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Debates and Discourses on Turkey and the EU

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Constructions of European Identity

Identities and Modernities in Europe

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Constructions of European Identity

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Series Introduction: *Identities and Modernities in Europe*

Atsuko Ichijo

The *Identities and Modernities in Europe* series examines one of the central issues in the social sciences, modernity, by way of a comparative study of processes of Europeanisation. Arising from a European Commission-funded FP7 project, 'Identities and Modernities in Europe', an international collaborative research project, the series brings together the latest research findings into modernity carried out by cutting-edge researchers across Europe using 'identity' and 'Europe' as a way into the study of modernity.

In the post-Cold War, 9/11 and Lehman Brothers era, which is also marked by a rapid pace of globalisation, questions concerning 'Europe' and identity are becoming more and more urgent and the debates are heating up. With the unfolding of the euro crisis, both 'Europe' and European identity are earnestly interrogated on a daily basis by a wide range of people, not only at the periphery of 'Europe' – both member states and non-member states of the European Union – but also within the euro area. In fact the question of 'Europe' has not been so pertinent for a long time since the inception of the European Union. This is taking place against a wider background of rapid globalisation which is accompanied, perhaps paradoxically, by an increasingly fragmented world. In such a supposedly fragmented world, identities inevitably attract more and more attention. Identities are a modern concern and 'Europe' is the birthplace of the currently dominant form of modernity, and therefore these existential questions about 'Europe' and identities eventually lead to the questioning of modernity as we know it. The series endeavours to address these concerns by gathering latest and interdisciplinary research results about the idea of Europe, European identities and Europeanisation.

The volumes collected in the series present original research grounded in history, sociology and anthropology on the question of 'Europe', identity and modernity. Some contributors present a comparative analysis; others present a one-country-based case study. The geographical areas covered in the series go beyond the European Union and include Turkey, Croatia and Japan. Various dimensions about 'Europe', identity

and modernity are explored: Europeanisation and modernisation, tolerance, discursive construction of Europe, religion, nationalism, collective identity construction and globalisation. A variety of methods to collect data are employed: in-depth interviews, discourse analysis, civilisational analysis and biographical interviews. Each volume's nuanced analysis will come together to help realise a more comprehensive understanding of 'Europe', identity and modernity.

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Introduction

At the end of the 1990s, the French political scientist Dominique Moisi (1999) used the phrase 'soul-searching' to describe Europe's quest for identity in an era of rapid change. The Eastern enlargement, the latest round of Treaty reform and, more recently, the Euro crisis have all significantly fuelled the drive to define Europe's identity and where it is heading. The question of Turkish accession to the European Union (EU) provides an ideal case to assess the essence of this 'soul-searching' in the EU. Turkey's relations with the EU officially dates back to 1959, when Turkey applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). Despite the long history, the relationship has been a thorny one. Economic and political instability in Turkey set the slow and unsteady pace of relations over the following four decades. Turkey was then officially declared as a candidate country destined to join the EU at the December 1999 European Council Summit in Helsinki. Although accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey began in October 2005, the outcome seems to be uncertain.[1]

Turkey has made important strides in fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria and in aligning its legislation with that of the EU. Yet as the accession process has progressed, debates on the desirability of Turkish accession have intensified in the EU. As the prospect of accession has become more real, opposition has been increasingly based on the grounds that the country poses a profound challenge to the European project due to the perceived ambiguities over its 'Europeanness'. It has been explicitly and increasingly voiced, most prominently by the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel among others, that Turkey's democracy, geography, history, culture and the mindset of its politicians as well as its people qualify it as a non-European state that is unfit to become a member of the EU.

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Amidst this strong emphasis on the criteria of being European with respect to Turkish membership, this book aims to take up the challenge of looking into the ways in which Europe is discursively constructed through current EU representations of Turkey. Europe is hereby taken as a contested notion, the meaning of which is not fixed. Nevertheless from a poststructuralist perspective, which theorises identity as relational and discursively constructed through difference, European identity is conceptualised as discursively constructed within representations where its construction is dependent on the definition of the European Self with respect to various Others (Connolly, 1991). On the basis of this assumption this book argues that EU discourses on Turkey, through their representations of the country, give significant insights into the discursive construction of European identity. This book is thus about *how* the EU talks about Turkey and, more importantly, about identity – belonging and estrangement, inclusion and exclusion. The two major questions tackled in the book relate to how the Europeanness of Turkey is represented in EU discourses and the ways in which the conceptualisations of Turkey lead to the discursive construction of European identity.

Identity in international relations

The importance accorded to identity in international relations is largely dependent on the conceptual framework utilised in analysing the international system. This book adheres to a poststructuralist reading of international relations that accords a fundamental emphasis to the concept of identity in the discipline. Poststructuralism is not the only theoretical stance in international relations that deals with this notion in its analyses. While rationalist approaches such as realism and neo-liberalism sideline the notion, constructivism also accounts for identity in its conceptualisation of international relations. Nevertheless there are significant differences in the ways in which constructivism and poststructuralism approach the concept.

One major divergence is seen in the nature of constructivism as an explanatory theory that treats identity as a variable that impacts on the policies of international actors (Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1999). Works from this approach argue that states acquire their identities in interaction with other states and, at the same time, that they view themselves and each other in terms of the subject positions that are constituted by the social structure of international politics (Wendt, 1999). In contrast to this argument poststructuralist accounts underline that identity

cannot be treated as a variable in foreign policy since the representations of identity are constitutive of foreign policy (Campbell, 1992; Hansen, 2006). A relationship of causality cannot, therefore, be formulated between identity and foreign policy since the two are intertwined through discourse (Hansen, 2006: 10).

Another important difference between constructivist and poststructuralist approaches relates to the role of difference in identity formation (Rumelili, 2004). Social constructivists, most prominently Wendt, argue that identity does not necessarily have to be constructed through difference (Wendt, 1999: 224–28). He highlights that states have pre-social corporate identities (as bodies and territories) in addition to their social identities, and these corporate identities are self-organising structures that remain aloof to Self/Other relations (Wendt, 1999: 225). He also distinguishes between two types of state identity, namely 'role identity' and 'type identity'. Whereas 'role identity' is constructed in relation to other states, 'type identities' such as democracy are intrinsic to a state and thus require no interaction with others (Wendt, 1999: 226). For poststructuralists, however, identity is unthinkable without difference. Identity is thus theorised as *relational* in the way in which it is constructed through difference. There is thus no authentic identity to a state apart from the various constructions that it incurs through its encounters with other states and collectivities.

The poststructuralist approach adopted in this book in turn requires an explanation of the relationship of poststructuralism to the two aforementioned constitutive dimensions of identity, namely discourse and difference, as well as its outlook on foreign policy, to which I turn below.

Identity through discourse

In poststructuralist approaches, identities are constructed through discourses. They are not grounded in any ontological truth and 'no identity is the true identity' since every identity is particular and constructed (Connolly, 1989: 331). Better known as the anti-essentialist theorising of identity, this approach stands opposite those who argue for an inherent content to identities and underlines that it is in fact the impossibility of identity that drives the search in the first place (Laclau, 1994: 4). Identities 'emerge out of a process of representation through which individuals...describe to themselves and others the world in which they live' (Weldes et al., 1999: 14) and in line with this discursive nature, they remain unstable and fragmented. Nonetheless particularly in conditions of ambiguity, one can come across attempts at attaining cohesion in

discourse to 'fix' identities once and for all (Norton, 1987) to the extent that they can be considered as part of what Neumann (2004) calls the 'deep structure'. This can have significant repercussions on the world since identities are often acted upon by social actors *as if* they truly exist. This brings forth the relationship between the discursive constitution of identity and the concept of power whereby those who 'control identity obviously [have] profound influence over the destiny and life of an individual, group or society' by imposing a certain constructed identity that leads to the marginalisation of alternative constellations (Vasquez, 1995: 223).

Within this framework, the notion of discourse as analysed in this book also deserves attention, particularly with respect to the ways in which it is tied to a specific understanding of language, which is hereby not viewed as a simple mirror of reality where it basically reflects what takes place in the social world. Rather language is treated as constitutive of social reality where there is no social reality existing outside language, rendering the process of interpretation crucial. It is only through interpretation that different versions of the social world can be analysed. Discourse is hereby theorised as 'a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – i.e. a way of representing – a particular kind of knowledge about a topic' (Hall, 1992: 291). Discourses systematically produce multiple subject positions from which individuals or groups act. For example the state is often viewed as an important subject produced through discourses on insecurity (Weldes et al., 1999). Similarly nationalist discourses often produce 'imagined communities' argued to be unified by blood, language or culture (Anderson, 1983).

Discourses help create a 'discursive economy' that consists of argumentation, metaphors and various other linguistic formulations. They can gain strength by borrowing from, reconstructing and recontextualising historical myths and tropes as well as various other current texts to the extent that they may be treated as accurate depictions of reality. This constitutes an act of *intertextuality*, which implies that 'texts are situated within and against other texts, that they draw upon them in constructing their identities and policies, that they appropriate as well as revise the past, and that they build authority by reading and citing that of others' (Hansen, 2006: 55). This means that similar discursive practices can be reformulated in different contexts (Wodak, 1999: 3). The concept of intertextuality is in fact similar to Laclau and Mouffe's (1985: 105) concept of *articulation*, which refers to the discursive practice of 'establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice'. Just like intertextuality,

articulation also embodies the point that discursive practice draws on earlier or contemporary discursive formations in constructing different versions of reality (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002: 141).

Once constructed, discourse as the 'representation and constitution of the "real"' provides a 'managed space in which some statements and depictions come to have greater value than others' (Campbell, 1992: 6). Hence although discourses do not 'cause', they can 'enable' certain actions by 'set[ting] limits to what is possible to be articulated', hence leading to 'political struggles' between different versions of reality (Diez, 1999: 611). In such a contestation, certain discourses have the benefit of being located in institutions with power. For instance the statist discourse is a classic example of how discourses of state officials gain their power via being 'constructed as representatives who speak for *us*' due to their access to information from the state, their constitutional legitimacy and privileged access to the media (Weldes et al., 1999: 17–18).

A remark that is deemed necessary here relates to the 'interests' of actors who produce the discourses. From a poststructuralist standpoint, this book is interested in broader discursive structures rather than the individual intentions or interests of actors. This, however, does not imply that the 'interests' of the discourse participants are completely omitted from the picture. Nevertheless the way in which they enter into analysis is different from rationalist accounts that try to explain the 'true' interests of actors. Since discourse participants treat various depictions of the world '*as if* they come from groups and individuals with interests, desires, ambitions and stake in some versions of what the world is really like', the invoking of interest in discourse needs to be considered as a powerful discursive tool in poststructuralist analysis (Potter, 1996: 110). Claims about interests are thus treated as descriptions themselves, not independent from the discursive constructions of reality (Potter, 1996: 114).

Identity through difference

From a poststructuralist outlook however minimal differences are constructed to be, they are still central in the very construction of the identity of the Self (Neumann, 1999: 35). In the words of Connolly (1991: 64):

> An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognised. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in

> its distinctness and solidity...Identity requires differences in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.

Hence identity is unthinkable without its 'constitutive outside' (Butler, 1993), without its Other(s). Conventional wisdom stipulates that the Others that constitute the Self are often depicted as dangerous and/or threatening. Applied to international relations, Campbell's (1992) work on the construction of US identity during the Cold War, for example, puts forward the argument that representations of a state's Others outside its borders as dangerous is a key requirement for the discursive construction of a state's identity. Nevertheless this need not always be the case in the discursive construction of the Self. In the words of Rumelili (2004: 36), 'the differences of the Other may be represented through various, more or less favourable predicates, metaphors, binaries', and 'it is through these representational practices that the constructed Other may be idealised or completely denigrated, affirmed or negated, or even eroticised and exoticised'. Previous poststructuralist research in international relations indeed finds that representations of the Other may well be cast in less negative terms, leading to binary dichotomies such as leader/partner (Milliken, 2001) or parent/child (Doty, 1996) in the respective construction of the identities of the Self and the Other.

Early research in fields other than international relations, most notably literature, rightfully underlined that there were various dimensions to Self/Other relations beyond evaluative representations. As Todorov (1999: 185) suggested in his seminal work on the relations between the Self and the Other based on an analysis of the early sixteenth-century Spanish clerical debate about the status of 'the Indians' of the New World, Self and Other relations cannot solely be grasped at the level of value judgements (the axiological level), but involve two other levels: the praxeological level that entails the extent of the distance between the Self and the Other, and the epistemic level that refers to the level of knowledge the Self has of the Other. In line with the aforementioned empirical studies in the international relations discipline on Self/Other relations he also argues that the evaluation of the Other does not necessarily have to be in radically negative terms. Regarding the praxeological level he suggests that the distancing of the Self from the Other may take the form of indifference towards the Other, the submission of the Self to the Other or the Other's submission to the Self. His analysis also denies the conventional thinking that

the more collectivities get to know each other, the less negative the representations become (Neumann, 1999: 21).

Identity through foreign policy

Poststructuralist views of international relations reject treating the notions of the state and its sovereignty as given, inevitable concepts, underlining instead their socially and historically constructed nature (Walker, 1993; Vasquez, 1995). They argue that the notion of sovereignty has been used in constructing the modern political identity of the state in relation to a given territory. In turn the imposition of a national identity on a geographic territory has not only played a crucial role in the pacification of competing identities, such as that of the church, in the domestic sphere of the modern state, but it has also served to draw borders between the national Self and the Other(s) outside. The state, with no ontological status, has thus been left to constantly (re)construct itself through discourses of identity with respect to both its inside and outside simultaneously.

It is in this framework that – unlike in constructivist thinking where foreign policy is treated as a medium for the expression of state identity – poststructuralism views foreign policy as a discursive practice that serves as a 'specific sort of boundary-producing political performance' through which a state constructs its own identity and hence its very own being (Ashley, 1987: 51). The discourses instantiated by foreign policy actors 'produce meanings and in so doing actively construct the "reality" upon which foreign policy is based' (Doty, 1993: 303). Conceptualising foreign policy as a discursive practice also implies that 'policy and identity are ontologically interlinked' (Hansen, 2006: 21). It is through foreign policy that particular subject identities are constructed for states, positioning them vis-à-vis one another and thereby constructing a particular reality in which certain policies become possible (Doty, 1993: 303).

This does not mean that there is a clear-cut distinction between a state's attempts at hegemonising a certain identity at home and another in the international system through foreign policy. In fact the two do not exist independently from one another. Often elements resistant to securing an identity on the *inside* are linked to discursively constructed external threats on the *outside*. For example, studies repeatedly demonstrate the ways in which national debates over migration and immigrants construe them as a national security *problematique* (Doty, 2000; Bigo, 2006; Huysmans, 2006; Kaya, 2009). Similarly David Campbell has shown how the US discourse on the 'communist threat'

from the outside during the Cold War was utilised to silence rival identity claims from within (Campbell, 1992: 195–223).

Construction of Europe through enlargement policy: The case of Turkish accession

From a poststructuralist standpoint, the EU, as any other collective entity, can be described as an imagined community that is constantly in need of articulation of its meaning (Diez, 2004; McNamara, 2011). This implies that just like in the case of the state where the lack of its ontological being requires the discursive construction of its identity (Campbell, 1992: 91), any attempt to define the EU entails the discursive construction of the collective entity by attempting to fill in and fix the meaning of the collectivity. This brings forth significant repercussions for the concept of European identity, due to the widely accepted discursive equivalence formulated between the 'European Union' and the concept of Europe that not only characterises, but also extends beyond the official EU discourse (Shore, 1999; Hülsse, 2000; Risse, 2004a, 2010; Krzyzanowski and Oberhuber, 2007; Tekin, 2010).[2] One only needs to be reminded of how the concept of European identity is much more widely used than EU identity in both academic and political debates, or the way in which the influence of the Union on its member states or on candidate countries is referred to as 'Europeanisation' and very rarely as 'EU'isation. The discursive struggle to define Europe is a political act, which, by definition, entails the drawing of both spatial and temporal boundaries that can only be revealed through deconstructing the various meaning(s) given to Europe in order to make more transparent the attempts at the fixation of the concept under the rubric of the European Union.

   The EU has been characterised in various ways in the academic literature, ranging, among others, from a 'regulatory' state (Majone, 1996) to a system of 'multi-level governance' (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). In defining the EU, a popular debate in both academia and policy circles has entailed the argument that the EU is moving beyond the modern state to resemble a postmodern or a post-national order.[3] This implies that the EU is becoming increasingly associated with more porous borders where strict territorial differentiations and imposition of uniform identities over a designated territory are diminishing (Ruggie, 1993). In other words, this involves 'moving beyond the hard boundaries and centralised sovereignty characteristics of the Westphalian, or "modern" state towards permeable boundaries and layered sovereignty' (Buzan and

Diez, 1999: 56). Hence in this perspective, the Union is viewed as more than merely an act of intergovernmental cooperation; it is also as an entity that does not resemble the modern nation-state with its baggage of sovereignty and a fixed, coherent notion of collective identity. This suggests that a European identity, which is open to a plurality of 'identities' both with respect to its 'inside' and the 'outside', is under construction whereby 'the distinction between the Self and the Other' is becoming blurred (Antonsich, 2008: 507).

Much of that claim, however, rests on an analysis of the institutional and the societal relationship between the members of the EU, rather than on the EU's relations with the outside (Rumelili, 2004: 27–8). EU enlargement policy, by contrast, provides the discursive space through which the discursive struggles over defining Europe, hence the relationship of the constructed European identities to that of the modern nation-state, can be discerned in the EU's relations with its outside. This stems from the conceptualisation of EU enlargement as a specific type of foreign policy. The EU official discourse flags enlargement under the rubric of a 'powerful foreign policy tool', particularly with positive connotations of 'success' due to its allegedly transformative impact on the political and economic systems of Central and Eastern European countries.[4] Similarly EU enlargement has also been described in academic circles as a form of foreign policy due to the EU's being in a position to shape large parts of applicant states' domestic and foreign policies through the prospect of accession (Sjursen, 1998; Smith, 1999).

Although this is indeed an important aspect of enlargement, the rationale behind referring to enlargement as a specific form of foreign policy hereby lies in the poststructuralist theorising of identity and foreign policy. From a poststructuralist perspective, EU enlargement policy can be considered as a specific type of foreign policy for this collective entity since the policy establishes certain boundaries. The decision to include or to exclude is based on two major conditions. The first requirement, based on Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), is to be a European state. This condition alone suggests that the enlargement policy involves primarily a decision to include/exclude on the basis of an evaluation of who is European and who is not, thus inviting various constructions of what it means to be a European state in discussing the accession prospects of an aspirant country.[5]

In addition to being a European state, aspirant states are also required to comply with the political, economic and *acquis*-related criteria, namely the Copenhagen criteria, that the EU introduces.[6] Identity constructs can also be traced in discussions over the Copenhagen criteria

since any act of inclusion/exclusion is a performance of identity, be it in terms of cultural/geographic referents or in terms of other characteristics such as democracy and human rights.[7] It has earlier been underlined that in the poststructuralist framework, identities are constructed relationally through discourse and that it is the discourses put forward by foreign policy makers that primarily construct certain subject identities for states. It can thus be argued that in the context of the Union, EU discourses on enlargement as a type of foreign policy construct various identities for Europe that have a significant bearing on the future of the European project.

The potential accession of Turkey, whose proximity to and distance from Europe have been an object of debate for centuries (Levin, 2011), and more recently, whose EU membership credentials have been challenged in terms of identity and Turkey's potential inability to act 'European' (Diez, 2004), hereby constitutes a crucial discursive site in analysing the construction of European identities. In turn it also provides a critical litmus test for claims regarding the emergence of a postmodern or post-national European identity. Despite this potential for inquiry, the existing literature on Turkey–EU relations have largely focused on the state of the main issues between the two (i.e. democracy, economy, foreign policy), the obstacles as well as the opportunities that they pose and the implications of the accession process for both sides.[8] The widening of the European discursive sphere on Turkish accession as a result of the intensifying relations between the two from the late 1990s onwards also led to a rising interest in the 'identity' factor in the literature on EU–Turkish relations and European integration. Early studies of EU–Turkish relations treated 'identity' as a more or less unified independent variable that hampered Turkish accession to the EU (Öniş, 1999; Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Nas, 2001).

More recent works on EU–Turkish relations have focused on the political debates on Turkish accession in specific EU member states. The edited collection by Tocci (2007b) presents a broad survey of views on Turkey's EU bid in a number of member states. Adopting a more rigorous methodology, Tekin (2010) analyses French oppositional discourses on Turkish accession and shows the discursive strategies through which Turkey has been subject to Othering in France. Yılmaz (2007) focuses on the ways in which the French and German oppositional discourses on Turkish accession are based on geographic, cultural and historical referents. The common point of these last two works is their focus on oppositional discourses (that is discourses that oppose

Turkish accession) in specific member-state settings and their treatment of the identified discourses outside the conceptual framework of international relations. Thus while the discourse analyses are valuable in demonstrating the discursive strategies utilised in justifying the exclusion of Turkey from the EU in certain national settings, they do not deal with the different visions of Europe that these discourses relationally construct (and in this they are also restricted by the limited cases).

In recent years the concept of European identity, specifically with respect to enlargement, has begun to occupy an increasingly important space in the literature on European integration that adopts a social constructivist outlook. Some of the works in this camp identify two broad contours of European identity constructed in debates over Turkey: an inclusive, cosmopolitan Europe that is more open to the idea of Turkey's accession to the EU and an exclusive, essentialist understanding of Europe that rejects seeing Turkey as a member country (Baban and Keyman, 2008; Risse, 2010; Levin, 2011). Although these visions echo dominant impressions from across the EU, detailed contemporary empirical analyses from different discursive sites as to the content of these constructed identities and thus their underlying differences from one another have not been undertaken. Other social constructivist studies that have attempted to understand why Eastern enlargement has actually taken place have also taken on the question of why certain countries are prioritised over others in the enlargement process (Sjursen, 2002, 2006). They have put forward the argument that since justifications for the EU enlarging to Turkey do not include a 'value' dimension that corresponds to a 'shared identity' and a 'kinship-based duty', the country has been pushed behind the CEECs in the decision to enlarge. As a characteristic of social constructivist work, these works treat language and discourse as explanatory rather than constitutive in nature and thus explain EU policy towards Turkey rather than focusing on the wider articulations of European identity through Turkey.

The importance of the latter has been highlighted by poststructuralist works that emphasise the discursive construction of identity through difference. Some have in fact focused on the discursive construction of European identity through Europe's historical relations with the 'East'. Neumann (1999: 63), for example, has argued that the discourses on Turkey and Russia in European history still have ramifications for contemporary European representations of the two countries.

Nevertheless he has also highlighted that in the case of Turkey, selective utterances from history and contemporary rhetoric tend to 'present a picture that is a bit too stark in that it largely fails to highlight the ongoing struggles over representations of the "Turk" '.

Other poststructuralist studies have dealt with the relationship between the European identities constructed through EU foreign policy, specifically enlargement, and the concept of the modern nation-state in international relations. Diez (2004), for example, has highlighted that the presence of geographic and cultural Otherings in the EU's relations with third countries problematises the popular claims of an emergent postmodern identity for the EU. While pointing out that the Europe(s) constructed through relations with third countries may not necessarily overlap with the paradigm of the modern nation-state, Rumelili (2004) has argued that the exclusion of Turkey on both cultural/religious and democratic grounds suggests that the vision of Europe in the EU bears both modern and postmodern elements. Nevertheless both works have underlined the lack of – and the necessity of undertaking – detailed empirical research on EU discourses on third countries in order to reach a better understanding and conceptualisation of constructed European identities in the EU from a poststructuralist perspective.

This book aims to fill this gap through focusing on EU discourses on Turkey in a wide array of decision-making in the EU where the empirical analysis includes, but extends beyond the specific nation-states to cover other EU institutions, namely the European Commission and the European Parliament (EP), and accounts for discourses that both oppose and favour Turkey's accession to the EU. Hence it accounts for differences and similarities between the discourses in different institutional, national and/or ideological spheres, identifying also the ways in which constructed institutional and/or national identities and ideologies infiltrate into different visions of the EU. To this end it makes use of primary sources (semi-structured in-depth interviews) that serve a crucial function in articulating narratives of identity. Perhaps more importantly, the book combines the two approaches followed separately in the works cited above. On the one hand, it applies Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to a wide corpus, thus demonstrating a novel way through which a poststructuralist account can be subjected to a systematic methodology. On the other hand it does not limit the results of the discourse analysis to merely identifying how Turkey is perceived or represented in the EU; as required by its poststructuralist premises, it focuses further on the different Europe(s) that these representations in turn lead to.

Research methodology

This book traces and analyses EU discourses on Turkey in three inter-related decision-making spheres of the Union, namely the European Commission, the EP and three selected EU member states (France, Germany and Britain). In doing so, it adopts a 'dual methodology' (Pace, 2006: 11), which brings together Commissioner speeches and (European/national) parliamentary debates with 84 semi-structured, open-ended, in-depth qualitative interviews conducted with politicians and key policymakers in these three spheres. Thus the analysis focuses on the discourses of selected national and EU elites.[9] The significance of analysing elite discourse in the context of this book stems mainly from its dominance in debates about Europe and the EU and the ensuing con-ceptualisation of the EU as an 'elite project' in the making (Risse, 2010). The time frame in the case of the speeches and the debates covers the period between the December 1999 Helsinki Summit when Turkey was granted candidacy status and June 2010, the point at which negotiations seemed to have come to a standstill.[10] The interviews were conducted between October 2006 and September 2008.

Spheres of analysis

All three institutional spheres of analysis play fundamental roles in the discursive construction of the debate on Turkey in the enlarge-ment policy. The EP enjoys a significant amount of discursive power in enlargement through various channels such as policy discussions with the Commission, parliamentary reports and resolutions on the can-didate countries as well as informal contacts of the members of the EP (MEPs) with Commission and Council representatives (Judge and Earnshaw, 2003). The assent procedure through which it has the power to veto the accession of a new member state in the final stage of enlarge-ment bestows it with its most effective official channel of influence in the process. Direct elections via proportional representation lead to the reflection of a wide range of political opinions on enlargement from different ideological and national standpoints.

The Commission is a key EU player that is 'engaged in all stages of the enlargement process' (Diedrichs and Wessels, 2006). The power of the Commission in the enlargement policy is twofold. It employs a significant amount of discursive power in both the member states and the applicant countries in question by shaping the terms of enlargement debates via the regular evaluations it provides on the appli-cant countries (Robert, 2004). Furthermore in its official/legal role as

negotiator and initiator of policy through recommendations to the Council, it also exercises power by 'governing' where the discursive power becomes institutionalised, in the way in which it officially and forcefully conditions the 'possibilities of action' for both the member states and the applicant countries.[11]

Member states play a central role in contributing to the discourses on enlargement and thus on Europe through the Council of Ministers and the European Council. They are responsible for deciding on critical stages of the accession process such as the acceptance of a country's application for membership, the opening of accession negotiations and (together with the EP) the final decision regarding accession. This institutional structure in turn paves the way for the construction of a wide discursive space in which the member states, through negotiations and bargaining, can (re)construct their national debates on enlargement in the institutional sphere of the EU.

The country cases are selected on the basis of both their political weight in the Union, defined in crudest terms by the reflection of the countries' population sizes in their representation in EU institutions and their voting weight in the EU, as well as the degree to which Europe plays a role in their self-conception. Previous research has found that that the role played by Europe in the national identity constructs of a given nation is central to that nation's outlook on European integration and its related policies, including enlargement (Larsen, 1997; Marcussen et al., 1999; Wæver, 2005; Risse, 2010).

France and Germany are the two cases where Europe seems to constitute the central tenet of the narrative on what these countries are and where they are heading, with both countries' national identity narratives displaying a strong belief that they can decide on Europe (Wæver, 2005: 42–60). In the case of France, a fusion was constructed between the concept of the French nation and Europe, primarily during the presidency of Mitterrand in face of the French political and economic decline of the 1980s. This was later adopted by the French right in defining the new role of France in the world after the end of the Cold War (Larsen, 1997: 89). In this discursive fusion, 'Europe is created as a larger France which takes on the traditional tasks and ideals of France because France has become too small to project its universal values itself' (Wæver, 2005: 44). This in turn constructs Europe not only as the scene in which France acts in a central position as Europe's vanguard, but also as an entity that is 'French in its form' (Wæver, 2005: 44). Europe as a replication of the French model at a higher level implies, thus, that

it should have clear borders and a hard capable core standing strong externally as more than a free trade zone that does not have the political capacity to act (Larsen, 1997: 89). Nonetheless this vision of Europe does not go uncontested in mainstream French political discourse, where one can still observe the presence of a 'distinct nationalist identity discourse' that upholds French sovereignty (Risse, 2010: 71–6).

In Germany both the main parties, from the centre-right and the centre-left, have since the 1950s coalesced around a 'federalist consensus' on Europe that has to this day remained resilient to challenges such as reunification (Risse and Engelmann-Martin, 2002: 300). The 'federalist consensus' has two major components (Marcussen et al., 1999: 622–5; Risse and Engelmann-Martin, 2002: 314–15). One is the way in which Germany's nation-state identity is constructed in opposition to its own nationalist and militarist past and in a close relationship to a Europe that is construed as a common peace project. The second component, closely related to the first, is the conceptualisation of German cooperative federalism as the main model for the construction of Europe, where the institutional order of the Union is discursively connected to the German domestic institutional set-up. This is seen as the only means through which power can be dispersed at many levels in Europe, preventing a balance-of-power approach between nation-states that could pave way for the return of the German power state (Wæver, 2005: 48). This is often interpreted as Habermas's 'constitutional patriotism' at the European level, where institutions and procedures have a central role in overriding deep-rooted nationalisms (Wodak and Weiss, 2004: 246). Some suggest that in addition to the institutional/procedural emphasis, there is also a strong cultural dimension to the German debates on Europe, as witnessed in references to a common European culture while justifying enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Good, 2001: 151–2 and 156; Zaborowski, 2006: 118).

While the definition of the British national Self also entails a close relationship with Europe, unlike in France and Germany, Europe is constructed as the friendly Other against which the British Self defines itself. It is identified in mainstream British political discourse with the 'continent' and contrasted to 'Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism' where the British Parliament has ultimate sovereignty (Marcussen et al., 1999: 625–7). In a similar vein, British discourse on Europe is often characterised by political and institutional pragmatism where, unlike the French and German discourses, there is hardly any emphasis on a broad European project, be it a civilisational, cultural or institutional one (Larsen, 1997: 51–7).

The data

In the case of the EP, the analysis in this book takes into account the contributions of the group members to the plenary debates on Turkey and to those on enlargement that include lengthy discussions on the question of Turkish accession[12] as well as 29 in-depth qualitative interviews conducted with those MEPs who are also members of the EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee (also known as the EU–Turkey Delegation) where each political group is represented in proportion to its size.[13]

The three largest political groups represented in the EP have changed little in the timeline of the analysis.[14] The centre-right has traditionally been represented by the largest political group, namely the Group of the European Democrats and Christian Democrats (EPP–ED), renamed as the Group of the European People's Party (EPP) following the 2009 parliamentary elections, after which the Eurosceptic faction led by the British Conservative Party split to establish the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR). The centre-left represented by the Group of the Party of European Socialists (PES), later rebranded as the Socialist Group (PS) in 2004 and the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) in 2009, is the second largest group in the EP, followed by the mainstream liberal and centrist parties which were under the European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party (ELDR) in the 1999–2004 parliamentary term and have been part of the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) after 2004.

The traditional centre-right under the EPP and the EPP–ED has been largely divided in its views concerning Turkish accession. While Christian Democrat parties in particular are largely critical of Turkey's entry into the EU, other conservative parties such as the British Conservatives (which were in the group until 2009) and the Italian *Forza Italia* are known for their explicit support for Turkey's membership. The PSE/PS/S&D and the ELDR/ALDE have been largely in favour of Turkish accession, a stance also shared by the fourth largest group in the EP, namely the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA). Opposition has been much more pronounced in the case of smaller groups, such as the nationalist and mostly Eurosceptic Union for a Europe of the Nations (UEN); the Independence and Democracy Group (IND/DEM), renamed as the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD) in 2009; and the short-lived far-right Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty Group (ITS) in 2007, whereas another relatively smaller group, namely the Confederal Group of the European Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) representing the far left, has remained divided on the issue.

Regarding the Commission, speeches of the Enlargement Commissioner and the President of the Commission on the issue of Turkey's accession to the Union or broadly on enlargement with specific sections devoted to Turkey[15] are coupled with interviews with European civil servants, thus accounting for the official rhetoric as well as the views of the bureaucrats. While the voices of the European civil service are not publicly heard, these individuals prepare the main reports and other policy documents on which much of the official discourse rests. Nineteen in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with officials from the European Commission. Those who were interviewed were all AD (Administrator)-level rank staff of the Commission and consisted of mid-level desk officers, international relations officers and programme managers working on Turkey in their Directorate Generals (DGs). Among the 28 DGs, only the 14 who at the time of the fieldwork had a specific department/desk dealing with enlargement-related issues that included relations with Turkey were approached. The DGs included were Agriculture and Rural Development; Competition; Economic and Financial Affairs; Education and Culture; Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities; Energy and Transport; Enlargement; Environment; Fisheries and Maritime Affairs; Internal Market and Services; Justice, Freedom, and Security; Regional Policy; Research; and Trade.

Within the scope of the member states, the analysis accounts for national parliamentary debates[16] on Turkey and for those on enlargement, foreign affairs and European integration that include lengthy discussions on the question of Turkish accession. It needs to be noted that the length and the number of parliamentary debates on matters relating to Turkey decreased after the opening of accession negotiations with the country in 2005. The analysis also includes in-depth qualitative interviews with the members of the national parliaments (MPs) of three member states – France, Germany and Britain. A total of 36 interviews were conducted with the members of the select parliamentary bodies dealing with EU affairs, with the political groups being proportionally represented.[17]

The data analysed covers the discourses of the members of the main political parties known to broadly represent the centre-left and the centre-right, thus capturing a wide segment of the national electorate in their respective countries in the period under analysis. In the case of France, this includes three political parties – namely *Union pour un mouvement populaire* (UMP),[18] *Union pour la démocratie française* (UDF)[19] and *Parti socialiste* (PS). The UMP is the main centre-right party in the French National Assembly, where the PS constitutes the largest party

of the centre-left in the French political scene. The UDF, another party of the centre-right, is also included in the analysis, mainly due to its 'sophisticated and measurable system of compromise' with the UMP, which has long resulted in close alliances between the two parties in French parliamentary as well as presidential elections (Hanley, 1999: 171). In the German political scene, the discourses under analysis pertain to the members of the Bundestag from the *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern* (CDU/CSU) parliamentary coalition,[20] the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SDP) and the *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*, herein referred to as the Greens.[21] The CDU constitutes the main centre-right party of German politics and collaborates with its conservative and Christian Democrat sister party CSU at the federal level, also forming a common caucus in the Parliament. The SPD and the Greens are located along the centre-left of the political spectrum. The British case entails the contributions of the members of the main party of the centre-right, the Conservative Party, together with the largest representative of the centre-left, the Labour Party.[22]

While the main centre-right parties of France and Germany, namely the UMP, the UDF and the CDU/CSU coalition, have been largely opposed to Turkish membership in the Union, the centre-left embodied in the PS, SPD and the Greens, despite their internal divisions, have generally been supportive of accession. In the British case, both camps have given their unequivocal support to the Turkish bid for membership.

Reflections on genre

Parliamentary debates, political speeches and interviews all constitute different genres, in this context defined as 'a particular use of language which constitutes social practice' (Fairclough, 1995: 56). The nature of discourse in parliamentary debates is dialogic, with members of parliaments responding to discourses articulated not only by other members of parliament, but also to those voiced outside the parliamentary context (Bayley, 2004: 24). Thus parliamentary debates, whether in the EP or in national parliaments, serve persuasive functions through which the members try to convince or dissuade others on policy-related issues, leading to the use of a variety of argumentative moves and persuasive strategies in discourse (Van Dijk, 1993: 71).

In Hansen's typology of genre in discourse analysis, sorted according to the three criteria of articulation of identity/policy, the degree of formal authority and the extent to which the text is read and attended to, parliamentary debates are classified as a type of genre that articulates both identities and policies and that carries high formal authority due

to the elected nature of the politicians as well as the existence of an electoral platform and of a constituency (Hansen, 2006: 85). Although parliamentary debates are not widely read and attended to, it is in fact the case that politicians are in constant interaction with society via various means such as the media and pressure groups, leading to the constant (re)articulation of their discourses in various other settings where exposure to a wider audience is possible.[23]

Unlike parliamentary debates, political speeches meet all three of Hansen's criteria by entailing high political authority, articulating both identities and policies and reaching a wide audience (Hansen, 2006: 82–7). Since they can be considered 'as a struggle over the resources for future battles that reside in the structuring of public discourse', they require a more intense focus on '*how* a politician argues than [on] *what* he says', calling for attention to the discursive means through which arguments are constructed in addressing the audience (Wæver, 2004: 200).[24] In the case of the Commission, the speeches can also be characterised as a specific type of new sub-genre of political speech, what Wodak and Weiss (2004: 235–42) refer to as 'visionary/speculative speeches' on Europe. In line with the distinguishing features of this genre, they are in general consensus oriented, with a high reliance on argumentative strategies geared towards 'making meaning of Europe' ('idea, essence, substance'), 'organising Europe' ('institutional forms of decision making and political framework') and 'drawing borders' (inside/outside distinction), where the interaction of these three dimensions form the basis of the talk. The speeches that will be analysed within the scope of this study pertain to those of the Enlargement Commissioner and the President of the Commission on the issue of Turkey's accession to the Union or broadly on enlargement with specific sections devoted to Turkey.

Compared with the use of political speeches and debates, qualitative interviews are rare in poststructuralist works, but pose particular advantages in discourse research that are not made available by other genres. The narratives and orientations of speakers are most often best revealed in interview data (Howarth, 2005: 338). That is largely due to the genre's dialogic nature that allows moving beyond a specific utterance of the respondent towards an extended narrative that sheds light on patterns of (constructed) identities. Nevertheless it is also this dialogical nature that endows the interviewee with the role of producing the discourse through interaction with the respondent. The dual methodology thus aids in countering the subjectivity of the interviews by the higher degree of formality in debates and speeches, which are still more explicit in

their articulations of identity than are legal/policy texts. This also provides for double-checking the (ir)regularities across discourses on Turkey and the EU, making it possible to see whether or not similar discursive patterns can be discerned in the two realms or whether alternative constructions occur in more unofficial, private and flexible settings.

The semi-structured interviews conducted for this research employed 'topical frames' to structure the general themes of the conversation while providing ample room for articulation by the interviewee (Krzyzanowski, 2005; Krzyzanowski and Oberhuber, 2007).[25] The goal was to attain lengthy narratives on the 'substantive content of identity' that '[capture] variability in meanings' (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009: 17). These topical frames consisted of the respondents' definition of Europe and Europeanness, their evaluation of Turkey's Europeanness, their views on the major issues that Turkish membership raises in EU discourse, including democracy and human rights, women's rights, religion, culture, immigration, security and the state of the Turkish economy, and finally their views on change in Turkey, so as to capture all the aspects of the debate on Turkish accession. Attention was paid to contacting and speaking with members of the political elite (in the case of the EP and the national parliaments) and officials (in the case of the Commission) who were familiar with the affairs of Turkey and its relations with the EU, as well as having the means to shape the discursive sphere on these matters.

Critical discourse analysis

The texts generated are analysed via Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), in particular the discourse-historical strand of CDA advocated mainly by the Vienna School.[26] CDA is a method of discourse analysis that focuses on the study of the relations between discourse and social and cultural developments in different social domains. It views discursive practices as an important form of social practice that contributes to the constitution of the social world, including social identities and social relations. Its theoretical premises go back to Althusser's theory of ideology, Bakhtin's game theory and, in particular, the philosophical traditions of Gramsci and the Frankfurt School (Titscher et al., 2000: 144). The influence of the Frankfurt School is particularly significant in the way in which the analysis has adopted Habermas's notion that critical science has to be self-reflective. Such a theoretical standing leads to a focus on the role of language in power relations, processes of exclusion, inequality and identity building in works that place themselves under the CDA umbrella.

Among the various distinct strands under CDA, this study draws closer to the discourse-historical approach of the Vienna School. This approach has been used in the analysis of national identities (Wodak, 1999) and has more recently been utilised in analysing the construction of European identities (Krzyzanowski and Oberhuber, 2007). It is distinguishable by its specific emphasis on identity construction, where the discursive construction of 'us' and 'them' is viewed as the basic fundament of discourses of identity and difference (Wodak, 2001: 73). In addition to providing an analytical toolkit in the analysis of texts, it incorporates the central concept of *intertextuality* in the analysis, which is a key notion that guides discourse-historical analyses. As discussed earlier, this concept also occupies a core place in poststructuralist approaches. Nonetheless this study does not treat intertextuality in the broader sense of the term, as observed in some poststructuralist analyses in which the concept accounts for the linkage between texts as well as between discourses. Instead it adopts the differentiation introduced in discourse-historical works between *intertextuality* and *interdiscursivity*. In more concrete terms, *intertextuality* is used here to refer to the ways in which a text draws explicitly or implicitly from other texts in the past or present 'through continued reference to a topic or main actors; through reference to the same events; or by the transfer of main arguments from one text into the next', whereas *interdiscursivity* accounts for the ways in which discourses are connected to and are drawn from one another (Wodak in Krzyzanowski and Oberhuber, 2007: 206). This is based on the conceptualisation of discourse as 'patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structures' where a text refers to a 'specific and unique realisation of discourse' through various genres (Wodak in Krzyzanowski and Oberhuber, 2007: 207).

A divergence between the discourse-historical CDA and the poststructuralist approach taken in this book concerns the notion of 'history' in the analysis of texts. The discourse-historical approach argues that 'the background of the social and political fields in which discursive "events" are embedded' needs to be integrated in the analysis. This rests on CDA's theoretical underpinnings that conceptualise a 'dialectical relationship between particular discursive practices and the specific fields of action (including situations, institutional frames and social structures)' (Wodak, 2001: 66). The poststructuralist assumptions in this book, however, deny the existence of such a distinction between discourse and social/institutional structures, by arguing that social reality does not exist independently from the way in which we talk about it. Thus while background information such as the timing and place of

discourses, discursive participants and their institutional affiliations and the actual material 'events', such as the signing of treaties, are provided as they are, the contextual narratives of events are presented in a critical light.

This theoretical divergence also emerges in this book's rejection of the conceptualisation of linguistic tools as the means through which the actual manipulative goals of actors are deciphered. The Habermasian underpinnings lead CDA approaches in general to conceptualise discourses as distortions from the way things really exist as 'truths' (Blommaert, 2005: 32–3), where the analyst enters the picture with the mission of revealing the falsity of representations and displaying the 'true' goals of the actors. For the poststructuralist framework adopted here, 'discourse is studied as a subject in its own right', where one does not look for underlying intentions (Buzan et al., 1998: 176–7). Hence rather than the intentions, beliefs and perceptions of individual speakers and authors, what is of interest is the broader discursive structures and the properties of discourse, the organisations of discourse that make particular talk or writing seem plausible and natural. Nevertheless although poststructuralist epistemology and ontology require a stress on the constructed nature of the data (Hansen and Sørensen, 2005: 98; Hansen, 2006: 213), this does not imply that 'anything goes' in assessing it.

Firstly the 'ethos of political criticism' adopted by poststructuralism constantly questions 'the idea that the national community requires the nexus of demarcated territory and fixed identity' to challenge the nationalist imagery that can lead to negation of difference, and even to violent relationships with Others (Campbell, 1998: 13). Secondly despite the theoretical divergence, it can be argued that the fundamental linguistic tools of the discourse-historical approach can be utilised to demonstrate the subject identities that are constructed via representations in discourse. As Torfing (2005: 9) highlights, CDA's 'analytical notions and categories for analysing concrete discourse...can be used in conjunction with concepts from poststructuralist discourse theories'. This rests on the assumption that a distinction can indeed be made between CDA with its epistemological and political/ideological content and CDA as a technique valuable for its empirical contributions.

The analytical apparatus of the discourse-historical CDA utilised in this study consists of three main steps. The first step involves outlining the main content of the themes and discourses, namely the *discourse topics* in the narrative on Turkey and its relation to Europe and/or the EU.[27] The second step involves the exploration of *discursive strategies* deployed in the construction of identities in the narrative to answer the following

empirical questions directed at the texts (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 44): How are the chosen subjects (Turkey, EU, Europe) named and referred to linguistically? What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them? By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes are certain representations of the subjects justified, legitimised and naturalised in discourse? Are the respective utterances intensified or mitigated? These questions all relate closely to how various 'we's' are constructed and naturalised in discourse. In discourse-historical works of CDA, the totality of discursive practices that undergo analysis to answer these empirical questions are referred to as 'discursive strategies' provided in Table 1 (reproduced from Wodak, 2001: 73). This step requires a particular emphasis primarily on referential strategies and predication in responding to the first two empirical questions, and a closer look at argumentation strategies in the case of the third empirical question. The third step of analysis explores the *linguistic means* that are used to realise these discursive strategies.

Referential/nomination strategies can use various linguistic means, such as the use of tropes, substitutions, certain metaphors and metonymies, with the effect of creating ingroups and outgroups in discourse. For example the use of 'we' and 'they' and of metaphors such as 'family' or 'home' can be cited as only a few linguistic means that involve referencing. These are very closely linked with the *strategy of predication*, which

Table 1 Discursive Strategies

Strategy	Objectives	Devices[28]
Referential/ nomination	Construction of ingroups and outgroups	Membership categorisation Metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches
Predication	Labelling social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively	Stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits Implicit and explicit predicates
Argumentation	Justification of positive or negative attributions	*Topoi* used to justify inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment Implicit presuppositions[29]
Intensification, mitigation	Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition	Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances

is the 'very basic process and result of linguistically assigning quali-
ties to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena'
(Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 54). It can be realised through attributes,
collocations, predicative nouns/adjectives and various other rhetorical
figures. For example the use of rhetorical devices such as flag words
and stigma words can be considered as implicit predicates in discourse.
Whereas flag words such as multiculturalism, integration, freedom and
democracy have positive connotations, stigma words such as racism and
anti-semitism carry negative associations.

Argumentation strategies that are used in justifying attributions can take
various forms. Among the most common is the employment of *topos*,
defined as 'parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either
explicit or inferable premises in the shape of content-related warrants
that connect the arguments with the conclusion' (Reisigl and Wodak,
2001: 74). For example in the discursive construction of national iden-
tities, one often encounters the *topos* of culture and history. Another
frequently used *topos* in the discursive construction of national identi-
ties is the *topos* of threat, which implies that if a certain course of action
entails dangerous consequences, then one should refrain from doing it
or that if certain threats are present, then one should take the neces-
sary precautions (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 77). Another argumentation
strategy that is found to be particularly widespread in the discursive con-
struction of identities is the strategy of implicitness where arguments
that are left vague and incomplete on the surface are in fact grounded in
certain implicit assumptions about the actors, events or processes (Van
Der Valk, 2003: 192–3). Finally *intensification and mitigation strategies*
can use a variety of linguistic devices such as hyperboles, diminutives
or augmentatives, overlexicalisation (the use of excessive synonyms in
referring to a given entity, event or process), omissions and disclaimers
in alleviating or strengthening the force of utterances.

The analysis in this book is organised around the discourse top-
ics, where the discursive strategies and the linguistic means utilised
in a given discursive topic are demonstrated via selected excerpts
from the text. The excerpts that are displayed and analysed at greater
depth are chosen particularly on the basis of their usage of the wide
array of discursive strategies and the related linguistic means that
have been utilised in other parts of the main body of parliamentary
debates/speeches/interviews, also referred to in the endnotes, in for-
mulating the same discourse topic.[30] The excerpts that are used in the
article should thus be viewed as 'typical discourse fragments' (Jäger and
Maier, 2009: 54) that have been observed in constructions of Europe

through Turkey throughout the data, and should not be generalised to all the members of the national/European political groups and the Commissioners/Commission bureaucrats.[31]

Main issues in EU–Turkey relations

Representations of identity do not exist in a vacuum. The discursive construction of identity through difference forms the basis of the poststructuralist approach to international relations, which argues that discourses on a variety of international norms and issues such as security, democracy and human rights are closely intertwined with oppositional structurings and categorisations of identity. Descriptions and accounts construct various 'versions' of the world that are oriented to a range of actions (Potter, 1996). A close reading of the textual data as well as the literature on EU–Turkey relations suggests that there are certain key political and economic issues that dominate the debate on the prospects of Turkey's accession to the EU.

One concerns *the size of the Turkish population*, currently approaching 78 million. This is often mentioned as a constraining issue by EU policy makers, mostly in the context of immigration as well as in terms of its possible institutional and economic impact on the EU. On membership, Turkey will become the most populous member country after Germany, with the total population of the 12 new member states being approximately 105 million. Furthermore about 30% of the Turkish population is under the age of 15, which means that Turkey has a young population, in contrast to the ageing EU population, bringing forward debates on the possible socio-economic merits of future Turkish accession.

The economic situation, including wide income disparities within the country, the structure of the economy and the persistent legacy of populism, corruption and/or patronage politics are frequently cited as fundamental barriers to closer relations. Human development indicators in Turkey are also often mentioned as signs of important divergence from EU member states, particularly in terms of investment in formal schooling and educational achievements (Derviş et al., 2004). The advent of the Euro crisis and the high growth rates in the Turkish economy have also recently triggered the emergence of some arguments in favour of the economic viability of Turkish accession.[32] Nevertheless the accession negotiations have exposed more clearly other problems such as a relatively weak administrative capacity that needs to be strengthened for sufficient alignment with the EU *acquis* both on paper and in practice (European Commission, 2010).

