# Discourse and Struggle in Minority Language Policy Formation

Corsican Language Policy in the EU Context of Governance

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Acknowledgements

List of Acronyms

ADECEC	Association pour le Développement des Etudes Archéologiques, Historiques, Linguistiques et Naturalistes du Centre-Est de la Corse
AER	Association of European Regions
ARC	Action Régionaliste Corse
BELMR	Bureau Européen pour les Langues les Moins Répandues (see also EBLUL)
CAPES	Certificat d'Aptitude Professionnelle à l'Enseignement Secondaire (see PGCE)
CCECV	Conseil de la Culture, de l'Education et du Cadre de Vie (de l'Assemblée de Corse)
CCU	Centre Culturel Universitaire (de l'Université de Corse)
CDDP	Centre Départemental de Documentation Pédagogique
CIEMEN	Centre Internacional Escarré per a les Minories Etniques i les Nacions
CoE	Council of Europe
CoR	Committee of the Regions (of the EU)
CPMRE	Conference for Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe
CRC	Centre de Recherches Corses
CRDP	Centre Régional de Documentation Pédagogique
CTC	*Collectivité Territoriale de Corse*
DEUG	Diplôme d'Etudes Universitaires Générales
EBLUL	European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (see also BELMR)
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EYL 2001	European Year of Languages (2001)
FLNC	Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale
FR3	France Région 3 (French public TV channel)
FRC	Front Régionaliste Corse
IMEDOC	Iles de la Méditeranée Occidentale
INED	Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques
INSEE	Institut National de Statistiques et d'Etudes Economiques

INTERREG	(EU) Interregional Cooperation Programme
IUFM	Instituts Universitaires de Formation des Maîtres
IUT	Institut Universitaire de Technologie
JDC	Journal de la Corse (weekly Corsican newspaper)
JO	Journal Officiel (de la République Française)
LCC	Langue et Culture Corses
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
OJ(EC)	Official Journal (of the European Community)
PGCE	Post Graduate Certificate of Education (see CAPES)
PULA	Publications Universitaires de Linguistique et d'Anthropologie (Centre de Recherches Corses de l'Université de Corse)
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
RCFM	Radio Corsica Frequenza Mora
RML	Regional and/or Minority Language
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UN	United Nations

Abstract

Various scholarly traditions have contributed to document the multifaceted relations between language planning and the distribution of political power in conflict-laden nation-building processes. With the construction of the European Union (EU), these relations are re-contextualised, because the EU project aims to create a supranational polity by integrating nation-states. This involves deciding on an approach to the constitutive linguistic diversity resulting from gathering many polities and languages. This study looks at sociolinguistic issues of Regional and/or Minority Language (RML) status and planning in this European context. It explores the links between competing political and linguistic ideologies and RML policy making in the EU at supranational, national and regional levels, concentrating on how political and/or linguistic ideologies are enshrined and operationalised in various legal/institutional and policy frameworks. Its ultimate objective is to examine whether the EU glottopolitical construction has affected one particular case of RML planning: the conflict-laden glottopolitical relationship between France and Corsica, and, if so, whether this has happened in ways that may contribute to reversing French-Corsican diglossic hierarchies and language shift.

Language policy formation is examined at three different levels and the analysis takes account of the fact that, at all levels, actual policy outcomes result from the complex negotiations between actors possessing varying discursive and/or legal and/or institutional powers. Since each level has been historically constructed *sui generis*, and involves a specific pattern of distribution of policy powers amongst varying numbers of actors, each level interacts with other levels in specific ways. Consequently, different theoretical and methodological frameworks are used to identify what players – with what respective powers – interact at each and/or across levels, and how.

At the supranational level, the theoretical/methodological tools used to analyse language policies are governance theory and power dependency theory, the concept of policy networks and the critical discourse analysis method. The analyses ultimately show that, on RML-related decisions, it is nation-states that remain largely sovereign. At the national level, RML policy-making processes vary according to the brand of linguistic nationalism that prevailed during nation-building

processes. I explore these through competing theories of linguistic nationalism and their respective conceptions of the nation and of language, focusing in particular on the complex ways in which these notions interrelate in French linguistic essentialism. I show how French 'traditional' linguistic nationalism and its constitutive ideology of monolingualism have been historically translated into legal/institutional provisions and then why and how, in recent years, a more liberal, national RML policy has emerged that has altered France's diglossic profile, albeit minimally. In Corsica, this has coincided with an experimental devolution plan through which a new RML policy network could surface. The dominant actors in that network have since attempted to reverse diglossic hierarchies through language-in-education planning but in such very unorthodox and contested ways as to sign away language revitalisation.

In that connection, this study shows that whilst legal issues of language status predominate in negotiations at, with and between other levels, in Corsican regional-local interactions, disputes between policy makers and their addressees largely revolve around corpus management issues. In turn, the strong emphasis on corpus issues means that language policies devised at the other levels, with their main focus on status issues, have less relevance to Corsica's RML policy developments and elite and popular attitudes to language plans at grassroots level.

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Introduction

This study investigates how the advent and functioning of a supranational polity like the European Union (hereafter EU) has modified the relations of power underlying Regional and/or Minority Language (hereafter RML) politics and policy making in Western Europe in general, and glottopolitical[1] relations between France and Corsica in particular. I examine the extent to which change in RML glottopolitics results from the complex interplay of ideological motivations, legal provisions and institutional practice at and across supranational, national and subnational levels of society. Therefore, the discourses on language, identity and the language-identity link produced at and across these three levels, and the complex ways in which these discourses interact in language policy formation, are central themes of investigation.

The construction of the EU supranational framework of reference has re-configured the context of ideological, legal and institutional bargaining on RML issues, from a formerly bi-lateral model of political bargaining over (often conflict-laden) issues of RML recognition and rights between individual nation-states and their respective, territorialised subnational entities (the regions), into a tri-dimensional space characterised by patterns of multilevel, multi-actor governance. In this book, I investigate how the interaction of dominant and resistant discourses on language, identity and language planning, which occurs at, but also transcends, all three levels of this space affects RML politics and planning.

Within the aforementioned new ideological/political, legal/institutional and sociolinguistic space, I argue that patterns of power distribution over issues of RML rights and policy are negotiated in various supranational, national and subnational fora, and involve, at each and all levels, a variety of actors with various ideological motivations and

unequal bargaining resources. Put otherwise, considering that ideological changes are constitutive of broad social and cultural change, I examine the extent to which European construction has both established a new arena and perhaps also modified pre-existing arenas for discursive struggle and changes on RML issues. My ultimate objective is to explore how political and/or linguistic ideologies are enshrined and operationalised in various legal/institutional and policy frameworks. To this end, I consider how the EU glottopolitical construction has affected one particular case: the conflict-laden glottopolitical relationship between France and Corsica.

This study thus examines the distribution of glottopolitical power between the participants in these arenas, diachronically and synchronically, and both at and across European (or supranational), national and subnational levels. Language policy formation is scrutinised both at and across levels, because not only does each level possess its own, historically shaped internal dynamic, thus requiring a specific theoretical frame of analysis, but it also interacts with the other two in specific ways.

Several frameworks of analysis are therefore drawn upon, bringing together theoretical and/or methodological contributions from political theory, social theory and sociolinguistics. Ultimately, this study aims to contribute to the field of language planning in particular and sociolinguistics in general, both in its detail and by extending the social theoretical framework of sociolinguistics.

I take the case of language policy formation in Corsica because it is exemplary in at least three respects. Firstly, as a Mediterranean, mountainous island whose acculturation to France has never been fully achieved, Corsica has maintained a cultural and linguistic specificity that could be capitalised on in its recent political and sociolinguistic history. The Corsican case thus offers a telling example of persistent conflict-ridden relations between a periphery and its core. Secondly, being within the political sphere of France, Corsica has dialogued with what has long been considered by many experts as one of the most conservative and RML-unfriendly polities in Western Europe, which has led to particularly acute political tensions. At the same time, because of these very tensions, Corsica has served as a testing ground for France's devolution policy from the 1980s, and this has reinforced the specific context of the island's glottopolitics. Thirdly, despite sociolinguistic devolution and a thorough process of language institutionalisation (albeit within the limits of France's sociolinguistic tolerance), Corsican language revitalisation efforts have obtained limited success. I will show

that this is largely due to the unorthodox, social-constructionist political and language ideologies that have informed the revitalisation process and made the Corsican approach rather unique in European minority language revitalisation contexts.

The book is divided into eight chapters of unequal lengths. Chapter 1 constructs the theoretical frames. I begin at the supranational level. I show that using a governance approach – articulated on power dependency theory and the methodological tools of policy network and Critical Discourse Analysis – helps overcome the weaknesses of more traditional sociolinguistic approaches to language status looking exclusively at legal provisions and paying too little attention to the actual process of policy formation. Ultimately, the governance framework explains how language policy is *made* in the EU, accounting more satisfactorily for the intricacies of policy formation by investigating which actors can participate in policy making, with what bargaining resources and according to what norms, values and motivations. In a more traditional sociolinguistic account, this process of bargaining is often invisible or unaccounted for. In the rest of this study, this analytical framework is then transposed to the national and especially subnational levels.

Moreover, as this study later demonstrates, at supranational level, member states remain core players in many policy areas, including language, because they remain largely hegemonic in producing and interpreting legal texts. To understand what the sources of dominant powers and the ideology underpinning them are, and ultimately how they inform language policy formation, one must address issues of language and political power as they first emerged and became prominent at national levels.

The second part of Chapter 1 therefore critically outlines several approaches to the dynamics of multilingual situations from various academic disciplines. I begin with a review of early research on the link between language, nationalism and nation-building processes, showing that approaches with that focus bring useful insights into the origins of the language status asymmetries currently observable in modern nation-states, and how these asymmetries have been historically shaped, during nation-building processes, both by political rhetoric about the relationship between language and identity and by processes of modernisation (e.g. Fishman, 1972b). Similarly, the sociolinguistic concept of diglossia constitutes a useful snapshot of language status asymmetries, and of the distribution of language functions amongst languages, in multilingual contexts.

Yet, as critical sociolinguists have shown (e.g. Cameron, 1990; Williams, 1992; May, 2001), these approaches suffer from similar, severe limitations on two related points. First, they assume that the processes whereby sociolinguistic situations changed during nation-building processes – according to various patterns of language maintenance and/or language shift – were conflict-free and fully endorsed by the social groups amongst whom these changes took place. Second, they promote a conception of language – as objectified (reified) and given iconic status (totemised) – which reflects these conflict-free perspectives and says little about the dynamics of change in language repertoires and about actual language practices.

In that connection, Bourdieu's sociology of language and power – in particular his concepts of linguistic habitus and linguistic markets – is more satisfactory in that it integrates the notion of social conflict and resistance to acculturation into descriptions of nation-building processes, *inter alia* by acknowledging that processes of language reification and totemisation themselves serve to construct social inequalities (Bourdieu, 1991). Bourdieu, however, argues that such inequalities can be and are resisted and that the social body is not unified and conflict-free. This implies that the contexts, meanings and nature of actual language uses themselves are not as clearly delineated as the above perspectives suggest and that the complex ways in which actual language uses reflect and enact patterns of identity formation and related conceptions of political allegiance must be accounted for. This is where Bourdieu's approach has limited value, because his theoretical contribution indicates no methodology to collect data on political and language ideologies and their relations to language use. As we will see, more recent linguistic anthropological approaches have largely contributed to address that methodological gap (Rampton, 1995; Heller, 1999; Jaffe, 1999).

For our purpose here, to understand language policy formation at local levels, more information is needed on the following: 1. the diachronic and synchronic dynamics of compliance with and resistance to political change through which sociolinguistic change took place in France and Corsica during nation-building processes and is currently taking place in France and Corsica and through the construction of the EU; 2. the various political and linguistic ideologies shaped during those processes, which inform both language policy actors negotiating policy designs and implementation at and across the aforementioned levels of analysis and the people for whom such policies are being designed (see Thiers, 1989; Jaffe, 1999); 3. information on the extent to which the various ideologies of policy makers are congruent, or not, with those of the recipients of language policies, which will determine the latter's

attitudes to language plans and eventually condition the acceptance of such plans.

Chapters 2 and 3 examine the development of language policies in the EU and the emergence of a RML policy network, and assess the latter's success in promoting RMLs at EU level. Chapter 2 first explores the ideological and legal foundations of the EU's sociolinguistic regime through a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of fundamental legal texts regulating the use of languages in the European Economic Community (EEC) and argues that the original 1958 design was articulated on discourses of multilingualism and language equality between national-state languages but originally devoted no political space to RML protection and promotion. Chapter 2 then shows that EU education and cultural policies (which were introduced as new sectors of EU competence in 1992), although containing no explicit reference to RMLs, have been a constant site and stake of ideological struggle for RML activists to obtain a durable legal basis for RMLs. I assess the success of that struggle, contrasting EU legal experts' and RML activists' contradictory interpretations of both treaty articles on education and culture and a variety of legal texts and implementation provisions, as well as on various Opinion texts produced by RML activists, and I show that pro-RML discourses of resistance to the exclusive protection of national-state language have not, in fact, been actualised in EU law.

Chapter 3 then brings evidences that, since the 1970s, the legal and institutional construction of the EU has then facilitated the emergence of a RML policy network that gave institutional representation and/or access to the advocates of a more inclusive EU approach to cultural/linguistic diversity and that, despite the apparent absence of EU legal competences on RML issues, the EU system of multi-level governance sets up certain contradictions that can allow spaces to be created for RMLs. As a result, the RML policy network could succeed in bypassing certain EU legal blockages and prompt an actual RML policy. After describing the processes whereby this could happen – drawing on historical accounts of the evolving role and powers of the European Parliament (hereafter EP) (e.g. Corbett *et al.,* 2000), as well as my own data collected through interviews with members of the EP – I argue that, beyond financial support, RML activists have nevertheless obtained only limited political success in their attempt to obtain some recognition for RMLs at EU level. I then claim that in today's EU it is still nation-states that retain the greatest glottopolitical powers because they monopolise legal hegemony.

As was indicated above, to understand whether the current exclusion of RMLs from the EU legal corpus may be overcome in the future,

it becomes necessary to explore the ideologies hegemonic at national levels to see whether such ideologies can be effectively challenged internally by RML activists.

Chapter 4, therefore, examines the history of French language policy making, relating it to the language ideologies that inform both French nation-building processes and the perceived role of French beyond the boundaries of the nation. The first part reviews the literature on early language planning measures in pre-Revolution France, outlining the historical salience of the ideological foundations of French linguistic nationalism, and shows that the reification of French and its totemisation as the embodiment of formal clarity, rationalism and universal humane values predate the Revolution. The second part first analyses the reification and totemisation of the nation during the Revolution through a variety of texts produced by revolutionaries, scrutinising the complex relationship between language, the nation and the state that revolutionaries theorised in essentialist terms and sought to actualise. It goes on to chart corollary institutional and policy developments and to explore actual sociolinguistic change in France between the Revolution and WWII, underlining how uneven this was across regions.

In the third part, spanning from WWII till today, I first illustrate how, from the 1960s, traditional French linguistic nationalism has been increasingly challenged both by growing language competition from English and by regionalist political and cultural demands largely motivated by uneven economic development amongst regions. As a response to the former, France developed more active strategies of language institutionalisation and of status and corpus management. As for regionalist demands, central authorities have been compelled to accommodate them, notably through regionally differentiated political devolution and greater flexibility towards RML education rights. As both forms of pressure intensified in the 1990s, France responded to each form of pressure *ad hoc*, creating a situation in which its discourses and actual language policies have become more inconsistent and contradictory both on the international scene and domestically, as the analysis of the contrast between French domestic language legislation (in 1992 and 1994) and France's sociolinguistic discourses in supranational arenas clearly demonstrates. In the final sections, I scrutinise how such contradictions and inconsistencies have eventually culminated during the debates on the ratification of the Council of Europe's (hereafter CoE) *European Charter for RMLs* (1999), showing that political and linguistic ideologies inherited from the Revolution remain deeply entrenched.

Chapters 5–8 relate the aforementioned contradictions to the (glotto-)political struggles between France and Corsica since the island's annexation (1769). I scrutinise the relationships between language ideologies and language planning on Corsica within two frameworks – that of Corsica's conflict-laden glottopolitical relationships with France and that of internal socio-political and sociolinguistic developments on Corsica itself. Drawing on various monographs on Corsica's political, socio-anthropological and sociolinguistic evolution since 1769 (e.g. respectively, Gil, 1991; Marchetti, 1989; Andréani, 1999), Chapters 5 and 6 respectively outline the political and sociolinguistic history of the island, describing how French nationalism altered patterns of political allegiance, nation and identity building, and language use in Corsica between 1769 and the late 1960s, when France's traditional political-ideological centralism came under challenge. I show how processes of French nation building in Corsica – the imposition of French political and language ideologies – have failed completely to eradicate traditional patterns of political loyalty and 'resistant' Corsican language use. I show that socio-economic inequalities and correlated incomplete acculturation to France have cyclically entailed the rise of sentiments of Corsican nationhood and fostered competing discourses on language, identity and the nation (examined in detail in Chapter 8), and I relate this to massive language shift. In the context of the economic, demographic, political and cultural crisis of the 1960s, these discourses have gained new political currency, attracted popular support and eventually led to political and sociolinguistic devolution.

Chapters 7 and 8 examine the emergence of Corsican language planning in this new devolved context from the 1970s and the concomitant, constitutive rise of a Corsican language policy network from the early 1980s. Chapter 7 examines various (regional) institutional texts, as well as policy documents issued by a number of political and sociocultural lobbying groups, and describes the phases and domains of institutionalisation of the language, showing that acquisition planning has become the main domain of RML promotion. Analysing various texts on Corsica's patterns of supranational institutionalisation, I then look at the extent to which Corsican language planners have attempted to find support for Corsican at the European level and argue that the EU has had only embryonic spin-offs in Corsica, essentially because RML policy gains within France have gone beyond what the EU can offer. In the final section, the analysis of quantitative data on school attendance and sociolinguistic census data illustrates that, despite substantial progress in status planning and institutional developments, especially on the

island, language shift has not been reversed and Corsican language use continues to decline.

In Chapter 8, I argue that this apparent contradiction results from the (mistaken) belief that language institutionalisation alone can suffice to reverse language shift (see the case of Ireland) and from the correlated failure to measure the weight of essentialist folk, political and language ideologies in patterns of resistance to language revitalisation plans. I argue that folk ideologies have been so ingrained in people's normative approaches to the relations between language, identity and the nation during nation-building processes in Western Europe (as demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 4 and to some extent in Chapter 5) that they largely determine popular attitudes and behaviours to political and sociolin-guistic plans. This is even more conspicuous in the Corsican case where elite-driven language revitalisation plans developed from both a social-constructionist philosophy of the identity/language link and a (critical) sociolinguistic approach to the nature of the object *language*.

Drawing largely on monographs on Corsican glottopolitics (e.g. Thiers, 1989 and Jaffe, 1999), and on my own interview data with lead-ing language policy actors and/or language activists collected during my fieldwork in Corsica in 2000–2001, I analyse how the deeprooted-ness of ideological forms of political and linguistic essentialism, in their various manifestations, explain and enact various resistant discourses to the institutionalisation of the Corsican language and to the various modalities of corpus planning.

Analysing a number of (daily, weekly and monthly) newspapers and magazine articles published in 2000–2001, I finally examine how widely these various language ideological trends circulated in the Corsican press between 2000 and 2001 and claim that language-related discur-sive struggles have now shifted from a focus on status planning to issues of corpus planning. My ultimate contention is that such disputes sig-nificantly account for the limited success of both Corsican language revitalisation and the 'Europeanization' of Corsican glottopolitics.

In that connection, although the construction of the EU as a system of multilevel governance can open new spaces for RML promotion, RML situations largely differ from one another for a variety of reasons, and such differences at local levels need to be understood for they largely determine the extent to which particular RMLs can exploit the oppor-tunities, which the addition of a new political level of society beyond that of nation-states – the EU – can create. Conversely, by documenting the particulars of individual RML communities, comparative analysis should, in the long run, help devise better adapted language policies at supranational levels.

1
Theoretical Frameworks and Methodological Implications: Regional and Minority Language Politics and Policy Making in the EU

Introduction

The broad theoretical aim of this study is to expand the social-theoretical foundations of sociolinguistics in continuation of a process begun *inter alia* by critical sociolinguists (e.g. Williams, 1992) and Linguistic anthropologists (e.g. Jaffe, 1999). My own contribution to expanding such foundations consists in exploring what political-theoretical and social-theoretical frameworks developed in various scholarly traditions can further contribute to reinforce the theoretical foundations of sociolinguistics and ultimately in providing a better understanding of glottopolitics and language policy formation in general and minority language policy-making processes in the EU in particular.

This chapter establishes a research framework to study the variety of language issues linked to EU integration processes, to questions of political and cultural/linguistic identities in national/sub-national relations and to the interaction between supranational developments and national/subnational relations. Its ultimate aim is to establish a sound theoretical and methodological framework first to measure the impact of EU integration processes on Regional and Minority Language (RML) politics and policy making (hereafter RML glottopolitics) at EU level, second to map out the politico-ideological framework against which RML legal/institutional and policy developments take place in France and Corsica, and third to examine ways in which supranational, national and sub-national levels may each interact with the others.

The actual impact of integration processes at national and sub-national levels will then be further explored in subsequent chapters.

My initial hypothesis is that change in RML glottopolitics results from the complex interplay of ideological motivations, legal provisions and institutional practice at and across all these social levels. Methodologically, this implies that this interplay must be studied at each level *per se* – because the dynamics of each level is *sui generis* and has been historically shaped in specific ways – and across levels because it may be the case that none of the levels is impervious to the others.

In the first part of this chapter, I therefore establish a multi-theoretical framework to explore the political economy of languages in the EU at the supranational level. I first outline the initial sociolinguistic regime of the EU, broadly sketching the ideological assumptions and legal measures that shaped it. In doing so, I argue that broad structural models of analysis focusing exclusively on legal provisions fail to capture both the causality and the nature of change in the current sociolinguistic regimes of the EU. The causes of change include *inter alia* practical considerations – financial and technical – that have come to challenge the original 'macro-' design and provisions, and the institutional game that eventually led to creating an actual RML policy despite the absence of a formal EU competence in that domain. In the following sections, I then go on to establish a multi-theoretical and multi-methodological framework that draws on various social-theoretical contributions and language/textual analytical traditions to explain the discrepancy between the macro-structural visions of the legal order and actual institutional practices and policy outcomes.

At the end of the 'supranational' sections, I argue that despite policy developments favourable to RML promotion and possible changes to come, which can already be traced in EU glottopolitical discourses and/or anticipated from ongoing political and institutional developments, the makeup and control of the EU sociolinguistic regime today remains largely in the hands of member states. To see whether the retention of glottopolitical powers by member states may result in future, more pro-active measures for RML promotion, I then examine the political and linguistic ideologies, norms and values that have prevailed during nation-building processes and see if these are and/or can be challenged at domestic levels. Arguably, inasmuch as member states remain dominant players in establishing supranational frameworks for RML promotion, binding RML international legislation is unlikely to emerge if changes do not first occur at national levels.

Consequently, the second part of this chapter establishes a theoretical framework to scrutinise the dynamics of RML glottopolitics at national and sub-national levels. I critically review several approaches to linguistic diversity (including dialectal variety) in nation-state contexts: 1. early political theoretical approaches to the relationship between language and nationalism; 2. the sociolinguistic concept of diglossia; 3. Bourdieu's sociology of language and power (Bourdieu, 1991) and I point to more recently developed ethnographic approaches to language ideologies (e.g. Jaffe, 1999). My ultimate aim is to examine the context and intricacies of RML policy making at national levels by investigating the historical origins and contemporary purchase of the political and linguistic ideologies currently dominant in national (and sub-national contexts), in particular the hegemonic approaches to the language-identity link underpinning dominant political economies of languages.

I begin with a critical exploration of political approaches to linguistic nationalism and the role of language in nation-building processes. I show that these offer useful insights into how the relationships between language, identity and power were durably shaped during nation-building processes but that, because of their epistemological biases, they fall short of accounting exhaustively for language ideologies and actual language uses. I then look at the sociolinguistic concept of diglossia and argue that it suffers from the same epistemological limitations. The critique of both these perspectives illustrates the necessity to transcend structuralist and essentialist approaches to issues of language status and language use in multilingual contexts. In that respect, Bourdieu's sociology of language and power, and in particular the central concepts of his approach to political economies of language – linguistic *habitus* and linguistic markets – illustrate how language ideologies and language uses vary across linguistic marketplaces. As he shows, dominant ideologies and dominant patterns of identity and attitude prevailing in the dominant markets can sometimes yield to alternative ideologies and approaches to identity making in alternative markets. In turn, such alternative ideologies can enact resistance to language shift. Paradoxically, though, they may also sign away RML revitalisation efforts either because those efforts are embedded in dominant, essentialist approaches to language planning or, conversely, because they challenge such essentialist premises, as the Corsican case shows. To go beyond these apparent paradoxes, then, what is needed, as the last section claims, is ethnographic information on the wide array of actual language ideologies and language practices

and how they interrelate. Such information ultimately provides better information on the pre-conditions of acceptance of language revitalisation plans by those for whom they are designed (Rubin, 1971). Put otherwise, following Cameron (1995) and Jaffe (1999), RML revitalisation plans must acknowledge dominant folk ideologies if they are to be successful.

Language issues in the EC – Official and Working languages, and RMLs

In the initial sociolinguistic regime of the EU (established in 1958, see Chapter 2), legal provisions established official and working languages within the EU institutional apparatus. From its inception, the EU opted for a multilingual language policy that granted the status of official and institutional working language to all member states' national/state languages. Language diversity and multilingualism – the equal respect for and treatment of national/state official languages at the supranational level – did not have the scope they have come to acquire following the various EU enlargement waves. Four languages were originally concerned, and the EC was then hardly different from other international organisations with official and working languages, e.g. the UN.

The Community's stance for multilingualism had predominantly symbolic, ideological determinants. Multilingualism was understandably regarded as a highly symbolic and necessary feature within a supranational organisation intent on constructing long-lasting peace through supra-national economic collaboration and, in the longer term, a politico-ideological commitment to liberal democracy: what legitimacy could the EC have indeed gained had it not treated its founding members equally? In the aftermath of WWII, the idea of national discrimination – the question of national preferences and hierarchies was loathed whatever forms it might take. The reconstruction of Europe hinged on the principles of reconciliation and mutual respect between nation-states. The principles of equality and respect for diversity governing the granting of language status participated in that effort: the sociolinguistic regime of the EU was characterised by (the construction of supranational) unity in (the respect of intergovernmental) diversity. These principles had constitutive force and were thus logically inscribed in Community law. Insofar as rules concerning the languages of the Community were determined by member states' representatives

acting unanimously, they first seemed to assure member states that official multilingualism and equal working language status were coterminous and unchallengeable. Second, the law guaranteed linguistic democracy for European citizens, who could henceforth access the new body of Community laws to which they were subjected in their own state/national language. For their political representatives within the Community institutions, in theory, it also meant the possibility to fulfil their political mandates in their own respective state/national language (see Chapter 2). Finally, at a more 'down-to-earth' level, the financial cost of official multilingualism within the young Community was proportional to the amount of its activity and therefore relatively insignificant in relation to the political and economic benefits that co-operation was expected to generate.

Throughout the years, however, this cost increased as the Community enlarged and as its domains of activity multiplied, but the Community's language law based on the discourse of unity in diversity remained significantly unchanged until the early 2000s. Today, especially since the 2004 enlargement, the cost of sustaining supranational multilingualism puts tremendous pressure on the EU through the astronomic sums it draws on its total budget, so much so that it defies the original economic logic of integration. In the post-May 2004 EU, the question of sustainability of the EU's sociolinguistic regime is posed: the conflict between pragmatic – financial and technical – and politico-symbolic considerations can indeed only sharpen as ever more voices call for a solution to the costly language *problem* of the EU.[1] Hitherto, the law has prevailed, respecting the initial sociolinguistic design and intergovernmental ideological make up of the Community, at least in theory. In the implementation of the law through institutional practice, as empirical analysis will show, this *de jure* sociolinguistic order of discourse has been considerably undermined *de facto*, due to the practical considerations mentioned above. The gap between the persisting symbolic equality in language official-ness and the growing hierarchisation of institutional working language use (in which English, and to a lesser extent French, have become dominant) has considerably widened.

The question of how the EU regime might approach RML policy making only became salient in the early 1980s, particularly under the impetus of the *Intergroup for Regional and Minority Languages* of the European Parliament (EP) and through a variety of EP-induced political and budgetary measures. Interestingly, promoters of EU actions in favour of RMLs summoned up the same principles of unity in diversity

as nation-states did during the initial negotiations to establish the sociolinguistic regime of the EC. Yet, the translation of these principles into concrete legal outcomes and concomitant financial measures – the sociolinguistic treatment of RMLs – has been very different from that of national/state languages (Chapter 3). Differences have pertained to both the symbolic and practical levels of language planning. First, no symbolic recognition of RMLs has been inscribed in Community law. To date RML policy making is not based upon primary or secondary legislation *per se* (Chapter 2), and it remains devised – and budgeted – *ad hoc*, on a yearly basis. We will see throughout the 'supranational' chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) that the issue of a legal basis – that conditions budgetary support for RMLs – has been both a site of and a stake in the struggle for the RML cause. Second, although it has been uninterrupted, the financial support allotted within the institutional framework of the EU has remained extremely modest, and the budgetary limits imposed on actions for RML defence and promotion are nowadays clearly established (Chapter 3). Both the lack of a clear or explicit EU legal competence on the issue and the limited scope of financial support have concurred to underline the reluctance and resistance of nation-states to transfer their domestic competence on issues of RML defence and promotion to the supranational level. The rationale for that resistance will be further explored through the case study of France in Chapter 4.

From a strictly legal perspective, however, in the absence of an explicit EU competence on the issue, the fact that the EU should play a role *at all* in European RML politics through budgetary provisions in particular may appear paradoxical. As will be shown in Chapter 3, the very existence of an EU RML policy can only be attributed to 20 years of parliamentary lobbying efforts at supranational institutional level and to a legal void in the EC's budgetary laws until 1998. The purpose of Chapters 2 and 3 will be to show the nature, the extent to which and the channels through which such efforts have been successful at the supranational level of decision making and, importantly, the reasons for that state of affairs.

This first section has broadly sketched the variety of issues linked to language planning in the EU, showing that questions of ideological motivation and politico-legal power distribution are central to the practicalities of EU language policy making. Moreover, the case of RML policy suggests that there is more to policy making than the formal/legal aspects of the allocation of power to the EU through primary and secondary legislation and that the legal framework alone cannot

satisfactorily account for institutional practices and fails to overcome certain apparent paradoxes. As indicated, language planning in the EU does involve ideological choices and a framing legal order. However, the relationship between ideological choices and preferences and their translation into legal norms must be made more explicit. Relatedly, the failure of RML defenders to fully actualise the primordial discourse of unity in diversity, on the one hand, and their capacity, on the other, to supersede certain legal constraints, must also be explained. Such an explanation calls for a more elaborate theoretical model and methodological approach to the *modus operandi* of ideologies and the legal order in shaping institutional practices and determining policy outcomes (Ager, 2001). Such a model must also be able to account for the success of pro-RML lobbying efforts despite an ideological environment where nation-states remain the primary locus of glottopolitical hegemony and the concomitant absence of a legal basis *per se* for RMLs.

Levels of analysis in European integration theory: governance and policy networks

To transcend the aforementioned apparent paradoxes regarding actual RML promotion, I use a *governance* organising perspective to approach RML politics and policy making. This perspective constitutes a critical response to previous structural-legal attempts to write grand narratives of integration processes, i.e. the *intergovernmental versus supranational* views of the EU. Put simply, exponents of the former approach claim that integration enhances, rather than undermines, the member states' power (Moravcsik, 1994), but their interlocutors in that debate retort that integration progressively builds the EU as a hegemonic super-state on the European scene (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989 quoted in Cram *et al.*, 1999: 12–13).

Applied to the EU, a fundamental premise of governance approaches[2] is that more 'macro-'approaches to integration phenomena like the above, focusing essentially on the broad structural – legal/institutional – context of policy making to encapsulate the whole of the integration processes, have failed to capture the dynamic character of the day-to-day functioning of the EU in specific policy areas. One of the underlying critical tenets of the *governance* perspective is indeed that a strictly formal-legal perspective on decision-making processes fails to account for the crucial weight of unofficial, informal relations, unwritten rules and individual and interest group preferences and agency in political

practices (Greenwood *et al.*, 1992; Greenwood, 1997). In the field of public policy studies, the *policy networks* approach has thrived on such initial criticisms (see below).

Since its inception, integration theory building has suffered from the overarching dichotomisation between structure and agency so familiar to social and political scientists. The theoretical and methodological problems linked to focusing on either end of the structure/agency continuum have been substantially documented, and much recent social theorising has sought to overcome such divisions by focusing on the dialectics of structure and action (Giddens, 1990; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 30–31). These problems have been largely perceived as linked to the level of analysis – either 'too macro-' or 'too micro-' – so that meso-level approaches nowadays gain wider acceptance amongst social scientists. Initially developed to account for policy processes at national levels, the *Policy Network* approach, within the 'socio-cybernetic' *governance* perspective, is increasingly adopted in EU integration studies, as it provides a meso-level methodological response to the aforementioned problematic dichotomisation.

Two major tenets of the 'socio-cybernetic' *governance* approach are that, since the 1980s, decision-making processes in Western polities can be increasingly characterised as follows: 1. *polycentric* (or *centreless*) (Luhmann, 1982: xv, 253–255; Kenis and Schneider, 1991: 34–36; Kooiman, 1993: 258) and (*a fortiori* in the EU) *multi-level* (Marks, 1996) and 2. *functionally differentiated* (Rhodes, 1988; Jachtenfuchs, 1997: 2). The *polycentric* characterisation postulates that decision making takes place less and less within a strong centralized political core (Rhodes, 2001: 47–53). Rather, as a response to problems of democratic deficit and cost-effectiveness, policy outputs result from the repeated interactions of a variety of consensus-seeking public and private social actors (Rosenau, 1992: 3–6). These come from and interact at a variety of social levels, from the supranational down to local levels, via national and regional strata: governance is *multi-level* (Richardson, 2001: 4–7). Additionally, each stage of the policy process – from agenda setting and consultation to implementation and evaluation – may also involve different and/or new actors: the *network* of policy actors may be rather fluid and open-ended (Bomberg, 1998: 172–173). *Functional differentiation*, on the other hand, implies that, despite broad formal-legal structures, policy-making processes are largely sector-specific and involve sector-dependent sets of actors – policy networks (Wallace and Wallace, 2000). In Chapter 3, however, we will see that RML policy making now tends to be more cross-sectoral than sector-specific.

In terms of level of analysis, one of the perceived assets of meso-level perspectives is thus their ability to include macro-structural elements – like the constraints and powers derived from the legal framework and/or institutional procedures – whilst not ignoring the importance of the ideas, norms and values of the plurality of individuals actually participating in decision making. The latter's participation occurs in various ways and at various levels and times (Kooiman, 1993; cited in Rhodes, 1997: Chapter 2; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: Chapter 2). Looking at RML policy making through a *policy network* lens then allows analysts to operationalise informal relations and individual and/or collective non-dominant preferences.

For all these reasons, this study considers the area of RML policy making as *sui generis* here, even though the aforementioned broad structural framework of decision-making processes cannot be ignored nor should be underestimated. The particulars of decision-making processes within area-specific policy sectors are thus viewed as dialectical relations between broad structural constraints and opportunities and the actual practices of a variety of policy participants themselves determined in various ways and acting according to various, often contradictory, norms and preferences. Analysis must, therefore, explore such norms and preferences and how they are operationalised in decision-making processes. In that respect, building consensus amongst the policy participants implies giving political weight to the plurality of norms and preferences. Finally, these broad characteristics of governance-based political functioning are not EU-specific and, as Chapters 4 and 7 show, political devolution can be seen as progress towards a more governance-oriented framework of political bargaining in that more actors can participate in fora where consensus is increasingly sought after.

Power dependency theory and network and policy change

Given the emphasis on the consensus-seeking characteristic of governance politics, power dependence is an essential feature of policy networks. The *resource/power dependency theory* indeed stipulates that policies result from the interaction of a variety of public and private actors, because all enjoy various resources necessary to one another for policies to be devised and implemented successfully (Rhodes, 1997: 8). Such resources can be material or immaterial, legal/institutional or discursive, formal or symbolic, and can be deployed at various stages of the policy process. In this study, I therefore use 'resources' in the broadest

sense to refer to any bargaining chip that can be thrown into negotiation processes. Such resources include *inter alia:*

1. Legal prerogatives (patterns of distribution of political powers amongst policy actors as sanctioned by hierarchised legal texts);
2. Public legitimacy and discourse representation (socio-political and/or discursive representativity);
3. Information and expertise (a command of theoretical and/or technical/empirical knowledge);
4. 'Behind-the-scenes' bargains or 'Knowing-someone-who-can-have-an-input-in-actual-decision-making';
5. Material and/or human local resources necessary for implementation purposes, etc. (Adapted from Greenwood, 1997: 18–20; see also Rhodes, 1997: 8–9.)[3]

From a theoretical perspective, looking broadly at resource dependencies thus helps integrate different levels of analysis, ranging from broad structural resources down to inter-personal factors in decision making.

Finally, as indicated above, another related, defining feature of meso-level approaches is that they endeavour to account for relations between structures and agents as dialectical relations. These can be (simplistically) summarised as follows: structures constrain agents (Thelen *et al.*, 1992: 12–13) but agents' practices can modify structures (Marsh, 1998: 185–197). In this context, structure is understood in terms of legal-institutional constraints and opportunities but also in the connected Bourdieu-ian sense of *system of habits*, a sort of institutional *habitus* based upon preferences and resource dependencies as defined above (Bourdieu, 1991; see also Giddens, 1990). This institutional *habitus* can change under various impetuses. Hence, it becomes relevant to examine the nature and causality of change. We will see that RML policy making provides an example of drastic and sudden exogenous change in decision-making processes and that RML network and policy change has substantially been a correlate of change in patterns of resource dependency (Chapter 3).

The relationship between network and policy change, however, is multi-faceted. Marsh and Rhodes (1992) identify four broad categories of environment change that can affect this relationship – economic/market, ideological, knowledge/technical and institutional. Ideological and institutional environment change, in particular, as determinants of network and policy change will be crucial issues

for this study since its focus is on the dynamic interaction between change in (political and language) ideologies, (legal) change in institutional designs that affect power distribution amongst policy actors and subsequent change in (regional and/or minority language) policy outcomes.

As was suggested with the outline of power dependency theory, and as is further asserted below, ideology is itself a powerful catalyst of change at the societal level and a policy resource at the institutional level. At the broad societal level, discourses constitute a structural order wherein patterns of power distribution can be reproduced and/or transformed. In turn, the extent to which the evolving order of discourse shapes and can potentially transform the social order in general and institutional practices in particular must be measured. For that purpose, Critical Discourse Analysis (hereafter CDA) is a useful analytical method, resting upon the idea that power structures and relations, *a fortiori* legal-institutional structures, are text-mediated and that power *inter alia* resides in privileged patterns of text production and reception/interpretation. CDA is useful for it provides actual tools of language analysis at text level that help analysts decipher power struggles for discursive hegemony as inscribed within texts and thus detect traces of change.

In the next section I scrutinise the multi-theoretical and methodological tenets of CDA and, in the following sections, I explore how some of these tenets can be applied to the analysis of legal texts.

CDA: discourse in a social theory of language and social change

Drawing largely on Foucault's social theory of discourse and change (Foucault, 1971, 1972, 1979, and 1981), CDA focuses on the production and/or reproduction or transformation of relations of domination/subjection, and on the role and *modus operandi* of discourse in such processes (Fairclough, 1989 & 2001; 1992). Further, critical discourse analysts argue that the possibility that, and ways in which, relations of domination/subjection can be transformed, in particular through competition between dominant and resistant discourses, can and must be linguistically analysed through the linguistic analysis of textual and discursive practices. Thus CDA attempts to synthesise language studies and social theory. For instance, Fairclough's starting premise is that '[...] *changes in language use are linked to wider social and cultural processes,* [...] [so that] *language analysis can be used as a method for studying social change.*' (1992: 1). He thus links language use to a theory of social and

political change. Central to this endeavour is the social-constructionist thesis that language and language use do not merely *reflect* but essentially *construct* the social order from particular ideological positions (see also Cameron, 1990). As Stubbs put it: '[...] *language is never neutral and texts are never innocent* [...] *all language choices are political*' (Stubbs, 1996: 235). This implies that all linguistic choices, down to those at the lowest levels of language organisation, are relevant to an understanding of the constitution of the social order. CDA thus seeks to decipher ideological credentials and assumptions intrinsic to language use and thus to reveal the ways in which language and language users construct and reproduce or transform the social world. Fairclough's theoretical stance summons up and elaborates on various social theoretical frameworks and different traditions of language analysis, wherein this social-constructionist view of language and language use is salient.

Regarding the social theoretical frameworks, in addition to Foucault's aforementioned works, Fairclough largely borrows from Neo-Marxist theorists of ideology and in particular from Gramsci's concept of hegemony (Althusser, 1971a; Gramsci, 1971; Bourdieu, 1991). Regarding the language and textual analytical methods, he resorts to the 'systemic' functional linguistics (SFL) of Halliday and his followers (Kress, 1985) to Bakhtin's theory of genres and Kristeva's discussions of the concept of *intertextuality* (Halliday, 1973, 1978, and 1985; Bakhtin, 1981 and 1986; Kristeva 1986). In his model, Fairclough thus draws together social-theoretical concepts of ideology, power, hegemony and discourse and methods of language analysis. The remainder of this section deals with the former and I will explore the latter in the next section.

Fairclough's conception of ideology rests on Gramsci's concepts of *hegemony*, *power* and *consent* (Gramsci, 1971). For Gramsci, hegemonies – the manifestation of the unequal social distribution of power through coercion and consensus building – are products of ideology, but social hegemonies are neither unchallengeable nor unchallenged. On the contrary, by emphasising *consent* as a determinant factor in social organisation, Gramsci underlines the fragility of social consensus, refutes the immutability of the distribution of power and thereby opens the door to understanding the potential transformation of social structures and the social order. Gramsci proposes a dynamic and unstable view of socio-political equilibrium. Gramsci, and later Althusser, indeed claims that political equilibrium is achieved by manufacturing/winning the consent of dominated classes/groups and that consent largely obtains through the naturalisation of dominant ideologies in and by the Ideological State Apparatuses (Althusser, 1971a). What he negates is the

deterministic approach to social reproduction and power relations which seems characteristic of structuralism and cannot easily account for social change, promoting instead a dynamic understanding of the relationship between social structures and power distribution (Gramsci, ibid). Likewise, while taking discourse as the surface part of ideology, and therefore as the manifestation of social power, Fairclough privileges the dynamics of discourse and sees discourse as a motor of social change. Thence he seeks to analyse linguistically the work of ideology. Further, his approach also rests on the assumption that language uses are not always critically weighed and analysed, i.e. there is a large part of routine in patterns of language use so that ideologies can be unnoticeably reproduced (see the discussion of intentionality in legal interpretation patterns below).

Moreover, Fairclough sees ideology as inherently hierarchical so that 'grand' discourses are themselves constituted by several 'sub-discourses', possibly in contradictory and conflict-ridden relations with one another, in ways that can trigger social change by altering social organisation and the distribution of power. Hence the role of the interaction of these various discourses has to be analytically accounted for. Crucial to this driving force of discourse relations is therefore the centrality of *orders of discourse*. Before going any further, it is necessary to clarify what *discourse* and *orders of discourse* in this context mean. The notion of *discourse* is one that has been repeatedly used in various disciplines and with very different meanings (for a review, see Fairclough, 1992: Chapter 1; Mills, 1997). For example, language studies have defined discourse sometimes as spoken dialogue, sometimes in reference to both written and spoken 'texts' and other times as synonymous with *register* (e.g. 'journalistic' discourse, 'academic' discourse, etc.). In contrast to these, discourse encompasses different meanings in the work of social theorists like Foucault, where it refers to '[. . .] *different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice*' (Fairclough, 1992: 3). In Fairclough's perspective (which is largely based on Foucault's), besides, discourses do not merely mirror social relations, they *constitute* them; social relations are *constructed* by and in discourse. As a result, different discourses produced by different social actors will construct different conflict-laden social realities and, conversely, the 'same' discourse will have different meanings depending on what order of discourses it is constitutive of (e.g. *multilingualism* has different 'meanings' in Jacobinist and regionalist discourses).[4]

Furthermore, one particular discourse may itself be constituted by elements of various other discourses (e.g. regionalist discourses in France in the 1960s drew upon de-colonisation discourses, discourses

on multicultural richness, discourses on minority protection and rights, etc.). Since discourses are not necessarily homogeneous, their analysis entails the deconstruction of their constitutive features, i.e. the (sub-) discourses they are made of. The composite character of discourses relates to what Fairclough refers to as *orders of discourse*, a comprehensive definition of which could therefore be a set of discursive practices combined to form a new discursive practice at a higher level of discursive organisation. In turn, this implies the existence of a hierarchisation of discourses resulting from the mode of configuration of specific discursive practices. To use an analogy, orders of discourse are to discourses what texts are to the sentences they consist of – a higher and more complex form of organisation with specific properties and calling for specific analytical methods and techniques. Put otherwise, the existence of a hierarchical structure of discourses is comparable to that which organises texts out of sentences and words so that orders of discourse are inherently heterogeneous.

The concepts of *intertextuality* and *interdiscursivity* hence become useful as they account for the textual and discursive traces of the various constitutive (sub-) discourses of a larger (order of) discourse (Kristeva, 1986) (see also the concept of *genre memory* in the next section). In this connection, *orders of discourse* also imply a hierarchy of discourses wherein some discourses are hegemonic, and therefore socially dominant, whilst others are less powerful but resistant. Thence social change potentially results from the struggle for hegemony between and within dominant and dominated, or resistant, orders of discourses.

In his endeavour to synthesise methods developed in language studies and social theory to understand the dynamics of social change, Fairclough proposes a methodological model consisting of three interconnected dimensions. Specifically, he suggests seeing every 'text' as the actualisation of a discursive practice and as an instance of social practice, where 'text' refers to instances of both spoken and written language use and therefore includes all types of interaction involving language use between social actors, ranging from conversations to interviews to letters to newspapers to books to legal texts, etc. (Halliday, 1978) Like Stubbs above, he claims that any communicative event, any 'text' production, is also ideology-laden and can be seen and deciphered as an instance of discursive practice which actualises broader social and political practices and hierarchies, in the sense of power relations. The ideological and socio-political constructedness of text can be revealed with the conceptual tools developed in Halliday's SFL, which distinguishes three functions of language, ideational,

interpersonal and textual (Halliday, 1978 and 1985). Halliday thus sees texts as simultaneously referring to reality (the ideational function), enacting social relations and establishing social identities (the interpersonal function) and organising the cohesion and coherence of information (the textual function). This approach to texts' functions is also characteristic of a politicised version of generic analysis most often associated with Bakhtin's work, which constitutes a theory of text production and interpretation/reception and power and which Halliday's analytical methods can serve to operationalize.

The politics of generic interpretation – reading legal texts: patterns of meaning-making in legal production and interpretation

The literature on genre theory has long taken literary genres as its unique objects of study, focusing predominantly on generic forms. In the 20th century, and significantly under the impetus of Neo-Marxist writer Mikhail Bakhtin, the socio-political nature and functions of many non-literary genres and their ideological dimension have been underlined. Whilst reasserting the inseparability of function and form, Bakhtin indeed placed strong emphasis on the problematic of generic *content,* which he predominantly defined in ideological terms. Thus, a central tenet of Bakhtin's approach is the representational function of genres: '[. . .] *genres are not simply sets of devices and conventions, but* **forms of seeing and interpreting particular aspects of the world**, *ways of* **conceptualising reality** *that are stored within the* **genre memory** [. . .]' (Quoted by Duff, 2000: 6–11) (emphases added). Such devices and conventions effectively serve to convey a particular worldview by way of excluding competing visions, and the resulting hegemonic worldview endorses particular power relationships. Generic analysis must relate the structure/morphology of genres to their (socio-political) function of power distribution.

Underlying this conceptualisation of the relationship between genres and the social order are the claims made above that '*social institutions and text types are mutually defining'* (Stubbs, 1996: 12) and broadly that the whole social order is textually mediated (Fairclough, 2000: 164–165). This is where SFL proves useful in that it can convey how language functions in texts for institutional texts to fulfil their social functions of power attribution and reproduction.

Halliday's functional analysis of text-in-context(s), which CDA has largely built upon, allows primary importance to the functions of

language in the construction and/or reproduction of the social order through social/institutional practice (i.e. the ideational and interpersonal functions of language). The approach is systemic: special emphasis is put on the ideological and social implications of language *choices* in texts. Texts must be analysed for both what they say and what they omit. SFL explores how textual features at lower (e.g. lexical and grammatical choices) and higher textual levels (e.g. cohesion and coherence) operate in determining a particular configuration of the social order, while seeking to exclude alternative configurations.

In that connection, Halliday and his followers have coined the concept of *social semiotics*, which conflates structural/formal conceptualisations of genre with reception – or reader response – theory (Iser, 1974, quoted by Stubbs, 1996: 7). Reception theory claims that particular interpretations of texts are contingent and therefore negotiable: although topics and reader positions are ideologically determined by what was called above 'genre memory' – which in effect naturalises particular readings within a genre through particular linguistic choices – various readerships can read the same texts in various ways. I do not embrace post-modern claims of an absolute contingency of interpretation patterns since, in institutional practice, there are still constraints limiting the institutional validity of alternative interpretations. However, the analysis of language-based issues in the EU will illustrate that the critical interpretation of texts becomes a site of power struggle between expert readerships and their challengers. The latter contest conventionalised reading positions by proposing alternative, resistant readings and call upon different ideology-laden patterns of meaning-making that entail changes in the power-distributing, constitutive schemes of the EU's order of discourse on language (as enshrined in EU law).

As in other social sciences, the question of meaning-making/ interpreting is fundamental in legal theory. Indeed, the location of power struggles within patterns of interpretation of texts is *a fortiori* relevant for legal texts because their primary function – or communicative purpose – is overtly to distribute political power in a directive manner:

> [. . .] *the general function of* [legislative] *writing is directive, to impose obligations and to confer rights* . . . [legal draftsmen attempt to] . . . *define their model world of obligations and rights,* [. . .] *as precisely, clearly and unambiguously as linguistic resources permit* . . . *they attempt to refer to every conceivable contingency within their model world and this gives their writing its second key characteristic of being all-inclusive.*
>
> (Bhatia, 1993: 102)

Legal draftsmen can use a number of qualifications to be clear and precise in constructing their 'model world': beside *action rules* that are mainly meant to impose duties and obligations, legislative provisions typically include *stipulation rules* (defining the domain of application of a particular act) and *definition rules* (meant to provide further terminological explanations) (Bhatia, 1993: 104–105). Yet, the more detailed the provision, the narrower its scope of application and the less likely to incorporate every conceivable contingency that may arise during the application of the provision. At production level, draftsmen are somehow compelled to choose a strategy between clarity and precision (which tend towards more details), and all-inclusiveness (tending towards generalisation). The resulting need for more or less interpretation at reception then varies along a continuum delimited by clarity/precision at one end and all inclusiveness at the other.

Each production mode is then likely to call upon different interpretive principles. Two main theories of legal interpretation prevail: the *cognitive* – or *formalistic* – theory of legal interpretation and the *sceptical* theory,[5] which recalls the reception theory sketched above. The former views interpretation as:

> [. . .] *a matter of empirical knowledge of either the objective meaning of statutory texts or the subjective intention of the legislature . . . the aim of legal interpretation is . . . the discovering of this pre-existing meaning or intention, already in legal texts.*
>
> (Guastini, 1984: 1739)

By contrast, the latter considers that:

> [. . .] *words have no proper meaning, since every word may bear the meaning put upon it by the user, or the meaning put upon it by the recipient, and no coincidence between the former and the latter is granted . . . each statutory text is likely to be interpreted in different ways depending on the different evaluative attitudes of interpreters.*
>
> (Guastini, ibid)

The cognitive/formalistic theory thus privileges a conceptualisation of meaning wherein interpreters retrieve meaning from the text itself – the literal, positivistic meaning – and/or from the author's intention – the so-called 'spirit of the law'. It follows that meanings are more easily perceived as 'true' and 'false', and expert interpreters claim to have the capacity to retrieve the original intended meaning and to do so objectively. In the sceptical or reception theory, this objective capacity

is denied: meaning-making is always contingent and ultimately located in the recipient's reading, rather than reflective of the text's essential meaning and/or author's perceived intentions. Ultimately, although legal meanings can be and are disputed in socio-political practice, some meanings become dominant whilst others are discarded. Analysis must then explain the rationale for certain interpretations to be privileged.

Law as a discourse on society: Formal and pragmatic institutional constraints and intentionality

Following Austin's and Wiggenstein's theory of legal interpretation (Wiggenstein, 1953; Austin, 1962), I endorse the view that:

> [...] *legal interpretation has no independent starting point but is entirely determined by pragmatic considerations...one cannot understand legal language outside the context of non-linguistic activities in which its use is interwoven. A legal interpreter, therefore, must participate in the form of life in which the social practice of legal interpretation is embedded. In short, nobody can understand laws without being trained to be a skilled jurist. Interpretation thus becomes the game of the interpreter's discretion.*
>
> (Summarised by Luzzati, 1984: 2088)

I therefore see the *sceptical* approach as largely unsatisfactory as it underplays the extent to which legal experts' readings do prevail and also plainly disregards existing objective institutional constraints upon both producers' and interpreters' choices, e.g. actual usages within a given discourse community and previously accepted interpretations (constraints intrinsic to the *genre memory*). As suggested above, one of the central explanatory powers of genre theory lies in its foregrounding of the conventions and constraints underlying processes of generic production and interpretation. Bhatia emphasises that:

> *From the point of view of applied genre analysis, our primary concern is twofold: first to characterize typical or conventional textual features of any genre-specific text* [...] *and second to explain such a characterization in the context of the socio-cultural as well as the cognitive constraints operating in the relevant area of specialization, whether professional or academic.*
>
> (Bhatia, 1993: 16)

Constraints/conventions determine the structural/formal organisation of legal texts, ranging from lexico-grammatical choices to higher patterns of textual organisation like structural and cognitive patterning

(Bhatia, 1993: Chapter 5), and they specify the functional role of legal texts, i.e. to construct worlds of rights and obligations. In that connection, action rules in legal texts typically establish the legitimacy of authorship and/or authority (i.e. who can legitimately draft texts and how such legitimacy is constructed)[6] and the correlative distribution of various power positions (i.e. the distribution of obligations and rights to various recipients), and they specify policy outcomes.

Bhatia underlines that cognitive constraints – the way knowledge is constructed, transmitted and shared – are area specific. This implies that experts of a given area of specialisation – discourse communities – share area-specific knowledge and/or regimes of truth making up the discursive formation they belong to, but they may not necessarily be critically aware of it: interpretation is then un-problematically described as positivistic and/or cognitive (the foundations of Bhatia's *model* world and Luzzati's *non-linguistic activities* in the quotes above). However, in line with Foucault's idea that the articulation of 'regimes of truth' is a means of social control, legal practice also catalyses the reproduction (and/or transformation) of society writ large (the law is an Ideological State Apparatus in Althusserian terms) (see also Geertz, 1973; Kress, 1985: 19). In turn, as will be amply illustrated in the analyses below, different discourse communities, such as RML activists, are characterised by different, competing 'regimes of truth', on the basis of which they challenge legal experts' certainties in order to gain a better power share in the social order.

Consequently, it is necessary to investigate the more area-specific knowledge-determined context of expertise, which presides over the selection/construction of objects and categories such as 'official and working languages' in EU language policy (Foucault, 1972; quoted in Fairclough, 1992: Chapter 2 and p. 128). Yet, this meso-level approach must be considered within the 'macro-' historical/socio-political context of meaning-making – the order of discourse – which determines the array of norms governing the construction of legal meanings. This calls for several remarks.

Regarding interpretive norms, these can be manifest or unwritten. Manifest norms – stipulation rules and/or legal intertextuality – are typically constitutive of legal texts and serve to reinforce the coherence and legitimacy of given texts and ultimately of the whole legal system. However, lawyers, judges and jurists also acknowledge the existence of implicit or unwritten principles: rules not expressly inscribed in legal texts but endorsed by legal interpreters, e.g. the necessary preservation and self-reproduction of the institution itself.

Claiming that certain interpretive principles are unwritten equates with saying that they are sometimes naturalised (in their *model* world) through training so that practitioners' interpretation patterns can become largely unconscious of the ideological choices prefiguring norm and text production, which in turn reinforces the positivist illusion of semantic univocity and all-inclusiveness. In other cases, unwritten rules relate to the *perceived* intention of the legislator that only emerges when expert interpretation is questioned and when experts are required to explain or justify a ruling. We will see below that when such challenges have been produced by parliamentary written questions on sociolinguistic issues for instance, the sometimes elusive response of the Commission's legal experts could be construed as reluctance to actually make explicit such unwritten rules as a means of self-preservation (Chapter 3).

This leads to the question of intentionality both in the production and interpretation of legal texts. When meaning-making is naturalised during periods of professional training, one cannot evoke the interpreter's intentionality as a conscious device to construct hegemony, since the very process of naturalisation makes rule production and interpretation unconscious of pre-existing ideological motives. However, intentionality in the sense of the strategic back-grounding of ideological motives can be identified in other textual devices, e.g. the construction of objects by one given discourse community whereby language choices result in maintaining the vagueness of the meaning of objects or categories. In that connection, I will show that the constitutive categorisation of objects like *language* and *diversity* is purposefully vague in the EU's legal discourse community and that its vagueness constitutes an effective means for legal interpreters to reinforce their meaning-ascription powers.

In turn, critical readers like CDA practitioners endeavour to de-naturalise or de-familiarise these motives. Methodologically, CDA is an approach that encompasses a theory of generic typicality but attempts to analyse a given generic text as an instance of social and discursive practice – as a social discourse – at the macro-political rather than meso-institutional level, i.e. in relation to the broad ideological context of texts. This discourse can be deciphered by looking at how authority, power positions and legal outcomes are textually constructed by dominant players (legal/political readings) and at how texts also constitute the site and stake of ideological and political struggle for dominated interests (sociolinguistic readings, in this study).

Considering discourse as socially constitutive, CDA seeks to underline the aforementioned discursive and linguistic processes of semantic

inclusion/exclusion and to explain such processes as the result of ideological struggle. In this study, CDA is applied as an interpretative analytical tool with critical reference to legal genres in particular. Moreover, the central focus on language status, use and promotion in the texts analysed here also suggests grounding critical analysis in sociolinguistic analysis. In the following chapters, I contrast the aforementioned two interpretative positions and show that, even on sociolinguistic issues of language status and/or language definition, legal/political readings curtail sociolinguistic readings in ways which have indubitable intergovernmentalist overtones.

In Chapter 2, I show that the EU legal order results from past discursive struggle and that the advent of the sociolinguistic regimes of the EU results from the order of discourse on glottopolitical hierarchy. In Chapter 3, I show that this order of discourse is potentially subject to change under the pressures of dominated discourses and through their representation in institutional practice. However, as was said above, member states currently remain hegemonic in language-based decision-making processes. Consequently, to see if RML status change can be induced at supranational level, the ideological foundations of member states' attitudes to linguistic diversity must be explored at national and sub-national levels.

I therefore now turn to the theoretical framework relevant to the analysis of RML issues at national and sub-national levels. I begin by critically examining two frequently used models for analysing societal multilingualism – those of linguistic nationalism and diglossia. I then discuss Bourdieu's sociology of language and power as an attempt to overcome some of their disadvantages, claiming, however, that Bourdieu's framework suffers from not being sufficiently embedded in empirical analysis of actual language uses which themselves enact particular political and/or language ideologies. In turn, it is essential that, if language planners want to secure popular and elite acceptance, these ideologies be understood and integrated into language plans. This is where linguistic anthropological approaches offer methodological tools to reveal the relation between grassroots language uses and ideologies.

