoli, the CUP responded to the threat to the capital by rounding up its leading Armenians on April 24, declaring this a preventative measure against an internal fifth column. A month and two days later, as Russian pressure in the east mounted, official orders were broadcast for the removal of the entire Armenian population of the six eastern Anatolian vilayets plus the adjacent Black sea vilayet of Trabzon.[20]

Just before the general deportation proclamation, the Allies had issued an unprecedented public declaration promising to hold Ottoman leaders to account for any crimes that they committed against "humanity and civilisation".[21] Newspaper accounts of Armenian massacres had become common fare during the previous month, though in fact widespread Ottoman atrocities against not just Armenians but also against other Christian Syriac—especially Nestorian—communities had been on-going, both in eastern Anatolia and across the Persian border since at least the beginning of the year.[22] It was almost certainly the scale of this violence in the Van region, for instance, that precipitated a defensive Armenian uprising in Van city itself just before the Gallipoli landings and that convinced the CUP that this was the beginning of a more general pro-Allied Armenian insurrection.[23]

Were the deportations a reaction to an imagined uprising or were they part of a concealed plan for Armenian destruction? Archival evidence suggests that the CUP was already committed in principle to the removal of non-Turkish *ethnies*, where they were the majority element, to other parts of the residual empire. Resettled thus in fragments, they would not be allowed to constitute more than five or possibly 10 per cent of the local population.[24] But even if Armenians would be transferred in this way to a Muslim-dominated Syrian desert fringe, the implication was one of forcible assimilation, not of mass murder. But this is what happened in 1915. From huge swathes of three of the six vilayets—Van, Bitlis and Erzurum—there were no deportations at all, only systematic massacres as carried out by military or paramilitary units, often composed of Kurds or Circassians mobilised under the aegis of a covert, Ministry of War-created Special Organisation, the *Teskilat-i Mahsusa*. In Trabzon, murder proceeded by way of mass drownings. Even where deportations did take place, these rapidly turned into death marches, men and boys dispatched early on, large numbers of women and children succumbing to exposure, starvation, dehydration or further extreme violence, including mass rape, as they descended off the Armenian plateau towards holding camps in the Tigris-Euphrates desert zone.[25]

Compared thus with the Russian-Jewish experience not only were the Armenian deportations altogether more violent but also involved movement not towards a metropolitan centre but in the direction of a remote and climatically unforgiving periphery. Once encamped in the desert south of Aleppo, disease took an escalating toll of Armenian survivors. However, later on in 1915 yet more Armenians from other parts of Anatolia and Thrace were deported there, this time partly by train. And whether overwhelmed by sheer logistical issues arising—not least the spread of disease to the surrounding population—or perhaps as a conscious decision to make a final end to the "problem," CUP officials *in situ* in 1916 (although clearly acting on orders from the Minister of Interior, Talaat Pasha) slaughtered—mostly by burning or asphyxiation—some 200,000 more Armenians.[26] Those in the Ottoman army by this time had also long been disarmed, turned into hard labour battalions and then mostly eliminated on the orders of senior unit commanders.[27] There were some belated efforts by German and other Central Power diplomats to try and protect Protestant and Catholic Armenians but with little discernible effect.[28] Allied dissemination of the massacres and their threats of punishment were equally ineffective. Of an estimated 1.7 to 2.1 million Ottoman

Armenians, modern day scholarship suggests that not less than half a million and possibly twice or even closer to three times that number perished.[29] The ancient yet vibrant Armenian presence in eastern Anatolia, and to a significant extent elsewhere in the empire, had been expunged.

Ottoman Armenians and Russian Jews: "The Enemy Within"?

If the difference in outcome for Armenians and Jews were a matter of clear and definite genocidal intent in the former case, against absence in the latter, the path to an explanation would be almost simple. Alas, genocides or their avoidance are rarely so linear in their trajectories. Moreover, focusing on some supposed premeditated blueprint or the lack thereof, fails to consider how Russian elite animus against Jews was every bit as virulent—if not more so—than the CUP animus against Armenians. That might suggest that concentrating only on the outcome misses other important lines of enquiry. In empires in which there were any number of non-Russian or non-Turkish ethnic or ethno-religious communities, almost any one of which might have been branded as disloyal, subversive or just plain difficult, why was it that these two became the wartime scapegoats *par excellence*?

Today, diaspora-based Jewish and Armenian communities—especially those in North America—are recognised both in scholarly literature and more generally as having strikingly similar socio-economic, demographic and geographical traits in common. Here, as increasingly professionally orientated middleman minorities, a sense of some elective affinity—though sometimes also victim competition—has been profoundly reinforced by respective Jewish and Armenian experiences of genocide.[30] That said, our First World War comparison is not founded on modern identity politics, rather it is founded on the way the war threw into sharp relief the exposed position of Ottoman Armenians and Russian Jews in their major geographical heartlands.

Then as now Armenians and Jews were transnational communities. But in 1914 their Russian and Ottoman majorities were concentrated in strategically exposed borderland regions. This did not make them in any sense the dominant communities of these regions, which were indeed long-standing and complex ethnographic mosaics. Historically speaking too, Armenian and Jewish political profiles were quiescent; the

Armenian kingdoms of the Middle Ages long-gone, the Jewish position in what once had been the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom entirely dependent on crown or *szlachta*. But by the late nineteenth century these historic relationships were entirely redundant. Religious distinctiveness, tolerated, even embraced under the Ottoman *millet* system, if much more grudgingly so under tsarism, was fundamentally not the issue either, even if Russian Orthodox fear and loathing of Jews was practically a given. The emerging crisis was much more in the way Jews and Armenians were rapidly able to navigate waves of imperial change *appearing* in the process to ostensibly advantage them over more traditionally *favoured* populations.

Clearly, this was as much projective perception as actual reality. The vast majority of both Armenians and Jews were feeling the same symptoms of rising population pressure, on the one hand, traditional economic breakdown, on the other, as their immediate ethnic neighbours. Yet accelerating levels of serious and widespread violence—massacres of Armenians, pogroms against Jews—suggested that they were actually more vulnerable than others operating within the same habitus. Even so, this involved a paradox. Conscious of being outside the religious and social mainstream, with occupational tendencies towards artisan and middleman roles, Armenians and Jews were more likely to become urban and entrepreneurial, more likely to seize new educational opportunities enabling social mobility, more likely to grasp opportunities to emigrate—for instance to the United States—as a way out of persecution and pauperisation. While these shifts carried with them marked internal conflicts, not least between tradition and modernity, Jews and Armenians became associated with forward looking, progressive ideas, which, in the teeth of actual economic marginalisation and/or state repression, meant that significantly higher proportions of their number gravitated towards radical opposition to the status quo.[31] The Russian "father of Marxism", Georgi Plekhanov, saluted Jews as "the vanguard of the workers' army in Russia".[32] Indeed the role of the Russian Jewish Worker's Bund was seminal in the failed revolution of 1905 and a reminder too that while the Jewish intelligentsia tended towards Marxism, there was often a strong ethnic element in Jewish grass-roots socialism. A full-blown Jewish nationalism—Zionism—may never have been as powerful as Armenian nationalism among *its* radicals but by the same token the impetus toward Armenian autonomy was also strongly influenced by a Marxist or *narodnik* (grass-roots populist) style engagement with social

and land questions affecting the most oppressed and down trodden of the Armenian masses in eastern Anatolia.[33]

Is it, thus, the political profile of these two communities, or the way they were *seen* by the state, which matters here? It is absolutely true that the Armenian revolutionary parties punched way above their demographic weight in the fraught domestic politics both before and after the "Young Turk" 1908 revolution. The CUP may have indeed looked to their erstwhile Dashnak comrades of that moment for lessons in how to organise and to mobilise their own cadres.[34] But the underlying structural problem was that neither empire was willing to loosen its authoritarian bonds sufficiently to embrace those whose only other recourse was revolution. This was far from only being about Jews and Armenians. And it is tantalising that in the mid-nineteenth century there had been a period—Tanzimat with its notions of a civic almost colour-blind Ottomanism, compare with the near-parallel Russian moves towards *sblizhanie* (rapprochement)—when more liberal, accommodating policies had hinted at a novel *modus vivendi* between state and subject peoples. But as soon as some of these—the Russian Poles most obviously in 1863, the Ottoman Bulgarians in 1876—began demanding greater *national* concessions, liberal reform came off the rails and the two regimes were back not just on the path of draconian repression but with Russification, or pan-Islam, the definitive state retort to the multi-ethnic challenge.[35]

It was in these circumstances that Jews and Armenians became *the* bogeys, almost as if state elites preferred to be spooked by some ethnically specific revolutionary threat rather than having to work through the complex social challenges of latecomer modernisation. And there is a further crucial as yet unconsidered factor as to why, as the genuine, if self-inflicted, existential threat of total war loomed, the spectre became all pervasive. Where Armenian nationalism was weak, in terms of a territorially based demographic weight and, to all intents and purposes, non-applicable to the Russian Jews, both groups were very strong in terms of their transnational ubiquity, identity and consciousness. Armenians, their revolutionary leaderships included, were contiguous on both sides of the Russo-Ottoman Caucasus border. When war began, the tsar sought to use this to his advantage by issuing a proclamation through the *Catholicos* (the head of the Russian-based Apostolic church) informing *all* Armenians of their "brilliant future".[36] Equally provocative, the German and Austrian high commands, aided and abetted by leading German and Austrian Jews,

issued proclamations declaring the imminent liberation of Russian Jewry from tsarist antisemitism.[37]

The key question though is to what degree did such dangerous propaganda reflect actual realities on the ground? All the belligerents of the First World War aspired to mobilise ethnic groups on the other side into coherent auxiliaries or fifth columns who could then be cynically jettisoned once they had served their purpose.[38] But the fact that there was no security threat that could be identified as specifically Jewish or Armenian rather suggests how reified these confabulations were. A Russian parliamentary enquiry, for instance, found that a widely disseminated Stavka report that Jews in Kuzhi had assisted an advance party of Germans—the pretext for the Kovno and wider expulsions—was a complete fabrication.[39] And when the British spoke of 15,000 Armenian irregulars based in the town of Zeitoun acting as a covering force for the actually aborted spring 1915 Cilician landings planned by the British, this too was largely a case of fabulous self-suggestion.[40] There were, of course, Ottoman Armenians who deserted or fled to the Russians or who actively sought to assist the western Allies, just as there were Russian Jews, in and out of the uniform, who played an important role in fomenting anti-war opinion. But for every one of them, there were thousands more who did *not* want to be the vanguard of anything; they just wished not to be killed, maimed, violated or accused of things that they had not done; only to be left alone to survive and come safe through the conflict as best they might.

Military Solutions

Trotsky, in reviewing the course of the Russian revolution from the apparent security of his Mexican exile, asserted that an army is a copy of the society that it serves.[41] But could it be that society could actually be shaped and moulded as an extrusion of the military mind? The 1915 Ottoman and Russian military were not just pillars of imperial rule; they were fundamentally what stood between it and extinction. In 1912 the Bulgarians in the first Balkan war came within a whisker of breaking through to Constantinople. But the threat to the Caliphate's divine order did not only come from "without". Repeated pre-war rebellions from within the empire—Albanians, Yemenis, Kurds—posed the possibility that saving it might demand extreme measures against its own peoples. Similarly, in Russia, it was not just the 1905 defeat by the Japanese that terrified its leadership. In 1913, the elder statesmen Count Witte, had

predicted that in the event of a European conflagration, some 30 of the country's 50 million non-Russian subjects "would render espionage service to the attackers, and would start a civil war inside the country".[42] The key question was, as ultimate defenders of the state, did the military have their own formulae for how to deal with these incubi?

By the outbreak of the Great War the military were, in effect, the Ottoman regime. CUP power was, to all intents and purposes, a function of the Third Army headquarters that, from Salonika in 1908, had marched against the sultan to prevent what they saw as the imminent Great Power partition of Macedonia. It was from within the same young officer clique around Enver and Cemal in 1913 that the CUP had stormed the Porte to ensure that it continued to fight the Bulgarian and other Balkan infidels.[43] Having then sacked 1,300 older officers, it was above all Enver, as Minister of War, who sought to bolster the military through German assistance and then propel the empire on Berlin's side into the Great War. Why? Because this was the militarised state's idea of how you saved the empire and made it strong *again*. Former officer cadets from the metropolitan military or medical military academies had cut their teeth in the merciless pre-1908 counter-insurgency warfare against *andarte, komitadji*, or *çeta* in the Salonika backlands. It was these same CUP founders who were not just inured to violence but now actively sought it, quite literally in the case of medical military graduates such as Drs Nâzim and Reshid, as a surgical answer to the spread of contagion.[44] That contagion came from those in the empire who were *seen* as destabilising forces. If they could be clinically cut out and removed to places where they were so reduced as to be ineffective—so the argument went—imperial destabilisation and ultimate dissolution could be avoided. Hence, the grand schemes on paper, emanating not least from the CUP Salonika conferences of 1910 and 1911, proposed a massive redistribution of troublesome peoples around the empire.[45]

Nevertheless, the ruthless *sacro egoismo* that informed this thinking was startling in its novelty. Far from being born nationalists, the military officer generation of 1908 were primarily socially conservative, empire men—many from Salonika's Balkan hinterland—whose preordained role was as middle ranking professionals acting as a bulwark for a retreating Porte. Their project had not begun as an attempt to control the empire, let alone replace it.[46] All that changed, as these CUP cadres, seeing the collapse of Ottoman rule all around them, converted from reluctant revolutionaries into fervent "Turkey for the Turks" nationalists. In one sense it could be

argued that this was simply a reaction to seeing *their* people—Turkish speaking Muslims—on the receiving end of ethnic cleansing at the hands of formerly subject Christian Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs and others. In 1914, one immediate regime riposte was the vengeful ethnic cleansing of large numbers of ethnic Greeks from the Asia Minor littoral though it was also catalysed by fears of a third Balkan war, this time with Athens only.[47]

What, however, is equally interesting is how this lurch towards a form of potentially lethal pre-emptive action against one supposed ethnic enemy within, so easily morphed under crisis conditions into an even more deadly assault on another. Even before war had been declared, the War Office had decided to disarm Armenian army draftees. Within months these men were being murderously slaughtered by their erstwhile comrades in arms. But such systematic massacres could not have occurred without direct orders from the War Office nor the active zeal of high-ranking front-line, CUP-affiliated generals such as Mahmud Kâmil, Ali Ihsan Sabis and Halil "Kut".[48] There also appears to have been a form of feed-back loop between the Second, Third and Fourth Army headquarters and the War Ministry in the sense that the former's repeated warnings of an imminent Armenian threat to railway and other rear communication hubs were then relayed back to them in ciphered Ministry cables, demanding increased surveillance, vigilance and security measures including local deportations.[49] By the time this had escalated into the general deportation order of May 26, it was being promulgated by Talaat's Interior Ministry. Even so, it came with the Supreme High Command imprimatur as a matter of absolute military necessity.

Yet this is all rather odd. While there were Ottoman Armenians fighting as volunteer *druzhiny* on the Russian side, including some who played a limited role in Enver's defeat at Sarakamish, the repeated reports from army headquarters and military intelligence that the clear and present danger was an Armenian one seems to have involved an almost wilful blind spot. As the war began there were Russian-assisted uprisings by some of the Kurdish tribes. And one can make a case for the Nestorian clans around Hakkari also making common cause with Petrograd.[50] There is also no doubt that in 1916 there was an open if, in actual practice, quite limited British-sponsored Arab uprising centred on the Hejaz. By contrast, where Armenians fought other Ottomans, most of this was as a last-ditch communal defence. So why were the military so fixated? And why did this go far beyond a gendered response—the mass murder of Armenian men

and boys—towards a root and branch extirpation of almost an entire community?

One answer might be to propose that this was not the military's doing but the CUP's. And it is true that there were some high ranking officers who were against the massacres, as it is also true that the killings associated with the deportations and their aftermath were largely determined by Talaat-appointed civil governors and police chiefs, by the *Teskilat-i Mahsusa*, or sub-contracted to a range of paramilitaries and tribesmen. Yet the CUP itself, as has been suggested, was, in effect, an extension of an already increasingly ideological and hard-line segment of the officer corps which, traumatised by the loss of its European heartlands, now staked everything on Turkification policies centred on Anatolia. It may well be that CUP-aligned officers saw Armenians as the potential spoke in the wheel, perhaps also seeing them as some latter-day mirror image of the Bulgarian insurgents of 1876. But we may further speculate that the potency of the Armenian "threat" arose through the political, cultural, social and economic alternative that it offered to an increasingly dictatorial, tunnel-visioned CUP rule. This is why—after the breakdown of the tentative dialogue around 1912 between CUP and Dashnaks about the future of the east Anatolian plateau—not to say the imminence of an Allied-supported pre-war reform programme in the Armenian interest, the CUP's quest for a "permanent security" veered towards a zero-sum elimination of their most powerful regional competitors.[51] It is equally significant that the mind-set which could envisage such a solution in terms of national *aggregates* could also do so in terms of national *assets*, one highly significant corollary of the actual physical murder of the Armenians being the sequestration of their businesses, land and property, in the interests not of an Ottoman plurality but of a *milli iktisat*—a wholly Turkish national economy.[52]

Dominant elements within the Turkish military, thus, were not at one remove from this sort of political thinking, but actually carried in their heads a very definite set of ideas about Armenians. They were not just "dangerous" but were at the heart of what was holding back the necessary, freed-up trajectory towards national salvation. One might equally note almost identical "Jewish" imperatives operating among the Ottoman military's Russian equivalents. To be sure, there is a critical difference. Where the praetors had effectively become the masters in Constantinople, in Petrograd they still remained its servants. General Kornilov's failed coup was *after* the first 1917 people's revolution. Yet if, until that moment,

power technically had resided with the tsar, the sweeping and total wartime powers known as the *Polozhenie*, which had been granted in July 1914 to the tsar's uncle, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, as nominal head of Stavka, determined that territories, both Russian and non-Russian beyond it, were under a form of military dictatorship.[53]

In these regions it was the social and economic priorities, not to say Russifying agendas as pursued, not so much by the Grand Duke, but his Chief of Staff, Nikolai Ianushkevich, that really counted. Both men's virulent anti-Semitism is not in doubt. But their views on the matter were hardly exceptional. In 1912 a secret questionnaire circulated among senior commanding officers found that 28 out of 48 respondents wanted Jews expelled from the army.[54] Again, it is important to be cautious of assuming that the Russian officer corps was monolithic in its views any more than were the Ottomans or, for that matter, Jews and Armenians themselves. The War Minister, Sukhomlinov, for example, was known as something of a Judeophile, which only confirmed to other officers that he was a thoroughly bad egg when he was accused in 1915 of treasonable conduct in the face of military disaster.[55] And in fact nearly everything points to a military mindset that behaved as if all its worst imaginings of Jewish treason and sabotage were fact, regardless of the actual evidence. When Russian troops ran amok in the Jewish quarter of Austrian Lemberg (Lvov) in September 1914 it was on the entirely doubtful accusation that it was from there that soldiers had been fired upon. Once started, troops were quick to turn this into a more general excuse for anti-Jewish rampages.[56] But this was not just a case of unruly soldiers off the leash and out of control. One unusually critical observer, Vladimir Grabar, the international lawyer assigned by the Foreign Office to Stavka, noted that the almost perpetual talk at military headquarters was of how the army should slaughter the Galician Jews while it had the chance and before the Duma attempted to prevent it.[57] The commander of the 11th Army, General Shcherbachev, came up with his own scheme, which was that the Jews of the province should be collected in a giant frontier holding pen where, without food, they would be forced to cross en masse into neutral Rumania, his premise being that this would upset Bucharest to such a degree that they in turn would expel them towards Austria![58]

However, what is shocking about this localised variation on a "final solution" theme is that nobody in Stavka sought to upbraid Shcherbachev for its outlandishness. On the contrary it was entirely consistent with a broader agenda—dubbed by Joshua Sanborn as Stavkaism—which sought

to favour Slavic populations in Galicia, or at home—by eliminating Jewish "dominance" and ensuring "economic nationalisation".[59] From this perspective, far from the 1915 Jewish deportations simply being an alibi for Ianushkevich's military failings, as assumed by the new Council of Ministers' head, Prince Shcherbatov, Stavka orders for *ochischchenie* (cleansing) represented a further step in an already emergent military agenda.[60] Moreover, it was an agenda—as a Cadet overhearing a railcar conversation between two officers reported in June 1915—in which completion "in the Turkish manner" was contemplated in all seriousness. Indeed, the conversation took place when the Russian news was full of the Armenian massacres.[61]

It would take another four years before "White" Russian armies, once again briefly in control of the western borderlands, would attempt to operationalise what the Cadet had feared. One historian has written of the justifications for these 1919 assaults "as a pre-emptive action against future betrayal".[62] The generals' second failure to carry through a thoroughgoing Russian Jewish genocide was thus not for lacking of trying but because their Bolshevik opponents were stronger. Paradoxically, there were generals from 1915, such as Bonch-Bruevich and Brusilov, on the "Red" side, with exactly the same anti-Jewish animus. The difference was that it was the ideological party, not the ideological army, who controlled their reins.

Again, the Ottoman comparison is worth consideration. Mustafa Kemal, the former CUP officer, who came riding out to proclaim a full-blown Turkish nationalist defiance of the Allied victory in 1919, simply completed through military strength what a defeated Enver had begun. In eliminating by fire and sword any return of an Armenian presence in eastern Anatolia, Kemal sent a clear signal of what the military-led national state was not just capable of, but *would* do.[63] Over the following two decades Kemalist generals genocidally excised Ottoman Greeks before turning their attention to Kurdish groups, culminating in the Dersim genocide of 1937–1938.[64] In neighbouring, newly independent Iraq in 1933, formerly Ottoman military academy-trained officers also took Kemal's cue in an attempted obliteration of the exiled Hakkari Nestorians. The so-called "Assyrian affair" was a major catalyst in Lemkin's efforts to outlaw genocide internationally.[65] However, for many young military officers who saw themselves as the guardians of national survival in fragile, post-colonial Third World states, it was exactly Kemal's method that confirmed to them not just appropriate ways of

"seeing like a state" but societally transforming and homogenising it in the interests of a streamlined, and hence resilient modernity.[66]

Zygmunt Bauman has posited two types of modern state responses to "strangers": the first, anthropophagic in which they are "annihilated by *devouring* them" before then metabolically transforming them "into a tissue indistinguishable from one's own"; the second, anthropoemic in which society *vomits* them out "from the limits of the orderly world".[67] Bauman does not discuss how the second process is implemented or by whom, or whether such scenarios might lead to extermination. Today when we think historically of such possibilities we tend to reach for examples from the Holocaust or from Stalinist Russia. And, from there, to a consideration of highly ideological parties that took over polities and then, by degrees, intruded into them secret police, surveillance and intelligence apparatuses whose primary role was to lock up or eliminate perceived enemies. The SS and NKVD thereby have become the twentieth century practitioners *par excellence* of deportation *and* extermination and, moreover, of ways of seeing the world in which whole aggregates of people—racial, ethnic, religious or otherwise—were marked down on the grounds of their supposed threat to state security.

What has been proposed in this chapter, however, are harbingers of these tendencies as found in the late Russian and Ottoman imperial turn towards nationalised societies and of a transmission belt to a post-war "New Europe". This, by implication, was less about Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany but more about a broader range of successor nation-states. We forget at our peril that the shatter-zone effect of imperial dissolution was the creation not so much of genuinely national societies so much as dominant nationalities within their own mini empires,[68] or put more precisely, national elite-led polities whose first and foremost neurosis was the destabilising effect of their perceived unassimilable minorities.

Where Ankara began years of counter-insurgency against its "problem" Kurds in eastern Anatolia, or Warsaw against its "problem" Galician Ukrainians, these polities were following in the footsteps—sometimes quite literally—of their Ottoman and Russian predecessors against Armenians and Jews. Indeed, these two groups remained the ultimate threats of a bad example, the minorities at the top of the priority removal list. And it was hardly a coincidence that the elite personnel who dreamt up counter-insurgency "solutions" and then sought to carry them out were from the same military officer corps responsible for the events of 1915. In 1919, Polish military violence against Jews, especially in the eastern *kresy*, for

example, was often led by commanders such as General Dowbor-Musniki, whose previous incarnation had been within the Russian officer corps. Indeed, it was Polish events—rather, ironically, than the far worse range of anti-Jewish atrocities committed by their former fellow officers operating simultaneously in the Ukraine—which helped galvanise the Big Three at the Paris Peace Conference towards a minorities protection scheme.[69]

However, two larger sets of research questions present themselves from these inquiries. First, there is a need for closer analysis of military elites, their place in modern state formations and, more especially, their roles in the making (and sometimes breaking) of nation-building projects.[70] The inference of this chapter has been that it was not just wartime contingencies that deserve greater attention but more precisely the way such crises enabled senior military officers to wrench an ostensibly civil state power towards radically transformational social and demographic goals. To arrive at that point a deeper historical exploration may be required not just as to how the personalised and familial networks—the social anthropology—of late Russian and Ottoman military elites intermeshed with the sources of state power, but of their cultural mindsets too. In this chapter, for instance, there has neither been time to fully explore how long-held religious or gender-based group prejudices against specific ethnic groups shaped violent responses, nor to consider a more proximate cognitive dissonance as socio-economic shifts *appeared* to advantage subordinate Armenians and Jews against traditionally ruling castes. Given that such dissonance tended to become more acute in the inter-war period, the very fact that successor states such as Poland increasingly came to be run by officer castes may give some clue as to how 1915 Russian (or Turkish) precedents were not so much forgotten as in abeyance awaiting some appropriate future opportunity.[71]

This brings us to a second consideration, which, rather than implying the need for new research, suggests instead fresh evaluation of what already exists. Lemkin's premise was that what stood between exposed minority groups and a militaristic barbarism was an international community (for which read "the liberal West") supported by a programme of international sanctions against malefactors. The Minorities system might appear to have been a first step in this political-legal framework. But the Lemkin premise was based on an assumption that Western arbiters of power were motivated by humanitarian as well as utilitarian principles. The British response to the 1915 Russian deportations, however, suggests *only* a faulty utilitarian reasoning. As for the Minorities Treaties, they were never intended as more

than a stopgap measure pending the full assimilation of troublesome minorities into the dominant national communities. There was no plan B should the new (militarily created) nation-states decide to deport or openly slaughter such groups. The only alternative, said C.A. Macartney, long-time secretary to the League of Nations, would have been to reconstitute states on something other than national lines. But that was firmly off the international agenda as was any notion of some communal middle ground between state and individual.[72] When, in the inter-war period, the big powers, acting on the other 1915 Ottoman precedent, might claim that they would punish those who committed crimes against humanity, this again was never intended to mean that they would intervene in contingent circumstances—most obviously war—to prevent the destruction of groups who they thought *ought* not to be separate anyway. Far from there being a First World War grounding upon which one might look to the development of minority rights standards, what the consequences of 1915 actually point towards is a West that did not see *its* international order based on anything other than sovereign nation states. Indeed, the Lausanne legitimisation of ethnic cleaning offered only one unforgiving lesson to those who now found themselves as "minorities": become a nation-state oneself.