Human rights- and democracy-related issues have been on the agenda of EU–Turkey relations, especially from the 1980s onwards, after the military coup in Turkey. Turkey has often been criticised by various EU actors due to problems related to the rule of law, its track record in torture and ill treatment, its violation of fundamental freedoms such as freedom of thought, press, association and assembly and its treatment of minorities, primarily the Kurdish minority and, to a lesser extent, the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. It has undertaken reforms towards democratic consolidation, especially in the last decade. Substantial reform packages were passed by Turkish governments expanding basic rights and freedoms, strengthening the fight against torture, improving minority rights and abolishing the death penalty (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009). Freedom House ratings suggest that since the mid-1990s, a gradual improvement has occurred in the levels of rights and freedoms in the country, to the extent that since 2004, it has been defined as on the verge of being free (Freedom House, 2008). Nevertheless substantial problems are still reported in areas such as minority rights, certain fundamental freedoms (i.e. freedom of the press), corruption and judicial reform (European Commission, 2010).

Related to democracy and the rule of law, *civilian control over the military* is also an important theme of debate between the EU and Turkey. Three military coups in the country's history (1960, 1971, 1980) have generated various institutional mechanisms to safeguard an influential role for the Turkish military over civilian authority. Discourses of 'internal security' and 'territorial and national integrity of the state' have obtained an almost hegemonic position via the Turkish military, which in turn has strengthened its position vis-à-vis civilian authority. Substantial measures have been taken in strengthening civilian control over the military in the last decade of democratic reform, albeit with problems remaining, particularly regarding military autonomy in the political and economic spheres (Gürsoy, 2011).

The Cyprus issue has been another of the major themes of discussion among EU policy makers on relations with Turkey. The accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 introduced novel obstructive dynamics to EU–Turkey relations. Despite various UN-led unification attempts on the island, the most recent of which was the 'Annan Plan' rejected by the Greek Cypriots in a referendum in April 2004, Cyprus has remained divided as a 'frozen conflict' for over three decades. In December 2006, the Council decided not to open negotiations on eight chapters of the *acquis* and not to provisionally close any of the chapters until Turkey opened its seaports and airspace to Greek Cyprus, as required by Turkey's customs union with the EU.

Another issue that often arises in the talks on EU–Turkey relations is the *geopolitical implications* of Turkish accession. It has commonly been argued that Turkey serves as a 'bridge' between Europe and the Middle East, due to its historical ties with both regions. The rising activism in Turkish foreign policy in recent years has given rise to debates on the compatibility of EU foreign policy and Turkish foreign policy in the wider EU neighbourhood. While some have pointed out the potential areas of foreign policy convergence and cooperation that could enhance the EU's influence primarily in its Southern neighbourhood, others have highlighted points of divergence that could provide sources of instability.[33]

One issue that has become more prominent in the aftermath of the rejection of the proposed Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands is the stance of *EU public opinion* on Turkish accession. Eurobarometer surveys repeatedly indicate that the majority of the EU publics are against Turkish accession, with particularly high rates of opposition observed in countries such as France, Germany and Austria. Studies have argued that these attitudes are closely intertwined with the perception of Turkey as a country that is foreign to Europe in terms of its culture and identity (Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2007). *Cultural and religious differences* have also been highlighted by prominent EU leaders, among others, as barriers to Turkey's entry.

The issues that are touched upon in Turkey-related EU discourses are not restricted to those introduced briefly above. Further themes concerning migration, border control, security and relations with neighbours (i.e. Armenia), among others, also appear in the actual analysis, where the focus is on how the issues are handled to privilege certain interpretations in constructing different versions of European identity through the discussions on Turkey.

Mapping of the book

This book identifies four main discourse topics under which different Europe(s) are constructed in the debate on Turkey and its relations with the EU. These correspond to the conceptualisation of Europe *as a security community*, *as an upholder of democratic values*, *as a political project* and *as a cultural space*.

Following the Introduction, Chapter 1 examines the ways in which Europe is constructed as a *security community* in the EU discourses on Turkey. It sets out the multiple discursive strategies through which this is realised, such as the construction of Turkey as a key dialogue player between civilisations, a model country for the Southern neighbourhood,

an impediment to the construction of a strong EU external identity and a potential threat in terms of migration and border control. The chapter explores the institutional, ideological and national differences (where they exist) in these constructions, such as the intensity of the securitisation of migration among centre-right and extreme-right groups as well as the transatlantic component in the British discourse. Nevertheless despite the variations, the chapter argues that EU discourses on security largely draw on the main tenets of the 'clash of civilisations' narrative as a political myth in constructing two monolithic and homogeneous cultural blocs of Europe/West and the South, and construct Europe largely with nation-state-centric notions of clear demarcations between the inside and the outside.

Chapter 2 sets out the ways in which Europe is systematically constructed as an *upholder of democratic values* through the EU debates on Turkish accession. It shows how democracy is conceptualised as a cultural/historic value among right-wing and extreme right-wing political groups and, to a much lesser extent, among left/liberal groups, reproducing neo-orientalist discourse. It demonstrates the discursive means by which some of the left/liberal political groups and Eurocrats in the Commission construe democracy as an acquired trait that Turkey can attain via copying the European model with its civilising mission, and argues that this construct, coupled with a lack of (or very little, limited to the Second World War) self-reflexivity, reproduces the Eurocentrism of modernisation projects, problematising the characterisation of the EU as a normative actor.

Chapter 3 demonstrates that in a vast array of EP and Commission discourse, as well as among most French and German political groups, Europe is constructed as a *political project* with a strong core of well-functioning institutions, a solid budget and pooled sovereignty. It shows that while major differences exist between political groups and national/institutional spheres regarding the perceived impact of Turkey on the political project, with the exception of such groups as the German Greens, the concept of Turkish 'sovereignty' that is tied to essentialist tropes such as culture and history is invoked as a problem for the coherence of the political project that requires a certain degree of internal homogeneity and singularity. Through these findings, the chapter also challenges the commonly held view of the Commission as a supranational actor by exposing the limits of its supranationalism. While Commission officials stress supranationalism and are critical of what they see as manifestations of Turkish nationalism, when it comes to strategic reflections on Turkey's membership or to sensitive issues

where EU member states are still attached to their national sovereignty, the discourses of Commission officials become 'nationalistic' themselves, what is referred to in this chapter as 'Euro-nationalism'. The chapter also identifies an alternative, albeit minority discourse among certain segments of the centre-right group in the EP (Swedish, British, Spanish and Italian factions) and across the two main political parties in Britain on the construction of Europe as a political project of nation-states, but argues that while the discourse topic seems to be different on the surface, the order of discourse that constructs it is largely similar in the way in which it rests on the nation-state.

Chapter 4 displays the discursive construction of Europe as a *cultural space* in the discussions on Turkey. While it finds that right-wing and extreme right-wing political groups in the EP as well as in France and Germany largely construct rigid borders between the inside and the outside on the basis of geographical, historical and cultural factors, it also points out that the discourses present among the left/liberal groups as well as in the Commission place a reiterated emphasis on cultural diversity and explicitly refute essentialism. Nevertheless a closer reading of these discourses highlights that although they do not construct clear-cut boundaries between the inside and the outside, based largely on essential attributes, they may still not escape the paradigm of modernisation and its view of the nation-state in the way in which they imagine political communities. This is found to be particularly the case for the conceptualisation of the notions of 'culture' and 'multiculturalism', where, despite the focus on diversity, unity is still sought in the extent to which the 'substantial' notions of 'culture' such as religion are expressed in society. The chapter also displays national/institutional variances in this construct, such as the identification of a clear distinction between a mythic Europe based on a common culture, history, a (rather flexible) geography and a Europe as a political project of nation-states in most of British discourse.

The 'Conclusion' brings together the arguments from the preceding chapters and places the empirical findings in relation to the broader conceptual debates of identity construction in international relations as well as of the role of the modernisation paradigm and the modern nation-state in the construction of European identity through EU enlargement policy.

1
Europe as a Security Community

The potential security implications of Turkey's accession to the EU are frequently debated in both the EP and the European Commission (see also Aydın-Düzgit, forthcoming) as well as across all the three member states under analysis, and these implications play a crucial role in the discursive construction of Europe as a security community. The analysis finds that this theme intensifies in the data particularly from the years 2002 and 2003 onwards, among those who argue both in favour of and against Turkish accession. Its intensity declines significantly after the opening of accession negotiations where attention shifts in all the discursive spheres more towards the domestic developments in Turkey. The discourse analysis reveals two dominant representations of Turkey that lead to this discourse topic: representation of Turkey as a panacea for the clash of civilisations and as a potential security threat for Europe.

Turkey as a panacea for the clash of civilisations

The notion of the clash of civilisations was first coined and elaborated by Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996) in the post-Cold War era, resurfacing strongly after the events of September 11 (Bottici and Challand, 2011). For Huntington, the dividing lines in the post-Cold War era would not be political or economic, but mainly cultural. His main argument was that in the post-Cold War world 'the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the rest"' where 'a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states' (Huntington, 1993: 146). His proposition rested on an understanding of cultures and civilisations as essential and static, identified through certain geographic constellations. In the words of Said (2003: 69), this thesis

constructs civilisations as 'monolithic' and 'homogenous' and 'assumes an unchanging character of duality between us and them'. The security-related discussions on Turkey as an aspirant for membership in all of the discursive sites are found to display a strong interdiscursivity with the clash of civilisations discourse by being based on similar conceptual grounds.

European Parliament

The delineation of strict civilisational faultlines in the clash of civilisations thesis may at first suggest that its usage in the security-related talk on Turkey, whose accession raises outspoken concerns on its 'Europeanness', is combined with a refutation of Turkey's accession. The analysis, however, suggests that this need not necessarily be the case. In fact, in the centre-right EPP-ED/EPP discourse on Turkish accession, the geostrategic importance of Turkey as a potential member is often justified through the conceptual lenses of the clash of civilisations discourse.[1] This is visible mainly among those national groups that are sceptical of an integrated Europe and that hold a strong transatlantic outlook such as the British (pre-2009), the Southern member states (in particular the Spanish and the Italians) and the Scandinavian factions (mainly the Swedish), as in the following:

> Throughout the Cold War, Turkey was a steadfast ally on the side of the West. Communism was kept at bay, partly thanks to Turkish loyalty towards the NATO Pact. That is something we must remember in this House today. There are substantial benefits to be had in terms of security policy from speeding up Turkey's integration into Europe. In my view, Turkey is the country that can build a bridge to the Arab world. I would therefore call upon us to act in the forthcoming process on the basis of Turkey's being 'a friend of Europe'.
>
> (Seeberg, EPP-ED, 13 December 2004)

> EPP-ED 2: Since I was first elected as a member of the European Parliament in 1999, I have been a member of the EU Turkey delegation of the joint Parliamentary committee and I have maintained my membership of that because I am very positive about Turkey's prospective accession to the European Union, and I have done all that I can to promote that in the best possible way. And why do I do this? Not because I have any particular links with Turkey, but first of all, I look at it from a sort of strategic political

point of view, and I see Turkey as a country which for the last 50 years has been a very good member of NATO. In today's world, she sits in a very important geopolitical position, as a kind of a bridge to the Islamic world. I think it is most important that Turkey's attachment to Europe in all respects should be maintained and strengthened and I see EU membership as an important part of that.

In both of the excerpts above, Turkey is predicated as a 'steadfast' and 'loyal' ally that has sided with the West during the Cold War under the NATO umbrella and that could contribute to the EU as a member. Both excerpts however further demonstrate that the inclusion of Turkey on the basis of (constructed) security interests should not be taken as an indication that the country is constructed as European. In the first excerpt, Turkey is not a part of, but a 'friend' of 'Europe', whereas the second excerpt constructs it as strongly 'attached' to Europe and the West. In both cases, a binary opposition is constructed between Turkey and Europe. Binary oppositions do not just oversimplify the world, but they also establish relations of power between its poles. Applied to the case at hand, their application as such not only leads to a clear demarcation between Turkey and Europe but also establishes a power relationship in favour of Europe itself.

   Turkey's predication as a 'bridge' between 'Europe' and the 'Arab/Islamic world' establishes a similar distance and reproduces a key assumption of the clash of civilisations thesis. Metaphors are not treated herein as 'objective mediators' between two similar pre-established subjects, but as crucial elements in constructing our knowledge of the world by becoming sedimented in discourse as 'common sense' (Drulak, 2006: 503).[2] The use of the 'bridge' metaphor is particularly significant in this context. A bridge is something that you walk on or cross but do not stop on. A bridge links two entities together without belonging to either one side or the other. In fact the two sides of the bridge referred to here are Europe and the Arab/Islamic World, which constructs a binary opposition that is classic of the clash of civilisations discourse that presents the two as coherent and bounded entities. Through the referential strategy of culturalisation (Van Leeuwen, 1996), 'ethnification' of one side through the use of the word 'Arab' is realised. Similarly, the use of the term 'Islamic world' also serves to homogenise the entity to which it refers via labelling it with a determining religion.

Along these lines, an Italian member of the EPP-ED argues the following:

> We *Forza Italia* Members have assessed the pros and cons and are united in the firmly-held conclusion that it is both advantageous and essential to give the green light to accession negotiations. To reject them would mean thwarting the efforts that Turkey is making to modernise itself and to develop a democratic system; it would mean consigning that country to the confusion and despotism of unstable regions such as the Middle East and the Caucasus; and it would mean sending out a negative signal to the whole moderate Islamic world, reinforcing the intransigence of the fundamentalists and lending support to those who predict a clash of civilisations. Today we have an opportunity to narrow the gap between Islam and the West, thanks to a country that has roots in both the history of Christianity and that of Islam.
>
> (Gawronski, EPP-ED, 13 December 2004)

Although the extract above can be considered as similar to the ones before it, specifically in the way in which it also constructs the issue of Turkish accession as a matter of 'interest' for the European security community, it also introduces related but novel dimensions to the debate in the argumentation strategies that it employs. First, the utterance constructs Turkey as a country dependent on Europe for democratising itself and attaining stability, negating any internal dynamic for change. It needs to be noted how the *topos* of threat is invoked in referring to a situation where the EU does not open accession talks with Turkey. Turkey, in that scenario, would be left alone amidst the stereotypically predicated Middle East and the Caucasus as regions of 'confusion', 'despotism' and 'instability'. Hence in arguing for eventual Turkish accession, Othering of other (constructed) regions such as the Middle East and the Caucasus is also undertaken vis-à-vis a secure and stable Europe. z Another consequence of Turkey's non-accession is sought in the strengthening of the clash of civilisations, where this time there is also a case of explicit intertextuality. The excerpt above, by presenting Turkish accession as 'an opportunity to narrow the gap between Islam and the West', in fact reinforces the underlying tenets of the clash of civilisations thesis. Following the same conceptual framework, the excerpt constructs Islam and the West as two disparate monolithic and homogeneous units. The West here is not labelled by its so-called 'distinguishing religion' whereas Islam, as it was also the case with

the preceding excerpt that referred to the 'Islamic world', is taken as 'expressive of the presumed totality of the civilisation that the West wishes to communicate with', (re)constructing a cultural/civilisational faultline (Keyder, 2005: 2). The underlying implicit assumption here is that whereas the West is greater than and has surpassed the stage of Christianity, the world of Islam is still mired in religion and primitivity, amounting to 'no more than Islam, reducible to a small number of unchanging characteristics, despite the existence of contradictions and experiences of variety that seem on the surface to be as plentiful as those of the West' (Said, 1981: 10).

Both the parliamentary debates and the interviews suggest that the interdiscursivity with the clash of civilisations thesis is also widely prevalent among the discourses of the centre-left, liberals and the Greens in the EP:[3]

> We have had enough of giving in to fear. We need a change, a sign, I would say a different policy, like the Zapatero-Erdogan proposal taken up by Kofi Annan regarding an alliance of civilisations. I am therefore in favour of opening negotiations for the sake of security of Europe's citizens; for the sake of peace; for the sake of the fight against terrorism.
>
> (Zingaretti, PES, 28 September 2005)

> ALDE 3: We do not have the East–West conflict anymore, we have the conflict between cultures, between civilisations, between let's say Western culture and Muslim culture and Turkey is a very crucial country in that conflict. It is a bridge builder, and I would prefer to have this bridge builder on our side and not somewhere outside or somewhere in between. They are in between, but I would like to have them in our fortress.

The first excerpt highlights the 'alliance of civilisations' initiative promoted by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the prime minister of Turkey, and José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the prime minister of Spain in 2005, geared to establish 'close contact between different cultures' and 'avoid widening the gap between the Eastern and Western worlds'.[4] Extension of relations with Turkey via the opening of accession negotiations is viewed in this respect as among the means of reaching out to the Eastern world, to a different 'culture' and to a different 'civilisation', to enhance the security of Europe. The *topos* of danger is used to justify such a policy via utilising the most commonly used post-September 11 war rhetoric: 'the fight against terrorism'. This time a policy of 'dialogue' is proposed to

succeed in this fight. A very similar argument is expressed in the second excerpt, which assumes the existence of two monolithic and disparate 'cultures' as the 'Western' and the 'Muslim' culture. The use of the container metaphor of 'fortress' in referring to the West is particularly notable here. Container metaphors are widely used spatial metaphors in the construction of states as bounded units that can be 'sealed or penetrated' (Chilton, 2004: 118). Hence its use in this context strengthens the boundedness of the 'West' as opposed to the (Muslim) East. Once again, the West of which Europe is a part is not identified by a distinguishing religion, but as a modern entity that is greater than the sum of its parts, whereas the 'world of Islam' refers to no more than 'Islam' itself. Turkey is yet again predicated as a 'bridge', as a country 'in-between' that can help reduce the gap between the two.

While refuting the clash of civilisations thesis on the surface, the discourse on the dialogue of civilisations thus helps to reinforce its key assumptions by embracing the idea that separate essential civilisations that are prone to conflict with one another exist. Attempts to disprove the clash of civilisations thesis in fact help to discursively reproduce it, obscuring the complex dynamics behind conflicts, hence covering alternative means of conflict resolution at the global level. This is also apparent in the way in which the means through which Turkey will contribute to the prevention of the clash of civilisations is left in oblivion. When probed on this in the field interviews, the response is almost repetitively as follows:

> Greens-EFA 2: The security dimension is an important question for Europe. Even if Turkey does not become a part of the EU, it is part of NATO. But on the other hand, I share the perception that it could have some influence on some countries in the Middle East, and to democratise them and for this, Turkey is an example. And yeah I see problems with all these countries at the moment, the neighbours like Syria and others, who are more or less dictatorial regimes. Indeed, some like Iran, they are supporting suicide bombers in Israel.

As also seen in the excerpt above, a stable Turkey as a security asset is argued to have a preventive impact of the conflict of cultures and civilisations via providing a 'model' for the Southern neighbourhood countries. The way in which these countries would be 'inspired' by Turkey or be 'influenced' by it is grounded in the implicit assumption that religious/cultural affinity would lead to a policy of imitation. This is once again an extension of the construct of Islam as a binding, monolithic, encompassing religion for the region as a whole.

It is an outgrowth of a discourse that denies the historical, economic, ideological and even religious variety that exists between and within the countries in the region. It also neglects the variety of competing discourses among the political and intellectual elite of the countries of the Middle East on Turkey and its political system.[5]

The common ground that the centre left-wing and liberal discourse shares with a particular segment of the EPP-ED/EP discourse falls away where the role that is accorded to Europe in contributing to security at the global level is in question. While certain segments of the EPP/ED group also refer to the clash of civilisations as a global matter in which Europe could play a constructive role, the interview data in particular suggests that in the case of the majority of Socialist/Liberal/Green-EFA members spoken to, the global role that Europe is supposed to play goes beyond the scope of alleviating the so-called clash of civilisations:[6]

> Greens-EFA 1: Turkey would be a security asset to the European Union. Everybody dealing with these issues has to admit that because of its geographical position, because of its connections and experiences in the region, to have Turkey as a modern democratic European country is an asset that could enable Europe to play a more visible and dominant role as a global player, because of energy, energy transport, size of the economy ... Europe with Turkey can play a global role in global competition or global decision-making on issues like global trade where none of these countries can play a global role on its own.

> ALDE 5: I think Turkey will be valuable for EU's security identity. I have always thought of that as a very strong argument for integration. Apart from anything else, it will force us to have a proper common security and defence policy. We cannot extend our borders to Syria without having a common foreign security and defence policy. So it will be a big stimulus for us. It will also strengthen our profile on the global stage in UN, with United States, with Moscow, with China etc ... Size does matter in this era of globalisation and the EU with Turkey inside would be much stronger internationally.

For a vast majority of the Socialist/Liberal/Green-EFA groups, Europe is constructed as a security community able to contain terrorism and violence through the inclusion of Turkey as a 'stable' and 'model' country. As exemplified in the second excerpt above, there is also a tacit assumption widespread in these political groups that having Turkey in without a stronger and a more coherent foreign and security policy

would leave Europe open to security threats emanating from the South. Securitisation of the Southern neighbourhood is by no means novel to EU discourse.[7] The strength of the securitisation discourse is that while it draws upon the politically powerful identity of a given community, it also simultaneously masks its specific, historical and thus contestable nature by constructing security as an objective, dehistoricised demand (Hansen, 2006: 34–5). Thus securitisation is not a discursively innocent act, leading to the violence of imposing a specific identity for both Europe and the Southern neighbourhood.

However, there is more to the moderate left-wing and liberal discourse in the way in which it constructs Europe as a security community, and it is here that the main difference with the discourse of the EPP-ED/EPP segments emerges. A sizeable proportion of the members of the centre-left and liberal groups construct Europe as a security agent aiming for interest maximisation in the global competition for power and hegemony among other powers such as Russia, China and the United States.[8] Referential strategies realised through metaphorical expressions such as 'global player' and 'profile on the global stage' combined with the *topos* of usefulness help construct in both excerpts a Europe that is bestowed with characteristics reminiscent of the discursive properties ascribed to nation-state foreign policies. 'Global competition', 'power struggles' and hence indirectly inequalities are naturalised and justified via the nominalisation of 'globalisation'. Nominalisations, by deleting the agency of an act, present it as a natural fact. In a similar vein, 'globalisation' is presented as a natural and inevitable process in relation to which Europe needs to position itself.[9]

European Commission

The Commission is not immune to the dominance of the discourse on the clash of civilisations in the security narrative on Turkey and the EU, particularly in the aftermath of September 11 where the geopolitical significance of Turkey begins to be contextualised within the larger framework of international security and the fight against terrorism:[10]

> Turkey is the first large country with a Muslim population to have committed itself to the realisation of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and the protection of minorities. If Turkey succeeds in this task and its efforts at reform in this direction are impressive, then it will be a breakthrough and we will have the first viable bridge to understanding between the Western democracies and

the countries of the Islamic world. Then we will not necessarily drift towards that conflict between the civilisations which has all too often seemed to arise like an evil spirit.

> (Speech by Günter Verheugen, 'Enlargement of the
> European Union: Expectations, Achievements
> and Prospects', Szczecin, 4 March 2004)

With the formerly communist East now part of the family, we no longer face the East–West arms race. In our era, without denying the role of geopolitics, it is evident that global cultural and identity politics have become more dominant. Thus, the relations between Europe and Islam – inside and outside Europe – is a, if not the major, challenge of our time . . . The European Union shall show resolve against terrorism and firmly contain all kinds of fundamentalism, while at the same time we shall continue building bridges with the moderate strands of Islam which respect universal democratic values. The 21st century is not doomed to a clash of civilisations, but can be built on dialogue and cooperation. This is not the least of the reasons why the EU is going to get accession negotiations started with Turkey on 3 October, now that the remaining conditions have been fulfilled.

> (SPEECH/05/465)

The first excerpt above establishes a clear binary divide between 'Western democracies' and the 'countries of the Islamic world'. The inequality in this binary dichotomy weighs in favour of 'Western democracies' that are positively predicated by their mode of governance (and not by their religion), juxtaposed against those countries defined by an all-encompassing religion, namely Islam. Hence the implicit assumption behind this binary classification is the discursive equivalence formulated between the Islamic religion and the political system in countries where majority populations are Muslim, without allowing for any differentiation within and between these countries on the basis of a variety of factors. This assumption links to the construction of a 'democratic' Turkey as a 'viable bridge' between the two poles of the binary construct, distinguished from 'Western democracies' by its religion and from the 'Islamic' world by its democratic governance, belonging to neither of the two. While Turkey as such is predicated as a bulwark against the 'clash of civilisations', this construction itself once again reproduces the clash of civilisations thesis through the *topos* of danger, treating it as a given phenomena that exists 'out there', waiting to come into force. Furthermore, the way in which Turkey will alleviate this so-called clash of civilisations is left under-elaborated. The implicit

assumption behind the 'bulwark' role points to a policy of emulation of Turkey by other countries with Islamic populations, which once again brings Islam to the fore as a binding and encompassing trait of these groups of countries.

The second excerpt is not only one among many instances where the Commission talk on Turkey reproduces the clash of civilisations discourse, but it is also demonstrative of the shift taking place in EU foreign policy talk from one that avoids geopolitical discourse towards another that orients around 'civilisational geopolitics'.[11] The communist 'East', which constituted the major Other of 'Western' Europe during the Cold War, is no longer constructed as a security threat, now that they are integrated into the 'family'; a metaphor that naturalises Europe/EU by connoting a self-evident naturalness, clear boundaries and thus exclusion, material safety, security and protection to it. Following the inclusion of the 'East' in the European family, the new dimension of conflict is constructed as one between cultures/identities/civilisations. By the use of the modality 'it is evident that' the speaker (Olli Rehn) projects the existence of such a conflict as a self-evident and universal one rather than his own personal perception, and hence implies an important degree of power via 'transforming into "facts" what can often be no more than interpretations of complex and confusing sets of events' (Fairclough, 1992: 160). Furthermore, this conflict is reduced to one between 'Europe' and 'Islam', where Europe is once again not identified by Christianity, but juxtaposed against a dominating religion, with no scope for diversity. This constructed 'Islam' is so monolithic that it denotes a specific challenge not just regarding Europe's relations with other countries but also for its relations with its immigrants. It is notable that a discursive equivalence is formulated between immigrant populations and Islamic religion as their defining trait, setting them apart from 'authentic' Europeans by constructing them as a challenge that needs to be managed within a certain scope of power relations.

The overlexicalisation attained by the words 'terrorism' and 'fundamentalism' in combination with Islam/Europe can be considered as part of an attempt to close the transatlantic gap on threat constructs that opened up in the immediate aftermath of September 11 (Van Ham, 2006: 260). It provides another case of the entry of the 'discourse of fear' as made familiar by US foreign policy discourse into the EU's discursive terrain on security that had long been characterised by its references to 'challenges, risks and possibilities' (Van Ham, 2006: 265). Just like in the Cold War, this discourse is being utilised in instigating a 'coded struggle between the civilized and the barbaric' where the fate of civilisation itself is at stake (Campbell, 1992: 68).

It hereby needs to be noted that such rhetoric is not confined to high-level Commissioners alone, where a majority of interviews with Commission officials have also provided narratives that reproduce such post-September 11 rhetoric with reference to the clash of civilisations. Such discursive constructs become all the more notable in the institutional context of the Commission, since it is often considered as a, albeit relatively weak, contender with the Council in the formulation of EU foreign policy (Spence, 2006).[12] The cooperative dimension of EU foreign policy is also highlighted in the second excerpt above, by the emphasis placed on 'building bridges' with the 'moderate strands of Islam' that respect democratic values. Such an expression, however, juxtaposes once again the Union vis-à-vis the Islamic religion, where institutional and power dynamics of the political movements in countries with Muslim populations are reduced solely to religion.

Analysis of the two excerpts above (and particularly the second) constructs a Europe that moves beyond a focus on its internal sphere towards a more global role via combating a potential clash of civilisations and related 'threats' such as terrorism. The title of the speech from which the second excerpt is taken, 'The European Union as a Global Actor?', also helps to strengthen that claim. The global role that Europe is supposed to play is discussed at more length in some of the speeches and interviews:[13]

In the world of the 21st century, the EU needs Turkey as an anchor and even exporter of stability and democracy in the most unstable and troubled regions in the world, where there is so much at stake at this juncture. The press and television remind us everyday of our common foreign policy challenges: whether on Iran, Iraq, Middle East, the energy crisis or the overall dialogue with the Muslim world, Turkey can play a special role and enhance the capacity of the European Union to contribute to stabilising the region. Turkish diplomacy is very active in the Middle East while Turkish armed forces work side by side with EU Member States armed forces in Lebanon, Afghanistan and the Balkans . . . Energy is another key area in which our cooperation with Turkey is set to grow in the coming years. Turkey is turning into a major energy hub for provisions to Europe from Central Asia, the Middle East and even North Africa. The completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline this year was a major step towards increasing security of the supply and mobilizing of the Caspian oil reserves . . . Turkey's membership will make the European Union a truly global actor and that may be another reason why some

people are hesitant. Let us not allow them to dodge the realities of the 21st century. As a strong and united Europe we can meet the challenges of our century.

(SPEECH/07/28)

COM 7: Basically, Turkey is just placed at a strategically very sensitive and very important region, where you have a lot of political issues, crime issues, trafficking issues. You have huge political crises and a hot crisis. You have the energy supply issue, so it is a hugely important region for us. And if Turkey would become something like Iran, we would have a massive massive problem. Our main task is to avoid that and the second is to keep Turkey going in our direction and to support the process of modernisation, which is the basis in my view to stop radicalism, terrorism and fundamentalism in the region. That is what we should do, and also we should think more in terms of institutional structures, give more weight, more substance to military identity, foreign and security policy. Look at what the US is doing, look at Lebanon. So the EU needs to step in. Turkey should be on our side with this, and this should also help to change the perceptions that Europe has a global role.

Both of the excerpts above are exemplary of the ways in which the prospects of Turkish accession are discussed in the Commission to construct Europe as a security community that competes for influence and power at the global level. This is realised via the *topos* of usefulness, combined with referential strategies through metaphorical expressions such as 'mobilizing oil reserves', 'security of (energy) supply', 'strong and united Europe' and 'more weight, more substance to military identity, foreign and security policy'. As was observed among the ranks of the EP and the nation-states, such metaphorical expressions bestow Europe with the discursive properties ascribed to nation-state foreign policies with their emphasis on unity, coherence and influence-related activism at the global level.

  Both of the excerpts engage in the strategy of securitisation, with the part of the EU's Southern neighbourhood, which Turkey borders, being in the first extract constructed as an '(unstable) foreign policy challenge' and the 'most unstable and troubled region' or, in the case of the second excerpt, an 'existential threat' through predicates associating the region with 'huge political crises', 'hot crisis', 'massive massive problem', 'crime issues' and 'trafficking issues'. Particularly in the second excerpt, the overlexicalisation attained through the use of

these expressions, belonging to the conceptual domain of 'danger' and 'threat', in combination with extreme case formulations such as 'huge' and repeated usage of 'massive', construct the region as a threatening Other to Europe. The implicit assumption is once again that a 'modern' and an 'economically developed' Turkey would 'inspire' the countries of the region due to religious/cultural affinity that would lead to a policy of imitation, as an extension of conceptualising Islam as a monolithic religion defining the region in its totality. In the case of the first excerpt is drawn, while this assumption is also present in the reference to 'the dialogue with the Muslim world', other means of influence such as Turkish diplomacy and the Turkish military's involvement in international conflicts are also raised. In fact, increasing references to a more active and effective Turkish foreign policy in the Commissioner speeches particularly after 2007 goes parallel to many other academic and policy accounts of the same period that highlight Turkey's growing involvement in its wider neighbourhood.

Regarding the narratives of international security in the post-September 11 period, Fairclough (2005: 47) has argued that in many of these accounts, 'the malignity of the antagonists is relatively explicit', whereas 'the benign character of the protagonists is by contrast assumed'. In a similar vein, the second extract above juxtaposes modernisation as an ultimate goal of progress (as a hegemonic paradigm of enlightenment) against the barbaric Other defined, again via overlexicalisation, by 'radicalism', 'terrorism' and 'fundamentalism', belonging to the conceptual domain of what Fairclough (2005) refers to as the 'discourses of malignity'. The 'benign character' of the protagonist, in this case the EU, is communicated implicitly via the flag word of 'modernisation' that conveys positive deontic-evaluative meanings (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 55). This demonstrates once again the close interdiscursivity with US foreign policy talk in the post-September 11 period. The combat with the 'evil Other' as (re)defined after September 11 attributes to the positively predicated Europe/EU a missionary 'global role' within which it needs to assert itself among other great powers such as the United States.

Not all Commission officials engage in this construction in combination with the argument that Turkish accession will be beneficial for the Union. In the personal interviews some express concerns as to whether Turkey may indeed impede the EU's role as a global power, mainly due to the potential problems the country may introduce with respect to decision-making in the Union (see Chapter 3). This however does not change the fact that Europe is still constructed in a certain manner

regarding its role in the international system, via reference to Turkish accession. As Hansen (2006: 58) highlights, a certain construction of identity does not necessarily entail a particular policy and 'multiple policies can be formulated around the same construction of identity'.

Member states

France

The articulation of the clash of civilisations thesis is also found to be widespread in the French political scene.[14] It is observed among the members of both the UMP and the PS, in arguing for closer links with Turkey that fall short of membership or (less frequently) for its ultimate accession:

> The emergence of a political Europe . . . allows the European Union to carry real weight on the global scene. Then what does the policy of the Union regarding its most immediate neighbours have to be? . . . Our tradition of the defence of fundamental human rights, our idea of tolerance, our attachment to the principle of *laicité* makes France support the path of democracy and economic development. Of course, all is not perfect, but Turkey, by its successful experience, has the value of providing an example of a secular state and of a democracy open to alternation to the Muslim world. Lastly, in a regional and international geopolitical context in crisis, it is in the interest of the Union to have an appeased Turkey, of incontestable geopolitical weight, by its side. Who can deny that a definite signal, a brutal rupture of dialogue between the European Union and Turkey would play into the hands of those who aspire to the clash of civilisations?
>
> (Accoyer, UMP, 14 October 2004)

> The response to Turkey cannot in any case be: 'You are not of us.' It would be a humiliating rejection that would send a signal to masses of Muslims that Ben Laden provides them with a credible perspective. Turkey is a counter model to the fundamentalist drift . . . In twenty years, there will be a more homogenous American bloc and a dominant Chinese bloc. One has to constitute a third pole composed of Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East. The hinge of this strategy is evidently Turkey, who needs Europe like Europe needs her. Only the European institutional set-up prohibits this coming together.
>
> (Boucheron, PS, 14 October 2004)

The first excerpt by the Member of Parliament from the UMP conceptualises Europe as a 'global player', hence with a strong external identity. It is close political integration signified by the term 'political Europe' that sets the basis of a significant global role for the Union. This emphasis on a strong external identity for the Union should be sought in the conceptualisation of 'state' in French national identity constructs and its repercussions for Europe, on which more will be discussed in Chapter 3 regarding the construction of Europe as a political project in French political discourse on Turkish membership.

The extract also points to the contributions that Turkey can make to strengthen Europe's global role and identity, borrowing largely from the main tenets of the clash of civilisations discourse. It needs to be noted that, despite advocating closer links or even accession, the utterances do not predicate Turkey as European. Turkey, predicated as an 'outsider' – through the metaphor of 'neighbour' – is construed as worthy of French support due to its efforts in adopting French/European values that are conflated into one another, visible in the way in which some of the main tenets of 'French exceptionalism' – namely 'fundamental rights of man/individual', 'tolerance', which can be interpreted as an extension of 'equality',[15] and secularism (*laïcité*) – are reiterated within the framework of Turkey's relations with Europe. Such an emphasis on certain values as being 'Europe's/France's own' (realised mainly through the deictic 'we') also contributes to positive self-representation on the part of France and Europe, where Turkey is predicated as not fully democratic, modern and economically developed, yet with the potential to be so.

This parliamentary contribution highlights the importance of Turkey in refuting the clash of civilisations thesis, with explicit intertextual references to the concept. Turkey is predicated as an 'example' to the Muslim world, with its secular state and its democracy, the shortcomings being acknowledged. The example is one for the Muslim world only, suggesting the implicit assumption that there is a direct link between religion and lack of secularism and democracy in a country with a majority Muslim population. As also highlighted with respect to the EP and the Commission discourse above, this claim rests on the implicit assumption that the Islamic religion encompasses the social and political system in countries where majority populations are Muslim, without allowing for any differentiation within and between these countries. While the Southern neighbourhood countries are characterised by an overarching religion, this does not seem to be the case for the West, since it is not Christianity that is juxtaposed against 'Islam' in the binary dichotomy.

The speaker invokes Turkey as a 'model' in the interests of the Union for gaining international political weight, hence a stronger external identity. The democratic and social progress of Turkey, which French and/or European interests require, is rendered dependent on outside assistance, negating any independent progress. The alternative to lack of outside support is the 'inevitable' 'clash of civilisations', which, through the *topos* of danger, is treated as a given phenomenon that exists out there by virtue of its unidentified adherents, waiting to come into force. This not only hides the dynamics behind social and political ills of the countries of the South, but also reproduces the basic principles of the clash of civilisations discourse in terms of the existence of monolithic and essentialised civilisational/cultural units with the potential to conflict. Hence, while arguing to be different at the level of manifest politics, it indeed shares codes with the clash of civilisations discourse at deeper levels of abstraction, which, according to Laclau and Mouffe, is a common state of affairs in political discourse where actors relate to each other and hence deal with similar issues, using related concepts and images in attempting to reformulate and achieve hegemony over key terms (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).

The second contribution by the Member of Parliament from the PS also (re)produces the main themes and concepts of the clash of civilisations discourse by arguing that Turkey's rejection on the basis of explicit Othering would help fuel Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims. Once again this argument does not only construct an all-encompassing Islam as a definitive and binding trait of Muslims' 'identity' with no scope for difference, where Turkey has a potential to be a 'model' for emulation on the basis of its Muslim population, but also hides the complex dynamics behind those acts that are predicated as 'fundamentalist'. Similar to what has been observed in the UMP discourse, Turkey's contributions to European security are linked with the 'global role' and the interlinked strong 'external identity' that Europe is espoused to play. This 'global role' in some instances like the one above goes beyond the prevention and/or alleviation of the clash of civilisations, to construct Europe as a 'security agent' aiming for interest maximisation in the global competition for power on a par with other 'global players' such as the United States and China.

It needs to be highlighted that such contributions to Europe's external identity do not necessarily imply the inclusion of Turkey in the European Self and/or Turkey's accession to the Union. The metaphor of 'hinge' constructs Turkey as an outsider that links Europe to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the choice of regions suggesting primacy accorded to geographical and religious affinity as a binding

tie between Turkey and countries of the regions concerned. This role, however, does not necessitate full accession, mainly due to the institutional state of affairs in the Union. Such an argumentation rests on the implicit assumption that Turkey could destabilise the internal coherence of the project due to its potential institutional weight as a full member, preventing such a contribution to a strong external identity (see Chapter 3).

Some of the Members of Parliament emphasise Turkey's contribution to Europe's defence, through securitising Turkey's Southern neighbourhood:

> UMP 5: Look, Turkey was a strong and true partner in NATO. Remember the Soviet Union and the NATO bloc, and they were a strong partner of Europe against the Soviet Union. But they still are a strong army, second-biggest in NATO. They have the materials, very good training, and so on, so it is a very strong strategic partner and for Europe, it is one of the most important defences against what is happening in the South, the South of Turkey where you have the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq which will be an Islamic Republic.

The excerpt above invokes Turkey's contribution to European defence identity, through employing the *topos* of history in reference to Turkey's role in the Cold War as part of the Western/capitalist bloc, as a loyal partner with a strong army. It needs to be noted that such an emphasis on defence in the UMP political discourse on Turkey, visible mostly in interviews (and shared also by some members of the PS), should come as no surprise, given the discursive context in which defence and military issues have historically played a prevalent role in constructs of the French nation/state and hence French thinking about security (Howorth and Chilton, 1984).[16] In the case of the excerpt above, the dominant Other which Turkey – as a strategic partner 'of' and not 'in' Europe – helps defend Europe from is no longer the Soviet Union, but the countries of the Southern neighbourhood predicated with Islam as their main defining trait.

Germany

The German political discourse in the mainstream left and the right, while often advocating adversarial policy positions on Turkish membership, shows important similarities in the construction of Europe as a security community through reference to the clash of civilisations in the discussions on Turkey's potential accession:[17]

Since September 11, the Eastern borders of Europe are conceptualised in a different sense and the possible strategic threats to our security will arise from this region. As Europeans, we need to try different methods here than the Americans, since the enemy we are facing is not a military one. The question that matters at this point is whether there is a big Islamic country that has undergone a successful process of modernisation on the basis of the rule of law and the market economy? Once Turkey becomes successful on the road that it is following, the biggest victory in the war against international terrorism will be achieved.

(Fischer, Greens, 4 December 2002)

Those who believe that Turkey will be a model to the Islamic world in terms of democracy, rule of law, human rights, civil society need to consider the fact that this model role will end as soon as Turkey becomes a full member of the EU...Dialogue between cultures and civilisations, partnership with the powers of the Islamic world, strengthening of multilateral decision-making mechanisms; these are all significant in their own right. However, none of these involve the precondition to join Europe.

(Schaeuble, CDU/CSU, 29 October 2004)

The first contribution by the then Foreign Minister from the Greens, Joschka Fischer, constructs a turbulent 'East' by securitising the region through predicating it with 'security threats' and 'international terrorism', as part and parcel of what has earlier been referred to as 'discourses of malignity' (Fairclough, 2005: 47) in the post-September 11 security talk. Premised on the assumption that there is an inherent tension between Islam and modernisation, Turkey is thus predicated as the 'quintessential' test case of how this tension can be resolved, hence becoming 'the exception that confirms the rule' (Tocci, 2007a: 29–30). Such a construction views Europe as a domain of foreign policy where it combats the 'evil Other' as (re)defined in the post-September 11 period with a missionary global role. What needs to be noted in the German political discourse is the reiterated emphasis on the role of Europe as a 'civilian power'.[18] This is hereby linguistically attained by juxtaposing 'civilian Europe' to the United States predicated as an actor that employs military means. Nonetheless, as it will be discussed in the next chapter, this emphasis on Europe as a 'civilian power' is not particular to German political discourse but is widely discernable in the other discursive sites under analysis, mainly in their discussions on the consolidation of

democracy in Turkey. What is perhaps more particular to the German case, differentiating it from the other spheres of analysis, is the way in which there was no evidence suggesting the construction of Europe as a 'military actor' in the German data studied. This can be considered as a case of interdiscursivity with the construction of Germany, in the post-Second World War German foreign policy discourse, as a 'civilian power' which refrains from 'hard-power solutions' such as military force and relies more on economic and diplomatic policy instruments in international relations (Maull, 1990: 92–3).

The construction of Europe as a 'civilian power' is reiterated in the second parliamentary contribution from a CDU/CSU parliamentarian via references to 'partnerships' and 'multilateral decision-making mechanisms' that are identified amongst the central elements of the 'civilian power' discourse.[19] The repeated emphasis particularly in CDU/CSU interview data on the distinction between NATO (of which Turkey is a member) and the EU in terms of their security roles, as a justification to reject Turkish membership, also serves to discursively reinforce this construct.[20] As with the first excerpt, the clash of civilisations discourse is also being reproduced, in this case by the frequently used trope of 'dialogue between cultures and civilisations', which assumes the existence of internally homogeneous blocs of cultures and civilisations and through reference to 'the Islamic world' that denotes a monolithic unit of states defined by an encompassing religion. Turkey is once again predicated as a potential model country in both these endeavours, so long as cultural and civilisational faultlines are not crossed by its accession to the EU.

Britain

Similar to the cases of France and Germany, British political discourse also articulates the security implications of Turkish accession mainly through the lenses of the clash of civilisations thesis.[21] The main difference with the other two member states is incurred over the way in which members of both main parties overwhelmingly advocate Turkey's full accession as a key tool in alleviating this clash:

> We have a large stake in the success of the new Government's national vision as a model, democratic, Muslim country that is coping with the challenges of globalisation in a way that marks it out for EU membership. Irrespective of the Union's outstanding obligations, Turkish membership should be a major strategic goal. Europe needs a western-looking Turkey – a secular Muslim nation joining us in the family of European democracies. That is a goal for which

it is worth striving in any circumstances, but especially now . . . The overwhelming majority of Turkey's peoples are Muslim. It has political parties that celebrate that, just as Western Europe has equivalent Christian parties, but it is a secular state and accepts our concept of liberal democratic values. Its accession would be hugely important to the stability of not only Europe but the entire world.

(Straw, Labour, 11 December 2002)

CONS 2: I think it [Turkish membership] improves European security. It will show other Islamic countries that there is an alternative route. Most of them think the only route is the feudal dictatorship they have at the moment or retreating to religious fundamentalism. If there were elections in most Gulf countries, the loonies would win. So it will show that there is an alternative. You can be a good Muslim in an Islamic country but still be a part of the mainstream economic development and the rule of law, democracy and all that sort of thing and that is a plus.

As also observed in the other discursive settings under analysis, both of the excerpts above predicate Turkey as a potential 'model' to be emulated by other 'Muslim' countries. This argumentation is hence once again an extension of the construct of Islam as a homogeneous and all-encompassing religion for the region as a whole. It is realised in discourse also through the repetitive juxtaposition of the Islamic religion via reference to 'Muslims' and/or 'Muslim/Islamic country(ies)' against 'democracy' as a political system and its constituents such as the 'rule of law', 'secularism' and 'mainstream economic development'. Conceptualisation of Islam as a totalistic religion determinant on political systems is also the product of a discourse that denies the historical, economic, ideological and even religious variety that exists between and within the countries in the region. The second excerpt explicitly engages in such homogenisation via employing the derogatory stereotype of 'loonies' for all of the so-called political Islamist movements in the Gulf region. One can problematise this generalisation via pointing at other interpretations in the literature that view some of these movements as legitimate quests for power, the suppression of which reinforces anti-democratic regimes in the region.[22]

In a related fashion, the excerpts above display the obsession to judge the developments in these 'Islamic' countries against positively represented 'European' criteria, most particularly liberal democracy, as objective benchmarks. The first excerpt takes a step further in such positive self-representation by predicating these standards as 'ours',

thereby reinforcing the superiority of the Self vis-à-vis Others. From the same standpoint, the first speaker constructs an analogy between Christian Democrat parties in Western Europe and the governing Justice and Development Party in Turkey, suggesting once again that there is one route to progress that goes through the European/Western model. However, even those 'European' observers who share this conceptual frame dispute this claim on the grounds that the birth and development of these movements have led to important differences between the two as well as considerable difference between Christian Democrat parties themselves.[23]

The way in which Turkey would contribute to European security via providing a model for 'Muslim' countries is elaborated in further depth in some of the parliamentary speeches, illustrated by the following exchange between a Conservative MP and the (former) Prime Minister Tony Blair:

> In the long-term battle to combat the causes and circumstances that lead to terrorism, is not the opening of negotiations with Turkey likely to be much more important than the invasion of Iraq, because it demonstrates the importance of soft power that the Europeans are good at, alongside hard military power? Will the Prime Minister perhaps persuade President Bush to recognise the importance of that European experience in creating stability and democracy in Europe and in the wider world, and to create more effective partnerships rather than depending almost exclusively on the hard power in which the Americans are so pre-eminent?
>
> (Curry, Conservative, 20 December 2004)

> I have to say that there are occasions on which we need both the hard and the soft, and if we succeed in Iraq – as I am sure eventually we will, despite the actions of terrorists and insurgents – that will be a force for stability and democracy in the region. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that Turkey's accession is an indication of the force for good that the European Union can be. I have no doubt that President Bush will probably agree with his point about Turkish membership of the European Union, when he comes over to Europe some time later next year.
>
> (Blair, Labour, 20 December 2004)

Both of the excerpts above construct Turkey as a security asset in the so-called 'war against terrorism'. The metaphoric expressions of

'soft power' correspond to the power of the EU to 'influence' the Southern region through providing Turkey as a model to be copied. This argument firstly presupposes that terrorism is bound with Islam, which is why a 'Muslim' country as a member of the EU will help in its combat. Secondly, it reproduces the binary division of the world between the 'forces for good' (via references to 'stability' and 'democracy') embodied in Europe and the West (via additional reference to the United States) and the implicitly predicated 'forces of evil' personified in terrorists/insurgents. In the case of the first excerpt, this division is accentuated by the language of 'partnerships' that texture 'equivalent, co-members of a class' whose differences are textually undermined (Fairclough, 2005: 49). This discursive bipolarity not only simplifies the complex dynamics behind contemporary global conflicts but also contributes to the setting of a 'blueprint for heightened difference and conflict' in the post-Cold War international system (Lazar and Lazar, 2004: 223). Both the discursive equivalence formulated between Islam and terrorism as well as the bifurcation of the world into 'protagonists' and 'antagonists' suggest a strong interdiscursivity with the former US President Bush's post-September 11 discourse on international relations and international security.[24] This can be interpreted as an extension of the strong Atlanticist component of the (constructed) British national identity and its related emphasis on a 'global role' for Britain (Mautner, 2001: 9).[25] This 'global role', now paralleled at the European level, involves the use of 'hard' (military) power along with 'soft' power where necessary.

The analysis up to this point suggests that Labour and Conservative discourse in constructing Europe as a security community in discussions over Turkey is largely similar. The full corpus, however, also displays important differences that need to be taken into account. The excerpts above suggest that both the members of the Conservative Party and of the Labour Party predominantly view Turkish accession as enhancing the 'global role' of Europe as a model for the solution of 'global conflicts' such as 'terrorism' and 'fundamentalism'. There is, however, an additional layer to the Labour discourse on European security, which seems to be largely absent from the Conservative data:

Enlargement has received cross-party support. As far as I can see, we are the only country that has always supported Turkey's application. The issue has never been party political and has always concerned how we can make Turkey's application happen. The rest of Europe has always seen that policy as a fiendish plot by perfidious Albion to

bring in Turkey in order to break up the European Union; far from it. In future, Europe must achieve greater co-ordination in its foreign and security policy, and Turkey is such a significant player that it is incumbent on us to make sure that it is with us.