Linguistic nationalism, nation building and language ideologies

Many commentators have claimed that the radical politicisation of language dates back to the beginning of nation-building processes, often

located at the time of the French Revolution and the ensuing wake of mass nationalism (e.g. Fishman, 1972b; Thiesse, 1999; May, 2000 and 2001).[7]

Students of nationalism and nation-building processes have analysed how language uniformisation policies were both a catalyst and a consequence of modernisation processes, treating language as a necessary, constitutive feature of political, social and economic change (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). The central roles of a common 'national' language have also been acknowledged by the multiple architects of nation-states – revolutionaries, nationalists, political activists and leaders of all trends. In all nationalist discourses, the promotion and/or adoption of a national language is closely linked to the modernisation of society, progress and ultimately the emancipation of the individual. This shift is legitimised by an evolutionary discourse that unproblematically depicts the 'modernisation' of society as an evolution or progress towards a harmonious, more egalitarian society (May, 2001: Chapters 1 and 4; see also Chapter 4), and the nation-state modelled by the American and French revolutions was perceived as the ideal political system that could make such emancipation possible. Inasmuch as it was based upon the sovereignty of the nation, it assumed that nation and state should be congruent.

This literature puts forward two fundamental roles of language – 1. language as a constitutive element of state-building processes (i.e. building political/institutional and bureaucratic structures), and a factor of economic development and growth, and social change (i.e. industrialisation processes and exodus) and 2. language as a symbol and cement of national identity. The former two refer to the instrumental, communicative function of language in modernisation processes; the latter brings up its symbolic role in identity formation. These roles are largely illustrated in the literature on nationalism, distinguishing between French and German ideal-types of the nation and their concomitant political discourses on the relation between language and national identity. France is seen as the cradle of 'civic' nationalism and Germany of 'ethnic' nationalism (reviewed by Blommaert, 1996: 235–237; see also Edwards, 1985; Schwarzmantel, 1991: Chapter 2, and Crowley, 1994). Language is, therefore, conceptualised as an objective feature of nation-building processes enabling increased communication between various social groups (Deutsch, 1966) and as a discursive object in ideal-typical nationalist discourses on language, identity and the nation.[8] Here, I focus mainly on the latter symbolic role of language and its instrumentalisation in nationalist discourses.

In the German nation-building context, language was the tangible proof of the historicity of ethnicity, the living link with the past (naturally, family-transmitted), which in turn legitimised the access to statehood of language-defined ethnic/*nation*-al groups without states, e.g. Germany, Italy. This 'biological' essentialist view of the relation between language and identity, i.e. 'one language = one culture = one nation' has subsequently prompted a large body of critical literature on the strategic uses of linguistic essentialism by nationalist movements (e.g. Gellner, 1964 and 1983; Smith, 1971 and 1986; Hobsbawm, 1990; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Numerous studies show that late 20th-century (sub-national) nationalist rhetoric largely resorted to the same linguistic essentialism, which, as a political discourse on the relationship between language, political identity and political legitimacy, retains enormous purchase, although it is now also widely deconstructed as strategic by academics writing on this topic (Jaffe, 1999; May, 2000, 2001; Freeland and Patrick, 2004). Nevertheless, this study shows that the discourse of linguistic essentialism today remains a core component of the order of discourse on language at both supra-national, national and sub-national levels.

In the French context, from the 16th century, various elites saw language uniformisation as a prerequisite to economic development and the building of state institutions and administrative structures (see Chapter 4). From the Revolution, language unity also served an ideological function insofar as it was a prerequisite to 'invent' the French nation, on which the legitimacy of the revolutionaries' power rested. However, in the French tradition, the link between language and political identity was presented along ideological and political lines of civic equality rather than along lines of ethnic essentialism as in the German model. French language use was presented both as a condition to socio-economic mobility and, ideologically, as the endorsement of rationalism as the catalyst of progress and of the 'universal' values inherited from the Enlightenment and embodied in the Jacobin Republic *one and indivisible* (Fenet, 2002: 35–36). In those discourses, shift towards the national language was deemed a sign of political loyalty. And, besides this, in that model of nationalist mobilisation, group-membership was inclusive and regardless of the citizens' origins, unlike in the German model.

Because German and French ideal-types of the nation rest on the same essentialist assumptions (i.e. one language = one (political) identity) they stand exclusive and antagonistic. Yet, because they are *perceived* as antithetic, one can be summoned as an alternative to the other (see Chapter 4) as happened with Corsican cultural nationalism in the late

19th century serving to mobilise against the negative aspects of so-called French civic nationalism (see also Herder and Fichte's anti-French discourses summarised by Mar-Molinero (2000: 8), May (2001: 58); and Chapters 5 and 6 here for Corsica).

Thus, these approaches advocating nation-state congruence (Smith, 1995) all assume that language is essential to the definition of political identities, whether these are conceived as ethnic and exclusive, and therefore biological and inherited, or as civic and inclusive, and therefore constructed and a matter of choice. Moreover, this identity-language link is intrinsic so that the uniqueness of language guarantees the uniqueness of identity, and in turn the uniqueness of identity guarantees the unity and stability of the nation-state: the nation must be culturally and linguistically homogeneous. This has several implications for both language and identity and their interrelations. Any corruption of one of the elements of the equation necessarily corrupts and/or endangers the other ones. Thus, if one language = one nation, giving official recognition to other (minority) languages within the nation-state challenges the fundamental congruence of the nation with state and undermines its integrity (see the debates around the CoE's *European Charter for RMLs* in France in Chapter 4), and linguistic diversity becomes synonymous with political instability. Likewise, introducing foreign elements into the language constitutes a threat to a perceived pure identity: language purism thus becomes a legitimate defence of the purity of identity (see the discussion of *franglais* in Chapter 4 and the stigmatisation of mixed codes in Corsica in Chapter 8). Consequently, the construction of nation-states implies the construction and ongoing protection of national-state languages, both in terms of their status and corpus. Status planning ensures that they become fully protected, promoted and diffused, and corpus planning that they are standardised, which creates the illusion that languages are monolithic, variation-less, bounded and autonomous.

In nationalist discourses, the variability of language uses is ignored and/or rejected and language is '[...] *reified* and *totemized* [...] *it is made into an object and given iconic status*' (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller, 1985: 236)[9]. What remains unsaid is that language, just like the nation, is engineered: it is not a reified linguistic system defined by its unity and boundedness *ex nihilo*. Rather, as was said above, these taken-for-granted qualities are engineered through corpus and status language plans (Billig, 1995: 32) during standardisation processes (Haugen, 1966). Then the notions of boundedness and autonomy imply that linguistic boundaries are clear-cut so that interference from other linguistic

systems is seen as impurities to be proscribed. This is what literary and/or prescriptive tools do: define what 'the' language is, both in oppositional terms of style and/or correctness within the same system (e.g. good/bad usage or grammaticality/a-grammaticality) and in cordoning it off from other systems, however similar, by creating dictionaries and grammars. Hence, inequalities between languages emerge, though it is a truism to any linguist that languages and dialects cannot be hierarchised in linguistic terms (at least *before* standardisation processes). Status distinctions and hierarchisation are political, not linguistic. As noted above, and as will be further illustrated in Chapters 4 and 8, the very totemisation and idealisation of the corpus as the main garment of identity entails language purism.

Diglossia – structural-functional models for the analysis of societal multilingualism: strengths and limitations

The study and characterisation of situations of bi-/multilingualism has been a central concern in sociolinguistic studies. The earlier literature largely focused on Ferguson's definition of the concept of *diglossia* (1959) and its subsequent elaborations by Fishman (1967 and 1972a) as starting points for a discussion of patterns of societal bilingualism, and these concepts are still widely used.

In subsequent critical overviews of the evolution and development of the concept, Martin-Jones (1989) and Williams (1992) illustrate some of the limitations of these initial typological approaches, pointing to their Durkheimian structural-functional 'macro-'orientation. Both also underline the weaknesses inherent in early ethnographic reactions against macro-structural approaches, showing that the focus on micro-interactions in bilingual contexts, although it accounts better for variation in use and change in practices, falls short of revealing the linkage between large-scale social processes and individual language use in micro-interactions (e.g. Gal, 1979; Gumperz, 1982). Finally, both advocate a multidisciplinary perspective introducing a (Neo-Marxist) conflict perspective into the study of patterns of language maintenance and shift in situations of language contact. In this section, I emphasise some of the strengths and limitations of structural/functional approaches to situations of language contact.

In Ferguson's original characterisation of diglossia, a status distinction is made within a given community between two language varieties – High and Low – of the same language, in complementary functional distribution determined by social norms of appropriacy. The core emphasis

is on functional distribution and status: the High variety is appropriate in formal and/or official contexts of use (e.g. school, administration, justice, the media, etc.) and enjoys social prestige, whilst the Low variety mediates informal relations, essentially in the private sphere, and is less prestigious.

Fishman (1972a: 92) placed less emphasis on the reference to societies with only two language varieties, and his main criterion was on complementary functional distribution but without the proviso of linguistic kinship.[10] To enlarge the model, Fishman overlooked the importance of kinship between the varieties in terms of linguistic empowerment and thus, indirectly, socio-political cohesion: the more linguistically close varieties are, the more (at least passive) bilingual individuals there are, and the least discernible language-based inequalities may be. The Corsican case illustrates the importance, but also the limitations, of the relation between linguistic kinship and language empowerment (see, respectively, Chapters 6 and 8). Chapter 6 will show that in a regional language situation like Corsica, Ferguson's emphasis on linguistic kinship retains substantial analytical power and is useful in explaining situations that predate the time of nation building and/or situations where language features centrally in cultural definitions of the nation.

The notion of unequal linguistic power is central in both Ferguson's and Fishman's approaches through the uneven distribution of prestige. However, the ideological and socio-political origins of power asymmetries are insufficiently pursued. For Williams (1992: 122), Ferguson (1959) and Fishman (1967 and 1972c) '[. . .] *express an evolutionary continuum which depends upon highly questionable assumptions about the nature of modernity, tradition and progress*'.

Amongst the 'questionable assumptions', one of the main weaknesses of the structural/functional bias underpinning diglossia is that the diglossic model identifies language-based power asymmetries based on prestige but does not ground language shift processes in historic conflict and injustice between language groups (as social groups).

In his critical overview, Williams shows that such structural/functional approaches assume a historiography of nation-building processes predicated on the 'modernisation thesis' (see Edwards, 1985 and May's critique of that thesis as linguistic social Darwinism in May, 2001: Chapters 1 and 4). As was outlined above, this thesis articulates an evolutionary discourse, assuming that socio-political change and language shift occur through the aggregation of individual rational choices and that individuals freely endorse new sets of values to participate in

the 'modernisation' of society. In the process, a series of dichotomies is established, creating hierarchies of values and norms, in which traditional values become obsolete and/or suspiciously irrational: modernity is equated with progress – and modern, urban, universal values are lauded and confer prestige – whilst traditional, rural, parochial values are stigmatised.

For both Ferguson and Fishman, the resulting social norms of linguistic appropriacy rest on the notion of prestige, which itself is seen as natural and largely resulting from the degree of codification – oral and written or just oral – of the respective varieties. The socio-political origins of such norms thus remain un-discussed and the superimposition of a language is justified in terms of linguistic resources rather than with a political theory of language. The High variety is simply better equipped to do the job: it is a 'language'. Its high status reflects its high level of codification acquired first through its canonisation by a body of written literature and then its spread through various formal and/or official domains of use, including education.

Like in studies of nationalism, language is conceptualised as a reified linguistic system defined by its unity and boundedness and consecrated by literary models.[11] The unity of the language pre-conditions its suitability for the fulfilment of the High social communication purposes of modern society and unity is conceived of as unity of form – uniformity – achieved through standardisation processes. Besides, once a set of prescriptive tools exists, any variation – dialectal and/or social – becomes stigmatised as the corruption of some ideal state of the language. The standard form thus embodies modernity and progress. The Low variety lacks prestige due to the very lack of such codification, and its confinement to, and oral transmission within, the private sphere is perceived as justified and natural. Individuals come to endorse these values, and their unproblematic internalisation becomes part of their *communicative competence* which is defined in static, apolitical terms of '*cultural knowledge'*, as a system of shared beliefs, values and attitudes (Gal, 1979: 9).

The implicit emphasis on social consensus is channelled through individual rather than collective choices so that the fact that social/language groups can be discriminated against is hidden.[12] Ultimately, the neat complementary functional distribution between varieties assumes the unproblematic awakening of a new social and linguistic order in which the emphasis on stability leaves little room for explaining phenomena of variation in use and change except as deviance. Actual patterns of language behaviour are seen as the mere endorsement of this order, which they contribute to maintain and reproduce. This approach assumes

a homogeneous, conflict-free social body from which divergent and competing interests would be absent and in which patterns of use are determined contextually (e.g. at work, at home, etc.) rather than socio-logically (e.g. age, gender, level of education, etc.). It leaves no room for strategic, individual choice.

To sum up, these diglossic models leave important questions of power in the shift and maintenance of languages in the linguistic market unexplored. The advent of power asymmetries linked to language status differentiation during nation-building processes has been a major theme of activist and academic discourses since the early 1970s. The absence – or the superficiality – of the discussion of power issues in early conceptualisations of diglossia has been underlined by many scholars who have forcibly criticised how such conceptualisations overlook *how* and perhaps more importantly *why* the High variety was *superposed* (Eckert, 1980; Gardy and Lafont, 1981; Lafont, 1982; see Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 8). For them, the very notions of prestige and appropriacy result from and reinforce sets of ideological values and attitudes – diglossic ideology – which in the long term contribute both to valorise the high variety and legitimise the socio-political domination of those groups that are bilinguals or monolinguals of the High variety (Eckert, 1980) and to vilify the practices of those whose command of dominant varieties is non-existent or incomplete, even in their own estimation (Calvet, 1974 and 2002; Lafont, 1977; Gardy, 1978; Kremnitz, 1981).[13] The work of legitimation and vilification underlying the unequal distribution of linguistic power links a theory of the nation with a concomitant, constitutive (normative) theory of language, and part of that work is discursive in nature and, therefore, partially hidden (Gardy and Lafont, 1981). Yet, it creates its own resistant, counter-discourse (Foucault, 1971, 1972 and 1979, and Bourdieu, 1991).[14] What is lacking in diglossic descriptions is a fuller diachronic and synchronic theorisation of the intrinsic conflicts underlying differentiated language uses and language shift.

Overall, critical commentaries on studies of linguistic nationalism and diglossia emphasise that, contrary to what the modernisation thesis claims, the acquisition of new social norms is not a matter of free will but imposed from above (even if this is a hidden process), but such analyses often overlook that power asymmetries can be and often are resisted, and the role of language in processes of resistance. Historical approaches underline how the diglossic compartmentalisation of languages has come to emerge, but more emphasis is needed that diglossia is the temporary result of unachieved and ongoing 'language wars' or processes of 'glottophagy', as Calvet (1974, 1999 and 2002) puts it.

This further suggests that the speakers of dominated languages have nevertheless the means to resist what some commentators have called *linguicism* (Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas, 1986). These means and the conflict they imply must be explored. In that connection, Bourdieu's sociology of language offers interesting insights.

Bourdieu's sociology of language and power and linguistic ethnographical approaches

Bourdieu's own contribution to how language and society interact is an exploration of the relationship between language and power with strong Neo-Marxist overtones. It begins with an epistemological attempt to move beyond the aforementioned classic set of oppositions: 'macro-' *versus* 'micro-', society *versus* individual, structure *versus* agency, etc. Hence, he develops his 'theory of practice' and the conceptual framework from the notions of *habitus*, *fields* and *markets* (1991: 17).

The *habitus* is a set of dispositions that incline social actors to act and react in certain ways, i.e. a system of habits. The dispositions constituting the habitus are *inculcated* (i.e. taught or acquired during childhood), *structured* (i.e. reflect the social conditions in which they were acquired, thus differentiating between social groups), *durable* (i.e. because they are embodied), *generative* and *transposable* (i.e. they can generate a multiplicity of practices and perceptions so that the habitus is reproduced in contexts other than those which inculcated it). The very notion of habitus thus extends from macro- to micro-levels of society: it is 'macro-' in that it is structured, i.e. class-related, 'meso-' for it involves the influence of the immediate social environment on the attitudes and behaviours of individuals, and 'micro-' as it can be observed at the level of interpersonal interaction. *Fields* are social contexts where 'products', i.e. instances of social practices, are exchanged with a view to increasing the agents' capital, i.e. economic and/or cultural and/or symbolic capital, according to a pre-determined exchange rate. Indeed, the products exchanged in a particular field are typically granted a particular *market* value by dominant social groups at 'macro-' level. Insofar as fields are the locus of the individual's social development, they are also anchored in 'meso-/micro-' or local social reality.

Crucially, however, social practices do not merely *reflect* the habitus of the agent in a deterministic way: rather, they are the products of the relation between the habitus and the market where participants interact in search of profit. The *linguistic* habitus is one dimension of the habitus, and linguistic practices – characterised as the relation between

a linguistic habitus and a linguistic market – can be considered as social behaviours intent on increasing one's linguistic capital and, thereby, one's symbolic power.

Finally, central to an understanding of Bourdieu's sociology is that it assumes that social actors are in a permanent quest for an increase of their different forms of capital, which are seen as the basis of power. Although not all fields are economic in the narrow sense, various practices follow a logic that is economic in the broader sense, seeking the augmentation of some kind of capital (e.g. cultural or symbolic), or the maximisation of some kind of profit (e.g. honour or prestige). For instance, most pragmatically, if the value of RMLs augments on the dominant market, they are likely to become more coveted and perhaps revitalised.[15] The question then becomes how value is determined.

When focusing on the relationship between the production and re-production] of social structures, Bourdieu argues that to understand the way the linguistic market functions, one first needs to consider the conditions of emergence of dominant linguistic varieties. As in the nationalism studies considered above, the relation between language change and language hierarchisation, i.e. linguistic market determination, first needs to be examined from a socio-historical perspective – in the processes of creation of the nation-state (ibid: 5–6) – and as a device of *élites* to linguistically secure their political and economic domination over the masses. The study of nation-building processes highlights how particular linguistic structures were imposed by socio-historical change and how resulting hegemonies are further nourished by those who benefit (and by those who 'suffer') from it. Thus Bourdieu's sociology accounts for the variability of language practices in a market where varieties are unequally valued. Moreover, like other aforementioned theorists of ideology and power (e.g. Gramsci, Foucault), Bourdieu underlines the role of ideology in establishing hegemonic hierarchies, thus indicating that because these ideologies are typically covert, users of 'low-value' varieties largely endorse the hierarchy that vilifies their own practices. This is what he calls symbolic power which wields symbolic violence.

However, most importantly, Bourdieu also acknowledges the possibility of resisting dominant market ideology and its value-system, notably by adopting or maintaining a parallel or alternative market on which products are valued according to different criteria. The notion of the alternative market itself embodies resistance and shows that people behave in complex ways that must be explored and accounted

for. Finally, the existence of alternative markets has several important further theoretical and methodological implications for our purpose here.

First, the fact that the aforementioned language-identity link is malleable and fluid and adaptable to different markets undermines the idea of the fossilisation of identities and suggests that identities can be plural and situated. If the definition of identity is plural and malleable, then the intrinsic equation between language and identity does not hold and rather seems to confirm, as 'post-modernist' commentators on the linguistic discourse of nationalism argue, that this relationship is largely contingent: '[...] *language does not define us, and may not be an important feature, or indeed even a necessary one, in the construction of our identities, whether at the individual or collective levels*' (Edwards, 1985; May, 2000: 372; see also Silverstein, 2000; Laakso and Östman, 2004). Identity, in this approach, is constructed by individuals or groups to achieve political ends. It follows that the nationalists' legitimising discourse of the existence of a cultural nation defined by its common language, that in turn legitimises access to statehood, is seriously undermined by the characterisation of that link as instrumental and strategic rather than primordial and essential. Notwithstanding, as May argues, the persistence of cultural forms of nationalism reflects that, engineered or constructed though it may be, essentialism as an ideology retains enormous purchase in people's affects and can thus be mobilised (2001: 70–80).[16] In that connection, we will see that plural models of language and identity departing from reified conceptions of language and based on actual language practices, like the *polynomic* approach developed by Corsican academics in charge of acquisition planning, are not easily accepted as a basis for language plans precisely because they seek to deconstruct and challenge deep-rooted, essentialist linguistic and political ideologies (see Chapter 8).

Second, and connectedly, the existence of an alternative market both deconstructs and confirms the weakness of the central 'modernist' assumptions on language and nationhood of structural/functional approaches like the ones sketched above. This leads to consider the laws and value systems that are hegemonic in the alternative markets to see how they function and ultimately if their existence can suffice to thwart language shift and perhaps trigger language revitalisation. Analysis must therefore determine the purchase of dominant and resistant discourses in both the dominant and alternative markets and in their interaction. As Bourdieu's theory of practice suggests, the order of discourse varies across markets. Therefore, since '*no two language-contact situations are*

alike, nor do language shifts resemble each other exactly' (Brenzinger, 1997; quoted by May, 2001: 146), the nature and functioning of the alternative market – its internal characteristics – must be approached *per se*, historically and ethnographically. Historical analysis must include a description of patterns of identity making and change in the alternative market during socio-political, economic and cultural/linguistic nation-building processes (see Chapters 5 and 6). This constitutes a sort of converse historiography of nation-building processes, the bottom-up history of the 'losers'.

As for linguistic ethnographic analyses, then, they can help document in great depth the relationship between 'grassroots' language repertoires and language practices and the discourses on language, identity and the language/identity link that participants in alternative markets produce and enact. Complementing the above-mentioned structural, macro-approaches, such works as Rampton (1995), Heller (1999) and Jaffe (1999) have much to offer to understand the norms, values and functionings of alternative markets and how these relate to dominant markets, and correlated questions of language maintenance and language shift. They also converge with 'post-modernist' commentators showing that identities can be multifaceted/plural, malleable and strategic. Besides, focusing on the relationships between practices, and discourses and ideologies, and seeing these relationships as socially constitutive, they respond to critiques that earlier ethnographies of communication (e.g. Gal, 1979) failed to relate micro-/meso-phenomena to macro-structures (and change in social orders). In this study, I draw extensively on Jaffe (1999) both for the theoretical frames she builds and for her specific focus and conclusions on the Corsican case.

To sum up, studies of nationalism and nation-building processes provide insightful cinematographic conceptualisations of the multifaceted relations between language, identity and the nation, and the concept of diglossia remains convenient as a 'bird's eye' characterisation of situations of language contact and a snapshot understanding of patterns of sociolinguistic dominance in a given multilingual situation. Because of the limitations of their 'macro-' perspective though, both these approaches must be supplemented with more 'micro-' theoretical and methodological tools. Bourdieu's sociology of language and power fills the former gap, while ethnographies of language practices and discourses provide useful information on the dialectics of compliance with/resistance to dominant ideologies and on their translation into actual practices.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have made the case for an interdisciplinary research framework to investigate language policy formation and language planning, drawing together concepts both from political and social theory and from sociolinguistics. I have drawn critically on governance and policy network approaches, studies of the role of language in nation-building processes and nationalist discourses, diglossia informed by such socio-historical approaches, Bourdieu's sociological concepts of linguistic habitus and dominant and alternative linguistic markets, and linguistic ethnographic perspectives on the relationship between language ideologies and language practice (i.e. language maintenance and language shift).

The governance and policy network approaches developed in the fields of public policy and European studies show that, in increasingly differentiated and polycentric polities like the EU (but this increasingly also applies at national and sub-national levels), new theoretical models are needed to understand who participates in sector-specific decision-making processes and how. The particulars of language decision-making processes and the variety of participants involved in various ways and with various resources in such processes must be identified more satisfactorily than through a mere formal/legal lens. Here, the policy network concept combined with power dependency theory accounts for such processes and interactions between actors more satisfactorily than traditional formal/legal models of government. Yet, the openness intrinsic to the concept of multi-level, multi-actor governance should not understate that member states remain largely hegemonic in EU language policy-making processes and that no change in RML glottopolitics is likely to take place that has not first occurred at national levels. Further, considering that the ideologies determining member states' approaches to linguistic diversity have been historically shaped in specific ways and, therefore, vary across national contexts, what is needed then to account for potential change in RML legislation at supranational level is an analysis of how language policy is devised at national levels – according to which principles and/or motivations and how.

The sections on linguistic nationalism and diglossia have therefore focused on the national level. Drawing on studies of linguistic nationalism, and the role of language in nation-building processes, I first sketched the main theoretical perspectives framing the practical and symbolic ways in which the notions of language, nation and identity have been conceptualised and operationalised during nation-building

processes. I emphasized the deeprootedness of essentialist approaches to language and political identity and how these notions have been made to interrelate in nationalist discourses. As a result, the construction of nation-states has articulated reified and totemised conceptions of language and identity. Likewise, early conceptualisations of the sociolinguistic concept of diglossia were described as exemplifying an equally unsophisticated approach to how language relates to conflict-ridden nation-building processes and what a 'language' actually is. Both these approaches fail to transcend the inadequacies, intrinsic to 'macro-' structural approaches, to account for actual language practices. I showed that the main reason for these limitations has to do with an uncritical assumption of the modernisation thesis, which itself is rooted in the 'evolutionary fallacy'. Ultimately, I suggested that approaches to linguistic nationalism document the origins and nature of linguistic and political ideologies and diglossic approaches have value as a snapshot for multilingual situations. Notwithstanding, the possibility of resisting the 'modernisation fallacy' must be better accounted for.

Bourdieu's sociology of language and power proves useful for it looks at nation-building processes as predicated on social and discursive conflicts, notably through the existence and/or the creation of alternative markets. Bourdieu underscores the concomitance of antagonistic systems of values and norms which has resulted from and perpetuated social conflicts originating in nation-building processes. By doing so, he undermines the aforementioned structuralist/essentialist biases that assume a homogeneous social body. Notwithstanding, Bourdieu's theoretical framework lacks a corresponding methodology to collect practice-based evidence of patterns of compliance and/or resistance to dominant orders of discourse on language and identity. For the heterogeneity of the social body to be described and analysed, some ethnographic data on patterns of compliance/resistance to diglossic hierarchies and on actual language practices must be collected at the subnational level (e.g. Jaffe, 1999).

What is, therefore, needed to account fully for contemporary RML sociolinguistic situations in general and that of Corsica in particular is as follows: 1. diglossic representations informed by studies of nation-building processes and nationalism; 2. ethnographic information on what discourses on language planning and language prevail both in dominant and alternative markets; 3. legal and policy analysis of which discourses are legitimised and institutionalised, and how, which gives an idea of how they interact and which are hegemonic, and who the dominant actors in the Corsican language policy network are; 4. finally,

and most importantly, both how these various discourses are accepted or resisted by policy recipients and ultimately translated, or not, into actual practices at meso- and micro-level. With reference to Corsica, Jaffe (1999) following Thiers (1989) has largely documented points 1, 2 and 4 above.

My own contribution to such issues in this study consists in bringing together the scholarly traditions outlined above in complementary ways. On the more specific issues of the impact of EU integration processes on French-Corsican glottopolitical relations and Corsican language revitalisation processes, further, I ultimately focus on the institutionalisation of discourses on language planning and language in contemporary Corsica (point 3), and I provide an update on elite and popular attitudes towards the modalities and outcomes of that institutionalisation through the analysis of media discourse on language and language planning (point 4) (Chapters 7 and 8).

In the next chapter, however, I first perform a CDA of the EU sociolinguistic regime to elicit the EU order of discourse on language, nation, identity and their interconnections, and to show that the EU legal frameworks and institutional arenas constitute sites of discursive struggles for RML activism at supranational level.

2
Foundations of the EU Sociolinguistic Regimes: Community Official and/or Working Languages

Introduction

This chapter comprises two broad parts of unequal length. The first part analyses the EU legal framework regulating issues of language status and language use within the EU and the political and linguistic ideologies underpinning it. The focus is on the legal configuration of the EU's sociolinguistic order, and especially on the distribution of glottopolitical powers between various European actors: member states, Community institutional actors and European citizens.

The second part shows on what legal fronts RML activists have fought to obtain a legal basis for an EU RML policy and with what success. I analyse the treaty articles with a language content (i.e. Articles 149 and 151, respectively, regulating the EU competence in education and culture) and their translation into concrete EU action programmes, looking at language promotion first in the EU education policy and then within the EU cultural policy. As indicated in Chapter 1, my initial hypothesis proposes that decisions made at EU level result from the interplay of various ideological motivations, formal legal provisions and actual patterns of institutional practice.

The main ideological frameworks relevant here are the ongoing debate on the locus of political power in the EU – the *intergovernmental versus supranational* debate and, within that broad debate, the EU's discourse on respect for multilingualism, linguistic diversity and language equality – the 'unity in diversity' discourse. Besides, insofar as European integration is largely a law-driven phenomenon, wherein primary and secondary legislation govern institutional relations and policy-making processes, legal texts play a primary role in establishing and legitimising

the pattern of distribution of (glotto-) political power within the EU and establishing frameworks of policy implementation. The analysis, therefore, first investigates the attribution/distribution of glottopolitical power as established by the legal provisions appertaining to language status and use within the EU – Article 53[1] and the derived Regulation 1/1958 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community – and then continues examining Articles 149 and 151. To show that these texts have become stakes and sites of discursive struggle for RML promoters seeking a legal base for RML promotion, I ultimately also consider other, non-legally-binding texts in an intertextual relation with the above ones.

The implementation of the provisions contained in Regulation 1/58 is scrutinised in the context of inter-institutional and intra-institutional practice, but I also look at how advocates of a pro-active EU intervention in RML protection and promotion – hereafter RML activists – have sought to interpret and exploit the glottopolitical provisions of EU law, and their underlying ideological assumptions, in ways that can benefit RMLs despite the absence of a legal base for RMLs *per se*. Indeed, although at first sight, and until recently, the question of official and working language status may have appeared largely irrelevant to the cause of RML recognition and rights, we will see in this chapter and subsequent ones that the principles of respect for multilingualism and language equality inscribed in Regulation 1/58 have been largely summoned up by RML promoters. Moreover, the vagueness of the requirements for Community official language status granting has long left open a discursive space in which language officialness at national levels could serve to catalyse claims for Community language officialisation on the basis of domestic statuses, e.g. Catalan and recently Irish, until the matter was partially resolved in 2007. Community official language status is an important stake both symbolically and financially. Symbolically, because for an RML to be officially recognised beyond the national level is unheard-of, and financially because language officialness determines which languages may be recipients of EU policy activities and therefore obtain financial assistance, e.g. notably through education and cultural policies and related programmes, and which ones cannot.

As was claimed in Chapter 1, central to these issues of attribution/distribution of glottopolitical power are the conditions of production, and above all interpretation of legal texts, as they are discussed within the EU institutional arenas. To understand how legal production and interpretation may constitute a discursive springboard for RML

activism, I draw on modern genre theory taken as a (critical) discourse theory. Modern genre theory indeed sees the rules governing patterns of text production and interpretation as socio-political constructs determined by ideological motivations and actualising particular schemes of power distribution. Thence the dominant interpretation of texts is open to challenges from those who benefit least from such schemes.

The analyses offered here, therefore, contrast two possible readings of legal texts – 1. a hegemonic, 'legal/political' expert reading and 2. a critical, more sociolinguistic, reading. The former is highly conventionalised and usually performed by members of the EU's legal *discourse community* (Swales, 1990) within EU institutions. Typically, it focuses essentially on the construction and legitimisation of various positions of authority, by defining glottopolitical rights and obligations. Unsurprisingly, the categorisations of *language* itself in these texts are unsophisticated.

By contrast, critical, sociolinguistically informed readings performed by RML activists focus on the definition/construction of the object *language* and pinpoint the ideological and political conflicts intrinsic to the definitions of the status of languages. This alternative reading points to the aforementioned, perceived inconsistencies resulting from the different ways in which language status is granted within the EU's glottopolitical framework and at national levels. In turn, these perceived inconsistencies constitute a privileged site of discursive struggle for RML activists to obtain a pro-active RML policy in the EU. Put otherwise, I measure the extent to which RML activists have been successful, or not, in challenging and elaborating on conventional readings, ultimately to impose their own paradigm(s) of text interpretation during the processes of implementation of the legal provisions via programmes and actions.

In the first part, I briefly analyse Regulation 1 from a 'traditional' legal/political perspective looking at how political authority is constructed and distributed amongst various actors and then show that actual institutional language use is in contradiction with the statement that the EEC respects and promotes language equality and multilingualism. Then, I provide a sociolinguistically informed reading and claim that the vagueness and/or absence of clear language definitions in Regulation 1 serves exclusive purposes on the Council's part, which in turn reinforces but may also endanger its glottopolitical hegemony. Finally, I conclude on the evolution of the EU's sociolinguistic regime from its establishment up to its transformations in the 2000s.

In the second part, I first analyse how glottopolitical power is constructed and distributed in the texts of Articles 149 and 151, looking first at how the subject positions of Community institutions and member

states are legally defined through particular lexical choices. To complement this legal perspective, I then also examine the sociolinguistic configuration of education and cultural policy, i.e. how *language*(s) is/are conceptualised within it and how this conceptualisation has positioned the various actors and become a stake of discursive struggle for RML activists. Specifically, I focus on the main institutional platforms through which challenges to conventional readings have been chanelled – parliamentary written questions and the still-born project for a Council Decision in favour of RMLs (i.e. the Archipelago project), as far as education policy is concerned. Regarding the place devoted to language promotion within the EU's cultural policy, I analyse other parliamentary questions and then briefly the framework programmes *Culture 2000* and *Culture 2007*. The analysis concludes with a review of changes brought about under the *Lifelong Learning Programme* (2007–2013).

Article 53 and Regulation 1/58: the initial language regime of the EC

Article 53 states that:

> *The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, without prejudice to the provisions contained in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously.*

The scope of applicability of this general provision is then further defined in Regulation 1/58 (see Annex I for the full text of Regulation 1/58). Regulation 1 determines the languages to be used within the framework of the EU. It sets glottopolitical positions for various social and institutional actors ranging from supranational institutions down to individual citizens. It regulates language use for both 'horizontal' interactions within and between the EU institutions, i.e. working languages (Articles 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7), and 'vertical' interactions between individual Community institutions and the Community as a whole and both member states and 'persons subject to the jurisdiction of a member state', i.e. (Community) Official languages (Articles 2 and 3). This section explores the ideologies underlying the glottopolitical power positions Regulation 1 constructs. I read the text in terms of the (legal) function it performs – imposing obligations and conferring rights – but my reading also critically calls upon Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) within a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach the better to convey the

formal linguistic devices at play to fulfil this function and the various underlying strands of the ideological struggle. Specifically, I explore the ways in which the text is made to cohere as a revelator of the ideological assumptions underpinning text production.

Following Halliday, I explore the text's ideational and interpersonal meaning, i.e. how it constructs a specific social reality, social identities and social relations *inter alia* through coherence building. Following Fairclough, my assessment is three-dimensional (Fairclough, 1989; 1992: Chapter 3; 2001: Chapter 2). I first discuss Regulation 1 as an instance of discursive practice, attending to its conditions of production, distribution and reception/interpretation. I thus explore its intertextuality, the chain of communication it enters, and its host of in-built subject positions (Bakhtin, 1981 and 1986). I also scrutinise it as an instance of textual practice, looking at diverse textual features – modality, voice and theme – to see how their analysis corroborates, or not, the findings of the discursive analysis.[2] Throughout, moreover, I attend to Fairclough's third analytical stratum and characterise the findings of the above perspectives as an instance of social practice, i.e. the EU's pattern of construction/distribution of glottopolitical power.

Authorship, authority, and intertextuality – the Council

I first examine the conditions of production and in-built subject positions of this text, discussing the relation between its authorship – who wrote the text? – and its authority – what is the nature of the power derived from and distillated through the text? And whose power is it?

The Council explicitly claims authorship and authority in the Preamble of the text, i.e. *the Council of the European Economic Community . . . has adopted this regulation*.[3] This assertion of authorship and authority frames the whole text, and authority here is legitimated by the intertextual reference to Article 53 of the Treaty that provides for the Council to act unanimously in language matters.[4] In turn, the unanimity of the collective author's voice reinforces its authority. Moreover, Regulation 1 directly originates from the Council and does not follow a Commission proposal, which is highly unusual in EU law making. The council is thus the only author, which consecrates its hegemony in language-oriented policy making.[5]

As a Regulation, furthermore, it is a decision 'legally-binding' in its entirety. Legal binding-ness constitutes a key criterion of legal authority and refers to the nature of the power constructed in Regulation 1. In that regard, text types like Directives, Regulations and Decisions are necessarily to be enforced, Resolutions and Opinions are not. Still, the

latter can constitute (non-binding) legal bases for Community action even though they do not necessarily generate policy outcomes.[6] This uneven legal status is both reflected and constructed through the distribution of authorship of particular texts and the generic conventions of each legal text type, i.e. *sub-genres* in Bhatia's terms (1993: 21) and by the interpretation of legal provisions. Thus, in language matters, the EP and the Committee of the Regions (hereafter CoR) can only pass Resolutions and emit Opinions, and, in effect, the consultative, 'advisory' status of these legislative acts positions them as (glotto-) politically subordinated to the Council in the legislative process. In language matters, the Council's decisions alone are hegemonic, and only they can prevail over national laws in cases of conflict, but EP and CoR texts can enact resistant discourses to that hegemony, as we shall see later.

Finally, Regulation 1 sets up the glottopolitical power positions of the other institutions. They are addressees in Regulation 1's 'chain of communication' (Bakhtin, 1986).[7] Looking at the 'chain of communication' that Regulation 1 enters into implies both considering its intertextual relations with other texts, e.g. with Article 53, and to whom it is addressed, i.e. individual EU institutions, individual member states and European citizens.

Subject positions – modality, voice and theme: constructing power relations and social reality

Here I focus on how the Council's dominance over other actors is both discursively and textually constructed. Regarding the latter, I specifically focus on interconnected semantico-grammatical categories[8] such as modality, voice and theme.

Modality was traditionally regarded as essentially constructed through the choice of particular modal auxiliary verbs. However, Critical Discourse Analysts amongst others have argued that this view is over-restrictive. Modality also encompasses the use of adverbs, hedges and various other grammatical features like voice and syntactic configurations (Halliday, 1985: 85–89; Hodge and Kress, 1988; Fairclough, 1992: 158–162; Stubbs, 1996: Chapter 8; Thompson, 1997: 56–65). Typically, the frequency of such or such modal device varies across text types; in legal texts their variety is rather limited. I explore below the text's modal profile, looking at the modal construction, voice (i.e. active or passive) and syntactic configuration of articles (i.e. what is thematic or rhematic). The thematic perspective relates to Halliday's textual function of language – how certain elements are foregrounded or backgrounded as

Theme or Rheme according to their sentential positioning. The rationale for that distinction lies in that thematic foregrounding, and rhematic backgrounding are ideologically motivated emphatic devices as well as cohesion devices.

Regarding the interpretation of how power relations are constructed, the use of various modal devices reflects/enacts the degree of *affinity* (Hodge and Kress, 1988) the author seeks to establish with its propositions. The construction of affinity determines how explicit or implicit, causality, agency and responsibility are, and each particular design indexes relations of power between the author and her/his addressees. I will explore below the relationship between these grammatical features and the construction of agency and authority.

The European Court of Justice: Preamble and Article 7

Amongst EU institutions, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) occupies an outstanding position. In Regulation 1, it is dealt with separately from other institutions, first in the Preamble and then in Article 7. This formalises a distinction between the ECJ and the other institutions, which can be read at two connected levels. At the intertextual level of legitimisation, it positions the ECJ on equal footing with the Council: the legitimisation of the Council's aforementioned power prerogatives is toned down by the constraint that they cannot cause '*prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedures of the Court of Justice'*. Looking at textual features though, the use of authoritative modal *shall* in the agent-deleting passive form in Article 7 tones down the ECJ's glottopolitical autonomy to make it look as if the Council had granted it.[9]

The Parliament and the Commission: Articles 2, 3 and 6

The Parliament and the Commission[10] are dually positioned in this text. They are both glottopolitically subordinated to the Council's authority, to member states and 'persons subject to the jurisdiction of a member state' (Articles 1, 2 and 3), and partially autonomous (Article 6).

Their subordinate status is manifest in that, in their internal functioning and mutual inter-institutional relations (Article 1), and when interacting with member states and/or 'European citizens'[11] (Articles 2 and 3), they must exclusively use the working and official languages determined by the Council, i.e. excluding RMLs. With member states and/or European citizens, furthermore, they must abide by the addressor's language choice (Article 2). Conversely, when addressing a member state and/or European citizens, EU institutions' communications '*shall*

be drafted in the language of such state' (Article 3). The language choice of the EU institutions is thus apparently more constrained than that of European citizens, and this constraint is modally imposed by the Council by means of authoritative *shall* and agent-deleting passive form *be drafted*.

Regarding institutional glottopolitical autonomy, Article 6 states that '*institutions* [. . .] *may stipulate in their rules of procedures which of the languages are to be used in specific cases'*. The voice is active and agency is thematically foregrounded conveying the institutions' glottopolitical autonomy. This autonomy is then further reinforced by the vagueness of the expression 'in specific cases' to be determined by the institutions themselves and not by the Council.[12] However, the use of permission-granting auxiliary *may* still signals that the institutions' autonomy remains a function of the Council's prerogative to grant some amount of autonomy. Regarding working language use too, then, the institutions' glottopolitical autonomy seems constructed in contradictory ways, which signals a process of hegemonic struggle for glottopolitical authority. Member states and 'persons subject to the jurisdiction of a member state' apparently enjoy greater glottopolitical powers than EU institutions, whilst the latter retain some glottopolitical autonomy for their internal workings only.[13]

The above analysis shows that the Council's authority remains hegemonic but unstable. The Council is glottopolitically positioned in complex contradictory ways through the combined use of different modal devices and instrumental syntactic choices in the successive articles. Critical analysis has helped further qualify the apparent omnipotence of the Council, more than a 'traditional legal analysis' of authority and autonomy, for instance, would, showing that EU institutions are both linguistically monitored and granted a significant amount of glottopolitical autonomy.

The next section pursues the analysis of how glottopolitical power and authority are constructed and distributed in Regulation 1, considering how glottopolitical power is sociolinguistically defined through the categorisation(s) of language(s) within the EU sociolinguistic order.

Categorising languages

This section explores the pattern of distribution of glottopolitical power within the EU, considering how *language* is categorised as *official* and/or *working* language. Whilst above I looked at modal and syntactic characteristics of textual construction, I now examine nominal and cohesive

features of the text to see how the object *language* is discursively constructed. Classifications of languages are themselves an important element in the EU's discourse on language and glottopolitical authority, within the larger order of discourse of power distribution in the EU. I therefore examine the glottopolitical power and subject positioning such categorisations construct. As Fairclough puts it: '*Cohesive markers have to be interpreted by text interpreters as part of the process of constructing coherent readings of the texts . . . Cohesion is one factor in coherence,*' and coherence is another surface mark of underlying discourses: by looking at how texts are made to cohere, we can trace the ideologies they assume (Fairclough, 1992: 177). Here, I show that the textual construction of language equality and multilingualism displays limited coherence and that textual cohesion/coherence is also defective in the characterisation of official languages. This 'lack' of coherence becomes apparent in a critical reading and betrays Regulation 1's failure to be both precise and clear, and all-inclusive. To illustrate this claim, I contrast the discourses on language and glottopolitical authority with actual patterns of institutional language use to emphasise further the discursive tensions and contradictions intrinsic to this Regulation and the discrepancies between legal provisions and empirical reality.

Coherence and cohesion in defining working languages and/or community official languages

Regulation 1 equips the Community with official and working languages. In Article 1, these are identified *ad hoc* rather than conceptually – i.e. through a definition rule – as the four languages of the original Community.[14] This *ad hoc* identification suggests that the four languages mentioned are equal between themselves and also individually both working and official languages. This tends to signal the Community's will to implement language equality and respect for multilingualism. Yet, the repetition of article *the* combined with coordinating conjunction *and* seem to establish a distinction between official and working status that is in contradiction with the aforementioned *ad hoc* definition along lines of equality: they act as separators (compare *the official and working languages* with *the official and the working languages*). The clausal and sentential organisation of Article 1 thus grammatically and semantically constructs the relation between *official languages* and *working languages* in contradictory ways: the combined use of *the* with *and* establishes a separation, whereas the *ad hoc* definition suggests equality between languages and between official and working language statuses.

As a result of this apparent contradiction, Article 1 only displays limited coherence *per se*.[15] One has to look elsewhere to transcend this apparent contradiction.

Working languages

In the absence of a definition rule for 'working languages', I define them as 'languages used within and between the institutions at various structural levels' so that they mediate actual institutional proceedings. Further characterisation can be found in Article 6's expression *which of the languages*, which implies a choice but without clearly specifying what the options denoted by *the languages* are. It is for the interpreter to make the expression cohere with *the languages of the institutions of the Community* as defined in Article 1. Via the use of *which,* furthermore, each institution can use *some,* not necessarily all, languages in their procedures according to *specific cases*. Potential linguistic inequality thus results from the fact that each institution enjoys some degree of glottopolitical autonomy which is ill-defined by the vagueness of the expression *in specific cases* (effectively the only stipulative rule here), even though this autonomy is intratextually restricted by Article 1. In terms of categorising languages in their mutual relationship, all official languages are not necessarily on an equal footing as working languages. The intratextual, cohesive link established between Articles 1 and 6 (i.e. *in specific cases*) regarding the categorisation of languages to be used reflects the conflict underlying the distribution of glottopolitical power underlined above, i.e. the tension between intergovermental and supranational sovereignty evidenced by the limited coherence between Article 1's implicit statement of linguistic equality and individual institutional working language autonomy, which opens some space for some form of language hierarchisation.

The limitation in coherence between Articles 1 and 6 originates in the actual generic legal conventions underlying the production of Regulation 1, where only limited aspects of cohesion are considered: the only cohesive link between Articles 1 and 6 is a vague expression (i.e. *in specific cases*) which, if it is all-inclusive, nevertheless remains imprecise and leaves more room for legal interpretation. In turn, I see the limitation in cohesion/coherence within and/or between the various articles as resulting from the discursive tension between the intergovernmental approach to integration (resting upon the symbolic equality of national languages) and the construction of a supranational entity to some extent autonomous and increasingly costly. The original context of production of Regulation 1 did not make that tension so acute since only four

languages were concerned. As the Community enlarged, the equal use of all the member states' languages as working languages became financially and technically difficult due to the important costs and time constraints involved. This has progressively become a more sensitive political issue and constitutes, after the 2007 enlargement, a further glottopolitical challenge. Today, in practice, the use of English and French has become the rule *de facto* at 'working group' level in all institutions, including in preparatory meetings of the EP despite the latter's recurrent advocacy of symbolic language equality and practical multilingualism. At higher levels – in Plenaries and Committees – interpretation is provided in all member states' languages, but it has to be required first (Bakker, 2003, Email to the author).

The limited coherence between Article 1 (language equality) and Article 6 (institutional glottopolitical autonomy) has entailed numerous parliamentary questions denouncing the discrepancy between the principle of language equality and the increasing hierarchisation of working languages. The Commission has, therefore, had to further qualify the meaning of *specific cases*:

- [. . .] documents intended for use outside the Commission are drawn up in the official languages of the Community in the case of instruments of general application and in the languages of those to whom they are addressed in other cases [Regulation 1/58, Article 4].
- [. . .] documents for internal use are drafted in the languages corresponding to the actual needs of the Commission and its departments based on operational efficiency [Regulation 1/58, Article 6].[16]

The need for operational efficiency has not been limited to internal use though, and on the EU's Website *Europa*, language equality in information has been repeatedly breached, where constraints of time and/or money justified language restrictions.[17] The Commission eventually explicitly acknowledged that constraints of efficiency and urgency must prevail over translation in all languages. Arguably these exceptions could be seen as infringing Article 4. The Commission having denied infringement following several such accusations, the case was eventually brought before the Court of First Instance that concluded against allegations of infringement, stating that:

> *Council Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community is merely an act of secondary law* [. . .] *To claim that that regulation sets out a specific Community law principle of*

equality between languages, which may not be derogated from even by a subsequent regulation of the Council, is tantamount to disregarding its character as secondary law [...] [Article 217] *does not provide that once the Council has established such rules they cannot subsequently be altered. It follows that the rules governing languages laid down by Regulation No 1 cannot be deemed to amount to a principle of Community law.*[18]

The 2001 Court's conclusions thus denied that Regulation 1 had established a specific Community law principle of equality between languages. Interestingly the repeated emphasis that, as an act of secondary law, Regulation 1 could be derogated from shifts the focus away from the initial discourse of language equality to the possibility of change. Is the Court acknowledging that Regulation 1/58 *initially* established a *de facto* principle of language equality? The implications of that recent judgement are far-reaching and fully legitimise the aforementioned discrepancy between apparent language equality (Article 1) and institutional language autonomy (Article 6) and the subsequent limitation in the number of working languages. They also undermine the oft-stated EU principles of respect for and promotion of language equality and multilingualism (see below).

I claimed above that the definition of working languages had only limited or indirect relevance to the question of RML status and use in 1958, because when Regulation 1 was drafted the question of RML status was not yet as politically salient at domestic levels as it later became, let alone at Community level, so that there was no pressure from RML activists for RML use within the Community (Milian, 2001). However, one 1990 EP Resolution[19] calling for use of Catalan in official publication and information campaigns, and for communication between the Commission and Catalan speakers met with *some* success: an agreement between the EEC and the principality of Andorra was drafted in all official languages and Catalan,[20] and it is reported to have been occasionally 'used' in plenaries in the EP (Strubell, 2002: 31).

Community and member states' official languages

The only explicit classificatory/definitional references to the *official languages of the Community* are in Articles 1 and 8. The existence of *Community* official languages (as distinct from *Member States'* official languages) is assumed in Article 1 through two linguistic devices – definite article *the* and the nominal group *official languages*. Besides, the thematic positioning of this noun phrase reinforces the assumption

of pre-existence, masking the Council's agency whilst emphasising its authority with *shall be.*

Like working languages, community official languages are identified empirically. However, the expression *official language* recurs throughout the text (Articles 2, 4, 5 and 8). Articles 4 and 5 seem to reinforce the linguistic equality hypothesised above. Article 4 establishes that all regulations and other legal documents produced by the institutions and aimed at public information must be drafted in all (Community) official languages, thus allowing EU officials to have access to draft texts in their own respective languages. Article 5 states that the Official Journal of the Community must be equally published in all official languages, allowing citizens to access legislation in their own language. Articles 1, 4 and 5 thus concur to ensure that official multilingualism and linguistic equality be built into the legal framework of European integration despite the concomitant translation costs.

The provisions contained in Articles 3 and 8 constitute an important stake for RMLs. Article 3 regulates the ways in which Community institutions must communicate with Member States and the 'persons subject to the jurisdiction' of such states. Communications must 'be drafted in *the language* of such State' (emphasis added). What is implicitly conveyed here, both in the thematic use of article *the* and in that of *language* in the singular, is a view of Member States as monolingual, which reflects the essentialist principles guiding Western European glottopolitics since early modern times (see Chapters 1, 4, 6 and 8). It is only in Article 8 that this categorisation of States as monolingual is further qualified. Article 8 acknowledges that Member States may have more than one official language. Still, Member States' potential multilingualism is only approached from the viewpoint of officiality. This calls for several observations.

First, Regulation 1 does not deal with non-official languages of the Member States, i.e. (most) RMLs as well as migrant languages. This can be seen as a generic constraint of the text, but I believe it is essentially not to encroach upon national prerogatives in the definition of their own sociolinguistic profiles. Besides, a coherent reading of Article 3 is conditioned by Article 8's provision: the expression *The language of such state* deceptively signals some yet unestablished shared knowledge that in situations of official multilingualism, the State in question chooses *one* language to be used in the Community.

Second, since Article 8 stipulates that (national) official language choice is 'governed by the general rules of its [i.e. a State's] law', the definition of official languages calls for a sociolinguistic distinction between

different levels of officialness within Member States. A more sociolinguistic discourse indeed would clearly distinguish between *state/national* official languages and 'sub-national' official languages, e.g. Catalan in Spain, Frisian in Holland. Insofar as this intertextual/interdiscursive reference remains implicit rather than manifest in Article 8, the distinction, or lack thereof, remains a stake of hegemonic struggle.

Looking at higher-level textual cohesion and coherence, finally, and given its location at the very end of the text, Article 8 textually underlines the aforementioned Member States' glottopolitical prerogative only in retrospect, which can be seen as a structural 'defect' in the cohesion, and hence coherence of the text. Thence, it is for the reader/interpreter to infer that Community official languages are Member States' national/official languages.[21] This inference is only implicit in Article 1 and only becomes partially explicit in Article 8, but nowhere is it stated that to become Community official languages, national official languages have to be official *throughout the territory of the member state*.

The question of official languages seems to have more relevance for RMLs for both symbolic and more practical/financial reasons. Article 8 remains vague on how to define official languages and does not clearly rule on sub-state official languages. In a 1999 written question, Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Camilo Nogueira Román asked the Commission for some clarification regarding '[. . .] *its view on the possibility of conferring the status of official EU languages not only on the official languages of the Member States, but also on those languages which are official in the Member States'* (e.g. catalan, Galician and Basque in Spain), written question E-1445/99; OJ 29-1-2000, C27 E/71). The Commission's answer invoked Article 53, invariably reiterating that *the rules governing the languages of the Community are to be 'determined by the Council, acting unanimously'* [and that] *the Treaty does not provide for Commission proposals on this matter.* The answer only indicates that granting officialness is beyond the Commission's remit. This question could have been put to the Council, at least to force it to clarify its position on the issue.

The 2004 enlargement gave Spanish RML activists another opportunity to ask the Council to grant EU official language status to all languages official in member states. In December 2004, following the possibility offered in the 2004 Draft Constitution to have such languages become Treaty languages so that all EU citizens could identify more strongly with institutions and laws in their own language, the Spanish government further requested that Catalan, Basque and Galician should also become full Community official languages as a token of the EU's will to reduce the democratic deficit of the EU. It also requested that the

above languages be fully eligible for the Lingua programme (see section below) and that Regulation 1/1958 should be modified accordingly.

Although full officiality was not granted, in its Conclusions of June 2005, the Council agreed that members states' *languages other than the languages referred to in Council Regulation No 1/1958 whose status is recognised by the Constitution of a Member State on all or part of its territory or the use of which as a national language is authorised by law* (Article 1) could be used in communications with the Council and EU institutions and that legal acts adopted in codecision procedures could be translated into those languages but as an *administrative arrangement* (Article 4) void of legal status (Article 5a). Moreover, it required that member states should systematically provide translations of texts in those 'other languages' in their official state language and should bear all translation costs. This apparent liberalisation was confirmed in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty – subject to ratification at the time of writing – where a provision was made for the Treaties to be translated into the member states' official languages 'whether they are official throughout or just on a part of the territory', but at member states' expenses. Ultimately, the reference to *administrative arrangements* pre-empted any future claim to 'legal' officialisation, while satisfying democratic communication needs, and Regulation 1/1958 remained unamended.

This nevertheless undeniably marks some (symbolic) progress since 1999 and guarantees that these *other languages* can become languages of communication with and within EU institutions. In that connection, Basque was first reported to be used in the Council in November 2007. Although this is merely an administrative arrangement without legal official dimension, this symbolically introduces RMLs into EU institutions. The question of the EU use of Welsh and other languages official at domestic levels is now being envisaged and may have a snowball effect.

Finally, the request for eligibility to participate in programmes like LINGUA (funding for activities promoting linguistic diversity and language learning, including didactic material) was simply ignored. As we will see in the next section though, the issue of whether languages need to be Community official languages to receive community support through certain provisions (e.g. education) creates more inconsistency in the EU language regime. Indeed, languages may not need official recognition at EU level to benefit from EU policy support (e.g. Luxemburgish and Irish until 2007). What is therefore also lacking in the EU's sociolinguistic regime is an explicit stipulation of the difference between Community official languages and languages considered by EU policy

activities. The section on education policy below will show that this inconsistency was somehow resolved in 2007 in a way more positive for RMLs.

Summary and recent developments

Regulation 1 establishes the fundamental glottopolitical positions for EU actors at large and defines their respective powers. As the author, the Council is the dominant producer of language policies and all language-related queries are referred to Regulation 1's provisions. As a multinational body, the Council has pledged to respect and promote linguistic equality, restrictively in the definition of Community Official languages, and in a less interventionist way regarding the institutions' working languages.

From a sociolinguistic perspective, Regulation 1 remains imprecise and ambiguous as to its inclusivity. Yet, these features do not come forth as long as the legal discourse excludes sociolinguistic analysis. I see the aforementioned lack of conceptual language definition (i.e. through definition rules) and the resulting vagueness of certain provisions (e.g. Articles 6 and 8) as a strategic discursive device aimed at avoiding interferences from a sociolinguistic discourse and genre, where such conceptualisations and categorisations could not remain as 'vague' or merely empirical. Arguably a sociolinguistic discourse on language might put Regulation 1's author's authority at risk and would point up the lack of coherence in Regulation 1's discourse on language and glottopolitical authority, as the above analysis suggests. Thence the EU sociolinguistic order can only be incomplete, inconsistent and unstable: various languages receive uneven treatments at EU level, and various statements regarding the meaning and scope of linguistic diversity, the locus of decisional power regarding language policies, and/or the appropriate legal basis for RMLs, are in contradiction with one another because of political reluctance to create and implement a fully coherent EU sociolinguistic system. This reluctance is instrumental in maintaining a predominantly intergovernmental approach to language issues. Consequently, when sociolinguistic issues arise, the EU chooses not to respond in sociolinguistic terms and can only retreat behind legal provisions, e.g. role distribution in law-making processes, or voting modes. In doing so, it preserves member states' glottopolitical sovereignties. Conversely, though, as the next part will show, the lack of sociolinguistic definitions also generates challenges to authority.

Regarding change in the EU's sociolinguistic regime, finally, the afore-mentioned dismissal of the principle of language equality by the Court of First Instance on 12 July 2001 signalled an important evolution which attests to the difficulty of remaining loyal to the principles that lay beneath the original sociolinguistic regime of 1958. Yet, the EU is not altogether ready to admit that language equality and multilingualism remain more symbolic than actual and, whereas the hierarchisation of languages is well advanced, the EU still adopts a blind eye strategy, continuing to claim that:

> *All the European languages, in their spoken and written forms, are equal in value and dignity from the cultural point of view and form an integral part of European cultures and civilization.*
>
> (Council Conclusion of 1995 reiterated in the Council Resolution of 14 February 2002; in OJ C 50/2, 23/02/2002)

In the EU's sociolinguistic regime, all the European languages are thus theoretically '*equally valuable from the cultural point of view*' and yet increasingly hierarchised at the practical level, and the practical level is also crucial as it opens the door to EU funding for RMLs.

It is on that contradiction that RML activism has focused since the inclusion in the 1992 Treaty of provisions indirectly establishing an EU language policy within member states – Articles 149 (Education) and 151 (Culture). The next part, therefore, provides a critical reading of Articles 149 and 151.

Languages in Education policy

A legal basis for Community action in the education domain was intro-duced in the 1992 Treaty of the European Union (TEU): Article 149 (see Annex II for the full text of Article 149).

Authorship and authority

The author of the text is the Council and its main addressees are member states. Nevertheless, the legislative procedure involves the Commis-sion (that proposes acts of secondary legislation to the Council and ultimately devises implementing measures, e.g. programmes and/or actions), the EP as a co-decision maker (see intertextual reference in clause 4 to Article 251 entailing the co-decision procedure), and for advisory purposes, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) and the Committee of Regions (CoR). To some extent, the CoE can also be asso-ciated to the EU education policy (clause 3). Glottopolitical authority

derives from clauses 1 and 4. The former defines the broad objectives of the EU education policy and provides for glottopolitical hierarchical positions. The latter regulates the potential policy outcomes.

