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ENLIGHTENED COLONIALISM

CIVILIZATION NARRATIVES AND IMPERIAL POLITICS IN THE AGE OF REASON

EDITED BY DAMIEN TRICOIRE

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Damien Tricoire
Editor

Enlightened Colonialism

Civilization Narratives and Imperial Politics in the Age of Reason

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Preface

Enlightened Colonialism seeks to bring together eighteenth-century political and intellectual history in a truly global framework. This bringing together of several continents, empires, and fields of research would be a Herculean task for a single scholar. Consequently, it seemed to me a logical step to seek the expertise of specialists from different continents and disciplines. I was happy to win over to this project eminent and creative scholars from Europe and the Americas. In order to discuss our mutual ideas, I organized a workshop in Halle, Germany, in June 2015. This book is largely – but not exclusively – the result of this collaboration, which took place in both a relaxed and concentrated atmosphere.

editing the language of articles written meanly by non-native speakers. Lastly, I would like to thank the Palgrave team, especially Peter Cary, Molly Beck, and Oliver Dyer, for believing in this project and making a book out of it.

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Introduction

Damien Tricoire

For decades, historians of political thought, philosophy, and literature have debated whether the Enlightenment provided the cultural and intellectual origins of modern colonialism. On the one hand, many postcolonial authors believe that the Enlightenment rationalism helped delegitimize non-European cultures. On the other hand, some historians of ideas and literature are willing to defend at least some eighteenth-century philosophers whom they consider to have been "anti-colonialists." Both sides have focused on literary and philosophical texts, but have rarely taken political and social practice into account.

Enlightened Colonialism seeks to give new insights into this important debate. In particular, the aim of this book is both to further qualify the postcolonial thesis and to show its limits. To reach these goals, it links text analysis and political history, which has little been done so far, at least on a global comparative scale. Most scholars specializing in Enlightenment studies are literature and philosophy historians. They often do not belong to the same academic disciplines as students of colonial history. They do not ask exactly the same questions, contribute to the same debates, and

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apply the same methods. From the point of view of the historians, the link that postcolonial studies makes between literary-philosophical texts on the one hand, and the political practice of colonialism, on the other, might seem a little hasty and still needs to be verified and explored empirically. That is one goal of this book.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND COLONIALISM: THE DEBATE

In her study about anthropology and historiography in the eighteenth century, published in 1971, Michèle Duchet developed a new image of the Enlightenment: instead of fighting against colonialism, major French *philosophes* had supported imperial expansion. Admittedly, they expressed sympathy with the subdued "wild" and "barbarian" peoples but suggested simultaneously that these people should be civilized by the Europeans.[1] Duchet's thesis was one of the origins of a debate concerning the adequate way to describe the link between the Enlightenment and (anti-)colonialism.

Duchet's study contrasted indeed sharply with a long tradition of writing Enlightenment history. "Enlightenment" is a highly normative concept. "Siècle des Lumières" and "philosophie" never had a neutral, purely descriptive meaning, but were on the contrary from their origin on polemical terms.[2] They were used by intellectuals to assert that they played, or should play, a central role in society and politics, and to disqualify rivals like the Jesuits or other *philosophes*.[3] This self-staging strategy was successful in the long run: since the nineteenth century, scholars have often believed that the *philosophes* indeed left their own imprint on a whole epoch and equated the eighteenth century with the Age of Enlightenment. The Enlightenment *philosophie* has furthermore often been considered as the origin of the French Revolution, and more generally of modernity. According to the respective assessments of revolution and modernity made by scholars, Enlightenment can be judged as a positive or as a negative phenomenon.[4]

In twentieth-century scholarship, positive assessments of the Enlightenment have clearly dominated. Most students have seen the Enlightenment as a liberation from religious dogmas, a fight for tolerance, freedom, and human rights. Joseph Fabre defined a canon of four *philosophes* considered to be intellectual ancestors of the Third Republic: Montesquieu stood for the separation of powers, Voltaire for religious tolerance, Rousseau for democracy, and Diderot for the popularization of the new ideas. Paul Hazard saw in the early Enlightenment a "crisis of the European

consciousness" consisting principally in the challenge to religious dogmas. Ernst Cassirer, for his part, did not define the Enlightenment as a set of ideas, but as an epoch which saw the liberation of philosophy from theology. Peter Gay saw in the Enlightenment a rejection of Christian religion thanks to the reception of ancient philosophy. Until now some scholars have interpreted the Enlightenment indifferently as a liberation. Jonathan Israel considers especially the so-called "Radical Enlightenment" as a movement fighting against religion and for the equality of all men, regardless of their beliefs, gender, nation, or race.[5]

For a long time, the scholarship about the *philosophes*' images of the non-European world mostly followed these tendencies (and today still partly does). Even in the 1970s, scholars wrote the history of eighteenth-century anthropology as that of a freeing from religious dogmas. The racist character of these theories was barely perceived.[6] According to Paul Hazard, the growing flow of information from overseas meant a challenge to old certainties.[7] This thesis proved very influential, and many studies underlined the increase of empirical knowledge about different world regions, the global scale of scientific networks, and the great scientific expeditions of the eighteenth century. The confrontation of new discoveries with old textual authorities led at the latest in the Enlightenment period to a reconfiguration of the European scientific field contributing to the birth of modern science.[8] In recent years, some scholars have criticized the Eurocentric tendency of this narrative. They have underlined that the birth of modern science was not a purely European process, but resulted from a dialog of civilizations.[9] However, they do not fundamentally contest the story according to which modern science was born through globalization in the eighteenth century.

Additionally, scholars have searched from the mid-twentieth century on for the roots of modern anti-colonialism in the Enlightenment. Guillaume Thomas François Raynal and Denis Diderot's monumental *Philosophical and Political History of the Two Indies*, called a "war machine" against colonialism, the "Bible of anti-colonialism," "the Bible of revolutions," or "the book that made a world revolution," has until now been considered a major work of the so-called "Radical Enlightenment" because of its critique of colonialism.[10] Some scholars have begun to raise doubts about the scope of the *History of two Indies*' anti-colonialism,[11] however, or even to put fundamentally into question the soundness of this term.[12]

In general, recent scholarship about eighteenth-century intellectual history has had a marked tendency to highlight the "Radical Enlightenment," for

example the authors having fought for gender equality.[13] This emphasis on some radical authors, considered to be the intellectual fathers of liberal democracy, might be in part a reaction to the postmodern critique of Enlightenment[14] which has grown strong in the late twentieth century. John Gray and Alasdair MacIntyre equate the *philosophes'* pretention to propagate progress with an "Enlightenment project," an imperialist discourse demanding a homogenization of the whole world, a replacement of all local and tradition norms with an allegedly universal rationality.[15] In a similar fashion, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Uday S. Mehta have seen in Enlightenment philosophy a tendency to marginalize and exclude non-European cultures from the realm of civilization.[16] In addition, the emancipatory character of eighteenth-century anthropology has been brought into question since the 1970s. Numerous scholars have explored the formation of racialist and racist theories in the Enlightenment period.[17] Some have even drawn a line from these theories to the Shoah.[18] Some students have also underlined the limits of the philosophes' abolitionism.[19] Furthermore, Edward Said's *Orientalism* influenced historiography about eighteenth-century intellectual history, although Said situated the emergence of an imperialistic orientalism only around 1800. In particular, students have shown that Enlightenment concepts have helped to draw within Europe borders between "progressive" and "backward" regions, between "civilization" and "barbarism."[20] Some scholars have considered thus that modern colonialism had its roots in the Enlightenment, due to the eighteenth-century absolutization of the European social model and a corresponding infantilization of non-European peoples.[21]

These new Enlightenment critiques have provoked passionate refutations like that by Robert Darnton.[22] In Germany, Jürgen Osterhammel, an eminent specialist of Asian history, has contested the idea that the *philosophes* had an undifferentiated and imperialistic perception of Asia, at least before 1800.[23] To counter the Enlightenment critique, scholars nowadays often concentrate on authors whom they believe to have been truly committed to human rights. According to Sankar Muthu, Diderot and Kant recognized that all peoples are "cultural agents," rejected the spread of European civilization, and criticized colonialism.[24] Differentiating between moderate and radical authors, opponents of the postcolonial interpretation of Enlightenment refuse to accept that it is legitimate to judge the Enlightenment as a whole.[25] On the other hand, postcolonial scholarship can hardly be denied the merit of having revealed numerous aspects of eighteenth-century intellectual history that had no place in the traditional master narrative of an emancipatory Enlightenment.

Although debates about the Enlightenment have had the positive effect of stimulating research on a broad range of topics and authors, they have also brought historiographical bias and blind spots. First, scholars select, on the basis of a normative premise that often stays implicit, authors or texts in order to prove in a circular reasoning that "the Enlightenment" was colonialist or "the radical Enlightenment" anti-colonialist. Second, the texts, or even parts of texts, are often stripped from their context. The author's general intention and the discussion in which he took part are neglected. For example, Diderot's contributions to the *History of the Two Indies* are singled out and analyzed as if they were independent texts having not much to do with Raynal's general intention.[26] In a similar fashion, the *philosophes'* racist theories are often considered separately from the religious debates to whom they were mostly a contribution.[27] Third, scholars participating in these debates concentrate very much on "philosophical" and literary texts. They barely explore the role of "enlightened" discourses in colonial social and political practice. The thesis according to which the Enlightenment was a critical factor of the emergence of modern colonialism has still to be verified thanks to archival work. This is also the reason for the fourth problem I would like to highlight: students of the Enlightenment often postulate a continuity between the eighteenth, the nineteenth, and the twentieth centuries but only rarely test this hypothesis empirically thanks to case studies concerning certain world regions or policies. In fact, the category "modern colonialism" remains unclear. Should we understand in a rather vague fashion the expansion of European powers in Africa and Asia in the late nineteenth century? Even if the fact that there was such an expansion cannot be questioned, we must be very cautious in postulating a uniformity of colonial societies and policies.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT NARRATIVE AND IMPERIAL ACTORS: THE APPROACH

Focusing on imperial agents, their narratives of progress, and their political aims and strategies, this book thus asks whether Enlightenment gave birth to a new colonialism between 1760 and 1820. On a theoretical level, *Enlightened Colonialism* aims to link the postmodern emphasis on master narratives[28] with the constructivist approach of the cultural history of politics[29] and with the type of discourse analysis associated with the Cambridge school of political

thought.[30] It considers the Enlightenment as a narrative, following Dan Edelstein.[31] In my view, this narratological approach answers convincingly what has probably been the main problem in Enlightenment studies during the past decades: the question of the unity or disparity of the Enlightenment, which is critical also to the question whether the Enlightenment lies at the origins of modern colonialism. Since the late twentieth century, scholars have been debating the geographical origins of the Enlightenment. Three countries have been regularly mentioned as potential birthplaces of eighteenth-century philosophy: France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands.[32] Simultaneously, numerous scholars have highlighted the multiplicity of the "Enlightenments," religious or materialistic, moderate or radical.[33] In all these fields, the discovery of the diversity of eighteenth-century thought has greatly enriched our picture of this epoch. However, the use of the plural does not answer the question whether there was a coherence, or not, of the Enlightenment: using the same concept – "Enlightenment" – even in the plural form, we signify that all the considered cases have something in common, which means in return that we can use the word "Enlightenment" in the singular to designate these common features.

The question thus remains: what did all these "Enlightenments" have in common? Dan Edelstein gives us an illuminating answer. According to him, the Enlightenment is best understood as a narrative formulated on the basis of a new "historicity regime,"[34] or in his own terms, "the narrative of 'the Enlightenment' emerged as a self-reflexive understanding of the historical importance and specificity of eighteenth-century Europe." This new narrative was a French invention which emerged gradually between 1680 and 1729, and the corresponding change in the history of "philosophie" was less epistemologic than narratological.[35]

On this theoretical background, *Enlightened Colonialism* explores whether and how imperial agents, appropriating enlightened narratives of progress, developed new colonialist claims, practices, and strategies. The book does not ask whether imperial agents were truly committed to progress and humanitarian ideals – which would be a somewhat naive question – but whether they used the Enlightenment's historical narratives in order to make claims about the right colonial policy and to plead for colonial reforms and expansion projects. The adjective "enlightened" is understood here in a neutral way, as referring to the "Enlightenment." The contributors to this volume treat texts about

colonialism as speech acts and political discourses. They also ask whether these claims and projects implied new constructions of imperial reality, and thus whether they motivated a new colonial expansion policy and new colonial practices.

Enlightened Colonialism seeks to enter into a dialog with intellectual history, global history, and ethnohistory. For this reason, I hope it will be of interest to scholars working on global intellectual history and on the colonial Enlightenment, both dynamic research fields in recent years.[36] Its topic seems to me also critical for specialists of colonial history and culture as well as social anthropologists using historical methods and sources. Most chapters put an emphasis on the interaction between European, indigenous, Creole, and mixed-race elites. Furthermore, the book seeks to adopt a global perspective: it brings together studies about the overseas empires of Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal as well as the continental empires of Russia and Austria. It tries to provide a global perspective on local phenomena.

ENLIGHTENED COLONIALISM: SOME CONCLUSIONS

In my view, this book qualifies and shows the limits of the claims made by postcolonial studies, according to which narratives of progress initiated a new epoch in colonial history. The chapters about the French, Portuguese, Spanish, Russian, and Habsburg empires demonstrate that imperial agents used Enlightenment narratives from the mid-eighteenth century on in order to plead for a change in policies. In all these cases, they developed plans not only to civilize, but also to assimilate indigenous peoples. Simultaneously, these rhetoric and schemes were rather ambiguous because, while aiming at equality in the long run, they also constructed colonial hierarchies based on civilization, ethnicity, and race.

Chapter two, entitled "The Enlightenment and the Politics of Civilization: Self-Colonization, Catholicism, and Assimilationism in Eighteenth-Century France", dealing with France, explains why colonial administrators could easily use eighteenth-century narratives about progress in history for their own purposes: it contends that the Enlightenment narrative itself was invented in the framework of "self-colonization" endeavors. In the early modern period, French elites thought they had descended from Gallic "barbarians" colonized and civilized by the Romans. Indeed, they even believed that most of their fellow countrymen still were barbarians and needed to be civilized. The Enlightenment narrative was a tool in the

hands of intellectuals in order to claim a leading role in France's self-civilization. This narrative proved highly attractive to the political elites of the country, who largely supported the *philosophes*. It also signified an appropriation and secularization of religious missionary goals and aspirations. Lastly, it stimulated the collaboration between intellectual and governing elites, notably in the field of colonial policy.

At the same time, *Enlightened Colonialism* shows that the scope of the novelties introduced in the framework of the eighteenth-century narratives of progress should not be overestimated. First, imperial agents often used the Enlightenment narrative in an instrumental way without intending to change colonial practice. In the French empire, for example, adventurers claimed to have civilized indigenous peoples, but actually pursued classic conquest projects, as my study of the French on Madagascar establishes (Chapter "Enlightened Colonialism? French Assimilationism, Silencing, and Colonial Fantasy on Madagascar").

Second, native elites actively negotiated with elites of European origin, and could sometimes oppose the assimilation policy. Native elites were aware of the mechanisms of European rule and used them to their own advantage. In the colonial world, they often took over the claim to be civilized in order to mark the difference between themselves and "wild" or "barbarian" groups, but at the same time often resisted assimilation policy and sought to maintain a separate status as natives. This can be seen, for example, in the Portuguese and Spanish empires, as the essays by Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida (Chapter "Portuguese Indigenous Policy and Indigenous Politics in the Age of Enlightenment: Assimilationist Ideals and the Preservation of Native Identities") and Lía Quarleri (Chapter "New Forms of Colonialism on the Frontiers of Hispanic America: Assimilationist Projects and Economic Disputes (Río de la Plata, Late Eighteenth Century)") show. New World or Asian intellectuals also engaged with European narratives about historical progress in a creative way. The case studies by Sven Trakulhun and Doris Garraway explore how two non-European intellectuals appropriated the Enlightenment narrative even if it was intimately linked to claims about European superiority. The Indo-Persian writer Abu Taleb (Chapter "Europe in an Indian Mirror: Comparing Conceptions of Civil Government in Abu Taleb's *Travels* (1810)") and the Haitian intellectual Baron de Vastey (Chapter "Black Athena in Haiti: Universal History, Civilization, and the Pre-History of Negritude in the Kingdom of Henry Christophe") both largely accepted the Europeans' negative views on their

fellow citizens and criticized at least some aspects of European societies and of European colonialism (while praising others). Above all, they rejected racialist and essentializing interpretations of their country's inferiority. In this way, they suggested that their countrymen can and will contribute to progress in the future. They have thus produced their own versions of the Enlightenment narrative.

Third, civilizing and assimilation policies were often contradictory. For example, Portuguese and Spanish officials sought to assimilate Indians in order to gain agricultural land, but at the same time wanted to maintain separate identities in order to better exploit native workers. Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida explores the contradictions in the goals and strategies of political actors in Brazil from the 1750s onwards (Chapter "Portuguese Indigenous Policy and Indigenous Politics in the Age of Enlightenment: Assimilationist Ideals and the Preservation of Native Identities"). Lía Quarleri makes clear that the Spanish officials in Paraguay, while endorsing an assimilationist policy, in fact hesitated between maintaining or suppressing the separation between Spanish colonists and natives as it had been previously established by the Jesuits (Chapter "New Forms of Colonialism on the Frontiers of Hispanic America: Assimilationist Projects and Economic Disputes (Río de la Plata, Late Eighteenth Century)"). Alain Beaulieu also points out major contradictions in indigenous policy, this time in Canada (Chapter "'Gradually Reclaiming Them from a State of Barbarism': Emergence of and Ambivalence in the Aboriginal Civilization Project in Canada (1815–1857)").

Fourth, the claim to be enlightened had different implications in colonies where, on the one hand, large groups of natives lived, and, on the other hand, in the Caribbean sugar colonies, where the major part of the population was "imported" from Africa and servile. Concerning the issues of slavery and racial order, the Enlightenment narrative was intertwined with different, partly contradictory visions. As Trevor Burnard makes clear in his chapter about the origins of British abolitionism (Chapter "Slavery and the Enlightenment in Jamaica and the British Empire, 1760–1772: The Afterlife of Tacky's Rebellion and the Origins of British Abolitionism"), the vocabulary of civilization and barbarism, combined with Christian cultural patterns, was instrumental in the emergence of a discourse about the violence of slavery. But the responses and strategies of imperial elites in dealing with the issues of slavery and racial order were very diverse. The abolitionist elites fought for the liberation of slaves but

had difficulties in recognizing the slaves' agency because they perceived Africans as barbarians. They closely linked the idea of freeing the servile population with plans to civilize and assimilate the Africans. The repression of slave revolts raised sympathy for the plight of the enslaved, as Trevor Burnard shows, but on the other hand slaves' violent uprisings were a special problem to them because they could be interpreted as proof of Africans' inability to behave as a civilized people. Anja Bandau's article, dealing with an abolitionist narrative about a slave uprising, explores innovative and untypical writing strategies designed to meet these problems (Chapter "Jean-François de Saint-Lambert and His Moral *conte* 'Ziméo' (1769) in the Context of Abolitionist and Imperial Activities").

As European–American reactions to slave revolts indicate, the narrative about universal progress in history made Africans appear not only as victims, but also as barbarians, which could be an argument against abolition. For example, in the French colony of Saint-Domingue, free mixed-raced elites appropriated the Enlightenment narrative in order to mark the difference between themselves and slaves, even as they argued for racial equality among free people regardless of their skin color, as Jeremy Popkin demonstrates in his essay (Chapter "Colonial Enlightenment and the French Revolution: Julien Raymond and Milscent Créole"). Their attitude towards the liberation of the servile labor force was thus ambiguous. Furthermore, Caribbean elites often feared that the presence of "free people of color" could hinder their country's efforts to become an enlightened place. The Enlightenment narrative was thus also instrumental in confirming or extending racial discrimination. Lastly, the Enlightenment seems to have played rather a minor role in the first abolition of slavery in the French empire (1794), as Matthias Middell shows (Chapter "France, the Abolition of Slavery, and Abolitionisms in the Eighteenth Century").

Fifth, because of diverse political traditions and structures, the Enlightenment narrative had rather a different meaning in the different empires. We shall differentiate among four groups of cases, as reflected in the structure of the book:

1. Some of the colonial empires already had civilizing and assimilation policies before the eighteenth century. This was the case of the French Empire in the seventeenth century. In this context, the Enlightenment narrative enabled the return of an old ideal of assimilation rather than the invention of a new one (Chapters "The Enlightenment and the Politics of Civilization: Self-Colonization,

Catholicism, and Assimilationism in Eighteenth-Century France" and "Enlightened Colonialism? French Assimilationism, Silencing, and Colonial Fantasy on Madagascar"). Nonetheless, as the assimilation project was embedded in a new universalist narrative, it changed deeply the perception of many world regions. The writings of French officials about Madagascar contended new colonial fantasies, blurring the borders between reports and literature, and silencing in a new way many aspects of Malagasy society and of French-Malagasy encounters (Chapter "Enlightened Colonialism? French Assimilationism, Silencing, and Colonial Fantasy on Madagascar").

2. Other empires had before the eighteenth century a civilizing, but not an assimilation, policy. This was the case of Spanish and Portuguese America, where missionaries had the task of civilizing the *Indios*. In these cases, Enlightenment narratives of progress helped develop new assimilation policies going, at least in theory, beyond the civilizing one of the missionaries. Above all, it encouraged state agents to claim the role played hitherto by the Church, especially by the Jesuits. But, as I have already noted, reality on the spot was often much more contradictory (see Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida (Chapter "Portuguese Indigenous Policy and Indigenous Politics in the Age of Enlightenment: Assimilationist Ideals and the Preservation of Native Identities") and Lia Quarleri (Chapter "New Forms of Colonialism on the Frontiers of Hispanic America: Assimilationist Projects and Economic Disputes (Río de la Plata, Late Eighteenth Century)").

3. In a third group of empires, both civilizing and assimilation policies were largely unknown before the eighteenth century. This was the case of continental empires like the Russian and Habsburg Empires. Ricarda Vulpius analyzes how the Enlightenment led to the innovative imperial policies transforming the empire into a colonial empire (Chapter "Civilizing Strategies and the Beginning of Colonial Policy in the Eighteenth-Century Russian Empire"). Russian state authorities first tried to Christianize "pagan" and even Muslim peoples in order to "civilize" them. They then designed a new territorial policy to force nomadic peoples to sedentarize and speak Russian. The non-Russian peoples were subdued to the same state institutions as the Russians. The new narratives of progress and civilization were also critical to the invention of intra-European colonialism, a new phenomenon in the eighteenth century. As

Klemens Kaps makes clear, some indigenous peoples living in the eastern regions of the Habsburg Empire were now perceived as backward. They were "orientalized" and subject to civilizing policies (Chapter "Creating Differences for Integration: Enlightened Reforms and Civilizing Missions in the Eastern European Possessions of the Habsburg Monarchy (1750–1815)").

4. By contrast, in the British Empire, the Enlightenment narrative had rather delayed consequences. Officials did not seriously think about civilizing or assimilating indigenous peoples before the nineteenth century, as shown by Alain Beaulieu (Chapter "'Gradually Reclaiming Them from a State of Barbarism': Emergence of and Ambivalence in the Aboriginal Civilization Project in Canada (1815–1857)") and Sven Trakulhun (Chapter "Europe in an Indian Mirror: Comparing Conceptions of Civil Government in Abu Taleb's *Travels* (1810)"). In the long run, however, British policymakers often developed concepts similar to those of French or Spanish officials, as Alain Beaulieu's study of the British policy in Canada demonstrates. Beaulieu locates the economic, political, and military factors that initiated the change and influenced its specific form. He also examines ambiguities within the civilization project. Although the three main elements of the project – sedentary lifestyle, education, and Christianization – were initially intended to fully integrate the aboriginal peoples into the colonial world, the new program, as it was implemented in the nineteenth century, instead upheld segregation. The Indians were maintained in a separate, inferior status, and confined to reserves. In the end, one can hardly speak of an assimilation policy.

Of course, these case studies can only highlight a few of the diverse strategies and practices developed by imperial and indigenous actors across the world. Much more work should be done if we want to assess precisely the impact of the Enlightenment on colonialism. However, we can already draw conclusions from this overview. First, there were many similarities in the concepts and narratives of imperial elites in the different empires, allowing us to speak of an "enlightened colonialism" at the level of political culture. Second, the chronology and impact of enlightened colonialism was very different from one place to another, because of both different local dynamics and different national traditions. Third, enlightened colonialism always competed with other concepts and practices. The result was mostly ambiguous and complex, as was the colonial world in general.

Notes

1. Michèle Duchet, *Anthropologie et Histoire au siècle des Lumières* (Paris: Maspero, 1971), esp. 18.
2. Roland Mortier, "'Lumière' et 'Lumières'. Histoire d'une image et d'une idée," in *Clartés et Ombres au siècle des Lumières: Études sur le XVIIIe siècle littéraire*, ed. Roland Mortier (Genève: Droz, 1969), 13–59; Dinah Ribard, "Philosophe ou écrivain? Problèmes de délimitation entre histoire littéraire et histoire de la philosophie en France, 1650–1850," *Annales HSS* 55, no. 2 (2000): 355–388.
3. Andreas Pečar and Damien Tricoire, *Falsche Freunde: War die Aufklärung wirklich die Geburtsstunde der Moderne?* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2015), 11–27.
4. The most prominent scholars criticizing the Enlightenment in the twentieth century were Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer: Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Die Dialektik der Aufklärung: philosophische Fragmente* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1993). On the postmodern critique see below.
5. Joseph Fabre, *Les Pères de la Révolution: De Bayle à Condorcet* (Paris: Alcan, 1910); Paul Hazard, *La Crise de la conscience européenne: 1680–1715* (Paris: Fayard, 1994); Ernst Cassirer, *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1932); Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation* (New York: Knopf, 1966); Jonathan Israel, *A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Id., *Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights, 1750–1790* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Pečar/Tricoire, *Falsche Freunde*, 11–27.
6. Werner Krauss, *Zur Anthropologie des 18. Jahrhunderts: Die Frühgeschichte der Menschheit im Blickpunkt der Aufklärung* (München: Hanser, 1978); Sergio Moravia, *Beobachtende Vernunft: Philosophie und Anthropologie in der Aufklärung* (München: Hanser, 1973).
7. Hazard, *La Crise de la conscience*.
8. John Gascoigne, *Science in the Service of Empire: Joseph Banks, the British State and the Uses of Science in the Age of Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Id., *The Enlightenment and the Origins of European Australia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Historians have discussed the question whether the discovery of the non-European world led to a decline of classical and biblical authorities as early as the sixteenth century: John Elliott, *The Old World and the New: 1492–1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Anthony Grafton, *New Worlds, Ancient Texts: The Power of Tradition and the Shock*

of Discovery (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of the Havard University Press, 1992), esp. 1–7. Concerning the eighteenth century, scholarship underlines the influence of knowledge from overseas in the formation of anthropology, universal history, and comparative religious studies: Robert Wokler, "Anthropology and Conjectural History in the Enlightenment," in *Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains*, ed. Christopher Fox (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), 31–52; Thomas Nutz, *"Varietäten des Menschengeschlechts": Die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in der Zeit der Aufklärung* (Köln: Böhlau, 2009); Lynn Hunt, Margaret Jacob and Wijnand Mijnhardt, *The Book that Changed Europe: Picart and Bernard's Religious Ceremonies of the World* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).

9. Kapil Raj, *Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the Construction of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650–1900* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Arun Bala, *The Dialogue of Civilizations in the Birth of Modern Science* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

10. Israel, *Democratic Enlightenment*, 413–442; Sudipta Das, *Myths and Realities of French Imperialism in India* (New York: Lang, 2012), 25; Guillaume Thomas François Raynal, *La Bible des révolutions: Textes et citations extraits de "L'histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes"* (Millau: Clapàs, 2013).

11. Sunil Agnani, *Hating Empire Properly: The Two Indies and the Limits of Enlightenment Colonialism* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013); Anthony Strugnell, "Diderot's Anti-Colonialism: A Problematic Notion," in *New Essays on Diderot*, ed. James Fowler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 74–85.

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The Invention of the Enlightenment
and the Return of Assimilationist Policy

The Enlightenment and the Politics of Civilization: Self-Colonization, Catholicism, and Assimilationism in Eighteenth-Century France

Damien Tricoire

The introduction to this volume has shown that the Enlightenment is best understood as a narrative born in France. This chapter's main goal is to explore the links between the Enlightenment narrative and the idea of a civilizing policy. In particular, it shows the connection between the Enlightenment's historical narrative and assimilationist imperial policy. This essay also examines some of the reasons why the Enlightenment narrative was invented in France and why it had a special radiance there. To be more precise, it highlights the role of both the French national narrative, and Catholic traditions, in the origins and history of the Enlightenment. I contend that it was precisely this merging of national narrative and religious concepts that suggested a civilizing policy in the French empire.

In this chapter, I argue that the history of the French Enlightenment can be seen as a continuation of seventeenth-century self-colonization

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efforts. As elsewhere, self-colonization in France involved the takeover of a former colonizer's civilizing program by the formerly colonized. These self-colonizing endeavors were one of the main reasons why the Enlightenment narrative gained such appeal in France. And the Enlightenment's self-colonization efforts explain partly why *philosophes* were so strongly supported by politicians. Furthermore, the imperial civilizing policy was also tidily linked to self-colonization. At the same time, as *philosophes* and politicians merged concepts derived from the self-colonization discourse with ideas coming from Catholic missionaries, they turned French assimilationism into a universalist norm.

FRANCE'S SELF-COLONIZATION, THE QUARREL OF THE ANCIENTS AND THE MODERNS, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT NARRATIVE

Scholarly consensus highlights the critical role played by the so-called Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns in the origins of the Enlightenment. This refers to the debate taking place in France around 1700 over the question of whether modern philosophy and art were superior or inferior to those of the ancient Greeks and Romans. In 1687, Charles Perrault provoked a scandal in the *Académie française* with his poem "Le Siècle de Louis le Grand." Perrault endorsed the thesis that under Louis XIV the arts and sciences had achieved a greater perfection than in antiquity. Although this was not a new idea,[1] his adversaries, and most prominently Nicolas Boileau, thought the poem was dangerous because it questioned the civilizational norms inherited from antiquity. Notwithstanding this opinion, and inspired by Perrault, the Moderns developed a narrative about scientific progress over the next decades that eventually transformed into a narrative about social progress which came to be considered the core of Enlightenment ideas.[2]

Retrospectively, the verbal violence of the Quarrel is surprising. Why did the French elites argue with such vehemence? Sara Melzer, writing about the pre-history of the Enlightenment, has argued that the Quarrel is best understood against the background of a postcolonial complex. Since the sixteenth century, French authors had considered their ancestors – the Gauls – to have been barbarians who were colonized and civilized by the Romans. In this context, the imitation of

antiquity had gained a dominant position in art and educational policy: the aim was to civilize further the French. Parallelly, however, some writers and artists reacted to this imitation of antiquity and dreamed of liberating France from the oppressive models of the former colonizer. The Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns was a moment when this debate crystallized and was led with a special intensity. Aside from the self-colonizing cultural assimilation of the French to ancient models, there were two strategies developed by the elite to overcome the sense of French inferiority and to de-colonize France.[3] One such strategy was classicism, a doctrine according to which artists and men of letters should find inspiration in the order and rules which the Ancients had discovered, but not produce direct copies of Roman and Greek examples. The second strategy involved a turn toward the idea of progress in history. Fontenelle, for example, considered that the ancient Greeks were closer to the American "savage" than they were to modern Frenchmen. Melzer argues that those who, like Fontenelle, took up the idea of progress became dominant in the Enlightenment era.

In this chapter, I argue on the contrary that, even as some aspects of Roman and Greek culture were jettisoned, the Enlightenment *philosophie* led to further self-colonization. Although ideas of progress gained followers, Peter Gay's study makes clear that eighteenth-century writers still largely identified themselves with at least some of the classical authors. Indeed, the very term *philosophe* indicates as much. The *philosophes* admired Cicero very much, and tried to play a similar political role to that which this great orator and author had played as a philosopher and politician.[4] Thus the Enlightenment narrative meant less a freeing from classical models, and a decolonization of French culture than continuous self-civilization efforts on the basis of classical culture.

The history of the Enlightenment narrative can surely not be written as the story of a triumph of the ideas of the Moderns. Indeed, the arguments of the Ancients were also highly influential. Although the modern science of nature was generally considered superior to the ancient one, most eighteenth-century authors saw classical philosophers and heroes as ethical models. Especially in the fields of art and political theory, classical authorities had an enormous influence.[5] As I show in this chapter, the Enlightenment narrative was a synthesis between the ideas of both the Ancients and the Moderns. On the one hand, it implied a continuation of self-colonization efforts; on the other, it offered a solution to France's postcolonial complex.

Voltaire's Synthesis of the "Ancient" and "Modern" Theses

Without doubt, Melzer is right in pointing out that the *philosophes* owned much to Fontenelle and other Moderns. The ideals of cultivation and progress were central to the Enlightenment, as was the idea that all peoples were originally savages.[6] Furthermore, Fontenelle was the inventor of the very concept of the "Siècle des Lumières."[7] However, one can hardly describe eighteenth-century intellectual life simply as "decolonization." To be sure, the ancient Greeks lost a part of their immense prestige and were considered a more archaic people than previously. But the *philosophes* still identified strongly with the Romans – France's former colonizers. Peter Gay found this phenomenon quite puzzling,[8] but it becomes comprehensible when it is put back into the framework of the French self-colonization movement.

To begin, I turn to Voltaire's work. Arguably, Voltaire was the author who contributed most to establishing the Enlightenment narrative. From the 1730s onwards, Voltaire developed a master narrative giving to France and its intellectuals a major role in universal history. From the first version of the *Siècle de Louis XIV* (1739), on to the *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* (1756) and finally to *La philosophie de l'histoire* (1765), he expanded the narrative considerably, and added new facets to it, but maintained a fundamental and clear line of argumentation. In the *Essai sur les mœurs*, Voltaire insisted that humanity had known only four centuries worthy of being remembered: the century of Pericles, Aristotle, and Plato in Greece; the century of Lucretius, Cicero, Livy, Virgil, and Vitruvius in Rome; the epoch of the Medici in Florence, especially from the middle of the fifteenth to the middle of the sixteenth century; and the century of Louis XIV. Of all periods of history, so the narrative continued, the century of Louis XIV brought humans closest to perfection. Voltaire wrote with conviction, that the progress of human understanding and the revolution in the arts, manners, and government made in France between the death of Richelieu (1642) and that of Louis XIV (1715) would make France eternally glorious, above all because this happy revolution had also carried science and good taste to England, Germany, and Muscovy.[9]

In identifying modern France with the climax of history, Voltaire followed the track of the Moderns. Indeed, he took over the idea of the "Siècle de Louis XIV" from Claude Perrault's poem which had provoked

the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns.[10] The particularity of Voltaire's work that distinguished him from other Moderns was the thoroughness with which he linked the ideas of scientific, artistic, and political progress.[11] It is these linkages which lie at the core of the Enlightenment narrative.

At the same time, however, Voltaire had a highly pessimistic view of history. As he saw it, history consisted of a succession of wars and revolutions – violent and sudden changes that brought nothing but the destruction of men and towns, and regularly reduced advanced people to a state of near savagery.[12] Such a conception of history was akin to that of classical republicanism which considered that civilization and freedom were always threatened by human passions.[13] It also proved highly influential among the French *philosophes* who acknowledged the possibility of man to perfect himself, and praised the progress that the human mind had made in a century, but also often feared that the barbarism described by Voltaire might return. Most French *philosophes* hesitated between an optimistic and a pessimistic view of the future.[14]

Voltaire described the history of France before Louis XIV as anything but glorious. As late as the first half of the seventeenth century, he opined, France was still barbarous and possessed neither art, commerce, nor industry. French cities were insecure, dirty, and without order nor monuments. Since the end of Charlemagne's empire, France had been ruled by feeble kings, and the country lived under the tyranny of a feudal nobility shut up in its fortified castles. To be sure, he conceded, Francis I (1494–1547) had tried to develop commerce, navigation, learning, the letters, and the arts, but civilization had not taken root and had perished after his reign. Indeed, France had plunged into the worst of barbarism, the wars of religion.[15]

Voltaire's view on ancient France and Europe was very negative too. He endorsed fully the Roman colonial discourse. He shared the opinion of the Emperor Julian that the Celtic dialects were horrible, resembling the cawing of crows. The druids, opined Voltaire, were clumsy impostors who immolated their victims by fire and plunged knives into the hearts of prisoners. Some Gauls, he wrote, even ate human flesh. The Gauls "needed to be submitted to an enlightened nation."[16] Indeed, for Voltaire the best proof of the barbarism of the Gauls and of many other European peoples was that the only information about them came from Roman sources: "We modern Gauls, Germans, Spaniards, Britons, and Sarmatians, know anything of our history, above eighteen centuries ago, except what little we have learnt of our conquerors."[17] Voltaire did not see the lack of sources as a result of the

colonial power relationship. He took it as a sign that the colonized peoples had been too barbarous to even write their own history.

For Voltaire, Roman colonization of Europe had brought only temporary progress. French history was full of relapses into barbarism and indeed, although the century of Louis XIV had elevated the human mind to new heights, Voltaire considered most Frenchmen still barbarous, or even savage. Voltaire feared especially religious fanaticism and superstition, which had led to civil wars and were in his mind still strong enough to disturb the peace.[18] In the *Philosophie de l'histoire*, he explained his opinion that French peasants were more savage than Canadian natives:

> Do you understand by savages, those rustics who live in cabins with their females, and some animals, ... acquainted with nothing but the earth that nourishes them; ... speaking a jargon that is unintelligible in cities; furnished with few ideas, and consequently few expressions; ... meeting upon certain days in a kind of barn, to celebrate ceremonies which they no way comprehend; ... sometimes quitting their cottages at the beat of a drum, and engaging to go and fight in foreign land ... ? There are such savages as these all over Europe. It must certainly be agreed that the people of Canada, and the Caffres, whom we have been pleased to style savages, are infinitely superior to our own.[19]

As his view on history makes clear, Voltaire's narrative certainly did not decolonize France from the ancients. As a *philosophe*, he did not postulate any civilization process in history that made modern Frenchmen generally superior to the Romans. His narrative was ambivalent: it underlined the progress of the human mind and postulated the savagery of contemporary Europeans; it glorified France and barbarized most of its population at the same time. Yet Voltaire felt no contradiction between the glory of France and the savagery of its masses because he believed that its glory came from the intellectual and artistic elite.

Voltaire's narrative thus also gave a leading social role to people like himself – artists and *philosophes* – in the form of a mission to civilize their barbarous countrymen. Repeatedly, he asserted that men of letters and science should be more honored than great conquerors.[20] In assigning such importance to men of letters, Voltaire was very much a classicist like Boileau. For this reason, Voltaire's poetic and dramatic works took most inspiration from the great classicist authors of the preceding century. Voltaire rejected modern aesthetics. For him, Shakespeare was a "drunken savage," who produced the opposite of a civilizing art.[21]

There was probably a bit of self-glorification in Voltaire's narrative that went beyond the dictates of classicism. After all, Voltaire contested Fontenelle's claim to have lived in a "Siècle des Lumières," dating the beginning of the enlightened era only around 1750 – the time at which Voltaire himself became a leading intellectual in France.[22] Nevertheless, the Ancients' influences on Voltaire's narrative are clear in his assessment that the culminating point of history, be it the Siècle de Louis XIV or the Siècle des Lumières, reflected the efforts of learned men and writers like himself.

To sum up, we may wonder if the Enlightenment narrative that Voltaire developed was so highly successful because it enabled French men of letters to solve the postcolonial dilemmas embodied in the Quarrel. On the one hand, the Enlightenment narrative was in continuity with the vision of history held by the Ancients. It acknowledged that the ancestors of the French had been barbarians until they were civilized by the Romans, and that they had fallen back into an almost savage state after the fall of the Roman Empire. It further stipulated that after this relapse, only a few people had stepped back out of barbarism, and only very recently. The French masses and other Europeans still needed civilization very much, and this was the task of the *philosophes* and artists. Such a stance legitimized a new leading social role for men of letters: that of the *philosophe* or, to use a modern term, of the intellectual.[23] For this reason, Enlightenment appears, under Voltaire's pen, as a self-colonization program.

The position held by the Ancients in their quarrel with the Moderns produced a somewhat humiliating postcolonial discourse. Voltaire's narrative, however, enabled a reconciliation between the two sides because it salvaged national pride and gave France a unique historical role in the civilizing process. Not only would French elites civilize their fellow countrymen, but they would civilize the whole of Europe. It is this synthesis between the different visions expressed in the Quarrel that must be considered an important element of the appeal of Voltaire's Enlightenment narrative.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE COMEBACK OF THE PROJECT TO CIVILIZE AND ASSIMILATE "WILD" AND "BARBAROUS" PEOPLES

The Enlightenment narrative would not have been so influential without the political support the *philosophes* enjoyed. The Enlightenment narrative was especially successful in France because powerful members of the royal

court furthered the career of prominent *philosophes*, and "enlightened philosophy" was promoted as a result of court politics.

Voltaire himself was a friend of the most influential French politician of the 1760s, the duc de Choiseul, who unofficially played the role of a prime minister. Choiseul was the *protégé* of Madame de Pompadour, and during the Seven Years War she succeeded in securing power for him. Even after the change of government and Choiseul's exile to his estate Chanteloup in 1770, the *philosophes* had important support at court. Most notably, Queen Marie-Antoinette protected "enlightened" intellectuals. From the 1750s to the French Revolution, one can name a range of ministers who actively helped the *philosophes*: Henri François d'Aguessau, René Louis d'Argenson, Antoine de Sartine, Étienne Charles de Loménie de Brienne, and most notably, Malesherbes, Jacques Necker, and Anne Robert Jacques Turgot. Also numerous *intendants* like Charles-Augustin de Ferriol d'Argental, Daniel-Charles Trudaine, and Pierre Poivre provided aid to Enlightenment intellectuals.[24]

Why was it attractive to members of the court to support the *philosophes*? One reason was that the Enlightenment narrative gave politicians, alongside intellectuals and artists, the mission to civilize their fellow countrymen. It helped influential persons at court to present themselves as friends of progress and patriots, and thus to legitimize their claim to power. Simultaneously, it legitimized a certain type of colonial policy: the policy of civilization and assimilation of "barbarous" and "wild" peoples.

Such a link between self-colonization efforts and an imperial civilizing policy was not a new phenomenon in the eighteenth century. Melzer shows that in the seventeenth century the way the French conceived of themselves as colonizers was intimately related to their self-image as a formerly colonized people. Especially in Canada, French elites tried to play the same role that the Romans had had in ancient Gaul: they endeavored not only to civilize, but even to assimilate Native Americans and turn them into Frenchmen (*franciser*) (that is sedentary, Catholic, French-speaking peasants). This assimilationist policy failed, as French elites recognized by the late seventeenth century, and was largely abandoned.[25]

The Enlightenment narrative about civilizing oneself and others could provide strong support for colonial civilizing policies. It is thus not surprising to see that fantasies about a civilizing colonial rule returned to French political circles in the second half of the eighteenth century, after the Enlightenment was well-established. The work of *philosophes* classified as "physiocrats" (because they supported a vision of government according to

the laws of nature) particularly promoted such fantasies. Physiocrats propagated the ideal of a society based on principles of natural order, and encouraged population increase and more freedom in agriculture. Simultaneously, physiocrats were deeply influenced by Catholic conceptions of history. The very words *civilisation* and *barbarie* were invented by the most influential figure in proto-physiocracy, the marquis de Mirabeau (father of the later revolutionary politician), in 1756, in order to enhance the historical role of Christianity in "softening" manners. The physiocrats took over these terms and postulated the existence of a large-scale civilization process in history. Such a conception of history had been outlined in the late sixteenth century by Jesuit missionaries like José de Acosta, who had classified societies in four historical "stages" and developed the idea that missionaries would first civilize "savages" and "barbarians" before turning them into Christians.[26] Physiocrats took over this "stadial" conception of history and associated through the term "civilization" a series of concepts which were previously partly heterogeneous: the softening of manners, the blossoming of art and science, the development of commerce and industry, and the comfort of modern life.[27]

In this context, physiocrats pleaded for a turn in colonial policy. In 1763, the Abbé Baudeau, who was a pupil of the marquis de Mirabeau and founded the physiocratic journal *Les Éphémérides du citoyen* in 1765, proposed a colonial project based upon civilizing policy. His idea was to buy and then free slaves, and to settle them in new French colonies on Madagascar, where they would work the fields and become civilized thanks to tight control and a military-like organization. In 1766, Baudeau propagated the idea of a civilizing policy towards the natives in North America thanks to a sort of Spanish–French joint venture.[28] A few years later, some French physiocrats began to discuss a colonization and civilization of Africa as an alternative to the Caribbean model. In an early abolitionist text published in 1771 in *Les Éphémérides du citoyen*, Dupont de Nemours not only attacked slavery as inhumane and unprofitable, but also proposed the creation of "some peaceful establishments on the African coast." France would send artisans to the establishments to teach the "Negroes" to produce cane sugar.[29] The first European king or queen to realize this project, he predicted, would be remembered by future generations as the "benefactor of Europe and Africa," and would gain both the affection of humanity and the blessing of God.[30] In the 1780s, French *philosophes* developed ideas for a similar project to be undertaken in Egypt. Claude-Étienne Savary in 1783, and even more

explicitly Constantin François Chasseboeuf Boisgirais de Volney in 1787, propagated the idea that France should conquer Egypt, liberate the population from the "tyranny of the beys," bring the blessing of civilization, and create a thriving plantation economy.[31] These texts inspired directly the French invasion of Egypt in the late 1790s.[32]

THE *PHILOSOPHES* AND THE POLITICIANS

The affinity between *philosophie* and civilizing policy enabled political and intellectual elites to work together. The collaboration between the Choiseul cousins and Raynal is a good example; it led to the publication of Raynal and Diderot's *History of the Two Indies* – one of the bestsellers of the French Enlightenment and a book which was meant to inspire a new, "enlightened," colonial policy. After the Seven Years' War, Choiseul and his cousin Choiseul-Praslin initiated important reforms and pursued innovative projects in order to restore French power overseas. In collaboration with Jacques Necker, who controlled the *Compagnie des Indes*, they changed the nature and responsibilities of the company, and in this way strengthened the colonial role of the French state. The *Compagnie des Indes* ceased to exercise sovereign rights in the name of the French crown and concentrated on trade only. The colonies of the Indian Ocean were now directly governed by the royal administration.[33]

Furthermore, the Choiseul government tried to create new colonies built on philosophical principles. These were to compensate for losses made in the Seven Years' War. One of their efforts was a major physiocratic colonization of French Guyana, in which 17,000 European farmers were settled as a new colony and slavery was prohibited.[34] The experiments of the Choiseul cousins contributed also to reviving imperial expansion through civilization and assimilation of "savage" and "barbarous" peoples. The first such project concerned Madagascar in the late 1760s. This is the focus of the next chapter; here it is sufficient to note that Maudave, the author of the project, was clearly inspired by physiocratic writings.

Raynal wrote the *History of the Two Indies* with an eye to satisfying his patrons' existing interests. Choiseul and Necker patronized both Raynal and Diderot. The Abbé Raynal specialized in patriotic writings for French elites, and his works were commissioned several times by Ministers of War. For his part, Choiseul rewarded the abbé with the attractive position of chief editor for the court newspaper *Le Mercure de France*.[35] As he designed a new colonial policy in the 1760s, Choiseul further commissioned a history

of European colonization from Raynal, who in turn engaged Diderot and other ghostwriters.[36] After Choiseul's fall from power in 1770, Necker became Raynal's main patron, and Diderot was also very near to this politician from Geneva.[37] The result of these patronages was the *History of the Two Indies.*

In conformity with the views of their patrons, but contrary to the reputation they have in recent historiography of being anti-colonialists, the authors of the *History of the Two Indies* strongly supported French governmental reforms and expansion projects. The *History of the Two Indies* pleaded for a strong state power overseas, and contrasted the destructive and violent conquest policy of the Spanish with the fruitful and republican colonization of North America by the British and the French. Indeed, it is doubtful whether even the seemingly radical passages by Diderot should be interpreted in an anti-colonial way. A close view reveals that the *History of the Two Indies* was above all a patriotic book deeply influenced by classical republicanism.[38] Whereas it criticized the selfish behavior of conquistadors, it valorized self-sacrifice for the common good. Following the classical-republican tradition, it had a pessimistic view of history, and at the same time, propagated positive images of settlers developing the colonized land and following natural order. This classical and physiocratic ideal was expressed particularly in a playful chapter about beavers, presented as the ideal republican settlers.

The *History of the Two Indies* furthermore called for a civilization of "barbarous" and "savage" peoples. Indeed, it contains one of the early formulations of the concept of the "civilizing mission." The earliest French formulation was made in 1772 by Maudave, when he suggested to the Minister of the Navy that the Madagascar colony should not be colonized by the usual methods because the colonization of this island was "a sort of political mission," in which settlers and soldiers should be regarded as "state apostles."[39] Maudave's clerical terminology may have been influenced by the example of the Jesuit reductions in America and the writings of José de Acosta, which Raynal implicitly cited.[40] In the third edition of the *History of the Two Indies* (1780), Raynal inserted Maudave's idea of a state mission and appealed to politicians to perform their duty and civilize the "barbarous" peoples:

> What glory would it be for France to raise a numerous people from the horrors of barbarism; to give them decent manners, a well regulated policy, wise laws, a beneficent religion; to introduce among them the agreeable as

well as the useful arts, and to raise them to the rank of enlightened and civilized nations! Statesmen, may the wishes of philosophy, may the wishes of a citizen, awaken your attention! If it be a glorious act to change the face of the universe, in order to increase general felicity; and if the honor that results from it belong to those who hold the reins of empire; let me inform you that they are equally accountable to the present age, and to future generations, not only for all the mischief they may do, but likewise for all the good they might do, and have neglected.[41]

In other passages, Raynal presented the Jesuit reductions in Paraguay in positive terms, endorsing the civilizing policy promoted by the fathers.[42] Indeed, the *philosophe*'s conception of a "soft" and "just" colonial expansion was akin to the Jesuit project of a "spiritual conquest" of the world in which a new universal empire was to be built thanks to mission and civilization.[43] It is interesting to note that in adopting the "civilizing mission," Raynal not only resumed the French tradition of assimilation, but also Catholic missionary ideas. Because the concept was inflected with religious terminology, the assimilation project, coming originally from the French self-colonization discourse, could be generalized for all mankind.

Conclusion

The *History of the Two Indies* thus shows the shared appeal of the Enlightenment narrative to intellectuals and political elites. The insistence on patriotic morality legitimized French governmental policy with values inherited from ancient republican Rome, furthering France's political identification with its former colonizer. The "enlightened" civilizing and assimilationist policy replicated overseas what the French considered themselves to have experienced many centuries previously.

Yet the Enlightenment was not a simple continuation of older self-colonization efforts on the principles of classical republicanism. As the *History of the Two Indies* shows, other streams of thought influenced the new conceptions of civilization and civilizing policy. First is the influence of the numerous authors of the French Enlightenment who explored ideas of natural order and built up theories of natural rights. As classical republicanism mixed with such physiocratic ideas, it was transformed into what Edelstein has called "natural republicanism."[44] Second, some *philosophes* departed markedly from classical republicanism in their conception of civilization. Here too physiocracy made a distinct impact because it rejected the

classical-republican criticism of luxury; to the contrary, physiocrats considered that material and moral progress were linked.[45] This meant that the development of commerce and luxury could be an instrument of civilizing policy.[46] Third, Christian traditions played a great role in the development of the Enlightenment narrative. The very term *lumières* was of Christian origin, and the marquis de Mirabeau employed the terms *civilisation* and *barbarie* to praise the civilizing force of Christianity.[47] Christian influences were particularly prominent in conceptions of historical progress and of historical mission.[48] Even the *philosophes'* application of the classical ideals expressed by Cicero had much to do with their education in Jesuit colleges, as the Society of Jesus considered the ancient Stoic philosopher to have been a teacher of morality.[49]

Most important for the subject of this book, the idea of a civilizing mission had roots both in French self-colonization, and in Jesuit thinking. It was above all the merging of French self-colonization, Christian conceptions of history, and Catholic missionary culture which provided the intellectual origins for both the Enlightenment narrative and a specific type of imperial culture in the second half of the eighteenth century: the enlightened colonialism. The next chapter will consider this phenomenon in greater detail.

Notes

1. Simone Mazauric, *Fontenelle et l'invention de l'histoire des sciences à l'aube des Lumières* (Paris: Fayard, 2007), 177–203.
2. Ibid.; Dan Edelstein, *The Terror of Natural Right: Republicanism, the Cult of Nature and the French Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 3–5, 24–29. Definition of the Enlightenment as a quest for social progress: John Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), introduction and esp. 28; Jonathan Israel, *Democratic Enlightenment. Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750–1790* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 7.
3. Sara E. Melzer, *Colonizer or Colonized. The Hidden Stories of Early Modern French Culture* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 211–218.
4. Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*. 2 vols. (New York: Knopf, 1966–1969), 32–126.
5. Ibid., 37–68.
6. David Spadafora, *The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Matthias Arning, *Die Idee des*

Fortschritts. Der sozialphilosophische Entwurf des Marquis de Condorcet als alternative Synthesis-Vorstellung zum Konzept der politischen Tugend (Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 1998); Thomas Nutz, *"Varietäten des Menschengeschlechts." Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen in der Zeit der Aufklärung* (Köln: Böhlau, 2009); Silvia Sebastiani, *The Scottish Enlightenment: Race, Gender, and the Limits of Progress* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Mazauric, *Fontenelle*, 357–366.

7. Roland Mortier, "'Lumière' et 'Lumières.' Histoire d'une image et d'une idée," in *Clartés et ombres au siècle des Lumières. Études sur les XVIIIe siècle littéraire*, ed. R. Mortier, 15–27 (Genève: Droz, 1969).

8. Gay, *Enlightenment*, 105–106.

9. Voltaire, *Essay sur le siècle de Louis XIV* (Amsterdam (London): Chez H. du Sauzet, 1739), esp. 3–6.

10. Charles Perrault, *Parallele des anciens et des modernes en ce qui regarde les arts et les sciences: Dialogues. Avec le Poëme du Siècle de Louis le Grand et une épistre en vers sur le génie* (Paris: Coignard, 1688); Edelstein, *Terror of Natural Right*, 37–41.

11. Mauzauric, *Fontenelle*, esp. 358–359.

12. Voltaire, *Essay sur l'histoire générale, et sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations depuis Charlemagne jusqu'à nos jours*. 7 vols. (La Haye: Jean Neaulme, 1757), vol. 7, 22–26.

13. Keith Baker, "Transformations of Classical Republicanism in Eighteenth-Century France," *The Journal of Modern History* 73 (2001): 36, 44.

14. Henry Vyverberg, *Historical Pessimism in the French Enlightenment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958).

15. Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV*, 7–9.

16. Voltaire, *Histoire générale*, vol. 1, 3–5.

17. Ibid., vol. 1, 4–5.

18. René Pomeau, *Voltaire* (Paris: Seuil, 1994), 65–76.

19. Voltaire, *The Philosophy of History* (London: I. Allcock, 1766), 34–35.

20. Ibid., 69.

21. Pomeau, *Voltaire*, 49, 54–55, 65–66.

22. Mortier, "'Lumière' et 'Lumières,'" 40–41.

23. Andreas Pečar, "Der Intellektuelle seit der Aufklärung: Rolle oder Kulturmuster?" *Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert* 35 (2011): 187–203.

24. Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, *Choiseul. Naissance de la gauche* (Paris: Perrin, 1998), 103–122; Leonhard Horowski, *Die Belagerung des Thrones. Machtstrukturen und Karrieremechanismen am Hof von Frankreich 1661–1789* (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2012), 355–366; Evelyne Lever, *Madame de Pompadour. Eine Biographie* (München: Piper, 2008), esp. 230–245; Jean-Denis Bredin, *Une singulière famille: Jacques Necker, Suzanne Necker et Germaine de Staël* (Paris: Fayard, 2000), 43–56; Simon Schama, *Der*

zaudernde Citoyen. Rückschritt und Fortschritt in der Französischen Revolution (München: Kindler, 1989), 164–165; Edelstein, *Terror of Natural Right*, 89–90. On Trudaine, see Anthony Vidler, *Claude-Nicolas Ledoux* (Basel: Birkhäuser, 1988), 32–33, 92–94, 122–125. On Poivre, see Commerson's letter to Lalande (February 15, 1769) in Paul-Antoine Cap, *Philibert Commerson, naturaliste, voyageur. Étude biographique, suivie d'un appendice* (Paris: Masson et fils, 1861), 112–113, here 113. See also "Philibert Commerson," Dictionnaire de biographie mauricienne, vol. 4, 1942, 115–116.

25. Melzer, *Colonizer or Colonized*, 75–124; Saliha Belmessous, "Assimilation and Racialism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century French Colonial Policy," *American Historical Review* 110 (2005): 322–349.

26. The Jesuit José de Acosta was one of the first theoreticians of civilization and laid the foundations for the later stadial theories of history of the Enlightenment era. On Acosta's ideas and influence, see Claudio Burgaleta, *José de Acosta, SJ: His Life and Thought* (Chicago: Jesuit Way, 1999), 47–50, 78–98; John H. Elliott, *The Old World and the New, 1492–1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 28–53; Pierre Berthiaume, "L'héritage de José de Acosta," in *Jesuit Accounts of the Colonial Americas. Intercultural Transfers, Intellectual Disputes, and Textualities*, ed. Marc André Bernier, Clorinda Donato and Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014). On the Jesuit accommodation strategy, see also Reis Correia and Pedro Lage, "Alessandro Valignano's Attitude Towards Jesuit and Franciscan Concepts of Evangelization in Japan (1587–1597)," *Bulletin of Portuguese-Japanese Studies* 2 (2001): 79–108; Ronnie Po-Chia Hsia, *A Jesuit in the Forbidden City. Matteo Ricci, 1552–1610* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Antje Flüchter, "Pater Pierre Martin – ein 'Brahmane aus dem Norden.' Jesuitische Grenzgänger in Südindien um die Wende zum 18. Jahrhundert," *Zeitenblicke* 11 (2012), http://www.zeiten blicke.de/2012/1/Fluechter

27. Jean Starobinski, *Le Remède dans le mal. Critique et légitimation de l'artifice à l'âge des Lumières* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), 7–22. On the religious origins of the philosophy of history, see also Karl Löwith, *Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen. Die theologischen Voraussetzungen der Geschichtsphilosophie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1953).

28. Nicolas Baudeau, *Idées d'un Citoyen sur la puissance du Roi et le commerce de la Nation dans l'Orient* (Amsterdam: [s.n.], 1763); [Baudeau], "Des colonies françaises aux Indes occidentales," in *Éphémérides du citoyen ou Chroniques de l'esprit national*, issue 5 (1766): 17–78. On Baudeau, see Chantal Dauchez, "'L'économiste inconnu.' Essai biographique de l'abbé Nicolas Baudeau (1730–1792)," in *Nicolas Baudeau. Un "philosophe économiste" au temps des Lumières*, ed. Alain Clément (Paris: Houdiard, 2008).

29. Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours, Observations sur l'esclavage des nègres," in *Éphémérides du citoyen*, issue 6 (1771): 242.

30. Dupont de Nemours, "L'esclavage des nègres," 244.

31. Henry Laurens, *Les Origines intellectuelles de l'expédition d'Égypte. L'orientalisme islamisant en France (1698–1798)* (Istanbul: ISIS, 1987); Laurens et al., *L'Expédition d'Égypte, 1798–1801* (Paris: Éd. ISIS, 1989).

32. Gabriel Debien and C. L. Lokke, *L'Expédition d'Egypte et les projets de culture coloniale* (Le Caire: Imprimerie de l'institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1940), 18–30, 337–354; Laurens, L'*expédition d'Égypte*, 105–106.

33. Kenta Ohji, "Raynal, Necker et la Compagnie des Indes. Quelques aspects inconnus de la génèse et de l'évolution de l'*Histoire des deux Indes*," in *Raynal et ses réseaux*, ed. Gilles Bancarel, 112–115 (Paris: H. Champion, 2011).

34. Marion Godfroy, *Kourou, 1763. Le dernier rêve de l'Amérique française* (Paris: Vendémiaire, 2011); Jacques Michel, *La Guyane sous l'Ancien Régime. Le désastre de Kourou et ses scandaleuses suites judiciaires* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989).

35. Gilles Bancarel, *Raynal ou le Devoir de vérité* (Paris: H. Champion, 2004), 106–144.

36. Michèle Duchet, *Anthropologie et Histoire au siècle des Lumières* (Paris: Maspero, 1971), 129–130.

37. Ohji, "La Compagnie des Indes."

38. Damien Tricoire, "Raynal's and Diderot's Patriotic History of the Two Indies, or the Problem of Anti-Colonialism in the Eighteenth Century," *The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation* (forthcoming).