Notes

1. Mark Levene, *War, Jews and the New Europe: The Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914–1919* (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilisation, 1992), 312–315 for the complete text.
2. Richard G. Hovannisian, "Historical Dimensions of the Armenian Question, 1878–1923," in *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1986), 37.
3. For notable studies of this ilk, see Bernd Hüppauf ed., *War, Violence and the Modern Condition* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997); Alan Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2; Bernd Weisbrod, "Military Violence and Male Fundamentalism: Ernst Jünger's Contribution to the Conservative Revolution," *History Workshop Journal* 49 (2000).
4. Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 77–87.
5. For the background, see Matthew Frank, *Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

6. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Convergent Aspects of the Armenian and Jewish Cases of Genocide: a Reinterpretation of the Concept of Holocaust," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 3:2 (1988); Helen Fein, "A Formula for Genocide: Comparisons of the Turkish Genocide (1915), and the German Holocaust (1939–45)," *Comparative Studies in Sociology* 1 (1978); Robert F. Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), for notable examples. For another variation on the theme see Mark Levene, "The Experience of Genocide: Armenia 1915–16, Romania, 1941–42," in *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah*, eds. Hans-Lukas Kieser and Dominik J. Schaller (Zurich: Chronos, 2002), 423–462.
7. For key studies, see Norman Stone, *The Eastern Front, 1914–1917* (London: Macmillan, 1975); W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953).
8. Peter Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War 1* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), Appendix 1, 211–216.
9. See Eric Lohr, *Nationalising the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War One* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2003), chapter 2.
10. Lohr, *Nationalising the Russian Empire*, 155.
11. Ibid., chapters 3 and 4.
12. Eric Lohr, "The Russian Army and Jews: Mass Deportation, Hostages, and Violence during World War 1," *Russian Review* 60:3 (2001).
13. See Conjoint Foreign Committee report: "The Eastern War Zone: Ill-treatment of the Jews" encl. in. Lucien Wolf to Lancelot Oliphant, September 1, 1915, The National Archives Kew (TNA), FO 371/2455/155; Joshua A. Sanborn, *Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 82.
14. Eric Lohr, "1915 and the War Pogrom Paradigm in the Russian Empire," in *Anti-Jewish Violence: Rethinking the Pogrom in Eastern European History*, eds. Jonathan Dekel-Chen et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 48.
15. Conjoint Report, "The Eastern War Zone."
16. For analysis, see Mark Levene, *The Crisis of Genocide*, vol. 2, *Annihilation: The European Rimlands, 1939–1953* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 107–111.
17. Michael Cherniavsky ed., *Prologue to Revolution: Notes of I.A. Iakhantov on Secret Meetings of Council of Ministers, 1915* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1967), 60–72.

18. Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, March 10, 1915, TNA, FO 800/74.
19. Lord Robert Cecil minute, January 6, 1916, TNA, FO 371/2744/4039.
20. For a succinct synopsis of events, see Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), chapter 2.
21. Bloxham, *Great Game,* 136–137.
22. David Gaunt, *Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War 1* (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006).
23. For contemporary soundings from the American ambassador at the Porte, see Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, 1918), chapter 23.
24. Taner Akçam "The Young Turks and the Plans for the Ethnic Homogenisation of Anatolia," in *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Borderlands*, eds. Omer Bartov and Eric D.Weitz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 258–279.
25. For province by province examination, see Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).
26. Raymond Kévorkian, "Ahmed Djemal pacha et le sort des deportés arméniens de Syrie-Palestine," in *Völkermord* ed. Kieser and Schaller, 206–207. Kévorkian however proposes a total of 630,000 Armenian fatalities, *including* those massacred, from this second phase.
27. See Erik Jan Zürcher, "Ottoman Labour Battalions in World War 1," in V*ölkermord*, eds. Kieser and Schaller, 187–196.
28. See Wolfgang Gust ed., *The Armenian Genocide: Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915–1916* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2014).
29. For careful consideration of the fatality numbers, see Hilmar Kaiser, "Genocide at the Twilight of the Ottoman Empire," in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, eds. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 382–383.
30. See Walter P. Zenner, "Middleman Minorities and Genocide," in *Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death,* eds. Isidor Walliman and Michael N. Dokbowski (Westport, CT: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 253–281; Peter Balakian, *Black Dog of Fate, A Memoir* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 39–49.
31. For notable analyses, see Erich Haberer, *Jews and Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

32. Léon Poliakov, *History of Anti-Semitism,* vol. iv, *Suicidal Europe 1870–1933,* trans. George Klin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 101–102.
33. See Gerard J. Libaridian, "What was Revolutionary about Armenian Revolutionary Parties in the Ottoman Empire?" in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Goçek and Norman N. Naimark (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 82–112.
34. Roderic H. Davison, "The Armenian Crisis, 1912–1914," *American Historical Review* 53 (1948): 484. See also Dikran M. Kaligian, *Armenian Organisation and Ideology Under Ottoman Rule 1908–1914* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2009).
35. For parallels and contrasts, see Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals* (London: John Murray, 2000).
36. Salahi Sonyel, *The Great War and the Tragedy of Anatolia* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Printing House, 2000), 82.
37. Egmont Zechlin, *Die deutsche Politik und die Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), 116–125.
38. For sober assessment, see Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923* (New York: Routledge, 2001).
39. Joshua A. Sanborn, "Unsettling the Empire: Violent Migrations and Social Disaster in Russia during World War I," *Journal of Modern History* 77:2 (2005): 310.
40. For close analysis see Bloxham, *Great Game*, 72, 79–83.
41. Leon Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, Vol. 1. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1937), 252.
42. Quoted in George Katkov, "German Political Intervention in Russia during World War 1," in *Revolutionary Russia*, ed. Richard Pipes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard and Oxford University Presses, 1968), 65.
43. For CUP background and profiles see Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The CUP in Turkish Politics. 1908–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 166–181.
44. James J. Reid, "Total War: The Annihilation Ethic and the Armenian Genocide, 1870–1918," in *The Armenian Genocide, History, Politics, Ethics*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New York: St Martins Press, 1992), 21–52; George W. Gawrych, "The Culture and Politics of Violence in Turkish Society 1903–13," *Middle Eastern Studies* 22 (1985).
45. Vahakn N. Dadrian, *Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of the Turko-Armenian Conflict* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1999), chapter 9.
46. Ahmed, *Young Turks*, 21.

47. Matthias Bjornlund, "The 1914 Cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a Case of Violent Turkification," *Journal of Genocide Research* 10:1 (2008).
48. Vakahn N. Dadrian, "The Role of the Turkish Military in the Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: A Study in Historical Continuities," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 20:2 (1992): 276–277.
49. Edward J. Erickson, *Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in Counter-Insurgency* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 163. Erickson's key failing, however, is his willingness to accept army reports at face value.
50. Kamal Madhar Ahmad, *Kurdistan during the First World War* (London: Saqi, 1994); Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
51. For the "permanent security" argument, see A. Dirk Moses, "Genocide vs. Security: A False Opposition," *Journal of Genocide Research* 15 (2013): 493.
52. Christian Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) chapter 3.
53. Alexander Victor Prusin, *Nationalising a Borderland: War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914–1920* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 19.
54. Yohanan Petrovsky-Stern, "The 'Jewish Policy' of the Late Imperial War Ministry: The Impact of the Russian Right," *Kritika* 3 (2002).
55. For the full story, see W. C. Fuller Jr., *The Foe Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006).
56. Prusin, *Nationalising a Borderland*, 30–32.
57. Peter Holquist, "The Role of Personality in the First (1914–1915) Russian Occupation of Galicia and Bukovina," in Dekel-Chen, *Anti-Jewish Violence*, 61.
58. Prusin, *Nationalising a Borderland*, 52.
59. Sanborn, *Imperial Apocalypse*, 254–255.
60. Ibid., 59.
61. Holquist, "Personality," 59.
62. William Rosenberg, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Syndrome of Violence in Russia's Civil Wars, 1918–1920," in *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War*, eds. Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 34.
63. Fatma Ulgen, "Reading Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on the Armenian Genocide of 1915," *Patterns of Prejudice* 44 (2010).
64. Martin van Bruinessen, "Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937–38) and the Chemical War Against the Iraqi Kurds (1988)," in *Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions*,

ed. George, D Andreopoulos (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 144–154.

65. Mark Levene, "A Moving Target, The Usual Suspects and (Maybe) a Smoking Gun: the Problem of Pinning Blame in Modern Genocide," *Patterns of Prejudice* 33 (1999).
66. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
67. Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodernity and its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity, 1997), 18.
68. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Meridian, 1958), 290–304.
69. Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chapter 6.
70. For the early groundwork, see Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
71. For one such Polish variation on a theme, see Laurence Weinbaum, *A Marriage of Convenience: The New Zionist Organisation and the Polish Government, 1936–1939* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1993).
72. Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 67.

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CHAPTER 7

Black, Arab and South Asian Colonial Britons in the Intersections Between War and Peace: The 1919 Seaport Riots in Perspective

Jacqueline Jenkinson

This chapter focuses on the riots around Britain's seaports during 1919. They were some of the severest episodes of twentieth century British rioting and their occurrence, just after the end of the war, was crucial in their outbreak. This chapter will suggest that the emphasis on the racist aspects of the rioting by historians has drawn attention away from their timing and location. They occurred in seaports, a distinctive form of community, and they took place at the intersections between war and peacetime Britain. The 1919 riots were a result of post-war social and economic dislocation, specifically the immediate consequences of large-scale demobilisation on housing and job opportunities for seaport populations.

Weekly demobilisation averaged 37,000 during the last two months of 1918.[1] Such rapid demobilisation in the months immediately after the end of war had a negative impact on job opportunities and access to housing and led to direct action by war veterans, including strikes and a march on

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parliament in May 1919, which ended in disorder.[2] The seaport riots, running from January to August 1919, were a further manifestation of such protests. The notion of rioting as a symptom of the fraught transition from war to peace is further supported when the seaport riots are positioned within the context of the wave of global unrest that affected metropolitan Britain, parts of its empire, continental Europe and North America during and in the wake of the First World War.

The trigger for the mass violence in nine large British seaports was dissatisfaction among sections of Britain's working class, including many veterans, at a range of unsatisfactory peacetime circumstances, chiefly severe post war competition for jobs, especially in the merchant navy, and local housing shortages. These wider frustrations in the immediate post-war period were keenly felt in seaport towns. Riots took place in Glasgow, South Shields, Salford, Hull, London, Liverpool, Newport, Cardiff and Barry. Further sporadic seaport rioting took place in 1920 and 1921. Five people were killed, dozens were injured, over 250 people were arrested and the rioting caused tens of thousands of pounds worth of damage to property. War veterans and service personnel were prominent among the rioters.

Historiography of the Seaport Riots

The 1919 seaport riots were key events in the aftermath of the First World War and more broadly in terms of mass disorder in twentieth century Britain.[3] They have been considered by a range of historians since the later twentieth century as interest in the history of minority ethnic peoples has expanded.[4] Barton Hacker has also indicated a further trend in that "historians have begun to pay considerably more attention to how distant peoples experienced the war".[5] Many historians, while noting the timing of the riots following the end of the war, have traditionally focused on the racist elements of the riots. The present author in initial doctoral research and early output also argued in this way.[6] Further research into the causes and events of the riots plus consideration of the historiography on seaport communities and the global rioting in this time period discussed at the end of this section led to the development of themes which emphasised time and place in the causes and events of the rioting.

Racist viewpoints were apparent in the comments of some of the white rioters and their supporters, in much press coverage and in official pronouncements on the unrest; hence this aspect of the riots merits full

consideration. However, although racist views were recorded during the seaport riots and were especially evident in official responses to the disorder, it is one dimensional to claim racism as the cause of the violence. It also echoes a much older "race relations" approach of events being determined by considerations of divergent ethnicity above all other factors, in this instance the economic and social motivations of those involved linked to the recently ended war.[7] An explanation of the riots based on the presence of racist antipathy among sections of white British society does not explain why these riots occurred only in seaports, nor why they took place in 1919.

Most recent authors have emphasised the racist motivations of white rioters, accepting the occurrence of the riots at the end of the war without exploring why this might have been the case. Stephen Bourne, in his popular empirical history of black British involvement in the war, drew on the present author's published research to exemplify his "racism in wartime" subject matter including reference to an attack in London by a white crowd on Jamaican Royal Navy sailor John Martin.[8] Although tacitly acknowledging the timing of the riots was important, Bourne used the term "race riots" and indicated that black people became the target for "white ex-servicemen who felt they had returned home from the battlefields to a country that was not fit for heroes".[9] Christian Høgsbjerg also viewed the events of 1919 as "race riots" in an empirical account of the life of black American political activist Rufus Fennell resident in Britain during the riots.[10]

A counter-argument to the traditional "race relations" approach to disorder within ethnically diverse populations was adopted by sociologists who stressed the economic role of black and minority ethnic workers as crucial to understanding their position in society.[11] The theory put forward by Marxist authors such as Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack was that divisions developed between workers of the same socio-economic class because economic migrants took jobs that local workers would not, yet migrants were granted admission to developed countries because of their economic value. These processes hindered class solidarity.[12]

While a Marxist analysis is more convincing than the "race relations" problematic, this approach has been downplayed by Caroline Bressey in her work on the black working class in which she placed emphasis on racist actions within the riots. In fact Bressey has argued for the crucial importance of the role of racism in the making of the British working class in the

period 1860–1920.[13] Her work researched both urban and rural communities in order to explore "how working class support networks were developed and manifested themselves and why, at times, they broke down, resulting in racial violence such as the riots which broke out in . . . 1919".[14] While Bressey's argument has merit, once again the timing and location of the seaport riots are overlooked in this approach.

A broader imperial perspective has been applied to the seaport riots by other historians, specifically as to how the violence reflected meanings of national identity and informed the relationship between colony and metropole.[15] In terms of the riots, this argument was initiated by Roy May and Robin Cohen. Writing on the Liverpool rioting, they commented: "The Liverpool events vividly demonstrate the intimate link between the origins of the metropolitan country in her colonial Empire".[16] Subsequent historians have expanded on the theme of colony and metropole in the context of the riots, including Colin Holmes and Michael Rowe.[17] These works uncovered a significant imperial power relationship at play, which can be applied to the 1919 riots.[18]

A minority of historians have considered the exceptionality of seaport populations in this time period. Richard Lawton and W. Robert Lee described seaports as distinctive urban environments dogged by poor living standards and a reliance on unskilled, casual employment.[19] Lee also identified the "substantial downward mobility in most port cities".[20] In seaports, large populations were over-crowded into poorly maintained private housing. Seafaring and dock work were irregular and poorly paid forms of employment that led to low socio-economic status for the workers in these occupations and their families. Lee noted the detachment of merchant sailors from the wider seaport community, which he labelled as a "specific spatial distribution within a port city".[21] By the outbreak of the First World War British seaports were home to more ethnically diverse populations than other urban environments.[22]

Timing was as crucial as location for the seaport riots. This can be demonstrated by placing them within the wider framework of the storm of wartime and post-war protest. Neil Evans has discussed the British seaport riots in the context of global unrest, in particular in the Atlantic fringes during and in the wake of the First World War. Evans described the 1919 rioting in the Atlantic basin as "rooted in the established patterns of migration" but "brought to a head by the First World War".[23] Panikos Panayi also considered the seaport riots alongside wartime rioting, pairing them with the anti German

riots as: "the two most serious incidents of racist violence in modern Britain", both of which "occurred during and just after the First World War when Germans and then Black people became victims".[24] In keeping with his exploration of "multicultural racism" since 1800, Panayi emphasised the role that stereotyped racist images of black people played in the riots.[25] However, his analysis recognised the transition to peacetime conditions as a trigger for the riots, noting they took place against the background of the demobilisation of white British soldiers who believed that black colonial males had taken their "jobs and women".[26] N. G. Orr, in his study of the Luton "peace riot" of July 1919, which involved war veterans, also identified the presence of "wider grievances" such as post-war housing shortages and rising unemployment in addition to specific protests over war gratuities, pensions and disability allowances among the riot causes.[27]

These works indicated that time and place were crucial. It was not coincidental that the seaport and "peace" riots occurred in the intersections between war and peace. The recently ended war and its peacetime aftermath were key determining factors in the outbreak of the riots. This is evidenced by the economic slump, which rapidly affected the fragile economies of the seaports. Meanwhile the return of service veterans put added pressure on the overcrowded living spaces, which became contested areas.

Wartime Recruitment and the Consequences of Demobilisation

Following on from a consideration of the historiography of the riots, the rest of this chapter will set out an argument in support of time and place as leading factors in the seaport riots. It will then consider how these aspects played out during key riot events, before returning to the more traditional approach considering the extent of racist motivations of police and government in their responses to the disorder.

By inference the timing of the riots indicates that the recent war was of importance in their occurrence. This is backed by the evidence. During the war the numbers of people from British colonies working and living in Britain rose. They filled gaps created by the ban on enemy alien workers and also as a consequence of wartime conscription. Upon the outbreak of war in August 1914, all enemy alien sailors were removed from British

merchant ships. In addition, around 8,000 white British merchant sailors joined the armed forces within two days of the declaration of war. This soon led to a serious shortage of sailors for the merchant marine. Thousands of additional African, Arab, Caribbean, Chinese and south Asian sailors from Britain's colonies were hired by employers to fill the void in the labour force. Colonial workers from these locations outnumbered labour recruited from other overseas territories, for example, Cardiff's Chief Constable David Williams reporting to the Home Office following the June 1919 rioting recorded a total of 60 "Portuguese, Indians, Cingalese [Singhalese] and Malays" resident in the port, in contrast to 400 Caribbeans, 400 Arabs from Aden; 200 Somalis and 100 West Africans.[28] Sailors from these groups secured jobs and houses alongside white native seaport populations.

Wartime colonial arrivals also joined the armed forces. David Killingray has suggested there was a black population of around 20,000 in metropolitan Britain during the First World War. Among this number significant wartime military recruitment was evident. Thousands of African and Caribbean people volunteered for the British armed forces during the First World War with many specifically making their way to Britain to join up. Among 700 black people under police protection during the Liverpool riots were "80 or so" who, as identified by a Ministry of Labour official, had seen military service (over 11 per cent).[29] Of 285 colonial black males resident in Liverpool whose details were recorded in a Liverpool police report to the Colonial Office following the seaport riot, 43 (15.1 per cent) had been or remained in the British Army or Royal Navy. Although these are two relatively small samples drawn from the same group of colonial residents in Liverpool it indicates recruitment levels to have been equal to those among the total male population around Britain during the First World War. According to Linda Colley, between 13 and 14 per cent of the populations of England, Scotland and Wales joined the armed forces, (recruitment rates were significantly lower in Ireland, at 3.8 per cent).[30]

In addition, increased numbers of Arab sailors from both British territory and beyond found employment in the wartime merchant navy. For example, Evans has indicated that there were 1,000 Arabs in Cardiff by 1916, a three-fold increase on the pre-war level.[31] During the war the distinction between British colonial and foreign Arabs was deliberately blurred due to the shortage of merchant sailors. Arab British subjects or those with British Protected Person status were

exempt from the rigours of the 1914 Aliens Restriction Act, which put limitations on the movement and employment of aliens in Britain. In 1917, the Board of Trade recommended to the Home Office that all Arab sailors who claimed British subject status should not be challenged over their claims.[32] An exchange between the Foreign Office and the India Office recorded this wartime reality: "The proposal is made to meet a political emergency created by the war. It seems expedient to accord to these Arabs during the war the limited measure of protection necessary".[33] This convenient fiction meant that all nationalities of Arab sailors could plug the gap in the merchant navy during the war. Colonial British subjects and British protected persons from Aden, the Aden Protectorate and British Somaliland were therefore joined in the merchant navy by Somalis, while others came from the province of the Yemen which until 1918 was part of the Ottoman Empire. As Turkish subjects, Yemeni sailors were technically enemy aliens who should have come under the wartime aliens' restriction legislation.[34] Government attitudes towards the employment of Arab merchant sailors soon changed as the war came to a close.

The augmented numbers of south Asian sailors did not compete directly for merchant navy employment with black, white and Arab colonial workers. Few south Asians moved out of their round trip merchant navy contracts or into other occupations in the seaports. There was also little evidence to show that significant numbers of south Asian sailors left their subsidised accommodation in sailors' homes (provided by employers under their distinctive contractual conditions). This removed south Asians from two of the contentious issues behind the 1919 rioting.[35] However, Chinese workers competed for housing in over-crowded port areas and some Chinese were attacked during the summer rioting in London and south Wales. Post-war, the Home Office actively sought the removal of Chinese workers from Britain and laid plans for their deportation, although this was not so easily achieved.[36]

Britain's seaports therefore witnessed a pattern of increased arrivals of colonial and other workers to fill gaps in the merchant navy. These workers remained in place at the end of the war when returning veterans flooded back to their civilian employment locations. The period of mass demobilisation naturally enough caused pressure on access to employment. Within six months of the ending of the war in May 1919, 2.5 million veterans had been discharged from the Army alone.[37] By

December 1919 nearly 4 million of a total 6.5 million personnel in the British armed forces had been released from service. The consequences of demobilisation on this massive scale negatively affected the wider working class including black, Arab and south Asian colonial people resident in Britain.

Richard Lawless has noted the involvement of service personnel and veterans in the South Shields rioting, thereby reinforcing the significance of the timing of the seaport riots as immediate post-war events.[38] A graphic incident illustrating this point occurred in March 1919 when a group of white soldiers clashed with some Arab sailors. Abdulla Hassan was struck by one of the soldiers while another tried to steal his watch and chain by cutting it away with a knife. In retaliation Hassan took out his razor and slashed one of the soldiers. All of those involved were charged with assault, although Hassan was the only one found guilty and fined 40 shillings.[39]

An article from the *Shields Daily Gazette* in January 1919 indicates that contemporaries were aware of how wartime developments led to post war tensions in the seaports:

> It is stated that the question of unemployment among merchant seamen is receiving the consideration of both masters and men. At present at many ports in the British Isles there is an excess of seamen, and it is difficult to place them all to ships. The situation is caused to a great extent by labour troubles. Also by demobilisation, and the fact that ships cannot be coaled as they used to be. Some of the men say it could be solved if no Chinese were employed. Among the unemployed British subjects are a number of coloured men and a serious view is taken of this fact.[40]

After years of full employment and indeed shortage of labour in key wartime industries, by April 1919 the numbers of unemployed had reached 1,093,000. Unemployment among insured workers, which had ranged from 0.6 to 0.8 per cent in 1916–1918 was on average 6.0 per cent by 1919.[41] These figures led the government to take action to address public concern about the access to jobs by foreign workers.[42] The economic difficulties specifically in the merchant shipping industry were quickly evident in 1919, as shipping tonnage was reduced because of a decline in peacetime strategic demand. At the same time the ranks of merchant sailors were swelled by those demobilised from the Royal Navy and the other armed services.

Post-war Job Competition and Housing Shortages as Triggers for the Seaport Riots

As with the timing of the riots in the months following the Armistice, place was crucial to the outbreak of these riots. Unemployment levels rose quickly in the merchant marine after the war. Those who had joined the industry during the wartime labour shortage, including colonial workers, were most vulnerable to being squeezed out by those who had longer-term employment records and a track record of trade union membership.

Organised sailors' union protests about rising unemployment levels played an important part in the outbreak of riots in Glasgow, South Shields and Hull in 1919. Glasgow was the first seaport to witness a full-scale riot in January 1919. The riot began in the yard of the mercantile marine office and broke out a few hours after a sailors' union protest meeting over rising unemployment. Speakers played down the demobilisation aspect to this and instead linked unemployment in the port to the hiring of cheaper Chinese labour. The West Africans who were attacked had recently arrived from Cardiff around the same time as Chinese sailors had arrived from Liverpool. This co-incidence allowed the local press to overlook post war oversupply of labour as a causal factor and to instead claim the West Africans "got the benefit of any ill-feeling directed against the Chinese". [43] Unemployment issues were augmented by the failure of some recently demobilised Royal Navy reservists to find work.[44] The clamour for jobs led to a heated argument about who was to be employed on a ship then in the harbour, which led to fighting between white and black colonial sailors. The white sailors chased 30 black sailors out of the yard.[45] The black sailors were followed by a hostile crowd described in the local press as "British and other whites". A running fight was kept up as the black colonial sailors sought refuge in their boarding house. The local press, displaying xenophobia engendered during the war years, initially portrayed the black sailors as "other" to the Glasgow readership, describing them as "aliens".[46] However, later accounts identified the group as colonial British subjects from Sierra Leone, West Africa. The British subject status of the group attacked was portrayed as a curiosity in the press. Comments on the "British" surnames of the black sailors brought to trial in Glasgow are to be found in several press accounts: "Most of the accused, although obviously of negro blood, bore familiar English-sounding surnames, such as Johnson, Davis, Parkinson, Alfred, Pratt, with Tom Friday at the end of the list".[47]

The South Shields rioting also broke out against a backdrop of transitional employment difficulties. More specifically, the war had disrupted the important coal trade in Tyneside (and also in south Wales). As in Glasgow, the main outbreak of rioting at South Shields in February 1919 arose from a dispute in the local merchant shipping office over employment. A crew of Arab sailors was refused permission to sail by two seamen's union officials. The Arab sailors reacted violently to the intervention of the sailors' union officials to remove them from the hiring process and a riot ensued.[48] The rioting involved groups of colonial Arab and black sailors and a crowd of white British and foreign sailors and locals. Arab sailors attacked in South Shields were identified as British subjects and British protected persons who came from Aden, the Arab Protectorate and British Somaliland. Yet they, like the British colonial sailors from Sierra Leone in the Glasgow riot, were forced out of jobs hitherto readily available in the wartime merchant navy by white sailors due to increased post-war job competition.

A smaller scale disturbance in Hull in May 1919 bore some resemblance to the riots in Glasgow and South Shields in that it occurred in and around the local merchant shipping office as sailors competed for work in an industry curtailed by the ending of the war. Information about the May 1919 incident is limited. A short account in the Hull branch report of a seaman's union newspaper stated: "During the past month there was a little disturbance in the street—the coloured seamen clearing the Shipping Office and Yard of Chinese crew—with the result that the Master decided to take Britishers".[49] The clearing of Chinese sailors from the Hull merchant shipping office coincided with a mass meeting of sailors staged in protest against the employment of lower-paid foreign sailors by shipping companies. The sailors' protest meeting discussed employers' use of lower paid aliens to undercut British sailors, saving £3 a month per person for shipping companies who employed foreigners out of British ports.[50] This did not apply to black colonial British sailors hired in British ports since they were paid the same rates as white British sailors. In Hull, black British colonial sailors allegedly took action in support of the white sailors' union campaign against the employment of Chinese sailors, while a few months earlier in Glasgow a similar group of British colonial sailors were themselves chased out of the hiring yard and portrayed as "alien" job competitors. In Glasgow, South Shields and Hull job competition led to divisions within the merchant navy workforce during the riots.

The peak of the rioting in June 1919 was dominated by issues of post-war job competition, residency issues and recent wartime service. In this phase of the riots racism was also in evidence at times alongside the crucial aspects of location and timing of the rioting. In Liverpool Charles Wotten (also identified in the local press as Wootton), a Bermudan Royal Navy veteran and former ship's fireman, was drowned in the Mersey as he ran from a white crowd with police watching from a distance.[51]

The south Wales riots were the most serious outbreaks during which four men died. In Cardiff, war veteran John Donovan, who sported a Mons service ribbon, died as a result of a bullet wound to the heart as he took part in an attack on an Arab sailors' boarding house. The Arab sailors inside fired shots at the crowd as their home was attacked and set alight. Nine Arabs were later charged with shooting offences. The charge of the murder of Donovan was dropped since the jury accepted that the men fired their guns in self-defence.[52] The night before Donovan's death, a young white local man, Harold Smart, aged 18, approached a police officer and alleged that a black man had just slashed him in the throat. Smart died early the next morning, but no one was ever arrested for causing his death, and no witnesses to the incident came forward.

In another fatal incident during the rioting in Cardiff, Mahomed Abdullah, an Arab sailor, died as a result of a skull fracture. At his funeral service, his coffin was draped in a Union flag, a move intended to pointedly underline his British identity.[53] Mahomed Abdullah was one of five Arabs who received serious head wounds during an attack by a white crowd on an Arab sailors' lodging house. The coroner's report gave a blow to the head as the cause of his death.[54] At Abdullah's inquest the five white men charged with causing his death alleged that police officers struck the fatal blow as they struggled to remove Abdullah and others from the house. The accused men were found not guilty.

