Unconventional Warfare *from* Antiquity *to the* Present Day

Edited by

Brian Hughes & Fergus Robson

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Brian Hughes • Fergus Robson
Editors

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Editors
Brian Hughes
Maynooth University
Maynooth, Ireland

Fergus Robson
Trinity College Dublin
Dublin, Ireland

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Introduction: Guerrillas and Counterinsurgency in History

Brian Hughes and Fergus Robson

This volume has its origins in a one-day international conference hosted by the Centre for War Studies at Trinity College, Dublin, generously funded by the Trinity Long Room Hub Research Incentive Scheme, and held in Trinity in March 2015. Entitled 'Unconventional Warfare: Guerrillas and Counterinsurgency from Iraq to Antiquity', the workshop brought together scholars interested in the phenomenon of fast-moving, 'irregular' forces employing hit-and-run tactics against more orthodox armies in a variety of theatres and across the centuries. Contributors traced the lived experiences and historical representations of this mode of war from antiquity and the early modern period through the turning point of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era and on to the guerrilla's role in, and state and military responses to, the twentieth-century wars of decolonization. One strong thread running throughout the workshop was an interest in narratives, in how this form of conflict was presented by its practitioners, its victims, and in collective memory; how it was perceived, and how this in turn often served as a motor for violence and

B. Hughes (✉)
Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland
e-mail: Brian.Hughes@nuim.ie

F. Robson
Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland
e-mail: frobson@tcd.ie

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counter-violence. As a group, we were interested in challenging and problematizing the frequently recurring dichotomy between 'regular' and 'irregular' fighters based, as it is, on an often idealized or even flawed understanding of the role and behaviour of traditional armed formations. Participants also explored how guerrillas relate to the communities from which they emerge and the similarly entangled roles of guerrilla and bandit, brigand, freedom fighter, fanatic, or terrorist.

The present volume is an extension and expansion of the scholarly discussion that emerged from this workshop, consisting of chapters by participants and others specially commissioned for the volume. It has brought together recently graduated doctoral candidates, early career scholars, and established academics from universities in Britain, Ireland, Europe, and the United States. The volume employs a regressive format, beginning with the twenty-first-century conflict in Afghanistan and working backwards, chronologically, to the seventh century BC. This novel approach allows us to avoid teleological assumptions about the modernity or singularity of terrorism and guerrilla conflicts, to look forwards as well as backwards, and to identify continuities alongside rupture and change. Chapters are divided into two sections. The essays in Part I will cover the modern era from ongoing conflict post-2000 to the nineteenth century and the American Civil War. Part II opens at what might be seen as the temporal fulcrum, the Revolutionary-Napoleonic era, with insurgency in early modern Europe, and continues back to our end point in Greece in the seventh century BC. The 11 chapters produced here bring together the most recent research and writing from scholars in History, Politics and International Relations, Archaeology, and Classics, all of whom share an interest in the dynamics of 'small war'.

Historiography

The entrance of US forces into Afghanistan in 2001, the joint US–British invasion of Iraq from 2003, and the subsequent military and political difficulties that developed, have coincided with – indeed encouraged – a vigorous renewed interest in counterinsurgency operations after what might be viewed as several decades of relative neglect. In 2006, the US army published *Field Manual 3–24* (*FM 3–24*) as a doctrine for modern counterinsurgency (or COIN).[1] The publication of *FM 3–24* can be seen as the culmination of a narrative trend that pointed to a successful means of carrying out irregular warfare,

specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan, and drawing overwhelmingly positive reflections on lessons learned in earlier counterinsurgency operations. This narrative is not without its critics and has generated a lively historiography. Indeed, further debate exists within the ranks of those critical of the 'COINdinista' narrative about how exactly such criticism should be framed and, perhaps more importantly, the most appropriate methodological and interpretive alternatives.[2]

At the heart of this debate is a disagreement about the use of history in understanding unconventional war and strategizing in the present, and accusations that the past has been misunderstood or, worse, misrepresented by those drawing parallels and lessons for application in present conflicts. The extent to which 'lessons' from the past can be applied to modern conflicts remains contested as scholars continue to examine the transferability of knowledge between campaigns.[3] Coinciding with the emergence of the 'COINdinistas' and their critics has been significant historical reappraisal of the records of imperial powers in their treatment of anti-colonial insurgency in the twentieth century. The British, for instance, were seen as the archetypal counterinsurgents. In the eyes of an 'orthodox' school of thinking, Britain was generally considered to be the most successful practitioner of counterinsurgency in the world. Even if there were incomplete victories (if they might even be called that) in Ireland and Cyprus, for example, and even defeat in Palestine in the 1940s and in Yemen two decades later, Britain was held to have an exceptional record. It learned from its mistakes, won more often than it lost, and did so without resorting to unnecessary or extreme violence, rape, torture, or mutilation; excesses were rare and often carried out by local forces rather than British troops.[4] The Malayan campaign between 1948 and 1960 in particular came to be seen as an exemplar of the way counterinsurgency should be done.[5] More recent research, making use of new sources and methodology, has led to a sustained revision of such tenets and it is no coincidence that the development of these investigations has coincided with US and British failures on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Work by David French, Andrew Mumford, Huw Bennett, Matthew Hughes, Karl Hack, David Anderson, Caroline Elkins, and John Newsinger, among others, has challenged Britain's counterinsurgency record and pointed to significant gaps between theory, rhetoric, and the reality. Along with widespread and brutal coercion were tactical failures, slow learning, and institutional cover-ups during British campaigns in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, and elsewhere.[6]

The comparative element in much of this literature, and other work on insurgency and counterinsurgency, has remained, for the most part, temporally narrow and rooted heavily in the modern era. For those interested in modern British counterinsurgency, and also those encouraged to look backwards by its failures in the twenty-first century, there is a significant focusing of attention on the wars of decolonization after 1945, what has been described as the 'classic age' of British counterinsurgency.[7] The earliest case study in Newsinger's 2002 reappraisal (now in its second edition), for instance, is Zionist insurgency in Palestine in the 1940s.[8] But the history of this form of war goes back much further.

Military doctrine in eighteenth-century Europe did also, in fact, clearly identify 'small war', *kleiner krieg*, or *la petite guerre* in opposition to war as practised by field armies on campaign and fighting in set-piece battles and sieges. This understanding, however, referred not so much to insurgency but to the deployment of regulars in raiding, ambush, and reconnaissance: irregular operations. It was only during and after the wars of the French Revolution, in particular the Peninsular War, that the more modern notion of the guerrilla began to take shape. This was a direct consequence of the spectre, and myth, of the Spanish guerrilla as a national uprising, as well as a variety of contemporary conflicts and concomitant changes in the ways armies were understood, raised, deployed, and imagined. Carl von Clausewitz identified the phenomenon and he and others attempted to theorize it in light of the French *levée en masse*, the Spanish guerrilla, and the Russian and German 'national' uprisings against the French.[9] Contemporary understandings of these conflicts were, however, blurred by mythologizing which in turn went on to influence conventional thinking about small war for much of the following century. Interpretations of these conflicts only came under sustained scrutiny in the final decade of the twentieth century, forcing a re-evaluation of the national and nationalist character of Revolutionary-Napoleonic small wars.[10] Importantly, when talking about pre-modern states and insurgency, the ideology of legitimate authority and pragmatic perspective of *raison d'état* both meant that rebellion was ferociously punished, albeit generally within certain normative parameters calibrated to communicate the futility of future resistance and the awesome power of the state but also to demonstrate a degree of clemency, commonly associated with a firm but just ruler.[11] Yves-Marie Bercé, in analysing the royal response to the rising of the Périgord in 1636–37, noted, in a passage which might equally apply to the repression of insurgency under Napoleon or during decolonization,

that 'the machinery of justice was set in motion. La Sauvetat was sacked with a brutality typical of the most ruthless practices of seventeenth-century warfare. The soldiery were given free reign.'[12] These resonances across centuries would seem to require the type of inquiry being undertaken in this volume, and an even longer temporal gaze.

As the contributions in this collection make clear, there is much to be gained by identifying continuities and change over the *longue durée*. Alexander Hodgkins points to the coherent mobilization and deployment strategies used by insurgents in East Anglia and Devon (Chapter "'A Great Company of Country Clowns': Guerrilla Warfare in the East Anglian and Western Rebellions (1549)") which are similarly evident in Raphaëlle Branche's description of FLN policies in Algeria (Chapter "'The Best *Fellagha* Hunter is the French of North African Descent': Harkis in French Algeria") and Daniel Sutherland's evocation of the traditions and structures of guerrilla recruitment and action in Civil War United States (Chapter "American Civil War Guerrillas"). On the counterinsurgent side, the strong parallels between the ways in which (some) French commanders practised pacification in Fergus Robson's chapter (Chapter "Insurgent Identities, Destructive Discourses, and Militarized Massacre: French Armies on the Warpath Against Insurgents in the Vendée, Italy, and Egypt") and the soft COIN analysed by Julia Welland in Afghanistan (Chapter "Gender and 'Population-centric' Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan") emerge as striking evidence for a cyclical process of learning (and forgetting) effective repressive strategies. While the messiness and complexity of insurgencies and unconventional warfare are evident throughout this volume, Matthew Lloyd (Chapter "Unorthodox Warfare? Variety and Change in Archaic Greek Warfare (*ca.* 700–*ca.* 480 BCE)"), Brian McGing (Chapter "Guerrilla Warfare and Revolt in 2nd Century BC Egypt"), Alastair Macdonald (Chapter "Good King Robert's Testament?: Guerrilla Warfare in Later Medieval Scotland"), and Seán Gannon (Chapter "'Black-and-Tan tendencies': policing insurgency in the Palestine Mandate, 1922–48"), in particular, demonstrate the analytic flaws of binary models of Western-non-Western, conventional-unconventional, Scottish-English, and colonial counterinsurgency ways of war.

Perhaps the most fruitful critique which has emerged in compiling and refining this volume has been that pertaining to an ideological and idealized conception of legitimacy in conflict. Throughout this collection the complexities of 'just war', acceptable tactics, and the rules of war frequently resurface as constructs which served dominant powers rather

than mitigated the tragedy of war, restrained the destructive impulses of fighting men, or expressed civilizational superiority. Constructs, which, when they went awry, served instead to provide a mental framework which legitimized massacre of irregular fighters and the communities from which they were drawn.[13] As such, the use of the Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars as an analytic fulcrum is persuasive. It is during this period that a characteristically Western way of war appears to emerge; the melding of standing (citizen) armies, highly disciplined infantry warfare, the 'fight to the death' mentality, and, crucially, the technological and political innovations which facilitated the above begin to come into their own.[14] This paradigm works as a loose bracketing which is, of course, not totally watertight. Western armies continued to use small war tactics after this point, just as elements of this paradigm existed beforehand. But, the crystallization in ways of thinking about and fighting wars is distinct and is strongly in evidence in the emerging imaginary of French soldiers and their opponents, whose attitudes to war, and especially small war, resonate so strongly in the contributions for later periods.

The historiographies of small war are addressed and challenged in many of the chapters – especially in those by Brian McGing, Matthew Lloyd, and Alastair Macdonald – and are adequately discussed in those chapters but a few words are necessary on that pertaining to the Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars. The flourishing scholarship on Napoleonic Europe has identified multi-layered resistance to French domination as a central aspect of European experience at the time and Michael Rowe, Michael Broers, Ute Planert, and Charles Esdaile among many others, have contributed to a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the dynamics of resistance and insurgency throughout Europe.[15] What the present volume brings to this historiography is a comparative element, both within the wars of the period and with other periods when the character and conduct of small war can be shown to have influenced, or been influenced by, those fought against the French. What is worthy of note in this regard is the persistence of loosely defined rules of war. In spite of Revolutionary decrees to the contrary, French soldiers understood and generally abided by these *ancien régime* understandings of soldierly conduct.[16] The extraordinary nature of French mobilization notwithstanding, a culture of combat infused with notions of honour prevailed among former royal army men, volunteers, and conscripts, except where civilian resistance was concerned.[17] And this is the crucial point here, the transition from the military entrepreneurship of old regime armies to large citizen armies occasioned by the French

Revolution brought with it a far more lethal discourse around the treatment of rebels.[18] This was partly a result of Revolutionary Terror and partly a result of political ideology but more than these it was governed by the scale and scope of soldiers' experience and self-conception in fighting small wars. It can be seen in its infancy in Fergus Robson's chapter, in adolescence in Daniel Sutherland's, and in something approaching wise old-age in Julia Welland's. Taken with Matthew Lloyd and Alastair Macdonald's contributions, this provides a necessary corrective to projections of the values and mentalities of modern citizen armies onto the military ethos of Classical and Medieval cultures.[19]

The aim here, however, is not necessarily to exclusively seek or find commonalities; neither would this necessarily be entirely helpful. Ideas and experiences that do not leap seamlessly from one conflict to another, or from one era to the next, are also a feature of this volume. Raphaëlle Branche, for instance, suggests that the intent and meaning behind the employment of native forces by the French in Algeria in the nineteenth century was very different to that in the twentieth. Similarly, the armed and organized Southern Unionist opposition to Confederate guerrillas during the American Civil War described by Daniel Sutherland is in marked contrast to the far more passive resistance offered by Southern Unionists/Loyalists during the Irish War of Independence, as seen in Brian Hughes' chapter (Chapter "'The Entire Population of this God-forsaken Island is Terrorised by a Small Band of Gun-men': Guerrillas and Civilians during the Irish Revolution"). Seán Gannon writes in Chapter "'Black-and-Tan tendencies': policing insurgency in the Palestine Mandate, 1922–48" of the predominance of situational circumstances, arguing that the experiences of British police in Ireland did not influence their later conduct in Palestine and questioning the extent to which institutional knowledge and individual experience were transferred between theatres. The ability of the British and the US to retain and transfer knowledge in this period has been regularly debated. David French has argued that rather than having a unique and innate understanding of counterinsurgency, as had been suggested, the British actually had 'chequered' success in collecting knowledge and disseminating lessons from one conflict to the next after the Second World War, while there are two conflicting schools of thought on the US relationship with counter-insurgency learning.[20] Spotting divergence, then, is just as pertinent as charting continuity.

Terminology

The broad exploration of war across time and space undertaken here inevitably draws one into what Beatrice Heuser has described as the 'jungle of terminology'.[21] A decision to explore irregular warfare necessitates an understanding of what exactly constitutes 'regular' warfare in the first instance, defining parameters and exploring often blurred distinctions between violence and warfare. Much has been written in this regard, not least because, as Heuser points out, 'there are few areas of strategic studies where the semantics are so complex and the terminology used so diverse, conflicting, overlapping, or else vague and confusing'.[22] Christian Malis' identification of tactical, operational and strategic components of small war require a recognition of structural and contingent features in all conflicts, which engenders a certain definitional looseness.[23] So the authors in this volume will write of violent actors as insurgents, irregulars, and guerrillas; and conflicts as small war, insurgency, and guerrilla war, taking both sets as broadly coherent and typologically related, while not obliterating the numerous nuances and distinctions in subject or context.

For practitioners, terminology was one of the tools used to fight the war; it has served as a means to provide or deny legitimacy, political currency, or moral supremacy through time. And language is clearly to the fore in the most recent and influential counterinsurgency doctrine. *FM 3–24* defines insurgency as 'an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict' while, in turn, counterinsurgency operations are the 'military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency'.[24] The emphasis on the wide range of elements that are necessary to 'defeat insurgency' is important, but so too are the very broad definitions given to both insurgency and counterinsurgency. Those who have organized in arms and attempted with various means to 'overthrow' a far larger and militarily superior 'constituted government' have, through time, been given a variety of labels (often interchangeably): insurgents, revolutionaries, rebels, subversives, terrorists. More broadly, armed actors engaging in alternatives to set-piece battles or acting as auxiliaries to a regular army have also been described as guerrillas, partisans, paramilitaries, underground fighters, resistance fighters; in 1959 Eric Hobsbawm introduced (not without criticism) the term 'social bandit'.[25] Sometimes, these terms – as used by contemporaries – were accurate, sometimes partially so, and sometimes

not so at all. For instance, as Hobsbawm and Michael Broers have shown, genuine banditry could and often did fuse with and provide leadership for revolt, further blurring the definitional boundaries.[26] Each of these terms has positive or negative connotations based on normative assumptions of the observer. Just as there are many potential terms to use to label irregular fighters, so too are there many permutations when classifying what actually constitutes counterinsurgency. Getting beyond broad declarations about the characteristic actions of counterinsurgency remains difficult.

One important way in which states and counterinsurgent forces have sought to delegitimize irregular fighters is through discourses that place them outside boundaries of 'acceptable', 'civilised', and legal war. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George's response to insurgency in Ireland after 1919 has been neatly summarised in his declaration that 'you do not declare war against rebels'; Irish insurgents were routinely described in British propaganda as a 'murder gang' in reply to the Irish Republican Army's own attempts to be recognized as a legitimate, armed force.[27] Similarly, Alastair Macdonald points to how British chroniclers' characterization of the Scottish evolved over time, in a medieval hunt for the right denunciatory pitch, indicating the important role played by language in categorizing and analysing war, small war, and insurgency. Alexander Hodgkins also points to discursive denigration of rebels by Tudor loyalists in response to the revolts of East Anglia and Devon and Cornwall, indicating a connection between state-building and dehumanization of insurgents seen as opposing the exercise.

Across this volume irregular fighters are labelled in decidedly non-military, derogatory ways by opponents. Arab rebels in Palestine are 'outlaws', 'bandits', 'gangsters', and 'highwaymen' (Chapter "'Black-and-Tan tendencies': policing insurgency in the Palestine Mandate, 1922–48"); guerrillas in the US are 'thieves and murderers', 'cowards by nature' (Chapter "American Civil War Guerrillas"); Vendean and Egyptian rebels are 'monsters', 'barbarians', and 'furious hordes' (Chapter "Insurgent Identities, Destructive Discourses, and Militarized Massacre: French Armies on the Warpath Against Insurgents in the Vendée, Italy, and Egypt"); while those in Early Modern England are 'ragged', 'rough', and 'untrained' (Chapter "Unorthodox Warfare? Variety and Change in Archaic Greek Warfare (*ca.* 700–*ca.* 480 BCE)"). A common denominator here is the emphasis on criminality; these are not soldiers, not members of an army, and not carrying out legitimate acts of war but are, instead, defying the established law of the land. By way of return, insurgents point to the illegality of the repression employed against them, or, in the case of wars of decolonization, the role of

the counterinsurgent as conqueror and usurper. In Ireland, the phrase 'murder gang' was also employed by republicans to the 'Black and Tans' and Auxiliaries, the mostly British-born recruits that joined the Royal Irish Constabulary from 1920.[28] Even Irish-born members of the police were seen as tools of the imperial power, and described by Éamon de Valera as 'England's janissaries'.[29] A similar dynamic is evident in the contrasting ways practitioners on both sides have labelled the war in which they are engaged. The conflict in Algeria is, for instance, the 'Algerian War' in France but the 'War of Liberation' or the 'Revolution' in Algeria. Again, legitimacy and justification for the means of achieving stated aims are at the forefront of this discourse.

Those writing about this form of war in the past, then, must be mindful of the vocabulary they utilize. 'Counterinsurgency' (or counter-insurgency)[30] is itself a modern term, with origins as late as the 1960s. It is also a Western term, and one that therefore comes with its own signifiers. Can this modern terminology work when applied to Ptolemaic Egypt, early modern England, or the nineteenth-century US? Indeed, one of the common concerns of the chapters dealing with pre-modern contexts is identifying the characteristics of war that are actually 'irregular' in the first place, and challenging traditional conceptions about what is 'regular'. This is not without its difficulties but, as Macdonald suggests in Chapter "Good King Robert's Testament?: Guerrilla Warfare in Later Medieval Scotland", when modes of warfare in the past correspond with our contemporary understanding of a term such vocabulary can, with due caution, be used fruitfully. In this sense we must maintain a distinction between 'guerrilla-style tactics' and insurgents, the latter often employ the former but are by no means the only armed forces which do so. Broadly speaking, the state/non-state axis can also be taken as a frequently useful point of differentiation. As such, if we proceed with an awareness of the use and abuse of language, and a focus on the part played by the state and its armed forces as against fighters drawn from civilian life, ethnic, linguistic, religious, or political minorities, while paying careful attention to tactical diversity, we can indeed use a range of terms and labels, like unconventional warfare or guerrilla conflict, in an analytically useful sense.

Thematics

The chapters in this volume treat their theme over a wide variety of places and eras. They cover Britain and Ireland in the late medieval, early modern, and modern periods; Europe, from ancient Greece to the sixteenth

century and up to the Napoleonic Era; the Middle-East and North Africa from the classical era and the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as Central Asia in the twentieth century; and nineteenth-century North America. While the coverage is necessarily limited in such a volume, one of the key aims here is to bring together a wide range of scholarship and seek out common themes, explore parallels across time and space, and discuss divergence and inconsistencies. With that in mind, a number of thematics will emerge across the work presented here.

A distinct characteristic of irregular war is the absence of clearly demarcated front lines as the boundaries separating the two (or possibly more) sides engaged in conflict are blurred and fluid. The removal of a front line often means that conflict takes place within communities and all members of these communities become potential participants, whether willingly or unwillingly, actively or passively. Insurgents rely on civilians to provide shelter, food, and supplies, to pass messages, store and smuggle guns, and more. Counterinsurgents similarly rely on the general public, but most pressingly for useful information. During the Irish War of Independence (1919–21), for instance, the 'war' for the support of the civilian population was key to the success of both sides (see Chapter "'The Entire Population of this God-forsaken Island is Terrorised by a Small Band of Gun-men': Guerrillas and Civilians during the Irish Revolution"). Those who were supposed to have acted as 'spies and informers', passing information on local rebels to the Crown forces, the motivations for informing (or not), and their fate at the hands of the Irish Republican Army remain among the most contested issues in a growing historiography.[31] Just as Irish republicans are often seen to have won the 'propaganda' and 'intelligence' wars, so too does Seán William Gannon's chapter on police counterinsurgency in Palestine point to a resolute failure of intelligence gathering and dissemination in Palestine in the 1930s. These failures, Gannon argues, played a significant part in the nature of repressive violence there as police and troops lashed out in response to attacks against colleagues when an absence of information saw perpetrators go unpunished.

As Julia Welland points out in Chapter "Gender and 'Population-centric' Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan", modern COIN doctrine has emphasized the centrality of the civilian population and the local territory to modern counterinsurgency operations. This is generally seen as a 'softer' approach, one that mixes political concessions and improvements to standards of living with 'minimum force' (however that may be defined). The phrase that encapsulates this idea – winning the 'hearts

and minds' of the people – is often associated with Sir Gerard Templar and the British campaign in Malaya in the 1960s, but much of what it suggests, and attempts to bring it into practice to lesser or greater degrees, can be seen throughout the history of irregular war. Complaints highlighted in Gannon's chapter about the 'civilianization' of the police in Palestine in the 1930s (and the 'domesticated' Royal Irish Constabulary earlier) – with the implication that this made them unsuitable or unable to effectively counteract the insurgency – are in stark contrast to the emphasis placed on the 'non-kinetic' approach explored by Julia Welland.

It is also clear that while the rhetoric may favour the 'hearts', the reality can often focus on the 'minds'. As Hew Strachan has put it, 'hearts and minds' was 'not about being nice to the natives, but giving them the firm smack of government. "Hearts and minds" denoted authority, not appeasement'.[32] This is echoed in the Napoleonic approach to pacification operations discussed in Robson's chapter. Both insurgents and counter-insurgents have struggled to balance a desire to win the 'hearts' of the population with what are seen as military necessities. As can be seen in Hughes' chapter on civilians in Ireland, Robson's on the French army in Italy and Egypt, and the Dutch practice of imposing contributions through raiding described by Tim Piceu, resistance by civilians often comes as the result of supposedly unfair exactions made by either insurgents or counterinsurgents on local populations. While in many cases this might be seen as plundering or theft, it can also be part of the acquisition of vital supplies and accommodation in a war zone with no frontline. Where necessities are denied, or coercion is needed to secure them, problems arise. As shown repeatedly in this volume, popular support for irregular fighters greatly increases their capabilities. When that support evaporates or is undermined sufficiently – for whatever reason – it becomes increasingly difficult to operate successfully.

Among the most problematic elements of this form of warfare for its practitioners, and for those who study it, is a significant blurring of the lines between civilian and combatant. Outsiders operating as counter-insurgents face what Stathis Kayvas has termed the 'identification problem': separating the enemy from the general public.[33] Can a civilian who collaborates with either side by, for example, passing information, providing food and accommodation, delivering messages, or storing arms, be considered a civilian anymore? Does it matter if the individual has done so because they were afraid not to and how does one tell whether collaboration is willing or forced? What about passive collaboration, which might

include doing nothing at all? When and how might it be 'lawful' or 'just' to kill civilians? This last question is one that remains contested among law-makers and theorists alike and it has proven consistently difficult to set the boundaries for the protection of non-combatants, particularly as warfare has continued to develop and change over time.[34]

The nineteenth-century Lieber Code (see Chapter "American Civil War Guerrillas") did have provisions insisting that civilian populations be treated humanely, attempting to differentiate between civilians and irregular combatants. Similarly, an important part of the 'limited warfare' thesis which tries to describe changes in Early Modern warfare was avoiding targeting civilian populations. Such conduct may not have been regulated as such, but Hugo Grotius was one respected legal theorist who made it clear that while killing civilians in war had happened and been justified in the past, it could only *justly* occur in very limited circumstances.[35] But attempts to regulate for and define the civilian in war were, generally, slow to develop. The Fourth Geneva Convention, held in 1949, eventually took up where the Lieber Code had left off with regard to the treatment of civilians, but was limited in scope. It focused mainly on the status and protection of civilians in enemy hands, either while living in an occupied territory or as prisoners of war, while doing little or nothing to regulate how war was actually carried out.[36] In 1977 agreement was reached on two Additional Protocols defining the civilian in a more comprehensive way. Protocol I excluded prisoners of war and members of any armed force from its definition of civilian but insisted that in case of doubt, 'that person shall be considered a civilian'. Armed actors of the nations who signed up were required to make the distinction between combatants and civilians and between military targets and civilian objects: 'Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.'[37]

There was progress here, but the historical problem of defining the irregular combatant and categorizing the acts that count as military combat still remains. Additional Protocol I stipulates that civilians are protected under its terms 'unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.' But the very existence of guerrillas who could be farmers or labourers by day and irregular fighters by night problematizes this concept and – aside from the challenge of deciding when a civilian has crossed the line into taking a 'direct part' in combat – the definition suggests that a guerrilla is no longer a combatant once they have returned home or to work, while regular armies or counterinsurgent forces are always legitimate targets.

When faced with irregular opponents operating within communities, traditional armed forces and counterinsurgents may decide to apply selective or indiscriminate violence. Selective violence targets groups and individuals based on their behaviour: assassination, orchestrated raids, or targeted bombing, for example. Indiscriminate violence – such as collective punishments, villagization, genocide – selects victims on the basis of their membership of a particular group and irrespective of their individual actions. Stathis Kalyvas has argued that political actors prefer limited, selective violence (as the 'hearts and minds' rhetoric demonstrates) but this is predicated on good intelligence; indiscriminate violence is easier and more cost effective but often counter-productive.[38] For rebels, similar problems arise when attempting to identify and root out civilians who collaborate with the enemy. As Hughes' chapter makes clear, and as Jeremy Weinstein has argued persuasively, the consequences of suspicion, hearsay, and gossip (founded or otherwise) are important factors in the dynamics of irregular war at the grass-roots.[39]

In the context of twentieth-century wars of decolonization, the boundaries of participation are further blurred by the recruitment of natives into the armed forces of the government or state. In exploring the *harkis*, Muslim Algerian volunteers raised in Algeria by the French to put down the National Liberation Front and the National Liberation Army, Branche's chapter is echoing recent work by Matthew Hughes on pro-British, anti-rebel Palestinian 'peace bands' during the Arab Revolt (1936–9) and Daniel Branch's study of the 'loyalist' Home Guard in Kenya in the 1950s.[40] As Branche demonstrates, the reasons individuals in Algeria took up arms against their compatriots on behalf of the colonial state are complicated, multifarious, and seldom universal. Branche's assertion that many *harkis* signed up to fight on behalf of colonial France simply because there was no alternative employment available reminds us of the difficulty of applying singularly ideological motivations to groups and/or individuals who become irregular fighters. In a similar sense, mercenaries can move from one theatre to another without any ideological commitment to the cause because fighting is all they know, are trained for, or want to do. This broadly 'materialist' set of motivations needs to be incorporated into understandings of situations of small war and instability.

Another group of 'natives' fighting alongside, or in this case assisted by, external forces are the Afghan National Army (ANA) discussed in Welland's chapter. Like the *harkis*, the Kenyan Home Guard, or the Palestinian peace bands, these were non-Western fighters incorporated

into or working alongside Western troops. Studying this dynamic raises a number of important narrative thematics. As can be seen in many of the chapters that follow, the idea that non-Western 'native' fighters had a unique way of waging war, one in many ways a direct contradiction to a range of supposedly Western ideas and values, has had a long shelf-life.[41] Arab or Islamic fighters have been consistently portrayed in Western narratives as possessing a singular capacity for callousness, trickery, and excessive violence. In turn, a maxim is repeatedly proposed suggesting that matching these extremes is the only way to defeat an insurgency in such theatres. Force, it is said, is all that indigenous populations understand and anything less is viewed as weakness. It is, therefore, the native who is best placed to match the violence of the non-Western insurgent.[42]

These assumptions and prejudices raise a number of issues, even if contemporaries either failed to notice or conveniently ignored them. Arab fighters are often seen as 'medieval' and vicious', but also very brave. In the case of the Afghan National Army, the actions of these native fighters – considered excessively aggressive, chaotic, and fanatical – were both lauded and denigrated by the Western troops that they campaigned alongside. If their bravery might be praised, or even envied, their methods of waging war remained inferior in the minds of their white, Western counterparts. Establishing binary categories of military morality overlaid with enmity similarly emerges as an important theme not so much of the conflicts examined by Matthew Lloyd, Alastair Macdonald, and Alexander Hodgkins, but more in the way they have been portrayed since, in many cases by historians. As Brian McGing notes, Tacitus and Polybius enjoyed recounting climactic battles and rarely reported instances of small war. This has skewed historical and popular understandings of warfare in that the huge role played by skirmishing and ambush is often all but written out of narratives.[43] It also provides space for polemical models for characterizing military culture over vast eras and swathes of land. We hope to sketch a more complex panorama whereby within and between states and non-state actors in rebellions, insurgencies, and civil wars, what we now see as archetypically guerrilla tactics were part of a wide range of strategic and tactical choices available to and used by both sets of combatants, reflecting an infinity of wider social and cultural (not to mention technological and environmental) variables.

It is only quite late on that a narrative of the cultural superiority of Western warfare emerges. Traces of it are visible in condemnations of rebels in Hodgkins' chapter and Macdonald makes clear that English polemicists

employed but abandoned it as a way of smearing their Scots rivals. But it comes much more clearly into view in Robson's and Sutherland's contributions, in which condemnations of an opponent's mode of combat rendered him less worthy as a combatant and induced genuine hatred of the enemy, legitimizing atrocity. Although it began to emerge in the eighteenth century, this narrative image of small war and insurgency as 'bad', against which it was permissible for 'good', conventional warfare to employ extreme measures, only really came into its own in the nineteenth century.[44] Although it may have drawn on older patterns of atavistic violence, its modern nature, enmeshed with nations (expressed by their citizen armies), and not just states, appears to have crystallized in intra-European wars and been exported for use in colonial and imperial warfare.

Another distinct, if related, theme is gender and the gendering of war narratives, as covered in Welland's chapter. Masculinity has been an important discursive tool in the history of warfare, not least irregular war, and gender can therefore be seen as a valuable analytical category. Desired and desirable 'masculine' traits of toughness, aggression, courage, and domination can, and have, been demonstrated via military service and combat throughout history. The dominance of this notion has also created a tension between 'enemy-centric' strategies in counterinsurgency – where the object is to attack and defeat the insurgents – and 'population-centric' tactics that are often associated with 'socially-constructed femininity' and seen as subordinate.[45] Welland describes a shift towards a positive emphasis on so-called 'feminine' traits – compassion, sensitivity, concern – in counterinsurgents (both male and female) during the conflict in Afghanistan. Tropes associated with 'militarized masculinity' and praised in other conflicts – and in other chapters in this volume – are being replaced with a 'new masculinity', one that is 'softer' and 'smarter'. And, in Afghanistan, women are being used by Western counterinsurgents specifically for their perceived ability to speak to this new approach. It is also striking – and revealing – the extent to which, with the exception of the female engagement teams (FETs) in Afghanistan, the unconventional fighters in this volume are exclusively male; women are most often collaborators or victims, but not the ones bearing arms (see, for example, the women mentioned in Hughes' chapter).

Perhaps the most common defining feature of the guerrilla is the perception that they operate outside of recognized 'rules' of war. *FM 3–24*, for instance, explicitly acknowledges, by way of warning, that the insurgent is not bound by the rules of war (see Chapter "Gender and

'Population-centric' Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan"). In fact, it might be suggested that it is the insurgents who set the terms of engagement. As Sir Charles Tegart reported of Arab insurgency in 1938, 'The choice of weapon ... really rests with the other side' (see Chapter "'Black-and-Tan tendencies': policing insurgency in the Palestine Mandate, 1922–48"). For guerrillas who considered themselves the victims of illegal or oppressive occupations, there was little logic in playing by the rules of the occupier; the Confederate irregulars in Daniel Sutherland's chapter saw no reason to fight fair against a ruthless foe who had invaded their land. Indeed, Sutherland points out that it was the absence of rules that attracted many Confederate supporters to irregular combat. To a large extent this notion of operating outside of 'regular' rules is one important part of the very essence of what is 'irregular' about these fighters, at least as it is understood by outsiders and opponents. But once again these are fluid boundaries and chapters in this volume demonstrate that ideas about what is within the law or acceptable during war have changed over time. As Macdonald points out, popular military manuals in medieval Scotland saw nothing unchivalrous in the use of deceit and trickery, nor, importantly, did their English opponents. Matthew Lloyd similarly argues that there is nothing in the epic tradition to suggest that day-time pitched battles were incompatible with the night-time raids and ambushes that are so often denounced by their celebrated historians, or that there is anything unheroic about the latter.

Binaries about the 'heroic' and the 'cowardly' are consistently problematic. One of the issues with this sort of terminology is that its use implies value judgements in the same way that the use of 'terrorist' or 'freedom fighter' does. Neither is it the case that such values have remained static over time. Union soldiers in the American Civil War were far from unusual in complaining about 'cowardly' hit and run tactics as employed by irregular Confederates (see Chapter "American Civil War Guerrillas") and while ambushing, avoiding open battle, and theft were considered dishonourable in sixteenth-century Flanders, raiding civilian homes and targeting them with violence was not. Medieval Scotland also sees a clear break with the common depiction of irregulars as 'cowardly', 'uncivilized', or 'uncouth'. Fighting against a stronger and better equipped army there, by whatever means, was in and of itself seen as equitable with moral superiority or, as Macdonald puts it, 'a badge of pride' (see Chapter "Good King Robert's Testament?: Guerrilla Warfare in Later Medieval Scotland").

What follows is a series of interrogations of the issues outlined above. Essays stand as individual case studies, representing fresh thinking and

research on individual instances of unconventional and irregular warfare. Collectively, they work towards a deeper understanding of narratives and discourses that have emerged around the most ubiquitous forms of fighting in history.

Notes

1. US Army et al., *Counterinsurgency: Field Manual 3–24* (Washington, DC, 2006).
2. See, for example, Sibylle Scheipers' discussion of Douglas Porch's work, where she welcomes Porch's rigorous challenge to the 'COINdinista narrative' but also suggests that Porch is too limited in his own critique and fails to place COIN in the broader historiography of irregular warfare: Sibylle Scheipers, 'Counterinsurgency or Irregular Warfare? Historiography and the Study of Small Wars', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25 (2014): 879–899. See also, Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (Cambridge, 2013).
3. For an analysis of this in the context of modern US counterinsurgency, see David Fitzgerald, *Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq* (Stanford, CA, 2013).
4. See, for example, Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60* (London, 1990); John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Iraq* (Chicago, 2002).
5. Andrew Mumford, *The Counterinsurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare* (Oxon, 2012), 25.
6. For a selection of this literature, see David French, *The British Way of Counterinsurgency, 1945–1967* (Oxford, 2012); Huw Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau: British Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency* (Cambridge, 2012); Mumford, *Counterinsurgency Myth*; John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency* (2nd edn, Basingstoke, 2015).
7. French, *British Way*, 2.
8. Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*,
9. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (London, 1993), 578–584.
10. Charles Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain 1808–1814* (New Haven, 2004). See also, Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon* (2nd edn, London, 2015), 233–236.
11. William H. Beik, *Urban Protest in Seventeenth Century France: The Culture of Retribution* (Cambridge, 1997), 132–133, 156–157; Yves-Marie Bercé, *History of Peasant Revolts: The Social Origins of Rebellion in Early Modern France*, trans. Amanda Whitmore (Ithaca, 1990), 145–150.

12. Bercé, *History of Peasant Revolts*, 146, Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, *Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain's Asian Empire* (London, 2007), 179–183, 447–454, Martin Thomas, 'Mapping Violence onto French Colonial Minds' in *The French Colonial Mind, vol. 2*, xxii-xxxiii.
13. Sibylle Scheipers *Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter*, (Oxford, 2015) makes this point, as does Philip Dwyer 'Violence and the revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: massacre, conquest and the imperial enterprise' in *Journal of Genocide Research*, vol. 15 (2013), 120–125 more generally. While for Medieval Europe, Warren Brown, 'Instrumental Terror in Medieval Europe' in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Terrorism* eds. Carola Dietze and Claudia Verhoeven (Oxford, 2014), points to a similar tendency towards legitimized terror being used against armed enemy civilians.
14. John A. Lynn, 'Discourse, Reality and the Culture of Combat' in *The International History Review* 27 (2005): 478–479, Martin Rink, 'The Partisan's Metamorphosis: From Freelance Military Entrepreneur to German Freedom Fighter, 1740–1815' in *War in History* 17 (2010): 8–10, and Gian P. Gentile, 'Counterinsurgency and War' in *The Oxford Handbook of War*, eds. Yves Boyer and Julian Lindley-French (Oxford, 2012), 391–393 point to analogous discursive transformations.
15. Michael Rowe, 'Between Empire and Home Town: Napoleonic Rule on the Rhine 1799–1814', *The Historical Journal* 42 (1999); Michael Broers, *Napoleon's Other War: Bandits, Rebels and their Pursuers in the Age of Revolutions* (Oxford, 2010); Ute Planert, 'From collaboration to Resistance: Politics, Experience and Memory of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Southern Germany' *Central European History* 39 (2006) and Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon*.
16. Gunther E. Rothenberg, 'The Age of Napoleon' in eds. Michael Howard et al., *The Laws of War; Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven, 1994), 90–94.
17. For some discussion of this see John A. Lynn, 'Towards an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789–1815' in *French Historical Studies* 16 (1989), Owen Connolly, 'A Critique of John Lynn's "Towards an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army 1789–1815"' in *French Historical Studies* 16 (1989). Connolly's assertions chime more with conclusions drawn from soldiers' writings.
18. David Parrot, 'Culture of Combat in the Ancien Régime: Linear Warfare, Noble Values and Entrepreneurship' in *The International History Review* 27 (2005).
19. The principal exponent of this projection is Victor D. Hanson, *Why the West has Won: Carnage and Culture from Salamis to Vietnam* (London, 2001).
20. French, *British Way*, 200–218; Fitzgerald, *Learning to Forget*, 3–5.

21. Beatrice Heuser, 'Introduction: Exploring the Jungle of Terminology', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 25 (2014): 741–753.
22. Ibid: 741.
23. Christian Malis, 'Unconventional Forms of War' in *The Oxford Handbook of War*, 186–189.
24. US Army, *Field Manual 3–24* (2006), 1–2.
25. Eric Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies of Archaic Forms of Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Manchester, 1959). This idea was fleshed out in Hobsbawm's *Bandits* (London, 1969).
26. Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, 100–105, Broers, *Napoleon's Other War*, 55–59.
27. Lloyd George quoted in Anne Dolan, 'The British Culture of Paramilitary Violence in the Irish War of Independence' eds. Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War* (Oxford, 2012), 203; For an example of the use of 'murder gang' in propaganda, see Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, 7/4, Charles Howard Foulkes Papers, Draft circular, 'Is the I.R.A. a murder gang'?, c. 1920.
28. For example, Tom Barry, *Guerilla Days in Ireland* (Dublin, 1981; 1st edn. 1949), 60–64, 105, 115.
29. Dáil Éireann Debate, 10 April 1916, vol. F, col. 67.
30. Counterinsurgency is preferred to counter-insurgency in this volume. The commonality of the phrase in modern discourse now suggests it can be viewed as a word in its own right, rather than as a compound.
31. For recent discussions of this topic, see Eunan O'Halpin, 'Problematic Killing During the War of Independence and its Aftermath: Civilian Spies and Informers', eds., James Kelly and Mary Ann Lyons, *Death and dying Ireland, Britain and Europe: historical perspectives* (Dublin, 2013) and Padraig Óg Ó Ruairc, *Truce: Murder, Myth, and the Last Days of the Irish War of Independence* (Cork, 2016), 73–130.
32. Hew Strachan, 'British Counterinsurgency from Malaya to Iraq', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 152 (2007): 8.
33. Quoted in Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge, 2006), 89–91.
34. For some discussion of this issue, see Ian Clark, *Waging War* (2nd edn, Oxford, 2015), 101–106; Uwe Steinhoff, 'Killing Civilians', in *Changing Character*, 381–393; Hugo Slim, *Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War* (London, 2007).
35. Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace, including the Law of Nature and of Nations, translated from the Original Latin of Grotius, with Notes and Illustrations from Political and Legal Writers, by A.C. Campbell, A.M. with an Introduction by David J. Hill* (New York, 1901), 360–362.
36. Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1948 (Article 4, Par. 1).

37. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (Article 50, Par. 1).
38. Stathis N. Kalyvas, 'The paradox of terrorism in civil war', 2003 <http://stathis.research.yale.edu/files/Paradox.pdf> (22 July 2016).
39. Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge, 2007), 167–169, 203–208.
40. Matthew Hughes, 'Palestinian Collaboration with the British: The Peace Bands and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–9', *Journal of Contemporary History* 51 (2016): 291–315; Daniel Branch, The Enemy Within: Loyalists and the War Against Mau Mau in Kenya', *Journal of African History* 48 (2007): 291–315; Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Deconolonization* (Cambridge, 2009).
41. William Gallois, 'Dahra and the History of Violence in Early Colonial Algeria' in *The French Colonial Mind, vol. 2: Violence, Military Encounters and Colonialism*, ed. Martin Thomas (Lincoln, NE, 2011), 8.
42. This theme surfaces in much extra- and even intra-European warfare, whenever conflict has shifted away from the pitched battle model familiar to European state armies since the Medieval period. See Scheipers, *Unlawful Combatants*, 36–42.
43. A prime example of this source-led disappearance of small war from understandings of warfare in the Classical and Medieval world is Victor Davis Hanson, *Why the West has Won*.
44. Scheipers, *Unlawful Combatants*, 67–70.
45. Claire Duncanson and Hilary Cornish, 'A Feminist Approach to British Counterinsurgency', *British Approaches to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan*, ed. Paul Dixon (Basingstoke, 2012), 147.

Dr Brian Hughes is NUI Research Fellow in the Humanities at An Foras Feasa, Maynooth University, Ireland and a historian of modern Ireland, specialising in civilian and grassroots experiences of conflict in revolutionary Ireland. His most recent book is *Defying the IRA? Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities during the Irish Revolution* (2016).

Dr Fergus Robson is Associate Director of the Centre for War Studies and currently lectures on Napoleonic Europe in Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland. He is a specialist on resistance and rebellion during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Empire. His recent work on French soldiers' cultural encounters with Italians and Egyptians complements his interest in the contested creation of national identities and states.

PART I

Insurgents, Counterinsurgency, and Civilians in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Gender and 'Population-centric' Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Julia Welland

The 'Long War' in Afghanistan (2001–14) challenged a number of traditional conceptions about what war is. Not only did the conflict deny a clear-cut victory for either the US-led invading forces or the Taliban, but it also provided the context for the revival of counter-insurgency doctrine and practice. Counterinsurgency – a term first popularized by John F. Kennedy in 1960 – can be defined as 'asymmetrical warfare by a powerful military against irregular combatants supported by a civilian population'. While the term may originate in the mid-twentieth century, 'this particular method of fighting has long been the mainstay of colonial war-fighting and imperial policing', including British colonial fighting during the Malayan Emergency (1948–60) and against the 'Mau Mau' uprising in Kenya (1952–60), and US imperialistic missions in the Philippines (1899–1903) and against the communist threat in Vietnam (1965–73).[1] Unlike 'conventional' warfare between states, counterinsurgency sees a 'regular' armed force deal with the threat of 'irregular combatants'. These 'unconventional forces' have been known 'through history as "insurgents", "rebels", "partisans", or "guerrillas" [and] are an armed segment of a

J. Welland (✉)
Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, England
e-mail: J.Welland@warwick.ac.uk

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population unwilling to submit themselves to a state authority, a particular regime or an ideology'.[2]

Counterinsurgency utilizes not just a military response to these unconventional forces, but employs economic, social, political, and psychological agendas in their effort to overcome them. As the conflict in Afghanistan merged from conventional war to occupation and back into war-fighting again, military strategists agreed that a shift from conventional 'search and destroy' tactics was needed in order to secure a safe and stable Afghanistan for the future.[3] In line with the majority of post-Cold War counterinsurgencies, the approach taken in Afghanistan was that of 'population-centric' counterinsurgency, 'in which the civilian population is persuaded to defect to the counterinsurgent forces'.[4] In comparison to 'enemy-centric' counterinsurgency, predicated on the use of violence to deter civilians from cooperating with the insurgents, population-centric counterinsurgency combines both 'kinetic' and 'non-kinetic'[5] elements. It was this shift towards the non-kinetic and the centrality of the civilian population that was central to the counterinsurgency doctrine implemented in Afghanistan.

Population-centric counterinsurgency – or 'COIN' as it came to be shortened to – was implemented as the central military doctrine in Afghanistan in 2009. The doctrine drew heavily on *Field Manual (FM) 3–24*, written by the US General David Petraeus and a team of advisors, and had been previously implemented in Iraq in 2006. *FM 3–24* forwarded 'a strategy that stood in stark contrast to the "shock-and-awe" campaign that was successful in bringing down Saddam Hussein's regime but failed in the reconstruction phase'.[6] In COIN, as understood in *FM 3–24*, it was the civilian population, not the enemy's military that was located as the centre of gravity. *FM 3–24* states that civilian protection is not only part of the counterinsurgent mission, but is its '*most important part*'.[7] Civilians are also included in the very *doing* of counterinsurgency. Civilian participation via political leadership is involved at every level of operations, as well as in 'non-kinetic activities' such as the building of infrastructure, the provision of jobs, and the creation of a functioning legal system, all of which acquire increasing importance given the primacy of political rather than military goals.[8]

What does this 'new' population-centric form of counterinsurgency have to do with gender? Feminists have long argued that war (and peacekeeping) is both gendered and gendering.[9] There has also been a sustained feminist engagement with the Afghanistan conflict; notably in relation to the ways in which women's rights were co-opted and instrumentalized in order to

garner support for the 2001 invasion.[10] Like all war-making, therefore, COIN requires specific constructions of masculinity and femininity in order 'to produce particular narratives, justifications and practices'.[11] This chapter explores how gender is integral to understanding the recent turn towards counterinsurgency and the implications of this for both the type of warfare enacted and the ways in which masculinities and femininities are rendered visible. Firstly, the chapter details the particular type of militarized masculinity required for population-centric counterinsurgency: one that has been reimagined as softer and gentler, and rendered distinct from the insurgent masculinities it fights and the masculinities of the Afghan security forces it fights alongside. The chapter then explores related ways in which COIN can be understood as a conduct of war that has seen a greater visibility of femininity – both physically and conceptually. While war has traditionally been assumed to be an almost exclusively masculine domain, COIN has allowed for, even needed, women's bodies on the front line in the form of so-called 'Female Engagement Teams', as well as the 'feminine' attributes of compassion and concern. The chapter ends with some conclusions regarding the effects of this gendered and gendering counterinsurgency.

Throughout this chapter, following Synne Dyvik, 'gender is understood as a concept that encompasses much more than a biologically grounded and predetermined understanding of physical bodies recognizable as "women" and "men"'.[12] Use of the term 'masculine' does not simply refer to sexed bodies that (are presumed to) bear the physiological characteristics that distinguish a body as 'male'; likewise, 'feminine' does not simply refer to sexed bodies that (are presumed to) bear the physiological characteristics that distinguish a body as 'female'. Rather, drawing on Judith Butler, gender is understood as performative and fluid, with masculinity and femininity flowing between sexed bodies (with sex itself also constructed by the social conventions of gender), and its performances having real effects on the practices of counterinsurgency.[13]

A Softer and Gentler Form of Soldiering

A burgeoning feminist and pro-feminist literature on gender and militaries reveals the ways in which militaries both produce and rely on particular gendered identities for their everyday workings and the enactment of force at home and abroad. One particular focus of this scholarship has been the specific type of masculinity required for war-fighting; a gendered subjectivity that has come to be termed as 'militarized masculinity'.[14] Following

Maya Eichler, at its most basic level militarized masculinity can be understood as 'the assertion that traits stereotypically associated with masculinity can be acquired and proven through military service or action, and combat in particular', and that this gendered subjectivity 'is central to the perpetuation of violence within international relations'.[15]

While the literature on militarized masculinities suggests a heterogeneity of military personnel and a range of gendered characteristics, behaviours, and traits that they encompass, assumptions about an 'idealized' militarized masculine subjectivity – and the combat soldier in particular – have solidified around associations with 'toughness, violence, aggression, courage, control and domination'.[16] After all, combat soldiers are expected to go into battle, kill, and do everything possible to avoid being killed themselves. However, when war is not primarily concerned with the annihilation of the enemy, and when it is the 'hearts and minds' of the civilian population that is central to the mission, to what extent must a militarized masculine subjectivity also shift and change?

Laleh Khalili has argued that the counterinsurgency doctrines of Iraq and Afghanistan were gendered in the ways they were formulated, put into practice, and experienced. Presented as the opposite of a 'hyper-masculine' and 'more mechanised, technologically advanced, higher-fire-power form of warfare', Khalili claims that counterinsurgency is itself gendered feminine.[17] Drawing attention to a 'new form of masculinity' that she understands as emerging in the location where COIN policy and doctrine is produced, Khalili terms this new form of (militarized) masculinity, 'the humanitarian soldier-scholar', whose 'softened' and 'sensitive' masculinity is 'authorised by . . . neo-liberal feminism' that 'over-shadows the hyper-masculinity of warrior kings'.[18] Unlike the raw physical masculinity of a warrior, these soldier-scholars 'are not interested in chest-thumping gestures, [they] deploy the language of "hearts and minds" much more readily and see their wont as being the wielders of softer or smarter power'.[19]

Building on Khalili's attention to counterinsurgency's production of new masculinities, but extending it from the location where COIN doctrine was produced to the everyday spaces in Afghanistan where it was enacted, a specific conceptualization of militarized masculinity can be traced. In the population-centric counterinsurgency context of Afghanistan, soldiers were expected to live, move, and work amongst the local population; to talk with them, listen to them, and earn their trust. As already noted, in Afghanistan the real battle was for 'civilian support for, or

acquiescence to, the counterinsurgents and host nation government'.[20] The priority therefore was for counterinsurgents to engage with the local community and create an environment where governance and development could flourish. Everyday counterinsurgency practices included holding *shuras*[21] with village elders, where senior military personnel would listen to concerns raised by locals and keep them updated with the security in their locality, ensuring the provision and safe passage of humanitarian relief, and contributing towards the repairing or building of infrastructure projects. In this context, an effective and idealized militarized masculinity may better encompass compassion, restraint, and cooperation, rather than aggression, toughness, and domination.

Suggestions, however, that the militarized masculinity of a counterinsurgent is in some way feminized or less masculine than a 'conventional' combat soldier is strongly contested, both by those responsible for drafting the doctrine and the soldiers responsible for enacting it. During a speech to the US Government Counterinsurgency Conference, David Kilcullen, an Australian counterinsurgency expert who helped design and monitor the Iraq war troop surge under General Petraeus, stated in relation to counterinsurgency tactics:

> If this [counterinsurgency] sounds soft, non-lethal and non-confrontational, it is not: this is life-and-death competition in which the loser is marginalized, starved of support and ultimately destroyed .... There is no known way of doing counterinsurgency without inflicting casualties on the enemy: there is always a lot of killing, one way or another.[22]

Such a statement tallies with figures released by the UK Ministry of Defence in response to a Freedom of Information request from a British newspaper. These figures reveal that between 2006, when British forces deployed to Helmand, southern Afghanistan, and their withdrawal in 2014, they fired 46 million rounds of ammunition at the Taliban. Up to two million rounds were fired from 9 mm handguns, suggesting close-range combat with the enemy; around 10,000 bullets a day were fired from troops' SA-80 assault rifles and light machine guns; at least 80,000 105 mm shells were fired from light artillery guns used to attack targets two miles away; and 55,000 bullets were fired from the 30 mm cannons attached to Apache helicopters.[23] Afghanistan required not only counterinsurgents who could win the hearts and minds of the local population, but also highly masculinized combat soldiers.

Central to this (re)masculinization of the counterinsurgent was the continued emphasis on risk and the threat of physical violence they were exposed to. *FM 3–24* explicitly states that counterinsurgency actually requires soldiers to assume *more* risk. Not only is the success of COIN premised on a reduction in the use of force, the manual also demands that soldiers interact with a local population infiltrated by the enemy. This, the manual states, 'is inherently dangerous'. Dangerous because the insurgent exploits the civilian: 'Guerrillas dress in civilian clothes, hide behind women, use children as spotters, and store weapons in schools and hospitals'.[24] The counterinsurgency soldier therefore faces danger whether confronted by an insurgent or when engaging with the civilian population they are supposed to protect.

The counterinsurgency environment of Afghanistan detailed above requires a counterinsurgent who is both war-fighter and nation-builder; one who is capable of deploying lethal force but knows when to hold it back and who combines the 'hard' masculinity of combat and command with the 'soft' femininity of compassion and humanitarianism. While counterinsurgency soldiers are expected to be integral to the peacebuilding process, they are also expected to put themselves in harm's way and engage in combat and violence. It is not that force or kinetic power is no longer used, but that it is deployed differently and – according to COIN doctrine – more sparingly. Counterinsurgency has therefore provided the context for the emergence of a 'new' militarized masculinity. It suggests a softer and gentler approach to soldiering, while the warrior capabilities and technological superiority long associated with Western militaries remains intact.

Colonial Other(ing)s

The so-called 'Orient' has long been considered a location of deviance, brutality, and sexual excess. In *Orientalism*, Edward Said notes that since the late eighteenth century the region has been designated as a site of particular libidinous natures and eroticism.[25] Today, stories told about the Middle East or Arabic and Islamic cultures reference 'medieval' forms of violence, the practice of men taking multiple wives, and an assumed proclivity towards homosexuality. These colonial and orientalist understandings of the region continue to inform and shape understandings and representations of those who live there. Thus, while the counterinsurgency environment provided the context for the emergence and production of a 'new'

militarized masculinity, it also emerged in and through these long-standing orientalist discourses and in relation to other(ed) masculinities. In particular, NATO counterinsurgency soldiers were rendered visible in contrast to both duplicitous and violent insurgent fighters, and their lazy, disorganized, and homosexualized counterparts in the Afghan security forces.

In line with COIN's positioning of the population, as opposed to the territory, as the battlefield, General Petraeus used his first tactical directive since assuming command of the international forces in Afghanistan in 2010 to 'double down on the orders imposed by his predecessor [General Stanley McChrystal] that put a premium on protecting civilians first'.[26] Petraeus tightened the rules of engagement that had previously prohibited NATO forces from calling in air strikes on village compounds where the enemy might have been mixed in with civilians by expanding it to a ban on air strikes and artillery fire on 'all types of building, tree-lined areas and hillsides where it is difficult to distinguish who is on the ground'.[27] Further measures included a curb on the small-arms fire that had yielded a steady stream of fatalities at checkpoints and in night-time raids on private residences. Echoing *FM 3–24's* assertion that 'killing the civilian is no longer just collateral damage', Petraeus stated: 'Every Afghan civilian death diminishes our cause'.[28]

However, the insurgents who faced these counterinsurgency soldiers and their strict rules of engagement were represented as fighters who did not play by the same 'rules of the game'. *FM 3–24* observes that the 'rules' favour the insurgent and that '[t]he contest of internal war is not fair'.[29] While COIN doctrine is explicit about avoiding civilian casualties, insurgents 'kill civilians to show that the government can't protect its own citizens'.[30] Likewise, the rules of engagement that governed NATO forces' actions in battle with enemy combatants – what General McChrystal termed 'courageous restraint' – caused some soldiers to complain they were being forced to fight with 'one hand tied behind [their] backs' and blocked soldiers who were being shot at from shooting back.[31] The insurgent, meanwhile, is understood as bound by no such conventions and engages in violence that is cruel, barbaric, and beyond the pale of 'conventional' warfare. Describing the rhetoric of the 'new wars' of the 'West' and 'East', Derek Gregory writes that while 'our' new wars are represented as those fought by professional armies and high-precision weaponry, with an emphasis on international law and violence directed towards combatants, 'their' new wars are fought using improvised weapons, are outside international law, and engage in indiscriminate killings.[32]

In his study of military orientalism, Patrick Porter demonstrates that several military historians frame 'oriental' warfare – and 'Islamic' warfare in particular – as 'different and apart from European warfare', specifically with regard to its reliance on 'evasion, delay and indirectness'.[33] Narratives such as these claim that whereas those in the West have 'historically preferred direct battle fought with guile to smash the enemy … the "Islamic" way of war chose standoff weapons, deceit and attacking enemy cohesion'.[34] The tactics of the insurgents are represented as barbaric, sly, and uncivilized. These characteristics are in turn remapped onto the bodies and masculinities of the insurgents themselves – supported and informed by a long history of colonial terms that encounters between the East and West have been portrayed and understood through. As the insurgents' masculinity – and the masculinities of Arab and Muslim men more widely – becomes associated and solidified around these characteristics, the counterinsurgent's militarized masculinity is associated and solidified in opposition to them.

Insurgent masculinities, however, are not the only masculinities that counterinsurgent subjectivities are produced in relation to. One of the key responsibilities of NATO forces in Afghanistan was training the local security forces in order to ensure security and stability once international forces left the country. American Embedded Training Teams and NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) were embedded in Afghan units as trainers and mentors, and tasked with facilitating the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA).[35] OMLTs mentored ANA leaders on issues such as leadership, implementation of doctrine, operational procedures, tactics, and 'on the job training' during operations in the field. OMLTs also provided crucial combat enablers such as fire support, MEDEVAC, command and control, and close air support.[36] NATO troops who were a part of these OMLTs would eat, sleep, patrol, and fight 'alongside soldiers of the ANA on a daily basis', with official rhetoric emphasizing the partnership and cooperation between the two sides.[37] While relationships formed between NATO soldiers and their Afghan counterparts within OMLTs could disrupt the dominant colonial logics through which the conflict and its male population were predominantly understood, they could also work to remap and rearticulate divisions and distinctions between the white and civilized militarized masculinities of the counterinsurgents, and the non-white and primitive masculinities of the local population.