(Stuart, Labour, 15 December 2004)

The excerpt above predicates Europe as a singular entity aiming for interest maximisation in the global competition for power and hegemony.[26] It utilises the 'game' metaphor through reference to Turkey as a 'significant player' in the international scene, implicitly implying that Europe should embrace it to 'win'. Reference to 'greater coordination' in foreign and security policy also enhances the singularity of Europe as a 'global actor'. The fact that such a construction is largely absent from Conservative data can be interpreted as part and parcel of the change that occurred in Labour's language in relation to Europe from especially 1987 onwards. Larsen (1997: 60) accurately depicts that as opposed to the Conservatives who continued to view Europe strictly as a mechanism of inter-state cooperation, the Labour Party towards the end of the 1980s began to present it as 'more of an organic, *Gemeinschaft*-like, civil association', which corresponds to 'more than just a single market'.

Turkey as a potential security threat for Europe

It has so far been argued that in all the discursive sites of analysis, Europe has been constructed as a security community via arguments on Turkey's role in the prevention of a potential clash of civilisations, which in some cases extended to denote Europe as a singular global actor. There is, however, another strand of discourse that constructs Europe as a security community, mainly through representing Turkey as a potential threat for the security of Europe.

European Parliament

In the case of the EP, Turkey's representation as a potential security threat is most visible in the discourses of the EPP-ED/EPP as well as those of the eurosceptic, extreme-right and extreme-left factions present in smaller political groups (IND/DEM, UEN, GUE/NGL) and among the non-attached members of Parliament who do not belong to any political group:[27]

By shifting its frontiers to Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Caucasus, Europe would forfeit the *cordon sanitaire* that has always separated it from

some of the world's most dangerous trouble spots. This is something else the Council must consider.

> (Stenzel, EPP-ED, 13 December 2004)

If Turkey joins the European Union . . . the European Union will border countries such as Syria, Iraq and Iran, with enormous potential for future conflict and confrontation.

> (Batten, IND/DEM, 11 March 2009)

EPP-ED 3: I think especially the security aspect will be a problem because it is a pity that Turkey has very difficult borders, very difficult neighbouring countries. You can not afford to have such difficult borders, so I think the security aspect is very severe because it is always possible to have problems with these borders, with these neighbour countries. Look at Iraq, the situation inside Iraq, it is terrible, horrible, and Iran has always been a difficult country and you do not know how it will develop. It is a really difficult situation for us as well. We do not want to leave Turkey alone, we need to, we want to support Turkey, but the question is: can we afford to make these Turkish borders our own borders? And that is not possible.

In all of the excerpts above, the *topos* of (security) threat is used in pointing at the consequences of Turkish accession upon which Turkey's 'geographic' borders will become the borders of the Union. A clear demarcation is established between the 'dangerous', 'problematic' countries of the South and the East and the 'stable and 'secure' Europe that needs to be insulated from them through Turkey as a 'buffer zone', expressed in the first excerpt via the '*cordon sanitaire*' metaphor, which Chilton (1996) defines as a container metaphor of securitisation that denotes a bounded political entity.[28]

Boundary drawing here does not just contribute to the construction of Europe as a geographic space that is securely protected from violence, but it in fact constructs a form of violence itself via the ascription of a homogeneous identity with respect to both the inside and the outside of Europe. Furthermore, the securitisation discourse lends an authoritative and legitimising dimension to border drawing and identity construction. This has been widely documented in the case of the nation-state where the security discourse contributes to the naturalisation of the national community by constructing existential threats to the state (including government, territory and society) (Buzan et al., 1998: 21). Thus security threats are not only perceived as 'potentially undermining

the state', but they in fact constitute the state itself by posing fatal risks to certain invoked 'national interests' (Hansen, 2006: 34).

In more recent debates, Turkey's representation as a potential security threat for Europe among these groups is also incurred over discussions on the so-called new foreign policy orientations of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government which, particularly after 2007, has upheld a foreign policy discourse that advocates closer relations with Turkey's neighbours:[29]

> Turkey is increasingly pursuing an anti-European and anti-Western foreign policy. Under the leadership of Mr. Erdoğan and President Gül, Turkey is becoming increasingly more Islamist in nature.
>
> (Claeys, NI, 25 November 2009)

A possible shift in Turkey's foreign policy orientations towards the East has been a popular theme in both policy circles and the academia since 2007 when the AKP came to power for a second term in government with a reiterated foreign policy line that discursively adheres to a zero-problems approach with its neighbours and underlines the need to be more proactive in its larger neighbourhood. This is repeatedly taken up in the far-right discourse in the EP and observed (albeit less commonly) among the centre-right as a testimony to the growing anti-Europeanism and anti-Westernism in Turkish foreign policy. Improved relations with Syria or problems encountered with Israel are often interpreted against the background of Islam and Islamisation as a threat to European security concerns.

European Commission

In the European Commission, representation of Turkey as a potential security threat is mainly encountered in the interviews where the majority of the interviewees responded to the raising of the issue of security in Turkey–EU relations with reference to border controls, asylum and/or human trafficking, themes that are absent from Commissioner speeches:

> COM 14: If you look at the region at your Southern borders, it is clear that a lot of people will be knocking on the Turkish door and their final destination is the EU. I think there is a problem; there is a huge migration pressure. Is it by definition bad? I mean we have a problem in Europe as well. Our population is becoming older and older and we need migrant workers to come here. So I think it is completely wrong to look at it in a very negative manner, saying that

the migration problem is by definition bad. We will need people to come to work in Europe, otherwise we will lose our standard of living. But it needs to be done in a way which is not causing additional burden to the societies. So there is an unhealthy tension in society which needs to be addressed. So my position would be a very balanced one ... The border question is a very complex one. You cannot expect that a country bordering regions or countries like Iraq and Iran just applies the same Schengen standards as Poland does with Belarus or Ukraine. The situation is completely different.

The excerpt above, delivered as a response to the invocation of the topical frame of security in Turkey–EU relations, securitises the issue of 'migration'. While other works have argued that migration is not always securitised in the discourses and policy practices of the EU, it has also been found that the tendency to securitise increases when the issue concerns Muslim communities already resident in the EU (Boswell, 2007). Securitisation of migration as such can be considered as part of an existing discourse in the EU on 'societal security' (Wæver, 1995). In the discourse on 'societal security', 'threats are less likely to be associated with aggression from other states, with violations of state sovereignty, but instead with challenges to society, and in particular, social, cultural and national identity' (Walters and Haahr, 2005: 96). In this framework, securitisation of not only migration but also drugs and organised crime can be considered as a part of the discourse on 'societal security'.[30]

The excerpt above also displays the close relationship between the discourses on 'societal' and 'state' security. In the discourse on the nation-state, it is often observed that migration, drugs and/or organised crime are constructed as 'transnational problems' that are 'layered upon a state-centric and territorially delimited "national security" problematique' (O'Tuathail, 1999: 19). A similar situation is discernible from the excerpt above where migration is predicated as a 'problem' for the EU due to the region that Turkey borders as a 'transit country'. The degree of Otherness ascribed to Turkey's Eastern neighbours such as Iran and Iraq hereby supersedes that of other Eastern Others such as Belarus and Ukraine.[31] Predicating migration as a 'problem' is itself a vague formulation that nominalises the immigrating activity of individuals into an abstract noun that devoids them of any agency of human form, hence naturalising the policies adopted in that framework. Furthermore, the utilisation of container metaphors such as 'door', 'pressure' and 'burden' constructs Europe as a bounded space that needs to be protected from external threats (Charteris-Black, 2006). Container metaphors utilised

in this way play a key role in legitimising restrictive policies regarding border controls, since 'the existence of a clearly defined container also implies a conscious controlling entity that fills or empties the container', namely governments (Charteris-Black, 2006: 576). Thus, as commonly seen in the case of the nation-states, discourses on the control of (transit) migration in discussions over Turkish accession in turn help reify Europe as a bounded space and justify centralised policies in this field.

The analysis above demonstrates how the 'enlargement paradox' manifests itself in the Commission officials' discourse on Turkey, regarding the ways in which enlargement – in which the Commission has traditionally played a pioneering role – leads to the erection of new borders at the EU's new outer edges (Diez, 2006: 241–2). There emerges a high degree of securitisation through reference to the smuggling of goods, trafficking of people and illegal immigration that extends beyond the borders of the candidate state to create new Others (Diez, 2006). In the case of Turkey, the country's Southern border is mainly securitised as a source of existential threats for Europe, which can also be conceptualised as an extension of the securitisation of the Mediterranean region by the EU (Pace, 2006). What is notable in the framework of this research is the way in which Commission officials orient themselves strongly to the securitisation of Turkey's Eastern/South-eastern borders. This was especially the case for the interviewees working in Directorate Generals that directly deal with border control and management in their related areas (i.e. DG Justice and Home Affairs, DG Trade, DG Agriculture, DG Regional Policy, DG Enlargement). This can be linked to the way in which the legitimacy of these officials/their posts and hence the power that stems from their role in the 'governmentalisation' of Europe are enhanced through such policies that are falling increasingly under the Commission's competences.[32]

Member states

France

In French political discourse, all three parties under analysis are found to express concerns over the formulation of a coherent European foreign and security policy and Europe's stability once Turkey becomes a member of the EU. This is in line with the federalist narrative that is still strong among the centre-right and the centre-left where Europe is conceptualised as France writ large. Nonetheless, this discourse is much more pronounced in the cases of the UMP and the UDF that use it to justify the non-accession of Turkey:[33]

UMP 6: I think you have first of all the idea of bridging the gap between civilisations or something like that. Well I guess it is arguable, but it cannot be the most important issue we have in mind when we are discussing the accession of a country. Accession of a country is above all an internal affair. It is above all an internal issue about the European project. This is a relevant question as to what kind of external policy the EU can have with Turkey inside. Of course this is a very serious matter because Turkey has, well, very special neighbours that raise security concerns in the South, in the Mediterranean, and very different relations with them. I think, definitely, this is one of the big issues whether the EU should integrate Turkey or not. If the price of integrating Turkey is, you know, being unable to go on with a common external policy, then I think it is extremely problematic. We have to be very careful on this.

The interview quote does not challenge the clash of civilisations thesis elaborated in the sections above. Neither does it challenge the construction of a global role for the EU and the interlinked need for a strong external identity, the necessity of which was partly justified by the clash of civilisations thesis in the earlier excerpts from France. This interviewee, however, constructs a Turkey that has attained EU membership as a potential threat for a possible global role that the Union can play, mainly via employing the *topos* of (security) threat in reference to its Southern neighbours. A singular and coherent external policy for the Union is made reliant on a coherent project inside (on which more will be said in Chapter 3), as expressed through the reference to the 'European project' that is very frequently employed in French political discourse, intensifying the link between a coherent internal and an external identity for the Union. Turkey's potential threat to this (constructed) identity stems from its neighbours in the South and its relations with them.

Such a claim rests on two implicit assumptions that require unravelling. The first is that the countries of the Middle East and the Mediterranean are predicated as 'raising security threats'. As discussed in further depth in the preceding sections, the securitisation of the region serves a crucial role in providing an authoritative and legitimising dimension to border drawing and identity construction. The fact that the Mediterranean is singled out in the Southern region should also be noted in this respect. Since explicit references to the Mediterranean are also found in other interviews and parliamentary debates in the French data, often securitised across different party discourses, one

cannot interpret this independently from the ways in which the notion of the 'Mediterranean' is used in French political discourse at large.[34] Pace (2006: 107), in her work on the discourses on the Mediterranean in the EU, finds that the Mediterranean is systematically constructed as a 'securitising object' in French political discourse, hence as a 'threat' to European security, carrying with it 'elements of power' linked to its past colonial presence in the region. The second implicit assumption behind the potential threat that Turkey poses for a strong external identity for Europe is that Turkish foreign policy is not in line with EU policies in the region. This assumption excludes widespread accounts that point at the lack of a common, coherent EU foreign policy in the region;[35] as well as those that highlight the points of convergence between Turkish foreign policy and the existing EU initiatives in the region, such as the New Neighbourhood Policy (NNP), while acknowledging the existence of contentious issues between the two.[36]

The same assumptions underlie UDF discourse, which also constructs Turkey as a security threat for Europe through its Southern neighbours and an impediment to a strong European external identity. The difference with the UMP discourse lies in some of the linguistic strategies employed as well as the relative uniformity of the discourse across the members of the political group, as mainly observed in the parliamentary debates:

> Accession of Turkey would make Europe frontier to Syria, Iraq and Iran: this is not Europe. If Mr. Ayrault contests this point, a map would suffice for us to decide! Everyone recognises the burning problems and the dramas in this part of the world. Europe has her word to say there. She cannot play the role that she has to play there. But she can only do that, as I hope, if she is impartial. It will be more difficult for her to do this if she is an involved party, interested, engaged by one of its members.
>
> (Bayrou, UDF, 14 October 2004)

The excerpt above not only securitises the Southern region via predicating it with the negatively connoted and hyperbolic phrases/words of 'burning problems' and 'dramas/tragedies', but it also engages in demarcation of clear boundaries. As was discussed previously with respect to European Parliament discourses, the *topos* of borders is crucial to identity (re)production, ascribing a homogeneous identity both for the 'stable' and 'secure' Europe and for the 'crisis-ridden' countries of the South. The reference to the 'map' provides further support to the critical political

geographers' claim that 'geography supports increasingly uncertain socio-cultural and political spheres' where 'geographical imaginings are constructed as an attempt to denote territory as well as identity concretely' (Pace, 2006: 163).[37] Securitisation grants further legitimation to identity construction through geography, mainly through the reading of the concept of security as an existential threat that requires action against it.

Similar to the UMP discourse, the global role and hence the strong external identity that Europe should espouse are emphasised, with Turkey being predicated as an impediment to it due to its involvement in the region. The argumentation strategy that this claim rests on is based on the implicit assumption that there is a common EU external policy that keeps the bounded entity at an impartial insulation from the region's ills. Such an assumption also excludes in its totality accounts that highlight the role of power politics played out by some of the EU countries in the region, France in particular, as part of its efforts to establish itself as a key power in the EU and vis-à-vis the United States on the global stage.[38]

Germany

The German data shows striking similarities with the French in the ways in which the discussion of Turkey's potential membership raises concerns regarding its implications for a strong European external identity. While this seems to be more pronounced in the case of the CDU/CSU, it is also visible to a lesser extent in the data that pertains to the SPD, particularly in the interviews:[39]

> Strategic significance and power for Europe lies in the political union. This will be placed under jeopardy by the extension of our borders. An EU that is unified and that has the capacity to act means more stability and peace for us.
>
> (Schaeuble, CDU/CSU, 29 October 2004)

> SPD 3: Turkey could be very helpful, from my view, to stabilise the problems in the Middle East, and also in Central Asia, and they have very important role, for example, for pipelines in the next century. So it is important for the security of Europe of course, for the global profile of Europe ... My fears are that we will have more problems to create a common policy, for our foreign policy of the European Community. For example you see it with Poland and it is the same problem for Turkey, because it is not a very long historical period

when they created Turkey as it is now. Before it was the Ottoman period, and it could not be so easy to have them understand that for a common policy in international affairs of the European Union, that they have to give up their national interest in this process.

In the first extract from a parliamentary contribution of a member of the CDU/CSU, the *topos* of borders and the *topos* of threat are utilised in constructing internal coherence as a prerequisite for the emergence of Europe as a security community with strategic significance at the global level. Thus a strong external identity and stability for Europe necessitates a coherent and homogeneous identity on the inside, which would be at risk upon the accession of Turkey (see Chapter 3). The second extract, in a fashion almost typical of the SPD and the Greens, constructs Europe as a 'global power' to which Turkey could contribute, both through its security-enhancing role and through its strategic location strengthening Europe's bid for global power (in particular through reference to energy supplies). Nevertheless, the essentialised historical burden of sovereignty on the part of Turkey is perceived as a risk factor for the emergence of such an external identity for Europe.

This frequent and cross-party construction of Europe as a 'global power' that Turkey could undermine by diluting homogeneity, either via explicit cultural/civilisational and geopolitical factors (more common among the CDU/CSU) or via more implicit essential traits such as concerns over sovereignty tied to history (observed across the three parties), suggests that it may be misleading to interpret this trope independently of the dominant German national identity constructs in the post-war period. It has already been argued in the Introduction that in the post-war (re)construction of the German national identity, a tightly integrated Europe with the political capacity to act and thus with a coherent external identity was constructed in order to prevent a much-dreaded German power state from (re)occurring in the international scene (Wæver, 2005: 46–8). Similarly, Spohn (2002: 305) has argued that behind the contemporary German 'quasi-imperial orientation which envisions the European Union as a renewed global player' lies the post-war equivalence constructed between Europe and German national identity, where German interest became synonymous with that of Europe.

Construction of Europe as a security community is not only realised through discussions on Europe's relations with the outside world in relation to Turkish accession. There are instances in the CDU/CSU

discourse where an alternative means of constructing Europe as a security community is incurred via discussions on immigration:[40]

> We need to be aware of the security problems that Turkey will bring into Europe. According to latest reports, out of a total number of 30,000 members, 27,000 members of Islamic organisations are Turkish. Millions of people of Turkish origin live in peace in Germany. But unlike what the red-green coalition has done so far, this should not lead us to close our eyes to fundamentalist Islamists. Ladies and gentlemen, you are closing your eyes to the Turkish reality in Germany . . . 4 million Turks live in EU member states today, with 2.5 million living in Germany. The same article (in *Frankfurter Rundschau*) points out that Turks who will be migrating to Europe will approach 4 million. Look at these numbers! The number of Turks in Germany will increase rapidly and it will even double!
>
>   (Strobl, CDU/CSU, 21 January 2005)

The extract above repetitively employs the *topos* of numbers, where absolute numbers instead of percentages are used, to gain credibility and a heightened sense of urgency to the constructed migration threat to security posed by Turkish accession. Turks indeed constitute the single largest immigrant group in Germany. Yet a closer look reveals that they constitute approximately 3.5% of the total population in the country (Kaya, 2009: 39) and there are varying views on the projected number of Turkish immigrants to the EU upon the country's accession (Erzan et al., 2006). Immigrants (both existing and potential) represented in hyperbolic numbers are securitised via the discursive equivalence formulated between Islamic fundamentalism and membership of Islamic organisations. This, however, excludes the wide variety of views conveyed by such organisations as well as accounts that point at their low membership.[41]

   The aim here is not to value one mode of interpretation over another since definitions over concepts such as 'religiosity' and 'Islamism' are themselves contested in discourse, but to point at the *impact* of the exclusion of one account at the expense of another. The discursive extension of the meanings ascribed to security from those that are primarily military-oriented to those that denote concerns regarding the preservation of (constructed) religious, cultural and ethnic identities have been frequently raised in security studies in the post-Cold War era.[42] In fact, and not limited to the German data, the reiterated reproduction of the clash of civilisations thesis can also be interpreted as

part and parcel of the widening of this concept. As also discussed in the scope of Commission discourse, such a discursive extension leads to the emergence of the concept of 'societal security' where immigration becomes a key nodal point around which the migrants are constructed as a threat for the host country, mainly on grounds of (constructed) identity.

In terms of its normative impacts, the construction of migrants as a threat to internal security through generalised associations with 'Islamic fundamentalism' not only helps to reify the exclusivist 'us–them' logic, but also foregrounds a complex web of dynamics including racism, unemployment and social discrimination in host countries. Furthermore, securitising immigration as such has the potential to pave the way for 'emergency measures', where actions that are 'outside the normal bounds of political procedure' are justified (Buzan et al., 1998: 24–5). It has been widely argued that the framing of migration as a 'security problem' is prevalent in the political discourse, particularly of the centre-right, on the state of immigrants in Germany as well as in other European countries such as France and Britain (Bigo, 2002). Thus the reproduction of this discourse in the CDU/CSU debates around Turkish membership in the Union suggests a close interdiscursivity with broader debates on the immigration/integration nexus across the EU including Germany, on which more will be said in Chapter 4.

Britain

Unlike the French and the German corpus, there is very little reference in the British data to Turkey as a potential threat to European security. As with the other two member states, this can be taken as a form of interdiscursivity with the dominant (British) national identity construct that is sceptical at large to a coherent external policy at the EU level. Nonetheless, a minority discourse, present marginally among the Labour and Conservative parties, constructs Turkey as a security threat for Europe, mainly around the topic of migration and/or Europe's borders:[43]

> CONS 2: What I do perceive is the problem that Turkey simply being transgressed, Turkey being crossed through by immigrants from outside the EU, coming to mainland Europe, which is the way some of the Africans came here through Libya and then to Italy, coming to the EU. It could be a route for people coming into the EU rather easily, and you go back to the argument that there should be border controls.

The extract above is a part of a response uttered within the topical frame of the security implications of Turkish membership to the EU. Thus it constitutes an exemplar of the way in which immigration can be securitised over the Turkey debates also in the British political discourse. It utilises the *topos* of threat and the *topos* of borders in constructing Turkey as a 'transit country' of migration, paralleling the observation made for the realm of the nation-state where migration is constructed as a transnational security problem that contributes in turn to the de-humanisation of the migrants and to the naturalisation of the policies adopted in this field.

Conclusion

The analysis has identified two major representations of Turkey that in turn construct Europe as a security community. One relates to the predication of Turkey as a key player in the prevention of the clash of civilisations and as a model nation for the countries of the Southern neighbourhood. This is highly prevalent among the main centre-right bloc and the mainstream left/liberal groups in the EP, the European Commission, the French centre-right and the centre-left, the German social democrats and the Greens as well as the British Labour and Conservative Party. This representation relies on and in turn reproduces Huntington's clash of civilisations thesis, where two monolithic and homogeneous civilisational blocs of Europe/the West and the (Muslim) South are juxtaposed against one another. In some cases (particularly the left/liberal groups in the EP, the Commission, the French centre-left, the German Social Democrats and the Greens along with the Labour Party in Britain), Turkey's role in the alleviation or the prevention of this clash is taken further to denote Europe as a global power, which, upon Turkish accession, would have a stronger say in the South due to the country's religious, cultural and civilisational affinity with the region and/or its role as a *cordon sanitaire* against the 'insecure' and 'backward' South. Europe is in turn discursively constructed to resemble a nation-state in its external policy, often in competition with other 'global players' such as the United States and China.

The second major representation of Turkey is that of a security threat for Europe, present among the ranks of the centre-right and the far-right in the EP, the interviewees in the Commission, the French centre-right as well as the centre-left, the Christian Democrats and less visibly, the Social Democrats in Germany. Europe is hereby constructed along nation-state lines with clear demarcations between the inside and the

outside through arguments that Turkey's accession, due to its proximity to the South would threaten a cohesive external European identity that is required for Europe to play a major role in the global scene and/or that it would pose tremendous security challenges in terms of migration and border controls. In formulating these representations, discursive strategies of securitisation and boundary drawing are coupled to denote a stable, progressive and peaceful homeland against a crisis-ridden and backward South.

Institutional, ideological and national faultlines are discernable in these representations. For example, in the Commission, those who perceive themselves as responsible for the governing of Europe's borders tend to be more engaged in representing Turkey as a potential security threat through the prospects of uncontrolled migration and border controls. A case in which ideological divides become visible is the intensity of the securitisation of migration among the far-right groups in the EP. National identity constructs along with political affiliations are traceable in the transatlantic component in the Labour discourse on international security through references to the war on terrorism in discussing Turkey's role in combating the clash of civilisations or in the underlined need for a coherent European foreign policy in the French and the German data.

Nonetheless, a core discourse that runs through these representations is that of the clash of civilisations, either through explicit references to the thesis in representing Turkey as a security asset or via implicit references in representing it as a security threat through dichotomisation of Islam or the Muslim world (often predicated with instability and crisis) with the Europe and the West. In line with Bottici and Challand (2006: 323), this analysis has also found that while constituting a rarely resorted-to narrative in the EU by the end of 2001, the clash of civilisations had become commonplace in the EU discourse on security (through Turkey) by the end of 2004.

Although much less widespread than the clash of civilisations thesis, another case of interdiscursivity (and intertextuality[44]) pertains to the discourse on 'new liberal imperialism', advocated by Robert Cooper, the former Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs in the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union and a Principal Adviser to the Corporate Board of the European External Action Service as in the following:

> ...the challenge to the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more

old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself.[45]

His main arguments are particularly visible in the security-related Commission debates and the left/liberal discourse on Turkey where Europe is accorded a more interventionist role in the global system. Turkey is represented as a future actor needed to help the internally 'postmodern' Europe combat and stabilise the 'modern/pre-modern' world. From another viewpoint that will be further elaborated in Chapter 3, Turkey is viewed as an actor unfit to participate in the postmodern Europe of ridden sovereignties and hence would provide an impediment to such a role. Both representations however reveal the increasing prevalence of a Europe constructed along power politics in its external relations. Construction of Europe as a 'global power' also entails some claims regarding the normative role of this power with respect to the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, particularly in its immediate neighbourhood. This is particularly due to the ways in which this construct discursively combines 'values' and 'interests' under the rubric of 'exporting stability' and 'attaining self-security and power' (Fairclough, 2005: 50). Further elaboration on the normative dimension of this role that is accorded to Europe is made possible by analysing the discourses on Europe and Turkey over discussions of democracy and democratisation, to which we now turn in the next chapter.

2
Europe as an Upholder of Democratic Values

Since the end of the Cold War, democracy and human rights have been among the most prominent issues in the relations between Turkey and the EU. The start of accession negotiations in 2005 was made conditional on Turkey's fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria, which brought the state of Turkish democracy to the forefront for the EU. The analysis suggests that the debate on Turkish democracy did not wane in the aftermath of the opening of accession negotiations. In fact, unlike in the case of the member states where the debates on Turkey in general lost their intensity after 2005, in the official EU institutions under analysis, namely the EP and the Commission where the discussion on Turkey continued, matters relating to the consolidation of Turkish democracy maintain a predominant position even five years after the Commission delivered its decision that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. However, following the launch of accession negotiations, the debate on democratisation in Turkey has taken a more nuanced form with references to specific developments in the country, such as constitutional reform, elections and judicial reform rather than general discussions on whether Turkey is sufficiently democratic in terms of 'European' standards.

It is well known that the EP expresses frequent concerns about the state of Turkish democracy. In fact a quantitative study of EP debates on Turkey (1996–2004) has suggested that the defects of Turkish democracy that are referred to in EP debates broadly cover the rights of non-Muslim minorities, the state of the Kurdish minority, civil–military relations, the Cyprus conflict, good neighbourly relations (namely with Greece and Armenia), recognition of the Armenian genocide, human rights and democratic freedoms, women's rights, the implementation of the rule of law, the state of the police force and corruption (Giannakopoulos and

Maras, 2005). Although the timeline of their analysis is more restricted than that of this book, the general issues touched on with respect to democratisation in Turkey also seem to hold for the sample under analysis.

Democracy is one of the major themes that shape the Commission discourse on Turkey. This is hardly surprising given that in 2002 the Commission was officially entrusted to monitor Turkish democracy and recommend the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey on its sufficient fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria. Since the opening of accession negotiations it has continued to regularly examine and report on Turkish democracy through its Progress Reports. Both the Commissioner speeches and the interviews repeatedly highlight deficiencies of Turkish democracy in the areas of fundamental rights and freedoms, minority rights, civil–military relations, women's rights, Turkish policy in the Cyprus conflict and (to a lesser extent and more so in the earlier Commissioner speeches) the country's bilateral relations with Greece.

In contrast to the other discursive settings, French political discourse on Turkey devotes relatively little attention to the country's track record in democratisation, with the major discussions revolving around geopolitical issues, the nature of the EU as a political project and its relation to the European people, culture, history and religion. In fact, in the period between the opening of accession negotiations and June 2010, only two MPs raised the issue of democracy in Turkey.[1] Where the issue of democratisation is raised, the cited problematic areas cover fundamental rights and freedoms, reconciliation with the past in reference to Turkey's relations with Cyprus and its recognition of the Armenian genocide, protection of minorities (the Kurdish minority in particular) and women's rights. As opposed to the French case, Turkey's track record in democratisation is a frequent theme encountered in the German and British data. The main issues that are discussed concern fundamental rights and freedoms, civil–military relations, minority rights, the Cyprus issue and women's rights in the German data; and fundamental rights and freedoms, the rule of law, minority rights and the Cyprus conflict in the British case.

The analysis identifies two main representations of Turkey in democratisation debates that in turn lead to the construction of Europe as an upholder of democratic values: representation of Turkey as a statically undemocratic country incapable of change and representation of Turkey as an undemocratic country capable of change under European assistance.

Turkey as statically undemocratic

One representation of Turkey that is continuously reproduced in the EP as well as in France and Germany is of a country that is locked into a state of being undemocratic and that by its nature is resistant to change under any conditions. As will be demonstrated below, this representation is achieved through various discursive strategies that in turn construct Europe as an upholder of democratic values.

European Parliament

A close look at the predicational/referential strategies utilised in discussions over democratisation reveals that across the majority of the centre-right and the far-right groups in the EP, Europe is consistently constructed as an upholder of European/Western democratic values, principles and standards[2] as opposed to Turkey, which is repetitively represented as an undemocratic state that is static and resistant to change,[3] even after the Commission's evaluation in its 2004 Progress Report that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. This is mainly realised through essentialisation[4] of the notion of democracy as well as through the consistent exclusion of alternative narratives of democratic progress in Turkey:

> Mr President, the Turkish legal system is based on the idea that collective order and security very definitely take precedence over individual human rights. That is how life is lived there. Such behaviour amounts to downright defiance of the norms and values of Europe. They do want to join, but they want Turkey to join the European Union on their terms. This we must prevent at all costs and make clear to the citizens and to every person of goodwill in Turkey that we do not want that.
>
> (Oostlander, EPP/ED, 13 May 2003)

> EPP-ED 1: How do the people think? How do they interpret things like democracy, freedom of the individuals, equal rights? These are European values that need to be understood and I have the impression that most of the Turks do not really understand them, the understanding of those values are different. The Turks always tell me, what do you want, we have a democracy here. But it is not a European democracy, not as we Europeans define and understand democracy.

In the first excerpt above, 'individualism' as a trait of the European self is placed against 'collectivism' as the underlying tenet of the Turkish

legal system. This necessitates two related remarks. One is that by stereotypically labelling the whole legal structure as upholding 'collective order and security', the utterance in fact constructs one 'version' of the truth by excluding the legal and constitutional reforms undertaken in the system since 1999, interpreted by many in Turkey as well as in Europe as geared towards enhancing individual human rights.[5] Secondly, the emphasis on 'individualism' as a European norm/value is in itself not new, being a well-entrenched essentialising stereotype of European identity dating back to the nineteenth century.[6] Another referential strategy, that of hyper pronominalisation, is utilised via the linguistic use of 'there', together with the use of other distancing pronouns such as 'they' and 'their own', further distancing the two entities (Europe and Turkey) from each other. The constructed distance strengthens the predication of Turkey as a hardliner country that resists democratic change.

The second excerpt, taken from an interview, again refers to Europe as the bearer of democratic values ('democracy, freedom of the individuals, equal rights'). However, as slightly different from the first excerpt, this time distancing is made between 'Europeans' and 'Turks' regarding the way in which they conceptualise democracy and human rights. Such tying of differences to ethnic nature, otherwise known as ethnification, together with the stereotyping of the Turkish 'people' as withholders of a 'different' notion of democracy once again excludes any alternative account of democratic change in the country.

Various other discursive strategies are used to denote Turkey as an undemocratic country that is resistant to change:

> In that country, in that Turkey, the prevailing mentality surely has to change first; something has to happen in people's minds. This cannot be done by compulsion. People have to be persuaded; they have to be won over by a convincing political case. This is the way to achieve a permanent change of mentality. It cannot be quickly engineered within ten years. It takes at least two to three generations, so why can we not give this country the time it needs?
>
> (Sommer, EPP/ED, 13 December 2004)

> Parliament and many other institutions are carrying on with their pretences, as though our tireless teachings can change Turkey. This, in fact, is the crux of the matter: the contradiction between this country, this nation, this great people, its evolution and the project we wish to operate together.
>
> (Toubon, EPP/ED, 21 May 2008)

> UEN 1: You know the general saying of the people of this House is that Turkey cannot enter now because Turkey does not fulfil the conditions, but Turkey should change and then it could become a member. I do not believe in changing that profoundly the culture of other people . . . And I can see many things in Turkey that need to change, but as Huntington expresses, if you try to force another country and another people to change, it will end up in open war, sooner or later.

The first excerpt above employs a common signifier, namely mentality or mindset, that is often used to denote a state of no change in Turkey.[7] Herzfeld (2002: 142) has earlier described 'mentality' as a concept that holds 'dubious analytic power' as a product of an essentialising discourse. It had long been a key term of nationalistic discourse where it is used to discursively construct national homogeneity. Hence the use of the term in the case of Turkey not only constructs the country as a homogeneous entity but also essentialises its differences with Europe. The timeline that the parliamentarian foresees for change in Turkey also needs to be underlined in this respect. In his work on *Time and the Other*, Johannes Fabian (1983) has shown how the positioning of a certain collectivity in a different time than that of a reference group can be used to create dichotomies to sustain relational differences. Turkey is hereby constructed with a temporal identity different from that of the European Self. In fact, describing it in Hansen's (2006: 49) words, the country can be considered as 'doubly temporally displaced: it is constituted as backward *and* as permanently located within . . . backwardness'.

The second excerpt, even though it is delivered three years into the accession negotiations, is exemplary of the many explicit remarks that Turkey can never change to become a democracy proper. The widely discerned teacher/student dichotomy is constructed whereby the inferiorly placed student (Turkey) can never sufficiently learn regardless of the efforts of the superior teacher (Europe) who possesses the necessary knowledge. There is an inherent incompatibility between Europe and Turkey that is not elaborated further, as opposed to the final excerpt in which Turkey's essentially undemocratic state is justified via the *topos* of culture, as is typical of the nationalist and far-right discourse on Turkey. Democratisation is hereby explicitly linked to a cultural essence and thus should not be asked from a country coming from a profoundly different culture. Thus the superiority of Western culture that is associated with democracy is clearly asserted. What is further notable here is the way in which intertextuality with Huntington's work is incurred

to highlight confined, static and essential cultures that are by nature antagonistic to one another and to construct a crisis situation of war in case that they clash, precluding any alternative measures in relations with the country.

Especially in the aftermath of the opening of accession negotiations, the need for Turkey to recognise Cyprus and to open its seaports and airspace to Cyprus is very often raised by the members of all political groups in the EP. In certain instances, particularly among the Greek and Greek Cypriot MEPs, this becomes a subject through which Turkey is represented as a perpetual violator of international law and also as defying European democratic values:

> If, in the future, it is possible for a country, such as Turkey, to continue to occupy a part of another future EU country, namely Cyprus, and yet remain a Member State, what will have happened to that democracy and spirit of reconciliation that forms the very soul of European cooperation and the very values that underlie it?
>
> (Sacredeus, EPP/ED, 14 February 2001)

> . . . This country [Turkey] will not stop demonstrating an important democratic deficit, blatantly infringing the human rights of millions of people and occupying the Republic of Cyprus, a Member State of the European Union . . . We can not listen in the sanctuary of democracy, the European Parliament, to unseemly expressions such as Northern and Southern Cyprus and talk of elections for Northern Cyprus, where 70% of the so-called electoral body are illegal colonists.
>
> (Theocharous, EPP, 10 February 2010)

Turkish military presence in Cyprus is constructed in both excerpts as a matter of (a lack) of (European) democracy on the part of Turkey that is negatively predicated as an 'occupier', 'coloniser' and an 'infring(er)' of human rights' as opposed to Europe that is positively predicated as the bearer of democratic values. Representing the issue in oppositional terms on democracy in turn excludes from the narrative the historicity of the Cyprus conflict and the constructed divisions on the island that underlie the rigid positions of both of the community leaderships in Cyprus as well as in Greece and Turkey. The first excerpt further contributes to the marginalising of the dynamics and actors at work in constructing and sustaining the conflict on the island by construing the potential persistence of Turkish 'occupation' as a

matter of 'Europeanness', whereby 'Europe' is essentialised through the attribution of human properties ('the soul of European cooperation', 'spirit of reconciliation'), also known as anthromorphisation. It was also observed in the EP data that after the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 and the ensuing representation of Cypriot MEPs in the EP, these new MPs in referring to the Cyprus conflict invoke 'Europeanness' by underlining that the 'occupied' nation and the country are 'European'.[8] Such a discursive move is significant for its political implications since, as it has been argued elsewhere (Rumelili, 2003: 232), the representation of international conflicts in identity terms such as 'Europeanness' justify threat perceptions by oversimplifying them and help prevent the emergence of alternative narratives to the resolution of conflicts.

Member states

France

In the French debates on democracy in Turkey, Europe is overwhelmingly constructed as an upholder of core European values across different party groups.[9] For the vast majority of the French centre-right, this construct is established in relational terms to the static picture of democratic stagnation in Turkey:[10]

> It [Turkey's candidacy] is indeed not justified from a geographic, cultural or human rights point of view: twelve thousand political prisoners, entire populations persecuted, a massacre committed, even yesterday, by the security forces, such is the political reality of Turkey, where the Charter of Fundamental Rights is ridiculed every day. I wait for the Minister of the country of human rights to give me a clear response.
>
> (Lequiller, RPR/UMP, 20 December 2000)

UMP 4: EU membership for Turkey means many duties. Turkey has to change its own structures, its own constitution to become a member. It has to create a new consciousness, a new culture ... I think that European values are fundamental to the project. First of all, values of liberty, social justice, social solidarity, of respect, of values of freedom. You have to take your own responsibilities to promote liberty. It is fundamental. So here in France, we are fighting for the values and to promote and to influence at a larger scale. So values are absolutely essential.

UDF 3: I think that, if you would like, there is a primary problem, it is the problem which is the problem of Turkey herself, if she really

wants to change to reach a political standard of human rights etc., the standard of the rest of the European Union. It is not an economic problem, in spite of the fact that Turkey is much poorer in certain regions – but it is not that. The problem, it is the cultural problem, thus religious and behind it all, there is human rights, the place of women etc. There is all that.

The first excerpt above constructs the political scene in Turkey as undemocratic with repressive elements. This negative other representation is realised via various referential/predication and argumentation strategies. One is the *topos* of numbers in referring to political prisoners, where absolute numbers that present a more impressive picture than percentages are used. The other one is the discursive strategy of 'hasty generalisation' that is utilised by referring to 'whole populations persecuted', a 'massacre committed' and to 'Charter of Fundamental Rights being regularly ridiculed', where not only a hyperbolic construction of reality is achieved but also alternative accounts of democratic progress are excluded from the narrative.[11] Such a state of affairs is presented as a 'political reality', where the *topos* of reality as a tautological argumentation scheme is used to attribute further credibility to the construct of Turkey as an undemocratic country that is resistant to change. The explicit Self that is positively represented in opposition to this negative Other is 'France', predicated as the 'country of human rights'.

The second excerpt above demonstrates the frequent way in which this construct of France as the guardian of human rights is placed at the centre of Europe, referred to as the 'project', which is a referential strategy used in construing Europe as a 'temporal process' that is 'realised in and through time' (Wodak and Weiss, 2004: 242). The centrality of France in the project is realised through the discursive equivalence formulated between French and European values. This can be observed in the way in which the cited European values of 'liberty/freedom', 'social justice/respect' and 'social solidarity' correspond to the French (Revolution) motto of '*liberté, égalité, fraternité*' respectively.[12] The 'universality' of these values and the need to spread them as dictated by the 'civilising mission' of Europe/France are highlighted by overlexicalisation attained through the 'fight (for values)' metaphor as well as the verbs 'promote' and 'influence', which can all be argued to belong to the same conceptual domain of 'change'. Such a claim to universality and change, however, is strongly contrasted by the use of the referential strategy of anthromorphisation, whereby the attribution of a human quality to Turkey, namely 'consciousness', is used to homogenise and essentialise

the 'undemocratic' nature of the country. The *topos* of culture further helps to strengthen the construction of Turkey as a homogeneous country with an essential and uniform undemocratic nature that is resistant to change.

The final extract above once again invokes a democratically superior Europe in relation to Turkey, but construes democratisation as essentially dependent on 'culture' equated with 'religion', thus locking the country into a permanent state of inferiority. The treatment of religion as a cultural matter impeding democratic progress is reminiscent of neo-orientalist discourse, with the hyperbolic representation of Islam in orientalist discourse as a dominant superstructure encompassing all aspects of social and political life in the Orient (Said, 1978) now being taken to create a vision of Islam that is intrinsically incompatible with democracy (Bottici and Challand, 2011: 56–7).

Germany

All the political parties under analysis overwhelmingly employ predicational/referential strategies that persistently construct Europe as an upholder of European values.[13] In relation to this construct, particularly among the CDU/CSU group, Turkey is repeatedly represented as an undemocratic state that is resistant to change.[14] In certain instances, this is achieved through essentialising democracy with reference to the *topoi* of culture, religion or history. Since these are posed as essential properties that cannot be acquired, the permanently static picture of Turkey as an undemocratic country is justified:

> The European Union is an institution with values shaped by the enlightenment and Christianity. Values such as human rights, equality between men and women, democracy based on the rule of law, freedom of the press and social market economy are all based on these roots . . . When you compare Islamic states with those that have been ruled with Christianity in the past, you will find deep divisions in terms of democracy, human rights, freedom of the press and freedom of religion. Until now, there has not been a single Islamic state that shares our values.
>
> (Hintze, CDU/CSU, 19 December 2002)

CDU/CSU 1: Some things are difficult to achieve in the short term. You cannot repeat history so to speak. That is why I said it has to grow over generations, it is not a short-term issue . . . There is the issue of political culture. That is how you implement policy I mean, and

it goes all the way up to religion which is in the widest sense also covered by the cultural umbrella. The culture of how to live with your neighbour, again about political culture, how to deal with someone who is not of the same faith or opinion. Culture of course is not about cultural heritage in the sense of monasteries, literature etc.., that of course is not an issue. It is more the political culture that I would have in mind.

In the first excerpt above, positively connoted flag words such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law are associated with European values, resulting in the positive representation of the European Self. These, however, are not presented as acquired characteristics of European states. In fact their essence is sought in religion (Christianity) and history (the Enlightenment), which makes them unique to Europe. The logic behind the clash of civilisations thesis where the world is divided along religious and historical faultlines is also at work here. As is typical of neo-orientalist discourse, in the binary dichotomy constructed between Christianity and Islam, Islam is accorded an inferior place where it is unconducive to democratic reform. This reinforces the superiority of Europe/West over those countries where the dominant religion is Islam and excludes in totality the differences that exist between their individual political systems.

The second excerpt above explicitly utilises the *topos* of culture where 'culture' equated with 'religion' is construed as the essential root of a democratic system. Thus there is one teleological route to democracy that owes its roots to European culture/religion. The interviewee's distinction between 'cultural heritage' and 'political culture' parallels Blommaert and Verschueren's (1998: 92) differentiation between two forms of 'cultural features' that are observed in the discourses of culture in the West. One relates to 'profound cultural features' or 'so-called guiding social principles' such as values, beliefs and religion and the other one consists of 'surface value (cultural features)' such as artistic forms and eating habits. The phrase 'political culture' can be argued to constitute a euphemistic term used to refer to these highly vague 'profound features' that are invoked to express positive self-representation and superiority on the part of Europe.

References to 'culture' and 'political culture' as impediments to democratisation in Turkey are frequently voiced among the ranks of the CDU/CSU and are reminiscent of Spohn's arguments on the relationship between culture and national identity in post-war Germany. Spohn (2002: 305–6) has argued that the 'synchronisation' of Europe

with the (constructed) German national identity in the post-war elite discourse in Germany has also led to the emergence of a 'crucial cultural layer in the current German meanings of Europe' where identification is with European culture (rather than a German national culture). Nonetheless, this (constructed) cultural identity, in its conservative–liberal variety, has always been highly exclusivist, demarcating itself clearly from Turkey (see also Chapter 4).

Besides culture, religion and history, other argumentation strategies are also used in representing Turkey's lack of democracy as static in the German political discourse:

> Turkey, for all this time, has remained unchanged. I think this is a crucial point in relation to its EU candidacy. Turkey is politically too distanced from the necessary criteria to start accession negotiations and I do not believe that it will be ready in a foreseeable future.
>
> (Glos, CDU/CSU, 17 December 1999)

The excerpt above typically precludes any notion of democratic change by systematically excluding any account of democratic reform in the country. It utilises strong modality ('has remained') and the argumentation strategy of 'hasty generalisation' to represent a Turkey that has remained static until the end of 1990s, excluding alternative accounts that point to shifting socio-political dynamics in Turkey in the 1980s and the 1990s.[15] The issue here is not whether Turkey has remained politically static or not, but how the static image becomes concretised in discourse. In order to strengthen the picture of staticity, the discourse participant uses the argumentation strategy of *non sequitur* where the lack of reform is presented as proof that it will not be forthcoming in a foreseeable future. Together with the *topos* of reality, it construes a tautological scheme where a certain action (starting of accession negotiations) is denied on the basis of 'the reality as it is' (no democratic progress) where the contents of that 'reality' itself are disputed. In fact, that disputed 'reality' does not only concern the state of democracy in Turkey, but also the stance of the EU towards democratic reform and its relation to membership. As Diez (2007: 417) highlights, if one were to argue that lack of democracy in Turkey persists, 'one should also recognize that such an argument has in the past been used *in favour* of EU membership in order to strengthen the domestic human rights regime by placing it in the framework of EU law', leading to the inclusion of Greece, Spain and Portugal, and later the Central and Eastern European countries in the Union.

Turkey as capable of democratic change

In all the discursive sites under analysis, a representation of Turkey as an undemocratic country that is capable of change can be discerned. The ways in which this representation relates to the construction of Europe as an embodiment of democratic principles is nonetheless subject to variation across and between the different sites of analysis.

European Parliament

In the EP a number of political groups, especially left and liberal elements along with a minor faction of the EPP-ED/EPP (mainly the Scandinavian, Southern and pre-2009 British members), represent Turkey as an undemocratic country that has the capability to change[16] through the assistance of Europe that relationally bears fundamental democratic values.[17] Chapter 1 has already discussed at length the ways in which this representation surfaced among the discussions on security among a certain EPP-ED/EPP faction, which has argued that Europe needs to assist Turkey in attaining stability, which is of high strategic importance to European security. Hence this section focuses mainly on the discourse of the left and the liberal groups on democratisation and democratic change in Turkey. While the country is not signified as fully democratic even by the latest debate of the analysis (10 February 2010) and in the interviews that were held in the course of 2008, the way in which the domestic changes in Turkey are included in the narratives prevents the country from being signified as fully anti-democratic, especially in the debates from the year 2002 onwards:

> Greens-EFA 2: Europeanness is very much linked to bad experiences and wars for which Europe is responsible. Trying on this history to build up a new understanding of Europe, of living together, of openness, on the basis of democratic values. It is not fixed, it is a process of Europeanisation and that is my understanding of Europeanness, and therefore for me it is not excluded that Turkey one day could belong to Europe, but that would mean that they would really have to be more democratic than they are at the moment. What I very much wish to avoid is to create the impression that in Turkey it was nothing, is nothing and never will be anything.

> All those people we have been talking to in Turkey, as Mr Eurlings can confirm – all those campaigners for human rights, for women's rights, all the democratic organisations, all the pro-democracy associations, both the employers' organisations and the trade unions – all have

been telling us that the prospect of accession to the European Union has changed their country, that the prospect of accession to this Union will make their country a normal parliamentary democracy. All this will not be accomplished as soon as tomorrow morning . . . but if we succeed in making Turkey democratic and stable, if European values succeed in putting down roots in its society, if we give the Turks the chance to become what they want to be, in other words, people accepting European values for themselves, then we will be creating a European Union that will be making a reality of its peace process, its potential for peace and for the stabilisation of democracy in a region that more than ever needs democracy, human rights, social security and peace. It is these very things that we in the European Union should be exporting to Turkey.

(Schulz, PES, 13 December 2004)

The first excerpt above involves the *topos* of history, frequently used in the discourse of these groups, where Europe is defined in relation to its nationalist and militarist past as its Other.[18] As opposed to its past, present-day Europe is positively represented via the lexicals of 'democracy', 'openness' and 'living together', all belonging to the conceptual domains of inclusiveness and plurality. The Othering of Europe's past does not just concern the relations between the present member states of the Union, but is also involved in regulating Europe's relations with its immediate neighbourhood where the lack of democracy is made the subject of Othering vis-à-vis Europe. Hence it is the lack of democracy that sets Turkey apart from Europe and only further democratisation as an ongoing process itself can make it a part of it. Although Turkey is still represented as democratically backward compared with the European self, as opposed to the dominant EPP-ED/EDD discourse, it is not locked into a permanent state of inferiority.

  The second excerpt demonstrates another – complementary and not alternative – means of argumentation where democratic change is accounted for in the narratives on Turkey. This is achieved through the inclusion of certain domestic voices within the country, hence accounting for alternative interpretations rather than opting for a unilinear and static picture relying on a 'single' version of events, as was the case with the large body of centre-right and far-right discourse on Turkey. This excerpt also constructs Europe as an active agent in bringing about democracy in Turkey. Turkey should be given the prospect of accession due to the democratic changes that this will bring. Thus a causal argument oriented towards the future, referred to by Kienpointer and Kindt

(1997: 566) as 'pragmatic argument', is utilised to justify the granting of membership perspective to Turkey. This argument also bears the point that the way for democracy runs through the adoption of European values for Turkey. The overlexicalised use of flag words ('democracy', 'peace', 'social security', 'human rights', 'stability') is used to strengthen this positive self-representation of today's Europe. The repetitive use of the 'we' pronoun, which is exclusive of Turkey but used in reference to the Europeans, endows Europe with a specific normative task to guide Turkey in this process of change. This task is endowed on Europe as an extension of its obligations arising from its construction in stark contrast to its own past, hence as a 'peace process'. This European obligation to assist Turkey, however, is constructed in such a way as to allow little active agency on the part of the domestic forces in the country. This is most visible in the interview data regarding the future of change in the country, and it also occasionally but less frequently emerges in parliamentary debates:

> I do believe that we, in the European Union, need to show Turkey what it means to think and act in a European way, and to go forward in confidence and with consistency. Otherwise we would soon run the risk of having to face the threat of an Islamic-fundamentalist state, no longer open to dialogue, by the back door.
>
> (Swoboda, PES, 28 September 2005)

The parliamentary excerpt above is a typical case in which the centre-left and the liberal discourse on democratisation in Turkey situate the relations between the two sides on an axis of a parent/child analogy where one is dependent on the other. The parent/child dichotomy leads to the construction of a subject (Turkey) as a child that, in the words of Doty (1993: 310), 'can simultaneously be a source of pride over progress thus far made, concern with shortcomings, fear of eventual failure, and desire to protect and guide'. There is a certain European way, a European model of 'thinking' and 'acting' that attributes coherence and a relatively fixed identity to Europeans, that Turks have to be taught about. Hyperbolic extreme-case formulations are used in referring to Turkey's future without European guidance. Islam conceptualised as a fixed political model is the main contender out there, despite the multiple accounts of ongoing contestations over Islam in the Turkish public sphere since the late 1980s.[19] The internal dynamics are minimised and the alternative for change is sought primarily outside. While this establishes a significant degree of superiority on the part of Europe, it also attributes a highly

subordinate role for Turkey that needs to be controlled and guided on the 'true' path.