Clause 1 defines the Community's remit in education matters. That the Community *contributes by encouraging* implies that member states retain full decisional powers and Community action is limited to providing material/structural-organisational assistance. Yet, the Community can also *supplement*. This leads to interpreting what follows in two significantly different ways. First, the article can be semantically understood as if it were written: '...*whilst fully respecting the responsibility of the member states for the content* 1. *of teaching and the organisation of education systems;* 2. *their cultural and linguistic diversity*', which accords responsibility to member states for the content of cultural and linguistic diversity. However, an alternative reading found in a report commissioned by the EP, and drafted by a group of well-known RML activists, suggests that there already exists a legal basis for an EU RML policy in the current Treaty in force, which another interpretation illustrates: '[...] *fully respecting* 1. *the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and* 2. *their cultural and linguistic diversity*'. In this alternative reading, the Community fully respects member states' cultural and linguistic diversity. Thence the meaning of *supporting and supplementing* suggests that Article 1 allows for independent Community action according to the principles of subsidiarity and supplementarity, whereby the Community can act independently of member states if the latter's policies are ineffective and/or insufficient to attain the Community's objectives[22] (Strubell, 2002: 24–25). What usually prevails is the stipulation clause that Community action must 'fully respect the responsibility of the member states'.[23] However, in that case, the report claims, '*the statement that the Community will act by 'supporting and supplementing their action' becomes void*' (ibid). Arguably, there is only limited coherence between keeping responsibility at member state level and allowing the community to act where supplementary action is necessary to achieve Community objectives, e.g. promoting linguistic diversity.

The distribution of political power is also a function of particular legislative procedures wherein various power positions are granted to various actors. The competition between levels of governance is finally arbitrated by the legal basis which a proposed policy invokes and which determines the following: 1. the kind of vote required, i.e. qualified majority or unanimity;[24] 2. the type of legislative outcome for a Commission proposal to become legally binding (Regulation, Decision and

Directive), or not (Recommendation, Opinion, Incentive Measures), in the Member-States. These measures, along with the substantial importance of budgetary grants for implementation purposes,[25] arguably reflect the political will either to preserve national sovereignties or to favour supranational governance.

Clause 4 provides that the voting mode is qualified majority and the legislative procedure is *co-decision* (Article 251). Qualified majority implies that decisions on education made at European level could potentially be binding at national levels regardless of the opposition of certain Member States, if a sufficient blocking minority cannot be obtained. *Co-decision* grants the EP some leverage on the content of education provisions. However, clause 4 also stipulates that the Council can only adopt 'soft law' legislative acts, i.e. *incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States … and recommendations* so that legislative outcomes provided for cannot be binding at Member-State level irrespective of the voting mode. Still, even a (non-binding) Recommendation can legitimately constitute the legal basis for a Commission proposal for Community action, even though it cannot be followed by sanctions in case of non-compliance. At the very least, it can become a potential site for grassroots activists to exert pressure (see Chapter 3).

Defining language(s)

Sociolinguistically, the text contains only two direct references to languages. Due to the ambivalence of clause 1 discussed above, clause 2's expression *the languages of the Member states* is also ambiguous. The Council's interpretation of Article 1 suggests that national prerogatives to define their own respective sociolinguistic profiles remain unchallenged. This implies that the above expression refers to national/state official languages, which establishes an intertextual reference to the restrictive interpretation in Regulation 1/58 of the expression *the languages of the Member states*. The alternative interpretation of how Article 149 relates to often-repeated Community objectives such as the promotion of and respect for linguistic diversity,[26] and legal principles – subsidiarity and/or supplementary principles – suggests that the Community could support and/or supplement member states' actions where their cultural and linguistic diversity is not fully supported (Strubell, 2002). Thence, *the languages of the member states* would refer *ex maxima* to all the languages used in member states, including RMLs, *ex minima* to those languages which have received officialness at domestic level.

Finally, an educational issue untouched by Article 149 concerns the actual foreign languages to be taught in priority. In 1988, the Commission had called for measures to '[...] *to ensure that all official Community languages are on offer within the educational system, even if there is an increasing trend towards certain languages* [= English and French]' (COM (88) 203: p. 14). This has consistently been reasserted ever since. Put differently, it has long been acknowledged that English is the first foreign language of a vast majority of European citizens, despite multiple statements reiterating the need to promote less widely spoken Community languages. Here again, multilingualism and linguistic equality were *de jure* objectives whilst *de facto* Community languages were steadily hierarchised with English being the dominant first, and sometimes the only, foreign language of European citizens.[27]

Moreover, by calling for measures merely *encouraging* Member states, by means of (non-binding) measures *to ensure that all official Community languages are on offer within the educational system*, the Commission perpetuated a policy of *laissez-faire* essentially benefiting English (and to a lesser extent French) and excluding non-*official Community languages*, whether non-EC migrant languages or RMLs, from its proposed policies of multilingual education.

It is significant that the Commission should have equated multilingualism with *official Community languages* thus stating unambiguously which languages should be targeted, whereas later Article 149 (2) ambiguously referred to *the languages of the Member States*. The ambiguity here lies in the fact that if Member States retain full responsibility to define their *cultural and linguistic diversity*, languages other than national official languages – which are granted some official recognition at subnational level – should be entitled to be embraced by European policy activity should a national government so decide.

Two definitions of the languages entitled to be the recipients of European policy activity emerge – a narrow one implicit in Article 53 and Regulation 1/58 and a broader one due to the ambiguous wordings of Article 149. For interpretation purposes, when sociolinguistic status-related queries arise, the former prevails.

Most significantly, the interpretation of Article 149 – that member states retain responsibility for the content of their cultural and linguistic diversity – excludes sub-national official languages. Yet, the text could also provide for their inclusion in the provision. Interestingly, what is naturalised in this essentialist interpretation is that member states wish to exclude them. This interpretation was confirmed by the Council's

negative response to Spain's 2004 proposal for Catalan, Galician and Basque to be made recipients of the Lingua programme.

From primary legislation to practice: the Archipelago proposal

As indicated above, once a legal basis grants the EU legal competence, the Commission can make proposals to have legal provisions and Community objectives translated into concrete actions. Practically, various Community education programmes and derived actions have been launched over the years, making foreign language teaching and learning core priorities. In 1989, the LINGUA programme was established, pioneering the promotion of foreign languages training in the EU. Various other educational programmes and actions have followed since, mainly under the 'umbrella' programme SOCRATES. Interestingly, participation in these programmes is open to 31 countries, thus going well beyond current EU Member-Statehood but eligibility to benefit from these programmes' funds has been restricted to the EU official languages plus Irish and Luxemburgish until 2007. The case of Irish and Luxemburgish was symptomatic of the EU's unequal treatment of languages and deserves some explanation: both are national/state languages domestically but during accession negotiations, Ireland and Luxemburg initially renounced demanding Community official language status. They were thus not working languages and official documents need not be translated in them. Yet, they have been eligible for all EU programmes, which has thus constituted a blatant case of exception to Regulation 1/58's Article 8. Interestingly, Ireland requested (December 2004) and eventually obtained that Irish should fully become an official and working language of the EU, which somehow regularises the aforementioned exception for Irish.[28]

We will see in the last sections of this chapter that the eligibility of RMLs under education programmes has finally evolved in 2007. For now, and to understand well that this question was an important stake of discursive and institutional struggle between the 1980s and 2007, I examine a programme project by the Commission intent on creating a legal basis for RML policy making within the larger legal framework of education policy – the stillborn programme *Archipelago*.[29]

Archipelago was a 1999 project for a Commission *Proposal for a Decision* aimed at creating a legal basis for Community action regarding the promotion of RMLs. It was established by the Commission's Language Policy Unit (in the Directorate General for Education and Culture) after the May 1998 legal 'crisis' for RMLs (see Chapter 3). I will return to its

interdiscursivity and intertextuality below. For now, I want to insist on two fundamental features of this proposal – 1. its invocation of the principles of subsidiarity and supplementarity; 2. its definition of linguistic diversity.

The legal basis invoked in the Proposal was Article 149. The Proposal first drew on the subsidiarity and supplementarity principles recalling that:

> [. . .] *Community action supports and supplements actions undertaken by and in members-states . . . The actions of the programme aim to produce results that could not be obtained by member-states acting alone or through bilateral cooperation.*

These actions notably included:

– *Developing teaching material*;
– *Encouraging the development of networks in the domain of education and the promotion of regional and/or minority languages*;
– *The observation, diffusion and exchange of experience.*

Archipelago thus defined various domains wherein Community action could be more effective and efficient than at member-state level. Most importantly, besides, the proposal offered a hitherto unheard-of definition of the EU's linguistic diversity and the languages qualifying for Community support:

> *Linguistic diversity is not limited to the official languages of the EU but also comprises all the languages spoken in some of our regions, sometimes called regional and/or minority languages. For the present programme, regional and/or minority languages refer to autochtonous languages traditionally used by nationals of a Member State of the EU or EEA, who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population, excluding dialects, migrants' languages and artificial languages.*

This definition – largely reminiscent of that of the CoE's *European Charter for Regional and/or Minority Languages* – was the first and only explicit definition in a EU document of 'linguistic diversity' which, as was seen, is the core bone of contention between RML activists and their opponents. This definition could be read as another intertextual reference to Regulation 1/58, expanding its approach to linguistic diversity and encompassing RMLs as cultural assets for the EU.

Had it been adopted, this proposition would have constituted a legal basis for Community actions in favour of RMLs and a legal precedent for the contentious definition of linguistic diversity. Besides, it provided for the largest budget ever devoted to their promotion: €30 million for a period from January 1 2001 to December 31 2005. However, it was blocked internally by the Commission's legal services. The only explanation for that refusal I could find was provided by a Commission Official via email, in which he commented on the objectives of the *Action for the promotion and safeguarding of RMLs* (conducted until the '1998 crisis'; see Chapter 4) and the impossibility to take education as a legal basis for RMLs:

> *The objective of safeguarding and promoting regional and minority languages in the regions in which they are spoken, which has been the principal objective of action in this field, is not compatible with the objectives of Article 149. It does not constitute per se a contribution to the development of quality education, nor does it fit into any of the aims of Community action listed in Article 149 (developing the European dimension in education, encouraging mobility, promoting cooperation, developing exchanges of information and experience on common issues, encouraging distance education, etc.) The appropriate legal basis is therefore Article 151 (ex 128) which has as its objective to 'contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.' **Activities involving regional and minority languages that are acceptable under article 149 (mobility, cooperation, exchange of experience, etc.) are already eligible for support under the Socrates programme.***

<div align="right">

(Commission Official McPhail, Email to the author, 2002) (emphasis added)

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The legal basis invoked was rejected on the ground that *Archipelago* did not pursue Community objectives, e.g. here quality education, and the proposal was stillborn. Arguably, one can question the extent to which the teaching of, say, English objectively contributes more to the quality of education than that of Welsh or Corsican. Additionally, the emphasis above clearly establishes that projects seeking to promote *mobility, cooperation and exchange of experience* contribute to quality education and are thus eligible under Article 149 (compare with Archipelago's planned actions above) and thus already incorporated in SOCRATES, which shows that the actions planned in Archipelago drew on existing practice and may therefore have been discarded for reasons of overlap

with SOCRATES rather than/as well as for legal invalidity. Relatedly, one can also wonder how this state of affairs can be made to cohere or be reconciled with the September 1998 Commission's response to a Written Question about whether Article 149 '*should be recognized in principle and used generally as the legal basis for RMLs*', that:

> *Community action must also be aimed at 'developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States'. In effect, the Commission's action in support of regional and minority languages is based on this article.*[30]

Confronted with what may justifiably be seen as a series of contradictions, I sought to obtain the actual Opinion of the Commission's Legal Services that declared the invalidity of education as a legal basis, but in vain. After sending requests to three different Commission addressees and eventually invoking Article 255 on transparency, I was finally denied the right to access that document on the grounds that disclosure, partial or total, would endanger the independence of the legal services:

> *The opinions of the Legal Service are internal working documents, the principal objective of which is to offer the Commission and its services advice on legal questions on the basis of which they can adopt their final positions. In order to ensure that these opinions are given frankly and objectively, it is necessary to preserve their confidentiality. Their disclosure would result in the internal discussions and exchanges of views on the legality and scope of legal measures to be adopted being made public. This, in turn, would give rise to uncertainty with regard to the legality of the measures and have a negative effect on the stability of the Community legal order and the proper functioning of the institutions, which are matters of public interest for which it is unquestionably necessary to have due regard.*
>
> (letter by David O' Sullivan, Secretary General of the Commission, received September 9 2003)

Interestingly this paragraph implicitly acknowledges both the arbitrariness of decisions regarding the legality of the measures and the danger of emphasising arbitrariness to the stability of the Community legal order and the proper functioning of the institutions.

Summary

There are inherent conflicts of interpretation over the meaning of legal provisions. Central issues include: 1. The definition of key concepts such

as working languages, Community official languages, national/state official languages, sub-state official languages or rather the lack of definition, and issues of coherence where such definitions lack or overlap (e.g. Regulation 1/58); 2. The interpretation and scope of applicability of principles like subsidiarity and supplementarity in particular policy areas (e.g. Article 149); 3. The interpretation of how proposals concur with Community objectives, e.g. *Archipelago*. One site of such conflicts can be the intra-institutional level, e.g. between different services within the Commission, as with the *Archipelago* proposal, which shows that RML supporters can also be found in the Commission. The interpretation ultimately favoured, amongst the range of possible interpretations, denotes and enacts a specific political choice, a social discourse that appropriates meaning according to ideological semantic patterns of inclusion and exclusion, e.g. an *intergovernmental* choice with *Archipelago*. Ultimately, the interpretation of meaning can be contested and the ECJ has the last word, but it is today unlikely that the ECJ would challenge the 'intergovernmental' legal interpretation of the current EU sociolinguistic order.

Before looking briefly at the room devoted to (regional and/or minority) language in the EU cultural policy, I now focus on the *Lifelong Learning Programme* (2007–2013) – the new umbrella programme for Education and Training which has brought together SOCRATES and Leonardo programmes – that now encompasses RMLs as recipients of EU policies.

To begin with, however, I relocate the Lifelong Learning Programme within its chain of intertextual and interdiscursive communication and therefore chronologically review the policy processes and, ultimately, texts that preluded to it: the *Decision on the European Year of Languages 2001* (EYL) (July 2000), the Council *Resolution on the promotion of linguistic diversity and language learning in the framework of the implementation of the objectives of the EYL 2001* (February 2002), and the Commission Communication *Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity – Action Plan 2004–2006* (August 2003).

From the EYL to the Lifelong Learning Programme (2000–2007)

The action EYL was conceived as a short term, one-off initiative involving a Europe-wide information campaign and a number of actions aimed at promoting linguistic diversity, in particular through language learning.

The Commission proposal for the EYL was made in October 1999. Under the co-decision procedure (Article 251), it was then submitted to the EESC and the CoR for preliminary Opinions and then passed to the EP. After receiving a number of amendments after the EP's first reading (April 2000), the EYL was eventually jointly voted in July 2000 by the EP and the Council (Decision 1934/2000/EC). The intertextual references to legal bases in the Preamble called on Articles 149 and 150 on education and vocational training, but Article 151 was also invoked as an interdiscursive reference to the link between languages and culture. Thus the EP stated that '*Among the cultural aspects, matters pertaining to languages are of great importance*' (Recital 3). The CoR statement on that link had been more radical: '[. . .] *the basic distinguishing feature of cultural identity is the language spoken by the people belonging to a Community*' (Introduction, 1.1.3). But this formulation was not eventually retained.

Symbolically, this programme was important because it was the first EU-wide action open to RMLs. Members States had indicated that no restriction to linguistic diversity would be established for that action. Interestingly, the initial formulation by the Commission proposed that measures '[. . .] *cover the official languages of the Community, together with Irish and Letzebuergesch,* **and other languages recognised by the Member States**' (emphasis added). In the final text though, a more neutral, less 'official-sounding' wording, i.e. *identified*, was substituted for *recognized*. The 200 odd initiatives eventually sponsored comprised language tasters, studies and conferences, publications, multilingual public entertainment and games, etc.

On February 14 2002, as a follow-up to EYL, the Council issued a Resolution *on the promotion of linguistic diversity and language learning in the framework of the implementation of the objectives of the EYL 2001.*[31] In generic and functional terms, a Resolution is a non-binding declaration *recalling* and *emphasizing* the discursive context of Community action in a particular field and *inviting* relevant actors to open a debate, make Proposals (Commission) and/or take action according to defined principles and objectives (Member States). The above Resolution constituted a step backwards for RML defenders as almost all the EP amendments in the EYL Decision that might have constituted a jurisprudential precedent for RMLs were removed. For instance, the Council left out the various forms of intertextual references linking linguistic diversity and language rights to other more political rights (e.g. the 1950 CoE's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) which, in effect, reduced the promotion of linguistic diversity to the exclusive

protection of member states' official languages. The only statement retained, potentially beneficial to RMLs, was the intertextual reference to the 1995 Council's Conclusions that '*all European languages are equal in value and dignity from the cultural point of view and form an integral part of European culture and civilisation*.' Overall, the Resolution re-located the promotion of language diversity under the education policy umbrella, linking linguistic diversity and multilingualism to broad social and economic objectives (e.g. language-in-education policy to facilitate freedom of movements of workers) rather than to cultural policy as the EP's introduction of Recital 3 had entailed.

Nonetheless, the Resolution invited the Commission *to draw up proposals by early 2003 for actions for the promotion of linguistic diversity and language learning*. The 2003 Action Plan responded to this request, in the context of imminent, massive enlargement that would make the EU even more linguistically-diverse. During the consultation phase leading to the drafting of the plan, the Commission received over 300 responses, including from RML organisations underscoring *the importance of action to assist so-called 'regional' and 'minority' language communities* (see also EBLUL next chapter). The plea was heard since the Action Plan proposed that RMLs should be supported under mainstream Education and Vocational Training programme as part of the objective of adopting a hitherto unheard-of *inclusive approach to linguistic diversity to build language-friendly environments*. Specifically, the Commission stated that:

> *The Socrates and Leonardo da Vinci programmes, and their successors, can play a greater part in promoting linguistic diversity by funding projects to raise awareness about and encourage the learning of so-called 'regional' 'minority' and migrant languages, to improve the quality of the teaching of these languages, to improve access to learning opportunities in them; to encourage the production, adaptation and exchange of learning materials in them and to encourage the exchange of information and best practice in this field* [. . .] *In the longer term, all relevant Community programmes and the Structural Funds should include more support for linguistic diversity, inter alia for regional and minority languages, if specific action is appropriate. National and regional authorities are encouraged to give special attention to measures to assist those language communities whose number of native speakers is in decline from generation to generation, in line with the principles of the European Charter on Regional and Minority languages.*

<div align="right">(p. 12)</div>

Beside making an intertextual reference to the European Charter for RMLs, this recalls the provisions of the Archipelago programme above but advocating RML promotion within a non-legally-binding, mainstreaming 'programme' approach rather than through RML-specific, legally binding secondary *legislation*. Even though the prospect of mainstreaming RML-promoting actions was not immediate, it nevertheless envisaged a more inclusive and RML-friendly approach for the third generation of education programmes (2007–2013). However, supporting RMLs unspecifically rather than through a RML programme *sui generis* effectively denied them a long-awaited symbolic status at EU level. It is in that context that the Action Plan preceded the drafting of the Lifelong Learning Programme. I now focus on the various stages of its production from the Commission *Proposal* to the final binding *Decision*.

Reconstructing the textual chain: adopting the Lifelong Learning Programme (2007–2013)

In this section, to emphasise how glottopolitical struggle is embedded in the very institutional processes of text production, I briefly review the respective textual contributions to the drafting process by the various institutional actors involves in processes of negotiation: the Commission (Proposal), the CoR and the EESC (Opinions), and the EP and the Council (Co-Decision). I show that policy formulation constituted a site of political struggle between various policy actors from the time the Lifelong Learning Programme was first envisaged, devised and negotiated, to the voting stage when the Council finally adopted the Decision. This journey into the intricacies of policy text drafting also provides insights into who the RML policy institutional actors are and how they share decision-making powers. This prolegomena will be further elaborated in Chapter 3.

The first document in that legislative chain was the July 2004 Commission *Proposal for a Decision for an Action Programme in the field of Lifelong Learning*. Structurally, after an explanatory memorandum recalling the broad economic and practical rationales justifying the need for an integrated, overarching Lifelong Learning Programme, the very Proposal itself refers to Articles 149 and 150 as its legal bases (therefore suggesting the codecision procedure). Then follow a number of intertextual references stipulating the rationales in the text itself (e.g. how education and training and mobility can contribute to the 2010 Lisbon agenda to make the EU *the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world*). The Action Plan Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic

Diversity features as Recital 14. In the following section on General Provisions (Chapter 1), Article 1.3.f on Objectives then includes '*to promote language learning and linguistic diversity*'. Article 37 on the implementation of a new transversal programme then refers to a key activity *to promote language learning and to support linguistic diversity in the Member States.*

Article 38 on anticipated Actions mentions ways to achieve objectives, including:

(a) multilateral projects [. . .] *aimed, inter alia, at*:

  (i) developing new language learning materials, including online courses, and instruments for language testing;
  (ii) developing tools and courses for language teacher training;

(b) networks [. . .] *in the field of language learning and linguistic diversity*;
(c) other initiatives in line with the objectives of the Integrated Programme [. . .] *including activities to make language learning more attractive to learners through the mass media and/or marketing, publicity and information campaigns* [. . .]

No direct mention of RMLs as eligible was made, but eligibility was arguably implicit through the reference to the Action Plan for Linguistic Diversity. The Proposal was then reviewed at the Council ministerial meeting (November 2004) but the Council made no substantial comments. The Proposal was then passed to the EESC and CoR for their Opinions (February 2005). Overall, both hailed the Proposal as positive and neither made any comments relevant to RMLs. The text was then passed to the EP for a first reading (September 2005). The Committee on Culture and Education of the EP proposed a number of amendments, including the following recital (re-numbered 14), after the reference to the Action Plan on Linguistic Diversity in the Preamble:

> *Promoting the teaching and learning of languages and linguistic diversity,* **including the official languages of the Community and its regional and minority languages**, *should be a priority of Community action in the field of education and training.*
>
> (Emphasis added)

It also suggested amending Article 1.3.f as follows:

> *to promote language learning and linguistic diversity*, **paying particular attention to rare or minority languages**.
>
> (emphasis added to mark the Committee amendment)

On October 25 2005, in the final EP Position, however, the amend-ment in Article 1.3 was removed in the text voted in plenary, and the Commission gave partial agreement to the final EP Position ('partial' whilst decisions on budgetary procedures were still pending). The Coun-cil endorsed the partial agreement in November 2005. It then reached full agreement following the agreement of May 17 2006 on the Financial Framework 2007–2013. In its May 18 press release, the Council declared that after the EP had proposed amendments, *a large number of the amend-ments proposed* [had] *been incorporated into the text, either in whole, in part or in essence.*

In the ensuing, amended Commission Proposal (May 2006), EP Recital 14 above remained the same (re-numbered 17). The Proposal was sent back to the Council that gave it its political agreement and endorsed the proposed Common Position. In its formal adoption of that Common Position in the OJ (July 27 2006), however, the reference to RMLs in Recital 17 was then also removed. In its comment on the Council 'final' Common Position, the Commission then subsequently declared it as appropriate and concluded:

> *the Chairman of the Committee on Culture and Education of the European Parliament has indicated in a letter to the Council Presidency that if the common position was adopted as such he would recommend to the Com-mittee to approve the common position in second reading. The Commission can therefore support the common position which reflects the agreement reached between the three institutions.*

Unsurprisingly, the text was then adopted – amputed from all refer-ences to RMLs whether in the Preamble's Recital or in Article 1.3 – in the EP second reading (October 2006) and the final Decision was voted (November 15 2006). Between the first introduction of Recital 14 and the complement to Article 1.3 by the EP Committee of Culture and Education and the final Common position endorsed by the Coun-cil, some 'behind-the-scenes' intra-institutional and inter-institutional agreements were made that all references to RMLs would be removed from the text of the Decision for the Council to vote it.

To remain in the spirit of the Action Plan, however, RMLs eligibility was added on the EU website in the 'administrative' section *Guidelines for Applicants to the LLP – Key Activity 2 – Languages*:

> *All languages (European official languages and regional and minority languages, migrant languages and the languages of significant trading part-ners) may be targeted, provided that the proposed activities are relevant to*

>   *European multilingualism policy, show a clear European added value and*
>   *are additional to the work done at local, regional and national level*.

RMLs were thus denied *symbolic* promotion in secondary legislation –
like for *Archipelago* – but nonetheless granted *practical and financial*
support through non-binding, 'administrative' provisions. Before con-
cluding this chapter, I now look at the room devoted to RMLs under the
EU cultural policy.

Language and cultural policy

I now analyse the legal framework for EU cultural action and show that
the provisions of Article 151[32] (see Annex III for the full text of Article
151) are even less precise and clear than those of Article 149. In turn, this
allows for greater interpretation. I then explore what patterns of inter-
pretation have been privileged in cultural actions and programmes –
Culture 2000 and *Culture 2007* – with particular reference to the issue of
including RML defence and promotion within the EU's cultural policy.

Distribution of authority – legislative and discursive powers

Broadly speaking, the subject positions of authority in the legislative
process recall those established for education (the legislative procedure
is co-decision, the CoR and EESC have consultative status, and policy
outcomes are non-binding), and Article 1 indicates that the Commu-
nity *contributes* to the cultural *flowering* of the member states with the
possibility for the Community to supplement their action. The extent
to which RML activists might seek to interpret and exploit Article 151's
provisions is, however, radically different from their strategy with Arti-
cle 149 for several reasons. First, language is not mentioned, and the
language-culture link is never explicit. This is extremely significant and
revealing since, as Chapter 1 illustrated, the essential link between lan-
guage and culture has long been one of the most potent elements of
legitimisation of ethnic groups' or stateless nations', political claims to
various forms of political autonomy ranging from partial devolution to
full statehood (Chapters 4–8 will return to this link and its ideolog-
ical and political implications). Arguably, however, the link between
language and culture is implicit *ex minima* in the aim to support lit-
erary creation, but as such it is void of political connotations. Second,
and most importantly, the Council must endorse any policy outcome
unanimously, which precludes any measure and/or any interpretation
of *supporting and supplementing* that would not be entirely approved

by all member states. Culture is clearly a matter of intergovernmental sovereignty.

Clause 2's aims are very broadly worded – thus leaving much room for interpretation – and, in turn, many projects can be related to such broad aims, especially as enhancing regional diversity is explicitly considered as an objective *per se* (clause 1). Additionally, clause 4 broadens the definition of culture by recognising that cultural considerations can also pertain to policy areas from which they may traditionally seem to be excluded, e.g. economic and social policy. The enlarged characterisation of the scope of community cultural action thus broadens the traditional view of cultural development, i.e. essentially applying to domains like literature, art, cinema and the like, to view culture as a dynamic component of a wider array of domains of socio-economic activity where practices may be culturally differentiated. Emphasis is reiterated on cultural aspects of policies as a means to promote diversity.

In sum, clauses 2 and 4 allow great freedom to seek Community support, thus encouraging a multiplicity of project initiatives by a multiplicity of actors but at the same time they subject RML-targeting policy implementation proposals to the necessity of obtaining unanimity, which on RML issues can be fraught with difficulty. This is why RML activists' reports on strategic areas to target for RML promotion suggest invoking Cultural policy as a last resort (Strubell, 2002: Chapter 3).

The next section briefly examines the extent to which the emphasis on the language-culture link was accounted for in the drafting of the umbrella programmes for EU cultural action *Culture 2000*, and more recently *Culture 2007*, and in particular what space is devoted to RMLs within it.

Implementing culture: *Culture 2000, Culture 2007*

Culture 2000 was the single programming instrument for Community cultural action for 2000–2006, bringing together all previous sector-specific programmes. The new *Culture* programme now frames cultural action for 2007–2013. I first analyse *Culture 2000* and then underscore significant changes for language promotion in *Culture 2007*.

Remarkably, *Culture 2000* contained only three mentions of language. First, paragraph 6 recalled the role of the EU in '[. . .] *contributing to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity* [. . .]', indicating that '[. . .] *special attention should be devoted to safeguarding the position of small cultures and less widely-spoken languages'*. The light cast remained very dim though, as nowhere

was the expression 'less widely-spoken languages' defined.[33] On that account, two interpretations were possible: it either exclusively referred to less widely spoken 'national official' languages or encompassed RMLs as well.

Unfortunately, the remainder of the text offered little clarification. Only two vague references to language(s) appeared in the Annexes, first refering to the support of *cultural diversity and multilingualism*, then to the Community's help in translation of literary works *especially those in the lesser-used European languages and the languages of Central and East European countries*. Ultimately, as a general rule, the Commission's working definition of *lesser used and/or lesser taught European languages* has been: 'all Community official languages but English, French and Spanish' (Loup, 2001 [Commission Official; Language Policy Unit] Interview with the author).

Culture 2007 mentions languages only twice: the Preamble reasserts the importance of 'respecting and promoting the diversity of cultures and languages in Europe' (paragraph 1), whilst Article 7 reiterates the transversality of cultural action across other EU policy areas, including languages. Cultural diversity is praised twice, but the expression is now dissociated from multilingualism (which is no longer mentioned). Finally, references to *lesser-used languages* have altogether disappeared.

Conclusion

Through the analysis of primary and secondary legislation establishing the EU's glottopolitical competence, this chapter has clearly showed that member states remain dominant players in sociolinguistic matters and that their sovereignty is enshrined in and protected by a variety of strategic legal devices. However, interestingly, that sovereignty is protected as long as it promotes official state monolingualism as enshrined in Regulation 1/58. As the 2004 Spanish request to have 'regional official languages' made official at EU level show, the EU will nevertheless act as a supranational polity if one member states seeks to depart from the essentialist view of states as officially monolingual. Ultimately, some symbolic gains were, however, made as some RMLs gained status as EU languages of communication.

We also saw that RML activists have long sought to find a durable legal basis for an EU RML policy but have significantly failed to have that policy secured through education and cultural policies. Regarding education, diverging interpretations of Article 149's provisions for language issues show how legal and sociolinguistic perspectives can

conflict but also that, in the interpretation of the EU's competence as inscribed in legal provisions, legal interpretation always prevails. The analysis of the *Archipelago* project further illustrated how Commission lawyers preserving member states' sovereignties avoided entering a socio-linguistic discourse and simultaneously addressing RML status issues legally, e.g. through an explicit definition of linguistic diversity. There-fore, by re-locating linguistic diversity exclusively under the education umbrella (which we have seen implies a restrictive approach to linguis-tic diversity) in its 2002 Resolution, the Council effectively reinforced its restrictive interpretation of how the EU defines linguistic diversity. In the text launching *EYL* and in the 2002 Resolution, finally, the potential benefit for RMLs was curtailed by the absence of explicit ref-erence to RMLs in the Preamble, by the rewording of Article 1 into a more 'intergovernmental' formula, and inasmuch as the *EYL* innova-tions regarding the scope of linguistic diversity, language equality and multilingualism were not echoed in the 2002 Council Resolution that followed and concluded the implementation of *EYL*. Thus the discursive shift introduced by the EP, e.g. the emphasis on the link between lan-guage and culture (Recital 3), was not taken up, although, arguably, it is one of the fundamental tenets of definitions of culture in Western Euro-pean national historiographies, as was seen in Chapter 1. Whereas RML actors had hoped that the *EYL* could serve as the basis for a genuine, multi-annual promotional programme for RMLs, the Council's 2002 Resolution insisted on the one-off character of *EYL* in terms of both practical actions and discursive production. The various texts leading to the Decision for the Lifelong Learning Programme (LPP) also revived hopes for RML promotion, but ultimately we saw that all possibility of politico-symbolic recognition in secondary legislation was vain. Recent practical developments will award RML communities funding opportu-nities under the LPP, but through administrative arrangements rather than legislative provisions.

In Article 151, the preservation of member states' sovereignties included *inter alia* particular legislative procedures and legal outcomes, i.e. unanimous vote and non-binding legal outputs. In the texts launch-ing *Culture 2000* and *Culture 2007*, legal restrictions included above all the scarcity and vagueness of the links between language promotion and cultural action.

Nonetheless, in the longer term, the discursive content potentially beneficial to RMLs of programmes like *Culture 2000*, the *EYL* and EP policy documents for the LPP should not be deemed nil. Indeed, the view that legal provisions enact a particular order of discourse on

glottopolitical authority and language does not rule out the discursive force of non-dominant, constitutive discourses. Moreover, if discourse is the matrix of the socio-political order, insofar as resistant discourses are largely incremental, the repeated, intertextual diffusion – in various texts constituting legislative chains – of ideas in favour of language equality, full multilingualism and *ex maxima* linguistic diversity, and of the legitimacy of EU intervention in language questions, give actual substance and discursive legitimacy to actions aimed at supporting and promoting RMLs. The next chapter will show that the inclusion of such ideas in recent EU programmes has resulted from a long process of lobbying at European level, process of which the main actors have been the EP and to a lesser extent the CoR, as well as civil society actors like NGOs, e.g. the *European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages* (EBLUL). Additionally, the implementation of the *EYL*, and especially now of the LPP, has granted further symbolic credit to RMLs as recipients – without discrimination and for the first time on a large scale – of EU action programmes.

Finally, this chapter has provided insights on who the RML institutional actors in the EU are and on their respective bargaining powers. As was observed, the Council remains dominant on issues of language status granting and language promotion. Regarding the Commission, the *Archipelago* project showed that a holistic view of the Commission ignores that there exists no institutional univocity on RML issues, and that the Language Policy Unit's efforts to establish a solid legal basis for RMLs failed because the Commission's Legal Service censored it. Regarding the EP, the analysis of the different stages of the textual construction of the policy text launching the LPP has shown that the EP remains the most fervent supporter of an EU pro-RML policy and offers a path for regional RML activists to have their voice heard at supranational level (e.g. in academic/policy reports commissioned by the EP). But a holistic view of the EP is equally misleading as the abandonment of RML-favourable clauses in the ultimate drafting of the Decision for the LPP demonstrates.

In the next chapter, we will see in which practical ways the EP can enact its pro-RML advocacy. As we saw that the analysis of actors promoting RML rights needs conducting at sub-institutional level, besides, the next chapter examines which EP actors belong to the EU RML policy network and how they interact with other institutional and non-institutional actors at and below EU level.

Annex I – Regulation 1/58 Determining the Languages to be used by the European Economic Community

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,
Having regard to Article 217 of the Treaty which provides that the rules governing the languages of the Institutions of the Community shall, without prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously;

Whereas each of the four languages in which the Treaty is drafted is recognised as an official language in one or more of the Member States of the Community;
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1
The official languages and the working languages of the institutions of the Community shall be Dutch, French, German and Italian.

Article 2
Documents which a Member State or a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State sends to institutions of the Community may be drafted in any one of the official languages selected by the sender. The reply shall be drafted in the same language.

Article 3
Documents which an institution of the Community sends to a Member State or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State shall be drafted in the language of such State.

Article 4
Regulations and other documents of general application shall be drafted in the four official languages.

Article 5
The Official Journal of the Community shall be published in the four official languages.

Article 6
The institutions of the Community may stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are to be used in specific cases.

Article 7
The languages to be used in the proceedings of the Court of Justice shall be laid down in its rules of procedure.

Article 8
If a Member State has more than one official language, the language to be used shall, at the request of such State, be governed by the general rules of its law.

Annex II – Article 149 – Education (TEU)

1. The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.

2. Community action shall be aimed at:
   - developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States;
   - encouraging mobility of students and teachers, inter alia by encouraging the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study;
   - promoting cooperation between educational establishments;
   - developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the education systems of the Member States;
   - encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio-educational instructors;
   - encouraging the development of distance education.

3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the field of education, in particular the CoE.

4. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the Council:
   - acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States;
   - acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations.

Annex III – Article 151 – Culture (TEU)

1. The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.

2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:

   – improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples;
   – conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance;
   – non-commercial cultural exchanges;
   – artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.

3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture, in particular the CoE.

4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.

5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the Council:

   – acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. The Council shall act unanimously throughout the procedure referred to in Article 251;
   – acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations.

3
The EU's RML Policy Network: Legal Governing and Governance Politics

Introduction

Chapter 2 indicated that despite vain efforts to have RML issues integrated into the education and/or cultural legal frameworks, and the resulting absence of a legal basis *per se*, some kind of EU RML policy has existed since 1981. This chapter provides an explanation for this apparent paradox, showing that the very existence of such a policy can be attributed to the political and discursive activity of a network of actors – institutional and non-institutional – who managed to bypass some of the legal obstacles mentioned above and succeeded in creating a supranational RML policy network comprising institutional and organisational apparatuses devoted to RML promotion and defence.

These actors had these opportunities because of the very nature of the EU as a system of governance. Limited though policy outcomes may be deemed, the successful translation of pro-RML rights discourses into actual policy actions exemplifies the very nature of the EU as a system of multilevel/multi-actor governance in which the particulars of policy making and implementation processes cannot be reduced to the sole consideration of the power positions intrinsic to the legal framework, because access to policy processes is granted to a wider panel of actors than in a traditional system of government. Looking at how the RML network works, this chapter investigates the kind of policy outcomes that can surface from such governance politics.

It is divided into three main sections, distinguishing between two main periods of RML lobbying activity which saw drastic change in the balance of decisional powers between the actors of the RML policy network – between 1983 and 1998, and since. The first section initially provides an overview of the context of the emergence of a RML

policy network from 1979 and then assesses the politico-discursive and budgetary successes obtained by RML activists until 1998. I show that this period set the symbolic (discursive) and material (institutional and organisational) foundations of the EU RML policy and that, in legal terms, the question of RML policy benefited from a legal void.

The second section first briefly returns to the context of what I have called above the 1998 'budgetary crisis' and analyses the subsequent change in power distribution amongst the actors of the EU RML policy network. Specifically, I focus on the strategic responses made by RML activists to the threat of seeing the RML policy annihilated and on the outcomes obtained in particular by the EP's *Intergroup for RMLs*. I explore the *Intergroup's* functional role and discursive contributions – the actual strategies whereby it collectively seeks to influence and/or determine RML policy making both within and outside the EP. Furthermore, by looking at written questions to the Commission and the Council, I assess whether the *Intergroup* is a Europeanised organisation or merely a European platform for a limited number of RML communities. I conclude by reviewing the latest attempts to obtain a legal basis and multi-annual funding programme for RMLs *per se*.

The third section then briefly examines the structure and roles and assesses the impact of other bodies constituted to represent, promote and defend RMLs – the Mercator information centres and, importantly, the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL). I conclude with an assessment of the current situation of RML activism in the EU.

RML policy making between 1983 and 1998: structural foundations and political and budgetary outcomes

The EP's budgetary powers

In the 1970s, various societal changes catalysed and legitimised supra-national action in Western European RML politics. The regionalist movements of the 1960s flourished and broadened their social base in the 1970s, as they embodied the protest against the homogenising effects of nation-state building and the concomitant sense of loss of cultural identity. Some communities, e.g. Corsica, sometimes adopted violent political strategies, which underlined the urgent necessity for political solutions of appeasement. Waves of political devolution across Western European states sought to defuse the crises, with some success (see Chapters 4 and 5).

In that context, the EP emerged as a new supranational forum for regional representation. Directly elected for the first time in 1979, the EP grew as the forum of the peoples in Europe, the champion of regional and minority interests, as more voices advocated a more democratic 'Europe of the Regions' (Jaffe, 1993). It thus responded to a growing sense of democratic deficit in the EU that somehow impeded further supranational integration. Moreover, understanding that many regional communities faced similar problems, and that regional interests might be better defended collectively at supranational level, various regional activists turned to the EU to defend minority rights. Alone, regional/minority communities were often demographically small, thus with limited political weight, and sometimes used violence as the last resort; collectively represented they numbered tens of millions and might gain a politico-institutional alternative to violence. In 1979, the EP was not yet the full co-legislator it became from 1992, yet it already possessed some political leverage, especially through its budgetary powers, and to some extent through the Resolutions it could take.

The EP was conferred substantial budgetary powers when the Community opted to function with its own resources (1970). Budgetary authority was shared with the Council: the latter prevailed on Compulsory Expenditure (CE), e.g. Agriculture, but the EP prevailed on Non Compulsory Expenditure (NCE) within certain agreed limits, e.g. in the 1980s the EP enjoyed significant discretion in distributing expenditure of between 300 and 400 million ECUs (Corbett *et al.,* 2000: 227). Under the NCE category, it could allocate funds to effectively initiate policies so that budgetary allowances could serve small-scale political purposes. The legality of such appropriations was disputed in the early 1980s: the EP considered that inscription in the budget constituted a sufficient legal base for spending *per se*, to which the Council objected. A compromise was reached in 1982 with the Council, the EP and the Commission signing a Joint Declaration specifying that a legislative base was only required for '*significant* new Community actions' (ibid: 229). Of course, such a vague specification entailed contradictory interpretations. This perhaps partially explains why the EP voted a number of Resolutions from the 1980s that, although non-binding, bore *some* politico-legal status making it possible to legitimise funding for RMLs. Arguably, even if 'significant Community actions' had been clearly defined in budgetary terms, the size of the first RML budgetary envelopes was not *significant* in relation to the whole budget. Such considerations held sway until 1998.

The EP's discursive powers: Resolutions

Resolutions can be initiated in the EP in several ways: a parliamentary Committee can draw a Report on its own initiative, or in response to an MEP or group of MEPs tabling a Motion for a Resolution. Typically, the Report is then discussed at the Committee level and then in plenary and, if enough support can be secured, a Resolution is voted which calls for new legislative proposals from the Commission. In that latter respect, in 1982, the Commission agreed to respond to EP initiatives orally, first during plenary debates and then through actual legislative proposals as long as it did not have major objections to the content of EP initiatives.[1] Put otherwise, Resolutions 'force' the Commission to clarify its position on a number of issues both as Guardian of the Treaties and as drafter of proposals for legislation.

The original sketch of an EU RML policy dates back to 1979 when five Motions for a Resolution were put forward in the EP calling up for a 'Bill of Rights for the Regional and Minority Languages of the Community'. North Irish MEP John Hume authored one, highlighting the discourse of richness in diversity, a leitmotiv in RML discursive activism in subsequent years: '[...] *this union ought to be and can be made compatible with the diversity of the peoples of Europe* [...] *this diversity is one of the main sources of the vitality, richness and originality of European civilisation*'. The draft resolution was translated and circulated, and a report was established by Gaetano Arfé (leading to the first eponymous Resolution).

In a subsequent seminar, Hume also called for the creation of '[...] *a non-official group of* [EP] *members actively concerned about the fate of the Lesser-Spoken Languages to act as a lobby on their behalf and to ensure in particular that the Parliament votes money for them*.' (Hume, 1981) Thus was defined the *raison d'être* of the *Intergroup for RMLs* which was formally established in 1983.

RML policy making between 1981 and 1998 crystallised around both EP Resolutions and budgetary lines. Ó Riagáin counts 14 such Resolutions, four of which are specifically targeting RMLs, whilst the others only mention RMLs as potential recipients of more broadly defined policies (Ó Riagáin, 1998). For reasons of space, here I focus on the content and outcomes of the RML-specific four[2]:

1. Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and on a Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities of October 16 1981 (Rapporteur: Arfé[3])
2. Resolution of February 11 1983 on measures in favour of minority languages and cultures (Rapporteur: Arfé[4])

3. Resolution of October 30 1987 on the languages and cultures of regional and ethnic minorities in the European Community (Rapporteur: Kuijpers[5])
4. Resolution of February 9 1994 on linguistic minorities in the European Community (Rapporteur: Killilea[6])

The first two Arfé Resolutions posited the EP's discursive strategy regarding RML issues. They recalled *the resurgence of regionalist movements*, thus rooting the legitimacy of the EP's action in both popular demands and the pressing needs to respond to tense political situations. Reasserting that *regional languages and cultures* [were] *a source of enrichment for European civilization and an indication of its vitality*, they reminded member states of their prior commitment, inscribed in international documents by the UN and the CoE, to bolster minority rights. To give policy flesh to this commitment, the 1981 Resolution invited member states to grant RML communities legal rights in education, media and public life, echoing a similar CoE Resolution voted in only a few days before, and anticipating the 1992 CoE *European Charter for RMLs*. At a colloquy on how to implement the 1981 Resolution, MEPs, Commission officials, independent experts and RML representatives then decided to create the *European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages* (EBLUL) (1982), an organisation that could speak and act on behalf of the various lesser-used language communities at European level. In addition to the 1983 Resolution, budget line B3-1006 for RML promotion was established with an initial 100,000 ECU envelope.

The 1987 Resolution re-asserted and further developed the principles and provisions contained in the first two Resolutions, regretting that *so far the Commission has not put forward any proposals to implement the abovementioned* [1981 and 1983] *resolutions*. The EP also raised the RML annual budget up to one million ECUs, thus allowing the creation of the MERCATOR Information Centres (to produce research databases on areas of RML promotion).

The 1994 Resolution, finally, the most elaborate then, reiterated the aforementioned principles and stressed the Community's commitment, made in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), *to contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States while respecting their national and regional diversity*[7] [clause A] which, it declared, *included the safeguarding of minority languages* [clauses B and L]. In relation to associated and third countries, and in preparation for its future enlargement waves, it re-emphasised the Community's *duty to draw attention to the rights of minorities and* [. . .] *to condemn any deliberate denial of these rights* [clause I], and

recalled that *many lesser used languages* [were] *endangered* given the rapid drop in their number of speakers [clause M].[8] It, therefore, called for the following measures: 1. the Member States for the urgent signature and ratification of the CoE's *Charter for RMLs* by EU member states; 2. the Commission to insert lesser-used languages in its existing, mainstream education and media programmes (Article 10(b)) and 3. the Commission to propose for a multi-annual programme for RMLs (11(b)).

Assessment and outcomes

Over that period, the EP progressively emerged as the champion of RML rights in the EU. EP Resolutions established its role as guardian of RML interests and disseminated a number of discourses through supranational channels, thus granting some sort of supranational access to grassroots regionalist discourses, e.g. the richness of diversity, language endangerment and the urgent necessity to preserve diversity, etc.

The EP also emerged as a stronger player in the EU's decision-making process, since the budget lines it voted led the Commission to create and fund supranational organisations for RMLs, i.e. EBLUL and the Mercator Centres. By doing so, Resolutions legitimised – and *de facto* legalised – the granting of increasing budgets for RML defence and promotion between 1983 and 1998. Through these years, budget line (B3-1006) for RML promotion voted jointly by the EP and the Council steadily rose from 100,000 to 4 million euros, a still relatively modest amount though, which may explain why the Council yielded to parliamentary pressure to have it increased throughout the years.

In practical terms, the Commission implemented line B3-1006 through a specific *Action for the Promotion and Safeguarding of Regional and Minority Languages*. In addition to funding EBLUL and the Mercator Centres, the *Action* also financed a large number of smaller-scale projects directly in the communities through calls for proposals so that both symbolic and material supranational support for RMLs became somewhat visible in domestic contexts, arguably an important social-psychological development for RML communities and for the legitimisation of the EU level of governance. Through its budgetary powers and discursive production, and despite its initial lack of formal legislative powers, the EP could thus initiate and sustain an RML policy by establishing and annually negotiating a budget line for RMLs despite certain Council ministers' reluctance (Ó Riagáin, 2001: 24).

Although they remained non-binding legal instruments, these Resolutions also served to exert discursive pressure on both member states

and EU institutions. In a variety of domestic contexts, some provisions were made for RML use in education and the media and, sometimes, the public service. Although it is difficult to assess the role played by EP Resolutions in these developments – were they causal or coincidental? – my contention is that discursive productions such as the EP's were conducive to more pro-active promotional policies for RMLs. In that respect, through its discursive contributions, at the very least, the EP *participated* in a general movement of liberalisation of RML politics in a number of national contexts.

At the EU level, however, Resolutions could not induce the Commission to encompass RMLs within mainstream EU programmes, '*for lack of legal basis'* as was seen in Chapter 2. Moreover, MEPs could neither induce member states to sign and ratify the CoE's *Charter for RMLs* nor bring the Commission to propose a multi-annual Programme for RMLs. The former was obviously not a domain of EU competence, and the EU could not have signed it because it does not have *legal personality*.[9] As for the latter, this failure indicates that conciliatory and consensus-seeking though it may have been, the Commission could nevertheless not exceed its legal-administrative remit. A multi-annual programme would have required a legal decision well beyond the EP's autonomous budgetary powers – multi-annual programmes fall under CE, a Council prerogative – or the Commission's administrative powers. Arguably, the Commission did not take up that proposal, because it knew that the Council would not vote for it.[10] RML policy thus continued to be devised on a yearly rather than multi-annual basis. These restricted outcomes provide an indication of what the limits of discursive inputs during that period could be.

In sum, the EP had only partially 'captured' the RML policy process, working 'hand-in-hand' with the relevant working group in the Commission that administered budget line B-1006, but it could not induce a legislative proposal to create a legal basis for RMLs *per se*. The 1998 budget crisis dealt a more serious blow to RML activists, as it challenged and eventually led to suppressing line B-1006.

RML policy making since 1998

The 1998 budgetary 'crisis' was not initially linked to the RML question but to the UK challenging a Community action programme against social exclusion on the ground that the EU had no competence for lack of a valid legal basis. The ECJ ruled in favour of the UK, thus making obsolete the aforementioned 1982 Joint Declaration on budgetary

procedure.[11] The Commission then had to 'freeze' a number of budget lines (including B3-1006), lest their legality might be challenged, and henceforth monitored the legality of budget lines much more closely. Effectively, this ruling ended the concern-free years during which the EP merely needed to vote line B-1006 for RML-based projects to be EU-funded.

The establishment of the illegality of budget lines like B3-1006 entailed two Inter-Institutional Agreements (1998 and 1999): the Council, the Commission and the EP sat to negotiate ways not to interrupt altogether all Community actions with uncertain legal bases.[12] In the 1998 Agreement, paragraph 36 stated that: '[...] *Recommendations and Opinions do not constitute basic acts* [=legal bases]*, nor do Resolutions or Declarations'* confirming the invalidity of Resolutions as sole legal bases for RML budgets and the consequent need to find other legal bases for RML funding. The 1998 judgement resolved the legal void as to what constituted a sufficient legal base for EU funding; the institutional agreement shed new light on the issue. From 1998 on, the legal-political value of Resolutions shrivelled. Subsequently, RML activists saw their legitimising resource for RML promotion reduced to a mere discursive device and had to focus on obtaining more solid legal bases for RMLs.

Notwithstanding, paragraph 37 of the Agreement stipulated that certain budgets could be appropriated for pilot schemes and preparatory actions without a basic act, provided that such actions fell *within the competence of the Community* (Introduction), i.e. intended actions should pertain to policy areas where the EU had been delegated competence. Further, two types of appropriations could be made: a. *for pilot schemes* [...] *aimed at testing the feasibility of an action* [...] *The relevant commitment appropriations may be entered in the budget for only two financial years*; and b. *relating to preparatory actions to prepare proposals with a view to the adoption of future Community actions* [...] *for only three financial years at most* [...] *The legislative procedure* [had to be] *concluded before the end of the third financial year* (par. 37, art. a (ii)). Both types were allocated a limited annual budget that the EP's Budget Committee would distribute and for which all interest groups whose budget lines had been frozen would compete. The struggle for an RML policy was thus also relocated onto the intra-institutional scene, with MEPs seeking to obtain the largest possible share of the budgets available for actions without a basic act. I now examine who lobbied, where and how, and with what results, scrutinising in particular the role of the *Intergroup for Regional and Minority Languages* in intra- and inter-institutional lobbying.

Institutional representation of RML interests within the EP: the Intergroup for RMLs and the 1998 crisis[13]

In his 1997 study on interest group representation in the EU, Greenwood underscores the variety of Intergroups present in the EP:

> [...] *groupings of MEPs clustered around particular areas where members have particular interests.* [...] *Because of their unofficial[14] and sometimes rather fluid status, no one seems clear precisely how many Intergroups there are.* [...] *The semi-anarchic existence of these groups means that they do quite different things and offer quite different avenues of influence to the EP for outside interests* [...] *Some meet frequently and have a full time secretariat, whereas others are little more than letterheads. Some restrict membership to MEPs, while others are open to a variety of outside interests.*
> (Greenwood, 1997: 44)

Intergroups thus vary in their focus but also, importantly, in the actual role they can play in decision-making processes in their respective policy areas because they widely differ in status, resources and membership.[15] Here, I investigate which EU RML policy actors belong to the Intergroup for RMLs and their respective bargaining powers, and the extent to which meetings of the RML Intergroup constitute one of the main fora where RML interests are represented, promotional strategies devised and where RML-based decisions are negotiated on the European institutional scene.

The *Intergroup* meets monthly in Strasbourg to tackle various RML-related issues. In March 2003, it comprised[16]:

1. 40 MEPs sitting on various Committees (including 9 MEPs on the Education and Culture Committee, and five on the Budget Committee).
2. EBLUL representatives attending meetings to report on EBLUL's activities and providing secretarial assistance.
3. Sometimes, Commission officials from the Education and Culture DG's Language Policy Unit.
4. Occasionally, representatives of the CoE and/or guest speakers from RML communities, e.g. to present EP-commissioned studies on RMLs.

It thus brings most EU RML actors together,[17] although, more often than not, RML communities are only virtually present through their MEPs. Meetings serve to keep members in touch, diffuse information, examine the Commission's actions in favour of RMLs, or the lack thereof and

in that case pressure it, and to update lobbying strategies. I will return to the Intergroup's interinstitutional role later. For now, I focus on its response to the budgetary crisis.

A first crucial outcome of the negotiations between budgetary authorities that followed the crisis was that, between 1999 and 2003, EBLUL and the Mercator Centres would be co-funded under line A-3015, an 'administrative' (*sic*) line requiring no legal basis other than that the recipients of funds should be 'institutions of European interests' (Grin and Moring, 2002). The next target was to secure funds to finance projects in the communities through calls for proposals.

The Intergroup rapidly secured funds for RMLs from the total allowance of 32 million euros negotiated at the inter-institutional level by the Budget Committee. According to former Intergroup Chairwoman, MEP, Eluned Morgan, this proved no difficulty, since 14 Intergroup members, belonging to six different political parties and sitting either on the Culture and Education Committee or on the Budget Committee, were personally sympathetic and actively supportive of the RML cause (Morgan, 2002, [MEP; Chairwoman of the Intergroup for RMLs] Interview with the author). The Intergroup thus ensured that the Education and Budget Committees would earmark funds specifically for RMLs from two budgetary lines: Lines B3-1000 (Cooperation in the Fields of Education and of Youth Policy) for 2000–2001 with 2.5 out of 4.5 million euros, and B3-1003 N (Preparatory Actions for Promotion of the Linguistic Diversity of the Community in the Information Society) with 2 out of 10 million euros for 2000.[18] Following calls for proposals, funds were then allocated to numerous projects.

Regarding line B3-1000, an agreement could be reached because that Cooperation Programme established no restrictions whatsoever as to the languages targeted by its action. In other cases, the Commission, acting as the Guardian of the Treaties, rejected the proposed legal basis for RML promotion due to such restrictions, e.g. RMLs were excluded from the action LINGUA.[19] Funding RML-based projects under the education heading was nevertheless problematic, and it took some negotiations for the Commission to finally accept the validity of some of the proposed legal bases.[20]

On balance, the question of education as the legal basis for RMLs points to an apparent paradox: RML promotion can be funded within obviously education-oriented actions – e.g. the Cooperation Programme – whilst legal services have refused to endorse other proposals taking the Treaty Article 149 as the RML legal basis, e.g. *Archipelago* (see Chapter 2). Article 149's scope as primary legislation

is indeed much wider and durable whereas action programmes are 'soft law' – implementation rather than legislative measures – and thus provisional and outside the ECJ's domain of competence. Article 149 is legally much wider ranging than action programmes. In Chapter 2, we saw that the Court of First Instance had denied that Regulation 1/58 established the legal principle of language equality, because it was a piece of secondary legislation. Likewise, the education issue illustrates that one way to prevent the interpretation of RML-promoting actions from having jurisprudential value is to locate such actions within broad administrative/implementation measures only (see also RML eligibility to LPP funding). Put otherwise, the EU does support RML policy making, in part as a response to pro-RML lobbying, but only to the extent that this does not grant them formal recognition.

As for line B3-1003 N, the negotiations around it show that although the Commission could not fund RML projects under an action *per se*, these could be financed as preparatory measures inasmuch as they corresponded to objectives of other programmes or actions no matter what the legal bases were, e.g. preparatory actions for promotion of the linguistic diversity of the Community in the information society or preparatory measures for the action *2001 European Year of Languages* (EYL).[21]

Inter-institutional representation of RML interests: the Intergroup and the Commission

In its relations with the Commission regarding policy initiation and implementation, the Intergroup possesses two main instruments of political leverage – Resolutions and parliamentary questions. This section assesses the impact of these resources in terms of the policy outcomes they produce, directly or indirectly.

Notably, when decisions to push forward a draft Resolution are put to the vote in the Intergroup, only MEPs can vote: they constitute the decisional 'core', while other members enjoy more 'peripheral status' (adapted from Maloney *et al.*, 1995*)*. However, although here I focus largely on MEPs, it must be borne in mind that 'non-MEP members' can participate in debates and in the production if not in the final adoption of draft texts. Indeed, various sources claim that RML-related Resolutions are first collectively drafted in Intergroup meetings (former EBLUL Official Bakker, email to the author, 2003; Corbett *et al.*, 2000: Chapter 10). Regarding written questions, besides, even if perhaps not systematically discussed at Intergroup meetings, they are undoubtedly

informed by those meetings (see the role of EBLUL below). Authorship is, therefore, extremely difficult to establish: it is unproblematic to know who signs texts but not who participated in text production processes.[22] Another related difficulty is that parliamentary questions – arguably important lobbying platforms – are usually individual questions and, therefore, not conspicuously attributable to the Intergroup *ex cathedra* since it possesses no formal existence.[23]

The actual outcomes of Resolutions were assessed in the previous section. The data I analyse now consists of 42 Written Questions addressed by MEPs to the Commission and/or the Council on sociolinguistic issues. Parliamentary questions are an essential feature of the EP exercising its prerogative of scrutiny and control of the executive, and their number has constantly increased during the 1990s. They serve various purposes: to control the implementation of the budget; to obtain technical information for non-specialist MEPs but also, importantly, as discursive platforms (e.g. recognition of official multilingualism in the EU on the basis of the existing legislation in the Member States).[24] They can effectively force a policy statement to be made (e.g. Is the threat made by the French state on bilingual RML immersion schools compatible with the Copenhagen criteria?),[25] as the addressees must obey time constraints to answer, and replies are published in the OJ. I classify the questions asked as follows:

1. General Questions relating to RML defence and promotion in general (type 1).
2. Questions specifically relating to the addressor's home RML community (type 2).
3. Questions relating to a RML different from the addressor's original RML (type 3).

A first observation was that type 1 questions (28) largely outnumbered the other types (14) so that the Intergroup did not seem to constitute an arena for individual RML communities to promote their domestic regional interests.[26] In their supranational capacity MEPs embody the collective voice of RML communities in general rather than defend the particular sociolinguistic interests of their own regional community, even though the most 'prolific' MEPs (in terms of producing questions) originate from regionalist/autonomist parties in their countries.

Type 2 and type 3 questions showed that MEPs remained attentive on a variety of problematic sociolinguistic situations throughout Europe. For instance, two questions referred to minority issues and freedom

of expression in Greece after a language activist was sentenced to 15 months in prison for distributing a Commission-funded EBLUL information brochure entitled Unity in Diversity that mentioned Greek minority languages. Several MEPs protested asking the Commission to verify the compatibility of such a sentence with the fundamental rights of self-expression (convicted February 2001; ultimately released December 2001).[27] Other questions on less dramatic situations were issued about language discrimination in France, Slovakia, Istria and Spain. Even if they do not systematically entail the desired effects, such questions undoubtedly exert pressure on the addressees, distill discourses supporting RML rights and contribute to sustaining the EP's profile as a prominent attentive public on European RML issues. Crucially, they also remind RML communities of the support they can find at the supranational level and can draw RML groups out of isolation by revealing similar situations and needs across communities.