These distinctions were primarily mapped through two particular orientalist discourses: that of the feminization and homosexualization of

Afghan men, and – somewhat paradoxically – Afghan men's hyper-masculinization and uncontrollability.[38] Beginning with the former: in Western media reporting and Western soldier memoirs of the Afghanistan conflict there was a preoccupation with the bodies of Afghan soldiers, about what their bodies looked like and what their bodies did, particularly with regard to their sexuality. Frequent and repeated references were made with regard to Afghan soldiers' perceived more effeminate appearance: their hennaed hair, kohl-rimmed eyes, and the flowers that adorned their weaponry and vehicles. Patrick Hennessey, a former officer in the British Army who served in Afghanistan, wrote that his first overwhelming impression of the ANA was that of 'sheer physical difference'.[39] While Hennessey and his fellow British infantrymen embodied the archetypal militarized masculine figure ('all over 6 foot tall … Giant, strapping, pink … with similarly cropped hair'), the ANA were 'small', 'scruffy as hell', and likened to children.[40] While feminists have long noted that the conflation of women with children is a way to infantilize women and femininity, this example shows its inversion: the infantalization of men to implicitly feminize them.[41] Such feminization is compounded by the deployment of orientalist tropes of (homo)sexualization, sexual lasciviousness, and deviance.

NATO troops who worked alongside Afghan soldiers reported unease with the behaviour of their comrades. Afghan soldiers were affectionate with one another, held hands, and sometimes wore make-up. According to one British newspaper, in order for Western troops to better understand the sexual behaviour of Afghan men and security forces a report was commissioned as part of the Human Terrain Systems Project.[42] The American social scientist Maria Cardinalli's 2010 report concluded that a 'culturally-contrived homosexuality … appears to affect a far greater population base then [*sic*] researchers would argue is attributable to natural inclination'.[43] Not only does such a statement rearticulate orientalist assumptions that mark homosexuality as something 'Arab' men are culturally predisposed toward, but also that homosexuality affects more men than is 'natural', thus marking the Afghan soldiers as deviant in both their sexual preferences and their numbers.[44]

Given the intimate links between masculine gender, heterosexual competency, and soldiering in Western militaries, it follows that the perceived effeminacy and homosexuality of the Afghan forces led to doubts over their combat ability by the NATO troops responsible for their training.[45] Two seemingly opposed concerns are frequently mentioned. Firstly, that ANA troops appeared to fear, or be unwilling to engage in, training or

fighting. Soldier memoirs describe that when opportunities for training would arise 'a mysterious bell would ring, and the ANA would all disappear on cue – prayers, lunch, siesta, we never really knew to where', and that the ANA were 'not really interested in doing any serious training'.[46] At an institutional level the ANA appeared to be written out of the Afghanistan mission, with a 'quasi-official history' of one British regiment's tour failing to mention the ANA at all.[47] While in these representations Afghan soldiers are feminized through their separation from the combat zone, doubts about their fighting credentials also stem from their representation as hyper-masculinized and excessively violent.

Descriptions of ANA fighting often portray it as uninhibited, chaotic, and unrestrained. Hennessey uses the Afghan word, *kharkus*, to describe the ANA's fighting style, meaning a mixture of crazy and brave.[48] These portrayals build on a long history of understandings of 'martial races'[49] and evoke a mixture of both envy and reservation in the Western soldiers who fight alongside Afghan soldiers. Just as the 'Islamic' way of fighting has been portrayed as barbaric and uncivilized, Islamic fighters have been portrayed not as disciplined and hierarchically ordered soldiers, but rather as 'Muslim warriors' who have an innate or intuitive need to fight and who demonstrate fanatical displays of bravery (and violence) in combat. This same fanaticism is what marks enemy 'Muslim warriors' as so dangerous or as those who will never surrender or negotiate, and therefore demand exemplary forms of violence to be used against them.[50] Faced with these representations Western military personnel experience a sense of envy for the abandonment of control and the separation of fighting from instrumental purposes and complex battle plans. In contrast, discipline and control are central to the counterinsurgency militarized masculinity constructed and produced in these spaces and in relation to these other(ed) subjects. Their recourse to violence – of which they are more than capable – is underwritten with the assumption that it is legitimate, proportionate, and controlled. Orientalism, 'a mixed bag of self-glorification and self-doubt', means that the ANA and their actions are both desired and disparaged, both envied and denied.[51] Ultimately, however, Afghan soldiers' lack of discipline, *kharkus* fighting, and kohl-rimmed eyes signal simultaneously a lack and an excess of masculinity, positioning their masculinity as always subordinate to that of the Western counterinsurgency soldier.

In the counterinsurgency environment an idealized militarized masculine subjectivity is produced not merely through COIN policy and

doctrine, but also through soldiers' everyday *doing* of counterinsurgency and their relation with other bodies and masculinities that occupy the warscape. In the differences between the 'courageous restraint' of the counterinsurgency soldier and the unmediated violence of the insurgent, and in their carefully constructed and measured masculinity in comparison to the simultaneously effeminate and hyper-masculinized local fighting forces, a counterinsurgency soldier is shaped and moulded. At the same time, this softer and gentler militarized masculinity rearticulates and reinforces the ultimate goals and mission of counterinsurgency as humanitarian, justified, and legitimate.

Rendering the Feminine Visible

As militarized masculinity was reshaped and remoulded in line with the needs and demands of counterinsurgency, the operation and practice of femininities also underwent a change. Notably, in the COIN environment of Afghanistan, femininity became increasingly visible; both physically in the bio-female bodies of women soldiers and conceptually in the need for more 'feminine' characteristics such as compassion for the effective doing of counterinsurgency.

War has traditionally been perceived as an almost exclusively male and masculine zone. When women did materialize and become visible in the warscape, they did so not as soldiers or warriors, but as 'camp followers' – as nurses, sex workers, and the numerous other women responsible for ensuring male soldiers are 'combat-ready'.[52] However, while women and femininity have always been integral to the fighting of wars, in Western militaries it wasn't until the end of the twentieth century that women began increasingly populating ranks more directly associated with combat and combat support. The Gulf War (1991–92) was considered a watershed moment, with 35,000 women deployed from the American armed forces, making up 7 per cent of the total military personnel deployed.[53] It was the largest single deployment of women in history. Women served as aircraft pilots, logistical support, and in supply and repair units.[54] This trend continued during the 2001 invasion into Afghanistan and the US and UK's second incursion into Iraq in 2003. Today, around 14 per cent of the American armed forces are female; more than 280,000 women participated in a tour of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, or contributed to the war effort in these countries from an overseas base.[55] In the UK, the second largest

troop-contributing country to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 9.8 per cent of the armed forces are female, with reports suggesting women made up around a fifth of the 8,000 British service personnel deployed to Afghanistan.[56]

Thus, while women have been deployed to warzones for years, what has been distinct about women's involvement in COIN was the instrumentalization of their gender in very particular ways, specifically in the use of 'Female Engagement Teams' (FETs). In 2009 the few women US Marines in Afghanistan were drawn together to form the first FETs. These all-women teams were attached to men-only units and tasked with meeting and speaking with Afghan women in order to find out what their concerns and needs might be. The following year, the Marine Corps began to formally train women members for duty on FETs, with 40 deploying to southern Afghanistan.[57] FETs visited Afghan women in their homes, distributed humanitarian supplies and, in cooperation with district governments, taught health classes.[58] Crucially, what FETs made possible was interaction with a segment of the population that until that point, due to their gender, had been largely excluded from counterinsurgency efforts.[59]

Just as the gender of the FETs allowed them access to Afghan women, the 'feminine' qualities of both the women soldiers and the role of the FETs signalled towards the soft power of counterinsurgency. Given that women remained barred from serving in combat branches during FET involvement in Afghanistan, the use of women soldiers in this way illustrated that this was not a conventional military deployment.[60] As McBride and Wibben note, women soldiers were allowed to be attached to frontline men-only units and carry out these tasks 'based upon gendered assumptions':

> Because of the ways in which tradition and religion condition Afghan women's lives, it is assumed that only women will have access to them – and that, because they are women, they are not "real" (read: manly) soldiers; as such, they will be perceived as nonthreatening. These assumptions are shared by both U.S. males and Afghans.[61]

A report by Matt Pottinger et al., the cofounders and trainers of the first FET in Afghanistan, quoted Afghan men saying, 'Your men come to fight, but we know the women are here to help.' The report noted that 'the presence of female Marines softened and facilitated the interaction with

local men and children', with Pashtun men actually 'show[ing] a preference for interacting with them over U.S. men'.[62]

Finally, like the other(ed) masculine subjectivities of the insurgents and local security forces, the femininity and visibility of the FETs did important work in the legitimation and justification of the military intervention and COIN doctrine. Like the softer and gentler counterinsurgency militarized masculinity, FETs helped frame the intervention as a benevolent and humanitarian mission. Furthermore, FETs justified the intervention by reinforcing the 'civilizational superiority' of the Western nations to their publics back home.[63] Following a long colonial tradition – including British colonial law banning the Hindu practice of *sati*[64] in India in the nineteenth century and French colonialists in Algeria using the veiling of women as proof of Algerian women's oppression and justification for the ongoing colonialism – of using the bodies of women as key 'civilizational' markers, women's bodies were made (hyper)visible in very particular ways throughout Afghanistan's 'Long War'. While in the opening months of the invasion, the bodies of Afghan women were co-opted and became *the* signifier of the Taliban's monstrosity and incivility, in the closing years of the intervention it was the bodies of women counterinsurgents that became the surface upon which the progressiveness of the mission and the civility of troop-contributing nations were written.

It is not, however, just the feminine bodies of women soldiers that have increased in visibility in the counterinsurgency context. 'Feminine' characteristics such as compassion and empathy have also emerged as central to COIN. Both scholars studying the military and soldiers themselves have long noted that military training has conventionally been structured so as to obliterate the feminine traits of passivity, weakness, and emotionality within recruits. Not only does basic training continue to privilege the assumed masculine attributes of strength, aggression, and physical and mental endurance, but recruits also face a variety of gendered, raced, and sexualized insults crafted to play upon his or her specific feminine or masculine anxieties. Insults include: 'whore', 'faggot', 'sissy', 'cunt', 'ladies', 'pussy', and sometimes simply 'you woman'.[65] For Sandra Whitworth, the aggressively gendered terms that military training is organized and enacted through come as little surprise due to the intimate connections between military organizations and hegemonic representations of masculinity. Whitworth states that the 'myths of manhood' inculcated in a soldier during basic training rely upon a recruit denying all that is soft and feminine within

himself.[66] A soldier emerging from basic training will be 'both physically and emotionally tough, portraying little emotion, with the possible exceptions of anger and aggression'.[67]

A straightforward expulsion of femininity within the military, however, is never entirely possible. Soldiering involves many traditionally feminine traits such as 'total obedience and submission to authority, the attention to dress detail, and the endless repetition of mundane tasks that enlisted men … are expected to perform'.[68] Nonetheless, in the figure of the softer and gentler militarized masculinity required for counterinsurgency, traits conventionally associated with femininity are not only explicitly retained, but are privileged. Given that gaining the trust and winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population are at the centre of COIN, the feminized attributes of collaboration, communication, and empathy are considered more appropriate to the needs and demands of counterinsurgency than the more traditional and masculinized soldiering qualities of violence, aggression, and domination.

Compassion is one emotion that has assumed a central importance in the understanding and doing of counterinsurgency. It is an emotion that opens the one who experiences it up to another's suffering, positioning the experiencer in direct relation with another and gives rise to a desire to alleviate that suffering, to engage in what Carol Gilligan called an 'ethic of care'.[69] As a sentiment that entails a revelation of vulnerability and an engagement in empathetic relations, compassion has been understood as distinctly feminine and one that is assumed as outside the (masculine) soldiering experience. However, in counterinsurgency, soldiers live amongst the host population, and listen and respond to their concerns and needs. Thus, soldiers are now expected to engage in empathetic and compassionate relations with those they have been sent to protect. Compassion therefore emerged as a central framing device for understanding the long military involvement in Afghanistan and was visible in soldiers' encounters with both civilians *and* enemy insurgents.[70]

Although the Afghanistan conflict was framed, in part, through a national security discourse in both the US and UK, when soldiers were asked about their personal reasons for joining a military embroiled in two active wars, responses often tended – particularly as the intervention stretched on – to assume a more humanitarian explanation than the security of their home nation. UK Guardsman David Walton told a journalist: 'It's not often in life that you get a chance to help people and defend the country, and that's what I think we are doing here'.[71] Likewise,

in his memoir of his time in Afghanistan, Sergeant Doug Beattie recalled that what kept him going during battle was the 'idea that you are doing what is right, that you are helping people'.[72] Many soldiers appear genuinely excited about getting involved with the local population, with doing something more than just war-fighting, and have an unself-conscious desire to 'do good'. Claire Duncanson has written about soldiers' empathy with the local population: although some soldiers engage in 'Radical Othering', they also describe the local population 'using terms such as friendly, loyal, brave, proud and lovely, and report building genuine relationships and attachments'.[73] Duncanson argued that a 'peacebuilding masculinity' could be constructed through interactions with Afghan civilians and security forces, and 'through relations of equality, empathy, care, respect and recognition of similarities and shared experiences'.[74] For Duncanson, this masculinity does not just substitute one hierarchical binary for another – for example, a denigrated hyper-masculinized Muslim insurgent replacing the feminized peace-loving woman in relation to a celebrated white, Western, and militarized man – but upends and dismantles the binary, thus having the potential to 'contribute to peace and security, even perhaps the undoing of Empire'.[75]

As noted above, while insurgents' masculinity is read as violent, cruel, and brutal through the tactics they use and orientalist logics, this is not the only way in which the counterinsurgency soldiers of Western states relate to them. For Duncanson, a 'peacebuilding masculinity' means that enemy soldiers are not always simply dehumanized, noting that British soldier memoirs often 'express admiration and respect for the insurgents they are fighting'.[76] It is not, however, only admiration and respect that counterinsurgents show enemy fighters; they show compassion too. Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Tootal describes a Taliban fighter receiving medical care by British soldiers despite fighting them only moments earlier.[77] Sergeant Beattie explains why he removes the plastic cuffs binding a captured and dying Taliban fighter: 'If he was going to die in a strange place, surrounded by the faces of his enemy, then at least he was going to have a degree of dignity.'[78] While such demonstrations of compassion reflect the etymological roots of the word – deriving from the Latin *com*, together, and *pati*, to suffer – suggesting an emotion felt on behalf of another who suffers and thus a relationality with them, it can also work to remap differentiations between the insurgent fighter and a counterinsurgency militarized masculinity, (re)producing the Western soldier as compassionate, empathetic, and morally superior in contradistinction to the violent enemy other.[79]

In both their relations with the local civilian population and enemy insurgents, the feminine emotion of compassion was crucial to the doing of counterinsurgency and the discursive construction of the project and militarized masculinities as softened and humanitarian in Afghanistan. Rather than traits and characteristics associated with the feminine being expelled or denigrated, they occupied a central and hypervisible location in which narratives and 'making sense' of the counterinsurgency project took place.

Conclusions: The Effects of Gendering Counterinsurgency

The counterinsurgency environment of Afghanistan and the shift to 'population-centric' warfare provided the context for the emergence of a softer and gentler militarized masculinity and the rendering visible of femininity both physically and conceptually. As this chapter has shown, however, gendered subjectivities were not only constructed in and through the practice of counterinsurgency, but were themselves constitutive of understandings, justifications, and legitimations of the long military intervention. The counterinsurgency militarized masculinity – particularly when positioned in relation to the violence of the insurgent, or the effeminacy or hyper-masculinity of the local security forces – was central for understanding the mission in a humanitarian framework. Likewise, the visibility of the (white, Western) feminine body in the use of FETs not only reiterated the benevolence of the military intervention, but also signalled towards the civilizational superiority of the interveners. As Dyvik has noted, counterinsurgency has 'appropriated women's bodies and lives in order to function'.[80] Finally, 'feminine' traits such as compassion and concern for others, which would have previously been expelled from the masculine soldiering subject, were privileged and even prioritized over and above more traditional masculinized characteristics, reflecting and emphasizing the claims that this was a campaign where the civilian was at its centre.

While gender is therefore central to understanding the operation of COIN in Afghanistan, I want to gesture towards two specific effects of the gendered and gendering of counterinsurgency. First, as this chapter has demonstrated, counterinsurgency has engendered a feminizing of the conflict zone; war is represented as softer, gentler, and more concerned with civilians and humanitarianism. This re-gendered understanding of conflict allowed for a more intimate form of warfare – a type of

engagement where it was no longer just the battlefield that was subject to soldiering presence and warfare was no longer purely concerned with the military defeat of the enemy. Instead, counterinsurgency permeated into spaces, places, and people that had been ignored by military planners and strategists in the opening months and even years of the conflict. The use of FETs meant that Afghan women became the 'target' of counterinsurgency operations, and the private sphere of Afghan homes became a public space of military engagement.[81] The everyday practices, lives, and doings of the Afghan population were no longer simply background to the military intervention, but their observation and regulation became integral for its success. The second and related effect of gendered/gendering counterinsurgency is that this less masculinized form of soldiering and war has led to a renewed seduction of militarism. The softer and gentler militarized masculinity and 'feminized' operations of counterinsurgency worked very effectively at disconnecting their practices from the simultaneous violence that continued throughout the military intervention. Violence that remained a central and continuous aspect of the thirteen-year 'Long War': from the vast amounts of ordnance rained down on and disgorged on Afghanistan detailed above, to news stories of illegitimate killings,[82] the collecting of Afghan body parts,[83] and the abuse of the local population,[84] the lives and livelihoods of Afghanistan were marked by violence. Indeed, even practices such as engaging with Afghan women and going on soft-hatted patrols were integral for the gathering of information for later airstrikes or other kinetic operations, yet these violences remained radically separated from the humanitarian discourses that framed counterinsurgency. Gender is thus shaped and (re)produced by counterinsurgency, provides a framework for its understanding and justification, and is integral to its concealments and seductions.

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Notes

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3. Paul Dixon, 'The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: "Hearts and Minds" from Malaya to Afghanistan', in *The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan*, ed. Paul Dixon (Hampshire, 2012), 1–48, 29.
4. Khalili, 'Gendered Practices', 1472.
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16. Ibid. 82.
17. Khalili, 'Gendered', 1473.
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45. Welland, 'Liberal Warriors', 298; see also: Welland, 'Militarised Violences'.
46. Hennessey, *Kandak*, 45; Leo Docherty, *Desert of Death: A Soldier's Journey From Iraq to Afghanistan* (London, 2007), 88.
47. Hennessey, *Kandak*, 98.
48. Ibid. 88.
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50. It is this presumed 'irrationality' of Muslim (male) fighters that also marks the bodies of Muslim men in Western societies, thus positioning them as inherently suspicious and potentially dangerous to society.
51. Porter, *Military Orientalism*, 29; Welland, 'Liberal Warriors', 299–300.
52. Enloe, *Manoeuvres*.
53. Rosemarie Skaine, *Women at War: Gender Issues of Americans in Combat* (North Carolina, 1999), 64–65.
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55. *The Guardian*, 25 January 2013.
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59. Dyvik, 'Women as "Practitioners"', 410.
60. McBride and Wibben, 'The Gendering', 209. In 2013 the US announced the lifting of the ban that excluded women from combat roles. The UK continues to exclude women from combat roles.
61. Ibid. 210.
62. Pottinger, 'Half-Hearted'.

63. McBride and Wibben, 'The Gendering', 210.
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65. Sandra Whitworth, Sandra, 'Militarized Masculinity and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder', in *Rethinking the Man Question: Sex, Gender and Violence in International Relations*, eds Jane Parpart and Marysia Zalewski (London, 2008): 109–26, 112.
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82. For example, Sergeant Alexander Blackman, the British Royal Marine who was convicted of murdering an injured Taliban insurgent and was caught on video stating, 'There you are, shuffle off this mortal coil, you cunt. It's nothing you wouldn't do to us', before shooting the fighter at point-blank range: *The Guardian*, 6 December 2013.

83. For example, the US army's so-called 'kill team', who hunted Afghan civilians for sport and collected their body parts as 'trophies': *The Guardian*, 11 November 2011.
84. For example, in 2011 a British soldier stabbed a ten year-old Afghan boy in the kidneys with the bayonet on his rifle: 'UK soldier jailed and dismissed for stabbing Afghan boy', <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-16017576> (6 July 2016).

Dr Julia Welland is an Assistant Professor of War Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick. Her research explores the gender relations of war and militarism, and is currently working on a Leverhulme early career project titled 'The joy of war: pleasure and performance in contemporary military conduct'.

'The Best *Fellagha* Hunter is the French of North African Descent': *Harkis* in French Algeria

Raphaëlle Branche

'We will not pacify Algeria without the Algerians'. This firm statement was part of General Maurice Challe's first directive on Algeria at the end of 1958.[1] By that time, the war, launched by a few armed groups four years before, had turned into a vast uprising led by the National Liberation Front (FLN) and fought by a National Liberation Army (ALN). The French military priority was definitively to crush what was at that stage still considered a rebellion. Counterinsurgency was extended and 'hunting commandos' established. It was in this context that General Challe, newly appointed chief of the military forces in Algeria, insisted on using native manpower. Thus, military imperatives were linked to what he saw as moral reasoning: 'the best fellagha[2] hunter is the French of North African descent' was another way of saying 'We will not pacify Algeria without the Algerians'.[3]

More than 100 years after the French conquest of Algeria, how can we understand this need to call upon the native population to keep the country part of France? To start with, let us look at the terminology. The inhabitants of French Algeria were not just called French. After

R. Branche (✉)
Normandie University (Rouen), Mont-Saint-Aignan, France
e-mail: branche@univ-rouen.fr

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several generations, they were still discursively distinguished from metropolitan French. Yet, incremental changes were evident especially in military vocabulary: the native population was for the most part referred to as 'French of North African descent' but sometimes also 'Algerians'; General Challe's use of both expressions is indicative of the ambiguity of the situation.[4] It also suggests the necessity of a reconsideration of the use of native forces within the French military and police forces in Algeria. In this chapter, I will refer to them as the 'natives' or the 'Algerians', as opposed to the 'French' or the 'French of European origin'. Before addressing the issue during the War of Independence,[5] I will consider the longer history of colonial Algeria and try to determine whether the recourse to native forces during the last war France fought in Algeria might be regarded as a continuity or a legacy of the first colonial period. I will argue that this more recent deployment of native manpower was quite different in both meaning and practice. In the second part of this chapter, I will particularly focus on the issue of interrogation and violence, and address the specific use of native forces for particular tasks. Finally, the last part of the chapter will consider the consequences of the use of native forces in the war and in its aftermath.

Auxiliaries: A Colonial Word

France's colonial presence in Algeria started in 1830 with a war of conquest lasting several decades. The French army had faced virulent opposition and France experienced violent acts of warfare in a particularly difficult climate. The need for guerrilla fighters and men and horses able to cope with the harshness of the country were the two main reasons for recruiting native people at the beginning of the conflict. The vast majority of the men among whom the French managed to gain support were the former Ottoman *maghzen*. They found themselves unemployed by the collapse of Ottoman power and some were quick to serve the new conqueror of the country. The French organized them on a regimental basis and they were rapidly dubbed 'the Turcos' (a reminder of their Ottoman origin). According to historian Jacques Frémeaux, they never made up more than 10 per cent of the troops on Algerian soil.[6] They were even used outside Northern Africa: on European battlefields such as the Crimea, Italy, or even further afield, in Mexico. In 1870, their participation in the Franco-Prussian War earned them a reputation as faithful soldiers. Later, they took part in the conquest of Madagascar,

Indochina, and Morocco.[7] Alongside these regiments recruited among the native population (but whose basic use was no different from other French regiments) the French also used Algerian troops for local needs. Recruited on a voluntary basis, they were used during the first period of the conquest to help the French officers in charge of the military administration set up '*Bureaux Arabes*' in the newly conquered territories – although French officers had limited recourse to deploy them, depending on the situation. Some were directly under French officers' command while others were dependent upon local chiefs. When civilians took over the administration of Algeria (under the Third Republic in 1870), this local manpower was retained and generally used as a police force. They were known as *moghaznis*, the men of the *maghzen*, the State. Although France shared these types of recruit with most of the other European Empires at that time, Algeria had a unique specificity within the French Empire: its political status.[8] Indeed, Algeria proved a sort of juridical monster. At first, the name 'Algeria' was given by the French to the territory they envisaged conquering by the end of the 1830s. Actually, the whole space named Algeria was not conquered at all by this time and the vast majority was still under military command for decades. Nevertheless, in this newly named 'Algeria', the South was separated from the North, where the European settlement was planned.[9] For this reason, the new 1848 republic divided the northern part of the country into three departments. The status of these territories made them apparently similar to French territory in the homeland (what historians of colonialism call the 'metropole') but the reality was quite different since the French authorities created a distinction between citizenship and nationality that enabled the administration to separate the inhabitants of Algeria into different types of French citizens with greater or lesser degrees of citizenship.

One of the main features of French citizenship under the Third Republic was universal conscription: every man over the age of 20 had to enlist. Although this took time to become totally effective, any male French citizen was, by the beginning of the twentieth century, expected to serve a limited period as a soldier.[10] By 1912, as the fear of a new war grew, an Algerian exception was erased: native males over the age of 20 also had to enlist.[11] During World War I, roughly 173,000 fought in the French uniform of whom 110,000 were sent to fight in metropolitan France. In 1940, there were 176,000 Algerians in the French Army and North African soldiers (including people from Moroccan and Tunisian protectorates) amounted to 10 per cent of the total army.

During the two world wars, they served under the French flag as '*Spahis*' or '*Tirailleurs algériens*'[12] – another type of regiment, the '*Zouaves*', were exclusively composed of French of European origin. At the end of World War II, citizenship was granted in the whole French Empire and Algeria had its own new status. Yet, the discriminations were not totally erased and it was not until the end of 1958 that full civil equality for all the inhabitants of Algeria was achieved. By that date, the country had already begun to be torn apart by a war that killed tens of thousands of people – mostly civilians – and displaced 1 million others. By the end of the war, the figure of displaced people would eventually grow to 2 million out of more than 8 million natives.[13]

Amidst this huge upheaval in such a short period of time, Algerian males faced the issue of conscription. The majority were exempted from military duty: they were not considered fit for military service with respect to their physical capacities, a situation that was an outright effect of widespread malnutrition in Algeria. Indeed, a ratio of 75 per cent of native conscripts, per age cohort, found unfit to serve was not uncommon. At the end of the day, only 20 per cent of young men were enrolled; approximately 100,000 Algerian men were conscripts during this war and served as other conscripts did.[14] Out of the 1.5 million conscripts who served in Algeria during the war, 100,000 natives is not an overwhelmingly large figure.[15]

In fact, between 1954 and 1962, as the war expanded and the threat to French Algeria became more serious, the French military and civilian authorities were not always keen on having Algerian conscripts within their ranks. They feared treason or, at least, a lack of will to fight against other Algerians.[16] On the other side, the FLN was effectively trying to persuade young men not to join the French military and to participate in the nationalist actions. It was not unusual to see long-serving soldiers desert and join the FLN, setting an example for younger men. Having served in the French Army for twelve years, Mohamed Zernouh was one of these elders: in February 1958, aged 33, he opened the gate of his military compound to a group of ALN fighters leading to the capture of a French lieutenant and thirteen *spahis*. Due to his outstanding and long-lasting carrier in the FLN/ALN and later the Algerian State, Ahmed Bencherif is probably the most famous of these Algerian deserters. He had volunteered in 1948 and fought brilliantly during the Indochina War (1946–1954). He was promoted to sub-lieutenant but chose to desert in 1957, having killed fourteen men and stolen several weapons.[17]

Many of these desertions were both excellent propaganda material for the FLN and sources of arms and intelligence. Algerian conscripts would be asked to defect when the FLN found it appropriate and pressure would be put on their families to ensure their compliance. Their situation became so problematic that the French authorities were more comfortable having them stationed in Germany where, since 1945, France retained a military force.

The situation of the auxiliary forces was totally different and this whole context has to be remembered: the men serving in French uniform during the War of Independence did not all have the same status, did not share the same circumstances, and did not face the same problems and challenges. In contrast to the Algerian conscripts, the auxiliary forces were used more and more by the French as the war went on. In this case, native men were free to enrol and their relationship with the French army was not based on compulsory conscription but on, at best, short-term contracts. Most of the time, until the end of the war, they were hired on a daily basis.[18]

Indeed, at the beginning of the war, there was significant improvisation and local initiative on the part of the military.[19] At first, civilian authorities created a rural police auxiliary force, the *Groupe Mobile de Police Rurale* (GMPR), composed of native men and organized in small units; it was used only in sparsely inhabited territories. The men were not recruited for their physical or technical abilities but for their influence and connections (to hire one man was to involve his whole family). Unofficially, the military did the same thing in the first year of the war: in some places they created an auxiliary force directly under military command. These *harkis* were paid on a daily basis but used only when needed (*harka* means movement in Arabic). The rest of the time, the men were supposed to live their ordinary rural life. Another initiative from the ground, quite different in reality if not in intent, was the creation of self-defence groups, *Groupes d'Autodéfense* (GAD). This term designated villages armed by the French and theoretically capable of protecting themselves from the ALN. They were not paid and French propaganda liked to portray these villages as sincerely attached to French Algeria. The two systems were run on a voluntary basis and, in 1956, the political authorities backed the military by legalizing the *harkas* and the GAD.[20]

Driven by an analysis promoted by some military officers based on their experience of a counterinsurgency war in Indochina, the French authorities decided to increase the number of *harkis*. From 1957 onward, the head of the military in Algeria was convinced that the conduct of the war needed a dramatic change. It had to be fought and conceptualized along

new lines: since the FLN was described by some French military officers and doctrinaires as leading a 'revolutionary war', France had to fight a 'counter-revolutionary war'.[21] The native population had to be engaged in many ways; recruitment into the *harkas* was one of them. There were around 2,000 *harkis* by the beginning of 1957, and this figure rose to more than 10,000 by the end of the year and to 60,000 by 1960.[22] They were to be used for two main purposes: counterinsurgency and psychological warfare, underpinned by two major assumptions. The first assumption was that natives were the type of soldier best equipped to fight against ALN guerrillas and the second was that their involvement in the war had to be publicized so that the native population would be influenced to follow their alleged choice of French allegiance.[23] Indeed, sometimes, as an element of psychological warfare strategy, *harkis* were asked to give public speeches. For the same reason, they were recruited on a local basis and supposed to be used only in a territory that they knew well. They were equipped with hunting guns, nothing more, and were supposed to return them once the military operation was over.

The two principles set at the beginning remained the same during the whole war: *harkis* were recruited for specific operations, which were always of limited duration. And yet the French authorities liked to think of them as 'partisans', as men taking sides in this war regarding the future of Algeria. Apart from a few cases – some of them very well known, like the bachaga Boualem[24]– this was not what triggered their choice to become auxiliaries.[25] They often had no other option to secure employment in a period of widespread conflict, as Charles-Robert Ageron has shown in a ground-breaking article.[26]

The role of the *harkis* in the war was considerably reinforced when General Challe was appointed head of the military in Algeria at the end of 1958. Charles de Gaulle engaged the country in a sweeping constitutional transformation. The war in Algeria also required a change of direction, something which was eagerly awaited.[27] The appointment of General Challe – alongside Paul Delouvrier as the civilian general delegate for Algeria – was an important element of this new Algerian policy. Parallel to this was a new strategy that aimed to force the ALN to split into very small groups to survive the dramatic increase of methodically imposed violence. This occasioned massive displacement of the rural population. From 1959 to 1960, the number of Algerians forced to leave their villages and live in 'concentration camps' amounted to 2 million. These camps were guarded

by the French military and meant to separate the villagers from the guerrillas. They had long lasting effects on the lives of the Algerian peasants since they were deprived of their lands and cattle. It was also a way of drying up the *maquis*' recruitment bases and depriving it of its civilian support. In the camps, the civilians would be exposed to military propaganda promoting France as the best provider of shelter and well-being for the Algerian population. True to his idea that 'we will not pacify Algeria without the Algerians', Challe made it very clear from the beginning that recruiting native men as military auxiliaries was a military as well as a political priority. It also had economic rationale. This massive recourse to *harkis* was indeed linked with the manpower issue in France: the metropolitan population was eager for the return of her sons and the end of the war. New forms of recruitment had to be found that would not be such a burden on French shoulders. The *harkis* could provide manpower when French conscripts were in short supply or when the political impact of deploying conscripts put too much pressure on the government. Yet, were they given enough military power to make a real difference in the war? Did their French officers trust them enough to allow them to really engage in the war and commit to smashing the nationalist combatants and militants?

The new approach under General Challe was meant to win the war definitively. It had two main impacts on a strategic level. On the one hand, General Challe used huge concentrations of the military for a number of major operations aimed at quashing the military power of the FLN/ALN by methodically moving from West to East (the '*plan Challe*'). On the other, he urged the military to establish small mobile units, which were supposed to live and fight as the guerrillas: the 'hunting commandos'. Most of the *harkis* would be based in the network of thousands of military posts spread all over Algeria, while a minority were recruited into the 'hunting commandos'. Even in the East of the country (the Constantinois), where the proportion of *harkis* in these 'hunting commandos' was the highest, they were never more than a third of the total strength. Historian François-Xavier Hautreux estimates that less than 20 per cent of all *harkis* were incorporated into these units between 1959 and 1961.[28]

On the Supposed Native Character of Violence

Yet these commandos were seen as a dedicated mission to some native auxiliaries: the former ALN fighters. Sometimes after their capture by the French, sometimes after their desertion from ALN ranks, they

chose to serve in the commandos where life was quite similar to the one they had experienced before – except that they were comfortably backed by a huge modern army. They were submitted to tight control by the military before joining the French ranks. Indeed, they were interrogated by special intelligence teams whose work was notorious for its brutality and the use of torture. Afterwards, these teams, the *Détachement Opérationnel de Protection* (DOP), would recruit some of these men to interrogate and torture their own prisoners. They would also use them to form commandos of their own. Indeed these men had many qualities that the French military actively sought: they could speak Arabic or Berber, they knew the FLN/ALN, its organization and rules, and their links with the insurgents were definitively ended following their recruitment by the French. Full devotion could, therefore, be expected from them, or at least a commitment to their mission: the defeat of the FLN/ALN.

Another assumption – explicit in some documents – was that they practised a specific form of violence, had a native way of being violent that was adapted to a war waged against natives. This idea of a native violence was not new: it can be traced back to the conquest. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the argument about the 'nature of the Algerian' was still sometimes employed. But its explicit use was complicated in that it ran against the possibility of changing Algerian society, with its supposed barbarian and savage habits, into something more civilized, which was, after all, the moral basis of the colonial project.[29] After more than a century of colonization, to restrict all the inhabitants of Algeria to a category of primitives was highly problematic. Nevertheless, the idea that Algerians (or Arabs) only respected force was very common. For example, General de Pouilly, head of the army in the Western part of Algeria, the *Corps d'Armée d'Oran* (CAO), wrote to his superior regarding violence committed by members of a commando composed at its maximum of 250 natives, the dreaded *commando Georges*. He insisted that despite the fact that their violence might be considered as 'sometimes a little too vigorous', it was 'unfortunately adapted to the mores of their co-religionists whom they knew better than anybody else'.[30] This commando was indeed well known for its extreme violence. Three-quarters of them were former guerrillas.[31] The year before, de Pouilly's predecessor had recommended that the commando should not be restricted in any way when fulfilling its mission of destroying the ALN units.[32] We

have extraordinary testimony in the diary of a French officer, also a seminarian, who witnessed the commandos' activities:

> no gunshot, blade. All former fellagha. Killers. For sure, I know that whatever they did in the past, it's better to have them with us today, but I don't care, their presence is frightening. Tonight will be atrocious to many: the question [that is torture], the electric generator, the settling of scores … robberies, rapes, loot … deaths, just deaths and innocent ones.[33]

When we return to one of the little-known instructions regarding the *harkis* and their use, we find that they were supposed to help the French military in three main fields, namely 'combat, hunting, intelligence'.[34] Those who had deserted the ALN numbered no more than 5 per cent of the *harkis* (3,000 maximum). They were undoubtedly very useful for the commandos (the 'hunting' element) but they were also useful for the intelligence element of the mission. Indeed, intelligence was undoubtedly a priority of central importance given that the French were lacking in manpower. Starting long before *plan Challe*, Algerian auxiliaries were used as interpreters by the military, which recalls the first steps of the French Army in Algeria when native people were recruited to help inform the military.[35] Thanks to their personal knowledge of the villagers, they were essential intermediaries for the French military. Their language skills were just one aspect of their cultural ability: they would often be the means French officers and soldiers had to gain some knowledge of the population they were supposed to protect and control. In a sort of Manichean pact they were given real power over the population. Many abuses bore witness to this power: blackmail, theft, even rape. Wives of ALN fighters were privileged targets for these men who were rarely sanctioned for their crimes. In two villages, south of Collo, at the beginning of 1961, the mayor reported the case of fifteen women, 'all married to rebels gone to the *maquis*', who reported violence by *harkis*. Fatima S., aged 22, the mother of two children, had to be hospitalized after being gang raped. The medical certificate ascertained a traumatic stress disorder and stated that 'the sexual and vaginal exam detected such a quantity of sperm that the vagina is full of, approximately 20 cm, such a quantity can not be the production of one man alone'. One of the *harkis* she accused of raping her denied every accusation but mentioned that, two years previously, 'rebels came to my house and imposed exactions to my family'.[36] His implicit defence of his actions draws attention to the personal scores that were

often at stake in the recruitment and the activities of the *harkis*. Given the massive recourse to native auxiliaries by the French Army, the war was tantamount to a civil war, with an internal logic such as that identified by Stathis Kalyvas.[37]

Even if we lack precise information regarding their use, it is obvious that the vast majority of the *harkis* were part of the military plan for maintaining territorial control but with no particular combat function. As individuals they could be guides or interpreters, they could also be '*voltigeurs*', or skirmishers, but this is not particularly a combat specificity, rather a use of basic native knowledge. In this regard, it may be considered that intelligence, broadly understood, was the main military reason to recruit *harkis*. It cannot, however, be argued that they were specifically trained as intelligence agents or even considered as highly valuable components of the military structure.

Yet, political imperatives were equally as important as military in the recruitment of native auxiliaries. Whether they were GAD or *harkis*, whose work was tightly connected with one regular military unit's mission, the auxiliaries were the corner stone of the new French Algeria General Challe wanted to build. Mimicking the FLN, he also mimicked the French Resistance: in one of his briefings, he told the officers of a military zone to impart to the members of the GAD, 'a mentality of attacking *maquisards* and not one of collaborators'.[38] He even stated: 'if we build heroes of the Resistance, the population will be on our side'.[39]

Although it has been shown that the main motivation for a man to become a *harki* was generally economic, related to the desire to settle personal scores, or to hedge the family's bets, the *harkis* were nonetheless presented by the French military as Algerians fighting on the French side.[40] As long as the war went on and the ALN lost more and more men, the French could claim that there were more Algerians on their side. And yet, they did not trust them very much. Until the end, the *harkis* were not authorized to use machine guns and they could not be tasked with watching over their military unit's arms. Even the deserters from the ALN were rarely trusted entirely. The French feared double agents. They made great publicity out of some major successes employing 'reverted rebels' but these successes did not constitute the bulk of their actions. By complete contrast, on many occasions the attempts made to set up counter-*maquis* led to the men rallying to the FLN/ALN with the arms the French had given them.[41]

The FLN had two very different, almost opposing, reactions to the *harkis*. On the one hand, it tried hard to encourage Algerians serving under the French flag (whether conscripts or auxiliaries) to desert with arms and/or open the gate of a military camp and help kill the soldiers and overrun the base. The *harkis* and their families were targeted by the FLN for military reasons: they could provide information as well as ammunition or arms. They were, however, also targeted for political reasons. For the FLN, their desertion from the French was living proof of the righteousness of its cause. On the other hand, it denounced acrimoniously the *harkis* and all Algerians whose actions could be said to be in 'collaboration' with the French. 'Treason' was very commonly used in FLN propaganda to describe, and attack, the *harkis*. They were called 'traitors' and were doomed to reprisals when the war was over as FLN leaflets repeatedly informed them. Many were executed during the war. Here is, for instance, a note left on the dead body of a 'traitor':

> Here is the fate of the one who obeys or loves France. Deserved death. He had no faith in our movement. He is not a Muslim. Together with colonialism, he deserves death as dogs do. He ignored the blessings of our ALN (National Liberation Army) and we cut his throat. Be rewarded for your treason, thee dog![42]

The Recourse to a Native Force and its Aftermath

Although the French military was aware of the potential ramifications of this propaganda, no proposals to address these consequences were considered until very late on. If France had to leave Algeria, what would become of these men and their families? Even for the French of European descent, for those who had been full citizens for decades and generations, the French authorities were very slow to envisage their repatriation as a serious issue. A secretary of state for Algeria was not created until May 1961 and the first important instructions regarding their integration into metropolitan France were dated to the end of 1961.[43] Compared to the population of former full French citizens (Algerian men *and* women had only been granted equal citizenship in 1958), the Algerian auxiliaries were not given very much attention. Two decrees were, however, issued in the Autumn of 1961.[44] For the first time, monthly contracts were offered to the *harkis* but those formerly working

on a daily basis were not automatically offered this new type of contract. *Harkis* were also given some advantages and their job in the *harka* was partially taken into account if they wanted to enrol for a longer period in the French army.

In the last months of the war, the tension increased. The life of the *harkis* and their families was under serious threat. Algeria was to be independent and the *harkis* had been on the wrong side. By a last moment move, an 'act of treason', they could possibly hope to gain the new authorities' confidence. Therefore, the desertion of *harkis* became a real plague for the French army during the closing stages of the war.[45] Their French officers were often aware of the situation in which the auxiliaries found themselves and, by the end of the war, the *harkis* were offered a 6-month non-renewable contract in order to remain under French protection during the transitional period between the cease-fire and the independence of Algeria.[46] In a note dated 8 March 1962, the Defence Minister's intention was made crystal-clear: the *harkis* had to be 'intellectually demobilized' and warned of the difficulties they should expect if they decided to come to France.[47]

Indeed, the possibility of coming to France was offered to those who feared for their safety: they could enrol in the French army and be transferred to France with their families. However, 80 per cent chose to quit the army after the cease-fire, theoretically rendering them ineligible for transfer to France.[48] Facing the chaos of the months following the cease-fire, fearing arrest, kidnap, torture, or death, many *harkis* changed their minds and tried to get help from their former officers. Some French officers took it upon themselves to give their former auxiliaries shelter and a passage to France (which they were forbidden to do).[49] At the end of the war, in 1962, about 12,000 former auxiliaries and their relatives came to France.[50]

Although things were very different from one area to another, the *harkis* were often viewed very negatively by the population, not to mention the FLN. Nevertheless, the vast majority stayed in Algeria where they were by no means assured of a safe life.[51] They were often asked to give over their redundancy bonus to buy a kind of political virginity. The first months after the cease-fire were particularly difficult but the former guerrillas were not even their most troubling foes. Last minute nationalists (nicknamed '*Marsiens*' out of the month where the cease-fire took place) and civilians all meted out retribution. Numerous accounts of violence give a vivid description of their fragile situation. In Palestro, in Kabylie, the

parish priest bore testimony to these acts of humiliation and violence: *harkis* had their moustaches, beards, and hair publicly shaved; others were forced to undress and had a wire run through their nostrils before being led to a public place where people could come and beat them.[52] Further East, near Moknea, a former *harki* recalled how 60 of them were forced to walk without shoes for weeks and were beaten with wooden sticks and metal bars; many of them died.[53] In his recent book, Pierre Daum has collected and presented many stories bearing witness to the reprisals the *harkis* faced after they lost the protection of their French masters.[54] Alongside other aspects, the symbolic dimension of these acts of violence undoubtedly referred to the need for a society to purify itself and to weave the social fabric anew after years of tension.[55]

Following up on the wartime discourse, the official discourse in independent Algeria was highly negative towards the *harkis* and, after independence, in July 1962, their situation deteriorated rapidly. They were called traitors to the Algerian nation. Some of them sought French protection – a protection that some French officers had granted in the months before leaving.[56] But the French authorities turned a blind eye, especially after the independence of Algeria.[57]

Today, the widespread killing of former auxiliaries is well known but the figures are subject to great variations depending on political opinions. Although no historian has been able to give a definitive figure, 10,000 casualties is a strict *minimum*[58] and 30,000 to 40,000 is certainly a more accurate figure for the first year of independence.[59]

Between 60,000 and 80,000 native Algerians eventually managed to get to France.[60] Many of them were former auxiliaries and their relatives, but not all. They were treated as mere migrants and despite their service to France, were not granted specific rights or protection – unless being hosted in camps can be considered protection. Some of these camps were still hosting them into the 1970s. Through different lobbying actions, they were eventually granted some recognition by the French State. In 1994, a law was passed in the French Assembly stating that 'the nation owed a "moral debt" towards the men and women who suffered directly because of their commitment to our country'.[61] In 1995, any former auxiliary living in France and who had been detained in Algeria after 2 July 1962 was granted a pension. Later, in 2001, a memorial day was established for the *harkis* and, the following year, they were included in the first national war memorial erected in Paris. A *Haut Conseil des Rapatriés* (High Commission for Repatriated People) was created in

December 2002: a section was devoted to the French repatriated from Algeria, another to the former auxiliaries. These men and their families were to be the target of a positive discrimination policy aimed at resolving their housing and unemployment problems.

Through these actions, the former auxiliaries were included in a French national narrative, which was quite apart from the actual reasons for their work within the French ranks. Where the wartime propaganda had failed, the peacetime discourse succeeded: the *harkis* now were as much a part of the losers of history as the other French repatriates. In being so, they were also made part of the French national community, at least as far as the dominant narrative is concerned.

This French discourse is maybe all the more powerful in that it echoes, or reflects, the Algerian nationalist discourse. In Algeria, '*harki*' has been seen as one of the worst insults since the war. The term is commonly used to describe a despicable or evil person. It is used by children as well as by politicians.[62] *Harkis* are still considered as traitors and collaborators. Even President Bouteflika, when speaking to the French Parliament in June 2000, used this last term, explicitly linking the *harkis* to the darkest hours of France. For a long time, their sons and daughters were not allowed to travel to Algeria. This is not the case anymore, but the *harkis* themselves are still forbidden to come back. A law insisted that they 'lose their civic and political rights', referring to 'those whose positions during the revolution of national liberation had been opposed to the motherland's interests and who behaved disgracefully'.[63]

Conclusion

Based on a long-term practice of recruiting native manpower to compensate for a lack of French manpower and intelligence, the recourse to Algerian auxiliaries during the war the French fought in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 had another meaning. As the French were fighting to protect and reinforce *Algérie Française* (French Algeria), they had to deal with the issue of popular support. On the other side, the nationalist forces were claiming that they had the Algerian people on their side, that they *were* the people. As a consequence, the recourse to native auxiliaries had above all a political meaning: it should bear witness to the Algerian support of the new relationships France claimed to be building between all the inhabitants of Algeria. In fact, Algerians had other rationales behind their involvement in the auxiliary forces beyond proving their attachment to French sovereignty over Algeria.

Day-to-day issues drove them more often than political perspectives. Yet both sides loved to portray them as political soldiers: this false representation would have great consequences for them, when the war was over and for decades after.

Notes

1. French Military Archives (hereafter FMA), Vincennes, 1H 2942, 'Nous ne pacifierons pas l'Algérie sans les Algériens'. Annex to the directive No.1, 28 December 1958.
2. *Fellagha* refers to armed Algerian nationalists in a pejorative way.
3. FMA, Vincennes, 1H 2942, 'Nous ne pacifierons pas l'Algérie sans les Algériens'.
4. Indeed, at the climax of the French presence in Algeria, 'Algerians' was the name used by the French settlers (mainly migrants from European countries and not from France) to distinguish themselves from the French people living in the metropole. They were the 'Algerians', other French people were the 'French', and the native people of Algeria were 'North Africans' or 'Arabs'.
5. This expression has been regularly used by historians for a decade. The war is more generally referred to as 'the Algerian war' (in France) or 'the war of liberation' or 'the revolution' (in Algeria).
6. Jacques Frémeaux, *L'Afrique à l'ombre des épées. 2. Officiers administrateurs et troupes coloniales: 1830–1930* (Paris, 1995); Jacques Frémeaux, *De quoi fut fait l'empire: les guerres coloniales au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 2009).
7. See Frémeaux, *De quoi* or Vincent Joly, *Guerres d'Afrique. 130 ans de guerres coloniales: l'expérience française* (Rennes, 2009). On Indochina, see Mike Fynch, *A Progressive Occupation? The Gallieni-Lyautey Method and Colonial Pacification in Tonkin and Madagascar, 1885–1900* (Oxford, 2013).
8. Algeria shared this status with the colonies from the First French Empire and the Four Communes of Senegal.
9. See Hélène Blais, *Mirages de la carte. L'invention de l'Algérie coloniale, XIX^{e}–XX^{e} siècle* (Paris, 2014), 347.
10. Citizenship and conscription were not automatically linked. In the French Empire, the French citizens of the Four Communes of Senegal had to fight to be granted the right to conscription. In their case, they were French citizens but not French nationals. Yet, as any French citizen, they had to fulfil their military duty. Their deputy, Blaise Diagne, insisted that their status should be strictly similar to those of the citizens of the West Indies and they were ultimately conscripted during World War I as of May 1915.

11. See Gilbert Meynier, *L'Algérie révélée, La guerre de 1914–1918 et le premier quart du XX^e siècle* (Genève, 1981).
12. In the twentieth century, the 'tirailleurs algériens' were created and named after the 'tirailleurs sénégalais', but after the 1912 conscription, their situation was very different: Algerian *tirailleurs* were conscripts as French citizens (although they did not have all the rights of a citizen) and not as colonial auxiliaries. Yet, they were still part of the 'Armée d'Afrique'.
13. See Kamel Kateb, *Européens, 'indigènes' et juifs en Algérie (1830–1962). Représentations et réalités des populations* (Paris, 2001), 386.
14. See Stéphanie Chauvin, 'Des appelés pas comme les autres? Les conscrits "français de souche nord-africaine" pendant la guerre d'Algérie', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 48 (1995): 21–30.
15. The figure is even higher when professional soldiers are taken into account.
16. A former officer in Algeria and a conscript, Claude Sales, published a very strong testimony on these feelings towards Algerian conscripts due to serve as French citizens: Claude Salles, *La Trahison* (Paris, 1999). It was adapted for film in 2006 by Philippe Faucon.
17. Ahmed Bencherif published a memoir on the War of Independence under the title *L'Aurore des mechtas* (Algiers, 1968). Close to Houari Boumediene, he was appointed head of the National Gendarmerie after independence and was a key figure in the Algerian political and military system in the 1970s and 1980s. On Bencherif, see Raphaelle Branche, *Prisonniers du FLN* (Paris, 2014), 182–187. For his military file, see FMA, Vincennes, GR8Ye131672.
18. For discussions of the *harkis*, see Tom Charbit, *Les Harkis* (Paris, 2006); François-Xavier Hautreux, *La Guerre d'Algérie des harkis, 1954–1962* (Paris, 2013).
19. On the chronology, see François-Xavier Hautreux, 'L'emploi des harkis dans la guerre d'Algérie: essai de périodisation', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 90 (2006): 33–45.
20. Today the word is used to name any sort of job as an auxiliary of the French military.
21. On the revolutionary turn, see Denis Leroux, 'La "doctrine de la guerre révolutionnaire". Théories et pratiques', in *Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale*, ed. Abderrahmane Bouchène, Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, Ouanissa Siari Tengour, and Sylvie Thénault (Paris/Alger, 2012), 526–532.
22. FMA, Vincennes, 1H 1391/3.
23. FMA, Vincennes, 1H 1809/2, 'Les meilleures troupes de contre-guérilla sont à base d'autochtones', in 'Guérilla et contre guérilla en Algérie', fiche du 3^e Bureau de l'Etat major de la X^e Région militaire, October 1955.
24. A former French officer in the Tirailleurs and a deputy and the vice-president of the National Assembly, the bachaga Boualam had a *harka* of his own. After the ceasefire, he hosted a *maquis* set up by the terrorist organization

OAS and, ultimately, came to France with dozens of his men and their families. He wrote several books *pro domo* after the war. See Bachaga Saïd Boualam, *Mon pays la France* (Paris, 1962).

25. See Charles-Robert Ageron, 'Les supplétifs algériens dans l'armée française pendant la guerre d'Algérie', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 48 (1995): 3–20.
26. Charles-Robert Ageron, 'Les supplétifs algériens dans l'armée française pendant la guerre d'Algérie', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 48 (1995): 3–20. Republished in *La Guerre d'indépendance des Algériens (1954–1962)*, ed. Raphaelle Branche (Paris, 2009). Fatima Besnaci-Lancou has collected dozens of interviews with former *harkis* living in France. Their stories give some insights into their motivations. See Fatima Besnaci-Lancou *Treize chibanis harki* (Paris, 2006). In a recent book, journalist Pierre Daum interviewed many former *harkis* who stayed in Algeria. See Pierre Daum *Le dernier tabou: Les harkis restés en Algérie après l'Indépendance*, (Arles, 2015).
27. See Charles-Robert Ageron, 'L'opinion française devant la guerre d'Algérie', *Revue Francaise d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer* 63 (1976): 256–285.
28. Hautreux, *La Guerre*, 167.
29. See Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize. The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1939* (Stanford, 1997), 367. And, more recently, Martin Thomas (ed.), *The French Colonial Mind. Vol. I: Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial Encounters. Vol. II: Violence, Military Encounters, and Colonialism* (Lincoln and London, 2011), xlvii–372 and liii–384.
30. FMA, Vincennes, 1H 1240/8, Letter from General de Pouilly to the commander in chief, 27 February 1961. On this reference to Muslim fighters as being particularly prone to violence in a broader colonial perspective, see Xavier Bougarel, Raphaëlle Branche and Cloé Drieu (eds), *Combatants of Muslim Origin in European Armies in the Twentieth Century* (Bloomsbury, 2017).
31. FMA, Vincennes, 1H 2028/3, Report from the officer commanding the Saïda sector, 25 May 1962.
32. FMA, Vincennes, 1H 3087/1, Internal memo from General Gambiez, 21 July 1960.
33. Alain Maillard de la Morandais' diary, 26 July 1960 (private source). He published it partially in Alain Maillard de la Morandais, *L'honneur est sauf* (Paris, 1990).
34. FMA, Vincennes, 1H 2772/3, Instruction by General Crépin, 20 September 1960.
35. On the military interpreters of this first age of the empire, known as the interpreters corps, see Alain Messaoudi, 'Renseigner, enseigner. Les interprètes militaires et la constitution d'un premier corpus savant

"algérien" (1830–1870)', *Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle* 41 (2010): 97–112. Contrary to natives informally recruited, these interpreters were French officers.

36. The case is documented in the military archives: SHD, 1H 4410/1.
37. Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge, 2006).
38. FMA, Vincennes, 1H 2750/1, Briefing to the commanding officers of military zones and sectors, CAA, 26 October 1959. The reference to the Second World War and the resistance was not unusual and was used by almost every political and military actor of the war, from the FLN to the French terrorist organization, the OAS.
39. Ibid.
40. This vision of *harkis* siding with the French out of political motivations is still present in many discourses today in France as well as in Algeria. In France, it goes with the victimization of their life stories and the expression of critical views on French government attitudes in the decades following the end of the war. In Algeria, it justifies the social relegation and political contempt (not to mention imprisonment and assassinations) they had to face from 1962 onwards.
41. One well-documented operation occurred in 1956. Based on ethnographic findings, the military set up a counter-*maquis* in Kabylie and provided it with arms and ammunition. After a while, all the men left for the ALN. See Camille Lacoste-Dujardin, *Opération 'Oiseau Bleu': des Kabyles, des ethnologues et la guerre en Algérie* (Paris, 1997).
42. FMA, Vincennes, 1H2591, notice of execution, wilaya 1, 9 January 1958, in Arabic. Translated into French and quoted in Mohammed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier, *The FLN. Documents et histoire* (Paris, 2004).
43. See Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain. Politique d'intégration et parcours de rapatriés d'Algérie en métropole (1954–2005)* (Paris, 2010).
44. Decrees issued by the Ministry of State for Algeria dated 31 October 1961 (61–1196) and 6 November 1961 (61–1201), *Journal official de la République française*, 5 and 6 November 1961.
45. Desertion is not an entirely suitable word as they were not always under contract.
46. FMA, Vincenne, 1H 2467/6, Information note from the Ministry of the Military Forces to the commanding officers of Army Corps in Algeria to 'éclairer les destinataires dans l'action qu'ils devront mener, dès l'annonce du cessez le feu, auprès de leurs subordonnés', 8 March 1962.
47. FMA, Vincennes, 1H 2467/6. Note to the military corps officers, 8 March 1962. Insisting on his preference that the *harkis* stay in Algeria, Pierre Messmer states that 'nous pourrons les y aider efficacement d'abord en les démobilisant intellectuellement, en les employant à des tâches non militaires'.

48. Charles-Robert Ageron, 'Le drame des harkis en 1962', *Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire* 42 (1994): 3–6; Hautreux, *La Guerre*.
49. For testimony from a former French officer, see François Meyer, *Pour l'honneur, avec les harkis: de 1958 à nos jours* (Tours, 2005).
50. According to Yann Sciodo-Zürcher, 15.
51. Pierre Daum, *Le dernier tabou. Les 'harkis' restés en Algérie après l'indépendance* (Arles, 2015), 238.
52. Archbishop's Archives, Algiers, Father Lucas to his bishop, 26 January 1963.
53. Interviews with former *harkis* and ALN fighters by Lydia Hadj-Ahmed. 'Deux villages en guerre (1954–1962). Vie quotidienne dans deux villages de Grande-Kabylie pendant la guerre d'indépendance algérienne: Aït-Bouadda et Moknéa', MA thesis (University of Paris-1, 2015).
54. Daum, *Le dernier tabou*.
55. See Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*.
56. On the figures, see Hautreux, *La Guerre* and Maurice Faivre, *Les combattants musulmans de la guerre d'Algérie: des soldats sacrifiés* (Paris, 1995). Maurice Faivre is a French general. As a young officer, he served in Algeria and managed to safely organize the transfer to France of several families of the *harkis* with whom he served. See Maurice Faivre, *Un village de Harkis: des Babors au pays drouais* (Paris, 1994). He later became an activist lobbying for the recognition of the rights of former auxiliaries.
57. Several books mention the government's abandonment of the *harkis* after the ceasefire and the Algerian independance but no historical research has been conducted so far.
58. The figure comes from journalist Jean Lacouture in *Le Monde* in November 1962.
59. For a discussion on the figures, see Charles-Robert Ageron, 'Le drame des harkis', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 42 (1994), 3–15. The historian is in favour of a low estimation but is not considering the whole period where executions of *harkis* took place in Algeria.
60. Hautreux, *La Guerre*.
61. 11 June 1994 Law.
62. In their book, *Algeria. Anger of the dispossessed* (New Haven and Londres, 2007), Martin Evans and John Philips mention several occurrences of the way Algerian people play with words or use words dating back to the war of liberation to characterize their present. The vocabulary of the war of liberation is omnipresent in today's Algeria.
63. 5 April 1999 Law, Art. 68.