39. Archives nationales d'Outre-mer, Dépôt des fortifications des colonies, XVII/mémoires/88, no. 40, 38.

40. Compare Maudave's formulation with Acosta's text: Archives nationales d'Outre-mer, C 5^A 2, no. 11, f. 3; José de Acosta, *De natura novi orbis libri duo. Et De promulgatione evangelii apud barbaros sive De procuranda Indorum salute, libri sex* (Coloniae Agrippinae: Arnold Mylius, 1596), 324 (book 3, ch. 19).

41. Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, *A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies* (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1783), vol. 2, 238–239.

42. Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissemens et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes*. 10 vols. (Genève: J. L. Pellet, 1781), vol. 4, 245–266; Horst Gründer, "Der 'Jesuitenstaat' in Paraguay. 'Kirchlicher Kolonialismus' oder 'Entwicklungshilfe' unter kolonialen Vorzeichen," in *Christliche Heilsbotschaft und weltliche Macht. Studien zum Verhältnis von Mission*

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43. Girolamo Imbruglia, "A Peculiar Idea of Empire: Missions and Missionaries of the Society of Jesus in Early Modern History," in *Jesuit Accounts of the Colonial Americas. Intercultural Transfers, Intellectual Disputes, and Textualities*, ed. Marc André Bernier, Clorinda Donato and Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014).

44. Edelstein, *Terror of Natural Right*, 45–125; Baker, "Classical Republicanism," 40–42, 49–50.

45. Starobinski, *Le Remède*, 7–22.

46. The introduction to the *History of the Two Indies* suggests that commerce brings progress and civilization: Raynal *History of the Settlements*, vol. 1, 1–4. This idea is also present in the writings about Madagascar: ANOM, DFC, XVII/mémoires/88, no. 25, 1; Ibid., no. 79, 52.

47. Starobinski, *Le Remède*, 11–59; Pierre Michel, "Barbarie, Civilisation, Vandalisme," in *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820*, ed. Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt, 7–49 (München: Oldenbourg, 1988).

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Enlightened Colonialism? French Assimilationism, Silencing, and Colonial Fantasy on Madagascar

Damien Tricoire

The preceding chapter explored the link between the imperial civilizing policy and the very idea of the Enlightenment, which partook both of a French national narrative and of a Catholic confessional culture. In particular, it showed that the French colonial policy was influenced by "philosophical" concepts and that the *History of the Two Indies* pleaded both for the creation of overseas settlements and for the assimilation of "barbarous" and "savage" peoples. Assimilation, as imagined in the Enlightenment, was intimately linked to French self-colonization endeavors and to Jesuit missionary concepts. This chapter develops a case study exploring in greater detail the consequences of the Enlightenment narrative on a local scale. It focuses on French colonization attempts (and writings related to such attempts) on Madagascar. As noted in the preceding chapter, schemes to colonize this island after the Seven Years' War played a significant role in the propagation of the assimilationist ideal and led to the first formulations of the French "civilizing mission." This chapter thus asks what was distinct about "enlightened" colonial practice.

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In 1767, Louis-Laurent de Fayd'herbe, count of Maudave (sometimes written Modave), proposed a scheme to colonize Madagascar through a civilizing policy. He claimed that if French administration used "soft" means of persuasion, propagated progress, and established a just order, the Malagasy would freely accept French rule. They would learn French technology, become more industrious, take over French lifestyle, language, and religion, and become incorporated into the French nation within a few generations. In this way, the French would soon rule the whole of the Great Island, as Madagascar was often called, and become the major power in the Indian Ocean.[1] Choiseul-Praslin, who was then Minister of the Navy and patron to several *philosophes*, was convinced by the plan. He tasked Maudave with the creation of a colony on Madagascar's east coast. Because they were undertaken under the explicit idea of a "civilizing mission," Maudave's colonization endeavors on Madagascar can be considered a turning point in the history of French colonialism even if assimilationism had already been the dominant idea in France's seventeenth-century colony in Canada.

Maudave transformed the discourse about Madagascar and the Malagasy. In the mid-eighteenth century, Madagascar had an execrable reputation in French writings, and colonization of the island was not considered attractive. In the mid-eighteenth century, the Malagasy were usually presented as perfidious, ignorant, superstitious, and lazy barbarians.[2] The first two editions of the *History of the Two Indies* (1770 and 1774) follow these negative images about Madagascar. But the third edition (1780) contained a more salubrious image of the island.[3] The mutation of Madagascar's reputation between the second and the third editions of the *History* is symptomatic of a general change in the island's reputation. Between 1770 and 1816, the Minister of the Navy received around 90 memoranda proposing, mostly in similar terms, colonial expansion to the island with an assimilationist policy.[4] Few writings differed in their basic view. A few years after the memoranda began to appear, "philosophical" writings also began to propagate the new image of Madagascar and its potential for civilizing.[5]

The mutual influences between memoranda, philosophical writings, and policy formulation are numerous. The new philosophical discourse about Madagascar introduced by Maudave stood in symbiosis with colonization endeavors. Following Maudave, most authors argued that Madagascar held immense natural resources and could serve as a military reserve. The arguments in favor of colonizing Madagascar pointed to the

instability of French rule in India, and opined that a solid foundation for imperial expansion into Asia could be built on the Great Island. Madagascar's population was described as presenting numerous advantages to those of other colonies: it would not be necessary to import slaves as it had been and still was in the Caribbean because Madagascar had numerous, cheap, and relatively qualified laborers. The Malagasy – so continued the proponents of colonization – were gentle, sociable, and had a talent of imitating civilized and industrious peoples. Moreover, they suffered under the tyranny of their princes and knew neither religion, nor good order, nor luxury. Such conditions seemed to beg for French conquest, but the writers further argued that since the Malagasy were a freedom-loving people, it would not be possible to submit them to French rule by the force of arms. Instead, the French should use "soft" means, showing them the advantages of civilized life. The Malagasy would then rebel against their princes in favor of the French. Thanks to the establishment of industrious peasants and artisans, the natives would learn the arts and overcome their laziness. Intermarriage between French and Malagasy would give birth to new French citizens; Christianity would expand. In the face of the colony's prosperity, order, and security, all the Malagasy would sooner or later submit voluntarily.[6]

In this chapter, I argue that this new narrative about Madagascar and the French expansion introduced new "silences" about native cultures and colonial experience. Official reports, for example, became remarkably mute about actual conflicts and violent events, the native society, or French-Malagasy hybrid identities. Importantly, the "enlightened" colonial discourse about Madagascar and its colonization blurred the border between literary production on the one hand, and reports and memoranda on the other. In the end, the Enlightenment ideals had greater narratological rather than political consequences. These ideals had little impact on colonial encounters, such as those between the French and Malagasy. But they did affect deeply the way imperial actors wrote about their experiences.

Maudave and the Imaginary Colonization of Madagascar

The fact that the count of Maudave developed expansion schemes about the Indian Ocean had largely to do with his background. Maudave was a former governor of Karaikal, who had lost his position due to the French defeat in the Seven Years' War.[7] He had settled on the Île de France

(today's Mauritius) in 1763, and bought a plantation on credit. It was on this island that he conceived the plan to colonize Madagascar.[8]

Maudave was also a great admirer of the *philosophes* and was part of Enlightenment networks. Before taking up the governorship of Karaikal, he visited Voltaire in Ferney in late 1760, to whom he had been recommended by d'Alembert. Following their meeting, Maudave wrote a commentary about the Vedas for Voltaire and promised to link him with a Brahman, whom the "philosophe de Ferney" expected to be more reasonable than any of the "pedants" of the Sorbonne. Voltaire was fascinated by the Vedas' ancientness – and he suspected that they indicated that the world was much older than the Church said it was.[9] The meeting of the two men made an impression on Voltaire as well, who noted mischievously in a letter to d'Alembert that Maudave had brought from India a cultic statue of a phallus, and "wore on his body a great copy [of this God]."[10] D'Alembert replied in turn that the Indians were definitely more reasonable than the Europeans: the former built their religion on a "solid" thing which can be called better than anything "Godfather."[11] Maudave seems to have felt at home in this freethinking milieu, where admiration for the East Indies went hand in hand with a critique of Christianity and sexual jokes.

After Maudave's nomination to the position of Governor of Fort-Dauphin and his arrival on the Great Island in September 1768, dreams about colonial expansion continued to dominate his writings. His visions contrasted strongly with the realities of expansion on Madagascar recorded in his diary, however. Initially, Maudave's actual colonial practice was really influenced by enlightened *philosophie*. As governor, he tried to use "soft" means to impose French rule: he sought to impress the Malagasy elite with a display of the achievements of civilization. But even if the Malagasy were deeply interested in French technique, Maudave could not transform this interest into political authority. Similarly, he soon became aware that he had to respect local social hierarchies; he was not free to pay respects only to those he wished.[12] Before long, Maudave felt frustrated and sought to use less honorable and peaceful methods: he considered making the Malagasy dependent on French alcohol or using violence to force them to work for him.[13]

Moreover, the colony of Fort Dauphin was confronted with grave problems. Many French settlers died from disease. There was little money, few goods, and open conflict. Commerce had slowed to a trickle in the late 1760s, partly because the French administration refused to pay

the Malagasy in silver coins. Imprudently, Maudave formed an alliance with the local chief Dian Mananzac without realizing that by doing so he placed the French into direct conflict with the king of Anosy. Mananzac was the enemy of the Anosy king, Maimbo; Maimbo was much more powerful and eventually won. During all this time, Fort Dauphin was politically isolated and impotent.[14] In 1771, Maudave had to leave Madagascar without having achieved his colonization dream. Fort Dauphin was almost entirely abandoned.[15]

These experiences notwithstanding, Maudave never stopped writing about the efficiency of "soft" colonial policy and the Malagasy willingness to become French. He continuously projected new colonial settlements in his letters to the Minister of the Navy.[16] Maudave dreamed of a new type of colony, based on the work of free laborers, and almost without slaves.[17] To make the strategy of gaining the Malagasy to French rule appear realistic to the Versailles elite, he made out the biggest possible contrast between the principles of his future government and the present rule of Anosy princes. According to him, these were cruel tyrants who cut the throats of their subjects for every small offence.[18] He presented the Malagasy as an unhappy people who would set aside their "indolence" and emigrate into the French colony to escape tyranny.[19]

According to Maudave, religion was not an obstacle to the assimilation of the Malagasy population. To be sure, he conceded that it would take time before the adults would put aside the Islamic influence, give up polygamy and circumcision, and become good Catholics, or, as he put it, "eat blood sausage."[20] He also perceived that the monopoly of ritual sacrifice held by the Anosy princes, along with diverse magical practices, were important caste privileges which the princes would not readily abandon.[21] But in his view, it was possible to teach the Malagasy "the eternal principles of natural religion" and – following Acosta's formulation – to make "men out of them, before they become Christians."[22] This was possible since the Malagasy had "no established cult," but only a few "prejudices of Jewish and Muslim origins."[23] As an admirer of Voltaire, Maudave classified local beliefs and practices as superstitious and thought they were doomed to disappear.[24] For this reason, Maudave never thought he would need religious legitimation to establish his political authority. Retrospectively, this seems an unlikely scenario. Before the nineteenth century, the Malagasy language made no distinction between religious, magical, or political power. Power over others was considered to be transmitted from the ancestors

through rituals such as the sacrifice of cattle. In Anosy, the religious and political elite were the same people.[25]

Maudave never reconsidered his project, but formulated it repeatedly both during and after his governorship. As governor, Maudave was expected to report on the events occurring under him. His reports bear witness to a variety of strategies to avoid admitting that actual experience was anything but glorious. The contradictions are numerous in the diary. For example, he recorded how "Negroes" robbed French soldiers, but wrote at the same time that "blacks" had a great respect towards "whites," a respect which guaranteed the security of the inland outposts.[26] In his letters to his superiors, the governor and the *intendant* of the Mascarene Islands, and above all to the Minister of the Navy, Maudave denied that people describing the misery of Fort Dauphin were well-informed. He declared as lies all reports that the Frenchmen in Fort Dauphin were suffering from hunger.[27]

Maudave thus concealed many problems and invented a positive narrative of the French expansion. While he could barely leave Fort Dauphin because of the insecurity caused by the war between Maimbo and Dian Ramanzac, he dreamed of escape, imagining other colonies that might permit him to trade with natives.[28] His reports provided no information about the war. Instead, they contained detailed plans to colonize Madagascar's southeast, written in the present tense rather than future or conditional, as if the new colonies were already under formation.[29] Narratives about the future replaced the reports on actual experiences.

The governor of Fort Dauphin also used stylistic devices that would let the actual experiences appear unimportant: emphatic enthusiasm and scathing irony distract the reader from assessing the facts. Again, he was influenced by Voltaire, the master of sarcasm in eighteenth-century France. Voltaire's influence was especially visible in Maudave's pleas for "natural religion" and in his attacks against the clergy.[30] Voltaire's ironic style permitted Maudave to suggest his own superiority to the Malagasy and hence to give a hint of his future success.[31] Especially, Maudave presented King Maimbo as a ridiculous figure, comparing him with a wild boar proudly wearing valueless jewels.[32] As a contrast to the laughable existence of contemporary Malagasy, Maudave depicted the future of the Great Island in an emphatic way. According to him, the colonization of Madagascar was "the most glorious and the most useful operation of the past hundred years."[33] Maudave's enthusiasm for progress may have been genuine; but it was also a rhetorical tool to conceal the actual difficult

situation. He used the Enlightenment narrative to tell the story of a glorious and humane colonization which remained purely imaginary.

Beňovský, or the Writing of a French Colonial Novel

The narratological consequences of the Enlightenment were even more visible under Maudave's successor, Móric Beňovský (whose name is often written Benyovsky). This nobleman from Upper Hungary (today's Slovakia) was a flamboyant personality. He arrived in Canton (China) in September 1771, telling a sensational story: sent by Empress Maria Theresa to Poland to fight against Russia and for the Catholic cause, he had been exiled to Kamchatka where he had organized an uprising among fellow prisoners and fled with them and the Russian governor's daughter across the Chinese border.[34] The story was only partly true. He had fought in Poland against Russian troops, but not out of religious motivation (he was a Calvinist). It was true that he had been deported by the Russians to Kamchatka and then managed to flee across the border; but he had not left Upper Hungary at the empress' request (he was fleeing arrest for killing his uncle), nor did he have a liaison with the Russian governor's daughter, as his version of the story suggested.[35] The details in his version are important because they lent him an air of importance in European politics and warfare.

Over the next several years, Beňovský used a similar strategy to win support for projects in Asia, Europe, and America. His self-reports relied on the imaginary worlds of the adventure novel. His narratives convinced numerous contemporaries – and are still believed here and there by historians – that Beňovský had created a major political, military, and economic power in northern Madagascar.[36] In reality, the outposts founded by Beňovský had, even more than Maudave's Fort Dauphin, a miserable existence. Most of the soldiers were ill and had little to eat. Beňovský led wars against small local chiefs, but did not manage to impose French rule on the region.[37] Like Maudave, he had to leave Madagascar after only a few years without having achieved any longstanding success.[38]

Notwithstanding these facts, Beňovský told his superiors and the European reading public the story of a successful and humane colonization. Under his pen, even more than under Maudave's, the information about real events in the French–Malagasy encounter gave way to the writing of what we can call a "colonial novel," which Beňovský invented in several steps. In his reports to the Minister of the Navy, he claimed

soon to have realized what Maudave had only projected, that is to have submitted significant parts of Madagascar to French rule, civilized its inhabitants, and built towns and roads. On March 22, 1774, only five weeks after his arrival in the Bay of Antongila in northeast Madagascar, Beňovský announced to the Minister of the Navy that he had dried the swamps around the colony he had founded, Louisbourg, and built a great range of facilities. Impressed by this, the "chiefs of this part of the island" had sworn allegiance to the king of France.[39] Five months later, in September, he claimed to have built a new colony on a healthy inland plain.[40] The "submited chiefs" were all enthusiastic about the "softness" (*douceur*) of French rule, and voluntarily placed troops under the governor's command. According to him, the manners and customs of the natives had already changed for the better. They had stopped betraying and poisoning each other, and no longer killed small children born on "unlucky days." The other Malagasy begged to live under such a good government.[41] A few months later, he reported that all the chiefs of northern Madagascar had recognized his authority,[42] and that the natives now paid great tributes.[43] In May 1775, Beňovský asserted that he had subdued the mighty kingdom of Boina in northwest Madagascar without having led a war. The Malagasy, who loved the French, had exerted pressure on the king, who had accepted to pay a huge tribute.[44] Beňovský claimed to have established French rule on the whole northern half of Madagascar only with the soft means of persuasion and good example. According to him, the Malagasy came from all the parts of the island in order to enjoy a happy existence under such a just government.[45] Even when he acknowledged that he had waged war on a local population, Beňovský always underlined his humane and just behavior. For example, he wrote that while besieging the Sakalava, he had provided them with food and beverages.[46]

In order to make such information appear more credible, Beňovský made up stories explaining his success. According to a letter he wrote to an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he had walked into the line between two hostile armies and held a speech in order to convince them to make peace. The Malagasy princes accepted him as an arbitrator, and he was recognized as a moral and political authority fighting for justice.[47] Beňovský also reported that infanticide stopped because he had commissioned his wife to hold a speech to the native women. She too had managed to convince the indigenous women, and the wives successfully exerted pressure on their husbands to change the laws.[48]

To reinforce the illusion, Beňovský also sent maps of settlements that did not exist, protocols of councils which had never taken place, and texts of imaginary treaties.[49] He also eventually created a single narrative of his Malagasy experiences for the Minister of the Navy. This "novel" consisted of a day by day narrative of his life on Madagascar, following the structure of a diary. In this text, Beňovský appeared as a lonely hero facing great dangers, suffering a great deal for the French king, but overcoming all the hurdles. Unjustly attacked by natives and left entirely without help from his superiors, whom he accused of acting against the new colony of Madagascar from jealousy, Beňovský portrayed himself has having managed nonetheless to submit the north of Madagascar and to civilize the island's wild inhabitants through his courage and justice. As in his official letters, he not only greatly exaggerated the number of his enemies and the greatness of his achievements, but invented events that never took place.[50]

Beňovský may have had two major sources of inspiration: the patriotic literature about war heroes which was strongly influenced by classical republicanism in the Enlightenment era[51] and the numerous novels inspired by Defoe's famous *Robinson Crusoe*. Beňovský's narrative shared several characteristics with the Robinsonades: the loneliness of life on a distant island; the central role of the hero's efforts and suffering; and the building of civilization by a single man. The Robinsonades were marked by imperial and masculine fantasies,[52] and, as with Beňovský, blurred the distinction between fiction and factual report.[53]

Beňovský's writing strategy was successful: he was munificently rewarded for fulfilling his duties on Madagascar. Even the failure of his aggressive expansion policy and an investigation by a commission that revealed him as a confidence trickster did not prevent his reward.[54] Following his return to Europe, Beňovský's career became yet more complicated. As he had no occupation, he tried twice to be hired as an officer of the rebel troops in North America, but did not succeed despite his acquaintance with Benjamin Franklin. He also tried without success to convince the courts in Versailles, London, and Vienna to resume the colonization of Madagascar. In London, he presented himself as the sovereign of a Malagasy state that sought Britain's protection.[55] For the British reading public, he wrote his memoirs, the last step in the invention of his "Madagascar novel." With this book, he probably hoped to win influential people to his cause and gain British support like the adventurer Theodor Neuhoff, who had been patronized by the British government

after claiming to be king of Corsica.[56] Beňovský's acquaintance Jean Hyacinthe de Magellan,[57] a Portuguese natural philosopher and fellow of the Royal Society in London, was critical because Magellan translated the text into English and saw that it was published.

The memoirs differ in several ways from the diary-like narrative Beňovský had written for the French Minister of the Navy. In his memoirs, Beňovský now portrayed himself as an independent actor who concluded treaties in his own name. The French government, he wrote, had asked him to subdue the island through force, but he had disobeyed and chosen to use "soft" means.[58] He had been successful, he continued, but the Minister of the Navy sent inspectors to arrest him and regain control over the island. Beňovský had received his would-be captors and proudly quit the service of the French king.[59] The climax of the memoirs' narrative is reached when the natives choose Beňovský as an "ampansacabe" or "king of the kings" of Madagascar. Beňovský invented the title "ampansacabe" during the redaction of his memoirs in the early 1780s.[60] According to him, an old Malagasy woman had spread the rumor that he was an off-spring of the reigning dynasty, and the natives elected him as an "ampan-casabe" in a formal assembly.[61] The enthronement allegedly took place shortly before the inspectors came to arrest him. Beňovský describes in great detail the impressive ceremonies, consisting of a military parade, speeches, blood oaths, homage, and women dancing.[62] In the framework of a second range of ceremonies lasting three days and containing among other elements a vow made by women dancing in the moonlight, the new king introduced a state constitution and created a government and laws.[63] One of the chiefs of the region recognized in a speech to his fellow countrymen that before "we lived like wild beasts. . . . Weakened and divided, we were the victim of the strongest, we were evil and deaf, we did not hear the voice of justice."[64]

Beňovský's election as king embodies a basic precept from theories of natural law: as he explains how and why he became king, Beňovský simultaneously describes the emergence of the Malagasy from a natural state and the creation of civil life through a social contract. Beňovský's memoirs are therefore especially reminiscent of Rousseau's vision: under his pen, the wild Malagasy did not live in innocence, but in a degenerated state of anarchy. Recognizing their misery, however, the Malagasy elected a Lycurgus – a historical figure that Rousseau very much admired – to rule over them, but with their consent.[65] At the people's will, Beňovský claimed, he had suppressed the slave trade.[66] Thus the memoirs were

not merely a document meant to gain British patronage; they were also a more complete example of enlightened colonialism, adding elements from *philosophie* to the Robinsonade Beňovský had written originally for the French Minister of the Navy.

It is interesting to note that both Maudave and Beňovský responded to their failed efforts at enlightened colonization by intensifying their narrative. Beňovský's writings also reinforced Maudave's initial "philosophical" image of the Great Island and of the relationships between the civilized and the Malagasy. In Beňovský's case even more than in Maudave's, there was a huge gap between the practices of the French–Malagasy encounter and the narratives produced in the Enlightenment period. In the case of Madagascar, the Enlightenment did not inspire a new colonial rule, but only phantasms about "soft" colonial expansion.

Beňovský's narrative failed to gain the support of the British government, but he did succeed in convincing private men in London and Baltimore to invest in a company that would use his position as an "ampancasabe" to facilitate slave trading.[67] In October 1784, a ship left Baltimore with Beňovský and 61 other persons on board, heading for the Great Island.[68] In 1785, under the pretension of being sovereign, Beňovský began to build a village in the region which he had formerly ruled for the French and – so provoked – the governor of the Mascarenes sent a military expedition to stop him. Beňovský was killed in the French attack in 1786 and died, weapon in hand, as a self-nominated "king of the kings" of Madagascar.[69]

ENLIGHTENED SILENCING THROUGH "SAMING"

Maudave's and Beňovský's cases show that enlightened colonialism was more a fantasy than a reality. However, such phantasms impacted the perception of diverse world regions. Having outlined the transformation of Madagascar's image and the new narratives about European expansion on this island, I would like to show that the Enlightenment led to a reduction of complexity in the description of this part of the world. I argue that we can speak of a specific enlightened "silencing" coming from the narrative about the superiority of civilization and expectations of assimilation.

In Said's model, "silencing" is a corollary of "othering" processes; both begin around 1800 in the texts about the Orient. However, French colonialism after the Seven Years War shows that there was

an "enlightened" silencing which was not linked with "othering" so much as something we could call "saming." This is visible in the case of Madagascar: it was precisely because the Malagasy were presented as proto-French, and the colonial expansion as a process towards civilization and assimilation, that French officials in Madagascar preferred to silence many aspects of Malagasy worldviews, and of their own experience of French–Malagasy encounters. A comparison with seventeenth-century texts about Madagascar reveals a loss of information about the Great Island and the French–Malagasy relationships. This loss of information concerns above all three aspects: violence; cultural hybridization; and indigenous social constructions of reality.

Violent conflicts could question the soundness of assimilationist policy. Maudave's expansion project was based on the idea that if the French used "soft" means, the Malagasy would voluntarily recognize French sovereignty. On the contrary, conflicts showed that the Malagasy princes did not accept French claims. For this reason, it was better for Maudave to silence the evidence of violent clashes as much as he could. This strategy is visible in the way he reported his conflicts with village chiefs.[70] Such a silencing of the violence of the French–Malagasy encounters due to colonial expansion endeavors was a new phenomenon. Seventeenth-century authors had had no problem admitting that the French colony largely lived of raids against Malagasy settlements; they enumerated the villages burned and described the killings.[71] For the seventeenth-century Frenchmen, it was legitimate to punish militarily Malagasy princes who had killed a Frenchman, stolen cattle, or only refused to pay the tribute.[72] Flacourt was proud to have burned down over 50 villages within two years.[73] The French authors depicted wars, in which their countrymen massacred women and children,[74] and severed the heads of their enemies.[75]

Seventeenth-century narratives about French colonial experiences in Madagascar also tell us a lot about French people going native or at least adopting a hybrid French–Malagasy identity.[76] Hybridity was indeed a very common phenomenon because most of the French settlers and soldiers, and even the first governor of Fort Dauphin, took Malagasy wives.[77] Furthermore, the seventeenth-century narratives largely celebrate a French deserter called La Case who married a Malagasy princess, adopted a Malagasy name and clothes, and became a very successful warlord.[78]

As a matter of contrast, such characters are almost totally absent from eighteenth-century narratives. The reason for that absence is not that the French stopped going native: from archival records such as judicial and personal files we know that some Frenchmen joined the Malagasy and even led wars against French colonies. These men, like La Bigorne[79] and his foster son Diard,[80] abandoned French clothing and married local women. Most eighteenth-century French merchants were also married to Malagasy women.[81] The reason for the absence of such hybrid figures in narrative accounts must be located not in changing French–Malagasy relationships, but in the assimilationist discourse: Maudave, Beňovský, and other officials assumed that Malagasy would turn into Frenchmen, not the contrary.

In addition, eighteenth-century authors silenced numerous aspects of Malagasy cultures and society. For this reason, in order to learn something about social stratification before the early nineteenth century, ethno-historians draw their information mostly from a seventeenth-century book, Flacourt's *Histoire de la Grande Isle de Madagascar*, and use eighteenth-century sources only marginally.[82] Authors of the Enlightenment period described indigenous categories less than their predecessors. For example, Flacourt's book provides significant detail about castes and racialism in southeast Madagascar. The inhabitants were classified first as "whites" or "blacks," and second as members of one of the social groups within these "racial" groups. "White" was not used to qualify Europeans, but a noble caste principally of Southeast Asian origin which was considered "pure" enough to perform the ritual of *shechita*.[83] Flacourt also reports myths of world creation and origins of the different social groups and dynasties. He furthermore explains the symbolic markers of social hierarchy, and the privileges and taboos associated with higher castes.[84] To be sure, no other seventeenth-century author gives as much detail about Malagasy society as did Flacourt. But many traces of local social categories still appear in the writings of Cauche, Rennefort, Du Bois, Dellon, and the missionaries Charles Nacquart, Jean-François Mousnier, Toussaint Bourdaise, and Nicolas Étienne.[85] Seventeenth-century engravings also depict the basic categorical distinction between two local "races."[86] By contrast, knowledge of local racial distinctions was largely forgotten by eighteenth-century authors who usually described all Malagasy as "blacks."[87]

Moreover, eighteenth-century authors were much less interested in Malagasy religious practices and beliefs than the seventeenth-century ones had been. The seventeenth-century authors showed no respect for

Malagasy beliefs, which they considered "superstitious."[88] They could not identify any temples or priests, and concluded that the Malagasy had no religion.[89] But they were nonetheless deeply interested in the ways the Malagasy conceived the invisible world. They reported on beliefs in God, the devil, angels, on Islamic customs, the Malagasy version of the creation of the world, the expulsion from the Garden of Eden, and the use of talismans.[90] One author even described the conversations he had with local scholars about the eternity of the world or the reason why we should adore God in the most humble things.[91] All these sources enabled social anthropologists and historians to study the Islamic–southeast Asian influences and the syncretisms in the region of Fort Dauphin.[92]

By contrast, for the authors of the Enlightenment period, it was enough to say that the Malagasy had no religion, but only "superstitions." They were barely interested in describing these "superstitions."[93] Sometimes, they summed up descriptions of the Malagasy religion from the preceding century but did not add any relevant information.[94] On the whole, they judged Malagasy religious beliefs and practices very harshly.[95] This lack of interest surely came from the fact that they expected the imminent civilization and Christianization of the Malagasy. For Maudave and his successors, it was above all important that the Malagasy had "no religion" because they thought it would make the missionary work easier and help to establish French rule.[96] There was no reason to study superstitions that would soon disappear.

Was There an Enlightened Colonialism?

French writings about Madagascar show that the Enlightenment – as a narrative about civilization – had profound narratological consequences. It totally transformed the perception of this island, rendering taboo numerous types of information and inspiring narratives about a half-wild people freely accepting European rule. But it did not transform the practices of the French–Malagasy encounter in a significant way. To be sure, the schemes to colonize Madagascar were inspired by philosophical discourse, and Maudave at least did try initially to gain authority over southeast Madagascar by displaying the symbols of civilization. But Maudave soon found this method inefficient and abandoned it, whereas Beňovský never attempted a strategy that differed significantly from that of violent conquest. In the end, the "enlightened" policy of the French Ministers of the Navy did not lead to colonial expansion on Madagascar at all. In the beginning of

the nineteenth century, it was not France that imposed its rule on Madagascar, but an indigenous polity, the Kingdom of the Merina.[97] The dream of an imperial expansion based upon "philosophical" principles remained a dead letter, very much like the project of a French Egypt, the physiocratic plans for colonies in Western Africa or for an assimilation of "wild" and "barbaric" peoples in America. The Enlightenment had favored dreams about colonization, rather than colonial expansion itself.

Notes

1. Archives nationales d'Outre-mer [hereafter: ANOM], Dépôt des fortifications des colonies [hereafter: DFC], XVII/mémoires/88, no. 26 and 28.
2. Antoine-François Prévost, *Histoire générale des Voyages ou Nouvelle collection de toutes les relations de voyages par mer et par terre...* 15 vols (Paris: Didot, 1746–1759), vol. 8, 551–627; De Barry, *Lettre de M. De Barry à M. G. de l'Académie des sciences, concernant l'état actuel des mœurs, usages, commerce, cérémonies et musiques des habitans de l'Isle de Malegache* (Paris: L. Prault, 1764); Rousselot de Surgy, *Mélanges interessans et curieux ou Abrégé d'histoire naturelle, morale, civile et politique de l'Asie, de l'Afrique et des Terres Polaires* (Paris: Panckoucke, 1765), 138–139; "Madagascar", Encyclopédie, 839–840.
3. Guillaume-Thomas-François Raynal, *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissemens et du commerce des européens dans les deux Indes*. 6 vols (Amsterdam: [s.n.], 1770), vol. 2, book 4, 4–10; *ibid*., 10 vols (La Haye: Gosse, 1774), vol. 2, book 4, 9–16.
4. The unpublished memoranda about Madagascar can be found in the following archive collections: ANOM, DFC, XVII/mémoires/88 and MAD 159 207; Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères [hereafter: AMAE], Asie 4; Bibliothèque nationale de France [hereafter: BnF], NAF no. 9344, 9345, 9381, 9413.
5. Guillaume Le Gentil de la Galaisière, *Voyage dans les mers des Indes fait par ordre du roi* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1779); Pierre Sonnerat, *Voyage aux Indes Orientales et à la Chine, fait par ordre de Louis XVI, depuis 1774 jusqu'à 1781* (Paris: Auteur, 1782).
6. Some typical memoranda: ANOM, DFC, XVII/mémoires/88, no. 61, 81 and 87; ANOM, C 5^A 8bis, no. 187; Séries géographiques, MAD 7 15 ("Mémoire sur Madagascar, par Siette la Rousselière, daté du Port Nord-Ouest (Île de France) le 6 germinal an XI").
7. B. Foury, "Maudave et la colonisation de Madagascar (1ère partie)," *Revue d'histoire des colonies* 41 (1955): 343–404.
8. Foury, "Colonisation de Madagascar (1ère partie)," 343–404.

9. Voltaire, *Correspondence and Related Documents (Œuvres complètes vols. 85–135)*, ed. Theodore Besterman (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1968–1977), vol. 43 (August–September 1760), 126, 167–168; ibid., vol. 44 (October–December 1760), 17–19, 27–28, 254.

10. Voltaire, *Correspondence*, vol. 44 (October–December 1760), 17–19.

11. ibid., 59–62.

12. MHN, Ms. 3001, Journal de Maudave, 12, 35, 42, 45.

13. ANOM, C 5^A 2, no. 66, f. 2, 9.

14. MHN, Ms. 3001, Journal de Maudave, 42, 46, 58.

15. B. Foury, "Maudave et la colonisation de Madagascar (2ème partie)," *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer* 43(1956): 14–81.

16. MHN, Ms. 3001, Journal de Maudave, 26–30.

17. ANOM, DFC, XVII/mémoires/88, no. 26, f. 3 and no. 40, 16–17.

18. ANOM, DFC, XVII/mémoires/88, no. 28, f. 3.

19. ANOM, C 5^A 2, no. 66, f. 26; MHN, Ms. 3001, Journal de Maudave, 55.

20. MHN, Ms. 3001, Journal de Maudave, 22; ANOM, C 5^A 2, no. 66, f. 30.

21. MHN, Ms. 3001, Journal de Maudave, 25, 36–37, 51, 60.

22. MHN, Ms. 3001, Journal de Maudave, 38; ANOM, C 5^A 2, no. 11, f. 3.

23. MHN, Ms. 3001, Journal de Maudave, 22.

24. For example, ibid., 25; ANOM, C 5^A 3, no. 47, f. 18.

25. Solofo Randrianja and Stephen Ellis, *Madagascar. A Short History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 62, 109; Philippe Beaujard, "Les manuscrits arabico-malgaches (sorabe) du pays Antemoro," *Omaly sy Anio* 28 (1988): 123–150.

26. MHN, Ms. 3001, Journal de Maudave, 27.

27. ANOM, C 5^A 3, no. 30.

28. Foury, "Colonisation de Madagascar (2ème partie)," 34.

29. MHN, Ms. 3001, Journal de Maudave, 26–30.

30. ibid., 37, 53–55, 63.

31. ibid., 18, 20.

32. ibid., 24.

33. ANOM, C 5^A 3, Nr. 30.

34. Leon Orłowski, *Maurycy August Beniowski* (Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1961), 108–113.

35. ibid., 11–113.

36. Gwyn Campbell, "Imperial Rivalry in the Western Indian Ocean and Schemes to Colonise Madagascar, 1769–1826," in *Afrikanische Beziehungen, Netzwerke und Räume,* ed. Lawrence Marfaing and Brigitte Reinwald (Münster: Lit, 2001), 84; Antoine Jully, "Extrait du compte-rendu lu dans la séance du 10 déc. 1903 de l'Académie malgache," *Bulletin de l'Académie malgache* 2 (1903): 81; Étienne Jacques Maurice de Villars, *Madagascar, 1638–1894. Établissement des Français dans l'île*

(Paris: Fournier, 1912), 117–143; Jean d'Esme, *Le Conquérant de l'Île rouge* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1945); Paul-Louis Férard, *Benyowsky. Gentilhomme et Roi de fortune* (Paris: Imprimerie Laballery et Brunet, 1931); Mieczysław B. Lepecki, *Maurycy August Beniowski: Zdobywca Madagaskaru* (Warszawa: Ludowa społdzielnia, 1961); Viera Pawliková-Vilhanová, "Móric Beňovský a Madagaskar," in *Móric Beňovský, 1746–1786–1996. Cestovateľ, Vojak, Kráľ. Súbor štúdií*, ed. Michal Kocaák and Helena Rusnaákovaá (Martin: Matica slovenská, 1997), 47–57; Edward Kajdański, *Tajemnica Beniowskiego. Odkrycia, intrygi, fałszerstwa* (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, 1994), 309–332.

37. Beňovský's texts are not helpful in reconstructing the history of his establishment. We must take other sources into consideration. The most important ones are the reports of the inspectors: ANOM, C 5^A 4, no. 126; ANOM, C 5^A 6, no. 12; C 5^A 7, no. 16–17, 24, 32–58, 61–64; ANOM, C 5^A 7, no. 8.

38. The best study of Beňovský's establishment on Madagascar: Prosper Cultru, *Un empereur de Madagascar au XVIIIe siècle: Benyowszky* (Paris: Challamel, 1906).

39. ANOM, C 5^A 4, no. 55, f. 1–2.

40. ANOM, C 5^A 4, no. 35, 105.

41. ANOM, C 5^A 4, no. 36, 47, 48, 49.

42. ANOM, C 5^A 5, no. 26.

43. ANOM, C 5^A 5, no. 28.

44. ANOM, C 5^A 5, no. 41; AMAE, Asie 4, no. 57, f. 131–132.

45. ANOM, C 5^A 5, no. 96, f. 1.

46. ANOM, C 5^A 3, no. 14, 86.

47. AMAE, Asie 4, no. 50, f. 110–115.

48. ANOM, C 5^A 5, no. 36.

49. Map of Louisbourg: ANOM, C 5^A 4, no. 13. Other maps: ANOM, C 5^A 4, no. 46; BnF, NAF no°9413, f. 346. Beňovský sent eleven maps to Versailles: AMAE Asie 4, no. 74. Other made-up evidence: AMAE, Asie 4, no. 49, 52, 57, 58; ANOM, C 5^A 6, no. 11; ANOM, C 5^A 5, no. 38, 41.

50. ANOM, C 5^A 3, no. 14.

51. On the image of patriotic heroes in the eighteenth century: Ronald G. Asch, *Herbst des Helden. Modelle des Heroischen und heroische Lebensentwürfe in England und Frankreich von den Religionskriegen bis zum Zeitalter der Aufklärung. Ein Essay* (Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, 2016), 20, 126–133; Simon Schama, *Der zaudernde Citoyen. Rückschritt und Fortschritt in der Französischen Revolution* (München: Kindler, 1989), 43.

52. Richard Philipps, *Mapping Men and Empire. A Geography of Adventure* (London: Routledge, 1997); Éric Fougère, *Les Voyages et l'Ancrage.*

Représentation de l'espace insulaire à l'âge classique et aux Lumières (1615–1797) (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995).

53. Martin Green, *The Robinson Crusoe Story* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990); Inga Pohlmann, *Robinsons Erben. Zum Paradigmenwechsel in der französischen Robinsonade* (Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre, 1991); Arthur Blaim, *Failed Dynamics: The English Robinsonade of the Eighteenth Century* (Lublin: Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Wydział Humanistyczny, 1987); Philipps, *Geography of Adventure,* introduction and first chapter; Fougère, *Les Voyages,* 51–61, 190–198.
54. ANOM, C 5^A 6, no. 8; ANOM, C 5^A 8, no. 3, 29, 30, 45, 53, 63, 66, 95, 132, 133 and 142; C 5^A 8bis, no. 164; Orłowski 1961, 163.
55. ANOM, C 5^A 8bis, no. 184, 185, 193; Orłowski, *Maurycy August Beniowski,* 208–209.
56. ANOM, C 5^A 8bis, no. 184.
57. ANOM, C 5^A 8bis, no. 235; Móric Beňovský, *Des Grafen Moritz August von Beniowski Reisen . . .* (Berlin: Voß, 1790), iii.
58. Móric Beňovský, *Voyages et mémoires de Maurice-Auguste, Comte de Benyowsky . . .* vol. 2 (Paris: Buisson, 1791), 440–441.
59. ibid., 14–23.
60. Orłowski, *Maurycy August Beniowski,* 162–208.
61. Beňovský, *Voyages et mémoires,* 308–309.
62. ibid., 417–419, 424–429.
63. ibid., 444–461.
64. ibid., 446–447.
65. Denise Leduc-Fayette, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau et le mythe de l'antiquité* (Paris: Vrin, 1974), 71–101.
66. Beňovský, *Voyages et mémoires,* 456.
67. Orłowski, *Maurycy August Beniowski,* 162–215; ANOM, C 5^A 8bis, no. 209, f. 2; ibid., no. 239, f. 1; contract between Beňovský and the merchants Zollickoffer and Messonier, September 5, 1784: ANOM, C 5^A 8bis, no. 190.
68. Orłowski, *Maurycy August Beniowski,* 216.
69. ANOM, C 5^A 8bis, no. 213, f. 4; ANOM, DFC, XVII/mémoires/88, no. 97, f. 5–6.
70. See, for example, his report on the expedition against the village chief Ramihongars: ANOM, C 5^A 3, no. 52, f. 1–3.
71. ANOM, C 5^A 1, no. 16, f. 1; ibid., no. 19, 4–5.
72. Étienne de Flacourt, *Histoire de la Grande Isle de Madagascar. Édition annotée, augmentée et présentée par Claude Allibert* (Paris: INALCO, 2007), 314; Urbain Souchu de Rennefort, *Relation du premier voyage de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales en l'isle de Madagascar ou Dauphine* (Paris: Clouzier, 1668), 78; [Du Bois], *Les Voyages faits par le sieur D. B.*

aux isles Dauphine ou Madagascar, et Bourbon ou Mascarenne, ès années 1669, 70, 71 et 72... (Paris: Barbin, 1674), 77–78; Jacob [Blanquett de] La Haye, *Journal de ce qui s'est passé par l'Escadre de Sa Majesté, envoyée aux Grandes Indes, sous le commandement de Monsieur de la Haye, à bord du Navarre, au mois de Mars 1670* (Paris: R. et N. Pepie, 1698), 54–56; [François Cauche], *Relations veritables et curieuses de l'Isle de Madagascar et du Brésil...* (Paris: Chez Augustin Courbé, 1651), 69–73.

73. Flacourt, *Grande Isle*, 263.
74. ibid., 314, 327; [Carpeau du Saussay], *Voyage de Madagascar, connu aussi sous le nom de l'Isle Saint-Laurent...* (Paris: Nyon, 1711), 205, 237.
75. Flacourt, *Grande Isle*, 326, 339, 351–352, 364; Cauche, *Relations veritables*, 68.
76. Flacourt, *Grande Isle*, 311, 320–321, 365, 372–374, 404.
77. ibid., 268–269, 271–275, 278, 302, 309, 317, 323; [Du Bois], *Les Voyages*, 153.
78. Rennefort, *Relation du premier voyage*, 102–121, 231–233; [Carpeau du Saussay], *Voyage de Madagascar*, 184–186, 216, 223, 230–234.
79. ANOM, C 5$^{\text{A}}$ 2, no. 1, f. 4, 7, 19; ANOM, E 184 (Filet, genannt La Bigorne).
80. ANOM, E 133 (Diard).
81. Nicolas Mayeur, "Voyage dans le nord de Madagascar, au Cap d'Ambre et à quelques îles du Nord-Ouest, par Mayeur, novembre 1774–janvier 1776. Rédigé par Barthélémy Huet de Froberville," *Bulletin de l'Académie Malgache* 10 (1913): 142; Charles-François Tombe, *Voyage aux Indes orientales pendant 1802–1807...* (Paris: Arthus Bertrand, 1810), 89.
82. For example, Paul Ottino, *L'Étrangère intime. Essai d'anthropologie de la civilisation de l'ancien Madagascar* (Paris: Editions des archives contemporaines, 1986), 16–30.
83. Randrianja and Ellis, *Madagascar: A Short History*, 67–69; Beaujard, "Les manuscrits arabico-malgaches," 268–269, 280.
84. Flacourt, *Grande Isle*, 154–159; Jean-Aimé Rakotoarisoa, *Mille ans d'occupation humaine dans le Sud-Est de Madagascar. Anosy, une île au milieu des terres* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998), 99–103.
85. Nivoelisoa Galibert, (ed.), *À l'angle de la Grande Maison. Les Lazaristes de Madagascar: Correspondance avec Vincent de Paul* (Paris: Presses Paris Sorbonne, 2007), 19–21, 206, 309; Cauche, *Relations veritables*, 10; [Du Bois], *Les Voyages*, 108; Rennefort, *Relation du premier voyage*, 238; Urbain Souchu de Rennefort, *Histoire des Indes orientales. Transcription du texte original par Dominique Huet* (Sainte-Clothilde: ARS Terres Créoles, 1988 [first edition in 1688]), 148; Charles Dellon, *Nouvelle Relation d'un voyage fait aux Indes orientales...* (Amsterdam: Marret, 1699), 22.

86. See the engravings in: Flacourt, *Grande Isle*; [Carpeau du Saussay], *Voyage de Madagascar* (engravings between the pages 246 and 247 and between the pages 248 and 249).
87. For example, ANOM, MAD 150 207; Alexis-Marie Rochon, *Voyage à Madagascar et aux Indes Orientales* (Paris: Prault, 1791), 30; ANOM, DFC, XVII/mémoires/88, no. 40, 20; ibid., no. 43, 6–10, 16; ibid., no. 51, 2; ibid., no. 52, 1; ibid., no. 79, 16, 24, 33–37; ANOM, Séries géographiques, MAD 150 207 (memoranda: [Cossigny?] "Mémoire où l'on propose un établissement à Madagascar et où l'on s'attache à en prouver l'importance et l'avantage"; "Observations sur Madagascar"; "Madagascar"; "Mémoire sur Madagascar"; "Réponse aux eclaircissements demandés sur l'île de Madagascar."
88. Flacourt, *Grande Isle*, 332, 347–348; Rennefort, *Histoire des Indes orientales*, 152, 245–246.
89. Flacourt, *Grande Isle*, 126, 321, 332, 421.
90. Cauche, *Relations veritables*, 49–62, 119–123; Flacourt, *Grande Isle*, 159–168, 332, 347.
91. Rennefort, *Histoire des Indes orientales*, 152–153, 245–246.
92. Ottino, *L'Étrangère intime;* Rakotoarisoa, *Mille ans d'occupation*.
93. ANOM, DFC, XVII/mémoires/88, no. 40, 3, 20; ibid., no. 81, f. 8; Sonnerat, *Voyage aux Indes Orientales*, 62.
94. For example, Prévost, *Histoire générale*, vol. 8, 601; Jacques Grasset de Saint-Sauveur, *Costumes civils actuels de tous les peuples connus, dessinés d'après nature, gravés et coloriés, accompagnés d'une notice historique sur leurs costumes, mœurs, religions, etc.* (Paris: Pavard, 1784–1788), 87–88.
95. De Barry, *Lettre de M. De Barry*, 5; Raynal, *Histoire philosophique* (1770), vol. 2, 5; "Madagascar," Encyclopédie, 839.
96. ANOM, DFC, XVII/mémoires/88, no. 14, f. 1; ibid., no. 26, f. 2, 5–6; ibid., no. 27, f. 2; ibid., no. 40, 6, 20; ibid., no. 81, f. 8.
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From Civilizing to Assimilationist Policy

Portuguese Indigenous Policy and Indigenous Politics in the Age of Enlightenment: Assimilationist Ideals and the Preservation of Native Identities

Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida

Portugal's administration of Brazil underwent significant change during the mid-eighteenth century regime of Marquês de Pombal[1] (Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, 1699–1782), prime minister to Dom José I and one of the principal advocates of Enlightenment thought in the kingdom. Various reforms were implemented to strengthen Portugal both politically and economically.[2] The main objectives were to increase tax revenue from the colony and expand its internal frontiers, while demarcating Portuguese holdings and protecting them from hostile Indians and foreign explorers, particularly after the signing of the Treaty of Madrid.[3]

Disputes with the Spanish Crown over American territory received special attention, as they had spurred diverse negotiations and conflicts involving representatives of local and metropolitan power, colonists, and native groups. The indigenous themselves, particularly in frontier regions, were keenly desired by both kingdoms in the form of royal subjects who

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could guarantee sovereignty of the occupied lands. From these pragmatic concerns developed a new approach to existing indigenous policy in Portugal that introduced the objective of assimilating Indians, which would render them into loyal Christian subjects of the king equal to any other in the colony.

Recent research has emphasized the importance of considering the actions of indigenous peoples as important variables for understanding historical processes involving these groups. No longer are Indians viewed as simple, defenseless victims of a seamless colonial system that yielded them no space for agency. Indeed, their many opportunities to act and speak (even while submitted to restraint and threats of violence) in search of better conditions of survival, through such strategies as novel articulations of culture, social networks, and identity, have been the focus of substantial interdisciplinary scholarship.[4] The understanding of culture and ethnicity as shifting products of history that continually transform through social interactions permits new perspectives into inter-ethnic relations and the processes of racial mixture (*mestiçagem*).[5] Analyses of the indigenous policy of the Portuguese Crown therefore also involve the political and cultural expressions of indigenous peoples, which gave it both limits and new possibilities and hence influenced its trajectories.

In this essay I explore Pombaline indigenous policy with a focus on the Indians who interacted with it in diverse ways in order to understand the limitations and contradictions of Enlightenment ideas, which, adapted to local circumstances, were appropriated by the different actors in a variety of ways. The study is centered in the captaincy of Rio de Janeiro, but includes comparative research from other regions in Brazil. Considering the actions and interests of a broader range of social agents reveals the complexity of the political dynamic between them, and discourages conceiving them reductively as static, monolithic blocs. The law was created in a context of disputes and agreements between the various colonial and metropolitan agents, including secular and religious authorities.[6] Indians, colonial residents, authorities, and other power brokers could cooperate or altercate according to circumstances and their interests, which were continually modified and re-expressed along the course of their interactions. A key insight emerging from this approach to the research is that assimilationist discourses coexisted in historical engagement with the preservation of ethnic differences. This is clear from many contradictions present in period documentation, including written law and the political rhetoric of

various actors in conflict. In fact, the application of the new policy was essentially based on a preservation of differences that served the distinct interests of officials, colonials, and Indians alike. Equality, freedom, progress and civilization were ideas that guided the indigenous policy, but meant different things to the various actors. They did not prevent the preservation of differences and in fact supported the application of the new law, to the extent that the differences served the interests of the officials, colony residents, and Indians alike. The limitations and contradictions of Portuguese Enlightenment policy become clearly visible in analyses that link the proposed indigenous policy to the political action of the agents, including the indigenous peoples.

Pombaline Reforms and Enlightenment

Pombal's policy towards the Indians must be understood within the broader context of his reforms, which aimed primarily at strengthening the absolute power of the Portuguese Crown and reviving the Portuguese economy. Without elaborating upon the discussion of the many controversies entailed with Pombaline reforms, it is important to think about how they were influenced by the Enlightenment, considering the specificities of Portugal and the ruptures and continuities that stood in relation to previous policies.

The enlightened character of eighteenth-century Portuguese policy must be considered by taking into account the political, economic, and social characteristics of the kingdom, ruled by an absolutist monarchy, whose power was challenged by the ecclesiastical hegemony over civil society, and by the increasing power of a manorial aristocracy.[7] These segments, added to the anti-monopolistic segment made up of merchant bourgeoisie, were the chief targets of the Pombaline policy that sought to eliminate all forms of opposition to the state, correcting abuses and modernizing the administrative structure. The imported ideology was established there beneath a reformism promoted by an "enlightened monarchy," very close, in fact, to the "enlightened despotism" of the "philosophers."[8]

The Enlightenment slowly penetrated the kingdoms of Iberia beginning in the first half of the 1700s, gathering strength mid-century with the reformist practices put into place mainly under the authority of Pombal in Portugal and Carlos III in Spain. Their reforms were developed in light of the new ideas adapted to the realities of their kingdoms, and despite the fact that they presented significant differences, they were not that far apart

with regard to their broader objectives and some of the practices carried out. Above all, they aimed to strengthen the absolutist power of the kings and revive the economies of their kingdoms, battling the segments that challenged them and exerting more control over their American colonies.[9]

Without delving into the discussion among historians about the ruptures and/or continuities of Enlightenment-influenced reforms before and after Pombaline rule, it is worth noting that the changes wrought by the Enlightenment had already been visible since the reign of D. João V and extended through the end of the century.[10] According to Falcon, Enlightenment ideas in Portugal were more strongly expressed in the realm of education, cloaked as an eminently political issue, at two critical points in time: upon publication of Verney's work *O Verdadeiro Método de Estudar* (1746) and during the tenure of Pombal (1750–1777).[11]

A series of false starts between progressive and conservative ideas marked the enlightened nature of Pombaline reforms and the rhetoric of principal representatives of the Enlightenment in the kingdom. Among them were Luís Antônio Verney and Antonio Ribeiro Sanches who, like Pombal, were among the so-called *estrangeirados*, Portuguese intellectuals,[12] who, having lived abroad, developed critical ideas with regard to the archaism of Portuguese society based on comparisons with more advanced societies of other kingdoms. They attributed Portugal's political and economic decline to the excessive power wielded by the clergy (especially the Jesuits, with their control over the educational sector), the Inquisition, and manorial nobility. Some of Pombal's goals involved controlling the power of these sectors without entirely removing them in order to strengthen a secular state that valued rational philosophy and experimental science as a way to overcome problems.[13]

Strengthening mercantilism and the monarchy were central goals of Pombal and were to be achieved through culture and education. The political, the economic, and the cultural came together in his discourses, in which the development of science and the arts was associated with overcoming backwardness.[14]

Educational reforms, influenced by the ideas of Locke, Newton, and Montesquieu had a distinctly political slant, since their chief aim was shaping men qualified to govern, in service to the state and not the Church.[15] The secular state should upstage the ecclesiastical sector and manorial nobility, which would be controlled, yet preserved. Portugal's enlightened pragmatism linked together universities, the Church and the state.[16]

Locke's empiricism, minus his liberal political assumptions, was welcomed in the educational reforms. Voltaire's notion of differentiated and exclusionary education had prevailed over that of Rousseau because it adopted differentiated instruction according to the social classes.[17] Although battle was waged against the "parasitic" nobility, its members were encouraged to study in order to occupy key posts of power in the government.[18]

The ideas of freedom, civilization, progress, and equality, so dear to the Enlightenment, guided some reforms in both the metropole and the colony, adapted as necessary. Measures were quite limited regarding the freedom of enslaved Africans and Indians. The former were freed in the kingdom but remained enslaved in the colony. The Indians were freed from slavery by a 1755 law,[19] but considered inferior and incapable of self-government, they remained under the aegis of a secular official responsible for civilizing them so that they could become just like the other vassals of the king, and thus contribute to the advancement of the kingdom. The principles of the Enlightenment were applied pragmatically and in contradictory fashion, well according to local circumstances and challenges. Such challenges included the numerous responses by different indigenous peoples from the backlands and villages to policies drafted for them that were also inevitably quite varied, as discussed later.

INDIGENOUS POLICY UNDER POMBAL: RUPTURES AND CONTINUITIES

If Pombal's reforms sent Portuguese indigenous policy in new directions, they were also rooted in themes of longstanding interest to the metropole as well as substantial legal precedent. Since the sixteenth century, the Crown had sought to integrate native peoples into colonial society, valuing especially those regarded as allies – and particularly any friendly leaders among the populations, who had special prestige as intermediaries between Indians and colonizers. The Portuguese had long depended heavily on natives for the successful function of the colony. Dividing them into two categories, "tame" (allies) and "wild" (enemies), legislation from the early colonial period established that the former should relocate near colonial settlements in formally organized, dedicated Indian villages (*aldeias*), while the latter could be battled in "just wars" and, once vanquished, legally enslaved.[20]

In the colonial villages, Indians were required to undergo a process of total re-socialization in order to abandon the state of savagery and become loyal Christian subjects. Prohibited from engaging in ancient cultural and religious practices, they were forced to abandon their traditions and adopt, in addition to Catholicism, new behaviors and values, and cultural, political, and economic practices of the Portuguese world. The damage was immense. They were vulnerable to discriminatory statutes regarding "blood purity" (*limpeza de sangue*), which precluded them from occupying positions of public or ecclesiastical authority, or receiving honorific titles. They were also obligated to perform compulsory labor. Nonetheless, they had specific juridical conditions that distinguished them from others and, apart from the damage, were guaranteed some rights, which they learned to both exercise and defend.[21]

Notable among these were the right to communal life in the villages based on collective landownership, and the right to not be enslaved. Documents from Rio de Janeiro's colonial settlements demonstrate that Indians would actively negotiate with the Portuguese to obtain the benefits promised them by law. From the Jesuits they learned cultural practices and political techniques to deploy in their struggles with colonial powers to improve their condition. They not only engaged with but also participated in the cultural politics of the Old Regime, trading services for royal favors the way non-indigenous subjects did. There are many instances of Indians addressing themselves to the king to solicit favors in exchange for collaboration with local colonial efforts, principally in warfare. In their petitions they presented themselves as "settled" Indians and loyal Christian subjects, assuming the generic identity that was imposed by the Portuguese Crown. They were careful to use their Christian names, given at baptism, and refer to their particular village of residence. A few even managed to follow their political ambitions all the way to Portugal to make their demands to authorities at the seat of royal power. The colonial Indian villages should thus be comprehended as complex spaces in which it was possible not merely to survive but to develop political sophistication and advocate for rights and interests, as well as to reconstruct cultures, identities, and sociability networks through intense processes of socio-cultural mixture.[22]

In the mid-eighteenth century, when Pombal's assimilationist indigenous policy sought to transform Indian villages into actual Portuguese settlements, thereby doing away with the distinctions between native and Portuguese colonial subjects, Indians residing in the Rio de Janeiro

area were still demanding rights based on their indigenous identity – a practice that would persist for another hundred years. This is easily understood, since it was their identity as "different" that guaranteed them the right to collective land ownership. The development of political consciousness and actions to defend their rights was an extension of their identifying as Indians, in opposition to any assimilationist discourse that regarded them as both civilized and undifferentiated from the rest of colonial populations. But the assimilationist ideal was intertwined with preservation of the sense of otherness, a fact that can be seen in the contradictions present in period documentation, including written law and the political rhetoric of various actors in confrontation, and perhaps most prominently in disputes surrounding the ownership and control of land.[23]

For the policy to achieve its goals, multiple, flexible strategies were necessary. Its application varied according to regional difference, the different degrees of insertion of Indian groups into the colonial world, and the natives' disparate reactions. Thus, authorities in some areas created new villages; others resorted to warfare and treaties with native leaders, as in the backlands; while in the oldest colonial settlements, the plan was to formally extinguish Indian villages and absorb the natives as colonial subjects. These strategies could develop concomitantly, even in neighboring regions, as occurred in the captaincy of Rio de Janeiro.[24]

By the closing decades of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, some Indian villages were being established in the Paraíba River valley, while closer to the city of Rio de Janeiro longstanding villages were being transformed into parishes as a first step towards their extinction. By whatever methods, the policy goal was to assimilate "wild" Indians into backlands settlements and "tame" Indians into village communities. The former needed to be lured or coerced into new settlements, domesticated, and civilized; while it was assumed that the latter, who had centuries of settled life, could more straightforwardly be integrated into colonial society and their villages abolished. Indians themselves responded to this in diverse ways. If many resisted through escape or rebellion, others collaborated and took advantage of rights accorded by laws based on their indigenous identities. If the specific ethnic character of that identity could change (for example, going from Tupi or Tupiniquim to "village Indian"), claiming it still continued to guarantee them benefits.[25]

Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, governor of the state of Grão-Para e Maranhão and brother to the Marquês de Pombal, composed the

new regulations, which were formally entitled the *Diretório* but commonly called either the Indian Rules (*Diretório dos Índios*) or the Pombaline Rules (*Diretório Pombalino*).[26] Proposed initially for Amazônia, the *Diretório* was quickly extended across Portuguese America. It was one of several period policies that had emerged to assimilate Indians and abolish their customs, but also to protect them from bondage. For example, the 1755 Liberty Law prohibited their enslavement, while the Weddings Law (*Lei dos Casamentos*, 1755) incentivized racial mixture by offering benefits to those who married Indians.[27] Other proposals encouraged the presence of non-indigenous people in the villages, and withdrew the imposition of "clean blood" rules that precluded natives from receiving honorific titles or holding public or ecclesiastical office.

However, the same policies that proposed the Indians' equality with non-Indians still kept them in their villages, subject to compulsory labor and placed under the legal custody of colonial directors who also functioned as administrators of the settlements. According to a 1755 law the Indians should be preferred for such offices in their own villages. This was reaffirmed in the 1757 *Diretório*; however, it cast them as rustic, ignorant, and lacking in capacity for governance, so went on to call for a non-indigenous director for each community who would scrutinize the efficiency of other officials.[28] Thus, whatever the changes introduced by the new law, it was part of a legal consensus to maintain the Indians in separate, supervised settlements. The *Diretório* also drew from older indigenous policy, notably the Missions Regulation of 1686 which had established several principles: the categorization of Indians into "tame" and "wild"; compulsory labor in the villages; land guarantees; and the imposed status of Indians as wards (legal children) under colonial directors. This law also maintained the benefits for "principals," as indigenous leaders are called in colonial documents.[29]

Novel in the new policy was the focus on abolishing native customs and increasing non-indigenous populations in the villages, strong incentives for racial-cultural mixture, and a call for the official end to Indian slavery and discrimination against Indians. These measures were in keeping with the intent to promote assimilation and equality among subjects in the colony. This was without a doubt the main rupture with regard to previous laws that, although they promoted catechesis and transformation of Indians into Christian subjects, sought to keep them separate and distinct from non-Indians.