As for General Questions, they were usually more technical in nature and essentially pertained to securing the implementation of budgetary lines benefiting RMLs on a yearly basis and to the establishment of a durable legal basis for RMLs. General questions therefore also significantly reflect the EP's role of budgetary scrutiny and control rather than being essentially discursive platforms like types 2 and 3.

A recurrent lobbying target through general questions was the action *EYL 2001*. Data examined in the previous chapter indicated that this action had entailed important financial support for RML projects in 2001. The previous section of this chapter showed that from the cancellation of the specific Action for RMLs, financial support for RMLs had been temporarily relocated within other programmes until, it was hoped, a durable RML-specific legal basis would be established, in particular as a follow-up to the action *EYL 2001* (see also Chapter 2).

This was the sense of a collective question put to the Commission on November 11 2000 requesting '[. . .] *a solid legal basis for a specific programme at European level in favour of the lesser-used languages*'.[28] The Commission's answer indicated its incapacity (political reluctance?) to yield to pressures: it replied that it would '***be looking at the possibility of presenting a draft programme*** *for safeguarding and promoting regional and lesser-used languages as a follow-up to the European Year of Languages*' (emphasis added). Likewise, to a similar question in March 2001, the Commission merely asserted its intention '[. . .] *to draw lessons from all these initiatives and discussions, and to arrive at conclusions as early as next year* [2002]'.[29]

Finally, a *Resolution on Regional and Lesser-Used European languages*[30] (Rapporteur: Eluned Morgan, Intergroup Chairwoman) was tabled on December 11 2001 that called for the execution of a budget line the EP had voted in 2001 for the 2002 budget; it targeted *Preparatory Actions Concerning the Promotion and Safeguarding of RMLs, Dialects and Cultures* (B3-1007). However, the Commission cancelled its execution, claiming that *there was no prospect of the legislative procedure for a legal base being concluded before the end of the third financial year of preparatory actions.*[31] It pledged to '*conduct a thoroughgoing evaluation of the European Year of Languages 2001 from which it* [would] *draw conclusions with a view to presenting proposals for actions in favour of linguistic diversity and language learning in 2003*' (ibid). Here again, the Commission carefully avoided committing itself to announcing the future tabling of a specific proposal for RML-based actions, let alone for a specific RML legal basis, and the Intergroup no longer had the means to impose its preferences through the combination of Resolutions and budgetary lines.

Notwithstanding, as indicated above, the *Action Plan on Linguistic Diversity and Language Learning for 2004–2006* issued in August 2003 can be seen as a positive response *inter alia* to the Intergroup's pressure (and EBLUL's pressure; see next section). It was drafted after the Commission launched a vast consultation process on promoting language learning and linguistic diversity. In the eponymous Consultation Document, it indicated its philosophical approach to language learning and linguistic diversity in Whorfian terms, i.e. '[...] *each language shelters a subtly distinct view of the world and is fundamental to the personal, social and spiritual identity of its speakers* [...]', and advocated an approach including RML-promotion into more EU action programmes in a more systematic way.[32]

Chapter 2 indicated that the Action Plan eventually contributed to the ultimate inclusion of RMLs under the mainstream education and vocational training programme LLP for 2007–2013. As we will see in following sections, this has meant that differentiated forms of funding for 1. structures promoting RMLs (e.g. EBLUL and Mercator; see Network for the Promotion of Linguistic Diversity [NPLD] below), 2. (short-/medium-term) actions promoting RMLs through specific RML projects, or 3. actions promoting RMLs through non-specific RML projects, eventually came under one single funding method.

Before examining semi-/non-institutional, RML-defending organisation, their actions, successes and limits, I now explore how, through the Intergroup and the Committee on Education, EP RML activists attempted to secure funding to keep RML funding specific (both for

its structures and actions). I review the most recent Resolutions in that domain and assess and show that the EP is not an unconditional RML supporter.

Towards a mainstream RML policy in the EP? Looking at the latest Resolutions

– Resolution with recommendations to the Commission on European Regional and Lesser-Used Languages – the Languages of Minorities in the EU – in the Context of Enlargement and Cultural Diversity (4 September 2003)[33]
– EP Resolution on a New Framework Strategy on Multilingualism (5 November 2006)

The former Resolution followed and reproduced a Parliamentary Report/Motion for a Resolution (Rapporteur: Intergroup member Michl Ebner, for the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport) drafted at a crucial conjuncture as a. a new draft Constitution for Europe was emerging, b. ten new members states were about to join the EU, and c. the Commission was to release its 2004–2006 Action Plan, paving the way to the third generation of education and training programmes (2007–2013). The Report called *inter alia* for two legals acts, respectively, for:

– *the setting-up of a* [central] *European Agency on Linguistic Diversity and Language Learning;*
– *a multi-annual programme on linguistic diversity and language learning* [including RMLs]*, building on the success of the European Year of Languages 2001*.

The former proposal would have helped *develop a* [RML-inclusive] *network to promote linguistic diversity*, while the latter would have secured pro-RML funds through the long-awaited multi-annual programme. Ultimately, the multi-annual programme was also foreseen as *taking into account, when determining aims and priorities regarding regional or minority languages, the findings of the monitoring carried out under the Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages*. Effectively, taken as complementary, these measures and the intertextual reference to the CoE's European Charter may have given the Agency some remit for the EU to promote recommendations of the CoE on

the implementation of the Charter with funding of the multi-annual programme.

The commission responded in 2004 by launching a feasibility study on the possible creation of a European Agency for Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity (see below). On the second request, it tabled a proposal that eventually led to *Decision No 792/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 establishing a Community action programme to promote bodies active at European level in the field of culture* and through which funding for EBLUL and MERCATOR networks was secured for 2004–2006.[34] Interestingly, for the first time since the 1998 crisis, EBLUL and Mercator networks were funded on the basis of an EU legal act, and this Decision invoked the cultural rather than education umbrella.

The second EP Resolution – on a New Framework Strategy on Multilingualism (November 2006) followed a Report on a New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism and Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Culture and Education (Rapporteur: Intergroup member Bernat Joan I Mari; October 2006). It responded to a Commission Communication (November 2005) – after the formal introduction of multilingualism in the portfolio of a Commissioner[35] – which advocated a number of measures in line with the rationale and aims of the 2003 Action Plan (e.g. sociocultural and economic aims dependent on language diversity). For RMLs, it suggested creating a *European Network of 'Language Diversity Centres'* rather than a central EU Agency for Linguistic Diversity, indicating that this would be financed under the LPP. Overall, the Committee's response, while it welcomed most aims and measures, strongly criticised the Commission's approach to linguistic diversity as largely excluding RMLs from key proposals. It, therefore, notably called for *an EU language act to give a legal base to language rights both collectively and individually*.

The explanatory statement, moreover, constituted a genuine manifesto for a fully-fledged EU language policy respecting and promoting full language equality, advocating the following:

- [. . .] *ring-fenced, direct funding (including pre-funding) without co-financing* [to avoid that] *minoritised languages should have to compete on the 'open market' with the big languages*.
- An *Endangered European language list to be established*.
- *A European Language Ombudsman* [. . .] *to follow the Canadian Language Commissioner Model*.
- *All European languages* [. . .] *to be made official in the EU* [. . .] *by reducing the number of working languages* [. . .].

In the final EP Resolution, however, the call for an EU language act was discarded and proposed measures promoting multilingualism remained very generic and vague. This Resolution thus also testified to the will of the EP writ large to follow the Commission's mainstreaming line of action rather than more radical demands by Intergroup members.

Semi- and non-institutionalised representation of RML interests in the EU: structures, discourse and RML network change

Before concluding this chapter, I concentrate on the main semi- and non-institutional organs for representation of RML interests in the EU – the Mercator Centres and the EBLUL – and I will examine their structures and actions to promote RMLs in the EU outside institutional spheres.

The Mercator information Centres

The Mercator Centres were founded in 1987 to constitute research databases and documentation centres on RML issues and to network RML-interested researchers. These databases were divided along the three traditional domains of language policy making: Education (Mercator, Friesland), Media (Mercator, Wales) and Law (Mercator, Catalonia), and the centres are hosted by actively RML-promoting academic institutions – the *Fryske Akademy*, the *Centre Internacional Escarré per a les Minories Etniques i les Nacions* (CIEMEN) and the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. Over the years, beyond such databases, the centres' activities have also revolved around a publishing role (i.e. bulletin, reports and working papers, articles and books) and the organisation of conferences gathering RML activists and/or academics and thus fulfilling a networking function. Often, these events have led to the publication of pleas for RML promotion. In sum, the centres serve to gather expert knowledge on RML policy-related issues and to provide scientific backing and legitimacy to RML defence and promotion strategies at the supranational level.[36]

EBLUL: status, roles and structures, discourse

The EBLUL presents itself as an NGO and has observer status at the CoE, UNESCO and the UN. Though, due to its particular relation with the Commission, its status remains problematic. NGO status implies

full independence in speech and practice from official/state institutions. In EBLUL's case, its almost total financial dependence on the Commission, which has forced it to adapt its *modus operandi* to the Commission's prerequisites, tends to suggest seeing it as a QuaNGO: '[...] *an organisation pursuing goals and operating using principles similar to fully independent NGOs, but receiving most of their funding from states*' (adapted from Grin and Moring, 2002: 60). Yet, its freedom of speech has been rather unrestrained, which is a defining characteristic of NGOs. This calls for further explanation.

Within EBLUL, two sets of actors must be distinguished – the executive/administrative antennas based in Brussels (until 2004)[37] and Dublin and the General Assembly federating the representatives of its Member State Committees (MSCs), which constitutes its political arm. The executive manages day-to-day activities – publications, project development, expert consultancy regarding the Commission's calls for proposals, facilitating networking and partnerships between RML organisations, secretarial assistance, diffusion of information, RML-focused web tool development and representing EBLUL at conferences and in RML-targeting fora in general. As for political actors, their objectives are as follows:

- to promote active EU policy making in favour of RMLs and to defend the linguistic rights of RML speakers
- to represent RMLs in dealings with EU institutions and other international organisations
- to maintain a permanent communication between communities and to facilitate contacts and exchanges between them
- to identify legal and political instruments in favour of the promotion of lesser-used languages of the Union's Member States.

Two strategies serve to attain those objectives: 1. regularly bringing together MSCs to define EBLUL's lines of actions and 2. designing and issuing lobbying documents during consultation phases in various policy-making contexts.

One of the major achievements of EBLUL since its creation has indeed been its networking function at supranational level, bringing together RML representatives from all member states. At one level, EBLUL thus helped create a supranational RML community, in which local communities could benefit from each other's experience and practices in RML planning, e.g. EBLUL's Study Visit Programme.[38] Also importantly, MSCs have allowed the RML communities of a given state

to network and voice their demands and/or grievances collectively to their own governments and to express themselves on supranational developments.[39] Other types of actions include offering expert help to apply for EU funding, establishing networking platforms for local, provincial and regional authorities to collaborate on RML-promoting initiatives, etc. Finally, it launched the Eurolang news agency (February 2000) – online daily news on RML issues – that eventually became an autonomous agency.

On the political front, as a consultant and interest group representative, EBLUL has conducted an important informative and/or discursive activity, notably through numerous publications, from countless booklets describing various RML communities' sociolinguistic situations, through glossaries about RML debates for non-experts, to pamphlets praising diversity and linking it to economic developments, etc. EBLUL has targeted public at both domestic and supranational levels. At domestic levels, in a way similar to the Intergroup's type 3 questions above, EBLUL's Assembly has passed many resolutions on RML 'current affairs', e.g. calling various member states to adopt more RML-friendly legislation. In that sense, its freedom of expression has been unrestrained, and it has helped increase the visibility of domestic RML developments in Europe.

At the supranational level, O'Riagáin (2001) draws attention to EBLUL's participation in the drafting of a number of international documents and its incessant lobbying of voters when texts were to be voted by international bodies, such as the CoE's *Charter for RMLs*, and/or EP Resolutions. Further, EBLUL has issued Opinions and Recommendations each time a consultation process was undertaken by the Commission or other international organisations. During the consultation process before the *Convention for the Future of Europe*, for instance, EBLUL's General Assembly reiterated the broad principles of richness in diversity and suggested a number of amendments to the Treaty – proposing a legal basis for RMLs per se, adding 'language' to Article 13 on non-discrimination, changing voting from unanimity to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in Article 151, creating a multi-annual programme for linguistic diversity with special reference to RMLs, etc (EBLUL, 2002).

Its ideological positions, epitomised in its motto 'unity in diversity' that has since become the motto of the 2004 EU, are enhanced in its *Contribution to the* [Commission's] *Consultation on Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity* (1 February 2003). This document shows that EBLUL's typical discourse on diversity is extremely heterogeneous.

Beyond broadly praising diversity as '[...] *a democratic and cultural cornerstone of the European construction'*, it argues that:

> [...] *linguistic diversity including lesser-used languages also importantly increases social cohesion, cross-border and inter-regional co-operation* [...] [our] *cultures and our linguistic heritage are not only part of the Union's wealth and a key element of the identity of its regions, but as well an important source of economic activity and new jobs* [...] [and] *a valuable and constructive mechanism for conflict prevention and conflict management* [...].
>
> <div align="right">(EBLUL, 2003)</div>

As can be seen, the heterogeneous discourse of diversity displays broad interdiscursive and intertextual strategies. As the excerpts quoted above illustrate, EBLUL strategically relates to a number of domains, where EU actions have become legitimate and preponderant, e.g. social cohesion, cross-border cooperation and links diversity to economic development[40] and conflict management. Economic development is a founding objective of the EEC, and conflict management refers to a growing body of minority rights literature that advocates granting political rights to regions, including language rights, as a solution to core-periphery conflict management (e.g. Daftary, 2000; Poleshchuck, 2003). EBLUL's pleas typically also call for defining language rights as fundamental rights and condemning language discrimination. In sum, EBLUL's discourse heterogeneity seeks to legitimate an EU pro-active approach to RML promotion by relating the preservation of diversity to the broad umbrella of the EU's traditional or more recent objectives and accepted domains of intervention.

RML network change?

In recent years, the legitimacy and functional role of the EBLUL's EU 'superstructure' as main representative and 'spokes-organisation' of RML communities in the EU has nevertheless been questioned. While its usefulness as a lobbyist at EU level is unchallenged, critiques have emerged arguing that EBLUL has been too institutionalised and is dependent on public manna, and consequently not critical enough *vis-à-vis* the Commission, and that decision making has been too centralised so that many civil society associations are not fairly represented. In 1999, the Commission organised a meeting asking MSCs to increase their representativeness at national levels (Menciassi, 2003, [EBLUL Project Officer],

email communication with the author).[41] Other trans-national networks have also emerged, like Europa Diversa, an organisation including mainly Catalan RML-defending organisations, the broad aims and objectives of which largely replicate EBLUL's – promoting cultural and linguistic diversity and RMLs in Europe through publications, networking and lobbying activities, etc. Relatedly, various other projects have also been sponsored by the Commission that provide similar information on RML issues. For instance, the *Universitat Oberta de Catalunya*, in collaboration with other academic and research centres in Belgium, Wales, Slovenia, Italy and Ireland, coordinates a project for a virtual community on minority languages – ADUM (Press release, 27 February 2004).[42] While the discourse on diversity as richness remains a broad common umbrella, and whereas the multiplication of RML-promoting organisations may increase the pressure on deciders, it may also be seen as a reflection of divisions amongst RML communities' representatives and, therefore, as an obstacle to their becoming a unified lobbying force. Organisational diversity may undermine lobbying efficiency.

Interestingly, the aforementioned new networks involve more academic actors than mainly political representatives from RML communities as in EBLUL's MSCs, even though the separation is not always clear-cut, as the Corsican example demonstrates (Chapter 7). One may, therefore, perhaps expect a change in their political agenda and in their lobbying discourse and/or methods, which requires further investigation. We will see in Chapters 7 and 8 how Corsican academics address language revitalisation issues in Corsica, as they play a central role in the Corsican language policy network.

As regards lobbying strength, finally, it is also interesting that Mercator and EBLUL RML activists lobbying at EU level should exclusively focus on status issues. Indeed, the information they provide on RML communities typically comprises sociolinguistic data on the demographic weight of RMLs in their respective states and on their legal status and institutional use. In the accompanying comment to that data, moreover, it is uncritically assumed that RML revitalisation depends essentially, if not solely, on obtaining a more favourable status and concomitant institutional space. This conception, largely inspired by structural/functional models and inherited from the sociolinguistic processes accompanying and/or enacting nation-building processes described in Chapters 1, 4 and 6, thus leaves aside many other issues linked to language revitalisation, e.g. corpus management issues and popular language attitudes.

The recent, apparent evolution in the sociology of the networks of RML activists at EU level and the institutionalisation of scholars of various origins with an interest in minority issues may induce a change in that approach. Scientifically informed claims may become more politically radical but less supranational, e.g. lobbying for an official EU recognition of certain RMLs only as some locally oriented organisations may not seek to become 'spokes-organisation' for all RMLs but rather work for their more immediate, own interest. They may also become more materially pragmatic and focus on obtaining more funds for research on RMLs in the communities and for transcommunity networking. Overall, multiplying opportunities for RML academics to network may further contribute to the development and diffusion of new discourses on and practices of language and language planning. It remains to be seen how these actors could lobby EU institutions and in what ways their action could come to supplement rather than being redundant with that of EBLUL's domestic and EU structures. More research is also needed on the sociology of academics and their participation in a more political (nationalist?) form of pro-RML lobbying.

Conclusion

Attempting a form of ethnography of RML policy making in EU institutions, this chapter has illustrated that in a system of governance, legal/institutional obstacles can be bypassed but that, even in a RML policy network characterised by power dependency and consensus-seeking attitudes, legal powers remain largely hegemonic. RML activists can and have persuaded the EU to support RML safeguarding. Between 1983 and 1998, the unclear legal weight of Resolutions enabled the EP to vote a yearly budget line that served to fund projects in the communities. When the legal status of Resolutions was clarified in 1998, however, the EP lost its legitimising device, and the Commission found itself in the difficult situation of having to respond to the EP's pressure – notably that of the *Intergroup* – to perpetuate its *Action for RMLs*. Moreover, the Commission's response remained strictly curtailed by the ECJ's 1998 judgement and by its function as Guardian of the Treaties. The compromise found through the inter-institutional agreements enabled the Commission to overcome this predicament and grant RMLs some support to an extent acceptable by the Council. Yet, it could not go as far as creating the legal basis for RMLs demanded by activists, which the Council would not have accepted. Some solutions were also found for

the institutional apparatus that had emerged from the 15 years of legal void to be preserved at low symbolic and material cost for the Council.

The main cause of the Commission's ongoing predicament is the persistent ambiguity around the EU's commitment to the value of cultural diversity and multilingualism and the necessity to preserve and promote them. Chapter 2 demonstrated, through the analysis of the *Archipelago* proposal, that the Commission could not use the education legal basis for RMLs, even though it is acknowledged to be the main channel to preserve multilingualism, and that any attempt to define diversity more broadly and as encompassing RMLs was doomed to fail. Yet, paradoxically, the action for RMLs is largely based on educational actions, but these stay legitimised at a secondary legal level, e.g. inter-institutional budgetary agreements between the EP and the Council, well beneath the level of primary legislation and not subject to the ECJ's scrutiny.

Analyses show that the EU will support RMLs but that the Commission, and behind it the Council, sole legislator on language issues, will not grant RML communities some symbolic recognition at supranational level, which they may not have at domestic level. The most recent Resolutions show that the EP *ex cathedra* acknowledges this and will not fight for an RML-specific status. RMLs will continue to receive material support within the framework of a number of programmes[43] but anything that would entail some specific recognition at EU level, and go against any member state's will, e.g. granting them some symbolic recognition derived from their inclusion in primary legislation, remains out of the question.

The RML policy is now strongly established and, considering the political salience of the discourse of diversity in recent years, it is unthinkable that the EU could stop promoting RMLs as it does now, even though their institutional representation may change. In the absence of a genuine legal basis based on primary legislation, however, RML policy making undeniably remains a domain of national sovereignty, albeit a contested one.

The developments after the 1998 crisis had had consequences for RML activists' subsequent strategies. After 1998, RML activists and lobbyists were 'divided' as to the appropriate legal basis for RMLs: academic proponents of a more pragmatic approach advocated obtaining money for RML indirectly, under the aegis of programmes not specifically geared at the RML promotion, the better to respond to each RML community's specific needs. This was the direction suggested early in the *Euromosaic* Report (Nelde *et al.*, 1996), and later in the *SMILE* Report established on RML support strategies (Grin and Moring, 2002),[44] and endorsed in

the Commission's *Action Plan* and LPP mentioned above. The other, more radical, route typically favoured by RML activists remained that of lobbying for a legal basis *per se*, as illustrated by the 2003 and 2006 Resolutions. Today, a legal basis for RMLs *per se* is even more unlikely to emerge in the future, now that RML promotion has been fully mainstreamed under the LLP (2007–2013). Futher, with the appointment of a Commissioner for Multilingualism to monitor all actions for language diversity, the long-awaited EU language plan seems to be taking shape, and a new form of mainstreamed RML policy is emerging, apparently endorsed by the three EU institutions deciding on RML issues. As a result, intergovernmentalists' worries that an EU-specific treatment of RMLs could undermine national sovereignties might now be fully alleviated, but RML activists worry that RMLs cannot compete in the same EU linguistic market as 'big' languages.

I will return to possible routes of evolution of the EU legal framework and their implications for RML rights in the General Conclusion. For the time being, in any case, RML-oriented decision-making powers remain located at national levels. If any evolution towards granting RML communities more language rights is to be found, it must primarily be within national arenas. To see if Corsican may be granted additional rights in the future, I therefore now turn to RML policy-making processes in France.

4

Language, Nation and State in French Linguistic Nationalism: History, Developments and Perspectives

Introduction

This chapter looks at the dynamics of glottopolitics and language policy formation at the national level in France. I explore France's internal glottopolitical dynamics and how this internal dynamics is also partly shaped by (glotto-) political developments at both supranational and sub-national levels.

This chapter thus maps out the politics of the French language in France and abroad and their inter-relations over three distinct periods: from early modern times until the Revolution, from the Revolution until WWII and since WWII. These three periods are characterised by different conceptions and ideologies of language, identity and the nation and of the ways in which they interrelate. The first period sees the reification and totemisation of the French language and its European hegemonisation; the second scrutinises the construction of the French nation through the politicisation of language and its slow diffusion in French society; the third witnesses the rise of political and linguistic insecurity leading to more active, but ultimately contradictory, discourses and strategies of language promotion and exclusion.

Throughout the chapter, I show how ideological, socio-political and sociolinguistic changes have been mutually constitutive in France and how the concepts of language, identity and the nation have been engineered in different and strategically connected ways according to the perceived and/or desired evolution of political situations. I base this analysis on the view, outlined in Chapter 1, that *language*, *identity* and *the nation* are largely constructed, situational and mutually constitutive notions. Besides this, I examine the ideological

context in which legal/institutional developments take place for each of the aforesaid periods, and at the implementation, or not, of the policies official discourses prescribe. Regarding the latter, I show that policy implementation and acceptance is not only a matter of formal structures but also, and perhaps most importantly, of attitudes towards the underlying discourses. Put otherwise, the possibility of resistance to change and the maintenance of former structures and political and cultural/linguistic loyalties and practices must be acknowledged.

In the first part of this chapter, I show that, from the late Middle Ages, a number of broad contextual changes in Western Europe facilitated the rise of new forms of elite national consciousness which led to the standardisation of national languages (Anderson, 1983). At the political level, in France, this entailed the gradual construction of a state apparatus and the concomitant reification and totemisation of the 'national' language and, in Western European politics more widely, the establishment of sociolinguistic hierarchies between national languages, the latter process eventually seeing the progressive hegemonisation of French as the international language (e.g. Calvet, 1974 and 2002; Wright, 2004a). Thus, French was ideologically constructed or totemised as a superior, 'universal language' due to the image projected abroad of the mutually constitutive relation between its intrinsic 'fossilized' linguistic characteristics (i.e. reification) and its embodiment of universal values (i.e. totemisation). During that period, the idea of the nation emerged but only in a restricted, elitist sense that did not include popular masses.

The second part analyses the politics of language and the advent of new political economies of language in France following the politicisation of those masses. Beginning with an account of the Revolutionary discourses on language and the nation which promoted their congruence as a corollary of the advent of French, so-called, civic nationalism, I then examine how discourses on language and the nation led to structural/institutional developments and actual policy-induced sociolinguistic change, or not, from the nineteenth century until WWII, and I consider the consequences in terms of popular attitudes to sociolinguistic developments and actual language use. The discussion first focuses on the construction of the heterogeneous discourse on language and the nation during the Revolution and then the Third Republic, and then considers other factors underpinning language shift, institutional or not, between the 1880s and WWII. Structural/institutional developments and the importance of non-institutional and/or unplanned

factors for language maintenance and shift in Corsica will be considered in detail in Chapters 5 and 6.[1]

The final part explores French politics and the political economy of language since WWII, showing that the domestic and international politics of the French language, which had hitherto followed parallel paths, converged in the 1960s under the pressure of a number of socio-economic, political and cultural internal and external developments. These developments catalysed glottopolitical change as a reaction to growing feelings of sociolinguistic insecurity and loss of image (Ager, 1999). On the international scene, these developments included the demise of French as the international language, decolonisation and the creation of *Francophonie*. Internally, they included the phenomenon known as *franglais*, and the language protectionist reaction it triggered, regionalism and sub-national cultural/linguistic demands and the political and (relative) cultural devolution that ensued. After this broad contextualisation, I analyse a corpus of legislative measures on the French language and on RMLs, as well as divisive language debates, e.g. over the ratification of the CoE's *European Charter for RMLs* (1999). I show that French language politics and discourses and the various language policies of the 1990s seem to have evolved in contradictory directions and argue that the French case constitutes an interesting illustration of the difficulty of transcending essentialist approaches to language, identity and the nation, and their interrelations, inherited from the Revolutionary period.

Language reification and totemisation: the politics of the French language in and out of France before the Revolution (1539–1789)

In his *Reflection on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Anderson (1983) argues that the emergence, or 'invention', of national forms of consciousness resulted from the gradual waning of Christendom and the dynastic realm. The rise of national languages from the sixteenth century thus coincides with the progressive decline of the political hegemony of Christendom and its unifying language Latin, facilitated and accelerated by the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation and then by eighteenth-century rationalist secularism. Later, national vernaculars also benefited from the growing importance of the 'mass nation' as an alternative source of political legitimacy as divinely ordained legitimacy slowly declined. Anderson also points to other important catalysts and consequences of socio-political and sociolinguistic change

favouring the promotion of national languages: the advent and exponential development of print capitalism,[2] the rise of an increasingly educated, urban middle class and the spread of bourgeois mercantilism facilitated by the extension and multiplication of trade routes and the more systematic use of vernaculars in the increasingly centralised administrative structures of developing states (regarding the significance of bureaucracy, see also Giddens, 1984, quoted in May, 2001: 64).[3] Anderson particularly foregrounds the printing revolution as an overarching determinant factor of change. Although he recalls that the development of administrative languages preceded both religious decline and the printing revolution, he underlines that the progress of printing techniques largely laid the bases for national consciousness, as communication and transactions became faster and easier, and as printing required the increased fixity of the language (1983: 41–45).

In France, the usefulness of a common 'national' language as an auxiliary for state building was understood at an early stage. *The Edit de Villers Cotterêts* (1539) by Francois 1st is usually regarded as the first important action on language, establishing that all public dealings (i.e. legal and administrative documents, notarised acts, contracts, etc.) should henceforth be written in the '*langage maternel françois*' and no longer in Latin: French thus became the state/administrative language, and this measure initially targeted Latin rather than regional/local 'languages'.[4] Arguably, although the promotion of a state language increasingly served the centralisation of power from the sixteenth century, the equation of language with *the nation* mentioned in Chapter 1 was yet unrealised and not even anticipated. What mattered for the consolidation of the King's political power was that all subjects should endorse the motto '*one faith, one law, one king*' (Peyre, 1933: 10) and:

> [. . .] [although] *the existence of a unique administrative language is an element favourable to the organization of the state which has attained a certain level of centralization* [. . .] *linguistic unity is not to be imposed on peoples speaking different languages who live under the same sovereign.*
>
> (ibid, 217)

France at the time was what Gellner describes as an 'agro-literate' society, i.e. where '*the state is interested in extracting taxes, maintaining peace* [. . .] *and has no interest in promoting lateral communication between its subject communities*' (1983: 10). The policy of language unification was therefore more symbolic than effective, and it was

implemented with caution. Although subsequent edicts confirmed official monolingualism in French in 1563 and 1629 (Grau, 1992: 94; Bell, 2001: 171), a large measure of bilingualism was tolerated (Grillo, 1989a: 28).

In addition to being *one* domestic factor in the consolidation and spread of the King's administrative and fiscal power, and one important factor in the development of the mercantile, increasingly self-aware middle class, more drastic French language status change was taking place on the European scene. The gradual demise of Latin had created a vacancy for a dominant European language which, it was increasingly understood, would bolster political hegemony, and the developing 'national' vernaculars – French, German and to a lesser extent Italian – joined the contest (Calvet, 2002: 29–35). The terms and stake of the conflict articulated on the so-called intrinsic linguistic values of each competing language which were seen as depending on their alleged etymological relation with the idealised, superior pre-Babel unique language. Beyond linguistic disputes, however, Calvet argues, was a struggle for political and linguistic hegemony between the European dynastic families, i.e. the French-speaking Valois-Angoulême *versus* the German-speaking Habsburg (ibid). What is important here is the embryonic theorisation of language superiority – the construction of language hierarchies based on formal characteristics – as a corollary of political disputes and a prolegomenon justifying colonisation, whether internal or external.

The theorisation of the superiority of French was asserted on two mutually reinforcing fronts in the seventeenth century. Domestically, the hegemony of the '*langage maternel françois*' was further consolidated through language institutionalisation and corpus development measures, i.e. the creation in 1635 of a body responsible for standardising and elaborating the language by publishing prescriptive tools to fix the norms of French and its status with respect to other languages of the kingdom – the *Académie Française*. The *Dictionnaire de l'Académie* was published in 1694. Thence, notions of a *bel usage* developed, refining domestic sociolinguistic hierarchies and postulating that the variety of French spoken in Paris (Malherbe) and/or by the Court (Vaugelas) and written by the great literary figures of the time had attained an unheard-of level of formal perfection. Thus, the theorisation of formal linguistic perfection created or reinforced geographical 'Paris/province' (Malherbe) and social 'aristocrat/people' (Vaugelas) dichotomies.[5] Likewise, the *Grammaire raisonnée et générale de Port-Royal* (1660) allegedly attempted a 'scientific' description of what constituted the logic of

Language (rather than languages). Yet, as Calvet (ibid: 40) shows, the elements of comparison remained limited to very few languages and, under the pretext of comparative analysis, it was sought to prove 'scientifically' that French was the most logical language, because its syntax reflected the natural order of logic.

On the international stage, from the seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century, French became the unchallenged international language. This was not merely due to its increased standardisation, since other national languages had preceded French on that route (e.g. the Italian *Academia della Crusca* had been created in 1582 and issued its *Vocabolario degli Academici della Crusca* in 1611). France was dominant economically and militarily, had the largest population of Europe (Schoell, 1936; Braudel, 1986), and Paris was acclaimed as the nucleus of the Enlightenment, progress, *savoir-vivre*, cultural and artistic production, etc. Through a process of totemisation, then, the French language came to embody all these qualities and virtues, so it was 'naturally' adopted in many European courts (from Germany to Russia, via Prussia, Poland and Sweden) as the language of diplomacy, the arts, literature and philosophy, scholarly writing, religion and in general as the language of communication of European elites (Fumaroli, 2001; Wright, 2004a: 121–122).

As many European courts adopted French, the theme of its 'universality' largely spread (see Montesquieu's and Voltaire's testimonies, quoted in Calvet, 1999: 71). As an illustration, in 1782, the Berlin academy's *concours* invited candidates to reflect on the universalism of the French language – its origins and its prospects. One of the two laureates' essays, Rivarol's, epitomised the ideological values attached to French: it is universal because it channels a prestigious, enlightened culture and is the language of a great political power. A second reason has to do with formal characteristics of the language: whereas men are torn between logic and passion, Rivarol argued, French syntax respects the logical order (i.e. it is the 'natural' vehicle of reason), whereas other languages, indulging passion, have unavoidably become corrupted:

> [. . .] *French, through a unique privilege, conveys direct order. French syntax is uncorruptible. Hence comes its admirable clarity, the eternal basis of our language. What is unclear cannot be French. What is unclear is rather English, Italian, Greek or Latin.*

> (ibid: 74)*

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* The translation is mine.

What was profiled here, through the salience of this heterogeneous discourse on the French language as the (only) natural vehicle of clarity and reason, was the struggle between reason- and passion-oriented philosophies which then dominated the nineteenth century and ideologically justified internal and external colonisation as a *mission civilisatrice*. The hegemonisation of French among European elites was indeed not uncontested by the time of the Revolution, and in the nineteenth century resisting the dominance of France also meant resisting the French language (Fumaroli, 2001: 18).

To recapitulate, by the late eighteenth century, through the combined effects of becoming the state language, the Academy's authoritative norm-setting activities that had taken over the standardisation process initiated by printers, the pseudoscientific conclusions of the *Grammaire* conveyed and furthered in Rivarol's essay, and the prestigious status it had acquired amongst European elites, the French language had become *reified* – represented as bounded and autonomous – and *totemized* – embodying in its forms the multifaceted (geographical, social, aesthetic) prestige and the universal (philosophical) values it conveyed.[6] The period covered here thus witnessed the construction of a multifaceted ideology about the French language that is still salient today whenever a new language debate surfaces, as this chapter later shows. Further, this ideology received institutional support and, most importantly, an authoritative language institution developed (i.e. the *Académie*) that helped French displace Latin in a number of diglossic domains, e.g. administration, literature, and has continued to regulate and promote the French language ever since.

In terms of language diffusion, however, the hegemonisation of French largely remained an elite phenomenon, as language education remained the privilege of the aristocracy and the growing urban middle class (i.e. bourgeois and professionals). Arguably, there was no congruence between language and the nation, and the sentiment of national consciousness remained a limited and restrictive notion: the term *nation* was already used in the seventeenth century but as a '[. . .] *self-description of the bourgeois elements of society*' (Guiomar, 1974: 28–29), and '*the rest were the people*' (Smith, 1983: 191; both quoted in Grillo, 1989a: 29). Yet, importantly, the link between language proficiency in French and social mobility had been established: French was the language of administrative acts, economic (pre-industrial) modernisation and growth and political power. At the dawn of the Revolution, however, the masses remained largely monolingual in their local dialects.

Political nationalism and language: the revolutionary discourses on language, the nation, and language planning

Article 3 of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* (1789) states that: '*The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation.*' After 1789, for the Revolution to stabilise, the nation had to be enlarged and 'invented': the various provincial peoples had to be politicised and made to imagine themselves as one nation eventually embodied in the monolingual state. The polity already had a state, the revolutionaries then had to proceed to '*the ethnicisation of the polity*' (Grillo, 1980, quoted in Grillo, 1989a: 29), i.e. to transform 'newly-promoted citizens' into 'nationals'. This implied that all should share and identify with *the* 'national' language.

From a discursive viewpoint, the revolutionaries could summon the heterogeneous discourse on the superiority of the French language developed during the seventeenth century (see Rivarol's quote above). To this, the revolutionaries added a new political strand to the discourse on language: French became the language through which the sovereignty of the nation could finally be embodied in the institutions of the *République, une et indivisible* to attain the Enlightenment ideals of '*Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*'. As was suggested in Chapter 1, the actualisation of that idealised modern political system promised to generate progress, happiness, welfare, equality, etc., to all those who endorsed its values.

To sketch it briefly, in the republican political ideology, each citizen endorsed a moral and social contract with every other, and the sum of these contracts created the nation which in turn was embodied by state institutions. In that process, the emphasis was put on equality and the abolition of any discrimination. To avoid discrimination, the citizen was in direct, unmediated, association with the rest of the nation, through the state structures and institutions (Articles 1 and 3 of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*). No intermediate body was officially acknowledged by the state. It followed from this form of republicanism that the indivisibility of the people, which guarantees their unity, precludes any recognition of minorities however defined (which would be a form of discrimination). Moreover, equality is interpreted formally and thus implies a uniform treatment. In terms of identity, this meant that citizens would renounce their former regional/ethnic identity in exchange for their citizenship. Put in modern political terms, the revolutionaries promoted liberal democracy, valorising individual citizenship

rights for their apparent universalism, their protection of fundamental liberal freedoms and their strict impartiality. Personal and political participation in liberal democracies ends up denying group difference and posits all persons as interchangeable from a moral and political point of view (adapted from Dworkin, 1978 and Young, 1993; cited in May, 2000: 375–376).

At a more practical level, the diffusion of the revolutionary 'programme' countrywide to inform citizens of their new legal rights and duties became a priority (De Certeau *et al.*, 1975: 303). The first language decrees emerged in 1790 requiring that official texts be translated into the local languages of the territory. The understandable rationale underlying this bilingual policy, however, soon yielded to more radical discourses of linguistic unification and uniformisation. These changes stemmed from the operational difficulties of having texts faithfully translated in the great variety of dialects and, more importantly, after the 1793 insurrection of Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, etc, from the fear of Counter-Revolution which regional languages were alleged to channel.

Two particularly important discourses significantly set the tone of French linguistic nationalism and have informed French official linguistic philosophy ever since – Barrère's and the Abbé Grégoire's 1794 speeches before the Convention. Both called for the eradication of local languages and the exclusive adoption of the French language. This call was still implicit in Barrère's laudatory speech on the French language and his vilifying portrait of other languages:

> [. . .] *the most beautiful language of Europe* [. . .] *that of* [. . .] *the rights of Man* [. . .] *meant to convey to the world the most sublime ideas of liberty and the greatest political speculations* [. . .] *must become the universal language* [. . .] *Italian must be left to expressing corrupt, banal poetry, German is unfit for free peoples, Spanish is the language of the inquisition, and English that of banking.*
>
> (Quoted by Marchetti, 1989: 106–107)*

Having fustigated other national languages, Barrère then scathes the idioms of France and takes the example of Corsica to advocate changing policy *vis-à-vis* these 'languages':

> [. . .] *Low-Breton, Basque, the German and Italian languages* [respectively for Alsatian and Corsican] . . . *these barbarous jargons and coarse idioms can only serve fanatics and counter-revolutionaries* [. . .] *Federalism and superstition speak Low-Breton; emigrants hating the Republic*

> *speak German; counter-revolution speaks Italian, and fanaticism speaks Basque. Let us break these vehicles of damage and mislead.*' (Quoted in De Certeau *et al.*, 1975: 299) [. . .] *Paoli* [leader of Corsica and founding father of the Corsican nation[7]] [. . .] *uses the Italian language to pervert the public spirit, and mislead the people* [. . .] *should we not send schoolteachers of French rather than translators of a foreign language?*
>
> (op. cit.)*

In June 1794, Grégoire presented the results of the survey launched in 1790, in his famous report entitled '*On the need and means to eradicate the patois and to universalize French language'*, for which he had sent around questionnaires investigating language behaviours and attitudes. He pleaded for the eradication of local languages even more forcefully by presenting quantitative data on language competence and behaviour:

> [. . .] *at least six million French people, especially in the countryside, do not know French;* [. . .] *about as many cannot have a conversation in it* [. . .] *hardly three million can speak pure French, and probably even fewer can write it correctly.*
>
> (Quoted by Calvet, 1999: 72)[8]

Not only are various languages differentiated according to their intrinsic qualities but also for the political discourses they serve to convey which, simplistically, are taken to reflect political loyalties.[9] The dichotomies established here echo the ones mentioned in Chapter 1 as a corollary of the modernisation discourse. What permeates the vilification of regional languages reified as 'barbarous jargons' and 'coarse idioms' and totemised as the language of 'fanatics and counter-revolutionaries', furthermore is an ideology of contempt, justifying their eradication among '[. . .] *a peasantry perceived as alien, primitive and incapable of abstract reasoning*' and thus needing to be enlightened (De Certeau *et al.*, 1975:155–169; quoted by Bell, 2001: 180). The linguistic nation was still to be constructed: 'universal' in some European Courts and among educated urban elites, French remained a foreign language for the vast rural masses.

To summarise, the Revolutionaries' discourses established a durable, coterminous relation between a theory of language and a theory of the nation. That relation expanded the hierarchies established during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to include other languages and/or dialects. This ideologically prepared the unification of France and, later, the colonial empire. Once these political and linguistic ideologies were

clearly established and/or reinforced, policy makers had indeed to translate them into durable and efficient practical measures. Two main channels of language diffusion were identified – 1. education and 2. the development and spread of republican administrative structures to monitor the implementation of the new body of laws.

Regarding education, on account of Grégoire's alarming statistics, popular education in rural areas, and in particular language education, was deemed a priority.[10] A French-speaking schoolteacher was, therefore, to be appointed in every non-French-speaking commune of the territory within ten days. However, this rapidly proved unfeasible for lack of qualified teachers (see Grau, 1992: 95 and Furet and Ozouf, 1982, for a detailed account of the spread of literacy in France). In general, the early 1790s saw a profusion of stillborn education plans (all summarised in Combes, 1997: 70–73), which indicates that the education of the masses aroused significant difficulties and resistance. The final blow to the revolutionaries' mass education discourse was then given by Napoleon, who did not favour mass education and focused his education policy on secondary education for elites.

Regarding state institutional/administrative structures, an initial 1794 decree inaugurated what Brunot called '*linguistic terror'* (1967: 189), stipulating that all public acts should henceforth be written exclusively in French, with any civil servant caught doing otherwise risking a prison sentence. This decree was short-lived and then excavated again in 1803 (Marchetti, 1989: 108–109). In practice, after threatening civil servants, the state developed a more incentive-based policy and the command of correct French spelling soon imposed itself as the main requirement to obtain any public position, thus becoming a class marker which favoured the middle classes' access to administrative and bureaucratic power. In the 'less French-speaking South', however, official French monolingualism was often unrealistic to implement. In Corsica, for instance, an imperial decree exempted the island from that measure – thus tolerating official bilingualism *'until otherwise stated'* (ibid) (it was repealed in 1852). Overall, despite apparent inconsistency and confusion in law making, the important recruitment conditionality requiring the mastery of French spelling was permanently adopted in 1805 and reinforced in 1833 (i.e. Guizot Law) (Ager, 1999: 129). This conditionality was unevenly applied though and, as Marchetti recalls, in Corsica official instructions required *some* proficiency in French. (Marchetti, ibid).

During the nineteenth century, the revolutionary discourses of *mass* instruction largely failed to be implemented because of the lack of

resources and political will. From Napoleon's rule, under the Restoration (1815–1848), the Second Republic (1848–1852) and then the Second Empire (1852–1870),[11] primary and secondary education structures multiplied, but, as education was neither free nor compulsory, they served the privileged classes only. Thus the growing, already French speaking, urban middle class continued its acquisition of French, responding to new job incentives and ultimately providing the French-speaking workforce needed in the rapidly developing bureaucratic system,[12] in its various new domains of state intervention (e.g. transport, communication) and in the growing domestic economic market (Balibar et Laporte, 1974; Higonnet, 1980). Free and compulsory popular (i.e. primary) education to accelerate *massive* French language diffusion did not emerge until the Third Republic (Calvet, 2002: 226–227). Initially, the restricted scope of language education reinforced social inequalities and the power positions of the already French-speaking middle and upper classes.

Language wars? Education policy under the Third Republic (1870–1939)

In 1864, the Duruy countrywide language survey underscored hugely different levels in proficiency above and beneath a diagonal *'running from Saint-Malo to Geneva',* at the south of which illiteracy rates remained much higher than in the north (Weber, 1979: 309). Weber stresses the rural/urban discrepancy in literacy rates, and argues that the provision and quality of education did not sensibly modify until the turn of the century (Weber, 1979; quoted by May, 2001: 160). Finally, the survey also indicated huge discrepancies among southern *départements* and that Corsica belonged to the five departments, where more than 90% of the population did not know French (De Certeau *et al.*, 1975: 270–272).

Efforts to accelerate the acculturation process, notably through public education, were therefore redoubled: new budgets were voted, new schools opened and the material conditions and salaries for schoolteachers improved. However, it is with the 1880s policies of free, compulsory and secular school education known as the *Ferry Laws* that French spread more rapidly. Interestingly and significantly, Jules Ferry – the acclaimed architect of French nation building through education in French mainstream historiography – was also the theoretician and minister in charge of colonial expansion. Ferry's several hats were no quirk, and the discourse of France's *mission civilisatrice* – which epitomised all the revolutionary positions on language and language planning – legitimated both French hegemony at home and the colonial enterprise. In view of

the uneven knowledge of French across regions, which was alleged to lie behind the persistent fragility of the new republican regime, the need to spread the French language was keenly felt and equally applied at home and abroad.[13]

As in 1793, the republican regime was indeed fragile and weakened by various anti-Republican forces (amongst them monarchists, ecclesiastical authorities, Bonapartists) and certain provincial elites inclined to cultural regionalism and in some cases, like Brittany and the Basque country, to regional separatism (Poignant, 2000: 103). The conquest of inner France remained incomplete and republican schoolmasters – *les hussards noirs de la République* – were to play a prominent role. To counterbalance the forces of opposition and succeed where the revolutionarties had failed, republican school was made compulsory, secular and free.[14] Moreover, Article 14 of the application decree for the 1881 Education Law reiterated the 1853 imperial language-in-education provision that: 'Only French may be used in schools' (Fusina, 1994: 64)*.

Historiographies of education policies and practices during that period offer contrasting views on schoolteachers' management of multilingualism. For a long time, 'regionalist' discourses (e.g. *Front Régionaliste Corse* [FRC], 1971; see also Poignant, 2000) have claimed that the use of regional languages, or *patois*, was systematically, severely repressed by schoolmasters through a range of punishments and measures of humiliation (for attested evidence, see Hélias, 1975: Chapter 4; Calvet, 1974: 229). A more recent study by Chanet (1996) – *L'école républicaine et les petites patries* – offers a more qualified account.[15] Chanet based his research on interviews with schoolmasters and pupils of the schools of the Third Republic and the analysis of the contributions of many schoolmasters to the rich pedagogical debate that emerged and was published in educational reviews in the late nineteenth century and flourished until WWII (see also Martel, 1992: 115–117).

Recalling that schoolmasters were typically recruited at the county level, Chanet reports that many praised the local cultures and used the 'dialect' as an auxiliary to the learning of French, not as a subject but as a medium of instruction. The two schools of thought – for the radical prohibition of local languages or for their use to supplement French language teaching and avoid alienating pupils – actually coexisted amongst schoolteachers, academics and education officials (Chanet, 1996: 216–234). Moreover, he adds, if the former view was hegemonic for certain regions like Brittany and the Basque country (where separatist struggle was fiercer) until the late nineteenth century, the general tendency was reversed from the 1920s, reflecting the more

liberal approach to the issue at the national level and the increasing participation and influence of schoolmasters in the pedagogical debate on the instrumentalist use of local languages (ibid; see also Fusina, 1994: Chapter 4). Notwithstanding, as Jaffe (1999) points out, this dichotomisation of the French 'language' *versus* the local 'dialects' reinforced French linguistic ideology of superiority. After all, as a mere auxiliary, the dialect could but remain a less prestigious form than 'the language': the language was written, codified and channeled a prestigious body of literature, etc. The dialect was fragmented and geographically varied, essentially used orally and did not have a *liter*ature (except essentially religious writings which Jesuits had translated or written in local languages; see Bell, 2001: 187–190).

All this illustrates the discrepancy between the radicalism of the official discourse (largely shaped during the most radical times of the Revolution) and the reality of educational practices by schoolmasters uneasily acting as mediators between the local and the national in an evolving ideological and political, and sociolinguistic context. Their pedagogical philosophies and practices under the Third Republic often departed from the radical official discourse and largely respected the plurality of identities: to many, love of the *petite patrie* and the *grande patrie* were not incompatible. Besides, official policies became somewhat more liberal between the beginning and the end of the Third Republic as a function of broader socio-political and sociocultural change. Overall, Chanet's work tones down the systematic, deliberate plan of cultural and linguistic genocide, often uncritically attributed to republican schools and schoolmasters, even though it does not question that, liberal though some schoolmasters may have been, they did promote a French linguistic ideology of language hierarchy (Chanet, 1996: Chapters 6 and 7; Poignant, 2000).

Finally, this study also reminds us that, central as the role of official discourse and the school may have been, other socio-economic and social psychological factors weighed in favour of language shift, including the popular will to be associated with the new political, economic and sociocultural orders. Ozouf (1996) emphasises social psychological change and argues that popular perceptions of the benefits of language shift and the unavoidability and/or desirability of modernisation processes were equally important alongside ideologies, official discourses, policies and plans. Weber's aforementioned detailed study of the *Modernization of Rural France* under the Third Republic shows that central factors of modernisation included demographic growth, industrialisation and massive urbanisation and increased geographical mobility

in general, compulsory conscription (1905) and enhanced patriotism during WWI, the spread of literacy, growth of the press and then of the media (Weber, 1979).[16] In brief, planned and unplanned factors participated in nation-building processes, and people were often willing to acculturate and acquire literacy to get on the train of modernisation. In Marxist historiographies of nation-building processes, the question of the spread of literacy is of course viewed as a planned effort from ruling classes to create the necessary workforce to reproduce their domination; people did not acculturate by free choice – the modernisation thesis – but because they were manipulated to do so by hegemonic discourses (Hobsbawm, 1990; Bourdieu, 1991).

As was indicated in Chapter 1, however, modernisation processes did not entail the unconditional language acculturation of the masses and language shift. First, as we saw, they did not take place evenly throughout the territory. Second, and relatedly, various patterns of resistance to the disturbing effects of so-called economic modernisation and the hegemony of French republican nationalism also flourished, notably through the valorisation of local cultures and the interest in folklore, traditions and rural knowledge induced by the Romantic mouvement throughout the nineteenth century.[17] Despite French nationalist discourses and the demands of a modernising society that eventually seriously undermined the value of local cultures and languages on the newly created dominant symbolic and material markets, forms of cultural and sometimes political regionalism also emerged that contributed to preserve dominated cultures. The revival of local cultures did not systematically lead to political demands for statehood. Yet, in cases like Brittany and Corsica, they became salient and socio-politically significant in the interwar period and again from the 1960s, as they catalysed significant popular support at times when these regions resented the action, or lack thereof, of the central state (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7).[18] In turn, this led to a gradual and modest recognition of the value of regional cultures and languages and their eventual tolerance in education, as the next section will show. Finally, Giordan argues that local languages also survived because the elites did not want the local population to become completely acculturated, which would undermine their local dominance (1992: 129–144). Put cynically, hegemony requires perpetuating inequalities.

To summarise the argument so far, this chapter has illustrated the discursive continuity between the *Ancien Régime* and the Revolution through to WWII regarding the linguistic superiority and universalism of the French language and the corollary stigmatisation and exclusion

of other languages and/or dialects. The construction of linguistic superiority and universalism resulted from a double process of reification and totemisation – itself supported by discursive and institutional means – which both reflected and furthered French economic, political, artistic and literary domination in Europe. Thus, French became the dominant international *lingua franca* until WWII (Gordon, 1978). With the advent of the Revolution and the politicisation of the masses, the French language became a stake in gaining political legitimacy and stability and of national identity in a mass nation. The discourse about the universalism of the French language was again couched in evolutionary terms that legitimised its mission to *civilize* the 'primitives': both the unenlightened French people and more external 'savages'[19] in the colonies from the Third Republic.

Through these processes of reification and above all totemisation, successive regimes have thus conflated theories of political legitimacy based on the sovereignty of the nation with theories of language in a way whereby unity and uniformity of the language and of the nation are mutually constitutive and reinforcing: 'one language = one nation'. In its social constructivist guise, the equation reads: one (superior) language must *become* the unique language of one (superior) nation, whose mission is also to spread its values by spreading the totemised language that embodies and best serves them.

French nationalism is thus just as essentialist as German nationalism in that it rests upon the equation of a conception of a reified language, which is the totem of a monolithic, uniform and all encompassing nation (as opposed to just an elite nation). The difference is that nationality can be acquired and must be diffused, whereas in the German model it is a given and remains exclusive.

Moreover, as was underscored in Chapter 1 and above, even under its *post hoc* guise, socially constructed linguistic 'essentialism' always refers to a language which is 'nobody's language' and so everyone's: it is the language of what Smith calls the *lateral* 'ethnie' that develops around a centralised state and is confined to a social and political elite (1986: Chapter 4; quoted in May, 2001: 71 & 89). Linguistic 'civic' essentialism, in that it articulates around a process of totemisation, which itself is based upon the values of a particular group, inevitably contains 'ethnic elements of identification'. This group is a partially ethnically, partially socially defined group, i.e. the pre-revolutionary (elite) French nation.

The second point emerging from the above analysis is the discrepancy between official discourses and their derived policies and plans on the one hand, and the implementation of such plans both domestically and in the colonies on the other. In effect, the mass instruction advocated

by the revolutionaries to construct a genuinely all-encompassing nation based upon the aforementioned ideological principles did not begin to materialise for the masses until the Education laws of the Third Republic. Even then, a significant discrepancy remained between official instructions and their implementation: the process of language education remained slow, socially divisive and geographically uneven, both catalysing and enabling resistance to acculturation. As a result, Chanet (1996: 205–206) indicates, local bilingualism persisted at least until the 1930s. In the colonies, where language planning started almost at the same time as in metropolitan France, the process also fell short of being massive and only applied to colonised elites that mediated between colonial authorities and the population (see Calvet, 2002: Chapter 11, for actual rates of literacy in Western Africa one and half centuries after the beginning of the *mission civilisatrice*). Notwithstanding, by denoting a French-speaking empire, and inasmuch as French was the international language at least until WWI and largely dominant until WWII, French retained a lot of the prestige acquired in the seventeenth and eighteenth century until recently.

Third, other factors – planned or unplanned – led to language shift but failed to eradicate the linguistic diversity targeted by the revolutionaries and later by Third Republic officials. Despite overall massive language acculturation, a number of regional languages survived alongside French. As the dominant linguistic market was unevenly created in certain regions, an alternative linguistic market survived and/or was created which secured the survival of these languages. In various cases, e.g. Brittany, Corsica, this unachieved acculturation and the growing opposition to the dominant discourses and the political hegemony of the centre entailed the cyclical rise of regionalist movements. In those regions, the first movements emerged during the Third Republic but were eventually delegitimised by their alleged or actual associations with foreign interests in the interwar period (Corsica and the Irredentist movement) and during WWII (Brittany and the collaboration of certain regional activists with the Nazi regime). They re-emerged in the 1960s but in a different socio-economic, cultural, political and discursive context to which I now turn.

Post-WWII France and French influence in the world: internal and external socio-economic, political and cultural factors of change

The processes of modernisation – including industrialisation and exodus – initiated in the nineteenth century significantly accelerated

in the interwar period and even more so after WWII. Their effect on language use and shift was emphasised above. When WWII broke out, France had become globally French-speaking. In many regions, RML family transmission had ceased even in the country. In many others, it still existed but was increasingly in jeopardy. With accelerated modernisation and the colonisation of the spaces of orality (still hitherto largely occupied by local modes of expression) by the media after the war, language shift accelerated exponentially.

The post-WWII period was called the *Trente Glorieuses* [the Glorious Thirty Years] to signify that the years 1946–1975 were years of drastic economic and sociocultural change (Fourastié, 1979). Fourastié's book's subtitle *la révolution invisible* reviews rapid demographic change and unprecedented economic growth, hinging on massive rural exodus as rural, agricultural France turned into an urbanised, mass-consuming, tertiary society. Beyond averaged national statistics, a very uneven picture emerges though, separating France into two halves, above and beneath a Brest-Marseille diagonal (comparable with Weber's St Malo-Geneva diagonal above, and see how the map of RML activism overlaps with economic underdevelopment in France below). Above this line, France was rapidly industrialising and modernising. Beneath it, it remained more agricultural and poorer. Moreover, economic backwardness and rising unemployment (due to the decreasing competitivity of traditional products) were driving people away from their original regions. Dayries and Dayries (1986: 15) indicate that between 1954 and 1962, depopulation affected 20 *départements*. Already in 1947, French geographer J.F. Gravier could talk about 'Paris et le désert français' (Gravier, 1958). To respond to this unbalance, the state began a prudent double regional policy of economic planning and political *déconcentration*.[20]

In the 1960s, the pressing need to reduce growing economic and demographic disparities between Paris and the southern and western regions entailed more top-down regionalisation: regions progressively emerged as new economic and administrative strata to which some state authority was devolved. By the late 1960s, the reshaped Socialist Party made devolution one of its electoral battle-horses. After the 1981 socialist victory, regional entities slowly gained new powers and responsibilities so that devolution partially accommodated regionalist demands (Keating, 1985), but these debates have remained highly controversial because of the aforementioned deeply ingrained idea that any form of division between the citizen and state authorities (centralised or deconcentrated) is a threat to national integrity. Less rigid attitudes

have nevertheless surfaced among certain national political leaders, as the debates on the CoE's *European Charter for RMLs* and the Matignon negotiations analysed below show.

Meanwhile, bottom-up regionalist movements surfaced longing for more devolution (Dayries and Dayries, 1986). The political salience of regionalist movements in the 1960s/1970s was a Europe-wide phenomenon, and many movements developed political agendas emphasising their self-perception as peripheries exploited and/or abandoned by their respective cores. Sub-state nationalist rhetoric drawing on the centre-periphery theory of *internal colonialism* could then appeal to decolonisation discourses.[21] In France, Occitan activist Robert Lafont diffused the thesis, and the Socialist Party in opposition even endorsed it at its 1966 national congress. As decolonisation became the orthodoxy, territorialised groups that considered they had been treated like colonies felt legitimate in claiming various forms of autonomy or 'home rule'. This discourse was especially topical in the post-1968 anti-centralisation atmosphere.[22] As was noted above, and will be seen later, the thesis of internal colonialism is linked to uneven economic development and found a favourable echo in such underdeveloped regions as Corsica in the early 1970s. Underdevelopment thus contributed to increasing popular support for autonomists' economic, political and cultural claims. In turn, this led to more RML planning as a state strategy to defuse swelling political tensions (see below and Chapter 7).

Two important external and internal developments determined France's language policy making from the 1960s. First, French language status on the international scene decreased as that of English rose. The international status of French constructed in the seventeenth century was relatively unchallenged even by France's political opponents until WWI, when English was also used in the Versaille Treaty (1919). Its decline as the pre-eminent international language accelerated with decolonisation processes after WWII and ever since, proportionally to the rise in power of the United States and English. Relatedly, feelings of growing insecurity linked to the 'Americanisation' of French society and the phenomenon of *franglais* – a corollary of a wider cultural phenomenon – emerged. Second, the international status of French also suffered through decolonisation. Before the creation and growth of *la Francophonie* from the 1960s, and its subsequent discursive construction as the alternative to ultra-liberal, English-only globalisation in the 1990s, decolonisation was initially experienced as another blow to the French language, since within 20 years France lost most of her colonial

possessions. In the following sections, I analyse the consequences of these changes on French glottopolitics.

Language insecurity, palliative language institution building and language legislation

The threat to French pre-eminence was felt at an early stage and the first institution of defence and promotion of the language was created in 1937 (Ager, 1999: 102; Wright, 2004a: 122). Feelings of linguistic insecurity then re-emerged in the mid-1960s, and as De Gaulle launched his manifold policy to restore '*the Greatness of France'* (notably against American dominance and through French hegemony in the EC), he inaugurated a new era of institution building for the French language. The founding institution was the *Haut comité pour la défense et l'expansion de la langue française* (1966) that later split into the *Délégation générale à la langue française* (DGLF) and the *Conseil supérieur de la langue française* (1989). Their role has been to defend and, significantly, to promote French against the threat of English both at home and abroad, in terms both of its corpus and status. Since 1995, they have been seconded by officially approved 'civil' associations, i.e. *Défense de la langue française* (DLF) (1958; housed by the *Académie Française*), *Avenir de la langue française* (1992), *Droit de comprendre* (1994), etc.