Professor Raphaëlle Branche is full professor in Modern History at Normandie University (Rouen) and a member of the Groupe de Recherche d'Histoire (GRHIS). She has worked extensively on colonial violence in Algeria and produced several books on the subject in English and French. She is also the editor of *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*. Her website is www.raphaellebranche.fr

‘Black-and-Tan Tendencies’: Policing Insurgency in the Palestine Mandate, 1922–48

Seán William Gannon

The course of British rule in Palestine never ran smooth. The warm rush generated by Allenby’s ‘reconquista’ of the Holy Land in 1917/18 soon gave way to frustration as, first the military regime, the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South), and then the civil administration inaugurated under high commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel in July 1920, grappled with the realities of governing a society increasingly polarized along ethno-national lines. By October 1918, when British-Turkish hostilities in Palestine formally ceased, it was obvious that Arab anti-Zionism was, despite the tendency of Zionist leaders to dismiss it as contrived, very real and deep-rooted, and the winter of 1918/19 saw the first stirrings of organized resistance through the formation of political clubs such as the Muslim-Christian Associations, and extremist secret societies such as Brotherhood and Purity and *al-Fida’iyya* (The Self-Sacrificers). Spasmodic outbursts of anti-Zionist violence followed, the most serious of which (an attack on Jerusalem’s Jewish Quarter in April 1920) left 5 Jews dead and over

S.W. Gannon (✉)
Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland
e-mail: seanwgannon@yahoo.ie

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200 injured. Worse was to follow: 47 Jews died during a week of rioting in May 1921, and another 133 were killed and 339 seriously wounded in August 1929 when the relative quiet of the intervening years was shattered by another week-long orgy of anti-Zionist violence. The early 1930s were punctuated by further eruptions (most notably in October 1933 when the British became, for the first time, the primary target), culminating in the 'Great Arab Revolt' against the Mandatory from 1936 to 1939. This was followed by a Zionist insurgency against British rule lasting until the Mandate's end.[1]

Public security in Palestine was the preserve of the police. The British first attempted to forge an effective policing service from the units that they inherited from the Turks, before raising a new British-officered, locally recruited Palestine Police force in summer 1920. However, the ability of these forces to manage inter-communal conflict was compromised by their overwhelmingly Arab ethnic make-up and the sectarian-based bias to which it gave rise. As early as August 1919, warnings were sounded about militant anti-Zionism among the Arab police, the extent of which became evident during the April 1920 disturbances when many of those deployed to restore order began themselves attacking Jews. Similarly, in May 1921, when the problem was compounded by the joining of some Jewish policemen to the fray on their co-religionists' side. Responsibility for public security therefore increasingly fell on Palestine's British army garrison, so when the colonial secretary, Winston Churchill, decided to remove it on account of its heavy expense and pro-Arab sympathies, he realized that a strong, non-partisan policing force would be required to replace it.

The result was the British Section of the Palestine Gendarmerie. Deployed in spring 1922, this 760-strong semi-military reserve was, through the agency of the Irish police chief, Major-General Henry Hugh Tudor, drawn almost entirely from disbanded members of the 'regular' Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and its Auxiliary Division (ADRIC).[2] This British Gendarmerie, which was organized and equipped along ADRIC lines, proved instrumental in containing anti-Zionist violence. The view that its success was achieved through the transfer of 'Black and Tannery' from Ireland has become a historical commonplace.[3] But this essay argues that, while its approach to policing was robust, it did not engage in the excesses that came to define the RIC's counterinsurgency; and while 'black-and-tan tendencies' did become a feature of the response of the British Gendarmerie's successor force, the British Section of the Palestine Police (BSPP), to the

Arab and Zionist insurgencies, they were an inevitable consequence of its inability to deal with the challenges of the 'small wars' into which it was thrust.

'At the Cost of a Few Bruises': The British Gendarmerie

As with the ADRIC, the British Gendarmerie's precise role was never officially defined. But it was soon decided that it would operate as a striking-force/riot squad which would assist the Palestine Police in the quelling of civil disturbances, and support the locally raised Palestine Gendarmerie in its fight against 'brigandage', a persistent problem in the region in the late Ottoman period. Both tasks cast the gendarmes as counterinsurgents, as the term is now understood. Almost all civil disturbances in 1920s Palestine were manifestations of anti-Zionist protest and, by November 1921, when the Balfour Declaration's fourth anniversary was marked by another murderous attack on Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter, they had assumed the appearance of an inchoate anti-Zionist insurgency which, while then directed only against Palestine's Jews, would inevitably target their British 'sponsors' as well. The same was true of brigandage. Writing of his time as British consul in Jerusalem in the mid-nineteenth century, James Finn could claim that brigandage 'seldom or never [had] any connection with government dealing', but arose instead out of 'lust for power among the Shaikhs, or hereditary feuds, or from vindictive retaliation'.[4] And while seldom consciously anti-colonial in the early 1920s, it had begun to resemble 'social banditry' – what Winder describes with reference to the Nablusi outlaw, Abu Jilda, as 'a rough and aggressive articulation of subaltern resistance' to the Zionist project.[5] This was acknowledged by the Jerusalem government which, in August 1922, noted an increase in 'professional brigandage, the most disquieting feature being the resuscitation of Political Brigandage, in connection with recent developments in the political situation'.[6] By June 1923, the *Palestine Weekly* was reporting an 'orgy of crimes, unchastened brigandage, murder and highway robbery'.[7] And although Tudor (who took up the position of Palestine's joint general officer commanding and director of public security in June 1922) at first flatly denied that 'political discontent' was the cause, he quickly recognized its proto-revolutionary subtexts, partly ascribing the increase in

attacks on Europeans in August to 'the general animosity against the Palestine Government roused amongst the Arab population by political agitation', and 'sourly' remarking to Palestine's attorney-general, Norman Bentwich, that the gendarmes 'had to leave Ireland because of the principle of Irish self-determination and were sent to Palestine to resist the Arab attempt at self-determination'.[8]

The British Gendarmerie proved effective in containing anti-Zionist violence. Six months after its deployment, Tudor was reporting its 'great influence already in keeping things quiet' and, two years later, the military advisor to the Colonial Office's Middle East Department, Richard Meinertzhagen, described it as 'the backbone of the defence and security of Palestine'. Samuel agreed, telling the force commandant, Angus McNeill, that 'he depended on [it] entirely … for political peace'.[9] This success is generally attributed to a policing approach based on brute force. The gendarmes, it is argued, were 'acclimatized to violence' through service in World War I and Ireland; they 'easily transferred' this violence to Palestine, earning the British Gendarmerie 'the nickname and reputation of its [Irish] parent unit'.[10] However, this nickname and reputation was largely inherited rather than earned.

Police brutality in revolutionary Ireland was widely reported in Palestine and Samuel expressed concern that the British Gendamermie would be 'discredited from the outset' on account of its RIC roots.[11] He proved prescient: despite official efforts to obscure its Irish parentage, the force was being routinely referred to as 'General Tudor's Black and Tans' even prior to its departure for Palestine and, by the time it docked in Haifa in late April 1922, propaganda against it was already 'rife'.[12] Its effect was noted by Douglas Duff, who recounted being asked shortly after his arrival as a British Gendarmerie constable whether he belonged to 'the new Police which … had been sent to Palestine because of the murders we had committed in some land from which the English had been driven because of our brutalities'.[13]

The Colonial Office was irritated by the British Gendarmerie's Black and Tan label, but officials in Palestine exploited it to enhance the force's deterrent effect. Strengthened by what Meinertzhagen termed 'the moral effect' produced by its formidable appearance (this 'magnificent lot of men' of 'exceptional physique' patrolling the country on horseback and in armoured cars), this deterrence was largely sufficient to prevent breaches of Palestine's peace throughout summer 1922.[14] In early July, for example, the British Gendarmerie maintained order during a strike in

Jerusalem by the power of its presence alone, producing 'a very good effect ... both on the over-bold and the over-timid'.[15] Its presence was also sufficient to keep order during the Mandate's official proclamation in Jaffa two weeks later, and similarly in Jerusalem where the government was so 'noisy about their force – the new gendarmerie very much in evidence, and lots of armoured cars', that 'nobody dared to express any great opinion about [the proclamation] either side'.[16] The same day in Haifa, a detachment of gendarmes dispersed a seething crowd of protestors using nothing more than an RIC-style drill movement. A show of strength was also enough to maintain order during a large Muslim-Christian Association rally in Jaffa in September.[17]

Confirmation that the force's fearsome reputation was well founded was seen to be provided in October when a company of gendarmes violently quelled a serious disturbance in Nablus: a demonstration against a municipal census (part of a national survey misrepresented by anti-Zionists as the registration of Arabs for deportation to make way for Jews) escalated into a riot during which three enumerators were abducted. Accounts of the British Gendarmerie's intervention vary; Duff's colourful account of 'a terrific fight' leaving some protestors dead is contradicted by other sources which describe a more modest, non-fatal affray.[18] Either way, it was undoubtedly robust and secured the force's reputation for brutality: the chief secretary, Wyndham Deedes, told McNeill that news of Nablus 'had a very good effect all over Palestine' and McNeill himself attributed the fact that there was little disturbance on the Balfour Declaration's fifth anniversary two weeks later to the strong impression that his men had produced.[19] This reputation was compounded by the fact that the method of riot control employed (charging the crowd and beating it back with rifle-butts and batons) became the force's favoured modus operandi when dealing with riotous anti-Zionist assemblies.[20] Its reputation for what Duff termed 'prowess and bloodthirstiness' was reinforced by its approach to guarding Jewish colonies and combating brigandage, which frequently consisted of shooting on sight and to kill.[21] Rare episodes of Jewish intra-communal disorder were similarly quelled and, by the time the force was disbanded in spring 1926 as part of another restructuring of Palestine's garrison, McNeill could boast of having 'established a name for impartiality' by giving 'both Arabs and Jews ... a taste of our methods'.[22]

These methods were not, however, regularly employed. For, by enhancing the British Gendarmerie's fearsome reputation, operations like Nablus

strengthened its deterrence in turn. The emergencies requiring the force's deployment were, in consequence, rare, and it could restore order on these occasions through fear rather than by force. In fact, so rare were such emergencies that the gendarmes spent much of their time idly at base. Nor were its crowd control methods particularly 'bloodthirsty' by contemporary standards, paling beside the British army's frequent use of live fire to quell civil unrest across the Empire, even in Amritsar's aftermath.[23] McNeill recognized this, noting approvingly that 'no firing was resorted to' at Nablus, as did Samuel, who told the colonial secretary that the gendarmes could 'dispose of an unruly crowd at the cost of a few bruises when a company of [troops] would probably find themselves obliged to fire'.[24] The British Gendarmerie's approach to tackling brigandage was also less 'bloodthirsty' than regional norms. The Ottoman gendarmeries had routinely inflicted barbaric corporal punishments on individuals and imposed collective punishments on entire districts or tribes; and the police in Transjordan and French Syria remained what Palestine Police commandant, Arthur Mavrogordato (drawing on the binary opposition between British and Ottoman state violence so beloved of colonial administrators in the 'Near East' according to which the former was proportionate and measured, the latter excessive and unconstrained) termed 'highly oriental in their methods'. These so-called 'Turkish methods' were not countenanced in Palestine in the British Gendarmerie period, despite the fact that Mavrogordato believed that 'our failure to apply these methods, which the criminal classes are used to, is interpreted as a sign of weakness', and had resulted in Palestine becoming a 'happy hunting ground' for Jordanian and Syrian armed gangs.[25]

Nonetheless, the British Gendarmerie proved effective. In July 1923, the *Palestine Weekly* noted that 'the coming of the Black and Tans [had] roused the utmost confidence' that brigandage would be brought under control; that the number of 'highway robberies' fell from 180 in 1922 to 71 in 1925, demonstrates that this confidence was well placed.[26] Nor were the British Gendarmerie's methods comparable to those that earned the RIC international notoriety. There was no parallel in Palestine in the 1922 to 1926 period with the semi-sanctioned policy of reprisals against Republicans and their communities for attacks on the Irish police. Retaliation for attacks on the British Gendarmerie targeted the perpetrators alone, even in cases where gendarmes were killed. In fact the extreme and often indiscriminate violence towards people and property that defined the RIC's reprisals policy resembled the 'Turkish methods' the gendarmerie eschewed.

'Occasional Black-and-Tan Tendencies': The British Section of the Palestine Police

'Turkish methods' were, however, a feature of the counterinsurgency of the BSPP. Raised in April 1926 from the disbanded gendarmerie's remnants, this 220-strong unit was originally conceived as a British Gendarmerie-style emergency reserve. But its establishment was dramatically increased in response to threats to public security. It was trebled in the wake of the 1929 riots when British police were too few to protect Palestine's Jews, and was gradually increased to 2,800 between 1936 and 1939, when Arab anti-Zionist resistance escalated into full-scale revolt. Force strength was further increased to over 4,000 between 1946 and 1947 to meet the challenges of the intensifying Zionist insurgency, waged by *Lehi, Haganah*, and the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* variously, or in concert, since summer 1939.

In its early years, the BSPP did operate as a gendarmerie. But, under reforms devised by the imperial policing expert, Herbert Dowbiggin, and instituted by his protégé Roy Spicer, whom he had installed as Palestine Police inspector-general in 1931, it was stripped of its striking-force status and, through a newly devised training programme described by one constable as 'very much accentuated to being policemen rather than soldiery', remodelled along civil lines.[27] However, this 'civilianization' process foundered as a result of the Arab Revolt (1936–39) when 'instruction compatible with duties essential for the restoration of order' was prioritized over the study of civil policing methods, languages, and law.[28] Although paying lip-service to 'civilianization', Charles Tegart (the colonial 'counter-terrorism' expert appointed Palestine Police 'advisor' in October 1937) effectively sought to formalize the BSPP's reversion to gendarmerie status by fashioning urban-based riot-squads from its ranks, and through the creation of a British-Palestinian Rural Mounted Police, which would 'anticipate and prevent ... crime, organised anti-Government activities and inter-racial conflict in the rural areas'.[29] But, although the collapse of the Arab police in autumn 1938 saw this plan shelved, a Mobile Police Striking Force (MPSF) comprising three mixed 50-strong troops was established in 1940. This return to gendarmerie-style policing was underscored in summer 1944 when the MPSF was replaced with the Police Mobile Force (PMF), a fully militarized 800-strong striking-force recruited largely from the army as 'a mailed fist' to crush the Zionist insurgency.[30] But the formation of gendarmerie forces did not represent

a complete reversal of 'civilianization'. First, they stood apart from the regular BSPP, which continued to be trained in and carry out routine policing duties. Secondly, they were relatively short-lived: the PMF was disbanded after two years on the recommendation of the former Royal Ulster Constabulary inspector-general, Charles Wickham, who, in a report on the police response to the escalating 'Jewish Revolt' published in late 1946, urged that it be tackled, not by PMF-style paramilitarism, but by 'an intensification of … normal [policing] procedure and operation'.[31] Nonetheless, three months before the Mandate expired, the former Palestine Police inspector-general, John Rymer-Jones, could remark that the BSPP had by this time 'necessarily abandoned police work as it was understood in Britain'.[32]

Although recourse to 'Turkish methods' by British policemen was rare in the 1926–36 period (only a handful of officers employed them and they generally did so by proxy) police brutality became general during the Arab Revolt.[33] Catalogues of BSPP abuses survive in Jerusalem's Anglican diocesan archives, while files on some of the most serious incidents rest in the Colonial Office's archives. But one of the most shocking records of police violence is contained in the letters of Sydney Burr, recruited as a constable in February 1937. In December 1937, he told his parents that 'any Johnny Arab who is caught by us now in suspicious circumstances is shot out of hand'. Ten days later he wrote of how, in response to the attempted bombing of a café frequented by police, his unit had 'descended into the sook [*sic*] and thrashed every Arab we saw, smashed all the shops and cafés and created havoc and bloodshed'. Yet another letter detailed how it was ordered to 'decimate [a village] which we did, all animals and grain and food were destroyed and the sheikh and all his hangers on beaten with rifle-butts. There will be quite a number of funerals their [*sic*] I should imagine.'[34] Other British policemen told similar tales.[35] The most infamous innovation of this period was the establishment of 'Arab investigation centres', in which suspected rebels were interrogated under torture. Unsurprisingly, the BSPP's counterinsurgency soon evoked memories of Ireland. In June 1936, Jerusalem's Anglican archdeacon declared himself 'seriously troubled at its "Black and Tan" methods' and, by September 1938, even the hardline high commissioner, Harold MacMichael, was noting 'occasional … black and tan tendencies' among the police.[36] Direct parallels with revolutionary Ireland were drawn too in the press.[37]

The BSPP's response to the Jewish Revolt was far more restrained. Dictated by political considerations, this restraint was facilitated by the

authorization of large-scale 'cordon-and-search' operations such as 'Agatha', 'Elephant', and 'Shark' which, by acting as official reprisals, maintained force morale by making policemen less likely to take matters into their own hands. However, the perceived incidence of excess during these (and, indeed, earlier operations such as those conducted at Ramat HaKovesh in November 1943 and Givat Chaim two years later), coupled with unofficial police reprisals such as those which followed the November 1946 killing of three BSPP constables by an *Irgun* mine, was sufficient to see the force routinely accused of 'reviving the Black-and-Tan days of Ireland in the Holy Land'.[38] Suspicions that Ireland's spectre was again haunting Palestine were confirmed by the Roy Farran affair. Farran, a highly decorated former SAS commando, headed one of two undercover 'snatch squads' formed in March 1947 under the aegis of the Palestine Police. These squads were instructed to use 'unconventional' methods which, broadly speaking, involved entering Jewish areas and provoking confrontation with the insurgents, methods which so skirted the borderline of illegality that Farran believed he had 'a carte blanche'.[39] This initiative ended in failure. In May, Farran's squad abducted Alexander Rubowitz, a 16-year-old *Lehi* operative found placing anti-British posters in Jerusalem. The police initially denied knowledge of his disappearance but an accumulation of circumstantial evidence led to a press campaign the authorities could not ignore. The squads were immediately wound down and, notwithstanding the fact that Rubowitz's body was never found, Farran was tried for his murder. He was quickly acquitted and protested his innocence until his own death in 2006. However, since-released case files have established his guilt and Palestine's civil and military authorities' awareness of it. According to Cesarani, the cover-up in which they connived, together with revelations concerning the snatch squads' activities, helped 'strip the British Mandate of whatever legitimacy it still had in the eyes of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine and of many others around the world'.[40]

'A Repetition of the Irish Show'

The brutality which characterized the BSPP's response to the Arab and Zionist insurgencies is generally attributed to the fact that the force was, through its recruitment of disbanded gendarmes, 'directly descended from the Black and Tans' and thereby imbued with a 'Black and Tan ethos'.[41] According to this view, ex-RIC serving in the BSPP, some at very senior

rank, exerted a 'pervasive and pernicious' influence on the force, and the excesses of its counterinsurgency, including the 'snatch squads', were simply 'a logical extension of what had been created in the earliest days of the Mandate' through their introduction, that is a policing model based on brute force.[42] Some ex-RIC serving in Palestine deservedly earned reputations for brutality; Alan Sigrist, for example, was so notorious for his savagery that a near-successful attempt was made on his life, while Douglas Duff favoured an approach to policing so heavy-handed that the expression 'to duff up', a colonial slang-word for ill-treatment/torture, was coined in his 'honour'. Yet the great majority of ex-RIC had uncontroversial careers and many served with distinction. Moreover, there is little evidence that these men played a significant role in the police counterinsurgency's formulation between 1936 and 1948. Certainly, all of the more drastic initiatives were instituted by police officers with non-'RIC' pedigrees, or by external agents: for example, the 'Arab investigation centres' were established on Tegart's recommendation and the MPSF (the only policing unit pervaded with what could be described as a 'Black and Tan ethos') by Alan Saunders, a career colonial policeman with no experience of Ireland, while the 'snatch squads' were the brainchild of William Nicol Gray, a former Royal Marines commando parachuted in as Palestine Police inspector-general in March 1946.[43]

The view that the BSPP's excesses were the result of its recruitment of ex-RIC is rooted in the traditional narrative of police violence in revolutionary Ireland according to which it was a function of the Black and Tans' low moral characters and brutalization by the Great War. This narrative has been discredited. Analyses of RIC service records have exploded the notion these men were 'jail-birds and down-and-outs' or the 'scum of London's underworld', and so forth.[44] And, although the brutalization thesis has proved more resilient, it is, as Dolan argues, 'as open to criticism in the case of the Black and Tans as it is in the context of any paramilitaries in postwar Europe': there is simply 'no way to gauge it beyond personal experience'.[45] Yet these types of what Leeson terms 'character-based explanations' for police violence are still used with reference to Palestine.[46] For example, much is made of Duff's description of the British Gendarmerie as 'a Legion of the Lost' and his catalogue of its complement of misfits while, drawing on a similar list provided by Geoff Morton (recruited as a constable in the early 1930s), the BSPP is presented as 'an agglomerate of adventurers, escapers and marginal men'.[47] Yet, an examination of relevant

RIC records, and BSPP personnel files, demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of British Palestine policemen were ordinary, everyday men while, in the absence of quantitative data on their personal wartime experiences, recourse to the brutalization thesis is, at best, glib. Certainly, the case of Duff, the most frequently cited exemplar of police brutality in Palestine, does not bear scrutiny in this regard. He served in the Merchant Navy during the war and saw minimal action in Ireland, joining the RIC on 1 April 1921 and receiving his first posting (to Galway) on 7 June, just five weeks prior to the Truce that, officially at least, ended the Irish War of Independence.

In any case, as in revolutionary Ireland, police brutality in Palestine had less to do with the characters of its policemen than with the circumstances into which they were thrust. Unsettled by the violence of the 1929 riots, British policeman Raymond Cafferata had predicted 'a repetition of the Irish show' if Arab grievances were not in some way assuaged and the outbreak of the 'Great Revolt' proved him right on many levels.[48] Like Dublin Castle in 1919, the British regime in Jerusalem was initially reluctant to interpret the violence of 1936 as politico-nationalist, treating it instead as a crimewave which, as the guardians of law and order, the police were expected to suppress. This reluctance, fuelled by a failure to appreciate the revolt's transformative contexts which saw outlaws recast as insurgents in the Arab imagination, persisted in some quarters until the insurgency's end: as late as December 1938, by which time the acephalous, unsystematic resistance of the Arab Revolt's first phase (April to October 1936) had so clearly matured into something approximating a popular revolutionary struggle that MacMichael was describing it as 'definitely ... national', the recently arrived divisional commander for northern Palestine, Major-General Bernard Montgomery, could ask whether he was facing 'a national movement or a campaign of professional bandits', before settling on the latter.[49] But, as in Ireland where the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was characterized as a 'murder gang', the defining of politically motivated offences as common crimes was partly deliberate: 'British officialdom and press routinely branded the mujahidin as "outlaws", "bandits", "gangsters" and "highwaymen" in order to discredit the movement's nationalist aims'.[50] Yet it was also borne of a colonial condescension which saw the Arabs as incapable of evolved national consciousness and organized opposition to imperial rule. In September 1923, Tudor told Churchill that Palestine would never 'become anything like Ireland. [The Arabs] are a different people and it is unlikely that, if

handled firmly, [they] will ever do much more than agitate and talk', and the development of a coherent revolutionary culture in the 1930s, sanctified by the 'martyrdom' of Izz a-Din al-Qassam in November 1935, was overlooked or ignored.[51]

Duff used an exchange between a BSPP inspector and a British visitor to Palestine about the insurgents to illustrate what he saw as the racism underpinning this type of thinking:

- They are nothing but a gang of toughs, looting and killing for what they can make out of it. They're not patriots, they're criminals …
- Some of the men who were hanged during the [Irish] Troubles were condemned as criminals. Kevin Barry and the rest.
- That's different. They were white men.[52]

This insistence that Arab violence was criminal saw the BSPP forming the frontline against an insurgency that its recent 'civilianization' had rendered it ill-equipped to handle other than by brutal coercion. For, although this 'civilianization' was checked by the insurgency's outbreak, it was so sufficiently advanced that, like the 'domesticated' RIC before it, the force lacked counterinsurgency skills.[53] This was widely noted: Angus McNeill, then living in semi-retirement outside Acre, complained that while Spicer had made the police 'word perfect at crime-sheets, traffic duties and elementary law – when they are called upon to go forth and take on a gang, they haven't the foggiest', while Tegart advised that 'gangs of banditry, armed with rifles, cannot be dealt with by policemen with notebooks'.[54]

Nor could the police restore order in the towns: the Peel commission of inquiry reported in 1937 that, although the BSPP ceased regular policing to act as a gendarmerie when disturbances occurred, it was 'not able to deal with widespread disorder which took the form of street rioting and urban demonstration', meaning that troops were generally deployed.[55] Far from being imbued with a 'Black and Tan ethos', the BSPP had, Tegart believed, been essentially emasculated by Spicer, not least through his active recruitment of large numbers of public schoolboys, the 'splendid type of young Britisher who is of good birth, well-educated and suitable in every way for rapid promotion in the Colonial Police Service' and who would, he believed, 'fit socially' into colonial society as well.[56] While Tegart thought such men suitable for the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and other key positions, he believed that the main

body of the force urgently required the recruitment of men capable of 'the rough work of a quasi-military kind that has to be done [by the police] in times of disorder'.[57] He, therefore, recommended the recruitment of soldiers and ex-servicemen, arguing that their military training made them ideally suited to counterinsurgency, and over 1,800 were recruited by April 1939. However, as with the RIC, this mass enlistment of what MacMichael described as 'in effect ex-soldiers dressed in police uniform', the majority of whom received minimal police training, further undermined the force's efficiency.[58] So too did the lack of a properly functioning CID. Although this department was completely overhauled by Dowbiggin, it was entirely inadequate to the task it now faced. Primarily, the absence of proficient Arabic speakers forced a near-complete reliance on the Arab police for intelligence, intelligence which they became increasingly reluctant to provide due to pro-rebel sympathies or fear for themselves and/or their families.

As in Ireland, the police failure saw the military assume increasing responsibility for the counterinsurgency. Although the army had shouldered some of the burden from the start, it acted subsidiarily to the police during the revolt's first phase: deployed under civil authority, its operations were largely defensive and routinely conducted under police command. The second, more belligerent, phase of the revolt, which opened with the September 1937 killing of the pro-Zionist district commissioner, Lewis Andrews, saw the military take a more aggressive, independent stance. This culminated in MacMichael's granting of full operational control of the BSPP to the army one year later (and a state of undeclared martial law), its effective defeat underscored by its evacuation of outlying stations and retreat to fortified centres – the famous 'Tegart forts'. The army's counterinsurgency was itself frequently savage (in June 1936 Palestine's former high commissioner, John Chancellor, accused it of running a 'Black and Tan' regime and, by early 1938, it was engaged in an active repression centred on 'village occupation' and collective punishment) and the placing of the BSPP under its aegis frustrated attempts by the newly appointed inspector-general, Alan Saunders, to curtail the culture of violence sanctioned by Spicer.[59] This, coupled with the fact that the BSPP, which retained responsibility for day-to-day public security, was left to do what one officer described as the 'dirty work', such as the expropriation of Arab farm produce in lieu of punitive fines, took a toll on force morale.[60] This inevitablably led to 'black-and-tan tendencies', sometimes surpassing those displayed by the soldiers.

The situation was exacerbated by rage at the police casualty rate. The severity of the BSPP's initial response to the Arab insurgency was partly conditioned by anger at what one constable described as the 'wicked, senseless murder' of his colleague, Robert Bird, in May 1936 which 'did more than anything to rally policemen together into a watchful force'.[61] And another 33 British policemen subsequently died at the insurgents' hands, most notably four constables killed in a September 1936 ambush, and Constable Edward Stephens, whose May 1938 shooting resulted in a police reprisal against Miska village during which seven Arabs were executed. As another constable subsequently noted, 'it's very difficult when you're being attacked not to retaliate in some way and [we] did retaliate ... when the so-called terrorism became critical, in order to fight terrorism, we became terrorists more or less'.[62] This recourse to 'terrorism' was facilitated by racism, particularly long-standing colonial views about the manner in which rebellious 'natives' could best be dealt. In his influential treatise on colonial counterinsurgency, Charles Callwell cautioned that, as 'uncivilised races attribute leniency to timidity', methods appropriate in Europe were 'out of place among fanatics and savages, who must be thoroughly brought to book and cowed'.[63] And such thinking was current in the BSPP: in June 1936 newly recruited Constable John Briance wrote to his parents that 'there is apparently only one method of handling the Arabs ... that is by ruthless white domination' while, according to McNeill, one month's 'brutal and bloodthirsty' repression would have the Arabs 'eating out of your hand'.[64]

BSPP excesses during the Zionist insurgency were also driven by situational factors. Although its political character was always acknowledged by British officialdom, the urban-based violence of which the insurgency primarily consisted was viewed as a police problem and this saw the BSPP forming the Mandatory's 'first line of defence against the insurgency and supposedly the chief means of rooting it out'.[65] The police did prove effective in the early 1940s when only *Lehi* engaged in active revolt and its alienation from the wider *Yishuv* resulted in a stream of intelligence to the CID.[66] However, the spring 1944 launch of the *Irgun's* more sophisticated campaign placed the BSPP squarely on the defensive and, by October 1945, when the three Zionist militias commenced what became ten months of joint operations, it was already under severe strain, not least because it was 50 per cent below strength due to postwar departures. Montgomery, who toured Palestine in June 1946 as chief of the imperial general staff, noted that, at 'a time when the situation was clearly about to

boil over' into general revolt, the BSPP was 'no more than 25 per cent effective'; and, despite the mass recruitment of reinforcements in the following twelve months (many with army experience), a British Palestine-based journalist estimated that there were just 800 'thoroughly trained' policemen in a force then 4,000-strong capable of what Sinclair terms 'counter-insurgency policing'.[67] Their capabilities were compromised by clear defeat in the intelligence war, the result of a too-small CID, a near-complete lack of British Hebrew speakers, and infiltration by *Haganah* (Palestinian-Jewish policemen posing a particular problem in this regard). Moreover, as in Ireland, the targeting of police intelligence was one of the insurgency's tactical constants. CID offices were frequently attacked and several senior officers assassinated: for example, Ralph Cairns (1939), Tom Wilkins (1944), Thomas Martin (1946), and Albert Conquest (1947). The intelligence deficit left the BSPP reliant on 'cordon-and-search' and open patrol, placing the force under severe pressure, and leading to collapses in discipline in turn.

But the driving force behind BSPP violence was the rising police death toll: 68 British policemen were killed between 1946 and 1947, and a further 26 between January and April 1948. Like the RIC, which considered the IRA's method of hit-and-run warfare to be, as the British army's 'Record of the Irish Rebellion' described it, 'in most cases barbarous, influenced by hatred and devoid of courage', policemen were enraged by the killing of their colleagues by (as they saw them) cowards who shirked a fair fight.[68] 'You can imagine how I feel about those b-ds', Constable Desmond Morton complained, 'who, without the slightest warning and having all the advantages, shoot you *in the back* [Morton's emphasis]'.[69] Moreover, what CID chief Richard Catling termed 'the Jewish brand of terrorism' as manifested in insurgent attacks such as the April 1946 shooting of seven members of the army's 6th Airborne Division in a Tel Aviv car park (which, according to its commanding officer, 'for cold-blooded brutality could hardly have been surpassed'), the bombing of the King David Hotel three months later and, most infamously of all, the hanging of two British army sergeants in July 1947, was repugnant to British beliefs about legitimate conduct during armed conflict.[70] As Kardahji has noted, Jewish insurgent attacks also offended 'a certain conception of honour and prestige' deriving from race-based 'ideas about Britain's role as an imperial power and the place of its police officers and soldiers in relation to the subjugated peoples of the Empire', according to which the former dispensed justice to the latter and 'held a monopoly on the exercise of

force'.[71] The sense of insulted personal and imperial honour to which insurgent attacks gave rise was assuagable only by harsh retaliation, resulting in a revenge culture culminating in the 'snatch squads' and several desertions to the Arab militias in the Mandate's final months. Retribution was also exacted against the wider *Yishuv*, its studied ambivalence towards the insurgency (often verging on tacit support) representing in BSPP eyes 'the most blatant ingratitude toward a benevolent country' that had 'allow[ed] them to create a home in the Holy Land'.[72] So intense was the pressure placed on the BSPP by the Zionist insurgency that a visiting Irish Redemptorist later remarked that many Irishmen working in Palestine, having 'now realised, as never before, what the strain of conflict with an underground enemy can do to human nature', were surprised that its reaction was not more robust. For, while 'not in the least condoning Black-and-Tan methods of reprisal, [they] knew how strong can be the temptation to resort to them in extremity'.[73]

Conclusion

Colonial policing was difficult even in peacetime. Civil policing provided the everyday interface between the colonial state and its subjects, making policemen the most visible symbol of imperial power and the primary agents through which it was exercised through their enforcement of colonial law. The alienation in which this resulted was exacerbated by the fact that the colonial police also performed an internal security function, operating as the state's principal coercive arm during times of popular resistance and public unrest. This hybrid identity compromised the ability of the colonial police to properly discharge either their civil or (para)military role. As events in Ireland and Palestine demonstrated, police counterinsurgencies irreparably breached relations with policed populations, rendering impossible the consensus-style policing upon which the prevention and detection of crime is optimally dependent, while moves towards 'civilianization' in the twentieth century stripped the police of their counterinsurgency capability, casting them, in the eyes of insurgents, as the soft underbelly of imperial defence.

The loss of counterinsurgency capability by the BSPP saw it resort to a policy of brutal coercion when challenged. Racism was also a factor: Palestine's 'native' populations could be treated with a harshness unthinkable in the Metropole, and insurgents were by definition unlawful combatants – the Arabs through their inherent incapacity for the evolved political consciousness that lent legitimacy to revolutionary campaigns, the Jews

through the ruthlessness of their 'brand of terrorism' which placed them outside of the protections due process conferred. However, such attitudes simply facilitated a culture of police violence that, given the pressures under which the BSPP operated, would have anyways emerged.

That the British Gendarmerie did not act with similar licence to its parent or successor forces underscores the primacy of situational factors in creating cultures of police violence during counterinsurgencies. The environment in which ex-RIC worked was entirely different to that in which they had operated in Ireland. Their timely deployment ensured that the anti-Zionist resistance of 1919 to 1921 did not escalate into an IRA-style insurgency, and Palestine remained largely peaceable during their four years of service. Moreover, they were unchallenged by the outbreaks of violence that did occur during this period, their capacity to suppress them never in doubt. Nor were they a primary target; these outbreaks were inter- or intra-communal and not directed against the British regime. Therefore the stresses and strains under which they had laboured during the Irish Revolution were absent in Palestine: indeed, Tudor described the country as 'a rest cure after Ireland'.[74]

The evolution of an 'Irish' environment during the Arab and Jewish insurgencies saw the emergence of 'black-and-tan tendencies' among the police. And so powerfully imprinted is the idea of character-based 'Black and Tannery' (the term has long been a byword for police brutality, not just in Ireland – where, historically, it served the important purpose of absolving the IRA of any responsibility for the culture of wanton violence unleashed by the conduct of its own campaign – but also in Britain and beyond) that their attribution to the influence of twice-brutalized ex-RIC seems a logical conclusion to draw. But this conclusion is based on a logical fallacy, being a *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*-type proposition which assumes that, because police brutality in Palestine occurred after the Black and Tans' arrival, it therefore occurred as a consequence.

Notes

1. For detailed surveys of these events see Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929* (London, 1974); Idem, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, vol. 2, 1929–1939: From Riots to Rebellion* (London, 1977); Bernard Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine: the Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict, 1917–1929* (Oxford, 1991); Martin Kolinsky, *Law, Order and Riots in Mandatory Palestine, 1929–1935* (London, 1993); Tom Segev,

One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate (London, 2000); Norman Rose, *A Senseless, Squalid War: Voices from Palestine, 1945–1948* (London, 2009).

2. The 'regular RIC' comprised the Black and Tans, here defined as any man, British or Irish, who joined the RIC on or after 2 January 1920 (the date on which the first RIC constable was recruited in Britain), and the 'old RIC', those who joined the service prior to this date. The ADRIC, a 'special Corps of Gendarmerie' composed of ex-officers, was recruited from July 1920 onwards. References to the RIC in the text refer to the 'regular RIC' and the ADRIC combined.
3. The term 'Black and Tannery' has been used since the time to describe the brutal counterinsurgency methods sometimes employed by the RIC during its attempted suppression of the Irish Revolution in 1920 and 1921, particularly reprisals and collective punishments involving unwonted or excessive violence against people and property, including extrajudicial killing. See, for example, Frank Percy Crozier, *A Word to Gandhi: the Lesson of Ireland* (London, 1931), 40, 91; Richard Bennett, *The Black and Tans* (London, 1959), 56; D. M. Leeson, *The Black and Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence* (Oxford, 2011), 68.
4. Quoted in Alex Winder, 'Abu Jilda, Anti-imperial Antihero: Banditry and Popular Rebellion in Palestine' in *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates*, ed. Cyrus Schayegh & Andrew Arsan (Oxford, 2015), 308–320, 309.
5. Ibid. 317.
6. National Archives, London (hereafter UKNA), Colonial Office files (hereafter CO), CO 733/25, 'Report of Palestine administration', August 1922.
7. *Palestine Weekly*, 29 June 1923.
8. UKNA, CO 733/49/100-107, 'Report on police and gendarmerie', 15 August 1923; Norman & Helen Bentwich, *Mandate Memories, 1918–1948* (London, 1965), 87.
9. Churchill College, Cambridge (hereafter CCC), Churchill Papers (hereafter CHAR), 17/25, Tudor to Churchill, 22 October 1922; UKNA, CO 733/65/113, Meinertzhagen, Colonial Office minute, 10 March 1924; Middle East Centre Archive, Oxford (hereafter MECA), McNeill collection (hereafter MNC), GB 165-0197, A/1, Diaries, 23 June 1924.
10. Matthew Hughes, 'A British "Foreign Legion"? The British Police in Mandate Palestine', *Middle Eastern Studies* 49 (2013): 697; David Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: the Royal Air Force, 1919–1939* (Manchester, 1990), 66. See also Matthew Hughes, 'The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39', *English Historical Review* 124 (2009): 333.
11. CCC, CHAR 17/11, Samuel to Churchill, 11 Dec. 1921.

12. MECA, MNC, A/3, Angus McNeill, 'Notes on the British Gendarmerie', 3 January 1923.
13. Douglas Duff, *Bailing with a Teaspoon* (London, 1953), 31.
14. Richard Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary* (London, 1959), 11 Apr. 1922, 116; UKNA, CO 733/61/38, Meinertzhagen, 'Military Report on Palestine', 25 March 1923.
15. Pembroke College, Cambridge, Sir Ronald Storrs papers, MSS/III/3, 'Secret political resume for Jerusalem District', 15 July 1922.
16. *Doar Hayom*, 14 July 1922; Jenifer Glynn (ed.), *Tidings from Zion: Helen Bentwich's Letters from Jerusalem 1919–1931* (London, 2000), 87.
17. Duff, *Bailing*, 36–38; *Doar Hayom*, 18 September 1922.
18. Duff, *Bailing*, 45–46; MECA, MNC, A/1, Diaries, 23 October 1922; *Falastin*, 28 October 1922; *Jewish Chronicle*, 3 November 1922.
19. MECA, MNC, A/1, Diaries, 23 October, 2 November 1922.
20. See, for example, Ibid. 14 March 1923, 1 September 1924.
21. Duff, *Bailing*, 31.
22. UKNA, Treasury files, T172/1551, McNeill to Churchill, 7 April 1926.
23. On 10 April 1919, troops opened fire on demonstrators in the Indian city of Amritsar, killing at least twenty. Two days later, a detachment of riflemen commanded by Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer deliberately shot dead several hundred non-violent protestors and bystanders to (in his own words) 'punish' their defiance of his ban on public gatherings and to produce 'the necessary moral and widespread effect' to deter further demonstrations in what the former British prime minister, Herbert Asquith, denounced as 'one of the worst outrages in the whole of our history': Derek Sayer, 'British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre, 1919–1920', *Past & Present* 131 (1991): 144–146, 131.
24. MECA, MNC, A/3, 'Notes'; UKNA, CO 733/62/46-7, Samuel to Devonshire, 23 February 1923.
25. UKNA, CO 733/49/124-34, 'Report of the Palestine police and prisons', 23 July 1923.
26. *Palestine Weekly*, 6 July 1923; UKNA, CO 733/128/2, 'Report on Palestine administration, 1925'.
27. MECA, Geoffrey Owen collection, GB165-0403, Interview with John Knight, 13 June 2006.
28. 'Police Force and Prison Service: Annual Administrative Report', 1937 (Jerusalem, 1937).
29. MECA, Charles Tegart collection, GB165-0281 (hereafter CTC), 2/1, 'Memorandum regarding the formation of a gendarmerie or semi-military force for Palestine', undated 1939.
30. David Cesarani, *Major Farran's Hat: Murder, Scandal and Britain's War against Jewish Terrorism, 1945–1948* (London, 2009), 27.

31. UKNA, CO 537/2269/50-3, 'Report on the Palestine Mobile Police Force', 2 December 1946.
32. UKNA, London Metropolitan Police archives, MEPO 2/8212, 'Recruitment of ex-members of the Palestine Police Force, 1948–49', 26 February 1948.
33. The most notorious of these officers was Douglas Duff, who had transferred to the ordinary establishment of the Palestine Police in April 1926 with the rank of 'British inspector'. While careful to distance himself from the actual practice of tortures such as water-boarding and suspension by hoist, he admitted to overseeing their employment by his Arab subordinates and using the information they yielded. Duff, *Bailing*, 168, 189.
34. Imperial War Museum, London (hereafter IWM), Sydney Burr collection, 88/8/1, Burr to parents, 19 December 1937, 29 December 1937, undated, c. December 1937; Burr to Alex, undated, c. December 1937.
35. See, for example, the John Briance letters quoted by Hughes in 'Banality', 327, 347; IWM, Sound archive 10688, Reubin Kitson interview, 26 April 1989; Roger Courtney, *Palestine Policeman: An Account of Eighteenth Dramatic Months in the Palestine Police Force During the Great Jew-Arab Troubles* (London, 1939), 176, 214–15, 238; Jack Binsley, *The Palestine Police Service* (London, 1997), 104–6, 119–20.
36. MECA, Jerusalem & East Mission papers, 61/1, Stewart to Matthews, 9 June 1936; MacMichael to MacDonald, 5 Sept. 1938, quoted in Charles Smith, 'Communal Conflict and Insurrection in Palestine, 1936–48' in *Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police*, 1917–65, ed. David Anderson & David Killingray (Manchester, 1992), 71.
37. *Spectator*, 14 October 1938; *Irish Independent*, 10 January 1939.
38. *New York Times*, 23 April 1947. See also Hansard, House of Commons' debates, 31 July 1946, vol. 426, cc934–5, c1017 & 1 August 1946, c1315; *New York Times*, 10 July 1946; *Irish Democrat*, August 1947.
39. Roy Farran, *Winged Dagger: Adventures on Special Service* (London, 1948), 348.
40. Cesarani, *Major Farran's Hat*, vii.
41. Charles Townshend, 'The Defence of Palestine: Insurrection and Public Security, 1936–1939', *English Historical Review*, 103 (1988): 931; Idem, *Britain's Civil Wars: Counter-insurgency in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1986), 92.
42. Nick Kardahji, 'A Measure of Restraint: The Palestine Police and the End of the British Mandate', M.Phil. thesis (University of Oxford, 2007), 45; Smith, 'Communal conflict', 79.
43. Nicknamed 'the punishment squad', the MPSF was composed of men 'who were good enough as policemen but were by nature rugged individualists who needed to be kept on a tight rein': Edward Horne, *A Job Well Done: A History of the Palestine Police Force 1920–1948* (Lewes, 2003), 499.

44. Florence O'Donoghue, 'The Sacking of Cork', in *Rebel Cork's Fighting Story, 1916–21: Told by the Men who Made It*, ed. Brian Ó'Conchubhair (Cork, 2009), 88–105, 90; D. M. Leeson, 'The Scum of London's Underworld? British Recruits for the Royal Irish Constabulary, 1920–21', *Contemporary British History* 17 (2003).
45. Anne Dolan, 'The British Culture of Paramilitary Violence in the Irish War of Independence' in *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War*, ed. Robert Gerwarth & John Horne (Oxford, 2012), 200–215, 212.
46. Leeson, *Black and Tans* (Oxford, 2011), 191.
47. Duff, *Bailing*, 19–20; Tom Bowden, *The Breakdown of Public Security: the Case of Ireland 1916–1921 and Palestine 1936–1939* (London, 1977), 154–55; Geoffrey Morton, *Just the Job: Some Experiences of a Colonial Policeman* (London, 1957), 19. See also Hughes, 'British Foreign Legion', 697.
48. Cafferata to his mother, 29 Nov. 1929, quoted in Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 325. Cafferata, a former section leader with ADRIC 'C Company', was acting police district superintendent in Hebron where the worst of the rioting occurred.
49. Townshend, 'Defence', 934, 946.
50. Ted Swedenburg, *Memories of the Revolt: The 1936–1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past* (Minneapolis, 1995), 94. British police referred to the insurgents as 'Oozlebarts', their rendering of the Arabic *Ursabat* ('gangs').
51. CCC, CHAR 2/126, Tudor to Churchill, 21 September 1923.
52. Douglas Duff, *Palestine unveiled* (London, 1938), 73–74.
53. W. J. Lowe and Elizabeth Malcolm, 'The Domestication of the Royal Irish Constabulary 1836–1922', *Irish Economic and Social History* 14 (1992): 27–48.
54. CCC, CHAR 2/348, McNeill to Churchill, 20 December 1937; MECA, CTC, 2/2, Tegart, 'Report on Police Reorganisation', January 1938, Section 3.
55. Report of the Palestine Commission, Cmd. 5479. H.M.S.O., 1937, 198.
56. UKNA, CO 850/40/7, Spicer to Hathorn Hall, 30 January 1934; *The Times*, 27 January 1938.
57. MECA, CTC, 2/2, 'Tegart Report', Section 6.
58. UKNA, CO 733/389/13/35, MacMichael to MacDonald, 8 February 1939.
59. UKNA, CO 733/297/2, Colonial Office minute, 5 June 1936. Spicer was forcibly retired in October 1937 due his hardline approach.
60. Binsley, *Palestine Police*, 99.
61. Quoted in Horne, *Job*, 212.
62. IWM, Kitson interview.

63. C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (3rd edn, London, 1906), 148.
64. Briance quoted in Hughes, 'Banality', 352; CCC, CHAR 2/348, McNeill to Churchill, 20 December 1937. See also Courtney, *Palestine Policeman*, 176; Duff, *Palestine Unveiled*, 60–62.
65. Cesarani, *Major Farran's Hat*, 26.
66. The *Yishuv* (literally the 'settlement') refers to the Jewish community in Palestine in the period predating the establishment of Israel in 1948.
67. B. L. Montgomery, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein* (London, 1958), 378–79; Georgina Sinclair, '"Get into a Crack Force and Earn £20 a Month and all Found": The Influence of the Palestine Police upon Colonial Policing, 1922–1948', *European Review of History*, 13 (2006): 55.
68. Quoted in Paul McMahon, *British Spies and Irish Rebels: British Intelligence and Ireland, 1916–1945* (Woodbridge, 2008), 164.
69. MECA, Desmond Morton collection, GB165-0405, Morton to parents, 15 November 1947.
70. IWM, Sound archive 10392, Richard Charles Catling interview, September 1988; R. D. Wilson, *Cordon and Search: With the 6th Airborne Division in Palestine* (Aldershot, 1949), 45.
71. Kardahji, 'Measure', 66–67.
72. Binsley, *Palestine Police*, 128–29.
73. J. J. W. Murphy, 'Irishmen in Palestine, 1946–1948', *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* 40/157 (1951): 88.
74. R.A.F. Museum, London, Viscount Trenchard papers, MFC76/1/285, Tudor to Churchill, 1 October 1922.

Dr Seán William Gannon holds a PhD in History from Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick, Ireland. He is currently a Government of Ireland Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Centre for Contemporary Irish History, Trinity College, Dublin.

'The Entire Population of this God-forsaken Island is Terrorised by a Small Band of Gun-men': Guerrillas and Civilians During the Irish Revolution

Brian Hughes

In 1955 Michael Cleary, a former Irish Republican Army (IRA) guerrilla from County Galway, concluded his statement to the Bureau of Military History (BMH) by saying:

> the local people were very good. They supported Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. financially and otherwise. They were always willing to do anything in their power for the men who were actively engaged in fighting for Ireland's independence and their houses were always open to men on the run.[1]

Cleary was not alone in acknowledging the contribution of the civilian population to the IRA's campaign during what has been variously called the 'Anglo-Irish War', 'Tan War', 'Irish War of Independence', or the 'Troubles' (c. 1919–21).[2] James Murphy, a guerrilla in County Cork, wished to 'pay a tribute to the civilian population of the area for the co-operation and assistance they extended to the men '"in the field" at all

B. Hughes (✉)
Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland
e-mail: Brian.Hughes@nuim.ie

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times'; Seán Prendergast recalled that 'the civilian population, or a large proportion of it, stood as it were in the way of almost every British move, every British activity'.[3] Similar sentiments were even expressed by members of the British army. Douglas Wimberley, an officer in the Cameron Highlanders who arrived in Cork in May 1920, wrote in his memoir that it 'was very difficult for some weeks to teach the Jocks that we were now in what was largely a hostile country, and that maybe 75 per cent of all local inhabitants, both men and women, viewed us with enmity, active or passive; though these sentiments were largely hidden'.[4]

These comments neatly encapsulate a traditional narrative of conflict in Ireland in this period, a tale of generous and uncomplaining civilian support for the Irish rebels against the 'brutality of the English forces'.[5] It was not a story without some element of truth in it. Neither was it one invented after the fact, or the preserve of nostalgic, ageing veterans. A circular from IRA General Headquarters (GHQ) in December 1920 reminded local brigade commandants that 'We are always inclined to cast ridicule on the enemy Intelligence System, but it must be remembered that they have to operate against a hostile population, while we have the ardent goodwill of the population.'[6] In 1923, Richard Mulcahy, former IRA chief of staff and by then commander-in-chief of the National Army, told Dáil Éireann that the army would not pay compensation for motor cars taken by the IRA before July 1921 as it was the duty of each area to 'provide the material means for supporting' the fighting men:

> the population generally supported and financed the soldiers in many ways – feeding them, furnishing them with housing accommodation, and in many cases clothing them. The occasional use of motor cars must be regarded as among those other services provided for its soldiers by the population generally and not unwillingly.[7]

This did not, of course, entirely reflect the situation as the British administration saw it at the time. Reports from government and police officials suggested that the majority of the general public were terrorized by a small number of extremists and that most nationalists were moderate (if easily frightened) and would happily accept a form of dominion home rule and peace.[8] The view of the perceptive civil servant Mark Sturgis that 'the entire population of this God-forsaken island is terrorised by a small band of gun-men' is also found in police reports and in the official army history of the conflict.[9]

This chapter will examine the extent to which either of these perspectives on guerrilla warfare in Ireland was an accurate reflection of what was actually taking place on the ground in communities around the country. The focus here will be on the more personal, and intimate, activity that took place in small towns and rural parishes in Ireland rather than what was, in many ways, a very different type of conflict in the major urban centres, most notably Dublin and Belfast.[10] Though the 'War of Independence', officially at least, lasted from January 1919 to July 1921 and historians now tend to refer to an 'Irish Revolution' encompassing a variety of conflicts between 1912 and 1923, this study will focus on the most intense period of war between Irish separatists and British counter-insurgents from 1920. The focus will also remain on the relationship between the IRA and Irish communities, and not on the simultaneous interaction between civilians and the Crown forces.

Firstly, the chapter will examine the nature of and motivations for civilian interaction with the IRA and, secondly, the ways in which the IRA defined, labelled, and punished those who had been, in their eyes, deviant. It will argue that most civilians and communities actually fell somewhere in between the two conflicting depictions above and are not easily categorized as either 'loyal' or 'disloyal', 'friendly' or 'hostile'. In his seminal work on the logic of civil war violence, Stathis Kalyvas notes a strong tendency for what he terms 'passive neutrality' and 'fence-sitting' among civilians during irregular war.[11] In earlier work on Civil War Missouri, Michael Fellman spoke of 'survival lies'.[12] James C. Scott's *Weapons of the Weak* points to the importance of '*everyday* forms of peasant resistance' and notes the capacity of peasants to display a combination of 'routine compliance and routine resistance' based on personal and local political circumstances.[13] Assuming that Ireland might be in some way an exception to this trend and placing civilians into one of two clearly labelled camps, in this case 'for' or 'against' the IRA, is to misrepresent the realities on the ground.

Loyal or Disloyal? Accounting for Civilian Behaviour

'Spies and informers' – the perennial scourge of Irish rebels – are the perceived deviants who have drawn most attention from historians of the Irish Revolution.[14] They are also the least common; Peter Hart argued that loyalist support rarely extended to passing information to the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and military.[15] A relatively small number of individuals

informed (often for money) but the most common acts of defiance were small, inconsequential on their own, intrinsically local, and by no means restricted to a small minority of stubborn loyalists. The small farmer refusing to pay an enforced levy or ignoring a boycott and the shopkeeper serving Crown forces or purchasing prohibited Belfast goods are more representative than the executed spy.[16] Through these everyday acts of defiance, often overlooked, we can get a greater sense of the civilian response to guerrilla warfare.

Kalyvas identified two key motives for civilian behaviour during irregular war. One is 'economic consideration'; that non-compliance with either armed actor could be influenced by the prospect of material gain or, more pertinently, the fear of loss.[17] The exactions made by the IRA on its hard-pressed local communities caused disaffection, often regardless of politics. The RIC county inspector in Tipperary South Riding, for example, remarked that 'the fact that the "flying column" descends on farmers [*sic*] houses and commandeers supplies does not make it any more popular'.[18] Similarly, after the IRA in Queen's County (Laois) attempted to restrict opening hours for public houses, the local head constable commented that '95% of the publicans are Sinn Feiners so long as it did not financially affect them, but now when their income is tampered with its [*sic*] a different matter'.[19] Volunteers sometimes admitted as much themselves, though rarely in the same terms. Seamus Robinson remembered his worry at discovering the financial cost that billeting IRA men was putting on local people but did not note any grumbling, instead remarking that 'These good people were too proud to drop even a hint of their embarrassment.'[20] A pamphlet on the record of a Cork IRA battalion offered another acknowledgment of the financial suffering inflicted on local populations:

> The second, and perhaps most important factor was the sympathy and cooperation of the civilian population, particularly in the poorer and mountainous districts where small Farmers fed and housed the Columns, which, without doubt, is the reason why a great many of them are in sore financial straits at the present time.[21]

As one republican supporter bluntly put it: 'business dealings with the I.R.A. were not profitable – rather the reverse'.[22] In May 1923, Thomas Keating claimed compensation from the Irish Free State government for '£364 . . . due to me by Ministry for Defence for maintenance of Flying Column 5th Batt Kilkenny Brigade I.R.A. at my home in Co Carlow'.[23]

Keating may well have been a supporter of the IRA, and may even have offered his support freely and willingly at the time, but the very act of reclaiming money spent on the struggle for freedom does not sit well with portrayals of an uncomplaining general public, silently willing to make sacrifices for the cause.

IRA guerrillas funded their war through local levies and collections (though the distinction between the two was not always clear) and their demands for money often brought opposition from within their own communities. Sara Malcolmson, a 60-year-old Church of Ireland Protestant from Kilkenny, stubbornly refused to pay towards an arms fund when visited by local IRA. Having told them 'it was against my conscience to give them money for any such purpose' she then brazenly wrote to the 'Dail Eireann Cabinet' to demand an explanation.[24] When Volunteers spoke to the Bureau of Military History in the 1940s and '50s, they often labelled civilians like Sara Malcolmson as 'loyalist', 'Protestant loyalist', 'Unionist', or simply 'hostile', conveniently placing them in a distinct, separate, and easily definable minority.[25] But resistance to levies and collections also came from those who were politically inclined towards the cause for which they were raised. A Cork tailor, Sinn Féin member, and IRA supporter confided that 'This Army Levy was compulsory – at least in the country – and the majority subscribed more through fear than love. There were no exceptions made. Everyone had to stump up if not in cash – in kind, if not directly – indirectly.' The lines between 'fear' and 'love' could be blurred: 'I don't know under what cat-e-gory I should be placed but I'll leave it an open question.'[26] Edmund Griffin, a Kerry farmer whose son was 'a Volunteer since "they started" and never refused any duty imposed on him as such', declined to pay a £4 levy, not because he was opposed to the collection, but because he felt the amount was unfair.[27] From the republican perspective, there was often little sympathy for those it was believed could afford what was being asked or people who, as Diarmuid O'Hegarty put it, 'want a Republic but are not prepared to give anything for it'.[28]

Once a Truce had officially ended hostilities in July 1921, compulsory levies were forbidden by the IRA hierarchy but they continued around the country well into 1922 and the subsequent Civil War (1922–3). This often prompted disgruntled civilians to complain in writing and Richard Mulcahy admitted that the enforced levies were 'simply irritating people'.[29] One local, who claimed to be 'a supporter of the national movement', wrote to the president of Dáil Éireann, Éamon de Valera,

pointing out that threats of shooting were made to those who refused to pay and wished to know if the notices had the authorisation of the Dáil as he feared 'the local authority of Sinn Fein are acting on their own authority'.[30] Despite Mulcahy's later assertion that motor cars and bicycles were 'given freely', the surviving papers of IRA liaison officers, appointed to deal with breaches of the Truce, are replete with requests from civilians for the return of their property. Todd Andrews later admitted that when 'a motor car was required for any purpose, there was no scruple in requisitioning the nearest at hand. In general we treated the population with little consideration.'[31] The complaints that survive are usually a mix of deference and frustration and the very fact that they exist at all is revealing.[32] Some expressed their disbelief that the IRA could behave in that way, or questioned if it had been IRA men at all. The owner of a commandeered bicycle in Kerry asked if it was 'a chivalrous act on the part of any man to put a revolver up to an old woman (my mother) & frighten her out of her wits?', while another who wrote on behalf of several neighbours stated, with more than a hint of sarcasm, that 'If it is the Roscommon Brigade rules or Dail Eireann laws to come at midnight and take away by force a bicycle . . . and hold them over for their own use in Peace days We as Irishmen fully comply.'[33] No matter how useful a bicycle or motor could be to the republican struggle, its absence often hindered a civilian's daily life and this was as likely to elicit grumbling as anything else. Dominick Foran insisted that he was 'always willing to oblige and contribute to the cause when demanded' but felt he had been unjustly treated by the IRA men who commandeered his property as 'I needed my bicycle urgently on several occasions'.[34] Complaints regarding unfulfilled promises about the return of bicycles and motor cars are similarly indicative of personal inconvenience when IRA demands for transport were met.[35]

To some extent, this ties in with Kalyvas's second motivator for civilian behaviour in irregular war: self-preservation. During conflict, most civilians will seek to avoid trouble and preserve their quality of life (or, more simply, their lives).[36] Among thousands of civilian applications to the Irish Grants Committee – a British Treasury-funded scheme of compensation for loss suffered on account of allegiance to the British administration – there are recurring claims for levies paid under duress. Many more claimed that they were forced to billet IRA men against their will.[37] Even among this group of self-proclaimed loyal British subjects one can find reluctant compliance as often as resistance: 'They . . . compelled my wife to give

them £10 . . . They also threatened to shoot me'; 'I was forced to pay levies to the I.R.A. on three occasions. They threatened me with a revolver, and said they would seize my cattle if I refused'; 'On their threatening to burn my house, I had to pay'.[38] Even if civilians were almost never shot for levy defaulting alone, the fear remained and, as Tim Wilson has found in Upper Silesia, where banditry was common but claimed few lives, 'Most people preferred to hand over their cash than be shot'.[39]

Although the British administration was often frustrated by the behaviour of loyalists, it was generally accepted that their failure to collaborate with Crown forces was justifiably motivated by the fear of IRA retribution. John Regan, who served in the police as a county inspector, wrote in his memoir that among those who 'well deserved the name of loyalist', were some who 'maintained what might be termed a strict neutrality. They did not conceal the fact that their sympathies were not with the IRA but kept aloof from both sides.'[40] 'They could not be blamed for this', he wrote, 'situated as they were in the country districts, at the mercy of their enemies and without protection of any kind, it would have been unreasonable to expect them to do anything to provoke IRA action against them.'[41] Hamilton Cuffe, Lord Desart, similarly described the dilemma in a letter to St John Brodrick, Lord Midleton:

> We blame, & rightly blame, the respectable people for never giving information, but it is only fair to remember that while the vengeance of Sinn Fein is almost assured, it is demonstrated that the Government afford no effective protection against such vengeance, and I am not sure that where such a terrorism is established the authorities would get much assistance in any country from people who cannot protect themselves, whose property is vulnerable, & who have wives and children to think of.[42]

For most southern loyalists, self-preservation and pragmatism won out over political allegiance. Indeed, it was a willingness to accept the new order, however grudgingly, after 1922 that helped many of those who had been politically opposed to the IRA to settle in the Irish Free State.[43] A Garda report on farmer George Cartwright, for instance, noted that he 'has been a Unionist, but since the Treaty became a supporter of the Free State'.[44]

Pragmatism is an aspect of the civilian response to irregular warfare that is often overlooked in studies of revolutionary Ireland but can be found throughout the documentary record. It often meant that Kalyvas's two motivators were intertwined and competing. Self-preservation could

overcome economic concern where there was a genuine fear of violence or if the economic losses brought about by defiance outweighed those resulting from collaboration. In the case of the boycott of Belfast goods – designed to economically punish Belfast loyalists after Catholic workers were expelled from the city's shipyards – it was often much cheaper for traders to buy from Belfast so adhering to the boycott affected profit margins. In areas where financial penalties for dealing with Belfast were not imposed regularly and consistently, the boycott failed.[45] In County Monaghan, where penalties were strictly enforced, IRA commander Eoin O'Duffy reported in April 1921 that 'several merchants including Unionists have fallen in with our wishes and paid pretty stiff fines to have their names removed from black lists'.[46] When utilized effectively, black lists – a notably public-facing form of punishment – were effective tools in achieving compliance. In County Cavan, the circulation of black lists prompted some listed traders to deny the offence but also encouraged others to publish apologies in the local newspaper to secure a reprieve.[47]

The nature of guerrilla war meant it was often difficult to know who was making the demands, even for those who had chosen a side. When Alex Evans reported a number of raids in his parish in County Leitrim he admitted that 'whether this was done by soldiers of the IRA or robbers I do not know'.[48] Kerry civilian Arthur Vincent, writing to Mulcahy, observed that 'In these disturbed times it is only to be expected that in country districts here and there a gang of ill-doers should arise, who are out for what they can get.'[49] Complaints were made both about criminals posing as guerrillas ('Before the gang took away a bicycle . . . they told me the Irish Republic will pay you for it') as well as guerrillas behaving like criminals ('it is the general opinion that this money will be converted to their own use') and accusations, denials, counter-denials, and confusion were not uncommon.[50] As in any case of irregular war, criminality and revolutionary violence could easily mingle. It is clear that some acts of violence or destruction carried out ostensibly as IRA activity were, in fact, 'thinly disguised land seizures' or motivated primarily by agrarian demands and grievances.[51] Also, as Anne Dolan has shown, once reports of civilians found shot dead with their bodies labelled as 'spies and informers' had become regular enough to be considered 'usual', it did not take much to disguise a murder as a political or military killing.[52] Both here and lower down the scale of violence, crime and criminality could be carried out under a revolutionary banner and, at the same time, guerrilla activity could be branded as criminal.