The other riot fatality in south Wales occurred in Barry where a white dock-worker and war veteran Frederick Longman died from stab wounds. Longman lived next door to a boarding house for black sailors. Longman and two other white men standing with him at his doorway verbally abused Caribbean sailor Charles Emmanuel as he walked towards the boarding house. They then attacked him with a poker. Emmanuel used a knife to defend himself, fatally wounding Longman. Following the incident a white crowd gathered and chased Emmanuel who was rescued by a police officer. Although charged with Longman's murder, Emmanuel was convicted of the lesser charge of manslaughter and sent to prison for

five years hard labour (the longest prison sentence of anyone jailed during the seaport rioting).

The contested residency issues, evident among the riot incidents in Glasgow and in the incidents surrounding the deaths of Abdullah and Longman in and around colonial sailors' boarding houses, illustrate another key factor in the outbreak of the seaport riots: increased pressures on housing in the intersections between war and peace.[55]

In the four years between 1915 and 1918, half as many houses were built in Cardiff as were constructed in a normal pre-war year. Evans has shown that the local police and press considered serious housing shortages to have been a factor in the Cardiff rioting. Black and Arab colonial wartime incomers were blamed for causing the housing shortage, yet they experienced similar problems to those facing white residents.[56] In Newport too, newspaper reports on the rioting claimed local housing shortages had become more acute since demobilisation.[57] Existing housing shortages were exacerbated in the first months between war and peace as service personnel were demobilised and as with unemployment, large seaports were among the hardest hit.

The shortage of housing in Britain's seaport cities was a problem of long standing, however, the wartime scarcity of materials and pressing patriotic priorities for builders and developers exacerbated the issue. By the end of the war Britain had an estimated shortfall of 600,000 homes. These housing pressures were given an anti-alien "spin". It was alleged in parliament that the post-war housing crisis was being made worse by "alien purchasers" who forced rent-paying locals out of their homes. In March 1919, the Home Secretary, Edward Shortt, responded to a question on housing pressures in the Commons by stating that there was no evidence that aliens were responsible for turning British subjects out of their houses.[58] Yet, this remained a popular belief. In London in June 1919, a Chinese man and his white British wife were alleged by local white residents in the Poplar district to have rented a house at an inflated rate after a recently demobilised local white man had been refused the property. The resentment led to a riot as the house and its residents were attacked and police fought to prevent the violence spilling over into an attack on all Chinese residents in the area.[59] As before, the local press were quick to identify the Chinese in Poplar as foreigners at a time when many Chinese from the British protectorate of Hong Kong were employed both in the merchant navy and in home front construction work.

As with unemployment, which was witnessed early among merchant sailors, housing shortages were also evident, as the chronically over-crowded

and poorly housed seaport populations struggled to accommodate returning war veterans during the transition from wartime to peacetime conditions.

Police, Court and Government Reactions

While the outbreak and events of the seaport riots owed much to time and place, trial evidence underlines that many of those involved in the judicial processes in the aftermath of the riots held racist attitudes to black and Arab people. Supporting this view, Panayi drew on examples of biased policing and convicting during the seaport riots as part of his evidence base for exploring the long history of "multicultural racism".[60] In the 1919 seaport riots more black and Arab people were arrested than white, which indicates police bias in arrest procedure, although this bias was not automatically reinforced in court proceedings. For example, of the 30 West African sailors detained following the Glasgow riot, three were convicted. Meanwhile the single local white person arrested was found guilty and given a similar three-month sentence as the convicted Sierra Leoneans.[61]

The Liverpool police were discriminatory in their arrest procedure during the rioting. Crowds of white rioters thousands strong attacked smaller groups of black people in Liverpool. Yet the arrest figures do not reflect the relative size of the groups. Among the 65 people arrested for rioting offences in Liverpool there were 29 black people and 36 white. The implication of police bias here can be supported by the fact that the evidence presented in court against many of the black detainees was at best flimsy. Of the 29 black people arrested, 17 were convicted, while 12 were found not guilty or freed without trial. In contrast, all 36 white rioters were found guilty as charged, many being imprisoned.

A central government response to the seaport violence came in June 1919 following widespread riots in Liverpool, south Wales and London with the establishment of an inter-departmental committee of enquiry. The labour shortages, which had led to the encouragement of black and Arab colonial labour to come and fill wartime gaps in the merchant navy, had gone with the advent of peace and the priority was to restore order by easing the employment and housing pressures in the seaports. The committee recommended an active repatriation programme to clear black and Arab colonial Britons from the metropole and disperse them around the empire. Their identity, as British colonial subjects with full rights of residence in Britain, while acknowledged, particularly by

the Colonial Office, was, as with their recent record of war service, increasingly set aside by the government.

The first committee meeting on June 19 at the Colonial Office was attended by representatives of that body, the Board of Trade, Home Office, Local Government Board, India Office, Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Shipping. A range of proposals to encourage black and Arab colonial workers to accept repatriation was discussed. Following the meeting, a resettlement allowance of £5 was introduced, topped up by a further £1 voyage allowance. Local repatriation committees were also set up in Cardiff, Glasgow, Hull, Liverpool, London, Salford and South Shields—all areas where there had been riots and other disorder and where there were noteworthy black and Arab colonial settlements.

The seaport repatriation committees encouraged the return of black colonial sailors to the Caribbean and West Africa as well as the return of Arabs to Aden and East Africa. The financial enticement was not offered to colonial south Asians. In government discussions, an India Office official explained this was because these sailors "...were under Indian articles under which the ship owners were obliged to repatriate...".[62] Between June 1919 and January 1920, 1,048 black, Arab and south Asian people were repatriated. Around 500 of these were Caribbean; over 400 were Arab sailors, and about 70 were West Africans. Fifteen south Asian sailors were repatriated from Cardiff via Devonport in July 1919. The final figure of those repatriated was considerably higher, since there were many ad hoc repatriation sailings that continued sporadically in the remainder of 1920 and into 1921. For example, Rozina Visram recorded that the SS *Kurmack* left Plymouth in September 1921 with "63 Indians and 150 Adenese" on board.[63]

By the end of the scheme around 2,000 principally black and Arab colonial Britons (some with their British-born dependants) accepted the small financial inducement on offer and were shipped back to their places of birth. Many arrived back home with burning resentment against their treatment by the "Mother Country". Some became involved in local protests and riots against white authority; others joined black political movements that helped draw attention to the severe post-war economic difficulties in Britain's colonies, particularly in the Caribbean.[64]

For black and Arab colonial workers who remained in Britain's seaports after the riots the future was bleak with long-term high unemployment levels, particularly in the merchant navy, and residence in over-crowded, poor quality housing. This was accompanied by local police and

governmental policies that evolved into systematic discrimination. Government measures taken in wartime and its aftermath—the 1914 Aliens Restriction Act and the 1919 Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act—allowed for Orders in Council to be passed by the Home Secretary to target specific issues. By the Aliens Orders of 1920 and 1925, black, Arab and south Asian colonial peoples were placed under controlling legislation for the sake of restricting their access to the job market and for the purposes of close police monitoring.

Despite hailing from British colonies and protectorates, colonial black and Arab workers were governed by these two Orders. They were specifically directed at or deliberately misapplied to Arab, black and south Asian colonial workers in order to undermine their rights as British imperial subjects, including their rights of settlement and free movement in Britain, replacing this with police checks, alien identity cards and the constant threat of deportation. Crucially these British subjects were now regarded as "aliens" who could be denied the chance to apply for jobs on the same basis as white native British workers. Overturning the government's wartime decision in 1917 to overlook nationality issues to allow the hiring of all Arabs who claimed British subject or protected persons' status, the 1920 Aliens Order was primarily designed to restrict the number of Arab sailors on British ships. However, its application was often stretched to those African and Caribbean sailors whose paperwork, based on their merchant seaman's identity book, was deemed unsatisfactory.

Five years later in April 1925, Conservative Home Secretary William Joynson-Hicks used executive powers granted under an article of the 1920 Aliens Order to issue the Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order. The 1925 Order sought to further curtail the employment opportunities and freedom of movement of black and Arab sailors. The 1925 Order re-classified foreign black and Arab sailors and all British subjects and protected persons who lacked documentary proof of their status, as "coloured aliens". Chinese and Japanese sailors were exempted from the Order. The penalties under the 1925 Order were severe. Imprisonment followed by deportation was a real possibility if a "coloured alien" failed to provide a passport or valid alien card when required to by the police. Initially the 1925 Order was applied only in areas of large Arab settlement: Hull, Liverpool, Salford, plus the Tyne and south Wales ports.[65] The Order was extended to include Glasgow in 1926 following requests from the Glasgow police to register south Asian sailors and peddlers

under the new regulations.[66] The 1925 Order was continued into the 1930s. By then the Order was misapplied to black African and Caribbean colonials on a mass scale in Cardiff where up to 2,000 black colonial people (including war veterans, among them a survivor of the Battle of Jutland) were wrongly classified as aliens. This policy was successfully challenged following the intervention of the black pressure group, the League of Coloured Peoples, forcing the Home Office to restore British subject status to many.[67]

The 1919 riots, some of the most severe incidences of unrest in twentieth century Britain, occurred in seaports at the crucial transition period from wartime to peacetime conditions. Location and timing were central to their outbreak, an aspect of their occurrence often taken for granted or left unexplored in writing by historians on this subject. This chapter has sought to redress this imbalance by emphasising the particularities of seaport cities as well as the negative impact of mass demobilisation in the months at the end of the war on access to jobs and housing. These issues were not simply important in the outbreak of the seaport riots they featured in episodes of mass violence across the Atlantic world.

In the years following the Armistice the ranks of unemployed colonial black, Arab and south Asian colonial residents in Britain's seaports did not disappear. However, the acute pressure points caused by mass demobilisation were lessened. This is demonstrated by the ending of the widespread rioting by August 1919 although isolated violent unrest in Britain's seaports occurred into 1920 and 1921 as the economic difficulties in the merchant shipping industry and housing shortages continued.

This chapter has argued that racism was not the cause of the 1919 seaport rioting. It has, however, indicated that racist police and government responses often followed the riot triggers of mass demobilisation leading to unemployment and over-crowded living conditions in the seaports in the aftermath of the war. Fearing further disorder, the British government continued its repatriation policy of June 1919 into 1921 although the numbers involved were greatly reduced since those who turned down offers in 1919 were no longer eligible for the scheme. The longer-term government solution to the pressures on employment in the merchant navy came with the introduction of special government measures. These regulations re-classified thousands of black, Arab and south Asian workers as "aliens" on whom "special restrictions" could be placed in terms of access to job opportunities and in freedom to move around the country in search of work. The blurred nationality issues which were loosely interpreted to allow

all Arab merchant sailors to claim British status without question during wartime were now misinterpreted to close the door to employment for many colonial Britons. By 1925, African and Caribbean war veterans and civilian wartime workers, along with Arab sailors from British protectorates and south Asian traders, were grouped together as "coloured aliens".

In the transitional months from war to peace those living in seaports encountered unique pressures on housing and job opportunities, which triggered a wave of post-war rioting. In the following years, black, Arab and south Asian colonial war veterans and former wartime workers living in the seaports found that rioting was followed by the threat of repatriation and re-classification.

Notes

1. Andrew Rothstein, *The Soldiers' Strikes of 1919* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980), 18.
2. Following the disorder, Labour MP for Fife William Adamson, asked the Home Secretary Edward Shortt for a report on "the serious trouble which arose outside the House this afternoon between a procession of discharged soldiers and sailors and the police". The procession marched from Hyde Park to the House of Commons to ask the Prime Minister and the Minister of Labour to find them work. House of Commons debates, May 26, 1919, vol. 116 cols. 988–989, accessed May 15, 2016, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1919/may/26/discharged-soldiers-procession.
3. Jacqueline Jenkinson, "The 1919 Riots," in *Racial Violence in Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, ed. Panikos Panayi (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1996), 92–111; Jenkinson, "Black Sailors on Red Clydeside: Rioting, Reactionary Trade Unionism and Britishness Following the First World War," *Twentieth Century British History* 19:1 (2008); Jenkinson, *Black 1919: Riots, Racism and Resistance in Imperial Britain* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009); Jenkinson, " 'All in the Same Uniform?' The Participation of Black Colonial Residents in the British Armed Forces in the First World War," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 40:2 (2012).
4. Among the historians who have written on the 1919 seaport riots are Neil Evans, "The South Wales Race Riots of 1919," *Llafur* 3:1 (1980); Evans, "The South Wales Race Riots of 1919: a Documentary Postscript," *Llafur* 3:4 (1983); Evans, "Red Summers 1917–1919," *History Today* 51:2 (2001); Peter Fryer, *Staying Power: A History of Black People in Britain*, 2nd edn (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 298–316; Colin Holmes, *John Bull's Island: Immigration and British Society, 1871–1971* (Basingstoke:

Macmillan 1988), 95–109; Roy May and Robin Cohen, "The Interaction between Race and Colonialism: A Case Study of the Liverpool Race Riots of 1919," *Race and Class*, 16:2 (1974); Michael Rowe, "Sex, Race and Riot in Liverpool, 1919," *Immigrants & Minorities* 19:2 (2000); James Walvin, *Black and White: The Negro and English Society 1555–1945* (Allen Lane: London, 1973), 202–215; Jerry White, "The Summer Riots of 1919," *New Society* 57 (13 August 1981).

5. Barton C. Hacker, "White Man's War, Coloured Man's Labour: Working for the British Army on the Western Front," *Itinerario* 38:3 (2014): 30.
6. See Jacqueline Jenkinson, "The Glasgow Race Disturbances of 1919," *Immigrants & Minorities* 4:2 (1985); "The 1919 Race Riots in Britain: Their Background and Consequences" (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1987); "The Race Riots in Britain: A Survey," in *Under the Imperial Carpet: Essays in Black History 1780–1950*, eds. Rainer Lotz and Ian Pegg (Crawley: Rabbit Press, 1987), 182–207; "Salford and Hull 1919–1921," *Immigrants & Minorities* 7:2 (1988).
7. In the 'race relations' approach, violent reactions based on divergent ethnicity are seen as sufficient explanation for outbreaks of rioting and extreme prejudice directed by elements of the white host society against black and minority ethnic populations. The eventual assimilation of minority ethnic populations into wider British society is viewed as the solution to the violence. For a discussion of the limitations of the 'race relations' approach see Kenneth Lunn, "'Race Relations or Industrial Relations?': Race and Labour in Britain 1850–1950," in *Race and Labour in Twentieth Century Britain*, ed. Kenneth Lunn (London: Frank Cass, 1985), 1–2. See Michael Banton, *The Coloured Quarter: Negro Immigrants in an English City* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955) and *White and Coloured: The Behaviour of British People towards Coloured Immigrants* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1959), for general surveys of black settlements in Britain using the 'race relations' approach.
8. Stephen Bourne, *Black Poppies: Britain's Black Community and the Great War* (Stroud: The History Press, 2014), 121, 129, 130 and 144.
9. Bourne, *Black Poppies*, 121.
10. Christian Høgsbjerg, "Rufus E. Fennell: A Literary Pan-Africanist in Britain," *Race and Class* 56 (2014): 64–65.
11. Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea, *White Man's Country: Racism in British Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 1984).
12. Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 6–7.
13. Caroline Bressey, "Looking for Work: The Black Presence in Britain 1860–1920," *Immigrants & Minorities* 28:2 (2010): 165.
14. Ibid., 167.

15. Key works on imperial inter-connectedness, as part of a wider debate on the 'Black Atlantic', include Catherine Hall, Keith McClelland and Jane Rendall, *Defining the Victorian Nation: Class, Race, Gender and the British Reform Act of 1867* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Catherine Hall, ed., *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830–1867* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Neil Evans, " 'Across the Universe': Racial Violence in the Post-war Crisis in Imperial Britain 1919–1925," in *Ethnic Labour and British Imperial Trade: A History of Ethnic Seafarers in the United Kingdom*, ed. Diane Frost (London, Franc Cass, 1995), 59–88; Jenkinson, *Black 1919*; and David Killingray, "'A Good West Indian, a Good African, and in Short, a Good Britisher': Black and British in a Colour-Conscious Empire, 1760–1950," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 36:3 (2008).
16. May and Cohen, "Interaction between Race and Colonialism," 112.
17. Holmes, *John Bull's Island*, 109 and Rowe, "Sex, 'Race' and Riot in Liverpool," 66.
18. Jenkinson, *Black 1919*, 5–7.
19. Richard Lawton and W. Robert Lee, *Population and Society in Western European Port-Cities, c. 1650 to 1939* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002) and W. Robert Lee, "The Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics of Port Cities: A Typology for Comparative Analysis," *Urban History* 25:2 (1998): 147.
20. Lee, "Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics," 163–164.
21. Ibid., 157, 166.
22. Ibid., 165–166.
23. Evans, "Red Summers 1917–1919," 28.
24. Panikos Panayi, *An Immigration History of Britain: Multicultural Racism since 1800* (Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd, 2010), 240.
25. Ibid., 219.
26. Ibid., 240.
27. N.G. Orr, "Keep the Home Fires Burning: Peace Day in Luton, 1919," *Family and Community History* 2:1 (1999): 17.
28. Report by Chief Constable David Williams, Cardiff City Police to Home Office, June 18, 1919, The National Archives, Kew (TNA), HO 45/11017/377969.
29. Killingray, "All the King's Men? Blacks in the British Army in the First World War, 1914–1918," in *Under the Imperial Carpet*, 164–181, (181). The estimate was given by Hackney, a Ministry of Labour representative at the conference on Repatriation, June 19, 1919, Colonial Office papers, TNA, CO 323/814.
30. Linda Colley, "Britishness and Otherness: An Argument," *Journal of British Studies* 31:4 (1992): 326.

31. Evans, "South Wales Race Riots", 8.
32. Letter from Assistant Secretary Marine Department, Board of Trade, to Under Secretary of State, Home Office, April, 19, 1917, TNA, HO 45/11897 332087/9.
33. Letter from India Office to Foreign Office, April 27, 1917, TNA, HO 45/11897.
34. Richard Ivor Lawless, "The Role of Seaman's Agents in the Migration for Employment of Arab Seafarers in the Early Twentieth Century," in *Ethnic Labour and British Imperial Trade*, 37.
35. Some individual cases involving south Asians occurred during the riots. See, for example, "Mill Dam Incident," *Shields Daily Gazette and Shipping Telegraph* [hereafter *Shields Gazette*], February 7, 1919, 3 and "Mill Dam Riot," *Shields Gazette*, February 13, 1919, 3.
36. House of Commons debates, April 1, 1919, vol. 114, col. 1062, accessed June 1, 2016, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1919/apr/01/employment-of-aliens.
37. Figure given by Home Secretary Edward Shortt during questions on post-war unemployment, House of Commons debates, May 26, 1919, vol. 116, cols. 991–992, accessed May 15, 2016, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1919/may/26/discharged-soldiers-procession.
38. Lawless, *From Tai'izz to Tyneside: an Arab Community in the North-east of England in the Early Twentieth Century* (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1995), 80.
39. Untitled, *Shields Gazette*, March 10, 1919, 4.
40. "Coloured Seamen," *Shields Gazette*, January 31, 1919, 4.
41. James Denman and Paul McDonald, "Unemployment Statistics from 1881 to the Present Day," *Labour Market Trends*, January 1996, 6, accessed June 2, 2016, www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market . . . /unemployment-since-1881.pdf.
42. Ministry of Labour Under Secretary George Wardle stated that action, including repatriation, had been taken to remove alien labour due to rising native unemployment. Labour exchanges had been advised not to offer vacancies to aliens employed before the war unless no suitable British applicant was available, and aliens were barred from applying for vacancies outside their registered area. House of Commons debates, April 1, 1919, vol. 114, col. 1062–1063, accessed June 1, 2016, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1919/apr/01/employment-of-aliens.
43. "Row on Clydeside," *Evening News*, January 29, 1919, 3.
44. "Riot at Harbour," *Evening News*, January 24, 1919, 5.
45. "Furious Fighting—Revolvers and Knives Used—30 Seamen arrested in Glasgow," *Glasgow Herald*, January, 24, 1919, 7. See also *Daily Record and Mail*, January 24, 1919, 9.

46. "The Broomielaw Riot," *Evening Times*, January, 24, 1919, 2.
47. "The Glasgow Riot," *The Bulletin*, January 25, 1919, 10.
48. "Mill Dam Riots—Stewards' Union Official Bound Over," *Shields Gazette*, February 11, 1919, 2.
49. "Branch Reports—Hull," *Marine Caterer*, 9:13 (June 1919): 204.
50. Ibid.
51. "The Race Riot—Official Version," *Liverpool Echo*, June 6, 1919, 5.
52. "Donovan's Death—Nine Coloured Men Acquitted at Assizes," *Western Mail*, July 17, 1919, 7.
53. "Riot Victim," *Western Mail*, June 19, 1919, 7.
54. Untitled, *Western Mail*, July 11, 1919, 6.
55. Jenkinson, *Black 1919*, 110, 220–221, *Barry Dock News*, June 13, 1919, 3.
56. Evans "South Wales Race Riots," 13.
57. Untitled, *Cardiff Times and South Wales Weekly News*, June 14, 1919, 6.
58. House of Commons debates, March 31, 1919, vol. 114, col. 910, accessed June 3, 2016, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1919/mar/31/alien-purchasers.
59. "Rioting in Poplar—Furniture Burned—Windows Smashed," *East End News*, June 20, 1919, 5.
60. Panayi, *Immigration History of Britain*, 216.
61. "Struck from Behind," *Evening News*, February 4, 1919, 3.
62. Colonial Office Memorandum on the "Conference on the Repatriation of Coloured Men," June 19, 1919, TNA, CO 323/814 275–278.
63. Rozina Visram, *Asians in Britain: 400 Years of History* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 204–205.
64. Jenkinson, *Black 1919*, 174–182 and W.F. Elkins, "A Source of Black Nationalism in the Caribbean: The Revolt of the British West Indies Regiment at Taranto, Italy," *Science and Society* 34:1 (1970): 99.
65. Jenkinson, *Black 1919*, 203–206.
66. Anne Dunlop and Robert Miles, "Recovering the History of Asian Migration to Scotland," *Immigrants & Minorities* 9:2 (1990): 156.
67. Fryer, *Staying Power*, 356–358.

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SECTION THREE

Remembering and Forgetting Minorities in Wartime

CHAPTER 8

Race and the Legacy of the First World War in French Anti-Colonial Politics of the 1920s

David Murphy

The history of "black France" in the interwar period has long been dominated by accounts of artistic and student life in Paris, or the "discovery" of African art by European artists (most famously Picasso). However, alongside and often intertwined with the world of jazz, *la vogue nègre* and Negritude was also to be found an emerging community of black workers in the major cities (Paris and Lyon) and port towns (Marseilles, Toulon, Bordeaux, Le Havre). The single biggest group of black people in France throughout the interwar period though were the *tirailleurs sénégalais* (African infantrymen), most of whom were stationed at the major colonial military base in the small Mediterranean town of Fréjus. As the US historian Tyler Stovall has argued, the First World War constituted a watershed in race relations in France: during the war, the French authorities brought over half a million soldiers and labourers to the Metropole from its colonies in Africa and the Caribbean, as well as from Asia (and this is without taking into account both British colonial troops and African-American soldiers).[1] The flood of publications that has accompanied the centenary of the war has included some illuminating

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work on this submerged history, examining the full extent to which it really was a "world" war, drawing in men from all continents.[2] This new material builds on the pioneering body of incisive historical work that has emerged, over the past two decades, on the role of France's colonial subjects in the First World War (in particular the work of Richard S. Fogarty, Joe Lunn, Gregory Mann and Stovall).[3] However, far less has been written on the relatively small group of African *tirailleurs* who stayed on in France and were involved in black community groups and or/ became militants in the radical anti-colonial movements created in the wake of the 1920 split between French communists and socialists.[4]

From his entry on to the political stage in late 1924 until his early death three years later, aged just 38, the most celebrated and feared of these militants was Lamine Senghor, a decorated war veteran from Senegal, who had been gassed at Verdun in 1917 and who now emerged as a communist-inspired, anti-colonial activist. This chapter will chart the course of Senghor's brief career as an activist from 1924 to 1927, exploring the nature of black anti-colonial activism in France during that period. It will also analyse the ways in which Senghor projected his identity as a war veteran in his speeches and writings and will examine more generally how France's "blood debt" to its colonial subjects became a key theme of anti-colonial discourse in the interwar period.

The First World War on Trial: Blaise Diagne Versus Les Continents

On November 24, 1924, Lamine Senghor made his entry on to the French political scene when he appeared as a witness for the defence in a libel trial, at the Tribunal de Paris, which for a few days at least thrust the politics of France's black colonial populations to the forefront of public debate, and in particular the issue of the participation of colonial troops in the First World War.[5] The antagonists at the heart of the trial were the most (in)famous black Frenchmen of their day: the plaintiff, Blaise Diagne, was a deputy in the French parliament representing the four communes of Senegal. Initially feared as a threat to France's interests, Diagne had become a respected national figure in France through his participation in the recruitment of African troops during the First World War. His pioneering role as a black man operating at the heart of a European imperial nation-state had also brought him to international prominence and, in 1919, he had used his political capital with both the

French authorities and with black internationalists to host W.E.B. Du Bois's landmark Pan-African Congress in Paris. The main defendant René Maran had for several years been a controversial public figure in French life, after he was awarded the prestigious literary prize, the *Prix Goncourt* in 1921 for his novel, *Batouala*, which in its preface had provided one of the most scathing denunciations of French colonialism in recent times (although the novel itself was, in fact, deeply ambivalent in its portrayal of Africans). In reality, very little separated Diagne and Maran in terms of their fundamental attitude to French colonialism: both believed profoundly in France's "civilising mission" and they argued for the full assimilation of black people into French culture.[6]

As with so much of the racial and anti-colonial politics of the 1920s, the fault line between the two men centred on the "blood debt" that France was deemed to owe to its colonial troops who had played such an important role in the First World War. Over 130,000 black African troops had participated in the war with over 30,000 killed.[7] Diagne was to become a central figure in the recruitment of the *tirailleurs* as the war dragged on in seemingly interminable fashion. In January 1918, he accepted an invitation from Prime Minister Clemenceau, desperate for the extra troops that might finally bring the war to a successful conclusion while limiting the loss of further French lives, to lead a recruitment tour in French West Africa. Given the title of *High Commissioner for the Republic*, Diagne was greeted in the colonies with the pomp and ceremony normally reserved for white dignitaries from the imperial centre, which initially enhanced his reputation amongst France's many black subjects and its few black citizens. However, by the time of the libel trial in 1924, Diagne had become a figure of hate for some, especially amongst black activists, from moderate reformists such as René Maran to more radical, left-wing figures such as Lamine Senghor. Promises made about black participation in the war leading to reform of the colonial system, as well as increased access to rights and citizenship, had proven illusory. Previously perceived as the scourge of the colonial lobby and in particular of white French dominance in Senegal, Diagne had signed the infamous "Bordeaux Pact" in 1923, which defended the commercial interests of the major Bordeaux trading houses as part of a deal to gain their electoral support. For his opponents, Diagne had quite simply sold out to colonial interests.[8]

It was in this context, in October 1924, that Maran published an article "The good disciple", in the black newspaper *Les Continents*, in which he accused Diagne of having received "a certain commission for

each soldier recruited". Similar accusations had previously appeared in the mainstream French press but an indignant Diagne regarded the publication of such claims in a "black" newspaper as a danger to his reputation as an advocate for equality. *Les Continents* was the newspaper of the *Ligue Universelle de Défense de la Race Nègre* (LUDRN), founded by the colourful figure of Kojo Tovalou Houénou, a lawyer and dandy, the son of a prosperous Dahomean merchant (who may or may not have been a descendant of the mythical King Behanzin). Although Houénou was a great admirer of Marcus Garvey and his United Negro Improvement Association (at the time of the trial, he was actually in the US where he met Garvey and addressed the UNIA convention), LUDRN and *Les Continents* shared little of the Jamaican's radicalism. In the terminology of the times, LUDRN was "anti-colonial" in the sense that it called for the reform of the colonial system; it did not call for the independence of the colonies. It was thus closely aligned with the position of the moderate French left—*Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (SFIO)—and the *Ligue des droits de l'homme* (*League for the Rights of Man*).