This institutionalisation responded to the so-called massive invasion of French by English expressions and the rise of a mixed code: *franglais*. Certain intellectuals denounced the bastardisation of French at an early stage (Etiemble, 1964). Etiemble's widely echoed manifesto against *franglais* made subsequent recommendations for the state to take legal measures to thwart the 'decline of French', which led to the following: 1. The creation of the *Haut comité* and of terminology committees in all ministries to propose alternatives to the use of English and 2. the Loi Bas-Lauriol (1975), the first significant law on the status of French.[23] The themes of invasion and decline have never waned since, and countless publications have developed them, often authored by well-known public figures. Noguez – chair of *Avenir de la langue française* in 1993 – published *La colonisation douce* [The Soft Colonisation] in which he denounced:

> [. . .] *a form of colonisation, agreeable and friendly but highly destructive* [. . .] [which] *had forced the French to believe in their own inferiority* [. . .] [affecting] *those who are socially and culturally least able to defend themselves: those in the lower social groups and the worst educated.*
>
> (Noguez, 1991; cited in Ager, 1999: 107–108)

Similarly, Maurice Druon – permanent secretary of the *Académie française* and as such member of the *Conseil supérieur de la langue française* – wrote a *Letter to the French People on their Language and Soul** (1994) warning them against the continuing impoverishment of the French language and its consequences: '[. . .] *disrespect for language signals disrespect for everything*,' and that '*France can only remain a Great Power and a world leader if it continues mastering a universal language*'* (1994: 23–39; quoted by Ager, 1999: 231). Variations on the same theme abound on the websites of the aforementioned associations.

   Interesting in the above quotes is the denunciation of an implied strategy of brainwashing by American colonialists targeted at those *least able to defend themselves*. Put otherwise, Noguez patronisingly emphasises the duty of the elites to defend their unaware, attacked population, and Americanisation is portrayed as reinforcing social inequalities, which reasserts the alleged role of French as a weapon against such inequalities. This position recalls both the actual strategy whereby French was first compared to dialects – the glorification/stigmatisation strategy – and totemises the French/American language relation in terms of the equality/inequalities opposition. Druon's letter's title is interesting in emphasising the essentialist relation between language and the soul of the nation. Although his argument is about corpus protection, Druon reiterates the revolutionary assumption that the nation is the unmediated sum of the totality of individual language uses finding the language use of *la France* in the sum of individual usages. This justifies that France should take the necessary measures to conserve her universalism.

   Facing such alleged threats, research was conducted to examine whether the discourse of invasion was grounded in reality. Hagège (1987: 74) argued that statistical analysis of lexical borrowings revealed that borrowings from English amounted to a mere 2.5% of the whole lexical stock and 0.6% in speech, which seriously undermined the claims of 'invasion'. An investigation of language attitudes in 1988 revealed that French people had a generally positive attitude towards English and that although they acknowledged the link between a language and the culture it carries, they did not believe that '[. . .] *speaking English would result in the adoption of American values*' (Flaitz, 1988: 191–197). Finally, a 1994 poll surveyed popular reactions and attitudes to the increasing presence of English in the French sociolinguistic panorama and people's evaluation of their own uses (cited in Ager, 1999: 102–111). The results showed that the majority of French people were aware of the increasing presence of English but did not feel it

threatened French, and were less idealistic than practical about fostering Americanisms if they could be useful. They also largely saw school and the lack of vigilance by the French as responsible for the alleged impoverishment of the French language. For Ager, this clearly indicates that sentiments of linguistic insecurity *vis-à-vis* the entrenchment of English in French society are mainly found in '[...] *the literary world and* [...] *those working on language and culture in government-related organisations or in associations devoted to the defence of French, which tend to see an Anglo-Saxon (i.e. American) plot for world domination*' (Ager, 1999: 113).

As a result of growing linguistic insecurity, new legislation updated the 1975 Loi Bas-Lauriol. The latter had been largely inspired by Etiemble's recommendations, and it made the use of French compulsory in commerce, the workplace, official notices and advertising. Despite modifications in 1976 and 1982, following European Commission arguments that its provisions hampered free competition, the law was universally regarded as ineffective because fines were small and enforcement mechanisms scarce. In the 1990s, the legal apparatus to protect French was therefore reinforced, both with the modification of Article 2 of the Constitution in preparation for the ratification of the TEU (1992) and through the Toubon Law (1994). Article 2 of the French Constitution was modified and the mention *French is the language of the Republic* added. This provision vested the French language with constitutional recognition making it a symbol of French identity alongside the flag, national anthem, etc. This consecrated *de jure* a long standing *de facto* situation and inscribed the defence of the French language at the highest level of the French legal hierarchy (whereas, as we will see, most RML provisions have only regulatory status). Indirectly, it endowed French with a powerful legal principle against the encroachment of English and other languages (i.e. RMLs) in official/public domains of use. The Toubon Law of 1994, which applied the 1992 constitutional principle, updated and expanded the Loi Bas-Lauriol and has incontestably been the widest ranging legal measure of language protection in France.

The 1994 Loi Toubon: discourse, legal scope and implementation

The Legendre Report – preceding the discussion of the Toubon Bill before the parliament – recalled the domains of use in which English had gained ground and was threatening French, particularly emphasising

the scientific domain and cultural production, both cinema and radio, and the alleged increasing choice of English by artists because it opens wider markets. The report opposed a view of culture as the expression of cultural identity and an instrumentalisation of culture in exclusively economic terms. French represented the former approach, based on intrinsic values (channeling universalism and humanism for cultural production) and English was depicted as the agent of '*economic savagery and cultural sterility*'. Facing such a plight, parliamentarians had no choice except to engage protective measures against English attacks and the risk of absorption of French values by the English world (Ager, 1999: 114–115). Article 1 of the Toubon law recalls that: '*The French language is a fundamental element of France's personality and heritage*.'* To Fenet, this legally furthers '[. . .] *the ethnicisation of the national bond and* [. . .] *blurs the distinction between the subjective and the objective nation*'* (2002: 72).

The law imposes the exclusive or dominant use of French in five domains: employment, education, publicity and commerce, the media, and scientific meetings and publication. Implementation is supervised by the DGLF with the collaboration of the aforementioned officially approved associations for the defence of the French language. In the foreword of its 1996 yearly report, the DGLF states that its actions aim at preserving '[. . .] *French* [which] *is an element essential to social cohesion*'* (Ager, 1999: 234). Closer analysis in the domains of employment, commerce, media (with quotas of French-language programmes and music) and even education show that behind that honourable purpose actually also lie a number of economic protectionist measures (Ager, 1999: 135–141).

Although predominantly aimed at safeguarding the status of French in these domains, an important outcome of the Toubon Law has been the development of corpus planning, and the actual implementation of the poorly enforced use of official terminology by civil servants, henceforth risking career sanctions should they lack zeal in respecting the French language.

The role of the approved associations has been to oversee the implementation of the regulations of French language use and to inform the DGLF of infractions and/or to act as aggrieved party in justice. Interestingly, they have largely focused on the quality of the language, especially in the media, and their reports are exemplars of purist attitudes. Moreover, being independent associations rather than government agencies, their freedom of speech has been less curtailed. The association *Droit de comprendre*, for instance, hosts the *Académie*

de la carpette anglaise [English Doormat Academy]: '[. . .] **The English Doormat** – *prize of civil indignity* – *is* [yearly] *awarded to one member of 'French elites' who distinguished her/himself through her/his relentless efforts to promote Anglo-American English in France against the French language*.'*[24] In terms of corpus-based action, the purist attitudes are usually overt. The DLF, for instance, states as one of its main aims: '[To] *safeguard the qualities that have long distinguished French amongst European languages, by combating the uncontrolled yet dangerous invasion of foreign words*.'*[25] Overall, whereas the DGLF has endeavoured to fulfil its mission through information and negotiations rather than court cases, it is clear that the associations' tone is much less diplomatic and amounts to a call to arms. As for their avowed motives, they summon the discourse of language endangerment, identifying both internal and external threats, and present their action as the noblest mission to preserve the integrity and greatness of the French language. Finally, although their membership includes well-known figures from Parisian French academic, literary and scientific milieux, their numerous branches in the French regions attest to the concern for French language-based issues among provincial elites too.

The reception of the Bill and then the law was very mixed: it was widely supported by elites but the Socialist Party denounced the institution of a 'language police' and the number of offences remains high (Ager, 1999: 143). Overall, the law and its implementation stimulated various negative reactions to the simplistic dichotomies conveyed in the preparation of the law and the purist assumptions during its implementation. As a result, the initial elitist discourse in government communication strategy on language, relayed and amplified by the associations, shifted towards stronger emphases on the rights of speakers of French and the economic advantages of the law (Ager, 1999: 151). However, this should not conceal the fact that, elitist though their representation of the language may be, the ideas propagated by the defence associations remain very deep-rooted in France and, as Ager points (ibid: 152): '[. . .] *there are many very active, self-appointed guardians of the language both in and outside the Associations*.' In the process of discursive shift, more space was also made to justify the law as an example of the defence of multilingualism which was also one dimension present in the associations' discourse againt American domination. As the next section shows, this element had long been a core theme of the defence of the status of French on the international scene.

Language planning outside France: the Francophonie and the EU

I claimed above that one of the sources of growing linguistic insecurity in France was the collapse of its colonial empire. Somehow, worries were rapidly lifted as several leaders from the former colonies founded an organisation aimed at preserving some influence for French in the world – *la Francophonie*. Ironically, at the time of its creation, it appealed little to De Gaulle, whose strategy to maintain the prestige of French against the rise of English was to reinforce French through the EEC. From the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the growing structures and membership of the *Francophonie* made it a privileged forum to promote Frenchness. Beyond economic cooperation, the theme of diffusing the French language was co-located with that of contributing to building a more democratic world. Another theme that developed in the 1990s equated the promotion of French with the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity and multilingualism in the world against cultural uniformisation through the hegemonisation of English-mediated dominance (Ager, 1996 and 1999; Wright, 2004a: 127). Arguments against the economic instrumentalisation of culture were also forcefully made in the 1993 GATT negotiations when France and other countries obtained the recognition of the *exception culturelle* to the advocated reinforcement of ultra-liberalism (Baer, 2003).

In sum, the creation and growth of the 'French commonwealth' has somehow compensated for decolonisation and maintained some French influence in one of the largest intergovernmental organisations. Although the French language was the initial precondition for membership, this requirement considerably loosened through the years until 1995 when non-French speaking countries were admitted. The organisation then also asserted more political and economic ambitions, although the defence of multilingualism and cultural diversity has become its core discursive battlehorse, and France remains its standard bearer, the world champion of cultural and linguistic diversity. Vested with this new mission, France thus retains its role as the diffuser of universal values, and the amalgamation of those values with that of the French language itself perpetuates the totemisation of the French language incrementally shaped earlier.

Within the EC and then the EU, France also sought to preserve its hegemony at an early stage. If Regulation 1/58 seemed to guarantee language status equality amongst the national languages of member states

(see Chapter 2), it is not in doubt that the long domination of French in European diplomacy and its continuing privileged position in a number of international organisations (e.g. UN, UNESCO) favoured its *de facto* pre-eminence as the EC's institutional working language. As late as 1971, President Pompidou could declare that: '*French is the natural language of the peoples of Europe, English that of America*' (Haigh, 1974: 33). De Gaulle objected to the UK joining the EC for fear that it could be a Trojan horse for American interests. When Pompidou finally assented to the UK joining, however, Phillipson reports (2003: 54), he demanded:

> [...] *that the preeminence of French as the dominant language of EU institutions should remain unchallenged* [to which Prime Minister Heath reportedly agreed that] *all British civil servants connected to the EU should be proficient in French.*

This dominance gradually vanished as Europe enlarged and new non-French speaking countries acceded. Gradually, English superseded French as the *de facto* institutional working language (Phillipson, 2003: 129–138; see also Chapter 2). Several attempts were then made to respond to the technical and financial problems created by EU's *de jure* commitment to official multilingualism and the *de facto* increasing pre-eminence of English in working groups. We mentioned in Chapter 2 the aborted proposal by French minister Lamassoure to establish five working languages, including French and English (1994), thus compromising between full multilingualism as equality and reduced multilingualism as reasoned, functional equality. In October 2004, another campaign was launched by Maurice Druon who sent a manifesto to have French adopted as the only legal reference language of the EU (*Le Monde*, October 20 2004). As Druon claims:

> [...] *The French language, like Latin before, offers, through its vocabulary, syntax and grammar, the best guaranties of clarity and accuracy, and utmostly reduces risks of diverging interpretations.*[*]

Beyond reasserting the perennial heritage of Rivarol, this text singularly departs from the logic of multilingualism to which France had allegedly been committed during the 1990s. If the French government did not officially endorse this text,[26] it cannot deny the one of 1994. The question of the absolute promotion of cultural pluralism and mutilingualism, then, can only be seen as an anti-English discursive strategy.

It also finds its empirical limits in the way RML issues have been dealt with in France since 1951.

RML legislation: from Deixonne to Lang (1951–2001)

Unlike other language legislation, RML legislation has almost exclusively been concerned with acquisition planning, which remained the hot potato of RML rights debates, until the 1999 debates on the *European Charter for RMLs*.[27] The Deixonne Law (1951) was the first legal act granting some (implicit and limited) recognition that RMLs no longer constituted the danger they had been deemed to embody since the Revolution. The law itself reflected more tolerance than the genuine political will to promote RMLs. Initially (i.e. until 1974), it restrictively applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan and Occitan, excluding Corsican on the ground that it was a dialect of Italian rather than of French. Not only were the provisions very limited and actually defined in ways that make their fullest implementation unlikely, but the first actual implementation decrees were only issued in the late 1960s (Fusina, 1994: 126). Besides, the law's minimal provisions for RML use – one hour a week in primary schools and three weekly hours for a minimum of ten students in secondary schools, outside normal timetables and on a strictly voluntary basis – granted limited scope for genuine language promotion. The *Commissions Académiques d'Etudes Régionales* constituted in 1966 offered little improvement to the various practical problems linked to RML teaching.

Further legal progress was made in 1975 with the Haby Law, which reasserted that regional cultures constituted a patrimony to be preserved but with a telling proviso assuming the potential socio-political danger of granting some recognition to RMLs and implicitly reasserting the primacy of French: '*The absolute respect of national unity suffers no challenge through a spurious opposition between local cultures and the national reality the State embodies*.'* Notwithstanding, Article 12 stipulated that '*The teaching of regional languages and cultures may be offered throughout the curriculum*.'* The law also provided for teacher training measures but emphasised that such measures should remain voluntary (quoted by Fusina, 1994: 153–155).

The first really influential and more systematic RML-promoting text was undoubtedly the 1982 Savary Circular (reproduced in Fusina, 1994: 256–264). It established a three-year language-in-education plan defining more clearly the role of the state in RML promotion throughout

school education. Crucially, it stipulated that the state would henceforth take central responsibility for such promotion, by establishing syllabuses, a pedagogical council, exams and training programmes, by sponsoring research and the production of teaching material, and by coordinating actions with civil society organisations (Article 1). This marked a significant change for Corsica from the Deixonne Law under which schoolteachers and families had to obtain Corsican language classes with no official support. Article 2 also made RML education a specific, rather than marginal, subject, timetabling up to three weekly hours for it. Article 3 re-emphasised the optional character of such teaching and learning. Finally, most importantly, as a circular aimed at providing guidelines for interpretation of the Haby Law, it left a large amount of discretion to interpreters in RML communities. The importance of having discretion in legal interpretation was outlined above and will be forcefully illustrated in Chapter 7.

The 1984 and 1989 Education Laws, respectively, reasserted that: '*Higher Education structures* [. . .] *guarantee the promotion and enrichment of both the French language and regional languages and cultures'* (Article 7) and that '[. . .] *Primary, secondary and higher education curricula* [. . .] *can include education in regional languages and cultures'** (Article 1).[28] These provisions that echo the 1975 law, nevertheless attest to the political will of the Socialist governments of the 1980s to boost RML promotion (for the implementation of these provisions in Corsica see Chapter 7).

Even more significant progress was made during the 1990s, beginning with the creation in 1991 of the IUFM (Teacher Training Institute) and the extension to RMLs of the *Certificat d'Aptitude à l'Enseignement Secondaire* (CAPES) (analogous to the PGCE in the UK education qualification system). The former enabled primary and secondary schoolteacher training to be provided in a systematic way, remedying one of the major weaknesses of language teaching during the 1970s/1980s. The latter formally put RML training on a par with any academic subject (see Chapter 7).

Finally, the 1990s saw the development of bilingual education legislation in France in application of the principles of generalised RML education in the aforementioned successive laws. Yet, the implementation of the law was largely left to the deconcentrated state education authorities – the *Rectorats* – and as Chapter 7 further illustrates, implementation varied across regions. Bilingual education was regulated by the *Ministerial Circulary No 95-086 of 7 April 1995: implementing education in regional languages and cultures**. The text remained rather vague,

leaving significant discretion to its interpreters. In Corsica, for instance, its interpretation/implementation led to both the creation of bilingual sections in a number of schools where French and Corsican were used on a par as medium of instruction and the creation of a few schools where teaching was articulated on the method of full immersion (Chapter 7). Both methods were only fully enshrined in national legislation for other French regions *post facto* through two ministerial orders on August 5 2001 and on April 19 2002, under the socialist government in which Jack Lang – a notorious supporter of RML rights – was the Education Minister. The lost election of April 20 2002 and the subsequent return of a right-wing government led to the amendment of the orders and the full immersion method was repealed (but bilingual education continued to develop).

Overall, despite limited provisions and slow implementation, the Deixonne Law and its legal offspring marked an apparent discursive shift in French glottopolitics. Although RMLs became legalised and institutionalised in educational settings *ex minima,* the process apparently put an end to the anti-dialect rhetoric of the Revolution and the Third Republic. In the 1990s, French attitudes towards English-induced corpus change appear to have remained very puristic among certain intellectual elites but less so among the population. In terms of status, the internal dominant discourse shifted from an elitist representation of the language to the defence of people's rights to live in their languages. On the external front, France positioned herself as the champion of cultural and linguistic diversity, both through the *Francophonie* network and in the EU, despite certain contradictory moves to reduce multilingualism and impose French within the latter. The real test to this new approach to diversity and the advocacy of multilingualism to preserve the intrinsic values of all cultures came with the debates on the CoE's *European Charter for RMLs*, which the next section briefly analyses.

Diversity and multilingualism: debates on the *European Charter for RMLs*

The idea of a charter for RMLs dates back to the late 1970s/early 1980s and was first formally advocated by the EP in the 1981 Arfé Resolution (see Chapter 3). The Charter finally came out in 1992 and entered into force in 1998.

The Charter comprises three main parts. Part I deals with general provisions (including language definitions), Part II establishes the objectives and principles to be retained for the application of general provisions,

and Part III comprises 98 articles regarding language use in education, judicial authorities, administrative authorities and public services, media, cultural activities and facilities, economic and social life and transfrontier exchanges. The meaning and legal scope of the provisions contained in Parts I and II were also made explicit in the Charter's Explanatory Joint Report. Signatories must endorse the provisions of Parts I and II and choose 35 out the 98 articles, including three articles from the 'education' and 'cultural activities and facilities' headings, and one under other headings. Each heading comprises articles sorted by their degree of constraint.

The debate on the Charter in France has been widely commented on not only in academic writing (e.g. Poignant, 1998 and 2000; Moutouh, 1999; Fenet *et al.*, 2000; De Saint Robert, 2000; Wright, 2000; Fenet 2002) but also in the press and media. In France, the first stage in the *Charter* 'saga' was Chirac's speech delivered in Brittany in 1996, when he lauded regional cultures and pledged to facilitate the signature and ratification of the Charter. After the return of the Socialists to power in 1997, Prime Minister Jospin commissioned a report on RMLs (Poignant Report, 1998) and an expert opinion on the Charter's compatibility with the Constitution from a Professor in Constitutional Law (Carcassonne 1998). The Poignant Report promoted the idea of republican regionalism as an alternative to the resurgence of regional nationalisms and strongly advocated signing and ratifying the Charter, arguing *inter alia* that RMLs no longer constituted a threat to national integrity and that continuing a policy of exclusion could exacerbate regionalisms: '*The twentieth century will have to manage the politics of identity. Republicans must tackle the issue or others will do it*'* (Poignant, 1998: 20)[29]. The Carcassonne Report identified 39 of the 98 articles immediately compatible with the Constitution. Jospin subsequently declared that: '*The respect and promotion of pluralism also imply that the contribution of regional languages and cultures to our national patrimony be acknowledged. [. . . .] The time when national unity and the plurality of regional cultures appeared antagonistic is long gone*'* (September 29 1998). The Charter was then signed on May 7 1999. Notwithstanding the Carcassonne Report, Chirac then solicited the Constitutional Council's opinion on the Charter's compatibility with the Constitution to see if a Constitutional revision would be necessary before its ratification. The latter ruled on June 15 1999 that the 38 retained articles constituted no obstacles but that Part II's provisions would force the government to deal with the rights of groups and established the right to use a language other than French in public matters: both provisions contravened

the Constitution. Finally, Jospin asked Chirac to launch procedures to amend the Constitution accordingly, which Chirac refused to do. Since then, the whole process has stalled.

An assessment of the legal interpretation of the Constitutional Council and its legal critics is beyond the author's expertise (for some contradictory expert legal analyses, see Moutouh, 1999 and Fenet *et al.*, 2000; Fenet 2002). As was claimed in Chapter 1 and illustrated in Chapter 2, legal analysis cannot be completely divorced from political considerations in any case. For our purpose here, I will just emphasise a few points.

First, in its interpretation, the Constitutional Council ignored the proviso in the Explanatory Report that: 'The Charter does not establish any individual or collective rights for the speakers of RMLs.' (p. 5) and that this proviso was reiterated almost *verbatim* in the government's legal reservation accompanying the Charter's signature: '[. . .] [the government] *interprets the charter as compatible with the Constitution* [. . .] *that only recognizes the French people, without distinction of origin, race or religion.*'[*30] Second, the 38 selected provisions largely overlapped and/or were often less constraining than the legislation current in domestic law (e.g. education and media). Third, where no provisions existed in the RML legislation such as RML use with public authorities, the options retained were the minimal ones and merely established that certain legal texts may be translated into RMLs (e.g. Article 9 on judicial authorities, paragraph 3: '*The parties undertake to make available in the regional or minority languages the most important statutory texts and those relating particularly to users of these languages unless they are otherwise provided*'). Fourth, the Charter somehow innovates with its final provisions on transfrontier collaboration, which is one of the main areas where RMLs have benefited from EU funds (e.g. through the interregional (INTERREG) programmes; see Chapters 3, 5 and 7). Finally, the whole texual modality, with such hedges as '*the Parties undertake as far as this is reasonably possible*', and verbs such as '*encourage'* and '*facilitate'* largely preserve the signatories' discretion for implementation purposes. Overall, it seems that the Council of Europe allowed a series of 'diplomatic' textual and discursive devices intent on diminishing the Charter's potentially threatening character. If the main contradictory interpretations had political rather than legal motives, then the importance of the Charter must be measured in ideological terms. I therefore now look at elite and popular responses to the debates and events.

What emerges from the analysis of elite and popular reactions in the media and press is the vociferous character of debates, the polarisation

of positions and, most remarkably, that opposition to the Charter substantially echoed Revolutionary rhetoric, both Jacobin (i.e. in favour of a high level of political centralisation) and Girondine (i.e. in favour of a more federal system). On the Jacobin front, best embodied on the left by the Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC), Jean-Pierre Chevènement stated that granting RML a status would lead to '*balkanize France*'* and in a very Manichean approach to the civic/ethnic dichotomy he objected that '[…] *the notion of French people is challenged by more dubious concepts calling upon ethnic origins*'* (Reuters, June 23 1999). Georges Sarre, echoing Barrère, denounced '[…] *a political weapon for autonomist and regionalist movements* [that would use it] *to facilitate the explosion of the national frame and create a Europe of the regions*'* (Le Monde, June 24). What is common to these approaches is that they equate RML recognition with the inevitable return to pre-Revolution political and dialectal fragmentation. In that connection, Wright (2000: 420) quotes Gallo (1999) who foresees the break-up of French society into its old provinces if RML rights were granted and the advent of regional language/English bilingualism in France [*sic*].

On the Girondine side, the advocates of the Charter fustigated the aforementioned rearguard Jacobin positions (in ways reminiscent of Poignant's arguments above) and redefined linguistic diversity as a vanguard European characteristic, notably against the hegemony of English. Le Drian, spokesman of Breton socialists, for instance, qualified the Council's decision as '[…] archaic and integrist jacobinism'* (Agence France Presse (AFP), June 24 1999). Other defenders of diversity like Bayrou, leader of the liberal democratic party, also emphasised the European general approach to diversity, evoking RMLs as '[…] *a treasure for human kind*'*, and denouncing the French contradictory discourses on diversity at home and abroad, arguing that '[…] the defence of regional languages complements rather than undermines the defence of French in resisting the Anglo-American bulldozer'* (AFP, June 24 1999). Unsurprisingly, all RML regionalist movements reacted violently to the stalemate created by the Constitutional Council's Decision and pledged to continue the struggle.

Popular reactions, finally, broadly reflected the discourses of the elites sketched above even though in popular discourse the pro-Charter position seems to have gained prominence between 1999 and 2000. A 1999 *CSA/DN* survey revealed that 50% were favourable to the Charter and 31% against (July 8 1999). A subsequent poll, after heated debates had cooled down, indicated that 80% would be favourable to its ratification and 79% even if it required a Constitutional amendment (*IFOP*, 2000).

Overall the debates on the Charter clearly show that, on the one hand, a significant proportion of the French society no longer endorses the radical, exclusive approach to RMLs inherited from the Revolution while, on the other, certain elite circles do perpetuate radical forms of linguistic Jacobinism.[31]

Conclusion

Although the French language became totemised in the seventeenth century, language use only became a litmus test of political loyalty at the time of the Revolution. Thence, the coterminous relation between language and nation became the Revolutionaries' goal – to create a unified nation out of the 'objective' linguistic, cultural and socio-political fragmentation characterising the various peoples living on the territory. Once that project was deemed to be achieved, the concept of the nation ceased to be a quest for an inclusive 'coming together' but fossilised into a form of 'being', exclusive of any variation and difference.

The very concept of universalism implies a constant process of spread of values, i.e. linguistic and political ideologies. As was seen, in French history, it goes hand-in-hand with imperialism under a civilising guise. Moreover, by definition, universalism can of course accept no challenge, and it knows no limits so that any potential check can only be seen as a return to a former, more fragmented and regressive state. The 'essence' of universalism is to be all-encompassing, holistic and indivisible; any divisions, even if merely formal and not at the level of values (i.e. one can speak Breton and endorse the values of *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*), are necessarily seen as a challenge to these values, because in a totemised approach form and substance are conflated. Hence, it is impossible to accept the idea of mixed identities and value systems.

Because it was constructed in opposition to biological (ethnic) loyalties (see also how the biological evolutionary metaphor justifies imperialism) themselves exclusive of other loyalties, French political ideology has become totemised in the political/institutional system *as* oppositional: divergence/difference is seen as regress and as opposition. Any admission of divergence/difference, or of the divisibility of the French nation (to put it in the dominant republican metaphor), is a denial of the *République'*s very legitimacy *as opposed to* exclusive 'ethnic' systems. Republicanism, therefore, reproduces the very exclusiveness and intolerance it claims to oppose. Transposed to the sociolinguistic level within a logic where languages are totemised, to acknowledge languages that are clearly identified with some long-standing ethnic culture in the

republican domain of legitimacy – the public domain – is to deny republicanism's own *raison d'être* (i.e. to combat the alleged exclusivism and *'backwardness'* of those languages and cultures). As long as the essentialist equation 'one language = one nation = one political system' and its converse 'one political system = [can only have] one nation = [and speak only] one language' prevail, there can be no official liberalisation of the RML question in France.

Article 2 of the Constitution, the Toubon Law and the debates on the Charter show that French nationalism has long ceased to be, if it ever was (Smith, 1986), a solely civic form of political nationalism, and both language purism (a reified and totemised vision of the 'formal language/clarity/universal values' equation) and the refusal to enshrine linguistic diversity in the French body of laws are telling evidence of the ethnic essentialism characterising some proportion of the French society. It is precisely because the French society has sanctified a covert form of 'biological' essentialist approach to political and cultural hegemony that it cannot open up to diversity and become more liberal towards RMLs. In that light, French liberal discourse about multilingualism in Europe is clearly an additional device to promote a French ethnic identity. The fact that it stemmed from linguistic insecurity following the rise of English can only confirm this. In a sense, accepting diversity in France would be tantamount to denying all French political history and the ideological construction of the superiority of French as universal since before the Revolution. Since that ideology is inevitably being forced to evolve in the outer, supranational spheres, the territory of the Republic is increasingly seen as the last redoubt of such values. This eventually results in the contradiction between France's intransigeance at home – its monolithic, monolingual and monocultural discourse – and its external pluralist discourse where it serves to thwart the ongoing minoritisation of French in relation to English. As France must admit that it is no longer *the* dominant world power, it seeks to compensate its international demise through more rigid attitudes at home.

The question of RMLs is therefore stalled at the level of rhetoric as long as political deciders cannot transcend these national/international contradictions and see the unity/diversity relation dialectically rather than as a set of incompatible and radically antithetical (political and cultural) value systems. At the level of practice though, as this chapter has illustrated, the universalisation of the core's dominance has always been very uneven, because the different peripheral contexts made the uniform implementation of dominant policies impossible. Consequently, different forms of resistance linked to different histories,

geographies, economic resources and cultural backgrounds have contributed to maintaining a large number of exceptions to the so-called uniform or indivisible system. This unachieved uniformisation has led to the cyclical rise of resistant forms throughout history when uniformisation under the guise of modernisation seemed to deliver more evils than benefits. It is to such resistant forms in Corsica – seen as the result of unachieved uniformisation (Chapter 5) in the context of different cultural histories and loyalties (Chapter 6) – that I now turn.

5
Unity and Diversity in Corsica: Patterns of Identity and Political Separatism

Introduction

This chapter and the following chapters focus on the regional and sub-regional levels. This chapter provides the general backdrop of geographical, socio-psychological and political elements that have shaped Corsican identity and patterns of political loyalty, especially since 1769. As indicated in Chapter 1, and illustrated in Chapter 4, identities are durable and ingrained on the one hand, and plural, inconsistent and shifting on the other. As Bourdieu's sociology has it, identities are shaped by the *habitus*, but their actualisations are unstable, contingent and context-dependent. This chapter illustrates the dual, dialectical nature of Corsican identity.

The first part begins with the influence of geography in Corsican perceptions and patterns of identity and political allegiance, pointing to two fundamental factors in identity formation: island-ness (or insularity) and mediterraneity. In the Corsican context, following Corsican anthropologists (e.g. Gil, 1991), I argue that the prominence of localism and local forms of political loyalty, and their political correlate – the rejection of external authority – are fundamental facets of Corsicanness for certain social groups. Localism has fossilised diversity and maintained social fragmentation, and the rejection of external authority features as an attitude reinforcing separateness. At the supralocal level, the rejection of authority especially expressed as opposition to French hegemony, has helped maintain some Corsican cultural distinctiveness, which was eventually institutionally acknowledged and recognised by the state. At the local level, however, it has undermined efforts to erect an internal, supralocal, pan-Corsican framework of political reference and loyalty.

In the second part, I continue with historical elements that have moulded Corsicans' political identity through their conflict-ridden experience of otherness in general and their contact with Frenchness and the French state in particular. I outline economic, demographic and political changes in Corsica between the nineteenth century and the 1960s that have aggravated the social fracture between pro- and anti-French forces on the island and thereby reinforced the local, oppositional nature of the identity of a significant part of the Corsican population. This illustrates that certain elements of identities are also largely the product of historical experience but can become ingrained and durable so that discourses questioning and attempting to reshape them are likely to be resisted, as we shall see in this chapter and Chapter 8.

The third part provides a brief sketch of political developments since the 1970s that have transposed the aforementioned divisions between region and state into the local *versus* the supralocal, thereby nourishing 'natural' inclinations towards defiance and wariness of forms of authority that overflow the local frame of reference. In this enduring, fragmented socio-political context, any form of supralocal planning after the 1980s devolution, including language planning, became subject to contestation by a significant proportion of the population. In turn, inner fragmentation has also considerably limited the potential Europeanisation of the island during the 1990s as the last section shows.

Geography and perceptions of identity – Corsica's 'double insularity'

Corsica is a Mediterranean island located 90 km west from the Italian peninsula and 170 km southeast from continental France. To Andréani, these two dimensions – insularity and mediterraneity – are fundamental constitutive facets of Corsican identity patterns (1999: Chapter 1).

First, insularity crystallises a sense of eternity due to immutable natural borders: Corsica has always existed (Dottelonde, 1989; cited by Jaffe, 1999: 35) and archaeology has recorded human presence as far back as the Neolithic. Second, the lack of territorial continuity – the natural boundedness of the island – has favoured the perception of the island as a centre rather than as a periphery, translating its natural closed-ness into social-psychological perceptions of 'us' and 'them'. This has had clear consequences for the social-psychological definition of Corsican identity and for the relation to 'others' throughout Corsican history, especially since the presence of the various regimes by which Corsica

was 'conquered' have long been confined to a few coastal cities, leaving inner Corsica largely unexplored and untamed until recently. Invaders have thus never completed assimilation and, even in the recent past, tradition has not disappeared but survived and conflicted with the advent of modernity. Island-ness has thus closed Corsica to the rest of the world, even with modern transportation – leaving the island remains no casual enterprise – if only because of the cost of travelling. This experience of closed-ness has somehow acted as cement amongst Corsican populations. At the same time, Corsica's strategic position exposed native islanders to the imperialist ambitions of their numerous invaders. Corsicans have been linked together in their experience of danger and wars, learning at their own expense that danger irremediably came from the sea. Corsican cultural tradition recalls past experiences of murder, kidnapping and human exportation into slavery. Hence, a cultural wariness of aliens still persists today, which is further enhanced by the internal isolation created by the mountainous relief of the island.[1]

For, Corsica is also, and perhaps above all, a chain of mountains, *a mountain in the sea*, to use the traditional formulaic definition. This chain of mountains running from the northwest to the southeast divides Corsica into two halves. With about 50 peaks reaching above 6000 feet, and many passes and valleys, Corsica's internal communications were considerably limited for a long time, except in rare plains such as the central-eastern Aleria plain. Yet, harsh though a mountainous environment may be for economic development, mountains have also constituted natural fortresses against invasions and contributed to preserve inner Corsican communities from acculturation. Indeed, as noted above, foreign administrative centres long remained confined to the cities of the littoral, and foreign influences hardly penetrated inner communities.

In a significant way, nonetheless, the mountainous configuration also kept village communities isolated from one another. In his *Report on the Economic and Moral Makeup of Corsica in 1839** Adolphe Blanqui indicated that:

> *All villages, without exceptions, are located on heights* [. . .] *isolation is such that two communes on two opposite sides of the same mountain and only a few hours from one another can have no contacts whatsoever for years.**

> (Quoted in Gil, 1991)

Andréani adds that '[. . .] *before roads were constructed and cars invented, isolation was the rule for inner Corsica*'*(1999: 11). Eugene Weber,

amongst others, has largely documented the importance of the road networks in the social-psychological building of communities beyond the village community (Weber, 1979, Chapter 12). First initiatives to build road networks in Corsica date back from the 1830–1840s and were relaunched under the Second Empire (from 1853). However, these modest structural developments did not suffice to break the isolation of villages (Arrighi and Pomponi, 1997: 100). Thus, the lack of mass road construction in Corsica until the 1960s contributed to sustaining a way of life, a particular socio-political, socio-cultural and linguistic set of habits, and non-industrial modes of production until late in the twentieth century. The main locus of identity and political loyalty has, therefore, long been, and largely remains, local – the immediate village community. In the village-based location of Corsican identities, *them* is somehow defined as everything external to the village, including other villages. Furthermore, although today half of the island population spends its working week in coastal cities, villages fill again at weekends and, during summertime, the Corsican Diaspora returns to live in the villages whose population then more than doubles.[2]

In sum, because of its mountainous landscapes, and due to the late development of its road network and routes of communication, Corsica is a Mediterranean island divided into a great number of 'mountain' islands – a geographic, geopolitical and socio-cultural (and therefore linguistic) archipelago. Analogically, it can be seen as a microcosm of the political, social-psychological and socio-cultural fragmentation of other nation-states before nation-building processes. The consequences of such a persistent localism have been numerous and have *inter alia* significantly shaped popular responses to centralising language planning efforts since the 1970s, as will be seen in Chapters 7 and 8.

As for mediterraneity, it can be defined as the set of characteristics common to the peoples living around the Mediterranean. Amongst these features, family ties are preponderant and constitute the matrix of solidarity. Further, the family is defined both narrowly as kinship and more broadly as the clan – the socio-political extension of the immediate family – itself the sole and ultimate limit of identity and social loyalty before the advent of the Republic. Mediterraneity also denotes a set of values such as honour and solidarity, and its bloody correlate *vendetta*, that participates in a justice system wherein solidarity prompts 'family' members to avenge in blood the maculate honour of any group member, outside institutional arbitration. Put otherwise, mediterraneity implies a form of violent justice autonomous from a

formal legal system imposed by outer forces. By extension, mediterrane-ity entails defiance towards forms of external authority that explains some Corsicans' resistance to that which is imposed in general. In a sort of antithetical way, island-ness and Mediterraneity thus constitute unifying links between Corsicans, based upon defiance and/or rejec-tion of the other's authority. Nonetheless, inner insularity also acts as a separator of communities – culturally unified in their mediterrane-ity, politically diverse and often opposed in their inner insularity (see Chapter 8).

In following sections, I survey the historical stages of the politici-sation of the island from the eighteenth century, contrasting patterns of resistance to authority with trends towards acculturation. I begin with Corsica's short-lived attempt to constitute itself as an independent nation-state from the 1730s and explore the extent and limitation of the Frenchification of the island from 1768 till today.

From independence to the French aegis

Colombani describes the eighteenth century as the *grand siècle* for Cor-sica (1999: 1). It is indeed the century of the Corsican Revolutions which, starting in the 1730s in the context of a loosened domination from Genoa, eventually led to the independence of Corsica, under the leadership of Pasquale Paoli, the *father of the nation* in contemporary nationalist imagery, between 1755 and 1769 (Ettori, 1971; quoted by Andréani, 1999: 64). These 14 years saw an embryonic Corsican nation-state develop its own political and judicial institutional structures, navy, conscripts, currency, flag, national anthem, university (1765–1769), Official Bulletin, etc., but no national language.[3] Although indepen-dence was short-lived, later Corsican nationalist historiography largely glorified the years of independence that concluded the turmoil of the previous 40 years and saw the birth of political feelings of Corsican-hood, especially as great eighteenth century figures like Jean-Jacques Rousseau had hailed the birth of the Corsican nation and begun drafting a constitution for it.

The advent of French rule in 1769 was resisted, but royal forces even-tually defeated the 'nationalists'. Royal administration then initiated various economic, legal and political reforms, privileging a few support-ers of the French presence but soon also entailing growing resentment and marked opposition to the new regime by many others. The news of the first troubles of the Revolution, therefore, unsurprisingly cata-lysed popular uprisings: Corsicans embraced early revolutionary ideals,

hoping for reform to bring them more egalitarian treatment and some material prosperity. Arrighi and Pomponi (1997: 87) argue that even ideas of an independent Corsica faded before the prospect of joining the Revolution. On November 30 1789, a decree promulgated by the National Assembly established that '[...] *Corsica is part of the French empire* [...] *its inhabitants are subjected to the same constitution as other French people'* (ibid). Paoli, exiled in England since 1769, returned and, resuming his role as leader of the nation, represented the island in Paris. However, he swiftly disapproved of the 'excesses' of the Revolution, standing against radical Jacobinism, which he foresaw as a new form of tyranny. His vision for Corsica was incompatible with the Jacobin conception of a highly centralised state that Napoleon was later to embody: Paoli advocated a more 'federalist' *Girondine* position. The two conflicting positions divided Corsicans but Napoleon's Jacobinism eventually prevailed.[4] Subsequent pockets of resistance could not constitute a really serious challenge to French domination. Notwithstanding, they were severely repressed.

After the ultimate armed upheaval of 1816, '[...] *Corsica became integrated in France. Its history was no longer that of a nation, but that of a département'* (Antonetti, 1990). But historians disagree on the unproblematic welding of Corsica in the French mould. As Vergé-Franceschi puts it: '[...] [in the first half of the nineteenth century], *the French graft was unsuccessful and the island remains in the continuity of previous centuries with its stockbreeding tradition, its export from Livorno and the resilient favour for Italian universities'* (both quoted in Andréani, 1999: 68).

Economic underdevelopment, demography and social fracture[5]

During the nineteenth century, the island population substantially rose, villages ended up overcrowded and, by the end of the century, the meagre resources could no longer feed everyone.[6] Although the insular economy had seen unprecedented positive developments from the 1820s, and demographic growth had entailed a proportional economic boom based on cattle breeding, increasing pastoral activity, and the development of agriculture and viticulture, agricultural techniques remained fundamentally unchanged and did not experience the technological innovations spreading elsewhere on mainland France: production increased but productivity did not, which in the longer

run proved lethal to Corsican products in competition with less costly external products.

Towards the end of the century, Corsican agro-pastoral economy collapsed under the combined pressures of demographic growth and increasing economic competition from mainland France and then the colonies. The fragile prosperity of the early nineteenth century, resting upon an autarchic agro-pastoral type of socio-economic organisation of life in 'inner Corsica', failed to resist the economic changes of the time. The international economy was increasingly based on policies of free-exchange and on industrial modes of production with which agro-pastoral economic modes and craftsmanship could no longer compete. The crisis was all the more drastic as internal communication channels were still largely underdeveloped. Communications with mainland France were in no better state and exchanges functioned in a colonial mode: Corsican exports were heavily taxed whilst continental products benefited from custom facilities (Parliamentary Report; Rapporteur Delannay, 1908). Prices therefore fell dramatically and the first waves of mass emigration ensued, prompted by the prospect of social ascent in the French administration and within the growing French colonial empire.

Corsica entered the twentieth century in a state of economic backwardness and moral despair and ever more voices emerged denouncing the abandonment of the island by France, and the concomitant corruption of the clans, which were held largely responsible for the lack of genuine policies of economic development. The Great War temporarily bracketed out protest. Enrolling massively, Corsicans paid a large tribute in human lives. As in other French regions, this significantly cemented their loyalty to France. Yet, the commitment of island forces and the trauma caused by high losses were poorly rewarded, as relations with mainland France temporarily loosened up:

> *With thousands of casualties and interrupted relations with the continent, on which the island had become increasingly dependent, Corsica hastily returned to the most archaic cultural practices to survive. The absence of monetary circulation propelled Corsica back to the eighteenth century.*[*]
>
> (Arrighi and Pomponi, ibid: 108)

The economic situation of the island continued its endemic decay during the first half of the twentieth century, due to both the lack of adequate economic structures and the increasing dependence on public

sources of income.[7] Besides, few economic incentives were offered for war veterans to return to the island and emigration continued. With an average yearly migration rate of 2.3% between 1946 and 1954, the population dropped to approximately 191,000 inhabitants in 1954.

To regenerate the economy and compensate for Corsica's increasing dependence on public money, the state launched a *Plan d'Action Régionale* (1957) to promote economic and social expansion in agriculture (especially viticulture) and tourism. But many commentators have reported that the provisions of the *Plan* favoured immigration and essentially benefited the 17,000 Northern African repatriated French nationals whose settlement in Corsica the government of the time found convenient to facilitate (Labro, 1977; Arrighi and Pomponi, 1997). Thus, the arrival of French *Pieds-Noirs*[8] and Northern African immigrants significantly accounted for post-WWII population growth.[9] Yet, little or no room was made for the masses of Corsicans whom decolonisation left unemployed and increasingly bitter and frustrated, in a context of growing cultural revival.

Indeed, during the 1960s, many native Corsicans felt excluded from the process of economic regeneration the central state had finally undertaken after two centuries of perceived abandonment, whilst continental France lived the 'Trente glorieuses', years of accelerated and unprecedented economic boom. The bulk of Corsica's new workforce was thus of 'foreign' breed,[10] and favourable fiscal and banking facilities were offered to newcomers but not to 'Corsican natives', which aggravated feelings of discrimination. Unsurprisingly, this fuelled the discourse of *colonial invasion* that was latent in many European regional contexts of the time (see below). As a result, although in absolute figures the island's population rose again, the proportion of Corsican natives slowly began to decline whilst that of non-Corsicans grew.[11]

In parallel with this remodelling of the demographic picture, coastal cities developed, whilst villages, offering little prospect of economic success, were progressively and massively abandoned and shrivelled during the 1960s. Internal emigration and immigration indeed converged towards the city accelerating the depopulation of rural areas and the concomitant growth of urban centres like Ajaccio and Bastia, respectively Corsica's administrative and economic capitals. As Andréani writes: '*Corsican society is torn between stasis and change, nostalgia of the past, opposition to change and the momentum of modernity*'* (1999: 35), and, quoting Taddei and Antomarchi, puts it: '*The twentieth century, the century of the city, eventually forced itself*

*on this rural, archaic society, late but brutally. [...] In two genera-
tions, a people of mountaineers turned into one of suburban dwellers'*
(1997).

Franchi (in *Corsica*, Mars 2000: 57), further comments on change from
the 1960s:

> *Brutally, Corsica imploded. In less than ten years, a typically agro-pastoral
> society collapsed: with community activities stopping, schools closing,
> families with young children must abandon villages. This marked the end
> of a society, of a culture, and the demise of the language that kept it alive.*

The 1960s thus saw drastic socio-demographic change in Corsica,
through population movements towards increasingly cosmopolitan
cities, with all the social problems rapid urbanisation entails, and
this situation accelerated language shift into French. For the uprooted
rural population, all this contributed to further stigmatise the 'evils of
modernisation' that France embodied.

In the 2000 census, the proportion of non-Corsican natives amongst
Corsica's residents almost equalled that of Corsica-born residents[12] and
about half of the island population now lives in urban areas. This demo-
graphic fact weighs a great deal in the difficulty of keeping Corsican
from language death today. Regionalist, autonomist and then nation-
alist political discourses since the 1960s have denounced emigration,
immigration and demographic change as the deliberate minorisation of
the *Corsican people*.

The next sections briefly survey the evolution of Corsican socio-
political structures under French rule. I first examine the development
of clanic politics in the 1850s, the concomitant rise of regionalism in
the early days of the twentieth century and then explore the revival of
regionalism and the advent and development of nationalism within the
post-WWII context to date.

Clanism, state dependency, more social fracture and early forms of regionalism

Clanism is a pyramidal type of organisation that can be seen as a
remnant of feudalism in that the people pledge their political and
military allegiance to the head in exchange for physical protection. It
pre-existed the French presence on the island, but French rule gave it
a new impetus whilst disturbing the balance of power between rival
clans through the selective distribution of public manna. Clanism can

be seen as the theoretical opposite of republicanism, since it implies renunciation of one's political rights whilst republicanism enhances and individualises such rights. In Corsica, traditional and modern types of political allegiance were conflated and dominant clanic structures were intertwined with nascent republican structures: '*Clans adapted to the Republic, and the Republic to clans*'* (Andréani, ibid: 71).

Modern forms of clanism developed under the Second Empire (1852–1870), and during the Third Republic (1870–1939) republican clanism fully spread its wings. During the first half of the nineteenth century, despite the advent of a liberal bourgeoisie on the island and forms of mimesis of mainland politics, Corsican elites were initially restrictively associated to French power structures and still largely linked to the Italian peninsula. By contrast, the second half of the nineteenth century, under the return of a Bonaparte to power, saw links with Italy loosen, while Corsican dynastic families fully became agents of Frenchification. Numerous Corsican elites were appointed in the highest political spheres on the mainland, whence they distributed favours and positions to their clientele on the island or attained positions in colonial administrations and, most importantly, in the colonial army. Two phenomena ensued. First, power distribution was bipolar and uneven amongst rival clans at the regional level; each had its own network of ramification at municipal levels, the effective level where individual-state relations were mediated. This favoured competition and conflicts of interests, since favours and privileges could not be granted to all: some clans were dominant, some were not.

Second, as the century advanced, the survival of that part of the population that was still largely agro-pastoral had suffered from agrarian reforms privatising free communal lands, and that had not benefited from public manna, became increasingly jeopardised. This enhanced social divisions. If a growing part of Corsica's social spectrum opportunistically endorsed French rule and its symbolic and material endowments, certain rural areas of society felt cheated and abandoned; they strongly resented socio-political evolutions and sometimes rebelled against authority. These sectors filled the ranks of regionalists and autonomists at the turn of century and from the 1960s. Typically, it was they who maintained village life and cultural traditions when urbanisation and depopulation transformed patterns of residence on the island.[13] Today, they largely constitute the remaining stock of Corsican native speakers.

The denunciation of clanism and clientelism were fundamental tenets of early regionalist protest and subsequent nationalist revival. This

situation was, however, somewhat paradoxical as autonomists and nationalists championed the defence of the Corsican nation and its decaying culture, while clan-based politico-administrative power and practices were an integral part of Corsican collective identity. Hitherto, the clans had always protected Corsicans against invaders. Under French rule, the system had been perverted, and many felt they were led astray.

Regionalist protest received a new impetus between the wars for the economic reasons mentioned above, which strengthened the discourse of cultural and linguistic loss and general abandonment of the island formulated in the late nineteenth century. As levels of instruction and basic literacy rose, protest was mediated through increasingly diffused newspapers and reviews, starting with Santu Casanova's *A Tramuntana* (1896–1914), and through associations promoting insular interests, e.g. *L'union corse*. Casanova projected the themes of the betrayal of the clans in the public sphere and did so in Corsican. This was symbolically important, because it associated the Corsican language with the oppressed, but resistant Corsican people, and French with that of the corrupted, betraying elites (Arrighi and Pomponi, 1997: 106–107). Besides, as the next chapter shows, it also divorced Corsican from Italian as the language of writing, which announced the symbolic individuation of both the 'dialect' from its 'standard language' and the people from their peninsular cousins (Thiers, 1989: 41–47).

The regionalist themes of abandonment and elite corruption were then relayed and transformed into autonomist discourses. The manifesto *A Cipra* (1914) claimed: '*Autonomy is salvation.*'* Autonomism was thwarted by the Great War, and the autonomous discourse was temporarily discredited in the interwar period when some autonomists embraced Mussolini's irredentism. In 1938, this led the population of Bastia to pledge loyalty to France through the Bastia Oath. The heroic resistance of Corsicans during WWII completed the demise of autonomism and delayed its re-emergence until the 1960s.

Regionalisation, regionalism and nationalism in Corsica: the ideological and socio-political context of the 1960s/1990s

The socio-political context of the 1960/1990s can be approached from different angles. I have already discussed the supranational level within the framework of international integration agencies, such as the EU, the CoE and the UN, and the state-national level covering ideological, socio-political and institutional developments in metropolitan France.

This section considers developments at the regional level, examining ideological, socio-political and institutional developments in Corsica.[14] These distinctions are of course largely artificial, as discursive and political developments at each analytical level overlap and interact with other levels, but it is analytically convenient to separate them. As was seen in earlier chapters, the national frame of political reference underwent drastic changes during the past half-century. Since the Revolution and under the various successive regimes, the strong Jacobin centralising impetus had periodically been challenged by competing political discourses on the nation and the state. Contending models of the nation-state and its cultural and linguistic ideologies were manifest throughout – political centralisation *versus* a more federal organisation of society and distribution of legal and political prerogatives; cultural uniformity and monolingualism *versus* some respect for and/or promotion of cultural diversity and multilingualism, etc. As was seen in Chapter 4, the post-WWII period eventually saw a form of political deconcentration first and then more genuine devolution. To a significant extent, Corsican regionalist movements can be credited for the form and scope of political devolution that began in the early 1980s.

Like earlier Corsican regionalist and/or autonomist protest movements, those of the 1970s consolidated group mobilisation and solidarity around a series of socio-economic themes and a renewed social-psychological mindset towards cultural revival and the preservation of regional identities. Economic backwardness, the fear of mass tourism and its danger for the environment, as well as important demographic change, however, gave them a wider social appeal than before. Multiple demonstrations by Corsican civil society during the 1960/1970s largely testified to this.[15] In Corsica, the thesis of internal colonialism was theorised in 1971 by the Front Régionaliste Corse (FRC) (created in 1966), which synthesised and gave new force to the socio-economic, political and cultural grievances mentioned earlier, in its manifesto, *Main basse sur une île* [Takeover of An Island]* (FRC, 1971). Regionalist rhetoric revolved around the defence of the environment against attempts to 'balearize' the island with mass tourism structures financed by non-Corsican capital and significantly around the cultural and linguistic loss portrayed as symptomatic of a deliberate minorisation of the Corsican people. Likewise, the Action Régionaliste Corse (ARC) (created from a schism from the FRC in 1967) later issued another important manifesto, *Autonomia* (1974), demanding a special statute for Corsica. Articulating their political discourse on the thesis

of internal colonialism, regionalist, and then autonomist or nation-alist, movements successfully summoned the concept of a Corsican nation, as inscribed in the Herderian and Fichtean traditions. Corsican culture and language were made the banners of Corsican nationhood that state policies since the Revolution had endeavoured to eradicate. This struck a familiar chord among the Corsican population, since earlier nationalist rhetoric had also equated language endangerment with the endangerment of the Corsican nation. Nationalist groups also benefited from the discrediting of the traditional political class – the clans, held largely responsible for the underdevelopment of the island – which failed to seize the language question until later in the 1980s and even then only rather inconsistently and weakly (see Chapter 7). The nationalists did not propose a practical language revitalisation pro-gramme, but they contributed to restore the symbolic significance of the language.

The political context of the island, however, became more complex in 1975 after the first armed action of autonomist movements and the subsequent formal creation of the *Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale* (FLNC). Inspired in choosing its name by the Algerian anti-colonial FLN, and claiming independence for Corsica, the FLNC thus went beyond the more limited claims of prior movements for forms of autonomy based on Corsica's specificity within the Republic. This spawned a radical split in the nationalist family – between autonomists and clandestine separatist groups viewing the state as the arch enemy. The latter group advocated violence as a political strategy. This split also entailed changes in popular support for radical nationalism. The subsequent drift by some groups towards corruption and mafia-like activities in the 1980s, and the fratricidal murders of the 1990s, alienated many Corsicans who dis-approved of nationalist anti-state ideology and violent methods, and eroded their legitimacy. Insofar as the defence of the language amalga-mated with nationalism, language activism was also not altogether and unconditionally supported.

In the 1980s, the new Socialist regime sought to contain political and military activism through devolution, and Corsica was granted a special status in the Republic. The *Assemblée de Corse* created in 1982 served as a laboratory for devolution laws and was endowed with unheard-of, though limited, economic, social and cultural prerogatives in the island's administration (see Chapter 7). However, its creation and ensu-ing mitigated success hardly appeased tensions, *inter alia* because it was seen to consolidate the clans' powers: it was provisionally dissolved in 1984 for lack of consensus. In the late 1980s, as violence persisted

and political activists became increasingly fragmented into competing autonomist and independentist organisations engaging in bloody conflicts with one another, new negotiations led to the second *Statut Particulier* for Corsica in 1991. Much wider ranging than the previous *Statut*, it granted the *Assemblée de Corse* increased powers in policy areas such as environment, education and culture.

Yet, throughout the 1990s, killings between rival nationalist groups and bombings targeting State buildings and mainland interests in general, private and public continued and climaxed. Further, the nationalist families lost much of their credit as proof of the corruption and mafia-like behaviours of some of their members emerged in parliamentary reports and were largely echoed by the press. An anonymous interviewee concluded that the nationalists had become '*a new clan, organised in sub-clans*'* (quoted by Andréani, 1999) thus losing their position as a potential, reformist political alternative to the clans.

All in all, since 1975, successive French governments have alternated strategies of dialogue with and repression against the nationalists, some of whom opted for democratic channels of political action, but to no avail. Despite nationalist electoral successes in the 1992 regional elections, political violence culminated with the murder of the French Préfet Erignac, the highest representative of the State on the island in 1998. A new plan to solve the *Corsican problem* was launched in 1999 – the Matignon Agreements – but did not survive the change of government in France in 2002. The majority of 'no' answers at the 2003 referendum asking Corsicans whether they desired more autonomy might indicate a growing disillusion with political autonomy as a solution to Corsica's endemic violence and economic difficulties.

Corsica and Europeanisation: prospects and limitations

A growing body of European studies literature looks at Europeanisation as a method for conflict management, as was indicated in the concluding sections of Chapter 3 (e.g. Daftary, 2000). This literature suggests two paths of Europeanisation: socialisation, which includes networking, and conditionality, which refers to enlargement.

The conditionalities attached to EU enlargement, especially the minority rights conditionality since 1993, may have consequences for the future RML-promotion strategy in the EU. I will return to that hypothesis in the general conclusion. I also suggested that the EU offered few bridges for RML communities politically to bypass the national level in terms of RML promotion. Here, I examine the other

path mentioned above – socialisation as networking, taking networking in the broad sense of economic and/or political and/or cultural networking. Specifically, I look at how the Europeanisation of Corsica has been synonymous first with direct political and economic support from the EU, and second with economic/political/cultural networking activities, and consider whether this has had a significant impact on RML promotion in Corsica.

As far as the EU's political impact on Corsica may be concerned, the *Collectivité Territoriale de Corse* (CTC) has a permanent representative in Brussels whose role is to cascade EU information of relevance down to Corsica. Due to space limitations, I can attempt no analysis of the activities of that antenna here. In theory, Corsican interests are also represented in the Committee of Regions created in 1994. However, we saw in Chapter 3 that the latter has essentially consultative powers and does little more than emit Opinions in the few sectors about which it is consulted. Moreover, every member state has full discretion to choose its appointment procedure: in France members are appointed by the government which of course precludes the appointment of radical regionalists. Finally, the idea of a 'Europe of the Regions' is perhaps best embodied by the EP but, given similar selection procedures in France, it is unlikely that French MEPs would be appointed on a regionalist agenda, although Max Simeoni (a founding figure of Corsican nationalism) had a seat in the EP between 1979 and 1994. However, we saw that the EP powers also remained limited. In Corsica itself, as Jaffe (1993) indicates in her analysis of Corsican attitudes and expectations at the dawn of 1992, the media, academic and political discourses displayed a mixture of hopes (that the 'Europe of Peoples' would bring economic welfare and larger political autonomy) and fears (that Corsica would find herself even more marginalised in a framework wider than the national framework). In economic terms, due to its weak economy, Corsica has been a recipient of EU structural funds, and the management of these funds is a shared competence between the deconcentrated and the devolved institutions.

Most importantly for our purpose, the main impact of Europeanisation and chief source of expected economic and political spin-offs for Corsica was its increasing networking activity with other European regions. At a time when membership in large lobbies was seen as a springboard for political influence and income generation, Corsica joined several large organisations. For instance, Corsica is a member of the *Conference for Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe* (CPMRE) created in 1973 to coordinate between the European Commission and

60 European island regions; it also sits in the *Association of European Regions* (AER), a political lobby organisation created in 1985 comprising 250 regions. In 1995, it founded the IMEDOC (*Islands of Occidental Mediterranean*)* network aimed at fostering economic, social and cultural cooperation between Western Mediterranean Islands by bidding for funds within the framework of the INTERREG EU programme of interregional cooperation (e.g. bringing together Corsica and neighbouring regions Tuscany and Sardegna).

INTERREG funds cross-border cooperation in a number of areas and '[. . .] *aims to encourage exchanges, transfers and various types of cooperation between economic, institutional, cultural and social players, with a view to fostering dynamic cross-border cooperation.*' In particular, support is provided for exchanges and cooperation in the fields of research and the sociocultural area. Amongst the cultural activities thus financed, various projects led by the Cultural Centre of the University of Corsica can be mentioned, e.g. the literature review *Bonanova*, various conferences and academic exchanges, cross-border projects of literary and/or drama creations, etc. It is through this network that Corsican has been indirectly (i.e. not *per* se) promoted.