The difficulty of distinguishing between a guerrilla and an opportunist criminal could, in fact, encourage civilian defiance. In Sligo a local man who injured IRA members collecting a levy argued that he had refused to pay as he doubted they were Volunteers and 'one of their men was a person I did not find "straight" in previous dealings'.[53] Once police and military protection was withdrawn after the July 1921 Truce, the local guerrilla (or, indeed, criminal) could operate with relative immunity. As so much of this behaviour was linked to local politics and personalities, the IRA hierarchy often found it difficult to control their subordinates. One company captain in Carlow apologetically reported that some local men who had been levying money and commandeering cars had acted 'altogether against orders' and would be punished, but many other investigations were dropped or hit a dead end.[54]

The complex personality politics inherent in any small community were, if anything, exacerbated and accelerated by revolutionary conditions and complicate any straightforward notions of idealistic popular support among civilians. Personal grudges often played out under the guise of the republican campaign. Joseph Ennis of County Westmeath insisted that the leader of an IRA raid on his house was 'a man who bore me a bit of petty spite'.[55] In Kilkee, County Clare, Michael Keane and his son suffered a prolonged IRA boycott, which they claimed was the result of a personal grudge with a Volunteer. While admitting their contact with Crown forces, the Keanes argued that they had only done 'the same as practically every house and persons in Kilkee who were not boycotted or charged'.[56] Others in the town, they claimed, 'had 3 times more to do with the police than we had' and they speculated that some were only supporting the boycott because 'There would be a good many people glad to have our places closed down for good as their [*sic*] is over £2000 due by them to us & they say they needn't pay same.'[57] Where there was no effective IRA deterrent, the people of Kilkee served their own interests and ignored the boycott against the police but equally, where there was a chance to avoid paying a bill, were willing to accede to a separate boycott ordered by the local IRA. Similarly, as pointed out by David Fitzpatrick, litigants often attended either British courts or the republican counter-state's equivalent based on the system they felt would be most favourably disposed towards their case.[58] Loyalty or allegiance could be acquired through the provision of 'mutual benefits' as much as by ideological commitment.[59]

Compliance was not only demanded by the IRA but also by members of the Crown forces. One observer of the conflict remarked that 'both

parties in the struggle had great belief in the weapon of intimidation, and there was taking place one long competition in intimidation between the Crown Forces and the Republican Volunteers'.[60] Another, the writer and former soldier Wilfrid Ewart, described how 'the unfortunate populace fell between two stools, if not three'.[61] This is not uncommon in irregular war. Matthew Hughes, for example, has described how Arab peasants were trapped 'between the hammer of rebel operations and the anvil of the British army' during the Arab Revolt (1936–9).[62] Part of the logic behind the creation of 'New Villages' and the forced relocation of civilian populations during the Malayan 'emergency' in the 1950s, and later in the same decade in Kenya (again by the British) and in Algeria (by the French), was to remove the potential for interaction with the rebels, 'allowing the population to offer information and support without fear of retribution'.[63] While nothing on such a drastic scale was ever considered necessary in Ireland, some arrangements were made to ensure the safe passage of information between Crown forces and willing civilians as British authorities allowed for the receipt of anonymous letters by post and deliberately avoided public contact with loyalists.[64]

'Persons Guilty of Offences against the Nation and the Army'? Labelling Suspect Civilians

Civilians in Ireland were motivated to defy guerrillas for multiple, and often competing, reasons but how did the IRA view and label civilian behaviour? One way to examine this is through the activity that brought members of local communities under IRA suspicion along with the types of individual most likely to be considered suspect. The battle for intelligence between the IRA and British forces was of vital importance to the conduct of the campaign. When it came to the execution of civilian 'spies and informers', GHQ (and, more broadly, the propaganda war) required reports, enquiries, incontrovertible evidence of guilt, and sanction from above.[65] But this demand was often at odds with the nature of local intelligence wars. One County Limerick brigade commandant acknowledged that it was 'exceedingly difficult to get any definite proof' of civilians associating with the enemy.[66] The need to cut off any potential leaks of information at their source did not encourage patience and the risks of having an informer, or potential informer, in a locality created anxiety. Anxiety in turn fuelled rumour, hearsay, and gossip. County Clare

commander Michael Brennan neatly reflected the state of much of the IRA's local intelligence when he reported some 'notoriously bad cases of men associating with the enemy' but admitted that 'We have no proof of their giving information – only suspicion'.[67]

Preparing for the expected resumption of hostilities in January 1922, local battalions in Cork, Kerry, West Limerick, and Waterford were requested to submit information to 1st Southern Division headquarters on 'all persons guilty of offences against the Nation and the Army during hostilities and to date, and of all persons suspected of having assisted the enemy during the same period'.[68] The surviving forms provide personal information, a summary of alleged 'offences', and available evidence.[69] Though it is not clear if the collection is complete – files do not survive for all battalions, and prospective punishments are not discussed – as a whole, the collection offers revealing insights into the process of labelling civilians and, therefore, some sense of the dynamics at play in local communities during guerrilla war in Ireland.

As information from local populations could lead to imprisonment or death for the guerrillas, they necessarily viewed all contact with Crown forces as suspicious and, by extension, dangerous. A local commander in Cork, for example, asked in March 1921 if it was 'time we get the Irish people, no matter who they are, not to freely supply the enemy' and suggested that if they were to 'rigidly put in force that none of the civilian population speak or communicate with them, it will break up their all-important Intelligence Department'.[70] It is clear from the suspect files that those with connections to service in the Crown forces, past or present, either themselves or through relatives, slipped swiftly under the suspicion of local intelligence officers. In 71 of the 340 surviving files (21 per cent) a link can be established to past service with the Crown; those who had served in the British army, Air Force, or Navy are explicitly described in the forms as 'ex-soldier' or an alternative. Another 30 worked in government administration in areas directly significant to the guerrilla campaign: justice and communication (including the postal system, justice system, and military administration). The IRA were equally aware of the tendency of policemen or soldiers to visit bars, hotels, and shops and the potential for intelligence gathering in these venues; one IRA threatening letter, for instance, warned the recipient that 'You frequent the hotels and enjoy the company of the murderous auxiliaries'.[71] Among the suspect files are 65 hoteliers, publicans, or merchants who were in a position to engage in regular business interaction with police or military prior to and during the war.

This highlights the ways in which previously normal behaviour could become suspect. Over half of the civilian suspects came under notice for activity that may not have been considered dangerous or hostile outside of a revolutionary context. Shared backgrounds and camaraderie naturally encouraged ex-policemen, ex-servicemen, and their families to socialize with serving members of the Crown forces. The police and military were also a consistent and profitable source of income for merchants, publicans, and hoteliers. Former or familial links necessitated visits to stations and barracks to collect pensions or see relatives. Certainly, some who might otherwise have been friendly to serving soldiers or police became reticent or reluctant. One ex-soldier later recalled that he deliberately avoided local British troops: 'That time, if you talked to them, they'd say you were giving information or something like that. So I kept away from them.'[72] But this was not always the case. Many self-proclaimed loyalists who applied for compensation from the British Treasury in the late 1920s insisted they had ignored boycotting notices and personal threats to continue serving and interacting with Crown forces.[73] But ideology, and a personal preference for Britain and British rule in Ireland, was not a singular or even, necessarily, a dominant motivator for those with a tradition of serving the Crown. While many shared that preference or felt a strong connection to some aspect of Britishness, for some who wore the uniform it had simply been a job, a way to earn a living. Equally, for those in the service industry it was essential to their livelihood. Nevertheless, that connection – however it originated or was felt – was not always easily forgotten or abandoned.

What is often most striking about these files is the flimsy evidence upon which a civilian could find themselves considered a suspect. In Kerry, Norah Griffin, whose husband was an ex-serviceman, was charged with visiting the local barracks and despite arguing that she merely wanted to get a government grant to emigrate to Canada was listed by the local intelligence officer.[74] The reliance on suspicion or hearsay in so many of the files is also notable. The report on Chrissie O'Halloran, for example, stated that 'we have no direct evidence in this case, except the evidence of suspicion'.[75] This reflects, to some extent, the nature of the files but is also further evidence of the way seemingly innocuous behaviour could bring trouble. That is not to say that none of those listed were hostile or potentially dangerous to the guerrilla campaign, but in the case of the Graham siblings in Kerry, for instance, their offences were described as 'None' or 'None as far as we know'. Miss Graham had simply decided to

marry a police district inspector.[76] Protestants, automatically associated with loyalty to the Crown in many contemporary eyes, were proportionally more likely than their Catholic neighbours to have their names added to one of the intelligence files.[77] Those who drank too much, or were seen with large sums of money and no discernible way of having earned it, were also viewed with suspicion and linked to (paid) informing.[78]

One useful sample are the submissions from the 2nd Battalion of the Cork No 5 Brigade, covering the Skibbereen area of West Cork where, aside from an unseemly habit of commenting on the attractiveness of female suspects, the local intelligence officer helpfully categorized suspects based on the extent of their perceived guilt. The less serious cases, those 'guilty in the second degree', were individuals who were friendly with the local police or Auxiliaries but for whom there was either no evidence or no expectation of informing. Thomas Connell was one of the former and 'would have no hesitation in transmitting information' if he had any to give; for Baby O'Shea the intelligence officer had 'no actual evidence of her giving information but I am sure from what I personally know of the girl that she would have done so'.[79] Two were guilty at least in part for their relationship with the well-known and charismatic Crown solicitor Jasper Travers Wolfe, who found himself 'guilty in the first degree' and was described as a 'bitter enemy of ours'. He was joined by Edwin Sikes, a Church of Ireland rector who was 'a bitter opponent of the movement in every way'; Edwin Angus Swanton who had refused to resign his commission of the peace; Patrick Sheedy, who as editor of the *Skibberreen Eagle* newspaper had 'frequently referred to our forces as murderers & did an immense amount of damage by enemy propaganda despite several warnings'; and Marjorie Young who was said to have given information about local Volunteers.[80]

There was, then, usually a clear hierarchy of perceived offences and offenders. Though local circumstances and personalities created exceptions and anomalies, the punishment of civilians can be said broadly to have matched their perceived offence. The stated penalty for informing – the most serious form of defiance – was death (the execution of women 'spies' was actually prohibited and they were instead to be deported, though a small number were shot in controversial circumstances).[81] Mistakes were certainly made but, equally, many suspected informers escaped punishment (along with those who did inform and avoided suspicion). Unlike informing, non-compliance is the 'most benign form' of defiance but, if left unpunished, can trigger 'cascades of more serious

instances of non-cooperation'.[82] When a civilian refused to pay towards an arms fund they were usually fined or had livestock confiscated in lieu of the levy. When the police boycott was flouted, fines were imposed or a boycott was ordered against those who had transgressed. Lethal violence was regularly threatened in boycotting signs without being carried out in practice.[83] What might be called non-military offences, or offences that did not impact directly on the guerrilla campaign in the way informing did, were rarely, if ever, enough to warrant shooting on their own.

While civilians could certainly fall victim to brutal and repressive violence from both sets of armed actors, in the context of other contemporary conflicts, and those examined in the course of this volume, the Irish Revolution is notably tame.[84] Tim Wilson has compared the nature of violence in Ulster, in the north-east of the island, with the contemporaneous conflict in Upper Silesia where violence was far more common and excessive.[85] In the south of Ireland it is clear, as R. B. McDowell has pointed out, that 'compared to the thorough methods for dealing with unpopular minorities developed during the twentieth century in eastern and central Europe and elsewhere, the harrassment of loyalists was not notably severe'.[86]

Conclusion

Even if it was more restrained than most, it is possible to see some of the key problems that are raised when irregular fighters interact with civilians in the Irish War of Independence. In Ireland at this time, as elsewhere during times of conflict, political instability and military activity presented opportunities for personal gain. Both the British authorities and Irish guerrillas were keen to point to the illegality or brutality of the other. At the same time, individual members of the Crown forces, guerrillas, and civilians took advantage of disturbances to commandeer, steal, or settle old scores. In this context, the processes by which individuals and activities were defined (or denigrated) are crucial to an understanding of the grassroots experiences of irregular war. Tied in with this is the very looseness with which suspect civilians could be labelled. The act of definition itself allowed ample scope for ordinary grudges and grievances to be relabelled as offences against the nation or for ordinary behaviour to be viewed as threatening or treacherous. Actual political and ideological preferences were far more difficult to definitively indentify within a community setting than this easy labelling would allow.

The dominant narratives of the Irish Revolution dictate that loyalty and allegiance be placed in one of two distinct camps. They do not allow for a middle ground, for conversion, wavering, or apathy. But there were civilians during the Irish revolution who did shirk or hide, who defied the guerrillas when it made sense for them to do so, or who obeyed their demands for the sake of an easy life. There were also those who were defiant in a different sense of the term. Those who, as Anne Dolan has put it, 'doggedly adhered to their side, refused to take a side, or won or lost small wars against local tyrannies'.[87] Then there were the 'indifferent and the unaffected'.[88] For some, previously normal behaviour found them inadvertently caught up in a conflict in which they had no desire to become involved. Local intelligence wars bred paranoia and suspicion; in the search for civilian enemies, rumour and gossip were far easier to come by than hard evidence. James Scott has argued that to assume that civilian interaction is defined by either pole of compliance is to miss the '*massive* middle ground, in which conformity is often a self-conscious strategy and resistance is a carefully hedged affair that avoids all-or-nothing confrontations'.[89] In the case of the Irish Revolution, it is clear that acts of support for, or defiance of, the IRA (of all kinds) were not simply motivated by political preference but by a wide range of shifting circumstances and attitudes.

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Notes

1. Military Archives of Ireland (hereafter MAI), Bureau of Military History Witness Statement (hereafter BMH WS) 1246, Michael Cleary.
2. Richard English argues that none of the above terms adequately describe what actually took place and prefers the term 'Irish War for Independence': Richard English, *Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland* (London, 2006), 28–7.
3. MAI, BMH WS 1633, James Murphy; MAI, BMH WS 755 (ii), Seán Prendergast.
4. William Sheehan, *British Voices from the Irish War of Independence 1918–1921: The Words of British Servicemen Who Were There* (Cork, 2005), 173.
5. MAI, BMH WS 1668, Thomas Hevey.

6. MAI, Collins Papers, A/0604, GHQ to Brigade Commandants, c. December 1920. Best results, it insisted, could only be had by taking 'full advantage of this goodwill'.
7. Quoted in Fergal Peter Mangan, 'Compensation in the Irish Free State 1922–23', MA thesis (University College Dublin, 1994), 18.
8. Charles Townshend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence* (London, 2013), 149–165.
9. Sturgis quoted in Townshend, *Republic*, 165. For examples from the police and military see: National Archives, London (hereafter UKNA), CO 904/109–110, Royal Irish Constabularly Monthly Confidential Reports (hereafter MCRs), Inspector General, August 1919 to January 1919; UKNA, WO 141/93, 'Record of the rebellion in Ireland in 1920–21 and the part played by the army in dealing with it. Volume I. Operations'.
10. For the comparatively impersonal nature of violence in Belfast, see Peter Hart, *The I.R.A. at War, 1916–1923* (Oxford, 2003), 247–50 and in Dublin, Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916–1921* (Dublin, 1996), 327–332.
11. Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge, 2006), 226–9.
12. Michael Fellman, *Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri During the American Civil War* (New York, 1989), 44–52.
13. James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (London, 1985), xvii, 277–81.
14. The most contentious example concerns the 'Bandon Valley massacre' in April 1922. For recent scholarship on the killings see David Fitzpatrick, *Descendancy: Irish Protestant Histories Since 1795* (Cambridge, 2014), 221–9; Barry Keane, *Massacre in West Cork: The Dunmanway and Ballygroman Killings* (Cork, 2014); John M. Regan, 'The "Bandon Valley massacre" as a historical problem', *History* 97 (2012): 70–98; David Fitzpatrick, 'Ethnic cleansing, ethical smearing, and Irish historians', *History* 98 (2013): 135–44. For Peter Hart's description of the killing, the work that has motivated the literature above, see Peter Hart, *The I.R.A. and its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916–1923* (Oxford, 1998), 273–292.
15. Hart, *I.R.A. at War*, 230.
16. Eunan O'Halpin has found that 277 civilians were killed by the IRA between January 1919 and December 1921, 183 of whom were executed as 'spies': Eunan O'Halpin, 'Problematic killing during the war of independence and its aftermath: civilian spies and informers', in *Death and Dying in Ireland, Britain and Europe: Historical Perspectives*, ed. James Kelly and Mary Ann Lyons (Dublin, 2013), 329.
17. Kalyvas, *Logic*, 104.

18. UKNA, CO 904/114, MCRs, County Inspector, Tipperary South Riding, January 1921.
19. UKNA, CO 904/115, Reports on Breaches of the Truce, Queen's County.
20. MAI, BMH WS 1721, Seamus Robinson.
21. National Library of Ireland (hereafter NLI), Ms. 31,399, 'Record of Activities 7th Battalion, Cork No. 1 Brigade' [no date].
22. NLI, Florence O'Donohgue Papers, Ms. 31,325, Jeremiah Keane to 'Ned', 30 September 1928.
23. National Archives of Ireland (hereafter NAI), FIN/1/1613, Thomas Keating to W. T. Cosgrave, 14 May 1923.
24. University College Dublin Archives (hereafter UCDA), Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/24, Sara Mary Malcolmson to 'Dail Eireann Cabinet', 4 October 1921.
25. See, for example, MAI, BMH WS 603, Stephen O'Brien; MAI, BMH WS 1563, Michael Dineen; MAI, BMH 1595, Seamus Babington; MAI, BMH WS 1738, Jeremiah Deasy.
26. NLI, Florence O'Donoghue Papers Ms. 31,325, Jeremiah Keane to 'Ned', 30 September 1928.
27. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/35, Patrick Brennan to Richard Mulcahy, 12 December 1921.
28. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/24, Diarmuid O'Hegarty to Minister for Defence, 20 September 1921.
29. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/35, CS to OC 1st Eastern Division, 21 Sep. 1921.
30. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/35, Edward Lynch to de Valera, 13 October 1921.
31. C. S. Andrews, *Dublin Made Me: An Autobiography* (Dublin, 2001; 1st edn. 1979), 236–7.
32. See, for example, complaints found in the Fintan Murphy Collection (MAI, BMH CD/227) and the Daniel Mulvihill Papers (UCDA, P64).
33. UCDA, Daniel Mulvihill Papers, P64/5(26), Donal O Maoilmicil to Daniel Mulvihill, 30 November 1921; MAI, BMH Contemporary Documents, CD/227/21/L6T, J. O'Dowd to Fintan Murphy, 25 August 1921.
34. MAI, BMH Contemporary Documents, CD/227/21/B21, Dominick Foran to Fintan Murphy, [late 1921].
35. See, for example, the numerous complaints about commandeered bicycles in the Fintan Murphy Collection (MAI, BMH CD/227).
36. Kalyvas, *Logic*, 104.
37. See UKNA, CO 762/3–202, Irish Grants Committee claims.
38. UKNA, CO 762/177/7, James Gordon claim; Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, D989/B/3/9, Frank Daunt and Henry Deverill claims.

39. T. K. Wilson, *Frontiers of Violence: Conflict and Identity in Ulster and Upper Silesia, 1918–1922* (Oxford, 2010), 36.
40. Joost Augusteijn, ed., *The Memoirs of John M. Regan, a Catholic Officer in the RIC and RUC, 1909–1948* (Dublin, 2007), 149.
41. Ibid. 150.
42. UKNA, PRO 30/67/42, Desart to Midleton, 27 March 1920.
43. Tim Wilson, 'Ghost provinces, mislaid minorities: the experience of southern Ireland and Prussian Poland compared, 1918–23', *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 13 (2002): 61–86; Andy Bielenberg, 'Exodus: the emigration of southern Irish protestants during the Irish war of independence and the civil war', *Past and Present* 218 (2013): 199–233.
44. NAI, FIN/COMP/A381/30(2), Garda Thomas Cassidy to Superintendent, Cavan, 5 August 1923 in George Cartwright claim.
45. Boycott director Joseph MacDonagh admitted as much: NAI, Dáil Éireann Papers, DÉ 2/261, MacDonagh to Department of Finance, 8 January 1921.
46. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/39, Monthly Report, Monaghan Brigade, April 1921.
47. See for examples, *Anglo-Celt*, 21 May 1921, 28 May 1921, 2 Jun. 1921.
48. MAI, BMH Contemporary Documents, CD/227/21/B9, Alex Evans to Fintan Murphy, 28 July 1921.
49. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/23, Arthur Vincent to Mulcahy, 30 August 1921.
50. MAI, BMH Contemporary Documents, CD/227/21/D18, Thomas Wheeler to Fintan Murphy, 4 August 1921; Patrick Conboy to Fintan Murphy, 18 Sep 1921 (CD/227/21/F6).
51. David Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish Life, 1913–1921: Provincial Experience of War and Revolution* (Dublin, 1977), 119. See also Fergus Campbell, *Land and revolution: nationalist politics in the west of Ireland 1891–1921* (Oxford, 2005), 264–6.
52. Anne Dolan, '"Spies and Informers Beware . . . ', in *Years of Turbulence: The Irish Revolution and its Aftermath*, eds, Diarmaid Ferriter and Susannah Riordan (Dublin, 2015), 157–171.
53. MAI, BMH Contemporary Documents, CD/227/21/H1, Jeremiah Gilmartin to Fintan Murphy, 25 August 1921.
54. MAI, BMH Contemporary Documents, CD/76/2/7, Captain, Carlow Brigade, to Divisional Commissioner, 27 Oct. 1921.
55. MAI, BMH Contemporary Documents, CD/227/21/D29, Joseph Ennis to Fintan Murphy, [late 1921].
56. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/34, J. J. Keane, to P. Barry, 22 September 1921.

57. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/34, Keane to Defence Department, Dáil Éireann, 27 October 1921; UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/34, Keane to Stack, 30 September 1921.
58. Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish Life*, 151.
59. Kalyvas, *Logic*, 111–114.
60. Joice M. Nankivell and Sydney Loch, *Ireland in travail* (London, 1922), 146.
61. Wilfrid Ewart [ed. Paul Bew and Patrick Maume], *A Journey in Ireland 1921* (Dublin, 2008), 30.
62. Matthew Hughes, 'The banality of brutality: British armed forces and the repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39', *English Historical Review*, 124 (2009): 324.
63. Karl Hack, 'Everyone lived in fear: Malaya and the British way of counter-insurgency', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23 (2012): 683. Raphaëlle Branche's chapter in this volume refers to the same process in Algeria.
64. For an example of police avoiding contact with loyalists see UKNA, CO 904/115, RIC Monthly Confidential Report, County Inspector, Cavan, June 1921. In 1920, British intelligence disseminated detailed instructions for sending information anonymously via a London address: MAI, BMH Contemporary Documents, CD/209/1.
65. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/45, General Orders (New Series), 1920, No. 20 'Spies'.
66. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/17, OC Mid-Limerick to CS, 3 March 1921.
67. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/17, Brennan to CS, c. April 1921.
68. Quoted in Hart, *I.R.A. at war*, 297.
69. MAI, A/0879, IRA Intelligence Reports, 1st Southern Division, 1922 (hereafter Intelligence Reports).
70. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/38, OC Cork No. 2 Brigade to CS, 19 March 1921.
71. MAI, BMH Contemporary Documents, CD/280/3/3, Threatening letter from 'Headquarters, I.R.A., Tralee', 1921.
72. Jane Leonard 'Facing "the finger of scorn": veteran's memories of Ireland after the Great War', in *War and memory in the twentieth century* ed. Martin Evans and Ken Lunn (Oxford, 1997), 63.
73. See, for example, UKNA, CO 762/170/4, Mary Anne Curtis claim; UKNA, CO 762/29/3, Margaret Notley claim; UKNA, CO 762/94/16, David William Hewitt claim; UKNA, CO 762/113/1, John Ryan claim; UKNA, CO 762/116/15, John J Cartwright claim.
74. Intelligence Reports, Norah Griffin, Kerry.
75. Intelligence Reports, Chrissie O'Halloran, Cork.
76. Intelligence Reports, Miss B. Graham, Kerry.

77. The famous West Cork guerrilla Tom Barry wrote in his memoir that the IRA there had 'no doubt that nearly all of them [Protestants] disagreed with our campaign': Tom Barry, *Guerilla Days in Ireland* (Dublin, 1981; 1st edn, 1949), 113. Of the 157 for whom religious denomination can be satisfactorily established using the 1901 and 1911 census returns, 117 (74.5 per cent) are Roman Catholic and 39 (24.8 per cent) Protestant; Cork suspect William Wood Wolfe is returned as Agnostic on his 1911 census form. Non-Catholics made up only 9 per cent of the population in Cork in 1911, 3 per cent in Kerry, 5 per cent in Limerick, and 5 per cent in Waterford.
78. Intelligence Reports, David Lyne, Kerry; Ernie Davis, Cork; Alexander Moynihan, Kerry; Thomas Relihan, Kerry.
79. Intelligence Reports, Thomas Connell & Baby O'Shea, Cork.
80. Intelligence Reports, 2 Batt. Cork No. 5 Brigade.
81. UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/45, General Orders (New Series), 1920, No. 13 'Women Spies', 9 November 1920.
82. Kalyvas, *Logic*, 104–5.
83. For an example of a boycotting poster see NLI, Ms. 739, 'Proclamation of Boycott of R.I.C.', West Donegal Brigade, 26 June 1920.
84. For some of the most recent work on the treatment of Protestants and other minorities during the Irish Revolution see Paul Taylor, *Heroes or Traitors? Experiences of Southern Irish Soldiers Returning from the Great War, 1919–1939* (Liverpool, 2015); Gemma Clark, *Everyday Violence in the Irish Civil War* (Cambridge, 2014); Fitzpatrick, *Descendancy*; Andy Bielenberg, 'Exodus: the emigration of southern Irish protestants during the Irish war of independence and the civil war', *Past and Present* 218 (2013): 199–233. Much of this scholarship has come about in response to Peter Hart's important and controversial book *The IRA and its enemies*, first published in 1998.
85. Wilson, *Frontiers of Violence*.
86. R. B. McDowell, *Crisis & Decline: The Fate of the Southern Unionists* (Dublin, 1997), p. 135.
87. Anne Dolan, '"The shadow of great fear": terror and revolutionary Ireland', in *Terror in Ireland, 1916–1923* ed. David Fitzpatrick (Dublin, 2012), 33.
88. Ibid.
89. Scott, *Weapons*, 285.

Dr Brian Hughes is NUI Research Fellow in the Humanities at An Foras Feasa, Maynooth University, Ireland and a historian of modern Ireland, specialising in civilian and grassroots experiences of conflict in revolutionary Ireland. His most recent book is *Defying the IRA? Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities during the Irish Revolution* (2016).

American Civil War Guerrillas

Daniel E. Sutherland

Scholars of the American Civil War were slow to recognize, or at least acknowledge, the significant role played by irregular fighters in that conflict. Their attitude stemmed, in part, from a widespread image following the war of guerrillas as murderous thugs. As Northerners and Southerners strove to put the ugliness of war behind them and reunite the nation, they condemned the indiscriminate violence and suffering caused by both Confederate and Union irregulars. A Union army veteran expressed the general sentiment when he characterized rebel guerrillas as 'thieves and murderers by occupation, rebels by pretense, soldiers in name only, and cowards by nature'.[1]

Background

That set the tone, and with twentieth-century historians being more interested in the war's large, conventional battles, it was easy to push the guerrilla conflict into the background. Not until after World War II, and awareness of the role played in the struggle by partisan and resistance fighters in both Europe and Asia, did a few scholars begin to reassess the

D.E. Sutherland (✉)
University of Arkansas, Arkansas, US
e-mail: dsutherl@uark.edu

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extent to which irregulars participated in past American wars. Even then, the significance of their contributions remained underappreciated, leading the American popular historian Bruce Catton to lament in 1956 that Civil War guerrillas had been treated 'as a colorful, annoying, but largely unimportant side issue'.[2]

That attitude did not change significantly until 1989, when Michael Fellman published an account of the guerrilla war in Missouri. It was a localized study, concentrating on a single state, but it laid bare the intensity and far-reaching implications of the irregular conflict. Fellman's work also fit nicely in an era of historical research and writing when social history, extending also to the 'new military history', could not be ignored. 'Guerrilla warfare blew the cover off respectable society', Fellman insisted, 'and undermined official values. No official response could end or even deflect the self-governing engines of guerrilla war.' A steady stream of state, regional, and at least one national study of the guerrilla war followed over the next two decades, until now, well into the twenty-first century, it is impossible to consider the conduct and implications of the general war without taking guerrillas into account. Most recently, the subject has found favour with students of 'historical memory', which, in some ways, takes us full circle, to those initial, postwar prejudices against guerrillas.[3]

Patterns and traditions of unconventional warfare in North America were established long before the United States was born, in 1776. Indeed, by that time, Americans were themselves experienced 'partisans', having honed their skills in a series of wars against Native Americans and Great Britain's colonial foes, experiences the colonists then used, quite ungraciously, to help overthrow British rule. This style of fighting also complemented a self-image that Americans had of themselves as rugged, self-sufficient individualists. Unconventional warfare, they believed, required little training. It was uncomplicated, natural, spontaneous. All one needed was a musket and the will to use it.[4]

This tradition of 'guerrilla' warfare, as it was called by the mid-nineteenth century, had its deepest roots in the American South, where the Revolutionary War exploits of 'Light-Horse Harry' Lee, Thomas Sumter, and, most especially, Francis Marion, the 'Swamp Fox', had become the stuff of legend. So strong was this Southern tradition by 1861, at the start of the American Civil War, that many Confederates, rather than volunteering for the conventional army, chose to join independent companies of guerrillas.[5]

Preparing for War

Assumptions about *how* and *where* they would serve varied. Some rebel guerrillas wanted to meet the enemy head on, to halt the anticipated Union invasion before it polluted Southern soil. The more cautious wished to serve closer to home, and so protect their communities should the enemy crash through or slip around the Confederacy's conventional armies. In case of 'actual invasion', they reasoned, the 'bold hearts and strong arms of a united people' would 'make each house a citadel, and every rock and tree a position of defence'.[6]

It was a timeless rallying cry, even if military theorists had only seriously considered the legitimacy of partisan or guerrilla warfare in the previous half-century. The foremost theorist was Carl von Clausewitz, and although he died in 1831, even before his monumental *Vom Kriege* could be published, he identified the tension that had always existed between the advocates and opponents of unconventional warfare. Having observed the French Revolution, France's reliance on a *levée en masse* to raise its armies, and the subsequent military campaigns of 1793 to 1794, Clausewitz concluded that such 'popular uprisings' lent an entirely new cast to warfare. In a chapter titled 'The People in Arms', he explained why many opposed it: '[They] object to it either on political grounds, considering it as a means of revolution, a state of legalized anarchy that is as much of a threat to the social order at home as it is to the enemy; or else on military grounds, because they feel that the results are not commensurate with the energies that have been expended.' So, from the very start of the Age of Revolution, irregular conflict occupied a specific and constrained place in military thinking, its proponents forced to seek legitimacy in the will of the people.[7]

Legitimacy aside, the Confederacy's irregular volunteers shared three assumptions. First, they thought themselves uniquely qualified for the conditions and circumstances of an unconventional war. Having associated irregular warfare with the Indian style of fighting, in which stealth, knowledge of the local terrain, and the ability to endure physical hardships were highly prized qualities, they touted their willingness to operate unflinchingly under the harshest conditions. One captain boasted that his men were 'young, athletic, and bold', 'accustomed to a hardy frontier life', and possessing 'great powers of endurance'.[8] Said another man, 'We are the best of horsemen, good fighters, accustomed to camping out on hunting expeditions'.[9] All claimed

to be expert marksmen who were equally familiar with knives and hatchets.

Mention of knives and hatchets suggests a second quality these men shared: a willingness to wage a ruthless, uncompromising war, to fight under a 'black flag', with no quarter sought or given. Just as they had learned stealth and cunning in fighting Native Americans, so, too, were they willing to defend their homes with the 'savagery' of the Indian. The editor of *DeBow's Review,* one of several Southern journals that openly advocated a guerrilla war, declared, 'Well! let the Yankees invade our mountain region and burn a few houses, and we predict that our mountain boys will become as savage as the Seminoles and twice as brave'.[10] Some rebels suggested that this ferocious image could be exploited by attacking federal troops with men 'painted and disguised as Indians'. South Carolina novelist and poet William Gilmore Simms, another early proponent of guerrilla warfare, reasoned, 'If there be any thing which will inspire terror in the souls of the citizen soldiery of the North, it will be the idea that scalps are to be taken'.[11]

Other Southerners recommended that Native Americans themselves be recruited for irregular service. The western states and territories, beyond the Mississippi River, offered the best prospects for this strategy, which helps to explain why the Confederate government swiftly signed treaties with the tribes of Indian Territory (the modern state of Oklahoma) and authorized the recruitment of Indian regiments. Some white enthusiasts envisioned 'a few thousand Warriors', on the warpath, invading the Midwest, and sweeping over stunned northern farming communities.[12]

A third assumption of the men who wished to serve the Confederacy as guerrillas was that they would be allowed to unleash their ferocious style of fighting without restrictions, which is to say, unfettered by the stifling rules and regulations that bound conventional soldiers. Indeed, the opportunity to fight on their 'own hook', as they called it, may have been the single biggest attraction of guerrilla service. An Arkansas guerrilla who had served briefly in the Confederate army explained, 'That kind of warfare did not suit me. I wanted to get out where I could have it more lively; where I could fight if I wanted to, or run if I so desired; I wanted to be my own general'.[13] Another guerrilla insisted, 'Most of these men preferred the free but more hazardous life of an independent soldier or scout, to the more irksome duties of the regularly organized forces of the Confederate Army'.[14]

Waging War

Their hit-and-run tactics, in which rebel guerrillas attacked supply trains, fired on pickets, and ambushed small patrols, initially drew the scorn of Union soldiers. One Federal complained in July 1861, 'They are the biggest Set of cowards I Ever Saw. If they would fight we would soon do up the work for them but they keep out of Gun Shot range.'[15] Not only did rebel guerrillas fail to engage the enemy directly, but by exploiting their knowledge of the terrain and relying on the loyal discretion of the local population, they could swiftly disband after an attack, slip back to their homes, and pose as peaceful farmers or shopkeepers. 'It is too easily done', fumed another Federal of these tactics. 'Shoot a few soldiers or Union men from behind a tree or a fence—gallop home—turn your horse loose in the woods—throw your rifle in the fence corner, & get lost in the tall corn, with a hoe in your hand.'[16]

French soldiers attempting to pacify the original breeding ground of *la petite guerre,* in Spain between 1808 and 1814, had the same reaction. Henrich von Brandt, a Prussian serving there as an officer of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw commented, 'The French were obliged to be constantly on their guard against an enemy who, while continually flying, always reappeared, and who, without actually being seen, was everywhere. It was neither battles nor engagements which exhausted their forces, but the incessant molestations of an invisible enemy who, if pursued, became lost among the people.'[17]

That said, as rebel guerrillas made their presence felt, the reaction of the Union army grew from mere frustration to unadulterated anger, even hatred. The generals, concerned about the soaring financial cost in government property destroyed in rebel attacks, insisted that thousands of extra men were required to protect vulnerable communication and supply lines. Common soldiers reacted more viscerally. Fighting guerrillas was not just annoying, it had become 'a dangerous business' that wore down men physically, emotionally, and psychologically. A Union soldier in Virginia said, 'We have been learning our full share of the realities of this conflict, rendered more terable [*sic*] … than any other from the savage and brutal mode in which it is waged by our enemies … who carry on a war more barborous than any waged by the savages who once inhabited this same country'.[18]

This was precisely the impression that advocates of an Indian style of fighting had hoped to make on the Federals, and its implications were

several. First, considering the imbalance of numbers between the Union army and rebel guerrillas, this unexpectedly brutal type of combat offered a splendid way to degrade the morale of enemy soldiers. Then, too, Confederates saw no reason to fight fair. They had not sought a war; their land had been invaded by a ruthless foe, whose 'atrocious and systematic violations of the laws of civilized warfare', including the destruction and confiscation of private property, demanded 'retaliation'.[19] Antoine Henri de Jomini had seen it all before. Commenting on the French predicament during the Peninsular War, he noted in his seminal work, *Précis de l'Art de Guerre*: 'An invasion against an exasperated people ... is a dangerous enterprise.'[20]

As suggested earlier, questions of manhood also came into play. The hit-and-run tactics of guerrillas could hardly be called heroic, and they were far from what the average Union soldier expected when he enlisted. Raised on stories of the martial grandeur of both their own nation's military heroes, including George Washington and Winfield Scott, and the exploits of Europe's great captains, from Alexander to Napoleon, they imagined war to be all pomp and circumstance, with battles decided by rival armies clashing in the open field. Visually, too, their impressions had been confirmed by paintings and prints of gallant charges and noble sacrifice on the field of battle. They saw none of this as they guarded railroads and supply depots against rebel guerrillas, tracked their elusive foe through mountains and swamps, or fell victim to their cowardly ambushes.

Another unanticipated result of the guerrilla conflict, but one that made it especially terrible and controversial, was the internecine struggle it sparked among Southerners. Aware of the value of a friendly civilian population to their own movements and activities, rebel guerrillas became wary of the 'traitors' in their midst, that is, of Southern Unionists who opposed the Confederacy. In yet another nod to America's Revolutionary past, rebels called these obstructionist neighbors 'tories', the name once used to identify the colonial supporters of King George III. Oftentimes, too, these divisions had little to do with the issues of the war. Rather, they might be rooted in quarrels that had begun years earlier, perhaps over a horse race, card game, or land deal. The violence unleashed by war only intensified old grievances and gave people an excuse to torment or bully those whom they already mistrusted or disliked. Nonetheless, such people either had to be driven out of their communities or be so intimidated that they would not dare collaborate with Union armies or endanger the

unprotected families of absent Confederate soldiers. One Union general who saw the potential problems of this clash for the United States was Ulysses S. Grant. As early as the first summer of the war, he was reporting from southeastern Missouri that 'Marauding parties are infesting the country, pillaging Union men, within 10 miles of here. At present I ... have not suitable troops to drive these guerrillas out and afford to Union citizens of this place or neighborhood the protection I feel they should have'.[21]

Determined not to be cowed by rebel neighbours, Southern Unionists formed their own guerrilla bands in self-defence. As a result, some of the most fierce and bitter irregular struggles of the war occurred not between rebel guerrillas and Union soldiers, but between rival bands of local rebels and Unionists. One of the earliest and most perceptive assessments of the situation came from a state hit early and hard by these divisions: Missouri. 'There will be hard fighting in Mo', wrote one resident in the summer of 1861, '[but] not between the soldiers, & in many of the Counties there will be ugly neighborhood feuds, which may long outlast the general war'.[22] Another person forecast with alarm, 'If things be allowed to go on in Mo as they are now, we shall soon have a social war all over the State'.[23]

This last observer was not thinking of a social *class* war, but rather of a rending of the societal fabric. This is not to deny that social class could be a factor in a white Southerner's decision to stand by either the Union or Confederacy, but the situation was more complex than suggested by the oft-quoted description of the conflict as a 'rich man's war, and a poor man's fight'. For example, older people, who had personal memories of the nation's earliest efforts to establish itself, often felt stronger ties to the Union.[24] Financial considerations might also play a role. Did a person profit from trade with the North or subsidies from the national government? Were people debtors or creditors, and did the stability of governments and banks affect their future prospects?[25] Such considerations could affect small farmers and planters, large merchants and small shopkeepers, alike. Not even the ownership of slaves was always a class issue, as the majority of men fighting on both sides were non-slaveholders.[26]

Regardless, overmatched Unionists could rarely hope to protect family, friends, and property long enough for the federal army to reach their communities. Most exceptions were found in the Upper South, especially in the Union slave states of Missouri and Kentucky and the northwestern portion of Virginia, where Unionist guerrillas often outnumbered the

rebels. There, they could hold their own, even, on occasion, assisting the US army in the same way that Confederate guerrillas reinforced their conventional troops. As a Union officer observed of friendly bands in northwest Virginia, 'They worked their farms, but every man had his rifle hung upon his chimney-piece and by day or by night was ready to shoulder it, … and every neighborhood could muster its company or squad of home-guards to join in quelling seditious outbreaks'.[27]

A more aggressive specie of home guard, and perhaps the most valuable way for Unionists to further their cause, was the 'guerrilla hunter'. These Southerners, having formally enlisted in the Union army, were assigned to what could be called, in modern parlance, counterinsurgency units. Operating in their own territory, they knew as well as the rebels both the topography of the land and the political sympathies of the inhabitants. Equally, having themselves been targeted by their foes, they hunted down the rebels with a vengeance. Andrew Johnson, the future US vice president and president then serving as the military governor of Tennessee, thought them the very best men for that sort of work. 'They are willing & more than anxious', Johnson assured President Abraham Lincoln, 'to restore the government & at the same time protect their wives & children against insult, robbery, murder & inhumane oppression.'[28]

Nevertheless, it was the rebel guerrillas who gained the most notoriety for operating with reckless, often ruthless, abandon, and it was precisely here that the Confederacy's guerrilla war worked against the rebels. Rather than becoming a source of strength for them, their unconventional tactics spiralled out of control in so many ways that they ultimately weakened the Confederate military effort and led many citizens to lose faith in their government.

The problems began when the Union army accused the Confederate government and its guerrillas of waging an 'uncivilized war', one contrary to the 'rules of civilized nations'. Both sides were employing those phrases by this time, but the Federals now insisted that the rebels abandon their irregular strategy. The Confederates, quite naturally, responded with indignation. General Daniel Ruggles, who depended on irregulars to supplement his conventional troops in eastern Louisiana, described guerrilla warfare as the 'first great law of nature, the right of self-defence'. Turning Union protests on their head, Ruggles told the local US commander in July 1862 that any army attempting to disregard such a fundamental right behaved as the 'rudest savages'. Nations at war had employed partisans for centuries, he said, and the right to make use of this 'peculiar

service' had been 'universally conceded'. 'But whatever difference of opinion may exist on this point', Ruggles continued rather heatedly, 'it has never been claimed, even by the most stringent advocates of legitimacy, that one belligerent has any right to complain of the name or form which the other may choose to give to its military organizations'.[29]

Union Reaction

The Federals responded to this defiant tone by taking matters into their own hands. The initial reaction came from Union commanders in Virginia, Missouri, and Louisiana, but it was the response to the guerrilla threat in Missouri – one of those states where protection of civilians was crucial if the authority of the United States was to be maintained – that established important precedents everywhere. A succession of Union generals in Missouri, including John Pope, John C. Frémont, and Henry W. Halleck, issued a series of 'stringent orders' against both the guerrillas and their civilian supporters between the summers of 1861 and 1862.[30]

To begin with, men 'not commissioned or enlisted' in the Confederacy's conventional army but caught in the act of pillaging, marauding, or killing soldiers or civilians were to be summarily executed. Men suspected or accused of those acts were to be imprisoned and tried as criminals, not soldiers. Civilians known to collaborate with such men were subject to monetary fines, confiscation or destruction of property, or banishment from their communities. Northern soldiers, politicians, and the general public cheered the new policies. 'They should be *summarily shot by thousands*', emphasized a Missouri politician of the rebels. 'They have well earned the fate, and the example made of them may be of great value elsewhere in deterring … robbers, spies, and assassins'.[31]

Historically, this had been the usual response to guerrillas. The French reaction in Spain, which, as already implied, bore many similarities to the American Civil War, had been swift and merciless. The American war produced nothing like the atrocities depicted in Francisco Goya's *Los Desastres de la Guerra,* but the Union's anti-guerrilla, or, in modern parlance, counter-terrorism, campaign was no less determined. Union leaders also had their own national experience as a guide. In their war against Mexico, between 1846 and 1848, US soldiers had fought a mostly conventional contest, but the Mexicans had also used irregulars, or

'guerilleros', whom the Americans despised as thieves and cowards. Announcing that these 'atrocious bands' had 'violate[d] every rule of warfare observed by civilized nations', General Winfield Scott, the principal US commander in Mexico, told the army that such thugs and murderers should be shown no mercy when captured. Given that many senior generals on both sides of the Civil War served under Scott in Mexico, the lesson had been learned.[32]

These rules of engagement were formalized and issued to all Union armies in the summer of 1862 through a directive titled, 'Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War'. The author was not a soldier but Dr Francis Lieber, a German-born professor of political economy at Columbia College, in New York City. The new commanding general of the Union army, Henry W. Halleck, elevated in July 1862 from department commander in Missouri, had commissioned the professor to provide legal precedents for the army's draconian response to the guerrilla war. Basing his conclusions on the roles played by unconventional forces in previous European wars, especially those of Napoleon, Lieber endorsed most of the counterinsurgency measures being used by the Union army. With very few exceptions, he declared, the rules of war did not protect a man 'simply because he says that he has taken up his gun in defense of his country'. Civilized nations drew clear distinctions, Lieber insisted, between brigands and soldiers.[33]

Nearly a year later, and again on a commission from Halleck, Lieber provided a broader set of guidelines. Issued to the army as General Orders No. 100, Lieber's Code, as it became known, repeated his indictment of 'guerrilla men' while also setting standards for the proper treatment of non-combatants, prisoners of war, and fugitive slaves, and establishing precise rules for the legitimate confiscation and destruction of property. That said, the code recognized that war was a nasty business. It deplored retaliation, which formed the essence of the guerrilla contest for both sides, but it also explained why the general war had deteriorated so badly. As Lieber emphasized, 'Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation' only produced 'the internecine wars of savages'. His code's guiding principal of 'military necessity' gave Union soldiers ample freedom to operate safely in hostile territory. Nations waging war in a 'noble cause', Lieber acknowledged, must base their actions on 'principles of justice, faith, and honor', but the 'more vigorously' such wars were prosecuted, he insisted, 'the better … for humanity'.[34]

Confederate Quagmire

By the time Halleck issued General Orders No. 100, in April 1863, the Confederate government had revealed its own displeasure with the guerrilla war. Even though rebel politicians and generals had bristled at the enemy's attempt to define the rules of engagement, many of them, in fact, shared federal fears about the possible excesses of an unchecked guerrilla contest. President Jefferson Davis and General Robert E. Lee, for example, as West Point graduates and veterans of the Mexican War, had grave doubts about both the legality and efficacy of unconventional warfare. The 'barbarism' of such warfare aside, both men feared that, if left unchecked, the bumptious, chaotically independent spirit that drove the guerrilla struggle would soon undermine good order and discipline throughout the army. To counter that tendency, Davis and his Congress had already tried, in the spring of 1862, to force all 'independent' guerrilla bands into carefully regulated, government-controlled companies of Partisan Rangers. These special units, operating as adjuncts to the conventional army, were to serve as properly enlisted scouts and raiders behind enemy lines. As such, they were also bound by all army rules, orders, and regulations, including the wearing of uniforms. Spanish military leaders did something very like this, and for similar reasons, with many of their guerrilla *partidas* in the Peninsular War. Considering the Confederate adjustment, even Lieber, conscious of the precedent for the military role of 'partizans', was willing to acknowledge these men 'as part and parcel of the army, and, as such, considered entitled to the privileges of the law of war'.[35]

Unfortunately for the Confederacy, its Congress acted too late. Irregular fighters were already a force to be reckoned with, and they were far too widely dispersed to be effectively regulated. Consequently, while hundreds of men did enlist as Partisan Rangers, many times that number continued to operate 'on their own hook'. And it was no longer a simple personal preference for independent action that drove them. By this stage of the war – again, the spring of 1863 – many Confederates had come to realize that their government and its armies could not possibly protect all citizens from the ravages of war. Confederate armies were clearly outnumbered by the ever-advancing Federals, and as more Southern communities, spread over a wider swath of territory, became exposed to often harsh, sometimes brutal, federal retaliatory measures, their only protectors were local guerrillas.

For instance, in Mississippi, a state that had only begun to witness federal intrusion, citizens clung to the belief that both Partisan Rangers and independent guerrilla bands provided the only defence against invaders and the best hope for social order. Any attempt by the government to disband or transfer irregular units elicited anguished wails. Well after the Ranger Act had been passed, independent bands sprouted up everywhere, and they were thickest in the northern part of the state, where the Union army was concentrated. Defenders of the guerrilla system accused critics of being elitists opposed to the democratic guerrilla impulse. 'Give us a fair chance and we are as good Southerners and as good Soldiers as there is any where', one irregular captain told the state's governor, 'but we are neither dogs nor heathens to be drove and kicked about … give us a white mans [*sic*] chance and we will defend Southern principles'.[36]

Something else had happened, too. The irregular war had produced a third type of guerrilla. In addition to the 'independent' bands and government rangers, violent gangs of deserters, draft dodgers, misfits, and genuine outlaws had taken advantage of the chaos of war to steal and murder with impunity. Organized and operating as 'guerrillas' in bands that ranged in size from a dozen to scores of men, they sometimes claimed to be acting in the name of the Union or Confederacy, but they were mainly interested in evading the law and enriching themselves. 'It is an old saying', a loyal Confederate observed as early as 1862, 'that the Devil is fond of fishing in muddy waters, and as soon as *war* stirred up the mud of confusion you see devils turn out in droves like avenging Wolves.' He predicted that if the war lasted another year, the entire South would be 'over run with vagabonds and [they] will have to be killed in some way'.[37]

Erosion of Popular Support

Of course, the war in 1862, or even 1863, would last much longer than another year, and since few people, including Union soldiers and Southern civilians, could distinguish between 'good' and 'bad', legitimate and illegitimate, guerrillas, the reputation of all irregular fighters suffered. This problem was compounded by the fact that the longer the war continued, with frustration and bitterness festering on both sides, rebel irregulars became ever more ruthless and desperate in their efforts to thwart the Federals and defend their communities. Determined to intimidate the enemy by any means and to survive at all costs, Partisan Rangers and independent guerrillas, alike, often yielded to the Dark Side. They

confiscated the property of friend and foe, and they were not above bullying defenceless civilians to get what they needed. For example, residents of southern Louisiana complained about a 'lawless band' of irregulars known as the 'Prairie Rangers'. In the process of tracking down and arresting suspected Union collaborators, the men had abused their authority by ransacking the homes of perfectly loyal Confederates. One woman appealed to the state's governor on behalf of all the women in her community 'for protection against the insults threats and outrages' of what she called the 'Prairie Banditti'. 'We could not fare worse were we surrounded by a band of Lincoln's mercenary hirelings', she insisted.[38] In Virginia, General Thomas Rosser complained to General Lee about the lack of military discipline among Partisan Rangers in the Shenandoah Valley. They had become a 'band of thieves', Rosser declared, notorious for 'stealing, pillaging, plundering, and doing every manner of mischief and crime'. They had become 'a terror to the citizens and an injury to the cause'.[39]

Similarly, neighbourhood battles between rebel and Union guerrilla bands intensified as the Union army moved ever deeper into the South, and so emboldened the anti-Confederate population.[40] A Missouri woman summarized the plight of many citizens and communities caught in the midst of the resulting chaos. 'You have all read of "wars, & horrors of war", among christianized civilized, & savages,' she wrote to a friend in August 1862, 'but I cannot convey to you the horrors of this one'. Union soldiers, guerrillas on both sides, and marauders of every stripe, she lamented, had pillaged towns and the countryside. Businesses and farms had been abandoned; civil law had collapsed. All was desolate.[41]

Union Solution

For their part, the Federals, frustrated by an inability to end the war, intensified counterinsurgency operations, especially by targeting non-combatants. Their reaction came partly in response to mounting rebel atrocities against Union soldiers and Southern Unionists, but there was a larger issue in play. The US government, and certainly many soldiers in the field, had become convinced that the only way to force the surrender of rebel armies and the capitulation of their government was to crush the willingness of the Confederate people to continue the war. Consequently, the Federals implemented a new, psychologically oriented 'strategy of exhaustion' in the spring of 1864 to demonstrate, through the destruction

of the rebel economy and 'public' property, as well as the defeat of rebel armies in the field, the futility of further resistance.

The strategy, which originated with Ulysses S. Grant, the Union army's new general-in-chief, has been characterized in many ways. It has been called a strategy of total war, absolute war, destructive war, hard war, relentless war, and savage war, but by whatever name, the plan's most striking feature was its resemblance to the policies used since 1861 to combat guerrillas. Grant's own experience in the irregular war had taught him that it was not enough to exterminate the guerrillas. He had also been forced to break up, punish, and demoralize the civilian network that harboured and encouraged them. His new, grander conventional strategy, by striking at both the Confederate military and citizenry, applied this same two-prong approach to the larger war. In this sense, the guerrilla contest influenced Union thinking about how best to achieve complete victory, and it worked.

Although Grant had not been a particularly apt student at West Point, graduating 21st in a class of 39 in 1843, he may have recalled in formulating his strategy something of his military history from the academy. Since Jomini was required reading, he would have known something of the French tactics used in southern Spain, Italy, and Egypt to break civilian will. Besides the quotation from Jomini cited above, he might also have recalled the Swiss officer's warning about the 'spontaneous uprising of a nation'. Though there was 'something grand and noble' in such a spectacle, Jomimi admitted, 'the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of humanity, we ought to hope never to see it'.[42] Jomini's great intellectual rival, Clausewitz, would not have been assigned reading at West Point, and in any event, the Prussian had admitted that his discussion of a 'People in Arms' was 'less an objective analysis than a groping for the truth'. Nonetheless, Clausewitz made this telling observation: 'No matter how brave a people is, how warlike its traditions, how great its hatred for the enemy, how favorable the ground on which it fights: the fact remains that a national uprising cannot maintain itself where the atmosphere is too full of danger.'[43]

Two of the most famous and successful examples of Grant's plan to create an atmosphere full of danger were General William T. Sherman's march from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia, and General Philip H. Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley campaign, in Virginia. 'This movement is not purely military or strategic,' Sherman emphasized, showing that he understood perfectly the strategy of his friend Grant, 'but it will illustrate the vulnerability of the South.' The Confederacy, he explained to General Halleck,

must be made to feel that 'war and individual ruin' were 'synonymous terms'. The 'utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people', Sherman declared, 'will cripple their military resources'.[44] One of Sherman's men boasted at the conclusion of their march, 'Our work has been the next thing to annihilation'.[45]

Grant's orders to Sheridan were unequivocal. 'We want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste', he said.[46] However, unlike Sherman, Sheridan would also have to battle one of the Confederacy's most formidable battalions of Partisan Rangers, the men of Colonel John S. Mosby. Sheridan's solution was not only to engage Mosby, but also to destroy the communities in northern Virginia that shielded him. 'It was a terrible retribution on the country that had for three years supported and lodged the guerrilla bands and sent them out to plunder and murder', admitted a Union officer as he surveyed the smoke rising from a hundred burning buildings and thousands of haystacks.[47] Years later, Sheridan acknowledged the harshness of the campaign but justified it, like Lieber, as a 'military necessity'. More sweepingly, he declared, 'Death is popularly considered the maximum of punishment in war, but it is not; reduction to poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and more quickly than does the destruction of human life.'[48]

Even before Sherman and Sheridan had completed their missions, their efforts to destroy the guerrilla network were applauded in Washington. 'We have tried the kid-glove policy long enough', Halleck observed in September 1864. 'We have tried three years of conciliation and kindness without any reciprocation.' It was time to acknowledge, he proposed, that 'the conduct of the enemy, and especially of non-combatants and women', not to mention the safety of Union soldiers, warranted 'severe rules of war'.[49] The commander of the Union cavalry in Mississippi would have agreed. 'This most infernal guerrilla system', he declared two years earlier, 'is bound soon to waste our entire army away for no equivalent. We must push every man, woman, and child before us or put every man to death in our lines.' The war, he had predicted, must ultimately become 'a war of subjugation, and the sooner the better'.[50]

Failure of the Guerrilla War

By the final year of the war, 1865, the ruthlessness spawned on both sides by the guerrilla contest had taken its toll on the Confederate citizenry, and as the privations and dangers of a continuing, seemingly never-ending,

conflict weighed ever more heavily on people, they began to abandon the Confederate cause. Many citizens, of course, had become discouraged by the declining fortunes of their armies in the field, but the ravages and self-destructive nature of the guerrilla conflict was, in many instances, even more responsible for the prevailing sense of doom. Everywhere people looked, they saw law and order, every vestige of civilization, disappearing from their lives. The surest sign of this despair could be found in places where citizens believed that Union occupation might be the only way to stop the violence. A Confederate living in northern Arkansas felt hopeless amid the roving bands of 'robbers and murderers' in her neighbourhood. 'Some of our citizens have been robbed and then hung off in the woods, where the family could not find them for days', she reported; 'others hung till almost dead and some burned nearly to death and then released'. If the presence of Union soldiers would stop the killing, she welcomed them, 'anything for Peace and established Laws again', she said.[51]

Other Confederates expressed themselves even more pointedly. They blamed not only the outlawry, but the very concept of guerrilla warfare for the suffering in their communities. An Alabama clergyman declared near the end of hostilities that both organized partisan resistance and bush-whacking were 'wrong in principle and practice', and that 'whatever apology men may have made for them', he continued, 'there can be none now'.[52] A Mississippian, despondent over the destructive nature of the war in her state, said of the guerrillas, 'Everybody is down on them'.[53] More strikingly, General Nathan Bedford Forrest, who had entered the war as a partisan fighter and retained a penchant for irregular tactics as one of the Confederacy's most formidable raiders, grew alarmed by the way guerrillas had drained public morale. The provost-marshal of the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by General George H. Thomas, reported in March 1865, following a discussion with Forrest concerning prisoner exchanges, 'In relation to guerrillas, General Forrest remarked that he is as anxious to rid the country of them as was any officer in the U.S. Army, and that he would esteem it a favor if General Thomas would hang every one he caught.'[54]

Retrospective

Even many guerrillas agreed. One of them thought that to continue fighting 'in the bush', as it was called, 'would not only be fruitless of any good, but be a source of serious injury to the people by inviting retaliatory

measures'.[55] Southern noncombatants knew exactly what those measures would entail, and they had seen quite enough of that side of war. In later years, going well into the twentieth century, ex-guerrillas tried to justify their style of warfare, but they did so knowing that their legacy had been tainted by bitter memories. 'From the mass of rubbish that has been written about the guerrilla,' protested an aged member of the brotherhood in 1903, 'there is little surprise that the popular conception of him should be a fiendish, bloodthirsty wretch.'[56]

Ex-rebel guerrillas tried to correct this impression by writing their memoirs and reminiscences, some to be published, others for the benefit of their families. Their elaborate justifications for a sometimes brutal unconventional war ranged from pleas that they had been forced to defend their homes and families to a defiant refusal to apologize for anything they had done. This last group dared anyone to question their motives, and they continued to glory in the name 'guerrilla'. 'I have often seen the term—Guerrilla Chief—applied to me in Southern papers,' John Mosby pointed out in 1899. 'I never regarded it as an insult'. If he and his men had been called 'guerrillas and bushwhackers', what of it? 'Bushwhacking is perfectly legitimate in war,' and what else, if not guerrillas, he asked, drawing again on America's revolutionary roots, were the 'embattled farmers at Lexington and Concord'.[57]

By the summer of 1865, the majority of Confederates had abandoned any hope of military victory or political independence, and the failure of the guerrilla war played no small role in their capitulation. Guerrilla movements are born of the people they serve, and so must maintain the support of the civilian population. In the case of the Confederacy, the actions and goals of partisan fighters caused too many citizens to suffer. When their guerrillas ceased to represent the will of the people, the people turned against them. Home fronts, after all, are important in wartime. As the sesquicentennial commemoration of the American Civil War gives way to the centenary of World War I, such scholars as William Philpott and Adrian Gregory have vouched for this enduring truth in probing the conduct of the Great War. The salient point, as they have shown, is that whether on home front or battle front, whether in a conventional or unconventional war, victory ultimately depends on 'outlasting the enemy'. Then, too, while unconventional warfare requires as much coordination and cooperation as any other military endeavour, the Confederates' guerrilla war lacked those qualities from the very start.[58]

A final thought. Some scholars believe that Jefferson Davis was willing to resort to a general guerrilla conflict as a means of prolonging the war after the fall of Richmond, in April 1865, but that seems unlikely. The Confederate president had never been an advocate of unconventional warfare. He had even shut down most of his Partisan Ranger programme by mid-1864. He did ask his cabinet in those last, desperate days if anyone could think of an effective means of continuing the struggle, but nearly all said no, and they were particularly opposed to the guerrilla option. Secretary of War John C. Breckinridge, knowing that many die-hard Confederates would be willing to wage a bushwhacker's war, told Davis that such a struggle would 'lose entirely the dignity of regular warfare', and so taint even an ultimate victory. Judah P. Benjamin, Davis's secretary of state and most trusted confidant, told his chief, 'Guerrilla or partisan warfare would entail far more suffering on our own people than it would cause damage to the enemy'.[59]

None of this is to say that a better conceived unconventional war would have saved the Confederacy, but its irregular warriors do appear to have done more harm than good.