In late 1924, Lamine Senghor occupied a far more radical position in relation to empire than *Les Continents*, and his testimony presented French society with a troubling image of the *tirailleur sénégalais*. The arrival of vast numbers of African troops on French soil had led to a significant transformation of the vision of the African in the popular imagination: in place of "the savage", the image spread of the *tirailleur* as a "big child" who smilingly served France (most infamously in the imagery for the *Banania* powdered chocolate drink). However, Lamine Senghor's intervention projected the *tirailleur sénégalais* as a man who had been radicalised by his experiences and who would now devote himself to the denunciation of colonial injustice. Unfortunately, we do not have access to Senghor's actual testimony but, shortly after the trial, he would write a general account of it for the radical newspaper *Le Paria* (The Pariah):

> Instead of attempting to prove precisely how much the great slave trader [Diagne] received for each Senegalese he recruited, they should have brought before him a whole procession of those blinded and mutilated in the war. . . .
>
> All of these victims would have spat in his face the infamy of the mission that he had undertaken.[9]

Senghor's views on the suffering endured by colonial soldiers were given authority by his own status as a "*mutilé de guerre*" [war wounded]. In April 1917, his battalion of the *tirailleurs sénégalais* had been gassed near Verdun, and Senghor had suffered terrible injuries from which he never fully recovered, and he would die of tuberculosis in late 1927. As will be illustrated below, his position as a "*mutilé de guerre*" opened up a space within 1920s France in which otherwise radical ideas could be given a hearing.

At the time of the trial, Senghor had been a militant for just a few weeks within the *Union Intercoloniale* (UIC), an organisation created by the French Communist Party (PCF) in 1921 with the aim of providing a forum in which a broad trans-colonial front against empire might develop. Although nominally an independent group run by and for representatives of the colonised peoples (Nguyen ai Quoc, the future Ho Chi Minh, was one of its most active members in its early stages), the UIC was in fact controlled by the PCF's Colonial Studies Committee. In the columns of the UIC's newspaper, *Le Paria*, were to be found the most violent denunciations of empire of the period, although the word "independence" itself was rarely mentioned. What made the UIC far more menacing than Houénou's group was its Communist provenance, for the Communist International (or Comintern) of 1920 had adopted a resolutely anti-imperial stance. In practice, this had led to little concrete anti-colonial activity on the part of the communist parties of Europe but communism had come to be seen by many activists from the colonies as an ideology that might permit the creation of a global front to combat the worldwide reach of empire. Of course, one might legitimately question the good faith of the communist movement in its anti-imperialism—many Western communists largely shared the views of their imperialist counterparts regarding the backwardness of the colonised peoples of Africa and Asia—but the fact cannot be underestimated that communism was the sole metropolitan movement of the mid-1920s to call for the independence of the colonies. In the eyes of its colonised members, the UIC represented the potential for fruitful alliances in the imperial centre, while for the French authorities, the movement was a potentially subversive revolutionary force that needed to be closely policed.

Why though did the UIC send one of its newest recruits to speak in defence of a bourgeois, reformist newspaper? In 1924, the Comintern had called on communists to seek alliances with all anti-colonial nationalist movements: and the Diagne-*Les Continents* trial was perceived as an

opportunity to create a united anti-colonial front between (bourgeois) reformers and (communist) radicals. This united front would only last a few years but it is in this context that we must situate Lamine Senghor's activism. The newspaper lost the trial but, as was indicated above, the incident cemented a profound change in the perception of Diagne: previously seen by many blacks as a defender of his race, his status as a deputy constituting proof of the promises of assimilation, he now came to be regarded as a traitor to the black cause. For the radical black movements of the next few years, Diagne was the *bête noire*, often caustically dismissed as a "*nègre blanc*" (white negro) or, in an echo of the charge made against him by Maran, decried as a "*négrier*" (slave trader). In a major irony, this prominent black politician became virtually the sole figure around whom disparate, radical black groups could unite in opposition.

What exactly had driven Lamine Senghor, the loyal *tirailleur sénégalais* who had defended the colonial "homeland" in its hour of need, to join the far-left militants of the emerging anti-colonial movement? The Diagne-*Les Continents* trial appears to have played a decisive role, for the young militant suddenly found himself face to face with the man who had promised so much to the African soldiers who had fought in the First World War. Indeed, for Sagna, Senghor's testimony during the trial reveals that "more than the UIC militant, it is the war-wounded veteran whose wounds have been reopened who speaks".[10] From November 1924 until his death three years later, Lamine Senghor would devote himself to various forms of anti-colonial militancy. Initially motivated by his status as a war veteran, this topic would remain central to almost every article and speech he would write. The fact that he had fought for France made it that much more difficult for the French authorities to dismiss him as a subversive, which surely did not escape the PCF leaders who decided to promote him within the movement's ranks. However, despite his commitment to the cause, Senghor's desire to return to Senegal never left him entirely. On March 9, 1925, a date by which he was immersed in anti-colonial radicalism within the UIC, Senghor wrote to the Governor General of French West Africa to ask for his intervention to help him to be repatriated. Much correspondence flowed between the colonial authorities in Paris and Dakar but it was eventually decided that they should accede to this request as Senghor could be more easily controlled in the colonies. However, in the meantime, Senghor had changed his mind, fearing that some form of brutal repression would be waiting for him back home. He would never see Senegal again.[11]

L'Union Intercoloniale and the Rise of Anti-colonialism

In the aftermath of the trial, Lamine Senghor quickly became a mainstay of UIC activities. He had joined the UIC at a moment when its geographical focus was evolving: initially dominated by representatives from French Indochina, it had gradually integrated North Africans, Caribbeans and now with Lamine Senghor, it reached out to sub-Saharan Africa. While many critics of colonialism would cite violence in the colonies as proof of the need to reform the colonial system, the UIC deemed this violence proof that colonialism could not be reformed. It is also striking that the UIC adopted a strategy in which violence and exploitation in the colonies were regularly evoked in relation to the suffering endured by colonial soldiers during the First World War. For example, a flyer for a UIC meeting in March 1925 announced:

> Colonial subjects! Senegalese, Dahomeans! During the war, black men were ground into the dust. Today, your brothers are still exploited to enrich the cotton plantations of Niger. They call it forced labour.[12]

Throughout 1925, Senghor was a regular contributor to *Le Paria*. He wrote about strikes in French West Africa projecting black and white workers united against their capitalist bosses, while condemning forced labour in the colonies as a new form of slavery, and, once again, decrying the failure of France to deliver on its promises to those African troops who had served the country so loyally during the Great War. In an article on forced labour, Senghor denounced what was essentially a "system of slavery". Outside of the four communes in Senegal (whose inhabitants enjoyed French citizenship), it was the code of *l'indigénat* (a set of colonial regulations concerned with the status of the native population) that governed relations between coloniser and colonised, and forced labour was a permanent threat for any colonial subject. In denouncing this injustice, Senghor reminded his readership of the "blood debt" and the promises that had been made to the colonised. The sacrifice made by the *tirailleurs sénégalais* was supposed to bring an end to forced labour and other forms of injustice:

> So, that's the recognition shown by the "Motherland" to its children who served as "cannon fodder" from 1914–18; under Painlevé's premiership when 6,000 negroes were sacrificed in 3 days on 16, 17, 18 April 1917 at

> the Chemin des Dames! So, that's the reality of the promises made by the recruiters Diagne and Angoulvant in 1917–18? [sic][13]

What is more, instead of compensating African soldiers for their sacrifice, they were now sent to fight in colonial wars in Morocco and Syria "where 75% of the French army are negroes" and, for those who might escape these conflicts, all they were offered was the "shameful slavery" of forced labour.[14]

Senghor's most significant contribution to the UIC was in seeking to forge alliances with representatives of other colonial movements, based on the principle that the transnational reach of empire must be met with a trans-colonial front of anti-colonial resistance. In particular, Senghor threw himself wholeheartedly into the campaign against the Rif War in Morocco—the conflict evoked in his article above in which *tirailleurs* formed the core of the French forces—appearing at countless rallies alongside prominent UIC members, such as the Antillean Max Bloncourt and the Algerian Hadj Ali.[15] He also shared a platform with French communists, in particular Jacques Doriot and Paul Vaillant-Couturier, the latter of whom it is possible he may have encountered through the pacifist *Association Républicaine des Anciens Combattants* (ARAC). Another speaker with whom Senghor often shared the platform at rallies was the novelist, Henri Barbusse, like Vaillant-Couturier, a war veteran who gravitated from ARAC to the PCF.[16]

The Rif campaign completed Senghor's transformation into an anti-colonial militant, thrusting the young man into the limelight, inviting him to take to the stage to deliver tub-thumping speeches evoking solidarity between the workers of the world: the cause of the European proletariat was also the cause of the colonised. It was during this intense period that Senghor appears to have developed his skills as a powerful orator. This was also the period when he began his political education. In 1925, the PCF opened a "Colonial School" for its growing band of colonised activists in the UIC, designed to improve their knowledge of Marxist ideology. Very few activists attended the classes and the "school" closed after a few months but, while its doors were open, Lamine Senghor was one of the most assiduous students and his writing for *Le Paria* bears the imprint of this ideological training. Essentially, the nationalist anti-colonial movements were considered by communists of the mid-1920s to be the prelude to a global world revolution (although later in the decade the Comintern would turn away from alliances with nationalist movements, denouncing

"bourgeois" nationalists as enemies of the workers). However, as will be shown below, Senghor's anti-colonialism deployed a rather heterodox form of communist ideology. The most important issue (as with Ho Chi Minh before him) was the attempt to imagine an anti-colonial discourse capable of mobilising all colonised peoples: communist orthodoxy counts for far less than the ability to unite the colonised of the world.

The PCF-UIC campaign against the colonial war in the Rif Mountains was led by Jacques Doriot who saw in the resistance of the Moroccan indigenous leader, Abd El-Krim, against Spanish and French domination of the Rif region, the perfect occasion for the PCF finally to prove its anti-colonial credentials to an increasingly impatient Comintern.[17] It seemed at last as though the PCF was fully embracing the Comintern's anti-colonial agenda but, in reality, much of the PCF hierarchy was reluctant to lend the campaign its full support. Ironically, the Rif War was won by the French primarily with the help of its colonial troops, which meant that Doriot's fraternisation strategy was largely irrelevant to conditions on the ground, a fact that was all too familiar to Senghor. His status as a former colonial soldier and a communist lent weight to the idea that common ground could be found between coloniser and colonised. In the transnational politics of post-war communism, Senghor's voice became a necessary part of the debate but the PCF generally insisted that he stick to a script devised by it.

Lamine Senghor adopted the "official" Comintern line and promoted an alliance between all those engaged in anti-colonial struggle: for instance, in his one (revealingly titled) article on the question for *Le Paria,* "The People of the Rif are not alone. They have by their side the oppressed of the world", he began by linking the events in Morocco with the communist-nationalist revolt in China. However, his contributions went beyond Doriot et al. in thinking through the specific nature of the uprising in the Rif, in particular articulating the potentially revolutionary nature of Islam and its role in fomenting anti-colonial revolt:

> The eyes of Islam, in particular, are turned towards the struggle unfolding between the valiant people of the Rif and the might of French militarism; the whole Islamic world, carried along on a wave of enthusiasm, is watching this victorious march towards independence.
>
> In light of this, French capitalism, which oppresses tens of millions of Muslims, screams in despair and rage.[18]

Whereas Doriot "translated" the actions of the Rif rebels into a proto-communism, Lamine Senghor regarded the sense of despair and oppression felt by the Islamic world as sufficient motivation in itself for their revolt. Indeed, his analysis of the role of Islam in popular resistance to Western military intervention was couched in terms that resonate with our own contemporary post 9/11 world:

> With its usual hypocrisy, [French imperialism] presents the success of the Rif armies as the prelude to an Islamic crusade against the Christian world.
>
> Islam, represented by 300 million slaves, crushed under the heel of different European imperialisms, thus receives the label of "Barbarism" while European capitalism becomes "Western Civilization".[19]

The Rif war was presented here not as the result of a Samuel Huntington-style clash of civilisations but rather the understandable resistance of a colonised people to external domination. Indeed, Senghor believed that there was considerable hypocrisy in the demonisation of Islam, for it was a "spiritual force" that France itself had recently tried to win over to its cause: "Can French imperialism not recall that France itself has built in Paris a mosque demanded by the faithful so that it could attempt to bring the spiritual force of Islam under its tutelage and rally its 'partisans' under its flag?"[20] Senghor's article referred to a decision taken by the French parliament in 1920 to build a mosque in central Paris, which offered official recognition for the contribution of France's Islamic subjects to victory in the First World War: at a moment of existential crisis for the nation, Islam had been a friend to France and Senghor was reminding the Republic of its gratitude towards the Muslims in its Empire.[21]

After loyally serving the PCF and the UIC throughout the Rif campaign, Lamine Senghor had gradually come, by early 1926, to resent the limited space devoted by the communist movement to black questions in general as well as to his own marginalised status in particular. Many historians of French communism have signalled "the imperial patriotism which coloured the colonial policies of the French Communist Party".[22] Although seeking to situate themselves as the natural allies of the colonised, the communists often saw themselves as culturally, intellectually and politically more advanced than those they were purporting to help. In March 1925, Lamine Senghor had already expressed his frustration when asked by the PCF to stand in the local

elections in the 13th *arrondissement* in Paris, a bourgeois district in which he had little chance of winning (a tactic not unfamiliar to French political parties today when "promoting" minority candidates). As Philippe Dewitte argues, Senghor was increasingly aware that he served as a "token" figure for French communism.[23] The final straw came when the PCF was invited to send two representatives to the Congress of Black Workers in Chicago in October 1925. They selected Senghor and Bloncourt but, at the last minute, informed them that they would have to pay for the journey out of their own pockets. When Senghor objected, it was suggested that he either work his passage to America or stow away: he refused. From this moment on, Senghor appeared to have decided that, in order to promote the interests of black people, it was necessary to create independent black organisations, and in March 1926 with the creation of the *Comité de Défense de la Race Nègre* (*Committee for the Defence of the Negro Race*), he did just that. However, it would be wrong to assume that Senghor had split definitively from the PCF: for the final 18 months of his life, he kept both his friends and his enemies guessing about his motives and his allegiances, seeking to carve out a political discourse in which both race and class might carry equal weight.

The Defence of the Negro Race

In March 1926, Lamine Senghor officially registered his new association and embarked on a tour of France's port cities in order to encounter the small working-class black community and attempt to convince them of the utility of joining the CDRN. His skills as a public speaker, honed during the Rif campaign, served him well and by the summer of 1926 it was estimated by the agents of the CAI, the system of surveillance overseen by the Ministry for the Colonies, that he had recruited over 500 members (in a black population numbered at less than 20,000).[24] Throughout the rest of the year, it appeared that he had broken entirely with the PCF and had decided to devote himself to defending the black community, deploying the reformist language of the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* and parts of the French Socialist party. Senghor's self-presentation was yet again that of a *"mutilé de guerre"*, thereby underlining his service to "the homeland". In early CDRN documentation, there was no mention of capitalist imperialism; instead, the group diplomatically positioned itself within the lineage

of France's great humanitarians and philanthropists. The respectable CDRN fired off letters to the President of the Republic and the Minister for the Colonies proclaiming their loyalty and devotion to France, and requesting financial and logistical support. In early October 1926, the Secretary General of the CDRN wrote to the French President asking him to support those who had given so much to France:

> We are asking France for a favour (indeed, we are asking all French people), for their support, in recognition of the blood shed on the battlefield . . . We are not engaging in politics by speaking about the rights of Negroes, for it was the French republic that first proclaimed them and it must now work to maintain them.[25]

The "blood debt" owed by France to its African troops is here invoked as a more general debt owed to all of France's black colonial subjects, a legacy of the First World War must thus be the improved treatment of France's African colonies and greater recognition for the rights of those black subjects, such as Senghor, who had remained in France after the conflict. However, the CAI archives reveal that this letter and other requests were met with silence by distrustful French authorities. There was discussion between colonial officials behind the scenes but no official response was ever given.

Fearful of the social and political consequences of its importation of millions of colonial soldiers and workers during the First World War, France had sought to repatriate them as soon as possible after the end of the conflict. However, the war had let the genie out of the bottle and the black population in metropolitan France, although it would remain small, was there to stay. The war also posed serious questions about France's colonial ideology of assimilation: the presence of so many culturally and racially different colonial subjects on French soil raised questions about the feasibility and/or desirability of attempting to assimilate millions of Africans into French culture. As Gary Wilder has illustrated, the interwar period saw French colonial administrators adopt a "colonial humanism" that was far more positive regarding the value of "native" cultures. This made assimilation appear less desirable as an outcome of the French imperial project and this would later prompt the likes of Léopold Sédar Senghor and Aimé Césaire to promote the notion of Negritude, as the valorisation of black cultural difference within the French imperial nation-state.[26] The cases of René

Maran and Kojo Tovalou Houénou (cited above) illustrate that calls for France to deliver on its stated aim of assimilation would not disappear but, in the aftermath of the war, the recognition of racial difference was now also firmly on the agenda.

As with many contemporary groups seeking equality for black people in France, the CDRN posited slavery and racism towards black people as a betrayal of Republican France (rather than a paradox inherent in the alleged universalism of the post-revolutionary nation). It is thus unsurprising that one of their first acts was to organise a procession in July 1926 to lay a wreath on the grave of Victor Schœlcher, the French abolitionist. Indeed a procession to Schœlcher's grave was the default gesture on which almost all black associations fell back at some point during this period. Far from the scathing attacks on imperialism found in *Le Paria*, the CDRN evoked the notion of "the Great Family of Man". Almost pleadingly, the group claimed that all they wanted was for "the Negro to be treated with a bit more humanity" and they proposed a set of concrete proposals for black community institutions: a museum, a library, a bar-restaurant, and a hostel.[27]

This might appear to situate the CDRN less within the frame of an emerging black internationalism and radical anti-colonialism than within the type of reformist assimilationism that critics have seen as the hallmark of black politics in France, especially in the 1920s. However, despite a (temporary) toning down of the radicalism that had marked the UIC, the CDRN continued to probe at the open wound of France's treatment of its African veterans. In the first issue of its newspaper, *La Voix des Nègres* [The Voice of the Negroes], an unsigned article focused on an issue dear to Lamine Senghor, namely the pensions awarded to the *tirailleurs*. In a litany of rhetorical questions—that begin with the title of the article, "Why are we treated as inferior?"—the author (who may well be Senghor) exposed the hypocrisy of France regarding the debt it owed to the *tirailleurs*:

> Why does a tirailleur sénégalais, wounded in the "Great War", now domiciled in France, receive a pension worth between 6 and 8 times less than that paid to a French veteran with the same injuries and adjudged to have the same level of invalidity? . . . Is the blood of a Negro not worth the same as that of a white man? Why was there equality when it came to responsibilities, but then two weights and two measures when rights were assessed?[28]

In what was perhaps a conscious echo of Shakespeare's Shylock ("Is the blood of a Negro not worth the same as that of a white man?"), Senghor revealed the racial prejudice that underlay supposedly dispassionate financial calculations. The article concluded in a fashion reminiscent of *Le Paria*—with a table comparing the pensions of the *tirailleurs* and French veterans.[29]

What is most original about the CDRN, however, as both Christopher Miller and Brent Hayes Edwards have shown in their meticulous analysis of CDRN writings, was its critical reflection on the language of race in its exploration of the modes of self-definition available to black people.[30] The CAI records indicate that there had been much internal discussion within the CDRN about whether to use the term *"noir"* or *"nègre"* in their title, and Lamine Senghor appeared to have played a decisive role in pushing the committee towards the latter term.

The two key newspaper articles in which Senghor articulated his ideas on the language of race were: "The Negroes have Awoken", published in *Le Paria* in April 1926, which constituted an intellectual "manifesto" announcing the creation of his new movement, and "The Word 'Negro'" from the first issue of *La Voix des Nègres*, published in January 1927. The latter article has received by far the greater critical attention, but, in fact, the two pieces are almost identical, the latter essentially a minor reworking of the former. This complicates the notion of the "racial" turn in Senghor's thinking as evidence of his complete disillusionment with communism: the publication of such an article in the columns of *Le Paria* makes it clear that in many respects the break with his former communist allies was only partial.

In "The Negroes have awoken", Senghor articulated a racial identity that was based not on shared racial characteristics but (as with the Islamic identity outlined in his article on the Rif War) on a shared sense of oppression:

> One of the great questions of our age is that of the awakening of the Negro . . . To be a Negro is to be exploited until one's last drop of blood has been spilt or to be transformed into a soldier defending the interests of capitalism against those who would dare try to stop its advance.[31]

The references to "one's last drop of blood" and "a soldier defending the interests of capitalism" clearly echoed Senghor's comments elsewhere equating exploitation in the colonies with the sacrifice of so many

African lives during the First World War. However, the call for "the awakening of the negro" was inspired by another context entirely. In 1926, such a call was immediately to evoke a set of ideas and a vocabulary that had been rendered popular by Marcus Garvey. In the course of his seemingly inexorable rise as a major leader of black America (until his conviction for mail fraud in 1925), Garvey had consistently called for the black world to wake from its long sleep, and his calls for black people to take pride in themselves had resonated around the world. Indeed, although not directly acknowledging his influence, the CDRN clearly owed a lot to Garvey—in terms of iconography (the shooting star in the naïve, romanticised image of Africa featured on the association's headed paper, and the black star of its official stamp) and of language, especially the repeated appeals to black pride and solidarity. Equally, Senghor and the CDRN rejected the elitism of the Jamaican's African-American rival W.E.B. Du Bois who argued that racial progress should be led by a "talented tenth" of black people. The influence of Garvey on black politics in interwar France has commonly been underplayed, as the general assimilationism that marks these French groups seems in many ways to be the antithesis of Garvey's identitarian discourse. Moreover the Jamaican's anti-communist stance meant that it would have been difficult for Senghor and other militants to embrace him openly (Garvey did meet black groups, although not the LDRN, successor to the CDRN, when he finally visited Paris late in 1928). However, from Kojo Tovalou Houénou to Lamine Senghor and later Césaire, Damas and Senghor, these black French activists were operating (consciously or not) within a discursive space opened up by Garvey. This was clearly visible when they argued for the dignity of "*le Nègre*" and called for the rejection of the white world's stereotypical and racist vision of the black world. This dialogue between Garvey and the militants of the CDRN should not come as a surprise, for as Brent Hayes Edwards has convincingly argued, the black movement of the interwar years is a resolutely transnational phenomenon in which translation (both literal and metaphorical) of ideas from one context to another plays a central role. Such translation can often appear as *mistranslation*, but, for Edwards, the translational and transnational nature of black diasporic practice inevitably highlights differences across black communities in the very process of seeking to imagine unity.

The most striking aspect of this transnational process of translation of Garvey's ideas is the CDRN's use of the term "*Nègre*" as a proud badge of self-identification, just as Garvey had proclaimed himself a "Negro"

(always with a capital 'N'). In an era when the term "*noir*" was widely gaining prominence as a more dignified replacement for "*nègre*", seen as derogatory and demeaning, Senghor and the CDRN deliberately choose "*Nègre*" as the term that encompasses all black people:

> It is our honour and our glory to call ourselves Negroes with a capital N. It is our Negro race that we wish to guide along the path towards its total liberation from the yoke of slavery. We want to impose the respect due to our race, as well as its equality with all of the other races of the earth; which is our right and our duty.[32]

According to Senghor, the "*nègre*" is an individual who has been downtrodden and oppressed through slavery, colonialism, and segregation. The terms "*noir*" and "*homme de couleur*" were, to him, seen merely as escape routes for educated blacks seeking a place in a dominant white society. The first step towards liberation is to embrace one's identity as a "*nègre*": for that allows one to perceive the true nature of Western oppression of the black world. The transnational black identity evoked here is, in sociological terms, "thin", that is, a strategic identity designed to create a coalition against empire. It was not until Negritude a decade later that a "thick" black identity, based on culture and philosophy would begin to be articulated.[33] Negritude would tie the celebration of difference into a reformist politics of empire but, for Lamine Senghor, one's identity as a "*nègre*", forged in the suffering of colonial exploitation or in the carnage of the battlefields of the First World War, could lead only to a radical anti-colonial politics.

The Dream of an Anti-imperialist Global Revolution

Despite the projection of a unified "Negro" community, dissent and conflict consistently undermined Lamine Senghor's efforts. Even as the first issue of the CDRN's newspaper, *La Voix des Nègres*, proudly and insistently proclaimed the unity of "*les nègres*", the CDRN was in fact in the middle of a long and protracted schism that would several months later lead to the break-up of the organisation with Senghor and his fellow radicals deserting en masse to create the *Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre*. In the midst of the CDRN in-fighting, Lamine Senghor enjoyed one final moment of glory, which sealed his reputation as the leading black anti-colonialist of his day, when he was invited to speak at the inaugural

meeting of the League against Imperialism (LAI) in Brussels, held between February 10 and 14, 1927.[34] The LAI was largely a communist initiative—the main organiser was Willi Münzenberg, the famous "red millionaire" and communist deputy to the Reichstag.[35] However in its initial phase it sought to rally all anti-colonial forces together (a realisation of the Comintern's 1924 call for alliances between communist and nationalists that would within a year of Brussels be superseded by a shift to the promotion of class-versus-class struggle). In his speech at the Congress, Lamine Senghor, liberated from the moderation that had marked most of his contributions to the CDRN, launched into a vehement attack on imperialism as a renewed form of slavery: Imperialism cannot hope to bring civilisation to the colonies for it is an inherently unjust system of domination. Senghor denounced the cruel treatment of the colonised, the violence, forced labour and, yet again, the iniquity and double standards of the pensions paid to colonial veterans of the First World War:

> You have all seen that, during the war, as many Negroes as possible were recruited and led off to be killed . . . The Negro is now more clear-sighted. We know and are deeply aware that, when we are needed, to lay down our lives or do hard labour, then we are French; but when it's a question of giving us rights, we are no longer French, we are Negroes.[36]

The speech was a huge success not solely in the Congress hall but around the world. W.E.B. Du Bois's *The Crisis* reported Senghor's words approvingly in its July 1927 edition, the author having discovered a translation of the speech in the May 15 edition of *The Living Age*.[37] In a fascinating article published just a few months after the Congress, Roger Baldwin, the director of the American Civil Liberties Union, cited Senghor as one of the most eminent of the "men without a homeland", those political exiles who had made Paris their home.[38] In the final stages of the Congress, the LAI placed Senghor at the head of the working party asked to draft the "Resolution on the negro question" and the finished document bore all the hallmarks of his fiery rhetoric.[39] Little more than two years after his first public appearance, this young man from Senegal had managed to carve out a position as a radical spokesman not only for black people in France but also internationally.

The final highpoint in Lamine Senghor's career was the publication of *La Violation d'un pays* (The Rape of a Land). This slim volume of about 30 pages related in polemical fashion the bloody history of slavery and

colonialism. Sometimes described as a brochure or pamphlet, it is in fact a deeply hybrid text that mixes the form of the fable (it even begins with the traditional "once upon a time" opening) with a highly didactic approach, utilising the political language of revolutionary communism. The text is also accompanied by five simple line drawings designed to reinforce the political message. The text concluded with the overthrow of the colonial regime by a world revolution that liberated not only the colonies but also the metropolitan centre from the yoke of capitalist imperialism:

> The same day, at the same time, in the land of the [darker nations], the revolution erupted in concert with the white citizens . . . The slaves were free! The citizens of every country were able to form their own government. They formed a fraternal alliance of free countries. LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION!!![40]

This resolution to the story would prove unrealistic in the context of the 1920s in Africa but it acted within the context of Senghor's story as a form of ideological wish fulfilment: we might usefully describe it as the "performance" of an international anti-colonialism.