Overall, the 'Europe of Peoples' imagined in the late 1970s and again on the eve of the Maastricht Treaty as an alternative to the 'Europe of Nations' has not materialised as hoped, and the main outcomes of networking have been economic – through cooperation funds – rather than political. Two discernible effects, trivial though they may seem, have been to lead '[. . .] *Corsicans to compare and contrast their political economy with other European regions* [. . .]' (Jaffe, 1993: 65) and to renew cultural and economic links with Italy, which until the 1990s were perceived '[. . .] *as an elitist attempt to undermine both the status of Corsican and the resources allocated to its teaching* (ibid: 67).'[16] To a lesser extent, Corsican autonomists have established links with the Sardininan autonomist party (ibid: 68).[17] I will explore in Chapter 7 the extent to which Corsica has exploited, or not, the few opportunities made available at supranational level, i.e. EBLUL's activities, the EYL 2001.

Conclusion

Corsican identity, we have seen, is complex and multifaceted. This chapter has identified some factors – geographical and sociopolitical – that have determined a particular psychological mindset for Corsicans. This chapter underscored the dialectics of unity and diversity shaped by both Corsica's double insularity and its mediterraneity and by the

uneven establishment of French rule on the island. Regarding the latter, a series of apparent paradoxes were mentioned, which result from the persisting blend of traditional and modern forms of economic and socio-political organisation and political allegiance.

Social divisions have indeed been polarised over the past two centuries, as France was both a material benefactor and a tutorial authority long perceived as indifferent to the economic predicaments of many islanders, and even as contributing to Corsica's economic and cultural decay with the complicity or apathy of certain elites. Hence the rise of regionalist and subsequently nationalist forms of opposition to the dominant regime that has largely polarised political loyalty, although the case of clanism somehow blurs the divide between the belief in republicanism and the rule of law that guarantees equal rights, and ancient, ingrained habits of political loyalty based on family ties. All this reinforces a hereditary inclination to wariness of external authority and suspicion against those in charge of its internal representation and implementation.

Emigration and immigration on the island, and the consequences of recent urbanisation, were also emphasised as core determinants of that polarisation. The result today is an image of a Corsican society fragmented by different logics which, however, are not necessarily mutually exclusive – the logic of the Corsica of the villages and that of the cities, the regionalist and/or nationalist Corsica championing the cause of the *peuple corse* and the advocates of French legitimacy and loyalty to the Republic.

To respond to tensions created by these divisions and resolve the endemic violence that began in 1975, the State has granted Corsica unheard-of political autonomy since 1982, which, in effect, has displaced poles of political loyalty back to the internal arena with unanticipated consequences. Part of this 'autonomy package' entailed sociolinguistic liberalisation and devolution as Chapter 7 shows. The other more recent pole of autonomisation of Corsica, as the last section underscored, has been through the direct and indirect Europeanisation of the island. However, we observed that Europeanisation entailed rather few political gains and that it was more conspicuous through direct economic support, i.e. EU structural funds and less significantly cross-border cultural exchanges, and through networking. So far this has entailed only limited direct benefits for the Corsican language.

The great absence from these prolegomena is Italy and Corsica's *italianità*. Briefly touched upon in the last section, this constitutes the third explanatory, cultural pole of Corsican identity and identity

politics. Exploring the evolution of the sociolinguistic situation of Corsica since its annexation by France,the next chapter shows that although the political ties with Italy gradually faded out in the nineteenth century, Italy remained a cultural and linguistic point of reference for Corsicans well into the twentieth century. This legacy and how to tackle it are still widely debated today, to say the least.

6

From one Diglossic Situation to Another – Ideological and Sociolinguistic Change in Modernising Corsica (1769–1974)

Introduction

This chapter reviews the evolution of Corsica's sociolinguistic situation from its annexation by France as a preparation for a more thorough analysis of the 1970s cultural and linguistic revival and its contemporary consequences. It shows how the diglossic conceptions of language, identity and their interrelation first emerged in Corsica. I describe how the various political and linguistic ideologies shaping Corsicans' cultural and linguistic identities and informing current language debates and attitudes to language planning were progressively constructed and distilled beween 1769 and 1974, who the actors involved in ideological struggle were and the nature and scope of their respective glottopolitical powers.

A number of related sociolinguistic issues are explored: I analyse changes in the functional status of Corsican within evolving diglossic frameworks – first Corsican-Italian, then Corsican-French – before Corsican language-in-education policies developed from the 1970s. This description of the evolution of diglossic functional compartmentalisation is predicated on the complex links outlined in Chapter 1 between competing conceptions of what a 'language' (as opposed to a dialect) is – i.e. the link between the status of a language, its use in writing and its degree of codification – and antagonistic political theories of the nation, i.e. the civic *versus* the cultural nation, and I show that the Corsican case presents a situation where '*cultural nationalisms can* [...] *be seen as contrapuntal to political nationalism*'

(May, 2001: 78). I will examine the practical response that Corsican Sociolinguists have given to the language planning problems resulting from the dichotomies created by the diglossic model of language and identity in Chapter 8.

Chapter 1 critically explored the sociolinguistic concept of diglossia. Following Martin-Jones (1989) and Williams (1992), I argued that the synchronic structural-functional approach underlying its use as an analytical concept unsatisfactorily accounts for the complex issues of historical construction and distribution of sociolinguistic power which are fundamental features of nation-building processes. Consequently, I claimed that socio-historical approaches to language maintenance, language shift and bilingualism provide a better understanding of how linguistic ideologies and language policy measures interplay with the construction of state-national socio-political structures. Notwithstanding, I also indicated that diglossia constitutes a useful snapshot device of sociolinguistic situations of dominance. It is in that sense that I use the concept here: I outline the *processes* of domination that lead to the establishment of diglossic political economies of language, and I use diglossia as convenient shorthand.

I first briefly examine the Corsican sociolinguistic situation before annexation to France and then explore in greater detail the paths followed by the French administrators of the island throughout the nineteenth century to achieve political and cultural assimilation, *inter alia* through linguistic acculturation. I argue that this assimilation was long delayed due both to the discrepancy delineated in Chapter 4 between French nationalist rhetoric and actual language policy measures and to the ongoing vitality of a number of fronts of resistance to French rule and acculturation. In the context of Corsica's dire economic, demographic and sociocultural situations towards the end of the nineteenth century the previous chapter evoked, I investigate the rise of Corsican regionalist and nationalist movements during the Third Republic (1870–1939) as a political alternative to French nationalist ideology and its homogenising policies. I argue that these movements of resistance to French hegemony, however, further increased endemic social and geopolitical divisions amongst Corsicans and investigate the role of language in the maturation and fragmentation of these movements. I conclude with an account of Corsican language activism after WWII as the result of the exclusion of Corsican from the provisions of the 1951 Deixonne Law, which contributed to the rebirth of cultural regionalism and its political radicalisation in the mid-1970s.

Corsican-Italian diglossia

Corsica was under peninsular influence since the early eleventh century, first under Pisan rule and then, between the thirteenth and eighteenth century, under Genoese rule until France acquired it in 1768. The Tuscanisation of elite milieux thus started at an early stage, as even under Genoese domination Tuscan was widely adopted as the language of culture and administration in the peninsula and within the whole geographical area under its influence (Dalberra-Stefanaggi, 2002: 12). Its prevalence was reinforced as it became the vehicle of a prestigious body of literature, both written and oral, that gained immense cultural prestige at the European level as the channel of the Italian literary Renaissance (De Mauro, 1963; Migliorini, 1966).

At first sight, the Corsican sociolinguistic situation at the time of annexation, before French entered the sociolinguistic stage, seemed to fit quite neatly within the contours of Ferguson's model discussed in Chapter 1. The High variety, Tuscan, was the language of culture and Letters, (elite) education, religion, the press, law and administration, superposed on a range of oral varieties (Marchetti, 1989: 66–93). These vehicled the intimate, social memory, popular wisdom and rural religious practice, thus mediating traditional forms of social and cultural communication in inner Corsica, including some forms of oral literacy and religious practice (Marchetti, ibid: 77; Arrighi, 2002: 49–54). The diglossic framework of complementary distribution of this period can be seen as stable for a number of reasons, but a closer look at the Corsican situation also illustrates some of the conceptual and methodological limitations of this framework.

After centuries of coexistence punctuated by regular economic, cultural and linguistic exchanges (especially between Bastia, the capital, and Tuscany), and due to the original linguistic kinship between Corsican varieties and their peninsular cousins within the Italo-Romance dialect continuum, the Corsican varieties spoken by the masses were perceived as dialects of Tuscan. On rare occasions when diglossic domains of use were 'trespassed', e.g. the Low variety used in written productions, this was clearly marked as exceptional. Salvatore Viale's *U Serinatu di Scapinu* (1817), one of the early traces of a written use of Corsican – eleven lines inserted into a long poem in Tuscan when he stages a shepherd – attested to the Romantic interest in popular culture but nevertheless represented no immediate challenge to the diglossic order. By contrast, travellers visiting Corsica well into the twentieth century reported on shepherds reciting great sixteenth-century Tuscan poetry

from memory, which testifies to the enduring presence of oral forms of literacy characteristic of Mediterranean societies *inter alia* (Marchetti, 1989: 68–69).[1]

The oppositional values given to the written and the oral, in Ferguson's diglossic model, fail to account for the prestige of profane and religious forms of literacy transmitted orally – oral literature – rather than through formal, writing-based school education. This also points to the importance of linguistic kinship between Corsican dialects and Tuscan, which facilitated access to prestigious forms without the mediation of schooling. As was suggested in Chapter 1, in a diglossic situation where varieties are perceived as akin and, therefore, where there exists some measure of societal bilingualism, the conflict between the varieties is significantly toned down or at least less pregnant or visible. This calls for a discussion of the community's language repertoire.

Discussing the language repertoire of Corsicans, Thiers (1989) and Jaffe (1999) warn of the discrepancy between perception and representation of language use and actual language use, claiming that self-assessments of Tuscan/Italian proficiency cannot be taken as indicators of language performance because of the linguistic kinship between Corsican dialects and Tuscan/Italian. Indeed, linguistic kinship allowed 'tapping into' the High variety when the context demanded it, but no data can conclusively document the extent to which actual speech resulted in consistently switching between clearly differentiated varieties rather than in mixing codes. In her recent ethnographic research, Jaffe observes that inserting certain linguistic markers of Italian in their speech in Corsican sufficed for some speakers to qualify it as Italian (Jaffe, ibid: 73). This recent observation certainly bears the mark of time as during the pre-French period, Corsicans were quantitatively more exposed to Tuscan/Italian, and also the kind of Italian to which they were exposed was not yet modern Italian as it exists today, which is now more remote from Corsican dialects (and Tuscan) than some 200 years ago. Relatedly, it is interesting to note the multiple accounts of the linguistic closeness of Corsican dialects and pre-modern Tuscan/Italian, which led many observers to claim that Corsican was 'the purest dialect of Italian' (Marchetti, 1989). This is not surprising as Tuscan served as the basis for modern Italian (De Mauro, 1963).

A tentative typology by Coco (1977) distinguishes between four levels of the *lingua materna* – literary Italian (written), regional Italian (used orally in Corsica in formal contexts and tinged with Corsicanisms), the regional dialects (distinguishing between northern and southern

Corsican dialect families) and the range of local dialects (spoken in a limited geographical area like the village). Yet, this typology, analytically convenient though it may be, only offers a coarse-grained photograph of actual variation, and its broad assumption of the boundedness of linguistic systems fails to account for actual patterns of language use. As indicated above, the diglossic model suffers from the same defect, failing to encompass mixed codes that make up people's language repertoires in situations of language contact.

Nevertheless, on balance, one can speculate that the situation was a long one of diglossia with broad societal bilingualism or rather, uneven patterns of individual bilingualism, since it is difficult to measure *a posteriori* how proficient in (what register of?) Tuscan/Italian 'uneducated' Corsicans were and impossible to draw quantitative conclusions. Ettori offers a simplified picture: '[. . .] *educated classes spoke Corsican and shepherds had some knowledge of Italian, even if they did not use it daily*'* (1981: 17–18). The majority did not have a command of written literary Italian, and their knowledge of 'regional Italian' as defined above – passive or active – varied across individuals. Notwithstanding, linguistic kinship with Italian was important and proficiency in French non-existent. Thus, the Corsican-Tuscan/Italian diglossic order was certainly not the most blatant mirror of social inequalities and, importantly, no apparent danger to social cohesion.

Finally, a third major reason, more socio-political than strictly linguistic, explains diglossic stability during that period. Under the umbrella of Tuscan, and partly because isolation largely remained the rule for the vast majority of Corsicans, Corsican varieties were not perceived as endangered as they would be after the advent of French sociopolitical structures and their sociolinguistic correlate and instrument, French linguistic ideology and policies of monolingualism. While the two varieties were seen as one language, and crucially, in the absence of a centralising project, including the politicisation and uniformisation of the social body and of language use, no attempt was made to eradicate speech varieties.[2] With a dominant language like French, linguistically remote (thus unintelligible) and of a different political and cultural tradition, most Corsicans were *de facto* excluded from nascent power structures, and through the aggressive homogenising policies of French nation builders, the demise of Italian and Corsican, henceforth on the French agenda, threatened the cultural equilibrium of Corsican society.

With the beginning of Frenchification, an altogether different diglossic framework was to emerge. In the long term, in the process of Italian

nation building, Corsican would probably have been partially absorbed into Italian too, as Italian would have become the linguistic referent for upward social mobility, but Italian gradually lost crucial domains of use to French before this could happen.[3] As Thiers puts it:

> *If Tuscan dominated by* **hegemony**, *French conquered by* **glottophagy**. *In either case, the threat is important* [....] *one smothers whilst the other devours!*
>
> (1989: 55)[*4]

Following Calvet's model of linguistic colonialism (1974), the next section illustrates the phases of the gradual demise of Italian and its concomitant replacement by French between the French Revolution and, broadly speaking, WWII.

Corsican-Italian diglossia *versus* Corsican-French diglossia: from hegemony to glottophagy

Calvet distinguishes between three phases of linguistic colonisation: first, the colonial language penetrates through the settlement of soldiers, administrators and merchants, essentially in urban contexts; then the acculturation of collaborative local elites eager to secure positions in new power structures begins. In the mid- or long-term, this results in a double exclusion – of both the local language and its speakers from power spheres. This first phase is characterised by the monolingualism of colonial elites, local (urban) elite bilingualism and popular monolingualism in the dominated language. Different patterns of language use thus serve to consolidate social differentiations.

In the second phase, the dominant language permeates the lower urban classes who become bilingual, thus sharpening the contrast between urban dwellers and rural masses, the latter initially remaining monolingual. Beside the political and economic incentives to acquire the dominant language, this second phase is catalysed by a whole array of language policies and plans aiming at diffusing the dominant language in administration, courts, schools and, in more recent times, the press, radio and television. This second phase reinforces the diglossic functional distribution and sees language attitudes change in opposite directions: whereas the dominant language gains increasing prestige among lower social strata, dominated varieties are progressively devalued, eventually by their own speakers too. Ultimately, the elites may

end up monolingual in the dominant language, whilst first urban and then rural masses gradually become bilingual. This phase, extending over various lengths of time in different contexts, also sees the emergence of contact-induced mixed codes amongst the less educated masses whose linguistic acculturation remains incomplete.

The third and final phase is that of completed, successful glottophagy in which the dominant language has totally eradicated dominated varieties, but this situation remains rare because pockets of resistance typically thwart complete glottophagy.

In what follows, I will assess the evolution of the sociolinguistic situation in Corsica using this broad model, pointing to the specificity of the Corsican situation, with the ultimate aim to glimpse at Corsicans' language repertoires at the eve of the language revival processes of the 1970s.

In the initial phases of the conquest of Corsica, French planners aimed at dethroning Italian to foster Corsican elites; what the masses spoke mattered little. The interplay of three factors slowed down the process. Firstly, the penetration of French into the inner circles of Corsican society was significantly delayed until the late nineteenth century due to the dichotomy between the French rhetoric of mass political integration and cultural assimilation and actual institutional and policy measures on the island (see above). Secondly, Corsican society remained largely anchored within Italy's sociocultural sphere. Finally, as the preceding chapter illustrated, most Corsicans were remote from outer and urban influences and, therefore, preserved traditional rural ways of living in which Corsican long remained dominant and unchallenged.

Diglossic conflict: French or Italian? language shift and language maintenance in Corsica till the Third Republic

At the time of annexation, a minute proportion of Corsicans knew French. The beginning of the language plan of assimilation of the island usually dates back to the Revolution, although premises of a policy of Frenchification began under the *Ancien Régime*. These initial plans only targeted Corsican elites, not the masses, providing for them to attend French schools or seminaries before they could come back and rule over the masses, whilst remaining subordinated to France (Marchetti, 1989: 100–105). During the Revolution, as Chapter 4 underscored, no significant measures were actually taken, and the first important status change occurred in 1804, with the decree that the command of French

would henceforth condition gaining positions in French institutions and administrative structures. As was also noted, this requirement was less stringent in Corsica than elsewhere. These efforts initially had little effect on Corsican elites. Various reports from the 1820s by French civil servants on the island, indeed, indicate the slow rate of penetration of French 50 years after annexation. Inspector of Public Education Mourre thus testifies:

> *Here is the situation of Corsica in 1818 regarding the French language fifty years after its reunion to France : lawyers plead in Italian, most sollicitors draft their acts in it, others drafting it in some barbarous French, administrations must keep writing in both languages, which doubles workload and administrative expenses; very few mayors, magistrates and even fewer churchmen know how to write in French, and hardly a few hundred can speak it* [...]*

(Quoted by Marchetti, ibid: 110)

The situation changed somewhat more rapidly after 1818 when a number of French-teaching schools opened but in a way that only sharpened the urban-rural contrast. A Calvi official observed in 1822: '*I think I am right in claiming that no village school offers education in the national language.* [...] *In cities too, most inhabitants resist French*'* (Marchetti, ibid: 110–111). Thiers' study on the Frenchification of the island in the nineteenth century nevertheless shows that during the 1814–1830 period, the use of French did progress in education and religious settings, especially through the successive actions of Education Inspectors Mourre (1817–1821) and Cottard (1821–1827) (Thiers, 1977). Yet, Arrighi recalls, in 1829 there were still as many schools teaching in Italian as in French (2002: 59). State education in French was still to be generalised and become secular, and popular education by clergymen in Corsican and Italian persisted.

In administration and justice, French did not make great strides, but through the development of the aforementioned public employment policy it eventually slowly penetrated domains of use hitherto exclusively occupied by Italian-speaking clerks (Calvet's second phase) (Fusina, 1994: 32). In justice, a 1777 decision had made French compulsory in higher courts and tolerated Italian in lower, 'police' courts. As illustrated above, by the 1820s, some lawyers and notaries had opted for French. An 1833 judgement set a precedent abrogating legal bilingualism and thus consecrated the exclusive use of French, making Italian

judgements invalid (quoted by Marchetti, 1989: 113–114). This decision was reinforced in 1859.

These policies were sometimes fiercely resisted. Some elites still largely connected to Italy carried on sending their children to Italy to study, despite the 1803 decree on the invalidity of diplomas not obtained from a French University, and the attachment of Corsica to the University of Aix-en-Provence in 1814. Beretti (1990: 14) reports that around the early 1830s, Corsican students still constituted a quarter of Pisa University's student population. Corsican departmental authorities also resisted Mourre's efforts to multiply the number of schools teaching French only (Thiers, 1977). In religious practice, bilingual editions of 'manuals' for catechism failed to supplant Italian ones, and testimonies report the use of Italian in homilies until the 1930s (Monti, 1982: 166; quoted by Fusina, 1994: 38). In literature, the first half of the century saw the production of acclaimed works in Tuscan, under the impetus of Corsican (e.g. Viale, 1817) and Italian (e.g. Tommaseo, 1841) intellectuals, while island literary production in French was long non-existent, and when it appeared it was deemed of mediocre quality. In that connection, in 1858, Viale's *Dell'uso della lingua patria in Corsica* [Of the use of the fatherland language in Corsica]* condemned the negative effects of the switch to French in literature (denouncing the 'literary sterility' of those Corsicans who attempted to switch to French for literary writing), justice (i.e. the promotion of language competence to the detriment of professional value),[5] education, etc. More widely, he denounced the danger, intrinsic to the French policy of cultural and linguistic assimilation, of debilitating Corsicans as they were slowly deprived of their *cultura materna* even though cultural contacts with the peninsula remained frequent (Marchetti, 1989: 116–119). Literature in particular remained one of the few domains, with rural religious practice, where the Corsican-Tuscan diglossic coupling was maintained until the twentieth century, but the number of Italian-medium authors declined during the second half of the century.

By the mid-nineteenth century, French had been successful in gradually displacing Italian in a number of official domains. Through official bilingual policies first, and then through progressively exclusive monolingualism in French, the French presence had become more tangible in administrations, schools and courts, and increasing numbers of Corsican elites embraced French as a springboard for social promotion. With the Second Empire (1852–1870), the pace of Frenchification greatly accelerated as Napoleon III's policy of assimilation of Corsica targeted larger layers of the population, hinging on the attribution of positions

and employment in both national and colonial administrations, justice and political life.

This acculturation was, however, very uneven and sharpened divisions among Corsicans, along patterns of residency (rural/urban) and social lines (popular/elites), even though cultural elites were divided, and some still hesitated between France and Italy (Ettori, 1980). If many urban elites had been convinced to foster French for written social communication, in villages where orality still very largely dominated social interactions, the demise of written Italian little affected traditional Corsican language use. In cities, though, the downfall of Italian in the public sphere closed the door to job opportunities in the developing administrative apparatus, which created new incentives to learn French. In 1854, a traveller observed that:

> *The government strives to substitute French for Italian; all educated Corsicans speak French [. . .] Fashion, ambition, necessity prompt everyone to learn it. [. . .] The French language is widespread in cities but the masses only speak Italian, even when they know French. The new language failed to penetrate deep valleys.*[*]
>
> (Gregorovius, 1854; quoted by Marchetti, 1989: 115)[6]

Adapting Fasold (1984: 48–49), the resulting situation resembles one of embedded polyglossia between three languages: French was becoming the exclusive official language, Italian largely remained the language of written cultural production and religious practice and most rural Corsicans remained 'monolingual' in Corsican. The conflict had initially opposed French to Italian for hegemony in official domains, taking little account of what people spoke. With Italian on its way out, except somewhat in the cultural and religious domains, Corsican varieties became the next main targets of French monocultural/monolingual ideology, and after the first phase of assimilation, targeting the upper classes and urban population, the second phase aimed for inner, rural Corsica.

As observed in Chapters 1 and 4, French strategy included several dimensions, ideological and practical. Ideologically, the aforementioned revolutionary dialectics of praise and vilification were re-actualised with the diffusion of the label *patois* and its luggage of derogatory connotations (for examples of its pejorative use in Occitany, see Lafont, 1977 and Gardy, 1978). Practically, the blooming institutional and colonial structures offered material reward to speakers of French and the school system was to prepare Corsicans to seize these new opportunities: French

became *la langue du pain*. On Corsica, integration was fostered by allocating administrative positions to Corsicans through clanic networks, rather than through a genuine project of economic development, but these positions were limited: many had to leave the island and those who stayed without obtaining administrative positions grew embittered.

Chapter 5 indicated that although a significant proportion of the population living on the island felt abandoned by central authorities, many others had embraced French rule and its socio-economic promises. Incentives were particularly abundant in Corsica since, as we have seen, the assimilation strategy largely rested on the allocation of positions in the public sector, for which the knowledge of French was a pre-requisite. This exacerbated social division amongst the Corsican people: whilst increasing numbers endorsed cultural and language shift, those feeling deprived of the socio-economic benefits associated with French dominance and betrayed by certain leaders found a new forum in the nascent regionalist protest movement. The next section sketches the ideological basis of that movement and the symbolic and practical role of the Corsican language therein.

Corsican regionalism and the language question

Chapter 4 claimed that one of the origins of regionalist movements in various regions of France can be traced back to the Romantic interest in popular cultures, *litera*tures and *orali*tures that developed in Western Europe in the nineteenth century. This influential movement for cultural revivalism granted renewed prestige – as in the Felibrige movement in Provence (Fusina, 1994), sometimes catalysing or accompanying the growth of sub-state cultural nationalism as in Catalonia (Conversi, 1997; Mar-Molinero, 2000: Chapter 3) – to regional cultures and languages. Although that movement did not always have political motives and echoes, as in Corsica, it allotted prestige to popular cultural production that dominant 'colonial' ideologies struggled to devalue. It also paved the way later for more radical forms of nationalism of the Fichtean type, in which nationalist mobilising ideology, and in particular the conceptualisation of national identity, rested on the idea that nations are primarily defined by an inherited community of culture and language (see Chapter 1). In some cases, this led to claims for statehood, in others it did not.[7]

In Corsica, arguably, intellectuals such as Viale and Tommaseo paved the way for cultural politics, albeit unintentionally. Towards the turn

of the century, this essentialist form of cultural nationalism was re-actualised by members of the intellectual elite still culturally attached to Italy, who strongly resented the cultural void engineered by French language shift strategies as a threat to their national and intellectual identity, especially as literary production in Italian disappeared at the turn of the century. Thence, many promoted Corsican to fill the cultural and identity gap.

In that connection, the pioneer, seminal journal was Santu Casanova's *A Tramuntana* (Marchetti, 1989: 95–98). Published between 1896 and 1914, exclusively in Corsican, it voiced these feelings of dissatisfaction, denouncing the derelict condition of the island and the minorisation of the Corsican people through 'forced' emigration and the responsibility of clans therein. It enjoyed great popular success. This unheard-of use of the language heralded the birth of Corsican regionalism and later nationalism and the sociolinguistic individuation of Corsican, notably its nascent codification and elaboration and growing use in writing, and accelerated the demise of the Corsican-Italian diglossic couple. One outcome of this demise was the publication of the first dictionary of Corsican in 1915.[8]

In 1914, *A Tramuntana* was succeeded by the journal *A Cispra*, created by two schoolmasters, but the war interrupted its publication. Its sole issue was, however, important as it advocated political autonomy, thus vesting the Corsican language with a new political symbolism in the Fichtean tradition. As the authors put it: '*Corsica is not a French department but a defeated nation that will be reborn*'[*] (quoted by Arrighi, 2002: 66). Advocating the maximum distantiation from Italian, they sought to promote Corsican language production in its own right along the federalist lines of the Felibrige movement: the nation must be reborn through its literary maturation.

In the interwar period, two competing reviews shared the heritage of *A Cispra* – *A Muvra* and *L'Annu Corsu* – respectively, created in 1920 and 1923, and they disappeared at the dawn of WWII (Yvia-Croce, 1979). Almost entirely published in Corsican for 17 years, they produced two contrapuntal political discourses. The former advocated political autonomy, demanding that Corsican culture and language be taught in schools, as a natural right of the Corsican nation, taking Tuscan/Italian as its natural linguistic reference point.[9] The latter's discourse responded to the growing nationalist orientation of the former and the perception that some collaborators to *A Muvra* were even tempted by fascist irredentism and separatism. Initially bilingual in Corsican and French and then increasingly in French (eventually changing its name to *L'Année*

Corse in 1937), it channelled a more moderate, regionalist discourse asserting the need to acknowledge and bolster Corsica's cultural individuality but '[. . .] as a province of the Grande Patrie'* (Arrighi, 2002: 68). On the question of Corsican language education, it also distanced itself from the Muvrist demand for Corsican teaching *per se* arguing that Corsican remained insufficiently codified (Paul Arrighi, in *L'annu Corsu*, 1924: 228).

All these journals played important roles, both symbolically and in terms of language elaboration: the multiplication of Corsican-medium journalistic writings and literary works propelled Corsican into functional domains whence it had hitherto been excluded, thereby prefiguring the new Corsican-French diglossic coupling in which Corsican was to gain a new status as a written language. Importantly, they diffused the various contending discourses circulating on the island – discourses on the Corsican nation and its political recognition within the French ensemble, and corresponding discourses on the Corsican language. As to the latter, they established the foundations of the discourses on language later forcefully re-actualised by Corsican political and language activists during the 1970s' revival (see next chapter). These foundations concerned both the status of Corsican as the core feature of Corsican nationhood and, in the Muvrist discourse, the related demand for its teaching, and various attitudes to the language itself. In particular, voices urged its codification (through grammar and dictionaries) and further linguistic elaboration (through written production). In that connection, opinions diverged on the instrumentalisation of its linguistic kinship to Italian – keeping Italian as the referent or advocating maximum distanciation. Also, some expressed the concerns to keep Corsican 'pure' and untouched by linguistic interference from French in a context where such interference was increasing as French was acquired by greater numbers.

Between the 1920s' early regionalist activism and the 1970s' political and cultural revival, the defence of the Corsican language and culture was for some time suspended, for several reasons. Besides the links/amalgamation between Corsican language activism and political separatism, largely echoed by the pro-French press, there were ongoing perceptions that Corsican was still a dialect of Italian and insufficiently codified and that its teaching could even hinder the learning of French.[10] This confirms that pedagogical arguments for using it as an auxiliary teaching language largely remained confined to intellectual circles. For some time after WWII, Fusina points out, socio-economic and political issues were also deemed more central than the defence

of the local cultures and languages – the economic and infra-structural development of the island, the reconfiguration of its political leadership, etc (Fusina, 1994).

When regional language activism in other regions, parliamentary lobbying and pedagogical debates eventually culminated in the 1951 Deixonne Law on the 'teaching of local languages and dialects', Corsican remained outside its scope (until its 1974 extension) (Poignant, 1998). If the Deixonne Law reflected a more tolerant attitude from the central state towards regional languages, authorising their teaching on a voluntary basis outside the normal curriculum, it was arguably more *assimilation-* than *maintenance-oriented* (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1994: 79–85).[11] Discrimination against Corsican triggered little immediate protest, which indicates the deeprootedness of the aforementioned political, sociolinguistic and pedagogical arguments against its teaching *per se.*[12]

Yet, cultural demands did re-emerge again in the mid-1950s, channelled by new regionalist reviews, e.g. *U Muntese* (1955), and associations, e.g. *Parlemu corsu* [Let's speak Corsican]* (1953) and *Lingua corsa* (1956) leading a 'Holy Crusade' [*A Santa Cruciata*]. Counting amongst their members former central figures from *A Muvra* and *L'Annu corsu*, these associations reiterated previous status demands but in a somewhat more radical manner, calling for mandatory Corsican language education:

'[we demand that] *the Corsican language be officially taught in secondary education as a second language, optional outside the island, <u>mandatory</u> on it, and a requisite to be awarded titles and diplomas.*'*

<div align="right">

(*U Muntese*, 1959; quoted in Fusina, 1994: 118)

(original emphasis)

</div>

Similarly, the Statutes of *Lingua Corsa* notably included the following founding objectives:

– *Maintain, order and illustrate the written and spoken Corsican language*;
– *Pursue the development of a grammar and a dictionary to consolidate the Corsican language's future*;
– *Cultivate and promote Corsican literature* [. . .]* (quoted in Fusina, 1994: 123).

Moreover, activists also re-engaged a reflection on the desirability of language unification: '[the association] *shall attempt to identify, in the*

*current polymorphism of the island's spoken varieties, the permanent prin-
ciples apt to facilitate an enriching and fruitful unification of these various
Corsican spoken varieties'** (ibid: 124). The latter dialectical approach to
unity and diversity (see also the implicit conflict between the two objec-
tives above) later proved to be a divisive issue amongst activists, as the
next chapter demonstrates.

Notwithstanding, the activism of the 1950s, however, confined
within small circles initially, ensured the continuity of language-related
demands between the pioneers and the 1970s generation, in a context
where post-WWII language shift knew unprecedented impetus. It also
heralded the emergence of academic language activism and research
from the late 1950s, the transregional networking of the language
activists from various regional language communities in the early 1960s
and, finally, the relative mobilisation of island parliamentarians on the
language status question (ibid, 128–142).

By the late 1960s, in addition to economic reasons, regionalist dis-
courses on culture, language and nation eventually attracted more sup-
porters, the more so as the discourse of endangerment of the Corsican
nation became more acutely felt due to mass emigration and economic
backwardness. The question of cultural and language loss then became
the banner of socio-political protesters, and popular mobilisation ulti-
mately catalysed the institutionalisation of Corsican language education
under the aegis of the Deixonne Law, auguring new language debates
and practical problems.

Conclusion

This chapter has delineated the long process of acculturation, whereby
the Corsican-Tuscan diglossic couple eventually yielded to the Corsican-
French diglossic order, after a transitional period that saw Corsican
varieties, Tuscan/Italian and French in complex polyglossic interrela-
tions. That gradual process, catalysed by slow state-nation building
and uneven socio-economic and socio-political developments, led to
the polarisation of competing theories of the nation: 'cultural' *versus*
'civic'. Concomitantly, the hegemonisation of the French language over
Tuscan/Italian and the spread of French linguistic ideology was paral-
leled by the nascent, resistant individuation of the Corsican language
amongst intellectual circles. This initially cultural form of resistance
eventually served to cement alternative patterns of political loyalty
towards the re-born Corsican nation but remained significantly con-
fined within intellectual circles, whilst patterns of mass language shift

attest to the entrenchment of dominant French discourses on the nation and language. Notwithstanding, drawing on Calvet's model again (1974 and 2002), glottophagy was not completed, and the resulting unfinished acculturation of the island entailed new forms of plural and/or mixed identities and, in some milieus, collective support for cultural regionalism and regional language activism after WWII and even more forcefully from the 1970s.

From a sociolinguistic viewpoint, the outcomes of these acculturation processes resulted in important changes in the language repertoires of Corsicans. Tuscan/Italian exited the stage as the cultural and literary reference idiom, and French colonised public spheres and largely permeated the private domain, undermining the family transmission of Corsican. The sociolinguistic situation between the 1920s and the 1970s varied greatly in one crucial respect: in the 1920s, all Corsicans spoke Corsican, and it was still largely family transmitted, even if signs of language shift within the family cell could be detected, as French became the dominant language of power and as the Great War boosted sentiments of patriotism. In the 1970s, family transmission was much weaker, and the percentage of immigrants residing on the island – both continental and foreign – who were monolingual in French was higher. During the former period, Corsican speakers largely outnumbered French speakers although many were becoming bilingual; during the latter, it was the reverse: perceptions of language endangerment were more salient whilst surviving, 'minoritised' Corsican varieties were also vested with new identity garments. Finally, mixed codes resulting from contacts between French and Corsican varieties had progressively emerged as new linguistic resources (see Chapter 8).

In terms of language attitudes, the discursive dichotomisation between the French *language* and the Corsican *dialects*, still largely geographically fragmented and un-codified in the 1970s, reflected the successful hegemonisation of French linguistic ideology even amongst activists, i.e. the mutually constitutive relations between language prestige, the level of codification and language formalism and literary production. Within that diglossic language ideological framework, Corsican varieties were inevitably stigmatised and relegated to a position of lesser prestige and value. By the time the Deixonne Law was extended to Corsican in 1974, this set of language values had become a central issue to tackle for Corsican language activists to prevent the death of the Corsican language and nation. Yet, these values and the dominant discourses underpinning them were not fully endorsed and unquestioned by Corsican language activists and planners, nor by the layers of the

population still speaking Corsican varieties, and alternative discourses on the symbolic value of Corsican, and on the language itself, gradually made their way into language decision-making circles from the 1980s.

The next chapter focuses on the institutionalisation of the Corsican language and the concomitant rise of a Corsican language policy network after a period of 'semi-anarchic' language planning from 1974.

7
Language Institutionalisation in Contemporary Corsica (1974–2005)

Introduction

This chapter and the next focus on Corsica's contemporary sociolinguistic situation. This chapter aims to review how the Corsican language was eventually admitted within the scope of the Deixonne Law in 1974 and then institutionalised, to reconstitute the Corsican language policy network that emerged from the progressive institutionalisation of Corsican from 1974, to identify who the dominant players in that network are and their respective powers and to assess the success of the language revitalisation plans they have devised amongst the population by looking at popular attitudes to such plans.

The first section outlines the historical conditions and modalities of the emergence of a Corsican language policy network, showing that after the 'semi-anarchic' *débuts* following the inclusion of Corsican in the Deixonne Law, the defence and promotion of the language largely fell under the responsibility of a more formal network of Corsican language activists occupying official positions in newly deconcentrated state institutions and devolved Corsican institutions from the early 1980s. Specifically, three main institutional arenas emerged, to which language decision-making powers have gradually been devolved: the *Rectorat*, the *Assemblée de Corse* and the *Université de Corse*. By looking at what revitalisation actions each regional institutional actor has undertaken under the overarching aegis of French central authorities and national law, moreover, I analyse the extent and the legal and political limits of the glottopolitical autonomy and powers granted to regional activists. Then, I review a number of other domains that Corsican has also entered, such as radio and TV broadcasting, literary production, the written press and performing arts, and I claim that the impact of

these developments on actual practice may appear quantitatively limited. On balance, however, it is more difficult to assess their effectiveness in the revitalisation process for lack of significant objective criteria, and these domains may have important symbolic effects that need exploring (see Chapter 8). I finally examine the extent to which Corsican language planners have sought to Europeanise their language promotion strategies.

In the subsequent sections, I assess the impact of revitalisation actions on Corsican society, seeking to draw a sociological picture of Corsican speakers and non-speakers from statistical data. Drawing critically on quantitative data (i.e. census results and statistics on school attendance), I show that, despite the aforementioned institutionalisation and structural developments, including the adaptation of European programmes to Corsican, and the most favourable interpretation and application of national legislation on RMLs by local policy actors, Corsican language policies since the 1970s have hitherto largely failed to reverse language shift. Census data indeed illustrates a continued decline in practice, and statistics on school attendance reveal that the attendance of Corsican language education decreases as students advance through the curriculum. I interpret this data as an index of popular indifference and/or opposition to Corsican language planning, which itself constitutes an indication of language planners' failure to sustain the initial popular support towards language revitalisation processes.

In the conclusion, I argue that this failure illustrates the necessity of devising more qualitative methods to supplement the above-mentioned more quantitative methods of assessment of success or failure of language revitalisation processes: quantitative methods indicate trends and correlations but fail to provide explanations for such trends. Likewise, the limitations of an analysis of language revitalisation strategies through objective, traditional categories based on the diglossic model (i.e. positive legislation, institutionalisation and structural developments, spread of the dominated variety in new domains of use) demonstrate that, necessary though they may be, these legal/institutional measures do not suffice to guarantee successful language revitalisation: there is more to effective language revitalisation than just reversing institution-based language hierarchies. As Jaffe (1999), amongst others, forcefully demonstrates, what is needed here is a theoretical approach to policy evaluation that also takes greater account of *all* language and political ideologies, both the ideologies of policy actors, whether they are dominant or not, and folk ideologies, and of how these ideologies interplay. Put otherwise, the community's norms and attitudes largely

determine its will to preserve and/or revive its language, or lack thereof, which in turn remains one prevailing factor in language maintenance or shift and the possibility of reversing diglossia. Chapter 8 explores such norms and attitudes in depth.

Language activism, language institutionalisation and language planning in the 1970s: context, developments and outcomes

The previous chapter indicated that Corsican language activism had been 'kept alive' in the after-war period, albeit within restricted cultural circles. Chapter 5 also showed that the 1960s had constituted a milestone in the political, socio-economic, sociocultural and sociolinguistic make-up of the island as sociolinguistic issues were revived with new momentum for various reasons. First, the 'top down' economic regionalisation of the island little benefited many Corsicans; it entailed unprecedented waves of emigration and hindered the return of many of those Corsicans who had lived in the colonial empire. Second, important waves of non-Corsican speaking immigrated, whilst massive internal migrations brought Corsicans into contact with them in coastal cities.[1] Third, the demise of family transmission begun in the interwar period became more conspicuous. Many youths no longer spoke the language.

Overall, the demographic weight of Corsican speakers in relation to the whole island population was, therefore, largely reduced. All this reinforced the perception that the Corsican people or nation had been deliberately minoritised and faced extinction (Fusina, 1994: 158). As an early nationalist slogan put it: *Morta a lingua, mortu u populu* [The death of the language is the death of the people]. This gave a new impetus to regionalist claims and regional movements championing the defence of the Corsican nation and its most prominent sign of identity – its language – and the very exclusion of Corsican from the 1951 Deixonne Law was presented as another form of discrimination against Corsicans.

Language activism emerged first on mainland France and then on the island and was taken up both by academic institutions and civil society organisations. On mainland France, various university courses were created in the late 1960s and the diaspora also organised various Corsican courses from 1971. On the island, where the language question had become a central rallying point, and aroused renewed interest in learning the language, isolated language courses were established from 1971 and eventually federated by the newly created association *Scola*

Corsa in 1972. Commentators of that period describe 1972 as seminal for language activism. *Scola Corsa* indeed networked all scattered initiatives and lobbied for the extension of the Deixonne Law and the creation of a university on the island. Regarding the former demand, in September, the minister of Education initially responded to a written parliamentary question on the possible extension of the law that: '[...] *teaching the Corsican dialect in state schools creates difficulties* [...] *Clearly, Corsican has not yet been unified nor codified. The proposed measure can therefore not yet be supported*'* (quoted in Marchetti, 1989: 184–185). His successor, however, relentlessly lobbied by activists, reconsidered the issue in January 1973 and agreed in principle to an 'experimental' extension of the law, perhaps responding to the growing popular mobilisation around the issue on the island, Marchetti suggests (ibid).[2] The law was finally extended in January 1974 granting Corsican some official recognition as a regional language of France. The university opened its doors to 500 students in 1982 in the symbolic fortress of Paoli in Corte.

Having obtained juridical status for the language, language planners were nevertheless confronted with a series of symbolic and practical challenges to its revitalisation. First, due to its lack of unity and codification, many saw Corsican as a dialect – or series of dialects – and dialectal variety as an insurmountable obstacle: what variety should be taught? Besides, for others, it was a still dialect of Italian and not a language *per se* (Marchetti, 1989: 185–188). Second, the language had hardly been taught before and extensive acquisition planning was needed: teacher-training programmes were almost nonexistent, volunteer teachers and teaching materials were scarce, no curriculum existed, etc. Third, as Chapter 4 indicates, the provisions of the Deixonne Law were very minimal and denoted a tolerance rather than a genuine political will. Besides, after *Scola Corsa* dissolved in 1977 due to internal dissensions, the responsibility for Corsican language teaching increasingly fell on schoolteachers whose motivations and commitment varied greatly. Fourth, many stood against the institutionalisation of the language at all for ideological (see the *resistance of separation* in the next chapter) and/or practical reasons, e.g. that other subjects should be prioritised.

Regarding the lack of language unity and codification, language activists responded in various ways. Di Meglio (1997) shows that the public funds devoted to didactic production in the 1970s served to produce textbooks in which a northern variety had been selected as part of a classical process of standardisation: one single variety is selected, codified and diffused to the detriment of others (Haugen, 1983: 275). This

very controversial approach was challenged by southern activists so that other scholars advocated a conception of language that saw diversity as richness and contacts as mutual enrichment and, in practical terms, endorsed that teachers should teach their own dialectal variety (see the discussion of the concept of *langue polynomique* in the next chapter). The pioneer work in that respect, *Intricciate e Cambierini* [Connectors and Alternators], was published by Geronimi and Marchetti (1971) who devised a spelling system that accounted for and respected dialectal variation, running counter to dominant models of standardisation. Equally important was the creation of the *Association pour le Développement des Etudes Archéologiques, Historiques, Linguistiques et Naturalistes du Centre-Est de la Corse* (ADECEC) in 1970. In the field of lexicographic research and innovations, it has remained the most active association to date, producing a very large body of work. As for teaching methods, they were typically devised *ad hoc*, although networks were progressively constituted to develop 'best practice' strategies (Fusina, 1994).

In sum, throughout the 1970s the implementation of the Deixonne Law and the concomitant standardisation of the language remained largely improvised, sometimes following opposite directions, and predominantly dependent on the good will, motivations and commitment of language activists, in the initial absence of solid institutional structures. Further legal progress was made in 1975 with the Haby Law although, here again, little effective implementation followed declarations and at the time when France was voting its first radical law of language protectionism (the Bas Lauriol law; see Chapter 4), its apparent commitment to promote RMLs must be viewed with extreme caution.

In the light of the obstacles to these first steps towards language revitalisation, assessments of the evolution of the situation were primarily subjective and tended to contradict each other. Thus, Ettori's initial account optimistically pointed to the progress made in enrolment figures (Ettori, 1975; quoted in Fusina, 1994: 144). The Bozzi Report for the Regional Council (1979) however regretted the scarcity of teachers participating in episodic teacher training days and, on the basis of statistical data on attendance, questioned the population's support for Corsican language education.[3] It concluded that: '[. . .] *without a crusade for the daily use of Corsican, especially by families that can still use it proficiently, and in the street, the battle for its survival will be lost'** (Bozzi, 1979; quoted by Fusina, 1994: 159–160).

To a large extent, crusaders emerged outside official institutional structures through associations with more ore less radical nationalist agendas. For instance, the revival of traditional Corsican-medium

singing, with groups like *Canta U Populu Corsu* [The Corsican People Sings] that undertook to revive feelings of Corsican nationhood by travelling and performing concerts in inner Corsica from village to village, played an important symbolic and practical role. In doing so, they diffused Herderian nationalist themes and prompted Corsicans to re-acquire their endangered cultural heritage. Their appeal was such that the state prohibited some performances because of the subversive message they channelled. Notwithstanding, many youths joined the band and/or created new bands reviving Corsicans' predominantly oral culture and experience of language use.

The next section sketches the institutional evolution pertaining to Corsican language status, focusing on the interplay of changing legal provisions at the national level and the creation of new language-planning institutional structures. By examining structural developments, one can reconstitute the institutional pillars of the emerging Corsican language policy network on the island and identify the dominant actors in it: the *Rectorat de l'Académie de Corse*, the University of Corsica and the *Assemblée de Corse*.

As these are not the only actors though, I take the concept of network in its broad acceptation as all the actors with an interest in Corsican revitalisation who have an input into Corsican-related policy debates and/or decision-making processes and/or who are involved in the implementation of policies and thus produce an output. In some cases, that input may be merely discursive and it can be retrieved through the analysis of policy text production patterns, e.g. the nationalist legitimising discourse and the demand for compulsory bilingualism and/or language co-officiality; in other cases the output may be more objectively measurable, e.g. the number of articles published in Corsican in the written press. In yet other cases, the input and output in terms of revitalisation might be more difficult to gauge objectively, e.g. the effect of polyphonic bands like *Canta U Populu Corsu* on revitalisation processes. I will therefore deal with policy inputs that have an effect on attitudes rather than on structures/institutions in the next chapter.

Language institutionalisation, policy network formation and language planning: overview of the 1980s/1990s

The 1980/1990s saw drastic legal change for RMLs through their institutionalisation within French state educational structures. For Corsica, this was managed by the *Rectorat de l'Académie de Corse* (autonomous

since 1975). Moreover, the University of Corsica also opened, which was to play a prominent role in subsequent plans of language revitalisation. These changes coincided with the national programme of increased political devolution, piloted in Corsica (see Chapter 5), from which the Assemblée de Corse gradually gained new powers, notably regarding cultural and language planning. These developments catalysed the emergence of an institutional language policy network which the next three sections examine.

The Rectorat: primary and secondary school education

In France, institutional responsibility for primary and secondary education rests with the *Rectorats*, the decentralised state education authorities in regions, in charge of implementing national education laws and adapting them to regional realities (therefore enjoying some budgetary autonomy).

As we saw in discussing the chronology of national language legislation on RMLs (Chapter 4), the 1982 Savary circular constituted a significant change in the State's approach to the question, because the State committed itself to taking active measures for RML promotion rather than simply adopting a tolerant laissez-faire policy as before. Significantly, though, this change was made by a Circular, a regulatory measure with less legal status and scope than a law. However, that Circular gave interpretative directions to the Haby Law, while leaving more discretion to administrators to implement it.

To monitor the implementation of these provisions, additional structures were created within the *Rectorat* and official responsibilities allotted to Corsican cultural activists, which would impact greatly on the design and implementation of policies. Put otherwise, state authority was granted to Corsican activists within the limits of new legal provisions. Implemented from 1983, the first language-in-education plan was evaluated in 1986. It showed the increase in secondary school students choosing to study Corsican since 1975, which signalled some positive popular responses to secondary school education in *Langue et Culture Corses* (LCC) as it became increasingly available. The evaluation of primary education offer in Corsican was more difficult as the content of Corsican language classes, less formalised than in secondary schools, varied significantly across schools, due to unequal teacher competence in and/or motivation for Corsican language teaching (Fusina, ibid: 183). This emphasised the dire need to boost teacher training programmes. Teacher training was systematised from the creation of *Instituts*

Universitaires de Formation des Maîtres (IUFM) [University Teacher Training Institutes] from 1991.

The production of teaching materials, sponsored by the Departmental/Regional Centres for Pedagogical Documentation (CDDP/CRDP), also steadily augmented from 1982. Since 1992 they have received EU education funds.[4] Regarding syllabuses, first outlines were produced in the early 1980s but only officially endorsed in 1988, which illustrates a recurrent concern for activists – the delay between policy design and decision making/implementation. Additionally, state authorities decided to encourage initiatives from cultural associations aiming at developing bilingual pre-elementary private education as in other regions, e.g. Diwan schools in Brittany, Calendretas in Occitanie, Iskatolas in the Basque Country, and progressively to integrate them within the public sector. In Corsica, only one association seized the opportunity, and only two such schools were opened in Haute-Corse. Public authorities however monitored other initiatives: two more bilingual state schools were opened, and education authorities also facilitated the experimental development of integrated Corsican language education, whereby Corsican became the medium of instruction rather than merely a taught subject. By the 1980s, then, cultural movements and associations that had originally borne the demand for teaching and programmed language courses had largely abandoned the ground to official structures. Nevertheless, having cultural activists in key positions at the *Rectorat* meant that decentralised state authorities would more readily accompany the cultural movement and even supplement it where needed.

Overall, the early 1980s thus witnessed structural progress for LCC education and encouraging, but not massive, popular support for it, as the population appeared divided on the relevance and legitimacy of such education. Indeed, as Fusina (ibid: 195) indicates, the issue of LCC education has remained a controversial focal point for Corsican society in general going well beyond educational frames.

Another evaluation report – the Arrighi de Casanova Report – released in 1989 – entailed more institutional developments. It observed a pause in attendance rate, indicating that out of 44,077 pupils in state education, a mere 5,454 (13%) attended Corsican classes (Silvani, 1988, in *La Corse*; quoted by Fusina, 1994: 202). It recommended to further generalise educational provision, notably by boosting teacher training programmes for all state schools to offer Corsican language education at all levels. Departing from a previous essentially institutional and structural approach to Corsican language educational provision, and in view

of growing disputes around language planning, moreover, the report also recommended to take account of the language ideologies behind them and, in so doing, reasserted the necessity of considering Corsica's cultural and linguistic kinship with Italy.[5] Finally, most importantly, it strategically suggested reinstalling Corsican language revitalisation as a priority within the State/Region Planning Contracts, underscoring the crucial role of the University of Corsica in language revitalisation efforts.

During the 1990s, institutionalisation continued with the creation of a Corsican CAPES and of the IUFM. The CAPES generated important symbolic and practical advantages. Symbolically, it brought teacher qualifications for Corsican secondary teachers into line with other disciplines through a national examination.[6] Practically, teaching positions were secured for graduates and professional opportunities were created for Corsicans following the LCC academic path.[7] With these innovations, the formal institutionalisation of Corsican within state educational structures was largely reinforced and secured. In the process, a number of Corsican activists – primary and secondary teachers, university lecturers and *Rectorat* civil servants – gained responsibilities in the RML policy network and control of implementation processes. Also important was the adaptation, in secondary education, of the EU initiative of European classes into Mediterranean classes. This EU initiative, launched under the EU education umbrella, sought to encourage the simultaneous learning of three European (national) languages and their progressive use as teaching medium. In Corsica, European classes were adapted into Mediterranean classes, in which Corsican replaced one of the 'national' languages, e.g. English, and was studied alongside 'Mediterranean' national languages, e.g. Italian, Spanish. This adaptation was possible because activists held the key institutional positions. In the process, notably, Corsican was given a status on a par with 'national' languages. Finally, in quantitative terms, the number of students also increased during the 1990s as Corsican language provision became progressively generalised.

The University of Corsica

Opened in 1982 with 500 students, the University of Corsica now trains over 5000 students across a variety of faculties. In Humanities, from the early days, academic positions were occupied by cultural and/or language activists of the 1970s who, in turn, trained students to become school teachers and university lecturers. Its opening was important both in terms of the possibility of developing Corsican studies 'at home'

and of offering a full curriculum for them. This was managed by the Corsican Studies Institute (which became the Corsican Research Centre (CRC) in 1988), and the Diplôme d'Etudes Universitaires Générales (DEUG) d'Etudes Corses (first two-year University Diploma in Corsican studies) was offered from the academic year 1983–1984, recruiting students from all over Corsica. Today the Corsican studies path delivers up to PhD degrees in LCC. Besides, the primary role of the university in language-in-education activism was further enhanced in 1990–1991, when the IUFM and CAPES courses in LCC were created. Since then, university lecturers have assumed full responsibility for the training of primary and secondary teachers and higher education teachers and researchers.

In the field of research, the CRC developed research teams across a variety of disciplines, including archaeology, history and geography, ethnology and ethnomusicology, linguistics, applied linguistics and pedagogy, and, most importantly, sociolinguistics from the early days (Thiers, 1989: 151–152). The research outcomes produced then fed into the curriculum. This has helped shape the language ideologies of a whole generation of LCC teachers who, since the 1980s, have been 'moulded' within the sociolinguistic classes. The importance of the sociolinguistic approach for corpus and acquisition planning will be explored in depth in the next chapter on ideological struggle: we will see that the hegemonisation in language plans of sociolinguistically-informed discourses on language has been one of the main reasons for elite and popular resistance to current Corsican language-in-education planning efforts. Finally, research has also served to revalue Corsican culture and history and certainly contributed to nourishing the Corsican sense of specificity and 'national' pride. In turn, enhanced feelings of nationhood and forms of national pride can fuel more political commitments.

Beyond teacher training, the university also occupies a central role in the life of the island for several reasons. First, it has provided a basis for and given scientific validity to Corsican studies and propelled Corsican research to new symbolic heights, as some of its research teams received accreditation from the highest national scientific authorities. In the process, new intellectual elites have become more visible in Corsican society. Second, it has developed a network of academic and socio-economic partners. Academics have thus received funds from the European programmes for networking and/or the organisation of conferences, cultural and literary activities and exchanges with other regions with an RML community, as platforms for language promotion,

e.g. through INTERREG (Interregional cooperation) (see Chapter 5). Third, it has brought together Corsican youths who found a new forum for political activism and Corte, where the university sits, thus became a crossroad and/or cradle for student nationalist groups. At a more linguistic level, this has also facilitated the contact between various Corsican varieties and thereby accelerated linguistic change and the koîneisation of Corsican. Fourth, on a small island like Corsica, Corsican studies academics, many of whom are also prolific literary authors and/or journalists, and have occupied official positions in the LCC unit of the *Rectorat*, have also gained enormous prestige. Fifth, as members of one of the main language institutions of the island, academics have been largely involved in the consultation process of the *Assemblée de Corse*'s consultative body (see below), making a scientifically legitimised input to the State/Region Contract and the tripartite negotiations between the *Rectorat*, the Assemblée de Corse and the University over education plans. As Bierbach and Hartamann (1980: 13–14) put it:

> *The conflation of the activist and scientific discourses is an aspect specific to the Regional Question, precisely because those who, in France, study regionalist movements are themselves actively committed. The boundary between 'objective' analysis and involvement in planning thus disappears.*[*]
> (Quoted by Grob, 1987: 35)

In sum, beyond their important teacher and teacher-training roles, academics play a multitude of roles in Corsican society, being involved in academic, literary and cultural and journalistic activism and, often, in Corsica's political life. Their role as language policy actors is, therefore, central and multifaceted, transcending dichotomies between the scientific and the political, and the public and the private.

Finally, the University has its own internal language policies which it has been able to develop as an autonomous body since a 1984 law that granted universities more autonomy in establishing their own curriculum. One such policy is particularly interesting for our purpose – that of co-officiality adopted in 1990, which in practice resulted first in bilingualism for signposting and drafting of official documents and, second, in the organisation of LCC classes for all students throughout their curriculum with an average of 1.5 weekly hours (planning to reach three hours in 2007–2013 State/Region Plan for LCC). This teaching is compulsory and counts towards the validation of diplomas, which goes

against the French state's legal voluntary principle of language education but has hitherto been unnoticed, or deliberately ignored. Here, the national law of autonomy for universities was interpreted *ex maxima*.

During the 1990s, RML education in Corsica thus considerably evolved and Corsican language-in-education provision was increasingly negotiated in regional institutions *in situ* rather than nationally. Amongst Corsican regional institutions, the Assembly of Corsica played a central role through its specific powers and the *ex maxima* interpretations of the Corsican language-in-education provisions of the State/Region Contracts established from 1989.

L'Assemblée de Corse

Elected in 1982, it was the first political body representing the island as a whole and was largely constituted by the traditional political class – the clans. Although it did not enjoy legislative powers, Article 27 of Corsica's first *Statut Particulier* gave it the right to address proposals pertaining to the economic, social and cultural development of the island to the Prime Minister. In 1983, it passed a first Resolution on language education:

> *L'Assemblée de Corse* [...] *has noted the fundamental character of language as cement of the culture and the urgency to carry out a genuine policy of cultural revival to show its will to give the language back to its people* [...] *[It] has decided to launch a policy of bilingualism within the framework of a triennial plan with the State* [...] *with bilingual education being offered from infants schools to the University* [...] *from next academic year* [...] *language education will be made mandatory and inserted within the curriculum* [...] *the use of Corsican will be made systematic in the toponymy of places, villages, cities, in information and audio-visual training programmes, as well as some acts of public life.*[*]
>
> (Quoted in Marchetti, 1989: 209)

This amounted to a form of officialisation of the language through its increased institutionalisation. The Resolution was altogether rejected by the French Prime Minister on the ground that mandatory bilingual education was incompatible with the respect for individual freedom.

Two subsequent motions moved in similar directions – a 1985 motion suggested making Corsican language education mandatory for the state and optional for students and a 1989 motion to establish French and Corsican as co-official on the island. Both had been prepared by the *Assemblée*'s consultative council representing '[...] *associations, and*

sometimes considered as a counter-power stimulating regional cultural life'* (Fusina, 1994: 219) which, by law, must be consulted on cultural and educational actions, notably those related to the safeguard and diffusion of the Corsican language and culture. This consultative body thus constitutes a gateway to official institutions for various interest groups to participate in policy design.[8] In these particular instances, Assembly men voted them down, which testifies to the fact that the 1983 discursive convergence about mandatory bilingual education between nationalists and certain clans had disappeared (see next chapter).

On the national scene, despite the socialist regime's multiple pledges to respect and promote cultural and linguistic diversity, the government also progressively stepped back into less radical positions between 1982 and 1986. Nor was much improvement to be expected from the right-wing government in power between 1986 and 1988. This is not to say that the *Assemblée de Corse's* potential for actions became non-existent. Indeed, in its 1986 *contrat particulier* with state authorities, it supplemented and/or sponsored language revitalisation actions such as the creation of a lexical database for the Corsican language, the establishment of language laboratories in all secondary education schools, and the production of textbooks and teaching materials. Yet, its more 'legislative' attempts had marked the limits of its political powers and reflected the ongoing dominance of central state authority in state/region negotiations.

Nonetheless, the return of a socialist government to power after 1988 augured further progress, especially after the 1988 visit of Education Minister Jospin, who requested the aforementioned Casanova report and subsequently announced his intention to generalise Corsican language education and to create a Corsican CAPES.