Notes

1. Albert O. Marshall, *Army Life: From a Soldier's Journal,* ed. Robert G. Schultz (1883; Fayetteville, Ark., 2009), 103.
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Professor Daniel Sutherland received his PhD from Wayne State University in 1976. He is currently a Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Arkansas, where he has taught since 1989. Sutherland has published fifteen books on a range of topics in US political, military, social, and cultural history, including *Guerrillas, Unionists, and Violence on the Confederate Home Front* (1999), *A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War* (2009), and *American Civil War Guerrillas: Changing the Rules of Warfare* (2013).

PART II

Small War from the Early Modern World to Antiquity

Insurgent Identities, Destructive Discourses, and Militarized Massacre: French Armies on the Warpath against Insurgents in the Vendée, Italy, and Egypt

Fergus Robson

Professional standing armies have often wrestled with the problem of small war. At different times and places throughout history it has been valorized and denigrated, portrayed as creative and effective or as cowardly and counter-productive. Large conventional forces and the states and societies they stem from tend to talk about guerrilla warfare as illegitimate, even when they employ tactical elements of it.[1] This narrative, which denigrates small war, serves to legitimize modes of combatting it, repression or counterinsurgency and the frequent abrogation of shared norms of war seen in these tactics. A crucial feature of the encounter between conventional and unconventional forces is an asymmetry of power and resources; support and intelligence. These asymmetries in turn inform the way soldiers thought, spoke, and wrote about their adversary. This indicates a dialectic of discourse and practice which can engender massacre and atrocity by conventional military forces fighting insurgents.

F. Robson (✉)
Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland
e-mail: frobson@tcd.ie

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The subject of this chapter is what happens to regular soldiers when resisted by civilian populations. This will be analysed through the comportment of French troops faced with rebellion in the Vendée in Western France (1793–1796), popular revolts in Italy (1795–1799), and violent resistance in Egypt and Syria (1798–1801). How soldiers responded to and wrote about guerrilla-type resistance will inform an analysis of the relationship between language and massacre. The soldiers' discourses overrode established practices of combat and obliterated any sense of shared identity or common humanity with the civilian insurgents. These examples will also lead into a discussion of changes and continuities in the way small wars were fought and thought about then and since.

In spite of a legacy of tacit 'rules of war', one area which was rather more complicated is what happened when the frontier between combatant and civilian became blurred. The first systematic attempt to schematize this came some seventy years after the Revolutionary Wars, with the Lieber Code, developed during and after the events analysed above by Daniel Sutherland (Chapter "American Civil War Guerrillas"). Franz Lieber drew on his own experiences of, and wider literature on the Napoleonic Wars, especially the Peninsular War when formulating these regulations. Early Modern soldiers knew how to interact with other soldiers, whether on the battlefield, taking prisoners, laying siege, or skirmishing. The 'rules' and the culture of combat for the most part guided their actions, even during the Revolution, despite politicians' attempts to abrogate these norms.[2] These rules included respect for a white flag, parleys, and truces; giving quarter to those who surrender; and reasonable treatment of prisoners, as well as prisoner exchange cartels. As Geoffrey Parker has noted, this set of practices was followed to avoid unnecessary killing of fellow professional soldiers, and officers were treated significantly better than the ranks.[3] Soldiers also knew what to do with civilians, who were generally supposed to be respected (except when a town was stormed) but were also a soft touch for food, money, or a place to sleep. They were, however, rarely killed in great numbers.[4] Civilians did suffer massively during wars and their general distaste for soldiers was undoubtedly intensified during the Revolutionary period when the scale and duration of the fighting exacerbated their suffering. The logistical deficiencies typical of French armies in the late 1790s also engendered even greater rapacity by military marauders. However, when civilians resisted

'legitimate' military demands, refused to allow entry to a town, or, worse still, rose up and ambushed or attacked troops, they slipped very quickly into a grey area where they enjoyed none of the protections generally afforded to either enemy troops or civilians.

This grey area is the focus of this chapter and particularly in light of the type of material I have been using in my research on militarized cultural encounters and their impact on national identities.[5] In this material, national and racial stereotyping of occupied populations is commonplace. The consensus that this period saw the emergence of modern nationalism ought to mean that the sharpening of identities contingent upon national feeling would inform the way the soldiers treated French, Italian, and Egyptian insurgents. Further, given the soldiers' tendency to elaborate military and cultural ethnographies of these populations, one might have expected differentiated perceptions to lead to differentiated treatment of civilian populations who resisted the French.

What instead appears to have been the case is that the type of dehumanizing discourse identified by Alan Forrest and Howard Brown in the way revolutionary administrators, journalists, police, and soldiers wrote about brigands, was extended very quickly to any civilian groups who dared to resist the French. This was true for a village where a soldier was massacred or an insurrectional conflagration across whole provinces. It applied to French Vendean rebels, to Pugliese peasants, and to Egyptian and Syrian Muslims. Sibylle Scheipers has argued that the nationalization of war during the era of the French Revolution precluded irregular fighters from enjoying the protections afforded to regular soldiers and that 'modern nation states', through the discursive prism of 'discipline', saw irregulars as brigands and 'enemies on a different moral footing'.[6] This is convincing up to a point but the evidence indicates that this process came from the bottom-up, rather than being constituted by elite-level nationalizing discourses, which appear to have had relatively little impact on regular troops' reactions to guerrilla conflict. When it came to the dehumanizing and destructive discourses which facilitated and legitimized militarized massacre, national identity and the emerging prejudices around it seem to have counted for relatively little, at least during the Revolutionary-Napoleonic period. When soldiers saw red, the colour of their enemies' skin or the language they spoke became at least temporarily irrelevant. In a sense therefore, these soldiers were practitioners of equal opportunity repression.

On the issue of terminology, there is a rich scholarship on the related problems of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and on popular resistance to the French Revolution and Napoleonic Empire. This essay speaks to this scholarship diachronically and analytically, as well as synchronically and spatially. Martin Boycott-Brown has picked apart resistance to the French in Northern Italy, recoiling from classifying it as truly guerrilla warfare, instead preferring to see it in terms of more atavistic traditions of revolt and resistance to outside authority.[7] This interpretation is persuasive although one need not necessarily preclude the other as Michael Broers has shown in his innovative survey of 'Napoleon's Other War' against revolts and resistance. Here the author is less concerned with drawing a definitional division between banditry, rural revolt, urban uprisings, and long-running insurgencies, instead he sees these as inter-related phenomena which drew on traditional impulses and enmities but were nourished by novel conflicts and ideologies.[8] Stephen Clay and Howard Brown have both shown the role which local politics and, indeed, plain vengeance could play in sparking and stoking the low-level conflicts which often metamorphosed into full-blown lawlessness, banditry, and even insurgency when – to borrow from Charles Tilly – 'political entrepreneurs and specialists in violence' mobilized their cultural and social bases.[9] Such an array of resistance to the Revolution demands clarity with regard to the terminology employed here. The foundational conflict of modern guerrilla war, the Spanish resistance to Napoleonic France, literally *la guerrilla* – the small war – lent its name to the phenomenon ever since, having drawn its name from the *petite guerre* or *kleiner krieg* of eighteenth-century military theorists. Hence, while this essay does not conflate peasant uprisings, endemic banditry, and urban insurrections, it will focus on where these merged into longer, or short but intense bouts of insurgency. The terms insurgency, unconventional war, and small war will be used interchangeably with guerrilla war because while civilian revolts took many guises during these years, the confrontation between a standing French army and an insurgent population almost invariably produced guerrilla warfare, broadly understood as persistent and asymmetric armed conflict between a regular military and a civilian-based force employing guerrilla tactics. These two interconnected problems, how we think about, talk about, and especially how we name insurgents; and then how they are treated in the fluid context of popular revolt, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare, have important resonances in conflicts which are being fought out today in print and in the deserts of Iraq and Syria.

The Vendéans, Brethren or Beasts?

The repression of the rebellion of the Vendée has been the focus of such a range of scholarship as to defy summary, suffice to say that it has been cast as civil war, religious war, guerrilla war, the clash of traditional and modern, local and national, core and periphery, and most controversially (and inaccurately) genocide. As Alan Forrest has convincingly argued, the sort of language which was used to describe those who resisted the French Revolution allowed the dehumanization of insurgents of all stripes, to the extent that acts which were seen as crimes when committed against civilian populations gained a degree of legitimacy.[10] Such acts encompassed: murder of surrendering fighters, torture and mutilation of rebels, rape of civilians, burning villages whose inhabitants were thought to aid insurgents, destruction of property and crops, and collective punishment of the population. These were rarely committed against the regular soldiers of Austria, Britain, or Prussia, nor against the inhabitants of the Netherlands or the German lands, where so much contemporary warfare took place. They were, however, visited upon the population in those regions characterized by civilian and guerrilla resistance to the French: the Vendée, Italy, Egypt, and Spain, to name a few. Those who resisted the Revolution were variously classified as fanatics, brigands, *chouans*, and royalists, but also as wild beasts, dogs, monsters, and more. Such language gave expression to the soldiers' fury at being fought by invisible or insurgent enemies, it legitimized their otherwise unlawful behaviour, and it facilitated cruelty beyond their conception of their own humanity.

To quote the soldiers themselves. Louis Maurdère described the Vendeans as 'monsters', the overwhelming majority of whom 'will be burned in a sacrifice to our freedom'.[11] Baubichon cadet likewise called the rebels 'bloodthirsty monsters' and expressed his joy that the Loire was now 'crammed with their dead bodies'.[12] Léger Cassin wrote to the *comité de surveillance* of Troyes that, 'we are surrounded by brigands in these marshes ... we will continue to kill them until they are completely exterminated'.[13] The otherwise humane Jean-Claude Vaxelaire wrote nonchalantly in his memoirs about the *noyades* in Nantes, describing how women and children were chained together in the boats before they were scuttled in the Loire.[14] Vinay-Crozat was even more sanguine about the mass killings, saying, 'we shot them in hundreds and in thousands ... we loaded them onto boats which we then sunk in the Loire' and went on to describe how 'we cut the throats of hundreds of

women captured in our victory over the brigands'.[15] The troops' behaviour was of course trenchantly denounced by the army command, in the words of General Dumas:

> Without mentioning the soldiers' pillaging of every consumable item, they break, destroy and burn everything that is not personally useful to them. They even rape and sodomise everyone they meet, without the least regard for early childhood or the most decrepit old age.[16]

The power of the discourse used in the Vendée and the extraordinary situation of guerrilla warfare and widespread civilian resistance faced by the soldiers had, however, made this behaviour almost impossible to prevent. In reporting on brigand violence and insurgency in France, the *Indicateur Universel* demanded, in an ode to Bonaparte, that he 'destroy the monsters' by 'giving them death so they can give you peace'.[17] This language and diagnosis was echoed in the way much of the press wrote about the related problems of insurgency, brigandage, and public order and while journalists rarely called for the extermination of whole villages, the language used nonetheless legitimized the use of extreme, expiatory violence to rid France of the problem.[18] The parallels here with the ways that Union troops described Confederate guerrillas, discussed by Dan Sutherland in Chapter "American Civil War Guerrillas", are striking and illustrate the vehemence of regular troops when faced with insurgents who refuse to play by conventional rules.

These examples of the discourse and the murderous acts validated by such language shed light on what was to be a recurring theme when French armies encountered civilians under arms. While Etienne-Francois Girard claimed that his men had a 'great repugnance to bear arms against their fellow French' (with reference to Toulon), this seems to have been a rarity and certainly was not applied in practice.[19] By stepping outside the soldier-civilian framework and engaging in acts of war against Republican troops, the Vendean rebels had cast aside the protection traditionally afforded to non-combatants.[20] Nor did they benefit from the status afforded to enemy soldiers which generally prohibited their massacre and provided for surrender and prisoner of war status.[21] The battle which saw the first major defeat for the Vendeans – Cholet, 17 October 1793 – was one of the few which was fought as a conventional engagement and the rebels performed well against regular troops but were eventually crushed. In the aftermath Republican troops slaughtered captured and wounded

rebels in Beaupréau, Candé, Fougères, Avranches, and La Flèche to name but a few, some of which had already been the sites of rebel atrocities.[22] Similarly, after the battles of Le Mans (12–13 December 1793) and Savenay (23 December 1793) hundreds were killed by Republican troops.[23] The notorious massacre of the debris of the Vendean rebel army, women and children included, after their desperate attempt to re-cross the Loire in November 1793, saw 12,000 killed, or captured then killed. The bloodletting at the defeat of the rebel army is well known but it is worth quoting General Westermann to illustrate the relationship between language and action:

> There is no more Vendée citizens, it has died under our free sword, with its women and children. I have just buried it in the marshes and woods of Savenay. Following the orders you gave me, I have crushed children under the hooves of horses, and massacred women who, these at least, will give birth to no more brigands. I do not have a single prisoner with which to reproach myself. I have exterminated everyone.[24]

This and similar language, which the soldiers spoke less eloquently if no less chillingly, was backed up in practice. The massacre of defeated Vendeans and the execution of rebel men and women who surrendered were in fact not ordered by the Convention, rather they were legitimized retrospectively by the Committee of Public Safety in its address to the army in the west on 23 October 1793 (even the infamous decrees of 1 August and 1 October 1793 did not call for killing prisoners, women, children, or the wounded).[25] This should instead be understood as the vengeance of soldiers rather than government ordered atrocity, or as Gavin Daly would have it, 'carrying out the punitive will of the Jacobin government against the "enemy within"'.[26]

The guerrilla armies and civilians of the Vendée, like those of Italy and Egypt, found themselves in the grey zone of insecure status within an exceptionally insecure space. As Philip Dwyer has pointed out, 'in theatres characterised by irregular warfare, there were almost never any prisoners taken'.[27] Jean-Clément Martin has made clear that exterminatory discourses (not necessarily the same as direct orders) were prevalent among politicians and administrators in Paris, and this can only have added to the ferocity Republican troops deployed and the sense of legitimacy they enjoyed.[28] Civilian and military discourses of destruction fused with, and fuelled, the militarized massacre of rebels and the civilian population.

Civilian administrators on the ground also played their part. Jean-Baptiste Carrier's behaviour in Nantes is adequate illustration of this but he was recalled to Paris for excessive conduct by the Robespierrist Committee of Public Safety and tried and executed during the Thermidorian Convention. The *Commission Bignon* and other tribunals which executed thousands throughout the region were – despite their legal sanction – staffed by soldiers whose apparent lust for extirpation extended beyond the battlefield.[29]

That this was at once a civil war and guerrilla conflict, with deep ideological and religious divisions meant that the brutality and prevalence of massacre is, with hindsight, unsurprising.[30] Whether conflicts outside of France saw similar atrocities, spontaneous or semi-institutionalized, can be instructive as to the relationship between small war and unrestrained killing by soldiers. A further texturing of this as a comparison is the idealization of national identity by the Revolutionaries, which could cut both ways. As traitors to the nation the Vendeans might be even more demonized, or as fellow French they may have been afforded greater consideration. The examples of Italy and Egypt will help to clarify these emerging ambiguities.

Italian Insurgents: Ransacking and Reprisal

The rapid conquest of northern Italy between March 1796 and February 1797, followed by the establishment of Sister Republics – satellite states – in most of the peninsula, posed a variety of challenges to the French. Their armies expelled the Austrians, forcing the Peace of Leoben (18 April 1797) upon them, defeated the Piedmontese, the Papal, and in 1798, the Neapolitan armies. They were, however, notoriously under-supplied. Officers had to contend with serious problems of discipline within the ranks, resulting in widespread marauding, pillage, and mutiny. And, with the departure of Bonaparte and many of the best troops for Egypt in May 1798, they were significantly weakened. This is not to mention the frequent hostility and resistance from the conquered population occasioned by the soldiers' behaviour, taxation, and requisitions, as well as religious policies and local politics in the Sister Republics. These problems fed into each other and the soldiers' indiscipline led to increased resistance from locals, in a cycle of retributive violence and seemingly escalating brutality.

Even before Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt massive popular revolts against the French broke out. In April 1797 the population of Verona rebelled against French troops and massacred a number of injured French

soldiers in the military hospital. Much of the hinterland of Verona, Bergamo, and Brescia erupted in rebellion as well, and the soldiers at the rear left vivid accounts of brutality reminiscent of the Peninsular War: 'the dismembered limbs of a French soldier became the plaything of the populace'.[31] While there was a degree of incitement by the French, and coordination among Venetian administrators, these are largely irrelevant to this discussion.[32] Far more important for present purposes is the evidence of widespread popular rebellions against French forces across northern Italy, and French reactions. The military memoirists studied did not recount particularly ferocious repression at this stage but as the campaigns in Italy continued the experience of persistent guerrilla warfare inspired an escalation in transgressive violence. Large peasant uprisings in the region between Pavia and Cremona in May 1796, the Veronese in April 1797, followed by eruptions in Calabria and Puglia in January 1799, bear witness to the extent to which French troops were exposed to insurgency and guerrilla warfare in Italy.[33]

As in the Vendée a way of talking and thinking about rebels developed among the soldiers which justified extreme reprisals and massacre. This was completely contrary to the law of 30 Prairial year III (18 June 1795) which stated that 'those inhabitants of the countryside who were brought to rebel gatherings are to be punished by 2–4 months imprisonment and a fine of half their wealth'.[34] This official injunction was rarely reflected in the words or actions of the soldiers when faced with civilian resistance. In the words of Jean Chatton, 'We shot them all, the peasants and the rebel soldiers'. When recounting the capture of villages said to have aided a band of brigands he claimed that, 'we pillaged and burned the villages … we grilled the inhabitants like herrings'.[35] Guillaume Lecoq described how after the defeat of the peasantry and inhabitants of the town of Acqui, the soldiers 'created a terrifying carnage, the men, women and children of the town had their throats slit, we then set the town ablaze'. He thought that this taught them a lesson and claimed it was justified because the inhabitants of Acqui had refused to allow the French to enter their town and sent back the French envoy having cut off his nose, ears, and fingers.[36] Henri Legrot recalled the same events, he claimed that 'it only happened because the peasants rose up against us' and that once the punishment was meted out 'we were no longer troubled by the population'.[37]

Antoine Bonnefons and Maurice Duviquet both noted the similar fate which had earlier befallen the village of Binasquo. Bonnefons wrote that 'the inhabitants had the imprudence to rise up … they paid dearly for

their daring, and their village was reduced to ashes'.[38] Duviquet for his part was no more merciful, he described the few remaining inhabitants 'seated in defiant despair among the smoking ruins of their village … which had been burned for their all too enthusiastic participation in the revolt of Pavia'.[39] Jean-Claude Carrier experienced the same revolt, and in his lyrical, ironic, and picaresque style he breezily recounted his capture by the insurgents, his subsequent escape, and alluded to the vengeance exacted by the French and how the inhabitants 'paid dearly for the cruelties they committed'. However, it is his characterization of the insurgents which is most interesting. He referred to them as 'ferocious hordes', 'barbarians', and 'furious monsters', similarly, in Verona, he described those who had fallen on the French as 'more barbarous than wolves or tigers' and as 'completely devoid of humanity'.[40] The way French soldiers wrote about Italians was often derogatory, they were described as lazy, cowardly, sycophantic, treacherous, and murderous. However, the treatment of Italian civilians who resisted the French was, as far as the sources reveal, no more ferocious than the way the Vendean rebels were dealt with.

Despite the commonplace perception among the troops of Italians as inferior to the French, when it came to small war they may even have gotten off more lightly than the rebels in the Vendée, at least at first. This may have been related to the perception that the Vendeans had betrayed their fatherland, but dynamics of violent retribution appear to have been at least as important in creating an atmosphere of insecurity, fear, and the resultant ferocity that enabled, nay encouraged, extreme violence. The feeling, especially from early 1799 when Austro-Russian armies advanced and the French army in Italy was substantially weakened, that French forces were in a sense under siege within Italy also contributed to the increasing ferocity of their repression. So, while the aftermath of the revolt of the Veronese was relatively restrained, despite the rumours of massacre of hundreds of wounded French soldiers, the reaction of troops to guerrilla warfare in the Abruzzo was significantly more bloodthirsty. The future General Boulart recounted the reprisals after having been besieged in Aquila by an insurgent population:

> We surrounded them and heads lowered created a carnage until there was not an insurgent left alive … in the monastery, whose monks had assisted and urged on the rebels … I saw a dozen corpses strewn here and there, in the nave, the choir and slumped over the altar, covered in blood and pierced by bayonets.[41]

The surrounding countryside was then terrorized and the generally genial soldier described how 'from time to time it was necessary to burn three or four villages, since the countryside was not pacified'.[42] All this was justified in his conception both by the behaviour of the insurgents but also by their nature, which he described as 'poor, superstitious, inclined towards theft and brigandage, ferocious like the guerrillas of Spain who they resembled in character and physiognomy, under monkish influence … and who committed the most atrocious cruelties against French soldiers'.[43] This combination of mutual brutality, cultural incomprehension, and the sense of being besieged in conquered territory also exerted a powerful influence upon the soldiers' reactions to being stranded in Egypt and exposed to civilian violence.

Egypt and Syria: Extra-European Enmity and Slaughter

One of the most infamous instances of militarized massacre of the entire period occurred during the French invasion of Syria. The town of Jaffa resisted Napoleon's siege and, once taken by storm, the inhabitants and garrison were subjected to slaughter on a massive scale. Besides this well-documented case there were a multitude of massacres of lesser notoriety. During the occupation of Egypt, the inhabitants of Cairo twice rose up against the French. Villages and entire regions resisted the French with both violence and non-cooperation. Zeinab Abul-Magd maintains that the population rose in Jihad against the French, while Bedouin and Arab tribes also frequently raided French camps and columns.[44] We therefore have a context which provides both the conventional warfare of pitched battles and sieges, as well as the diverse elements which together constituted guerrilla warfare: urban rebellions, banditry, and peasant revolts, which fused into insurgency. As such the army of occupation, fresh from stunning victories against conventional armies in Italy but also blooded by experience of civilian resistance, was faced with an array of guerrilla-type resistance in an unfamiliar and unforgiving environment, to which they often struggled to respond. The usual orders to refrain from interfering with the population and to respect civilian property were emphasized.[45] This was particularly important given that after the naval defeat at Aboukir Bay the French were essentially besieged within their tottering Egyptian fortress, not to mention the challenges of communicating with, and hence winning over, the population. It was also made clear, in a number of pronouncements printed in (poor) Arabic, that any civilians who resisted the French would see their homes and villages burned and razed.[46] Thus

the lessons of previous occupations appear to have been internalized and embodied as policy within the military, and it should be no surprise that the consequences of this were similar to what had gone before in the Vendée and Italy.

Very soon the familiar language of brigands and monsters resurfaced. Bricard described the Bedouin as 'wild beings with barbarity etched on their cruel monstrous faces' and Alexandre Ladrix went so far as to claim that 'the Egyptians do not even appear human'.[47] It is here, perhaps, that identity and race played a role since the invaders were exceptionally quick to form a negative view of the inhabitants. Rougelin derided native women as 'disgusting' and the future General Pépin averred that 'if I had to remain here for fifty years I would still detest the women's faces'.[48] The men did not fare much better. Moiret reckoned that the Bedouin were 'nothing but thieves, brigands and assassins', while derogatory and condescending imagery of locals was widespread in letters and in memoirs.[49]

Meanwhile, from the inhabitants' perspective, French attempts to impose taxes, requisition horses and grain, provoked anger and resistance, and the French – despite their proclamations of friendly intent – often suffered the consequences.[50] Accounts abound of villagers who murdered small groups of soldiers as well as much larger risings of thousands of peasants. In the very same way as in the Vendée and Italy, Pierre Millet described how 'we passed a village where a dragoon had been killed, we pillaged it and killed the inhabitants to reward them for their fine work'.[51] The military occupation of Egypt had been relatively straightforward, the famed Mamluk cavalry was cut down by the French *bataillons carrés*, or square formation. The French had respected these opponents but when met with similar types of civilian resistance to that encountered in France and Italy, coupled with banditry practised by some of the Bedouin tribes, they responded as was their wont elsewhere, with savagery. Joseph-Marie Moiret explained how a repressive expedition was sent against a village where 15 French soldiers were killed but the locals had all fled, unable to exact the 'resounding vengeance we wished for, we contented ourselves with burning it to the ground, an elderly couple we found were killed'.[52] An anonymous dragoon, recounted how when attacked by both regular Mamluk troops and a 'horde of armed peasants, we first saw off the Mamluks before turning on this miserable crowd, it was a frightful massacre, we hacked them to pieces, more than 1,500 bodies were left scattered after us'.[53] Villages were burned, minarets were torn down, civilians suspected of complicity were slaughtered, and livestock and

moveable goods were seized. The insurrection in Lower Egypt was patchy and diffuse, large areas remained peaceful but repeated demands for taxes, foodstuffs, and especially horses could ignite local revolts, maintaining persistent pressure on the occupiers.

Worse was to come. The attempt to capture Acre and forestall an Ottoman invasion saw the French pass through Syria and besiege Jaffa. The Pascha refused to capitulate after a breech had been blown in the fortifications, which was traditionally the point at which an honourable surrender could spare the lives of those inside. The dragoon remarked that 'Bonaparte abandoned the town and its inhabitants to the fury of his soldiers', which was traditional but theoretically disavowed by Bonaparte.[54] Millet explained that 'a terrible carnage took place … the shocking spectacle of French soldiers with fury in their eyes massacred anyone in front of them without exception for age or sex, even infants at their mother's breasts were not spared'.[55] Antoine Bonnefons described 'the horror of that bloody spectacle … neither women nor children were spared, the streets were choked with dead bodies'.[56] Two days later, once the slaughter had subsided, the remainder of the garrison, some 3,000 men, were brought shackled to the beach and bayonetted in order to save cartridges for the coming campaign. In an example of the need to shift blame from themselves for acts that they knew to be beyond the pale, the soldiers maintained that it was the fault of the Pascha, the garrison, or the inhabitants for not having surrendered.

During the same campaign in Syria, another account relates how the villages of the mountains around Nazareth revolted against the French 'and paid the price, their villages were pillaged and burned, the inhabitants were all killed'; 'this was beneficial since we had been surrounded by savages and barbarians'.[57] This campaign saw religious identities activated on both sides. The French recalled Biblical and Crusader accounts of the region while local Christians at times sided with them and Muslim villagers harried their rear during the siege of Acre and the battle of Mount Thabor.[58] The identity language used, however, does not appear to have made the violence perpetrated any worse than similar rebellion and repression would have seen in Europe. Bonaparte even explained his lifting of the unsuccessful siege of Acre by the need to return to Egypt to forestall uprisings there while the bulk of the army was in Syria.[59] After the bloodbath at Jaffa and the costly failure of the siege of Acre the French troops burned villages and crops all along their route home, in a direct echo of the tactics used in the Vendée and later in the Russian campaign.

The final major episode of bloodletting in Egypt came during the second revolt of Cairo, which had already risen up against the invaders on 21 October 1798, not long after the French had first taken the city. This was put down with relative ease. Following the disastrous Syrian campaign Bonaparte had left for France in August 1799 and General Kléber assumed command. After a capitulation agreement broke down the French were faced with and defeated a significantly larger Ottoman force at Heliopolis on 20 March 1800. Remnants of the Mamluk and Ottoman forces made their way into the undefended city and the populace rose against the French a second time. This was a far bloodier affair. Grandjean maintained that 'we set fire to everything and killed all we could find, men, women, children and the elderly, nothing was spared in this horrible massacre of the inhabitants'.[60] The nearby town of Boulaq also rose against the French and here Moiret related the recapture of 'this unfortunate town, where I witnessed the majority of the inhabitants killed by bayonet, was unrecognisable afterward … the result of the horrible "rights of war"'.[61]

The bombardment and street-fighting in Cairo went on for nearly a month and the soldiers became particularly vengeful. Millet's account is almost gleeful in describing shelled houses and mosques collapsing on those inside.[62] At nearby Boulaq, the reasonably sympathetic Charles François related how 'we used our bayonets to fill their trenches with dead bodies' but noted that after the surrender Egyptians were to be given quarter while non-Egyptians, whether English, Turkish, or Middle-Eastern, were to be killed.[63] The combination of massacre with an element of identity-activated clemency is unusual and indicates that the soldiers' rage at insurgents could be, and in this instance was, channelled against those seen as more complicit. This chimes with post-insurgency behaviour in the Vendée, Italy, and elsewhere. The incidence of massacre was broadly defined by being resisted by civilians but was also contingent upon the soldiers and their commanders' perception of who was accountable. François went on to recount with pride that he found an Englishman in Boulaq after the surrender and killed him out of hand 'proving my hatred for this nation, the cause of all our ills'.[64] This is evidence of the soldiers' capacity to establish a hierarchy of enmity even during the bloody end of an urban uprising and, similarly to the slaughter of monks in Aquila, it indicates that whatever contempt they may have had for Egyptians (or Italian peasants), they detested the supposed fomenters of resistance even more.

The similarity of discourse and practice in Egypt, Italy, and the Vendée, dehumanizing language coupled with, powering, and legitimizing militarized massacre leads to the conclusion that the conditions which gave rise to atrocities were rooted in the experience of combating insurgency and the psychological responses to it, rather than a racialized or identity driven sense of French or European superiority. This is important as during the course of European colonialism violence became deeply embedded in the imperial enterprise but it appears that this was exported from intra-European violent practices rather than forged solely in the fires of colonial conquest and racial domination.[65] So while the ways in which French soldiers thought about Egyptians contained many of the seeds of later racialized and orientalist conceptions of the people of North Africa and the Middle East, these did not determine the nature or the extent of the violence used in combating insurgency. This violence, as Michael Broers has shown for Europe and Latin America, was rooted in dynamics of the 'Other War' – small war – practised by and against bandits and insurgents whether in France, Italy, Spain, or further afield.[66]

Conclusions

It is notable that for all the attempts to justify massacre whether as within the rules of war, as salutary examples, or as the inevitable consequence of soldiers' fury at being attacked by civilians, there was often a sense of regret (in hindsight at least) at the destruction wrought, especially on civilians and towns. The idea that massacring the inhabitants of a town would make the next town more likely to surrender is evidently flawed: the example of Jaffa certainly did not work with Acre. The notion that burning villages and murdering their inhabitants provided any sort of dissuasion was also clearly mistaken given that the towns and villages of the Vendée, Italy, and Egypt continued to rise up and seek vengeance upon the French. The most apt therefore of the common justifications offered, seems to be the idea that a bloodlust comes over soldiers when faced with civilian resistance, and that even well-disciplined troops can turn viciously on civilian populations in such circumstances.

What is also clear is that the way the soldiers spoke of the populations which resisted them provided ways of justifying their behaviour, the people were fanatics, monsters, barbarians, savages, or a menagerie of wild animals. This vocabulary was applied equally to French, Italian, and Egyptian (not to mention Spanish and Russian) victims of the French

army and was easily interchangeable. Rather than describe specific traits of the population in question, it served to dehumanize civilians, remove them from the spectrum of humanity deserving of mercy, and facilitate massacre. This set of words and ways of using them served the men at the time, and later in life, in their attempts to clear their consciences of what today would be understood as war crimes. As Philip Dwyer has pointed out, these killings cannot but have had a deeply traumatizing effect on those who witnessed and took part in them.[67] This is also evident in the ways they sometimes summarized a massacre, in particular the expression: all the horrors of war were visited upon them. This phrase had a two-fold effect in that it normalized what had happened by making it part and parcel of warfare, while also allowing the memoirist to avoid a potentially trauma-triggering, detailed recounting of the kinds of violence examined in this chapter. It provides a suitable finishing point for this examination of the ways in which language can legitimize, normalize, and help repress violence and violent memories. While this language also indicates that it was not a matter of who was on the receiving end but that it was war, and a specific type of war, that led to such slaughter.

Warfare had long legitimized certain types of massacre, the rape of the Palatinate in the late seventeenth century is but one example of how military necessity sometimes prevailed over the supposed 'rules of war', while resistance to a besieging army or peasant partisan action was frequently met with ferocity. However, what might mark the Revolutionary era out as a new stage in the dynamics of guerrilla war and counter-insurgency was the growing power of national identity (not to mention the growing power of national states) in mobilizing the civilian population both to fight in mass armies but also to resist invading or enemy armies, not that this need be exclusive to modernity as Brian McGing shows elsewhere in this volume. There are other ways in which responses to guerrilla war in this period looked both backwards and forwards. Early modern conceptions of the rules of war and the legacy of massacre in the Wars of Religion informed the treatment of civilians. Looking forward to the coming era of armies of occupation battling in insecure spaces against quasi-civilian enemies, especially in the colonial sphere but also within Europe, which engendered a psychology of insecurity and discourses of superiority, forces facilitative of massacre.

Another 'modern' feature of these wars were counterinsurgency manuals which were compiled by military governors of conquered provinces under the Napoleonic Empire.[68] Ideas remarkably similar to

'Shock and Awe', usually called 'salutary examples', as well as 'Hearts and Minds', were present in these guides on how to manage conquered populations and they illustrate that there was considerable change and innovation as well as continuity in the practice of asymmetric warfare during this period. This speaks strongly to the chapter in this volume by Julia Welland whose Allied soldiers' initiation in the softer arts of war was mirrored by Thiébault in Spain as well as Rampon in northern Italy.[69] There are echoes here too of Seán Gannon's chapter where the distinction between police work and military repression emerges sharply. These lessons had been learned during the Napoleonic Empire when after pacification, the gendarmerie were installed whose approach to policing was, relatively speaking, less abrasive and more engaged with communities than military occupation.[70] This demonstrates the emergence of French counterinsurgency *avant la lettre* in administrative and military thinking which grew out of the experience of guerrilla warfare during these years. General Paul Thiébault is an excellent example of this, having cut his teeth as a staff officer in southern Italy he had direct experience of the fusion of urban revolt in Naples, peasant uprising in Calabria and Puglia and banditry throughout the Apennines and brought these lessons to bear later in his career as the military governor of Salamanca during *la guerrilla*.[71]

A final conclusion which can be drawn from this chapter in conjunction with others regards the emergence of a 'Western Way of War' and a diffuse but distinct military culture which focused on large standing armies, whether conscript or professional, and excludes other 'ways of war' from its hierarchy of legitimate modes of combat. This is evident in the way historians have wished to cast archaic Greek warfare as contingent with disciplined modern infantry, thoughtfully complicated by Matthew Lloyd's contribution to this volume. It is also evident in the ways in which these values clearly did not apply to military thinkers and practitioners in Medieval Scotland or England, as we see in Aly Macdonald's and Alexander Hodgkins' chapters. But the genesis of this way of thinking is quite possibly present in the emergence, first among the troops and then army and civilian command, of talking about insurgency as illegitimate and not deserving of the protections afforded to either civilians or enemy combatants. These destructive discourses have in turn contributed to militarized massacre by Western militaries when faced with unconventional warfare and insurgencies, be this in Civil War era United States, as shown in Dan Sutherland's chapter, or in myriad repressive wars in Europe

or the rest of the world during colonialism, the wars of decolonization and since. The relationship between experience, language, and violence analysed here is possibly one of the deadliest and least well-known legacies of the French Revolution and its military and discursive innovations.

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Notes

1. Deployment of regular troops in partisan formations and as raiders was of course commonplace, as demonstrated in Tim Piceu's chapter here and by Charles Esdaile for the Peninsular War, but this is largely inconsequential for the present argument. See Charles Esdaile and Leonor Hernández Enviz, 'The Anatomy of a Research Project: The Sociology of the Guerrilla War in Spain 1808–1814' in *Popular Resistance in the French Wars: Patriots, Partisans and Land Pirates*, ed. Charles Esdaile (Basingstoke, 2005), 117–118.
2. For some exceptions to this see Fergus Robson, 'Siege Warfare in Comparative Early-Modern Contexts: Norms, Nuances, Myth and Massacre during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars' in *From Sarajevo to Troy: Civilians Under Siege* eds, Alex Dowdall and John Horne (forthcoming, Basingstoke, 2017).
3. Geoffrey Parker, 'Early-Modern Europe' in eds, Michael Howard et al., *The Laws of War; Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven, 1994), 44–48.
4. Gunther E. Rothenberg, 'The Age of Napoleon' in Howard, *The Laws of War*, 90–94, Alexander Gillespie, *A History of the Laws of War*, 2 vols (Oxford, 2011), vol. 2, *The Customs and Laws of War with Regards to Civilians in Times of Conflict*, 136–144.
5. This includes memoirs, letters, diaries, newspapers, folk song and story, and popular prints and has largely focused on the rank and file.
6. Sibylle Scheipers, 'Prisoners and Detainees in War' in *European History Online*, ed. by Peter H. Wilson, 2011, < http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/alliances-and-wars/war-as-an-agent-of-transfer/sibylle-scheipers-prisoners-and-detainees-in-war > (22 June 2016), 12–14.
7. Martin Boycott-Brown, 'Guerrilla Warfare *avant la lettre*: Northern Italy, 1792–97' in Esdaile (ed.), *Popular Resistance*, 64–65.

8. Michael Broers, *Napoleon's Other War: Bandits, Rebels and their Pursuers in the Age of Revolutions* (Oxford, 2010), 46–51, 56–61, 193–194.
9. Stephen Clay, 'Vengeance, Justice and the Reactions in the Revolutionary Midi' in *French History*, (2009) vol. 23, no. 1, 40–46, Howard G. Brown, *Ending the French Revolution; Violence, Justice and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon* (Charlottesville, 2006), 269–280, Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge, 2003), 34–40.
10. Alan Forrest, 'The Ubiquitous Brigand: The Politics and Language of Repression' in Esdaile (ed.), *Popular Resistance*, 31–34.
11. Service Historique de la Défense (SHD), Vincennes, Xw30 (Drôme), Letter from Louis Maurdère to his father (4 Floréal Year II).
12. Idem, Letter from Baubichon cadet to his parents (3 Nivôse Year II).
13. SHD Xw8 (Aube), Léger Cassin to the Comité de Surveillance of Troyes (7 Prairial Year II).
14. Henry Gauthier-Villars (ed.), *Mémoires d'un vétéran de l'ancienne armée (1791–1800) siège de Mayence, pacification de la Vendée, campagne d'Égypte* (Paris, 1900), 30.
15. Archives Départementales de la Drôme (ADD) Valence, J 25 – Correspondance de Vinay-Crozat, letter from son to his father, 12 Nivôse Year II (1 January 1794).
16. Cited in Brown, *Ending the French Revolution*, 243.
17. *L'Indicateur Universel*, 19 Nivôse Year IX (9 January 1801).
18. Brown, *Ending the French Revolution*, 219–220.
19. Paul Desachy (ed.), *Les Cahiers du Colonel Etienne-François Girard, 1766–1846, publiés d'après le manuscrit original* (Paris, 1951), 34.
20. While David Bell holds that the soldier-civilian binary only really began to emerge in this period, this can only really hold true for the higher ranking officers, the rank and file having been long excluded from civilian society. Bell, *The First Total War*, 24–26.
21. The widely condemned no-quarter to enemy combatants decree of the National Convention in 1794 was not actually applied in practice. See Sibylle Scheipers, *Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter* (Oxford, 2015), 44–46.
22. Elie Fournier, *La Terreur Bleue* (Paris, 1984), 61–62, 81, Savary, *Guerre des Vendéens*, vol. 2, 285–287, 425–426.
23. Savary, *Guerre des Vendéens*, vol. 2, 431–432, 457.
24. Cited in Bell, *The First Total War*, 173.
25. Jean-Julien Michel Savary, *Guerre des Vendéens et des Chouans contre la République française ou Annales des départemens de l'Ouest pendant ces guerres*, 6 vols (Paris, 1824), vol. 2, 287–288, *Réimpression de l'ancien moniteur*, 32 vols (Paris, 1858–1870), vol. 17, 338–341.

26. Gavin Daly, 'War in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Age: the French experience 1792–1815' in *Violence and the State*, ed. Matt Killingsworth et al., (Manchester, 2016), 30–31.
27. Philip G. Dwyer, '"It Still Makes Me Shudder": Memories of Massacres and Atrocities during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars' in *War in History* vol. 16, (2009), 396.
28. Jean-Clément Martin, *Contre-Révolution, Révolution et Nation en France, 1789–1799* (Paris, 1998), 175–178.
29. Colin Jones, *The Longman Companion to the French Revolution* (New York, 1990), 114.
30. Stathis Kalyvas, 'The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War' in *The Journal of Ethics* vol. 8 (2004) argues that 'indiscriminate violence' in civil war is a function of strategy and means, this often compelling analysis does not appear to hold for a context like the Vendée.
31. Ernest Gaillard and François Vermale (eds), *Jean-Claude Carrier: Mémoires d'un Jeune Militaire Savoyard de 1793 à 1800* (Chambéry, 1930), 150.
32. Philip G. Dwyer, *Napoleon, The Path to Power 1769–1799* (London, 2007), 293–296,
33. Boycott-Brown, 'Guerrilla Warfare', 51–59,
34. Archives Nationales (AN) AF III 182 – Directoire Exécutif, Comité Militaire, Division Police Militaire: Adresses et mémoires IV-VIII, Instructions sur la loi du 17 Germinal sur les jugements militaires, 18 Prairial Year IV (6 June 1796).
35. Ernest Gridel, Capitaine Richard (eds), *Cahiers de Vieux Soldats de la Révolution et de l'Empire* (Paris, 1903), 27, 34.
36. 'Lecoq, journal d'un grenadier de la Garde' in *La Revue de Paris* (1911), vol. 18, no. 5, 845–846.
37. Nizier du Puitspelu (ed.), *Mémoires des soldats: Les trente années de service du capitaine Legrot* (Nyons, 1891), 10.
38. Léon-Gabriel Pélissier (ed.), *Un soldat d'Italie et d'Égypte (souvenirs d'Antoine Bonnefons, 7 novembre 1792 – 21 février 1801)* in *Carnet de la Sabretache* (1903) series 2, vol. 1, 30.
39. Frédéric Masson (ed.), *Souvenirs de Maurice Duviquet (de Clamecy) Vendée-armée de réserve, la Westphalie sous Jérôme Napoléon 1773–1814* (Paris, 1905), 138.
40. Gaillard and Vermale, *Jean-Claude Carrier*, 98–104, 149–152.
41. Jean-François Boulart, *Mémoires militaires du Général Baron Boulart sur les guerres de la République et de l'Empire* (Paris, 1892), 48–49.
42. Ibid. 50.
43. Ibid. 42.
44. Zeinab Abdul-Magd, *Imagined Empires: A History of Revolt in Egypt* (Berkeley, 2013), 55–57

45. A.D.D. L 430: Ordres du Jour de la campagne d'Egypte envoyés à Marc Aurel imprimeur, ans VI-VII, Ordre du Jour, 4 Fructidor Year VI (21 August 1798) and 7 Vendémiaire Year VII (28 September 1798).
46. Proclamation of General Bonaparte to the inhabitants of Egypt 15 Messidor Year VI (3 July 1798) cited in Joseph-Marie Moiret, *Mémoires sur l'expédition de l'Egypte* (Paris, 1984), 29–31.
47. Lorédan Larchey (ed.), *Journal du cannonier Bricard 1792–1802*, 2 vols (Paris, 1891), vol. 2, 325.
48. Chanony (ed.), 'Journal des campagnes du commandant Rougelin de 1791 à 1814'in *L'Impartial*, 30 May 1852, 7, M. Pépin de Bonnerive (ed.), 'Un soldat de l'Empire, le général Joseph Pépin (1765–1811) in *Carnet de la Sabretache* (1932) series 4, vol. 5, 84.
49. Moiret, *Mémoires*, 32.
50. Abul-Magd, *Imagined Empires*, 56–62.
51. Stanislas Millet (ed.), *Le Chasseur Pierre Millet, Souvenirs de la Campagne d'Égypte 1798–1801 avec introduction, notes et appendices* (Paris, 1903), 109.
52. Moiret, *Mémoires*, 60.
53. Commandant Merrau (ed.), *Journal d'un dragon d'Egypte (14e dragons)* (Paris, 1899), 55.
54. Ibid. 76.
55. Millet, *Le Chasseur*, 81–82.
56. Pélissier, *Un soldat*, 229.
57. Paul and Louis Calendini (eds), 'Journal Historique des faits de l'armée d'Orient rapportés par un militaire de cette armée' in *Revue d'Anjou* (Jan–Feb 1902), vol. 44, 84–85.
58. Gaston Wiet (ed.), 'Journal du lieutenant Laval; mémoire inédit sur l'expédition d'Égypte' in *La Revue du Caire* (April 1941), no. 29, 86.
59. Ibid. 90.
60. Gaston Wiet (ed.), 'Journal de Grandjean; mémoire inédit sur l'expédition d'Égypte' in *La Revue du Caire*, (January 1941), no. 26, 499.
61. Moiret, *Mémoires*, 150.
62. Millet, *Le Chasseur*, 190–191.
63. Jacques Jourquin (ed.), *Journal du capitaine François, dit le dromadaire d'Égypte* (Paris, 2003), 374–375, something similar happened with the storming of the fort of El-Arisch on the way to invade Syria.
64. Jourquin, *Journal du capitaine*, 375.
65. Michael G. Vann, 'Fear and Loathing in French Hanoi: Colonial White Images and Imaginings of "Native" Violence' in *The French Colonial Mind* 2 vols (Lincoln, 2011) vol.2: *Violence, Military Encounters and Colonialism*, ed. Martin Thomas, 52–54.
66. Broers, *Napoleon's Other War*, 130–136.

67. Dwyer, '"It Still Makes me Shudder"', 393.
68. Ruth Godfrey, 'Paul Thiébault and the Counter Insurgency Manual', paper given at the 44th conference of the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era 1750–1850, High Point, North Carolina, 19–21 February 2015.
69. Boycott-Brown, 'Guerrilla Warfare', 63–65.
70. Broers, *Napoleon's Other War*, 49–51, 86–88.
71. Fernand Calmettes (ed.), *Mémoires du Général Baron Thiébault*, 5 vols (Paris, 1893–95), vol. 2, 453–456, 461–465.

Dr Fergus Robson is Associate Director of the Centre for War Studies and currently lectures on Napoleonic Europe in Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland. He is a specialist on resistance and rebellion during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Empire. His recent work on French soldiers' cultural encounters with Italians and Egyptians complements his interest in the contested creation of national identities and states.

Lords of the Forests in Flanders: Small War by Freebooters and the Dutch Contributions System in Flanders, 1584–1592

Tim Piceu

They 'plunder, rob, capture, ransom and murder not only the poor peasant returned home in order to start working and cultivating again, but also the merchants travelling around the country for their business'. A 1586 royal decree thus described the violence committed by freebooters (*vributers/ vrybuiters/vrijbueters*).[1] Venturing from one of the Dutch frontier towns in the region, freebooters ravaged the Flemish and Brabantine countryside, while marauders operating from a garrison town under Spanish control raided Guelders, Overijssel, the Groninger Ommelanden, and Frisia. This kind of violence, termed 'small war' *(kleiner Krieg/guerre guerroyante* or *petite guerre)* by contemporaries and scholars,[2] was a not uncommon feature of both the Dutch revolt and Early Modern warfare in Europe, as shown by many scholars of the social history of war. Indeed, patrols inevitably skirmished with one another and residents of the war zone fell victim to pilfering mutineers, raiding freebooters, and exactions by

T. Piceu (✉)
University of Leuven (campus Kulak Kortrijk), Kortrijk, Belgium
e-mail: tim.piceu@kuleuven.be

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the very soldiers who were supposed to protect them.[3] The paintings of the contemporary Antwerp painter Sebastiaan Vrancx, who pioneered genre painting of everyday life during times of war, skilfully yet stereotypically illustrated the vicissitudes of life in the front zone in the Low Countries.[4]

This chapter is dedicated to the small war waged by the freebooters, who had a short but violent existence in the second half of the 1580s. Focusing on the county of Flanders, which had a war experience similar to that of other front zones,[5] this chapter aims to shed light on the identity of the freebooters, moving past sixteenth-century narratives, and to describe their raids in enemy territory and the economic impact thereof. Despite the fact that countermeasures fell short and the freebooter bands reigned supreme over large swathes of the Flemish countryside, freebooters had nonetheless virtually disappeared from the sources by 1592. I will argue that the disappearance of the freebooters occurred in tandem with the breakthrough of what Marjolein't Hart, in a recent synthesis of early modern warfare in the Netherlands, called 'commercialized warfare' in the countryside. As villages started to pay contributions to the Dutch, the freebooters no longer played the leading role in small war on the Flemish countryside.

As Simon Pepper has observed, 'the phenomenon of small war remains relatively under-researched' up to this day.[6] A major reason might be the fragmented and dispersed nature of the sources. Five types of source, scattered throughout archives and libraries in Belgium and the Netherlands, inform us about freebooters and their raids. Local chronicles recount the most daring freebooter raids, and correspondence and records of decision making by local authorities narrate the actions undertaken to control the freebooter threat. In addition, strict legislation meant that contemporary accounts recorded the money spent on fighting freebooters. The crown witnesses, however, are the criminal examinations of captured freebooters: written records of the interrogation by a bailiff (whether under torture or not), containing a detailed description of the freebooter bands and their raids. These sources, among others, allow us to (partially) reconstruct 110 smaller actions and raids in the county of Flanders for the period May 1584, the *conquista* of the major towns in Flanders by the Spanish, and December 1592, when freebooters disappeared from the sources in large parts of the county.[7] Given that many village records for those years did not survive or were not kept, the real number of raids must have been higher.

Cruel, Criminal, and Cowardly: Who Were the Freebooters?

The word *vribuiter,* derived from the verb *vribuiten* meaning 'to raid', first appeared in the Dutch language in 1572 to describe a pirate. As early as 1574, freebooter was used to describe onshore robbery and by the end of the century freebooters had firmly secured their place in the Dutch language. In 1599, Cornelis Kiliaan, author of the first modern dictionary of Dutch, defined *vrij-bueter* as a 'robber who becomes proprietor of the things taken from the enemy; and pirate'.[8] Perhaps, the novelty of the noun explains why contemporary sources often looked to describe the freebooters. Victims frequently labelled their aggressors according to their base of operations: freebooters thus became *those from Ostend* or from another Dutch frontier town.[9]

Another way victims classified their assailants was by means of juxtaposition. Law texts and regulations put freebooters alongside *geuzen* or Beggars, brigands, vagabonds, *rennets, raskals, straetschenders* or highway robbers, extorters, murderers, thieves of the woods, and 'other similar evildoers and delinquents', in short all 'enemies of the land [of Flanders]'.[10] The link with the *geuzen* or Beggars is especially interesting. In the late 1560s and early 1570s, the Beggars were the remnants of the Calvinist bands that had unsuccessfully risen in revolt in 1566. Operating from the woods or high seas, the Wood Beggars and infamous Sea Beggars challenged royal authority. Before their suppression in September 1568, the Wood Beggars had a short-lived period of plunder and anticlerical violence, including the castration of priests, in the Flemish *Westkwartier*. Yet, while freebooters plundered too, and at times targeted churches and captured priests, no sources point towards the religious motives for their raids that were incontrovertibly present in the case of the Wood Beggars.[11] In the western parts of Flanders, many could recount the brutality of the Wood Beggars. Linking them with freebooters was a powerful message indeed.

Criminalization was the dominant feature of the freebooter narrative in the war-struck provinces of the Low Countries, north and south alike. This discourse was completed with the appetite for cruelty ascribed to freebooters, also vividly captured by the paintings of Vrancx and his followers. Some colourful nicknames earned by the freebooters, like *Casimirus,* referring to count palatine John Casimir of Simmern (+1592), leader of a band of rapacious *Reiters* in the 1570s, or *Duc Dalve,* echoing

the notoriously severe duke of Alva, contributed to this reputation. The *Vlaamsche Kronijk,* for instance, noted that it 'was surprising that they [the freebooters] had not yet been swallowed by the earth for the abundant murders they commit every day and in several ways like cutting prisoner's throats, hanging prisoners or throwing them from the dikes [into the water] and keeping them under water with their sticks until death arrives'.[12] Here, as in other texts, the frequency of the acts committed (daily) was an aggravating circumstance. Certain brutal murders accompanied with transgressive violence, cutting of noses and ears revenging the mutilation of dead freebooter corpses by bounty hunters, were met with opprobrium by chroniclers on both sides.[13]

The final element in the narrative was cowardliness. Neither raiding nor targeting civilians was considered dishonourable by contemporaries, but the stealthy tactics of ambushing and avoiding open fights while on a raid for private benefit were. Commenting upon the battlefield behaviour of a Dutch ritmaster, 'a renowned dare-devil and freebooter', chronicler Everard Van Reyd once again saw a confirmation 'of the rule that freebooters, drilled for the advantage and surprise actions, rarely dare to look their enemies in the eye'.[14] 'Assuredly, that true warrior who prevails not by stealth but by strength of arms is far removed from this uncouth class [of robbers]', Hugo Grotius noted, adding that 'those individuals who steal … [and take] possession of enemy property by making clandestine raids,… incur universal detestation, since by audacious but unwarlike devices they turn public loss into private gain, a course of conduct clearly incompatible not only with justice but also with fortitude'.[15]

This threefold discourse was powerful, but was it also accurate? Studying the detailed interrogation records of 73 freebooters captured in the Kortrijk district, Els Guillemyn stated that all freebooters were soldiers in Dutch service and often carried a passport, issued by their commander, allowing them to raid in enemy territory.[16] Contemporary jurisconsults writing on the laws of war, such as Baltasar de Ayala, Alberico Gentili, or Hugo Grotius all agreed that soldiers despoiling enemy subjects firmly acted within the outlines of the *ius in bello*, the set of rules regulating the conduct of belligerents, and thus could not be considered as criminals. Reprisals against civilians for personal and public loss and attacks on the enemy's economic resources were licit war practices, the scholars concluded. These soldiers, having the consent of an officer and acting according to the laws of war, were soon labelled by Dutch civil servants as 'decent freebooters' (*behoorlicke vrybuiters*).[17] However, sources for the district of

Bruges show that a minority of the captured freebooters were civilians who had joined a freebooter band out of greed or necessity. Dutch sources also indicate that some freebooters were not enlisted in the states' army. This corresponds with Kroener's findings on marauders during the Thirty Years' War who could be traced back to the train of an army.[18] These 'illicit freebooters' (*schendelicke vrybuiters*), acting without legitimate authority to raid, could be considered as land-based pirates. 'To despoilers of this kind', Hugo Grotius noted in his *De iure praedae commentarius* (1604), 'we refer (and not unjustly) as "freebooters". ... Such attacks on property are severely censured by writers on the subjects as acts of "robbery"'.[19]

The bulk of the freebooters were thus in Dutch service and had, according to contemporary laws of war, a licence to plunder. Only a minority of the freebooters were civilian and operated outside the boundaries of the laws of war. Complicating things further is that while Dutch observers and jurisprudents tended to limit the use of the term freebooter to marauding civilians 'operating under no banner', the victims tended to call all of their assailants freebooters. The line between regular soldiers and freebooters was, therefore, blurred at best. Wondering whether to call their assailants 'decent' or 'illicit freebooters' was probably the last thing on the minds of victims of a shocking and violent encounter with freebooters.