Whatever conclusions we draw about the resolution of the text, *La Violation d'un pays* is a remarkable work that attempted for the first time under the French imperial nation-state to give narrative form to the independence of the colonised world. Some historians of the period, such as Philippe Dewitte, have argued that independence was pretty much "unthinkable" in the 1920s, but the case of Lamine Senghor illustrates that the desire to overthrow Empire was fostered by many on the radical fringes of colonial society, even if the means to achieve independence escaped them. Senghor's suffering on the battlefields of the First World War lent an urgency to his critiques of empire: the likes of Blaise Diagne and René Maran, far from the cottonfields and the battlefields, might call for the long-term reform of colonialism but the downtrodden "*nègre*" could not wait for such incremental improvements. The anti-colonial movements of the interwar period are often dismissed as failures on the basis that their militancy did not lead to independence. However, as Frederick Cooper, the renowned historian of Francophone Africa, has argued in another context: "the failure . . . is explainable, but explainable does not mean that failure was inevitable and that the attempt is a minor detour along the path of history".[41] The movement created by Lamine Senghor did not achieve success in his time but that does not mean we should simply write it off as a failure,

for as Gary Wilder reminds us: "Insofar as political imagination pivots around historical reflection, it requires us not only to examine the paths that led us to our present but to remember futures that might have been".[42]

Within a month of the publication of *La Violation d'un pays*, Senghor's health faltered, and he would pass away just a few months later. The anti-colonial cause lost one of its most prominent figures and it is debatable whether the black community in France has ever known a more effective political leader. The issue of France's blood debt to its colonies would remain a source of division throughout the interwar period and would of course become a key component in the challenge to Empire that occurred after the Second World at the end of which France was famously liberated (in part) by its colonies. An engagement with the black radicalism of the 1920s, embodied in the career of Lamine Senghor, helps us to understand better the role of the First World War in sowing the seeds of the Empire's ultimate demise. Anti-colonial thought of that later period often imagined France's colonial troops as stooges of empire. However, as a former veteran, Senghor knew that the *tirailleurs* were both agents of empire and its victims.

Notes

1. Tyler Stovall, "Love, Labor and Race: Colonial Men and White Women in France During the Great War," in *French Civilization and Its Discontents: Nationalism, Colonialism, Race*, eds. Tyler Stovall and Georges van den Abbeele (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2003). See also Richard S. Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914–1918* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008) for an influential analysis of the social significance of France's use of colonial troops during the war, and David Murphy, "Love, Trauma and War: the *tirailleurs sénégalais* and sexual-racial politics in 1920s France," *Irish Journal of French Studies* 13 (2013).
2. See, for example, Santanu Das, ed., *Race, Empire and First World War Writing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) and David Olusoga, *The World's War* (London: Head of Zeus, 2014). The Olusoga volume is a companion to his two-part BBC series of the same name, screened in August 2014.
3. Fogarty, *Race and War in France*; Joe Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom: A Senegalese Oral History of World War One* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann; Oxford: James Currey, 1993); Gregory Mann, *Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Stovall, 'Love, Labor and Race'.

4. Two key early texts on this subject are Philippe Dewitte, *Les Mouvements nègres en France 1919–39* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1985); Olivier Sagna, "Des Pionniers méconnus de l'indépendance: Africains, Antillais et luttes anticolonialistes dan la France de l'entre-deux-guerres (1919–39)" (PhD diss., Université Paris VII, 1986). Important recent scholarship includes Jonathan Derrick, *Africa's 'Agitators': Militant Anti-Colonialism in Africa and the West, 1918–39* (London: Hurst, 2008) and Jennifer Anne Boittin, *Colonial Metropolis: The Urban Grounds of Anti-imperialism and Feminism in Interwar Paris* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010). Minkah Malakani, *In the Cause of Freedom: Radical Black Internationalism from Harlem to London, 1917–1939* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011) looks at this radicalism in a wider Atlantic context.
5. For a brilliant account of this landmark trial see Alice L. Conklin, "Who Speaks for Africa? The René Maran-Blaise Diagne Trial in 1920s Paris," in *The Color of Liberty: Histories of Race in France*, eds. Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).
6. See René Maran, *Batoaula: véritable roman nègre* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1921).
7. The most comprehensive overview of African participation in the First World War is to be found in Marc Michel's *Les Africains et la grande guerre: l'appel à l'Afrique (1914–1918)*, 2nd edition (Paris: Karthala, 2003), whose first edition appeared in the early 1980s.
8. The best account of Diagne's career remains G. Wesley Johnson's *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle for Power in the Four Communes, 1900–1920* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971).
9. "Un procès nègre" [A Negro Trial] in Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays et autres écrits anticolonialistes* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012), 33–34. All translations are mine.
10. Sagna, *Des Pionniers méconnus*, 311.
11. See Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 79–80.
12. Flyer for UIC meeting, March 1925, Archives Nationales d'outre-mer (ANOM), Slotfom 3, Carton 3.
13. "En A.O.F.—Le travail forcé pour les indigènes," in Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 40.
14. Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 40.
15. For an overview of the campaign against the war, see David H. Slavin, "The French Left and the Rif War, 1924–25: Racism and the Limits of Internationalism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 26:1 (1991).
16. Gregory Mann has studied the ways in which a shared experience of the battlefield had the potential to bring French and African veterans together. See Mann, *Native Sons*. The possibility that ARAC played a role in forging

bonds between left-wing French and African militants is a topic worthy of further exploration.

17. When Abd el-Krim won a remarkable victory over the Spanish colonial army in September 1924, Doriot and Pierre Semard sent a congratulatory telegram on behalf of the *Jeunesses communistes* (published on the front page of *L'Humanité* the following day), which expressed the wish that "after its definitive victory over Spanish imperialism, the people of the Rif will continue, together with the French and European proletariat, the struggle against all imperialists, until Moroccan soil has been fully liberated". See Doriot and Pierre Semard, "Le Parti Communiste franc□ais unanime fe□licite Abd-el-Krim pour ses succe□s," *L'Humanité*, September 11, 1924, cited in Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 121. Doriot's notoriety increased when he suggested in parliament on February 4, 1925 that French troops in Morocco desert rather than fight their "proletarian" brothers in the Rif.
18. "Les Riffains ne sont pas seuls—Ils ont avec eux le monde des opprimés," in Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 35.
19. Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 36.
20. Ibid.
21. Given that France had forgotten this gratitude within six years of the decision to build the mosque it is unsurprising that this is a part of the historical record that is rarely dusted off in contemporary debates about secularism in France.
22. See, for example, John D. Hargreaves, "The Comintern and Anti-colonialism: New Research Opportunities," *African Affairs* 92 (1993): 261. Dewitte's *Les Mouvements nègres* and Sagna's *Des Pionniers méconnus* are also very critical of the PCF.
23. Dewitte, *Les Mouvements nègres*, 109.
24. The full title of the Service de Contrôle et d'Assistance aux Indigènes (generally known as the CAI) indicated its twin mission to police (*contrôle*) and to assist (*assistance*) the 'indigenous' populations from the colonies resident in France; however, the primary, unspoken mission of the CAI was to carry out surveillance on colonial subjects.
25. See Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 92.
26. Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
27. Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 43–46.
28. Ibid., 53.
29. An article in the first issue of *La Race Nègre*, June 1927, the successor to *La Voix des Nègres*, "Réponse d'un ancien tirailleur sénégalais à M. Paul Boncour" deploys a different method to give voice to African war veterans.

Written in the first person in the '*petit nègre*' [pidgin French] taught to its *tirailleurs* by the French army, the article allows a (real or imagined) *tirailleur* to tell his story in his own terms. See Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 104–105. The emerging anti-colonialism of the period consistently used statistics and other information provided by the colonial system to denounce the injustice of that very system.

30. Christopher L. Miller, *Nationalists and Nomads: Essays on Francophone African Literature and Culture* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998); Brent Hayes Edwards, *The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation and the Rise of Black Internationalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
31. Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 41. Once again, Senghor links military service for Africans as part of a continuum linked to other forms of colonial exploitation.
32. Ibid., 43.
33. As Senghor believed that only the independence of the colonies and liberation from the white man could bring freedom and equality for '*les nègres*', this meant that there could be no liberty within the western colonial system. His articles for *Le Paria* envisaged a colour-blind community bound together by communist ideals, and the revolutionary conclusion to his most sustained piece of writing, the allegorical *La Violation d'un pays* (1927), might be deemed an attempt to imagine a multiracial future in the post-imperial world. However, as he wrote in the article "Ce qu'est notre Comité de Défense de la Race Nègre" in the first issue of *La Voix des Nègres*: "Negroes are not of any European nationality and do not wish to serve the interests of one imperialism against another". Under empire, black people cannot and will not be French. Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 47.
34. Generally known as the LAI, the League's full title was the League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression.
35. Sean McMeekin, *The Red Millionaire: A Political Biography of Willi Münzenberg, Moscow's Secret Propaganda Tsar in the West* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).
36. Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 61 and 63.
37. "The Browsing Reader," *The Crisis* (July 1927), 160; "A Black Man's Protest," *The Living Age,* 332:4306, May 15, 1927, 866–868.
38. Roger Baldwin, "The Capital of the Men without a Country," *The Survey*, August 1, 1927, 460–468.
39. The situation of blacks in Africa, the Caribbean and the Americas were brought together within a history of oppression dating back five centuries: "For almost five centuries, the negro peoples of the world have been victimised and cruelly oppressed". Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 63. The unity of all '*nègres*' and all colonised would finally bring such oppression

to an end. The July 1927 issue of *The Crisis*, mentioned above, published a long extract from the "General Resolution on the Negro Question" in its "The Far Horizon" section, 165–166.

40. Senghor, *La Violation d'un pays*, 29–30.
41. Frederick Cooper, "From Imperial Inclusion to Republican Exclusion? France's Ambiguous Postwar Trajectory," in *Frenchness and the African Diaspora: Identity and Uprising in Contemporary France*, eds. Charles Tshimanga, Didier Gondola, and Peter J. Bloom (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 117.
42. See Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 13. For a more in-depth analysis of these issues in relation to Lamine Senghor, see David Murphy, "Success and Failure: Frantz Fanon and Lamine Senghor as (False) Prophets of Decolonization," *Nottingham French Studies* 54:1 (2015).

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CHAPTER 9

Memory, Storytelling and Minorities: A Case Study of Jews in Britain and the First World War

Tony Kushner

Given the importance of the subject matter, it is surprising, as scholar of nationalism, Anthony Smith highlighted that "Although there is a vast literature both on ethnic groups and on warfare, scholars have devoted little systematic attention to their interrelation".[1] Smith's seminal overview on war and ethnicity was published in 1981. There have been many excellent individual studies since then and the contributions to this volume reveal the progress that has been made in the world of history.[2] But, in the theoretical realm, what Smith termed a "serious omission" in the literature has only been partly confronted by those working either in the field of war and society or within ethnic, racial and migrant studies other than in relation to genocide and mass murder. One exception is the work of Daniele Conversi, which engages with and critiques that of Ernest Geller on the nature of nationalism, adding militarism to our understanding of this complex subject. But whilst Conversi builds on the work of Smith, his focus is not largely on minority experiences and perspectives with regard to militarism and war-making.[3]

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In *John Bull's Island* (1988), the first detailed history of immigration in modern Britain, Colin Holmes observed that the First World War "in common with other wars . . . exercised a significant impact on the lives of immigrants and refugees. Even so, historians have neglected such matters".[4] Commenting five years later in the introduction to the *Minorities in Wartime* collection, which focused on Europe, North America and Australia, Panikos Panayi noted that such studies still remained "relatively few, despite both the expansion of ethnic history and the growth of the study of war and society".[5]

Despite this stimulus, subsequent to Panayi's collection, works of synthesis (as opposed to detailed case studies relating to war and ethnicity) have been sadly lacking.[6] In his introductory essay in *Minorities in Wartime*, Panayi highlighted different perspectives depending on "whether we take a sociological or historical approach".[7] With regards to the latter, the desire for a more inclusive study of the past, which is already been made manifest in the treatment of the First World War, has led to the recovery of minority contributions and, to a lesser extent, responses to such groups from the dominant society. Such work can be challenging, requiring skilled research to rediscover lost voices, but also face the task of avoiding the danger of celebratory "contribution history".

A century on from the First World War and we are at a key stage of restoring a past diversity that for many years has been regarded as either embarrassing or of no particular significance or value, other than to the minority groups concerned. To give an example, the author researched an article on the 250,000 Belgian refugees in Britain during the First World War that was published in 1999 and remained un-cited and obscure for its first 14 years in the public domain—even though it outlined what was the largest such movement in British history.[8] But, since the First World War centenary commemorations began, its rediscovery has led to interest from a variety of radio stations across England to help contextualise why there were so many Belgians present locally during the war. It was used by Hampshire County Council, which put together an exhibition, website and video on the subject and by national BBC Radio for an extended drama on life in Folkestone—the major port of arrival of the Belgian refugees. In many cases this interest after a century of amnesia reflects nothing more than a desire to make sense of a presence in the archive that had previously been ignored but that now fascinates an audience more sensitive to the pluralistic nature of the not so distant past.

If we are thus at the building block stage, with an increasingly strong foundation in the *historical* study of war and minorities, the same cannot be said for either military studies or ethnic and racial studies. For the former, in its unreconstructed form, it is simply not a subject of interest or importance in what still has strong remnants of the "great men school of history" approach. When reconstructed, there has been progress, as with the historical profession more generally, in a less elitist framework, confronting the experiences of ordinary soldiers, non-combatants, women, and, to a lesser extent, ethnic minorities. Overall, however, war studies remains one of the least progressive areas of the humanities and social science.[9]

But more surprising is the lacunae in the field of ethnic and racial studies in relation to the study of war. Fredrik Barth's classic collection, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (1969), does not explicitly mention war once. This absence is worthy of greater attention. Barth is insistent on the crucial fact that

> boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them... categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories.[10]

The study of war would surely provide the perfect forum for the exploration of the nature of such boundaries and the processes of exclusion and incorporation. But it is not just Barth who neglects this field—it is also absent in Anthias and Yuval-Davis' *Racialized Boundaries* (1992) and all subsequent major volumes providing a synthesis or cutting edge approach in the field of ethnic and racial studies. Why is this the case?

The critical factor is the present-centred nature of such research in which history is regarded as of minor significance. Linked to this is the focus on colonial and postcolonial contexts in which non-colonial minorities are not considered as relevant, as the discourse related to them is perceived as fundamentally different and non-comparable. The sub-title of the Anthias and Yuval-Davis study reveals what *is* regarded as relevant of study: *race, nation, gender, colour and class and the anti-racist struggle*. Of course, all of these themes are especially prominent in wartime. Yet studying how they operate in times of armed conflict would require a full

engagement with the past. Over 30 years later, there is, beyond Conversi's intervention within *nationalism* studies, no major attempt to either challenge or develop Anthony Smith's attempt to create sociology of war and ethnicity.

What this contribution aims to do is add another way of studying the subject from a different disciplinary, or interdisciplinary perspective. It is one, I will argue, which is of critical importance when confronting the new historical research that is fast emerging on war and minorities. The emphasis is on one element within the many complex and interrelated factors at work—the importance of memory and storytelling.

"Martial Race" Theory and the Writing of Minorities in Wartime

After conflict, ethnic and other minority war efforts have sometimes been rewarded with enhanced settlements, independence/self-rule and citizenship as well as collective remembrance of the sacrifices made. There have been, however, alternative forces at work. In the twentieth century, vested interests, including the organised labour movement, have often tried to insist on a return to the pre-war status quo and a reversal of the gains made by former "outsiders" whether defined by race, nationality, gender, age, disability or sexuality. Moreover, official commemoration and grassroots memory work has often been partial, leading to an amnesia of the contributions made by such groups. Indeed, denial of the shared war effort and loss helped facilitate post-conflict exclusion from the workplace, places of residence, relationships with "local" women and even the right to remain in the country itself. It is for this reason that battles over the *memory* of war have been so intense and emotionally loaded. The stakes—essentially the entitlement to be a national member—British, German, French and so on—and both legally and culturally—have been and continue to be high. Thus for migrant groups especially, great energy has been expended in recovering and celebrating military contributions to the "host" nation, whether in the recent or *distant* past. Underlying such efforts has been a desire to prove the right to belong and to partake equally in post-war social, political and economic settlements, a theme that will be explored as the chapter develops.

What follows is an exploration and analysis of the interplay between history and memory utilising a case study of British Jewry, especially in relation to the First World War. As Geoff Eley notes, destabilizing the

"customary approach to conceptualizing boundary between 'memory' and 'history', where the one used to be straightforwardly the professional organizing and contextualizing of the other" can be "extremely fruitful".[11] Here the role of myths in constructing narratives of war and the nation will receive special attention following the work of Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson. These innovative scholars have chastised the historical profession for its "persistent blindness to myth [which] undeniably robs us of our power to understand and interpret the past". In relation to the exercise of power and of particular relevance here, they add that

> whether at the ballot box or on the battlefield... national myths and the sense of national history which they help to build also raise fundamental questions of just who belongs and who does not. Time and again, in rallying solidarity, they also exclude, and persecute the excluded.[12]

Perhaps the strongest myth that appears throughout the confrontation of war and minorities is that of the *Damnosa Hereditas* or "martial race" theory. Building on earlier national, racial, ethnic and religious stereotypes and discourses of masculinity, it was formalised in elite British military circles following the shock of the Indian mutiny in 1857 and had a currency in other western nation states. As Anthony Kirk-Greene argues, "a feeling that certain ethnic groups made 'good' soldiers while others had shown their loyalty to be unreliable grew from a hunch into a principle".[13] With the expansion of the British Empire in the late nineteenth century, the theory was exported from India into the recruitment and usage of suitable "native" tribal groups in Africa.[14] And by the twentieth century, as Joanna Bourke has illustrated in *An Intimate History of Killing* (1999), "More than any other indicator, scientific racism was employed to identify the best combatants".[15]

Bourke quotes the Irish journalist, Michael MacDonagh who wrote in the latter part of the First World War that

> Each nationality evolves its own type of soldier... As troops... are the counterpart of the nations from which they spring... so they must... reveal in fighting the particular sort of martial spirit possessed by their race.[16]

MacDonagh produced two books in close succession on the Irish contribution to the war effort. It was only the second, *The Irish on the Somme* (1917), which specifically referred to the "racial environment" accounting,

he believed, for the attributes of the Irish soldier. But the idea ran through his earlier narrative and was made explicit in the introduction provided by the Irish Nationalist politician, John Redmond. The MP stated proudly that "The war has brought into view again what had been somewhat obscured of late: the military qualities of the Irish race".[17]

These particular examples and why MacDonagh and Redmond were so desirous of proving the capability of Irish soldiers on the western front reflected the unique dynamics of the wider relationship between Britain and Ireland. What is important here is that a wide range of groups by the modern era was deemed either suitable or unsuitable military material. So deep has the idea of the *Damnosa Hereditas* been entrenched, however, that it made its mark beyond the *selection* of soldiers and their usage. It has also impacted on the subsequent *narration* of war—at an official level in justifying racial discrimination in relation to military effectiveness and within the groups themselves in challenging past assumptions. At both a scholarly and a popular level in the construction of history and heritage the mid-nineteenth century notion of *Damnosa Hereditas* has been employed well into the twentieth century to explain the "success" or "failure" of particular groups in battle. In every group of migrant origin to be studied, and responses to them, discourses of manliness and effeminacy, refracted through race and nation, have shaped and continue to shape understanding of their role in battle.

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to what Smith calls "the direct and indirect impacts of war on ethnic and national consciousness and imagery".[18] The aim will not be simply to provide a history of the military contribution of a particular minority group—substantial though it was. Instead, it will explore which elements have been the subject of attention in the evolution of British Jewish historiography and wider memory work, analysing the politics of inclusion that have underpinned the writings and representations of the narratives constructed and reconstructed. It is not a trivial pursuit. As Samuel and Thompson note "for minorities, for the less powerful, and most of all for the excluded, collective memory and myth are often still more salient [than for the dominant]: constantly resorted to both in reinforcing a sense of self and also as a source of strategies for survival".[19]

For the minorities themselves, it is therefore a complex task to identify the space to operate within the national story—one that is constantly subject to change and contestation. As Homi Bhabha notes in *Nation*

and Narration (1990): "The 'locality' of national culture is neither unified nor unitary in relation to itself, nor must it be seen simply as 'other' in relation to what is outside or beyond it". He adds that

> The boundary is Janus-faced and the problem of outside/inside must always itself be a process of hybridity, incorporating new "people" in relation to the body politic, generating other sites of meaning and . . . producing unmanned sites of political antagonism and unpredictable forces for political representation.[20]

In times of war some cultural-political borders become open and others utterly impermeable. It has led to the varying strategies that have been employed by those of migrant origin and the contestation of the past *within* such minorities. What follows reveals the intricacies and compromises involved in the desire to obtain membership within the nation, as well as the acute pain and hurt of omission from it. Yet identity is rarely straightforward and uncontested. Individual as well as group identities and loyalties are multi-layered, often confused and contradictory and frequently subject to change as Bhabha emphasises. The question of belonging is constantly negotiated, challenged and contested within and outside the groups concerned.

Memory Battles: The Jews of Britain and the First World War

Cecil Roth's Presidential lecture to the Jewish Historical Society of England in the autumn of 1940 provides a neat starting point for wider issues concerning migrants and warfare in the British past in the realm of memory.[21] Published as a pamphlet, it offers a blatant example of instrumentalising history: the needs of the present were in mind as much as, if not more so than the desire to study the past for its own sake. It was produced in conjunction with the Board of Deputies of British Jews, which was responsible for producing a multitude of Jewish defence materials during the Nazi era.[22] Delivered in "this grim hour of crisis", Roth's contribution was, on the one hand, a call to civic duty and an exercise in ethnic pride for its Jewish audience and, on the other, for wider circulation, a propaganda weapon to set the record straight regarding the "Jews in the Defence of Britain".[23]

Roth's "enemies" at home were both historical and contemporary. With regard to the former, he singled out the English poet George Crabbe who had written in *The Borough* (1810):

> Nor War nor Wisdom yields our Jews delight
> They will not study, and they dare not fight.[24]

As a Church of England minister, Crabbe's "Religious Conservatism" was certainly present in this work, which contrasted in a derogatory manner the Jewish figures of the Bible with those in Georgian England:

> *Jews* are with us, but far unlike to those,
> Who, led by *David*, warr'd with *Israel's* Foes[25]

But Roth would have been equally concerned that the poem was constructed and published during the Napoleonic Wars. It has been suggested that Crabbe was "obdurately refusing to lay a prejudice that had far less currency than it might have only fifty years before".[26] Yet the animosity that Jews in Britain faced during the period of the French Revolutionary Wars (1793–1802) and Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) and the difficulty they had in being accepted as volunteers because of concern over their ultimate loyalty and fighting prowess, suggested otherwise.[27] Indeed, that Crabbe's verses were still causing hurt some 130 years later highlights the persistence of assumptions about the fighting abilities of the modern "Jewish race".

In terms of the latter, Roth's historical polemic was more indirect. In the First World War, British Jewry had been (and was now again at the point at which Roth gave his lecture) accused of war shirking, cowardice and profiteering.[28] Apologetically, Roth argued more generally that "to point out that to consider the military ability of the Jew negligible, is not only erroneous but is in diametrical opposition to the facts". Roth tried to meld the idea of *Damnosa Hereditas* to champion his particular ethno-religious group by emphasising a Jewish martial record from the Bible onwards.[29] In this he was following the Chief Rabbi of the British Empire, Joseph Hertz, who announced at the start of the First World War that

> In this solemn crisis of our nation's life . . . all my Jewish brethren will . . . fully realise the supreme duty of the hour. Once more will we prove that the old

> Maccabean spirit is still alive among us. We will offer our lives to defend Great Britain's ideals of justice and humanity![30]

Hertz's starting point was antiquity and a semi-mythical Jewish past. More specifically, Roth used his local knowledge to construct an "Anglo-Jewish military tradition" from the medieval period onwards. In attempting a deep history through thick description, Roth pointed towards the Jews who defended the Tower of London during the Barons' Wars in the 1260s.[31] Then, to enable continuity, he provided examples of Marranos who maintained the Anglo-Jewish military tradition in the centuries following expulsion from England in 1290, one that Roth stressed was continued after the formal readmission of the Jews in the mid-seventeenth century.[32]

Jews were excluded from commissions in the Army and Navy through the stipulation of Christian oaths of obedience until the second half of the nineteenth century and the slow process of political and civic emancipation. Nevertheless, Roth pointed out how non-converted Jews continued to serve, especially in the Royal Navy, including those who fought under Nelson during the French Revolutionary Wars. Where there was not clear evidence, Roth was still keen to show the possibility of presence in iconic moments of British history:

> In the Trafalgar Roll of *Victory* there is more than one name... which perhaps indicates Jewish birth. Family traditions, moreover, tell of other Jews who fought at Trafalgar[33]

It is also revealing of what Roth omitted. Using a comparative approach, Derek Penslar notes that across the Atlantic, American and Canadian Jews in equivalent literature around the time of the Second World War employed an "eclectic and capacious definition of military heroism". In contrast, Roth's more apologetic work did not "breathe a word about the great Jewish banking families' historic contributions to England's victories, dating back to Nathan Mayer Rothschild during the Napoleonic wars".[34]

Roth dominated Anglo-Jewish historiography from the 1930s through to the 1960s but after he died in 1970 his more recent successors have continued the quest to prove a Jewish connection to Nelson and his famous battle of 1805. As Trafalgar has become a crucial moment in forging the "island story" the desire to be included within this narrative

of military prowess and national/imperial "greatness" has been powerful. In his 1989 prize-winning study of the Royal Navy and Anglo-Jewry in the Georgian era, Geoffrey Green notes that in the Muster Roll of the *Victory* Moses Benjamin was "Discharged from the service on order of Lord Nelson agreeable to order from the Lord commissioners of the Admiralty . . . [he] being a Jew". Green adds that "In fact the order was not complied with before the *Victory* left Portsmouth . . . He was therefore at the battle . . . ".[35]

Whilst belief in the idea of "martial" and "non-martial" races was beginning to wane by the Second World War, it had far from disappeared.[36] Roth was therefore anxious to show that Jews were not by nature adverse to armed conflict and displaying bravery. His goal was thus to challenge wider discourse in popular culture that still constructed the Jewish man as effeminate and cowardly.[37] To bolster his argument, Roth referred to the memoirs of George Sanger, *Seventy Years a Showman* (1908), where "an account is given of a couple of Jewish performers, Israel and Benjamin Hart, who were pressed for service on *Pompey* [at the time of the French Revolutionary War] and turned out to be good sailors and brave fighting-men".[38] The phrase "turned out" suggests that Roth appears nearly as surprised in the outcome of this anecdote as was the original source. Roth thus partly internalised the image of the Jewish man as feminised and timid even though he himself had fought in the British army during the First World War.[39] Such self-doubt can be located elsewhere within world Jewry, especially in the earlier part of the twentieth century. When Isador Straus, the American Jewish department store owner died on the *Titanic* in April 1912, refusing the offer of a lifeboat, his New York rabbi pronounced "Now when we are asked, 'Can a Jew die bravely?', there is an answer written in the annals of time".[40]

With such defensiveness apparent in the years immediately preceding 1914, it is not surprising that the imperative to provide evidence of loyalty and sacrifice to bolster ethnic pride and challenge wider perceptions was even more to the fore in the First World War than was to be the case in the later global conflict. In 1922, an extensive and lavish publication, the *British Jewry Book of Honour*, was produced, edited by the former Jewish army chaplain, Reverend Michael Adler.[41] The book included endorsements by prominent figures, including the Chief Rabbi. Recognition, argued Joseph Hertz, was owed to the "brave sons of Israel who so gladly gave their lives that Freedom and Righteousness prevail". British Jewry

had a duty to make sure that "their names shall not be blotted out nor the memory of their heroic deeds forgotten". Hertz was equally anxious to ensure that

> This permanent written record of the part played by Anglo-Jewry in the Great War will help lovers of the Truth in their warfare against the malicious slander that the Jew shrinks from the sacrifices demanded of every loyal citizen in the hour of national danger.[42]

In addition, the volume emphasised the imperial dimension to the British Jewish war effort: "From all corners of the British Empire they came. From South Africa, from Canada, from Australia and New Zealand, they came in their thousands".[43] Outside endorsement also came from those of high office, including Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War. Churchill let the (clearly scripted for him) facts "speak for themselves":

> Although Jews form but a small proportion of the population of the British Empire, some 60,000 fought in the War in Europe, Africa and Asia. Of these, 2,324 gave their lives for the Cause and a further 6,350 became casualties. Five Jewish soldiers won the highest honour it is possible to obtain in our country, namely the Victoria Cross, while a further 1,533 obtained other honours.