The lands belonging to villages, even if they had been transformed into towns or parishes, continued to belong to the Indians, although in many

areas this became a source of heated conflict with other colonial interests.[30] All this was occurring in the context of the Jesuits' loss of power, and their ultimate expulsion from Brazil, which would deprive native peoples in Jesuit-administered settlements of a powerful ally in conflicts with colonial society over land and labor.

INDIGENOUS POLICY AND INDIGENOUS POLITICS: NEGOTIATING INTERESTS WHILE PRESERVING DIFFERENCES

If Pombaline indigenous policy intended to do away with distinctions between native and non-native, its various modes of application were based, fundamentally, on the preservation of ethnic differences. There were three distinctions carried over from earlier legislation, recognized as differences between village Indians (principals and commoners); between "wild" backlands Indians and "tame" village Indians; and between Indians and non-Indians. In this, too, there was continuity with earlier law, and it should be recalled that such separations could also serve natives who learned how to deploy them in the various circumstances the new law traversed. For example, Leônia Rezende has demonstrated how Indians in Minas Gerais' villages exploited the Liberty Law by abandoning their commonly used *mestiço* identities (mixed-race categories such as *pardo* and *caboclo*) to affirm themselves as fully indigenous in order to petition for freedom from illegal enslavement.[31]

Native leaders, in particular, came to understand the policy's tripartite differentiation of identity, and both participate in and reaffirm it in varying ways when they stood to benefit. Principals had received special honors and advantages from colonial authority since the sixteenth century, but they were especially valued under Pombal. The new legislation expanded their opportunities for both public office and military rank, and in some regions, Indian leaders became aldermen or other town officials. This practice was perhaps most pronounced in Amazônia, where there were few white colonial residents.[32]

The goal of abolishing discrimination against natives and transforming them into subjects equal to all others reflected Enlightenment ideals, but more practically, sought to create conditions for native people to occupy administrative positions in the new villages. An essential step would be to "elevate" their habits, to render them capable of such functions. "Civilizing" them, with the objective of turning them into citizens,

responded to that necessity and was also consonant with the enlightened and regalist character of the period (in which the priority was to civilize rather than catechize potential subjects).[33] The importance of this objective is seen in the *Diretório*'s substantial number of entries regarding the eradication of Indian customs in the villages, including obligatory, exclusive use of the Portuguese language. Yet if policy sought to civilize, equalize, and assimilate Indians, and prohibit discrimination against them, actual results were ambiguous. The inequalities, prejudices, and hierarchies persisted and became even more entrenched as the natives learned to exploit them.[34]

Maintaining the distinction between "wild" and "tame" suited colonial concerns as well as those of settled Indian populations. Pombaline policy perspectives were based on a longstanding conceptual opposition between civilization and barbarism. But village Indians also drew from and reaffirmed that discourse, frequently deploying it to their own advantage in political demands. Portraying themselves as champions of the king's interests in the defense of territory – against foreign invaders, but above all, against uncivilized, hostile Indians – was a strategy used by principals to help assure a sympathetic reception of their petitions in Portugal. The existence of backlands savages was favorable to principals in another way, as it increased their opportunities to serve the critical function of mediating assimilationist policies. Whether they were combating or pacifying the "wild" Indians, then, principals used them to enhance their own negotiations with colonial authority. The notion of opposition between civilization and barbarism (between "tame" Indians and "wild" ones) inherent in legislation as well as in the imaginations of all the social agents involved (natives, authorities, colonial populations, missionaries, travelers, etc.) since the sixteenth century became more pronounced during this period and influenced the diverse applications of indigenous policy. Meeting the goals of incorporating the barbarians and assimilating the villagers would require politics of attraction or confrontation for the former, and the ultimate extinction of the latter as a separate ethnic category.[35]

However, it is important to note that the "backlands" Indians did not exist in complete isolation from the colonial world. Interactions between them and the settled Indian villages were frequent and actually grew more pronounced under Pombaline law, which incentivized mixture, exchange, and miscegenation between indigenous and non-indigenous. The policy also expanded efforts to attract and engage groups located outside the reach of Portuguese administration. Thus in the captaincy of Rio de

Janeiro, along the banks of the Paraíba River, in the area then known as "fierce Indian back-country," groups such as the Coroados, Coropós, and Puris were being gathered in and settled between the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth century. This initiative was spearheaded by Capuchins, who, unlike their Jesuit predecessors, did not vainly attempt to maintain isolated native groups but actively sought to mix them with non-Indians to speed their assimilation. Both "wild" and "tame" Indians circulated among the region's farms, backlands, and villages, with the knowledge and support of Portuguese civil and religious leaders.[36]

It becomes clear that the rigid distinction between civilization and barbarism, a central tenet of indigenous policy since the beginning of Brazil's colonization, existed more in legislative prose and in the discourse of authorities, intellectuals, travelers, and even indigenous leaders themselves than in this region's daily life. In reality, a highly diverse assortment of colonial agents, indigenous and non-indigenous, intersected and interacted. In the mid-eighteenth century Indians residing in the interior, in the colonial villages, and in the new parochial townships maintained extensive contact, and the continuing existence of the former served the interests of the latter two, settled populations – groups for which Pombaline indigenous policy had its own goals.

ASSIMILATIONIST IDEALS AND THE PRESERVATION OF INDIGENOUS IDENTITIES IN COLONIAL INDIAN SETTLEMENTS

The transformation of long-established indigenous villages into new townships in the captaincy of Rio de Janeiro involved numerous conflicts, principally over land, that intensified in the 1800s and persisted until the official extinction of many older settlements. Starting in the mid-eighteenth century and unfolding over a century, it was a process marked by a series of false starts as the village Indians responded in diverse ways, at various times allying themselves with or confronting colonials, missionaries, and municipal authorities.[37] However intense the racial and cultural mixture they had experienced in village life, in the second half of the eighteenth century they were still seeing themselves (and being seen) as distinctly indigenous. Over many generations these groups had located themselves – or, to use Oliveira's term,[38] territorialized themselves – within a political-administrative sphere that had been given to them, or imposed upon them, yet one they had also engaged as a space of survival in

the colonial world. Part of this involved demanding the rights guaranteed them by law of the Portuguese Crown, rights which were anchored in their being a separate ethnicity from other royal subjects. The affirmation of an indigenous identity constructed through the colonial experience was a powerful political tool that Indians would leverage until roughly the mid-nineteenth century, a hundred years after Pombal began to implement his assimilationist ideal.

But if the Indians benefited from maintaining a line between native and non-native, so, too, did colonial authorities, as can be seen in their laws and other official documents. According to the *Diretório*, village Indians represented a second-class social category subject to compulsory labor, and held in the legal custody of the Director. Some changed their status to resident, but they typically continued to be regarded as Indians and remained subject to prejudice. A map of Amazônia from the late 1700s depicts the population divided into village Indians, white residents, and black slaves, indicating the endurance of the ethnic distinctions.[39] Statistical records from towns and parishes in Rio de Janeiro present very similar characteristics. Some of them register parishes as Indian villages, yet nonetheless list residents and Indians separately. In 1766, records from the Bishopric of Rio de Janeiro show that its parishes included five Indian villages: São Lourenço, São Barnabé, São Francisco Xavier de Itaguaí, Nossa Senhora da Guia de Mangaratiba, and São Pedro.[40] A 1797 map of Itaguaí parish includes a list of 141 heads of household; after entry 87, the remainder of the list is described by the sub-entry "Village Indians of Taguaí."[41] An 1816 map of the townships in the district of Rio de Janeiro still makes reference to Indian villages, distinguishing them from towns and parishes of the same name, although in most cases it does not break out separate population numbers.[42] Clearly, even decades after their introduction, Pombal's policy reforms did not prevent indigenous royal subjects in their villages from being identified as Indians.

Historical documentation regarding the conversion of Indian villages into more formal townships in the captaincy remains sparse. In 1758, some royal communiqués were delivered to Rio de Janeiro, instructing various authorities how to implement the changes enumerated in the *Diretório*. Steps were taken to preserve the lands associated with the villages and to confiscate Jesuit property. There was evidently some preoccupation with maintaining village patrimony for the Indians (despite the Crown's tacit encouragement of the growing presence of "white" colonials in their lands hoping to usurp parcels for development). No village

was relocated, and all but one was converted to parishes. The lone exception, São Barnabé, transitioned directly to the status of town still in the eighteenth century.[43]

By the mid-1700s, disputes over communal village lands were intensifying as the availability of unoccupied territory shrank under increased demand. The situation was complicated by the expulsion of the Jesuits because while their land was confiscated and returned to the Crown's dominion to be quickly requested in allotments by Portuguese settlers, the Indians also lost a significant ally in their struggles with colonial residents. It was a period of open conflict as more and more colonials advanced onto Indian lands. Socio-economic development of the captaincy relied on penetrating the interior in an effort to capture increasingly more land. This ultimately meant creating new villages for dislocated Indians, with an increased threat to the patrimony of extant villages. There was fierce resistance on the part of the Indians to strategies such as outright dismantling of villages or relocating villages to distant and less desirable locations.[44]

The village of São Francisco Xavier de Itaguaí underwent an intriguing transition in the late eighteenth century. It was extinguished but restored in 1790, by orders of the queen herself, who was sympathetic to the pleas of José Pires Tavares, an indigenous militia captain who traveled to Lisbon to argue for its rehabilitation.[45] That case is too complex to be fully addressed here.[46] But another experience at Itaguaí several decades later illustrates how those who called for doing away with the villages would often point to the Indians' dispersion and ultimate social integration as a desirable result. It was on these grounds that neighboring colonial residents again wanted to convert the village to a town around 1818, but the owner of a constructed mill within its territory opposed this initiative to protect his investments. He hoped to simply expel the Indians. In response, the Indians redoubled their claims to rights based on indigenous identity, but notably, they also allied themselves against the mill owner with the residents who wanted to maintain the village in place and transform it into a town. The joint effort was perhaps too successful, as the village was saved from the mill owner's machinations but ultimately formally converted into a town – whose newly created council quickly declared the village terminated once and for all. A temporary partnership with residents allowed the Indians to retain the village for a brief period of time, but conflicting interests were soon manifest.[47] The episode demonstrates the fluidity and complexity of alliances and interests among the various groups.

Documents from the captaincy of Rio de Janeiro reveal numerous other cases of disputes and agreements between residents and natives over control of land. They indicate that despite the presence of non-indigenous in the villages, and incentives for colonial development of Indian lands, authorities were still concerned about safeguarding Indians' rights to land and agricultural production. Controversies over ethnic classifications of village Indians are woven through the diverse arguments. To be Indian or not had implications for access to villages' collective lands, and to that extent such ambivalences and disputes over ethnicity had a clear political and social dimension that was strategically leveraged by actors on all sides.[48]

Final Considerations

Analyses of Pombaline indigenous policy in the context of Indians' political actions and reactions should be framed by several key themes. Central among these are the complexity of the political interactions among the various agents, and the fact that official assimilationist discourses coexisted with the preservation of differences in ethnic identity. To civilize and assimilate Brazil's indigenous were basic tenets of Pombal's Enlightenment-era legislation, and they were applied in highly diverse ways. At the same time distinctions, inequalities, hierarchies, and prejudices were maintained to serve various interests, notably those of the Indians who learned how to exploit them for their own benefit. As we have seen, the law itself, while encouraging assimilation and equality, affirmed differences between indigenous and non-indigenous; the former placed in a special juridical status, with its own specific obligations and rights. In this period the rhetoric of opposition between civilization and barbarism was taking on new and heightened significance, serving various actors in various forms. In that context, village Indians learned to take advantage of the new law to gain what was possible from a system that otherwise constrained them. From the mid-eighteenth century to the early nineteenth, documents show that disputes over ethnic classification sharpened in the context of conflicts over land, and the extinction of Indian villages. Whether classified as Indian or *mestiço*, they learned to navigate the cultural politics of the Old Regime, which led them to demand "as Indians" favors from authorities in exchange for services. On the other hand, the concept of legal equality signified for them the end of collective rights, and I argue that it was principally the fight to maintain these special rights that motivated the particular assertion of indigenous identities experienced in Brazil until the

nineteenth century. The process of terminating older colonial Indian villages succeeded but was gradual, impeded, in my view, by the political actions of the Indians living in them who wanted to preserve their land and patrimony – and who rejected assimilationist discourses that regarded them as mixed-race (hence "extinct" as full-fledged Indians).

Pombal's indigenous policy was contradictory to the core. While mandating assimilation and integration of Indians into colonial society, it offered them various avenues for political action based on maintaining their separate indigenous identity.

Notes

1. Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo was named Secretary of State of Internal Affairs of the Kingdom in 1750 by Dom José I of Portugal (1750–1777). In 1759, he became the 1st Count of Oeiras and in 1769, the Marquês de Pombal, the title for which he became famous in history and the reason for its use in this chapter.
2. Francisco Falcon and Claudia Rodrigues, eds., *A "Época Pombalina" no Mundo Luso-Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2015).
3. Boundary treaty signed in 1750 between Portugal and Spain that redefined the borders between the two Americas. Among other measures, it specified that Portugal would return the Colônia do Sacramento to Spain in exchange for the Sete Povos das Missões, which unleashed numerous conflicts involving Indians and Jesuits, including the Guarani War (1754–1756).
4. Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, ed., *História dos Índios no Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1992); John Monteiro, "Tupis, Tapuias e Historiadores Estudos de História Indígena e do Indigenismo" (Habilitation thesis, Campinas: UNICAMP, 2001); Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida, *Os Índios na História do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2010); Frank Salomon, and Stuart Schwartz, "Introduction," in *The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas*, vol. 3, ed. Frank Salomon and Stuart Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–18.
5. Frederick Barth, "Os Grupos Étnicos e suas Fronteiras," in *O Guru, o iniciador e outras variações antropológicas*, ed. Tomke Lask (Rio de Janeiro: ContraCapa, 2000), 25–67; Jonathan Hill, ed., *History, Power*

and Identity: Ethnogenesis in the Americas, 1942–1992 (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1996); Sidney W. Mintz, "Culture: An Anthropological View," *The Yale Review* 71, no. 4 (1982): 499–512.

6. Mauro César Coelho, "Do Sertão para o Mar: Um estudo sobre a experiência portuguesa na América; o caso do Diretório dos Índios" (PhD thesis, São Paulo: USP, 2005).

7. Francisco José Calazans Falcon, *A Época Pombalina: Política Econômica e Monarquia Ilustrada* (São Paulo: Ática, 1982).

8. ibid., 197.

9. ibid., 316.

10. Falcon and Rodrigues, *A "Época Pombalina"*; Nuno Monteiro, "As Reformas na Monarquia pluricontinental portuguesa: De Pombal a dom Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho," in *O Brasil Colonial 1720–1821*, ed. João Fragoso and Maria de Fátima Gouvêa (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2014), 111–156.

11. Falcon, *A "Época Pombalina,"* 364.

12. For more, see ibid., 319–323.

13. ibid., 321.

14. Ana Rosa Cloclet Silva, "O Marquês de Pombal e a formação do homem-público no Portugal setecentista," in *A Época Pombalina no Mundo Luso-Brasileiro*, ed. Francisco Falcon and Claudia Rodrigues (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2015), 423.

15. Falcon, *A Época Pombalina*, 429; Silva, "O Marquês de Pombal," 423.

16. Silva, "O Marquês de Pombal," 445.

17. Luis C. Villalta, Christianni C. Morais and João Paulo Martins, "As reformas pombalinas e a instrução (1759–1777)," in *A Época Pombalina no Mundo Luso-Brasileiro*, ed. Francisco Falcon and Claudia Rodrigues (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2015), 459.

18. Silva, "O Marquês de Pombal," 429.

19. Liberty Law (*Lei da Liberdade*, 1755), which prohibited the enslavement of Indians under any circumstances.

20. Beatriz Perrone-Moises, "Índios Livres e Índios Escravos: Os princípios da legislação indigenista do período colonial (séculos XVI a XVIII)," in *História dos Índios no Brasil*, ed. M. Carneiro da Cunha (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1992), 115–132.

21. Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida, *Metamorfoses Indígenas: Identidade e Cultura nas Aldeias Coloniais do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2003).

22. ibid.

23. Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida, "Política Indigenista e Etnicidade: Estratégias indígenas no processo de extinção das aldeias do Rio de Janeiro; Século XIX," in "Sociedades en movimiento. Los pueblos

indígenas de América Latina en el siglo XIX," supplement, *Anuario del IEHS* 22, S 1 (2007): 219–233.

24. Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida, "Política indigenista e políticas indígenas no tempo das reformas pombalinas," in *"A Época Pombalina" no Mundo Luso-Brasileiro*, ed. Francisco Falcon and Claudia Rodrigues (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2015), 175–214.

25. Almeida, *Metamorfoses Indígenas,* 261–264.

26. Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, "Diretório que se deve observar nas Povoações dos Índios do Pará e Maranhão, enquanto Sua Majestade não mandar o contrário." Pará, May 3, 1757. Published in Carlos de Araújo Moreira Neto, *Índios da Amazônia: De Maioria a Minoria, 1750–1850* (Rio de Janeiro: Vozes, 1988), 199–201.

27. Sections 39 and 80 of the *Diretório*. In Moreira Neto, *Índios da Amazônia,* 199–201.

28. For more, see José Oscar Beozzo, *Leis e regimentos das missões: Política indigenista no Brasil* (São Paulo: Loyola, 1983), 59; and *Diretório*, Section 2 in Moreira Neto, *Índios da Amazônia*, 167.

29. Devised especially for Amazônia, this law ultimately structured Jesuit villages across Brazil until the mid-eighteenth century when the *Diretório* supplanted it. "Regimento das Missões do Estado do Maranhão e Pará, 1/12/1686," in Beozzo, *Leis e regimentos*, 114–120.

30. Almeida, "Política Indigenista e Etnicidade," 220–221.

31. Maria Leonia Chaves de Rezende, "Gentios Brasílicos: Índios coloniais em Minas Gerais setecentista" (PhD thesis, Campinas: Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2003).

32. Ângela Domingues, *Quando os índios eram vassalos. Colonização e relações de poder no Norte do Brasil na segunda metade do século XVIII* (Lisboa: CNCDP, 2000).

33. Rita Oliveira de Almeida, *O Diretório dos Índios: Um projeto de civilização no Brasil do Século XVIII* (Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1997).

34. Almeida, *Os Índios na História do Brasil*; Rezende, "Gentios Brasílicos"; Patrícia Melo Sampaio, *Espelhos Partidos. Etnia, legislação e desigualdade na colônia* (Manaus: Edua, 2012).

35. Almeida, "Política Indigenista e Políticas Indígenas," 193–197.

36. Márcia Malheiros, "Homens de Fronteiras: Índios e Capuchinhos na ocupação dos Sertões do Leste do Paraíba ou Goytacazes" (PhD thesis, Rio de Janeiro: UFF, 2007).

37. Almeida, "Política Indigenista e Etnicidade," 219–233.

38. João Pacheco de Oliveira, "Uma etnologia dos 'índios misturados'? Situação colonial, territorialização e fluxos culturais," in *A Viagem da Volta: Etnicidade, política e reelaboração cultural no Nordeste indígena*, ed. João Pacheco de Oliveira (Rio de Janeiro: ContraCapa Livraria, 1999), 11–36.

39. Mapa das Famílias, que a excepção das dos Índios Aldeados se achavão existindo em cada huma da mayor parte das Freguesias de ambas as Capitanias do Estado do Grão-Pará, e da sua possibilidade, e applicação no Anno de 1779, caixa Rio Negro, caixa 10, doc. no. 8, Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU).

40. Memória de todas as Freguesias desse Bispado do Rio de Janeiro, 22 de janeiro de 1766, container 84, doc. no. 7, AHU Rio de Janeiro/Avulsos (RJA).

41. Mapa das Famílias, AHU.

42. Mapa em que se compreende a relação individual das Vilas desta Comarca assim das que tem juizes de Fora, como das em que há juízes Ordinários com declaração da extensão dos Termos de cada uma de suas Freguesias, do número, e denominação dos Engenhos, Lugares ou Aldeias, Fogos e Habitantes, lugares de comunicação, por onde passam as principais Estradas para outras Capitanias, e distancias elles, July 16, 1816, Rio de Janiero, I-31, 19, 14, MS, Biblioteca Nacional.

43. Descrição de vários distritos da capitania do Rio de Janeiro, 1797, container 164, doc. no. 62, MS, Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU).

44. Almeida, "Política Indigenista e Etnicidade," 219–233.

45. Portaria de 6 de agosto de 1790. In Joaquim Norberto de Souza Silva, "Memória Histórica e Documentada das Aldeias de Índios da Província do Rio de Janeiro," *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro), ser. 3a, 17, no. 14–15 (1854): 372.

46. For a more detailed account of the case of São Francisco Xavier de Itaguaí, see Almeida, "Política Indigenista e Etnicidade," 219–233.

47. Almeida, "Política Indigenista e Políticas Indígenas," 220–225.

48. Guillaume Boccara, "Mundos nuevos en las fronteras del Nuevo Mundo: Relectura de los procesos coloniales de etnogénesis, etnificacón y mestizaje en tiempos de globalización," *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos* (2001), https://nuevomundo.revues.org/426

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New Forms of Colonialism on the Frontiers of Hispanic America: Assimilationist Projects and Economic Disputes (Río de la Plata, Late Eighteenth Century)

Lía Quarleri

By the end of the eighteenth century, intense transformations had taken place in the Americas in relation to both local processes and to more general circumstances that affected the population, economy, and politics. Over the colonial period, the Iberian Crowns had developed new political goals, means, and priorities concerning their American domains. These were reflected in their direct interventions in the colonies, and in the resulting relations between the metropolitan centers, their intermediaries, and local governments. Enlightenment ideas, as they were adapted to the Ibero-American context, influenced the formation of new patterns of thought concerning colonial administration and led to new state policies.[1] Specifically, most of the Bourbon civil servants were inspired by an enlightened spirit with a physiocratic tendency, which was spread wide by the Economic Societies of Friends of the Country. The purpose of these

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societies was to reflect on particular situations, and subsequently, to set general principles "useful for society." They aimed at promoting regional agriculture, industries, and trade in the colonies by dismantling the *latifundia*, and by encouraging smallholding, population dispersion, science, and exploratory expeditions.[2] Furthermore, their ideas had a utopian dimension because they conceived of progress as social change without conflict.[3]

The Spanish Crown's eighteenth-century intervention in its American colonies represented a new form of colonialism, marked by the modernization of certain governmental structures, trading, and administration. This new form of colonialism implied changes in narratives, policies, and social practices.[4] The starting point was administrative centralization and the shifting of political agency to central bodies.[5] The new administrative centers were to be created and staffed by a reformed caste of capable and loyal civil servants. These civil servants, in the roles of administrator and manager, were opposed to the preceding model of local government with its native ruling elites (*criollos*) who had monopolized power through factions and cliques.

The new colonial policy was a secularized one. The Jesuits were expelled and the sacramental functions of empire were separated from the civil ones within the new governmental structures. Moreover, the so-called "enlightened absolutism" prompted new punitive practices that were exemplary and disciplining. From the mid-eighteenth century, the enlightened Iberian ruling elites started to propagate the conception that the "*Indias*" were not realms with their own political status, but colonies. They were domains to be associated to the metropole's economic interest.[6]

Accordingly, the Spanish Crown expressed a vigorous interest in its American colonies through economic goals formulated in the framework of a general plan regarding fiscal, administrative, and geopolitical reforms.[7] In the Río de la Plata region, in particular, a policy fostering the territorial annexation of strategic regions was implemented. These zones had remained, until that moment, peripheral and marginal areas because of their proximity to Lusitanian domains, to resistant indigenous populations, or to the lack of direct state intervention. Areas inhabited by Guarani Indians that had been under the administration of the Jesuits are a case in point. The colonial expansion in the territory of the missions was part of a bigger plan, which can be termed "frontier reformism."[8]

This chapter aims, therefore, to analyze the specificities of the new assimilationist policy applied to former Jesuit missions in the Río de la Plata area. The period under study extends from the Jesuit expulsion in 1767 to the "exemption" of the communal obligations project implemented by Viceroy Avilés in 1801. Particularly, I will focus on the internal contradictions of the Bourbon policies regarding the well-being and happiness of the people, and the disputes over power and economic resources.

The intervention of the colonial state in the Jesuit reductions of the Guaraní Indians is a paradigmatic case. Here, enlightened, absolutist, and centralist features were combined in the configuration and design of new assimilation policies. Narratives about modernization, for example, justified the hierarchical integration of the reductions' population into Hispanic society. Such integration was in contrast to the Jesuit segregationist model. For their part, the Indians can be seen as having strategically taken over certain European codes, habits, and customs that were associated with the new mercantilist policies.

Assimilation as a Transformation Utopia

Reductions – that is settlements of indigenous peoples – had been created by Jesuits at the beginning of the seventeenth century in agreement with important Guaraní *caciques* (indigenous chiefs). The chiefs had considered such an alliance with the religious men to be a way to reduce the effects of colonization. Specifically, it allowed them to avoid the extension of the *encomienda* system (a system by which the colonists obtained taxes and labor from indigenous peoples). Furthermore, the reductions were a means to obtain political, military, and sacred support in the regular inter-tribal wars. From the Crown's perspective, the system of reductions was an effective way to bring together an important number of indigenous populations, with no direct investment, in a territory the control of which was disputed with the Portuguese.[9] For the Society of Jesus, the founding of small villages far away from the viceregal centers provided an opportunity to spread its own philosophy and doctrinal practices. The Jesuits followed a model of strategic segregationism, characterized by the control of relationships between the reductions and the Hispanic settler society in terms of trade, intermarriage, and residence. However, there was space for negotiation and privileges for the *caciques*.[10] The segregationist policy had been the basis of the division between the so-called

"Indian Republic" and "Spanish Republic" during the first period in colonial history. However, the new colonial requirements and the dynamics of *mestizaje* (miscegenation) brought into question this segregationist policy, although the tribute payment as a fiscal obligation of the indigenous population was maintained.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the concentration of power in an ecclesiastical institution – such as the Society of Jesus – was at odds with new ideals and paradigms promoted by Enlightenment philosophers. The Jesuit expulsion from the Spanish territories in 1767 took place a few years after the Jesuit extradition from Portugal and France in 1759 and 1764, respectively. The governor Francisco de Paula Bucarelli y Ursúa was in charge of the expulsion in the Rio de la Plata area. In a month, he implemented the expulsion decree in all the schools and farms of the region, ordering the transfer of the Jesuit priests to Europe. This process was delayed in the 30 Guaraní reductions because of the risk of an indigenous uprising. The governor thus gathered *caciques* and *corregidores* (native governors of each mission village) in Buenos Aires, organizing a political action in order to have the support of the Guaraní authorities.[11] Indigenous resistance was feared and Guaraní cooperation sought because only a decade earlier (between 1753 and 1756), the Guaraní had aligned with the Jesuits to rebel against the combined forces of the Spanish and Portuguese armies that were trying to evict the population from seven reductions following the ratification of a border treaty between the two countries in 1750.[12]

After the expulsion of the Jesuits, Bucarelli organized a new government in which the civil government was separate from the ecclesiastic one. To this end, he appointed new priests, Franciscan friars for the most part, to be in charge of religious indoctrination and the administration of sacraments. He maintained, however, the indigenous *cabildo* (council), while delegating to Hispanic *criollo* administrators the supervision of the production on communal lands and its commercialization. He left the *caciques* to control communal work. Finally, he appointed a governor for the 30 reductions. The governor was in charge of several political duties, such as making ordinances, mediating in conflicts, and channeling claims and charges. He was also responsible for the circulation of services, goods, and products, and for the general well-being of the population. The appointment of this governor was the best expression of Bourbon centralization endeavors.

This new government inspired by modernization narratives and meant to integrate and assimilate the population, was not wholly invented by Bucarelli. It was underpinned by a set of instructions written under the direction of the governor of Buenos Aires.[13] This set of laws, which revisited some central ideas of the ordinances written in the past for the Portuguese Missions Pará and Maranhão, was the backbone of the Bourbon policies towards the reductions.[14]

Colonial administrations faced similar challenges on both sides of the border between the Spanish and the Portuguese-Brazilian dominions. In both colonial border areas, settlements had been founded by the Jesuits, and the effects of Jesuit administration now had to be countered. The new legal corpuses for both colonial administrations similarly aimed to assimilate progressively the population of the reductions into colonial society, and to maintain socio-ethnic and political asymmetries in the spheres of production, trade, and (compulsory) labor. This double objective was to be accomplished by the teaching of the Spanish or Portuguese language, prohibiting the use of native languages, creating schools to promote basic literacy in each village, providing incentives for "mixed" marriages, and encouraging subsistence and commercial forms of agricultural production. Trade was to be "liberalized," but the fiscal obligations associated with the Indian legal status were to remain untouched. The combination of fiscal obligation schemes, inspired by mercantilism, determined the nature of these policies; and the alleged benefits of these "modernizing" measures contributed to the creation of fundamental ideological dispositives. These policies were also implemented, with some local adjustments, in the reductions of Moxos and Chiquitos – now in Bolivian territory – after the expulsion of the Jesuits.[15]

In summary, the new policy of the Bourbon period intended to supplant Jesuit practices with a unifying pedagogy, a system of stratification by status and gender, and a new demographic, economic, and productive policy. The structure incorporated some older elements. For example, there was continuity in indigenous political organization based on the power of *caciques* and *cabildos*; there was also continuity in the observable division of labor by gender and age.

The assimilation process was conceived specifically as a process of goods and marriage exchanges. With the aim of creating a "reciprocal union" of the indigenous and Hispanics, the reductions were "opened" under the guidance of Spaniards and *criollos*. Such supervision was justified because the Indians were considered by the ruling elite as inexperienced, less

capable, and naive. Thus Crown officials promoted Hispanic–Indigenous relationships by authorizing the settlement of *criollos* in the reductions, the selling of products to traders inside or outside the villages, and marriages between Hispanics and indigenous women. Likewise, the new colonial policy aimed at discouraging extended families from living together in spacious communal houses. The objective of these measures was to introduce some socio-cultural changes, such as the implementation of the nuclear family model, which implied a modification of domestic roles and responsibilities between parents and children, and husbands and wives.

This new way of domination, with its mix of modern paternalism, enlightened progress, and colonial mercantilism was presented as fostering the well-being and happiness of the indigenous population. However, in order to make Guaraní peoples useful and happy vassals, their habits, imaginaries, and sensibilities had to be transformed. For this purpose, the Bourbon bureaucracy decided (from an ethnocentric and rationalist perspective) which were the desirable and positive ways of life, cultural expressions, and thought, and which were to be discarded. Colonial assimilationist policies were contradictory. Though Indians were to be integrated for their own good, this process was to be initiated and controlled by the Hispanic elites. This form of modern tutelage instituted a renewed form of domination and economic exploitation. Although the division between "Indian" and "Spanish" republics was suppressed, integration resulted in an asymmetrical, guided, and hierarchical assimilation.

PRODUCTION, TRADE, AND DISPUTES OVER THE RESOURCES OF THE VILLAGES

The productive exploitation and commoditization of the villages realized by Bucarelli's instructions were central to the Bourbon project. As in all the policies, some elements of Jesuit administration were preserved. For example, the distinction between family and communal lands was maintained. The new policies, however, authorized the commercialization of crops obtained from the "common plantation," and provided for the establishment of community warehouses for locally needed clothes and food. Moreover, civil servants promoted the productivity of family farms to guarantee self-sufficiency and, consequently, to reduce reliance on the communal warehouses. The continuities and changes were motivated by the Bourbon desire to generate a surplus from the communal work that

could be introduced into the local market as taxable sales that would reach the state treasury.

The new conjunction of ideas and policies surrounding family and communal lands was underpinned by a concept of "abundance." Abundance was associated with good accumulation and resulted from "productive work" and from the "effective" and "civilized" uses of time. These notions were, in turn, connected with the condemnation of "leisure," repeated in all the reports written by the Hispanic civil servants about the region of the former missions. The Jesuits, too, had disapproved of leisure, but in its new rendering as an unproductive use of time, the colonizers' disapproval gained strength. Like production, trade was considered a natural way to further the "progress of the peoples" and the "happiness of the republic." These ideas were highlighted in Bucarelli's instructions.[16]

The settlement of Spanish people in the former reductions, and the delivery of houses and land parcels to them, were meant to encourage commerce and "the cultivation of the land."[17] The promotion of trade implied a wider commercial exchange between Guaraní and Spanish people and between the former missions and nearby urban centers.[18] Even though there was an implicit freedom of action regarding commercial exchange, a structure of intermediation was implemented. Bucarelli and other Bourbon public servants considered that the Guaraní (as indigenous people) were not able to act efficiently or to exchange goods profitably without being deceived; they would not be able to play favorably by the rules of "free trade." Thus, a political control of commerce was implemented. The authorization and supervision of trading was delegated to different governmental institutions: indigenous *cabildos* and Spanish administrators, and a general administrator in Buenos Aires. Bucarelli assumed that a mixed administration would guarantee a good government (that is, without arbitrariness or fraudulence), and that the market economy would make possible the integration of Guaraní people into colonial society.

Within a few years, the former missions fell into a crisis. Far from realizing a utopian model sustained by controls, incentives, and European cultural patterns, the new system had produced social, economic, and political deterioration. Physical punishments, rapes, labor exploitation, administrative embezzlement, clandestine commerce, building deterioration, and a shortage of food and clothes were repeatedly denounced in reports, litigations, and correspondence for three decades.

In addition, lethal smallpox and measles epidemics spread with interethnic coexistence, low levels of subsistence, poor sanitary conditions, and a lack of appropriate medical attention. The situation was alarming by any account.

Interestingly, the reports themselves were generated to a large extent by ongoing power struggles.[19] The creation of the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata in 1776 increased the number of political agents who were interested in profiting from the villages.[20] Accordingly, the first Viceroy (Pedro de Ceballos) and the governor of Buenos Aires (Juan José de Vértiz y Salcedo) requested reports about the peoples' conditions. The reports were discouraging, and concrete actions were taken to reduce the jurisdiction of the governor of the former missions, Francisco Bruno de Zavala.

The policy, however, was not fundamentally altered. Old administrators were replaced by new ones, and the system put forward in Bucarelli's ordinances was maintained. When further complaints appeared, the process was repeated. Inspectors were sent; evaluations and reports were written. The circumstances that resulted from the demarcation of state borders carried out by Portuguese and Spanish commissions during the decade of 1780 as a response to the San Ildefonso Treaty were one such site of repeated complaint and investigation.[21]

Another such area of repeated reform involved the buying, selling, and circulation of products from the Guaraní missions. Efforts at reform did not have the expected effects and only contributed to nourish interwoven networks of clientelism between the Spanish local authorities and Guaraní people. In view of this situation, in 1785, the new Governor Intendant of Buenos Aires, Francisco de Paula Sanz, issued ordinances to reinforce the control and supervision of mercantile activities carried out in the villages. Three years later, he requested the three departmental deputy-governors, who were under the jurisdiction of that intendancy, to inform him in detail about the "profits and losses that the native peoples had" in the purchase of various products. He saw this as necessary because "for some time now and with no intermediation, different traders are visiting the missions' villages carrying clothes and other goods."[22] The resulting report included the opinions of administrators and revealed the struggles around resources between the Buenos Aires administration, the governor of the missions, departmental deputy-governors, village administrators, the Guaraní *corregidores*, and the authorities of the indigenous *cabildo*. These reports also showed a network of crossed accusations among all the actors involved, as

everyone sought to avoid responsibility. The opinion of the indigenous *corregidores*, considered emblematic figures of communal misrule, was not required in the reports; nevertheless, they were mentioned in the documents due to their active participation in commercial activities.

In general terms, the Crown officials thought that the Guaraní people of the reductions were "incompetent" in identifying and purchasing good-quality products. They thought that Spanish traders usually "misled" them by selling very high-priced, defective and unnecessary products. However, with respect to the losses, responsibilities, and nature of these activities, the reactions of the Spanish administrators were not uniform. Some criticized radically the resulting damage of these commercial practices, whereas others, from a political perspective, had more moderate opinions. Some even defended vigorously the commerce between the indigenous people and traders, claiming that it would contribute to the welfare of the people.

The first group was represented by the deputy-governors of San Miguel and of Concepción, Manuel de Lasarte y Esquivel and Gonzalo de Doblas. They described the sales as "plagues" and the products sold as "useless, luxurious and profane." The presence of traders was considered "damaging" because of the "illicit alliances" they made with the population with the objective of "taking them away" from the villages. Taking a halfway position, the deputy-governor of Yapeyú, Pedro Castellanos, said that the sale of products and their exchange for livestock and leather was carried out under his authorization. Finally, the governor of the former missions, Francisco Bruno de Zabala, pointed out a connection between the acquisition of commercial products and the "happiness and abundance of those villages," and stressed the "importance of free trade." He also denounced the "clandestine commerce" carried out by the deputy-governors and Spanish administrators of the missions.[23]

The standpoints and arguments are best understood in the context of the agents' mutual accusations. Zabala pointed directly at Doblas as the leader of the illegal commerce, in an underlying conflict of interests that influenced his statements. On the other hand, Doblas denounced the existence of "*monipodios*" (a group of people associated for illicit purposes) between administrators and traders and, like Lasarte y Esquivel, he thought that the General Administration in Buenos Aires should control the economic activity in the missions. In their defense, the administrators pointed at the Guaraní *corregidores* as the main "contraveners."[24] For his part, Zabala, who had a conflict with the General Administration chiefly

because of the suspicions raised over these issues, preferred not to participate in the government of the reductions.[25] The results of the report did not change the situation of the missions. Moreover, the intermediate agents, placed in strategic positions, were part of a ferocious competition regarding the commercial benefits that was increased by the overlapping of authorities and intra- and interethnic hierarchies. Nor were any of these phenomena separate from the pressure being put on the indigenous workforce to grow yerba mate and other commercial crops on communal plantations. Thus, the assimilation model – conceived as an idealistic form of coexistence between the Hispanic and indigenous populations marked by new (and common) social and family habits regarding work, production, and commerce – showed itself to be more complex than imagined when administrators attempted to combine it with the exploitation of village resources and of the indigenous workforce. In order to obtain economic benefits (in some cases) or due to power struggles (in other cases), Spanish agents and native authorities established alliances based on financial interests which undermined communal order and left exposed the most vulnerable sectors of the missions' population.[26]

COMMUNAL LIBERATION: ENLIGHTENED PROGRESS OR TERRITORIAL EXPANSION?

In the 1790s, the administrators, certain representatives of the indigenous *cabildos*, and the traders who visited the villages continued to obtain the maximum possible benefit from the available goods and the indigenous labor force. With the surge of a policy with an explicit commercial nature, some voices questioned the productive performance and efficiency of the missions' communal regimen of productivity and work. On this subject, the intellectual and political elites had a wide variety of ideas ranging from the perspective of those who stood for a "de-Indianization" to those who sought to maintain unaltered the status and state of the villages. To be an *Indio* implied one's belonging to a specific category of taxpayer and to a social collective. However, for the Hispanic reformers, the indigenous population ought to abandon all their peculiarities in favor of Hispanic culture (that is, certain traditions, a particular temperament and rationality).

In order to illustrate this position, it is worth mentioning the stance of Felix de Azara, the commissioner appointed to settle the border between the Spanish and the Portuguese domains in this region. This public

servant, who lived in Paraguay for almost 20 years (1782–1801), argued strongly – in specific reports – in favor of dismantling the system of reductions. His objective was to "release" the Guaraní people from their communal obligations in the reductions, and to resettle families in lands that were assigned particular productive and commercial purposes by the state. These new settlers would furthermore pay taxes on their commercial activities just as the rest of the Spanish people did.[27]

The proposal of exempting the Guaraní people from communal obligations (that were, by the way, controlled by administrators), was retaken by Viceroy Gabriel de Avilés. During his brief reign, between 1799 and 1801, the Viceroy sought to impose substantial changes in the reductions in order to rationalize the exploitation of resources, to supervise the population, and to guarantee the occupation of the territory for agriculture and livestock-raising by the surrounding population of *criollos*. In 1800, by decree, the Viceroy released some families from their obligations. Following a predetermined profile, certain heads of household, their women and children, and their kin (reckoned bilaterally) were "freed" from the communal system. Those selected for the "benefit of freedom" were to have proved effort and dedication to agriculture or industrial activities, or to have worked in a trade (as, for example, blacksmiths, weavers, carpenters, musicians or shoemakers); moreover, they were required to learn the Spanish language, to appear suited for understanding market trade, and to carry out a Christian life with "fairly Castilian" habits. The families, selected from lists proposed by priests and administrators, received parcels of land, cows and oxen, tools for agriculture and, in the case of craftsmen, instruments and materials. Additionally, these families received food "assistance" for one year until the next harvest, "only with the precise obligation of paying an annual tribute of one peso, attending daily to mass, and participating frequently in sacraments." The freeing policy had to be implemented prudently because, according to the Viceroy Avilés, the shift from a "state of ignorance, rudeness and despotism to another of Enlightenment, freedom and regulated life" had to be "progressive" to be "effective."[28]

After being consulted, most of the authorities of the missions backed the position of a progressive "freeing" of the Guaraní people from the system of reductions. They argued that there was a "lack of freedom," an absence of incentives to progress, and that it was therefore impossible for the indigenous people to make individual choices and develop personal abilities. Therefore, on May 20, 1801, Avilés "freed" from the

"community system" 6,212 inhabitants out of a total of 42,885.[29] During the implementation of this measure, several conflicts and difficulties emerged.[30] One of the issues to consider was the scope of the measure, that is, how it would impact on the relatives of the "dissociated" subjects. A *carta de liberación* (document of release from labor obligations in the reductions) was given to the chiefs of the extended families and their relatives, but these yielded conflicting interpretations. Furthermore, the policy of assigning land to the "liberated" families generated new tensions with the growing *criollo* population in areas near the missions. These *criollos* demanded adequate spaces from the authorities for the development of their own agricultural activities. Many had occupied "ownerless" lands on the outskirts of the villages, and because they had introduced animals and improvements on the land, they now claimed property rights.[31] Indeed, the central government did not protect the missions' territory from the progressive advance of the *criollos*, nor did it protect the Guaraní people from the *criollos*' aggressive competition for livestock resources. Such an attitude of tacit support for the *criollos* reveals that the state's disruption of the previous communal order, under principles of freedom and progress, was actually aimed at redefining the economic rules of the territory – and collecting the taxes demanded by the Crown – without losing access to the indigenous labor force.

The opening of the missions' territory to Hispanics and the progressive "freeing" of indigenous peoples from communal obligations corresponded to the conviction that segregation, as a method of colonization, was no longer functional. The changed objectives of the Spanish Crown and the influence of new ideological paradigms regarding the relations with ecclesiastical institutions led to a direct intervention in the colonies. Under the new policy, the indigenous peoples living in reductions were considered new subjects with rights and obligations. In a general context of mercantilist reforms and exploration expeditions, the economic potential of the missions stood out in relation to the soil fertility, the variety of agricultural and livestock resources, the existence of inland waterways and ports, and the availability of a labor force. The result was a policy meant to maximize resources and extend access to the indigenous labor force and to land. Thus, Crown officials proposed policies of assimilation and "progressive" measures to decouple the Guaraní people from the former reductions. As a consequence, an intense process of *mestizaje* took place

being, in practice, the result of complex dynamics in which economic factors, strategies regarding population, and new power relations interacted.

Notes

1. José Carlos Chiaramonte, "La 'Ilustración en Iberoamérica': Problemas de interpretación," in *Fundamentos intelectuales y políticos de las Independencias. Notas para una historia intelectual de Iberoamérica*, ed. J. C. Chiaramonte, 167–182 (Buenos Aires: Tesco, 2010).
2. This boost as well as the global market requirements renewed the expansionist projects of the European nations. The increasing rivalry among them was combined with the growing number of expeditions to demarcate boundaries in the frontiers, and to explore the hitherto marginal places.
3. Salvador Albert, "Las utopías y el reformismo borbónico," in *El reformismo borbónico*, ed. A. Guimerá, 247–263 (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1996).
4. In this respect, it is interesting to consider the different forms of colonialism in America, Africa, and Asia as defined by Jorge Klor de Alva in his analysis of the notions of "colonialism" and "postcolonialism": Jorge Klor de Alba, "La poscolonización de la experiencia (latino) americana: Una reconsideración de los términos 'colonialismo', 'poscolonialismo' y mestizaje," in *Repensando la subalternidad. Miradas críticas desde/sobre América Latina*, ed. P. Sandoval, 109–158 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2009).
5. Antonio Hespanha, *La Gracia del Derecho. Economía de la Cultura en la Edad Moderna* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1993), 236.
6. François-Xavier Guerra, "El ocaso de la monarquía hispánica: Revolución y desintegración," in *Inventando La Nación. Iberoamérica siglo XIX*, ed. A. Annino y F. Guerra, 117–151 (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003).
7. The central axes of this reform program were a reduction of the power of the *criollo* elite, an increase in fiscal incomes, a delimitation of geopolitical borders, an expansion in frontier regions, and a development of trade. For historiography on the Bourbon Reforms, see Federica Morelli, "La redefinición de las relaciones imperiales: En torno a la relación reformas dieciochescas/independencia en América," *Nuevo Mundo, Mundos Nuevos* (2008), https://nuevomundo.revues.org/32942

8. Manuel Lucena Giraldo, "El reformismo de frontera," in *El reformismo borbónico*, ed. A. Guimerá, 265–292 (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1996).

9. The villages extended along the Paraná, Uruguay, and Paraguay rivers. Their male inhabitants formed a royal militia, obtaining military means for defense, a high level of autonomy, tax and tributary exemptions, the possibility of territorial expansions, and legal endorsement. These villages knew a demographic and economic growth; in 1750, there were 30 villages with 100,000 people. By the time of the Jesuits' expulsion, the population was 88,000 souls.

10. Lía Quarleri, "Comunalización jesuita y desintegración reduccional. Políticas alternativas de colonización en la frontera luso/española," *Histórica* 38, 2 (2014): 111–144.

11. Guillermo Wilde, "Los guaraníes después de la expulsión de los jesuitas. Dinámicas políticas y prácticas simbólicas," *Revista Complutense de Historia de América* 27 (2001): 69–109 and Guillermo Wilde, *Religión y poder en las misiones de guaraníe*s (Buenos Aires: SB Ediciones, 2009).

12. Lía Quarleri, *Rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del Plata. Guaraníes, Jesuitas e Imperios coloniales* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2009).

13. "Instrucción a que se deberán arreglar los Gobernadores interinos que dejo nombrados en los pueblos de indios guaraníes del Uruguay y Paraná, no habiendo disposición contraria de Su Majestad. Francisco Bucarelli y Ursua, Candelaria, 23 de agosto de 1768," in *Colección de Documentos relativos a la expulsión de los jesuitas de la República Argentina y del Paraguay, en el Reinado de Carlos III*, notes F. Bravo, 200–324 (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de José María Pérez, 1872).

14. Rubén Alvarez Iglesias, "Entre la asimilación y el exterminio: Los indios de Brasil desde el 'Diretório' hasta la abolición de la esclavitud indígena c. 1750–1845," *Cuadernos del Tomás* 4 (2012): 21–44; Ernesto Maeder, "El modelo portugués y las instrucciones de Bucarelli para las misiones de guaraníes," *Estudos Ibero-Américanos* XIII, 2 (1987): 135–150; Patricia Melo Sampaio, "Fronteras de la libertad. Tutela indígena en el Directorio pombalino y en la Carta Regia de 1798," *Boletín Americanista* LXII, 1, 64 (2012): 13–23.

15. Muriel Morgan, "Funcionarios borbónicos y espacios de frontera. Objetivos de las políticas de población entre las Reducciones de Moxos y Chiquitos," *Memoria Americana* 23, 1 (2015): 129–157.

16. "Instrucción a que se deberán arreglar los Gobernadores interinos," 202–203.

17. ibid., p. 208.

18. A General Administration of Missions was created in Buenos Aires with the purpose of regulating all the economic activities in the villages, showing one of the inconsistencies of the Bourbon administration.

19. Juan Luis Hernández, "Tumultos y motines. La conflictividad social en los pueblos guaraníes de la región misionera (1768–1799)," *Memoria Americana* 8 (1999): 83–100.
20. The Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata was created in 1776 in order to protect resources, fertile ground, navigable ways, and transatlantic commerce from Portuguese expansionism. For that reason, a "free trade" policy through the port of Buenos Aires was implemented in 1778.
21. Lía Quarleri, "Expediciones, narrativas y utopías. Nuevas miradas sobre el 'espacio guaraní-misionero' (1784–1796)," *ANTITESES* 4, 8 (2011): 753–782.
22. "Informe solicitado por el superintendente general, Francisco de Paula Sanz, sobre la introducción de bebidas y efectos de comercio en los Pueblos de Misiones guaraníes, años 1788 y 1789." Archivo General de la Nación Argentina (Buenos Aires). División colonia. Sección Gobierno. Legajo 17-8-6, sin número de documento, 1. (National General Archive. Division "Colonia." Sector "Gobierno." File 17-8-6, without number of document, 1).
23. ibid., 1–4v.
24. ibid., 4v, 8v and 15.
25. Hernández, "Las reformas del virrey Avilés"; Maeder, *Misiones del Paraguay.*
26. This phenomenon may be better understood in a wider context, which involved the tensions generated by the last Bourbons. The designation of new ethnic authorities, the increase of fiscal burdens, the introduction of goods, the pressure over workforce, and commerce affected the relations of reciprocity within the villages. Guillermo Madrazo, "Pacto étnico, rebelión y modernidad en el siglo XVIII," *Andes* 16 (2005): 27–44 and Sergio Serulnikov, "El gobierno de los pueblos andinos en el siglo XVIII. Cambios y continuidades," *XXXIV Colloque international du GIREA* (2013): 179–193.
27. Branislava Susnik, *El Indio Colonial del Paraguay II: Los trece pueblos guaraníes de las Misiones, 1767–1803* (Asunción: MEAB, 1966).
28. "Copia del informe que hizo a S.M. el Exmo. Señor Marqués de Avilés, Virrey de Buenos Aires sobre el Gobierno Temporal y Espiritual pasado y presente de los treinta Pueblos de las Misiones guaraníes, Buenos Aires, 8 de marzo de 1800," in *Colonias Orientales del Río Paraguay o de la Plata,* ed. M. Lastarria, T. III, P. 1, 145–146 (Buenos Aires: Compañía Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco, 1914).
29. "Apuntamiento de las Providencias libradas por el Virrey de Buenos Aires, Marqués de Avilés sobre la variación del sistema del Gobierno en Comunidad de los Indios de los treinta Pueblos de Misiones Guaranís, en él de libertad, propiedad individual." ibid., 58.

30. The *caciques* and *corregidores* approved of the fact that some family chiefs and their relatives were released from their labor obligations in the reductions. Lía Quarleri, "El 'beneficio de la libertad'. Objetivos y límites de las políticas reformistas en los pueblos guaraníes (1784–1801)," *Folia Histórica del Nordeste* 21 (2013): 7–32.
31. Hernández, "Las reformas del virrey Avilés"; Maeder, *Misiones del Paraguay*; Quarleri, "El beneficio de la libertad"; Susnik, *El Indio Colonial del Paraguay*.

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The Invention of Intra-European Colonialism

Civilizing Strategies and the Beginning of Colonial Policy in the Eighteenth-Century Russian Empire

Ricarda Vulpius

The appropriation of the Enlightenment in Russia has traditionally been viewed first and foremost from the perspective of the "Westernization" of the Russian state and society. This discussion has largely focused on the two leading personalities of the eighteenth century, Peter the Great (1689–1725) and Catherine the Great (1762–1796), their surrounding influences, their communication with Enlightenment writers in the West, and the associated impact on the development of the arts and sciences in Russia. By contrast, very little consideration has been given to the question as to what extent the adoption of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century impacted Russia as an empire.[1]

In general, research on the imperial dimension of Russian history has greatly increased in the last decade. But this trend in scholarship mostly focuses on the empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, whereas the imperial history of eighteenth-century Russia has been substantially neglected.[2] Investigating expressions of Russian imperial identity impinges

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on the fundamental question as to when Russia became an empire at all. Did it assume an imperial character with the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan in the middle of the sixteenth century, that is with the rule of Ivan IV over a non-Slavic and non-Christian ethnic group? Or could Russia first be considered an empire with the establishment of rule over Central Asia, in the late nineteenth century?

As this article attempts to show, the eighteenth century – the epoch in which Russia adopted the Enlightenment – must be considered as a turning point in the development of Russia as an empire. Not until the eighteenth century did the Russian state start to develop an imperial identity, not only in the modern sense of the word. The assimilation of Enlightenment ideas among the Russian elite even influenced the shaping of colonial practices in relation to non-Russian and non-Christian subjects.

This thesis challenges the position of historians such as Jörg Baberowski, Manfred Hildermeier, and Jürgen Osterhammel, who maintain that the civilization discourse initiated by Peter the Great applied to the state's population as a whole.[3] In their view, in the eighteenth century no differentiation was made between civilizing the Russian-speaking population and civilizing non-Russians; both endeavors were rooted in one and the same underlying discourse. In addition, the Russian historian Aleksandr Etkind recently claimed that Russia's imperial experience has been limited to a process of "internal colonization."[4] By using the term "internal colonization" to describe the appropriation of foreign cultural realms, Etkind utterly ignores the significance of an expansive, and in this sense "externally" directed colonization practice for Russia.

Drawing on the work of Jürgen Osterhammel, I would like to base my arguments on the following three key criteria defining colonialism (in a modern sense): first, the attempt to exert external control over a society and alter it to match the needs and interests of the colonial rulers; second, the expectation that the colonized shall acculturate to European values and customs; and third, a specific attitude of cultural superiority from which a universal reform mandate is derived or justified.[5]

Through a discussion of two realms of policy I seek to demonstrate how Russian governments of the eighteenth century developed imperial political strategies that differed from those of the preceding centuries and ushered in civilizing policies of a colonial nature. These strategies, which

can only be roughly outlined within the scope of this paper, address both religion and economic practices and lifestyles.

Civilization Through Religion

Shortly after returning from his "Great Embassy" – the first major journey of Peter the Great throughout Central Europe, during which he not only encountered innumerable experts in various trades but also great minds of the early Enlightenment – the tsar was eager to put his understanding of the interworking of Christianity, education, and state reform into practice.[6] In June 1700 the tsar issued a directive entailing a missionary mandate of previously unknown scope: with God's help, the newly appointed Russian Orthodox metropolitan of Tobol'sk should ensure that "people persisting in the blindness of idolatry and other forms of unbelief" "are guided in the knowledge, service, and worship of the true living God." The new metropolitan was ordered to bring educated monks from Kiev circles, who would be able to learn Chinese and Mongolian in order to "destroy the roots of superstition and through the hard proof afforded by the Holy Gospel lead many souls out of the realm of Satanic darkness and into the light of the knowledge of Christ, our God."[7]

Never before in Muscovite Russia had there been any word of "people persisting in the blindness of idolatry," of souls needing to be led "out of the realm of Satanic darkness" and into the light – and this many decades *after* the integration of different peoples into the tsardom. To the contrary, for all those decades the beliefs of Siberian peoples had never been an issue for the state and had certainly not been subject to judgment.[8] With the words cited above, however, Peter the Great fused the language of the early Western European Enlightenment with the aim of proselytization and thus brought to an end a phase of relative religious tolerance in Muscovy. Within a few years he managed to establish a discourse in the tsardom, which proclaimed a Christian contempt for "nature worshippers" and then later also for other religious communities.

The decree of 1700 marked indeed only the beginning of a new imperial policy in the domain of religion.[9] As before, orders were given that no one should be baptized against his or her will, but the frequent repetition of this interdiction indicates that this rule had been regularly broken. Also, these admonitions often appeared in conjunction with illegal enslavement perpetrated by state servants. Peter the Great's missionary zeal by no means abated. Concerned that recently baptized peoples would

return to their old ways, he instructed the Siberian metropolitan to send specially selected church servants to the Ostyaks, so that their "supposed God-Satans" (*mnimye bogi šajtany*) would be found, burned, and chopped to pieces, and that their heathen temples would be destroyed. In the place of the heathen shrines they were to build chapels, set up "holy icons," and encourage Ostyaks to be baptized and to "come to know the single and triune God." The tsar threatened any Ostyaks who resisted this order with the death penalty.[10]

Perhaps the most important law impacting Christianization, which applied to a number of peoples and was conceived as comprehensive, was issued by Peter the Great in December 1714. It ordered the Siberian metropolitan to search the territories of the Ostyaks, Tatars, Voguls, and Yakuts, and wherever he found idols, idol worshipers, or other "ignoble altars," upon the orders of the Great Ruler, he was to burn them and convert all "foreigners" (*inozemcy*) to Christianity.[11]

Whenever members of the Muslim upper classes of the Kazan Tatars had been pressured to give up their traditional faith under the tsars Ivan IV and Fedor, at stake had always been the conversion of a single person, not of a whole people. As tsar, Peter I abandoned this approach; he was interested in proselytizing entire peoples and converting the masses. Historian Leonid Taimasov coined the term "ethnic Christianization" to describe this, contrasting it with the previous aims of individual or "territorial Christianization," as was attempted to a certain extent in Kazan in the sixteenth century under Ivan IV, for example.[12] Taimasov, however, makes the assumption that this new phase of Christianization first began in the 1730s, placing too little weight on the explicitly ethnically connoted Petrine missionizing orders issued at the beginning of the century. An analysis that evaluates missionary activities under Peter the Great by their efficacy alone is equally unconvincing. Certainly the success rate of this policy was low, and its aims were met, if at all, only on a limited local scale. There was also a lack of people suited to carry out the order, money to pay out compensation for being baptized, and the state and ecclesiastical infrastructure to systematically implement the mammoth task of mass Christianization, as the tsar desired.[13]

However, to identify the "new" phase of Christianization in the Russian Empire as the period in which the Commission for the Affairs of the Newly Converted was founded under tsarina Anna is to overlook the major shift in religious policy under Peter the Great.[14] Instead, an analysis of this major change – which is evident in the extent of the missionary

decrees, a patronizing tone of expression, and attempts to ensure the lasting nature of such changes – is precisely the key to comprehending the far-reaching nature of this shift in Russia's imperial policy.

But Peter the Great was not merely interested in proselytizing "idol worshipers." He also had his eye on Muslim landowners. In November 1713, he ordered the Muslim landowners of the Middle Volga who owned orthodox serfs and farm workers to have themselves baptized within half a year, as a "matter of course." Otherwise their land and its bound serfs would be taken away and become the property of the ruler.[15] Thus the unbaptized Tatar elite was faced with the choice of fully integrating themselves into the Russian social structure through baptism or suffering economic impoverishment.

Petrine religious policy towards "nature religions" in Siberia and Muslims in the Volga region thus seemed to point in a clear direction: it was an apparent declaration of war against all those who were unwilling to assume the Russian Orthodox religion. It seemed to be a policy that sought to reinforce the Russian Orthodox religion as an expression of the political and cultural legitimacy of Russian hegemony and to religiously homogenize the entire population. However, this perception obscures a fundamental motive behind such policies, which is essential to the analytical assessment of missionary measures. This motive only becomes evident when the policy is examined in the context of the entire empire, or, more specifically, in conjunction with Petrine religious policies toward non-orthodox Christians of other confessions.

Throughout the entire seventeenth century, anyone who did not adhere to the Russian Orthodox belief was deemed a "foreigner" (*inozemec*) on Russian soil. This applied in equal measure to Siberian reindeer herders as to the "German" nobles of the Baltic region. The perceived community of the Russian people was based on belonging to the Russian Orthodox faith. Whoever converted to the Orthodox faith was considered Russian from then on and was no longer allowed to leave the country freely.[16] The communities of all those belonging to some other Christian faith were of little or no value from a Russian-Orthodox perspective: Protestants were considered "heathen Germans" (*poganye nemcy*),[17] Western Europeans were "unbaptized foreigners" (*nekreshchenye inozemcy*),[18] and Catholics were absolute heretics, who had to do penitence and were subsequently required to be rebaptized.[19]

As a result of his orientation toward Western Europe, Peter the Great broke with this seventeenth-century tradition. In his manifesto of April

1702, in which he invited Western Europeans to come to Russia and enter the service of the tsar for the betterment of the Russian state, he implemented some of the newest and most revolutionary formulations of his era in addressing the issue of the freedom of religion, ensuring those interested in coming to Russia that they could continue in the practice of their respective Christian faith without disadvantage. The intention was, to quote Peter, "hereby it shall be once again affirmed (. . .) that We, by the power invested in Us by the Almighty, shall not assert Our will on the conscience of men and thereby gladly permit every Christian to pursue the nurturing of his soul in the manner he thinks fit."[20]

The same tsar who had ordered or would soon order the violent conversion of heathens and the dispossession of Muslim landowners recognized in his manifesto of 1702 the principle of freedom of faith as a positive value. The key to resolving this apparent contradiction can be found in the Petrine understanding of religion, Christianity, and the Church. In terms of his religious policies Peter the Great was not driven primarily by religious motives. The Russian Orthodox Church was of no value to him on its own; its purpose was to serve the state and not the reverse.[21] In addition, (the Christian) religion was of service to humanity, inasmuch as it could facilitate something he considered of utmost importance: the capacity of a person to shape his or her own destiny through education. The cultivation of reason in the form of science and morals and the fight against all forms of bigotry or religious superstition, was to be achieved through Christianization. In other words, Christianization meant education; education meant civilization; and civilization meant becoming Russian. This was the underlying principle that explains Peter's political tolerance towards those of other Christian denominations, on the one hand, who in his eyes already adhered to these standards of education and civilization, and, on the other, his rigorous discriminatory actions against non-Christians, who needed help in becoming civilized. Through the Russian Orthodox religion and the intervention of the Church, in Peter's eyes the non-Christian could be led "out of the dark and into the light" and thus become more valuable and useful to the state.