Frontier Cities and Freebooter Raids

Protected by a river barrier and by the imperial necessities of Spanish policy directing the Army of Flanders to support the Armada and the French *Ligue*, the coastal provinces of Holland and Zeeland experienced no war after 1576. The main theatre of war after 1585 was located far away from the rebels' economic powerhouses. The formerly thriving provinces of Flanders and Brabant, on the other hand, experienced protracted warfare for more than three decades. Dutch-held frontier towns in Flanders and Brabant such as Ostend, Sluis, Axel, Biervliet, Terneuzen, Hulst, Bergen-op-Zoom, Geertruidenberg, Heusden, and Breda, never conquered or only briefly occupied by Spanish arms, made the Flemish and Brabantine countryside vulnerable to small war. All the Flemish places and Bergen-op-Zoom were located on the coast. These rebel exclaves could thus never be fully closed in, besieged and starved into surrender by the Army of Flanders, which lacked the naval capacity to control the sea



Fig. 1 Fortresses and frontier towns in Flanders (1584–1592)

and river deltas in the Low Countries. What made these towns even more impregnable were inundations. Terrified by Alexander Farnese's swift progress in the years 1584 and 1585, the rebels had breached the dikes and flooded the surrounding polders turning Ostend, Sluis, Axel, Biervliet, and later Hulst, into islands.[20] Some of these towns, such as Sluis (1587), Hulst (1596), and Ostend (1604) did change sides, but only after extraordinarily long or bloody sieges. In other words, while most of Flanders and Brabant was firmly under royal control, the Dutch-held exclaves presented the rebels with a stronghold on enemy soil and were the bases of operations for the freebooters (Fig. 1).

Freebooter raids generally started in a tavern in one of the above-mentioned frontier-towns or in a town on the isle of Walcheren (Zeeland). There, a group of around a dozen men – no women are known to have been freebooters – discussed a tip received by a local informant who knew of booty. Although freebooter bands acted under the guidance of an experienced marauder, the *conducteur*, and some friends raided together, there seemed to be no regular composition of the crew. Everybody who had the courage could join in. If the value of the booty outweighed the risks, the group would decide to leave for enemy territory. They packed their weapons

and victuals for some days, dressed themselves like peasants, and slipped past enemy posts to a hiding-place in enemy territory. The sources mention freebooters carrying a vaulting-pole to move across the many Flemish creeks, ditches, and tidal inlets. Travelling happened mostly at night and the band avoided major roads. Once in their hide-out in enemy territory, the group awaited the opportune moment to strike.[21]

For the rural districts of Bruges, Ghent, Kortrijk, Ypres, and Oudenaarde, 110 freebooter raids can be (partially) reconstructed. Five major types of raid emerge from the sources.[22] Although the bands left their base of operations with a clear goal in mind, the operations deep in enemy territory show a high degree of flexibility. It was not rare for a raid on a poorly protected village to be supplemented by taking prisoners, stealing cattle, or snatching travellers along the way. On their way to Ostend to join the ranks of the freebooters, for instance, Bartholomeus Tant and two of his friends started by taking four prisoners. The theft of cattle was mentioned 17 times in the sources. If the beasts could not be brought back to the base of operations, the freebooters let the cows go into hiding in the stables of a *fence*, a friend of the freebooters who would sell the animals after some time.

Taking captives for ransom, reported 51 times in the sources, was the most common action undertaken by freebooters. Frequently, well-to-do local lords or officials were targeted, as were persons representing an institution or authority such as clerics, tax farmers, or city envoys. Yet common folk such as peasants or day labourers also ended up being captured. Freebooters 'practiced all sorts of pain to extort money' and to make the victims agree to sky-high ransom demands. We know the story of a priest from the Kortrijk region who approved of a staggering ransom of 500 Flemish pounds because freebooters threatened 'to screw his penis between the hammer and barrel of a gun'.[23] Liberating a counsellor of the Council of Flanders, the highest court of justice in the province, would cost the astounding amount of 1,200 Flemish pounds and for one of its aldermen, a clerk, and two of their travelling companions, the city of Bruges paid 1,833 Flemish pounds, more than 10 per cent of the total city income for the year 1591. It is impossible to detect a rationale behind the ransom demands, yet the prisoners were certain of two things. Ransoms were never ever low – the *cuartel,* an agreement between the warring parties in the Low Countries on the ransoms of captured soldiers, would not

apply to civilians – and the higher the captives stood on the social ladder, the more their friends and relatives would have to pay. The payment was better made quickly too, because on top of the ransom freebooters charged a *per diem* fee for board and 'lodging' while in captivity.

Villages and convoys protecting merchants and travellers proved to be challenging, yet rewarding targets. Plundering villages (18 entries) and ambushing convoys (mentioned 15 times) required cooperation between several freebooter bands. At times, gathering a force of approximately 250 freebooters, pillaging villages teetered somewhere between freebooter raids and small-scale military operations. Sacking villages was accompanied with brutal violence and setting ablaze the local church, (communal) buildings, and defensive field works. Attacking convoys on one of the major roads or rivers required even more guts, since the freebooters had to account for the armed escort. The severely depleted countryside with its unmaintained hedges and large heathlands offered plenty of possibilities for ambush. Not surprisingly, the freebooters often chose a place halfway between two cities (Bruges – Ghent, Bruges – Kortrijk, Bruges – Diksmuide). There, the large band split in two and hid along the road. As the convoy passed, the first group attacked the head of the convoy; the other group cut off the escape route. With the element of surprise, the freebooters soon gained the upper hand, even over escorts numbering 200 men, and could plunder the carriages. These attacks had a disruptive effect: in the summer of 1587 Bruges had to suspend all convoys and in 1591 the convoys could only set out if all available troops escorted the carriages and travellers.[24]

Although local chronicles depicted freebooters as vicious murderers, the conscious and purposeful killing of a person during a raid was rare in the freebooter repertoire (only mentioned eight times). In a way, this is logical, since no ransom could be extorted from a corpse. However, freebooters did murder – some like Cornelis de Cruwenaere or Jan Don gained a reputation for homicide – and the motive was invariably greed – as was the case in the drowning of a merchant who would not agree to the ransom demanded for his freedom – or to enact revenge against police forces. Indeed, no quarter was given to the freebooter's direct adversaries, whose deaths were accompanied by transgressive violence. Jan van Ootegem, who led a modest force to fight the freebooters in the *Oudburg*, the countryside surrounding Ghent, was burned alive in a

hollow tree. A Brabant bailiff suffered the same fate after his adversaries cut off his nose and ears. The ruthless violence underlined the strength of the freebooters and avenged the cut off noses and ears of slain freebooters, but was strongly disavowed by chroniclers in the northern and southern Netherlands alike.[25]

All these actions had two things in common. Firstly, freebooters relied heavily on the element of surprise, as all guerrilla tactics do. Speed was key, because freebooters never knew if and when opposing forces would show up. In December 1584, for instance, freebooters operating from Ostend killed 22 horses 'out of fear of being caught by our garrisons'.[26] Secondly, freebooting was only possible if a band had sufficient local intelligence and support. Therefore, it is hardly surprising to see that more than 75 per cent of the captured freebooters came from the southern Low Countries, often from the very region where they were captured. Although early modern armies were multinational and Ostend, for instance, housed a large English garrison,[27] only Flemish freebooters knew the terrain and could rely on trustworthy local contacts. Tips revealing passing booty often came from local friends, unwieldy booty like cattle was hidden in a Flemish stable or taken care of by a local *fence*, loyal middlemen transported ransoms, food and drink was provided, and the houses of local allies were hideouts for wounded or pursued freebooters. Perhaps the most striking example of the strength of the freebooters' local networks of friends and kin was the case of Lyne Vlamincx. On Christmas Eve 1585, she had baked waffles for the band of Clais Hoefnaghele and had hidden a wounded freebooter. For this, Vlamincx was flogged and banished from the county of Flanders. For all the local help freebooters could count on, they were not the kind of social bandits described by Eric Hobsbawm. The frequent and bitter complaints by village authorities, their stubborn yet mostly failing attempts to stop the raids, and touching pleas by individual victims show how hard freebooter violence hit the people in Flanders and put strains on loyalties towards both friends and the village community. As the years passed by, identities hardened and loyalties to old friends faded. By 1600, when the Dutch army invaded the county of Flanders and encouraged the villages to rise in revolt against their Spanish overlords, the Dutch demand fell on deaf ears. A decade and a half of freebooter violence and exactions had turned the Dutch, and the freebooters associated with them, into bitter enemies.[28]

'As if under Siege': Consequences and Countermeasures

It is tempting to assume that freebooters grew wealthy. At least one released prisoner testified to how one of the most notorious freebooters, 'on arriving in Veere [in Zeeland], immediately changed clothes and dressed up in silk and gold brocade', while other freebooters tried to persuade Flemish countrymen to help them by showing a well-stuffed purse. However, research on the profits of piracy shows us that the booty only resulted in capital accumulation for a very small number of captains.[29] Most freebooters probably used their takings for living expenses, paying off debt or, to quote a Dutch civil servant, 'to indulge for a little time in a bad and godforsaken life of drunkenness and whoring'. For all the risks taken, the common freebooter did not end up as a wealthy man. Neither did their victims: for them, the violent encounters with freebooters resulted in an accumulation of debt, as shown by requests to local governments for financial help.[30]

On a different level, the money and goods turned into booty and the sums spent on fighting the freebooters could not be invested in the economy. Investment by local (urban) capital was badly needed because the economy of Flanders was in terrible shape after Farnese's campaigns of 1583 and 1584. The sieges of Bruges and Ghent had made a large part of the Flemish population flee to the walled towns or, further away, to Holland and Zeeland. Most of these people were never to return to their homes. The countryside was virtually deserted, according to accounts of eyewitnesses and tax registers. For example, in 1588, four years after Farnese's campaign in Flanders, the tax registers of the district of Bruges show a collapse of 99.5 per cent in tax income as compared to the fiscal year of 1576. The reclaimed lands close to Ostend and Sluis that had escaped flooding were completely uninhabited. Small wonder then that the Dutch chronicler Emanuel Van Meteren assessed the situation in Bruges and its neighbourhood 'as if under siege'.[31] An analysis of the tax registers further informs us that the economic impact of the war declined as one travelled away from the frontier zone. In the area close to frontier towns it also took longer for the local economy to reach its nadir. Only in 1593 can we detect a modest improvement of the economic situation in the Bruges area close to such freebooter bases as Ostend and Sluis. The appearance of large packs of wolves, descriptions of rampant

hedges, plummeting rents for agricultural land, and sky-rocketing prices for agrarian products and manpower all indicate massive population loss in Flanders in the late 1580s and subsequent decade. Geoffrey Parker estimated the population loss for the Bruges district at two thirds. Neither royal decrees permitting anybody to cultivate fallow land, nor local initiatives to provide peasants with cheap credit lured many people (back) to Flanders.[32]

Military campaigns alone cannot be held accountable for the terrible shape of the Flemish rural economy. Before 1600, the county only saw large-scale fighting in 1587 (siege of Sluis) and 1596 (siege of Hulst) and major troop movements in 1588 (Armada campaign). The fear of freebooter violence inhibited people from returning to their homes and lands. As one Flemish farmer put it: many wanted to return home, but 'the excursions and plundering of the enemy deprive us of the means to do so'.[33] The main damage freebooters caused was thus indirect, keeping large swathes of territory subjected to violence and insecurity. For the countrymen of Flanders, there was indeed much at stake in dealing with the freebooter threat.

Four countermeasures were devised to tackle the freebooter problem. To start with, local governments quickly issued royal laws forbidding acts of freebooting and thievery in general. These so-called 'placards' encouraged a rigorous prosecution of the freebooters: no quarter was to be given to them by the local bailiffs and freebooters were outlawed. Anybody could slay a freebooter and, more than that, would receive a lavish prize if he could show the corpse or the cut-off nose and ears of the deceased freebooter. Small wonder then that outraged freebooters murdered direct adversaries such as bailiffs in cruel ways, as we have seen. Secondly, Flemish authorities espoused a military approach to the freebooting threat. Districts erected fortresses, sconces, and field works to secure strategic points such as river crossings and dikes, aiming at keeping the freebooters cooped up in their frontier town. These fortifications were manned by troops raised by the districts to hunt down and fight the enemy bands (see Fig. 1). Additionally, all healthy men between 16 and 60 had to enlist in the village militia. One villager had to watch the area from the church tower and on his signal the others – who had to be armed at all times – could hunt down freebooter bands. Thirdly, since travelling alone was tempting fate, regular convoys were instituted between the major towns and cities of Flanders, thus securing commerce and food supplies. However, these three measures were merely cosmetic: they only fought the symptoms of the given strategic situation. The last, and best, option was to persuade the military leaders to campaign in Flanders. Recapturing the frontier towns would provide a lasting solution to the freebooter problem (Fig. 2).[34]

Fig. 2 Dutch held frontier towns (1584–1592)

As the reissuing of the royal decrees against freebooters in 1585, 1586 (twice), and 1589 show, the countermeasures largely failed. The harsh criminal laws were mostly ignored. Captured freebooters were released because they carried a passport or escaped the scaffold because they were exchanged for prisoners under ransom. Even high-ranking military officials indulged in exchanging captives and in Bruges a regular messenger-service was set up to conduct and follow up negotiations on ransoms and exchange. Local governments in Flanders knew that reprisals were likely if they executed freebooters on a large scale. Following a wave of freebooter executions in 1586, the bands in Ostend and Sluis retaliated by hanging a higher number of prisoners. Later on, only freebooters renowned for murder and rape ended up at the gallows. The fact that towns and districts were cash-strapped and could not afford to pay the bounties for captured freebooters further hampered compliance with the laws.

The military solutions too fell short of expectations. Since many villages simply lacked manpower, and not everybody wanted to risk their lives in a fight with experienced freebooters, the militia was a failure in large parts of Flanders. Moreover, inspection reports listed drunks at guard duty and insufficiently armed peasants often arriving at the battle scene too late. The sconces and fortresses never managed to lock the freebooters out of mainland Flanders. Therefore, these field works were badly situated. The string of fortresses constructed in 1584 to contain freebooters in Ostend lay too far from the coastal town and the distance between the individual strongholds was several kilometres, a gap wide enough to allow a small band of men to slip through. The very troops manning these fortresses pilfered the countryside too, 'doing this at night, saying that they are from Ostend or Flushing'. The irregular and insufficient payment of this force was to blame, yet sacking these men was not an option since they might 'run off immediately to Ostend to enlist with the enemy', as happened frequently with Early Modern mercenaries quick to change allegiance to those who could pay for it. The multinational Early Modern armies eagerly welcomed all seasoned soldiers regardless they had served under the enemy before.[35] The convoys, finally, did secure travel and trade across Flanders, but always remained vulnerable to a well-executed ambush.

Hence, the oppressed local authorities actively lobbied to have the Army of Flanders deployed against the frontier towns. Their diplomatic efforts resulted in the reconquest of Sluis (1587) and later also of Hulst (1596) and Ostend (1604). However, since enough frontier towns

remained under Dutch control, the Flemish countryside did not benefit from these costly sieges. To conclude, the countermeasures largely proved to be a failure. What made things even worse – or at least no better – was the fact that the rural districts of Flanders did not cooperate in their resistance. The Veurne district for instance, was shielded by the river Yzer from large-scale freebooter incursion, and left her neighbouring districts to cope with the problem. Instead of a coordinated effort, every district handled the persistent raiding on its own, which resulted in a fragmented defence. In 1590, one band of freebooters openly boasted in a Flemish inn that they were 'the lords of the forests of Flanders'. At that time, nobody could say they were wrong.[36]

The End of Freebooting

Ironically, at the very moment this confident band of freebooters proclaimed themselves lords of the Flemish woods, freebooting was on the verge of disappearing. By the end of 1590, freebooters had vanished from the Bruges district only to reappear briefly in 1597. By 1592, freebooters seemed to have disappeared in the whole of Flanders north of the rivers Lys and Scheldt and west of the river Yzer. The answer to this puzzle lies in the quick breakthrough of the Dutch contributions system in 1590/1. It was requested by the oppressed country dwellers of the Bruges district, who hoped payments to their enemies would deliver them from plundering. The freebooters no longer had to prey on the enemy countryside; the countryside willingly delivered its wealth. Indeed, villages which paid a given amount of cash each month received a *sauvegarde*, a letter forbidding Dutch soldiers from plundering the village. A *sauvegarde* granted the villagers the safety they craved, but only for one month. 'If you fail to meet our demands', one of the clerks managing the contribution in Flanders wrote, 'your houses, livestock, housewives and children are at our mercy.'[37] This punitive measure served to remind the villagers who was in charge and was meant to ensure that they paid promptly. Therefore, John A. Lynn has justifiably labelled the contributions a 'tax of violence'.[38]

Only villages whose inhabitants feared the violence they might be subjected to paid contributions. According to existing tax practices, contributions were paid by a whole village. Still, well-to-do individuals could buy extra protection for their country houses and rural belongings with a *particuliere sauvegarde,* an individual *sauvegarde* granted to the

possessions of one (noble) family. Villages close to frontier towns were eager to buy safety and quickly yielded, but those shielded by major rivers and riverside sconces that had never borne the massive impact of freebooter violence chose to oppose. The years 1590 to 1592 show us a shift in operations, both in location and goals. Sources no longer reported actions of small or medium-sized freebooter bands, but massive *sorties* of several hundred men, at times 1,500 or more, aimed at destroying fortresses blocking river crossings in order to open up the more protected territories for the levying of contributions. In spite of all these efforts, the more isolated villages never became regular payers of contributions. The Dutch garrisons in Ostend and Hulst could never keep up the military pressure long enough to bring the more remote districts firmly into contributing territory. As soon as the more distant villages felt they would not be punished for not paying contributions, they stopped the payments.[39]

With the advent of the contributions, the Dutch also developed, albeit slowly, a strategic view of the enemy countryside. Every year, the States-General of the Republic would discuss the policy towards the enemy countryside, consenting to a certain amount of contributions, and thus also to increasing prosperity of the rural economy in enemy territory. The link with the *licenten,* regulating trade with the enemy, is apparent. Some observers had already in the 1580s advocated taking advantage of the strategic possibilities of the frontier towns. Large garrisons placed there could scourge the Flemish countryside and thereby thwart Spanish offensives elsewhere or whole parts of countryside could be turned into scorched earth, denying resources to the enemy. Although the freebooting Dutch soldiers had at times attacked economic targets in Flanders, such as mills, sluices, or convoys, they never truly pursued economic warfare. The city of Bruges, for instance, relying heavily on convoys for its supply and trade, could have easily been locked off by a coordinated effort. Small war was an integral part of early modern warfare, but, unable to assert the necessary control over their frontier garrisons, Dutch commanders could not make it a part of their operational strategy. In other words, freebooting happened to the countryside. It was one of the integral elements of early modern war; but the Dutch did not deliberately opt to wage guerrilla war.[40]

Underlying these dramatic changes were the institutional and army reforms of the nascent Dutch republic in this period. The states reduced the number of men in their service, thereby creating a smaller, but more regularly paid and

thus more disciplined, force, under civilian control.[41] A cornerstone of these reforms was the *Articulbrief* (August 1590), a revised list of articles of war regulating army discipline. Wandering further than cannon range outside one's garrison was strictly forbidden and raiding the countryside (*op vrybuit gaan*) was only allowed with the consent of the highest ranking officer in the garrison.[42] A civil administration was set up in major frontier towns, for Flanders these were Ostend and Hulst, to run the contributions. Clerks, often Flemish exiles with ample administrative and fiscal experience, assessed the financial strengths of the villages, kept the books and ordered execution by 'decent freebooters'. At its peak, in the first months of 1599, the Ostend clerks would collect 13,000 Flemish pounds a month.[43] The contributions system was no novelty of Early Modern warfare. Already in the 1570s both rebels and Spanish forces had organized a contributions system.[44] In fact, demanding tribute is perhaps as old as war itself. The novelty of the Dutch contributions system of the 1590s in Flanders and elsewhere was that it was state-run, drew on existing tax practices in Flanders, and effectively ended freebooting. This state-run contributions system was thus an example *par excellence* of what Marjolein't Hart recently called commercialized warfare, the ability of the young Dutch republic to be 'the first *territorial* state to make money out of organized violence, with continuing profits in the longer term'.[45]

What happened to the freebooters? Well, the 'decent freebooters', those who had enlisted in the Dutch army and had lawfully raided the countryside they had lived in and cultivated prior to the war, were engaged in the contributions system. They only raided the countryside to punish villages unwilling (or unable) to meet their financial demands or to extend the contributing territory. The 'illicit freebooters' still pilfered wherever, whenever, and whatever they liked, thereby frustrating the villagers under *sauvegarde* and the civil servants running the contributions system. At times, 'illicit freebooters' were executed by the Dutch. Yet, the illicit freebooter actions are only scarcely mentioned in Flemish sources. We know for certain that at least some of the clerks' complaints were confected to mask their fraud.[46]

In the 1590s, the Dutch Revolt changed character: the civil war turned into a conflict between two powerful states: Spain and the young Dutch Republic. Freebooters were the victims of this evolution. The Dutch managed to control this fluid aspect of early modern warfare and turned freebooter violence into a way of exploiting the enemy countryside. The birth of a new state and its pragmatic, yet coherent, economic policies towards its enemy had ended the 'age of the freebooters'.[47]

Notes

1. Octave Mussely, *Inventaire des Archives de la Ville de Courtrai publié sous les Auspices de l'Administration communale. Tome second* (Kortrijk, 1854), 130–131. In what follows, Flanders will refer to the county of Flanders, not to the whole of the (Spanish) Low Countries.
2. Benjamin Deruelle, 'The sixteenth-century antecedents of special operations 'small war', *Small Wars & Insurgencies,* 25 (2014), 754–766, especially 755–757.
3. On small war in Early Modern Europe, see Frank Tallet, *War and Society in Early Modern Europe, 1495–1715* (London, 1995), 148–51; Jonathan R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450–1620* (Bath, 1985), 179–209; Ronald G. Asch, '"Wo der soldat hinkömbt, da ist alles sein": Military Violence and Atrocities in the Thirty Years War Re-Examined', *German History,* 18 (2000): 291–309; Simon Pepper, 'Aspects of operational art: communications, cannon and small war', in *European Warfare, 1350–1750,* ed. Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim (Cambridge, 2010), 181–202; Christian Desplat ed., *Les villageois face à la guerre (XIVe–XVIIIe siècle)* (Toulouse, 2002). Still useful is Fritz Redlich, *De Praeda Militari. Looting and Booty, 1500–1815* (Wiesbaden, 1956); for small war during the Dutch Revolt see Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659. Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' War* (Cambridge, 1972), 12–18; Olaf van Nimwegen, *'Deser landen crijchsvolck'. Het Staatse leger en de militaire revoluties, 1588–1688* (Amsterdam, 2006), esp. 127–130; Leo Adriaenssen, *Staatsvormend Geweld. Overleven aan de Frontlinies in de meierij van Den Bosch, 1572–1629* (Tilburg, 2007); Tim Piceu, *Over vrybuters en quaetdoenders. Terreur op het Vlaamse platteland (eind 16de eeuw)* (Leuven, 2008); José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, 'Corsarios de la Tierra. La Guerra Irregular en el Norte de Francia a Fines del Siglo XVI' *Homenaje a Antonio Domínguez Ortiz,* ed. Juan Luis Castellano Castellano and Miguel Luis López-Guadalupe Muñoz (Granada, 2008), volume 2: 699–722; Marjolein't Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence. Warfare and Commerce in the Netherlands, 1570–1680* (Routledge, 2014), esp. 101–125.
4. Joost vander Auwera, 'Historische Wahrheit und künstlerische Dichtung: das Gesicht des Achtzigjährigen Krieges in der südniederländischen Malerei, insbesondere bei Sebastiaen Vrancx, 1573–1647, und Pieter Snayers, 1592–1667', in *1648: Krieg und Frieden in Europa. Textband II: Kunst und Kultur,* ed. Klaus Bussmann and Heinz Schilling (Münster, 1998), 461–468. On the representation of war in Flemish and Dutch art, see also Bernardo García García (ed.), *La imagen de la guerra en el arte de los antiguos Países Bajos* (Madrid, 2006).

5. Compare with Leo Adriaenssen, *Staatsvormend Geweld. Overleven aan de Frontlinies in de meierij van Den Bosch, 1572–1629* (Tilburg, 2007) for Brabant and with Ronald De Graaf, *Oorlog, mijn arme schapen. Een andere kijk op de Tachtigjarige Oorlog, 1565–1648* (Franeker, 2004) and Olaf van Nimwegen, *'Deser landen crijchsvolck'* for the wartime experience in the eastern provinces of the Dutch republic.
6. Pepper, 'Operational art', 196.
7. Data based on Piceu, *Over vrybuters*; Els Guillemyn, *De vrijbuiters. XVIde-eeuwse guerrillastrijders als voorposten in de Tachtigjarige Oorlog* (Aartrijke, 1990), 2 vols; Rik Castelain, 'De kasselrij Oudenaarde slachtoffer van het militair optreden van Gentenaren en gereformeerde Hollanders (1582–1609)', *Jaarboek van de Geschied- en Oudheidkundige Kring De Gaverstreke,* 11 (1984), 97–124 and Achiel De Vos, *De strijd tegen de vrijbuiters binnen de kasselrij van de Oudburg (1584–1609)* (Ghent, 1957).
8. Marlies Philippa e.a., *Etymologisch Woordenboek van het Nederlands* (Amsterdam, 2003–2009), <www.etymologie.nl>. 'vrij-bueter' in Cornelis Kiliaan, *Etymologicvm Tevtonicae Lingvae sive Dictionarivm Tevtonico-Latinvm…* (Antwerp, 1599), *Digital Library of Dutch Literature* <http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/kili001etym01_01/kili001etym01_01_0030.php#36188>.
9. Antoon Viaene, "Oostendenaers en Slusenaers. Benamingen uit de Vrijbuiterstijd", *Biekorf. West-Vlaams Archief voor Geschiedenis, Oudheidkunde en Folklore,* 60 (1959), 401–406.
10. Quoted in *Tweeden Placaect-bovck inhovdende diversche ordonnancien, edicten ende plaete[n] vande coninclicke Ma[jestei]ten ende haere deurluchtige Hooc-Heden, Graven van Vlaendren, Mitsgadres van heurliederen Provincialen Raede aldaer, ghepubliceert inden voorghenomeden Lande van Vlaendren t'zedert den Iaere Vyfthien-hondert t'zestich, tot ende metten Iaere zesthien-hondert neghenen-twintich* (Ghent, 1629), 157.
11. Marcel Backhouse, 'Guerilla war and banditry in the 16th century. The wood beggars in the Westkwartier of Flanders, 1567–1568', *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte,* 74 (1983), 127–256.
12. Quoted in 'Vlaamsche Kronijk', in *Chroniques de Brabant et de Flandre,* ed. Charles Piot (Brussels, 1879), 685, see also 688–9, 729.
13. Examples of these murders in Piceu, *Over vrybuters,* 79–80 and Guillemyn, *De vrijbuiters,* 71. Condemnation of these practices in, among others, Emanuel Van Meteren, *Historie der Nederlandscher ende Haere Naburen Oorlog…* (The Hague, 1623), f319r and 'Vlaamsche Kronijk', 654. For the opinion of jurisconsults and the bounty, see *infra*.
14. Quoted in Arie T. Van Deursen, *Maurits van Nassau. De winnaar die faalde* (Amsterdam, 2000), 90–1.

15. Hugo Grotius, *De jure praedae commentarius: commentary on the law of prize and booty. A translation of the original manuscript of 1604 by Gwladys L. Williams* (Oxford, 1950), 318–337, there 326.
16. Guillemyn, *De vrijbuiters,* 17–19, 79–93.
17. On the laws of war and booty in early modern Europe, see Redlich, *De Praeda Militari,* 1–18; Geoffrey Parker, 'Early Modern Europe', in *The laws of war. Constraints on warfare in the western world,* eds. Micheal Howard, George J. Andreopoulos en Mark R. Shulman (New Haven, 1994), 41–54. Sixteenth-century and early seventeenth-century treatises: Baltasar Ayala, *Three Books on the Law of War and on the Duties Connected with War and on Military Discipline. Volume Two. The translation by John Pawley Bate* (Washington, 1912), esp. 239–246; Alberico Gentili, *De Iure Belli Libri Tres. Volume Two. The translation of the edition of 1612* (New York, 1933), 22–26 and *book II;* Grotius, *De jure praedae.* For the notion of 'decent' and 'illicit' freebooters: Piceu, *Over vrybuters,* 66–68.
18. Bernhard R. Kroener, 'Kriegsgurgeln, Freireuter und Merodebrüder. Der Soldat des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Täter und Opfer', in *Der Krieg des kleinen Mannes. Eine Militärgeschichte von unten,* ed. Wolfram Wette (Munich, 1991), 51–67, there 62–65. See also Hale, *War and Society,* 79–80.
19. Quoted in Grotius, *De jure praedae,* 326–327. For the link with piracy, see Ruiz Ibáñez, 'Corsarios de la Tierra' and Deruelle, 'The sixteenth-century antecedents', 755–757.
20. On inundations as act of war during the Dutch Revolt, see't Hart, *Dutch Wars of Independence,* 105–108.
21. Vaulting-poles are mentioned in, among others, a *Requête pour les Quatre Membres du Pays et Comté de Flandre*, February 1592. Brussels, Algemeen Rijksarchief, *Audience. Lettres Missives*, 1789/3 and Joannes Petrus Van Male, *Geschiedenis van Vlaenderen, van het jaer 1566, tot de vrede van Munster,* ed. Ferdinand Vande Putte (Bruges, 1843), 291.
22. Freebooter raids and actions are described great detail in Piceu, *Over vrybuters,* 68–83.
23. The story of the priest in Guillemyn, *De vrijbuiters,* 71. The sum of 500 Flemish pounds corresponds with 24,000 workdays of one unskilled labourer (wages of 1594). Compare with Charles Verlinden and Etienne Scholliers, *Dokumenten voor de Geschiedenis van Prijzen en Lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant. Deel II (XIVe-XIXe eeuw). A. Vlaanderen* (Bruges, 1965), 135.
24. The tactics used to attack convoys are almost identical to those describes in Christoffel von Grimmelshausen's great novel on the Thirty Years' War *The adventurous Simplicissimus,* book III Chapter 7. The 'Vlaamsche

Kronijk', 648, 651, 666, 685, 687–688, 741, and 782–783 describes attacks on convoys.

25. Piceu, *Over vrybuters,* 79–80 and Guillemyn, *De vrijbuiters,* 71.
26. 'Vlaamsche Kronijk', 648.
27. On the English garrison in Ostend and its relations with the Dutch: Edward Vlietinck, 'La ville d' Ostende, fut-elle remise en gage à la Reine d' Angleterre par les Provinces Unies?', *Annales de la Société d'Emulation de Bruges* 48 (1898): 269–83 and Piceu, *Over Vrybuters.*
28. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (London, 1969). The case of Lyne Vlamincx is described in Guillemyn, *De vrijbuiters,* 76–77.
29. Description of the clothes of Cornelis de Cruwenaere, one of the most notorious freebooters active in Flanders, in Bruges, Rijksarchief, *Verzameling Stad Brugge,* 661, f100r/v. Roland Baetens, 'An essay on Dunkirk merchants and capital growth during the Spanish Period', in *From Dunkirk to Danzig. Shipping and Trade in the North Sea and the Baltic, 1350–1850. Essays in honor of J. A. Faber on the occasion of his retirement as professor of Economic and Social History at the University of Amsterdam*, eds. W. G. Heeres e.a. (Hilversum, 1988).
30. Quote taken from the letter of Charles Everwijn, one of the clerks administering the contributions in Flanders, to the *Gecommitteerde* States of Zeeland, 19 July 1593. Middelburg, Zeeuws Archief, *Staten van Zeeland,* 1207. Individual pleas for (financial) help appear regularly in the requests to the local councils. See for instance: Bruges, Stadsarchief, *Rekwesten* and *Brieven en Akten*.
31. Van Meteren, *Historie,* f227r.
32. On the economic toll of war in Flanders and the Low Countries: Herman Van der Wee, 'Typologie des crises et changements de structures au Pay-Bas (XVe-XVIe siècles', *Annales. Economies – Sociétés – Civilisations* 18 (1963): 209–225; Niklaas Maddens, 'Het uitzicht van het Brugse Vrije op het einde van de XVIe eeuw', *Handelingen van het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis* 103 (1966): 31–73; Geoffrey Parker, 'War and Economic Change: the economic costs of the Dutch Revolt', in *Spain and the Netherlands, 1559–1659. Ten Studies,* ed. Geoffrey Parker (Short Hills, 1979), 177–203; Etienne Scholliers, 'De eerste schade van de scheiding. De sociaal-economische conjunctuur, 1558–1609', in *1585. Op gescheiden wegen . . .*, eds. Jan Craybeckx en Frank Daelemans (Leuven, 1988), 75–83; Myron P. Gutmann, *War and Rural Life in the Early Modern Low Countries* (Assen, 1980) and her 'Why they stayed: the problem of wartime population loss', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis,* 91 (1978), 407–428.
33. Quote from a letter of L. de Paeshout to the Bruges city council, 26 July 1589. Bruges, Stadsarchief, *Brieven en Akten,* 1589.

34. Piceu, *Over vrybuters,* 83–96 analyses the countermeasures taken to suppress freebooters and how and why these measures failed.
35. Quote taken from a letter of the baron of Croisilles, bailiff of the Bruges area, to archduke Albert, 1597. Brussels, Algemeen Rijksarchief, *Audience. Lettres Missives*, 1862/3. Perhaps the most striking example of changing allegiances during the Dutch revolt was the selling of the town of Geertruidenberg by its garrison to the Spanish army. The former garrison joined ranks with the Spanish *ejército.*
36. Also on other fronts the defensive measures failed, see Ruiz Ibáñez, 'Corsarios de la Tierra', 711–713. Quote taken from the letter of Michiel Everwijn to the States General. The Hague, Nationaal Archief, *Staten Generaal,* 4883.
37. Quote taken from the instructions for Charles Everwijn, administrator of the contributions of the eastern part of Flanders. The Hague, Nationaal Archief, *Raad van State*, 1880, f14r-f16r.
38. On contributions during the Dutch Revolt, see Adriaan M.J. De Kraker, 'Een Staatse strategie in een "uitgestorven" land: organisatie en ten uitvoerlegging van de brandschat in Vlaanderen, 1585 tot 1604', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden,* 121 (2006) 3–34; Piceu, *Over vrybuters,* 97–183; N.J. Tops, 'De Heffing der Spaanse Contributiën tot 1635 in het Oosten der Republiek of de "landbederfelijke" rol van Grol, Oldenzaal en Lingen', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen Gelre* 78 (1978): 34–64; Van der Ent, Oostersche Contributiën; Olaf van Nimwegen, *'Deser landen crijchsvolck'. Het Staatse leger en de militaire revoluties 1588–1688* (Amsterdam, 2006), esp. 127–30; Erik Swart, *Krijgsvolk. Militaire Professionalisering en het ontstaan van het Staatse leger, 1568–1590* (Amsterdamse Gouden Eeuw Reeks 1, Amsterdam, 2006), esp. 147–55; Griet Vermeesch, *Oorlog, steden en staatsvorming. De grenssteden Gorinchem en Doesburg tijdens de geboorte-eeuw van de Republiek (1572–1680)* (Amsterdam, 2006), esp. 139–47; Leo Adriaenssen, *Staatsvormend Geweld. Overleven aan de Frontlinies in de meierij van Den Bosch, 1572–1629* (Tilburg, 2007); José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, 'La guerre, les princes et les paysans: les pratiques de neutralisation et de sauvegarde dans les Pays-Bas et le Nord du royaume de France vers la fin du xvie siècle', in *Les ressources des faibles. Neutralités, sauvegardes, accomodements en temps de guerre (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle),* eds. Jean-François Chanet en Christian Windler (Rennes, 2009), 187–204; Compare with John A. Lynn, 'How war fed war. The tax of violence and contributions during the Grand Siècle', *Journal of Modern History* 65 (1993): 286–310 and Bernard Peschot, 'Les "lettres de feu": la petite guerre et les contributions paysannes au XVIIe siècle', in *Les villageois face à la guerre,* ed. Christian Desplat (Toulouse, 2002), 129–142.

39. On the dynamics of the contributions system, see Piceu, *Over vrybuters,* 150–161.
40. 't Hart, *Dutch Wars of Independence,* 108–113 (scorched earth campaigns) and 134–135 (trade with the enemy). Philip of Marnix, a close collaborator of William of Orange, urged the States to exploit the strategic options offered them by the frontier towns: 'Avis de la guerre, 1586', in *Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire du XVIe siècle* (Brussels, 1883), 292–294, 297; Johannes H. Kernkamp, *De handel op de vijand, 1572–1609* (Utrecht, 1931–1934) is still useful.
41. Van Nimwegen, *'Deser landen crijchsvolck',* 33–102 and't Hart, *Dutch Wars of Independence,* 37–57 discuss the army reforms and the organization of the Dutch army.
42. On the *Articulbrief*: Jan Willem Wijn, *Het Krijgswezen in den tijd van prins Maurtis* (Utrecht, 1934), 572–574. See Redlich, *De Praeda Militari*, 7–18 for contemporary articles of war.
43. Piceu, *Over vrybuters,* 141–183.
44. Parker, *The Army of Flanders,* 17–18.
45. 't Hart, *Dutch Wars of Independence,* 113–118, 191–197.
46. On the suppression of illicit freebooting, fraud by the civil servants administering the contributions, and their strategies to deceive their superiors, see Piceu, *Over vrybuters,* 175–183.
47. Antoon Viaene, 'Oostendenaers en Slusenaers' uses the image of the 'age of freebooters'.

Tim Piceu is a researcher and teaching assistant at the University of Leuven, Belgium. His research has focused on the Dutch contributions system, small war, and the historiography of the Southern Netherlands between 1500 and 1830. His publications include *Over vrybuters en quaetdoenders: terreur op het Vlaamse platteland* (2008) and '"Une oppression insupportable au people": The Impact of Contributions on Armistice, Peace and Truce Negotiations' in *The Twelve Years Truce, 1609* (2014)

‘A Great Company of Country Clowns’: Guerrilla Warfare in the East Anglian and Western Rebellions (1549)

Alexander Hodgkins

In the summer of 1549, Tudor England was convulsed by a widespread series of regional uprisings commonly known as the ‘Commotion Time’. These disturbances were at their worst in East Anglia, where insurgents under the nominal leadership of Robert Kett took control of Norwich and usurped the local administration, and in the Western counties of Devon and Cornwall, which were gripped by the so-called ‘Prayer Book Rebellion’ against Edward VI’s religious reforms. Government control of both areas was only restored following a pair of month-long campaigns by loyalist forces, coupled with the imposition of martial law, in which as many as 10,000 people were killed in the fighting and subsequent reprisals.[1] Despite the scale and cost of these incidents, the risings’ military aspects have been consistently downplayed by chroniclers and subsequent historians, with their participants being characterized as ‘ragged, rough, untrained [and] ill-armed’, or, as Alexander Neville branded the Norfolk insurgents, ‘a great company of country clowns’.[2]

Such comments are not only at odds with the rebellions’ initial success, resilience, and relative longevity, they have also informed

A. Hodgkins (✉)
Independent Scholar, England, UK
e-mail: alexhodgkins86@gmail.com

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interpretations that these events are irrelevant in the context of 'the grim business of siege and counter siege', which are said to have characterized warfare in this period.[3] However, while protracted sieges, including Henry VIII's capture of Boulogne (1544), and large-scale field engagements, such as Protector Somerset's victory at Pinkie (1547), were the most spectacular manifestations of Renaissance conflict, they were far from its only expression. As in the modern day, soldiers were most likely to experience combat not in a climactic battle, but rather during lesser actions, such as patrols, ambushes, and raids, which formed an ever-present backdrop to the era's more memorable encounters.[4] For the Tudors, such low-level conflicts were commonly associated with unstable frontier zones, namely the Scottish Borders and the Pales of Ireland and Calais, where the sporadic skirmishing characteristic of guerrilla warfare occasionally escalated into minor battles, as at Ancrum Moor (1545).[5]

This framework of small wars gives the 1549 revolts a broader significance, and can contest the prevailing view of 'a pathetic, futile and gallant rebellion' which posed little challenge to the armies of Edward VI.[6] Instead, the following chapter will suggest that insurgents in East Anglia and the West successfully integrated locally available military resources with unconventional assets to oppose and, in some cases, defeat loyalist soldiers. While rebels engaged in what might be termed conventional warfare, typified by battles and sieges, alongside fighting smaller actions, they employed guerrilla-type methods of ambush, surprise attack, and deception in these larger-scale encounters against theoretically superior enemies. This was most notably the case during the capture and subsequent defence of Norwich. Before investigating these specific instances, however, the chapter will first discuss the strategic aspects of both insurgencies as a precursor to considering the nature of the rebel forces.

Strategic Context

The risings of 1549, while occurring almost simultaneously, were unrelated and pursued radically different strategic aims, a phenomenon that arguably accounts for their different degrees of success. In the West, insurgents implemented an aggressive policy from the outset, amassing supporters and spreading the revolt between Devon and Cornwall in early June, and capturing potential centres of loyalist resistance at

Trematon Castle and St Michael's Mount, prior to advancing eastwards. By 2 July, Exeter, the last major impediment to a march on London, was under siege by Devonian rebels, who were joined by their Cornish counterparts towards the end of the month.[7] Despite a lack of organized resistance from the regional gentry, the city held out for over a month, allowing the government to amass a small army at Honiton, under the command of Lord John Russell, which, after driving off a rebel detachment at Fenny Bridges on 28 July, and being reinforced by foreign mercenary bands, began to advance on Exeter. The halting of the insurgents' advance thus compelled an ineffective change in strategy, as they attempted to maintain the siege, while unsuccessfully opposing loyalist relief forces at Woodbury, Clyst St Mary, and Clyst Heath between 3 and 5 August, a failing noted by the Spanish Ambassador's claim that Russell 'split up their force and defeated them'.[8] Two weeks after the relief of Exeter, however, surviving rebels demonstrated sufficiently high morale to regroup and make a last stand against a vastly superior force at Sampford Courtenay, an action which brought the military phase of the rising to a close and precipitated a spate of reprisals throughout Cornwall.[9]

In contrast to this high-risk approach, which actively sought to engage enemy forces, the East Anglian revolt proceeded more cautiously, expanding from a small-scale, anti-enclosure protest to establish an encampment atop Mount Surrey on Mousehold Heath, East of Norwich, in early July. From here, the insurgents exercised unopposed control over the surrounding region and liaised with similar camps at Downham Market, Kings Lynn, and Watton, while they petitioned the government for redress.[10] Matters came to a head with the arrival of the royal herald, whose exhortations for Norwich to resist threatened the rebels' supply lines, which necessitated and resulted in their capture of the city on 24 July. This act, in the government's eyes, exemplified the revolt's transition from a popular protest into a military threat.[11] An initial attempt to suppress the rising by the Marquis of Northampton at the end of July failed disastrously, with loyalist forces being driven from Norwich in disarray, securing the rebels a further three week's control of the region, until the arrival of a second, much larger, loyalist army led by the Earl of Warwick. While Warwick's troops eventually defeated the rebels at the Battle of Dussindale, on 27 August, the preceding days' recapture of Norwich (24–26 August) saw significant combat in tactical circumstances that favoured the insurgents, and negated loyalist strengths in cavalry and artillery.[12] While the East Anglian revolt remained essentially defensive in its overall strategy,

implementing a policy that has been described as a 'vast, sit down strike', its resistance to opposing forces in Norwich highlights the ways in which guerrilla warfare could yield results against conventional armies.[13]

Rebel Forces

The peculiar circumstances of guerrilla warfare in a pre-modern context significantly hinder attempts to accurately characterize the 1549 rebellions. One of the foremost problems with assessing the insurgencies' strength lies in the fluidity of popular resistance movements, whose membership fluctuates depending on their degree of success. While accounts emphasized the scale of the revolts in their early stages, they also attested to diminishing levels of participation as the rebellions were suppressed, with all but the most prominent or stubborn of insurgents disbanding to flee or surrender. In Devon, for instance, John Hooker related how the relief of Exeter saw the loyalist force joined by 'the commons who, upon submission, had obtained pardon', while the Spanish Ambassador noted the deterioration of the East Anglian rising's manpower following the recapture of Norwich.[14] Another source of uncertainty, common to modern and historic insurgencies alike, stems from the difficulty of identifying guerrilla fighters amidst an area's population, particularly when civilians provided assistance in the form of shelter, funding, and intelligence, as occurred in Norwich, but also in the context of rural Devon and Cornwall. This leads directly to a related issue, regarding the positioning of irregular fighters, who often dispersed their forces when operating away from their bases. Even in the West, where rebels fought more like a regular army, opposing loyalists in the field and besieging fortified areas, their forces were typically only concentrated for combat, and were otherwise distributed among a series of villages and camps surrounding Exeter.

The limitations of extant source material, which is largely confined to contemporary hearsay, subsequent records, and the critical narratives of chronicles, allows only approximate assessments of the rebels' numbers, which can be tentatively estimated at 10,000 in the West and 15,000 in East Anglia. Notwithstanding derogatory descriptions of insurgents as 'peasants', 'slaves', and 'dregs and filth', it is clear that the 1549 risings comprised a relatively comprehensive reflection of Tudor society.[15] MacCulloch and Whittle have, for instance, demonstrated that participants in the East Anglian revolt were drawn from three main categories of landless rural labourers, the urban poor of Norwich, and wealthier

farmers and smallholders from the yeomen class, all of whom contributed to the rising in different ways.[16] For the first two groups, this contribution constituted the provision of fighters, equipment, and intelligence, with elements of the urban population noted to have acted as a 'fifth column' inside Norwich, while yeomen such as Robert Kett exercised their traditional role as non-commissioned officers, forming the core of the movement's command structure.[17] The involvement of these individuals, as opposed to exclusively poorer members of the commons, confirms the continuation of a long-standing pattern, which can be traced from the late-medieval French *Jacquerie* (1358) and English Peasants' Revolt (1381) through to Early Modern insurgencies.[18]

In the West, initial commons' leadership, represented by the parishioners of Sampford Courtenay, incrementally gave way to minor members of the regional gentry, including Humphrey Arundell of Helland, John Winslade of Helston, and Robert Smythe of St Germans, alongside their Devonian counterparts John Bury and Sir Thomas Pomeroy.[19] This shift in authority mirrored the dynamic of earlier revolts, such as the 1536/7 Pilgrimage of Grace in Northern England, and foreshadowed the uprisings of the *Tard Avisés* in Limousin and Pèrigord at the close of the French Wars of Religion.[20] These disparate movements demonstrate a common trend, wherein command was transferred from the initial ringleaders to people of higher status, who were persuaded or compelled to act as figureheads.[21] While gentry participation was limited, being confined to Arundell's associates and a handful of their Devonian counterparts, it is notable that these figures had a degree of martial proficiency, serving as captains in Tudor armies and regional garrisons, and so may have proven attractive to the rebels.[22]

This widespread popularity gave insurgents access to some of the Tudor state's conventional military assets, particularly the shire militia, a trained reserve comprising all able-bodied men from 16 to 60, which was organized at a local level and thus vulnerable to subversion within rebellious regions.[23] In East Anglia, Neville's claims that traditional mustering methods were used to gather supporters, and that 'the people of Norfolk … by the ringing of bells and firing of beacons, came flocking thither', are corroborated by records of militia officers from areas like Tunstead and Sco Roston leading their forces to join the camp at Mousehold.[24] Similarly, churchwarden's accounts demonstrate that militiamen from Morebath in Devon were openly despatched to a nearby camp at St David's Down, northeast of Exeter, with supplies and the backing of their community.[25]

In the same manner, Arundell's role as commander of St Michael's Mount may have facilitated the rising's recruitment of locally based soldiers.[26] These situations, whether arising from individual defections or wholesale mutiny, would have furnished many rebels with militia training, which, while inferior to that possessed by the mercenary bands and magnate retinues typically comprising Tudor armies, would have incorporated weapon-handling practice and drill.[27] The results of this training can be seen in the West, where insurgents, officered by members of the local gentry, adopted conventional tactical formations to confront loyalists in battle, arraying 'a great number under banners displayed' at Fenny Bridges and other encounters.[28] In consequence, it is not only difficult but undesirable to impose binary distinctions between the bulk of rebel and loyalist forces, as, prior to the emergence of professional standing armies, both were likely to share sources of recruitment.

While the militia offered one source of trained personnel, rebels also drew upon the wider population for further assistance, with near-contemporary narratives reporting the mobilization of 'ragged boys and desperate vagabonds in great numbers'.[29] In East Anglia, accounts emphasized the support and supplies insurgents received from Norwich, both before and after the city's capture, with Cheke subsequently chastising 'the greate noumber [who] not onely obeyed the rebell for feare, but also folowed him for love'.[30] This support found open expression in some instances, such as when, upon the approach of Kett's forces, 'there came a great number of lewd people unto them, as well out of the city of Norwich, as out of the country, with weapon, armour and artillery', but it could also take more covert forms.[31] For example, Edward VI's assessment that the rebels, long before capturing Norwich, 'had the town confederate with them' can be substantiated through insurgents' regular entry into the city for provisions, alongside reported meetings between Kett and the city authorities, and the use of the castle gaol to imprison members of the gentry.[32] Elements of Norwich's population also provided more direct assistance to rebel forces by opposing efforts to recover the city, with Cheke alleging that Northampton's soldiers 'suffered more dammage oute of their houses by the townesmen, then they dyd abroode by the rebelles'.[33] Exeter's refusal to negotiate with the Western rebels, combined with its stronger defences and tighter control over its inhabitants, narrowly averted a similar crisis, although Hooker's eyewitness narrative described several outbreaks of disorder occasioned by the insurgents' 'many friends within the city' and by the attendant hardships of the siege.[34]

In the context of this widespread support amongst the commons, there are relatively few documented instances of individuals directly opposing the rebels without the protection offered by loyalist field forces or garrisons. Even local authority figures, such as county sheriffs, were unable or unwilling to disperse insurgents in the revolts' early stages, perhaps as a consequence of the size and resolution of rebel bands, or of the perceived sympathies of their own followers.[35] While accounts record a handful of exceptions, their results were decidedly mixed, with Sir Edmund Knyvet's successful night attack on an enemy patrol outside Norwich contrasting with the fate of William Helyons, who was killed in a foolhardy attempt to singlehandedly disperse the incipient rising at Sampford Courtenay.[36] Where successful resistance was employed in rebel communities, it was typically of a covert nature, as demonstrated by Alderman Augustine Steward's contact with loyalist relief forces and his subsequent opening of Norwich's gates to admit Warwick's army.[37] Such activities were unsurprisingly perilous, with the hanging of a Devonian miner from Chagford, 'because secretly he had conveyed letters between [Lord Russell] and his master, and was earnest in the reformed religion', eloquently illustrating the dangers to which would-be loyalists were exposed.[38] In this respect, the apparent scarcity of resistance to the insurgents may signal popular support, but could also denote acquiescence engendered by a fear of reprisals, a situation not unlike that explored in Brian Hughes' Chapter "'The Entire Population of this God-forsaken Island is Terrorised by a Small Band of Gun-Men': Guerrillas and Civilians during the Irish Revolution".

Equipment

Given that militiamen were known to have participated in the revolts, a degree of similarity can be assumed to exist between official muster rolls, which catalogued the weapons and armour supplied by local defence forces, and the equipment used in rebellions.[39] Analysis of such documents suggests that the population of both regions adhered to Henry VIII's reissued Winchester Provisions, on the traditional arming of the militia, and confirms Oman's claim that 'bills and bows were in every farm and cottage'.[40] Narrative sources provide further indications that rebels made use of these armaments, describing how, in the West, insurgents employed bills and bows during the siege of Exeter and the battle of Fenny Bridges, and directed 'a whole shower of arrows' at the defenders of St

Michael's Mount.[41] Many of the East Anglian insurgents reportedly had comparable weapons, including 'halberds, spears [and] swords', while Neville described 'a mighty force of arrows; as flakes of snow in a tempest' being unleashed against loyalists in Norwich.[42]

The evidence from these accounts is supplemented by the later Elizabethan author Sir John Smythe's selection of 'the rebels of the west parts' and 'the rebellion of Kett in Norfolk' as case studies in the effectiveness of English archery, and by legal records produced in the risings' aftermath.[43] The indictment of Robert Kett, for example, listed the rebels' possession of a range of military equipment including 'swords, shields, cannon, halberts, lances, bows, arrows, breast-plates, coates of mail, caps, helmets, and other arms offensive and defensive'.[44] On a smaller scale, Quarter Session reports described parties of insurgents 'arrayed as if for war' and noted the theft of weapons and armour from private houses and armouries, the latter being frequently contained in church halls and other civic buildings, and thus proving vulnerable to locally based insurgents.[45] A systematic process of procurement was especially apparent in Norfolk, where rebel 'commissioners' were appointed to oversee the collection of surrounding areas' resources, including 'ammunition, corn, cattle, money, and everything else' necessary for maintaining the insurgency.[46]

The insurgents' principal weapons of bows and bills were, although arguably outclassed by pike and shot in Early Modern field engagements, well suited to skirmishing and guerrilla war in areas such as the Northern Borders.[47] Bows were not only quiet, relatively portable, and reliable, but, more importantly, allowed archers to reclaim their own and enemies' arrows, making their weapons ideal for use in situations where ammunition was scarce.[48] Accounts of the fall of Norwich emphasized this practice, relating how rebels, facing loyalist archery, 'came among the thicket of the arrows and gathered them up', in some cases extracting arrowheads from casualties to furnish their own forces.[49] The Privy Council's draft correspondence to Lord Russell similarly cautioned that 'the more arrows ye use … the more ye furnish your enemy, who will return your own arrows again to you', and recommended employing firearms whose shot 'never returneth'.[50] In addition, bows were well regarded for their range, high rate of shooting, and accuracy in the hands of a trained archer, who, in the right conditions, could loose as many as five arrows per minute, or reliably hit targets within an effective range of 150m.[51] While archery had begun to decline in favour of firearms, given the increasing prevalence of

plate armour in Renaissance warfare, the bow retained its value when engaging softer targets, with Smythe praising the 'great effects of archers against harquebusiers', who typically fought unarmoured, and describing the wounding of unprotected horses at Dussindale.[52]

Bills, a halberd-like staff weapon that had proven its worth during James IV's defeat at Flodden in 1513, were amongst the most common armaments of England's militia.[53] While Elizabethan authors criticized the bill's continued role in battle, they conceded its strengths for individuals fighting at close quarters, noting its suitability 'to perform execution if the enemy break ...; to mingle with shot ... to pass with convoys, and to stand by your artillery; to creep along trenches and enter into mines, where the pike would be overlong'.[54] These examples emphasize the bill's utility in constricted areas, circumstances which, while less common in field warfare, were plentiful in the 1549 risings, ranging from urban combat in Norwich and Clyst St Mary, to skirmishing in the enclosed landscapes of rural Devon and east Norfolk. Rebel militiamen also managed to augment the firepower of their comrades by obtaining artillery, with insurgents in East Anglia requisitioning numerous guns from armouries at Paston Hall, Yarmouth, and King's Lynn, while their Western counterparts similarly possessed 'much cannon, taken from Plymouth and other forts of the King'.[55] Although the majority of this artillery comprised light pieces, which were insufficient to breach fortified walls like those of Norwich, Exeter, or Trematon Castle, such weapons met the rebels' needs for portable, effective armaments able to be easily transported and concealed in ambush.[56] Insurgents also made use of these weapons in field engagements, as accounts of Dussindale illustrate, while a letter sent by Lord Russell after his victory at Sampford Courtenay reported the recovery of 'xv pieces of ordnance' from the enemy camp.[57]

The equipment available to rebel militiamen, which was often regarded as sub-optimal in conventional warfare, points towards an increasingly evident asymmetry with the military technologies of more professional forces. Even in Tudor England, where ideas of a standing army remained at an embryonic stage, access to the most modern armaments of pike and shot was frequently restricted to garrisons, urban militias, and specialist formations, prompting insurgents to mobilize less-conventional assets.[58] At the siege of St Michael's Mount, for instance, the Western rebels advanced 'carrying up great trusses of hay before them' to absorb the defenders' archery.[59] Offensive weapons could be similarly makeshift, as demonstrated by Neville's description of the 'unarmed multitude ... part

with clubs and swords, others with spears [and] staves' who accompanied Kett's army.[60] While such improvised weapons reveal the limitations of the rebels' arsenal, they could be effective in the right circumstances, as proven by the death of Sir William Frances, killed by stones hurled from atop a sunken lane during the loyalist attack on Clyst St Mary.[61]

Furthermore, the 1549 rebels demonstrated the initiative often associated with modern-day guerrillas in using their available resources to secure superior equipment from enemy troops and stockpiles. In addition to raiding armouries and capturing garrisons throughout the West and East Anglia, accounts of both revolts describe repeated incidents in which rebels seized arms from loyalist soldiers, increasing the quality of their own equipment while diminishing their opponents'. Northampton's defeat, for example, gave the rebels eleven field guns, supplementing the 'six small pieces' previously acquired from Norwich, while insurgents, 'some of them naked and unarmed, some armed with staves, bills, and pitchforks', successfully attacked Warwick's artillery train on 24 August and redeployed the heavy guns to bombard the city that night.[62] A similar incident occurred at Clyst St Mary, where rebels overran the loyalists' baggage train, capturing 'munitions, armour, and treasure' while 'the pieces of Ordnance … with the shot and powder, they bestowed in places convenient, and employed the same against [Russell] and his company'.[63]

Guerrilla Tactics

The 1549 rebels not only used a mixture of regular and irregular personnel in their campaigns, they also employed guerrilla methods during their encounters with loyalist soldiers, as the aforementioned description of Clyst St Mary reveals. Even when fighting regular field engagements, as at Fenny Bridges, such approaches were blended with unconventional tactics and deployments. On this occasion, the Western rebels followed traditional military principles, positioned their forces 'in a great fair meadow' behind several river crossings, but also used the area's embanked lanes to conceal their Cornish reserves, facilitating a counterattack upon the victorious loyalists.[64] This intervention, combined with the actions of local partisans who set 'bells ringing in sundry parish churches', convinced Russell that 'all the country behind him was up and coming upon him', leading to the curtailment of his pursuit and the preservation of the rebel force.[65] The rebels' attempts to prevent the relief of Exeter similarly demonstrated their skill in combining different modes of warfare, with a night attack on

Russell's camp at Woodbury buying time for the garrison of Clyst St Mary to have 'fortified the town, and made great rampires for their defence' by the next day.[66] While the loyalists eventually prevailed, their first assault was thrown into near-fatal disarray by Sir Thomas Pomeroy, one of the rebel leaders, who 'perceiving the army to be past him ... commanded the trumpet to be sounded and the drum to be stricken up', convincing Russell that he had fallen into an ambush and prompting his retreat.[67] The evening after the town's capture, insurgents from the siege lines of Exeter approached and encircled Russell's encampment on Clyst Heath, emplacing artillery to commence firing 'as soon as daylight served', a skilfully executed manoeuvre which cost their enemies numerous casualties as they were compelled to advance and attack the rebel positions.[68]

Even when forced into untenable situations through wider strategic circumstances, insurgents retained their tactical acumen in the resulting actions. Despite being vastly outnumbered at Sampford Courtenay, for instance, the rebels entrenched half their force in a hilltop camp as a decoy, while the remainder prepared an ambush in the surrounding fields, whose 'sudden show' stalled the loyalist attack and led Russell to confess that 'we wished our power a great deal more not without good cause'.[69] The last stand of the East Anglian rebels at Dussindale was similarly hard-fought, with contemporaries noting how 'it could be hardly judged ... which side was like to prevail', and reporting that Warwick's victory involved 'greater loss on his side than he cared to confess'.[70] The costliness of this encounter was, in part, the result of the insurgents' astute use of terrain and field fortifications, which saw them 'devise trenches and stakes ... and set up great bulwarks of defence before and about', to supplement their artillery and archery, but also stemmed from their use of prisoners as human shields 'chained together in their forward'.[71] While such measures, taken to offset enemy tactical and technological superiority, were unable to prevent the loyalists' victory, they increased the casualties suffered as 'many gentlemen, and some of the chiefs of the city, were slain in this tumult'.[72] Although insurgents struggled to defeat loyalists in battle they were thus capable of significantly increasing both the time and losses necessary to suppress them, a feature earning the respect of their opponents, as demonstrated by Russell's admission that 'all this night we sat on horseback' for fear of a further counterattack at Sampford Courtenay.[73]

Notwithstanding the fierce resistance offered to loyalist field armies, the insurgents' true capabilities are demonstrated through their use of guerrilla tactics to avoid conventional encounters, for instance during the

taking of Norwich and the opposition of subsequent efforts to recapture the city. In the first instance, deception enabled the rebel victory, with diversionary assaults upon Norwich's western side drawing the defenders away from the eastern walls and creating opportunities for the insurgents to ford the river and overrun the artillery batteries sited to guard Bishopsgate.[74] When facing more determined opposition, the rebels exploited their advantage in numbers, alongside their familiarity with the urban terrain, to entrap and overwhelm their enemies, often through the co-ordinated use of ambush, surprise, and trickery. This was particularly apparent during Northampton's defeat, with insurgents permitting the Marquis's small force of 1,500 horsemen and 11 field pieces to enter and occupy Norwich before launching attacks on the overstretched government positions throughout the night.[75] Accounts attest to the comprehensive nature of the rebel assault, which tested the loyalist defences from all sides as 'some go about to set the gates on fire . . . others climb up upon the walls, some swim through the river [and] many convey themselves into the city by the lower places, and breaches of the old walls'.[76] While the loyalists retained control of Norwich, these hostilities prepared the ground for the following day's deception, wherein insurgents lured Northampton over to the city's western side with false promises of negotiations, before launching a renewed attack from the east. In the confused fighting that followed, rebels managed to draw out and defeat a contingent of loyalists at Tomblond, near the Bishop's Palace, resulting in the deaths of over 40 soldiers, including Lord Sheffield, the army's second-in-command, and the retreat of the demoralized government forces.[77]

The success of these tactics informed the East Anglian insurgents' approach during Warwick's retaking of Norwich on 24 August, corroborating Macdonald's argument, in Chapter 'Good King Robert's Testament?: Guerrilla Warfare in Later Medieval Scotland', that the choice of military methods owed more to effectiveness than ingrained cultural attitudes. Accordingly, rather than seeking to defend fixed positions once the loyalists had breached the city gates, the bulk of Kett's force once again withdrew to Mousehold Heath and prepared a counterattack.[78] Just as when facing Northampton, the rebels sought to ensnare their opponents in the network of streets towards Tomblond and made opportunistic attacks upon isolated parties of loyalists in the hopes of provoking a reaction from their main force garrisoning the market place.[79] The continued effectiveness of this approach can be seen in the ambush of Warwick's responding troops around St Andrew's Church, which may, but for the timely intervention of Captain Drury's professional arquebusiers, who

arrived from a different direction to disperse the attackers, have caused significant losses.[80] The insurgents' greater manoeuvrability within the city environs not only facilitated guerrilla tactics, but also forced their opponents to adopt a defensive posture in maintaining control of Norwich, leaving rebels free to capitalize upon tactical errors such as the misdirection of Warwick's artillery train towards rebel-controlled Bishopsgate.[81] This perilous situation was further exacerbated by the poor conditions of Norwich's eastern walls, which allowed bands of insurgents to infiltrate the city and harass government troops with arson and raids between 24 and 26 August, culminating in the destruction of Whitefriars Bridge and the burning of Conisford and neighbouring parishes.[82] While these policies caused devastation in Norwich, partly because of the relaxation of laws governing building materials, and partly owing to Warwick's refusal to disperse his force and extinguish the flames, they were nonetheless insufficient to secure victory for the rebels.[83]

The eventual loyalist victory in Norwich was only accomplished thanks to the sheer size of the government army, estimated to comprise at least 5,000 footmen, 3,000 horsemen, and 'four and twenty field pieces', which was further augmented by the arrival of 1,000 Landsknechts, German mercenaries armed with pike and shot, on 26 August.[84] Crucially, Warwick's force possessed a large infantry contingent, in the form of the shire militia, which, although no better armed than their rebel counterparts, could hold ground seized from the insurgents, restrict their freedom of manoeuvre, and garrison the city during the battle of Dussindale. These functions served to consolidate the loyalist position in the face of a rebel force numbering in the thousands and capable of effective counterattack, allowing elite formations, such as Captain Drury's arquebusiers and the Landsknechts, to operate as roving columns to pursue insurgents and degrade their supplies. This approach had a far greater effectiveness than the strategy employed by Northampton, which relied upon the use of small forces of cavalrymen and troops with firearms to sever supply lines, harass enemy encampments, and hunt down bands of insurgents, and, as a result, was more appropriate to dealing with small-scale revolts than regional uprisings.[85]

Conclusions

The West and East Anglian insurgents successfully created guerrilla armies through fusing traditional avenues of military recruitment, training, and resources, such as the militia system, with popular support,

while acquiring supplies from local stockpiles and enemy forces. In doing so, they displayed ingenuity and adaptability, qualities that were further demonstrated during their encounters with loyalist soldiers, clearly refuting their contemporary and subsequent representations as an ineffectual rabble. Although both movements shared common features, there were also distinct differences between their strategy and tactics, with the Western rebels tending to operate more akin to a conventional army, albeit with the support of guerrilla elements, which emphasized the capture and control of territory. This necessitated confronting government forces in field engagements, a contest to which the insurgents' skills were not best suited, as, despite their incisive use of terrain, high morale, and irregular tactics of ambush and deception, they were unable to defeat a regular army which included experienced mercenaries.[86] In this respect, the anonymous Spanish Chronicle offers the final word on their performance, remarking that 'the rebels were not soldiers, although they were very brave and well-armed'.[87]

In East Anglia, insurgents adopted guerrilla principles from the revolt's inception, gathering resources from a wide area and according little value to the occupation of ground beyond their fortified encampment on Mousehold Heath, an approach which allowed the rebels to make unanticipated, opportunistic attacks against their enemies' weak points. The rebels' only real failure was their inability to sustain a wider support network, a fundamental strategic error that resulted in the camp at Mousehold eventually becoming isolated. Nonetheless, by refusing to be drawn into a conventional battle for possession of Norwich, preferring instead to allow their enemies to occupy ground which would place them at a tactical disadvantage, the insurgents not only preserved their forces, but succeeded in defeating Northampton and prolonging their resistance to Warwick's army. The rising was only supressed once Warwick methodically closed down its supply lines and places of refuge, with the occupation of Norwich driving the insurgents into the open, where they were forced to fight a conventional field engagement at Dussindale. While both uprisings ultimately failed, their mobilization of a wide range of regular and irregular assets, alongside the stubborn nature of the campaigns fought to suppress them, shows the effectiveness with which guerrilla forces could resist sixteenth-century armies, and reveals the limitations of purely military solutions to unconventional conflicts.