He concluded that this record was a "great one" and that British Jews could "look back with pride on the honourable part they played in winning the Great War".[44] Much of the *British Jewry Book of Honour* was devoted to listing those who had served (and particularly the fallen) and the recognition they had been awarded.[45] As David Cesarani notes, as early as September 1914 the *Jewish Chronicle* had introduced an "Honour Record", and to refute allegations of "Jewish 'shirking'... published a special War Issue in November 1915".[46]

The conclusion to this impressive gathering of detail was both firm in its message and revealing of wider concerns: "By this record of patriotism and sacrifice, British Jewry will be judged in years to come, and there need be no fear as to the verdict that will be pronounced". If the Jew of the British Empire had been on trial, they had shown that they had risen to the challenge and taken their place "side by side with his compatriots of all other creeds and nationalities".[47]

Exposing the marginality and sense of conditional acceptance, the elite authors of the book of honour were insistent that "British Jews have vindicated, once and for all time, their right to British citizenship. They have proved in an unmistakable manner that they are part and parcel of the Empire". A storyline that started with the arrival of foreign Jews from the seventeenth century onwards had now been provided with a suitable and gratifying conclusion. The virtues of their descendants were rewarded with full civic rights during the mid-nineteenth century. Yet if "Great Britain was the first country in the world completely to emancipate the Jews", the chance "to justify that emancipation did not come for sixty years". When it did arrive, however, in August 1914, "the opportunity was seized with a spontaneity and enthusiasm that surprised even those who knew the loyalty of the British Jews".[48] Here was a graphic illustration of the wider tendency identified by Derek Penslar:

> From the beginnings of conscription in the late 1700s until the end of the Second World War, military service was of enormous concern to Jews throughout the world. Advocates for Jewish rights presented the Jewish soldier as proof that Jews were worthy of emancipation and social acceptance.[49]

In an editorial "Jews Respond", published on 14 August 1914 and much reproduced thereafter, the *Jewish Chronicle* argued that "In such an hour it is but natural that we in this country should recollect and be inspired by the thought that 'England has been all she could be to Jews', and should determine that 'Jews will be all they can be to England'".[50] Fifteen months later, in its special "War Issue" the self-professed "organ of Anglo-Jewry" returned to this theme: "Upon these words the Jews of England and the Empire have never gone back".[51] The *Book of Honour* created a fresh opportunity to reflect further on the satisfaction gained on more than meeting a patriotic obligation.

Here was a clear example of what has been labelled the "emancipation contract" among Jews, the British state and society. Analysis of its informal workings has been most persuasively provided by Bill Williams in his study of the liberal city *par excellence*, Manchester. There and elsewhere, argues Williams, from the Victorian era onwards, "Jews were validated not on the grounds of their Jewish identity, but on the basis of their conformity to the values and manners of bourgeois English society".[52] Nowhere more obviously were these values to be expressed by patriotism and service during war. It would take several generations before there was recognition

of alternative actors and voices within British Jewry during the First World War. These included the many thousands of East European origin who wanted no part in what they saw as an unnecessary conflict and one in which Britain was on the same side as the hated Tsarist Empire.[53]

By a critical examination of the statistics, Mark Levene provides a very different narrative to that produced by the *British Jewry Book of Honour* and parroted by Churchill:

> Put another way, the Jewish war record would run thus: for the 10,000 [Russian Jews of military age] who voluntarily enlisted before the Military Service Act of 1916, there were twice as many who hid or made themselves scarce, or who were exempted mostly because they were genuinely unfit, and a further 30,000 who served because the state demanded it of them.[54]

Even more controversial were the Jewish conscientious objectors who suffered for their convictions.[55] As Levene adds, what is interesting and revealing is not so much the "actual record" during the First World War but the energy placed in creating what "became received wisdom for later generations of British Jewry". Indeed, it was a version of the past instrumentalised by both assimilationists and Zionists. With reference to the latter, Levene points out that Vladimir Jabotinsky's account of the Jewish Legion, formed by the War Office in 1917, combined patriotism with an attempt "to legimate the Zionist claim to Palestine".[56]

Freed from communal restraints and more self-confident in a self-consciously plural society, a new generation of historians from the 1980s onwards recovered aspects of British Jewish experience in times of conflict previously "swept under the carpet". It included the life story of Arnold Harris, born in Lithuania and raised in Jewish Whitechapel, who in his (significantly unpublished) memoirs admitted that during the First World War he had been determined not to "surrender to the call-up, not for ideological reasons but out of plain fear".[57] Harris's autobiographical praxis, however, remained in the private domain until unearthed by Levene. The dominant narrative told by British Jewry to itself and to a wider audience continues to emphasise sacrifice and service rewarded by civic and social recognition. Geoffrey Green thus concludes his survey of Jews and the Royal Navy by noting that "A small contribution had been made by the Jews in their connections with the Royal Navy towards the wider aspirations of the Anglo-Jewish community. The beginning of the

quest for emancipation of British Jewry was not far away".[58] Similarly, the Jewish Military Museum in North West London, which opened in 2005 to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the ending of the Second World War and was melded into the London Jewish Museum in 2015, displayed artefacts from "proud British serving Jews". It offered "up fascinating evidence of the patriotic contribution given by Jewish men and women, who fought in so many of the major conflicts in British military history"—including the Battles of Waterloo and Trafalgar.[59]

The strategy of the Jewish Military Museum has been repeated by many historians and heritage keepers of other migrant origin groups. Thus the *African Times and Orient Review*, Britain's first black newspaper, wrote in 1917 that

> It is the duty of everyone within the British Empire to loyally support the Empire to the last drop of blood and the last penny remaining within their coffers. If you do this loyally and willingly, when the day of settlement arrives you cannot be left out of the reckoning.

With absolute certainty, its editor, the Egyptian—or, more likely, Turkish—born, London-based Duse Mohamed Ali, concluded "If, as we have already done and are still doing, we give of our blood and treasure there is no human agency to stop payment of our just demands".[60] Duse Mohamed Ali's newspaper warned in August 1914 that British defeat would be disastrous for its colonial subjects: "Are the Germans to extend their rule over vast numbers of Black and Brown men. We . . . say God forbid!"[61] In a similar pattern to the *Jewish Chronicle*, his newspaper regularly printed items detailing the bravery of non-white colonial soldiers, especially those that had died in battle. The tactics employed by *The African Times and Orient Review*, the *Jewish Chronicle* and the efforts of Michael MacDonagh to celebrate the Irish soldier during the First World War provide evidence of the urgent need for ethnic minorities to gain or retain citizenship rights and wider social acceptance. It reflects what Bill Williams argues has been the "informal mechanisms of liberal toleration". Such conditional acceptance, he concludes, "remain the quintessential means by which British society accommodates ethnic minorities".[62]

There have thus been two dominant themes in official Anglo-Jewish historiography and heritage work concerning the military contribution. The first and most pressing has been to emphasise patriotism reflecting the

particular history of and attitudes towards the Jews as a transnational minority to whom majority culture possessed fantasies of its international power. Indeed such beliefs were manifest most clearly during the First World War with the Balfour Declaration of 1917 through which the British government attempted to win over world Jewry by promising a Jewish homeland in Palestine.[63] As a result the desire of British Jewry to show devotion to the nation was and remains intense. The second was to prove this loyalty through rootedness.

Both defensive and self-critical tendencies were evident in the London Jewish Museum's "For King and Country?" (2014), a major exhibition and the most prominent heritage engagement with the issue of Jews in Britain during the First World War in this year of intense centenary commemorations. The insertion of the question mark in the exhibition title reflected the new historiography and the desire to show the plurality of Jewish voices during the conflict and the contemporary struggles that bitterly divided the Jews of Britain. The querying of the narrative that had been dominant for close to a century was, however, internally contested within the museum and led to some external dissent.[64] Even so, "For King and Country?" did not fully avoid the celebratory and as with the *British Book of Honour*, pride of place is given to the display of Frank de Pass' Victoria Cross medal.

Lieutenant de Pass, from an elite British Jewish family, was a professional soldier and the first Jewish recipient of this medal won for "conspicuous bravery" in November 1914 on the Western Front. He is commemorated not only in the *British Jewry Book of Honour* and then in the Jewish Military Museum followed by the London Jewish Museum, but also more generally in virtual sites such as "J Grit" which provides an "Internet Index of Tough Jews".[65] The reasons for such defensiveness and the desire to provide evidence of Jewish masculinity (even into the twenty-first century) became apparent during the opening ceremony of "For King and Country?". The guest of honour, Falklands War veteran Admiral Lord West, repeatedly referred to the Jews as an immigrant group and closed by thanking them for their contribution, which he concluded was one that sadly other immigrant groups in Britain were failing to match. West, formerly First Sea Lord, and his remarks were, for the most part, warmly received by an audience with a strong Jewish ex-servicemen's contingent.[66]

To return to wider questions of migrant memory in Britain and at wartime, much has been made recently about Walter Tull, the

Tottenham footballer who during the war became the first black person to become a captain in the British army. The campaign for Tull to receive the medals he deserved for bravery is, of course, a just one and his rediscovery is important and overdue. There are, however, intellectual tensions in the desire to achieve such belated recognition for him and expose the scientific racism that was at the heart of his exclusion from formal recognition at the time and in subsequent memory. Tull joined up because of his patriotism and desire to help the British Empire in its hour of need. Celebrating Tull's contribution, as has been done, for example, by his biographer, Phil Vasili, and the Black and Asian Study Association, runs the risk of ignoring an ambivalent situation regarding the price of belonging.[67] It can lead to the ignoring or vilification of other members of minorities who do not so easily fit into reassuring national narratives.

An example is Emmanuel Ribeiro, of Jewish immigrant origin, who wanted no part in what he believed was a capitalist and imperialist war. Imprisoned, he was violently force fed by the British state because of his political pacifism. It is to the credit of the London Jewish Museum that there is brief mention in the landmark "For King and Country?" exhibition of his story and those such as Bertrum Russell and George Lansbury who campaigned for his release from prison. It remains that the narrative of "For King and Country?" is dominated by the story of Frank de Pass, continuing the path of the *Jewish Chronicle* at the time through to the *British Jewry Book of Honour* and then the contributions of Cecil Roth outlined here.[68] But Ribeiro, along with the story of others who opposed or were indifferent to the war, certainly merits the exhibition title's question mark.

The inclusion, for example, of Isaac Rosenberg's story could have been simply and uncritically used within the exhibition to celebrate the contribution of one of the great war poets of the twentieth century. But "For King and Country?" puts Rosenberg within a less comfortable narrative. It outlines the pacifist upbringing of Rosenberg by his immigrant parents and how poverty in the East End of London, rather than patriotism, pushed him into the army. The ongoing anti-Semitism of his fellow soldiers ("my being a Jew makes it bad amongst these wretches") was also emphasised, resisting any reassuringly Whiggish interpretation of life in the trenches as being at least prejudice reducing.[69]

Beyond the exhibition, whilst the approach of the London *Jewish News* and its series on the "Jewish Heroes of [the] First World War" (which

included Major General Sir John Monash) was still the main thrust of the centenary commemorations, other more troubling experiences have been incorporated.[70] This has included the tragic story of Abraham Bevistein born in Warsaw in 1898 and whose family emigrated to the East End of London some four years later. An apprentice leather worker, Abraham enlisted into the 11th Battalion, Middlesex Regiment in September 1914. To do so, he lied both about his age (he was 16) and his nationality. Abraham also joined up without his parents' knowledge.[71]

Abraham's motivations for doing so are unknown, although he was far from alone in being an underage soldier in the British army during the First World War. He may well have been a member of one of the many Jewish youth groups that instilled a sense of intense patriotism and militarism in those of immigrant origins. For some this went alongside a desire for adventure beyond the confines of East End poverty, or, like Rosenberg, poverty and a desire to help his family financially. Such naivety was soon quashed. Writing from France on July 2, 1915, the pain of his separation from his family was made clear. Even with the desire not to worry his parents, he cannot stop himself from the brief sentence, which however understated, reveals the mental strain he was under: "Dear Mother, I do not like the trenches".[72]

On December 29, 1915, Abraham's mental fragility intensified as he was hospitalised after being blown up by a landmine. Physically recovered, but suffering from shellshock, he was returned to the Front just several weeks later. He sought medical support, which was denied, and in a state of confusion he took shelter in a farmhouse. He was found, arrested and tried for desertion. Again, the impact of his Anglicisation is revealed in another letter home. It reveals both the success of imparting English understatement and the failure for it to allow him to communicate the dire situation he now found himself in:

> We were in the trenches and I was ill so I went out and they took me to prison and I am in a bit of trouble now and won't get any money for a long time.[73]

On March 4, 1916 Abraham Bevistein was court-martialled and sentenced to death—in spite of evidence from his officers that he was shell-shocked. He was executed on March 20, 1916 in Labourse, France.[74]

Abraham Bevistein's case was taken up by Sylvia Pankhurst and her Workers' Suffrage Federation in April 1916 through its journal, *Women's*

Dreadnought.[75] The narrative it produced fitted the pacifist politics of the Federation but was not one that now suited mainstream British Jewry and its official leadership:

> [Abraham] had enlisted without his parents' knowledge or consent, and they bowed down with sorrow, for to old-fashioned Jewish families it is an honour for a son to be a priest and a scholar—a disgrace for a son to become a soldier.[76]

Not surprisingly, after 1918 the Bevistein case was not part of the war memory of either British society as a whole or its Jewish minority. Nevertheless, the memory work of non-professional scholars in recent decades has kept Abraham from falling into total obscurity and, with the more open approach to the First World War with the centenary, his story has at least been rediscovered. For the first time, the life and execution of Abraham Bevistein were given widespread and sympathetic treatment in the form of a television documentary on "Teenage Tommies" on Remembrance Day, 2014.[77] Whilst not broadcast on a "prime time" slot, it at least was part of the alternative, awkward stories of the war that have found some space to be articulated 100 years on. It would, however, be hard to imagine Bevistein being given the same form of national commemoration that has been recently granted to Frank de Pass.

In November 2014, Conservative Culture Secretary, Eric Pickles, unveiled a memorial stone near Whitehall and the Cenotaph to de Pass. It was one of a series for "our First World War heroes". Pickles was keen to use the background of this Jew of longstanding British presence, to make a wider political point, one that in reality complemented and anticipated (rather than queried) that of Admiral Lord West:

> Lieutenant de Pass displayed exceptional courage one hundred years ago, in the cause of liberty. The legacy of men like Frank and their acts of supreme valour in service of their country is the Britain of today, united by shared values, where there is mutual respect and tolerance of all faiths.[78]

Here de Pass has become "usable history"—an example for others of minority faiths (especially Muslims) to follow. In contrast, the troublesome case of Abraham Bevistein (who, at best, might be pardoned but without the possibility of compensation or memorialisation) shows the

power of the state to dictate life or death, even for those minorities who broke the rules to better perform their patriotism.

The first step towards a more reflexive and theoretical perspective of minorities and war is the recognition of the importance of storytelling and myth-making. From there it is possible to explore the paradox that silencing and marginalisation can still occur not *in spite of* but *because of* greater inclusivity when confronting the past, whether in the form of either "ethnic cheerleading" or majority celebration of surface diversity within the nation. With regard to the latter, the tendency towards superficiality is best illustrated in the Imperial War Museum's new "First World War" galleries, which opened in 2014. Despite their size and lavish funding, token attention is given to involvement of ethnic minorities, the often-devastating impact of war on them and the excruciating dilemmas they faced.[79] Such a critical perspective may appear a luxury whilst the loyalty of minorities more than ever is under scrutiny by state and society alike. But it is a necessity if we are to understand properly the challenges and complexities of belonging and being a minority in wartime—both past and present.

Notes

1. Anthony Smith, "War and Ethnicity: The Role of Warfare in the Formation, Self-Images and Cohesion of Ethnic Communities," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4:4 (1981): 375.
2. See also Santanu Das, ed., *Race, Empire and First World War Writing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), which is a remarkably wide ranging and multi-layered collection of essays.
3. Daniele Conversi, "Homogenisation, Nationalism and War: Should We Still Read Ernest Geller?," *Nations and Nationalism* 13:3 (2007); Daniele Conversi, "'We are all Equals!'. Militarism, Homogenization and 'Egalitarianism' in Nationalist State-Building (1789–1945)," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37:7 (2008).
4. Colin Holmes, *John Bull's Island: Immigration & British Society, 1871–1971* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 87.
5. Panikos Panayi, "Dominant Societies and Minorities in the Two World Wars," in *Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia During the Two World Wars*, ed. Panikos Panayi (Oxford: Berg, 1993), 3–4.
6. Thus David Goldberg and John Solomos, eds., *A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), a state of the art collection,

includes wide ranging material including contributions on political economy, space, and culture but has no section or sustained mention of war.
7. Panayi, "Dominant Societies", 23.
8. Tony Kushner, "Local Heroes: Belgian Refugees in Britain during the First World War," *Immigrants & Minorities* 18:1 (1999).
9. The exception is in the study of war and memory, pioneered by Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). But even in this innovative and productive field, little space has been given to ethnic minorities.
10. Fredrik Barth, "Introduction," in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, ed. Fredrik Barth (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), 9–10.
11. Geoff Eley, "Foreword," in *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Martin Evans and Ken Lunn (Oxford: Berg, 1997), ix.
12. Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson, "Introduction," in *The Myths We Live By*, eds. Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson (London: Routledge, 1990), 4–5; 18–19.
13. Anthony Kirk-Greene, "'Damnosa Hereditas': Ethnic Ranking and the Martial Races Imperative in Africa," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 3:4 (1980): 395.
14. Ibid., 397.
15. Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare* (London: Granta, 1999), 16.
16. Bourke, 117 citing Michael MacDonagh, *The Irish on the Somme* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), 57.
17. MacDonagh, *The Irish on the Somme*, 57 and John Redmond, "Introduction," in *The Irish at the front* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916), 2. More generally on MacDonagh's work see Terence Denman, "The Catholic Irish Soldier in the First World War: the 'Racial Environment'," *Irish Historical Studies* 27 (November 1991): 355.
18. Smith, "War and ethnicity", 393.
19. Samuel and Thompson, "Introduction," 19.
20. Homi Bhabha, "Introduction: Narrating the Nation," in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 4.
21. The lecture was delivered at Magdalen College, Oxford, October 27, 1940.
22. Elisa Lawson, "'Scientific Monstrosity' yet 'Occasionally Convenient': Cecil Roth and the Idea of Race," *Patterns of Prejudice* 42:2 (2008): 223.
23. Cecil Roth, *The Jews in the Defence of Britain: Thirteenth to Nineteenth Centuries* (London: Jewish Historical Society of England, 1940), 29.
24. Ibid., p.5; Norma Dalrymple-Champneys and Arthur Pollard eds., *George Crabbe: The Complete Poetical Works*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 396.

25. Peter New, *George Crabbe's Poetry* (London: Macmillan, 1976), 2; Dalrymple-Champneys and Pollard eds., *George Crabbe: The Complete Poetical Works*, 396.
26. Frank Felsenstein, *Anti-Semitic Stereotypes: A Paradigm of Otherness in English Popular Culture, 1660–1830* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 231.
27. Tony Kushner, *Anglo-Jewry since 1066: Place, Locality and Memory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 134–137.
28. Tony Kushner, *The Persistence of Prejudice: Antisemitism in British Society during the Second World War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 119–125.
29. Roth, *The Jews in the Defence of Britain*, 5.
30. Joseph Hertz, "The War," *Jewish Chronicle*, September 11, 1914, 10.
31. Roth, *The Jews in the Defence of Britain*, 5–6; 8.
32. Ibid., 9–12.
33. Ibid., 13.
34. Derek Penslar, *Jews and the Military: A History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 211–212.
35. Geoffrey Green, *The Royal Navy & Anglo-Jewry 1740–1820* (London: Geoffrey Green, 1989), 88–89.
36. Kirk-Greene, "Ethnic ranking".
37. Nadia Valman, "Manly Jews: Disraeli, Jewishness and Gender," in *Disraeli's Jewishness*, eds. Todd Endelman and Tony Kushner (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2002) provides a sophisticated reading of this tendency and Jewish counter-strategies to it.
38. Roth, *The Jews in the Defence of Britain*, 13.
39. George Sanger, *Seventy Years a Showman: My Life and Adventures in Camp and Caravan the World Over* (London: C. Arthur Pearson, 1908), 12. For a wider consideration of Roth's prolific output and its status between defence and ethnic cheerleading, see Elisa Lawson, "Cecil Roth and the Imagination of the Jewish Past, Present and Future in Britain, 1925–1964" (PhD diss., University of Southampton, 2005), chapter 2.
40. "Tribute to Straus Paid in Synagogues," *New York Times*, April 21, 1912, 7. See Richard Davenport-Hines, *Titanic Lives* (London: Harper Press, 2012), 290.
41. Michael Adler, ed., *British Jewry Book of Honour* (London: Caxton, 1922).
42. Ibid., ix.
43. Ibid., 1.
44. Ibid., xix.
45. Ibid., 7.
46. David Cesarani, *The Jewish Chronicle and Anglo-Jewry 1841–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 117–118; "Our Honour

Record," *Jewish Chronicle*, September 11, 1914, 9, 19–20 and November 19, 1915.

47. Adler, ed., *The British Jewry Book of Honour*, 27.
48. Ibid., 1.
49. Penslar, *Jews and the Military*, 1.
50. "Jews Respond," *Jewish Chronicle*, August 14, 1914, 5.
51. "Jews and the War," *Jewish Chronicle*, November 19, 1915, 7.
52. Bill Williams, "The Anti-Semitism of Tolerance: Middle-Class Manchester and the Jews, 1870–1900," in *City, Class and Culture*, eds. Alan J. Kidd and K. W. Roberts (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 94.
53. An excellent overview of recent literature, grounded in original research, is provided by Anne Lloyd, "Between Integration and Separation: Jews and Military Service in World War I Britain," in *Whatever Happened to British Jewish Studies?*, eds. Tony Kushner and Hannah Ewence (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2012).
54. Mark Levene, "Going Against the Grain: Two Jewish Memoirs of War and Anti-War, 1914–18," *Jewish Culture and History* 2:2 (1999): 71.
55. Evelyn Wilcock, "The Revd. John Harris: Issues in Anglo-Jewish Pacifism 1914–18," *Jewish Historical Studies* 30 (1987–88).
56. Levene, "Going Against the Grain," 67; 71.
57. Ibid., 80.
58. Green, *The Royal Navy and Anglo-Jewry*, 182.
59. Jenni Frazer, "Medals, Memories and Military Heroes on Parade in Ajex Museum," *Jewish Chronicle*, July 8, 2005, 18. See also "The Jewish Military Museum 'About Us' page," accessed December 13, 2011. http://www.thejmm.org.uk/about-us.
60. Editorial, *African Times and Orient Review* 4:1 (January 1917), 1–2. On his complex identity and confused origins see Ian Duffield, "Duse Mohamed Ali: his purpose and his public," in *Commonwealth Writers Overseas: Themes of Exile and Expatriation*, ed. Alastair Niven (Brussels: Revue des Langues Vivantes, 1976).
61. "War!," *African Times & Orient Review*, 1:20, August 4, 1914, 449–450.
62. Williams, "The Anti-Semitism of Tolerance," 94.
63. Mark Levene, "The Balfour Declaration: A Case of Mistaken Identity," *English Historical Review* 107: 422 (1992).
64. There were threats of a boycott because of the possible implications of this question mark. Information provided to the author who was historical advisor to the exhibition, which ran from March 19 to August 10, 2014.
65. *British Jewry Book of Honour*, 7; "Frank Alexander de Pass" in J Grit, "The Internet Index of Tough Jews", accessed May 26, 2015. http://www.j-grit.com/military-and-spies-frank-alexander-de-pass-victoria-cross.php.

66. Official opening of the exhibition, March 18, 2014. Charlotte Oliver, "Recalling the Great War Effort," *Jewish Chronicle*, March 21, 2014, 14 simply quotes Admiral Lord West that "This exhibition is a timely reminder of the Jewish community's contribution".
67. Phil Vasili, *Walter Tull, 1888–1918: Officer, Footballer* (Mitcham: Raw Press, 2010); Association for the Study of African, Caribbean and Asian Culture and History in Britain, *Newsletter* 11 (January 1995), 6–7.
68. "For King and Country?" and the permanent exhibition of the Manchester Jewish Museum. See also and *Hansard* (HC) 103: 715–716, February 20, 1918.
69. The exhibition's treatment of Rosenberg is highlighted in Adam Foulds, "Spirit of the Maccabees," *Guardian Review*, March 15, 2014, 16–17. More generally see Joseph Cohen, *Journey to the Trenches: The Life of Isaac Rosenberg 1890–1918* (London: Robson Books, 1975).
70. Derek Taylor, "Our veterans of the Great War," *Jewish News*, July 3, 2014, 1.
71. Details from 1911 census and David Lister, *Die Hard, Aby! Abraham Bevistein—The Boy Soldier Shot to Encourage the Others* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2005).
72. Abraham's case was taken up by Sylvia Pankhurst and her Workers' Suffrage Federation. The *Women's Dreadnought*, April 22, 1916 reproduced his letters home.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid. and Lister, *Die Hard, Aby!*
75. Sylvia Pankhurst, *The Home Front* (London: Hutchinson, 1932), chapter 38.
76. 'Executed: East London Boy's Fate," *The Dreadnought*, April 22, 1916, 1.
77. "Teenage Tommies", BBC Two, broadcast November 11, 2014.
78. "First Jewish VC hero honoured with central London memorial," *Jewish News*, November 25, 2014, 1.
79. The re-modelled Imperial War Museum, including the First World War Galleries, opened in July 2014 in time for the centenary commemorations and with £6.5 million of Heritage Lottery Funding. Indian, African and other colonial soldiers are mentioned, as are Belgian refugees, but there is no sustained consideration of their experiences or attitudes towards them. And beyond the British imperial war effort, the treatment of the Armenian genocide in the new galleries is thin and misleading, especially unfortunate as the re-modelling also led to the closure of the Genocide gallery linked to the permanent Holocaust exhibition. Author site visit, August 19, 2015.