The pride that the parent object (Europe) takes over the progress of the subject child (Turkey) is often explicitly expressed as the outcome of Europe acting as a moral force in its neighbourhood, differentiating it from other international actors:[20]

> We have managed to influence a democratic transformation in Turkey, with the will of the Turkish people, but without tanks, without rifles and without arms. As we have said, it has been a democratic revolution. We have managed to propagate the European democratic model by peaceful means. In my opinion, the challenge that we have almost – not completely, but almost – overcome was a major challenge and let me say that I am proud of that Europe, the Europe that feels no fear in its belly.
>
> (De Keyser, PES, 13 December 2004)

> As Europeans, we must ask ourselves where we actually want to go. If, as a global player, we want to pass on not only economic . . . but also political values, not only in Europe but also beyond European borders out into the world, then for this, ultimately, we need Turkey.
>
> (Ertug, S&D, 20 January 2010)

In these two extracts from EP debates, predications pointing at relatively mild mechanisms of change such as 'influence', 'propagate', 'pass on' and 'peaceful means' construct Europe, as part of the grander strategy of positive self-representation, as a normative power capable of attaining democratic change in countries through the spread of the 'European democratic model'. In the first excerpt, references to 'rifles' and 'arms' amidst the escalation of the Iraq War also imply an implicit denunciation of American foreign policy in the face of a normative European model. From the second excerpt, Europe's normative power is construed as part of its global strategy, extending beyond its immediate neighbourhood.

Europe defined within the parameters of the 'normative power' discourse is by no means novel to academic debates. In fact, there is very strong interdiscursivity between such talk of the left and the liberals in the EP and the academic attempts at defining the external role of the EU. Ian Manners (2002) was the first to apply the term 'normative power' to Europe to denote it as an external actor that works through ideas

and opinions instead of military or purely economic means. Norms in themselves were to achieve what otherwise is done by military means or economic incentives.

At first instance it can be argued that this discourse itself is not necessarily problematic. In fact, in the Turkey debates – particularly in the years 2004 and 2005 where the decision to open accession negotiations was specifically discussed – it is often combined with appeals to uphold Europe's credibility by being consistent in the demands made of and the promises made to the country. Hence the 'normative power Europe' discourse can even be taken as having a possible constraining effect on discriminatory practices or double standards towards Turkey. Nonetheless, as Diez (2005a) has warned, the very danger inherent in the discourse on Europe as a 'normative power' is a potential lack of self-reflexivity that could in turn help to reify a Eurocentric worldview that is 'messianic' and 'self-righteous'. Preventing that necessitates 'consistency requiring a constant checking of the EU's narratives of projection on to its own internal goals and...deficits' (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002: 771). The analysis suggests that in the discussions over Turkey such self-reflexivity is almost non-existent. While Europe is largely constructed as the ideal and the unquestionable model that needs to be adhered to, only three speakers in the EP debates[21] and none in the interviews problematise the normative superiority of Europe, question the 'Europeanness' of democratic values or mention problems with member-state democracies regarding the violation of democratic norms in areas such as minority rights.

What makes the 'normative power' discourse even more problematic is that in addition to the lack of self-reflection, claims to universality can also be made.[22] Democratic values that are defined as particular to the EU can also be branded as universal. Chouliaraki (2005: 6) sees this as the '*topos* of orientalisation' where the equation of European/Western values with universal values leads to the 'annihilation of the cultural weight of Other(s)'. Hence the Eurocentric manner in which the superior European Self relates to its Others is being reproduced (Borg, 2011: 33).

European Commission

The predicational and referential strategies used in the Commission over democratisation in Turkey persistently construct Europe as an upholder of core European values/standards,[23] whereas Turkey is represented as an 'undemocratic/not fully democratic state', yet with the capability of change.[24] The notion of change is particularly emphasised via the inclusion of alternative narratives of democratic progress in Turkey, especially

following 2002 when sets of constitutional reform packages were ratified in the country:

> The European Union is, above all, a community of shared values based on the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. All these values are enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In November of last year, the Commission noted that Turkey has made further impressive efforts, which constitute significant progress towards achieving compliance with the Copenhagen criteria . . . These criteria were not invented for Turkey, but apply equally to all candidates. For our report next October, as in previous years, the Commission will apply the same principles to Turkey as to all other candidate countries. There should be no doubts that the report will be fair and objective.
>
> (SPEECH/04/16)

> The very existence of our Union rests on the basic values of democracy, the rule of law and human rights that we share among ourselves . . . The Negotiating Framework spells out these values and it is the Commission's duty to monitor them . . . We want to see Turkey move on by respecting European values.
>
> (SPEECH/08/275)

> COM 2: Essentially, we have the common values and the common values are the values related to human rights, to the body of rights which are enshrined in the various conventions of the Council of Europe that all countries are part of, and they have accepted. The Americans have a completely different set of values. There are some common values also like the freedom of expression, but there are some values in the States which are different. Like the value of human life is different . . . It is interesting to see the recent evolution in Turkey after the Helsinki decision. Ocalan, Leyla Zana, the leaders in jail. They said that accession negotiations should be supported. And they see that a few steps have been made, but it is not enough.

All of the excerpts above define Europe on the basis of a set of indisputable European values that follow an almost mythic doctrine that perpetually reiterates democracy, human rights and the rule of law as part of the positive representation of the European Self. The contested nature of these 'values' is ignored whereby a presupposed European identity established on these 'values' is to govern Europe's relations

with the outside world (Diez, 2006: 244). The *topos* of law/*topos* of right ('Charter of Fundamental Rights', 'Negotiating Framework', 'Council of Europe') is used in all of the excerpts in the legal grounding of these values, a common practice in the Commission where legalism is a profound aspect of its work offering a 'supremely rational, binding and political solution to the problems of European construction' (Shore, 1999: 134).

The ascription of an unquestionable democratic identity for Europe entails in itself a process of Othering codified in the Copenhagen political criteria, delineating the border between the democratic Europe as 'a force for the good' and a variety of Others lacking in the standards of European values (Diez, 2006: 245). As seen in the final excerpt above, in the Commission discourse these relational Others sometimes include not only candidate countries but also other states such as the United States. This is found to be particularly the case in the construction of a 'social Europe' juxtaposed against the unconditional neo-liberalism of the United States. Muntigl et al. (2000) found this type of European identity construction, in which the United States is represented as Europe's primary Other on the basis of social values, to be typical of the Commission's discourse on Europe.

Whilst the excerpts above presuppose the existence of a specific European identity around specified values as such, the adoption of such values is not deemed impossible for a candidate country like Turkey. In fact, references to political and socio-economic reforms in the country in the first and final excerpts show how the narratives of change can be accounted for in discussing the country's democratic credentials. In the first excerpt, progress towards Copenhagen political criteria is given credit on the basis of the Commission's 2003 Progress Report on Turkey and the final excerpt takes an even broader time frame dating back to the 1999 Helsinki Summit to point at the process of change in Turkey, albeit with the usual disclaimer that it is not yet complete. In various Commissioner speeches and interviews, the concept of 'modernisation' is used as the ultimate destination reached upon the adoption of European values whereby a distinction is drawn between 'modern' Europe and the 'pre-modern' Turkey that can reach modernity via emulating the European model.[25]

The Commission itself is constructed as a significant agent in triggering this change. The first excerpt predicates the Commission as a fair referee via overlexicalisation attained by the use of words and expressions belonging to the domain of impartial treatment, such as 'criteria will apply equally', 'Commission will apply the same principles', 'fair' and 'objective', while the second excerpt simply raises its

duty of 'monitor(ing)' political reform. The final excerpt, through the expression 'we still have work to do', refers to the Commission as a whole with the duty to transform those new member states and/or candidates that are lacking in democratic standards. Hence, in line with Wodak (2005) who has earlier argued that Commission officials orient strongly to their organisational identity in their narratives, the (constructed) institutional identity of the Commission as the body impartial to any governmental position in the Union and responsible for the monitoring of political reform in line with EU law is invoked. Terms such as 'we', 'Commission' and 'Europe/European Union' appear relatively interchangeable, providing further support to the thesis that the construction of a European identity in the Commission is in many cases inseparable from the constructed identity of the Commission as the conscience, the bearer and the gatekeeper of that very identity. Nonetheless, it is not just the Commission as an institution but the EU that is bestowed with the duty to assist Turkey on the road to the adoption of European values such as democracy and human rights:

> In reality, enlargement is a great success story. It reflects the essence of the EU as a civilian power; by extending the area of peace and stability, democracy and the rule of law, the EU has achieved far more through its gravitational pull than it could ever have done with a stick or a sword. The membership perspective works as an extremely powerful incentive for reform.
>
> (SPEECH/05/362)

The excerpt above constructs EU enlargement as a foreign policy tool that allows the EU to construct its identity as a normative power.[26] The 'civilian power' discourse that was very popular during the 1970s and the 1980s is retained, with a particular emphasis on its normative dimensions (democracy, human rights and the rule of law) that were prioritised in the EU's foreign policy discourse during the 1990s with the end of the Cold War (Manners, 2002). Metaphoric expressions of 'extending the area of peace and stability, democracy and the rule of law' and '(EU's) gravitational pull' help engage in positive self-representation for the EU as a normative external actor as opposed to a military actor constructed through the metaphors of 'stick' and 'sword'.

The problematic relationship between the 'normative power' discourse and the lack of self-reflexivity has already been mentioned in the case of the EP. It has also been observed that in both the speeches and the interviews in the Commission, there is little self-reflection on

the way in which those norms are adhered to by the EU, with respect to its relations with both inside and outside. Where self-reflexivity is present, it is realised through references to the Second World War as both the founding myth and the Other of today's European project. Asad (2003: 162) describes this as the limit of the 'conceptual boundaries of moral legal solidarity' in Europe, leaving out other collective violences such as those in colonial Africa or in the Middle East. The lack of self-reflexivity does not only pertain to history but, perhaps more importantly, also involves the present day. Diez (2006: 245), for example, argues that whilst the Union attempts to reify its identity as a 'normative power' through demanding political reforms from Turkey, it also undermines the 'normative power' discourse by paving the way to alternatives to full membership.[27] In a similar vein, such a contradictory move is not dismissed in silence but applauded in Commissioner speeches both prior to and after the publication of the draft negotiating framework document on Turkey in June 2005.[28]

The normative power discourse often goes hand in hand with formulating a relationship of high dependence of Turkey on the EU in attaining democratic change:

> COM 1: What has been working for other countries will certainly prove to be rather powerful for Turkey, and this is the fact. EU conditionality works as a powerful magnet for introducing reforms. Reform in Turkey would be very difficult without it. But this leads us to the question of process versus objective. We know that the objective is very much a question mark. Of course the shared objective is accession, but we know that it is an open-ended process. And this is why the official view is that the process is as important as the ultimate objective. The trip as much as the destination. Commissioner Verheugen used to say that the future of European integration and the reform process in Turkey are quintessentially intertwined. The problem with Turkey, in my view, is that we are in different timeframes . . . How much will Turkey be able to catch up, it depends on how much you can accelerate history of course. Well, history is accelerating, but can you change the mentality in 20 to 30 years?

The excerpt above ties democratic reform in Turkey to its EU accession prospects, constructing Doty's (1993: 310) parent/child dichotomy, where the subject (Turkey) is dependent on Europe for guidance on the way to democratic progress. In some of the Commissioner speeches, the expressed need for the EU to be 'firm and fair' in its dealings

with Turkey also reinforces this dichotomy.[29] While Europe's 'normative power' is highlighted through the 'magnet' metaphor and the reform trajectories of the countries of the previous enlargement waves, this 'normative' basis is contradicted via questioning the accession perspective for Turkey. The difficulty of attaining democratic change in Turkey is expressed through the formulation of an inferior temporal identity for the country vis-à-vis Europe, as commonly observed in interviews with Commission officials. As discussed earlier in this chapter, placing a certain country or certain people outside one's own 'temporal space' rids them of the 'chance of doing something *themselves* about their situation' since 'naturally, only people who have reached a higher step on the ladder of civilisation can possibly recognise a temporal gap or, at the very least, would know what to do about it' (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998: 101). This in turn leads to a lack of power on the part of Turkey in democratic policy making where a real dialogue between Europe and Turkey is also ruled out. While in most interviews the temporal distance between the two is not always as wide as is expressed in this excerpt, temporal gaps of at least one generation are foreseen and tied to factors such as 'mentality' that espouse homogeneity and in some cases culture, history and tradition, on which more will be said in Chapter 4.

Member states

France

There is no uniform discourse among the French centre-right on the prospects of democratic change in Turkey. As discussed earlier, while for the vast majority of the UMP and the UDF members Turkish democracy is resistant to change, there is an alternative, yet more marginal discourse present particularly among the ranks of the UMP that points at the contrast between French universalism replicated at the European level and essentialisation of Turkey's lack of democracy, arguing in turn that democratic change is possible in the country:[30]

> Refusing Turkey the possibility to prove that she can adapt to Europe is to judge Turkish people as fundamentally inadaptable to *laïcité*, democracy and human rights. It contradicts our conviction of the universality of our republican values ... Give them the time to give us that proof; without any complacency, from the point of very strict accession criteria.
>
> (Barnier, UMP, 14 October 2004)

The utterance above once again equates French Republican values with the values of Europe where both constitute the positively represented French/European Self that upholds democratic principles. This is not only observable through the way in which Europe is predicated with 'secularism' (*laïcité*) as well as 'human rights' and 'democracy', but also via the interchangeable usage of these values with those of the Republic. Although the extract explicitly denies essentialisation of democratic attributes on the basis of the universality of French Republican values, Turkey still needs to provide 'proof' that it is capable of adapting to them. Hence beneath the surface, the extract implicitly constructs democratisation as a matter of innate ability, ignoring the role of a variety of social, political and economic factors in their historicity, despite the case where the static picture of no reform in the country is construed less rigidly. As discussed in further detail in Chapter 1, those members of the UMP who invoke the clash of civilisations discourse in constructing Europe as a security community also construct Turkey as a country with the potential to attain democratic change, albeit rendering democratic progress in the country dependent on Turkey's close relations with Europe and/or (less frequently) its ultimate accession to the EU, hence attributing an inferior identity on the part of the country.

The PS talk on democratisation in the framework of Turkey's prospects of accession to the EU refrains from both explicit and implicit essentialisation of democratic attributes:

> PS 3: Europe is a certain number of values, human rights, *laïcité*. They are a part of European values. They are a part of its civilising mission . . . With Turkey, I think that giving a true perspective of entry to the European Union could tilt the balance among Turkish opinion in favour of accession to the European Union. This means efforts by Turkey to fulfil in terms of the state of rights, respect for human rights; revolution regarding the status of women; its relations with the external world, in particular with Greece and Cyprus. So I think, I am convinced myself of the positive effect of a serious, real accession perspective on the evolution of Turkey. In return, if you multiply the obstacles, the barriers, we will have a country which will turn its back to Europe.

As illustrative of the discourse of the French Socialists on Turkish democracy, the interviewee above allows for change in Turkey in line with French/European values by accounting for Turkey's democratic progress in her narrative. Such progress is not rendered dependent on essential

features such as culture and religion, but construed as a matter of will. Through bestowing the French 'civilising mission' onto Europe, such narratives very often construct Europe as an active agent in bringing about democracy in Turkey, regardless of whether eventual accession takes place. This obligation to assist Turkey, however, is constructed in such a way as to allow little active agency on the part of the domestic forces in the country, since it is the 'European' orientation that triggers the 'evolution' towards democratisation. While this establishes a significant degree of superiority on the part of Europe, it also attributes a highly subordinate role for Turkey that needs to be guided by 'Europe', invoking once again the parent/child analogy.[31]

The French/European 'civilising mission' in bringing democratic change in Turkey, invoked primarily by PS members as well as some members of the UMP, raises questions as to the self-reflexive nature of this mission. The highly positive self-representation of the French and the European Self on democracy-related issues in discussions over Turkey seems to allow for little self-reflexivity, even among the French Socialists. Construction of France as a bearer of democratic values at the core of Europe by all the parties under analysis systematically excludes accounts that France itself is one of the three states (together with Italy and Turkey) that was most often condemned by the European Court of Human Rights around the time when Turkish democracy was most intensely scrutinised in France (Le, 2002: 297), as well as the controversies around reconciling with its colonial past.[32] Such a lack of self-reflexivity points at the presence of the self-righteous messianism of Eurocentric thought in current political constructs of French and European identity as they are revealed through the debates on Turkey and Turkish democracy.

Germany

Although the SPD and the Greens in Germany largely stand on opposite grounds to the CDU/CSU regarding their views on the prospects for democratic consolidation in Turkey,[33] a closer analysis suggests important similarities in the order of discourse among both segments of the German political spectrum, as displayed in the excerpt below which contains a wide array of discursive strategies that are commonly encountered among both groups:

> SPD 4: They [the Turks] must make a decision in the next 20 years. Will we live with our face to the East or with our face to the West, and I hope it is better for us and it is better for them that they

make a decision with us, that we live with our faces to the West, with Western values. I think it is for human development, for global development, very important that we show to the Muslim states, to the Islamic world that it is possible to live in a common value community, a common legal society, a community of law. It is possible, and there is a danger for the clash of civilisations. Samuel Huntington was right. There is a possibility of a clash of civilisations and we must do all that we can so that we do not have this clash of civilisations. I think we can take a big step against clash of civilisations, if we integrate the state of Turkey into Europe, if we can attract them to our values ... They cannot make this change on their own, that is not believable. Then they must decide for another development, that they live their faces to the Arabic and the Turkish world. Then they live with their faces to the East, and that is not good for Turkey and also not good for us ... Turkey must take the *acquis* on all questions and also the genocide question with Armenia. Today it is not possible for the Turkish government, for the Turkish people to say that, to realise that. But I think in five or ten years, they will realise that, because it is the same problem as for us. We must also understand that we were the people that made the Holocaust, and only when we speak about it clear and right in the world society, about these questions in our own history, can we be a part of the European value system.

The excerpt above constructs Europe as a bearer of European/Western values in relation to Turkey that is predicated as an undemocratic state with the potential to adopt these values. Nonetheless, this democratic change is not conceptualised independently from European assistance that is necessary to avoid the alternative scenario that it remains undemocratic, as is argued to be the case in other countries with 'a majority Muslim population'.

Such argumentation requires further unravelling beyond the dependent relationship, and hence the inferior identity that it constructs for Turkey. First of all it is exemplary of the way in which the binary discursive frame between the (constructed) East and the West is dominantly present in the SPD and Greens discourse on Turkey. As discussed in further depth in the previous chapter, the intertextuality and interdiscursivity with the clash of civilisations thesis implies that international relations are being conceptualised through the prism of essentialist features such as culture and religion. A monolithic and homogeneous West/Europe, positively represented as democratic and

with no reference to religion, is once again juxtaposed against a uniform and undemocratic East defined by religiosity ('Muslim states', 'Islamic world') and, via the ethnified term 'Arabic', ethnicity. With no references to Christianity, Europe is in turn relationally constructed as a superior entity that has passed the stage of religiosity. While the SPD and the Greens advocate Turkish membership to avoid cultural and religious conflict through democratisation, this argumentation in fact helps reproduce the main tenets of the clash of civilisations thesis by assuming that such conflicts are 'real' to begin with.

Construction of Europe as a focal point of attraction for democratic consolidation can be considered a case of interdiscursivity with the 'normative power Europe' discourse. Particularly in the interview data pertaining to the SPD and the Greens, self-reflection on democracy and human rights is limited to the German experience in the Second World War.[34] This finding is parallel to other studies, which suggest that Germany's primary Other is its nationalist and militarist past, the antidote for which is European integration (Risse and Engelmann-Martin, 2002). This limited self-reflexivity can be problematised on two grounds. The first is that, as argued earlier, it helps leave out other collective violences, both in the past and today. The second is that, as in the case of the excerpt above, it leads to parallels being drawn between Germany in the Second World War and Turkey, either regarding the country's past deeds (i.e. the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide) or with respect to its present stance on them (denial/public acceptance of genocide). Blommaert (2005: 134) describes this as an act of 'synchronisation' where 'artificial continuities and coherence are discursively constructed between patterns observed'. This also involves an act of power where the complexity of events are reduced to 'flat comparison[s] within one timeframe, the present, *our* experiential present', resulting in anachronistic conclusions (Blommaert, 2005: 136).

Regardless of political party affiliation, certain German politicians are also found to tie the discussion on Turkish democracy to the issue of Turkish immigrants living in Germany:[35]

> We acknowledge the reform packages that were recently accepted. We believe that in the case of a clash of values, the East and the West would reach out to each other in peace. This would be a major gain for us all. We understand that we should not be mixing our desire for such a development with reality by looking at the integration problem in Germany, which persists despite a lot of positive experiences. A responsible policy line would take these kinds

of problems seriously, rather than disguising them under friendly wishes.

<div align="right">(Hintze, CDU/CSU, 19 December 2002)</div>

The rule that is valid for Germany is also valid for Europe: Those that doubt the democratic capability of the Turks in Turkey also doubt the democratic capability of the Turkish-origin citizens living in Germany. Our constitution rules that our state's attitude towards different cultural, religious and ethnic groups is tolerance, integration and the will to live together in peace.

<div align="right">(Schröder, SPD, 19 December 2002)</div>

The first excerpt above, from a member of the CDU/CSU group in the Parliament, engages in the construction of a monolithic East and the West, juxtaposed against each other with disparate values. What distinguishes this extract from others where the clash of civilisations discourse is also used is the way in which these values are ethnified by reference to Turkish immigrants in Germany. Turks cannot 'integrate' into German society because of their 'essential' values that clash with those of the host society. While the speaker from the SPD criticises this view, the main tenet of his argument does not differ substantially from that of the statement by the MP from the CDU/CSU. By arguing that 'Turks' (in Turkey and in Germany) are 'capable' of being democratic, the speaker also constructs democracy as an individual and inherent value, but one which the Turks as an ethnic category possess. Thus the speaker also ethnifies democracy by reference to Turkish immigrants in Germany.

The use of the words 'integration' and 'tolerance' in referring to immigration policies also deserves further attention since it provides some insight into the immigration debate across the main political parties (see also Chapter 4). 'Integration' is a nominalisation that denotes a bounded spatial area where something is brought 'inside' from the 'outside'. Its use hereby leads to the implicit characterisation of Turkish migrants in Germany as outsiders, whose 'only valid *entry* into the society is through a process of integration' that is regulated by the host society, which is in turn constructed as a 'well-defined, unproblematic unit with clearly defined boundaries' (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998: 112). This exclusion is further accentuated in the second excerpt above through the use of term 'tolerance' (of migrant groups). The use of the notion 'tolerance' in discourses on minority rights has for long been contested by critical scholars.[36] Like 'integration', 'toleration' is also a boundary-drawing concept that denotes the frontiers between the

'tolerable' and the 'intolerable'. In so doing, it creates an unequal power relationship where the 'tolerator' possesses the 'evaluative authority' to decide on the boundaries of what can or cannot be 'tolerated' (Brown, 2006: 29; Dobbernack and Modood, 2011: 25). Hence in reconstructing the superior democratic identity of Europe in relation to Turkey through references to Turkish immigrants in Germany where they are portrayed as a microcosm of Turkish society, these concepts position them both outside the confines of and in an inferior power positioning vis-à-vis the host, be it Europe and/or Germany.

Britain

While both of the main political parties overwhelmingly construct Turkey as a currently undemocratic country with the propensity to change,[37] they incur significant differences in the way in which they conceptualise the so-called 'European' values:

> CONS 1: There are universal values which are not European and which Turkey can adopt in due time. It is a conceit of the Europeans to think that things like the rule of law and democracy are uniquely European, they are not. In fact, I would go further. I think that the EU values include a renouncing of self-government, which is wrong.... There is a prescriptive human rights convention called the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which would have formed part two of the European Constitution, and that would be judged not in Strasbourg, but by Luxembourg, by the European Court of Justice, and they might take the view that of course it is a human right [to wear the headscarf/veil], that people can wear whatever they like. So I am just making the suggestion that Turkey could be paying a heavier penalty, you might be caught up in a rights-driven legal agenda, which undermines much of what Turkey has achieved.

> What really matters is whether Turkey shares the same values and aspirations as the rest of the EU. I am convinced that its leadership does, and with the obligations to meet EU norms and values implicit in accepting the responsibility of seeking to become an EU member state, the Turkish nation will embark on its second great modernisation after that of Ataturk. Of course, Turkey must deliver its side of the bargain. Like any other candidate country, it must fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria, including ensuring respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities. That is happening fast, as my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly

saw when he visited Ankara in May. Since the AK Party came to power, the Turkish Parliament has passed a plethora of legislation to bring its law into line with European norms.

(MacShane, Labour, 23 June 2004)

The Conservative MP in the first extract predicates democracy and the rule of law as 'universal', rather than 'European' values. The interviewee also constructs 'Europe' as a negative Other to the British Self by treating 'Europeans' as a separate category (predicated as arrogant) in discourse and Europe in the form of the EU as an intruder into national sovereignty that can also have an adverse influence on domestic affairs in the country. The implicit assumption behind this potential negative impact is that democratic progress fuelled by the prospect of EU accession will result in the extension of public liberties, and thus extended rights for religious expression in the public sphere, which would undermine secularism in Turkey. This argument rests on the belief that Islamic expressions in public, symbolised through reference to the 'headscarf/veil', should be kept at a minimum due to the (perceived) inherent incompatibility between Islamic imperatives and a secular political system. This adverse influence is coupled with a further negative representation of Europe through reference to the 'EU Charter of Fundamental Rights' as a 'prescriptive human rights convention'. The Charter sets out the rights which citizens across the EU already have through the European Convention of Human Rights or through existing EU law, and thus can hardly be characterised as a novel and detailed prescription.[38] Nevertheless the predication of the Charter as such once again reveals the discomfort with the EU's intrusion into national sovereignty. Where Europe's democratic influence is discussed, the implications can thus be predicated as negative, since EU standards are perceived as a straitjacket that denies the unique features of the nation-state (most notably in relation to the Islamic religion in the Turkish case) and thus entails unwanted repercussions.

As opposed to the Conservative discourse, Labour MPs often predicate the EU as an embodier of European democratic norms codified in the Copenhagen political criteria, as exemplified in the second excerpt above.[39] These values can be adopted by Turkey whereby narratives of progress are accounted for by references to democratic reforms that have been undertaken by the Turkish government. This democratic change leads Turkey to the route of 'modernity'. This is not only realised through predicating Turkey's reform trajectory within the scope of its EU

membership prospects as the country's 'second great modernisation', but also through implicit reference to the 'first great modernisation', which refers to 'Western'-oriented reforms introduced following the establishment of the Republic by Ataturk. The discursive equation between European 'values'/'norms' and 'modernity' encountered frequently elsewhere in Labour data implies a positive representation of the modern European Self, and a sense of superiority against the undemocratic Other(s), in this case, Turkey.[40]

Nonetheless, European values can be subject to contestation, even in Labour discourse:

> LAB 1: I think the talk about European values is complete nonsense. It irritates me no end, because what it is – and this is where I think the British are very different to continental Europe – anybody from Mars coming down and looking at Europe over the last hundred years would see that the great European values are that they slaughter each other, the Europeans would slaughter each other once every 20 years in large numbers and have got the most unprecedented genocide on its doorstep. There is this collective amnesia, which I find quite amazing . . . I think we have rules within the EU, which you need to comply with, it is fine. But when it comes to what they say European values, I think they are pretty much universal human values, and I cannot see what is European about them and how they are different from American values or the Canadians.

In the excerpt above, the concept of 'European values' is discarded by both derogatory referential strategies (predication of the talk on values as 'nonsense' and 'irritat(ing)') and the adoption of a reflexive stance towards Europe's own past. While this observation may at first suggest an emergence of a self-reflexive and normative construction of Europe, open to self-criticism and prone to equality in its relations with various Other(s), a closer analysis warrants caution. Firstly, even though democratic values are defined as 'universal human values' by the interviewee, the references to 'America' and 'Canada' in addition to Europe suggest that the scope of 'universality' is limited to the 'West'. Since 'articulation of all universalisms portrays those who perform the articulation as the good citizens of international society' (Diez, 2006: 245), this claim to universality reinforces the superiority of the West against the rest of the world and fortifies the borders between the two. Secondly, the reflexivity that seems to be present on the surface applies only to Europe, which is predicated outside the confines of the British self, and thus

cannot be conceptualised as an act of self-reflexivity that could aid in the alleviation of this sense of superiority. There is a clear binary construct in the extract above between Britain and (continental) Europe where it is the latter whose past is constructed as the Other of democracy. Also observed overwhelmingly in Conservative discourse, this can be considered as a case of interdiscursivity with what Risse (2003: 500) refers to as the identification of Europe with the continent as a core component of British national identity constructs where (continental) Europe is 'perceived as "the other" in contrast to Englishness'.

Despite contestation on the 'Europeanness' of democratic values, MPs from both parties agree on the significant role that Europe plays in the attainment of these values in Turkey:

> The EU exports its values – its democracy, its open market and its liberal traditions – osmotically, as it were, and during the adult lifetime of everybody in this Chamber we have seen considerable advances in many European countries, which were in a very different situation not so long ago . . . The very act of preparing for engagement with the EU is a powerful pressure on all Turkish society and its political leadership to conform to the values of Europe.
>
> (MacShane, Labour, 12 October 2004)

> LAB 1: I think if you slam that door shut, you play into the hands of all the most unhelpful forces in Turkey. I think it would be absolutely terrible. My personal view on Turkey is absolutely clear. As it stands now, Turkey is not ready for accession. It will probably take longer than both Turkey itself admits, and the EU admits of how much it has to change to allow Turkey to come in. But the biggest mistake is to shut the door and say never. I just think that would be such a mistake. I do not even want to think about it.

> We in Europe have a simple choice: either we encourage Turkey to move towards us, holding out the hope of membership of the EU, or we risk a Turkish backlash when those in Turkey believe that no matter what changes they make they will never be allowed into the EU, and instead of having a secular, modernising state on the European borders, we find ourselves with a militant Islamic state on the border of Greece.
>
> (Fox, Conservative, 22 November 2006)

The first extract from the Former Minister of Europe from the Labour Party is exemplary of the interdiscursivity encountered more commonly

among the Labour Party with the 'normative power Europe' discourse outlined in the earlier sections. As the 'normative power' thesis also implies, the concept of 'export(ing)...osmotically (values)' through 'engagement' entails the diffusion of gradual democratic change through peaceful institutional interaction. As seen in this excerpt among others, the European values cited in Labour discourse often extend from democracy, human rights and the rule of law to include those signifiers that belong to the conceptual domain of the neo-liberal capitalist model, such as 'open market' and 'its liberal traditions' as uttered above.[41] This is hardly surprising, given the adoption of the 1980s' Thatcherite discourse on neo-liberal economics by New Labour under Blair's leadership (Good et al., 2001: xii).

In other instances such as the second and third extracts, Turkey is represented as a country that is incapable of attaining progress by itself. The *topos* of disaster attained by the hyperbolic expression of 'absolutely terrible' is utilised in the second excerpt to denote a general state of affairs that will result in the country in the absence of the accession prospect. Similarly, the final extract from a parliamentary speech by a Conservative MP represents Turkey as dependent on the EU to avoid the reversal of democratic progress attained in light of its accession prospects. While what will happen and how it will come into being in the case that the accession perspective is withdrawn is left unarticulated in the second excerpt, the final excerpt's alternative scenario to the membership perspective is that of 'militant Islam' as opposed to a 'secular' and 'modernising' state. The *topos* of threat is combined with the *topos* of ('European') borders in denoting Europe as a bounded entity against the force of 'militant Islam'. Thus the potential threat in a lack of democratic standards is not denoted as one of rising authoritarianism, but one of religious fundamentalism. The implicit assumption in this argument is conceptualisation of the Islamic religion as a fundamentalist political force that will exert itself once the European anchor is no longer present. Modernity entailing secularism is thus only possible through the emulation of the European model with European assistance. This argumentation has two major discursive implications. One is the enhancement of European superiority through the invocation of Doty's parent/child analogy where Turkey is predicated as the country that has to be guided by Europe to attain democracy. The other is the silencing of domestic voices for political reform within the country by construing it with a passive public and political sphere waiting to be taken over by Islamic fundamentalism.[42]

Conclusion

The analysis has identified two major representations of Turkey that in turn construct Europe as a bearer of democratic values. One concerns the representation of Turkey as a country that is resistant to democratic change. This is found to be widespread among the main centre-right group and the far-right ranks of the EP, as well as the centre-right in France and Germany. This representation is mainly realised through essentialising democracy as a cultural, religious and historical value, which also goes together with the consistent silencing of alternative narratives of democratic progress in Turkey. Conceptualisation of democracy as a characteristic inherent to Europe and the West conveys a strong interdiscursivity with neo-orientalist discourse in which democracy and human rights are construed as culturally, religiously and historically dependent traits of the West (Bottici and Challand, 2011: 56–7).

The second major representation of Turkey that constructs Europe as an upholder of democratic values is that of a country that is capable of democratic change through following the EU-assisted European model. This is particularly visible across the left and the liberal groups as well as some moderate-right MEPs in the EP, the Commission, the French Socialists, the Social Democrats and the Greens in Germany and Labour and Conservative MPs in Britain. The interdiscursivity with the modernisation paradigm is apparent in the construction of Europe as the superior entity, which sets the yardstick for democratic standards with which Turkey needs to comply. Its superiority is often strengthened by invoking an inferior temporal identity for Turkey, where it is conceptualised backward in some instances by generations or through the classical 'traditional' versus 'modern' dichotomy of the modernisation thesis. In an interdiscursive fashion with the discourse on Europe as a 'normative power', this Europe is further bestowed with a 'civilising mission' to transform countries like Turkey in its neighbourhood, which are conceptualised as void of the capacity to attain democratic change by themselves. Nonetheless, coupled with the lack of self-reflexivity on the so-called European values or with little self-reflection limited to the Second World War, this aids in the reproduction of the Eurocentrism of modernisation projects in discourse.

Variations in the discursive strategies are present both within and between different institutional spheres of analysis, demonstrating the infiltration of national, institutional and ideological themes in the

construction of this discourse topic. For example, in the case of Germany, essentialisation of democracy among the CDU/CSU can be realised through references to Turkish immigrants. In the French data, it was observed that the French and European values are equated in discourse where the French *mission civilisatrice* is replicated at the European level. The notion of European values does not go uncontested among the members of the two main parties in Britain. The Commission, however, invokes its institutional identity by constructing itself as the guardian of the democratic identity of Europe in the debates over democracy in Turkey. The constructed shape of the European political project in which European democracy should be guarded also reflects these faultlines, the contours of which are presented in the next chapter.

3
Europe as a Political Project

The discourse on Turkish accession to the EU overwhelmingly constructs Europe as a political project with a strong core of well-functioning institutions, a solid budget and pooled sovereignty. It is only in the British setting that this construct is largely absent whereby Europe is constructed as a political project *of nation-states* instead. Articulation of the 'political project' construct is rarely visible in the Commission and the Parliament before 2004, but predates this year in the cases of France and Germany, intensifying in all four sites of analysis after 2004. Nonetheless, with the exception of France, its intensity significantly declines after 2006. Hence its presence appears to be closely related to the debate on the future of Europe fuelled with the Eastern enlargement in 2004, the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty in the same year and its refutation in the French and Dutch national referenda in 2005. The analysis reveals two main representations of Turkey which in turn construct Europe as a political project with an institutional and financial core: representation of Turkey as a potential threat to European institutions, finances and policies and representation of Turkey as adaptable to European institutions, finances and policies.

Turkey as a potential threat to the European political project

Representation of Turkey as a potential threat to the European institutions, budgetary arrangements and policies is very common across the European Parliament as well as in French and German political discourse on Turkish accession whereas it is largely absent from the Commission and the British data.

European Parliament

This representation is most visible in the EP among the main centre-right faction of the Parliament, namely the EPP-ED/EPP.[1] Nonetheless, national divisions within this political group are apparent in the undertaking of this representation. For instance, German and French members of the group are found to be more commonly active than others in constructing Europe as a political project:

> EPP-ED 12: Turkey will bring serious economic and financial problems for the EU. Especially if Turkey would become a member, the whole EU would need to change its whole structural policy and the agricultural policy because it is a big country with a lot of financial problems and a lot of regional problems as well. I do not think these can be resolved.

> The more we enlarge the Union, the more we will dilute it, the further we will move away from political Europe and the less able we will be to pursue common policies. If Turkey were to join the EU in 2015, it would be the most populous country with 80 million inhabitants, which would give it the highest number of Members of this Parliament and significant weight in the Council.
> (De Veyrac, EPP/ED, 13 December 2004)

The first excerpt above is a typical example of the combined usage of the *topos* of finances with the *topos* of threat and the *topos* of burdening in discussing the negative ramifications of Turkish accession for the EU. The threat is accorded immediacy although economic integration does not fully occur until accession, which takes place following the conclusion of accession negotiations involving political and economic reform. These accounts share a common characteristic that by highlighting a financial crisis of immediate urgency, they systematically exclude alternative academic and policy narratives which argue that the membership of Turkey may not necessarily entail an unbearable financial burden on the Union. The goal here is not to demonstrate that one account has more 'truth value' than the other, but to juxtapose two different narratives that rest on similar figures to show how one can be marginalised or excluded at the expense of the other. Similar economic figures can be utilised to make opposite claims, which are noticeably absent from the EPP-ED/EPP discourse on the matter. Such alternative accounts have suggested that with the already existing ceilings for contributions by member states, the cost of Turkish

accession to the EU budget – estimated at a maximum of around 0.20% of the EU's GDP – will be manageable.[2] Comparative approaches have also made similar claims by suggesting that Turkey's economic position is not fundamentally different from the starting position of Poland, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria at the beginning of their accession process.[3]

The *topoi* of threat, burdening and finances often co-exist with the representation of Turkey as a potential threat to the political cohesion of Europe, as illustrated in the second excerpt above. The excerpt is demonstrative of a common representation of Turkey with its large population as a potential disrupter of institutional balances that would undermine a politically cohesive Europe. As in this excerpt, the *topos* of numbers is frequently used in referring to Turkish population in parliamentary data to enhance an institutional threat situation that requires attention. Alternative narratives on the potential impact of Turkish accession on EU institutions and decision-making processes are also systematically denied any voice in the EPP-ED discourse on Turkey. Alternative accounts based on similar population data at around the time of the parliamentary debate have argued that Turkey would not directly change institutional balances since it would have very little power to initiate or block any decision on its own and would thus have to join existing coalitions (Aleskerov et al., 2004; Müftüler-Baç, 2004). Besides, while on raw numeric figures alone Turkey's votes and seat shares would be equal or very close to those of Germany in the EU institutions, there is no '*a priori*' reason or 'evidence' to suggest that the country would disrupt the already questionable 'consensual' mode of policy making in the EU by importing divergent or destabilising agendas into the Union. In the words of Diez (2007: 418), 'while one may well take issue with the way "Europe" is constructed in Turkish political discourse, it is not at all clear whether Turkey would behave any more disruptively or, for that matter, constructively than existing member states'. Nevertheless, constructing Turkey as a political/institutional threat as such constructs Turkey *a priori* as a 'different' country. Otherwise it would be hard to comprehend why the principle of equal representation based on population weight in the EP (where the highest number of MEPs that can come from a member state is already subject to limits)[4] would be acceptable for big and medium-size member states such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, and not for Turkey, or indeed why future Turkish MEPs are treated as if they would constitute a monolithic national bloc in the EP with no political differentiation among them.

The interview data, however, sheds further light on the constructed fears regarding the impact of Turkish accession on EU decision making:

> EPP-ED 8: My impression is that Turkey has a very strong national identity, and I am not sure how to solve this problem. In the EU, we go another way, step by step far from the national ideology. I see no such developments in Turkey. There is a strong monolithic national identity. This is a situation completely against European development. The European model is characterised by reduced national identity and it is completely against the general ideas in Turkey. The importation of those ideas could be the end of Europe as we know it.

> EPP-ED 6: If Turkey becomes a full member of the EU, that would mean that Europe will be at the end very different from the Europe of now or Turkey would have to throw its national identity. I refuse that Europe becomes in the future, simply a market or a free trade area, because Turkey is very far from European standards, and that the distance between the two is unbridgeable you know. The unity of Turkey is made only by Turkish nationality and the Turkish identity.

As seen in the excerpts above, in the interviews with a majority of the MEPs from EPP-ED/EPP, Europe is constructed as a political project in which national identity matters less and less. In the first excerpt, this is made out to be a unique European trait through references to a specific 'European development' and a 'European model', whereas Turkey is ascribed a strong monolithic national identity. The second excerpt constructs Turkish national identity as a given, static property that keeps the country together, and it is this very identity that sets it as essentially different from Europe and with no capacity for change. Hence both of the interviewees represent Turkey as a threat to the political system of Europe as a supranational project with the 'risk' of imposing its own 'national' agenda against a development where national identification is ceasing to matter. Such an argumentation gains its power from not only denying the ongoing struggles over the construction of national identity in Turkey but also negating the way in which national identity constructs are still largely dominant in similar struggles in Europe.[5] The argumentation in both texts represents Turkish accession as an existential threat for Europe. In the words of Kiewe (1998: 81), discursive constructions of political crises as existential threats 'communicate an urgency and call for out-of-the-ordinary decisions and actions'. In this case the decision to keep Turkey out is justified via the

politically weakening effect it will have on the Union due to its being 'too different'.

   Interestingly the far-right and eurosceptic groups in the EP are also found to share in this construct of Europe as a political project that is under threat by the prospect of Turkish accession. Even though these groups are by and large known to express their opposition to supranationalisation through the EU, when the issue comes to that of Turkish accession, the Europe that they envisage becomes a coherent project that is under institutional, financial and demographic threat from Turkey:[6]

> NI 3: Turkey will have more inhabitants than Germany. It will be a big problem because also on an economic level it will be difficult to integrate. I think it would be difficult to integrate a country that is a part of Asia, but it is also a member of the OIC [Organisation of Islamic Conference] and you know what Huntington called a torn country. It could disintegrate Europe.

In some respects the ways in which these groups construe Europe as a political project display important similarities with the majority discourse in the EPP-ED/EPP. This is most visible in the utilisation of the *topos* of finances and the *topos* of burdening in discussing the ramifications of Turkish accession. However, instead of fears over sovereignty, explicitly essentialist traits such as culture and religion are invoked as disruptive factors of the European project. For example, in the case of the excerpt above, the *topos* of authority through reference to Samuel Huntington is used to gain credibility for the argument that civilisational differences serve as an obstacle for Turkey's integration with the EU. For Huntington (1993), Turkey is a 'torn country' in the sense that its religion, culture, traditions and institutions rely on Islam while its ruling elite wishes to Westernise the country. It needs to give up its ambition of Westernisation and stick to its Islamic heritage to be in a leading position of 'Islamic' civilisation. In this excerpt, predicating Turkey as 'Asian' and as a 'member of the OIC' strengthens Huntington's claim that Turkey does not in essence belong to the West whereby its difference is endowed with the potential to 'disintegrate' Europe.

Member states

France

Construction of Europe as a political project with institutional and financial dimensions under threat from Turkish accession is a macro

discourse topic that is widespread particularly among the centre-right in France:[7]

> The stakes are numerous: What will happen when this country which will comprise nearly 100 million inhabitants there in 10 or 15 years is integrated into the entire community and has the largest number of deputies to the European Parliament? Will the EU accommodate Turkish Islam? What are the political and geographic limits of Europe? Will the integration of Turkey, by its nature, create budgetary difficulties?... We wanted to have this debate, we had it and we will have other occasions to raise this subject. Until then, trust the Government. There is, without doubt, a dividing line there between those who are attached to the institutions, thus for a certain voice for France, and those who want them to weaken.
>
> (Baroin, UMP, 14 October 2004)

> France is not in favour of Turkey's accession to the European Union. What is in question is not Turkey herself...but it is the idea that we are making the European Union, that has to assert its political identity for having weight in tomorrow's world...Our priority is to reinforce the European institutions, define a common economic policy, increase the weight of Europe in the world, in order to guarantee 500 million European citizens the peace, prosperity and security to which they aspire.
>
> (Le Maire, UMP, 8 April 2009)

> Europe, it is no more of diplomacy, it is no more of foreign policy: from now on, it is another way to pose problems of internal politics – it is the politics of the nation, it is the most intimate aspect of the nation that is in danger!...The truth is that there is a choice between two models: unitary Europe or dispersed Europe...Our nations, proud and big, have battled a lot, have exhausted themselves one against another, have discovered that their size, their division and their dispersion forbid them from acting one against another, have decided that from now on, for their language, for their life styles, for their idea of ethics, for their social contract, they have to act together. Not to dissolve, but to gather together. This is the federal idea: we have undertaken to find together our lost memory. In monetary, military matters, in the field of research...The more Europe is rendered dispersed, the more it is rendered powerless. And then one understands the excessive insistence of the American administration in imposing on us the enlargement to Turkey!
>
> (Bayrou, UDF, 14 October 2004)

In the first excerpt above, Turkey is represented as a threat to the cohesion of Europe as a political project. The *topos* of finances and the *topos* of burdening through references to Turkey's budgetary impact accompany this *topos* of threat that emphasises the economic dimension of the project. Such a dominant representation in the UMP discourse not only attributes a static state of economic backwardness for Turkey, but as argued earlier, systemically excludes works of economics, which argue that the membership of Turkey may not impose an excessive financial burden on the Union, given the budgetary ceilings imposed on contributions of member states and the dynamism of the Turkish economy. The *topos* of threat is also used in referring to Turkey's disruptive effects on the institutional balances within the Union. This is combined with the *topos* of numbers, where absolute numbers rather than percentages are used in enhancing the effect of argumentation. Again, from a juxtapositional perspective, alternative narratives utilising population data in assessing Turkey's impact on the institutional set-up of the EU are systematically kept out of the UMP discourse, with the same implicit assumption that the country would undermine the EU's capability to act by importing divergent stances into the Union.

The underlying factors of this assumption can be sought in various other factors with essentialist attributes that help to construct a homogeneous Europe. The excerpt employs the *topos* of culture/religion via reference to 'Turkish Islam' as a foreign element that Europe has to put up with. Such presupposition and emphasis on essential differences often 'serve as the negative, debasing delimitation from an outgroup considered to be a different national collective' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 67). The *topos* of borders via reference to frontiers (in geographic/political terms) helps to concretise such delimitation.

Similar views have also been voiced in more recent parliamentary debates, as in the second excerpt by the Minister of State responsible for European Affairs. Turkish accession is once again being problematised for constituting a threat to a strong political identity inside the Union that is necessary for the construction of a strong external identity on the global stage. Unlike the previous extract above, the assumptions on which this assessment is based are left unarticulated. Nevertheless, the use of the metaphor 'friend', which discursively links Turkey to Europe but does not constitute it as a part of the European Self, and the exclusion of alternative narratives on the impact of Turkish accession on institutions and policy making in the EU signal that Turkey may indeed be conceptualised as an essential threat to the homogeneity that underlies the political union. The Minister of State

engages in this argumentation with almost exactly the same words in three consecutive parliamentary debates in 2009 at the French General Assembly.

As exemplary of the UDF discourse that is largely similar to that of the UMP in constructing Europe as a political project, the final excerpt predicates Europe as an internal matter to France regarding its politics and national identity where the fate of the two are tied into each other. As with the UMP discourse, a united Europe is juxtaposed against a dispersed one as an unavoidable dichotomy through the *topos* of facticity. Unification is hereby based primarily on essentialised and homogenised attributes (of nation-state constructs) that are argued to be shared by European nations – such as 'language', 'life styles', 'idea of ethics', 'history' and a 'social model' implied by a uniform 'social contract'. Such homogeneity, despite their conflictual past, requires the unification of European nations to preserve their 'essential' traits.

It is on the basis of this homogeneous Europe that the federal political project grows by the pooling of sovereignty in areas of more concrete policy such as a common currency, defence and research to make Europe a powerful actor in the global sphere. The traditional American foreign policy line that supports Turkey's accession to the EU is highlighted as the 'proof' of Turkey's dilution of this federal and homogeneous Europe. Such an argument rests on two implicit assumptions. One is the assumption that the United States is a competing Other of Europe in the global competition for power. This can be considered as a case of interdiscursivity with the dominant French political discourse across all major political parties on European foreign policy that constructs Europe as a powerful international actor with increasing independence from the United States.[8] The second implicit assumption is that Turkey by its nature lies outside the common 'we' group. Unlike the UMP discourse, in the UDF talk on Turkey, institutional and financial impacts of Turkey's accession are often not explicitly used as rationalising arguments for Turkey's diluting effects on the project. Instead, Turkey is constructed as a threat to the federal project without much elaboration, as a simple 'fact', through the argumentation strategy of *petitio principii* where 'what is controversial and in question, and has thus to be proved is presupposed as the starting point of argumentation' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 73). However, constructing the basis of the project on essentialist grounds prior to delimiting Turkey outside its confines suggests that the main assumption behind dilution/dispersion may very well be that Turkey would dilute the homogeneity of the project by its different 'nature'.

Overall Europe is largely construed among the French centre-right as a political project that goes beyond having functioning institutions and a solid budget to resonate more closely with a modern nation-state imagined on the basis of collectivised and monolithic identity constructs that help to differentiate it from another national collective, namely Turkey. Furthermore, French role/power in Europe is rendered dependent on the existence of such a Europe with state-like properties. Hence the stronger and the more cohesive the political project, the more power that France can exercise in it.