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Dr Alexander Hodgkins is an early career researcher with interests in the military history of late-medieval and Early Modern England. He obtained his PhD from the University of Leeds Institute for Medieval Studies in 2014, and has since taught at Leeds Trinity and Manchester Metropolitan University. He is a regular speaker at academic conferences, assists with the International Medieval Congress, and has delivered guest lectures for the Royal Historical Society Seminar Series. Dr Hodgkins has previously contributed articles to the *Journal of Conflict Archaeology*, the *Transactions of the Devonshire Association*, and *Internet Archaeology*, and is a reviewer for *Reviews in History*.

Good King Robert's Testament?: Guerrilla Warfare in Later Medieval Scotland

Alastair J. Macdonald

Unconventional warfare has been seen as vastly important in Scottish history. It has often been thought that such an approach to war enabled the very survival of the medieval kingdom from foreign conquest. In 1296 the English king, Edward I, invaded and conquered Scotland with easy rapidity. Rebellion soon broke out, followed by decades of continuing conflict in which the Scots learned to apply a guerrilla strategy to defy the military might of their more powerful southern neighbour.[1] The so-called 'wars of independence' are usually taken to have lasted until 1357, in two main phases (1296–1328 and 1332–1357). But Anglo-Scottish warfare remained a regular feature for the rest of the Middle Ages and into the sixteenth century. There was another major English attempt at conquest in the 1540s which was again successfully resisted.

There are three prominent strands to the extant historiography relating to the evidently crucial topic of unconventional warfare. One of these is 'Good King Robert's Testament' of the chapter title. Following the initial attempts to deploy techniques of unconventional warfare by Sir William Wallace (executed 1305) it is believed that Robert I 'the Bruce', king of Scots between 1306 and 1329, perfected a template for a successful mode

A.J. Macdonald (✉)
University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland
e-mail: a.j.macdonald@abdn.ac.uk

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of war in which his relatively small and impoverished kingdom might defeat its more mighty English rival. At the heart of the king's military vision were classic techniques of unconventional war: avoidance of battle; scorched earth to deny resources to invading armies; small, fast-moving forces; use of surprise and trickery in combat; and destruction of fortifications to prevent them being used by the enemy. At his death in 1329 it is believed that Robert I passed on guidelines to his commanders and that their adoption saved Scotland from conquest in the renewed war against England in the 1330s and beyond. This image of the transmission of a fully developed military template is widely accepted in both academic and popular approaches.[2]

A second – related but not identical – concept with connections to the theme of unconventional warfare has also achieved wide currency. This is the idea that the Scots engaged in a type of combat, often labelled as 'guerrilla war', which was the antithesis of a more widespread practice of 'conventional' or 'chivalric' war as practised by their English opponents. The Scots are taken to have adopted normal military practice in 1296: an open and honourable approach which led to disastrous defeat. They learned their lesson and opted for unconventional techniques thereafter, a method of war eventually perfected by Robert I. It was a style of combat quite alien to their enemies, tied to aristocratic ethics and chivalric convention. In this conception there is a binary divide in the types of war practised in the later Middle Ages, one type 'conventional' and the other 'guerrilla'. As with the deathbed testament of the king this binary conception is widely accepted as true, most clearly seen in the title of Chapter 5 of Geoffrey Barrow's formative work *Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland*: 'Two Kinds of War'.[3] In this chapter the alleged transition from one type of war to the other (within the span of a year) is described.

Finally, a third concept has been used in the attempt to understand unconventional warfare in later medieval Scotland. It has overlapping aspects with the other two approaches but is again not identical. The first two models suggest the existence of divergent cultures of war between Scotland and England. This resonates with the third approach, 'transcultural' warfare, which proposes that clashes of alien ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groups might produce distinctive patterns of military interaction. Insofar as this typology has been applied to Anglo-Scottish warfare the Scots have been taken to represent, at least in part, a 'Celtic' culture and way of war similar to the other military opponents of the English crown,

the Welsh and the Irish.[4] In this model the Scots are seen as engaging in war unrestrained by chivalric convention in treatment of both combatants and non-combatants. This, quickly reciprocated by the English and inflamed by mutual ethnic hostilities, led to a greater level of brutality in Anglo-Scottish war than is evident in mainstream Western military culture.

It will be maintained here that there are difficulties of varying levels of severity with all three of these approaches. The remainder of this article is an examination of these problems and what they might tell us more broadly about applying a concept of unconventional – or guerrilla – war in the later Middle Ages. Guerrilla war is a modern conception, taken to have its prototype in early nineteenth-century Spanish resistance to French occupation.[5] How useful is it as a tool for understanding a much earlier period? In what follows key traits of unconventional war are discussed in three groupings as they best accord to the three approaches that have been made to the subject in a Scottish context. That is, alongside 'Good King Robert's Testament' the themes of battle avoidance, scorched earth, and destruction of fortifications will be covered. Themes of trickery, surprise, and cunning, and the use of small, mobile units will be considered with the concept of 'Two Kinds of War'. Finally, levels of violence and atrocity, and the combatants responsible for such actions, will be discussed alongside consideration of transcultural typologies. Discussion of all of these matters has previously been heavily focused on the period between 1296 and 1328, usually termed the first 'war of independence'. My coverage in engaging with this historiography must likewise focus on this timescale, but in military terms a divide in 1328 makes little sense given that a second war of independence broke out in 1332 and is taken to have lasted to 1357. Many further episodes of war continued beyond this date and examples from later periods will be used where informative.

Battle Avoidance: Good King Robert's Testament

The first bundle of themes to be considered is battle avoidance and the related Fabian techniques of scorched earth and the dismantling of fortifications (the latter referred to as 'slighting' of castles in the terminology of the time) alongside the idea of Robert I passing on a military template featuring these characteristics just prior to his death on 7 June 1329. There is a much-reproduced medieval poetic text which purports to represent the testament of the Scottish king, and it resonates powerfully

with widely accepted traits of unconventional war, including measures designed to deny the opposition the conditions for military success without risking battle:

> On foot should be all Scottish war
> Let hill and marsh their foes debar
> And woods as walls prove such an arm
> That enemies do them no harm.
> In hidden spots keep every store
> And burn the plainlands them before
> So, when they find the land lie waste
> Needs must they pass away in haste
> Harried by cunning raids at night
> And threatening sounds from every height.
> Then, as they leave, with great array
> Smite with the sword and chase away.
> This is the counsel and intent
> Of Good King Robert's Testament.[6]

Robert I clearly did pass on advice and instructions while mortally ill.[7] It is widely believed that this included sage guidance in war which was to mould the behaviour of future generations and ensure the continuing independence of Scotland throughout the later medieval period.

The key trait of battle avoidance must be examined first. Were the Scots, under the influence of Robert I's words of wisdom, especially good battle-avoiders? The answer must be: not especially, no.[8] Even considering only major encounters featuring full-scale armies on either side, there is quite frequent battle in Anglo-Scottish conflict, given the widespread orthodoxy (albeit one that has been contested) that such clashes were very rare in medieval warfare.[9] The Scots faced two comprehensive defeats against first-class English armies right at the start of the wars, at Dunbar in 1296 and Falkirk in 1298. This was before Robert I was in charge of strategy, although William Wallace, allegedly a foundational figure in the development of guerrilla methods, was the commander in 1298. But Robert himself led a Scottish army in a full-scale battle against a host led by the English King Edward II at Bannockburn in 1314. Particular circumstances explain this exceptional encounter, but Bruce was obviously not inflexible on the issue of seeking or rejecting battle. And the Scots certainly did not follow a battle-avoiding template after the death of Robert I, facing total defeat at the hands of a royal host led by

Edward III at Halidon Hill in 1333. Very avoidable major battlefield defeats were also suffered in invasions of England, at Neville's Cross in 1346 and Humbleton Hill in 1402.[10] Such disasters were not so frequent thereafter, but the cumulative message of catastrophic defeat in major encounters seems more cogent as an explanation – along with the diminishing intensity of Anglo-Scottish war over time – than any adherence to the strategic advice of King Robert. Lesser battlefield encounters were also frequent: my estimation is that in the 39 years in which there was open war between 1296 and 1346 there were 25 battles. This is not impressive testimony, in the lifetime of Robert I and the aftermath of his death, to the Scots being adept battle-avoiders.

Scorched earth, on the other hand, was indeed a well-practised technique of Scottish war. A textbook example under the supervision of Robert I was in response to the major invasion led by Edward II in 1322. The great English host was faced with a landscape stripped of provisions and was forced to withdraw afflicted by hunger.[11] Despite the self-inflicted destructiveness of scorched earth its military effectiveness was such that the technique was repeatedly deployed in the face of large-scale invasions, for instance the royally led incursions in 1356, 1385, and 1400.[12] Again, though, it is difficult to maintain that this tradition of response should be credited to Robert I. Removal of resources in the face of a more powerful enemy was an obvious and widespread strategy in the Middle Ages. In a Scottish context it long pre-dated Robert's reign. That William Wallace was able to enact highly effective scorched earth in the face of Edward I's invasion of 1298 is very telling, given that he lacked the authority of kingship or even magnate status.[13] That he was still able to persuade or coerce suggests an early, widespread acceptance of the need for this drastic measure in war against England.

It might seem more probable that Robert I gave clear and original guidance on the issue of slighting of castles – the destruction of strongpoints once taken back from English control to deny the enemy use of them in the future. This has been shown to be a striking feature of the king's military strategy.[14] The technique might be regarded as simple necessity in the early years of his struggle when after seizing the throne in 1306 most of the kingdom's strongpoints were occupied by English garrisons or Scottish opponents. So when Aberdeen castle was captured in 1308 it made sense to demolish the fortification: Robert did not have the men or resources to hold such places, and it was prudent to ensure that the

enemy could not do so either.[15] The amazing circumstance is that even as times became more prosperous for his cause King Robert adhered to a policy of destruction of strongholds, including the first-class royal castles of Edinburgh, Stirling, and Roxburgh. It is testament to the importance of the issue, and the innovative military thinking of the king, that as a usurper he still felt able to dismantle these key sinews of power and symbols of royal authority. But whether a firm policy of castle destruction was passed on to future generations remains questionable. When Berwick (town and castle) was recaptured from English control in 1318 the fortifications were strengthened, not demolished.[16] This place was to be a defiant bulwark of Scottish royal power right on the border line. Generations after Robert's death castles were still often destroyed when they fell into Scottish hands, for instance Lochmaben (1384), Jedburgh (1409), and Roxburgh (1460). But these were all border strongholds long occupied by troublesome English garrisons. A decade after the death of Robert I Edinburgh and Stirling castles, taken in 1341 and 1342 respectively, were re-established as key seats of Scottish royal power, regardless of the possibilities of renewed English occupation.[17]

Of course Robert I left instructions and passed on advice prior to his long-anticipated death. But it must be questioned whether this amounted to the detailed military template that has come down to us. The version we have gives the impression of being composed in hindsight, with the great battlefield defeats of 1332 and 1333 in mind. The king's decision to fortify Berwick in 1318 in particular muddies the waters on both castle-slighting and avoiding battle as items of rigid military dogma. In 1333 the Scots were defeated trying to defend Berwick at a time when the wishes and intentions of the king were still fresh in their recollections.[18] Regarding battle Robert I's policy was flexible. He fought a major encounter in the right circumstances in 1314, and numerous lesser ones, including a battlefield victory deep on English soil, at Byland in 1322. The troubles for Scotland after King Robert's death really started, meanwhile, when a small group of invading Anglo-Scottish nobles won a victory against huge odds at Dupplin Moor in 1332. But he would certainly have advocated battle against the seemingly feeble group of refugees who landed in Fife in that year.[19] The military legacy of the king was far from straightforward. Robert I was simply too impressive a military leader to be tied to an inflexible template of battle avoidance and related methods; and there is no good reason to suppose that he sought to bind future generations in a straight-jacket of convention.

'Guerrilla' Techniques: Two Kinds of War

The second group of themes to be explored consists of key aspects of the modern conception of guerrilla war: ambush; surprise; rapid movement; use of small forces; trickery. Scottish historians have been happy to identify these traits in the Middle Ages and to use the term 'guerrilla' to describe them.[20] As long as care is taken to avoid anachronism, descriptive application of the term to medieval warfare can be perfectly appropriate.[21] More problematic, though, is the conception that guerrilla war existed in medieval Scotland in opposition to something entirely antithetical, variously termed 'chivalric' or 'conventional' war. Acceptance of this binary contrast between opposing types of war is remarkably widespread, in academic historiography as well as works mainly aimed at a wider audience.[22] One can certainly see all of the traits mentioned above in abundance in Scottish war; but the key question is how distinctive such practices actually were in relation to wider military norms.

One feature of the war effort under Robert I was the rapid movement of small, flexible formations able to surprise and disorientate opposition, such as in his greatly successful campaigns in northern Scotland in 1307–8.[23] It is uncertain how many of Robert's forces were mounted at this stage, but light horse – precisely the sort of troops most expert at this form of combat – came to feature heavily among Scottish forces. There is an excellent eyewitness description, by the Low Countries chronicler Jean le Bel, of these forces at large in England in the Weardale campaign of 1327. He describes the Scots mounted on small, hardy, and manoeuvrable ponies, carrying emergency rations to obviate the need for a supply train. The depicted reaction of English forces to these invaders is one of bafflement and frustration as they fail to corner their elusive enemy, best represented by the tears of vexation shed by the youthful English commander, Edward III.[24] But despite this vignette it is impossible in a fuller view to accept a clear Anglo-Scottish divide between conventional war and an alien guerrilla variant. Light horse were hardly distinctive to the Scots, and were utilized in their thousands in the English military establishment. Indeed, one vital influence on Scottish mounted forces was the 'hobelar', a style of troop widespread in Gaelic Ireland and employed in great numbers by the English crown.[25]

Similar issues arise when we turn to the connected themes of trickery, ambush, and surprise. Clearly these techniques were much practised by the Scots. With a widely acknowledged weakness in the expensive business of siege warfare, for instance, a variety of cunning and ingenious methods

were the hallmark of Scottish castle-capture, such as at Linlithgow, Roxburgh, and Edinburgh, in 1313 and 1314.[26] But the question remains: were these methods part of a distinctive form of war, antithetical to conventional mores? The answer is surely a firm 'no'. The use of guile and trickery was unhesitatingly advocated in the ubiquitous military manual of the Middle Ages, the *Epitome Rei Militaris* of Vegetius.[27] Use of cunning to achieve martial success had never been a bar to the celebration of chivalric prowess.[28] Perhaps most telling of all, there was no notable English criticism of the ruses used by the Scots (as opposed to their more generalized faithlessness and deceit as a people). A source like the *Vita Edwardi Secundi* might be hostile to Robert I, but that is because he is a murderer and traitor, not for his methods of war, which are described (around 1310) in admiring fashion.[29] Similarly, the *Lanercost* chronicler sees nothing to be ashamed of in the surprise attack by Sir Archibald Douglas which led to the flight of Edward Balliol (the English-backed and anti-Bruce claimant to the Scottish throne) in 1332. Rather, it is suggested that the feat is of significant reputational value and might end up being credited to the more powerful earl of Moray instead.[30]

This all begs the question of why Scottish historiography has been so amenable to accepting a blunt divide between guerrilla and conventional/chivalric war. Adoption of such simple divides is not unique to Scotland, and has a long tradition in approaches to war. Often, however, the insistence on simple categorizations has been by those claiming to engage in 'conventional' war which is taken to be more humane and civilized than that waged by enemies who are thus able to be stigmatized as savage due to their brutal or uncouth martial practices.[31] There need not be much truth to the stark contrasts offered between different types of war, but a propagandistic purpose can be seen readily. The Scottish case suggests itself as an interesting variation on this pattern. For historians of Scotland moral superiority resides in the valiant struggle of a small nation against a more powerful foe. In that context the desperate (and unconventional) measures required to triumph are a badge of pride. The more different the style of war adopted by the Scots can be shown to be, the greater the force of the ultimate message: this is a small nation battling worthily and resourcefully against a much mightier enemy.[32]

Another key factor in the broad acceptance of a clear divide between modes of war is the influence of John Barbour's *Bruce* (1376), a source which dominates modern Scottish approaches to chivalry and the representation of war in the later Middle Ages.[33] Clearly a discourse on the

ethics of war is indeed played out in this work with the different key characters – Robert I, his brother Edward, Sir James Douglas, and Thomas Randolph, earl of Moray – personifying different martial values. Randolph in particular (before seeing the light) is represented as advocating open combat, and that the use of guile or trickery is dishonourable.[34] Barbour's view is made abundantly clear and is quite the opposite: it is necessary to use ruses and deception to defeat more conventionally powerful enemies and this does not detract at all from chivalric worthiness. Nonetheless, a debate is aired at the heart of Barbour's work. But even if one regards the poem as articulating real attitudes to the conduct of war in the author's time – a big assumption, given the obvious literariness of the text and the dramatic usefulness of differentiating the heroic Scottish figures by their approach to war – it clearly does not suggest a binary divide between chivalric and guerrilla warfare, but something much more layered and complex. If military figures existed who always sought open battle and eschewed any advantages that their wit might open up for them, they have left more traces on the pages of romance than the historical record, just as it is far easier to find condemnation of 'unchivalric' modes of warfare by modern commentators than medieval writers.

The real Scots who fought in the later Middle Ages regarded themselves as inhabiting a shared martial culture with their peers in western Christendom. To give just one example, when Duncan, earl of Fife sealed an indenture agreeing terms for his release from captivity in 1350 he undertook not to bear arms against the English king, Edward III, in the future. He swore on the holy evangels to keep his faith; but equally important as a guarantee was his honour as a chivalric knight.[35] There is evidence here of cultural affinity, expressed both by the Scots and their great rivals in war. Alongside this sense of martial belonging and communal understanding the Scots waged a style of war in which trickery and related techniques continued to be highly prized, as represented in abundance in the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century narrative sources.[36] There was no contradiction in this, no enemy which pursued a fundamentally different style of war. When in 1420 a band of Scots seized the English border castle of Wark many traits akin to the modern conception of guerrilla war could be seen. The castle was taken at night by a small group of 24 combatants in a surprise escalade. There was open war between Scotland and England at the time, but there is little sense, as so often in irregular war, that the actors in this exploit were guided through any central command structure. This, then, looks like it could be labelled

fairly as a 'guerrilla' action. But it was not met with a 'conventional' response. The English reaction was to engage the Scots in discussion about buying back the castle. Meanwhile, the walls were scaled secretly, the intruders were surprised and overpowered. They were decapitated and their bodies thrown over the castle ramparts.[37] A conception as blunt as 'two kinds of war' cannot begin to help us understand later medieval Anglo-Scottish conflict.

Atrocity and Brutality: Transcultural Approaches

The brutal executions at Wark connect to the last bundle of themes, those relating to atrocity and excessive violence.[38] It is one of the features of irregular warfare that it leads to greater than usual levels of brutality as conventional forces encounter foes who do not share agreed standards for military engagement.[39] One means for examining the resulting transgression of normal boundaries and the patterns of retributive behaviour is the concept of 'transcultural war' and related typologies.[40] An issue of obvious importance in these concepts is the social and ethnic make-up of combatants. The focus of transcultural approaches in the Anglo-Scottish case has been on the impact Gaelic forces may have had, but the social class from which Scottish soldiers were drawn will be argued to be more significant, and some attention is given to this issue. The subject of excessive violence is complicated in that there are many factors beyond ethnicity that might be expected to act in an exacerbating fashion. The Anglo-Scottish wars were lengthy, desperate, often existential struggles in which national hostilities were expressed and sharpened. They also featured a very large measure of civil war, a circumstance, we are told, always inclining towards a greater level of savagery.[41] To complicate engagement with these themes still further, all war was brutal in the later Middle Ages, routinely targeted as it was at non-combatants, and with soldiers themselves also often enjoying very limited and conditional protections. What, among our anecdotal evidence, will help us identify traits of particular violence in such a heavily violent landscape?[42] The task is further complicated by the narrative sources we must rely on. They are partial and prejudiced when reporting on war, of course, but frequently also highly formulaic in their listing of stock outrages committed by enemies against notionally protected groups: the very old, the very young, women, and clergy.

The few attempts to locate Anglo-Scottish war within a structure valuing transcultural typologies have focused mainly on the Gaelic ethnicity of

some Scottish forces.[43] It has been shown that excessive violence, linked to cultural disconnect and ethnic hostilities, marked the military interactions between England and its Welsh and Irish neighbours in the twelfth century and beyond. In the Welsh case a high level of atrocity has still been observed during the revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr in the early fifteenth century.[44] English commentators of the twelfth century also stigmatized Gaelic speakers in Scottish forces, especially those from Galloway (Galwegians), as being barbarous and inhuman in war.[45] More problematic is the attempt to posit Gaelic/English antipathies as having a continued formative influence on conduct in the wars of independence and beyond. Even in the twelfth century the Gaelic-speaking forces so vilified by contemporary witnesses were only one element in Scottish armies, with English-speakers also present alongside an Anglo-Norman aristocratic cadre culturally attuned to their peers south of the border.

By the time of the wars from 1296, however, it is hard to distinguish a more merciless martial culture among Scottish Gaels. There had been many generations in which the various ethnic and linguistic groups in Scotland were assimilated under the auspices of a royal and aristocratic establishment attuned to wider Western European patterns, in military organization and otherwise.[46] There is some stigmatization of the Scots at the outset of the wars of independence that has resonances with the older ethnic tensions. Galwegians are again singled out as especially brutal, but this suggests the recycling of a trope as much as realistic depiction. The blue colouration given to Scots shown enacting atrocities in the early fourteenth-century *Luttrel Psalter* gives a visual perception of barbarousness without much specificity.[47] English commentators do not long persist in denigration of the Scots that can be tied particularly to Gaelic ethnicity. Their greatest ire in the early years of the wars is in fact reserved for William Wallace. There is an assumption that he should be a linguistically alien barbarian, hence the allegation that he had all those who spoke English killed.[48] He was, though, an English-speaker himself, as were many of the troops he commanded. There is a sense here of English observers searching uncertainly for an appropriate type to use in disparaging the new national enemy. Gaelic barbarism was tried on for size but was no sort of fit for the actual adversaries being faced in war, so over time other motifs were deployed instead, notably the Scots as rude, deceitful, and uncouth – but not as alien Celtic savages.[49] There are resonances here with different periods and locations, where abusive stereotypes aimed at enemies in war similarly match only tenuously to the historical 'reality'.[50]

Even the idea that Gaelic Scots fought a more brutal style of war than their English-speaking countrymen in the later Middle Ages rests on no very firm basis. Gaels are stigmatized in 'lowland' Scottish sources as unruly and prone to criminality, but they are not accused of being more vicious in war.[51] The poem of 1513 written for the earl of Argyll and advocating a genocidal approach to anticipated war with England should not be read as a realistic account of the ethics of war in the Gaelic world, but as deliberately overblown literary artifice.[52] Prejudices and preconceptions, meanwhile, may go far to explain continued stigmatization by historians of Gaelic military practice as especially savage in ensuing centuries.[53]

It is, in any case, very hard to fit specific evidence of particular brutality in the later Middles Ages to a framework of Gaelic/English ethnic hostility. A high-profile and well-documented incident at the outset of the wars is the sack of Berwick by Edward I's forces in 1296.[54] Whether this was as great an outrage as Scottish historians have depicted is questionable.[55] Certainly, it cannot be seen as resulting from a transcultural clash based on language and ethnicity, attackers and defenders both being largely English-speaking. A more convincing example of the adoption of more than usually extreme violence in war is Edward I's response to the seizure of the Scottish throne by Robert I in 1306 (leading to renewed Anglo-Scottish war) and the murder of the powerful Scottish magnate, John Comyn of Badenoch, which preceded it. Edward's fury with Bruce was based on sheer frustration at the inability to pacify Scotland, as well as the range of crimes that Robert could be accused of: murder, sacrilege, treason, usurpation.[56] But Gaelic ethnicity was clearly not important here: the English king was not outraged because of the alien-ness of Bruce and his supporters, but because they were of precisely the same social and cultural milieu as high status Englishmen. Their betrayal was all the more heinous because their social environment should have guaranteed their faithfulness. It is notable that, among many executions, that of Sir Simon Fraser, who had been one of Edward's household knights and whose breach of faith was all the more reprehensible, was loaded with extra humiliation.[57]

If we turn to some of the most high-profile Scottish atrocities we find a similar picture: transcultural hostility based on ethnicity rarely seems of great explanatory power, compared to a variety of other particular circumstances. As Robert I sought to extend his royal authority in Scotland in the face of domestic opponents, one method was the systematic devastation of enemy lands to enforce changes of allegiance. The most famous example

of this process is the 'herschip', or harrying, of Buchan (north-east Scotland) in 1308. Much like the sack of Berwick it might be questioned whether excessive brutality (compared to the norms of war at the time) was actually enacted in this process, with some assertions of its destructiveness not according well with Barbour's account, on which they are based.[58] Many of Bruce's forces may have been Gaelic-speakers in this operation; but so, it seems, were the communities they ravaged.[59] Mutilation, meanwhile, is a telling category of Scottish atrocity, often carried out by Sir James Douglas, again an English-speaker rather than a savage Gaelic warlord. Some captured archers were subjected to hand amputation by Douglas in 1314, an English commander, Elias the Clerk, was displayed with his severed head inserted up his backside in 1317 and the mayor of York, killed at the battle of Myton in 1319 among local forces opposing a Scottish invasion, was dismembered.[60] These examples are resonant of the Scots seeking to send out brutal visual messages in the context of the desperate, dirty frontier wars of the time. Many intensifying factors were at play in this era, but a clash between Gaelic and English ethnicities does not suggest itself as prominent among them.

Social tension having an impact on the scale of brutality in Anglo-Scottish conflict seems a more promising option, although this has been touched on only briefly in scholarly discourse.[61] Scotland, smaller in population and less wealthy than England, was forced to rely mainly on unpaid military service and to include in arms a wider social spread than their adversaries.[62] This was reflected in the martial self-perception of the Scots, for instance in literature which explicitly celebrated the involvement of unconventional social groups in war throughout the later Middle Ages. To offer just one example, the poem *The Taill of Rauf Coilyear* has as its hero a coal merchant who battles bravely and is of sufficient valorous worth to be made one of Charlemagne's captains.[63] I have argued elsewhere that a distinctive, earthier, and less deferential chivalric culture can be detected in Scotland.[64] For their part, the English developed tropes to describe the Scots that resonate with the greater prominence of the lower orders in war – their enemies were rough and uncouth, their leaders brigands (William Wallace) or counterfeit kings (Robert I, 'King Hobbe').[65] But the question is whether this social divergence in military affairs actually led to a higher level of atrocity, and that is far from clear.

There is a widespread belief that the lower orders in war were excluded from the chivalric conventions that governed aristocratic

martial conduct. In the light of this truism, and the particularities in the Scottish case that might be thought to exacerbate extreme behaviour, there seems very little evidence of social hostilities fuelling atrocities. There are, in fact, signs of mercy to captured troops of low status, such as the 300 Scottish infantry allowed to go free after the fall of Dunbar castle in 1296.[66] Mercy might even be accorded to the lower orders while denied to aristocratic warriors: during Edward I's attempt to crush the rising of Robert I in 1307 orders were issued that commoners, who might have been coerced into taking arms, should be treated leniently, while patently guilty aristocrats were to be granted no mercy.[67] The earl of Menteith was executed after his capture in 1346 at Neville's Cross. He was a traitor who had broken his faith. Lower status Scots, clearly less culpable, might survive capture and even settle in England permanently.[68] If it is hard to locate enhanced levels of atrocity related to social status, this most promising of potentially intensifying factors, a further question arises. Were the Anglo-Scottish wars, taken as a whole, particularly brutal after all?

Conclusion

This paper has examined unconventional warfare in a later medieval Anglo-Scottish context through scrutiny of three explanatory concepts. It has been argued that none of them is satisfactory as currently deployed. This is not to suggest that there is no truth to them; just that when abutting against the messy realities of war they all fail as overall explanatory models. The tale of 'Good King Robert's Testament' in its entirety cannot be accepted. There is no strictly contemporary witness to it, and no clarity (without the benefit of hindsight) on what Robert I would have intended his successors to do in relation to the issue of battle avoidance or acceptance, and the status of Berwick as a fortified post. A careful descriptive use of 'guerrilla' war may offer a useful short-hand description of certain military techniques, albeit with a lurking danger of anachronism. But any positing of a binary divide between warfare according to accepted chivalric conventions on the one hand and guerrilla warfare on the other does not accord with the complex reality. The concept of transcultural warfare no doubt has its merits in inviting thought about structural frameworks to help us understand war.[69] The way the concept has been applied, however, is by looking to a Gaelic/English ethno-linguistic divide analogous to that experienced in military interactions between the English and

their Irish and Welsh neighbours. This makes a very poor fit with the circumstances of Anglo-Scottish war.

All of this, in turn, might invite us to question whether 'unconventional war' itself is a useful category for the Anglo-Scottish conflicts. One of the key traits in this conceptualization is, for instance, a lack of accepted conventions of war governing rules of engagement and treatment of combatants and non-combatants. Clearly this is not the case between England and Scotland, where practices (whatever we think this actually meant for non-combatants in particular) were observed in similar fashion as in the Anglo-French Hundred Years War.[70] In relation to techniques of war often regarded as unconventional – such as small unit actions, use of surprise, and trickery – it is again hard to see a divide between the conventional and the unconventional, even if the use of cunning and ruses might be especially valued in a military culture like that of Scotland, where wars were habitually fought against a more powerful national foe.[71] Another key aspect of unconventional conflict is the heavy involvement of irregular and non-traditional fighting personnel. But when the Anglo-Scottish wars broke out neither side had a standing army (nor would for centuries to come) and the vast preponderance of those who fought in the wars were occasional soldiers. Uniforms were not worn, and all armies had many common people among their forces. Determining a line between regular and irregular troops is thus a nearly impossible task. The demarcations between 'conventional' and 'unconventional' warfare, then, are blurred to the point of undermining the usefulness of the distinction.[72]

That this is true of the wars of Scotland and England invites similar questioning of the usefulness of guerrilla war as a categorization in the wider world of later medieval Europe. Even a glance at the easily shifting status of the companies in the fourteenth century and the *ecorcheurs* in the fifteenth, between being in the pay of the French and English crowns on the one hand and independent, uncontrolled freebooters on the other supports this scepticism. Beyond the Middle Ages broader questions are invited as to the utility of this sort of demarcation in other eras. The emergence of neater conventional/unconventional boundaries is perhaps attested more readily for modern war in some of the essays in this volume, although even here the ability of conventional forces to adopt 'guerrilla' practices, and vice versa, for instance in the Peninsular War, must be accepted.[73] This caveat aside there may indeed be fundamental changes in how war can best be categorized between the medieval and modern eras. This might run counter to one intention of this volume, which seeks in its chronologically regressive

format to challenge simple notions of linear change over time. Yet if we look backward rather than forward from the Middle Ages a more complex pattern emerges: cultures of war in Ancient Rome seem as amenable as those in modern times to being understood as clashes of conventional forces and their unconventional enemies. This is a reminder that we must shun lazy assumptions leading to simple models of progressive change along chronological lines, and of the imperative to be very careful in examining critically the categorizations we use to imagine cultures of war. The present chapter has, I hope, offered a case that the neglected medieval angle, and the even more neglected Scottish one, can play powerfully into these vital debates.

Acknowledgement I am grateful to the editors for their helpful suggestions, particularly in encouraging wider comparative contexts.

Notes

1. The classic account is in G. W. S. Barrow, *Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland* (4th edn, Edinburgh, 2005).
2. Alexander Grant, 'Richard III and Scotland', in *The North of England in the Reign of Richard III*, ed. Anthony J. Pollard (Stroud, 1996), 116–148, 116–117; Margaret E. Wallace, *Good King Robert's Testament* (Cambridge, 2005).
3. Barrow, *Robert Bruce*, 91–116.
4. Michael Prestwich, 'Transcultural Warfare – The Middle Ages and Beyond', and Matthew Strickland, 'Rules of War or War without Rules? – Some Reflections on Conduct and the Treatment of Non-Combatants in Medieval Transcultural Wars', in *Transcultural Wars from the Middle Ages to the 21st Century*, ed. Hans-Henning Kortüm (Berlin, 2006), 43–56, 107–140. The impact of Gaelic ethnicity, although without explicit adoption of a transcultural model, is also discussed in Matthew Strickland, 'A Law of Arms or a Law of Treason? Conduct in War in Edward I's Campaigns in Scotland, 1296–1307', in *Violence in Medieval Society*, ed. Richard W. Kaueper (Woodbridge, 2000), 39–78.
5. Hans-Henning Kortüm, 'Clash of Typologies – The Naming of Wars and the Invention of Typologies', in *Transcultural Wars*, ed. Kortüm, 11–26, 16–19.
6. This translation from middle Scots is in Colm McNamee, *Robert the Bruce: Our Most Valiant Prince, King and Lord* (Edinburgh, 2006), 287–288.
7. Michael Penman, *Robert the Bruce King of Scots* (New Haven, 2014), 300–301.

8. Supporting detail for this paragraph can be found in Alastair J. Macdonald, 'Triumph and Disaster: Scottish Military Leadership in the Later Middle Ages', in *England and Scotland at War, c.1296–c.1513*, ed. Andy King and David Simpkin (Leiden, 2012), 255–282.
9. John Gillingham, '"Up With Orthodoxy!" In Defence of Vegetian Warfare', *Journal of Medieval Military History* 2 (2004): 149–158.
10. Besides the ones mentioned in the text Stirling Bridge (1297) and Dupplin Moor (1332) are also usually regarded as major battles.
11. John Barbour, *The Bruce*, ed. A. A. M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1997), 678–685; *Chronicon de Lanercost*, ed. Joseph Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1839), 247.
12. Walter Bower, *Scotichronicon*, ed. Donald E. R. Watt, 9 vols (Aberdeen and Edinburgh, 1987–1998), vol. 7, 290–291; Macdonald, 'Triumph and Disaster', 270.
13. Michael Prestwich, *Edward I* (new edn, London, 1997), 479–481.
14. David Cornell, 'A Kingdom Cleared of Castles: The role of the castle in the campaigns of Robert Bruce', *Scottish Historical Review* 87 (2008): 233–257.
15. E. Patricia Dennison, et al., eds, *Aberdeen Before 1800: A New History* (East Linton, 2002), 19.
16. Cornell, 'Kingdom Cleared of Castles', 252.
17. David MacGibbon and Thomas Ross, *The Castellated and Domestic Architecture of Scotland from the Twelfth to the Eighteenth Century*, 5 vols (Edinburgh, 1887–1892), vol. 1, 447–449, 464–466; Alastair J. Macdonald, *Border Bloodshed: Scotland and England at War, 1369–1403* (East Linton, 2000), 40–41.
18. Ranald Nicholson, *Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Military Career 1327–1335* (Oxford, 1965), 119–138.
19. Ibid. 80–81.
20. Colm McNamee, *The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306–1328* (East Linton, 1997), 40–42; Penman, *Robert the Bruce*, 105–107.
21. Indeed, the present author is guilty of this descriptive usage in his own writing: Alastair J. Macdonald, 'The Kingdom of Scotland at War, 1332–1488', in *A Military History of Scotland*, ed. Edward M. Spiers, et al. (Edinburgh, 2012), 158–181, 160.
22. Alexander Grant, *Independence and Nationhood: Scotland 1306–1469* (Edinburgh, 1984), 6; Sonja Cameron, 'Chivalry and Warfare in Barbour's *Bruce*', in *Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France*, ed. Matthew Strickland (Stamford, 1998), 13–29, 15; Peter Marren, *Grampian Battlefields. The Historic Battles of North East Scotland from AD84 to 1745* (Aberdeen, 1990), 66.

23. Barrow, *Robert Bruce*, 226–230.
24. Jean le Bel, *The True Chronicles of Jean le Bel 1290–1360*, trans. Nigel Bryant (Woodbridge, 2011), 39–50; Nicholson, *Edward III and the Scots*, 36.
25. McNamee, *Wars of the Bruces*, 24.
26. Barbour, *Bruce*, 366–401; Alastair J. Macdonald, 'Trickery, Mockery and the Scottish Way of War', *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland* 143 (2013): 319–337, 324–5.
27. Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Science*, trans. N. P. Milner (2nd edn, Liverpool, 2011), 83–88, 108–110; Diane Bornstein, 'The Scottish Prose Version of Vegetius' *De re militari*', *Studies in Scottish Literature* 8 (1971): 174–183.
28. Matthew Strickland, *War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066–1217* (paperback edn, Cambridge, 2005), 128–131.
29. *Vita Edwardi Secundi: The Life of Edward II*, ed. Wendy R. Childs (Oxford, 2005), 22–25.
30. *Lanercost* (Stevenson), 271, discussed in Chris Given-Wilson, *Chronicles: The Writing of History in Medieval England* (London 2004), 102–103.
31. As is apparent in the contributions of Julia Welland, Daniel Sutherland, and Fergus Robson, to this volume.
32. I am grateful to the editors for comments that helped to shape this paragraph.
33. Most recently among an extensive literature see Stephen I. Boardman and Susan Foran (eds.), *Barbour's Bruce and its Cultural Contexts: Politics, Chivalry and Literature in Late Medieval Scotland* (Cambridge, 2015).
34. Barbour, *Bruce*, 356–359.
35. National Archives, London (hereafter UKNA), E39/14/18. The salient detail is lacking in Joseph Bain et al. (eds.), *Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland*, 5 vols (Edinburgh, 1881–1986) [hereafter *CDS*], vol. 5, no. 812.
36. Macdonald, 'Trickery', 320–322.
37. Bower, *Scotichronicon*, vol. 8, 112–113. The correct dating of this incident is 1420 rather than 1419 as habitually stated: UKNA, E403/645, m. 8; Thomas Walsingham, *The Chronica Maiora of Thomas Walsingham, 1376–1422*, trans. David Preest (Woodbridge, 2005), 437.
38. For a recent discussion of the theme, especially as it relates to the church see Rory Cox, 'A Law of War? English Protection and Destruction of Ecclesiastical Property during the Fourteenth Century', *English Historical Review* 128 (2013): 1381–1417. For a fuller treatment by the present author see 'Two Kinds of War? Brutality and Atrocity in Later Medieval Scotland', in *Killing and Being Killed: Bodies in Battle. Perspectives on Fighters in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jörg Rogge (Bielefeld, 2017), 199–230.

39. Rory Cox, 'Asymmetric Warfare and Military Conduct in the Middle Ages', *Journal of Medieval History* 38 (2012): 100–125, 106–109.
40. Stephen Morillo, 'A General Typology of Transcultural Wars – The Early Middle Ages and Beyond', in *Transcultural Wars*, ed. Kortüm, 29–42.
41. Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge, 2006); McNamee, *Robert Bruce*, 137.
42. Clifford J. Rogers, 'By Fire and Sword: *Bellum Hostile* and "Civilians" in the Hundred Years War', in *Civilians in the Path of War*, ed. Mark Grimsley and Clifford J. Rogers (Lincoln, NE, 2002), 33–78; Sean McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire: Cruelty and Atrocity in Medieval Warfare* (London, 2009).
43. Prestwich, 'Transcultural Warfare', 46–48; Strickland, 'Rules of War', 121–127. See also Strickland, 'Law of Arms', 40–53.
44. Strickland, 'Rules of War', 125.
45. Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 291–297.
46. See now for an authoritative discussion of state development in Scotland in the central Middle Ages Alice Taylor, *The Shape of the State in Medieval Scotland, 1124–1290* (Oxford, 2016).
47. Strickland, 'Law of Arms', 43–47; Michael Camille, *Mirror in Parchment: The Luttrell Psalter and the Making of Medieval England* (London, 1998), 284–292.
48. Strickland, 'Law of Arms', 47.
49. For instance: Thea Summerfield, 'The Political Songs in the Chronicles of Pierre de Langtoft and Robert Mannyng', in *The Court and Cultural Diversity*, ed. Evelyn Mullaly and John Thompson (Cambridge, 1997), 139–148, 141–142.
50. See the chapters in this volume by Daniel Sutherland, Fergus Robson, and Raphaëlle Branche.
51. Martin MacGregor, 'Gaelic Barbarity and Scottish Identity in the Later Middle Ages', in *Mìorun Mòr nan Gall, 'The Great Ill-Will of the Lowlander'? Lowland Perceptions of the Highlands, Medieval and Modern*, ed. Dauvit Broun and Martin MacGregor (Chippenham, 2009), 7–48.
52. William J. Watson (ed.), *Scottish Verse from the Book of the Dean of Lismore* (Edinburgh, 1937), 158–164. The poem is cited in Matthew J. Strickland, 'The Kings of Scots at War, *c.*1093–1286', in *Military History of Scotland*, ed. Spiers, 94–132, 117, and elsewhere.
53. For Highland soldiers allegedly coming from a less civilized culture and a 'backward and primitive' region see Huw Strachan, 'Scotland's Military Identity', *Scottish Historical Review* 85 (2006): 315–332, 322, 324.
54. Strickland, 'Law of Arms', 64–67.
55. For instance: Alexander Grant, 'Disaster at Neville's Cross: The Scottish Point of View', in *The Battle of Neville's Cross 1346*, ed. David Rollason and Michael Prestwich (Stamford, 1998), 15–35, 20.

56. Matthew Strickland, 'Treason, Feud and the Growth of State Violence: Edward I and the "War of the Earl of Carrick", 1306–7', in *War, Government and Aristocracy in the British Isles, c.1150–1500*, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, et al. (Woodbridge, 2008), 84–113.
57. Ibid. 91–92, 97, 108–109.
58. Barbour, *Bruce*, 332–335; Penman, *Robert the Bruce*, 107.
59. Robert McColl Millar, *Northern and Insular Scots* (Edinburgh, 2007), 110.
60. Alastair J. Macdonald, 'Courage, Fear and the Experience of the Later Medieval Scottish Soldier', *Scottish Historical Review* 92 (2013): 179–206, 199; Macdonald, 'Trickery', 332–333; *The Anonimalle Chronicle 1307 to 1334*, ed. Wendy R. Childs and John Taylor (Leeds, 1991), 98–99.
61. Prestwich, 'Transcultural Warfare', 44, 52.
62. Archibald A. M. Duncan, 'The War of the Scots 1306–23', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,* 6th ser. 2 (1992): 125–151, 138–146; David H. Caldwell, 'Scottish Spearmen, 1298–1314: an answer to cavalry', *War in History* 19 (2012): 267–289, 286–288.
63. Priscilla Bawcutt and Felicity Riddy (eds.), *Longer Scottish Poems, Volume One: 1375–1650* (Edinburgh, 1987), 94–133.
64. Macdonald, 'Trickery', 329–332.
65. Archibald A. M. Duncan, 'William, Son of Alan Wallace: The Documents', in *The Wallace Book*, ed. Edward J. Cowan (Edinburgh, 2007), 42–63, 53–54; *Facsimiles of the National Manuscripts of Scotland*, 3 vols (London, 1867–71), vol. 2, no. xiii.
66. *Lanercost* (Stevenson), 177.
67. *CDS*, vol. 2, no. 1909.
68. Bower, *Scotichronicon*, vol. 7, 260–261; Dorothy M. Owen, 'White Annays and Others', in *Medieval Women*, ed. Derek Baker (Oxford, 1978), 331–346, 343–344.
69. Space has precluded engagement with another suggested tool for understanding medieval warfare, the concept of asymmetry: Cox, 'Asymmetric Warfare'.
70. Andy King, '"According to the custom used in French and Scottish wars": prisoners and casualties on the Scottish marches in the fourteenth century', *Journal of Medieval History* 28 (2002): 263–290.
71. Macdonald, 'Trickery', 320–323.
72. Similar problems, with more acute dangers of anachronism, beset the attempt to apply the concept of 'special operations' to the Middle Ages: Yuval Noah Harari, *Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100–1500* (Woodbridge, 2007).
73. See the chapters in this volume by Tim Piceu, Julia Welland, and Raphaëlle Branche.

Dr Alastair J. Macdonald is Mackie Lecturer in History at the University of Aberdeen. His research is focused especially on two broad fields: Anglo-Scottish relations; and warfare in Scotland. He is the author of *Border Bloodshed: Scotland and England at War, 1369–1403* (2000), and is working on a monograph covering Anglo-Scottish relations over a broader timespan, between 1286 and 1603. His interests in warfare are especially focused on understanding the social and cultural contexts of military activity and the impacts of war. He is a contributor to *A Military History of Scotland* (ed. Spiers et al., 2012). He edits the journal *Northern Scotland*.

Guerilla Warfare and Revolt in Second Century BC Egypt

Brian McGing

When Alexander the Great died in 323 BC his vast empire eventually, after much jockeying for position among his successors, split into three main units: the Antigonids controlled Macedonia and Greece, the Seleucids the whole central part of Alexander's territories from the coast of Syria to the borders of India, and the Ptolemies ruled in Egypt.[1] The latter two powers were, then, foreign kings in lands that they called 'spear-won', that is, lands they had seized by military conquest or take-over. On the whole, modern scholarship has been kind to the kings of the Hellenistic period, most of it being written by scholars from countries with their own imperial conquests – Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and so on – who admired empire and thought that, like themselves, the Greek conquerors brought their superior culture to places that needed it. If the Ptolemies and their modern interpreters have tended to congratulate themselves for being civilized and cultured, it was not a sentiment shared by all the subjects of Ptolemaic Egypt. The first revolt against Ptolemaic rule we hear of occurred in 245 BC. From that time on, there were periodic outbreaks of rebellious unrest among the Egyptians throughout much of the rest of Ptolemaic history.[2] What caused this unrest? There would be little

B. McGing (✉)
Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland
e-mail: bmcging@tcd.ie

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disagreement that social and economic conditions were crucial – although not necessarily precisely what those conditions were – rather more debate about whether nationalist-type feeling had any role in events. I believe it did, and in an article in 2012, I challenged both the refusal of modernist dogma even to countenance the possibility of such a thing as ancient nationalism, and the attendant insistence of some Classical scholars on social and economic conditions as the only possible causes of Ptolemaic revolt.[3] In a different context, Aviel Roshwald and David Goodblatt made a, so far, unanswered case that the ancient Jewish community shared many of the characteristics that even modern theorists would attribute to a nation. The same for Cohen's analysis of Athenian nationalism.[4]

The problem with the subject of revolt in Ptolemic Egypt, as so often in ancient history, is the sources: they are scattered and random at best, often just passing references to a revolt or disturbance that make no attempt to explain the reasons for what happened, and mostly have very little to say about the course of events beyond the fact that there was insurrectional activity. Although from time to time a new papyrus text may throw new light on a particular revolt, it seems unlikely that we will substantially increase our understanding of what was going on, and whether nationalism played any role, from the ancient sources alone. It might, therefore, be instructive to approach Egyptian revolt from a different, comparative angle. Do revolts in the modern world throw any suggestive light on what happened in the ancient world?

There is one particular revolt in Ptolemaic Egypt for which we have considerably more evidence than we do for any other. From 207 to 186 BC there occurred what we call the 'Great Revolt' of the Thebaid, the southernmost part of Ptolemaic Egypt.[5] In that period two new pharaohs appeared. We know their names: first, Haronnophris, and after him, Chaonnophris.[6] Incidentally, as Clarysse has shown, these names, Haronnophris and Chaonnophris, contain a message that the two rebel pharaohs were presenting themselves as the messianic restorers of legitimate royalty, expelling the enemies of Osiris and ushering in a new golden age.[7]

The problem with the 'revolt' of the Thebaid is simply stated. How could part of Egypt be 'in revolt' for twenty years? What does that mean? Are we just talking about the complete secession of the Thebaid from Ptolemaic rule? In other words, was the Ptolemaic army that had, unexpectedly, defeated the mighty Seleucids at the battle of Raphia in 217,[8] a mere ten years earlier, now simply unable to reassert control against the 'rebel forces' in the Thebaid? On the face of it, that seems highly

improbable. Admittedly the Ptolemies were pushed out of Palestine in 200 BC, and out of most of their possessions in the Aegean and Asia Minor, so they were weaker than they had been. But twenty years is still a very long time to be 'in revolt' against what was still one of the major powers of the Hellenistic world. When armed rebel forces took over Jerusalem in AD 66, or Delhi in 1857, or Dublin in 1916, the situation was clear: the imperial government simply could not allow such an open challenge to its authority, and at the earliest opportunity (considerably delayed in the case of the Roman response to the situation in Judaea) brought overwhelming military force to bear in order to defeat the rebels. Is that how we should picture the situation in the Thebaid? The rebel pharaoh, Haronnophris, expels Ptolemaic forces and establishes a new government in the area, and his (and his successor's) army then defends its territory, with mixed success, against the military forces of the Ptolemaic government for twenty years? It is some such unspoken assumption that underlies much of the scholarship on the subject. In modern examples of revolt, however, where there are plentiful sources – India in 1857, or Dublin in the years 1916 to 1922, for example – or indeed in the ancient world where there is similarly detailed information, Jerusalem in AD 66 and the long account of the Jewish historian Josephus being the obvious example, what stands out is the untidy and confused nature of revolt and rebellious activity, and the variety of factors at play. This suggests that we should be looking for similar complications in Ptolemaic Egypt.

There is an alternative to the simple picture of a rebel 'government' in control of the Thebaid – political agitation combined with guerilla warfare. For there are different levels of resistance to colonial government that are separatist in intention or desire, but not expressed in full-out military 'rebellion'. The Greek sources almost invariably use the word *tarache*, 'disturbance', to describe the politically unsettled situations that occur in Egypt in the Hellenistic period, and although official language may well want to play down the importance of resistance by describing it merely as a 'disturbance', in the way that the description of the 1857 revolt in India as a 'mutiny' rather than the major revolt it clearly was, looks like imperial damage limitation, perhaps to translate the word *tarache* automatically as 'revolt' might suggest more than it should.

Ireland in the years 1918 to 1922 provides the first successful example in the twentieth century of resistance to imperial rule using the combination of political agitation and guerilla tactics (I omit the relatively straightforward military rebellion against British rule of Easter 1916, which was an

immediate failure, although ultimately inspired a different Irish response). My intention is not to suggest an exact parallel between Ireland in the twentieth century and Egypt in the second century BC, but there might just be aspects of the two very different situations that are more similar than appear at first sight. The Easter rebellion in 1916 was a confused, disorganized, small-scale military uprising limited almost entirely to Dublin that initially attracted a largely hostile public response. Two years later in the Westminster elections of December 1918 Sinn Féin won a remarkable 73 seats.[9] The new MPs did not take up their seats in the British parliament, but unilaterally declared an independent Irish Republic, and convoked the national assembly. They appointed ministers, and a whole parallel (rebel?) government came into existence, creating parallel administrative documents, that was completely illegal in the context of British rule and, of course, unrecognized. Revenue was a problem as taxes still went to the British crown, but levies were imposed and the Dáil (the Irish government) began to issue government bonds. They also introduced, for example, a new court system that began to work in some places, creating a parallel legal system; and there were plans for housing, poor law reform, even for municipal milk distribution.[10] This gave rise to an extraordinary situation: while still supposedly under direct British rule, Ireland began to ignore British government structures and operate its own illegal counter-state. How effective this was, or the details of how it worked, need not detain us: I am not trying to build a model for close application to the situation in Ptolemaic Egypt. But the whole idea of a counter-state, where life appears to go on much as before, but where a native population in 'revolt' is in fact operating on an entirely different understanding from its imperial masters, might suggest an interpretation of what was happening in the Thebaid. Theoretically this could be a virtual counter-state, with no meaningful application in reality. What turned it into a challenge to the colonial government in Ireland was guerilla activity: ambushes, attacks on isolated police stations, assassinations, roadblocks, widespread arson, especially of income tax offices. Total casualties for the whole period, even when the fighting became more intense in 1921, were a fraction of those killed on the first day of the battle of the Somme in 1916.[11] Disorder, disruption, subversion rather than direct all-out military defiance characterized the Irish disturbance/rebellion, a very difficult situation for a colonial government to counter.

The second century BC Greek historian, Polybius, famously explains an Egyptian revolt that Ptolemy IV Philopator (ruled 221–204) had to face

(literally, 'his war against the Egyptians') in terms of a mutiny by Egyptian troops after the battle of Raphia in 217.[12] Philopator had recruited 20,000 Egyptians into his army, out of a total of either 50,000 or 70,000.[13] Although not as large a proportion of native troops as in the East India Company armies in nineteenth-century British India, it was a substantial number.[14] Polybius regarded this measure as immediately helpful in achieving victory, but a mistake for the future. For the Egyptian troops were very proud of their role in the victory and 'were no longer disposed to put up with their orders, but set about looking for a leader and figurehead, in the belief that they were capable of helping themselves, a situation they eventually achieved not long afterward'. Polybius is saying, and it is difficult to see how he could mean anything else, that the problem was caused by a group awareness of strength on the part of the native Egyptian troops, that led to a mutiny against their Greek officers and the appointment of their own leader. Polybius may not have got this right, but that is what he thinks happened.[15] How the mutiny developed into a revolt, Polybius does not explain.[16] As Christelle Fischer-Bovet observes, 'It is of course plausible that rebellions led by military groups encouraged other population groups to foment a chain reaction of revolts'.[17] This is not the time to pursue it, but it seems to me that it is precisely such a chain reaction that the situation in India in 1857 illustrates.[18] Of course, it may not be exactly the same process as happened in Egypt 2,000 years earlier, but it does at least show how this process *can* happen.