In 1991, Corsica became the *Collectivité Territoriale de Corse* (CTC) through its second *Statut Particulier*, which consecrated further devolution and gave its assembly new powers. Draft Article 1 included a historic motion recognising the *Corsican people*:

> *The French Republic guarantees the living, historic and cultural community constituting the Corsican people the rights to preserve its cultural identity**.
> (Quoted by Fusina, 1994: 227)

Unsurprisingly, the Constitutional Council deemed such an 'institutional recognition' of the *peuple corse* contrary to the French Constitution, the latter stipulating that there exists only one, indivisible

people – the French people. Nonetheless, in the field of education and cultural planning, Article 53 of the *Statut* stipulated that:

> [The] *Assemblée adopts a plan for the development of Corsican language and cultural education and organises its insertion in the curriculum. The modalities of this insertion shall be jointly established by the CTC and the State.**

<div align="right">(ibid: 228)</div>

This formulation significantly departed from that of the 1982 *Statut*, granting the CTC more than a simple advisory, consultative role and reinforcing its powers in negotiating education plans with the state via the *Rectorat* LCC services. The Assemblée's new powers were implemented through the successive contract plans. Starting in 1989, the efforts of the Assembly and the state – and the *Rectorat* for educative actions – were increasingly combined within the frame of the successive Planning Contracts (1989–1993, 1994–1998, 1999–2003, 2003–2006, and 2007–2013). These contracts have consecrated further devolution to the CTC, whose role within the policy network increased along its new political and increased budgetary powers. Through the successive plans, LCC education gradually became generalised,[9] first throughout the school curriculum, then into teacher training programmes, and increasing funds were progressively devoted to didactic, artistic, cultural and literary production in Corsican. Notably, the 1994 Plan entailed the opening of two educational centres for full Corsican language immersion, which was formally legalised *post facto* the following year by a national circular, dated April 7 1995.[10] In the latest Plans, then, the *Assemblée*'s lobbying action has concentrated on the generalisation of bilingual education as the only path for producing Corsican speakers, and it has also sought to generalise the bilingual topographical signposting voted in 1989. Today, this is still not fully implemented, which illustrates the resistance of some part of the population to the increased institutionalisation of the language, as Jaffe shows (1999: 9–11).

   The last important developments regarding the institutional emancipation of the Corsican region were the Matignon Negotiations, initiated in 1999 between the government and the CTC, which led to the *2002 Law No 2002–92 on Corsica** (*Journal Officiel* [JO], 17 January 2002). After long, heated debates, notably about the mandatory character of Corsican language education a number of activists demanded, negotiations resulted in the following 'diplomatic' provision for Corsican language in primary education planning: '*The Corsican language is a subject taught*

systematically and is inserted within timetables of infant and primary schools in Corsica'[11] (Art. L. 312-11-1). This provision consecrated the generalisation of Corsican language education at pre-school and primary levels.

Finally, the report established in preparation for the June 2003 State/CTC Convention for the Development of LCC Teaching underlines that all efforts now tend towards the generalisation of bilingual education in infant schools[12] and its follow-up throughout the curriculum, as well as towards more creation of LCC-specific primary school teaching positions. This 'generalisation' objective is still not fully achieved, but progress is undeniable and has been deemed a priority of the devolved authorities' actions on RML education, with the necessary budgetary allowance. Today, it appears that once the targeted generalisation is completed, Corsica will have obtained the maximum that national RML laws can grant.

Overall, during the 1990s, even before the Matignon negotiations were concluded, through the progressive generalisation of the LCC provision, enrolment in LCC classes became the default choice in early secondary education structures. As of 1999, following a decision by the *Rectorat*, the voluntary nature of LCC education has modified from parents opting into LCC provision to parents opting out of it (*L'Express*, 21 June 2001: 97–100; Arrighi, 2002: 94).[13] Many voices have, however, opposed this shift, which is seen as effectively making LCC education mandatory. In that respect, the positions of the *Association for the Defence of the Rights of Corsica within the Republic** are clear:

> *To force parents to have to opt out of Corsican language and cultural education equates with making it mandatory. This testifies of the hypocrisy underlying the elaboration of a text only meant to satisfy the demands of a minority**

(2000: 8)

This section now concludes on the processes and extent of language institutionalisation in Corsica with two observations on the almost total lack of interest for the Europeanisation of Corsican language revitalisation among Corsican language activists (beyond the funds received for the production of teaching material and *ad hoc* allowances granted to Corsican academics via INTERREG for trans-regional cultural exchanges and the publication of literary works in Corsican; see Chapter 5). My contention is that this limited interest for EU support results from the equally limited nature of EU opportunities for RMLs (see Chapters 2

and 3) but also from a general apathy that hinders private initiatives to language revitalisation (illustrated above by the total disappearance of private Corsican language schools). In that connection, finding that EBLUL's national secretary in 2000 was Corsican, and based in Bastia, I interviewed him during my fieldwork and he readily admitted that EBLUL was merely a letterhead in the Corsican sociolinguistic panorama. Another example of apathy was that the only association putting in a bid for funding during the *EYL 2001* was the anti-racism association. No other cultural/linguistic manifestations took place. I will return to the rationale underlying such apathetic attitudes in Chapter 8. The next, final section attends to the presence of the language within the Corsican community.

Corsican language use in today's Corsican society: quantitative and qualitative aspects

Significant institutional progress has been made since the 1970s to thwart language shift and promote Corsican. Corsican entered diglossic domains from which it had previously been excluded, in particular education. Advances were also made in various other domains, increasing the social visibility of the language. I now briefly sketch advances in literary production, the media and artistic creation, and conclude with some tentative quantitative and qualitative patterns of language use in the population.

Regarding literary production, a first distinction must be established between Corsican-medium productions and others with Corsican themes but in another language. Here I focus on the former. A second distinction separates out oral and written literature. As we saw, the former has always existed in Corsica whereas the latter constitutes a more recent development, finding a new impetus especially from the 1970s as a symbol of Corsican's sociolinguistic maturation and individuation, in the effort to transcend the political language/dialect dichotomy. Put otherwise, oral literature, and in particular poetry and singing, is traditionally ingrained in Corsicans' experience, while using Corsican in 'cultural' writings cannot be completely separated from politico-cultural developments. Today's literary production is largely sponsored by public authorities, but publication figures reflect the tiny size of Corsican-medium readership (Arrighi, 2002: 111–122).

Use of Corsican in the written press remains rare except in the only remaining literary review *Bonanova*. In the daily, weekly and monthly press, articles in Corsican are scarce. However, as the next chapter

shows, articles in French about the status of Corsican and LCC education abound. According to Arrighi, the scarcity of articles *in* Corsican is mainly due to the tiny size of the readership, since older Corsican-speaking generations do not necessarily read the language and younger generations' reading skills are not yet sufficiently developed (2002: 90). Nonetheless, the development of various cultural and/or political websites has helped diffuse the language more widely.

Corsican appeared in the broadcasting media – radio and television – from the 1980s, most importantly after the creation of the ADECEC's radio *Voce nustrale* [our voice] broadcasting entirely in Corsican, and after the regionalisation of the national radio Radio France – that became Radio Corsica Frequenza Mora (RCFM) – and the TV channel FR3 (1982).[14] RCFM is a bilingual radio channel that devotes a large space to Corsican alongside French and has acted as a channel for dialectal contacts through a number of typical radio promotion activities (helping to make it what Thiers calls a *socially-circulating language**; Thiers, 1989: 85*ff*). From 1991, its staff has benefited from language training programmes sponsored by state education authorities and the CTC, and so has that of FR3, although it devotes much less air space to Corsican.[15] I will return to the practical and symbolic importance of a radio and TV channelling Corsican language use(s) and to popular attitudes to Corsican-in-the-media planning in the next chapter.

Finally, drama production and polyphonic singing have grown as popular forms of performing arts, and I previously mentioned the enormous impact and emulation that groups like *Canta u populu corsu* have catalysed and the immense popular success they have encountered. Importantly, they militated by means of a collective oral patrimony to which Corsicans could relate more easily than through the promotion of Corsican as an institutionalised written medium, which in effect was alien to most Corsican *speakers*. To many observers, polyphonic creation in particular bears the hope of sustained 'natural' traditional practice in the language and remains an essential channel of diffusion of nationalist themes.

What emerges from this presentation is that Corsican has progressed into new domains of use, whilst traditional domains of sociocultural language use, like polyphonic singing, have revived and often sustain the diffusion of nationalist rhetoric. To a significant extent, the scarcity of readers of Corsican has, however, limited the success of written-medium channels of language revitalisation and confined these developments to the Corsican literate elites. Oral media like radio, by contrast, have propelled popular Corsican use into new 'public spaces',

albeit in 'private space' guise because, unlike written production, where the sense of hierarchy and authority is intrinsic and omnipresent, radio-channelled forms of practice appear unmonitored and are thus more congruent with traditional Corsican-medium orality. TV is a different issue, as it combines spontaneous expression from Corsicans with more formal journalistic genres and their set of diglossic 'high' themes, e.g. international news, from which Corsican was previously excluded. As Chapter 8 shows, popular attitudes towards such developments have varied. I now tentatively assess quantitative and qualitative patterns of language use on the island as revealed by successive language surveys and then by statistics provided by the *Rectorat* on LCC class attendance in recent years.

Various quantitative surveys have been conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and the National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED) on Corsican language use and competence, reception and/or transmission and/or reading skills since the 1970s. Methodologically, such surveys are limited by their reliance on self-evaluation questionnaires, which were not corroborated by qualitative data and did not address the question of what 'speaking Corsican' means. The results obtained are, therefore, to be taken with extreme caution as '[...] *they are representations of language use rather than accurate reports of practice*' (Kristol, 1996: 7) and are especially problematical in the Corsican context '[...] *where language issues carry heightened social and political significance*' (Thiers, 1986a: 29; both quoted by Jaffe, 1999: 87). A further difficulty is that questions differed from one survey to another.

Table 1   Self-evaluation of language proficiency in Corsican between 1977 and 1995

	Total claiming fluency	Total able to write Corsican	Total claiming some proficiency (a little)	Total claiming understanding Corsican	Total able to read Corsican
1977	69%	33%			
1982	68%		12%		
1995	64%			81%	57%

Source: INSEE statistics; adapted from Arrighi, 2002: 83–85.

Bearing in mind the aforementioned methodological weaknesses, the most complete language survey conducted was that of 1999 when sociolinguistic questions were added to the enquiry on families in the

national census. In Corsica, 200,800 adults (over 18) were surveyed on language reception, transmission and use:

1. In what languages, dialects or 'patois' did your parents usually talk to you when you were about 5?
2. In what languages, dialects or 'patois' did/do you usually talk to your children when they were about 5/now?
3. Today, do you sometimes speak with family, friends, colleagues, shopkeepers, etc., in languages other than French?

Table 2 Evolution of the use of Corsican with parents during the twenieth century.

| | Were spoken to in Corsican at the age of 5 (% of the total of adults surveyed) | | | |
	Usually	Occasionally	Total	Total born in Corsica
Total adults	26	26	53	
Born before WWI	60	15	70	90
During WWII	around 30	around 30		
Born after WWII			55	80
Less than 35 years old	Less than 10%	30	41	44

Source: INSEE and INED, 2004; from data collected in the 1999 census.

Table 3 Use of Corsican with 5-year-old children by parents spoken to in Corsican (except last row)

	Totals parents out of all adults surveyed in Corsica (%)	Total parents spoken to in Corsican (%)	Parents spoken to in Corsican who spoke/speak Corsican to their 5 year-old children out of total parents who were spoken to in Corsican (%)	Parents spoken to in Corsican who spoke/speak Corsican to their 5 year-old children out of total parents surveyed (%)
Parents living in Corsica	72.1	51.9 Occasionally: 27.9 Usually: 27	59.9 Occasionally: 41.9 Usually: 18.4	31.1 Occasionally: 21.7 Usually: 9.5

Table 3   (Continued)

	Totals parents out of all adults surveyed in Corsica (%)	Total parents spoken to in Corsican (%)	Parents spoken to in Corsican who spoke/speak Corsican to their 5 year-old children out of total parents who were spoken to in Corsican (%)	Parents spoken to in Corsican who spoke/speak Corsican to their 5 year-old children out of total parents surveyed (%)
Parents born and living in Corsica	32.6	81.5 Occasionally: 37.6 Usually: 48.6	61.2 Occasionally: 42.1 Usually: 19.4	23 Occasionally: 15.8 Usually: 7.3
Parents born in Corsica but living on mainland France			25.1 Occasionally: 21.2 Usually: 3.8	N/A because not surveyed on the island

Source: INSEE, 2002, provisional results[16]; from data collected in the 1999 census.

Finally, the survey indicates that 45% of all adults – about 90,000 people – claim to speak Corsican with family and/or friends and/or colleagues, etc. The survey revealed the following age differentiations:

Table 4   Use of Corsican in today's Corsica according to age

	Adults surveyed speaking Corsican today
Generations born between 1900 and 1925	60%
Generations born in the 1940s	Below 50%
Generations born in the mid 1960s	40%
Generations born in the late 1970s	33%
Under 35 years old	1. 50% (born in Corsica)[17] 2. 60% (born in Corsica with parents born in Corsica)

Source: INSEE, 2004.

Overall, this survey indicates a gradual decline in both usual and occasional use: 53% of adults surveyed declared they had been spoken

to in Corsican (Table 2) but, in turn, only about 23 and 31% of all pass it on, more occasionally than usually (less than 10% do so usually) (Table 3). Today, older generations still speak the language (with differences according to birthplace, residence and socio-professional categories) but only a third of younger generations do, with somewhat higher figures when Corsican-born (Table 4). In sum, throughout the century, native speaker competences seem to have progressively declined, whilst non-native competences have increased. Language shift seems to have accelerated from the interwar period (Tables 2 and 4), which correlates with the patterns of emigration and demographic change outlined in Chapter 5.

Other sociological indicators further refine the picture, showing that Corsican use varies across socio-professional categories with significant differences between Corsican borns or not. For instance, the highest rates of use are for peasants, pensioners and craftsmen and shopkeepers – usually Corsican born by more than 70% – with, respectively, more than 70%, 50% and 47% using Corsican. At the other end of the social scale, professionals, and workers, less often Corsican born, speak it between 35% and 40%.

As was said above, however, the design of the questionaires leaves inexplicit what speaking Corsican means – With what level of competence? In what registers? – and the categories *usually* and *occasionally* are far too vague for precise interpretations. It is, therefore, impossible to draw precise conclusions about the vitality of the language on the strength of such data, although the trends elicited above do seem to confirm language shift[18] and increasing change in competence towards receptive rather than productive skills. Also it is too early to observe any significant impact on Corsican use from the institutionalisation of the language. As we have seen, school education now almost exclusively leads the revival effort, but it is impossible to predict whether this will suffice to reverse language shift, as those who have benefited from it are not all yet parents, and most were not included in the survey.

I now look at statistics on school attendance provided by the *Rectorat* to examine the extent of parental support towards LCC education.

As this table indicates, between 2000 and 2004, LCC education involved almost all primary school students, despite the fact that only half of primary schoolteachers taught LCC. However, the provision of three hours a week applied to only 16% of pupils, the rest benefiting from an average of two hours (*Journal de la Corse*, 22–28 March 2002: 6–7). With the creation of a special exam to recruit LCC-specific

Table 5 Primary and Secondary LCC education and attendance

	Number of students studying LCC in Primary Education	Number of primary school teachers teaching LCC	Number of students studying LCC in *Collèges* (secondary education, first cycle)	Number of students studying LCC in *Lycées d'enseignement général* ('general' high school)	Number of students studying LCC in *Lycées professionnels* (vocational training high school)	Total of students studying LCC in Secondary Education
2000–2001	**19,614 (78.09% of all students)**	**604 (50.08%)**	6408 (51.63%)	896 (15.36%)	895 (37.45%)	**8199 (39.74%)**
2001–2002	No statistics available	No statistics available	7017 (55.08%)	887 (15.99%)	2276 (43.28%)	**8889 (43.23%)**
2002–2003	**20,031 (84.64%)**	**619 (54.66%)**	7108 (52.1%)	1117 (18.3%)	451 (38.3%)	**8676 (41.43%)**
2003–2004	**20,031 (84.64%)**	**619 (54.66%)**	6733 (48.03%)	1143 (18.5%)	828 (37.7%)	**8704 (38.94%)**

Source: *Rectorat*; http://www.ac-corse.fr/communication/stat/Statistiques.htm; accessed 25 June 2004.

primary schoolteachers since 2002, these figures have increased but not drastically as an annex to the 2005 CTC/State Plan for LCC shows.

In secondary education, results remain more mixed with high enrolment rates during the first two years of *collèges* (for which enrolment is automatic and opting out requires a written request) but a significant fall from the third year in *collèges*.[19] At *lycée* level, where enrolment is no longer automatic, rates also fall, although this is somewhat less marked in vocational education where LCC enrolment remains higher. This may indicate that students destined to working and lower middle class positions are keener to learn Corsican, perhaps because in those social strata Corsican speaking retains a higher value. Interestingly, in that connection, in 2000, an article by the President of the Assemblée consultative body, entitled *Dix ans pour réussir* [Ten Years to Succeed] lamented that elite and bourgeois classes seem less interested in LCC education, essentially because of the lower market value of Corsican. This is perhaps also due to the ongoing perceived political overtones of Corsican speaking: speaking Corsican is still marked as a nationalist political statement. All this reflects varying parental attitudes (with differentiations according to socio-professional categories that echo the survey results above) regarding the institutionalisation of the language now that provision is more widely available, and enrolment practices significantly conflict with discourses according to which a large majority of Corsicans – 62% according to a 2000 opinion poll – actually support mandatory Corsican language education (*Corsica*, January 2000: 12).

In her detailed account of the mid-1980s debates surrounding mandatory Corsican language education, Jaffe reports on the large variety of opinions – *pro-* or *anti-* mandatory language education – among both elites and the population, and she shows that these opinions are grounded in a wide array of attitudes towards the institutionalisation of language and towards the various values linked to the freedom of choice in matters relating to language use (see Jaffe, 1999:170–177 and the next chapter). Language revitalisation is not merely a matter of reversing diglossic language asymmetries by extending the boundaries of Corsican's official domains of use, but it also involves various, often antagonistic, attitudes that can potentially hinder the implementation of language plans.

This chapter has shown that glottopolitical powers have been largely devolved to Corsican activists in devolved institutions. To some extent, the Corsican Assembly's 1983 failed attempt to make Corsican a compulsory subject at school and the later attempt to prompt French-Corsican co-officiality were somewhat compensated by the *de facto* generalisation

of Corsican language education in secondary schools and higher education. However, although the generalisation of LCC provision guarantees that a certain freedom of choice regarding LCC education *can* be exercised in schools, it does not guarantee that this freedom *will* be exercised. The amalgamation of the possibility of choice and of the actual exercise of choice is tantamount to assuming that the desire for institutionalised language education is universal. Moreover, as was reiterated by Kristol and Thiers above, and as Jaffe's study constantly emphasises (Jaffe, 1999), and as the statistics on school attendance presented in this chapter confirm, the discrepancy between discourses on language use – what people say that they do or want – and actual language behaviour must be taken into account: the discourse on mandatory language education – 62% of opinions favourable to it – does not necessarily translate into 62% of pupils attending LCC classes. The shift noted above from the generalised *possibility* to the eventual quasi-*imposition* of LCC education triggered unexpected forms of popular disinterest and/or resistance to language institutionalisation, which quantitative data on the continuous decline of language use and mixed patterns of school attendance tends to confirm.

As was claimed in Chapter 1, and as the next chapter will further illustrate, in the very design of language plans, language planners must give careful consideration to the various folk ideologies at play in a given situation and the attitudes they determine (and to the fact that people may behave in complex, and sometimes inconsistent, ways). Although people are not policy actors *strictu sensu*, language policy acceptance (as shaped by political and/or language ideologies), or the lack thereof, ultimately conditions language policy success or failure, as Chapter 8 dramatically shows.

Conclusion

The 1970s attested to mass popular mobilisation for the language led by nationalist movements. This resulted in greater tolerance from the state towards the teaching of all France's regional languages and cultures, even though this was initially enacted through limited legal provisions and modest and uneven structural and implementation measures. Symbolically, however, these measures constituted a giant step that began to meet nationalist language demands and were, therefore, instrumental in divorcing the language question from the more radical political claims with which it had been conflated from the late 1960s and to a large extent around the Deixonne Law issue. Indeed, treating

Corsican on the same terms as France's other RMLs, the state significantly undermined nationalists' mobilising claims that Corsicans were systematically discriminated against. As a Corsican stage actor observed in 1986, under the socialist government allegedly more prone to promote RMLs: '[. . .] *The language situation has only worsened* [. . .] *responding to cultural demands but emptying them of their political content, the current government is accelerating and completing assimilation*'* (quoted in Marchetti, 1989: 212). The law's central emphasis on the voluntary basis for such teaching, both for teachers and families, meant that the state initially accompanied rather than directed teaching initiatives. The responsibility for language re-acquisition was thus reattributed to Corsicans themselves, and the limited results initially obtained soon entailed new demands from language activists, i.e. mandatory LCC education and co-officiality.

From the 1980s, new public institutional structures were created which catalysed the emergence of a Corsican language policy network. Within this network, in addition to central state authorities, the dominant actors have since been the political representatives and members of the consultative body of the Corsican assembly on the one hand, and civil servants from the *Rectorat* and university and IUFM lecturers, and among them sociolinguists, on the other. The former deal essentially with issues of status but with limited political outcomes; the latter have largely captured the corpus planning process and, in general, deal with the interpretation of national law and/or the implementation of the new educational provisions. Thus, new institutionalised elites largely took over the revitalisation process from civil society's organisations, and in particular from language associations with a nationalist agenda (e.g. *Scola Corsa*), even though the re-birth of cultural forms of language promotion (e.g. with polyphonic bands and in performing arts) has continued to diffuse a more or less radical nationalist discourse. However, Corsica constitutes a unique case among the largest French RML communities in that Corsica's associative schools have almost disappeared.

This absence of associative initiatives may originate from its political history under the French umbrella, when it was maintained in a greater state of dependence *vis-à-vis* state administration from an early stage than other regions (see Chapter 5) and, as was noted above, the resulting apathy may help partially explain the lack of interest for EU support among language activists. One consequence of that enduring, exclusive reliance on state intervention has been that, in the absence of associative initiatives, those actors who occupy public

positions from which they promote RMLs have a quasi-monopoly of control over public resources and structures/institutions (i.e. schools). Because of their institutional position, their freedom of expression may be more constrained but having prime access to public resources for RML confers them a dominant status on which (natural) forms of resistance to (their) institutional authority can in turn focus (see Chapter 8).

Notwithstanding, most importantly, Corsican has penetrated formerly out-of-reach diglossic domains of use: the media and in particular education. The quantitative impact of the former has remained rather limited but, in education, the status and presence of Corsican improved to an extent unprecedented and unequalled in other French regional communities. This perhaps also partially explains why language planners have not sought RML support from the EU: the EU has little to offer in terms of RML support, and Corsican activists have already obtained the maximum that can be retrieved from current national RML legislation. Indeed, by contrast with the other French RML communities, and thanks to 'zealous' state education executives, the provision of LCC education is becoming almost universal on the island, and LCC has become the default choice, so much so that it can arguably be seen as a form of quasi-mandatory provision. Despite such structural improvements, activists still lament the decrease in Corsican language use and the perceived disengagement of the population, illustrated by the quantitative data examined. This disengagement is especially marked among certain sociological and socio-professional categories, which may bring about the imminent death of Corsican, if the community does not accompany and supplement structural and institutional achievements.

The next chapter will seek to explain why the 1970s massive discursive support for institutionalisation has apparently failed to be sustained and transformed into actual support for LCC education from the 1980s. As this chapter illustrates, it cannot be blamed on the absence of structures or funds.

8
Language Ideologies, Language Planning and Language Attitudes in Contemporary Corsica

Introduction

This final chapter explores the various ideologies underlying Corsican language debates and language-targeting decisions, and status and corpus planning measures. It proposes another complementary reading to the previous chapters, focusing on the different ideological and normative positions on language and language planning of the local language network's various actors, and on whose positions are hegemonic in the actual planning process.

After being a bone of contention between the region and central authorities, language revitalisation largely became an internal matter when its institutional organisation was devolved to regional actors. This chapter shows that this did away with the original large consensus that had formed around the inclusion of Corsican in the Deixonne Law. The initial wider (symbolic?) popular support for Corsican linked with nationalism dissolved due to both the progressive disfavour of nationalist movements (see Chapter 5), and the fact that once relocated into Corsicans' hands the politics of language became more contested, because LCC-related policy powers were captured by educational elites and to a lesser extent the traditional political class (see Chapter 7). These disputes may partially reflect the pattern suggested in Chapters 5 and 7, whereby, due to their 'natural' rejection of external authority, in their conflicts with outsider powers Corsicans tend to unite, whereas in internal politics divisions prevail. As institutional provisions for LCC were gradually secured, the language status question, initially about Corsican being granted legal recognition, also became embedded in other, more corpus-based issues linked to the principles and modalities of implementation of the LCC policy. A number of new issues became salient and

increasingly divisive: Is Corsican a language? What should be the link between Corsican and Italian in the revitalisation strategy and process? How can language/dialectal diversity be tackled in education policy? What Corsican variety should be taught?

This chapter identifies what and whose answers to such questions have prevailed, investigating which discourses on language and language planning are hegemonic in contemporary Corsica and assessing the amount of consensus built around that hegemony. My ultimate aims are to understand what the dominant order of discourse on language and language planning is in contemporary Corsica, to scrutinise the resistant discourses in that order, and to analyse the policy outcomes of discursive struggles in their implication for the revitalisation process, and eventually to examine how Corsica's internal glottopolitical dynamics affect the interaction between the local and supra-local levels.

The first section broadly contrasts two largely antithetical models of language, identity and their interrelation – the 'diglossic' model and the 'polynomic' model. First reviewing the set of norms and attitudes persisting from the earlier hegemony of the diglossic model, and the problems they posed in the Corsican context, I then outline the theoretical contours of the polynomic approach as an alternative, plural model of language, identity and language planning. The polynomic model has been largely promoted by language planners since the 1980s to overcome some of the problems created by a language planning framework based upon diglossic ideology and eventually gain the popular support so sorely needed for language revitalisation. The following sections show that, although the polynomic model has become dominant in educational practice, it faces a large amount of constestation. Specifically, I sketch three forms of resistance to language planning efforts embedded in various ways in the diglossic model and its essentialist assumptions – what I call, after Jaffe (1999), the 'resistance of separation', the Italianist position and language purism. All language models posit the equation of national unity with language unity, but they differ radically in their conception of linguistic unity. In the following section on the implementation of the polynomic model in education and its limitations, I then show that some of the thorniest issues dividing Corsicans revolve around the dialectics of linguistic unity and diversity and the meaning of that dialectics for definitions of *language* and the modalities of its planning. The final section then focuses on elite and popular reactions to language planning, largely basing my analysis on press-mediated debates on Corsican language status and corpus planning gathered during my fieldwork on the island in 2000–2001.

In the conclusion, I tentatively delineate routes of evolution of the Corsican sociolinguistic situation on the island and then in the broader trans-regional and supranational contexts.

Contrasted models of language and identity for language planning: diglossic ideology and the polynomic response

Chapter 1 showed that the concept of diglossia gives only a very coarse picture of the functional distribution of languages and says little about actual language repertoires and language practices. Looking diachronically at the construction of diglossic situations does reveal the process, whereby language status inequalities are established as a correlate of the construction of political inequalities between language groups and thus helps understand the establishment and contemporary functioning of political economies of language. Yet even historically-informed analyses of glottopolitical economies say little about actual language practices.

In the account of the processes of construction of Corsican-French diglossia, I evoked the range of essentialist discourses on the link between language and nation and on language itself that the architects of diglossia summoned and instrumentalised (see Chapters 1 and 4). These discourses contributed to secure the dominance of French political and linguistic identities, to the detriment of Italian and then Corsican political and linguistic identities. However, dominated identities did not disappear altogether, glottophagy was incomplete, and resistant political and linguistic ideologies became salient, borne by regionalist and nationalist groups. As was claimed in Chapter 5, the political philosophy invoked by the nationalist groups seeking to secure a popular basis to legitimise their political claims at various times of nationalist upsurges was embedded in the romantic, cultural model of language nationalism that had taken root in Corsica during the nineteenth century (Chapter 6).

In their opposition to the state, nationalists called upon the cultural model of the nation and claimed a separate Corsican identity, thus reinforcing the French-Corsican diglossic binary model of opposition in which Corsicanness is defined as everything that Frenchness is not, and vice versa. Ultimately, their purpose was to reverse language shift by revitalising the Corsican identity through the institutional promotion of the Corsican language. They tapped into their experience of how French had come to dominate and applied the same method to Corsican. This is what Jaffe called the *resistance of reversal* (1999: Chapter 1) and Heller the 'old politics of identity' (1999: Chapter 1). The previous

chapter showed that the basic strategy consisted in installing Corsican into High diglossic domains. To do so, literacy – the passage to writing – and language standardisation and elaboration were key goals to attain to prove that Corsican was a *language* (recall the initial objections to the inclusion of Corsican in the Deixonne Law on the grounds that it was not yet unified nor codified in Chapter 6) and could thus fulfil all High diglossic functions – literary expression, education, media communication, etc. However, as Jaffe highlights, this strategy reproduced the dominant set of values underlying the diglossic ideology they had internalised, rather than challenged its fundamental tenets about the nature of *language* (Jaffe, 1999). Consequently, *before* such key goals were attained, the problem for Corsican activists was that Corsican varieties fulfilled none of the linguistic criteria for '*language*-ness': Corsican had no apparent unity, was mainly characterised by infinite geographical variation and had no standard form and no literary models (ibid: 24 *ff*).

In short, nationalists claimed some political legitimacy and sought popular support by summoning a separate, Corsican identity indexed by a distinct language but, in doing so, embraced the very strategy and values that had devalued their own identity and values and dismissed Corsican's status as a *language*. With such a paradoxical attitude, they faced significant popular resistance to their strategy which this chapter later examines as the 'resistance of separation'.

To respond to the urgency of the situation, some Corsican activists proposed a model of language in which languageness would also be based on unity but where unity would not be conceived as uniformity as in traditional models of standardisation. Rather, they suggested adopting a plural model of language unification based on the notion of unity in diversity rather than uniformity. This model was then fostered by the Corsican sociolinguists dominating the Corsican language policy network from the mid-1980s. It was predicated on the concept of *polynomic languages*.

The concept was first coined at a 1983 symposium by Marcellesi but, arguably, it is implicit in Geronimi and Marchetti's 1971 definition of the Corsican language in their proposal for a spelling/pronunciation system that could almost exhaustively account for all Corsican varieties, *Intricciate e Cambierini*:

> *We call 'Corsican language' the sum of all spoken varieties, distinguished from one another by slight variations, in use on the territory of Corsica* [...] *we object to the 'concept of clarification through the reduction to ideal forms'* [...] *We believe that the uniformisation* [of the language]

can only result from the constant and general use of the langage, and that [its] *unification – in any case unrealistic – would constitute some impoverishment based on amputations decided by some self-appointed judges, which Corsican users would legitimely and swiftly reject.*[*][1]

Marcellesi's 1983 definition of polynomic languages referred to:

[. . .] *languages the unity of which is abstract and results from a dialectical movement rather than from their mere ossification into a unique norm, and the existence of which is based upon the collective decision of their speakers to give them particular names and declare them autonomous from other known languages*[*].

(1983: 314)

Both approaches articulate the refusal to establish a single, arbitrary norm, claiming that there can be *language* unity in *dialectal* diversity. The former leaves open the possibility for a uniform variety to emerge naturally in the long run – a koîne – and re-emphasies the importance of non-authoritative attitudes. The latter relates the very existence of the language to the *popular will* to identify it as autonomous and distinct from other languages. As Marchetti (1989: 195), citing Thiers (1986b: 19–20), recalls, however, the notion of *popular will*, found in Heinz Kloss's theory of language elaboration, '[. . .] *does not always express the will of the majority nor reflects that of members from all social strata of the population in question*'[*], and he denounces that popular will can be '[. . .] *the opinion of a restricted part of middle-classes, and particularly of some intelligentsia.*'[*] For Marchetti, the limited nature of 'popular will' delegitimises its possible role in the birth of the Corsican language. It is, he claims, little more than a theoretical creation of language activists with nationalist inclinations, to legitimate their politicisation of the language situation (ibid: 195–196).

In subsequent definitions of the polynomic character of languages, its proponents have then increasingly insisted on the centrality of the social-psychological criterion of tolerance towards and within diversity and objection to any form of linguistic hierarchisation. As Marcellesi (1989: 170; quoted by Jaffe, 1999: 185) writes:

[A polynomic language is] *a language the unity of which remains abstract and to which its users recognize several modalities of existence, all equally tolerated without establishing any hierarchy or functional specialization. Its existence rests upon its speakers' mutual tolerance for varieties differing*

> *phonologically and morphologically, and lexical multiplicity is seen as a token of its richness.*[*]

The notion of polynomic languages thus underscores the refusal to create a hierarchy between linguistic varieties for and through standardisation processes. In theory, thus, it offers solutions to one of the premises underlying Corsicans' resistance to authority and hierarchisations: a plural norm dismisses the need for selection and all varieties are equally valued. Opposed to diglossic ideological attitudes and values, polynomic attitudes thus seek to de-stigmatise dialectal loyalty and linguistic diversity, representing them as richness rather than as problems, and therefore as compatible with Corsican's status as a *language*. Put otherwise, polynomic theory implies attitudes of inter-tolerance directly opposed to diglossic ideas of linguistic hierarchisation based upon praise or stigmatisation, and it is anchored in people's practices.

Yet, as we will see below, the implementation of polynomic theory in the educational system requires establishing some limits to variation and diversity. The polynomic approach to how language should be conceptualised in a minority language revitalisation situation like Corsica can thus be located somewhere on a 'language status' continuum between a diglossic model presenting an idealised vision of language repertoires where languages are monolithic, bounded and distinct, and ethnographic accounts of language performance showing that languages are polymorphous and that mixed codes are central in minorities' language repertoires.

I will demonstrate below that language planners of the sociolinguistic school of thought seeking to promote such a practice-based model of language and language planning as polynomy have encountered both elite and popular resistance to language planning due to this wide discrepancy between deeprooted diglossic representations of language use and actual language practices.

In popular discourses on language (i.e. metalinguistic discourses), indeed, the binary, oppositional dichotomisation of linguistic systems is often fiercely maintained against ethnographic evidence of plural language uses (i.e. code mixing and code switching; for empirical evidence, see Thiers, 1989: 70–115 and Jaffe, 1999: 108–117) because of the symbolic weight language practices acquire in a diglossic ideological framework: language practices become a metaphor for political identities and loyalties. This further attests to the ideological force of diglossic ideology with its fundamental, essentialist logic of separation of both languages and cultural and/or political identities. By contrast, the

polynomic framework implies that this dichotomisation is a construct and by showing that, in situations of language contact, languages are often mixed, it suggests that identities too can be mixed and/or plural.

I now show that one main source of resistance to language planning, as it developed in Corsica, is linked to the internalisation of the diglossic model of oppositional identities which, following Jaffe (1999), I call the *resistance of separation*. This attitude can be found amongst some of the remaining native speakers who, according to the evidence of Table 4 above (Chapter 7), were/are spoken to in Corsican in 'Low' diglossic domains and have managed to pass it on 'naturally'. Typically, they do not abide by moderate or radical nationalist claims for Corsican's co-officialisation, prefering to keep Corsican in the private sphere.

The resistance of separation

The 'resistance of separation' is a direct social psychological product of the processes that have led to the Corsican-French diglossic situation. In Corsica, it refers to the resistance to the imposition of Frenchness at the political and linguistic levels outlined in the previous three chapters.

We saw that diglossia was produced by the French nationalist dichotomisation of language *versus* dialect, in which the French language was glorified, *inter alia* because of its (uni-)formal qualities, and the 'dialects' stigmatised for the opposite reason. Paradoxically, however, these normative, hierarchical grounds for separation helped preserve Corsican and Corsicanness from everything Frenchness embodied and sought to assimilate. This is what Bourdieu (1991) calls the alternative market:[2] whereas in the market dominated by French hierarchies Corsican varieties and Corsicanness were devalued, Corsicans maintained a parallel market in which Corsicanness could retain its value. In this reactive alternative market, discourses reinforce group boundaries in such ways that Frenchness cannot permeate them: in discourse Corsican-ness crystallises as everything Frenchness is not.[3] Within this dichotomy, any link between language and identity remains natural, local and typically rural and non-hierarchical, and communication is exclusively oral.

Thus, the resistance of separation endorses the biological essentialist theory of the nation in which language, as the primary marker of identity, is acquired naturally as the 'mother-tongue': '*Corsican cannot be taught in schools*'* (Thiers, 1989: 238). The groups priding themselves on maintaining family transmission perceive institutionalisation as dispossessing since institutionalisation contradicts the existence of

Corsican as a *natural* feature of the Corsican nation, i.e. the mother tongue image. Of course, it is now established that Corsican is no longer anyone's 'mother tongue' (which in diglossic essentialism implies exclusive early monolingualism in Corsican) although it is sometimes still family transmitted. Thus, for sociolinguists like Thiers (1989: 242), it matters to raise popular awareness of the dichotomy between the 'mother tongue' image that symbolically reflects the collective identity function of language but is today unreal, and the plural reality of language practices and sometimes of language transmission. Further, from the deeprooted essentialist equation 'one language = one culture = one nation', substituting the state for the family implies denying the naturalness of language transmission which, Jaffe suggests (1999: 125), has the following implication: '*no* language = *no* culture = *no* nation'. Institutionalisation can thus be de-authenticating.

Paradoxically, institutionalisation can also deprive Corsican of prestige in that only very restricted intellectual elite groups, and not the bulk of the Corsican-*speaking* population, possess a command of the institutionalised, written Corsican language. In redefining Corsican as a written medium used in High diglossic domains, and therefore in transposing Corsican into the strongly hierarchised world of French values, the alternative Corsican values of orality, informality and tradition become relegated to a position of secondary importance. The institutionalisation of the language through writing can thus be seen as an attempt by some newly emerged intellectual class to establish new power hierarchies, with the result that their discourse of language democracy is simply not heard (see below).

As was claimed above, the question of mixed forms is interesting and illustrates the discrepancy between actual practices and discursive positioning. Whereas mixed forms are highly stigmatised in the dominant linguistic market, in the alternative market they are common practice and '[. . .] *index a (minority) community of use defined by its ability to manipulate more than one language'* (Jaffe, 1999: 26). Whilst constructing a new form of minority identity, therefore, local plural uses also question and challenge dominant views of language as monolithic and bounded. However, in discourse, the unity/purity and exclusive integrity of minority language use as a reflection of the separation of identities can be fiercely defended (see Thiers' *fable d'identité*, 1989: Chapter 11). As Jaffe (1999: 29) puts it:

> [. . .] *The diglossic schema* [. . .] *comprises multiple and conflicting values attached to both Corsican and French that are in simultaneous operation in*

Corsica. The coexistence of these competing discourses means that in actual practice, dominant and alternative linguistic marketplaces are not always clearly delineated. [. . .] These moments of integration of plural identities, however, are seldom articulated in the public discussion of language and identity.

And she adds (ibid: 31):

[. . .] *explicit linguistic ideology seems to bolster the simple, exclusionary nature of the binary model, even though people express contradictory opinions and behave in complicated ways. This is [. . .] one of the reasons that literary and academic justification of a plural model of language identity fall on deaf ears: they keep the focus at the metadiscursive level where the hold of dominant language ideology seems to be difficult to avoid.*

Other motivations underlying the resistance of separation include the denial that language planning is necessary, even when it is aimed at the survival of Corsican,[4] or even legitimate. Regarding the latter, as a form of exertion of political power, and therefore authority, institutionalisation and planning indeed run counter to the non-authoritative value system of the alternative market, and passive or active resistance to this system sustains a consistent logic of total or partial opposition. The resistance of separation, therefore, thwarts the resistance of reversal and rejects hierarchy and authority at all costs, even to the risk of language death. The refusal of Corsican Assemblymen to vote for obligatory bilingualism and mandatory Corsican language education (1985) and co-officiality (1989) may be interpreted as an illustration of that logic, whereby the natural, uninstitutional, non-authoritative value of Corsican initially precluded its official imposition (see Chapter 7; and Jaffe, 1999: 170–177).

Finally, and most importantly in a context where linguistic identity remains predominantly local, the institutionalisation of the language through education (even in a polynomic approach as will be seen below) triggers a process of code selection for standardisation, which alienates the speakers of all un-chosen varieties. Additionally, other channels of language elaboration may also clash with traditional registers of use so that radical forms of the resistance of separation can entail 'separatist' reflexes against the creation of new domains of language use (e.g. TV, the radio, etc.; see below). In brief, the resistance of separation can manifest itself in attitudes towards both the socio-political status of the language

and its corpus and can be expressed in more or less radical ways. In all its numerous guises, it is immersed in diglossic ideology.

In the two following sections, I return to the initial, more corpus-based objections to including Corsican in the Deixonne Law and to the institutionalisation of Corsican from both the legislators and some proportion of the Corsican people. I explore issues linked to linguistic kinship with Italian and to purist challenges to language revitalisation processes.

Language of France or dialect of Italian? The Italianist position

The objections to Corsican's inclusion in the Deixonne law were dual: first, it was not a language but a group of dialects; second, it was a group of dialects of Italian. Activists were first to respond to these two objections. I dealt with the issue of Corsican's status as a language in the opening section above. With reference to linguistic kinship with Italian, this has remained a hot potato in activist milieus to date – how close/distant is Corsican to/from Italian?

Following Jaffe (1999: 132–133), I believe that it is not possible to discuss the kinship issue only in strict linguistic terms, because the selection of particular linguistic criteria of assessment (e.g. syntax) rather than others (e.g. lexis) cannot remain politically and ideologically neutral. Linguistic boundaries serve to establish boundaries between identities and are, therefore, inherently political and ideological. As Comiti (1992: 57) writes:

> *What matters is not what unites Romance Languages* [. . .] *but rather what sufficiently distinguishes them today so they can be seen as different languages.**

He thus implicitly acknowledges that the identification of some 'sufficient' difference is subjective and, therefore, ideological. But were the features that serve to emphasise the distance today non-existent yesterday or was there rather no political will to solicit them? Echoing Walker Connor's (1990; excerpt reproduced in Hutchinson and Smith, 1994: 154–159) question *when* is a nation? one could ask: *when* is a different *language*? When does a variety cease being a *dialect*? The answer can only be political and ideological; therefore, it ought to be acknowledged upfront as a political/ideological decision. As Létia (*Corsica*, January 2000: 62) puts it: '*Between linguistically-related languages, the claim that a*

language is autonomous constitutes a social and political choice'*. The question then becomes: what political/ideological purposes/interests do uses of the essentialist discourse on language and identity serve?

The debate on Corsican's linguistic kinship with Italian – assertions of linguistic distance or closeness – largely predates the 1970s' cultural revival. As Chapter 6 showed, during the nineteenth century, Corsican and Italian were perceived as two varieties of the same linguistic system, by both the people and some acclaimed intellectuals hesitating between France and Italy (e.g. Tommaseo, Viale). This is still the Italianists' position today (Marchetti, 1989 and 1997). At the turn of the century, the move towards Corsican's individuation actually came from two directions with two contradictory purposes. First, Santu Casanova's *A Tramuntana* empirically 'invented' Corsican as a journalistic and literary language and as a cultural substitute for fading Italian, thus signing one of the birth certificates of Corsican regionalism through the individuation of a language for the Corsican nation. Second, the French state also invoked linguistic distance between Corsican and Italian – implicitly endorsing the individuality of Corsican – but as a means to dismiss Italian (Thiers, 1989: 28–29). In both cases, linguistic individuation was strategic or political. By the same token, the interwar review *L'Annu Corsu* advocated maximum distance from Italian to oppose the strategic discourse of kinship adopted by Fascist irredentism (which the Muvrists had endorsed; see Chapter 6). Similarly, in the post-WWII context, as the state then invoked again linguistic kinship with Italian to justify the exclusion of Corsican from the Deixonne Law, Corsican cultural revivalists sought again to dismiss linguistic kinship between Corsican and Italian (Fusina, 1994). In the 1970s again, activists had to prove that Corsican was not (any longer?) a dialect of Italian and, as Jaffe (1999: 136 & 141) illustrates, even in the 1990s they had to face objections to the 'language' status of Corsican, from both state officials and Corsicans.

The Italianist voice nevertheless reappeared in the late 1980s, in part because some perceived Corsican as increasingly 'bastardised' by French interference (see the discussion of the Casanova Report in Chapter 7 and of purism below). The Italianists' emblematic figure is Pascal Marchetti, a linguist, language historian and journalist, opposed to the individuation of Corsican from Italian. In *La Corsophonie*, a history of the Corsican language, he largely documents Corsican's linguistic and sociolinguistic debt to Italian. In the late 1980s, a significant number of intellectuals followed him, who petitioned for the teaching and learning of Italian and/or objected to the instrumental, sometimes 'constructed' distantiation between the two.[5]

The Italianist position largely rests on the essentialist position discussed in Chapter 6: '*Italian is not a foreign language for us, but the language of our history and culture*'* (Poli, 1989; quoted by Jaffe, 1999: 137). Two points are never questioned: Corsican and Italian are mutually intelligible, and the knowledge of Italian gives access to Corsica's whole written tradition – historical, literary and legal – before French annexation. From that essentialist perspective, Italian thus constitutes a historical reference point, anchoring Corsican in its antique, cultural cradle and also in its linguistic structure from which, Italianists say, French has begun to uproot it (Casanova, 1996; cited by Jaffe, ibid: 139–140). As Mondoloni (*Corse-Matin*, March 2001) put it, following Marchetti's publication (2001) – *L'Usu Corsu*, a Corsican-Italian-French lexicon:

[…] *Marchetti embodies* […] *the linguistic, critical consciousness of Corsica* […] *Hence the refusal to dig Corsican out of its obvious and natural roots; hence too the constant objection to lazy direct literal translation which, under the pretext of keeping the language alive, can only impoverish it further*.*

The Italianist position flatteringly and devotedly expressed here is thus also a form of language purism calling upon 'obvious and natural roots' and refusing to endorse linguistic interference from French which impoverishes the language and ends up killing it. In that connection, when interviewed a few weeks later and asked if Corsican could survive, after vituperating against code mixing and the sociolinguists (see below), Marchetti further stated:

Yes, if through the joint teaching and simultaneous practice of both registers one courageously acknowledges the **mother language,** [the] *common denominator and indispensable counterweight to balance out French's solid position** […]

(*JDC*, 2–8 March 2001) (Emphasis added)

Also interesting in Marchetti's quote above, although this may seem paradoxical, is how essentialism can also be summoned to establish a difference between Italian and Corsican by emphasising that Italian is Corsican's 'mother language' understood as its standardised variety (*common denominator*). For Marchetti, this locates the unity of Corsican varieties in Italian, and the latter has instrumental value in that

it can thwart French on its own (Linguistic? cultural? political? all together?) terms.[6]

Implicitly, however, this undermines the idea that Corsican possesses a cultural existence on its own (recall Thiers' quotation on Italian jeopardizing Corsican via hegemony, whereas French threatened it via glottophagy). Further, the subordination of Corsican to Italian has inclined some Italianists to define the future role of Corsican as an auxiliary to the Italian language like Alsatian is an auxiliary to German (Peretti, 1995: 1) and to underscore Corsican's important role at the dawn of newly defined trans-regional relations within the framework of the European Union (e.g. through the INTERREG European exchange programme).[7] In educational practice, as was indicated in Chapter 7, the Corsican/Italian association has been implemented through the Mediterranean classes (in which Corsican is taught in parallel with Romance languages such as Italian and Spanish).

Of course, seeing Corsican pragmatically as a mere auxiliary for learning Italian denies that Corsican is autonomous, with a cultural personality of its own, and therefore a cultural value – in the Whorfian sense – *per se* (and ultimately a political value – in the Fichtean sense – for nationalists). For Geronimi, this is the heart of the dispute: he posits that the only value of the Corsican language is to actualise a specific Corsican identity and worldview and dismisses its pragmatic value for accessing the Italian culture: '[...] *otherwise one should learn Italian directly*'* (Geronimi, May 2001, Interview with the author).

The subordination of Corsican to Italian, finally, also implicitly expresses an anti-nationalist position which has further crystallised antagonistic views of language(s) and political identities amongst Corsicans and, incidentally, denies 30 years of militant, nationalist rhetoric and planning efforts. As Létia writes:

> *This would seemingly imply concluding on the failure of actions to make Corsican a language in its own right, and reconstituting the Italian-Corsican language-dialect couple** [...].
>
> (Corsica, January 2000: 63)

It is therefore anachronistic, as Létia's use of the conditional mood satirically shows: the autonomy of Corsican has largely been built and there is no turning back. Arguably, it nevertheless reflects a major source of division between the elites on the legitimacy of Corsican cultural nationalism (in both its moderate and radical forms) and further undermines the chances for popular support to language planning.

The next section sketches the position of language planners towards another major theme of debate in Corsican language activism, which is a most prominent manifestation of linguistic essentialism – language purism. As argued in the subsequent and last section, this also hinders successful language planning.

Language purism and the sociolinguistic response

In the Corsican context, language purism is a prescriptivist reaction against linguistic interference – semantic, syntactic, lexical and phono-logical – from French and, to a lesser extent, Italian. Like all forms of purism, it rests upon some ideology of an original, ideal state of the lan-guage from which any subsequent deviance can but be a 'bastardisation' and thus an impoverishment. From a biological essentialist perspective, further, this bastardisation is related to a dilution of a perfect state of Corsican identity, its corruption by alien influences, and can therefore have nationalist overtones (see Chapter 1). Linguistic impurities thus become a symptom of cultural in-authenticity: the loss of traditional linguistic distinctions impoverishes the language and signals a loss of identity (Franchi, 1984 and 1988; quoted by Jaffe, 1999: 150). Put other-wise, language purism is a constitutive element of a radical diglossic attitude of separation in which both language and identities are and must remain bounded and exclusive.

Nevertheless, if one accepts the idea that the language must be ela-borated to survive and that diglossic boundaries must disappear, from the purist viewpoint, language planners must revive authentic, but forgotten, vocabulary and coin new words using the language's own morphological mechanisms to adapt it to the linguistic needs of modern life (see the actions of the ADECEC and Franchi's description of the philosophy of *Rigiru* the main literary review in the 1970s, in *Corsica*, March 2000: 57). In doing so, they participate in the effort to reverse language shift by providing the dominated language with the vocab-ulary to fulfil the functions formerly reserved for the dominant one. In this conception, language planners ought to help diffuse a model of correctness and authenticity after identifying pure original, uncorrupted forms: they must preserve authentic identities by preserving authentic language.

In line with diglossic compartmentalisation, however, language purism can be more or less salient according to the degree of formality of the context. As an illustration of that kind of diglossic or 'compart-mentalized' purism, a very eminent cultural and linguistic activist, once

President of the Conseil de la Culture, de l'Education et du Cadre de Vie (CCECV), said:

> *When I chat with someone in the street, I do not judge whether he speaks Corsican well or not. However, I consider that since Corsican is today no longer spoken and only heard on the radio and a little on TV, those on radio and TV who speak it, should speak it correctly. This is what is expected from someone speaking French on the radio. Now, in the street I don't mind: all day long I chat with people who speak Corsican using lots of French words and syntactic structures, but this is no business of mine as I am not a judge. But those responsible for teaching it must speak it* [correctly]. *Alas, I long for teachers linguistically and culturally very competent* * [...]
> (Bassani, 22 February 2001, Interview with the author)

For sociolinguists, language purism is unjustifiable for both philosophical and practical reasons. On the philosophical front, even though they acknowledge that certain forms can hurt some linguistic sensitivities, they object to purist, normative attitudes on the fundamental ground that the assumption of original, pure forms is a construction. Thus, Thiers (1989: 43–47) claims that, in Corsica's essentialist historiography, Santu Casanova's *A Tramuntana* plays the symbolic role of the 'founding father' of pure, written Corsican. Yet, as he forcibly demonstrates, the linguistic analysis of excerpts of *A Tramuntana* underlines the discrepancy between its symbolic representation *a posteriori* as an icon of the original uncorrupted norm, and its instrumental use as such in cultural nationalist discourses, and the mixed linguistic reality of the text. As Thiers (ibid: 40) concludes: *When monuments are not available, some are invented. If they are too insignificant, they are dressed in gold.**

Put otherwise, in the Corsican context, in the absence of any description of the so-called ideal state of the language via early grammars and/or a substantial literary corpus, any attempt to judge the quality of language practices with reference to some former 'pure' state of the language is illegitimate. For Thiers, language is therefore best seen as a social construct: there is no absolute linguistic essence; there are no objective, 'natural' language boundaries. In this social constructionist philosophy, but also for the practical purposes of a prominent language planner like Thiers,[8] the Corsican language is what Corsicans collectively speak and say it is. As Jaffe (1999: 153) summarises the sociolinguistic position: '*Thiers thus does not accept the purist premise that French influences deform the essence of the Corsican language because he defines language as practice, not as form.*'

On the practical front, the objection of sociolinguists to purism and purist censors is that the idealisation of linguistic form as the index of cultural authenticity intrinsic to essentialism, rather than legitimising actual practice, risks leaving non-speakers or imperfect speakers out of the 'national' community. Thus, purism either denies national identity to non-speakers or silences 'semi-speakers' already anxious to prove their identity by using Corsican (see Hill, 1985; cited in Jaffe, 1999: 24). As Comiti puts it (in *Corsica*, July 2001: 58):

> [...] *the advocates of a purist discourse on language and the respect of authentic ancient forms inherited from History,* [...] *paradoxically precipitate its demise. For this discourse inhibits, fuelling the anxiety of speakers becoming afraid of making language mistakes, who end up not speaking at all*[*]

This postulate – one language equals one national identity – also largely ignores or wilfully denies the actual plurality of identities in minority populations which surface in multi-form language practices and mixed codes. Yet, in contexts of language endangerment, all speakers are needed to revitalise the language, and no 'waste' can be afforded.

Finally, too much emphasis on the 'retrieval' of original forms can hinder understanding and communication. This has entailed both academic and popular forms of condemnation of purism. An oft-given example is the purist attitude of Sicurani (a prescriptivist columnist in and on Corsican in the weekly *Corse-Matin*) who systematically digs out words from his own experience and knowledge of the oral tradition to replace more gallicized equivalents. Another highly stigmatised derived approach, according to a number of my informants, is the use of Sicurani's vocabulary in the news by TV presenter J. Castellani (see also Létia, in *Corsica*, September 2001: 49–50).

In his column in *Corsica* (February 2001: 53), Arrighi underlines how counter-productive such an approach is:

> *Motivated by the legitimate desire to maintain a patrimony, some, obsessed with lexicon, have undertaken a crusade that – Alas! – risks undermining Corsican by exasperating its speakers. The principle is simple. To designate such object or fact, one claims to know the true word, inherited from some unverifiable memory, of the kind 'heard in June 1923 in the mouth of a ninety-year-old shepherd in such village'. Through never-ending repetition, they seek to impose twenty odd words that have become emblematic. This pedagogy of repetition is channeled via a few diffusing platforms,*

> *columns in the local paper* [by Sicurani] *and on TV news* [by J. Castellani], *the main purpose of which is no longer communication – the main function of any language – but the teaching of vocabulary* [...] *The proposed words undoubtedly come from a Latin dictionary rather than from village traditions*[*] [...]

Likewise, in another criticism of purism but with a different agenda, i.e. to justify the restoration of Italian, Marchetti (*Corsica*, 2002: 53–54) condemns the aforementioned media practices:

> [...] *the media, unable to use the Corsican that people understand, seek to impose another Corsican: a coarse calque of French words and syntax* [...] *mixed with ridiculous neologisms.*[*]

The various forms and degrees of language purism further underline the persistent hold of diglossic ideology and of the biological essentialist position in the context of reversing language shift. Besides this, in a number of discussions I had during my fieldwork, I was told that forms of radical purism like the ones described above could sometimes even put off the most motivated Corsican-speaking language activists and discouraged them from watching TV news in Corsican at all. Overall, even though some forms of purism can be praised when they motivate an interest in lost lexical patrimonies, purism hindering communication is counterproductive and damages the revitalisation process. In Corsica, such forms of purism are quantitatively scarce, but their presence in TV news gives them a wide audience, stimulating mockery and trivial attitudes detrimental to the revitalisation process.

In the next section, I will show how language-in-education planners have challenged both the essentialist dimension of the aforementioned language ideologies (both the Italianist position and language purism) and the oppositional model of identity intrinsic to diglossic ideology, in their implementation in schools of the polynomic principles outlined above.

Challenging diglossic ideology? Implementing polynomy in schools

Despite persisting challenges to calling Corsican a language, it gained institutional status as a language in 1974. As seen above, the main public to convince has been Corsicans themselves, because their support for the revitalisation effort has been strikingly absent despite institutional

gains. The previous sections outlined various forms of resistance to planning effort deeply rooted in the ideological premises of the diglossic model. The opening section sketched the principles underlying the polynomic approach to language and language planning, underlining how it seeks to respond theoretically to some of the problems created by diglossic assumptions in a context of minority language revitalisation like Corsica, e.g. dialectal diversity hinders language unity. In what follows, drawing largely on Di Meglio's PhD thesis on Corsican glottodidactics, I critically examine how the Corsican sociolinguists in charge of Corsican language education have translated the theoretical polynomic principles into practical didactic strategies.

As Di Meglio (1997: 141–194) illustrates, the incorporation of the main philosophical precepts of polynomy (i.e. inter-tolerance between dialectal varieties and refusal to hierarchise) into the field of education practices from the late 1980s has posed a number of problems, notably because pedagogical strategies relating to minority languages that take account of their specific condition as unstandardised languages run counter to dominant pedagogical practices (see also Comiti, *Corsica*, July 2000). In theory, polynomy means that teachers, pupils and, later, students are moulded to accept and tolerate all variability and diversity. Yet, this does not abolish the necessity of norm-setting in practice.

For reasons of space it is not possible to detail here all the problems of implementing polynomic principles in the education domain, so I will just mention a few core issues. First, all educational actors agree that some minimal teaching norms are unavoidable. As Di Meglio (ibid: 124) points out, *Intricciate e Cambierini can be hailed for establishing first reductions within plural norm, to avoid graphic anarchy or a norm too close to microlocalisms*.* The limitation of the number of norms chosen can be seen as a plural standard. As Di Meglio (ibid: 136–137) writes:

> [...] *we have set the norm within a frame of variation.* [...] *It seems the teaching of Corsican has entailed an original form of ossification, one that gives written elements not a unique form but a limited set of possible forms, usually three, and rarely more. What French does on an exceptional basis with the word **clé/clef**, becomes more systematic in Corsican; this is not to reflect the whole array of dialectal variation, but rather to give a symbolic representation of it*

Put otherwise, for practical purposes in education, some difficult compromise has to be reached between the need of a teaching norm, however minimal, and respect for the plurality of linguistic identities

(ibid: 144). An additional difficulty is linked to the actual management *hic et nunc*, in educational practice, of codemixing, including phenomena of koîneisation.

Addressing the first difficulty, in practice, has meant reducing linguistic diversity to a manageable set of variants, reflecting differentiations between three supralocal dialectal zones – Northern, Central and Southern. Comiti labels them *régiolectes* and distinguishes them by typical phonological features such as consonantal change in stressed, intervocalic position, and/or grammatical/morphological features, e.g. in the northern *régiolecte*, the mark for feminine plural agreements is *e* whilst the masculine plural is *i*, whereas in the central and southern *régiolectes*, there is only one plural form – *i* (1992: 71–75). 'Applied' polynomy thus implies *some* choice and *some* reduction of linguistic diversity. In the reduction of diversity to *régiolectes* the choice allows for diversity, whilst inciting Corsican speakers to project their local linguistic identity onto a supralocal, symbolic representation of sub-regional variation. In turn, this may be instrumental in transforming localism into supralocal, pan-Corsican forms of identity. Notwithstanding, not all variability can be accounted for in a *symbolic* representation, and attempts to do so can provoke some resistance from those Corsicans most radically attached to their local variety and unwilling to consent to *any* sacrifice of their natural variant.