Germany

It is particularly in the CDU/CSU discourse that various argumentation and predication/referential strategies are encountered in the representation of Turkish accession as a threat to Europe as a political project:[9]

> We are moving from an institution where each acts alone towards a political union. This is why we need to ask ourselves: What does the accession of Turkey mean for a political union? This is exactly why the Copenhagen criteria do not only concern the candidate country, but also the absorption capacity of the EU. At this point, I would like to tell you that a political union with Turkey cannot proceed as we imagined. This is a very important point. At this juncture, I would like to quote the words of the former judge of the Constitutional Court, Böckenförde: 'Turkey is an impediment to a European political union in terms of its geographic location, population, national and cultural identity, economic and political structure'.
>
> (Merkel, CDU/CSU, 16 December 2004)

The excerpt above predicates Turkey as a threat to a cohesive European political project. It utilises the metaphorical term of 'absorption capacity' that is commonly employed in the CDU/CSU discourse on Turkey. In parallel to the role it serves in the discursive construction of bounded national identities, 'absorption' as a container metaphor borrowed from the domain of 'fluids' serves to construct in this context an internally homogeneous space for the EU with fixed and clear borders. As in assimilationist discourses of immigration that often resort to the term 'absorption' (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998), the concept is used to construct an entity, in this case Europe, that embodies the capacity to homogenise and subsume another and that reaches its limits with Turkish accession.

The *topos* of authority is employed through the reference made to a judge of the German Constitutional Court – one of the most esteemed institutions in the country – to provide credibility to the base of homogeneity that renders Turkish accession problematic.[10] The *topos* of threat is combined with the *topos* of burdening in problematising the political, economic and institutional impacts of Turkish accession. The exclusion of alternative narratives regarding these impacts is also present as observed in the EP and the French discourse, and hence will not be elaborated further here.

The reference to 'national and cultural identity' in the excerpt suggests that the basis of the 'difference' with Turkey that constitutes it as a potential threat to the political project can be sought in essentialist attributes that help delineate Turkey from a homogeneous Europe. In the same excerpt, the use of the *topos* of borders via reference to 'geographic location' helps concretise such delimitation. The frequent utilisation of the *topos* of culture/religion and the *topos* of borders along with less common references observed primarily in interview data to collectivising metaphors such as the Turkish 'mind', 'habit' and 'consciousness' as impediments to a functioning political project strengthen this claim by serving to construct essential barriers between Turkey and Europe. Thus it can be argued that the dominant construct of Europe in the CDU/CSU imagery closely resembles that of the (constructed) modern nation-state where a functioning political and economic system goes alongside essentialist and monolithic identity constructs. Similar to modern nation-state constructs, this bounded 'internal identity' for Europe is deemed necessary for a strong 'external identity', a theme already identified in the German political discourse in Chapter 1.

In the discourse of the CDU/CSU, the essentialist bases of the homogeneous European political project are also construed with reference to Turkish immigration:[11]

> We all live in peace in our country with our Turkish-origin citizens and we wish to continue it this way. This is as valid for the SPD and the Greens as it is for the CDU and CSU. This is not the problem. Our problem is that integration has only taken place to a limited extent among these citizens. The biggest task lying ahead of us for the coming years is to remedy this situation. Helmut Schmidt is right in stating that free movement of people will constitute an important problem in a European Union to which Turkey accedes as a full member. Those who cover up this issue are deceiving the people.
>
> (Merkel, CDU/CSU, 19 December 2002)

The excerpt above problematises Turkish accession on the grounds that it will exacerbate the 'integration problem' via allowing the free movement of Turkish people in the EU, using the *topos* of authority through reference to former Social Democrat Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to gain credibility for the argument. Such a statement rests upon two main assumptions. One is that there will be a significant inflow of people from Turkey into the EU upon the country's accession. This is an assumption widely shared by those members of the CDU/CSU who also utilise the *topos* of threat in referring to the consequences of Turkish membership regarding the free movement of people. From a juxtapositional perspective, these accounts systematically exclude interpretations which highlight that a successful accession period with high growth and effective implementation of reforms reduces and gradually eliminates migration pressures, as is argued to have been the case with the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal, or those narratives which underline that net migration rates of the past five years in EU countries are close to zero, meaning that the numbers of those who leave and enter these countries are almost equal.[12]

It is the second assumption that Turkish accession will contribute to lack of integration, however, which constructs this as a 'problem' for the EU. As argued earlier, the concept of 'integration' denotes Turkish migrants as 'outsiders' who need to enter into a well-defined, homogeneous society under the rules designated by the host. Even the binary division between 'us' (we Germans) and 'Turkish origin citizens' helps construct an unequal relationship where the two are divided. Furthermore, the argument that the 'integration problem' is exacerbated with more Turkish immigrants automatically bestows responsibility on the migrant groups to 'integrate', reproducing the relationship of inequality. Such argumentation remains one-sided in the way in which it omits the role of host society in the construction of ethnic and religious minorities. Kaya (2001: 58–72), for example, highlights that in the case of Germany, 'exclusionist incorporation regimes' of the receiving country were crucial in the organisation of Turkish immigrants along ethnic lines in both social and political life and in their (re)construction of static and homogeneous cultural and ethnic identities at the fringes of German society.

Turkey as adaptable to the European political project

Construction of Europe as a political project is also realised through the representation of Turkey as a candidate country that can be adapted to

Europe as a political system. This is commonly observed in the EP, the Commission, France and Germany. In the case of Britain and a minor segment of the EPP-ED/EPP group in the EP, Europe is seen to be capable of integrating Turkey institutionally and financially, not as a coherent political system but as a political project of *nation-states*.

European Parliament

The Socialists, Liberals and the Greens in the EP are also found to be engaged in the construction of Europe as a political project with its institutional, financial and public dimensions. With the exception of some Socialist and Liberal members from France and Germany,[13] the main difference between the prevalent discourse among these groups and that of the centre-right in the EP pertains to the capability of the political project to reform itself in the face of further enlargement. The construct is visible in the parliamentary debates,[14] but is more frequently observed in the interviews:

> PES 9: The main thing in my view is whether you have the political will to act together politically. It is not just a free trade area ... The bigger problem for Europe is even though I believe that it is possible for Turkey to achieve this and without it I would never raise my hand and vote for Turkish accession, will the EU be able to absorb [what would then be] its largest member state by population which would still by far be the poorest, and what kind of problems would that cause for Europe. This is my worry. This could be resolved before Turkey's accession, but it will be hard. There is a lot to be done, and there is the problem of pride. Turkish people are very proud. It really needs some mentality changes that are not in place now.

> Greens-EFA 1: I see that the absorption capacity is being used, is being put forward by those who want to put a stop to further enlargement. I think some of them believe that by not talking about it or by not elaborating on it, they can find an extra argument to keep Turkey out. Absorption capacity, if you think about it, has several components. Institutionally, I agree we have to reform the Union as it is now. But that does not reflect badly on Turkey. It has to be done before Turkey comes in. Then financially, what are we talking about? We will not go broke even if Turkey comes in.

The first interviewee from the PES utilises the well-known predication of Europe as more than a 'free trade area' in constructing it as a political

union capable of taking decisions in an environment rid of sovereignty concerns. While the excerpt cites the main problem as EU's capacity to 'absorb' Turkey, mainly institutionally (via reference to 'population') and financially (via the *topos* of finances), hence constructing Europe as a political institution requiring effective governance and coherent decision making, this is not viewed as an irresolvable problem. The main obstacle lies in the perceptions of 'sovereignty' and 'national interest' argued to be upheld in Turkey as against a cohesive Europe with common supranational goals. The expression of 'Turks as proud people', a dominant and essentialising stereotype dating back to the eighteenth-century constructs of the Ottoman Empire (Çırakman, 2005: 105–64), provides further support to the argument that the concept of 'sovereignty' lies at the heart of this debate. As in this excerpt, for an important segment of these political groups, the tenets of the discourse on political Europe are similar to those of the centre-right, with the difference being the view that such challenges can be overcome, although how remains uncertain.

The second interviewee from the Greens demonstrates how the concept of 'absorption capacity' has penetrated into the EU talk on Turkey among the left as well as the right.[15] The excerpt is exemplary of the critique directed at the utilisation of the concept in right-wing discourse as an argument against Turkish membership, by accounting for alternative narratives of institutional and financial implications of enlargement and rejecting a unilinear interpretation based on the exclusion of such accounts. Turkey is hereby not treated differently from other countries with respect to the degree to which it could disrupt decision-making balances since efficient decision making is constructed as a problem generalised to the whole of the existing EU, regardless of Turkish accession.

For a minority segment of the EPP-ED/EPP group such as some of the (pre-2009) British, Italian, Spanish and Swedish members, Turkey is adaptable to the European political project mainly because its membership is perceived as a contribution to *their* vision of Europe as a political project of *nation-states*:[16]

EPP-ED 2: I am not a supporter of a very deep European integration. In fact, I want to see the EU develop in an entirely different way, to the way it is heading at the moment. I would like to see the EU being a strong community of sovereign nations, focused on the single market and cooperating closely in areas where there is clear mutual benefit and where there is clear added value. I certainly do not want Brussels

running our country for us. And I have to say the prospect of Turkish accession is a catalyst for a change in the European Union. Because of the great differences between Turkey and most of Europe, differences in culture, in size, in economic situation, and many other differences, because of that, you could not possibly have this tightly integrated European state, with Turkey part of it.

The excerpt above is a clear demonstration of the way in which certain segments within the EPP-ED/EPP group situate the discussion around Turkish accession within a given vision for Europe as a loose project of nation-states that retain a major amount of their sovereignty. In the first excerpt, conventional metaphors of equilibrium such as 'a strong community of sovereign nations', 'cooperation' between member states and 'mutual benefit' are used to construct an understanding of Europe as 'interaction between fixed units which continuously seek mutual trade-offs … embed[ding] among others a powerful realist metaphorical expression, namely the *balance of power,* which has shaped international thinking since the sixteenth century' (Drulak, 2006: 512). This does not come to mean that Turkey is constructed as a European country in this vision. For instance, in the case of the excerpt above, the binary opposition of Turkey and Europe on the basis of culture, size and economy clearly delineates the country from Europe. Europeanness is thus still a valid construct in this imagery which Turkey does not fit. However, a distinction is proposed between Europe and the European Union, where the 'unEuropean' essence of Turkey would help further that distance in achieving a project of nation-states that does not resemble a supranational state where attachment to Europe overrides national identifications.

European Commission

Previous research has argued that supranationalism is embedded in the constructed institutional identity of the European Commission at both the individual and the institutional levels.[17] The discussions on Turkey do not seem to challenge these findings:

The impact study we are presenting today is modest in its claims. It does not seek to be exhaustive or to predict the future while essential parameters such as economic growth in Turkey and the Union remain uncertain. Nonetheless, it does already draw attention to various sectors that will require lengthy periods of preparation and adjustment in Turkey's policies, notably rural and farming policy.

Long transition periods could be needed, and sometimes, as with the free movement of persons, permanent safeguard clauses could prove necessary . . . A Europe with self-confidence and a Constitution, strong institutions and well-established policies, which is in the process of recovering economic growth and is underpinned by its model of peace, prosperity and solidarity, has nothing to fear from Turkey's accession.

(SPEECH/04/440)

COM 3: Europe is a construction. Europe is not a completed Union . . . When you speak about absorption capacity, it means that you do not foresee many changes to the policies that are currently in the EU, it means you have a status quo and you are enlarging, keeping these policies. You cannot carry on with the same policies we did. I work in DG X and it will be difficult to sustain the X policy in a few years, we have to change it anyway, regardless of enlargement.

Both the Commissioner speeches and an overwhelming majority of interviews construct a Europe that is – in the medium to long term – capable of institutional, financial and policy reform to accommodate Turkey, as well as other official enlargement candidates such as Croatia and the countries of the Western Balkans.[18] The first excerpt above primarily refers to the 'impact assessment study' requested by the European Parliament from the European Commission in the aftermath of the Copenhagen Summit of 2002, which contains 'the main issues arising in connection with the prospect of Turkey's accession, with particular regard to EU policies and the Community budget' (SPEECH/04/40). Description of the impact assessment study by the then Commission President Romano Prodi involves the use of a mitigating strategy (via the use of words and expressions such as 'modest', 'does not seek to be exhaustive', 'uncertain') where the epistemic status of the report is established with a certain degree of prudence (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 81). Hence the future impact of Turkey on the EU budget and policies is left rather vague and open into the future, with also the mitigating subjunctive of 'could' and predications indicating an orientation to the future such as 'estimate'. Such uncertainty with respect to the future EU financial and institutional adjustment in response to Turkish accession does not however preclude the construction of Europe as a political project with clearly designated and well-functioning policies and institutions. This construction is mainly realised through a predicational strategy via references to the 'Constitution', 'strong institutions',

'well-established policies' and 'economic growth', reminiscent of those predicates associated with nation-states.

Similar to the first excerpt, the second excerpt through the metaphor of 'construction' imagines a Europe whose process of building is never complete.[19] Shore (1999: 207) considers this metaphor of 'European construction' as the 'last and possibly the greatest of the Enlightenment grand narratives', sharing 'most of the same positivistic, rationalist and Eurocentric assumptions about progress' as well as related uncritical assumptions about harmony and consensus. 'Absorption capacity' as an almost sedimented metaphorical expression utilised to refer to policy-wise, institutional and financial challenges posed by enlargement is also being taken up in the Commission, but is refuted with respect to its validity due to this constantly changing nature of Europe under construction.

From a broader perspective, these two excerpts echo the findings of Abélès (2000) in his anthropological research on the Commission, as reflected on the topic of Turkish accession. Abélès (2000: 50) argues that Europe for the Commission officials is overwhelmingly framed within a discourse of indeterminacy, as a project 'whose accomplishment is forever postponed', which they, as its main architects, participate in constructing every day. According to Abélès (2004) this follows from Jacques Delors' construction of Europe as *un objet politique non identifié*. In the interviews conducted within the scope of this research, even those officials who explicitly define themselves as 'federalists' or believers in a 'supranational European project' defined Europe as adaptable to the institutional, financial and policy challenges posed by further enlargement inclusive of Turkey, albeit with unclarity on how such a challenge would be met and with question marks as to what the final project would look like.

Yet, even in such a discursive field of indeterminacy for the future of Europe as a political project, it is seen that the most common predicates pertaining to the future political state of the Union include that of a 'strong Europe' (especially in the face of 'globalisation' as a nominalisation) with 'well-functioning institutions' capable of decision making and feasible budgetary arrangements – all congruent with certain core elements of modern nation-state constructs. The binding element of this Europe is sought in 'shared/pooled sovereignty', 'solidarity' and the 'common European interest/good' upheld by the Commission:[20]

> COM 10: We should work together, for common goals that we can no longer achieve individually. Being European for me is also realising

our own smallness, in terms of our old borders. European means we should try to work together, to overcome our smallness where it is necessary. What would be the effect of Turkey joining this Community? I do not know whether there is a strong desire in Turkey to build together. It will cause big problems in the preparation stage if the country is not convinced that it will have to give up sovereignty in joining the EU. Joining the EU means giving up sovereignty. You no longer have the rights to define your own trade policy. If the member states together decide to impose sanctions on I don't know which country, you have to follow that.

In combination with the 'we' pronoun that constructs Europeans as a bounded group, the excerpt above utilises predicates such as 'work together for common goals', 'working together', 'build together' and 'overcoming our smallness' that serve to discursively promote a 'consciousness of common belonging' within Europe. As Abélès (2004: 11) highlights, such a consciousness that is promoted in Commission discourse via the invocation of a common good/common interest/common European idea can be interpreted as an affirmation 'against what is established as alterity (that of nation-states as opposed to Community) and as particularisms (national histories as opposed to modernity)' in the Commission. Hence, the use of such notions in Commission discourse not only aims to serve operational purposes in the sense of fostering efficient policy making, but more importantly helps to define Europe vis-à-vis the member states of the EU (Abélès, 2004: 11). In the excerpt above, the reference to 'old borders' designating nation-states of the EU prior to the establishment of the Community and defining their previous isolated presence as an act of smallness demonstrates how such a definition can be invoked in combination with the notions of common goals and interests. This entails once again a strong reference to the future in Commission discourse, strengthened through the use of the dominant metaphorical expression of 'building together' where Europe as a political project is conceptualised as under constant (re)construction.

Within the scope of Turkey-related discussions, this overwhelming emphasis of the Commission officials on 'working together for common goals' is interlinked with the way in which they conceptualise Turkey's outlook on nation-state sovereignty. When probed on their construct of Europe and the positioning of Turkey in this wider discursive construct, the Commission bureaucrats often highlight the issue of 'sovereignty' as one of the key problematic areas in Turkey's accession to the EU.

In particular those respondents working in DGs who are responsible for policy areas that constitute significant segments of the *acquis* infiltrating into national policy making (i.e., DG Environment, DG Justice and Home Affairs, DG Agriculture, DG Regional Policy, and DG Internal Market) highlight 'problems' regarding Turkey's attitude towards 'state sovereignty':

> COM 15: Integration with Turkey will be difficult. I think sovereignty and attitudes play a role. When you discuss with Turkish authorities issues which are not mainly political but to a large extent technical, you feel immediately that this issue of sovereignty is very close to the surface. And of course, when you are a country of 70 million people, you do not have the habit of being told what you have to do and so on. So I understand that there is this sort of a survival instinct, which is still very strong in Turkey and which is necessary given the neighbours.

> COM 8: First of all, Europeans do not consider themselves to be different from one country to another. Of course they have their specificities, North-South-East-West, but this is a plus. I have the feeling that Turkey stands as Turkey versus Europe. This does not happen with other countries. Of course, they are defending their national interests and principles, but one does have the impression that they have something deep, completely different. Europe is a family and Turkey, for the time being, by its own willingness, considers itself Turkey versus Europe, if you understand. They think that what they are thinking and what they believe in and so on are above criticism. They have the knowledge; they have the right ideas.

Both of the excerpts above predicate Turkey as a 'proud', 'nationalist' and 'arrogant' country unwilling to delegate sovereignty to the EU. In the first excerpt, this 'proud' nature is essentialised further via the biological metaphor of the 'survival instinct', justified through reference to Turkey's neighbours and hence securitising them in a different context. The second excerpt above constructs a clear-cut binary division between Turks and Europeans, homogenising them, positioning them against one another and engaging in stereotypical attributions for both parties. The stereotyped European is defined by similarity rather than difference and bound by natural properties as implied by the 'family' metaphor. While the interviewee constructs Turkey as standing opposed

to Europe at its own will, she also essentialises this 'will' by tying it to the innate nature of the country and its people.

It is notable here how the dominant stereotype of 'Turks as proud people' utilised in the eighteenth-century European accounts of the Ottoman Empire is still present in the Commission elite discourse on Turkey.[21] In a majority of interviews, Turkey's attitude towards state sovereignty is tied to the existence of a 'proud' mentality and culture. What further binds the two excerpts above is the way in which both silences alternative narratives that highlight that 'the problem of reconciling the demands of European integration with national "pride"...is by no means unique to Turkey' (Diez, 2005b: 171–2) and concerns even present-day member states (see Checkel, 2007). This is not to engage in discussions regarding 'proudness' of nations and hence to justify such generalising constructs in the first place, but to point to the danger of constructing a flawless homogeneous European identity against a posited Turkish nationalism vis-à-vis the EU.

The data thus suggests that Commission officials stress supranationalism and are critical of what they see as manifestations of Turkish nationalism. Yet, when it comes to strategic reflections on Turkey's membership or to sensitive issues where EU member states are still attached to their national sovereignty, such as security, border control and immigration as discussed in Chapter 1, the discourses of Commission officials become 'nationalistic' themselves – what we have elsewhere defined as 'Euronationalism' (see Aydın-Düzgit and Suvarierol, 2011). Whereas the Commission officials are critical of sovereignty and nationalism when it comes to Turkey, they are protective of European sovereignty and interests in their own discourses on Turkey without framing them as nationalistic.

Member states

France

Unlike the UMP and the UDF discourse, the PS discourse on Turkey refrains from explicit references to essentialist and homogenising attributes in the discursive construction of Europe as a political project:

> We first have to ask for, before all of the debate on negotiations with Turkey, the reinforcement of political Europe, the taking of a big step towards the federal option, at least for a part of the Union. Then, a budgetary capacity binding on all parties to take on this new enlargement. We need clear perspectives of fiscal and social harmonisation

to prevent the constitution, within the Union, from enclaves taking salaries, social protection and public services to the bottom. For us, the bottom question is the direction that European construction has to take. It relates to the reform of the institutions which goes beyond the constitutional project...Accession of Turkey is thus only possible, supposing that we can see so far, upon taking a profound reorientation of the European enterprise.

(Paul, PS, 14 October 2004)

PS 1: I do not know if the European Union, in 10 years, 15 years, will adopt a new mode of functioning permitting the integration, the accession of a new proud country. At that moment, I would be in favour, but there are a lot of ifs and I do not know the answers to these questions...One day one can very well say that the European construction can very well enlarge beyond Europe, but provided that the means are found.

The first extract above is quite typical of the PS discourse on Turkey that invokes a functioning state-like European political project construed along federalist lines, at least among certain key member states, as a precondition for Turkish accession. It underlines the institutional and financial dimensions of the project and, as demonstrated in the excerpt above through references to 'fiscal and social harmonisation' and the danger of a race to the bottom in terms of 'salaries', 'social protection' and 'services', constructs a 'social Europe' as part and parcel of the European political project. While the social dimension is also brought up in some of the debates and interviews with the UMP/UDF members, it seems to be significantly more prevalent in the PS discourse on Europe, which can be interpreted as a case of interdiscursivity with the discourse of the French left on the possible negative impact of the EU in the social realm (see Schmidt, 2007: 1002–3).[22]

The second extract from an interview invokes the eighteenth-century stereotype of the 'proud' Turks in suggesting that the concept of 'sovereignty' may lie at the heart of assumed divergent interests that may make it difficult to integrate the country in Europe. Hence, although the political project is not articulated as homogeneous in culture and identity terms, implicit essentialisation through stereotypical references with respect to attitudes towards sovereignty can be traced in the PS discourse on Turkey, particularly through interview data that allows probing on the perceived potential ramifications of Turkish accession. Nonetheless, both excerpts demonstrate that there is

still an element of change in the PS discourse that is almost absent from the UMP and UDF constructs of Europe as a political project whereby Europe may still have the 'capability' to reform itself in the face of further enlargement, even if such a possibility is a long way off and a lot of uncertainty remains over the means through which it can be achieved.[23]

Similar to the UMP/UDF discourse, the PS accords a significant role for France in such an integrated political Europe, where its power is tied into the efficient functioning of the European project:

> She [France] has abandoned her capacity to have weight in the course of history, in the course of Europe…Stop believing that a powerful Europe will be built by rejection [of Turkey] or by decree. She will be born from our capacity to involve our partners and our peoples in a Europe of projects: economic government, social harmonisation, common defence, research and innovation.
>
> (Ayrault, PS, 21 December 2004)

The excerpt above predicates France as a country that is losing its influence and power in the international scene and in Europe. The way in which such predication is followed with the need to build a powerful Europe, regardless of Turkish accession, demonstrates that a powerful France requires a powerful Europe where France, as a vanguard of political Europe, will lead its partners and the publics in projects of further integration, including that of social harmonisation, resonating with the widespread concern with social issues among the French left mentioned above.

Taking also into account the initial sub-section of this chapter on France, this predominant construction of Europe as a political actor with state-like properties where France is a central player needs to be conceptualised and understood within the framework of French national identity constructs and their relation to Europe. As highlighted in the Introduction, Larsen (1997: 100) finds that such a construction of Europe as a state-like actor is directly linked with the equivalence formulated between France and Europe at the discursive level in the 1980s, where Europe began to refer to more than 'a scene or instrument for France', now constituting an existential necessity for the country in the face of its perceived economic and political decline.

This equivalence did not come to mean that France would be 'usurped' by Europe, but that there would be a Europe marked with French colours, in particular with French 'values', as was observed in the previous chapter. Thus, the prevailing discourse was that 'France

had become too small, and its mission must be taken over by Europe', which tied the fate of the two together (Wæver, 1998b: 120). This was exemplified by Mitterrand (1986) in his famous phrase: '*La réussite de l'Europe suppose la réussite de la France*'. Larsen (1997: 87–111) argues that this discourse also gave rise to the ascription of the features of the French state onto the European level. This replication of the Jacobin conception of the state at the European level led in turn to the (re)construction of Europe in the French political discourse as a political actor who is able to act and who is coherent inside with a strong external identity as well as clearly defined boundaries.

The predominant construction of a federal Europe does not imply that there is agreement within and between these political parties regarding the exact institutional shape that the political project should take. As Le (2002: 301–2) highlights, a European federation for the Socialists and the majority of the UMP implies a 'Federation of Nation States' where the national interest is still invoked, as opposed to a German or US federal model. The UDF discourse, by contrast, is found to be closer to that of a 'European federation', implying a further loss of sovereignty. Some of these conceptualisations can also be traced in the excerpts above where the federal idea is invoked either explicitly and/or implicitly by all the discourse participants in question. Indirect reference to a multi-speed Europe – implying closer integration among a group of nation-states in the EU – in the first parliamentary debate excerpt from the PS, when considered in combination with the finding that such a reference also exists among the members of the UMP, suggests that flexible models of federation where those nation-states that are willing to proceed further with integration come together can be espoused by members of the UMP and PS.[24] Such a reference, however, is non-existent in the UDF discourse, parallel to the finding above that the members of the party are overwhelmingly in favour of a European federation that is more encompassing at the EU level.

Germany

In the German political discourse, it is largely the members of parliament from the SPD and the Greens that discursively construct Europe as a political project that is capable of attaining institutional, financial and policy-related reform in accommodating Turkey:[25]

> Ladies and gentlemen, it is true that enlargements bring a heavy burden on the deepening of the EU. The EU needs to change its institutions until 2004 so that enlargement does not restrict its capacity

to act ... Globalisation has eroded the concept of the nation-state. Therefore the deepening of the EU does not amount to loss of sovereignty, but to regaining of sovereignty through the change of integration policy.

(Schwall-Düren, SPD, 19 December 2002)

Greens 1: Absorption capacity is an important factor. The EU has to have the political capacity to act. But this is more about the homework of the EU, and not of the members. The EU needs to make itself fit for new members.

Endowing the EU with the 'capacity to act' in both excerpts constructs it as 'a body politic' onto which 'the source concepts of the (human) body' are mapped. As Musolff (2004: 83–5) highlights, while the target referent of the 'body politic' mappings has traditionally been the nation-state and the socioeconomic system, it is also widely observed in reference to the EU, primarily among federalist visions of European integration. In line with Musolff's findings that the 'body politic' mappings of the EU often exist together with metaphors from the conceptual domain of strength and firmness due to the close conceptual links between the two, the speaker in the first extract makes reference to the need to strengthen the EU.

The use of the term 'absorption capacity' in the second excerpt demonstrates how the concept has also infiltrated into the discourse of the left in Germany. Its presence in the Coalition Agreement of the CDU/CSU and the SPD coalition in 2005–2009 testifies to the hegemonic use of the concept in construing Europe as a bounded political entity in German political discourse.[26] Nonetheless, as seen in the excerpts above, the discourse of both the Greens and the SPD employs the *topos* of responsibility to bestow a duty upon Europe to reform itself for enlargement and argue that this is possible. Turkey is not singled out as the only candidate country that necessitates reform. Reform is deemed necessary in the face of all further enlargements. While it was earlier found that the strength of the political project was also sought in explicitly essentialist attributes like culture by a vast majority of the CDU/CSU members, this does not seem to be the case for the members of the SPD and the Greens. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier in Chapter 1, there are cases in which the notion of 'sovereignty' linked to Turkish history is constructed as a possible impediment to the construction of a coherent Europe with a strong internal/external identity also across these political groups.

The first excerpt above justifies a politically integrated Europe via reference to 'globalisation'. Rosamond (1999: 661) had earlier found that signifiers such as 'globalisation' or 'global competition' in defining the 'changing external context of European integration' appear frequently in discussions on the EU. In the German case, they are found to justify a coherent European political project in the CDU/CSU discourse as well as that of the SPD and the Greens.[27] These signifiers construct Europe 'as a valid space in the light of external challenge' that is 'more or less competitive and which should, therefore, command the loyalties and expectations of various actors' (Rosamond, 1999: 662). Such signifiers can be conceptualised in various ways in discursively legitimating specific courses of action.[28] Hay and Rosamond (2002: 160), for example, find that the dominant conception of globalisation in mainstream German political discourse is one of inexorable external constraint, which 'cannot be resisted and whose imperatives must be internalised both domestically and at a European level'. They further argue that the appeal to discourses of globalisation in the German debate is focused less on the German economy and more on the character of European integration (Hay and Rosamond, 2002: 161). Thus it is not surprising that the CDU/CSU, the SPD and the Greens make references to globalisation and global competition in constructing Europe through Turkey as a political/economic space that requires a strong internal/external identity to adapt to this (constructed) external environment in a successful manner. While policy preferences differ in the sense that the CDU/CSU members often highlight Turkish membership as an impediment to the construction of such an identity whereas the members from the SPD and the Greens largely view it as problematic but manageable, the main tenets of their discourse on globalisation in relation to Turkish accession remain highly similar.

The predominance of the construction of Europe as a tightly knit political project across the main political groups in Germany, through differing views on the implications of Turkish membership, can be considered as a case of interdiscursivity with the reconstructed post-war German national identity where 'to be a "good German" meant to be a "good European" and to wholeheartedly support European integration efforts' in overcoming the country's militarist and nationalist past (Risse, 2003: 498). This reconstructed national identity is argued to be the crucial factor behind a federalist vision for Europe across the mainstream political parties in Germany (see also Risse, 2010: 65–9). Studies suggest that this discourse remained relatively stable despite major events such as the end of the Cold War and reunification, and culminated in the

famous keynote speech delivered by the former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at Humboldt University in 2000 where he called for a EU federal state with a parliament, a government and a constitution.[29]

Britain

In the discursive settings analysed so far, Europe was predominantly constructed as a coherent political project through the debates on the ramifications of Turkish accession for the institutions, finances and the legitimacy of the Union. While this construct was found to be challenged in the European Parliament, it was shown to be predominant in the European Commission as well as in the French and German political discourse on Turkey/Europe. In the case of Britain, a rather different picture emerges, where Europe is largely constructed as a political project of *nation-states* that can accommodate Turkey since the core political unit should reside mainly at the level of the nation-state and not at the level of the EU.[30] This macro discourse seems to be shared by members of both the Labour and the Conservative party:

> Our response to Turkish accession is, as much as anything, about the kind of Europe we want to create. Do we want a Christian club for reactionary economies or a dynamic union of nation-states focused on improving the economic performance of those countries and providing security and a climate free from terrorism? In that context, I refer to the lamentable remarks that former President Giscard d'Estaing made recently about Turkey joining the EU. He said that those who support Turkey's accession are enemies of Europe. He said that Turkey is a different culture, with a different approach and a different way; that Turkey is a country that is close to Europe but it is not a European country. Those arguments are serious, because when Giscard d'Estaing speaks, he speaks for many, albeit not a majority, who would prefer to see the European Union as a club, not an effective single market working for the peoples of nation-states.
>
> (Woodward, Labour, 11 December 2002)

> CONS 1: To me, Europe is an old and diverse and varied collection of nation-states which can come together for common purposes and interests . . . Now if you believe as they do in Brussels that Europe is a strong and united political entity and then of course you must have a recognised boundary and Turkey is outside that I am afraid. But if you accept my vision of Europe, I think it would come within my definition because of its European vocation and its historic connections

with many countries in Europe and because of this secular tradition which I recognise in Turkey, making it possible and desirable for Turkey to be included. But my vision of Europe is not shared in Brussels, so Turkey will, I am afraid, be out and that is a tragedy.

The first excerpt constructs a binary dichotomy of two separate visions of Europe. One is a 'Europe' that is characterised as a 'Christian club'. The 'club' metaphor is a container metaphor that denotes Europe as a bounded entity, a fixed unit where inclusion is dependent on a set of certain rules. The predication of the 'club' as 'Christian' refers to the essentialist bases of the club where the grounds of inclusion and exclusion lie on religious homogeneity. This vision of Europe, which is equated to the federalist ideal as represented by the former President of the French Republic and the President of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, is negatively represented as one that serves 'reactionary economies' and is juxtaposed against a vision of 'Europe' defined by a positively represented dynamic 'union of nation-states' gathering to act in economic and security interests. The 'union of nation-states' can be considered as a conceptual metaphor of 'equilibrium of containers' where Europe is construed as an intergovernmental sphere of interaction between nation-states as fixed units, seeking to maximise their interests (Drulak, 2006: 512).

What is implied by 'security interests' in the British discourse was analysed in further depth in Chapter 1. However, as the first excerpt above demonstrates, there are also frequent references to 'economic interest' in discussions over Turkey–EU relations primarily in Labour discourse.[31] In fact, in the first excerpt above, the reference to the single market serves to emphasise the economic nature of the European project, which may be the reason behind frequent references to the economic implications of Turkish accession among Labour. The predication of Europe as a 'Christian club' with 'reactionary economies' suggests the presence of an implicit assumption that an exclusionary union resembling the nation-state would not benefit from the changes in economic environment introduced by the accession of Turkey. This, coupled with frequent references in Labour discourse to the '80 million populated Turkish market' as an economic asset for the Union, implies that Europe is being constructed as a space of neo-liberal economic policies where foreign direct investment and the export of capital go hand in hand with territorial expansion.

The second extract above from a Conservative member of parliament also constructs Europe as an interest-seeking 'collection of

nation-states' – another conceptual metaphor of 'equilibrium of con-tainers'. However, a 'collection' (of nation-states) envisages a looser degree of association between them than a 'union' (of nation-states). Similarly, the overlexicalisation attained by 'diverse' and 'varied' in ref-erence to the nation-states that form part of the 'collection' accentuates the loose basis of this gathering. This loose association of nation-states is juxtaposed against a 'strong' and 'united' Europe that necessitates bor-ders, thus resembling the construct of the nation-state with a strong internal and external identity. The latter excludes Turkey since it is perceived to lie beyond the confines of the homogeneous nation-state model projected onto Europe. None of the predications ascribed to the country constructs it as 'European'. It is 'oriented' towards 'Europe' (via reference to 'vocation'), it is connected to 'Europe' (via 'histori-cal ties') and it shares a common political trait with 'Europe' (that of 'secularism'). This suggests that Turkey does not fit the federal model due to its essential outsiderness to Europe, where it is the preference for the loose, intergovernmental type of association that leads to the inclusion of Turkey in the European narrative.

In fact, there is a certain similarity here with the implicit argu-ment advanced in the first excerpt with reference to D'Estaing's views on Turkish accession. D'Estaing was quoted in November 2002 saying that 'Turkey is not a European country', it is part of 'another culture, another way of life' and that its accession would mark 'the end of Europe'.[32] The explicit intertextual reference to Giscard d'Estaing in the first extract does not lead to the questioning of his Othering of Turkey on essentialist grounds. By predicating his arguments as 'serious' and as representative of a certain segment of people upholding a federal vision of Europe, the speaker in fact justifies Turkish exclusion as long as Europe is projected as a federal political entity. The federalist vision is juxtaposed against a more intergovernmental order that rests on primar-ily economic (and security) interests of member states whereby it is this order that leads to the inclusion of Turkey in the speaker's construct of Europe.

It can be argued that the excerpts above parallel the findings of Risse (2003: 500) in his work on British political discourses on the euro, which led him to conclude that despite policy changes across the years, dom-inant political visions of European order across the two major parties in Britain still refer to 'an intergovernmental order where sovereignty resides in the nation-state'. While he also encounters the construction of a 'mythic' Europe via references to 'a common European cultural and historical heritage' in the British corpus, he finds that 'Europe is

rarely constructed as a *political community of fate* in the British political discourse'.

This should not come to mean, however, that the Labour and the Conservative discourse on this projected model of Europe are uniform. The excerpts above already suggest that a certain difference exists between the two regarding the degree to which the nation-states in the EU should be associated with one another. The following extracts from speeches by the former Prime Minister Tony Blair and the then Conservative leader Michael Howard are further demonstrative of the drifts in this macro construct:

> The implications for the future of Europe are profound. In time, all these new countries will be part of the European economy, part of monetary union, part of European defence, part of the European political system. For us in Britain, the implications are equally profound. It is our job to be part of the new Europe that is developing, to be a leading power within it and to understand the degree to which our national interest is bound up with it. Isolation from Europe in this new world is absolute folly. That is why we shall continue to fight for our interests, but recognise that they are best served inside the European Union, not on its margins.
>
> (Blair, Labour, 16 December 2002)

> Will he [the Prime Minister] confirm that . . . Britain will continue to support EU enlargement – including sticking to the timetable for Romania and Bulgaria to join, and starting talks on Turkey's future accession? Does he agree that 'the British view is that there should be a modern, flexible, reformed Europe; a Europe ready for the challenges of the 21st century; a Europe that is truly free, based on co-operation and not coercion; a Europe that transfers power back from Brussels to the nation state?' A year ago, when I put that case in those words to the Prime Minister, he responded by accusing me of 'prejudice' and of 'a transient populism that betrays the very national interest that it says it safeguards' [*Official Report*, 21 June 2004; Vol. 422, c.1085–86].
>
> (Howard, Conservative, 20 June 2005)

The first extract above is taken from a speech delivered by Blair to the House of Commons in the aftermath of the 2002 Copenhagen Summit decision to conclude accession negotiations with ten countries and to open accession negotiations with Turkey upon the decision of the

Commission that it fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. The way in which Blair discusses the implications of these decisions deserves attention since it displays a detailed vision of the European political order largely shared in the Labour Party. Predication of Britain as a (leading) 'power' (in an enlarged Europe), the invocation of (British) 'national interest' and the 'fight' metaphor in describing the way in which Britain would seek to attain its self-interests in Europe construct a vision of Europe from the prism of a 'realist' outlook where international politics is conceptualised as the interaction of self-interested, rational and unitary states that seek to maximise their interests. Such a 'realist' construct of Europe in enlargement discussions can be considered as a case of interdiscursivity with the dominant realist paradigm found in broader British political discourse on international relations (Larsen, 1997: 73–7). It can thus be argued that it is not limited to Labour Party discourse since the Conservatives also frequently invoke British national interest in their discussions on Turkey/Europe.

The second excerpt, however, demonstrates a faultline within this shared realist vision. While the predications of 'modern', 'flexible' and 'reformed' for Europe are employed by both parties, this is as far as the commonality goes. Where Blair in the first extract predicates British engagement with the EU as the means for maximising the country's self-interest, implying also that Britain could and should lead Europe, the second excerpt demonstrates that this argument seems to be challenged by the Conservative data available. The predication of a desired 'Europe' as 'free' in the second excerpt emphasises the importance of national sovereignty freed from interference from the EU since, as Teubert (2001: 68–9) finds, 'freedom' and 'independence' are frequent collocations of the banner word 'sovereignty' in the Conservative discourse on Europe.[33] Similarly, the reference to coercion implicitly assumes the presence of an unwanted and dictating central authority (metonymically referred to as 'Brussels') that impedes national sovereignty. The wish for a 'transfer of power back to the nation-state', an expression found to be frequently collocated with the notion of 'sovereignty' in Conservative discourse (Teubert, 2001: 71), further strengthens the importance assigned to national sovereignty in the Conservative discourse on Europe in discussions over enlargement.

Hence in the British case, discussions on Turkish accession also reveal the presence of two rival discourses within the macro discourse topic of Europe as a political project of *nation-states*. While the Labour discourse can at large be defined, in Larsen's (1997: 63–6) words, as one of 'essential cooperation', where 'a close and cooperative relationship

with Europe is essential in order to further Britain's interests', without viewing sovereignty in absolute terms; the dominant discourse among the Conservatives is one of strict 'interstate cooperation' where 'parliamentary sovereignty in relation to Europe is presented as a zero-sum game'. Although exceptions exist within the parties regarding adherence to these discourses, they do not seem to be sufficient to challenge the centrality of these two respective views on Europe in the parties in question.[34]

Conclusion

The analysis has found two main representations of Turkey through which Europe is constructed as a political project. One relates to the representation of the country as a potential threat for a Europe that rests on well-functioning institutions, a solid budget and pooled sovereignty. This representation is found to be widespread across the right and to a certain extent the far right in the EP, as well as across the centre-right in France and Germany. It is mainly realised through construing an essentialised divergent and destabilising nature on the part of Turkey and the Turkish elite regarding their involvement in the European project, as well as a systematic exclusion of alternative narratives that present a more diversified view of the institutional and financial implications of Turkish accession to the EU. The second representation is one of Turkey as a country that can be integrated into this similarly defined coherent European political project, albeit over time and through rigorous internal reform. This is widely shared by the left-wing and liberal groups in the EP as well as the SPD and Greens in Germany, the PS in France and the European Commission. This is primarily attained via attributing responsibility on the part of Europe to attain internal reform to accommodate Turkey's membership or, less commonly, through accounting for interpretations that present a more nuanced picture of the expected institutional and financial repercussions of Turkey's accession.

Despite their differences, in almost all of these discourse communities, with the exception of the German Greens, the concept of sovereignty tied to essentialist tropes such as culture and history is invoked as a 'problem' for the coherence of the project. The implicit assumption here is that culturally and historically dependent attachment to national sovereignty in Turkish national identity may have a disintegrating effect on the internal coherence of the project. A certain degree of homogeneity and singularity is thus desired for a strong political project,

which in turn constitutes a case of interdiscursivity with the discourse on the modern nation-state as one that imposes internal homogeneity together with the institutional measures that help to secure it. In a similar vein, one can also argue that the Commission shares in the discourse on the modern nation-state in its enlargement policy on Turkey. This is reflected in the double discourse on the country: whereas Turkey is expected to act as an insider and surpass its nationalism in sovereignty-related issues, the Commission itself frames Turkey as an outsider with regard to issues touching on the sovereignty of Europe (or its member states).

The analysis has also revealed the presence of a minority discourse among certain segments of the EPP-ED group in the EP and across both of the main political parties in Britain that constructs Europe as a political project of *nation-states*. This discourse converges with the dominant one explicated above in the way in which it defines Europe as an internally bounded entity, yet does not reflect it onto the EU which is construed as a loose gathering of member-states where the political core rests with the nation-state. Hence the main tenets of the arguments still rest on the defining features of the nation-state, where the reference point of the political project is the national level rather than the EU as an institutional body. This has demonstrated once again how national identity constructs such as that of the British with its emphasis on the sovereignty of the British Parliament come to the surface in the construction of Europe. Similarly, the widespread construction of a coherent political project along federal lines in France and Germany cannot be conceptualised independently from the core place that the notion of Europe occupies in the national identity narratives of these countries.

There are other cases where in addition to national imprints, ideological and institutional marks are visible. It was seen for example that in the German setting, the CDU/CSU invokes the Turkish immigrants' 'incapability to integrate' as an additional proof of the potential dilutive effects of Turkish accession on the internal homogeneity that the political project requires, drawing from the contemporary German national identity repertoires that often rest on the topic of Turkish immigrants and combining it with a right-wing anti-immigrant rhetoric. National and ideological rifts also appear in the construction of Europe as a 'valid economic space'. While utterances on the costs and benefits of Turkish membership to the European economy were also observed in the EP and the Commission, it was in the national contexts where most references to the economic aspects of Turkish enlargement were found. The

signifiers of this economic space vary across different national settings and political groups. While a 'social Europe' seems to be a major concern for the French and the German left, particularly with reference to globalisation, the British discourse especially of Labour is more occupied with construing Europe as a neo-liberal economic space. As for the infiltration of discourses on institutional identity into constructs of Europe, the European Commission presents a clear case in which the future shape of Europe as a political project is left open in line with the constructed future-oriented indeterminacy within which the Commission as entrusted in its (constructed) institutional identity helps build the 'European project'.

In the discursive sites under analysis, construction of Europe as a common political system is often tied to a geographically bounded entity that bears a common culture and history, to which we turn in the final chapter.

4
Europe as a Cultural Space

The issue that has probably raised the most controversy in the EU in relation to Turkish accession is the cultural implications of Turkish membership for Europe. The intense contestation over the extent to which Turkish cultural identity is European has also surfaced in this study where it has been taken up by the discourse participants in all of the institutional spheres of analysis. It was also observed however that the notion of culture is closely related to the discursive articulation of European history and geography in the EU talk on Turkish membership. Cultural contestations over Turkish membership continue to occur in the aftermath of the opening of the accession negotiations with Turkey, along with the focus on specific domestic developments within the country. Discursive construction of Europe as a cultural space is realised through two major representations of the country: Turkey as a diluter of European cultural homogeneity and Turkey as a contributor to cultural diversity in Europe.

Turkey: Diluter of European cultural homogeneity

Turkey is commonly represented across the EP as well as in France and Germany as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of Europe based on the country's 'non-European cultural essence'. Through this representation, Europe is constructed as a homogeneous cultural space resting on essentialist grounds. This cultural space is closely intertwined with the construction of a particular European history and a strictly delimited European geography.

European Parliament
Construction of Europe as a culturally bounded and exclusive entity in the discussions on Turkey seems to be most present among the

major centre-right group (EPP-ED/EPP) and the smaller eurosceptic and extreme-right factions in the EP.[1] The *topoi* of culture and history are often used in combination with one another to construct an essentialist identity aligned with Europe as a delimited territorial construct:

> We have different conceptions of the future of the European Union; this Europe, this European Union of ours, must have borders, and that is why we conclude special agreements with our immediate neighbours. With this in mind, I believe that Turkey, be it for reasons of history, geography or culture, would not fit in as a direct member of the European Union.
>
> (Ebner, EPP-ED, 1 April 2004)

> EPP-ED 7: Europe is a cultural, a specific cultural system, which is kind of a synthesis between three different sources: the Greek philosophy, the Roman organisation and law, and Christianity. And it is a mixture of those three elements which made during history the specificity of European culture. And you have a totally new phenomenon in the eighteenth century, which is what we call enlightenment, the separation of church and state and the origins of democracy. And I would say that a society, a country with all those four characteristics in some kind of a mixture is European. That is the specificity of European culture. It is not only a question of territory – for me, it is essentially a question of culture. I think Turkey does not belong to the culture of Europe, as I define it.

The first excerpt above constructs Europe first in the geographical sense of the word, with exclusive borders. In fact, it is through the exclusion of Turkey in geographic delineations that we are conveyed the idea as to where Europe's eastern borders lie. The second excerpt also engages in geographic construction ('it is not *only* a question of territory'), although with no explicit reference to borders. 'European' borders, as with any frontiers, are hereby treated as contested social constructs that have been ascribed various different meanings in history.[2] Similarly, 'continents' are conceptualised as discursive constructions rather than fixed geographic entities that exist independent of the ways in which we talk about them. Hence, predicating Turkey as beyond the boundaries of Europe discursively constructs Europe as a geographically bounded area with strict delimitations as to who is in and who is out.

In addition to the discursive construction of an essentially bounded 'European' geography, both excerpts, through the usage of the *topos*

of culture and the *topos* of history, construct Europe as a cultural and historical entity that is exclusive of Turkey. This 'alignment between territory and (cultural) identity...supported by a particular account of history' (Campbell, 1998: 80) can be described, in the words of Derrida, as an act of ontopology that is defined as the 'ontological value of present-being to its situation, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the *topos* of territory, native soil, city, body in general' (quoted in Campbell, 1998: 80). While the first excerpt simply predicates Turkey euphemistically as not 'fitting in' with the history and culture of Europe, the second excerpt further explicates the relationship between European culture and history by conceptualising European culture as dependent on specific historical developments. In doing that it resorts to the strategy of 'departicularisation', commonly utilised in the discursive construction of national identities where historical events are cherry-picked to constitute their (constructed) essence.[3]

Asad (2003: 166) highlights that invoking such historical narratives in relation to the so-called European political and cultural principles in discussions over Muslim populations implies that it is because these historical moments have not influenced the Muslim experience that these populations cannot be considered as belonging to Europe. Such a version of 'European history' can thus be considered as the 'narration of an identity many still derive from "European (or Western) civilisation" – a narrative that seeks to represent homogenous space and linear time' (Asad, 2003: 167). This narrative, for Asad (2003: 167), assumes 'a single universal development', 'the collective character of a people or a period that is different from and incommensurable with others' and a given 'culture of a particular population, which is rankable as higher or lower than another'. Barker's (1981) well-known study defines this as 'cultural racism' or 'meta-racism', where superiority is no longer assumed through presumed biological–genetic differences, but via differences between cultures represented as homogeneous entities.

In the case of the MEPs of the far right, cultural superiority is expressed in more explicit ways as in the following parliamentary contribution of an independent Italian MEP:

> We must not overlook the factor of religion: millions of Turks entering Europe would mean the opening of thousands and thousands of mosques and therefore certainly a reduction in Christian and civil identity in Europe. We must also not forget that mosques

are often willing accomplices in allowing in ideas that are strongly anti-libertarian, anti-women, and anti the European public.

(Fiore, NI, 5 May 2009)

As is typical of the far-right discourse on Turkey in the EP, the MEP in his parliamentary speech resorts to the argumentation strategy (also termed in CDA the argumentative fallacy) of 'extreme case formulation' in referring to the consequences of Turkish accession in terms of the number of Turkish immigrants that will enter into the EU upon Turkish membership. This argumentation strategy entails condemning a policy or an action through 'starkly exaggerated terms' (Van Dijk, 2000: 219) such as by the use of hyperbolic numbers and, as in the excerpt above, is usually combined with the *topos* of threat. This *topos* is herein incurred with a counterfactual argument, the dilution of Europe's cultural identity following the entry of the ethnified 'Turks' into Europe. This argument is strengthened through the well-known stereotypical depiction of mosques and the Islamic religion as 'anti-libertarian', 'anti-women' and 'anti the European public' that results in the positive representation of the European cultural Self against its negatively predicated Islamic Other.