Unlike Ivan IV's, from the very start Peter the Great's missionary efforts were targeted to achieve more than baptism. His aim was to fight the supposed "ignorance" of native populations – a goal which was not the result of a short-term desire for conquest, as in 1551–1555. It was also not a matter of ensuring political domination. Instead this policy marked the

transition from a policy of conquest to one of civilization, which intended to educate the "foreign" subjects of the state in the "correct" set of beliefs and canon of values.[22]

Looking at the religious policies of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries from the bird's-eye view of the historian, only to a limited extent can one thus describe Peter's policies as a temporary, short-term deviation from the basic line that was pursued before Peter and then similarly after Elisabeth, which consisted of tolerating foreign religions in the Russian empire.[23] Certainly Catherine the Great placed much greater emphasis on tolerating foreign religious communities and on cooperating with their representatives than on the kind of confrontation favored by Peter.[24] Nevertheless, a perspective in which the Petrine (and subsequent) proselytization offensives are reduced to a matter of faith, tends to limit insights into deeper threads of continuity running through the imperial policies of Peter the Great (and his immediate successor) and of Catherine the Great. The profound shift in imperial policy that occurred under Peter the Great only becomes comprehensible when one understands the Petrine attacks on the belief and value systems of non-Christians as merely the first component of a much more comprehensively understood policy of civilization, which simply began with religion but then during the phase of systematic missionary activities in the first half of the eighteenth century was extended to many other spheres, including ways of life and economic practices, the culture of daily life, and to a certain extent even the language of non-Russian natives. Then the commonalities between the two "great" tsars become evident, who both no longer wished to tolerate indigenous peoples living according to their customs but demanded far-reaching cultural transformation. Although Catherine the Great took a more tolerant approach to non-Christian religions, she too did not completely forego localized missionary campaigns. She also viewed conversion efforts as opportune, when they served as instruments for the consolidation or legitimation of power.[25] The step leading from civilization strategies in the realm of religion to those in the realm of economics and ways of life was small, and the one led into the other.

THE "CIVILIZING" OF THE ECONOMY AND WAY OF LIFE: FARMING AND DOMESTICATION

It is in fact possible to trace a direct line of continuity between missionary efforts and offensives to settle nomadic peoples. This supports the thesis that the conceptual shift which occurred under Peter the Great – based on

a growing self-conception of the Russians as superior – was irreversible, and over the course of the eighteenth century simply expanded to include other areas of life, ultimately forming the basis for a broadly conceived colonial policy.

However, the offensives launched by the Russian government to settle nomadic populations differed substantially from region to region and were oriented towards the respective needs of the Russian administration. In eastern Siberia and in the Far East, the central government resisted introducing farming and corresponding settlement among its non-Russian subjects until the late eighteenth century. Financial interests in the revenue from tribute payments (*jasak*) made by nomadic hunters on sable furs was too great, as was the need for workers in early factories.[26] In the Northern Caucasus there was an overriding geopolitical interest in developing appropriate strategies for fostering loyalty in order to prevent the Circassians and, most of all, the powerful Kabardians from collaborating with the Ottoman and Persian Empires. By contrast, in the southern part of the empire, the Petersburg central government as well as local governors saw the nomadic Kalmyks, Bashkirs, and Kazakhs as immediate threats to Russian interests. At stake was not only preventing attacks on settlements of Russian farmers, but most importantly, Peter's desire to expand the promising trade with India via the Silk Road was threatened by the nomadic way of life of the steppe peoples.

In contrast to the widespread opinion among scholars that Russian politics of the eighteenth century did not aim or at least not seriously attempt to intervene administratively in the traditional economy and system of land use within the nomadic societies of the South, over the course of the eighteenth century both the central government as well as local officials became increasingly convinced of the need to effect enduring changes in the economy and lifestyle of the nomads – and acted accordingly. By no means did this sentiment first emerge with the reign of Catherine the Great; rather, it took shape in the late 1730s and intensified under tsarina Elizabeth through the end of the 1750s. Catherine the Great merely made use of existing discourses as well as ongoing offensives, which she developed and expanded upon.

Certainly, in the eighteenth century efforts made at introducing domestic life and agriculture among the nomads of the steppes, especially among the Kazakhs of the Small, Middle, and Great Horde, only reaped modest results in terms of numbers. But even in the nineteenth century, when substantially more intensive offensives followed and the pressure to settle

was often accompanied by violent force, the goal of denomadizing Central Asia had not been reached even by half. Robert Kindler's most recent study on Stalin's policy towards the nomads demonstrates that not until the mid-twentieth century did Stalin's brutal methods finally break the back of the Kazakhs' nomadism.[27] However, the seeds of the often violent campaigns enforcing settlement in the nineteenth and twentieth century were sown in the eighteenth century, both in a discursive and methodological capacity.

In the early eighteenth century, the Russian empire's new self-understanding as belonging to the "civilized peoples" – a view which only made sense through comparison with those who had not yet achieved this status – broadened the perspective on humanity as a whole, on the one hand, whereas in the eyes of the Russian elite the status of nomadic peoples was diminished, on the other.[28] Thus, in his decree of 1722 to make the Kazakhs Russian subjects, Peter the Great himself employed a new tone by calling the Kazakhs an "unreliable people of the steppe" (*stepnoj i lekhko-myslennyj narod*).[29]

Although religious conversion brought a sweeping shift in identity and was therefore to be linked to lasting settlement, his core concern was sustained proselytization. Lasting settlement and the adoption of agriculture as a new economic model for previously nomadic peoples did not yet factor as independent political aims.[30] Only towards the end of the reign of his successor, tsarina Anna, was a shift in attitude towards the steppe and its peoples manifested, which took greater issue with their "erratic" way of life – a tendency that become significantly more pronounced under tsarina Elisabeth. This was initially spurred by a desire to sustain missionary gains by protecting the converted. For example, out of fear of the remaining non-Christian members of her tribe, the widow of the deceased Kalmykian Khan Petr Taishin appealed to Anna to be allowed to settle, along with other baptized Kalmykian nobles and converted Kalmyks, a safe distance away from their ancestral herding grounds.[31] The government of the tsarina saw this request as an opportunity and planned a compact "island" for converted Kalmyks with the aim of accustomizing this vanguard population to "agriculture and a domesticated lifestyle" (*obyknut' k pashne i k domovnomu zhit'iu*), so that over time it would serve as an example to the common Kalmyks, who were initially allowed to remain nomadic.[32] This was the first time that a graduated model was conceived on the part of the Russian government. However, at this point in time the initiatives to encourage settlement were still closely bound with the aim of

religious consolidation, and both these initiatives were provided with substantial support from the senate and the College for Foreign Affairs.[33]

Well into the 1750s religious conversion was considered a precursor to initiating changes in the way of life. Only when tsarina Elisabeth effected a clear change of course in her missionary politics – for reasons of internal security and imperial stability – towards a more tolerant approach to other faiths in 1755, did the drive for permanent settlement shed its religious mantle.[34] In the late 1750s, representatives both at the center as well as on the periphery of government demanded that obedience and a transition from wildness (*dikost'*) to a civilized existence (*liudskost'*) replace the despotism and lawlessness of nomadic life.[35] The notion of progress took hold, and the construction of civilizatory difference assumed increasingly greater weight.

A substantially more caustic tone can be found in a seminal strategy document written by Ivan Ivanovich Veimarn, the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops stationed along the Siberian fortification line. Published in Russian and German, his paper describes the Kazakhs as "a people lightheadedly swarming around in the desert," whose "typical, predatory custom of plundering and ravaging settled areas" demonstrates its "barbaric" and "brutish nature" and its "terrible inclinations" that should be "wiped from the face of the earth to the greatest extent possible."[36] To an unprecedented extent Veimarn's memorandum reflects the negative image of the nomad as destructive, morally inferior, and backward, which was meanwhile common in Western Europe. That Veimarn doubted the potential for complete domestication of the nomads represented a new element in the discourses on the nomads in the Russian empire up until that point. Instead he describes how "there is little or almost no hope of a complete improvement in their morals and customs," and how it is impossible to civilize them completely through the use of traditional methods. This viewpoint led into his suggested strategy: although the leaders of the hordes were still to be recruited for settlement through exemplary buildings and these leaders would then have an influence on their tribes, a key change was a notion of these tactics as accompanied by the "debilitation" of the nomads as a means of "weakening them from within." Only then could one subjugate them and "accustom them to a better, more peaceful life."[37]

According to Veimarn, the most suitable method of weakening the nomads was to reduce "in a subtle manner" the numbers of their cattle and horses, since both were essential to their wealth and well-being. The

less livestock they had, "the less one need fear their wild boldness or unrest." The means to the end of weakening this population was to make the animals "enervated" and to "coddle" them in a manner so that the cattle and horses kept in stalls and given prepared food would become unaccustomed to and incapable of finding food for themselves in the age-old manner and would die if the seasonal nomadic way of life were to be taken up again. For this reason, stalls or barns should be constructed, at least for the "highest ranking commanders or elders," whereby they also should become accustomed to building structures. "Their remaining comrades" would then be encouraged to follow their example and would emulate them. The more they would busy themselves with construction, the more they would refrain from marauding. This would also be furthered by the enervation of the people themselves.[38]

Veimarn's memorandum was very well received. For many years it defined additional policies toward the nomadic peoples of the South, for the most part the Kazakhs of the Small and Middle Hordes, and may be considered the most significant formulation of strategy in the eighteenth century in terms of civilizing the nomadic peoples of the steppes on the southern flank of Russia.[39] Over the next few decades the tsarist government did in fact build numerous houses, barns, and sheds for the Kazakh elites and their cattle.[40] It also provided hay and seeds, had scythes delivered, and sent Russian experts to the steppe in order to train Kazakh dignitaries in agriculture.[41] Around the turn of the century, the policy of providing incentives – such as medals for the largest amount of grain produced – was increasingly matched with other elements that put massive pressure on the population. There were increased considerations of strategically settling Russians in the region to limit available land and force the Kazakhs to give up their nomadic way of life.[42]

However, it cannot be said that there was a substantial turnaround by the end of the eighteenth century in the numbers of wealthy Kazakhs who had rejected nomadic herding in favor of farming and agriculture. Most of the major herdsmen among the Kazakhs of the Small and Middle Horde still continued to view their economy as more advantageous than labor-intensive farming.[43] Yet, the intended goal of the increased impoverishment of the Kazakhs, especially those of the Small Horde who were closest to Russian settlements, was attained. This impoverishment was achieved less through the proposed "enervation" of humans and animals than by taking away suitable grazing pastures and by preventing the Kazakhs from pasturing their livestock on the fertile grazing lands on the "inner" side of

the Ural River in winter. By the turn of the century, poverty had increased to such an extent that many large families, having sold their cattle, also resorted to selling their children to survive.[44] Others attempted to reach the "inner" side of the Russian line of fortifications, where they worked as day-laborers for dumping wages.[45]

CONCLUSION

These considerations on the implementation of civilization strategies through religion and through new economic structures and lifestyles demonstrate to what extent the empire took on a new quality in the eighteenth century. Peter's missionary policies were not religious policies in a narrow sense of the term but instead can be seen as the beginning of a political shift, which was colonial in approach, and which, going far beyond a religious framework, introduced a fundamental change in imperial strategy towards non-Russians in the South and East of the empire. This fundamental change was carried forward by Peter's successors, removed of its religious trappings, and turned into an offensive to bring about the settlement of nomads, who were increasingly viewed as inferior.

Over the course of the eighteenth century, Russian governments thereby developed a comprehensive civilizing mandate out of strategies used to civilize individual populations. Not all of these strategies could be discussed in the context of this paper. Apart from the ousting of Muslim and shamanistic beliefs in favor of the Russian Orthodox faith and apart from the policy envisaging the replacement of nomadic ways of life with settlement and agriculture, the Russian imperial elite's policy encompassed: driving the nomads out of their ancestral lands; restricting the nomad's movements by lines of fortresses; gradually displacing indigenous customs through the introduction of Russian traditions; replacing traditional tribal political structures with governors who were often violently imposed by Russia; attempting to marginalize indigenous languages in certain regions through the use of the Russian language; and integrating populations into the community of subjects dependent on the tsar's grace (milost'), rewards (that is, bestowal of titles for dignitaries), and Russian justice (that is, involvement in specifically designed Russian courts of justice (*raspravy*)).[46] If one uses the characteristics proposed by Jürgen Osterhammel in his widely recognized definition of colonialism, then the Russian empire clearly meets the criteria that

would allow it to be described as a colonial empire in terms of its rule over non-Christian peoples.

The driving force behind this shift towards colonial policy was the Russian reception of the Enlightenment. The adoption of Enlightenment ideas – such as the universality of civilization, progress, and the educability of humankind – by Russian imperial actors led, in a first step, to the construction of a civilizatory distance between Russians and non-Russians, then, in a second step, to the assumption of a gradual model for effecting progress, and, in a third step, to the resulting formulation of colonial policies. The self-directed civilizing processes of Russia spearheaded by Peter the Great should not hinder our ability, as historians, to recognize the emergence of discourses and practices of externally directed civilizing processes. Furthermore, the analysis of the reception of the Enlightenment in Russia should from here on include this important and consequential imperial dimension, which laid the foundation for the civilizing missions of the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries.

Notes

1. Some of the latest publications on Enlightenment in Russia are Michael Schippan, *Die Aufklärung in Russland im 18. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012); Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, "Thoughts on the Enlightenment and Enlightenment in Russia," *Journal of Modern Russian History and Historiography* 2 (2009), 1–26; Andreas Renner, "Russland. Die Autokratie der Aufklärung," in *Orte eigener Vernunft. Europäische Aufklärung jenseits der Zentren*, eds. Andreas Renner and Alexander Kraus (Frankfurt: Campus, 2008), 125–142.

2. Great exceptions are Andreas Kappeler, *Rußlands erste Nationalitäten. Das Zarenreich und die Völker der Mittleren Wolga vom 16. bis 19. Jahrhundert* (Köln: Böhlau, 1981); Yuri Slezkine, *Arctic Mirrors. Russia and the Small Peoples of the North* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier. The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Willard Sunderland, *Taming the Wild Field. Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

3. Jörg Baberowski, "Auf der Suche nach Eindeutigkeit: Kolonialismus und zivilisatorische Mission im Zarenreich und in der Sowjetunion," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 47 (1999), 482–504; Manfred Hildermeier, *Geschichte Russland. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Oktoberrevolution* (München: C. H. Beck, 2013), 549–557; Jürgen Osterhammel, "'The Great Work of

Uplifting Mankind'. Zivilisierungsmission und Moderne," in *Zivilisierungsmissionen. Imperiale Weltverbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert*, eds. Boris Barth and Jürgen Osterhammel (Konstanz: UVK-Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005), 363–426, here 392–395.

4. Aleksandr Etkind, *Internal Colonization: Russia's Imperial Experience* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).

5. Jürgen Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus. Geschichte, Formen, Folgen* (München: C. H. Beck, 1995), 20–21.

6. *Peter der Große in Westeuropa. Die große Gesandtschaft 1697–1698* (Bremen: Ed. Temmen, 1991); Dmitrii Guzevich and Irina Guzevich, *Velikoe posol'stvo* (St Petersburg: Fenirs, 2003).

7. *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*, 1-aia seriia (hereafter cited as *PSZRI*) (St Petersburg: 1830–1916), Vol. 4, No. 1800 (18.6.1800), 59–60.

8. N. Firsov, *Polozhenie inorodcev Severo-Vostochnoi Rossii v Moskovskom gosu-darstve* (Kazan': 1866), 203; Yuri Slezkine, *Arctic Mirrors. Russia and the Small Peoples of the North* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 40, 44.

9. Michael Khodarkovsky perceives a "new dimension in the mission" including the change in attitude towards non-Christians in the South and East only in the twenties of the eighteenth century: Michael Khodarkovsky, "The Conversion of Non-Christians in Early Modern Russia," in *Of Religion and Empire. Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia*, eds. Robert P. Geraci and Michael Khodarkovsky (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 115–143, here 130.

10. *Pamiatniki sibirskoi istorii XVIII v* (St Peterburg: Tipografiia ministerstva vnutrennych del, 1882), Vol. 1, No. 96 (7.6.1710), 413–414.

11. *PSZRI* Vol. 5, No. 2863 (6.12.1714), 133.

12. Leonid Taimasov, "From 'Kazan's Newly Converted' to 'Orthodox Inorodtsy': The Historical Stages of the Affirmation of Christianity in the Middle Volga Region," in: *Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire*, ed. Kimitaka Matsuzato (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007), 111–138, here 115.

13. Hans-Heinrich Nolte, *Religiöse Toleranz in Rußland 1600–1725* (Göttingen: Muster-Schmidt, 1969), 88–89; Joseph Glazik, *Die russisch-orthodoxe Heidenmission seit Peter dem Grossen* (Münster: Aschdendorff, 1954), 39, 46–49, 84–85; Joseph Glazik, *Die Islammission der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche: Eine missionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung nach russischen Quellen und Darstellungen* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1959), 73.

14. Taimasov, "Kazan's Newly Converted," 122/123.

15. *PSZRI* Vol. 5, No. 2734 (3.11.1713), 66–67.

16. *PSZRI* Vol. 6, No. 4067, 754–755.

17. Cited in V. I. Buganov, *Razriadnye knigi poslednei chetverti XV-nachala XVII v* (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1962), 35. See also Hans-Heinrich Nolte, "Verständnis und Bedeutung der religiösen Toleranz in Rußland 1600–1725," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 17 (1969), 494–530, here 505.

18. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim, sobrannyia i izdannyia Archeograficheskoiu Kommissieiu* (St Peterburg: Archeograficheskaia Kommissiia, 1846–1872), vol. 3, No. 69, 250; Nolte, *Religiöse Toleranz*, 505.

19. Nolte, *Religiöse Toleranz*, 110–122.

20. Pis'ma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo. Vol. 2 (St Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1889), No. 421, 39–50, here 41–42.

21. Igor Smolitsch, *Geschichte der russischen Kirche 1700–1917* (Leiden: Brill, 1964), 133.

22. For more details on methods of conversion in the Petrine era, see Ricarda Vulpius, *Russland als Imperium und Kolonialreich im 18. Jahrhundert. Konzepte und Praktiken russländischer Eliten*. Manuscript, publication in 2018.

23. According to Andreas Kappeler, the four years of aggressive missionary activities under Ivan IV towards the Tatars of Kazan were a "temporary, short-term deviation from the basic line." Andreas Kappeler, "Die Moskauer 'Nationalitätenpolitik' unter Ivan IV," in *Russian History* 14 (1987), 263–282, here 282. In contrast to this phase in the sixteenth century, the aggressive missionary policy in the first half of the eighteenth century has to be categorized differently.

24. Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

25. M. M. Fedorov, *Pravovoe polozhenie narodov vostochnoi Sibiri (XVII-nachalo XIX veka)* (Iakutsk: Iakutskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1978), 65–67; E. M. Zalkind, *Obshchestvennyi stroi buriat v XVIII i pervoi polovine XIX vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), 24–47; N. V. Kim, *Iz istorii zemledeliia u buriat v konce XVIII i pervoi polovine XIX veka. Issledovaniia i materialy po istorii Buriatii* (Ulan-Ude: Buryatskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1968), 99–125; G. P. Basharin, *Iz istorii priobshcheniia iakutov k russkoi zemledel'cheskoi kul'ture* (Iakutsk: Iakutskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1958); F. G. Safronov, *Russkie krest'iane v Iakutii* (Iakutsk: Iakutskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1961).

26. Fedorov, *Pravovoe polozhenie*, 171.

27. Robert Kindler, *Stalins Nomaden. Herrschaft und Hunger in Kasachstan* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2014).

28. More details in Vulpius, *Russland als Imperium*.

29. *Kazakhsko-Russkie Otnosheniia* (hereafter cited as *KRO*) vol. 1, No. 24 (1722), 31. On the multiple connotation of *legkomyslennyi* in the sense of

"unreasonable," "ignorant" as well as "unstable" and "unsolid" see *Slovar'* *russkogo iazyka XVIII veka* (St Petersburg: Nauka, 2000), vol. 11, and *Slovar' Akademii Rossiiskoi* (St Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademia Nauk, 1792), vol. 3.

30. Exemplary is here the regulation envisaging the settlement of newly baptized Kalmyks. It deals exclusively with the question of locality; the settlement itself, the ultimate goal of sedentarization, is not mentioned at all. *PSZRI* Vol. 5, No. 3062 (14.1.1717), 485–486.

31. *PSZRI* Vol. 10, No. 7228 (18.4.1737), 126–128.

32. *PSZRI* No. 7335 (26.7.1737), 226–228.

33. *PSZRI* Vol. 11, Nr. 8394 (6.6.1740), 436–438; *PSZRI* Vol. 10, Nr. 7733 (15.1.1739), 702–704.

34. The only exception was the North Caucasus. There, throughout the eighteenth century, Christianity and civilization were seen as inseparable entities. Thus, one can observe an astonishing parallel in time with regard to changes in politics within the Iberian and French colonial empires. There, too, in the middle of the 1750s the state's strategy of civilization became detached from religious mission and the latter was reduced to just one aspect among others. See the contributions in this volume by Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida, Lía Quarleri, and Damien Tricoire.

35. *KRO* Vol. 1, Nr. 225 (22.1.1759), 571–591, here 575.

36. The Russian text can be found in an abridged version in *KRO* No. 246 (2.11.1761), 630–632. See the unabridged text, published in German, in Beate Eschment, "'Wider die leichtsinnigen wilden und der viehischen Lebensart sehr ergebenen Kirgis-Kaisaken.' Vorschläge eines baltendeutschen Adligen in russischen Diensten zur Befriedung der Kazachen," in *Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte* 15, Mitteilungen des SFB "Differenz und Integration" 4/2 (2004), 131–157, here 140–146.

37. *KRO* No. 246 (2.11.1761), 630; Eschment, "Wider die leichtsinnigen," 144.

38. *KRO* No. 246 (2.11.1761), 630; Eschment, "Wider die leichtsinnigen," 144/145.

39. During the following years, time and again the College for Foreign Affairs as well as governors in the steppe regions referred to Veimarn's argumentation. See *KRO* no. 257 (9.2.1764), 659–663. *KRO* no. 267 (17.11.1766), 682–684.

40. Ivan Ivanovich Kraft, *Sbornik uzakonenii o Kirgizakh stepnych oblastei* (Orenburg: Tipo-Litografiia P. N. Zharinova, 1898), no. 279, 104; N. G. Apollova, *Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi Kazakhstana s Rossiei v XVIII-nachale XIX v.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1960), 174–177; A. Iu. Bykov, *Istoki modernizacii Kazachstana (Problema sedentarizacii v rossiiskoi politike XVIII-nachala XX veka)* (Barnaul: Izdatel'stvo Azbuka, 2003), 53.

41. *KRO* No. 257 (9.2.1764), 659–663.
42. More details in Vulpius, *Russland als Imperium*.
43. A. I. Levshin, *Opisanie kirgiz-kazach'ikh ili kirgiz-kaisackikh ord i stepei* (St Petersburg, 1832), vol. 1–3, here vol. 3, 198; Apollova, *Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi*, 174; I. R. Prochorov, "Istoricheskaia geografiia kazakhskogo zemledeliia (1758–1822)," in *Vestnik Karagandinskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta* 2006. http://articlekz.com/article/53499
44. *Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR (1785–1828 gg.)* (Moscow: Akademiya nauk SSSR, 1940), vol. 4, 19.4.1804, no. 66, 217–224, no. 78 (23.5.1808), 239–240. *KRO* vol. 2, 20.9.1805, no. 89, 165.
45. *KRO* Vol. 2, No. 107, 12.8.1820; No. 111 (not later than 1820), p. 187.
46. Ricarda Vulpius, "Räumliches 'Ordnen' und Gewaltmobilisierung: Festungslinien an der südlichen russländischen Frontier im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Umkämpfte Räume. Raumbilder, Ordnungswillen und Gewaltmobilisierung*, ed. Ulrike Jureit (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016), 139–157. On other fields of civilization see Vulpius, *Russland als Imperium*.

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Creating Differences for Integration: Enlightened Reforms and Civilizing Missions in the Eastern European Possessions of the Habsburg Monarchy (1750–1815)

Klemens Kaps

The beginning of the eighteenth century marked the climax of Habsburg geopolitical power, with its expansions towards the east thanks to military successes against the Ottoman Empire, as well as to the west and south with the end of the Spanish War of Succession. Although the loss of Silesia in 1742 could hardly be compensated for by the annexation of Galicia in 1772/1795, the acquisition of the Innviertel (1779), and that of Venice and Dalmatia (1797, confirmed in 1815), the Habsburg Monarchy appeared at this time as a major geopolitical player in continental Europe.

The empire's expansion meant that its traditional constitution as a composite monarchy based on strong local nobilities organized in *diets*, and rather weak central institutions was hard to maintain.

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Accordingly, as early as 1713, Emperor Charles VI issued the Pragmatic Sanction, declaring the unity and indivisibility of the Habsburg possessions.[1] At the same time, increased cultural diversity put the imperial cultural paradigm[2] – Counter-Reformation Catholicism – more and more into question. Both the determination to maintain unity and the challenge to this cultural paradigm were related, and the dynamics of each brought deep changes to empire-building in Habsburg Central Europe. The imperial court managed to strengthen its "fiscal-military"[3] apparatus by a combination of centralization and a polycentrism which increased the ability of the central government to impose administrative control over provincial estates and feudal manors in the Bohemian and Austrian provinces, but allowed local compromises in Hungarian, Italian, and Flemish territories.

This paper examines to what extent enlightened discourse encouraged imperial actors to treat Habsburg dominions differently on either side of an imaginary line separating east from west. Larry Wolff has argued that enlightened discourse had this general effect throughout Eastern Europe.[4] Below I shall examine to what extent Habsburg imperial elites (who were shaped by Enlightenment ideas and were largely, but in no way exclusively, German-speaking) developed distinct strategies of discursive othering towards the eastern territories of the empire. I also examine how this determined the uses of the idea of progress and of the "civilizing mission" of the Habsburg state and/or the German-speaking elites following the military conquest and/or occupation of the eastern provinces.

CAMERALIST REFORM AND SOCIAL PROGRESS: CATEGORIES AND TAXONOMIES AS PREREQUISITES FOR BUILDING HIERARCHIES

Centralizing and homogenizing efforts, which ultimately aimed to strengthen the imperial framework, were guided by the place given to each individual territory (and its people) in an imaginary hierarchical scale. This can be traced back, most clearly, to the discourses related to cameralist reform. Cameralism was an Enlightenment philosophical doctrine which had a strong influence on the shape of Habsburg imperial reforms from the late seventeenth century onwards.[5] Its impact was particularly strong on the reforms under Maria Theresia after 1748 due to its growing influence among employees of the state in the second half of the century.[6] Originally, cameralism involved a series of techniques intended to provide the early modern state with sufficient fiscal revenues. Cameral sciences,

however, gradually developed to offer a general theory on economic development and social progress, always focusing on the *Glückseligkeit* (happiness) of the people. Fostering the circulation of money and goods was one of its main recipes for encouraging economic development. Subsequently, later cameralist theoreticians such as Joseph von Sonnenfels (appointed Professor for Political and Cameral Sciences at the University of Vienna in 1763), demanded the derogation of commercial monopolies and privileges as well as the reform of guilds. Protectionism, however, was also in the cameralist policy toolkit. Their political economy explicitly referred to states (not to market spaces), and aimed at fostering spatial economic equilibrium between single territories.[7]

One of the basic conclusions that cameralist writers reached was that a parallel increase in tax revenue and production could be achieved only by making the population work harder. Cameralists showed a remarkable awareness of the institutional prerequisites for growth in productivity – thereby justifying encroachment upon, and redistribution of, property rights. Nevertheless, an assessment of the quality of the workforce played an important role in cameralist treatises and their derivates, such as descriptive social statistics. Categories such as "laziness," "idleness," and "industriousness," but also broader categories such as "dirty" or "orderly," already used in social discipline discourse, became key parameters for the evaluation of the economic performance of the population.[8] It is important to stress that cameralism was no mere precursor to modern economics. In its appearance in the works of figures such as Johann Beckmann, cameralism was heavily engaged also with the classification of natural resources and the population's potential, according to taxonomies taken from natural history, such as that proposed by Carl Linnaeus. Indeed cameralists focused much more on classifying natural resources than on developing theories of wealth creation, such as developed by both early liberals and physiocrats.[9]

In 1684, Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk highlighted the "diligence" of Silesia's woollen weavers, of the German peasants in the Bohemian mountain regions, and of Vienna's own population in his famous work, *Österreich über alles, wenn es nur will* (*Austria Over All, If She Only Will*). The work was an important reference for central European cameralists for decades.[10] While Hörnigk pointed out that there was a negative correlation between fertile soil and an industrious population, so that "peasants in mountain regions are diligent people, the others often are

lazy boors,"[11] he did not hierarchize the territories and the peoples of the Habsburg dominions. This perception of equality between the peoples of the empire started to decline during the following decades, following social and economic reforms and territorial expansion towards the east.

Encyclopedic works published outside of the Habsburg Monarchy pointed to increasing differences already at a fairly early date. Thus, the entry for Bohemia and Hungary in the *Atlas Historique* edited by Henri Abraham Châtelain and Nicolas Gueudeville, published in Amsterdam in 1720, associated the Hungarian population with a violent character and declared their cultural affinity with the Ottomans. The "German" status of Bohemia, as part of the Holy Roman Empire, was disregarded; instead, it was deemed to be closely related to Hungary.[12] The French *Encyclopédie* similarly offered its readers the view that Hungary was a land between "Asia and Europe," but it praised the "diligence" of the Bohemian population.[13] During the first half of the eighteenth century differences between Bohemia and Hungary became gradually noted in other statistical and encyclopedic works. This was the first step in the discursive strategy of othering and orientalizing – as references to Hungary's affinity with Asia demonstrate. Although differences between regions of the western provinces were also made out, this happened in a far more nuanced way. In a report addressed to the Duke of Grafton in 1765, the British ambassador in Vienna, David Murray Lord Stormont, identified serfdom in Bohemia as a major obstacle for the "Growth of Affluence and Industry." In contrast, he underscored the fertility of the soil and good conditions for agriculture that prevailed in the western provinces.[14]

By the mid-1760s, the prevailing differences in agrarian structures between the Austrian and Bohemian provinces were perceived as being far more important than the similarities that had been wrought over two decades of reinforced administrative and judicial homogenization. Bohemia was similarly presented as distinct from the Polish-Lithuanian conglomerate in terms of social structure – the same variable that had been key in German discourses about Poland-Lithuania in the early modern age.[15]

The perception of spatial hierarchies was in no way limited to external observers and statistical theoreticians. Geographically bound differences were also a common theme among bureaucrats who were trained in and influenced by cameral sciences and/or policy science (*Policeywissenschaft*). A key document in this regard is the *Politische Anmerkungen* (*Political Comments*) on the reports on Austria and Bohemia ordered by the Court

Council of War and drafted in 1770 and 1771, probably by Directorial Court Councilor (*Direktorialhofrat*) Karl Joseph Cavalier von Hauer,[16] within the process of reform of the imperial army's system of recruitment. Tyrol and the Hungarian lands were left outside this survey, but the reference is still significant, because the precise assessment offered by Hauer (based on particular reports by army officers on the district level) took into consideration the health, moral behavior, and work ethos of the population, as well as agrarian structures, economic activities, and administrative features (even at the level of single districts). In sum, the survey which was modeled according to 14 questions set up by the Court Council of War is a remarkable source for the analysis of regional differences in the west as they were perceived by the imperial army a decade before the beginning of the Josephinist reformist period. In general terms, the reports categorize the population of Carniola and the Bohemian lands much more often as "lazy," "inert," "negligent," "bibulous," and "dirty" than in the case of Upper and Lower Austria or Styria. Such categorization, however, was kept on a district level; it was neither translated into a more general taxonomy nor used to construct a mental map of the potential of western provinces for development. In contrast, some ethnic differences were constructed: Germans in Carniola and some districts of Bohemia and Moravia (for example Znaim/ Znojmo) were defined as more diligent and industrious than "the Slavs."[17]

In sum, the military survey of the early 1770s demonstrates that the cameralist reformist discourse which tried to strengthen the empire's fiscal and military capacities also reinforced the perception of internal differences. The observations and information coming from interviews with local people made by army officers and local civil functionaries were structured according to a catalog of criteria which evaluated the capacities of the population, both in terms of economic potential and of military and political value. The officers were interested in identifying causes for the socio-economic reality of the population in order to point out adequate reforms; underlining this process, cameralist taxonomies were an important factor in the strengthening and expansion of the eighteenth-century Habsburg imperial framework. At the same time, the principles according to which different territories and their peoples were categorized following cameralist taxonomies in combination with other anthropological and moral categories were a solid basis for constructing internal cultural hierarchies. This construction of an internal hierarchy is precisely what happened in the discourse on the Eastern Habsburg dominions.

FROM CAMERALISM TO ORIENTALISM: THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HABSBURG EAST

As hinted in the aforementioned works dealing with Hungary and Bohemia, descriptive statistical works eventually combined different taxonomies drawn from Enlightenment philosophy with what can be considered an orientalizing ideology. In contrast to the common perception of Bohemia and Austria, the cameralist reformist discourse insisting on the diligence and discipline of the population was related to a cultural geography that expressed otherness, most notably in comparing Hungary to Asia. As András Vari has demonstrated, to the authors of different descriptive statistical works published between the 1790s and the 1830s in the Habsburg Empire, the defining characteristics of Hungary's multi-cultural population were "laziness," "idleness," "poverty," and "drunkenness." Sometimes the statisticians attributed to them a minor talent for crafts and industry and a tendency to be superstitious. Statistical works thus did not merely describe, but interpreted data using a cameralist taxonomy as they sought to evaluate the degree to which Hungary was "advanced" or "backward." Statisticians, like Andreas Demián (1804) and Martin Schwartner (1798), saw Vlachs, Croats, and Serbs as "wild people" and "natural men" who had to be "civilized" before they could contribute to social and economic progress. In practice, this meant teaching them codes of behavior and social norms that were conducive to economic development, a civil society and more refined manners. The description of these wild peoples stood in sharp contrast to the corresponding descriptions of Germans. Saxons living in Transylvania, for example, were depicted as diligent, industrious, and thrifty by Michael Lebrecht (1792) and Lucas Joseph Marienburg (1813).[18] It is thus quite clear that the cameralist taxonomy participated in more general trends which proclaimed horizontal cultural differences as a strictly hierarchical social order. This discursive hierarchization situated subjects under examination "as close to nature as possible,"[19] and excluded them from the community of enlightened, rational, and cultivated people.

These images and codes were hardly new when they appeared in descriptive statistical texts from the 1790s onwards. Also, they were not limited to published material on the Habsburg imperial political economy. In the 1750s, internal administrative documents circulating in the Austrian Adriatic province registered a complaint filed by the Administrator of the District Governor (*Hauptmannamts-Verwalter*) of

the port city of Fiume/Rijeka, which at that time belonged to the joint Austrian Littoral district (in 1776 it was incorporated into Croatia). The author of the complaint, who addressed himself to the Supreme Commercial Intendancy in Trieste, claimed that his colleague in Zengg/Senj was paid higher board wages (*Quartiergeld*) than himself. He received an answer that the unequal pay was justified. The administrative superiors in Trieste explained that the Main Office Administrator in Senj received higher board wages because he had to carry out his duty "at an alien place between cliffs and rocks and among half-wild people."[20]

This example demonstrates that the discourse that was gradually drawing an imaginary line between the "West" and the "East" in the Habsburg Empire was reproduced on smaller regional scales, such as that of the Austrian Littoral. It also demonstrates that bureaucracy contributed very much to this construction, and that it influenced everyday administrative mechanisms and practices. The most important role played by this discursive hierarchization, however, was in the legitimation of imperial policies. Thus, in the 1790s, the traveler Count Hofmann described the Banat of Timişoara as "empty, wild and marshy" and called for a revival of the schemes for the colonization of idle land. In fact, the lands had already seen colonization – the Josephinist serfdom reforms had forced many German colonists to settle on empty land in the 1780s.[21]

In sum, these examples demonstrate how the cameralist taxonomies not only operated as a tool to assess the potential for modernization of different populations under the Habsburgs, but were also intimately connected with orientalizing notions. The codification of cameralist categories like work ethos, hygienic conditions, and the state of roads, alongside many expressions of cultural otherness, demonstrates the orientalization trend. Orientalization in turn justified the construction of civilizing missions because categories like those of "wild" or "natural men" presupposed that the situation so described could be improved by imperial policies. Improvement would be civilizing because it would be facilitated either by institutional and legal changes, or by supporting the transfer of knowledge and social learning (including resettlement). It must be stressed that cameralism was not orientalizing as such, but when it was combined with more general ideas of Enlightenment – in particular the civilization discourse – it produced orientalizing notions. These metaphors created a socio-cultural hierarchy in order to legitimate reforms and, thus, strengthen integration within the empire.

In this way, cameralism and orientalism were related tools in the hands of the imperial elites whose target was to foster the extension of Habsburg imperial rule. It seems to some extent paradoxical that taxonomies that combined cameralist, anthropological, and moral categories were invented in order to reduce regional inequalities. In the long run, they led to the emergence of socio-ethnic stereotypes.[22] The construction of differences between the western and the eastern provinces stresses the imperial character of Habsburg rule with the utmost clarity, because the construction of a subordinated, inferior Eastern European space, as claimed by Larry Wolff and Marija Todorova,[23] was in the Habsburg case directly linked with empire-building.

THE CREATION OF AN IMPERIAL PERIPHERY: GALICIA

The trends described above can be perfectly illustrated with the case of Galicia. The province was annexed by the Habsburg Monarchy after the First Partition of Poland-Lithuania in 1772. The partition differed from the acquisition of other territories in that the territory was incorporated into Habsburg rule neither as a result of traditional matrimonial alliances between dynasties nor as the result of an internationally recognized and legitimate treaty. Although the Viennese Court made persistent efforts to represent the Crown's historical rights over a large proportion of the annexed territory – the Hungarian Crown's former rule over the medieval Kingdom of Halych-Vladimir, and the Wenzel Crown's claims on the Principalities of Zator and Auschwitz, near to the Austro-Silesian border – international recognition of this legitimation discourse was not forthcoming. This forced the Crown to a permanent exercise of "invention," as Larry Wolff has called it. In contrast to the incorporation of Hungary, Transylvania, or even the Banat, the imperial authorities were concerned with creating political legitimacy in former Polish-Lithuanian territory. Thus, "cultural and ideological construction" went hand in hand with "social and political integration."[24] In consequence, the Habsburg authorities felt in no way bound by historical traditions or legal-political patterns when they came to organize the government of their newly acquired province.[25] In this context, the cameralist reformist discourse was intensively used to establish and legitimate political rule. In particular, after the relaxation of norms limiting freedom of opinion in 1781, economists, statisticians, army officers, and bureaucrats published treatises, travel accounts, and pamphlets, in which they regarded the province as

backward. It was a territory that "had not yet become as advanced as its neighbors"[26] and which had to be "lifted up" and "civilized"[27] by the Habsburg authorities.

This meta-narrative was extremely widespread among the enlightened imperial elites and became increasingly more orientalist in character than parallel discourses referring to the territories of the Hungarian Crown. The descriptions of bad and "dirty" roads and the mentions of a "lazy," "idle," "ignorant," and "dirty" population that lacked social discipline, mainly due to "drunkenness," were framed as undeniable proofs of the "crude," "wild," and "barbaric" character of the local population. Social hierarchies within the population were taken into account. Almost all groups – peasants (considered homogeneous, with no regard for Roman Catholic or Greek Catholic affiliations), Greek Catholic clerics, the lower nobility, and especially Jews – were integrated in the orientalizing narrative as "dirty." But some ascriptions (like "laziness") were reserved for the lowest social group (that is, peasants). Particularly skeptical were the assessments of populations throughout the province's mountainous areas.[28]

These depictions, not only during the Josephinist reformist period, extended to the higher nobility. These traditional elites could contest Habsburg rule, and accordingly, the system of severe serfdom that was established in the region was described as a system of "tyranny," "pressure," and "despotism" that held peasants in a state of "slavery." The aristocracy was portrayed as incapable of running an ordered and an efficient economy on its estates due to a lack of "enterprise" and "thriftiness," and parallels were drawn between the "laziness" of the peasants and that of their landlords.[29] However, these messages were mixed with those that praised the high culture of the Polish aristocracy, even if its material conditions and education were deemed precarious.[30]

These representations were the basis for the aforementioned calls to "civilize" Galicia and its population. The claims to a Habsburg civilizing mission came from an imperial elite defining itself in terms of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Thus, the military officer Alphons Heinrich Traunpaur wrote in 1787 that Polish aristocrats should cooperate and "provide their compatriots with that salutary Enlightenment from which they have been so far away up to this day."[31] Two decades later, Samuel Bredetzky, the Protestant Superintendent in Galicia, reported the case of the burial of a seemingly dead person who later woke up. The locals, thinking him a "ghost" cut off his head and feet. Bredetzky stated that

"for the second time this unlucky man became a sad victim of the ignorance and barbarism of a nation that stands so low on the ladder of culture."[32]

Thus portrayed as ignorant and superstitious, it was all too clear that the population of Galicia needed to be educated according to Enlightenment standards upheld by the Habsburg imperial centers of power and knowledge. At the same time, Bredetzky's account reveals the impact that stadial models of history had on the translation of cameralist categories into orientalist codes. Apart from educated elites, resettled German peasants and artisans were meant to be "carriers" (that is, imposers) of the imperial culture (*Kulturträger*), just as they had been in Transylvania and the Banat. German settlers were expected to spread agricultural techniques and crafts skills throughout Galicia in return for the state's support in the forms of tax exemptions, civil rights, and crafts rights, granted during the period between 1774 and 1785.[33]

Between the first decree passed for supporting the settlement of colonists in Galicia in 1774 and the withdrawal of state support in 1785, at least 9,355 settlers established themselves in the region[34] (other sources claim that the settlers numbered 15,000 between 1782 and 1786 alone[35]). Generally, descriptive statistical works, travel accounts, and pamphlets refer positively to the new settlements, praising their high level of culture in comparison with that of Galician peasants and artisans.[36] Sometimes the image of Galicia as a poor region was questioned; authors such as Bredetzky pointed to the fact that the climate in Galicia was "less rough" than in Hungary even though Galicia was often called "Siberia"; that the urban culture of L'viv was "flourishing"; and that Galicia exported as much grain as Hungary.[37] Authors also attested to a very limited spread of new techniques among the local population, and noted that in some isolated cases, it was the settlers who had adopted the Galician lifestyle, and not the other way around. These Germans too were "lazy," lying about all day in the tavern and letting their children become "brutes."[38] Inevitably, cases of settlers "going native" were evaluated negatively, and the prevailing discourse gradually revealed that the settlement policy was intimately linked to a Habsburg-German civilizing mission: it was always the imperial culture that was expected to spread to Galicia, and almost never the other way round. Evidence that suggested that the civilizing mission was failing was used in reports, in turn, to support the idea that the region's population was irredeemable. In these texts, backwardness thus became an essential national characteristic. Even the positive depictions of

Galicia's potential were framed within an imperial logic, stressing the possibilities that settlers would find to develop their own endeavors.

Cultural hegemony was expressed in yet clearer terms in the statistical treatises and travel accounts that explicitly drew a parallel between Galicia and the overseas colonies of other European powers. The authors of such texts compared Galicia repeatedly to Peru, El Dorado, Spanish America in general, India, the South Sea, and Siberia.[39] Comparisons could be also indirect, as demonstrated by Balthasar Hacquet's words: "Galicia can be considered a newly discovered island for the Austrian states."[40] Though not explicit, he undoubtedly meant to compare the region with the South Sea, which was being explored at this time.

Another example of the framing of Galicia within a colonial discourse is the comparison of Polish Jewish peddlers with "orang-utans" and Indian Fakirs.[41] Such comparisons were not isolated cases. One example appears in Hacquet's description of the poor Jewish population of Ternopil in 1791. According to Hacquet, whose anti-Jewish feelings were so strong that he stood for the physical elimination of Galician Jewry,[42] Jews were not acceptable even when properly dressed and clean, because the body and faces were ruined by their "scrunched repugnant monkey-face…"[43] The topic was picked up by Bredetzky nearly two decades later, in his quotation of another scholar, Schultes: "Let's continue comparing the face formation of a Polish Jew with that of a Galician peasant and you will see that this means putting together a man with an orang-utan."[44] Orientalism was here intertwined with the development of early racist categories that excluded a substantial part of Galicia's population from mankind.

There are hence many sides to the "discursive colonization" of Galicia, following the discursive traditions applied to Poland-Lithuania in preceding decades.[45] This symbolic representation was directly related to the incorporation of the province into the Austro-Bohemian administrative model, as demonstrated by the creation of a separate Galician Court Chancery and its integration into the Austro-Bohemian Chancery (in 1776). Similarly, Galicia adopted the basic legal framework in operation in the western provinces,[46] and by the early 1770s, Queen Maria Theresia declared that Galicia should be reordered according to the pattern of Bohemia and Moravia, which were more akin to Galicia than were other lands.[47] After Galicia's swift integration into the customs union which also embraced Austria and Bohemia, in 1785, it was clear that, despite the orientalizing discourse, the newly created border province at the

northeastern edge of the Habsburg dominions was more closely integrated with the center than Tyrol.

The strong codes that expressed horizontal cultural otherness and vertical regional and social hierarchies helped legitimize this process of incorporation. In Galicia, the construction of regional and social cultural hierarchies in order to legitimize the expansion of the Habsburg Empire towards the east was even clearer than in Hungary. While the authorities acknowledged the highly multicultural character of Galicia and adopted inclusive policies – such as the upgrading of the Ruthenian Unitarian Church to the category of a Greek Catholic Church (in 1774) or the toleration patents for the Jewish Population in 1785 and 1789 (which went far beyond the ones enacted in other provinces) – the civilizing discourse was still linked to the imperial elite's claim to cultural superiority. In 1786, Franz Kratter (a jurist and later theater director in L'viv) explicitly demanded the dissemination of the German language. He propagated the idea that only the spread of German culture – understood in terms of the social and civic norms of cleanliness, diligence, and sobriety – could help Galicia to overcome its miserable situation. Repeatedly, Kratter demanded that the Galician social system (and especially the Jews) be "recasted."[48]

Habsburg Enlightened Orientalism: From Social Reform to Ethnic Stereotypes

The narratives outlined above were not only expressions of the enlightened public discourse. They were categories and narratives shared by bureaucrats in the central institutions of the Viennese Court and in the regional Galician administration. It is not only the presence of these linguistic formulations that matters, but the impact that such discursive practices had on laws and reforms.

A case in point is the reform of the agricultural system and the imposition of limits to seigniorial jurisprudence and the associated obligations in kind, money, or labor. While civil servants unanimously depicted Galicia's peasants as "lazy," "idle," "inert," and "drunken," they always declared the abusive practices of landlords as the main cause of these grievances. Therefore, the construction of cultural otherness was in this case part of a reformist discourse which legitimized and spurred the first reforms of the agrarian structure of Galicia in the 1770s, and the rapid and breathtaking

reform process in the Josephinist period throughout the 1780s. These measures included the limitation of the maximum number of corvée days per week for full peasants (1781), the abolition of a range of extraordinary services that landlords had managed to impose upon their serfs (1775, 1786), and the reinforcement of personal liberties of serfs such as the freedom of marriage, the choice of profession, and mobility (1782). All these measures were in part labeled as acts of civilization against barbarism.[49]

For example, the estate owner Wyczolkowska (probably Wyczółkowska) was punished by the district authorities alongside her late husband for mistreating serfs on their estate in the village of Kulichkov (Bels district, East Galicia). The lady asked Joseph II to repeal the sentence, arguing that she regretted her behavior, which actually had included beating up the peasants who had reported her mistreatment of serfs to the district office. The landlady defended herself by attributing her behavior to "her education in the wild Ukraine" and promised to behave better thenceforward. As a proof of her willingness to adopt new habits she pointed to her new marriage to the district commissioner who had investigated the case. She was thankful to him for conducting "her metamorphosis of the Wyczolkowska of evil fame into this peaceful, calm and loyal obedient subject of Your Majesty."[50]

Similarly, during a visit to Galicia in 1788, the later Emperor Francis II praised Joseph II's policies, declaring that his uncle's reforms had turned the serfs from slaves into free humans.[51] This demonstrates how serfdom reforms were linked to a civilizing discourse, and how this dispositive did structure reform policy. Although the category "slave" was also used in other provinces for attacking severe serfdom,[52] the discourse in Galicia showed its particularity as resting precisely in finding the solution to the "peasant question" in a civilizing mission. As the Wyczolkowska case underlines, discourse about civilization was not limited to the elites at the imperial centers trying to implement enlightened doctrines in the imperial peripheries. In fact, peripheral elites adopted the discursive scheme to legitimate themselves and their actions under the new banner; they self-orientalized and, by doing so, became part of the imperial apparatus.

As orientalizing metaphors were used to express social and political critiques, they legitimated imperial political action and the empire's ongoing reform process. This pattern was, however, far from being a

one-way process. During the whole reformist period, most Galician landowners fiercely opposed the reforms, arguing that the grievances described by the government officials were due to the "natural characteristic" of the peasants which could only be overcome by forced labor (that is serfdom). Here, peripheral elites appropriated part of the civilizing mission, launched by the imperial centers but turned it upside down. Such narratives orientalizing their own peasants were an effort to maintain the traditional social order and distribution of resources.

With the gradual swing against the most radical of Joseph II's reforms, the anti-reformist discourse gained the support of the bureaucracy. After the bad harvests of 1785/1787, some local functionaries started to blame the low grain yield not on the obvious causes – bad weather conditions – but on the serfs' defective ethos. In turn, such a bad ethos was interpreted as a direct consequence of the reforms because they had reduced excessively the obligations of serfs.[53] This was a widely shared perception across the empire's noble ranks, and they claimed in the late 1780s that the peasants would not work without being forced to.[54] When the Josephinist agrarian tax reform failed, a councilor of the Galician Governor's Office in L'viv, Ernest Traugott Kortum, went as far as calling the serfs "Galician helots" and compared them to the "wild people in the Southern Sea." The serfs, he said, were staring at the "present of reduced corvée services" in the very same way that the indigenous people in the Pacific Ocean stared "at European ships." They did not take their reduced obligations as an opportunity to improve their economy; instead peasants had turned their freedom to the pursuit of vice, and relied more and more on Jewish tavern keepers who sold them liquor on credit.[55] Kortum nevertheless supported further agrarian reforms, though he claimed that obligations in kind should be made instead of duties in cash. As the latter had been tried without success, the former was the only way to develop the region's rural economy.[56]

The failure of the Josephinist reformist project in 1790 ensured that its civilizing mission and orientalist metaphors remained alive. They remained present even after Galicia was integrated into the institutional framework of the fairly homogeneous Austrian and Bohemian provinces by the end of the 1780s. The post-Josephinist orientalist discourse, however, was no longer linked to a reformist agenda or to attempts to homogenize and integrate Galicia into the Habsburg imperial framework. The new discourse regarded cultural differences as fixed and even as part of essential hierarchies. It was during this period that the characteristics of peasants

("laziness" and "drunkenness") were not presented as the result of social and institutional restraints that might be improved. In contrast, they were regarded as "natural" characteristics, as illustrated by the topos of the "natural man."[57] At the turn of the nineteenth century, cultural differences in Habsburg Galicia were gradually translated from reformist metaphors into ethnic stereotypes.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The geopolitical expansion of the Habsburg Monarchy led to a profound reshuffling of its internal power structure. Accordingly, centralist tendencies were reinforced to impose a tighter control on resources and political power by the imperial court institutions in Vienna. This manifold process was inextricably linked to a legitimizing discourse that strived to impose homogeneous cultural values and social norms that were considered conducive to future cultural and socio-economic transformation. The imposition of these values and norms ultimately led towards the construction of a strong fiscal-military state and facilitated empire-building. While many of these social norms, such as thriftiness and industriousness, were part of the cameralist reformist discourses, their cultural framework was heavily influenced by other Enlightenment ideas, such as the civilization discourse and the theory of developmental stages. This background explains how the different perceptions and arguments of statisticians, university professors, writers, priests, and bureaucrats developed in a broad temporal framework between the middle of the eighteenth century and the Congress of Vienna in 1814/1815. The western provinces, namely the Austro-Bohemian core regions, were deemed generally suitable for socio-economic progress. There were some minor exceptions, such as the region of Carniola which lay precisely on the imaginary line that separated east from west, both from a general European perspective and from that of the Habsburg Monarchy. The eastern possessions – Hungary, Transylvania, the Banat, and Galicia – were regarded with much more skepticism. Poor work ethos and inability for thriftiness and sobriety were readily translated as characteristic of "wild" and "natural" men. Sometimes these regions were compared with colonial spaces and indigenous people that had to be "civilized" according to the criteria set up from norms of the imperial centers (with Vienna at the top). The enlightened imperial elites translated the categories of the cameralist taxonomies into a classification of cultural otherness, which was then applied to the eastern Habsburg territories.

In general terms, it was ultimately not the description of work ethos, roads, and social discipline that created the orientalizing labels, but their embedding in broader cultural metaphors. Orientalist metaphors contributed to construct social and spatial hierarchies within the Habsburg Empire. These hierarchies created the pretext for homogenizing and integrating policies, and for the efforts to assimilate Polish aristocrats, Jews, and Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic peasants. While homogenization and integration strengthened the imperial framework, the discourse that facilitated these processes also contributed to the establishment and legitimation of unequal treatment between the centers and peripheries of the Habsburg Empire.

As has been demonstrated, developments in the eastern Habsburg lands were the complex outcome of combined and sometimes conflicting interests of the imperial court and the local nobility, played out against the background of international political and ideological trends. While the imperial elite improved their position by spreading a discourse on orientalism and civilizing missions, peripheral elites could adopt the dominant narratives and pursue acts of self-orientalization. However, in order to criticize social reform policy, they also developed their own anti-discourses which incorporated only selective elements of the dominant discourse. They attributed the peasants' alleged cultural inferiority not to social structure, but to essential characteristics.

Yet a proclivity for essentialism was not limited to peripheral elites. Members of the imperial elite repeatedly argued in essentialist terms, especially when they saw their reform efforts waning or failing. Essentialist discourses emerged prominently, for example, in the post-Josephinist reformist period, and when German settlers in Galicia adopted some features of the traditional local lifestyle. In conclusion, the impossibility of creating a homogeneous imperial Habsburg culture, and in consequence, the overall failure of the Habsburg civilizing mission, greatly contributed to the emergence of essentialist, ethnic stereotypes within the Habsburg Empire at the turn of the nineteenth century.

NOTES

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9. Lindenfeld, *Practical Imagination*, 26–3q1, 42.

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31. ibid., 17.
32. Bredetzky, *Reisebemerkungen*, vol. 2, 129–130.
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44. Bredetzky, *Reisebemerkungen*, vol. 2, 194–195.
45. Orłowski, *Polnische Wirtschaft*.
46. Glassl, *Einrichtungwerk*.
47. Maner, *Galizien*, 43.
48. Kratter, *Briefe*, vol. 1, 130.
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Towards Civilizing Policy in the British Empire

"Gradually Reclaiming Them from a State of Barbarism": Emergence of and Ambivalence in the Aboriginal Civilization Project in Canada (1815–1857)

Alain Beaulieu

The Royal Proclamation of 1763 is clearly one of the key documents in Britain's policy regarding Aboriginal peoples after the Conquest of New France in 1760. As the Proclamation provided specific protection for Aboriginal land, it was hailed in the nineteenth century as the "Indians' Charter of Rights." The Proclamation also reflected the central view of British colonial policy regarding the Aboriginal peoples of North America: segregation. By prohibiting colonists from settling on the vast swaths of land temporarily reserved for the Aboriginal nations, the Proclamation drew a precise line of demarcation between the colonial world and that of the Aboriginal peoples. Creating this reserved land stemmed from a political desire to appease the Aboriginal peoples of the continent's interior who had just begun to take up arms (Pontiac's War), but it demonstrated how little

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importance the British at the end of the eighteenth century placed on integrating the Aboriginal peoples into the colonial world.[1]

The policy, however, changed rapidly and radically in the early nineteenth century. The new official objective of Britain's policy quickly became civilizing the Aboriginal peoples. This article analyzes the process leading to this new policy. Focusing particularly on the period during which the civilization program emerged, it situates the military, economic, political, and ideological factors that initiated the change and influenced its specific form. The analysis integrates the sometimes discordant views of the metropolitan and colonial actors. Indeed, the implementation of the civilization project took place amongst intense discussions between the metropolitan and colonial authorities. Colonial inquiry commissions were charged with examining the administration of Indian affairs and making recommendations, which would have critical influence on the concrete implementation of the project.[2]

The analysis encompasses the period from 1815 to 1857. The first date marks the beginning of a series of proposals for reforming Indian Affairs. The second date is when the Parliament of the United Provinces of Canada formalized the civilization project as law, associating it with emancipation. A reflection of increasingly direct interventions by the colonial authorities in defining the Aboriginal policy in Canada, this law was the prelude to the official transfer of responsibility on this issue from London to the colony, in 1860.

This article focuses more specifically on Lower Canada, one of the five British colonies in North America. This colony was created in 1791 by the Constitutional Act, which divided the Province of Quebec into two parts, Lower and Upper Canada (Map 1).[3]

The Aboriginal peoples living there had faced several changes, particularly in the Saint Lawrence River valley, where native communities had been created by missionaries, mainly the Jesuits, starting in the seventeenth century. The heart of the former French colony, this area remained the most populated settlement in Canada for a long period after the conquest of New France. The Aboriginal populations in this area had regular contact with the colonists, which encouraged the blending of the races and led to many cultural changes. As such, it is a particularly interesting area in which to examine the evolution of the British Indian policy, because the changes to the Aboriginal way of life had already mitigated the differences between them and the colonists. The particularity of their situation however would be largely obscured by the new Indian policy, which gave rise to the standardization of the legal status of all Aboriginal peoples.

Map 1 Lower and Upper Canada, 1791

This situation highlights the ambiguities in the new civilization program, which I will also examine in this chapter. Some of these ambiguities stemmed from the specific context of the new Indian policy, which arose out of Britain's desire to improve the situation for Aboriginal populations, but also to eliminate the costs associated with this element of colonial administration, which they often complained about. Other ambiguities come from the ideological differences between the London authorities and the colonial political players, who did not necessarily share the same view of how to implement the civilization project. Misconceptions about the civilization project are also reflected in one of its most paradoxical results: although designed to integrate the Aboriginal peoples into the colonial world, the project instead led to the development of mechanisms that reinforced segregation and government guardianship.

THE FACTORS BEHIND THE CIVILIZATION PROJECT

The decline of the Aboriginal peoples' military importance in the first decades of the nineteenth century certainly played a key role in the process leading to the entire revision of the Indian policy in Canada. During the first half-century of Britain's presence in Canada, the Aboriginal policy was largely shaped by strategic and military matters. The role of the Department of Indian Affairs, established in the mid-1750s during the war with France, was mainly to ensure military support from the Aboriginal peoples, or at least their neutrality. The American Revolutionary War (1775–1783) and the subsequent rivalry between Great Britain and the United States helped maintain this policy, based in particular on large distributions of annual gifts (clothing, weapons, ammunition). Although expensive, this policy was still essential because the Aboriginal peoples played a strategic role in North American conflicts.[4] However, the War of 1812, the final conflict between Great Britain and the United States, represents a breaking point in the military role of Aboriginal people in the northeast. Tensions between the two powers gradually decreased in the following years, a phenomenon which contributed to launching the debate on how to manage the relationship with Aboriginal peoples.