As Di Meglio shows, however, this characterisation of linguistic diversity has become hegemonic in didactic materials since 1987 (ibid: 130). This implies that secondary school teachers must know the whole system of variability to be able to introduce it to pupils and to teach them a tolerant approach towards variations. At primary school level, as far as possible, teachers teach in the local variety, and at university level, students are expected to command the whole system and its variations (ibid: 147). For educators, moreover, the strategy of adopting *régiolectes* is increasingly justified by the fact that, in school populations, especially in secondary school education, Corsican local varieties are increasingly mixed as local variants come into contact with one another (Marcellesi, 1987: 14). Finally, the reduction to three forms has the symbolic advantage that it tends towards unification which heightens Corsican's *language* status.

This management of diversity has found *some* consensus amongst certain educational actors, as increasing numbers of LCC teachers have been trained according to the sociolinguistic principles inhering in the approach at the University from the mid-1980s and later at the IUFM. Voices have nevertheless emerged that challenge these very principles.

For instance, as Fusina (1994: 190) indicates, by refusing to publish a document facilitating the implementation of polynomic principles in the late 1980s, certain members of administrative authorities clearly manifested their opposition to such plural premises for norm-setting.

Most importantly, protest has emerged regarding the implementation of the principle of tolerance towards mixed forms. Comiti (1992: 80–87) distinguishes between two ideal-type categories – *intralectes* (mixed varieties resulting from the contact between various Corsican varieties) and *interlectes* (mixed varieties resulting from the contact between Corsican and other linguistic systems like French). As was said above, the polynomic language philosophy implies a refusal to hierarchise and a commitment to linguistic tolerance so that its advocates accept mixed forms within the Corsican linguistic system (i.e. *intralectes*) and across different linguistic systems (i.e. *interlectes*) as legitimate forms of expression, in order to avoid linguistic insecurity and sociolinguistic silencing (Thiers, 1989: 56–57). As such mixed forms are becoming common due to increased contacts between local varieties, the 'implementation' of tolerance has had to adapt to this new phenomenon of koîneisation.

In the context of educational practice, however, accelerating koînisation creates new pedagogical problems. Arrighi (1990: 41), for instance, advocates maintaining some standards of acceptability to preserve linguistic identity, and warns against the danger of conceiving polynomy as some form of anomie. For instance, he argues that polynomic writing should remain internally coherent and avoid co-locating feminine plurals in *e* and in *i* in the same text because this can create confusion. This constitutes the very limit of polynomic tolerance and its ability to dismiss linguistic essentialism: when does a new linguistic form cease to be a mistake and come to reflect a new form of linguistic identity? Or, put otherwise, just as we observed various degrees of purist attitudes, polynomic attitudes can also range from simply tolerating variation in speech to tolerating intralectal varieties and, finally, perhaps even interlectal varieties.

Regarding popular language attitudes in Corsica, Comiti (1992) shows that Corsicans have developed polynomic attitudes in that they recognise other varieties than their own as Corsican and authentic (the autonomy criterion). However, he also shows that both *intralectes* and *interlectes*, and particularly the latter, are highly stigmatised in Corsica, which evidences that the polynomic attitude remains limited to what is perceived as (ideal-typical) natural or territorialized, 'pure' or bounded varieties and that the population does not fully endorse the implications of the polynomic philosophy. The polynomic spirit is bounded

by essentialist values. Even in academia, objections to the polynomic philosophy have surfaced, vested with purist rationale and condemning the blind acceptance of interlectal mixed forms: *it is obvious, and media evidence it daily, that this Corsican can only be deciphered via French codes which it builds upon*[*] (Dalbera-Stefanaggi, 1989; quoted in Di Meglio, 1997: 193).

As shown below, the question of how to deal with mixed codes has reinforced the popular 'resistance of separation' and the wariness and condemnation of 'revolutionary' academic positions and discourses on language and language planning that bolster or endorse mixed uses, especially in school education. In turn, this has contributed to radicalise forms of language purism as a reaction to what is perceived as at best unacceptable laxity and at worst a (socio-)linguistic *coup* (recall Bassani's 'diglossic' purism in the previous section and his final judgement on certain LCC teachers). According to the particulars of the context(s) in which they are expressed, the dialectics of identity and linguistic norm-setting *versus* respect for and acceptance of diversity, including new speech and written forms, remains extremely divisive, and the hegemonic positions of sociolinguists in educational spheres are still extremely controversial and contested.

In the next, final section, I analyse the representation of language debates in the Corsican media at the time I did my fieldwork (2000–2001) to identify the bone of contention and assess whether attitudes are embedded in continuity with the past or whether they are changing.

Elite and popular responses to language planning: the media discourse

The data drawn upon in this chapter originated mainly from Corsican researchers (e.g. Marchetti, 1989; Thiers, 1989; Di Meglio, 1997), although I have also borrowed widely from Alexandra Jaffe's (1999) ethnography of language ideologies, language planning and language attitudes on Corsica. Both the Corsican sources I used and Jaffe's work span the 1980/1990s and both illustrate the issues I have detailed in the previous four chapters. I did my own fieldwork research during the academic year 2000–2001 at the propitious time when the Matignon discussions spectacularised language debates and disputes between mainland France and Corsica and within Corsica. Considerable media space was devoted to language issues. My data is drawn from numerous articles from the daily *Corse-Matin* and its weekly supplement *La Corse-Votre Hebdo*, the weekly *Journal de la Corse* (JDC) and

the monthly magazine *Corsica*. In this final section before conclu-
ding, I attempt an updated synthesis of all the positions in the lan-
guage debates presented above and the way they come into conflict at
this level.

The thematic analysis led to two main findings. First, unsurpris-
ingly, very many articles dealt with the various institutional phases
of the Matignon discussions and their impact on the evolution of
language-in-education provision through these phases. On other
language-related, more corpus-based issues, however, it also emphasises
the continuity of discursive positioning on language and language plan-
ning: all the antagonistic ideologies and political positions found in
the literature discussed above appear in the various newspapers articles
unchanged. Thus, we find various illustrations or reiterations of Italian-
ist, purist and polynomic discourses, advocating strategies of reversal
of language shift or simply manifesting some well-ingrained strategy
of separation (for the former two) or seeking to de-legitimise diglossic
ideology under its various manifestations (for the latter).

Second, and this is striking throughout the wealth of articles, writ-
ing styles reflect and express antagonistic views with bitter acrimony.
Positions are criticised and their defenders are sharply attacked, some-
times by name, sometimes not: *ad hominem* feelings often permeate
more academic arguments. The following excerpts are taken from the
few Corsican newspapers and magazines mentioned in the previous
chapter and show that, once institutionalised, Corsican has become a
desirable and contested object, all the more so as sociolinguists have
largely captured the (corpus) planning process. A series of increas-
ingly acrimonious exchanges published in the JDC between January
and March 2001 attests to the sensitivity of language issues, and the
acid tenor of the arguments is so blatant that it requires little critical
commentary.

The JDC 'fired off' in its December 2000–January 2001 issue:

> *0/10 for Professor Jacques Thiers and some of his disciples for the careless,
> anarchic mix of northern and southern varieties.*[*]

To which Thiers replied, in the *Forum des lecteurs* of the 2–8 February
2001 issue, accusing the newspaper of purism and anachronism. In his
reply, the newspaper journalist used *ad hominem* arguments:

> *Thiers cannot bear criticism and gets mad when one does not cover him
> with glory.*

And in the February 23 to March 1 issue he portrays Thiers as an

> [. . .] *academic tycoon whose contempt verges on racism.**

In the same issue the *Forum des lecteurs* also features a longer and more sociolinguistically informed attack against Thiers in particular, and the University's sociolinguists in general, by a teacher Marc Biancarelli who accuses sociolinguists of engineering *a new language, artificial and arbitrary, which will consecrate the triumph of void, and the institutionalisation of mistakes and lack of competences** and states that sociolinguists attempt to seize power through language:

> [. . .] *The teaching of Corsican, with its institutional relays (PGCE, university, rectorat, media, etc . . .), can indeed appear as a stake to seize power. The one who elaborates a new language, like an Orwellian Newspeak* [. . .] *must think he is God the Father* [. . .] *Even more tomorrow than today, language will be the instrument of power. Those commanding the language will command its communication tools and their power will go far beyond Corte* [where the university sits] *because this power will be institutionalised (and therefore political), scientifically referenced, funded, unavoidable and unchallengeable. This is, in my opinion, the true stake behind the Corsican Newspeak**

Illustrations of this brand of verbal violence can be multiplied coming from Italianists against sociolinguists:

> *They are right, Southerners and Northerners, to oppose the arbitrary mixing that casual, self-appointed managers seek to impose* [. . .] *I observe that the official circles have produced no relevant didactic instrument in 20 years**.
> (Marchetti, in *JDC*, 2–8 March 2001: 5, Interview with Aimé Pietri)

or from purists like Sicurani responding to Arrighi's aforementioned criticism (see previous section on purism) (*Corsica*, May 2001: 50):

> *Arrighi cannot accept that media open their channels to those who disagree with him. Contrary to others, I have never endeavoured to impose anything to anyone, and I let others give lectures . . . My fieldwork has only sought to save what can still be saved, without thinking this could be held against me by those building a career in transmitting the language . . . Others pretend to believe that Corsican remains to be invented and that they have been entrusted with that mission . . . Nobody can claim ownership of the*

> *language. We knew what the situation was in 1970, the language has become a private property today. Therefore, when JM Arrighi announces that 90% of authors abide by imposed norms, I see a good score for a totalitarian regime**,

or from Comiti (*Corsica*, 2001: 56) referring to criticisms against sociolinguists as *sterile controversies orchestrated by those longing for recognition**, etc.

These statements illustrate one of the issues undermining successful language planning in a small society like Corsica that one of my informants pointed out: 'everyone knows everyone' among the 'handful' of language activists, planning cannot be anonymous, and ultimately, to understand language disputes, one cannot ignore the political economy of biographies and personal relationships. Typically, debaters are all actors from the 1970s or their followers: some have become decision makers through the process of institutionalisation of the Corsican language, while others have not; some have kept these positions and others have not. The resentment and/or envy thereby created govern reactions or at least make their expression more scathing. Thus, in perhaps a slightly caricatured way, my impression is that the way Corsican society has addressed language issues in the changing socio-political and institutional contexts since the 1980s has created new forms of clanic loyalties along patterns of unreasoned defence of highly sensitive issues of identity from which language questions are inseparable and that the opposition of the 'heads of clans' has cascaded down to the population.

With the institutional hegemonisation of sociolinguistic approaches to acquisition planning, more importantly, the biological essentialist views of linguistic identity underlying nationalist/purist and Italianist discourses have become increasingly challenged by more plural, social constructionist – or practice-based – views of linguistic identity and their corresponding planning orientations. Put otherwise, beyond the strict linguistic issue, polynomists seek to legitimise a plural, unifying conception of the Corsican society, rich from the diversity of its constituents, rather than a view of Corsica as divided internally and/or doomed by the political and/or cultural and/or linguistic minoritisation of its natural, ethnic, 'pure' population. Their position is perceived as all the more threatening to other 'heads of clans' (e.g. Marchetti and Sicurani) and their followers, because they can be diffused to the island's entire youth throughout the curriculum. Thus, it is perhaps also because polynomists have captured the RML planning process that a certain proportion of the population has resisted an institutionalisation of the language resting on

social constructionist principles. Finally, the disputes were perhaps most extremely acerbic in 2000–2001, because the outcomes of the Matignon negotiations could well have led to the creation of new institutional structures such as a language office, for a (reconfigured?) LCC policy network.

Conclusion

This final chapter has explored the various contending ideologies informing current language debates in Corsica and their actualisation, or not, in the language planning process. It has shown that the essentialist conceptions of language and identity, and how they interrelate, inherited from the experience of French nation-building processes, and the correlated construction of French-Corsican diglossic ideology retain enormous purchase in both elite discourses on and popular attitudes to what a language is and how it should be planned. However, in Corsica, an alternative, pluralist discourse on language, identity and their inter-relation – the polynomic approach – has been developed by Corsican sociolinguists at the same time as they have captured the Corsican corpus language planning process, and as they have come to manage the LCC education processes, which nowadays prevail amongst Corsican language revitalisation strategies. As a result, polynomic philosophy has become hegemonic and fully isntitutionalised in the Corsican language revitalisation process.

This alternative model has sought to overcome the discrepancy inherent in diglossic models of language planning (and in theories of nationalism) between representations of language use and actual language practices, by grounding its approach to language planning into actual practices rather than in idealised – reified and totemized – conceptions of language, such as in the diglossic model. The objective of that model has been to promote a potentially wide-ranging model of language unification based on intertolerance and the refusal to create inequalities through language hierarchisation. In doing so, the proponents of that approach have nevertheless encountered various forms of resistance themselves directly grounded in various, complex diglossic essentialist representations of language and identity: the 'resistance of separation', the Italianist position and language purism so that the struggle for glottopolitical hegemony has remained very acute in Contemporary Corsica.

The 'resistance of separation', which we have seen retains significant purchase in the Corsican population, opposed the polynomic approach

inter alia because it is recognised that even a plural model of language unification cannot be totally dissociated from (well-known) individuals – here the sociolinguists – and therefore constitutes some form of authoritative discourse and power stake. The discrepancy between the absolute notions of equality between dialects underlying polynomic theory and the necessity to reduce dialectal diversity to a manageable set of variants in education has reinforced the authoritative character of the polynomic proposal in a context of resistance of authority, where language planners are forced to negotiate every norm they wish to adopt. The Italianist and purist positions, in their diverse strands, also illustrate that constructed though forms of essentialism may be, and as well-informed as their critiques might be in deconstructing them and in highlighting the inequalities and wrong beliefs on which they lie, essentialism remains well ingrained in elite and popular approaches to language and identity and it sustains attitudes of opposition against what plural models of language and identity propose.

As Jaffe claims, '[. . .] *it is the only discourse of legitimate identity that has political currency*' (Jaffe, 1999: 121). In the French-Corsican diglossic context, forms of linguistic essentialisms have generated a large array of both elite and popular positions and opinions on language, identity and their interrelations. An implication of such a diversity of opinions is that they betray the divisions amongst the language-planning elites and their respective followers. Through their mutual ideological and discursive oppositions, leaders display a lack of unity (to say the least!). As the press excerpts show, the content of language debates is shadowed by acrimonious open conflicts, which in turn preclude any enactment and representation of a successful planning process. This certainly has some deplorable social psychological effects amongst the Corsican 'attentive publics' – Corsican society writ large – and constitutes no incentive to transmit/re-acquire/learn/promote the Corsican language.

Another implication of the perpetuated spectacularisation of disputes about language and identity is that they convey an image of the Corsican society as doomed by conflicts and incapable of creating a pan-Corsican identity that would unify society in its diversity. The ideals of equality and tolerance the polynomic model seeks to embody could be usefully exported to other minority language contexts, where relatively similar problems of fragmentation of and conflict over language and identity exist, e.g. Occitany. In that case, the Corsican example could acquire a genuinely transregional and perhaps even supranational dimension. Because of the continuous rejection of any form of authority

in Corsica, though, this model fails to receive all the attention it may deserve beyond the walls of academic conferences.

Notwithstanding, criticised though they may be, and contested though their legitimacy may appear to a number of Corsicans, sociolinguists have held most of the institutional reins of the revitalisation process since the mid-1980s. In the medium or long run, they may well eventually naturalise the polynomic solution.

General Conclusion

This study has assessed the impact of the construction of the EU on regional and/or minority glottopolitics in the EU in general and French-Corsican glottopolitics in particular. Its main objective was to examine whether EU construction has created a new order of discourse on language, and in particular on RMLs, and language planning, and whether this has had repercussions on the RML legal and/or institutional and/or policy frameworks at and across supranational, national and regional levels, with special reference to France and Corsica. Put more briefly, I looked at the interaction between various discourses on RMLs and RML legal/institutional/policy frameworks at each level and across levels.

Chapter 1 established a multitheoretical, multimethodological framework in order to study the dynamics of language policy formation at each level of analysis *per se,* and in its relations to other levels. In doing so, it brought together analytical frameworks and theories from political theory, social theory and sociolinguistics, thus broadening the social theoretical foundations of sociolinguistics. At supranational level, the governance approach, combined with such analytical tools as the policy network concept, power dependency theory and the Critical Discourse Analytical method, has provided useful lenses to understand how language policy making actually takes place – through which processes, with what actors and according to which norms and values and within which limits. This manifold approach to language policy formation – as resulting from the interplay of ideological motivations, legal provisions and institutional practice – has proved a useful approach at other levels of society and contributed to the refining of traditional sociolinguistic approaches to language policy formation, where such language decision-making processes are scrutinised in less sophisticated ways.

Regarding language policy formation at national levels, I argued that neither students of linguistic nationalism nor sociolinguistic conceptualisations of diglossia had satisfactorily documented the glottopolitical conflicts inherent in nation-building processes and their implications for current issues of RML policy formation at sub-national, national and supranational levels. In that respect, Bourdieu's sociology of language and power proves useful broadly to conceptualise the power relations underlying processes of language maintenance and/or language shift during nation-building processes. Specifically, his central concepts of popular resistance and alternative markets help deconstruct uncritical historiographies of nation-building processes articulated around what I called the 'evolutionary fallacy'. Thus, the notions of conflict and resistance bridge the gap between contradictory historiographies and point to the specificities of each situation of compliance/resistance. In turn, such specificities need to be informed by ethnographic data on the relations between dominant/resistant political and language ideologies, and actual elite and popular attitudes that determine behaviour *vis-à-vis* such ideologies, in the context of RML policy formation, at sub-national levels.

At regional and grassroots levels, focusing on Corsica, indeed, I highlighted the enduring purchase of essentialist political and linguistic ideologies and the difficulty of challenging essentialist premises in language revitalisation policy processes. I showed that planners seeking to foster alternative, social constructionist models of language, identity and their interrelation in language planning formation have encountered great resistance, when they have endeavoured to challenge the essentialist premises intrinsic to the diglossic model.

As indicated above, at and across all levels of analysis, I argued that language policy formation resulted from the interplay of ideological positions on language, identity and their interrelation, legal provisions, and institutional practices involving a variety of actors with various motivations and uneven bargaining powers.

Chapters 2 and 3 scrutinised the EU's own approach to language issues in general and to RMLs in particular. Chapter 2 showed that the principle of language equality that had seemed to prevail in the EU's original sociolinguistic design established in Regulation 1/58 had gradually become *de facto* undermined by the growing dominance of English as a working language and *de jure* challenged by the 2001 judgement of the Court of First Instance. It then showed that RML activists' efforts to interpret rather vague legal definitions of cultural and linguistic diversity in primary legislation (Articles 149 and 151) in a way

that may have granted RMLs some symbolic recognition at EU level, and, more practically, a durable legal basis for RMLs *per se* were also legally proscribed by restrictive patterns of legal interpretations (as with the Archipelago project). Chapter 3 finally showed that the RML policy networks that had emerged on the supranational scene since the late 1970s have been accessible to RML communities and have managed to obtain some EU protection for RMLs but also that this protection was still decided on an *ad hoc* basis and could/did not constitute a challenge to member-states sovereignties on language issues. These chapters thus show that, for the time being at least, member-states retain full glottopolitical powers on their minorities' language rights at EU level. For a long time, moreover, some RML activists tried to play the supranational card against the national card. If they managed to secure some protection at EU level and some symbolic recognition, notably thanks to the *Intergroup*, recent developments have showed that RML protection has now become fully mainstreamed rather than *sui generis* as it was hoped for years. What has, therefore, been gained at a practical level through potential LPP funding has been so instead of politico-symbolic recognition *per se*. When member states concede some minimal protection to RMLs, they can wield legal power, because no supranational binding legal texts constrain them otherwise.

International law needs changing before RML status and glottopolitics evolve, and as law making at those levels remains a prerogative of states, it is clear that issues of a formal RML status and protection continue to be decided at national levels. The main reason for that state of affairs and for the politicisation of language issues resides in the fact that languages have been central elements of nation-state building processes, however these may be ideologically informed. As such they constitute primary markers of nation-states' identity, image and sovereignty.

Chapter 4 therefore scrutinised the construction of glottopolitical hegemonies, or political economies of language in France. I showed that the historical construction of language hierarchies in France had deep historical roots and that, through drastic changes in ideological and political environments, languages had been reified and totemised since the seventeenth century and loaded with immense ideological value at an early stage of French political history. This politicisation of languages called upon formal distinctions and hierarchies that have persisted throughout French modern history and have served as rationale to discard the recent opportunities to have the protection and recognition of RMLs durably enshrined in French national law and international glottopolitical discourse. In that respect, the radical politicisation of

French in relation to other – both national and sub-national – languages through the reinforcement of protectionist French language legislation since 1992 has isolated France on the international scene, where more sociolinguistic devolution has generally taken place, e.g. UK, Italy, Spain. In France, RMLs gained a significant place in the education sector only, and any form of officialisation beyond this and to some extent the media sector remains currently unachievable, as the 1999 debates on the *European Charter on RMLs* showed. This is because the essentialist approach to language and identity inherited from the construction of the French nation-state retains significant purchase among the language planners who are currently hegemonic in France.

At the same time, like other nation state-building processes, French nation-building has been uneven which has resulted in various patterns of compliance and resistance to acculturation in the regions: as was seen, nation-building processes significantly varied across time and space. As a result, the uneven (*inter alia* glottopolitical) conquest of the national territory during nation-building processes facilitated the actualisation from the 1960s of patterns of resistance to 'internal colonisation', and the concomitant organisation of social movements of protest against the (glottophagic) establishment of dominant (linguistic) markets.

Chapters 5–8 first examined some of the reasons that explained this uneven acculturation (Chapters 5 and 6) and then the consequences of uneven acculturation for the contemporary language revitalisation process (Chapters 7 and 8). In the dialectical processes of acculturation and resistance, in Corsica, the Corsican language became invested with political symbolism against the immoderate dominance of French. Thus Corsican cyclically served as a rallying symbol and political banner for other socio-political and economic grievances during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Chapters 5 and 6). As a result of protest forms and the salience of a new orthodoxy of decolonisation from the 1960s, eventually, French traditional political and linguistic Jacobinism has become less forceful, and restricted RML rights have been granted as part of a package of devolved powers.

As Chapter 7 showed, in Corsica, this eventually resulted in increased political, and to some extent sociolinguistic, devolution from the 1980s, and the actualisation of a devolved Corsican language policy essentially in the education sector. It is in that context that Corsican language activists have sought to reverse the language hierarchies and patterns of language shift inherited from the experience of French domination through language institutionalisation. The institutionalisation of Corsican continued steadily throughout the 1980s and until today, under the

impetus of a very active Corsican policy network that exploited fully, and often in innovative ways through their interpretation *ex maxima* of national RML laws, the small concessions made in national legislative acts and, in particular, in regulatory acts. As quantitative data on language use showed, however, substantial language institutionalisation did not suffice to reverse language hierarchies and language shift (Chapter 7).

Reasons for this state of affairs were examined in Chapter 8, which showed that popular attitudes to what a language is and how it relates to identity – which remain a determining factor in the success or failure of language plans – were shaped in very complex and often contradictory ways during nation-building processes in Corsica. I showed that various forms of resistance to the legitimacy and/or modality of language revitalisation processes have emerged (i.e. the resistance of separation, the Italianist position, language purism), which are deeply embedded in essentialist conceptions of language, identity and the language-identity link. These forms of resistance then became even more acute in the Corsican context from the 1980s, as the language policy network rapidly became dominated by sociolinguistically trained policy makers and as these proposed a very innovative model of language acquisition that has sought to counter (the negative effects of) essentialist ideologies and promote instead a plural, polynomic model of what language is and of the language-identity link. Indeed, both the reified and totemised approaches to language, identity and their relations that are intrinsic to essentialist models, and the deeprootedness of such models in popular attitudes to what languages *are* and *mean*, make it difficult for a plural model of language and identity to receive popular endorsement and active support.

This polynomic model has been intensely contested and its innovative character creates one of the main difficulties for language revitalisation in Corsica, because it goes against both (some) elite and folk ideologies of language and identity. Initially developed as an alternative to authoritarian – monolithic and essentialist – models of language and identity engineered and naturalised in the national arenas, furthermore, this model has paradoxically become so hegemonic in the almost exclusively education-channelled processes of language revitalisation in Corsica that it is now largely perceived as a form of local authoritarianism, which has historically been abhorrent to Corsicans.

As Chapter 8 illustrated, finally, much of the language debates in contemporary Corsica revolves around corpus rather than status issues so that the actual co-officialisation of Corsican desired by all language activists would probably not resolve internal corpus-oriented disputes.

In turn, the focus on such corpus issues also means that the developments and lobbying strategies for status change at national and supranational levels are less useful in Corsica than perhaps in other RML contexts, where corpus issues are less salient and/or no longer massively divisive, e.g. Catalonia, Wales, Ireland. In that connection, more ethnographic analyses, like the one on which the present study is based, of what sociolinguistic situations are at grassroots level may also help devise better adapted proposals for RML policies at local, regional and national levels.

It is too early to attempt to predict how the sociolinguistic situation may evolve in Corsica, since the original planning solution adopted there is very recent given the time language planning takes to foster new attitudes and obtain actual changes in language behaviour and use, as was clearly seen in the case of the sociolinguistic construction of France. Progress is steadily being made in Corsica both in terms of corpus development, notably through literary production and constant lexical development, two important factors of legitimation of status development, and in terms of institutional status development, through the generalisation of Corsican language education and bilingual education. As for attitudes to what a *language* is, as we saw, the education system now very largely promotes a plural, sociolinguistic approach to and reflection about the definition of language and the complex, multifaceted nature of the language-identity link. Recent ethnographic research on educational practices documents the successes and obstacles to the implementation of polynomy throughout school education (e.g. Jaffe, 2003 and 2005). If this strategy succeeds, and if the education system manages to undermine essentialist ideologies, in the medium or long-term, Corsica might pave the way to the recognition of new, genuinely post-modern, conceptualisations of language(s) and its/their relation(s) to identity/identities that could be exported to other RML contexts where similar issues are salient (e.g. Occitany?).

At the national level, especially in France, language issues remain extremely divisive, and participants in language debates, when these arise, are extremely antagonistic and polarised. As a result, it is unlikely that the general movement of officialisation of RMLs in numerous other nation-state contexts in Western Europe will inspire similar evolutions in France in the near future, notably because conservative ideologies are well represented in society, both among elites and the population, and language hierarchies are strongly supported by the legal and state institutions and, to some extent, civil institutions.

At supranational level, the limited extent to which identity issues are tackled and the limited scope of the legal protection of language

diversity is clear, even though regulatory frameworks have recently proved more prone to support RML revitalisation efforts. Notwithstanding, several chapters of this study showed that changes in RML status are not always planned and that changes in political environments can trigger changes in RML status in an unplanned fashion.

In that connection, the EU has undergone drastic political and legal change coming from two connected directions in recent years: on the one hand, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty and its inclusion for the first time of provisions for minority rights in primary legislation and, on the other, the emergence since the 1990s of new forms of political conditionality for EU accession, including minority language provisions, and their actualisation in the processes leading to the EU eastwards enlargement and since. I will conclude by sketching ways in which these current developments may have an influence on future RML-oriented debates and developments, which may cascade down to lower levels of society.

First, the Lisbon Treaty, scheduled for ratification by Member States by 1 January 2009, might entail new perspectives and hopes for RML activists, notably though the implementation of Article 2. The Treaty, indeed, now implicitly includes minority rights, which could include RML rights, under the category of human right:

> *The union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, <u>including the rights of persons belonging to minorities</u>. These values are common to the Member States* [. . .]
>
> [TEU Article 6(1); Emphasis reflecting the new formulation in the Lisbon Treaty, Article 2][1]

This provision, if it finally goes through, might open new prospects for RML lobbying strategies – notably through interdiscursive and intertextual references to the CoE's *European Charter for RMLs* and *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* – but the consequences of this linkage must also be assessed in the light of existing critical evaluation of the Linguistic Human Rights approach (e.g. May, 2000 and 2001; Freeland and Patrick, 2004).

Finally, more glottopolitical change may come from the recent enlargement wave of 2004, with drastic consequences for the EU-level RML network and future RML policy measures. In Chapter 3, I mentioned the relationship between the 2004 Enlargement and linguistic rights in the EU. In my treatment of parliamentary questions, I merely evoked the 'double standard' existing today, and denounced by MEPs, between provisions for RML rights in current member states

and the demands made on candidate countries with respect to linguistic rights: France is a case in point. My contention is that in the enlarged EU this 'double standard' might not remain sustainable.

From the new member states' viewpoint, having had to adopt some RML-supporting measures in their domestic contexts, they may well seek to redouble their efforts to obtain EU-funding to sustain the costly language policies entailed by EU demands in their application prerequisites. On the other hand, they may well seek to guarantee that their national languages receive equal treatment as working languages, as other official languages do. In that scenario, the cause for RMLs could well be deemed of secondary importance, especially where a significant number of minority languages in applicant countries are 'majority' languages in neighbouring countries and may not need the same support as unique regional or 'indigenous' languages. In yet another scenario, they may also resist granting further linguistic rights to their minorities, especially where their current minorities are sometimes yesterday's 'colonial oppressors' (e.g. the Russian minority in Latvia) (Poleshchuk, 2001, 2002, and 2003; Adrey, 2005). Considering that there exists as much a variety of minority contexts in recent member states and candidate countries as in Western Europe, the sort of ethnocentrism that has underlain academic research on Western RML activism might be at odds with Eastern and Central European majority–minority relations and their concomitant glottopolitical expectations and priorities, as well as with differentiated understandings of concept such as nationalism, ethnicity, identity, minorities, citizenship, etc. Academic research in that 'enlarged field' – notably focusing on Post-Soviet sociolinguistics, minority rights and bilingual education policy (e.g. Hogan-Brun, 2005 and 2006; Pavlenko, 2006 and 2008) – is rapidly developing, triggering a fruitful dialogue between Western and Eastern/Central European scholars. The unprecedented, 2004 EU Enlargement will undoubtedly further precipitate its growth.

As can be seen, there is considerable uncertainty as to what will happen to the sociolinguistic regimes of the enlarged, post-2004 EU and its concomitant RML network and policy change. What is not in doubt is that RML activists will need to adapt to a newer 'New Europe' with reshaped patterns of multilevel and multi-actor governance and new glottopolitical discourses and that developments in this newer Europe may catalyse sociolinguistic developments at national and sub-national levels in ways that remain to be explored.

Notes

Introduction

1. The term *glottopolitics* is synonymous with the expression 'language politics'. It appeared in French sociolinguistic literature in the 1970/1980s (i.e. *la glottopolitique;* ethymologically from Greek *Glotto-* which means *language*) to denote an approach to language politics from a conflict perspective. Since this study advocates such a conflit-based perspective, I use it throughout this study as shorthand for 'conflict-laden language politics'.

1   Theoretical frameworks and methodological implications regional and minority language politics and policy making in the EU

1. In that respect, as early as December 1994, French Minister for European Affairs, Lamassoure, suggested replacing the 11 official languages with five working languages: French, German, English, Italian and Spanish (see Chapter 4). For a recent assessment of sociolinguistic problems in the EU and the various solutions proposed, see Phillipson (2003) and Wright (2004b: 219–242).
2. Of the various conceptualisations and uses of the term *governance*, the one I am using here is closest to that which Rhodes describes as 'governance as a socio-cybernetic system' (Rhodes, 1997: Chapter 3). It rests substantially on Kooiman (1993) and Rosenau (1992) (both quoted by Rhodes, ibid: 50–51; see below).
3. This representation of resources as clear-cut is an oversimplification, as information and expertise for instance also belong to the second category of discursive powers (see Chapters 2 and 3).
4. This points to a crucial issue of CDA, namely, the issue of interpretation: from what perspective is a particular discourse decoded? I will come back to this in the next section and in greater detail later in the analysis of my data.
5. The following account is adapted from Guastini (1984: 1738–1744) and Luzzati (1984: 2086–2091).
6. Chapter 3 illustrates that production rules can to some extent be 'bent', for instance, as far as authorship is concerned when decision-making results from open-ended networks of policy actors.
7. Depending on the definition of a *nation*, nation-building processes can be traced back to early modern times though (Anderson, 1983: 9–46; see Chapter 4).
8. This distinction is however largely made for analytical convenience since, as Chapter 4 illustrates, actual language-based policy development is of course ideologically informed.

9. As Rushdie (1990) puts it: '[...] *language, not territory*, [is] *the prime cause of aggression, because once language reache*[s] *the level of sophistication at which it* [can] *express abstract concepts, it acquire*[s] *the power of totemization; and once peoples ha*[ve] *erected totems, they* [will] *go to war to defend them'*.

10. For a more detailed presentation of Fishman's approach, see Fasold (1984: 40–42) and Williams (1992: 97–109).

11. This conception of language as discrete largely underlies representations of language at the supranational level among RML institutional supporters (see Chapter 3).

12. We will see in Chapter 4 that this conception of individual rights, which is central in French political philosophy, is also an insurmountable obstacle to recognising minority rights.

13. Catalan sociolinguists have called this phenomenon *auto-odi* and Albert Memmi the 'complex of the colonised' (quoted in Thiers, 1989: 23).

14. The Corsican situation is a case in point where such counter-discourses are produced by academics closely involved in language planning processes.

15. This is why language officialisation with its train of positive values is so insistently demanded by RML activists.

16. Put otherwise, analysts must be aware that academic discourse is not necessarily hegemonic: as was pointed out above and as the Corsican example dramatically shows, folk ideologies, however poorly informed in academic terms, must be acknowldged and accounted for in plans if those are to be accepted.

2   Foundations of the EU sociolinguistic regimes: community official and/or working languages

1. For convenience's sake, the numbering system used is that of the latest Treaty in force.

2. For a discussion of the importance of convergence to validate analyses, see Gee (1999: 94–95).

3. In Bhatia's framework, the preamble thus serves as the main provisionary clause (ibid: 113).

4. For legal texts as a particular genre of textual product, manifest intertextuality is a requisite to the process of legitimisation, a necessary generic feature of the compositional structure of legal texts: what Bhatia calls the *referential qualifications* of legislative provision (Bhatia, 1993).

5. For further discussion of the concept of text authorship, see Goffman (1981: 144; quoted in Fairclough, 1992: 78–79).

6. See the analysis of Article 149 below.

7. On *addressivity*, see Bakhtin (1986: 95–100).

8. The adjunction of the prefix *semantico-* here points to a view of grammar, as advocated by Halliday and his followers, which does not separate form from meaning.

9. An alternative syntactic (and modal) organisation of Article 7 could have foregrounded rather than backgrounded the ECJ's glottopolitical prerogatives (e.g. '*The Court of Justice lays down in its rules of procedures the languages to be used in its proceedings'*).

10. The Committee of the Regions [CoR] is not mentioned as it did not exist at the time this Regulation was adopted. However, since the text refers to 'the Institutions of the Community', provisions equally apply to the CoR.
11. I use European Citizen as a convenient shorthand for 'persons subject to the jurisdiction of a Member state.'
12. See the discussion of working languages below.
13. Yet this is no minor issue, as we will see in subsequent sections when we discuss the general coherence of this text.
14. As the Community further enlarged, the official language of the new member states acquired official recognition and working language status as well. In 2008, there are 23 EU official languages.
15. Coherence later emerges from the provisions of Articles 6 and 7. Article 1 becomes retroactively coherent with Articles 6 and 7.
16. Answer to Written Question E-0615/02, OJ C 309 E, 12/12/2002 (p. 33).
17. See Written Question E-201/02 and the Commission's Answer (OJ C 92, 17/04/03, pp. 3–4).
18. Christina Kik *versus* Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market; Case T-120/99. Available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi! celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=61999A0120&model= guichett (accessed 10 October 2004).
19. OJ C 019, 28/01/1991, p. 0042.
20. OJ L 374, 31/12/1990 p. 0014–0032
21. Incidentally, French only became the official language of France via constitutional provision in 1992. It was official *de facto* before, but not *de jure*.
22. I return to the importance of objectives for legal interpretation below.
23. See for instance the Council's answer to written question E- 3948/00 by Pere Esteve. (OJ C 235 E, 21/08/2001, p. 35.)
24. By default, the voting mode is unanimity. In most cases, however, the Treaty does provide for a different voting system.
25. The crucial importance of the budgetary issue, both at legal and practical levels, will be further underscored in the section of Chapter 3 devoted to the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages.
26. See for instance the *Council Conclusions on Linguistic Diversity and Multilingualism in the EU*, 26/06/95 (see Press Release 7839/95 at http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.asp?lang=1; accessed November 26 2003). See also Article 22 of the *EU charter for Fundamental Rights* now appearing in the Lisbon Treaty (2007).
27. We will see the importance of this *de facto* evolution and its consequences for the production, by certain Member-States, of discourses of promotion of multilingualism and respect for linguistic diversity at European and supranational level. Specifically Chapter 4 illustrates that, in the case of France, discourses on the desirability of multilingualism at European level are in sheer contradiction with domestic discourses of monolingualism when addressing sub-national groups' claims.
28. This change attests to the politicisation of the language issue in Irish domestic politics but seems at odds with Article 1's characterisation in the 2005 Council Conclusions above, except if one considers that Irish is the *first* official/national/state language of Ireland, before English. Effectively, this introduces a new EU sociolinguistic category and prerequisite for EU

language officialness: 'candidate' languages should be 'first' constitutional official languages.

29. Although here it is referred to as *Archipelago*, the proposal was only drafted in French, i.e. *Archipel*. It was a Commission internal document transmitted to me by a source that chose to remain anonymous. It was never translated as the Commission's legal advisors censored it. Quotations that follow are my own translation.

30. Written question E-2139/98 by Friedhelm Frischenschlager; Commission Answer, 23 /09/1998 (both in OJ C 50, 22/0/1999, p. 130).

31. OJ C 050, 23/02/2002, pp. 1–2.

32. Like education, culture became an EU competence in 1992.

33. The EU's language terminology remains obscure, comprising many overlapping, ambiguous expressions: lesser taught languages, least taught languages, lesser-used languages, lesser-used European languages, less widely used languages, least widely used languages and regional or minority languages. (Strubell, 2002: 31).

3   The EU's RML policy network: legal governing and governance politics

1. See the Andriessen Report (Bulletin EEC supplement 3/82).

2. The 2003 and 2006 Resolutions relevant to RMLs will be analysed later.

3. OJ C 287, 9 November 1981, p. 57.

4. OJ C 68, 14 March 1983, p. 104.

5. OJ C 318, 30 November 1987, p. 144.

6. OJ C 61, 28 February 1994, p. 110.

7. See the analysis of Article 151 in Chapter 2.

8. In that connection, the 1993 Copenhagen EU summit established economic and political criteria by which candidate countries would have to abide as a precondition to EU accession. The political criteria included the *'respect for and protection of minorities'*. For an assessment of how the Commission has monitored compliance with such criteria focusing on the Baltic States' application for membership, see Adrey (2005).

9. In that respect, Article 46a of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty would give the EU *legal personality* so that it could henceforth sign and ratify international treaties.

10. See discussion of the *Archipelago* project in Chapter 2.

11. It was formally cancelled in the 1999 inter-institutional agreement.

12. OJ C 344, 12 November 1998, p. 1 and C 172, 18 June 1999, pp. 1–22.

13. The Intergroup has had various names through years. Since the 2004 legislature, it is called the *Intergroup for Traditional National Minorities, Constitutional Regions, and Regional Languages*. For convenience's sake, I will simply refer to the *Intergroup*.

14. Although the Intergroup for RMLs was granted '[. . .] *full status as an official Intergroup of the European Parliament',* such a status is largely symbolic and implies consultative rather than formal decisional powers. See also Kuipers Resolution above, 30 October 1987: Article 17.

15. Around 50 Intergroups were listed in 1994 and over 80 in 2000, gathered around subjects ranging from Ageing, Ceramics, Ethnic Minorities, to Rugby

League via Friends of Music and Indian Peoples (Jacobs, *et al.*, 1995; quoted in Greenwood, 1997: 44–45; Corbett, 2001).

16. Because of its fluid nature, the membership is in permanent flux. Here I use the membership list of March 2003 provided by EBLUL. The parliamentary questions analysed below were posed between 1999 and March 2003 by MEPs on that list.

17. Notable absentees are state representatives though, but these are present at Committee level.

18. For more details, see Written Questions E 0465/00 and E 1732/00 by Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna.

19. See Written Question E 1731/00.

20. See Written Questions E 1730/00 and E 3098/00.

21. See Written Questions E 1732/00 and E 0043/02.

22. This requires a reconsideration of the actual authorship of policy texts and the relevance of distinguishing between policy consultation and policy formulation; in turn, this can be seen as emblematic of the permeability of institutions in the EU system of multi-governance.

23. In the past, in particular policy sectors, Intergroup meetings have been perceived as a direct challenge to the Committee level regarding the locus of decision-making. In 1999, the EP's Bureau issued a statement recalling the unofficial status of Intergroups. This status is ambiguous though as they can be recognised as official but not in an institutional 'decisional' sense (Corbett *et al.*, 2000: Chapter 10).

24. Written Question E 1445/99 by Camilo Nogueira Román to the Commission.

25. Written Question E 3812/02 by Miquel Mayol I Raynal to the Commission. The Copenhagen Criteria comprise *inter alia* the respect of minority rights, including linguistic rights. There exists a controversy because current member states do not have to comply with them whereas candidate countries do which in fact seems to establish a 'double standard' of minority rights protection in the EU. I return to this issue in the General Conclusion.

26. This was further illustrated by the fact that there were only five type 2 questions.

27. Written questions E-0487/01, E-2884/01. For further details, see *Contact Bulletin*, March 2002, volume 18, No. 1.

28. See collective Written Question E 3702/00.

29. See Written Question E 0620/01.

30. OJ C 177 E, 25 July 2002, pp. 334–336.

31. See Written Question E 0445/02 and minutes of the Intergroup meeting (03 July 2002).

32. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/policy/consult_en. html (accessed 13 October 2003).

33. See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP// NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2003-0271+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN (accessed 12 April 2008).

34. OJ L 138, 30 April 2004, pp. 0040–0049.

35. In 2007, a Commissioner for Multilingualism was then appointed and a specific EU language portal created.

36. Since 2007, Mercator Centres have no longer been EU-funded.

37. The bankruptcy of the Brussels' Office in 2004 was a telling illustration of Eblul's dependency on Commission money. Under the LLP, EBLUL is now funded as a Network Promoting Language Diversity, like any other network promoting language diversity, rather than as a RML-specific defense organisation (see the plea for a specific European Agency in the 2003 and 2006 Resolutions).

38. More than 105 visits, in 41 RML communities and involving 1140 persons have been organised since 1983, available at http://www.eblul.org (accessed December 2003). The programme was however eventually cancelled for lack of funds.

39. We will see in Chapter 8 that in the case of Corsica, this opportunity has not been fully exploited.

40. The link between diversity and economic development is explored in detail in the Euromosaic final Report (Nelde *et al.*, 1996).

41. See also Comités Catalan, Galicien et Basque (2001).

42. Available at http://www.uoc.edu/web/eng/noticies/ADUMeng_imp.html (accessed 3 December 2004). See also the MIRIS database on minorities hosted by the European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano (South Tyrol); available at http://dev.eurac.edu:8085/mugs2/aboutEurac.jsp?TopBarItem=Eurac (accessed 4 December 2004).

43. Material support for RMLs within non RML-specific programmes rose from 375, 855 euros in 1997 to 3, 667, 409 euros for 1999–2000 (Grin and Moring, 2002: 67).

44. Available on http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/langmin/support.pdf (accessed 9 June 2003).

4 Language, Nation and State in French Linguistic Nationalism History, Developments and Perspectives

1. For reasons of space, I do not tackle the issues linked to the sociolinguistic developments of French in its colonial empire here.

2. Printing did not only favour state languages though and also facilitated the publication in local languages of literary and religious works aimed at educating and evangelising the province (Bell, 2001: 173 and 187–189).

3. In France, the expansion of the royal administrative structures from the thirteenth century progressively covered the Languedoc (thirteenth century), Brittany (1532), Béarn (1621), Flanders (1684), Alsace (1685), Roussillon (1700), Lorraine (1748), Corsica (1768) and Nice (1860) (see Grau, 1992: 94 and Bell, 2001: 274, note 5).

4. This formula is usually accepted as meaning the language spoken in the Kingdom of France and the edict is largely seen as the birth of 'country-wide' language planning.

5. These dichotomisations paved the way for the language-patois dichotomy underlying post-Revolutionary language policies (see next section).

6. France has not been isolated in producing a discourse of linguistic superiority justifying linguistic colonialism. Fishman has collected a number of similar discourses in various contexts (Fishman, 1997; quoted by Phillipson, 2003: 214).

7. Between 1794 and 1796, Corsica under Paoli's leadership had seceded; see Chapter 6.

8. These figures must be taken with caution though as they add up to 13 million, whereas the population of the time was attested to be around 23 million (e.g. Schoell, 1936; Hobsbawm, 1995: 56).

9. Against this radical Jacobin position, some Girondine (i.e. federal) voices emerged that denied the intrinsic relation between language behaviour and politic loyalty and advocated linguistic federalism. Jacobinism nevertheless prevailed, and Girondine perspectives were swiftly discarded (Brunot, 1967: 80–83; De Certeau *et al.,* 1975: 280–283; Bell, 2001: 185–186).

10. Although they were important North-South geographical variations, French had steadily progressed in cities since the seventeenth century, *inter alia* as a result of the development of middle class education (Combes, 1997: Chapter 6).

11. For an overview, see Furet and Ozouf (1982) and Combes (1997: Chapter 8).

12. Hobsbawm indicates that '*Mid-nineteenth-century Europe witnessed a rapid increase in state expenditures and the size of state bureaucracies* [...] *Between 1830 and 1850, public expenditure increased by 40% in France* [...]' (1995: 229).

13. The network of the *Alliance française*, the institution in charge of diffusing French linguistic ideology and the French language in the colonies, was created in 1883 (Bruézière, 1983).

14. Yet, even when education became free, Weber (1979) writes, school truancy remained high in rural contexts where child labour on the farm long remained a necessity.

15. See also Agulhon (1988), Thiesse (1999) and Lacorne et Judt (2002: Chapter 1).

16. See also Agulhon (1988: 172–173).

17. This is not to say that the romantic valorisation of local cultures had essentially economic determinants, but I endorse the view that economics play a role in the dormancy or salience of regionalist/autonomist/nationalist 'culturalist' mouvements (Nairn, 1977).

18. For Bourdieu, the supposed readiness to abandon one's own cultural heritage for material reasons – so-called individual rational choices in modernisation theory – is the response to a form of symbolic violence and therefore morally indefensible. There may seem to be no objective moral position on this topic as the value of one's cultural heritage varies across individuals. Yet, whereas it was in the interest of dominant classes to abandon local uses in exchange for other forms of capital, arguably, lower classes incited to reason in the same way were not rewarded in the same way. Hence the unkept promises of the modernisation discourse, with its language shift corollary, may legitimise the academic and nationalist discourse of deception and the attitudes of resistance that are further explored in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.

19. In that connection, it is significant that Weber's opening chapter is entitled 'a country of savages' (1979).

20. The term *devolution* unsatisfactorily renders the distinction in French between *déconcentration* (i.e. the process whereby state authority is exerted by state representatives in regions rather than in Paris) and *décentralisation* (i.e. more authority is granted to regional, non-state, actors).

In what follows, I will use *devolution* for *décentralisation* and keep *deconcentration* as synonymous of state power's relocalisation.

21. On the relationship between uneven economic development and nationalism, see Nairn (1977); for 'regional' case studies, see Lafont (1967) for Occitanie; Front Régionaliste Corse (FRC) (1971) for Corsica; Hechter (1975) for Wales, Scotland and Ireland; McDonald (1989) for Brittany.

22. A further consequence was that the wide diffusion of this discourse throughout European minority contexts strengthened the transregional links established at the turn of the century and re-actualised in the 1950s (Fusina, 1994).

23. This was the first *law*, rather than edict or decree, on the French language in French sociolinguistic history, which attests to the new approach adopted by the state on status issues.

24. Available at http://www.langue-francaise.org/Articles_Dossiers/Carpette_2007.php (accessed 29 December 2007).

25. Available at http://www.langue-francaise.org/Origine.php (accessed 29 December 2007).

26. The text was, however, signed by high-level politicians from various countries, such as two former heads of state, two prime ministers, and five ministers.

27. Provisions were also made for the use of RMLs in the media (1982 and 1986 laws respectively on audiovisual communication and freedom of expression).

28. Relevant excerpts available at http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/dglf/garde.htm; accessed January 2 2005.

29. We saw in Chapter 3 that this has now also become a central element of the pro-RML discourse at supranational level (EBLUL, 1/02/03).

30. A precedent in the use of such a proviso to ratify an international treaty was in 1980, when France ratified the UN's *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (in force from 1976), with the reservation that Article 27 on minority rights did not apply in France since there are no minorities (Fenet, 2002: 64).

31. A recent example of the polarisation of opinions on the RML question emerged in June 28 as the French National Assembly voted an amendment to the French Constitution's Article 1, stipulating that '*Reginal languages belong to the Nation's patrimony'.** The amendment entailed heated debates reminiscent of the 1999 debates around the European Charter. The *Académie Française* even intervened, voicing its disapproval and waving the threat to national unity. The amendment was ultimately voted down by the French senate.

5   Unity and Diversity in Corsica: Patterns of Identity and Political Separatism

1. The theme of *invasion* is a recurrent element of Corsican consciousness and has been passed on almost genealogically.

2. Jaffe (1999: Chapter 2) shows that the village is the locus of the inalienable identity where diasporic members retire and, in many accounts, this

return wipes out a sometimes life-long parenthesis away from the village. The village is then the unbroken cord and living one's Corsican-ness is tied to village life.

3. The next chapter offers some explanations for what, at first, constitutes an oddity.

4. It is no wonder then that Paoli's image and discourse should have been re-appropriated by regionalist and then nationalist movements in the 1960–1970s, as the terms of the discursive conflicts have remained almost identical.

5. The following account is largely based on Pomponi (1979).

6. From 130,000 inhabitants in 1770, it rose to 185,000 in the mid-1820s, to 255,000 in the mid-1850s, to finally reach about 300,000 inhabitants at the turn of the century, its highest rate ever. (Pomponi, 1979: 330–331).

7. Briquet indicates that by the 1930s, salaries and pensions amounted to 40% of the regional revenue, and more than 50% by the 1950s (1997).

8. This is the generic term to call French nationals residing in Northern Africa before independence.

9. The INSEE reports an average yearly immigration rate of 2.1% between 1962 and 1968, while 28,000 Corsicans left the island during that period, the FRC claims (1971: Chapter 3).

10. 'Foreign' here is to be understood in the sense of 'non Corsican natives', therefore including both Northern African nationals (Moroccans and Algerians) and repatriated French nationals (even though a certain proportion of the *Pieds-Noirs* was of Corsican ascent).

11. Still, some Corsican natives returned to the island to retire. The Diaspora also fed into demographic growth, but an ageing population.

12. The Corsican Diaspora on the continent henceforth outnumbered native Corsicans on the island, with consequences for contemporary Corsican language politics.

13. It would be exaggerated to dichotomise the urban-rural divide as reflecting the pro-/anti-clan divide, since the rural world – as the guardian of tradition – has helped preserve clanism as a traditional form of political loyalty (Andréani, 1999: 78).

14. To these levels of analysis can be added the transregional level of cooperation and exchange bringing together various regions of Western Europe (see the final sections of this chapter).

15. Dayries and Dayries indicate that a 1975 meeting of the *Action Régionaliste Corse* (ARC) brought together 30,000 people, a considerable number for Corsica.

16. The reasons for anti-Italianism will be made clear in Chapters 6 and 8.

17. In that connection, Corsican nationalist parties also belong to the federation of political parties *Régions et peuples solidaires* created in 1995 that lobbies for a more federalist Europe of autonomous regions.

6   From one Diglossic Situation to another – Ideological and Sociolinguistic change in Modernising Corsica (1769–1974)

1. Chapter 9 returns to the ingrained cultural presence of orality and its consequences with regard to popular responses to language planning.

2. Thus, Paoli's 'failure' to include a national language among the various symbolic attributes of his state-national project mentioned in Chapter 5 makes more sense. In a context where Tuscan/Italian was not yet the language of another state, conserving Tuscan as the national language did not compromise ambitions of political independence and Tuscan represented no linguistic exclusion of Corsican masses.

3. Also, the linguistic ideologies of the two countries and the respective states' management of multilingualism are in sharp contrast.

4. This view assumes that Corsican varieties and Tuscan were different languages, which itself is an ideological position I will return to in the last chapter.

5. Viale was a lawyer in Bastia from 1817.

6. Press production also indicates the rate of penetration of French. Poggioli (1971) shows that of the newspapers existing before 1865 still published after, three are in French and only one in Italian. From 1880, only French remains.

7. For a synthesis of the phases of cultural nationalism, see Hroch's influential model (Hroch, 1985; cited by Hobsbawm, 1990: 103–104).

8. However, the chosen variety was very much based on northern dialectal varieties, which was later to undermine its representativity and its acceptance as the norm (see below and next chapter).

9. This movement echoed a number of similar movements in other regions in the aftermath of the war as the project of reconstruction re-actualised the revolutionary debates between federalist and Jacobin conceptions of the nation-state (for an account of such movements in Brittany, see Fusina's account) (Fusina: 1994: 78–81).

10. This last aspect was particularly significant, as the social basis of the partisans of French rule had considerably widened after the two wars.

11. Besides, its application decrees were delayed until the mid-/late-1960s (Fusina, 1994: 151).

12. Regarding the political argument though, the involvement of Corsicans in the Resistance and the symbolic self-liberation of the island from the occupiers in 1943 eventually eclipsed suspicions of political separatism.

7   Language Institutionalisation in Contemporary Corsica (1974–2005)

1. In 1954, Bastia and Ajaccio gathered 54,000 inhabitants, in 1975 they were 100,000, more than a third of the population.

2. A petition with 12,000 signatures mirrored the large mobilisation in favour of the inclusion of Corsican in the law and was sent to the minister (Arrighi, 2002: 78).

3. A 1981 report established by state authorities observed the same situation: low commitment of teachers and poor attendance (Fusina, ibid: 163–169).

4. If funding was overtly for Corsican, this may seem an oddity since producing teaching material was funded under the LINGUA action that was normally exclusively for EU official languages, which again testifies of the importance

of policy implementation powers. One of the Archipelago aims had been to extend that EU funding of teaching material to RMLs (see Chapter 2). This oddity was somehow 'resolved' in the new LLP (see Article 33, 2.a.i).

5. As Vinciguerra, member of the L'Assemblée de Corse and president of its *ad hoc* Commission for the Promotion of LCC, later put it:

> *Corsican has found its marks.* [...] *Reactivating links with Dante's language will be all beneficial. Not doing it might leave Corsican isolated against French which, increasingly, would erode it. Italian will also give us back the memory of our history written in Tuscan* [...] *Corsican, thanks to Italian, will help access a linguistic area of 400 million speakers.* (*Corsica*, July 2002: 53, Interview with Arrighi, J.-M.)

6. However, the LCC CAPES is also the only RML CAPES where LCC is the only subject taught; all other RML CAPES are bivalent: candidates have to have two areas of expertise, e.g. Occitan and history.

7. There were 14 graduates at the first session; there are now more than a hundred certified teachers on the island.

8. During the consultation process in preparation for the 1997 State/Region *Plan de développement de la LCC*, a number of contributions were made. For instance, the *Cullettivu Pà a Lingua Corsa* [Inter-Organisation for the Corsican Language] submitted a series of proposals inspired by the *European Charter for RMLs*, demanding the generalisation of LCC education, more media space for Corsican and its co-official use in public services. This *ad hoc* organisation consisted of a large number of cultural and/or political organisations, e.g. trade unions, polyphonic bands, Corsican language associations with a notorious nationalist agenda like *Scola Corsa Bastia*, etc.

9. This was achieved for 95% of students in *collèges* from the 1999–2000 school year (CTC, April 1999).

10. As was noted in Chapter 4, this measure, initially specific to Corsica, was then generalised to other RML regions in 2001.

11. The original formulation included the concluding expression '[...] except if parents refuse it'* which a number of opponents saw as a mandatory clause *a contrario* (Le Monde, 16 May 2001: 7). This was suppressed by the French parliament's *Committee of Laws** (see also *Corse-Matin*, 10 February 2001: 19; 19 April 2001: 2; 15 May 2001: 2 and the issue of *Journal de la Corse* of 25–31 May 2001: 7–8, for a report on the debates on the Corsican language at the parliament).

12. In that context, Corsican language education is *de facto* mandatory when teaching is provided since pupils do not leave the classroom during LCC lessons (*Corsica*, September 2000: 52).

13. Interestingly, the author, Jean-Marie Arrighi, is the highest *Rectorat* civil servant coordinating LCC education. He is also a cultural activist, has authored many publications on Corsican history and writes columns and papers on Corsican in the monthly review *Corsica*. His conception of language is similar to that of the Corsican sociolinguists (see Chapter 8).

14. Interestingly, some space was given to Corsican in these media long before the law formally allowed it (1987).

15. Both media offer Corsican-medium daily news updates. FR3 also broadcasts a regional magazine at peak times – *Noi* [us] – as well as a weekly documentary – *Ghjente* [people] – on various aspects of Corsican culture, traditions, history, etc, and a cartoon and sitcom.
16. I use the figures from the 2002 provisional report rather than those of the 2004 final analysis here, because the former are more detailed in terms of the frequency of use with children, i.e. occasional or usual.
17. The proportion of Corsican born between 1975 and 1999 has evolved from 73% to 60%.
18. The survey also indicates that today 1 in 10 children speak Corsican with their parents, usually or occasionally.
19. The Rectorat's statistics indicate that the rate of enrolment between the second and third year in *collèges* fell from 68.54 to 27.30% (2000–2001), from 72.3 to 35.68% (2001–2002), from 71.8 to 32.8% (2002–2003) and from 66 to 33.4% (2003–2004).

8   Language ideologies, language planning and language attitudes in contemporary Corsica

1. As Di Meglio (1997: 157) indicates, this spelling system has been almost universally acclaimed in Corsica within years after its publication. For an early illustration of the deconstruction of the idea that variation hinders obtaining the status of a language, see also Thiers (1977, cited by Di Meglio, 1997: 148).
2. For a similar pattern and concept, see also Hechter's theory of reactive ethnic group formation (1975).
3. For other examples of the logic of total opposition, see McDonald (1989) on Brittany and Woolard (1989) on Catalonia.
4. Having maintained Corsican themselves, Corsican 'natural' speakers often deny it is in danger and can altogether dismiss the need for language planning.
5. See also the various positions expressed in the Italian-medium, pro-Italian Corsican magazine *A Viva Voce* created in 1993.
6. See also Jaffe (1999: 139–140).
7. Corsica receives about € 15 million for cross-border exchanges as part of the EU budget for the development program *Interreg III A – Italy/French Islands*. These exchanges involve Corsica, Tuscany and Sardegna and can serve to fund various cultural and/or academic events. See http://www.europa.eu. int/comm/regional_policy/country/prordn/details.cfm?gv_PAY=FR&gv_reg= ALL&gv_PGM=2000RG160PC015&LAN=5 (accessed November 2004).
8. Thiers was one of the earliest language activists. When the University of Corsica opened, he became a lecturer. He was trained in sociolinguistics, diffused the controversial concept of polynomy in Corsica and organised its hegemonisation in teacher training and subsequently LCC education. He was president of the CAPES panel for years. He is also an acclaimed Corsican medium literary author, and is a regular interviewee in *Corsica*. As director of the Cultural Centre of the University (CCU), finally, he

has also played a central role in organising cultural exchanges and con-ferences with other regions notably with European funds, e.g. from Inter-reg. Since 2005, he has also headed the new Scientific Committee for the LCC at the CTC, thus having a direct input in regional glottopolitical decisions.

General conclusion

1. OJ C115, 09/05/2008, p. 17.

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