   Interview data allows us to focus further on the ways in which 'European culture' is discursively constructed in the right-wing EP discourse on Turkey and Europe. The subject of Turkish immigrants in the EU constitutes a fertile area in observing some of these constructs:

EPP-ED 7: We have the biggest difficulties in all the European countries, at this moment, for example in Holland, Germany, Belgium, France, to treat the Islamic minorities on our territory. We have the biggest difficulties in dealing with those communities because they confine themselves with their culture and habits and I cannot express it but I feel that they do not accept the way we are living. And they would be interested in not only imposing – not 'imposing', it is too hard – but they ask for recognition for the way they are living, but they also try to provoke change in our society. I have a problem with the way in which Turkish members of the communities which are on the territory of Europe now behave.

UEN 1:... Islamic people are coming to conquer Europe and to change the religion and the culture of Europe, which they are doing in my country. Many of them are very primitive people and they behave in a very primitive way... If you have a very large group

which is not participating but has a net draft on the economy, then the people will react against you and you get a hostility.

These two excerpts are from two separate interviews by a member from the centre-right EPP-ED group and a member from the nationalist and eurosceptic UEN group respectively. In the first excerpt, through references to 'our territory' and the exclusive use of the 'we' and 'they' pronouns, immigrants are predicated as 'outsiders' living on European territory. Essentialised cultural differences signified also as 'habits', 'way of life' and 'behaviour' are constructed as the main tenets of incompatibility between host societies and the minority populations. The labelling of the minorities in their totality as 'Islamic' is telling of the definition accorded to Islam, as an all-encompassing 'cultural' trait that provides the root cause of incompatibility. The *topos* of threat is then used to predicate minorities as potential diluters of the homogeneous European culture. While choosing the verb 'provoke' instead of 'impose' can be interpreted as the discursive strategy of mitigation whereby the speaker 'mitigates the illocutionary force' of a negative utterance (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 81), it does little to change the meaning conveyed. In an interdiscursive fashion, the component of 'cultural threat' that is typical of right-wing anti-immigration rhetorics surfaces in the realm of international relations where Turkey is accorded the role of a cultural Other.

  Designation of Turkey as a cultural Other through immigration is more explicit in the discourse of those political groups that are situated further on the right of the political spectrum. As observed earlier as a common trait of the far-right discourse, the second excerpt contributes to the construction of the fear of mass immigration from Turkey following the country's accession. This is realised mainly through a metaphor of war ('conquer') and the *topos* of threat. Metaphors that belong to the conceptual domain of war represent Turkey as 'an alien and threatening entity' in cultural and religious terms (Tekin, 2010: 198), resulting in the construction of a hyperbolic cultural threat for Europe. As typical of the far-right discourse on Turkey and immigration, the speaker explicitly uses derogatory racial phrases to negatively predicate Muslim immigrants ('primitive people') that are presumed to increase exponentially with Turkish membership. Positive self-representation (*the home country providing economic benefits)* is coupled with negative Other representation *(migrants as abusers of the system)* through the *topos* of abuse – a very common argumentation strategy that relies on the so-called exploitation of the economic system by the immigrants. This is taken to

justify racist sentiments among the public of the home country against these immigrant populations. While for some among the EPP-ED/EPP the subject of immigration is brought into the debate to demonstrate the so-called cultural incompatibilities between the Europeans and the Turks, the members of the far right add on top of that the risk of mass immigration that would exacerbate the immigrant problem in Europe based on the cultural/racial aspects of the matter.

The presumed cultural incompatibility that is observed among these groups goes beyond the individual or group level to encompass a political system:

> EPP-ED 7: European culture is a culture with first emphasis on human rights, democracy, separation of powers, equality between men and women. I would say it is also a culture with social solidarity and a lot of freedom of expression. And I would say something else which is also more specific to a European country, it is a sense of culpability for the pathologies of European history . . . . Culturally, there is not a country in Europe where you have this kind of relationship between the state and society like you have in Turkey. If you would not have the role of the armed forces, I think it would be impossible to maintain secularism in Turkey. That is a big difference with European countries. Islam is not a religious problem, it is a cultural problem. It is a conception of state, it is a conception of history, it has influence on the way you consider other people, the way you behave with your children, but the biggest difference is in the way they behave in relations with women.

Chapter 2 has already displayed how neo-orientalism surfaces in the discussions (particularly of the right) on the state of Turkish democracy in the EU whereby Turkey's democratic deficiencies were construed primarily as a cultural problem implicated in Islam. The excerpt above is a case in which discussions on culture lead to the same interdiscursivity with neo-orientalism. It provides a clear manifestation of the discursive construct of democracy, human rights and secularism, alongside social solidarity, self-reflexivity and gender equality as uniquely and essentially European characteristics. Thus it also suggests that there are no clear-cut divisions in the EU discourse on Turkey between the so-called 'acquired' membership criteria such as democracy (Rumelili, 2004) and identity-related 'inherent criteria' such as an essentialist understanding of culture. In other words, seemingly 'acquired' characteristics such as democracy and human rights may very well be constructed as inherent

characteristics used to exclude Turkey or any other country that does not share in this specific European cultural model.

This neo-orientalist discourse draws its strength from the orientalist treatment of religion as a 'cultural matter' with implications in almost all areas of life. Said (1978: 278–9) has demonstrated how Islam for the orientalist has 'ultimate precedence and domination' in the Orient as a superstructure to explain the totality of social and political life in the region. Hence it is hyperbolically represented to 'signify all at once a society, a religion, a prototype and an actuality' (Said, 1978: 299). This discourse not only constructs unbridgeable differences with the Orient, but it also establishes a relationship of superiority vis-à-vis the Orient. In the case at hand Islam, predicated as a 'problem', is negatively represented as deterministic of state structures, of history and of relations in society as well as in the family. In turn this aids in the construction of Europe as the progressive, self-reflexive and democratic entity juxtaposed against a backwards and undemocratic Turkey.

The neo-orientalist discourse becomes particularly visible in debates over secularism in Turkey. Studies on Turkish secularism repeatedly highlight that secularism in Turkey since the establishment of the Republic has been constructed along two discursive axes: separation between state and religion, and control of religion by the state.[4] In fact, the high degree of control over religion across a wide array of social and political life has been taken to denote Turkish secularism in the academic literature as 'assertive secularism' (Kuru, 2009) or as a specific type of 'laicism' (Shakman Hurd, 2007) where the state aims to purge religion from the public realm to confine it strictly to the private sphere. As also seen in the excerpt above, for a large segment of the centre-right and the far-right groups in the EP, the separation between state and religion in Turkey cannot be sustained without the 'control' aspect that also necessitates a political role for the Turkish military as the traditional guardian of Turkish secularism. This view is based on the conceptualisation of Islam as an inherently 'political' religion that has the potential to pervade every aspect of political life in the country unless the necessary measures that contravene democracy are taken to control it. This results in a vicious cycle in which Turkey cannot be 'secular' in the European sense since the nature of the dominant religion requires effective state control that goes beyond the mere separation of state and religion, and it also cannot be a European style 'democracy' since this control mechanism can only be sustained through compromising democratic standards, for example through attributing a vanguard role for the military. This insufficiency of its secularism and democracy is deemed

perpetual since 'it does not share the common cultural and religious ground that serves to anchor European forms of secularism, and, by extension, European democracy' (Shakman Hurd, 2006: 409).[5]

For a minor faction of the EPP-ED/EPP members, although Turkey has the inherent potential to dilute European cultural homogeneity, this does not necessitate its exclusion from the EU:

> EPP-ED 2: I think we are a community of ideas, of values, of history I have to say, and to some extent culture. Of course when we get into these areas, we start seeing the difficulties with Turkish accession. Of course, there is not a sort of cultural homogeneity in Europe. There are a lot of differences, but nevertheless there are some familiar threads that run through it. But I think the important thing is that the EU should be seen as a community of values over an attachment to democratic principles, to freedom, to market economy, to all these sort of things. So I think from that point of view, there is no theoretical limit to this EU thing, but again, it takes us in the direction of a community of sovereign nations, rather than some integrated European entity.

The predication above of the EU as a union of values – the entry to which is based on acquiring the characteristics of a democracy and a functioning market economy – is found to be common among interviews with certain national groups such as the pre-2009 British or the Southern and Scandinavian factions of the EPP-ED/EP. Nonetheless, the interviewee also identifies certain essential traits that underlie Europe through the use of the metaphor of '(cultural) familiar threads' that tie Europe together and euphemistically refers to 'difficulties' that Turkish accession can pose in this respect. It is the predication of the EU as an intergovernmental organisation through the classic metaphor of equilibrium – 'community of sovereign nations' – that makes possible the inclusion of Turkey in the EU, despite its cultural characteristics that render it different from Europe. In other words, Turkey's essential differences do not pose a problem for an intergovernmental EU only to the extent that identification lies with the nation-state and not in a bounded 'Europe', which by its nature excludes Turkey.

Member states

France

A considerable majority of the members of the UMP and the UDF construct Europe as a fixed, essential and exclusive cultural entity

whose cultural homogeneity is under threat by the prospect of Turkish accession to the EU.[6] This is realised through various discursive means, one of which is the construction of a coherent European body that is equivalent to the 'nation' of the modern nation-state:

> To act together, in the fields of sovereignty, one has to be equipped with democratic institutions! Because this is the second aspect of the community or federal approach.[7] Where there is power, there also has to be democracy ... And for democracy to be able to function the European citizens must have sufficient common points of reference, they must share a vision of the world and of man. There is no political unity without a cultural unity!
>
> (Bayrou, UDF, 14 October 2004)

In the excerpt above, extracted from a speech where the UDF leader Bayrou lists his objections to Turkey's accession to the EU, an essentialist notion of democracy where there is only one route to democracy that rests on the presence of a pre-existing community and its sovereignty is transferred from the sphere of the nation-state to that of Europe. The interdiscursivity with the construction of Europe as a political project is evident, where a discursive equivalence is formulated between a political union and cultural homogeneity. This can also be defined in Derrida's terms as an act of 'ontopology' since it refers to an alignment between territory and a homogeneous essential identity, the state and the nation, constructed above in the case of Europe.

In other cases, European cultural homogeneity is espoused through discursive strategies that do not necessarily employ explicit references to a 'European people':

> Our European culture is not only Christian; she has received a Judeo-Christian heritage which has also led to the invention of our concept of *laïcité,* guaranteeing the strict separation between the church and the state. This is not the case with Turkey, which remains as a land of Islam. Yes, like all countries, she has been subject to the influences of her neighbours. *Laïcité* is one of these, but how many times will it be necessary to resort to force to protect it? Tomorrow like yesterday, democratisation or not, this country will remain Asian and Muslim ... Will one say that once Turkey is integrated, one also has to integrate Iran, Iraq or Syria which have common borders with her?
>
> (Riviere, UMP, 14 October 2004)

The excerpt above employs the *topos* of culture and the *topos* of history to construct a bounded Europe. The *topos* of borders is also utilised to construct Europe as a geographically bounded body, which excludes the countries in its Southern 'neighbourhood'. The extract provides further insight into the components of the constructed cultural and historical identity of Europe, often utilised in combination with one another. Culture seems to be strongly implicated in the Christian religion, situated in a historical framework with reference to a 'Judeo-Christian heritage' that is viewed as having paved the way for *laïcité* (laicism). Three points need to be underlined here.

One is the repetitive invocation of the principle of *laïcité* in French discourse with respect to discussions over Turkish accession across all political groups. The way in which the French Republican model of *laïcité* with its strict separation between religion and the state is modelled onto Europe can be considered yet another case of interdiscursivity with the replication of French Republican principles at the European level. However, such a construction excludes in its entirety accounts that highlight different understandings of secularism in different EU member states.[8]

The second point concerns the invocation of the so-called Judeo-Christian heritage as a historical justification for the principle of *laïcité*. Bottici and Challand (2011: 67–8) define the idea that the Judeo-Christian tradition provides the foundation of the Western civilisation and its key organising principles as a 'post-1945 invented tradition' that helps to attain Western/European homogeneity by erasing internal diversity. Hence it is not surprising that invoking the Judeo-Christian heritage as a key underpinner of *laïcité* does not only pertain to issues that concern the EU's relations with Turkey. For example, the French parliamentary committee known as the Stasi Commission which proposed the 2004 law banning conspicuous religious symbols in French schools has also referred to the Judeo-Christian heritage as an 'indirect contributor' to the principle of *laïcité* in its report on the application of the principle of *laïcité* in France (Bottici and Challand, 2011: 68).[9]

The third point, which extends from the second, is that the construction of the principle of *laïcité* as an essential property that is unique to Europe and Christianity entails that it can only be sustained through the use of force (implicitly invoking the Turkish military) in an Islamic context. As argued earlier, this claim rests on the conceptualisation of Islam as an inherently political religion, not able to separate politics from culture, and hence is in line with the neo-orientalist discourse which

views the separation of church and state as a uniquely Western trait that rests on a shared civilisational heritage of which Christianity is a crucial component.[10] This can be interpreted as an extension of the ahistorical view on Muslim societies where 'the relationship between religion and the state [is] determined from the beginning and not as a result of subsequent historical developments' differing across time and space (Sabra, 2003).

Interview data provides further insight into the different ways in which 'culture' can be invoked, particularly in discussions over immigration:

> UMP 5: Turkey is a big country with a big population, bigger than Germany, which is the second most important population. They are coming into Europe and they do not have the same language, culture, religion. It will be very difficult at the beginning. So are we able to integrate them into our way of life? Because the way of life is the same if you go to Portugal or Finland. It is exactly the same. The language, food and so on may change but the way of life is the same, because the European way of life depends on the same religion. You do not have big differences. Can we have that with a country that is coming from the Middle Ages?

In the excerpt above, the reference to 'integrate them (the Turkish people)' into a 'European way of life' as an essential, static and generalised cultural/religious trait can be considered as a case of interdiscursivity with the discourse on the Muslim immigrants as a 'cultural threat' in national anti-immigration rhetorics in the EU.[11] It needs to be underlined that such Othering is not only spatial (in terms of conflictual cultural difference) but also temporal, as seen in the inferior temporal identity ascribed onto Turkey through predicating it as a country from the Middle Ages. Hence, just like migrants who are often required to 'diachronically' move out from the past of their 'home' culture to the 'present' of 'host' society, Turkey is locked into a 'primitive past' as long as it does not accept the main tenets of the European cultural model (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998: 101–2). As Blommaert and Verschueren (1998: 99) highlight, such cultural Othering in both its spatial and temporal forms reproduces the 'image of a homogeneous community as the norm' in which differences are marginal, if any. Hence, it replicates the 'assimilationist integration' model of the French Republic towards its migrants onto the European level. Just like the French society and the French Republic faced with immigration,

Europe faced with Turkish accession is construed as one, indivisible and homogeneous.[12]

It needs to be highlighted that during Jacques Chirac's second term in presidency between 2002 and 2007, which corresponded with an intense debate on Turkey in France, certain members of the UMP speaking on behalf of the government in the parliament, such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were found to refrain from explicit constructions of a culturally homogeneous Europe, but did not denounce them. This can be attributed to the division between the French President Chirac (and his government) and his party (UMP) on the policy line to take regarding Turkish accession at that time. Schmid (2007: 20–7) demonstrates the strong duality between the former President's line on Turkey, not fully committing to eventual accession yet not negating it in its entirety, and the official line of his party explicitly rejecting Turkish membership.[13] This interpretation, however, should be treated with caution since it does not come to mean that government representatives from the UMP were aloof from such essentialist constructs. In fact, while the French Prime Minister Raffarin was observed to refrain from such constructs in the parliamentary debates where he often responded to oppositional queries from within his party as well as other political parties, he was famously quoted as saying 'do we want the river of Islam to enter the riverbed of secularism?' in his response to a question on Turkish accession in an interview with the *Wall Street Journal*.[14] This indeed demonstrates that engaging in the construction of homogeneity on cultural grounds, which leads to clear-cut exclusion in discourse, may have been restricted for the select members of the Chirac government by the discursive context of parliamentary debates where they were asked to explain and justify their positions of ambivalence on Turkish accession by members of their own party as well as those of the opposition. In other words, such explicit Othering on essentialist grounds could undermine the stability of the government's discourse of ambivalence on Turkish accession in the face of opponents, which is why it was observed very rarely and in discursive settings other than the national parliament. In fact, very soon after Raffarin's statement, the Foreign Minister gave an interview to *Le Monde*, highlighting that the Prime Minister's words had been twisted and that 'religion of leaders and peoples is not a criterion for joining the European Union'.[15] Such ambivalence was clearly absent under the Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, who had adopted an openly hostile stance against Turkey's accession bid on explicitly religious and cultural grounds.[16]

Germany

Discussions on Turkey's EU membership among the CDU/CSU group often lead to repetitive constructions of Europe as a bounded, essential and exclusive entity. The *topoi* of culture and history are employed together in constructing an exclusive and homogeneous Europe that is also geographically bounded:[17]

> European identity means a historical and a cultural heritage along with a sense of common responsibility in a globalised world. Those who do not see this put at risk a Europe that has a full political union as well as the political capacity to act...Europe's borders cannot extend to Iran and Iraq. None of us would feel ourselves in Europe in those places. The people of Turkey who live in those regions also do not feel that they are in Europe.
>
> (Schaeuble, CDU/CSU, 29 October 2004)

The excerpt above constructs Europe as an entity with a homogeneous culture and history, which by this essence excludes Turkey. It combines the *topos* of culture and the *topos* of history with the *topos* of borders in constructing Europe as a geographically bounded and a historically and culturally unified entity. References are made to Turkey's Southern borders and the country's regions that are proximate to these borders to delineate definite geographic boundaries between Europe and non-Europe. This delineation, however, refers to more than a mere continental configuration. As critical geographers highlight, the geographical divisions of the world cannot be considered as 'objective' or 'neutral', but instead as socially and politically constructed in ways that are constitutive of power relations between the centre(s) and the periphery(ies) (Henrikson, 1994). In line with this argument, the phrase 'feeling oneself in Europe' differentiates a Europe that is united by a cultural and historical essence from its concentric Other(s), namely Turkey that is non-European to a certain extent depending on its regions and the Southern neighbourhood countries, namely Iran and Iraq, that are excluded in their entirety. The requirement of a homogeneous culture, history and clearly defined borders for a European political union presents another example of the application of the model of the nation-state to the European level where the ontopology of the nation-state with its close alignment between a bounded territory and a homogeneous identity is being reconstructed. 'A globalised world' sets the background against which such a political union operates, demonstrating once again the prevalence of the concept of

'globalisation' in German political discourse, alluded to in the previous chapter in constructing Europe as a valid political and economic space, which necessitates a strong internal/external identity in successfully adapting to this (constructed) external environment.

The following excerpt exemplifies the use of 'departicularisation', which refers to the arbitrary selection of historical events in construct- ing unifying and teleological historical narratives, in the construction of a homogeneous European history and culture in the CDU/CSU data:

> CDU/CSU 1: I think, what is European is a number of issues. First of all, you have a common past which filters down to the actual set-up of our current states and societies, and that combines a number of things. I mean what you could call the occidental tradition, starting of course with the Roman influence . . . Then Christianity is one thing, which you believe it or not, which shaped our common tradition including of course the split with Reformation that influences think- ing. Then the individualistic approach of thinking, again, codified already in a certain way in the Roman law. But also the scholas- tic times and Renaissance which puts the individual at the front and, those were the elements. Enlightenment of course . . . On Turkey, well, it is probably one of those things where you say there are ele- ments, where you can say this is clearly a part of European culture in the way that I have described it and others where you would say, probably not quite. There are some where it is a matter of choice, there are others where it is not so much opt in or out where you can adopt all these values and experiences. That is also true for parts of the Balkans.

In the version of departicularisation adopted above, the speaker selects the 'Roman Empire', 'Reformation', 'Renaissance', 'scholastic times' and the 'Enlightenment' as the roots of a historically unified Europe. The construction of this historical model is closely interlinked with the construction of Europe as a common cultural space, since these histor- ical specificities are predicated as the bases of a positively represented European cultural model, upholding an accumulation of shared 'values' such as 'individualism' and 'pluralism'. This deterministic conceptuali- sation of history helps to construct a holistic cultural space for Europe that is 'highly integrated and grasped static whole' as in the central paradigm of classical modernity (Kaya, 2001: 33). This holistic nature in turn leads to the exclusion of Others such as Turkey and the Balkan countries that remain outside the confines of the historical narrative(s) of the European cultural model.

Chapter 2 has already dealt in detail with the employment of an integral notion of European culture by the members of the CDU/CSU in constructing Europe as an essential bearer of democratic values vis-à-vis Turkey, which is by its nature incapable of attaining democratic change. This binary construction is in some cases elaborated in further depth by the members of parliament from the CDU/CSU, exemplifying the different means through which 'culture' is signified in the CDU/CSU discourse on Turkey/Europe:

> CDU/CSU 6: Turkey has to decide where to go. On the one hand, they can integrate themselves in the Union by guaranteeing the freedom of religion, and may be running the risk of promoting Muslim organisations in a more fundamentalist way than today, or on the other hand Turkey can stress its role as controller of religious communities, but then it cannot fulfil the requirements of integration into the EU...It is of course a cultural aspect that in Turkey there is no freedom of religion, and it is a cultural aspect that Turkey has a strong role of the military.

The excerpt above discursively constructs freedom of religion and civilian control over the military as cultural attributes, which Turkey, by its essence, is unable to attain. As encountered earlier in the case of the EP and French political discourse, the implicit assumption behind this argument is that Islam is an inherently political religion, which would dominate political life unless it is controlled by the Turkish military. In the words of Salvatore (1999: xx, quoted in Shakman Hurd, 2007: 117), 'the attribution to Islam of an inherently political dimension states the degree of the divergence of this religion from the assumed normality, and the degree of the divergence of the "Islamic" polity from a normal concept and practice of politics'. Two distinct political orders can thus be constructed, namely a modern, superior and normal political order (embodied in Europe) resting on the European/Western secularist ideal and its ill-fitting imitation as practiced in Turkey.

Culturalisation of immigration, whereby immigration and the problems related to it are explained on cultural grounds, appears frequently in the interview data to show another way in which a homogeneous cultural Europe is constructed in the CDU/CSU discourse on Turkey:

> CDU/CSU 2: Germany is the country with the biggest Turkish community, and these days we have a number of issues about the state of the education sector and others that are linked to the problem of

migrant families and their integration or the lack of integration. Of course, when you talk about migrants in Germany, it is very quickly Turkey you talk about. And there is the cultural issue of course, these so-called honour killings, there is the issue of violence in schools.

The excerpt above employs the *topos* of culture in explaining the 'integration problems' of Turkish migrants in Germany, and by doing that excludes from the narrative those alternative interpretations that account for socio-economic factors, power relations and discrimination in explaining the problems encountered by migrants in host societies. In the German context, a common point of reference for this assumed cultural incompatibility is the presence of honour killings/crimes among the Turkish migrants in Germany. Although these crimes are often portrayed by the conservative political elite as a vital component of Islam, they are also found to exist in the so-called Judeo-Christian world (Kaya, 2010: 55). Attributing their presence to a fixed culture implicated in Islam silences the alternative narratives that put an emphasis on 'the traumatic acts of migration, exclusion, and poverty by uneducated subaltern migrant workers' in accounting for domestic violence and honour crimes (Kaya, 2010: 55).

Explaining 'lack of integration' largely by 'culture' implies that the Turkish immigrants are essentially unfit to be fully acceptable members of the German society, resulting in their exclusion from the 'homogeneous' host society. Another point that needs to be highlighted is the blurring of the division at the discursive level between the Turkish migrant community in Germany and the Turkish population living in Turkey. Despite the fact that the Turkish migrants have been present in Germany for almost five decades, the notion of 'cultural dynamics' is almost absent from the migrant debate where a static and primordialist culture that unites the immigrants with their home country is constructed.

Britain

The previous chapter has already displayed cases in British discourse where Turkey was represented as essentially non-European, yet considered as a future member of the EU characterised as a political project of varied nation-states promoting self-interest. The interviews in particular reveal further and more explicit ways in which Europe as a cultural space exclusive of Turkey, yet also as a political project that is inclusive of the

country, can be constructed among some members of the main political groups in the British discourse:

> LAB 1: Well, I have got this real problem, that we talk about Europe which is a geographic and historic entity, which when I grew up went as far East to the Urals, and as far as Istanbul or Constantinople. So you have got a geographical thing and now we have got a political thing where the Norwegians are Europeans, but they are not part of the Union. So we are mixing that. I think that is very dangerous. And what will happen, my prediction is that there will come a point where the countries that are a part of the single currency will require a far deeper political union than we have at the moment and the ones who do not will not join in the foreseeable future, and you will start having this redefinition of powers. Turkey will exacerbate this in one sense, but not seriously. I think Europe is a Christian, largely white cultural unit, but that is not its politics, its political structure.

> CONS 1: Yes, cultural incompatibility is an important part of their thinking if you think that Europe is or should be a country which I do not. They probably deny that EU is a country, but that it has many features of a country with the parliament, a court, a body of law, a flag and anthem. If you believe like the more extreme advocates of the EU, then Turkey is culturally incompatible. But I reject that, I myself as a true friend of Turkey. The enemies of Turkey put very high barriers and say that you must conform to our view of what Europe is, by which they mean the EU and they equate the European Union with Europe.

In the first excerpt above from a Labour MP, there is a (constructed) distinction between a geographically, historically, culturally, religiously and even racially ('*white* cultural unit') bounded Europe and a Europe as a political project which nation-states join of their own will. Turkey is excluded from the former since the South-Eastern border in both the geographic and the historical sense is not extended beyond Istanbul and the reference to Christianity excludes the country par essence. Nonetheless, the country is included in the latter where the interviewee's construction of Europe as a political project resonates with those visions of Europe advanced in the academic literature under the banner of *à la carte Europe* (Dahrendorf, 1979, quoted in Warleigh, 2002: xi) or those put forward by prominent EU officials such as the

former Commission President Jacques Delors under the rubric of 'variable geometry' and/or 'concentric circle' Europe (Usher, 1997), which has also penetrated into the academic literature. These concepts refer to the EU as an institution where 'rules and policies...do not hold for all, but only for states that expressly agree to them' (Beck and Grande, 2007: 75). They run counter, in the words of the former Labour Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, to a 'narrower vision of the EU' that entails a homogeneous cultural identity for Europe.[18] Thus different levels of integration can be incurred between states, depending on their will and their ability to integrate in certain fields, which in turn leads to the incorporation of a certain degree of cultural diversity that cannot necessarily be accounted for in the scope of a mythic Europe.

The second interviewee, from the Conservative party, undertakes a similar construction through the negative representation of a discursively distanced 'they' who 'think that Europe is or should be a country', referring to the so-called federalists who uphold the vision of a politically integrated Europe in which they reflect the model of the nation-state. Turkey is predicated as outside the confines of this vision due to its (constructed) cultural incompatibility. The implicit assumption here is that there is an essential, homogeneous European culture to which Turkey does not belong, whose homogeneity is at risk under Turkish accession, with Europe being modelled as a nation-state. It is the distinction construed between a mythic Europe and Europe as a political project of nation-states in the form of the EU that leads to Turkey's inclusion in the latter. Although the speaker engages in the positive representation of the Self through predicating himself as a 'true friend of Turkey' against the negatively predicated 'enemies of Turkey' equated with 'extreme advocates of the EU', hence the proponents of a federal Europe, it needs to be kept in mind that his positive stance on Turkish accession rests on a political preference for a loosely integrated Union and not on the rejection of essentialist grounds of exclusion. There is a (constructed) European cultural identity exclusive of Turkey, but it is just not projected onto the EU, leading to the implicit predication of the country as culturally non-European, yet with the propensity to join the Union.

Turkey: Contributor to cultural diversity in Europe

Another key representation that is commonly observed across all of the discursive sites under analysis is one of Turkey as a contributor to

cultural diversity in Europe. Through this representation, Europe is constructed as a more inclusive multicultural entity that is respectful of diversity.

European Parliament

This representation is mainly observed among the left and the liberal groups in the EP. The members of these groups overwhelmingly predicate Europe as a land of cultural diversity and hence argue that cultural arguments to exclude Turkey are not justifiable:[19]

> ALDE 3: Europeanness for me is not just about a single culture that can be used to argue against Turkey. Europeanness is of course a mixture of geography and values, and I have two theories to explain these values. The first is the three towns on which European values are based. The first is Jerusalem, which for the first time introduced monotheism ... The second is Athens, bringing democracy to humanity. The third is Rome, bringing the rule of law to humanity. These are the three main values: monotheism, democracy and the rule of law. Turkey is influenced to a very high extent by these three towns. Now on the other hand, based on these values, we have achieved a sort of a European model, and this model, which is also the business card of Europeanness is that we have worldwide high standards of democracy, social security, ethical and environmental standards and wealth ... I know that if we manage to protect our European model, then a lot of other regions and blocs will try to copy us.

> I was perturbed to hear how Mr. Poettering, on behalf of the European People's Party, added a so-called cultural criteria to our relations with Turkey. What was he referring to? To the fact that there are unavoidable cultural differences between Europeans and Turks, which prevent Ankara from having the chance that their country might join the European Union? I am radically against this unacceptable view. We can embrace cultural diversity in Europe. We can require that there be political principles, democracy, respect for human rights, and fair treatment of minorities and of the Kurdish people, and that international law be respected. But to add other criteria would certainly not be European in the best sense of the word.
>
> (Carnero Gonzalez, PES, 6 October 1999)

The first excerpt above engages in constructing Europe first as a geographical space. It needs to be noted that while the left and the

liberal factions are also engaged in exclusive demarcations of European borders in geographic terms, the borders that are construed are generally more flexible than those of the right, yet almost always exclusive of the EU's Southern/Mediterranean neighbourhood.[20] Besides geography, 'European values' are conceptualised as lying at the heart of the project, a theme encountered earlier in Chapter 2. What is notable in the left and the liberal discourse is that these values are very often based on a particular and teleological historical narrative involving the Judeo-Christian heritage, Hellenic roots of democracy and the Roman legacy, displaying little difference from the historical narratives of Europe put forward by the members from the right. One can hereby problematise these roots with reference to the constructed nature of characterising Ancient Greece as the cradle of 'European' democracy (Bernal, 1987), the emergence of the so-called Judeo-Christian tradition only after the Second World War to signal a new integration of the status of Jews into Europe (Asad, 2003: 168), the way in which some member states never experienced Roman rule or the divisions within monotheistic religions, most notably in Christianity. The goal here is not to replace one set of historical narratives with others, but to show the ways in which these referents along with the Enlightenment (in other interviews) in various constellations contribute to the construction of a particular historical narrative of Europe. The difference with right-wing EP discourse can be ascertained in the way in which for the left and the liberals the adoption of these values is largely viewed as possible for a country that is mostly constructed as outside the boundaries of this historical narrative, although it has to have been 'influenced' by it at some point in its history. The discourse on the possibility of others' adopting these values resting on given historical peculiarities brings with it a high degree of positive self-representation, to the extent of implying superiority, via predications such as the European 'model' and having to 'copy' the model, as reminiscent of the modernisation paradigm, which entailed the pursuit of one particular European/Western route to modernity.

The second excerpt is a typical example of the repeated statements in the plenary debates particularly from the left and the liberals on the unacceptability of right-wing culturalist arguments resting on a conception of culture as an essentialising and totalising entity in justifying the exclusion of Turkey from the EU. Cultural diversity is favoured on condition that 'unity' is found in political values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. These references to 'cultural diversity' together with connotations of unifying political principles can be considered as a case of interdiscursivity with the multiculturalist ideology of

the national realms, described by John Rex as involving the 'nurturing of commonality' in the shape of shared laws and principles in the public sphere and 'the ensuring of freedom' involving the maintenance of ethnic minority traditions in the private sphere (Rex, 1986: 65). This multiculturalist metanarrative has been subject to many criticisms in the literature, most notably regarding the way in which it tends to promote the compartmentalisation of cultures in their own private spheres, hence leading to the reification of cultures as 'internally consistent, unified and structured wholes attached to ethnic groups' (Kaya and Kentel, 2005: 65). In a similar vein, at the etymological level, the term 'diversity' has been problematised for denoting a 'numerical condition of several identities which have to be chosen...with an unclarified relation to multiplicity conceived of as overlapping and entangled identities' (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 65).

Interview data sheds light on whether these concerns are founded in the adoption of the multiculturalist narrative in the discussions on Turkey:

> Greens-EFA 2: I think there are different cultural attitudes and behaviours and conceptions and traditions and values and religions but I think it could go together in this conception of cultural diversity in Europe, if it is clear that there are these political shared values. Are you willing to accept these basic values and if we have these basic values accepted, then you can say there is much room for cultural difference. But of course, on the other hand, you have to limit this cultural difference to a special area of living. Otherwise you would have cultural conflicts or cultural wars. And therefore, it is always, in these differentiated multicultural societies, the question is, if there is a common understanding or not.

The excerpt reproduces the multiculturalist discourse not just through references to 'cultural diversity' and shared 'values', but also through the widespread contemporary multiculturalist repertoire of 'differentiated multicultural societies' that point at confined cultural milieus. Critiques of multiculturalist discourse remind us that its distinction between the public and the private realms with respect to the extent to which 'cultural difference' can be displayed (realised in the excerpt through the notion of a 'special area of living' and the *topos* of threat over 'cultural conflicts'/'cultural wars' in the case of no separation) can reinforce the dominant group's hegemony over subaltern groups and thus contribute to the sustenance of unequal power relations (Russon, 1995).

Hence, although it does not share the general right-wing assimilationist aversion to diversity or its view on essentialised, encompassing and deterministic cultures as incapable of change, it can be argued that the multiculturalist discourse observed among the left and the liberals on Turkish accession also needs to be problematised with respect to its political effects.

This is particularly valid for the role envisaged for religion in Turkish politics and society. Since a conceptual overlap is formed between culture and religion also in these political groups, the widespread concern with the limits regarding the expression of cultural difference has significant implications for the way in which the left and liberals view the place of religion in Turkey. Opinions are divided on the role of Islam in Turkish society and politics and what this implies for Europe, although the discussions are largely focused on the division between the public and the private regarding the expression of religion. Interviews, and to a lesser extent parliamentary debates, help us discern that the laicist vision, particularly among the French left, constitutes one frame within which such boundaries are debated:

> PES 6: Kemal Atatürk has not succeeded in eradicating the weight of the so-called Islamic tradition. It is clear that Atatürk wanted it to finish, wanted to make Turkey a modern nation. He forbid the veil and he even decided for equal rights between men and women in justice, inheritance etc . . . All this has not deeply penetrated into Turkish society.

> Greens-EFA 2: For me, the most important thing to decide on is are they ready to accept that there is a distinction between religion and state. And like in other countries, after the time of enlightenment, they do accept that religion is more or less in the private level . . . I think there is a difference between the official line of the Republic of Turkey and the influence of Islam religion. There is the big influence of Islam and growing Islam influence in a lot of areas of the country. More and more women in the streets are wearing headscarves and there you see this cultural conflict, where do we want to go. But I think that is the main question. Will Turkey really take the development of being modernised in this European sense, that there is a space for religion, but it is really more or less for private life.

Both of the excerpts above can be considered as assessments of the role of religion in Turkish politics and society from the prism of a

laicist ideology. In laicism, 'religion is dismissed as a distraction from other more important determinants of global order' where 'the separation of church and state is celebrated for its contribution to modernity' (Shakman Hurd, 2004: 241 and 244). Religion is thus conceptualised as an impediment to rationality and progress. The way in which Kemalist reforms to establish laicism is associated with attempts at creating a 'modern nation' in the first excerpt and references to the complete purge of religion from the public sphere as a requirement of 'European modernity' and 'enlightenment' in the second excerpt show that although modernisation theory seems to have been largely challenged and discredited in academic circles, its laicist elements still remain intact in the European imagery of the certain segments of the European political elite. In both of the excerpts, eradication of religion from the public realm is considered as a necessary step on the road to modernity. Against this background, Muslims are construed as not yet having undergone their 'historical mutation into the secular citizen of the nation bestowed with Western values' (Göle, 2006a: 12–13) which is signified above all by the state of women's rights in the country, symbolised by the wearing of the veil/headscarf. It is notable how the wearing of the veil/headscarf, within this laicist vision, is predicated as beyond the confines of 'modernity', as a troublesome aberration from the norm. This is in stark contrast with alternative interpretations that define veiling as the means through which Muslim women move beyond their traditional roles to 'have access to higher education, urban life and public agency' and hence differentiate themselves from the male-dominated and home-bound women of their previous generations (Göle, 2006a: 18). Otherwise known as the 'multiple modernities' approach (Eisenstadt, 2000), which argues for the constant reinterpretation and reconstruction of Western modernity in different parts of the world and by extension views the veil/headscarf as a 'modern' instrument for facilitating the participation of Muslim women in public life (Göle, 2003, 2009), such iterations are systematically excluded from these laicist accounts.

Not all of the EP members in these factions subscribe to the laicist vision. Some (especially among the Liberals and the Greens) instead criticise the excessive intrusion of the Turkish state into the public display of religion:

Greens-EFA 1: What Atatürk tried to do was to push Islam to the private sphere. You can have your mosques, no problem, but we do not want to have anything to do with it in public life . . . In that respect,

I support breaking up a little bit of that old secular system. At the same time, the limits of how far you can go with your religious orientation should also be clear. On the headscarf again, I support the right of women to wear it at university, but to me there it stops. So yes, open up the system, but also be clear where the new boundaries of the system will be. Are they able to be tolerant on unbelievers, that is the key question. And quite a lot of believers are not very good at that, because if they want to wear a headscarf, they think you should do as well.

The excerpt above is initially critical of Turkish laicism's imposition of strict boundaries between the private and the public spheres in the expression of religion. Despite adopting a more critical approach towards Turkish laicism, the position taken on the headscarf ban displays the concern with delineating clear borders between the private and the public in the expression of religion in the country. In Turkey, the headscarf ban covers all educational institutions (both public and private) as well as the civil service. Even among those MEPs who do not share the laicist view on the relations between state and religion, there is an overwhelming tendency to define once and for all the boundary between the private and the public, as symbolised over the headscarf debate regarding where it can be worn. This inclination mainly stems from conceptualising and stereotyping Muslims as 'intolerant' of unbelievers in a society with a Muslim majority population and by excluding the possibility of 'hybridations and negotiations between Islamic imperatives and secular life practices' that could give rise to new subjectivities among Muslims (Göle, 2006a: 28).

Discussions on Turkey hence reveal that the Turkish candidacy challenges many of the age-old assumptions on the relationship between politics and religion in society at a time when this challenge is also being posed by the migrants in EU societies. In other words, the issue of Turkish accession 'destabilises the European secular social imagery' (Göle, 2002: 183). Unlike the vast majority of EPP-ED/EPP members, the left and the liberals do not seem to commit to Judeo-Christian secularism that denies the possibility of being secular in the 'European' sense due to cultural and historical factors. Nonetheless, where secularism itself is a contingent and a contested social construct, a secularist narrative with clear delineations between the public and the private in the expression of religion seems to dominate the left and the liberal discourse just like that of the EPP-ED/EPP.

European Commission

With the exception of isolated utterances on Turkey's rich 'cultural heritage',[21] there are no references to the notion of culture in the speeches of the Enlargement Commissioners and the Presidents of the Commission on Turkey. In the interviews, construction of Europe as a cultural space in the European Commission discourse is rarely realised in tandem with the delimiting of Europe as a geographic or a historical entity, but through a repeated emphasis on cultural diversity:

> COM 17: I would say that the policy of the EU is to increase cultural diversity, bringing common heritage to the fore and to consider that cultural diversity is what makes the EU rich. So I would view Turkish accession in that sense as positive. In fact I see that it would be a negative argument to exclude Turkey because of its religion.

> COM 19: Regarding culture, diversity is the key. But it depends on how you put in the word. It is not a problem, it is enrichment, it is not like the problem of religion and stuff like that. You have difference of cultures, diversity, differences of languages. This is not much of a problem until you come to ways of thinking, ways of perceiving things. Then it can be problematic. Turkish culture should be perceived as part of this unity in diversity, but it is also the case that 80 per cent of the population is applying a different way of living and believing, this is the case. Almost 15 per cent of the EU is already from this religion and this could increase. It is a real issue. How can we cope with this? How can we be united in diversity with this?

Both of the excerpts above are exemplary of the way in which discussions on the cultural implications of Turkish accession in the Commission are wrapped up in the EU's official repertoire on culture. Otherwise known as the maxim of 'unity in diversity', Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (former 151 of TEC) states that the EU 'shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore'. In an act of intertextuality, the first excerpt quotes from this legal basis, whereas the second one makes references to the phrase 'unity in diversity' as implied by the legal definition.

The (constructed) meaning that the concept of 'unity in diversity' entails is highly dependent on the (constructed) contents of the 'unity' and the boundaries that it espouses for 'diversity'. It can connote a

'celebration of pluralism' or constitute a call for 'power to the centre' (Shore, 1999: 54). In his fieldwork in the Commission, Shore (1999: 54) finds that the celebration of national diversity in the institution is almost always coupled with an emphasis on the way in which the national specificities fit the overall 'European picture'. This is found to echo Durkheim's concept of society, where European culture is constructed as a 'super-organic and *sui generis* object: a moral whole and level of reality with its own class of facts'. Detailed discussions on Turkish accession suggest that the specificities included in this 'unity' are indeed limited, especially on issues regarding religion and way of life, both appearing as frequent collocations in the Commission discourse on Turkey.

The second excerpt exemplifies some of the frequently observed contents of the limits to diversity. The interviewee views Turkish accession as a cultural 'enrichment' in so far as the notion of culture that is construed consists of what Blommaert and Verschueren (1998: 92) have defined as 'surface value' cultural features such as language, which can be compartmentalised and differentiated. Predication of 'religion' and 'way of life' as 'problematic' yet still construed within the macro discourse of culture suggests that 'profound cultural features' such as values, beliefs and religion are not unproblematically included among those elements where diversity is welcome. The discursive equivalence formulated between 'religion' and 'way of life' construes religion as a deterministic factor on 'life styles', where the equivalence itself that needs to be questioned is presupposed as the basis of the *topos* of threat (by employing the argumentation strategy of *petition principii*[22]), strengthened further via the *topos* of numbers used to gain credibility. The conceptual overlap between religion and culture is not questioned, despite the case where 'one can seriously call into doubt the reality of a "Muslim culture" that would be so constitutive of the daily life of Muslims' (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998: 96). The *topos* of threat then extends to combine the internal and external spheres via the discursive equivalence established between Turks and the immigrants in the EU defined by and associated with sole religious allegiance, defying any diversity in question.

Limits to diversity within the scope of 'religion' and 'life styles'[23] are frequently incurred in debates over the private/public delineations in the expression of religious belief:

COM 4: Sometimes if you look at France and Germany, we had this headscarf discussion for such a long time, and I find it so funny when

you go to Turkey and in Turkey you cannot wear it? You can ask yourself, does it make sense, is it really important? But it is important and it would do Turkey much good in the coming years to stick to that because I mean, you know, that is a one very good thing that came from the past. I mean personally I do not mind the headscarf, it is just a symbol of religious belief, but in the context that we look at it, it is a different thing. It is a different thing if this would happen here than it would happen in Turkey. I do think that this would exert a lot of pressure.

The excerpt above makes a positive evaluation of the strict secularism applied in Turkey, where religion is attempted to be purged from all aspects of public life. The public/private delineation in religious expression is linked directly to the wearing of the headscarf, where the presence of Islam as the majority religion construes the headscarf as a pressure instrument for others to conform. The *topos* of threat that is used is based on the implicit assumption that the unchecked practice of Islam breeds intolerance in a context where the majority of the population consists of Muslims. Not all of the Commission officials share this support for the strict laicism applied in Turkey. A minority of interviewees criticise it, yet hardly challenge the main tenets of the secularist discourse with clear and fixed boundaries between the public and private spheres regarding the expression of religious beliefs in Turkey. Even in cases where Turkish laicism is criticised on the grounds that it is not flexible enough, the reservation that Islam has the potential to overrule all aspects of public life and ultimately lead to the curbing of fundamental rights lurks in the background. The trope of women's rights, particularly in the context of the wearing of the headscarf, appears frequently as the main medium of pressure that Islam would impose.[24]

The limits of cultural diversity espoused in the Commission become more visible when the discussion turns to the clear distinctions that Commission officials draw between their Turkish interlocutors and the rest of the Turkish population:[25]

COM 4: If I go to Turkey and I work with the ministries, I have to say, I find they are much more advanced than many other countries I have been dealing with. They are much more European in the sense of education, more modern or whatever. You would define as more as cultural values or whatever when you talk about that . . . Then you come to the other part and you come to let us say the rest of the population. And there I find that there is a big gap . . . It needs to

transcend this spirit from this part of the population to the rest of the population. There is a value difference, and I think that is about everything. I mean women's rights are definitely one thing, and then also education, also in that sense religion plays a big role, and how that is seen.

COM 6: I meet with women, with men at all levels. Gender is vey well embedded at the higher level, and it is a very open society, but it is of course the top that we see. So I have to start thinking or saying that for the time being, it is still very much a dual society. I would not put it rich and poor, but it goes together, educated and uneducated, religious and nonreligious, which I think is now more pronounced than before.

As seen from the excerpts above, Commission officials are often engaged in constructing clear-cut binary distinctions between the elite with whom they interact on a professional basis and the 'people' established as a separate category. Referential strategies attained through phrases such as 'dual character' and 'gap' divide the country into the binary oppositions of modern/premodern, educated/uneducated, advanced/backward, rich/poor, religious/less religious or nonreligious defined within the framework of European-oriented cultural values. In other interviews, other binary oppositions such as urban/rural also help to construct a dual Turkey that is European in one part and non-European in the rest. 'Gender' and/or 'women's rights' seem to be key issues through which these binaries are constructed. This entails the perception of Turkish society in its mass as a homogeneous entity, with little scope for diversity. It points to a single linear historical European narrative (Baban and Keyman, 2008: 110–11) and thus excludes accounts that point to the emergence of multiple modernities in Turkey where the clearly delineated categorisations do not necessarily match (Göle, 2002). More importantly, these predicates displayed above provide insights into the European cultural space that is envisaged by the Commission officials: a modern, progressive, open and enlightened one where religion plays a minimal role.

Member states

France

The PS is the only party in France where the conceptualisation of the EU on essentialist grounds is explicitly refuted by those of its members who participate in the shaping of the discourse on Turkey.[26] Nevertheless, the

interview data reveals that the construction of Europe as a cultural space is also present in the PS discourse:

> PS 1: It is true that Europe is first geography. It is geography, history and culture, the values, there are a lot of things. But from this point of view, I think that Turkey is a country which has strong historical relations with Europe, which also has geographic links since a part of Turkey is in Europe, it is undeniable.

> PS 5: I believe that one must start from the roots, the historic roots. Turkey was the big Greece, there are Byzantine churches, there is a root there. It is really the historical part that can justify a belonging to Europe, a belonging that is not geographic when one looks at Asia Minor. But if one thinks of the crusades, if one thinks of the taking of Constantinople by the crusaders, I want to say that until Mehmet the Conqueror, it is nevertheless a land which was reputed for being religiously close to Europe. So I think that these roots are there, one cannot deny these even if a different culture and religion was later imposed on Turkey from fifteenth century onwards.

As observed among the French mainstream right, both of the excerpts above construct Europe as a geographically bounded entity, exclusive of Turkey, which has only a geographic link with Europe. The *topos* of history is invoked in both excerpts where Turkey is included in the narrative of a unifying, homogeneous European history, albeit with reservations. In the case of the first excerpt, Turkey is predicated as a country having 'strong historical relations' with Europe and not part of the European Self, similar to the historical construction of the Ottoman Empire as part of the European state system from the seventeenth century onwards, yet not as fully 'European' (Neumann, 1999: 49–60). In the case of the second excerpt, through Turkey, not only is a linear European historical narrative involving Ancient Greece, the Byzantine Empire and the Crusades formulated, but also the religious roots of such a historical identity emphasised. The historical roots that tie Turkey to Europe are those that pertain to Christianity prior to the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul and the fall of the Byzantine Empire, after which a foreign culture and religion (namely Islam) break the bond. Thus it can be argued that, differences notwithstanding regarding the degree of Turkey's inclusion/involvement in the historical narratives, there are similarities between the PS discourse and that of the UMP and the UDF

regarding the construction of a teleological and homogeneous European history.

   The difference with the prevalent UMP and UDF discourse occurs over the way in which the members of the PS overwhelmingly predicate Europe as a land of 'cultural diversity':

> PS 1: I think that there is already cultural diversity in Europe, this is good. There is a quite different culture between Latin culture, Germanic culture, there are cultures that are rather different. There are different religions, between Catholicism, Protestanism, these are important roots from the point of culture and religion. But Islam is already present in Europe, because there are already millions of Europeans who are of the Muslim confession. And throughout history, impregnation of the Muslim culture has been strong in Europe, thanks to or because of Turkey, which has already been present in Europe for centuries.

The excerpt above can at first be interpreted as a celebration of multiculturalist ideology, where the 'cultural diversity' that is espoused relies on the assumption that cultures are compartmentalised in their own separate milieus. Furthermore, these 'cultures' imply 'profound features' such as 'religion', as observed from the conceptual overlap formed between the two. This is what compels the problematisation of the limits accorded to diversity within this multiculturalist discourse, since a hierarchy is discursively established between Christianity, with its schisms, predicated as the roots of cultural and religious identity, and Islam which, through the metaphoric expression of 'impregnation', is predicated as a permeating foreign element into the already bounded body through immigrants or Turkish influence.

   Such a hierarchy can also be reproduced in debates over Turkish immigration, displaying the challenge that Islam poses to the limits of diversity espoused in such multiculturalist talk of the French mainstream left:

> PS 5: Turkey is a country of contrast, with a gigantic and European city which is Istanbul. It is very modern and rich and Asia Minor, the Asiatic part of Turkey which is equally contrasting. I also think that it is a human contrast. I have observed the society in Istanbul, totally Westernised; by contrast, the Turks who come from Sarıkaya, they still have traditions, cultural practices, social practices that are extremely backward. There are also a few who come from Ankara

and they are much more open and much easier to integrate than the population that comes from Sarıkaya … One must not deny that there are cultural differences between Turks and Europeans related to religion. It is true when you observe the Turkish community in my city. There are difficulties in integrating them precisely because there is an attachment to religion, but also to tradition.