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CHAPTER 10

Selective Remembering: Minorities and the Remembrance of the First World War in Britain and Germany

Tim Grady

In the spring of 1954, one senior member of Britain's Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC) made a special trip to Brighton on the country's south coast to view the Chattri memorial. Consisting of a domed pavilion resting on eight stone pillars, the Chattri had been dedicated in 1921 to the Indian soldiers killed fighting with Britain in the First World War. Unfortunately, however, the IWGC's representative struggled to ever locate the memorial. Once in Brighton, he made his way up the hills of the Downs to the north of the town to look for the actual site. But after several hours of scrambling around in the fog and low cloud of the Downs, he was "wet through for [his] pains" and in the end simply "gave it up".[1] This was not just the case of poor map reading skills. In the late 1920s, not so long after the memorial had first been dedicated, a member of the influential Indian Tata family also experienced a similarly futile visit to the Chattri. "Nobody can see it and there is no road up to it so that it can be visited", Tata complained.[2]

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The Chattri memorial highlighted the visibility, but conversely also the very invisibility, of ethnic and religious minorities in Britain's remembrance process. While the sacrifice of these soldiers was often acknowledged, as was the case with the Indian war dead in Brighton, this was very different to active commemoration. The situation in Germany, if not the same, was at least comparable. Had Tata wished to hunt out sites of memory for Germany's own soldiers who hailed from an ethnic or religious minority background, then he would have discovered a very similar picture of selective remembrance. Some minority groups, such as German Jews, found a place—albeit disputed—in the country's memory culture, while others—most notably Poles and Danes—languished at the margins. In both Britain and Germany, therefore, minorities occupied a space in the public remembrance of the First World War, but in most cases it was only a very minor one.

Historical writing by contrast has tended to suggest a much starker divide in the way that the two countries approached the remembrance of the war dead in general and their religious and ethnic casualties in particular. On the one side was Britain's supposedly liberal approach to war commemoration, which appeared to be based on flexibility and inclusivity. Incorporating the countries of the United Kingdom as well as the Empire into a narrow memory culture was impossible, so space had to be given for differing interpretations of the vague refrain: "For King and Country".[3] The IWGC seemed to be the very epitome of these values. In designing its cemeteries, the association—in the words of Philip Longworth—made "respect for different creeds…a fundamental of policy".[4] On the other side—and standing in stark contrast to British practice—was the German approach to remembrance. Against the backdrop of defeat and revolution, Germans struggled to find appropriate narratives in which to remember the dead. A nationalistic "cult of the fallen", as much historical writing has argued, gradually pushed more pacifistic ideas to one side.[5] Within this revengeful atmosphere, Germany's religious and ethnic minorities looked to have been entirely forgotten.[6]

While points of divergence in Britain's and Germany's memory cultures have been frequently highlighted, there were also considerable areas of convergence.[7] In both countries, spaces emerged for ethnic and religious minorities to bury their dead according to their own traditions and conventions. These opportunities were most readily available to groups, such as the Jewish communities, which had a deep and longstanding connection to the two metropoles. However, as this chapter argues, even these

opportunities largely evaporated during the transition from war to peace. In the post-war world, both the British and the Germans sought to standardise their commemorative practices, which had the effect of shutting out much of the previous diversity. Crucially, comparing the remembrance process in Germany and Britain demonstrates that these shifts were never solely about the difference between victor and vanquished, but were rather about the visibility of a particular minority. As a means to unpick these complexities, this chapter begins with an exploration of wartime practices, including frontline burials, commemorative rituals and mourning practices, before moving on to examine both local and national memory cultures in the two countries.

Diversity in the German and British Armies of the First World War

Perhaps unsurprisingly a rise in jingoistic nationalism accompanied the outbreak of hostilities. In Berlin, Kaiser Wilhelm II proclaimed that now "we are all German brothers". In less effusive terms, the British monarch, George V, reminded his people that "we are fighting for a worthy purpose" and *The Times* wrote of "A United People".[8] However, peeling back the rhetoric of national unity actually revealed significant diversity within the British and German armies. Men from different ethnic and national backgrounds either volunteered or were recruited into the two countries' military machines. On top of this, there was also a considerable variety of religious beliefs in each army, with Jewish, Hindu and Muslim soldiers jostling for recognition alongside the larger numbers of Catholic and Protestant troops. During the war years, some of this diversity could also be evinced in military burials. Although the bodies of many soldiers disappeared amidst the chaos of battle, a large number were eventually laid to rest. Where space and time allowed, some attempt was often made to consider the soldier's individual background in burial.

Ethnic and national identities certainly provided the strongest lines of difference in the two armies. The fighting forces of the United Kingdom were drawn from all of its constituent parts: England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales. But such were the political tensions across this fragile union that conscription, when introduced in 1916, was never extended to Ireland.[9] Adding another dimension to Britain's military struggle were the soldiers of its Empire. Over 1.2 million Indian troops joined the war effort, along with 458,000 Canadians, 112,000 New Zealanders, 332,000

from Australia, 136,000 white South Africans and some 44,000 black South Africans, who were confined to the dominion's Native Labour Corps.[10] Although the German military lacked access to the same wealth of colonial troops, it could nonetheless draw upon a range of different minority groups: 380,000 men from the annexed provinces of Alsace and Lorraine served; 26,000 Danish-speaking soldiers and 850,000 Poles also formed part of the German army.[11]

The ethnic and national breadth of the two armies was also matched by considerable religious diversity. The vast majority of soldiers were members of the Protestant or Catholic Churches. Alongside these soldiers, almost 100,000 Jews wore German military uniforms during the conflict and some 35,000 Jews fought on the British side. Reflecting their roots in the Empire, Britain's fighting forces also added another strand to this already diverse picture. Hindu, Muslim and Sikh soldiers, mainly within the Indian army, contributed to the British war effort during the course of the conflict. Unlike Chinese labourers and Britain's black colonial troops, members of the Indian army were deemed able enough to fight at the front.

With such a breadth of religions, nationalities and ethnicities within the two armies, the list of casualties on both sides was always destined to be as equally diverse. Clearing stations and field hospitals near the front contained bloodied and wounded soldiers from a whole host of backgrounds: Jews recuperated alongside Christians; Germans, Danes and Poles lay together, as did those from England, Ireland or India. Georg Salzberger, a rabbi with the German Fifth Army in the West, described his visit to a frontline hospital as akin to entering "a hidden world of misery". The screams of the wounded and the "nasty smell of blood, sweat and phenol" left Salzberger repulsed. But at the same time, it also forced him to recognise the ubiquity of frontline mutilation. Asking just to see the Jewish wounded was inappropriate, he decided: "The stereotypical question about religion seemed to be so cruel for the poor wounded and also so out of place with the task of spreading human love".[12]

Death too failed to discriminate between soldiers' religious, ethnic or national identities. By the war's end, almost 12,000 German Jews and more than 3,000 British Jews died in the war; 4,000 Danes, at least 210,000 Irish and some 800,000 Poles also lost their lives. All those killed in battle suffered a similar fate. Shell splinters smashed bodies into pieces, machine guns tore human flesh to shreds while the whole time enemy snipers carefully picked off their next targets.

Sometimes there were no remains to recover; on other occasions bodies were left on the battlefield, as it was too dangerous to undertake a rescue. Where bodies could be collected, they sometimes ended up in mass graves. The smell of rotting corpses and the associated sanitary dangers meant that a swift disposal trumped a dignified burial.[13] One large group of soldiers killed in the First World War, therefore, was forever destined to be classified as "missing". As the IWGC realised in the early 1920s, this made it particularly difficult to respect a soldier's religious heritage. "The great majority of [Indian] graves" on the Western Front, it lamented, "were unmarked and lost".[14]

However, the graves of many Muslim, Hindu and other non-Christian troops disappeared not simply because they had been unmarked. Of equal significance was the fact that the default position for both the British and German militaries was to bury the dead under a Christian Cross. The use of a simple cross may have been a practical choice given that the majority of the soldiers were Christian, but it also had the effect of obscuring all forms of difference. When Rudolf Stern, a young German-Jewish student from Würzburg, was killed on the French/Belgian border near Bousbecque, his body was immediately laid to rest under a wooden cross. "Eight crosses stand" in the local cemetery, reported Stern's fellow students. "Today two new, bright simple white crosses have been added".[15] Although Stern's friends appeared to have revelled in the shared symbolism of the cross, the Jewish communities more generally were less enamoured. Jews in both Britain and Germany campaigned resolutely for the use of alternative grave markers, both for religious reasons and as a means to ensure the visibility of their dead.[16]

Yet being killed at the front did not always have to mean an anonymous death. The vast space of the various frontlines could also provide the freedom to conduct burials according to the deceased's own religious or ethnic identity. Therefore, while many minorities simply vanished into mass graves or behind rows of Christian crosses, others remained highly visible. The key determinant in this regard was generally whether or not an army chaplain was present to perform a funeral. In November 1914, Jacob Sonderling, a German army rabbi, happened to be visiting a military hospital in the East Prussian city of Insterburg. His timing was sadly fortuitous as Julius Sänger, a 32-year-old Berlin Jew, had just succumbed to his wounds. Sonderling was able to ensure that the body was ritually dressed for burial. A proper funeral also took place in a local Jewish cemetery, where Sonderling too had the chance to say a few words.

Finally, Sonderling was able to send a personal message to Sänger's loved ones in Berlin to detail his final resting place.[17]

Father Francis Gleeson, a Catholic military chaplain with the Royal Munster Fusiliers, proceeded over a number of similarly personal funerals in the West. On one occasion, Gleeson had to bury three Irish soldiers who had been killed by a single shell. He prayed with their bodies, before giving them "a most beautiful little burial service". At the end of the funeral, some of the soldiers' comrades erected "little wooden crosses" over the graves that recorded the regiment of the deceased as being from Munster.[18] Priests from Alsace who served either in the German army or near the frontlines also managed to personalise military funerals. In their case, the main task was always to ensure a Catholic burial. Some of the priests added their own personal touch to proceedings; they avoided any use of German national phraseology, thereby asserting their own ambivalence towards Germany.[19]

Where funerals were personalised, then there was also a good chance that grave markers would follow suit. Provisional cemeteries—sometimes consisting of only a handful of graves—generally contained a mismatch of different markers. Wooden crosses mingled with plainer stele. Some of these had longer inscriptions, while others were more minimal in design, containing little more than a name and date. The sheer variety of styles ensured that an individual's background could often shine through. During the Second Battle of the Aisne in April 1917, two German-Jewish casualties—Julius Hirsch and Artur Wolfsbruck—were laid to rest in neighbouring graves behind the lines. Even though the pair were surrounded by a sea of Christian crosses, they received personalised Jewish headstones adorned with a Star of David. Hirsch's grave marker was shaped as a biblical scroll, while Wolfsbruck received a more conventional headstone. On both stones, a common Hebrew burial inscription completed the ensemble: "May his soul be bound up in the bond of eternal life".[20]

Another feature of some provisional graves was the inclusion of the deceased soldier's place of birth on the headstone. This was the case in Sallaumines in Northern France, where the German army's Ninth Reserve Regiment established a cemetery for its war dead. During the latter half of 1916, the regiment began to consolidate the cemetery by planting neat hedgerows and shrubs throughout the site. It was still possible, though, to make out the details of each individual soldier. Anybody entering the cemetery could see, therefore, that a Peter Bührke from the town of

Spangen had died fighting in the German army in March 1916.[21] British war graves from the 1914 to 1918 period could also sometimes give hints of an individual soldier's background, with different forms of marker, inscription and even symbol used.[22]

Soldiers who succumbed to their wounds or to illness within either the German or the British metropoles also generally received an appropriate burial. And as such, the home front was another space in which the war dead from different minority groups were made visible. When faced with the deaths of members of the Indian army, for example, the British agreed to provide cremation facilities for Hindus and Sikhs. For Muslim soldiers, the military later established a separate cemetery in Woking. The reason for choosing this small Surrey town was that it contained the Muslim Mission as well as the country's oldest mosque. Having an established Muslim community nearby ensured the involvement of the local Imam, who officiated at funerals and also advised on the design of the new war cemetery.[23]

In Germany, the authorities made similar arrangements for the burial of Muslim soldiers—mainly from Russia, North Africa and India—who died in German captivity. Early in the war, a cemetery was established near the town of Zossen, some 40 kilometres south of Berlin. According to German publications, which did their best to promote a positive picture of life in German internment camps, all of the Muslim dead were offered appropriate funerals. In practice, however, the adherence to Muslim burial practices was far patchier. The bodies of the dead were ritually bathed in the neighbouring Wünsdorf mosque, but beyond this, it is unclear whether other religious rituals were ever followed.[24]

Within Britain and Germany, other minority groups often had the freedom to bury their own war victims. Jewish soldiers who had died of their wounds at home were laid to rest in community cemeteries throughout the two countries. Hamburg's Jewish community provided a separate space for military burials from late 1914, while the first burial—that of David Moss—took place in Willesden's Jewish cemetery, London, in August 1914.[25] Elsewhere, Britain's Irish diaspora also managed to conduct funerals for their war dead. Patrick Mitchell, a member of the South Irish Horse Regiment, for example, was buried in Doncaster after a bout of meningitis. His immediate family from Dublin travelled over to Yorkshire for the mass and Catholic funeral.[26] The experience of Muslims, Jews and Irish was typical for other minority groups during the actual war years. Where time and space existed—principally on the home

front or behind the lines—then more individual burials occurred. Religious rites were generally followed and personalised headstones used. However, for the most part, the exigencies of battle ensured that soldiers from a minority background simply disappeared into the mass ranks of the dead.

A Narrow "Circle of Mourning"[27]

Small printed memorial sheets for the war dead became extremely popular in Germany, particularly in Catholic communities, during the First World War. Consisting of little more than a single piece of paper, the sheets generally contained a photograph of the deceased, some biographical details and a few liturgical lines.[28] These memorial sheets formed one small part of a very visible mourning culture that took root not only in Germany, but also in Britain and the other main belligerent countries. Black-framed obituaries, elaborate funerals and well-attended prayer services formed the main tenets of public mourning in the two countries during the war. The families of black African, Indian or Polish troops also experienced huge losses during the conflict, but their presence—and that of other minorities—in the mourning process was far weaker. What determined the extent of these minority groups' involvement was how deeply rooted they were in either the British or the German metrople or whether their presence had been far more transient. In the situation where the relatives of the war dead played no role in local "circles of mourning", then it proved very easy for these soldiers to be forgotten.

The Jewish communities in both Germany and Britain demonstrated very clearly how a strong presence in each respective nation could lead to the inclusion of minorities within emerging wartime memory cultures. While not necessarily enjoying an entirely secure position in either country, Jews nonetheless represented a significant section of the wider population. Germany's Jewish community numbered upwards of 550,000, while British Jews totalled approximately 245,000. As a long-established part of the two countries, the Jewish communities were also deeply involved in the wider "circle of mourning". When local and national remembrance events were held, Jews, along with representatives of the Protestant and Catholic Churches, generally participated.

In early August 1915, for example, the British staged a series of ceremonies to mark the anniversary of the war's outbreak; these were an opportunity to maintain public support for Britain's struggle but also to

reflect on lives lost. Alongside the main service in St Paul's Cathedral, the Chief Rabbi held a special memorial service in London's Grand Synagogue. In Germany, the narrative was very similar. The Jewish communities played an active role in ceremonies staged for the war's one-year anniversary. In the Hamburg Temple Synagogue, to give but one example, Rabbi David Leimdörfer combined prayers for the war dead with an affirmation of further sacrifice, all of which were reportedly well received by the large audience. Events such as those in Hamburg or London helped to place the Jewish communities within an emerging narrative of national sacrifice and loss.[29] Jews in both countries may have suffered from the persistence of prejudice both during and after the war, but they were still afforded some presence in early memory cultures.[30]

In contrast, ethnic and national minorities, such as the Irish, Poles and Danes, enjoyed a much weaker presence in Britain and Germany's emerging memory cultures. Individual soldiers may have fought and died as members of their respective armies, but the remembrance of these individuals for the most part took place not in the metropole, but in distant territories. Take the example of James Maughan, an Irish Catholic soldier, who died fighting with the British army in late 1917. Father Francis Gleeson, as ever diligent in his duties, wrote to Maughan's family in Limerick to explain the circumstances of their loved one's death. Gleeson's letter home, of course, went not to the British mainland, but rather to Maughan's home in the Garryowen district of Limerick. And it was here on Ireland's west coast—far from Britain's developing memory culture—that Maughan's relatives quietly mourned their loss. With such distance between the bereaved and the British metropole, it is easy to see how the deaths of minorities could so easily be overlooked.[31]

A similar sense of isolation existed with the deaths of Polish, Danish and Alsatian soldiers serving in the German army. News of their loss reverberated not around Berlin, but also around Germany's borderland regions in the north, east and west. In February 1915—to give but one example—Alfred Schaufler was killed while fighting in the German army on the Eastern Front. Schaufler, who was still only 20 years-old, came from the city of Metz in Lorraine. It was in Metz that Schaufler's friends and family remembered their loved one as news of his loss filtered home. His childhood friend, Hertha Straub, recalled with pain how, a few months' earlier, they had celebrated together in the very house she was now sitting in. "Poor, poor Fred!", she wrote.[32]

Each national minority also had their own small—or in the case of the Irish sizeable—diasporic community in Britain and Germany. Within these specific communities, there was also a direct connection to the war dead. The area around County Durham in North East England, which had a significant Irish population, gave birth to the so-called Tyneside Irish Battalion. Formed in October alongside a local Scottish Battalion, the Tyneside Irish aimed to recruit Irishmen or those from long-established Irish immigrant families into the British army. Rooted in the industrial towns of Newcastle, South Shields and Gateshead, a strong Irish identity flowed through the Battalion. Shamrocks were distributed to the men on St Patrick's Day, regular services held in the Catholic churches and a ladies' committee raised funds for the soldiers in the field.[33] This sense of community was particularly evident in the remembrance of the Battalion's war dead. Obituaries, notices in local newspapers and memorial scrolls emblazoned with images of shamrocks and Irish harps all formed part of the local community's mourning practices.[34]

A similar pattern of mourning could be found within Germany's own diasporic communities. In strongly Polish areas, such as the Ruhr, where some 300,000–350,000 Poles worked in the mining industry, the dead were remembered within the numerous trade and cultural societies that formed the close-knit immigrant community.[35] Typical in this regard was the Sokol Polish gymnastics association. During the group's annual meeting in 1917, 142 of its members who had suffered a "heroes' death" were collectively honoured.[36] Nonetheless, in the case of both the Tyneside Irish and the Ruhr Poles, the "circle of mourning" was extremely limited. It remained anchored within the Polish and Irish communities that had set up home in Tyneside and the Ruhr respectively. The regional dimensions of these "circles of mourning" made it difficult for these soldiers to feature in national narratives of wartime sacrifice.

If national minorities within Britain and Germany struggled to be a part of the two countries' emerging memory culture, then the situation was even more difficult for the soldiers from Britain's colonial empire. The British public's gaze focused mainly on the contribution of the white Dominion troops, who occupied most lines in the press. There was also some recognition of the participation of Indian soldiers on the Western Front in particular, helped no doubt by the establishment of an Indian Soldiers' Fund in 1914, which provided the soldiers with winter clothing as well as financing the treatment of the wounded.[37]

The fact that Indian soldiers also died in the conflict—some 75,000 by the war's end—was less appreciated. As was the case with other groups of soldiers, "circles of mourning" for the Indian war dead developed amidst their own friends and families; only in the case of the Indian soldiers, individual grief reverberated not around the British metropole, but rather around distant India. When Chur Singh, a Jemadar in the 47th Sikhs, was hit by a bullet and died in 1915, it was a Sepoy who wrote to friends in the Punjab to deliver the sad news. "[Singh] drew his sword and went forward", he wrote. "A bullet came from the enemy and hit him in the mouth. So did our brother Chur Singh become a martyr".[38]

Within Britain itself, in contrast, Singh's death barely registered; understandably people were too distracted with their own losses.[39] It was only when Indian soldiers succumbed to wounds on British soil that interest grew; proximity to death made it very hard to ignore these other wartime losses. For the most part, though, this knowledge was confined to the areas surrounding the major south coast military hospitals that treated Indian servicemen: Brighton, Brockenhurst, Bournemouth and Netley near Southampton. The local press serving these conurbations regularly reported on their wounded Indian soldiers, highlighting their frontline service, but at the same time also reassuring the local population about these foreign visitors. In Brighton, the Chief Constable confirmed that since their arrival the "conduct of the Indians . . . had been in every way exemplary".[40]

Other groups of minority servicemen enjoyed an even more fleeting place in Britain's memory culture. In February 1917, the troopship, SS Mendi, was en-route from Cape Town to Northern France. It had just passed south of the Isle of Wight when it was struck in heavy fog by a larger cargo ship. The Mendi immediately took on water and sank within 20 minutes. The 30 crew members and 616 South African servicemen, of whom all but nine were black members of the South African Native Labour Corps, lost their lives in the sinking.[41] Despite the enormous loss of life, the disaster barely warranted a mention in Britain. *The Times* initially reported on four British deaths after a "Collision at Sea". The severity of the sinking only trickled out a month after the loss, when the South African prime minister spoke of the deaths of "10 Europeans and 615 natives".[42]

As there were at the very most 11 British graves for the Mendi's dead, a firm connection between Britain and these victims of the war never existed.[43] Another barrier towards recognition of these black soldiers lay

in the fact that the soldiers' next of kin were all based in South Africa. After all, the voyage to the battlefields of Europe was for most of the victims their first journey beyond the African continent. Without a direct connection to the war dead, the deaths of these 607 black South African soldiers never found a place within Britain's wartime memory culture. During the conflict, death was clearly ubiquitous, but acknowledgement of the fact was far more varied. If individual lives were to be remembered, then there had to be a voice within Britain willing to stake their claim. As was the case with those killed on the Mendi, it often proved difficult for minority groups, whose place in either Britain or Germany was often fragile, to feature in each country's nascent memory culture. All too easily, therefore, the deaths of these soldiers disappeared to the margins.

Local Communities and Post-War Remembrance

The signing of the armistice in November 1918 and then the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles the following June ushered in a sustained period of memorialisation that stretched through into the early 1920s. In both Britain and Germany, the impetus for commemoration came from both the state and local communities. Germans and Britons who had suffered massively during the conflict reached for permanent memorials as both a statement of national sacrifice and as a means to work through the enormity of individual loss. However, despite the fact that towns and cities across much of Europe's urban environment were awash with new war memorials, this memory boom never favoured victims from a minority background. Indeed, for these other casualties of the conflict, the turn from war to an awkward peace meant not greater acknowledgement of their sacrifices, but rather far less.

The first restriction on the remembrance of minority servicemen came from the way that war memorials were initially conceived. Sites of memory in British and German towns generally emerged from within local communities. As such they tended to reflect the post-war—rather than the wartime—demographics of a community. The main war memorial in Chester in North West England clearly reflected this selective process. Ten plaques, which in total listed the names of 768 men, were erected in the foyer of the town hall building in the early 1920s. However, in this long list of names, there was no space for Constantin Wauters, a Belgian soldier who died in the city in March 1915 and was even laid to rest in the city's Overleigh Cemetery. Presumably the town hall memorial's central

inscription precluded Wauters' inclusion: "The Memorial Bears the Names of Chester Citizens who Fell in the Great War 1914–1919".[44]

While Chester's memory culture found no place for Belgian soldiers who had died in the city, in Seaford, on the country's south coast, it was the dead of the British West Indies Regiment (BWIR) who were absent. Formed in 1915, the BWIR contained black soldiers from Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago as well as from Britain's other West Indian colonies. A racialised understanding of military combat meant that these men were to be restricted primarily to support roles. The first BWIR soldiers arrived in Britain in late 1915 and were stationed in Seaford Camp. It was here in the depths of winter that the regiment suffered its first casualties as 19 men succumbed to disease and illness.[45] These victims were buried in Seaford Cemetery, but at the war's end their names never made it onto the town's war memorial. This was again a case of an absent community. After the conflict, few West Indians and likewise few Belgians remained in Britain. Therefore, when memorials were constructed, the focus turned not to the apparently fleeting presence of wartime minorities, but to more established victim groups.

A similar pattern of remembrance also occurred amongst national minorities in post-war Germany. In Hamburg, for example, a number of the Danish soldiers killed in the war, but born in the Hanseatic city, never appeared on local memorials. Johann Classen, killed in 1916, or Ferdiand Borchers, for example, were both absent. The same was true for the working class Polish communities in the Ruhr. Faced with accusations of wartime betrayal, many Poles started to leave the region at the cessation of hostilities, mainly for Poland, America and Northern France. With a much weaker presence in the Ruhr, a connection between the Polish war dead and the region was broken, which made it much easier for these soldiers to be forgotten.[46]

The suspicions of local people in the Ruhr towards Polish workers hinted at a second reason for the much weaker position of minority groups in post-war remembrance: the formation of newly independent successor states. Poland was reconstituted as a state at the end of the war, while Alsace and Lorraine were returned to France, and Denmark gained the province of Northern Schleswig after a plebiscite held in 1920. During a period of territorial reconfiguration, Britain also lost control of 26 of Ireland's 32 counties with the formation of the Irish Free State in 1922. The soldiers from these new nations who had once fought and even died as members of the German and British armies respectively had now suddenly become

outsiders. In many cases, they ended up being viewed with suspicion by members of both the old states and by those in the new successor states.[47]

In France, the return of Alsace and Lorraine threw up huge problems for the state's developing memory culture. Finding a way to commemorate soldiers who had died fighting in the German army often against the French was clearly a particularly thorny task. The solution for the most part came through the use of religious symbols. Angels, crucifixes and sacred hearts proliferated in Alsace and Lorraine, which alleviated the need to mention either the French or German nations.[48] Poland faced an even trickier situation as Poles had fought on both sides, serving in the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian armies. The new Polish state chose to circumnavigate the whole issue by ignoring the First World War almost entirely. Instead memorials and rituals of remembrance took the Polish-German border clashes of the early post-war years as their starting point.[49]

In the British sphere, tensions over the remembrance of the war arose on the island of Ireland. Volunteer rates amongst Irish Catholics were not too dissimilar to levels of military recruitment from other parts of the British Empire, but therein lay the problem. Against the violent backdrop of the Irish War of Independence, few nationalists wanted to commemorate the fact that Irishmen had died in the First World War fighting for the British. Yet the deaths of over 200,000 Irish soldiers could not simply be ignored. What emerged during the 1920s, therefore, was a highly contested memory culture. Arguments occurred over the design of memorials as well as over the form of annual rituals. For many years in Cork, war veterans held two separate remembrance services: one parade with a Protestant character, the other more Catholic and nationalist.[50] The situation in Northern Ireland was even more partisan. The dedication of the Belfast cenotaph in 1929, for example, took place before an almost entirely Protestant audience, as invitations were not extended to local Catholic groups.[51]

Within the British and German metropoles, there was also a noticeable ambivalence towards commemorating those killed from the new successor states. With on-going conflict between the British and nationalists in Ireland, Irish Catholics living on the British mainland struggled to remain within local remembrance activity. In the Welsh towns of Mold and Bargoed, for example, representatives of the Catholic Church were present during memorial dedication ceremonies, but they were not invited to speak and instead had to look on from the sidelines.[52] In Newcastle meanwhile, the Tyneside Irish developed their own separate remembrance

rituals. Rather than commemorating their dead each year on 11 November, the survivors gathered in Newcastle on St Patrick's Day.[53] The same was true for the Polish communities in the Ruhr. Rather than taking a full part in local commemorative events, Poles tended to remember their war dead within their own community groups and associations. A notable exception to this model, however, came from Protestant Masurian immigrants, whose loyalties lay more with Germany than Poland. In Bochum, members of this Masurian community erected a memorial plaque for their war dead, which graced the assembly rooms of the *Ostpreußisch-evangelischer Arbeiterverein* (East Prussian Protestant Workers Association).[54]

The third main impediment to the remembrance of the minority war dead reflected much greater levels of wilful neglect. In both Britain and Germany, incidents occurred where a long-established minority was deliberately snubbed during the remembrance process. Amidst a growing wave of anti-Semitism, German Jews started to be blamed for revolutionary discord as well as for the country's military failings. In such a tumultuous atmosphere, on a very small number of war memorials, Jewish names were deliberately omitted. This was the case in the small West Prussian village of Zippnow, where the name of the only Jewish war victim was absent. When probed on this omission, it emerged that a group of local landowners who had funded the memorial had only done so on the condition that no Jewish names be included.[55] To a lesser extent, anti-Semitism was also a feature of British remembrance activity. Local newspapers in London's East End, for example, often chose to ignore dedication ceremonies for synagogue memorials, filling their column inches instead with stories of Protestant and Catholic memorial unveilings.[56]

A fourth and final impulse that led to a weakening of the position of minorities in each country's memory culture came with the decline of provisional sites of memory. In both Britain and Germany, stones had been erected during the war to mark the site of Indian soldiers' burials, or in the case of Hindus and Sikhs, cremations. But at the war's end, the Indian servicemen, who had once taken a caring interest in these sites, returned home, the war wounded left Britain's hospitals and Indian POWs in Germany were repatriated. With these departures, a connection between the dead and the living was lost. In Brighton, nobody—not even the IWGC—wanted to claim responsibility for the upkeep of the Chattri.[57] The situation was little better in Woking. Although the town's Muslim war cemetery came under the care of the IWGC post-war, the

Commission itself noted that "the quality of headstones" was "poor" in comparison to other cemeteries.[58] As was the case with other sites of mourning that lacked a community custodian, the Woking cemetery descended into a spiral of neglect until the bodies were eventually removed in the 1960s and reinterred in the nearby Brookwood Cemetery.