The civilization program was also partly inspired by movements in London that were concerned about the fate of the Aboriginal peoples in the British colonies. For example, in 1836, the Aborigines Protection Society was founded in England. It quickly became a powerful pressure group that was particularly concerned with the progression and civilization of the Aboriginal populations in the British Empire. By casting themselves as the promoters of the grand civilizing design that the British had inherited, these liberal, philanthropic movements influenced the redefinition of the Aboriginal policy.[5] The link between civilization and responsibility toward the Aboriginal peoples was clearly stated in 1837 by the Select Committee on Aborigines, a special group established by the British government to address the question of the empire's Aboriginal peoples:

> It is not to be doubted that this country has been invested with wealth and power, with arts and knowledge, with the sway of distant lands and the mastery of restless waters for some great purpose in the government of the world. Can we suppose otherwise than that it is our office to carry civilization and humanity, peace and good government, and above all the knowledge of the true God, to the uttermost ends of the earth?[6]

In the nineteenth century, the rapid transformation of colonial economic realities in Canada also encouraged a thorough review of the Indian policy and gave a stronger legitimacy to the proposed changes. The fur trade had been a key driver of the Canadian economy until the end of the previous century. Aboriginal peoples were crucial players in the fur trade, as they provided most of the furs to be exported and sold on European markets. This economic activity did not require a significant colonial presence in the interior. A few forts and trading posts were enough to manage operations, which considerably limited the impact on traditional Aboriginal hunting activities.

However, the importance of the fur trade declined rapidly early in the nineteenth century, to make room for forestry. Stimulated by the needs of the British Empire, the timber industry experienced explosive growth, becoming the primary driving force of the colonial economy in Lower Canada. In 1810, lumber accounted for approximately 75 percent of the total value of exports leaving the port of Québec.[7] In the early decades of the nineteenth century, logging sites and sawmills proliferated in the area, mainly along the large rivers flowing into the Saint Lawrence (the Ottawa, Saguenay, and Saint-Maurice Rivers, and others),[8] on land that had until then only been frequented and exploited by Aboriginal peoples. This economic change affected relations with the Aboriginal nations: since the fur trade required their active participation and cooperation, they played an important role in the colonial economy. However, the forestry industry needed their land, so it excluded them and turned them into a problem that needed to be dealt with.

The population of Lower Canada also experienced appreciable growth during this period. The American Revolutionary War, followed by the arrival of several thousand Loyalists, marked a first step in this growth process, but the movement truly accelerated in the nineteenth century due to a high birth rate and the constant influx of new colonists from the British Isles. At the fall of the French regime in 1760, the Saint Lawrence Valley colony – the main French settlement – had approximately 70,000 inhabitants. The population grew to 200,000 in the early nineteenth century, 511,000 in the 1830s, and 890,000 in the mid-nineteenth century.[9]

This demographic pressure was felt particularly in the Saint Lawrence Valley, where the decrease in good agricultural land resulted in encroachment onto lands that had been granted for Indian missions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[10] The phenomenon of

encroachment onto Aboriginal lands extended beyond the Saint Lawrence Valley, spilling over to include large swaths of hinterland hunting grounds. As a result, the Aboriginal peoples' subsistence economy, which relied largely on fishing and hunting, became more precarious.

All the Aboriginal nations living in southern Quebec were affected by this new wave of colonial expansion: the sedentary, such as the Wendats, Abenakis, and Mohawks, in the Saint Lawrence Valley; and the nomadic like the Algonquins, Nipissings, Innu, and Atikamekw. In the early nineteenth century, they all subsisted in part on hunting, which also produced the furs that they traded to colonial fur merchants. The communities that depended more on hunting and the fur trade were the ones that suffered the most from population growth, which inevitably pushed them into destitution.

In 1844, the Bagot Commission reported the "disastrous effects of the progress of settlement" on the Aboriginal nations. Decades earlier, the "wandering tribes" could still find "game and peltries in abundance," the commissioners noted; they "lived well and were well clothed." But by the early 1840s, they were "raged [*sic*] and starved half of the year."[11] The commissioners' observations were neither nostalgic nor compassionate. As proponents of changing the Aboriginal way of life, their observations were made with a cold colonial logic that transformed suffering into civilizing virtue: "As to the preservation of the Game," they wrote, "they considered that its entire extinction or disappearance might be ultimately more beneficial to the Indians than its most rigid preservation for their use." All the witnesses interviewed for their inquiry held the same opinion: "As the Game is destroyed, the Indians take the cultivation of the land for sustenance."[12]

These observations threw harsh light on the impact of colonialization on the Aboriginal groups in Quebec and the colonial logic at work in the process that led to the dispossession of Aboriginal lands and their confinement to the limited space of the reserves. From the perspective of the metropolitan and colonial administrators, colonial expansion morally and practically legitimized the need for a new Indian policy focused on integrating Aboriginal peoples into the colonial world. The reasoning was simple: since the ramifications of colonization had spread over large areas of the colony, the Aboriginal inhabitants had no choice but to profoundly alter their lifestyle to adapt to this new environment.

1830: A Turning Point

The premise that the Aboriginal peoples needed to imitate the colonizers crystallized as of 1830 in the concept of civilization, which condensed the essence of Britain's new Indian policy. "It appears to me," wrote George Murray, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in 1830,

> that the course which has hitherto been taken in dealing with these people, has had reference to the advantages which might be derived from their friendship in times of war, rather than any settled purpose of gradually reclaiming them from a state of barbarism, and of introducing amongst them the industrious and peaceful habits of civilized life....Whatever may have been the reasons which have hitherto recommended an adherence to the present system, I am satisfied that it ought not be persisted in for the future.[13]

A delegation of Mohawks from Kahnawake (near Montreal) went to London that same year, hoping to meet with the king. Instead, they got a taste of the new British philosophy grounded in a sweeping transformation of Aboriginal societies. Murray used the occasion to try to make them understand "how much it would be for the advantage of the Indians nations generally that they should depart gradually from their old habits of life, and bring up their children in a manner more in conformity with the habits of life of the white people." The white people, he told them, "were spreading every where over the country like a flood of water." If the Aboriginal peoples did not change their ways, "they would be gradually swept away by this flood, and would be altogether lost."[14]

This official change in Indian policy extended the recommendations made the previous year by the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, John Colborne, and by the governor of Lower Canada, James Kempt.[15] As a sign of the change in perspective in London and in the colony, the Department of Indian Affairs, until then under the control of the army, was transferred in 1830 to civil administration. Officially, the role of the Indian Affairs agents changed as well. They were no longer required to retain military support from the Aboriginal nations when circumstances required; rather, they were to work toward changing their way of life.[16]

Financial Blockages

In the decades that followed, the civilization project remained central to the new Indian policy in Canada. The nineteenth-century commissions of inquiry charged with studying the administration of Indian Affairs reiterated the need to convince the Aboriginal nations to abandon their way of life that relied on hunting and fishing, and instead adopt agriculture. This unanimity, however, contrasts with the slowness in implementing the measures needed to even begin such a transition to another way of life. The three decades between the official announcement of the civilization project in 1830 and the transfer of responsibility for Indian Affairs to the colony in 1860 were characterized by constant dithering in the execution of the civilization program. The methods used by the government to this end were so modest as to be almost nonexistent.

Various obstructions explain this situation. First are the financial elements. The initial proposals to reform Indian Affairs arose during a period of budget cuts. The enthusiasm for the Aboriginal civilization project was partly justified by accounting logic: the Aboriginal nations' radical lifestyle change would free the government of its financial obligations to them. Starting in 1815, the idea of reducing expenditures in this branch of colonial administration recurred like a leitmotif in the correspondence between London and colonial authorities.[17] Metropolitan authorities quickly took aim at the yearly distribution of gifts to Aboriginal allies. To the Aboriginal peoples, the gifts were a tangible demonstration of their alliance with the British Crown. And London officially shared this view until the War of 1812. Immediately afterwards, however, its stance rapidly shifted to seeing the gifts as a reason for the Aboriginal nations' dependency. In 1837 members of the Executive Council Committee shared their opinion that receiving gifts had delayed their incorporation into the colonial world. The gifts had reinforced "their natural Improvidence," distanced them "from the ordinary Pursuits and Industry of civilized Life," and led them to see themselves "as under the special Tutelage of the Crown."[18]

London's obsession to cut spending is clear in the missions assigned to the inquiry commissions to examine the Indian Affairs issue. For example, the Executive Council Committee of Lower Canada, created in 1836, had to first and above all identify the means "to decrease and ultimately eliminate the expenses paid by the British government until then" by the Department of Indian Affairs.[19] The refusal to commit

money to the civilization program was also seen in the fate facing the Department of Indian Affairs, whose staff numbers continued to shrink. In 1813 the Department had 38 employees in Lower Canada, but there were only 21 in 1820, 18 in 1825, 15 in 1831, 13 in 1817, 11 in 1839, and 7 in 1842.[20] The official desire to change the role of Indian Affairs agents to that of civilization promoters was not backed by adequate funding, or even at least similar to the levels of funding that had been the rule when military order was the main concern.

The proposals to make short- or mid-term investments in order to decrease or eliminate long-term expenses were not welcomed. In 1837, the Executive Council Committee asserted that the Aboriginal peoples needed government support for their transition to an agrarian life. In January 1842, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs made the recommendation concrete in his submission to the colony's governor of a project to settle 140 Algonquin and Nipissing families, who seemed determined to establish a settlement and take up agriculture. Napier assessed the costs at £6,090 for the two first years.[21] The governor quickly rejected the project: finding the costs prohibitive, he felt it would be "useless to enter into any discussion respecting the proposed settlement."[22]

The colony continued to request that money be allocated to assisting the Aboriginal nations that wanted to transition to agriculture. In 1845, the Commissioner of Crown Lands, for example, made a recommendation to this effect, suggesting that land be put aside for use by the Aboriginal nations. This move seemed all the more legitimate because the lands on which they had relied for survival until that point were to be sold "for the benefit of the Province."[23] In 1851, the Parliament of United Canada took a first step in this direction by reserving £1,000 each year for all the nations in Lower Canada, but the measure was largely symbolic: the money was intended to provide occasional support to the most underprivileged communities, not to fund a potential civilization program.[24]

IDEOLOGICAL DISAGREEMENTS

The apparent unanimity surrounding the civilization project also concealed significant disagreement over how the project would be put in place. The Aboriginal nations' requests for land where they could settle permanently faced ideological obstacles for example, that went back to the

methods of enabling this new policy to gain a foothold on the ground. Even if they wanted sedentary Aboriginal communities, the British leaders were still reticent to grant land that would permit entire communities to settle in one place. The preferred method was individual land grants, which would incite Aboriginal people to settle on Crown lands to open up new regions and to mix with the colonial population there. The civilization project was thus based on a desire to break Aboriginal peoples' link to their native communities in order to encourage them to integrate into the colonial world, a process that implied the rapid dissolution of any particular status.

Clearly, the Aboriginal peoples did not share this view. They wanted land on which they could settle together, that was separate from the colonists, not among them. The grants they were asking for would ensure their collective survival, not lead to its disintegration in the midst of the colonial population. Opposing views between the government and the Aboriginal nations were nothing new; they are almost as old as European colonization in the Saint Lawrence Valley. In the seventeenth century, the French, who dreamt of quickly integrating the Aboriginal nations by amalgamating them into the colonial population, had to modify their project, eventually granting lands that, though not formally reserved, kept the nations relatively isolated and under the supervision of missionaries, mainly the Jesuits. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the British encountered the same dilemma as the French: they could urge the Aboriginal peoples to settle by living on individual land grants dispersed throughout the territory, without hope of short-term results, or they could grant collective land parcels, an idea that was closer to the Aboriginal expectations, but that would support, and in fact strengthen, their distinct identity.

The issue would be formally studied in 1836–1837 by the Committee of the Executive Council of Lower Canada.[25] Equally opposed to completely isolating the Aboriginal peoples and to expeditiously integrating them into the colonial population, the Committee proposed a compromise: partial isolation in communities relatively close to European settlements, so that the Aboriginal nations would benefit from both government protection and the example of nearby colonists.[26] With support from the colony's governor,[27] the Executive Committee's report was also seen positively in London, where the

minister responsible for the colonies, Lord Glenelg, approved all the included measures and recommendations.[28]

This should have cleared the way for lands to be given to the Aboriginal people who wanted to settle down, but that was not the case. There was still opposition at the highest level of the colonial administration, and certain governors argued against the appropriateness of this type of land grant for establishing Aboriginal communities. In 1841, Governor Sydenham declared his reticence about the project to create distinct settlements for two particular nations, the Algonquins and the Nipissings.[29] A supporter of the accelerated integration of Aboriginal peoples into colonial society, he generally disapproved of maintaining separate communities under the government's protection:

> The attempt to combine a system of pupilage with the settlement of these people in civilized parts of the country, leads only to embarrassment to the Government, expense to the Crown, a waste of the resources of the Province, and injury to the Indians themselves. This circumstanced, the Indian loses all the good qualities of his wild state, and acquires nothing but the vices of civilization. He does not become a good settler, he does not become an agriculturist or a mechanic. He does become a drunkard and a debauchee, and his females and family follow the same course. He occupies valuable land, unprofitably to himself and injuriously to the country. He gives infinite trouble to the Government, and adds nothing either to the wealth, the industry, or the defense of the Province.[30]

In 1847, a new governor, Lord Elgin, told the Algonquins and Nipissings, who were still asking for land to settle permanently on, that he was not inclined to sanction new Indian settlements within provincial borders.[31]

The colonial leaders' reluctance clearly illustrates the conflicts that existed over the definition of the new Indian policy. Even if the main orientations had been emerging since the 1830s and civilization seemed to be the ultimate objective, the measures needed to achieve those goals did not achieve consensus. As it was the Governor General, then in charge of Indian Affairs, who expressed the greatest reticence on the issue, this was enough to halt the process of creating territories reserved for collective Aboriginal settlements.

The Civilization Project and the Formalization of Guardianship

The barriers to territory creation were, however, quickly lifted in the late 1840s.[32] This reversal occurred shortly after ministerial responsibility was given to United Canada, a move that had been desired for several years and that gave the colony more autonomy in managing its internal affairs.[33] The sudden acceleration of the process to create Indian reserves in Lower Canada appeared closely connected to this power transfer, which became manifest in other direct interventions in Indian Affairs by the colony.

In 1851, the Parliament of United Canada adopted a law setting aside 230,000 acres of land "for the usage of specific tribes of Savages in Lower Canada," thus generalizing the reserve system in the territory.[34] The first plan for distributing this land, dated July 1852, included granting almost all of the 230,000 acres, most of it to the Algonquins, Nipissings, and Innu. After a few modifications, namely, the decision to also allocate land to the Aboriginal groups in the Saint Lawrence Valley, the plan was adopted in 1853. The process, however, did not escape criticism from Governor Elgin, who found it was "premature" to decide to give large parcels of land to Aboriginal nations, as, in his eyes, the "uncivilized nomadic tribes" would be "necessarily slow to take up agriculture and to settle down." He called for prudence in the matter, until "the success of the experiment could be shown."[35] This representative of London charged with defending Aboriginal interests as the head of Indian Affairs paradoxically continued to promote a less generous stance regarding the Aboriginal populations than that suggested by United Canada authorities. The failure of Elgin's caveats illustrates a paradox in the history of Lower Canada that is often overlooked: making Aboriginal nations wards of the government, symbolized by the creation of reserves, stemmed from the colony's acquisition of greater internal political autonomy.

The previous year, the same Parliament had adopted a law placing under direct governmental administration the lands already set aside for Aboriginal nations in Lower Canada and those that would be in the future.[36] This law created the position of Commissioner of Indian Lands, giving it authority over "all lands or properties" that were "reserved [for] or appropriated" by the Aboriginal nations of Lower Canada. The measure aimed in particular to clarify the legal status of the lands that the French had given them. The status of these lands had been ambiguous until then, which emerged when the Aboriginal nations tried

to defend their rights in court, which routinely refused to recognize their legal capacity to initiate legal proceedings. The Odanak Abenakis faced this problem several times in their attempts to oppose moves to encroach on their land. In the late 1840s, they were still soliciting the involvement of colonial authorities to have their legal capacity recognized so they could bring cases to court. In 1849, the nation sent a petition to Lord Elgin, asking for a law that would confirm the legal status of the proxies they named in the document, so they could sue, on behalf of the Abenakis, bad debtors and those attempting to seize their land.[37] Rather than give them the means to assume their own defense in court, the 1850 law formalized their status as minors in the eyes of the law, depriving them of any role in controlling their lands.

This process of guardianship was also seen in the first measures adopted to create a legal definition of Indian identity. The 1850 Act for the Better Protection of the Lands and Property of the Indians in Lower Canada also set out for the first time the legal criteria distinguishing "Indians," that is, the people who had the right to live on a reserve, from others who were to be expelled. The question of what criteria established an Indian identity was the subject of much debate in the Saint Lawrence Valley communities in the first half of the nineteenth century.[38] By establishing criteria that could be used to identify who had the right to live on reserves and who did not, the colonial government not only solved a problem, but also declared itself the authority that could decide who was Indian and who was not.[39]

The guardianship process would be strengthened several years later via the adoption of a new law: the Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes in the Province (20 Vic., Cap. 26). Passed in 1857, the law clearly expressed the colonial authorities' desire to extend their jurisdiction over Indian Affairs. It officialized and formalized, for the first time, the inferior legal status of Aboriginal individuals, who, in order to be emancipated, had to prove their ability to integrate into colonial society. This new law was the logical extension of the recommendation made 20 years earlier by the Executive Council Committee, which had proposed placing Aboriginal nations under provisional guardianship, on lands reserved for them, where they could be initiated into the realities of the colonial world, under the benevolent watch of the government. In theory, the law opened the door to the gradual integration of the Aboriginal nations; but in fact, it ushered in a ward system that forced them into a mold, that of state ward, from which it would be difficult to escape.

CONCLUSION

The civilization project ultimately aimed to promote the integration of Aboriginal groups, whose military role had become nominal, into colonial society. In the decades following its adoption, the project instead, paradoxically, created a framework that led to a broader formalization of their inferior legal status, a reinforcement of segregation and a shift to internal colonialism. The Indian reserves, one of the symbols of the new Aboriginal policy in the nineteenth century, are a fitting illustration. Originally designed as areas of temporary transition that would promote integration into the colonial world, they rather became, somewhat like the land reserved by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, spaces of segregation where new Aboriginal identities were forged but still distinct from those of the colonial world.

Even if United Canada did not officially inherit full power over Indian Affairs until 1860, it had, a decade earlier, already begun to define the scope of its Indian policy. The measures implemented in 1850, 1851, and 1857 thus appeared as a shift in colonial logic, which was no longer applied by London onto a faraway territory, but from within the colony, on groups that were marginalized by the new legal and political order. The laws could be interpreted as the manifestation of a greater sensitivity to the problems faced by the Aboriginal nations in protecting their lands and surviving in an environment disrupted by colonialization – which they of course were, at least in part. But we can also see them as an operation that helped strengthen a new sovereignty over the territory, an exercise in which the new colonial authorities, who had just received greater autonomy, defined Aboriginal rights within the confines of a guardianship relationship.

NOTES

1. See Gregory E. Dowd, *War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 177–212; Patrick Griffin, *American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 19–45. For a broader perspective, see P. G. McHugh, *Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, Status, and Self-Determination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 61–116.
2. Three of these Commissions are of great importance in the development of the new Indian policy in Canada: (1) the commission conducted by a committee of the Executive Council of Lower Canada, in 1836–1837;

(2) the Bagot Commission, which cited from 1842 to 1844; and (3) the Pennefather Commission, which submitted its report in 1858. On these commissions of inquiry, see John Leslie, *Commissions of Inquiry into Indian Affairs in the Canadas, 1828–1858: Evolving a Corporate Memory for the Indian Department* (Ottawa: Indian Affairs and Northern Canada, 1985).

3. Following the Patriots' Rebellion of 1837–1838, Upper and Lower Canada would, however, be reunited in 1841 and would form, until the Canadian Confederacy of 1867, the United Provinces of Canada.

4. On the role played by the Aboriginal peoples in the defense of the British Empire, see: Robert S. Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in The Defence of Canada, 1774–1815* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992).

5. As noted by John Leslie, the "philanthropic liberalism" of these movements was no stranger to a shift in the Indian policy in the 1830s: "This was a decade of industrialization, social reform, and political radicalism, a period which saw the rise of humanitarian movements and the concept of the 'white man's burden' characterized by the Clapham Sect's campaign against the slave trade, the spread of missionary zeal, and a new attitude toward the aboriginal people in the colonies" (Leslie, *Commissions of Inquiry*, 39).

6. Aborigines Protection Society, *Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Aboriginal Tribes* (London: William Ball, Aldine Chambers, Paternoster Row, And Hatchard & Son, Piccadilly, 1837), 105; see also James Heartfield, *The Aborigines' Protection Society: Humanitarian Imperialism in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Canada, South Africa and the Congo, 1836–1909* (London: Hurst & Company, 2011).

7. Brian Young & John A. Dickinson, *Brève histoire socio-économique du Québec* (Québec: Septentrion, 1995), 93.

8. They were 765 in 1831 and 911 in 1844 (Serge Courville, *Le Québec: Genèse et mutations du territoire* (Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 2000), 218).

9. Serge Courville, ed., *Population et territoire*, coll. "Atlas historique du Québec" (Sainte-Foy, Presses de l'Université Laval, 1996), 43, 96; Courville, *Québec*, 183.

10. Sometimes referred to as the first Indian reserves in Canada, these lands were shrinking rapidly after the conquest of New France, a result of encroachment by squatters, of corrupt practices of some landowners located nearby, or even of concessions made by Aboriginal peoples themselves.

11. Canada, *Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada, Laid Before the Legislative Assembly, 20th March, 1845*, Sect. I and II, in *Appendix to the Fourth Volume of the Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada*, Session 1844–1845, Appendix E.E.E., n. pag.

12. Canada, *Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada, Laid Before the Legislative Assembly, 20th March, 1845*, Section III, in *Appendix to the Sixth Volume of the Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada*, 1847, Appendix (T.), n. pag.

13. Great Britain, *Copies or Extracts of All Such Reports From the Governors or Lieutenant Governors of British Possessions in North America, and of the Answers thereto* (London: The House of Commons, 1834), 88.

14. Great Britain, *Copies or Extracts*, 63.

15. Robert Allen, *A History of the British Department in North America* (Ottawa: National Historic Sites Services, Ottawa, 1971), 200–202.

16. Leslie, *Commissions of Inquiry*, 25.

17. See John S. Milloy, *The Era of Civilization: British Policy for the Indians of Canada 1830–1860* (Ph. D. Thesis, Oxford University, 1978), 36–60.

18. Great Britain, *Copies or Extracts of Correspondence Since 1st April 1835, Between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Governors of the British North American Provinces Respecting the Indians in those Provinces* (London: The House of Commons, 1839), 28.

19. ibid., 27.

20. Brian Gettler, *Colonialism's currency: A Political History of First Nations Money-Use in Quebec and Ontario* (PhD Thesis, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2011), 151; Canada, *Report on the Affairs*, Section III.

21. Duncan C. Napier to T. W. C. Murdock, January 14, 1842, Library and Archives Canada, RG10, vol. 78, 43082–43088.

22. T. W. C. Murdock to Duncan C. Napier, January 20, 1842, Library and Archives Canada, fond RG 10, vol. 78, 43114.

23. "Extrait du rapport du Commissaire des terres de la Couronne relativement à son voyage au Saguenay en date du 27 septembre, 1845," Appendice A du Cinquième volume des Journaux de l'Assemblée Législative de la Province du Canada, depuis le 20e jour de mars jusqu'au 9e jour de juin, Session 1846.

24. "An Act to Authorise the Setting Apart of Lands for the Use of Certain Indian Tribes in Lower Canada," 14–15 Vict., 1851, ch. 106.

25. Great Britain, *Correspondence Since 1st April* 1835, 30.

26. Great Britain, *Correspondence Since 1st April* 1835, 25–26, 30.

27. ibid., 25.

28. ibid., 6.

29. The view of the governor is expressed in a letter from his secretary, T. W. C. Murdock, to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Duncan C. Napier, July 19, 1841 (Library and Archives Canada, RG10, vol. 102, pp. 42445–42446).

30. Sydenham to J. Russell, July 22, 1841, in Canada, *Report on the Affairs*, Sect. I, in *Appendix to the Fourth Volume*, n. pag.

31. Library and Archives Canada, RG10, vol. 604, George Vardon to Duncan C. Napier, March 18, 1847, p. 49638.
32. In 1849, the Executive Council of United Canada formally approved the concession of land applications for two Aboriginal nations, who had asked them for several decades (Library and Archives Canada, RG10, vol. 603, J. Joseph to the Governor, August 7, 1849, 49302).
33. This measure was adopted in 1848, after years of procrastination.
34. Act to Authorise the Setting Apart..., 1851.
35. Quoted in Jacques Frenette and Gérard L. Fortin, "L'acte de 1851 et la création de nouvelles réserves indiennes au Bas-Canada en 1853," *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, 19, n° 1 (1989): 34 [translation: AB].
36. An Act for the Better Protection of the Lands and Property of the Indians in Lower Canada, 13ᵉ & 14ᵉ Vict., Cap. 42.
37. Library and Archives Canada, RG10, vol. 606, Simon Obomsawine and al. to lord Elgin, January 24, 1849, 50825–50826.
38. See Alain Beaulieu, "Contestations identitaires et indianisation des Autochtones de la valleé du Saint-Laurent (1820–1869)," in *La indianizacioón: Cautivos, renegados, 'hommes libres' y misioneros en los confines Americanos (s. xvi–xix)*, Salvador Bernabeéu, Albert Christophe Giudicelli y Gilles Havard, coords (Madrid, Ediciones Doce Calles, 2013), 335–362.
39. An Act for the Better Protection..., Sect. V.

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Europe in an Indian Mirror: Comparing Conceptions of Civil Government in Abu Taleb's *Travels* (1810)

Sven Trakulhun

HYBRID EMPIRE: THE BRITISH IN INDIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

There is probably no topic more controversial in the study of the European Enlightenment than the entanglement of Enlightenment thought and colonialism. This historical predicament is no coincidence, as it reveals the ambiguous nature of the Enlightenment era itself. In hindsight, the unquestionable reality of slavery and colonialism in the eighteenth century contrasts sharply with the universal idea of freedom and political equality fostered by French revolutionaries and their European partisans. Postcolonial scholars have therefore critically engaged with the period's intellectual legacy, sometimes arguing for a connection or even complicity between European imperial politics and Enlightenment philosophy.[1]

One intellectual inheritance that is particularly controversial today is the Enlightenment narrative of "progress."[2] Philosophers and historians

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of the Enlightenment era offered a theoretical account of human development that unfolds in a sequence of historical stages, progressing from a natural state of man that ostensibly still existed in some remote parts of America, to an ever more polite and commercial social condition apparently attained by the most enlightened and free nations in Europe.[3] In English, this narrative is often called *stadial* or *conjectural history*. It features prominently in the writings of Scottish philosophers such as William Robertson, Dugald Stewart, and Adam Smith.[4] The ideas they held on a succession of stages in human history – ranging in Smith's rendering from hunters to herdsmen, and thence to farmers and traders – were based on historical speculation, not on empirical evidence. Conjectural history was merely a heuristic construct that helped scholars to understand the meaning of historical change and served them to explain why human societies took on such different forms in different parts of the world.[5]

It has been noted by J. G. A. Pocock that while the Scottish model of historical development may have worked sufficiently well for explaining the course of British history, it entailed some troubling conclusions when applied to non-European cultures.[6] Scottish philosophers shared a common European assumption of superiority and were convinced that all societies would pass through quite similar stages of development. Those peoples whose government or economy diverged from the European level of civilization were either considered as existing in an earlier stage or as being locked in a savage or barbarous condition, unable to advance towards greater refinement without foreign assistance.[7] Conjectural history thus lent itself well to arguments in favor of the establishment and maintenance of overseas colonies, as it made it possible to believe in a European civilizing mission that would assimilate non-European peoples to a rational and universal humanity, annihilating cultural difference over time.[8]

Asia, and more especially India, occupied a peculiar place in this discourse. Europeans had for centuries been aware of the East, both as a shadowy, threatening "other" with which the West was in conflict, and as a source of the most ancient traditions of human culture.[9] Western interest in India rapidly grew during the second half of the eighteenth century as the Mughal Empire declined and the influence of the British East India Company (EIC) rose, flowing into a longer period of Anglo-Mughal rule. Recent scholarship has revealed the highly ambiguous nature of this rule, and explored how European concepts of historical progress and

enlightened notions of civil government interacted with non-European political norms and ideas of civilization.[10] British government in India became a central topic in public debates on empire, culminating in the famous impeachment of Warren Hastings, who in 1788 was accused of corruption and self-enrichment at the expense of the Indian population. The "scandal of empire" not only prompted questions about the extent to which the EIC (as a trading company) was entitled to interfere with local traditions of political authority. It also turned public attention in Britain to the ominously growing influence of a new class of wealthy "Indiamen" whose morals were said to have been spoiled by "Asiatic principles of government." Edmund Burke's furious attack on Hastings during the trial was born out of fear that the destructive effects of global capitalism would threaten Britain's political system and undermine the country's social order. The impeachment was therefore a test of both the ideal of empire and state sovereignty in Britain.[11]

The early history of British rule in India complicates the story of Western cultural imperialism. Company servants in the eighteenth century never aimed at a systematic transformation of Indian customs and society in a progressive direction, as later generations of colonial administrators were to do. According to their own understanding they did quite the opposite, not least because the adoption of "oriental" forms of government provided ample scope for the British to wring immediate profit from the country.[12] Although Mughal authority was more nominal than real, EIC traders adopted the Mughal administrative system, assumed Mughal titles, received "presents" from Indian political authorities and were regarded by local populations as Mughal grandees in British uniforms.[13] The formation of orientalism as an area of European academic study was a by-product of these Anglo-Indian entanglements, as it became necessary for the British to understand Indian culture as a basis for a sound administration of the country. Early orientalists like Nathaniel Brassey Halhed, Sir William Jones, and William Wilkins spared no effort to expand Europe's knowledge of India, collecting and translating a wide range of materials on the languages, literatures, and laws of India.[14] Until the 1830s British rule depended heavily on highly placed *munshis* and elite informants who were familiar with the complex polity and diplomatic languages of the Mughal state. British surveyors encouraged local scholars to provide information on virtually all aspects of Indian society and within a short space of time built up an immense body of manuscripts written in several South Asian languages on a great variety of topics.[15]

Edward W. Said remarked that Sir William Jones and other late eighteenth-century European scholars tried to "domesticate the Orient" by turning Asia into "a province of European learning."[16] In the more than three intervening decades since Said's publication, a large number of studies have interrogated the connections between power and knowledge in colonial India, examining in particular the establishment of a Western colonial discourse on the Orient.[17] Most of these works have tended to consider European hegemony as a force so dominant that it prevented the "others" from representing themselves. Much less has therefore been written about the ways in which Indian contemporaries responded to the challenges British supremacy posed for traditional ideas of political order. Yet there were Indian authors who commented in their own terms about the political transition taking place around them in the eighteenth century, while also trying to capture the characteristics of European (and particularly British) manners, culture, and political thought. Most of these cultural brokers have long been forgotten in Europe and India alike, because they were detached to some extent from their original culture, inevitably foreign in Europe, and often highly critical of both European and Asian politics. Mostly written in Persian, their works have been erased from the genealogy of orientalism that was scripted as genuinely European, renouncing the hybrid conditions of its emergence. They also did not fit into the historical master narratives of postcolonial nation states; there was little use in India for accounts from individuals with shifting cultural loyalties, and whose personal careers were mired in colonialism.[18] The recent works of historians like Michael H. Fisher, Gulfishan Khan, and Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi have greatly enhanced our knowledge of this long forgotten body of material. This chapter extends their approaches while focusing on Mirza Abu Taleb Khan Isfahani (hereafter referred to as Abu Taleb) and his *Travels of Mirza Abu Taleb Khan, in Asia, Africa, and Europe* (1810).

Abu Taleb and His *Travels*

The work of Abu Taleb (1752–1806) is part of a range of Indian texts on Europe written in the second half of the eighteenth century.[19] The first Indian visitor to Europe in the period was I'tisam al-Din, a pious Muslim from the Bengali gentry who went to Britain in 1767–1769. His travel account *Shigarf-nama-i wilayat* was published in English and Urdu in 1827. Abu Taleb's immediate precursor was Mir Muhammad Husain from Murshidabad, a scholar of Persian descent with a keen interest in Western science. He undertook his journey to England and

France in 1775 and after two years was sufficiently familiar with the English language to propose, though in vain, a project of translating European scientific works into Persian for dissemination among the Indian literati. He also prepared an account of his journey in Europe written in Arabic and Persian. Another example is the mathematician and writer Tafazzul Hussain Khan (1727–1800), who himself did not travel but learned Latin and English and translated Isaac Newton's *Principia*, William Emerson's *Mechanics*, and Thomas Simpson's *Algebra* into Persian.[20]

Abu Taleb fits well into this tradition of cross-cultural intellectual exchange. His publications reveal that he had a reasonably clear understanding of European ideas of the liberties of man, technological progress, and human perfection which he conceived in light of his own political anthropology. Abu Taleb belongs to a generation of Indo-Persian scholar-bureaucrats who had witnessed the emergence of the EIC as a major political power in India, continuously expanding its colonial possessions on the subcontinent in subsequent decades. Born in Lucknow to a Persian immigrant family, Abu Taleb was educated by distinguished scholars and later pursued a career as a revenue officer (*amildar*) in the administration of the Mughal bureaucracy in Etawah. In 1778 he was appointed to Colonel Alexander Hannay as a revenue collector in Gorakhpur and later spent some years in the service of Nathaniel Middleton, then British Resident in Awadh. In 1787 Abu Taleb was dismissed from office and moved to Calcutta, where he unsuccessfully attempted to regain his position; he earned some fame as a writer and scholar in subsequent years. In 1797 he was invited by David Thomas Richardson to travel to Europe. Abu Taleb set out from Calcutta on board a vessel bound for Denmark. He traveled through the Nicobar Islands, Cape Town, and Saint Helena, and finally disembarked at Cork in Ireland. From there he traveled to a number of other European cities (including London and Paris), returning to India overland via Greece, Malta, Turkey, and Persia in 1803.[21]

The idea behind this journey was to establish a governmental Persian-language training institute in England under Abu Taleb's direction. The project was not realized and Abu Taleb returned to India without achieving anything in this regard. But he took the opportunity during his travels to gather first-hand information on Europe (and especially on Britain) that he turned into a detailed travel account written in Persian, the *Masir-i Talibi fi Bilad-i Afrang*. The work was completed in 1804 and for a

number of years circulated in manuscript form before it came to the attention of Charles Stewart, professor for oriental languages in Hailey, Hertfordshire, who published the account in two volumes in 1810. A posthumous Persian edition and a German translation appeared in 1812, followed by a French version in 1813.[22]

We know from Taleb's account that he was introduced to British society as a "Persian prince" of noble descent. That was an exaggeration in terms of his class affiliation and only partly true with regard to his origin. Yet his courtly manners and infatuating eloquence in conversation (although in broken English) made him an attraction for his English hosts. Abu Taleb was lionized by high society and had the pleasure of being passed around from one official reception to the next, where he met with the crème de la crème of scholars, Company grandees and the British aristocracy, including Sir William Jones, Warren Hastings, and King George III himself. Most of the impressions he gained of the English "character" therefore derive from his London encounters with members of the upper class.[23]

Abu Taleb also authored a number of other works on a great variety of themes. He was a skilled Persian poet and commentator: he published in 1791 a scholarly edition of the works of Hafiz (*Diwan-i Hafiz Shirazi*), followed by a survey of roughly 500 ancient and modern Persian poets a year later (*Khulasat-ul-Afkar*). Among his historical works is the *Tafzih al-ghafilin*, a chronicle of events during the administration of Asaf al-Daula, the Nawab of Awadh (*r.* 1775–1797). Abu Taleb was remarkably sympathetic towards the poor of Lucknow and at the same time radically hostile to the local government. The *Tafzih al-ghafilin* contains a harsh critique of the Awadh ruling classes whose members are depicted as hopelessly sunk in debauchery and court intrigues, while the peasants were deprived of their property by excessive taxation and arbitrary acts of dispossession from the Nawab and his ministers.[24]

Abu Taleb's travel account was written for a Persian-speaking audience in order to provide readers with information on "the curiosities and wonders" he had observed in Europe, "and to give some account of the manners and customs of the various nations he visited, all of which are little known to Asiatics" (p. xxxv). Nigel Leask has pointed to a mix of literary traditions that may have informed the composition of the book, highlighting its resemblance with the fictional genre of "Persian letters" inaugurated by Montesquieu in 1721 and the book's affinities with the "mirrors for princes" in Muslim literary

culture, most famously represented by al-Ghazālī (*d.* 1111) and his *Naṣīḥāt al-mulūk* (*Counsel for Kings*).[25] Despite his unquestionable erudition, Abu Taleb was not too optimistic about reaching a broader public in India, blaming the Indian elites for their lack of intellectual curiosity:

> [W]hen I reflect on the want of energy and the indolent dispositions of my countrymen, and the many erroneous customs which exist in all Mohammedan countries and among all ranks of Mussulmans, I am fearful that my exertions will be thrown away. The great and the rich, intoxicated with pride and luxury, and puffed up with the vanity of their possessions, consider universal science as comprehended in the circle of their own scanty acquirements and limited knowledge; while the poor and common people, from the want of leisure, and overpowered by the difficulty of procuring a livelihood, have not time to attend to their personal concerns, much less to form desires for the acquirement of information on new discoveries and inventions; although such a passion has been implanted by nature in every human breast, as an honor and an ornament to the species. (p. xxxvi)

Abu Taleb's social criticism was directed at the Indian government officials who in his eyes had failed to ensure the welfare of the state and its people, but his contempt was by no means confined to the Indian ruling elites. His description of the countries of Europe, and more particularly of England, is equally critical of the achievements of Western civilization, carefully weighing the "virtues" of the English people (*fazai'l-i Ingilish*) against their "vices" (*razai'l-i Ingilish*).[26] On the one hand, Abu Taleb did not expect to find in Britain a new model of social or political organization that should be copied in India. As an Indo-Persian scholar, he was firmly embedded in Muslim culture, and accepted monarchy as the most rational form of government; the principles of statecraft, as he understood them, were based on inherited traditions centered on kingship. Even the British constitutional monarchy could be construed as operating within this traditional framework.[27] On the other hand, it was deemed possible nevertheless that Abu Taleb would learn something relevant from the West, because "many of the customs, inventions, sciences, and ordinances of Europe . . . might with great advantage, be imitated by Mohammedans" (p. xxxv). Substantial parts of his travel account are therefore devoted to a close comparison of Eastern and Western principles of government.

COMPARING CONSTITUTION AND LAW

One of the chapters of Abu Taleb's *Travels* gives a long account of the "Nature of the British government," covering details on the British constitution and its history. He begins his inquiry with a flattering comment on the English system of government:

> The British Constitution is of the mixed form, that is, a union of the monarchical, aristocratical and democratical governments, represented by the King, Lords, and Commons; in which the powers of each are so happily blended, that it is impossible for human wisdom to produce any other system containing so many excellences, and so free from imperfection. (p. 116)

According to Abu Taleb, the British Constitution was an advanced and almost perfect form of monarchy. He was aware that it was the result of England's distinctive historical development, ranging from the Roman period (when the English were still "barbarians") up to the reign of George III. Abu Taleb described in some detail the mechanisms of political representation in Britain and was particularly attracted by the division of powers between the crown and the two Houses of Parliament (the House of Lords and the House of Commons) that limited the king's sovereignty and prevented him from abusing his power. Moreover, the succession to the English throne was obviously well ordered, so that "all the disputes between the brothers are prevented, and the blood of the subject spared; no one daring to assert a right to the throne, unless daily [*sic* duly] qualified by law" (p. 118).[28] Abu Taleb acknowledged the advantages of such an order and clearly saw the weaknesses of the late Mughal regime, where bloody court struggles and violent revolutions had become frequent concomitants of royal successions. But he did not believe, as many of his European contemporaries, that violent regime change or more generally despotic forms of rule in Asia were reflective of a certain "oriental" character:[29]

> On this subject, I once had a disagreeable altercation with a gentleman in London, who affirmed that the natives of Hindoostan were hard-hearted, treacherous, and cruel; and, in support of his argument, adduced the instances of the Emperor Aurungzebe confining his father, and destroying his three brothers and of the wars between Bahadur Shah and his brethren. I replied, that princes were not to be judged by the same rules as other men;

that if, in England, the only alternative left them was a throne or a coffin, such scenes would often have occurred in their history. (pp. 118–119)

While Abu Taleb admired the balance of the British Constitution, he was more critical of English Common Law. Although it conceded to every British subject the right of being tried by a jury composed of "perfectly disinterested and unbiased" members, he considered English laws as "excessively voluminous, and in many instances either contradictory or obscure" (p. 135). However, the legal deficits Abu Taleb observed in England appeared almost negligible compared with those in India, where Company servants had established a judicial system that was virtually inscrutable for Indian subjects. The extensive use of fees and fines under British jurisdiction, Abu Taleb argued, was prone to abuse by the rich and the devious and it distressed ordinary people who were unacquainted with English laws and customs:

I cannot pass over this opportunity of freely expressing my sentiments with respect to the establishment of British courts of law in India; which, I contend, are converted to the very worst of purposes, and, unless an alteration takes place in the system, will some time or other produce the most sinister consequences.

In Calcutta, few months elapse that some respectable and wealthy man is not attacked by the harpies who swarm round the courts of judicature. Various are their modes of extorting money; and many of them have acquired such fortunes by these nefarious means, as to live in great splendour, and quite eclipse the ancient families. (p. 137)

Abu Taleb then gives various examples for what he called "the terrors of the English law" to demonstrate the defectiveness of a hybrid juridical system which in fact was neither British nor Indian but the result of more than four decades of Britain's fickle legal policy in India. The hybrid system can be dated to the Battle of Plassey in 1757, in which the British conquered eastern India. In Europe, the battle became known as the "revolution in Bengal,"[30] and as such denoted a critical transition that profoundly altered the political landscape of the region. Indian contemporaries employed a similar vocabulary to characterize the event, using the Persian-Urdu word *inqilab* (from *qalb*, to invert) to indicate a complete reversal of the existing political and social order in Bengal.[31] The changes were great indeed: when Robert Clive accepted the *diwani* for Bengal,

Bihar, and Orissa in 1765, the EIC became responsible not only for the collection of revenue in India's richest provinces, but also for the local police, military, criminal administration, and civil justice.

English public opinion was from the outset divided on the legal principles that should be applied to the new colonial possessions. Broadly speaking, there was dispute between those who preferred to assimilate to local forms of government, and others who argued for the introduction of British law in the colonies.[32] The Company's official policy was to rule its Indian territories in accordance with the received Mughal system while applying British law only to people of British origin. Both Hastings and Cornwallis claimed they were restoring India's "ancient constitution" in justice, introducing changes only to ensure the functioning of the system, and emphatically invoked the rule of law that would stop the notorious abuse of power by Indian tyrants and some earlier British Company authorities.[33] Hastings contended in 1774 that they did so in order to avoid conflict with their new Indian subjects who claimed respect for their own legal and political traditions:

> [I]t would be a grievance to deprive the people of the protection of their own laws, but it would be a wanton tyranny to require their obedience to others of which they are wholly ignorant, and of which they have no possible means of acquiring a knowledge . . . In this establishment no essential change was made to the ancient constitution of the province. It was only brought back to its original principles, and the line prescribed for the jurisdiction of each court, which the looseness of the Mogul government for some years have suffered to encroach upon each other.[34]

The majority of eighteenth-century British administrators in India came to a similar conclusion, including determined republican Whigs like the famous polymath Sir William Jones, who considered the British constitution as the most advanced form of government in the world. It was a "beautiful system of judicature, which, while it secures many important rights of our countrymen, contributes to the glory of our country itself by attracting the admiration of all mankind."[35] At the same time Jones believed Indian society to be unfit for this constitution because the Indians completely lacked a spirit of freedom: "In these Indian territories, which providence has thrown into the arms of Britain for their protection and welfare, the religion, manners, and laws of the natives preclude even the idea of political freedom."[36] In 1784 Jones even

argued that "if liberty could be forced upon them by Britain, it would make them as miserable as the cruelest despotism."[37]

Of course, Jones' distinction between Indians and Europeans (and more specifically Britons) appears highly doubtful today since it depicts South Asians as servile by nature, adhering to political traditions that were deemed incompatible with Western liberalism. Britons were convinced of their difference to other nationalities and moreover of being considerably in advance of them, because many of the features they considered indicative of a "modern state" (such as the separation of powers, legal egalitarianism, and a relatively free press) had been established already in the seventeenth century. Extensive economic growth had brought unprecedented wealth and refinement, a rapidly growing division of labor and a boom in technological innovation later known as "industrialization."[38] Britain's prosperity even in times of warfare and its possession of a substantial measure of civil and political liberty were central to the way in which Britain viewed itself vis-à-vis other European as well as non-European countries.[39] Abu Taleb was willing to admit that the common people in England enjoyed "more freedom and equality than in any other well-regulated government in the world" (p. 112), but in his view nominal freedom tended to obfuscate the enduring differences between social ranks and the unequal distribution of wealth in British society. Despite the benefits of a liberal constitution, he argued, "this equality is more in appearance than in reality; for the difference between the comforts of the rich and of the poor is, in England, much greater than in India" (p. 113).[40]

THE CHALLENGE OF REVOLUTION

Abu Taleb lived in one of the most disruptive periods in world history, when emancipatory ideals of individual freedom and popular sovereignty challenged the *ancien régimes* in Europe and were discharged in political revolutions and world-wide military conflict. The Indian writer Humayun Kabir has argued that Abu Taleb anticipated some of the central assumptions that would later appear in Marxism concerning the connections between class relations, social conflict, and economic change.[41] It would thus seem likely that Abu Taleb was aware of the ideological controversies that divided Europe at the time he was writing. While there was some compatibility between his social advocacy and revolutionary politics, it did not extend so far as to engender his sympathy for French political innovations. The ongoing violence in France

and French aggressive foreign policy rather highlighted the gap that separated his own political norms from those of the Jacobins and their successors. The consequences of the Revolution of 1789 and the Napoleonic Wars in subsequent years could indeed be felt around the globe, but the turmoil appeared disturbing rather than encouraging to Abu Taleb. It was still hard for him (as well as for other Asian observers) to see why a republican constitution should be preferred to inherited monarchical traditions. Furthermore, Napoléon Bonaparte's campaign in Egypt in 1798 and his subsequent conquests in Europe only seemed to confirm the French conqueror's insatiable imperial ambition.[42]

In many respects Abu Taleb's comments on the French Revolution echoed the opinions of his English hosts. The initial British reaction to the events of 1789 was overwhelmingly positive. But public enthusiasm rapidly waned when the Revolution degenerated into mob rule, the terror of 1793–1794 and Bonaparte's seizure of power in 1799. It was largely undisputed in Britain that the main causes of the Revolution had been the peasantry's widespread resentment of the privileges of the nobility and the clergy, and that it had succeeded because there was a weak king and because the authority of the government was inexorably fading in the face of the Crown's chronic financial instability.[43] Abu Taleb condemned the execution of King Louis XVI in 1793 as an illegitimate act of violence, but he was less concerned with the political division between republicans and monarchists in European political debate. In his search for the causes of the French Revolution he indicated the dangers which mass poverty and prodigality of the wealthy posed for every society irrespective of its constitutional form. He considered morality, law, society, and polity to be derived from human need and human nature. If there was a lesson to learn for Abu Taleb's account, it was that the French king had deliberately ignored some of the basic principles of good government and was thus deposed and killed. Muslim Indo-Iranian precepts of kingship implied that a ruler's dynastic or religious legitimacy alone was not sufficient to establish his right to rule. Successful sovereigns were also required to administer their domains wisely and justly.[44] Even the English, concluded Abu Taleb, were at risk for revolution if the divide between rich and poor widened further:

> It is said, that, previous to the late revolution, the French government expended immense sums on public buildings, gardens, illuminations, &c. and were parsimonious in the expenses of the navy and army; that the nobles lived in a superb style, whilst the lower classes were reduced to the most

abject poverty; that the patience of the latter having been exhausted, they readily joined the leaders of faction, and drove their inconsiderate and domineering masters from among them.

    If the English will take the trouble of reading ancient history, they will find that luxury and prodigality have caused the ruin of more governments than was ever effected by an invading enemy: they generate envy, discord and animosity, and render the people either effeminate, or desirous of a change. To these vices may be ascribed the subversion of the Roman empire in Europe, and the annihilation of the Moghul government in India. (pp. 152–153)

Abu Taleb subsumed the French Revolution under a cyclical theory of history to explain social and political change: the cycle of rising and declining dynasties repeats itself again and again, driven by the same basic forces.[45] Abu Taleb found little reason to regard the French Revolution as a defining act of modern politics or a fundamental break with the past, let alone a fulfilment of Enlightenment and human reason, as the revolutionaries did and many Western historians were later to do.[46] Like in European political discourse *prior* to the French Revolution, Abu Taleb defined "revolution" (*inqilab*) as the overthrow of the government of a state by which the social order was turned upside down: "the powerful were reduced to weakness, and the base raised to power. The common people elected representatives from the lowest classes; and appointed officers of their own choice, to defend their territories" (p. 163). Although Abu Taleb conceded to the French people every right to revolt against their unjust ruler, there was little evidence for him to assume the events in France differed significantly from other popular rebellions in the past. Political change hardly brought about something new in the world since there were a limited number of possible constitutional forms replacing each other in the course of history, only to finally return to the point of departure. Like celestial bodies, or the hands of a clock, dynasties moved in cycles; history followed an inevitable law of nature and constantly repeated itself.

    Abu Taleb's critique of British rule in India is remarkably restrained given the vigorous regime they were establishing in India during his lifetime. In 1799 Company troops defeated Tipu Sultan of Mysore in South India and were close to battering the distracted Maratha confederacy, then the only remaining competitor to British hegemony on the subcontinent.[47] The conquests in India during Richard Wellesley's tenure as Governor-General (1797–1805) effectively turned the Company state into a military dictatorship; civil justice was suspended and martial law was enforced, advancing the authority of British rulers even further and providing them with an

unprecedented concentration of armed power.[48] Judging from the structures of the colonial state that were taking shape in India in the early nineteenth century, there seemed to be little practical difference between British and local forms of government. As far as the unlimited power of the ruler was concerned, the colonial regime was sometimes regarded as even more "despotic" than traditional forms of absolute rule, since it further tightened social segregation and economic inequality.[49]

So great was Abu Taleb's resentment of the Indian administration that he was prepared to tolerate even the British, if they would only manage to overcome the fundamental crisis that had befallen the Mughal institutions.[50] It was this urgent demand for order and the concurrent British promise to restore the ancient form of government that enticed many Indian officials to cooperate with the foreign regime. Dazzled perhaps by Britain's stunning military strength and the Company servants' formal rhetoric of subservience to Mughal sovereignty, only few Indian collaborators, if any, realized the British would in fact little by little undermine Mughal authority in order to establish (in Thomas B. Macaulay's words), "a system which was, perhaps, skillfully contrived for the purpose of facilitating and concealing a great revolution."[51]

Abu Taleb's career and writings can be seen as an attempt to hold to the traditional ideal of government while adopting from British culture those elements that could be construed as compatible with the inherited political system. From the outset there was a tendency inherent in Abu Taleb's narrative to distinguish between political ideology and practical knowledge, creating a peculiar form of Enlightenment in which confidence in the principles of political tradition and a spirit of rational inquiry were able to coexist. National reform movements all over Asia would unwittingly adopt some of his arguments later in the nineteenth century when they sought to come to terms with the challenge of colonial modernity.

NOTES

1. For a discussion, see Daniel Carey and Lynn Festa, "Some Answers to the Question: 'What is Postcolonial Enlightenment?'" in *The Postcolonial Enlightenment. Eighteenth-Century Colonialism and Postcolonial Theory*, ed. Daniel Carey and Lynn Festa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1–33.
2. For a conceptual history of the term, see Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 218–235.

3. There were different variants of this theory current in eighteenth-century Europe – from Friedrich Schiller's concept of *Universalgeschichte*, where history was viewed as a purposeful evolution of humankind moving towards a free world community, to Condorcet's vision of an ideal course of history in which the faculties of men constantly improve over time. See Walter Grossmann, "Schiller's Philosophy of History in His Jena Lectures of 1789–1790," *PMLA* 69, no. 1 (1954): 156–172 and Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 91–95.

4. Istvan Hont, *Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), ch. 6.

5. Dugald Stewart defined conjectural history as a method of comparison between "our intellectual acquirements, our opinions, manners and institutions, [and] those which prevail among rude tribes"; quoted in H. M. Hopfl, "From Savage to Scotsman: Conjectural History in the Scottish Enlightenment," *Journal of British Studies* 17, no. 2 (1978): 19. Adam Smith introduced his analysis of progressive society in his *The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith*. Vol. 5, *Lectures on Jurisprudence,* ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael and P.G. Stein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 14 (i27).

6. John G. A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion: Volume Two: Narratives of Civil Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 317.

7. Daniel Carey and Sven Trakulhun, "Universalism, Diversity and the Postcolonial Enlightenment," In *The Postcolonial Enlightenment: Eighteenth-Century Colonialism and Postcolonial Theory*, ed. Daniel Carey and Lynn Festa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 246–249. See also Karen O'Brien, *Narratives of the Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 133–136.

8. See Saliha Belmessous, *Assimilation and Empire: Uniformity in French and British Colonies, 1541–1954* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); for India Michael Mann and Carey A. Watt, eds., *Civilizing Missions in Colonial and Postcolonial South Asia: From Improvement to Development* (London: Anthem Press, 2011).

9. For a nuanced intellectual history of Europe's encounter with Asia, see J.J. Clarke, *Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian and Western Thought* (London: Routledge, 1997).

10. Abdul Majed Khan, *The Transition in Bengal: A Study of Saiyid Muhammad Reza Khan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

11. Nicolas Dirks, *The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

2006), 12–13. Warren Hastings was Governor-General of India from 1773 to 1785. Edmund Burke was appointed chairman of the Commons Select Committee on East Indian Affairs; see Frederick G. Whelan, *Edmund Burke and India: Political Morality and Empire* (Pittsburgh, PA.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996). English Company servants returning from India with huge fortunes were called "Nabobs" in colloquial English, a corruption of "nawab," the Mughal title for a provincial governor in charge of revenue collection. The English dramatist and actor Samuel Foote has immortalized these orientalized Englishmen in his satirical play *The Nabob* (1772); for more on this topic, see Tillman W. Nechtman, *Nabobs: Empire and Identity in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

12. Robert Clive is said to have amassed in India a personal fortune of about £400,000; see Peter J. Marshall, *East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Clarendon Press, 1976), 236–237.

13. For example, Robert Clive was known in India as *Sabut Jang* (firm in war), while Hastings and George Vansittart were known as *Jaladat Jang* (daring in war) and *Hoshyar Jang* (wary in war), respectively; see Khan, *Transition in Bengal*, xii–xiii.

14. David Kopf, *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of Indian Modernization, 1773–1835* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 11–42. On William Jones, see Michael J. Franklin, *Orientalist Jones: Sir William Jones, Poet, Lawyer, and Linguist, 1746–1794* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

15. Christopher A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapter 2; Velcheru Narayana Rao, David Dean Shulman and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Textures of Time: Writing History in South India 1600–1800* (New York: Other Press, 2003), 189–193.

16. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* [1978]*: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Penguin Press, 1996), 78.

17. See especially Ronald Inden, *Imagining India* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990).

18. Nigel Leask, "Travelling the Other Way: The Travels of Mirza Abu Taleb Khan," in *Romantic Representations of British India*, ed. Michael J. Franklin (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 222; Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, *Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Historiography* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Publishers in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford, 2001), 8–9, ch. 2.

19. Michael H. Fisher, *Counterflows to Colonialism: Indian Travellers and Settlers in Britain, 1600–1857* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004), 2 has counted some 20 Indian travelers to Europe until *c.*1857 who wrote books on Europe in several Asian languages. See also Gulfishan Khan,

Indian Muslim Perceptions of the West During the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), chapter 2.

20. Abu Taleb has written an elegy on this philosopher and diplomat appended to his travel account; see Rosie Llewellyn-Jones, *Engaging Scoundrels: True Tales of Lucknow* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 95–96.

21. Abu Taleb, *Westward Bound*, 2–6.

22. The full English title runs: *The Travels of Mirza Abu Taleb Khan, in Asia, Africa, and Europe, During the Years 1799, 1800, 1801, 1802, and 1803. Written by Himself, in the Persian Language. Translated by Charles Stewart.* 2 vols. (London: Longman, 1810). A second edition appeared in three volumes in 1814. See Khan, *Indian-Muslim Perceptions*, 116–117. Stewart's English translation of 1810 is regarded as fairly accurate, although he has omitted most of Abu Taleb's poetry and toned down the language of the Persian original to bring the text in line with European literary conventions. A collection of poems from Abu Taleb's pen were later published as a separate book (*Diwan-i Talibi*). An English translation appeared in 1807 under the title *The Poems of Mirza Abu Taleb Khan*.

23. Kate Teltscher, "The Shampooing Surgeon and the Persian Prince: Two Indians in Early Nineteenth-century Britain," *Interventions* 2, no. 3 (2000): 416–419.

24. For an English translation of this work, see Abu Taleb Khan Isfahani, *History of Ásafu'd Daulah, Nawáb Wazír of Oudh: Being a Translation of Tafzíhu'l Gháfilín; A Contemporary Record of Events connected with his Administration; Compiled by Abu Tálib, an Official of the Day, and Translated from the Original Persian by W. Hoey, M.A., D.LIT.* (Allahabad: Printed at the North-Western Provinces and Oudh Government Press, 1885). For an appreciation of Abu Taleb's works, see Humayun Kabir, "Mirza Abu Taleb Khan," in *Islam in South Asia*, ed. Mushirul Hasan, vol. 2, *Encountering the West: Before and After 1857* (Delhi: Manohar, 2008), 53–54.

25. Leask, "Travelling the Other Way," 222; see also Linda T. Darling, "Mirrors for Princes in Europe and the Middle East: A Case of Historiographical Incommensurability," in *East Meets West in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times: Transcultural Experiences in the Premodern World*, ed. Albrecht Classen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 223–242.

26. *Westward Bound*, 144–161.

27. Khan, *Indian Muslim Perceptions*, 355–360.

28. Other Indian observers in the eighteenth century equally stressed the importance of a law of primogeniture to avoid wars of succession; see Khan, *Indo-Muslim Perceptions*, 339.

29. The concept of "Oriental Despotism" has long served Europeans to distinguish themselves from the civilizations of Asia; see John-Pau Rubiés, "Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu," *Journal of Early Modern History* 9, no. 1–2 (2005): 106–180.

30. Robert Travers, *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: The British in Bengal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 31–66.

31. See Muzzafar Alam, "Eastern India in the Early Eighteenth Century 'Crisis': Some Evidence From Bihar," in *The Eighteenth Century in Indian History: Evolution or Revolution?* ed. Peter J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 193–194. For a conceptual history of *inqilab* and the equivalent Arabic term *thawra*, see Bernhard Lewis, *Islam in history: Ideas, Men and Events in the Middle East* (London: Alcove Press, 1973), 253–263; Ami Ayalon, "From Fitna to Thawra," *Studia Islamica* 66 (1987): 145–174.

32. Peter J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America, c. 1750–1783* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 182–183.

33. Radhika Singha, A *Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

34. Qutoted in Rosame Rocher, "British Orientalism in the Eighteenth Century," in *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia*, ed. Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 220.

35. Sir William Jones, *Works of Sir William Jones: With the Life of the Author by Lord Teignmouth in Thirteen Volumes*, vol. 9, "The Speeches of Isæus in Causes Concering the Law of Succession to Property at Athen" (London: John Stockdale, 1807), 8–9.

36. *Idem, Works of Sir William Jones: With the Life of the Author by Lord Teignmouth in Thirteen Volumes*, vol. 3, "On Asiatic History, Civil and Natural" (London: John Stockdale, 1807), 216.

37. *Idem, The Letters of Sir William Jones*, ed. Garland Cannon, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 642.

38. Abu Taleb stressed Britain's technological and military superiority as the chief factor of its rise to global dominance; see *Westward Bound*, 95–115, passim.

39. Gregory Claeys, *The French Revolution Debate in Britain: The Origins of Modern Politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 4–5.

40. Abu Taleb also wrote a lengthy treatise on the social statuses of Asian and European women, arguing for the superiority of Asian over British womanhood; see Michael H. Fisher, "Representing 'His' Women: Mirza. Abu Talib Khan's 1801 'Vindication of the liberties of Asiatic Women'," *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* 38, no.1 (2000): 215–237.