The interview extract above formulates a binary contrast at two interrelated levels; one is between 'European' and 'Asiatic' Turks in Turkey and in Europe among immigrant populations and the other is between ethnified Turks (yet again differentiated among themselves as more or less European depending on cultural values) and Europeans. The binary constructs are established around the nodal points of modern/premodern, rich/poor, Westernised/Eastern (Asian), religious/non-religious, progressive/backward, in construing the European/non-European dichotomy both within Turkey and in Europe. The association formulated between 'tradition'/'culture'/'cultural–social practices'/'religiosity' and 'backwardness' is used to juxtapose an inferior non-European cultural space against a European one that is progressive, enlightened and freed from religion.

Taking the argument a step further, such differentiation of cultural spaces is highlighted as the factor behind the immigrants' will 'to integrate'. This interpretation becomes naturalised in discourse via excluding in its entirety accounts that point at discrimination faced by immigrant populations in France.[27] Furthermore, the concept of 'integration', earlier highlighted as a boundary concept that connotes 'bring(ing) something inside from the outside', points at the cultural conditions for acceptance for the minority where the majority decides on 'how and when the process takes place', establishing and reifying unequal power relations between the two (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998: 111–16). In other words, 'the explicit pursuit of equality (or at least similarity) to be achieved by way of "integration" thus emphasizes, paradoxically, the inequality (or the difference)' (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998: 113).

The excerpt above suggests that, despite its prevalent multiculturalist rhetoric flagging diversity, 'assimilationist integration' may also be upheld by the French mainstream left, employing different discursive strategies than the UMP and UDF talk on these issues. Hence references to 'multiculturalism' and 'diversity' may even be considered as strategies of face-keeping vis-à-vis the more implicit homogeneous European cultural space assumed by the PS. It needs to be noted, however, that

the invoking of a European cultural space where Islam poses a challenge is not limited to discussions over Turkish immigration. In fact, Turkish immigration is brought up by only three interviewees (one from the PS and two from the UMP) who are elected from constituencies with a high number of Turkish immigrant populations. This may not come as surprising, considering that Turkish immigrants represent only a little more than 4% of the total migrant population in France (Schmid, 2007: 50). A European cultural space is more often constructed through references to the principle of *laïcité*, and the challenge posed to it by Islam:

> PS 2: I try to understand what was done by Atatürk, who has taken a considerable step in the *laïcité* of the country. Our law, the 1905 law of the separation of churches from the state has implied that religions have become elements of personal life and that the French state does not finance religions, but at the same time respects all the religions. One has seen this problem of the veil on the heads of women in Turkey, in fact, certain Islamists here in France make provocations, the obligation of wearing a veil, covering up. The *laic* Republic, she cannot allow that in the schools, there is a provocation there.

Similar to the UMP and UDF discourse, the principle of *laïcité* is also very often invoked in the PS discourse on Turkey. While the UMP and the UDF references to the concept had predominantly constructed Turkey as unsuited to adopting the French/European model of *laïcité* due to inherent properties of Islam, often without any further elaboration, this is not the case for the way in which the French mainstream left employs the concept. In fact members of the PS often praise the French-inspired Turkish laicism associated with Kemal Atatürk, although as the excerpt above demonstrates, its element of excessive state control can be distinguished from the French model. The main challenge to *laïcité* is viewed in the delineation of the public and the private, especially with respect to the wearing of the headscarf/veil as a form of religious expression. The invoking of 'schools' as the main space over which this contestation occurs can be attributed to the role that public schools occupy in French political discourse as the 'pillar of the formation of citizenship in the republican French sense' where 'it is in the school that individuals are distanced from their local attachments, class origins, regional accents, ethnic differences, and religious convictions in order to embrace a universal knowledge and become French citizens' (Göle, 2006b: 253).[28] Thus the presence of Muslims in public schools (as well as in 'urban life' in general, as suggested by some interviewees) carries

'undesired difference' into those spaces that are supposed to be blind to difference, conveying the limits to 'diversity' espoused even by the French left. Furthermore, by often invoking the 'forced' nature of the headscarf, as visible in the excerpt above, little agency is bestowed upon those who choose freely to wear such a symbol, alternatively interpreted as the means through which many young Muslim women find a space for themselves in the public sphere.

The headscarf debate in relation to the boundaries between the private and the public in religious expression has been widespread in French political discourse especially from the mid-1980s onwards and culminated in the banning of the wearing of the headscarf in public schools in March 2004, a law passed with high political consensus in the French national assembly (Amiraux, 2007: 127).[29] The interdiscursivity between these internal debates and those on Turkey/Europe suggest that the French norm is once again being universalised in discussions over Turkish accession. This excludes any notion of complex public spaces, both in France and in Turkey, where (constructed) secular and Muslim identities can be (re)negotiated, carving new spaces of self-definition and democracy.

Germany

The parliamentarians from the SPD and the Greens, particularly in their contributions to parliamentary debates, frequently refute the construction of Europe along cultural lines to deny Turkey the perspective of membership.[30] Parliamentary debates suggest that the members of parliament from the Greens are more engaged in this refutation than the members of the SPD. Almost all of the speakers from the Greens explicitly advance the argument that Turkey cannot be left out of the EU on the grounds of an essentialist understanding of culture:

> Mr. Stoiber is trying to exclude Turkey from the Western world by claiming that Turkey has no place in the European Union on the basis of the fact that it did not experience the Enlightenment. We are against this kind of cultural war and we will not allow it to happen . . . We wish to see processes of modernisation and democratisation topped with cultural diversity. This is a goal which Europe needs to fulfil. For us, the European Union is not a future project that is dependent on Christian ties and neither is it a part of a cultural bloc.
>
> (Steenblock, Greens, 19 December 2002)

The excerpt above is a typical example of the repeated statements from the German left on the unacceptability of right-wing primordialist arguments resting on a conception of a totalising and homogeneous understanding of culture and history. 'Cultural diversity' is favoured alongside 'modernisation' and 'democratisation', suggesting at first sight the presence of a construct of Europe among the left that differs from the essentialist vision of Europe that is prevalent among the right of the German political spectrum. The interviews, however, show that this dominant discourse along the left needs to be problematised regarding the degree to which it differs from essentialist visions of Europe promoted by a vast majority of the members of parliament from the CDU/CSU:

> SPD 3: In fact, Europe also has a European tradition. It is not only values. It is also that you have a lot of moments in history, and now also in the way the people think they have to solve their problems. Turkey, I think, belongs to these countries who look sometimes in the same ways as Western European countries. They have the same modernisation process now, that we had in the 50s and the 60s.

> Greens 1: Of course Europeanness comes with a cultural and historical heritage. Those in the East bring their specificities, but they subscribed to the *acquis* and the values that are part of that history. A country like Turkey can be Europeanised and modernised, it is possible.

Both of the excerpts above employ the *topos* of history in constructing a unified past for Europe. The inclusion of Turkey in these historical narratives is not without qualifications. By employing the *topos* of comparison, both of the extracts predicate Turkey as not constituting a part of the European Self in its historicity, but as a country that shares in the model that lies on Europe's historical (and in the case of the second excerpt, also cultural) specificities. The prevalence of the modernisation paradigm is apparent here. The diffusionist view in modernisation theory divides the world into two main sections. While one of these sections ('Greater Europe, Inside') invents and makes progress, the other one ('non-Europe, Outside') receives these advances through diffusion from the first (Blaut, 1993: 14). Parallel to this conceptualisation, the excerpts above visualise one particular teleological and evolutionist route to modernity, where Europe serves as a model that Turkey can imitate. The myth of modernisation that owes its roots to the employment

of the nation-state as an interpretative framework contributes to the discursive construction of European superiority. Situating backwardness in the lack of one particular model of modernity also hides the dynamics behind differential levels and types of development between states.[31]

The discursive application of modernisation theory is not limited to the interpretation of inter-state relations, it can also be utilised in explaining uneven development within states (Huysseune, 2006: 17). This can also be observed in the way in which some members of the SPD and the Greens talk about differences within Turkey:

> SPD 1: The actual situation in Turkey, they live in two different centuries maybe. When you go to Ankara or Istanbul, you do not see a lot of women with headscarves. But you have a lot of villages, it is like the end of the nineteenth century, but in Ankara and Istanbul it is like living in the beginning of the twenty-first century. It is a problem we have, maybe two different worlds within Turkey, which makes it more complicated. And you have in the background something like a cultural struggle between some people who are more in favour of an Islamic republic . . . Cultural differences exist, you cannot say that this does not exist, you cannot close your eyes . . . First, the position of women, but it is a position only in a part of Turkey and not in Istanbul or Ankara.

> Greens 2: Islam is beginning to have more prominence in public life in Turkey. This is a traditional faultline in Turkish society, a cultural problem, an obvious division between the more modern seculars and the religious people, coming on stronger now. Whether this can threaten secularism is an open question to me. Look at the headscarf debate. People should be free to express their religion, but if you let go of all restrictions tomorrow, it will not be a healthy development. The question of women is also a question of mentality of course. A certain culture that you grow up with in certain regions. It is hard to change with law, it is a gradual process.

It is possible to discern the traits of the modernisation paradigm in the first excerpt above. A temporal divide that bestows a superior temporal identity for Istanbul and Ankara against the rest of the country is constructed with reference to cultural/religious attributes. Similarly, the second excerpt constructs binary dichotomies of the modern/premodern and the secular/religious based on cultural factors within the country. Hence, the country is being discursively divided

between two homogeneous and monolithic blocs along the nexus of the modern/premodern, secular/religious and progressive/backward dichotomies. The situation of women in general and the wearing of the headscarf in particular are the most frequently employed references around which such binary divisions are created.

This, first of all, excludes narratives such as the colonial feminist, native Orientalist-Kemalist and political Islamic discourses that account for a variety of factors in explaining the problems with women's rights in Turkey (Kadıoğlu, 2003: 71). Secondly, it omits earlier mentioned accounts that highlight the increasingly hybrid and reflexive natures of the constructed national identities in Turkey and among Turkish immigrants in the EU, where religiosity and/or the wearing of the headscarf does not necessarily involve the negation of secular life practices, but results in the emergence of multiple modernities where new subjectivities are being (re)created.[32] Thirdly, it displays the limits of cultural diversity repeatedly espoused by the SPD and the Greens in their discourse on Europe/Turkey by demonstrating that the public expression of religion, symbolised by the wearing of the headscarf, challenges the modern secular social imaginary upheld by the SPD and the Greens, by constituting an aberration from the modern norm (in the case of the first excerpt) and/or by necessitating clear divides between the private/public spheres regarding where it can be worn.

Britain

It was earlier argued that a distinction can be perceived in the British political discourse among some members of both parties between a cultural Europe exclusive of Turkey and a political Europe that rests on a loose gathering of member states that is inclusive of Turkey. In some cases, this distinction ceases to be replaced by the attribution of a certain cultural identity to the EU that is inclusive of Turkey:[33]

> There are some who argue that Turkey is not European, historically, culturally and geographically. I think they do not know their history, their culture or their geography. Turkey's history is Europe's history. From Ephesus to Byzantium, from St. George, who many say was an Anatolian; although others believe he came from Dalmatia. From those things, and from the pleasures of UEFA football and the Eurovision song contests, we have a shared history and cultural inheritance. The very name Europe comes from the fair maiden Europa, who was carried off to what were then the shores of Asia

Minor, and are now Turkey, to be, in what I think is the technical term, ravished.

(MacShane, Labour, 23 June 2004)

I do not know whether any hon. Members are foolish enough to oppose eventual Turkish membership of the European Union. If so, I ask them where they think Europa was when she was raped by the bull? Where was she?...I will tell the House where Europa was – on the coast of Asia Minor. She was on the Turkish coast, which is one of the many reasons why Turkey ultimately has a European vocation.

(Johnson, Conservative, 21 May 2003)

Both of the excerpts above utilise the *topos* of history that serves to reconstruct a well-known founding myth of Europe, namely the myth of the rape of Europa.[34] This founding myth is employed in rationalising the geographic ambiguity of the country. Turkey is predicated as a country that is geographically located in Asia Minor, yet belonging to Europe due to being home to the founding myth of where Europe sprang from. This founding myth that is used to justify Turkish accession in turn contributes to the concealment of the constructed nature of European cultural identity in discourse. In constructing Europe as a historical and a cultural space, the first excerpt also resorts to the linguistic strategy of departicularisation where there is a cherry-picked selection of the various so-called unifying roots of Europe, such as 'Ephesus', 'Byzantine' and 'St George', which all belong to the conceptual space occupied by the narrative on the Roman Empire and the so-called Judeo-Christian heritage as the cultural and historical bases of Europe, as well as more contemporary 'pan-European' events such as European football championships and the Eurovision song contest.

Personal interviews provide more insight into other ways in which European culture is signified in British discourse across those that emphasise the significance of cultural diversity in Europe:

LAB 7: If you look at Istanbul, there is no question it is a modern European country. If you look at the situation in the Southeast of Turkey, not only geographically, but because of culture, it is less obvious . . . Women's rights will continue to be one of the big issues. Well I think that is where you have the cultural differences, trying to reconcile a traditional kind of Muslim attitude. It is one of the more difficult areas to do it.

> CONS 2: I have been to Turkey two or three times. I tend to meet government and business people. They all speak English, they are Westernised . . . They do not take Fridays off, women do not veil themselves, religion – as in our societies – is a private thing . . . I think it is not just their elites. It is their sort of upper middle class, it is very Westernised.

As also observed in previous discursive settings, a culturally based binary division is constructed within Turkey. In the case of the first excerpt, this division is incurred explicitly through the predication of Istanbul as 'modern' and 'European' juxtaposed against the Southeast of Turkey that is implicitly and uniformly assumed to be 'premodern' and 'non-European' on the basis of cultural factors. The modernisation paradigm that upholds Europe and the West as the ideal bearers of modernity resting largely on cultural attributes is thus at work here. This paradigm also extends to the way in which women's rights are conceptualised, where their lack is tied to premodern (via reference to 'traditional') cultural attributes implicated in religion.

   The second interviewee in his response to the topical frame on culture engages in the construction of a binary Turkey through a positive representation of a certain segment of the country that has 'Westernised'. Westernisation here is mainly signified through secularism, limited public expression of religion and proficiency in English. The discursive impact of the division of the country along the lines of the modern/premodern and non-religious/religious axes entails two major discursive impacts. One is the construction of Europe and the West as a superior and a culturally homogeneous space that is rid of religion. The other is the oversimplification of the complex social, political and economic dynamics behind uneven development within and across different regions in Turkey.

Conclusion

The analysis has found two main representations of Turkey through which Europe is constructed as a cultural space. One concerns the representation of the country as a diluter of a culturally homogeneous Europe that results in the discursive construction of a cultural Europe resting on essentialist bases. This is found to be widely present across the centre-right and the far-right factions of the EP, the UMP and the UDF in France and the CDU/CSU in Germany, as well as across some members of the Labour and Conservative Parties in Britain. It is mainly

realised through the construction of rigid borders between the inside
and the outside (of Europe) on the basis of geographic, historical and
cultural factors exclusive of Turkey. This essentialist cultural identity is
aligned with a given geographic territory and people, thus replicating
the model of the classic nation-state with its (discursively constructed)
need for a coherent internal and external identity onto the European
level and resembling the Enlightenment narratives of a modern, supe-
rior and progressive Europe as opposed to the pre-modern, inferior and
backwards cultural, historical and geographic Others around it.

The second representation entails the designation of the country as a
contributor to cultural diversity in Europe that results in the discursive
construction of a multicultural Europe. This is widely shared by the left-
wing and the liberal groups in the EP as well as the SPD and Greens in
Germany, the PS in France, the European Commission and some mem-
bers of the Labour and the Conservative Parties in Britain. The reiterated
emphasis on cultural diversity and multiculturalism, along with explicit
refutations of essentialism among these groups, suggests at first sight the
presence of a substantially different discourse than that of the preva-
lent right-wing constructs of a cultural Europe. The analysis also shows,
however, that it overlaps with the right-wing discourse in the reliance of
both on the modernisation paradigm and the central role that it accords
to the nation-state in the imagining of political communities. It can be
argued that inside/outside boundaries based on essentialist attributes
are not construed as clear cut as in right-wing discourses. Europe is
not discursively constructed as a coherent cultural entity and cultural
diversity is positively valued. Nonetheless, unity is still sought in the
extent to which 'substantial' notions of culture such as religion are pub-
licly expressed in society. This brings with it a risk of excluding new
approaches to the negotiation between religion and politics in fostering
plurality and difference required from a radical democracy (Shakman
Hurd, 2004: 239–240).

Ideological, national and institutional faultiness can be dis-
cerned in the presumed boundaries of the European cultural space.
Unsurprisingly, this space is strictly delimited across the right wing
of the political spectrum, with the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion
expressed more explicitly and in more derogatory terms in the rhetoric
of the far right. In terms of national divisions, it is seen for example
that in the case of the German right, it is the Turkish migrants who
are often found to be the objects of the construction of essential cul-
tural boundaries in the designation of a European cultural space. In the
case of Britain and some national groups in the EPP-ED/EPP, a clear

distinction can be discerned among some members between a mythic Europe based on a common culture and Europe as a political project of nation-states that come together to promote their self-interest, hence expanding the cultural boundaries of the 'EU', but not of 'Europe'. While the boundaries of this cultural space and their flexibility are generally wider across the left and liberal ideological groups, they can also be reflective of specific narratives on national identities. For example, in the case of the French political parties under analysis, the laicist vision of relations between religion and the state seems to be the dominant narrative through which the limits of the public expressions of Islam are conveyed. In terms of institutional discourses, the Commission's motto of 'unity in diversity' that has been taken up in the literature to denote the Commission as a cosmopolitan actor (see Suvarierol and Aydın-Düzgit, 2011) occurs frequently in interviews with Commission officials. Nonetheless, the stereotypical depictions of Turkey as a predominantly backward and traditional society as opposed to its 'European' Turkish interlocutors suggest that for the Commission elite, the borders of cosmopolitan Europe may stop at the borders of Turkey.

Conclusion

This study has examined the ways in which Europe is discursively constructed through representations of Turkey in the debates on Turkey's accession to the EU in the European Parliament, the Commission and three selected member states of the EU (France, Germany and Britain). Based on the theoretical assumption that identities are relational, fragmented and discursively constructed through representations, it has been found that there are multiple Europes that are constructed in the talks over enlargement to Turkey, varying within and between different ideological, national and institutional settings within the scope of the study. It has discerned four main discourse topics over which these Europes are constructed. These correspond to the conceptualisation of Europe *as a security community*, *as an upholder of democratic values*, *as a political project* and *as a cultural space*.

This study thus shows that Turkey constitutes a key case in exploring various discursive constructs of European identity, since the talks on the country pave the way for the construction of different versions of 'Europe' in discourse. This also strengthens the claim that EU enlargement policy can be conceptualised as a specific type of foreign policy due to its role in setting the boundaries of Europe on the basis of a variety of factors. It is justifications for and/or against Turkish accession that pave the way for the establishment of boundaries that lead to the construction of multiple Europes in discourse. The discourses on Turkish accession have demonstrated that the relational aspect of identity construction in the case of Europe is not limited to Turkey but extends to various Others such as Europe's own past, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the United States. It also lends support to the theoretical claim that these Otherings do not necessarily denote perceptions of danger or threat. This does not mean that

notions of danger or threat underlying the representations of these Other(s) are absent in the EU discourses analysed. The securitisation of the EU's Southern neighbourhood and the fears constructed over Turkish migrants and potential Turkish migration following the country's accession constitute certain prime examples where the Turkish Other is conceptualised as a clear threat to the identity of the European Self. Nonetheless, as observed particularly across the left-wing discourse in the member states and among the Commission, the parent/child dichotomy established in denoting Turkey as an undemocratic country capable of attaining democratic progress only under the guidance of Europe provides an example of the way in which Otherings can manifest themselves along different sets of dichotomies other than those that signify danger or threat.

The study also demonstrates the significance of the concepts of *intertextuality* and *interdiscursivity* in the discursive construction of European identities. A major case of intertextuality in the scope of this study involves frequent references to Samuel Huntington and his thesis of the clash of civilisations in various discourse topics such as security, democracy and culture. Other cases of intertextuality are discerned in explicit references to Giscard d'Estaing's culturalist views on Turkish accession or to Robert Cooper's views on liberal imperialism in bestowing a specific security identity for Europe.

The importance of the concept of interdiscursivity is distinguished at various levels. One key case concerns again the thesis of the clash of civilisations. Even in situations where explicit references to Huntington or his views on the clash of civilisations are not incurred, the underlying 'patterns of knowledge and structures' of his arguments are visible in the ways in which Islam and/or the Muslim world is juxtaposed against Europe and the West, in the over-encompassing role attributed to Islam in determining political and social life in the East or in the presumed incompatibility between Islam and democracy over the discussions on Turkey and its accession prospects. The intertextuality and the interdiscursivity with this thesis are pervasive enough to lend support to Bottici and Challand's (2006: 316) claim that 'the narrative of the clash of civilisations, which has been strongly criticised as too simplistic and scientifically inadequate...[has] turned into a successful political myth' in the sense that the continuous reproduction of the narrative in different contexts such as that of Turkish accession to the EU has succeeded in naturalising it in discourse. Other cases of interdiscursivity pertain to the underlying arguments of Cooper's liberal imperialism in the way in which Europe is accorded the role of

a more interventionist global power in discussions, to the 'normative power Europe' discourse through which Europe is construed as a foreign policy actor that functions through the spread of norms and values or to domestic immigration rhetorics regarding the ways in which 'integration' debates are framed in discourse.

At a broader level, interdiscursivity with national identity constructs is discerned, most visibly in the analysis of French, German and British constructs of Europe. The British case stands out as one in which the prevailing notion of Europe as an albeit friendly Other to the British Self in the discursive construction of British national identity surfaces in the British constructs of Europe through the discussions on enlargement to Turkey. In contrast, the central role that Europe occupies in the current dominant constructs of French and German national identities is visible in the desire for a more coherent political and cultural Europe challenged by the accession of Turkey. In a similar vein, interdiscursivity with constructed institutional identities is also discerned, particularly regarding the European Commission, which – primarily through its discourses on security, democracy and political integration – reproduces its role as the key player in managing Europe's relations with the outside world, as the vanguard of its democratic identity and as the key builder of its indeterminate political integration.

Two other cases of interdiscursivity, observed across all of the four discourse topics, concern the discourse on the modernisation paradigm and the discourse on the (imagined) modern nation-state. The modernisation paradigm is visible primarily in the division encountered between tradition and modernity, the culturally/religiously dependent notions of progress, the construction of Europe as a superior and benevolent cultural model – as one that is modern and rational, freed from religion – to be emulated by the rest, unequal relations of power constructed between separate cultures/civilisations and in the limited degrees of self-reflexivity in the discussions over Europe. Combined with the interdiscursivity with the clash of civilisations discourse, it can thus be argued that neo-orientalist discourses have a notable presence in the debates on Europe through Turkey.

The interdiscursivity with the (imagined) modern nation-state is discernable mainly in the widespread reproduction of the democratic myth of the nation-state at the level of Europe by establishing congruence between a (European) nation, a sovereign and functioning political system and a given territory with established cultural, historical and geographic boundaries between the inside and the outside (of Europe), the flexibilities of which vary in discourse in accordance

with ideological, national and institutional affiliations. Hence the study shows that the key organising notions of the modern nation-state such as 'territoriality', 'borders' and 'sovereignty' still play an active role in the imagining of Europe by 'linguistically disciplining' notions of identity and political community (Van Ham, 2001: 94). This problematises accounts which argue that Europe is moving beyond the modern nation-state to resemble a postmodern order that does not rest on strict territorial differentiations and the imposition of uniform identities and stands closer to the observations that 'the construction of Europe pursued in the EU in the recent years is very much an extension of the national process of community construction' (Busch and Krzyzanonowski, 2007: 115).

The interdiscursivity with the (constructed) modern nation-state does not end here, but is also observed in the paralleling at the level of Europe of the blurred distinction between a state's attempts at hegemonising a certain identity at home and one in the international system. Similar to the modern nation-state, in the case of Europe as constructed through Turkey, resistant elements to a secure identity on the inside are often found to be linked to external destabilisers of identity on the outside. This becomes particularly visible in discussions over the public expression of religion, symbolised by the wearing of the veil/headscarf in both Turkey and in the EU member states, the ascription of essentialised identities (that are used in justifying the exclusion of Turkey) to immigrant populations and the limited notion of multiculturalism (espoused in national settings) utilised in reference to the cultural implications of Turkish accession.

On the basis of the analysis, the study also argues for interdiscursivity with the various historical tropes on Europe. It shows that just like in the case of the construction of national identities, historical tropes can play a key role in the current constructions of European identities through discourse. Historical tropes in contemporary discourses on European identity through Turkey are found to manifest themselves through two related means. One concerns the deployment of selected historical resources to construct a teleological European history from which Turkey is included or excluded. The other is related to the ways in which certain historical tropes utilised in the construction of multiple Europes in the past are being reemployed in more contemporary constructs of Europe in discourse. It is seen, for example, how the certain key aspects of the historical discourse on 'oriental despotism', specifically regarding the construction of democracy and human rights as a cultural matter that cannot be acquired by a non-European country, are employed primarily in the discourse of the right-wing political parties

and party groups under analysis. In fact, the predication of Turks as 'proud people' in the narrative of oriental despotism is found to be one of the most frequently used stereotypes on Turks/Turkey across all of the discursive sites under analysis.

The book also shows that particularly among left-wing political groups as well as the Commission, an historical interdiscursivity is incurred with the nineteenth-century European discourse on the 'standards of civilisation' (Gong, 1984).[1] In this discourse, certain properties of states, such as respect for basic human rights, were deemed crucial in deciding which 'non-European' nations were eligible to interact with 'European' nations. This discourse also rested on a firm belief in progress where 'modernisation' embodied in Europe was perceived as the ultimate destination. The yardsticks on the road to modernisation were drawn from a specific European model. Furthermore, Europe was bestowed with a 'civilising mission' in these countries' transition to modernity. In the words of Levin (2011: 198), the contemporary reflections of the nineteenth-century representations of Turkey as the 'sick man of Europe' subject to a European *mission civilisatrice* on the current debates on Turkish accession to the EU construe an 'enlightened *EUtopia* whose mission is to defend the weak, rescue Turks from themselves, and ensure the spread of civilisation to the dark corners of the world'.

Overall this study suggests that when the issue concerns Turkey's membership to the EU, there is indeed a common discursive sphere across the EU, even extending to Britain to a certain extent, that can be characterised as 'European'. This is mainly visible in the way in which similar issues are debated at similar levels of intensity at around the same time periods and are framed through similar 'meaning structures' across the EU (Risse, 2010: 125). Nonetheless, at the level of the discourses of the political elites and administrative elites (in the case of the Commission), this study also problematises the conventional thinking that two distinct visions of Europe are incurred regarding their take on the prospects of Turkish membership: a modern, cosmopolitan view of Europe that favours Turkey's accession to the EU and a more parochial, culturalist vision of Europe that stands opposed to Turkish membership. The study argues that drawing a stark division between these two visions may be misleading since the analysis points at, in Stuart Hall's words, a high degree of ideological closure in discourse – converging on key tenets of the discourse on the modern nation-state and modernisation – that leads to significant discursive similarities between those who argue for and against Turkish accession across the EU. It should be underlined that the discourses on Europe of

the political parties and the party groups of the left or the Commission, which are mostly associated with a cosmopolitan vision of Europe in support of Turkish membership, indeed display important differences from those of the centre-right and especially the far right under analysis. They explicitly refute cultural essentialism, remain proponents of multiculturalism and argue for the adoption of democratic values as the most fundamental criterion for EU membership. Yet, for instance, when it comes to their reflections on the components of cultural diversity in Europe, their discourses largely remain within the confines of the conventional multiculturalist narrative in the nation-states of the EU where there is a strong urge to delimit the public expression of Islam. Through underlining Europe as the embodiment of democratic values with limited self-reflexivity and a lack of a critical reading of European history, they can aid in reproducing a Eurocentric articulation of Europe that entails superiority. Or, with the exception of the British case, they can espouse a certain degree of homogeneity and singularity for a strong political project that is deemed to be challenged by the culturally/historically dependent notion of sovereignty in Turkey.

Nevertheless, the contested nature of discourses that makes them open to change is also exposed in this study, which shows the different ways in which the stability and coherence of these discourses can be challenged. For example, alternative readings of European culture and history or alternative interpretations of religious expression in society are often accounted for in the interpretations provided, not with the intention of replacing one narrative with another, but with the aim of demonstrating the internal instability and incoherence of discourses that are open to contestation. Yet the analysis also finds that those alternative constructions with the potential to radically alter the ways in which Europe is conceptualised in discourse remain highly marginal in the current constructions of Europe. For example, there are isolated utterances by discourse participants, particularly among left-wing political groups and in the Commission, where they construct the geographic borders of Europe as in constant flux, or where they engage in self-reflexivity beyond the experience of the Second World War, or where they refute the notion of shared culture(s). Although these are empirical manifestations that change is always possible through fundamentally different discursive articulations of Europe, these alternative constellations are found to currently remain highly marginal and thus do not seem to pose a fundamental challenge to the dominant discourses.

Finally, regarding the relationship between discourse and political action, this study has argued that discourses have enabling and disabling

impacts on policies where they can impose certain limits to the policies that are articulated. Although this book has not focused on how this relationship between discourse and political action unfolds in the case of EU policies towards Turkey, it has provided certain initial insight into how certain EU policies are made intelligible given the discursive environment on Turkish membership. A case in point concerns the permanent derogations clause in the Negotiating Framework with Turkey that allows for the first time for the introduction of permanent derogations in the free movement of people (as well as structural policies and agriculture) towards a member country.[2] It can be argued that while this may be problematised on normative and ethical grounds that it violates the principle of equal treatment in the enlargement policy, the policy goes almost uncontested in EU discourse. While this may not be considered surprising given the dominance of the discursive articulation of Europe as a bounded political and cultural project (albeit with varying flexibilities in the boundaries) in the face of Turkish accession, it suggests that further research may prove useful in looking into such specific EU policies towards Turkey in relation to the discursive environments that enable them to remain largely uncontested or contested in EU discourse.

Appendix

A.1 Debates in the European parliament

Dates and titles of debates

6 October 1999	State of relations between Turkey and the EU
1 December 1999	Turkey
11 April 2000	Situation in Turkey
5 September 2000	Economic and social development of Turkey
14 November 2000	Turkey
14 February 2001	Accession partnership with Turkey
24 October 2001	Turkey
7 February 2002	Earthquake in Turkey
27 February 2002	Democratic rights in Turkey, in particular the situation of HADEP
13 May 2003	Search made of the Ankara headquarters of the Human Rights Association of Turkey
4 June 2003	Turkey's application for EU membership
1 April 2004	Progress towards accession by Turkey
13 December 2004	Turkey's progress towards accession
5 and 6 July 2005	The role of women in Turkey
28 September 2005	Opening of negotiations with Turkey – additional protocol to the EEC–Turkey Association Agreement
6 April 2006	Situation in South-East Turkey
26 September 2006	Turkey's progress towards accession
12 February 2007	Women in Turkey
24 October 2007	EU–Turkey relations
21 May 2008	Turkey's 2007 Progress Report
11 March 2009	Croatia: Progress Report 2008 – Turkey: Progress Report 2008 – FYROM: Progress Report 2008
5 May 2009	Democratic process in Turkey
25 November 2009	Enlargement Strategy 2009 concerning the countries of Western Balkans, Iceland and Turkey
20 January 2010	Democratisation in Turkey
10 February 2010	2009 Progress Report on Croatia – 2009 Progress Report on the FYROM – 2009 Progress Report on Turkey

A.2 Speeches in the European Commission

Speech numbers,[1] speakers and titles of speeches

SPEECH/99/151	Günter Verheugen: 'Enlargement: Speed and Quality'
SPEECH/99/168	Romano Prodi at the OSCE Summit, Istanbul

9 March 2000	Günter Verheugen: 'The Enlargement Process and Turkey's Place in This Process'
SPEECH/00/419	Günter Verheugen: 'Strategy Paper, Accession Partnership with Turkey and Progress Reports'
SPEECH /01/469	Günter Verheugen at the Launch of EU–Turkish Foundation Inaugural Meeting of EU–Turkey Foundation, Brussels
SPEECH/01/487	Günter Verheugen at the European Parliament, Strasbourg
SPEECH/02/425	Günter Verheugen at the French National Assembly, Paris
SPEECH/02/576	Romano Prodi at the European Parliament, Strasbourg
SPEECH/03/423	Günter Verheugen: 'Implementation of Reforms in Turkey is a Determining Factor'
SPEECH/03/519	Günter Verheugen at the European Parliament, Brussels
SPEECH/04/16	Romano Prodi at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Ankara
4 March 2004	Günter Verheugen: 'Enlargement of the European Union: Expectations, Achievements and Prospects'
SPEECH/04/141	Günter Verheugen: 'European Neighbourhood Policy'
SPEECH/04/309	Günter Verheugen: 'Turkey and the EU towards December 2004'
SPEECH/04/437	Olli Rehn at the European Parliament, Brussels
SPEECH/04/440	Romano Prodi: 'The Commission's Report and Recommendation on Turkey's Application'
SPEECH/04/466	Olli Rehn: 'Turkey and the EU: A Common Future?'
SPEECH/04/534	Olli Rehn: 'EU and Turkey: Ahead of a Historical Decision'
SPEECH/04/538	Olli Rehn: 'EU and Turkey on the Threshold of a New Phase'
SPEECH/04/545	Jose Manuel Barosso at the European Council, Brussels
SPEECH/05/20	Olli Rehn: 'The State of Play: Enlargement Process'
SPEECH/05/32	Olli Rehn: 'Values Define Europe, not Borders'
SPEECH/05/142	Olli Rehn: 'Common Future of the EU and Turkey: Roadmap for Reforms and Negotiations'
SPEECH/05/271	Olli Rehn: 'Prioritisation: Where should Turkey Focus its Energies?'
SPEECH/05/362	Olli Rehn: 'Is the Future Enlargement of the EU in Peril'
5 July 2005	Olli Rehn at the European Parliament, Strasbourg
SPEECH/05/465	Olli Rehn: 'The European Union as a Global Actor?'
SPEECH/05/556	Olli Rehn: 'Accession Negotiations with Turkey'
SPEECH/05/587	Olli Rehn: 'EU and Turkey together on the Same Journey
SPEECH/05/716	Olli Rehn: 'Accession Negotiations with Turkey: The Time for Celebration is Over, Now Comes the Time for Delivery'
SPEECH/05/733	Olli Rehn: 'Accession Negotiations with Turkey: Fulfilling the Criteria'
SPEECH/06/392	Olli Rehn: 'Turkey: State of Play of the Accession Process'
SPEECH/06/536	Olli Rehn: 'Reforms in Turkey – In the First Place It Is the Interest of the Turkish Citizens
SPEECH/06/559	Olli Rehn: 'Turkey's Best Response is a Rock-Solid Commitment to Reforms'
SPEECH/06/747	Olli Rehn: 'Turkey's Accession Process to the EU'

SPEECH/07/362	Olli Rehn: 'Why Turkey and the EU Need Each Other: Co-operating on Energy and Other Strategic Issues'
SPEECH/07/370	Olli Rehn: 'Finland's Role in Turkey's EU Accession'
SPEECH/07/651	Olli Rehn: 'Turkey on the Road of Reforms'
SPEECH/08/121	Olli Rehn: 'An Open and Self-confident Society: Fundamental Freedoms, Constitutional Reform and Democratisation in Turkey'
SPEECH/08/188	José Manuel Durão Barroso: 'Turkey: Master of the Straits, Master of its Destiny'
SPEECH/08/191	José Manuel Durão Barroso: 'Winning Hearts and Minds: The EU/Turkey Partnership'
SPEECH/08/257	Olli Rehn: 'Turkey to Refocus on EU Reforms'
SPEECH/08/275	Olli Rehn: 'Constructive Dialogue and A Spirit of Compromise are Key for the Accession Process'
SPEECH/08/520	Olli Rehn: 'Turkey and the EU: A Win–win Game'
SPEECH/08/581	Olli Rehn: '45 Years from the Signing of the Ankara Agreement: EU-Turkey Cooperation Continues'
SPEECH/09/89	Olli Rehn: 'Turkey as an Energy Hub for Europe: Prospects and Challenges'
SPEECH/09/104	Olli Rehn: 'Accession Process of Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – Making Progress in Challenging Circumstances'
SPEECH/09/128	Olli Rehn: 'Women's Rights in Turkey's EU Accession'
SPEECH/09/148	Olli Rehn: 'EU and Turkey – Tackling Economic Downturn through Partnership'
SPEECH/09/214	Olli Rehn: 'Democratic Process in Turkey'
SPEECH/09/162	Olli Rehn: 'Turkey's Path towards the EU – Progress through Reforms'
SPEECH/09/565	Olli Rehn: 'Turkey and Europe – An Example'
SPEECH/09/318	Olli Rehn: 'The European Future of Turkey'
SPEECH/10/191	Stefan Füle: 'Women's Rights in Turkey'

A.3 Debates in the national parliaments

France

Dates and titles of sessions in debates

14 December 1999	Turkey's candidacy for accession to the European Union
20 December 2000	Presidency of the European Union and Turkey's candidacy
18 January 2001	Recognition of the Armenian genocide
12 November 2002	Turkey's candidacy of the European Union
10 December 2002	Turkey's candidacy of the European Union
25 November 2003	Enlargement of the European Union
7 April 2004	Turkey's accession to the European Union
22 June 2004	Turkey's candidacy for accession to the European Union
5 October 2004	Turkey's entry to the European Union

6 October 2004	European Union and Turkey
14 October 2004	Government's Declaration on Turkey's candidacy of the European Union and debate on this declaration
14 December 2004	Turkey's accession to the European Union
21 December 2004	Questions to the Government
8 November 2006	Turkey
21 May 2008	Modernisation of the Institutions of the 5th Republic
29 May 2008	Article 33
7 April 2009	Position of France on Turkey's accession to the European Union
2 June 2009	Turkey's entry to the European Union
9 June 2009	Government's declaration on the European Council and debate on this declaration
7 April 2010	France–Turkey Relations

Germany

Dates and titles of sessions in debates

3 December 1999	Chancellor informs the Parliament
17 December 1999	Chancellor informs the Parliament
4 December 2002	On the EU's proposal to Turkey Chancellor informs the Parliament
26 June 2003	10/11 June Thessaloniki European Council
8 September 2004	On the powers of the Chancellor
29 October 2004	Report on the proposal on the 'EU's Proposal to Turkey' Proposal on sustainable continuation of the EU's relations with Turkey and the opening of accession negotiations Proposal on the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey
16 December 2004	Report on the proposal on the 'EU's Proposal to Turkey' Proposal on sustainable continuation of the EU's relations with Turkey and the opening of accession negotiations Proposal on accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey
21 January 2005	Problems with Turkey should not be discarded
16 June 2005	Problems with Turkey should not be discarded
27 November 2006	Foreign Affairs
30 November 2006	Foreign Minister informs the Parliament
14 December 2006	Chancellor informs the Parliament Proposal on the opportunities and challenges posed by Eastern Enlargement to EU's Development Aid
24 May 2007	Steps to be taken on the Cyprus Conflict – The tasks of the German Presidency
14 February 2008	2007 European Union Report on Human Rights
19 June 2008	Chancellor informs the parliament

| 23 April 2009 | Proposal on the strengthening of Trade Unions in Turkey |
| 10 November 2009 | European Foreign and Security Policy, Enlargement Policy and Human Rights |

Britain

Dates and titles of sessions in debates

13 December 1999	Helsinki European Council
18 January 2000	Turkey
23 January 2001	Turkey
10 July 2001	Cyprus
10-11 December 2002	European Union Enlargement
16 December 2002	European Council (Copenhagen)
21 May 2003	European Union (Accessions) Bill
20 November 2003	Terrorist Attacks (Istanbul)
10 December 2003	European Affairs
15 June 2004	Turkey
23 June 2004	Turkey (EU Accession)
12 October 2004	Turkey
24 November 2004	Foreign Affairs and Defence
15 December 2004	European Affairs
20 December 2004	Brussels European Council
25 January 2005	Turkey
1 March 2005	Turkey
18 May 2005	Foreign Affairs and Defence
8 June 2005	EU Constitution
15 June 2005	European Affairs
20 June 2005	European Council
30 June 2005	European Union
19 July 2005	Turkish Visit
11 October 2005	EU Accession (Turkey and Croatia)
14 December 2005	European Affairs
15 November 2005	Orhan Pamuk
31 January 2006	Prospects for the EU in 2006
22 November 2006	Foreign Affairs and Defence
6 December 2006	European Affairs
18 December 2006	European Council
9 October 2007	Turkey
12 November 2007	Foreign Affairs and Defence
9 December 2008	European Affairs

Notes

Introduction

1. As of June 2012 only one out of 35 chapters of the *acquis* were closed in accession negotiations, with Turkey negotiating 12 chapters. In December 2006 the Council decided not to open negotiations on eight chapters of the *acquis* and not to provisionally close any of the chapters until Turkey opened its seaports and airspace to Greek Cyprus, as required by Turkey's customs union with the EU.

2. Shore (1999) and Risse (2004a, 2010) argue that the wide usage of the concept of Europe for the European Union in fact demonstrates the hegemonising and powerful effect of the Union on the continent. Hülsse (2000) focuses specifically on the German discourse on Turkish accession and highlights that the widespread equation of Europe with the EU underlines the perceived significance of the cultural dimensions of the European project in the German context. Tekin (2010) reaches a similar finding for the French discourse on Turkish membership. Krzyzanowski and Oberhuber (2007) empirically demonstrate the ways in which this equivalence plays itself out both in official speeches that pertain to the future of Europe, what they refer to as 'speculative talks on Europe', and in a variety of EU documents. Nevertheless they also point to the existence of a certain discourse among some of the political elites of the member states, where a divergence is formulated between the EU and Europe, mainly due to their outlook on their nation-state identities, as a part of which the EU is conceptualised mostly in organisational terms.

3. See, among others, Ruggie (1993), Wæver (1998a), Buzan and Diez (1999), Cederman (2001), Van Ham (2001), Zielonka (2006).

4. See, for example, Rehn (2009).

5. One can in this respect recall the rejection of the Moroccan application for EU membership in 1987 on the grounds that Morocco is not a European country.

6. The three Copenhagen criteria were set at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen on 21–22 June 2003: 'Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union.' The Presidency Conclusions also highlighted that 'the Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate states'. There is, however, considerable controversy over whether the 'Union's capacity to absorb new members' constitutes the fourth pillar of

the Copenhagen criteria. See European Council in Copenhagen, 21–22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 180/1/93.

 7. Such an approach does not mean that it is only through enlargement that the Union constructs its identities. One would expect EU discourses on other countries with which it has significant links, such as the United States or Russia, to also produce various identity constructs.

 8. See, among others, Jørgensen and LaGro (2007), Müftüler-Baç and Stivachtis (2008), Çakır (2010), Usul (2010), Avcı and Çarkoğlu (2011).

 9. This does not mean that public discourses are treated as unimportant. In fact it is impossible to strictly demarcate between the two since elite discourses are not only influential in shaping what is commonly referred to as 'public opinion' but, as opposed to arguments like those advocated by Van Dijk (1993) that place a disproportionate emphasis on the 'manipulative' powers of the elites, they also react to the shifting discourses among different social groups in the public.

10. As of June 2012, the last chapter of the *acquis* that was opened with Turkey dated back to June 2010.

11. See Foucault (1979) for the exercise of power through governmentality.

12. After 2009, the EP debates held on the Commission's Progress Reports on Turkey are incurred together with the debates on the Commission's Progress Reports on Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

13. At the time of the fieldwork, the delegation consisted of ten MEPs from the EPP-ED, six MEPs from the PES, three MEPs from the ALDE, two MEPs from the Greens/EFA, one MEP from the IND/DEM, two MEPs from the GUE/NGL and three independent MEPs (one later joined the UEN). Thus all of the members of the delegation were interviewed for the purposes of this study.

14. Debates of the European Parliament have been retrieved through the archives website of the EP (for debates dated 1999–2004, see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/plenary/cre/search.do?language=EN; for debates dated 2004–2010, see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/archives/cre.do?language=EN). The analysis covers three parliamentary terms: the fifth parliamentary term from 1999 to 2004, the sixth parliamentary term from 2004 to 2009 and the seventh parliamentary term from 2009 to 2014. The political party groups under analysis are: (from 1999 to 2004) Group of the European Democrats and Christian Democrats (EPP-ED), Group of the Party of European Socialists (PES), European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party (ELDR), Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), Confederal Group of the European Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) and Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN); (from 2004 to 2009) Group of the European Democrats and Christian Democrats (EPP-ED), Socialist Group (PES), Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), Confederal Group of the European Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN), Independence and Democracy Group (IND/DEM) and Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty (ITS) Group; (from 2009 to 2010) Group of the European People's Party (EPP), Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European

Parliament (S&D), European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), Confederal Group of the European Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) and Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD). There are also non-attached MEPs (NI) in all three parliamentary terms that do not belong to any EP political group.

15. Commissioner speeches have been retrieved through the electronic search engine of the press releases of the EU, also known as RAPID, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/setLanguage.do?language=en and the enlargement website at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/speeches.

16. The French, German and British parliamentary debates were retrieved through the following parliamentary archives in the respective order: http://recherche.assemblee-nationale.fr/, http://suche.bundestag.de/bundestag Suche/volltextsuche.jsp, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/semaphoreserver?DB=semukparl&FILE=search.

17. In France, the interviews were conducted with the members of the Delegation for the European Union, including nine deputies from the UMP, five from the PS and one from the UDF. In Germany, the interviews took place with the members of the Committee on the Affairs of the European Union, including five deputies from the SPD, five from the CDU/CSU and one from Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. In Britain, interviews were conducted with the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, including five MPs from the Labour Party and four MPs from the Conservative Party.

18. The UMP was named the RPR (*Rassemblement pour la République)* from 1977 until 2002.

19. In 2007 the UDF was transformed into the 'Democratic Movement' (*Mouvement démocrate*) under the leadership of François Bayrou, with the dissenting members forming the group titled 'New Centre' (*Nouveau centre*) in the Parliament.

20. Discourses of the CDU and the CSU are treated together in the analysis.

21. Although the German Greens cannot be considered as the major party of the centre–left in Germany in the period observed, the party is incorporated into the analysis due to its role as a coalition partner in the 1998–2002 and 2002–2005 governments in which it was very vocal on the issue of Turkish accession to the EU.

22. The timeline of the analysis corresponds to three legislative periods in France, namely 1997–2002, 2002–2007 and 2007–2012. In 1997–2002, the PS held the parliamentary majority by 255 seats, with the RPR and the UDF holding 139 seats and 112 seats respectively. In 2002–2007, the parliamentary majority was overturned by the UMP and the UDF who won 357 and 29 seats respectively and with the PS holding 140 seats. The victory of the centre–right continued in 2007–2012, with the UMP and the New Centre holding 313 and 22 seats respectively and the PS holding 186 seats. Four legislative periods are covered in Germany, namely 1998–2002, 2002–2005, 2005–2009 and 2009–2013. In the 1998–2002 legislative period, during which the SPD governed in coalition with the Greens, the SPD held 298 seats, the CDU held 198 seats and the CSU and Bündnis 90/Greens each held 47 seats. In 2002–2005 under the SPD/Greens coalition, the SPD held

251 seats, the CDU held 190 seats and the CSU and Bündnis 90/Greens held 58 and 55 seats respectively. In 2005–2009 under the grand coalition of the SPD and the CDU/CSU, the SPD held 222 seats and the CDU 180, whereas the Greens and the CSU held 51 and 46 seats respectively. In 2009–2013 under the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition, the CDU held 194 seats followed by the SPD and the FDP, which held 146 and 93 seats respectively. The Greens had 68 seats and the CSU had 45. The analysis covers three legislative periods in Britain in which the Labour Party was in government, with the Conservatives in main opposition, namely 1997–2001, 2001–2005 and 2005–2010. In 1997–2001, the Labour Party held 418 seats and the Conservative Party held 165 seats. In the 2001–2005 legislative period, the Labour Party held 413 seats and the Conservative Party held 166, whereas in the 2005–2010 legislative period, the Labour Party held 356 seats and the Conservative Party held 198.

23. Differences between debates in national parliaments and in the EP plenaries need to be acknowledged. As opposed to national parliamentary debates, EP debates lack spontaneity in that the speeches are simultaneously translated and arguments are presented within strict time limits (Abélès, 2000).

24. While concerns regarding elections and public support may differentiate Commissioners from national politicians, Commissioners must still attain cohesion in argumentation to gather support for Commission actions, policies and initiatives from the EU institutions, the European public and in the case of enlargement, the candidate states.

25. The interviews were taped (with the interviewees' consent) and transcribed. Each interviewee was assured at the stage of requesting an appointment for the interview that the interviews were confidential and anonymous and that no information that can be traced back to individuals would be provided in the final text.

26. For a comprehensive discussion of the discourse-historical approach, see Titscher et al. (2000).

27. Van Dijk (1984: 56) defines a discourse topic as 'the most "important" or "summarising" idea that underlies the meanings of a sequence of sentences'.

28. The linguistic devices cited in Table 1 are not exhaustive, but the most common ones observed in the analysis.

29. Although implicit presuppositions are not included in the original table by Wodak (2001), I have incorporated them into the table for their wide array of use in identity discourses. See, for example, De Fina (2006).

30. For a similar approach, see Van Dijk (1993).

31. The methodology is described in greater detail in Aydın-Düzgit (2008).

32. See 'Cameron "Anger" at Slow Pace of Turkish EU Negotiations' (27 July 2010), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-10767768, date accessed 18 August 2011.

33. For a recent account of convergence, see Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy (2010). Regarding concerns over divergence, see 'EU Enlargement Commissioner Warns of Divergence with Turkey and Ukraine' (1 July 2010), available at http://www.europeanforum.net/news/913/eu_enlargement_commissioner_warns_of_divergence_with_turkey_and_ukraine, date accessed 18 August 2011.