The chronology of the war against the Egyptians to which this mutiny, Polybius says, gave rise, is difficult to determine. On the whole it seems best to accept Polybius' statement at 14.2 that in the immediate aftermath of the Raphia campaign Philopator turned to a life of abandonment – Polybius elsewhere says that Philopator was so devoted to sex and drink that he paid no attention to politics[19] – and only later in his reign had to fight the war already mentioned. Is this war, then, the revolt of 207–186, as Peremans suggested?[20] Having looked for a leader and figurehead and found one, was it Haronnophris, crowned Pharaoh in 205, to whom Polybius was referring? If so, then Polybius' description of the war that Ptolemy IV Philopator had to face in Egypt late in his reign is interesting for present purposes.[21] For he says that 'apart from the mutual savagery and lawlessness of the combatants, [it] contained nothing worthy of note, no pitched battle, no sea fight, no siege'; what happened constituted 'small events not worth serious attention'.[22] This passage is the earliest clear description of guerilla warfare we have from the ancient Mediterranean

world. Greek and Roman historians wrote about wars between nations and kings and the great battles that were fought. This is what they liked. Tacitus apologizes to his readers for not having more wars to write about.[23] Polybius does not really know how to deal with guerilla warfare; it is just not interesting enough. But if we make the connections, then we have a clear statement that the revolt of the Thebaid was characterized by guerilla warfare.

Other sources seem to confirm this. The second priestly decree of Philae (186 BC), for example, refers to the rebel against the gods (Chaonnophris) gathering insolent people from all districts, who attacked the governors of the nomes and took some sort of hostile action (the text is very fragmentary) against temples, statues, towns, the population (including women and children). 'They stole the taxes of the nomes, they damaged the irrigation works.'[24] This is exactly the sort of thing guerilla fighters do.[25]

The Philae decree also refers to one of only two military actions that we hear of taken by the government against the rebels in twenty years. This is the last action of the revolt, in which a battle took place in 186 and Chaonnophris was captured, taken to the king (by this stage Ptolemy V Epiphanes) and executed. Now, this is a battle and Polybius says there were no pitched battles in the war. But two points need to be taken into consideration. First, Greek papyrological sources record the provisioning of the Ptolemaic force, enough grain, Willy Clarysse estimates, for 4,000 soldiers for three months.[26] Even if this is not a completely secure figure, the size of the forces involved would scarcely qualify as a pitched battle for Polybius. At the battle of Raphia the Ptolemies had either 50,000 infantry or 70,000 plus 5,000 cavalry and 73 African elephants. The Seleucid forces numbered 62,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 102 Indian elephants.[27] That is a pitched battle. Second, the priests in the decrees they issue always have a vested interest in exaggerating the achievements of the Ptolemaic kings, because they are receiving benefits from them. It is still a military action, and if we are looking for a reason why the government finally got serious, it may well be supplied by the presence of Ethiopian troops allied to Chaonnophris who are mentioned in the Philae decree.

The only other presumably serious military enterprise we hear of during the revolt, is a siege of Abydos mentioned in passing in a Greek graffito written by a Greek mercenary in 199.[28] There is no context, no description and we cannot tell the scale of the operation and whether it would count as a siege in Polybius' estimation. Even if it was a major operation,

the question remains, what was happening between 207 when ignorant rebels interrupted the building work on the temple at Edfu and the siege of Abydos in 199? And between the siege of Abydos in 199 and the battle of 186? What was going on all this time?

There is a danger of reading too much into a scattered set of sources. We learn in a Lycopolite text that 'from the time of the disturbance of Chaonnophris it happened that most of the farmers were killed and the land has gone dry'.[29] Clarysse refers to a 'battle'. Pestman says that after being driven out of Thebes in 199, Chaonnophris 'daringly went north ... and even reached the Lycopolite nome'.[30] But the papyrus says nothing about Chaonnophris' movements: it simply refers to the time of the disturbances linked to Chaonnophris. Pestman seems to have had in mind a sort of Spartacus situation. The Thracian gladiator Spartacus led a revolt against Rome in 73 BC. He collected an army that the ancient sources think numbered somewhere between 70,000 and 125,000. For two years he roamed around Italy defeating Roman armies sent against him, until in 71 Marcus Licinius Crassus finally cornered him in Lucania and destroyed his forces.[31] This seems to be the assumption behind Pestman's analysis of Chaonnophris' revolt: Chaonnophris leads a rebel army round the countryside for thirteen years. And the papyrus says nothing about a battle either. Why not a local disturbance by Chaonnophris' supporters who kill farmers, and as the Philae decree says, damage the irrigation works? Disrupting agriculture is again exactly the sort of trouble guerillas like to cause.[32]

Another Greek papyrus refers to a certain Hermias withdrawing southwards from Thebes at the beginning of the revolt 'with other soldiers'.[33] Pestman pictures Haronnophris seizing Thebes, forcing what he calls 'the Greek army' to leave. But we need to ask, what Greek army? We know of no Greek army stationed in the south at this period. Clarysse has argued for a very small Greek presence in Thebes.[34] What we do know of is the Ptolemaic policy of planting military settlers on the land. Hermias was presumably one of these settlers, and it would certainly seem that they had to leave the area.[35]

There is interesting scribal evidence from this period in Thebes. We find some documents dated by the regnal years of the rebel pharaohs, Haronnophris and Chaonnophris, and others dated by the regnal years of Ptolemy V. It is assumed that these are evidence for periods of rebel control or government control. When scribes date documents by Ptolemaic regnal years, the Ptolemies are in control of Thebes; when they

use the years of the new pharaohs, the Ptolemic forces have been pushed out and the rebel forces are now back in control of Thebes. This is neat, but it leaves Thebes occupied improbably often by each side. I suggest a more ambiguous situation with a sort of counter-government that did not offer full military resistance to the Ptolemies, or was only able to do so intermittently. In Ireland, after the formation of a counter-government by the 'rebel' leaders, the British could not even find where the Irish cabinet met in Dublin under their very noses every week for three years, and were unable to arrest its members.[36] Clearly the Ptolemaic authorities were unable to lay hands on the rebel pharaohs. Perhaps the 'government' of Haronnophris and Chaonnophris operated under Ptolemaic rule in a similarly semi-visible and elusive way as the self-declared Irish Republic operated under British rule from 1918 to 1922. There would be a situation in which the Ptolemaic government was nominally in control, or claimed to be, but in reality that control was seriously compromised.[37]

And the question needs to be asked, how disturbed was Egypt by the 'revolt' of the Thebaid? Clarysse suggests that the Ptolemies never lost control of the Nile in this period. And Egypt was the Nile: it was a very narrow strip of cultivable land along most of the Nile's course. Documentation also shows that private economic activity continued with contracts of sale recorded and dated to the years of the rebel pharaohs.[38] So there was some level of normality. Agricultural activity, even if disturbed by guerilla activity, must also have continued, or the entire population would have starved. There are no tax receipts in the south of Egypt from 205 to 186, but does that mean no taxes were collected, or just that the situation was not stable enough for proper record-keeping? It seems possible that the Ptolemies continued to receive taxes, if at times in an interrupted, irregular and unrecorded way. There are, for instance, no tax receipts from Elephantine in this period, but there is general agreement that the Ptolemies never lost control of Elephantine. Were the inhabitants of Elephantine not taxed?

The sort of confused and ambiguous situation in Ireland from 1918 to 1922 seems to offer an alternative to thinking of events in the Thebaid in the second century BC in terms of neat lines of rebel-held territory or government-held territory, with the rebel army in control of Thebes at certain times and the Ptolemaic army expelling them, getting pushed out themselves – and this going on for twenty years. Given the military strength of the Ptolemaic government, this seems extremely unlikely. I would suggest, rather, a period of political uncertainty and instability,

with levels of normality in terms of people getting on with their private business and with the business of agriculture, and some degree of Ptolemaic control, but with guerilla warfare disturbing the peace, and the situation escalating at times so that a degree of military intervention was required, especially at the end, when Chaonnophris seems to have recruited external military reinforcements.

The different varieties of revolt in the modern world are probably too diverse to create a model for close application to the ancient world. But they can perhaps suggest some lines of investigation, and question assumptions made solely on the basis of very limited sources. In this chapter I have concentrated on using modern parallels to try to describe what might have happened in the revolt of the Thebaid, not on what caused it. Polybius, as we saw, suggests the possibility of some sort of national consciousness. Modern revolts, in nineteenth-century India or early twentieth-century Ireland, however, suggest a confused situation, in which local relationships and grievances are played out in the context of colonial rule and cannot be disconnected from it. That is not the same as saying that nationalism caused all the trouble, just that it was one of the factors in the complicated mixture that went to make up revolt. Striking above all, perhaps, is the confusion, disruption and complication of modern revolt. We can scarcely have good reason to think it was substantially different in Ptolemaic Egypt.

Notes

1. Standard accounts of 'Hellenistic' history are E. Will, *L'histoire politique du monde hellénistique (323–30 av. J.-C)*, 2 vols. (Nancy, 1979–1982); G. Shipley, *The Greek World after Alexander: 323–30 BC* (London, 2000).
2. See B. C. McGing, 'Revolt Egyptian Style. Internal opposition to Ptolemaic rule', *Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete* 43 (1997) 273–314.; A.-E. Véisse, *Les "révoltes Égyptiennes". Recherches sur les troubles intérieurs en Égypte du règne de Ptolémée III à la conquête romaine* (Leuven, 2004); A-E. Véisse, 'Retour sur les "révoltes Égyptiennes"', in G. Charpentier, V. Puech (eds), *Villes et campagnes aux rives de la Méditerranée ancienne. Hommages à George Tate. Topoi*, supplément xii (2013), 507–16.
3. B. C. McGing, 'Revolt in Ptolemaic Egypt: nationalism revisited' in P. Schubert (ed.), *Actes du 26e Congrès international de papyrologie* (Geneva, 2012), 505–516.
4. E. Cohen, 2000. *The Athenian Nation* (Princeton, 2000) 49–103; A. Roshwald, *The Endurance of Nationalism. Ancient roots and modern*

dilemmas (Cambridge, 2006) 8–44; D. Goodblatt, *Elements of Ancient Jewish Nationalism* (Cambridge, 2006), 1–27.

5. The standard account is P. W. Pestman, 'Haronnophris and Chaonnophris' in S. P. Vleeming (ed.), *Hundred-gated Thebes. Acts of a colloquium on Thebes and the Theban area in the Graeco-Roman period* (Leiden, 1995), 101–37.
6. For discussion of the possibility that Haronnophris and Chaonnophris were in fact one and the same person, see Véisse, 'Retour', 513–14.
7. W. Clarysse, 'Notes de prosopographie thébaine, 7. Hurgonapher et Chaonnophris, les derniers pharaons indigènes', *Chronique d'Egypte* 53 (1978), 252–3; W. Clarysse, 'Greeks in Ptolemaic Thebes', in S. P. Vleeming (ed.), *Hundred-gated Thebes. Acts of a colloquium on Thebes and the Theban area in the Graeco-Roman period* (Leiden, 1995), 1–19.
8. Polybius (5.79–85) provides the standard ancient account.
9. I rely heavily here on the account of C. Townshend, *The Republic. The fight for Irish independence 1918–1923* (London, 2013).
10. Townshend, *The Republic*, 124–30; 266–70.
11. R. F. Foster, *Modern Ireland 1600–1972* (London, 1988), 506 estimates a total of 7,500 killed and wounded in the period 1917–1923, which includes the Irish Civil War.
12. Pol. 5.107.
13. Pol. 5.65.9.
14. There were 136,000 sepoys and 24,000 European troops in the Bengal Presidency, according to E. Stokes, (edited by C. A. Bayly). *The Peasant Armed. The Indian revolt of 1857* (Oxford, 1986), 19. Overall numbers in the East India Company armies are usually cited as 232,000 sepoys, 45,000 Europeans.
15. C. Fischer-Bovet, 'Social Unrest and Ethnic Coexistence in Ptolemaic Egypt and the Seleucid Empire', *Past and Present* 229 (2015): 21–2, plays down the ethnic motivation.
16. Colonial and conquering powers do not like attributing 'legitimate' motivations to native populations' resistance to their power. See also in this volume the chapters by Daniel Sutherland, Seán Gannon, and Fergus Robson.
17. C. Fischer-Bovet, *Army and Society in Ptolemaic Egypt* (Cambridge, 2014), 91.
18. The most influential recent account of the mutiny is W. Dalrymple, *The Last Mughal. The fall of a dynasty, Delhi, 1857* (London, 2006), but see also C. A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire. New Cambridge History of India* (Cambridge, 1988), 169–99; C. Hibbert, *The Great Mutiny: India 1857* (London, 1978). K. A. Wagner, *The Great Fear of 1857. Rumours, conspiracies and the making of the Indian uprising* (Oxford, 2010) is a very useful review of recent scholarship.
19. Pol. 5.34.4–10.

20. W. Peremans, 'Ptolémée IV et les Égyptiens', in J. Bingen *et al.* (eds), *Le monde grec. Pensée, littérature, histoire, documets. Hommages à Claire Préaux* (Brussels, 1978), 393–402.
21. Pol.14.12.5.
22. For the tendency of colonial historians (ancient and modern) to dismiss guerilla warfare as not real war, and indicative of the lesser worth of those fighting it, see also in this volume the chapters by Matthew Lloyd, Fergus Robson, and Daniel Sutherland.
23. Tac. *Ann.* 4.32–3.
24. Pestman, 'Haronnophris and Chaonnophris', text tt; W. Clarysse, W. 2004. 'The Great Revolt of the Egyptians' at < http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/files/TheGreatRevoltoftheEgyptians.pdf > text 6 (6 November 2016).
25. For the same sort of activity, see in this volume the chapters by Tim Piceu, Aly MacDonald, and Seán Gannon.
26. *SB* 6, 9367.
27. For discussion of the figures, see F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*. Vol 1 (Oxford, 1957), 589–92.
28. Pestman, 'Haronnophris and Chaonnophris', text t.
29. *SB* 24, 15972.
30. Pestman, 'Haronnophris and Chaonnophris', 107.
31. For a recent analysis, see B. Strauss, *The Spartacus War* (New York, 2009).
32. On the part played by civilians in revolt, and the way in which guerillas can alienate the populace on whom they depend, see chapters by Daniel Sutherland, Brian Hughes, and Raphaëlle Branche in this volume.
33. Pestman, 'Haronnophris and Chaonnophris', text g.
34. Clarysse, 'Greeks in Ptolemaic Thebes'.
35. The challenge of controlling territory for imperial or conquering powers faced with a guerrilla style insurgency is a recurring theme of this volume, for some of the consequences of this see the chapters by Branche, Robson, Hodgkins, and Hughes.
36. Townshend, *The Republic*, 85. For a not dissimilar situation in French Algeria, see Branche in this volume.
37. It would be tempting to think of the revolt of the Thebaid in Ptolemaic times as part of a longer continuity of the sort of low-level resistance to imperial domination that manifested itself in the modern era: Z. Abul-Magd's study of revolt in Quina province over the last 500 years, *Imagined Empires. A history of revolt in Egypt* (California 2013) paints an interesting picture of a region supposedly under imperial control, but in reality pursuing its own course.
38. For example, Pestman, 'Haronnophris and Chaonnophris', texts m and n.

Professor Brian McGing is Regius Professor of Greek at Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland. His research spans a fault line between east and west that runs from Asia Minor down the east coast of the Mediterranean and on into Egypt. Major interests include the Hellenistic kingdoms of Asia Minor, particularly Pontus; Jewish history; the history of Egypt after Alexander the Great; Greek papyrology; Polybius of Megalopolis; Appian of Alexandia. He has published extensively on these subjects.

Unorthodox Warfare? Variety and Change in Archaic Greek Warfare (ca. 700–ca. 480 BCE)

Matthew Lloyd

In scholarship on the ancient world the warfare of primitive, uncivilized societies is sometimes likened to the techniques and tactics of guerrilla warfare. The comparison is established on the belief that both guerrilla and primitive warfare are the actions of war bands consisting of part-time warriors, not professional soldiers, who conduct acts of murder, terror, and the destruction of resources.[1] If one were to look for such warfare in the early history of Greece, one might expect to find it in the period commonly, although not without controversy, known as the Greek 'Dark Ages' – between the twelfth and eighth centuries BCE. With the sudden, violent end of Bronze Age Greek civilization around 1200 BCE, the centralized control of the Mycenaean palaces collapsed, resulting in centuries of apparent cultural, economic, and social impoverishment. When civilization was restored with the rise of the *polis* (city state) in the eighth century, warfare too became more 'civilized' with the advent of the hoplite phalanx – or so traditional interpretations of Greek warfare would have us believe.[2]

M. Lloyd (✉)
University of Oxford, Oxford, England
e-mail: matthew.lloyd1985@hotmail.co.uk

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It is possible to illustrate this understanding of early Greek warfare with a recently excavated mass-burial from the Aegean island of Paros, dated around 700 BCE. This burial contained the cremated remains of about 160 young men, believed to be warriors killed on the battlefield; an interpretation supported by a number of features of the burials, including the decoration of two of the burial amphorae. On one of these amphorae the scene depicted shows a group of warriors attacking unarmed men in what appears to be a field, alongside grazing goats (Fig. 3).[3] On the belly of the other amphora two organized lines of warriors are depicted fighting over the fallen body of a man; on the shoulder, armoured men remove the body from the battlefield, while the neck of the vessel depicts a funeral (Fig. 4).[4] The excavator suggested that these vases were produced by two separate pottery workshops, about a generation apart, and that the earlier amphora depicts a looser formation while the later amphora shows the tactics of the hoplite phalanx.[5] This identification, based on preconceived ideas about how Greek warfare developed, is flawed on a number of counts. Firstly, the so-called 'phalanx' appears to have a front row consisting of archers and slingers, who shoot at one another over the body of the deceased – this depiction is one of few contemporary vases to show archers with their own shields, or to show slingers at all. 'Hoplite warfare' – if such a thing can be said to exist at all – consisted of heavily armed spearmen who clashed at close range, with limited if any

Fig. 3 Warriors attacking unarmed men while goats graze nearby

Not shown in the drawing: four or five horsemen, one raising a spear near a corpse, another warrior on foot with a round shield, and another chariot. Paros Museum, B 3523. Author's drawing based on photographs from the museum



Fig. 4 Archers and warriors with slingshots battle over the body of a fallen warrior

Not shown in the drawing: a third slinger and two warriors with spears and shields behind the slingers; six or seven horsemen and three warriors with spears and shields behind the archers. Paros Museum, B 3524. Author's drawing based on photographs from the museum

involvement of light-armed missile troops.[6] Secondly, and more importantly, is a methodological assumption which does not hold: that pitched battles as depicted on the later amphora and raids as depicted on the earlier cannot co-exist. This incident was far from the first time and will not be the last that a Greek depiction of warfare is assumed to show the hoplite phalanx. Indeed, this assumption is not limited to Greek depictions.[7]

A similar assumption of chronological discrepancy between mass warfare and small-scale combat is found in early literature. Book 10 of the *Iliad*, in which the Greek heroes Odysseus and Diomedes engage in a night raid against the Trojan camp, is often dismissed as a later interpolation into the text of the original poem that does not 'fit' with the rest of the epic tradition; however, this ambush episode may make more sense within the epic tradition if the poems which do not survive are taken into account.[8] Summaries of lost epic poems include various ambush episodes from the Trojan War, usually performed by Odysseus and Diomedes. Indeed, the *Odyssey* includes several of these episodes of raid and ambush: Helen describes an encounter with Odysseus within Troy; her husband Menelaus recalls the ambush from the wooden horse that led to the fall of Troy; and the poem concludes with Odysseus' return to his home on Ithaca, in

disguise, where with Telemachus his son, Eumaeus the swineherd, and Philoetius the cowherd, he ambushes the Suitors pursuing his wife, Penelope.[9] Besides these episodes, Homeric heroes describe raids by land and sea throughout the epics – Homeric warfare is not just pitched battles on the plain of Troy.

The argument for 'chronological discrepancy' within the *Iliad* also raises a problematic assumption about the date at which these poems were 'composed'. It is well understood that the Homeric Epics are the product of a long oral tradition extending back into the Bronze Age, but they are usually assumed to have become 'fixed' through writing not long after the invention of the Greek alphabet in the eighth century BCE.[10] Further research into oral composition suggests that such a scheme is too simplistic; indeed, it is well acknowledged that variations of episodes from the extant epics continue to be depicted in vase painting throughout the seventh century and later.[11] It is necessary to understand that, while the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* may have become more well known and thus less susceptible to major change after the eighth century, the epic tradition continued to evolve for centuries to come.[12] It is unlikely, therefore, that these epics record a fossilized version of pre-hoplite warfare, replaced after the epics were 'fixed' *ca.* 700 BCE.

Dué and Ebbott use 'irregular', 'guerrilla', or 'alternative' warfare to describe these epic ambush episodes; however, I prefer to more broadly assert that the single model of warfare assumed for the Archaic Period of Greece – the seventh to the early fifth century BCE – does not hold up to scrutiny.[13] Rather, it is a methodological hindrance to focus on pitched battle just because many ancient sources do so. The modern scholar must approach the evidence with a more open mind. Thus, rather than focus on literary descriptions, we should look to archaeological evidence for our understanding of early Greek irregular warfare.

Orthodoxy and Heresy: A 'Western' Way of War?

There are three main schools of thought in the study of Archaic and Classical Greek warfare, all of which focus squarely – almost obsessively – on the heavily armed infantry warrior that we call the 'hoplite'. The orthodox view holds that around 700 BCE, following the composition of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, there was a political, military, and agricultural revolution across Greece. This revolution, cast by some as the rise of an agricultural 'middle class', changed the political landscape of Greece

forever, resulting in the political unit known as the *polis* and the warrior class known as 'hoplites'. These 'hoplites' fought in a dense formation, the 'phalanx', to the exclusion of almost all other fighters, and followed strict rules in order to ensure the fairness of combat. The 'hoplite phalanx' persisted unchanged for over two centuries, before the Persian and Peloponnesian wars of the fifth century gradually eroded the ideals of the hoplite, resulting in new forms of warfare and, ultimately, the collapse of the *polis* system at the end of the fourth century.[14] The second approach agrees broadly with the orthodoxy, but contends that the appearance of the hoplite is much more gradual on the basis that the armour and weapons associated with the hoplite take much of the seventh century to appear in the archaeological record and formations resembling the phalanx are not depicted on vases until the middle of that century.[15] The political implications of the 'hoplite phalanx' still emerge in the course of the seventh century, but without a revolution.

The third 'heretical', 'revisionist', or unorthodox approach challenges the orthodoxy by reading the traditional literary sources on which the orthodox understanding of Greek warfare is based with a more scrupulous and critical eye.[16] A key example is an oft-cited passage of Herodotus, in which the historian has Xerxes' cousin and advisor, Mardonius, describe the practice of Greek warfare:

> Besides, from all I hear, the Greeks usually wage war in an extremely stupid fashion, because they're ignorant and incompetent. When they declare war on one another they seek out the best, most level piece of land, and that's where they go and fight. The upshot is that the victors leave the battlefield with massive losses, not to mention the losers, who are completely wiped out.[17]

Taken at face value, this passage has been used to argue that there was a widely acknowledged 'Greek way of waging war' by the time of the Persian Wars and that this warfare followed strict rules.[18] But it has become increasingly clear that the weight of the argument based on Mardonius' words is too heavy for them: Herodotus has structured the speech to show the recklessness and duplicity surrounding the second Persian invasion, portraying Mardonius as an untrustworthy advisor concerned with personal gain; indeed, the Greek defeat of the invasion revolved entirely around avoiding pitched battle, except where the Greeks held geographical advantages as at Thermopylae and Plataea – details of the invasion we know from

Herodotus' own account.[19] It is certainly not a reliable description of a typically Greek way of war.

The basis of the orthodox idea of a political revolution believed to coincide with the emergence of the hoplite is a passage of Aristotle's *Politics*. In this passage, Aristotle sketches an outline of early Greek political history in which kings were replaced by horsemen and then hoplites – each in turn dominant on the battlefield.[20] Despite an absence of chronological evidence within Aristotle's account, historians of the orthodox school place the replacement of horsemen by hoplites at the end of the eighth century, to coincide with the apparent first appearance of hoplite equipment in the archaeological record.[21] Unorthodox historians have taken several approaches to showing the limitations of Aristotle's analysis, the most poignant of which is van Wees' comment that 'Aristotle here does little more than project his political philosophy into the past, and that his account is of almost no historical value'.[22] It is also worth noting that the evidence for 'horsemen' on the battlefield is as strong, if not stronger, in the seventh century than in the eighth.[23]

The unorthodox approach has even challenged the very words used to characterize the debate. The use of 'hoplite' to describe the heavily armed warriors of the Archaic Period is entirely modern: the Greek word *hoplitês*, on which it is based, is not known prior to the fifth century.[24] Modern scholarship identifies the hoplite by the convex, double-grip shield in use from around 700 known as the Argive shield, the *aspis*, or, in the misleading account of Diodorus, *hoplon*.[25] We know of no specific term used in the Archaic Period to describe a heavily armed warrior, such as we see in contemporary vase painting, although Tyrtaeus does distinguish between heavy- and light-armed warriors.[26] The Archaic 'hoplite' is said to have fought in a densely packed formation known as the 'phalanx', again derived from a Greek word with which the modern use has a dubious relationship. Despite the use of the term in the Homeric epics – although almost exclusively in the plural – it is not until the fourth century that *phalanx* is used, by Xenophon, to designate a dense, ordered tactical formation.[27]

In addition to more open-minded approaches to the literature, the unorthodox approach is also more receptive to archaeological evidence. If a 'hoplite revolution' were to be located in the late eighth century, incorporating the political and agricultural changes attributed to it by orthodox historians, then this revolution is entirely invisible archaeologically as land usage fails to change substantially until several centuries after

this 'revolution' is alleged to have occurred.[28] Furthermore, the understanding of Mycenaean agricultural practices, their connection to the palatial political system, and the proposed shift from an agricultural to a pastoral diet proposed by orthodox historians of Greek warfare has been shown to be entirely lacking in credibility.[29] The underlying methodological assumption that 'revolutions' in economic, social, and political structures are integrated phenomena, that one will necessarily lead to another, has also been challenged – it is far from clear that the collapse of the Mycenaean palace system led to a completely different military structure in the Greek Early Iron Age. Rather, with the collapse of palatial social and economic structures military leaders may have continued to operate in much the same ways as they had done previously for several centuries.[30] The unorthodox approach has been criticized as being destructive rather than constructive, in that it 'retreat[s] to the position that we cannot know' about early Greek history.[31] While to some extent this criticism may be true, one might respond that we *cannot* know everything, as scholars who focus on those habitually ignored by ancient sources – women, children, slaves – accept as a basic operating principle. However, it is also no longer the case that the unorthodox school offers no alternate model to the 'hoplite revolution' of early Greece. Hans van Wees has proposed that leisured landowners dominated the battlefields of Archaic Greece, the tiny fraction of the population which could afford to equip itself with the 'hoplite' panoply of bronze armour and heavy shields. These 'gentleman farmers' – really landowners – may have been accompanied into battle by their personal allies – other heavily armed – and their dependents, labourers on the land, who acted as retainers to help carry the heavy hoplite armour and who fought as light-armed missile throwers, among their heavily armed masters, ducking behind the large shields for protection. While the landowning class filled sanctuaries with dedications, commissioned large stone sculptures for their graves, and constructed fortifications and increasingly complex buildings, these lower-class labourers are largely invisible in the archaeological record.[32]

Nonetheless, the orthodox approach remains popular, perhaps as a result of the version of this hypothesis which presents 'hoplite warfare' as a particularly 'Western' – the capitalization is significant – way of war. In a number of works in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Victor Davis Hanson argued that the revolution at the end of the eighth century was significant not only to Greek history, but to the history of the Western world as a whole. Following the (inevitable, according to Hanson) collapse of the bureaucratic,

centralized Mycenaean palaces of the Greek Bronze Age with their absolute control of warfare and agriculture, the subsequent Greek 'Dark Age' was a turning-point, in which the Greeks grounded themselves in agriculture, from which developed the ideals of (male) freedom and (male) equality which have defined the West ever since. At the core of this ideology, Hanson argued, was the hoplite phalanx, a community of warriors who owned their own weapons and came together to fight decisive pitched battles on the open plain. It is as a result of this basis that Western warfare so despises the skirmish, the ambush, and guerrilla warfare.[33] The contrast between free and democratic pitched battle and 'the interminable, deracinating, and wealth-draining uncertainties of guerrilla warfare' is emphasized by John Keegan in his introduction to Hanson's tellingly titled (and tellingly capitalized) *The Western way of war*, and the moral lesson that modern democracy, in which wealth and ingenuity have replaced courage and strength, prevents male citizen soldiers from doing their duty to protect their families and property from destruction. Hanson himself mentions guerrilla fighting only rarely, the inclusion of light-armed skirmishers in the Peloponnesian war marks the decline of his hoplite ideal and the Greek city-state; it is Keegan who provides the contrast to 'Oriental' warfare.[34]

Two of the most interesting challenges to Hanson's approach have questioned how 'Greek' this warfare was and how 'Western'.[35] The former has emerged from a growing movement towards 'Mediterraneanism' in ancient Greek history; that is, from the trend to situate developments in Greece in a broader Mediterranean context.[36] With regards to warfare, this context has usually been pointed eastwards to include the Levant, Anatolia, and Egypt, and radically different conclusions have been reached regarding the similarities and differences of hoplites, their strategy, and underlying ideology to other Mediterranean heavy infantry.[37] However, there are many other ways to think about how much more varied Greek warfare actually was. If one is not searching for a single model of combat the literary and archaeological evidence reveals surprising variations in the practice of combat throughout the Archaic Period. Away from the battlefield, the epic poems and, to some extent, vase painting highlight that civilians – women, children, and the elderly – also suffered in times of war.

For the remainder of this chapter I will continue the unorthodox tradition of questioning the assumptions of the orthodox approach and proposing alternative interpretations of Archaic Greek warfare.

Regional Diversity: The 'Local Scripts' of Archaic Greek Warfare

In the study of most aspects of Archaic and even Classical Greece, variety is assumed. For example, vase painting, coinage, and sculpture all have regional variations that are the subject of numerous studies. In looking at variety in the archaeological record, it is important to question whether variety existed between regions that became more similar, or if variation develops after an idea is introduced to different regions. For example, when the Greek alphabet reappears in the eighth century BCE, different scripts are known from different areas, prompting the question whether the alphabet had a single source from which these variations deviate, or if multiple sources became more similar as states continued to interact with one another. The latter process is known in archaeological theory as 'peer-polity interaction', which states that autonomous states of similar size that interact through competition, symbolic incorporation, or trade will become more structurally similar as these interactions continue.[38] Applied to warfare, the question becomes: did the tactics of pitched battle known to modern scholars as 'hoplite warfare' spread rapidly across the Greek world and then deviate over time from their original form, or did different developments in Greek warfare culminate at around the same time and then, through interactions with one another, become more similar? Put more simply, we could ask: were there 'local scripts' of Archaic Greek warfare?

There are hints of local variation in seventh-century lyric poetry. Lyric poetry – written to be sung at various communal events among elite groups such as the symposium or religious festivals – is the most geographically diverse literary evidence to survive from Archaic Greece; however, it is a problematic source. Evidence for the dates of poets is usually late, centuries after the time at which they are said to have lived; furthermore, the certainty of poetic authorship is undermined by the possibility that all of the poetry of a particular *polis* is attributed to a heroic, 'original' poet, when it was actually composed over several generations.[39] Thus, when we talk about 'seventh-century lyric poetry', we may in fact be discussing later or traditional poems attributed to a poet for whom there may be more or less convincing evidence to indicate that they were composing in the seventh century BCE.

The most significant lyric evidence for regional variety of warfare is in a poem attributed to Archilochus, preserved in a passage of Plutarch,

writing at the turn of the second century CE. In his *Life of Theseus*, Plutarch describes the Abantes, lords of the island of Euboea, as close-quarter fighters, citing Archilochus as witness:

> There won't be many bows drawn, nor much slingshot,
> when on the plain the War-god brings the fight
> together; it will be an agony
> of swords – that is the warfare that the doughty
> barons of Euboea are expert at[40]

This fragment is often used to show that close-quarter fighting was common at the time of Archilochus, that is, the mid-seventh century.[41] However, Archilochus, himself originally from Paros, ascribes this method of fighting in particular to the Euboeans. In contrast, the poet Tyrtaeus, usually dated to the later seventh century, exhorts his fellow Spartans to fight in the front lines, but with lighter-armed troops using bows and arrows mixed in with the heavily armed spearmen. The survival of these fragments is usually the result of selective quoting by later authors, such as Plutarch, and these authors generally quoted those passages that were most relevant to their subject. Therefore, while Tyrtaeus appears to describe something like the classical close-knit phalanx of Thucydides and Xenophon, this similarity is perhaps because of the selectivity of the authors. It is therefore much more significant to note the variety, for example Tyrtaeus' inclusion of slingers and archers, distinct from Archilochus' Euboeans.[42] The significance of archers in Archaic Spartan warfare is supported by the voluminous dedications of lead figurines of squatting archers at the sanctuary of Artemis Ortheia.[43]

In proposing a homogenous style of early Greek warfare, variety in its iconographic representation has usually been attributed to regional varieties of depiction rather than regional styles of warfare. The approach of orthodox scholars relies heavily on the Corinthian school of vase painting of the middle of the seventh century, known as 'Protocorinthian', in particular an olpe – a kind of jug – found in an Etruscan grave, known as the Chigi Olpe (Fig. 5). The decoration of the top register of this vase has been described as the first 'unambiguous' depiction of 'hoplite tactics', although what is depicted on the Chigi Olpe has been challenged.[44] The orthodox interpretation places this scene just before the phalanxes clash, spears held aloft for the thrust, and the rear ranks ready to push.[45] The unorthodox school draws attention to the second spears grasped by these warriors (just visible above their helmets), the different actions of each

Fig. 5 Heavily armoured warriors enter battle – Chigi Olpe
Museo di Villa Giulia 22679. World History Archive / Alamy

'rank', and the men arming on the far left of the scene (not visible in Fig. 5), whose spears clearly display a throwing-loop – the scene is not before the clash but rather a moment at which the warriors will throw their first spear at the enemy.[46] Regardless of which interpretation one prefers, 'unambiguous' the Chigi Olpe is not.

Taking the Chigi Olpe as indicative of the typical Greek way of war also fails to acknowledge that the depiction is unique.[47] Other scenes attributed to the same painter may show a rout and pursuit – an inevitable part of most combats and certainly represented in the *Iliad* – and densely packed formations which need not be organized phalanxes.[48] When one takes in the wider Corinthian repertoire, it is certainly notable that earlier in the seventh century archers appear, and these have disappeared by the middle of the century.[49] If the Chigi Olpe depicts the 'typical' Greek way of fighting, then it is strange that it should be so rarely depicted elsewhere.

If we turn to another region of Greece, we find that the depiction of warfare is different again. Athens has a prominent series of eighth-century battle depictions, in which formations are loose, weapons are varied, and tactics limited.[50] The seventh century 'Protoattic' style gives more details of arms and armour, but little in terms of formation or tactics. Perhaps the earliest depiction of the double-grip *aspis* is the Hymettus Amphora, on which are depicted several confronted pairs of warriors fighting with shields and either swords or spears.[51] On another Protoattic vase, a

stand, two opposing forces are depicted, in which it is clear that the shields in use are convex, and perhaps that the fighting units are distinct – indeed, the only trait inconsistent with the orthodox view of the phalanx is that some of these warriors hold two spears.[52] But it would be a stretch to say that this vase represents the same formation as the Chigi Olpe. Lorimer describes these vases as 'effort[s] to represent the hoplite phalanx', but it is unclear why we should suppose that this phalanx was in the vase-painter's imagination, rather than in Lorimer's.[53]

Sixth-century Athenian black-figure vase painting complicates matters further. Tactical formations are sometimes depicted, but often in scenes which can be identified as mythological episodes. On the lid of a lekanis – a short, cup-like shape – by the C-Painter, ranks of warriors similar to those on the Chigi Olpe charge, but they are interspersed with men on horseback, and central to the scene is Neoptolemus killing Astyanax during the sack of Troy.[54] Other scenes are not obviously mythical, but include horses or chariots, elements incompatible with the 'hoplite phalanx' and thus usually deemed unhistorical. Sixth-century Corinthian depictions are similarly more chaotic than the organized files of the Chigi Olpe, and even include archers and cavalry.[55]

The mythological scenes present a conundrum at the heart of the hoplite debate: can 'hoplite' arms and armour be used in formations besides the phalanx? It is certainly the case that the Archaic vase painters of both Athens and Corinth could imagine them used in many different circumstances, exemplified by the use of contemporary equipment in depictions of mythological episodes throughout the sixth century and later, but also in non-mythological scenes of ambush.[56] The orthodox argument is that the phalanx was the 'optimum usage' of this equipment.[57] But the particular shape of the *aspis* – round, convex – suggests other situations to which it is suited – amphibious battles, dismounting from horseback – while a rectangular shield would be better for forming a shield-wall.[58] One should not assume the most prudent use of an artefact was how it was actually used. The adoption of bronze armour in the late eighth century may have been as much about display of wealth in metal than the actual protection it offered.

If the argument is to be based in Archaic Greek vase painting, then one must conclude that there do not appear to have been strict rules organizing warriors into the same formation each time. When lyric poetry is incorporated, regional variation becomes likely. The most significant evidence is for fluctuations in the prominence of the light-armed – limited in

Euboea and perhaps seventh-century Corinth – but more prominent in Sparta. With the evidence so scarce, however, it is useful to acknowledge that there was a common core to Greek warfare, reflected in the similarity of arms and armour, which came about through the interactions of these states – friendly or otherwise – and their adoption of arms, armour, and tactics from one other.

Little War, Big War: The Size and Scale of Archaic Greek Warfare

As the interpretation of the Parian amphorae offered above indicates, variety in Greek warfare is not just a matter of geography, but also of kind. In the epic tradition two types of warfare are identified: *polemos*, the daytime battle which comprises the majority of the *Iliad*, and *lokhos*, the night-time ambushes and guerrilla-type warfare of *Iliad* 10 and much of the *Odyssey*.[59] Indeed, the supreme example of guerrilla warfare in Archaic Greece is the climactic battle between Odysseus and the Suitors: 'His own home becomes a citadel occupied by an enemy force he must expel.'[60] While modern scholars have sometimes derided ambush scenes as 'un-heroic' or even 'un-Homeric', the most prestigious heroes excel at both *lokhos* and *polemos*; Diomedes is the most prominent, both as the greatest Achaean warrior in Achilles' absence and the hero of many ambushes, but Achilles too is a hero of ambush, and he accuses Agamemnon of being too cowardly to fight in either method, *polemos* or *lokhos*.[61] There is nothing in the epic tradition to suggest that ambush was un-heroic; indeed, the surviving epics suggest rather the opposite: the *lokhos* was the best test of both the courage and the endurance of the hero.[62]

Scenes of ambush from the Trojan War are often depicted in Archaic Greek iconography, as are generic scenes of ambush. The most common is Achilles' ambush of Troilos, a son of Priam, an episode that was originally part of the lost epic poem the *Cypria*.[63] These scenes follow different conventions to the depiction of ambush in surviving poetry – they do not appear to take place at night – but Achilles is often depicted crouching behind a fountain house from which Polyxena, Troilos' sister – for whom Achilles lusted – draws water or chasing one of the siblings, Troilos on horseback, or Polyxena on foot.[64] Hardship, such as long periods of crouching, is an important part of ambush scenes both in epic and in vase painting.

The earliest known depiction of the ambush that ended the Trojan War is on the neck of a relief pithos from the island Mykonos. On the body of this vessel are panels depicting the subsequent slaughter: warriors kill children in the presence of women; however, none of the women appear to be under attack and only one warrior is dead (Fig. 6). The use of warfare as a means of controlling women is a main theme of epic – the *Iliad*, like the Trojan War, begins with the capture of a woman, Chryseis, and the conflict which results.[65] The capture of cities in epic means the slaughter of children and the enslavement and rape of women, a constant fear of the Trojans and delight for the Greeks, who see the act as vengeance for the capture of Helen.[66] Besides Chryseis, Briseis, and Helen, references to women who have been or will be captured appear throughout the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, implying that this fate was not uncommon for women as victims of war.[67]

Archaic vase painting rarely reflects these consequences of warfare, and where it does it is also with reference to the mythical sack of Troy. One scene which is particularly common is the murder of Hektor's son Astyanax, in front of his grandfather Priam, by Neoptolemus, the son of

Fig. 6 Scenes from the fall of Troy

Mykonos Museum 2240. Hackenberg-PhotoCologne / Alamy

Achilles;[68] another, the rape of Kassandra by Ajax, in the chaos of the ambush rather than in its aftermath.[69] Polyxena, whom Achilles considered his prize, is depicted sacrificed at his tomb while grasped by armed men.[70] But in general, the fate of the women and children captured by the Greeks at Troy receives elaboration only in literature.

The sack of Troy is noteworthy because, while the destruction of a city might seem to be large-scale warfare, it is depicted in epic and on the Mykonos pithos as an episode of ambush, more akin to guerrilla than siege warfare. The consequences, for victor and defeated, remain the same. Several Greek cities are known to have been utterly destroyed in the Archaic Period, which may indicate that such destruction was rare, or that they were the tip of the iceberg.[71] Certainly poetry emphasizes the city at siege – even the Greek camp in the *Iliad* is fortified, and many other Archaic poems describe besieged cites.[72] However, sieges are notably absent from the iconography of the Archaic Period, unless one concedes that the warriors of the Cypro-Phoenician Amathus Bowl are Greek 'hoplites', both storming and defending a city.

Archaeological evidence for the destruction of cities is confined to the ruins of cities themselves. Complete destruction and abandonment is more archaeologically visible, but less common historically. The identification of destroyed cities in the archaeological record is problematic, largely because of what is known as the 'positivist fallacy' – the equation of what is archaeologically visible with what is historically significant.[73] The earliest convincing example of the destruction of a city in the Archaic Period is Asine, in the Argolid, which was destroyed, probably by neighbouring Argos, around 700 BCE.[74] We do not know how Asine was destroyed – whether by siege or ambush – although the involvement of light-armed troops is supported by the discovery of an arrowhead in the destruction layer. Argos is also said to have destroyed other neighbouring cities, Nauplia, Mycenae, and Tiryns, although the dates of these destructions are less secure. In addition to the destruction of cities, newly constructed fortification walls are known in the eight and seventh centuries for the first time since the Late Bronze Age.[75] However common the destruction of settlements may have been, it certainly appears to have been a recognized risk.

A notable pattern in the destruction and fortification of settlements in the eighth and seventh centuries is the proximity of these settlements to the sea. The sea adds an additional element to early Greek warfare, as many of the raids in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are amphibious operations, similar to those depicted on Athenian Geometric vessels, and literary sources from

the Near East suggest that groups believed to be Greeks were raiding the Levantine coast in the eighth century.[76] Pirates – *leistes* – are mentioned in the epics, and although their actions are neither shameful nor particularly distinct from the heroes of epic, they are not heroes.[77] On the other hand, depictions of sea-faring disappear in the seventh century, limiting the scope of the evidence. Literary sources provide some indication of naval operations in the Archaic Period and while these lack detail, the same can be said of much of the evidence for pitched battles.[78] As mentioned above, the convex shape of the *aspis* makes it particularly suited to amphibious assaults.

It is clear that variation in warfare was recognized in Archaic Greece – whether between *polemos* and *lokhos* or raiding and piracy. While the epics never call a hero a pirate, the same heavy-armoured warriors are depicted in formation, mêlée, or waiting in ambush – that is, in *polemos* or *lokhos* – at times alongside the light-armed. It seems that the distinctions modern scholars draw in ancient warfare were not drawn in the ancient world.

Conclusions: Unorthodox Warfare

Studies of warfare in the Archaic Greek world may not all focus on the hoplite, but it is a significant trend to seek out that particular kind of warrior and shine a spotlight upon them. It is certainly the case that hoplite and phalanx are at the forefront of the minds of many scholars of ancient warfare, orthodox or otherwise. But it is also worth noting that the heavily armed warrior, not yet called *hoplitês*, seems also to have been on the mind of many Archaic Greek vase – and perhaps wall – painters, given the prominence of the figure in this period. The phalanx, however, is less obvious. Insofar as tactics are concerned, the Archaic Greek warrior appears to have been flexible, adaptive to different terrain and circumstance, accompanied by light-armed, lower-class companions, and circumscribed by few, if any, rules.

The interest of vase painters in heavily armed warriors and the interest of ancient writers in the poems of Archilochus, Tyrtaeus, and others which best matched their concept of an earlier time, will always in part guide our understanding of Archaic Greek warfare, but need not do so completely. Rather than focus on similarities, themes, and shared concepts, it is fruitful to highlight variety, examine difference, and consider the selective processes through which evidence from the past comes down to us. Thus, we may consider not only the differences between the Athenian and Corinthian styles of painting pottery, but also the different ways in which they portray warfare; we can approach Archilochus and Tyrtaeus, or the two amphorae

from Paros, not as chronological points along a continuous development of warfare, but as varieties of practice across geographical regions. The evidence for such variation may be slim, but its existence is as significant for early Greek warfare as the similarities that seem to emerge later in the period. It also facilitates the incorporation of warfare into the scholarly trend of focusing on the wider, Mediterranean scope of Greek history, understanding that similarity and difference exist on a scale.

Furthermore, in focusing on contemporary evidence it is possible to see that many approaches to Archaic warfare have given moral supremacy to a certain kind of fighter while obscuring both the complexities and horrors that can be found in the evidence. Once one is trained not to focus on the hoplite, one can look to the other fighters, particularly the light armed, and see battle as dynamic and varied; but one can also examine the experience of those kept just out of sight, off the battlefield – women, children, and the elderly, whose fate is so often bemoaned throughout the *Iliad*, who appear occasionally on vases, but who have been excluded from much of the traditional dialogue on Greek warfare. Ultimately, it allows the study of Greek warfare to become a much richer and more fruitful endeavour, highlighting the variety and excitement of the dynamic world of Archaic Greece.

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Notes

1. For example, Lawrence Keeley, *War Before Civilization*, (Oxford, 1996), 75–81. On the historical context of anthropology connecting primitive and guerrilla warfare, see Keith Otterbein, 'A History of Research on Warfare in Anthropology', *American Anthropology* 101 (1999): 799.
2. See especially Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (Oxford, 1989).
3. Paros Museum, B 3523.

4. Paros Museum, B 3524.
5. Photini Zaphiropoulou, 'Geometric Battle Scenes on Vases from Paros', in *Pictorial Pursuits: Figurative Painting on Mycenaean and Geometric Pottery. Papers from two seminars at the Swedish Institute at Athens in 1999 and 2001*, eds. Eva Rystedt and Berit Wells (Stockholm, 2006), 271–277, 276–277.
6. Hanson, *Western War*, esp. 27–39.
7. For example the 'Amathus Bowl' (British Museum 123053), a Cypro-Phoenician silver bowl from Cyprus, is described as 'the earliest depiction of a hoplite phalanx', by Nino Luraghi, 'Traders, Pirates, Warriors: The Proto-History of Greek Mercenary Soldiers in the Eastern Mediterranean', *Phoenix* 60 (2006): 21–47, 37.
8. Casey Dué and Mary Ebbott, *Iliad 10 and the Poetics of Ambush: A Multitext Edition with Essays and Commentary. Hellenic Studies 30* (Washington, DC, 2010), especially 4–13 on past Homeric scholarship on *Iliad* 10.
9. Helen's story: *Odyssey* 4.240–258; Menelaus' story: *Odyssey* 4 265–289; the ambush of the Suitors: *Odyssey* 22.1–389.
10. On the 'fixing' of Homer see Ian Morris, 'The Use and Abuse of Homer', in *Oxford Readings in Homer's Iliad*, ed. D.L. Cairns (Oxford, 2001), 57–91; for a summary of the adoption of the Greek alphabet see Jonathan Hall, *A History of the Archaic Greek World ca. 1200–479 BCE* (2nd edn, Oxford, 2014), 56–59.
11. Gregory Nagy, 'An Evolutionary Model for the Making of Homeric Poetry: Comparative Perspectives', in *The Ages of Homer: A Tribute to Emily Townsend Vermule*, eds J.B. Carter and S.P. Morris (Austin, 1995), 163–179; Anthony Snodgrass, *Homer and the Artists. Text and Picture in Early Greece*. (Cambridge, 1998).
12. Dué and Ebbott, *Iliad 10*, 3–30 covers the history of the 'Homeric question' in detail, including their own approach.
13. Dué and Ebbott, *Iliad 10*, 34–35, 80.
14. See, for example: Hilda L. Lorimer, 'The Hoplite Phalanx with special reference to the poems of Archilochus and Tyrtaeus', *Annual of the British School at Athens* 42 (1947): 76–138; Hanson, *Western War*; Victor Davis Hanson, *The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization* (2nd edn, London, 1999); Victor Davis Hanson, 'The Hoplite Narrative', in *Men of Bronze. Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, eds Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano (Princeton, NJ, 2013), 256–275.
15. Anthony Snodgrass, 'The Hoplite Reform and History', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 85 (1965): 110–122; reiterated in Anthony Snodgrass, 'Setting the Frame Chronologically', in Kagan and Viggiano, *Men of Bronze*, 85–94.
16. Unorthodox viewpoints: Peter Krentz, 'The Nature of Hoplite Battle', *Classical Antiquity* 4 (1985): 50–61; Hans van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities*, (London, 2004).

17. Herodotus 7.9b.2; translated by Robin Waterfield (Oxford, 1998).
18. For example: Hanson, *Western War*, 9–10; Hall, *Archaic Greek World*, 165.
19. On Mardonius speech, see Roel Konijnendijk, 'Mardonius' Senseless Greeks', *Classical Quarterly* 67 (forthcoming 2017); against the notion of Greek 'rules of war' see Peter Krentz, 'Fighting by the Rules: The Invention of the Hoplite Agôn', *Hesperia* 71: 23–39.
20. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1297b, 16–18.
21. Gregory F. Viggiano, 'The Hoplite Revolution and the Rise of the Polis', in Kagan and Viggiano, *Men of Bronze*, 112–133, 113.
22. Hans van Wees, 'Farmers and Hoplites: Models of Historical Development' in Kagan and Viggiano, *Men of Bronze*, 222–255, 242.
23. J.J. Brouwers, 'From Horsemen to Hoplites. Some Remarks on Archaic Greek Warfare', *Babesch – Bulletin Antieke Beschaving* 82 (2007): 305–319.
24. Fernando Echeverría, 'Hoplite and Phalanx in Archaic and Classical Greece: A Reassessment', *Classical Philology* 107 (2012), 291–318, 292–303.
25. Diodorus 15.44.3; J.F. Lazenby and David Whitehead, 'The myth of the hoplite's *hoplon*', *Classical Quarterly* 46 (1996), 27–33.
26. Tyrtaeus Fr. 19 West.
27. Echeverría, 'Hoplite and Phalanx', 303–313.
28. Lin Foxhall, 'Can We See the "Hoplite Revolution" on the Ground? Archaeological Landscapes, Material Culture, and Social Status in Early Greece', in Kagan and Viggiano, *Men of Bronze*, 194–221.
29. The orthodox understanding of Mycenaean agriculture: Hanson, *Other Greeks*, 27–35; against which: Lin Foxhall, 'Bronze to Iron: Agricultural systems and political structures in Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age Greece', *Annual of the British School at Athens* 90 (1995): 239–250.
30. Stephen O'Brien, 'Achilles and the anthropologists: States, non-states, and military organisation in the Late Bronze and Early Iron Age Aegean', paper given at The Phalanx and Beyond: Ways Forward in the Study of Greek Warfare, London, UK, 25th April 2014.
31. Viggiano, 'The Hoplite Revolution', 126.
32. For 'gentleman farmers' see van Wees, 'Farmers and Hoplites', especially 236–240 on the Archaic Period generally, and 240–45 on the development of the 'hoplite phalanx' and the light-armed as 'retainers'; for the light-armed using the shields of the heavy-armed, see Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, 173–74.
33. While these themes permeate all of Hanson's writing, of particular importance are Hanson, *Other Greeks* on agriculture throughout, on the Mycenaean Palaces 27–35, and on 'Western' ideals 403–04; Hanson, *Western War*, on pitched battles. Hanson is also the only ancient historian of whom I know to have an article entirely devoted to exposing the ideological underpinnings of his work: Francisco Javier Gonzáles Garcia and Pedro

Lópes Barja de Quiroga, 'Neocon Greece: V.D. Hanson's War on History', *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 19: 129–151.

34. John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (London, 1994), 332–33 shows the contrast between 'primitive' warfare and the 'hoplite phalanx', with Hanson's influence openly cited.
35. Ian Morris, *War: What is it Good For? The Role of Conflict in Civilisation, from Primates to Robots* (London, 2014), 64–111 challenges the idea that 'the Western way of war' is particularly 'Western'.
36. Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, 'The Mediterranean and "the New Thalassology"', in *The American Historical Review* 111 (2006): 722–740.
37. Kurt A. Raaflaub, 'Early Greek Infantry Fighting in a Mediterranean Context', in Kagan and Viggiano, *Men of Bronze*, 95–111; Hans van Wees, 'The Other Hoplites, or: what's so special about Greek heavy infantry?', paper given at The Phalanx and Beyond: Ways Forward in the Study of Greek Warfare, London, UK, 25th April 2014.
38. Colin Renfrew, 'Introduction: peer polity interaction and socio-political change', in *Peer Polity Interaction and Socio-Political Change*, eds Colin Renfrew and J.F. Cherry, (Cambridge, 1986), 1–18.
39. Hall, *Archaic Greek World*, 6.
40. Plutarch, *Theseus* 5.1–4; Archilochus Fr. 3 West; translated by M.L. West (Oxford, 1993). West translates *douriklutoi*, 'spear-famed', as 'doughty', to convey that the epithet is not necessarily to be taken literally.
41. The date of Archilochus is derived from the description of a solar eclipse in Archilochus Fr. 122 West, which has been dated to 6 April 648 BCE. On Archilochus as evidence for the decline of the bow, see Lorimer, 'Hoplite phalanx', 114–121; On Archilochus as evidence for Euboean hand-to-hand fighting see Walter Donlan, 'Archilochus, Strabo and the Lelantine War', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 101 (1970): 131–142; meanwhile Hall, *Archaic Greek World*, 1–7 is essential on the 'Lelantine War'. Zaphiropoulou, 'Geometric Battle Scenes', 276 suggests that this fragment describes the same scene as Paros Museum B 3524.
42. On Tyrtaeus and the selective preservation of lyric poetry, see Hans van Wees, 'The development of the hoplite phalanx: Iconography and reality in the seventh century', in *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, ed. Hans van Wees, (London, 2000), 125–166, 149; Hall, *Archaic Greek World*, 176–178.
43. Van Wees, 'Iconography and reality', 152–54.
44. Hall, *Archaic Greek World*, 170.
45. Lorimer, 'Hoplite phalanx', 80–83.
46. For example: Van Wees, 'Iconography and reality', 134–39.
47. Fragments of a wall painting from the seventh-century Temple of Apollo at Kalapodi have been reconstructed as a similar scene to that on the Chigi

Olpe, but this reconstruction is based on the Chigi Olpe itself: W.D. Niemeier, B. Niemeier, and A. Brysbaert, 'The Olpe Chigi and new evidence for early archaic Greek wall-painting from the oracle sanctuary of Apollo at Abai (Kalapodi)', in E. Muglione and A. Benincasa (eds) *L'Olpe Chigi: storia di un agalma: atti del Convegno internazionale, Salerno, 3–4 giugno 2010* (Salerno, 2012), 79–86.

48. Rout and pursuit: the Macmillan aryballos (British Museum 1889.4-18.1) in Lorimer, 'Hoplite phalanx', 104–05 or Van Wees, 'Iconography and reality', 142. Dense formation: the Berlin Aryballos (Berlin 3773) in Lorimer, 'Hoplite phalanx', 84–85 or Van Wees, 'Iconography and reality', 140–42.
49. For example an aryballos from Leichaion (Corinth Museum CP-2096).
50. Gudrun Ahlberg, *Fighting on Land and Sea in Greek Geometric Art* (Stockholm, 1971); Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, 166–68.
51. Beazley No. 1001756.
52. Beazley No. 1001740.
53. Lorimer, 'Hoplite phalanx', 89.
54. Beazley No. 300496.
55. Chaotic: Louvre E 622; Archers and cavalry: British Museum 1814,0704.491.
56. Mythological scenes: Beazley Nos 300496, 42143, and 201724. Non-mythological scenes of ambush: Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York 26.60.76.
57. Hanson, 'The hoplite narrative', 267; also, Lorimer, 'Hoplite phalanx', 128: the shield 'implies hoplite tactics'.
58. Amphibious conflicts: John R. Hale, 'Not Patriots, Not Farmers, Not Amateurs: Greek Soldiers of Fortune and the Origins of Hoplite Warfare', in Kagan and Viggiano, *Men of Bronze*, 176–193, 189; horseback: Brouwers, 'Horsemen to hoplites'.
59. Dué and Ebbott, *Iliad 10*, 34–43.
60. Madeleine M. Henry, 'The Traffic in Women: From Homer to Hipponax, from War to Commerce', in *Greek Prostitutes in the Ancient Mediterranean, 800* bce*–200* ce, eds A. Glazebrook and M.M. Henry (Madison, WI, 2011), 14–33, 24.
61. The tradition that book 10 was not originally part of the *Iliad*, including the ancient precedents, is discussed by Dué and Ebbott, *Iliad 10*, 3–30, with references; for ambush as 'un-heroic' and 'un-Homeric' see Malcolm Davies *The Greek Epic Cycle* (2nd edn, London, 2001), 47, 66–67; Achilles accuses Agamemnon: *Iliad* 1.225–228; Achilles is successful at ambush: *Iliad* 9.323–327, 21.34–39, as well as the myth of Troilos.
62. Dué and Ebbott, *Iliad 10*, 43–49; Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, 132–33.
63. For example Beazley Nos 457, 300000 (the François Vase), and 301715.
64. Dué and Ebbott, *Iliad* 10, 44–45.

65. Lin Foxhall, 'Gender', in *A Companion to the Archaic Greek World*, eds Kurt A. Raaflaub and Hans van Wees (Hoboken, 2011), 483–507, 484.
66. Henry, 'Traffic in Women', 2118–22; rape of Trojan women revenge for Helen: *Iliad* 2.354–56.
67. For example *Iliad* 6.289–92, 8.287–91, 22.60–65; *Odyssey* 4.682–83, 22.421–23, 24.208–12; Henry, 'Traffic in Women', especially 25.
68. Beazley Nos. 310170, 201724, and 203900.
69. Beazley Nos. 310314 and 201724.
70. British Museum 1897,0727.2; Beazley No. 310027.
71. Rare: Henk Singor, 'War and International Relations' in Raaflaub and van Wees, *Archaic Greek World*, 585–603, 586–87; the tip of the iceberg: Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, 124–26.
72. *Iliad* 18.509–40; Archilochus Fr. 98 West; *The Shield of Herakles*, 239–40
73. Anthony Snodgrass, *An Archaeology of Greece: The Present State and Future Scope of a Discipline* (Berkeley, 1987), 36–66.
74. Hall, *Archaic Greek* World, 160–61; Strabo 8.6.11; Pausanias 2.36.4–5, 3.7.4, 4.8.3. 4.34.9.
75. Rune Frederiksen, *Greek City Walls of the Archaic Period 900–480 BC* (Oxford, 2011).
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78. Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, 203–06.

Dr Matthew Lloyd studied Classics and Classical Archaeology at the University of Oxford, completing his DPhil in 2014. His research focuses on warfare from the end of the Greek Bronze Age to the Archaic Period (*ca.* 1200– *ca.* 480 BCE) including burials with weapons, vase painting, and the destruction of settlements. He is currently working on the British School at Athens excavations of Xeropolis-Lefkandi, where he has been a team member since 2007.

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