41. Kabir, "Abu Taleb," 72.

42. In the Middle East, the French Revolution was perceived by most contemporary observers as a military event and, after Bonaparte's campaign in

Egypt, as a threat to religion and public order. See Nikki R. Keddie, "The French Revolution and the Middle East," in *The Global Ramifications of the French Revolution,* ed. Joseph Klaits and Michael H. Haltzel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 140–157; Bernhard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey," *Journal of World History* 1 (1953): 105–125.

43. Claeys, *The French Revolution Debate*, 2.
44. Antony Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present.* Second Edition. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 114 et seq. Abu Taleb therefore sharply criticized Asaf al-Daula who "expects that people will yield him allegiance on account of the claims and names of his ancestors, will submit to these tyrannies with perfect complacence, will wink at his evil practices, which are harder than death to endure, and will not open his lips to complain," quoted in Mushirul Hasan, "Editor's Introduction," in *Westward Bound: Travels of Abu Taleb* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), xxvii.
45. This notion may derive from the historian Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406) who in his *Kitab al'ibar* inquired into the origin and development of the state to identify an underlying law. His work has been compared with that of Machiavelli, who shared his preference for empirical observation and examination of political reality; see Rosenthal, *Medieval Islam*, 107–109, *passim*.
46. See the examples given in Reinhart Koselleck, *Future's Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time,* trans. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 45–46.
47. Rajat Kanta Ray, "Indian Society and the Establishment of British Supremacy, 1765–1818," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire,* vol. 2: *The Eighteenth Century*, ed. Peter J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 508–529.
48. D. A. Washbrook, "India, 1818–1860," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 3: *The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 404–408. See also Elizabeth Kolsky, *Colonial Justice in British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 27–68.
49. Robin Moore, "Imperial India, 1858–1914," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 3: *The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 422–446.
50. Kabir, "Abu Taleb," 71.
51. Thomas Babington Macaulay, "Essay on Warren Hastings," in *Prose and Poetry*, ed. G. M. Young (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), 384.

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Civilization, Racial Order, and Slavery

Jean-François de Saint-Lambert and His Moral *conte* "Ziméo" (1769) in the Context of Abolitionist and Imperial Activities

Anja Bandau

"Humanism and antislavery do not evolve only from the history of ideas but also from a history of colonization."[1] Michel Duchet's motto on the imbrication of Enlightenment and colonialism will be one guiding principle in this chapter's discussion of the works of Jean-François de Saint-Lambert in the context of colonial and abolitionist politics between 1766 and 1789. The other prominent problem I will discuss is the question of how it was possible to represent slave revolution in the framework of Enlightenment esthetics.

Astonishingly, Saint-Lambert's moral tale (*conte*) "Ziméo" (1769) is one of the rare French literary texts on the topic of slave revolution. Several studies have stated this topic's peculiar absence from the texts of Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, and other *philosophes-écrivains*.[2] Different reasons for this relative silence in major literary texts have been given: the *philosophes*' involvement in the colonial venture, a divergence between philosophical ideas and (political) actions, the impossibility of imagining the impact of slave revolution, fear of repression, or the authors' racist

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attitude. In analogy to Michel-Rolph Trouillot's thesis that the Haitian Revolution was erased or bagatellized because of a lack of appropriate categories to think and represent slave emancipation,[3] I too want to look beyond individual "reasons" for the authors' silences and explore the categories and conventions of representation (for examples tropes, plots) that produced these silences and absences across texts, and conversely those that were used by authors who did address the topic of slave revolution. The question that evolves is: how (if at all) could slavery and colonial violence be represented in abolitionist discourse? To answer this question, the apparent universal esthetic debate has to be re-linked with the historical (that is colonial) context that brings up questions of representation and representability of colonial others as well as of colonial violence. Certain perceptions, ready-made categories, tropes and conventions of speaking about slavery and slave revolt evolved. If it is first of all slavery and its abolition that are articulated in Enlightenment texts, these texts – so I hold – prepare and pre-constitute the forms representing slave revolution at the end of the eighteenth century and afterwards.

Being one of the few French literary texts that addresses the topic of slave revolution, Saint-Lambert's "Ziméo" figures as an exemplary esthetic model showing a way to talk about slave revolution in a French metropolitan context. At the same time, it is an example of literature's role in the abolitionist discourse. Saint-Lambert's texts more generally provide an interesting case study of the presentation and construction of abolitionist thought between 1760 and 1790. Furthermore, they provide insight into the ways the integration of the non-European into the "civilized" European national body was imagined (or not) as possible. The esthetic strategies of what Lynn Festa calls the "sentimental figures of Empire" enabled texts written in the French and British empires to move their audience. Sentimentality locates and assigns emotion to particular characters and thus helps to define who is human and who is not. According to Festa, these sentimental figures produced an experience of closeness between imperial and colonial subjects that nevertheless was characterized by pity and remained a hierarchical, non-egalitarian relationship. Though it suggests the possibility of empathy, "sympathetic identification creates difference rather than similitude."[4] Appeals to sentiment, as will be seen below, are important to imaginations of slave revolt.

The chapter develops its argument along two main points. First, I discuss Saint-Lambert's roles as abolitionist and imperial agent by analyzing his use of rhetorical strategies, tropes, and genres in

"Ziméo." Second, I examine the multi-faceted conjunctions of litera-
ture, philosophy, and politics in Saint-Lambert's œuvre and its circula-
tion and reception in the context of the Enlightenment – especially
physiocracy – and abolitionism. Saint-Lambert's texts intertwine
abstract philosophical discourse and fictional narration, and they make
use of certain rhetorical strategies, tropes and genres to appeal to the
reader's sentiments and to enable the representation of divergent dis-
cursive positions through polyphony.

SAINT-LAMBERT – "ENLIGHTENED" PHILOSOPHER, AUTHOR, AND ABOLITIONIST

Saint-Lambert (1716–1803) was an author of literary, philosophical, and
political texts. He held membership in different but partly imbricating
intellectual (and political) networks in metropolitan France after the
1760s. His circles included the Enlightenment philosophers and authors
of the *Encyclopédie* (Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, Helvetius, Holbach,
Marmontel); the abolitionists around Brissot de Warville and Mirabeau
(later Société des Amis des Noirs); the physiocrats (Quesnay, Dupont de
Nemours, Turgot); the co-authors of Abbé Raynal's *Histoire des deux
Indes* (Diderot et al.); and the authors of reform projects working in the
colonial administration of the Secretary of State for the Navy and the
Colonies (Charles Eugène Gabriel de Castries).

   After pursuing a career as an officer at the Lorraine court of the Polish
king Stanisław Leszczyński where he led a life as soldier-poet (and met
Madame de Graffigny as well as Voltaire), Saint-Lambert moved to Paris.
There he had access to important literary salons and dedicated himself
entirely to writing, philosophy, and politics. To his contemporaries, Saint-
Lambert was known as the lover of two important women in eighteenth-
century France – Madame de Châtelet (linked to Voltaire) and Madame de
Houdetot (Rousseau) – and as the author of the long poem *Les Saisons*
that was published 17 times between 1769 and 1797. *Les Saisons* mirrors
the physiocratic re-evaluation of nature (it is heavily indebted to Quesnay's
concept of "belle nature") that would be echoed during romanticism. It
was no doubt this successful text that made possible his election as a
member of the French Academy in 1770. To subsequent generations,
Saint-Lambert is known also as the author of several moral tales (the
best known is set in the Americas and deals with violent cultural encoun-
ters and universal moral values as friendship) that received a positive

reception. Several critics – from his age until today – attest to Saint-Lambert's capabilities as a writer, though rather modest ones.[5]

Saint-Lambert participated in the most important discursive projects of the Enlightenment – the *Encyclopédie* and the highly influential history of colonialism *Histoire des deux Indes* (1770/1774/1780). For the *Encyclopédie*, Saint-Lambert authored several entries on esthetics (on "genius" for example), on economics and politics (on "luxury" and "legislators") as well as on philosophical notions such as "interest."[6] Physiocratic opinions on nature, economy, and politics influenced his general attitudes towards economic and social matters, and in particular his attitudes towards colonial issues. As Muriel Brot and Michèle Duchet are able to show, Saint-Lambert was something of an "expert" on colonial affairs: he had knowledge of colonial policy, ties to several colonial administrators, and he was engaged actively as an advisor in French colonial policymaking. According to Brot, Saint-Lambert drafted, or at least participated in writing, the explanations on the Siamese economy, forms of government, and manners in the fourth book of Abbé Raynal's *Histoire des deux Indes*.[7] Nevertheless, he had no direct experience in the colonies.

Saint-Lambert was very close to Helvetius' materialist philosophy and wrote on philosophical questions of education, moral improvement, and self-fulfillment. For example, he wrote on the individual pursuit of happiness in the aftermath of Helvetius (*Essai sur la vie et les ouvrages de M. Helvétius*, 1772) and the issue of education in *Catéchisme universel* (1797). In *L'Analyse historique de la société* (1797/1800) he propagated the enlightened monarchy as the most appropriate social system to further the progress of art, science, and commerce.[8] Indeed, not long after the beginning of the French Revolution, Saint-Lambert, who had been a deputy for the nobility of Nancy, withdrew from public life because he was not in favor of the revolutionary change.[9]

Saint-Lambert's texts were informed by numerous other texts and display a high degree of intertextuality. He himself could not draw on eyewitness experience in colonial questions. This was quite common among those who wrote on colonial subjects. Few exceptions set apart, only at the end of the eighteenth century would writers begin to use eyewitness experience. The abolitionists felt, nevertheless, the need for authentic voices on the atrocities of slavery to convince their audiences. Saint-Lambert too was eager to reach different audiences in a way that enabled them to grasp and accept his moral messages. He shared this effort with

many Enlightenment authors. Therefore his use of textual and rhetorical strategies to convince his readers that the abolition of slavery was morally and politically necessary is of exemplary character.

"Ziméo" – Saint-Lambert's Abolitionist Moral Tale

"Ziméo" (1769) was one of the first representations of slave rebellion in French literature. Contrary to its literary predecessor *Oroonoko* (written in 1688 by Aphra Behn and translated in 1745 into French) the plot is not situated in Suriname, but in the context of Tacky's Rebellion in Jamaica around 1760.[10]

Like the English author Aphra Behn, Saint-Lambert placed his story in another colonial empire; the French appear neither as slaveholder nor as slave trader. This caution might have been taken to avoid offending the French public with moral critique, but it also addressed the history of a strong English-speaking abolitionist movement and the presence of members of the Society of Friends (Quakers) as plantation owners in the colony of Jamaica. Behn's hero Oroonoko is inspired by the figure of an African prince who is separated from his beloved through the odds of slave trade and slavery, and details the prince's encounters during his journey of various slave owners, some humane and some inhumane. Saint-Lambert's "Ziméo" adopts the same plot motif but provides detailed descriptions of life on plantations (gleaned from the author's vast reading of travel narratives, texts by missionaries, and abolitionist writings) and integrates contemporary discussions on the subject of slavery.[11]

In Saint-Lambert's narrative, the enlightened Englishman George Filmer travels to visit his philanthropic friend and plantation owner Paul Wilmouth. It is Filmer who then narrates the destiny of the African prince Ziméo who is kidnapped together with his beloved Ellaroé and her father Matomba. Ziméo is brought to the Caribbean where he is sold as a slave. Separated from Ellaroé, Ziméo wants to avenge the atrocities of the Middle Passage. He flees to live with the Maroons in Jamaica and eventually becomes the leader of a slave rebellion. The rebellious slaves terrorize and burn down those plantations led by cruel white slaveholders, but befriend the humane Quaker Wilmouth who, by a lucky coincidence, has saved Ellaroé and Matomba.

Saint-Lambert's denunciation of slavery wants to move and instruct the reader on moral terms, and to do so it draws on different literary genres:

the sentimental novel, the political moral tale (*conte*), the travelogue, and the philosophical treatise. Furthermore, Saint-Lambert's *conte* is twofold, a textual hybrid: the above-summarized fictional narrative is followed by a "philosophical and political reflection on the character of the Negros" and on the relationship between Europe (center) and the non-European world (periphery). As I will show below, this second part of the work at least partially contradicts the message of the first part.

The first part addresses non-violent possibilities for emancipation. While in the beginning the narrative might seem to endorse a right to violent insurrection against the atrocities of slavery, the *conte* ends with the sentimental friendship and love between the rebellious Maroon Ziméo and the abolitionist Quaker and plantation owner Wilmouth. This deep friendship forecloses any radical change through revolution on Ziméo's part. This non-violent solution of the conflict through reform which the tale envisions refers to the theory of gradual abolition advocated by the French abolitionists. Indeed, the story is consistent from its beginning, as we are told that emancipation is to be achieved in the utopian space of Wilmouth's plantation, by displays of virtue, and that this virtue is to be attained through motivation and good example:

> Un esclave qui pendant dix années se conduisait en homme de bien, était sûr de sa liberté. Ces affranchis restaient attachés à mon ami; leur exemple donnait de l'espérance aux autres et leur inspirait des mœurs.[12]

Saint-Lambert proposed the same regulation in a memorandum that he wrote 18 years later as an advisor for the Bureau des colonies of the Ministry of the Navy, as I will show below.

In "Ziméo," as in other abolitionist and Enlightenment texts,[13] pity and sympathy are evoked and made possible through the performance of physical and emotional pain. The colonial subjects are shown to experience bodily harm, which they suffer as individualized characters. Their personal testimonies are witnessed by European characters (for example George Filmer, as the narrator in "Ziméo") who become textual representatives of the envisioned European audience. Their vision brings distant realities – both foreign to the reader's cultural experience and at a considerable spatial distance – close to the reader. Or, in other words, the reader imagines himself as a witness of the protagonists' reality. In addition, distant realities are brought close to the reader through familiar and

supposedly universal concepts such as love, friendship, and virtue, that gloss over the reality of a slave society marked by violence and hierarchy.

Saint-Lambert uses analogy as well as strategies of assimilation to bring Ziméo's story close to his readers and to make the character acceptable. Ziméo is attributed with a Greek beauty rather than African features to assure his outstanding character and grandness also in terms of European beauty standards.[14] Here, Saint-Lambert draws on the anthropological literature of his time[15] and uses the same strategies found in *Oroonoko* and in Lavallée's *Le Nègre comme il y a peu de blancs* (1789).[16] Contrary to this veiled and dubious "africanness" that the text assimilates and translates into sameness, the author assures Ziméo's difference from the European population via the excessive sentiments the character experiences. Ziméo's sentiments are of extreme intensity and seem to be inspired by Saint-Lambert's readings about the influence of climate on tempers. At the time of Saint-Lambert's writing, physiological determinism such as climate theory seemed acceptable mainly because physiocrats attributed positive connotations to sentiment. Indeed, to underscore the point, Ziméo himself explains that emotionality distinguishes Africans from Europeans and marks them as more humane.

The philosophical-political second part of the text – a compendium of contemporary positions towards slavery and political theories of society – contains conflicting positions.[17] The narrator George Filmer, who presents himself as widely traveled, enters into dialog with several contemporary treatises. He contradicts opinions of physiological determinism put forward by philosophers such as Voltaire and de Pauw.[18] He refutes generalizations on the character of Africans, and he takes clearly anti-racist stances as he insists that African people vary tremendously and whole "nations" possess "la taille et le visage . . . [d]es plus belles proportions."[19] This attitude was probably inspired by Saint-Lambert's readings of Helvetius and Buffon, who insisted on the variety of African people and their fundamental sameness to Europeans. Unlike Helvetius, though, the narrator does not conclude that variety makes Africans like Europeans; as seen in the first part, he prefers Montesquieu's theory on climate's influence on the efficiency and development of people.[20]

A significant difference stands out between the first and the second part of the text. Whereas the fictional narrative makes reference to the figure of a "noble savage," the philosophical-political discourse does not mention it at all. The moral tale of the first part presents Ziméo, Ellaroé, and Matomba as persons of great virtue who serve as models to all the other

slave characters; in this respect, the narrative echoes both Rousseau's natural philosophy and Helvetius' theory of morality. Saint-Lambert's text echoes also physiocratic beliefs in the importance of nature and agriculture. Two spaces of happiness on both sides of the Atlantic – the idyllic village in Benin and the Maroon republic in the Jamaican mountains – fully embody the idea of a life close to and in harmony with nature. It is in these places where the love between Ziméo and Ellaroé can grow. Slave ships and plantations, marked by the barbaric and inhumane treatment of slaves by slave traders and plantation owners, contrast with these bucolic spaces. Wilmouth's plantation is an exceptional space that differs from the barbarism of the surrounding plantations. Due to this distribution of virtue the characteristics "barbaric" and "civilized" are attributed in a reverse manner to the mother country and the colony. The moral superiority of Ziméo, Ellaroé, and Matomba is carefully introduced in the story's first part to present them as characters that attain the right to emancipation because of their virtue (according to the regulation at Wilmouth's plantation).

The second part of the text, the "reflection on the character of the Negros," has no such discussion of the moral qualities of Africans themselves. Instead, it propagates a strong and far-reaching critique of European mercantilism and its governance. The special focus of the critique is on the unjust European colonial enterprise that goes along with the implementation of a system of difference (that is, a racist taxonomy). The author-narrator ends with a moral plea. In his view, only when Europe will acknowledge the principle of *droit naturel* will its governance be moral and good:

> Peuples polis, peuples savants, prenez-y garde, vous n'aurez une morale, de bons gouvernements et des mœurs, que lorsque les principes du droit naturel seront connus de tous les hommes…c'est alors que vous ne serez pas les tyrans et les bourreaux du reste de la terre…vous saurez que votre argent ne peut vous donner le droit de tenir un seul homme dans l'esclavage.[21]

The narrator takes the position that all people have the same value, but live in different stages of development that history has ascribed to them:

> Portons-leur nos découvertes et nos lumières, dans quelques siècles ils y ajouteront peut-être, et le genre humain y aura gagné. N'enverrons nous jamais des apôtres de la raison et des arts? Serons-nous toujours conduits par

un esprit mercantile et barbare, par une avarice insensée qui désole les deux tiers du globe, pour donner au reste quelques superfluités?[22]

Undoubtedly, Saint-Lambert introduces the idea of civilizing mission here: for him, European Enlightenment and reason (as well as the implementation of *droit naturel*) are warrants of future advancement and perfection that shall be brought to the non-European people.[23] He makes also clear that civilization is a state that shall be reached by all people, and that Europeans have the best conditions to arrive at that stage.

Thus the second part of "Ziméo," a kind of political-philosophical postscript, displays another geography of civilization and barbarism. It presents Africans as dramatically imperfect people on an inferior level of historic development. They are people to be civilized. This stands in strong contrast to the fictional first part, where African village life appears as a utopic, virtuous, just and peace-loving space of moderate politics. As a device of fiction, the attribution of "barbaric" characteristics to European characters and "civilized" ones to non-Europeans serves the important function of reversing the logic of Eurocentric discourses. But, in the epilogue, where the picture becomes more complex, such reversal is no longer needed.

ON SAINT-LAMBERT'S ESTHETICS OF CONTRAST

Through the use of contrast as a rhetorical device in the first part, Saint-Lambert hoped to provide his reader with new emotions which would prepare him to engage with the topic of slavery and the moral appeal in the second part. According to Saint-Lambert, the biggest impression could be achieved by contrasting the sublime (that is the terrible) with the charming and beautiful. Saint-Lambert thought that this was the case because this contrast did not exist in nature and would come as something unfamiliar, as a surprise. The tale gives a prominent example of this esthetic: while crossing the Atlantic, the slave ship is becalmed; food becomes scarce and the slaves are condemned to cannibalize each other to survive. In the midst of this atrocity, enduring feelings of horror and despair, and physical and emotional pain, Ziméo and Ellaroé enjoy their first sexual encounter.[24]

Shortly after the work's publication, two of the most accomplished literary critics – Denis Diderot and Friedrich Melchior Grimm (in their journal *Correspondance littéraire*) – severely criticized Saint-Lambert's

excessive use of contrast. They concluded that it annoyed the reader. They condemned, in particular, the above-described scene. Diderot considered the juxtaposition of anthropophagy and love-making an incredible (*invraisemblable*) result of bad taste.[25] Grimm disqualified it as childish and despicable. In his view, the up and down on the register of emotions disregards the call for moderation and harmony inherent in the conventions of classical rhetoric that can be found in various entries of the *Encyclopédie*, from the *sublime* to *vraisemblance*.[26]

To my understanding, this critique does not show merely that Saint-Lambert was just a mediocre writer or that he offended good taste. In my view, Saint-Lambert's excessive use of contrast also points to his attempt to grasp a plot beyond the rules of credibility and verisimilitude. His writing thus points towards the limits of the Enlightenment world apprehension.

If the apparent universal esthetic debate is re-linked with its colonial context through questions about the representation of colonial others and of colonial violence, then Saint-Lambert's "excesses" make more sense. The actual violence of slavery and slave rebellion eludes a harmonious presentation, and thus conflicts with an esthetics of moderate contrast. In his unusual contrasts, Saint-Lambert succeeds in marking the scene of slave transport as an exceptional situation of disorder that suspends existing laws. He presents it as a conflict of moral standards.[27] The physical union of the protagonists and the resulting pleasure are described as a way of forgetting the terrible reality. The lovers themselves refer to the Grand Orissa, a deity who guides them through life and – facing death – they decide to listen to their hearts and pursue their individual way to self-fulfillment. What Diderot defines as an incredible (*invraisemblable*) scene because it appears to contradict universal assumptions about the human psyche (that is, that pleasure might not be overridden by disgust and fear) and because it defies explanation by appeal to universal reason, points to the irreconcilability of slave trade with Enlightenment ideals. The contrast in this short narrative causes a productive uneasiness. The esthetic carries traces of the very violence that it tries to sublimate. The responses by the two critics Grimm and Diderot seem to prove that Saint-Lambert's esthetic fulfilled its goal: it did provoke a strong reaction on the part of readers. What Saint-Lambert's excesses might unintentionally show us, then, are the points of fracture in the enlightened and abolitionist discourses around 1760. Classical and

Enlightenment esthetics and poetics reached their limits when attempting to address slavery and colonial violence.

PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE AND FICTIONAL NARRATIVE: COMPLEMENTARY OR ANTITHETICAL VISIONS?

If Saint-Lambert's use of contrast in the fictional first part draws attention to the limits of Enlightenment genres for addressing questions related to slavery, what can we make of the apparent contrast between the first and second parts of "Ziméo"? Are the fictional narrative and philosophical-political epilogue to be read as complementary or as antithetical? Does each help to illustrate the other? Or do they diverge fundamentally?

In his presentation of eighteenth-century literature, Michel Delon confirms that philosophical abstraction and fiction constantly crossed paths in the writings of Enlightenment philosophers as they reached out for the biggest possible audience. The ironic, moral, and sentimental tale (*conte*) as well as the epistolary novel seemed the most fitting genres to combine fiction and philosophy.[28] At the end of the eighteenth century the entanglements of philosophical reflection and fiction became more frequent and added semantic dimensions to texts.

In the case of "Ziméo," major differences between the tale and the "reflection on the character of the Negros" invite us to consider the possibility of an antithetical relationship between the two parts of the book. As noted above, the abstract nature of the philosophical treatise lacks, and is even opposed to the excess of contrast and emotion in the fiction. And, parts of the argument and narrative structure can hardly be reconciled. Nor are these minor contradictions: the possibility that love and friendship within the framework of a paternalistic slavery might lead to emancipation is at odds with the accusatory philosophical-political epilogue, which links emancipation with civilizing mission. The sentimental narrative would accept reform, but the epilogue insists that reform is not a solution and attacks and denounces both slave trade and colonial slavery.

Yet there are several arguments that support the idea that the two parts of the text are complementary. The fictional tale can be considered a device to prepare the European reader to accept the arguments of the second part. For this, it uses several means. First, it is meant to move the reader: by translating the mass experience of slavery into a personal story, it prompts the identification with slaves. Second, the first part also contains allusions to principles of Enlightenment philosophy and to abolitionist

policies that are later addressed in the philosophical treatise, designed to appeal to reason more than to feeling. Thus, the sentimental narrative, which draws the reader to sympathy with excessive sentiments and contrasts, and resolves the conflict in universal love, friendship, and virtue, aims at preparing the reader to accept the moral and political message of the non-fictional epilogue. The non-fictional second part takes then the reader in another direction: it rejects this excess of sentiment and reproduces Enlightenment discourses on abolition, on just society, and non-European cultures. Its compendium-like way of incorporating and joining diverse, sometimes conflicting theories and opinions, reminds the reader of the articles that Saint-Lambert has written for the *Encyclopédie*. If we compare both texts, it seems that "Ziméo's" two parts are complementary in topics and ways of presentation; both comment on each other as they amplify, extrapolate, but also vary and mislead each other's argument and thus create a tension.

SAINT-LAMBERT – THE ABOLITIONIST AND IMPERIAL ACTOR

In 1787 Saint-Lambert used his pen to serve directly a government institution. He figured as an advisor to Castries, the Minister of the Navy and the Colonies, concerning the reform of legislation on the status of *gens de couleur* (free non-white population) in Saint-Domingue (Comité legislatif relatif aux noirs et aux hommes de couleur de Saint-Domingue). This call for colonial reform was part of a longer process that had begun in 1758 with the creation of a Comité de legislation. For various reasons the Comité's main proposals were implemented only under Castries in 1787.[29] According to M. Duchet, Saint-Lambert is the author of an unpublished memorandum (*mémoire*), entitled "Réflexions sur les moyens de rendre meilleur l'état des négres ou des affranchis de nos colonies," that was written around March/April 1787. Duchet herself had found it by accident in the Moreau de Saint-Méry papers.[30] In his memorandum, Saint-Lambert commented on a dossier containing several papers on the status of "people of color" (*gens de couleur*) in France's richest colony, Saint-Domingue. The case was fought by Julien Raimond, the metropolitan representative of the *gens de couleur* (see Jeremy Popkin's chapter in this volume), and the papers that caught Saint-Lambert's attention were Raimond's three *memoires*, "Réclamations en faveur des gens de couleur" (published from March 1786); a response (dated September 25, 1786) to the *memoires* by the then newly appointed

governor of Saint-Domingue (César Henri de la Luzerne) and the inten-
dant (François de Marbois); and a draft of the legislation proposed by the
Comité de legislation.

In the manuscript later found by Duchet, Saint-Lambert wrote in
support of Raimond's position; he too found that full rights of citizenship
should be ascribed to the "free people of color" and that racial prejudice
against this group should be fought. It is worth noting, however, that
Saint-Lambert wrote in support of improving the status of a comparatively
small and free group of people who were often plantation owners them-
selves. His note refers to the desirability of a general liberty for all enslaved,
but the formulation of this possibility is quite vague and clearly something
he imagines as being achieved only over the long term. Instead, Saint-
Lambert argues very much in sync with the abolitionists who were going
to found the Société des Amis des Noirs, a group of practice-orientated
reformists whose support Raimond had sought in his efforts to lobby for
the *gens de couleur*'s cause in Paris. In the following years, the Amis des
Noirs inspired a series of laws in favor of the "people of color." These were
fiercely contested by the white colonial elite as well as by less privileged
white inhabitants of the colony (the so-called *petit blanc*) who defended
their rights to social privilege by all means of argument (including distinc-
tion in headdress).

In his 1787 note, Saint-Lambert rejects the white settlers' response as
racist. He demands a policy that is in tune with humanity: "Il faut dans la
vue de préparer l'affranchissement général, rapprocher dès à présent les
mulâtres des blancs, pour rapprocher un jour les noirs des mulâtres."[31] At
the same time, Saint-Lambert proposes to assimilate the small group of
free non-white people rapidly and to win them as allies, first of all against
the majority of slaves:

> Je crois que plus les mulâtres ou affranchis seront rapprochés de la condition
> des blancs, et plus, dans tous les tems ils seront séparés des noirs. Alors dans
> toutes les occasions ils feront cause commune avec les blancs, alors s'il est
> nécessaire ils les défendront avec zele contre les Noirs.[32]

This position appears contradictory as it is meant to defend the white
population from the black majority and to prepare the equality of the black
population with the whites. Nonetheless it was very common and even
Julien Raimond used it in his plea for equal rights.[33] Free "people of
color" were often considered the warrants of French rule in the colony

and natural allies. In the French colonial context, it was supposed that people of mixed racial background were close to their "white fathers." Social conflict between the racial groups was masked and re-framed in paradigms of private relations. Organized as a family romance-plot, the close ties between "white" fathers and their "colored" children was pseudo-natural, but the specter of betrayal was always present, and mis-cegenation was regarded – in the end – as suspicious.[34] The majority of the colonial establishment shared this paternalistic view, as did enlightened abolitionists.[35]

In his memorandum, Saint-Lambert was anything but clear about the timing or conditions of a general emancipation of the slave population, which he seemed to have envisaged only in a very remote future. He imagines only vaguely how the black population in the colony could be assimilated. One possibility he does identify for achieving moral better-ment and assimilation is religion, which placed him very much in sync with British abolitionists. Saint-Lambert considers the activity of "reformed" Christian missionaries[36] to be an important and helpful means in the full assimilation of the *gens de couleur* and the slaves, so far not implemented because of the shortcomings of the corrupt and hypocritical clergy in the French colonies.

Saint-Lambert's memorandum, however, does give practical advice on the implementation of the new laws enacted in 1787. He advocates a cautious policy that annoys neither the *colons* nor the *affranchis*. He advises that the laws should be implemented as a new *Code Noir* – the set of laws installed in 1685 to regulate the treatment of slaves. Saint-Lambert's propositions included convincing slave owners to treat their slaves better out of economic considerations; arguing for a higher import rate of female slaves so that the slave trade would become unnecessary thanks to local reproduction; and convincing African princes to grow sugar and coffee on plantations on their continents with or without slave labor as they themselves chose. All in all, his very detailed propositions aimed to introduce moderate improvements abolishing the brutal and inhumane punishments for the enslaved and guaranteeing more humane living conditions without changing radically the colonial status quo. His practical agenda did not include concrete steps to general liberty, contrary to what the title suggests. The tension between Saint-Lambert's engaged plea and his moderate reformist propositions was typical of the French abolitionists. Saint-Lambert can thus be considered an imperial actor in

the sense that the Enlightenment and abolitionist causes were implicated in the colonial and imperial ventures.

I would like to conclude this chapter with the history of "Ziméo's" circulation. Soon after its publication, "Ziméo" entered the canon of abolitionist literature. In 1771, Dupont de Nemours reprinted parts of "Ziméo" in the physiocratic journal *Ephémérides du citoyen, ou bibliothèque raisonnée des sciences morales et politiques,* joining economic objections to slavery with Saint-Lambert's moral critique. The article subsequently became an often-cited reference in French abolitionist texts.[37] Dupont de Nemours' publishing practice vividly illustrates his conviction that literature disposes of special characteristics, which enable it to reach a broad public. In his view, literature had the ability both to instruct and to entertain. In sync with physiocratic esthetics that privileged arts and literature that had the capacity to elevate morality, the literary texts in the journal were meant to accomplish more than diverting the reader's attention.[38] Saint-Lambert refers to the complementarity of different lines of argument in a letter to Dupont de Nemours: whereas he pointed out the injustice and barbarism of slavery the journal underlined the unproductiveness of slavery. The joint arguments proved that slavery was a "useless and expensive crime." Besides their interest in economic productivity and the reform of royal administration, the physiocrats reflected about education and ways to "prepare the public 'to think properly,' invoking . . . the very mental processes that lay behind."[39] Although neither all physiocrats nor all *philosophes* shared Dupont's rather utilitarian approach, theories about the sublime, about sensitivity and how it could be induced, "speculations on the effects of pain and pleasure on audiences"[40] were of common interest to the *philosophes*, physiocrats, and artists alike.

Moreover, "Ziméo" was among the documents that Brissot de Warville, a founding member of the Société des Amis des Noirs, sent to its sister abolitionist organization in England in 1788, just after the foundation of the French society. In the following years, "Ziméo" was also translated into German and English and adapted by Kotzebue (*Die Negersklaven*, 1796) and Herder (*Negeridyllen*, 1997), producing numerous resonances in diverse literary texts of both languages. In French literature, several texts were clearly inspired by "Ziméo": *Le Négre comme il y a peu de blancs* by Lavallée (1789), *Adonis* (1798) and *Bug-Jargal* (1820). *L'An deux mille quatre cent quarante* by Mercier (1771) too resonates with Saint-Lambert's work, but it presents a different vision

of slave revolution that is not compatible with reform; Mercier's work calls instead for the astonishing and daring figure of an "avenger of the new world" ("*vengeur du nouveau monde*") who frees the world from the worst and oldest of all tyrannies (that is, slavery).[41]

Considering these facts, I would like to formulate a hypothesis. As the texts of several colonial actors between 1791 und 1815 show, Saint-Lambert's text might be considered one of the textual references which provided rhetorical strategies for speaking about the actual threat to (and ending of) the colonial French Empire in the Caribbean – the slave revolution in Saint-Domingue between 1792 and 1804. This is the case because its esthetic aimed at finding a "language, a vocabulary," specific textual strategies, and figures to talk about slave revolution in a French metropolitan and imperialist discursive space.

NOTES

1. Michèle Duchet, *Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des Lumières* (Paris: Albin Michel, (1971) 1995), 179.
2. See Madeleine Dobie, *Trading Places. Colonization and Slavery in Eighteenth-Century French Culture* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2010); Jean Ehrard, *Lumières et Esclavage: L'esclavage colonial et l'opinion publique en France au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Versaille, 2008). In the wider context of Enlightenment and colonialism, see the radical but still seminal essay by Louis Sala-Molins, *Dark side of the Light: Slavery and the French Enlightenment* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Srinivas Aravamudan, *Tropicopolitans: Colonialism and Agency, 1688–1804* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 1999); Daniel Carey and Lynn M. Festa, eds. *The Postcolonial Enlightenment: Eighteenth-Century Colonialism and Postcolonial Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), here esp. Garraway's chapter on Lahontan and Diderot are important. Jean-François Hoffmann, *Le Nègre romantique: Personnage littéraire et obsession* (Paris: Payot, 1973) has provided a valuable overview of literary texts from where to start a postcolonial revision.
3. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 95–107.
4. Lynn Festa, *Sentimental Figures of Empire in Eighteenth-Century Britain and France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 4.
5. On Saint-Lambert's biography, see Roger Poirier, *Jean-François de Saint-Lambert (1716–1803). Sa vie, son œuvre* (Sarreguemines: Édition Pierron, 2001) as well as Youmna Charara, ed. *Fictions coloniales du XVIIIe siècle:*

Ziméo, Lettres africaines, Adonis, ou le bon nègre, anecdote coloniale (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005), 27–29 and Jean-François de Saint-Lambert, *Contes américains L'Abenaki, Ziméo, Les deux Amis*, ed. Roger Little (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997); on his writings and literary qualities, see Saint-Lambert, *Contes américains*, v-viii. Whereas Grimm and Diderot in *Correspondance littéraire* wrote positively about the "contes orientaux" as well as *L'Abenaki* (cf. Saint-Lambert, *Contes américains*, xiv), his 20th-century editor Little himself confirms that the long poem "Les Saisons" merited most the praise (viii). Grimm and Diderot disliked "Ziméo" (Cf. *Correspondance littéraire*, 15.02. and 01.03.1769; cf. Saint-Lambert, *Contes américains*, xviii–xix) and the latter did also criticize "Les Saisons" (cf. *Correspondance littéraire*). Literary critics in the nineteenth and twentieth century perpetuated the critique and had their reservations (cf. Little). Duchet, *Anthropologie et histoire*, 137 qualifies Saint-Lambert as a "poète médiocre".

6. See Saint-Lambert, *Contes américains*, vii for the articles written by Saint-Lambert.

7. Cf. Charara, *Fictions Coloniales*, 28–29; Duchet, *Anthropologie et Histoire*, 177–193; Muriel Brot, "La collaboration de Saint-Lambert à *l'Histoire des deux Indes*: Une lettre inédite de Raynal," in *Raynal, de la polémique à l'histoire*, eds. Gilles Bancarel and Gianluigi Goggi (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2000), 99–107. Cf. Lüsebrink 2006 on the art of compilation in the *Encyclopedia* and especially in *l'Histoire des deux Indes*.

8. All these texts were published in 1801 as *Oeuvres philosophiques* (5 volumes).

9. Cf. Poirier, *Saint-Lambert*, 270, 271, 275.

10. Charara, *Fictions coloniales*, 33 assumes that Saint-Lambert chose Jamaica over Suriname not because of historical differences but because reference texts depicted Maroon resistance in Jamaica as more successful. On Tacky's Rebellion, see the chapter by Trevor Burnard in this volume.

11. The most important texts are Antoine-François Prévost, *Histoire générale des voyages, ou nouvelle collection de toutes les relations de voyages par mer et par terre qui ont été publiées jusqu'à présent dans les différentes langues de toutes les nations connues* (Paris: Didot, 1746), Olfert Dapper, *Description de l'Afrique* (Amsterdam, 1686), and Guillaume Bosman, *Nouveau Voyage de Guinée* (Utrecht, 1705). The travel narratives by Labat and Dutertre, especially Charles Leslie, *Histoire de la Jamaïque* (London: Chez Nourse, 1751) give information on the Antilles. See Charara, *Fictions coloniales*.

12. "A slave who conducted himself as a good man for ten years was sure of his freedom. These freed men remained with my friend; their example gave hope to others and inspired their behavior." Saint-Lambert quoted in Charara, *Fictions Colonials*, 50.

13. Lynn Festa, *Sentimental Figures of Empire*.
14. Saint-Lambert, *Contes américains* points to the fact that the godlike features of Ziméo and his like also refer to the genre of fairy tales where these characters have supernatural abilities.
15. Charara, *Fictions Coloniales*, 69.
16. See Saint-Lambert, "Introduction," in *Contes américains*, 17–19.
17. The philosophical-political reflections draw on the notion of natural law (*droit naturel*) formulated by Locke, Montesquieu, and others that provides every human being with inalienable rights. On this basis the author demands justice for every human being. References in this context are Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* (1689), Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois*, the essays of Burlamaqui on natural law (*Principe du droit naturel*, 1747, *Principes du droit politique*, 1751), theories of the state by Hobbes (*Leviathan*, 1651), and Machiavelli (*Il Principe*, 1513; *Discorsi*, 1531).
18. Saint-Lambert quoted in Charara, *Fictions Coloniales*, 62, 76 (Fn 57).
19. "a size and face … of most beautiful proportions." Ibid., 61.
20. Ibid., 62.
21. "Polite people, learned people, beware, you will not have moral, good governments and manners until the principles of natural law are known to all men…it is only then that you will not be tyrants and executioners of the rest of the land … you will know that your money does not give you the right to enslave a single man." Ibid., 62–63.
22. "Take them our discoveries and lights, in a few centuries perhaps they will adopt them, and the human race will be saved. Do we not send the apostles of reason and the arts? Will we always be led by a commercial and barbaric spirit, by a senseless greed that ruins two thirds of the globe to give the rest a few luxuries?" Let us bring them our discoveries and our knowledge (enlightenment), in a few centuries perhaps they will contribute to them and the human race will have profited from this. Will we never send apostles of reason and the arts? Will we always be guided by a mercantile and barbaric spirit, by a senseless greed that ruins two-thirds of the globe to give the rest some superfluities? Ibid., 62.
23. Ibid., 61.
24. Ibid., 58.
25. Denis Diderot, "Observations sur les Saisons, poème par M. de Saint Lambert," in *Correspondance littéraire* (March 1, 1769), 190–191.
26. "Vous y apercevrez à chaque ligne le dessein de l'auteur de vous renvoyer de la terreur à la volupté, et de la volupté à la terreur; et vous n'êtes pas à la troisième page sans mépriser ce jeu puéril d'escarpolette." ["At each line, you perceive in it the author's intention to send you from terror to delight and from delight to terror; and you will not have arrived at the third page without despising this childish game of swinging."] (Grimm,

Correspondance littéraire, 15.2.1769, 170); Diderot, *Correspondance littéraire*, 1.3.1769, 190–191.

27. Saint-Lambert in Charara, *Fictions Coloniales*, 57.
28. Michel Delon, Robert Mauzi and Sylvain Menant, *De l'Encyclopédie aux Méditations* (Paris: Flammarion, 1998), 242–243.
29. Cf. Jean Tarrade, "L'administration coloniale en France à la fin de l'Ancien Régime: Projets de réforme," *Revue historique* 229, no. 1 (1963): 103–122.
30. Duchet, *Anthropologie*, 178.
31. "From now on, one must in preparation of general liberty bring closer mulattos and whites, in order to one day bring closer blacks and mulattos." Saint-Lambert quoted in Duchet, *Anthropologie,*181, also 186.
32. "I think that the more mulattos or free people of color come closer to the condition of the whites and are always separated from the blacks. And on all occasions they will make common cause with the whites, so that if it is necessary they would defend them with fervor against the blacks." Ibid., 182.
33. See Jeremy Popkin's chapter in this volume.
34. Cf. Daut, *Tropics of Haiti*, 4–5, 7, 11 as an introduction and actually the main thread of the whole study.
35. The "people of color's" role as allies to the white planters was a frequent trope used in various contradicting ways by different factions in the fight for independence, autonomy, and emancipation in Saint-Domingue as this closeness always implied the threat of betrayal.
36. Saint-Lambert quoted in Duchet, *Anthropologie et histoire*, 186–187.
37. Condorcet referred to it in the most famous French abolitionist text, *Réflexions sur l'esclavage des Nègres, et autres textes abolitionnistes*, 1781.
38. Liana Vardi, *The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012), 192–193.
39. Ibid., 22.
40. Ibid., 196.
41. Roger Little states that Saint-Lambert's "Ziméo" (1769) preceded Louis-Sébastien Mercier's noble and impressive figure of a rebel who re-installs the *droit naturel* on the American continent (1771). Both bear interesting resemblances. The famous similar paragraph from *Histoire philosophique des deux Indes* (probably written by Diderot) appeared only in 1780; it is thus posterior to Saint-Lambert's and Mercier's fictional texts that were certainly known to the author Diderot. See Jean-François de Saint-Lambert, *Contes américains: L'Abenaki, Ziméo, Les deux Amis*, ed. Roger Little (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), XV.

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Slavery and the Enlightenment in Jamaica and the British Empire, 1760–1772: The Afterlife of Tacky's Rebellion and the Origins of British Abolitionism

Trevor Burnard

What role did people of African descent play in the remarkable changes beginning after the Seven Years War that led abolitionists in Britain to begin to denounce, for the first time in history, not just the cruelty of slavery, but also its very existence? To answer this often-asked question, let's start with three famous images of Africans in the eighteenth-century Atlantic world. One image is Anne-Louise Girodet's magnificent 1797 portrait of Jean-Baptiste Belley in the dress of a member of the French National Assembly, leaning against a bust of Abbé Raynal, proponent of colonial reform and enlightened Christianity. It was a bold and intellectually adventurous painting, suggesting that Africans were integral to the Enlightenment project. Such a view accords with recent scholarship, in

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which blacks were vitally involved in the revolutionary project of extending liberty and human rights even outside Western Europe.[1]

A second image is an anonymous portrait from around 1745 of Francis Williams, a Creole Afro-Jamaican free black who had been sent to Cambridge under the sponsorship of the Duke of Montagu to see if blacks "if properly educated" were capable of "the same improvements as whites." Williams is resplendent in wig and breeches and is pictured as a scholar with a Caribbean scene in the distance. He was mentioned by David Hume as someone who might seem an exception to the rule of African intellectual inferiority, given that Williams wrote Latin poetry and saw himself as an intellectual. But for Hume, and for Immanuel Kant, who followed Hume in this matter, the idea that a black man could be a man of intellectual accomplishments was laughable. Hume thought of Williams that "it is likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly." Kant used the authority of Hume to claim that no African "was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praiseworthy quality." The contemporary Jamaican historian, Edward Long, devoted a considerable portion of his 1774 three-volume history of the island to denigrating Williams' poetry as derivative and mediocre. Long noted that Williams had the advantage of a fine education, "under every advantage that able preceptors, and munificent patrons, could furnish." But even with this help, Long concluded, Williams' talent was mere mimicry. Thomas Jefferson had a similarly low opinion of black intellectual abilities, arguing that he had never found "a black [who] had uttered a thought above the level of plain narration; never saw even an elementary trait of painting or sculpture."[2] Such views on black incapacity were commonplace during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. No serious scholar today adheres to such racist understandings of the black mind.

The third image to consider is the poet William Blake's engraving in John Stedman's *Narrative of a Five Years' Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam* (1796) entitled *A Negro hung alive by the Ribs to a Gallows.* It shows a nearly naked African man, with arms detached and a forlorn look on his face, mirroring paintings of Christ on the cross, suffering a slow and painful death, with memento mori skulls drawing attention to a ship in a distant harbor. It is an image intended to shock, and it achieves its purpose, albeit in an almost pornographic and at least prurient manner. The tortured slave is a martyr to European cruelty and to the barbarities of life in the Caribbean. It is indicative of an aesthetics of

suffering in which an enslaved man was endowed with "the fortitude of Christian martyrs and thereby elevating them to a level of heroic suffering from which they were otherwise barred."[3] It spoke to an antislavery audience, "encoding the evangelical approach to death in macabre detail, along with the condemnation of colonial slavery."[4] These graphic portrayals of black suffering were intended to lead to metropolitan disgust both at slavery and even more against the un-Christian slave owners who inflicted such terror.

In this essay, I approach the question of how enslaved people contributed to their own emancipation through an argument that relies more upon the third image than upon the first image and certainly not upon the second image. I look at the political and cultural consequences of Tacky's Rebellion in Jamaica in 1760, the most important eighteenth-century slave rebellion in the West Indies before the events of the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) provided a model of a successful slave revolution that usurped Tacky's Rebellion as the emblematic Caribbean slave insurrection. We can get fresh insights into the role enslaved people played in influencing metropolitan opinion about slavery and slave owners at the very beginning of a concerted campaign of abolitionism in Britain through looking at how Tacky's Rebellion and the fierceness by which it was put down were perceived.

By doing so, we can bridge the gap between a historiography that affords too much agency to enslaved people as determined adversaries of planters, even in the years before abolitionism became a major social movement, and a historiography – in which the Portuguese historian of Africa, João Pedro Marques, plays a leading role – denying almost all agency to enslaved people as originators of an abolitionist impulse.[5] I agree with Marques that the immediate and even medium-term political consequences of a slave revolt on the position of enslaved people in the Americas was limited and often contradictory in its impact, insofar as a slave revolt encouraged slave owners to be more vigilant in keeping enslaved people under check. But these slave revolts were neither pointless nor irrelevant. Enslaved people may not have been able to initiate any change in slave-holding regimes through acts of rebellion. But their actions and even more so their deaths sent a powerful message to metropolitan opinion that slavery was morally wrong and that it was slave owners, more than enslaved people, who were the true barbarians in the Americas.[6]

During the African period of slavery in Jamaica (the years in which the majority of the enslaved population were African and when insurrections were planned and carried out almost exclusively by Africans), African rebels managed to appropriate a language which paradoxically, as non-Christians, they probably never intended to appropriate – that of stoic Christian martyrdom. That appropriation of the language of martyrdom – "stealing the martyr's crown" – had a remarkable ability to generate empathy for enslaved Jamaicans' desperate state as victims of an implacable set of planter enemies. It did so among a British population of evangelical Christians, led by the pioneering abolitionist, Granville Sharp, who were extremely well attuned to narratives of Christian martyrdom and Christian redemption. As martyrs, therefore, the enslaved men and women who challenged British authority in 1760 in several places in Jamaica and who were put cruelly to their death for their temerity achieved an influence over British abolitionism in its very earliest days as a social movement that gave their deaths some meaning and historical significance, albeit not the meaning that they may have wanted.[7]

The Slave Rebel's Vision of Self-Liberation

There are two themes that historians have focused upon in connecting enslaved people to Enlightenment ideologies. I won't deal, except tangentially, with the first theme here. That theme concerns what role Africans played in shaping the discourse on race, slavery, and Africa in the second half of the eighteenth century. It is not until the first abolitionist of African descent, Olaudah Equiano, started to write against slavery in 1789 that we know how slaves or ex-slaves viewed their predicament as slaves.[8] I am concerned with the second theme, which is how much slaves contributed to their own self-liberation. There are sufficient slave rebellions in the mid-eighteenth century Caribbean for us to have some evidence about the extent to which enslaved people sought freedom through armed resistance. This essay canvasses these matters through an analysis of how people in Jamaica and Britain in the years between Tacky's Rebellion in 1760 and the cause celebre of the Somerset case in 1772 thought that a slave revolt might have implications for the survival of slavery as a social system in the New World.

Nevertheless, when considering the role enslaved people played in winning their own freedom, the temporal and spatial variations of New World slavery very much conditioned the parameters of slave action.

Studying slavery in Jamaica in the period around the mid-eighteenth century, when most enslaved people were African and when opposition to New World slavery in metropolitan Europe was extremely limited, makes it hard to argue that Caribbean slaves had an anti-slavery ideology intended to lead to general slave emancipation. What little we know about the motivation of rebellious African-born slaves in this period is that their aims in any rebellion were relatively limited and were specific to individuals rather than to the larger collective. The primary ambition in African-led revolts was probably maronnage for a select few rather than emancipation for the collective whole.[9] Thus, it has been argued, it is anachronistic to go looking for evidence of well-developed anti-slavery ideologies among enslaved people who were brought up in African societies where slavery was normal.[10]

João Pedro Marques is the strongest advocate of this position. He dismisses those historians who argue that slaves played a significant role in the abolition of slavery as being "tainted by ideology." In particular, he objects to how historians, mostly from the "left of the political spectrum," do not just "celebrate the various forms of slave resistance" but have "so exaggerated their thesis of slave resistance forcing open the door of abolition that they [have] ended up relegating white politicians and abolitionists to a secondary or residual role." He contends that "it is not possible to establish a necessary and sufficient casual connection between slave resistance – or, more specifically, slave rebellion – and the emancipation laws enacted in the West." He denies that enslaved Africans had an anti-slavery ideology, mainly because Africans who became slaves in the New World came from societies in which slavery was an established social fact. The Africans who led Tacky's Rebellion in 1760 had no experience of what a society without slaves would look like. Indeed, many of them were slave owners themselves back in Africa and seem to have intended that, after their revolt was successful, slavery would continue with themselves rather than Europeans in the position of masters. He argues that "as a rule, runaways and rebels sought merely to escape a system in which their prospects were grim, but they had no intention of reshaping it." He admits that "slaves objected to their own enslavement" but insists that "they rarely objected to the practice of slavery."[11]

The absence of an anti-slavery ideology means that any possibility of long-term change through slave insurrection was therefore impossible. He notes that slave rebellions have always occurred in history, and were not just confined to the Atlantic world. It is true that the only successful slave

insurrection in history happened in Saint-Domingue, at the center of New World slavery, but there had been previous large-scale revolts, such as that led by Spartacus in the late 70s BCE in Rome and that of the Zanj in southern Mesopotamia between CE 869 and 883. There were also large scale grand marronage in places like Palmares in seventeenth-century Brazil where thousands of runaway slaves created their own state-within-a-state for nearly a century, and in Jamaica, where decades of internecine warfare between Maroons and settlers was concluded by a truce in 1739 that allowed Maroons an autonomy in Jamaica that exists to the present day.[12] "In sum," he concludes, when colonial slaves rebelled, like slaves elsewhere and outside of the Atlantic world, they did so "for revenge, or land, and for individual or group freedom" and "they did not seek freedom for all, a goal that is indispensable in the anti-slavery conceptions of human relations."[13]

What made the difference, he argues, was the birth of an anti-slavery movement in Western Europe, specifically Britain, around the time of the Seven Years War. During the second half of the eighteenth century, this movement grew rapidly until it became a major threat to British American planter power. It was a truly distinctive movement, grounded in universal principles of human rights and global justice and it attracted many hundreds and thousands of ordinary people in Europe to its cause. It rose into prominence, ironically, just as colonial slavery in the Americas was becoming an institution increasingly central, rather than marginal, to European wealth and economic growth and just as scientific racism was developing intellectual legitimacy. But the abolitionists were even more powerful than planters, being at the forefront of what David Brion Davis has termed a momentous change in moral perception.[14]

Abolitionists succeeded beyond their wildest expectations. As Marques argues, it was only in the last 30 years of the eighteenth century that "new hopes for human progress" and a fresh concentration on evocations of human sympathy for the plight of people "arriving from Africa, wretched and naked, in a floating prison" could overcome previous assumptions, tinged with material interest, that saw slavery as "just and inevitable." Marques endorses Davis' view that the rise of anti-slavery ideas in Europe provided the means by which slavery and the slave trade could be attacked. As Davis neatly concludes, "If there had been no abolitionist movements, there would have been no end to the New World slave systems in the nineteenth century."[15]

In general, Marques is right, though the combative nature of his prose and his underestimation of the risks that enslaved persons faced when engaging in forms of slave resistance (as in the dismissive "merely" noted above) is off-putting.[16] As Ira Berlin notes, Marques "challenges not only the scholarship of his opponents, but also their motives" while emphasizing slaves' failures rather than their achievements.[17] It is correct, however, as Marques argues, that slave rebellion was not synonymous with anti-slavery; that there is a trend in current historiography to replace an unhelpful view of slaves as docile with an equally unhelpful view of enslaved people as always rebellious; that the rise of anti-slavery in Britain during the Seven Years War was the decisive factor transforming general patterns of revolt into a specific movement for human justice; and that the importance of slave rebellion as a factor leading to abolition has been over-exaggerated. It is also true that slave rebellions were not as frequent as is often claimed and that when they are compared to rebellions by other groups of oppressed people, such as European serfs or peasants they do not seem all that impressive. There are many slave societies that seem remarkably tranquil from the perspective of early modern Europe and China. Luanda, Brazil, Hispaniola, Cuba, Peru, the Chesapeake, and Barbados are among many slave societies that did not have a slave rebellion for a century or longer. Moreover, many slave revolts, even the most celebrated, were extremely short, lasting for a few days or even, as in the famous 1835 Bahia Revolt, just a couple of hours.[18] As Philip Morgan notes, we need to "recall the bitter fact that the vicious system of Anglo-American slavery lasted for hundreds of years without serious challenge" with "no mainland region fac[ing] a large-scale slave insurrection in the eighteenth century."[19]

Where Marques is on strongest ground is in regard to African-led revolts prior to abolitionist agitation in Europe, though his argument is focused mostly on slave rebellion in the age of revolutions. As he argues, where we can reconstruct what enslaved people thought they were doing when rebelling (and that in itself is a highly problematic assertion), "the most common objectives were flight, retaliation, and restoration; in other words, the aim was to reconquer freedom, kill the whites, destroy the sugar mills and other facilities, and, depending on the balance of forces on the ground, to escape or subjugate the region, where modes of social organization of African origin would then tend to be restored."[20] The large slave rebellion in Dutch Berbice in 1763, for example, fits the Marques thesis very well. The leaders of this revolt were happy to continue

slavery, proposing to divide the colony into two, one an African republic or monarchy, the other with an Atlantic slave trade and slavery. Marjoleine Kars argues, persuasively, that an in-depth analysis of this revolt shows that there was a range of motivations that shaped enslaved people's response to rebellion. What leaders wanted departed significantly from what followers desired. She notes that the internal politics of the rebellion – the struggle over rule at home – shows a confusing mixture of outright rebellion, limited resistance, strategic accommodation, and reluctant cooperation. She argues that "Berbice rebels were willing not just to live alongside slavery, but to practise it themselves."[21]

THE PLANTERS' RESPONSE TO TACKY'S REBELLION

Tacky's Rebellion in Jamaica in 1760 also fits Marques' model. Indeed, given the completeness of the victory of the Jamaican state and the planters who controlled it over slave rebels in 1760–1761 and given the impetus that planter victory gave for the reshaping of Jamaican society so that future slave rebellions would also be failures, Tacky's Rebellion seems to go even beyond what Marques argued in showing the futility of slave rebellion. We tend to underappreciate the importance of this revolt in shaping the politics of slavery in the Greater Antilles because we know that a much greater slave revolt was to come along in Saint-Domingue after 1791. But in the period between the Seven Years War and the French Revolution Tacky's Rebellion was the emblematic West Indian slave revolt. It shaped West Indian attitudes to slave rebellion and metropolitan responses to what West Indians did to put down a rebellion.[22] For white West Indians, their success in brutally suppressing Tacky's Rebellion proved that a determined planter class supported by the authority of a hard-headed imperial state could always prevail over whatever slaves threw at them. For many Europeans, however, the lesson drawn from Tacky was that, as Samuel Johnson had claimed in 1756, as the Seven Years War started, Jamaica was "a place of great wealth and dreadful wickedness, a den of tyrants and a dungeon of slaves."[23]

Tacky's Rebellion was a series of possibly coordinated attacks against white rule in Jamaica that started with acts of great ferocity on April 7, 1760. It was not suppressed fully until nearly a year later. It took a combination of the Jamaican state, led by an impressive and responsive governor, Henry Moore, local white militia, Maroons and British soldiers and sailors to overcome the determined resistance of the rebels. Tacky's

Rebellion was the most severe challenge to British rule by non-white colonial subjects until India's Sepoy Rebellion in 1857 and the most severe wartime challenge to British imperial rule by imperial subjects between the 1641 Rebellion and the 1916 Easter Rising in Ireland. Perhaps 60 whites, 60 free blacks and 500 enslaved persons lost their lives. A further 500 slaves were transported to the Bay of Honduras. The event revealed to whites the extent to which blacks hated them. Edward Long argued that the rebels wanted "no other than the entire extirpation of the white inhabitants, the enslaving of all such Negroes who might refuse to join them, and the partition of the island into small principalities in the African mode, to be distributed among their leaders and head men."[24] Long's explanation is compelling but unprovable as we know virtually nothing about the rebels' motivation. The revolt was so worrying to white authority that it did not bother to try and ascertain what drove rebels to rise against them but instead just killed rebels as quickly and as gruesomely as they could.[25]

The shock of the revolt led to numerous changes in Jamaican politics and society. The Jamaican Assembly passed a number of laws to improve slave discipline. It petitioned the Crown for more troops and for the first time in Caribbean history passed laws that criminalized as witchcraft the African spiritual practices that whites felt had given rebels the courage to revolt. The revolt ended abruptly any ideas that Jamaica might become transformed into a settler society on the model of colonies in British North America. Instead, Jamaica was to be a colony of exploitation rather than a colony of settlement. Just like the Anglo-Irish in southern Ireland following their seizure of land between 1580 and 1620, Jamaican planters after 1760, especially in new settlements in western parishes, started building great houses with corner towers with gun loops allowing for direct and enfilade fire. The trend was towards defensible houses to protect whites from their internal enemies.[26]

Jamaican creole elites also took a harder line against non-resident owners, whose delinquencies they thought encouraged slave rebellion. The Assembly became more intransigent to British authority, blatantly disregarding imperial decrees and engaging in prolonged fights against Governor William Henry Lyttleton. They even introduced a temporary Stamp Act between 1761 and 1763 to pay for strengthening the militia. Finally, they constructed policies that created clear racial boundaries between "free people of color" and whites, so that passing from the former to the latter became very difficult. If whiteness was made the fundamental

basis for status, then a united white caste would be able to confront any challenge from black people.[27]

These measures worked. Whites believed that if enough terror was applied against blacks by a committed white population backed up by a determined and repressive state then enslaved people could be kept forever cowed and submissive. Repression, they believed, was essential in a slave society where over 90 percent of the population was enslaved and over 70 percent were African. Historian Bryan Edwards spelled out the logic with brutal clarity in the last decade of the eighteenth century: it was a notable feature of political order "in all countries in which slavery is established" that "the leading principle on which government is founded is *fear*, or a sense of that absolute coercive necessity, which leaving no choice of action, supersedes all sense of *right*."[28]

METROPOLITAN RESPONSES TO TACKY'S REBELLION

But there was a different view about the necessity of enacting fearsome displays of fierce repression in order to terrify enslaved people and accustom them to obedience. Metropolitan Britons were appalled by white Jamaican brutality. It made them wonder whether these self-proclaimed British people actually deserved the name. White Jamaicans' repressive brutality in 1760–1761 confirmed British suspicions that Jamaica was a barbarous outpost of inhumanity. The executions of rebels and more importantly their stoicism in the face of gruesome torture received a lot of attention in the British press. Such barbarity by Britons living overseas in the middle of a global war, in which Britons took over large amounts of territory and many millions of non-white subjects, was alarming. If Jamaicans continued to act as tyrants, surely another slave revolt would soon deliver the island to France or Spain. Significantly, initial metropolitan responses to Tacky's Rebellion concentrated not on its inequity but on how slavery debased Englishmen in the West Indies so that they became tyrants.