1   Europe as a Security Community

1. See, for example, Tajani in the debate on 6 October 1999; Cushnahan, Sacredeus in the debate on 24 October 2001; Gutierrez-Cortines in the debate on 1 April 2004; Gawronski, Seeberg, Salafranca-Sanchez Neyra, Brok, Sonik in the debate on 13 December 2004; Poettering in the debate on 28 September 2005; Tajani, Sonik in the debate on 26 September 2006, Preda in the debate on 10 February 2010.
2. See Lakoff and Johnson (1980) for the role of metaphors in the discursive construction of reality.
3. See, for example, Martinez (PES) in the debate on 6 October 1999; Schulz (PES) in the debate on 14 November 2000; Van den Bos (ALDE), Nordmann (ALDE) in the debate on 4 June 2003; Leinen (PES), Ollson (ALDE) in the debate on 1 April 2004; Schulz (PES), Rocard (PES), De Keyser (PES), Hansch (PES), Oger (PES), Malmström (ALDE), Ludford (ALDE), Lagendijk (Greens/EFA), Özdemir (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 13 December 2004; Rocard (PES), Zingaretti (PES), Corbett (PES), Cohn-Bendit (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 28 September 2005; Swoboda (PES), Pinor (PES) in the debate on 26 September 2006; Wiersma (PES), Menendes del Valle (PES) in the debate on 21 May 2008.
4. See Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, 'A Call for Respect and Calm', *International Herald Tribune*, 5 February 2006. See also *Southeast European Times* accessible at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2005/11/28/feature-01
5. See Altunışık (2010) and Podeh (2007) for the identification of a variety of competing discourses in the Middle East on Turkey, its role in the Middle East as well as Turkey's relations with the EU.
6. For this construction in parliamentary debates, see Duff (ALDE) in the debate on 26 September 2006; Ertug (S&D) in the debate on 20 January 2010.
7. Pace (2006) discusses in depth the securitisation of the Mediterranean in official EU discourse as well as that of the member states.
8. See, for example, Rocard (PES), Howitt (PES), Swoboda (PES), Bonino (ALDE), Szent-Ivanyi (ALDE), Özdemir (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 13 December 2004; Zingaretti (PES) in the debate on 28 September 2005.
9. For more on the concept of globalisation as a specific type of nominalisation, see Fairclough (2005).
10. See, for example, SPEECH/01/469; SPEECH/01/487; SPEECH/04/16; SPEECH/04/141; SPEECH/04/466; SPEECH/04/534; SPEECH/04/545; Speech by Günter Verheugen on the 'Enlargement of the European Union: Expectations, Achievements and Prospects', Szczecin, 4 March 2004; SPEECH/05/20; SPEECH/05/142; SPEECH/05/465; SPEECH/06/536; SPEECH/06/559; SPEECH/06/747; SPEECH/07/28; SPEECH/07/362; SPEECH/07/370; SPEECH/08/188; SPEECH/09/318.
11. For an assessment of this shift, see, among others, Van Ham (2006) and Bilgin (2004).
12. It can be argued that this 'discourse of fear' and 'danger' is also present in Council documentation such as the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council in December 2003. See 'A Secure Europe in a Better

World: European Security Strategy', 12 December 2003, Brussels, accessible at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf

13. See, for example, SPEECH/02/576; SPEECH/04/16; SPEECH/04/141; SPEECH/ 04/466; Speech by Günter Verheugen on the 'Enlargement of the European Union: Expectations, Achievements and Prospects', Szczecin, 4 March 2004; SPEECH/05/142; SPEECH/05/271; SPEECH/05/465; SPEECH/07/28; SPEECH/ 07/362; SPEECH/07/370; SPEECH/08/191; SPEECH/08/520; SPEECH/09/148; SPEECH/09/162.

14. See, for example, Raffarin (UMP), Accoyer (UMP), Lellouche (UMP), Bardet (UMP), Leonetti (UMP), Ayrault (PS), Blisko (PS), Boucheron (PS) in the debate on 14 October 2004; Accoyer (UMP) in the debate on 21 December 2004.

15. Elisabeth Le (2002: 294–5) argues that in French political discourse, 'respect for the particularities of each people and nation' is subsumed under the Republican value of 'equality'.

16. For construction of a European defence identity in discussions over Turkey, see, for example, Raffarin (UMP), Blisko (PS), Le Guen (PS) in the debate on 14 October 2004.

17. See, for example, Fischer (Greens) in the debate on 4 December 2002; Schröder (SPD), Bury (SPD) in the debate on 19 December 2002; Fischer (Greens) in the debate on 26 June 2003; Mütefering (SPD), Fischer (Greens), Zapf (SPD), Roth (Greens), Weisskirchen (SPD) in the debate on 16 December 2004; Schaeuble (CDU/CSU), Erler (SPD), Roth (Greens), Fischer (Greens), Volmer (Greens) in the debate on 29 October 2004.

18. See, for example, Fischer (Greens) in the debate on 3 December 1999; Fischer (Greens), Wieczorek (SPD) in the debate on 17 December 1999; Fischer (Greens) in the debate on 4 December 2002.

19. According to Maull and Gordon (1993: 8), in addition to a disbelief in the use of military force, the key components of the 'civilian power' discourse include 'a preference for diplomatic bargaining, negotiation and compromise', 'an inclination to seek solutions to international problems through multilateral channels' and 'a close entanglement of domestic and external considerations, of strong value orientations and democratic elements'.

20. For this distinction in parliamentary debates, see, for example, Merkel (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 19 December 2002; Merkel (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 16 December 2004.

21. See, for example, Woodward (Lab), Anderson (Lab), Vaz (Lab), Straw (Lab), Ancram (Cons), Hendrick (Lab), Luff (Cons) in the debate on 11 December 2002; Smith (Cons), Blair (Lab) in the debate on 16 December 2002; Straw (Lab) in the debate on 21 May 2003; Woodward (Lab), Straw (Lab) in the debate on 20 November 2003; Spring (Cons) in the debate on 10 December 2003; Drew (Lab), MacShane (Lab) in the debate on 23 June 2004; Blair (Lab), Howard (Cons), Curry (Cons) in the debate on 20 December 2004; MacShane (Lab) in the debate on 25 January 2005; MacShane (Lab) in the debate on 1 March 2005; Alexander (Lab) in the debate on 8 June 2005; Curry (Cons) in the debate on 15 June 2005; Straw (Lab) in the debate on 30 June 2005; Straw (Lab), Fox (Cons) in the debate on 11 October 2005; Beckett (Lab) in the debate on 6 December 2006.

22. See, among others, Emerson and Youngs (2007).
23. See, for example, Hale (2007).
24. For the discursive equivalence formulated between 'Islam' and 'terrorism' in Bush's speeches following September 11 attacks, see Lazar and Lazar (2004: 238). Leudar et al. (2004) demonstrate how US President Bush's discourse on international security in the aftermath of September 11 constructs a category of 'us/them' corresponding to the dichotomy of 'defenders of civilisation/terrorists'. They also highlight that such categorisation in Bush's discourse is also observed in Tony Blair's speeches.
25. Frequent references to Turkish membership in NATO as an indication of the country's loyalty as an ally can also be interpreted within this broader frame. See, for example, Blair (Lab) in the debate on 13 December 1999; Vaz (Lab) in the debate on 18 January 2000; Woodward (Lab) in the debate on 11 December 2002; Smith (Cons) in the debate on 16 December 2002; Spring (Cons) in the debate on 10 December 2003; Ancram (Cons) in the debate on 15 June 2004; Straw (Lab), Taylor (Cons) in the debate on 15 December 2004; Blair (Lab) in the debate on 20 December 2004; Gapes (Lab) in the debate on 30 June 2005.
26. See, for example, Straw (Lab) in the debate on 11 December 2002; MacShane (Lab) in the debate on 23 June 2004; Stuart (Lab) in the debate on 15 December 2004; Blair (Lab) in the debate on 20 December 2004, Beckett (Lab) in the debate on 6 December 2006.
27. See, for example, Rack (EPP-ED) in the debate on 6 October 1999; Queiro (UEN) in the debate on 14 November 2000; Queiro (UEN) in the debate on 14 February 2001; Queiro (UEN), Mölzer (NI), Mathieu (IND/DEM) in the debate on 1 April 2004; Queiro (EPP-ED), Stenzel (EPP-ED), Sommer (EPP-ED) in the debate on 13 December 2004; Rogalski (IND/DEM) in the debate on 26 September 2006; Batten (IND/DEM) in the debate on 11 March 2009; Borghezio (EFD) in the debate on 25 November 2009; Fontana (EFD) in the debate on 10 February 2010.
28. Securitisation of Turkish accession with respect to its Southern borders can be interpreted as an extension of the EU's securitisation of the Mediterranean through its discourses on the region. Boundaries of the Mediterranean in official EU discourse were widened in the follow up to the Iraq War in 2003 to include Turkey's Southern neighbours: namely Iran, Iraq and Syria. See Pace (2006: 101, 111).
29. See, for example, Tannock (EPP-ED) in the debate on 26 September 2006; Salavrakos (EFD) in the debate on 25 November 2009; Claeys (NI) in the debate on 25 November 2009; Tannock (ECR), Salavrakos (EFD) in the debate on 20 January 2010; Belder (EFD), Tzavela (EFD), Fontana (EFD), Mon (EPP), Madlener (NI) in the debate on 10 February 2010.
30. For more on the securitisation of migration in the EU, see, among others, Huysmans (2000, 2006).
31. On the various degree of Otherness ascribed to the countries of Eastern Europe, see Kuus (2004).
32. For increasing competences of the Commission in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, see Lewis and Spence (2006).
33. See, for example, Pemezec (UMP), Poniatowski (UMP), Bayrou (UDF), Boucheron (PS) in the debate on 14 October 2004; Le Maire (UMP) in the

debate on 7 April 2009; Le Maire (UMP) in the debate on 2 June 2009; Le Maire (UMP) in the debate on 9 June 2009.

34. For references to the 'Mediterranean' as such, see, for example, Estrosi (UMP), Raffarin (UMP), Boucheron (PS), Bayrou (UDF) in the debate on 14 October 2004; Floch (PS) in the debate on 27 January 2005; Le Maire (UMP), Dosiere (PS) in the debate on 29 May 2008.

35. See, among others, Emerson and Tocci (2004).

36. See Kirişçi (2006) and Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy (2010).

37. For more on the relationship between critical geography and the politics of identity, see especially Keith and Pile (1993).

38. See, among others, Cherigui (1997).

39. See, for example, Weisskirchen (SPD) in the debate on 17 December 1999; Merkel (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 19 December 2002; Merkel (CDU/CSU), Müller (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 16 December 2004; Schaeuble (CDU/CSU), Pflüger (CDU/CSU), Müller (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 29 October 2004.

40. For securitisation of migration in the German parliamentary debates on Turkish accession, see, for example, Glos (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 17 December 1999; Strobl (CDU/CSU), Koschyk (CDU/CSU), Müller (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 21 January 2005; Koschyk (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 16 June 2005.

41. See International Crisis Group, 'Islam and Identity in Germany', International Crisis Group Europe Report, No. 181, 14 March 2007.

42. See, among others, Wæver et al. (1993).

43. See, for example, Mackinlay (Lab) in the debate on 15 December 2004; Gapes (Lab) in the debate on 15 June 2005; Mackinlay (Lab) in the debate on 11 October 2005; Mackinlay (Lab) in the debate on 6 December 2006; Mackinlay (Lab) in the debate on 18 December 2006.

44. In fact the former enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn makes explicit references to Cooper's works in one of his newspaper articles and in his book. See Olli Rehn, 'Values Define Europe, not Borders', *Financial Times*, 4 January 2005 and Rehn (2006).

45. Robert Cooper, 'The New Liberal Imperialism', *The Observer*, 7 April 2002.

2   Europe as an Upholder of Democratic Values

1. See Charette (UMP) in the debate on 8 November 2006; Blisko (PS) in the debate on 29 May 2008.

2. For reference to European democratic values/principles, see, for example, Tajani (EPP-ED) in the debate on 6 October 1999; Zacharakis (EPP-ED), Lang (IND/DEM) in the debate on 14 November 2000; Gawronski (EPP-ED), Gemelli (EPP-ED), Langen (EPP-ED) in the debate on 4 June 2003; Demetriou (EPP-ED), Matsis (EPP-ED) in the debate on 13 December 2004; Brok (EPP-ED), Poettering (EPP-ED) in the debate on 28 September 2005. For reference to 'Western' values, see Tajani (EPP-ED), Salafranca Sanchez-Neyer (EPP-ED) in the debate on 6 October 1999; Van Orden (EPP-ED) in the debate on 4 June 2003; Salafranca Sanchez-Neyer (EPP-ED) in the debate on 13 December 2004; Dimitrakopoulos (EPP-ED), Sonik (EPP-ED) in the debate

on 26 September 2006; Vanhecke (ITS) in the debate on 12 February 2007; Camre (UEN) in the debate on 21 May 2008; Madlener (NI), Schöpflin (EPP) in the debate on 25 November 2009; Hökmark (EPP), Balzco (NI), Sonik (EPP) in the debate on 10 February 2010.

3. See, for example, Giannakou-Koutsikou (EPP-ED), Rack (EPP-ED), Belder (IND/DEM), Speroni (NI), Brok (EPP-ED) in the debate on 6 October 1999; Zacharakis (EPP-ED), Queiro (UEN), Belder (EDD), Raschofer (NI) in the debate on 14 November 2000; Sacredeus (EPP-ED), Queiro (UEN), Belder (IND/DEM), Sichrovsky (NI), Atxalandabaso (NI), Langen (EPP-ED) in the debate on 14 February 2001; Sacredeus (EPP-ED), Atxalandabaso (NI) in the debate on 27 February 2002; Langen (EPP-ED), Belder (IND/DEM), Borghezio (NI), Zacharakis (EPP-ED) in the debate on 4 June 2003; Poettering (EPP-ED), Belder (IND/DEM), Sommer (EPP-ED) in the debate on 13 December 2004; Claeys (NI), Grossetete (EPP-ED), Poettering (EPP-ED), Sommer (EPP-ED) in the debate on 28 September 2005; Mölzer (NI), Camre (UEN), Claeys (NI), Posselt (EPP-ED), Sommer (EPP-ED) in the debate on 26 September 2006; Allister (NI), Batten (IND/DEM) in the debate on 24 October 2007; Georgiou (IND/DEM), Langen (EPP-ED), Toubon (EPP-ED), Borghezio (UEN), Brok (EPP-ED) in the debate on 21 May 2008; Borghezio (UEN), Claeys (NI), Rogalski (UEN) in the debate on 11 March 2009; Madlener (NI), Claeys (NI), Fontana (EFD), Bizzotto (EFD), Sonik (EPP) in the debate on 10 February 2010.

4. Essentialisation can be defined as 'the reduction of various aspects of a given group into a very few characteristics which gradually become the kernel of their "essence"...It surreptitiously reduces to one single dominant factor very complex and variegated social contexts'. See Bottici and Challand (2011: 60).

5. See, among others, Müftüler-Baç (2005) and Hale (2011).

6. An interesting point is that at other times and in other contexts, such as in Italy in the nineteenth century, it has been argued that it is the very capacity of social cooperation that underlies European modernity, while individualism was coded as non-modern. See Huysseune (2006: 51 and 90–9).

7. See also Morillon (EPP-ED) in the debate on 1 April 2000; Morillon (EPP-ED) in the debate on 5 September 2000; Oostlander (EPP-ED) in the debate on 4 June 2003; Oostlander (EPP-ED) in the debate on 1 April 2004; Sommer (EPP-ED) in the debate on 13 December 2004; Zaleski (EPP-ED) in the debate on 21 May 2008.

8. See, for example, Giannakou (EPP) and Papadopoulou (S&D) in the debate on 10 February 2010.

9. For reference to European democratic values/standards in French parliamentary debates, see, for example, Lequiller (RPR) in the debate on 20 December 2000; Salles (UDF), Blazy (PS), Muselier (UMP) in the debate on 18 January 2001; Villepin (UMP) in the debate on 12 November 2002; Raffarin (UMP) in the debate on 20 December 2002; Ayrault (PS) in the debate on 25 November 2003; Haignere (UMP) in the debate on 6 October 2004; Raffarin (UMP), Ayrault (PS), Bayrou (UDF), Accoyer (UMP), Lellouche (UMP), Estrosi (UMP), Bardet (UMP), Blisko (PS), Leonetti (UMP), Baroin (UMP), Barnier (UMP), Riviere (UMP) in the debate on 14 October 2004;

Bayrou (UDF), Ayrault (PS), Raffarin (UMP) in the debate on 21 December 2004.

10. See, for example, Lequiller (RPR) in the debate on 20 December 1999; Devedjian (RPR) in the debate on 18 January 2001; Albertini (UDF) in the debate on 22 June 2004; Bayrou (UDF), Baroin (UMP), Pemezec (UMP), Riviere (UMP), Poniatowski (UMP) in the debate on 14 October 2004; Charette (UMP) in the debate on 8 November 2006.

11. For an EU source that provides a mixed picture of progress and problems regarding democratisation and human rights in Turkey in the year 1999–2000, see European Commission (2000).

12. The equivalence in the case of 'liberty/freedom' is explicit and does not require further explication. 'Social justice/respect' can be argued to correspond to the principle of equality (*egalite*) since both social justice and respect (breeding plurality) allows for equality between all people whatever their differences may be and 'social solidarity' can be argued to constitute a form of fraternity (*fraternite*) (Le, 2002: 294–5).

13. For reference to European democratic values and principles, see, for example, Schröder (SPD), Sterzing (Greens) in the debate on 3 December 1999; Schröder (SPD), Glos (CSU/CSU) in the debate on 17 December 1999; Fischer (Greens), Hintze (CSU/CSU) in the debate on 4 December 2002; Schröder (SPD), Steenblock (Greens), Hinzte (CDU/CSU), Schwell-Düren (SPD) in the debate on 19 December 2002; Mütefering (SPD), Weisskirchen (SPD), Akgün (SPD) in the debate on 16 December 2004; Roth (Greens) in the debate on 29 October 2004; Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 10 November 2009.

14. See, for example, Hintze, Glos in the debate on 17 December 1999; Merkel, Hinzte in the debate on 4 December 2002; Hintze in the debate on 19 December 2002; Merkel, Pflüger, Müller in the debate on 16 December 2004; Müller in the debate on 29 October 2004; Carl in the debate on 24 May 2007; Steinbach in the debate on 14 February 2008.

15. See Keyman (2001) for an alternative in-depth account of the state of democracy in the 1980s and the 1990s in Turkey.

16. See, for example, Swoboda (PES), Katiforis (PES), Sakellariou (PES), Fava (PES), Roure (PES), Martines (PES), Duff (ALDE), Ludford (ALDE), Ceyhun (Greens/EFA), Uca (GUE/NGL) in the debate on 6 October 1999; Schulz (PES), Sakellariou (PES), Swoboda (PES), Souladakis (PES), Ludford (ALDE), Ceyhun (Greens/EFA), Maes (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 11 April 2000; Swododa (PES), Katiforis (PES), Gonzalez (PES), Carrilho (PES), Van der Laan (ALDE), Lagendijk (Greens/EFA), Cushnahan (EPP-ED), Gutierrez-Cortines (EPP-ED) in the debate on 14 February 2001; Baltas (PES), Lagendijk (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 27 February 2002; Jensen (ALDE), Wyn (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 13 May 2003; Paasilinna (PES), Kacin Jelko (ALDE), Henis-Plasschaert (ALDE), Seeberg (EPP-ED), Brie (GUE/NGL), Ransdorf (GUE/NGL), Agnoletto (GUE/NGL), Figueiredo (GUE/NGL) in the debate on 13 December 2004; De-Sarnez (ALDE), Matsakis (ALDE), Smith (Greens/EFA), Gawronski (EPP-ED), Jalowiecki (EPP-ED), Wurtz (GUE/NGL), Agnoletto (GUE/NGL) in the debate on 28 September 2005; Bozkurt (PES), Wiersma (PES), Özdemir (Greens/EFA), De Keyser (PES), Oger (PES), Beglitis

(PES), Willmott (PES) in the debate on 26 September 2006; Lambsdroff (ALDE), Gonzalez (PES), Bozkurt (PES) in the debate on 24 October 2007; Mon (EPP-ED), Ferreira (PES), Hökmark (EPP-ED), Lehtinen (PES) in the debate on 21 May 2008; Lagendijk (Greens/EFA), Kazak (ALDE) in the debate on 5 May 2009; Howitt (S&D), Flautre (Greens/EFA), Lunacek (Greens/EFA), Dörfler (S&D), Plumb (S&D) in the debate on 10 February 2010.

17. For references to European values/principles in Socialist/Liberal/Green-EFA discourse, see, for example, Fava (PES) in the debate on 6 October 1999; Schulz (PES), Katiforis (PES), Swoboda (PES) in the debate on 14 November 2000; Swoboda (PES), Katiforis (PES) in the debate on 14 February 2001; De Keyser (PES) in the debate on 7 February 2002; Schulz (PES), Wiersma (PES), Arif (PES), Beglitis (PES), Malmström (ALDE), Szent-Ivanyi (ALDE), In't Veld (ALDE), Lagendijk (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 13 December 2004; Matsakis (ALDE), Cohn-Bendit (Greens/EFA), Lagendijk (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 28 September 2005; Matsakis (ALDE) in the debate on 26 September 2006; Kirilov (PES), Pribetich (PES), Lehtinen (PES) in the debate on 21 May 2008; Lambsdorff (ALDE) in the debate on 5 May 2009; Lambsdorff (ALDE), Paleckis (S&D) in the debate on 10 February 2010.

18. See Wæver (1996) for an elaborate discussion on Europe's past as its dominant Other.

19. For transformations of Islam in the Turkish public sphere in the face of social movements, see Göle and Ammann (2006).

20. See, for example, Ceyhun (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 6 October 1999; Swoboda (PES) in the debate on 14 February 2001; Nordmann (ALDE) in the debate on 4 June 2003; De Keyser (PES), Schulz (PES), Swoboda (PES), Arif (PES), Oger (PES), Howitt (PES), Bonino (ALDE), Kacin (ALDE), Jelko (ALDE), Flautre (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 13 December 2004; Schulz (PES), Beglitis (PES), Zingaretti (PES), Bonino (ALDE) in the debate on 28 September 2005; Cappato (ALDE), Pinior (PES) in the debate on 26 September 2006; Cappato (ALDE) in the debate on 24 October 2007; Flautre (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 25 November 2009; Ertug (S&D) in the debate on 20 January 2010.

21. See Uca (GUE/NGL) in the debate on 4 June 2003; Resetarits (ALDE) in the debate on 12 February 2007; Veld (ALDE) in the debate on 10 February 2010.

22. See, for example, Martinez (PES) in the debate on 6 October 1999; Van den Bos (ALDE), Lagendijk (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 4 June 2003.

23. For references to European values/standards/principles in Commissioner speeches, see, for example, SPEECH/99/151; SPEECH/04/16; SPEECH/04/141; SPEECH/04/440; SPEECH/04/534; SPEECH/04/538; SPEECH/04/545; SPEECH/05/20; SPEECH/05/32; SPEECH/05/142; SPEECH/05/362; SPEECH/05/556; SPEECH/05/587; SPEECH/05/716; SPEECH/05/733; SPEECH/06/559; SPEECH/07/362; SPEECH/08/188; SPEECH/08/191; SPEECH/08/257; SPEECH/08/275.

24. See, for example, SPEECH/99/151; SPEECH/00/419; SPEECH/01/469; SPEECH/01/487; SPEECH/02/425; SPEECH/03/243; SPEECH/03/519; SPEECH/04/16; SPEECH/04/309; SPEECH/04/440; SPEECH/04/534; SPEECH/04/538; SPEECH/05/142; SPEECH/05/271; SPEECH/O5/556; SPEECH/05/587; SPEECH/05/716; SPEECH/05/733; SPEECH/06/392; SPEECH/06/536;

SPEECH/06/559;   SPEECH/06/747;   SPEECH/07/362;   SPEECH/07/651;
SPEECH/08/121;   SPEECH/08/188;   SPEECH/08/257;   SPEECH/08/520;
SPEECH/09/104; SPEECH/09/128; SPEECH/09/162; SPEECH/09/565.

25. See, for example, SPEECH/07/362; SPEECH/08/188; SPEECH/08/520;
SPEECH/08/581; SPEECH/09/89; SPEECH/09/104; SPEECH/09/148; SPEECH/
09/318; SPEECH/10/191.

26. See, for example, SPEECH/02/576; SPEECH/04/141; SPEECH/04/437;
SPEECH/04/440; SPEECH/05/32; SPEECH/05/362; SPEECH/05/465; SPEECH/
08/191; SPEECH/09/565.

27. The negotiating framework document on Turkey states that 'while having
full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of
the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obliga-
tions of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in
the European structures through the strongest possible bond'. This phrase,
which invites reflections on alternative outcomes such as a 'privileged
partnership', is non-existent in the text on Croatia, drafted on the same
day with very similar language. Similarly the negotiating framework doc-
ument on Turkey allows for permanent safeguard clauses in areas such
as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies and agriculture
whereas the text on Croatia only allows for transitional measures in cer-
tain areas which the document does not specify. See Negotiating Framework
(Turkey) and Negotiating Framework (Croatia), 3 October 2005, both avail-
able at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_en05_TR_framedoc.
pdf#search=percent22percent22negotiatingpercent20frameworkpercent22
percent2Cpercent22turkeypercent22percent22andhttp://ec.europa.eu/enl
argement/pdf/st20004_en05_HR_framedoc.pdf#search=percent22percent
22negotiatingpercent20frameworkpercent22percent2Cpercent22croatiaper
cent22percent22. See Aydın-Düzgit (2006) for a detailed comparison of the
two documents.

28. See SPEECH/04/16; SPEECH/04/538; SPEECH/05/556.

29. See, for example, SPEECH/05/716; SPEECH/06/747.

30. See, for example, Vedrine (PS) in the debate on 14 December 1999; Vedrine
(PS) in the debate on 20 December 2000; Villepin (UMP) in the debate
on 12 November 2002; Ayrault (PS) in the debate on 25 November 2003;
Raffarin (UMP), Ayrault (PS), Accoyer (UMP), Le Guen (PS), Lellouche
(UMP), Boucheron (PS), Bardet (UMP), Blisko (PS), Giacobbi (PS), Leonetti
(UMP) in the debate on 14 October 2004; Raffarin (UMP) in the debate on
21 December 2004; Blisko (PS) in the debate on 29 May 2008.

31. See, for example, Vedrine (PS) in the debate on 14 December 1999; Vedrine
(PS) in the debate on 20 December 2000; Raffarin (UMP), Ayrault (PS),
Accoyer (UMP), Barnier (UMP), Lellouche (UMP), Boucheron (PS), Blisko
(PS), Leonetti (UMP), Bardet (UMP) in the debate on 14 October 2004;
Raffarin (UMP), Accoyer (UMP) in the debate on 21 December 2004.

32. On the neglect of the legacy of France's colonial empire and, in particular,
her relationship with Algeria in the construction of French national identity
and memory, see Adamson (2006).

33. See, for example, Schröder (SPD), Fischer (Greens), Sterzing (Greens) in the
debate on 3 December 1999; Schröder (SPD), Weisskirchen (SPD) in the
debate on 17 December 1999; Müntefering (SPD), Roth (Greens), Fischer

(Greens) in the debate on 4 December 2002; Schröder (SPD), Steenblock (Greens), Schwell-Düren (SPD) in the debate on 19 December 2002; Höfken (Greens), Fischer (Greens) in the debate on 26 June 2003; Mütefering (SPD), Roth (Greens), Nickels (Greens), Akgün (SPD), Weisskirchen (SPD), Fischer (Greens) in the debate on 16 December 2004; Erler (SPD), Fischer (Greens), Gloser (SPD), Volmer (Greens), Roth (Greens) in the debate on 29 October 2004.

34. For such self-reflexivity in parliamentary data, see, for example, the speech by Weisskirchen (SPD) in the debate on 17 December 1999.

35. See, for example, Schröder (SPD), Hintze (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 19 December 2002; Erler (SPD), Hintze (CDU/CSU), Gloser (SPD) in the debate on 29 October 2004.

36. For a detailed treatment of the role the term 'tolerance' plays in politics of cultural diversity in the EU, see Dobbernack and Modood (2011).

37. See, for example, Woodward (Lab), Anderson (Lab), Moore (Lab), Straw (Lab), Ancram (Cons), Hendrick (Lab) in the debate on 11 December 2002; Straw (Lab) in the debate on 21 May 2003; Spring (Cons) in the debate on 10 December 2003; David (Lab), MacShane (Lab) in the debate on 23 June 2004; Blair (Lab), Howard (Cons), Curry (Cons) in the debate on 20 December 2004; MacShane (Lab) in the debate on 1 March 2005; Alexander (Lab) in the debate on 8 June 2005; Gapes (Lab), Curry (Cons) in the debate on 15 June 2005; Straw (Lab) in the debate on 30 June 2005; Alexander (Lab) in the debate on 19 July 2005; Straw (Lab) in the debate on 11 October 2005; Pearson (Lab) in the debate on 15 November 2005; Fox (Cons) in the debate on 22 November 2006; Spring (Cons) in the debate on 6 December 2006; Hague (Cons) in the debate on 26 September 2008.

38. See http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/unit/charte/en/charter-rights.html.

39. For references to European values/standards/norms in Labour discourse, see, for example, Woodward in the debate on 11 December 2002; MacShane in the debate on 23 June 2004; MacShane in the debate on 12 October 2004; Straw, Irranca-Davies in the debate on 15 December 2004; MacShane in the debate on 1 March 2005; Pearson in the debate on 15 November 2005; McCarthy-Fry in the debate on 12 November 2007.

40. See, for example, the speeches by Moore in the debate on 11 December 2002; Blair in the debate on 16 December 2002; MacShane in the debate on 15 June 2004; David, MacShane in the debate on 23 June 2004; MacShane in the debate on 15 November 2005; Milliband in the debate on 9 October 2007.

41. See, for example, Straw in the debate on 11 December 2002; MacShane in the debate on 12 October 2004; MacShane in the debate on 23 June 2004.

42. For an alternative account on the role of domestic forces in Turkey's democratisation, see Toros (2007).

3 Europe as a Political Project

1. See, for example, Poettering, Van Velzen, Schröder, Langen in the debate on 6 October 1999; Elles, Oostlander, Suominen, Brok, Langen, Stenzel in the debate on 1 April 2004; De Veyrac, Toubon, Poettering, Langen, Brok, Sommer, Posselt, Andrikiene, Itala in the debate on 13 December 2004; Brok, Poettering, Eurlings, Grossetete in the debate on 28 September 2005;

Brok, Toubon, Posselt in the debate on 26 September 2006; Toubon in the debate on 21 May 2008.

2. See, among others, Gros (2005), Derviş et al. (2004).

3. See, for example, Independent Commission on Turkey (2004: 38–41).

4. Under the Lisbon Treaty, there is an overall limit of 750 seats in the EP, with a maximum of 96 and a minimum of 6 seats per member state.

5. See, for example, Risse (2004b).

6. See, for example, Gollnisch (NI) in the debate on 6 October 1999; Lang (IND/DEM), Queiro (UEN) in the debate on 14 November 2000; Queiro (UEN) in the debate on 14 February 2001; Queiro (IND/DEM), Claeys (NI), Camre (UEN), Mathieu (NI) in the debate on 1 April 2004; Szymanski (UEN), Piotrowski (IND/DEM), Martin (NI), Camre (UEN), Allister (NI), Karatzaferis (IND/DEM), Mölzer (NI), Masiel (NI), Vanhecke (NI) in the debate on 13 December 2004; Masiel (NI), Dillen (NI) in the debate on 5 July 2005; Claeys (NI), Masiel (NI) in the debate on 28 September 2005.

7. See, for example, De Vabres (UDF), Lequiller (RPR/UMP) in the debate on 14 December 1999; Bosson (UDF) in the debate on 12 November 2002; Morin (UDF) in the debate on 20 December 2002; Bayrou (UDF) in the debate on 5 October 2004; Morin (UDF) in the debate on 6 October 2004; Raffarin (UMP), Bayrou (UDF), Accoyer (UMP), Balladur (UMP), Baroin (UMP), Pemezec (UMP), Poniatowski (UMP), Estrosi (UMP), Paille (UMP), Leonetti (UMP), Lellouche (UMP), Bardet (UMP) in the debate on 14 October 2004; Bayrou (UDF), Accoyer (UMP) in the debate on 21 December 2004; Estrosi (UMP) in the debate on 27 January 2005; Mallié (UMP), Lagarde (UDF/NC), Lequiller (UMP) in the debate on 29 May 2008; Le Maire (UMP) in the debate on 7 April 2009; Le Maire (UMP) in the debate on 2 June 2009; Le Maire (UMP) in the debate on 9 June 2009.

8. See Treacher (2001) and Jachtenfuchs et al. (1998), especially p. 430. When US President Bush called for Turkey's admission to the European Union in June 2004, French President Chirac was the only European leader who reacted immediately: 'If President Bush really said that in the way that I read, then not only did he go too far, but he went into territory that isn't his. It is not his purpose and his goal to give any advice to the EU, and in this area it was a bit as if I were to tell Americans how they should handle their relationship with Mexico.' See http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/06/29/bush.chirac.turkey/. For the replication of this theme in the parliamentary debates, see, for example, Ayrault (PS) in the debate on 25 November 2003; Morin (UDF) in the debate on 6 October 2004; Paille (UMP), Ayrault (PS), Bayrou (UDF) in the debate on 14 October 2004; Ayrault (PS), Bayrou (UDF) in the debate on 21 December 2004.

9. See, for example, Schaeuble, Glos in the debate on 17 December 1999; Glos, Merkel, Schaeuble, Müller in the debate on 4 December 2002; Merkel, Müller, Wissmann in the debate on 19 December 2002; Müller, Hintze, Schaeuble, Schockenhoff, Pflüger in the debate on 26 June 2003; Merkel, Müller, Pflüger in the debate on 16 December 2004; Schaeuble, Müller, Hintze, Pflüger in the debate on 29 October 2004; Koschyk, Strobl in the debate on 21 January 2005; Silberhorn in the debate on 19 June 2008.

10. On the respectability of the German Constitutional Court, see Miller (2001: 1).

11. See, for example, Glos in the debate on 17 December 1999; Merkel in the debate on 19 December 2002; Müller in the debate on 29 October 2004; Strobl in the debate on 21 January 2005.

12. See, for example, Erzan et al. (2006) for an alternative account on the expected rate of migration from Turkey to the EU upon accession. For net migration figures in the EU countries, see Kaya (2009: 20).

13. See Paasilinna (PES), Vallve (ALDE) in the debate on 1 April 2004; Hansch (PES), Paasilinna (PES), Pahor Borut (PES), De Sarnez (ALDE) in the debate on 13 December 2004; De Sarnez (ALDE) and Koch-Mehrin (ALDE) in the debate on 28 September 2005.

14. See, for example, Nordmann (ALDE) in the debate on 1 April 2004; Bonino (ALDE), Özdemir (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 13 December 2004; Schulz (PES), De Keyser (PES), Bonino (ALDE), Duff (ALDE), Cohn-Bendit (Greens/EFA) in the debate on 28 September 2005; Wiersma (PES), Pistelli (ALDE), Lambsdorff (ALDE) in the debate on 26 September 2006; Gonzales (PES) in the debate on 24 October 2007.

15. The concept of 'absorption capacity' had officially entered EU discourse during the Copenhagen Summit of 1993, which stated in its conclusions that 'the Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries'. See European Council Meeting in Copenhagen, 21–2, June SN 180/1/93, 14.

16. See, for example, Hannan in the debate on 12 February 2007; Tannock (ECR) in the debate on 25 November 2009.

17. See Shore (1999), Trondal (2007), Suvarierol (2007).

18. See, for example, SPEECH/04/16; SPEECH/04/309; SPEECH/04/437; SPEECH/04/440; SPEECH/04/466; SPEECH/04/538; SPEECH/05/32; SPEECH/06/559; SPEECH/06/747.

19. For more on those metaphors that occupy the conceptual domain of 'the EU as a building site', see Musolff (2004: 138–9 and 141).

20. See, for example, SPEECH/02/576; SPEECH/04/16; SPEECH/04/440; SPEECH/05/32; SPEECH/06/747; SPEECH/08/188.

21. For British and French representations of the Turks in the eighteenth century, see Çırakman (2005).

22. See, for example, Ayrault (PS), Accoyer (UMP), Pemezec (UMP), Paul (PS), Valls (PS), Giacobbi (PS), Blisko (PS) in the debate on 14 October 2004; Ayrault (PS) in the debate on 21 December 2004.

23. See, for example, Ayrault (PS) in the debate on 15 November 2003; Ayrault (PS) in the debate on 25 November 2003; Ayrault (PS), Paul (PS), Valls (PS), Boucheron (PS), Giacobbi (PS), Blisko (PS) in the debate on 14 October 2004; Ayrault (PS) in the debate on 21 December 2004.

24. For references to a 'multi-speed Europe' in the French parliamentary debates, see, for example, Ayrault (PS), Balladur (UMP), Paul (PS), Boucheron (PS), Leonetti (UMP) in the debate on 14 October 2004.

25. See, for example, Fischer (Greens) in the debate on 17 December 1999; Schwall-Düren (SPD), Bury (SPD) in the debate on 19 December 2002; Mütefering (SPD), Fischer (Greens), Zapf (SPD), Akgün (SPD) in the debate on 16 December 2004; Roth (Greens), Schwall-Düren (SPD), Fischer (Greens),

Gloser (SPD) in the debate on 29 October 2004; Akgün (SPD) in the debate on 21 January 2005.

26. The Coalition Agreement's section on enlargement opened with the claim that 'a circumspect enlargement policy, which does not overtax the European Union's capacity to absorb new members, constitutes an important contribution to peace and stability on our continent'. See Coalition Agreement, Section IX: Germany as a Responsible Partner in Europe and the World.

27. See, for example, Schwall-Düren (SPD), Bury (SPD) in the debate on 19 December 2002; Schaeuble (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 26 June 2003; Schaeuble (CDU/CSU), Pflüger (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 29 October 2004; Fischer (Greens) in the debate on 16 December 2004.

28. Hay and Rosamond (2002: 152) identify four main conceptions of globalisation: 'globalization as external economic constraint', 'globalization as threat of homogenization', 'globalization as a political project which should be defended' and 'globalization as a political project which must be resisted'.

29. See, among others, Thielemann (2004). For the full text of Joschka Fischer's speech, see http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/4cd02fa7-d9d0-4cd2-91c9-2746a3297773/en;jsessionid=B98ACC76BBEE2DAE445BB3447D923581

30. See, for example, Woodward (Lab), Vaz (Lab) in the debate on 11 December 2002; Johnson (Cons) in the debate on 21 May 2003; Selous (Cons), Spring (Cons) in the debate on 10 December 2003; Anderson (Lab) in the debate on 24 November 2004; Straw (Lab), Hopkins (Lab), Heathcoat-Amory (Cons), Cash (Cons), Ancram (Cons) in the debate on 15 December 2004; Howard (Cons) in the debate on 20 December 2004; Hopkins (Lab) in the debate on 8 June 2005; Hague (Cons) in the debate on 15 June 2005; Howard (Cons) in the debate on 20 June 2005; Fox (Cons) in the debate on 11 October 2005.

31. See, for example, Vaz (Lab) in the debate on 18 January 2000; Woodward (Lab), Straw (Lab), Dismore (Lab) in the debate on 11 December 2002; MacShane (Lab) in the debate on 23 June 2004; Straw (Lab) in the debate on 15 December 2004; Alexander (Lab) in the debate on 18 May 2005; MacShane (Lab) in the debate on 1 March 2005.

32. Quoted in the interview of Arnaud Leparmentier and Laurent Zecchini with Valery Giscard d'Estaing, 'Pour ou Contre l'Adhésion de la Turquie a l'Union Européenne' ('For or Against Turkey's Accession to the European Union'), *Le Monde*, 9 November 2002.

33. According to Teubert (2001: 49), 'banner words' are those that 'positively identify a discourse community and the ideas it stands for'.

34. See, for example, Hopkins (Lab) in the debates on 15 December 2004 and 8 June 2005.

4 Europe as a Cultural Space

1. See, for example, Poettering (EPP-ED), Gollnisch (NI) in the debate on 6 October 1999; Lang (IND/DEM), Queiro (UEN) in the debate on 14 November 2000; Queiro (UEN) in the debate on 14 February 2001; Pasqua (UEN) in the debate on 24 October 2001; Langen (EPP-ED), Gemelli (EPP-ED) in the debate on 4 June 2003; Szymanski (UEN), Piotrowski (IND/DEM),

Camre (UEN), Allister (NI), Karatzaferis (IND/DEM), Mölzer (NI), Masiel (NI), Vanhecke (NI), Ebner (EPP-ED) in the debate on 1 April 2004; Posselt (EPP-ED), Brok (EPP-ED), Andrikiene (EPP-ED), De Veyrac (EPP-ED) in the debate on 13 December 2004; Dillen (NI), Masiel (NI) in the debate on 5 July 2005; Claeys (NI), Masiel (NI), Poettering (EPP-ED), Itala (EPP-ED) in the debate on 28 September 2005; Camre (UEN), Rogalski (IND/DEM), Speroni (NI), Claeys (NI), Posselt (EPP/ED), Tannock (EPP/ED), Langen (EPP/ED) in the debate on 26 September 2006; Krupa (IND/DEM), Hannan (EPP/ED), Schenardi (ITS), Vanhecke (ITS) in the debate on 12 February 2007; Musumeci (UEN), Batten (IND/DEM) in the debate on 24 October 2007; Chruszcz (NI), Toubon (EPP/ED), Camre (UEN), Borghezio (UEN), Zaleski (EPP/ED) in the debate on 21 May 2008; Borghezio (UEN), Claeys (NI), Lang (NI) in the debate on 11 March 2009; Fiore (NI) in the debate on 5 May 2009; Van Dalen (ECR), Obermayr (NI), Mölzer (NI) in the debate on 25 November 2009; Madlener (NI), Mölzer (NI), Balzco (NI), Bizzotto (EFD), Sonik (EPP) in the debate on 10 February 2010.

2. For the discursive construction of Europe as a continent and its borders in history, see Pocock (2002).

3. For more on the use of 'departicularisation' in the discourses on national identities, see Alonso (1988).

4. For a hermeneutic approach that reveals the prominence of these two dimensions in Turkish secularism, see Davison (1998).

5. Shakman Hurd (2006: 409) refers to this neo-orientalist conception of secularism as 'Judeo-Christian secularism'.

6. See De Vabres (UDF) in the debate on 14 December 1999; Lequiller (RPR/UMP) in the debate on 20 December 2000; Raimond (RPR/UMP) in the debate on 18 January 2001; Bosson (UDF) in the debate on 12 November 2002; Salles (UDF) in the debate on 7 April 2004; Albertini (UDF) in the debate on 22 June 2004; Bayrou (UDF) in the debate on 5 October 2004; Bayrou (UDF), Baroin (UMP), Pemezec (UMP), Poniatowski (UMP), Paille (UMP), Riviere (UMP) in the debate on 14 October 2004.

7. The first aspect of the federal idea indicated and elaborated in the first section of Bayrou's speech is the giving up of national sovereignty at the European level.

8. For diverse practices of secularism in EU member states, see, among others, Hurd (2007: 23–46).

9. For the full text of the commission's report including the proposed law, see http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/034000725/index.shtml.

10. Huntington (1996) and Lewis (2002) constitute well-known examples of such neo-orientalist accounts.

11. For example, Blommaert and Verschueren (1998: 91–102) demonstrate how migrants are discursively constructed as 'cultural Others' in the Belgian majority discourse on immigration.

12. On 'assimilationist integration' in France, see among others, Hargreaves (1995); Kaya and Kentel (2005), especially 16–17.

13. Chirac's position on the issue could indeed be considered as equivocal. In a speech he delivered on public television on 15 December 2004, Chirac expressed his support for Turkey's membership in the EU, but reminded his

listeners that any of the member states could veto Turkey's membership and that France also retains the right to have the last word. See 'Chirac's Mixed Legacy on Turkey', *Turkish Daily News*, 13 March 2007, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chiracs-mixed-legacy-on-turkey.aspx?pageID=438&n=chiracs-mixed-legacy-on-turkey-2007-03-13. On the other hand, Alain Juppe, the UMP party leader at the time, declared on 6 April 2004 that the UMP was against starting EU accession talks with Turkey and that the countries on the periphery of the EU, such as Turkey, 'have no business joining [the bloc], otherwise it will be diluted'. Juppe said that his party instead wanted a 'privileged partnership' with Turkey on the same footing as one that would be extended to North African countries and Southern states of the former Soviet Union. See 'France's Ruling Party Comes Out against Turkey's EU Entry', 9 April 2004, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/france-ruling-party-comes-turkey-eu-entry/article-112944

14. See 'Raffarin Demurs at Turkey's EU Bid', *Wall Street Journal*, 23 September 2004.

15. Interview given by M. Michel Barnier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the *Le Monde* newspaper, 29 September 2004. Quoted from the website of the French Embassy in the United Kingdom, available at http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Interview-given-by-M-Michel,4401.html

16. He was famously quoted saying, 'If Turkey were European, we would know it' (*France 2*, 18 December 2004).

17. See Schaeuble, Glos in the debate on 17 December 1999; Glos, Schaeuble in the debate on 4 December 2002; Hintze, Müller in the debate on 19 December 2002; Hinzte, Pflüger in the debate on 26 June 2003; Schaeuble in the debate on 8 September 2004; Merkel, Müller, Pflüger in the debate on 16 December 2004; Schaeuble, Müller, Pflüger in the debate on 29 October 2004; Strobl, Koschyk (CDU/CSU) in the debate on 21 January 2005; Ramsauer, Nüsslein in the debate on 14 December 2006.

18. Straw in the debate on 11 October 2005.

19. See, for example, Agnoletto (GUE/NGL), De Keyser (PSE), Cappato (ALDE), Willmott (PSE) in the debate on 26 September 2006; Corbett (PSE) in the debate on 24 October 2007; Poc (S&D) in the debate on 20 January 2010; Howitt (S&D), Boştinaru (S&D) in the debate on 10 February 2010.

20. Alternative constellations of borders that extend to the Western Balkans, Caucuses, Ukraine, Belarus and even Russia can be observed, although North Africa is consistently excluded. The construction of the Eastern frontier as more flexible than the Southern border in the left and liberal discourse in the EP, as well as across the left-wing discourse in Germany and France along with the Commission and the British political discourse parallels Klaus Eder's (2006: 263) observation that in the narrative construction of the borders of Europe, the 'Southern rim is fixed with the consequence that Southern Italy (Sicily, Apulia) together with Greece, play the role of the ambiguous yet unchangeable border towards a non-European South'.

21. See, for example, SPEECH/01/487.

22. In the argumentation strategy of *petitio principii*, 'what is controversial and in question, and has thus to be proved is presupposed as the starting point of argumentation' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 73).

23. In the personal interviews, the phrase 'life style' is often used interchangeably with the words 'mindset', 'mind', 'way of thinking' and/or 'way of life'.

24. While problems encountered in women's rights are often conceptualised as related to Islam in the interviews, only one interviewee mentioned 'patriarchy' as the means through which gender inequality is exercised in Turkey.

25. For a more detailed account of the discourses of Commission officials with regard to their own cultural identity as well as their discourses on the Turkish elite, see Suvarierol and Aydın-Düzgit (2011).

26. See, for example, Ayrault (PS) in the debate on 25 November 2003; Boucheron (PS), Ayrault (PS), Paul (PS) in the debate on 14 October 2004; Ayrault (PS) in the debate on 21 December 2004.

27. For academic accounts of discrimination against Muslim migrants in France, see, among others, Tribalat (2003).

28. It is notable that the debate in Turkey over the wearing of the headscarf in public schools, particularly in universities, precedes the one in France. In the words of Göle (2006b: 250), 'methodologically speaking, such a reversal of perspective has important consequences for the social scientific narration of modernity, derived from experiences of the West, supposed to be in "advance" in terms of both temporality and knowledge'.

29. The Law makes no reference to the 'headscarf', but mentions 'ostentatious signs of religious belonging'.

30. See, for example, the speeches by Struck (SPD), Sterzing (Greens) in the debate on 17 December 1999; Roth (Greens) in the debate on 4 December 2002; Schwall-Düren (SPD), Bury (SPD), Steenblock (Greens) in the debate on 19 December 2002; Zöpel (SPD) in the debate on 26 June 2003; Roth (Greens), Weisskirchen (SPD), Akgün (SPD) in the debate on 16 December 2004; Roth (Greens), Fischer (Greens) in the debate on 29 October 2004; Künast (Greens) in the debate on 14 December 2006.

31. For the use of the *topos* of comparison in constructing hierarchical spatial/temporal identities where the 'superior' serves as a model, see Wodak et al. (1999: 40).

32. See the interview with Nilüfer Göle entitled 'Cumhuriyet Umarız Kendi Çocuklarını Yemeyi Bırakır' ('We Hope the Republic Will Stop Eating Its Own Children'), 9 June 2008, available at http://www.medyakronik.com/news/cumhuriyet-umariz-kendi-cocuklarini-yemeyi-birakir-666.html.

33. See, for example, Johnson (Cons) in the debate on 21 May 2003; MacShane (Lab) in the debate on 15 June 2004; MacShane (Lab) in the debate on 23 June 2004.

34. According to this founding myth, the Cretan God Zeus who disguises himself in the form of a bull abducts Europa, the daughter of the Phoenician king, to the island of Crete.

Conclusion

1. Behr (2007) highlights that the same discourse was also employed in Europe in the case of the accession of the CEECs to the EU.

2. See the Negotiating Framework (Turkey), 3 October 2005, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_en05_TR_framedoc.pdf#search=
percent22percent22negotiating percent20framework percent22 percent2C
percent22turkey percent22 percent22

Appendix

1. Speech numbers are provided where available. Dates are provided in cases
where speech numbers are not indicated.

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