In Germany, meanwhile, the Muslim burial ground near Zossen also suffered from neglect. A neighbouring mosque, which had been built for the POWs, fell into disrepair when the final Muslims living in the region left in the mid-1920s. The building was finally demolished in 1930. Although the military burial ground remained in situ, it too drifted from public consciousness.[59] With the end of hostilities, people were once again forced on the move. Borders changed, loyalties shifted and communities declined, leaving some minorities pushed to the very margins of society. Many minority groups may have played a role in the early wartime remembrance process, but this counted for very little amidst the new realities of post-war Europe.[60]

Forging National Memory Cultures

An important symbiosis existed between local and national memory cultures in post-war Britain and Germany, with shifts on one level filtering either up or down to shape practices elsewhere. A concise example of this relationship occurred between London and the regions. In 1919, Edwin Lutyens designed a temporary cenotaph memorial for Whitehall; such was its popularity that the structure became permanent the following year. Its immediate impact also encouraged a plethora of local cenotaphs to pop up quickly throughout the country. In Chester a wooden structure was erected in 1919 on the town hall square that contained a similar inscription to the London memorial: "To our Glorious Dead". Lutyens himself designed prominent cenotaph memorials in cities including Southampton, Manchester and Norwich. The relationship between local and national remembrance activity was equally true for the position of minorities. In the same way that minority groups struggled to find representation in local memory cultures at the war's end, so they also found themselves increasingly marginalised on a national level.[61]

Certainly both the British and German governments attempted to impose some form of unity onto their countries' respective memory cultures. Germany's republican government, desperate to bring cohesion to a divided country, belatedly launched its first official *Volkstrauertag*

(Day of National Mourning) in 1924. In line with remembrance ceremonies already in place in other belligerent nations, the event consisted of a series of intricate remembrance rituals and speeches along with a period of quiet reflection.[62] A far more powerful evocation of unified remembrance ran through the design of Lutyens's cenotaph, which was dedicated to the war dead from the British Empire. Drawn of simple lines and devoid of explicit symbolism, the memorial encouraged public expressions not of triumphalism but of grief and loss.[63]

Both Germany's Day of National Mourning and Britain's cenotaph appeared to have been designed for the remembrance of all war dead, including those from a minority background. In the run up to Germany's remembrance day, the *Berliner Tageblatt* even went as far as to remind its readers that members of "every German tribe (*Stamm*), every party, every confession gave their lives for the fatherland".[64] The British government had been equally as keen to stress this same message. In his brief to Lutyens, the British prime minster, David Lloyd George, had asked that the "structure should be nondenominational in character".[65] Lutyens duly obliged, ensuring that no Christian symbols appeared in the final design. He even repelled a request from the Archbishop of Canterbury to include a Christian cross on the structure, pointing out that "Indian troops have to salute the cenotaph".[66]

However, despite the talk of minority representation, in both cases these national acts of remembrance proved to be fairly restrictive in scope. The British very carefully selected members of the dominions and colonies to attend national ceremonies at the cenotaph. Representatives from Sierra Leone and Nigeria who had asked to be present were sidelined.[67] Germany's Day of National Mourning revealed even deeper schisms. The event had been shambolically organised from the start. Not only did the government make no effort to invite representatives from Denmark, France or Poland, whose citizens in some cases had served in the German army, but it also failed to consider the country's Jewish communities. The official list of speakers included members of the Catholic and Protestant churches, but completely overlooked a rabbi. Germany's main Jewish organisations rightly registered their anger; the government, though, remained intransient on the matter.[68] Rather than breeding unity, national acts of remembrance in both Britain and Germany proved divisive, precisely because minority victims of the war received only scant recognition of their losses.

It was relatively straightforward to configure war memorials and rituals of remembrance according to the post-war political landscape. As these were new commemorative acts, the British and German governments were free to develop them as they saw fit. Military cemeteries, in contrast, that contained the remains of Britain's and Germany's diverse armies should have proved more resistant to change. After all, these burial grounds had generally been laid out during the conflict itself and as such were fairly well established by the time peace arrived. However, during the post-war years, these sites also went through a process of reconfiguration and change, all of which once again led to the war dead from minority backgrounds being further obscured.

Under the determined stewardship of Fabian Ware, the IWGC was formally established in Britain in May 1917.[69] Its equivalent organisation—*Volksbund deutscher Kriegsgräberfürsorge* (The German War Graves' Commission, VDK)—was formed in 1919 in Berlin. Both organisations set out to turn the provisional war cemeteries scattered throughout Europe into permanent structures in which the dead would be suitably honoured. In approaching this task, the IWGC and the VDK adhered to a very similar set of working principles. Both wanted to ensure that military cemeteries were easily identifiable as such; under no circumstances were these sites to be mistaken for their civilian equivalents.[70] Achieving this look required unity in design and layout. As each soldier killed had apparently died together with his comrades, then one basic tenet of a cemetery had to be to unite the dead together. Each German soldier would be buried in the same way and under a standard headstone.[71] The same held true for Britain, where the IWGC declared that the "headstones or the graves should be of uniform shape and size".[72]

A drive for commemorative unity erased much of the previous diversity that had existed in cemeteries both at home and at the front. While touring the former battlefields of Northern France and Flanders, Michael Adler, who had been the British army's Senior Jewish Chaplain, recalled the personal memorials that soldiers had erected in the aftermath of battle. For the Jewish dead, four-foot tall white wooden markers, complete with a Hebrew inscription, often adorned the graves of those recently killed.[73] After the war, however, there was no longer any place for personal grave markers such as these. The IWGC instigated a programme of renewal, where all existing headstones were replaced with one of the Commission's standard designs. In Germany, the same process of

standardisation also occurred, first with the cemeteries at home and later—once access was agreed—to German war graves abroad.

The result in both the British and the German case was a whole series of uniform cemeteries stretching across Europe and beyond. The IWGC set the standard in this respect. Gone were the individual markers to Jewish servicemen or dead Indian soldiers. In their place, neat rows of Portland stone markers crisscrossed the newly ordered cemeteries. Although specific religious symbols were added to the graves of the Jewish, Hindu and Muslim war dead, these individual lives now disappeared into a vast sea of light-coloured headstones. Germany's war cemeteries displayed the same desire for unity. In Berlin's Garnison Cemetery (*Garnisonfriedhof*) all of the war dead were marked with a small grey stone block that did little more than to record the name, date of birth and death of each solider. Although there was no indication of the fact, included in the long lines of stones were the graves of Polish and Danish soldiers killed while fighting in the German army. Jens Nielsen, originally from Nordborg, and Johan Buttkus who hailed from Fjelstrup, for example, were among several Danes to find their final resting place in Berlin.

The rush for uniformity in headstone design was certainly not to everyone's tastes. The Salvation Army and the Wesleyan Church demanded that the IWGC allow their own emblems to be inscribed in place of the standard cross.[74] The IWGC, though, was far from enamoured at the suggestion, fearing that any deviation in design would be a drain on its time and resources.[75] If loved ones disregarded its advice and continued to push for alternative symbols, the Commission threatened to erect the headstone "without any emblem" at all.[76] This warning proved enough to silence a Mrs Crane, whose Salvation Army son had died at the front. "I think perhaps after all it will be better to have the Cross like the others", she reluctantly agreed.[77] An argument along very similar lines erupted in Hamburg when the Jewish community attempted to standardise all of the headstones in its own war cemetery. A Frau Aron was so incensed at changes to her husband's grave that she demanded that either the inscription be altered or the headstone that she had originally erected be returned.[78]

Mrs Crane in London and Frau Aron in Hamburg may have failed in their attempts to personalise their loved one's gravestones, but at least they had an opportunity to express their preferences. Relatives of the war's non-white victims generally lacked a voice even to have such conversations. Instead it was left to the authorities in Germany and Britain to make

decisions over the care of their war dead for them. There can be no doubting that the IWGC made determined strides to recognise the sacrifice of the Indian and other colonial soldiers killed in the conflict. To great fanfare, the Commission promised to build a temple and a mosque in honour of the Hindu and Muslim war dead respectively and even employed Frederic Kenyon, Director of the British Museum, to design suitable headstones for these groups of soldiers.[79]

As laudable as the IWGC's intentions were, the actual implementation of their ideas proved to be patchy at best. The mosque and temple plans had been quietly dropped by 1920 because of cost and design concerns, while the installation of headstones for the war's black and Indian victims lacked the Commission's usual thoroughness.[80] A 1931 report highlighted a long list of errors with Indian headstones, with misspellings of names, incorrect personal details and even examples of Hindu soldiers buried under Muslim grave markers. "Labr. BADSHA 49th N.W.F. Labour Coy. has a Hindu headstone and should be given a Muhammadan one. His name should be spelt BADSHAH", noted the exasperated report writer.[81]

If the care of the Indian war dead along the former battlefields of the Western Front was poor, then it was even worse in sites outside of Europe. At the war's end, the IWGC faced the momentous task of recording the lives of thousands of Indian soldiers killed in Mesopotamia, Egypt and Palestine. Rather than erecting individual headstones, the Commission decided to concentrate its efforts on several central memorials for the missing. It quickly became clear that even this limited form of commemoration was going to be incredibly time consuming. The Commission's officials had already complained of the difficulties of checking the spelling of Indian names. It apparently took 15 minutes to check the details of each name, but with less scrupulous checks "some eight to ten thousand clerk hours" could reportedly be saved.[82] Unable or unwilling to collect the names of the Indian war dead, the IWGC instead chose to do little more than to list their service numbers. However, "white officers and other ranks", as well as "native officers", were to be commemorated by name.[83]

The pattern of selective remembering experienced by the Indian war dead also extended to black African soldiers. The victims of the SS Mendi disaster did at least have their names—albeit often misspelled—recorded on the Hollybrook memorial in Southampton, along with details of other servicemen lost at sea.[84] Beyond Europe, however, the IWGC showed even less interest in properly commemorating black soldiers. In Sierra Leone, Nigeria

and Kenya, amongst other British colonies, only white soldiers received Commission headstones or full identification on war memorials. In many cases, these soldiers were also reduced to the category of the nameless "missing".[85] The treatment of both groups of soldiers highlighted on one level the centrality of racial thinking within the IWGC, but on another level also the ease by which minority groups were erased from national memory cultures post-war. This history of partial commemoration extended to the German case too. In drawing the boundaries of its remembrance activity, the post-war Weimar Republic focused more on its current citizens than on the diverse range of individuals who had fought in the wartime German army. Whether in Germany or in Britain, national remembrance was extremely narrow, which meant that each country's ethnic, national and religious minorities struggled to have their own war dead adequately commemorated.

In his post-war recollections, Rabbi Michael Adler recalled how his first two frontline services had been for an Algerian-Jewish infantryman and then for a German-Jewish POW who had succumbed to his wounds.[86] Without even highlighting other wartime minorities, Adler had managed to hint at the diverse lines that ran through the British, but also the German military machines. However, as the two countries entered the post-war world, much of this wartime diversity quickly dissipated. These shifts partly reflected a reduction in military strength. After 1918, the German army had to adjust to the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, while the British military contracted to less than 200,000 men. Beyond these structural changes, shifting national boundaries and the emergence of new successor states in Ireland and Eastern Europe also filtered into the military demographic. People, who may have previously fought in the British or German military, now had different states to serve. The transition from war to peace, therefore, had the immediate effect of diluting much of the wartime breadth of the two armies.

However, it was not just the diversity of the respective militaries that evaporated at the war's end; it was also the breadth of the two countries' memory cultures that declined. During the war, spaces, though often limited, had existed for remembering the war's minority victims. Frontline graves and circles of mourning at home had at times captured a wide range of war victims. However, by the end of the conflict, even these limited opportunities had largely faded. On a local level, people generally concentrated on the dead from their own communities, rather than on soldiers from seemingly distant parts of the British Empire or from Germany's former territorial interests in Eastern Europe. Nationally, the picture was

very similar. The two war graves commissions developed their own memory cultures, which also prioritised those living within the post-war boundaries of Britain and Germany over the more diverse demographics of the wartime armies. Crucially, as this chapter has argued, the shifts from war to peace applied not just to defeated Germany, but also to victorious Britain.

Notes

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4. Philip Longworth, *The Unending Vigil: The History of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, [org. 1967] 2010), 37; David Crane, *Empires of the Dead: How One Man's Vision Led to the Creation of WWI's War Graves* (London: HarperCollins, 2013), 177; John Stevens, "The Ghosts of Menin Gate: Art, Architecture and Commemoration," *Journal of Contemporary History* 44:1 (2009): 16.
5. George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Christian Saehrendt, *Der Stellungskrieg der Denkmäler. Kriegerdenkmäler im Berlin der Zwischenkriegszeit (1919–1939)* (Bonn: Dietz, 2004). For a recent challenge to this narrative, see: Benjamin Ziemann, *Contested Commemorations: Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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Germany, 1914–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 291.

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11. Alan Kramer, "*Wackes* at War: Alsace-Lorraine and the Failure of the German National Mobilization, 1914–1918," in *State, Society and Mobilization During the First World War*, ed. John Horne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 106; Claus Bundgård Christensen, "Fighting for the Kaiser: The Danish Minority in the German Army, 1914–18," in *Scandinavia in the First World War: Studies in the War Experience of Northern Neutrals*, ed. Claes Ahlund (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2012), 267; Alexander Watson, "Fighting for Another Fatherland: The Polish Minority in the German Army, 1914–1918," *English Historical Review* 126:552 (2011): 1138.
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51. Richard Grayson, *Belfast Boys: How Unionists and Nationalists Fought and Died Together in the First World War* (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), 171.
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53. Sheen, *Tyneside Irish*, 184.
54. "Bochum—das fremde und das eigene". Exhibition in Stadtarchiv / Bochumer Zentrum für Stadtgeschichte.
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57. IWGC to S. Dutt, February 2, 1945, CWGC, WG1606/15.
58. Director of Works, July 2, 1932, CWGC, UKC10319.
59. Höpp, *Muslime*, 150; Martin Gussone, "Architectural Jihad: The 'Halbmondlager' Mosque of Wünsdorf as an Instrument of Propaganda," in *Jihad and Islam in World War I: Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck Hurgronje's "Holy War Made in Germany"*, ed. Erik-Jan Zürcher (Leiden: University of Leiden Press, 2016), 210.
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68. Tim Grady, *The German-Jewish Soldiers of the First World War in History and Memory* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 100.
69. Crane, *Empires*, 97.
70. Johann Zilien, "Der 'Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V.' in der Weimarer Republik: Ein Beitrag zum politischen Denkmalkult zwischen Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus," *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 75:2 (1993): 453, 457.
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83. "Commemoration of 'Missing' Indian Soldiers," October 10, 1925, Ibid.
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CHAPTER 11

Afterword

Panikos Panayi

It is a great pleasure to have been asked to provide an afterword to this volume, a commission falling to me as the editor of the very first collection of essays on a similar theme published in the early 1990s. That volume, *Minorities in Wartime*, evolved, similarly to this volume's origins, from a conference at Keele University on the relationship between war and minorities in Europe, North America and Australia during both twentieth century world wars.[1]

The origins of my interest in the position of minorities in wartime arose from the PhD thesis I had, at the time of the Keele conference, recently completed and which emerged in book form in 1991.[2] My now classic and seminal text looked at the situation of Germans in Britain during the First World War. The Germans were an apparently integrated minority who had experienced some animosity as the conflict approached because of rising Anglo-German antagonism; however, they had not become the victims of any significant anti-immigrant rhetoric. The First World War, though, resulted in an intensity of hostility that no migrant group in Britain had experienced since the anti-Catholic and anti-Irish Gordon Riots and that no other minority would face in twentieth century Britain.[3] A combination of public opinion and government

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actions and legislation resulted in what would today attract the description of the "ethnic cleansing" of Germans from Britain or, to quote the slogan of the right-wing pressure group, the British Empire Union, "the Extirpation—Root and Branch and Seed—of German Control and Influence from the British Empire".[4] Germans found themselves vilified as spies and conspirators who prevented British victory. As a result, they became the victims of the most widespread riots in twentieth century Britain, had all of their commercial property confiscated (a policy affecting the High Street baker and butcher right through to the Deutsche and Dresdner Bank) and also faced, in the case of males of military age, wholesale incarceration. All other Germans in Britain were earmarked for deportation, treatment that became general policy at the end of the war and that meant that the German population of Britain declined from 57,500 in 1914 to 22,254 in 1919.[5]

While carrying out the research for my PhD thesis, other scholars pointed out to me that similar events had occurred in the USA during the same conflict. This observation led me to the work of Frederick C. Luebke who had published a volume on this subject as long ago as 1974 and followed this up just before my own book appeared with an account comparing the situation of Germans in the USA during the Great War with that of their compatriots in Brazil.[6] Similarly Gerhard Fischer published a volume on the experience of Germans in Australia at about the same time.[7] Since then much research has emerged on the plight of Germans in countries throughout the world between 1914 and 1919, much of it summarised in a volume that I recently edited on this subject.[8]

Germans represent an example of a "persecuted" minority in wartime, which was perhaps the most common experience, but to which we should also add the "integrated" and the "exploited".[9] Immediately after completing my PhD thesis it seemed clear to me that not only did the position of Germans in Britain during the First World War find reflection in the lives of other Germans throughout the world during that conflict, but also in minority experiences during wartime more generally. This acted as the motivation for bringing a series of scholars together to examine the plight of minorities throughout the world during the two world wars. Two contributors to the Keele conference, Tony Kushner and Mark Levene, have also contributed to this volume.

The Keele collection focused predominantly on the plight of the persecuted. Indeed, my own introductory essay to the volume attempted to explain why persecution intensified during wartime and why some nation

states treated their outsider groups worse than others. This phenomenon I explained largely by referring to "traditions of intolerance".[10] Pre-existing tensions become heightened during wartime when the survival of a nation state may seem at stake and when, in the context of the war in the "Age of Catastrophe", total war engulfs all sections of society, both majorities and minorities.[11] In states such as the Ottoman Empire or Nazi Germany, which had already largely marginalised and excluded a perceived enemy group in peacetime, war led to far worse treatment, in these two cases the genocide of the Armenian and Jewish populations respectively.[12] Traditions of tolerance help to explain why the Germans in the British Empire during the First World War did not quite suffer this fate, although they did face ethnic cleansing.

However, minorities do not just fulfil the role of the persecuted during wartime. Certainly many minority groups had previously experienced integration. Jews provide one of the best examples during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as demonstrated in the essays by Sarah Panter, Tony Kushner and Tim Grady in the present volume. This group found itself caught in a trap wherever it lived during the First World War. While Jewish elites, whether in Britain, Germany or Russia, desperately tried to prove the loyalty of Jewish citizens by pointing to the extent of participation in the armed forces, anti-Semitism on the ground intensified during the conflict.

At the same time, we can also point to exploited minorities, whose labour power proved important on the home front. Christian Koller has claimed that: "About 15,000 civilian war workers from South Africa (31,200), the West Indies (8,000), Mauritius (1,000) and the Fiji Islands (100) as well as from China (92,000) and Egypt (82,000) came to work behind the British front".[13] Meanwhile, the German economy also became reliant upon over 2.5 million prisoners of war. Unemployment in Belgium and Russia—both invaded by the German Army—resulted in a willingness of some of the local population to move to work in Germany when recruitment began in 1915. By the end of 1916, the Germans also implemented labour conscription upon the local populations of Russian Poland and Belgium.[14] France also adopted a policy of labour importation during the Great War meaning that as many as 662,000 foreigners moved to the country. The largest number, 230,000, came from Spain, but over 100,000 arrived from North Africa, while over 85,000 came from the Far East, including China. Over a quarter of a million non-Europeans entered France during the war.

These newcomers, particularly those from beyond Europe, found themselves employed especially in agriculture and the manufacture of armaments.[15] Like the persecuted, they experienced racism.[16]

As essays in the current collection have indicated, people from beyond Europe also served in the armed forces of the European Empires. Christian Koller claims that the Entente powers deployed about 650,000 soldiers from the colonies on European battlefields. The British Army used about 150,000 Indian soldiers together with West Indians auxiliaries. France used over 400,000 Africans.[17] These figures do not give the entire picture of the role of imperial troops in the European armies. Shortly after the conclusion of peace, the Government of India published an account of the country's contribution to the Great War, pointing to the fact that it sent 943,344 people (552,311 combatants and 391,033 non-combatants) to a series of fronts throughout the world.[18] While these troops from beyond Europe may partly play the role of the exploited, they also resemble the integrated who lived within European borders because, while they saw themselves as part of the imperial forces, they also remained second class citizens and could face various forms of subtle and more overt racism, as contributions to this volume demonstrate.

Research on minorities in wartime has come a long way since the 1989 Keele conference and the 1993 volume that followed it. Apart from the growth in the study of Germans as minorities during the Great War, the Armenian genocide has seen an explosion of interest.[19] Mark Levene's contribution examining Jews in the eastern war zones from 1914 to 1920 and in 1941[20] not only acted as a starting point for his subsequent monumental studies of genocide[21] in the "Age of Catastrophe", but it also points to the fact that, against the background of the indiscriminate killing of civilians during the Second World War, the study of the Holocaust had begun to gain in importance.[22] Studies of war and minorities in the USA have also taken off since the early 1990s, building on the seminal work of Roger Daniels on the Japanese Americans during the Second World War,[23] with key examples including Jörg Nagler's comprehensive study of Germans during the First World War.[24]

The brief bibliographical foray into the growth in the study of war and minorities simply represents the tip of the iceberg of the current state of war and minority studies that has exploded since the early 1990s. This current volume, with its focus on such a wide range of minority groups—from Belgian refugees and interned Germans through to Muslim soldiers and African war veterans—hints at the ways in which the field has developed.

The real importance of this breadth of essays is that it allows for comparisons. There were commonalities of experience between minorities, but the way these groups moved through the war was always different.

The uniqueness of the current collection, contrasting it especially with my original Keele volume, lies first in its concentration solely upon the First World War and second in the fact that the essays have also examined the transition from war to peace. This often difficult shift from a state of war to a state of peace has increasingly begun to gain scholarly attention, epitomised by Robert Gerwarth's *The Vanquished*. Gerwarth's study focuses upon the Russian Revolution and the collapse of the continental European Empires, concluding with the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, which was concerned with the "exchange of populations" between Greece and Turkey.[25]

This volume, of course, emerges against the backdrop of the First World War centenary. Public interest, particularly in the British case, in the history of the conflict has boomed during this commemorative period. Within this context, there has also been an increasing public focus on the plight of minorities in Britain and in Europe more generally during the First World War.[26] It can only be hoped that this interest survives the end of the First World War centenary, at a time when the world seems set upon a new age of nationalism. As this volume has demonstrated, the war did not suddenly finish for minority groups in November 1918; the shift from war to peace was a prolonged, and often rocky, process. The commemorative centenary of the First World War, therefore, also needs to recognise the legacies that were left in the conflict's wake.

Notes

1. Panikos Panayi, ed., *Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia During the Two World Wars* (Oxford: Berg, 1993).
2. Panikos Panayi, *The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain During the First World War* (Oxford: Berg, 1991).
3. See, most recently, Ian Haywoood and John Seed, eds., *The Gordon Riots: Politics, Culture and Insurrection in Late Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
4. Panikos Panayi, "The British Empire Union in World War I," *Immigrants and Minorities* 8:1–2 (1989): 113–128.
5. Panayi, *Enemy*, 97.
6. Frederick C. Luebke, *Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World War I* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974); Frederick C. Luebke,

Germans in Brazil: A Comparative History of Cultural Conflict during World War I (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987).

7. Gerhard Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914–1920* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1989).
8. Panikos Panayi, ed., *Germans as Minorities During the First World War: A Global Comparative Perspective* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014).
9. See Panikos Panayi, "Minorities," in *The Cambridge History of the First World War, Vol. III Civil Society*, ed. Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 216–241.
10. This phrase comes from Tony Kushner and Kenneth Lunn, eds., *Traditions of Intolerance: Historical Perspectives on Fascism and Race Discourse in Britain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989).
11. Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: A Short History of the Twentieth Century* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), 6–7, taking a global approach, described the "decades from the outbreak of the First World War to the aftermath of the Second" as "an Age of Catastrophe". See, more recently, Heinrich August Winkler, *The Age of Catastrophe 1914–1945* (London: Yale University Press, 2015).
12. One of the best comparisons of these two episodes consists of: Robert F. Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and Holocaust* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
13. Christian Koller, "The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and their Deployment in Europe During the First World War," *Immigrants and Minorities*, 26:1–2 (2008): 113.
14. Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labour in Germany, 1880–1980* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 87–119.
15. See, for example, John Horne, "Immigrant Workers in France During World War One," *French Historical Studies* 14:1 (1985).
16. Tyler Stovall, "The Color Line Behind the Lines: Racial Violence in France During the Great War," *American Historical Review* 103:3 (1998).
17. Koller, "Recruitment," 113–114.
18. Government of India, *India's Contribution to the Great War* (Calcutta, 1923), 96–97.
19. The pioneering Vahakn Dadrian contributed to the Keele volume. See Vahakn Dadrian, "The Role of the Special Organisation in the Armenian Genocide During the First World War," in *Minorities in Wartime*, ed., Panayi, 50–82. The most comprehensive recent study is Raymond Kevorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History* (London: IB Tauris, 2011).
20. Mark Levene, "Frontiers of Genocide: Jews in the Eastern War Zones, 1914–1920 and1941," in *Minorities in Wartime*, ed., Panayi, 83–117.

21. Mark Levene, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State*, Three Volumes (London: I B Tauris, 2005–2013). See also his two subsequent books: *Devastation*, Volume 1, *The European Rimlands 1912–1938* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); *Annihilation*, Volume 2, *The European Rimlands 1939–1953* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
22. For a series of essays stressing the centrality of the Second World War in the Holocaust see: Jeremy Black, ed., *The Second World War*, Volume V, *The Holocaust* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
23. Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II* (London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971).
24. Jörg Nagler, *Nationale Minoritäten im Krieg: "Feindliche Ausländer" und die amerikanische Heimatfront während des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2000).
25. Robert Gerwarth, *The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917–1923* (London: Allen Lane, 2016).
26. See the list of projects supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council funded Centre for Hidden Histories at the University of Nottingham: http://hiddenhistorieswwi.ac.uk/projects/.

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