From this point, an image of the West Indian planter as very rich but cruel and overly proud developed. For Jamaicans, demonstrating authoritarian "mastery" over dependents served an important purpose. It showed that whites could control a potentially hostile enslaved population by utilizing their own power structures and employing exemplary terror against slave rebels. For evangelical Christians, on the other hand, devoted to ideals of the unconditional love of a caring Savior and brought up with

notions of Jesus' meekness as the basis of moral authority, such self-assertiveness and willingness to employ tools of domination and coercion were anathema.[29] British abolitionists saw planters in negative terms, as debauched tyrants and people who had adopted too much of black customs for comfort, including sensual depravity and tolerance of cruelty. The planters' reactions to slave revolt only confirmed that they were barbarians and antisocial philistines. They lacked the restraint and sense of noblesse oblige that marked the character of the British benevolent aristocrat. Planters' brutality was manifest in the cruel ways they put slave rebels to death and in their relentless pursuit of profit, no matter at what cost to overworked enslaved people. Their ruthless creation of a particularly brutal plantation system made them "a hideous parody of the English lord of the manor." Evangelical Christians, who were seldom social radicals and who generally celebrated traditional patterns of social life, thought planters to be exemplars of "a disturbingly extreme version of the 'new' improving landlords in rural Britain who callously hired and fired tenants and laborers without any sense of obligation or responsibility to those beneath them." Even worse, planters were not just a "dissipate unthinking race" but combined modern approaches to labor organization with a propensity to extreme violence that suggested an absence of moral standards. They dealt with slaves using the whip and chains rather than connecting with them, as many middle-class Britons believed was the case in Britain, through "bonds of loyalty, traditions and proverbial mutual regard."[30]

In addition, the timing of Tacky's Rebellion is significant in how it shaped British opinion. Opposition to slavery was virtually non-existent before the start of the Seven Years War in 1756. The established opinion was that put forward by Sir Philip Yorke and Sir Charles Talbot, Attorney-General and Solicitor-General respectively in 1729 that West Indian slaves did not become free when they came into Great Britain or Ireland. Indeed, this opinion had been confirmed in law as recently as 1749 by Lord Hardwicke in the *Pearne v. Lisle* case, with Hardwicke declaring that a "Negro slave ... is as much property as any other thing."[31]

Yet by 1772, Hardwicke's opinion had been overturned (at least in public opinion, if not in actual law) by Lord Mansfield's judgment in the *Somerset v. Steuart* case. Opposition to slavery was still in embryonic form. Quakers, especially in Pennsylvania, had started to become opposed to slavery as a result of a spiritual crisis brought on by the conflict between patriotism and pacifism in the Seven Years War. There

were some prominent Britons who disliked both slavery and West Indian slave owners. Samuel Johnson was one such early anti-slavery thinker. But he did not choose to make his anti-slavery opinions widely known.[32] The sole exception was Granville Sharp who from 1765, when he had personal experience of how appallingly West Indian planters treated their slaves, devoted himself tirelessly to humanitarian efforts to weaken slavery in London. He did so, however, as Christopher Brown points out, less from concern about the treatment of black servants than from outrage about the unrestricted tyranny that West Indian slave owners residing in Britain exercised over enslaved people.[33] Sharp almost single-handedly brought abolitionism to public notice, encouraging through his publicizing of Mansfield's decision significant British evangelicals like John Wesley to start public campaigning against slavery and the slave trade.[34]

We still don't know very much about the early origins of abolitionism and how it moved from the very margins of British society to a more central position by 1772. The frustrations that Christopher Brown has expressed about how accounts of the beginnings of abolitionism fail to do more than describe what happened before moving onto the exciting years once abolitionism was established still remain, especially for the years between 1756 and 1772. Accounts of abolitionism traditionally start in the 1770s, although there is occasional acknowledgment that the actual beginning of a modern abolitionist movement began in the Seven Years War, both in America and in Britain.[35] Moreover, there is a tautological aspect that makes explanations unsatisfying – Quakers and evangelicals were opposed to slavery because the shift in "moral perception" that according to Davis entailed the momentous change from seeing sin as slavery to seeing slavery as a sin accorded with their developing religious worldview.[36]

What we miss from the many histories of British abolitionism, most of which start from 1772 or from the publication of great works against the slave trade that came out after the end of the American Revolution, is an analysis of the political process of anti-slavery. That process led a few pioneers from an unquestioning acceptance of slavery as not much more than a necessary evil to believing that the institution was such an evil that it besmirched Britain's good name and needed to be destroyed. This essay does not pretend to address this question with any great acuity. But I suggest that what happened in Jamaica in 1760 had a role in galvanizing Britons to start identifying with black West

Indians in ways they had not done previously. It also helped shape British disquiet about the character of West Indian planters who were so willing to make rebels die in such terrible ways. It was not enough that Britons increasingly came to see slavery as abhorrent. They also had to see this particular moral wrong as so egregious that it drove them to confront, as Granville Sharp did in 1772, entrenched institutions and long-standing beliefs. In short, anti-slavery ideas had to be translated into effective action.[37]

The Slaves' Death as Martyrdom

The executions of slave rebels in Jamaica in 1760–1761 were crucial in providing that sense of outrage that led people like Sharp to take action against wicked West Indian planters. Britons might not be able to identify with alien peoples or strange tropical lands but they found it easy to empathize with executed rebels and to imagine their sufferings because these executions were placed within a Christian discourse that evangelicals found easy to deal with. What was stressed in numerous reports of rebels being executed was how stoical they were while suffering grotesque and painful punishments. It was easy to translate such suffering into Christian terms. Vincent Brown summarizes the translation of slave rebels into Christian martyrs in the following way: "the political killings of African rebels were understood according to the same conventions used to describe the passion of Jesus Christ and the political executions of later martyrs. In a bizarre appropriation . . . the deaths of African rebels became the subject of an empathetic poetry of death and righteousness, emerging in sentimental scenes of suffering and fortitude that argued in favor of the possibility of a united polyglot British nationality."[38]

Of course, rebels did not see their actions as a form of Christian martyrdom – they could hardly do so not being Christian. But evangelical Christians, immersed in a theology in which conversion narratives allowed them to talk about enslavement to sin, the universal offer of salvation, and the empowerment of individuals, all in the context of being modernist expressions of personal freedom and self-actualization, were immediately and permanently drawn to lurid and potentially voyeuristic recitations of brave rebels facing death in a defiant way as if they knew that they were certain of bodily Christian resurrection.[39]

In death, therefore, slave rebels achieved an influence that they were unable to do in their actual rebellions. They made a contribution to their

self-liberation that was more significant than what Marques allows. Whatever their aims in fomenting rebellion, those aims were unsuccessful. Jamaican slavery not just survived Tacky's Rebellion; it flourished as never before after the revolt had been put down.[40] But as martyrs, rebellious enslaved people provided an important language that abolitionists could use to evoke sympathy for slaves as people and as Africans. They shaped a narrative important in Jamaican history where even though enslaved people were helpless against overwhelming planter power, supported by the Jamaican state, through a strategy of heroic suicides, such as participating in a slave insurrection that was brutally put down, they were able to transform attitudes towards Africans in Britain to such an extent that we see the first flourishing of abolitionism emerge soon after Tacky's Rebellion. Such a strategy is more common in imperial history than one might think – Patrick Pearse thought this way when leading the Easter Uprising in Dublin in 1916.

So let's return to the third image, one of many scenes of flagellation, torture, and death that William Blake drew. These images were intended to evoke in viewers powerful if voyeuristic feelings of disgust and horror.[41] West Indian executions had a particular iconography. Jamaican authorities conducted them with a minimum of ritualistic spectacle, emphasizing how executions demonstrated their absolute power over blacks and their willingness to inflict extreme pain as well as their lack of concern for the afterlife of the executed. Yet a ritual did emerge. It revolved around the ability of those suffering punishment to withstand without complaint the most horrific bodily mutilations. That slave rebels died with extraordinary bravery and that West Indians were deliberately and needlessly cruel became a standard trope within abolitionist literature.[42]

Slave owners themselves contributed to this trope of the rebel slave able to withstand unbelievable punishment with stoic fortitude. Bryan Edwards, for example, wrote a eulogistic poem in 1760 from the perspective of a condemned man which was widely reprinted. He had arrived in Jamaica as a young man in 1759 and Tacky's Rebellion affected him deeply. He wrote in 1792 that, "I felt a shock at a scene which presented itself to me on my arrival, that has not yet lost its impression. If it had, a paper which I wrote on occasion of a miserable wretch that was burnt, and which has since appeared in a great number of different publications, would stand in judgment against me." But although Edwards "felt the utmost indignation and horror at such extraordinary punishments," he came to realize, he argued as an older man in 1792, that such punishments

were justified, given the crimes those "wretches" had committed as part of their strategy to "take over the country." He noted, for example, that these "fierce and warlike savages" killed whites "in a savage manner and literally drank their blood mixed with rum."[43]

In short, Edwards realized that he had made a terrible mistake. He had allowed an image of the suffering but defiant rebel slave to be imprinted on the abolitionist mind. By 1792 he knew the magnitude of his error. But by then, when the abolitionist campaign had become established as a major threat to West Indian planters' control of slaves, the genie was out of the bottle. The rebels who challenged planters in 1760–1761 failed in their mission. In this respect, Marques is right. But like Jesus Christ, an example to which enslaved people did not aspire but whose example of redemptive sacrifice through painful execution was part of Christian dogma, slave rebels succeeded in death to serve as an example for future generations of slave rebels, through their self-sacrifice to larger desires.

NOTES

1. Laurent Dubois, "An Enslaved Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French Atlantic," *Social History* 31 (2006): 1–14.
2. Simon Gikandi, *Slavery and the Culture of Taste* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 102–107. For Williams, see John Gilmore, "The British Empire and the Neo-Latin Tradition: the Case of Francis Williams," in *Classics and Colonialism,* ed. Barbara Goff (London: Duckworth, 2005), 92–106.
3. Hugh Honour, *The Image of the Black in Western Art*. Vol. 4, *From the American Revolution to World War One* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 19; Marcus Wood, *Blind Memory: Visual Representations of Slavery in England and America, 1780–1865* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 234–239; Vincent Brown, *The Reaper's Garden: Death and Power in the World of Atlantic Slavery* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 192–194.
4. Brown, *Reaper's Garden*, 192.
5. Seymour Drescher and Pieter C. Emmer, eds., *Who Abolished Slavery? Slave Revolts and Abolitionism – a Debate with Joâo Pedro Marques* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 1–92. For the theoretical utility of agency, see Walter Johnson, "Agency: A Ghost Story," in *Slavery's Ghost: The Problem of Freedom in the Age of Emancipation*, ed. Richard Follett (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 8–30 and Sherry B. Ortner, "Resistance

and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37 (1995): 173–193.

6. Trevor Burnard, *Planters, Merchants, and Slaves: Plantation Societies in British America, 1650–1820* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015) and Trevor Burnard and John Garrigus, *The Plantation Machine: Atlantic Capitalism in French Saint-Domingue and British Jamaica* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).

7. For martyrdom, see Brown, *Reaper's Garden*, 152–156. See also Emilia Viotti da Costa, *Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood: The Demerara Slave Rebellion of 1823* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

8. James Sidbury, *Becoming African in America: Race and Nation in the Early Black Atlantic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

9. An important pioneer on the differences between African and Creole-led slave rebellions is Michael Mullin, *Africa in America: Slave Acculturation and Resistance in the American South and the British Caribbean, 1736–1831* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992).

10. Drescher and Emmer, *Who Abolished Slavery?*, 99–100.

11. Drescher and Emmer, *Who Abolished Slavery?*, 14, 71–72, 185.

12. Drescher and Emmer, *Who Abolished Slavery?*, 15; Theresa Urbainczyk, *Slave Revolts in Antiquity* (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008); Alexandre Popovich, *The Revolt of African Slaves in Iraq in the Third/Ninth Century,* trans. Léon King (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

13. Drescher and Emmer, *Who Abolished Slavery*, 15.

14. David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 90.

15. Drescher and Emmer, *Who Abolished Slavery*, 167.

16. For a more balanced treatment, see John Stauffer, "Abolition and Antislavery," in *The Oxford Handbook of Slavery in the Americas,* ed. Robert L. Paquette and Mark M. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 556–577.

17. Ira Berlin, *The Long Emancipation: The Demise of Slavery in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 5–8.

18. Marjoleine Kars, "Dodging Rebellion: Politics and Gender in the Berbice Slave Uprising of 1763," *American Historical Review* 121 (2016): 42, n.10.

19. Philip D. Morgan, "The Black Experience in the British Empire, 1680–1810," in *Black Experience and the Empire*, ed. Philip D. Morgan and Sean Hawkins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 107.

20. Drescher and Emmer, *Who Abolished Slavery?*, 13.

21. Kars, "Dodging Rebellion," 68–69.

22. Burnard and Garrigus, *The Plantation Machine*, 127–136, 138–145, 147–154.

23. Michael Bundock, *The Fortunes of Francis Barber: The True Story of the Jamaican Slave Who Became Samuel Johnson's Heir* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 112.

24. Edward Long, *History of Jamaica; or, General Survey of the Antient and Modern State of that Island, with Reflections On its Situation, Settlements, Inhabitants, Climate, Products, Commerce, Laws, and Goverment; Ill. with Copper Plates* (London: T. Lowndes, 1774), 2: 447.

25. For an eye witness account, see Trevor Burnard, *Mastery, Tyranny, and Desire: Thomas Thistlewood and His Slaves in the Anglo-Jamaica World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 170–174.

26. Burnard and Garrigus, *Plantation Machine*, 138–145, 147–154; Louis P. Nelson, *Architecture and Empire in Jamaica* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 36–64.

27. Burnard and Garrigus, *Plantation Machine*, 147–154; Lynne Oats, Pauline Sadler and Carlene Wynter, "Taxing Jamaica: The Stamp Act of 1760 & Tacky's Rebellion," *eJournal of Tax Research* 12 (2014): 162–184.

28. Bryan Edwards, *The History, Civil and Commercial, of the West Indies, with a Continuation to the Present Time* (London: Miller, 1819), 3: 7–11.

29. Trevor Burnard, "Powerless Masters: The Curious Decline of Jamaican Sugar Planters in the Foundational Period of British Abolition," *Slavery & Abolition* 32 (2011): 185–198.

30. Sarah Yeh, "Colonial Identity and Revolutionary Loyalty" in *British North America in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,* ed. Stephen Foster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 203–205.

31. Davis, *Problem of Slavery in Western Culture*.

32. James G. Basker, "'The next Insurrection': Johnson, Race, and Rebellion," *The Age of Johnson* 11 (2000): 37–49.

33. Christopher Leslie Brown, *Moral Capital: The Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 93.

34. David Hempton, "Popular Evangelicalism and the Shaping of British Moral Sensibilities," in *British Abolitionism and the Question of Moral Progress in History*, ed. Donald A. Yerxa (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2012), 59–66.

35. Brown, *Moral Capital*, 18–19; Stauffer, "Abolition and Antislavery," 558–560.

36. Brown, *Moral Capital*, 19; Davis, *Problem of Slavery in Western Culture*.

37. Brown, *Moral Capital*, 1–3, 17–18.

38. Brown, *Reaper's Garden*, 154. See also Brad S. Gregory, *Salvation at Stake: Christian Martydom in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

39. D. Bruce. Hindmarsh, *The Evangelical Conversion Narrative: Spiritual Autobiography in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2005) and Phyllis Mack, *Heart Religion in the British Enlightenment: Gender and Emotion in Early Methodism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

40. Burnard, *Planters, Merchants and Slaves*, 166–168.

41. The key theoretical text is Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). See also Karen Halttunen, "Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture," *American Historical Review* 100 (1995): 303–334.

42. Diana Paton, "Punishment, Crime and the Bodies of Slaves in Eighteenth-Century Jamaica," *Journal of Social History* 34, no. 4 (2001): 923–954; Brown, *Reaper's Garden*, 137–144, 148–155.

43. Bryan Edwards, *Poems Written Chiefly in the West Indies* (Kingston: A. Aikman, 1792), 67–68.

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France, the Abolition of Slavery, and Abolitionisms in the Eighteenth Century

Matthias Middell

One of the topics that has had probably the most astonishing fate over the past two decades – at least within the framework of French and revolutionary history – is the story of the Haitian Revolution, qualified as the only successful revolution by slaves against their masters and against colonialism in world history so far. The rebellion in the Caribbean sat for two centuries, until 1989, at the margins of the narratives devoted to the French Revolution. On the eve of the bicentennial, even in an expert summary of the research so far undertaken like Michel Vovelle's *L'Etat de la France pendant la Révolution française* (1988), the upheaval in Saint Domingue is mentioned only in a short chapter that comes at the very end of the book.[1] While in the five-volume collection of images, published by the same author, the emancipation of black slaves is not missing, it is also not critical to the well-established narrative from the Bastille to Napoleon's empire.[2] On the other side of the bitterly political controversies of the 1980s, the faraway colonies had no better standing, on the contrary.[3] This is surprising insofar as the enormous importance of the

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sugar islands for the French economy was known to historians before 1989.[4] Nevertheless, only a few authors insisted on abolition in their appraisal of the Revolution; among them, the most prominent without any doubt was Yves Benot, who wrote extensively about the slave trade and the plantation system as well as about the French tradition of anti-colonial criticism.[5] Marcel Dorigny was among the first who followed Benot in the undertaking of enlarging the picture of France's imperialism during the Revolution while opening it up for comparison with other colonialisms.[6] When looking at Marcel Dorigny's efforts to put the French way of dealing with colonial trade and plantation slavery into relation with British and North American abolitionism, one becomes aware that French historiography was relatively late in investigating French colonial history in the late eighteenth century, particularly when compared to the growing interest in this topic among US scholars since the 1960s when the civic rights movements put the country's long-lasting historical legacy of slavery on the political agenda.[7]

This has changed over the past twenty years, with an entire generation of scholars in the United States, France, and the Caribbean having turned more than a page in the history of French colonialism and abolition through intense archival work and critical debates that has shaken a couple of well-established narratives going back to engaged anti-colonial writings such as C. L. R. James' *Black Jacobins*.[8] This has not only inspired detailed studies of individual French colonies[9] but has also raised the question of how and where interaction took place between the French and the Africans,[10] and how that influenced the first years of the Revolution in France.[11]

However, in these debates, the abolition of slavery and abolitionism as an intellectual movement criticizing enslavement, the slave trade, and an economic system based on slavery, are often confused. Scholarship about the origins of abolitionism – which hesitates between the French Enlightenment and British Protestant movements as the intellectual source of more or less consequent criticisms of slavery – has for a long time suggested that abolition also had its origins in Europe. Thanks to detailed studies of what happened in the colonies themselves published in recent years, the historiography is now much less Eurocentric and invites to distinguish clearly between abolition and abolitionism.

Certainly, the Société des Amis des Noirs did not emerge in 1788 out of the blue but took inspiration from the debate about slavery that had been developing since the 1770s,[12] for example in Sebastien Mercier's

utopia *L'An 2440*, or in Abbot Grégoire's and Condorcet's abolitionist writings.[13] The intellectual pathway was a different one in Catholic France compared to Protestant Britain, with its many religious groups. In French public opinion, the discussion of Roman slavery, and its critique by Montesquieu, played a much bigger role than the contemporary reality of plantations in the Americas. As a result, the debate remained abstract for a long time, which went hand in hand with the increasing economic importance of trade with the Caribbean islands. It became evident that the nascent discourse about human rights[14] was in conflict with any defense of enslavement; however, this did not prevent many French authors from insisting on the practical necessity of utilizing the workforce of thousands of slaves on plantations. For instance, it did not stop authors like Voltaire from investing in a very profitable business based upon slavery like the Compagnie des Indes, even if it violated some principles the same author had previously advocated.[15]

Even Condorcet, who is often celebrated as the most radical of the abolitionists among the French authors of the time, takes a rather ambiguous position. To be sure, he published his famous *Réflexions sur l'esclavage des nègres* in 1781 under the pseudonym of "Schwartz," thus expressing his solidarity with the enslaved people. He also openly characterized enslavement as a crime that cannot be legitimized by any utilitarian argument. This open rejection of such a crime was interlinked with the rejection of an immoral law and a legislator violating moral standards. In contrast to North American authors like Thomas Jefferson, Condorcet avoided the trap of opposing freedom (of the individual) and property as the pillars of republicanism, which made it possible to criticize and defend slavery at the same time. But even Condorcet suggested in the end of his essay a gradual abolition based upon the argument that slaves would lack – due to the treatment by their masters – the necessary morality and civilization to become immediately free. As a consequence, the man who became seven years later the first president of the abolitionist Société des Amis des Noirs, just before the Revolution started, foresaw a process of 70 years that ironically comes very close to the final step of French abolitionist legislation under the Second Republic in 1848.[16]

Undoubtedly, European and American intellectuals seriously discussed the matter of enslavement and the economy based upon slavery, but this debate was greatly influenced by the specific experiences with plantations. Americans debating the issue were under the impression that influential people in the struggle for independence, military men

and civilians alike, owned large plantations with often more than a hundred slaves. This not only impacted legislation but also the public debate both in North America and later – during Independencía – in South America. For British and French intellectuals, the specific experience with slavery was most often a faraway reality, being more a subject of theoretical concern – at least until 1789. The influence of European ideas therefore should not be exaggerated when it comes to abolition. French Abolition was much more the consequence of dynamics that resulted from the revolutionary sequence of events and from the changing constellations between the various factions on the islands than an effect of moral verdicts expressed by authors representing themselves as the voices of the Enlightenment.[17]

COLONIAL POLICY UNDER THE OLD REGIME BETWEEN ASSIMILATIONISM AND RECOGNITION OF COLONIAL PECULIARITIES

In France itself, the Caribbean gained considerable importance after the loss of Canada, the loss of influence in India during the Seven Years War, and growing financial problems after the American War of Independence. Two points were seen as crucial: geopolitical competition with England and increasing imports from Saint Domingue, by far the most important extra-European possession of the French Empire in the eighteenth century. Vertus Saint-Louis has recently calculated that the productivity of slaves in Saint Domingue were a little bit higher than those of French peasants in the mainland (200 *livres tournois* v. 196 for a Frenchman and only 156 for an Englishman). Other figures he provides prove similarly the economic value of the islands: colonial commerce with the Caribbean represented 4–4.75 percent of the French economy, which seems to be small but is above the average of 3 percent that has been calculated for all European commerce with the colonies.[18] For the manufacturing sector alone, it represented in the 1780s already 9.5–15 percent. During the last decade before the Revolution, more than one-third of all French imports came from colonial islands in the Caribbean and possessions in the Indian Ocean, while similarly 22 percent of all French exports went to those destinations. The more than 8,000 plantations on Saint Domingue were the powerhouse of this high productivity, based upon an enormous number of slaves employed. In the decade 1781–1790 alone, 319,000 of them

(out of a total of 754,000 slaves being sent to the Americas) were transported to Saint Domingue.[19]

The effects on the political culture on both sides of the Atlantic were different. In France, the effects were mainly in the coastal cities as well as the political centers in Versailles and Paris, where colonial matters were present in the public sphere, while large parts of the country were only indirectly touched by the question of how to proceed further with overseas possessions. There was a clear division in France between the orientation of its coastal and interior population.[20] But of course, there were also those who flocked to the revolutionary Atlantic, seamen and cooks, as well as those involved in colonial administration who hence traveled back and forth and thus somehow connected the two parts of France with its different take on the colonial question.[21]

From a look at the legislation between the *Code Noir* in 1685 and the collapse of the Old Regime,[22] we see on the one hand a strong assimilationist strategy dominating the French court's policy towards the colonies. All territories belonging to the empire were treated as if they were part of the metropolitan *Hexagone*. Overseas administrative functions had the same names as in France, resulting in colonies being represented by governors and seneschals. There is an evident assimilationist intention and it dates back to the seventeenth century. On the other hand, we should not overestimate intentions when the target of such intentions is far away (it took two to three months for a letter exchange with the Antilles) and when it is dominated by adventurers or filibusters (as was especially the case in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries), who did not necessarily have the willingness to recognize royal authority.[23]

Furthermore, social realities were without a doubt quite different in French agriculture and in the New World plantation economy. The history of legislation in colonial affairs is therefore full of examples where the particularities and the public utility of the plantation system based upon slavery became again and again an argument for specific regulations, which in fact undermined the assimilationist intention inscribed upon the legal status of the colonies.[24] It is primarily the legitimization of slavery since March 1685 that was an explicit contradiction to the "coutume générale du royaume de France." The document known since 1718 as the *Code Noir* came into effect step by step between 1687 in Saint Domingue and 1704 in Guyana. It is a clear indicator that there was a separate colonial law and that the planters were able to limit royal interventions into their

business. There was always a sort of compromise with the local rules and conditions, so that colonial law became increasingly complex when extended, for example, to Louisiana in 1724. The colonial situation was obviously difficult to cover by legislation fundamentally made for mainland France.[25]

The question of the "people of color" born free or released from slavery (*gens de couleur libres*[26]) raised substantial concerns and became the object of more detailed regulation between enslavement and full liberty – in contrast to what the *Code Noir* of 1685 had foreseen. It was especially their right to enter French territory that became more and more disputed, leading in 1777 to access being completely denied. The original assimilationist tendency in *Code Noir* was progressively undermined by ad hoc regulations and by insistence on the specificity of the colonial territories and their inhabitants. This increasing complexity is demonstrated by the regular publication of collections of laws and orders. There were special collections like the "recueil de Moreau de Saint-Méry" for Saint Domingue, the Code de la Martinique in 1767, or the Code Delaleu in 1777, which particularly addressed the islands in the Eastern Indian Ocean (the Mascarene Islands). These collections demonstrate that even the most professional lawyers had, to an ever greater extent, lost an overview of the situation,while at the same time the demand for legal certainty was increasing with the number of disputed cases.[27]

The national norm seemed to be less and less applicable. The certainty and predictability vanished and a lot of privileges were ceded to individuals or limited communities; at the same time, however, court cases demonstrate that these privileges were challenged regularly, even recently after they had been established. It is no wonder that under such circumstances it took even the revolutionary assemblies a while to gain a more nuanced picture of the rather chaotic legal situation concerning the colonies when deliberating in the committees on colonial affairs of the succeeding assemblies.[28]

Another problem that complicated the situation was the fact that in France slavery laws had become obsolete in the fourteenth or early fifteenth century, so that in 1691 the minister of the navy, Louis Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain, comte de Maurepas, declared that "freedom is given to all those enslaved by the laws of the kingdom once they touch French soil." This legal situation was confirmed in 1710 by a ministerial order. In fact, the number of black people in France was relatively high, rising to 15,000 as shown recently by Erick Noël.[29] Almost half of them lived in Paris and

Versailles, while the other half populated the bigger and smaller cities along the Atlantic coast. On paper, that looks again like a clear-cut assimilationist policy, but as one may expect given the high numbers of people concerned, things were not that simple. Already in 1716, planters and colonial officers managed to have a regulation enacted that stipulated, under certain conditions, their right to bring black slaves to France as domestic servants, thereby excluding them from the right to claim personal freedom. The argument used in the document was an assimilationist one: this regulation was supposed to make sure the imported slaves took up an occupation and learned something about religion in France. This kind of circumstance was not limited by any other criterion as long as the applicant got permission from the state authorities.

Over the next decades, this regulation, which obviously covered a widespread social reality, was discussed and transformed again and again, introducing periods in which the presence of black people was accepted (three years following the royal declaration of October 15, 1738). This transformation also involved more and more institutions which had different views on the cases, so that there were growing opportunities to call for another opinion when the decision was not in favour of the applicant – most often being planters, navy officers, and trading elites who had their black domestic servants or sometimes their wives with them in Nantes, Saint Malo, or Paris. There was a fear expressed in many complaints to the regional authorities as well as to the courts that "people of color" living for too long in France could assimilate and develop an "esprit d'indépendence."[30] For that reason, the minister of the navy addressed the planters in Saint Domingue with the argument that the king wished to avoid the "mixture of blood" ("le mélange du sang des Noirs dans le Royaume"). It is interesting to note that the terms slave and slavery were not simply silenced and avoided but actively contested by legal instances like the Parlement de Paris, which insisted in 1777 that while there could not be slavery on French soil, it might exist in the empire. One gets the impression from the many cases reported and dealt with at courts that the royal declarations were not very much respected and were seen rather as a social norm that was not necessarily binding for the planters, many of whom came from the first noble families within the kingdom.

After the Seven Years' War, the policy of Étienne François de Choiseul-Stainville became more severe; he insisted on the departure of all slaves to the colonies with the argument that the labor force was lacking to a great

extent on the plantations due to the long interruption of the slave trade during the war and British dominance over the seas. At the same time, he extended a purely economic argumentation: he expressed the idea in a letter to the intendants of the navy and the *commissaires* in the ports that the extended contact between blacks and whites would cause trouble and again lead to racial mixture ("sang mêlé"). In the 1770s, there was another initiative to reduce the number of black people in France and to force the planters to send their slaves back to the colonies by declaring all of them free if they did not leave the country before August 1777, but again the declaration did not have very much of an impact. The number of "colored people" in France increased, many of them remaining in an enslaved position. In 1783, the maréchal de Castries, then minister of the navy, made a last effort; however, the discussion around his order only demonstrates that both the legislators and the planters addressed by such laws shared a strong sentiment that it would not be good to have more freed slaves in France because they would corrupt French civilization. Firm control, especially in the port cities, and a reduction of the number of slaves living in France would be the choice wherever possible.[31]

Given all the tensions between the royal administration and the colonial elites, many of whom lived in France and were criticized for their absenteeism, there was evidently complicity between the planters and navy officers owning slaves, on the one hand, and the government, the legal authorities, the police, and the ministerial administration, on the other. Arguments used by both the planters and the administration referred occasionally to the Enlightenment when slavery was banned on French soil, when assimilationist aims were mentioned, and when the rationality of national economic success was ranked higher than individual privileges. Notwithstanding this, all the imperial actors involved insisted on the specificity of the colonial situation. They legitimized the slave trade, exploitation on the plantations, and slavery not only in the Americas, but even in France, where it was actually not permitted. Abolitionism in France had not only to struggle with the question of the moral legitimacy of slavery but also with related questions concerning the future configuration of statehood once the established social and racial hierarchies had been adjusted.

Seen from a mainland perspective, the continuity between territorialization at home and territorialization in the Caribbean was a precarious one.[32] The imperial border was porous; legislation and especially its application remained fragmented. While territorialization under the

Bourbons went on in mainland France, the colonies remained outposts with extensive privileges for those who dominated them. At the same time, these colonial elites were able to exercise their privileges not only in the Caribbean but also when traveling to France and residing there. The position of the planters was a powerful one given their rank in the society of the Old Regime – many of them were nobles from long lineages and with excellent relationships with the court – which offered them opportunities to obtain de facto exemptions from the law. Their wealth gave them the necessary economic power and opened doors towards the newly emerging capitalist elites. The importance of the colonial trade for the French economy earned them a strategic key position as the French state got further into debt and became dependent on new sources of income.[33]

A critique of slavery and slave-based economy therefore meant at the same time a criticism not only of the state and the legislation of the Old Regime, but also of the elites who were generating a most significant income for the country. The question of slavery, presented by the most radical authors from the Enlightenment movement as a moral issue, became one of further development towards a fully territorialized state, a state that would replace the imperial ties between motherland and colonies by new ties that would fully integrate the islands into a homogenized nation state, implying that all inhabitants of these subterritories had the same rights.[34] For the reasons mentioned above, the Revolution was the moment when the colonial question came to the fore while also raising enormous hesitation about whether one of the centers of the early modern globalized economy should be sacrificed.

When looking from the side of the island, the situation was also a mixed one. Saint Domingue's growing economic importance had led to a politicization that took various directions.[35] There were the big planters who had become exceptionally rich and nevertheless felt hindered in becoming even more so by the royal administration, which forced them by the so-called "régime de l'*exclusif*" to sell their products only to the motherland instead of profiting from the higher prices offered by North American and British traders and smugglers. This brought them into opposition not only with the representatives of the Crown but also with the merchants who specialized in trade with France. A pointed weapon in the hand of the colonial authorities was the control of properties of those planters who were not residing in Saint Domingue but in mainland France, as stipulated in several ordinances in 1784 and 1785. The conflict was further

aggravated when the insufficient harvest in 1788 led to a massive reduction in flour exports to the island, which especially affected the upper ranks of colonial society.

Colonial Questions in the French Revolution

Under these circumstances, the proposal made by Governor Du Chilleau to open ports to foreign traders met the strong resistance of *intendant* François Barbé-Marbois, who insisted on full compliance with the "*exclusif*."[36] The governor decided in May 1789 to open the ports for five years and to allow trade with the Americans. To explain to the ministry in Versailles this action taken against the *intendant*'s opinion, he decided to travel back home. At the moment when the news about the storming of the Bastille in Paris reached the island, the governor was thus absent and the *intendant* became the object of heavy attacks from assemblies of colonists who were strongly opposed to royal authority. In the end, in October 1789, he too left the island. As a consequence, the central matter of the "*exclusif*" was now discussed once again in France, where it was of great interest for a lobby group of planters living in Paris that had been formed the year before, in July 1788.

Their goal was the preservation of slavery and the plantation economy but the abolition of the "*exclusif*," while merchants were in favor of slavery too but insisted on the continuation of the "*exclusif*." They were both confronted with activists from the community of "free people of color" like Julien Raimond and Vincent Ogé,[37] who had nothing against slavery but were fighting against the racial divide among the free inhabitants of the colonies and were supported among others by Abbot Grégoire, representative of the Société des Amis des Noirs, who argued in favor of a complete abolition of slavery.[38] Both the planters and the "free people of color" organized delegations to the States General and the National Assembly, and it is significant to note that the planters did not hesitate to support the Third Estate in its conflict with the representatives of the nobility and the clergy, thus searching for the broadest possible coalition for their case. After the formation of the National Assembly, the colonial question came on the agenda when the number of representatives from Saint Domingue became a matter of dispute. For whom would the delegates speak: only for the planters or for all free inhabitants of the island? It was apparent to everyone that the answer to the question would have consequences for future elections and voting rights. On the famous night

of August 4, when feudal rights over persons were abolished, the topic of slavery was briefly discussed but not seen as fundamental enough to disturb the well-arranged theater play that was acting out national unity.[39]

While the big planters and the trader faction were able to overcome their differences, at least temporarily, within the Club Massiac, a lobby group of planters from the island formed in August 1789. This alliance of the wealthiest part of the colony's elites openly rejected the demand from the "free people of color" – who as a group owned one-quarter of all the slaves in Saint Domingue – to participate in the pro-slavery front. While the first opposition, which had caused trouble in Saint Domingue between the interests of the planters and the royal administration became less and less relevant the more the Revolution advanced, the racial divide had many more consequences. In their long fight for acceptance as proper citizens of France with full rights to vote, the "free people of color" increasingly distanced themselves from the white slave owners and joined forces with the abolitionists. Three elements came together here: first, the big planters had much less control over the social hierarchy of the island than before 1789; second, the *gens de couleur* remained loyal to France (and the Brissotins with whom they had already allied earlier on) when the emigrant colonists asked for British support in 1793;[40] and, third, the news from Saint-Domingue made it clear that a simple continuation of the slave-based economic system was becoming more and more unrealistic.[41]

The deliberations of the National Assembly's colonial committee in 1790 had made clear that no change was to be expected from the committee's propositions for the new constitution. Antoine Barnave had argued that only the colonies helped France to resist British supremacy and therefore everything had to be done to keep the connection to the islands intact. Neither slave trade nor the much hated "*exclusif*" were disposed of; the protectionist policy of the Old Regime was simply continued. This led, however, to an important inconsistency: the new constitution voted in at the end of the first assembly in 1791 had no clear definition of the place of the colonies within the newly elected regime. The question was thus handed over to the successor assembly. The National Assembly had changed France's constitutional outlook tremendously but was not able to solve the contradiction between territorialization at home and the imperial framework. The decision, therefore, was made elsewhere, namely in the colonies themselves.

Thanks to more in-depth studies of colonial archives undertaken over the past two decades, the story of the slave rebellion in Saint Domingue

has been substantially nuanced. The relatively quiet colony – which saw less upheaval and runaways by slaves in the eighteenth century than other parts of the French Empire, not to mention British, Spanish, Portuguese, and Danish possessions – all of a sudden became the scene of massive armed conflicts. One must not overestimate the role played by the spread of abolitionist arguments from Europe, facilitated by the rise of the press since 1789. There are, of course, sources confirming the emergence of such writings – and even more so of actions taken to hinder their effect on audiences – but they would not be sufficient to explain the revolutionary events.

Much more important than the influence of abolitionist propaganda – and better to prove empirically than the influence of the origin of many slaves from the Kingdom of Kongo – was that the old elites armed slaves against their opponents when it came to the conflict over obeying any longer or not the "*exclusif.*" Merchants who were in favor of the privileged linkage to the motherland fought against plantation owners, declaring their wish for an autonomous island. The merchants mobilized so-called *petit blancs* (small growers), who styled themselves as patriots and forced the planters to call the motherland for help to gain control again over society. Since there was not very much to be expected in the short term from mainland France, the big planters of Saint Domingue,[42] refusing to enter in coalition with the *petits blancs* due to their pro-autonomy agenda, then turned for support from the "free people of color," who opposed the *petit blancs* and launched violent attacks with hundreds of people being killed. A first attempt by slaves to use the disorder to free themselves failed in October/November 1790 when the coalition of planters and "free people of color" was strong enough to turn them down. But escaping from the plantations (maroonage) became more and more an option. While the mulattoes gained equality with the white elites on April 4, 1792, the slaves continued resistance – often against *petits blancs* defining themselves as patriots, the slaves being for their part on the side of the "aristocrats" fighting in the name of Louis XVI, whom they believed had ceded freedom to them.[43] The slaves profited from the fundamental division among the whites, and both the big planters and the *petits blancs* helped in providing them with arms and directed them against their own adversaries. What seemed to be stable in perpetuity – the colonial social and racial hierarchy – crashed within a couple of months due to the tectonic changes in France as well as to those within the colonial society, both mutually related to one another but not identical by far. It seems as if

it was much less the idea of abolitionism spreading from the Enlightenment or revolutionary meetings in Paris than the complete opposition between the factions comprising the island's society that made the slave rebellion likely to succeed. Individual freedom was on the agenda of individual slaves from the beginning, but collective emancipation appeared only later on the horizon of the rebels' outlook.

The split among former elites was also critical to the events taking place during the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish wars. The planters that emigrated to London formed a committee and transferred the defense of their interests somehow to the British government, which undertook military campaigns after the treaty of February 1793 was signed by the planters and the government. Arming slaves became an instrument not only in an inner-societal conflict but also in an international war, and slaves understood that entering one of these military formations was the easiest way to escape from work on the plantation. Besides the superior military chances, the convincing abolitionist arguments by Léger-Félicité Sonthonax and Victor Hugues helped many slaves to see the French as their natural ally. The National Convention in Paris understood the message and voted in February 1794 the abolition of slavery and gave the now former slaves all the rights of citizenship, which allowed Sonthonax to hold Saint Domingue and Hugues to recapture Guadeloupe from the British. This enabled the French republic to reconquer the majority of the Windward Islands in 1795, and the number of soldiers involved (11,000 in total, of which 1,900 came from metropolitan France) clearly demonstrates that black people had gained significant autonomy vis-à-vis the European powers.

The Constitution of Year III (1795) completed the process of territorialization by making the colonies an integral part of the nation. Later on, the geographical ordering of France into departments was extended to the Caribbean as was citizenship to all people living there, regardless of the color of their skin or their involvement in activities such as cultivation, military service, or trade. But the prior situation returned owing to the fact that the next French constitution (1799) turned the clock back to separate regulations for the colonies, thereby again disconnecting the territorialization processes in Europe and in the Caribbean. At the end of the revolutionary decade, France was not the homogeneous nation state that became a model for many European societies during the nineteenth century; Napoleon had ambitions to again combine territorialization in mainland France with a specific legal regime for the occupied territories – just like in the French Empire before and

in many empires around the world at that time. As is well known, the expedition led by Charles Leclerc – which was sent out to the Caribbean in order to regain the island, to re-enslave its population, and to weaken the Jacobin spirit of the Rhine army from which many of the soldiers were recruited – failed. In 1804, Jean-Jacques Dessalines declared Haiti's independence.

What we can conclude from the many criss-crosses the revolutionary curve took between metropolitan France and Saint Domingue is that there was a sharp difference between the situation before 1789, when the two places were politically and socially both stable and separated from each other, and after the turmoil of the summer 1789, when the enormous dynamics at both ends were interwoven in such a way that they doubled their effects. Enlightened ideas on empire and slavery had to prove their validity – or better, their capacity of inspiration for future politics – in a radical new context. Abolitionists were confronted with the reality of abolition and this abolition was – against the expectation of the vast majority of European abolitionists – not run mainly by European actors but, on the contrary, was in the hands of former slaves, Maroons, and "free people of color." The *commissaires* sent to the islands in 1793 were confronted with a new social balance and a new balance of military power they had to accept rather than introduce, whatever their opinion about abolitionism had been. For the revolutionary assembly to which they reported back, the de facto abolition was a new point of departure for further reflection upon the formulation of a post-abolitionist policy of integration. But this policy was far from being accepted by the former elites and provoked in subsequent decades a series of efforts to turn the wheel back until abolition was eventually accepted half a century later.

Notes

1. Michel Vovelle (ed.), *L'État de la France Pendant la Révolution: 1789–1799* (Paris: La Découverte 1988), 441–448.
2. Michel Vovelle, *La Révolution française. Images et Récit, 1789–1799* (Paris: Livre Club Diderot, Messidor 1986) 19, vol. 2, 232–247. To take another example, the large congress held in summer 1989 in Paris, which had brought together the broadest group of specialists of revolutionary history from many countries within and outside Europe, saw no more than eight contributions on topics related to the Caribbean and the French colonies during the revolutionary decade.
3. François Furet, the major opponent of the Sorbonne-based "Jacobin school of thought," did not deal at all with the colonial complex. In the books he

published himself or in cooperation with other scholars there is no individual chapter on the colonies.

4. Paul Butel, *L'Économie française au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: SEDES, 1993).

5. Yves Benot, *Diderot: de l'atheisme à l'anticolonialisme* (Paris: F. Maspero, 1970); idem, *La Révolution française et la fin des colonies, 1789–1794* (Paris: La Découverte, 1988); idem, *Les Lumières, l'esclavage, la colonisation. Textes réunis et présentés par Roland Desné et Marcel Dorigny* (Paris: La Découverte, 2005). As a contribution from African studies, see Robert Cornevin and Jean-Pierre Bruneau, *Haïti, Saint-Domingue* (Paris: Éditions Centre Delta, 1980); Robert Cornevin and Marianne Cornevin, *La France et les Français outre-mer* (Paris: Hachette, 1990).

6. Marcel Dorigny (ed.), *Les Abolitions de l'esclavage. De L.F. Sonthonax à V. Schoelcher: 1793, 1794, 1848* (Paris: UNESCO, 1995); Marcel Dorigny and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol (eds.), *La France et les Amériques au temps de Jefferson et de Miranda* (Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 2001). See also François Blancpain, *La colonie française de Saint-Domingue. De l'esclavage à l'indépendance* (Paris: Karthala, 2004).

7. As one example among many, see Seymour Drescher, *Econocide. British Slavery in the Era of Abolition* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1977). Undoubtedly there was also in France an interest in the history of colonialism at roughly the same time (due to the leftists' criticism of colonialism) but it had much less of an impact on continued research efforts. See, for example, Serge Daget, "L'abolition de la traite des Noirs en France de 1814 à 1831," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 11, no. 41 (1971): 14–58.

8. C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963) (written in 1938).

9. David Geggus, "Esclaves et gens de couleur libres de la Martinique pendant l'époque révolutionnaire et napoléonienne," *Revue Historique* 1, no. 597 (1996): 105–132; Claude Wanquet, *La France et la première abolition de l'esclavage (1794–1802). Le cas des colonies orientales: Île de France (Maurice) et La Réunion* (Paris: Karthala, 1998); Frédéric Régent, *Esclavage, métissage, liberté. La Révolution française en Guadeloupe (1789–1802)* (Paris: B. Grasset, 2004); Jeremy D. Popkin, *You Are All Free. The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

10. Erick Noël, *Etre Noir en France au XVIIIe Siècle* (Paris: Tallandier, 2006).

11. For a summary, see Jeremy D. Popkin, "Saint-Domingue, Slavery, and the Origins of the French Revolution," in *From Deficit to Deluge: The Origins of the French Revolution*, ed. Thomas E. Kaiser and Dale K. van Kley (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

12. Jean Ehrard, *Lumières et Esclavage. L'esclavage colonial et l'opinion publique en France au XVIIIe siècle* (Brussels: A. Versaille éditeur, 2008). On the

controversy between Ehrard and Louis Sala Molins, who attacked the Enlightenment for its moral corruption when not fighting against slavery, see Andreas Pečar and Damien Tricoire, *Falsche Freunde. War die Aufklärung wirklich die Geburtsstunde der Moderne?* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2015), 105.

13. David Williams, "Condorcet and the Abolition of Slavery in the French Colonies," in *Enlightenment and Emancipation*, ed. Susan Manning and Peter France (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2006).

14. Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights. A History* (New York: Norton & Co, 2008).

15. Ian Davidson, *Voltaire. A Life* (London: Pegasus, 1996), 30–34; Jean Ehrard, *Lumière et Esclavage. L'esclavage colonial et l'opinion publique en France au XVIIIe siècle* (Brussels: André Versailles, 2008).

16. Lawrence C. Jennings, "Abolitionnisme, jeu politique et réforme: France, 1814–1848" in *Abolir l'esclavage. Un réformisme à l'épreuve (France, Portugal, Suisse, XVIIIe-XIXe siècles)*, ed. Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008); Marcel Dorigny, ed., *Les Abolitions de l'esclavage: De L.F. Sonthonax à V. Schoelcher; 1793, 1794, 1848* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1995).

17. Frédéric Régent, "Revolution in France, Revolution in the Caribbean," in *The Routledge Companion to the French Revolution in World History*, eds. Alan Forrest and Matthias Middell (London: Routledge, 2015).

18. Patrick K. O'Brien, "Provincializing the First Industrial Revolution," Working Paper No. 17/06, Department of Economic History, Global Economic History Network, London School of Economics, 2006. It is evident that such calculations cannot be more than rough estimates.

19. Vertus Saint-Louis, *Mer et liberté. Haiti (1492–1794)* (Port-au-Prince: Bibliothèque Nationale de Haïti, 2008).

20. Michel Vovelle, *La Découverte de la politique. Géopolitique de la Révolution française* (Paris: La Découverte, 1993).

21. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).

22. For a diachronic comparison of the various versions, see Jean-François Niort, *Code Noir* (Paris: Dalloz, 2012).

23. David Geggus, "Urban Development in Eighteenth Century Saint Domingue," *Bulletin du Centre d'Histoire des Espaces Atlantiques* 5 (1990), 224–229.

24. Frédéric Régent, Jean-François Niort, and Pierre Serna (eds.), *Les Colonies, la Révolution française, la loi* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires Rennes, 2014).

25. Pierre Boulle, "Elaboration et pratique de la législation sur les noirs en France au cours du XVIIIe siècle," in *Les Colonies*, eds. Frédéric Régent et al.

26. Erick Noël, "Les libres de couleur dans le jeu politique en France en 1789. Origines, implications, devenir," in *Les Colonies*, eds. Régent et al., 41–50.

27. Boulle, *Elaboration*, 37–39.

28. Frédéric Charlin, "L'expérimentation de l'identité législative aux colonies. De la Convention au Directoire," in *Les colonies*, eds. Régent et al., 93–106.

29. Noël, *Être noir*.

30. For this and the following, see the examples given by Erick Noel, *Etre Noir en France*, 67–96.

31. Ibid., 79–81.

32. The idea of territorialization, central to the definition of global processes, is inspired by the New Political Geography: Neil Brenner, "Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies," *Theory and Society* 28 (1999): 39–71. For its application to historical processes before the late twentieth century, see Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, "Global History and the Spatial Turn. From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalisation," *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010): 149–170.

33. Silvia Marzagalli, "The French Atlantic World in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in Nicholas Canny and Philip Morgan (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World 1450–1850* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 235–251.

34. For a discussion of the various types of empire, see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper (eds.), *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) and Peter F. Bang and Dariusz Kołodziejczyk (eds.), *Universal Empire. A Comparative Approach to Imperial Culture and Representation in Eurasian History* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press 2012).

35. Régent, *Revolution in France*, 66–69.

36. Manuel Covo, "L'Assemblée constituante face à l'Exclusif colonial," in *Les colonies*, eds. Régent et al., especially 71.

37. Florence Gauthier, "Le rôle de Julien Raimond dans la formation du nouveau peuple de Saint-Domingue 1789–1793," in *Esclavage, résistances, abolitions*, ed. Marcel Dorigny (Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 1999), 223–233. See also the extensive notes on both personalities by Bernard Gainot and Dominique Rogers in *Dictionnaire des gens de couleur dans la France moderne* (Geneva: Droz, 2011), 100–103 and 108–110.

38. Abbé Grégoire, *Mémoire en faveur de gens de couleur* (Paris: Chez Belin, 1789).

39. Patrick Kessel, *La Nuit du 4 Août 1789* (Paris: Arthaud 1969).
40. On the extensive and surprisingly fast established negotiations of the London planters assembly with the British government and especially the role baron Malouet played in this game, see Friedemann Pestel, *Kosmopoliten wider Willen. Die "monarchiens" als Revolutionsemigranten* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 255–298.
41. Carolyn E. Fick, "The Saint Domingue Slave Revolution and the Unfolding of Independence, 1791–1804," in David Patrick Geggus and Norman Fiering (eds.), *The World of the Haitian Revolution* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 2009).
42. It was different in Martinique and Guadeloupe, where the *petits blancs* supported the mercantilist faction of traders and thus remained loyal to the French monarchy. See Régent, *La Révolution française en Guadeloupe.*
43. Frédéric Régent, "From Individual to Collective Emancipation. War and the Republic in the Caribbean During the French Revolution," in *Republics at War, 1776–1840: Revolutions, Conflicts, and Geopolitics in Europe and the Atlantic World*, eds. Pierre Serna, Antonio de Francesco, and Judith Miller (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013).

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Colonial Enlightenment and the French Revolution: Julien Raymond and Milscent Créole

Jeremy D. Popkin

The Enlightenment principles of liberty and equality, embodied in the French Revolution's "Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen" of 1789, challenged the most basic institutions in France's overseas empire: the institution of slavery and the system of racial discrimination against even legally free people of color that had grown up around it. In France, most of those who spoke out about the need for change in the colonies in order to bring them into conformity with these principles, such as Condorcet, Brissot, Grégoire, and Olympe de Gouges, had no personal familiarity with the realities of colonial life. On the other hand, most of those who knew the colonies were adamant defenders of the racial status quo there, such as Médéric Louis Élie Moreau de Saint-Méry, who justified slavery but was a tireless promoter of every form of Enlightenment culture in the main French colony of Saint-Domingue. Moreau de Saint-Méry was the main force behind the creation of the Cercle des Philadelphes, the Caribbean's first learned society, and he worked hard

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to ensure the success of the local press, the theater, and local medical institutions.[1]

Although Moreau de Saint-Méry was certainly the most prominent example of the phenomenon of colonial or trans-Atlantic Enlightenment in the early 1790s, he was not the only individual with roots in the Caribbean to take part in intellectual debates in France during this period. Two figures who played a prominent role in public life during these years, Julien Raymond, the leading spokesman for the free people of color from Saint-Domingue, and Claude Milscent, known as "Milscent Créole," the one white colonist who became a prominent advocate for racial equality and a fundamental reform of slavery, can be considered representatives of a "colonial Enlightenment" that was willing to question the fundamental bases of plantation society. Raymond and Milscent both spoke out against colonial racial prejudices and even, to a certain extent, against Negro slavery, the central institution of colonial life. In contrast to the metropolitan participants in the revolutionary period's debates about slavery, Raymond and Milscent had not only lived in Saint-Domingue but had both owned plantations and slaves. Their interventions in the period's debates brought an element of first-hand knowledge about such topics as the intersection of gender and race in the colonies and the history of slave uprisings that was notably absent in the writings of white abolitionists. A consideration of their ideas adds new complexity to our picture of the "colonial Enlightenment" and to our understanding of how ideas about race and slavery evolved during the Revolution.

Among the hundreds of colonists from Saint-Domingue who found themselves in France during the revolutionary years, Raymond and Milscent stood out not only because they both criticized fundamental aspects of the colonial racial order but because they became major participants in revolutionary print culture. Many colonists intervened in the period's heated debates about slavery and the colonies, but most of their publications were strictly topical and polemical, dealing with specific events and personalities. Raymond and Milscent were among the few who wrote pamphlets and newspaper articles about colonial issues that attempted to go beyond commentary on the crises of the day and address general issues.

Born in Saint-Domingue's South Province, Julien Raymond, the son of a white father and a mixed-race mother, was educated in France. His family was part of a wealthy clan of free colored people who dominated the parish of Aquin in the South Province. Raymond had already gone to

France in 1784 to represent the interests of that group. In 1786, he presented the French colonial administration with four lengthy memoranda on the situation of free people of color, urging that they be granted greater rights. Discouraged by the lack of response to his proposals, he left the court for several years, but the revolution of 1789 brought him back to Paris to press his cause. Between 1789 and 1795, he wrote numerous pamphlets arguing for the rights of free people of color and refuting the arguments of their white opponents. Imprisoned during the Terror, Raymond played no direct part in the maneuvers that resulted in the National Convention's dramatic decree abolishing slavery in February 1794. After his release from prison, he returned to Saint-Domingue in 1796 as a member of the Third Civil Commission, sent to implement the French Republic's policy of abolition and allied himself with the black general Toussaint Louverture. Raymond died in 1801, just prior to the arrival of the Napoleonic military expedition sent to reimpose white control of the colony. In recent years, the importance of his role in the period's debates has been increasingly recognized, but there has still not been a serious study of his ideas.[2]

Claude Milscent is less well known than Raymond. A white plantation owner from Saint-Domingue, he left the colony early in the Revolution and founded a newspaper in Angers. His articles caught the attention of Brissot, the leading figure in the Paris Society of the Friends of the Blacks, who reprinted several of them in his *Patriote français.* In 1791, Milscent moved to Paris and in 1792 he established a daily newspaper, the *Créole patriote*, whose title advertised his colonial background. For six crucial months in 1792–1793, his newspaper was the officially designated "journal of record" for the Paris Jacobin Club, a surprising fact in view of his earlier association with Brissot, who was by then the target of virulent attacks on the part of the Montagnard faction that had driven him out of the club. Initially an advocate only of a gradualist strategy for the abolition of slavery, Milscent became increasingly outspoken in opposing slavery and racial inequality. Forced to suspend his own newspaper in early 1793, he wrote a series of articles in another revolutionary publication stating explicitly that "there is no intermediate point between slavery and the state of liberty" and asking "should slavery even exist in lands inhabited by the French?"[3] Later in 1793, Milscent managed to restart his own newspaper. Expelled from the Jacobin Club at the insistence of Robespierre, he became a leading target of the pro-slavery lobby. Although he managed to win acquittal

in a first trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal, he was rearrested, convicted on trumped-up charges, and executed in May 1794.[4]

Julien Raymond on Race and Slavery

The decades prior to the French Revolution saw increasing debate about the nature of race and the legitimacy of slavery.[5] In contrast to the discussions of these issues in the Anglo-American world, all participants in the French versions of these controversies spoke in the secularized language of the Enlightenment. The supporters of abolition did not use the Biblical assertion that all humans were equally children of God to make their case, and the defenders of slavery made no reference to the curse of Ham or to the argument that slavery gave the blacks the benefit of exposure to Christianity. Until 1789, the participants in these debates in the metropole also tended to frame them in terms of the relationship between two racial groups with fixed identities: whites, who were characterized by their capacity for reason and who could not legitimately be enslaved, and blacks, whose capacity for reason was a subject of dispute and who might therefore be subject to servitude. Authors who had lived in the colonies, such as Moreau de Saint-Méry, were certainly aware that the reality of French colonial life was more complicated than this. In his encyclopedic *Description . . . de la partie française de l'isle Saint-Domingue*, Moreau de Saint-Méry included an elaborate table of the 128 possible gradations between pure white and pure African "blood."[6] The *Description* was not published until 1797, however, and the issue of the rights of free people of color did not figure in pre-revolutionary debates.

Julien Raymond's most important contribution to these debates was his *Observations sur l'origine et les progrés [sic] du préjugé des colons blancs contre les hommes de couleur*, published in January 1791 with a preface by Brissot.[7] Raymond's pamphlet stood out from the other polemical literature of the early revolutionary years for a number of reasons. In the first place, he separated the issue of race from the issue of slavery. The white colonists, he asserted, "have deceptively confused the issue of the people of color with that of the slaves."[8] By focusing on the issue of the rights of his own group, Raymond reminded readers that there was a part of the colonial population that was neither entirely white nor entirely black, and that was not subject to slavery. At a time when even the most enlightened and supposedly scientific thinkers were increasingly embracing

the notion that skin color reflected innate racial characteristics, Raymond also offered a pioneering argument that racial attitudes were social constructs that could be shaped by legislation. Indeed, Raymond claimed, white prejudice against free people of color in the colonies "is no more than thirty years old." Finally, Raymond blamed this prejudice largely on gender politics. "It is due entirely to the jealousy of white women, and to the impolitic and tyrannical ordinances by which, since 1768, it has been attempted to abase the men of color," he wrote.[9]

To support his argument, Raymond pointed out that, in the early decades of colonization in the Caribbean, white men had shown no particular reluctance about establishing relationships with black women and acknowledging their mixed-race children. Originally, he wrote, these relationships came about because there were virtually no white women in the colonies, but even when more of them immigrated, white men continued to show a preference for black or mixed-race partners. Whereas Moreau de Saint-Méry attributed white men's attraction to black women to the latter's supposedly greater sexual virtuosity, Raymond explained it as a consequence of the power imbalance between whites and blacks: slave concubines were especially attentive to their lovers because "they hoped to gain from them their greatest reward, their liberty."[10] By the middle of the eighteenth century, an increasing number of the male children of these unions were being sent to France to be educated and then returning to the colony. "The talents and polish they had acquired, and their fortune, only made the whites more jealous," Raymond wrote. "They were reproached for their origins, because they could not be reproached for anything else."[11] Raymond anticipated present-day historians such as John Garrigus in describing the cascade of new legal restrictions imposed on free people of color after the end of the Seven Years' War as a change in policy, reflecting the French colonial administration's efforts to encourage an influx of white settlers by assuring them that they would not have to compete for jobs and status with men of African or part-African ancestry.[12] In response to accusations that women of color lived dissolute lives, routinely having children out of wedlock, he pointed out that French laws sought to bar interracial marriages. Raymond was particularly concerned to dispute the claim that most free people of color were *affranchis*, former slaves freed by their masters and therefore morally obliged to defer to their benefactors. "The majority of the class of people of color were born free, of free parents who were legitimately married, and those who were illegitimate had free mothers," he insisted.[13]

Having demonstrated that the restrictions on free people of color were nothing more than the reflection of prejudice, a term that, in the Enlightenment's vocabulary, invariably carried a negative connotation, Raymond concluded by insisting that the abolition of distinctions between whites and free non-whites would benefit both the colony and the metropole. A single, united class of free people would be better able to maintain its domination over the more numerous slaves. Once all free people were put on a basis of full equality, any reason for the maintenance of caste distinctions would disappear. Raymond did not hesitate to predict that white women would then be prepared to disregard the most entrenched of all taboos by marrying men of color. Furthermore, the denial of equality to free people of color violated the basic Enlightenment principles incorporated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen:

> Does the National Assembly have the right to decree, as a constitutional article, that a class of individuals who are free, who own property, who pay taxes, et cetera, should have to obey laws to which neither they nor their representatives have consented, but that have been made by a class of individuals who are their self-proclaimed enemies?[14]

At a moment when the National Assembly was about to take up the issue of the colonies, Raymond provided a powerful theoretical statement against racism, framed in Enlightenment language. Repeated by publicists such as Brissot, his arguments underlay the famous Rewbell amendment of May 15, 1791, which granted equality to free people of color whose parents had been free and legally married, a decree that represented the first breach in the structure of colonial racial hierarchy, and the more sweeping law of April 4, 1792, which granted equal rights to all free people of color.

Powerful as his denunciation of racism was, Raymond carefully and deliberately avoided raising the issue of slavery. Some of his white metropolitan allies, including Brissot and Grégoire, made no secret of the fact that they saw the granting of rights to free people of color as a first step in a process that would eventually lead to the emancipation of the slaves, but Raymond was more cautious. Aware of the potential embarrassment that his ownership of slaves could cause him, he sold off his own plantation in 1790, but, as he reminded his free colored correspondents in Saint-Domingue in 1792, "one could hardly imagine that I wanted to suddenly ruin my whole family, which owns among themselves between seven and

eight millions in property in Saint-Domingue."[15] In response to free men of color in the colony who had allied themselves with wealthy white royalist planters, Raymond argued that they had nothing to fear from republican ideas:

> But, they will say to you, a purely democratic government cannot be appropriate for a country where there are slaves? Why not? Athens had slaves, and no government was ever more democratic than theirs. For my part, I think, on the contrary, that a democratic government is more suited to keep control over the slaves, since all the free citizens, being obliged to come together often and in large numbers for their common interest, this movement will result in better control, since there is more action among all the individuals who have an interest in conserving their properties, and the slave who constantly sees this surveillance and its united forces, will not dare to do anything.[16]

Raymond spelled out his own views on the slavery issue most elaborately in another pamphlet, *Réflexions sur les véritables causes des troubles et des désastres de nos colonies*, published at the beginning of 1793, more than a year after the start of the great slave insurrection that had begun in Saint-Domingue in August 1791. Ending the insurrection, Raymond admitted, would require making concessions to the slaves. "One should allow them to participate in this revolution," he wrote, referring to the French movement that had, by this time, granted full rights to all free people of color by the law of April 4, 1792. The slaves should be given a stake in the movement, "not in its whole extent, but they should be given an interest, by significantly improving their situation, without destroying our commerce, or causing losses to private fortunes."[17] Like most of the white reformers with whom he had become closely associated, Raymond argued that the slaves needed to be thoroughly "regenerated" before they were fit for real freedom. His pamphlet was notably devoid of the sentimental language about the slaves' sufferings that characterized his white allies' effusions. Instead, Raymond laid out a tough-minded scheme under which the slaves would have to earn their freedom through their individual efforts, and prove themselves fit for inclusion in a society based on the principle of rational individualism.

In his *Réflexions*, Raymond proposed an elaborate "Proclamation to be made to the slaves in revolt in the French colonies" that showed just how little sense he had of the new realities created in Saint-Domingue by the slave insurrection. He blamed the blacks for the damage their revolt had caused and told them that their first obligation was to end their rebellion: "Submit

yourselves promptly, misled men, and await in respectful silence the laws that will regenerate you." If they wanted to enjoy the benefits revolutionary France was prepared to bestow on them, they needed to demonstrate their respect for the rights of property, acquire "the love and the habit of work," and have "morals" and "social virtues." If they behaved, they would be given an opportunity to earn "the first form of property that you need to acquire, that of your own person." Men under the age of 40 would be allowed to buy their freedom for 3,000 *livres*, women would only have to pay 2,600 *livres*, but slaves who had been taught special skills would have to pay a higher price of 4,000 *livres* to compensate their masters for the cost of their training.[18] Unlike the schemes for gradual emancipation put forward by metropolitan reformers such as Condorcet, Raymond's plan required each slave to pay for his or her freedom, rather than setting a specified number of years of service after which liberty would be granted automatically. Raymond's plan was also unique because of the sharp contrast it drew between the free population of color, whose legal rights had been assured by the law of April 4, 1792, and the slaves. He warned the latter not to think that they were entitled to the same treatment as the former: "It would be useless and unjust for you to make an argument based on the rights that the nation has restored to the men of color and free blacks in order to immediately claim the liberty that you should some day attain."[19] Ignoring the armed movement that the free men of color had formed to demand their own rights, he contrasted the violent slave uprising unfavorably with the appeals to "humanity" that the free men of color had made.

Whereas white reformers' emancipation programs usually emphasized only the necessity for the supposedly lazy blacks to acquire regular work habits, Raymond had a considerably broader notion of "regeneration." Before they could enjoy full freedom, the former slaves would have to learn the appropriate "conventions and customs." Among other things, he stressed that the freed blacks would have to become good consumers. "You will thus recognize that, in order to put yourself on the same level as free people, you need to work, once you have your freedom, in order to obtain for yourselves all the luxuries and conveniences that distinguish the free person from the slave." He was particularly concerned about sexual conduct, warning black men against seducing women and practicing polygamy and urging them to see that their women practiced modesty in their dress. If women

> continue to go about in public without being decently covered, or if they
> dress in a way that inflames desires, then, no doubt, they will be attacked and

they will succumb; an unrestrained libertinage will prevail, and the maladies that it brings in its train will assail and destroy your children even in their mother's womb.[20]

Raymond thus extended the misogyny already evident in his condemnation of white women for creating racial prejudices to the blacks.

Whereas Raymond's white allies in the fight for equality for free people of color had often imagined that the achievement of this goal would lead directly to the abolition of slavery and that there would be a natural alliance among all those with any trace of African ancestry, Raymond's program shows that he had no real moral sympathy with the black slaves. There is a certain irony in the fact that Raymond, himself the beneficiary of the revolutionary edict of April 4, 1792 that gave free people of color full equality with whites on the basis of an Enlightenment-inspired notion of universal rights, should have been so reluctant to see those rights extended to other people of African ancestry. Nevertheless, Raymond's treatment of the blacks in Saint-Domingue was well within the range of Enlightenment attitudes toward "savage" peoples and his rejection of the idea of fixed and innate racial characteristics put him on the progressive side of the period's debates.

CLAUDE MILSCENT: FROM SLAVE OWNER TO ABOLITIONIST

Whereas Raymond appeared, rightly or wrongly, as the principal spokesman for the group of free people of color in France, Claude Milscent, "le Créole patriote," was a more isolated figure. At the outset of the Revolution, he was a plantation owner in Saint-Domingue's North Province, where he had commanded militia units charged with hunting down runaway slaves, and even a deputy to the provincial assembly there. By the time he founded his Paris newspaper, initially titled *La Revue du Patriote*, at the start of June 1792, his views had clearly changed. Although he campaigned explicitly only for the application of the recently passed law of April 4, 1792, granting rights to the free people of color, he also asked whether "one wants to extend the gaze of justice and humanity further, to these slaves of whom one only speaks as if they were unworthy even of the attention of nature?"[21] Milscent continued to publish his paper, renamed the *Créole patriote* on June 23, 1792, until February 21, 1793, when he announced that he could no longer keep up with the work; according

to his own subsequent account, he had run out of money.[22] For several months, he became a major contributor to another paper, the *Bulletin des amis de la vérité*. He restarted the *Créole patriote* by the end of July 1793 and continued it into the early months of 1794.

Although Milscent has remained an obscure figure, his newspaper was one of the most ambitious journalistic enterprises in the capital. He undertook to compete with the Revolution's well-established "journal of record," the *Moniteur universel*, a creation of the veteran Enlightenment publisher Charles-Joseph Panckoucke. Panckoucke's journal accommodated a complete transcript of each Convention session because it covered four folio-sized pages, whereas the other Paris journals used quarto-sized pages half as large as those of the *Moniteur*. The *Créole patriote* used the smaller quarto format, but Milscent managed to compete with the *Moniteur* because he published two four-page issues of his paper every day, one devoted primarily to coverage of the Convention and the other including accounts of the debates at the Jacobin club and the Paris Commune, the municipal assembly.

Milscent's occupation required him, more than Raymond, to evaluate the erratic stream of news reports arriving from Saint-Domingue. He claimed that his background made him particularly well equipped to sort out fact from fiction on this subject. Unfortunately, his credibility was repeatedly undermined by his tendency to assume that any reports that appeared to favor the positions of the pro-slavery colonists were necessarily false. Thus, when the first news of the August 1791 slave uprising reached France at the end of October 1791, Milscent cast doubt on the seriousness of the affair, announcing that it could not amount to anything more than an effort by a small number of slaves to escape to the woods.[23] In August 1793, when reports of the burning of Cap Français in June 1793 arrived in Paris, he once again denounced them as fabrications of the colonists, and even succeeded in persuading the Jacobins to refuse to listen to a letter describing the event.[24] The exigencies of daily journalism gave Milscent less chance than Raymond to set out his ideas in any systematic fashion. On the other hand, his involvement with the rapidly changing events in Saint-Domingue meant that his ideas evolved more quickly than those of Raymond. Whereas Raymond never really anticipated the full emancipation of the slaves before it occurred, Milscent clearly embraced this possibility by early 1793.

The fullest statements that Milscent published of his views on race and slavery were a series of editorial articles that appeared in the *Créole patriote* in February 1793, in the weeks before he suddenly suspended its publication, and then in the *Bulletin des Amis de la Vérité*. Milscent turned to the subject because the outbreak of war between France and rival colonial powers Britain and Spain at the beginning of February 1793 directed attention to the Caribbean and particularly to Saint-Domingue. In addition, Milscent wanted to support the efforts of the two civil commissioners Léger-Félicité Sonthonax and Étienne Polverel, allies of Brissot who had been sent to Saint-Domingue in 1792 to implement the law of April 4, 1792 and to defeat the slave rebellion. Milscent and Raymond had both participated in meetings with Sonthonax and Polverel in the spring of 1792, before they left on their mission, and had advised them on the situation they would find when they arrived. By the beginning of February 1793, Milscent knew that Sonthonax had taken strong measures against intransigent white colonists in the colony's main city of Cap Français, expelling a number of them to France, and that he had forged an alliance with the colony's free men of color. Sonthonax's successes made Milscent optimistic. "One can say that everything finally augurs the return of peace and order in Saint-Domingue, if the National Convention backs the estimable civil commissioners who are there now," he wrote in the first of his series of articles on the colonies.[25]

At the beginning of his series of editorials, Milscent identified himself strongly with Raymond, even lamenting that he had not been chosen as one of the civil commissioners. "Raymond, knowing the special character of the Negro, and everything that could contribute to the prosperity and tranquillity of the colony, would have rendered important services," he wrote.[26] Milscent was more prepared than Raymond to envisage the immediate emancipation of the slaves, however; indeed, as he assessed the military situation in Saint-Domingue, he concluded that they had already achieved a de facto freedom that had to be recognized. "Can one hope now to make the slaves return to their respective plantations? The outbreak of the war seems to have decided this question in the negative," he announced.[27] The strongest piece of evidence Milscent presented to justify his conclusion was a letter written in the name of three of the leaders of the black uprising, the self-proclaimed generals Jean-François and Biassou, and a third officer, Belair, that had been published in Paris by one of the white colonists deported by Sonthonax

and that Milscent reprinted in his paper. Scholars continue to dispute the authenticity of this document, but Milscent took it as genuine. After reading its demands for an end to slavery and racial privilege, he told his readers,

> one can decide whether it is possible to defeat 94,000 men, oh! true sans-culottes if there ever were any, who think and speak like this. The facts justify what the letter says; it will serve as a new proof of the nature of the black race, which vanity, or rather cupidity, has been pleased to represent as deprived of the faculty of thinking and of feeling.[28]

The exact nature of Milscent's ideas on the subject of slavery at this point are not entirely clear, since his articles veer back and forth from the question of the rights of free men of color to the issue of slavery, with frequent detours to discuss the decisions made about the colonies earlier in the Revolution and the major political figures involved in them. In addition, several of his articles resort to the venerable Enlightenment device of philosophical dialogues between a fictional "savage from the Appalachians" and various interlocutors, making it difficult to determine whether Milscent was truly speaking in his own name. Nevertheless, the most outspoken of these articles certainly made an unequivocal case for the immediate abolition of slavery. In the last article he published before suspending his paper, Milscent had his philosophical Indian ask a white planter,

> As far as the colonists' claim to own their slaves as property, who can justify it? What man has the right to dispose of the liberty of another? Only the law can determine the situations in which one can lose it, and the law knows no situation that makes even the most criminal of men the property of another . . . Nothing can justify an injustice or excuse tyranny, no more with respect to the Negro slaves than with respect to white serfs.[29]

Milscent's language clearly echoed the theoretical dismissal of slavery in Rousseau's *Social Contract*, but whereas Rousseau, as critics have noted, made no specific linkage between his general principles and the realities of plantation slavery, Milscent was quite specifically discussing the latter.

Having declared slavery inadmissible in principle, Milscent went on in this article to refute the argument that its maintenance remained a practical necessity. If France had given the blacks their freedom, Milscent

claimed, "she would now have three hundred thousand soldiers in the islands, true sans-culottes, to send against all the maritime powers." This result could have been achieved, he contended, if the revolutionary government had been willing to compensate the slaveowners. The idea that slaveowners deserved any compensation for having violated the natural rights of their slaves outraged most of the period's abolitionists, but Milscent was willing to contemplate it as a way of facilitating the end of the institution.

On the other hand, Milscent had little patience for Raymond's suggestion that the blacks end their insurrection and return to work while the revolutionary government dealt with the issue. If the insurgent slaves were told to "put down your arms and return to your masters," he wrote, the blacks would be justified in responding,

> Our aim is to reassert our rights, which have been usurped but not extinguished. But you, in whose name do you give us orders that contradict the same law that justifies your authority? . . . Here are the constitutional decrees: they tell us that the law authorizes us to break our chains; if they didn't say so, nature would tell us, would cry out from the depth of our hearts that every man has the right to resist oppression with all the resources he has. . . . Does what is just for you cease to be so for us?[30]

The articles Milscent published in the *Bulletin des amis de la vérité* after he stopped putting out his own paper were even more outspoken. It was not possible, he told readers, for France to "defend two such contradictory constitutions, and fight ceaselessly on the one hand against slavery and on the other to keep it." He admitted that he had previously favored gradual emancipation, but he now argued that the slave uprising had made any further delay impossible. Whereas Raymond had shown a marked lack of sympathy for women, regardless of their color, Milscent argued that one of the white colonists' main motives for defending their domination over the blacks was their desire to preserve a system that "left their daughters and their wives at our unchallenged disposition, and gave us the opportunity to form harems that we would have to give up if slavery was ended."[31]
When the Convention finally acted in February 1794 – somewhat surprisingly, since the Committee of Public Safety had in the meantime forged close links with the pro-slavery lobby and had made the accusation that the Girondins had "destroyed the colonies" through their anti-slavery rhetoric[32] – Julien Raymond was in prison and unable to comment

publicly. Milscent, on the other hand, celebrated the new decree. "All my dilemmas about the events in Saint-Domingue, all the speculations I have made about them, on the sole basis of my knowledge of local conditions, have been justified," he wrote triumphantly. Thanks to the arming of the former slaves, the colonies were now safe from a possible British takeover. He dismissed the colonists' warnings that the blacks would now refuse to work on the plantations, and concluded by boasting of his own disinterestedness in supporting their cause: "I cannot be suspect in this regard, since my position is completely contrary to the interests that are the dearest to me, after those of the country, and contrary to my family's welfare. Such are the dispositions of a true republican."[33] His highlighting of his personal loss was a reminder of his very specific situation as a representative of a colonial version of the Enlightenment.

CONCLUSION

The cases of Julien Raymond and Claude Milscent illustrate the special situation of writers with roots in the slave colonies at the moment when the French Revolution posed the challenge of putting the Enlightenment's principles of natural right into practice. Some participants in the Enlightenment, such as Thomas Jefferson and Moreau de Saint-Méry, argued that only whites were genuinely capable of freedom and of exercising the political responsibilities that derived from it. Raymond and Milscent instead insisted that racial equality and even the abolition of slavery were compatible with the maintenance of a trans-Atlantic empire – neither one of them envisaged the abandonment of the colonies – and even with the continuation of the plantation system. Raymond's critique of racism was an important answer to the pseudo-scientific biological determinism that was steadily gaining ground at the end of the eighteenth century and that would come to dominate the Western world throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth centuries. His observation about the power of legislation to create racial prejudices anticipated by more than 150 years the American historian C. Vann Woodward's analysis of the historically contingent nature of the Jim Crow laws in the post-Civil War American South, one of the turning points in the struggle for civil rights in the United States.[34] Raymond's discussion of the gender dimension of racial prejudice, although tinged by a certain misogyny, also raised issues to which European abolitionists were largely blind, and anticipated theoretical discussions of a much later era.

Raymond's reluctance to embrace slave emancipation and full equality in the colonies certainly reflected his continuing ties to plantation society. Even after he had sold his own slaves, he remained connected to the milieu from which he had come, that of the wealthy free colored elite in Saint-Domingue, and his conduct after he returned to the colony in 1796 shows that he still hoped the upheavals there would turn to the advantage of that group. Claude Milscent, on the other hand, had cut his ties with the colonial world by early 1793 and accepted the idea that the principles of natural rights truly included people of all colors. Even if he occasionally reverted to the idea that slaves should be required to compensate their owners before being granted their freedom, the main thrust of his numerous articles in early 1793 was to insist that since "the men of color and the Negroes" were the majority in the colonies, their rights had to be recognized.[35]

The cases of Raymond and Milscent illustrate the complexities of the relationship between the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the realities of colonial society. Neither man fits comfortably in the major frameworks that have shaped scholarship on the subject in recent years. Critics of racial prejudice and, in their different ways, of slavery, Raymond and Milscent were not opponents of colonialism: both saw the intervention of the European metropole in Saint-Domingue as essential to bring about reforms in the racial status quo. Indeed, in the context of Saint-Domingue, the argument for colonial autonomy in the years prior to Toussaint Louverture's rise to power was one made by the white colonists who feared that reforming royal ministers prior to 1789 and revolutionary legislators in subsequent years would undermine their position. On the other hand, however, Raymond and Milscent cannot be accused either of ignoring the realities of slavery and racism in the colonies or of advocating an abstract universalism that masked a refusal to recognize the humanity of the blacks. They remind us that starry-eyed idealists such as Condorcet and diehard defenders of slavery and racial prejudice such as Moreau de Saint-Méry were not the only representatives of what we can term the colonial Enlightenment.

Notes

1. James McClellan, *Colonialism and Science: Saint-Domingue in the Old Regime* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992) 179–256.
2. John Garrigus, "Opportunist or Patriot? Julien Raimond (1744–1801) and the Haitian Revolution," *Slavery and Abolition* 28, no. 1 (2007): 1–21;

Florence Gauthier, *L'Aristocratie de l'épiderme. Le combat de la Société des citoyens de couleur 1789–1791* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2007); Jeremy D. Popkin, *You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

3. *Bulletin des amis de la vérité* (Paris: Imprimerie du Cercle social, March 2, 1793).

4. Alexandra Tolin Schultz, "The *Créole patriote*: The Journalism of Claude Milscent," *Atlantic Studies: Global Currents* 11, no. 2 (2014): 175–194; Yves Bénot, "L'Affaire Milscent (1794)," *Dix-Huitième Siècle* 21 (1989): 311–327; Jean-Daniel Piquet, *L'Émancipation des Noirs dans la Révolution française (1789–1795)* (Paris: Karthala, 1992).

5. Madeleine Dobie, *Trading Places: Colonization and Slavery in Eighteenth-Century French Culture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Jean Ehrard, *Lumières et esclavage. L'esclavage colonial et l'opinion publique en France au XVIIIe siècle* (Brussels: André Versaille, 2008); Laurent Estève, *Montesquieu, Rousseau, Diderot: Du genre humain au bois d'ébène. Les silences du droit naturel* (Paris: UNESCO, 2002).

6. Doris Garraway, *The Libertine Colony: Creolization in the Early French Caribbean* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 247–292.

7. Julien Raymond, *Observations sur l'origine et les progrés [sic] du préjugé des colons blancs contre les hommes de couleur; sur les inconvéniens de le perpétuer; la nécessité, la facilité de le détruire; sur le projet du Comité colonial, etc. Par M. Raymond, Homme de couleur de Saint-Domingue* (Paris: Belin, Desenne, Bailly, and Bureau du Patriote François, 1791).

8. ibid., 1.

9. ibid., 13.

10. ibid., 2.

11. ibid., 6.

12. John D. Garrigus, *Before Haiti: Race and Citizenship in French Saint-Domingue* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).

13. Raymond, *Observations*, 13.

14. ibid., 22–23.

15. Id., *Lettres de J. Raimond, à ses frères les hommes de couleur. Et comparaison des originaux de sa correspondance, avec les extraits perfides qu'en ont fait MM. Page et Brulley, dans un libelle intitulé: Développement des causes, des troubles, et des désastres des Colonies françaises* (Paris: Cercle social, 1793a), 66 (letter of April 15, 1792).

16. ibid., 74 (letter of May 30, 1792).

17. Id., *Réflexions sur les véritables causes des troubles et des désastres de nos colonies, notamment sur ceux de Saint-Domingue; avec les moyens à employer pour préserver cette colonie d'une ruine totale; adressés à la Convention nationale; par Julien Raymond, colon de Saint-Domingue* (Paris, 1793b), 5.

18. ibid., 20, 21, 24.
19. ibid., 23.
20. ibid., 20, 28.
21. *Revue du Patriote,* (Paris: Imprimerie de Milscent, June 19, 1792).
22. *Créole patriote* (1792–1794) (Paris: Imprimerie du Créole patriote, 11 pluviôse II).
23. Claude Milscent, *Sur les Troubles de Saint-Domingue* (Paris: Imprimerie du Patriote français, 1791), 4.
24. *Créole patriote* (1792–1794) (Paris: Imprimerie du Patriote français, August 29, 1793; September 24, 1793).
25. ibid., no. 276, February 6, 1793.
26. ibid., no. 278, February 8, 1793.
27. ibid., no. 280, February 28, 1793.
28. ibid., no. 282, February 9, 1793.
29. ibid., no. 301, February 19, 1793.
30. ibid., no. 301, February 19, 1793.
31. *Bulletin des amis*, February 23, March 2 and 17, 1793.
32. Popkin, *You Are All Free*.
33. *Créole patriote*, 28 plu. II.
34. C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955).
35. *Bulletin des amis*, March 5 and 13, 1793.

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Black Athena in Haiti: Universal History, Colonization, and the African Origins of Civilization in Postrevolutionary Haitian Writing

Doris L. Garraway

In critiques of the Enlightenment that have proliferated in postcolonial studies in recent decades, few ideas have been more consistently maligned than that of "universal history," whether understood as the synthesis of secular histories or ethnographies of known peoples around the globe, or as the stadial, philosophical narrative of (Western) humanity's progressive journey, by virtue of its exercise of reason, from a stage of primitivism to one of civilization. For perhaps no other concept conveys better the tendency on the part of Enlightenment-era thinkers to engage in the practice of "worlding," in Gayatri Spivak's terms – that is, to constitute modern, rationalist Europe as a universal sovereign and subject by positing its particular standards of value as the unique and totalizing lens through which to assign meaning and worth to all of the world's peoples, life forms, and histories.[1]

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Initiated by works such as Bossuet's providentialist but methodologically ambitious *Histoire universelle* of 1681, eighteenth-century universal history took many forms, but its ideological overtones came into sharp focus when Enlightenment narratives of human progress and perfectibility were infused with the new vocabulary of "civilization." This term was coined by Victor Riquetti de Mirabeau in mid-century and came to signify not only certain mores, socio-political practices, forms of governmentality, and scientific advances in Europe, but also a sacred ideal by which Europe distinguished itself from its colonies.[2] What is more, in opposition to Rousseau's famous critique of society as the source of all moral and social inequality, Enlightenment thinkers from Turgot to Condorcet and Adam Smith celebrated the increasingly commercialized, urbane, secular humanist, and in many cases politically liberal European form of society as the highest stage of civilization, its stadial evolution as the universal model for the development of human societies elsewhere.[3] In this sense, universal history became a way both to promote Western European achievements, and to explain the diversity of actually existing human societies as examples of earlier stages of development that the West had surpassed.

If such arguments for the superiority of Western civilization easily shaded into justifications for the extension and maintenance of European domination over "less civilized" peoples throughout the world,[4] nowhere were Europe's dreams of imperial domination more literally expressed, its progressivist teleologies more strident, and its historical subjectivity more exclusionary than in the system of the genre's best known practitioner, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel's version of universal history – what he defined as "philosophic history" in the Introduction to the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*[5] – expressed nothing less than the realization of the sovereignty of the Idea, or Reason, as "the True, *the Eternal*, the absolutely *powerful* essence," of the universe, which is revealed through the progressive unfolding of the secular, Western European state, itself the actualization of freedom. Yet, insofar as the subject of history was no longer only man, but also "Spirit," since Hegel assimilated "the substance of Reason" with the "Infinite Energy" of both material reality and the immaterial powers of cognition and spirituality, world history became the perfectly rational and legitimate manifestation of divine providence.[6] It is no wonder that this avowed theodicy admitted of winners and losers, as Hegel famously positioned Europe (or more precisely, the "German world") as achieving the highest expression of the idea of freedom in history, while relegating most of the rest of the known world

to the realm of pre-history.[7] As Susan Buck-Morss contends, Hegel justi-fied colonialism itself as necessary to the dialectical unfolding of reason in the world, and inscribed the West as "the historical avant-garde for all humanity progressing necessarily toward a common end."[8]

Postcolonial theory commonly reads the austere self-confidence of Hegelian universal history as an expression of the ideology of a European right to mastery over non-European peoples and resources. In response, postcolonial scholars have sought either to reject the idea of universal history and even universalism itself insofar as it invariably suppresses differ-ence and legitimates domination, or to devise a more critical universal or "world" history in the interests of rendering visible the violent dissonances marking the progress of the human species, thus telling an alternative story supportive of a new politics of emancipation. Drawing on the philosophy of Theodor Adorno and the earlier work of Dipesh Chakrabarty, for example, Antonio y Vásquez-Arroyo theorizes a universal history capable of lending voice to the suffering of those sacrificed to the principle of identity inscribed in the idea of progress, reconceiving progress as "simply the prevention and avoidance of total catastrophe" in a world on the verge of ecological destruction.[9] Ranajit Guha, on the other hand, envisions for India a form of historicality "rescued from its containment in 'World History,'" arguing against the invariable exclusions, reductions, and idealism inherent in the Hegelian narrative of the world as a totality.[10]

Yet, whereas these challenges have been launched in hindsight by postcolonial commentators on (post)Enlightenment thinkers, the ques-tion arises as to the extent to which an alternative mode of universal history was voiced at the very moment of its contemporary European articulation, precisely by those subalterns who were its primary casualties. Looking in particular at the northern kingdom of Haiti, under the rule of Henry Christophe from 1806 to 1820, I will outline briefly the intellectual historical significance of the regime's polemical writings as instances of a counter-narrative of European universal or "world" history. As I will argue, this counter-narrative critiqued pro-slavery ideologies prevalent in early nineteenth-century anti-Haitian propaganda as well as the more stridently biological or polygeneticist strains of European anthropological theory that emerged in the early nineteenth century.[11] At the same time, it examined both the original centrality of blacks (as in, "*nègres*") and African-descended peoples to the history of universal civilization and progress, and their progressive exclusion, by European thinkers and colo-nial projects, from that history.

The motivations for this analysis are twofold. In addition to developing a new interpretation of the work of the most prolific writer publishing under Christophe – Jean-Louis Vastey, better known as Baron de Vastey[12] – I also wish to foreground the particular ideological significance of his arguments for Haiti given its geopolitical position as what I am calling an unrecognized abolitionist state – that is, a state owing its independence to a simultaneous rejection of both colonialism and slavery. Emerging at a time when the first scientific narratives of European racial superiority were beginning to congeal, and voiced as the triumph of civilization over barbarism, liberty over slavery, and sovereignty over colonial subjection – the Haitian Revolution itself epitomized the very criterion of world historical self-consciousness prescribed by Hegel in his account of who should be included in world history: "The Spirits of those nations which [have] become conscious of their inherent principle, and have become aware of what they are and what their actions signify, are its object."[13] Yet, Haiti would remain excluded and unrecognized by European nations for decades, due both to the fundamental challenge its existence as a black abolitionist state posed to the European narrative of modernity, and to the manner in which its historical self-consciousness subverted that of Europe. For what Haiti projected on the world stage through the discourse of revolutionary actors and writers from Toussaint Louverture and Jean-Jacques Dessalines to Henry Christophe, Juste Chanlatte, and Baron de Vastey, was a radically different vision of world history, which foregrounded blacks as having both suffered the consequences of the European will to mastery and acted as agents of progress and civilization, past and present. Critical to this articulation, in the work of Vastey, was the assertion of the role of ancient Egypt as the origin of world civilization.[14]

In tracing this narrative, I seek not to present writers from the northern Haitian state as either theoretically pure, infallible, or even fully systematic in their revision of Western perspectives on world history. While French theorists such as Voltaire, Condorcet, Raynal, and later Guizot wrote elaborate and minutely organized tomes of philosophic, or "world" history, the Haitian perspective is highly fragmented and must be teased out of shorter, topical works on questions of contemporary political or diplomatic importance for the Haitian state, whose primary objective was not to present a new synthetic narrative of the global past. What is more, Vastey and the Haitian monarchy shared many of the presuppositions of various European theorists of universal history, including the notion of a singular "universal" civilization defined by shared cultural values and opposed to

"savagery," and most strikingly, a favorable stance towards certain forms of colonialism similar to those espoused by Raynal or Condorcet. The difference is that Vastey invoked the value of civilization to promote not a racialized hegemony or civilizational supremacy, but rather ideals of radical racial equality, the universal abolition of slavery, and the righteousness of the Haitian Revolution in pursuit of those ends. In addition to redeeming the African race from the infamy of racial slavery by reinserting Africa into a narrative of progress, Vastey ultimately sought to persuade readers of the Haitian right to formal membership in the community of nations that hitherto constituted the exclusive subjects of universal history and that increasingly identified themselves in terms of civilization. For this a new historical narrative was needed, one that both appropriated and moved beyond the positions of abolitionists, sympathetic Enlightenment *philosophes*, and early defenders of racial equality such as the venerable Abbé Grégoire.

As we shall see, in gesturing towards this narrative of universal history, Vastey brokered a compromise with Europe, on Haiti's terms: while Europe retained the right to colonize, it was only in the humanist sense of spreading arts, sciences, and civilization so that its fruits could be enjoyed by all nations. As for Haitians, Vastey justified the Haitian Revolution as the honorable reclamation of not only their human and political rights, but also of their rightful place in civilization. In Vastey's representation of Haiti as a world historical actor, Haiti is the agent of divine retribution, and its revolution is an act of sacred violence against the forces of slavery, which have derailed the progress of universal civilization and Enlightenment, corrupted Europe, and obstructed the sacred path of history. In this sense, the ideology of the Northern state resonates with the more Romantic, metaphysical overtones of Hegel's world history. The implication is that only by recognizing Haiti and devoting its energies to promoting civilization and Enlightenment can Europe redeem itself morally and spiritually.

Early Nineteenth-Century Debates About Haiti, Race, and Civilization

Focusing on Vastey's most important theoretical works – *Le système colonial dévoilé* (Cap-Henry 1814) and *Réflexions sur une lettre de M. Mazères, ex-Colon français, adressée à M.J.C.L. Sismonde de Sismondi, sur les Noirs et les Blancs, la civilisation de l'Afrique, le Royaume d'Hayti, etc.* (Cap-

Henry, March 1816) – I will synthesize what I see as the main elements of the author's diffuse historical argument, focusing in particular on his claims about African civilization in the ancient world. Baron de Vastey was the most prolific voice of post-revolutionary Haiti and one of the earliest African-descended writers in the Francophone world.[15] Between 1807 and 1819, he became the leading ideologue and apologist for Christophe's kingdom, publishing at the presses of Cap-Henry and Sans-Souci numerous polemical works and pamphlets, most of which were circulated and sold abroad.

Vastey's oeuvre speaks to the critical importance of publishing for a state that was almost entirely isolated in the Atlantic system. His best-known publications were state-sponsored efforts to counter threats of a second French expedition to re-conquer Haiti following the fall of Napoleon and the Bourbon restoration. Although the May 1814 Treaty of Paris contained an unprecedented clause abolishing the international slave trade, a special dispensation allowed France to carry on the trade for another five years. Less than six months later, King Louis XVIII author-ized a covert mission to Haiti, organized by the Minister of Navy and the Colonies Pierre-Victor Malouet and led by Dauxion Lavaysse in the interest of negotiating the restoration of French colonial rule in Saint-Domingue. Documents from this expedition demonstrated that the French reserved the right to re-take Haiti by force if not by informal diplomacy, and they sought to rely on the slave trade to repopulate the colony in the event that they were forced to carry out a war of extermina-tion against former slaves.[16] In response, Christophe's secretaries pub-lished several works intended to publicize, deride, and denounce French designs, among which Vastey's *Le système colonial dévoilé* (1814).

Yet, Haitian writers didn't only produce material in reaction to the neocolonial machinations of the French state: they also actively contrib-uted to debates about Haiti and slavery that were playing out in the French and transatlantic public spheres. French machinations in favor of the trade provoked the outrage of various philanthropists and philoso-phers, including those typically not concerned with questions of slavery and colonization. Hence the contribution of Swiss liberal philosopher and historian Sismonde de Sismondi, whose 1814 tract, *De l'intérêt de la France à l'égard de la traite des nègres*, advanced a series of economic, military, and rational arguments against a French war of extermination in Saint-Domingue. Sismondi's work provoked the ire of the planter lobby, leading him to publish the "Nouvelles réflexions sur la traite des nègres" in

answer to his critics.[17] Here, Sismondi argued for the racial equality of blacks and whites against pro-slavery claims about the supposed lack of civilization among blacks. This text, far from satisfying his critics, only further incited them, triggering a rebuttal by F. Mazères, a former planter from Saint-Domingue who had already published in 1814 a work endorsing a plan for the reconquest of the colony entitled *De l'utilité des colonies, des causes intérieures de la perte de Saint-Domingue, et des moyens d'en recouvrer la possession* (Paris: Renard, 1814). Mazères' response to Sismondi, published as *Lettres à Sismonde de Sismondi sur les nègres, la civilisation de l'Afrique, Christophe et le comte de Limonade* (Paris: Renard, 1815), is notable for its intellectual pretense and its explicit appeals to Enlightenment authorities such as Montesquieu, Fontenelle, and Voltaire, as well as various travel writers. The work is also notable for making the geopolitically significant assertion that black peoples (*les nègres*) were essentially uncivilized, a claim that would be vigorously rebutted in Vastey's monumental *Réflexions sur une Lettre de Mazères... sur les Noirs et les Blancs,* published in 1816. Striking the tone of a reasonable philosopher himself, Mazères insists that blacks (by which he means sub-Saharan peoples) comprise a distinct and inferior race that is naturally disposed to servitude. For Mazères, as for other "enlightened" pro-slavery authors such as Pierre-Victor Malouet and Palisot de Beauvois, the evidence for black inferiority is to be found in the history of slavery and barbarism in Africa, which pre-dates the European slave trade. Yet for Mazères, Africa is not only savage, it is essentially resistant to civilization.[18] Haiti offers the ultimate illustration of black savagery, owing both to its revolutionary violence, and to the innate ignorance and shameless mimicry of the former slaves. Mazères' argument for the justice of slavery is premised on both a belief in racial inequality and a passionate denial of the legitimacy of Haitian independence and the existence of civilization there, contra the evidence of Haitian writers. Deriding Christophe's publications as purely mimetic fabrications, Mazères treats the king himself as a mere play actor betraying a natural penchant for despotism: "a veritable king of melodrama, drinking naively on his throne of blood to the health of his brother the king of England, and governing by gunshots."[19]

By the time Vastey was writing, the term "civilization" had begun to shift from denoting a set of social and cultural characteristics (for example norms of civility and politesse, literacy, advances in arts and sciences, self-government, the rule of law, and property protections), to functioning as a litmus test for formal inclusion in the international society of almost

exclusively European states, which was itself beginning to congeal around a system of international law.[20] Haitian writers thus sought not only to assert their claims on civilization and defend their revolution in terms of civilization, but to explore the history of white barbarism in order to attenuate the notion that, in the words of Mazères, "Africa has always been submerged in barbarism and … ignorance is inherent to the nature of its inhabitants." They did so in part by pointing out certain nations of whites, located largely in peripheral regions of Eastern Europe, that they judged to be more barbaric. As Vastey writes in the *Système colonial dévoilé*,

> Take a look at the inhabitants of Laponia, New Zemble, Kamchatka, and Greenland, these ichtyophagous people, vegetating in a beastly state, haphazardly, without morals and without laws; have you ever seen anything so savage? … Why don't you establish the slave trade to abduct these barbarians charitably, as you have done for the blacks of Africa?[21]

This ironic invitation to the implied European reader to enslave white "savages" establishes a comparison between contemporaneous peoples in Africa and Europe who are allegedly without either morality or the rule of law in order to problematize the notion that blacks are more savage than whites. This line of argument is expanded in the *Réflexions sur une Lettre de Mazère… sur les Noirs et les Blancs*. In a spin on the anachronistic comparative ethnology of the Enlightenment, Vastey maintains that prehistoric Europe was as brutish as present-day Africa, singling out the Gauls as particularly resistant to civilization:

> The Gauls … were still idolaters, plunged in the crassest ignorance, practicing the most barbaric and superstitious customs. Although the world had already been in existence for 4,000 years, these peoples of Europe had not received a single spark of light. In vein did a belt of civilization surround its [Europe's] southern parts; the light could penetrate neither the dark forests of the Gauls nor the minds of their inhabitants.[22]

Infusing a set of Roman stereotypes of the Gauls with a discourse of geographical determinism dramatized by the Enlightenment opposition of light and darkness, Vastey equates the savagery of their natural habitat with their supposed civilizational ignorance, just as Europeans had done in the case of Africans. Another technique by which Vastey claimed the mantle of civilization was to insist on the civilized status of present-day

African kingdoms such as the Mali, the Mandika, and the Yoruba, together with the savagery of ancient and contemporary European practices of slavery. Europeans' very insistence on questioning black humanity leads Vastey himself to reverse the accusation of subhumanity, doubting "if they are men, those who dared to open for discussion such an impious, immoral question."[23] Yet, among the most provocative and original claims Vastey makes about civilization are those that introduce a diachronic dimension to his analysis by treating the relationships between various peoples in world history. In this sense, he addresses a common fallacy in comparative thinking, which often assumes that the entitites to be compared both conform to normative categories and yet are formally distinct from one another.[24] By contrast, Vastey inquires into the shifting yet intimate historical relations between Africa and Europe that must be suppressed in order for such comparisons to be valid, relations that have both shaped the exclusivity of the normative categories and inscribed the two continents in the same history of the progress and tragic regression of universal civilization.

AFRICA AS THE CRADLE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Essential to this argument is a set of claims about ancient Egypt as the first civilized country in the world, whereby Vastey portrays Africa as "the cradle of the arts and sciences."[25] The effect is both to elevate Africans over Europeans as the originators of Enlightenment, and to create an alternative narrative of the history of civilization itself, one that decouples civilization from ethnicity and emphasizes instead the rightful role of nonexploitative forms of colonization in its spread.

Vastey's comments about Egypt must be placed in the context of earlier writings by his principle influences Abbé Grégoire, Comte de Volney, and Le Sage, as well as the revival of research on ancient Egypt in the wake of the Napoleonic expedition of 1798–1801. This period brought about a shift in the use of Egypt in European abolitionist discourse, from its depiction as a land of slavery to one of black intellectual prowess, following new claims about the African ethnicity of the ancient Egyptians. Although earlier authors had questioned the meaning of the racial signifiers used by ancient authorities such as Herodotus to describe the ancient Egyptians as having "black skin" and "frizzy hair," the philosopher, Orientalist, and abolitionist Comte de Volney in his highly influential *Voyage en Égypte et en Syrie*, the definitive edition of which was published in 1799, presented

new evidence that the ancient Egyptians were ethnically black, or "*nègres.*" Combining anthropological, physiognomic, and linguistic research, Volney identified the Coptic Egyptian population as the true descendants of the ancient Egyptians, arguing that their phenotypical traits, resembling those of the Great Sphinx, proved that ancient Egyptians were "real [N] egroes of the same type [*espèce*] as all of the indigenous peoples of Africa."[26] In the 1799 edition, Volney bolstered this argument by citing German anthropologist and anatomist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's 1794 paper on his dissection of ancient Eyptian mummies, in which the latter identified the "Ethiopian" as one of "three principal varieties in the national physionomy of ancient Egypt."[27]

In so unequivocally attaching ancient Egyptians to a pan-African notion of blackness, Volney seized on the potential abolitionist import of his claims with a sensational passing remark: "This race of black men, now our slave and the object of our hatred, is the very race to which we owe our arts, our sciences, and even the use of language."[28] This paradox would be taken up by the Abbé Grégoire, who, in his 1808 *De la littérature des nègres*, endorsed Volney's claims about the blackness of the Egyptians, hence the role of blacks in conveying the arts and sciences to Greece.[29] Summarizing the findings of Volney, Blumenbach, and the traveler Ledyard on the Coptic phenotype, Grégoire pointed out the conservative reaction to the new scientific research on Egyptian ethnic origins. As Martin Bernal has argued, anti-Enlightenment Christian backlash, scientific racism, and the expansion of colonialism and racial slavery contributed to the progressive devaluation by some European intellectuals of Egypt's scientific prowess and to the emergence of a counterargument about the Indo-European origins of Greek civilization, beginning with the research of Karl Otfried Müller in the 1820s.[30] At the time of Grégoire's publication this idea was in its early stages; Grégoire refers to a few early proponents, polygenecists Edward Long and Christoph Meiners, who disputed Egyptian talents and denied their influence on the Greeks.

By contrast, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century French universal histories had been somewhat ambivalent about the status of Egypt. While Bossuet had asserted unequivocally that Egypt was the first kingdom, and the place where laws, police, and knowledge began, Turgot and Condorcet played down Egyptian grandeur and scientific influence relative to Greece and later Enlightenment Europe, emphasizing rather its place in the history of political despotism next to a resplendent Greek

liberty.[31] However, the thesis of the civilizational advancement of ancient Egypt over Greece had gained great popularity in Napoleonic France, where the argument served to glorify General Bonaparte's 1798 invasion of Egypt and its associated intellectual projects and therefore to elevate France over the Egypt of ancient times.[32]

One of Vastey's main sources on the ancient world was the best-selling *Atlas historique, généalogique, chronologique et géographique* (London 1801, Paris 1803–1804) by Le Sage, pseudonym of the French ex-patriot Emmanuel de Las Cases, an admirer of Napoleon. A passage from the book, quoted by Vastey, hailed ancient Egypt as "the original home from whence the antique spark took off, which through the centuries has engendered all of the light that illuminates Europe today."[33] Vastey follows Grégoire in ascribing Africanity to the Egyptians, thus subverting pro-slavery arguments according to which Africans were inherently savage and Europeans had a monopoly on civilization. As he repeatedly points out, the Greeks were living in ignorance when they were civilized by Egypt, and the rest of Europe has in the past been at least as barbarous as Africa. Yet, even as he extols African civilizations past and present and invests hope in their future potential, Vastey allows that many African societies do practice superstitious and barbarous customs that can only be eradicated "with the help of civilization."[34] By the same token, while insisting on Europe's original savagery and persistent indulgence in barbaric practices such as the commerce in slaves, Vastey invests in the same civilizational values as his European critics, and promotes both Enlightenment and Christianity.

Clearly, therefore, in his attempt to rebut European criticisms of Africans, Vastey chose neither to relativize difference by repudiating all judgments of value, nor to spatialize and historicize differences as anterior stages of a self-generating evolutionary process that had reached its apex in Europe, as many Enlightenment *philosophes* had done. For Vastey, all races are equal, but there is only one civilization, the expansion of which is facilitated by cross-cultural contacts and human agency. In detailing the history of civilization's spread, therefore, Vastey promotes an alternative understanding of the very meaning and intent of colonization, one that echoes evolving liberal thought on colonization in late Enlightenment tracts by Raynal and Condorcet. In this account, what distinguishes the ancient black Egyptians is not only their advanced state of enlightenment, but also their benevolence and generosity in disseminating their cultural riches

to other peoples. Referring to early Egyptian figures that settled in Greece, he writes:

> But Inachus, Cecrops and Lelex, instead of selling whites into slavery and teaching Greeks about theft, pillage, and arson, instead of selling them arms, ammunition, and liquors strong enough to annihilate their reason and bring them to sell one another; instead, I say, of inciting them to this inhuman traffic, brought them wheat, taught them agriculture, the Egyptian arts and sciences; instead of discussing with these ignorant Greeks in order to demonstrate their physical and moral inferiorities, they taught them to imitate them in the arts of societies, and soon to surpass them![35]

In Vastey's counter-history, colonization is imagined precisely as the obverse of slavery, as a kind of cultural apprentissage designed to propagate one's civilizational achievements. Power is measured not by the degree of domination of one people over another, but rather by the degree of cultural transformation and further discovery the conquering nation can inspire. According to Vastey, this is how civilization spread in the ancient world from Egypt to Greece, and then to Rome, with Europe eventually civilized in the medieval period by the influence of Christianity spread by Alfred the Great and Charlemagne. Throughout this narrative, Vastey is keen to emphasize the profound state of savagery from which Europeans emerged, which he considers greater than that which they deplore in present-day Africa. Citing Porphire and the Roman conquerors Ceasar, Tacitus, Lactance, and Lucian on the supposedly barbarous religious practices of ancient Gauls, Druids, and northern Europeans, he lingers on the lurid details of ritual human sacrifice and murder, including the Druid ceremony of the gathering of the mistletoe of the oak.[36] According to Vastey, rituals of mass human sacrifice would not end in northern Europe until the ninth century. Colonization as civilization thus represents a form of salvation – an instance of Enlightened regeneration from a state of savagery.

CIVILIZING MISSIONS

Yet, just as Vastey charts the history and spread of ancient civilization from one people to another, he accounts for its fall, and what he considers to be its incomplete realization. In the case of Africa, while extolling present-day kingdoms of Mali, the Mandika, and the Yoruba, among others described by the Scottish traveler Mungo Park, he provides a theory as to why Africa

was never, in his view "entirely civilized." Recounting the progress of Carthaginian colonies on the coast of northern Africa, Vastey argues that the destruction of Carthage by Rome, together with the invasion of "barbarous peoples from the North," prevented the complete civilization of Africa. This was compounded when Egypt, which Vastey now names "the Ancient African civilization" (38) was invaded by Muslims, and the continent was engulfed several centuries later in the vicious triangular slave trade. Unlike many abolitionists, Vastey does not blame the slave trade for all of Africa's challenges; he attributes many practices he deems savage, including slavery itself, to simple ignorance. He insists, however, that slavery has had a de-civilizing effect on Africans and Europeans alike. Most significantly, Europe is itself a fallen civilization due to its involvement in human trafficking and sacrifice. Indicting the most aggressive pro-slavery critics of Africa for their own role in perpetuating the practices of slaveholding and human sacrifice they pretend to deplore in Africa, he writes,

> The ex-colonists and traffickers in human flesh have taken it upon themselves to describe the bad treatments that ignorant Africans have inflicted on their unfortunate slaves, when they who are civilized, and who have been enlightened, have visited the most outrageous cruelties upon their own unhappy slaves. Let them take a look at the horrors of the trade and the crimes that they are guilty of in the colonies, and they will see how doubly odious they are to calumny these unfortunate Africans![37]

In the logic of Vastey's universal history, therefore, Europeans are more than mere hypocrites; they are profoundly uncivilized, for they have deviated from the course of civilization by replacing regenerative colonization with destructive practices that sever entire peoples from the human by rendering them incapable of contributing to its common civilization.

Three crucial implications follow from Vastey's vision of universal history, which reflect the particular geopolitical subject position from which he writes as a representative of an abolitionist state. The first is his unequivocal call to Europe – especially England but also France – to reverse its indulgence in slavery and to civilize Africa in the sense of spreading knowledge of the arts and sciences. This is necessary both to restore Europe's own dignity as civilized and to perform its civilizational duty. Ironically reprising the discourse of many Enlightenment elites, Vastey raises the possibility of a massive civilizing mission as a point of honor, one that would help European nations equal and even surpass the

civilizational greatness of their ancient forbears. Inviting England to take this role, he explains,

> The immortal glory of civilizing one quarter of the world, bringing one hundred million Africans close to European society, this grand work which must surpass the greatest and most glorious feats that the peoples of ancient and modern times have ever achieved … belongs to the magnanimous and generous England![38]

Clearly this passage was meant to curry favor among the English, whom Vastey and Christophe hoped would facilitate the diplomatic recognition of Haiti. Later in the text, however, France is also called upon to do her duty and extend her empire through philanthropy.

Still, while Europe is accorded a means by which to redeem its crimes and return to civilizational greatness through benevolent colonization, this does not preclude Africans themselves from defending their natural human rights when in a state of slavery. On the contrary, Vastey's narrative of universal history as the tragic fall of civilization into the practice of slavery, and the subversion of a divinely ordained racial equality, serves also to legitimate the Haitian Revolution as precisely what will restore the rightful order of civilization and rectify the fall of Western Man. For if Europeans are called upon to become true civilizers, Haiti's role in universal history has been to act as an agent of divine justice in response to Europe's persistent vitiation of natural law and the rights of man, restoring human liberty in the most brutal of slave colonies. In this sense, Haiti has served as "the only asylum of liberty where the black man can raise his head, enjoy and contemplate the good works of the universal father."[39] In a fascinating revelation of the providentialist, Romantic sensibilities of postrevolutionary universal history that he shares ironically with Hegel, the religious aspect of Vastey's narrative comes to the fore as the author, addressing his readers in familiar terms, characterizes the Haitian Revolution as "the all powerful divine hand that punishes you," inspired by "the universal father of men, whom you have for too long disregarded and outraged!"[40]

The main drawback of this conception of universal history for Haiti, however, is the teleology it implies in terms of the obligations placed on Haitians, present and future, with regard to their own civilizational advancement. Far from being merely the agents of Europe's retribution, Haitians are also tacitly called upon to demonstrate, as proof their racial equality, their capacity for civilizational advancement on the level of Europe; that is,

they are asked to establish through their own Herculean efforts a kind of intellectual, civilizational, and cultural parity with Europe. These demands place an undue burden on former slaves, who are summoned to redeem themselves from slavery precisely by approximating the civilizational standards of those whose greatness was founded in large part on their subjection. At the same time, Vastey introduces a radical temporal discontinuity between Haitians and Europeans, as Haitians attempt to catch up with a Europe that is still advancing. For Christophe, this demand arguably generated much of the alleged brutality of his reign, leading him to drive his people to endless travails in an effort to equal and even surpass Europe materially and culturally.[41] In the ideology of the postrevolutionary Haitian monarchy of Henry Christophe, therefore, Haitian sovereignty was predicated on its subjection to the civilizational norm of the former master, and not unlike in Hegel's version of history, Haiti would be fated to follow Europe on the path to universal freedom and Enlightenment.

Notes

1. Here I am synthesizing the meaning of several uses of "worlding" in the work of Gayatri Spivak. For a helpful discussion of this terminology, see "Worlding," in *Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies*, eds. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffen (London: Routledge, 1998), 241–242. Vociferous critiques of both historicism and universalism abound in postcolonial theory. On the problems raised by the production, in the West, of world, global, or non-European history in particular, and of normative epistemological premises in the discipline of history as a whole, see Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London: Routledge, 1990); Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Arif Dirlik, "Is there History after Eurocentrism? Globalism, Postcolonialism, and the Disavowal of History," *Cultural Critique* 42 (Spring 1999): 1–34. For a critique of postcolonial studies' own blind spots relative to history that takes into account various positions in the debate, see Frederick Cooper, "Postcolonial Studies and the Study of History," in *Postcolonial Studies and Beyond*, ed. Ania Loomba et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 401–422.

2. On the appearance and evolution of meanings of the term "civilization" in eighteenth-century France and early modern Europe, see Anthony Pagden, "The 'defense of civilization' in Eighteenth-Century Social Theory," *History of the Human Sciences* 1, no. 1 (May 1988): 33–45; Brett Bowden, *The Empire of*

Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); and Jean Starobinski, *Le Remède dans le mal: Critique et légitimation de l'artifice à l'âge des Lumières* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989). On the genres and forms of universal history in the early modern period, see Tamara Griggs, "Universal History from Counter-Reformation to Enlightenment," *Modern Intellectual History* 4, no. 2 (2007): 219–247. For a philosophical and intellectual historical critique of universal history, see Benedetto Croce, *Theory and History of Historiography*, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: Ballantine Press, 1921), 51–63.

3. Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, "Discours sur les progrès successifs de l'Esprit humain," in *Œuvres de Turgot,* vol. 2, ed. Gustave Schelle (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1914), 587–611; Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat Marquis de Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain,* translated as *The Sketch*, in Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat Marquis de Condorcet, *Political Writings*, ed. Steven Lukes and Nadia Urbinati (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–148; Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, ed. Jonathan Wight (Petersfield: Harriman House, 2007). On the backlash against Rousseau, which predisposed some later European thinkers to justify certain inequalities as natural rather than created by society, see Pagden, "The 'Defense of Civilization'." For a discussion of conjectural histories celebrating commerce as the pinnacle of progress and civilization in the Scottish and European Enlightenments, see Bowden, *The Empire of Civilization*, and Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, vol. 2, *The Science of Freedom* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 330–367.

4. This was especially the case in the early nineteenth century, following the successes of campaigns against slavery in Britain and the Haitian Revolution in the French context. See Pagden, "The 'defense of civilization'."

5. "Universal history" is often used as a shorthand for Hegel's own method of "philosophic" history in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, a method in which, as the author explains, the history of the world is revealed to be a rational process, itself ascertained by Reason or "speculative cognition." However, Hegel himself designates as "universal history" a different genre of history, categorized under the general method of "Reflective history," in which the objective is to traverse long periods of time or gain a view of the entire world. See Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (Kitchener, ON: Batoche Books, 2001), 17–18.

6. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, 23–30.

7. Hegel repeatedly describes the northern half of the temperate zone as the "true theater of History," and privileges the "Old" world over the "New," where Spirit is underdeveloped. Yet he considers that only the "German world," by which he occasionally means the whole of Western Europe, has attained the fourth, "mature," phase of World History, due to the resolution

there of the antithesis between Church and State and Germany's more robust recognition of the freedom of all humans. See Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, 97, 121, 126–127. On the meanings of Hegel's notion of "the Germanic World" in relation to later nationalisms, see Lydia Moland, *Hegel on Political Identity: Patriotism, Nationality, and Cosmopolitanism* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011), 113–115, and 150–160.

8. Susan Buck-Morss, *Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 116.

9. Antonio Y. Vásquez-Arroyo, "Universal History Disavowed: On Critical Theory and Postcolonialism," *Postcolonial Studies* 11, no. 4 (2008): 458.

10. Ranajit Guha, *History at the Limit of World History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 6, 29–30.

11. On the rise of biological explanations for the diversity and inequality of societies in the context of debates about the superiority of European civilization, see Pagden, "The 'defence of civilization,'"40–43.

12. While some mystery has surrounded his proper name, research on Baron de Vastey has flourished in recent years with pathbreaking work by scholars such as Chris Bongie, Marlène Daut, Laurent Quevilly, and myself, exploring aspects of his biography, politics, and poetics. This chapter is, to my knowledge, the first study of his work in relation to the production of narratives of universal or world history.

13. From Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction; Reason in History*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), quoted in Guha, *History at the Limit of World History*, 35.

14. It is worth noting that Vastey was preceded by one Haitian writer in suggesting an ethnic affiliation between Egyptians and blacks, and that was Juste Chanlatte, who made a passing suggestion of the same in the first chapter of his *Le Cri de la nature; ou, Hommage haytien au très vénérable abbé H. Grégoire ….* (Au Cap: P. Roux, 1810). Subsequent nineteenth-century Haitian writers would develop even more extensively Vastey's arguments, notably the anthropologist and Egyptologist Anténor Firmin, thus anticipating the twentieth-century Africanist discourse on ancient Egypt. See Joseph L. Celucien, "Anténor Firmin, the 'Egyptian Question' and the Afrocentric Imagination," *Journal of Pan African Studies* 7, no. 2 (August 2014): 127–154.

15. Born in 1781 in the north of Saint-Domingue to a French father from Normandy and a Creole woman of color, Vastey served under Dessalines and later Christophe as a private secretary and as tutor to Christophe's son, Victor-Henry, the royal prince. On Vastey's personal biography, see Chris Bongie, "Jean Jouis Vastey (1781–1820): A Biographical Sketch," in *The Colonial System Unveiled* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 11–27.

16. On the circumstances surrounding the Dauxion Lavaysse expedition, see Chris Bongie, "Introduction," 43–56; Jean Coradin, *Histoire diplomatique d'Haïti, 1804–1843* (Port-au-Prince: Éditions des Antilles, 1988), 67–84; and Baron de Vastey, *Essai sur les causes de la révolution et des guerres civiles d'Hayti* (Sans Souci: Imprimerie royale, 1819), 204–224.

17. Jean-Charles-Léonard Sismonde de Sismondi, *De l'intérêt de la France à l'égard de la traite des nègres* (Geneva and Paris: J. J. Paschoud, 1814). The "Réflexions" were appended to the third edition of the original work.

18. F. Mazères, *Lettres à Sismonde de Sismondi sur les nègres, la civilisation de l'Afrique, Christophe et le comte de Limonade* (Paris: Renard, 1815), 19–22. Endnotes of this and all French-language sources cited in this article are my own unless otherwise indicated.

19. Mazères, *Lettre à Sismonde de Sismondi*, 36. The Comte de Limonade had relayed the toast offered by Christophe to King George III of England in his 1811 account of Christophe's coronation: Julien Prévost comte de Limonade, *Relation des glorieux événements qui ont porté Leurs Majestés Royales sur le trône d'Hayti; suivi de l'histoire du couronnement et du sacre du roi Henry 1er, et de la reine Marie-Louise* (Cap-Henry: P. Roux, 1811).

20. On the progressive deployment of "the standard of civilization" as a criterion for exclusion of non-European states from the international community beginning in the early nineteenth century, see Bowden, *The Empire of Civilization*, 15–20, 103–128; and Antony Anghie, "Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law," *Harvard International Law Journal* 40, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 1–80.

21. Baron de Vastey, Le système colonial dévoilé (Cap-Henry: P. Roux, 1814), 21.

22. Baron de Vastey, *Réflexions sur une lettre de Mazères, ex-Colon français, adressée à M.J.C.L. Sismonde de Sismondi, sur les Noirs et les Blancs, la civilisation de l'Afrique, le Royaume d' Hayti* (Cap-Henry: P. Roux, 1816), 35–36.

23. Vastey, *Réflexions*, 15.

24. On the pitfalls of comparative thinking, see Radhika V. Mongia, "Historicizing State Sovereignty: Inequality and the Form of Equivalence," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, no. 2 (April 2007): 384–411.

25. Vastey, *Réflexions*, 32.

26. Constantin-François Chassebeuf comte de Volney, *Voyage en Égypte et en Syrie* [1799], ed. Jean Gaulmier (Paris: Mouton et Co., 1959), 62–63. On the history of European ideas about ancient Egypt, see Martin Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, Vol. 1, *The Fabrication of Ancient Greece 1785–1985* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

27. Volney, *Voyage*, 63. Volney does not provide the title or direct quotations from the Blumenbach source, so I am quoting from John Frederick Blumenbach's findings in his article, "Observations on Some Egyptian Mummies Opened in London," *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London* 84 (January 1, 1794): 191.

28. Volney, *Voyage*, 64. According to Abbé Grégoire, Volney was preceded in making the argument that "Negroes were our masters in science" by George Gregory in *Essays Historical and Moral* (London: J. Johnson, 1785). See [Abbé] Henri Grégoire, *De la littérature des nègres; ou, Recherches sur leurs facultés intellectuelles, leurs qualités morales et leur littérature …* (Paris: Maradan, 1808), 12.

29. Grégoire's first chapter is devoted largely to the defense of the idea of the ethnic commonality of "black" peoples throughout the African continent, as opposed to their division between different races, but his view is not devoid of ambiguities and contradiction.

30. On the influence of politics, ideology, and race on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century debates about Egypt's role in the origins of Greek civilization, see Bernal, *Black Athena*, 25–28, 201–300. Grégoire, *De la littérature*, 12–13.

31. Condorcet made an effort to devalue Egyptian achievements in astronomy and geometry relative to later scientific breakthroughs in the Enlightenment, and insisted that Egyptians only used science to serve the interests of despotic power and superstition. See Condorcet, *The Sketch*, 24–25.

32. Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt resulted in the establishment of the Institut d'Egypte, a team of Orientalist specialists in all disciplines, and a 23-volume *Description de l'Egypte*. On the growth of Egyptomania and Orientalist colonial fantasies spawned by these developments, see Patrice Bret, ed., *L'Expédition d'Égypte, une entreprise des Lumières 1798–1801* (Condé-Sur-Noireau: Corlet Imprimeur, 1999); Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978), 76–91.

33. Vastey, *Réfléxions*, 34.

34. Vastey, *Réflexions*, 40.

35. Vastey, *Réflexions*, 35.

36. Vastey, *Réflexions*, 42. Vastey was preceded in his criticism of the savagery of Gauls and Druids by Voltaire, who provocatively opened his 1756 *Essai sur les mœurs* with an account of the savagery of pre-historic Europeans. See the preface to François Marie Arouet de Voltaire, *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations et sur les principaux faits de l'histoire depuis Charlemagne jusqu'à Nos Jours*, vol. 1 (Genève: Cramer, 1756). On perceptions of the Gauls' savagery, see chapter "The Enlightenment and the Politics of Civilization: Self-Colonization, Catholicism, and Assimilationism in Eighteenth-Century France" in this volume.

37. Vastey, *Réflexions*, 46.

38. Vastey, *Réflexions*, 50–51.
39. Vastey, *Réflexions*, 82.
40. Vastey, *Réflexions*, 87.
41. Accounts of the brutality of Henry Christophe abound in historical and contemporary sources, particularly in reference to coerced labor at his building projects and on the plantations. For an overview in English of his regime and its authoritarian tendencies, see Hubert Cole, *Christophe: King of Haiti* (New York: Viking, 1973).

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